samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The "tariff shield" introduced at the end of 2021 explain 3-percentage points of the inflation differential in favour of France. It can thus help to reduce "second round effects" on prices and wages. But it can only be temporary: it is intended to smooth the shock, not to give the illusion that it no longer exists. The French government will therefore courageously start to reduce support for households by increasing gas and electricity tariffs by 15% next January and February. The second lesson is from Germany: domestic mechanisms must, to the greatest possible extent, allow for a reduction in the demand for gas and electricity in order to minimise the risk of shortages. The proposed tiering mechanism, which calls for the application of a regulated tariff of 80% of the historical annual consumption for households and a tariff at the market price beyond that, preserves an important "price signal", and therefore provides an incentive for this reduction. There remains the very sensitive question of electricity and gas prices for companies: should there be a regulated Spanish-style cap or a strong German-style fiscal buffer?

And yet, we have just emerged from a successful experience: let us recall that it was collectively considered that we Europeans were in a very bad position in March 2020 at the onset of the Covid crisis. But together we have managed to weather this crisis very well, thanks for instance to the joint purchase of vaccines and the SURE1 and Next Generation EU programmes, backed primarily by Germany and France. I will therefore venture to outline here, in the field of economics, where we will succeed together, what we differ on today, and - lastly and perhaps most importantly, what both our countries are in danger of forgetting. I. Where we will succeed together: monetary policy This shock further increased inflation, which had already reappeared during the strong post-Covid recovery. Thus, after a decade of too low inflation, and even a risk of deflation during the Covid crisis, inflation now stands at 10.7% in the euro area as a whole (7.1% in France, and 11.6% in Germany). Exogenous factors, especially energy prices (up 42%) and certain food prices, still account for half of total European inflation. Nevertheless, inflation has become more "domestic" and broad-based: core inflation excluding energy and food - has gradually increased and reached 5.0% in October, and this is precisely where monetary policy has a more direct impact. The ECB Governing Council therefore decided at the end of October to raise its key rates by a further 75 basis points, bringing the deposit facility rate to 1.5%.
5  situation because, in many cases, the level of profits in 2020 is not representative of expected future profits. The increase in debt and the decline in revenues affect some firms’ debt repayment capacity. But the extension of maturities and the lower interest rates on new loans granted during the crisis compared with pre-existing loans are substantial mitigating factors, contributing to lessening the financial burden on firms. Looking ahead, debt repayment capacity will depend mainly on the scale of the economic recovery. Economic policies to address future challenges Currently, the economy is experiencing a recovery that is incomplete, uneven and subject to a high degree of uncertainty, caused mainly by pandemic-related developments. This means that the risks to the business sector will continue to be significant until the pandemic is under control, especially for the firms most affected by the shock. Allow me now to summarise the courses of action which, in my view, should be followed in the current macroeconomic environment. First, economic policies should continue providing support to the economy. In particular, we should avoid a premature withdrawal of the support measures and economic policymakers should monitor risks and stand ready to introduce further stimuli if the macroeconomic outlook continues to worsen. In the specific case of micro- and macroprudential policies, and as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has reiterated, banks should use during this crisis the capital and liquidity buffers introduced by Basel III.

If we were convinced of the existence of a bubble and had the necessary instruments available, we should act. But it is not our conviction that monetary policy can in any meaningful way control asset price developments. Low and stable consumer price inflation is the operational target of monetary policy. There is, however, an ongoing discussion on how best to capture the cost of housing in the CPI. It might very well be that our present methods could be improved. 13  Financial Times January 17 2008. El-Erian is co-chief executive and co-chief investment officer of Pimco. 14  Kenneth S. Rogoff (2006, see footnote 8) and M. Lettau, S. C. Ludvigson and J. A. Wachter (2004) “The declining equity premium: What role does macroeconomic risk play?” NBER Working paper 10270. 15  Proponents of this view are Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe in some BIS studies, se for example Working Paper 114/2002 “Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: Exploring the nexus” and Working Paper 216/2006 “Monetary and prudential policies at a crossroad? New challenges in the new century.”  6  BIS Review 14/2008  While monetary policies aimed at nominal stability have stood us in good stead, and can continue to be pursued also in a world where markets are truly global, the sailing might very well be less smooth ahead.
When borrowers pledge eligible collateral or guarantees, and thereby reduce the potential loss on an exposure, banks will be able to hold less capital against that exposure than the 1988 Accord stipulates. This change is especially pertinent to SME lending, since national supervisors will be able to recognise several of the types of collateral and guarantees that SMEs provide. Results of QIS 3 How do we know that these adjustments will help SMEs? To ensure that we’ve got it right, the Basel Committee has conducted a series of “quantitative impact studies” with the active support of many commercial banks. Our most recent study, under the name “QIS 3,” was the most comprehensive, involving an extremely detailed survey of how capital requirements will change for over 350 individual banks in more than 40 countries, including in all EU countries. QIS 3 demonstrates clearly that the new rules will not increase the capital required for banks’ credit exposures to SMEs if we compare the new proposals to the current solvency rules. In fact, our studies show that, on average, banks’ capital charges on loans to SMEs included in the corporate portfolio will remain largely stable for banks using the standardised approach to credit risk and will decline by an average of between 3% and 11% for banks on the IRB approach.

Philipp Hildebrand: The global financial crisis – analysis and outlook Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the NZZ-Podium, Zurich, 5 February 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  We are currently experiencing the most severe and most complex financial crisis in several decades. It has affected many people around the globe, and finger-pointing and casting blame happen all too easily. Yet only a careful investigation of the responsibilities is likely to point to ways in which our financial system, and ultimately our economy, can be made more resilient once this crisis has been overcome. Financial markets react to incentives, and these incentives were misplaced in the past. It is in our power to start lobbying for clearly defined and risk-limiting conditions. If the responsible authorities wish to enact more stringent regulation, we ought to give them our unconditional support. The National Bank is determined to employ all the means at its disposal to ward off an economic contraction. BIS Review 12/2009  1
The outlook for 2012 and 2013 depends, for instance, on developments in international economic activity and on the result of the coming wage bargaining rounds in the labour market. The financial markets during the summer Developments in the financial markets have been dramatic over the summer. Share prices, government bond yields and exchange rates have fluctuated substantially. This turbulence is one factor that could have significance for future forecasts. This is essentially due to renewed concern over sovereign debt problems in the euro area and the United States. Focus has primarily been on four issues: public finances in Greece, the risk of problems spreading to Spain and Italy, potential problems in the European banks and the management of the debt ceiling and public finances in the United States. New support package for Greece At the beginning of the summer there was particular concern over developments in Greece. After a series of meetings of various policy-making bodies within the EU as well as a vote of confidence and a decision on budget-strengthening measures, structural reforms and the sale of state-owned companies in the Greek parliament it was decided in mid-July that Greece would receive a further support package from the euro area and the IMF. This led to a slight fall in the yield on Greek government bonds from their extremely high levels (see Figure 11).

The second group of challenges, with which 2014 will undoubtedly be remembered, includes those events that put the very resilience of the banking system to the test. A point was even reached where questions were raised in the public space about the BNB effectiveness, in particular the banking supervision thus far exercised. The events in question started with the severe liquidity attack against several banks in the middle of the year. 2014 will go down in history also with the huge misappropriations of depositors’ money, malpractices of governance and breach of regulations revealed in the second half of the year in the fourth largest bank in the country – “Corporate Commercial Bank” AD (KTB). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The KTB case was finally resolved with the effective application of the statutory guarantee on deposits. By coincidence, exactly today, 4 of December 2014, the long-awaited payment of guaranteed deposits with KTB has started. The depositors in this bank had no access to their deposits for a very long time. The central bank truly wished to see the KTB issues resolved in the shortest time possible. Unfortunately, as it is well known, with a large part of the documentation missing and the absence of legal means for quick restructuring of KTB, voluminous actions were needed to restore the credit files in KTB. Gathering this information was a necessary condition for the independent auditors to perform a complete analysis and assessment of KTB assets.
It has established technical working groups to address inter alia consolidated supervision, crisis management and Basle requirements and has put in place the requisite instrument to facilitate information sharing and cooperation with foreign regulatory bodies. Your members are also active participants in supervisory colleges where banks span several countries and I am aware that yesterday three supervisory colleges were held. Much emphasis has been placed on ensuring that the banking sector remains safe and sound, however, there are non-bank institutions that could severely threaten such safety and soundness and consequently the same level of attention/emphasis should also be directed to those institutions. Perhaps, CGBS could consider expanding its conference scope in the future to include regional non-bank regulators with whom your constituents interface. Both banks and non-bank financial institutions are integral to the safety and soundness of the financial system. Ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude by saying that our approaches to supervision and the depth of our regulation would continue to require proactivity and enhancement as the financial landscape continues to change. The Central Bank Governors of the region will continue to rely on the CGBS to provide the advice and guidance needed to keep our region safe. Success in this regards depend on the thoroughness and robustness of your work and 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the reliability and efficacy of the methods you employ.

Lawrence Williams: An evolving financial services landscape in the Caribbean Welcome remarks by Mr Lawrence Williams, Governor of the Bank of Guyana, at the 30th Annual Conference of the Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors, hosted by the Bank of Guyana, Georgetown, 24 May 2012. *  *  *  Chairman, Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors, Mr. Ramnarine Lal Hon. Minister of Finance, Dr. Ashni Singh, M.P. Hon. Minister within the Ministry of Finance, Bishop Juan Edghill, M.P. Deputy Governor Bank of Guyana, Dr. Gobind Ganga Banking Manager, Mr. Leslie Glen Conference Delegates Special Invitees Members of the Media It is indeed an honour for the Bank of Guyana to host the 30th annual conference of the Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors under the theme “Regional supervisory imperatives in an evolving financial services landscape”. I wish to welcome all of the visiting delegates to our shores. I acknowledge the presence of the delegates from thirteen of the sixteen CGBS membership. Though our region is small, we are geographically dispersed and travelling to some territories can be a bit of a challenge. I am therefore pleased at the representation and sincerely hope that your stay will be pleasant and memorable.
The projections are based on the assumption that interest rates in Norway and abroad will rise somewhat faster than may be implied by today’s forward rates. Since the previous Inflation Report, the upward movement in Norwegian and international long-term interest rates has become more pronounced. Exchange rate movements are difficult to project. In Inflation Report 1/06, the path for the interest rate in Norway and abroad was assessed to be consistent with an approximately unchanged krone exchange rate. The high rate of economic growth implies that price and cost inflation will edge up after a period. Inflation measured by the CPI-ATE is projected to increase from today’s level of around 1¼ per cent, up to almost 2 per cent at the end of 2007. There are prospects that inflation will increase further and be close to the target of 2.5 per cent three years ahead. With a gradual reduction in unemployment, Norges Bank expects wage growth to edge up. At the same time, it will probably be easier for enterprises to pass on cost increases to prices in pace with the rise in demand and capacity utilisation. Capacity utilisation is now projected to be somewaht higher than its normal level. Mainland GDP is still growing strongly in 2006. Capacity utilisation in the economy is expected to rise over the next two years. Even though a gradual increase in the interest rate will result in somewhat weaker growth impulses after a period, monetary policy will still be expansionary.

Oil prices are of importance for the activity level in the Norwegian economy and the government revenues. In recent years, oil prices have risen sharply. High demand for oil, limited idle production capacity and uncertain production levels in many oil-producing countries have contributed to this. Oil prices have risen to over USD 74 per barrel, partly as a result of the uncertain political situation in a number of producer countries. Futures prices for Brent Blend are now more than USD 72 per barrel until autumn 2008. Futures prices indicate that oil prices will remain at around USD 70 per barrel several years ahead. This is higher than the level assumed in the March 2006 Inflation Report. Statoil and Hydro gas prices have also increased sharply in recent months. Petroleum production is expected to increase gradually in the period to 2011, and decline thereafter. Developments in the gas market will become increasingly important. During the next 10 years, gas production could become as high as oil production, measured by energy content. High oil prices have led to a strong increase in activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. Many projects have been launched to increase recovery from fields in operation. A number of companies have revised up the long-term oil prices that are used as a basis for investment decisions, but they are still moderate compared with futures prices. Further out in the projection period, developments in petroleum-related investment become highly uncertain.
It is of course possible that some of the technologies developed in the crypto world might be useful in the development of a digital pound, but as I will explain later, there is a large range of technologies that are now under consideration. Why is a digital pound likely to be needed? There are a number of considerations behind our assessment that a digital pound is likely to be needed. The assessment is forward looking. It turns first on current trends in the way we use money to make payments and the potential of emerging digital technologies and second on the public policy response necessary to ensure innovation and competition can flourish without jeopardising the safety and uniformity of the money we use in the UK. Money is at its root a social convention[1] based on trust that allows us to store, transfer and settle obligations we hold on each other in society. It’s safe and efficient operation is, as history has demonstrated, fundamental to social and economic stability. The forms that money takes and the ways it is used have changed throughout history driven by changes in technology and the changing demands of ever more sophisticated and complex economies. However, trust in money is the bedrock on which that innovation is built. Two forms of money are currently available to the public[2] throughout the UK. The Bank of England and the Royal Mint issue a physical form of money to the public – bank notes and coins, otherwise known as ‘cash’.

Increasing productivity is the key to securing our welfare and the stability of our social security systems. BIS Review 63/2004  1
To be frank, the situation we sometimes faced as regulators in the past, where firms were unable quickly to tell us their asset exposures, and solvency reviews sometimes occurred 18 months in arrears, was unacceptable, particularly given the fast pace at which serious economic and financial crises can develop in the modern interconnected world. However, I keep an open mind about whether we have struck the right balance – there may be a case for lowering the burden, if it turns out that some of the new reporting doesn’t deliver supervisory benefits commensurate with its cost. We are also investigating the potential for publication of selected statistics to provide an overview for market participants. 2  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/861.aspx CP47/16, issued December 2016, consultation closed 15 March 2017, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/cp/2016/cp4716.aspx 3  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  On 16 November 2016, the Bank published its first edition of a new quarterly Statistical Release for the UK 4  banking sector . We are considering the potential for issuing something similar for the UK insurance sector, derived from the data insurers submit to us. We plan to engage with industry soon to discuss what format and content would be of most use and interest, with a first release potentially in the autumn. A third topic of rumbling discontent relates to how easy insurers find it to invest in illiquid assets, and then to receive appropriate regulatory recognition. In my view, there are two quite separate issues at play here.

The first is a certain ‘clunkiness’ in the design of the Solvency II Matching Adjustment (MA), a feature of the regime which gives insurers a capital benefit if they can match asset cashflows with liability cashflows. The rules were written on the assumption that insurers generally match annuities with simple securities, such as liquid corporate or sovereign bonds. This assumption was broadly true when the rules were agreed several years ago, but more recently insurers have increasingly turned their attention to other classes of investments that, generally speaking, have appropriate characteristics for meeting long-term insurance liabilities. But those types of investments often fail to meet certain rather prescriptive rules. Some in the industry argue that we have the flexibility to ignore some elements of the rules. I don’t think that is right. The directive is quite clear that cashflows from MA-eligible assets must be “fixed”, not “predictable” or some other more flexible term. Now, it is not our job to unpick the law. But we should apply it sensibly. And I think there is plenty of evidence that that is what we are doing, whether in our approach to certain assets (for instance in allowing pairing of variable cashflow assets with derivatives, and restructuring of assets like equity release mortgages) or in the fact that we have allowed infrastructure assets in sectors like healthcare, social housing and telecoms infrastructure to achieve MA-eligibility.
The sukuk will be given equal regulatory treatment as SGS, such as qualifying as an asset in the computation of capital and liquidity requirements, and as eligible collateral for tapping MAS' liquidity facility. The sukuk will be issued on a reverse-enquiry basis, based on the demand of financial institutions operating here. BIS Review 9/2009  1  MAS is committed to the facility, issuing to meet the needs of financial institutions that are carrying out or plan to carry out Shariah-compliant activities in Singapore, as this will strengthen their ability to meet their capital and liquidity requirements. This sukuk issuance facility underscores our strong commitment to the development of Islamic finance in Singapore. We invite eligible financial institutions to approach MAS to register their interest. I would like to place on record our appreciation to the Islamic Bank of Asia and Standard Chartered Bank, as well as Allen & Gledhill, which have been instrumental in creating this first sukuk to be issued by a Singapore statutory board. Thank you all for joining us this afternoon. 2  BIS Review 9/2009

Monetary policy was used in conjunction with fiscal policy and supported with various forms of direct control to pump up demand, when the economy declined and unemployment rose, until inflation and the balance of payments threatened to get out of hand, at which point all the policy levers were thrown into reverse. It was a recipe for short-termism throughout our economies. We gradually learned from experience - perhaps more slowly in this country than some others - that there is no trade-off between growth and stability in the medium and longer term, and that, in managing demand - which of course we continue to do - we needed to pay far more attention to the underlying, supply-side, capacity of the economy to meet that demand. We came to recognise that direct controls merely addressed the symptoms of instability rather than its causes. We realised increasingly that fiscal policy was not well suited to the task of short-term demand management, and needed to be constrained within prudent limits if debt levels were to be sustainable in the medium- and longer-term. And this left a more distinctive and clearly defined role for monetary policy as the primary instrument for maintaining broad balance consistently over time between aggregate demand and underlying supply. All this has become the accepted wisdom just about everywhere. "Stability is a necessary condition for sustainable growth" has become the universal central-banking credo - though that doesn't necessarily make it any easier to achieve!