samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In economic terms, the net effect for the system in aggregate is to inject reserves against wider-collateral up to some targeted level consistent with monetary policy, together with a further collateral swap of Bank bills against wider-collateral. But the structure employed has distributional benefits too. Haircuts Consistency with monetary policy is one constraint on our provision of liquidity insurance. Controlling our risk is another. For its loan (repo and swap) operations, the Bank uses  15  The Bank has retained discretion to lend cash via the DWF in various circumstances, including where the gilt repo market was not functioning. 6  BIS Review 67/2009  valuations, 16 haircuts and daily remargining to leave financial risk with its counterparties. Haircuts can be based on past volatility and on scenario or stress analysis. We increase haircuts for own-name securities, where a market price can no longer be observed, or sometimes in the light of the particular circumstances of individual counterparties. Consistent with its role as central bank, the Bank aims thereby to unbundle liquidity risk from credit and valuation risk. And that means we do not, and could not, lend 100% of our valuation of the collateral, which is a constraint on the scale of the liquidity insurance we provide. Haircuts are kept under review, and the Bank reserves the right to alter them, including on outstanding transactions. Looking ahead, the Bank aims to take into account structural and cyclical changes in financial conditions.

Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Bloomberg TV Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, and Bloomberg TV, conducted by Ms Caroline Connan and broadcast on 9 July 2018. * * *  Donald Trump has pulled the trigger on tariffs on China; China is retaliating. Could that complicate the ECB’s task going forward? What’s really important for us to gauge is the impact on business confidence, which so far has been limited. We see this escalation process: we start with skirmishes and then skirmishes may turn into clashes and then, at some point, clashes may turn into a fully-fledged war. That would be very bad for business confidence. So far, the backdrop is very strong growth in the Eurozone, resilient growth in the Eurozone, meaning that what we’ve seen so far doesn’t have the potential to derail the recovery. Can the ECB just sit back and watch this trade war happening? We are never sitting back and watching; we have to understand what’s going on. So far we believe that growth is strong enough to withstand the shock. Have you already seen some companies holding back investments because of these protectionist policies risks? Yes, that may happen. We are not complacent on the possible risks. A fully-fledged trade war would be extremely bad for the world economy – starting with the United States, by the way. The first victim would be American jobs, American workers. We very much hope that this doesn’t happen.
An altogether bigger prize would be to put these data to work before the fact, identifying the next victim pre-autopsy. That could mean using transactions data to help detect early warnings of systemic fault-lines and stresses. This is a potentially massive analytical and technical challenge. The technical challenge is certainly surmountable. Advances in computer power over the past decade mean that storing and processing huge volumes of data poses no technological barrier. The answer lies in the clouds – conveniently enough, since they too exhibit fractal properties. If we can search and track the world wide web in close to real time, we can certainly do the same for its financial sub-component. The analytical challenge is altogether greater. In essence, it is to find summary measures of billions of transactions data which are informative about impending market stress. There is serious needle-in-haystack risk with such an endeavour. And experience in economics and finance of finding robust early warning indicators is mixed. But here again, the market microstructure literature offers some tantalising clues. For example, Easley et al (2011b) have suggested that measures of “order imbalance” may provide early warning signs of liquidity voids and price dislocations. Their measure of imbalance follows closely in Mandelbrot’s footprints. It uses a volume-based metric of the proportion or orders from informed traders. Any imbalance towards informed traders causes potential liquidity problems down the line as a result of adverse selection risk.

A recent BIS survey4 of central banks found that 86% were actively researching the potential for CBDCs, 60% were experimenting with the technology and 14% were already deploying pilot projects. The central bank digital money, intended to be digital equivalent to cash, could further increase consumer choice, competition and accessibility with regard to digital payments, thus supporting financial inclusion and making cross-border payments faster and cheaper. In addition, some central banks see the preservation of monetary sovereignty in case of widespread use of crypto assets (issued by private entities) as a motivation factor. However, central banks are also exploring possible side effects of digital currency. For example, the risk of financial disintermediation as households and businesses can chose between holding accounts with commercial banks or central bank, or the increased run risk in case of distress, as there will be readily available safe assets, hence endangering the financial and monetary stability. Therefore, it is crucial that digital currency meets public demand, contains possible risks and ensures that payments landscape remains competitive. How do we as a central bank embrace evolving challenges in the payments area? Two years ago, we established an Innovation Hub aiming to facilitate, encourage and support financial innovation. We find this communication channel very useful for both the fintech and the National Bank. We help new players to better understand the existing regulation, and in turn, they help us discover potential regulatory gaps.
He noted that President Harry Truman “wanted a one-armed economist, not the usual sort that analyzes every problem with ‘on the one hand, this, and on the other, that.’” Gross claimed that Fed Chair (Janet) Yellen, in her speech given recently at the Fed’s Jackson Hole, Wyo., conference, introduced so many qualifications about the status of the labor market that “instead of the proverbial two-handed economist, she more resembled a Hindu goddess with a half-dozen or more appendages.”2 Whether you analyze the labor markets with one arm or two, or six or 19, the issue is how quickly we are approaching capacity utilization, so as to gauge price pressures. After all, a central bank is first and foremost charged with maintaining the purchasing power of its country’s currency. Like most central banks around the world, we view a 2 percent inflation rate as a decent intermediate-term target. Of late, the various inflation indexes have been beating around this mark. Just this last Friday, the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) index for July was released, and it clocked in at a 1 percent annualized rate, a pace less than the run rate of April through June. Does this mean we are experiencing an inflation rate that is less than acceptable? I wonder. At the Dallas Fed, we calculate a trimmed mean inflation rate for personal consumption expenditures to get what we think is the best sense of the underlying inflation rate for the normal consumer.

It seems very timely that we overcome the history that has separated us and begin working more closely together. During the Cold War, it was the view of many in the United States that India was too closely allied with the Soviet Union. American businesses that looked at India found it afflicted with the legacy of the worst of British bureaucratic administration. (The old joke was that you could never get morning tee times at any Indian golf course because the bureaucrats had locked them up at least until noon). From an Indian perspective, America seemed too hegemonic. Attempts by U.S. companies to invest and do business in your homeland revived memories of the East India Company. We viewed each other through the lens of the time and against a background of our own histories, with suspicion. But the (Berlin) Wall came down, the economy has been globalized and cyberized, and new threats to security have arisen, many of them from nonstate actors or forces who operate from within failed states to inflict damage elsewhere. This is a time for like-minded people to unite and work together. We are like-minded in that we are democracies. But tonight we celebrate something even more fundamental. My reading of India is that, like in the U.S., your country men and women are more pragmatic and business-oriented than they are ideological or inherently bureaucratic. The recent election of Prime Minister (Narendra) Modi offers the promise of making this abundantly clear.
As we continue to ponder its broad and complex dimensions, platforms such as this for open and active dialogue between public and private interest groups are important to provide further insights on the many issues that will provide the direction forward for the wider and effective global implementation of Basel II. On that note, I wish you all productive and successful discussions. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 99/2008

This rate is in compliance with the provided demand of the economy for money, coming from its real growth by 6 percent. The Bank of Albania monetary program is designed in line with other policies of the economy, where its harmonisation with the government fiscal policy is highlighted. The Bank of Albania estimates that like in the past years, even in 2005, the country's economic development will be in conformity with the overall development program objectives. The last developments of the banking system consolidate the optimism that it will fulfil to the best of its knowledge the role of financial intermediation in the economy. We deem that its consolidation will continue with accelerated rhythms throughout this year, providing to the large public more credits, more services and more security in the savings conduct. 2/2
By the end of 2003 for example, the domestic banks’ assets amounted to over 277% of GDP, compared with a euro area average of 273%, while the ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP stood at 155%, as against 143% in the euro area. More significantly, spreads between short-term lending and deposit rates in Malta, at 2.41 percentage points in 2003, were even narrower than the euro area average of 3.48 points. This suggests that the local banks compare favourably in terms of efficiency with banks elsewhere in the European Union. Furthermore, despite the global economic slowdown and the recent weak performance of the Maltese economy, the profitability of banks in Malta, as evidenced by the return on assets, has been fairly stable at around 0.8%. This compares with an average return of 0.6% recorded by European banks in 2001. At the same time, bank liquidity remains very high, with the domestic banks’ holdings of liquid assets as a share of short-term liabilities, just under 50% at the end of 2003, consistently exceeding the 30% prudential requirement. Maltese banks are also strongly capitalized. Their aggregate capital adequacy ratio, defined as the ratio of own funds to risk-weighted assets, stood at 16.7%. On the other hand, the banks’ loan portfolio still tends to be concentrated on a few sectors, reflecting the structure and small size of the Maltese economy. Furthermore, they still rely too heavily on property as collateral.

The monetary reform in 1965 replaced the earliest Lek banknotes with new ones, in a ratio of 10 to 1, by changing at the same degree the value of prices, wages and, of any other financial operation. Since then, most of citizens have not been adopted yet with this change and are used to communicate with the outdated term “old lek”, driving to confusion in both the communication of prices of goods and services and the accurate reading of economic and financial indicators. Even before the launching of this awareness campaign -postponed due to the difficulties caused by the restrictions imposed to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic situation – the Bank of Albania has been attentive in encompassing this message in its educational publications and programmes, such are: Global Money Week, or the campaign on the issue in circulation of the new banknotes. Recently, we have conducted the measurement on the use of terminology “new lek” – “old lek” on a national level, through the inclusion of dedicated questions in the survey on measuring financial literacy of the Albanian population structured pursuant to the model of International Network of Financial Education (INFE, OECD). The analyses of these questions provides information on the degree of wrong use of terminology by: location-residential, age-group, gender, education, employment and average level of income, as well as the settings where it is more frequently used; aimed at adopting the campaign undertaken by the Bank of Albania on the elimination of the outdated terms “new lek”- “old lek”.
7 Moreover, raising the policy rate to prick a hole in a potential housing market bubble could damage the economy more than if one allowed the bubble to burst on its own. 8 Leaning against the wind is thus a policy that is not without its problems. The welfare costs of making wrong decisions could be high. Moreover, many of the bubbles that have corrected themselves have not led to any major problems for the real economy. Perhaps, on the whole, it is not the role of monetary policy to steer developments in, for instance, the housing market. There are other means of preventing excesses, such as tougher regulations and supervision as well as demands for increased transparency in the  6  Kohn (2008). 7  Mishkin (2007). 8  Greenspan (2002) and Kohn (2006). 4  BIS Review 162/2009  financial system. A number of measures have recently been proposed to bring about a change in this direction, and this could mean there is less risk that bubbles will arise in the future. One can also argue that it is primarily the responsibility of other authorities – such as the financial supervisory authorities and the finance ministries to take measures to prevent bubbles arising in the housing market. Arguments for But it is nevertheless the case that burst bubbles can have serious consequences for developments in the real economy and thereby also for monetary policy.

Satellite Seminar on Financial Inclusion held in conjunction with the 61st World Statistics Congress  Opening remarks by Mr. Abdellatif JOUAHRI Governor of Bank Al-Maghrib Marrakech, July 14, 2017  1  “While data is important, the right data is essential” Albert Einstein  Honorable Chair of the Irving Fisher Committee, Honorable Governor of the BEAC, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to Morocco on the occasion of this international seminar on financial inclusion, which will focus on data and their important role in developing policies and strategies that take into account on-the-ground realities and then measuring and assessing the impact of these policies. First of all, I would like to thank our partners, the Irving Fisher Committee on Central Bank Statistics and the Center for Latin American Monetary Studies for their valuable contribution to the organization of this event, held as usual on the sidelines of the 61st World Statistics Congress. The topic of our meeting further underscores the importance that central banks and international standardization bodies attach to financial inclusion. It is a subject that is of increasing interest to them, particularly with regard to its interactions with financial stability, resulting in hindering the policies put in place to develop access to and use of financial services. A sustainable and efficient financial inclusion requires a long-lasting balance between innovation and the safeguards that need to be developed in order to ensure the soundness of the financial sector.
Second, regulatory capital ratios offer, on average, little if any advance warning of impending problems. These conclusions are essentially unchanged using the Basel III definitions of capital. This visual evidence can be formalised by constructing some Type I (false positive) and Type II (missed crisis) error estimates for the same 33-bank panel. Assume, by way of illustration only, that if a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio dips below 8%, this is deemed to signal distress (Table 1). The probability of a Type I error using regulatory capital ratios is 50%, while the probability of a Type II error is around 43%. On those assumptions, this suggests regulatory capital ratios do about as well in predicting crises as a coin toss. They are essentially uninformative about future bank stress. Taken together, this does not paint an altogether encouraging picture. A critic might argue that regulatory capital ratios have become too complex to verify, too error-prone to be reliably  7  4  Hayek (1974). BIS central bankers’ speeches  robust and too leaden-footed to enable prompt corrective action. From a first principles perspective, they score poorly as an optimal control device over a complex system such as finance. Resurrecting the third pillar What could be done to strengthen the framework? As a thought experiment, consider dropping risk models and instead relying on the market. Market-based metrics of bank solvency could be based around the market rather than book value of capital.

–  Requirements for sustaining pegs have become very demanding in an environment of high capital mobility; however, “intermediate solutions” may still remain a relevant option for a number of countries; particularly for open economies with close links to a partner country or a partner single currency area that maintains price stability or for countries experiencing high inflation, where anchoring the currency provides a simple and credible rule for monetary policy. Needless to say that the intermediate solutions are considered particularly appropriate in the European framework where the belonging to an exchange rate mechanism plays a major role in the preparation to join the single currency. –  In cases where countries need to respond to very large capital inflows and related risks of inflation and real appreciation, greater exchange rate flexibility might become desirable. Let me conclude these considerations with two observations: –  First, we should concentrate all our efforts on implementation of existing codes and standards. Implementation is the key word at present times. Applying standards and codes in 3  BIS Review 52/2000  all economies of the world, including emerging economies and economies in transition is an immense, challenging and urgent endeavor. –  Second, as regards the private sector involvement, I will recommend being as pragmatic and as consistent as possible. Pragmatic because a case by case assessment is always needed and there is, in my opinion, no mechanistic “a priori” approach which would be advisable.
Gradually, there is also an increase in output in the services sector, which boosts employment in that sector. Our judgement is that this will also be the case this time. At the same time, it is important to remember that a process of structural change has been underway in the Swedish economy for some time, where jobs in the manufacturing sector have been replaced by jobs in the private services sector. This development, too, is likely to continue in the period ahead. Consequently, there is no reason to expect robust growth in manufacturing employment in the coming years. Furthermore, in the current economic upswing, it appears to be taking somewhat longer than usual for jobs to pick up. The number of hours worked, on the other hand, has risen more than normal for the current economic climate. Firms thus appear to have boosted production by making greater use of already employed staff instead of recruiting new employees. Although there is still considerable uncertainty about developments in the labour market, it is nevertheless likely that the number of employed will increase some time around the turn of the year. At roughly the same time unemployment should be able to begin to fall. The other side of the coin of robust growth and a subdued jobs market is continued high productivity growth and low cost pressures in the Swedish economy. The extent to which this is temporary and due to economic activity, or is a result of longer-term factors, is hard to determine.

Our assessment in May was that economic activity in Sweden would continue to strengthen in the period ahead owing to both relatively loose monetary and fiscal policy and an expected economic upswing abroad. GDP growth was forecast to average almost 3 per cent from 2004 to 2006. One reason that there now is cause to revise up the growth forecast is that exports once again have increased unexpectedly fast. Export growth has been robust because international demand in general has grown more rapidly than anticipated and because the relative price of Swedish exports has been unexpectedly low. As I pointed out earlier, some 20 per cent of Swedish exports go to countries outside the OECD area where economic growth has been vigorous. During the first half of this year exports of goods, measured in current prices, rose 9 per cent compared with the same period in 2003. Swedish exports have also benefited in part from the revival in the IT and telecommunications sectors. However, robust growth in exports is not unique to Sweden; average export growth in the EU has been roughly as strong during the first half of this year. Another positive signal is that a pickup in investment, which the Riksbank and other forecasters have been waiting a long time for, seems to have begun. This was a major contributory factor to our more positive outlook for the Swedish economy at the latest monetary policy meeting in August.