samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
13  With the addition of 25 expanded counterparties who were cleared to participate fully in RRP operations starting on March 16, 2015, the Desk’s 163 RRP counterparties comprise 141 expanded counterparties (105 money market funds, 12 government sponsored enterprises, and 24 banks) plus 22 primary dealers. A list of the Desk’s reverse repo counterparties is available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/ expanded_counterparties.html. 14  Consistent with the temporary nature of the ON RRP facility, the New York Fed does not expect to increase the total number of RRP counterparties further, unless the addition of new counterparties is deemed necessary to support the implementation of monetary policy. Thus, the number of expanded RRP counterparties is not expected to exceed 150. Additional firms that meet the eligibility criteria are allowed to submit applications, but will be added to the counterparty list only if the maximum number of expanded RRP counterparties has not been reached. On March 9, 2015, the Desk released a policy statement indicating that it could remove an entity from the RRP counterparty list for failing to meet prescribed eligibility and participation criteria. The statement is available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/ operating_policy_150309.html. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A series of rate adjustments last November and December was particularly instructive in this examination. During the six-week test, the offering rate was temporarily lowered from 5 basis points to 3 basis points, then raised to 7 basis points and 10 basis points.

39 As an example, recently we collaborated with the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) and NUS Business School to bring together global academics for our Workshop on Digital Currency Economics and Policy. I encourage more of such forums. In fact, I would not be surprised if the themes I have touched on have been discussed in research forums and this Cavalcade. 40  Thank you. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
The second group of challenges, with which 2014 will undoubtedly be remembered, includes those events that put the very resilience of the banking system to the test. A point was even reached where questions were raised in the public space about the BNB effectiveness, in particular the banking supervision thus far exercised. The events in question started with the severe liquidity attack against several banks in the middle of the year. 2014 will go down in history also with the huge misappropriations of depositors’ money, malpractices of governance and breach of regulations revealed in the second half of the year in the fourth largest bank in the country – “Corporate Commercial Bank” AD (KTB). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The KTB case was finally resolved with the effective application of the statutory guarantee on deposits. By coincidence, exactly today, 4 of December 2014, the long-awaited payment of guaranteed deposits with KTB has started. The depositors in this bank had no access to their deposits for a very long time. The central bank truly wished to see the KTB issues resolved in the shortest time possible. Unfortunately, as it is well known, with a large part of the documentation missing and the absence of legal means for quick restructuring of KTB, voluminous actions were needed to restore the credit files in KTB. Gathering this information was a necessary condition for the independent auditors to perform a complete analysis and assessment of KTB assets.

In addition, trading income recovered strongly as financial markets rebounded after the first quarter of 2009. Finally, revenues from fees and commissions held up remarkably well throughout the financial turmoil. At the same time, a number of significant risks remain and some may have even increased. First, the slowdown in the growth of assets held by euro area banks limits their future earning capacity in terms of interest and investment income. Second, a deterioration in the credit quality of borrowers may put a drag on banks’ future earning capacity. In fact, while large and complex banking groups seem to be gradually absorbing the losses they suffered on their securities holdings, driven in part by the reclassification of assets, they have reported sharply higher provisions for loan losses. Let me now turn to capital ratios. The recovery in the earnings of large and complex banking groups in the euro area, together with a slowdown in the growth rate of both risk-weighted and total assets and an increase in capital, from both public and private sources, has meant that the capital ratio of the average banking institution has typically been relatively stable. There is, however, considerable divergence between groups. A somewhat reassuring finding is that the institutions which reported the largest increases in loan loss provisions also seem to have the highest capital buffers. This may mitigate the solvency risks originating from deteriorating asset quality in the future.
Jean-Pierre Landau: International monetary arrangements Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Landau, Second Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, before the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee, Beijing, 6 September 2010. *  *  *  Opinions expressed are solely mine and do not represent the views of Banque de France or the Eurosystem. International financial and monetary arrangements are currently extensively debated. For many countries, both advanced and emerging, the crisis has shown that there is a close link between internal and international financial stability. In addition, rebalancing of the world economy stands at the forefront of the G20 policy agenda and there is a perception it may be difficult to achieve under current arrangements. According to an apt definition, an international monetary system consists of (i) exchange rate arrangements; (ii) capital flows; and (iii) a collection of institutions, rules, and conventions that govern its operation (Carney, 2009). Explicit or implicit “rules of the games” form the backbone of such a system. This is an ambitious approach and it may seem too normative to some. But it has a long history, starting with the gold standard, from which the phrase “rules of the games” originated. The Bretton Woods system itself was built around an elaborate framework of rules, disciplines and support mechanisms aimed at ensuring convertibility for the current account – but, crucially, not the capital account –, together with fixed but adjustable exchange rates. With the generalisation of flexible exchange rate regimes, the normative approach to the international monetary system was somehow weakened.

Ravi Menon: MAS Marks 50 Years Serving Singapore Welcome remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at MAS 50th Anniversary Partners Appreciation Evening, 7 October 2021. * * * Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman and Board Members of MAS, ESM Goh Chok Tong, Friends and Family of MAS Welcome to the MAS’ 50th Anniversary Partners Appreciation Evening – the first in a series of events to commemorate our Golden Jubilee. This evening is a time for thanksgiving. There are about 50 of us here at the MAS Building and about 800 friends and family joining us virtually. This includes our friends from the financial industry, consumer and governance groups, tripartite partners, academic institutions, and international organisations. And of course, our family – past and present staff and leaders of MAS and our colleagues in the broader Public Service. This is a special occasion for me personally. I joined MAS in 1987 and have spent most of my professional career here. So much of what I have learnt and how I have evolved, I owe it to the many bosses and colleagues I worked with in MAS over the years. MAS was already a highly competent organisation in 1987, and I have seen it grow over the decades to become what it is today – a central bank and financial regulator highly regarded among its international peers and the global financial industry.
It is likely that a significant portion of these moneys is managed out of Hong Kong. In fact, over 40 Mainland companies providing fund management, securities and futures, insurance, and other services have already established a presence in Hong Kong to manage the funds flowing out of the Mainland and engage in fund advisory businesses. 13. So, the implications from the gradual liberalisation of Mainland China’s capital account are clear. Hong Kong is bound to be a key destination as well as the management hub for the gradual increase in the portfolio flows from Mainland China. This trend will present huge opportunities to financial institutions, private banks, fund managers, and other financial service providers looking to tap these funds. 14. Having said that, one should expect that the process of financial liberalisation in Mainland China will be a gradual and controllable one, in a manner that will fit the Chinese saying of “crossing the river by feeling the stones” so that one can adjust the speed and tactics of crossing the river without fear of falling in and getting drowned. It is, however, important to realise that this process has already begun: this is something that global financial firms, especially asset managers, should not ignore in their business planning process. The wider external use of the RMB 15. RMB. 2  Now, let me move on to the second important trend: the wider external use of the  BIS Review 153/2010  16.

MAS initiatives to face the challenges I am sure Governors will discuss at length the various challenges that I have highlighted earlier. Perhaps I could share with Governors efforts taken by Singapore to address some of these challenges. The Monetary Authority of Singapore undertook a fundamental review of our supervisory and regulatory policies. In the area of banking, our reforms have focussed on liberalising the banking sector, strengthening corporate governance and raising disclosure standards of local banks, and shifting away from one-size-fits-all regulation to risk-based supervision. MAS announced a five-year programme to liberalise access by foreign banks to the domestic banking sector in May 1999. We are currently reviewing the measures to position ourselves for the next phase of liberalisation. In the area of corporate governance, MAS has set guidelines on the composition, roles and responsibilities of banks' Board of Directors and Nominating Committees. We are finalising the guidelines for the Compensation and Audit Committees. Local banks are also required to divest all of their non-financial business interests to limit contagion risks to the local banks arising from their non-financial businesses, enhance market discipline and improve transparency, and focus management attention on core banking business. Disclosure standards of our banks have also been significantly raised. Local banks have taken steps to disclose directors' remuneration, related party transactions and risk management practices. They will be disclosing further details next year on all these areas. Our success in these endeavours will require effort by all market participants.
Because weather effects are by their nature temporary, the widely held expectation coming into the second quarter was that there would be a sharp rebound in growth similar to what took place last year. But current data suggests that the rebound has been relatively muted. I think this is because some of the non-weather factors evident in the first quarter – such as the drag from the sharp drop in oil and gas investment – have persisted into the second quarter. Also, real disposable income growth has slowed over the past three months as aggregate hours worked have grown more slowly and crude oil and gasoline prices have partially recovered. This means that the fundamentals for consumer spending are not as strong as they were at the beginning of the year. Nonetheless, my view is that growth will likely pick up further during the remainder of this year. This judgment reflects several factors. First, some of the forces that have been restraining growth are likely to fade later this year. For example, consider oil and gas investment. The U.S. oil and gas rig count dropped precipitously during the first quarter, but the rate of decline has slowed during the current quarter. Combined with the partial recovery in crude oil prices, this implies that oil and gas investment is likely to stabilize during the second half of the year. Second, business fixed investment outside of oil and gas seems likely to advance, reflecting strong fundamentals.

With respect to inflation, as long as growth remains strong enough to lead to further improvement in labor market conditions – and this is an important caveat – I am becoming more confident that inflation will move up toward the FOMC’s 2 percent objective over the medium term. The firming of inflation that I anticipate reflects my expectation that resource utilization will increase and the fact that some of the factors that have pulled down inflation, such as lower oil and gas prices and a firmer dollar, have already stabilized or partially reversed. Putting this all together, I still think it is likely that conditions will be appropriate to begin monetary policy normalization later this year. But the likelihood and timing will depend on the economic outlook, and that will be largely shaped by the incoming economic data. When the FOMC begins to raise short-term interest rates, this will occur in a very different environment than in the past. Reserves in the banking system are very plentiful, reflecting the large increase in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet over the past few years. But this circumstance should not adversely affect our ability to push the federal funds rate into a higher target range. We have the appropriate tools to push up short-term interest rates. However, lift-off may not go so smoothly in terms of the impact on financial asset prices. After all, lift-off will represent a regime shift after more than six years at the zero lower bound.
Although my remarks today focus on the banking sector, in this context I also want to highlight the work the Bank has done internationally and with HM Treasury on proposals to expand resolution for Central Counterparties, which are a key part of the financial market infrastructure to improve safety and efficiency. The UK was one of the first jurisdictions to establish a CCP Resolution regime and the current Consultation Paper17, from HMT, sets out some important updates to our regime to align it with recently agreed FSB guidance, as part of our commitment to implementing robust global standards. The Resolvability Assessment Framework is key to being ‘fit and ready’ I’m going to focus now on our Resolvability Assessment Framework, or RAF, which brings together the Bank and PRA’s resolvability rules and policies into three outcomes which major UK banks must be able to achieve by January 2022. That outcomes-based approach reflects the fact that resolvability is a spectrum rather than a binary concept. The outcomes we look for are: i) having sufficient financial resources to support a resolution; ii) being able to continue to do business through resolution and restructuring iii) being able to co-ordinate and communicate effectively so that a resolution and restructuring can be orderly. The overarching aim is to ensure that larger banks and building societies operating in the UK are, and are able to demonstrate that they are, resolvable, and that they are accountable for this.

I think this is now a conclusion shared by all Central Bankers in the world, whatever the regulatory environment they live in. An intimate knowledge of the banking sector and of different financial institutions is extremely helpful in managing periods of tensions and stress on money and credit markets. Central Banks have had to make almost instant judgment on the provision of liquidity in different forms and different maturities. There are circumstances where being able to assess the creditworthiness of market participants and the effective amplitude of their needs is of extreme help. More generally (and somehow academically), in times of crisis, the distinction between liquidity and solvency problems becomes both more important and much more difficult to make. Having, so to speak, all the cards in your hands, minimizes the risk of making mistakes. Second, as concerns the supervision infrastructure, it seems to me that clear, simple, robust and pragmatic arrangements have performed better than more sophisticated and elaborate schemes. As you know, I had myself to face a situation of acute crisis and make decisisions in real time, concerning a major, and internationally active, financial institution. At no time did I have the feeling that our current arrangements were deficient and prevented me for getting the necessary information and making the necessary decisions. As you also know, seen from a public interest perspective, we could solve the situation without any significant disturbance to capital market. Nobody knows about the future.
I wondered some years ago 2  whether such effects were at work after the financial crisis . Given the potential reallocative effects of any material change in the UK’s trading arrangements, it’s conceivable they could arise in this case too. Indeed it’s possible they could arise even ahead of the formal date of the UK’s departure. In September/ October a CIPS survey of procurement managers suggested there could be significant unwinding of supply chains through the course of next year: 40% of UK firms who currently use EU suppliers are actively looking for domestic alternatives; the equivalent figure in the other direction – the proportion of European businesses expecting to move away from existing UK suppliers – is 63%. A CBI survey in October found that, in the absence of a transition deal, 60% of firms would begin to activate “worst-case” contingency plans by the end of March 2018, a full year before the UK’s exit. Chart 3: Reductions in supply can add to It’s true that incremental changes in underlying  inflationary pressure  productivity can have knock-on consequences for wages, and for demand, that would blunt their impact on inflation. If in aggregate firms are less productive, they would probably spend less, including on pay awards. But to the extent those knock-on effects lag in any way, firms would also respond by raising prices. In other words, reductions in supply can add to inflationary pressure even as they also lower aggregate GDP. Chart 3 is an extremely stylised description of this effect.

All this means that tradable output responds powerfully to the depreciation and, on the demand side, net trade and investment grow significantly. In reality, perhaps because there are significant frictions and uncertainties in the real world, the actual response of the tradable sector has been much more modest (even though the fall in the exchange rate has been bigger than 10%). 8  The impact of news about the future on the current economy is an area of active research for economists. See, for example, Beaudry and Portier (2006), Kurmann and Otrok (2013), and Kamber, Theodoridis and Thoenissen (2017). 9 The model used here is based on the model in Di Pace, King and Theodoridis (2017). 10 Broadbent (2017). 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  Chart 9a: Total factor productivity  Chart 9b: Real exchange rate  Chart 9c: Investment  Chart 9d: Hours worked  Chart 9e: Saving ratio  Chart 9f: Consumption  Chart 9g: Output  Chart 9h: Inflation  11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  But there’s also a significant difference in the predicted behaviour of consumption, this time in the opposite direction. Because they agree about the coming hit to income, households cut their spending immediately in this simulation – it falls 1½% in the year after the news comes through – and the saving rate goes up. This dominates the sizeable response of net trade and investment, such that aggregate demand and output also decline.
The G20, the Financial Stability Board and its Standing Committees, and the Standard Setting Bodies are all working hard and there is no lack of specific subjects to address – the Basel capital framework, the accounting standards for valuation and for off-balance sheet activities, capital requirements for trading activities, compensation practices, central counterparties, principles for the oversight of hedge funds, supervisory colleges, cross-border cooperation on crisis management, oversight regimes for the rating agencies, etc, etc. Some of you may already be suffering from meeting fatigue and, like me, somewhat sick of these subjects already; so I do not want to add to your agony. I am fortunate to have had the privilege of setting up and heading a central banking institution over a relatively long and exciting period in a significant international financial centre that is free and open. And as the time for retirement draws near, after sixteen and a half years, I do have a few reflections, from a rather different perspective than those of present pre-occupations, which I would like to share with others. They are nothing profound or technical; just a few issues that I have found particularly challenging over the years. The first concerns a conflict. This is the conflict between the private, particularly short term, interest of financial intermediaries in maximising profits, and the public interest of effective financial intermediation that provides crucial support to the economy.

Indeed, we have just had a case of co-occurrence of highly remunerated financial innovation and a temporary narrowing of the intermediation spread that was built upon, among other things, a serious erosion of credit standards. We all know how this ended; rather miserably with investors losing a lot of money and borrowers finding credit expensive and hard to come by, and consequently considerable damage to the economy. How do we deal with this conflict? I am afraid I have no answer, other than always to be alert to it and be ready, as protectors of the public interest (in terms of maintaining stability, upholding integrity, promoting diversity and efficiency in financial intermediation) to act whenever the private interest of the financial intermediaries threatens to override the public interest. But this is easier said than done, particularly when financial innovation is often packaged and presented skilfully by financial intermediaries as an effort to enhance financial efficiency. Furthermore, in capitalist, free-market economies, the authorities generally do not have a lot of influence over innovation. The financial intermediaries often constitute a strong political lobby against regulation, arguing quite forcefully that regulation stifles innovation and progress. And so, regrettably, we have an environment that is often not conducive to the financial authorities taking preventive measures to protect the public interest. You have I am sure heard of the rather unkind and unfair street talk that the US Treasury was being run largely by Wall Street.