samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The estimate of the current account deficit measured at trend  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  prices is also adjusted downward, so the risk associated with the evolution of the current account that had been identified in the last Monetary Policy Report is reduced (table 2). In the baseline scenario, CPI inflation will converge to 3 percent towards the end of the projection horizon, this time the last quarter of 2015. Thus, reaching the target will take longer than expected in September. The CPIEFE will continue to gradually approach 3 percent, without major changes from the September forecast (figure 4). This projection implies that nominal wages will be adjusted in line with productivity and the inflation target. It also includes as a methodological assumption that the RER will remain virtually unchanged. Finally, the baseline scenario uses as a working methodological assumption that the policy rate will follow a path similar to the one shown in the latest Economic Expectations Survey (figure 5). The baseline scenario reflects those events that are estimated to be the most likely to occur with the information at hand at the closing of this Report. There are risk scenarios, however, which if materialized, may reshape the macroeconomic environment and, therefore, may modify the course of monetary policy. On this opportunity, having evaluated the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance is unbiased for both output and inflation. On the external front, one risk relates to growth in emerging economies, particularly China.

8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1: Ongoing Weak Recovery  Figure 2: Weak Investment and Lower Productivity Growth  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 3: Weakened Global Trade Growth  Figure 4: Indebtedness Levels of EME Government and Private Sectors  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5: Declined Original Sin Ratio  Figure 6: Well Capitalized EME Banking Sector  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 7: GDP Growth Rates of EMEs and AEs and Inflation Rate in EMEs  Figure 8: Accumulated Macro-prudential Policy Space in EMEs  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 9: Improved Economic Confidence in EMEs  Figure 10: Volatile Global Financial Markets  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Figure 11: Volatility in EME Financial Markets  Figure 12: GDP Growth Rates in Turkey  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 13: Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy Conditions in Turkey  Figure 14: Differentiated Loan Growth Rates in Turkey  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  Figure 15: Current Account Balance in Turkey  Figure 16: Worsened Inflation Expectations in Turkey  16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 17: Maturity Lengthening in External Liabilities of the Turkish Banking Sector  BIS central bankers’ speeches  17
The Treasury financed deficit operations by taking overdraft loans from the Central Bank - the equivalent of money printing - or by taking foreign loans, converting the proceeds to krónur in the Central Bank, and using them to finance development and deficit operations – another equivalent of money printing, which fuels inflation. 2/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  3) And then came the game of leapfrog: labour unions responded to price hikes by demanding nominal pay rises, followed by even more nominal pay rises in response to even higher inflation - and so the game continued, while repeated currency devaluations safeguarded exporters' earnings. Since then, improvements have been made on all these fronts. Not only is the Central Bank independent, it has also been granted more authority and more tools since it merged with the Financial Supervisory Authority in 2020. This enables the Bank to act more decisively and effectively than before. The Government's overdraft account was closed by agreement between the Central Bank and Minister of Finance Friðrik Sophusson in 1993, and the Bank's authority to finance the Treasury was revoked with the passage of a new Central Bank Act in 2001. Furthermore, Iceland's fiscal health has improved vastly in recent years with the regular preparation of fiscal plans. It should be noted here that COVID-related expenditures and revenue losses put public sector finances under heavy strain that has been difficult to unwind.

BIS Review 78/2000  8  This raises the question of whether to separate production and distribution. Many institutions, particularly smaller ones, may find it beneficial to distribute other companies’ products. Different cooperation agreements make it possible for small players to offer a broader product range than they would have been able to on their own. We have seen several examples of this in Norway, particularly among savings banks. At the same time, some larger institutions may benefit from offering their products for distribution through other institutions. This may contribute to keeping Nordic banks - both large and small - competitive in the retail market. In the segment of large enterprises, however, production and distribution are perhaps more difficult to separate. This may imply that many Nordic banks are too small to compete for the business of large and advanced customers. Competition in this segment is perhaps more international than Nordic. How does cross-border integration change the risk outlook for the financial system? If it improves the long-term profitability, and thus the robustness of institutions, it is clearly advantageous. Spreading production costs over a larger customer base may improve profits. In addition, cross-border competition might lead to efficiency gains and a spillover of best practices. However, there are also counter-arguments. For example, increasing the size of operations may reduce management focus. In general, more integrated financial markets can spread financial unrest between countries more easily. This could have a negative effect on financial stability.
It states that the Bank communicates with the public by way of official notices and publications, minutes, previously announced public conferences, interviews or public declarations made by board members. It also says that the Governor is directly responsible for all the information the Bank puts out, except for whatever the individual board members might publish or say in public. At the same time, the policy rules that the Bank must publish all information or resolution relevant to the market as soon as it has been validated, thus obliging itself to give out all market-sensitive information as quickly as possible. Whenever a board member or Bank executive gives a talk with information that could be relevant for the market, it is published on the website. Any public presentation given by the Governor is posted on the web as soon as they begin so that the general public has access to the information at the same time as those present. In my own case, and so that there is no discrimination between those who attend the presentation and those who do not, I leave a written text of my speech which is not an easy task to do, but ensures providing a precise message. For you as journalists, this is useful to your work and contributes to avoiding the use of the old excuse “I was misinterpreted”, which may occur, but in most cases is the fault  4  See Blinder and others (2008) for more details on communication in central banks and relevant references.

On the other hand, this would create an attractive surrounding for absorbing and accommodating foreign investment, and allowing the entry of new capital into the economy, which is vital to support the country’s economic activity and its credibility in the region and beyond. The Bank of Albania is committed to guaranteeing a sound banking system and efficient in channelling public savings into the economy. We will continue to carry out our periodic examinations to guarantee the banking system’s stability. Sufficient capitalisation and capital quality remain our primary objective. I would like to guarantee the system that the Bank of Albania will take all the measures to supply with liquidity, while increasing the pressure for higher credit volume and improved quality. Dear guests, I invite you to actively participate in today’s debate and discussions on issues that have been and will remain the focus and our common interest in the future. I invite you all to contribute,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  through presentations and discussions, to setting objectives our region will face in the future and solving the current challenges. Thank you for your attention! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
MONETARY POLICY REPORT PRESENTATION BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMISSION OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC  Mario Marcel Governor Central Bank of Chile 14 June 2018    The June 2018 Monetary Policy Report can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Mr President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, senator Juan Pablo Letelier, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) about the latest macroeconomic developments, prospects and implications for monetary policy. This vision is detailed in our Monetary Policy Report (the Report) released this morning. The information therein provide the backdrop for the decision adopted by the Board at yesterday’s monetary policy meeting. In this Report we confirmed that the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario has lowered the risks for the convergence of inflation to 3% within the policy horizon. This risk, that lingered for quarters, has faded in line with the gradual consolidation of the recovery it has shown since mid- last year and which has received an upward inflationary impulse coming from the increase in fuel prices in pesos. Accordingly, the lower bound defined for the 2018 growth range and the headline inflation forecast at December have been revised upward, while we reaffirm the trajectory of gradual convergence of core inflation to the 3% policy target over a two-year horizon. These projections are consistent with the two-year-ahead inflation expectations that have remained well anchored to the target.

But recent data on the housing sector indicates that the recovery has stalled (Chart 20). As with consumption, we are unlikely to see the typical surge of housing starts and residential investment that was a key feature of most past recoveries. There is already an unusually large volume of vacant homes for rent and for sale (Chart 21). More are likely to come onto the market in the months ahead due to the large volume of mortgage loans currently in the foreclosure process. For the government sector, large federal budget deficits are a constraint and fiscal policy is slowly shifting from an expansive policy back toward restraint. At the state and local level, the constraints are even more binding, as budgetary gaps will need to be addressed by spending cuts and tax increases (Chart 22). Exports rebounded sharply over the second half of 2009, particularly to the emerging world (Chart 23). However, domestic demand in Europe and Japan – important export markets for the United States – remains very weak. This suggests that the U.S. trade balance is likely to change little over the next year or two, and, thus, will be relatively neutral in terms of its impact on growth. Only business fixed investment is in a position to be a true locomotive of growth. Profits have stayed high relative to investment, and corporate balance sheets are awash with cash (Charts 24 and 25). However, even here, the growth impulse is likely to be weak.
This may have contributed to debt building up while prices of housing, commercial property and financial assets rose.20 The fact that low interest rates over a long period of time can build up risks in the financial system has been pointed out by Ben Bernanke and others:21 “Another cost, one that we take very seriously, is the possibility that very low interest rates, if maintained too long, could undermine financial stability”, and has been shown in a recent empirical study by the NBER:22 ”We find that when the stance of monetary policy is accommodative over an extended period, the likelihood of financial turmoil down the road increases considerably”. 19 See Svensson (2012) and Svensson (2017), where he shows in a model that the costs of monetary policy taking  into account financial imbalances may exceed revenues. See also Brandao-Marques (2020). 20 However, monetary policy has not been the cause of the trend decline in global interest rates in recent decades, which has been the main explanation for the low interest rates. For a discussion of the causes of the trend decline, see Andersson et al. (2020) and Lundvall (2020). Another important reason for the rising debt in Sweden has been a poorly functioning housing market that has not been able to meet the rising demand for housing. 21 See Bernanke (2013). 22 See Grimm et al. (2023).

I am aware of the debate between those who believe that central banks should take financial imbalances into account in their monetary policy decisions and those who do not. A basic structure, where monetary policy focuses on monetary stability and where other policy areas – not least the decisions taken by Finansinspektionen – safeguard financial stability is reasonable. But there will be times when interest rates are low for such a long time that risks build up that mean that 28 See Ministry of Finance (2023). 29  See Stein (2013). 30 See also the discussion in Nessén (2016). 17 [30]  monetary policy should take account of financial imbalances. I do not want to belong to any of these camps that quite categorically believe that "leaning against the wind" is always right or always wrong. However, I believe that it may nevertheless be reasonable and wise to allow monetary policy to take into account the build-up of financial imbalances in certain special situations. Some central banks, such as Norges Bank, have a clear mandate for this.31 The Riksbank considers risks associated with developments on the financial markets as long as the credibility of the inflation target is not threatened, and the fulfilment of the target for price stability and macroeconomic stability in the longer term is improved. But to prevent unbalanced developments in asset prices and indebtedness, a well-functioning regulatory framework and effective supervision are needed in particular.
Among other things, this provides advice on the characteristics of financial transactions that may arouse suspicion, particularly when one or more of the parties is known or suspected to be a terrorist or terrorist organisation. Even if there is no evidence of a direct terrorist connection, a transaction should still be reported to the JFIU if it looks suspicious for other reasons. This obviously applies to remittances as well as the opening of an account. It may subsequently emerge that there is a terrorist link. Thus, success in the fight against terrorist financing depends in large measure on the overall quality of AIs’ controls against money laundering - in particular, their ability to detect suspicious transactions. 2  BIS Review 47/2002  The customer due diligence process This in turn depends on an institution’s knowledge of its customers and what is a normal pattern of account activity for a particular customer. It is crucial therefore for AIs’ to have effective systems for customer due diligence. The main essentials are already there in the HKMA’s guideline, which requires AIs to make reasonable efforts to determine the customer’s true identity. But the process may need to be articulated more clearly so that AIs are in no doubt about what they should be doing.

Existing customers As I have already mentioned, it is likely that AIs will have to upgrade their due diligence procedures in some respects to comply with changing international standards. Obviously, these enhanced procedures would be applied to new banking relationships. But this begs the question about what should be done in relation to existing customers. To what extent should institutions go back and undertake renewed verification of the identity of existing customers? Our current view is that we should not impose an across the board requirement in this respect, but it would certainly be sensible to review those existing customers who fall into higher risk categories. The six major banks in the UK have just announced that they will undertake a risk-based initiative of this type. I would encourage those AIs with a large customer base to do the same. Other triggers for review of existing records may arise when a customer undertakes a significant transaction and where there is a material change in account operation or customer documentation standards. The way forward These are some, but by no means all, of the current issues we are considering in the context of our revised guideline. We hope to have something ready for consultation with the industry later in the year. While this may impose new obligations on AIs, we will try to ensure that these are of a nature that wellmanaged institutions would adopt of their own accord.
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The regulation of the financial sector affects the country’s citizens Policy discussions in Sweden, in the EU, globally  Could be perceived as abstract Often technical  Behaviour of the financial sector  Effects on the real economy  Swedish citizens and consumers  Crises cost society enormous amounts GDP growth in Sweden, 1960-2010, SEK billion  Source: The Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The real effects have a high social and economic price Unemployment in Sweden, 1985-2000, percentage of labour force  Source: The Riksbank  Problems in the banking sector impact the country’s citizens in many ways Via the real economy  Problems in the banking sector  Directly against bank customers  Via the public sector  Weaker economic development  Deposit guarantee Need for capital injections  Increased uncertainty  New banking relationships  Higher unemployment Lower wages Lower pensions  Higher taxes Deterioration of public welfare  Higher interest rates  New terms  Poorer economy for households  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A financial crisis will ultimately threaten basic social functions The financial system is central in the society  Household  Who can pay whom in a serious crisis? Household’s bank Grocery shop  Grocery shop’s bank  ?

Christian Noyer: Economic and financial crisis – the post-G20 outlook Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at a luncheon organised by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 11 June 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to speak to you today. At a time when the regulation of the financial and banking sectors is being discussed in-depth, this meeting is a unique opportunity for exchanging our ideas and thoughts on the most topical issues. I would like to raise three questions that seem absolutely essential today, a couple of weeks after the G20 summit and the Spring meetings of the IMF. These three questions are the following: •  What is the economic and financial outlook? •  What type of financial regulatory framework are we moving towards? •  How can we strengthen financial stability at the international level? What is the economic and financial outlook? After the recession that has been affecting the world economy since September 2008, the first signs of a recovery are being examined very closely. While in the first quarter output data confirmed a further decline at a similar or stronger pace than by end-2008, survey indicators point to deceleration of the slowdown in the second quarter, which justifies cautious optimism. Indeed, I see several reasons for hoping that “the worst is behind us”.
“Lender of last resort” assistance, even when it is extended by the central bank, involves the commitment of public money - ultimately taxpayers’ money - and it needs to be justified in terms of the damage that would otherwise result to the financial system and to the wider economy. For this reason the MOU, to which I referred earlier, BIS Review 18/1998  -8-  provides that the Bank should always seek the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s explicit prior approval wherever circumstances allowed, or at least his tacit prior approval in emergency situations and where the risks are manageable in relation to the size of our capital. These arrangements ensure that we have the capacity to act to limit systemic damage where that becomes necessary; but they rightly make such intervention subject to appropriate authorisation and accountability, by and to, both the Chancellor and Court. Conclusion Mr Chairman, we have come a long way in the Bank, even since I first joined it some 35 years ago. We tended at that time to explain our role as being the “Banker to the Government and Banker to the commercial and other central banks”. And the truth is that our responsibilities, and the extent of our authority, were never very clear. Today we remain a bank, as we always have been, at the heart of the financial system, as indeed we must in order to carry out our wider functions.

In reality the division between us was a very narrow one, reflecting the fact - now acknowledged by most outside commentators - that the decision, as to whether or not we will need to raise interest rates moderately further, sooner or later, is very finely balanced. I hope this is a situation that we will get used to. I would expect the professional experts on the MPC to agree quite easily when monetary policy is clearly off track; but I would equally expect them to disagree as often as not at the margin when we are there or thereabouts. As it is I was actually encouraged by the reaction of many of the more thoughtful commentators who - in the circumstances - recognised that it was a reflection of a grown-up process that we could publish a division within the Committee and the reasons for it without generating significant market disturbance. In this sense, too, I think it likely that once the new arrangements are properly bedded down they will be seen to be a very considerable advance on what has gone before. Financial Stability Let me turn now to the Bank’s second core purpose, the maintenance of financial stability. On the same day that the Bank of England Bill was introduced into Parliament, the Chancellor launched the new Financial Services Authority, the FSA, which will become responsible for the authorisation and regulation or supervision of effectively all forms of financial services activity in the UK.