samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Food and energy prices continued to rise in the second quarter of 2008 and financial markets remained under stress. In the meantime domestic uncertainties have intensified, having further adverse impact on the medium term inflation expectations. Accordingly, there has been a significant upward surge in the medium term inflation expectations in the second quarter of 2008 (Figure 7). BIS Review 100/2008  5  Figure 7: Inflation Expectations* 9 12 Months  24 Months  8 7 6 5  07.08  05.08  03.08  01.08  11.07  09.07  07.07  05.07  03.07  01.07  11.06  09.06  07.06  05.06  03.06  01.06  11.05  09.05  07.05  4  *24 months expectations is available from May 2006 onwards. Source: CBT. In order to contain the deterioration in inflation expectations and to prevent the materialization of the second round effects of supply-side shocks, the Monetary Policy Committee tightened monetary policy in the past three months, increasing the policy rates by a cumulative of 150 basis points (Table 1). In current conjuncture, where the consumption demand keeps slowing down, I would particularly like to emphasize that the monetary tightening policy was adopted in order to halt the deterioration in inflation expectations and the upsurge in the risk premium. As a consequence, the deterioration in inflation expectations ceased and market rates declined in July (Figure 7).

Krzysztof Rybinski: Globalisation - opportunities, threats and implications for the economic policy Speech by Mr Krzysztof Rybinski, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at a meeting with entrepreneurs who have participated in the economic climate survey carried out by the National Bank of Poland, Rzeszow, 10 March 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Welcome to the meeting in the regional branch of the National Bank of Poland in Rzeszow. First of all, I would like to thank very much the management of the branch for their efforts to organise this meeting. Since 1998 the National Bank of Poland has carried out quarterly and annual economic climate surveys of enterprises. Results of this survey allow a better assessment of the state of the economy and the outlook for inflation. They also constitute a vital element of the economic analyses carried out by the NBP. Therefore, I would like to thank all of you for your contribution to the accumulation of knowledge at the NBP about the current processes in the Polish economy. Such knowledge, gained from people who create jobs, make investments and face domestic and foreign competition on a daily basis, is particularly important in the environment of the changing structure of the economy. Structural changes may bias results derived from econometric models used by central banks.
This is upward-sloping and statistically significant, consistent with agglomeration effects. Moving from a city the size of Oxford (population 535,000) to one double its size such as Sheffield (around 1.2 million) should be  Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2017). In a personal capacity, I chair the Government’s Industrial Strategy Council which evaluates its progress. 50 Forth (2019). 49  36  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  36  expected, on average, to boost GDP per head from £ per head to £ per head, or around 2.6%.51  Chart 22: City population and GDP per head  Sources: OECD Metropolitan Areas Population and Bank calculations. Notes: GDP per capita in $ in 2015 and log scale used for metropolitan area population. In fact, GDP per head in Sheffield is around 44% lower than in Oxford. This is not just a North-South divide. Income per head in Sheffield is little different than in Doncaster just down the road (population 305,000). 51  Data set underlying Chart 22 refers to GDP per capita in $ in 2015. Numbers which convert to sterling in the text are based around average $ bilateral exchange rate of 1.34 in 2018. 37  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  37  And it is not just Sheffield. Many large UK cities sit below the line: Belfast, Glasgow, Leeds, Manchester, Cardiff, Birmingham, as well as Sheffield. Agglomeration multipliers seem to be consistently smaller in a number of UK cities. Why?

No amount of computer capability will enable you to access the computers of the money centers of other countries, and of the off-shore center of the world. These are vast sum that we are talking about, directed at an opportune moment on markets which are not yet sophisticated, deep or varied and for political or financial reasons are at the time vulnerable somehow. In Thailand, for instance in 1997, the amount of non-resident baht moved in that year was 900 billion dollars when our total GNP was only 140 billion dollars. When that kind of money moves against a nation, there is really no way a reasonable defence could be made. Of course, the important powers of the world say that the country should behave itself better, but one has to ask a question why important powers of the world try to make sure that each country behaves itself, yet allows the international monetary system to behave totally as it wishes without due regard to responsibility or the misery and famine that such events could cost. The obvious answer is that all the major important money centers and funds are in the advanced countries and the major countries systems being much more diverse is less liable to collapse when there are large movements of funds in any particular sector. Banking in Thailand for instance provides 77% of all credit available in the country at this moment while in the US it is only 26%.
It can and will be deployed all the more efficiently that the rest of the policy environment remains sound. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Before you reach for your telephones, let me stress that we have no intention of trying this out. Monetary affairs are, as I have said, unpredictable, and the direction and magnitude in the movement of the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate, if it were allowed to float, is anyone's guess and may not have any bearing on the underlying economic fundamentals. We have no wish to find out. And, in answer to the many dramatic statements made over the past couple of weeks or so, our somewhat relaxed attitude towards small deviations in the exchange rate on the strong side of 7.80 does not mean that we are any less committed to maintaining the Link. Minor fluctuations in the market exchange rate on the strong side of the Link are a feature of our monetary system, and they are nothing to get too excited about. And there is an effective mechanism for us to ensure that these fluctuations are not so large as to undermine credibility and confidence in the Link. It is, however, worth putting into perspective some of the reasons for the sudden strengthening of the Hong Kong dollar, because they have a significance that goes beyond short-term fluctuations in the market. The trigger, you may recall, was the political pressure from outside for a revaluation of the renminbi. The read-across to the Hong Kong dollar, combined with a realisation that the Hong Kong economy was not doing so badly after all, led to a scramble to cover short positions.
5 [12]  So far, interest rates and the Riksbank’s costs have been lower than expected As the statistical estimates of the term premium are uncertain in many ways and have several possible sources of error, I think we obtain a clearer picture of the effects of bond purchases on the Riksbank’s balance sheet by studying different interest rate scenarios. Let us begin with the situation in February 2015 when we started purchasing bonds. The interest rate on five-year government bonds fell to just under zero after our monetary policy announcement. But Chart 4 shows that those of us on the Executive Board of the Riksbank as well as the money market participants in Prospera’s survey thought at the time that the repo rate would be brought back into positive territory towards the end of 2016 and then continue to increase. One can say that the Riksbank purchased government bonds that gave a return of approximately zero but that were expected to be funded according to the repo rate forecast. The chart shows that the Riksbank therefore expected to make a loss, as the funding costs were expected to be higher than the yield. 11 Chart 4. Actual and expected interest rate developments Per cent 3  3 Repo rate Survey MPR February 2015  2  2  MPR October 2016  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 12  14  16  18  20  Note.

On the one hand, some have argued that the Fed’s monetary policy is driving a global financial cycle.10 On the other hand, others have argued that the key driving forces of capital flows are global risk and uncertainty, with a much looser connection to US monetary policy.11 Another example of diverging views concerns the question of whether emerging economies have the tools to neutralise the spillovers originating from other parts of the global economy. As a result of our poor understanding of the types of shock and their transmission, establishing which policy responses are the best for each country seems to be rather difficult. Internalising the effects of one’s monetary policy on other jurisdictions would be even more challenging. Suppose the Fed had a mandate to internalise the global impact of its decisions, which it does not have, would the financial stability impact of cheap dollar funding in emerging market economies have called for a later, or for an earlier, normalisation of US monetary policy? Ultimately, there is necessarily a high degree of subjective judgement involved. As I already suggested, crisis times such as 2008–2009 are the exception, since the spillovers are at the same time less ambiguous and more visible. The scope of coordination This does not imply that regular dialogues between central banks as well as exchanges of views during meetings at the IMF, the BIS, the G20 and at regional level, are not useful. In fact, I believe that it is quite the contrary.
But at the same time, this may be a strength compared with the macroprudential tools, simply because it is difficult to “avoid” a policy rate increase. I am also convinced that quite regardless of what formal responsibility the central bank bears for financial stability, it will always receive a large share of the blame if a financial crisis arises. When all is said and done, the interest rate is the price of credit and as the central bank controls this price, at least regarding shorter maturities, I believe that the general public will hardly absolve the central bank of blame if a financial crisis arises after a period of  5  The comparison with fiscal policy, which is regarded as a foregone conclusion in monetary policy discussions, falters somewhat, as I see it. Fiscal policy is formulated by politicians with varying goals and we are probably wise to regard it as a foregone conclusion. However, regarding the relationship between monetary policy and macroprudential supervision in a similar way may function as a conceptual model, but would not work in practice. 6  For a recently-published study of the importance of credit and debt for the economic cycle, see Jordà, Ò, M. Schularick and A.M. Taylor, “When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business Cycles, and Crises”, NBER Working Paper No. 17621. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  cheaper credit. It will probably therefore be difficult in practice to conduct a monetary policy that does not take into account financial stability.

At one end of the spectrum are those who say that the crisis has meant that the dividing line between monetary policy and financial stability policy has in many ways been erased, or at least become less evident. If the central bank does not already have the clear and express task of maintaining financial stability, it should be given this – in addition to the natural task of acting as “lender of last resort” in a crisis. Monetary policy should be regarded as a legitimate tool in the financial stability toolbox.3 At the other end of the spectrum we find those who say that monetary policy and financial stability policy are distinct policies that should not be confused with one another. They claim that monetary policy and financial stability policy differ in the same way that monetary policy and fiscal policy differ, and they have different targets and methods. The policy rate should therefore not be regarded as an instrument for financial stability policy. Both types of policy should react to one another, but they should not be coordinated and conducted together as  1  The concept “balance sheet recession” was introduced a few years ago as an explanation for developments in Japan and its “lost decade”; see Koo, R.C., Balance Sheet Recession: Japan’s Struggle with Unchartered Economics and its Global Implications, Wiley, 2003.
Øystein Olsen: Management of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), before the Storting’s Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs, Oslo, 30 April 2013. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. Charts in pdf I would like to thank the Chairman and thank you for giving Norges Bank the opportunity again this year to report on the management of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). Chart: Changing the regional allocation The investment strategy of the GPFG builds on its specific features, purpose and our perception of the functioning of financial markets. The GPFG is a large fund and features a long investment horizon. The objective of investment management is to preserve the longterm international purchasing power of the GPFG. In 2012, the investment strategy was changed. As a result, investments in emerging markets have increased. Just over 10 percent of the overall portfolio is now invested in these markets. Chart: Increasing investments in real assets The allocation to equities was increased to 60 percent between 2007 and 2009. When the allocation to real estate reaches 5 percent further ahead, the GPFG's allocation to real assets will make up two-thirds of the overall portfolio. The long-term expected return on real assets is higher than on nominal bonds. The risk is also higher, but the long-term investment horizon puts us in a solid position to carry that risk.

Pablo Hernández de Cos: Evidence-based policies - from theory to practice Address by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the presentation of the collaboration agreement between the Center for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) and the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, Madrid, 18 January 2022. * * * Minister of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, General Secretary of Inclusion and Social Welfare Objectives and Policies, director of CEMFI, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Allow me to begin this short address by saying how pleased I am with the signing of this collaboration agreement between CEMFI and the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration. In recent months I have had the opportunity to publicly emphasise the importance of the evaluation of public policies and of incorporating the results of these evaluations into decisionmaking by public authorities,1 in the belief that, in a democratic society, evaluations should play a political as well as a technical role. In the political sphere, evaluating the design and effects of public policies should foster transparency regarding policy-makers’ actions and their outcomes. This facilitates accountability and democratic oversight by Parliament and citizens. It also fulfils a technical function, strengthening the decision-making process by providing it with valuable information to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency.
Throughout the years, Brazil has adopted more cautious and broader regulatory standards than the international norm. Just to mention a few examples of what I am referring to, there are twenty-one different types of financial institutions under the regulation and supervision of the Central Bank, from universal banks to credit unions, all sharing common prudential and leverage rules. Furthermore, not only capital requirements are higher in Brazil than the Basel recommendation but also all capital requirements and controls are applied on a consolidated basis that includes non-financial subsidiaries in a banking group, so that most institutions are consolidated for supervision purposes. Finally, accounting standards adopted in Brazil require that all operations be kept on balance, with the respective risk requirements and provisions. Risk management and internal controls regulations, as well as prudential loan loss provisioning requirements and large exposure limits have been in force for many years in Brazil. Additionally, having learned from past experience of international integration and fast contagion, the Central Bank makes careful evaluation of financial innovations and their impact on financial stability, so that the development of new products should be compatible with adequate prudential regulation. For instance, access to credit derivatives is limited and all over-the-counter derivatives that have a supervised entity as counterparty have to be registered and monitored. The continuous review and update of the prudential regulatory framework is a priority for us.

I believe we need to have this new framework in place by 2010, as the current crisis is left behind, hopefully, and growth and stability are restored. As part of the work program already laid down in the G-20, critical points in the reform include the need to make regulatory capital more neutral over-the-cycle, by integrating the macro prudential framework into the required capital of individual institutions; the need to reach, with prudential regulation and supervision, all quarters of the financial industry; and the need to enhance transparency of financial instruments and markets. Thank you very much. 2  BIS Review 44/2009
And capital adequacy is of course only one aspect of prudential regulation, with other aspects of risk management such as liquidity management and systems and controls also being vitally important. The Basel Committee has now of course explicitly recognised that the formal regulatory minimum capital framework is only one pillar in the edifice of bank soundness. It has to be complemented by supervisors individually reviewing the capital adequacy of banks in the light of a wide range of risk factors - the second pillar of the proposed new Accord - and by market discipline on banks, the third pillar. On the question of why we focus on banks, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of a stable banking system to economic health and growth. Banks play a crucial role in intermediating savings and credit and they are at the heart of the payments system. Most firms in most economies remain heavily reliant on banks for finance, and even in economies where a significant number of firms can turn to the capital markets for finance, banks retain important roles as providers of payment facilities, short-term credit, and backup liquidity. In less advanced economies, their role is even more dominant, to the extent that a number of full-blown macro-economic crises have had their roots in weak banking systems. Changes to the Basel Accord As I have said, the capital framework for banks is currently under review by the Basel Committee. It is worth reminding ourselves what this framework consists of.

But since 1970, real gross private capital flows have risen by a factor of more than eight double the growth in world trade and four times the growth in world income. Rising capital flows have delivered huge benefits to the developing countries. Capital liberalisation, like trade liberalisation, has facilitated “catch-up” in the levels of income of these countries. It delivers a permanent, and potentially huge, welfare gain. The experience of the Asian tigers from the 1970s onwards, and before that of Germany and Japan during the 1950s and 1960s, is testimony to that. But large-scale capital flows also bring risks. Capital flows are not just large, but volatile too. The financial crises in Mexico in 1994, across South-East Asia in 1997, in Russia in 1998 and in Brazil last year are the most recent and visible examples. But the incidence of financial crisis has in fact been rising since the early 1980s. And the cost of financial crises are considerable. In the stricken South-East Asian countries, capital flow reversals and output losses were anywhere between 5% and 20% of GDP. In many of these cases, there has been encouraging evidence of a V-shaped recovery in output and asset prices following crisis. But the depth of the V is clear evidence of the potential cost of volatile capital movements. Capital markets have of course been prone to “panics, manias and crashes” for as long as they have existed.
I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate CEMFI newly recruited faculty member, Federico Kochen, for winning the 2022 Young Economist Prize of the European Central Bank earlier this week in Sintra for his paper "Finance over the life cycle of firms" and specially Manuel Arellano for being awarded the prestigious Premio de Economía Rey de España prize for all his contributions to the development of highly influential econometric tools in a ceremony presided by King Felipe VI. All these personal and institutional achievements have taken place under the highly effective leadership of the CEMFI director, Rafael Repullo, to whom I am particularly grateful. To conclude, let me specifically address the students of the class of 2022. You are about to enter a challenging stage of your lives. Regardless of whether you continue studying for a doctoral degree or embark upon a professional career, I am sure that the knowledge and experience you have acquired during the Master in Economics and Finance will prove to be extremely valuable. Use your human capital wisely and productively, for your own benefit, but also for the benefit of those surrounding you. You can make a difference to make a better future. I wish you every success in your careers. Thank you very much.

If the exchange rate is actually misaligned from its fundamentals, the intervention will have a better chance to amend the situation, while it will also bring financial benefits. Conversely, if these are fundamental trends, the intervention will have transitory effects at best, at a substantial cost. Since the implementation of the floating regime at the end of the last decade, we have intervened in the foreign exchange market on three occasions. In the current circumstances we have not ruled it out. It is an option we are permanently evaluating. I want to go deeper into the elements that are weighed for this decision. It is always possible to design an intervention of such magnitude that it can affect the evolution of the nominal exchange rate. But this has other consequences on the economy that need consideration. One such consequence is the need to sterilize the monetary effects of the intervention. The money that is issued to buy the dollars must be taken out; otherwise monetary policy would be subordinated to the exchange rate objective, jeopardizing the stability of growth and inflation. This sterilization pressures long-term interest rates upward, which has an impact on activity, while inducing capital inflows that render the intervention ineffective. In turn, the intervention entails high financial costs, because financing the intervention via debt costs more than the returns on the international reserves, except, as I said before, when it is grounded on the expectation of an important correction of the exchange rate misalignment.