samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The weak domestic demand has created spare capacities in the economy, and has led to weak pressures for higher production costs and wages. Additionally, stable prices and exchange rates in global markets resulted in contained  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  pressures from imported inflation. Developments in the real economy, especially the weak domestic demand and low monetary expansion, will condition low inflation rates to continue even in the period ahead. Inflation expectations remain anchored and in line with price stability. During the second quarter, economic growth was driven by public sector demand, whereas other components were weak. Though higher than in the first quarter, consumer spending did not manage to provide significant contribution to economic growth. The performance of this domestic demand component continues to be affected by high uncertainties and limited financing resources. Against the low consumer demand, presence of spare capacities, and relatively tight lending standards, private investments remained low. Developments in fiscal indicators during the first nine months of the year point to a stimulating fiscal policy, especially in the first half of the year. Stimulating features were present both in terms of expenditure and revenues. During this period, budget expenditure increased 8.3% from a year earlier, driven by both current and capital expenditure. At the same time, revenues marked a 4% annual decrease, reflecting the decline in most of its constituent items.

Financial union is essential in a single currency area where cross-border capital flows can lead to credit booms and other imbalances – and where the negative effects of a bust can spread rapidly to other members. One essential part of financial union is a single banking supervisor. As you know, the European Commission has recently proposed that the new supervisor should be based at the ECB. This is important to ensure consistency across the euro area and to prevent regulatory capture. Day-to-day tasks, however, would remain with national supervisors who have the competence and resources to implement them. But financial union does not have to imply the pooling of deposit guarantee schemes, an issue that I know is of concern in this country. Organising and funding deposit guarantee schemes can remain a national responsibility, with comparable effectiveness. In the longer term, all four pillars are equally important. They are the bedrock for the enormous potential of the single currency for Europe’s citizens. Completing economic and monetary union would give citizens greater security against any future crisis. It would create the foundations for sustainable growth and employment. For all citizens of the euro area, it is therefore essential that Europe’s leaders stay on course. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
  Funding of the restructuring firm.   The reactions of rating agencies and of customers either influenced by rating agency actions or subject to bylaws or guidelines.   Legal authority and enforceability across jurisdictions. The appropriate legal authorization not only needs to exist in each home country jurisdiction, but we also need proposed legal mechanisms to ensure that: –  Supervisors in other countries will not treat the triggering of bail-in as an insolvency event;  –  Supervisors in other countries will coordinate with the home country in exercising any supervisory trigger in their jurisdiction; and  –  The company’s debt conversion will be honored in all jurisdictions (through choice of law or other legal foundation). I’ll conclude with the timing of the trigger. A key question is when such a mechanism has the greatest chance of success. In my personal view, it seems unlikely that the proverbial “one minute to midnight” is the right moment for action – by then most firms would face a severe shortage of liquidity and serious constraints in the ability to undertake new business. Timing that is too early brings with it a host of repercussions and risks, of course. If I interpret a bail-in mechanism against the three-part supervisory program for troubled firms that I described at the beginning, conversion of debt to equity stakes is a mechanism to replenish capital, a critical element, but just one of the three key elements.

Conclusion I’ll conclude with this: If the history of central banking teaches us one thing, it’s that “necessity is the mother of invention.” Severe crises demand innovative and decisive responses, and the Federal Reserve is striving to deliver just that. These are unprecedented times, and the pandemic presents truly unique challenges. However, the actions we have undertaken harken back to why the Federal Reserve was created in the first place. That is, to do what only a central bank can do: to keep credit flowing when fear and uncertainty take hold, and in that way to foster a strong economy with maximum employment and stable prices.1234567 1  More information about this financial crisis can be found in Donald P. Morgan and James Narron, The Final Crisis Chronicle: The Panic of 1907 and the Birth of the Fed, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, November 18, 2016. 2  For a more detailed overview of the Federal Reserve’s responses to the pandemic-related disruptions in financial markets, see Michael Fleming, Asani Sarkar, and Peter Van Tassel, The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Fed’s Response, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, April 15, 2020. 3  The impact of these strains on liquidity in the Treasury market is discussed in Michael Fleming and Francisco Ruela, Treasury Market Liquidity during the COVID-19 Crisis, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, April 17, 2020.
In this context, there are several key issues that Malaysia needs to address to face a new world, a world in which trend growth will be lower, capital will be less readily available and at higher cost, competition more intense, short-term capital flows remain volatile and protectionism could rear its ugly head again. Malaysia also has to position itself to seize the opportunities to fully benefit from the growing economic integration and dynamism in Asia. Yet at the same time, Malaysia must be ready to face more intense competition for foreign direct investments (FDIs) and markets from key Asian neighbours. Aftermath of the crisis – emergence of a new world After one of the worst crises in modern history, the global economy – led by the emerging economies, especially China – is now en route to recovery but this revival is yet entrenched and risks remain on its sustainability. The global economy is still fundamentally weak, with the recovery uneven and growth remains highly dependent on policy support of very large fiscal stimulus and aggressive monetary easing around the world. The crisis-affected advanced economies continue to face rising unemployment, weak financial systems, ongoing de-leveraging of households and financial institutions with weak balance sheet. Although financial markets have begun to stabilise following extensive policy support, the progress of financial sector resolution and reforms in the advanced economies is far from complete.

Øystein Olsen: Management of the Government Pension Fund Global Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting, Oslo, 3 May 2021. * * * Please note that the text below may differ from the actual address. I would like to thank the Committee for the invitation to speak on the Bank’s management of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). Norges Bank manages the GPFG with the objective of achieving the highest possible return over time within the limits of the investment mandate defined by the Ministry of Finance. The GPFG is to be managed within an adequate control and risk management framework and in a responsible and efficient manner with a high degree of transparency. The GPFG is managed to track the benchmark index fairly closely, ie the return largely tracks the return on the benchmark index. The benchmark index is defined by the Ministry of Finance and endorsed by the Storting. However, even though Norges Bank closely tracks the GPFG’s benchmark index, many large and small choices have to be made every day. These choices are based on a clear mandate from the authorities and a well thought-out investment strategy. The year 2020 was a special year for us all, including the GPFG. As for many others, working conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic have been demanding.
Luis M Linde: The recovery of the Spanish economy Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XVI Congreso Nacional de la Empresa Familiar, Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, Madrid, 28 October 2013. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for inviting me to take part in this Congress. It is an important meeting and offers me the opportunity to discuss, firstly, the recently released data suggesting an improvement in economic activity across the European Union, and also in Spain. And, secondly, to address the strengthening of the Spanish banking sector and its role in the start of the recovery we expect in 2014. In the euro area, the indicators signal that activity is beginning to pick up, and most analysts foresee that this recovery can take root. As a member of the European Central Bank’s Governing Council I should, before continuing with my address, highlight the contribution of the monetary policy applied by the ECB to containing the crisis. In facing up to the crisis, the European Central Bank has used its full range of measures, providing abundant liquidity at increasingly lower prices. The easing of monetary conditions has led to a substantial reduction in official interest rates, to their current level of 0.5%, almost 4 pp down on that five years ago.

This was all done in collaboration with the European Commission, the ECB, the IMF and the European Banking Authority, in the presence of independent consultants and auditors, and with the participation of the Banco de España supervisory and regulatory teams, which was technically very important for the performance of the exercise. The recapitalisation of our banks has been carried out through private access to markets; the injection of capital financed via the financial assistance programme agreed with the European authorities; the conversion of hybrid instruments into capital instruments; and the provision of funds by the FROB (Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector) and the Deposit Guarantee Fund. From May 2009 to last September, the public assistance afforded to financial institutions to reconstitute their capital amounted to a somewhat over € billion (6% of our 2012 GDP), close to € billion of which were under the Financial Assistance Programme approved with the European authorities in July 2012. The essential aim of these recapitalisation operations using public funds has been none other than to preserve the deposits in the institutions in question (as is widely known, these are the only bank liabilities not to have undergone any loss throughout the process), providing for business continuity by these institutions’ own means or by their absorption by others. This is a crucial point I wish to highlight, as it is not always well-understood.
SPEECH DATE:  31 August 2022  SPEAKER:  Deputy Governor Anna Breman  VENUE:  Sveriges Riksbank  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  From 500 per cent to −0.5 per cent to − what is next? * On the afternoon of 16 September 1992, my teacher Conny came into our class and exclaimed: “The Riksbank has raised its policy rate to 500 per cent”. I said spontaneously “no” – I did not believe him. I studied the science programme at upper secondary school and thought I was good at maths, and an interest rate of 500% was something no one could pay. I started to contradict him. But the teacher insisted he was right - and so he was. The Riksbank had raised its policy rate to 500 per cent in an attempt to defend the fixed exchange rate. This sparked an interest that led me to study Economics at university a few years later. The so-called 1990s crisis fundamentally changed Sweden. It led to a series of reforms that we are still living with today: the inflation target, the fiscal policy framework and the Industrial Agreement. At present, the economic policy framework, and not least the inflation target, is being put to the test.

In addition, the tax rules meant that the impact of interest expenses was reduced, which would change with the tax reform in 1990-91. Moreover, there was a strong domestic inflation trend with price and wage spirals, which had long been something of a structural problem in the Swedish economy. The combination of high inflation, high inflation expectations and the design of the tax system meant that the interest rate after tax and inflation was negative for many investors and households, which of course made it tempting to take out a loan. Stabilisation policy was not sufficiently strict to dampen lending, and so the economy was heading toward overheating in the late 1980s. In 1990–91, there was a substantial reversal in the real interest rate, for several reasons. German reunification pushed international interest rates upwards, foreign exchange market unrest forced the Riksbank and central banks in other ERM countries to raise their policy rates to defend their respective exchange rates, and  5  More detailed accounts of the 1990s crisis and its background can be found in, for example, the Economic Commission (1993) and Wetterberg (2009). 3 [16]  the tax reform in 1990–91 made it more expensive to borrow. From having been negative, the real interest rate rose in a short time to around 5 per cent, in what has been called the ‘real interest rate shock’. This reversal shook up the financial system, property prices fell and a combined financial, banking and property crisis broke out.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Le Monde Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, in Le Monde, France, conducted by Mr Frédéric Lemaître, Mr Stéphane Lauer and Mrs Marie de Vergès, on 31 May 2010. *  *  *  Is the euro in danger? The euro is a very credible currency which keeps its value. Since its introduction 11½ years ago, average annual inflation has been below but close to 2%, in line with our definition of price stability. The euro’s capacity to maintain its value is absolutely essential for the confidence of investors both inside and outside the euro area. So what is the problem? The issue is that of financial stability within the euro area on account of bad fiscal policy in certain countries, in particular Greece. It is imperative that this be corrected. The responsibilities of each of the countries concerned are the primary cause. But there is also a true collegial responsibility. Close multilateral surveillance, which is fundamental in the spirit and the letter of the Stability and Growth Pact, has been terribly neglected. This is not particularly surprising, given that in 2004 and 2005 the Pact was unfortunately subject to severe criticism, including from large countries such as Germany, France and Italy. They set a very bad example, both in terms of managing and being accountable for their own fiscal policy, and as members of the Eurogroup and thus essential figures in the surveillance of the fiscal situation in each country.

As you know, I never comment on what my colleagues have said. On the basis of our decision, which was taken by the Governing Council with an overwhelming majority, I would like to emphasise the following points. First, we are totally independent of governments and pressure groups of any kind. It is not by chance that we have guaranteed price stability, but by taking decisions which have pleased neither governments nor lobby groups. Second, our mandate is price stability. From 1999 to the present we have delivered average annual inflation of 1.98% for 330 million European citizens. We are unswervingly committed to price stability. Third, we re-absorb all of the liquidity that is injected through our interventions. We are not printing money and there is no change to monetary policy. Fourth, the aim of our interventions is to enable certain markets to function more normally, in order to ensure the correct transmission of our monetary policy, which is unchanged. Fifth, we have taken note of the decision by governments not only to strictly comply with their undertakings to reduce deficits, but also, on the part of a number of them, to step up their budgetary consolidation efforts. For us, this is absolutely of the essence. BIS Review 76/2010  3  Does the situation of the Spanish banks concern you? I have no particular comments at this stage. On the international level, prudential supervision by the Banco de España has always been regarded as rigorous, particularly with its concept of dynamic provisioning.
Many observers fear that the forthcoming ruling by Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court will impose strict limits on OMTs, and that this could trigger turbulence. How big is that risk? I don’t know how the judges in Karlsruhe will rule either, and I have great respect for the court – from one independent institution to another. I think, though, that the views of market participants in New York, Frankfurt and Hong Kong are quite clear: the OMTs are fine the way they are, without any limitations being imposed. Is it really realistic to assume that the mere announcement of OMTs will be sufficient in the longer term? Jens Weidmann, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, has said that one lesson from the crisis is the fact that announcements will be tested. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The principle of deterrence also applied in the cold war. But what matters is that we are completely ready to act. When the necessary conditions have been met, we will take a monetary policy decision. We’ve had extremely low interest rates worldwide for a long period of time, combined with unprecedented non-standard measures. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is warning that, this time, the exit will be even more difficult than in the past. Is it actually possible to exit this situation without turbulence? Otmar Issing said that an exit was a question not of technical possibilities, but of political will. This exit will certainly be more complex on account of the non-standard instruments.

Would that be appropriate, and would it be feasible from a political perspective? 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I don’t think the answer here is black and white. On the one hand, every central bank has a national mandate. And I don’t think that will change in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, there is already some coordination – at the BIS, at the G7 and at the G20. The latest G20 summit has just ended. Little came of it. Are you disappointed? The summit was clearly overshadowed by events in Syria. I think the fact that the issue of tax avoidance and tax structuring is now being raised at G20 level is a positive development. There was some limited progress in terms of financial regulation. However, I was indeed disappointed by the decisions made in the area of fiscal policy, as the United States and Japan in particular – especially the latter – have no credible medium-term consolidation plans. These are required as a matter of great urgency. You have talked about the reform of the global financial system. Almost exactly five years after Lehman Brothers, where are we exactly? I do think that the global financial system has become more robust. However, it’s quite clear that we are not yet where we should be. Progress is urgently needed on the “too big to fail” issue, which primarily concerns the complexity of these institutions. The second issue is shadow banking. It is true that we have tightened up the regulation of banks.
And the best prepared people are those who know what they want to achieve, in other words people who have a vision of a certain state in future they are pursuing. Lack of vision poses a risk of discrepancies in understanding the goal, pursuit of inconsistent goals and in consequence leads to wavering and wasting time and money. Lack of vision almost certainly leads to failure, as today everything happens very fast. And sharing one vision does make a difference. First of all, we are all moving in the same direction. And we are likely to accelerate the pace. A clearly defined vision allows – after reviewing what we have now – choose suitable methods and means to achieve a desired state, that is to set indirect goals. The vision of John Global may seem a distant future, but in fact it can come true faster than it is currently believed. The majority of examples from John Global’s life in 2026 are already a reality, not a figment of my imagination. That is how life is in Asia now, and with increasing frequency in Europe too. I do not know your morning routine, but in my case it is not significantly different from John Global’s. True, while driving to work I still scan papers (I completed a course in speed-reading). When I am at work, though, I start my day with reading an e-newspaper I designed myself by using the features offered by Web 2.0.

As you can imagine, on the ECB Governing Council we closely track labour negotiations in several countries, as the outcomes can directly affect the prospects for price stability. 2  BIS Review 59/2007  Immigration In several euro zone economies, and notably in Spain, it is immigration that has had the biggest economic impact. Immigration to Europe has surged and taken several forms. Sometimes you will see workers move permanently from one country to another. In other cases, they move back and forth. What is happened is that immigrants have not only increased the labour force in the euro area; they have also brought more flexibility and dynamism to our labour markets. Since the turn of the century, Spain’s immigration rate has been the highest in Europe. Once an emigration country, Spain’s foreign resident population rose from just over 900,000 in the year 2000 to 4.2 million in 2006. As a result, Spain’s population has increased by a number roughly equivalent to the total population of Ireland in just six years, as a result of immigration. The proportion of immigrants in other Western European countries may be bigger yet, but it is hard to find examples in recent times of such a large influx of immigration in such a small period of time. Clearly, what has attracted the immigrants to Spain rather than to other euro-zone countries has been the long economic upturn that has already lasted thirteen years.