samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Copper prices at the London Metal Exchange (LME) fell from highs of $ per tonne in July 2008 to as low as US $ per tonne in December 2008. The dramatic decline in the price of copper led to reduced earnings from copper exports by mining companies and subsequently reduced earnings for the Government from mineral royalties and corporate taxes from this source as well as falling income taxes from employees in the mining and related sectors. The reduced export earnings for the mining sector also translated into lower investments and production. Further, some mining companies, which were carrying out exploration works, discontinued these activities. Ultimately, all this led to job losses in the country’s extractive industry, leading to lower income tax revenue. In addition, the downturn caused a reduction in the Government’s capacity to develop the much needed infrastructure as it had to scaledown its capital expenditure in line with lower revenue. Loss of employment In the real sector of the economy, the impact of the crisis was reflected in the scaling down of production or the closing down of some mining operations due to low copper prices. This had the inevitable consequence of loss of jobs. However, the reopening of some closed mines which has followed the recovery in metal prices has since led to a slight improvement in the situation. External position weakened The declining earnings from copper exports adversely affected Zambia’s balance of payments position.

Caleb M Fundanga: The global economic crisis – Zambia’s strategy to maintain stability Remarks by Mr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the 4th Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) Summer School Event, Arusha, 29–30 November 2009. * I. *  *  Introduction  It is a great honour and privilege to be invited by ESAMI to discuss Zambia’s experiences in the global economic crisis and the strategies that have been chosen to deal with its effects and to bring economic recovery. In discussing this topic, I will begin by highlighting the effects of the crisis on the Zambian economy. I will also highlight the strategies used to maintain stability, indicate the current state of the economy, the challenges and then conclude. II. Origins of the crisis  As you may already be aware, the beginning of the global economic crisis has been traced to the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market which started between 2002 and 2006. This was when lending to the household sector in the United States of America (USA) was growing at a rate far beyond that of the broader economy (i.e. growth in GDP). The rising delinquencies in the subprime mortgage market triggered turbulences in the subprime mortgage-backed securities market leading to a financial crisis in October 2008, first, in the USA, and which later quickly spread to financial institutions in Europe.
The EU also has an internally motivated incentive to address its economic weaknesses if it aims to preserve many of the core social values which lie at the heart of the European integration project. In light of the prevailing European demographics, welfare reforms are imperative. In the end, however, the core values of the European social model can only be maintained for future generations if Europe’s growth potential is augmented. I would like to begin by briefly addressing a number of measurement issues that need to be kept in mind when comparing Europe’s economic performance with that of the United States. I will then address the underlying cause of Europe’s economic weakness, namely its potential growth rate with a specific focus on the all important measure of productivity growth. Finally, I will venture outside of the traditional domain of a central banker’s portfolio and offer some tentative conclusions as to where the main EU economic policy challenges will likely lie in the years ahead. GDP growth differences EU – U.S. As you can see in Graph 1, real GDP growth in the U.S. has consistently outperformed growth in the European Union since the early 1990s. Between 1995 and 2003, real annual GDP growth in the U.S. has averaged 3.3% compared to 2.2% in the EU-13. This sustained growth gap suggests that there is a structural dimension to the seemingly cyclical question of why the EU recovery is so weak.

However, this central scenario is not free from risks. The international environment has not only deteriorated recently, but it has also become more vulnerable due to the extent of the slowdown of the global economy -in particular, of some emerging economies, as far as they may affect world growth and international tradeand the evolution of commodity prices, in a context where there are doubts about the reaction of markets to the normalization of US monetary policy. On the Spanish domestic political front, it is obvious that the uncertainty regarding the formation of a new government may affect investment and consumption decisions. So far, the impact on the Spanish financial markets has been limited. In any case, I take it for granted that any new government will show respect towards European Union commitments and the general framework of the European Union fiscal governance. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
[23] For instance, workers may accept some loss in real income as demand softens, costs can no longer be passed on easily to consumers and risks to job security increase. In some euro area countries, wage negotiations focus on core inflation rather than headline inflation. This can be seen as a recognition that the terms of trade loss has to be borne – at least to some extent – rather than retrieved. Also, in this setting, households may choose to reduce consumption – instead of smoothing it and mitigating the hit to spending – because a permanently lower potential output would also permanently reduce their future income and wealth. Recent research using endogenous growth models shows that, if supply shocks cause “scarring”, the prospect of lower potential output reduces investment and productivity growth. By compressing households’ future income and their current spending, it can cause demand to drop by as much as – or even more than – supply. [24] All told, these effects imply that, even in the face of lasting consequences of supply shocks on potential output, the implications for the output gap, inflation dynamics and optimal policy calibration can only be  derived over time. And this reinforces the case that, for as long as inflation expectations remain anchored, monetary policy should adjust but not overreact. [25] ECB staff projections published in September 2022, which foresee inflation close to 2% at the end of their horizon, are consistent with a withdrawal of monetary policy accommodation.

Philipp Hildebrand: Risk management Introductory remarks by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 14 December 2006. *  *  *  As I have reported at a number of recent media conferences, the SNB has updated its investment policies for foreign exchange reserves over the past few years. I would like to take this opportunity to look back, once again, at our motives for these adjustments and to outline the context of conflicting objectives within which the investment policy of a central bank operates. I would like to devote special attention to risk management, which performs a key function in investment policy at the SNB. Looking at the current structure of our foreign exchange reserves, it is evident that we have moved a certain distance from the traditional structure of central bank portfolios. Traditional portfolios consisted almost exclusively of short-term government bonds in USD as well as, possibly, EUR or JPY. By contrast, we at the SNB have gradually diversified our currency risks over the past few years, have lengthened the maturities of our investments and invested in additional bond categories and in shares. As a result of these adjustments, we are probably one of the most innovative central banks in the area of investments nowadays. However, I would like to stress the fact that we have never pursued innovation for its own sake.
by rules of the game that would be coded once and for all and for which respect would be entrusted to algorithms, even if they are encapsulated in “smart contracts"... Will the forces pushing towards decentralised finance make unbalanced relationships disappear? As well as failing governance mechanisms, the concentration of operational risks, and cyber attacks? In my opinion, the answer is no: trusted third parties, central banks and supervisors are not about to disappear... Secondly, and this is a corollary of my first point, confidence requires maintaining central bank money as the anchor of the financial system. Finally, confidence requires a regulatory framework that is clear, fair (“same business, same risk, same rule”) and balanced, i.e. capable of both encouraging innovation and maintaining the stability of our financial system. The search for this balance implies that regulators and supervisors be involved in innovation issues alongside the innovative players. I will come back to this. Once the principle of confidence has been established, central bankers and supervisors must also be able to distinguish between what changes quickly and what changes more slowly in the sector they supervise. First of all, the health of French fintechs should not mask the importance of another piece of good news: the “traditional” banking world is resilient and useful. It showed its robustness during the two major crises that have occurred since the beginning of the century.

It is also a pledge by the industry to provide the required support by allocating the needed resources in our endeavour to create and promote an internationally recognised Islamic finance professional body. Industry recognition to the bearers of CIIF qualification as highly qualified and competent professionals will give an added boost to the entity as it embarks on this important journey. Although CIFF is only being officially launched today, the entity has completed two guiding principles and two guidelines which will be launched today. These issuances will set the minimum requirements on the pathway of becoming Chartered Professionals and for financial institutions to become accredited institutions that would enable the training of staff as Islamic finance professionals. More is in the pipeline and I am confident that CIIF is committed towards developing the highest quality of guiding principles and guidelines that are in line with the current and future developments. Another bold action that we shall embark on is the transformation of The Association of Shariah Advisors in Islamic Finance (ASAS) to become the leading professional body for Shariah advisors. This transformation would further complete the Islamic finance service providers ecosystem. This is envisioned in the Financial Sector Blueprint, with standards to be set for professional programmes, qualifications and continuous professional education on Shariah. I would like to congratulate the Board and management of CIIF on its official launch. I am confident that CIIF can contribute towards higher professionalism for the Islamic financial services industry.
William C Dudley: The longer-term challenges ahead Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Council of Society Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, 11 March 2010. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak here today. As always, my remarks reflect my own views and are not necessarily reflective of the views of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. As we emerge from a deep and protracted global recession and terrifying financial crisis, we should count our blessings – the outcome could have been far worse. Extraordinary interventions helped to keep the financial system from collapsing and large doses of fiscal and monetary policy stimulus helped to put a floor under global demand, thereby preventing a full-blown depression. However, now that we are on a bit of firmer ground, it is even more important that we take stock and evaluate the challenges that still face us. How we respond will determine whether the path forward will be relatively smooth or instead will be more tortuous. I want to discuss three of these challenges today. The first challenge relates directly to the recent crisis: What needs to happen at the national and international levels to strengthen the financial system so that a crisis of this magnitude does not occur again.

The improvements in the functioning of markets, together with wage moderation, have contributed to strong employment growth and a considerable reduction in unemployment over the past couple of years. This is clear proof of the benefits of committing to a rigorous implementation of the agenda agreed in Lisbon and confirmed in Barcelona. However, while a number of initiatives were taken in this direction in the course of last year, it is of the utmost importance that further progress in these areas be achieved. To conclude my statement, I should like to express my confidence that the euro will prove a stimulus for further economic and financial integration. The introduction of the euro banknotes and coins has not only enhanced price transparency, it will also highlight the fact that the European Single Market is not yet complete and that a number of regulatory, administrative or legal impediments to the free circulation of goods, the cross-border provision of services and to labour mobility still exist. It is my belief that the euro, as a visible symbol of European identity in everyday life, will increasingly bring these obstacles to light and stimulate efforts to eliminate them. In this way, the euro will accomplish one of the pre-eminent functions of the single currency, namely to "crown" the establishment of a single market in Europe. Finally, I should like to mention that this is my last appearance in this forum as Vice-President of the ECB.
In addition to this, they have further expanded their loss-absorbing capital base. The Swiss National Bank welcomes these measures and sees them as further steps towards achieving a sounder capital situation. Additional efforts are necessary, however, because the loss-absorbing capital of big banks is still low, given their risk profile and the considerable uncertainty in the international environment. In order for them to be better equipped to deal  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  with a possible worsening of current economic conditions, the big banks must further improve their capital situation. They can achieve this by retaining earnings. Another measure would be to issue contingent convertible bonds or contingent capital instruments with write-off features, an essential element of the “too big to fail” regulations. They can also strengthen their capital base by accelerating the announced reduction of their risk exposure. By making use of these options, the big banks could quickly and substantially improve their capital situation. Situation of domestically focused banks Allow me now to move on to the situation of banks with a domestic focus. The capitalisation of most domestically focused banks remains good. Profitability – as measured by the ratio of gross profits to assets – dropped slightly, however; not least because of the low interest rate margins. At the same time, domestically focused banks are having to contend with two significant risk factors, namely interest rate risk, which has remained unchanged at a high level, and credit risk, which has risen further.

World trade and manufacturing have bounced back, although remain below precrisis levels. Confidence has revived, but may not yet be resilient. The rate of job losses in the USA, the epicentre of the crisis, has slowed. But growth in the euro area, our largest trading partner, has been less encouraging recently. In the UK, against a backdrop of massive monetary stimulus, nominal demand grew in the third quarter of 2009 for the first time for over around a year (Chart 4). And real output recorded very slight growth in the fourth quarter. “Bumping along the bottom” – but a lot better than might reasonably have been feared twelve months ago, when there was a tangible risk of the economy sliding away into depression. The outlook is better. As we said in the recent Inflation Report, gradual recovery is in prospect. But it is still highly uncertain. As I have said before, 1 I think it will take at least until the middle of the year for us to have much of a sense of whether growth will be anaemic or robust enough to begin to absorb the slack in the economy. That view is broadly consistent with the MPC’s latest collective forecasts, published a fortnight ago. The central thrust of those projections is for growth in economic activity to revive quite quickly but for the level of activity to recover slowly (Chart 5), which is what really matters for welfare.
The forward exchange and options markets have expanded in recent years. A deeper market reduces transaction costs and it is easier to find counterparties. This has provided companies with greater scope for hedging against exchange rate risk. Instruments that reduce the risks associated with a floating krone are increasingly being used, also in Norway. Hedging against fluctuations in the krone involves costs for businesses. A krone that is stable - but too strong - also entails costs to the economy in the form of low activity. Similarly, a krone that is stable but weak - is a source of high inflation. Petroleum revenues generally provide substantial, but uneven currency inflows into Norway. The currency flows might have resulted in a strong krone and large variations in the exchange rate. This tendency is countered, however, when the annual use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget is predictable and independent of annual revenue flows, and the remaining revenues are saved and invested abroad. The capital outflows through the Government Petroleum Fund contribute to both curbing the appreciation of the krone and maintaining its stability. Higher oil prices have resulted in higher current account surpluses. In isolation, this contributes to strengthening the krone. However, higher surpluses are being offset by higher long-term capital outflows through the Government Petroleum Fund. In addition, the oil companies primarily invest their cash surplus abroad. Foreign trade figures indicate that mainland imports have increased sharply in recent months. This increases demand for foreign currency.

I am still waiting for someone to offer a plausible analysis of how the change of the exchange rate regime will boost economic growth. Except naive statements in the media, so far no one has offered such an analysis. In the economic literature, it has long been concluded that the exchange rate regime does not affect economic growth. Do you think that Macedonia has an efficient economic model and exchange rate regime if it records economic growth rates which do not exceed 3–4 percent, and everybody agrees that it is necessary to have growth of over 8 percent? It is very naive to link economic growth only with the exchange rate regime. Economic growth is a very complex phenomenon that depends on about a hundred of factors. Competitiveness of an economy does not depend only on the exchange rate. Take the global competitiveness index of the World Economic Forum. It takes into account more than one hundred indicators for measuring the competitiveness of countries. If someone believes that Macedonia will realize an 8 percent growth rate only if the exchange rate regime is changed, I am left speechless. The change in the exchange rate is used as an instrument for improving the competitiveness only when the country has failed to improve other factors and there is no other choice.
Paul Fisher: Microprudential, macroprudential and monetary policy – conflict, compromise or co-ordination? Speech by Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director for Supervisory Risk Specialists & Regulatory Operations and for Insurance Supervision of the Bank of England, at Richmond University, London, 1 October 2014. *  *  *  The author is also chair of the ifs School of Finance. Any views aired in this speech are personal and should not be taken as a policy statement by the Bank of England. Nevertheless, the speaker is grateful to colleagues at the Bank for helpful comments, and to Andrew Hughes Hallett for his advice on policy coordination issues over many years, including comments on the content of this speech. Thank you for inviting me once again to speak at Richmond University. In the last year I have moved within the Bank of England from the Markets Directorate to the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and from the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to the PRA Board. The PRA Board is one of our three formal policy committees, and makes the highest level supervisory decisions for those firms authorised by the PRA. That includes insurance companies, banks, building societies, credit unions and major investment firms. I have been attending meetings since June and will become a voting member in due course.

As can be seen from Chart 2, inflation climbed rapidly from below 2 per cent in 1997 and 1998 to a peak of 9.4 per cent in January 2002. At the same time the short and medium term growth prospects of the economy deteriorated. Facing conflicting demands, from the inflationary pressures stemming from a weakening currency on one hand and the outlook for a slowing economy on the other hand, the Central Bank opted to lower interest rates by ½ percentage point when the new monetary framework was announced. But that cut was made from a very high level as the policy rate had peaked at 11.4 per cent. The Central Bank kept a tight monetary stance until the spring of 2002, when it was clear that inflation would decline. Within less than one year, inflation was reduced from nearly 10 per cent to the target of 2½ per cent, and even below it for a while. Furthermore, the current account deficit disappeared in a matter of two years, partly due to the depreciation of the króna. This turnaround was much more rapid than might have been expected and is almost unparalleled among the developed countries. The economy is currently in a relatively good balance. But once you are in calm waters new challenges usually emerge. Ahead are new investments in the aluminium sector and related power plants, that will commence in 2003 and most likely continue until 2010.