samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is a global phenomenon in the post-crisis period, extending across the entire South East Europe, which have experienced even lower growth rates. I hope that during this conference we will have the opportunity to analyse in depth the reasons behind this situation, sources that feed it and the difficulties it imposes on the business model and financial intermediation. Furthermore, it would be useful to discuss on the options available to policymakers and the way out of this situation, which, I believe, is a temporary situation rather than a long-term economic equilibrium. The Bank of Albania has been actively using two main instruments, the monetary policy and macro-prudential one, to give its contribution for a swift and systematic closure of the negative output gap in Albania. The Bank has continued to implement an accommodative monetary policy lowering the key interest rate to the historic 2% level. Notwithstanding the scepticism that has accompanied this process, the lowering of the key interest rate is reflected in a wide range of interest rates in the financial market, including those on loans and government securities. The fact the economy continues to grow below its potential, does not necessarily reflect the absence of an effective transmission channel for the monetary policy. We are more and more convinced that, above all, we have a weak aggregate demand, which is not generating the much needed stimuli for the recovery of the economic activity. Recent data, however, render us more optimistic.

During this process, we have been assisted and overseen also by important international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Beyond the non-performing loans issue, the banking system continued to be well capitalised, liquid and financially sound. The issue of non-performing loans will require some more time to resolve, but this should not keep us from the recovery of the credit activity at home. For as long the positive performance of the other above-mentioned indicators continues, the banking sector has room and the potential to credit convincing projects and investments. In my judgement, it is important to administer with courage and persistence the prevalent perception that non-performing loan have forced banks to adopt a very conservative approach to lending. To permanently address this problem, additional measures have been taken and will be taken in the future. I would like to briefly focus on the latest initiative in this regard: a coordinated plan between the Bank of Albania, Government of Albania, Association of Banks, and International Monetary Fund, consisting in two main pillars: The first pillar relates to the drafting and completing the legislation that regulates lending from the moment of concluding a contract until the final repayment, including disputes among the parties. These changes aim at making more precise in legal terms all procedures related to banking activity, bailiff services, borrowers and other relevant state institutions.
But the Swedish banks had also become involved in activities that proved to be risky. I refer to their lending in the Baltic countries. These exposures also affected confidence in Swedish banks during the crisis. As we are affected very directly by disruptions on the international financial markets, it is in our interests to have functioning global regulation. We therefore welcome the proposals made by the Basel Committee. Hopefully, the new regulations will contribute to preventing new crises in the financial system, or will at least alleviate their dramatic effects. More capital of better quality provides larger buffers I shall begin by describing the new requirements regarding the banks’ capital. Because this is what a large part of the changes agreed by the Basel Committee concern. One can say that this capital is the money at the bottom of the treasure chest that the financial supervisory authorities require the banks to always hold. The banks have long been obliged to observe special minimum levels regarding the size of their capital. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that the capital is to reduce the costs to the state if the bank fails. Even though Sweden escaped relatively lightly on this occasion, we know from experience that such costs can be very extensive. For instance, the state may be forced to take over bad assets or have to pay money to depositors under the Swedish deposit guarantee scheme.

Market risk is the risk that the bank’s assets will vary in value in a way that was not anticipated, and this makes it difficult for the bank to get hold of capital without making a loss. For example, fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates can affect the value of the assets. In addition to these risks, there are what are known as operational risks. This can involve, for instance, a technical system failing to function, or a human error that puts the bank at great risk. Some of you may remember how the British bank Barings collapsed in 1995 as a result of speculation and unchecked risks taken by a single employee. Risk management is about protecting oneself against such undesirable and unexpected outcomes. In short, one wants to take calculated risks. According to earlier agreements within the Basel Committee, the banks have the possibility to develop models themselves to calculate the size of their risks and this is an opportunity most of the major banks have used. Over time, their risk calculation models have become increasingly sophisticated. But during the crisis it turned out that not even the most advanced models managed to capture the real risks. Sometimes it was not the model that was inadequate; there was a lack of available data for assessing the risk. In many cases there was quite simply not enough historical data, as the financial instruments were such fresh inventions. You may have heard of various types of complicated derivative, such as CDOs, CDSs and so on.
This year, as explained in Malta’s Convergence Programme 2004-2007, the general government deficit is expected to fall to just above 5% of GDP, which is still, however, one of the highest ratios in the EU. The persistence of the fiscal deficit has resulted in a rapid accumulation of government debt, which as a percentage of GDP trebled between 1990 and last year to around 70%. There is clearly no alternative to the fiscal consolidation envisaged in the Convergence Programme because, if the deficit is left unchecked at this year’s level, the debt to GDP ratio would exceed 80% by 2010. The fact that this heavy burden of debt has been accumulated to a large extent to finance recurrent spending rather than to build up income-generating assets is a matter of some concern. 1  2  Except where otherwise specified, fiscal data refer to the Consolidated Fund. BIS Review 67/2004  A further undesirable consequence of this behaviour is an increasingly unmanageable debt-servicing burden. This year the Government is spending Lm1 out of every Lm8 of tax revenue merely to service its debt. Put differently, the fiscal deficit would be just one-tenth of its actual level were it not for debt-servicing costs, which now amount to around 95% of expenditure on health and 90% of that on education. This is not a healthy state of affairs. Not only does interest on the debt increase the fiscal deficit, but it also crowds out those expenditures which should be receiving priority.

While we were initially less optimistic about buy-side adoption relative to the sell-side, our outreach efforts have indicated that once the buy-side sees the benefits the Code brings, they become enthusiastic adopters. The third reason why this Code will be different, is that it was developed by an unprecedented public-private partnership, and will be kept relevant over time. The development process for the Code was an intense and inclusive one, involving the participation of a wide range of market participants. Hence, we expect strong buy-in from market participants. This partnership also recognises the importance of keeping the Code relevant over time. Moving forward, the Code will be collectively owned and maintained by the local Foreign Exchange Committees (or FXCs), through the Global Foreign Exchange Committee (or the GFXC). The GFXC was launched in May this year, together with the publication of the Code. The GFXC, comprising members from key central banks and private sector market participants, will assess regularly if there are new market developments that should be included into the Code. It will also oversee a comprehensive review of the Code on a less frequent basis, keeping the Code relevant over time. Fourth, extensive outreach to market participants has been done and will continue. Over the past two years, extensive outreach was undertaken to more than 120 sell-side and buy-side industry associations, and key market infrastructure globally. The response has been positive. These efforts by the GFXC, central banks and local FXCs, to raise awareness and encourage adherence to the Code, will continue.
Enterprises with worldwide operations may be another. The economic indicators show a clear slowdown in growth in Europe’s industrial output. The effect on the Swedish economy has been severe, resulting in a record-low exchange rate. One Swedish krone now costs approximately 80 Norwegian øre. This is 30 per cent less than 10 years ago. Vulnerable emerging economies with high government debt must pay very high interest rates to borrow capital. Many central banks have reduced interest rates, most recently 17 and 18 September. Interest rates have been reduced because of the prospect of a downturn in each of these economies. Real interest rates are low in many countries. The inflation component that is driven by domestic wage and price increases is still high. Growth in Norwegian labour costs has been around 5-6 per cent in recent years. This is 1½ - 2 percentage points higher than among our trading partners. The higher interest rate level in Norway reflects this fact. At the moment, there is no clear indication of a marked slowdown in the Norwegian economy. The price of oil remained high for a long time, despite the international downturn, but fell more than USD 3 yesterday, 24 September. The price of aluminium has fallen somewhat but is still high compared with the average price in recent years. The year-on-year increase in the export of metals, excluding iron and steel, was 0.7 per cent in the second quarter of 2001.

So far, however, it is difficult to draw any conclusions except that uncertainty has increased. The Norwegian economy is operating at capacity limits and there are few if any available resources in the labour market. Unemployment has declined throughout the country. Unemployment in Western Norway, which increased marginally last year, has returned to its previous level. Unemployment has risen slightly again in Eastern Norway. This reflects lower employment in private services that may be a result of a slight downturn in the ICT industries and retail trade. The Government’s Long-Term programme for 2002-2005, which was approved by the Storting in June 2001, states: "Considerable emphasis must be placed on stabilising fluctuations in the economy in order to ensure appropriate capacity utilisation and low unemployment. Petroleum revenues will gradually be phased into the economy, approximately in step with the expected real return of the Petroleum Fund." Fiscal policy will contribute to stimulating activity in the economy because of the increase in spending of oil revenues. The new guidelines imply that the non-oil deficit will increase in the years ahead. This will provide a substantial fiscal stimulus every year. Summary The tragic events in the US on 11 September will contribute to a further dampening of activity in the American, Asian and European economies. It is too early to predict the long-term effects. Reactions in financial markets have been pronounced. Share prices have fallen sharply. The U.S. dollar has depreciated. Currencies of other economies such as Sweden have depreciated.
Ensuring the Bank of England has the instruments necessary to achieve its financial stability objective will depend on the EU continuing to have regulations of the highest standards, which strike the appropriate balance between harmonisation and flexibility, and which accommodate necessary national responsibilities, including for supervision. 5. Principles of a new settlement for financial stability  A successful and sustainable Economic and Monetary Union is important for the dynamism and stability of both the euro area and the UK. Since the crisis, many euro-area economies have undergone difficult reforms to improve competitiveness. Adjustment mechanisms to address the underlying problems of the euro area have been built, including measures to create a Banking Union and the development of the European Stability Mechanism, a permanent crisis resolution facility for euro area countries. Although much has been accomplished, further financial and fiscal integration within the euro area will be necessary to put EMU on a more sustainable basis. In particular, closer financial integration requires increased risk sharing in the public and private sector. That risk sharing can be achieved by the development of the more complete Banking Union in the euro area and, more broadly, a Capital Markets Union for the EU. How financial regulation in the EU evolves in future will be critical to the resilience of both the euro area and the UK economy. Closer union between euro-area member states is likely to necessitate further harmonisation of financial regulation across the euro area. By extension, those regulations can affect the rest of the EU.

In recent years, the MPC has increasingly focused on structural changes in the economy, including by instituting regular reviews and publishing our assessment of the most important variables, such as the equilibrium unemployment rate. Over this period, as unemployment has fallen towards its estimated equilibrium rate and companies have found it harder to recruit and retain staff, pay growth has picked up. Across the economy as a whole, growth in average wages excluding bonuses has risen from around 1¾% a year during 2010-15 to around 2½% in 2016, and wage growth is expected to have picked up a little further to around 2¾% around the middle of this year. The most recent outturns support that judgement, with whole economy total pay increasing by 2.9% in the three months to July and private sector regular pay up 3% over the same period, and domestically generated inflation at rates consistent with the 2% inflation target. 39  Cavallo, A (2018), ‘More Amazon Effects: Online Competition and Pricing Behaviors’, paper prepared for the 2018 Jackson Hole Symposium. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  This brings me to a larger point. Although current rates of pay growth in the UK are below pre-crisis averages, this largely reflects continued weakness in productivity growth. While that weakness may reflect the early consequences of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, other factors seem more likely to be at play.
They involve adopting: a risk based approach for focusing the Fund’s crisis prevention work; a more intensive framework for the surveillance process to provide a stronger anchor for the member’s economic program; a reinforced framework for providing support to countries undertaking a debt restructuring; and a more credible form of financial insurance that creates better incentives for stronger policies in advance of crisis. These proposals do not require amending the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, and can be achieved without major changes in the structure of the institution. They are evolutionary rather than revolutionary. More policy ambition Studies by IMF staff, the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office, and others catalogue a number of criticisms of the substantive content of the Fund’s policy advice. Many of these studies conclude that the Fund has had insufficient ambition in its prescriptions for reform and in a number of cases was too deferential to domestic political constraints on adjustment and reform. Some conclude it was too supportive of choices by its members to run exchange rate regimes that were incompatible with the rest of the policy framework, that led to substantial appreciation of the real effective exchange rate over time, that encouraged borrowing in foreign currency, and that proved too brittle under stress. Some suggest the Fund was in some cases insufficiently attentive to or ineffective in addressing the increases in debt, particularly foreign exchange denominated and linked debt, that created the balance sheet problems, which made crises so damaging and difficult to resolve.

Done well, these can also augment market discipline by promoting debates on important CG issues and in educating investors to be discerning. In sum, building a strong CG ecosystem is most effective when there is collective effort involving multiple gatekeepers – beyond the regulators and the boards of companies. To end my remarks, let me also acknowledge, as this forum demonstrates, that many companies have and do take good CG seriously. The care and vigilance put into this effort must continue. I am sure the boards and management of all the firms present here will not rest on your laurels either. And I trust that from your examples as good CG stewards, others will follow likewise. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
However, Mr Chairman, I am disappointed that the cost of borrowing has remained high in spite of the improvements in the fiscal management of our economy. As you know, the high cost of borrowing stifles the growth of the productive sector. BIS Review 52/2009  1  I therefore appeal to all the banks operating in Zambia to show more commitment to the growth and development of our country by: •  Opening more branches  •  Providing more loans to increase the productivity of our economy, and  •  Encouraging more Zambians to open bank accounts through provision of easily accessible and affordable products and services  All this, ladies and gentlemen, will greatly contribute to the emergence of a middle class in Zambia, which will bring real economic development and lead to poverty reduction. I am pleased to observe Standard Chartered Bank’s commitment to growth and reinvestment. You will all agree with me, however, that those who have more should do more. I therefore look forward to seeing more from Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limited, as it is one of the leading banks in this country. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 52/2009

The existing criteria and selection process are undergoing a rigorous review to strengthen the current assessment process and uplift the quality of audits so that auditors are also abreast with the emerging risks and implications of the Basel III framework and the new accounting standards that are to be enforced within the next few years. With a view of facilitating risk management of emerging technologies and to encourage further digitalisation of banking operations, several policies will be introduced to define regulatory expectations on use of cloud computing and define minimum regulations on the use of relevant fintech solutions. Further, a comprehensive technology risk assessment programme would be conducted to assess and improve the technology risk resilience of banks. Over the last five years, while the banking sector has grown approximately by 15 per cent annually, the non-bank financial institutions sector has grown approximately by 20 per cent. Although the sector accounts for a comparatively small share of around 8 per cent of the total assets of the financial system, the rapid growth and broad outreach of the sector necessitate proactive supervision and regulatory guidance. While several regulations have been introduced to strengthen these institutions, some licensed finance companies have shown signs of stress, while the rapid expansion of certain others have been curtailed due to their lack of compliance with regulatory requirements. This reiterates the need for continued strengthening of the existing regulatory framework of non-bank financial institutions to ensure the soundness of the sector and contain its spillover effects on the whole system.
I regret to say that the present Governor neither has the power to command a private railway station nor would he know where to put it if he did. My Lord Mayor, you will see that there are indeed many challenges for economic policy. We have to pass through turbulent waters. But we have set the right course. There is an appropriate policy mix to rebalance the UK economy and reach a new equilibrium. With the Financial Policy Committee there is a new body responsible for monitoring and, more importantly, responding to risks to the financial system as a whole. And a new approach to prudential supervision will be implemented by the Prudential Regulation Authority. If we stick to this course, adjusting the tiller in response to changing conditions, I am confident that we shall return to both price and financial stability. Lord Mayor, all of us here tonight would like to pay tribute to your charitable work since you became Lord Mayor. Your personal involvement in the regeneration of Spitalfields, and the Lord Mayor’s Appeal in support of disaster relief and to help children and young people in need, are a demonstration of the charitable instincts of the City of London. We salute you for that leadership, and I am sure that everyone here tonight thanks both you and the Lady Mayoress for the splendid hospitality which you have extended to us all this evening.

After a deep-seated banking crisis, now transmuted into a sovereign debt crisis, the need to reduce debt as the world adjusts to a new equilibrium pattern of spending and trade will mean only a gradual recovery in many advanced economies. Storms from the world economy are likely to stir up the waters through which the UK economy must pass as it too adjusts to a new equilibrium with lower levels of debt and a rebalancing from domestic to external demand. So, my Lord Mayor, there is no shortage of challenges at home. Consumer price inflation has risen to 4½%, and further large rises in utility prices are expected. Output has probably grown by only around 1% or so over the past year. Our banking system faces a need, over time, to build higher levels of capital and find new sources of domestic funding. And regulation must be reformed to respond to the lessons from the crisis. So I want tonight to comment briefly on three themes: monetary policy; macro-prudential policy, and the work of the new Financial Policy Committee at the Bank; and the new approach to banking regulation that will follow the creation of the Prudential Regulation Authority. The challenge facing monetary policy is obvious – the combination of high consumer price inflation and weak economic growth. Both of these might seem surprising given the large amount of spare capacity in the economy.