samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Achieving financial system stability Welcoming remark by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Conference on Banking Sector Issues: Weak Banks and Systemic Crises, Bangkok, 18-20 February 2004. *  *  *  Distinguished panelists, Honorable guests and participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the Bank of Thailand, I would like to warmly welcome you to the city of Bangkok and this BIS/FSI Conference. My sincere thanks to our overseas speakers and guests who have followed through with your commitment to share your expertise at this international conference despite the recent outbreak of the bird flu. It is my sincere hope that you will take the opportunity to see more of our country beyond the conference hall and enjoy your stay here in Thailand. At the outset, I would like to say I am honoured to have this opportunity to address a distinguished audience of bank supervising experts from all corners of the world. The conference has adopted the theme: Banking Sector Issues: Weak Banks and Systemic Crises, a timely subject - appropriate and critical to bank supervisory authorities, since risk management is inherent in all commercial activities. I would like to suggest that this is a commonly faced challenge to us all, regardless of borders or stages of socio-economic development.

These are just a few examples of the important work accomplished by the international financial institutions and various experts. Your presence here at this Conference is the best testament to how the solutions and ways for crisis prevention are still evolving, situations being reassessed, and tools being refined. Ladies and Gentlemen, There has been a saying that “every crisis is a new crisis” - we don't have the same kind of crisis twice - and this indeed is a scary thought. We can come up with a how - to book on solving banking problems and crisis resolution, but the challenges are still enormous. I would like to reiterate the point made earlier that prevention is key because once a weak bank explodes into a full-blown crisis, the depth and complexity of problems could be of the magnitude that is unimaginable. It is with these thoughts in mind that I would have to sum up with this simple message: a supervisor can never be complacent. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Asian crisis started from Thailand slightly over six years ago, and it induced a train of international coordination programs and discussions to prevent a recurrence and means to manage it. I hope this conference will add to our knowledge of supervisory tools that can aid participating supervisors to better meet the challenges of weak bank resolution and systemic crisis regardless of the stages of economic development and forms of financial system.
Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Promoting innovation in finance in Singapore Speech by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch of the Singapore FinTech Festival, at the Asia Society, New York City, 12 April 2016. *  *  *  I’d like to thank the Asia Society for hosting us this evening, for the launch of the Singapore FinTech Festival. The Festival will take place over 5 days in November this year in Singapore, bringing together technology players, financial institutions, FinTech players and regulators. We are launching the festival in New York City, and that is not as surprising as it may first seem. It says something about how we view innovation in finance. It is an inherently open system. Innovation is about ideas and enterprise flowing between cities, and connections between players everywhere. We can’t predict how those connections will unfold, but we know that there’s no neat geography that will define financial innovation. It’s also why we shouldn’t focus too much on the rankings of different financial centres at this stage of the game. You know what they say about the rankings of colleges and universities. If you rank very well, the rank is extremely important. And if you are not ranked well, they are unimportant, irrelevant, and they don’t get to the heart of what you are really trying to do. Well, we are nicely on both sides of that.

Evaluating banks’ readiness  First, the member countries of the Basel Committee have begun to survey their banks’ preparation for the New Accord. Some are gathering information on how banks plan to benefit from the new framework, while others have already evaluated selected banks’ internal rating systems and databases to understand how close those banks may be to meeting the stringent requirements associated with the more advanced approaches. In all cases, we are working to understand the challenges that banks will face and are seeking ways to smooth the transition to the new framework. BIS Review 52/2002  5  2. Training and preparing supervisory staff  Likewise, supervisors in all of the Basel Committee’s member countries are laboring to make sure that they, too, will be ready for the new rules, which is a second area of focus. From the supervisor’s perspective, the New Basel Accord will require a heightened sense of the internal processes used to identify and quantify risk. This, in my mind, focuses our energy on exactly the right place – that is, how we can encourage improvements in risk management by critically evaluating current practices. Our supervisory assessments will encompass several relatively new elements – importantly, validating the integrity, accuracy and consistency of the bank’s process for assigning internal credit ratings. Since those ratings will feed directly into models used to manage credit risk, we will scrutinize more than ever their accuracy and integrity. If the initial inputs are wrong, the whole capital allocation system becomes faulty.
In particular, given Asia’s role as an important growth centre in the global economy and the growing significance of the financial markets in Asia as a destination for global financial flows, there has been increased focus on central banks in Asia. Asian economies for several decades have established strong financial and economic linkages with the rest of the world. In this recent decade in particular, Asia has experienced significant structural changes that have altered the dynamics of the global economy and growth patterns. Since 2000, per capita income levels in Asia have risen twofold. With a growing middle class population that will reach 3.3 billion by 2030, Asia is projected to become the world’s largest market for consumer goods and services. Low unemployment and a resilient financial sector has reinforced this trend. Domestic demand has continued to strengthen while the growth in intra-regional economic and financial activities has been sustained. Intra-regional trade now represents more than 50% of total trade, increasing from 32% in 1995. Similarly, intra-regional portfolio investments have risen from 20% of total assets holdings in 2001 to 28% today. The growth in cross-border trade and investments in Asia has not only provided the impetus for the development of the domestic economies, but also enabled the region to emerge as an important economic bloc. A more recent phenomenon is the effort to promote greater regional financial integration through increased cross-border banking and financial activities within the region.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Asia’s role as an important growth centre in the global economy Opening address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the First Asian Central Banks’ Watchers Conference, organised by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) and the Lafferty Group, Kuala Lumpur, 1 November 2011. *  *  *  It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the first Asian Central Banks’ Watchers Conference organised by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) and the Lafferty Group. Bank Negara Malaysia is very pleased to host this event here in Kuala Lumpur. Central banks have generally been the most watched organisations given the significance and far reaching implications of their actions on financial systems, the economy and the economic well being of the public at large. This is even more so during periods of financial stress and economic distress. During such periods, central banks have generally been at the forefront in managing such crisis and its consequences. Indeed, this current global crisis has prompted central banks in the United States and Europe to be closely watched given the impact of their actions on not only their own national economies but also on the rest of the world. With the growing significance of the emerging economies in the world economy, our policy actions have increasingly drawn significant interest.
Relation Between Risk Premium and Credit Rating Credit Rating–CDS Rate  Maximum Change in CDS During Crisis*  (January 8, 2010)  95 0 85 0  Bulg aria  20 0  Indon esia  18 0 C DS R ate (bp)  R ate of Chan ge in CDS (bp)  Colombia  Rus sia  16 0  Turkey 14 0 S. Africa Me xico P eru P oland Braz il  12 0  T haila nd  10 0  S. KoreaMalay sia Czech Rep . 80  75 0 65 0 Hung ary 55 0  S.Korea  Mexi co S.A frica C olombia B ulgari a Peru T urkey Brazil Malay siaTha iland Polan d C zech Rep. Chi le  45 0 35 0 25 0  C hina  Çin  60 0  In dones ia  Ru ssia  H ung ary  22 0  2  4  6  8  10  S&P Credi t Rati ngs (A+:1 , BB-:9)  15 0 0  2  4  6  8  10  S&P Cred it Rat ings (A+:1, BB-:9 )  *The difference between the highest CDS spreads during and before the crisis. Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. BIS Review 68/2010  5  15.

8 The decision to restrict the issue of money in this way, despite the disadvantages, had, of course, to do with the strong temptation to issue too much money. 9 And, as we all know, this results in their value being undermined due to high inflation. There are many historical examples showing what happens when central government mismanages its assignment in this area. For example, we have the hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s, which led to an economic collapse and political  See, for example, “Sveriges Riksbank and the history of central banking”. Edvinsson, Jacobson and Waldenström. 2018. Cambridge University Press. 7 It was also common for the metal content in the coins to be debased. See, for example, Schnabel, I. and Shin H. S. (2018) “Money and trust: lessons from the 1620s for money in the digital age”. BIS WP No 698. 8 See, for example, Eichengreen, B and Temin, P. (1997) ”The gold standard and the great depression”. NBER Working Paper 6060. 9 The fixed exchange rates maintained between 1944 and 1971 under the Bretton Woods system were also tied to the value of gold. It was not until after this that the convertibility to gold was abandoned and the US dollar became a fiat currency, which is to say a currency whose value is not linked to any external store of value. However, even after this, many currencies, including Sweden's, were tied to other currencies in fixed exchange rate arrangements. 6  3 [15]  instability.
27  Work is underway under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board, which published Principles endorsed by G20 heads of government in April; and in the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors. These issues were also discussed recently by Eric Rosengren, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in a speech at the Institute of Regulation and Risk, Hong Kong, 5 May 2009 “Challenges in Resolving Systemically Important Financial Institutions”. 12  BIS Review 67/2009  many others have said, 28 we need to find a solution to Too-Big-To-Fail, or too interconnected, too complex – however one wants to think about it. That might involve requiring banks to have credible resolution plans for themselves, with higher regulatory capital and liquidity charges entailed if they do not. As we have seen across many countries during the current crisis, governments can otherwise end up having to provide capital support in order to prevent the financial system unravelling, with unfathomable costs for the real economy and so for households. The long lesson of history is that we must build a resilient system; but that we and our successors would be foolhardy to imagine that governments will never again need to provide capital to save the day. If that is right, then society needs principles and policies for what might be called “Capital of Last Resort”, to sit alongside the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) principles developed by and for central banks since the 19th century. Clear and timeless principles in this area barely exist.

17  More information on the Discount Window Facility (DWF) can be found in the Bank’s Market Notice, released on 19 March 2009. www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/discount/index.htm  18  In the auctions there would be separate stop-out rates for lending against liquid and less liquid collateral and the proportion of the Bank's long-term lending allocated to the different types of collateral would be related to the spread between the stop-out rates. A high proportion would be allocated to lending against less liquid collateral only if, given the bids received, there was an appropriately large spread between the stop-out rates. BIS Review 67/2009  7  Knowledge of the framework’s pricing structure can be factored into banks’ liquidity management and contingency planning. Mitigants for the “stigma problem” But during the turmoil of the past eighteen or so months, around the world banks have at times been reluctant to pay such “penalty” rates of interest for fear of signalling, if somehow their use leaks or is revealed by a “witch hunt”, that they have an idiosyncratic problem even when they don’t. During 2007 this became known as the “stigma problem”, 19 and it caused standing lending facilities, a key piece of central bank machinery for providing overnight liquidity to the payments system, to more or less atrophy in some centres during the first phase of the crisis. That state of affairs was not sustainable, and it prompted a number of central banks to innovate.
The bail-in rules that will be then in place stem only from the European Commission’s communication on “State Aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis” of July 2013, which establishes that any public support to banks considered as State Aid should be preceded by bail-in of bank shares, capital hybrids and subordinated debt. The text contemplates that exceptions “can be made where implementing such measures would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results”. For specific cases at the end of the Comprehensive Assessment, it may be adequate to invoke such principles. On a more general note, it is clear that to avoid moral hazard, any public interventions should penalise shareholders and managers appropriately, as was done in the exemplary case of the Nordic banking crisis. Here financial and economic collapse was avoided with, in the end, virtually no costs for taxpayers when the restored banks were sold. Thus, after the misbehaviour of several institutions that triggered the recent crisis – which by the way is still being uncovered – I fully support the change of culture from easy public bailouts to a new culture of private bailing-in. The burden of proof should be put on those who want to invoke exemptions to the new approach. Yet, we need to bear in mind that it is not only direct public support for banks that has a cost for taxpayers, but also financial instability – indeed, the costs of the latter may be higher.

If these three steps are still insufficient, ex post contributions from the institutions authorised in the affected Member States will be used. However, if such contributions are not immediately accessible, including for reasons relating to financial stability, the Board may exercise its power to contract borrowings or other forms of support for the Fund, or to make temporary transfers between national compartments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Banking Union and European Integration I mentioned before that the Banking Union complementing Monetary Union will have farreaching implications for European integration in general as it implies a vast sharing of sovereignty. European construction is still under the grips of the Jean Monnet functional method of integration: at each new reform step, other become logical and pressing. Regarding Banking Union itself, the other element that should complement centralised supervision and bank resolution in a banking union concerns a centralized deposit insurance scheme. Such a scheme would have several benefits. It would be commensurate to the centralized supervisory regime, and ensure that decisions that are taken on a centralized level affect depositors in all countries in the same way, thus ensuring a level playing-field. Depositors would be treated in a uniform way across countries, independently of their location and the location of the bank to whom they have entrusted their savings.13 What was achieved in December 2013, when the co-legislators agreed on the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) was only a little part of what in the end will be necessary.
In the case of social bonds, for example, the European Platform on Sustainable Finance has been working on a proposal for a social taxonomy, but this area evolves very quickly and more dimensions need to be included, such as diversity, equity and inclusion. In addition, the focus of sustainable finance is widening from climate to include nature and the environment because climate change and biodiversity loss are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. 7  Central banks are starting to analyse the consequences of the loss of biodiversity for the financial system. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) has set up a task force on biodiversity loss and nature-related risks. We need to research and learn more about the transmission channels from nature loss to the economy and the financial system, as we are already doing in relation to climate change.7 Thus, we have a further challenge here, and probably next year there will be a session at this conference focusing on biodiversity. In the meantime, to conclude, we can see that the issuance of green bonds is recovering in 2023. However, other bonds in the sustainable finance family are seeing less interest from investors. The challenges are several: i) the lack of common definitions, ii) the voluntary aspect of the European green bond standard, and iii) the lack of verification of sustainabilitylinked bonds. In addition, a higher degree of transparency and a global disclosure standard would contribute to the development of sustainable bond markets and a reduction in greenwashing. 7  See NGFS (2022).

As Marvin Goodfriend will discuss, part of this was due to appropriate market pricing of credit risk, but other aspects reflected segmentation in the money markets that was exacerbated by a pronounced lack of dollar liquidity. Some of this decline in money market functioning was not reflected in the effective fed funds rate as it was measured at that time. 7 The situation today is very different for a number of reasons. The Federal Reserve has the authority to pay interest on reserves. Many countries that run a “corridor” system of monetary policy implementation have had this authority for a long time and could transition from reserves scarcity to a state of more plentiful supply of liquidity while maintaining adequate control of their interest rate, as I noted was the experience for the European Central Bank. In addition, the Desk has augmented an old tool, reverse repurchase agreements, or RRPs for short, that allow an expanded set of counterparties to invest with the Federal Reserve either at a fixed interest rate or up to certain quantity. 8 With the advent of interest on reserves, RRP, and the Term Deposit Facility mentioned previously, policymakers have more tools for influencing market interest rates, and sterilization is no longer necessary to control rates with large amounts of excess reserves. Perhaps the most important development is the successful liftoff of the federal funds rate in December.
Most notably, governments need to ensure, under any circumstances, the achievement of announced fiscal targets and deliver the envisaged institutional and structural reform programmes. This is of utmost importance for improving market confidence and regaining macroeconomic and financial stability in the euro area. Thank you for your attention. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s latest economic and financial developments Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision-Making of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 31 October 2012 *  *  *  Today, on 31 October 2012, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council reviewed and approved the quarterly Monetary Policy Report. Based on the analysis of Albania’s latest economic and monetary developments, and following discussions on their performance outlook, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 4.0%. The Supervisory Council deems that the current monetary conditions are adequate to meet Bank of Albania’s inflation target in the medium term. Keeping the key interest rate at its minimum historical level ensures the necessary monetary incentive to promote Albania’s domestic demand and economic growth. Let me now proceed with an overview of the economic and monetary developments and key issues discussed at today’s meeting. *** The Albanian economy was faces with a challenging global environment over the first three quarters of 2012 due to difficult situation of the world economy, and particularly of the euro area. Domestically and externally generated supply shocks determined the economic growth profile and continued to test Albania’s macroeconomic and financial foundations. Over this period, the Albanian economy was faced with slow foreign demand growth, increased financial risk premia and tendencies of several financial market agents to reduce exposure to Albanian economy. These developments were also reflected in low consumption and investment levels.