samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For instance, the Economist magazine estimated that about USD 500 billion to USD 1.5 trillion is laundered through banks each year. Further, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - an intergovernmental organization under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also estimates money laundering to be in the ranges of USD 590 billion to US1.5 trillion. As a percentage of world economic output, money laundering accounts for about 2% to 5%. Obviously, given the secrecy and the illegal nature of this business, it is difficult to tell exactly the extent of money laundering. Nevertheless, these figures give us an indication of the magnitude of the problem. In this regard, financial institutions, in particular, banks provide a conduit through which money (including laundered money) flows. Because of this, the financial system is the focal point of antimoney laundering initiatives because dirty money is most visible when it is first introduced into the financial system. Ladies and Gentlemen, before I proceed in discussing the various aspects of money laundering including stages in money laundering, its effects on the economy, the global and local initiatives to fight money laundering and the role that banks can play in combating money laundering, allow me to define what money laundering is. For the purposes of my presentation today, I shall define money laundering as the method of hiding, mixing and disguising the proceeds of criminal activities through legally operating institutions for the purpose of destroying the origins of the proceeds.

As Fehrenbach puts it, the key to overcoming the odds in the Lone Star State has been that “the Texas ethic and Texas society rewarded enterprise,” ... “work was the real virtue.” … “We chose this land; we took it; we made it bear fruit.” We are a people, in Fehrenbach’s words, for whom “the cult of courage was obvious.”1 And he distills the Texas spirit that prevails to this day in one sentence: Here, “men who exist get overrun by men who act.”2 It is time for our great Latino population to have the courage to face the facts: They must do a better job as families and within their communities to dedicate themselves to educational achievement. And it is time for all Texans, Hispanics and non-Hispanics, to act to create the conditions that will safeguard and nourish the prosperity of all our children and that of our children’s children. ¡Ándale pues! Delve into the Hispanic experience. Help us understand through this conference and your various studies how to advance Hispanic prosperity. For in doing so, you are helping us advance Texas and the nation. Thank you. 1  Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans, by T.R. Fehrenbach, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1985, pp. 708–12. 2  See note 1, p. 717. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
After the licensing of Popular Bank, with Albanian capital, the number of banks increased from 15 to 16, and a preliminary license is granted to Union Bank (Albanian capital), which is expected to raise the number of banks to 17 over 2005. The system assets have further increased by 14 percent while there was an increase of banking products and an expansion of their network after the successful privatisation of the Savings Bank from Reiffeissen Bank, Austria. During this year there will be sold the public shares of both the Italian Albanian Bank and United Bank of Albania, which will lead to an increase of effectiveness and banking competition, paving the way to the processes of selling, merging and acquisitions towards a new consolidation of the banking system. The lending activity increased by 38 percent where one can distinguish inter alia the significant growth of medium-term and long-term loans compared to short-term loans. The map of coverage of the country with the banking system has further expanded, including new areas ever covered before. At the end of 2004, the total number of branches reached 88, or 11  BIS Review 41/2005  1  branches more that the end of the previous year, while the number of agencies recorded for the first time a full three-digit number, 100 and the number of the employed people increased by 26 percent.

On the other hand, a developed and financially integrated region will be more attractive for foreign strategic investors, opening up the path toward regional development projects, particularly infrastructure ones where region’s banks might be directed in financing and investment. Further on I would like to give to you a short overview on the latest Albanian banking system achievements. After many years of difficult transition, in this late spring of 2005 the banking system is growing on a stable basis. Dear participants, I would like to ensure you that recently there are many qualitative developments of the Albanian banking system. I use the opportunity of this event to express that positive assessments on the banking system have been given also in the report prepared by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund after the completion of their assessment made on the Albanian financial system (FSAP-Financial System Assessment Program). Of course, this is good news. Conclusions of FSAP, of this important international passport, are an indication of our earliest conclusions that the Albanian financial system is characterized by a supervised and effective banking system. Regardless of what I mentioned above, sincerely feeling myself as a part of the banking system I would envisage that it needs better and faster motivation to reach higher contemporary standards in all the aspects of the banking activity. The banking system has experienced remarkable developments recently.
SPEECH DATE:  23 May 2023  SPEAKER:  Governor Erik Thedéen  VENUE:  Swedish Economic Association, Stockholm  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  The links between monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy1 I shall begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here. I have been looking forward to speaking to the Swedish Economic Association, as it is an opportunity for me to discuss a subject in more depth. Today, however, I intend to mix some current topics – high inflation and risks in the financial system – with a more fundamental discussion of the links between monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy. Finally, I will also say something about how I view the monetary policy tools. My main messages For some time now, inflation has been far too high both in Sweden and abroad. It is important that inflation quickly falls back to the 2 per cent target. We need low and stable inflation to secure confidence in the inflation target and good economic development. Our most recent assessment is that inflation will be close to the target next year, but it is of course difficult to be sure, and new information about developments will – as always – be decisive for monetary policy going forward. There has been turmoil on the financial markets during the spring.

8 [30]  Well, the Silicon Valley Bank run resulted in the US authorities deciding to guarantee all deposits in the two worst affected banks. They felt they had to do this to prevent the problems from spreading. The bank run in the United States also happened very fast. Technological developments allow depositors to move their deposits with a few keystrokes, to other banks, to money market funds or to crypto-assets. Social media also makes the information spread faster than before. All this raises the very fundamental question of whether the deposit guarantee scheme actually fulfils its purpose of providing security to depositors, reducing the risk of bank runs and, on the other hand, reducing the problems of moral hazard. These are difficult trade-offs and need to be carefully analysed. Ways forward? So how should we proceed now? I note that when large price changes occur in the stock market, for example, so-called "circuit breakers" are introduced, i.e. trading is shut down for a short time to allow traders the opportunity to reassess the situation. I am not convinced that this approach can be applied to banks, but perhaps it would work if a larger proportion of deposits were fixed in time so that depositors do not have the right to withdraw them until at maturity. A larger interest rate difference between regular deposit accounts and accounts with a fixed maturity might lead more depositors to choose the latter option.
The comparatively large size of these two sectors made Irish public finances vulnerable to the bust of the cycle, leaving personal income tax as the shock absorber until the economy recovers. Interestingly, the fiscal package that is included in the Irish adjustment programme with the IMF is of a comparable magnitude to the pre-crisis fiscal expansion. Surveillance has clearly failed to understand this phenomenon. More attention needs to be paid to the overall size and interconnectedness of the financial sector as a whole in the various countries, and to the ability of these countries to absorb shocks affecting not only a single financial institution but the whole financial system. It is now fashionable to stress-test the banks. It would probably be appropriate to stress-test countries as well. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Conclusions Let me conclude by suggesting that surveillance of the world economy, in particular some of its systemically relevant members, has to focus more on the sustainability of their policies, in particular their fiscal and monetary policies. Some policies may appear to be sustainable on the basis of assumptions which may turn out to be simplistic, especially those relating to long-term trends of growth and inflation. In particular they may not take sufficiently into consideration the impact of broader developments under way in the global economy. As Keynes said, we may be “slaves of some defunct economist”.

For instance, if the long-term trend growth of the economy is overestimated, the output gap (in absolute terms) would as a consequence be overestimated too and so would the deflationary risks. Monetary and fiscal policies would then be considered, ceteris paribus, as excessively tight and there would be a bias towards excessive expansion, with a view to achieving an optimistic rate of growth. The borrowing capacity of countries, households and companies would also be overestimated if their potential growth were overestimated. Ex post, the miscalculation of growth potential would result in an excessive accumulation of debt, both public and private, a misalignment between the interest rate and its long-term “neutral” level, and insufficient savings. As shown by Kydland and Prescott in their work on time inconsistency of optimal policy, which was later applied to monetary policy by Barro and Gordon, policy-makers who aim at excessively “optimistic” growth will conduct an inconsistent policy which will generate instability. The solution to this problem, at least for monetary policy, is to set a rule or establish an independent central bank which is aware of such an inconsistency and has a sufficiently long horizon to avoid it. This assumes however that the independent policy-maker knows what the right, “not over-optimistic” long-term growth of the economy is. He or she also has to know what the right model of the world economy is. This brings me back to the question I raised at the start, i.e. the impact of globalisation on the long-term growth of advanced economies.
Capital Market Instruments to Mobilize Institutional Investors to Infrastructure and SME Financing in Emerging Market Economies: Report for the G20, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015. 7. Opportunities and Constraints of Market-Based Financing for SMEs, OECD Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central bank Governors, OECD, 2015. 8. Report on Financial Structure, ECB, 2017. 9. Financial Systems in Western Balkans – Present and Future, World bank, Washington, DC, 2016. 10. Wright, W., Suarez, J., Mc Ghee, P., and P., Bax, L., (2016) “The Benefits of Capital Markets to High Potential EU Economies: Analysis of the Growth Opportunity for Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). 17  11. Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), Analytical Report, European Commission, 2017. 12. Small vs. Young Firms across the World Contribution to Employment, Job Creation, and Growth, Policy research working paper No. 5631, World Bank, 2011. 18

B  The introduction of the euro has increased the homogeneity of European economies and limited the risks of macroeconomic disequilibrium inside the euro area  The convergence process, the homogeneity of European economies and the synchronization of business cycles have increased since the introduction of the euro •  Regarding business cycles, some recent work presented by a working group joining the CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research) and the Eurosystem shows that the correlation between business cycles as a whole and also consumption and investment in most euro area countries has increased since 1999. A common European component seems to play a more important role in these economies than the national components do. The  degree of correlation between national cycles and the euro area aggregated cycle varies between 0.70 and 0.92. •  Concerning inflation, the research conducted by the Eurosystem shows that the degree of dispersion of inflation rates inside the euro area is not significantly superior to that observed in the USA, where the federal budget and the much more unified market of goods and services constitute additional room for manoeuvre. The standard error of the annual growth of prices in the 12 euro area countries is in the vicinity of 1.1, compared with 0.8 in the 14 regions of the USA. •  Finally, the updating of the vast work on monetary transmission mechanisms led by the Eurosystem shows that Member States’ economies are more homogeneous as regards the transmission of monetary impulses since the introduction of the euro.
Political uncertainties are on the rise, especially in the EU, which has to contend with Brexit negotiations and elections in France and Germany. Populist movements are on the rise in many parts of the world. They could precipitate a more radical shift in policies that could in turn dampen confidence and investment. Finally, I have not said anything about the Singapore economy. I will leave that to MTI’s Annual Economic Survey, the report of the Committee on the Future Economy, and the Budget Statement – all happening next month. Suffice to say: The Singapore economy is expected to continue on its modest pace of expansion this year. GDP growth is likely to come in the 1-3% range. Modern services – including finance, business, and ICT – will be supported by continued growth in the region and our growing status as a hub. Our trade-oriented industries should benefit from the mild upturn in global and regional electronics. In fact, the strong showing in the last quarter of 2016 indicates that the Singapore economy retains the capacity to ride on cyclical upswings in demand for our exports. That is not to say that all is well. Economic restructuring remains work-in-progress and we need to do more to raise productivity growth. Singapore will not be immune to the global tightening of financial conditions, volatility in capital flows, and potential stresses in the regional corporate sector. But our macro fundamentals are sound and we will weather these storms.

Ravi Menon: Global economic outlook - renewed optimism, higher uncertainty Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the UBS' Wealth Insights Conference, Singapore, 16 January 2017. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. The global economy in 2016 – resilient but uninspiring 2016 was an eventful year for the global economy. If you recall, we began the year with anxiety over China’s financial markets but breathed easier over the course of the year as China steadied its economy and avoided the hard landing feared by many. We saw economic momentum in the US slip, and then pick up towards the end of the year, which also saw the second rate hike by the Fed in 10 years and an unexpected presidential election outcome. The EU economy was stirred but not shaken by the shock of the Brexit vote in June, with accommodative monetary policy providing support while domestic demand gradually improved. Japan saw further innovations in monetary easing – with negative interest rates and yield curve control – with some but not decisive improvement in growth outcomes. In the ASEAN economies, growth was respectable but below potential, as a pick-up in private consumption was offset by weaker investment and exports. Overall, I would say the global economy in 2016 was resilient but uninspiring. Economic growth was sustained in the face of shocks but remains sub-par.
I am not claiming that the current framework is perfect, or that it is necessarily better than the old framework augmented with the new tools used to directly absorb excess reserves, but it is useful to have flexibility in how to implement monetary policy. We have now seen in practice that changes in administered rates can effectively move market rates – both because effective competition helps bring administered and market rates closer together and because the mere existence of administered-rate facilities, like the RRPs I mentioned earlier, can affect competition between private borrowers and investors even when these facilities see little usage. As we learn more about the practical aspects of using these mechanisms to influence money market rates in the United States, a much wider range of potential operating frameworks becomes viable. It will now be important to make sure that all the costs and benefits of different approaches are considered carefully to get the most effective framework for monetary policy implementation. In particular, there are important trade-offs that may need to be considered in a framework that can flexibly provide liquidity for monetary policy implementation and broader transmission. It is possible, for example, that financial market participants may anticipate that the central bank will make liquidity plentiful during times of stress and that this could reduce their incentives to manage their liquidity conservatively. For banks, new Basel III liquidity regulation, such as the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio, partially mitigates this concern.

But, if you look closely, you’d see that excess reserves actually  1  An extended effort to evaluate potential long-run monetary policy implementation frameworks was announced in the July 2015 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes. This effort was previously discussed at the dinner address for the Bank of England-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference on Money Markets and Monetary Policy Implementation. 2  Congress had agreed to give the Federal Reserve the authority to pay interest on reserves in 2006, but this authority was to take effect on 2011. The effective date of the authority was moved forward to October 1, 2008, with the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 3  The FOMC published its Policy Normalization Principles and Plans on September 16, 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  started expanding earlier and control of the federal funds rate deteriorated. 4 So what happened? In reviewing the events of the second half of 2007 and most of 2008, it is clear that the Federal Reserve faced a tension between the need to provide liquidity to ease money market strains and the need to keep control of the interest rate target within its earlier framework. Demand for dollar liquidity increased in many money markets and some of that demand came from banks headquartered outside of the United States. A by-product of the Federal Reserve’s efforts to provide liquidity to the financial system is that the supply of reserves, which can only be held by banks, increased.
But, as Mark Twain would have said, “[we] didn’t know it was impossible so [we] did it.” Today it is a tangible reality. In fact our supervisory practices have been harmonised upwards. Our legal framework is stronger thanks to the single rulebook. And European banks are sounder – the CET1 solvency ratio for major institutions has increased by more than 3 points since 2014 (from 11.3% to 14.6% at the end of last year). Danièle [Nouy], you deserve our congratulations on this achievement! Yet Banking Union’s second pillar, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), is still incomplete. Yes we have already managed our first cases, substantially improving the health of a number of banks, notably in Spain and Italy. But making the SRM fully operational should be our top priority. In my opinion, it is the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund that is really the key. Experience from abroad is instructive: in most large jurisdictions, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom, the intervention capabilities of resolution funds are backstopped by the fiscal authorities. And they are not a burden on public finances, since any public outlays are generally reimbursed by the private sector. The euro area agreement on the backstop reached on the 29th of June is a crucial first step. It is now urgent to deliver on it by the end of 2018.

I welcome the current initiatives, including the creation of the Simplification Group chaired by Petra Senkovic from the ECB and Edouard Fernandez-Bollo from the ACPR. Various measures are under development, like the growing use of delegation, the streamlining of SREP or JST functioning. However, an essential challenge will be to make sure that all processes will remain optimised over time and that simplification becomes a full and permanent part of decision-making, from conception to execution. To do so, simplification has to become one of the values that guide the SSM. The second priority is to promote mobility, thanks in particular to staff secondments and more on-site supervisors working on banks outside their home country. Other initiatives could include very short staff exchanges or swaps within JSTs, between the ECB and national authorities, to allow members to better understand the culture and practices of their 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  counterparts. The third and final priority is to develop synergies. Just as with the Eurosystem, the Banking Union constitutes a system with a strong center and strong national components, which ultimately have to act as one team. The goal is to make the best use of national resources by fostering their participation in all key tasks of the SSM. National authorities should not hesitate to step up their involvement in the SSM. In return, the ECB should further empower national authorities, especially in the framework of day-to-day supervision and in the field of on-site inspections in branches or subsidiaries of significant institutions.