samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, the financial problems spilled over the real sector, bringing about global recession primarily caused by the substantial decrease in the private consumption (in the USA) and in the exports (of the Euro-area and Japan). In the last quarter of 2008, the financial and economic crisis in the developed economies spilled over the developing countries. Their export demand went down as a result of the depreciated private and investment consumption in the developed economies. Simultaneously, for overcoming the significant lack of liquidity in the domestic markets, some international banks reduced their lending to these countries. The higher need for liquidity, and the higher risk aversion resulted in a withdrawal of portfolio investments by foreign investors. Under such conditions, the countries with high current account deficit faced with a higher need of external funding, which, given the high instability on the international financial markets, was very hard. Reasonably, this led to pressures on the exchange rates of the economies with higher external unbalances. How and to what extent has the financial crisis spilled over the Republic of Macedonia? The Republic of Macedonia has not been hedged from the problems shaking the world, particularly at the end of 2008 and 2009.

The depreciated global demand, reflected through several channels, with a decrease in the national economy and real decrease in the GDP in the first half of the year of 1.2%. BIS Review 127/2009  3  Also the pressures on the inflation caused by the import prices decreased, which together with the entering into the zone of a negative production gap, resulted in price stabilization. The average annual inflation rate in the first eight months of 2009 is negative and it equals – 0.3%, which is a significant downward movement, compared to the preceding year. Alike the pressures on the foreign exchange market caused by the indirect effect of the global crisis, transmitted through the movements in the balance of payments, no movements typical for the global money markets characteristic for the past two years on the Money Market in the Republic of Macedonia were registered. Namely, on the Money Market, in the segment of the non-collateralized borrowing, increase in the turnover and stable movements of the interest rate in the last two years were registered, proving that the mutual confidence in the banking system of the Republic of Macedonia was not impaired. Thus in 2007 exactly, when the global financial crisis began in August, the turnover registered on the Money Market in the Republic of Macedonia started to increase, with the average monthly turnover reaching the level of Denar 1,712 million and it was higher by twice relative to the average monthly turnover registered in the preceding year.
Seeking broad adoption  So if we have reached the point where a new Code has been launched and there are encouraging early moves on adoption, what needs to follow? Most obviously, it’s important that we maintain this early momentum so that adoption becomes the norm. As I have already implied, virtually all of the firms directly engaged in developing the Code have publically stated their intention to sign up, and members of the various central-bank organised foreign exchange  4  http://www.globalfxc.org/public_registers.htm?m=62%7C379 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  committees across the globe will do so too. This captures many of the large sell side firms and infrastructure providers. The challenge at this stage is to ensure that firms engaging in the full range of wholesale market activities are equally committed to incorporating the Code into their business practices. The audience in this room represents a key constituency: buy-side participants. A traditional, though I hope fading, attitude is to view codes of conduct as the preserve of sell-side firms only. But the Code provides key guidance that is relevant to both sides of any FX transaction. Moreover, an objective behind providing principled rather than rules-based guidance was to encourage market participants to think through how those principles apply to their own business context, and to apply the Code in a manner which is proportionate to that context.

The Code benefits all participants in the FX market, from asset managers to PTFs, who should recognise this, show their support and sign up to the Code. Keeping pace with an evolving market  If the first task is to promote consistent and widespread adoption of the Code, the second is to ensure the Code itself continues to provide relevant guidance. The job of the GFXC is to ensure this happens. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  On occasion the GFXC may judge that broad public feedback is needed on particular topics or market trends to achieve its objectives. The first such example is the Request for Feedback on Last Look practices that the GFXC launched in May. 5  The Code has already made a significant step forward in setting out a common understanding of what last look is and how it should be used fairly, in line with its proper purpose as a risk control mechanism. It also sets out guidance on appropriate transparency around its use, for example by engaging in regular dialogue with clients on how their orders are handled. And anecdotally, as in many other areas of the Code, the discussions held during its development have already spurred some industry changes which have led to greater transparency. The most challenging area though was agreeing on the guidance that should be provided with regards to the specific topic of trading activity in the last look window.
xii Two hundred years later, Bertrand Russell wrote that “not to be absolutely certain [is] one of the essential things in rationality”. xiii I am glad we still need science, including on the new challenges I stressed, to reconcile uncertainty and rationality. Blanchard (2006). Garnier (2022), Presidential Lecture at the French Economic Association. iii Rostagno et al. (2021). iv See Savignac, Gautier, Gorodnichenko and Coibion (2021) for first results on a new survey conducted by the Banque de France on expectations of French firms. v See Coibion Gorodnichenko Kumar (2018), Coibion Gorodnichenko Ropele (2020), and Rosolia (2021) for the few papers that seek to empirically assess the effect of inflation expectations on pricesetting. vi See Werning (2022) for recent advances on these questions from a theoretical perspective. vii Brunner (1981). viii Brainard (1967). ix Dupraz Guilloux-Nefussi Penalver (2020). x See Cukierman (1991) and Stein and Sunderam (2018). xi See Weidmann (2022), Jacobsson Lecture, for a recent articulation of this idea. xii In a letter to Frederick II, King of Prussia, on April 6, 1767. xiii Russell (1947). i  ii

In the long term, monetary policy cannot affect the real economy and the overall objective of monetary policy should therefore be price stability. However, monetary policy does have an effect on the real side of the economy in the short term, and in this way there is scope for monetary policy to help stabilise fluctuations in, for instance, production and employment. The legislator therefore considered that the Riksbank should have an obligation to support the general economic policy objectives laid down by the Riksdag, but to the extent that these did not conflict with the price stability target. They considered that this was a natural consequence of the Riksbank being an authority under the Riksdag, so this obligation did not need to be written into the act. There is thus no reference to this in the Sveriges Riksbank Act, although it is mentioned in the bill adopted by the Riksdag. So how do we Executive Board members ensure that inflation will be on target at the same time as giving consideration to the real economy? Well, quite simply by not behaving as "inflation nutters” who concentrate blindly on how far inflation is deviating from the target. Normally, if inflation has deviated from the target we do not necessarily aim to bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible. In this way, we create the scope to conduct monetary policy so that fluctuations in the real economy are dampened. Monetary policy is flexible in this way.
For a more detailed discussion, see Cimadomo, J. Hauptmeier, S., Palazzo, A.A. and Popov, A. (2018), “Risk sharing in the euro area”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 3, ECB. 2. Draghi, M. (2018), “Risk-reducing and risk-sharing in our Monetary Union”, speech at the European University Institute, Florence, 11 May. 3. More details on financial integration, including the latest data, can be found on the ECB’s website. 4. Some caution is necessary when interpreting these movements at present, given the potential impact of Brexit on measurement. 5. The findings of the ECB’s ongoing quantitative assessment of climate-related risks are discussed in more detail in Alogoskoufis, S. et al. (2021), “Climate-related risks to financial stability”, Financial Stability Review, ECB, May. 6. More details on the findings to date of the joint workstream of the ECB and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) on the insurance protection gap will be published in EIOPA’s forthcoming June Financial Stability Report. 7. These are funds that select assets based on environmental, social and governance criteria. 8. De Haas, R. and Popov, A. (2019), “Finance and decarbonisation: why equity markets do it better”, Research Bulletin, No 64, ECB, 27 November; De Haas, R. and Popov, A. (2019), “Finance and carbon emissions,” Working Paper Series, No 2318, ECB, September. 9. Lagarde, C. (2021), “Towards a green capital markets union for Europe”, speech at the European Commission’s high-level conference on the proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, 6 May.

Lars Nyberg: The mortgage market from a Riksbank perspective Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at The Swedish Bankers’ Association’s Annual Bank Meeting 2004, Stockholm, 11 November 2004. *  *  *  First and foremost, thank you for the invitation to speak at the bank meeting today. The mortgage market is the focus of today’s meeting and I will discuss this market from a Riksbank perspective. But what is that exactly? The Riksbank’s remit is to conduct monetary policy in such a way that leads to stable prices, but also to promote stability and efficiency in the payment system. For both of these tasks, the situation in the mortgage market since the mid-1990s, with increasing household debt and rising housing prices, has been of great interest. Is this development sustainable? And if not, what should be done? Incidentally, we share these issues with a number of other countries in the Western world. I intend to begin with a brief reminder of how we arrived at this situation. Then I will discuss the risks to financial stability. Finally I will give my views on the possible implications for the inflation target and monetary policy. Housing prices and debt Since 1996 house prices have risen by just over 80 per cent in current prices. Swedish household debt has increased by 85 per cent over the same period (Figure 1).
The Board has welcomed the results of stress tests made by the Financial Sector Assessment Program Mission which showed a rise in the levels of liquidity and capital held by the Saudi banking system, representing preventive reserves that impart more confidence to the banking system ability to withstand shocks. The Board members praised the monetary policy of the Kingdom which aims to enhance the strength of the banking system and price stability. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Despite the remarkable achievements fulfilled at all levels, there are still some challenges that you spare no effort to follow up and strive to overcome, such as: First: Creating more decent work opportunities for the sons and daughters of this country. Despite the good achievements in employment of citizens, estimates show that the unemployment rate among Saudis is still unsatisfactory. Taking into account the composition of the population in the Kingdom, which is mainly dominated by young people, it is imperative to face this issue, exert more efforts and overcome the difficulties encountering the process of creation and Saudization of jobs, including continued improvement of education and training outputs in line with the requirements of the labor market, determination of Saudization rates by activities and increasing them gradually. It is also important to achieve flexibility in the labor market to stimulate production and innovation and preserve the rights of workers and employers. Second: Diversification of income sources and reducing reliance on oil as a major source of income.

Over the period from 1985 to 2018, there is a continuing link between labour cost and price inflation in the four major euro area economies and across the three main sectors.11 Passthrough is on the whole strongest in the services sector, where wages account for around 40% of costs. That is important for the current inflation outlook given the resilience of services to the growth slowdown. What appears to be delaying the pass-through today is the fact that firms are absorbing labour cost increases by squeezing profit margins. This reflects two cyclical factors. First, the euro area is coming out of a prolonged period of low inflation, which historically leads to 12 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  a slower pass-through.12 One reason is that price dispersion is narrower when inflation is low, implying that if an individual firm were to raise its prices, it would attract the attention of consumers and lose market share. Firms are therefore more reluctant to pass on cost increases to consumers.13 The second factor is the softening of activity in 2018. Labour costs are typically passed on more strongly to prices when demand is stronger, 14 so the fact that the euro area has recently experienced a negative demand shock is likely to have held firms back from raising prices. The delay in pass-through may also be explained by an additional factor, which is lower imported inflation over the last two years.
The Riksbank's losses do not reflect the overall result The Riksbank's task is not to generate profits. Our mandate is to maintain permanently low and stable inflation and also to contribute to a balanced development of production and employment. The bond purchases made prior to the pandemic were part of the expansionary monetary policy that would safeguard the credibility of the inflation target. In addition, during the pandemic, the intention was to support the real economy by ensuring that credit provision continued to function. An evaluation of our asset purchases cannot therefore be based solely on the financial gains or losses that have arisen on the Riksbank's balance sheet. One needs to examine, among other things, how government finances were affected. 32 Until the end of last year, the government bonds we purchased in phase 1 had increased in value. Unrealised  value increases of SEK 9 billion were therefore recorded in revaluation accounts, see Table 4. 33 These calculations are based on the cash flows that have so far been generated for each bond purchased, combined with a market valuation at current prices of the bonds that have not yet matured. The calculation can therefore be seen as the final result of the purchases, assuming that the remaining holding is sold today. 18 [30]  Two examples of questions that need to be answered are: Did the government's borrowing costs fall? Did growth and employment in the economy rise, so that state tax revenues increased?

In addition, the IoD provided input into the Corporate Governance Model Board Charter which has been developed with technical expertise from MTN Special Engagements led by Ms Mary Ncube. The outcome of this work is what will be presented to you today. The presentation will focus on the significant position that Boards of Directors occupy in the whole Corporate Governance process and how their role, functions and operations may be reduced into a charter that might guide their work., including;   Powers, functions and delegations of the board;    Board composition and mix – and the challenge in state-owned institutions;    The Chairperson and CEO – and whether they should be different persons and why;    Rights and duties of Directors – and that ultimately the buck stops here;    The role of the Board Secretary – and how they can help drive the right agenda;    Disclosure of conflict of interest and the challenge of ethical standards;    Members’ remuneration and expenses – and what is morally right?   Corporate social responsibility; and,    Evaluation of the Board’s performance, etc. But why do we need a Board Charter one may be tempted to ask?
The net effect of particular forms of intervention may enhance the capacity of the private sector to create wealth and employment - I imagine that most people would generally regard public health and education services, for example, in this way, or forms of regulation that enable markets to function more effectively. But even then there are questions of degree. And other forms of intervention may be more likely to reduce the wealth-creating capacity of the private sector by, for example, blunting incentives either to provide or to take up employment. That is not, of course, to say that they are in any sense necessarily wrong, merely to point out that here again choices to be made, the difficulty often being to know where to strike the balance between conflicting objectives. The question of relieving poverty needs to be addressed within this framework. Our social conscience may say that we should lean more towards redistribution in favour of the poorer sectors of our community generally, or in favour of those who are particularly disadvantaged in one way or another and goodness knows there are endless causes that in themselves are worthy of our collective support. 3  BIS Review 110/2000  But it is important to recognise that in doing so, we could reduce the wealth and income generating capacity of the economy as a whole, and so reduce our ability to provide rising living standards to all sectors of society, including rising absolute living standards of the poorer sectors we were seeking to help.

The Bank has benefitted from capacity building, training, technical assistance, and funding from:   The African Development Bank (AfDB);    The Association of African Central Banks (AACB);    The British Department for International Development (DFID);    The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);    The European Union (EU);    The German Technical Cooperation (GTZ);    The International Monetary Fund (IMF);    The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD);    The Reconstruction Credit Institute (KFW);    The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);    The West African Monetary Agency (WAMA);    The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI);    The West African institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM); and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9    The World Bank  This list is by no means exhaustive. We want to assure these organisations of our cooperation at all times and we know that with their continued support we shall maintain the course despite the challenges of our time.
We are, as I have said, also seeking feedback on the technical approaches for such a model of the digital pound. The Technology Working Paper accompanying the Consultation Paper sets out an illustrative and complementary conceptual model consisting of a core ledger, API layer, analytics and alias service. The core ledger operated by the Bank might be centralised, running as a traditional database, or it might use Distributed Ledger Technology (whether a blockchain or another form of the technology). The paper includes key questions which will be further explored in the next phase of work, including for example which privacy-enhancing technologies might support our policy objectives and what features of an API for the digital pound would best enable innovative use cases. The digital pound within a digital payments landscape Finally, I want to cover briefly how a retail digital pound, designed for use by firms and households in everyday transactions, might sit alongside a wholesale central bank digital currency, privately issued digital money, and also alongside central bank digital currencies issued by other jurisdictions. On the question of a ‘wholesale CBDC’ the first point to emphasise is that for the Bank this is not a question of either one or the other of ‘retail or wholesale’. We are working extensively on both areas, including through the renewal of the digital infrastructure we currently use to provide money to commercial banks in the form of Bank of England reserves.

Or how the advances in the functionality of the smartphone, as most recently seen during the pandemic, would transform daily lives. But while we cannot know with certainty how current trends in payments and technology will play out, it would be complacent to assume that developments in money and payments will end with the status quo. There are already in existence new digital technologies that are being applied to the digital representation, transfer and storing of money like obligations. These offer the prospect of new possibilities in the way money and payments can be configured to interact with digital processes. Programmable money, for example, could enable the development of smart contracts which carry out specific actions based on pre-defined actions and conditions[5]. Moreover, money and payments are no longer the exclusive province of banks. New, non-bank players have already been successful in providing innovative payment services. Looking forward a wide range of non-bank payment firms, including bigtechs and some players from the crypto universe, are becoming increasingly interested in the possibilities of these new technologies in money and payments. Our assessment that a digital pound is likely to be needed is grounded first in the view that further decline in cash use and further development in the digitalisation of money and payments is likely and second in the view that these developments raise important questions to which the Bank of England and the Government should respond.