samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A survey of more than 31 European countries also shows that there is a high degree of job satisfaction among Norwegians.17 Demographic developments will have a dampening impact on demand for public services and social security disbursements over the coming years. The number of elderly among pensioners, i.e. 80 years and older, will not grow and the post-war generation will only start drawing on social security in the next decade. There will still be pressures for higher public spending. Demand for services we have chosen to let the government provide, for example health services, increases markedly when revenues rise at the pace they are rising today. Growth in government revenues – among others the return on the Government Pension Fund which is rising rapidly – also raises our expectations. At the same time, this is also a period of strong growth in demand for labour in the business sector. With the exception of part-time employees who want to work more, there are now few idle resources in the labour force. We cannot expect a substantial increase in the supply of foreign labour. Workers from other countries, such as Sweden and Poland with families and the largest share of consumption in their home country, have increased production capacity in Norway, but it now appears that the supply of foreign labour is starting to become more limited. Other inward labour migration does not generate higher value added per capita. Immigrants that become permanent residents make the same contribution to increasing demand as to increasing production.

The function of state banks has become more concentrated and their share of the credit market has been reduced from more than 30 per cent in the1980s to 8 per cent today. The first wave of banking deregulation in the mid-1980s was not particularly successful. It was only after the banking crisis and the tax reform that Norwegian credit and capital markets started to function efficiently. It became more profitable to channel capital to investment projects that yield the highest social return and locked-in capital was freed up for new industries and businesses. It became easier for entrepreneurs to start up and build up businesses and capital. Illustrative of the enterprise spirit in the period 1998-2003 – which was not a period of particularly strong growth – was the start-up of 12 new businesses for every 100 existing businesses, which was quite high compared with other countries. Norwegian credit and capital markets are relatively well developed today. Sound projects will always find funding. The main weakness is still to be found in housing, property and wealth taxation, which favours considerable overinvestment in dwellings and holiday homes. In addition to the changes I have highlighted, the framework conditions for the electricity market, telecom market, aviation and audiovisual industry have changed. Retail trade has been liberalised. State-owned companies were listed on the stock exchange and new forms of managing public entities were developed. 16  BIS Review 15/2007  Economic growth has also been bolstered by higher female labour force participation.
For example, while policymakers were aware that trade activity had deteriorated during the height of the global financial crisis around October to November 2008, it was not until January 2009 that the extent in which global economic activity had fallen off the cliff was realised. Indeed, as financial conditions are often vulnerable to sudden shifts in sentiments and herd behaviour, the window of opportunity to take decisive policy action is often very small – potentially, just a matter of hours during periods of crisis. This is where availability of statistics on a timely manner does make a difference. The second is the continuous re-evaluation of underlying relationships. Beyond errors in reporting and limitations in aggregation, statistical estimates of economic variables are also subject to movements in relationships amongst variables across time (the so called “structural breaks”). As a consequence, in the words of former Governor Duvvuri Subbarao of the Reserve Bank of India, “the chance of being fooled by randomness is much higher in the assessment of economic events”. Why is this so? It is because, in the field of economics and finance, outcomes are shaped by human behaviour – which, contrary to fundamental assumptions, is not always rational. In addition, economic systems are reflexive, in the sense that beliefs about what will happen often influence what does happen. Going forward, as the global landscape and expectations of economic agents adjust to, as yet, an unknown new normal, the demands on the timeliness and quality of data and analysis will only increase further.

BIS Review 9/2000  2  Here is how exchange rate policy will be conducted during the program period. We are already announcing to the public the daily value of an exchange rate basket consisting of $ 1 and Euro 0.77 for the coming 12 months. The monthly depreciation rate of the basket adds up to a 12-month depreciation rate of 20%, in line with the WPI target for the period. At the end of each quarter, we will pre-announce a depreciation rate for the quarter beginning nine months later, and leaving the pre-announced rates for the intermediate quarters unchanged. This means that at the end of every three-month period, the rate of increase in the exchange rate basket for the next 12 months will be publicly known. The system will function in this manner for the first 18 months of the program. Then, starting in July 2001, a gradually widening symmetrical band will be introduced for the pre-announce exchange basket. From this point on, the total width of the band will be 7.5% by end-2001, 15% by end-June 2002, and 22.5% by end-December 2002. It will be noted that while we are making strong commitment to a pre-announced exchange rate path, we are simultaneously announcing our exit strategy, which should allay concerns about the difficulty of making a smooth exit from such systems. Of course, there are also some risks created by pre-announcing the path of the exchange rate.
If that is the cause, bring out the bodies. For this would imply low returns to innovation and low future growth. Falling real rates would instead signal secular stagnation. The pessimists would have it. 42  Hansson and Stuart (1990). 43  There are less optimistic interpretations of this rise in savings, including that it reflects a “savings glut” among in particular emerging market economies (Bernanke (2011), or that is reflects a shortage of supply of safe assets for investors (Caballero (2013)). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  I want to argue, in a typically two-handed economist way, that both sides of this argument are right. There are good grounds for believing technological forces are driving innovation and hence growth, in a classic Neo-Classical cycle. But there are equally-good grounds for believing sociological forces are retarding growth, in an endogenous-growth pattern. Let me start with the secular innovation side of the argument, the Neo-Classical account. It contends that future growth will be forged in the white heat of a digital revolution. All GPTs take time to reach their melting point.44 Even very rapid, or exponential, rates of technological growth take time to become truly transformative at an economy-wide level. 45 Given past trends, it could take 30–40 years or longer for GPTs to reach critical velocity. That was the case with earlier GPTs, including the steam engine and electricity.

These projections are conditioned by a series of factors. First, they assume that the external economic and financial setting will remain favourable to support Albania’s economic growth. Second, they do not envisage potential shocks, which, if materialised, would cause our economy or inflation to diverge from the expected trajectory. Third, the projection for the return of inflation to target assumes that the exchange rate will be more stable in the periods ahead. Based on the above, we judge that the balance of risks remains skewed to the down side. In accordance with these projections, the Bank of Albania deems that the current policy mix is adequate. The fiscal policy is and should remain committed to lowering the debt level and diminishing fiscal vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the monetary policy should maintain the accommodative stance. The convergence of inflation toward the target implies that the intensity of the monetary stimulus will be diminishing over the medium-term; yet, it does not imply a change in the nature of the monetary policy. Lastly, our philosophy as well as the supervisory and regulatory measures will continue to balance the needs for promoting development vis-à-vis guaranteeing the stability of the banking sector and safeguarding the savings of Albanian citizens. But, our duties as policy makers go further than this. With a view to accelerating the pace of development and enhancing its sustainability, the structural reform agenda needs to continue. Let me now list some priority aspects.
The revision of the supervisory methodology on the qualitative assessment of the corporate governance in banks, of the functioning and independence of their committees, of the internal audit structure in assessing the risks and their functioning continued during 2017. In this project, we partnered with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Notwithstanding the progress made in reducing the non-performing loans, attention has been paid to the achievement of banks’ annual objectives regarding the situation of non-performing loans and the compilation of the Recovery and Resolution Plans for larger borrowers. Banks report regularly to the Bank of Albania on the level of their relationships with every borrower, as well as the expectations and plans on future developments, in compliance with our requirements. With assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a regulatory framework, aiming to encourage the collaboration and coordination of banks for addressing common borrowers, is being compiled. Special attention is being paid to the consolidating processes with the expected merger of two banks in Albania and the strategic plans on the re-positioning in the market depending on the dominant short and long-term factors. In parallel with the work to improve the regulatory framework and the adoption of the best international standards, high priority has been given to on-site examinations. During 2017, fourteen full-scope and partial examinations were performed in banks, non-bank financial institutions, and savings and loan associations.

The second obstacle is the still-low appetite of banks to expand lending. This behaviour continues to reflect the effect of two factors: (i) deleveraging policies for reducing exposure in the countries of the region, including Albania, implemented by parent banks from the euro area; and, (ii) perception of credit risk at home. While banks’ balance sheets have improved and the credit risk has diminished, the policies for reducing their exposure in countries outside the EU remain conservative. Such policies reflect also EBA’s new supervisory rules on reducing the exposure of European-based banking groups in South East Europe. In the context of addressing this issue, the Bank of Albania has signed a memorandum of cooperation with the European Banking Authority College in 2015, on exchanging information and harmonising supervisory policies. Regarding non-performing loans, the Bank of Albania continues to be committed to implementing the measures set out in the national plan for reducing them. The reduction of the credit risk, in parallel with the improvement of the banks’ balance sheets and economic growth, should be accompanied by more realistic lending policies by the banking system. This is a recurring appeal I have made in my public appearances. The implementation of such policies would create the conditions for fulfilling the needs of the economy for financing, which are expected to be upward in the future. The third obstacle is the development level of financial markets and the narrow range of financial instruments.
We could, for example present an “optimal” interest rate scenario, based on model-based calculations and an explicit loss function, or on more judgmental assessments. Another alternative is to base future interest rate developments on a simple rule, for example, a variation of the Taylor rule. In the inflation reports of The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the interest rate varies over the projection period based on a simple forecast-based interest rate rule. Even though these endogenous interest rate paths are a theoretically more satisfactory way of presenting these forecasts, they are not unproblematical. For example, an “optimal” interest rate path could lead to a misconception that the central bank is committed to setting future interest rates in line with this path, regardless of the shocks that occur. An interest rate path based on a simple rule may give the impression that the interest rate is actually set on the basis of this rule. 9  Svensson, L. E. (2003): “Comments on Laurence H. Meyer, ‘Practical Problems and Obstacles to Inflation Targeting’”, at the conference “Inflation Targeting: Prospects and Problems”, the Twenty-Eighth Annual Economic Policy Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 16-17 2003. BIS Review 6/2004  5  In terms of communication, there is no definitive answer as to what are the best interest rate assumptions. Sometimes, projections based on specific interest rate assumptions may indicate that the monetary policy objective will not be achieved within a reasonable horizon.

A press conference is held after each monetary policy meeting, whether the interest rate is changed or not, where either the central bank governor or deputy governor presents the background for the decision and answers questions. The strategy documents, which are published at a later time, should serve to further clarify the tradeoffs and the rationale behind the decision. The Inflation Report contains our analyses of the economic situation and projections concerning developments in inflation and output in the next few years. These reports provide guidance for market participants and the general public concerning monetary policy in the period ahead. Thus far, Norges Bank has generally used two alternative technical assumptions concerning the interest rate in the Inflation Report: that the interest rate follows market expectations, represented by implied forward rates, or that the interest rate remains unchanged. We have often used both assumptions, but in the last Inflation Report, we only used forward rates. Based on the assumption that the interest rate and the krone exchange rate move in line with the forward interest rate and forward exchange rate respectively, our projection implied that inflation would return to target after two years. We interpreted this as an indication that the market’s interest rate expectations were consistent with achieving the inflation target at the two-year horizon. This type of assumption also provides an internal consistency between interest rate and exchange rate assumptions. There are also other possible interest rate assumptions, however.
The banks in a number of countries stayed open longer than usual to deal with the extra business, which was received positively. However, there have been reports that some banks did not wish to implement pure exchanges, but forced customers to deposit national currency in an account, only then putting the equivalent amount in euro at their disposal. This created some dissatisfaction that could have been avoided by giving customers more information in advance. In many countries the banks carried the heaviest burden, while in Finland, a country whose use of cash is similar to Sweden's, the retail trade had to shoulder a large part of the changeover, as the banks deal with cash to a relatively small extent. This example shows the importance of co-operation between the central bank, the banks, the post office, the retailers and other companies handling cash in order for a cash changeover of this scope to function. One important lesson is that the retail trade would play a major role in the introduction of the euro, particularly if Swedish banks further reduce their cash management. The studies we have made of other countries' changeovers show that the retailers have chosen different approaches, as I am sure you already know. In some countries they have had, for instance, special exchange desks to avoid handling double currencies in the normal cash desks, something that has had varying results.

The distribution of euro banknotes and coins had been well prepared in all countries of the euro area well before 1 January 2002. Euro banknotes – particularly the smaller denominations – had to a large extent been distributed in advance to banks and retail traders, beginning in September 2001, and the coins were distributed mainly to retailers and the general public in December. Without this preliminary work, the logistics of the transition would have been much more complicated, so frontloading can be considered a decisive factor in the successful outcome. The countries chose slightly different methods the frontloading of coins; e.g. in the Netherlands a major investment was made in providing a free set of coins to every citizen over the age of six years, while other countries sold sets of varying sizes at their face value. In this way, the euro coins soon became familiar to the general public and created an interest in the new currency. In Finland the central bank exchanged "company packages" equivalent to FIM 2,000 and containing both banknotes and coins, with the aim of preparing small companies for the transition. Common to all of the countries involved was that they supplied the retailers with large amounts of coins so there would be no shortage of change during the transition. Another important factor in the cash changeover was the ATMs, as a large part of the euro banknotes was distributed via these.
Daleep Singh: Creating opportunity out of crisis - extending access to the Fed’s emergency facilities Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr Daleep Singh, Executive Vice President and Head of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the National Association of Securities Professionals’ 15th Annual Legislative Symposium, 10 September 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery Good afternoon, and thank you, Guy, for the kind introduction. I must say, it's a bittersweet feeling to speak before you today. I'm honored to have the privilege of addressing this gathering, and I want to express my deep gratitude to you, Ron Parker, and the entire NASP membership for engaging with the New York Fed in our response to the COVID pandemic. But the context is tragic—we continue to face the worst public health and economic shock of our lifetimes, hitting people of color the hardest during a summer filled with bitter reminders of systemic racism that continues to plague our society. Today I'll share our ambition to create opportunity out of this multifaceted crisis. As you've heard me say before, we've moved at maximum speed and with maximum care to implement the Federal Reserve's crisis response. In practice, this means our policy execution has been guided by a set of principles, including transparency, governance, accountability, and access. In my remarks, I'll focus on access: what it means, and why it matters in the context of implementing the Fed's emergency facilities.

Any firm making large-scale use of reinsurance needs to consider their capacity to recapture that risk in the event of the failure of one of their counterparties. We note that some firms are reliant on an action to re-cede offshored risk to another reinsurer, should the original reinsurer default. This would only be possible if the reinsurance market can operate continually and without interruption. There could be myriad drivers of reinsurer counterparty default, but some of these could point to market issues, and potentially temporary market tightening or even closure. Firms should consider this risk in their counterparty assessments, and we will look to protect UK policyholders, who are ultimately dependent on the reinsurance payments being made[10]. Process improvements The three main areas of process improvements that I want to highlight, all noted in the Government’s April Consultation Document, are: The internal model application process;  Page 7  Reporting; and The matching adjustment (MA) application process. On internal models, we are seeking ways to improve and streamline the application process as well as achieving a more flexible approach to the modelling of complex and emerging risks. This may allow models that are adequate but suffer from some non-fatal shortcomings to nonetheless be used whilst those shortcomings are addressed over a realistic timetable. Potentially, this approach could also make use of safeguards where appropriate. We will not allow the best, in modelling, to become the enemy of good enough.
In the first half of 2008, strong increases in commodity prices accompanied by signs of rising wage pressures and an upward drift of inflation expectations implied that risks to price stability over the medium term were increasingly on the upside. To counteract these upside risks and ensure the solid anchoring of inflation expectations, the Governing Council of the ECB raised its key interest rates by 25 basis points in July 2008. With the intensification of the financial turmoil from mid-September last year, the macroeconomic situation and outlook changed fundamentally and suddenly. As the financial crisis deepened and broadened, global demand and economic activity weakened substantially, commodity prices declined markedly and, as a result, inflationary pressures and risks in the euro area diminished. Monetary growth and the expansion of credit to the private sector decelerated, confirming that upside risks to price stability were abating. In response, the Governing Council lowered the key ECB interest rates decisively, by an unprecedented 300 basis points between October 2008 and April 2009. The Governing Council will continue to do what is necessary to preserve price stability and ensure the firm anchoring of inflation expectations over medium to longer-term horizons. Such anchoring is indispensable to supporting sustainable growth and employment and also contributes to financial stability. Let me also stress that, from the onset of the financial market tensions, the ECB has taken forceful action in its liquidity management, also through non-conventional measures, to make sure that banks are able to refinance themselves.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the citizens of Slovakia on having joined the euro area at the beginning of this year. The continuing enlargement of the euro area shows that Monetary Union is not a “closed shop”; it remains open to newcomers. However, even if the reasons for celebration are manifold, there is no room for complacency, as the challenging economic situation and outlook amply demonstrate. Economic developments and monetary policy For the euro area, 2008 was an exceptional year characterised by severe and increasing financial market tensions as well as by significant and abrupt changes in the economy. Following strong economic growth in the first quarter, economic conditions worsened progressively, especially after the extraordinary intensification of the financial turmoil in September. For the year as a whole, real GDP in the euro area grew modestly, by 0.8%. The latest available information suggests that in the first quarter of 2009 aggregate output recorded a further sizeable decline. We expect economic activity in the euro area to remain weak for the remainder of 2009 and to gradually recover in 2010. Taking into account the effects of the substantial macroeconomic stimulus in progress and the measures taken to restore the functioning of the financial system, the risks to this outlook are assessed to be broadly balanced over the medium term, but uncertainty remains unusually high.