samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is in our own interest to make active efforts to counteract such a development. Monetary policy – a nominal anchor Against the background of an economic downturn and low interest rates among Norway’s trading partners, the conduct of monetary policy in Norway is challenging. A higher key policy  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  rate might have curbed debt growth and demand pressures in the Norwegian economy. But in an environment of persistently low external interest rates, such a policy would likely have led to a sharp appreciation of the krone, resulting in too low levels of inflation and economic activity. Thus, the crisis in Europe and weak growth in the US are also contributing to keeping interest rates in Norway at a low level. The main objective of monetary policy in Norway is low and stable inflation. This objective provides the economy with a nominal anchor. With firmly anchored inflation expectations, monetary policy can contribute to stable developments in the real economy. Chart 6  The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 percent over time. Over the past ten years, average inflation has been somewhat below, but close to, 2.5 percent. A credible and firmly anchored monetary policy can contribute to curb the impacts of external shocks. This increases the resilience of the Norwegian economy. More resilient banking sector The financial crisis provided us with some important insights. First, the crisis illustrated that low and stable inflation is not sufficient to secure financial stability.

In the meantime, the Bank of Thailand has been keeping a close eye on the economy as well as any sign of excessive turbulence in the financial markets, and stands ready to take appropriate actions as warranted. In response to the weakening economic conditions, the MPC has cut the policy rate by 25 basis points at its November meeting to shore up sentiments and mitigate downside risks. The rate was further maintained in the last MPC meeting to retain the accommodative stance without compromising financial stability. 8. With that said, preparation on the side of the private sector is equally important. In this regard, I would like to encourage commercial banks to help raise the private sector’s awareness and encourage the use of the available financial instruments to manage their FX risks. I wish to point out that in these uncertain times where outcomes are driven as much by expectations as by the underlying fundamentals, protection against the FX risks should be viewed as the dominant strategy. That is, protection should be recommended irrespective of whether there is any observable trend of the currency and irrespective of whether one is on the importing or exporting side of the trade. Also, if your clients are engaged in intra-regional trade, recommending using a regional currency to reduce overreliance on the major currencies may be worth considerations. 9. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to touch upon two more important developments in the Thai financial markets before concluding.
Richard W Fisher: “Never let your brains go to your head” (With reference to the Sages of the Ages, Diana Sorensen, John Paul Jones and “Babe” Fisher) Address by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, for the 151st Commencement, Bryant University, Smithfield, Rhode Island, 17 May 2014. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Before I begin my formal remarks, I want the candidates for degrees to think about the fact that over 5,000 people are here today to celebrate your success. These are your parents and grandparents, cousins, uncles and aunts; your brothers and sisters; your friends; your teachers and coaches and counselors. They have been by your side through joyful moments and less-joyful ones. They have encouraged you. They have believed in you. And they have occasionally badgered and hectored you and … driven you nuts. All to good effect. They are here with glad and happy hearts to celebrate your admission to the society of educated men and women. You will be applauded by them many times today. But I want you, the graduating class, to turn the table on them and give them a round of applause. So stand up, turn around, put your hands together and give them a cheer. Thank them for loving you. Now, please be seated.

Challenges still remain. For example, we have to work out and implement efficient solutions across countries that have different start points, practices and regulatory frameworks. But it is encouraging that governments are more seized with this problem, and more ready to collaborate with one another, than ever before. Singapore has taken the lead in several of the regional initiatives. Financial institutions here should also take part actively. This is the time to engage regulators and government officials in the region, to enter their growing markets and position yourselves for the business opportunities that the initiatives create. As a leading foreign exchange centre with a critical mass of global fixed income and equities expertise, Singapore can service international investors operating in Asia. Our market is well placed to facilitate the hedging activities that are essential for risk management and improving market efficiency. BIS Review 39/2004  5  These will complement the domestic markets in the countries of the region. Our strong legal system and the availability of international legal expertise and product structuring teams equip us to structure complex cross-border transactions. The growing wealth management industry will also generate a steady source of funds for regional investment products. Human capital A major issue that concerns all parts of the financial sector is human capital. A distinguishing characteristic of a successful financial centre is that it attracts talented and dynamic professionals from a broad range of disciplines and experiences. They make the financial centre what it is.
And we are fortunate to have Jerry Corrigan engaged in working to shape a set of recommendations to help us get the balance right. Regulatory structure Apart from the mix of incentives and constraints set by regulatory policy, the structure of the regulatory system in the United States needs substantial reform. Our current system has evolved into a confusing mix of diffused accountability, regulatory competition, an enormously complex web of rules that create perverse incentives and leave huge opportunities for arbitrage and evasion, and creates the risk of large gaps in our knowledge and authority. This crisis gives us the opportunity to bring about fundamental change in the direction of a more streamlined and consolidated system with more clarity around responsibility for the prudential safeguards in the system. In this regard, Secretary Paulson's blueprint outlines a sweeping consolidation and realignment of responsibilities, with a clear set of objectives for achieving a better balance between efficiency and stability, between market discipline and regulation. This proposal has stimulated a very constructive set of discussions, and will help lay the foundation for action when the dust settles. BIS Review 74/2008  5  The most fundamental reform that is necessary is for all institutions that play a central role in money and funding markets – including the major globally active banks and investment banks – to operate under a unified framework that provides a stronger form of consolidated supervision, with appropriate requirements for capital and liquidity.

Timothy F Geithner: Reducing systemic risk in a dynamic financial system Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at The Economic Club of New York, New York, 9 June 2008. *  *  *  Since the summer of 2007, the major financial centers have experienced a very severe and complex financial crisis. The fabric of confidence that is essential to the viability of individual institutions and to market functioning in the United States and in Europe proved exceptionally fragile. Money and funding markets became severely impaired, impeding the effective transmission of U.S. monetary policy to the economy. Central banks and governments, here and in other countries, have taken dramatic action to contain the risks to the broader economy. Why was the system so fragile? Part of the explanation was the size of the global financial boom that preceded the crisis. The larger the boom, the greater the potential risk of damage when it deflates. The underpinnings of this particular boom include a large increase in savings relative to real investment opportunities, a long period of low real interest rates around the world, the greater ease with which capital was able to flow across countries, and the perception of lower real and inflation risk produced by the greater apparent moderation in output growth and inflation over the preceding two decades.
In the 20 years since the Monetary Policy Committee was created, inflation has averaged pretty much exactly 2%. In the preceding 25 years, it averaged 8%. In financial stability, the benefit of committing to take the long view can be even greater than in monetary policy. In monetary policy, the upside of living for the moment is enjoyed only for as long as inflation remains a surprise. And inflation is not something easily hidden. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  In financial stability, the benefits of being underinsured can be enjoyed for a long time before the costs are felt. And the complexity of the system means it can be easy to let good intentions slip without notice. The consequences of today’s actions for tomorrow’s crisis can be hidden away, just as they were in the run up to the financial crisis. So in the aftermath of the crisis, Parliament created the Financial Policy Committee in the Bank of England – the institutional memory of the financial crisis and its costs.3  An independent committee, free of short-term political considerations, and with members drawn from inside and outside the Bank, its job is to take the long view. 4  Its aim: to ensure the UK financial system has the resilience to serve households and businesses in bad times, as well as good. The Committee has considerable powers with which to deliver that. And it has used them to build a more resilient financial system.

In a developing economy such as Thailand, the customary savings behavior is to save first and spend later. BIS Review 50/2004  1  Developing economies can and should benefit from this type of behavior since it allows for vital investments to be madc using domestic savings, thereby lessening reliance on extemal capital inflow, while at the same time promoting an economically viable savings-investment gap. On the other hand, the savings behavior of the west and developed economies tend to lean toward spend now save later. This type of behavior is practicable in western countrics due to many factors that can be summed up under the heading of high level of economic development. The existence of social welfare systems, mature capital markets, diversified economy, and highly educated workforce are a few factors that allow such countries to be able to grow under a relatively low savings environment. Without such factors, a country could find it difficult to grow and develop without straining its finances. Coming back to Thailand, it is possible to say that with more widespread usage of credit cards and other types of consumer loans, we can expcct Thailand’s savings behavior to become more in line with those of the developed economies. This trend is a double-edge sword that if not managed carefully can cause a severe negative savings-investment gap. Such predicament will worsen Thailand’s dependence an extcrnal capital inflow that historically has shown its ability to change direction rapidly and jeopardize macroeconomic stability.
A flatter curve on the other hand, not only affects the timing of the build-up of pay pressure as unemployment falls and hence the timing of policy action. It affects also the sensitivity of pay pressure to unemployment and hence the degree of policy action necessary to bring inflation to target. If the curve is pretty close to flat, monetary policy will have to work very hard to affect domestically generated inflation. As Borio, and other, have noted this may bring into question the very ability of central banks to meet their inflation targets. There is no curve  The Phillips curve framework has been a central part of our thinking about the economy for over 50 years. But it has not always been that way. Keynes, after the Great Depression, posited a world where absent government intervention labour markets did not clear even with lags. In this world unemployment could get stuck at high levels even though wages fell and fiscal policy was therefore required to bring unemployment down. And it is true also that the Phillips curve framework has had to be adapted and extended substantially over the past 50 years to maintain its explanatory power in the face of the actual evolution of pay growth and unemployment over the period in a range of countries. 22  Carney (2017b) 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  We cannot exclude other possibilities.

14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Chart 1: Unemployment and wage growth since 1971 35 Per cent  Chart 2: Stylised decomposition of four quarter wage growth Other  Unemployment  Percentage points  Productivity  30  Wage growth  5  Wage growth (per cent)  4.5  25  4  20  3.5 3  15  2.5 2  10  1.5  5  1 0.5  -5  1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016  0  0  2001-07  2010-12  2013-17Q2  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Notes: Whole economy average weekly earnings (AWE), total pay. Unemployment rate for 16+ population. Average whole-economy AWE growth. Productivity per worker is based on the backcast for the final estimate of GDP. The decomposition assumes a one-for-one relationship between productivity growth and wage growth over these periods.
Today, another important milestone is being achieved with the establishment of the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM), a liquidity management infrastructure to enhance the capacity of Islamic finance in facilitating efficient cross–border flows. This represents another major breakthrough for the Islamic financial services industry. [ It will enable more effective liquidity management not only for the Islamic financial institutions but also for the management of Islamic financial portfolios.] This development is also significant as it demonstrates an international collaboration among the Central Banks. The greater collaboration among regulators seen in this decade cumulatively serve to contribute towards the continued resilience of the global Islamic financial system. The foundations for the sustainable development of Islamic finance has raised the potential for the industry to have a greater role in the global landscape. As we usher into a new decade, it is timely for the industry to reflect on its existing strengths and build new capabilities to create new engines of growth in this next wave of market opportunities that are before us. This Global Islamic Finance Forum (GIFF) 2010 is designed to discuss these potentials. Following the success of the inaugural GIFF in 2007, GIFF 2010 has drawn more than 1000 participants from across the globe for the opportunity to have meaningful and catalytic engagement on issues concerning the future of global Islamic finance. This year’s gathering is taking place in the aftermath of the worst global financial and economic crisis of the modern era.

We have to take all the necessary measures to ensure that our economic fabric is not destroyed, to ensure that businesses that are solvent can survive and that once this urgent health crisis is over, they can return to normal. You have talked about a temporary crisis, a sort of pause. The Spanish government has talked about the same thing. But do you think this is how things will turn out or do you think the economic consequences for Europe could be more severe for longer? This will depend on how long the health crisis lasts and, to be honest, I wouldn’t dare to guess how long it might last. What happened in China is a leading indicator. What’s happening to us now happened two months ago in China and now they are starting to get back to normal. Obviously this is something that gives us hope: we can get through this. From an economic perspective, we have to look for instruments to get us through this period at the lowest economic cost and, of course, with no financial cost from a debt market perspective. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
Today, these institutional principles for monetary policy are enshrined in the statutes of central banks in all of the major advanced countries and a growing number of emerging markets. This much is now largely accepted for monetary policy and inflation-fighting. It is somewhat less well-accepted for financial policy and crisis-fighting. Yet, in theory and in practice, the case for placing financial stability policy in the hands of an arms-length institution is at least as strong, and arguably stronger, than for monetary policy. This is the case for three reasons. First, financial cycles are longer-lived than the typical business cycle. Chart 3 plots a measure of the cycles in credit and GDP in the UK over the past century (Aikman et al. (2010)). Peak-to-peak, the credit cycle lasts between 8 and 20 years, the business cycle between 2 and 8 years. The longer duration of credit cycles increases the chances of policymakers falling prey to disaster myopia. That is why “This time is different” has so often been the pre-crisis narrative (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)). In an “information-rich-yetattention-poor” world, people in future may be even more prone to such myopia. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, the financial cycle exhibits wider fluctuations, and imposes much larger costs, than the typical business cycle. As Chart 3 shows, the amplitude of the credit cycle is more than twice the business cycle. The costs of crisis dwarf those of business cycle fluctuations (Claessens et al. (2008), Jorda et al. (2011)).

Perhaps that is why marriage rates have halved, and divorce rates doubled, in the UK since 1970; why the tenure of global CEOs has halved since 1995; and why holding periods for stocks has more than halved since 1980. For many key decisions, myopia has been mounting. It may also have become self-reinforcing – a myopia trap. For addicts, shortened horizons generate a quest for quick fixes which further shorten horizons in a downward spiral (Coffey et al. (2003)). For gamblers, a sequence of losses shortens horizons and increases risk-  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  taking (Xiu et al. (2011)). For depression-sufferers, low confidence in the future becomes self-fulfilling (Alloy and Ahrens (1987)). Myopia traps affect countries as well as individuals – and their macro-economic costs can be large. For developing countries, they often materialise as “poverty traps” (Sachs (2005)). That trap is self-sustaining because poverty leads to under-investment in the human and financial capital that would allow the country to break free in the future (Banerjee and Duflo (2011)). Low future prospects for growth become self-fulfilling. Advanced economies are not immune to these problems. An information-rich-attention-poor world will generate under-investment in physical and human capital, infrastructure, the environment. That will be self-sustaining if it lowers future prospects or heightens future risks (Davies et al. (2013)). More hurry then assuredly means less speed. This is not a poverty trap. It is a poverty of attention trap. Policymakers have recently begun to focus on shorttermism, perhaps for that reason (G30 (2012), FSB (2013)).
12 Towards the end of this  9  Article by Kåre Lunden in the newspaper Klassekampen, 11 November 2008. 10  Encyclopædia Britannica, http://search.eb.com/. 11  Eitrheim, Øyvind (2005) in Eitrheim and Qvigstad (Eds. ): “Tilbakeblikk på norsk pengehistorie. Konferanse 7. juni 2005 på Bogstad gård (Norwegian monetary history in retrospect. Conference, 7 June 2005, Oslo)”, Occasional Papers No. 37, Norges Bank. 12  See for example Hodne, Fritz and Ola Honningdal Grytten (2000): Norsk økonomi i det 19. århundre (The Norwegian economy in the 19th century), Fagbokforlaget. 4  BIS Review 136/2008  period, confidence provided Norges Bank with the scope to adjust the interest rate to the domestic economic situation rather than solely in relation to the gold standard. 13,14 4. The era of broken promises  The interwar years proved to be highly turbulent, both in Norway and abroad. In 1921, for example, per capita GDP in Norway fell by 11 per cent. The structure of the economy had changed, the functioning of the labour market had deteriorated 15 , external trade had become more important and the share of employment in agriculture had declined. We had become more vulnerable to external economic developments. The objective of monetary policy continued to be a stable value of money in relation to gold. However, the authorities set an ambitious goal: they aimed to restore the krone’s pre-war value, which implied deflation. Moreover, they were more patient than had been the case after the Napoleonic Wars a hundred years earlier.

Ladies and Gentlemen, The topic of this meeting centered on the place of women in governing bodies refers inevitably to the challenges of women contribution to economic activity and more broadly to the issue of gender inequality. In this respect, I think there is no need to argue nor to justify the importance of this issue. It is discussed and debated every now and then in public debates within national and international bodies, not to mention the regular or specific reports devoted to it. This increasingly highlights the stakes involved and, fortunately, the greater awareness about it. It is not only a problem of social exclusion but, as we all know, a considerable economic loss. The available data on the different dimensions of this issue unfortunately show that our region MENA appears to have among the highest levels of gender inequality, if not the highest, in the world. However, I believe that there is a growing awareness about the situation. We have seen in recent years the adoption of policies and initiatives in the region to empower women and strengthen their economic, social and political status. I would like, if I may, to illustrate further on this referring to my home country and the institution I have the honor to lead. Ladies and Gentlemen, Since many years now, Morocco engaged in a process of improving the situation of women, ratifying several international conventions and complying with UN instruments on human rights in general and women rights in particular.