samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In short, good governance works and we should all simply try it! In conclusion therefore, I would like on behalf of Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf to commend the Zambian commercial banks, international banks and development finance institutions that have participated in this syndication. This is not only testimony of their confidence in Celtel Zambia plc but confidence in the Zambian people and the economy as well. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 126/2006

Leigh-Pemberton, R. (1989), Speech given at the Ernest Sykes Memorial, 24 May 1989 available from Bank of England Archive, ref. 7A320/10. Mahate, A A (1994), “Contagion Effects of Three Late Nineteenth Century British Bank Failures”, Business and Economic History available at http://www.thebhc.org/publications/ BEHprint/v023n1/p0102-p0115.pdf Norman, B, Shaw, R and Speight, G (2001), “The history of interbank settlement arrangements: exploring central banks’ role in the payment system”, Bank of England Working Paper No. 412. Orbell, J (1985), “Baring Brothers & Co., Limited. A History to 1939”, Butler & Tanner Ltd. Roberts, R and Kynaston, D (1995), “The Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence 1694–1994”, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Roberts, R, Reading, B and Skene, L (2009), “Sovereign Rescues: How the forgotten financial crisis of 1914 compares with 2008–2009”, Lombard Street Research, Special Report. Saw, R (1944), “The Bank of England, 1694–1944”, George G Harrap & Co Ltd. Sayers, R S (1976), “The Bank of England 1891–1944 (Volumes I–III)”, Cambridge University Press. Wood, G (1999), “Great Crashes in History, Have they lessons for today?” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 15 (3), pp 98–109. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9
25  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  25  Chart 17: Impact of monetary policy on wealth, across the age distribution (%)  Chart 18: Impact of monetary policy on income, across different UK regions (%) Impact as 2012-14 (% of annual income)  Impact as of 2012-14 (% of net wealth)  Macro effects on labour income Net interest reciepts/payments Total  50  Financial asset prices Inflation effects House prices Pensions Total  35 30  40  25  30 20  20  15 10  10  5  0  0  -10 25-29  35-39  45-49  55-59  65-69  75-79  All  -5 NE NW Y&H EM WM E LON SE SW WALSCO All  Region in 2012-14  Head of household age in 2012-14 Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Note: Chart shows average cumulative real impact of policy changes since 2007 as of 2012-14 as a percentage of net wealth. Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Note: Chart shows average cumulative real impact of policy changes since 2007 as of 2012-14 as a percentage of annual income.

The benefits the world economy has reaped from having pursued that path are now only too clear. Global integration and co-operation has boosted dramatically flows of goods, services, people and monies. Each is at levels never previously seen. This, in turn, has helped deliver higher living standards and lower levels of 1  poverty in pretty much every country on the planet. Finch would have wholeheartedly approved. Looking to the future, however, this wind is at risk of changing direction. The global financial crisis has left lasting scars. That has created pressure to place speedbumps, or in some cases roadblocks, on flows of goods, services, people and monies. One of the key policy challenges ahead will be to prevent the hard-won gains from global integration and co-operation being lost. The stakes could scarcely be higher. Tonight, I want to discuss a different policy challenge facing policymakers, specifically central banks. It too has risen in prominence since the global financial crisis. It too has posed big questions about the existing policy order. And it too needs, I believe, to be tackled transparently and comprehensively if stability and trust in the international monetary system is to be preserved. Just before the 2016 referendum on EU membership, Professor Anand Menon of King’s College London was explaining to an audience in Newcastle that, in the view of most economists, leaving the EU would be bad for their economic health. GDP was likely to fall.
The data has not been transparent, especially for privately-held investments, it has not been put together, and this is what EDHEC  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  is doing. So that’s one dimension of it. Getting the data together to allow institutional investors to allocate a desired portion of funds to infrastructure as an asset class. 35. Second, the regulatory treatment for insurers has to evolve so as to make possible long term investments, including infrastructure investment. Some rethinking is already underway globally on the design of capital frameworks for insurers. It has to be aimed first of all at ensuring that individual insurers are on a sound prudential footing, not just for the short term but for the long term. It should also support efforts to ensure that our economies are able to grow and to remain healthy, which is also in the interests of every player. This means we have to support long term investment. •  The European regulators are already in close consultation with the industry, on providing some measure of capital relief for long term investments. Globally too we have to do this. We need lower risk charges for equity held by insurers for the long term, including infrastructure. I hope globally regulators will arrive at an understanding that makes this possible. •  Here in Singapore, MAS is engaging closely with the industry in this regard.

This is a normal ‘life cycle’ allocation of assets, where people entering retirement seek to reduce the risk in their investments, and aim for some stability in income. This coming shift in asset allocation towards bonds over the medium to long term is itself expected to add to the downward pressure on interest rates. 10. And low interest rates are themselves leading to increases in savings rates, particular among older people. It is debated between economists: whether low interest rates lead to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  higher or lower savings. But we are seeing how in some countries, older people responding to low interest rates not by going out and spending more, but by saving more so as to be able to assure themselves of a the level of income that they desire in retirement. 11. So we are in a situation where there are self-reinforcing forces. People are getting older, they expect to live for longer, they are saving more and they are allocating more of their funds to bonds. Interest rates remaining low as a result. Older people saving more as a result of low interest rates. The structural gap between savings and investment remains, in turn keeping interest rates low. A self-reinforcing cycle that we are going to have to live with for some time to come. 12. There is a second major factor that adds to this, which is the slowdown in the underlying growth of economies around the world.
In 2019, nearly 18 percent of spending – one krone in six – was transferred from the GPFG (Chart 10). Because of the fund’s substantial size, this has been possible without breaching the fiscal rule. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  In the course of a decade, public budgets have come to rely heavily on the return on the GPFG, which was originally established to shield the Norwegian economy from oil price volatility. Today, a large portion of the resources under the shelf has been tapped and converted into investments in global equities and bonds. The GPFG has grown to become immense. This has provided fiscal space, but it has also increased our exposure to fluctuations in global securities markets. One vulnerability has been replaced with another. Chart 11 Considerable movements through 2020 GPFG. In billions of NOK 1500  1500  1000  1000  500  500  0  0  Return Krone exchange rate Transfers  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Source: Norges Bank  The year 2020 clearly illustrated how quickly equity markets can change course – in both directions. The decline was more brutal and the rebound faster than we have previously seen. Over 22 days, the global composite equity index fell by 20 percent, but the markets quickly reversed direction. Already in the second quarter, the GPFG’s worst quarterly result turned around to one of its best (Chart 11). The GPFG has enjoyed several years of solid returns – above the returns expected.

In the light of long-term considerations, it is also important to reverse the sharp rise in government spending during the crisis. In 2020, NOK 300 billion was transferred from the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) to cover the central government budget deficit. The decision to tap the GPFG has been the right one. An economic shock of the scale that we have witnessed requires potent medicine. The GPFG is intended to act as a buffer when the economy is exposed to shocks. At the same time, it is an intergenerational investment fund to be distributed across current and future generations. The pandemic is the third large economic shock to hit the Norwegian economy in the space of a few years. Each time, transfers from the GPFG to the central government budget have increased, but without being substantially reduced afterward. Chart 10 Before the crisis: One krone in six transferred from the GPFG Transfers from the GPFG as a share of public spending. Percent 30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0 2001  0 2006  2011  2016  2020  Sources: Ministry of Finance, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  12  In 2020, one krone in four of all central government budget spending came from the GPFG. But even in more normal years, transfers have been considerable.
Figure 14: Selected Sub-items of Consumer Loans (Annual Percentage Change)  570  450  Housing  400  470  Automobiles (right axis)  350  370  300 250  270 200 150  170  100 70 50 01/08  10/07  07/07  04/07  01/07  10/06  07/06  04/06  01/06  10/05  -30 07/05  0  Table 3: Consumer Loans and Claims From Credit Cards (Quarterly Real Percentage Change)  2006-II  2006-III  2006-IV  2007-I  2007-II  2007-III  2007-IV  Consumer Loans  20,0  1,5  3,6  2,6  9,0  10,0  6,6  Housing  22,8  0,9  2,2  2,7  7,5  10,2  5,4  Automobile  5,1  -6,4  -5,0  -8,9  -3,4  -2,0  -1,4  Other  24,3  6,0  8,9  6,6  14,5  12,8  9,9  Credit Cards  6,8  2,1  2,1  -1,6  7,7  2,4  3,2  Source: CBRT. External demand conditions are also expected to contribute to disinflation in 2008. Recent data on global economic activity suggest that world economic growth is likely to moderate in the forthcoming period, increasing the downside risks on external demand. Accordingly, our medium term outlook is constructed under a baseline scenario of gradual slowdown in external demand.

Percent 30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  2001  2006  2011  2016  2021  0  Sources: Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank  10  As a nation, we are in a fortunate position thanks to our strong public finances. But substantial government wealth also entails challenges that must be addressed. More than 50 years as an oil nation have taught us an important thing: Oil prices are volatile. This is why it was important to establish the petroleum fund mechanism and the fiscal rule. We have succeeded in shielding government budgets from widely fluctuating oil revenues. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 17 FEBRUARY 2022  Today a large portion of Norway’s oil and gas wealth has been transformed into investments in global securities markets. The risk to the nation’s wealth that oil price volatility previously posed has been replaced by the risk of financial market volatility. Chart 11 quantifies the expected normal volatility of the GPFG’s value, as a measure of the risk we are facing. The calculation shows that we can expect that GPFG returns will normally vary within a range of plus or minus 10 percent, which amounts to about NOK 1 200 billion at current market value. But not that infrequently, every six years or so, we can expect to lose more than that. Chart 11 We are not immune to volatilty  GPFG. Expected absolute volatility.
Chart 4: Switch from services to goods has been a global phenomenon  Sources: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook and Bank calculations. Chart 5: Production limits have led to bottlenecks and steep price rises for some traded goods  Nor have these shifts been limited to goods versus services. In the UK, there seems to be quite a bit of divergence in demand even within sectors, not just between them. Some of this may reflect differences across regions in the strength of the recovery – there are indications that activity has been slower to return in cities than in less urban areas. And whatever the underlying causes of this dispersion, it seems to have resulted in a degree of mismatch in the labour market. Some firms are finding it hard to recruit people, even as others have kept significant numbers on furlough. If only at the margin, this mismatch may have added to  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  near-term pressure on wages. The full-time pay of those on furlough doesn’t fall but, where there are shortages, firms have to pay more4. In January, I felt that these mismatches would probably get ironed out over time. If the pandemic had caused significant shifts in demand those would be reversed as economies recovered: we were likely to see the strongest growth in the areas hardest hit during the downturn, and in which there was therefore more spare capacity.

Though some central banks have delegated the bank supervision function to a separate agency, it is vital that financial system stability is also ensured. This, in fact is the other objective of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. It is important that the inter dependence of the price stability and financial system stability, is well recognized. It would not be possible for a central bank to use its instruments to ensure price stability without financial system stability as these instruments operate through a well functioning stable financial system. Further, if we failed to restrain excessive credit expansion and maintain price stability, it is likely to have a serious impact on maintaining financial system stability. We should also be mindful of the fact that an attempt to ensure financial system stability through an injection of high-powered money could greatly endanger the achievement of price stability. Mr. Volcker, former chairman of the Fed Reserve Bank of USA has once said that “ The truly unique power of a central bank is the power to create money, and ultimately the power to create is the power to destroy”. Designers of central banks have well recognized the danger of this power. They have ensured that this power be exercised diligently by assigning the responsibility of maintaining price stability to central banks. I hope that you will have a chance to deliberate these developments, concerns and challengers during your sessions today and tomorrow. I wish all of you a very fruitful learning experience. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 52/2007
One area I might be slightly—but not particularly—worried about is financial market asset valuations, which I would characterize as elevated. While valuations are noteworthy, I am less concerned than I might be otherwise because the economy’s performance and outlook seem consistent with what we see in financial markets. Volatility in the real economy has been low, and this has been matched by low volatility in financial markets, which has helped support high valuations. I am also less worried because the financial system today is much more resilient and robust than it was a decade ago. Thus, even if financial asset prices were to decline significantly—which presumably would occur if the economic outlook were to deteriorate—I don’t think such declines would have the destructive impact we saw a decade ago. Higher capital and liquidity requirements for major banks have made the banking system more resilient and better able to absorb market shocks without this impairing its ability to intermediate credit flows between borrowers and savers. It was the collapse of confidence in the financial system in 2008 that caused credit availability to dry up, contributing greatly to the severity of the Great Recession.7 So, what am I worried about? Two macroeconomic concerns warrant mention. The first is the risk of economic overheating. Now, this seems like an odd issue to focus on when inflation is low, but it strikes me that this is a real risk over the next few years.

The New York Fed is proud to play a role in connecting and convening leading policy influencers, stakeholders, and thinkers from across the city and around the country. Our goal in hosting events like these is to be a catalyst for collaboration and creative solutions. The panelists we'll hear from today will help us accomplish just that. They each have a deep understanding of the issues, a familiarity with the communities, and many innovative ideas to share. The topics on the agenda complement the work that many people do in this very building every day. Our outreach and community development team is actively engaged with people and leaders around the Second District through regional visits, advisory councils, and frequent events. And our researchers study economic conditions and trends in the region and make their findings widely available. This is a pivotal time for our city. We are excited to be back here, and we will continue this important work in forums similar to this one. I hope you'll partner and engage with us, because our collective efforts will make a difference. Let's take advantage of this opportunity-this New York moment- and together shape a bright future for this great city. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
This is the component of demand that lags the most and, at the same time, contributes to increase potential growth, helping to avoid price pressures and thus generating a more gradual convergence of inflation. Although the latest data shows an improvement in investment, and our projections assume that this variable will increase more than GDP in the 2018/2020 triennium, this is not assured. For it to materialize, some conditions are necessary, including an efficient financial system and authorities maintaining a favorable climate, helping projects to meet the environmental, urban and social standards adopted by the country. It is always important to be aware that investment is very sensitive to changes in the external and internal scenarios and depends strongly on having favorable conditions for projects to develop. In a more medium-term view, even in a scenario where the economy behaves as expected in the coming quarters, the fact that activity grows steadily at a faster-than-expected pace requires some changes of a more structural nature. Under current conditions, it is not possible to think that the Chilean economy can sustain growth rates above 3% to 3.5% in the long term, which is our estimate for trend growth in the medium term. In September of last year, we presented the Senate a document in which we gave an account of the factors producing this estimate of potential growth and possible ways to improve it.

True, headline inflation rose initially in many countries, especially the US, where it ticked up to nearly 5%, before falling sharply to less than 1.5% when oil prices fell this autumn. But central banks have been on the alert for any signs that higher oil prices would feed into higher wages, and so trigger an inflationary spiral. And so far wage growth has remained moderate in all developed countries, including the UK. Monetary policy Inflation has remained firmly under control despite a doubling in the price of oil. This, to my mind, is striking evidence of a sea change in policy since the 1970s. But how far was the Great Stability due to good policy, as opposed to globalisation or plain good luck? This broader question is probably unanswerable, but a couple of points are worth making. First, there is no doubt that, in the medium term, the actual inflation rate is determined by the Bank of England. Our decisions about interest rates – the price of money – determine the amount of total money spending in the economy. The rate of inflation reflects the difference between this spending and what the economy is capable of producing – total supply. The faster money spending grows relative to supply, the higher inflation will be. In that sense low inflation reflects policy, not luck. But external conditions may make it more or less easy to keep inflation low and stable.
Accordingly, inflation is expected to be, with 70 percent probability, between 3.9 and 6.7 percent (with a mid-point of 5.3 percent) at the end of 2013, and between 3.1 and 6.7 percent (with a midpoint of 4.9 percent) at the end of 2014. We expect inflation to stabilize around 5 percent in the medium term (Chart 21). 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 21. Inflation and Output Gap Forecasts  * Shaded region indicates the 70 percent confidence interval for the forecast. Source: CBRT. In sum, we maintained inflation forecast for end-2013 at 5.3 percent, as there has been no major revision in the factors affecting inflation outlook in the past three months. We expect inflation to resume its downward trend after creeping up in January due to tobacco price adjustments. Although inflation may increase temporarily in May and June due to base effects in energy prices, it will continue to decline in the following months, closing the year at 5.3 percent (Chart 21). We expect core inflation indicators to display a steady downward path and materialize below 5 percent at the end of the year. Revisions in our inflation forecasts are presented on the slide. Although there was no change in the end-year inflation forecast, we revised our inflation forecasts downwards compared to the path presented in the October Inflation Report in the short term due to the benign course of unprocessed food prices (Chart 22). Chart 22.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in the OTC derivatives market, where banks are trying to compress hundreds and thousands of lines (and over USD 700 trillion of notional value 7) of OTC derivative transactions, so as to consolidate liquid collateral for margin efficiency. Second, as jurisdictions roll out clearing and trading mandates for OTC derivatives, more transactions will be traded and cleared on regional and global platforms to reap the benefits of scale and liquidity. This will be instrumental in transforming complex webs of gross exposures into smaller sets of net exposures, reducing systemic risk and strengthening the derivatives  4  “Asset Management 2020: A Brave New World,” PwC, 2014. 5  Market capitalisation as of 31 March 2014, Relbanks. 6  “Myanmar’s Banking Sector Liberalisation: A Win-win for All,” PwC, 2014. http://pwc.blogs.com/growth_markets/2014/10/myanmars-banking-sector-liberalisation-a-win-win-for-all.html  7  BIS derivatives statistics, September 2014. http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  market. These pressures will naturally drive more aggregation across geographies and asset classes, and place the issue of market integration squarely on the agenda. Global reforms, if they are implemented consistently, can also support financial integration by making it less burdensome for financial institutions to comply with regulations in different jurisdictions and for regulators to mutually recognise and defer to each other where appropriate. III. Market integration is happening at two levels: among jurisdictions and among participants  11. Over the last three years, market integration has been taking place in Asian financial markets.