samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In some countries, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Baltics, Slovenia corporate debt level was rapidly increasing, bringing the debt level very close to 100% of GDP. The higher the debt level, the more difficult the adjustment was, particularly given the soft post –crisis economic recovery and hence the low capacity to reduce the debt burden. In fact, only Slovenia and the Baltic states managed to deleverage markedly, while in Bulgaria, the adjustment was slower and the debt level remained relatively high. In some countries such as Slovakia, North Macedonia, Poland and the Czech Republic, the corporate sector continued to accumulate leverage post-crisis. In the case of North Macedonia, the rise in corporate debt was predominantly driven by external borrowing, mirroring the expansion of foreign companies established in the Technological Industrial Development Zones (TIDZ) that mostly rely on external funding through inter-company loans from their parent entities. Corporate debt continues to account for majority of total private debt in most CESEE countries (close to 70% of total private debt on average). Loose financing conditions contribute to mitigating the risks to corporate debt sustainability. 6  Chart 7. Bank credit to households and non-financial corporations (y-o-y change, in percent)  Chart 8. Bank credit to households (structure, in percent, 2010-2018 average)  (y-o-y growth, in percent, 2010-2018 average)  Source: central banks websites. Household debt increased from a very low base in almost all countries in the region, as supply and demand factors kept this segment underserved.

The indicators we analyze here are based on data from the OeNB Euro Survey. 4 DSTI estimates (from Aleksandra Riedi “Household debt in CESEE economies: a joint look at macro- and micro-level data”, Focus on European Economic Integration, 2019, issue Q1/19) are based on the OeNB Euro Survey wave conducted in fall 2017, where respondents were asked to report the amount spent per month to service all loans held by household members (including interest and principal payments). Author relates these payments to the household’s monthly net income also reported by the respondent to calculate the ratio. 8  countries with the highest DSTI. This particularly holds for lower income households as more vulnerable group of households. Romania has the highest share of vulnerable households (with DSTI above 40%) and potentially vulnerable households with low income and low educational attainment. In response to these developments, the National Bank of Romania undertook macro-prudential measures by setting up a cap on indebtedness at 40 percent of net income for leu-denominated loans and 20 percent for foreign currencydenominated loans starting January 2019. Measures are intended to address vulnerabilities associated with highly indebted borrowers and sustain financial stability in the country. Chart 10. GDP per capita and private debt, 2017  Chart 11. Financial development and private debt, 2017  Source: IMF Global debt database, IMF WEO database and IMF Financial development index database.
And short-term interest rates throughout the euro-area would be set, identically, by the ECB, that will have been established in the early summer of next year. From 1 January, 1999 the participating central banks would immediately begin to denominate their money and foreign exchange market interventions, on behalf of the ECB, in the new currency. Their national currencies would nevertheless continue to exist for a period of some three years, as broken-amount denominations of the euro, and it will still then be possible, through the payments mechanism, to convert those national currencies into euro and vice versa, effectively automatically, for anyone that wished to do so. The likelihood is that wholesale financial market transactions generally within the euro-area will rapidly switch to the euro-denomination, although that would be up to the operators in those markets. The principle that will apply is one of no compulsion but equally no prohibition. It means that, here in Hong Kong, you should expect to be able to have accounts denominated in euro across which to conduct wholesale, particularly, financial market activity, if you BIS Review 89 /1997  -3-  wished to do so, although you would equally be able to continue for the time being to operate across accounts denominated in the national currencies participating in the euro if you preferred. Euro bank notes and coin will not become available until some time probably towards the end of 2001 and it is unlikely that retail transactions denominated in euro will develop much before then.

–  Second, to avoid any loophole basically due to an international failure to apply the debtor principle in withholding taxation, we are ready to reshape our system in line with the EU directive, i.e. to apply the payment agents principle in withholding taxation whenever a client of a Swiss bank is fiscally domiciled in the EU. –  Third, and this must not be forgotten, Switzerland grants full judicial co-operation to fight tax fraud. Thus, our position is fair. With these measures - which are fiscally equivalent to the exchange of information - Switzerland cannot be accused to be a fiscal paradise attracting foreign money like an offshore centre. With capital being extremely mobile internationally, it is evident that co-ordinated taxation policy makes sense only if it covers all the main financial centres. The EU regulation will not have to be only implemented in the member countries, but also in their many dependent and associated territories. Furthermore, it is crucial for Europe that similar measures are taken on a world-wide basis. Without a fully watertight solution, offshore centres around the globe will expand their business at the expense of Europe and this with an increasing lack of transparency and with higher global risks. One last point about fiscal harmonisation. I live in a country that counts nearly three thousand different tax regimes. In Switzerland, every town, every canton and, of course, the federal government, all have the authority to levy taxes and to set the rates.
24  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  As one example, VAT data from SMEs in a subset of industries have recently been used by the ONS when constructing output-based estimates of GDP. As with prices, the gains in sample size and granularity from using such administrative data are potentially large. The ONS’s Monthly Business Survey of activity typically relies on a sample of around 8,000 firms to represent this subset of SMEs. This is now being complemented 29  by VAT returns from around 630,000 reporting units. These new data augment, rather than replace, existing survey methods. They have the potential to improve the timeliness and accuracy of National Accounts data on aggregate economic trends. The ONS has its own Data Science Campus to spearhead these efforts. And new research organisations, such as the Alan Turing Institute, are doing excellent work applying new data and techniques to economic measurement. Another potentially fruitful area of exploration, when tracking activity flows in the economy, is financial data. Almost all economic activity leaves a financial footprint on the balance sheet of some financial institution. Tracking the flow of funds between financial institutions can help in sizing that footprint and thus, indirectly, in tracking economic activity. At the Bank, we have over recent years drawn on the Financial Conduct Authority’s Product Sales Database (PSD). This is a highly granular source of administrative data on owner-occupier mortgage products taken out in the UK. It contains data on close to 16 million mortgages since mid-2005.

Traditional surveys of market participants or the general public tend to be biased in their sampling and framed in their responses. As in quantum physics, the act of observing can itself alter behaviour. These realities may call for exploring non-traditional means of revealing people’s preferences and sentiments. To give one recent example, data on music downloads from Spotify has been used, in tandem with semantic search techniques applied to the words of songs, to provide an indicator of people’s sentiment. Intriguingly, the resulting index of sentiment does at least as well in tracking consumer spending as the Michigan survey of consumer confidence. 51  And why stop at music? People’s tastes in books, TV and radio may also offer a window on their soul. So too might their taste in games. Indeed, I am interested in the potential for using gaming techniques, not just to extract data on people’s preferences, but as a means of generating data on preferences and actions. Existing models, empirical and theoretical, often make strong assumptions about agent behaviour. Theoretical models are based on axiomatic assumptions. Empirical models are based on historical  49  Rotemberg (1984), for example, discusses the statistical rejection of rational expectations models for consumption and labour demand. 50 Tuckett and Nyman (2017), Shiller (2017) and Nyman et al (2018). 51 Sabouni (2018). 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  behaviours. These restrictions may, or may not, be borne out in future behaviour.
However, with the normalization in financial markets, we foresee that the distinguishing characteristics of countries will come to the fore in the upcoming period and currencies of those countries with lower risk, stronger economic and financial fundamentals and high growth potential are expected to perform better. In this regard, it would not be surprising if Turkey’s credit rating is raised to reach the investment grade implied by the actual CDS spread. As for recent developments in the Turkish economy, the moderate recovery in economic activity continues. Quarterly growth in GDP continued in the last quarter of 2009. As tax cuts that were put into practice with the aim of spurring economic activity were phased out, private consumption demand displayed a more moderate rise compared to the first half and the gradual recovery in private consumption expenditures continued in the third quarter. Meanwhile, private investment expenditures continued to pick up in the last quarter but remained lower compared to strong growth periods. Taking into account the uncertainties pertaining to domestic and foreign demand and the low capacity utilization rates, it is estimated that it would take an extended period of time for investment expenditures to reach their pre-crisis levels and no significant rise is expected in the short run. Recently, imports have increased faster than exports and this indicates that the recovery in the economy is mainly driven by domestic demand. The course of exports in the upcoming period will be determined by the pace of global recovery.

In trade in value-added terms (“TiVA”), more than one-third of the exports from the five economies of Northeast Asia and the eight economies of Southeast Asia 1 ends up in the region itself – this is nearly twice their exports to the US. ASEAN in particular is becoming a major economic force in Asia. It is a $ trillion market with over 630 million people. Based on current growth rates, ASEAN is expected to become the fourth largest market by 2030, behind the EU, China, and the US. ASEAN has emerged as a key global manufacturing region, with extensive supply chains linking the individual economies and to China. ASEAN is the world’s fifth largest manufacturing economy in value-added terms. So, in the face of rising trade protectionism, it is important for Asian economies to strengthen trade, investment and infrastructure networks to sustain long term growth. Indeed, the best response to trade restrictions is to further liberalise trade among willing economies. And this is exactly what Asia is doing. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) is a good example. It brings together the ten ASEAN economies and China, India, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. It signals the region’s commitment to freetrade. Negotiations are ongoing, but when successfully concluded, the RCEP will create the world’s largest trading bloc, covering one-third of global GDP. And by the end of next month, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP-11”) will enter into force.
Goh Chok Tong: Sharing some perspectives on growth Speech Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Group of Thirty(G-30) International Banking Seminar and Lunch, Singapore, 18 September 2006. *  *  *  The good, the bad and the ugly Let me first bid you a warm welcome to Singapore. I was recently invited by the World Bank to be a member of the Growth Commission chaired by Professor Michael Spence. So today's topic "Sharing Some Perspectives on Growth" fits me like a glove. In offering my perspectives, I shall draw heavily on the experience of Singapore. Forty years ago, soon after I started work in the Economic Planning Unit of the Finance Ministry, I was sent to do a post-graduate course in Development Economics at Williams College in the US. The course was designed for young officials from developing countries. There were 20 of us from 16 countries spanning four continents - Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America. The countries included the Philippines, Pakistan, India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Tanzania, Liberia, Honduras, Colombia and Mexico 1 The 1960s was dubbed the "Decade of Promise". An unprecedented number of colonies had just gained independence. My fellow students and I were taught the latest development theories. Brighteyed and bushy-tailed, we were full of hope. But 40 years later, history tells a different story. Only a few had our hopes fulfilled; most had their dreams dashed.

The duty of the central bank in such a situation has been to keep the lid of the jar tightly so that the child is unable to take out cookies at its own pleasure. This is not a popular measure, but central banks throughout the world have been found to keep the cookie jar in tight control for the benefit of the society. Given the above economic costs, inflation is undoubtedly the public enemy number one. 4  BIS Review 55/2007
The economic crisis that began in 1997 represents the latest national challenge. True to historic form, Korea has responded decisively and vigorously to that challenge, with the Bank of Korea playing a critical role in the overall effort. A strong case can be made that, of all the countries affected by the broader crisis in the emerging markets, Korea has gone furthest to repair the damage and institute underlying reforms to prevent future crises. That said, in Korea and elsewhere, the recovery is not yet complete, and more remains to be done. The depth, breadth and rapidity of economic and technological developments of the last several years clearly underscore the increasingly international nature of policy challenges, and the dramatic transformation of the international financial landscape. The intensified integration of markets - reflecting the globalization of capital, production and labor - has increased the risk of contagion, making it virtually impossible for any country that wants to be part of the global trading system to insulate itself from external forces. The crisis and the recognition that we have entered a new environment have set in motion a range of efforts dedicated to building a new international financial architecture. My remarks today will focus on what I believe can be done, from my perspective, to enhance domestic financial resiliency, within the context of these international efforts, and particularly on two essential building blocks: a strong financial system and a sound and stable macroeconomic environment.

A hike in interest rates would directly affect households’ purchasing power, especially given that households are increasingly taking variable-rate loans. A drop in house prices would also reduce their wealth. So, should interest rates rise and housing prices fall, it would have a bigger impact than before on households’ purchasing power, and thereby probably on consumption and saving as well. This brings me to the connection to price stability. Now and again we hear concerns in the public domain about the effects that households’ higher sensitivity to interest rates and asset prices could have on future consumption and thereby on economic developments in general. Several voices have called for monetary policy to be more attuned to this. Shouldn’t interest rates be raised to curtail a build-up of debt and a rise in housing prices? Should housing prices fall rapidly, might not demand and thus inflation be affected in a way that is not taken account of in the Riksbank’s forecasts? And, looking somewhat further ahead, might it not have a real economic impact that the Riksbank would also have reason to take into consideration? These highly legitimate questions are often based on concerns that some kind of speculative bubble has been blown up, in much the same way as in the commercial property market in the early 1990s or in the equity market ten years later. Let me first address the question of the forecasts.
Second, monetary policy must remain able to steer money market interest rates. I believe that this will continue to be the case as long as money market participants need to have recourse to the central bank for providing the final means of settlement. Third, electronic money, as a close substitute for banknotes and coins, needs to be included in the definition of monetary aggregates. Therefore, even though e-money currently remains in its infancy, the ECB has started to collect data on the amounts of electronic money in circulation. Without going into further details on these issues, let me emphasise that we are confident that electronic money will not pose risks to the ECB in the pursuit of its objectives. To conclude my remarks today, I would just recall that, in particular in the financial sphere, remarkable changes have taken place already. Banks have developed new products and services as well as new ways to commercialise them. Financial markets have been transformed by the emergence of electronic trading systems. These developments can be a source of great benefits since they generally tend to augment the range of options available to borrowers and investors. This may contribute to a better allocation of financial resources in the economy and, thereby, eventually to higher economic growth. As in all periods of rapid change, there are some risks associated with the developments currently underway. However, I am confident that these risks can be addressed satisfactorily, allowing the euro area to reap the benefits of e-finance. BIS Review 27/2001  3

This is partly because about 60% of all investment funds fall under the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive and so face tight leverage constraints. On the other hand, many alternative investment funds do not face any binding restrictions on leverage. Among those alternative funds, we find a tail of highly leveraged bond and hedge funds, which sometimes have a leverage multiplier of more than 30. I urge authorities to use the new data which is available to shed more light on this highly leveraged part of the sector. 5 This may help to better understand some of the lightly regulated and less transparent activities where risks may be building up. For instance, private loan funds may potentially erode credit standards and take on higher credit risk in the current market environment, whereas private equity funds may facilitate excessive leverage in the non-financial sector. Some of these activities may be escaping our attention, as statistics on them are scarce and they are often conducted by funds outside the euro area. Leverage may be building up, for instance, by the use of derivatives or in off-shore centres. Therefore, consistent reporting frameworks have to be developed with a view to gaining a system-wide perspective on evolving risks, also at global level.
Opening Remarks Bangkok Sustainable Banking Forum 2018 Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand Monday, 23 July 2018 Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, A very good morning to you all. I am delighted to welcome all of you to the Bank of Thailand for our very first Bangkok Sustainable Banking Forum. This forum aims to enhance greater awareness of sustainability practice in finance by bringing together leaders in the area of sustainability, showcasing best practices and efforts taken by participants from the financial sector, and identifying areas we can improve. This event is a part of a series of conferences organized throughout this year to commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the Bank of Thailand. Ladies and gentlemen, In 1987 the United Nations first defined sustainability or sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs1.” Since then, this concept has served as a guiding principle for various long-term global development agendas. Yet, the principal ideas of sustainability, especially of moderation, responsibility and maintaining long-term focus, hardly takes the center stage in popular media, most notably in the economic and financial headlines—where we often focus our narratives on shortterm indicators, like GDP growth, shareholders’ earnings, stock prices, or bonus paychecks. Whatever it takes today to maximize these short-term indicators is believed to be the best course of action. We often forget that our short-sighted actions also dictate and impact the path for our long-term development and well-being.

(2019) for studies that find that the impact of monetary policy on financial stability is too small to make it worth the cost on price stability. See Adrian and Liang (2018) and Gourio et al. (2018) for more nuanced discussions of the key assumptions that matter to the desirability of leaning against the wind. xiii Coimbra and Rey (2019). xiv See e.g. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2015, 2016) for the role of publicly issued safe assets in preventing the creation of privately issued safe assets, and Stein (2012) for a formal model of the impact of safe assets on the severity of fire sales. See Woodford (2016) for a comparison of the fire-sales risks of balance-sheet policies and interest-rate policies.