samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
• In recognition of such trends, the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”) has introduced a “comply or explain” regime for sustainability reporting in 2017, where listed companies are required to disclose and explain their sustainability practices. • ASEAN governments have also imposed regulatory drivers, to assist companies with identifying gaps and areas for improvements in their sustainability eworts [7] . For example, in the mining and minerals sectors, companies are subject to commonly-agreed-upon regional guidelines for assessing and reporting on the awected environment. 15 Đ Đ We are heartened that the WFE has taken the lead in advancing the sustainability agenda in two particular areas: • First, the integration of sustainability with commodity derivatives. The WFE has published a white paper that explores how commodity derivatives exchanges could create new mitigation or investment tools that respond to environmental challenges, and incorporate sustainability elements into existing contracts; Đ • Second, the adoption of sustainable practices and principles. The WFE has partnered the United Nations Sustainable Stock Exchanges to set out a  blueprint to support exchanges in embedding sustainability in their operations. 16 Đ Đ Overall, these eworts will drive wider discussions on sustainability as well as provide guidelines on how WFE members could adopt relevant sustainable practices and principles in their strategies for growth and operations.

4 Đ Đ The agenda of this year’s WFE General Assembly and Annual Meeting will further the WFE’s objectives and work as it covers a wide spectrum of issues that are forward-looking and relevant to how WFE members can navigate the changing world.Đ These include the future of capital raising and the adoption of distributed ledger technology.Đ In the same vein, I will speak about three trends that continue to shape the financial markets of tomorrow - sustainable finance, technology and innovation, and the evolving dynamics of our public and private markets. 5 Đ Đ Before I outline these trends, let me first start by setting out the macroeconomic picture, as this is the backdrop against which we must view these developments. Global Economy – Heightened Uncertainty 6 Đ Đ There is no doubt that these are challenging times. Global growth is expected to slow going forward.Đ IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecast for April 2019 sees global growth moderating to 3.3% this year, from 3.6% in 2018 [1] .Đ Indications are that the October World Economic Outlook to be released next week will likely paint a cautious assessment of global growth prospects and include downward revisions to growth forecasts.Đ Slowing global growth is chiefly due to an elevated level of policy and geopolitical uncertainty, with ongoing trade tensions that continue to dent business sentiment and investment. These ongoing developments have important implications for the financial industry and we need to be vigilant and flexible to adapt and respond.
We would also have had to try to understand why the zigzag profile of the new Average Earnings Index was not visible in other measures – shown in chart 4 – of nominal earnings growth, such as wage settlements and private surveys. As I have said BIS Review 103/1998  –8–  elsewhere, trying to reconcile the new earnings series with other labour market data is far from easy. The Chancellor wrote to Giles Radice, the Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee, on 23 October announcing that he had asked Sir Andrew Turnbull and myself to conduct a review of the revisions to the average earnings figures. The review, which is considering both methodological and managerial issues, is being carried out by Martin Weale of the National Institute, supported by Peter Sedgwick of the Treasury. Martin and Peter have made an enormous effort over the last month or so to finish the review as quickly as possible. However, exactly when the Report will be finished and what it will conclude are, I am afraid, still not known. As a result, the ONS has yet to decide when to resume publication of the average earnings series. All I can say today is watch this space. The labour market and the objectives of monetary policy In the final part of my talk, I want to turn to the question of what this analysis of the labour market implies for monetary policy.

On 8 October, six of the world’s major central banks, including the ECB, cut official interest rates by half a percentage point in a coordinated move. Later in the month, the Eurosystem shifted the conduct of its monetary operations toward the injection of liquidity at fixed rates, with full allotment at the minimum bid rate, to ease funding concerns and to drive money market rates closer to official ones. A further half-point interest rate cut by the ECB followed in November, and yesterday we reduced rates by a further 75 basis points amid growing evidence that inflationary pressures are diminishing further. The crisis has so far had a limited impact on the domestic financial system and on the Maltese economy. While the latest data point to continued, if slower economic expansion in the third quarter, Maltese banks continue to benefit from an approach based on traditional intermediation between retail depositors and borrowers. Their funding model, therefore, eschews reliance on wholesale markets; they have substantial liquidity, adequate capital and prudent lending policies. Exposures to asset-backed securities or failed institutions are small, while lending in foreign currency to residents is limited. It would be naïve, indeed dangerous, however, to expect that the turmoil abroad will leave the Maltese economy and its financial system unscathed. First, Malta has a small open economy, highly dependent on trade. As the recession grips our major markets, Maltese exporters will be increasingly affected.
But inflation and economic activity in the shorter run – during the normal forecast period – also play a major role in the decisions. A monetary policy that leans against the wind is thus, like most economic policies, a question of degrees. It is not the case – as one might sometimes believe from the debate – that one either refrains entirely from leaning against the wind or leans against the wind one hundred per cent and disregards everything else. It is thus no 0–1 variable. As I have explained, the Riksbank’s policy in recent years has been at the same time to support the recovery and get inflation to rise towards the target, and to some extent to address the risks that may be a threat to sustainability. When things happen in the economy, this balance is of course affected. As I mentioned earlier, inflation has for some time been lower than the Riksbank and other analysts have expected, and it has now undershot the target for a fairly long time. Moreover, long-term inflation expectations have fallen. Although these are only a few tenths of a percentage below the target of 2 per cent, the trend has been downward for some time (see Figure 10). As the basis of an inflation-targeting policy is that long-run inflation expectations are anchored around the target, this development has made it even more important to prioritise bringing up inflation. In other words, the cost of taking risks into account by holding the repo rate a little higher has increased.

Krugman, Paul (2014b), Apologizing to Japan. The Opinion Pages, The New York Times, October 30. Malmqvist, Peter (2014), Låg ränta bäddar för överhettning. (Low repo rate paves the way for overheating) Svenska Dagbladet Opinion, 19 July. Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir (2014), House of Debt. University of Chicago Press. Mitelman, Henrik (2014), Nu blir Ingves börsens bästis. (Now Ingves is the stock market’s best friend) Dagens industri newspaper, 29 October. Münchau, Wolfgang (2014), What central banks should do to deal with bubbles. Column, Financial Times, July 13. OECD (2011), OECD Economic Outlook, No. 89, May 2011. Schularick, Moritz and Taylor Alan M. (2012), Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008. American Economic Review 102(2). Smets, Frank (2013), Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely interlinked? Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2013:3. Jubilee issue. Stein, Jeremy C. (2013), Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses. Speech at “Restoring Household Financial Stability after the Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter”, research symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Summers, Lawrence (2014), Washington Must Not Settle for Secular Stagnation. Financial Times, 5 January. Svenska Dagbladet (2014a), Krugman har fel om svensk bubbla. (Krugman is wrong about a Swedish bubble) Interview with Lars Svensson, SvD Näringsliv (business section of Svenska Dagbladet newspaper), 14 January. Svenska Dagbladet (2014b), ”Nollränta är som att kasta bensin på en brasa”.
There are, however, still various risks associated with the introduction of a single currency. Two I would like to mention: First, problems related to the decision on which countries are allowed to participate right from the start, and second, problems related to the transition period. In an ideal world, the decision on which countries can participate in EMU would be based primarily on economic factors. Given the various expectations associated with the single currency, it is unavoidable that EMU is as much a political as it is an economic project. The decision on membership will thus be influenced by both political and economic factors. As the likelihood rises that some important countries will not be able to comply strictly with the convergence criteria, political factors will become more important. A loose interpretation of the convergence criteria for some countries would make it politically much more difficult to exclude other countries, which also miss some convergence criteria, from participating in the EMU. Depending on how well this selection process is handled, expectations about the future course of monetary policy by the ECB will be either positively or negatively affected. Should political BIS Review 102/1997  -4-  factors unduly dominate economic factors, there is undoubtedly a potential for creating expectations about a less than optimal degree of political independence for the ECB. The ECB would therefore face an uphill battle at the start of EMU.

Relaxing monetary policy too little might not be enough to break the upward pressure on the franc; relaxing monetary policy too much might lead to inflationary tendencies later on. The dilemma faced by the SNB would become even greater should the pressure on the Swiss franc to appreciate become more pronounced. In such a situation, we could react by pegging the exchange rate of the franc to the Euro. A peg could either be temporary or the Swiss authorities could decide to link the Swiss franc permanently to the new single currency through a fixed exchange rate. BIS Review 102/1997  -5-  A permanent peg could do away with the problem of an appreciating currency. It would, however, have major drawbacks: First, we would give up our relative autonomy in setting the course of monetary policy in Switzerland. Monetary conditions in our country would be determined entirely by the ECB. As a consequence, interest rates would rise close to the level prevailing in the EMU. Adapting to this new level of interest rates would pose major problems, especially for the real estate sector and for those sectors of the economy which rely on low interest rates to finance their capital-intensive production. Second, choosing the right parity in a system with fixed exchange rates is a very difficult task. A peg that would leave the Swiss franc overvalued would force the SNB to follow a monetary policy that is too restrictive.
15  Housing  120  60  Commercial  15  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  02  05  08  11  14  17  (3) Real data built with splice of CPI annual base 2013. (4) Horizontal dotted lines show average of last ten years of each series. Sourcee: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF information. Sourcee: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF information. 18  Figure 9 Inflation indicators (annual change, percent)  CPI  6  6  5  5  Services  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  CPIEFE (*)  Goods  0  1 0  -1  -1 14  15  16  17  18  (*) For definition, see Glossary. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

At the statistical close of this Report (28 August), the peso/dollar parity was somewhat above CLP660, 5.5% higher than at the close of the previous Report. In the days that followed the peso has depreciated further vis-à-vis the dollar. However, in multilateral terms the depreciation has been milder, even with an appreciation against other emerging and commodity exporters' currencies, reflecting the greater relative strength of the Chilean economy. The real depreciation of the peso has been lower (near 1% since the previous Report). As a working assumption, the baseline scenario of this Report continues to assume that, in the course of the policy horizon, the real exchange rate will go back to its averages of the last fifteen to twenty years (Figure 7). As for domestic credit, local financial conditions are still good, in line with the ongoing expansionary stance of monetary policy. Accordingly, the interest rates of many segments stayed low and credit growth remained limited. However, it is worth mentioning that commercial rates increased again, in a context where qualitative indicators report increased demand and more accommodating supply (Figure 8). For the moment, the higher risk perception has translated into a limited revision to global growth prospects, with decelerating growth rates in 2019 and 2020. By blocs, the outlook for developed countries does not differ from that in the June Monetary Policy Report. Instead, in the emerging countries the downward adjustment in Latin America stands out, especially Argentina and Brazil. Add the expected slowdown in China (Table 2).
In his presentation today, he presents a system for evaluating and ranking different policy alternatives, showing how Taylor diagrams can be used to evaluate whether one interest rate forecast results in lower volatility in inflation and the output gap than another. If a forecast results in inflation closer to target and a narrower output gap through the forecast period, this forecast is selected. On other occasions, the choice between two forecasts can be more problematic. The forecast that is selected will depend on preference and the considerations that are given weight. I completely agree with Lars Svensson that policymakers must rank the different policy alternatives based on their preferences. In some cases, policymakers may wish to keep the interest rate high while in others a low interest rate may be preferred. However, it is equally important to take account of preferences over time, i.e. having a system to check whether the preferences underlying the baseline scenario in one report are the same as those of the previous report. And once preferences have been formalised in a loss function, it is relatively simple to find the optimal interest rate path for a given model. The choice of path will then depend on policymakers’ preferences. A policymaker’s preferences may of course change over time, but I am in favour of basing the analysis on the same set of preferences as previously. This approach will contribute to consistency in communication over time. 1  Cf.

Besides the increase in basic food prices, April’s inflation rate has reflected also the secondround effects, being materialised in higher prices of several services. The Bank of Albania judges that the Albanian economy should find space to face the external supply shocks or international price fluctuations by promoting domestic production in some key sectors. Annual inflation of tradable goods sector resulted 4.9% in April, accounting for about 73% of the headline inflation rate. High inflation rate of this sector of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) basket continued to be affected by high primary commodity prices in global markets, nonoptimistic mid-term anticipations related to them, and depreciated exchange rate pass-  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  through. On the other hand, the decline in this item’s share to determining the headline inflation was an outcome of entry of domestic agricultural supply into the market. Nontradable goods inflation, reflecting better the domestic inflationary pressures, settled at 2.5% in April, attesting to a slight upward trend. April’s core inflation, which strips out the temporary effects, was close to 3.3%, reaching historical highs. Monthly paces of inflation rise, which are a better signal about inflation expectations trend, however, registered slower paces than in the previous months. Core inflation shows that the economy’s inflation expectations, although reflecting a relatively higher rate, remain well anchored at the Bank of Albania’s target.
The ECB is monitoring developments in this area, and I believe that providing clear guidance on this issue is pivotal to improving the confidence in and the comparability of banks’ financial statements. Finally, another area where good progress has been made under the impulse of the FSF concerns the role of credit rating agencies, which is being clarified thanks to new regulation by the SEC and the revision of the IOSCO Code of Conduct. At the same time, in Europe, the European Commission will engage in regulatory initiatives for the credit rating agencies’ authorisation and supervision. Let me now focus on three issues which I believe are especially important in the current context and for which transatlantic cooperation between central banks and financial regulators is warranted, namely risk management, procyclicality and financial stability arrangements. With regard to risk management, it has become clear that the current situation in the financial markets originated for the large part in excessive risk-taking and leverage by financial institutions. A key explanation for this behaviour lies in banks’ risk management systems, which did not appropriately price risks, resulting in the creation of capital and liquidity buffers that (in many cases) proved insufficient to insulate them from the dislocation in the financial markets. Furthermore, liquidity risk did not receive enough attention in banks’ overall risk management. Strengthening risk management techniques and procedures is key in the current context.

We at the Central Bank welcome innovations such as empowerment loans but urge caution with products such as Islamic Loans since an innovation of this nature needs close collaboration with the regulatory authority. 7. Closing remarks  In closing, Mr Managing Director, having celebrated your 10th anniversary I urge you not sit on your laurels. May this be a time of serious reflection as you chart your path towards celebrating your next 10 years and beyond! I look forward to Investrust Bank Plc being represented in other countries as well. Regarding the strategic planning session that we are gathered here for, I wish to commend you, Mr Managing Director for coming up with this initiative. Every organization needs to plan its future actions and activities. This is a process that must be embraced by all top management. Although only senior managers are represented here today it is my expectation that what ever you will be discussing will have benefited from lower levels of your bank. For your plan to succeed it is important that all senior managers embrace the plan whole heartedly. With these remarks, I declare the Strategic Planning Conference of Investrust Bank Plc officially open. I thank you all. 2  BIS Review 36/2007
For example, the Federal Reserve has new tools, like the authority to pay interest on reserves and reverse repurchase agreements with an expanded set of counterparties, which were not available pre-crisis. 2 The money markets in which the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the Desk) operates have different dynamics than before, in part because of our large-scale asset purchases. We want to take stock of these changes and ask ourselves what the best way of implementing monetary policy is today and in future environments in a manner that is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s normalization principles. 3 To make good choices about the monetary policy implementation framework going forward, it is, of course, useful to learn from the past. Our task is to assess the strength and weaknesses of existing and previous frameworks, particularly through the lens of what happened during the recent global financial crisis, when central banks were called on to innovate in a number of ways. In addition, the varied experience of other central banks prior to the crisis can also provide valuable insights. What have they learned about what worked well, or did not work so well, with their frameworks? The current framework in the United States looks very different than the pre-crisis framework. One way in which it is different is that excess reserves are much higher than they used to be. This shift is due, in large part, to the large-scale asset purchases that the System undertook, starting in December 2008.

But, if you look closely, you’d see that excess reserves actually  1  An extended effort to evaluate potential long-run monetary policy implementation frameworks was announced in the July 2015 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes. This effort was previously discussed at the dinner address for the Bank of England-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference on Money Markets and Monetary Policy Implementation. 2  Congress had agreed to give the Federal Reserve the authority to pay interest on reserves in 2006, but this authority was to take effect on 2011. The effective date of the authority was moved forward to October 1, 2008, with the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 3  The FOMC published its Policy Normalization Principles and Plans on September 16, 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  started expanding earlier and control of the federal funds rate deteriorated. 4 So what happened? In reviewing the events of the second half of 2007 and most of 2008, it is clear that the Federal Reserve faced a tension between the need to provide liquidity to ease money market strains and the need to keep control of the interest rate target within its earlier framework. Demand for dollar liquidity increased in many money markets and some of that demand came from banks headquartered outside of the United States. A by-product of the Federal Reserve’s efforts to provide liquidity to the financial system is that the supply of reserves, which can only be held by banks, increased.