samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For Norway and other countries that are dependent on exports of oil, gas and other commodities, government revenues and current account surpluses are reduced. This will most likely curb the growth of sovereign wealth funds in the near-term future. BIS Review 58/2009  1  The financial crisis dealt a heavy blow to investors all over the world, as global equity prices plummeted. International stock exchanges lost more of their value in 2008 than in any other single year in recent history. Absolute results, especially with regard to equities, were highly abnormal. An investor such as the Government Pension Fund – Global will possibly earn more in the long term because of wide fluctuations in equity values. Many investors have suffered losses on equities. As a result of this experience, required returns will be higher in the future. For investments in fixed income markets, the picture is more varied. The crisis resulted in large and unexpected fluctuations in various parts of the fixed income market. While government bonds in some countries were regarded as “safe havens”, with a subsequent surge in prices, segments of the fixed income market were hit by higher credit premiums and dwindling liquidity. The crisis presented major challenges for risk management. Historical relationships between risk factors collapsed, and liquidity was greatly reduced in most markets. Market volatility was very high in both equity and fixed income markets, and market movements were on par with the most volatile periods of the past century.

We also learnt that we must ensure clear responsibilities and limits to delegation. The fund is a long-term savings plan and capable of riding out large market swings. This is the very foundation of the investment strategy with its high allocation to equities. Our ability to adhere to this strategy in a critical phase – even if this should last some time – is crucial if the Fund is to deliver the returns we expect in the longer term. Norges Bank’s Executive Board has reinforced its oversight of the Bank’s investment management. It has issued a new mandate that delegates investment management responsibility and introduces additional limits in the risk profile for investment management. As with the Fund’s long-term investment strategy based on active management and active ownership, the results of our operational management of the Fund need to be measured over time. To that extent, we need to maintain an incentive structure in order to retain and build long-term competence. We also need to ensure the quality of the investment management. In our view, the search for excess return has had a strong disciplinary effect on the organisation. 6  BIS Review 58/2009  I am confident that the operation we have built up will deliver good results in the long term. Thank you for your attention!
The previous regulation from 2001 stated: “In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account.” The formulation “extraordinary temporary disturbances” must be interpreted in its historical context. In inflation targeting’s early phase, exception clauses were normally included in the mandates to clarify that monetary policy should not contribute to unnecessary fluctuations in the real economy. After the change in 2018, the mandate reads: “[i]nflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flexible”. The specification “forward-looking” means that in its conduct of monetary policy Norges Bank shall disregard temporary disturbances that do not affect inflation further out and that an exception clause for extraordinary temporary disturbances was, in the Government’s view, no longer necessary. [5] The question of whether monetary policy should disregard imported inflation is related to the choice of price index for inflation targeting. This topic is also discussed in the economics literature (see literature review in Section 3.1 of Husabø (2017)). However, the literature is not fully unanimous about which price index the central bank should aim to stabilise. [6] Table 3.2 in Husabø (2017) shows the degree of covariance with activity for alternative price indices. [7] One difference is that average domestic inflation has run somewhat higher than CPI inflation, which might suggest that a target for domestic inflation could be set somewhat higher than the target for CPI inflation.

If we manage to make progress on those fronts in 2013, I am confident it will be possible to resume economic growth and to create net employment in 2014. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches
For EMEs, this manifests in volatile capital flows that amplify domestic imbalances and leave them more vulnerable to foreign shocks (Charts 3 and 4). One fifth of all surges in capital flows to EMEs have ended in financial crises, and EMEs are at least three times more likely to experience a financial crisis after capital flow surges than in normal times.18 While the typical EME receiving higher capital inflows will grow 0.3  Gopinath, G and Stein, JC (2018), ‘Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency’, Working paper, Harvard University. The euro is in second place at 20% and the yen is in third at 4% (ECB Staff (2017)). 13 Gourinchas, P, Rey, H Sauzet, M (2019), ‘The International Monetary and Financial System’, NBER Working Paper No. 25782. 14 Ilzetzki, E, Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K (2017), ‘Exchange arrangements entering the 21st Century: Which anchor will hold?’, forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. 15 See Krugman (1980). 16 Rey, H. (2013). "Dilemma not trilemma: the global cycle and monetary policy independence," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 17 Reflecting the fact that most of the assets of EME companies are priced in local currency. See Bruno, V and Shin, HS (2015), ‘CrossBorder Banking and Global Liquidity’, Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, Vol. 82(2), pp. 535-564 and Cesa-Bianchi, Ferrero, Rebucci (2018), ‘International Credit Supply Shocks’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 112, 2018, pp. 219- 237.

11 Boz, Gopinath and Plagborg-Moller (2017) show that a 1% appreciation of the dollar leads, all else equal, to a 0.6% contraction in trade volumes in the rest of the world. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  Third, a growing asymmetry at the heart of the IMFS is putting the global economy under increasing strain. Huge network effects mean the dollar has remained dominant in the IMFS despite the transformation of the global economy. At the time of the Latin American debt crisis, EMEs made up a little more than one third of global GDP. Since the last Fed tightening cycle, their share of global activity had risen from around 45% to 60%. By 2030, it is projected to rise to around three quarters. As well as being the dominant currency for the invoicing and settling of international trade, the US dollar is the currency of choice for securities issuance and holdings, and reserves of the official sector. Two-thirds of both global securities issuance and official foreign-exchange reserves are denominated in dollars.12 The same proportion of EME foreign currency external debt is denominated in dollars13 and the dollar serves as the monetary anchor in countries accounting for two thirds of global GDP.14 The US dollar’s widespread use in trade invoicing and its increasing prominence in global banking and finance are mutually reinforcing. With large volumes of trade being invoiced and paid for in dollars, it makes sense to hold dollar-denominated assets.
This raises the question of whether this expansion has already entered its twilight years, with the risk of recession edging higher with each passing month. As I have said before, expansions do not simply die of old age. 1 Rather, expansions end either because a significant inflation risk emerges that requires a sharp tightening of monetary policy, or the economy is adversely impacted by a large shock that cannot be offset by monetary policy in a timely manner. While the sample of post-war U.S. expansions is still too small for reliable statistical analysis, the evidence suggests that after an expansion’s first few years its likelihood of ending is mostly independent of age, and depends mainly instead on the level of inflation. Since the possibility is low that a significant inflation risk would emerge over the near term, this means that the main danger facing the current expansion is the risk of large, adverse shocks. Given that the labor market still appears to have some excess slack and inflation is below the Federal Reserve’s objective, monetary policy is appropriately still quite accommodative despite the advancing age of the expansion. While this limits to an extent the degree to which monetary policy can aggressively respond to any adverse events, the good news is that the economy is more resilient to any shocks. Key sectors of the U.S. economy, such as the household sector, seem to be in good shape.

Rather than borrowing against the rising equity in their homes, mortgage balances have instead essentially stabilized and remain well below their previous levels. As my colleagues will describe in more detail shortly, this stabilization reflects an increase in debt paydown due to a combination of lower interest rates, shorter loan terms and aging of mortgages. This trend is reflected in increased household saving and growing home equity, and we expect these trends to continue to help households rebuild their balance sheets over the near term, thereby further increasing the household sector’s resiliency to shocks. Low interest rates have also been important in driving the household debt service ratio to the lowest levels observed in our data. This means that households have more capacity with which to absorb any temporary adverse income shocks. One clear reflection of these improvements is the very significant decline in delinquency rates. At this point, the great majority of the bad debt from the boom years has been charged off and new foreclosures are at the lowest level we’ve seen in our data. The combination of charge-offs and tight mortgage underwriting standards over the last several years has shifted the stock of outstanding mortgage balances toward lower-risk borrowers, who are typically older with more stable incomes. For all these reasons, the household sector looks much better positioned today than in 2008 to absorb shocks and continue to contribute to the economic expansion.
In particular, they act out of self-interest or greed often at the expense of others. It is time to put this to rest. One can just take Islamic ethics as they are, and act as one say and as one mean. However, we should build on this, infuse it with a creed of professionalism that will provide its practitioners with not only a clear set of principles, but a sense of vocation to do what is right and to strive for the greater good and the betterment of the society to truly achieve the aspirations of maqasid al-Shariah. Let me share some further thoughts on this. In building such an ethos, we should always have in mind the basic or fundamental Islamic ethics that are also shared across many religions and societies. Such prescriptions lay out the fundamental basis of decency and behaviour. We cannot steal, cheat, lie, and act dishonourably. Principles that essentially guide us to be decent and in fact socially acceptable and responsible members of society. A natural component of this is ‘amanah’ or trust. As professionals, we should act as it is entrusted upon us, protecting the interests that we serve; our customers, shareholders, institutions, and sometimes this comes at personal expense. Trust is often called a valuable commodity. Indeed, it is even larger than that. Trust is a foundation or pillar of many relationships, including that of business and finance.

Some of the disadvantages of unilateral adoption could be reduced by negotiating a bilateral agreement with the anchor country providing for central bank liquidity facilities for the domestic banking system, a share in seigniorage revenues, renewal of banknotes and coin, and participation in monetary policy formulation. Such an arrangement would somewhat resemble euro area membership. But it could be difficult to obtain such a commitment from another country, and there is no precedent for it. At all events, it is likely that such an agreement would be conditional upon giving the anchor country and its central bank a say in the domestic financial system regulatory framework and allowing it to participate in domestic financial supervision, as the historical origins of financial supervision are in central bank liquidity facilities and lending of last resort. In that case, a bilateral agreement of this type would entail relinquishing considerable sovereign powers, even more than in the case of euro area membership. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1.6  Flexible exchange rate and improved framework for demand management and the financial system  As has already been discussed, Iceland’s experience of independent monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate has been mixed, to say the least. Monetary policy has not been effective enough, and more often than not the exchange rate of the króna has been a source of shocks rather than a shock absorber.
Therefore, addressing the issue of inequality and deprivation while expanding the economy, has today become a great challenge to economic planners across the globe, and indeed to those in Sri Lanka as well. In other words, poverty alleviation has to become an integral part of the development process if true prosperity is to be ushered. That is one of the reasons why we at the Central Bank do not only track the traditional macro-economic fundamentals. We also track the indicators that tell us whether or not “wealth” is reaching the ordinary people of our country. In that context, let’s take a quick look at some of the fundamental indicators as well as discuss some other trends to assess as to how inequality, poverty and development is progressing in our country.

We are confident that you, together with other stakeholders would overcome the various challenges and someday soon, we would all be in a position to truly state that we have ushered in development with equality. I wish your Conference all success. BIS Review 88/2007  7
Since market-based finance needs good collateral to grow sustainably, its availability directly influences the supply of finance to British households and businesses. The use of collateral is not without risks. When collateral values rise, fixed haircuts allow banks and non-banks to borrow more, pushing up asset values further. The reverse is also true. This inherent pro-cyclicality exposes the system to sharp corrections in collateral values. In extremis, a sell-off in financial markets leads to higher haircuts, a run on repo and ultimately a market freeze. To reduce these risks, the FSB has proposed minimum regulatory standards for collateral valuation and management as well as a schedule of numerical haircut floors to repo transactions. The FSB also now requires central clearing of “standardised” derivative transactions to limit exposures between counterparties, promote efficient netting of positions and moderate collateral cycles. New minimum capital and margining requirements for bilateral OTC derivative trades will similarly protect banks from defaults of their counterparties while reducing procyclicality in the system. The combination of such reforms and the experience of the crisis will mean that institutions both need more collateral and need to manage it better.9 Fortunately financial markets know  7  The ratio of US primary dealer fixed income holdings to bonds outstanding has fallen by between 70% and 85% since 2007. This measure includes US investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, non-agency MBS and commercial paper, and excludes government securities and Agency MBS.

And those risks will grow, unless we put global banks and markets on a sounder footing. Suppose, for example, that UK-owned banks’ share of global banking activity remains the same and that financial deepening in foreign economies increases in line with historical norms. By 2050, UK banks’ assets could exceed nine times GDP, and that is to say nothing of the potentially rapid growth of foreign banking and shadow banking based in London. Some would react to this prospect with horror. They would prefer that the UK financial services industry be slimmed down if not shut down. In the aftermath of the crisis, such sentiments have gone largely unchallenged. But, if organised properly, a vibrant financial sector brings substantial benefits. Today financial services account for a tenth of UK GDP and are the source of over 1 million jobs.5 Two thirds of those are outside London, including jobs in asset management in Edinburgh, transaction processing in Bournemouth and insurance in Norwich. Being at the heart of the global financial system also broadens the investment opportunities for the institutions that look after British savings, and reinforces the ability of UK manufacturing and creative industries to compete globally. Not to mention that financial services represent one of the UK’s largest exports. More broadly, London’s markets serve a vital global role. London acts as Europe’s window to global capital; is a centre of emerging market finance; and can play an important role in the financial opening of China.
Finding the right balance Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking  Society of Professional Economists Annual Conference, London 28 September 2018  With thanks to Amy Lee and Tom Smith for their assistance in preparing these remarks and to staff across Markets and BPFR and elsewhere in the Bank for their many contributions, as well as to my colleagues on the MPC and among the Governors for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Introduction It’s an honour to be invited to talk here for the Society for Professional Economists (SPE) today, and I’m very grateful to Bloomberg for the opportunity to speak again in their fantastic HQ. Although I’ve spoken many times at the Society’s events over the years either in my previous role at the Treasury or in in my ongoing role as President of the SPE this is the first time I’ve spoken at the Society in its new guise as the Society for Professional Economists and in my role as the Bank of England’s Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking. This week is national inclusion week in the UK. And in that spirit I do think the SPE’s new moniker, which Kevin Daly has championed, is more inclusive and speaks to a wider group of economists. That is borne out by the excellent turn-out today. At the same time we need to improve diversity in today’s economics 1  profession, in central banking and in finance more generally.

Based on the “Open Day” events held in 8 towns in 4 states for the past 2 months, more than 900 (911) banks’ customers have signed up to use the online banking services. For information of all participants, to date, cheques are still widely used in our country. Based on the last 3 years data, an average of 205 million cheques amounting to about RM2 trillion are issued on an annual basis. In terms of the number of cheques over the country’s population, or cheques per capita, it is at 7.1. This figure is much higher than 3.9 in advanced countries such as Norway, Finland and Australia. It is also worth noting that 92% (or 18.4 million) of the total adult population in Malaysia have banking accounts and of these, about 74% (13.7 million) of bank account holders have Internet banking accounts. However, although 74% of the bank account holders have Internet banking access, only 43% (5.9 million) of the Internet banking subscribers are active users in conducting financial transactions. In this regard, we have not reached a stage where the masses are familiar or have gained sufficient trust in using Internet banking to conduct their financial transactions. It is through educational programs such as this roadshow event that we hope the businesses will take the opportunity to learn more about the security safeguards and safe practices to gain sufficient confidence to adopt online banking and conduct e-payments.
As a result, although we expect the slowdown in external demand in the third quarter to be partially offset by the rebound in domestic demand, I would like to emphasize that the third-quarter growth accommodates downside risks stemming from the agricultural sector. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  A steady recovery in consumer and investor confidence is yet to appear, suggesting that downside risks to domestic demand still persist. We believe that the deceleration trend in external demand will curb the rise in exports for a while. However, we expect falling commodity prices to contribute positively to the current account balance by reducing import costs (Chart 16). Distinguished Guests, As you all know, food, energy and import prices also play a great role in inflation forecasts. Therefore, before moving on to forecasts, I will briefly talk about our assumptions regarding these variables. In the third quarter of the year, oil and import prices remained below the path we envisaged in the July Inflation Report (Chart 17). Accordingly, we revised our assumptions of average oil and import prices for 2014 and 2015 downwards. Given the current outlook, due to external prices, year-end inflation forecasts for 2014 and 2015 were revised downwards by 0.3 and 0.2 percentage points, respectively. Considering also the high course in food inflation in the third quarter, we revised our year-end inflation assumption for food prices upwards to 12.5 percent for 2014 and 9 percent for 2015.

We expect inflation to stabilize around 5 percent in the medium term (Chart 18). We expect inflation to considerably exceed the 5-percent target by the year-end, and decrease significantly as of the start of 2015 and fall to 6.1 percent at end-2015. This noticeable decline we forecast in inflation is driven by the projections that cumulative exchange rate effects will continue to taper off, food inflation will recede to past year averages and commodity prices, chiefly oil, will stay at expected lower levels. Moreover, we believe that demand conditions and the announced tight fiscal policy stance will support the decline in inflation in this period. The fluctuating course in 2015 inflation forecasts that you see on the slide stems from the base effects (Chart 18). Distinguished Guests, In addition to these forecasts, alternative scenarios on the inflation outlook and the global economy are discussed in the Risks section of the Inflation Report. You can examine the Report for details. While concluding my remarks, I would like to thank all my colleagues who contributed to the Report, primarily those at the Research and Monetary Policy Department as well as the members of the Monetary Policy Committee, and thank every one of you for your participation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9