samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We must stick to the reforms that work, in particular the tax credit for competitiveness and investment (CICE) and the Responsibility and Solidarity Pact (RSP), and we need to go further still. The unemployed and youth cannot afford to wait. There are at least four reforms that are a priority, because our neighbours successfully implemented them and they are fully compatible with the European social model that we share: the large-scale development of apprenticeships; simplifications, starting with labour law; the decentralisation of social dialogue to the company level, i.e. as close as possible to the economic and human reality; and lastly, the development of entrepreneurship. Second, we need to mobilise both public and private investment in order to take advantage of the exceptional financing conditions created by our monetary policy. To do so, we need to put the Juncker Plan back on the table. The Juncker Plan has yielded results, but they are insufficient. To support the revival of this Plan, I have proposed the creation of a true European “Financing and Investment Union”. To achieve this, we must combine the Juncker Plan, the European Commission’s plan for a Capital Markets Union, and the Banking Union. The aim is to create synergies in order to achieve three ambitious goals: better channel euro area household savings to productive investment and equity; better pool risks across countries; and thus better finance innovation and the networks our economy needs. This is the direction we should take now.

Long taken for granted, this has become the holy grail of banking regulation and supervision. And it has become the ultimate goal of all the relevant reforms that have been undertaken since the crisis. And much has been done. We have revamped the global standards for capital and liquidity – Basel III. Rules for banks are now much stronger than they were before. And the same is true for supervision. Just think of European banking supervision, which was set up in 2014. All this will help to make banks more resilient, so that they can reliably serve the economy. But there is one thing which neither rules nor supervisors can do. They cannot prevent each and every bank from failing. And in my view, we should not even try to. The possibility of failure is inherent to any kind of business, and it is a core element of well-functioning market economies. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  No, it is not the job of supervisors to keep individual banks alive. We, in particular, must not lower our standards to cater for the weakest bank. It would also be wrong to assume that each bank, even the weakest, just needs time to sort itself out. It would be wrong to assume that the local economy just needs to grow for a few more years for the bank to recover. The result would be weak banks that stagger on, zombie-like, barely able to survive in good times.
José De Gregorio: Monetary policy and financial stability – an emerging markets perspective Presentation by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 17 September 2009. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to participate in this meeting and to speak about the lessons for monetary policy the current crisis is teaching us. The big difference between the current crisis with previous ones in emerging economies is that this time “it was not our fault.” The evidence on the performance of emerging countries facing an unprecedented global downturn shows that some lessons have been properly learned. Today I would like to concentrate on inflation targets, especially in the context of strongly rising and strongly falling commodity prices, financial stability and exchange rate fluctuations. Many of the issues I will be discussing today I have covered in recent presentations elsewhere. Indeed, there is not much new material, but I think those are important issues in conducting monetary policy in emerging countries. 1. The causes of the crisis: was it monetary policy or was it financial fragility? The argument blaming monetary policy for the current crisis claims that low interest rates combined with large current account surpluses in emerging economies, particularly Asian and oil-exporting ones, created an abundance of liquidity that triggered excessive increases in asset prices (bubbles). This was particularly acute in the housing market. When the bubble burst, the crisis erupted.

One issue that will have to be carefully examined in the future is the cause of the real estate boom and the housing crisis, and why it occurred in the United States. At this point it is clear that lending standards were relaxed beyond reason, and financial innovation went too far. 3 2. Inflation targeting and asset prices  A corollary of those blaming monetary policy is that, apart from focusing on the variation of the prices of goods and services, it should also take into consideration asset prices, beyond their direct impact on projected inflation. Under an inflation targeting regime, increased lending and asset prices can have repercussions on the inflation outlook, through their impact on the output gap. This would require a monetary policy adjustment to prevent a persistent rise in inflation. Hence, in an inflation targeting regime, asset prices and the level of credit aggregates affect the monetary policy decision to the extent that they affect the inflation perspectives (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). 2  Interestingly and, according to Blinder and Reis (2005), using Taylor rules as from the first quarter of 1988, the residuals indicate that in all the mentioned episodes the Federal Reserve set the interest rates significantly below those prescribed by the rule. 3  Ellis (2008) shows that in the U.S., households had strong motivation to increase their leverage through tax, legal and regulatory incentives.
That opinion could determine the rights of countries most exposed to climate change. It could also touch on the obligations of those most responsible for driving the climate crisis. Let’s now focus on Europe and the possible implications of these developments in international law for my own institution, the ECB. Under the Paris Agreement adopted at COP21 in 2015, many countries committed to the long-term goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. [2] To fulfil its commitment as one of parties to the Paris Agreement, the EU last year adopted the European Climate Law. [3] The implications of the Climate Law are significant. Before going into why, let me first explain what the Climate Law does. The Climate Law has three key elements. The first is its objective that the EU reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, with a new reduction target to be set for 2040. The EU should achieve climate neutrality by 2050 and aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter. The second important element is to ensure that we move towards that objective. The European Commission has established a framework for assessing concrete progress and checking whether national and Union measures are consistent with the objective. It will issue regular reports on the conclusions of these assessments. The third and last element is to ensure that we use the most effective instruments to achieve the objective.

Second, “tilting” the CSPP also serves the ECB’s secondary objective of supporting the general economic policies in the Union. “Tilting” its corporate bond reinvestments towards “greener” companies enables the ECB to align these reinvestments with the objectives set out in the Climate Law, which form part of those economic policies. This action was assessed as also being conducive, and not prejudicial, to price stability. More generally, this measure ensures that the CSPP complies fully with the ECB’s obligations under Article 11 TFEU by integrating the objectives of the Climate Law into the definition and implementation of the ECB’s policies and activities. This is one of the first steps in the ECB’s climate action plan, but the ECB is also looking into other ways to take climate-neutrality objectives into account in its monetary policy – for example, through the collateral that we ask when providing liquidity to banks. For banking supervision, there are several dimensions that I will briefly discuss. Again, we do not directly apply the Climate Law. The Climate Law does not directly relate to our tasks as a banking supervisor nor does it relate to prudential supervision. Therefore the ECB does not impose an obligation on banks to take the necessary measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Climate Law. However, we cannot ignore it. Not only because we need to integrate environmental obligations into our policies due  to Article 11 TFEU, but also since the law will have prudential implications.
We feel that this situation has not only come about because of the globalisation of the financial markets, but also because international banks have become increasingly vulnerable over the last few years – vulnerable because of their thirst for profit and their underestimation of the ensuing risks. Second, the banks’ risk measuring and management instruments could not cope with the crisis. Consequently, the actual losses incurred in the area of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) clearly surpassed the potential level calculated by the sophisticated statistical models, and the liquidity haemorrhage suffered by the banks was greater than the most pessimistic scenarios had suggested. In other words, the risk measuring systems failed despite the fact that they were being monitored by the best-informed experts around. This summary may sound a little harsh, but is not intended to put the blame on the banks. Instead, it illustrates that no model can do complete justice to the complexity of financial instruments and the economic environment in which banks operate these days. Third, the events of the last few months raise question marks about the efficiency of the banking supervision standards applied so far. The call for more sophisticated risk measurement systems, supervision and regulation of banks is understandable. There is room for improvement in these areas, and it must be exploited. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that more extensive regulation on its own represents an unsatisfactory response to the growing complexity of banking activities.

Turmoil on the financial markets The financial storm of the last nine months has challenged our assessment criteria. Such turmoil poses considerable risks for the future. Before I deal with these issues, please allow me first to look at the factors which have brought us to this situation. After several years of rising home prices in the United States, there was a trend reversal to the downside which hit the high-risk sub-prime mortgage segment hard. It was when credit rating agencies began a massive downgrading of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities that the global financial markets realised the full enormity of what was happening. During the summer months of 2007, the prices and liquidity of these securities plummeted. This turn of events alarmed investors. Risk premiums subsequently increased, with uncertainty as to the extent of the losses incurred by banks triggering a general crisis of confidence among financial market participants. Liquidity on the major monetary markets became scarce and there was a return to volatility on the stock markets. Repercussions for Switzerland Switzerland quickly felt the storm due to the exposure of its financial sector. First, our two big banks saw their profitability fall sharply in the second half of 2007. Losses made in connection with their investment activities in the United States were a decisive factor in this respect. One of the big banks even required fresh injections of capital, such was the extent of the losses it suffered. The private banking sector and domestic banking activities continued to flourish, however.
It is likely that a significant portion of these moneys is managed out of Hong Kong. In fact, over 40 Mainland companies providing fund management, securities and futures, insurance, and other services have already established a presence in Hong Kong to manage the funds flowing out of the Mainland and engage in fund advisory businesses. 13. So, the implications from the gradual liberalisation of Mainland China’s capital account are clear. Hong Kong is bound to be a key destination as well as the management hub for the gradual increase in the portfolio flows from Mainland China. This trend will present huge opportunities to financial institutions, private banks, fund managers, and other financial service providers looking to tap these funds. 14. Having said that, one should expect that the process of financial liberalisation in Mainland China will be a gradual and controllable one, in a manner that will fit the Chinese saying of “crossing the river by feeling the stones” so that one can adjust the speed and tactics of crossing the river without fear of falling in and getting drowned. It is, however, important to realise that this process has already begun: this is something that global financial firms, especially asset managers, should not ignore in their business planning process. The wider external use of the RMB 15. RMB. 2  Now, let me move on to the second important trend: the wider external use of the  BIS Review 153/2010  16.

Hong Kong is the first and so far the only place outside the Mainland that has developed a RMB bond market. So far, 19 RMB bonds have been launched in Hong Kong with a total issuance size of over 50 billion yuan. The issuer base was expanded from only Mainland Chinese banks at the start, to Mainland subsidiaries of Hong Kong banks and China’s Ministry of Finance in 2009, and further to Hong Kong corporations and international institutions like McDonald’s and the Asian Development Bank this year following an important elucidation regarding the operation of RMB business in Hong Kong in February. 20. The net effect is that any issuers, including foreign corporations and multilateral organisations, are now free to issue RMB bonds in Hong Kong, just as they can issue bonds in any other currencies. Of course, if the proceeds are to be used on the Mainland, the moving of funds into Mainland China will have to meet the requirements there. By the same token, banks can now also offer RMB trade finance, corporate loans, syndicated loans and project finance to their clients in accordance with Hong Kong’s existing banking practices. 21. The latest developments have provided more flexibility and larger scope for the further development of RMB financing activities in Hong Kong. As the pool of offshore RMB funds in Hong Kong continues to grow, there will be huge opportunities for financial institutions to take part in RMB financing as well as in the origination, distribution, investment and trading of RMB bonds. 22.
Andrew G Haldane: Twin peaks Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director of the Bank of England, at the Kenilworth Chamber of Trade Business breakfast, Kenilworth, 17 October 2014. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Maria Barriel, Jeremy Franklin, Clare Macallan and Brad Speigner for assistance in preparing the text. I would also like to thank John Barrdear, Lucy Canham, Rob Elder, David Latto, Richard Harrison, Jeremy Harrison and Martin Weale for their comments and contributions. Back in June, with the cricket season in full swing, my views on the appropriate stance for UK monetary policy were evenly-weighted between the front foot (moving rates sooner) and the back foot (moving them later). With the sun shining, meteorologically and economically, the evidence leaned slightly towards a front foot stance (Haldane (2014)). Underpinning that judgement was the UK’s increasingly well-established and broadly-based economic recovery. Moving in a timely fashion to normalise rates helped avoid the risk of a hastier reaction later. In other words, it supported a limited and gradual subsequent path for interest rate rises. Three months on, with temperatures falling and the football season in full swing, how do economic prospects now look? Has the financial weather changed? How have the economic batting averages evolved? And how has the appropriate monetary stance, back or front foot, been affected? Reasons to the cheerful In many respects, the UK’s recovery remains both strong and well-balanced.

This means that the interest rate should be set so that monetary policy mitigates the risk of a buildup of financial imbalances. Normally, the key policy rate cannot achieve several objectives simultaneously. In the case of conflicting objectives, the choice of interest rate path will involve a trade-off between different considerations. If monetary policy only took into account the low level of inflation, the key policy rate would be rapidly reduced and kept close to zero for a good while. Inflation might then pick up faster, partly as a result of a weaker krone. In the light of the trade-off against other considerations, however, the Bank does not want to accelerate the pace of inflation. The result would be a pronounced impact on output and employment and increased risk of a buildup of financial  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  imbalances. A prolonged period of low interest rates may increase the risk that debt and asset prices will be driven up to levels that are unsustainable over time. When weight is also given to the two other criteria, the interest rate path therefore becomes higher even though the level of the key policy rate is low from a historical perspective. The Norwegian economy is well poised to face new shocks and challenges. While many of our trading partners are struggling with low growth, high unemployment and mounting government debt, the Norwegian economy still features buoyant activity, low unemployment and government budget surpluses.
See  Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2022), 'Energy efficiency: what you need to knowOpens in a new window' 5 See CFRF (2022), 'Climate Financial Risk Forum Guide 2022: Scenario Analysis in  Financial FirmsOpens in a new window', NGFS (2023), 'Scenarios PortalOpens in a new window', Bank of England (2021), 'Guidance for participants of the 201 Biennial Exploratory Scenario: Financial risks from climate changeOpens in a new window'  7/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

With expectations rising faster than the ability of governments to meet them out of available resources, however, the norms of prudent financial management were put aside and growing resort was made to deficit financing. Understandably, politicians are wary of asking citizens to give up any of the rights they have acquired in the process, especially on the eve of elections. The problem is that there comes a time – and that time is now in Malta as in some older EU members – when the financial burden of an extensive welfare system (itself compounded by the effects of an aging population) and of a large, and relatively inefficient public sector becomes too heavy to bear. It also deprives the economy of both the resources and the flexibility necessary to respond successfully to the competitiveness challenge coming from low-cost or more efficient producers. This is a challenge which cannot be ignored. The people need to be told that certain attitudes and practices are unsustainable, and that the only effective response to the relentless march of globalization, to EU membership and other sources of competitive pressures is nothing less than a culture change, a complete break with the past. I believe it is possible to build an alternative, more efficient system for managing the economy and which nevertheless reconciles the objectives of social cohesion and financial sustainability. It is in this broader context that I have often called for a wider application of means testing.
Averages for the periods 1970-1989 and 1995-2003  10  10  9  9  8  8 7  7 1970-1989 1995-2003  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1 0  0 Inflation  GDP growth  Productivity change, Nominal wage rises, whole economy whole economy  Real wage rises, whole economy  Open unemployment  Source: Statistics Sweden  6  BIS Review 65/2004  3. Open unemployment i different counties Share of the labour force i each county respectively 8  8  7  7  2002  6  6  2003  Norrbottens  Gävleborgs  Skåne  Örebro  Dalarnas  Västmanlands  Värmlands  Södermanlands  Blekinge  0  Västernorrlands  0  Gotlands  1 Östergötlands  1 Kalmar  2  Västra Götalands  2  Hallands  3  Stockholms  3  Västerbottens  4  Uppsala  4  Kronobergs  5  Jönköpings  5  Source: Statistics Sweden  4.

Residential construction of apartments in apartment blocks in relation to the population increase has been lowest in Stockholm county, followed by Skåne county and Västra Götaland county. One ray of hope is that the number of building permits granted for apartment blocks is continuing to increase, which indicated a continued increase in new production of apartment blocks. Factors such as regulated rents for rental properties, i.e. the utility value system, a lack of land with planning permission in growth regions, the construction of the municipal tax equalisation system, the imbalance between traffic situations and housing in growth regions and long planning processes probably all contribute to the relatively low level of residential construction, even in areas where demand is high. A further restriction is the lack of competition in the construction sector. This is demonstrated in the developments in prices and wages in the sector. Construction workers’ wages have increased more than those of industrial workers in recent years. Another example is that the costs of construction  2  BIS Review 2/2002  materials, which constitute approximately one-third of total construction costs, have shown price increases over and above other industrial products for some time now, with price rises even during periods of low demand. One important explanation for this is the fact that the construction trade is concentrated to a small number of large companies. In some markets, for instance, those for cement, reinforcement steel and plasterboard, one company accounts for more than 50 per cent of total sales.