samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The journey to get there is not over and we have ground to cover. So, we will be as restrictive as long as needed in order to make sure that we reach that destination. Under the current parameters, 2.2% in 2025 is not satisfactory and it's not timely – which is why we are making the decisions that we are making today, and later on. At the end of June banks will reimburse € billion that they had borrowed under TLTRO, which was this very special facility that we had put in place to help the financing of the economy at the time of the pandemic. Those loans were granted for periods of three years and there were various operations in the course of the pandemic. The repayment which is coming due now, is known and has been known for a long time. Actually it was so well-known that it should have been a lot higher than that but we took measures in order to avoid that we had this sort of cliff effect of a massive reimbursement which would have exceeded € trillion. But banks know about it, they have known about it. They have done their funding plans in order to respond to the situation. In any event, we have the normal facilities available, whether it's MRO or LTRO if that was ever needed, just in case. The APP reinvestment will be completed at the end of June, and we will let run-off take place as of July.

Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement Introductory statement by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 15 June 2023. *** Good afternoon, the Vice-President and I welcome you to our press conference. Inflation has been coming down but is projected to remain too high for too long. We are determined to ensure that inflation returns to our two per cent medium-term target in a timely manner. The Governing Council therefore today decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. The rate increase today reflects our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. According to the June macroeconomic projections, Eurosystem staff expect headline inflation to average 5.4 per cent in 2023, 3.0 per cent in 2024 and 2.2 per cent in 2025. Indicators of underlying price pressures remain strong, although some show tentative signs of softening. Staff have revised up their projections for inflation excluding energy and food, especially for this year and next year, owing to past upward surprises and the implications of the robust labour market for the speed of disinflation. They now see it reaching 5.1 per cent in 2023, before it declines to 3.0 per cent in 2024 and 2.3 per cent in 2025. Staff have slightly lowered their economic growth projections for this year and next year.
And, lastly, while it is still early days, our judgements on the behaviour of the economy so far in 2018, and the effects of the snow, appear to have been borne out. Nevertheless, our view of the outlook and the prescription for monetary policy remains conditional on the data, how they evolve and what pointers they give to the future. It is likely that supply, demand and the exchange rate will continue to move around as Brexit negotiations progress and external conditions change. 17  And the data and the outlook will change to reflect all of these. 16  Again, for more details see Box 5, “How has the economy evolved relative to the February 2017 Report”, in the Prospects for Inflation section of the May 2018 Inflation Report. In fact inflation overshot by a little more than we had expected, partly reflecting the rise in oil prices over the previous year, demand rotated by a greater degree than we had expected, and productivity growth slowed by more than we had expected. And, as discussed above, demand fell back by less than we had initially predicted in the August 2016 Inflation Report. But the broad shape of the economic response to Brexit was in line with what we had forecast in February 2017.

We are beginning to aggregate and analyse large data sets to: gain richer insights into customer behaviour and needs; detect fraud or anomalies in financial transactions; sharpen surveillance of market trends and emerging risks. Big data is in turn being driven by advances in: sensor networks and natural language processing to gather information from a wide universe of sources; cloud technologies to store and retrieve large volumes of information at low cost and ondemand; learning machines and smart algorithms that can continuously adapt and improve on their decision making with every iteration. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Smart Financial Centre Vision Be it countries, businesses, or people – those who are alert to technology trends, understand their implications, and harness their potential will gain a competitive edge. To be sure, many of these technologies are disruptive to existing jobs and existing business models. But if we do not disrupt ourselves – in a manner we choose – somebody else will – in a manner we will not like. Last year, MAS laid out a vision for a Smart Financial Centre, where innovation is pervasive and technology is used widely. Since then, MAS has been working closely with the financial industry, FinTech start-ups, the institutes of higher learning and other stakeholders towards this shared vision. MAS’ role in supporting this FinTech journey is two-fold: provide regulation conducive to innovation while fostering safety and security; and facilitate infrastructure for an innovation ecosystem and adoption of new technologies.
Flexibility is a critical element of the Federal Reserve’s approach to policy normalization. Policymakers have said that they will adjust the IOER rate and parameters of an ON RRP facility, and use other supplementary tools as necessary – including term tools – during the normalization process. In doing so, they will weigh the efficacy and costs of each of the tools in their arsenal to ensure that they are optimizing policy objectives while maintaining appropriate interest rate control. I’ll now explain our confidence in and readiness to implement this approach. 10  That said, to the extent that an ON RRP facility’s existence provides a credible outside investment option to money market lenders, it could potentially improve competition and support interest rate control even without large actual use of the facility. 11  These assumptions are derived from responses to the Desk’s Survey of Primary Dealers (December 2014), in which respondents expected liftoff to occur in the second quarter of 2015 and principal reinvestments of SOMA securities holdings to end two quarters later, and include a neutral assumption that the FOMC returns to a long-run operating framework with a relatively low level of excess reserves. Survey results are available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/survey/2014/December_result.pdf. For more details on this projection scenario, please see the Report on Open Market Operations during 2014 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, April 2015), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/annual_reports.html.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  At the same time, rapid urbanisation is concentrating ever higher economic wealth in exposed areas. Eight out of the ten global mega-cities most at risk from natural perils are located in Asia. They include Jakarta, Kolkata, Manila, and Shanghai. This large protection gap in Emerging Asia presents the global insurance industry, confronting mature markets and excess capacity, with a significant opportunity to deploy capital for better returns. London and Singapore as complementary insurance centres International financial centres in Asia, like Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as domestic financial centres in China and Korea are well-placed to meet this growing demand for insurance in Asia. But international financial centres outside Asia – such as London – with the enormous breadth of their markets, depth of financial expertise, and connectivity with other financial centres – also stand to gain from Asia’s rise. On occasion one hears stories of London losing ground as an international insurance centre due to tightening regulatory standards and a shift in the global economic centre of gravity to emerging markets. But polls and expert opinion also predicted the recent UK election race would be neck and neck. On both counts, the numbers prove otherwise. •  London is the undisputed global insurance market for specialty commercial risks – insuring highly exotic and bespoke risks from Formula 1 drivers to Cristiano Ronaldo’s legs.
The MPC now views the economy’s potential growth rate to be around 1.5%, about 60% of its pre-crisis average. That diminished rate of supply growth reflects the climate of the past few years, with the shallowest investment recovery in over half a century,  12  lower growth in labour supply and modest productivity growth. By the first quarter of this year, UK GDP had increased by 1 percentage point less than the MPC had projected in May 2016. Factoring in the stronger-than-anticipated growth in the European and global economies and more supportive fiscal policy, the shortfall increases to around 1¾%-2%. 11  This was in line with the MPC’s standard approach to condition its projections on the government policy of the time. By contrast, growth in UK total investment outperformed the rest of the G7 in 2017. That reflected strong growth in spending on buildings. Dwellings investment (1.7pp) and spending on other buildings and structures (2.1pp) together contributed 3.8pp to total growth of 4.0%. 12  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  Even without taking those additional factors into account, average household incomes are currently 4% lower than the MPC had expected prior to the referendum, equivalent to over £ per household. 13  Lambda: trade-off management in exceptional circumstances The MPC has repeatedly emphasised that monetary policy cannot prevent either the necessary real adjustment as the UK moves to its new trading arrangements or the weaker real income growth likely to accompany that adjustment.

Let me begin by discussing different types of measure more generally, and then I will say a few words on the quantitative effects of household indebtedness. Put simply, we can say that there are two different ways to manage the problems on the housing market: either attempt to increase the housing supply in order to dampen housing prices, or dampen demand for housing and mortgages by making it more expensive to borrow, or simply limit how much households can borrow. In terms of measures which subdue demand, it is important to differentiate between measures which affect all loans, or the whole stock of credit, and measures which only affect new loans, or the flow of credit. But let us begin with measures which affect the supply of housing. An increased supply of housing could dampen price increases – but it would take time! Structural problems on the Swedish housing market are the main reason why housing construction has been unable to meet rising demand. An increased supply of housing is a central piece of the puzzle, as it can subdue the increase in housing prices, which would also help to limit household indebtedness. However, the quantity of housing is not the only significant factor in terms of household indebtedness. It is also necessary to review how we can exploit the current housing stock more effectively. The distribution between purchased and rented housing is significant.
Some players may want to avoid all exchange rate fluctuations for a time, while others are prepared to take this risk in return for a premium; by operating in the derivatives market they can arrive at the appropriate risk profile. Globalisation has led to increased competition across countries and markets and aided the emergence of new activities and structures. This in turn seems to have contributed to increased capital productivity—more can be done than before with a given capital input. It is just these factors—more efficient financial markets and higher capital productivity—that are often cited as the main forces behind the American economic miracle: the combination of high growth and low inflation despite low saving. Problems The globalisation of financial markets is also dogged by some problems. It affects the scope for national economic policies. Moreover, financial market prices tend to fluctuate widely, sometimes for little apparent reason. Before considering these issues, I just want to say a few words about the reality behind the notion of the financial market, which consists in practice of various categories of savers and borrowers. Besides private individuals, these include national, regional and local governments, small and large companies, high-risk hedge funds, banks, insurance companies and long-term pension funds. So the market cannot be reduced to what goes on in trading rooms, even though, for want of a better  BIS Review 52/1999  2  alternative, television’s financial newscasting often visualises the market in such terms.

The players in financial markets had found ways of getting round the regulations, which in some cases had thereby become virtually toothless. In Sweden, for example, the capital controls had gradually lost much of their bite; companies were able to take up exchange positions, for instance, by shifting trade credits over time. There was also a growing awareness that economic growth would benefit from fewer controls. The interventionist line of economic policy had not been particularly successful. The pace of deregulation varied from country to country and the process was rather protracted. Britain and  1  BIS Review 52/1999  the United States led the way. Sweden was one of the last countries to abolish controls on crosscountry flows of short-term capital. Since the 1970s, financial market turnover has risen markedly and is now very much larger than the flows generated by global cross-country trade in goods and other services. According to the latest BIS study, from 1995, global exchange market turnover, for instance, was 1200 billion dollars, which is approximately five times the value of Sweden’s annual GDP. The figure is roughly twice the level at the end of the 1980s. A new BIS study, for 1998, is due next week and can be expected to show a further increase in global exchange market turnover. Equity and bond market turnovers have also risen rapidly. To some extent, the nature of the flows as well as the players in international financial markets have changed.
The consequences of the historic failure of financial markets to price climate risk have been two fold. Much of the focus has been on the under-pricing of downside risk – to polluters, or polluted – and the potential for a ‘climate Minsky moment’: a sudden sharp downwards adjustment when that risk crystallises. But opportunities to improve climate outcomes have been under-priced too: making it harder to get the finance needed to drive positive change. Both sides of this equation need to change – and they are. The building blocks of change In what follows I want to cover those three key building blocks for an effective capital markets infrastructure that I mentioned at the start: climate disclosure; climate-linked capital instruments; and climate-focused asset allocation strategies. But before doing so I will note an irony – which is that the very need to have climate-specific tools reveals the immaturity of financial markets’ relationship with climate risk. In a world where climate risks were fully internalised, measured, priced and traded, there would be little need for dedicated climate financial infrastructure: climate risk would be factored into each and every risk and reward decision. Green bonds would just be bonds. And ‘impact investors’ could focus their efforts on other challenges, as market pricing would align the private and societal costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions. That ‘integrated approach’ is a worthy goal: the Holy Grail of market maturity. But we are some way from that today.

But amidst all this frenzied activity, the most pressing question is how to put all of this money to work in a productive way that appropriately reflects climate factors, but also continues to deliver the desired risk and return profile for investors. 36  https://www.ft.com/content/247f4034-4280-318a-9900-87608a575ede 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  16  Chart 14: number of launches of new  Chart 15: AUM and flows into sustainability-  ‘climate aware’ funds  rated open ended funds  Source: Morningstar  Source: Morningstar, Sustainalytics, and Bank calculations. The nirvana is so-called ‘ESG integration’ – when climate is just one more risk factor in an otherwise fully integrated risk/return framework. Chart 16, drawn up by the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute and Principles for Responsible Investment, illustrates the sort of processes required, working outwards from research in the centre through security-level analysis to portfolio construction on the outer rim. It’s an impressive story – but the sheer complexity of the picture also rams home just how comprehensive full integration really is. Everyone may be talking about it, but few are actually doing it – yet at least. If that’s the ultimate goal, the challenge facing asset managers today is how to build robust but consciously partial or second-best investment strategies that bridge between investors’ desire to express a particular view on climate risk and return, and the practical limitations of today’s climate disclosures, climate modelling and asset universe.
Compared with the March projections, the average inflation rate for 2023 is revised downwards by 0.5 pp. This is the result of a sharper-than-expected slowdown in energy prices and, to a lesser extent, in food prices. As with the euro area as a whole, there is still a great deal of uncertainty and the risks to the growth projections remain predominantly tilted to the downside. With regard to inflation, the Employment and Collective Bargaining Agreement recently reached by Spain’s main social partners includes recommendations for wage rises for the period 2023-2025 that somewhat mitigate the probability of second-round effects emerging via wages in Spain. Indeed, according to the data on the collective bargaining agreements registered up to May, the wage moderation continues.1 In terms of profit margins, the results of the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ) show an uptick in 2023 Q1, although the margin on sales remains below its 2019 level. In any case, there is a high degree of heterogeneity across sectors.2 Recent developments in the banking sector With the context given so far, the most recent developments in the banking sector can be characterised by the following stylised facts. Financing First, financing in the sector is being influenced by the tightening of monetary policy. This has led to a reduction in Eurosystem financing,3 which has been offset above all by  1  The average wage rise agreed for 2023 stands at 3.3%, slightly above the 2.9% agreed for last year.

6  Thus, between December 2021 and April 2023, the cost of deposits with agreed maturity increased by 0.65 pp for households and by 1.5 pp for non-financial corporations (NFCs), while the 12-month EURIBOR rose by more than 4 pp. 7 This cost of equity stands somewhat below the 7.2% seen in 2019, prior to the pandemic. 8  This ratio has fallen by around 30 pp since March 2022, at least partly in response to the Eurosystem’s gradual liquidity withdrawals. 9  Consolidated debt securities grew by 11.7% and represented 13.6% of total assets at December 2022 (10.7% in 2007). 4  2023.10 This was also the case for new lending, although it occurred more slowly in the housing segment than during past periods of monetary policy tightening. By sector, the stock of loans to NFCs and sole proprietors fell by 1.3% year-on-year in March, while loans to households dipped by 1.1%, with the stock of mortgage lending dropping by 1.6%. Credit quality Credit quality has continued to improve. In particular, the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio has maintained its downward movement, to stand at 3.4% in March, its lowest level since 2008 and 1.4 pp below its 2019 level.
These buffers, created in periods of good economic conditions and necessarily associated with the adequate mechanisms to draw them down during recessions, may come in the form of non-distributable reserves to compensate economiccycle losses. Nevertheless, the possible advantages and disadvantages of such a measure should be accurately calculated and appropriately compared to those coming from other tools that act in the same way but affect the profit and loss account. 2  BIS Review 55/2009  We should not forget the interconnection that exists between valuation, leverage and procyclicality and how these issues should be properly managed under a macro-prudential perspective. The introduction of supplementary floors to capital requirements under a risksensitive approach, could be a safety net,. Setting limits on the build-up of leverage in periods of rapid credit growth can be seen as a way of strengthening the incentives for correct risk pricing of institutions, as well as a deterrent of excessive risk-taking. Furthermore, the development of valuation reserves should also be under our consideration as a way to mitigate the cyclicality inherent in risky and illiquid securities. Improvement of general stress test practices and their wide implementation, particularly during the most favorable part of the economic cycle, should also be included in our toolbox approach to fight against procyclicality. Solid stress test frameworks will allow assessing the adequacy of buffers, both in their construction and in their applicability over the cycle. Finally, remuneration schemes may be another tool for dampening the undesired cyclical fluctuations of banking activity.

In addition, Estonia has no problems with financing its external  2  BIS Review 91/2009  debt. Companies and people in Estonia have taken serious steps to pave way for getting through the global crisis and recovering growth. Therefore, the state needs to implement some important macro-level objectives to support the recovery of economic growth. Here I mean, above all, the readiness to join the euro area as well as medium-term and long-term stability of fiscal policy. In the current situation, accession to the euro area is Estonia's utmost short-term objective. The adoption of the euro will ensure the stability of the money used in Estonia and is extremely important for further reinforcement of the banking system and the investment climate. It can be said the clear perspective of joining the euro area is an absolutely necessary precondition at the national economy level for the permanent recovery of growth. Declining inflation has created all the possibilities in Estonia to meet the Maastricht criteria by end-2009, which makes it possible to join the euro area on 1 January 2011 at the latest. In this context and from the point of view of monetary and financial system stability, fiscal policy has two tasks in 2009. First of all it must be made sure that the current account deficit, which cannot be avoided in the prevailing economic environment, remains below 3% of GDP both this year and in 2010.