samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 62/2002  5  The change in our conduct of monetary policy has also been cautious and incremental. We have progressively become more explicit in stating our assessments and intentions. We now publish MAS’ assessments of the state of health of the economy in the Macroeconomic Review, and the factors considered in each policy review through the Monetary Policy Statement. We even publish a chart showing the movements in the trade-weighted index, although not our policy band or the trade-weights themselves. Enterprising analysts have tried to divine the trade-weights of MAS’ basket of currencies from the graph, not totally unsuccessfully. This enhanced disclosure has made our monetary policy more effective. Despite the more volatile external environment and the liberalisation of the use of the Singapore dollar, there has been less need for MAS to intervene in the markets to manage the exchange rate within our policy band. Greater market understanding of MAS’ thinking, underpinned by sound and credible policies that are in line with economic fundamentals, have contributed to continued confidence in the Singapore dollar. The best defence against speculative attacks remains Singapore’s sound economic fundamentals and a credible exchange rate policy. MAS works with the other economic agencies to manage and preserve these economic fundamentals. Our role is to provide in-depth assessments of economic developments and short and medium-term economic outlooks.

It is not MAS’ role to front all investor education – this is where industry bodies and consumer groups come in. However, MAS will need to act as a catalyst to increase the focus on investor education in the financial sector. MAS can set out clear directions for industry, do more to explain its own market conduct regulation to investors and consumers, work with industry and other partners to co-ordinate current education efforts and, where relevant, co-fund with industry new investor education initiatives. Focusing and targeting our development efforts Fifth, we need to focus and target our development efforts. Despite the adverse environment, there are still opportunities for Singapore. The Financial Services Working Group (FSWG) set up at the beginning of the year has identified three promising areas: wealth management, universal processing centres and an Asia Risk Exchange. In identifying wealth management, the Working Group has reaffirmed a key thrust of our developmental efforts. It has gone on to single out alternative assets, such as private equity and hedge funds, as areas for development. Universal processing centres and the Asia Risk Exchange will be two new fields for Singapore, where Singapore’s efficiency, technology and infrastructure will be important strengths. For universal processing centres we need to consolidate global transactional flows into Singapore. The Asia Risk Exchange will combine Singapore’s existing insurance and capital market expertise into a new physical vehicle for the transfer of large and sophisticated risks.
However, in the case of the Riksbank, the differences between the minority and the majority have been so great and so persistent that it has become evident that they are not merely temporary differences in, for instance, the assessment of economic developments. It rather seems to be a case of more profound differences in the ways of regarding monetary policy and what it can achieve. This need not necessarily be a problem, either. But it does require, at least, that a thorough analysis is made of the differences and that one attempts to evaluate, as far as possible, both points of view. The arguments in favour of a higher policy rate So how has the policy conducted by the Riksbank in recent years been justified? Why hasn’t the Executive Board wanted to conduct the more expansionary policy advocated by the  1  See, for example, Calmfors (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  minority? Such a policy would have had better target attainment in terms of inflation and unemployment, with higher inflation closer to the target and lower unemployment closer to a long-run sustainable rate. My view is that the arguments have not been particularly clear, at least earlier on, and that the stated motives have varied.2 Recently, however, the arguments appear to have converged somewhat.

2/5  I say they are all stakeholders because, when it comes to this planet, everybody living on it is a stakeholder. I believe this is groundbreaking because, when an issue is as global as this one, there is a tendency to go precisely in the other direction. It is too easy to dilute personal and corporate responsibilities, find excuses and carry on without changing anything substantial. The message we are receiving is that this is not the time to look for excuses. The writing is on the wall: it is time for action. Of course, whatever a person, a municipality, a region or even a country can do to combat fight global climate change is quite futile if the rest of the world stays the same. But the message today should be that each of us must do our bit, large or small, without looking at what others might or might not be doing. I am here today, precisely, to talk about doing “our bit”. The contribution that the financial sector can make to this global struggle is no silver bullet, but it is an important one. It is clear that finance is not regarded as a polluting sector. That, at least, is a positive development in these difficult times for banks´ reputation. Traditionally, the companies dependent on oil products have been those most affected by the environmental regulations resulting from international agreements. In fact, we should admit that the financial sector’s involvement in this battle has been rather limited.
In response to announcements by jurisdictions in the region of blanket government guarantee on deposits, the Singapore Government announced on 16 October 2008 a guarantee on deposits of individuals and non-bank customers of banks licensed in Singapore. This was aimed at ensuring a level international playing field for banks in Singapore and demonstrated the Government’s confidence in the soundness of the financial system. It has also had the effect of maintaining the confidence of investors and depositors in our banking system. State of the financial System The measures taken around the three pillars of maintaining sound financial institutions, ensuring well functioning markets and maintaining confidence of investors, as well as the way in which institutions and market players responded to the crisis, have helped our financial sector weather the crisis. A healthy and functioning financial system has continued to support credit and capital intermediation to the economy. Compared to the Asian Financial Crisis, the moderation in bank lending has been milder. While credit conditions have tightened, there has not been disruption of credit flows to corporates. A total of $ billion 2 was raised by SGX listed companies in the first half of 2009, which accounted for 65% of  2  2  Source: SGX & Thomson Reuters. BIS Review 91/2009  total rights offerings in Asia in this period. More than 7,300 Government-backed loans amounting to $ billion have since been approved in the first half of 2009.

Together with NUS, we will engage internationally renowned academics to lead and conduct research in Singapore in the areas of finance, international economics, monetary economics or public finance. Economic outlook Finally, on the economic outlook. More recent data, including the advanced estimates released by MTI, showed that the Singapore economy had rebounded strongly in the second quarter. This recovery has to be seen in the context of the sharp retraction in economic activity which took place during Q4 2008 and Q1 2009. As such, businesses have started to rebuild inventories to levels that are more sustainable and consistent with underlying demand, which has stabilized somewhat amidst easing financial conditions. In the domestic financial sector, several areas of activities posted gains in the second quarter. Improved sentiment has buoyed stock market turnover, while the latest figures for May showed that domestic non-bank loans remained firm. Nevertheless, much still depends on the strength of final demand in the G3. Given that there remain stresses in the global financial system and job markets in the major economies continue to weaken, the domestic economy is likely to witness slow and uneven growth, rather than sharp and decisive recovery. For the economy as a whole, MTI has revised the official growth forecast for 2009 to between -6% and -4%. In tandem with the weak demand and easing domestic costs, consumer price increases are expected to be muted. For the whole of 2009, CPI inflation is now expected to come in between -0.5% and 0.5%.
The tax and transfer fee incentives pertaining to purchase of real estate expired at the end of 2003 has helped encourage consumers to take up mortgage, adding extra boost to its growth. BIS Review 22/2004  1  As for the credit card segment, in addition to the factors cited above, some relaxed subscription conditions during the economic slump and early stage of recovery have contributed to high growth of credits in this segment. Findings from studies on the financial services in the banking sector Now, allow me to move on to the assessment of the services provided by the banking sector - what our customers have to say about their needs - what our customers really want. The assessments are based on the studies and surveys commissioned by the Bank of Thailand as part of the formulation of the Financial Sector Master Plan. In order to move forward, we need to have a clear grasp of what is needed and missing in the financial sector, and we found that the following issues are key: •  financial service availability;  •  consumers’ preference of channel of service distribution;  •  expectations on financial services; and  •  factors driving them away from using bank financial services. Quantitative and qualitative gaps in both credit to personal sector and small enterprise sector Quantitative gap: individual customer group Allow me to elaborate a little further on these findings. Financing facility is the most dissatisfied aspect in terms of financial services provided by financial institutions.

This in turn enables banks to differentiate good debtors from more risky ones, and charge them commensurate to their risk profiles. In view of bank oversight, the Bank of Thailand has reoriented its focus on supervisory framework away from solo-basis transaction-testing analysis, towards risk-based supervision on consolidated basis. To fulfill this objective, we have already issued guidelines on all key risk categories and undertaken internal reform and capacity building to meet the challenge posed by comprehensive risk-based supervision. An example in this area is the development of examiners’ manuals that are regularly revised to ensure consistently high standards of supervision. 4. Going forward  Ladies and gentlemen, in the next few years, Thailand anticipates both opportunities and threats in the retail banking sector for existing banks in the light of the implementation of the Financial Sector Master Plan. As regards the focus of regulators, more attention will be given to watchful monitoring of the use of credit cards, monitoring of non-bank credit institutions, and observance of governance by market participants. The changing landscape of financial system to be brought about by the Financial Sector Master Plan will create opportunities for present market participants that have the courage to explore the niche and capability to satisfy the specialized needs of this group of customers. They come in the form of a new type of bank license - retail bank and other incentives. The tier1 capital requirement of 250 million baht for retail banks will be conducive to their specialized lending to retail customers.
6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  6  losses on the swings of increased working hours more than made up for on the roundabouts of reduced time spent commuting. The second potentially potent effect, brought out in today’s study, is improved worker empowerment. This could arise in part from the increased flex home-working gives us, with our working days now tailored more to our personal needs and less to organisational requirements. It might also reflect on increased ability to “be ourselves” at work, when work is at home – the pyjamas, the unkempt hair, the Bermuda shorts - none of which, I hasten to add, I am sporting today. Well-being studies suggest these agency and empowerment effects are important for well-being. For example, studies have found that working from home is positively associated with perceived autonomy and this, in turn, has positive spillover effects to our job satisfaction and levels of stress.19 Both boost workplace productivity over the medium term. If home-working is broadly neutral in its impact on our economic contribution, but positive for our welfare, this suggests it is win-win, or at worst draw-win. The Covid crisis may inadvertently have fast-forwarded us to a better-way-of-working, perhaps even back-to-a-future where most work takes place in and around the house rather than in an office or factory, as was the case prior to the Industrial Revolution. I would hesitate before jumping to that conclusion.

Many people have travelled to the UK and Ireland in particular, and the barriers to inward labour migration may be greater in the Norwegian labour market than in the British and Irish labour markets. Activity is edging up in the central European countries. Therefore, there is uncertainty about how large the supply of labour will be from these countries in the future. There is also considerable inward labour migration from other Nordic countries, but measured in terms of number of persons, the supply of labour from these countries has not changed substantially in recent years. Swedish nationals have comprised the bulk of the supply of labour from the Nordic countries. In view of the tightening taking place in the Swedish labour market, there may be reason to expect a reduction in the supply of labour from Sweden. The supply of labour is also affected by developments in persons on disability benefit and sickness absence. The trend in sickness absence has reversed, and is now rising, and the number of persons on disability benefit continues to show a steady increase. Consumer price inflation has edged up, but is still very low even 2½ years after the cyclical change. The year-on-year rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 2.7 per cent in April. Price impulses from consumer goods imported to Norway have been negative virtually every year since the mid-1990s. This is due to international trade liberalisation and a shift towards imports from low-cost countries.
Looking at Sweden, I think it is quite clear that the introduction of inflation targeting in connection with the crisis in the early 1990s was one of the most important reasons why the Swedish economy has developed so well since then. However, financial crises can also arise in environments with low and stable inflation. Nominal GDP target scarcely better Can one say that inflation targeting has been an obstacle to the recovery, and in that case are there other ways of conducting monetary policy that might succeed better? Here one can begin by noting that, in general, inflation-targeting countries appear to have managed the crisis better than countries without inflation targets.12 The central banks with inflation targets acted more powerfully, inflation expectations in inflation-targeting countries were better anchored and the risk of deflation was lower. Nevertheless, the slow recovery in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States has started a discussion as to whether alternatives to inflation targeting would be better. One suggestion that has gained supporters is to replace the inflation target with a target for nominal GDP.13 The main discussion recently has concerned introducing a policy  9  See Reichlin and Baldwin (2013) for a compilation of a number of economists’ views on inflation targeting and its future. 10  See, for example, Bini Smaghi (2013). 11  See Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999). 12  See De Carvalho Filho (2011). 13  See, for example, Frankel (2012).

Other shocks, such as changes in energy prices and other so-called supply shocks have thus reasonably been relatively more important for developments in inflation. The flatter Phillips curve also means that the central bank must influence demand more than previously to achieve a given change in inflation. This means that if the central bank reacts in the same way as before to supply shocks that cause inflation to deviate from the target, the fluctuations in economic activity will be greater. Say, for instance, that the central bank has been used to subduing a particular part of an upturn in energy prices. A flatter Phillips curve would mean that demand has to be dampened more than before to prevent inflation rising. Over time this would entail greater fluctuations in economic activity. This could be perceived as an undesirable effect and gradually give rise to dissatisfaction with the central bank’s policy. Ultimately, this could also mean that the independence is  5  See, for example, Krugman (2013). 6  See, for example, IMF (2013) or Wolf (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  brought into question. One possibility would thus be for the central bank to try to become slightly more “flexible” than before in this situation and to react somewhat less aggressively to supply shocks – and thereby try to find an economically more acceptable combination of fluctuations in inflation and fluctuations in economic activity. If inflation expectations are securely anchored, there should be scope for this.
The proportion in favour of Sweden participating from the start in 1999 was as high as 46 per cent, while 13 per cent wanted to wait and see and 33 per cent did not voice an opinion about participation. Many of the interested parties are for EMU: the Federation of Swedish Industries, the Retail Federation, the Bankers' Association, the Confederation of Professional Associations and the Employers' Confederation, to mention just a few. In general it seems that the discussion of EMU has spread from the financial sector to companies, authorities and large organisations but has not yet reached the man in the street. The time ought now have come for us all to consider the matter. How does EMU affect retail trade? The details of how EMU will affect retailing in Europe are not yet clear. We do not even know which countries will make up the euro area from the start. Still, I shall try to present some general features. EMU is intended to strengthen and deepen European integration and promote the mobility of capital, goods and services. In time, therefore, a single currency is likely to make retailing more efficient and cheaper. Inside the area, prices will be more transparent and there will be no exchange risk. Decreased costs for currency exchange and hedging suggest that in time retailing will benefit from EMU, an opinion I share with the Wholesale & Retail Research Institute. In the short run, however, the union involves retail trade in a great deal of work.

All those concerned must of course also solve any problems they encounter as a consequence of EMU. For the Riksbank, a highly important task in Sweden's preparations is information about and consultations with the financial sector on matters to do with the changeover. To this end we have formed a consultative group (SIFS) and five sub-groups to work on the practical preparations together with the financial sector. This collaboration has led us to conclude that the financial sector can cope with a changeover to euro on 1st January 1999. We also consider that in some respects joining later would make the preparations more difficult. The worst alternative would be a long period of uncertainty about our participation, what we usually call a "soft no". Costly double systems would then be required in several areas. We have also observed concern in the financial sector that staying outside the euro area would entail increased costs, competitive disadvantages and risk various forms of discrimination. "Wait-and-see" may be less attractive A common opinion at present seems to be that a soft no is not unlikely and would not involve appreciably higher economic costs than participation from the start. Deferring participation for some years would not exclude us from the euro area for good. In our cooperation with the financial sector, however, we have seen that uncertainty about participation is causing many financial agents to make preparations for handling euro as well as kronor.
We have seen an unusual pattern emerge here over recent years. Jobs growth has been strong, with over 2 million new jobs created since the end of 2012. But pay growth has remained weak by historic standards, averaging around 2% annually. This pattern has been replicated across a number of other advanced economies. As we reach the anniversary of what has become a “lost decade” for inflation-adjusted pay in the UK, it is a good time to take stock. What explains this puzzling pattern of rich jobs but poor pay growth? Some of the reasons for weak pay have been cyclical. The financial crisis caused large job losses. A significant pool of unemployed workers emerged and job insecurities rose, depressing pay growth. Recently, the UK’s economic recovery has shrunk the pool of unemployed workers and reduced somewhat job insecurity. Had these cyclical factors been the only ones at work, we might have expected a stronger recovery in pay. The reason we have not is because longer-term, structural forces have also been holding back pay growth, notably weak productivity. Over the medium-term, productivity is the single most important determinant of the national income pie. Productivity growth pays for pay rises, at individual firms and for the economy as a whole. Over the past ten years, productivity has barely grown in the UK. That second “lost decade” goes a long way towards explaining the lost decade in pay. Productivity is not, however, the only structural factor at work in the labour market.

And, on the price front, they note that the disinflationary pressures of 2009 and 2010 have given way to inflation rates closer to what I and the majority of Fed policymakers see as the Fed’s objective of 2%. These considerations lead many to say that when adding up the costs and benefits of further accommodation, the risk of over-shooting our inflation objective through further policy accommodation exceeds the potential benefits of speeding the improvement in labor markets. I would argue that this view is extremely, and inappropriately, asymmetric in its weighting of the Fed’s dual objectives to support maximum employment and price stability. Suppose we faced a very different economic environment: Imagine that inflation was running at 5% against our inflation objective of 2%. Is there a doubt that any central banker worth their salt would be reacting strongly to fight this high inflation rate? No, there isn’t any doubt. They would be acting as if their hair was on fire. We should be similarly energized about improving conditions in the labor market. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Act charges us with maintaining monetary and financial conditions that support maximum employment and price stability. This is referred to as the Fed’s dual mandate and it has the force of law behind it. The most reasonable interpretation of our maximum employment objective is an unemployment rate near its natural rate, and a fairly conservative estimate of that natural rate is 6%.