samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But despite the uncertainties surrounding DLT’s potential, we want to be prepared for a scenario where market players adopt DLT for wholesale payments and securities settlement. We must ensure that, in such a scenario, central bank money would still retain its role as the settlement asset for wholesale transactions. If, for example, market players start to use DLT for securities settlement but face difficulties using TARGET Services[10], they may turn to alternatives like commercial bank money or stablecoins. This would entail a number of risks, such as central bank money having a reduced role in settlement processes, as well as trading and liquidity becoming fragmented. The result would be payments and securities settlement becoming less safe and less efficient, which would undermine financial stability. The use of stablecoins would magnify these risks. As we have seen in recent months, stablecoins are prone to runs. In other words, they are stable in name only. And allowing them to be fully backed with central bank money would effectively outsource the provision of central bank money to private entities, endangering monetary sovereignty. [11] A shift away from central bank settlement systems would also imply that authorities would lose direct access to settlement data. This could slow the speed of intervention in the event of settlement bottlenecks and impair the analysis of financial stability. The Eurosystem is therefore exploring ways in which market participants who adopt DLT could interact with the TARGET Services to settle the euro cash leg of their transactions in central bank money.

It is understandable that it is easier as concerns liquidity in national currency, whereas as concerns the one in foreign currency, at least in Bank of Albania’s case, we did never consider acting as a lender of last resort for providing foreign currency assets to the banking system. On the other hand, we exerted maximum pressure on the parent banks to ensure capital adequacy and sufficient credit lines to their banks, and for the sake of truth, we have found a spirit of cooperation and concrete actions in this regard, without any exception. Today, one year after the onset of the global financial crisis, I would say that all the measures taken by central banks in certain countries of the region resemble to one-another. The Bank of Albania considered as indispensable the prudential monitoring of the situation, taking a number of actions, which significantly dampened the pressure over the banking system. These actions have helped cooling down the liquidity situation and have been in line with the operational actions applied by the European Central Bank in response to the crisis. First, an ad-hoc task force was set up. Its main responsibility still continues to be the daily monitoring of the situation for each individual bank. Our direct conclusion was that the analysis should consider all micro-level aspects, each and every cell of the system and its indicators. Second, a number of facilities were adopted for the incessant supply of the system with the required liquidity.
Experience shows that free trade and transformations in the financial field require a great deal from economic policy, its decision-makers and various authorities, as well as extensive cooperation between countries. This is all the more the case in that, with the increasingly integrated financial system, mistakes in one part of the world may quickly lead to economic repercussions elsewhere. Many financial crises in the past decade The financial problems at present in countries in Asia and other parts of the world are in many respects similar to the situation in Mexico a couple of years ago, as well as to the Swedish crisis in the early 1990s. Financial problems arise in an economy essentially as follows. Banking involves accepting deposits from the non-bank public and transforming these short-run savings into loans with longer maturities to households and firms. This transformation of maturities is normally an economic benefit for society as a whole. The banks provide payment services and mediate credits. However, the commercial practice of borrowing short and lending long is associated with risks. If people perceive a bank’s position as uncertain and withdraw their savings, the bank will need to obtain liquidity elsewhere; otherwise it will have to suspend payments and ultimately go bankrupt. In the latter event the bank ceases to contribute to the workings of the economy. If this happens to a single bank, the economic consequences may not be serious. If it involves the whole of the banking system, however, economic activity may be profoundly weakened.

These include: •  Stable macroeconomic environment as reflected in single digit inflation, reduction in lending interest rates and a stable exchange rates  •  Amendments/Harmonisation of financial sector legislation such as the Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ) Act, the National Savings and Credit Act (NSCA), the Pensions and Insurance Act, the Building Societies Act (BSA) and the Banking and Financial Services Act (BFSA) in 2005. •  Establishment of a credit reference bureau in 2006; and Promulgation of microfinance regulations in 2006. Honourable Minster – The production of market knowledge on the supply and demand for financial services in Zambia was identified as one of the priority areas under the FSDP. In this regard, FinMark Trust of South Africa was contracted by our cooperating partners the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) to undertake this important activity and subsequently, the FinScope Zambia 2005 Survey, a comprehensive demand-side survey of consumer interactions with financial markets in Zambia, was conducted in November 2005. The main objective of the survey was to measure access to and use of financial services, along with how people manage their finances and what drives their financial behaviour. Honourable Minister and Invited Guests - This morning we are here to share with you, the findings of the FinScope Zambia 2005 Survey. These findings are expected to play an important role in profiling demand for financial services in Zambia.
Governments and parliaments, as guardians of the public’s trust, have the necessary legitimacy to set the 1  Mark Carney (2015), Breaking the tragedy of the horizon – climate change and financial stability, speech at Lloyd’s of London, London. Available at: https://www.bis.org/review/r151009a.pdf. 2  Real Instituto Elcano (2019), Los españoles ante el cambio climático. Apoyo ciudadano a los elementos, instrumentos y procesos de una Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/1c5a8ff2-2533-44bf-b2d6-a0c8053b231a/Informe-Espanolesante-cambio-climatico-sept-2019.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=1c5a8ff2-2533-44bf-b2d6-a0c8053b231a. 3 Real Instituto Elcano (2019), Los españoles ante el cambio climático. Apoyo ciudadano a los elementos, instrumentos y procesos de una Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/1c5a8ff2-2533-44bf-b2d6-a0c8053b231a/Informe-Espanolesante-cambio-climatico-sept-2019.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=1c5a8ff2-2533-44bf-b2d6-a0c8053b231a. 1  path for this transformation process. And, moreover, they have the most appropriate instruments to make it happen. Specifically, within the ambit of public policy, fiscal policy can and should play a leading role in the management of the transition to a more sustainable economy. Indeed, from the standpoint of economic theory, the origin of the problems associated with climate change is clear: economic agents pursue their activity taking into account only their private benefit or cost, while ignoring the social cost (in this case, environmental) that they generate. As a result, the emission into the atmosphere of greenhouse gases exceeds the socially optimal level. This is what is known in the economic system as a negative externality which needs to be internalised.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Are the regulations implemented to guarantee financial stability compatible with the required acceleration in euro area growth? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Académie des sciences morales et politiques (Academy of Moral and Political Sciences), Paris, 6 November 2017. * * * I would like to thank Anne-Sophie Cavallo, Marine Dujardin, Pierlauro Lopez, Elise Peron, Guillaume Richet-Bourbousse, Bérengère Rudelle, Valerio Scalone and Oana Toader for their help in preparing this speech. Dear Chairman, Dear Permanent Secretary, Dear Academicians, Ladies and gentlemen, It is an honour for me to speak before you this afternoon and I wish to warmly thank your Chairman Michel Pébereau for his kind invitation. We also have with us at this illustrious gathering some of my most renowned predecessors: Jacques de Larosière and Jean-Claude Trichet. I am very pleased that the topic you have chosen for this year is that of reforms. This term is often given too little prominence in France, between our supposed taste for revolutions and our actual conservatism.
14  Selling dollar rolls when concerns arise about the availability of certain TBA contracts is conceptually similar to making SOMA Treasury holdings available to the market through our securities lending program. One key difference is that the Desk offers settled Treasury holdings to the market through its securities lending program, whereas the Desk only rolls unsettled MBS holdings. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  directive, with the goal of supporting a stronger economic recovery in the context of price stability. References Fleming, Michael (2000). “The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market: Recent Performance and Possible Alternatives.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Vol. 6, no. 1 (April): 129–45. Fleming, Michael (2002). “Are Larger Treasury Issues More Liquid? Evidence from Bill Reopenings.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 34, no. 3 (August): 707–35. Gagnon, Joseph, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache, and Brian Sack (2010). “Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 441, March. Hancock, Diana, and Wayne Passmore (2011). “Did the Federal Reserve's MBS Purchase Program Lower Mortgage Rates?” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 58 (July): 498–514. Krishnamurthy, Arvind, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). “The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2: 215–65. Li, Canlin, and Min Wei (2012). “Term Structure Modelling with Supply Factors and the Federal Reserve’s Large Scale Asset Purchase Programs.” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012–37. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May.

Higher interest rates should help shift priority to the investment projects that are the most profitable and economical. This is the best way to foster increased productivity. The aftereffects of the 1970s - when inflation had finally been subdued - provide a good object lesson as well. Many companies had grown accustomed to negative real rates;  5/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  too many investments had been undertaken on the assumption that real rates were negative and would remain so. This led to a painful adjustment when inflation subsided and real rates turned positive, and many firms - even some large ones - folded as a result. All of this points in the same direction: it is of paramount importance to take the reins firmly and bring inflation down before it starts to distort the economy. Honoured guests: The Central Bank's interest rate hikes have caused a marked increase in monthly debt service on non-indexed, variable-rate loans. Furthermore, fixed-rate clauses on many borrowers' loan agreements will expire this coming winter. A decisive response is needed, but first we must diagnose the problem. To start with, it is clear that there are few casualties in the real estate market - as yet. Those who have financed home purchases with nominal-rate loans in the past three years have profited on higher property prices and negative real rates. At the same time, wages have risen significantly overall.
There are two channels through which the effects of deleveraging will be transmitted to Asia: financial and trade. The financial channel could see several global banks operating in Asia downsize their assets. The areas more likely to be affected are trade financing, project financing, asset leasing, SME lending, and syndicated lending. No doubt, some Asian banks will step up and fill some of these gaps. But it is unlikely that there would be full substitution. The resultant tightness in credit could lead to a slowdown in economic activity. The trade channel could see transmission through a slowdown in exports to the US and Europe as consumption and investment in the latter become weaker.   According to the ADB, 60% of sales from developing Asia are to the G3 economies.   According to the IMF, if growth in the EU declines by 3.5% points below the baseline for two years, growth in Asia will decline 1.5–4.0% points below the baseline.   Taking the perspective from Singapore, Europe is also one of our largest trading partners and source of investment. A scaling back of global risk appetite precipitated by slower growth in the G3 will dampen consumer and business sentiment in Asia generally. In short, Asia is not decoupled from America and Europe. But while Asia is not decoupled, it will not derail either. Growth will slow but will not stall. Asia is entering the current downturn from a position of strength.   Public finances are healthy.

So, the phenomenon of large capital inflows into Asia is here to stay and we should learn how to handle it. Large capital inflows pose two risks. First, these flows can potentially overwhelm Asia’s ability to channel them to productive use, and create asset market bubbles – especially in real estate. Residential property prices in some Asian markets have increased by more than 50% since 2009, outpacing income growth. To be sure, there are underlying structural factors supporting housing demand, such as urbanisation, growing populations, and the rise of the middle class. But surplus liquidity and rapid credit expansion fuelled by low global interest rates and large capital inflows have exacerbated asset price inflation in Asia. The unwinding of asset bubbles can be rapid and extremely unpleasant. Second, large capital inflows can turn into sudden outflows. Sharp capital flow reversals can cause exchange rates to weaken, trigger panic in funding markets, and even result in destructive wealth effects. The unwinding of long positions in Asian markets as global investors sought to de-risk their portfolios was partly responsible for the sharp selloff in many Asian currencies in recent months. The most effective way to manage capital inflows is to allow interest rates or exchange rates to go up so that capital is priced appropriately. Indeed, as emerging Asia continues to grow, allowing the exchange rate to steadily appreciate over the medium term is vital to ensuring that capital inflows are moderated and allocated to productive investments.
How should we think about moral hazard and the long term effect of the use of the Federal Reserve's Section 13(3) powers on the evolution of financial markets and the economy, as well as official sector responses to future economic crises? In responding to a crisis, how should the official sector best calibrate its lending response through the central bank, compared to its spending response through the fiscal authorities? And, in an emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic, where should decisions about the allocation of resources in the economy rest? If independence is prized in allocating emergency aid, should there be a new, independent agency with responsibility for economic investment?23 These are interesting theoretical questions. In practice, however, the Federal Reserve is what Congress has made it. Its coordination with Treasury and its administration of economic relief proceed as Congress has directed. Looking Ahead I would like to leave you with some observations on challenges still ahead of us—in the near term, medium term, and long term. Near-term challenges—those arising within the next twelve months—are many. To manage them, I commend to you Martin Wolf's advice: "Above all, make sure we get through this. That is our chief aim. "24 Like many of you, I have confronted new legal and compliance questions arising from a remote workforce, and have had to balance new priorities against ongoing commitments. To get through this, we have to do both. We have to walk and chew gum at the same time.

11, 2020) ("The financial stability risks that would be associated with an unsuccessful transition away from LIBOR are as relevant in the current environment as they were before. "); Michael Held, "SOFR and the Transition from LIBOR" (Feb. 26, 2019). 28 See AnnaMaria Andriotis, "Americans Skip Millions of Loan Payments as Coronavirus Takes Economic Toll," Wall Street Journal (June 19, 2020); Anna Zabai, "How are  household finances holding up against the COVID-19 shock?" BIS Bulletin No. 22 (June 15, 2020). 29 See Board of Governors, Monetary Policy Report (June 12, 2020) at 23 ("Importantly, some small businesses and highly leveraged firms might have to shut down  permanently or declare bankruptcy, which could have longer-lasting repercussions on productive capacity.") and 25 ("Taken together, these data suggest considerable risk of failure for a large number of small businesses."). 30 See Adam Harris, "The Other Way the Coronavirus Will Ravage Our Cities," The Atlantic (Apr. 1, 2020). 31 Large Corporations Committee of the Bankruptcy & COVID-19 Working Group, Letter to Congressional Leadership (May 7, 2020). 32 International Monetary Fund, Global Stability Report: Markets in the Time of COVID-19 (Apr. 2020). 33 John C. Williams, "Now is the Time for Banking Culture Reform" (June 18, 2018). https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200625  4/4
Considering the need for market development and the identification of the role of the Bank of Albania in these markets as the Lender of Last Resort as indispensable, we have prepared and will soon enough implement a complete package of regulations, whose purpose is to establish incentives and minimize risks in the Albanian financial market. Concretely, these changes consist in:  2  BIS Review 122/2007  The law on repurchase agreements. There is compiled the draft-law, which enables the risk-free conduct of repurchase agreements among commercial banks. It will guarantee the prevention of credit risk, which is cited by commercial banks as one of the primary causes for the existence of limits in the lending relations among banks. This law will also prevent the legal risk the banks are faced with when using repurchase contracts. Drafting of the regulatory framework and putting into application the custodian principle of delivery versus payment. In order to minimize the payment settlement risk and facilitate the intermediation in all types of transactions involving securities, such as collateralized loans, repurchase agreements, and outright purchase and sale of government papers, it is being worked on to put into practice the principle of delivery versus payment. Reducing the frequency of government treasury bill auctions. In collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, we have agreed on less frequent and increased size auction schedule of the government treasury bills.

In the latest survey conducted by the Bank of Albania on “Money Market Issues”, 7 out of 14 respondents (commercial banks), (which possess 59 per cent of the market share), outlined “the excess structural liquidity” as the main barrier to the development of the interbank money market, while 4 out of 14 banks (which have a market share of 30 per cent) highlighted “the credit risk” as the second most important barrier. The tendency to keep excess structural liquidity as a bank policy was pinpointed by 13 out of the 14 interviewed banks, otherwise meaning that banks that share 92 per cent of the market do have a tendency to keep excess structural liquidity. We notice that the reasons and obstacles brought up by banks are mostly subjective, and their prevention depends more or less depend on their policies and behavior. Banks keep excess liquidity because there is no a developed money market where they could invest this liquidity at all times at a fair market price. This market can not be developed on its own! It is banks’ active liquidity management as opposed to a passive one that creates incentives for developing the markets. In this context, I would highly recommend you to implement stricter internal control policies and procedures, so that they can identify opportunity cost and missed profit opportunities. Such a thing will lead to improved efficiency and competitive positions of the bank on the one hand and market development on the other.
Consistent with that, a further 25bp hike – smaller than the 50bp increases seen at previous meetings – was announced in March. Given the lags in monetary policy transmission, there is a lot of policy-in-the-pipeline still to come through. Nevertheless, on balance the onus remains on ensuring enough monetary tightening is delivered to ‘see the job through’ and sustainably return inflation to target. Although headline inflation is set to fall significantly in the course of this year owing to a combination of base effects and falls in energy prices, caution is still needed in assessing inflation prospects on account of the potential persistence of domestically generated inflation. I hope my remarks today have given some insight into how I am thinking – and will think – about the role inflation persistence will play in coming to monetary policy choices: focusing on intrinsic persistence through the lens of an interpretation of the incoming data using a structural story about  Page 12  price and wage setting behaviour. Of course, the evolution of inflation persistence against the background of the terms of trade shock stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is only one of many challenges facing monetary policy makers at present. It needs to be seen in the context of other economic disturbances, not least the recent turmoil in the financial sector. We have been told by our colleagues in the Financial Policy Committee that the UK financial system remains robust and resilient.

It needs to recognise that the improving terms of trade driving those improved prospects for activity is simultaneously weighing on both inflation (through the direct and indirect effects of energy price falls) and inflation persistence (by reducing the intensity of the distributional conflict, as the foreign claim on domestically generated economic surplus falls back). Having said that, some part of the recent positive news to UK employment and activity might have a less benign interpretation as regards inflation prospects. If it were to reflect a new positive demand shock, rather than the unwinding of the deterioration in the terms of trade, then – other things equal – it would strengthen the case for further monetary tightening. In that case, the recent improvement in the prospects for UK employment would challenge the view embodied in the MPC’s February forecast that an easing in the labour market – as reflected in higher unemployment, a lower vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, or less job churn – will ultimately weigh against persistent inflationary pressures. In interpreting the implications of recent data for monetary policy, the MPC will need to exercise its judgement about which of these two underlying stories is more relevant. Concluding remarks In February, the MPC signalled that it had adopted a more ‘data-dependent’ stance. This was consistent with establishing a clear inflection point in the upward path of Bank Rate – but not necessarily a pause, still less a turning point.