samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If one has not created a credible crisis resolution mechanism in good time and does not manage to do so during the crisis, there is finally only one last resort, and that is the ECB. The ECB is the monetary union’s central bank and can do in a crisis what the union’s national central banks are unable to do. It can always create liquidity and buy securities as needed and therefore in principle it can also attain the same credibility as the Bank of England has in the United Kingdom. The problem is that the ECB does not have an indisputable mandate to do this, and that the EU member states have differing views as to whether it should be given such a mandate. The ECB should not save countries from making necessary adjustments in legislation and public finances, many quite rightly point out. But this also risks having the consequence that one refrains from the only remaining mechanism that can manage an acute crisis. Obstacles to setting up crisis management mechanisms One reason why it appears difficult to set up clear frameworks for managing a crisis in advance is, as I mentioned earlier, that crises occur so rarely. “There will be no more crises during my mandate period,” a politician said to me after the Swedish crisis in the early 1990s, when we were to discuss new crisis legislation. And he was right, of course. It took almost 20 years until the next crisis occurred, and by then he had left politics long ago.

The way we conduct monetary policy has also changed over the past thirteen years. The inflation-targeting policy introduced in 1993 has of course always been the nucleus, but it has developed in various ways. Work in my particular field of interest, financial stability, has also been refined in many ways. For obvious reasons, this is an area that has come under particular focus in recent years. One might say that if the task of maintaining financial stability had previously tended to be overshadowed by the usually more attention-grabbing task of maintaining price stability, the situation has almost been reversed during the crisis. The financial stability work has in any case gained a more prominent position and become more on a par with monetary policy. Now I do not intend to devote my last speech as member of the Executive Board to outlining my central bank memoirs. I have always been more interested in looking ahead than looking back, and I intend to do so today. More specifically, I intend to take up some areas that I believe will feature in the discussions on central banks and their activities in the coming years. They are all connected with the financial crisis in one way or another; it is difficult to avoid it in this context. In brief, I will talk about two themes: The importance of indebtedness not becoming too high and the importance of having crisis management mechanisms in place before the event. The most important lesson: Don’t allow too much debt to build up!
All in all, our initial findings demonstrate impressive efforts on the part of the accession countries to achieve satisfactory regulations with regard to their central banks and financial systems in conformity with EU requirements, even if further work is still needed. At the same time, a sound financial legal system requires not only the adoption of the "right" financial laws, but also the support of an infrastructure – and, indeed, a culture – that ensures that the relevant laws can be effectively applied. The strengthening of the financial and banking sectors Although the restructuring process in accession countries has made substantial progress, the financial sectors of accession countries still need to be further developed in terms of size, depth and functioning. This applies, in particular, to the banking sector that largely dominates the financial sector of these economies. The challenges ahead are numerous: inter alia, the weakness of banking intermediation, reflected in the low level of credit to the private sector, the relatively large proportion of bad loans in banks' balance sheets in some countries or the exceptionally high spreads between lending and deposit rates that will progressively vanish in the next years. Fortunately, the privatisation process and the increasing participation of foreign investors in the banking system have supported the rehabilitation and transformation of formerly state banks into efficient and profitable banking institutions.

Christian Noyer: The ECB and the accession process Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the European Federation of Finance House Associations (EUROFINAS) conference, Warsaw, 15 October 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Let me begin by saying that it is a great pleasure for me to participate in this conference, and that I appreciate the invitation of the "European Federation of Finance House Associations" (EUROFINAS). The Federation's effort to bring together finance and credit institutions throughout Europe deserves full merit. The choice of the city of Warsaw for this year's conference seems particularly interesting to me, as this city is witnessing the far-reaching links that are currently being developed between the countries represented by EUROFINAS' members and the so-called accession countries preparing for EU membership. As a representative of the European Central Bank (ECB), I welcome the EUROFINAS members' objective to jointly tackle the challenges faced by the European financial industry at an international level. Not only is this remarkable in such a competitive industry, but it is also key to support the development of the financial sector in the economies of central and eastern Europe. Despite the achievements of the past decade, the accession countries still need to devote effort both to the reinforcement of prudential policies and business practices and to the development of highly valuable capital and "know-how" in the financial sector.
On the basis of these data the Central Bank reduced its growth forecast for 2017 to 12%, compared to 1.5-2.5% in December. At the same time, for 2018 we are expecting the economy to grow between 2.25 and 3.25% (Table 1), based on the fact that the economy does not appear to have any relevant imbalances, the mining-related investment adjustment is expected to end, and a more favorable external outlook. Fiscal policy is assumed to follow the fiscal consolidation path announced by the Government. Table 1 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent)  2015  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national saving (% of GDP) GFCF (% of nominal GDP)  2.3 2.0 1.7 -0.8 2.4 -1.8 -2.7 -2.0 21.4 23.6  2016 (e) Dec.16 Mar.17 Report Report 1.5 1.1 2.0 -0.6 2.8 0.1 -1.4 -1.7 19.3 22.2  1.6 1.1 2.0 -0.8 2.8 -0.1 -1.6 -1.4 20.2 23.2  2017 (f) Dec.16 Report  Mar.17 Report  2018 (f) Mar.17 Report  1.5-2.5 2.6 2.0 0.7 2.4 2.0 4.1 -1.9 19.2 21.7  1.0-2.0 2.3 1.9 0.2 2.5 1.6 4.3 -0.9 20.3 22.5  2.25-3.25 4.1 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7 7.2 -2.1 20.5 22.6  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 6  15. Our base scenario assumes that monetary policy will remain accomodative throughout the policy horizon.

Following the adoption of an expansionary bias in December, the policy rate has been cut 75bp, acting promptly upon the prospects of a softer economy. In the April monetary policy meeting, while adopting the last 25bp cut in this series, the Central Bank Board signaled that it could consider some further policy easing if economic prospects remained subdued. This is reflected in the evolution of market expectations (Figure 8). Compared to a neutral real rate of 1%-1.5% Chile´s monetary policy continues to be one of the most expansionary among comparable economies. Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent)  5  5  MPR  4  Financial asset prices, December 2016 Report (*)  Financial asset 4 prices, March Report (*)  3  3 EES Financial asset prices (17 April)  FBS  2  2 14  15  16  17  18  19  (*) Constructed using interest rates on swap contracts up to 10 years. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 16. As usual with forecasts, this macroeconomic scenario is exposed to risks. External risks include political and policy risks, especially concentrated on fiscal and monetary policy decisions in the US. China remains a concern although its authorities appear to have successfully managed a gradual deceleration without a major disruption thus far. External risks are particularly relevant for a small open economy like Chile´s. Upside risks essentially emerge from a more robust expansion of the world economy and additional improvement in terms of trade. 17.
The strong contractionary impact of the decline in domestic spending on economic activity has been cushioned, however, by external demand. That said, the positive effect of foreign trade has been the consequence, above all, of the substantial cut in imports, since exports – despite improving their market share – have also been affected by the sharp decline in world trade. Fortunately, the latest figures for the Spanish economy indicate that, as in the euro area and in the rest of the world, the sharpest phase of the contraction is now behind us. The decline in activity in the second quarter was still substantial (1.1%), but more moderate than in the  2  BIS Review 124/2009  first quarter (1.6%). As in other areas, the main conjunctural indicators are beginning to show signs of more modest declines or of stabilisation, suggesting that the virulence of the crisis has continued to abate in the third quarter of this year. The recession is also correcting some of the main imbalances that built up in the Spanish economy during the boom period, mainly high private-sector debt, the excessive weight of the real estate sector and a persistent inflation differential, which translated into a growing external deficit. The growth rate of credit to the private sector has fallen substantially and will probably continue to do so in the coming quarters. Such developments in lending correspond to what might be expected – in circumstances like the present – of its usual cyclical pattern, exacerbated by the tension on international financial markets.

Against this backdrop, we expect GDP growth of 2.5% to 3% for 2021. The recovery thus remains incomplete. Unemployment is likely to rise again, and production factors will remain underutilised for some time yet. The forecast for Switzerland, as for the global economy, is subject to high uncertainty. Monetary policy’s contribution to crisis management and outlook  Prices will decline this year as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, and economic output will be lower than in 2019. Production capacity is likely to still be underutilised next year, with inflation still at 0.0%. An expansionary monetary policy therefore continues to be necessary for crisis management. Our monetary policy contributes to crisis management via three channels. First, we provide favourable financing conditions for Swiss businesses and the public sector via the low level of interest rates. This eases the burden on those companies and institutions that face increased funding needs as a result of the crisis. Second, the negative interest rate and our foreign exchange market interventions counter the upward pressure on the Swiss franc. This pressure is especially high in periods of uncertainty, and a strong appreciation would weigh particularly heavily on the economy in the crisis. We have therefore made considerable foreign exchange purchases this year to maintain appropriate monetary conditions. Third, we are making additional liquidity available to banks via the CRF, allowing them to refinance the COVID-19 loans they grant and to do so at an interest rate of −0.75%.
In parallel, the reduction by 5.6 percentage points of the interest rate on lek credit compared to 2011 – when the monetary policy easing started – helps Albanian firms and households to save around ALL 15 billion per year. Third, the accommodative monetary policy has supported Albania’s financial stability. Growth of demand for goods and services and reduction of debt costs led to the improvement of the solvency of firms and households, and has encouraged loan restructuring. Also, the orientation of lending toward lek credit has reduced the exposure of the economy and of the financial system against exchange rate volatilities. Monetary policy-related measures undertaken by the Bank of Albania have contributed to the expansion of aggregate demand and boosting economic growth. Our assessments suggest that the accommodative monetary policy stance has contributed positively, on average by 0.5 percentage point, to economic growth in the last two years. Also the accommodative monetary policy stance has contributed to the stability of the domestic currency. Both transmission channels have contributed and will continue to contribute to price stability in Albania. The current trends in the development of the economy and our projections suggest that inflation will converge toward the target within a two-year horizon. Banking supervision and financial stability The main aspects of our work for safeguarding financial stability were strengthening the stability of the banking system, enhancing its resilience to shocks, adopting international standards on supervision and regulation, and administration of consolidation processes in the banking sector.

Ardo Hansson: Celebrating the tenth anniversary of Estonia’s accession to NATO and EU Opening speech for Europe Day by Mr Ardo Hansson, Governor of the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank), at the Seminar on the impact of the European Union on Estonia, Eesti Pank, Tallinn, 9 May 2014. *  *  *  Today we are celebrating Europe Day. We have just passed the tenth anniversary of Estonia’s accession to the European Union, though the move towards Europe had started when the country regained its independence and linked the Estonian kroon to the German mark. To people in Estonia, being part of Europe means democracy, freedom, security and well-being. Closer integration with the European Union has been driven by the desire to ensure that these benefits are maintained. These core European values remain more in the background in our everyday life as we take them for granted, but events in Ukraine have given a sharp reminder of their importance. Accession to the EU has increased Estonia’s influence on the world. Estonia’s voice is heard better in Europe than ever before and Estonia is involved in setting the joint economic policy of Europe and the euro area. This gives us the power to affect processes ourselves, and the responsibility to do our work as well as possible and to answer for the results. As the central bank of the Republic of Estonia and a member of the Eurosystem, Eesti Pank has also contributed to the sustainable development and increased prosperity of the Estonian economy.
Farmers, traders, rulers, missionaries and the military have all had a part in the cosmopolitan societies that existed in Nusantara. Money has taken many forms over the millennia, and our region has seen a greater diversity than most. Cowrie shells, tin “tampan” and brass gongs are some of the more exotic stores of value. But among coins and banknotes there are some equally distinctive means of making commercial exchange a safe and convenient activity. Nowadays the central banks have taken on this role. In the past, there was less clarity about issuing authorities. Many different currencies could circulate in the same location, resulting in a variety of payment options. Often this resulted in confusion and even counterfeiting. In this exhibition there are examples of forgeries intended to deceive, along with local copies that represented a tribute to the originals. Good designs have always had their admirers, some of whom have created coins to pay homage to innovations such as the pohon pitis, the coin money tree that had coins which could be detached from its branches or used as an entire “money tree”. In other cases it is the name of a coin that became adopted by different societies. The “leeuwendaler” (“lion dollar”), which circulated in the Dutch colonies such as New York, ended up as the official US currency after the war of independence from Britain. The same Dutch coins were also common in the Malay Archipelago, but only in Brunei has the dollar survived as an official term for the currency.

In Malaysia, the old British unit of the “shilling” lived on long after it ceased to exist in the United Kingdom. There is no end to the links that can be found between the different countries and their coinage. Nusantara was at the centre of this international network, leaving us with a diverse inheritance of numismatic material. Much of the physical evidence of this global trade has, however, been lost. Evolution is an intrinsic part of the nature of money; coins have been melted down, misplaced or sometimes incorporated into other items such as jewellery; banknotes have been destroyed. We are left with shipwrecks as some of the most useful sources information on the money that was in circulation in our history. What remains is a faint reflection of the millions – literally – of coins that once circulated in the archipelago. Some are of the highest rarity while others may not be. Bank Negara Malaysia has for many decades been a custodian of local numismatic heritage, resulting in an unrivalled collection of Malaysian coins and banknotes. This is a natural role for a central bank to adopt. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We would like to thank the input of private collectors such as Mr. William Barrett, whose passion for Nusantara numismatic material has produced the core of the present exhibition. “Knowing Nusantara” is the first numismatic exhibition of this nature to be held at Bank Negara Malaysia.
The net zero challenge and the UK's role as a global financial hub The transition to a low emission world brings with it a unique set of risks – such as the risk of disorderly transitions away from emissions-intensive assets. Only the financial sector has the capability to marshal the vast sums of investment needed to help businesses and individuals structurally reduce emissions and move in an as orderly way as possible towards sustainable alternatives. The IEA expects that the world will need annual clean energy investment of $ trillion by the end of the decade to limit warming to 1.5oC2, while other recent studies have estimated that between $ trillion and $ trillion of cumulative investment will be required to meet global net-zero emissions by 2050.3 One of the key areas of COP27 is mobilising climate finance for developing countries. The UK's position as a global financial centre means it has a pivotal role to play in relation to the provision of sustainable finance to tackle climate change. This was strengthened further when the UK Government published its UK Green financing framework in June 2021 followed by the launch of the first green gilt issuance in September 2021 which raised £ billion and was the largest inaugural green bond issuance ever undertaken by a sovereign. Total green gilt issuance for the financial year 2021-22 raised a total of £ billion, and further green gilt issuance of £ billion is planned in 2022-23.

Islamic finance by its very nature has synergies with climate finance in that it seeks to avoid investing in socially detrimental activities.4 The ESG-linked sukuk market, though currently small – only 2.6% of global outstanding sukuk – is fast-growing, and expected to increase to around 5% of the sukuk market in the next 5 years.5 Global annual sukuk issuance itself is estimated to grow at a rate of nearly 7% per year over the next five years, reaching $ in 2027.6 The growth of green and sustainability sukuk over the coming years presents an opportunity for the world to accelerate sustainable investment. The Bank of England's role in supporting the transition to net zero The Bank of England is supporting the transition to net-zero in three main ways. First, through policy advocacy. The Bank of England supports the global objectives of mobilising finance flows consistent with the Paris Agreement and supporting climate-  2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  resilient development. For example, during the Indonesian G20 presidency, the Bank has worked to ensure consistency and comparability in climate disclosure frameworks in its support for the IFRS's ISSB and its draft standards. For the global financial sector to mobilise finance efficiently to support the transition to net zero, we need a transition finance infrastructure to be put in-place. This includes common definitions, climate disclosures, broader government policy and transition plans from across the economy.
Under the floating exchange rate regime, the Sri Lankan currency can no longer be regarded as a steadily and continuously depreciating currency. With the maturing domestic foreign exchange market, the exchange rate is now more responsive to, and determined through, market forces of supply and demand, while the intervention by the Central Bank is limited to mitigate excessive volatility in the market and to build up official external reserves. The stabilization of the Sri Lanka rupee utmost underlines the need for the export and import competing sectors to focus more on productivity improvements and market access in order to maintain external competitiveness. Instead of waiting for the exchange rate to depreciate and then for our businesses to become competitive, it is time for all of us to improve our productivity in whatever manner we can. The garment sector, I hear is trying to gain from higher productivity and also through cost efficiencies. How does inflation and productivity affect each other? Increased productivity is an important prerequisite to achieve low and stable inflation levels in the long-run. The lower productivity allows cost increases that flow through to product prices and thereby raises inflation. Therefore, the lower productivity growth thus represents a negative supply shock that generates inflationary pressures. In such context, it is necessary to pay due attention to improving the productivity in order to prevent potential inflationary pressure associated with high income arising from faster nominal growth and cost-push factors that raise the cost of production.

Even the nonavailability of raw materials or essential inputs or the domestic demand for the output no longer does inhibit industrial growth in view of globalization of trade and services and the advancements in information and communication technology. Although the importance of the agriculture sector in Sri Lanka is reducing, the share of industry has been improving. By end 2007, the share of industry remained at around 30 per cent of GDP compared to 20 per cent in 1950. However, there are still risks and weaknesses in industry sector as well. The higher reliance of imported raw material, increased cost of economic infrastructure, higher wages per unit of output, overall increase in cost structure, intense global competition and possible abolition of various concessions certainly tells us there is an urgent need to improve productivity in the industry sector as well. The demand for the country's industrial goods will always depend on its comparative and competitive advantages. This requires local industries to raise productivity and efficiency in production so as to successfully compete with the rival producers in other parts of the world. Since Sri Lanka does not have an unlimited natural resource base it would be difficult to enhance growth through industry or agriculture alone. As mentioned above, services sector is important for both industry and agriculture sector performance. Hence, we need to focus more on services sector. However, the focus should be placed on a “more productive” services sector.