samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Table 1 FLS data The table below includes all participating groups that had signed up to the scheme and certified their Base Stock of loans by 24/09/2012 FLS Group  Certified lending to UK households and PNFCs Aggregate outstanding FLS £ drawings £ Base Stock of loans as at 30/06/12  Quarterly net lending flow  Cumulative net lending since 30/06/2012  1,211,736  n/a  n/a  n/a  Aldermore  1,567  n/a  n/a  n/a  Barclays  181,020  n/a  n/a  n/a  Hinckley & Rugby Building Society  433  n/a  n/a  n/a  Ipswich Building Society  444  n/a  n/a  n/a  Kleinwort Benson  11  n/a  n/a  n/a  Leeds Building Society  7,567  n/a  n/a  n/a  Lloyds Banking Group  443,255  n/a  n/a  n/a  629  n/a  n/a  n/a  Nationwide Building Society  152,155  n/a  n/a  n/a  Principality Building Society  5,408  n/a  n/a  n/a  RBS Group  214,816  n/a  n/a  n/a  Santander  189,339  n/a  n/a  n/a  Virgin Money  15,093  n/a  n/a  n/a  TOTAL  Monmouthshire Building Society  The FLS measure of lending covers drawn sterling loans to households and private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) by the FLS Group, which includes all UK resident monetary financial institutions and related specialist mortgage lenders within a group.

The FLS does not seek to allocate credit to particular parts of the economy directly – the Bank is not taking a view on this matter. But SMEs and first time home buyers in particular are thought to be credit hungry. Banks will collectively need to meet that demand if they are individually to make the most of the FLS. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Not necessarily every bank will support every sector. But if the big firms don’t then the smaller banks will. We are relying on the pressures of demand and supply, and competition, to ensure that credit flows to where there is demand. The normal business model of a bank is that their lending rates are related to their funding rates. The process for doing so is not immediate and funding from different sources – both retail and wholesale, secured and unsecured, might be used to support lending activities. There is no reason to think that the provision of cheaper funding via the FLS will cause a bank to change its business model in this regard. Indeed the incentives in the scheme are for banks and building societies to cut lending rates and hence lend more to get the cheapest funding. Since the scheme was announced we have seen widespread falls in funding costs across different sources and an equally wide variety of lending rate reductions.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Figure 10 Nominal rates on 10-yr government bonds  Chile: Interest rates by type of loan (2)  (percent)  (index, 2006-2016=100)  18 15  Brazil  12 9  Colombia  6  14  175  175  15  150  150  12  125  9  100  15  125  Housing  100  Consumer  Perú Mexico Chile (1)  3  18  6  75  3  50  75 Commercial 06  16  08  10  12  14  50 16  (1) Considers Central Bank and Treasury bonds. (2) Weighted average rates of all operations performed each month. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. Figure 11 Total debt of non-banking enterprises (*) (percent of GDP)  125  Domestic  125  External  100  100  75  75  50  50  25  25  0  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  0  (*) Based on firm-level information with the exceptions of factoring and leasing, securitized bonds and commercial papers. Preliminary estimate for March 2016. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on Achef, SBIF and SVS data.

Ravi Menon: Emerging Asia – restructuring for sustained growth Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at JP Morgan Singapore’s 50th Anniversary Dinner, Singapore, 31 October 2014. *  *  *  Mr Jamie Dimon, Chairman & CEO, JP Morgan Chase & Co Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen I am delighted to join you this evening to mark JP Morgan’s 50 years in Singapore. During these last 50 years, JPM Singapore has grown to become an important node in the bank’s global network.   It is the Asia hub for commodities and treasury services.   It is the hub for FX and private banking in South and Southeast Asia.   JPM Singapore entities together employ about 2,800 people. This is projected to increase to 3,500 over the next few years. JPM has had an even longer presence in Asia – close to a century.   JPM has thus had a front row seat witnessing Asia’s remarkable transformation and shift in the global economic centre of gravity to the region.   And it is now positioned to participate in the next exciting chapter of the Asian growth story. As we approach 2015, the economies of Emerging Asia are at an inflection point.   Externally, they have to deal with the normalisation of monetary policy and interest rates in the United States.   Domestically, they have to sustain growth and macro stability amidst ongoing structural reforms.
Már Guðmundsson: To what extent do international and EU reform proposals address the fault lines in cross-border banking? Keynote address by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Eighth High-Level Meeting for the Middle East & North Africa Region “Recent policy developments for strengthening the resilience of the financial sector”, Abu Dhabi, 28 November 2012. *  *  *  Governor, chairmen and participants, Let me begin by thanking the organisers for inviting me to address this impressive gathering and thus enabling me to visit this fascinating place. In my speech I will discuss the risks in cross-border banking that manifested themselves in the crisis and what has been done since to address them. The bottom line is that, at the global level, we had developed significant cross-border banking operations that were only very partly covered by the safety net of lender of last resort (LOLR), deposit insurance and adequate resolution powers, and the associated regulation and supervision. I use the metaphor of a fault line to describe this. But first I want to tell you a little more about the origin of my perspective on these issues. It comes first from my tenure at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) from 2004–2009, where I was involved in work on these issues, with the BIS International Banking Statistics providing a constant point of reference.

First, appropriate intervention by supervisors vis-à-vis prime brokers to make sure that they ask for and get broad information from hedge funds and that they put in  12  Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon, 2003  13  Noyer, 2006a  14  Noyer, 2007  4  BIS Review 42/2007  place comprehensive risk management of all hedge funds-related exposures is essential. Second, there may be scope for policy-makers to encourage appropriate organisation of infrastructure in order to improve the information available on the markets in which hedge funds operate. Third, a specific information system to be triggered in the event of a crisis could be established ex ante in order to ensure that relevant information on exposures and positions could be quickly gathered if necessary. -  At the macroeconomic level •  Increased financial asset holding resulting from financial innovation is likely to result in higher sensitivity of households to asset price booms and busts 15 . On the liabilities side of non-financial agents’ balance sheets, by facilitating the management of risk and easing liquidity constraints, financial innovation stimulates both the supply of and demand for credit, which may lead to higher leveraging and financial fragility. Note that both effects run counter to the result I mentioned at the start, i.e. that financial innovation tends to reduce growth volatility. Although this result may still hold true in normal circumstances, it may thus be reversed in specific ones, especially in stress situations.
Fiscal policy will have to play a predominant role in the strategy needed to attain the objectives set in this area, both to deter environmentally harmful activities, through an internationally harmonised tax system, and to foment the public and private investment needed to develop cleaner technologies, and to alleviate the social costs of the transition. The financial sector is also called on to play a key role. To do so, it is crucial that it incorporates into its decision-making the risks associated with climate change. Environmental stress tests devised by supervisors will be a useful instrument in this connection, as will the international harmonisation of a taxonomy that provides transparency on the activities that contribute to the transition to a low-carbon economy. 4.6. Maintaining a sound financial sector I devoted my last appearance before the Parliamentary Economic Committee to analysing the challenges this crisis will pose to the financial sector. I should in any event like to stress today that, from the medium-term standpoint, the current crisis will entail additional downward pressure on profitability. That highlights the need for banks to urgently address some of the challenges associated with digitalisation and the management of cybersecurity risks, along with others of a reputational nature. An additional drive must be made to reduce operating costs and to achieve efficiency gains, to invest in technology and to improve banks’ conduct and reputation. 4.7. Addressing the new structural challenges after COVID-19. All the challenges I have mentioned were prior to the pandemic breaking.

Apart from the developments in the nature of financial risk due to globalization and regional integration, the ramifications of the Basle II capital accord, and the potential for developments in Islamic derivative instruments, I am aware that there are many other highly technical matters that need to be appreciated and understood. I will leave this to the experts who have given their valuable time to share their knowledge with us today at this banking and law school event. I wish you an engaging learning experience. This is also a rare opportunity to develop your networks, share your knowledge with your peers and reflect upon how this learning experience will make a difference in your professional career. 4  BIS Review 11/2004
Still, the world over currency counterfeiting and design concerns prevail irrespective of modern technology. Second, it attempts to protect the real value of currency by maintaining inflation at low levels through monetary policy. If prices or inflation rise day by day, the value of currency in terms of goods and services it can buy gets less and less and people will tend to dispense with currency as money and tend to use other international currencies as their preferred media of exchange. In such events, the currency system will collapse and the existence of the Central Bank will be questioned. This happened in Germany in 1920 and Zimbabwe in recent years. Second, the conduct of monetary policy Monetary Policy contains measures to regulate the supply, availability, cost and international exchange of the country’s money. Accordingly, levels of interest rates, exchange rate and credit in the economy are under the control of the Central Bank. These economic variables determine almost all economic activities of the public such as investments, savings, international transactions, production and employment. Their changes first affect our expenditure (what is called aggregate demand) its impact on production, income and employment. This course of effects is termed the monetary policy transmission mechanism. As these variables are part and parcel of our day-to-day life and their effects vary on different segments of people, the world over Central Banks get their fair share of praise or blame for whatever ensues in the economy.

Lars Nyberg: The framework of modern central banking Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a Conference on Reforming the State Bank of Vietnam, Hanoi, 21 March 2006. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to this conference on reforming the State Bank of Vietnam. I imagine that one reason why I have been invited here is that the central bank I represent, Sveriges Riksbank in Sweden, just over a decade ago was in a situation which resembles the one the State Bank of Vietnam is experiencing now. At that time we had reached a situation where there were strong reasons – if not imperative ones – for reconsidering the way in which we used to think about monetary policy. It became clear that a reform of monetary policy and its framework was both desirable and necessary. Of course, Sweden is by no means the only country where monetary policy has undergone major changes in recent times. The view of how best to conduct monetary policy has changed fairly radically over the past twenty years and this has been reflected in a more or less worldwide reform process. What I hope to be able to contribute here today – as an introduction to the discussions – is to provide an overall picture of the ideas that formed the basis for this process and to describe what are today considered to be the guiding principles for a modern central bank, according to established research and practical experiences.
In recent years, non-bank financial institutions are also playing an important role in this regard, by implementing innovative solutions. Public authorities have initiated and developed electronic platforms for the public payment services, such as taxes. The progress is notable – if compared with 10–20 years ago. But, our benchmarks are visionary: alignment with the standards of the countries we aspire to integrate with and the development of a society with a broad base of financial inclusion, where the use of electronic payment instruments are part of everyday life. The Bank of Albania, based on this vision, has placed at its focus the modernisation of retail payments system to bring about a tangible change. In collaboration with all market stakeholders, and with the valuable expertise of the World Bank, funded by SECO, the Bank of Albania finalised a set of analyses and studies on the situation of payments in Albania. I would like to mention here three main reports, published on our website: 1. The so-called PAFI project report on the market analysis on financial inclusion, which is implemented, in many other countries, and aims at reforming the retail payment systems and promoting financial inclusion; 2. Review of the Market for Remittances in Albania, a component of retail payment systems; 3. The study on measuring the costs of payment instruments. This study identified the costs for each element, finding that cash is the most costly means to the Albanian economy. In addition, it sets out scenarios for the replacement with various innovative instruments, which reduce these costs.

To follow, I will discuss the role of policy in and ensuring that growth is sustainable and not prone to relapses, especially ways to mitigate potential economic and financial imbalances. And finally, I will explain how the Bank of Thailand intends to find the right balance for policy to foster businesses and investment during the rise of Asia. Ladies and Gentlemen, Since the ancient Greek and Indian times, a golden age refers to a period of peace and unity, stability, and rising wealth, with an abundance of hope and opportunities. Evidence has pointed out that Asia has increasingly embraced these characteristics. In terms of peace and unity, we have witnessed increasing international cooperation to boost economic welfare and safeguard against risks in the region. For ASEAN, this has been reflected by the increase in free trade and investment agreements both bilaterally and under the ASEAN Economic Community. In a broader group, the ASEAN+3 countries have been working closely to set up and improve a committed mechanism for regional crisis prevention and management. As for economic stability, I think that the robust recovery, low level of public debt, together with sufficient foreign reserves have demonstrated that Asian regional economies have the satisfactory capacity to cope with future shocks. In terms of increasing wealth, it is clear that the share of emerging Asia in world GDP has been increasing markedly with a status as a global production hub of manufactured goods. This is projected to rise even further.
The first point is that when fixed or foreseeable exchange rate regimes are implemented - like we did in the past-, in economies similar to our economy, where capital movements are free the exchange rate risk does not disappear, but is assumed by the public sector or by the central banks, as the monetary authority. Considered as a whole, in environments where the economy has a relatively fragile structure, further elevated by the loose fiscal policies of governments, this may be even more costly than each economic unit assuming its own exchange rate risk under the floating exchange rate regime. The second point is that the presence of derivatives markets would enable foreign trade firms, under the floating exchange rate regime, to act as if exchange rates were fixed. In other words, with the development and widespread use of derivatives markets, the level of foreign trade would not differ under the floating exchange rate regime from that under the fixed exchange rate regime, and exchange rate risk would cease to be a factor influencing the level of foreign trade5. Although these markets are being newly founded in Turkey, I would like address a point, which often comes up in international literature and which I believe might arise in Turkey in the coming periods. Leaving aside the fact that speculative transactions are frequently made in derivatives markets, and especially in the foreign exchange market, these markets are alleged to increase risk and volatility in the economy.

Risk can be measured. Cases where the course and results of the events neither cannot be measured nor predicted are not referred to as risk but uncertainty. In other words, the intangible aspect of events is defined as uncertainty. Due to the intangible nature of uncertainty, its results and the extent of its effects cannot be predicted. Probability cannot be attributed to uncertainty. Uncertainty is inevitable and its results are unmanageable. There exists no market that can avoid uncertainty. 1  Knight, F.H. (1985), “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit”, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Chapters 2 and 7. BIS Review 17/2005  1  On the other hand, risk refers to the part of the future effects of events which can be measured. Risk can be calculated; results of risks can be explained by certain probabilities. In this context, risk is predictable and we can manage its results. There exist markets for risk management. In Turkey, high and volatile inflation has been the main source of uncertainty for the last 30 years. Concepts of uncertainty and risk have become indistinguishable. Hence, it has been impossible to implement risk management or to establish risk management agents on this slippery slope. At this point, I would like to emphasize on a technical matter. As it is known, volatility is priced in derivatives markets. When uncertainty is high, volatility increases significantly. This makes pricing difficult and in these circumstances prices reach very high levels. Hence, risk management becomes almost impossible.
This means there is a fiscal honeymoon in the first year of higher prices that creates the illusion for policymakers that there is additional room in the budget to spend. It is only during the next year or two as costs adjust and indexation mechanisms start to work that the painful reckoning comes due. Caution is therefore needed when any additional fiscal support measures are designed. Ongoing research at Eesti Pank has attempted to estimate the extent to which an unexpected rise in inflation would affect fiscal balances in the euro area using data from the mid-1990s to 2021, and has found that inflation has a sizeable positive effect on the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP7. The positive effect comes both from the expenditure side of the budget and from the revenue side. This is particularly true when there is a significant positive inflation surprise, meaning when actual inflation turns out to be higher than expected. Governments in Europe increased their spending in 2022 so they could fund energy subsidies, invest in their defence forces and provide the help needed by Ukraine. Despite this extra spending though, the fiscal picture has remained relatively benign in most countries and in the euro area overall. This also applies to Estonia, where preliminary data suggest that the fiscal deficit for 2022 will be around 1.2 per cent of GDP. This benign outcome can in large part be ascribed to the high inflation that we saw last year.

Looking ahead, this boost to public finances is likely to be reversed when  4/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  inflation comes down, at which point deficits will creep up again. This is something that politicians should keep in mind as they plan their government's spending and taxes for the years ahead. The monetary policy response Times are clearly challenging for central banks. It is difficult for monetary policy to address supply-side shocks that are both inflationary and recessionary at the same time. If such shocks do not last for long, it might be appropriate to wait and see whether inflationary pressures will recede by themselves without any additional strain being put on the economy by higher interest rates. This was not the case this time however, and central banks were not able to just wait and let inflation spread through the economy. Because once the inflationary mind-set has taken hold, it is very difficult to change. Businesses and consumers must have confidence that central banks are determined to bring inflation down to its target, even if they cannot do it overnight. Before I discuss the latest monetary policy decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB, let me take a brief detour into not-so-distant history. Late in autumn of 2021, we were quite confident in the Governing Council that most of the supply-side inflation pressures caused by the pandemic would fade by the coming spring.