samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In contrast to the ECB’s two-pillar strategy, the SNB decided at the time to adopt an integrated approach. For the purpose of today's discussion, I would like to highlight two important elements of the SNB’s monetary framework. First, communication considerations were an important element in the design of the new framework. Clearly inspired by the early inflation targeters, a definition of price stability and a quarterly inflation forecast became the primary communication tools with regard to monetary policy. These were considered to be clearer than the alternative of attributing a specific role to monetary aggregates. In other words, the two pillar model of the ECB was rejected primarily on the grounds of communication considerations. Second, the new monetary framework was deliberately designed to allow sufficient room for judgment and flexibility in the conduct of policy. The inflation forecast as the main indicator for policy decisions is derived from a "portfolio" of models and indicators. Some of these models contain monetary aggregates; others don’t. The weights assigned to different models and indicators are allowed to vary over time as their reliability and applicability may also vary across different economic situations. Empirical studies backed the "portfolio of models" approach. Empirical evidence drawing on six years of Swiss data suggests strongly that combining inflation forecasts from different models and specifications improve the forecasting accuracy of the SNB’s inflation forecasts. 3 Of course, the SNB does not claim to have solved the fundamental problem of linking monetary and non-monetary analyses.

The pace at which the role of the euro as an international currency will develop is hard to predict. But what can be said is that the global acceptance of the euro in the international financial markets depends first and foremost on market confidence in the stability of the euro. In this context, the ECB’s monetary policy committed to the pursuit of price stability provides an important contribution. In the same vein, by participating in 5  BIS Review 72/2000  international policy cooperation, the ECB contributes to reducing the risks of negative externalities and to fostering the adoption of best policy practices at the international level. This is an important contribution of Europe to a more stable international financial system. BIS Review 72/2000  6
Our message to Italy, as to all euro area countries, is the following: the benefits that higher than expected economic growth is bringing, in particular in terms of higher tax revenues, should be allocated entirely to reducing the public deficit and preventing the growth of debt. That is a kind of recommendation. Yes. The position of the Governing Council is very well known. We are recommending rigorous compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. And as a general rule we would suggest first that public spending be reduced, and only after as much as possible has been done in this area, that taxes be increased if necessary in order to comply with the Stability and Growth pact. You know Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa well after having worked with him for so many years here in Frankfurt. Will he do this to improve Italy’s accounts? Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa is one of the most experienced persons, not only within Italy and Europe, but also in the world. He has personal influence, and personal prestige in all fields of money and finance, which I regard as being very important. Of course, it is clear that the challenges and risks that he faces are enormous.” Being a minister is not like being a banker, the tasks and responsibilities are quite different. “Tommaso has been a marvellous banker, but he has also held a large number of other responsibilities. These are different tasks, but they both require clear judgement, decision-making ability, strength of character and determination.

Since then, we’ve seen more positive readings on China’s economy, in part due to steps the authorities have taken to reignite growth. And financial markets have definitely rebounded from their winter doldrums. Still, we’re not entirely out of the woods regarding risks from a global growth slowdown. Signs of weakness in Japan, South Korea, and some regions of Europe continue, so I am particularly vigilant about monitoring the international data. Trade tensions and ongoing uncertainty regarding Brexit continue to present downside risks. Monetary Policy What does this mean for monetary policy? At last week’s meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee decided to leave the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged, between 2-1/4 and 2-1/2 percent. We also reiterated our patient approach to assessing the need to adjust interest rates in the future. In a nutshell: The economy remains on a path of healthy growth, with a very strong labor market and without the emergence of inflationary pressures. The current setting of policy positions us well to keep it that way. Although my view that we are in the right place in terms of monetary policy has not changed of late, the reasons for it have evolved in line with the economic and financial developments I sketched out earlier in my remarks. The strength of recent data on economic activity, the rebound of growth in China, and the reversal in the tightening of financial markets all imply that near-term risks to growth have receded somewhat.
10.  recently Ricardo Caballero 13 presented his theory that (financial) asset shortages are at the heart of the global imbalances problem, and his idea was also put forward by Raghuram Rajan 14 speaking recently on (real, fixed) asset shortages. Asset shortages hypothesis  5  Rajan R. (2006) “Perspectives on Global Imbalances”, Remarks by Economic Counsellor and Director of IMF Research Department at the Global Financial Imbalances Conference London, United Kingdom, 23 January 2006; and Rato R. (2006) “Shared Responsibilities: Solving the Problem of Global Imbalances”, Speech of the International Monetary Fund Managing Director at the University of California at Berkeley, 3 February 2006. 6  Greenspan A., Kennedy J. (2005) “Estimates of Home Mortgage Originations, Repayments, and Debt on One-to-FourFamily Residences.” Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series Paper 2005-41; Lansing K. (2005) “Spendthrift Nation”, FRBSF Economic Letter, November 2005. 7  Greenspan A. (2005) “Current Account” presentation at Advancing Enterprise 2005 Conference (London, United Kingdom), 4 February 2005; OECD (2004) “Economic outlook”, June 2004; Faruqee H., Laxton D., Muir D., Pesenti P. (2005) “Current Accounts and Global Rebalancing in a Multi-Country Simulation Model”, presented at the NBER conference, “G-7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment”, 1–2 June 2005; Chinn M. (2005) “Getting Serious about Twin Deficits”, working paper, The Bernard and Irene Schwartz Series on the Future of American Competitiveness, CSR No. 10, September 2005.

This is the pathology I worry most about. So I ask: Can my colleagues and I at the Fed cure this with monetary policy? Obviously, businesses cannot create jobs without the means for investing in job-creating expansion, so, yes, monetary policy is necessary to propel job creation. But as I have shown you tonight, the store of bank reserves awaiting discharge into the economy through our banking system is vast, yet it lies fallow. Take a look at this chart of total reserves of depository institutions: They have ballooned from a precrisis level of $ billion to $ trillion. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  There is plenty of money available for businesses to work with. Consider this: In fourth quarter 2007 the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $ trillion; at year-end 2013 it was estimated to be $ trillion. Had we continued on the path we were on before the crisis, real GDP would currently be roughly $ trillion in size. That’s a third larger than it was in 2007. Yet the amount of money lying fallow in the banking system is 60 times greater now than it was at year-end 2007. One is hard pressed to argue that there is insufficient money available for businesses to put people back to work. Now, bear in mind that we at the Fed only control the monetary base (cash plus bank reserves), not the velocity with which money is used.
To make the choice of path regarding digitalisation of the payment market easier, we need a clear Swedish stance that is based on political priorities and decisions. This includes a review of the Sveriges Riksbank Act that clarifies the Riksbank's mandate. It is also important to cooperate with other public authorities. The e-krona would have points of contact with many other authorities, for instance the tax account, to which all those who are to pay tax receive access, functions as a form of state money. It is possible that the best solution would be to build an e-krona system together with other authorities. It would also be good if the legislation in this field in Sweden was updated to take into account the fact that payments will in future be made digitally. If the means 8 See, for instance, Project Jasper https://www.payments.ca/sites/default/files/29-Sep-17/jasper_re-  port_eng.pdf, Project Ubin http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/ProjectUbin.aspx and Project Stella https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/stella_project_leaflet_march_2018.pdf. 4 [9]  of payment issued by the Riksbank is not generally accepted, it will be difficult for the Riksbank to perform its task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system. According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, the Swedish krona, in the form of cash, is legal tender. But at the same time, it is possible to waive the obligation to accept cash by, for instance, putting up a sign that cash is not accepted. As the use of cash is declining rapidly, it is urgent that the legislator takes a stance on what status in the law legal tender shall have.

2 [9]  that there have not been excessive monopoly gains and inefficiencies on the payment market, which otherwise tends to gravitate towards monopoly. 5 The e-krona can fulfil the same function as cash has traditionally held An e-krona would mean that the functions of cash would remain, even in a digital future. On the other hand, if the Riksbank does not offer a new, modern, viable alternative, this means that we will be giving up a tradition and functionality that has worked well for 350 years. Over the years, it has been the state’s role to standardise and guarantee all money in society. The basic condition for the ekrona is that it, like cash, will be broadly available to all members of society. It must work with the existing systems and be exchangeable one-to-one for cash or money in private bank accounts. At present, many private solutions on the market function so that services are offered that at the same time tie up customers into specific systems or to specific suppliers. Ultimately, this can lead to poorer competition and innovation. The advantage of central bank money is that there is no commercial enterprise behind it and it is therefore always fungible (freely exchangeable). It is not only the Riksbank that considers it worth analysing the possibility of issuing central bank money in a new form to continue fulfilling their traditional role in a digital future; there are similar projects in several other countries.
In 2019, the Ministry of Finance decided that fixed income securities in emerging markets would no longer be a part of the fund’s benchmark index. The Covid-19 year 2020 has been a peculiar one. When the pandemic spread in March, global exchanges fell sharply. Since then they have recovered to a great extent, but there are considerable differences across sectors. The real estate sector has been particularly hard hit, along with some services. At the other end of the scale, we find the tech giants. The news of a vaccine breakthrough has generated renewed optimism in equity markets in recent weeks. In spite of the turbulence and large market movements, the overall value of the fund has held steady, also in USD terms. We have avoided large losses – in both absolute terms and relative to the benchmark index against which the fund is compared. But volatility has been high through the year, and it remains to be seen where we end up. One characteristic of developments over the past seven years has been the solid results from the more traditional part of our active management – security selection. As we see in the table, our external asset managers have performed particularly well. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In my view, these results are linked to the key words appearing in the title of today’s speech: Responsible investment and active ownership. The fund’s size and long horizon are unique characteristics that have an impact on this part of asset management.

Ardian Fullani: The confidence indices Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the regional seminar “Development and implementation of business and consumer confidence indices in Albania 2”, Tirana, 1 December 2006. *  *  *  Dear participants, Today’s seminar, on the confidence indices, has a special importance, due to the fact that it regards the evaluation and decision-making basic elements in economic policies, information and in its real dimension. As in any decision-making process information is the first step to reach a sound judgment on the right monetary policy for a central bank. It is indispensable for the monetary authorities to prepare the analysis of the macroeconomic indicators, in order to prepare a monetary policy that ensures the stability of the internal indicators as well as the relations with the partner economies in trade affairs. On a more general view, the economy of a country can not achieve competitiveness and international standards, if development policies are built on a non complete information basis. The preparation of a complete information framework in the economic field is a challenge for the regional countries to reach occidental standards. At the current stage, for Albania this challenge is even more urgent. The actual condition of the national statistics has room for spreading the statistical basis and for providing stable statistics over time. However, the progress in the statistics field, as well as in other related ones, needs time, funds and the right legal ground for undertaking substantial projects.
Developments in food prices are still considered as an important risk to the short-term inflation outlook, as food items constitute more than one fourth of the CPI basket. The course of food inflation is highly dependent on domestic weather conditions as well as global developments. In the medium term, there is a significant chance of a downward correction in unprocessed food inflation, especially given the base effect created by the last two years’ elevated food prices. On the other hand, it is also possible that global developments and increasing demand for certain food items may continue to push up the food prices. Therefore, food prices continue to pose risks to the inflation outlook on both sides. 12  BIS Review 20/2008  So far, Turkish economy has been resilient to reappraisal of risks in global financial markets. The support of fiscal policy and structural reforms are critical in shielding the economy against possible further deterioration in global sentiment. In this respect, the European Union accession process and the implementation of structural reforms envisaged in the economic program remain crucial. Finally, I would like to conclude my speech by mentioning that advances in structural reforms enhancing the quality of fiscal discipline and raising productivity are monitored closely with regard to their implications on macroeconomic and price stability. Thank you. BIS Review 20/2008  13

We again look at a cost shock. In the model exercises I showed earlier, expectations formation remained unchanged even when inflation surged. Both firms and households have assumed that inflation will move down relatively quickly. The effects in the standard model are represented by the dark blue lines. [14] In the scenario shown by the light blue lines, we introduce the possibility of a more persistent change in inflation expectations when inflation becomes high. [15] Here households and firms pay more attention to the inflation numbers and assume that inflation will remain persistently high. The cost shock propagates, and inflation continues to move up. A stronger and prolonged period of monetary policy tightening is then required to bring down inflation. The real economic costs associated with high inflation increase. Chart: Concluding slide  Conclusion Let me conclude. Norges Bank is charged with ensuring low and stable inflation. Inflation has surged to a high level over a short period. Our task is to bring it down again. Wage-price spirals have not been a theme in Norway or among our closest trading partners for a long time. One of the lessons learned from the Great Inflation of the 1970s and 1980s is the importance of firmly anchored inflation expectations. Many countries experienced a period of high unemployment before inflation was brought under control, and inflation expectations fell. [16] We do not believe that there is an imminent danger of a wage-price spiral in Norway.
It may prevent negative feedback loops emerging via the public sector, but to prevent also their emergence in the financial sector – as we have seen in the Irish case – a broader remit for governance is needed. Imbalances in the euro area would not have developed in the same scale if the behaviour of the banking sectors in all countries, in core and peripheral countries, had been better supervised. Some banking sectors distributed too much credit and others provided a  1  Bolton, P., and O. Jeanne, “Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 8358  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  significant part of the funding that then dried-out when the crisis came and the credit risk was suddenly reassessed. All this implies necessarily that effective economic governance needs also to address the financial sector, in order that imbalances, externalities and spillovers are tackled effectively. Conceptually, financial supervision needs to be exercised as much as possible at the European level. It cannot be left, as presently, in the domain of exclusive national competences. The components of financial stability governance in the euro area Accordingly, let me now propose what are, in my view, the key components to achieve reinforced governance in the euro area for financial stability. First: macro-prudential risk monitoring and assessment The first component is enhancing the capacity of public authorities to identify and address systemic risk at the European level, both from an analytical and an institutional perspective.

After the crisis occurs, the policy has to be conducted according to the separation principle that allows a central bank to separate the decision on the appropriate monetary policy stance and the decision on the support of the financial system. We clearly demonstrated this in April when we decided to leave the non-standard measures unchanged, but at the same time decided to increase our key policy interest rates. In the future we will continue to live up to our mandate. We will do whatever is necessary to deliver price stability in the medium term,  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  using our policy interest rates, and continue to contribute to the stability of the financial system, using our non-standard measures. Conclusions To sum up, significant progress is being made in Europe to produce a more comprehensive and encompassing concept of economic governance. Looking forward, I believe however that it is crucial that the euro area dimension of economic governance is further reinforced in order to be commensurate with the wide range of sources and channels of financial instability, which has been made evident by the financial crisis. This reinforcement should involve two main institutional moves:   Closing the gap between the economic and financial aspects of euro area governance by fully integrating financial supervision within the concept of economic governance; and, consequently    Significantly strengthening the arrangements for financial supervision within the euro area, which could be supported by the establishment of a pan-euro area resolution fund.
Haruhiko Kuroda: How to sustain economic growth in Asia Speech by Mr Haruhiko Kuroda, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the Amartya Sen Lecture, organised by the Cambridge Society of Thailand, Bangkok, 21 July 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Bank of Japan’s website. Introduction It is a great honor to give a presentation in front of such a distinguished audience, especially Mr. Anand Panyarachun and Professor Amartya Sen. I have admired Professor Sen ever since I became acquainted with his work when I studied economics at Oxford, about 45 years ago. At that time, I was fascinated to read not only his elegant theoretical papers on social choice but also his research on poverty and inequality, which has had a huge impact on development economics. Today, I have chosen a topic which is inseparable from the subject of development, and that is economic growth. More specifically, I would like to discuss how we can sustain economic growth in Asia. As Robert Lucas has correctly pointed out, “Once one starts to think about economic growth, it is hard to think about anything else.” 1 Therefore, I will take off my central bank governor’s cap for a while, and there will be no mention tonight of either “unconventional monetary policy” or “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing.” In recent years, the question of how to sustain economic growth has become an increasing preoccupation both within academia and among policy makers.

The picture is not as bright as last spring At the time of my previous meeting with the Committee, our discussion was coloured by some relief that the effects of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 had not had a particularly marked impact on the world economy. The uncertainty among firms and households had subsided to some extent and there were signs that economic activity abroad was beginning to improve. An optimistic mood was spreading. Order books seemed to have stabilised and in some cases had even taken a turn for the better. Moreover, an expansionary economic policy in many countries was expected to provide an additional stimulus. At the same time, I pointed out that we could not be entirely certain that world economic activity would pick up. Among other things I mentioned that the economic imbalances in the United States were still large and stock market valuations were high. So there were a number of questions as to whether demand would in fact rise on a broad front. Last spring, the moderate economic slowdown in Sweden had meant that inflation here remained high and resource utilisation was still tight. GDP growth seemed to have bottomed out during the summer of 2001. Unemployment had stopped falling. Inflation had been noticeably above the Riksbank’s 2 per cent target for a time. This was partly because so-called supply shocks had raised the price level and led to temporarily higher inflation.