samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some CCPs are systemically relevant for multiple jurisdictions in view of the direct and indirect clients they serve worldwide and their interconnectedness with systemically important global banks. We have seen progress in making global CCPs safer and more resilient, starting with the safeguards introduced to address the shortcomings that the global financial crisis revealed. Today, clearing risks are much lower than they were ten years ago. And the robustness that CCPs have displayed since the outbreak of the pandemic shows that regulatory efforts are paying off. We should, however, continue to strengthen the resilience of CCPs. Last March we saw spikes in volatility and trading activity, coupled with a surge in liquidity and credit risk at the global level. Such situations call for closer cross-border regulatory, supervisory and oversight cooperation between CCPs, banks and public authorities. To prevent market fragmentation and preserve financial stability, both domestically and internationally, in the face of such adverse shocks, CCPs must meet the highest standards of financial and operational risk management. And an enhanced dialogue is necessary between CCPs, clearing banks and clients to ensure that, while managing their risks prudently, they each consider the impact that their actions may have on others and on the entire financial system. Central clearing is critical for sharing and managing risks effectively, and thus for supporting economic growth. Euro-denominated central clearing must not be a source of instability in the euro area or hamper the transmission of monetary policy.

We may already have entered into the next phase of the crisis: a sovereign debt crisis following on the financial and economic crisis. Fiscal policy challenges Most governments in the advanced countries will exit from the recession with the highest deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios recorded in times of peace. 2  BIS Review 51/2010  As can bee seen in the chart, the general government deficit in the euro area is expected, according to the latest projections by the European Commission, to exceed 6.0% of GDP in 2009, 2010 and 2011. In Japan, the government deficit-to-GDP ratio is foreseen to reach around 9.0% of GDP in these years, whereas the UK and US government deficits are expected to be in excess of 10.0% of GDP in the period 2009–11. These high government deficits are reflected in mounting government debt, which will reach 88% of GDP in 2011 in both the euro area and the United Kingdom, 100% of GDP in the United States and 200% of GDP in Japan. These developments are the consequence of sizeable fiscal stimulus measures and of interventions in support of financial institutions in many advanced countries, but also of the sharp contraction in economic activity. In the euro area, adverse fiscal developments are a cause of particular concern in several countries, generally those that did not exploit more buoyant economic times to firmly consolidate their public finances. In the United States, too, some States (e.g.
Therefore we are not positioning ourselves as a market that can match the supply and demand of Islamic products from domestic angle. 2  BIS Review 59/2008  Our objective is to make Hong Kong a platform for international intermediation activities for Islamic finance. What can we offer to the Islamic investors? Hong Kong’s advantages lie in its strategic location, highly developed financial markets and infrastructure, and a business-friendly free-market environment. We are strategically located at the heart of Asia with a broad hinterland that gives investors unique access to virtually every market in the Asia Pacific time zone. Almost all Asian countries are within reach by a three-hour flight from Hong Kong. What makes Hong Kong a natural destination for Islamic funds is our deep and highly liquid capital markets. Almost all of the most actively traded financial instruments are available for exchange in Hong Kong, and this gives Islamic investors a much wider choice of where to place their funds. More importantly, when it comes to investing in China, Hong Kong is about the only natural choice. Hong Kong has the largest and deepest Chinese equity and debt markets outside Mainland China. We are the first and remain the only major international financial centre that has banking business and financial products related to the renminbi. The development of a local renminbi bond market which started in the middle of last year has firmly positioned Hong Kong as a pilot market for China’s continuing financial market liberalisation.

Eddie Yue: Hong Kong’s possible role in Islamic finance Welcome address by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Executive Board Chairman of the Treasury Markets Association, at the Hong Kong Showcase on Islamic Finance, Dubai and Amman, 11-12 May 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and gentleman, It is with great pleasure that I welcome you all to the Hong Kong Showcase on Islamic Finance, presented by members of the financial services industry in Hong Kong, and jointly organised by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Hong Kong Treasury Markets Association and Hong Kong Trade Development Council, which is being held over two days in Dubai, UAE and Amman, Jordan. I would first like to thank Her Majesty Queen Rania Al-Abdullah of Jordan, who is hosting the Islamic Financial Services Board’s Annual Summit, the Central Bank of Jordan, and of course the IFSB itself, for graciously agreeing to allow us to organise this event under the auspices of the Annual Summit. This forum is indeed an excellent opportunity for the regulators, industry practitioners and investors in the Gulf region and Hong Kong to share new perspectives in the rapidly expanding area of Islamic finance, which transcends national borders and is fast penetrating global financial markets. Today we will be focusing on what Hong Kong has to offer and where it fits into this changing global financial landscape.
Although we can’t expect inflation to be exactly 2.0% very often (just four times since it was announced as the target variable in December 2003), inflation has been above target for most of the past six years. Both the extent of the overshoot and its persistence were greater than the MPC initially expected. The pain of that experience of high inflation over the past few years should remind us all why the UK attaches so much importance to keeping inflationary pressure under control and why we have an inflation target. Inflation is costly in all sorts of ways.1 It can destroy real incomes, for example by acting as a hidden tax2, and destroy wealth through a misallocation of resources. Those on fixed nominal incomes or who depend on savings income may be badly affected whereas it can inflate away the debts of others. And it generates a variety of other economic costs and distortions as changes in the general level of prices start to dominate the information contained in relative or “real” prices. Many of these costs are pernicious by being implicit; for example in businesses having to change price lists, or consumers having to spend more time looking for real value. The MPC could have set a tighter monetary policy to try and limit the rise in inflation. Why didn’t we? First, because we were pretty sure that the factors driving inflation higher were going to cause changes in the price level rather than being consistent with, say, excess demand generating persistently higher inflation.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Overview of the global economy Statement by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) Twenty-Fourth Meeting, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 24 September 2011. *  *  *  On behalf of the Constituency representing Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga and Vietnam. Global and domestic policy actions The IMFC is convening at a time when global growth outlook has dimmed considerably since our Spring meeting. Recovery in major advanced economies has weakened in the last several months. Meanwhile, growth in emerging market economies has moderated. Stresses in the Eurozone periphery have not abated and have impacted larger economies, undermining market confidence. Consequently, the clearest risks currently to the global economy are unstable debt dynamics, sluggish economic performance, banking sector funding stresses and policy responses perceived by markets as inadequate. Further, risk aversion in the current environment has already had an impact on emerging market economies, including those with strong fundamentals. Risks to the global economy and financial system demand decisive policy responses. For advanced economies with some fiscal space, this means a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan and policy flexibility to support growth in the near term. Eurozone economies under market pressure should deliver credible commitment to fiscal consolidation and implementation.
Ljube Trpeski: Goals and objectives of the monetary policy for the year 2001 Address by Ljube Trpeski, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia to the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia on 6 February 2001. *  *  *  Honorable, According to Article 3 of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Act, the Central Bank is responsible for the stability of the domestic currency, the monetary policy and the overall domestic and international payments liquidity in the Republic of Macedonia. Furthermore, the National Bank, within its rights and duties, is responsible for providing and preserving sound banking system of the Republic of Macedonia. Given such defined legal duties and taking into account achievements in this area, it may be concluded that in 2000 the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, acting in compliance with the given rights, accomplished its legal duties. Stability of the domestic currency The stability of the domestic currency may be observed from two aspects: •  Stability of the internal value of the Denar. It is expressed through its purchasing power, i.e. the price stability in the Republic of Macedonia; and  •  Stability of the external value of the Denar. It is expressed through the stability of the exchange rate of the Denar, i.e. its preservation at adequate level against other currencies. The preservation of the price stability is the primary objective of the monetary policy of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.

Thus, measured according to the costs of living index, the annual rate of inflation in 2001 on December basis (December 2001 / December 2000) is projected to equal 1.2%. In that sense, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia will continue with its intention to preserve that inflation rate to low, stable and predictable level, which is in compliance with the empirically confirmed knowledge that the price stability creates the most favorable macroeconomic environment for accelerated, long-term sustainable economic growth. The second aspect of the domestic currency stability is preserving the stability of the Denar exchange rate. The National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia managed to preserve the nominal exchange rate of the Denar against the Deutsche Mark at the targeted level of Denar 31 per 1 Deutsche Mark. The exchange rate stability was preserved, despite the developments on the foreign exchange market, where the supply significantly exceeded the demand for foreign currency. As a result, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia intervened on the foreign exchange market in order to prevent the appreciation of the domestic currency – Denar. From the beginning of the year to December 31, 2000,  BIS Review 9/2001  1  net-amount of USD 190.1 million was purchased on the foreign exchange market. Relating other currencies, the Denar fluctuated according to the changes of the exchange rate of the Deutsche Mark against these currencies on the world markets.
24  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  As one example, VAT data from SMEs in a subset of industries have recently been used by the ONS when constructing output-based estimates of GDP. As with prices, the gains in sample size and granularity from using such administrative data are potentially large. The ONS’s Monthly Business Survey of activity typically relies on a sample of around 8,000 firms to represent this subset of SMEs. This is now being complemented 29  by VAT returns from around 630,000 reporting units. These new data augment, rather than replace, existing survey methods. They have the potential to improve the timeliness and accuracy of National Accounts data on aggregate economic trends. The ONS has its own Data Science Campus to spearhead these efforts. And new research organisations, such as the Alan Turing Institute, are doing excellent work applying new data and techniques to economic measurement. Another potentially fruitful area of exploration, when tracking activity flows in the economy, is financial data. Almost all economic activity leaves a financial footprint on the balance sheet of some financial institution. Tracking the flow of funds between financial institutions can help in sizing that footprint and thus, indirectly, in tracking economic activity. At the Bank, we have over recent years drawn on the Financial Conduct Authority’s Product Sales Database (PSD). This is a highly granular source of administrative data on owner-occupier mortgage products taken out in the UK. It contains data on close to 16 million mortgages since mid-2005.

Unlike a normal firm, part of the value of a bank does depend upon its capital structure. There is also a deeper point here about the wider benefits to the economy of the maturitytransformation services delivered by banks financing their longer-term loans with monetary  2  Basel 2 in effect required a minimum equity capital ratio of 2 percent. But under Basel 3 there is a greater focus on the equity that is truly free to absorb losses. As such, almost all regulatory deductions from capital are to be made from equity rather than being split across tier 1 and so-called tier 2 “capital” or made from total “capital”. Also, some risk-weights are increased; for example, on counterparty credit risk exposures. Together those changes mean that an old Basel 2 core tier 1 minimum risk-weighted asset ratio of 2% is equivalent to around 1% on a Basel 3 basis. Taking into account the capital conservation buffer and the surcharge for systemically important financial institutions, for the largest banks the Basel 3 equity minimum comes to around 10% (plus any Pillar 2 buffers). 3  For the original paper, see Modigliani and Miller (1958), “The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review, 48, 261–97. Later papers by the same authors addressed the implications for their result of tax, bankruptcy costs etc. 4  This assumes a bank’s post-tax return on equity is determined, given the riskiness of the bank’s business, in competitive global capital markets, with excess returns competed away.
More than four-fifths of that assessment rests on the extent of non-traditional non-insurance activities in a firm’s business model and on its interconnectedness to the wider financial system. Nine firms have been designated. It is vital that these systemic insurers, like systemic banks or financial market infrastructure, can be resolved in the event of failure without the need for taxpayer support and without disruption of the wider financial system. That’s why the development of resolution plans is a top priority. Nonetheless, given the externalities from the failure of a systemic insurer, it is of course preferable that their probability of failure is lower. That’s why systemic insurers will be subject to higher global standards. The Higher Loss Absorbency requirements, being developed now by the IAIS, will ensure that all of the activities of a systemic insurance group – but especially non-traditional, noninsurance activities – are backed with an appropriate minimum level of capital resources. Given the patchwork of capital standards across major jurisdictions, the first step towards applying these heightened resilience requirements is the development of the Basic Capital Requirement – an internationally comparable capital measure that will act as the baseline for additional resilience. Last week in Cairns, the FSB approved the final BCR proposal which will be presented to G20 Leaders at the Brisbane summit in November. It is simple and factor-based, contains a common valuation approach, and captures all activities of insurance groups.

Mark Carney: Putting the right ideas into practice Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries General Insurance Conference, Wales, 25 September 2014. *  *  *  Introduction It is an honour to be invited to address you today. Insurance is at the core of the new Bank of England. As regulator, we are tasked with ensuring the safety and soundness of the UK’s insurance companies and the protection of their policyholders. To discharge these responsibilities, we draw on the entire resources of the Bank. Fully one third of our regulatory staff – over 200 supervisors and 50 actuaries – are engaged in supervising insurance companies. But that is just the start. Our supervisors are supported by hundreds of credit risk analysts, scores of monetary policy experts and macro-financial analysts. As a central bank with responsibilities for both monetary and financial stability, we have a view of both the asset and liability sides of your balance sheets. And as a highly active participant in global financial reform, we influence the measures that are reshaping the global system. In all of our actions, we recognise the importance of insurance to the economy. The UK insurance industry makes a major, direct contribution: £ to annual GDP and 300,000 high-paying jobs including many of the 14,000 members of the Institute & Faculty of Actuaries. It is a major exporter with about 30% of premiums earned overseas.
20  The algorithm also puts some weight on smoothing of the interest rate path. For more information on COMPASS, see Burgess et al (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  17  Chart 29: Simulation of Bank rate and CPI inflation Path for Bank rate  CPI inflation  Per cent 1.5  Per cent 3 2.5  1  2 1.5  0.5  1 0  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  -0.5 2013 2018  0.5 2014  2015  2016  0 2018  2017  February IR Simulation with a lower bound at 0% Simulation with a lower bound at 0.5%  February IR Simulation with a lower bound at 0% Simulation with a lower bound at 0.5%  Source: ONS and Bank Calculations. Simulations show optimal policy under full commitment. Were downside risks to inflation to materialise, this case is strengthened. Chart 30 shows the optimal policy paths if we assume the starting level of slack is larger in line with Chart 18. The interest rate path now implies that rates should be cut and held at their lower bound for longer. This alternative policy path returns output and inflation to target sooner, at the cost of a more significant over-shoot.

All of us have contributed to and are familiar with what has been accomplished in 2010. I will therefore refrain from listing our past achievements but concentrate on the things that remain to be done. Let us therefore start to think about our New Year’s resolutions for 2011. New Year’s resolution number one: let’s define a SEPA migration end date There is a consensus that an end date is needed for the migration to the SEPA credit transfer (SCT) and SEPA direct debit (SDD). Throughout 2010 representatives from almost every stakeholder group have been calling for a defined end date. Just recently a study conducted by BearingPoint revealed that more than 80% of the banks surveyed consider a binding SEPA migration end date to be necessary. In fact, the majority are in favour of an EU regulation to set one. 1 Of course it is no secret that, despite this general agreement, the details of such a regulation have been widely debated since the summer. For this reason, I had welcomed the European Commission’s decision to organise a public hearing on the issue, which took place last Wednesday. We in the Eurosystem have been very explicit in our comments on this topic and we have been calling for a regulation setting a migration end date for SCT and SDD. Indeed, we have gone one step further and have announced preferred dates, i.e. the end of 2012 for credit transfers and the end of 2013 for direct debits.
Øystein Olsen: How does the key policy rate operate? Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME), BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, 25 September 2018. * * * Accompanying charts of this speech. Introduction Just over a week ago, we marked the tenth anniversary of an event that shook the global economy. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy added fuel to a smouldering financial crisis, which gathered strength and spread quickly. Financial market activity came to a halt. Investors demanded high risk premiums. Faced with a crisis that could lead the economy into a deep recession, central banks cut policy rates sharply and injected liquidity into the market. It was the beginning of ten years of historically low interest rates and the use of unconventional instruments. It would take a long time to get economies back on their feet again. For Norway, the financial crisis brought an abrupt end to a three-year long period of gradual increases in the key policy rate. In the course of autumn 2008, the key policy rate was lowered three times, by a total of 2.75 percentage points. By the following summer, the key policy rate had been lowered further, to 1.25 percent. Even though growth in the Norwegian economy picked up fairly quickly, Norwegian interest rates over the next few years were influenced by a persistently low international interest rate level.

As a rapidly growing region, greater regional financial  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  integration will support the more effective and efficient intermediation of Asia’s sizeable funds towards meeting the investment opportunities of the region. Efforts to enhance cross-border financial linkages and advance financial integration have also intensified in Asia in this decade, mainly through the progressive liberalization of the financial sector, the pooling of resources to promote the development of domestic capital markets and the integration of payments and settlement systems. These developments have also seen the growing presence of Asian financial institutions in the region. In 2011, central banks in the ASEAN region have endorsed an ASEAN Financial Integration Framework which will pave the way for greater market access and operational flexibility for qualifying financial institutions. This represents the collective commitment of the region in the efforts to strengthen the region’s capacity to intermediate regional and international financial resources to productive activity in the region. A third imperative is the alignment of the financial sector to Asia’s demographic trends. Demographic profiles vary widely across Asia and have a significant impact on economic potential of the region. For many parts of Asia, demographic developments foreshadow significant changes in consumption, health and educational patterns. These changes have reinforced the significance of domestic sources of growth. Asia’s rising domestic demand has been supported by the development of a much broader range of financing options.