samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Actions will be taken to amend/repeal Financial  23  Transactions Reporting Act No 6 of 2006 (FTRA) and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, No. 05 of 2006 (PMLA) in line with international recommendations. We will also facilitate and coordinate with stakeholders to amend the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA), NGO Act and Trust Ordinance. In 2014, an AML/CFT National Risk Assessment (NRA) was conducted by the Central Bank with the support of more than 70 professionals representing key stakeholders. In 2018, we will take actions to update this NRA report. We will also coordinate with the Information and Communication Technology Agency of Sri Lanka (ICTA) to assist stakeholders to develop individual databases to maintain statistics in relation to AML/CFT. Moreover, we will coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other stakeholders to implement UN Resolutions on proliferation financing (UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 2231). Further, we will continue to coordinate with the international community, including the Egmont Group, to fulfil our international obligations and to strengthen cooperation. During the year 2017, the Central Bank continued to strengthen the regulatory framework for the microfinance sector by issuing directions to licensed microfinance companies and principles, standards and guidelines to the Registrar of Voluntary Social Service Organisations, for the regulation and supervision of Microfinance NGOs.

Caleb Fundanga: The cost of capital – wither the Zambian financial markets? Keynote address by Dr Caleb Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Business Conference on “Change and the Paradigm Shift in the Accounting Profession”, Livingstone, 6 August 2010. *  *  *  The President of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants; Mr Chintu Mulendema The Chief Executive of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants; Mr Hapenga Kabeta Distinguished members of the Eastern, Central and Southern African Federation of Accountants Members of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Members of the Press Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen The theme for this symposium portends an important aspect of our daily lives, either at individual or corporate level. We are all, one way or the other, affected by developments in our financial markets. The role that finance plays in an economy is certainly an important one and you do not need to go far back in history for you to appreciate that role. You only need to make reference to the recent financial crises to appreciate the potency that finance has on economic activities. Chairperson, your choice of this topic therefore could not have been more appropriate. This topic is also timely given the current challenges that face many countries in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, some of which seem to be just unfolding in some European countries.
Estimates suggest that both China and India have large and growing domestic middle-class markets - estimated to be about USD1 trillion per year in China and USD250 billion annually in India. This trend is expected to continue given an increasing young population in Asia with new spending patterns, threreby leading to the rise of a modern retail sector across the region. In China, organised retail trade as a share of total retail trade has increased from 5% a decade ago to an estimated 17%, while in India, the retail market is growing by 7% per annum. The second factor is the relatively sound financial position of households in Asia, with high saving rates that exceed 30% of GNP in most countries and relatively low debt levels, thus providing the potential for rising consumption to be sustained. This is further supported by the ability of the financial sector to provide financing to support consumption. In this regard, Malaysia is an example, with household debt at 66.8% of GDP as at end-July 2009, while the growth of credit to the household sector has continued to increase in this recent decade. Of significance is the quality of these assets, measured by the level of non-performing loans, remains low. The second strategy is the further diversification of the external markets, in particular, to accelerate the efforts to foster greater regional trade ties, for Asia.

Conclusion In a short span of just fifty years, Asia, with its vast diversity in population, ethnicity, social structure and political regime, has made remarkable progress throughout the region. Despite broad and different challenges from urbanisation and rising income inequality to economic crises and social instabilities, Asia has time and time again risen to the occasion and resumed the economic progress. The “Asian miracle” was achieved not by chance, but by pragmatic policies, ensuring sound economic fundamentals and strong institutions. Today, a global shift, triggered by a severe global economic and financial crisis is resulting in an increasingly multi-polar world. In this new phase of globalisation, the concentration of economic power in the global economy will become more dispersed. Asia will very much be a part of this new emerging future. With growth in the advanced economies expected to remain slow and with the emerging economies increasingly becoming the growth centres in the global economy, Asia must review and accordingly change its existing development in this new environment. Of significance, strengthening of the domestic Asian economies supported by the necessary institutions, the further development of the financial markets, and greater regional financial integration that is reinforced with overall regional cooperation. As these trends become more pronounced, it will not only contribute towards unlocking Asia's full potential, but it will also contribute towards a more balanced growth in the global economy. References Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2008, "Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity".
Gains to shareholders are potentially unlimited. But the same is not true in bad states of the world. The reason is limited liability. That constrains the losses of shareholders to around zero. Losses beyond that point are borne by other parts of banks’ capital structure – wholesale and retail depositors. Therein lies the problem. If protection of depositors is felt to be a public good, these losses instead risk being borne by the state, either in the form of equity injections from the government (capital insurance), payouts to retail depositors (deposit insurance) or liquidity support to wholesale funders (liquidity insurance). The gains risk being privatised and the losses socialised. Evidence suggests this is a repeated historical pattern. Socialised losses are doubly bad for society. Taxes may not only be higher on average. They may also need to rise when they are likely to be most painful to taxpayers, namely in the aftermath of crisis. So taxes profiles will be spiky rather than smooth and will spike when the chips are down. This is the opposite to what tax theory would tells us was optimal. 13 So far, so bad. But it is about to get worse, for this tells only half the story. This is a repeated game. State support stokes future risk-taking incentives, as owners of banks adapt their strategies to maximise expected profits. So it was in the run-up to the present crisis.

Andrew G Haldane: Banking on the state Paper by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, and Mr Piergiorgio Alessandri, based on a presentation delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago twelfth annual International Banking Conference on “The International Financial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed?”, Chicago, 25 September 2009. Contributions and comments were provided by Paul Doran, Marius Jurgilas, Samuel Knott, Salina Ladha, Ouarda Merrouche, Filipa Sa, William Speller, Matthew Willison and Nick Vause. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Historically, the link between the state and the banking system has been umbilical. Starting with the first Italian banking houses in the 13th century, banks were financiers of the sovereign. Sovereign need was often greatest following war. The Bank of England was established at the end of the 17th century for just this purpose, financing the war debts of William III. From the earliest times, the relationship between banks and the state was often rocky. Sovereign default on loans was an everyday hazard for the banks, especially among states vanquished in war. Indeed, through the ages sovereign default has been the single biggest cause of banking collapse. 1 It led to the downfall of many of the founding Italian banks, including the Medici of Florence. As awareness of sovereign risk grew, banks began to charge higher loan rates to the sovereign than to commercial entities.
4 A higher labour supply leads to greater competition for vacant jobs, thus restraining the rate of wage increases. My assessment is that there are overarching cyclical forces that suggest wages will rise during the forecast period, but that the rate of increase may remain low despite the high level of resource utilisation. When the effect on the economy from upheavals such as technological advances, demographic changes or increased cross-border trade has worn off, employees should be able to increase their pay again. However, this can take time and, during the transition, the best contribution monetary policy can make is to facilitate, via high resource utilisation and as far as is compatible with the inflation target, the various adjustments demanded by structural transformation and demographics. Education and oversight of competition – to meet the future However, if Sweden as a country is to be able to meet these challenges over the long term, other policy areas than monetary policy will have to be used. Here, I would like to name two important areas: education and oversight of competition. In light of technological developments and population increases, opportunities for life-long education and professional development will be completely decisive. Even well-educated professional groups that have previously had low unemployment have started to become aware of a growing risk of being automated out of work. This applies, for instance, to investment advice, financial accounting and legal support.

Thus, even in an economic boom, employers can hold back wage increases without the risk of losing valuable labour. Of course, these changes in wage formation may vary considerably in different economies. But they interact with each other due to the global 2 Read more at: https://www.riksbank.se/sv/finansiell-stabilitet/det-finansiella-systemet/betalningar/  3 The risk of unemployment is one of many factors behind wage expectations. The experience of unpleasant mac-  roeconomic events characterises the behaviour of different age categories, as discussed, for example, by Malmendier and Nagel in “Depression babies: Do macroeconomic experiences affect risk taking?” (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2011)  3 [5]  market for goods and to a growing part of the service sector also being traded globally. The increase in the number of self-employed people, the many part-time positions and the changed wage composition are factors that tend to crop up as explanations for low wage growth in other economies but which I consider to be less important for understanding wage formation in Sweden. On the other hand, what is special for Sweden is that we have become many more on the labour market. The number of persons between 15 and 74 in the labour force increased by just over half a million between 2006 and 2016. This increase is largely due to high immigration but the labour force is also growing due to changed rules and reforms on the labour market and to tax, benefits and pension rules.
However, inflation should not become too low either. Deflation is often synonymous with recession. Central banks have always had a natural responsibility for stabilising the value of money. Schweigaard was concerned with stabilising the krone’s value in silver terms. Since that time, Norway has operated various regimes with the aim of stabilising the value of money. A silver standard for the krone was followed by the gold standard. Later Norges Bank sought to stabilise the krone’s value against other currencies, first the pound sterling and thereafter the US dollar. For a long period after the war, various fixed exchange rate systems were introduced under international agreements, which were subsequently abandoned in favour of  1  Slagstad, Rune (1998), “De nasjonale strateger” (National strategists), Pax  2  Aubert, L. M. B. (1883), “Anton Martin Schweigaards barndom og ungdom” (Anton Martin Schweigaard’s early years), P.T. Mallings Boghandels Forlag  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  a more unilateral stabilisation of the krone against various currencies. Since 2001, the objective of monetary policy has been low and stable inflation. Rather than stabilising the value of money indirectly through an exchange rate target, we now aim to attain a more direct objective which we believe monetary policy can achieve over time. The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2½ per cent over time. Monetary policy shall also contribute to stabilising output and employment. In this respect, inflation targeting is flexible.

After the transaction, the central bank has a building on the asset side of its balance sheet. But, at the same time, on the liability side, there is an equivalent amount representing the currency issue of the bank. Governments impose inflation tax on the society by borrowing from central banks. When such borrowings are effected, the government would give the central bank a government security such as a treasury bill. The central bank, in return, permits the government to take away an equivalent amount of currency and spend it to make payments. So, on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet, it has a treasury bill. On the liability side, this asset is matched by a new liability called currency issued by the bank. But, to acquire that asset, the central bank has to spend only a fraction of the face value of the asset enabling it to make a huge profit out of the transaction. Central banks’ lending to governments become highly inflationary on another count. That happens when the commercial banks make use of this currency issued by the central banks as seed money to produce more bank money in the form of deposits. When governments spend the currency borrowed from central banks, such currency finally gets back to commercial banks as deposits of the public. Commercial banks, in turn, use such deposits to create more deposits and credit.
But was the Concordat based on a false premiss: that the division of supervisory-labour during peacetime can carry smoothly over to the only period that really matters, distress? Because, as it happens, neither standard resolution regimes for commercial banks nor any super-SRR of the kind I have just outlined for going-concern restructurings could be applied easily to the cross-border activities of LCFIs. SRR tools cannot automatically be applied extraterritorially. It seems to me that policymakers need to face up to, and decide whether or not to fix, the really big issues about how insolvency and resolution laws are applied to internationally active financial companies. BIS Review 33/2010  3  Broadly speaking, countries’ laws apply either territorial principles to international insolvencies, consistent with separate procedures for each of a bank’s entities in different jurisdictions (so-called “separate-entity resolution”); or universal principles, consistent with a single procedure applying to the resolution of an international bank and its branches abroad, wherever they are located (“single-entity resolution”). I believe that top-level policymakers have to choose what kind of regime they want. This issue needs to be elevated above the level of middle-ranking technocrats where, through no great fault of their own, it has wallowed for too long. The issues were articulated as long as 20 years ago, following BCCI’s failure. 2 Nothing much has been done globally. So in the second half of my remarks today, I just want to sketch why this problem arises.

All other creditors typically travel with the “bad bank” and become claimants in the insolvency. We can be confident that this will help to buttress stability. Encouragement from the EU to all members states to establish such regimes would be really useful. But we also know that, of itself, this is insufficient. It cannot cope with distressed LCFIs (“large and complex financial institutions”) without injections of public money. In the first place, every country having its own Special Resolution Regime does not solve the problem of resolving cross-border banking groups. Second, such regimes cannot cope with investment banking, whether national or global, if a buyer cannot be found. Even for a (hypothetical) LCFI operating entirely within a single jurisdiction, with all of its counterparties, customers and contracts domiciled there, a standard resolution regime could not effect an orderly run down of, for example, a massive, complex derivatives portfolio. Putting over-the-counter derivatives though central counterparties would help. But it would not securely solve the problem. Today I want to surface those big issues, and to encourage the EU and the international community more generally to explore possible solutions. In doing so, I take our objectives to be twofold: (i)  First, to avoid a disorderly disruption to the provision of financial services to the economy in the event of firm distress;  (ii)  And second, to put market discipline back into the system, by having losses fall to uninsured creditors as well as to equity holders, and without public sector solvency support.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  roubles, and instead the BNB was obliged to pay out to the Soviet armed forces passing through our country “the amounts they needed at their request” and those amounts were to be accounted for as a debt of the country.3 We do hope such times would never again return in Bulgaria. Bolshevik enthusiasm and decisions made under street pressure are the most dangerous approach when it comes to public policies regarding the monetary regime, banking supervision or financial stability. Today, once again we are called to stand up for the professionalism and independence of the central bank – with responsibility and concrete actions. The public interest requires that the reputation of the central bank be respected and its institutional independence and continuity in its work be safeguarded. The strength of institutions in a country is a pre-condition for stability and economic growth, while the weakness of institutions is the first sign of forthcoming economic or financial failure of a country. It is not a coincidence that in the countries which usually serve us as an example of democracy and prosperity, the strong public institutions by rule outlive the individuals and the political parties too. Dear Colleagues, Finally, please allow me to convey the best wishes on behalf of the BNB Governing Council and me for success of the banks run by you and for professional and personal achievements of all of you in the coming year of 2015. Happy Banker’s Day, dear colleagues! Thank you for your attention!

Strategic decisions need to be made on establishing relevant competent authorities tasked with the responsibility of resolving banks and investment firms, on setting up resolution funds, and on the drawing up by the supervised entities of adequate plans for recovery or controlled restoration of their viability by restructuring. In connection with the new EU capital framework CRD4, in 2014 the BNB began to implement the new reporting framework for supervisory purposes (the so-called FINREP and COREP), consisting of over 100 separate reporting forms. The additional supervisory reporting will meet the accumulated information needs of the Banking Supervision Department and will tackle the most sensitive sources of risk in banks’ portfolios. In 2015 it is expected that the EU-wide banking supervision rules will become more and more common in banking practices. Numerous technical standards, developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and adopted by the European Commission, are going to be put in place. In supervising the subsidiaries of euro area banks, the BNB is going to cooperate actively with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which started in November 2014. Last but not least is the BNB’s intention to initiate an asset quality review of the entire banking system, which will cover all banks operating in Bulgaria. This will also be a key requirement if the government should decide, at some point, to start talks with the ECB for joining the SSM.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The takaful industry in Malaysia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the launch of Prudential BSN Takaful Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, 8 August 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, The takaful industry in Malaysia today is poised for greater dynamism and growth, within the expanded domestic and international frontier of the Islamic financial system. This reflects the culmination of the wide-ranging strategies that have been implemented over more than two decades for the full potential of Islamic finance to be now realised. However, to ensure that the momentum in the development of Islamic finance is sustained in a now more challenging and fast changing international financial environment, it not only requires continued development of the Islamic financial infrastructures, and the range of products and services it offers, but also an increase in the number of players and an enhancement of their capacity and capabilities in terms of size and quality of their participation in the financial system. The launch of Prudential BSN Takaful Berhad today marks a new phase of development in the Malaysian takaful industry. Prudential BSN Takaful Berhad is one of four successful consortia that has been identified to conduct takaful business. With the entry of the four new players into the financial system, the competitive element that is injected into the market structure of the industry can be expected to contribute to accelerate the pace of industry development.

Ardo Hansson: Nordic-Baltic financial linkages and challenges Opening remarks by Mr Ardo Hansson, Governor of the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank), at the conference “Nordic-Baltic financial linkages and challenges”, Tallinn, 13 December 2013. *  *  *  I am honored to welcome you here in Tallinn at the conference Nordic-Baltic Financial Linkages and Challenges jointly organized by the IMF, Riksbank and Eesti Pank. Jean Monnet once famously said that Europe will be the sum of the decisions taken in crises. We hope to have soon put one of these crises behind us. We now know that inadequate assessment of risks and weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory framework were among the causes of the crisis. We hope that the lessons learned from the crisis will be profound and lasting enough to provide the energy for us to follow through with the fundamental reforms we have initiated in the EU. We also now understand the need to remain vigilant and ready to act against possible new risks to financial stability. Today’s conference will take a close look at the challenges and rewards involved in the evolution of a new paradigm in the operation and regulation of the European financial sector. The financial sector in the Nordic-Baltic region is regularly used as an example of regional integration and cooperation. In my remarks, I would like to highlight the key features of the region and put them in the broader context of European developments.