samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In effect, the single currency has removed the exchange risk between the countries of the euro area and is facilitating the standardisation of debt instruments and their management on a much larger scale. This integrating effect of the euro has been most evident in the money market, by virtue of, in particular, the establishment of the large-value payment system TARGET, made available to the banks by the European System of Central Banks. This integration has shown itself in, for example, the rapid adoption by the market of reference rates for the euro area, such as the EONIA overnight rate or the EURIBOR rate for maturities of less than one year. Above all, we have seen a total convergence in short-term interest rates within the euro area. In the bond markets, the integration of the markets remains incomplete, owing to: national differences relating to property rights over securities; taxation, accounting and supervisory regulations; and payment systems (which are also hindering the integration of the short-term securities markets and repo markets). The integration of the bond markets is nonetheless progressing. First, we have seen European bond indexes become standardised. Second, the differences in rates between sovereign issues within the euro area fell substantially in 1998. Furthermore, 1999 was characterised by a spectacular growth in euro bonds issued by private non-financial firms (a threefold increase, over the first ten months, compared with the same period in 1998), and an increasing share of bonds being issued by small and low-rated companies.

In addition, integration in the stock markets is progressing, although they have to overcome barriers of the same kind as those I have just mentioned. In addition to the closer links between stock market firms, a notable increase in transactions on the new European indexes has been observed. Moreover, the “new markets”, with growth figures benefiting greatly from the establishment of the large European market, have expanded considerably. The broadening of the capital markets and their greater integration are contributing to a more efficient allocation of savings. First, this development is also leading to lower transaction costs and increasing the liquidity of the traded instruments (which in turn contributes, ceteris paribus, to reducing the absolute level of interest rates). Second, it is multiplying investment opportunities and increasing the range on offer. At the same time, it is fuelling competition between issuers, investors, and even, to some extent, regulatory systems (as shown, for example, by the adoption in several countries, including France, of a legal framework for real estate bonds, modelled on the German Pfandbriefe). Meanwhile, the deeper market calls for restructuring and rationalisation of the finance industry, the effect of which would be to strengthen the management of savings in Europe.
Islamic finance has grown by leaps and bounds, from only one Islamic financial institution three decades ago to over 300 today in more than 75 countries, including non-Islamic countries in Europe and the United States. The total assets of Islamic finance worldwide is estimated to exceed $ billion, and is growing at an estimated annual rate of 15 percent. Islamic finance has been transformed from a "nice to have" into a "must-have" system, evident by the growing number of jurisdictions allowing their financial institutions to offer Islamic financial services and increasing number of global financial players now offering Islamic financial services as part of their spectrum of services. Islamic finance continues to provide tremendous potential for growth and development due to a number of  BIS Review 13/2006  1  factors. These factors include the strong demand for Shariah-compliant financial services and transactions , the availability of a wider choice of products that meet consumers' discerning expectations, as well as growing acceptance of Islamic finance as a form of financial intermediation. In Malaysia, the advancement and progress that have been achieved in Islamic finance has demonstrated its potential as an effective form of financial intermediation that supports the needs of the economy. The industry has become a major contributor to the overall economic growth, with assets encompassing nearly 25% of the country's gross national product. This is a significant achievement considering the stiff competition offered by the conventional banking and insurance sectors. 5. The takaful industry in particular has shown remarkable growth.

Oil futures prices have fallen and indicate an oil price of around USD 60 per barrel in 2010. Other commodity prices that are important for the Norwegian economy have also fallen sharply. Metal prices are particularly sensitive to cyclical developments. Futures prices for a selection of raw materials indicate unchanged or moderately rising prices in the next few years. Many countries that have been hit by the economic setback will see an improvement in their terms of trade and growth in their disposable income. The current downturn followed a period of very high global and domestic economic growth, supported by favourable trading conditions. Few countries benefited more than Norway from  1  Folketrygdfondet will manage the new Government Bond Fund. 2  The Government has increased the capital of Kommunalbanken Norway (the local government funding agency), it has increased the scope of GIEK (the central government export credit agency) and Innovation Norway, and has offered state loans to Eksportfinans Norway (the credit institution for export financing). 2  BIS Review 42/2009  the economic upturn, which drove up prices for oil, gas and other export commodities. At the same time, an increasing number of cheap consumer goods were imported from new EU countries and from Asia. Norway’s real disposable income increased by more than 40 per cent from 2002 to 2008, more than that of any other western country. But our terms of trade are now deteriorating.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  For example, to cool Singapore’s property market, we imposed multiple measures to target different aspects of systemic risk. •  Tighter LTV ratios on borrowers with multiple housing loans served to moderate credit-fuelled investor demand. •  Caps on housing loan tenures served to curtail the phenomenon of those who stretched out their loans in order to meet the tighter LTV ratios. •  Transaction taxes in the form of stamp duties served to constrain demand from investors who did not take loans to buy properties a. Stamp duties on sellers helped to deter speculators who resell their properties shortly after purchase. b. Stamp duties on buyers helped to curb investor demand by raising the hurdle rate. •  Such a multi-dimensional approach required close co-ordination among the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of National Development. So, where does all this leave monetary policy? •  To the extent that strengthened microprudential policies coupled with the newly developed macroprudential policies can adequately address the problem of financial stability, monetary policy is freed to focus on price stability. •  We are back in the Tinbergen world. •  Or are we? Monetary and macroprudential policies: working hand-in-hand? If only our job were that simple. Macroprudential policies are still in the experimental stage: •  Its transmission mechanisms are not well understood. •  Its collateral effects and potential distortions have not been studied in depth.

The first was the crisis in the early 1990s as Head of the Swedish Bank Support Authority, colloquially known as the “banking ER”, which was responsible for the state’s support measures to banks. Then, it was a question of guaranteeing the solvency of banks. The second was the financial crisis in 2008‒2009 when the Riksbank took action and basically guaranteed to supply the banking system with all the liquidity required to ensure it continued to work. I now have reason to say this for the second time as Governor of the Riksbank. But the crisis this time is different. To begin with, it is not a financial crisis in origin but a crisis that has arisen due to a total collapse in demand and restrictions on the supply side. This time it 4 [5]  is a question of the state bridging over in different ways so that companies can survive. The Riksbank, together with Finansinspektionen, the Swedish National Debt Office and the Ministry of Finance, has so far taken forceful measures and we have supplied large amounts in order to ensure that credit supply continues to work. The Riksbank stands ready to do more if and when necessary to help the Swedish economy get through this economic crisis as well. We may need to do even more if necessary, and do it again and again until we all see the light at the end of the tunnel. And this we are prepared to do. 5 [5]
Durmuş Yılmaz: Recent economic and financial developments in Turkey Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the press conference for the presentation of the Inflation Report, Ankara, 30 April 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests and Members of the Press, Welcome to the press conference for the presentation of the April 2009 Inflation Report, one of the most important communication tools of the inflation-targeting regime. The report typically elaborates global and domestic macroeconomic developments and presents the medium-term inflation forecasts revised in line with the previous quarter developments. It also presents six boxes examining the recent monetary policy decisions and the relevant economic developments. Now, I would like to give you a short summary of our evaluations and the Central Bank’s revised inflation forecasts in the Inflation Report, which will be posted on the CBT website today. 1. Inflation developments  Distinguished Members of the Press, The world economy has been undergoing a period dominated by dynamics quite unlike to those of previous years. With the loss of confidence resulting from the on-going financial crisis, the global economy entered a significant contraction trend after a long period of time. Impacts of the crisis on real economic activity deepened in the first quarter of 2009. Thus, inflationary pressures, which were perceived as a major concern until the last quarter of 2008, were overtaken by fears of deflation in developed countries in the first quarter of 2009.

Paul Tucker: Introductory remarks at the book launch for “Investing in change – the reform of Europe’s financial markets” Introductory remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at the Association of Financial Markets in Europe book launch, London, 1 February 2012. *  *  *  AFME’s book is significant as it has reached beyond its own community – of investment and wholesale bankers. The contributions come from journalism, politics, academia, business, and central banking. Each of our communities carries some of the responsibility for the mess that engulfed the world’s financial system, inflicting hardship on households and businesses around the globe. That must continue to drive us as we work to devise new “rules of the game” for a better financial system. This evening, I want to dwell on just one of the guiding principles of the international reform programme: banks should not depend on a safety net from taxpayers. Of course, retail deposits – up to £ in this country – will continue to be insured. And we probably also need measures – possibly segregated accounts – that can protect the Temporary High Balances that arise when, for example, a person sells a house or receives a legacy. But regular creditors of banks should be at risk. Pretty much everything underway in international finance at present reflects the dynamics set in train by a progressive withdrawal of the safety net. Two points on how that will be delivered.
(iv)  More efficient retail payments  Given its legal mandate, one of the priorities of the Central Bank is to contribute to the development of the retail payment system in a manner that strikes a right balance between security and innovation, efficiency, and inclusion. The Central Bank will continue with an active agenda in this area, just as in previous years, although the focus might shift from “traditional” issuers and acquirers of payment cards towards fast or instant payments. In the near future, it is urgent to solve frictions that affect the market of payment cards, which may affect incentives of market participants to continue the path of development that we have seen in recent years after changes in regulation made by the Central Bank. Recently, new acquirers and issuers of prepaid cards have entered the market bringing competition and alternatives to persons and merchants, and the use of digital payment instruments has had a huge increase. This is the result of long-standing efforts, and momentum gained during the pandemic with a wider use of digital payments. 12  Regarding fast or instant payments, there is an international trend to implement systems that allow funds to be received by the final beneficiary as soon as it is triggered by the payer. In Chile, this has been the standard for a long time for electronic transfers of funds, but we believe that there is still room to improve.

Asia including China is clearly a key focus area. Take the Bond Connect as an example, in 2020 the scheme recorded an average daily turnover of nearly RMB30 billion, representing a growth of 82% over 2019. This accounts for 52% of foreign investors’ total turnover in the CIBM market, and shows that Hong Kong continues to be the preferred channel for investing in the Mainland market. The next exciting thing will be the launch of the Southbound Bond Connect, which will open up a ground-breaking conduit for Mainland investors to access the international bond market via Hong Kong. All these will be important impetus for the further development of fixed income including structured credit markets in Hong Kong. 11. Another important macro trend is the burgeoning green and sustainable bond market. The global green bond market has grown from practically non-existent ten years ago to $ billion in 2020. Recognising this trend, Hong Kong launched a few supportive initiatives in the last few years, including the Green Bond Grant Scheme in 2018. The latest Government Budget announced a new Green and Sustainable Finance Grant Scheme, which will focus on green and sustainable bond issuers and borrowers and extend the scope of eligible products, external reviewers and expenses. To create the demonstrative effect and establish a benchmark yield curve, the Government itself has issued two rounds of green bonds since 2019 that are aligned to international standards such as ICMA’s Green Bond Principles.
8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3  Commodity prices (1) (2)  (index, May 2010- June 2011=100)  (monthly index, 2006=100)  140  140 250  250  120  120  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0  100  100  80  80  60  60  jun.10 oct.10 Feb.11 feb.11 Jun.11 jun.11 Jun.10 Oct.10  Energy  Metals  06 07 08 09 10 11 11(f)12(f)  Copper  Grains & cereals  Oil  Foodstuffs, FAO  (1) Left chart shows indexes of aggregated S&P GSCI. (2) Right chart uses data up to May 2011 for foodstuffs, up to June for oil and copper. (f) Dots indicate average prices forecast for 2011 and 2012 in June 2011's Monetary Policy Report. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. Figure 4 Actual and expected monetary policy rate in the world (1) (percent) 24  24  20  20  16  16  12  12  8  8  4  4  0  0 97  99  01  Developed economies (2)  03  05  07  09  Emerging economies (3)  11 Chile (4)  (1) Solid lines show simple average of reference rates of each group of countries.

While these trends tell us something about relative patterns of global interconnection, they leave unanswered the question of whether global finance is a truly integrated network. To gauge that, consider an alternative measure of global capital market integration – the correlation between national saving and investment rates. From Feldstein and Horioka (1980), we know that this correlation provides a proxy for capital market integration. For example, a savings/investment correlation of one indicates a closed capital account: all domestic investment needs to be fully financed from domestic saving. At a global level, this  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  would signify something close to global financial autarky. By contrast, a correlation of zero implies that domestic investment can be fully financed on global capital markets. This would signal something close to perfect capital market integration. So saving/investment correlations of zero and one define the outer limits of global capital market integration. Chart 3 plots this correlation coefficient over the same 140-year period shown in Chart 1. Broadly-speaking, the two series track one another fairly closely. But Chart 3 now allows us to say things about the absolute degree of capital market integration. And what a rollercoaster ride it has been. During the first period, from around 1880 up until the Great Depression, global financial integration sat roughly mid-way between its outer limits. Integration was high-ish, but far from perfect. For around a fifty year period, from the 1930s through to the 1980s, global finance then went into hibernation.
After it became clear in August that Russia would not, in practice, be servicing its foreign debt, market participants became highly riskaverse. The unrest also spread to European financial markets and to Norway. Investors moved their funds to Germany, the US and Switzerland. The currencies of countries with less liquid and more volatile financial markets, such as Norway and Sweden, depreciated. The Norwegian krone depreciated from around 101 against the ECU index at the beginning of the year to 115 in October, the weakest rate since the objective of exchange rate stability against the ECU was adopted. Norges Bank responded to the sharp depreciation of the krone by raising its key rates in several steps through 1998. Following the last increase in interest rates on 25 August, the sight deposit rate stood at 8.00 per cent, 4.50 percentage points higher than at the beginning of 1998. Kjell Storvik stated a few days later that "The interest rate level which has now been established should, in addition to directly contributing to stabilising the krone exchange rate, dampen price expectations, which in turn implies that expectations of a further depreciation will gradually recede." During the autumn, it appeared that the effects of the depreciation of the krone on inflation would not be as great as assumed originally. First, the krone had depreciated less against an average of trading partners' currencies than against the ECU. Second, price inflation in the global economy fell. At the same time, it appeared that the turnaround in the real economy would be considerable.

As long as economic fundamentals do not support the krone exchange rate at the initial range, it is highly unlikely that this would persist. If monetary policy has contributed to a deflationary recession, it could not be characterised as successful even if the krone has been stable around the initial range for a period, because this would have created the basis for future fluctuations in the exchange rate. Similarly, a krone exchange rate around the initial range combined with high inflation will not be sustainable. Monetary policy could not be said to have been successful in relation to the guidelines because, also in this case, it must be assumed that it was partly responsible for creating the basis for an unstable krone exchange rate at a later stage. The Norwegian economy may be exposed to economic disturbances that contribute both to higher inflation and to a temporary appreciation of the krone exchange rate. In this situation, monetary policy should have attempted to counter a sustained higher level of inflation because higher inflation provides the basis for subsequent krone instability. However, Norges Bank should in advance have notified the government authorities, which should also have evaluated other measures for stabilising economic developments. The Norwegian economy may also be exposed to negative events that provide the prospect of a deflationary recession and a depreciation of the krone. For example, a fall in oil prices may influence the economy in this direction.
Developments in the public sector were unexpectedly strong at the beginning of the year, which counteracted the fact that developments in the private sector were weaker than we had expected. The strained economic situation in the public sector indicates that employment there will develop weakly during 2004, while the economic upturn is still not expected to be reflected in any increase in the number of employees in the private sector. The fact that the labour market to some extent lags behind production development in the business sector is a normal part of the economic cycle, but developments in employment in the private sector have so far been slightly weaker than we had expected. Monetary policy can only marginally influence the weak labour market situation in the coming months. However, the situation in the labour market is a central factor in the assessment of demand and thus  2  BIS Review 7/2004  for long-term assessments of inflation. Labour market developments can influence future inflation in several different ways. If the demand for labour remains weak during a longer period and unemployment soars, there is a risk that this will have negative repercussions on household consumption and thus on demand. Households have become more pessimistic during the autumn, both with regard to unemployment and with regard to their private finances. So far we have seen no signs that household demand is about to slacken, but this was a factor we included in the risk assessment in the December Inflation Report.

We are home to: four of the top five global insurance players; a vibrant ecosystem comprising a strong brokers’ cluster where nine out of ten of the top global brokers are based here; the largest captive community in Asia Pacific; a growing concentration of more than thirty specialty players; and the largest grouping of Lloyd’s syndicates outside of London, with 26 syndicates. Reflecting the increasingly important role of non-life insurance in driving overall industry growth: The share of offshore non-life insurance as a proportion of total non-life insurance premiums has increased steadily, rising from 60% in 2010 to close to 70% in 2016. Over one-third of offshore premium flows are attributed to specialist lines of business, such as large and complex property, marine, construction and engineering, energy, financial lines and agriculture. Insurance companies are gradually anchoring more global and regional positions in Singapore, and most Asian risks, including large reinsurance programmes and specialty risks, can now be fully placed in Singapore. Singapore’s share of global Asia-Pacific originated reinsurance premiums has also risen from 3% in 2013, to close to 10% in 2016. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Vision 2025: Global capital for Asian risk transfer 6 So what next after this? 7 The global reinsurance industry continues to face structural challenges, in a few forms: Alternative capital, which gives rise to excess capacity and softening rates, is expected to persist. Insurance underwriting is not keeping pace with the rate of emergence of new risks, such as cyber, supply chain, and reputation risks.