samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Four times a year the Riksbank produces a so-called inflation report. This is a detailed account of the state of the Swedish economy, which leads to an assessment of inflation in the coming two years. These assessments are based on the development of GDP, investments, consumption, public expenditure, the central government budget balance, foreign trade and various prices. The forecast horizon is adapted to the time period that “the Riksbank’s weapon”, the so-called repo rate, has an effect on the economy. 3. The morning after the Executive Board has made an interest rate decision, which normally takes place 6-8 times a year, the decision is published with a motivation in a press release. The Governor of the Riksbank, the Executive Board member responsible for preparing the monetary policy decisions and some of the Bank’s economists also take part in a press conference and answer questions when decisions have been made to change interest rates or when the so-called inflation report is published. 4. A few weeks after the Executive Board has had a monetary policy meeting, minutes are published from the Executive Board meeting where the submissions made by the different Board members are presented anonymously but where any reservations against the inflation report and/or majority decisions on the interest rate are reported stating names. The Riksbank, together with the Bank of England, has a distinctive position among central banks with regard to openness. In this respect the Bank of England has shown the way for the Riksbank.

The Riksbank in a democracy When Sweden became a member of the European Union and the Government signed the so-called Maastricht Treaty, this entailed, among other things, acceptance of the requirement that the Riksbank was to have an independent position in relation to the Government and the Riksdag. However, many regarded it as a controversial demand, not least in the Swedish trade union movement and within social democracy. It is hardly surprising that there were strong reactions in many places as an independent central bank is a quite new and unfamiliar element in Swedish public administration. It meant that the conduct of monetary policy should be delegated to an authority that was only restricted by legislation. This procedure can be most closely compared with the independent interpretation of laws by the courts. 1  BIS Review 44/2000  However, on closer inspection of the content of the new law and the practice established since then, it can probably be said that the reactions and concerns were exaggerated. Mention is often made in general discussion of, for instance, “the independence of the Riksbank”, which may call to mind an organisation that can carry out its policy wholly without control and parliamentary supervision. In fact, in my view, what is involved is rather more a sensible arrangement, where the objective of monetary policy, stable prices, has been established by law.
Zdeněk Tůma: Consolidation before expansion Summary of a speech by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, for the conference on "Modernising Germany - Gaining Competitiveness for Europe", Berlin, 1 June 2006. *  *  *  Do we really face the dilemma of choosing between consolidation and expansion? We should look at the integration process from both the political and economic perspectives. From the economic point of view, deepening and enlarging are both primarily spontaneous processes, but this does not necessarily hold for the political aspect. Unfortunately, these two perspectives are often confused, which can lead to misleading conclusions. Let me consider the economic perspective first. As a recent EU newcomer I can confirm that we observed spontaneous integration with the EU well before the timing of our accession had even been mentioned. Therefore, I do not expect the expansion of the EU to end just because there is a lack of political will for enlargement. Market forces will keep the surrounding countries “in the game”. The political and institutional framework can encourage or discourage this process, but it can hardly stop it. On similar ground, the deepening of the already integrated area is quite spontaneous from the economic point of view. For instance, we are seeing dynamic integration of the financial architecture and a growing number of cross-border mergers in both the financial and non-financial sectors. Here, too, an appropriate institutional framework would help, but the consolidation process is going on even without it.

10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the case of supply curve C, there is no intersection between the RSS and the demand curve. We then face a decision about where to allocate. To date, we have chosen to allocate at the bid closest to the RSS, rather than allocating at the intersection of the RSS and the discontinuity in the demand schedule. There are pros and cons to that approach. For example, the current practice lacks transparency in that counterparties can observe significant variance in the auction clearing spreads, and might take false signals about the RSS as a result. Set against that, allocating at the RSS could mean providing liquidity to counterparties at a rate lower than any of the bids in the auction. Review to date Following their launch in June 2010, the Bank is reviewing how the ILTRs have functioned (Table 3 provides the key auction statistics to date). That work is still going on, but so far the operations have worked well. A few key points of interest are:   Participation levels have been lower than in the extended-collateral LTRs at the peak of the crisis, but broadly in line with the long-run/pre-crisis average.   Although the sample is small, the 6 month auctions appear to have generated greater demand relative to the amount on offer (higher cover) than the 3 month operations. Anecdote from counterparties suggests that reflects the attractiveness of securing longer-term liquidity and the relative scarcity of market sources of 6-month funding.
It's hard now to imagine that we had no formal banking supervision at all in this country until about twenty years ago. But for the most part such regulation today does not tell us what we can and cannot do, rather it sets the criteria that we must meet, and the behavioural standards we are expected to observe, in doing whatever it is that we choose to do. It leaves much more room for both consumer and producer choice, including producers from overseas, and much more room, and more incentive, therefore for competition and innovation. And, in that less prescriptive, more permissive, environment, the new technologies have brought about massive changes in traded instruments, in the way in which markets operate and are organised and in payments, settlements and delivery arrangements and so on, which, while not without occasional problems, have overwhelmingly on balance brought massive benefits in terms of market efficiency. In reflecting on this whole process in the UK, there are a number of characteristics of the general approach that I think have been important. The first relates to the extent to which it was market-driven. No attempt was made as far as I am aware - certainly not by the Bank - to tell market players what they should do individually or in organising themselves collectively.

Of course we followed what they were getting up to very closely, and always stood ready to help when we were called upon by the markets to do so, as we occasionally were, intervening on our own initiative only to ensure that the public interest was properly respected. For the most part we took the view that market participants know better than we do what will work and what won't; it is after all their salaries if not their jobs that are on the line. Where public policy issues were involved, we established a tradition of extensive consultation right across the relevant sections of the market - a tradition which the FSA has certainly maintained. In the UK's relatively well-developed markets - particularly the wholesale markets - we recognised early on that where intervention was judged to be necessary - in the interest of market transparency or of prudential or behavioural conduct for example - it needed to be informed by those who properly understood the subtleties of the market if we were to reduce the risk of unforeseen consequences which could either frustrate the purpose of the intervention or unnecessarily obstruct market innovation. In some instances this approach, which I suppose might be described as market-sensitive, involved encouraging the market itself to address the particular issue in question as a preferable alternative to official action.
Some conclusions Now back to Lars Göran's question: Does globalisation have anything to do with the closing of the ATM? Yes and no. In a dynamic economy with rapid growth, the production of goods and services is constantly changing. There is cost cutting, restructuring, closures, innovations and new production starting up all the time. When an ATM gives rise to more costs than it brings in income, it is closed down and bank services have to be handled in a different way, sometimes at higher costs to the customers, but always at lower costs to the bank. These are the conditions in a market economy. Globalisation speeds up the process by increasing competitive pressure. The closing down of the ATM may occur sooner than it would have otherwise. But the tougher competitive pressure provides us with other services, e.g. we can sit at our desks at home and pay our bills via the Internet as well as making transfers between wages accounts and bank loans. And we can pay by card. The ATM becomes less important. Globalisation speeds up the process in the changes in production and consumption patterns in a competitive market economy. This probably cannot be avoided and if we are careful, it can be turned to our advantage, as has been demonstrated in recent years. And we Swedes have shown that we can quickly adopt technological innovations, such as computers, mobile phones and IT. Let me finish with a few reflections.

I have pointed out the advantages of free movement of capital, but also the instability that has followed in the footsteps of deregulation and the crises that have occurred since the early 1990s. The free movement of capital makes great demands on the countries' economic policy. If it turns out that the crises increase in number and become more profound, the demands for a return to regulation will strengthen. There are already demands for this, which are put forward in various international forums. History shows that periods of liberalisation have been followed by periods  BIS Review 9/2002  5  of regulation. It is possible that the regulatory frameworks on which the international organisations are currently working will stabilise the foreign exchange markets, but it is also possible that some form of "Tobin tax" will win political support. The story isn't finished yet. 6  BIS Review 9/2002
15  Additionally, some segments in the non-bank financial sector exhibit high levels of vulnerability, similar in fact to those witnessed before the crisis. The search for yield may have also fostered an increase in leverage among relatively risky firms. For example, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase at the global level in the volume of lowerrated investment-grade corporate bonds and in the issuance of leverage loans, many of which are distributed in the form of CLOs. Macroprudential policies are well-equipped to deal with some of these risks. Indeed, the evidence suggests that these policies have been effective in curving financial stability risks. However, most of the existing tools in this area apply only to banks. In a world in which the share of non-banks is increasing, we need to develop new macroprudential tools that can be used to prevent the build-up of systemic risks outside the perimeter of the banking sector. Conclusions  Let me conclude. We seem to be in a new economic context characterised by older and declining populations, radical technological innovations (but not necessarily much higher productivity growth), high debt and low interest rates. All this entails substantial challenges both for macroeconomic policies and for the financial sector. Central banks will need to redefine not only their strategy but also the toolbox to be used when the constraints on their interest rate policy become binding.

The acceleration of the nation's migration to the more efficient electronic payments continues to be an important agenda of the Central Bank. Complementing institution building has also included the support given to the development of talent in the financial services industry. The growth of the financial sector cannot be achieved without adequate attention to the development of the professional requirements of the financial services industry. In the recent two decades, a comprehensive Islamic financial system has also evolved in Malaysia, including the institutions, markets and supporting legal, regulatory and supervisory framework. The Islamic financial system now offers the full breadth and depth of Islamic financial services. Malaysia is the host to the secretariat for the Islamic Financial Services Board in Kuala Lumpur that sets the international regulatory and supervisory standards in Islamic finance. Financial market development has also been central to building a robust financial system. The Central Bank's efforts in this direction have included establishing the institutions and the infrastructure to improve market efficiency of money, capital and foreign exchange markets. The Securities Commission, the domestic rating agencies, Cagamas and the Cooperative Commission were among the initiatives initiated by the Bank. The development of a robust and vibrant foreign exchange market still remains an outstanding area of development. As a highly open economy, this market is a vital part of our financial system. The country exited from the Currency Board system in 1967 and introduced the ringgit (known as the Malaysian dollar then). The changeover was successful.
Central banks had to react to unforeseen developments with very little recent historical experience to guide their decisions. Overall, the response to the crisis was largely a “learning-by-doing” process. With hindsight, however, there appears to be an underlying logic to all these interventions. First, after the bursting of the credit bubble, all advanced economies entered a phase of deleveraging, in an attempt to reverse and absorb the excesses of the pre-crisis period. Deleveraging, which is basically a balance sheet contraction, has affected almost all sectors in our economies: banks, obviously, households (in the United States and United Kingdom) and, now, governments. Deleveraging is unavoidable and necessary. Both borrowers and lenders need to re-establish sustainable debt positions in order to restart credit and restore the normal financing of the economy in the long run. But deleveraging creates huge difficulties in the short run. It may be extremely deflationary as it involves both a contraction in credit and money and an increase in savings rates. To some extent, central banks have counteracted this development. By expanding their balance sheets, they increased their leverage when other economic agents (with the exception of large corporates) were all deleveraging simultaneously. Second, the uncertainty created by the crisis has led to an increase in the demand for safe and liquid assets. At the same time, the supply of these assets has been significantly reduced, especially in Europe, since credit risk has appeared on government debt.

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Pillar 2 recognises that national supervisors may have different ways of entering into such discussions and provides flexibility to accommodate those differences. At the same time, Pillar 2 will ensure that supervisors share insight  2  BIS Review 42/2003  into their approaches with others and will foster a better understanding among supervisors and bankers about the differences in national regulatory practices. Over time, discussions among supervisors will undoubtedly improve our understanding of each other’s processes and promote information sharing and cooperation among regulatory agencies. Consequently, Pillar 2 should help us to reduce the supervisory burden on globally active banking organisations and foster more consistent supervisory approaches and practices across national borders. This corresponds directly to the mandate of the Committee’s Accord Implementation Group, or “AIG”. The AIG was set up at the end of 2001 under the Chairmanship of Nick Le Pan of the Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, and Vice-Chair of the Committee. The group comprises high-level supervisors from member countries, who share planned approaches to implementation. The intention is that this exchange of information should enhance the consistent application of the New Accord and thereby promote a level playing field - which we all agree is an important objective. In this sense, the AIG has a practical focus, while policy issues remain the responsibility of the Committee itself. Home / host implementation issues on a world-wide basis. This brings me to the second topic on my list, which is home/host implementation issues.

Ardian Fullani: Agreement between the Bank of Albania and the Competition Authority Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, Tirana, 17 July 2007. *  *  *  Dear participants, I am pleased to have concluded this co-operation agreement between the Bank of Albania and the Competition Authority. In observance of the legal responsibilities of the institutions we represent, this agreement concludes the formal basis for cooperative efforts, in terms of achieving the objective of enhancing the competition conditions, in which the banking and financial activity is being conducted. Fair competition promotes the efficiency in the banking business and refines the composition and the functioning of the banking market, by providing significant services to clients and the public at large, being users of banking and financial services. It has been for some years now that the Albanian economy and the financial system are in an intensive process of integration into the regional economies and markets. This process requires the improvement of the legal and regulative framework for developing the business and the enhancement of the human and institutional capacities to cope with the challenges deriving from the economic openness and the enhancement of competition.
The rate of petroleum revenue spending – growth in public expenditure – is important for developments in competitiveness, which is also referred to as the real krone exchange rate, in the long term. But, in the short term the krone exchange rate can vary widely, and it depreciated in autumn 2008 because capital sought safe havens. This helped Norwegian manufacturing in the first phase of the downturn. Since then, the krone has appreciated considerably. In 2009 and 2010, government petroleum revenue spending shows a substantial increase and foreign investment via the wealth fund a decrease. This increases commercial demand for NOK, which directly contributes to an appreciation of the krone. More fundamentally, the krone is influenced by the difference in activity at home and abroad and how fast the interest rate has to be increased in Norway to keep inflation low and stable. The economic geography of Norway will change over the next 10–15 years. The domestic cost level and the real economy crisis abroad will bring pressure to bear on jobs and businesses in manufacturing communities. Job losses may have the most severe effects in areas where manufacturing has the highest concentration. In the ten most typical manufacturing municipalities Vestre Toten in Oppland, Lund in Rogaland, Fusa in Hordaland, Årdal in Sogn and Fjordane, Ulstein, Hareid, Sykkylven, Stordal and Haram in Møre and Romsdal and Verran in Nord-Trøndelag, local manufacturing accounts for more than a third of total employment.

There are prospects that new annual transfers to the fund will be made for perhaps a little longer than another decade. The fund will in that case continue to grow and may reach twice its current size. The actual building up of the fund may span a short generation. The fund will thereafter enter into a new phase. With lower revenues from oil and gas activities, the fund will no longer receive capital transfers from the government. When oil and gas revenues no longer provide the government with economic rent, only the annual real return on the fund can be used on a permanent basis. In the mid-1990s, oil prices were around USD 20 per barrel and income was set aside. This year the oil price must be over USD 50 to generate sufficient oil revenues to make transfers to the fund. We must be prepared for wide variations in oil prices, and the first year without transfers of oil revenues – but rather withdrawals – may be near. 9  Kjell G. Salvanes, Jarle Møen and Kristiina Huttunen (2009): “Bedriftsnedlegging, omstillingsevne og regional mobilitet i norsk økonomi” (Enterprise closures, adaptability and regional mobility in the Norwegian economy). Appendix to the Ministry of Finance’s Long-term perspectives for the Norwegian economy 2009 [Report no. 9 (2008–2009) to the Storting]. BIS Review 15/2010  17  The government has stated that the annual return on the fund will be close to 4 per cent over time. Since its establishment, the average return has been 2¾ per cent.
For Chile, baseline projection in March 2011's Monetary Policy Report. Sources: Bloomberg and Consensus Forecasts. Figure 10 Incidences on annual CPI inflation (1) (2) (percentage points) 12  12  9  9  6  6  3  3  0  0  -3  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Othe r (64.7%)  Fre sh fruits and ve ge table s (2,9%)  Foodstuffs w /o fre sh fruits and ve ge table s (21.3%)  Fue ls (5.7%)  Public utilitie s (5.4%)  Total  -3  (1) Gray area, as from first quarter 2011, indicates breakdown of inflation forecast in baseline scenario. (2) In parentheses, shares in CPI basket. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

The higher international prices of foodstuffs have a strong impact on inflation in these economies, considering that they weigh more in their CPI baskets. Inflation forecasts for 2011 have been raised everywhere. Worth noting is the case of emerging Asia, where by mid-2010 the market consensus expected inflation to average 3.8 percent annually this year, and revised it upward to 4.8 percent last March (figure 4). The baseline scenario assumes that during this year the external inflation relevant to Chile will exceed December’s forecast. In this scenario, the central banks of several economies have either started or continued their monetary policy normalization processes, implying that inflation might be temporarily above their targets, which coincides with the market consensus expectations. Some of them have continued applying alternative measures to tone down increases in liquidity and credit, such as China, India, Brazil and other countries in the region. In some developed economies, although monetary policy has remained very expansionary – with unconventional measures and record-low interest rates – policy makers have explicitly exposed their concerns about future inflation and a few have even considered the option of beginning their cycle of normalization sooner. Thus, in the U.S. and Europe, market expectations regarding the timing of the process’s kick-off have changed (figure 5). Hence, the outlook for world economic growth is somewhat brighter than it was last December. Actual output data in developed economies, especially in the U.S., have exceeded expectations and market consensus projections have been revised upwards.