samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is worth noting, however, that this risk persists because a large part of 6 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  promised projects in 2015 were due to be delivered between the last quarter of 2016 and the year 2017. Lately, there has been an increase in the down payment required by the banks to grant a mortgage loan, which could result in more withdrawn promises by those households that were unable to meet the necessary savings to comply. Profitability of the banking system has dropped, as interest spreads have reduced their contribution. This can be explained by a change in composition of the credit portfolio towards lower relative return products—fewer consumer and more mortgage loans—and by the migration towards less risky clients, who are offered lower interest rates. At the same time, the capitalizations of the first half of 2016 drove up the banking system’s capital adequacy ratios (CAR), strengthening their position to deal with adverse economic scenarios. In fact, stress tests indicate that banks have the sufficient capital to face severely stressful conditions. All in all, capital gaps are similar to those in comparable countries. Although several capital increases have been made lately, no changes in banks’ dividend withholding policies have been observed that would allow increasing the capital base endogenously. In an international context, the CAR level of the banking system remains below the 25th percentile in both OECD countries and in the region.

Most recently, after OPEC agreements and announcements by other producers that they would limit production, it is trading around 55 3 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  dollars per barrel. I now turn to our projections and associated risks. In the baseline scenario of the MP Report I present today, this year’s growth is estimated at 1.5%. As I said, this is the lower bound of the range we estimated in September, considering the slower growth foreseen for the fourth quarter. About 2017, the slower initial pace, in a context of higher risks and still very pessimistic confidence levels, we foresee that activity will take longer to resume near-potential growth. Accordingly, our growth estimate for 2017 has been adjusted to a range between 1.5% and 2.5% (1.75% to 2.75% in September). This higher growth in 2017 compared with 2016 is based on the fact that the economy does not present any imbalances, the mining sector will not to repeat the sharp drops of previous years, and investment will post some increase after three years in a row falling in annual terms. The effects of these changes will be seen more clearly in the second half of the year. All this, in a context where the fiscal consolidation announced by the government continues and monetary conditions remain expansionary. Excluding inventories, domestic demand will grow 2% in 2017. Just as in 2016, we expect private consumption to boost expenditure, considering a further gradual adjustment of the labor market and lower inflation driving real wages.
Heng Swee Keat: Achieving good regulatory outcomes – the way forward Welcome speech by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 16th International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Singapore, 22 September 2010. *  *  *  1. Good morning. My colleagues and I at the Monetary Authority of Singapore are delighted to welcome you to Singapore, and to the 16th International Conference of Banking Supervisors (ICBS). We are honoured to join the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as organisers of the conference. Looking back on the crisis 2. When we last met in Brussels in September 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a tail-spin in the global financial system. The global economic outlook was then grim. Decisive policy action has averted the worst scenarios of the crises, and the overall situation has improved significantly. Still, financial vulnerabilities and uncertainty over the pace of global economic recovery remain. 3. This year’s ICBS comes at a critical juncture. In the last two years, all of us, as national financial authorities, have undertaken extensive reviews to enhance the resilience of our financial systems. Globally, the FSB and IMF have been working to forge agreement on measures to prevent and mitigate a crisis of such systemic proportions. In particular, the Basel Committee under the leadership of Governor Nout Wellink has been at the forefront of devising a new regulatory framework that underpins and fosters a more resilient global banking system. 4.

Various ideas are being explored – such as systemic surcharges and counter-cyclical capital buffers, and the viability of a more structured and rule-based framework for such measures. We should certainly explore new approaches and better tools. But let me make a few points on this. 14. First, unlike monetary policy, research on macroprudential tools of a more structured, rules-based nature is at an early stage. There are no simple targets like an inflation target, or clear measures of success built on detailed analysis of a long data series, since tail risks do not, by definition, materalise frequently. This makes the task inherently harder. Nor are there many rule-based tools that have proven their efficacy at the global level. Much more analytical work is needed. 15. Second, we now have a better understanding that the systemic risk posed by a bank depends on its size, interconnectedness and substitutability. It does not come from just “toobig-to-fail”, though sometimes these terms are used interchangeably. Many small banks  2  BIS Review 121/2010  pursuing similar business models can build up large correlated positions. There can be systemic impact if these banks unwind their positions at the same time. 16. In the coming years, we will be focusing on some new tools such as countercyclical capital. Their effectiveness will need to be assessed over time, and against other options. We need to agree on the right set of policy tools to deal with systemic risks with the least unintended consequences. 17.
David Clementi: Banks and systemic risk – theory and evidence Speech by Mr David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at a Bank of England Conference held in London, 23 May 2001. *  *  *  Introduction I would like to begin by extending a very warm welcome to you all to the Bank of England and to this conference. It is a great pleasure indeed to be welcoming so many distinguished participants, both as speakers and audience members; I am confident that we have the right mix of academics, officials, and industry representatives to take forward our chosen subject. 'Banks and systemic risk' is our title, and I would like to introduce the conference by saying a few words about the choice of material: why is it important to discuss these issues? And why is it topical to discuss them now? Having dealt with the importance of financial stability and the challenges presented by the current environment, I would then like to turn to some policy responses and to focus in particular on disclosure, the procyclicality of capital requirements and the impact of the new Basel Accord on overall capital. I would like to finish by saying something about the importance of consistency in the capital requirements for banks and insurance companies. One theme which I will return to throughout is the importance of achieving an acceptable balance between financial stability and financial efficiency.

Finally, we have to do our best to ensure that market discipline is exercised in a relatively benign and gradual way – graded differentiation of spreads on debt for example, rather than sudden refusal by the market to rollover debt at any price. This means we need to think hard about the frequency as well as detail of disclosures, and specifically the trade-off between the two. Too frequent disclosure might not only be too onerous but also add to the volatility of company ratings. Too long and the potential for large step changes in an institution's risk profile will increase market uncertainty and volatility. Of course, there may be times when this cannot be avoided – the sudden emergence of fraud for example – which is where crisis management by the bank concerned and by the authorities comes into play. But we should not overemphasise the relevance of these new disclosure initiatives in this particular sort of situation: publicly owned banks are after all already required to disclose any information which could significantly affect their share price. BIS Review 43/2001  3  Impact of the New Basel Accord Turning to the Basel proposals on minimum capital, their aim is to align regulatory capital much more closely with risk. This should have financial efficiency benefits, as I explained just now. To the extent that seriously undercapitalised risk taking by banks will in the future be more difficult, there are also clear financial stability benefits.
But it needs to be complemented by action from the public and private sectors in individual jurisdictions to determine where progress is needed and how to best implement it through a range of projects and changes, in time to meet the 2027 targets. 1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  I encourage central banks, payment system operators, providers, participants, and users from all countries – including all those at the conference today and extending well beyond the G20 – to work together to enhance cross-border payments. We can continue learning from each other and refining our approaches via international forums led by the FSB and Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) – such as the annual Payment Summit with senior industry representatives, the new Industry Taskforces 4, 5 working jointly with the IMF and World Bank on identifying appropriate technical assistance, and the new Central Banks' Community of Practice6. At the Bank of England, we are already making tangible progress towards enhancing cross-border payments. We are currently undertaking a transformational RTGS Renewal Programme to deliver a range of new features and capabilities for payments. This will include several features highlighted in the priority focus areas – such as the adoption of ISO20022 this summer, reducing barriers to access RTGS, and enhancing user functionality such as Application Programme Interfaces (APIs).

As set out in the Financial Stability Board's (FSB) latest progress reportOpens in a new window in October 2022, much progress has already been made including: agreeing global quantitative targetsOpens in a new window and a methodology for measuring progress towards them, undertaking stocktakes and analyses of existing payment systems and arrangements, and publishing proposals and best practice for achieving progress. And there have already been tangible changes, for example the move by SWIFT and some key systems to ISO 20022Opens in a new window messaging standards, increased operating hours and the launch of interlinking arrangements such as between Thailand's PromptPay and Singapore's PayNow. Now the work is at an inflection point: many of the original roadmap actions have been completed, providing a solid foundation from which to make real changes to the crossborder payments experience. In February 2023 the FSB published a set of priority actions that will be taken forward to meet the cross-border payments targets by 2027. The actions are grouped in three priority focus areasOpens in a new window: Payment system interoperability and extension; Legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks; and Cross-border data exchange and message standards. We need to work together to make payments faster, cheaper, more accessible, and more transparent. Some of this work needs to continue to be international for example, agreeing approaches to harmonising rules and standards.
I see before me that the securities portfolio will be able to decline in the coming years, provided that the current inflation and economic assessment hold. The table indicates that one could envisage further fine tuning of the portfolio holding to affect different parts of the fixed income market. However, I think that such an approach works primarily in crisis situations, in other words in the introduction of the QE phase, when problems in certain markets need to be dealt with using particular tools. This was particularly clear in the spring of 2020. Should we sell securities? Let me now come back to the question of how we reduce our holdings when monetary policy is made less expansionary. Why do we not sell bonds before they mature instead of reducing the holding 'passively' through maturities? For example, the Bank of England has announced that it is considering actively selling certain securities before maturity when the policy rate has reached 1 per cent.20 An important difference in relation to the Bank of England is in the maturity of our bond holdings. The UK government bond has a long maturity term of on average around 15 years.21 This means that it will take a very long time before the holding decreases to any great extent if a representative sample of the bond stock has been purchased, as the Bank of England has done.

As China’s consumption increases, its rising import demand will have a positive impact on Asia and on the rest of the world. Besides China, India’s middle class is estimated to grow to almost 600 million people by 2025, and almost 60% of Indonesian households, in a country of 240 million people, are expected to reach middle-class status by 2020. The Asian Development Bank projects that, by the middle of the century, Asia will account for more than half of global GDP and will own half of the world’s financial assets and financial institutions. I’m sure all of you are cautious about long-term extrapolations, but this projection is one of many which are reflective of the optimism and growth potential that we see not just in China, but Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. As these countries in Asia power ahead, they will drive further economic integration within this region. PricewaterhouseCoopers’ “Future of World Trade” study describes how new trade corridors will form within Asia as a result of this integration. In 1990, 20 years ago, the developed economies dominated the world trade map. Europe was responsible for over half of the world’s exports, although these were mainly intra-Europe flows. In 2010, this map has changed with the global shift in manufacturing to Asia, with China accounting for 9 out of the top 25 bilateral trade routes by value.
4  BIS Review 132/2007  A strong Swedish economy with increased cost and inflationary pressures… If we begin with the situation at home, it is clear that the Swedish economy is continuing to show strong growth (slide 5). We see increased cost and inflationary pressures ahead of us and there are a couple of main factors in this development that I wish to highlight. Strong growth Both the statistics in the National Accounts and the survey of Swedish companies carried out by the Riksbank confirm the picture of strong growth in Sweden. Although the rate of increase in GDP has slowed down slightly, it remains fairly high and is expected to be around 3 per cent this year. Our assessment is that we are in a situation where we are currently making more use of economic resources than normal. If we look ahead, we are expecting GDP to grow slightly more slowly up to 2010 than it has in recent years. This is due to several interacting factors; we believe that productivity and the labour supply will increase more slowly, and that international growth will be lower. In addition, we are expecting the interest rate to rise gradually, the exchange rate to be stronger and investment to increase at a slower rate. These factors subdue growth. … and tighter labour market Despite the fact that GDP growth has been strong for several years, it was not until 2005 that employment began to increase (slide 6).

All of these reasons are legitimate in themselves. But, taken together, they considerably restrict supply even though – as foreign examples have shown – demand is potentially sizeable. These restrictions also encourage the substitution of labour by capital and therefore result in growth that is both constrained and has an insufficient employment content. They are sometimes based on a notion of working rhythms that is out of step with the functioning of a modern society and technological progress. They are very costly for the economy. And, lastly, they do a disservice to those they set out to protect. The main victims are those for whom access to employment requires flexibility, adaptation, and freedom to choose working hours, i.e. primarily young people and women. A complete overhaul of all the legal and regulatory conditions governing a wide range of commercial and services activities therefore appears to be an urgent priority. Lastly, in order to increase France’s productivity, a shift towards technology- and sciencebased activities is essential. To do so, research and development (R&D) efforts must be encouraged. In this respect, while the share of public R&D expenditure is comparable or even greater than that of the country’s main trading partners, private sector R&D investment remains well below that in Germany, the United States or Japan. The creation of poles of competitiveness in 2005 and the Industrial Innovation Agency in 2006 contribute to achieving this strategic objective.
Mr Yam looks towards a stronger financial system in Hong Kong  Speech given by Mr Joseph Yam JP, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Annual Dinner 1999 of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants on 29 October 1999. *  *  *  Introduction I feel greatly honoured to have been invited to speak at this year’s Annual Dinner of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants. I must confess that I became a little worried when I checked up on the list of speakers at your Annual Dinners in the past 10 years. I realise that, in accepting this speaking engagement, I have taken on the almost impossible task of performing to a standard that may well be beyond me. I shall nevertheless try my best not to make you feel that you have gone down market. You are of course well aware of the close working relationship between the accounting profession and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Your involvement in all our many advisory committees and in regulatory compliance of the financial institutions we supervise is crucial to our work, and I take this opportunity to thank you all for your help and forbearance in our ever-increasing supervisory demands. As a gesture of gratitude I shall this evening steer well clear of the irksome domestic supervisory issues. Instead I shall focus on the broader subjects of economy and finance as we recover from the financial turmoil of the last two years.

If you wish to operate in our markets, or make use of our market infrastructures, including effecting any payment or settlement arising from relevant transactions, as participants or as intermediaries, you have to follow these disclosure rules and ensure that you deal only with those who follow these rules. The regulation of international finance is even more difficult, but I think the same cooperative spirit can be applied, if indeed regulation in whatever form is considered necessary. But then, looking at the situation facing the key players in a position to influence the direction of this important reform, I doubt whether the political will is there to make changes of this nature. Views of strong domestic lobbies may prevail and urgent domestic issues may divert attention. As you may know, it is not the desirability of reform, nor the technical feasibility of the details, that dictates action or inaction, it is, regrettably, more often than not, the political reality. Meanwhile, international discussions on this subject are moving into a critical stage when we will either see results or see much recent effort jettisoned as momentum is lost. Regional initiatives What recourses, then, are left to small open markets such as our own to enable us to pursue the legitimate goal of ensuring monetary and financial stability? Not a lot, I am afraid.
Specifically, they are expected to reduce the level of GDP growth in 2022, as currently estimated, by around 1,3 percentage points, from 3,6 per cent as per the Central Bank of Cyprus December projections, to around 2,3 per cent. Inflation is currently expected to hover around 6,8 per cent in 2022, compared to the December projection of 2,5 per cent. This impact is associated with the rise in oil and other commodity prices, as well as the disruption in exports of goods and services to Russia,  2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  which on average constitute about 16 per cent of overall exports of goods and services. Important such services exports to Russia include tourism, transportation, financial, professional and computer services. In addition, indirect consequences are expected via the impact on consumer and business confidence. Nevertheless, the medium-term economic outlook remains positive, supported by disbursements from the European Recovery and Resilience Fund. The allocation for Cyprus for the period 2021-2026 is € of which € in grants and € million in loans. The total grants allocation for the EU is € which implies 0,3 per cent of the total grants package is allocated to Cyprus. In terms of the banking sector of Cyprus, it faces the effects of the Russian invasion in Ukraine from a financially sound position. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio amounts to 344 per cent as at February 2022 which is almost double than the respective EU average of 175 per cent.

The aim is to ensure that the inflation generation is replaced by a new generation, a generation for whom economic success will depend more on their own efforts than on the accidental consequences of high and unstable inflation for the distribution of wealth – whether in housing, pensions or financial savings. Conclusions So what should we make of the Monetary Policy Committee after two years? As all parents know, second birthdays are often the prelude to a difficult period: the “terrible twos”. But I am confident that, whatever difficulties lie ahead, the Chancellor will be able to take some pride in his offspring. Philip Ziegler has described the British constitution as an accumulation of “instantly invented precedents”. Indeed, there is a tradition in the UK of making radical reforms in such a way that it is impossible, after a few years, to imagine that things were done any other way. That I predict will be true of the MPC. The whole monetary policy process is today systematic and professional in a way that was unimaginable less than ten years ago. Then, meetings between the Chancellor and Governor to discuss interest rates were often called at only a few hours notice. Now, analysis, meetings of the MPC and the publication of both the decision and the reasons for it proceed on a pre-announced timetable. The change has significantly reduced the uncertainty facing financial markets and enhanced the quality of the decisions themselves.