samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In order to support foreign exchange liquidity and ensure smooth operation of FX markets, in February 2009, the Central Bank extended the maturity of foreign exchange deposits denominated in US dollar or Euro for banks in the FX Deposit Markets, and lending rate was reduced for transactions where the Central Bank is counterpart. Moreover, upon observing unhealthy pricing in the foreign exchange markets as a result of vanishing depth, 18 foreign exchange selling auctions were held between 10 March-2 April 2009 and 900 million USD was sold in total. 45. With the aim of supporting the corporate sector and widening the use of export discount credits, arrangements were introduced in March and April, larger number of firms was granted access to export discount credits and credit limits were raised. Distinguished Guests, 46. Recently, one of the most debated issues with respect to monetary policy is the “exit strategies”, which entail withdrawal of measures taken during the global crisis and provide normalization of operations for monetary policies. Many central banks have been working on exit strategies for quite a long time as the adverse effects of the crisis diminish and signals of economic recovery grow stronger with the ultimate goal to prepare markets for the normalization process. Obviously, each central bank will form its own exit strategy according to country-specific conditions such as improvements in financial markets, degree of economic recovery and the severity of inflationary pressure.

We effectively used all policy instruments to maintain financial stability during the height of the crisis. As the crisis began to deepen in October 2008, we, by establishing a strong line of communication with the public about the details and the robust structure of the liquidity management strategy, have announced liquidity facilities to be provided to the markets step-by-step, in a clear and transparent way. Subsequently, by gradually introducing the announced measures for both Turkish lira and foreign exchange markets, we considerably removed the disturbances and volatilities in the markets. In this regard, we continued to implement measures that were taken as of October 2008 – when the crisis started to deepen – for ensuring smooth operation of Turkish lira and foreign exchange markets and supporting the corporate sector, in 2009 as well. In this part of my speech, I would like to outline the measures that we have taken. 41. The monetary measures implemented for Turkish lira during the crisis can be classified into two main groups: The first pillar of monetary measures was the implementations to ease the uncertainties in money markets caused by the crisis. In this regard, as of October 2008, we started to inject liquidity excessively in order to reduce potential tension in money markets and to completely eliminate volatility in overnight interest rates. However, at this point, I would like to remind you that the excess liquidity generated as a result of the implementation which was continued throughout 2009, was sterilized by overnight operations at the end of the day.
Global pipes – challenges for systemic financial infrastructure Speech given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee  Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, London Wednesday 22 February 2017  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is said that the first 500 years of an institution’s life are the most difficult. By that reckoning, the Bank has 177 years to go before we reach less challenging times. But at least, with 323 years behind us, we can draw both inspiration and warning from those who have gone before us. In difficult times, I certainly take both from my predecessor, Michael Godfrey. Godfrey was one of the three co-founders of the Bank in 1694 and its first Deputy Governor. But his tenure was short. While on Bank of England business in Flanders, in 1695, he sought a meeting with King William III. William was at the time engaged in the 9 Years War and busily laying siege to the town of Namur. Keen to demonstrate his loyal and fearless service, Godfrey ignored his monarch’s warning that as a central banker in a war zone he should keep his head down. His head was promptly removed by a French cannonball. So when faced with today’s challenges, Godrey’s fate reminds me that previous inhabitants of this post have seen more testing times.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  assessments of the level of resource utilisation can lead to different views of how monetary policy ought to be conducted. It is therefore essential that more analyses are conducted to better understand what it is that determines the development of output and potential GDP in conjunction with financial crises and deep recessions. One important factor behind the development of potential GDP seems to be total factor productivity (TFP). This is particularly troublesome as TFP itself is often counted as an unexplained residual. One possible way forward could be to combine the production function approach with economic short-term statistics to analyse how TFP behaves in normal cyclical fluctuations and in deep recessions. The almost unique opportunities for Sweden to conduct analyses based on micro data for individuals and companies should be a major asset in this regard. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figures and tables 1. Actual and trend GDP Logarithmed levels 6.5  6.5 GDP  6.0  6.0  Trend  5.5  5.5  5.0  5.0  4.5  4.5 50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  00  05  10  Note. HP trend derived solely from annual data 1950–2010. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  2.
The key topic within this block is the interaction and mutual influence of these two components of the Bank of Russia’s set of tools used to address the task of maintaining price stability and financial stability. Finally, work stream 6. New challenges to monetary policy. Within this block, we will analyse such long-term trends in economic development and finance as the introduction of digital currencies, innovations in the financial market, and climate and demographic changes. We will also estimate how these issues might impact the implementation of central banks’ monetary policies in the future. We have already started our analysis within all these work streams. The results of the Review will be discussed until the end of 2022 Q1. Following the discussion, we will compile a summary report in 2022 Q2 and publish it on the Bank of Russia website together with analytical notes addressing individual issues. The summary report will present the Bank of Russia’s opinion on the topics reviewed and proposals regarding a possible adjustment of the parameters of the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy. The report will then be discussed with the public and the professional community. We are going to sum up the results by the middle of 2022. It would be possible to conclude whether we need to adjust our policy following the Review only after we complete the analysis and the extensive discussion of its findings.

Alexey Zabotkin: Plan of analytical work and events for the Bank of Russia’s Monetary Policy Review Speech by Mr Alexey Zabotkin, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, on releasing a plan of analytical work and events for the Bank of Russia’s Monetary Policy Review, Moscow, 6 October 2021. * * * Good afternoon, As Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina announced making a speech at the International Financial Congress at the end of June, the Bank of Russia plans to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy, its objectives and instruments — the Monetary Policy Review — over the period of inflation targeting in Russia. Today, we have launched a special web page covering the plan of analytical work and key events within this Review. I will provide a brief summary of this announcement and then answer additional questions. Why is this important and why are we doing this right now? First. The Bank of Russia switched to the inflation targeting regime in 2015. Annual inflation decreased to 4% in 2017. It has been seven years since we started to implement this policy and nearly five years since inflation reached the target. This is a sufficient period for us to be able to make conclusions about our achievements. The Review is intended to assess the effectiveness of the monetary policy implemented and take a look at past events.
The impact is computed on the basis of a shadow-rate term structure model following Geiger and Schupp (2018). Estimates are based on a sample ending in June 2014 in order to avoid interference with the period of negative policy rates and asset purchases. Some studies have looked at specific channels by which term premia help explain certain yield curve phenomena that can hardly be reconciled by the expectations hypothesis alone. For instance, Hanson and Stein (2015) observe that monetary policy rate decreases tend to coincide with surprisingly strong reactions in long-term forward rates. [13] One way to explain this pattern is by assuming that there may be “yield-oriented investors” in the market who do not trade based on forward-looking risk-return optimisation but rather react to changes in current yields. Those players may try to reallocate their portfolios in response to the policy-induced short rate decline in order to keep their average portfolio yields constant. Their increased demand for longer-term bonds will then increase bond prices and decrease term premia. This term premium compression will come on top of the decline in rate expectations and thus amplify the overall effect of a cut in short-term rates. While this is one promising way to rationalise term premium responses to a monetary policy rate change, overall, our understanding of the interaction between monetary policy and term premia is still very limited. Take, for instance, the standard workhorse dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models commonly used by central bankers.

Subsequently, the financial crisis created a recessionary economic environment in which global trade, stock market indices, and commodity prices, such as copper and cobalt, declined significantly. The global financial and economic crises thus negatively impacted on economies around the world through falling export demand and tourist receipts, declining commodity prices, reductions in the availability of credit and trade finance, and less inflow of remittances, foreign portfolio, direct investment and other capital flows. In response to this crisis, several actions were taken at global level by the major economies to address the root causes and the effects of the global financial and economic crises. These were fiscal and monetary policy stimulus measures aimed at boosting global consumption and investment demand in an effort to avoid a much sharper global contraction than that which has already occurred. Measures typically ranged from reduction of interest rates, tax cuts and increased Government spending in form of bail-outs of strategic institutions and in some cases virtual nationalisation. Concrete steps were also taken to reform the regulatory and supervisory frameworks governing the financial sector. Further, increased resources were provided to key multi-lateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions were also given the mandate to play a central role in leading the global response to the crisis and evaluating the efficacy of the various measures that had been implemented. III.
Trichet: If I stick to my own understanding of the difficulties we face, I would say we are certainly paying a price for the absence during a long period of time of appropriate balances in the various economies the world over. I’m not mentioning one economy or another in particular, because I think that we have had a phenomenon in the industrialised world which is very complex and which has manifested itself not only in the US but also in a significant number of industrialised economies including the European economies, where you see a permanent tendency to have domestic imbalances between savings and investment, with the mirror image of large external imbalances. I think we have to be aware of that. It seems to me that what we are told presently is – and again it is a message for all industrialised countries in my understanding – that it is not a normal position, that it is a dangerous position to be domestically and externally significantly in imbalance. Reflecting on what you call the “overwhelming force”… I don’t know. I have no memory of colleagues on the other side of the Atlantic telling me that as if there were no limit … All colleagues trust that there are limits, in any case. I would echo that and I would say that there are always limits. There are limits as regards the structural features and the permanent features of the functioning of the various economies.

On the labor market front, we see continuous improvement in manufacturing employment, reversing a multiyear decline trend. These are encouraging signs that the benefits from export growth has spilled over to other sectors. As we move into the second half of this year and the next, even more spillovers are expected from various public infrastructure projects that we have heard about earlier this morning. Certainly, there are risks to this growth outlook, both external and domestic. Recent developments in the trade war between the United States and China, development of the financial conditions in vulnerable emerging market countries, as well as the recovery of tourism in the Southern region after the Phuket boat accident are some of the major risks discussed by the MPC. While monetary policy decisions will need to take these risks into account in supporting the economy towards a more robust growth, solving the two-speed economy requires solutions beyond the scope of monetary policy. Structural challenges that caused this two-speed economy require more precision tools like fiscal programs that could accurately target the specific sectors in need of support. Promoting education and skills reform could help address the change in labor market landscape mentioned earlier. As another example, creating an environment that stimulates innovation will be the key for boosting productivity and lifting Thailand onto a higher long-term growth path. The third factor that the MPC considers when deliberating its policy is financial stability.
See the notes to Chart 2 for how excess current account balances are calculated. And since all countries cannot become more competitive at the same time – it is a relative concept – there is no avoiding it: higher global growth will require comprehensive measures to boost productivity and with it, real wages and demand. This means domestic policies to spur innovation, technology adoption, and the reallocation of resources. Particularly important will be measures to re-start the stalled ‘diffusion machine’. 18  While the most productive  companies have continued to innovate, others have become slower at adopting those innovations. Speeding up the rate of take-up of new inventions and processes – for example through greater product market competition or challenges to management to benchmark against best practice  19  – would provide a  significant boost to overall productivity growth. And higher growth requires a new approach to trade policy. Consider that Bank of England research estimates that up to one half of the post-crisis productivity slowdown could be related to the deceleration in global trade growth. 20  It will not be enough for the G20 to “resist protectionism.” The G20 now needs to make “trade work for all.” That includes using e-commerce platforms to promote free trade for SMEs across the G20,  21  and it requires  an urgent and critical examination of trade in services. 18  See https://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/OECD-2015-The-future-of-productivity-book.pdf.

Such an action may be vindicated if there are risks to macroeconomic or financial stability or even if self-fulfilling runs on public debt may be a threat to market access, or lastly to avoid the deflationary consequences of a public debt event. However, one may be tempted to underestimate risks for inflation, especially since they only materialize with a lag, and such interventions could also increase moral hazard in terms of government incentives to keep their finances in order. These considerations explain why, when we set up the OMT, we required central bank interventions to be conditional on resolute fiscal policy adjustments, guaranteed collectively by euro area Member States. In addition to highlighting the main trade-offs between public debt sustainability and monetary policy, the great merit of Professor Gita Gopinath’s presentation is to use a formal model to support her rigorous analysis. In particular, she shows how the degree of commitment to low inflation may change the level of sustainable public debt. This analysis is most welcome, not only because public debts are very high, but also because in several parts of the world inflation appears stubbornly low in spite of extremely aggressive monetary policies. The second session examines changes in financial intermediation. Hyun Shin will focus today on the surge of bond-financing in the global economy over the last few years and the pros and cons associated with a broader shift from bank to market financing.
A higher capital adequacy requirement for taking bigger risks will thus lead to the banks being forced to charge more for lending money to higher risk borrowers. This is a regulatory system that is used by 120 countries and it contributes to financial stability around the world. However, the current capital adequacy rules from 1988 are divided into 4 fairly rough risk classes, which do not very well reflect the risk with various borrowers. For instance, the risk classification means that all companies are in the same risk class, despite the fact that they can differ markedly from one another. There has therefore been intensive work on further developing these rules by the Basel Committee, in which both the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen (the Swedish financial supervisory authority) participate. The idea with the new rules is that the risk weighting will better reflect the actual credit risk. This means that the banks will become more thorough in assessing the relationship between the risk in the credit and its yield. An increased risk will therefore be marked in the banks’ pricing of loans, i.e. the interest rate. There are both advantages and disadvantages with the proposed capital adequacy rules. The proposed rules mean that the banks must hold more capital if the risks in their given loans increase. If they do not have more capital than the rules require, they must either acquire more capital or reduce the risks in their lending.

However, it will be interesting to see if, to what extent, and in what areas people in Switzerland will use the euro as a means of payment. Certain structural effects of the euro have already become evident for quite a while, for example on the primary bond market, where the Swiss franc is losing in weight while the euro capital market is enjoying growing popularity due mainly to its excellent liquidity. According to the survey conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for the trading days of the month of April, the trading volume in international foreign exchange transactions dropped by nearly 20% within three years. Another contributing factor to this development was the advance of electronic trading and the discontinuation of trading between the euro's predecessor currencies. Roughly 6% of all global foreign exchange transactions include the Swiss franc. This share still amounted to 7% three years ago and to just over 8% nine years back. The fact that the Swiss franc has lost relative significance in foreign exchange trading is probably largely attributable to institutional conditions for trading in additional currencies having improved. By far most of the Swiss franc transactions were effected against the US dollar. This currency pair was traded approximately five times as frequently as the Swiss franc-euro pair. This volume ratio, however, is likely to be subject to strong fluctuations depending on specific exchange rate developments.
Negative coverage of the banks and Icelandic economy went hand in hand at this time, both temporarily eroding international investor confidence. The reputation of Iceland’s economy and banks was tarnished. From an Icelandic perspective, the first months of 2006 were therefore characterised by a currency depreciation, falling equity prices and international discussion about the viability of Icelandic banks and macroeconomic imbalances in Iceland. A massive economic downswing was even predicted, possibly comparable to the southeast Asia crisis of the late 1990s. This was a development we had not particularly expected or prepared for. Interestingly, not only did Iceland feel the tangible effects of changes in sentiment in global financial markets – the turbulence in Iceland also reverberated through a number of distant countries with which we have no business contact. This shows that Iceland had become integrated into the global financial market. It was obvious that the Icelandic banks and authorities faced a major challenge that called for a serious response. The banks responded with greatly increased communication about their activities, financial position and other targets of criticism. They made various reforms, answered other points in detail, slowed down their expansion, tapped new credit markets and, last but not least, refuted predictions that the turnaround in external conditions, weaker króna, lower Icelandic equity prices, higher finance costs, etc. would have to dent their profitability severely.

Ingimundur Fridriksson: Turbulence in Iceland's financial markets in 2006 Keynote address by Mr Ingimundur Fridriksson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the UBS conference “Annual Reserve Management Seminar for Sovereign Institutions”, Thun, Switzerland, 4 June 2007. *  *  *  Where is Iceland? What is it? Why do we want to know about it? In the first half of 2006, hardly a day passed without Iceland and Icelandic banks being mentioned in newspapers and financial journals around the world. Although attention is often welcome, this was not necessarily true of all the discussion about Iceland and its banks a year ago. The coverage was highly critical, in some ways rightly so but in other ways not. When I was asked to address this conference, the turbulence in the Icelandic financial markets in the first half of 2006 was doubtless fresh in the organisers’ minds. So I was asked to discuss that episode and how the Central Bank of Iceland monitored it and responded. As well as covering this topic I shall add some comments on recent developments and prevailing conditions. But first a few facts and a brief description of the background are needed. Iceland is an advanced industrial economy with one of the highest national incomes per capita in the world. Through membership of the European Economic Area, Iceland is part of the European single market and has the same financial infrastructure as in the European Union.