samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This enabled them to support mortgage and corporate lending growth to a slightly greater extent, as can be seen in the last two columns of Table 1, though these differences in lending outcomes are not statistically significant. Taken together, these international and UK results are striking. 13 Table 6, Basel report on “Early lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic on the Basel reforms”. 14 Record of the Financial Policy Committee - 13 December 2019 (bankofengland.co.uk) (pg. 4) 15 The UK CCyB rate is set with respect to banks’ UK credit exposures and therefore has a greater quantitative impact  when raised and reduced for banks with a high proportion of UK credit risk-weighted assets relative to total riskweighted assets. 16 The analysis was carried out by a team including Aakriti Mathur, Matthew Naylor, Aniruddha Rajan, Katie Low, and Damien Lynch. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  The fact that the release of the CCyB has such a positive effect globally, and to a degree in the UK, seems like good news. But recall that the CCyB is itself an extension of the Capital Conservation Buffer. So when we take a step back it suggests something less positive about the non-releasable Capital Conservation Buffer: it indicates that, to be treated as practically useable, regulatory capital buffers may first need to be released into management buffers; and suggests that, despite their purpose, non-releasable regulatory buffers such as the Capital Conservation Buffer may well be unusable in practice.

If we wish to shore up this resilience, we must proceed further with the design and application of reforms that tackle the main longterm challenges: productivity, a reduction in structural unemployment and tackling the consequences of population ageing. These are reforms whose positive effects can only fully crystallise following a lengthy period of time. This is precisely why it is desirable that we should set about them as soon as possible. Among the challenges outstanding, I would highlight that of population ageing, owing to its far-reaching consequences, the effects of which will make themselves felt in numerous areas. These include most notably, and primarily, the compatibility between the sustainability and sufficiency of the public pensions system, against the background of the progressive rise both in life expectancy and in the number of pensioners relative to current employees, but also other potentially adverse effects on productivity and the capacity to develop and adopt technological innovations. As we all know, reversing demographic trends is very difficult owing to various cultural, sociological and economic reasons; and, in any event, any policy along these lines requires  4  time to produce appreciable effects. Accordingly, without abandoning policies in the medium and long term that seek to alter or alleviate such adverse demographic trends, in the short term the means of tackling the situation involves growth in employment and productivity.
Imported inflationary pressures remain subdued; inflation in Albania’s trading partners and the rise in commodity prices are at low levels, while the exchange rate is stable. Inflation expectations and the liquidity situation in the economy are in line with the low inflation rates for the period ahead. Indirect available data on economic activity signal for positive growth rates in the first months of the year. Aggregate demand improved, driven by both private domestic and foreign demand, while the consolidating fiscal policy pursued during this period did not contribute to an increase in demand. Incoming data for June have not changed our assessment on the performance of private consumption and investments. While these important components of aggregate demand were upward during the period, their performance remains weak. Their steady recovery continues to be impeded by uncertainties faced by households and businesses and reflected in the greater risk aversion of the real and financial sectors of the economy. The Bank of Albania expects further improvement in private consumption and investments for the rest of the year, reflecting, among others, its easing monetary policy. The pace of recovery of these two indicators will determine the short and medium-term dynamics of the country’s development. Data on public sector performance show a consolidating fiscal policy over the first five months of the year. This policy materialised in a budget deficit of about 68% lower than the previous year. The tightening fiscal policy is evident both on the revenue and expenditure side.

Figure 3 CPI Inflation (*)  Core inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Dec. 2016 Report  Mar. 2017 Report  (*) The grey area, starting from the first quarter of 2017, corresponds to the forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. 6. Activity has been somewhat weaker than expected. According to recent data the output gap is currently larger than we anticipated in December. GDP grew by 1.6% in 2016, in line with what was anticipated. However, revised national account data suggests the economy was somewhat stronger towards the beginning of 2016 and weaker towards the end of the year, leaving a low starting point for 2017 and a higher base of comparison for the beginning of the year. The new data also point to weakness in investment-related areas and in sectors that tend to be more persistent, such as business services (Figure 4).
The possibility to improve productivity using economic policy, in addition to the basic contribution made by price stability and healthy government finances, is probably fairly small, as it is difficult, for instance, to govern how and when technological breakthroughs will occur. On the other hand, one can try to affect the conditions for good productivity growth, for instance by ensuring that competitive pressure is maintained in the economy and by conducting a good research and education policy. Labour supply growth Let us now leave productivity growth and move on to the other important component, the labour supply. Figure 3 shows the annual growth in the number of hours worked throughout the economy from 1981 onwards. As before, I have included an estimate of the long-term development. As can be seen, it is only weakly positive for the period as a whole. During the 1980s, the labour market was strong and we can see that the number of hours worked essentially grew during the whole period, up to the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. The fact that the crisis had a dramatic effect on the labour input in the economy is also clear. On average, developments then improved during the second half of the 1990s, but the positive trend has been broken in recent years. What lies behind this and what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the future development of the labour supply? One way of examining what has driven developments is to divide up the number of hours worked into different sub-components.

The number of newly-granted early retirements rose sharply from 1997 onwards. In recent years, this increase has been particularly large with regard to people under the age of 50.2 The percentage of those participating in the labour force has fallen from around 88 per cent at its highest point in 1990 to about 82 per cent today. The fact that such a high percentage of people of working age are outside the labour force will limit growth in the future and will contribute to further exacerbating the problem of an ageing population. Figure 6 shows both the percentage of employed actually working and the mean working time for people in work.3 As you can see from the Figure, developments in these factors also vary according to the economic cycle. During the boom at the end of the 1980s, the number of hours per person rocketed while the percentage of people in work declined, partly due to a growth in sick leave. Many studies have indicated that there is a link between total absence due to sickness and the situation in the labour market. When the situation in the labour market improves, absence due to sickness increases, and vice versa. However, this relationship does not seem to apply to long-term sick leave, which is the type of sick leave that has increased most in recent years. How to resolve this is another subject much debated at present.
This means that across a broad range of scenarios, our large-scale asset purchase program is likely to result in a lower federal debt-to-GDP ratio. To sum up, the better choice is for the Fed to pursue the policy that best achieves its mandated objectives and puts the U.S. government in a better fiscal position. This dominates a policy of fewer purchases simply so we can avoid potentially having to explain why our remittances may have fallen to zero for a short period. Issues associated with the normalization of monetary policy Finally, I’d like to talk about some of the other issues associated with the normalization of monetary policy. In general, I think it is premature to spend much time focusing on exit when we have not yet secured a sustainable economic recovery. That’s putting the cart before the horse in my opinion. That said, we nevertheless do need to understand the issues surrounding exit so that we can design the best monetary policy regime to achieve our objectives. On this topic, let me ease three concerns I hear frequently expressed. The first is that the large amount of excess reserves in the banking system will be “dry tinder” and fuel a rise in inflation. As I have mentioned repeatedly, the ability of the Federal Reserve to pay interest on excess reserves ensures that we can control the credit creation process and prevent an upsurge in inflation.

After the drop in the midstream of the crisis, unit labour costs in the region started to rise moderately until 2017-2018 when sharp rise was noticed, supported by the cyclical upturn, as well as the rise of wages in public sector and minimum wages in some of the countries. During 2011-2016, the overall growth of ULCs in the region averaged around 2%, while in 2017 and 2018 the y/y growth picked up to 5% - very close to the pre-crisis average growth. The sharp rise of the productivity adjusted wages should translate into higher core inflation. Yet, it only supported the disposable income and the rise in private consumption, while price pressures remained subdued. This disconnect between unit labour cost and inflation might indicate probable time lag between the two. Or “there might have been structural changes to the way firms incorporate costs into their pricing decisions that has affected the relationship between wage growth and inflation. If firms and workers expect low inflation going forward, for example due to the improved credibility of the central bank, firms may be reluctant to raise their prices even when faced with higher wage costs as they expect increases in costs to be only temporary. In such a situation, the pass-through of higher wages to prices would be muted due to lower expected persistence of cost and price changes.
This is no easy task even if there is every indication that they will continue to be low for the foreseeable future. We must remember, however, that history has also taught us how economic development can sometimes take unexpected twists and turns. Future challenges The global real interest rate continues to be low I have mentioned a few different possible reasons for the downward trend in the global real interest rate – demographic factors, lower growth and higher demand for safe assets. These factors will probably continue to exert an influence in the period ahead, with lower interest rates as a consequence. In such a case, this  8 See Hansen (1938). 9 See also Bernanke (2015) and Rogoff (2015) for additional arguments that can call the theory of secular  stagnation into question. 10 See Yi and Zhang (2016). 10 [23]  would also be in line with pricing on the Swedish financial markets. The market pricing of the overnight rate five years ahead is around 1 per cent, which indicates that the policy rate will continue to be low (see Figure 6). Market participants’ expectations of the policy rate as expressed in surveys indicate similar levels (see Figure 6). Figure 6.

The long-term distribution effects of reducing tax relief on interest expenditure are uncertain, as they also depend on how the government uses the budget funds made available, something we perhaps do not think about too often. The funds could be used to compensate the indebted households or even to increase public expenditure in other ways, for example through various reforms. From a socioeconomic perspective, a reform gradually reducing tax relief on interest expenditure would probably be beneficial. The distorting effect of tax relief, which benefits excessive indebtedness in society, would thereby cease. In summary, it could very well be beneficial to have lower indebtedness from a distribution perspective. The most important effect of lower indebtedness is, as I have pointed out several times before, reduced risks to the financial system. But, as well as this, mortgage borrowers’ disposable income and thereby their consumption may thus also become higher over the longer term. The Riksbank’s responsibility for financial stability needs to be clarified One of the primary tasks of the Riksbank is to “promote a safe and efficient payment system”, as it is expressed in the legislation. This means that the Riksbank is to conduct a policy for financial stability but no more exact definition is given. One controversial issue in this context is whether monetary policy should take consideration of the risk of a financial crisis.
The global financial crisis has tested both the ECB and the organization that I am privileged to serve, the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability role, my topic for today, was at the center of the response to the crisis in the United States. Because this was the worst financial crisis in the United States since our Great Depression, conditions within our national economy produced instability, which naturally provoked a reaction from the Federal Reserve. From my personal perspective, one of the most inspiring moments was when Chairman Bernanke spoke in February of 2009 at the National Press Club. There, he said “the Federal Reserve has done, and will continue to do, everything possible within the limits of its authority to assist in restoring our nation to financial stability and economic prosperity . . . .”1 No statement encapsulated the financial stability objective as succinctly and as clearly. In speaking here at the ECB, I would be remiss if I did not mention a substantially similar statement by ECB President Mario Draghi in July of 2012. President Draghi said that “[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”.2 Whenever I have referenced President Draghi’s “whatever it takes” statement, Antonio is quick to note that President Draghi, unlike Chairman Bernanke, appended a forecast to his version of “whatever it takes”. He assured everyone that “it will be enough”.

This is an implicit part of what Chairman Bernanke was communicating at the National Press Club – until financial stability could be restored, the ability to achieve the goals of maximum employment and price stability through the monetary transmission mechanism were beyond the Federal Reserve’s reach. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve used its monetary policy tools to lower the targeted Fed funds rate to zero. In addition, the Federal Reserve used its lender of last resort authorities in new and creative ways to restore financial stability to the U.S. economy. When the crisis in the United States abated in late 2009, following the successful introduction of stress testing, the Federal Reserve began to speak about terminating some of its emergency facilities. These facilities had been introduced during the “whatever it takes” era, and when the Federal Reserve was executing the delicate task of winding these facilities down, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) made clear that financial stability remained a key objective. For example, the Committee said in its release of December 16, 2009 that “[t]he Federal Reserve is prepared to modify these [wind down] plans if necessary to support financial stability and economic growth.”4 The legal basis for deriving implied powers from the penumbra of other express powers is best seen in Justice Douglas classic opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.5 In the Griswold case, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraception.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Enhancing interlinkages and opportunities – the role of Islamic finance Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Islamic Finance Conference "Islamic Finance in Southeast Asia: Local Practices, Global Impact"; Georgetown University, Washington DC, 18 October 2007. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to be here in Washington D.C. to speak at this important conference which has brought together policymakers, market practitioners, members of the academia and the business community to discuss the new opportunities in Islamic finance and its role in enhancing international financial linkages. It is exactly five years ago, when I spoke on this very subject of Islamic Finance at the First International Islamic Finance Conference that was held in Washington D.C. in 2002. The issues discussed at that time were on the challenges faced in developing an efficient and robust Islamic financial system. Five years hence, the Islamic financial system has evolved significantly to become a dynamic and competitive form of financial intermediation in the global financial system. This transformation has been achieved in an increasingly challenging environment. My remarks today will focus on this transformation that has taken place in these five years in both the national and international Islamic financial system.

These bills were bought by the Bank and stored in its vaults, in what became known as the “cold storage” scheme.5 By freeing the banks’ balance sheets in this way, the cold storage scheme was intended to stimulate credit. It was only a limited success, with the banks still fearful about making new loans because of the rising risk of default by overseas borrowers. In response, the government announced an extension to the scheme, with the government effectively insuring the banks against the credit risk on these assets too. It worked. Within a couple of months, money market conditions had stabilised and credit was once more flowing. Cunliffe’s cold storage plan had averted a credit crisis. The cold storage scheme was a piece of clever financial engineering by the Bank, designed to support credit and the wider economy. In the past few years, with credit growth and the economy weak, the Bank has been in the vanguard of creating new pieces of machinery to serve a similar end. In 2008, the Bank introduced a Special Liquidity Scheme, or SLS, to help finance UK banks’ legacy asset portfolio. Over £ billion of support was provided to the banks and has since been repaid.6 The SLS bears more than a passing resemblance to the first phase of the cold storage scheme. In June this year, the Bank announced a second scheme, the Funding for Lending Scheme, or FLS.
I think you can all imagine how complicated it could be to achieve anything like “a clear line of command” when there is a multitude of countries – and perhaps several authorities in each of these countries – involved in the decision-making. Then there is no longer merely the financial supervisory authority, the finance ministry and the central bank in one country that have to be involved, but all of these authorities in several countries. If there are no prior agreements on the division of responsibilities between the national central banks and the other relevant crisis management authorities, and on how to coordinate decisions in the case of a crisis, there is great risk that any attempt to manage the crisis will fail miserably. Language differences and different legal structures can often reinforce the problems. On top of this, there is a clear cross-border mutual dependence, which means that no single country’s authorities are entirely sovereign in implementing a solution to the crisis without the risk of significant repercussions in other countries. Recently, there have been a number of initiatives, regionally as well as on a European level, to enhance coordination. For example, a number of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) have been worked out and agreed, either bilaterally or multilaterally, and more MoUs are underway. These MoUs detail a number of principles and practical issues regarding the cooperation, the exchange of information and assessments between authorities and certain issues concerning the delineation of responsibilities.

The enhanced and robust competition in the marketplace would lead to greater consumer benefits in terms of improved business efficiency, product development and service quality. It is envisioned that the achievement of these imperatives will ensure that the Malaysian takaful industry is well-positioned to successfully make the transition from being "good-to-great" and, InsyaAllah, will remain as the global leader for takaful and retakaful. Ladies and Gentlemen, The overarching objective of our regulatory policies is to ensure that the financial system is in a position to serve the public with the best range and quality of products and services, that the interest of the consumer is at all times protected, and that best practices are adopted to ensure the soundness and stability of the system. It must be emphasised, however, that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring this rests on the players in the financial system, in particular, the Senior Management and the Board of Directors. This is particularly important to ensure public confidence in the efficiency and performance of the financial system to contribute to the overall development of the economy. The initiative formulated for the takaful industry in strengthening competition through the creation of new takaful players, is aimed at achieving this overarching objective. The presence of players with the right qualities and calibre in the marketplace is part of the process of ensuring product innovation and service excellence.