samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Basel III implementation has been proceeding on a comparable basis in advanced and emerging market countries. The Financial Stability Board has been monitoring the unintended effects of reforms on EME banks and EMEs report no significant adverse effects. 4 However, potential differences in reform implementation across jurisdictions could create challenges, particularly in countries where foreign banks are active. This underscores the importance of continued home and host coordination. I would like to briefly touch on two U.S.-specific financial regulatory issues with international implications, namely enhanced prudential standards for foreign banks, including intermediate holding company requirements for the largest institutions, and issues surrounding correspondent banking, U.S. anti-money laundering rules, and “de-risking”. Of these, the latter may have the most relevance for the EMEs broadly. The adoption of enhanced prudential standards for foreign banking organizations (FBOs) is a key element of U.S. regulatory reforms, and a significant change in supervision of FBOs. 5 The largest FBOs (with U.S. non-branch assets greater than $ billion) must hold their U.S. subsidiaries under an intermediate holding company (IHC), and meet various capital, leverage, liquidity, stress testing, risk management and corporate governance requirements. These requirements respond to a mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act for enhanced standards for the largest domestic and foreign banks.

Since the end of the Great Recession almost six years ago, U.S. growth has averaged a somewhat disappointing 2.3 percent. But growth has picked up recently, and the latest Blue Chip forecast is for growth to average slightly below 3 percent over the next year. There are good reasons to think that a period of stronger growth can be sustained. •  Household balance sheets are in much improved condition, with total household liabilities well below their 2008 peak, and debt service burdens at the lowest share of disposable income in more than 30 years. Moreover, consumers are benefitting from the positive wealth effect of higher house and equity prices. •  Labor market improvement has picked up pace, with payrolls gains over the last several months the strongest since the mid-1990s. Workers are finally beginning to see at least modest real wage gains. And the U.S. unemployment rate has fallen to the lowest level since mid-2008. •  The recent drop in oil prices is providing a significant boost to household spending power with nearly a percentage point increase to real disposable incomes. •  The housing sector is now in much better balance. The inventory-sales ratio for homes is near, or even slightly below, levels typically considered “normal,” and there has been a significant drop in the fraction of households carrying mortgage balances in excess of the value of their homes. •  The fiscal restraint that has held back growth in recent years has given way to a more neutral posture.
Norges Bank’s district branches lost their right to set the interest rate in their own district – Norway became one interest rate kingdom. And the stock of gold would no longer set an absolute limit on the supply of banknotes. A formal obstacle to the Bank’s provision of emergency liquidity to private banks in a crisis had been removed – and, as it turned out, the need for emergency liquidity would soon arise. A more complex banking system with a growing number of links to the international financial system had set the stage for financial turbulence. Just before the turn of the century, a speculative economy had developed in Christiania. Property prices soared and newly established banks willingly provided loans – often based on short-term foreign credit. The ensuing crash was to claim many victims. One day in June 1899, a delegation from one of the banks, Discontobanken, marched into Norges Bank with some very bad news: one of the country’s largest companies could not meet its payment obligations and Discontobanken was on the verge of collapse. If the bank fell, panic could ensue, triggering a domino effect in the banking system. Norges Bank, under the leadership of Governor Bomhoff, took immediate action to provide liquidity support. Credit was injected into the economy. Norges Bank soon had to take on the additional task of resolving speculative banks while at the same time protecting healthy banks from being caught in the undertow. Norges Bank was later praised for its approach.

“The spirit of the people”, said Wergeland, “demanded and created the bank … in the midst of hardship. It gave them the strength of the tired, who rouse themselves from their rest to soldier on and complete their task, and are rewarded by the sun’s benevolent smile.” 2 With the silver tax, many Norwegian citizens involuntarily became shareholders of Norges Bank. However, holding shares in the Bank proved to be a sound investment, for the shareholders and for the country. Confidence in the monetary system was painstakingly restored. The Bank also extended loans to private individuals. Acquaintances or loan sharks were no longer the only sources of credit. The foundations had been laid to enable the economy to grow and to lift living standards. In 1874, the stock of silver was exchanged for gold. The transition to a gold standard met little opposition. The proposed currency union with Denmark and Sweden, however, was difficult for many Norwegians to accept. Norway’s own currency was an important symbol. The general aversion to government officials, who had proposed the union, also weighed heavily in the debate. And under the proposal, the currency itself would be changed. People were used to counting in speciedaler, divided into 120 skilling. Although the decimal system of krone and øre was in fact far simpler, many people found it unnecessarily complicated. The proposal fell at the first vote in the Storting. One Norwegian who expressed pleasure at the apparent rescue of the speciedaler was cantor Olafsen from Romsdalen in the west of Norway.
We have witnessed a global trend of increasing food prices, which is yet to be normalized. Many food products surged in price during the exit from the pandemic. The persisting drought also has an adverse impact on production conditions and prices in this area. On the other hand, weight of food items in the global consumption basket and domestic food inflation may differ between countries. Hence, this increase in food prices can affect inflation at different rates in different countries. A cross-country comparison reveals that Turkey is among the countries in which the prices are the most adversely affected. In the table, we see that food inflation in August was considerably higher than the average of the last three years. Finally, I would like to talk about our foreign exchange reserves while evaluating our economy. The improvement in reserves is in line with our projections. Our reserves, which were USD 85-90 billion, increased by approximately USD 30 billion and exceeded USD 120 billion. Swap agreements, rediscount credits, gold ore purchases and arrangements in required reserves were the main factors contributing to this increase. Before concluding my speech, I would like to talk about the Central Bank’s views on the future of the normalization process. Although significant progress has been made in the struggle with the pandemic, virus variants have caused case numbers to rise again, which adds to uncertainty over the course of the pandemic. As you can see on the slide, many countries are now facing a new wave of infection.

Caleb M Fundanga: Integrity and professionalism in finance, industry and business Keynote speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the ACCA Professionalism and Ethics Event for Employers, Lusaka, 7 November 2007. *  *  *  • The Chairman • Mr Sundeep Takwani, ACCA Head of Ethics and Regulation – Professional Standards • Mr Chintu Mulendema, ZICA President • Senior Government Officials • Heads of Corporates • All protocols observed • Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen I am honoured to stand before you to discuss the matter of “integrity and professionalism in finance, industry and business”. I commend ACCA Zambia for organising this forum which allows us to discuss matters which have long been considered of primary importance in the financial sector. I am certain that the importance of this subject extends beyond the financial sector to all sectors of the economy. Mr Chairman, this event, the first in the series of ACCA professionalism and ethics events to be held in Zambia coincides with the launch of the ACCA new professional qualification, which will be first examined in December 2007. Named the ACCA qualification, it will build on the success of the current professional scheme, which has become the world’s fastestgrowing international accounting qualification.
But it is no stranger that we should revise our view of the future development of the repo rate than that we should revise our view of growth, employment or inflation when new information is received that changes the outlook. Nor is it stranger for the central bank to revise its forecasts than for other analysts to do so. What is important is that we can motivate why we are revising our views and that we can do so in an understandable manner. This is linked to the fact that it is difficult to make forecasts, not merely for interest rates, but also for other macro economic variables. The fact that it is difficult to make forecasts for the interest rate is illustrated clearly in the development of, for instance, forward rates over time. The figure (figure 1) shows implied forward rate curves calculated on the basis of bank papers from the middle of each quarter. Expectations of the development of the repo rate have varied substantially over time when measured in this way. During the years the interest rate has gradually been cut, expectations according to implied forward rates have substantially overestimated the level of the repo rate. After we began to raise the interest rate one and a half years ago, there has rather been a tendency for the repo rate path to be slightly underestimated. It can thus be noted that market agents have had difficulty in forecasting interest rate developments.

The fact that forecasters revise their assessments is not at all strange, as new information is received all the time. This indicates that as the conditions for the real economy change and new information is received the forecasts for the repo rate path need to be adjusted. There is nothing particularly dramatic about this. It applies to all market agents, to the major banks, to the Ministry of Finance and also to us at the Riksbank. The great uncertainty factor means that all forecasters should be humble, but this should not prevent them from making forecasts. I would therefore like to emphasise once again that the repo rate path we present in the Monetary Policy Report is a forecast and not a promise. The Riksbank cannot undertake, regardless of what  BIS Review 62/2007  3  happens in the economy, to follow the path published. The interest rate path is quite simply the best assessment we can make at a given point in time, given the information that is then available. New information may change the picture of the economy and then the Executive Board will have to rethink how we set the repo rate. The reason why we have chosen to publish our interest rate forecast despite the uncertainty over the future is largely because we believe this is the best way of explaining our thoughts on monetary policy. It also makes it easier for us to justify forecasts and interest rate decisions and to outline alternative scenarios for the repo rate.
Regarding the International Capital Standard, which aims to develop an international capital standard in order to be able to establish a comparable basis in terms of prudential requirements for all international groups, recent progress was made in Kuala Lumpur in November 2017 which should lead to, by the end of 2019, a version called “ICS 2.0” that will be used as a reference in international supervision Colleges, for a transitory period of five years. During this timeframe, each internationally active insurance group will have to ensure a compulsory and confidential five-year monitoring period based on the ICS, after which this standard is expected to become effective. Now, I will turn to IFRS17: it would be unreasonable to apply the new IFRS17 accounting framework right now. Given the obvious issue of timing, it is quite welcome that the IASB reopened the discussion and that the application of this standard has now been postponed by one year. This will primarily give us time to reach an agreement on identifying groups of loss-making contracts. We also want to bring the discussion on the 4  treatment of reinsurance contracts held to a satisfactory conclusion. At this point, there is too much room for interpretation in the standard, which could interfere with the comparability and consistent application across countries. In Europe, the current “hot topic” is the forthcoming Solvency 2 review. This review must include a full and objective assessment of the framework that has now been in place for three years.

The dilution of investment yields has reinforced risks for the industry such as a serious lapse risk if interest rates were to rise abruptly, financial losses for insurers who guarantee high technical rates compared to financial returns, or risks related to insufficient cost coverage. Among this quick review of the most salient characteristics of the environment in which insurers have been operating I would like to add that climate change risk has now become a reality and although insurers usually know how to deal with climate risks, including in extreme events, it is more than likely that further adjustments will be needed. Against this backdrop, French insurance companies have reacted in three main ways: lowering of paid interest rates in life insurance, development of alternative investment strategies  and  adaptation  of  their  traditional  business  model  including  an increased business diversification. As a result, for instance, unit-linked liabilities are increasing, and the profit-sharing payments for euro-denominated contracts are decreasing. However, I note that these payments remain significantly higher for mutual undertakings: they amounted to 2.3% last year while the French average is lower, and the reserves for deferred profit sharing have been strongly reinforced and amount to approximately 6% of mathematical reserves at YE 2017, which is 50% higher than the French average.
Behind the chair But before coming to any of those things, unbeknownst to you the prudentist has in fact used some of the Covid lockdown to check her own teeth and try out some new tools on herself before starting in on yours. I can assure you that if you employ hundreds of people whose main job is to identify the weak spots in institutions, then when you step back a take a good look at yourself it is not an easy process! Nonetheless, through a thorough check-up of the PRA we have identified some ways in which we think we can improve our work going forward, with an eye to being as effective and efficient as possible. Much of this is about internal improvements of the kind which will be familiar to many of you from your own change programmes, across areas such as flexible resourcing, organisational design, the consistency of operations across silos and how well we use data and 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  technology. But two areas may be of broader interest: the significant change we need to make as we take on a fuller rule-making role following Brexit; and an increased emphasis we intend to place on ease of exit. Ease of exit Starting with ease of exit, this is of course a very important thing to consider when you visit the dentist – just in case they turn out to be the kind of dentist who appears in Marathon Man.

Speeches 25 Aug 2022  Welcome Remarks at the HKIMR-ADB-BIS Joint Workshop on "Monetary Policy Spillovers" Edmond Lau, Deputy Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 1. Good morning, Mr Park (Chief Economist and Director General of the Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, Asian Development Bank (ADB)), Mr Zhang (Chief Representative for Asia and the Pacific, Bank for International Settlements (BIS)), ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this Workshop on monetary policy spillovers, jointly organised by the ADB, the BIS and the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research (HKIMR). We are honoured by the impressive list of panellists, discussants and speakers today, who will share their expertise on this timely and important topic. 2. Since early this year, central banks around the world have tightened monetary policy to fight raging inflation, with the US Federal Reserve (Fed) being particularly assertive as it tries to cool down the unwelcome rise in inflation and avoid inflation expectations from getting de-anchored. As global financial conditions tightened, financial markets rattled and many emerging market economies (EMEs) experienced capital outflows given their narrowing interest rate differentials against the US. The crux of the latest situation is, will such gyrations in asset prices and capital flows pose a threat to EMEs’ financial stability? 3. As far as emerging Asia (EM Asia) is concerned, the latest situation does not seem too bad.
But an equilibrium can be realised through careful design, taking into consideration an institution’s internal structures and behavioural norms. Needless to say, the accepted behaviour and values promoted and demonstrated by the senior leadership will influence the business culture and values throughout the organisation. Talking about cultures and values, we should also be mindful about the need to educate and instil into the new generation of bankers the importance of integrity, ethics and professionalism. For this reason, industry training institutes like the recently established Asian Institute of Chartered Bankers play a vital role in cultivating higher standards of governance, ethics and professionalism in the financial sector. The importance of the contributions by these institutions cannot be underestimated. After all, graduates starting off their careers in the financial sector will be the leaders and captains of the industry in years to come. Good governance ultimately depends on the existence of strong and competent boards and a pool of professional senior management. To remain effective, boards are often confronted with the challenge of achieving an optimal balance between the need for continuity and the need for fresh perspective. This brings into question the issue of board composition and membership, and how talent on boards should be continuously renewed. Because financial institutions are complex creatures, longer-serving individual directors can bring a depth of knowledge and experience into the business of the financial institutions, which would consequently strengthen the ability of the board to provide effective oversight. Such continuity also encourages a cohesive board.

Jörg Asmussen: The public and the private banking union Speech by Mr Jörg Asmussen, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the joint conference “The Single Resolution Mechanism and the Limits of BankRegulation”, Humboldt Universität/Financial Risk and Stability Net-work in Berlin, Berlin, 8 November 2013. *  *  *  Dear Mr Aehling [Veranstalter], Dear colleagues, Ladies and gentlemen, Intro The timing of today’s conference on “The Single Resolution Mechanism and the Limits of Bank-Regulation” could not have been better chosen as the SRM is the dominating theme in all European fora at the moment. Thank you for inviting me and I am happy to share a view on banking union from the European Central Bank with you. Banking union Looking back with the experience of the crisis, I think that many here today share the assessment that the key problem in the past was that there was too little cooperation and too much diversity – we lacked a coherent European approach to financial sector policies. But there is clearly scope for more cooperation today as, particularly after the experience of the crisis, preferences are more aligned in Europe. We all want banks that are well supervised and that can be resolved at minimum cost to the taxpayer. To achieve this, I think we need not reinvent the wheel. There are elements of the US approach that have worked and that we can usefully borrow in Europe.
But more importantly, it comes from my current position as a policymaker from a small, open economy where the collapse of three cross-border banks was the most noticeable event in the unfolding of the financial crisis that hit the country in 2008. The combined balance sheets of these banks was 10 times Iceland’s GDP, and their combined bankruptcy, measured in terms of balance sheets, ranks second in size in the international history of corporate failures, only after Lehman Brothers. And this happened in a country that ranks among the smallest in the world. I will use the case of these banks to illustrate current problems with cross-border banking more generally and as a yardstick against which to measure current reform proposals. Cross-border banking expanded significantly in the years prior to the financial crisis, as is witnessed, for instance, by the growth in cross-border banking claims measured by the BIS International Banking Statistics. Attending this growth was a steady build-up of cross-currency liquidity risk. Such risk can take two forms: currency mismatches and maturity mismatches between foreign currency assets and liabilities. To take an example, the euro area as a whole had a more or less balanced current account position. A fact that drew less attention before the crisis, however, was that European banks had built up huge USD-denominated balance sheets that had mismatches, especially in terms of maturity. This became a major problem when there was a run on dollar-denominated bank liabilities of non-US international banks post-Lehman.

The Financial Supervisory Authority was granted broad-based powers to intervene in failing institutions, and the Government was authorised to inject capital into new domestic banks. This so-called Emergency Act thus allowed new domestic banks to be created when the old cross-border banks failed and were placed in special resolution regimes followed by winding-up proceedings. The new banking system amounted to around 1.7 times GDP, compared to 10 for the old banking system. As a result of these measures, the domestic payment system functioned more or less seamlessly throughout, and customers had continuous access to their deposits. I have expanded at some length on the measures taken when the banks failed, as there are still a number of misconceptions about the process in international discussions. There have been claims that Iceland allowed its banking system to collapse, with what now seem reasonable results, and that others should consider doing the same. The fact is that Iceland kept the domestic part of the banking system running throughout; otherwise, the consequences would have been dire. Some have claimed that the banks were nationalised. They were not. The old banks are private companies. They are in winding-up proceedings governed by law; they are not under the control of the Government. The Government has a majority stake in only one of the new banks. Others have claimed that Iceland defaulted and got away with it. The opposite is true. The credit of the sovereign was preserved, and all debt obligations have been paid on time.