samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Sweden, the Financial Crisis Commission proposed, in its first interim report, that the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen together bear responsibility for macroprudential policy in Sweden.8 This is to occur through the formation of a macroprudential council, in which both authorities work together with independent experts, entailing in principle that the existing Council for  7  See IMF (2013) Sweden—2013 Article IV Consultation: Concluding Statement of the Mission, Stock-holm: 31 May 2013 and European Commission (2013) Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on Sweden’s 2013 national reform programme and delivering a Council opinion on Sweden’s convergence programme for 2012-2016, Brussels: 29 May 2013. 8  SOU 2013:6 Att förebygga och hantera finansiella kriser, Delbetänkande av Finanskriskommittén, Stockholm: 2013. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Cooperation between the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen is confirmed in law. The Council is to seek to promote greater knowledge about systemic risks and the development of macroprudential tools, and discuss appropriate measures. In our consultation response, we gave our view on the commission report and also added our own proposals.9 We believe that the Financial Crisis Commission’s proposal for shared responsibility between two authorities risks giving rise to ambiguity about who should act. This ambiguity could result in indecisive action. In order to ensure decisive action, responsibility for macroprudential policy should be placed on one body.

Michael Gondwe: Collective bargaining Remarks by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW) Negotiations Forum – Phase 1, Lusaka, 20 March 2012. *  *  *    The ZUFIAW President, Mr Cephas Mukuka    The General Secretary of the Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW), Mrs Joyce Nonde Simukoko    The Executive Secretary of Federation of Free Trade Union in Zambia, Mr Lyson Mando    The Representative from the International Labour Organisation    Workshop Facilitators    Distinguished Participants    Ladies and Gentlemen  I wish to welcome you all to this important Workshop, on Collective Bargaining, organized by the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW). Let me take this opportunity to commend ZUFIAW for taking the initiative to organise this Forum, which is intended to facilitate exchange of information and views on aspects of effective collective bargaining. Mr President, as you are aware, in spite of the recent global economic crisis, our country has continued to enjoy relative macroeconomic stability, with favourable prospects for the future. As a result of consistent implementation of appropriate macroeconomic policies: i. The country has registered positive real GDP growth averaging 6.5% annually since 2007. This is a necessary condition for poverty reduction efforts;  ii. Inflation and exchange rates developments have also been favourable.
It corrupted the idea of market openness and the liberalisation process. Such destabilising risks bear upon the integration process among financial markets of this region. Developing long term solutions through the Financial Markets Committee Addressing the speculative impact of the NDF market is only part of the solution. Of greater importance is the need to put in place sustainable long-term solutions. With this in mind, the Financial Markets Committee (FMC) was established in 2016, and tasked with the responsibility to look into the overall development and strategy for the Malaysian financial market. The FMC also looked into the factors that caused imbalances in the demand and supply of foreign currencies in the domestic market, including the reduced capacity of the market to provide liquidity to intermediate the portfolio adjustment by non-residents. The underlying motivation of the FMC is to create a deeper and more liquid onshore market that will enhance its capacity to intermediate these flows and strengthen our resilience against excessive volatility. Despite the havoc caused by episodes of volatility from the opaque, unregulated and value destroying activities of the NDF market, the FMC in identifying the possible remedial measures have concluded that market based mechanism and solutions is still the best way forward. Through close consultation with various stakeholders, including corporate entities and small and medium size enterprises, the FMC developed a series of targeted initiatives to develop the onshore financial market.

Yes, my role is sometimes to remind you of your 5-a-day  Page 9  commitments, to maintain a healthy and balanced diet, even when everyone else is promising you ice-cream. So let me circle back to the core of my remarks today: the BPA market is in a period of accelerated growth and yes, while we are pleased with the opportunities this brings, insurers should approach this with moderation. Our existing principles, including senior management responsibility and the Prudent Person Principle – play into all the areas. These are importantly strengthened and supplemented by the additional supervisory measures announced in the Solvency UK package. The combination of existing and new tools will bolster the role of Boards and firms’ senior managers owning their decisions. And, through improved disclosure, we will support market discipline to empower broader stakeholders. Should those prove insufficient, we will not shy away from highlighting areas of market-wide concern or taking the necessary supervisory actions. My resolve is strong: A healthy and sustainable life insurance market is a long-term value creator for the whole economy. It is in everybody’s interests to work together to ensure a dynamic vibrant industry for years to come. One that serves the needs of, and provides protection for, customers, and makes the strongest contribution it possibly can to investment in the wider UK economy. I would like to thank Alwin Luchmaya, Sejal Haria, Alan Sheppard, Stephen Walton, Igor Brkic, Jemima Ayton and Tapasya Bhandari, for their assistance in preparing these remarks. Thank you. 1.
Banking Supervision, Banking Regulation and our Legal Services have been involved in major actions affecting the most vulnerable institutions, such as, for instance, removing most of the managers from 30 credit institutions, converting savings banks into commercial banks and assessing numerous clean-up and recapitalisation plans, and complying at all times with the  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  mandate of different governments to minimise the use of taxpayer funds. It is telling that the image (measured by their ratings) of our major banks has systematically been above that of the world’s 23 biggest banks throughout the crisis until, in recent weeks, a downward spiral of downgrades has ensued and doubts about our banking system as a whole have spread. But this is no time for despondency. I am convinced that, once time puts everybody in their place, your work during these years of crisis will be acknowledged and rightly appreciated by all. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Forums like this, which bring together a range of experts from different areas, can help advance our understanding of the important issues we will have to face. So, I hope to see more of this type of engagement going forward. We have a unique opportunity to think very broadly about the issues that will confront us in the foreseeable future. We should seek diverse perspectives and be open to new ideas and perspective. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
This is worrying, because misconduct erodes trust in the system. If investors, depositors and policy holders stop believing that their interests are being safeguarded, the entire system quickly comes unraveled at significant costs to society. These costs can arise from failures of financial institutions, a misallocation of economic resources, or simply steep fines that destroy shareholder value and employment prospects for affected workers. Since the global financial crisis, banks have paid more than USD320 billion in fines and legal costs and have been the subject of numerous Government financial inquiries due to misconduct. In Malaysia, in the last 5 years, Bank Negara Malaysia has imposed fines on financial services providers to the tune of RM116 million. A survey conducted by the Bank revealed that almost twothirds of reported losses by banks in 2016 were associated with internal fraud, regulatory noncompliance and operational lapses. We have examined these incidents in some depth. Our observations lead us to conclude that behaviour is very much influenced bycontextual factors such as organisational values, incentives and management responses to misconduct or non-compliance. The rightcontextual setting can exert a powerful influence on individual behaviour. We believe this begins with setting and clearly communicating expectations of desired behaviour. Without clarity on what is acceptable in the first place, it would not be possible to encourage, much less enforce, these expectations. The FSPB serves an important role in this regard through its work in defining and developing codes of behaviour for financial institutions.

We will continue to pursue investigations and enforcement actions into serious conduct breaches to the full extent of powers provided under laws administered by the Bank. Beyond the limits of the Bank’s powers, the Bank 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  maintains close cooperation with other authorities to facilitate investigations and enforcement actions. Conclusion Building trust is not easy. It takes hard work, a determination to do the right thing and confidence to make judgements in situations that are not always well-defined. Taken in this context, the work of the FSPB serves as an important anchor for decisions and actions that will engender trust in the financial industry. In a fast moving world, a strong commitment to a professional code of conduct provides the assurance that the public seeks – that financial institutions and employees are held to and will consistently demonstrate high standards of professional and ethical conduct. I hope that the industry will continue to lend its strong support to the FSPB’s work. Following today’s launch of the Professional Code, the Bank would urge financial institutions and professional bodies to reflect the standards set out in the Code in the values and conduct that you demand of your staff, agents and members. This needs to move beyond symbolic gestures, to the diligent implementation of policies and programs that promote the desired culture.
Tarisa Watanagase: Combating the global financial crisis – role of international cooperation Remarks by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the HKMA Distinguished Lecture, Hong Kong, 16 December 2008. *  *  *  Governor Draghi, Governor Yam, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honored and delighted to be here among this gathering of distinguished policymakers, financial experts and academia, at this year’s HKMA Distinguished Lecture and would like to thank Governor Yam for the kind invitation. This lecture truly provides an excellent opportunity for us to share our views on the topical issues that are at the center of international financial community. Ten years ago, we had the Asian financial crisis. In Thailand, there were plenty of discussions about the causes and remedies of the crisis, some of which still continued until these days. To me, the Thai crisis had 4 main causes, namely, we had weaknesses in the macroeconomic management leading up to bubbles, lax supervision, excessive risk taking of both the financial sector and the private sector in general, and the inadequate legal and information infrastructure. The crisis we are facing now has many surprises as pointed out by Governor Draghi, but I also see plenty of similarities in the underlying root causes. Because of the crisis’s global scale and its severity, this time around we have seen unprecedented efforts taking at both the national, regional and international levels. Today, one decade after the Asian financial crisis, emerging markets look less vulnerable to financial disturbances.

This will, in turn, help raise the comfort level and can usefully avoid potential policy missteps and create policy synergies that eventually foster confidence of investors. This is the kind of trust that no amount of legal text, conditions precedent, or covenants can match, but is developed through the friendship and goodwill among friends within the region. Countries in the same region tend to possess better understanding and coordination, and therefore, policies and initiatives at the regional level can be more effective and timely. Second, while the Asian financial crisis was a wake up call for Asia on the need for regional liquidity facility, Asian countries need to consider making such facility sufficiently large and effective with timely disbursement in light of the current global crisis. During the Asian financial crisis, more than 75% of the IMF’s financial package for Thailand came from the funding within the region. The present global situation has also reconfirmed the vision set for the by the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) that Asia needs to have its own regional liquidity facility to protect itself from contagion, be it caused within the region or from outside. It is therefore timely that coordination and cooperation among countries be further strengthened to ensure that prompt remedial actions can be put in place in light of the ongoing global financial crisis.
13 Report  2014 (f)  Sep. 13 Report  Sep. 13 Report  GDP  5.6  4,5-5,5  4,0-5,0  4-4,5  4,0-5,0  Domestic demand  7.1  6.1  4.9  4.9  4.9  Domestic demand (w/o inventory change)  7.3  6.1  5.1  5.7  4.8  Gross fixed capital formation  12.3  7.2  5.5  5.6  4.5  Total consumption  5.8  5.7  5.0  5.6  5.0  Goods and services exports  1.0  3.1  3.8  4.0  3.3  Goods and services imports  4.9  5.9  5.0  5.6  4.5  Current account (% of GDP)  -3.5  -4.4  -4.7  -4.5  -4.8  December CPI  1.5  2.8  2.6  2.6  2.8  December CPIEFE  1.5  2.5  2.0  1.7  2.8  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In this regard, the main challenges facing us all (including the financial sector) when it comes to managing these risks are plain to see. Among others, I would single out a lack of harmonised definitions, ESG data gaps and the ability to measure impacts. With this in mind, I will now address certain key aspects that concern all sectors, and not just the financial sector. Main regulatory initiatives  We authorities, regulators and supervisors have been shaping the regulatory framework for appropriate management of this risk. This is still an ongoing task, but important progress has been made. At the European level, I would highlight the following: first, the EU Taxonomy Regulation,13 which establishes the bases for determining when an investment or economic activity may be considered environmentally sustainable, and lays the groundwork for other European sustainable finance regulations; and second, Directive (EU) 2022/2464 (CSRD)14 on corporate sustainability reporting, published on 14 December 2022, which updates and reinforces the rules on environmental and social reporting by the companies concerned, which are large undertakings (defined as those that meet at least two of the following requisites: balance sheet total over € million, net turnover over € million or average number of employees over 250), along with listed small and mediumsized undertakings.15  13  Regulation (EU) 2020/852  14  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022L2464  15  Article 19 bis of Directive 2013/34/EU amended by the CSRD.
Investors revised up their baseline forecasts for the economy and reduced the perceived downside risks that they see around that outlook. This shift in the outlook led the market to price in the possibility of earlier increases in short-term interest rates and to scale back the size of asset purchases that they expect from the Federal Reserve. Both of those developments contributed to the significant rise in yields. In contrast, the rise in yields does not appear to be driven by the concerns expressed by some that the asset purchase program would unleash a considerable rise in U.S. inflation and inflation expectations to levels well above those consistent with the Federal Reserve’s  12  The portfolio balance channel was discussed by Chairman Bernanke in a speech at the Jackson Hole Symposium in August 2010. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  mandate. Such an outcome would be detrimental to the economic outlook, leading to downward pressure on risky asset prices and a substantial weakening in the value of the dollar. However, what has taken place in U.S. markets to date does not resemble this outcome. Indeed, over the period since the November FOMC meeting, longer-term inflation expectations have remained at levels consistent with the Federal Reserve’s mandate, risky asset prices have advanced and the dollar has held its ground. Overall, the broad improvement in financial conditions since last summer has been an important and encouraging development.

Risky asset prices such as equities have risen at a rapid pace, and credit spreads and measures of credit availability have continued to ease. These changes have been driven to a large extent by the improvement in the economic outlook and, in turn, will help to promote the economic recovery going forward. The decisions taken in the second half of 2010 affecting the size of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio have provided support to that process. To be sure, economic fundamentals will ultimately exert the strongest force on financial conditions, as can be seen by the rise in Treasury yields even as the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet. But the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet actions have helped to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. Characteristics of the SOMA portfolio The set of asset purchase programs launched by the Federal Reserve, including those initiated at the peak of the financial crisis and the more recent actions, have changed some of the basic characteristics of the SOMA portfolio. I thought it would be useful to review those changes and to discuss their implications for the conduct of monetary policy. The most obvious effect of the purchase programs has been on the size of the SOMA portfolio. If the intended asset purchases announced in November are completed, the size of the domestic portfolio will reach approximately $ trillion by mid-year – considerably larger than the $ trillion portfolio that would be in place in the absence of the asset purchase programs.
Restrictions designed to balance the costs and benefits of data collection and analysis have not kept pace with rapid changes in the financial system. The financial system is likely to continue to change rapidly, and both regulators and market participants need the capacity to keep pace. Regulators have been hampered by a lack of authority to collect and analyze information from unregulated entities. But the recent financial crisis illustrated that substantial risks from leverage and maturity transformation were outside of regulated financial firms. In addition, much of the Federal Reserve’s collection of data is based on voluntary participation. For example, survey data on lending terms and standards at commercial banks, lending by finance companies, and transactions in the commercial paper market rely on the cooperation of the surveyed entities. Moreover, as we have suggested, the data collection authority of financial regulators over the firms they supervise should be expanded to encompass macroprudential considerations. The ability of regulators to collect information should similarly be expanded to include the ability to gather market data necessary for monitoring systemic  BIS Review 16/2010  17  risks. Doing so would better enable regulators to monitor and assess potential systemic risks arising directly from the firms or markets under their supervision or from the interaction of these firms or markets with other components of the financial system. The Paperwork Reduction Act also can at times impede timely and robust data collection.

In such circumstances either the Bank would need to relax the tolerances around banks’ reserves targets to accommodate the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  extra cash in the system, or drain the excess cash, which it can do by one of several means. In either case, the Bank would not compromise its capacity to set Bank Rate or purchase assets. Since the start of the Bank’s asset purchase programme in March 2009, this interaction has not been binding. Because quantitative easing directly injected more cash into the economy, forcing the commercial banks to hold more reserves than they would otherwise have chosen to, the reserves averaging system was suspended and all central bank reserves have since been remunerated at Bank Rate. But when reserves averaging is re-introduced in due course, we will need to be conscious of the potential interaction between liquidity support and monetary policy operations. The framework is designed so that both policy objectives can be achieved at the same time. 9 Recent policy initiatives/issues a)  Pre-positioning  Since the DWF was put on a permanent and transparent footing in late 2008, the Bank has been working on a number of initiatives to develop the facility further. One important expansion has been the Bank of England’s capacity to assess and lend against portfolios of loans (e.g. mortgages) as well as securities. 10 There are a number of benefits to having this capacity.