samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Corporate bond sales had started from March 2022. 2. See ‘Bank Rate increased to 4.25%’ - MPC minutes March 2023, Bank of England. 3. The canonical reference is Friedman (1961) ‘The lag in effect of monetary policy,’ Journal of Political Economy 69(5), pp. 447-466. For an overview of more recent results, see Havranek, T. and M. Rusnak (2013). ‘Transmission lags of monetary policy: A meta-analysis,’ International Journal of Central Banking 9(4), pp. 39-75. 4. My MPC colleague Catherine Mann argued in this direction in a recent speech; see Mann, C.L. (2023). ‘Expectations, lags and the transmission of monetary policy,’ speech at the Resolution Foundation, 23 February. Support for this view is offered in Cesa-Bianchi, A., G. Thwaites and A. Vicondoa (2020). ‘Monetary policy transmission in the United  Page 13 Kingdom: A high frequency identification approach,’ European Economic Review 123 (art 103375). However, that view is not uncontroversial. For example, subjective assessments of the lags in transmission have been found to suggest lags are longer than in the past, as reported in Andre, P., C. Pizzinelli, C. Roth and J. Wohlfart (2022). ‘Subjective models of the macroeconomy: Evidence from experts and representative samples’, Review of Economic Studies 89(6), pp. 2958–2991. In the UK, a case can be made that lags may be longer, as transmission via the mortgage market now relies on longer maturity rate (2 – 5 year maturity) to a much greater extent than in previous interest rate cycles. 5.

Durmuş Yilmaz: Expectations in global economy Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Leaders of Change Summit, Istanbul, 15 March 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, It is a great pleasure to speak here at the Leaders of Change Summit that has gathered politicians, decision makers, journalists, economists and bureaucrats who have played prominent roles in their fields and inspired societies across the world. Today, I will share my thoughts regarding the outlook of the global economy and the challenges faced by the emerging market economies in the aftermath of the crisis. Then, I will discuss the role of central banks in this new era. Finally, I will conclude my remarks with the experience of the Turkish economy and the response of the monetary policy. Distinguished Guests, More than two years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the dust over international financial system seems somewhat abated. Unprecedented measures taken by central banks and fiscal authorities have put financial markets back on a relatively steady course by late 2009. As economic activity has started to gain pace, risk perceptions gradually improved, notwithstanding heightened sovereign risk in the Euro area, concerns over housing and labor markets in the United States, uncertainty regarding the health of financial institutions in advanced economies, huge influx of capital flows and associated risks in emerging market economies, and last but not least, questions surrounding the pace of demand rotation in the global economy.
The knowledge you have acquired through your training here is only part of the cherished objective. The more important requirement is to conduct yourselves in a sound professional manner, comply with regulations, and invest your capabilities and knowledge to attain real professionalism. May Allah render your knowledge useful to you and your country. I wish you all success, and may God bless you. BIS Review 14/2007  1

Wc are increasingly moving towards more principles based prudential standards; in addition, we have revamped our supervisory framework to provide a more structured and risk-oriented approach to the on and off-site examination process, while encouraging our front-only supervisors to think analytically. Despite these achievements, we still have substantial work ahead of us. Above all, our experience with risk-based supervision indicates that there is no going back to the mles-based approach of supervision given the dynamic nature of the banking business. And second, building a robust risk-based supervisory regime requires substantial time and resources and it will necessitate a material shift in the way both supervisors and bank managcment think about risk and risk management. I must therefore, commend APEC for this initiative in bringing together bank supervisors from the AsiaPacific region to learn and to share views on this very important topic. It is my sincere hope that all of you take this opportunity to gain insights from our highly experienced and knowledgeable experts as well as from each other on the practical aspects of risk-focused supervision. BIS Review 56/2004  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to declare open the APEC Pinancial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Seminar on Risk-Focused Supervision and Risk Assessment. I wish you all stimulating discussions in the week ahead and a very pleasant stay in Bangkok. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 56/2004
And other  companies exposed to these directly affected companies reduced their own employment, grew more slowly and achieved lower productivity. There is evidence this had a sizable impact in aggregate. Studies show that the excessive tightening of corporate financing conditions during the GFC accounted for 33-50% of the increase in SME unemployment in the United States, while contributing to 12.5-30%  of the  reduction in productivity among Italian corporates. Macroprudential reforms introduced following the crisis have sought to alleviate the risk of banks having to sharply curtail the supply of finance to protect their own balance sheets. Strengthened bank capital standards, including the introduction of buffers, and the active use of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer in particular, have reduced the risk that banks feel compelled to cut lending rapidly in a downturn. And alongside fiscal interventions, these efforts contributed to banks continuing support of UK corporates during the pandemic. More recently the failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in the United States reminds us that we need to remain vigilant of the potential for banking stress to impact corporates. When problems in the US led to the failure of SVB’s UK subsidiary, the Bank of England stepped it to use its resolution powers and transfer SVB UK’s business to HSBC, ensuring continuity of service and lending.

The group has produced recommendations and guides to support defined contribution (DC) pension schemes safely investing in less liquid assets. This is in itself a great investment – DC scheme assets  more than doubled over the last ten years, and are projected  to be around £ trillion by 2035. So the benefits to pension scheme members of long-term investment gains, and to businesses of accessing this pool of capital, will only grow over time. We also need the right structures to facilitate long-term investment, which links back to our focus  Page 11  on financial stability. Like the CFOs looking to fund long-term projects with long-term investment, we worry when non-bank financial institutions pair illiquid assets – things you can’t sell or exit in a hurry – with short-term liabilities. If investors pull out, the financier needs either to sell assets at a discount, or stop withdrawals – as we saw with commercial property funds in Brexit and Covid. And because once you suspect others of withdrawing it is rational to do so yourself, ‘run dynamics’ can escalate quickly. That’s why the FPC has been supportive of work by the Productive Finance Working Group, the FCA and others on the long-term asset fund (LTAF) – a new type of UK fund structure specifically designed for investment in long-term, less liquid assets. From an FPC perspective it ticks the boxes for both our primary and secondary objectives. And just last month the FCA authorised the first LTAFs – hopefully the first of many.
Deposit insurance started life later in the US in 1934, but has since spread to most major developed countries. The recent financial crisis illustrates perfectly the time-consistency problems both policies face. Pre-crisis, deposit and liquidity insurance were enshrined in a well-defined regime. But in the teeth of crisis, these regimes were abandoned. Liquidity and deposit insurance was offered in close to unlimited amounts in most countries to protect confidence among bank creditors, whether retail or wholesale. Prior policy commitments proved time-inconsistent. This is a pattern familiar for well over a century (Alessandri and Haldane (2009)). These time-inconsistency problems, private and public, have been made more acute by a dramatic structural shift in the industrial organisation of banking over that period. This has seen the emergence of leviathan institutions too-big-to-fail. At the start of the 20th century, the UK’s largest 3 banks’ assets accounted for 7% of GDP (Chart 7). By the middle of the century they had reached 27%. By its end, they had reached 75%. By 2007, assets of the big 3 banks had risen to 200% of GDP. Other countries tell a similar tale. Size and concentration in banking has hit the roof. Too-big-to-fail heightens the time-consistency dilemma for managers and policymakers. Big, connected firms increase the chances of a bad situation turning not just worse but catastrophic. Knowing the authorities will shoulder that tail risk, debt-holders will not price it for themselves.

This fault-line lies at the heart of the imbalance between privatised returns and socialised risks. Only in banking do control rights and incentive wrongs combine so uncomfortably. That calls for fundamental reform. Post-crisis that has been recognised, as regulatory reform has come thick and fast. These reforms are unquestionably a step in the right direction. But if they are not to reappear, deep-rooted incentive problems in banking need to be tackled at  1  US Treasury (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  source. I wish to argue there is unfinished business before these incentives are properly aligned with the public good. Limited liability In the first half of the 19th century, the business and governance of banking was relatively simple. By the mid-19th century, the United Kingdom had around 500 banks and 700 building societies. Most of the former operated as unlimited liability partnerships, the latter as mutually-owned co-operatives.2 Financial sector assets represented less than 50% of annual GDP and the largest banks had assets of less than 5% of GDP. Bank balance sheets were heavily cushioned. Equity capital often accounted for as much as a half of all liabilities, while cash and liquid securities frequently accounted for as much as 30% of banks’ assets. Banking was a low-concentration, low-leverage, high-liquidity business. A broadly-similar pattern was evident across banking systems in the United States and in Europe. This governance and balance sheet structure was mutually compatible.
But would making the repo rate negative and quite simply forcing the banks – and, ultimately, perhaps their customers – to pay to keep money in an account really have the same impact on final interest rates for households and companies and, if so, could it be implemented without causing problems elsewhere in the system? One objection towards negative interest rates is that people will choose the alternative of keeping cash in their mattresses. As this would be troublesome and not entirely risk-free, it can be imagined that most people would want to hold off stuffing their mattresses with cash as long as interest rates stay only slightly negative, but it is, of course, difficult to gain clarity as to exactly where such a boundary would lie. If the banks were unwilling to introduce negative deposit rates, would they then attempt to maintain their earnings by not cutting their lending rates either, in the eventuality that the repo rate was cut to below zero per cent? There are some international experiences, albeit short-lived, of  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  negative interest rates that can be looked at – from the euro area, Denmark and Switzerland – but how would the Swedish system react? Purchasing government bonds? Another measure with the potential to push interest rates down and counteract the excessively rapid appreciation of the krona was the purchasing of government bonds. There were significantly more comprehensive historical and international experiences of this than there were of negative interest rates.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of Russia's economic and financial developments in 2018 Speech by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the plenary session of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 30 May 2019. * * * Good afternoon, esteemed colleagues. Today, I draw to your attention the report on the Bank of Russia’s activity in 2018. The Report was sent to the State Duma three weeks ago, and we had a chance to discuss it in working groups, at parliamentary group meetings and at the joint meeting of relevant committees. Allow me to express my gratitude for your attentive consideration and deep interest in what we do. I would like to dwell on our key activities determined by the Constitution and the Central Bank Law. They are associated with the national development goals set forth in the Presidential May decree and strategic goals of the Bank of Russia. I will start with monetary policy issues. Our main goal is near 4% inflation. This is stipulated in the Presidential decree. Low inflation is paramount to long-term investments and a rise in public prosperity. We first reached the inflation target in 2017, as we had promised. Since that period, our policy has aimed to keep inflation close to this level. In 2017 and early 2018, both internal and external factors were favourable and we could cut the key rate, whereas in the second half of 2018 serious inflation risks emerged.
11  Assuming that the improvement in the outlook is not endogenous to the chosen policy setting to the extent that it would disappear if purchases were slowed. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Because growth this year will be constrained by fiscal consolidation, there is a risk that this could happen again. As a result, it is premature to conclude that we will soon see a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook. Efficacy of the asset purchase program exceeds the costs Our asset purchases are also conditional on our ongoing evaluation that the efficacy of the program exceeds the costs. That clearly has been the case to date – affirmed by our policy decisions. Since we put the outcome-based approach in place in September, my assessment is that efficacy has been as high or higher than I expected at the onset of the program, and costs the same or lower. Efficacy has two components: the effect of the purchases on financial conditions and the effect of financial conditions on the economy. Our latest purchase program has been associated with a substantial easing in financial conditions, higher equity prices, and narrower credit spreads. The resumption of additional agency MBS purchases in September pushed down MBS yields. With some lag, much of the drop in yields has been passed through to primary mortgage rates. Meanwhile, the impact of the improvement in financial conditions on the real economy has been somewhat stronger than I had expected.

A current issue that has disproportionately drawn attention to banks is the affordable housing issue. Bank Negara Malaysia recently featured a box article on this subject in 2016 Annual Report. The public debate largely continues to misdiagnose or ignore the root cause of the problem, that is, affordability and accessibility, rooted by low incomes and compounded by the huge mismatch between demand and supply of affordable houses. The popular myth, is that it is all about access to financing. I am perplexed. Actual data is selfevident. It shows the continued strength in bank financing to households for the purchase of affordable homes, with four in five new housing loans extended for houses priced below RM500,000. Yet banks have done little to educate and inform the public on this financing trend. The industry ought to be at the forefront in explaining the real situation and where possible, offering suggestions to help address this issue. Affordable housing is not a problem that is unique to Malaysia. Policymakers around the world, 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  including in developed countries, continue to look for creative solutions to this delicate socioeconomic challenge. A common thread across these solutions is their multi-faceted dimensions. The solution for Malaysia has to involve rebalancing the supply of housing towards the affordable segments. We require a bold and pragmatic solution. We estimate a shortage of 960,000 units of affordable housing. This is projected to reach 1 million units by 2020.
Since September 28th the krona has weakened almost 2 per cent in terms of the TCW-index, while since the depreciation began last May the exchange rate has fallen about 9 per cent. Just as on previous occasions, financial unrest has hit the Swedish krona as investors play safe and move to larger and more stable currencies. This time, however, the unrest seems to have less to do with uncertainty about the future for Sweden’s economic fundamentals. Instead it appears to involve general risk aversion among investors. Support for this interpretation is to be found in market letters (Swedish as well as foreign), et cetera, as well as in price setting of # and ##. That should point to an appreciation in the next phase, when the general unrest has subsided and investors concentrate once again on economic fundamentals. Judging from Prospera’s surveys for the Riksbank, for instance, it seems that market players are also allowing for this in their assessments. The recent market weakening of the Swedish krona is a reminder of both the advantages and the drawbacks of a flexible exchange rate. The weaker exchange rate can serve as a mechanism for adjustment when international activity is slowing down. This could be valuable if the crisis is profound. At the same time, the recent events illustrate that our vulnerability with a flexible exchange rate is considerable. The krona has fluctuated even though economic policy is basically focused on stability.

Mr. Heikensten discusses monetary policy Address by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikensten, at the Autumn Conference arranged by the Centre for Business and Policy Studies on 14/10/98. First a word of thanks for the opportunity to attend this meeting. The autumn conferences are a fine tradition to which it is a pleasure to contribute. On previous occasions I have used the opportunity to look back over the past year and discuss what the Riksbank has been doing, including how monetary policy is conducted. Then I have tried to look ahead and pick out some issues of importance for monetary policy in the longer run. My approach this year will be broadly the same. First a review of what has happened since last autumn, with comments on how the Riksbank’s assessment of inflation has evolved over the year. Then, as previously, a look at the question of how we communicate policy and how it has been perceived in financial markets. On this occasion we are in the throes of an international financial crisis, with great uncertainty as to what its real economic effects may be. Contagious effects of the crisis have gradually become larger and larger. Looking back, one can clearly see how the economic forecasts of most observers have swung during the year, from a phase of concern about a future increase in inflationary pressure to a phase of strong anxiety that the global economy will be hit by a recession.
Øystein Olsen: Launch of the new 50-krone and 500-krone banknotes Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at RS Noatun, Horten, 18 October 2018. * * * More information on the banknotes are available on Norges Bank's website. Good morning. It is a great pleasure to be here in Horten and Noatun to mark this important occasion for Norges Bank. On 30 May 2017, we went to Lofoten to launch the new 100-krone and 200-krone banknotes – the first two denominations in Norway’s new banknote series. Today, we are in Horten to celebrate the launch of the new 50-krone and 500-krone banknotes. So why did we choose Horten? This is an easy question to answer. The primary motif of the new 500-krone banknote is a rescue lifeboat. Since its foundation in 1891, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue has saved more than 6 000 lives at sea. Through their tremendous efforts, largely based on volunteer work, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue has contributed to making Norway’s coastline safer and more prosperous. Many of the lifeboat crews are trained where we are today, here at RS Noatun. These crews are on stand-by around the clock to assist people and vessels along the entire Norwegian coast. The boat you can see on the front of the 500-krone banknote is the lifeboat RS 14 Stavanger, launched in 1901.

The NCA also has a very important role in the prevention of pollution and emergency response in the event of spillages. The NCA head office’s Department for Emergency Response is located here in Horten. We at Norges Bank are very proud of the new banknote series – primarily because they are the most secure banknotes we have ever issued, but also because we are very pleased with the choice of motifs and theme. The new banknotes represent quite a significant break with Norwegian banknote tradition. For the first time since the Norwegian krone was introduced in 1875, Norwegian banknotes do not feature the portraits of well-known people. This time we have chosen a different type of motif, but a motif that has one thing in common with portraits: binding Norway together as a nation. The sea, which is the theme of the new banknote series, influences our country in many different ways. The Norwegian people live by the sea and use the sea both as a transport artery and for recreation. The sea is a source of well-being, welfare and prosperity. On the reverse side of the 500-krone banknote, the faint outline of an oil platform can be seen, symbolising an industry that has helped to raise the level of prosperity in Norway in recent decades. But the sea was also important before the oil age. Cod, shown on the new 200-krone banknote, has been one of our most important export products for centuries and still is today.