samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Higher productivity leads to a bigger economy that can more easily support the ever increasing number of retired workers. As we take such steps to put our own house in order, we could reasonably look to other nations to take complementary steps to promote global economic rebalancing. By spurring domestic demand growth, emerging market economies could support global activity while enabling their own citizens to reap the full benefits of the remarkable increases in productivity and output they have achieved in recent years. If we were to take all the steps outlined above, then I think we will have a pretty good 2012, with even better prospects after that. If instead, it is all left to monetary policy, then the outlook will be much less satisfactory. My baseline forecast – absent the full suite of complementary policies to support growth – is that 2012 will not differ much from the second half of 2011: moderate growth, slightly stronger employment and some moderation of inflation. But I worry about the downside risks to this forecast especially if the stresses in Europe continue to escalate, or if little progress is made on housing, fiscal policy and global rebalancing. In particular, accommodative monetary policy becomes much less effective if the housing market remains in the doldrums. Conclusion I know that I have laid out here today a daunting set of policy objectives in an environment that is quite challenging.

At the same time, the monetary policy stance of the ECB, while fully oriented towards the price stability objective, does influence the exchange rate. From a theoretical viewpoint, one can argue that the member countries of the euro area have chosen to go beyond a fixed exchange rate by adopting a single currency. The adoption of the euro implies the irreversible abolition of national currencies and, hence, of national exchange rates themselves. This choice involves a trade-off. On one hand, a single currency, as we have seen, eliminates the volatility of exchange rates within the monetary union. The euro, as a freely-floating currency, helps protect the economies of its member countries from external shocks. The single currency also facilitates trade between them, deepening economic integration. However, the elimination of national currencies implies that market signals regarding domestic economic imbalances are lost, allowing such imbalances to build up. More importantly, the absence of national currencies also implies that a valuable tool for stabilising the economy in the short term in the face of asymmetric shocks is no longer available. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has brought home the implications, both positive and negative, of membership of a single currency area. It remains my firm opinion, however, that the gains outweigh the losses. It is also my firm opinion that greater efforts need to be made to reduce and eventually eliminate internal imbalances within the monetary union in order to protect its sustainability.
Sources: WB, IMF, BIS and Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Financial Markets Commission; IMF REO Western Hemisphere, 2016. Regarding the risk at the public sector, in normal times the fiscal space is determined by the fiscal rule and public indebtedness. Fiscal policy in Chile is based on a structural (cyclically-adjusted) balance rule adopted in 2000, but after seven years of strict compliance of a 1% surplus target, a tacit escape clause was called at the time Page 8 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  of the GFC, raising the structural deficit from 0.5% of GDP to 3.1%. Despite fast economic normalization afterwards, the actual structural balance never returned to pre-crisis levels and even softened targets were frequently not met in the ensuing 10 years. It is currently conducted based on an explicit commitment of the fiscal authority to attain a previously defined target. However, during times of crisis and periods of emergency Chile’s experience suggests that the space of fiscal policy is limited. In fact, the fiscal impulse of 2009 generated a fiscal deterioration that is still under consolidation. Nonetheless, in the current juncture, the Chilean economy appears to be prepared to face external shocks, but with some gaps to be filled in the fiscal front. For these reasons, several measures are being taken to achieve fiscal consolidation.

Measures taken by the Eurosystem to fight against the financial crisis  Our analysis of the recent situation suggests that the weak outlook for economic activity in the euro area is weighing downward on costs, wages and prices. Accordingly, the Governing council decided twice to lower the key ECB interest rate by 25 basis points, in its early November and early December Meetings. Changes in the ECB rates ultimately affect inflation through changes in bank lending rates, monetary and financial conditions and aggregate demand. Under normal financial-market conditions, monetary-policy transmission mechanisms work properly and non-standard measures are unnecessary. But when transmission mechanisms are impaired, standard policy is likely to be less effective. In such exceptional circumstances, extraordinary, or nonstandard, measures must be implemented. It is in that spirit that the Eurosystem has constantly and reactively updated its set of non-standard measures, keeping pace with the crisis’ developments. On December 8, we have announced extensive measures to contain the refinancing risks of Euro area banks. The Eurosystem has announced in particular two longer-term refinancing operations with a maturity of 36 months which will be conducted as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment as well as the extension of the collateral it considers eligible to borrow its liquidity. We also have reduced the rate of reserve requirements from 2% to 1%, which is also contributing to stem collateral constraints of parts of the euro area banking system.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Presentation of the Annual Report 2009 Address by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, to the Governing Council of the Bank of Spain on the Presentation of the Annual Report 2009, Madrid, 16 June 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, The presentation of the Annual Report for 2009 is taking place at a particularly complex juncture for Europe and, most especially, for the Spanish economy. What began as an isolated fiscal crisis episode in a euro area Member State has turned into an event of systemic scope that has obliged the European authorities and national governments to adopt measures on an unprecedented scale to defend the stability of the area. At the same time, the spread and heightening of tensions have firmly focused analysts’ and markets’ attention on the situation and on economic policy responses in those countries which, like Spain, face comparatively more demanding challenges and are, consequently, perceived as potentially more vulnerable. This is a demanding conjunctural situation, for which it is difficult to find points of reference in our recent past. And more than ever before, it is important to diagnose accurately the true scale of the challenges our economy faces, to prepare promptly the tools needed to meet the challenges and to use them as decisively and forcefully as the situation requires.

To its credit, the insurance industry has taken important strides in rising to the challenges faced. Generally, Bank Negara has been encouraged by the positive response of the industry to new regulations that further strengthen corporate governance and risk management standards and promote the fair treatment of consumers. Of course, some companies have been more progressive than others in absorbing the regulatory principles within their companies. But overall, our supervisory interactions with the industry have shown that the industry as a whole has made good progress in lifting standards of financial and business practices. This is encouraging as ultimately, both the industry and Bank Negara have a common interest in promoting an efficient and stable insurance market in Malaysia. At Bank Negara, we are continuing to strengthen our regulatory and supervisory capabilities as well as sharpen our focus. As those from Malaysia would be familiar, we are now into the fourth month of the Bank’s new regulatory and supervisory structure. The new organisational structure for the regulatory and supervisory functions within the Bank were realigned back in November last year to move from the previous sectoral approach to regulation, to one that will integrate the Bank’s regulation of the different financial sectors under its purview along functional lines. As a result, the functions previously under the former Insurance Regulation Department have now been assumed by the newly established Financial Sector Development Department, the Prudential Policy Department, the Consumer and Market Conduct Department and the Financial Surveillance Department.
This is Statutory Instrument 32 now revised and re-named SI 55 on the Monitoring of Balance of Payments. Ladies and Gentlemen, as the name of the SI suggests, the aim is to “monitor” and not to “control”. There has been much public debate on this subject matter which seems to suggest a public misunderstanding of the intentions of the SI. Some quarters have gone so far as to link the issuance of SI 55 to the earlier issued SI33 as amended through SI78 (Currency Regulations) and concluded that Government is introducing exchange controls. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Managing Director, Distinguished invited Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to clarify that SI33 was issued with the primary intention of reinforcing the use of Kwacha, which legal tender, for all domestic transactions. This is in line with practice in most countries around the world. The SI has is no way intended to stifle business. The initial Monitoring of Balance of Payments regulations were initially issued under SI 32. When the Government issued SI 32, Bank of Zambia embarked on an exercise to seek the views of the financial system players, the business community and the public at large. Arising from these stakeholder engagements, it became clear that some of the provisions of SI 32 would impede the smooth flow of business. It was also evident that the timeframe within which stakeholders were supposed to prepare for the implementation of the SI was not adequate.

03.10.2016  Second Financial Education Day Banco de España/CNMV Luis M. Linde Governor  Good morning I would like to begin by saying how pleased I am to be participating in this celebration of the Financial Education Day. The purpose of this event is to raise society’s awareness of the importance of improving and broadening financial and, more generally, economic knowledge, helping people take decisions that affect many aspects of our lives. At times like the present, characterised by the constant evolution and development of saving and borrowing instruments, the ability to correctly assess the risk and profitability of different financial products is particularly important. Indeed, different products may be more or less appropriate depending on an individual’s risk exposure profile, age and income. The role of experience when choosing products is limited, since we are frequently faced with new products or products with features that are not well known. I would like to stress that the main purpose of financial education is not to train experts in how to understand complex products, but to help ordinary people with their spending, saving and investment decisions. Particular prominence is given in financial education to aspects such as preparing a household budget, prudence when taking decisions, the assumption that higher returns are generally associated with higher risks, and, no less importantly, the time profile of economic decisions, and, specifically, preparation for retirement, which is obviously very important given current demographic trends and the challenges of population ageing.
11  Chart 5: Securitisations relative to stock of M4 lending  Chart 6: UK household sector assetbacked security spreads Bas is points  Percentage of sectoral M4L stock 25  400  20  300  350  Basis points  Commercial mortgages Credit cards Prime mortgages Non-conforming mortgages (LHS)  150 120  250  Household secured 15  90  200 60  150  10  Household unsecurd  0 2002  0 98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  0 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  Source: LehmansLive Note: weighted averages of AAA, AA, A and BBB 5years spreads for prime and commercial mortgages and of AAA, A and BBB 5-year spreads fro credit cards and non-confirming mortgages.

You saw from the slides I showed earlier that the general public on the whole has relatively good access to places where they can made cash withdrawals and the retail trade has good access to service points where they can leave their daily takings, but is it at the same time a well-known fact that several of the banks have cut back on their manual cash handling. The consequence is that a number of households, perhaps those in sparsely-populated areas in particular, have had a long way to travel to the nearest bank that handles cash. This is a problem that may increase with regard to the banknote and coin changeover. The Riksbank is therefore conducting a regular dialogue with the banks on how the changeover should be managed. The banks have said that they will help their customers to the extent that they need it and that they will contribute to a smooth changeover. We are assuming that the banks will take this responsibility, but we are at the same time monitoring developments, for instance, by making a survey of access to cash services in different parts of the country. The continued dialogue with the banks will show whether the Riksbank needs to take any further measures. Starting from 2015, we will carry out extensive information campaigns aimed at both market participants and the general public. The effects of more electronic payments The challenges regarding electronic payments are essentially very different.
Clearly, in economic terms, the cost of litigiousness and its terrible effect on the reputation of the entire sector more than exceeds any hypothetical benefits that individual banks might have obtained through questionable practices. Society has clearly evolved and, in tandem, so have demands regarding the transparency, diligence, rigour and integrity expected of banks. I believe the sector is responding to this challenge, which involves achieving a significant cultural change in the way banks relate to their customers. I have pointed out that it is premature to analyse the results of this Law in terms of potential improvements to legal certainty, but we can see a change in the number of complaints submitted to the Banco de España. As you will know, in recent years the problems related to mortgage loans have led to the change in the number of complaints lodged with the Banco de España. This is due in particular to two issues: the above-mentioned floor clauses and mortgage loan arrangement costs, which saw a record number of complaints submitted in 2017. However, mortgage loan complaints made last year fell to levels of a decade ago. We expect this trend to continue. But apart from one-off changes in the time series, I wish to emphasise the fact that the problems behind these complaints stem from operations entered into prior to the enactment of the Law in question.

This is particularly important for the common assumption that a mortgage must be arranged at the time of purchase, which means entering into a very longterm payment commitment with a credit institution. Something which, as the crisis brought painfully to light, may entail problems in the case of economic or labour market instability. Comparatively speaking, mortgage risk performed well during the previous financial crisis, despite the fact this is not always perceived as such. Defaults on house purchase mortgage loans at no point exceeded 6%. However, financing for real estate development and construction reached non-performance levels of over 36%. This demonstrates that individuals treat their monthly mortgage payments as something that is a priority, whereas the financing of these same houses before their completion and sale evidences much riskier characteristics. Yet despite this relatively good performance, the crisis showed that the mortgage market had certain shortcomings that needed correcting. Apart from the evident social and economic drama, in the final years of the crisis we experienced a bout of litigiousness and unprecedented legal uncertainty. Notably, much of this litigiousness was concentrated in the mortgage market. One paradigmatic instance of this conflict were the so-called floor clauses. According to end-August figures, more than 1.2 million complaints were lodged in this connection, with a cost for banks of almost € billion. 1  The economic and, no less importantly, reputational harm that cases such as the floor clauses have caused to the sector is evident.
However, voices have raised the concern that, in light of the ever-increasing cost of safety and against the background of the significant cost pressure due to deteriorating market conditions, investment in resilience might in fact be increasingly limited. But, as I said before, the higher requirements for operational reliability, for contingency planning and for crisis management stem mainly from the financial industry’s own development. Clearly, increasing concentration, geographic clustering, connectivity and interdependency are highly beneficial, but they do also have a price when it comes to the reduction of risk. We cannot enjoy the benefits without paying this price. The point here is that we all have to be very careful about how we invest in resilience. And we have to make sure that no resources are wasted. For sure, the regulatory community will keep this in mind and will do its best not to impose unnecessary burdens on the private sector. Summary and conclusion Finally, let me sum up my main points. •  Today’s globalized financial industry shows impressive long-term value growth. This growth is due to market integration and technological progress. Together they led to sizable reductions in transaction costs and to expanding markets. •  Every transaction eventually leads to a transfer of money. From trade to settlement usually at least one system of financial market infrastructure is involved. Overseers care for the safety of these systems. This is their responsibility. •  The events of September 11, 2001, made the industry, the regulators and the overseers rethink their approach to safety.

The second credit-related measure adopted was to step up the work currently under way to design a programme for the purchase of asset-backed securities. This market was heavily affected by the crisis, and its underdevelopment in Europe is constraining the greater diversification of sources of corporate finance, particularly for SMEs. Initiatives such as this may stimulate the deepening of this market, although they are unlikely to be decisive if not accompanied by further action in equally important areas, such as that of regulation. To sum up, the situation of the euro area justifies the differing conduct of its monetary policy which, as I have attempted to explain, is still at the stage of scaling up its expansionary action, in contrast to the likely winding-down of stimuli prevalent in other advanced economies. This adds complexity and uncertainty to the exceptional situation of abundant liquidity and low interest rates prevailing in the markets. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Countries in this situation remain BANCO DE ESPAÑA  11	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  THE BUDGET DEFICIT TARGET AND THE FISCAL POLICY STANCE IN 2019 STRUCTURAL BALANCE CHANGE  GENERAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURAL BALANCE  0  CHART 10  % of GDP  4.0  -1  % of GDP  3.0  -2  2.0  -3 -4  1.0  -5  0.0  -6 -7  -1.0  -8  -2.0  -9 2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2010  2019  BANCO DE ESPAÑA (WITH 2019 STATE BUDGET MEASURES)  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  1.3% DEFICIT FULFILMENT  SOURCES: European Commission, IGAE, 2019 State Budget and Banco de España.

BANCO DE ESPAÑA  15	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  OTHER STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES  CHART 15  TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY  116  POTENTIAL OUTPUT GROWTH AND CONTRIBUTIONS  1995 = 100  4  LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RATE (a)  % pp  16  114 3  112 110  2  108 106  1  104 102  0  100 98 1995  2001 SPAIN  2007  2013  GERMANY  2019  -1 1995  EURO AREA  2001  2007  2013  2019  % of labour force % of dependent employees  36  14  34  12  32  10  30  8  28  6  26  4  24  2  22  0 1995  20 2001  2007  2013  2019  EMPLOYMENT  CAPITAL  LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (b)  TFP  POTENTIAL OUTPUT  TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RATE (right-hand scale)  SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España. a Annual data for Q2. b Unemployed seeking work for more than one year.
There is a lot as well that is outside the Fed’s purview that could have been done to make the U.S. economy perform better. This includes tax reform, job retraining programs and infrastructure investment. So, what can we do to bolster global growth in the future? The first is to undertake the necessary structural reforms to make our economies more efficient. Productivity growth is not preordained. The steps we take as countries to eliminate and lessen bottlenecks and improve our human and physical capital are important. The second is to ensure that our financial systems are well-functioning. Tremendous progress has been made globally in 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  implementing higher capital and liquidity standards post-crisis. But we still see some important banking systems impaired by bad loans, low profitability and inadequate capital. The population aging in the developed world does imply that, purely from the productive factor side, less of the global growth contribution is likely to come from Japan, Europe and the United States. And economies like China are likely to continue to slow as their per capita income increases and they make the transition from investment-to consumption-led growth. But this doesn’t imply a bad outcome. There are many other countries with tremendous potential for growth in areas such as Africa, Asia, and South America. Take, for example, the surge in growth that we are seeing out of India. I am an optimist. To a large degree we do control our destiny. It is up to us to seize those opportunities.

William C Dudley: Panel remarks at Bank Indonesia-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joint International Seminar Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bank Indonesia-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joint International Seminar, Bali, 31 July 2016. *  *  *  Linda Goldberg, Jonathan McCarthy and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. In my remarks today, I will focus on why global growth has been so anemic following the financial crisis and what we can do about it. I think it is fair to say that the global recovery following the financial crisis has been disappointing. Growth is below pre-crisis levels for the United States, Europe, Japan and China. For example, in the U.S., real GDP growth has averaged only about 2.2 percent per year over the period from 2010 to 2015, below the pre-crisis average of 2.4 percent from 2003 to 2008. This slower growth performance has been accompanied by relatively low inflation rates – persistently below the objectives of the monetary policy authorities in the United States, Europe and Japan. As I see it, there are many causes for these persistent shortfalls in growth, and they vary across regions and countries. Let me focus on the reasons for the United States in the post crisis period. Growth has been weaker than expected for many reasons.