samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The extent of pre-positioning varies across firms, however, and we hope to continue to both sign up new counterparties and encourage firms to increase further the quantity of pre-positioned collateral over time. b)  Addressing perceptions of stigma  The latest data, published in the Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin this week, show that there was no borrowing under the DWF between its introduction in late 2008 and 30th September 2011. In part, that is likely to reflect the fact that the UK banking system (in aggregate) has not been short of sterling liquidity over this period – the Bank has injected large amounts of liquidity through a variety of operations including both the SLS and expanded LTR operations. And since early 2009 asset purchases under the MPC’s QE programme have mechanically led to a large increase in the stock of central bank reserves. Of course more reserves in total do not ensure an appropriate distribution of liquidity across individual banks – but it does help. Some people have suggested that lack of use of the DWF may reflect concerns about stigma attached to such support facilities. Stigma might arise from counterparty concerns that their use of the DWF would be detected, coupled with a perception by others that only weak institutions would ever use a bilateral, on-demand facility. In fact, as we have made clear, the DWF is not there to support a failing firm – when borrowing from the DWF, firms must have convinced the Bank of their ability to repay.

Paul Fisher: Liquidity support from the Bank of England – the Discount Window Facility Speech by Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director for Markets of the Bank of England, at the National Asset-Liability Management global conference, London, 29 March 2012. *  *  *  Introduction The Bank of England’s market operations are designed to allow the use of its balance sheet to deliver on its two core purposes of monetary and financial stability. Specifically, they allow us to perform three important tasks. First, to implement in the market the decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on Bank Rate and, since March 2009, on the quantity of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves (better known as Quantitative Easing or QE). Second, they enable us to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system and hence reduce the cost of any unexpected disruptions to the commercial banks’ payment services to the UK economy. Third, they provide the bedrock for the Bank’s market intelligence work, which feeds in to both core purposes. Over the past three years or so, I have used opportunities such as this to set out the policy objectives and rationale underpinning the Bank’s various market operations. 1 Today, I want to fill in some pieces of the jigsaw puzzle by discussing in detail two of the new operations which provide liquidity insurance: the Discount Window Facility (DWF) and the recentlyannounced Extended Collateral Term Repo Facility (ECTR).
During this period the krona strengthened by around 10 per cent and we were forced to revise our exchange rate forecasts in a stronger direction on several occasions. One possible explanation is that the forecast did not fully reflect the large interest rate differential that monetary policy entailed. One consequence of the strong development of the krona is that Swedish import prices have fallen in absolute terms and fallen more than other countries’ import prices (see Figure 2a). This puts downward pressure on inflation. Another consequence is that the international competitiveness of domestically-produced goods and services deteriorates. This could be reflected in lower sales volumes and, to the extent the firms instead prefer to guard their market shares, lower price mark-ups. A strong krona, combined with weak demand from abroad, has meant that the situation for the export industry has been particularly hard pressed, which has probably led to low wage increases in the manufacturing sector. As this sector is traditionally a wage leader, the low wages may have spread to the rest of the Swedish economy and in this way have contributed to the low inflationary pressures. Figure 2a. Figure 2b.

Erdem Başçi: Global finance in transition Keynote speech by Mr Erdem Başçi, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the conference on “Global finance in transition”, Istanbul, 7 May 2013. *  *  *  Esteemed participants, distinguished guests, Welcome to the conference on “Global Finance in Transition”, held under the Russian G20 presidency and hosted jointly by the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee (RBC) and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT). In this conference, we will be analysing and discussing with experts, the structural changes in global finance experienced as of 2008. In these opening remarks, I would like to briefly point out the impact of these changes on emerging market economies. Three fields have undergone significant changes in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis: fiscal policies, monetary policies and financial sector policies. These changes have had significant subsequent impacts on global finance. As for the fiscal policies; those of the emerging market economies differ considerably from the fiscal policies of the advanced economies. Automatic stabilizers did cause emerging market economies to have wider budget deficits temporarily in 2009. Yet, EME’s sovereign debt has been very low compared to that of advanced economies, and still on a downward trend since 2010. Emerging market and advanced economies diverge in terms of monetary policies as well.
In the euro countries, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact provide guidelines for fiscal policy, including requirements to reduce government debt and to record a budget surplus during upturns and the establishment of limits on deficits during recessions. Sweden has placed a cap on government expenditure in the medium term, and is systematically reducing government debt. The UK is complying with a guideline stating that public consumption should not be debt-financed. They have also placed a cap on government net debt. The US has created a significant budget surplus, and government debt is being reduced. In Norway it is important that the annual budgets are anchored in a long-term strategy which takes into account that oil revenues may fluctuate from one year to the next. It is an advantage if fiscal policy can also be used to counter fluctuations in demand and production. Given the policy objective, the government budget should not have a procyclical effect. It would be undesirable for government budgets to contribute to increased demand for labour at times when price and wage inflation is appreciably higher than the rate in other countries. Transparency in monetary policy In order to contribute to greater credibility and confidence, Norges Bank places emphasis on transparency with regard to its interest rate policy. Transparency promotes predictability in the behaviour of the central bank and helps reduce uncertainty for economic agents.

However, one fundamental problem is that it is difficult to see how a relaxation of rules in certain areas could be compensated by a purposeful tightening in others. Relaxing the 3 per cent rule would thereby imply a weakening of the construction as a whole at a time when - as I mentioned earlier - the conduct in some countries suggests that if anything the opposite appears to be required. There is already flexibility in the regulatory framework for different interpretations of the phrase “exceptional circumstances”. To increase this flexibility by allowing for country-specific factors on a general level would lead to risks. In particular, there is a risk that the rules would be interpreted too much ex post and that small countries would be discriminated against even more than is already the case. However, there is room for substantial improvements in the preventive arm of the Pact. The Achilles’ heel of the Pact is not actually the 3 per cent limit but its asymmetry; the pact involves gentle warnings in booms but hard sanctions in slowdowns. This means that the pact lacks credibility when, after impotently highlighting indiscipline during booms, it is expected to force governments into highly painful, 180-degree turns towards austerity during slowdowns. It also risks contributing to procyclical policy. Against this background the Commission has worked hard on improving the preventive arm in recent years. I have sympathy for many of their proposals. Some examples: •  Strengthen incentives in good times. Here, considering the debt level could play a role.
Secondly, is having the ability to articulate this vision with others in the organisation and also with those that will be affected by the actions taken by the organisation. This is to ensure that the energies of the workforce will be channelled to achieving the strategic results required. Very often, the shared vision with those that are affected by the actions of the organisation also allows for the combined efforts to be mutually reinforcing. Thirdly, and importantly is knowing and understanding the business and the key elements that drive the organisation. Knowing how the system works and how the objectives might be realised. This involves having the knowledge, the skills, the information, the methodologies and the organisational structures needed to deliver the results. This is important so that the ideas can be translated into results. Fourth, given the nature of the business of the public sector and the diverse stakeholders involved, leadership in the sector requires coordination and integration skills that is able to pull together diverse thinking and diverse information and the ability to integrate the different perspectives into a solution that produces the desired outcomes. This will also involve coordination skills required to bring together not only the different parts of the organisation but also other organisations in the public sector that can contribute to achieving the desired results. Fifth, it involves managing trade-offs. Frequently, actions that need to be taken involve different implications on different target groups. This may involve interests that are conflicting.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Demography and economic policy – the challenges ahead Summary of a colloquium by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, on “Chances et défis du vieillissement” (opportunities and challenges of demographic ageing), at the University of Geneva, Geneva, 10 November 2006. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  What will Switzerland look like in 2050? The demographic changes under way will have a strong impact on the future demographic landscape, with regard to both the working population and the older age segments. The ageing society poses two major challenges for economic policy: ensuring the production capacity of the Swiss economy as well as the continuance of the social security scheme. To address these challenges, an economic policy that promotes productivity increases while guaranteeing economic growth must be implemented with immediate effect. In line with this economic policy, adjustments must be made to our social security system.
Today, more than half of the Thai labour force is in the non-agricultural sector (including services), which is more averse to changes in global competition for trade and investment. Moreover, to maintain competitiveness, our economy needs the labour force that possesses higher and more flexible skill sets to move up the valued added chain of production and trade. In reality, Thailand, just like other countries, has weakness in the mismatch of skills produced through formal schooling from those which firms find useful. Government policies need to address this weakness quickly, by finding ways to align formal education with training through vocational schools and apprenticeship programs organized by private businesses. Key questions will be on designing appropriate incentive structures for players in the education and business sectors, while being mindful of social safety net considerations when businesses close. This is especially important because the agricultural sector now accounts for about 10 percent of the overall economy and cannot provide social-safety support for the non-agricultural sector should a downturn hit. In addition to government policies, investors and firms can play their parts in helping to improve labour skill and quality development. This can be achieved through building more experience in the workplace by investing in the best technology and capacity to use that technology efficiently. Importantly, we also need to focus on the quality of investment that will help build skills and enhance production techniques that adds higher values and saves costs. Ladies and Gentlemen, To close, let me highlight another important underlying strength of the Thai economy.

3 15 0,4 2  3 2  9 8  * Market shares of Controlled banks multiplied by their capital share, end of 2002  BIS Review 53/2003  Romania  7 1 0,6 6  7,5 1,2 2,3 5,9 2,2 1,5 4,3 6 3,3 3,9  Bulgaria  15  Croatia  5 1 3 3 16 9  18 4 9  3  CEEC 5- Total  Slovakia  15 0,2  Slovenia  7 9 8 6 5 3 3 3  Poland  KBC Bank Bayerische Landesbank Intesa Bci HVB Group Raiffeisen GE Capital Citibank Erste Bank Societe Generale UniCredito  Czech republic  Hungary  Role of Foreign Banks  0,1 14 6 7  7 4  2 4 3  7 27  5 19  8 0,5  20  5  As said above, the economic transformation had a large negative impact on balance sheets. Banks tended to lend to previously existing companies undergoing privatization that were faced with a sudden loss of foreign demand (mainly from Soviet Union) and had to restructure themselves by laying off a big part of their workforce. This proved to be a recipe for financial disaster. Financing of newly established companies with no track record, with business plans based more often on good intentions than on thorough analysis was no better. In addition, the political elite, who saw bank financing as the quintessential source of economic growth, encouraged this lending boom. Existing risks were widely disregarded.
It is, however, encouraging to see that these deficiencies are being addressed and that efforts are being made to render BIS Review 93/1999  2  the impact of economic decision-making on the euro area as a whole visible and transparent for the markets and the public at large. Moreover, the recognition that Europe’s performance depends to a large extent on its ability to take on the task of implementing real structural reforms appears to be gaining ground. There is no alternative to orienting the conduct and the presentation of economic policies to the new framework of EMU in order to explore its full potential. It remains to be seen whether these adjustments will have institutional implications, either motivated by functional necessity or in response to the demands from our partners and interlocutors. I should add that institutional changes will in any case be on the agenda of the EU in the coming years, not least in order to endow Europe with a capacity for decisive external action. This is a consequence not only of the momentous changes in the wider Europe, but also the projected expansion of the EU. The European Union has launched an enlargement process of unprecedented dimensions, with 12 countries from central, eastern and southern Europe currently involved in, or preparing, entry negotiations. The prospect of EU membership and the eventual participation in EMU has galvanised these countries into pursuing economic reforms, re-orienting their trade and embarking on a difficult and sometimes painful process of disinflation.

Project Greenback 2.0 is indeed an experiment which allows us to seek answers to the questions that we never understood before. These include the motivation behind the migrant workers for not choosing the formal remittance channels and their propensity to use digital financial services. We have made good progress in understanding these issues. But that is not enough. We wish to understand more about how remittances can be further leveraged to fight poverty. This includes developing greater understanding into: How remittances can be linked to insurance and investment products which would help to break the vicious cycle of poverty; How digital payment and remittances can be used as a tool to support the needs of small rural businesses; From education perspective, how to channel remittances to support provision of quality education for poor children; and From gender perspective, how we can use remittances to drive women entrepreneurships particularly in the era of digital economy. Moving forward, these are the areas that we will continue to explore; and in doing so I have no doubt that there will be more opportunities for all of us to work together again. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Waldenström, Daniel (2016), “The National Wealth of Sweden, 1810–2014”, Scandinavian Economic History Review 64(1), pp. 36–54. Waldenström, D (2017) “Wealth-income ratios in a small, developing economy: Sweden, 1810-2010”, Journal of Economic History 77(1), pp. 285-313. 6 [6]

For example, the Basel Committee published a framework to identify optimal levels of bank capital and used that framework as an input into the calibration of Basel III capital requirements.10 This approach considered how the probability of a financial crisis varies with bank capital, the social costs of banking crisis, the link between bank capital and bank funding costs, and the impact of higher loan spreads on economic activity. Moreover, this efficient frontier is not fixed and is likely to vary over time as technology, official sector tools, and bank business models evolve. For example, technology-driven innovations that rely on bigger datasets and more sophisticated predictive algorithms might change the risk/return opportunities associated with certain intermediation services. Similarly, supervisory innovations like stress testing or more sophisticated horizontal assessments could make official sector oversight more effective. Finally, changes in business strategies like a shift to a more diversified business model might change the overall risk of certain activities. One can think of these changes as shifting the efficient policy frontier where there is more intermediation for a given level of risk. Alternatively, constraints on supervisory authorities or practices could shift the frontier in the opposite direction if use of effective tools is prohibited. Given the complexity of these relationships, it is not surprising that there is a wide range of estimates and theories about the optimal type and level of oversight of financial institutions. Nonetheless, we need to understand better these relationships in order to make policy choices more effective.
The "Banker" program comes as a solution complementary to the study programs arranged by educational institutions, and a parallel to the banks' direct efforts in attracting and employing national cadres. We are gathering here today to celebrate the opening of the first course of this integrated program, which hopefully will provide the financial institutions with needed human resources, and offer good job opportunities for the youth of our homeland. In conclusion, I can only reiterate my thanks to all those who contributed to accomplishing the "Banker" program, which I hope will continue to successfully achieve the objectives for which it has been established. Thank you for listening. BIS Review 125/2006  1

In fact - in one of many examples of how Basel II seeks to reflect reality - the new framework draws on the tremendous advances that many firms have already achieved in quantifying their exposures to credit and operational risk. This reflects as well one of the Committee’s goals to build the new framework on sound risk management practices in use today and to provide sufficient flexibility for it to evolve with advances in the future. At the same time, the Committee knows that mathematical formulas and financial models are only as good as the assumptions they make. At best, therefore, they serve as supplements to our insight: they do not replace our need for expertise and judgement. Even Einstein warned of the dangers of confusing mathematical certainty with reality. He said once that, “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.” Reasonable supervisors and bankers know that we cannot rely purely on the apparent mathematical certainty of models and formulas to make decisions for the uncertainty of the future. Likewise, some banks may engage in unique activities that are not captured in the minimum standards. To guard against overdependence on quantitative models, we have included qualitative provisions to ensure that strong risk management and internal controls are adopted throughout the organisation and to ensure the involvement of boards and senior management. The New Accord also stresses the importance of independent assessments and audits.
We have learned a great deal – about the opportunities and the challenges that need to be met before DL could be used in central banking. Some of those challenges are familiar to any payments system. 10 Others are more specific to DL. For example, we would need assurance that DL systems can be scaled, retain data integrity, and operate at the speeds and volumes required by central bank infrastructure – day in, day out. And we need to be certain that the privacy of the data in those distributed copies cannot be compromised by cyber attack, not just today but in the future. One way this might be achieved is to limit the distribution of the ledger to existing trusted parties, such as other public sector entities. To move forward we are working with other central banks. Beyond this we are open to working with others to explore further possibilities, including alternative applications of the technology. 9  The criteria are publicly available in the Bank’s Settlement Account Policy, available http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/paymentsystems/boesettlementaccounts.pdf. 10  In particular, participants need to be identifiable; permissions need to be assigned; messaging must be secure; and transactions must be verified, recorded, and stored. Ownership of assets must be capable of being determined with certainty, particularly in the event of a participant default. 6  at:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the extreme, a DL for everyone could open the possibility of creating a central bank digital currency. On some levels this is appealing.

I would like to draw your attention to the following issues: í  first, the euro area will have to face up a number of challenges to confirm its initial success;  í  second, the success of the euro will make a contribution towards encouraging a balanced international monetary situation. I believe that in the current overall economic situation, the success of the euro will help not only Europe but also the rest of the world which will benefit from European prosperity and growth as part of a healthy world economy. This would help facilitate the current accounts adjustments of the countries affected by the crisis. The success of the euro will be complete if a number of challenges are taken up A few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great deal of sceptic people that the euro was a viable project. Many of them pointed to its presumed contradictions and its alleged inconsistencies: for example, the impossibility of achieving an efficient policy mix without a political federation; the impossibility of avoiding some “asymmetric shocks”; the lack of sufficient flexibility of the economy and real mobility of the labour force in the European countries, etc. The result was that the euro would never exist! BIS Review 81/1999  4  These criticisms proved wrong as to the introduction of the euro. But they are useful to help answer the question of what are the conditions for ensuring that the euro is a complete success.