samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Short-Term Inflation Expectations Continue to  Decline, Tick up Slightly in Longer Term , January 9, 2023. 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC  Statement , December 14, 2022. 5 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Plans for Reducing the Size of  the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet , May 4, 2022. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

An excellent example of Ben’s interdisciplinary work is his book ‘The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth’, published in 2005. Economists have written countless papers on how to increase growth. But very few have addressed the question of why growth is desirable in the first place, in particular for societies that are already rich. Ben’s book fills this gap. It argues that economic growth improves the moral character of society. People tend to be more generous and tolerant towards each other when the economy grows. Economic stagnation, on the other hand, is associated with repression and bigotry. Ben’s latest book, ‘Religion and the Rise of Capitalism’, was published last year. It describes how religion has shaped economic thinking since the beginning of our discipline. The early economic thinkers of the European Enlightenment, such as Adam Smith, were not committed to religion. Ben argues, however, that their world view was profoundly influenced by developments in religious thinking. There is therefore a close connection between religion and the beginning of modern capitalism. With this I would like to conclude my remarks, since you are surely eager to learn more about this fascinating topic from Ben himself. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Benjamin Friedman with a big round of applause. Page 4/4
Second, we could see demand pressures on either side of the most likely outcome. Demand could be weaker if Covid continues to be a material health concern and prompts more caution in activity and spending habits. But there is also an upside risk that the substantial build-up of excess savings in the last year or so raises consumer spending to a larger degree than currently projected. Third, we could also see wage pressures arising if the number of people in work or seeking work does not return to pre-Covid levels, and inactivity remains at a higher level. A return of labour supply is therefore important. Fourth, a further challenge would arise if these temporary price pressures have a more persistent impact on medium-term inflation expectations, which shift to a higher level inconsistent with the target. As set out in the Minutes of the MPC’s June meeting, taking together the evidence from financial market measures and surveys of households, businesses and professional forecasters, the Committee judges that UK inflation expectations currently remain well anchored. It will be important to continue to monitor closely movements in measures of medium-term inflation expectations, however, and to adjust policy accordingly. The post-pandemic economy I want to look further forwards, to the second big question that will shape the performance of the economy. I have described the bounce-back of the economy from the Covid shock.

A persistently high rate of increase in house prices can in isolation engender expectations of a further rise and can thus prove to be self-reinforcing for a period and push up credit demand. At the same time, the switch to a flexible inflation targeting regime reduces the possibility of exposing households to a double shock in the form of higher unemployment and higher interest rates, as was the case prior to the banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. If the economy is exposed to disturbances that may lead to higher unemployment, inflation will normally decline and interest rates will be lowered. High debt growth increases the vulnerability of households to economic disturbances. As a result of low interest rates, the household interest burden will remain fairly low in spite of high debt growth. It may prove to be particularly challenging for borrowers to assess their debt-servicing  4  BIS Review 53/2004  capacity over time in a period when the interest rate is abnormally low. Such a low interest rate also places particular demands on banks in assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers. The interest rate can be used to reduce credit demand. At present - with low interest rates abroad and a close link between domestic interest rates and the krone - a tighter monetary policy would restrain credit demand primarily because job security would be reduced as a result of a stronger krone. Summary of the situation in the Norwegian economy A turnaround in the Norwegian economy has occurred.
The crisis opportunity costs for UK and euro-area citizens have been the highest for at least a century.2  Much the same picture emerges if we look at measures of the fiscal cost of crisis. Again, there are a number of methods for gauging this cost. But one simple metric is to look at the pattern of government debt-to-GDP ratios after the Great Depression and Great Recession, recognising that the larger part of the debt sustainability cost of crisis typically arises from the denominator shrinking than from the numerator rising. Chart 2 plots these debt-to-GDP ratios, again for the US, UK, France and Germany. It suggests that, in the decade after the Great Depression, levels of government debt relative to GDP had increased by around 28 percentage points in the US, 9 percentage points in Germany, but actually declined in the UK. Since the Great Recession, levels of debt relative to GDP have increased by, on average, 1  For example, Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2001). 2  Figures in this paragraph calculate a continuation of pre-crisis GDP using the average growth rate of output in the 10 years preceding the crisis. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  28 percentage points for the same set of countries. The fiscal cost of the Great Recession, at least on this metric, is larger than during the Great Depression.

Aikman et al (2014) discuss where the classification of failure departs from Laeven and Valencia (2010). 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  23  instrument if policymakers have a low tolerance for failure. That matters if, for example, the costs of higher capital requirements increase non-linearly (Greenwood et al (2017)). These points are also evident if we assess individually the performance of the RWCR and NSFR. Chart 18 and Table 3 below show that hit rates of 80 or 90% can only be achieved with high false alarm rates and stringent calibrations of these metrics. Overall, each metric individually does somewhat worse than the leverage ratio in balancing hit and false alarm rates. And similar results hold when the loan to deposit (LTD) ratio is considered instead of the NSFR in the wider sample (Chart 19).
Negative surprises in these markets might amplify shocks and impair the functioning of key markets, potentially even affecting the financing of the real economy. The surge in volatility witnessed last February illustrates this point. Central bank policies are affected by this scenario in at least two dimensions. First, it makes more challenging the definition of an adequate monetary policy normalisation path. A too-rapid adjustment of monetary policy could trigger the materialisation of some of the risks mentioned. A too-gradual adjustment may ultimately force policy to be tightened more rapidly to contain overheating, thus giving rise to the “snap-back” scenario. By the same token, the persistence of very easy financial conditions and very low volatility extends the “search for yield” behaviour of investors and the build-up of vulnerabilities in the financial system. In this regard, effective communication by central banks throughout the monetary normalisation process will be key to helping anchor financial conditions, despite the threat of heightened volatility. Second, in this complex environment, it is particularly important to emphasise the role played by one of the major policy innovations generated during the financial crisis, namely the development of macroprudential policy frameworks. The proper and timely use of the new macroprudential tools, together with the regulatory and supervisory overhaul of the global banking system undertaken in recent years, should help to contain the build-up of financial imbalances. However, given its novelty it’s difficult to know ex-ante how effective these new macroprudential tools will be. In addition, multiple new challenges remain and need to be dealt with.

It is most appropriate he should be our first Keynote Speaker given his profound knowledge on the topics to be addressed in this conference. Among his recent honours, I would recall that last year he received the 2016 Bernácer prize at the Banco de España as the best European economist under the age of 40 working in macroeconomics and finance. His keynote speech today will focus on “Central bank swap lines”. Ricardo, we are very grateful to have the opportunity to exchange views with you again in our institution. The floor is yours. 5/5
1  BIS Review 96/2000  Second, faith is used in everyday language as a synonym for “belief”, “reliance” and “trust”, which could perhaps be interpreted in the sense of “well-founded expectation”. In this context one could think of faith as a probabilistic statement. Immanuel Kant has associated faith with an intermediate degree of certainty, in between mere “opinion” but short of “knowledge”. On this definition my basic answer to the question becomes “yes”. At least in the example of the institution I represent, I see good reasons to believe that the public in Europe should and that it can rely on the European Central Bank to fulfil its mandate and maintain price stability. This sort of “reasoned faith” or “confidence” is (as it should be) underpinned by a sound institutional setup, the application of well-established economic principles and, last but not least, by the quality and determination of the people dedicated to this task. A third aspect of faith relates to “keeping a promise” or “engagement” as in “acting in good faith”, in the sense of reflecting “honesty of intention”. For Thomas Hobbes “to have faith”, “to trust” and “to believe a man” are synonymous. One could think of this dimension of faith as representing a twosided relationship, rather than a unilateral act of faith. From this perspective faith - or here better: trust - is similar to a contract established between two parties.

Fourth, MAS is partnering Enterprise Singapore to host “Deal Fridays” – which are basically curated events to match emerging growth companies with investors seeking private market opportunities. Deal Fridays began last month and will take place every Friday until the Singapore FinTech Festival cum Singapore Week of Innovation and Technology in November. 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Last year, MAS surveyed angel investors, family offices, and venture capitalists to try to get a sense of how much money is potentially on the table. By their own account, there is about $ billion in total available for direct investment into ASEAN start-ups during 2019-21. We hope that Deal Fridays can encourage the deployment of this capital. Sleeping Well: Investing for Retirement with Ageing Demographics Next, sleeping well – or securing sufficient funds for retirement. Safe investment is needed for retirement planning, as the world’s population ages. Populations are ageing across most countries. 2018 was a milestone of sorts: for the first time in human history, persons aged 65 or over outnumbered children under 5 years of age. The rate of demographic ageing will be particularly rapid in Asia. The proportion aged 65 or over in East and Southeast Asia is expected to increase from 11% in 2019 to 24% in 20504 . As people live longer and the workforce shrinks, individuals will face an uphill struggle to fund longer retirements. Retirement planning should thus start young. Starting early gives you more time to reap the benefits of compounding interest.
5 Figures 1 and 2 show a comparison of the accuracy of the forecasts in the period 1999-2008 for CPI inflation and GDP growth for a number of analysts. The red bars show the absolute mean error adjusted for differences in publication dates. The blue bars show the mean error with positive or negative sign. The shorter the blue bars, the smaller the systematic over- or underestimation has been – and the less bias the forecasts have had. If the bar is above the zero line the mean error has been positive and the forecasts have on average been too low, and vice versa. In the case of both inflation and GDP growth, the Riksbank's accuracy has been relatively good and its bias relatively small compared to other forecasters. Was monetary policy well-balanced ex ante? Given that it has been determined that the central bank's forecasts are normally satisfactory, the next step is to analyse, ex ante, the monetary policy deliberations the central bank has conducted on the basis of the forecasts. The first question to answer is whether the monetary policy conducted has been efficient. Given the information available at the time the decision was made, would it have been possible, by selecting a different interest rate path, to have stabilised inflation or the real economy better without stabilising the other less well? Would it even have been possible to achieve a better stabilisation of both?

By remaining true to the revolution – while not wasting our time and energy in refighting it – we can all turn our attention to the challenges of the future. In this way we will reinforce the stability of the financial system, for the good of the people of the United Kingdom. The revolution is over. Long live the revolution! 6  Have big banks gotten safer? By Natasha Sarin and Lawrence H. Summers, September 2016, available here: https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/have-big-banks-gotten-safer/ 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  9
We have also worked on a data dashboard for the top management to track gender progress through KPIs on an annual basis, we have launched leadership and mentoring programs to strengthen strategic skills and encourage female to apply for management positions, we guarantee gender equitable panels in managerial recruitment processes, we are deploying training in unconscious bias, we have an internal D&I manifesto and we are working closely on a regular basis with our colleagues of the ESCB and SSM on a specific network to advance diversity and inclusion in our institutions. These actions are already proving we are on the right path, but events, such as this, sharing different views, challenges, approaches, and possible ways of improving, allow us to discover new pathways to become more efficient in the fulfilling of our goal: gender equality in central banks. Thank you very much and enjoy the sessions! 2

In fact the issue of central bank independence, Ladies and Gentlemen, is as old as central banking itself, having been debated on and off over the past couple of hundred years. Many of the “transitional economies” of Eastern Europe also have adopted reforms aimed at  BIS Review 136/2007  1  making their central banks more independent. 19th and 20th century economists such as, David Ricardo and John Maynard Keynes have all added their views to the subject. There seem to be consensus that central banks must be given a charter which includes a strong commitment to price stability, and the freedom and sufficient scope to pursue it. This means that while central banks may not have goal independence, they should have instrument independence. One need not dwell on the desirability of price stability. Economies work better if investment and wage decisions are not thwarted and confused by high inflation. However, the fears in some respects are associated with the financing of fiscal deficits that governments in the developing world from time to time have to run to meet, for instance, social obligations or indeed provide public goods. This indeed is a genuine fear (including others that may be identified) that this symposium must address. There are arguments that there is a fundamental conflict between independence and an obligation to finance the budget deficit – a conflict which often is resolved at the expense of price stability.
However, there is another area in which the Confederation and cantons have made an even more important contribution to the independence of monetary policy. They put the favourable years before the crisis to good use by making their public finances pretty weatherproof. As a result, Switzerland was one of the few countries where government finances did not deteriorate substantially in the crisis. Sound government finances are essential not only for the competitive strength of an economy but also for safeguarding social security institutions – and thus for social cohesion. In the long term, excessive government indebtedness can also endanger price stability and the independence of monetary policy; one reason for this is that it increases the temptation to keep interest rates very low for longer than necessary. At this point, I would like to draw a preliminary conclusion with regard to the SNB’s role in monetary policy. I am firmly convinced that no change is needed in the SNB’s current mandate and therefore with regard to its fundamental role in monetary policy. Our job is to ensure price stability while taking due account of economic developments. This is a sensible and credible mandate. Our clear definition of price stability has also stood the test of time. The SNB equates price stability with a rise in the national consumer price index of less than 2% a year. Deflation – in other words, a protracted decline in the price level – also breaches the goal of price stability. However, we do not react automatically to inflationary developments.

At the end of the sales programme, the National Bank still held 1,290 tonnes of gold, corresponding to one third of the value of its currency reserves. Even though it has been demonetised, the yellow metal still plays an important role in our reserves. It is an asset category that traditionally affords good protection in times of crises in the international monetary system. It also allows us to hold part of our reserves on our own country, which is not possible with financial assets. Moreover, as expressly requested by Parliament, Article 99 of the Federal Constitution requires the National Bank to hold part of its currency reserves in gold. The Governing Board considers that the holdings of 1,290 tonnes are appropriate to the current international environment. It does not intend to proceed with further sales of gold. Distribution of profit This General Meeting of Shareholders will find a special place in the National Bank's annals, as you are going to decide on how the proceeds of the gold sales are to be distributed. This will close a chapter first opened in 1997, when a group of experts came to the conclusion that the SNB's currency reserves were larger than required for the execution of its mandate and that it could thus consider selling half its gold holdings, once the Swiss franc's gold parity was discontinued.
There is nothing bad per se about speculation, high risk taking or even high levels of remuneration, provided the principals fully assume the consequences of their actions, and provided, in particular, that the tax payer remains out of the picture. It is clear that our financial system did not satisfy this requirement. In the  BIS Review 33/2010  3  advanced G20 countries, public-sector capital injections to the banking sector so far have been estimated at 3.4% of GDP! 3 This is a lower bound for the risks assumed by the public sector; the latter may have been closer to 25% of GDP for the major western economies, according to a recent estimate by J.C. Trichet. 4 There is absolutely no economic, let alone moral, justification for situations where individuals enjoy high levels of remuneration or high returns when times are good, while the public sector has to come to the rescue when times are bad. In an ideal world, it should now be the responsibility of the financial sector – rather than regulators – to come up with credible proposals for change. These proposals must inevitably imply that all the main players, in particular managers and creditors, have much more at stake than in the past. Depending on how creative we are in finding solutions, financial institutions will have to be smaller and less prone to risk taking. For managers, at the very least, this must mean bonuses being tied to the long-run performance of their firm. Logically, one could envisage going further.

The second reason is that transparency reduces the inevitable uncertainties related to monetary policy implementation. If markets know how we judge future inflationary pressures and how we may react to these, they can better predict our future monetary policy. Improved predictability of monetary policy leads to fewer painful surprises in the economy. Moreover, less uncertainty about monetary policy reduces both risk premiums in financial markets, and financing costs. The third rationale for central bank transparency is public and political accountability. Central banks are mandated to act in the interest of their country, usually by maintaining price stability. This can imply unpopular decisions, which is essentially the reason for central bank independence. . Central banks should thus be free from public and political pressure. But it is obvious that some mechanism must be set in place to ensure accountability of independent central banks. Transparency about monetary policy is essential to central bank ensure accountability. However, transparency in itself is  BIS Review 55/2006  1  not enough. The statements made by central bankers must be accessible to the public and must be subject to scrutiny. Here, a critical press has a very important role to play. 2. Communication of monetary policy by the Swiss National Bank  In order to improve monetary policy effectiveness and enable public accountability the Swiss National Bank started to regularly explain its monetary policy decisions to the public already in the 1970's.