samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Criticising these two pillars is not only pointless, but is also dangerous: • Pointless: the ECB was able, within its institutional framework and mandate, to be active, innovative and responsive…even more than some political institutions. Damage the central bank’s independence and you undermine its strength and agility, the very things that protect an economy in a crisis. • Dangerous: these two pillars, enshrined in the Treaty, are the legal and democratic foundation of our legitimacy and capacity to act – and not only in “Northerners” eyes. Furthermore, they are the foundations of European’s trust in their currency. To give only one example: the Eurosystem cannot cancel public debt, neither legally nor “fiduciary”: a suspicion of fiscal dominance would give rise to monetary distrust as seen in history and more recently in some emerging market economies. Independence and the price stability mandate are not an obstacle to the ECB’s powerful action. On the contrary, they are its two best levers. I will come back to this. II. What European policies for the gradual exit? Talking about European solidarity, arguably, Europe could have done more. But let us not forget that the glass is at least half full, thanks to the major support from the Eurosystem, but also the SURE framework of the European Commission to help preserve jobs, and the welcome agreement last Friday on unconditional ESM [European Stability Mechanism] credit lines to finance health expenditure. Page 6 sur 10 Let us now look to the future.

Alessandro Manzoni, one of the greatest Milanesi, wrote in 1815 : « Liberi non sarem se non siam uni v [Liberi non saremo se non siamo uniti]». Today, we Europeans will not be masters of our own destinies if we are not united. Let us now overcome the current “malinconia” and face our challenges not with fear or distrust, but with pride. Pride in what we have already achieved and pride in the future we want to shape. Thank you for your attention. Televised address by Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the coronavirus pandemic at Schloss Bellevue, on 11 April 2020. ii « Education in the digital world », Speech by Ignazio Visco, Governor of the Bank of Italy, Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation – Seventh Consultation Meeting “Ethos, Education and Training: Avenues toward equality and ethical behaviours in the digital era”, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, 31st January 2020 iii Arnoud Boot, Elena Carletti, Hans‐Helmut Kotz, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Loriana Pelizzon, Marti Subrahmanyam, “Corona and Financial Stability 4.0: Implementing a European Pandemic Equity Fund” 25 April 2020, Vox, CEPR Policy Portal. iv European Fiscal Board (2019), “Assessment of EU fiscal rules with a focus on the six and two-pack legislation”, août, Bruxelles. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2019-09-10-assessment-of-eu-fiscal-rules_en.pdf v Alessandro Manzoni, in Proclama di Rimini, 1815. i
Kerstin af Jochnick: Does the Riksbank have to make a profit? Challenges for the funding of the Riksbank Speech by Ms Kerstin af Jochnick, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish House of Finance (SHoF), Stockholm, 23 January 2015. *  *  *  The Riksbank is in good form! Last year the foreign currency reserves brought in more than SEK 30 billion. This in turn meant that the Riksbank’s equity increased by almost the same amount. (We will reveal the size of the reported profit at the beginning of February.) In the long run, the largest part of the Riksbank’s profits are paid back to the government in the form of dividends, and over the past 25 years the Riksbank has paid in more than SEK 210 billion to the Treasury. Although the amounts involved here are very large, we rarely discuss the Riksbank’s profits or equity. This is because the Riksbank’s assignment does not concern making a profit; it involves maintaining price stability and promoting a safe and efficient payment system. However, it is important to remember that if we are to perform our tasks and ensure the Riksbank’s independence, we must have adequate financial resources. Carrying out our monetary policy assignment and the task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system includes measures that are made in various ways through the balance sheet. All of these measures affect the size of the balance sheet, the profits and equity.

In this connection, it should be noted that a large part of the adjustment in banks’ earnings in the first half of this year is due to the provisions made in advance for credit impairment  6  that has still not materialised, but will do so in the coming quarters. Specifically, Spanish banks have set aside almost double the amount of provisions they recorded in the same period of last year. This has significantly reduced their profitability, but it has also raised their capacity to absorb credit impairment, something that is particularly highly valued by investors in these circumstances. The message I wish to convey is that banks should persist with this early recognition policy, as it will subsequently facilitate their ability to continue to perform their function of providing financing to the economy. In short, especially if the crisis proves to be prolonged, banks must ensure proper and timely recognition of effective impairment of the quality of their credit exposures through compliance with supervisory guidelines. Global banking regulation  Fourth, I would like to reflect on global banking regulation. As I mentioned earlier, the Basel reforms phased in over the last decade have attempted to incorporate into regulation the lessons learned during the global financial crisis. The first phase of the Basel reforms began in 2010 and was completed through a second wave of changes published in 2017. The initial phase was aimed at raising the level and improving the quality of banks’ microprudential regulatory capital.
Some observers have therefore posed the following question: has the functioning of the economy changed so that higher demand does not necessarily translate into higher inflation, but instead results in growing financial imbalances? If so, a conflict may arise between achieving the inflation target in the short term and financial stability. There are several reasons why financial bubbles can develop in periods of low inflation. First, a highly credible monetary policy results in low inflation expectations. Explicit or implicit long-term price and wage contracts will become more common. It will take longer for higher demand to translate into higher inflation. Cyclical changes will have less impact on inflation. Moreover, periods of higher productivity growth may lay the basis for high corporate earnings, heightened optimism and reduced risk awareness. At the same time, with strong productivity growth, inflation remains low. Banks that record low losses and solid results can increase lending without eroding their capital adequacy level. Debt-financed investments may lead to a faster rise in house and property prices. A third factor is that strong international competition may contribute to curbing inflation during a period of strong economic expansion. China, because of its access to an abundance of cheap labour and its substantial production capacity, has contributed to a fall in prices for many manufactured goods. In Norway, we have not experienced situations where there has been a conflict between the objectives of financial stability and price stability.

The change in monetary policy from an exchange rate target to an inflation target has probably made it less likely that households will be exposed to a "dual shock" in the form of higher unemployment and higher interest rates, as was the case during the banking crisis. This may imply that households can bear a somewhat higher debt burden than was the case prior to the banking crisis. The level of household debt in Norway is also high by international standards, although not as high as in Denmark. However, if we look at debt in relation to wealth, the picture is very similar for all the Nordic countries. In Denmark, household financial wealth is high, while housing wealth is relatively high among households in Norway. The value of the housing stock may partly explain the level of debt. However, housing wealth does not provide a liquid buffer against payment problems. After a lengthy and sharp increase, house prices have edged down recently. From May last year to 6 May this year, house prices fell by 1.1 per cent. The price level is nonetheless high in a historical context. Growth in corporate debt has been more moderate, but the debt burden is high. Debt growth among Norwegian borrowers can also be illustrated by the credit gap, an indicator developed by the BIS. The credit gap is derived from developments in the ratio of credit to nominal GDP and is defined as the deviation between actual developments in this variable and trend.
But after a rapid recovery, the level of activity in the Norwegian economy is now high and spare capacity is limited. The labour market is tight. Since June unemployment has fallen slightly more than we expected and is now at a very low level. The employment rate is at its highest for more than ten years. The number of people outside the labour market has decreased, which is a welcome development. At the same time, the number of job vacancies is high, and labour shortages are a challenge in many industries. With intensified competition for labour, employers are willing to go to greater lengths to recruit people with the right skills. We expect wage growth to continue to rise ahead. New data also indicate that wage growth may have been somewhat higher earlier this year than we had assumed. When demand for goods and services is high, as it is now, firms can in turn pass on higher costs for labour, energy and intermediate goods to domestic consumer prices. Some firms may take advantage of the good times by raising prices a little more than necessary in order to increase margins. Chart: Low and stable inflation is a public good The political authorities have mandated Norges Bank to keep inflation low and stable. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability over time. Low and stable inflation is important for the economy to function well and is a prerequisite for predictability.

The Bank of Thailand has taken steps to guard against the potential development of such risk, by establishing macro-surveillance framework that provides early warning about areas that may be under threat. In practice, Thailand is also among the first countries to implement “macro-prudential policy”, the application of supervisory and regulatory policy in pursuit of system-wide financial stability. The second policy priority is to continue enhancing the efficiency of financial intermediation. The Bank of Thailand will encourage a more widespread provision of hedging instruments and will seek to improve financial access especially for small and medium-sized businesses and retail customers. In addition, for businesses, people and government agencies to receive fast, safe and efficient payment services, the Bank of Thailand will work with all related parties to promote electronic payments such as using money transfer instead of cheque usage and using debit card instead of cash payment, which would reduce payment costs and allow government and businesses to manage cash more efficiently. The goal is to ensure that all parts of the economy benefit from the strong and stable financial system, an aspect of what constitutes an “inclusive growth”. The third and last policy element is consumer protection. Consumers of financial services have the rights to good quality of services and fair protection. The Bank of Thailand encourages financial institutions to disclose all relevant information, including fees, to consumers before providing services to them.
This is the situation currently existing at the Banco de España, which has a solid structure based on an Audit Committee and 12 other committees, some with a very significant mandate, such as the Steering Committee and the recently created Financial Stability Committee. This modus operandi is particularly important for the analysis of economic policy in general, and of monetary policy in particular, as well as for the exercise of supervisory powers, given the complexity of the environment and regulations, the profusion of data, the influence of external and internal factors and the different elements that need to be taken into consideration to assess the probability and severity of the risks. All of this means that every possible viewpoint of experts of proven experience and specialisation is required, to ensure that the responsible bodies are in a position to take the most appropriate decisions. This way of proceeding is also the one most commonly used by our central bank and supervisory peers. It is embedded, for example, in the structure of the ECB, which includes various committees supporting its decision-making bodies, with representatives from all NCBs and the ECB, and in that of the SSM, which is based on joint supervisory teams (JSTs) of staff of the ECB and the national authorities who participate in formulating the proposals that are submitted to the Supervisory Board. This body decides on the action to take in this area on a collegiate basis, through the high-level representatives of which it is composed.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Insurance and pensions – institutional innovation, economic innovation, technological innovation Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the7th annual EIOPA Conference, Frankfurt am Main, 22 November 2017. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be in Frankfurt today for this 7th Annual EIOPA Conference and I wish to warmly thank EIOPA’s Chairman Gabriel Bernardino for his kind invitation. I must say that I feel at home, since we are not far away from the ECB building where I take part in the meetings of the Governing Council at least every two weeks. But today I will speak in my capacity as President of the French supervisory authority, the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR), which belongs to the board of supervisors of EIOPA, and which is in charge of the supervision of both insurance companies and banks in France. This is an important responsibility as the French insurance market is the second largest in the European Union, just behind the United Kingdom, with an aggregated balance sheet of approximately EUR 2,600 bn. Given that I am speaking before the panel dedicated to innovation, I will take this opportunity to focus on three kinds of innovation, which in my view can lead us to rethink insurance and pensions: institutional innovation, economic innovation and technological innovation. 1. Institutional innovation Let me start with institutional innovation.
This puts pressure on emerging economies’ exchange rates and external accounts. This is one element we have seen in the past year, with parities against the dollar posting the greatest appreciations of the last decade (figure 2). So far, the Chilean economy has been able to withstand this challenge, but the risk of these pressures intensifying is still latent. The real exchange rate has risen after the announced intervention early this year, and now its level is near its average of the past 15 to 20 years (figure 3). Among the policies that emerging economies have used to mitigate the impact on their currencies has been the adoption of foreign exchange measures. These have taken a variety of forms, including foreign currency purchases and the implementation of administrative measures. In Chile, in early January, we announced a program of reserves accumulation of 12 billion dollars, which will be completed over the course of this year. This is the equivalent of 5 GDP points, the largest since the first half of the 1990s (figure 4). To this date, we have already made purchases amounting somewhat more than 8.5 billion U.S. dollars. This program serves two purposes. The first, as we emphasized in the announcement, is to transitorily attenuate the appreciation of the peso. This should allow the productive sector to make the necessary adjustments within a context in which these pressures could remain for a long time. The program did have an effect on the peso. Without the intervention, it would have appreciated further.

Also, it is foreseen that the weakening of the developed world will have an impact on emerging economies which, in any case, will continue to outperform their developed counterparts. This projected world growth forecast is lower than consensus, which at the closing of this Report probably does not reflect the full effect of current financial turmoil. Nonetheless, incoming reports by investment banks do carry significant downward corrections for these developed economies, in line with the assumptions that make up our baseline scenario. As I said, concerns about an overheating of the emerging world and its consequences on inflation have subsided. Adjustments already made to the monetary policies of several economies, the weakening of the global economy, and the recent drop in commodity prices are behind this assessment. So, several countries have already suspended their cycles of policy rate increases and, in general, market expectations have adjusted to expect a flattened rate. In the developed economies, it is most likely that monetary policy will hold on to – or possibly even intensify – its current degree of expansiveness for some time. The Federal Reserve has just announced its intention to keep the fed funds rate at a minimum at least through mid-2013 (figure 11). All these facts combined will result in that the external impulse that the Chilean economy will be receiving over the coming quarters will be milder than previously estimated. On one hand, the worsened global performance will have a negative impact on our trading partners’ economies.
the ratio of persons over the age of 67 to persons aged 20 to 66, will rise sharply in the years ahead. The National Insurance Scheme’s spending on old age and disability pensions, based on current social security rules, is increasing. The return on the Petroleum Fund can only cover a small portion of higher pension expenditure. The chart shows how pension expenditure and the real return on the Petroleum Fund will develop in the years to 2060. The calculations were carried out by the Ministry of Finance and based on a long-term oil price of 180 2004-kroner (around USD 27). Even with a long-term oil price of 230 2004-kroner (around USD 35), a funding requirement equivalent to 6 per cent of GDP will still not be covered in 2060. Oil futures six to seven years ahead are now higher than this. If oil prices remain as high in the future, the funding requirement will be somewhat lower. To base decisions on this, however, would be a very risky strategy. The economic outlook The size of the return on our savings, at the national or the personal level, will depend on how well we have invested, but also on economic developments. For our pensions, it is important that wealth creation is substantial in the years ahead. It is natural for me to focus on how monetary policy can contribute to high wealth creation. Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards low and stable inflation.

Fundanga: Islamic banking – building partnerships for development Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, to the Islamic Banking Conference “Building partnerships for development”, Lusaka, 20 October 2008. *  *  *  The Guest Speaker, Mr. Ahmad Zaini Bin Othman Chief Executive Officers of Banks and Non bank financial institutions; Distinguished invited guests; Colleagues; Ladies and gentlemen; On behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to you all to this important conference on Islamic Banking. To our Guest Speaker, Mr Ahmed Zaini Othman, I wish to extend a special welcome to you to Zambia and in particular to Lusaka, the capital city. Like the rest of Zambia, Lusaka is a city of tranquility with an easygoing African charm. The city is not short of interesting sites and places to visit. I therefore urge you to find time or indeed stay an extra day or more to sample this special menu that Lusaka offers. I also wish to extend my sincere thanks to Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Plc, the Islamic Council of Zambia and the Eastern Province Chamber of Commerce and Industry for graciously accepting to make presentations at this conference. Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia is honoured and delighted to host the first Islamic Banking Conference in Zambia that begins today, the 20th and ends on 21st October, 2008.
When the bubbles burst after the global financial crisis of 2007, governments stepped in to support growth and some of them were called to rescue ailing banks. In this way, private indebtedness turned into public indebtedness, with disastrous fiscal consequences even for countries that had run fiscal surpluses prior to the crisis, such as Ireland and Spain, and even more for those that had not, such as Greece. A further shortcoming of the Maastricht framework was the inability to deal with what is now being called the “bank-sovereign nexus”. When systemically important banks run into trouble, governments are expected to step in and provide fiscal support to contain the spillovers. Beyond that, banks are typically the largest holders of government debt from their respective sovereigns. These ties, or nexus, between banks and their governments can lead to a dangerous downward spiral Another effect of this downward spiral, under way since the euro area crisis erupted in 2010, is the fragmentation of capital markets. The bank-sovereign nexus has led to a situation whereby cross-border lending of banks has gone down significantly, as banks retreat more and more to their domestic markets, encouraged by their shareholders and, sometimes, by  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  national banking supervisors. The crisis is undermining a key achievement of the euro, the integration of capital markets. A fundamental problem of the Maastricht Treaty was its over-reliance on the assumption that market discipline and peer pressure would provide sufficient incentives for national policy-makers to conduct sound fiscal and economic policies.

IMF involvement will be sought for the design and monitoring of conditionality. The OMTs are an instrument in the ECB’s toolbox to help it fulfil its mandate, maintaining price stability. They will be conducive to the monetary authority restoring its power to control credit conditions in the euro area and, through that channel, inflation in the medium term. 3.2. Government actions to fight the crisis  Ultimately, however, the current crisis is the result of the lack of incentives in the Maastricht Treaty to pursue sound fiscal, economic and financial market policies. This can only be amended by the Member States, not by the ECB. The key to resolving the crisis thus lies first and foremost with governments, individually and jointly. Since the start of the crisis, the Member States have adopted a number of important measures to strengthen the institutional framework of EMU. A procedure for the surveillance of excessive macroeconomic imbalances has been established in order to detect and correct divergences at an early stage. In the case of non-adherence to agreed fiscal and economic rules, sanctions will be applied in a more automatic manner to reduce the potential for political interference and delay in the process. Further improvements are currently under consideration, such as the mandatory submission of draft national budgets to the group of euro area finance ministers – the so-called “Eurogroup” – for vetting before those budgets are submitted to national parliaments for adoption.