samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A discussion on this has recently been intensified within the EU and has also involved the question of what type of institution should in that case be the responsible authority at European level. Here I believe that it would be best to wait and see and to build upon the only path that there is currently political scope to realise, namely to ensure that the co-operation between the existing authorities functions efficiently. Some conclusions Financial integration is an ongoing process throughout the world and has positive welfare effects in all countries that accept it and ensure to adapt their regulatory framework to make it possible. International co-operation takes place within several bodies in order to develop the regulatory framework, and Sweden is affected in particular by the legislation within the EU. When designing the rules and regulations for the financial sector, it is most important to identify the essential elements for counteracting stability problems without making product development and efficiency more difficult. There are distinct advantages to focusing on an overall framework legislation without too many details, which would obscure the view and hamper continued adaptation. When it comes to the implementation of the rules and regulations, co-operation is required between central banks and supervisory authorities in order to enable the financial system to develop effectively without risks to the overall stability. A general framework legislation does not make supervision simpler, but instead makes greater demands for competent analysis of operational conditions in the financial sector.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Economic activity in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Berne, 16 June 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen As we have just announced in our press release, the Swiss National Bank is leaving the target range for the three-month Libor rate unchanged at 0.25-1.25%. It intends to keep the rate in the middle of the target range at around 0.75% for the time being. The fourth quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 saw a stagnation of economic activity in Switzerland, with the high price of oil as well as the depreciation of the dollar in the final quarter of 2004 acting as brakes. These factors also held back economic activity in Europe, as had been expected, thus further weakening the Swiss economy. Despite the sluggish development in the first quarter of 2005, the SNB still expects the economy to recover during the course of the year, with an increase in momentum in the second half. This notwithstanding, the pace of expansion for 2005 is likely to slow further. The SNB thus projects a growth rate of around 1%, as compared with 1.5% at the last assessment. Its expectations with regard to inflation in 2005 remain unchanged from the March assessment, so that average annual inflation for the year is likely to amount to 1%.
History tells us that such imbalances can persist for some time, but increase in risk as they widen. History also tells us that current account imbalances eventually require macroeconomic adjustment - adjustment that is smoother and more orderly the earlier and more coordinated the policy response. While I am not one to second-guess the markets, I also believe that we in the United States must ask ourselves whether the surge in the stock market over the past several years will continue to be accompanied by commensurate growth in output and earnings. To date, consumer spending increases spurred by the growth in the stock market have not been exceptional compared with the growth in wealth, but the growth in wealth has certainly been astonishing. Let me turn now to some of the longer-term trends driving the US economy in recent years. It is these trends that have led many to question whether the structure of the US economy has changed and to ask whether, in fact, the United States is a “new economy” today. BIS Review 29/2000  2  While the bottom line is that there is not a consensus on this issue, no one disagrees that the performance of the US economy has changed dramatically in recent years. Annual real GDP growth over the past four years is higher than it has been in decades, averaging 4% a year in comparison with average annual GDP growth rates of roughly 3% in the 1970s and 1980s.

IS is an aggregate demand schedule, with demand a decreasing function of both the policy rate, R, and a macroprudential instrument, K. PC is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, in which inflation expectations are assumed to be anchored at the inflation target. 6 For any given set of shocks to aggregate demand and supply, the inflation target can be achieved by the set of pairs of R and K along the downward sloping schedule PS (for Price Stability) in the righthand diagram. An increase in demand resulting from, say, an increase in the propensity to invest, would shift this schedule out to the right. 6  6  In the literature, credit frictions and macroprudential policies can also affect potential output; see for instance Vasco Cúrdia and Michael Woodford (2010), “Credit spreads and monetary policy.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42(S1), pp3–35. For simplicity of exposition, I abstract from such effects here. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Turn now to the credit market. Conventional macroeconomic analyses of the market for loanable funds tend to focus on the flow of funds from saving households to businesses undertaking capital expenditures. But, as Chart 9 makes clear, such lending constitutes only a small fraction of the assets held by UK banks. The vast majority of loans are instead provided to finance the acquisition of existing assets, especially real estate. This should be borne in mind when contemplating the factors behind the demand and supply of credit, shown in the left-hand panel of Chart 10 as CD and CS respectively.
21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  21  Chart 10: Major structural changes are increasing the sensitivity of Capital Flows-at-Risk to push shocks  2006  2018  2030 excluding growth 2030 including growth in in EME external balance EME external balance sheets sheets  -1  -2  Impact of the increasing role of investment funds  -3  Impact of the shift to market-based finance Impact of higher share of FX-denominated debt in EMs Pre-crisis  -4  Total  Capital Flows-at-Risk as a % of GDP  Sources: IMF, EPFR, IIF, Bank calculations. Notes: This chart shows estimates and projections for the sensitivity of Capital Flows-at-Risk to negative push shocks at different points in time. The chart is based on separate panel quantile regressions for FDI, banking, market-based finance and investment fund flows. We use the global FCI (push), country-specific FCIs (pull), and the share of NFC debt denominated in foreign currency as regressors. The third bar combines regression results with projections for the composition of flows and the role of FX-denominated debt in 2030. The fourth bar also takes into account projected growth in EM’s external balance sheets. IV.

Lending rates for very small loans, which can be taken as a proxy for loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have declined by almost 190 basis points. The significant improvement in funding conditions for SMEs is especially encouraging as they provide two-thirds of total private sector employment in the euro area. Heterogeneity of lending rates across countries has also fallen sharply. For example, the difference between the average lending rate for firms in countries that were severely affected by the crisis versus other countries has narrowed by around 100 basis points over this period. The pass-through of monetary policy has become more even. Banks are passing on the favourable funding conditions to their customers due to the second series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations, which further supports these positive 2 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  developments.2 The sharp reduction in bank lending rates has been accompanied by easier access to funding, which continues to improve in the third quarter according to newest survey results.3 Furthermore, bank lending volumes have been gradually recovering since early 2014. According to the latest Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, covering the period from October 2016 to March 2017, euro area SMEs have continued to signal improvements in the availability of bank loans. Market-based funding conditions, too, have improved significantly in response to the corporate sector purchase programme launched in June 2016.
Then there are the more forward-looking arrangements for the development and linkages of elements of the financial infrastructure to facilitate the efficient and safe financial intermediation across monetary systems. 13. Obviously no one point on this wide spectrum of international monetary co-operation can be considered as the ideal situation. Much depends on the needs arising from the circumstances, and the circumstances are changing all the time. But along with financial liberalization and the globalization of financial markets, the trend, to the extent that one can be ascertained, seems clearly to be one of increasing monetary co-operation. As is well known, European monetary co-operation is aiming for monetary integration by 1999, having moved in the past 50 years from BIS Review 91/1997  -3-  information exchange to policy co-ordination. Whether this could be achieved on time or not, and whether monetary integration should necessarily then be considered as the final goal of monetary co-operation in other regions, we shall have to wait and see. But one has to admire the vision of the pioneer thinkers. I understand that the French economist Jacques Rueff actually declared way back in the 1950s that “Europe will be created via a currency or not at all”. 14. By contrast, Asian monetary co-operation is considerably less well structured. There is traditionally some exchange of information, mostly on a bilateral basis, through meetings conducted annually, and largely prior to a game of golf or even on the golf course.

Yves Mersch: Behaving responsibly in a low interest rate environment - a central banker's perspective Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Stiftung Marktwirtschaft: Expertentagung "5th Kadener Gespräch", Alveslohe, 10 February 2017. * * * The policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is often said to be at the root of the current problems in the banking and financial sector. Particularly in Germany, there’s the added accusation of monetary policy “expropriating” savers. A closer look quickly reveals that such hasty judgements fail to appreciate the complexity of the matter. Today, therefore, I shall examine carefully the underlying reasons for our monetary policy action. By focusing on the reasons for our actions we can understand more easily how to get back to a normalisation of monetary policy. Low natural interest rates Why are interest rates so low? The growth trend has been declining in many mature economies not just since the crisis, but for several decades. This slowdown in growth has led to lower long-term interest rates. The structural causes of this trend of slowing growth is a subject of controversy among specialists. Demographic and technological developments are mentioned, as are the effects of the financial cycle, which may be out of sync with the business cycles. I do not want to pre-empt this ongoing discussion.
In the next section, I will return to the possible structure of the managerial organisation of such a merged authority. Naturally, there would also be objections to merging the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen. One of these is that a great deal of power would be gathered in the Riksbank. However, this should be weighed against the fact that Sweden would be gaining a powerful actor able to safeguard financial stability. Another objection is that the Riksbank’s reputation may be marred by criticism of decisions in individual cases. I think that this could be avoided if these decisions are taken by a separate board of committee. No doubt there are also a great number of other issues that would need to be solved in a possible merger, for example the  8  In its most recent report, the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council proposed two alternative methods to strengthen macrofinancial supervision. The first of these is based on greater responsibility for the Riksbank, the second on a new authority, a financial stability council, or a committee for systemic risks. 9  In the most recent Financial Stability Report, we recommended the Swedish banks to retain or increase their capital ratios, to reduce their financing and liquidity risks, and to improve their public liquidity reporting. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  possibility of appealing against decisions in certain cases. I think that, in an unbiased investigation, the advantages of a merger would be shown to outweigh the disadvantages.

My experience is also that the arrangement with six people taking decisions works well for monetary policy. There are effective routines for producing bases for monetary policy decisions and the reasons behind the different members’ positions are clearly given in the minutes from the monetary policy meetings. For these reasons, monetary policy decisions should continue to be taken by a monetary policy committee at the Riksbank which is independent of political bodies. For the same reasons, decisions on the application of the new tools for safeguarding macroeconomic stability should also be taken by this monetary policy committee. It is as yet unclear what these will be. They may include capital requirements, liquidity requirements, risk weightings, loans ceilings etc. that vary over time. But this arrangement doesn’t work well in other areas. When six people, all of whom have the individual responsibility of leading the Riksbank, are to decide on issues where opinions are divided, the preparatory processes can easily become prolonged. It can also lead to a complete inability to act. If one or more members strongly oppose a decision, this can lead to the issue not being taken up for decision at all. Being six people can be particularly problematic when it comes to financial security. In these issues, we have striven to agree. Frequently, of course, we have had to take decisions to strengthen financial stability in a reality marked by a financial crisis. In such cases, it would not have been appropriate to show disunity over the best course of action.
That was corroborated by our Agents’ pay survey which was pointing to a ½ percentage point increase in settlements this year, from around 2½% to around 3%, with the ability to recruit and retain staff the number one factor driving growth. Since February the picture has remained the same. Wages did indeed pick up to 2.8% by the May Inflation report. And the very latest observation, of 2.9% regular pay growth in March, was slightly higher than our expectation even in May. Wage growth has now been rising steadily over the past six months, and unit labour costs have been rising towards growth rates consistent with overall inflation at target. The period of unusually subdued growth in wages appears to be coming to an end. The year so far That brings me to the third unusual situation that that we have had to contend with – developments in the economy so far this year, and how the MPC have responded to them – most recently at our May policy meeting. At the time of the February report we judged that the trade-off between managing slack and controlling inflation was much diminished. We went so far as to say that “were the economy to evolve broadly in line with the February Inflation Report projections, monetary policy would need to be tightened somewhat 14  See: Ramsden, D (2017), “Monetary Policy from End to End: Define, Decide, Deliver”, speech at King’s College London, 20 November 2017.

On the one hand, productivity growth has serially disappointed and could continue to do so in future. In that case excess demand could build more quickly and inflation could stay above target. That said, I am optimistic about the potential for Fintech and other new technologies to lead to productivity gains, either directly or by driving competition, and in turn to potentially higher, and non-inflationary, wage growth. 15  One thing to emphasise about our central forecast is that it is conditional on the market yield curve. At the time of the May Inflation Report that yield curve was pricing in roughly three rate rises over the three years covered by our forecast. And those three rate rises were one of the forces preventing excess demand rising faster in the forecast and inflation from remaining persistently above target. To demonstrate what would happen without those rate rises, we also publish a version of the forecast in the Inflation Report showing what would happen if Bank Rate remained unchanged (Chart 13). In that version of the forecast inflation does not fall back to target. Instead excess demand and domestic cost pressures build much more rapidly. And so inflation stays persistently at around 2.4%, little changed from where it is now and materially above our inflation target. 15  I set out my views on the opportunities presented by Fintech in a speech in March – see: Ramsden, D (2018), “The Bank of England – Open to Fintech”, speech at HMT’s International Finance Conference, London, 22 March 2018.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: The strength of the Thai economy and future development in Thailand’s financial system Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the British Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 4 September 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank the British Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to give a keynote speech at this prestigious gathering. The Great Britain and Thailand have built strong economic relationship and business ties over the decades. Within Europe, the Great Britain is by far the second biggest trading partner of Thailand, accounting for 13.9 percent of total trade volume between Europe and Thailand. In terms of foreign direct investment, Britain is also the second most important investors among European nations, particularly in banking, real estate, and retail sales sectors. I, therefore, hope that Thailand and Britain will continue this strong tie both in terms of trade and investment, and to prosper together in the future. The past few years have brought us many economic surprises and challenges. After severe floods took a toll last year, Thailand is currently facing much challenge from the global economic downturn, particularly from the continued Euro debt crisis and more intensified global competition. Despite this backdrop of strong headwinds from abroad, I believe that the Thai economy will be able to sail through. I am pleased to say that during the first half of this year, post-flood recovery has been robust.

Apart from the internal push, ASEAN exchange linkage under the vision of AEC is taking place this year to allow global investors to trade ASEAN blue chip stocks at lower costs through a single platform. This initiative will ultimately raise the visibility of ASEAN capital market and continue to attract more capital flow. To sum up, as economic integration and upgrade of efficiency and competitiveness is key to our development, Thailand’s financial system is geared to facilitate this process. To do so, financial liberalisation will play a key role, with contribution by ASEAN banks as well as foreign banks operating in this region. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to reiterate that with solid economic strengths and a wide-ranging development in Thailand’s financial system, the Thai economy will continue to be resilient in the face of the dismal global outlook. The BOT is fully committed to sound monetary policy conduct and financial-sector development via the Financial Sector Master Plan as well as play a supporting role in Capital Market Development Master Plan. Let me end my remark by thanking the British business community for substantial contribution to our economy. Your contribution will not only strengthen our long history of economic partnership but also bring economic prosperity to both Britain and Thailand. I very much hope that the mutually beneficial ties between British and Thailand will blossom into the future. Thank you  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
While bubbles are hard to detect, we nevertheless know from the repetition of financial crises through history – including the current crisis – that the economy is always subject to the risk of a new bubble. Given this risk, we ought to reflect on the features of financial systems that may create bubbles and allow them to develop to proportions that threaten economic welfare. We know a few things about the procyclical characteristics of the financial system. Our accounting and prudential regimes may have increased procyclicality in recent years. In a mark to market environment, asset prices movements quickly translate into changes in the capital base of financial institutions. This, in turn, triggers additional demand for assets and a further increase in their prices. This kind of "inverted demand curve"; where demand increases with prices, may create the conditions for a bubble. But it does not have to. Strictly speaking, procyclicality refers to bigger amplitudes of fluctuations around a trend. But a bubble may induce deviations that are so long lasting that we start wondering about the trend itself. Whether wider fluctuations in prices will lead to lasting deviations is uncertain. We have good insights on the dynamics of a bubble, once it develops. But we do not know much about what actually starts a bubble, and this is a crucial point. 2  BIS Review 37/2009  So there needs to be a rule guiding macroprudential decisions knowing that we have to live with this uncertainty. Actually, such a rule may exist, but implicitly.

The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110-3, 663-691. Kiyotaki N. and J. Moore (1997), Credit Cycles, The Journal of Political Economy 105, 21148. Meltzer A. (2003), Rational and Non rational Bubbles, in Hunter, Kaufman, Pomerleano (eds), "Asset Price Bubbles". MIT Press. 6  BIS Review 37/2009