samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Bank of Albania will constantly monitor and confirm that you are taking the necessary concrete measures to maintain and improve the capacity to constantly generate a positive financial result, by preserving the assets’ quality and the liquidity indicators. If necessary, being the regulatory authority of the banking sector, the Bank of Albania will orient and support these measures through constant revision and creation of necessary regulatory stimuli. BIS Review 120/2008  5

The total non-government sector deposits (including the demand deposits) are planned to increase by Denar 5,139 million or by 13.6% in 2001. The deposits growth should result from the increased confidence of the economic agents in the banking system, as a result of: •  Stable macroeconomic environment  •  Increased income of the economic agents resulting from the projected acceleration of the economic activity  •  Initiation of bond repayment process of so-called “old foreign exchange savings”  •  Modification in the legal framework regarding the operations of the Insurance Deposit Fund, which has been transformed into a state fund. Moreover, the amount of the insured deposit, and the indemnfication percentage in case of risky event have been increased, as well  •  Increased presence of foreign investors in the banking system of the Republic of Macedonia. Analyzed by currency denomination, in 2001, Denar and foreign currency deposits are projected to increase by Denar 3,139 million, or by 12.0%, and by Denar 2,000 million, or 17.5%, respectively. Namely, following its introduction in the first half of 2002, the Euro will replace the currencies of the EMU member countries. This will result in enhanced Euro conversion of the households' foreign currency deposits currently denominated in these currencies and not deposited in the banking system. Hence, part of the converted savings are expected to remain within the banking system, increasing the foreign currency deposits.
15  In addition, the Federal Reserve Board has been testing a facility through which it offers term deposits to credentialed depository institutions. Term Deposit Facility (TDF) transactions could be used to temporarily immobilize reserve balances. An eight-week series of tests this summer explored how demand for term deposits responds to variations in the maximum individual award limits and rates. Higher offered rates relative to IOER attracted greater use, both in the number of participants and the total dollar volumes. The next round of TDF testing, which gets underway in October, will incorporate an early-withdrawal feature, as well as gradual increases in the maximum individual award amount and rate. For details see http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140904a.htm. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Conclusion In conclusion, during normalization the FOMC will continue to communicate the stance of policy through a target for the fed funds rate, and will move the fed funds rate into the target range primarily by adjusting the IOER rate. ON RRPs and other supplementary tools will be used as needed to control the fed funds rate. The Committee will continue to test features of the ON RRPs to determine how a facility might best be structured to supplement IOER in the control of the funds rate while limiting the potential for unintended effects in financial markets. Given the range of available tools, I am confident in our ability to raise short-term interest rates from the zero lower bound when the time to do so arrives.

Losses increase in downturns, and the supply of equity capital can dry up, compelling banks to restrict their lending. The impact is stronger since the value of property used as collateral fluctuates in step with cyclical developments. At the same time, counterparties and rating agencies may require higher capital levels. When credit is rationed by banks with large market shares, in regional or national terms, sound investment projects are also postponed. This results in an adverse feedback loop, with banks incurring higher loan losses and weaker earnings – as economic activity stalls. Banks operate with very low levels of equity capital. A manufacturing enterprise or a firm in the service sector should preferably have an equity ratio of between 30 and 70 per cent, depending on the level of risk involved. Banks can operate with a far lower level of equity capital because they are supposed to diversify risk, have sound management systems and be well regulated and under supervision. In Norway, banks’ equity capital makes up six per cent of their assets. Before the Second World War, the ratio was over 10 per cent, falling to five per cent in the postwar period. Government capital injections resulted in a rise in equity capital at the beginning of the 1990s, but the ratio has fallen again in recent years. Equity capital in investment banks in the US and Europe was very low, as low as 2-3 per cent of total assets. Many of these banks have now collapsed.
They are linked to one another in a network which seeks to create an Islamic state in Southeast Asia through violence and terror. The recent bomb attack in Bali was a tragic reminder that Southeast Asia is at the frontline of the worldwide war against terrorism. A third, more cyclical, factor underlying Southeast Asia’s under-performance, has been weakening external demand. Although Southeast Asia’s economies have been diversifying their sources of demand, they are still heavily dependent on external demand, unlike China. But Southeast Asia’s main export markets – US, Japan, and the EU – are all languishing. The timing and strength of a pickup in the US economy is uncertain, especially given the possibility of a war in Iraq, and the concomitant impact on oil prices and the international security climate. The Japanese economy is still mired in difficulties, with no imminent prospect of decisive fundamental change. With fiscal and  BIS Review 61/2002  1  monetary policies constrained by the Maastricht Stability Pact and a stringent inflation target, the EU economy too remains weak. Southeast Asia’s response These three factors – China’s rise, regional political and security problems, and weak external demand – explain Southeast Asia’s under-performance, but they do not condemn Southeast Asia to perpetual stagnation. How can Southeast Asia overcome these problems? China First, Southeast Asia should not see China only as a challenge, but also as an opportunity.

We need to imbue our young with entrepreneurial instincts and attitudes, through their school education and life experiences. At the same time, the government should cut red tape, create more economic space for private enterprise, nurture high-potential local enterprises and develop a culture tolerant of risk-taking, experimentation and honest failure. A self-renewing, self-sustaining entrepreneurial culture will not emerge overnight, but we are making some headway. Ten Singapore companies made it to this year’s list of Forbes’ Global 200 companies with revenues under $ billion. This ranks among the largest number of companies for any country. A third area of focus is the development of our human capital, both local and foreign. Singaporeans rank highly in technical skills, and our students often top international mathematics and science competitions. But we need to improve our soft skills, such as people skills, management skills, communications skills, as well as cultural and artistic skills. We will also continue to welcome foreign talent to work, live and play here, to add to our talent pool. Fourth, we need to identify, nurture and promote new areas of growth in both manufacturing and services, the two complementary engines of our economy. The continuing emergence of lower-cost locations spurs us to constantly review and refresh our manufacturing value proposition, be it in refining our division of labour, exploiting economies of scale through shared facilities, or undertaking more innovation and R&D work.
But the impact of this weak pay on companies’ costs has been offset by businesses appearing to hold onto more staff than warranted by the lower level of output. The corollary of the resilience in employment has been a sharp drop in labour productivity. As a result, growth in labour costs per unit of output has remained relatively firm, although it has fallen back as productivity has begun to recover. Companies that have spare capacity within their business should be able to use these underutilised resources to increase output relatively cheaply. As such, spare capacity within  4  4  See Benito et al (2010) for a discussion of the impact of the financial crisis on supply. BIS Review 122/2010  companies should, at the margin, push down costs and prices. But reports from our network of Agents suggest that some companies responded to the sharp fall in output by temporarily decommissioning some of their capacity in order to reduce their cost base. 5 Companies mothballed production lines; cut back on capital leases; reduced the number of shifts and so on. Although it is perhaps most natural to think of this mothballing behaviour in the context of manufacturing, it was also apparent within the services sector. It was relatively commonplace for professional services companies to encourage staff to take sabbaticals at much reduced pay. Aircraft were taken out of service. Shops were left empty. This type of adjustment has helped UK industry to withstand the effect of the recession.

GDP for Mainland-Norway has on average increased by 2.8 per cent annually since 1990. This compares to 1.7 per cent in Sweden, 2.1 per cent in Denmark, 1.9 per cent in Finland and 2.5 per cent in Iceland over the same period. The differences for average GDP growth since 1995 are somewhat smaller. Although GDP growth in Norway was moderate in 2001, capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy remains high. So far, the impact of the international slowdown on the Norwegian economy has been limited, partly due to high oil prices. Unemployment has been low since the mid-1990’s. Private consumption is expected to remain buoyant due to high wage growth and an expansionary fiscal policy in the years ahead. Prices for domestically produced goods and services are rising fast. Inflation in Norway is being dampened by a close to zero rise in prices for imported consumer goods. The different cyclical developments in Norway are also reflected in the stock market. Norwegian stock prices have become much less correlated with world markets over the last years. The correlation is considerably lower than in the other Nordic countries. The correlation for Denmark is also rather low, but this is partly due to low exchange rate correlation. When looking at the correlations using national currencies, the Danish correlation is higher and more in line with that for Sweden and Finland. BIS Review 47/2002  1  Iceland and Norway have the highest key interest rates among the Nordic countries, at 7.9 and 7.0 per cent respectively.
When the interest rate is zero the exchange rate becomes an interesting indicator of expectations of the future price level. According to the interest rate parity condition, the current exchange rate is determined by the expected future exchange rate, current and expected future interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates and expected future currency risk premia. The future exchange rate depends on future price level, the future real exchange rate and future foreign price level. For exchange rates and price levels expressed in logarithms we can specify the following relation: Current exchange rate = Expected future (exchange rate – interest rate differential + foreign exchange risk premium) = Expected future (price level + real exchange rate – foreign price level – interest rate differential + foreign exchange risk premium)  With an expected future domestic interest rate that is zero or low, future interest rate differentials and foreign exchange risk premia for a small open economy are largely exogenous and given. At a reasonably long horizon, the expected future real exchange rate is given by a neutral real equilibrium rate and is largely exogenous for a small economy. The expected future foreign price level is also exogenous for a small open economy. Consequently, under these conditions, the expected future price level is practically the only endogenous variable that affects the current exchange rate. With this reasoning, the current exchange rate, all other things being equal, becomes a direct indicator of the expected future price level.

By observing the exchange rate, the central bank can thus observe expectations of the future price level. Higher inflation expectations and thereby a higher expected future price level lead then to a depreciation of the currency today, all else being equal. A measure that raises expectations of future inflation and the future price level should thus show up in a depreciated currency. A strengthening of the currency may therefore be ominous and interpreted as a sign that inflation expectations are falling. 11  9  www.rba.gov.au. 10  A well-argued proposal on a combination, a hybrid, between a price level target and an inflation target is presented in Giavazzi, F and Mishkin, F. S. ”An Evaluation of Swedish Monetary Policy 1995-2005”. (2006/07:RFR1), www.riksdagen.se. 11  See equations (8) and (9) and more details in the appendix to this speech. BIS Review 19/2009  5  The exchange rate as a policy instrument – "The Foolproof Way" to escape a liquidity trap The direct link between the current exchange rate and the expected future price level first leads, as mentioned, to the insight that the current exchange rate depends on the expected future price level and can be used as an indicator of the latter. But the link also leads to the idea that cause and effect can be reversed. Instead of the expected future price level determining the current exchange rate, the current exchange rate can determine the expected future price level.
To be sure, wage growth among lower-skilled workers has outpaced that of supervisory staff in recent quarters, in the US at least, but this is likely a reflection of cyclical labour shortage in the low-skilled sectors rather than a sustained trend. Indeed, it is worth bearing in mind the bigger picture that UMPs did not help arrest the trend of a falling labour share of income, which emerged in the US since the 1970s, well before the GFC. It is clear that UMPs should not take all the blame, but it is true that the combination of stagnant wages, very low interest income and rising asset prices has fuelled the populist sentiment in many places, especially in the advanced economies. Questions for the future design and implementation of monetary policies 7. Ladies and gentlemen, as we continue to fortify the global financial system and economy against downside risks, a crucial question is how monetary policy, in conjunction with fiscal policy, may cause significant distributional effects on different segments of the society. It may be worthwhile to rethink how the monetary and fiscal policies can be modified to take better care of the less privileged or those who have been left behind. 8. The theme of our conference is monetary policy and heterogeneity, and I am glad that so many accomplished economists and researchers have assembled in Hong Kong to deliberate on issues relating to the distributional consequences of monetary policy. I hope that the discussions will be fruitful in helping us better understand these important issues.

It would be simpler to have just one set of basic licensing requirements, one set of basic requirements for general managerial skills and one set of basic requirements for the trustworthiness of senior officers for the entire financial market. We would welcome a single, universally applicable set of assessed functions and requirements for sound internal control systems. Examples could include harmonised basic requirements for outsourcing and for the distribution of own and third-party products. It is impossible, of course, to unify all requirements across the financial market. However, the basic set could, or even should, be unified. Even if we succeeded in harmonising only onethird of all the requirements, the quantity of regulations would decrease sharply. This would substantially reduce the load on financial institutions, which are currently struggling with inconsistencies in the sectoral regulations applying to financial groups and with the sheer number of such regulations. It would also be of great benefit to supervisory authorities. The necessary sectoral specifics could then connect to this single common base. Let me make one last remark on safety versus growth. In recent years, we have witnessed on numerous occasions just how diverse the impacts of financial sector problems can be on national economies.
Mr Yam: Risks and challenges in coping with international capital flows  Opening address by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Sixth Manila Framework Group Meeting, held in Hong Kong on 20-21 March 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you to this Sixth Meeting of the Manila Framework Group.1 As you will no doubt recall, the Manila Framework Group was founded in the deep throes of the Asian financial crisis in November 1997 to develop a concerted approach to restoring financial stability in the region. With the worst clearly behind us, and with signs of a strong economic recovery in the region, the mission of this group has still not ended. This forum embodies a valuable spirit of cooperation, with wide participation of emerging market economies in the dialogue. The value of this forum lies in its quality dialogue on regional surveillance and on reform of the international financial architecture. There is no doubt that economic recovery in the region has gathered considerable momentum. Economic growth for most economies has been better than expected, external balances have improved remarkably, international funds have renewed interest in the region’s asset markets, and yield spreads of Asian sovereign bond issues over the US treasuries have narrowed notably.

Rapid deleveraging of positions in markets associated with the default of an HLI of the size of LTCM could have systemic impact even in large and mature markets, thereby threatening the global financial system. It has been said that a repeat of the like of an LTCM debacle is most unlikely to occur, given the downsizing of hedge funds. I certainly hope that this is the case but I also notice that the recovery of investor sentiment has seen more money from institutional investors as well as high net worth individuals flowing to the hedge funds. The second scenario, commonly known as the “Elephants in the Pond” problem, is a situation whereby the HLIs take very large and concentrated positions in smaller financial markets and adopt aggressive trading practices that could be destabilising to such markets. It is very encouraging that the “Elephants in the Pond” problem is by now recognised quite extensively as a real issue to be tackled. What is being done and is it enough? Different approaches have been floated to tackle the problems arising from the two scenarios I just described. The prevailing approach is through improving counterparty risk management. This is done indirectly by asking the banks and other financial institutions to be more prudent in granting credit lines to the HLIs, and directly by encouraging the HLIs to enhance their own risk management standards.
The program covered the 19 largest domestic bank holding companies—firms with assets of at least $ billion—accounting for two-thirds of the assets and one-half of the loans in the U.S. banking system at that time. Collectively, these firms spanned nearly every business area in the U.S. banking industry—including commercial and consumer lending, real estate lending, trading, derivatives, custody services and investment banking. The key point in our paper was that the SCAP was a program that used microprudential supervisory tools to achieve macroprudential objectives. I am sure that everyone here is familiar with these two terms, but let me provide a quick overview. Microprudential objectives focus on the health, performance, safety and soundness of individual firms. This was the perspective that 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  dominated supervision prior to the financial crisis. In contrast, macroprudential objectives focus on the stability and performance of the entire banking and financial system, emphasizing links among firms, how their activities can interact and the impact of the financial sector on the broader economy. This perspective has become more prominent since the global financial crisis. Macroprudential objectives can themselves be divided into two distinct groups. The first is what might be called structural objectives, which focus on the impact large, systemically important institutions have on the rest of the system when they fail or become distressed.

But the problem is not just the high volume of unemployment; it is also the high proportion of long-term unemployment (defined as the number of people out of work for over a year). Our rate of long-term unemployment has scarcely dipped from its 2014 peak, which means that it is currently three times as high as in 2008. If we only consider persons unemployed for over two years, the rate has increased by 44% in 2015, to four times the level in 2008. These levels of unemployment and long-term unemployment indicate the difficulty our economy has in matching supply and demand in the labour market and have, among others, two consequences that should not be overlooked: they generate inequality (unemployment has been and is in Spain, unquestionably, the driving force of greater inequality); and they pose difficulties for the public pension system, because the financing of the unfunded system obviously depends crucially on employment. Our labour market arrangements have traditionally – and by “traditionally” I mean over decades – suffered from two serious and chronic problems: first, the mismatch, in many cases, between companies’ working and wage conditions and their particular competitive, technical and commercial conditions; and, second, the highly marked duality between the conditions of temporary employment and of what we call “permanent” employment.