samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Impact of implementing the IFRS 9 by banks in Romania (June 2017)  Figure 16. Profitability of the banking sector: ROA, 2016 1.5  percent  1.0 EU median  0.5  0.0  percentage points  percent  50  0  40  -1  30  -2  20  -3  10  -4  0  -5  -10  -6  -20  -7  -30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Total  -0.5  1  change in total capital ratio GR IT CY PT DE ES FR NL AT PL IE MT SK SI LT RO CZ HU BG  -1.0  Source: ECB, consolidated banking data  change in impairment loss (expected loss; rhs) Source: NBR and credit institutions that are Romanian legal entities 13  Figure 18. Map of risks Map of risks to financial stability in Romania Deterioration in investor sentiment in emerging economies Tensions surrounding macroeconomic equilibria Higher household indebtedness through both banks and NBFIs Weak payment discipline in the economy, vulnerabilities in firms' balance sheets Faster increase in property prices severe systemic risk high systemic risk moderate systemic risk low systemic risk Note: The colour shows risk intensity. Arrows indicate the outlook for risk in the period ahead. 14  Figure 19. 5-year government bond yields 3.5  Figure 20.

The academic faculty will include permanent as well as regular visiting professors and scholars-in-residence. INCEIF will also form strategic alliances with leading local and international learning institutions to complement our pursuit to provide world-class knowledge for the benefit of the industry in particular, and the ummah in general. It is our vision that INCEIF will one day be an international nucleus for tertiary education in Islamic finance, training and research and provide a strong support in the development of Islamic financial infrastructure. With the grace of Allah, and with the support of the international Islamic financial community, it is our hope that INCEIF will make a meaningful contribution to the future development of Islamic finance for the benefit of the ummah. In closing, once again, I would like to express our deepest appreciation to the Yang Amat Berhormat, Dato' Seri Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister of Malaysia for gracing this occasion and for accepting to officiate the launch of INCEIF. 2  BIS Review 22/2006
BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  The international data on consumer prices are relatively rich: we have annual numbers for over 70 countries, most of them back to 1960 17. In all, across countries and years, there are 3,300 separate post-war observations. In only 70 of these – barely 2% of the sample – has inflation actually been negative (Chart 12a); the majority of these “deflations” (46 out of 70) have lasted no more than a year, many of these shorter episodes coinciding with falls in oil prices; of the 24 deflations lasting two or more years, 20 have been in economies with fixed exchange rates, most of those emerging economies; among countries with freely floating exchange rates, only Bahrain and – somewhat more famously – Japan have experienced protracted deflations, both of them twice (Chart 12b). This is not a common occurrence. A credible monetary policy reduces the persistence of movements in inflation Why might deflations be rarer in countries with floating exchange rates, and in emerging economies, and should this provide any reassurance today? Yes, I think – to a degree. One plausible reason for this pattern is that countries with fixed exchange rates give up autonomy to control their own rate of inflation. Instead, domestic inflation is determined by (i) inflation in the country to which their exchange rate has been fixed (most often the US) and (ii) forces affecting their real exchange rate.

The problem with both is that other policies, such as fiscal policy, will then have to take care of domestic economic stabilisation. But will they? Third, they can use FX intervention to reduce the effect of volatile capital flows on the exchange rate. Fourth, they can increase resilience and the ability to live with exchange rate fluctuations (reduce the fear of floating) by strengthening financial regulation and supervision or employing macroprudential tools. Fifth, if everything else fails, they can introduce tools aimed directly at the financial integration part in order to regain greater monetary independence and shift the effect of monetary policy more to the interest rate channel and towards the non-traded goods sector. These so-called capital flow management measures are probably most needed when countries are faced with large capital inflows at the same time as domestic conditions warrant significantly higher interest rates than among core rate setters. In Iceland, we have used many of these tools in recent years. We have used FX intervention to reduce short-term exchange rate fluctuations and, in recent years, to lean against strong appreciation pressures. We have introduced a liquidity coverage ratio and a net stable funding ratio in foreign currencies. In 2016 we were faced with strong capital inflows that flattened the yield curve as the policy rate was being increased and more was signalled. We then introduced a special 2  Rey (2013) and Obstfeld (2015) analyse this issue and provide somewhat different views on whether it is a dilemma or a trilemma.
Tackling this challenge is especially important at the current juncture, given the confluence of an intense digitalisation of economic activity, marked population ageing and various factors that may require a profound cross-sectoral reallocation of activity. In this regard, given the current changes in the demand for training, which are likely to intensify in the years ahead, the education system should be flexible and provide a decisive response. To absorb the rise in demand for vocational training, the RTRP aims to provide 200,000 more vocational training places in the coming years. Furthermore, the Organic Vocational Training Bill fosters the accreditation of skills — not only for students, but also for adults — and promotes tools to increase collaboration between training centres, universities and firms. In addition, harnessing the opportunities of digitalisation calls for increasing the population’s digital skills, especially in the case of the older generation, those with lower educational attainment levels and those on lower incomes. A comprehensive skill recycling strategy throughout the life cycle is also key in a setting in which society finds itself faced with marked population ageing and, at the same time, the need to extend people’s working life. Active labour market policies are also vital to limiting the loss of human capital stemming from job losses. A recent Banco de España paper shows that job displacements in a 16  collective dismissal lead to a sharp reduction (of 16 pp) in Spanish workers’ employability five years later.

Regarding incomes policies, based on the findings of the assessments required by law, further adjustments must be made to the conditions governing eligibility for Spain’s minimum income scheme (MIS), to ensure that this instrument can effectively fulfil its mission of eradicating extreme poverty while avoiding undesired effects. To that effect, social security authorities have recently signed agreements with several research institutions in order to evaluate social inclusion itineraries linked to the MIS. Housing affordability has tightened in recent years. According to Eurostat data, 48.7% of Spaniards living in market-price rented accommodation in 2020 were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the highest rate in the European Union (where the average stands at 32.3%), while 35.9% devoted more than 40% of their disposable income to housing, versus the EU average of 25.8%. The Draft Law on the right to housing seeks to ease such difficulties, which hit the young and lower-income households particularly hard. However, some of the measures envisaged, such as rent control, may not have the desired effect or may even have adverse effects in the medium term. Conversely, certain measures that could give a significant structural boost to the supply of rented housing, such as offering greater effective legal certainty to landlords, are absent. 17  (iv) The challenge of increasing firm size, facilitating cross-sector reallocation and fostering innovation Another major challenge is the small size of businesses, which results in less innovation and low productivity.
Market power, in this setting, is captured by the capacity of firms to charge prices in excess of marginal costs, rather than by their capacity to build-up ever-larger market shares. Market power means higher markups, but not higher degrees of market concentration. Different competitive settings might generate quite different pricing behaviour and Phillips curves (for example, Rotemberg (1982)). In this setting, the monopolistically competitive firm maximises profits by setting its price (𝑃 ∗ (𝑖)) as a mark-up over nominal marginal costs (𝑀𝐶): 𝑃𝑡∗ (𝑖) = 𝜇𝑀𝐶𝑡  (4)  𝜖 𝜖−1  (5)  𝜇=  where 𝜇 is the mark-up defined in terms of the elasticity of substitution. This tells us a firm increases its mark-up as the demand for its good becomes more inelastic. That might arise for a variety of reasons. Customer loyalty or brand might be one reason. Network economies of scale and scope might be another. In either case, the implication is that prices are being set above (and sales below) their socially optimal value – that is to say, their value under perfect competition when price equals marginal cost (𝜖 tends towards infinity). When prices are sticky, firms set prices in a forward-looking manner to get as close as possible to the desired mark-up over time. The forward-looking Phillips curve in (1) summarises that price-setting behaviour in the economy at large. The slope of the Phillips-curve, 𝜅, is a composite of deep structural parameters in the model.

37  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  37  Chart 18: Mark-ups and optimal policy weight on output stabilisation Weight on output stabilisation 0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1  Estimated increase in global mark-ups  0.0 1.0  1.2  1.4 1.6 Mark-up level  1.8  2.0  Sources: De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018), Galí (2008) model and Bank calculations. Notes: Parametrisation such that 𝛽 = 0.99, 𝜃 = 2/3, 𝛼 = 1/3, 𝜑 = 𝜎 =1. Chart 19: Impact of mark-ups on inflation and output gap volatility Standard deviation of inflation 20 Baseline 15  Higher mark-up shock variance Higher mark-up shock variance and higher mark-ups  10  D  5  B C  A  0 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  Standard deviation of output gap Sources: Galí (2008) model and Bank calculations. Notes: Parametrisation such that 𝛽 = 0.99, 𝜃 = 2/3, 𝛼 = 1/3, 𝜑 = 𝜎 =1. Standard deviation of mark-up shock increases from 0.1 to 0.125 when moving from the blue to red line. The steady-state mark-up level increases from 1.1 to 1.6 when moving from the red to the green line.
The notion that the welfare of a country boils down to the short-run profits of a few foreign exchange dealers is narrow minded. The reality offers a completely different picture. Switzerland has always suffered from external monetary turbulences and always wished for a stable monetary order. For example, the various crises of the European Monetary System in the 1990s, with a dramatic drop of the Italian lira, have led to the complete removal of the traditional textile industry from our economic geography. Such structural adjustment could arguably have occurred anyway, but the decisive factor at the time was of monetary origin. The purpose of the creation of the common currency was not only to concentrate the monetary power in the hands of the European Central Bank, but also to promote the conditions for transparency and competitiveness that would in turn foster trade, investment and growth in the internal European market. Price comparisons are indeed easier today, andtrade and liquidity management are much simplified, although it is still too early to numerically assess the impact of these effects on growth. Simplifying trade and investments in the European market not only benefits members of the European monetary zone, but it also helps anyone interested in being active in the European market. Switzerland, with its high degree of integration in the euro zone, reaps large benefits from this stable situation. Thus, it is clear that on those aspects, the introduction of the euro was very good news for the Swiss economy. 2.

It is estimated that 2.7 billion adults in the world economy are currently excluded from the financial system. In addition to the G20 initiative, there are other global institutions such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) that have assumed an increasingly active role at the international level in developing new research, setting standards and providing a platform for policymakers to share experiences. This improved visibility of financial inclusion on the global agenda has lent significant support to the initiatives at the national level to promote greater financial inclusion. In this recent decade there has also been a growing body of research in the area of financial inclusion. This has contributed towards enhancing our understanding of the different approaches and policies that have been adopted and their relative successes in achieving greater access to financial services. This has also allowed for an enhanced appreciation of the issues that need to be addressed and on how sustainable financial inclusion might be achieved in our own countries. While considerable progress has been made in improving the financial inclusion environment, the sheer numbers that remain excluded from the financial system suggest that much more needs to be done, both at the national and international level. Barriers to financial inclusion continue to exist in many countries.
First up, how the new accounting standard interacts with the bank capital framework here in the UK – a most enjoyable discussion, because you can never have too much of accounting standards. Next on the menu: consumer credit, of which you definitely can have too much. Some of the most difficult issues greeting our return, however, were not so domestic in nature. Would cross-border reinsurance contracts function properly in the wake of Hurricane Irma? How might a bad outcome on the Korean peninsula affect British banks and financial markets? Supervisors of the world's leading international financial centre have always had to juggle domestic and global risks. In between them, however, is a dynamic which is fundamental to retail and wholesale finance in the modern economy. It is a dynamic at play in the cliff-edge risks from Brexit and the differences of view between countries over Basel 3 finalisation. I am thinking of the impact of borders, location and distance on the shape of banks, insurers and financial regulation. Put simply: the impact of geography on the geometry of finance, a dynamic we might call 1  geofinance . With the revolution in regulation following the financial crisis coming to its end, and with changes to the geopolitical landscape looming large, I think that geofinance is likely to be the defining challenge of the next few years. The domestication of retail banking  Soon after the crisis I worked with the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB).

The structural reform of major UK banks and a small number of international banks will help anchor their safety and soundness. And by guarding against the risks of double leverage, we are ensuring that UK banking groups operating around the world are robust. But signals from overseas suggest that geofinance could go too far, too fast. Bringing up the borders in wholesale finance would be regrettable for all sides, be they the home or host of international groups. To finish where I started:   Although it makes our job more challenging, it is a good thing that investors putting capital at risk in London provide insurance cover for properties hit by hurricanes in Florida.   It is a good thing that banks are able to provide some services across borders, whether between the UK and our fellow nations in Europe or further afield.   And it is a good thing that we have, to date, been able to agree global capital standards for banks. Doing all of these things efficiently and effectively relies on a strong degree of trust and co-operation between public authorities across borders. We hope we can secure that in the years ahead. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9
Over the past six months: •  the level of unconfirmed trades has fallen substantially, for probably the first time since the inception of the credit derivatives market,  •  the practice of assigning positions without the knowledge or consent of all counterparties has stopped, and the market has adjusted with relative ease to a regime that now ensures that firms actually can capture their exposure to their counterparties,  •  there has been a dramatic increase in the share of active participants in these markets that are able to use the automated confirmation platforms, and a significant increase in the share of transactions conducted on those platforms,  •  the length of time between trade dates and confirmation is becoming shorter,  •  industry participants are making progress toward an agreement on a settlement process for credit events that will build on the approaches taken in the Calpine and Dephi cases and reduce the risk of price dislocations in cash markets given the large size of notional derivatives positions relative to the value of the underlying obligations, and  •  the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation announced a plan to establish a "trade information warehouse" for all OTC derivative transactions that would provide for a centralized repository of derivatives contract terms and specifications, which will, in a more fundamental way, improve all aspects of the post-trade cycle.

However, we still face considerable uncertainty about how market liquidity will behave in the context of a major deterioration in credit conditions or a sharp increase in volatility in equity and credit spreads, and this uncertainty is hard to quantify and therefore hard to integrate into the risk management process. •  The apparent increase in the scale of demand for exposure to credit risk relative to the growth in supply of credit has contributed to a substantial reduction in credit spreads and to some erosion in credit terms. Banks and dealers have reported pressure to reduce initial margin levels. The scale of leverage in some transactions is reported to have risen. The spread of portfolio-based margining creates the potential for greater overall leverage in the financial system, and the substantial variance in margin required by different dealers for similar portfolios suggests a wide diversity of views on how to measure the economic exposure. BIS Review 14/2006  •  Although banks hold a substantially smaller share of the overall credit risk in the system than they did twenty years ago, this shift understates the importance of the role they play in the underwriting, distribution, trading and market making of credit related assets, and it understates the importance of earnings derived from these activities to overall profitability.
In Mr Hon’s words, said back in 1972:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  “In Asia, Singapore now offers the best prospects for developing into a financial centre, if not for the whole of Asia, at least beyond the Southeast Asian or ASEAN region.” So it started then, and continued through the years when Dr Goh Keng Swee became Chairman (1980-85). But the most important development in this second phase, starting when Dr Goh led the MAS, was the re-orienting of our monetary policy to one centred on the $ exchange rate. It was a novel policy at the time. We were one of the few central banks that managed monetary policy by focusing exclusively on the exchange rate. It was not conventional, but it has worked. Through that second phase in MAS’ evolution, with Dr Goh as Chairman and subsequently under Dr Richard Hu’s chairmanship (1985-1997), we built credibility in our exchange ratecentred monetary policy. We also built credibility as a no-nonsense financial regulator. That was a very important second phase, in the 1980s and 1990s. The third phase began when PM Lee Hsien Loong, then DPM, took over as Chairman of MAS (1997–2004), and continued through the years when ESM Goh was Chairman (2004– 2011). It involved liberalising and opening up our financial sector to greater competition, and at the same time developing further resilience in the system.

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: The Gallery – promoting Singapore’s central bank role and mission Remarks by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Opening of the MAS Gallery, Singapore, 16 February 2016. *  *  *  ESM Goh Chok Tong Family members of Former Chairmen, Mr Hon Sui Sen and Dr Goh Keng Swee, and of former Managing Director Mr Lim Kim San Former Managing Directors, Mr Michael Wong Pak-Shong, Mr JY Pillay and Mr Lee Ek Tieng Current Board members Members of the MAS management and staff, and especially, MAS Pioneers Thank you to everyone for coming to the opening of our MAS Gallery. The Gallery is aimed at helping the public understand the mission of the MAS, and its role in promoting both growth and stability of the Singapore economy and financial system. The Gallery aims to help the public understand •  how we keep inflation low over the long term through MAS’ policies in managing the exchange rate of the Singapore dollar,  •  how we supervise the financial sector – the banking, insurance and securities industries - to ensure confidence in our financial system,  •  how we promote the development of a vibrant financial centre that serves a good part of Asia and in some respects the rest of the world,  •  how we also seek to ensure that the financial system serves the interests of consumers, and how we try to help Singaporeans manage their finances well.