samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are a large number of legal acts from the EU and the ECB that regulate how the introduction of the euro should be implemented. Although the legal acts currently only apply to the countries that have already adopted the euro as legal tender, the corresponding regulations will probably also be applied to future applicant countries. To keep the door open for a rapid future membership, the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) decided back in 1997 that Sweden should maintain the highest possible state of readiness by continuing the technical and practical preparations for membership. The Riksbank has therefore been working on internal EMU preparations for almost five years now, as well as preparations together with the financial sector. This work is conducted within the SIFS group, whose seventh progress report was presented in the autumn and is available to read on our website. The most recent progress report describes two possible transition scenarios, a gradual scenario and what is referred to as "Big Bang". A gradual transition would mean that the exchange rate would be irrevocably fixed on membership of EMU and the euro would become Sweden's currency, while banknotes and coins in krona would continue to be legal tender during a transition period. This means that if someone wants to pay with banknotes and coins in krona, they must be accepted as payment. During this period there is no compulsion to use the euro and no prohibition either. It would be fine to pay with euro if both parties are in agreement on this.

This has been the focus of considerable discussion, particularly in Finland, as there they have chosen to continue their practice of rounding-off and to round off cash payments to the nearest five cents, something we would probably also do in Sweden if we adopt the euro. Eurostat's euro indicator for January 2002 shows that the price level in the euro countries rose by 0.5 per cent between December 2001 and January 2002. However, this is not considered to be caused primarily by the cash changeover - the effect of this is estimated to be somewhere in the interval of  2  BIS Review 23/2002  0.0-0.16 per cent. The Bank of Finland has not yet made a complete analysis of how large an effect the cash changeover has had on prices, but the figures for the month of January give no indication of inflationary pressure from the price rounding-off. However, there have been reports from the Netherlands of some effects on inflation. In a number of other countries (e.g. Greece, France and Ireland) the authorities have been keeping a very close watch on price increases and are working to counteract them. Naturally, there are a large number of other experiences from the introduction of the euro that could be mentioned in this context, and the Riksbank is working on a compilation of the information we have received from other central banks in the euro area. This compilation will be presented in the next progress report from the SIFS group (no.
In general, the young are borrowers with a stock of debt, the old are savers with a pool of assets. 18  Bunn et al (2018). We also use the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for household incomes. 20 See https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/debt/methodologies/wealthandassetssurveyqmi 21 As discussed in Vermeulen (2016), for example. The ONS Wealth and Asset Survey is probably the UK household survey with the best coverage of the tails of the distribution. 22 The measure of wealth used is net total wealth, comprising financial, property, physical and pension assets, net of debt. There is a question about how much households are aware of pension wealth, and therefore value it. The distributions are not especially sensitive to whether pension wealth is included. 19  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  If we overlay the income and wealth distributions in 2007 and 2013 (the end-date for our exercise), these are pretty-much identically-shaped (Charts 5 and 6). On that basis alone, there has not been any clear shift in income or wealth inequality since the crisis. Standard summary measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, confirm that conclusion: for both income and wealth, the Gini is largely unchanged. 23  On the face of it, then, this does not strongly suggest that the relaxation of monetary policy since the crisis has significantly worsened inequality. Unless, that is, other factors have more than counterbalanced the effect of monetary policy.

“Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 108(S1), pages 59–75. Rachel, Lukasz & Smith, Thomas D., 2017. “Are Low Real Interest Rates Here to Stay?” International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(3), pages 1-42. World Bank, 2016. “Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality”. World Bank Group report. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
29  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  29  Chart 6A: Mentions of central banks in The Times newspaper  Bank of England  Number of mentions  Federal Reserve  14,000  Number of mentions  4,000  12,000 10,000  3,000  8,000 2,000  6,000 4,000  1,000  2,000 0 1800s  1850s  1900s  Bank of Japan  1950s  2000s  0 1900s 1920s 1940s 1960s 1980s 2000s  Number of mentions  600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1900s 1920s 1940s 1960s 1980s 2000s Source: Factiva. Notes: Charts show number of mentions per decade. 30  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  30  Chart 6B: Mentions of central banks in The Financial Times newspaper Number of mentions  Bank of England  Number of mentions  Federal Reserve  10,000  10,000  8,000  8,000  6,000  6,000  4,000  4,000  2,000  2,000  0  0  1900s 1920s 1940s 1960s 1980s 2000s  1900s 1920s 1940s 1960s 1980s 2000s  Number of mentions  Bank of Japan  3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0  1900s 1920s 1940s 1960s 1980s 2000s Source: Factiva.

Sapienza, P and Zingales, L (2013), ‘Economic Experts versus Average Americans’, American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 3, p. 636-642. Sentance (2015), ‘We expect too much of the new masters of the universe’, article in the Financial Times. Shafik, M (2017), ‘In experts we trust?’, speech available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech964.pdf Shannon, C (1948), ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’, Bell System Technical Journal, 27 (3) Shiller, R (1997), ‘Why Do People Dislike Inflation?’, Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, NBER, p. 13-70. Shiller, R (2017), ‘Narrative Economics’, NBER Working Paper, No. 23075. Smart, L (2016), ‘Full disclosure: a round-up of FCA experimental research into giving information’, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper 23. Stockton, D (2012), ‘Review of the Monetary Policy Committee’s Forecasting Capability’, available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/cr3stockton.pdf Strunk, W and White, E (1979), The Elements of Style, Idg Books (3rd edition). Sturm, J and de Haan, J (2009), ‘Does Central Bank Communication really Lead to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model for the ECB’, CESifo Working Paper Series, No. 2760. Taylor, J (2011), ‘Legislating a Rule for Monetary Policy’, Cato Journal, vol. 31(3), p. 407-415. Taylor, J (2012), ‘Monetary Policy Rules Work and Discretion Doesn’t: A Tale of Two Eras’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44: 1017–1032. Tetlock, P and Gardner, D (2016), Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction, Broadway Books. Thaler, R and Sunstein, C (2008), Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness, Yale University Press.
Medium-term inflation expectations per se have remained firmly anchored around levels consistent with price stability. This is in line with our reading of survey-based inflation expectations. The second message is that markets are, however, deeply sceptical that inflation can surprise much on the upside in the future. This is corroborated by survey-based measures, which show that, since the financial crisis, survey participants have been more concerned about deviations in the direction of lower inflation and less concerned about deviations in the direction of higher inflation.7 Another way of looking at this is to consider the option-implied distribution of average inflation over the next five years. You can see this on my next slide in the case of the euro area. Although this distribution reflects expectations over a nearer horizon, it re-emphasises the point that investors assign only a small probability for inflation to surprise much to the upside. But it also demonstrates convincingly that markets have by and large priced out deflationary risks in the euro area. As you can see, when we announced the APP in January 2015 these risks were considered to be very different. I see two main factors that may help explain why investors and professional forecasters are currently casting doubt on positive inflation risks.

Japan's take-off continued right up to the onset of World War II. Economic historians have estimated that Japan experienced a 14-fold increase in income levels over this period. Total defeat in World War II reduced Japan to ruins. After the war, Japan faced the massive task of reconstruction and development. Japanese firms cooperated with the Americans, raised their technical expertise, and benefited from institutional reforms of the Occupation period for a new, market-based economy. By 1950, the pre-war zaibatsu conglomerates were dissolved and family control had been eliminated. The zaibatsu system was replaced by the keiretsu system, built around the main banks, which shared large cross-shareholdings with the corporate sector. Control passed from shareholders to top managers. Managers and workers worked together as one to rebuild the country. The whole system was underpinned by the consistent and coherent political leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party, supported by an elite civil service. This strategy yielded 30 years of unparalleled growth. By the 1980s, Japan had become an economic superpower. But the formula did not work forever. In 1990, the excesses of the bubble economy ended in the collapse of Japan's property and stock markets. Japan entered a prolonged period of stagnation, whose end is still not yet in sight. Policies and institutions had not kept up with the demands of globalisation. The keiretsu model and the lifelong employment system were too rigid to adapt to the rapid changes of the new economy.
It is, however, ultimately incumbent upon the industry to support and promote adoption of the Code across the marketplace. I’d like to highlight a variety of initiatives underway to support this adoption. First, outreach and education regarding the Code is critical and has been underway via events like this and ongoing engagement with industry associations. Central bank colleagues and industry market participants here and abroad have been active in reaching out locally to raise awareness of the Code. New and updated education tools are already in development to help further promote the Code. As awareness permeates the market, these efforts will support better understanding and adoption of the Code. Second, industry market participants have expressed a desire for a mechanism, such as a public register, to make public their Statements of Commitment. Discussions with industry suggest that multiple public registers may likely be established over time. I look forward to seeing how this work evolves. It will be important to understand how the Code is being adopted across the industry. To this end, the GFXC is also developing a survey to help assess how the Code is being applied following its publication. This survey can provide a baseline that we can measure against over time, and can help to assess how the Code is filtering into the market, going forward. GFXC, evolution of the Code and last look Over the past two years, the industry has been very heavily engaged in Global Code efforts through the MPG and the regional foreign exchange committees (FXCs).

I hope that you all continue your focus on these issues and do your part to support a resilient global, wholesale FX market. I encourage you to adopt the Code as a benchmark for your firm’s activities in the wholesale FX market and use the Statement of Commitment to demonstrate that adoption to your fellow participants. As we state in the foreword of the Code, the goal is an FX market that is a “robust, fair, liquid, open and appropriately transparent market in which a diverse set of Market Participants, supported by resilient infrastructure, are able to confidently and effectively transact at competitive process that reflect available market information and in a manner that conforms to acceptable standards of behaviour.” Many thanks for your time and continued active engagement. 1 The FX Global Code is available at www.globalfxc.org/index.htm. 2 For more information about the FXWG see: www.bis.org/about/factmktc/fxwg.htm. 3 2015 FX Week USA speech available at: www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/pot150714. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
As data comes in, the Bank’s projections for unemployment are far more likely to change, in one direction or the other, than the Committee’s forward guidance. Probabilistically, that could explain part of the rise in the money market curve given the signs of recovery. All this underlines the need for the Committee to keep under review, month by month, a wide range of indictors of slack in the labour market and in firms. For example, if participation in the workforce develops in unexpected ways, the degree of slack implied by any rate of unemployment might change.7 That recovery is, I trust, finally underway should not be a complete surprise. The MPC has provided a massive amount of monetary stimulus over recent years. Its effects were arrested for an extended period by the threat of severe turmoil in the euro area, coming on top of an erosion of spending power from rising commodity prices. Monetary policy (and credit policy for that matter) works partly by incentivising households and firms to bring forward future spending. They were not likely to do so when the risks and uncertainties on our Continental doorstep were so great and so unusual. As those immediate risks and uncertainties receded,  5  See Volker (2013), “Central banking at a crossroad”.

Some countries, such as France and Spain, which have remained more buoyant in this period, have also posted slowdowns – to 0.3% and 0.5%, respectively – in the second quarter of the year. 5 In contrast, the most favourable factor since the onset of the economic recovery in the euro area has been the improvement in the labour market. This has been at the root of household income growth. During the current upturn, employment has responded forcefully to GDP growth. The unemployment rate currently stands at 7.5% of the labour force, very close to the historical low seen in the pre-crisis years. Strong job creation has contributed to reducing labour market slack. This has begun to be mirrored in wage growth and in an increase in labour income, which has enabled consumption to play a key role in euro area growth. That said, labour continues to be underutilised in some economies in the area. Yet in the euro area as a whole, the rise in wages and in unit labour costs has not fed through to prices, which has prompted a contraction in business mark-ups. In fact, the globally prevalent moderate inflation and growing competitive pressures, along with the increased uncertainty over future euro area exports, would account for firms’ heightened caution when passing through labour cost increases to the prices of their products. The upshot is that, excepting the oscillations associated with more volatile items such as energy or certain services (e.g.
This lower growth, beyond the possible effects of the adverse external scenario, responds mostly to the economy converging to trendconsistent growth rates, which we estimate to be around 5%. We are facing a very complex external scenario. In last Thursday’s monetary policy meeting communiqué we said that the deepening of international economic trends could shape a more adverse scenario than the baseline assumed in the September Monetary Policy Report, with potential consequences for growth and inflation in Chile, as well as for the orientation of monetary policy. Accordingly, we are paying close attention to external developments and we have the necessary flexibility to act whenever necessary. However, I would like to pause to examine two aspects. First, it is important for monetary policy not to react too little, too late. But just as important it is that it does not act haphazardly. A monetary policy that keeps changing signs because of mistaken diagnoses loses credibility. Potential delays can be compensated by being aggressive. That was the case between end of 2008 and beginning of 2009. We could have reduced the rate a couple of months earlier, but because inflation was so high and the economic outlook was so uncertain, it could have hurt the credibility of our monetary policy. In this context, a policy rate cut would have ultimately been slower and less effective. Once  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  the severity of the situation was confirmed, we reduced the rate with unprecedented force and with much success.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 11 Inflation expectations (*) (annual change, percent) 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 10  10  10  10 Jul. 10  10  11  One year ahead  11  11  11 Jul. 11  Two years ahead  (*) Economic Expectations Survey. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 12 Consensus Forecasts for inflation (*) (percent) 2011 5 5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  Developed economies Emerging Asia  2012  5  Latin America  Emerging Europe  (*) For 2011, uses CF forecasts between September 2010 and September 2011. For 2012, as from January 2011. Geometric averages of y-o-y mean inflation forecast for the economies of each region except for Latin America, which uses December-to-December inflation forecast. Developed economies are the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone; Latin America includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru; Emerging Asia includes China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. Emerging Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia. Devloped economies and Emerging Asia consider information through October 2011; Latin America and Emerging Europe, through September 2011. Source: Consensus Forecasts.
The dividing line is instead at the question of whether monetary policy may need to support macroprudential policy to counteract imbalances.14 Which side of the line you end up on depends on what you believe about the effectiveness of the tools for macroprudential policy and monetary policy respectively. How well do they counteract specific imbalances and what consequences do they have for the rest of the economy? If one believes that the instruments available to macroprudential policy can effectively keep the imbalances in check, and that monetary policy is too blunt an instrument and mostly affects the rest of the economy – well, then one probably ends up in the “Modified JacksonHole-consensus”, to return to Smets. On the other hand, if one is more uncertain about the effectiveness of the macroprudential instruments and believes that monetary policy nevertheless has some sting, then there is a greater probability that one will have the view that monetary policy may need to lean against the wind. If one is very uncertain about the effects of both policy areas, one probably also prefers monetary policy to be used parallel to macroprudential policy, at least until more is known about the effects. Monetary policy may need to support macroprudential policy Those who are sceptical about a monetary policy that leans against the wind often state, as I mentioned earlier, that the policy rate is a blunt and ineffective instrument in counteracting financial imbalances.

While we welcome the measures announced at the Eurozone summit in July, further resolute measures to strengthen the banking sector, credibly restore debt sustainability in the Eurozone periphery, and lift long-term growth potential through structural reform are necessary to restore market confidence in the short term and contribute to global growth and stability in the long term. The Fund should be pro-active in proposing solutions and mediating their adoption. We believe that progress in structural reforms will be key to restoring growth in the mediumand long-term. Although each crisis is different, our efforts during the Asian crisis that brought about a relatively fast recovery may provide a useful lesson for countries facing current difficulties. From our experience, the determination to undertake and stick with structural reforms, particularly in the financial sector, was a crucial factor that led to an improvement in confidence, competitiveness and growth. The fund’s response i) Global Financial Safety Nets (GFSN) With substantial downside risks to growth in the global economy and heightened volatility in financial markets, the Fund should assess the adequacy of its resources against expected financing needs. At a minimum, there should be no reduction in Fund resources during this time. In this regard, countries in our constituency which are participants of the New Arrangements to Borrow fully support the extension of the activation period to March 2012. We also regard as particularly relevant the Fund’s work to develop a more coherent response to systemic events, including short-term liquidity provision to crisis bystanders.