RIX thus plays a very central role in the Swedish economy, as it is the economy's “circulatory system” through which the Riksbank acts when supplying liquidity to promote financial stability and also when conducting monetary policy. As a result of the increasing internationalisation, the rapid technological developments and the emergence of new regulations, RIX, like the central payment systems in many other countries, is currently facing strong pressure to change. One effect of these developments is that an increasing number of credit institutions and some other institutions want to be able to participate directly in the payment system, instead of through agents. With more participants in the RIX system, the concentration risks will decline, as there will be more institutions that have the possibility to borrow directly from the Riksbank, which is positive. But a larger number of institutions, and new types of institutions, becoming participants in RIX could also lead to the risks of other problems increasing, such as operational problems, money laundering, financial problems and cyber threats. It is therefore important that the Riksbank regularly oversees the participants in RIX and has the power of authority to make strong demands of them. Thus it is essential that the Sveriges Riksbank Act provides sufficient flexibility in this respect. Function as Lender of last resort – emergency liquidity assistance A third important part of the central banks’ responsibility for the efficiency and stability of the financial system is the task of providing emergency liquidity assistance.

Clearly, these institutions are engaged in substantial activities outside the traditional banking role. It is within these very largest banks, and perhaps a few slightly smaller yet highly complex or interconnected ones, that systemic risk is concentrated. If the enhanced-supervision requirements are not highly graduated and imposed primarily on the very largest banks, it is not difficult to imagine how the costs associated with such supervision could lead mid-tier banks that exceed the $ billion threshold – yet fall well short of megabank status – to seek merger partners in order to achieve sufficient scale by which to help cover the cost of regulation. This would compound the problem rather than alleviate it. With regard to enhanced standards for such important factors as capital and liquidity requirements, leverage limits and risk management, Dodd–Frank instructs regulators to differentiate among these banks. Enhanced supervision can be implemented on a graduated scale, based on the extent of assets beyond $ billion and possibly other factors. Let us do that fully, then, applying these measures along a highly graduated scale, with only minimal added mandates directed at mid-tier banking organizations. However, when it comes to the top 10 or so, I would apply Dodd–Frank extensively and vigorously. I would apply all the elements of heightened supervision – from enhanced standards for capital and liquidity requirements, leverage limits and risk management to the additional measures of living wills and credit-exposure reports, concentration limits, extra public disclosures and short-term debt limits – with full force.