  The G20 group was constituted early during the crisis, as a main forum for international discussion on the global economic stability;    Under the patronage of the G20 the Financial Stability Board, previously the Financial Stability Forum, increased the number of its member states from 12 to 24, and the area of competence as well. Now it secures unprecedented degree of international coordination in the field of the regulatory questions, as an addition to the old mandate as the Financial Stability Forum. FSB is now empowered with additional assignments, including: (i)  undertaking joint strategic reviews of policy development of the international standard setting bodies;  (ii)  setting guidelines for, and supporting, the establishment of supervisory colleges;  (iii)  supporting contingency planning for cross-border crisis management.   The International Monetary Fund has refocused its activity on monitoring the international financial system, identifying threats to the global financial stability;    In Europe, based on current draft legislation, the financial supervision will be characterized by a two-pillar structure. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will be responsible for macro-prudent supervision of the European financial system as a whole, while the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) will be focused on micro-prudent supervision. ESRB will be especially focused on the potential threads to the financial stability arising from the macro-economic developments, as well as the developments in the financial system as a whole. It will issue general warnings or warnings for specific aspects (e.g.

The challenge is to learn how to use these instruments in the best way.” Recently, Petra M. Geraats (Mаy 2010), concluded in the same direction: “Recent financial crises have revealed that a ‘nice’ (non-inflationary, continuously expanding) economy can mask the build up of toxic imbalances that threaten the financial system. So it is vital for policymakers to proactively pursue not only price but also financial stability. Although the pursuit of both objectives could give rise to uncomfortable trade-offs, these can be bypassed by supplementing the main instrument of monetary policy, with tools for prudential policy, in line with the Tinbergen rule.” Accordingly, asking whether the central banks should have double mandate and answering affirmatively, she (Petra M. Geraats) says: “Although the twin goals sometimes give rise to dueling demands, with an appropriate policy framework central banks can accomplish both and achieve a dual mandate of price and financial stability”. Definitely, the consensus for this point of view is mounting, since larger number of authors are basically on the same line. Тhis highlights the importance of ongoing efforts to strengthen the macro-prudential supervision role of central banks (de Larosiere, 2009). Macro-prudential policies could aim to contain the build up of financial imbalances and ensure that the financial system is sufficiently resistant to withstand a disorderly unwinding (Papademos, 2009). Considering the important informational synergies between micro-prudential supervision and systemic risk analysis, bringing micro-supervision under the same roof as other central bank functions seems an attractive proposition.