samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the specific case of Switzerland, the current account is not a good measure for assessing trade flows and changes in the international investment position or a suitable metric on which to base monetary policy. If we had let ourselves be guided by the development of the current  1  Cf. Jordan, Thomas (February 2013), ‘Strong Swiss franc and large current account surplus – a contradiction?’, www.snb.ch/de/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20130219_tjn, and Jordan, Thomas (October 2013), ‘Reconciling Switzerland’s minimum exchange rate and current account surplus’, www.snb.ch/de/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20131008_tjn. Page 2/13  account in recent years, we would have had to allow the Swiss franc to appreciate even further. This would have caused a recession and falling prices. Furthermore, stronger appreciation of the Swiss franc would neither have placated the critics of our current account surplus nor would it have been in the interests of other countries. First, not even a significantly stronger Swiss franc would have reduced the current account surplus to any great extent. The reason for this is that Switzerland’s current account surplus, as reported according to international standards, is chiefly attributable to statistical distortions and to structural factors which are not significantly affected by the exchange rate. Second, with a domestic recession, Switzerland’s contribution to global demand for goods would have declined, which in turn would have had a negative impact on other countries.

Speech  Embargo 23 November 2017, 5.30 pm  High Swiss current account surplus: consequences for SNB monetary policy? University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board ∗ Swiss National Bank Basel, 23 November 2017 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2017 (speech given in German)  ∗ The speaker would like to thank Thomas Nitschka and Pınar Yeşin for their support in drafting this speech. He also thanks Simone Auer, Alain Gabler, Petra Gerlach, Peter Kuster, Carlos Lenz and Alexander Perruchoud as well as SNB Language Services. Page 1/13  Introduction Switzerland has had a surplus on its current account ever since the 1980s. In simple terms this means that, in our economic exchanges with other countries, we have more receipts than expenses. In 2016, this surplus stood at around 10% of GDP – and it has even approached 15% in some earlier years. Textbook economic theory suggests that a current account surplus is a function of an undervalued currency. In order to restore balance in future years, the currency of a country running a surplus would need to appreciate, leading to a reduction in net exports. However, this contrasts with the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) assessment that the Swiss franc has been highly valued for years, and at times even hugely overvalued. Despite a slight weakening of the exchange rate, our monetary policy thus continues to be geared towards easing the pressure on the Swiss franc and making investments in Swiss francs less attractive.
Mr Lee examines issues relating to the changing financial landscape  Keynote address by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Monetary Authority of Singapore and Deputy Prime Minister, at the 16th General Meeting of the Asian Bankers Association, held in Singapore on 26 November 1999. Introduction The international financial landscape is changing rapidly. In Asia, economies and financial systems have undergone a traumatic two years. Weakening economies uncovered flaws in financial institutions and supervision. Entire financial systems went down, undermined by slack lending practices and inadequate legal frameworks. The financial troubles in turn affected the real sector, sending economies into steep decline. Now the crisis is passing. In many countries, macro indicators have stabilised, and growth has resumed. But it will take years of hard work to clean up the bad loans, recapitalise the banks, strengthen the legal and supervisory framework, change long established cosy relationships, and put long-term growth on a firmer foundation. While Asia has been preoccupied with reconstruction and recovery, globalisation and technology have progressed apace, especially in the US and Europe. Technology is both a critical cause and a catalyst. Financial arenas are becoming more open, new products and services are being invented and marketed, and regulators everywhere are scrambling to assess the changes and master the flux. An international wave of mergers and acquisitions has swept the industry, as boundaries between financial sectors and products have blurred dramatically.

$ equity listing Related to the bond market is the development of the Asian equities market. Companies will increasingly turn to the equity market to raise capital or reduce their debt-equity ratios. They will either seek to list in their home exchange or list abroad, and their shares will often be traded on more than one exchange. The Singapore stock exchange aims to be one of the centres in the Asian equities market. Foreign companies seeking to list on SES often want to do so in $ This enables them to tap the local investor base, which contributes significantly to liquidity, and hence to higher stock valuations. However, we have required foreign companies wanting to list in $ to have at least 20% of their revenues, profits, or expenses attributable to Singapore. MAS has now decided to remove this requirement. We will allow all foreign-owned companies to list $ denominated shares freely on SES, without consultation, subject of course to meeting SES’ listing  1  Defined in the Companies Act (Cap 50) as an individual whose total net personal assets exceed $ million or its equivalent in foreign currencies or whose income in the preceding 12 months is not less than $ or its equivalent in foreign currencies; or a corporation whose total net assets exceed $ million in value or its equivalent in foreign currencies as determined by the last audited balance sheet of the corporation. BIS Review 130/1999  4  requirements.
Looking at Europe’s regional economies, it is striking that relativities between them have remained so stubbornly large for so long, even within individual member states. Indeed only in the UK have there been some recent signs that relative unemployment rates, from prosperous to less prosperous regions, have begun to converge. That appears to be related in changes in relative wages which have come about as a result of the dismantling of centralised pay bargaining, and of other labour market restrictions, in the 1980s. Elsewhere in Europe those changes have not been made; without them we would have to enter a reserve on the preparedness of some European economies for the rigours of a single currency. That is another point which, I am sure, any British government will wish to take into account in making its final decision. And we would feel more comfortable about the likely success of EMU as a whole - and I emphasise that the success of EMU is strongly in the British national interest, whether we are in or out were we to see faster progress towards greater labour market flexibility elsewhere in Europe. It may be argued that EMU itself will act as a stimulus to reforms needed in fiscal policy, and in labour markets; indeed that the prospect of EMU is already doing so. We cautious, pragmatic, non-visionary people that we are - would like to see the needed reforms implemented first.

(2000): “Estimating and interpreting interest rate expectations”, Economic Bulletin 3/2000, Norges Bank, and Myklebust, G. (2005): “Documentation of the method used by Norges Bank for estimating implied forward rates”, Staff Memo 2005/11, Norges Bank. Both articles are available on www.norges-bank.no. 2  BIS Review 6/2006  As from Inflation Report 3/02, the Bank has published a recommended interval for the sight deposit rate over the following four months. To begin with, the interval was published at the end of the period to which it applied. Since Inflation Report 2/04, it has been published ahead of the period. The interval reflects the Bank’s sight deposit rate projection for the following four months, conditional on economic developments that are approximately as projected. The interval is an important part of the Bank’s communication strategy. Since we now also publish an interest rate projection for the entire projection period and not only for the next four months, economic agents gain broader insight into the analytical base, the assessments made and the Bank’s response pattern. Possible advantages of an explicit interest rate projection In forecasting inflation and output, there may be a number of advantages to basing forecasts on an interest rate projection that in the Bank’s opinion provides a reasonable balance between the different monetary policy objectives. 2 A communication such as this makes it clear which interest rate path, in the Bank’s opinion, provides a balance between monetary policy objectives.
So is this the new paradigm of known-unknown? That is, we know what the major drivers of change are, but we cannot forecast outcome. So the key strategic challenge is how to deal with Known-Unknown. For the short-term, the key priority is dealing with the fragile and volatile global economy. Stability is the priority for banks and regulators. The strategic policy question is how to get the right balance between risk and return, stability and growth. Weaker banks will retrench, leaving rooms for the few stronger banks to take up market share. In Asia, we have seen banks from the Asia-Pacific, notably Japanese, Chinese, and Australian banks moved into market space where European and U.S. banks have retracted. ASEAN banks are also shifting strategy to play a greater role to support their conglomerates in the regional expansion. If this regional banking trend continues, what are the implications for banks, regulators, and central banks? While the region has so far remained relatively resilient to the first round impact of European bank deleveraging, there is significant concern about the second round impact through the slowdown in global trade and economy that will impact growth. Another known-unknown in the short-term is the impact of interaction of various traditional and non-traditional policy measures, such as monetary policy, prudential policy including macroprudential. As a result of this crisis, the acceptable policy space has been significantly widened, for example, macroprudential policy now includes sectoral measures such as those to prevent property bubbles or to control adverse impact of capital flows.

The total financial packages provided around the world to various economic sectors (health and non-health) amounted to around USD 10.8 trillion, equivalent to 10.2% of the global GDP, while the amounts allocated to support liquidity injected into the economies reached USD 6.1 trillion, or 6.2% of the global GDP. Like the other countries in the world, the Kuwaiti economy encountered many challenges, as economic activities have been shut down for several months, and global shipping of merchandise goods has been severely disrupted. Proceeding from the importance of discussions and sharing of experiences to pave the way towards making the right decisions and bringing about thorough strategies that strengthen the monetary and financial stability, I would like to briefly present the efforts made by the Central Bank of Kuwait to achieve this goal during the previous period, and the measures it have taken to alleviate those challenges and develop a mechanism for follow-up thereon and a plan for safe exit.   Speech delivered by His Excellency the Governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait, Basel A. Al-Haroon, in the 46th Ordinary Session of the Council of the Governors of the Arab Central Banks and Monetary Authorities, held in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 18, 2022. Page 1 of 4  In line with its proactive approach adopted since March 2020, the Central Bank of Kuwait has taken several measures and actions through its various monetary, supervisory and hedging instruments.
But at the same time, the model of ecosystem creation that currently dominates can lead to the monopolisation of the market, and in the end (like any monopoly, no matter how effectively it started out), it can lead to stagnation in the technology market in the long term, and a slowdown in the introduction of innovations, which threatens consumer interests. And, of course, straight away there is a collateral risk that we have to learn to manage: that large amounts of sensitive data (payment, medical and other data) from all spheres of our citizens’ lives are gathered by one system. That is why we as the Central Bank would like to see healthy competition between a number of players. The conditions of access to emerging ecosystems should be completely open, nondiscriminatory to all suppliers, and consumers should be able to choose the most appropriate products and services for them. Meanwhile, “external” ecosystem participants will also have to comply with certain rules and ecosystem requirements — both in line with rules pertaining to sales and high requirements for cyber resilience. Regulating emerging ecosystems is, of course, a very difficult task. But we need this regulation to avoid the risks I mentioned and to develop the benefits that ecosystems offer, which includes safeguarding the potential for small players to develop. Therefore, we propose working with the market to develop approaches to ecosystem regulation. We have established a working group at the Bank of Russia and will soon publish the first consultation paper on this topic.

Even though the start of the year did not turn out quite as weak as it seemed in June when we lowered the repo rate, it still appears that economic growth and resource utilisation this year will be markedly lower than we expected at the beginning of the year. In the period ahead we expect that the cyclical upswing to a greater extent will be associated with increasing domestic demand. There are currently a number of signs that such a change is on the way. During the second quarter this year, growth in household consumption seems to have picked up and it appears that consumption continued to grow strongly in the third quarter as well. Moreover, the upturn in investment that began last year has also continued during the first half of 2005. Export growth, however, was somewhat weaker than expected during the first half of the year owing to the dip in international economic activity. However, monthly data for goods exports and the NIER's business tendency data for new export orders point to a slight pick-up recently. The high productivity growth in recent years indicates continued good growth in the Swedish economy in the coming years. It has meant that companies have been able to increase their production with their existing work forces. This in turn has improved the cost situation for companies and held back price increases in the economy. The low inflation rate has made it possible to conduct an expansionary monetary policy for a comparatively long period.
In addition to being unfair, it creates greater risks to financial stability by encouraging greater size and complexity. We have made considerable progress toward ending TBTF – raising capital and liquidity requirements for the largest, most systemic banks – but there is a ways to go. In particular, to paraphrase former New York Fed President Tim Geithner, while the single point of entry concept “beats no plan”, significant barriers to achieving a cross border resolution remain, and there are still insufficient incentives in place for firms to take corrective actions early on to prevent their failure in the first place. The third challenge for the Federal Reserve is to put financial stability on par with monetary policy. As our experience from 2007 to 2009 has demonstrated, monetary policy cannot work properly when there is financial instability. When financial instability occurs, it disturbs market functioning and can impair bank balance sheets in a way that disrupts their financial intermediation function, constraining the availability of credit for households and businesses. This, in turn, can lead to further reductions in aggregate demand that put additional stress on  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the weakened financial system. Financial stability cannot be subordinated to any other priority. The fourth challenge is to sustain and enhance the capabilities of the New York Fed. This starts most obviously in continuing to attract, develop and retain the best people.

Last year Sweden had one of the largest surpluses in public savings in the EU, which enabled an expansionary fiscal policy. The slowdown in 2001 also differs from the problem periods during the 1970s and 1980s in that the manufacturing industry’s competitive situation was very strong from the start. The weakening of the krona began as soon as one year before industrial activity slowed down and contributed to a strong development in net exports during 2001. Nor was it lack of competitiveness or a decline in productivity that lay behind the depreciation of the krona - it was financial flows resulting from the decline on the  BIS Review 37/2002  5  stock market and portfolio investments connected with the AP pension funds being given the opportunity to invest some assets abroad. A recovery in the Swedish economy has now begun and the Swedish economy has a good foundation to stand on, with a surplus in both the central government finances and in Sweden’s trade abroad. Inflation is on the way down. At the same time, wage formation and pricing behaviour in general will comprise an uncertainty factor when economic activity gradually picks up speed. It may therefore be necessary to implement further interest rate hikes in future. However, the next monetary policy stage depends, as always, on what happens with regard to economic activity, inflation and in the world around us.
With these differences in mind, we can note that it is unlikely that the fall in prices we have seen so far will lead to a crisis on the Swedish property market. However, an economic downturn is always associated with increased risks. During the second quarter of this year, nominal prices for office premises in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö fell by between 14 and 20 per cent on an annual basis. These are substantial price falls, although not as substantial as during the crisis of the 1990s. Prices began to fall in late 2007 and this was primarily driven by that fact that investors increased their return requirements. At the same time, rents were still increasing at a good rate, which counteracted an even more substantial fall in prices. However, rents began falling in the spring, especially in Stockholm where the number of vacancies has also increased. Given that the outlook on the labour market is deteriorating and that bankruptcies are expected to increase among tenants, it is highly probable that vacancies will continue to increase. Such a development will reduce the earnings of the property companies, thus weakening their ability to make interest and amortisation payments. Ultimately, this may also lead to the suspension of payments on the part of property companies too. Falling prices may also cause difficulties for the property companies if they do not meet the banks' requirements regarding maximum leverage.

Svein Gjedrem: Transatlantic economic partnership - Nordic and American perspectives Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Nordic Investment Bank Economic Colloquium, New York, 19 November 2002. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  The Nordic countries and the US have long historic ties. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the number of Norwegians and their descendants living in the US today is larger than the population of Norway. I think similar numbers can be found for the other Scandinavian countries. I will attempt to show here today that even in economic terms, the ties have never been closer. I will mainly concentrate on the Nordic perspective, but I also have few specific remarks about Norway. GNI per capita 2000. PPP 40000  International dollars  35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 US  Norway  Iceland  Denmark  Finland  Sweden  Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 7/16/01 SG 240802  The Nordic economies are small, open and mature economies. At least, Norway, Iceland and Denmark compare roughly with US income levels. In the case of Norway, the income differential against the US is mainly explained by shorter working hours. Labour productivity in the US1) and Norway2) Index.
There is also another simple but important reason why people as well as the politicians elected by them would want to continue to spend beyond their means even though they realise that they could not afford to repay the debts in their lifetime. This is what I would like to call the “collective irresponsibility” syndrome. A father or mother will do almost anything to protect their children. Some would be prepared to sacrifice their happiness and even lives for their children. It is only in great desperation, such as the great famine in China depicted in the movie “1942”, that we would witness children being sold by their starving parents. But that was a very extraordinary and tragic situation. We can hardly say that the developed world is now in that desperate situation. There is an interesting point here: when a parent mortgages his child, he is accountable for this brutal and inhumane act. However, when a voter elects politicians who promise continued and unsustainable spending he is just one of many, many voters. The vote is cast in anonymity and the voters have no direct accountability for how they vote and for the consequences of such voting decisions. The voters may also think or hope that, even if the national debts can only be paid back by the next generation, it would be someone else’s children, not their own, who will have to shoulder the burden.

In the US, the federal government still persistently registers fiscal deficits (averaging 3.2% of GDP per annum since 1980s) only except for the second term of the Clinton presidency in 1997–2001. Incurring persistent fiscal deficit means that the governments have to continuously raise additional debt to finance their spending. Quantitative easing: Lessening of pain of excessive debts? 10. This ballooning government debt raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. For now, the situation seems manageable as central banks in these economies are pursuing quantitative easing (QE) policies to artificially suppress government bond yields. The aggressive asset purchases by major central banks have now suppressed bond yields to extremely low levels, where shorter-term government bond yields in some European economies like Germany, Austria, Denmark and Switzerland have already turned negative. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Negative government bond yield means that lenders are paying borrowers for the privilege of holding their debt, which is clearly not making any sense. I doubt how long such an unusual phenomenon could last, but in any case, I’m certain that such distortions will definitely come with unintended consequences. At least, one side-effect I can already observe is that QE penalises prudent savers and pensioners very badly. In Japan, for example, QE helps reduce the financing cost of public debt at the expense of eroding the purchasing power of JGB holders, with many of which being retirees and pension funds, by paying them negative real yield. Sovereign debt crisis: Mishaps that belong only to EMEs? 11.