samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The economic fundamentals of the euro area are sound and there are no major imbalances that would require a lengthy process of adjustment. The expectation of a recovery in the euro area in 2002 is furthermore supported by favourable financing conditions and by real disposable income benefiting from past and expected future declines in inflation. There is also increasing confirmation that economic activity outside the euro area is picking up, which should lead to a gradual strengthening of the external demand for euro area products and services. While the strength of the recovery remains uncertain, there are good reasons to expect a return of economic growth to levels in line with potential towards the end of the year. Turning to short-term price developments, annual consumer price inflation picked up substantially in January. Part of this increase was expected, as it related to base effects stemming from falling energy prices in early 2001 and to higher indirect taxes in some euro area countries. Furthermore, the increase reflected a considerable rise in unprocessed food prices due to adverse weather conditions in parts of Europe. Part of the latter effect seems to have been reversed in the meantime, as preliminary data for February indicate. Some increases have also been observed in oil prices and in the rate of growth of services prices in January.

Weitzman, M, (2009b), “Some Basic Economics of Extreme Climate Change”, Discussion Paper 09-10, Harvard Environmental Economics Program. World Economic Forum (2019), “The Global Risks Report 2019”, 14th Edition. 18 [18]
It will contribute to strengthening of the role of the National Bank in ensuring price stability and the stability and efficiency of the financial system in the country, as well as strengthening the capacity of the National Bank in meeting the challenges that lie ahead on the road to the accession of the Republic of Macedonia into the EU. Let me discuss briefly the results and significance of the project in relation to the further operation of the National Bank. The first and most important benefit of the project is the set of relevant findings of the experts on the existing gaps, and the recommendations for their overcoming within time frame and resources needed. In this regard, the Needs Analysis Report will be the basis for strategic planning of the National Bank and for setting the future strategy for joining the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem. With great pleasure I would point out that in the Report, the NBRM is regarded as a professional, independent, technically efficient and strategically oriented institution, and in some areas of central banking it is noted that it already operates in accordance with EU and ESCB standards. Also I am pleased to say that some recommendations that were given  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  during the project have already been implemented, which encourages me to confirm our strong commitment for implementing and applying the recommendations given in the Report.

I would like to assure you that depending on the nature of the recommendations, some will be implemented in a short period of time, while others will take more time and additional technical and human resources, and of course, further technical assistance in terms of experience and knowledge of the ECB and the national central banks of the EU. It is the creation of opportunities for further cooperation that I consider the second important benefit for the National Bank from the implementation of this project. Namely, the project involved a number of experts from various areas of central banking from the ECB and from 11 central banks of the European System of Central Banks. In the past nine months they had intensive communication and cooperation with their counterparts in the NBRM and conducted a total of 16 assessment missions within which they unselfishly transferred their whole experience and knowledge. The implementation of the project, further contributed to increasing the awareness and knowledge of the NBRM staff in the relevant EU regulations, standards and practices applied by modern central banks. Hence, I would especially like to emphasize the future prospects of our mutual cooperation that will hopefully continue in the same spirit and will further deepen. Finally, let me once again emphasize my satisfaction and give the credit for the successful implementation of the project, to the resident programme coordinator from the ECB, and to all participating experts from the ECB, the European System of Central Banks and the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.
And joint distributions with independence in the central mass but high correlation in the tails are likely to be extremely hard to model and calibrate. Monetary policy Other macroeconomic features also probably contributed to the growth in credit leading up to the crisis. In particular, according to some monetary policy was too loose over this period, especially in the United States (see Taylor, 2007). Fig. 6 shows the difference between the policy rate and benchmark estimates of an “appropriate” policy rate derived from a Taylor rule. Notwithstanding the usual caveats about the construction of such benchmarks, the very low level of the Federal Funds rate relative to the Taylor rule during 2001-5 is striking. Of course, the FOMC held rates this low for a reason – they were concerned about entering a Japanese-style deflation and in order to mitigate that risk committed to holding the policy rate at a low level for a sustained period so as to pull down longer-term market interest rates. There is, though, little to suggest that policy rates were noticeably out of line in the euro area and the United Kingdom. Credit was nevertheless growing rapidly, as documented earlier in Fig. 1. Despite generally low and stable inflation, that led some – most notably Bill White and colleagues at the Bank for International Settlements (Borio and White, 2003; White 2006) – to argue that the credit/asset-price boom was storing up trouble for the future.

Such views should take into consideration the interests of European and Polish consumers, the interests of Polish banks and the interests of the institutions comprising the infrastructure of the Polish payment system. Moreover, they should be coherent with the assumptions of the Lisbon Strategy, i.e. with the obligation to prepare the European Union economy for global challenges of the 21st century. A separate issue is to specify the pace of works in Poland as regards the implementation of SEPA standards and mechanisms that have already been worked out. According to the timetable approved by the EPC, Poland will have to comply with SEPA standards for euro transactions already in 2008. However, the lack of established date for Poland’s accession to the euro area means that Poland should have more time to implement solutions specific for SEPA, which would mean that necessary investments and changes could be spread over time. On the other hand, it seems that early involvement of Polish banks and infrastructural institutions in the approved solutions, e.g. through the implementation of mechanisms to lower costs in the sector, through increased efficiency and attractiveness of offered payment services and through strengthened security of financial transactions, could be extremely significant for increasing their own competitive edge on the overall European scale. Thus, it seems that the above dilemma over the appropriate pace of works should be thoroughly analysed by the banking community and infrastructural institutions.
The "tariff shield" introduced at the end of 2021 explain 3-percentage points of the inflation differential in favour of France. It can thus help to reduce "second round effects" on prices and wages. But it can only be temporary: it is intended to smooth the shock, not to give the illusion that it no longer exists. The French government will therefore courageously start to reduce support for households by increasing gas and electricity tariffs by 15% next January and February. The second lesson is from Germany: domestic mechanisms must, to the greatest possible extent, allow for a reduction in the demand for gas and electricity in order to minimise the risk of shortages. The proposed tiering mechanism, which calls for the application of a regulated tariff of 80% of the historical annual consumption for households and a tariff at the market price beyond that, preserves an important "price signal", and therefore provides an incentive for this reduction. There remains the very sensitive question of electricity and gas prices for companies: should there be a regulated Spanish-style cap or a strong German-style fiscal buffer?

It rests on a two-pillar approach: on the one hand the economic analysis examines cyclical, economic and financial indicators related to the main determinants of short-term inflation; on the other hand the "monetary analysis" looks at the behaviour of money and credit aggregates and provides a perspective on longer-term inflation. Cross-checking the outcome of the economic analysis – broadening growth in the euro area – with the monetary analysis – ample liquidity and strong monetary growth – supports the assessment of risks over the medium to long-term horizon, which have led to the Governing Council’s decisions since December 2005. Implementation is decentralized. Monetary policy decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB are implemented by the NCBs. This framework has proven its robustness and efficiency. But there are limits to what monetary policy can deliver. Its main contribution to growth is to achieve price stability. Ultimately, however, whether this will translate into higher growth in the longer run depends on reforms aimed at increasing the economy's potential. Here European countries are making progress, although at too slow a pace. 3)  How can EU Member States increase their growth potential? In 2000, the Lisbon European Council designed a new strategy in order to promote competitiveness of the EU and defined ambitious goals in that respect. The Lisbon agenda has introduced a multilateral surveillance of structural policies. In 2005, EU Heads of Government re-launched the Lisbon strategy with an enhanced focus on jobs and growth and a streamlined governance regime.
The new standard was very much a response to the financial crisis, the first reform of the Accord to be backed by a remit from world leaders to effect real change on the global scale. It built on a number of more immediate domestic responses, including in the UK the FSA’s so-called 4–6–8 approach. The new standard requires more and better quality capital, and is a step change in capital adequacy. For the largest UK banks, and taking into account all of the changes brought in by Basel III, there is a seven-fold increase in the amount of Core Tier I capital, the highest quality of capital that must have the characteristics of equity which major banks are expected to hold. Under the Basel II regime, the Pillar I minimum requirement was £ of this highest quality capital for the largest five UK Banks. Compared to this, taking both capital minima and capital buffers together when Basel III is fully implemented the figure will be £ as measured in September 2013 (ie on a like-for-like basis in terms of the point in time). Breaking down this increase of £ in Core Tier I capital, the largest part £ is accounted for by the change in the definition of capital resources, a further £ relates to raising the minimum requirement from 2% to 4.5% of risk weighted assets (and changes to the risk weights), £ to the Basel III Capital Conservation Buffer, and £ to the Basel III Globally Significant Banks Buffer.

321–349 Kashyap, A, Rajan, R and Stein, J (2002), “Banks as liquidity providers: An explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit-taking”, The Journal of Finance 57, 33–73. Lainà, P (2015), “Proposals for Full-Reserve Banking: History and Critique from David Ricardo to Martin Wolf”, Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland. Lowe, P (2015), “The transformation in maturity transformation” speech given to Thomson Reuters’ 3rd Australian Regulatory Summit, Sydney, 27 May 2015. National Savings and Investments (2008–09), Annual Report and Accounts available at http://nsandi-corporate.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/13428-Annual-Report-Web.pdf Pennacchi, G (2012), “Narrow banking”, Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 141–159, 2012 Rogoff, K (2014), “Costs and benefits to phasing out paper currency”, NBER Working Paper No. 20126 Shafik, M (2016), A New Heart for a Changing Payments System, speech given at the Bank of England. Simons, H, Cox, G, Director, A, Douglas, P, Hart, A, Knight, F, Mints, L, Schultz, H (1933): “Banking and currency reform”, Manuscript. [Reprinted in Samuels, Warren (ed.) (1990): Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology. Archival Supplement, Volume 4. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.] Tobin, J (1987),”The Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1987, pp. 167–183. Walport, M (2016), “Distributed ledger technology: beyond block chain”, Council for Science and Technology. Wolf, M (2014): “Strip private banks of their power to create money”, Financial Times, 24 April 2014. Yermack, D (2013), “Is Bitcoin a real currency? An economic appraisal”, NBER Working Paper No. 19747.
The recovery in financial markets that we have seen in the past 6 months or so, is in part driven by the statement that the ECB will do “whatever it takes” to keep the euro area together and the perceived commitment that the Fed will do whatever it takes to restore growth in the US. The belief in these policy approaches has been immensely powerful. But it must be backed not only by perceived intent but also by capability and delivery if needed – and economies always generate some surprises. If the actions don’t follow the words when necessary, then similar policy statements in future will be less effective. In the UK, market expectations are already consistent with monetary policy remaining very supportive for some time to come, indicating no change in Bank Rate until well into 2015. Yet there is still a debate about whether the MPC should give more “forward guidance”. In practice we have being doing this through the Inflation Report. The most recent edition makes it clear that we do not see much pressure arising from domestically generated inflation. Rather, we continue to see inflation being driven by factors such as tax changes, higher commodity and energy prices, and other external influences. These and similar adverse relative price changes have made us all financially worse off and contributed to keeping inflation higher than target over the past few years. In response, the Bank could have chosen to tighten monetary policy to keep measured inflation rates down.

Denis Beau: The Euro area sovereign debt markets in the crisis role and impact on financial stability perspectives Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Risk Live 2021, 7 June 2021. * * * The demand and supply environment in which European sovereign debt markets operate has changed over the last years and is still changing: 1. Firstly, liquidity in the financial system has increased, both in terms of excess reserves held by commercial banks and deposits held by the non-financial sector, notably corporates, whose considerable increase in gross debt has so far largely been offset by a similar rise of liquid assets on aggregate; 2. Secondly, central banks have strengthened their presence in the secondary sovereign debt market. This is a common and global feature. The Eurosystem for instance, has reinforced its accommodative policy stance notably by stepping up its asset purchases of public sector securities under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) while continuing those under the asset purchase programme (APP). This implies that a large proportion of the stock of some governments’ debt -for the major currencies- is currently held by central banks; 3. A third obvious factor lies in the significant increase in sovereign debt issuances since last year, as European countries implemented substantial fiscal measures to cushion the economic impact of the Covid crisis and foster a subsequent recovery. All in all, euro area governments issued close to EUR 1 trillion in net debt in 2020.
Muhammad Al-Jasser: The need for national data compilation and dissemination Opening speech by His Excellency Dr Muhammad Al-Jasser, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), at the Special Data Dissemination Standard and Monetary Statistics workshop, Institute of Banking, Riyadh, 11 December 2010. *  *  *  Dear Workshop Organizers and Participants, It is my pleasure to inaugurate such an important workshop at a time when many national data compiling agencies are confronted with ever increasing user demands and challenges. I take this opportunity to express my thanks to all the GCC organizations (central banks, ministries of finance, and statistics centers) participating in this event. Of course, I also extend my appreciation to the IMF for providing pivotal leadership in building capacity for producing official statistics in the region, and paving the way for adding new dimensions and quality to official statistics and thereby contributing to the global statistical system. Dear Participants, The need to compile and disseminate data in a systematic and professional way, especially with respect to the growing data needs, can hardly be overemphasized. For example, the recent global financial crisis has exposed the lack of data in key statistical areas that might have helped authorities better measure and understand the risks to the international financial system. Remedies to fill such data gaps (e.g., maturity mismatches) are critical for monitoring systemic risk originating from systemically important financial institutions. Similarly, the rapid transformation of the world economy has also brought new data needs for environmental and social welfare statistics.

Because we had cut the repo rate so quickly and substantially during the autumn of 2008 and early 2009, the scope for pursuing traditional monetary began to shrink as the repo rate began to approach its lower limit. Determining what level is the repo rate's lower limit also proved to be difficult. Can the repo rate be cut all the way to zero, or even to a negative level? There is no clear answer to these questions. However, in line with the majority of the Executive Board, my assessment in July was that the repo rate should not be cut beyond 0.25 per cent. The reasons for this were the concern that some financial markets would find it difficult to function normally at lower interest rate levels and that it could have a negative impact on the profitability of the banks. My view was that the economic situation in principle called for an even greater cut. At the same time, I thought it was too risky to reduce the repo rate even more when we did not really know how the financial markets would function with such low interest rates. One can note after the event that cutting the repo rate to 0.25 per cent was carried out without any apparent problems. In this perspective, the fears that I had in July would seem to be somewhat exaggerated.
It is conceivable that for various reasons monetary policy’s impact  BIS Review 24/2002  1  via market interest rates may have become quicker in recent years. Financial markets have become more responsive to expectations, many households have flexible mortgage rates and so on. There are, however, other factors at work in the opposite direction. One is that the exchange rate, which in a small open economy is a central component of the transmission mechanism, does not always respond to instrumental rate adjustments in the same way as before. Moreover, on account of the associated menu costs, in a low inflation regime it seems that firms adjust prices less frequently. Still, until further notice most things speak in favour of the established view that the greater part of monetary policy’s impact on inflation shows up after one to two years. That naturally does not rule out the possibility that a part of the effect materialises either sooner or later than this. From this it follows that basing monetary policy on current inflation can lead to problems because the economic situation that may have changed completely by the time the repo rate adjustment elicits its full effect. A rather abrupt change of course may then be needed to deal with the situation that then prevails. Perhaps a parallel can be drawn with piloting a car ferry among the islands en route from Stockholm to Finland.

Whilst non-performing loans in the banking sector rose from around 5% in July 2008 to their current levels of around 10%, they remain within the prudential ceilings above which concerns of systemic risks would be warranted. The increase in non-performing loans thus reflects the deterioration in the real sector of the economy. It is in this sense, i.e. the absence of a significant volume of impaired assets in the financial system, that I describe “financial markets” rather than the “financial system” as bearing the brunt of the crisis. The weight of adjustment was reflected in exchange rates and the Balance of Payments – reflected in a marked draw down of international reserves. However, the ramifications of the crisis on the real sector of many sub-Saharan African economies are real and potentially far reaching, and it is to these that I now turn. In my reflections on the impact and implications of the global economic crisis on Africa, I wish to emphasize four key points: The first and perhaps the most significant effect of the global financial and economic crisis has been the marked slow-down in real GDP growth in SSA, to a projected 1.5% in 2009 from an estimated 5.5% in 2008. This slow-down in growth has occurred after a significant period of strong economic growth and investment that had laid the platform for sustained and significant reductions in poverty across the continent.