samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It should be pointed out that the reason that a central bank may wish to lean against the wind does not have to be because it only wishes to safeguard financial stability. That may be the case, but it may also be a purely monetary policy decision. The bank may simply wish to attempt to avoid severe fluctuations in the real economy and inflation, even if these are not deemed to be associated with financial stability problems. Leaning against the wind is not a problem-free strategy. Three primary counterarguments have been put forth. 7 Firstly, the imbalance must be identified at a sufficiently early stage. Attempting to rectify the imbalance too late may be problematic as monetary policy acts with a time lag. If property prices fall steeply immediately following an increase of the policy rate by the central bank, the delayed effects of the interest rate increase will reinforce the negative effects on the economy of the falling property prices. Of course, one must also be sufficiently certain that an imbalance really is building up. If the upturn is being caused by fundamental factors, a higher interest rate would hinder growth unnecessarily. Secondly, one has to rely upon being able to deal with the property price increase through reasonable increases of the policy rate. One hypothesis is that the optimistic mood often prevailing during a boom in the property market means that significant increases of the policy rate are required to have an effect.

As you will have gathered, in effect it was: “If Asia was going to be in surplus, and other things equal the West was going to run the counterpart external deficit, what should we have done?” As one looks back at the evolution of sectoral balance sheets and their role in the origins of the crisis, that question cannot stand alone. The crisis was not rooted simply in our economy’s external balance sheet, nor in that of the US. Does that mean that fiscal policy was and is irrelevant to national balance sheets? Hardly. On the one hand, it would be odd for fiscal policy to take upon itself the task of actively offsetting shifts in private sector saving through the government balance in order routinely to manage overall (net) national saving. If parts of the private sector are becoming overindebted, the authorities should use other tools to address the problem at source. Similarly, if the composition of aggregate demand is persistently unbalanced, government should perhaps at least see if it can rectify any microeconomic incentives that aggravate the imbalance. On the other hand, I would argue that the management of a government’s balance sheet cannot be indifferent to the balance sheet of the rest of the economy. It matters if, as was the case in the UK, the public finances are especially sensitive to the well being of highly levered sectors of the economy and the automatic stabilisers are strong.
Between the beginning of 2004 and their peak in August of this year, world oil prices rose from $ to $ a barrel. There have been comparable increases in the prices of metals and other raw materials over the same period. Economists have also speculated that globalisation may be changing wage- and price-setting behaviour in developed countries, by adding to the competitive pressures facing domestic producers and wage earners. This is not just a reflection of increased competition from cheap manufactured imports, and the greater availability of migrant labour to ease domestic labour shortages. A Welsh audience will need no reminding of the many ways in which both inward and outward foreign direct investment can affect domestic employment opportunities. Hard as it is to quantify, the net effect of these trends may have been to reduce the sensitivity of domestic inflation to changes in the margin of spare capacity in the economy. But while these effects go some way towards explaining why the global inflationary climate may have been relatively benign over much of the past decade, I think they fall short of providing a complete explanation for the strength and resilience of global output growth. For this we might look to the more elusive influence of financial integration, and the added impetus to global growth provided by the increasing weight of fast-emerging market economies, particularly in Asia. It is just worth pausing on the remarkable ease with which the world economy has apparently absorbed the impact of sharply higher oil prices.

Since August, the short- and medium-term outlook for inflation have both improved somewhat, as world oil prices have fallen back very sharply, and sterling has risen. The odds of inflation rising above 3% have lengthened. There are still no real signs of pressure in the labour market. And while it never does to be complacent about pay, in today’s labour market there is quite a difference between asking for higher pay and getting it – even in sectors not exposed to the full blast of global competition. There are, of course, still some risks. But insurance is never costless. In the case of monetary policy, taking out insurance against risks that don’t materialise can inject unnecessary volatility into the economy, with consequences for jobs as well as demand. That is why we have the remit we have. It gives the MPC scope to exercise its judgement. But those are precisely the sort of judgements about which reasonable people can – and probably - should disagree. So it was this month. One judgement about which reasonable people could disagree is how robust the Committee’s treasured credibility might be, if it ever came under real pressure. It is often said that it takes decades to build a high reputation but only a moment to lose it. And there are plenty of business horror stories that seem to prove the point. What moral should a member of the MPC draw?
The 1.1 percentage-point gap we’ve seen between Texas and national job growth over the current recovery corresponds almost exactly to the long-run (40-year) historical gap between our growth rate and the nation’s. The shortfall in jobs at the national level is but one indicator of the pervasive anguish of American households since the Panic of 2008. Another sign of that anguish is that average real per capita net worth in the United States has not regained the losses incurred in the latter part of the last decade. At the end of the first quarter of 2011, average per capita net worth was nearly 14 percent below the peak seen four years earlier. Real income has not fared as badly, but per capita salary income is, nevertheless, almost 2 percent below its peak in the first quarter of 2008. A likely widening of income dispersion over the period, however, suggests that median income has probably fared worse. We will get a better read on this when the Federal Reserve Board completes it triennial Survey of Consumer Finances early next year. I do not expect that survey to paint a pretty picture. I am most aware, as are many of you, that if history is any guide, getting back to where we were will be no small task. The 2008–09 recession was precipitated by a banking crisis.

In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm the importance of continued training and development of human resources working in this field to insure that they have necessary skills and to keep them acquainted with developments. Thank you for your attention and I welcome you all once again, wishing you a successful gathering. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Stage 2: Normalization The second stage of normalization followed lift-off and has involved two processes: 1) raising the federal funds target closer to more normal levels, reflecting the ongoing improvement in the economy, and 2) gradually reducing the Fed’s balance sheet as we work to unwind the asset purchase policies put in place during the crisis. Let’s start with interest rate normalization. Since lift-off, we’ve raised interest rates as the economy moved toward maximum employment and our 2 percent longer-run inflation objective. We continued this process with our most recent rate increase this week.4 Throughout, we’ve repeatedly stressed that we foresaw this to be a process of gradual normalization, reflecting the balancing of risks to reaching our goals. In particular, downside risks to the achievement of our employment and inflation goals amid very low interest rates were compelling arguments for a cautious and relatively predictable approach to policy. This approach proved its worth: The economy continued to expand at a healthy pace even as the Fed raised rates numerous times. I’ll now turn briefly to the normalization of the balance sheet. We began this process about a year ago.

We have indicated that we plan to shrink the balance sheet to the smallest size consistent with the efficient and effective conduct of monetary policy, and that, in the long run, the asset side of the balance sheet will consist primarily of Treasury securities.9 That’s our strategy, but its execution will depend on the operating framework of monetary policy, among other factors. Here, the Fed basically has two choices. We could return to a system similar in spirit to that used before the financial crisis, in which the supply of reserves in the banking system was kept relatively scarce, and the interest rate was set by adjusting reserves on a frequent basis through open market operations. Alternatively, we could continue with the system that we’ve been using since the crisis, in which bank reserves are abundant and the federal funds rate target is achieved through adjustments to administered rates. As I said, this approach is working very well at controlling interest rates and has proven to be easy to communicate and adaptable.10 The Fed will be looking closely at these options in the coming months and will subsequently make a decision on the future operating framework. And, as is our standard practice, we will be sure to communicate our thinking and decisions on this issue as soon and as thoroughly as practicable. Conclusion Monetary policy-making has perhaps never been more challenging than it was following the financial crisis.
Under the baseline forecast, next year inflation will come close to the target of 4–4.5%. Our policy rate will range between 7.3% and 8.3% on average over the year. That level is relatively high but necessary to bring inflation back to target in the course of next year as we work towards that. I would like to stress again that the Bank of Russia’s policy will not hamper economic activity. On the contrary, it will foster sustained and balanced growth. We have to understand that sustained growth rates are certain to be lower than in the current rapid economic recovery. The key rate is on course to return to the so—called neutral range in the years to come, which is projected at 5–6%. That is the range when inflation neither accelerates nor decelerates. I will briefly outline the alternative scenarios. The alternative scenarios are not built in the abstract, but in order to see how the situation might change and how monetary policy would change then. We construct three alternative scenarios. Scenario one is ‘Pandemic Expansion’; scenario two is ‘Global Inflation’, and the third is ‘Financial Crisis’. Should the pandemic intensify, we would promptly change over to monetary policy easing to help the economy live through restrictions. In contrast, were the Global Inflation scenario to prevail, we would tighten monetary policy for quite a while. In the Financial Crisis scenario, the key rate would first be raised to deal with volatility and financial market problems, and the policy would thereafter become accommodative to support a recovery.

Mr. Erçel considers the European financial markets and their implications for Turkish institutions Speech given by the Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Gazi Erçel, in Istanbul on 23/10/97. The EMU will be the most important change in the international monetary system since the creation of the IMF at Bretton Woods. The creation of a new currency, the Euro, is in fact a historical event for the European Union (EU). It marks a new quality in the process of European unification because it is the final point and coronation of efforts since 1958 to create one big market in Europe. The success of the Euro area will, of course, depend on the future development of the value of the Euro. The Euro, as we all know, has to compete with two strong international currencies: the US dollar and the Japanese yen. According to one school of thought, the Euro will have a stable value. That is because the high stock of assets in Euro, held by official or private foreign holders and which were converted from national currencies, in particular from Deutsche Mark, will not be switched into other currencies. Besides, once the Euro is introduced, there could be a significant switch of foreign exchange reserves out of US dollars and into Euro. This could give a boost to the exchange rate of the Euro against the US dollar over time.
Ladies and Gentleman, For Thailand to achieve the goal of long-term sustainable growth, commitments have to be made today. And, this leads to the final part of my talk. As Governor of the central bank, I am committed to pursuing price stability and financial stability to foster medium and long-term economic growth. On the financial stability side, I see that the Thai banking sector has decoupled from the direct impact of the global credit crisis. In fact, the banking sector’s exposure to CDOs was only 0.3 percent of its total assets in 2007, which was completely sold off. On non-performing loans, the net NPL level will be one of the issues that we will be addressing through second-phased financial sector master plan. As of end June 2008, net NPL of the banking sector in relation to its total credit is 3.4 percent, not a terribly high level. In addition, since the potential losses of these NPLs have already been provided for according to IAS39, the international accounting standard, the financial implication of NPLs on the banking sector’s financial standing is very small. However, reducing NPLs further should improve the banking sector’s credit rating. The master plan will also focus on improving competition and efficiency of banks, while also broadening financial access to a bigger base of clientele. After the industry-hearing, we will announce the FSMP so that market players have a clear picture of the banking sector going forward.

If the uneven pace of economic recovery in the euro area is confirmed and if we see a risk of inflation being too low for too long, we can take action in June. We can act in various ways, depending on the situation. At present, however, it is too early to say what exactly we’re going to do. A lot depends on the forthcoming economic data and on our staff growth and inflation projections, which are to be released in June. Your room for manoeuvre is limited as interest rates are already very low: the key rate is only 0.25%. They are low but they can still go lower. Are negative interest rates in the euro area possible? Negative rates are one of the instruments available to us. They have been discussed extensively by the Governing Council. We are technically and legally prepared for such a possibility. And market participants are well aware that we are contemplating such a move. Wouldn’t negative rates discourage people from keeping their money in banks? This depends on how negative they would be. Indeed, rates that fall deep into negative territory could have an impact on depositors. But a deposit rate slightly below zero does not necessarily imply that depositors would be affected, while still providing incentives for banks to lend more. In recent years, the ECB has used a number of non-standard monetary policy tools. It has purchased bonds on the market, pumped hundreds of billions of euro into the market in the form of cheap loans for banks.
The third imperative is to professionalise and modernise waqf management. For waqf to progress strongly, it requires a new character and a more modern image. In this regard, I would identify two priorities, namely professionalising those who are entrusted to manage waqf and putting in place proper governance framework. Let me elaborate. The management of waqf must be entrusted to experienced and knowledgeable experts with the highest integrity – that is, people with the right calibre, right competency and right character. The USD 37.1 billion Harvard Endowment is run by some of the best minds in finance, who determine the most optimal asset allocation strategies that deliver the best sustainable returns for the university. In 2017, the endowment contributed more than a third of Harvard’s operating revenue. Returns from the fund help to provide scholarships and to fund ground-breaking research. Surely we would like to see the same in our Malaysian universities. Acquiring such expertise and capability may take time. To expedite this, I would like to suggest that waqf authorities explore partnering or collaborating with experts from the private sector to commercialise or monetise waqf assets. In particular, partnerships with Islamic financial institutions can help waqf authorities develop waqf assets productively with the required financial expertise on board. A good example is the partnership between Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan and Lembaga Tabung Haji in developing Menara Bank Islam on a 1.2 acre waqf land in Kuala 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Lumpur.

Marzunisham Omar: Waqf – an economic perspective Speech by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Forum on "Waqf: An Economic Perspective", Kuala Lumpur, 9 April 2018. * * * It is an honour to speak on waqf from an economic viewpoint. Waqf, or Islamic endowment, is a virtuous act which not only serves as a philanthropic tool but holds great potential for economic development. Allow me to share some thoughts on the relevance of waqf and three strategies to unlock its full potential to benefit our country. Revival of waqf is timely to unlock its full potential Waqf is part of Islam’s great and long history. It is a well-established concept, conceived during the time of the Prophet, peace be upon him. When Umar ibn al-Khattab acquired a piece of land, he asked the Prophet how best to use it. The Prophet advised him to make the land inalienable and to use it for the benefit of the unprivileged – the poor and those in need. With that, the land was established as waqf. Over the centuries, this tradition continued and waqf has made vast contributions to the development of Islamic civilisation. Notable examples include the waqf of Süleymaniye in Istanbul, which provided for the construction of schools and universities, and the waqfs of Murad II and of Bayezid II in Edirne that built and operated hospitals that provided free treatment.
During the same period, the average inflation in emerging market economies with inflation targeting rose from 3.4 percent to 6.1 percent. Figure 6: S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Price Indices  750  550  Commodity Prices Metal Prices Energy Prices (right axis) Agricultural Prices (right axis)  675  450  600 525  350  450  5  250  375  3/12/2008  11/14/2007  24-07-2007  29-03-2007  01-12-2006  09-08-2006  150 17-04-2006  300  Source: Goldman Sachs. Figure 7: Inflation in Other Countries a. Inflation Rates  b.Diff. Between Turkey and Other Emerg. IT’ers*  9  Developed Economies Developing Economies Turkey  02.08  12.07  10.07  08.07  06.07  04.07  02.07  12.06  10.06  08.06  06.06  01.08  11.07  2  09.07  0 07.07  3  05.07  2 03.07  4  01.07  4  11.06  5  09.06  6  07.06  6  05.06  8  03.06  7  01.06  10  04.06  8  02.06  12  12.05  14  *Sample of emerging economies under inflation targeting covers Brazil, Czech Republic, Colombia, Philippines, South Africa, Israel, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Chile, Slovakia and Thailand. Source: Web sites of central banks, IFS, TURKSTAT, CBT  BIS Review 62/2008  5  2.

The banking sector in the Balkans is dominated by foreign-owned banks. In Albania, subsidiaries of foreign banks account for around 78% of banking sector assets, while those from European countries account for 48%. The Bank of Albania is the Resolution Authority for seven subsidiaries of EU based banking groups, of which four are classified as systemically important under the mandate of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). Due to this, the signing of cooperation agreements between the resolution authorities of the banking group and the local authorities where the subsidiary operates is very important for coordinating actions, exchanging data for planning and implementing the resolution, and coordinating crisis management. I have the pleasure to share with you the news that the Bank of Albania has signed an important cooperation agreement with the Single Resolution Board, i.e., the Resolution Authority of the Banking Union, on 3 October 2018. Dear ladies and gentlemen, This Conference is the culmination of our work over the past 18 months for developing a complete framework for bank recovery and resolution. For this reason, the presence of colleagues from supervisory and resolution authorities from various entities assumes special importance. We have representatives from the European Union at the central level, from individual countries of the European Union and representatives from countries of the region, national and foreign bankers as well as the representatives of the media. This presence means sharing experiences and opportunity to evaluate what has been done.