Indeed, I wish to argue that the evolution of central bank policy frameworks over recent years can be seen as an attempt to make them robust to  1  It was a term first popularised by Ben Bernanke, then-Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board (Bernanke (2004)). 2  In Greek mythology, Nemesis was the spirit of divine retribution against those who succumb to hubris (arrogance before the Gods). The term hubris now typically refers to a loss of contact with reality and an overestimation of one's own competence, accomplishments or capabilities. 3  Loewenstein et al (2008), Kahneman (2011), Mischel (2014), Urminsky and Zauberman (2014). 4  Blinder (2004), Reis (2013) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 5  There are some obvious exceptions in research on monetary policy decision-making, discussed below. Sibert (2006) also discusses the topic of “Central bank psychology”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  psychological biases. I want to illustrate that by reference to the Bank of England’s policy framework. And, based on that analysis, I want to suggest some areas where a further evolutionary “nudge” in those frameworks might be warranted. 6 Behavioural biases in practice The literature on behavioural economics has sky-rocketed over recent years. 7 This identifies a long list of cognitive ticks that can affect human decision-making. All of these are likely to affect policy decision-making to some degree. But from that potentially very long list, let me highlight four biases which may pose a particular policy-making challenge.

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