We had to abandon our fixed exchange rate policy in December 1992. One important reason for this was the inherent weaknesses in the fixed exchange rate system in an environment of free capital flows and deep financial markets. When the fixed exchange rate policy was formally abandoned, there was a risk that the Norwegian economy could again lose its nominal anchor. However, the krone exchange rate showed little movement and soon found a new range. Fiscal policy had a stabilising effect. The exchange rate remained stable until autumn 1996. This was partly due to low wage growth and a level of total demand that did not generate pressures in the economy. After a period, the krone began to show wider fluctuations. The experience of the latter half of the 1990s demonstrated that monetary policy cannot fine-tune the exchange rate. Developments in the international financial markets led to greater fluctuations. And more fundamentally – exchange rate developments no longer sent signals back to wage formation and fiscal policy when labour market pressures mounted and incomes policy failed. High petroleum revenues, fiscal slippage and expectations of increased use of petroleum revenues contributed to this. The exchange rate was therefore no longer suitable as a nominal anchor. As a result, Norges Bank gradually placed increasing emphasis on low and stable inflation. In 2001, the Norwegian authorities decided that monetary policy in Norway was to be oriented towards low and stable inflation through a numerical target for inflation, as was the case in many other countries later in the 1990s.

As a blunt banning of crypto-asset activities is not seen as an option for most, for a number of reasons, starting for instance with the belief in France that it would most likely lead to regulatory arbitrages between jurisdictions, most of the attention at national and international level has been put on "what?" (what activities and what risks) and "how?" (by which means) to regulate. In my short introductory remarks today, I would like to share with you my perspective, as the organisers of this Global Payments Week Conference have kindly suggested, speaking from the standpoint of a central bank in charge of ensuring financial stability, on the types of risks associated with crypto-activities that particularly need to be considered for regulation and supervision, and the importance of a convergent and coordinated regulatory approach on crypto-assets at the international level. I. What risks to consider for regulation and supervision in the crypto ecosystem 1) Traditional and new risks associated with the development of the crypto ecosystem The bankruptcy of FTX in November 2022, one of the largest crypto exchanges, and the resulting knock-on effects on its users and other market participants, have  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  spectacularly shown the instability of the crypto-assets ecosystem. Within the regulatory and supervisory community, a root cause of this instability is well recognised. At present, crypto-asset infrastructures and activities generate risks which are similar to those of mainstream finance services, and inherent to the provision of financial services, including credit, liquidity and market risks.