samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For the most part, these measures are implemented without delay. Plans for cooperation on a logistical level and in connection with raising capital have become more attractive as well. It is to be hoped, however, that the reluctance to give up an often only presumed autonomy will be overcome sooner rather than later. The idea that a bank is only a «real bank» if it is itself involved in the entire value chain as much as possible is a thing of the past. Moreover, further development will depend heavily on the economic trend and the stabilisation on the financial markets. Two things merit particular mention: firstly, the capital ratio of Swiss banks is on a comfortable level overall, allowing them to act from a position of strength. Secondly, banks in Switzerland have mostly used the prosperous years since the end of the nineties to bring their lending business in line with the risks and to reform their liquidity and risk management. Under the current difficult circumstances, these efforts are now paying off. In other words, the problems facing the Swiss banking system will be solved. The banks in Switzerland have the necessary strength. Structural changes are taking place at a fast pace and are likely to progress even more quickly. The banking system may be undergoing radical changes, but is nevertheless stable. The role of the euro in payment transactions A little less than a year ago, the euro was introduced in the European Monetary Union in its physical form.

The SFBC is mainly responsible for the supervision of banks and institutions, while the National Bank is entrusted with overseeing payment and securities settlement systems and promoting the stability of the financial system. Our activity in this area focuses on analysing the structures, the behaviour and the results in the Swiss banking system. Up until now, the National Bank was known primarily for its banking statistics. Furthermore, it frequently conducted and published banking surveys. We are now increasingly turning our attention to the analysis of topical issues, including a periodic analysis of the situation in the financial system. In so doing, we concentrate on those aspects which are relevant for assessing system stability. For this reason, banks are the main focus. Developments in the insurance world jeopardise system stability only indirectly at the most, e.g. in the case of a financial conglomerate. The situation in the Swiss banking sector The Swiss banking sector found itself in a hostile environment in the past few months. There was a slowdown in economic development. Hope for a prompt recovery was dampened. The number of corporate bankruptcies increased substantially compared with the previous year. Uncertainty surrounding company profits hit the stock markets with full force. As elsewhere, Swiss stock prices dropped significantly amid high volatility. While the Swiss market as a whole (SPI) lost 22% from the beginning of the year, the SPI banking index weakened by 30% and the share index of insurance companies plummeted by as much as 47% (as of 9 December 2002).
This reflects the systemic impact CCPs can have in situations of extreme stress, by disrupting repo markets or channelling liquidity strains to banks – which are also monetary policy counterparties – thus affecting the circulation of liquidity in payment systems. Ultimately, CCPs may need to rely on central banks as lenders of last resort. Central banks therefore have an important role to play in the regulation of central clearing – a notion which is largely recognised but often misunderstood. In this context, let me say a few words about recent developments in the area of CCP regulation, and in particular the outcome of the legislative process regarding the revision of the supervisory framework for CCPs, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR II), and the recommendation to amend Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. The ECB recommended to EU legislators that its Statute be amended to clarify that the ECB had legal competence over CCPs, which would have allowed it to perform its statutory monetary policy role under EMIR II. We made the case that the ECB needed explicit general competence to monitor and address risks relating to our mandate, including broad discretion to take necessary measures in exceptional situations where the stability of the euro is at stake.

There is also firm evidence that the inflation targeting regime has earned credibility in the markets and the community. The monetary regime will be further tested in the period ahead, which will among other things be characterised by an exceptional level of foreign direct investment in the aluminium industry and associated publicly owned and debt financed power plants. Our experience is a strong indication that inflation targeting is a policy which can be pursued in a very small and open economy as in a large economy with very deep financial markets. This policy is resource-demanding and imposes by necessity a very strong discipline on the respective central bank. In our view the increased focus on financial stability in the Central Bank Act of 2001 was natural and well within the accepted framework of central bank activities. The Bank was responsible for banking supervision until the end of 1998 when that function was merged with the Insurance Supervisory Authority in a new and unified Financial Supervisory Authority, with which the Central Bank cooperates quite closely on financial stability issues. While the Central Bank had responsibility for banking supervision, its attention was necessarily focused on individual institutions and overseeing that their operations complied with existing laws and regulations. Before banking supervision was transferred elsewhere, the Central Bank had also begun to focus its attention on broader financial stability issues along the lines that many other central banks were doing at that time.
In order to have sustainably higher interest rates tomorrow, we must have them low today. That being said, not all unconventional instruments are legitimate. There are limits on how negative interest rates can go, as Mario Draghi stressed it. So this type of unconventional measure, although useful, should be used with care. And I think that socalled “helicopter money” would bring more harm than good: we do not need it and it is not on the table. The real issue is that monetary policy cannot do everything. We have done our bit but cannot create the lasting economic growth which underpins prosperity, including for savers. For this we need other policy makers to act. At a time when the euro area is experiencing both a negative output gap and a large external surplus – i.e. an excess of savings over investment, we must reflect on how abundant European savings could be put to the most productive use for investment in Europe.

The internationalisation of Islamic finance has observed the strengthening of ties between Asia and the Middle East in trade and investments in the recent years. The early trade ties allowed the Old Silk Road to flourish. Today, Islamic finance involving financial flows between the two regions has revived and revitalized these economic ties that generate mutually reinforcing growth prospects for both regions. The emergence of new financial centres in Asia and the Middle East and their increased integration has strengthened the foundations for a New Silk Road. It has also opened up and extended this potential to  BIS Review 60/2010  1  developed economies to forge stronger financial linkages with the growth regions of Asia and the Middle East. Our ties with Bahrain have long been cemented with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Central Bank of Bahrain and the Central Bank of Malaysia in 2001 to jointly develop Islamic finance. There is a presence of institutions from Bahrain with interest in institutions in Malaysia and from Malaysia in Bahrain, since 2001. In Malaysia, they have become part of more than 150 entities that participate in our Islamic financial system that offers the spectrum of Islamic products and services. While Islamic finance has demonstrated its resilience during the challenging period, continuous efforts are being taken to further strengthen its resilience and facilitate effective liquidity management across border.
The króna is now worth only 0.05% of its value prior to the 1922 devaluation; in other words, it has depreciated by 99.95%. In terms of consumer prices, the króna has eroded in value even more, or about 99.99%. In other words, its purchasing power in terms of goods and services is currently only 0.013% of what it was in June 1944, when the Republic of Iceland was founded. Nevertheless, over this period, Iceland developed from being one of the poorest countries in Europe to one of the richest in per capita terms, despite the economic costs of persistent inflation. Currency depreciation and subsequent inflation episodes have sometimes expedited the necessary adjustment following economic shocks, however, thereby returning the economy more quickly to a path of economic growth. Chapters 3 and 12 focus on certain aspects of Iceland’s experience with an independent currency. In Chapters 9 and 13, two key questions are asked. First, how effective is monetary policy in achieving the goals with which it is tasked? Second, has the flexibility of the exchange rate facilitated economic adjustment and stability, or has it instead been a source of shocks? Summarising these findings reveals that Iceland’s experience of independent monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate has been poorer than that in many other countries, in that monetary policy has not been successful in achieving its goals and the flexible exchange rate has tended to be a source of shocks rather than a shock absorber.

It is likely, though, that the flexibility of the króna has facilitated adjustment to severe downturns under certain circumstances, such as the collapse of the herring stocks in the late 1960s and the steep contraction following the 2008 financial crisis. The possible reasons for this are explored in the above-mentioned chapters. It is too soon to draw any final conclusions, however, and research beyond the scope of this report or conventional economic analysis is needed in order to shed light on why the objectives of low inflation and economic stability seem so elusive in Iceland, and why undisciplined stabilisation policy and an environment of loose financial regulation and supervision was allowed to flourish during the pre-crisis years. However, as is pointed out in the report, the ineffectiveness of independent monetary policy and the possible procyclical influences of floating currencies are not uniquely Icelandic phenomena, nor are they due solely to flawed stabilisation policy. To some extent, they can also be attributed to exchange rate volatility where, as with any other asset price, expectations and speculation play an important role. In addition, there are indications that smaller countries have more difficulty than large ones in pursuing independent monetary policy while they are becoming more integrated globally. In this context, it is worth noting that, prior to the financial crisis, Iceland was by far the smallest country in the world with a floating currency. Further discussion of the possible reasons for small countries’ vulnerability to such problems can be found in Chapters 9 and 13.
The Hong Kong dollar has been staying strong against the US dollar, reflecting continuous fund inflows – not the outflows that 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  some might have feared. Since April 2020, the HKMA has repeatedly taken in the inflows that came into our System, amounting to a total of 50 billion US dollars. 11. In these two challenging years, deposits at Hong Kong banks have grown by a total of 8.5%. The perception that capital is fleeing from Hong Kong is simply not borne out by facts. 12. Our banking sector’s capital strength, liquidity position and non-performing loan ratios all compare favourably with those of international peers. Banks in the city have also been using the buffers they built up when the economy was strong to provide timely financing support to corporates and households during these testing times. 13. What about the other sectors? If you look at Hong Kong’s asset and wealth management sector, it is the same story. It remains very robust. Assets under management grew by 20 per cent in 2019. And that growth momentum remained strong in 2020. 14. All this might seem hard to believe when you consider what has been happening. But I believe our problems during the last couple of years have only served to demonstrate the extraordinary resilience of our financial system. 15. So these times of trial actually show why Hong Kong is, and will remain, a great financial centre.

Eddie Yue: Why challenges reinforce Hong Kong’s value as an international financial centre Keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asian Academy of International Law Conference “Why challenges reinforce Hong Kong’s value as an international financial centre”, 26 February 2021. * * *  Opening 1. Good afternoon. I am delighted to be your keynote at this important event today. I thank the Secretary of Justice, Tony (Neoh) and Stephen (Phillips) for inviting me. 2. This conference is titled ‘Why Hong Kong is irreplaceable’. And in the context of international finance, I think it’d be fair to start this session with a question rather than a statement and ask: why is Hong Kong irreplaceable? 3. The answer is that no city is totally irreplaceable as a financial centre. For decades, London has been established as one of the leading global financial hubs. But even with this entrenched position, we have been hearing questions whether London can maintain this dominance in Europe after Brexit. 4. Or look further back in time. Modern banking was probably pioneered in Genoa in the 15th century. But no-one sees this picturesque Italian city as a financial centre today. In China, Pingyao in Shanxi was once the cradle of banking during the Qing dynasty; it is now more of an open-air museum for tourists. 5. The truth is that what financial centres do is irreplaceable, not where they are.
Recently, it has begun doing so. The Bank has been working with the organisation ‘We Are Futures’ to develop material on the economy to be taught in schools to children aged 11-16. The aim is to help create that missing foundation stone in the economics educational pyramid. 60  The Bank’s programme is called EconoME. As its name suggests, EconoMe aims to link the economy and financial system to people’s everyday lives; it is everyday economics. It seeks to give economics the same characteristics as sticky stories – local, personal, topical. Trial materials are available for teachers now. The programme will be fully launched in Spring 2018, with a state schools focus. Over time, we will seek to broaden the schools coverage and develop materials for 16-18 year olds. To help with this roll-out, the Bank is increasing significantly the numbers of school visits it undertakes, with a target of 200 in 2018. We are working with the charities Speakers for Schools and Inspiring the Future to achieve that objective, again with a focus on state schools. 61  Importantly, these visits will not just include the  Bank’s top brass, but staff at every level. From personal experience, I know just how important and uplifting (at least for the speaker) these visits can be. 62  They are also the best media-training I have ever  encountered, with performance feedback that is instant and brutal.

Also, the series of corporate failures in 2001-02 revealed weaknesses in corporate governance practices, including accounting and audit rules, which are currently being addressed by the US authorities. Latin America Over the last two years, growth in most Latin American countries has been weak. This year, however, there are signs of a modest upturn, with confidence slowly returning. This has been due, in part, to the direction of the structural reform agendas of many countries in the region. To strengthen the foundations for growth, policy-makers must remain committed to implementing structural reforms. Countries that have made the greatest strides in reform are already reaping the benefits. Both Mexico and Chile, which are at the most advanced stage of reform in the region, have proven remarkably resilient to turmoil in regional economies and have weathered the period of weak global growth well, considering their exposure to sluggish mature economies. Other countries in the region have embarked on reform agendas and should be encouraged by the international community to see them through as swiftly as conditions allow. East Asia As for the crisis-hit countries in Asia, economic performance has been positively correlated with progress in reforms. Stronger average growth potential in countries such as Korea and Malaysia reflects partly the authorities' determination in pushing through corporate reforms, reforming the financial sector and strengthening insolvency laws. In China, the authorities have repeatedly emphasised that banking reform, if coupled with the restructuring and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, is key to strong growth and financial stability in the medium term.
I should hasten to add that not everyone has shared equally in this otherwise strong economy. The unevenness of the recovery is evident in my travels around the Second District, where, for example, the economic recovery in upstate New York continues to lag the nation as a whole. So, while the national economy is in good shape, longer-run economic challenges have meant that not all Americans have benefited from the improvement in the economy. Beyond supporting a strong overall economy, monetary policy has limited reach into these issues, which are best addressed through other means, such as investments in education, workforce development, and economic development. Three Stages of Monetary Policy Normalization In thinking about the outlook for monetary policy, it’s useful to remember how we got to where we are today. The financial crisis and the Great Recession led the FOMC to lower the federal funds rate target to near zero and to keep it there for seven years. This lengthy spell at zero reflected the long shadow of the crisis—evident in the subsequent subdued growth rate and inflation rate —and the need for the economy to convalesce after enormous trauma. With the unemployment rate still very high and inflation low, the Federal Reserve embarked on a long journey through terra incognita of unconventional monetary policy actions, including large-scale asset purchases and forward guidance on the future path of interest rates. We weren’t alone: Indeed, some central banks across the globe went even further down the road of unconventional policies.

John C Williams: Remarks at the 42nd Annual Central Banking Seminar Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 42nd Annual Central Banking Seminar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 1 October 2018. * * * It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to participate in the 42nd annual Central Banking Seminar. This is truly an impressive group—our largest ever—with so many countries, institutions, and central bank departments represented. The program and speakers are similarly wide-ranging: You can expect to hear not only about the global economy, monetary policy, financial stability and supervision, technology, operations, and payments, but also about issues outside the usual central banking orbit. We see this breadth of coverage and participation as a key distinction and strength of the Seminar. The long history of the Central Banking Seminar reflects the New York Fed’s deep commitment to strengthening central bank cooperation over the long term. Such cooperation is vital to better understanding the world around us and the execution of our responsibilities. Those relationships are also essential during times of financial stress, and were critical to managing events during the Global Financial Crisis. A broad perspective is absolutely necessary for central bankers today given the tremendous array of issues we face, the high level of economic and financial integration across the globe, and a range of uncertainties within and outside our traditional remit.
Given these conditions, when the signals of a recovery became clearer at the beginning of 2002, the Riksbank elected to raise its steering interest rate on two occasions during the spring, by a total of 0.5 percentage points to 4.25 per cent. These increases should also be regarded in the light of the fact that inflation was still at a high level then and risked having a negative effect on inflation expectations. During the spring the rate of price increase turned back towards the target of 2 per cent as forecast. As an external analyst my assessment differed slightly from that of the Riksbank. This applied to both the international picture, where it was uncertain whether a turnaround had actually taken place, and resource utilisation in Sweden and the risk of tension that could cause rising inflation. I interpreted the high rate of wage increase that we had then as a delayed effect of an overheated labour market during 2000 and part of 2001. Shortages on the labour market had eased considerably in spring 2002. In the services sector, as in construction, capacity utilisation had fallen significantly, which indicated that wage increases would gradually become more subdued. I therefore perceived the inflation risk as less evident and did not see any immediate need for raising the interest rate. It is clear that the inflation risk the Riksbank seemed to see declined as unease on the financial markets grew in the wake of bankruptcies and corporate scandals in the USA.

Gradually, unease increased because of security policy developments. The financial unease gradually infected the real economy; confidence among companies and consumers began to fall in several countries over the summer and it became increasingly clear that total demand had been negatively affected. This contributed to enabling the Riksbank to lower the repo rate twice during the autumn, measures that were in my assessment quite fitting under the circumstances. What we can observe today, compared with one year ago, is that the questions baffling forecasters are roughly the same and that they are dominated by the question of how far the adaptation process following from the stock market bubble has come. Today an additional factor making assessments more difficult is the threat of war in the Middle East. We do not know whether there will be a war or how it will all end. The crisis also creates uncertainty that makes it difficult to correctly interpret economic signals. In addition, the more prolonged the crisis is, the greater the risk that the actual uncertainty will have a negative effect on the real economy. I shall now turn towards the future and discuss developments over the coming 1-2 years. Right conditions for a recovery in the USA… One difference now compared with the situation one year ago is that the adaptation of the imbalances in the US economy has probably progressed further.