samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Factors that generate changes in ongoing rate of inflation must be distinguished from temporary effects on inflation due to once-and-for-all shifts in the price level. It is mainly variations in the output gap and in expected inflation which have an impact on the ongoing rate of inflation. Monetary policy accordingly focuses on these factors. Temporary effects on inflation may come, for example, from changes in indirect taxes and subsidies or from shifts in terms of trade. Monetary policy measures as such may likewise have temporary effects on inflation via changes in house mortgage costs, which are included in the measurement of consumer prices. This was the case in 1996, when the average rate of inflation fell below the lower band limit of 1 per cent mainly as a temporary consequence of the Riksbank’s reduction of its instrumental rate. Clearly, monetary policy should not respond to temporary effects on inflation from upward or downward movements in the instrumental rate; to do so would be to make interest rate policy procyclical and thereby destabilising. The monetary policy reaction to other temporary effects depends essentially on how these affect inflation expectations. If a temporary increase in the rate of inflation is taken, for example, to indicate a more lasting upward shift, so that people adjust their inflation expectations, monetary policy would have to respond in order to prevent the ongoing rate of inflation from increasing. If expectations are unaffected, on the other hand, temporary effects may be of secondary importance for monetary policy.

Much attention will also be required, in the fullness of time, to make sure that the financial systems through which financial intermediation takes place are robust so that the benefits of financial liberalization could be maximized and the associated risks could be minimized and prudently managed. 3. As a financial services centre which operates with a highly liberal regime, Hong Kong has important roles to play in all this. There is not enough time to go into details here on this occasion, so I shall just identify three general areas for your consideration. 4. The first area concerns financial intermediation within individual economies, in other words, the channelling of domestic savings into domestic investments. Here Hong Kong, at this stage at least, largely only plays an advisory role. The less liberalized financial systems in this region are very much dominated by domestic financial institutions, particularly in the banking market. Further, domestic politics and a desire to protect domestic financial institutions from undue competition are such that liberalization to admit foreign financial institutions to take part in domestic financial intermediation would only proceed at a pace dictated by these considerations. For example, it will, I think, take some time and patience for Hong Kong-based banks to gain a physical presence in the mainland of China, be allowed access to renminbi banking business and command a significant share of that business. 5.
New framework for macroprudential policy  Source: The Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15

Focus was first placed on strengthening the institutional capacity of the domestic financial intermediaries so as to narrow the performance gap between the domestic and international financial intermediaries. In parallel with this was the intense effort to develop the domestic bond market. During this phase of the development of the financial system, significant advancement in the banking sector was made in terms of capitalisation, risk management and governance practices, delivery channels and in human capital development in the industry. This paved the way for the interest rate reform to move to greater market orientation, thereby supporting a more efficient pricing of financial products and services. The more competitive environment that it generated also became an important driver of productivity gains, customer centricity and innovation in the financial system. Equally important, was the attention that was given to the development of a deep and vibrant domestic bond market as an alternative channel for the efficient raising of funds, particularly by the corporate sector. The development of the bond market has enabled better matching of long-term projects with long-term funds, and by reducing the over-reliance on the banking system, it has contributed significantly to financial stability. Among the institutions that was established to support the development of the domestic bond market was the establishment of the domestic rating agencies and Cagamas, the mortgage corporation. The Malaysian bond market has since evolved to become the largest in South East Asia to now account for 110% of GDP.
And it is that attitude, ability and esprit de corps that will no doubt allow us and the System to meet the important challenges on the road ahead. I will focus briefly on a few such challenges: The first will be on the monetary policy front. The Federal Reserve has engaged in a set of unconventional monetary policies in recent years. These policies have been necessary because the FOMC could not ease monetary policy further by conventional means – the federal funds rate was constrained by the so-called “zero lower bound”. Exit from these unconventional set of policies is certainly feasible – the ability to pay interest on excess reserves gives us a viable tool to manage monetary policy even with an enlarged balance sheet, and the New York Fed is prepared to execute on this mission, as we always are. But we do have to be a bit humble about what we don’t know. There will undoubtedly be communications and operational challenges and unexpected consequences. We will need to be sufficiently agile so that we can best achieve our dual mandate of maximum sustainable employment in the context of price stability. The second challenge for us at the New York Fed, and within the regulatory community more generally, will be in staying the course and implementing a regulatory regime in which no institutions are “too big to fail” (TBTF). TBTF is wrong for several reasons. It creates an unfair disparity between large and small institutions.

But it also extends to tending to the so-called culture of the institution – for example, ensuring that good ideas rise to the top no matter where they originate, and that people feel comfortable to challenge the conventional wisdom. These challenges are energizing, and that’s why being president of the New York Fed is the greatest job in the world. And I am confident that, because of the talent and dedication of our staff, the New York Fed will succeed in surmounting the challenges it faces now and will face over the next 100 years. And to drive home the point of our staff’s dedication, I would like to highlight the efforts of one person, Rosemary Lazenby, who has made this exhibit possible. Rosemary is the longest tenured employee at the Bank – 55 years – she is our resident historian and curator and she has delayed her retirement in order to develop this centennial exhibit. Her efforts are just another example of what really glistens at 33 Liberty Street (and I am not referring to the gold in our vault). Thank you Rosemary, and thank you all for coming out this this evening to enjoy the centennial exhibit. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
We believe there is a need for financial advisers to possess a larger body of financial and technical knowledge, that includes a deeper awareness of latest developments in the industry and opportunities available, and to be able to apply this knowledge to a client’s advantage. Other core competencies that need to be given greater emphasis include effective communication and problem solving skills. The second priority is to identify and address the barriers that are preventing qualified parties from entering the industry, and the constraints that are limiting the ability of financial advisers to recommend the best solutions to their clients. We are close to making an announcement on revised minimum entry requirements for financial advisory business. The Bank is also currently working on measures to create a more level playing field with respect to product offerings among the insurance intermediaries. The Bank and the Securities Commission will also continue to coordinate closely in facilitating the ability of financial advisers and financial planners to provide advice on a broad range of financial solutions. In this respect, further enhancements are expected to be made to regulatory processes to improve efficiency and further ease the regulatory burden on the existing players. The third priority is to improve the alignment between the interests of consumers and financial advisers. We believe how incentives are structured have an important role in shaping the quality of advice that a consumer receives.

We have a negative policy rate and have carried out extensive purchases of government bonds to hold longer-term interest rates down as well. Maintaining confidence in the inflation target is the main task of monetary policy. A challenge for monetary policy in recent years has been to push up the excessively sluggish inflation rate, which is one explanation for the expansionary policy. By doing so, we can correspond with the expectations of all the participants in the Swedish economy who base their calculations on the fact that we are aiming for a fixed target. The inflation target has been a cornerstone of the Swedish economy for twenty years, it is well known and established and helps to boost confidence in the Swedish economy. The Riksbank’s forecasts indicate that monetary policy will continue to be expansionary with low interest rates in the period ahead in order to stabilise inflation around the target. But this could also bring new challenges with it. Continued low interest rates could lead to the policy rate hitting its lower bound more often, thereby making it more difficult to stimulate the economy when economic activity weakens and inflation is below target. In such a case, it could be necessary to implement other measures, both from the Riksbank and from other policy areas. 1 For a discussion of the concepts of target range and tolerance band, see Sveriges Riksbank (2016).
Episodes of global financial crises are an excellent illustration of how macroprudential policy measures can be activated in a counter-cyclical manner. In the upward phase of the financial cycle, they were undertaken in a timely manner, with the aim of limiting banking system's exposure to risks and strengthening its resilience by building additional reserves. After 2008, in the downward phase of the cycle, this extra liquidity was released to provide support to the financial sector and the economy. The banking system remained highly capitalized and profitable at the aggregate level. Only a few smaller banks left the market, and there was no need for bank resolution, apart from one regionally significant bank. A different scenario from that in a number of European countries, which went on to bail out banks at a very high fiscal cost. Still, a deep recession took place during the GFC, demonstrating the need for a macro-prudential policy to work hand-in-hand with other policies. Even a very tight financial regulation may fall short of fully curtailing the buildup of macro imbalances and their eventual unwinding. Capital inflows came to a halt and borrowing costs surged as risk premia increased due to worries about growth and fiscal position. As that happened, as you would expect, asset price overvaluations unravelled. However, all systemic banks were doing fine, thanks to a massive use of macroprudential policies in the run up to the GFC. Smaller banks continued to exit either by being closed down or acquired.

Not all of them disappeared though, for example, Charlemagne capital bought four regional banks and consolidated them into a single bank. Cleaning up the market, by removing inefficient banks, laid foundations for a healthier banking system, resistant to macroeconomic disturbances and improved risk management. Moreover, these two crises made us attentive to emerging risks, such as rapid credit growth or lax risk management practices and generated political support required to provide us with the toolkit needed to prevent future disruptions in the financial sector with large spillovers to the real economy and potentially huge costs to the budget. Since then, we continued cleaning up the system with no threat to either the financial stability or the budget. Navigating the Boom and the Bust The resumption of growth and resolution of weak banks eventually stabilized the banking system, setting the stage for the period of rapid international integration and financial deepening of the 2000's. After the first clean-up at the turn of the century, the number of banks has fallen to slightly above 40, and consolidated institutions started to compete strongly. In their pursuit of higher market shares, banks turned to foreign sources of financing, facilitated by extremely favourable financing conditions and high liquidity at the global level. At the surface, the financial sector supported the story of economic growth and convergence. However, experiences from the 1990s provided an optics needed to spot risks emerging underneath.
Arguably, this is more of a communication issue than one of actual policy, and less emphasis on the readiness to clean up after a sharp fall in asset prices might have been a preferable alternative. The International Monetary Fund (2009, Chapter 3) has investigated the role of monetary policy in causing financial crises. A large number of countries and financial crises were included in the sample. The conclusion is that “the stance of monetary policy has not generally been a good leading indicator of future house price busts… There is some association between loose monetary policy and house price rises in the years leading up to the current crisis in some countries, but loose monetary policy was not the main, systematic cause of the boom and consequent bust.” Further-more, the overall relationship between the stance of monetary policy and house-price appreciation across countries in the years before the current crisis is statistically insignificant and economically weak, and monetary policy differences explain only about 5 percent of the variability in house price appreciation across countries. 13 Lessons for flexible inflation targeting What conclusions can we draw so far from the financial crisis about the conduct of monetary policy and any need to modify the framework of flexible inflation targeting? One obvious conclusion is that price stability is not enough to achieve financial stability (Carney 2009, White 2006). Good flexible inflation targeting by itself does not achieve financial stability, if anyone ever believed that. Specific policies and instruments are needed to ensure financial stability.

As a Fed policymaker, I strive to be clear in my communications. But I can’t tell you today precisely what I’d favor doing in the future, because that future remains uncertain. Thank you very much for your kind attention. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
They continued to grow in the postcrisis period, driven mostly by the debt component of the government. As for the foreign direct investments, their growth in the last period stalled, mainly due to the decline observed in the CEE countries. In the other two sub-regions growth continued, but at a much slower pace especially during 2012-2015 period. Overall, the data indicate that the ECB policy measures positively affected financial conditions in the region. First, loosening of the monetary stance through conventional instruments (policy rate) created a room for loosening of the monetary stance in the Central and South Eastern  economies without negative implications for the balance of payments. Reduced policy rates led to reduced lending rates thus decreasing the costs of borrowing of the private sector. Second, the ECB asset purchase programs that resulted in unprecedented increase of liquidity most probably positively affected the liquidity conditions in the region, as well. Although at a significantly decelerated pace, capital inflows continued in most of the countries of the region. Exceptions are the outflows from the banks in the context of the process of deleveraging, although the outflows might have been bigger in absence of asset purchase policies. Portfolio investments have been relatively solid, explained to a great extent by governments’ borrowing on the international markets. Although the capital inflows were not sizable leading to creation of imbalances in the economies, vigilance is warranted. The pre-crisis process of rapid worsening of the net international position was stalled, but with differences across countries.

Albeit for solving the growth puzzle a larger focus on structural policies and productivity growth is called, it is more than obvious that accommodative monetary stance of the ECB will persist in the forthcoming period, as a tool for growth support and for closing the gap between the current inflation and the medium term inflation target. Chart 1: ECB balance sheet and key interest rate (%) 6  ECB assets as % of GDP 40 35  ECB key rate  Deposit facility  Marginal lending facility  5 4  30  25 20 15  3 2 1  10 5  0  0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  -1 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  Source: ECB, WEO and Federal Reserve Economic Data  Having in mind the magnitude of the monetary accommodation and the fact that ECB tapering seems remote, this note investigates the effects the monetary accommodation produces on the countries in the Central and South-Eastern Europe3. All economies in the region are open economies with strong trade and financial linkages with the EU. Thus, there are a couple of channels through which the accommodative monetary policy of the ECB may be transmitted to the  Since 2009 ECB adopted a number of asset purchase measures aimed at stabilizing dysfunctional financial markets.
Tarisa Watanagase: Strengthening the banking and financial sector – what needs to be done? Speech by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at Finance Thailand, a seminar organised by The Banker Magazine and Financial Times Business, Bangkok, 22 February 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank The Banker Magazine and The Financial Times for the invitation. It is an honour, and indeed an opportunity, to join all of you here at this conference, and to share with you my thoughts at this very challenging juncture, not only for the global economy and financial system, but also at an important stage for development of Thailand’s economic and financial sector. The past three years have been one of the most turbulent periods in global economic development. On the global economy front, despite the signs of green shoots in the global economy, we are constantly reminded of the remaining fragility and vulnerability of such recovery in various hot spots around the world, with emerging new paradigm of risk, namely sovereign risk. For the global financial system, risk and challenges remain abound. The key challenge strikes at the heart of the global financial system – regaining trust. Trust in market mechanism, as well as its regulator, has been severely tested.

The response to the new note has been predominantly positive; feedback indicates that the public find the theme and the design appealing, and the security features easy to remember. The SNB’s extensive information campaign surrounding the 50franc note in Switzerland and Liechtenstein played a role here. Among experts – both at home and abroad – the note is seen as high-quality and cutting-edge in terms of its security features. First impressions suggest that, overall, the new 50-franc note is more stable and, as hoped, more resistant to tearing than the eighth-series notes. However, given that so little time has elapsed, we do not yet have any hard data or long-term forecasts of the quality and fitness for circulation of the new notes. We do have some initial data on the  Page 1/3  Berne, 10 May 2017 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference on new 20-franc note  security front. So far, only a handful of crude counterfeits have come to our attention; these were spotted immediately and withdrawn from circulation. We are happy to say that our logistics strategy for the issue worked well. The new 50-franc notes were available in the right place at the right time, right across the country. The decision to include the manufacturers of ATMs and other types of banknote-processing equipment early in the process paid off – the changeover was virtually seamless. The process of returning old 50-franc notes has so far also gone as expected. So far, over two-thirds of the old (eighthseries) 50-franc notes have been exchanged.
16.07.2020  50th anniversary of the UNAAC Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good afternoon. Thank you very much, Manuel. And my thanks also to Cristina for this invitation for me to speak to you today, on the 50th anniversary of the UNACC. It is a shame that we have not been able to celebrate this anniversary as was originally planned. We are living through strange and difficult times, but we must adapt to them. Yet despite this unique scenario, a 50th anniversary is an event well worth celebrating. Anniversaries, especially those which mark the passage of a decade, not least a halfcentury, are an ideal time to take stock of our achievements. Undoubtedly during this period a great deal has been achieved, but if you will allow me, in my supervisory capacity, I would like to make some mention of those areas where we must continue to improve. Over these 50 years we have been through several banking crises. The picture of our financial system as it stands today is naturally the result of these crises. And one point to note in this “family” photo is the large number of cooperatives which are present. The truth of the matter is that a highly significant number of credit cooperatives, or rather, a highly significant number of yourselves, have overcome these crises.

Evidently the supervisor’s aim must be to ensure that the banking sector is a fortress against the storm and not an added problem that we have to face at the worst time imaginable. 1  Recently, it has been frequently said that the banking sector is in much better shape than it was before the previous crisis. This will allow it to become part of the solution. In any event, crises are, by definition, periods of transition and COVID-19, despite its specific features, will be no exception. I believe this crisis will serve as a catalyst which will speed up many of the trends that we have already seen and discussed on many occasions at our meetings. First, as regards the importance of digitalisation. Second, in respect of the need to gain in efficiency and cut costs. Also, naturally, as regards the criticality of good governance and risk control, underpinned by the best international practices which will allow institutions to react appropriately to such changing circumstances. And, above all, regarding having a sound and sustainable business model for the medium and long term. We do not know what the future holds for us, but what we do know is that the better prepared we are, the better we will fare. Before I conclude, let me apologise for not having made the most of this address to introduce a supervisory “wedge”.