Naturally, those of us behind the Plan are obliged, as I advocate for public policies as a whole, to support our actions with empirical evidence substantiating their efficiency and effectiveness. To obtain data on which to base the evaluation, I would stress that the Banco de España will be conducting in the coming months the second wave of its Survey of Financial Competences. And, in coordination with the OECD, work to evaluate the financial literacy of our small and mediumsized firms has just been concluded. Evaluation as a basis for political consensus This call for evidence-based public policies as a key element for progress and freedom in democratic societies should not be understood as being at odds with the healthy ideological debate proper to free and plural societies. On the contrary, I believe both elements should complement each other. Ideology has, at least, a dual role in the public policy decision-making process. The first is related to ends. It provides an ethical notion of what is good or bad for society. And this cannot or should not be subject to evaluation. It is a question of personal preferences which, in the event of legitimate discrepancy, should be settled in the political domain democratically, under each nation’s constitutional framework. Professor Fuentes Quintana, who has also received here deserved acclaim from the Spanish General Council of Economists, stated in 1948 that “theoreticians aspire to see reality eclipsed by their light, and it is politicians who must ultimately transform theoretical proposals into a wealth of favourable outcomes.

Assimilating the long-term view that price stability requires is harder for the political power, which may have incentives to prioritise shorter-term considerations tied to the electoral cycle. The grounds for the independence of central banks are thus general interest considerations. Firstly there is the belief that such independence benefits society far more than if the powers were to be directly assumed by the political authority. And further is that fact that the legitimacy resulting from this independence is conferred by a decision of the State’s highest political institutions (parliaments). Independence must of course go hand in hand with guarantees as to the professional competency and personal integrity of the members of the independent body, especially of its 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  senior officers, and controls over, and accountability for, their actions. Control and accountability are also crucial to adequate institutional quality. Yet aside from independent central banks being an example of effective institutional design when it comes to incorporating long-term considerations into our democratic societies, I wish to use my address to outline three complementary matters. These are, in my view, essential to encouraging the public authorities to include these long-term considerations in economic policy decision-making, and how independent institutions such as the Banco de España can make a decisive contribution. An assessment culture to launch us forward The first of these three matters stems from the incorporation of an ongoing and thorough publicpolicy assessment culture.