samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Global exchanges – like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, ICE and Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) in the US, and London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the UK, and Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx), Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Group and the Japan Exchange (JPX) Group in Asia – are also SROs. This brings me to my next point. 16. There is no single “correct” model for the SRO. Neither is a particular model cast in stone and unchangeable. The division of regulatory responsibilities between the statutory regulator and the exchange’s SRO function – or some other regulatory model – has to reflect and adapt to each jurisdiction’s circumstances, market environment and other idiosyncrasies. To illustrate this diversity: •  In the US, the SEC has primary responsibility for reviewing IPO filings made by companies. Member supervision is undertaken by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a separate industry SRO which supervises all securities broker dealers. US exchanges are responsible for market surveillance, although some have outsourced the duties to FINRA. •  In UK, the LSE performs market surveillance and member supervision, while listings are approved by its statutory regulator i.e. the Financial Conduct Authority. •  In Asia, HKEx, JPX Group and ASX Group perform all SRO functions in the areas of listings, member supervision and market surveillance, much like in Singapore. There may also be additional structures and processes in place to supplement the SRO functions. For example HKEx has an independent Listing Committee that makes all formal decisions on listing applications. 17.

This is a small change, well within normal variations from one year to the next. Government revenues - and thus the budget surplus - would increase by almost 1% of Norway’s annual GDP. If the increase in petroleum revenues is used in Norway, it corresponds to almost half of the annual growth in the non-oil economy in a normal year. If the private sector of the economy is also expanding, and the economy is already close to capacity, this policy would swiftly lead to strong pressures on the resources in the economy. This would result in a rise in wages and prices, and would also lead to unstable conditions in the foreign exchange market. The Government Petroleum Fund shall serve as a buffer against short-term fluctuations in oil revenues. As large portions of the revenues from oil activities accrue to the state, fluctuations in oil prices and oil revenues will primarily result in changes in allocations to the Petroleum Fund. Since all of the capital in the Petroleum Fund is invested abroad, such changes will in principle not influence  1 2  See Auerbach et al (1993). See Report to the Storting No 1 (2000-01), the National Budget for 2001. BIS Review 105/2000  4  the level of activity in the economy. This makes the Norwegian economy more robust to fluctuations in oil prices and thus less dependent on oil, even in the short run. Some of the petroleum revenues are therefore used to finance central government budget expenditure.
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy transmission in a changing financial system – lessons from the recent past, thoughts about the future Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Barclays Global Inflation Conference, New York City, 14 June 2010. *  *  *  I wish to thank Luca Benati, José Luis Peydró-Alcalde, Massimo Rostagno, Jens Tapkins and Flemming Würtz for their contributions to this speech. I remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. Introduction It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this conference. Since the crisis erupted, in mid-2007, central banks throughout the world have conducted their monetary policies using new instruments and techniques. Are these changes temporary, and linked to the effects of the financial crisis? Or do they mark more lasting changes in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy? These are important questions to understand the role of central banks in the current crisis and in the future. The simple answer is that monetary policy operates through financial markets, markets that have changed substantially over the last decade. Monetary policy cannot be implemented without taking these changes into account. However, since central banks have to be accountable, they need to explain how they reflect these changes in their monetary policy operations without changing their underlying objective. I will try to address this issue by dividing my remarks today into three main parts.

First, I will review trend developments in financial intermediation and single out a recurring theme in the evolution of the financial markets over the last 30 years: the rise of securitisation and collateralised finance. I will then consider the consequences of this innovation for the transmission of monetary policy in the post-crisis world. I will start by looking at the money markets and turn to the wider financial system, including the shadow banking sector. Looking forward, the main sources of collateralisation will be an issue to consider if the present trend towards downscaling the creation of private asset-backed securities continues. Public debt instruments are likely to play an important role. This will lead us to reflect on the role of central banking at a time of high public debt. 1. The rise of collateral  The financial system has undergone profound changes over the past few decades. Markets have grown significantly; competition has intensified. These are well-known phenomena. I would like to focus on the consequence of this, namely that the core of financial intermediation has moved from depository institutions – commercial banks – to a hybrid aggregate of institutions and functions, which is broadly referred to as the shadow banking system. The rise of the shadow banks, their ups and their downs, are inseparably connected with a key financial innovation of the last 30 years: securitisation. The emergence of a shadow banking system is not a new phenomenon.
In terms of European cooperation, supervision will be given a new structure, based on proposals presented by the European Commission last summer. One element of this proposal is the creation of a European risk board, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), in which central banks and supervisory authorities will meet to discuss exactly the kind of overall systemic risks that were overlooked in the run-up to the present crisis. Another element is the upgrading of the three supervisory committees in which all European supervisory authorities collaborate into European authorities with somewhat greater independence and more widespread authority than previously. All of this will hopefully be agreed upon by the finance ministers in December of this year, while Sweden still holds the Presidency of the EU. 2 The costs of financial crises are greater than was previously believed. The present crisis has shown that the world’s financial markets are more strongly interlinked than there has previously been reason to believe. Who would have thought that the collapse of a US  2  This issue was discussed in more depth in my speech “Towards a new European supervisory structure”, recently held at SIFMA’s Annual Meeting in New York on 27 October. investment bank would cause the entire world’s credit systems to break down? A national financial crisis can rapidly spread across the entire world if, for example, the value of certain assets starts to be brought into question and it is not known in which balance sheet these assets have been hidden.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Monetary policy situation and economic prospects Summary of a speech by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Centre for Banking Studies, Lugano, 28 September 2004. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In formulating its medium-term monetary policy, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) must take the uncertainty surrounding the development of the economic environment into consideration. The SNB believes that the economy is well on the road to recovery, both in Switzerland and abroad. For our country, it anticipates real GDP growth of close to 2% in 2004. Sustained growth is also expected for the coming years. Consequently, the utilisation of the economy’s production capacity will steadily improve, while unemployment will gradually decline. The improved utilisation rate will be accompanied by a rise in inflationary pressure in the medium term. This scenario could be revised, however, if new information were to come to light. The SNB will thus continue to monitor economic developments closely and will subsequently draw the necessary monetary policy conclusions. BIS Review 54/2004  1
In the event policymakers contemplate asset purchases again in the future, they should be able to undertake them with confidence that balance sheet expansion will not compromise the Fed’s ability to effectively implement monetary policy when the time comes to lift rates from the zero lower bound. Lesson 3: The Fed could purchase large amounts of securities without damaging the market Absent a conflicting policy objective, a central bank should aim to promote good market functioning in its operations to help ensure effective transmission to the rest of the financial system. This objective is a vital one for the Fed because of the importance of the U.S. Treasury market as a global benchmark. As such, the staff of the New York Fed’s Open Market Trading Desk considered how to execute asset purchase programs in ways that avoided harming market structures and activity. 24 If the Fed became too dominant a buyer or holder, it could have reduced the tradeable supply of targeted securities and discouraged trading among market participants, leading to diminished liquidity and price discovery. A significant deterioration in liquidity could lead investors to demand a premium for transacting in these markets, ultimately raising borrowing costs and undermining the program’s policy goal. I do not believe the Fed’s purchase programs had any unintended adverse effects on market functioning. In fact, over time, we learned that we were able to purchase in larger sizes and faster paces than perhaps initially expected.

Managing market expectations about monetary policy implementation takes on even more importance in the challenging environment posed by the zero lower bound. Both in shifting into a regime that uses the balance sheet as an active tool for policy implementation and then shifting away from such use, there is an important interaction that the settings of overnight rates, forward guidance on those rates, and balance sheet configurations have on overall financial conditions. Having clear and credible communications that help market participants understand the central bank’s intended use of these tools can thus affect overall program effectiveness. Indeed, a central bank’s clarity around how it would pursue its goals at the zero lower bound can, in itself, produce a more stable environment with fewer and shorter trips to the zero lower bound.31 And even at the zero lower bound, the speed and accuracy with which market participants understand the central bank’s reaction function could contribute to better macroeconomic outcomes.32 6 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  My analysis takes its cue from the framework proposed by Chair Yellen, where unconventional policy tools are deployed to provide additional policy accommodation at the zero lower bound, and a supposition that balance sheet expansion would be introduced if the zero bound is viewed to be more restrictive than can be mitigated by forward guidance alone, just as they were during the financial crisis and subsequent recession. Communications are central to the two primary channels through which balance sheet policies are believed to work.
Lars Nyberg: IT in the financial sector Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at UNISYS, Executive Business Conference, 16 September 2002. *  *  *  To begin with, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to come here today and discuss how information technology has affected the financial sector. This is a very large subject, with many possible approaches and my aim is merely to illustrate a few of these. I have also been given the chance of selecting which of them I wish to discuss, which I especially appreciate. IT and the stock market Probably the first thing one thinks of when one hears the words IT and the financial sector is the “bubble” on the stock market, the increasingly unrealistic assessment of the profits that would be generated by the new technology and the “new economy” at the end of the 1990s and the painful sobering up process when the stock market took a downturn in winter 2000. Although we all feel some unease with regard to the stock market fall when we read our old age pension forecasts, this is perhaps in the long term the least interesting aspect of IT in the financial sector. I therefore intend to limit myself to two reflections regarding the “bubble issue”. The first is that it has happened before and will probably happen again. Let me remind you of the first “IT bubble”, at the beginning of the previous century when the new technology was wireless telegraphy.

This translates to at least 6,000–7,000 new jobs for the financial industry annually. We should come together to invest in adding to the talent pool here, and avoid unproductive poaching from within the industry. MAS and IBF will continue to work with the industry to see how we can extend more competency-based skills training to new entrants joining the industry. More than any other industry perhaps, the financial industry depends on talent. Identifying, nurturing, and developing talent must therefore be the number one priority of every financial industry CEO. IBF has been organising these Annual Conferences – to bring together industry leaders to deliberate on how we can do better in building talent for the industry. Today's Conference will focus on leadership development – how we can build a robust pipeline of leaders in our organisations and develop our talent base. I wish you a fruitful session ahead and I look forward to your continuous partnership in our common journey of learning and growing in the year ahead. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
So far, the repricing of assets and the unwinding of positions have been quite orderly and the financing of the US current account deficit continues to be smooth. In broad terms, bond yields have increased, equity prices have declined, and the US dollar has appreciated in nominal effective terms. In terms of policy, the key issue in the global economy now is how to manage the transition to a higher interest rates environment so as to safeguard economic stability in view of the continued firm growth. Another is the management of the risk that higher oil prices might affect the global recovery. And the third is the issue of addressing the major global imbalances without creating serious volatilities to the financial markets. Let me turn now to the domestic economy. This year a theme that has kept recurring in my presentation of the Thai economy is that of risks and adjustment. This is to say that, for Thailand, this year has been a year of greater risks and the key theme has been adjusting to risks as the global economic and financial environment has become less helpful. The key external pressure an the Thai economy throughout this year has been the higher oil prices, the higher global interest rates, and the potential impact an our exports of a slowing Chinese economy. This year, we also have our own domestic challenges.

The risk to global growth from higher oil prices is now an issue that captures the attention of financial markets. Compared to the previous episodes of high oil prices, this time the high oil prices could very well persist longer because the increase has been driven by the rise in global energy demand as well as by supply disruptions. But because the oil prices in real terms are still lower than the peak levels during the oil crisis of the 1980’s, while the global economy has also become less dependent on oil,  BIS Review 50/2004  1  common wisdom at this time is that the higher oil prices will put pressure on global growth and inflation but will not in itself derail the ongoing momentum of global recovery. As for the rise in interest rates, the risk to global growth coming from higher global interest rates so far looks less threatening. This is because interest rates especially in the US are being increased from very low levels and are being done gradually. In the case of the US, the increase is more of an indication that the Fed is regarding the current recovery as being solid. Moreover, because the increase in rates is good for maintaining economic stability as well as for addressing global imbalances, the increase in interest rates should be seen as a good thing and should be welcomed.
The recent market stability issues resulting from the Covid health crisis has provided an opportunity to ensure there is a good flow of information between authorities and coordinate our approaches where appropriate. As a recent example, in December, the PRA, European Central Bank (ECB) and Federal Reserve Board all published short statements on our respective websites5 highlighting that, recognising the global and interconnected nature of banks, we are committed to working closely to ensure that supervisory approaches on operational resilience are well coordinated. Given the UK’s exit from the EU, I would like to specifically mention the open and supportive relationship we have with colleagues at the ECB and individual National Competent Authorities (NCAs) across the EU. Clearly, the nature of those relationships has changed, both in terms of its legal basis but also how some of the supervisory interactions will work. As Sam Woods noted in his Mansion House speech, we will double down on our cooperation efforts to ensure good relationships continue. The good news is that we have agreed a range of tools to facilitate this, from Memorandums of Understanding to information exchanges and supervisory colleges. Given this and the long history of building relationships with Home State authorities, we are confident our relationship with the ECB and the NCAs will continue to develop and deepen. Robust and proportionate requirements for international firms  Having talked about our expectations of supervisory cooperation, let me turn to what we expect from international firms.

Responsible openness: The PRA’s approach to supervising banks Speech given by David Bailey, Executive Director for International Banks Supervision, Prudential Regulation Authority  Bank of England Hosted Webinar 11 January 2021  I am grateful to Andy Murfin, Tom Crossland, Orfhlaith Sheehy, Caleb Barnes, Shakir Anverally, Marina Barnard, Ross Howie and Tanveer Hussain for their assistance in writing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction  Welcome. I am delighted that so many of you could join us today. I started my role as Executive Director for International Banks Supervision in late 2019. I took on the role, in part, because of the wide variety of firms I would be supervising, the diversity of cultures I would be interacting with, and the promise of travel to exotic locations. The role has delivered in many respects – although given the events of the last year, the travel has been somewhat disappointing. While my travel guides are left unread, my videoconferencing systems guide has many worn pages. One clear lesson I have taken away from talking to such a variety of institutions remotely, is the value of simple and clear communications. So today I will be giving you the headlines from our Supervisory Statement published today that sets out the PRA’s approach to supervising international banks. It sets out publicly, for the first time, our approach to subsidiaries and combines that with the approach set out in our existing Supervisory Statement on branches (SS1/18)1.
What has been done so far I shall begin by examining progress to date. At the time of the outbreak of the international financial crisis the Spanish economy and banking system had seen more than ten years of real estate expansion, excessive private indebtedness and continual competitiveness losses. Such imbalances had been generated in an environment characterised by very low interest rates and dominated by the absence of any significant structural reforms in relation to public spending, pensions, the labour market or savings banks. After ten years building up imbalances it was inevitable that the economy would have to adjust and reforms were essential to restore growth and employment as soon as possible. If we examine what has happened during the two and a half years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it is clear that our country’s economy and banking system have both made considerable progress in terms of adjustment and restructuring. The private sector has made progress in reducing its imbalances at a faster rate than in other countries with similar problems: the external deficit fell from 10% of GDP at the beginning of the crisis to 5% last year and Spain has even managed to turn some long-standing deficits, such as those in trade with the European Union and in non-tourism services, into surplus.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Reflections on the Spanish banking sector and economy Opening remarks by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the “XVIII Encuentro del sector financiero”, organised by Deloitte-ABC, Madrid, 5 April 2011. *  *  *  Good morning, I am most grateful to Deloitte and to ABC for giving me this opportunity to share with you some reflections on the banking sector and economy of our country. In my talk I am going to take a hopeful view of the future of our economy and our banking system, based on the extent of the adjustment already under way and the progress made with fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Let no one be mistaken, I am speaking about the future, because the present continues to be dominated by an overwhelming statistic: the more than four million who are unemployed. Until this number is significantly reduced, nobody is entitled to even hint at the slightest satisfaction. But it is true that, for the first time since imbalances began to build up in the late 1990s, Spanish society seems to be prepared to change and to undertake reforms that are absolutely essential, not just for growth, but for solid and sustained growth. And such change, perceived and appreciated by the markets, is the main base for a hopeful view of the future, although there is clearly still much to be done and no time for any let-up in our efforts.