samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To achieve this we are building a central bank for the 21st Century that combines the finest aspects of our history and traditions with the best of the modern and new. That is how we will contribute to the good of the people. The Mais Lectures of decades to come – along with the stability of our economic and financial system – will testify as to whether we have succeeded. 22  10  Carney (2009). BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Brunnermeier, M and Y. Sannikov, (2013), “The I-theory of Money”, mimeo. Adrian, T. and H. Shin, (2010), “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics”, in Friedman, Benjamin M and Michael Woodford (eds), Handbook of Monetary Economics. New York: Elsevier. Aikman, D., A. Haldane and B. Nelson (2014 forthcoming), “Curbing the credit cycle”, The Economic Journal. Bank of England (2009), “The role of macroprudential policy: a discussion paper”, Bank of England. Blinder, A., (2010), “How Central Should the Central Bank Be?”, Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1): 123–133. Capie, F., (2002) “The emergence of the Bank of England as a mature central bank”, in D. Winch and P. O’Brien, eds., The political economy of British historical experience, 1688–1914, Oxford University Press. Carney, M., (2009), “Some Considerations on Using Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity”, Remarks at the Jackson Hole Symposium, Wyoming. Available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2009/08/some-considerations-using-monetary-policy/. Collins, M., (1988), “Money and banking in the UK: A History”, Croom Helm.

Amongst the fundamental strengths are, first, our ample foreign currency reserves: at the moment they are the third largest in the world, after those of Japan and the mainland of China. These reserves enable us to tackle unexpected shocks. Second, we have a rule-based monetary system characterised by currency board arrangements that work effectively under modern day financial technology. Our linked exchange rate system has a high degree of credibility. Third, we are very BIS Review 2/1999  –4–  committed to maintaining open and liquid markets. Fourth, we pursue a prudent fiscal policy and have no external debt: the government sector, which is very small, is not a drag on the economy. Fifth, as a consequence, our economy, operating largely under free market discipline, is flexible and responsive to market forces. And, sixth, we have a sound banking system, which is strong, solvent, and able to cope with the tight discipline and interest rate movements necessary under our currency board arrangements: strengthened by some thoroughgoing reforms in the 1980s, the banking sector has weathered the current storms extremely well. Taken together, these fundamental strengths have enabled us to adjust to the new regional realities of the last eighteen months without the shock of a currency collapse: we have been able to maintain the external value of our currency while keeping it freely convertible, but we have also improved our competitiveness through the ability of the many other variables in our economy to respond quickly and flexibly.
We will benefit greatly from your expertise on the Banknote Advisory Panel. So without further delay, let me hand over to Maggie to give you a scientist’s perspective on the importance of…science. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6

Meeting the needs of the future To continue to serve the interests of our member countries and the international community at large, the IMF has to be in a position to deal with the influences that are expected to shape the global economy in the coming years. We must not remain static, nor must we change only in a reactive manner when forced to. For that reason, I have initiated an examination of the Fund’s medium-term strategic direction. We hope to use this opportunity to explore a variety of issues and their implications for the work of the IMF. These include matters like global financial flows, regional integration, efforts to reduce poverty, and questions concerning global governance, transparency, and accountability. We are still in the early stages of the review, and there have been many preliminary ideas floated and discussed. At this juncture, it is important for all of us to remain flexible and open-minded, particularly to views and opinions from outside the IMF. However, there is a sense that the continuing evolution of the Fund must remain grounded in the institution’s key areas of responsibility, as specified in our Articles of Agreement – that is, to facilitate international monetary cooperation, to foster a liberal system of international trade and payments, and to promote macroeconomic and financial stability, as a condition for sustained growth.
On the asset side, central banks have increased their holdings of government bonds and bonds issued by private enterprises and institutions. These holdings are matched on the liabilities side by increased deposits from private banks in the form of central bank reserves. The stock of central bank reserves in the US and UK is now five times larger than it was before the financial crisis. In the euro area, reserves have doubled in size. These figures provide a good illustration of the extent of the measures implemented. Such large increases in central bank reserves may evoke associations with historical examples of extensive government money printing. But this comparison only goes so far. Historically, money has usually been printed to finance government budget deficits. The increased money supply then had a direct effect on the economy through purchases of goods and services. The result has often been high and uncontrolled inflation. Quantitative easing is different. In the same way as traditional monetary policy, the way quantitative easing is able to influence the wider economy is through lower interest rates and higher securities prices. The transmission mechanism of quantitative easing to the real economy operates through several channels. First, the central banks’ purchases have supported their communication concerning future policy rates. When central banks purchase long-term government bonds, this is in itself a signal that policy rates will be kept low for a long time. This also pushes down interest rates on other securities.

While that is a secondary listing, it certainly underlines the unique position of Hong Kong as an international financial centre that connects the fast growing Mainland market to global investors. 4. I know some of you may have doubts that the Chinese economy is actually slowing down in face of trade dispute and deleveraging. That is true if we compare to the days when Mainland GDP was growing at double-digit every year. But let’s remember, a real growth of 6% is still a very respectable pace compared to economies around the world. And with Mainland China’s sheer size, a 6% GDP growth means adding some $ trillion nominal value to the world’s GDP in a single year. This is more than the total size of the Indonesian economy, or close to that of Australia. 5. With such economic expansion and its deepening capital markets, China continues to be a compelling investment theme for global investors. As an investment manager ourselves, we are among the first offshore players in the Mainland’s capital markets. Surely, for the past eight or nine years since we invested in the Mainland, there had been some very challenging times, such as the RMB exchange rate reform, the stock market turmoil and fear of economic hard landing. But looking through these short-term ups and downs, two unmistakable trends are consistently borne out by actual developments. The first is the progressive opening of the markets, and the second is the growing momentum of international investors’ allocation to Chinese assets.
Contagion might, for example, arise where other institutions are heavily exposed to the troubled institutions or share characteristics that could be interpreted as the origin of its problems. General sentiment could also be a factor, when, for example, there is heightened nervousness about the stability of the banking or monetary systems. But there are many other possible scenarios. Consistency with Currency Board Arrangements A limitation on the HKMA’s exercise of lender of last resort support is the need for consistency with the Currency Board arrangements in Hong Kong. Our Currency Board system requires that the monetary base, which in effect represents the ultimate liquidity of the financial system, can only H[SDQGDORQJZLWKLQFUHDVHVLQIRUHLJQUHVHUYHV RUPRUHSUHFLVHO\ZLWKWKHIRUHLJQUHVHUYHVLQWKH backing portfolio, which has been established to segregate the Currency Board component of the foreign reserves. However, the system would not preclude use of the Exchange Fund’s other assets, including its Hong Kong dollar assets, outside of the Currency Board account, to provide last resort support to a problem institution. Nor would it preclude funding temporary liquidity injections through borrowing from the interbank market or through a sale of foreign currency assets held by the Exchange Fund, again outside of the Currency Board account, not touching those assets earmarked for the Backing Portfolio. A further option would be for the HKMA to operate within the Currency Board account and conduct repos using Exchange Fund paper or US dollar assets.

Preconditions for Lender of Last Resort Support The basic precondition for lender of last resort support is the systemic risk that would, in the judgement of the HKMA, arise from the failure of a troubled institution if it were deprived of liquidity assistance. This is the basic precondition, but not the only precondition. The institution in question would also need to satisfy a number of further conditions designed to demonstrate that lender of last resort support is genuinely being sought as a last resort, and that such support would not amount to throwing good money after bad. To be specific, the additional preconditions are: •  First, the institution would need to have a sufficient margin of solvency. As a measure of sufficiency, we would generally require the institution to demonstrate that it maintains a capital adequacy ratio of at least 6% after making adjustment for any additional provisions that might be necessary. •  Secondly, the liquidity support extended to the institution would need to be adequately collateralised. •  Thirdly, the institution should have sought other reasonably available sources of funding before seeking lender of last resort assistance. •  Fourthly, the shareholder controllers of the institution should have made all reasonable efforts to provide liquidity or capital support as a demonstration of their own commitment to the institution. •  Fifthly, there must be no prima facie evidence that the management is not fit and proper, or that the liquidity problem is due to fraud.
The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: The progress of the euro  Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Cercle de L’Union Interalliée in Paris on 24 October 2000. *  *  *  Thank you, Mr Chairman. I am grateful to the French Section of the Franco-British Council for giving me this opportunity to address this distinguished audience here in Paris, and I am delighted to share this public platform with my dear colleague, Jean-Claude Trichet. You have invited us to speak about the progress of the euro. I am very happy to do so from my British perspective - at least for the time being - as a keenly interested observer. My perspective you might expect would be very different from that of Jean-Claude, who was, and is, one of the principal architects of and a major driving force behind the process of European monetary union - one of the true founding fathers. In fact you will find that our analysis and assessment of the euro’s progress so far is very similar. I hope that will not come as too great a disappointment to you! We would certainly, I think, agree that the preparations for and introduction of the euro at the beginning of last year were a technical triumph. The euro-payments infrastructure is generally working well and has underpinned the integration of the euro money market which is an essential precondition for the effective implementation of Eurozone monetary policy.

And there has from the beginning been clear evidence of the anticipated broadening and deepening of euro financial markets more generally, reflected, for example, in increasing issuance of euro-denominated commercial paper, corporate bonds and equities. (If you would like chapter and verse on all this I commend to you the Bank of England’s half-yearly publication, “Practical issues arising from the euro” - available free from our public information department.) I am happy to say that the City of London has played a positive role in this process of euro market integration: it is in fact the greatest contribution that we can make to the success of the project from outside the Eurozone. And it runs in parallel with the distinct, but closely related, pressure for broader international integration of financial markets which is currently reflected in a whole series of market initiatives to unify trading platforms and both clearing and settlement systems, in which both London and Paris are, of course, very much involved. I have no doubt that increased financial market efficiency has an important part to play in improving overall economic efficiency - the question is how best we can bring it about. Jean-Claude and I would also agree, I suspect, that the introduction of the euro has contributed to the increasingly positive macro-economic performance of the Eurozone economy, taken as a whole, over the past couple of years.
But that does not mean global effects are absent. The doubling of the effective global labour pool represents a huge, positive supply shock for the global economy. It has encouraged the shift of the production of goods and services that use lower-skilled labour intensively to countries with an abundance of lower-skilled workers – predominantly emerging market economies – while production of goods and services requiring more highly skilled labour has concentrated in countries with a greater share of higher skilled labour – predominantly advanced economies. The growing ability to split production components and tasks through global value chains has amplified this effect. 19  Globalisation has also increased the contestability of labour markets, weakening the extent to which slack in domestic labour markets influences domestic inflationary pressures. 20  That is, the increased ease with which  activities can be off-shored or domestic vacancies filled by sourcing workers from abroad may have reduced the relative bargaining power and wage expectations of workers. While it is difficult to measure precisely, available evidence suggests that contestability effects could be significant. 21  Greater openness appears to  22  and led to growth in domestic  have reduced the sensitivity of wages to domestic labour market conditions unit labour costs (ULCs) becoming more closely tied to global ULC growth. 23  Overall, the greater global supply of labour has lowered the relative wages of lower-skilled workers in advanced economies.

movements along the Phillips Curve) and global integration along all dimensions – labour, final goods and services, and intermediates – acts as a series of positive supply shocks that impart sustained disinflationary pressures (i.e. shifting the Phillips Curve downwards and flattening it). And just as global factors affect the relationship between domestic slack and inflation, they have made it more difficult for central banks to set policy in order to achieve their objectives. Major secular forces have lowered the equilibrium rate of interest, meaning that central banks have had to use unconventional tools in order to provide stimulus. At the same time, open and integrated markets have reduced central banks’ control over their domestic financial conditions. In the wake of such disinflationary challenges some have argued that monetary policy frameworks should be overhauled. For example, Claudio Borio recently suggested that the secular disinflationary effects from continued global integration could dominate increased cyclical inflationary pressures from a smaller global 38  Bonis, B, Ihrig, J and Wei, M (2017). ‘The Effect of the Federal Reserve's Securities Holdings on Longer-term Interest Rates’ FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20 April 2017. 39 This analysis uses the IMF’s Flexible System of Global Models, a semi-structural model of the global economy that captures international trade and financial linkages. 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  output gap as the recovery progresses.
This may involve a risk that capacity utilisation will remain high and that inflation will eventually overshoot the target. Household debt has increased at a faster pace than income over the past ten years. Norges Bank’s calculations indicate that debt growth may largely be due to the sharp rise in house prices in recent years. Higher house prices have a fairly prolonged effect on household debt growth. Even though the rise in house prices is expected to slow, credit growth will therefore remain high for a fairly long period. Given the assumptions underlying our projections, it is likely that debt will continue to grow at a faster pace than disposable income through the entire projection period. The household debt burden has increased over the past year and is now record high. The interest rate burden is, however, relatively low. A normalisation of interest rates will increase households’ net interest expenses, but according to the projections the interest burden will not be higher than it was at the end of the 1990s. Households will be vulnerable if unexpected disturbances result in higher-thanexpected interest rates. Challenges ahead Petroleum activities give us an economic base that is not available to many other countries. But it also presents us with many challenges. 5/7  First, our petroleum resources are part of our national wealth. When oil is extracted and sold, petroleum wealth is transformed into financial assets. This wealth belongs not only to our generation, but also to future generations.

However, if unrealistic expectations of the future push up prices on a more lasting basis it can lead to serious problems. …but if they are pushed up by unrealistic expectations and lending… Expectations of the future, “mood” and attitude to risk are very important factors with regard to the prices of most assets. During the course of history investors have from time to time behaved as though prices on a particular market would keep on rising for ever. Exaggeratedly optimistic expectations of the future may entice investors into a particular market, prices will then rise, which will attract even more investors in the belief that prices will go on rising. Unless the spiral is broken reasonably early, a bubble will arise. If exaggerated optimism and a high risk propensity over a long period of time have pushed up prices, there is also a considerable risk that the fall from the inflated price level will be very hard once the mood changes. And this will probably have a negative effect on the rest of the economy. It is probably necessary to be most on our guard regarding what developments can be considered sustainable when things appear to be going well. By this I mean times with a high level of growth in the economy and in household incomes, good investment opportunities and low loan losses in the banks. It has happened more than once that a normal economic upturn inspires excessively optimistic expectations of economic developments and the price of risk thus becomes unreasonably low.
1  Relevant documents are published on our website: https://www.snb.ch/en/ifor/finmkt/fnmkt_benchm/id/finmkt_reformrates  Page 3/5  Berne, 13 December 2018 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Charts  Page 4/5  Berne, 13 December 2018 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Page 5/5

The requirement normally made of a settlement system is that settlement can be achieved even if the largest party should fail. This requirement is not met in Sweden and the security in the Swedish payment system would not be regarded as satisfactory in an international evaluation. VPC's owners, i.e. the banks, undertook to remedy this problem when they purchased VPC from the government. That was in spring 1999, and as far as I know nothing has yet been done. Common to all methods, unfortunately, is that they cost a lot of money to implement and this money has to come from the market players in some way. However, it should be in the interests of the market players that something is done. In the long run, it is unlikely that the banks' international counterparties will accept that settlement in Sweden is done through systems that are inferior to those in the rest of Europe, and with questionable security. It is reasonable that we should live up to the international standards now being established. It would be a defeat for the market if the government had to enforce solutions in this field through legislation. Starting point for a renaissance These brief comments show that there are challenges awaiting those who work on the Swedish fixed income market.
They will add twenty-five percent to Europe’s population, twenty-three percent to Europe’s land mass and nine percent to European GDP on a purchasing power parity basis. Average GDP per capita in Europe will therefore decline by thirteen percent to a level slightly above sixty percent of that of the United States. Fifteen years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the new member states are keen to compete on the internal market. The adjustment process will entail important challenges to both newcomers and old-timers. On balance, I remain confident that in the longer term, the growth contribution to the European Union will be a positive one. In a world of rapid change and integration, countries with a long history of open economies and societies are well positioned to reap economic and social benefits. Both of our countries doubtlessly fit into that category. Note that in a recent global survey, Switzerland was voted the third most open country in the world. The challenge will be to maintain our ability to adapt to changing external conditions. On the important issue of domestic structural reform, Switzerland would be misguided to consider EMU membership as a strategy for curing domestic problems. Instead, we have much to learn from our friends across the English Channel on how to reform a domestic economy on the basis of domestic needs. Thank you.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Inside Europe, outside EMU - lessons and outlook Speech by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the British Swiss Chamber of Commerce, Geneva, 23 April 2004. *  *  *  My long-standing personal attachments to the United Kingdom make it a special privilege to be here this morning to speak about Europe and its significance to our two countries. Geneva is one of Europe’s truly international cities and provides a fitting platform for a discussion on some of the salient characteristics about the relations of the United Kingdom and Switzerland toward Europe. The United Kingdom and Switzerland are both undeniably European nations. Nonetheless, they both firmly remain outside of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Institutionally, the links of the two countries with Europe differ, of course. The United Kingdom is in EU Europe while Switzerland is only in Europe, despite the fact that until the EU welcomes ten new Member States next week, we Swiss can be forgiven to think of ourselves as representing the “heart” of Europe. Culturally, our two countries are rooted in different European traditions: Anglo-Saxon on the one hand and Continental European on the other hand, notwithstanding the fact the historical roots of the Saxons are, of course, on the continent. During the remainder of my time with you today, I will sketch more fully a number of salient common features and differences between the United Kingdom and Switzerland.