samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The monetary reform in 1965 replaced the earliest Lek banknotes with new ones, in a ratio of 10 to 1, by changing at the same degree the value of prices, wages and, of any other financial operation. Since then, most of citizens have not been adopted yet with this change and are used to communicate with the outdated term “old lek”, driving to confusion in both the communication of prices of goods and services and the accurate reading of economic and financial indicators. Even before the launching of this awareness campaign -postponed due to the difficulties caused by the restrictions imposed to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic situation – the Bank of Albania has been attentive in encompassing this message in its educational publications and programmes, such are: Global Money Week, or the campaign on the issue in circulation of the new banknotes. Recently, we have conducted the measurement on the use of terminology “new lek” – “old lek” on a national level, through the inclusion of dedicated questions in the survey on measuring financial literacy of the Albanian population structured pursuant to the model of International Network of Financial Education (INFE, OECD). The analyses of these questions provides information on the degree of wrong use of terminology by: location-residential, age-group, gender, education, employment and average level of income, as well as the settings where it is more frequently used; aimed at adopting the campaign undertaken by the Bank of Albania on the elimination of the outdated terms “new lek”- “old lek”.

It has also shown a striking positive relationship with growth in GDP per head: for  19  For example, the models of Solow-Swann model (Solow (1956) and Swann (1956)) and Ramsey-CassKoopmans (Ramsey (1929), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965)). 20  See, for example, Eichengreen (2014). 21  These are taken from Clark (2009) for the period up until 1750 and based on Bank estimates in the subsequent period. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  every £ rise in the capital stock per head since 1850, GDP per head has risen by £ per head. This, too, is just as Neo-Classical growth theory would predict. That same pattern is replicated across countries. Chart 6 plots the relationship between the capital stock and GDP per head since 1980 in a cross-section of countries. Clearly, countries are on different steps on the growth escalator. But in each case this escalator has moved relentlessly upward, with sustained rises in the capital stock associated with secular rises in per capita incomes. Yesterday’s investment has been today’s growth. Sociological roots of industrial revolution If this were the whole story of three industrial revolutions, the growth recipe would be simple. Growth, like surfing, would mean simply waiting for the next big innovation wave to break. Rising living standards would be not so much natural as preternatural, “suspended between the mundane and the miraculous”. 22 Because policymakers cannot part the waves or perform other miracles, public policy would have a minimal role.
However, looking ahead, some of these factors will foreseeably lose steam, owing partly to the effects of the appreciation of the euro, in nominal effective terms, and to dearer oil. These effects will give rise to a considerable reduction in the Spanish economy’s net lending vis-à-vis the rest of the world, which is nevertheless expected to remain positive over the coming years. With regard to the labour market, 2.3 million jobs have been generated since 2013. These developments, along with the reduction in the labour force as a result of population ageing, have enabled the unemployment level to be reduced most significantly. The unemployment rate thus stands below 15%, 12 pp down on its 2013 high (see Chart 10), although still far off the level observed in the euro area on average (slightly above 8%). Most recently, the robustness of employment has eased in line with developments in activity, making for continuing and very low growth in productivity, as has been the case since the start of the recovery. 5/14  Strong job creation has been accompanied by a modest increase in wage compensation in the past four years. Chiefly contributing to this has been the high degree of slack in the labour market which dates back to the start of the current pick-up, and the expectations of very low inflation rates during these years.

In the economic and tax spheres, some kind of common cyclical insurance mechanism is also needed, to cut adjustment costs for countries experiencing asymmetric shocks, and help is needed to design a fiscal policy more tailored to the euro area as a whole so that, in the event of a severe crisis, monetary policy will no longer be the only tool available to uphold aggregate demand. In future, further progress must also be made in the capital markets union, which is essential to achieve greater capital market integration, fortify banking union and strengthen the private mechanisms for efficient allocation of financial resources and the risks associated with their investment throughout the European Union. Conclusions As you can see, the Banco de España’s Annual Report provides an ambitious analysis and diagnosis of the Spanish economy. The main conclusions drawn in the Report, which was prepared in the first half of the year, remain essentially valid, despite the apparent growing deceleration of the global, European and Spanish economies: -  First, the need to take advantage of a level of economic growth that is still above potential to speedily and determinedly address the necessary fiscal consolidation process. In this respect, guaranteeing the financial sustainability of the public pension system is particularly important, in view of the medium-term implications. For this purpose, a comprehensive package of measures to address the effects of population ageing on the economy is essential.
This document, which we hope to be able to publish shortly, once we have incorporated a number of comments received during the public consultation period, does not resolve all the problems, but it does represent a significant step forward in improving coordination and the distribution of tasks between supervisors. We are also keeping a close watch on how cooperation is being handled in practice between countries with supervisory responsibility for institutions belonging to international banking groups. In this respect, the AIG is gathering and sharing information and experience on the functioning of bilateral agreements and of supervisory colleges. In my view, either of these two collaboration methods can be fully valid, depending on the size and complexity of the group concerned. Over the years, these kinds of agreements on the exchange of information and reciprocal cooperation have been established among supervisors as a means to perform effective crossborder supervision. Time has shown that such agreements are more effective when the relations between home and host supervisors are based on mutual trust. In this regard, I believe that we as supervisors should steer clear of excessively formalist and legalistic approaches and try to be pragmatic. I think that the questions which need answering are more operational than legal in nature. It is a matter of finding a way of cooperating that makes us all more efficient in the use of our resources, reduces the supervisory burden for the banks and improves the stability of the financial system.

Neither is there an urgent need to update the assessments; in this respect, one should stress the validity of the self-assessments carried out by the countries themselves, as a complement to the assessments performed by the Fund and the World Bank during their FSAP missions. The second general direction followed by the Core Principles revision was to keep their character of a single universal standard for assessing the quality of banking supervision, independently of the complexity of each country’s financial system. To maintain this universality, on the one hand, it was decided to place greater emphasis, throughout the text, on the idea that the Principles should be applied proportionally, always taking into account the material impact of the risks or the complexity of activities, which allowed application to be adapted to less sophisticated financial systems. On the other hand, the new Principles, by taking into account the most advanced practices, have gained in validity as regards the assessment of complex financial systems which were previously outside the scope of many of the established criteria. I would like to express my view that this universal character is one of the most positive aspects of the Principles. To achieve this, the Committee worked closely with a very large number of supervisors. Thus the initial drafts were prepared using groups made up of equal numbers of representatives from Committee members and non-members, involving both the IMF and the World Bank as interested parties.
This report comes at an opportune time as there have been growing concerns that terrorist groups are using the pandemic outbreak to advance their propaganda and fundraising efforts. Although the risk seems muted at the moment due to strengthened border enforcement, online activities and financial transactions related to terrorism could easily go under the radar of authorities. This bolsters the continuous need to better understand and profile key players involved in the furtherance of terrorism financing activities. I believe that the typology report and also discussion during this Workshop will help us to close gaps and reduce our blind spots. As we progress, financial crimes will continue to evolve and take on more complex forms. As such, we should remind ourselves to not let our guards down. The fight against terrorism is a shared battle and it must always be our collective priority. This can only be successfully conquered through the sharing of information between members. Conclusion As we face unprecedented times, we are bound to encounter unknown challenges. Thus, there is a need for all of us to stay prepared, agile and responsive in facing those threats. Collaboration amongst us, through sharing of information and experience, will further strengthen our collective readiness to address the ML/TF risks. I note that a diverse mix of participants including from the private sectors have registered for the Workshop which will no doubt enrich the discourse this week.

Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Der Tagesspiegel Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Der Tagesspiegel, conducted by Ms Carla Neuhaus on 19 September 2018 and published on 1 October 2018. * * *  Mr Cœuré, the financial crisis erupted 10 years ago. Is the eurozone now better prepared for a crisis? As central bankers we always need to be prepared for the next crisis. It is our job to make the financial system as resilient as possible. And a lot has been done on that front. The financial system is now much safer than it was 10 years ago. We have better regulation and higher capital and liquidity buffers in banks. Good progress has been made, but we are not there yet. Why not? There are still parts of the financial system that are not nearly as well regulated as we would like them to be. I’m thinking of the shadow banking sector, for example, meaning financial institutions that conduct activities similar to those of banks but don’t have a banking licence. Regulators still don’t have proper instruments to adequately monitor and control risks in these institutions. It would be up to politicians to change that. But are they still ready to do so, 10 years after the start of the crisis? There is indeed a risk of complacency. After all, the economy is doing well, memories of the crisis are fading, and bankers have been trying again and again to soften regulation.
And perhaps in the same way, too, might forced asset sales into stressed financial markets have negative spillovers for all other users of that market. In the case of the core government bond market that could be significant. What is being done to address risks from non-bank leverage, and where is there further progress to be made? Having set out how leverage in non-bank financial institutions might create risks to financial stability, I’ll turn now to what needs to be done if we are to ensure those risks are reduced. Let me be clear. The onus for building resilience in the non-bank system sits first and foremost with the firms themselves. If firms use leverage, they must be able to manage the liquidity consequences of their risk exposures. As part of this, they need to learn from the decades of experience that show how leverage and liquidity risk creates rollover risks; volatility; operational challenges in accessing liquidity; and exposures to amplification mechanisms from the wider system. Firm stress testing and resilience must be set with reference to the system and to market dynamics and not just a firm’s own atomistic actions. Indeed this is where associations such as yourselves, ISDA and AIMA, can be hugely supportive in sharing best practices and industry standards. LDI funds have demonstrated the art of the possible here, by building resilience at speed when severe stress demonstrated the clear need for it. Regulators worked with LDI funds during the Bank’s operations to ensure greater resilience for future stresses.

Such a self-reinforcing price spiral would have resulted in even more severely disrupted gilt market functioning. And that would in turn have led to an excessive and sudden tightening of financing conditions for households and businesses. In response to this threat, the Bank of England intervened on financial stability grounds. But what led to that intervention? The root cause is simple – and indeed is one we have seen in other contexts too – poorly managed leverage. So today I’ll set out how leverage outside the banking sector can create risks to financial stability, starting with that small corner of the pensions market. And then I’ll set out what needs to be done - by participants, by their regulators and by financial stability authorities - if we are to ensure those risks to financial stability are reduced. How did a small corner of the pensions industry threaten financial stability? Many UK DB pension schemes have been in deficit, meaning their liabilities – their commitments to pay out to pensioners in the future – exceed the assets they hold. DB pension schemes invest in long-term bonds to hedge the interest rate and inflation risk that arises from these long-term liabilities. But that doesn’t help them to close their deficit. To do that, they invest in ‘growth assets’, such as equities, to get extra return to grow the value of their assets. An LDI strategy delivers this, using leveraged gilt funds to allow schemes both to maintain material hedges and to invest in growth assets.
Joseph Yam: Basel II - back to the future Opening remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Seventh Distinguished Lecture: “Basel II: Back to the Future”, Hong Kong, 4 February 2005. *  *  *  Let me first extend a warm welcome to all of you to this seventh HKMA Distinguished Lecture. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce our speaker, Governor Jaime Caruana, and our discussant, Mr David Eldon. Basel II, or the New Capital Accord, or whatever we might call it, has been on the minds of bankers and regulators for around five years now. This new framework of capital adequacy standards for banks, issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, is an important step forward in the field of regulation. By making capital requirements more risk-sensitive, Basel II will bring banking regulation more into line with the way that banks themselves manage risk. It will also give banks the incentive to improve their own risk management. Basel II will help make banks stronger, and it will improve the safety, stability and efficiency of financial systems. The title of Governor Caruana's lecture today, "Back to the Future", might for a moment give the impression that Basel II is the stuff of science fantasy. There is no doubt that it is a highly complex matter, and that it has – literally – required the recruitment of physicists and rocket scientists by the regulators and banks tasked with its implementation.

Today, on the basis of a Progress Report, we have reviewed the advances of the banking industry against the objectives set by the Eurosystem and we have identified the outstanding issues that need quickly to be addressed. A press release on this topic will be issued later on today. The Progress Report will be available on the ECB’s website shortly. 3  BIS Review 74/2000
Svein Gjedrem: Economic perspectives Annual address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank, at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank, Oslo, 14 February 2002. *  *  *  Introduction The world economy is experiencing a slowdown. Growth in the US economy came to a halt last spring. Overinvestment, particularly in IT and telecom equipment, led to low returns on real capital and reduced corporate earnings. Stock markets declined when growth prospects were revised. Terrorism and war added to the uncertainty. These developments had contagion effects on European and Asian economies. Japan is in a deflationary recession. The US economy is flexible and seldom remains in recession for a long period. There are some signs of an early recovery. However, there is a risk of a longer period of stagnation. Companies are highly leveraged and vulnerable. Household saving is at a low level. There is uncertainty associated with household wealth as it is invested in stocks and the housing market. Oil prices have plunged by about 40 per cent since autumn 2000. Prices for other Norwegian export goods have declined since spring 2001. Exports fell in autumn of last year. The global economic downturn and the prospect of low import price inflation induced Norges Bank to reduce its key interest rate in December. In spite of this, the effects of the global downturn on the activity level in Norway have been limited. Private and public consumption and housing investment continue to show strong growth.

The broad spread of fairly complicated constructions of financial instruments that has contributed to the current confidence crisis in the financial markets is a clear example that risk awareness has been low. There is currently a process under way where various authorities around the world are reviewing their regulations, supervision and general frameworks for crisis management. This applies not only on a national basis, but also at an international level. If, for instance, one does not harmonise the regulations for crisis management, one country’s measures may create problems for another country. These are not merely challenges for the "external” systems. There are also challenges for our analysis framework. It is difficult to take credit markets and asset prices into account in a really good way in our forecasts. Some work still remains in this field, for instance, with regard to finding good ways to include asset prices and other financial variables in models of the whole economy. There is a lot of work going on in this field in many parts of the world, not least at the Riksbank. I also believe that there will be many developments in this area, too, over the coming years. Concluding remarks It has been incredibly interesting and stimulating to work at the Riksbank. And it is possibly even more stimulating today than when I first began here. I must confess that it feels a little strange to know that I will no longer be ”on the inside” and involved in managing the challenges we face.
23 Not only will this system likely mean that banks’ binding constraint on reserve levels will be different from before the crisis, but also that bank behavior when reserves decline will likely be different. For example, in comparison to the 14-day maintenance period I mentioned earlier under Regulation D, many of these new constraints are measured quarterly, while some are measured daily for certain purposes. This means that signs of reserve scarcity may emerge differently and on a different timescale than they would have in the old system. Moreover, banks 20  For example, there has been an expansion of access to centrally-cleared repo, through the introduction of the GCF Repo Service’s Centrally Cleared Institutional Triparty Service (CCIT), which opened the centrally-cleared triparty repo market to institutional cash lenders, and the growth of activity in the centrally-cleared bilateral repo market by institutions being sponsored by members of the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation’s (FICC) Government Securities Division. Separately, some foreign banking organizations that had been active borrowers in the offshore Eurodollar market have shifted their borrowing in favor of domestic deposits that are economically similar to Eurodollars. 21 Kroeger, McGowan, and Sarkar (2018) provides detailed background on behavior of the pre-crisis framework. 22 The Regulation D reserve requirement is still binding for many smaller banks.

Further, the prevalence of standing business relationships has seemed to mean that in practice transitory shocks can have more permanent effects on pricing. Indeed, despite a recent decline in repo rates, the effective federal funds rate has remained fairly stable at nine basis points below the top of the range. 30 Moreover, there have been various other recent shocks that may have influenced money market flows and structure, such as those from recently enacted tax reform measures. There are various opinions in the market on how things go from here. Some believe that we might see federal funds rates remain at a similar spread to IOR or rise somewhat closer to it—for example, due to a forecasted seasonal increase in net Treasury bill issuance heading into 29 In particular on June 20 and 21 our market intelligence and analysis of data suggest that LCR-motivated borrowing from FHLBs by a few banks placed modest upward pressure on traded rates in the federal funds market. A contributing factor was a decline in funds supplied into the market from the FHLBs, due to an increase in demand for advances around the mid-month tax date. Data on historical traded rates in the Eurodollar market are published with a quarterly lag as part of the New York Fed’s Quarterly FR 2420 Summary Statistics release.