samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That might sound flippant; but the fact is that if anyone were to read certain statements for the first time, they might reach the conclusion that raising solvency levels entails all kinds of problems. As I said earlier, profitability and capital should go hand in hand. But the flattening in solvency ratios has come about against the background of a sustained decline in lending, not an increase therein. If we analyse the change in CET1 capital ratios since the start-up of the SSM, we see that in 2014 Spanish banks had average levels below the European average, very similar to those of French banks and indeed higher than those of Italian banks. Yet at the end of this period our banks show levels clearly below those of both these countries. It would be worth reflecting on why our banks – which initially showed lower solvency levels than the European average and which, moreover, have maintained higher average profitability than their peer group – should have seen not only a reduction in the starting difference in solvency levels, but also a widening in this difference. Unlike their counterparts, Spanish banks have not been able to offset the erosion in CET1 brought about by the gradual entry into force of Basel III with increases in capital or reserves. Clearly, our banks consider that, since the launch of the SSM, the demands placed on them in respect of capital needs have been very great.

9 The ARRC Selects a Broad Repo Rate as its Preferred Alternative Reference Rate 10 Information about SOFR can be found at apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/sofr. 11 In addition to the London Interbank Offered Rates, the other major interbank offered rates (IBORs) are the Euro  Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) and the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR).
350  300  300  250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  Jan.05  Jul.05  Jan.06  Latin America Eurozone  Jul.06  Jan.07  Jul.07  Jan.08  Emerging Asia United States  Jul.08  50  Jan.09  Emerging Europe Japan  (*) MSCI for regions, Dow Jones for the U.S. and Nikkei for Japan. Source: Bloomberg. Figure 12 Commodities prices (index 01/03/2005=100; gold in US dollars per ounce) 400 Subprime crisis erupts  300  Bear Stearns  1,200  Lehman, AIG, etc. 900  200  600  100  300  0 Jan.05  Jan.06  Jan.07  GSCI grains and cereals GSCI energy GSCI metals  Jan.08  Gold  Jan.09  0  Source: Bloomberg. BIS Review 76/2009  13  Figure 13 Share of durable goods in total exports and contribution of exports to GDP quarterly growth in the fourth quarter of 2008  Durable exports (percentage of total exports)  HK  60  SIN  50  COR  HUN FIN  RCH  40  TAI  ALE  30  HOL BEL  R2 = 0,52 -35  -30  20  CAN  BRL AUS CHL  ARG  -25  -20  -15  -10  -5  NZL  10 NOR  0  COL  5  10  Exports (contribution to GDP, annualized quarterly change, percent) Source: Central Bank of Chile.

It would seem that the need to distinguish between different roles was not very firmly rooted: the first permanent chair of the board, director Karl Gether Bomhoff, was also a parliamentary representative. 8 He was, by the way, one of Henrik Ibsen’s few friends. 9 In 1897 the Storting had enough confidence in the independence of the central bank to relocate Norges Bank’s head office to Kristiania (now Oslo). Payment by cheque was introduced in Norway in the same year, and from 1898 Norges Bank functioned as settlement bank for payments between private banks. 10 The more flexible note issuing rules proved very useful during the Kristiania crisis in 1899. The crisis followed a housing and construction bubble in the capital. This was the first time the central bank acted as lender of last resort for the banks. Boom, banking crisis and parity policy The fairly stable years that then followed after the turn of the century came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of World War I. 5  Lars Fredrik Øksendal (2008): “Trondhjem som hovedsete for Norges Bank – noen faktiske og kontrafaktiske betraktninger” [Trondheim as Norges Bank’s headquarters – some factual and counterfactual considerations], Staff Memo 2008/8, Norges Bank. 6  See Oskar Jæger (1894): “Udsigt over de forandringer, som Norges banks virksomhet har undergaaet ved den nye banklov” [Changes in Norges Bank’s operations as a result of the new Norges Bank Act]. Statsøkonomisk tidsskrift.
Finally, let me once again welcome our guests, the experts from the Czech Republic, who will pass on the Czech experience in the realization of the decade-long EU project – the establishment of the Single European Payment Area – SEPA. I believe that today’s panel discussions will encourage all stakeholders in the national payment system of Macedonia in creating realistically achievable integration initiatives in the area of cross-border payments in euros, which would open new opportunities for Macedonian companies and citizens for effective and cheap payments in the economic exchanges with the European Union. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

But the total amount of the macroeconomically stable debt burden is, unfortunately, an absolute value not depending on the period, during which the debt is being accumulated. The lack of clear fiscal strategy in the future can destabilise the markets already now. Whether the government debt is good or bad, as I have already mentioned, is a sham question to a certain extent. Another sham question is a choice between the financial stability and economic growth. Both the central bank and the Ministry of Finance are being quite often criticised for focusing monetary and fiscal policies respectively on the problem of financial stability to the detriment of economic growth. In actual fact, economic growth is impossible without financial stability. While a stable budget is the basis of financial stability. It is possible to stake money, including government one, at the microlevel, at the level of small specific projects. To take risks at the macrolevel means to endanger economic growth and social stability. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  An important question is how to finance the deficit: through reserves or through debt? Strictly speaking, both options lead to growth in net debt (net of reserves) and consequently to debt burden accumulation. That is why this choice is also a sham one to a large extent. Nevertheless, since the commodity market risks are high, we believe that today the priority should be given to debt financing and keeping reserves for more complicated scenarios, when the access to debt financing is even more difficult.
In the labour market this was reflected in a rise in employment of some 1.65 million to an all-time high on the latest figures (for the three months to last November) of 26.6 million. It was reflected, too, in a fall in the rate of unemployment from a peak of 10.6% (on LFS figures) to the current rate of 6.1%, which is the lowest rate for almost 20 years. As far as the regional impact is concerned, I would note that over this period unemployment in Scotland – though still higher than in the UK as a whole – has also declined – to 7.6% on the latest LFS data, compared with a peak of 10.8%; and on a claimant count basis it, too, is currently lower than for 22 years. These developments in the labour market produced only a fairly gradual pick up in pay settlements and earnings growth compared with past periods of labour market tightening – though we have, of course, been unsighted on what has happened to earnings growth more recently. And underlying retail price inflation – on the Government’s inflation target measure (RPIX) – averaged some 2¾% a year through the expansion, and is currently exactly on target at 2½%. By the time of your last dinner it was already becoming clear that overall output growth needed to moderate if we were not to run into overall capacity constraints and a pick-up in inflation.

The BIS Review 7/1999  –4–  counterpart is a sharp decline in net external demand in the industrial countries, which, if it is not offset by action to stimulate domestic demand in those countries, could lead to weakening global activity and price deflation. In fact to varying degrees – reflecting differing assessments of how far their particular currency area is expected to be affected by the slowdown in external demand, and different starting points in their assessment of trends in domestic demand, and of how close they were initially to full capacity, in their respective overall economies – both the UK and the euro-zone, as well as the US, have acted fairly aggressively to reduce interest rates since the autumn; and Japan has moved to more active fiscal stimulus. And if the global economic prospect, and net external demand in the industrial countries, were to deteriorate further, then it would be right to contemplate further moves in the same direction – consistently with our aim of effective price stability. What we are trying to do, as I said earlier, is to keep aggregate demand in line with the supply capacity of our economies. We have no interest in the creation of unnecessary spare capacity in our economies as a whole or in a fall in the underlying general price level.
Managing huge volumes of data, carrying out machine or deep learning requires investing in human and automatic data technology, in training and hiring data analysts and scientists. Indeed, Big Data requires novel and significant human resources, and this has to be anticipated and properly managed. d)  The appetite for real time intelligence, the “short-termism” that can be inflated  by the Big Data Revolution, entails risks that “bad data chase good ones”, thereby impeding the understanding of economic and financial developments by the general public and the media. We must do our best to kill fake news, and there is also economic fake news. But, in a society of communication more than of information, delivering data of good quality, which will always be a trademark of central banks, can hardly be the only answer. Central banks need to make their publications clearer, more readable, and more visible. In particular, if we want sound data to be shared and used, we should speak to each and every one and not just to experts. We should be more “B to C” and not only “B to B”: this is a cultural shift beyond mere technology change. e)  Central banks and I would say public authorities in general can no more work  in silos. Data sharing is a must. In France, we have an excellent cooperation with the national statistical institute and we do share on a day-to day basis many data between supervisors and central bankers but the issue is deeper and wider.

In this area, Islamic finance instruments will have to comply with conventional or general financial regulation, while maintaining their specificities. In particular, the contractbased nature of Islamic finance normally linked to an underlying asset poses challenges in areas such as risk weight analysis and the fiscal treatment of Islamic-type instruments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Financial instruments have to be carefully calibrated to take due account of the risks linked to the underlying asset and its liquidity. In taxation, there are problems of double or multiple taxation and equality of treatment with interest-based instruments that also need to be addressed. Several European countries are adapting their legislation in this respect. In addressing these regulatory challenges, the IFSB is playing a very important role by providing a forum for coordination and dissemination of better international practices. It is also contributing to the integration of Islamic finance into the general framework of conventional finance regulation, as established by international bodies, such as the FSB itself and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In parallel, other institutions such as the G20, the IMF and the World Bank are stepping up their efforts to further the analysis of Islamic finance and to identify the necessary reforms to its insertion in the international financial system. Many of these issues will be dealt with in the different sessions of today´s Forum. The agenda includes four technical sessions on regulatory aspects and the specific challenges regarding Sukuk markets, equity-based financing and financial inclusion.
Jean-Claude Trichet: The Euro and the monetary union Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Banque de France, at the Society of Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, 12 February 2002 *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and an honour to be with you today, in the occasion of the Annual Dinner of the Society of Business Economists, in front of such a distinguished audience. I am particularly pleased to express my views on the euro and its prospects following the successful launch st of the notes and coins on 1 January 2002. I am happy to have an opportunity to present my views on the successful set-up of the euro, on the economic and financial integration of Europe and on the challenges that the euro-zone has to cope with. The Euro: built on a successful set-up Set-up of the Eurosystem The single monetary policy is formulated and implemented within a sound institutional framework, the Eurosystem, comprising the European Central Bank and the twelve national central banks of the euro area. Three principles are shaping up the Eurosystem: independence, transparency and decentralisation. The independence of the European Central Bank and national central banks is enshrined in the Treaty. When exercising their powers and carrying out their tasks and duties, neither the central banks of the Eurosystem nor any member of its decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.

15  In particular, the Federal Reserve states that, under its new strategic framework, when inflation stands persistently below 2% it will attempt to keep inflation moderately above 2% for a certain time.12 With regard to the ECB, in January this year it announced the launch of a review of its monetary policy strategy. This review has been delayed by the emergence of COVID-19 and is expected to extend into next year. Since this review is ongoing we still do not know what its conclusions will be, but I can confirm that this is an open process: both the ECB and the Eurosystem national central banks are performing a large amount of analysis and requesting the opinion of civil society, academic economists and other professional and social groups. One of the key aspects of this review will be the definition of price stability. The current inflation objective, consisting of rates below, but close to, 2%, may be reformulated. On one hand, it may be necessary to clarify the specific level of inflation that is targeted, in order to make it easier for economic agents to understand.
When these corrections occur, the result could be weak development of the economy over a long period of time. We have therefore acted to reduce the risk of this scenario to some extent and to contribute to a calmer adjustment in house prices. We have done this by highlighting the risks entailed in the rapid credit expansion and by beginning the interest rate increases that were already on the table slightly earlier than would otherwise have been justified. I would at the same time like to emphasise that this does not mean we have downgraded our inflation target. On the contrary! We believe that monetary policy that is active and forward-looking, but at the same time cautious, is the best means of safeguarding low inflation and a stable economy in the long term. The current situation and future prospects How do we regard future developments? Before I answer this question it may be worth a reminder that the forecasts we have made are based on the assumption that the repo rate will develop in line with  4  BIS Review 101/2006  market expectations (Figure 9). This means that the repo rate is expected to rise slightly further in future. International economic activity has been good in recent years. There are numerous indications that international growth will be relatively strong in future, although it is expected to slow down slightly (Figure 10). Despite the good international economic activity, prices are expected to rise at a fairly moderate rate.

In Germany, as in other euro are countries, there were and are forces in disagreement with the Monetary Union, analysts and economic agents who considered the break-up of the euro as likely. But what counts is what the German Government’s position was and its support, at key moments, to save the Monetary Union and the euro, its support to the programmes for stressed countries and the Banking Union process. Rather, we can say that the new hegemon is the culture of monetary and fiscal stability that has gained in strength over the course of the crisis. The strengthening of the institutions and of the rules to ensure fiscal stability is essential for maintaining the stability of the Monetary Union and of the euro. This is because, as we all know, the source of the Monetary Union crisis lay basically in certain countries’ fiscal performance, even more so than in the banking crisis which has also affected – to differing degrees of intensity – virtually all the euro area members. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In particular, it introduced new bridge refinancing operations for banks, improved the conditions of the existing TLTRO III refinancing operations (which give banks incentives to lend to the real economy) and relaxed the collateral framework in order to increase the amount of funds that banks can obtain in these operations. Additionally, with the aim of easing financing conditions in fixed income markets and averting their fragmentation, the ECB increased the size of the existing asset purchase programme by EUR 120 billion and introduced a new programme (the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme) for an amount up to EUR 1.35 trillion. The design of this programme allows for a higher degree of flexibility in the distribution of purchases both over time and across regions to make it more efficient. Finally, financial policies have also played a role in supporting bank lending. In particular, both macroprudential and microprudential requirements on capital and liquidity for European banks were relaxed. Additionally, the European regulation on capital requirements was reformed, with rule changes affecting sovereign exposures, impairments on nondefaulted exposures, SME support factors and software deductions, among other elements of bank capital calculation. These latest regulatory changes generally involve an increase in banks’ capital ratios. In order for banks to preserve loss-absorption resources in the near future, the ECB and national authorities asked banks to halt dividend distributions until 1 January 2021, and also to refrain from share buybacks and to apply moderate variable remuneration policies.

In any case, this indicator tends to overstate the deterioration in firms’ solvency since, in most cases, the level of earnings in 2020 will not be representative of future earnings. Higher debt and lower earnings impair the ability of some firms to repay their debts. However, the longer term to maturity and the lower interest rates on new loans granted during the crisis, compared to pre-existing debt, are significant mitigating factors as they 5  Net debt is financial debt (i.e. interest-bearing borrowing) minus liquid assets. Liquid assets are the sum of cash and other equivalent liquid assets, short-term financial investments in shares (not including shares of group companies), short-term financial investments in securities and other short-term financial investments other than credits. Net assets are assets net of non-interest-bearing borrowing. 11  contribute to reducing firms’ debt burden. Also, many of the new loans, in particular among those arranged under the loan guarantee programme, include a grace period of one year, a feature which contributes additionally to reducing the burden of debt in the short term. In the future, firms’ debt burden will mainly depend on the extent of the economic recovery. This deterioration in corporate credit quality has been reflected in rating downgrades. The downgrades have affected to 13% of outstanding volume of fixed income debt issued by Spanish corporates.
Norman T L Chan: Reform and liberalisation in China – the positioning and future of Hong Kong Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Economic Summit 2015, Hong Kong, 1 December 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Hong Kong’s success story – borrowed time and borrowed place? 1. I am glad to be invited to address the Economic Summit 2015. This year’s theme is “Connectivity Breeds Opportunities” and “Breaking New Grounds for Economic and Trade Development”. I would like to share with you my views on Hong Kong’s positioning and prospect amidst the reform and opening up of Mainland China. I always believe that Hong Kong will be all the more prosperous as Mainland China continues to deepen its reform and open up further to the world. I do not subscribe to the view that our prosperity is built on borrowed time in a borrowed place. 2. There are some who think that time has changed and Hong Kong’s golden years are behind us. With China’s rise, Hong Kong will decline in its relative importance and relevance to the Mainland. Some also think that the Central Government will trigger a Plan B in favour of other Mainland cities to replace Hong Kong as its international financial centre if Hong Kong becomes unstable or is no longer reliable for whatever reasons.

As I see the Czech Republic a part of the developed world, I believe this is a topic that is relevant to the Czech National Bank. The key constraint or dilemma – or even puzzle, if you will – for us in the central banking community has been one key real variable which we believe is beyond the reach of central bankers. That variable is the real equilibrium, or natural, interest rate. We believe that this variable is absolutely key for the economy and that it is exogenous (i.e. not in hands of anybody, or at least not central bankers). At the same time, it critically influences both the financial sector and the real economy. I have tried to depict what I want to say on this very stylised chart (Chart 1). Chart 1: The role of the equilibrium interest rate  1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  It basically shows that if you have got the natural real equilibrium interest rate at a certain level – and, of course, it is not directly observable, we can only estimate it, like the output gap, for instance – monetary policy must take this variable into account and must in fact respect it. Given the inflation outlook, the movements of nominal interest rates or policy rates should, in an ideal world, imitate those of the equilibrium rate. Or at least they should not deviate much from equilibrium. Why? Because this interest rate interconnects the future, the present and the past.