samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It has broadened its representation and established three sub-committees, which deal with issues ranging from market practices and product development to training and education. The Committee also expects to adopt a higher profile – for example, through the publication of standard documentation and promotional literature, and by organising seminars of the kind that we are having today. 3. The reconstructed MPC has already begun to show achievements. Some of its contributions may seem a little quaint, such as its work in formulating a set of standard typhoon and rainstorm procedures for settling foreign exchange and money market transactions under extreme weather conditions. But just imagine the chaos and confusion if everyone were to adopt a different methodology for interest calculations and use a different date to settle the trades every time the markets close down because of bad weather. The MPC has also been advising the HKAB on other payment and settlement standards. Again, the advice given may seem insignificant or prosaic, like the creation of a standard format for the settlement code needed by participants in our new US dollar clearing system; but it is often tiny creations like this one that go a long way towards strengthening efficiency in payment and settlement systems. 4. Apart from this “domestic” work, the MPC has also served as a window connecting the local forex and money market industry with the outside world. It has already started to strengthen its ties with overseas foreign exchange committees.

Growth in the first quarter has been subdued as domestic spending, both private consumption and investment is weaker-than-expected. Part of this pullback may have been a natural reversion to a more normal pace of growth after an unusually strong expansion last  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  year. At the same time, on the external side, a drag on the overall Thailand’s trading partners’ growth continues to weigh on Thai exports. Going forward, however, many of the supporting factors remain in place. High level of employment and strong private sector confidence should provide an enabling environment for growth. Fiscal stimulus related to large-scale infrastructure investment should also begin to phase in from the latter part of this year. This would potentially generate a positive crowding-in effects on private spending. For this, I would expect the economy to return to its normal path in the third and fourth quarter of this year. Apart from slower growth, a potential threat to financial stability has increased, stemming from development in household indebtedness. Currently, household debt is rising to over 70 percent of GDP. International evidence suggests that a prolonged period of rapid credit growth could lead to a build-up of financial imbalances, worsen households’ debt servicing ability and loan quality, as well as sow a seed for asset price bubbles. The need for long-term focus Ladies and gentlemen, Having said all of the above, I may seem to paint the picture that the Thai economy is slowing down recently, largely as a result of weaker global growth.
But this equilibrium could be unstable in a different inflation environment. Indeed, markets seem to be aware of some inflation “tail risks” and are hedging against these risks through gold and the CHF, whose prices have reached historical highs. In the Euro Area, we consider that any lasting backstop has to come from governments. This is why we have been asking for a speedy implementation and greater flexibility in the EFSF and very much welcome decisions taken in this regard in July and in October. At this stage, therefore, the euro area is paying a double price. One for its mistakes and one for its virtues. The mistakes, for governments, was to allow the piling up of debt through unsustainable fiscal policies over a decade, and then to create ex nihilo a doubt as to their willingness to pay those debts. And we are also paying the price for our virtue and our refusal to liquefy public debt through massive monetization of our fiscal deficits. I believe that virtue will eventually be rewarded. In the next decade, markets and lenders will trust those currencies that, whatever the circumstances, are managed with one overriding priority: preserving price stability and the intrinsic value of the currency unit. On this fundamental basis, we can look at the future of the euro with strong and realistic optimism. I see the recent decision by the Swiss central bank to peg the CHF to the euro as a confirmation of this statement.

Mugur Isărescu: Enhancing the role of governance in international business Address by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the 37th EIBA Annual Conference, Palace of Parliament, Bucharest, 8 December 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Distinguished audience, It is an honour and, at the same time, a great pleasure to address the 37th edition of the Annual Conference of the European Academy of International Business. Allow me to join the organisers in addressing all participants a warm welcome. I am delighted that Bucharest is hosting today such a momentous event attended by so many guests from among world-famous professionals. I am also glad to welcome you this evening to the reception offered by the National Bank of Romania. Throughout its 131 years of existence, the NBR, established in 1880 as the 16th central bank in the world, has constantly supported and developed strong ties with the academic community, hosting numerous conferences, encouraging debates and building partnerships aimed at enhancing financial education. In this context, we are happy to contribute these days to the annual gathering of your organisation. Today’s theme – governance – is quite a vast topic, and was clearly brought to the spotlight by the recent global economic and financial crisis. When talking about governance, one cannot ignore the times we live and the major economic and financial uncertainties we all are grappling with.
The SNB’s latest analysis has led us to adjust our conditional inflation forecast downwards once again. As my first slide highlights, the most recent forecasts for 2012 show an inflation rate of –0.6%, as compared to a rate of 0.3% in 2013 and 0.6% in 2014. Price stability is therefore assured. That said, if developments in the international economy prove to be worse than foreseen, or if the Swiss franc does not weaken further, as it is expected to, downside risks for price stability could re-emerge. Whatever the case may be, the SNB stands ready to take further measures at any time, if the economic outlook and the risk of deflation so require. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Explanations for low interest rates Today’s low interest rates are a defining feature of the current economic environment far beyond the Swiss borders and this has been the case for some time. I will hence paint a picture of the global situation with broad brushstrokes, before outlining the specifics of the Swiss case. The current low interest rate levels can be viewed as the endpoint of a downward trend that has marked the last twenty years and which has been accentuated by the necessary policy responses to the current economic crisis. As my second slide shows, one can observe a significant and continued decrease in long-term nominal rates of various maturities since the early 1980’s. Several factors are responsible for this evolution.

Investors have increasingly questioned the relative security of assets that were previously considered safe. This is reflected in the main credit rating agencies’ recent downgradings of several sovereign bonds that were formerly triple A-rated. This increased demand for, and decreased supply of, risk-free assets has directly affected Switzerland. The reasons for this are well known. The country has managed to maintain a longstanding reputation for stability. In relative terms, the Swiss economy has also withstood the 2007 financial crisis rather well (slide 10), its economic figures are healthy and, at less than 40% (slide 11), its GDP-to-debt ratio is relatively low (slide 12). All of this has prompted a surge in the demand for Swiss franc-denominated assets and put downward pressure on Swiss interest rates. At the policy level, the SNB used a range of instruments to increase the supply of liquidity on the Swiss money market and exert vigorous downward pressure on interest rates, particularly after the Swiss franc reached an all-time high in early August. In line with the goals stated in the SNB’s announcement of 3 August, the three-month Libor fell from 17.5 basis points on 2 August to a low of 0.3 basis points on 5 September. Other money market rates then fell to historical lows. At that time, futures contracts on the three-month Libor even implied negative future rates. These negative levels were the inevitable result of the exceptional liquidity measures I mentioned earlier.
Therefore, I would like to invite all other stakeholders to be open-minded and very cooperative to boost lending to the economy. First, I would suggest to the business community to be more creative, transparent and formal in its operation. It should comply with all obligations arising from the contractual relations with the banking system. This should be broadly understood and accepted. A correction is necessary in the economy, first of all implying a rebalancing of prices. There may be no reduction in non-performing loans, increase in lending to the economy, improvement in business and bank balance sheets, unless collaterals are executed and, subsequently, fix asset prices are corrected. This process would release huge financial resources that would be a vital serum of fresh money injected back into the economy. With this fresh money we must encourage the creation of new and effective initiatives that yield swift return on investment. One of the lessons learned from the crisis is that any new healthy money should go to a healthy business initiative. We need to encourage highly productive sectors of the economy. This is the only way to ensure revitalisation of the economy and make it a dignified European partner. Second, I would like to encourage the banking system to be more dynamic, by looking continuously for worth-funding opportunities. Offer reliable funding packages by assigning priority to economic health of the country, which would, in turn, guarantee the long-term success of your business.

Third, to increase our prudence towards the financial system stability, we adopted new techniques for a more comprehensive systemic risk assessment, enriched stress test exercises with the “bottom up” approach and improved models for the indirect credit risk assessment. The twinning project concentrated most of its resources on supervision and financial stability. In addition to constant motivation for improving the regulatory framework, supervision activities and risk administration, this priority becomes even more necessary given added challenges related to specific developments over the past years. The Bank of Albania has undertaken a number of actions to face and overcome these challenges. For the fourth consecutive year, the Albanian economy has been under the influence of the global economic and financial crisis. Its latest stage, the sovereign debt crisis and its interrelation with the balance sheets of the financial system have placed us on the frontline. Our two main trading and financial partner countries, Greece and Italy, have been severely hit by the crisis. Against this unfavourable landscape, the Albanian economy has grown and has maintained its financial soundness. Private agents have an overall sound financial position, relatively low debt levels and positive savings rates. In contrast to other countries in the region, the Albanian financial system has continued to lend to the economy, although at slower pace and somewhat tighter terms. Building on an appropriate and flexible regulatory framework, this response has been determinant to encourage the restructuring of the economy and guide it towards profitable sectors.
Under the solo-approach, capital requirements are also applied to each of Bank A, Bank B and Bank C individually, after having deducted from Bank A’s capital, its investment in B, and from B’s capital its investment in C. Under the sub-consolidation approach, capital requirements would be applied on the consolidated accounts of Bank B, ie after adding the assets and liabilities of B and C and eliminating any intra-group exposures. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  For groups for which Single-Point-of-Entry – broadly, bail in of debt issued through a holding company – is the preferred resolution strategy, local subsidies need a combination of equity and intragroup GCLAC (ie intragroup bonds) that permits losses to flow smoothly to the topco. By transferring losses upwards, an ailing subsidiary is recapitalised. Whether that suffices for the host authorities will depend on their confidence in the capacity and willingness of the group’s home authorities to execute an effective resolution of the topco. By contrast, for groups for which Multiple-Point-of-Entry – breaking up a group – is the preferred resolution strategy, the host authorities of a subsidiary identified for “separation” must ensure that it has a capital structure and sufficient operational independence to enable them to resolve it themselves with their particular set of powers. Put simply, for firms within a group for which SPE is the preferred resolution strategy, the group as whole is a source of strength on which local supervisors can place weight.

In the fourth quarter, however, it showed improvement. Indirect data obtained from the import of consumer goods, fiscal indicators and consumer confidence indices signal the recovery of consumption during this period. On the other hand, the presence of uncertainties for the future amongst Albanian consumers continues to discourage consumption and dictate the consumer’s behaviour towards saving. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Private investment is assessed as improved in the fourth quarter for certain branches of the economy, while across the sectors of the economy the improvement remains low. Furthermore, below potential growth and low capacity utilisation rates have reduced incentives to undertake new investments. The contribution of fiscal expenditures to aggregate demand growth has been positive over 2011, reflecting a moderate fiscal stimulus, especially during the first and fourth quarters of the year. The fiscal policy has been prudent with a view to keeping fiscal indicators within sound parameters. Budget deficit for 2011 was ALL 45.7 billion, remaining within the envisaged level. Its performance has reflected low rates, both in terms of fiscal income and expenditures, recording an annual growth of 1.8% and 3.7%, respectively, in 2011. Monetary indicators performance suggests the existence of contained monetary inflationary pressures. The annual growth rate of M3 monetary aggregate was 9.2% in December, in line with the deceleration over the second half of 2011. According to our analysis, the expansion of money is in conformity with the demand for real money in the economy.
It is actually on a flatter slope than it was in the 1990s and that of other emerging economies  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  that have adopted measures to control capital inflows (figure 12). Still, it is important to be on the watch for excess flows that might incubate financial fragilities and exacerbate economic cycles, in which case it could be necessary to review financial regulations in place to avert any costly imbalances. Recent monetary policy decisions The scenario outlined in the latest Monetary Policy Report assumes that in the coming quarters the Chilean economy will grow in line with its potential. This will allow trend inflation, today in bounded levels, to converge and remain around the 3% target in the coming quarters. To achieve this objective, we have withdrawn some monetary stimulus, bringing the monetary policy interest rate (MPR) closer to the neutral range. Although this is the baseline scenario, the Report also indicated that inflation (and growth) risks were biased upward. For inflation, arguments were based on the combination of adverse supply shocks in energy and foodstuffs, the closing of output gaps and the strong dynamism of the domestic demand. Some of the aforesaid risks have eased. Private inflation expectations have moderated, consistently with MPR adjustments and the recent decline in oil prices and other commodities (figure 13). Anyway, commodity markets remain volatile, so it is premature to evaluate at what level international prices will settle.

6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 Quarterly economic growth (1) (q-o-q change, percent) 3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  -3  -3 07  III.07  08  III.08  09  Developed (2)  III.09  Emerging (3)  10  III.10  (1) Regions weighted at PPP. (2) Includes: Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Eurozone, Japan, New Zealand, the Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. (3) Includes Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Taiwan, Turkey and Venezuela. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on each country’s statistics institute and International Monetary Fund. Figure 2 World growth (*) (y-o-y change, percent) 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15  15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15 80  85  Developed  90  95  Chile  00  05  Latin America  10  (*) Gray area shows April 2011's WEO forecasts. Source: International Monetary Fund.
The problem, of course, is one of terms: the long-term business sustainability objective clashes with other short-term objectives, in particular the search for swift profit, under the pressure occasionally of shareholders. Changes in bank regulation, management and supervision Keynes once criticised those unprofessional bankers who imitate the short-term strategies of their rivals only to hide behind the behaviour of the sector as a whole as justification for their own mistaken decisions.2 Unfortunately, the crisis suggests Keynes may have been right. Though not so in all instances, the search for short-term profit may lead to the pursuit of risky strategies, despite the fact that this may compromise the bank’s future in the medium and long term. We have also seen that, if a large number of banks coincides in a mistaken strategy, entailing future problems, the problem ceases to be an individual one and become systemic, and individual responsibility is diluted. I appreciate that the question we must ask ourselves here is what we have changed in attempting to correct this type of behaviour. Or, expressed otherwise, why should this time be different? Regulatory changes Firstly, deep-seated changes have been made to the regulations applicable to banks. The biggest revolution is in the Basel capital framework, which has been reformulated in its virtual entirety so as to incorporate the lessons from the crisis. The changes are far-reaching, and describing them would alone take up the rest of my address today.

4 First, thriving banks exercised a comparatively conservative growth strategy during good times, with a management culture that focused on long-term franchise value and not short-term profitability. Successful banks had lower concentrations in commercial real estate lending generally; and much lower concentrations in construction and land development loans specifically. While profitable during the boom, these loan categories suffered the greatest losses as real estate values declined and the recession set in. As the boom progressed, the more conservative underwriting standards of successful banks led to declines in their market shares as other banks competed for business by relaxing their standards. However, successful banks were able to gain back this market share and then some after the bust due to the relative strength of their balance sheets. The successful community banks were patient and conservative regarding investments – desiring reasonable, sustainable returns, not necessarily “spectacular” returns. It seems that their managers devised their business plans heeding Friar Lawrence’s advice to Romeo as he devised his courtship plan for Juliet: “Wisely and slow; they stumble that run fast.” Other noteworthy characteristics also identified in this research were an engaged board of directors, talented staff who were familiar with the community, sound senior management oversight and thorough due diligence before offering a new product or service.
AMCESFI is structured as a collegiate body in which the senior officials from the aforementioned institutions participate. It is entrusted with the oversight of the financial system as a whole, acting in an advisory capacity with respect to the proposed macroprudential measures put forward by the sectoral authorities. 5  The need for coordination in this field is also very necessary at the supranational level, and in particular in Europe since the creation of the Banking Union, which centralises at the European Central Bank (ECB) the supervision of the significant banks in the 21 EU countries.3 In this respect, although decisions on macroprudential instruments in Europe are in the hands of national authorities, the ECB scrutinises these national banking authorities’ proposed macroprudential policy measures to ensure that they are consistent across the euro area countries. In particular, the ECB is empowered to tighten the measures applied by national authorities to specific instruments envisaged in Community banking legislation. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), on which the heads of the EU central banks and regulatory and supervisory authorities for banks, securities, insurance and pension funds sit, has been in place since 2011. The ESRB, whose Advisory Technical Committee it is my honour to chair, has macroprudential oversight functions and is empowered to issue opinions, warnings and recommendations on matters relating to the emergence of systemic risks, and the suitability of macroprudential measures proposed at the national level.

One underlying cause is the low labour force, which limits the supply of workers. The total size of workforce may further decline with the secular demographic trend, an important issue I will come back to in a moment. But the low degree of cyclicality of unemployment suggests that there may be factors keeping the labour market tight other than demand pressure. Through our business contact and recent surveys, the labour shortage has repeatedly come up as one of the top concerns, alongside competitiveness and production costs among others, yet pressure on wages is largely absent. What labour market imperfections are responsible for the structural shortage of labour supply, or equivalently, persistent excess demand for labour? A long standing issue is that of education and skills mismatch. The manufacturing industry, for example, often reports difficulties in hiring workers with vocational training, which is in shorter supply relative to university graduates. There are also reports of under-supply of graduates in science, relative to social science. One reason may be the firms’ reluctance to adjust wage upwards, resulting in shortage of supply at the going wage. This reluctance, in turn, may be caused by low marginal productivity of labour, which is a consequence of subdued capital formation over the years, resulting in low capital-to-labour ratio. Escaping this vicious cycle of low wage and labour shortage, involves an improvement in labour productivity via higher investment in physical capital. Several strategies have been proposed.