samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
David Clementi: The City and the Euro: innovation and excellence Speech by Mr David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the City Seminar on 'London into the 21st Century' at the Palace Hotel, Tokyo on 13 February 2001. *  *  *  Introduction The City of London is, and always has been, a centre of innovation and excellence. I want to talk to you today about the City's role in the euro markets as an example of how London proposes to maintain its standing and reputation for innovation and excellence in the 21st century. For me, it is a great pleasure to be able to talk to you about this here in Tokyo. There are historic links between Tokyo and the City of London, and I am glad that these links are continuing to flourish. We welcome the fact that so many important Japanese financial institutions are represented in London; and, of course, that UK-based financial institutions have operations here in Tokyo. It is not surprising that there are such strong links between Tokyo and the City of London, because London is one of the three global financial centres, alongside Tokyo itself and New York. Tokyo and New York are global centres because of their large domestic markets. Unlike Tokyo and New York, London's primary focus is international. London is much the largest international financial centre in Europe. Historically, London developed as a financial centre because of the international role of the pound sterling.

Industry platforms such as VBI-COP and the JC3 could potentially play a central role to ‘intermediate’ the data. As a first step, conversations between the Islamic banking and takaful operators to identify impact-driven and innovative financial solutions under VBI and VBIT, can take place to facilitate respective outreach to the underserved or unbanked population. Outside the financial sector, FIs can embark on collaborations with organisations sharing similar sustainability aspirations including state religious authorities, waqf institutions, business industry associations and advocacy groups, or non-governmental organisations who are at the heart of the vulnerable communities. For example, FIs can collaborate with government agencies and utility companies to support the consumers’ shift to energy-efficient residential homes or vehicles. Beyond the existing sustainable financial products offering preferential rates for the purchase of electric vehicles (EV) or green residential properties, more can be done to raise consumer awareness and to develop complementary infrastructure namely, charging stations. Initiatives such as the development of the VBIAF sectoral guides which are now underway for the manufacturing, construction and infrastructure, as well as oil and gas sectors, is a step in the right direction to streamline the cross-sectoral understanding of sustainability issues, thus allowing for better coordination of efforts to address sustainability risks throughout the value chain. In conclusion, it is our fervent hope that with sustainability, an innovative and collaborative mindset, we can come to develop value-driven solutions and discover new avenues for synergistic collaboration.
Debt markets are profoundly disrupted and international movements of capital have been highly volatile over the last two years. Fifth remark. The intervention capacities of central banks are of course limited. They can remedy temporary market disruptions and situations of illiquidity caused by uncertainty. Recently they have intervened to an unprecedented extent, as reflected in their balance sheets. But they cannot permanently substitute financial markets and banks when financial intermediation malfunctions. Likewise, low or zero interest rates can contribute to stabilising  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  the economy in periods of crisis, but if maintained over a protracted period, they can create distortions, encourage the formation of bubbles and create risk for long-term investors. Indeed, on this topic, I would like to make one observation. The question of monetary financing of deficits was raised by David Thesmar. Such financing cannot in any way resolve the problem of the dislocation between savings and investment, either at the national level or at the global level. Some central banks have developed large-scale public debt acquisition programmes. They have done so for reasons relating to immediate macroeconomic stabilisation... to go beyond the zero-interest rate limit. The Eurosystem as well intervened on a much smaller scale when malfunctioning debt markets prevented the effective transmission of monetary policy impulses. There is not a single central bank that is seriously considering the monetisation of deficits with the more or less declared intention of reducing the weight of debt via inflation.

But despite these differences, a common theme arises: emerging markets dependent on the production and export of raw materials (Russia, Brazil and South Africa serve as good examples) are less resilient than countries dependent on vigorous labour force and innovations (exemplified, within BRICS, by China and India). There are also differences in resilience among the “emerging” countries of Central Europe. During the Great Recession, Poland – a big country (by Central European standards), less open and with greater potential for catch-up growth – proved to be the most resilient. The Czech Republic was also quite resilient (it experienced its own banking crisis in the late 1990s, with banks becoming more conservative and risk-averse in consequence). Hungary and Slovenia proved less resilient, and in these countries the government had to intervene in the financial market. In the case of the Czech Republic, the fact that our host financial sector was more resilient to shocks than its home countries was the reason why we never joined the Vienna Initiative. The resilience of emerging economies is now under the spotlight also because we remember the effects of the 2013 taper tantrum. That year, many emerging countries experienced a huge outflow of capital, while at the same time some other countries like the Czech Republic and Poland were effectively trying to discourage foreign short-term capital from coming in. This discouragement was accompanied by interest rate cuts and other forms of monetary easing in general.
27  For example, Goodfriend and King (2016), p. 98, write as follows: “We do not think it sensible to extend the objective of the central bank to include numerical targets for employment and output. The experience of forward guidance in both United States and United Kingdom suggest that attempts to use numerical values for these variables can crumble in the hands of policymakers within a short period of time.”  28  See Woodford (2012). 29  See Stein (2014), Billi and Vredin (2014) and IMF (2015). 30  See Bryant, Henderson and Becker (2012) and Acharya (2015) for different arguments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  factors, on how well the price stability objective has been met and on how effective macroand microprudential policy are when it comes to promoting financial stability. Flexible inflation targeting involves, as I stated earlier, the central bank allowing certain deviations from the target in order to take, for example, output, employment or financial imbalances more into account. But this flexibility is not just something that is there, one has to accumulate it. A prerequisite for using the policy rate for something other than stabilising inflation is that confidence in the inflation target is firmly rooted and that it works as a nominal anchor in the economy. The higher the confidence in the inflation target, the more consideration the central bank can show for aspects other than inflation – the more flexible monetary policy can be.

The test is whether member countries are ready to make genuine commitments to each other. Without that the institutions lack any real purpose. So the subject of my talk today is why we need rules of the game to govern globalisation, and the institutions that are necessary to oversee those rules. 2. Is the post-war settlement still relevant today? At the end of the Second World War, a new global order was put in place by the United States, Britain and their allies. One of those primarily responsible, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, described his time as being “present at the creation” of a new global order. A range of new international institutions was created – the United Nations, the two Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and World Bank), the OEEC that implemented the Marshall Plan (and later became the OECD) , NATO, and GATT (which has subsequently been succeeded by the World Trade Organisation). Those institutions are now, for the most part, past their 60th birthdays. And there has been much heartsearching over the past few years as to their role and governance. Unless the spirit of the original founders is rekindled, there is a real danger that the present institutions will wither on the vine leaving us with a more unstable and fragile international environment. As Martin Wolf pointedly wrote, “To defend a liberal world economy is not to defend the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation or any specific institution.
Audience Member: Greetings, good morning to – or good afternoon to you and your guest. Now while it would be interesting to speak of why the New York Fed and the Atlanta Fed are differing on their economic forecasts, that might be interesting, but I want to speak to something far more local. Far more local. This community, and communities like this, were devastated, were ravaged – and I could use a stronger word – during the financial crisis of 2008. We’ve never recovered from this. The black community lost approximately 50% of its wealth in four years. 50% of the wealth accumulated from slavery till today lost in four years. No one, of course, was ever jailed for these things, no one was ever – very little punishment, if anything, was done. I understand that while you may want to do or feel strongly it’s not the purview of the Federal Reserve – I understand that. Using your researchers at Liberty and other parts of your organization, I need to know what laws that I can put on the books to protect communities like this. We’re about to go back into another phase of exotic mortgage-lending, and I will humbly differ with you on Glass-Steagall, of course. We’re about to go into another phase of exotic lending. They call it exotic lending. We call it predatory lending, and we pay for it. We can expect that again.

But, as a French and European citizen, I cannot help and feel proud of having one the two main currencies in the world. In sum, benefits of the euro include a high degree of credibility of monetary policy reflected in the level of long-term interest rates; diminished exchange rate volatility; completion of the single market and encouragement to cross-border trade. None of this, of course, can be taken for granted. Benign conditions currently prevailing on financial markets can be reversed. Shocks may be coming, which would impact negatively European economies. Despite some signs of cooling, imbalances are still building up, especially in the housing sector, fuelled by a dynamic expansion of credit, although in no way comparable to those in some other developed economies. But I have the strong conviction that we are fully equipped to deal with any contingency, and, provided the necessary structural reforms are undertaken, keep the economy on a path of growth and stability. BIS Review 51/2007  1  2)  How have those successes been achieved? A lot comes, in my view, from the institutional and operational framework in which monetary policy is developed and implemented. The independence of the ECB and of the 13 participating NCBs is enshrined in the Treaty. They are institutionally, operationally and financially independent from European Community institutions and national governments. We have a clear and transparent definition of price stability: inflation below but close to 2% over the medium-term. The monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem is “medium-term” oriented.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: From here to there – transition in emerging markets Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, delivered in the Thailand@Harvard Series, Harvard Kennedy School, Boston, Massachusetts, 7 October 2013. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to be back here at Harvard and to have a chance to contribute to the Thailand@Harvard series. Boston has certainly changed a lot since I graduated over 30 years ago. But the warmth and sense of intellectual purpose that I still feel here makes it all seem like yesterday. And by that I don’t necessarily mean the stress of studying for my general exam! Later this week I will be attending the Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. Undoubtedly one of the key issues that will be discussed is the recent growth slowdown in many emerging market economies. Certainly, among market commentators and in policy circles, the medium-term growth prospects for China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies have become the talk of the town. And it will be the focus of my remarks today. What happens in emerging markets matter. Together, they account for more than half of world GDP.1 Since the early 2000s, when Jim O’Neill at Goldman Sachs coined the acronym BRIC for Brazil, Russia, India and China, emerging markets have powered global economic growth. By mid-2009, these economies were growing 7 percentage points faster than the G7 economies and contributed around two-thirds of world output growth.

Greece is hot and has plenty of sunshine. Yet the Dutch can produce 70kg of tomatoes per year in a square metre of his temperature controlled greenhouse whilst Greek and other Mediterranean grower get approximately 7kg through traditional open-air  1  In purchasing power parity terms. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  plantations. Ironically, in the summer Greece imports tomatoes from Holland because local farmers are unable to grow enough during the hottest time of the year. Natural and geographical constraints can be overcome. Japan and Singapore also spring to mind as countries that have made much of their limited resources. Critical to longrun growth is how you make use of and develop your resources. Doing so requires constant reshuffling of factors of production. Workers, capital, and land has to be devoted to activities that generate the most value added for the economy. In other words, growth requires structural change. Advanced economies are simply not blown-up versions of developing economies. They are structurally different. Development entails more than just aggregate growth. It requires significant transformation in the productive structure of the economy. In Thailand the average worker in the manufacturing sector is roughly 10 times more productive than those in agriculture. Yet, the latter employ about 40 percent of our workforce compared to 15 percent in manufacturing. It is easy to see that simply moving workers from agriculture to industry can lift our income tremendously.
Instead, just as CCPs were part of the solution when it came to counterparty credit risk, they can play a role in helping to solve the liquidity risk we have seen recur in each recent episode of stress. In particular, CCPs can: ensure that IM is sufficiently conservative in good times that it reduces the need for wild swings once a crisis hits; and ensure that participants have sufficient information, data, and tools to anticipate what margin calls might look like under stress, and how pro-cyclical they may be. Importantly, tackling the side effects will also require addressing participants’ preparedness to meet stress margin calls. While CCPs can play a part in the solution, this is not something CCPs can solve on their own. We also need to take a hard look at the ability of non-banks to insure against severe but plausible liquidity stress. The international work to look at these issues[8] is welcome – it offers opportunities to address them in a way that preserves and enhances the role of CCPs. If done right, it can help to address the lessons of the COVID and Russian invasion market turmoil, while ensuring that market participants have incentives to centrally clear their derivatives trades in good and bad times. (2) The past is not always a good guide to the future Markets, especially those for physical commodities, can behave in unexpected ways. Let me give you just a few examples.

The FTSE All-Share index fell over 10% on 12 March, the largest one-day fall since 1987. Other markets also saw shocks beyond or close to the largest in history. 2. FSB (2017) Report on effectiveness of derivatives reforms  . 3. By March 2020, 60% of credit default swaps were cleared, and 80% of interest rate contracts, up from about 10% and 40% respectively in 2008. 4. Review of margining practices (bis.org) 5. From Lender of Last Resort to Market Maker of Last Resort via the dash for cash: why central banks need new tools for dealing with market dysfunction (bankofengland.co.uk) 6. VM calls were six times larger compared to normal levels on 1 March 2022 £ compared to a five-fold increase on 18 March 2020 £ VM calls at the most affected clearing services were as high as 35 times normal levels (LME Base). 7. Total IM requirements of UK CCPs peaked at around 30% higher relative to their pre-stress levels in Q1 2020. The peak aggregate increase in Q1 2022 was 13% (relative to 1 February 2022). 8. Review of margining practices (bis.org) 9. Joint statement from UK Financial Regulation Authorities on London Metal Exchange and LME Clear | Bank of England 10. This is different to climate change, where it is possible to model how the future will be different to the past and this is informing the pricing of risk today – but there is no obvious way to identify future market shocks and volatility robustly. 11.
That is, not to introduce large changes in the aggregate amount of capital currently held in the banking system while at the same time to provide tangible incentives for banks to adopt the most advanced and sophisticated approaches to capital adequacy. As we near completion of the New Accord, I am reminded that the tremendous progress we have made is a reflection of the steadfast commitment that so many have put forth to see the revision process through to its completion. The success of the New Accord will be directly attributable to the enormous support and assistance provided by both bankers and supervisors. Yet a Chinese proverb reminds us that, "On a journey of one hundred miles, ninety is but halfway." I suppose the last miles of any marathon are the toughest to finish. The wisdom of that proverb is borne out by the critical nature of the tasks ahead of us to complete, and then to implement, the new capital framework. Adopting the New Accord will be a challenging but also an exciting undertaking for us all. The potential benefits are many - including improving the management of risk, enhancing transparency and promoting greater financial stability. In short, this new framework will make all of us - bankers, supervisors and others - better at what we do. Thank you very much.

As a result, the household sector’s financial condition today is in unusually good shape for this point in the economic cycle. In relative terms, household indebtedness is low, and—thanks in part to low interest rates—debt service burdens relative to household income have fallen to levels not seen since at least the early 1980s. As we will show in today’s presentation, compared to 2008, a greater proportion of overall debt today is now held by older households that have higher and more stable incomes and more experience as borrowers, on average. Consequently, a much larger proportion of debt is currently held by borrowers with higher credit scores. The resulting higher overall debt quality is reflected in historically low overall delinquency rates. Transition rates into new delinquency are below the levels of the early 2000s, and foreclosure and bankruptcy rates in 2016 are the lowest since our data series began in 1999. Notwithstanding this overall rosy picture, the improvement in aggregate debt quality and performance conceals important underlying changes in debt holdings that could be consequential, with implications for the housing market and for consumer spending over the longer term. While older borrowers hold more debt of all types, there has been a significant shift among younger people toward student debt and away from mortgage and other debt. Student debt has increased more than fivefold over the past 14 years, with more young adults taking out loans and borrowing larger average amounts. And, while debt delinquency rates overall have fallen, those for student debt have remained elevated.
Most things suggest that traditional demand policy is not capable of lowering unemployment appreciably. Most economic observers also expect that even with decent growth, unemployment will remain high in the coming years. Whatever the causes of the high unemployment, an important key to turning this tendency lies in the functioning of the labour market. I have not considered conceivable specific measures, such as stimulating private sector employment, contributing to efficient wage formation and encouraging individuals to look for and accept jobs and maintain and develop their competence. I believe that, as Assar Lindbeck pointed out recently,10 the problem of unemployment in Sweden and, indeed, in the whole of Western Europe has to do with a great many factors connected with how the labour market functions. Although the most effective measures cannot be identified for certain in advance, the central concern is the workings of the labour market and thereby also the labour market organisations. This applies to employer and employee representatives alike. The climate in the labour market will be of significance for the possibility of bringing the high unemployment down. One issue is whether a mood of mutual understanding can be created so that employment has priority in wage setting. An important lesson seems to be that Sweden ought not to opt for a standard in wage formation that matches the average level in Western Europe; such a relatively high level could impede a reduction of unemployment. The model should rather be the Netherlands.

D iagram 5  G D P 1970-96 U SA, EU , N etherlands and Sweden Index 1970=100 2 20  2 00  1 80  1 60  2 20  2 00  USA EU N e the rla n ds S we de n  1 80  1 60  1 40  1 40  1 20  1 20  1 00  1 00  80  80 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98  1996-97 O E C D fore ca s t  S ou rce : E U R O S T A T  It is important, I think, to underscore that, notwithstanding the marked differences in employment, GDP growth does not differ substantially between the United States, the EU area, the Netherlands and Sweden. Therefore it is not high demand generated by a more expansionary monetary and fiscal policy that can account for the creation of so many new jobs in the United States or, in the past decade, in the Netherlands. This is an indication that structural factors lie behind the development in Western Europe as a whole. An important part seems to be played, not least, by wage formation. The weak growth in Sweden is also evident from Diagram 5. This is another interesting observation in the present context.