samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The second tool that many of us believe really should be considered, and which the Financial Stability Board is likely to urge countries in the G20 to consider seriously, is to be able to write down, or haircut, claims of unsecured, uninsured creditors and impose a partial conversion from debt to equity in conditions of distress while leaving the non-toxic parts of the bank or dealer as an otherwise viable concern. This is a technique sometimes called Bail-in, although that term is also used for a purely contractual route for recapitalising banks which is rather different in some crucial respects (both operationally and in terms of policy). Reduced to its bare essentials, it involves the following. You take the distressed bank or dealer, and examine whether it is rotten all the way through, or whether – as can easily be the case for highly-levered firms – its financial problems are concentrated in specific parts of the business. In other words, is there a viable underlying franchise once the toxic parts are written off? That will sometimes be the case, although by no means always. When it is, you also make an estimate of the firm’s loss. Sometimes that may not be possible due to chaos in the firm or the breadth of its problems. But if you think about the SIFI failures during this financial crisis, there are some instances where supervisors could, perhaps, have made estimates of the losses before the final curtain came down because they were on notice of accumulating stress.

This sounds quite straightforward but actually it would be quite a step because, of course, all of us are answerable to our national parliaments. But nor do I think it is realistic for countries to engage in or embark on what one might think of as unilateral disarmament, where a country that acts as host to financial institutions says to the home countries “I will let you lead in the resolution of all banks in all circumstances, notwithstanding whether you take account of the interests of my country”. So countries probably need to reserve some powers for themselves but should eliminate from their regimes any automatic triggers that can cut across sensible resolution led by a firm’s home country. The other step that we could sensibly take, I suspect, is for there to be much closer planning on a bilateral basis between host and home countries in respect of particular banks. I mean at the level of entering into more or less binding agreements on who would do what in the event of distress. That, again, sounds easy, but actually it would be embarking on quite a change from where we are right now.
The Sellers Stamp Duty (SSD) holding period was shortened and the rates lowered because speculative flipping of properties had declined significantly. Mortgage equity withdrawal loans (MWLs) with LTV ratios of 50% or less were excluded from the TDSR framework to give home owners greater flexibility to monetise their properties for retirement needs. - This is for a very small category of people: we estimate that MWLs excluded from the TDSR framework made up just 1% of new private housing loans granted in the last three months. Over the medium-term, property prices should be aligned with broader income trends in the economy. Ultimately, residential property purchases are financed out of buyers’ income. In turn, income growth depends on GDP growth. If property prices increase faster than nominal GDP growth on a sustained basis, buyers would end up taking on more leverage than they can reasonably repay out of their incomes. Such highly-leveraged households will be particularly vulnerable when interest rates rise or their incomes fall. Therefore, market participants – owner-occupiers, investors, developers – need to set realistic expectations regarding future property price increases. MAS, together with MOF and MND, will continue to keep a close watch over developments in the property market. MAS’ FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE After contribution to the Consolidated Fund, MAS made a net profit of $ billion for FY2016/17. This is a record profit but as I have often reminded at these briefings, MAS’ profit and loss outcomes are subject to sharp swings.

Until the beginning of 2012, the path of the SNB’s conditional inflation forecast lies above that of the previous quarter’s forecast. This is attributable to the assumption of higher oil prices compared to the previous quarter and somewhat higher import prices. Assuming an unchanged three-month Libor of 0.25% over the forecast horizon, the SNB expects average inflation rates of 0.9% for 2011, 1.0% for 2012 and 1.7% for 2013. Over the course of 2012, the path of the new forecast is lower than that of March because of the latest appreciation of the Swiss franc and the slightly slower development of international growth. Towards the end of the forecast period, inflation rises briskly and exceeds the upper bound of 2%. This shows that the current expansionary monetary policy cannot be maintained over the entire forecast horizon without compromising price stability in the long term. Due to the risks mentioned previously, the conditional inflation forecast is, however, associated with a high level of uncertainty. Global economic outlook Economic growth continued worldwide in the first quarter, although there were considerable regional differences. As in the previous quarters, the emerging economies recorded the highest growth rates. In the euro area, particularly Germany, the recovery was supported by strong export and investment activity. In the US, by contrast, high energy prices weighed on sentiment and held back growth. In addition, the persistent crisis on the real estate market is hampering the economic recovery. In Japan, there was a significant decline in GDP as a result of the earthquake.
Extending the term of a deposit by a few days to mature exactly just after the boundary of the liquidity risk measure is compliant with the letter of the regulation – but the overriding principle of safety and soundness must be considered. Firms should expect supervisors to ask these questions and they should be prepared to defend their compliance, not only with the letter of the regulation, but also with our principles of prudence, effective risk management and adequacy of financial resources at all times. Indeed, our approach has been to bake the spirit of the law into the letter of the regulation, via our Fundamental Rules. These rules define broad principles which firms must respect in addition to their compliance with the detail of any particular requirement. The Fundamental Rules require firms to act prudently, to conduct their business with skill, care and diligence, to have effective risk management as well as adequate financial resources, and to be open and co-operative with the regulator. The Fundamental Rule requiring firms to maintain adequate financial resources is supplemented by the overall financial and liquidity 49  adequacy rules . These provisions require firms to look at their financial resources in the round, not limiting their assessment to the specific financial ratios set out in the regulation. Moreover, they are backed up in statute  50  by the PRA’s Threshold Conditions for authorisation of  deposit-takers and insurers, which stipulate that firms should have adequate financial resources and adequate non-financial resources at all times.

Jan F Qvigstad: Comments on Lars E O Svensson's lecture "Policy expectations and policy evaluations – the role of transparency and communication" Speech by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference "Ten Years of Riksbank Independence", Stockholm, 11 September 2009. *  *  *  Introduction It was a great pleasure to accept the invitation to discuss professor and fellow central bank deputy governor Lars Svensson’s lecture in connection with the tenth anniversary of Riksbank independence. In his lecture, Lars Svensson discussed communication, credibility and monetary policy evaluation. He looks at general issues for central banks seeking to influence key rate expectations, using the Riksbank as an example. 1 I will not venture to remark on the Riksbank’s assessments but will offer my comments on the same issues in the light of Norges Bank’s experience of interest rate forecasts. There are a number of similarities between the communication strategies of the Riksbank and Norges Bank. And underlying these strategies is a model developed by, among others, Lars Svensson. In his lecture today, he described how to arrive at an interest rate path that “looks good”. He showed, as he has on many previous occasions, that this can be formalised by finding the interest rate path that minimises a given loss function. When does the interest rate “look good”? Svensson raises the issue of whether monetary policy is well balanced, not only ex-post but also ex-ante.
The Eurosystem has decided to take firm action when it considers that these interest rates do not reflect a genuine credit risk differential, but rather unfounded fears about the reversibility of the euro. Because at that point, the effectiveness of the single monetary policy is clearly jeopardised: the key interest rates that we set no longer feed through to the real economy in the same way in all countries via the bank lending channel – which is a crucial channel in the euro area given the predominance of intermediated financing. In order to fulfil our mandate of maintaining price stability, our monetary policy impulses need to be transmitted homogeneously across the whole area. This is why we decided to create a new instrument: Outright Monetary Transactions. The idea is to have a credible backstop to counter unjustified increases in sovereign yields. This backstop must naturally be accompanied by strict conditionality to guarantee that the country concerned makes effective progress towards a more robust economic situation. By means of this new tool, as with all of the other tools that we have deployed since the start of the crisis – in particular the measures to support bank liquidity – the Eurosystem is endeavouring to relieve the pressure from the markets which may undermine the ability of countries to implement the reforms embarked on, and which may eventually jeopardise price stability.

At the same time, there has been a need to fundamentally rethink conceptual frameworks and approaches to financial regulation. The rapid digitalization of trade and finance has transformed the nature of financial services, the types entities offering them, and the location from which they are being offered. Borders and dividing lines are being eroded, creating potentially large gaps in regulatory perimeters. Meanwhile the  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  rise of data-intensive platforms with strong network effects have raised issues concerning privacy and competition. How best to foster innovative solutions while safeguarding stability, ensuring fair competition and market contestability, and providing adequate consumer protection? What is the appropriate balance and combination between entity-based and activity-based regulation? How does this relate to the application of micro-versus macro-prudential regulation? Moreover, we also need to consider how best to gear regulation to facilitate the green transition that is so critical. Our conceptual framework for financial oversight has to shift as we grapple with these complex regulatory challenges. The climate challenge The third and final fault line is climate change and central banks' role in combating it. Of all the three challenges, this is arguably the most daunting one. It is new to us. There is no precedence to follow. And the outcome is not under our direct influence, testing the limits of our tools. Yet we cannot ignore it. Given the potential consequences, combatting climate change is simply too urgent and too important.
In such market we indeed observe the emergence of monopolistic situations and systemic risk is associated to the possibility of the default of such market infrastructures. We should therefore make sure that we –all collectively- are shielded from a too strong market concentration in terms of clearing, which create risks that can’t be addressed by cooperation among their supervisors and overseers. Conflicting interests may indeed arise between (i) the authorities in charge of the oversight of the CCP, and its financial resilience, and (ii) the authorities in charge of the financial stability of the offshore markets served, especially in times of crisis, as we have seen in Europe during the sovereign debt crisis. To prevent such situation levers to be used include in my view a location policy of clearing activities and direct oversight by authorities in charge with the financial stability of the markets served. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Uncertainty and capital adequacy Ease of exit is a consequence of the good risk management that pillar 2 requires of firms: risk management that is forward looking and prepares for unpalatable scenarios by structuring the balance sheet and business model appropriately. Good risk management is also about organising the firm in a way that allows the adequacy of the  Goldilocks and the three pillars: how much capital is just right? ‐ speech by Anna Sweeney | Bank of England  Page 4  capital base to be sensibly assessed, and the judgement about any need for intervention to be made in a timely way. In any balance sheet there will be risks that can be quantified, and there will be uncertainties that cannot. Uncertainties emerge for example, from reliance on unobservable assumptions or indeed concentration of exposure to any single risk factor on either side of the balance sheet. Another pertinent example is reliance on matching adjustment for illiquid assets: market prices of such assets are not directly observable and the calibration of the matching adjustment benefit relies on further splitting that unobservable spread into unobservable credit and liquidity components: so heavy reliance on the resulting matching adjustment is a source of material, inherent uncertainty. The greater the exposure to uncertainty, from any source, the less confidence we can have in the adequacy of the capital determined by a quantitative model.
On the other hand, we are constantly holding the banking system under pressure not only for its further geographical extension, but also for raising its quality and inventory of payment instruments. The establishment of an ever update payment infrastructure, side skipping investments in technology or out-dated solutions, will be a clear orientation of the Bank of Albania. In this sense, there is room for further increasing the use of electronic credit cards, on which I have observed that certain banks have been very active. In the quality of the central bank, we welcome any rationalism in terms of simplifying and unifying the use of various cards issued by the banking system. *******  8  BIS Review 38/2005  Further to my speech, allow me to make a summary of the financial activity of the Bank of Albania over 2004: Meeting the objective of price stability and financial sustainability of the country has dictated the need for a more active policy by the Bank of Albania. Also, the developments of two main foreign currencies, Euro and US dollar, have had significant effects on the financial indicators and the Bank of Albania balance sheet. During 2004, the total assets of the Bank of Albania were increased by 4.8 percent, reflecting growth of foreign assets by 14.7 percent. The growth of the latter ones was due to two factors: the Bank of Albania intervention in foreign exchange market by purchases, and the converting of foreign currency government income.

Interest rate developments abroad may have a considerable influence on movements in the krone exchange rate. The inflation outlook in Norway implies that Norway will not be the frontrunner when other countries increase interest rates. As mentioned earlier, themes shift in foreign exchange markets. Norges Bank does not have the instruments for fine-tuning the exchange rate. Normally, Norges Bank will not intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to influence the exchange rate. Foreign exchange market intervention, irrespective of whether foreign exchange is bought or sold, is not an appropriate instrument for influencing the krone over a longer period. We do not wish to act in a way that may trigger a game situation in the foreign exchange market. Foreign exchange intervention rather than a change in the interest rate may give ambiguous signals to foreign exchange operators and a game situation may arise. However, interventions may be appropriate if the krone deviates substantially from the level that the Bank judges to be reasonable in relation to fundamentals, and if exchange rate developments weaken the prospect of achieving the inflation target. Interventions may also be appropriate in response to pronounced short-term fluctuations in the krone when liquidity in the foreign exchange market falls to a very low level. Although the krone may fluctuate in the short term, when inflation is low and stable, the exchange rate will generally stabilise over time. When inflation has been higher in Norway than among our trading partners for a longer period, the krone has generally depreciated.
Against the grain of established thinking, and now famously, Raghu Rajan argued at Jackson Hole in 2005 that the Federal Reserve’s commitment at the beginning of last decade to keep policy rates low for a prolonged period had fuelled financial risk taking.9 While this is now  6  See Borio and Disyatat (2011), “Global imbalance and the financial crisis: Link or no link”; and Cecchetti (2011), “Global imbalances: current accounts and financial flows”. 7  The gross foreign assets of each country’s residents, summed across all the countries in the world. 8  See Cabellero (2009), “Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol 99, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 584–588. 9  See Rajan (2005) “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the future”. Speech given at a Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. August 27, 2005 He warned “persistent low interest rate can be a source of significant distortions for the financial sector, and thence for asset prices. Not only does this mean staying further away from deflation so that extremely low policy rates don't have to be used as a tool, it also implies exercising greater supervisory vigilance when those rates are in place to contain asset price bubbles”. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  posited as the “risk channel” of monetary policy,10 there has until recently been relatively little empirical work bearing on whether it actually exists. That may be changing.

A more gradual change in the interest rate can also be justified by the uncertainty of the forecasts and statistics. Monetary policy is normally aimed at attaining the inflation target within two years. This horizon is justified by the fact that monetary policy's impact comes after a time lag, but also by the desire to contribute to subduing fluctuations in activity in the real economy. By aiming to allow some time before the inflation target is attained, the Riksbank can contribute to stabilising the development of the real economy, but at the same time we must safeguard confidence in the inflation target. Taking into consideration developments in the real economy must not mean that the price stability target is set aside. The two-year horizon provides scope for flexibility but at the same time sets a limit for how large the deviations from target can normally be. The fact that we have chosen to specify an exact target for inflation is an expression of our desire to be clear and open. This is also why we have explicitly stated that inflation will normally be returned to target within two years. Similarly, the deviation interval around the inflation target aims to explain that monetary policy cannot, and does not, attempt to exactly attain the target all of the time. The deviation interval thus also emphasises that there must be scope for temporary deviations from the target, which may be justified with regard to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in growth and employment.
In contrast, the composite yield rate on Government bonds stood at 23.0%, up from 20.9% registered in 2004. As at May 29, 2006, the composite weighted average Treasury bill yield rate came down sharply to 6.5% while the composite yield rate on Government bonds declined to 11.0%. The sharp reduction in yield rates on Government securities has been due to low inflation expectations, coupled with high demand for these securities by Banks, the non-bank Private and Public financial institutions, and foreign portfolio investors. You may wish to know, Your Excellency, that there are no restrictions with regard to foreign participation in the Government securities market. With continued improvements in the macroeconomic environment, investor confidence is heightened with foreign portfolio investment in Government securities recording appreciable growth. Foreign portfolio investments in Government securities increased to K400 billion at end-December 2005 from K5.6 billion at end-July 2005. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, with respect to developments in the money market, commercial banks lending rates have also been coming down, though not as fast as the decline in inflation and Treasury bills rates. Commercial banks nominal weighted average lending base rate declined from 29.8% in 2004 to 27.6 % in 2005. As at May 30, 2006, the weighted average lending base rates stood at 22.5%. Clearly, there is a need for commercial banks to do more to reduce lending rates in order to influence a substantial expansion of private sector credit. Lower lending rates will contribute to the reduction in the cost of doing business in Zambia.

Your Excellency, from this, it is clear that the current strengthening of the Kwacha has been caused mostly by changes in economic fundamentals. I recognise the concerns by some of our exporters of non-traditional commodities that they are losing external competitiveness. I wish to point out that not all has been lost as a result of the appreciation of the Kwacha. Some non-traditional exporters have benefited through, among other things, the reduction in the cost of capital goods and imported raw materials. In addition, may I mention the fact that the exchange rate alone does not determine external competitiveness of exports. Exporters should look at those areas in their production processes where they can attain efficiency gains and improve productivity. These efforts need to be complemented by Government through directing investment in infrastructure and structural reforms, including labour  BIS Review 72/2006  3  laws, so as to reduce the cost of doing business in Zambia. On its part, the Bank of Zambia will carry out its function of smoothing the movements in the exchange rate in a way that would not compromise the low inflation objective. At this point, Your Excellency, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to humbly say once again that I am deeply honoured to be invited to address you on this occasion. I thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 72/2006