samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A large part of the petroleum production is exported and the bulk of the revenues saved in a sovereign wealth fund. 6 A strong fiscal position, along with a well anchored inflation targeting regime, allowed us to use both fiscal and monetary policy actively during the recent international financial crisis. The unemployment rate has stayed around and below four percent during recent years, and the inflation rate has been low and stable. This picture seems rosy, but there are concerns: property prices have risen sharply over the last 20 years and households are heavily indebted. Norges Bank was given a formal inflation target for its monetary policy in March 2001. The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 percent over time. Monetary policy shall also contribute to stabilising output and employment. In this respect, the inflation targeting regime is flexible. Norges Bank’s Executive Board comprises seven members, including the Governor, Deputy Governor and five external members. The Board decides collectively on the key policy rate, normally six times a year. 7 Our Monetary Policy Report with financial stability assessment is published on a quarterly basis. Analyses and discussions on interest rate decisions are reflected in the Report. Together with press conferences after our monetary policy meetings, the Report is the main channel for our communication of monetary policy. Since 2013, the Report also includes an evaluation of financial stability conditions, which is also used as a background for Norges Bank’s recommendation on a countercyclical capital buffer for banks.

11 The key policy rate was kept at a lower level through 2013 than projected at the end of 2012. At the same time, the forecasts for 2014 and 2015 were revised downwards. The primary reason for the revision was weaker-thanexpected developments in the Norwegian economy. Capacity utilisation and cost growth were both lower than projected. At the same time, there were prospects that growth ahead would be lower than previously assumed. Moreover, growth among Norway’s trading partners and interest rates abroad were lower than projected, and banks’ lending spreads were higher than expected. Conversely, a substantial depreciation of the krone through the  11  This setup is from Norges Bank Annual Report 2013. In each monetary policy report, we present a decomposition of the contribution from different factors to the change in the interest rate path in relation to the previous report. The most recent report shows the change in the interest rate path through 2016. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  year, which was viewed mainly as due to an increase in the risk premium, kept the interest rate forecast from falling further. A decline in premiums in the money market also pulled in the same direction. Experiences So far I have discussed the motivation for forward guidance and how we implement it in Norges Bank. Let me now share some of our experiences with you. As a starting point, let me again address the preconditions for forward guidance to enhance the effect of monetary policy that I mentioned previously.
The financial flows (FDIs and borrowing of private and public sector) are projected to be sufficient to cover current account deficit and to provide some further accumulation of reserves. Thus the foreign reserves are expected to remain at comfortable level during 2013, indicating adequate capacity for maintaining the fixed exchange rate. In a medium run, we expect more positive effects of the FDI’s in the tradable sector on the exports, thus lowering the trade deficit, which is one of the main structural problems. The Macedonian banking sector has remained stable and sound despite the global financial and economic turbulences in the last few years reflecting orientation towards traditional banking activities at domestic market and stable domestic sources of financing. In May 2013, the total banks’ deposits were higher by 3.3% on annual basis, and what is very important,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  the trend of more pronounced growth in the Denar deposits relative to the foreign currency deposits from the previous three years continued. In May 2013, the Denar deposits were higher by 9.3%, while foreign currency deposits declined by 3.4%, on annual basis. Therefore, the level of euroization, measured through the share of foreign currency deposits in the total deposits went down from almost 55% in mid-2009 to 44% in May 2013, which is a positive indication for the confidence in the national currency and monetary policy credibility (providing more space for accommodative monetary policy).

I will not have time today to dwell on the details of the plan, let me just say that the plan is now complete and is currently being considered by the finance ministry, and is scheduled to come into effect this year. It is our hope that this continuing momentum of reform will help expand the competitiveness and the growth of the Thai financial sector and the economy in the years to come. I probably have used up my allotted time. Again, I want to thank Euromoney for the invitation. It has been a pleasure and thank you for your attention. BIS Review 76/2009  3
For example, similar effects of diversity have been found in studies of the resilience of crops to pathogen outbreaks; in the robustness of savannas and grassland to drought; and in morbidity and mortality rates among humans facing disease and infection. 21 Diversity of the gene pool, it seems, improves durability. The financial system has mirrored the fortunes of the fisheries, for many of the same reasons. Since the start of 2007, 23 of the largest European and US banks have seen their market capitalisation fall by 90% or more – the fisheries equivalent of collapse. But what took marine eco-systems two hundred years to achieve has been delivered by financial engineers in two. In explaining the collapse in fish and finance, lack of diversity seems to be a common denominator. Within the financial sector, diversity appears to have been reduced for two separate, but related, reasons: the pursuit of return; and the management of risk. The pursuit of yield resulted in a return on equity race among all types of financial firm. As they collectively migrated to high-yield activities, business strategies came to be replicated across the financial sector. Imitation became the sincerest form of flattery. So savings cooperatives transformed themselves into private commercial banks. Commercial banks ventured into investment banking. Investment banks developed in-house hedge funds through large proprietary trading desks. Funds of hedge funds competed with traditional investment funds. And investment funds – pension, money market mutual, insurance – imported the risk the others were shedding.

They are complexity on the one hand, and homogeneity on the other. In essence, the financial network has over time become progressively more complex and less diverse. Why? And what have been the consequences? In the 1987 film Wall Street, the financial sector mantra was “greed is good”. The stock market crash of the same year put paid to that doctrine, at least temporarily. By the early part of this century, both the circumstances and the individuals had changed. So too had the mantra. It had become the rather gentler “diversification is desirable”. Risk-taking became less Gordon Gekko and more Merton Miller. Diversification came care of two complementary business strategies. The first was “originate and distribute”. Risk became a commodity. As such it could be bundled, sliced, diced and then re-bundled for onward sale. Credit became, in the jargon, structured. Securitisation was one vehicle for achieving this. Derivatives, such as CDS, were another. As these marketable instruments passed between participants, the network chain lengthened. In principle, these instruments delivered a Pareto-improving reallocation of risk. Risk would flow to those best able to bear it. They had deep pockets which they sought to line with higher yield. For the system as a whole, this sounded like the land of milk and honey. For a risk shared was a risk halved – perhaps more than halved, given the magic of diversification. The network chain, meanwhile, just kept on growing. 1  Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2007); May, Levin and Sugihara (2008); Allen and Gale (2000).
That decision was shaped by the inappropriateness of leaving the listing authority with the LSE when other competing exchanges are emerging in the UK. We believe that the current arrangements for the regulation and supervision of the securities markets between the MAS and SGX, with an enhanced oversight responsibility for the MAS and  4  BIS Review 14/2001  powers to pursue civil prosecution, will prove robust. But we will continually review the arrangement, keep in touch with international practices, and re-calibrate the roles of MAS and SGX where necessary to ensure effective oversight of the local markets. I would now like to touch on two features of the regulatory arrangement that we have recently reviewed. The first concerns the approval of substantial shareholdings in the SGX; the second, proposed changes in the prospectus registration regime. Approval of substantial shareholdings in the SGX The Exchanges (Demutualisation and Merger) Act requires anyone who wishes to acquire 5% or more of SGX to seek prior approval from MAS. This provision recognises the unique and important role of SGX in providing the infrastructure and marketplace for the trading, clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives in Singapore. Strategic investors As announced previously, MAS will allow suitable strategic investors who can promote SGX's growth and development to acquire substantial stakes of 5% or more in SGX.

How large a stake these strategic investors will be allowed to take will depend on what they are able to contribute to the exchange in terms of business alliances, technology or other ways of supporting the business and infrastructure of the exchange. Fund managers In addition, SGX has received indications from fund managers that they would like to hold more significant stakes in SGX than is currently permissible under the 5% cap. Fund managers are key institutional players on the buy-side of the capital markets, and will, as shareholders, add to the diverse range of groups with an interest in SGX's business. MAS will therefore generally allow fund managers who invest pools of customer funds to hold SGX's shares beyond the 5% limit. They will have to apply to MAS for approval first. The combined holdings of such a fund manager will be capped at 10%. A fund manager, however, cannot expect to be represented on the SGX Board unless it has a substantive, strategic relationship with the Exchange. Proposed changes to the prospectus registration regime The Companies Act requires every company seeking to raise funds via a public offer to issue a prospectus to inform potential investors of the financial status of the company, its business plans, the risks of investing in the company, and all other material information which will enable them to make informed investment decisions. Currently, companies submit their draft prospectuses to the Registry of Companies and Businesses (RCB) to be vetted for compliance with the Companies Act.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Riksbank  GDP growth in the euro area Quarterly changes in per cent calculated at an annual rate, seasonally-adjusted data 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Note. Broken columns represent the Riksbank’s forecasts in M PR 2008:2. The dot is the outcome for Q2 2008. Sources: The OECD and the Riksbank  BIS Review 100/2008  9  GDP growth in the world Annual percentage change 8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  Note. Broken columns represent the Riksbank’s forecasts in M PR 2008:2.

In principle, the three-pillar structure of the New Accord provides more precise directions to regulators to strengthen bank supervision and incentives to banks to become more sophisticated in risk management. Implementation of Basel II eliminates “one size fits all” methodology to assess risks and offers instead a wide range of methods to evaluate risks based more on failure likelihood. But the supervisory authorities in several emerging markets and many developing economies are concerned that Basel II puts a challenge they cannot meet. Probably our greatest concern relates to the need of the standardized approach to rely on external rating agencies for calculating minimum capital requirements. Currently domestic rating agencies are totally absent in Albania and not well developed as in many other non-OECD countries. On the other hand, in most of our economies many small enterprises cannot afford to be clients of international rating agencies. Since borrowers unrated from rating agencies will be assigned a 100% risk according to Basel II, initially most domestic credits may end up under this 100% category. This could reduce risk sensitivity of the new system brining it close or similar to that of Basel I. On the other hand, Albanian banks hold a significant share of government treasury bills and notes. Actually, under Basel I to this exposure of the banking system denominated in local currency is assigned 0% risk independently whether credit risk of the sovereign debt is rated or not.
It is possible that the boost to the nation’s productive capacity from higher capital spending and greater labor supply will be higher than anticipated, leading to faster growth and greater revenue. But, on the other side, the revenue projections might also turn out to be overly optimistic as households and businesses react to changes in the tax code by adjusting how they conduct their activities in a way to minimize their tax liabilities. This might especially be true as people look to take advantage of the lower top marginal pass-through rate that is available on sole proprietorships, partnerships, LLCs and S corporations compared to wage income. Debt service costs will undoubtedly be boosted by higher levels of federal debt and higher interest rates. In fiscal year 2007, federal debt service costs totaled $ billion on $ trillion of federal debt held by the public. By fiscal year 2017, although federal debt held by the public had nearly tripled to almost $ trillion, debt service costs were $ billion, only modestly above where they were 10 years earlier. Over the past decade, the sharp decline in short- and longterm interest rates has kept a lid on debt service costs—that lid is now being lifted. Although the future path of interest rates is highly uncertain, the most recent 10-year projections of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) illustrate where debt service costs are heading.

The longer that task is deferred, the greater the risk for financial markets and the economy, and the harder it will be for the Federal Reserve to keep the economy on an even keel. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. 1 Gerard Dages, Saraphin Dhanani, Beverly Hirtle, Jonathan McCarthy, Richard Peach, and Paolo Pesenti  assisted in the preparation of these remarks. 2 See William C. Dudley, Remarks at the Economic Press Briefing on the Regional Economy, August 10,  2017 and 2017 Economic Press Briefing: Wage Inequality in the Region. See also William C. Dudley, The Monetary Policy Outlook and the Importance of Higher Education for Economic Mobility, October 6, 2017. 3 See the New York Fed’s Economic Press Briefing on Household Borrowing, Student Debt Trends and  Homeownership, April 3, 2017. See also Bleemer, Brown, Lee, Strair, and van der Klaauw, 2017. Echoes of Rising Tuition in Students’ Borrowing, Educational Attainment, and Homeownership in Post-Recession America. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 820 (July). 4 For example, business investment in new equipment has historically been highly correlated with the capacity  utilization rate, which remains relatively low. 5 As measured by average hourly earnings or the Employment Cost Index. 6 Peach, Richard, Robert Rich, and M. Henry Linder. 2013. The Parts Are More Than the Whole: Separating Goods  and Services to Predict Core Inflation. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 19, No. 7.
Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Regulating the capital markets: making market discipline work Speech by Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore at the StanChart-Reuters-Business Times Investment Awards ceremony, Singapore, 16 Feb 2001 * * * The capital markets are undergoing a sea change. Technology and the Internet have opened new channels for investors to access a wide range of investment information and to transact in securities, often without advice or assistance from market intermediaries. Market intermediaries themselves are consolidating, and exploring new business models to capture clients and add value to their decisions. It is a more competitive environment all round, and the margins from traditional financial intermediation have thinned. Regulators are having to rethink their approaches towards the oversight of the markets in this new and rapidly changing environment. The objectives have not changed to preserve confidence by maintaining fair, transparent and efficient markets, and to minimise the risk of disruptions that threaten the stability of the system. But the methods of achieving these objectives are being refashioned. It is no longer possible for the regulator to root out all that is evil, dangerous or vaguely suspicious before they get to the market. Greater emphasis is therefore being placed on discipline being exercised within the market, and by the market.

Andréa M Maechler: How negative interest works and changes in the management of foreign exchange reserves Speech by Ms Andréa M Maechler, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 10 December 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. In my remarks today, I will begin by talking about developments on financial markets since the middle of the year. Then I will discuss the way in which negative interest works. I will conclude with a report on changes in the way we manage our currency reserves. Situation on the financial markets I will start with the situation on the financial markets. Financial market developments since the middle of the year have mainly been shaped by three topics: the uncertainty surrounding the first interest rate move by the Federal Reserve, monetary policy easing measures by the European Central Bank (ECB) and concerns about growth prospects in the emerging economies, particularly China. In mid-August, disappointing economic data and an unexpected depreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar resulted in a sharp decline in the Chinese stock market. The fallout was also felt by stock markets of other emerging and advanced economies in short succession. After volatility on the stock markets had increased sharply at times, investors’ appetite for risk gradually returned at the end of September. Favourable economic data from the US and the euro area contributed to the more positive sentiment.
First, recent monetary policy actions around the globe have included the aggressive, and in many cases unprecedented easing of policy interest rates, as well as measures to extend and improve banks’ access to long-term liquidity, limit systemic risk, and increase banks’ willingness to lend. But the use of these unconventional measures remains in unchartered territory, and few countries have had actual experience with their use, or to identify which ones are the most effective. Therefore, we need to significantly improve our understanding about how these measures might or might not work, what the conditions or indicators are that they aim to achieve, such as a pickup in growth or inflation, or a narrowing of short- and long-term bond spreads, for instance. BIS Review 33/2009  3  Second, given that such measures are relatively new and unconventional, communications with the public and investors are important so that they understand what these unconventional measures mean in terms of monetary policy stance and when to expect an exit once these conditions or indicators are met. Clear understanding will improve confidence, which we need to restore as soon as possible. Third, the feasibility of unconventional measures such as credit easing may be limited in emerging markets, where the stock of such assets for purchase is limited. What then, are the alternatives should emerging economies run out of interest rate ammunition, and are there other options before the traditional ammunition runs out?

But the important point here is that financial innovations, coupled with technological advances in communications, helped to link financial markets across the globe. This globalization of financial services allowed the collapse of major financial centers to spread to the rest of the globe so efficiently. In fact, these very financial instruments which had been earlier used to diversify risks turned out to be the very means for spreading contagion. The spread of the impact of the financial crisis onto the global real economy through the trade channel changed the world’s economic outlook rapidly and dramatically. This had a drastic impact on the inflation outlook, and the threat of inflation has rapidly shifted to one of possible deflation. At the same time, central banks are running out of traditional monetary policy ammunition to fight the slowdown in growth and potential deflation – namely cutting interest rates. Given the increasing influence of external factors on global inflation dynamics, traditional monetary policy which focuses on domestic dynamics of inflation needs to be reconsidered. As a result of globalization, the prices of important commodities and goods tend to move together, making external price shocks a more and more important determinant of domestic inflation. Fluctuations in oil prices and other commodity prices, or even a sustained period of cheaper or dearer exports, can change global inflation dynamics.