samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
From mid-2014 onwards, the international monetary policy environment began to change. On the one hand there were increasingly clearer signs that the US was about to adopt a tightening stance, whereas in the euro area a loosening of monetary policy was becoming more and more likely. The euro subsequently depreciated markedly against the major currencies. As a result, by the beginning of 2015 the minimum exchange rate was no longer sustainable. To retain control over our monetary policy, we therefore decided in January 2015 to change tack. In that exceptional situation, we had to weigh up the pros and cons of using alternative unconventional instruments. It became apparent that we would have to lower interest rates below zero given that various other central banks had already done so. This was the only way we could limit the appeal of the Swiss franc. When we discontinued the minimum exchange rate, we thus also imposed negative interest of –0.75% on banks’ sight deposits held at the SNB. This then brought the level of interest rates in Switzerland back down below that in other countries. Coupled with our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary, the negative interest rate has taken the pressure off the Swiss franc and prevented a sharp drop in inflation.

The essential raison d'être of banking is that an economically advancing society needs effective intermediation between savers and borrowers, and mechanisms for making payments efficiently. As already noted, the initial basic intermediary function of providing deposits and loans expanded subsequently into the organisation of alternative channels of intermediation such as bonds and equities (these activities may be conducted in some jurisdictions outside the narrowly defined banking sector, but the distinction is not material in the present context). Although it is human nature for savers to complain that the returns are inadequate, and borrowers that costs are extortionate, in the marketoriented economies competition in financial intermediation has mostly been quite intense, and most of us would probably agree that this has worked to the increasing benefit of customers on both sides of the balance sheet. Meanwhile, the provision of payment services has developed markedly at both the wholesale and retail levels. Banks are at the centre of this activity, typically supported by the central bank as ultimate provider of liquidity. In fact, whereas many other types of institution may nowadays be involved in lending money or providing avenues for savings, banks themselves remain firmly at the core of the payments system. A sound and efficient payments system is acknowledged to be a prerequisite if an economy is to realise fully its potential.
4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  MAS’ view is that early readiness is an essential ingredient in achieving a smooth transition. Early readiness on the part of the banking industry and markets will in turn encourage early readiness from their customers. A bank that adopts a “wait and see” attitude and leaves things till next year, is likely to find itself with too much on its plate before the end-2021 deadline. This is something which we must avoid. Banks that do not keep pace with industry transition timelines potentially expose themselves to additional market, liquidity, operational, technology and legal risk, and can expect to have more intensive supervisory engagement at the senior management level. 17 Second, at the industry-level, the focus must be on achieving a smooth and wellcoordinated transition. The key challenge, is how to encourage market participants to shift from a SOR-based market which is still deep and liquid, to the nascent but developing SORAbased market. 18 We need to take deliberate steps to catalyse additional liquidity in SORA derivatives market, and engineer early and progressive shifts of activity from SOR to SORA to achieve greater transition momentum. We will address this in two ways:  Following the strong market response to MAS’ inaugural $ million SORA FRN issuance, we will expand this programme, through increasing the issuance sizes and lengthening the range of tenors. We will announce more details before the end of this year.

Jacqueline Loh: Act now to transition to SORA Keynote speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at The Association of Banks in Singapore’s Roundtable Session on SGD Interest Rate Landscape Changes, Singapore, 9 September 2020. * * * 1 Good morning to everyone. First, let me thank Ai Boon and her team in ABS1 for organising this Roundtable session, and inviting me to speak. It is heartening to see the large number of participants comprising banks, as well as corporates, SME and retail customers joining this virtual session. This reflects the importance of the topic that we’re discussing today – the shifts in the interest rate benchmark landscape, and what we must do in preparation. 2 Interest rates in Singapore are determined by global developments given our exchange rate centred monetary policy framework. Against that, robust market-driven interest rate benchmarks, play an important role in the domestic financial system and the broader economy. Similar to other economies, interest rate benchmarks reflect the cost of borrowing in underlying markets. They are used widely by – banks, to price loans to individuals and businesses; financial market participants, in pricing financial products such as bonds, floating rate notes and interest rate swaps; and corporates, as a discount rate for financial reporting of its assets. 3 In Singapore, SIBOR and SOR2 have served as the key interest rate benchmarks in  Singapore Dollar (SGD) financial markets for decades.
Question: Do you feel completely certain that this interest rate cut represents no danger of inflation to any part of the euro zone, I am thinking, in particular, of smaller, more dynamic economies, such as the Irish one. And secondly, is it fair to conclude that the opposition to a rate cut came from the representatives of those countries? Duisenberg: I will not allude to any opposition by anyone in the Governing Council. We do believe that this rate cut, otherwise we would not have done it, will not pose any additional threat of inflationary pressures arising either in small or in large countries. Question (translation): President Duisenberg, with regard to risks and side-effects. First question: will you keep the interest rate at 2.5% even if a recession occurs? Have we understood you correctly in this respect? Second, is it indeed so that too much capital flowing to the United States at high interest rates flows could become a problem for the external stability of the euro? I mean, the higher interest rates in the United States indicate that, at the moment, still more capital will be flowing to the United States. Third question: did you intend to increase the pressure on lenders, i.e. also on the banks, because your impression was that, in the light of the official rate of 3%, they were not answering borrowers’ demands for cheaper loans? Duisenberg: I am not going to speculate about a potential recession if we do not see one coming.

Underlying this stable rate of price increases have been offsetting developments at the level of services and goods prices. In February, services price increases moderated further slightly, mainly owing to downward adjustments in prices 1  BIS Review 39/1999  in the telecommunication area. At the same time, goods prices contributed slightly more to overall HICP increases than before, due both to price developments for unprocessed food and a deceleration in the fall in energy prices. It may be worth noting that goods prices may continue to move upwards temporarily, in particular as oil prices increased strongly from mid-February onwards. Such movements reflect the higher volatility of price changes of some categories of goods, in particular imported oil and other commodities. The interest rate decision has been taken in a forward-looking perspective, focusing on the mediumterm trends in inflation and the compatibility of these trends with the Eurosystem’s definition of price stability. In the view of the Governing Council, monetary growth is - at the current juncture - not a risk for future price stability. The decision taken today keeps monetary policy on a longer-term stability-oriented course and, by doing so, contributes to creating an economic environment in which the considerable growth potential of the euro area could be exploited.
Factors which could potentially accelerate the return of inflation back to the target include a higher wage growth than assumed in the projection, provided it would not be accompanied by  11  National Bank of Poland “Financial Stability Review Report”, Warsaw, September 2005  12  National Bank of Poland “Financial System Development in Poland 2004”, Warsaw, November 2005  13  H. Koskenkylä, Ed. “Finnish Financial Markets 2002”, Bank of Finland, 2003  14  Monetary Policy Committee statement, 26 April 2006  BIS Review 61/2006  3  sufficiently fast increase of productivity, further oil price hikes or a deterioration of the public finance situation in relation to that envisaged in the Convergence Programme. The Council maintains its belief that the most favourable scenario for Poland would be to implement an economic strategy focused on creating conditions which would ensure the introduction of the euro at the earliest possible date, which would be conducive to a higher long-term economic growth.”, end quote. Public finances prospects This brings me to the developments in public finances. The fiscal outlook over the medium-term future would be broadly positive, if it were not for substantial risks, mainly political, surrounding the deficit path. In 2005, Poland recorded an ESA’95 deficit of 2.5% of GDP.

In case of a favorable macroeconomic scenario, particularly one in which the job-rich growth observed in 2004 and 2005 continues over the period 2006-2008, the deficit could decline more than set forth in the Convergence Programme, even in the absence of consolidation measures but also without the introduction of new, deficit-increasing legislation. A stronger deficit reduction could be additionally supported by the implementation of the new Public Finance Act, which should contribute to more efficient fiscal management. Unfortunately, these upside risks to deficit targets in the Convergence Programme are far outweighed by downside risks in the form of new deficit-increasing legislation. This includes the recently proposed 4.5 point cut in social contribution rates. While this measure would bring about the much needed reduction of the tax wedge on labour income, it would cost the budget more than 1% of GDP in foregone revenue. Therefore it is essential that it should be accompanied by cuts in spending. Instead, it is more likely that spending will increase, with, among other measures, salary hikes promised to various groups of public employees, as well as more generous social assistance and pension indexation formulas. To sum up, in the medium-term horizon, Poland should be in a position to achieve a general government balance in line with the Maastricht fiscal criteria. This would require moderate discipline in public spending, which unfortunately does not appear very likely at the present moment.
News conference  Berne, 13 December 2018 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and gentlemen It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I will begin by explaining our monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation. I will then hand over to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will speak about developments in the area of financial stability. After that, Andréa Maechler will review the situation on the financial markets and will update you on the progress towards replacing Libor. Finally, we will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions. Monetary policy decision  Let me begin with our monetary policy decision and the inflation forecast. We are maintaining our expansionary monetary policy, thereby stabilising price developments and supporting economic activity. Interest on sight deposits held by banks at the SNB is to remain at –0.75% and the target range for the three-month Libor is also unchanged at between −1.25% and –0.25%. We will remain active in the foreign exchange market as necessary, while taking the overall currency situation into consideration. Since the monetary policy assessment of September 2018, the Swiss franc has depreciated slightly on a trade-weighted basis. This development is primarily due to the strengthening of the US dollar. The franc is virtually unchanged against the euro. Overall, the Swiss franc is still highly valued, and the situation on the foreign exchange market continues to be fragile.

In this context, global growth lost momentum somewhat in the third quarter. This was largely attributable to special factors, such as production losses in the German automotive industry and extreme weather events in Japan. Economic expansion in the US and China remained robust. Employment figures in the advanced economies rose again and unemployment continued to decline. The growth in international trade in goods also continued. In our baseline scenario for global economic developments, we anticipate solid growth in the coming quarters. In the short term, the world economy is set to continue to expand somewhat above potential, benefiting from the clear improvement in the labour market situation and the ongoing expansionary monetary policy in the advanced economies. However, a gradual slowdown is likely in the medium term. Nevertheless, we also see significant risks to this baseline scenario, primarily in connection with political uncertainties and protectionist tendencies. These risks have considerable potential for damage. The resulting uncertainty alone can curb growth and weaken the resilience of the global economy. For instance, surveys indicate that trade tensions have prompted companies to reassess their investment plans and value chains. As far as Brexit is concerned, uncertainty remains high following the postponement of the vote in the UK parliament. The tension surrounding Italy’s fiscal policy also persists. All these risks could lead to turbulence in the financial markets, jeopardise global economic growth, and also influence monetary policy.
12  BIS Review 103/2009  Figure 20: GDP Growth by Periods  Figure 21: GDP  (Percent)  (Seasonally adjusted, at 1998 Prices, billion TL)  15 10  27  9.4 6.8  6.2  8.4  7.3  6.9  5.3  25  4.7  5  2.8 1.1  1.2 23  0 -5  21  -5.7  -6.2  -10 19  -13.8  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1  2009-1  2008-4  2008-3  2008-2  2008-1  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  -15  Source: TURKSTAT  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 2009  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. An analysis of national income developments in terms of production in the first quarter of 2009 reveals that value added has decelerated in all sectors on an annual basis. Parallel to the sharp contraction in industrial activity, value added in the services sector became the component contributing most-negatively- to growth (Figure 22). On the other hand, making the said comparison in terms of expenditures, besides the sharp contraction in private sector demand, the negative contribution of stock change is remarkable. In this period, the contribution of net exports to growth went up due to the sharp deceleration in imports.

For 2019, we now expect inflation of  Page 1/4  Berne, 15 June 2017 Thomas Jordan  News conference  1.0%, compared to 1.1% last quarter. The conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the three-month Libor remains at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon. Global economic outlook  I would now like to turn to economic developments abroad, as these have a considerable bearing on the inflation and economic outlook in Switzerland. In line with our expectations, the global economy has strengthened further in recent months. Global GDP growth in the first quarter was more robust than in previous quarters. This is due in large part to an encouraging upturn in emerging economies. In the euro area, too, economic recovery has gained strength. Owing to the stronger economic growth, the labour market situation in advanced economies has improved further; with full employment now almost reached in the US, Japan, the UK and Germany. Across the euro area, unemployment has declined again. Despite these positive developments in the real economy, inflation remains modest in most advanced economies. Against this background, monetary policy in Japan and the euro area in particular is likely to remain very expansionary. In the US, monetary conditions are expected to gradually normalise. In our new baseline scenario for the global economy, we anticipate that economic developments will remain favourable. For 2017, economic growth looks set to be its strongest in six years.
Short-termism estimates which are statistically significantly below unity (at the 5% confidence level) are shown in red. The simple average of x across the 20-year period is very close to one (0.9935). On the face of it, this does not suggest that short-termism has been a particular problem among this crosssection of firms. Chart 4  Chart 5  Short termism estimates over time  Industry estimates  Source: Bank of England. Source: Bank of England. Notes: Bars show the estimated x parameter for regressions for the UK and US pooled data. Estimates where the 95% confidence interval spans 1 are coloured grey. Notes: Bars show the industry estimates for the sample split into (1) 1985–1994, and (2) 1995–2004 for each industry. S&P and FTSE industry classifications were used. Bars are coloured based on the significance of the estimates at the 5% level. But this masks some important within-period variation. In 13 of the 20 years, x is lower than 1. And in 9 of these years, x is statistically significantly below unity. Moreover, there is evidence of a rising tide of myopia: 8 of these 9 years occur in the final decade of the sample. To illustrate, Table 5 shows point estimates of x over two decadal sub-samples (1985–1994 and 1995–2004) and over the full sample. Estimates are significantly below unity in the second sub-sample, but not the first.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  The core inputs to the analysis are firm-level measures of dividends and equity prices. The average dividend-price ratio in each industry segment is shown in Table 3. The mean dividend-price ratio across the panel is 2.6%. But there is a fairly significant degree of crosssectoral and time-series dispersion. For example, dividend-price ratios are almost twice as high in the energy and utilities sector as the health and pharmaceuticals sector. And mean dividend-price ratios were two thirds third higher in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Table 3 Mean dividend-price ratio for firms in each industry segment Consumer  Energy & Utilities  Financials  Health  IT  Industrials  Materials  S&P  1.94  2.82  3.19  1.87  1.69  2.55  2.22  FTSE  4.12  3.96  2.63  1.38  2.92  3.81  3.16  To estimate (9), we require a selection of quantitative inputs. Taking these in turn: (a)  Company-specific risk premium  Following Miles (1993), the company risk premium is modelled based on firm-specific characteristics, in particular the company beta and the level of gearing: (10)  where .21 Betas are estimated using daily return data for firms listed on the S&P 500 and FTSE, together with daily data for the indices themselves.22 Mean estimated betas are shown in Table 4. These average below one for both UK and US firms.
However, the Riksbank cannot affect the trend or the average for unemployment in the longer term. The fact that unemployment is higher now than it was prior to the 1990s crisis is essentially due to the factors I mentioned earlier, and not to monetary policy. However, the importance of monetary policy lies not merely in the possibility to influence through temporary changes in the repo rate. An essential part of monetary policy’s ability to stabilise lies in influencing inflation expectations so that they come close to the inflation target. A firmly anchored 2 per cent inflation target will affect price-setting and wage formation so that shocks - such as those we had during the "bridging over" policy years 1973-74 can be avoided. Once again: With regard to employment and unemployment, the most important measures must be taken outside of the Riksbank. What we can contribute is to conduct well-balanced monetary policy in line with the intentions of the Sveriges Riksbank Act, so that economic agents know what money will be worth in future. 5  6  These calculations can be made in different ways. Here the Riksbank has used an HP filter to calculate the trend. BIS Review 43/2006

Looking at the prospects and having in mind the country’s strategy for expeditious accession to the euro area, however, this is a macroeconomic variable which faces the country with the greatest challenges. The inflation criterion, as defined in the Maastricht Treaty (this is not the place to deal with the issue how good this definition is), is very strict and requires a purposeful policy going beyond the monetary and fiscal policies. In Bulgaria’s case, under the currency regime of fixed exchange rate and extremely conservative fiscal policy, untapped prospects should be sought in encouraging competition and improving the business climate, thus ensuring to the economy the flexibility to respond to exogenous changes (including with regard to the prices of raw materials) and enabling supply to react more promptly to increases in demand (both domestic and external). In the past year, inflation reached 6.5 % under the strong proinflationary impact of the increase in the prices of energy resources (direct contribution of 1.0 % in the overall price increase).In addition, the largescale floods resulted in an unexpected increase in foodstuff prices (contribution of 2.6 % in the overall price increase). This year, inflation is expected to decline to 6.0%. The slow process of decreasing inflation is mainly determined by the harmonization of indirect taxes with the minimum levels in the EU, pursued early in the year.