samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Frameworks are in place to facilitate the adoption of sustainable finance by FIs (climate change and principle-based taxonomy, Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) and Value-Based Intermediation (VBI)) My third point is that various frameworks are now being put in place to empower DFIs in sustainable finance, and DFIs can already step up efforts in this space. For example, BNM’s climate change and principle-based taxonomy facilitates all FIs to be part of the driving force that promotes orderly transition towards a low-carbon future. Other frameworks focus on creating incentives that would shape DFIs’ behaviour to be more in tune with their developmental roles. The adage “what gets measured gets managed” reflects the 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  importance of building a structured and holistic measurement framework for DFIs. This will support DFIs to pursue national economic and social well-being while simultaneously support an orderly transition of the economy towards achieving sustainability goals. In this, it is particularly pertinent for DFIs to advocate accountability, transparency and efficiency since DFIs are also public institutions. Towards this, DFIs that are part of the Value Based Intermediation or VBI community are encouraged to apply impact-based disclosure on value-based practices and financial solutions contributing to the triple bottom line (people, planet and prosperity). Institutions are required to disclose an optimal set of information to stakeholders with an objective to generate intended market discipline and promote stakeholder activism. Similarly, the Performance Measurement Framework or PMF is anchored on the concept of additionality creation by DFIs.

Willem F Duisenberg: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2001 to the European Parliament Introductory statement by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 2 July 2002 *  *  *  Six months ago we witnessed a milestone in European history: the launch of “the euro, our money”, in its visible form. European citizens are now able to perceive - and benefit from - the tangible reality of the euro, and the rapid substitution of legacy currencies at the beginning of this year bears witness to the successful launch of the euro banknotes and coins. The year 2001 provided a particularly challenging environment for the monetary policy of the ECB. The worsening economic outlook was accompanied by short-term upward pressures on prices from various sources, which complicated the conduct of monetary policy. This task was made more difficult by the extreme uncertainty which followed the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September. As usual, the monetary policy response of the ECB to such a situation had to look beyond short-term developments, focusing on the risks to price stability over the medium term. From this perspective, we could see that medium-term inflationary pressures were in fact receding. The ECB took account of this by reducing interest rates four times in 2001, by a total of 150 basis points.
Caleb M Fundanga: Important building stones for successful organisations in Zambia Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, on the occasion of the opening of Investrust Bank PLC 2007 Management Strategic Planning Session, Mfuwe, 11 April 2007. *  *  *  • The Managing Director • Heads of Departments • Members of the Investrust Bank Plc Management Team First of all, I wish to take this opportunity to say congratulations on your 10th anniversary attained on 19th September, 2006. Considering that the Bank opened its doors at a very difficult time when confidence in locally owned banks was at its lowest, reaching 10 years is no mean achievement. The Bank of Zambia is proud to be associated with your achievements and can assure you of our full support now and the future. It was only on 30th March 2007 that Bank of China also celebrated 10 years of operations in Zambia. It is a great privilege and honour for me to officiate at this wonderful and history making occasion in your bank. History making in the sense that you have gathered in this conference to chart a path for your Financial Institution to ensure its sustained growth. Decisions you will make in this gathering are critical to all your stake holders. The public is keenly following your growth and performance. Allow me to remind you of the following issues which I believe are important building stones for successful organizations. 1.

I also commend the Bank for adopting a “Whistle-blowing” policy to help ensure professional conduct is adhered to at all times. These measures, Mr Managing Director will work to your own Bank’s benefit. The Bank of Zambia stands ready to assist in any way in your quest for Best Practice. BIS Review 36/2007  1  4. Lending rates  On the banking front, we have witnessed Bank lending rates follow the downward trend. Mr Managing Director, these are positive indicators. I am aware that the perennial complaint from our local business houses has been the prohibitive interest rates charged by banks on credit facilities. There is need to continue work on reducing lending rates further as the current levels are still unbearable by most of our upcoming entrepreneurs. In certain fora, Mr Managing Director, the borrowing culture of Zambians has been heavily criticized. It is said that Zambians borrow with no intention of paying back. It is one of the reasons the Bank of Zambia is taking seriously the matter of the Credit Reference Bureau being operational as soon as possible. The Bank of Zambia is keen to ensure this negative perception is eradicated. 5. Banking services to the unbanked  Mr Managing Director, late last year Bank of Zambia launched the findings of the FISCOPE SURVEY, a survey which revealed that 68% of Zambian have no access to banking services.
13  See Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor of the Bank of England: Financial Policy Committee remit: Budget 2020 14 Source: Association of Investment Companies, The Investment Association, and Bank calculations 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  An investor bias towards open-ended funds arises in part because some seem to offer the irresistible, but inconsistent, combination of a return from holding less liquid assets – like property and corporate credit – and at the same time the opportunity to redeem daily at little cost. A liquid investment with illiquid returns: what’s not to like? [See slide 7 of accompanying deck]  Closed ended funds (and open ended funds with long notice periods) might be able to invest in truly illiquid growth capital and offer an even higher return. But not enough to compensate for the appropriate lack of a quick redemption offering. The inconsistency in some open ended funds makes them look unduly attractive. Until of course the inconsistency is exposed, when investors rush for the exits and it hits the headlines.15  This had been the focus of a joint Bank of England-Financial Conduct Authority Review before the virus disruption. The need to meet a potential demand for new equity issuance makes that review now all the more urgent and important. We had already concluded that open ended funds should align their redemption terms with the liquidity of their assets.

3  See Chancellor of the Exchequer: A Plan for Jobs 2020 See speech by Jon Cunliffe (2020): Financial System Resilience: Lessons from a real stress 5 See letter from FSB Chair Randal Quarles to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: July 2020 4  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  Since central banks acted, markets have opened up again, allowing companies to raise finance. Britain’s companies issued more than £ of new bonds since March. A second response was also needed. The seizure of corporate debt markets meant that larger companies that normally enjoy market access were suddenly faced with uncertainty about access to that finance when it was most needed. They turned, as a precaution, to banks to bolster their cash positions. What followed was not a run on the banks driven by fear about the banks, but a run to the banks driven by fear on the part of businesses about their own access to finance. In a complete contrast to what happened in the 2008 financial crisis, bank lending shot up. Net of repayments, banks lent £ in March – more than 30 times their normal monthly net lending flow as large companies drew on committed credit lines. That threatened to overwhelm the capacity banks have to lend to the wider population of businesses. The Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF), owned by the Treasury and operated by the Bank of England, was designed to alleviate that pressure.
How effective we are in meeting this political challenge is likely to depend significantly on how effective we are in improving educational opportunity and achievement in the United States, and perhaps also in improving the design of the temporary assistance we provide those individuals who bear the brunt of the adjustment costs that come with greater global economic integration. These policies by the United States would help improve the prospects of a more benign adjustment process. But they would not be sufficient to produce a more favorable adjustment path. A more favorable adjustment scenario would require policy changes in each of the major economic areas. For global growth to be sustained at a reasonably strong pace during this period of adjustment, the desirable increase in U.S. savings, and the necessary slowing in U.S. domestic demand growth relative to growth of U.S. output, would have to be complemented by stronger domestic demand growth outside the United States, absorbing a larger share of national savings. Exchange rate regimes, where they are currently closely tied to the dollar, will have to become more flexible, allowing exchange rates to adjust in response to changing fundamentals. Reforms to financial systems and to social safety nets over time would help reduce the need for exceptionally high levels of domestic saving we see in many countries. The global nature of these requirements does not imply that the United States can put the principal burden for adjustment on others.

Since 2000, and especially in recent months, the picture has changed. The mines have opted for another strategy and have cut back on price hedging. This strategy change can be partly attributed to more positive expectations regarding the gold price. As a result of the central bank agreement on gold sales, producers no longer fear large-scale sales by the central banks. Moreover, it seems that producers have recently become more upbeat in their assessment of private investment demand. It is interesting, in this respect, that gold producers' hedging activity tends to accelerate market trends. When they expect price decreases, prices do in fact decrease faster as a result of hedging, and when they expect price rises, prices do rise faster owing to the decrease in hedging. Such strategy changes, which are always due to changed market expectations, have to be reckoned with in future as well. •  Reviving private investment demand in the industrialised countries has also contributed to giving the gold price a boost. This phenomenon has been particularly pronounced in Japan, but Europe and the United States have also seen gold demand booming. Economic imponderables, concern over the financial health of some companies, heightened political tension in different parts of the world, the terror attacks of September 2001 and concomitantly subdued stock markets have caused investors to increase their holdings of the  BIS Review 39/2002  1  yellow metal. It seems as if gold is, for the time being, once again assuming its role of a safe haven investment.
Since the power spectrum is a where function of the auto-covariances (including the variance , it can be viewed as a decomposition of the variance of the time-series in terms of frequency. When the power spectrum is normalised by the variance , the resulting standardised function is known as the spectral density. The filter then isolates ‘bands’ in the frequency domain of the spectral density and returns the resulting series. 10  BIS Review 168/2010  Chart 4 Ratio of loans to GDP and assets to GDP (UK)  Sources: Shularick and Taylor (2009) and Bank calculations. Chart 5 Ratio of loans to GDP and assets to GDP (US)  Sources: Shularick and Taylor (2009) and Bank calculations. The credit cycle is distinct from the business cycle in amplitude as well as frequency. To show this, Charts 6–7 plot the medium-term cycles in real GDP for the UK and US alongside the credit cycle. The amplitude of the credit cycle is twice that of fluctuations in GDP over the medium term. It is roughly five times that of fluctuations in GDP at conventional business cycle frequencies. The peak-to-trough variation in the typical credit cycle has been around 20 percentage points in the UK. For real GDP, it is around 10 percentage points. As a result,  BIS Review 168/2010  11  ratios of credit to GDP themselves exhibit a distinct cyclical pattern in the UK and US (Charts 4–5). Chart 6 Medium-term cycle in real GDP and credit (UK)  Source: Bank calculations.

Furthermore, our analysis6 shows that there are only limited spillovers from the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve to euro area inflation and output. This suggests that ECB monetary policy actions are, by and large, able to shield the euro area economy from spillovers from US monetary policy. But undoubtedly, there is evidence that US monetary policy is a driver of a “global financial cycle”.7 In step with such a financial cycle the risks to euro area financial stability can change as well. Current financial stability concerns in the euro area As you know, our characterisation of the main risks to euro area financial stability has remained broadly unchanged over the recent years. We see four main risks: The most prominent risk stems from the possibility of a disorderly increase of global risk premia. The second risk is related to renewed debt sustainability concerns, for sovereign debt in particular. The third risk is that banks’ intermediation capacity may be hampered by their continued low profitability. Finally, we are of the opinion that possible liquidity strains in the investment fund sector constitute a growing risk. All four risks are intertwined and would have, if they were to materialise, the potential to be mutually reinforcing. In 2018, a growing economy and improved banking sector resilience were important positive factors supporting financial stability. Now, however, the assessment is affected by a weakening economic growth outlook for the euro area.
It also contributed to a growing central government debt. The economy was fuelled during economic upturns, which led to overheating and inflation. The Riksbank’s task was to try to defend the fixed exchange rate. The social partners were instead to contribute to low inflation by ensuring that wage increases were not too high. Soaring wage costs and poorer international competitiveness meant that the system broke down in the mid-1970s. To safeguard the objective of full employment, the krona was devalued by a total of around 40 per cent on five different occasions between 1976 and 1982. Each devaluation held unemployment down temporarily, but instead contributed to kindle the inflation fire until it was time for the next devaluation. Unemployment was also held down in that the number of employees in the public sector increased substantially. The number of persons employed in the public sector increased from 15 to 30 per cent between 1960 and 1980. In my opinion, unemployment was held down during this period using methods that were not sustainable in the long term. I consider this to be the first important aspect to bear in mind when discussing why unemployment is now much higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Towards the end of the 1980s the situation became untenable. Everyone was then counting on the krona being devalued if the rate of increase in prices and wages rose too high. The driving forces for holding down prices and wages had thus disappeared.

Joining T2 and T2S is expected to benefit the participants of the Riksbank’s current settlement services. For instance, they will gain from increased cost-efficiency and harmonisation, that is, alignment with European standards and practices. In the end, that should also lead to improvements for banks’ customers. Importantly, a decision to connect to T2 and T2S should be taken into account by the Swedish banks in their future business and investment planning. My speech today will be about the Riksbank initiatives just referred to and the motives behind them. First, however, I plan to take you on a short tour of the history of payments. This is because I believe there are lessons to be learned here. Lessons that over time have formed the way that we at the Riksbank think about payments and the financial infrastructure in general. As such, they have played into also our recent decisions, of course. Looking at the past, the key observations that I make are the following:         Firstly, for a well-functioning monetary system the trust of money is key. A credible issuer can ensure this. Moreover, converging on one monetary unit in a given country, what economists refer to as the uniformity of money, increases simplicity and efficiency. Secondly, technological developments, often far away from payments, are an important driver of change. This goes hand in hand with innovation of ideas, humanity’s ability to react creatively to recognised needs. Sometimes this can even lead to the emergence of new types of business.
Percentage of 21-34 year olds living with their parents  1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014  15  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 30 – Share of people living in absolute poverty after housing costs*  Chart 31 – Share of people living in relative poverty after housing costs* Per cent of age group  60  60  Under 16  55  16-65  50  50  45  45  40  40  Over 65  Under 16  16-65  Over 65  35  35  30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  94/95 97/98 00/01 03/04 06/07 09/10 12/13  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. * A household is defined as living in absolute poverty where their income is less than 60% of 2010/11 median income held constant in real terms. 55  94/95 97/98 00/01 03/04 06/07 09/10 12/13  10  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. * A household is defined as living in relative poverty where their income is less than 60% of median income. Chart 32 – Financial market measures of inflation expectations Per cent  3.5  23/06/2016  06/07/2016  3.0  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  2.5  Years  Source: Bloomberg and Bank calculations. * Instantaneous RPI inflation implied from swaps. BIS central bankers’ speeches  23

I note from the very elaborate programme for this meeting that you will in the next three days cover a wide spectrum of issues some of which will focus on factors that constrain SMEs access to finance and some of which will focus on what needs to be done to change this situation. The meeting is, therefore, an opportunity for us to face a number of challenges that characterize this sector. These will include revisiting strategies and approaches to SME financing currently in use as much as it will require a review of current institutional arrangements through which finance is directly delivered to SMEs, on one hand, and those which indirectly obstruct or facilitate this flow of resources, on the other. However, I believe that probably the greatest challenge before this assembly is to attempt to narrow the gap between analysis of the problem and the implementation of measures and actions that work. Meetings, workshops, seminars, etc. on SME financing are plenty at national, regional and international levels. Some of you have had the opportunity to attend several of these meetings in the past. Indeed, some of you have become experts at talking about the subject. Barely two weeks ago, the Bank of Zambia held a financial sector forum here in Lusaka at which views of various stakeholders on what needs to be done to address binding constraints to the SME sector were considered. The fact that the discourse on SME financing continues underpins two significant positions.
Or, even if investors do not differ greatly in their attitudes toward duration risk, they may require lower compensation for holding duration risk when they have smaller amounts of it in their portfolios.” [25] Vayanos, D. and Vila, J. (2009), “A preferred-habitat model of the term structure of interest rates”, NBER Working Paper, No 15487. [26] For the euro area, flow effects are found to be small, yet sometimes significant, see, e.g., the overview in Arrata, W. and Nguyen, B. (2017), “Price impact of bond supply shocks: Evidence from the Eurosystem’s asset purchase program”, Banque de France Working Paper, No 623; as well as De Santis, R. and Holm-Hadulla, F. (2017), “Flow effects of central bank asset purchases on euro area sovereign bond yields: evidence from a natural experiment”, Working Paper Series, No 2052, ECB; or Schlepper, K., Ryordan, R., Hofer, H., and Schrimpf, A. (2017), “Scarcity effects of QE: a transaction-level analysis in the Bund market”, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, 06/2017. [27] For quantifying the yield curve impact via the duration channel in the United States and the euro area, see respectively Li, C. and Wei, M. (2013), “Term structure modelling with supply factors and the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase programs”, International Journal of Central Banking, 9(1), pp. 3–39; and Eser, F., Lemke, W., Nyholm, K., Radde, S. and Vladu, A. (2019), “Tracing the impact of the ECB’s asset purchase programme on the yield curve”, Working Paper Series, No 2293, ECB. [28] See, e.g., Hammermann, F., Leonard, K., Nardelli, S. and von Landesberger, J.

Of course there are many exchange rates for sterling against different currencies, but the relative strength of sterling and the dollar against the euro has been surprising. Over the past five years or so, sterling has risen by almost 40% against the euro. No doubt part of this euro weakness is accounted for by the strength of domestic demand in the US and UK, which, at least in the case of the US, has been driven by higher productivity growth. But the resulting current account deficits cannot be sustained at their present levels indefinitely. Following the sharp slowdown of the world economy last year, it is those countries with the largest current account deficits, the US and UK, which are experiencing a more robust recovery than that in countries, such as the euro area and Japan, with current accounts close to balance or in surplus. In the short run, this pattern of growth could exacerbate current account imbalances. But it is encouraging that the slowdown has proved more short-lived than was feared. US GDP growth was positive in the final quarter of last year, following only one quarter of falling output, and is expected to be substantially positive in the first quarter of this. Here at home, growth is expected to be positive in the first quarter, following one quarter of growth close to zero. And manufacturing output has now started to rise in both the US and UK. Surveys of business confidence have turned round markedly.