samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If we were to be in exactly the same position as in April, but with the difference that we had already decided to phase out the CPIX – would we have made different forecasts for the repo rate and for the CPI? No, we would not. Our target has not changed. We considered the  BIS Review 73/2008  5  rate at which the CPI approached the target according to our April forecast to be reasonable on the basis of our task. It is also important to put the phasing out of the CPIX in a broader context. The Riksbank conducts a policy of flexible inflation targeting. This means, for instance, that we can let it take a couple of years before the CPI reaches 2 per cent in our forecast if we consider this to be justified by, for instance, temporary shocks. The long-term difference between the CPI and the CPIX is calculated, as I have mentioned earlier, at roughly 0.3 percentage points. The flexibility of our monetary policy means that this type of deviation does not need to have any immediate consequences. But it is of course important that deviations from the inflation target are not too large and that it is clear that the CPI will reach 2 per cent. Otherwise we jeopardise the credibility of the inflation target. The current situation involves factors that have much greater significance for which future interest rate developments we believe to be reasonable than the difference between the CPI and the CPIX.

We presume that oil prices will tend to go down. Consequently, inflationary pressure will subside somewhat, particularly towards the end of 2005. With an unchanged monetary policy, we are likely to see an inflation rate of 0.9% in the first quarter of 2006. 2. Continued recovery  In order to assess inflation in the medium term, economic prospects are paramount. During a phase of economic recovery, as we are currently experiencing, how rapidly the capacity utilisation rate increases is important from a monetary policy perspective. Even though GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2004 is likely to be lower than we projected in the September assessment, we expect the Swiss economy to expand by close to 2% this year. The upswing will continue next year. We anticipate a growth rate of 1.5% to 2% for the whole of 2005. The fact that the economy braved the oil price hike and the stronger franc is testimony to a robust recovery. There is less uncertainty now as to the inflation prospects for next year. Utilisation of economic resources, which is slowly increasing, will not lead to any additional pressure on prices in 2005. As can be gleaned from the new inflation forecast, improved capacity utilisation is likely to have an impact on price development only in the course of 2006. 1/3  The current inflation forecast for the medium term, ie for the coming two years, is characterised by a similar course to the one charted in September.
Examples in other countries show us that there is a strong positive correlation between the transaction volume and liquidity rise of derivatives markets and the presentation of the issue, introduction of the markets and the training to be given. It has been confirmed that training programs aimed at enabling the economic agents to perform more effective risk management using derivatives instruments fueled the development of derivative markets in many countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Japan. Taking these examples into consideration, we see that the training of institutional and individual investors bears great importance in Turkey as well, where derivatives markets are a new concept. The Central Bank has provided all kinds of support for the development of these markets and will also continue to give support from now on. However, it is crucial that especially non-governmental organizations should fulfill their liabilities, introduce the Turkish Derivatives Exchange to their participants and provide the necessary training. Dear Participants, To conclude, I would like to emphasize once more that a drastic step has been taken today with the inauguration of the Turkish Derivatives Exchange, in line with recent favorable developments in our country. I hope this step will bring with it new opportunities for the future. Thank you. BIS Review 17/2005  7

Putting these two features of the objective function together, the policymaker places some weight on the prospect of unusual volatility in inflation down the road. This is not just hypothetical. In 2002-03, some of us on the MPC voted to maintain an unchanged policy rate rather than cut partly on the grounds that, by stoking the embers under household debt and house prices, too great a risk would be taken with future output and, most important, inflation variability 28 . Speaking for myself, that was directed at avoiding policy settings that, on balance, could have increased uncertainty about demand conditions and inflation in the future, and complicated the operation of policy down the road, not on some spurious aspiration of steering asset prices along some (unknowable) equilibrium path. Maybe that would be one way, consistent with focussing on a single objective, to construe the thoughtprovoking papers that have come out of the Bank for International Settlements in recent years 29 . Certainly this is an area where policymakers still have lots to learn. 27  28  See Cecchetti, S., H. Genberg and S. Wadhwani, 2002, ‘Asset prices in a flexible inflation targeting framework, NBER Working Paper 8970.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  On the form and use of capital instruments, the Basel I Accord also allowed hybrid debt capital instruments to support the required deductions from the capital calculation, such as goodwill, expected losses (introduced later under Basel II with the internal models regime for credit risk) and investments in other banks’ capital instruments. However, as a matter of fact, rather than reporting, any losses arising from these items hit common equity because it will absorb losses first in the going concern state, according to the hierarchy of the capital structure. As a result applying these deductions at the level of total capital, or Tier 1 capital, has the effect of overstating the core equity capital ratio. The Accord therefore incentivised wrongly the issuance of hybrid debt capital instruments to cover deductions. A further flaw was that deferred tax assets were not deducted from capital and minority interest assets were recognised in full. This, too, was a mistake. DTAs depend on future profitability (which is not assured) and minority interests are not fully transferable to absorb losses for a group. Last on the capital side, there were problems starting in the original Basel Accord in relation to the treatment of provisions. Under the current international accounting standards provisions are based on incurred rather than expected losses.

As at 9 March 2012, the outstanding amount in the Malaysian bond market was RM899 billion compared to RM301 billion at the end of 2001. This represents a 300 per cent increase over the last decade. Within the region, both Hong Kong and Malaysia have participated actively within the EMEAP Group in promoting regional bond market development initiatives such as the Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the Asian Bond Fund. I am confident that this pilot platform will bring benefits, not only to Hong Kong and Malaysia, but the region as a whole. We envisaged that this pilot platform will increase the efficiency of issuance, investment and settlement of bonds through the increased harmonisation of cross-border processes and standards. We expect this initiative to strengthen the cross-border linkages and facilitate the intermediation of surplus funds within the region. This increase in cross-border flow of funds will further enhance the efficiency in the mobilization of surplus funds to meet the rising investment needs of the region. The implementation of this pilot platform is indeed timely and opportune and, will serve as an important catalyst for further development in linking financial markets within this region. This, I believe, is a development that we should all welcome. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
As the onset of balance sheet normalization comes closer over time, the effect of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet actions on the term premium will gradually diminish. This means that the size of the federal funds rate adjustment should also diminish over time. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  rate has fallen, as I believe it has, then the entire trajectory of short-term rates implied by Taylor 1999 shifts down and this pushes back the liftoff date implied by Taylor 1999 significantly. So how strong is the evidence that the neutral real rate has fallen significantly at least in the short term? First, and most importantly, if the neutral real rate were really 2 percent, then the U.S. economy should be growing faster11 as monetary policy would be extraordinarily stimulative right now. But, if that is the case, then why do we see such a lackluster economic performance? Thomas Laubach and John Williams have devised a means of estimating how the equilibrium real interest rate varies over time based on how the economy has actually performed. The estimate generated by their model for the first quarter of 2012 is 0.3 percent.12 Second, we can identify good reasons why the neutral real rate is depressed currently. The channels through which monetary policy stimulates the economy are weaker than normal right now.13 Monetary policy works through its effect on financial conditions that influence economic activity.

In particular, a well-articulated framework for policy that explains our goals and how we use our tools to promote these goals helps market participants, businesses, and workers to anticipate how the Federal Reserve will respond under different circumstances and plan accordingly.1 This helps to anchor private sector expectations in ways that make it easier to achieve the dual mandate objectives. In contrast, if we acted in an unpredictable way, policy would be ineffective at anchoring expectations and this shortcoming would disrupt the transmission of the monetary policy impulse to the real economy. Over the years, this logic has led the Federal Reserve to become increasingly transparent and systematic in its decisionmaking.2 In January, the Federal Open Market Committee took another important step in this direction, endorsing a public statement of longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. This document articulated a 2 percent inflation objective and committed the FOMC to a “balanced approach” with respect to promoting the dual mandate objectives. For me, the key issue is how to interpret these principles and put them into practice. I interpret the strategy document as expressing a relatively straightforward proposition: The Fed should seek the policy setting that generates the best achievable path back to full employment and price stability following shocks that push us away from either of our objectives.
Earlier this month, the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced three new initiatives to strengthen mutual access between Mainland and Hong Kong financial markets. These are, first, broadening the scope of Stock Connect to include foreign companies with primary listings in Hong Kong and more companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges; second, development of an RMB- securities trading counter in Hong Kong and possible inclusion of RMB securities in Southbound Trading via Stock Connect; and third, the introduction of Mainland government bond futures in Hong Kong. These measures will enrich the investment choices for Mainland investors, attract more foreign companies to list in Hong Kong, and provide more offshore risk management tools to meet global investors’ hedging needs. Apart from the expansion of the Connect Scheme, in July this year, the HKMA’s currency swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China was also increased from RMB500 billion to RMB800 billion and made permanent. Following this change, Hong Kong’s facility is the largest of any jurisdiction and the only one that is not subject to renewal, giving us an effective liquidity back-stop to support the development of the offshore RMB market in Hong Kong. Also in July, the HKMA enhanced the operational flexibility, size and repo rates of its RMB Liquidity Facility. The changes will make it easier for banks to provide services to clients and other offshore centres in different time zones.

Thirdly, the financial and asset markets on the Mainland should be wide, deep and liquid enough to allow the Exchange Fund of Hong Kong – the backing for our Linked Exchange Rate System – to hold substantial amounts of RMB assets to support the Hong Kong dollar, preserve capital, grow in value and meet contingent needs. 36. Obviously these fundamental conditions are not met, and the Hong Kong dollar Link to the US dollar remains the most appropriate policy for Hong Kong. So, let me take this opportunity to reiterate that we have no plan to change the Linked Exchange Rate System. It has served Hong Kong well since 1983 and is the pillar for the monetary and financial stability in Hong Kong. 37. Thank you. BIS Review 153/2010  5
Until a sufficient track record is established, the ECB - by necessity - has to rely primarily on the strength of its institutional setup and the force of its arguments to win the trust of the public. As a new institution it is unsurprising that the ECB has been subject to an extraordinary degree of public scrutiny and, indeed, criticism in its young life. I firmly believe that over time this is generally a healthy situation. Over time any public institution, which is based on a sound constitutional foundation, can only benefit from being open to outside advice and from being exposed to criticism and debate. This creates desirable incentives for constant improvement and helps the institution to strengthen its commitment to fulfil its mandate in the best possible way. An open, frank and fair dialogue is particularly crucial in the process of developing understanding and a bond of trust between a young institution like the ECB and its principal, whom it ultimately serves, i.e. the European public. I do believe that this process of trust-building requires some patience and indeed “good faith” on both sides. Not “blind faith”, but perhaps some “good-will”. Undoubtedly well-established central banks with a long and proud history like the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve or the Bundesbank face an easier task in this regard. They can draw on a large stock of “trust capital”, an often formidable reputation and a safety net of deep-rooted public support, if not devotion.

Our reliance on London also stems from the fact that, in some cases, the City represents a gateway to global financial markets for euro area financial and non-financial firms, allowing them to tap into global capital and liquidity pools. In other areas, however, reliance on London is quite limited. For instance, UK-domiciled banks play a marginal role in direct lending to euro area households and non-financial companies. Had it not been for Brexit, certain global and regional trends might even have led to an increase in the EU’s reliance on the City of London as a centre for market-based finance. Indeed, the 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  balance between banks and non-bank financial institutions in the EU has been evolving in recent years: although still very much bank-based, our economy is increasingly financed by non-bank institutions. In the euro area, total assets held by non-banks have almost doubled over the last ten years, growing from € trillion in 2008 to € trillion in June 2019. Non-banks currently account for around 55% of the euro area financial sector. Their fast growth reflects their expanding role in financing the euro area real economy. Whereas in 2008 non-banks accounted for 14% of the euro area financial sector’s loans to non-financial corporations, that share roughly doubled in a decade. Non-banks provide a steady net flow of financing to non-financial corporations through the purchase of debt securities.
10  There are exceptions to this division of responsibilities between the plenary and executive sessions. First, whenever a resolution scheme would require the use of the Fund above certain thresholds, which levels depend on what the Fund’s means will be used for, a member of the plenary can within a strict deadline request the plenary session to decide. In such a case, the decision will be taken by a simple majority of the plenary members, but the majority must also represent certain levels of contributions to the Fund. Second, any decision which would involve the raising of ex post contributions from the banks or voluntary borrowing between financing arrangements, among other things, will also be taken by the plenary session. During the transitional period, such decisions require a majority of 2/3 of the plenary members, representing at least 50% of contributions to the Fund. In the steady state, after eight years, the same majority share of the plenary only need to represent at least 30% of contributions to the Fund to take such decisions. 11  This would be the case when the Commission does not agree with the scheme adopted by the Board. In such case, within 12 hours from receiving the resolution scheme from the Board, the Commission may propose to the Council to either: (i) object to the resolution scheme on grounds that there is no public interest of resolution, or (ii) approve or object to a material modification of how much the Fund is used in the resolution scheme.

Opening Remarks Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand  ASEAN Banking Cybersecurity Conference 2019 Crystal Hall, 3rd Floor, The Athenee Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand 6 September, 2019  TBA Board of Directors, TBA members, Members of ASEAN banking community, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be here with you this morning, and I would like to thank TB-CERT for inviting me to speak at this event. Technology and the internet have undeniably become integrated into our daily lives. Customers’ behaviors continue to evolve and adapt to the technological progresses. In response, new technologies are developed to serve and accommodate customers’ ever-evolving needs. A prime example is the invention of smartphone over a decade ago, which has completely transformed our ways of lives and increased people’s connectivity to unprecedented levels. The banking industry, too, is undergoing massive digitalization, from the user-facing tools like mobile banking apps to backend infrastructure and essentially everything in between. These developments are the key drivers behind the convenience and productivity that we all enjoy today. But, inherent to any invention, these technological revolutions come with their own form of risk: cyber risks. The more “digital” banks become, the more channels for potential points of attacks from cyber criminals, who are constantly evolving to exploit new loopholes. Even when these loopholes are identified and patches are issued, delayed updates could also pose potential risk. We have repeatedly witnessed that the various—and many times severe—cyberrelated incidents often revolve around financial institutions.
2  BIS Review 25/2006  We thus endeavour to attain the inflation target within a two-year time perspective, under normal circumstances. In certain cases, however, we may need to have even greater flexibility than the twoyear perspective allows. If the economy were to suffer very large supply shocks, for instance, in the form of structural changes that have a major effect on inflation, or if extreme situations such as war or natural disasters occur, the process of bringing inflation back to the target may need to take even longer to avoid excessive strain on the real economy. In this type of situation it would be even more important that there was confidence in the inflation target. However, flexibility must not be allowed to undermine the nominal anchor. If confidence were to fail, we would be forced to act more strongly and would not have the same possibility to consider the real economy. Thus, the objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability. However, it is possible to give consideration to the development of the real economy. This does not mean having a target for growth or employment. Instead, this type of consideration is made possible by the way in which we have chosen to formulate the principles for attaining the inflation target. However, it assumes that there is sufficient confidence in the inflation-targeting policy.

On the other hand, what effect would it have on confidence in the inflation target if we allowed a long time for the adjustment? How long can inflation deviate from the target without this affecting confidence and without the inflation target being perceived as meaningless? These are difficult questions that I know we at the Riksbank are not the only ones to be reflecting on. I would very much like to hear your thoughts and reasoning on this. Safeguarding confidence in the inflation target is of central importance for monetary policy. I therefore believe that the best means of managing these concerns is to be open and clear with regard to the analyses produced and the decisions made on the basis of these analyses. I believe that this will in the long run create the best conditions for the policy to be accepted and to win confidence. Thank you! 6  BIS Review 25/2006
Chile)  2.4 0.9 -0.1 7.3 7.3 4.0 1.0  2.5 1.5 1.0 6.9 7.5 4.2 0.2  2.4 1.5 1.0 6.7 7.5 3.7 -0.1  2.4 1.5 0.6 6.9 7.5 3.4 -0.6  2.9 2.0 1.4 6.5 7.8 4.5 1.8  2.8 1.9 1.4 6.4 7.8 4.0 1.0  2.6 1.7 1.2 6.4 7.8 3.7 0.4  2.8 1.9 0.5 6.1 7.5 4.2 1.4  2.8 1.8 0.5 6.1 7.5 4.0 1.5  LME copper price $ Oil price (Brent y WTI avg) $  311 96  280 60  255 52  (levels) 249 51  290 67  245 53  220 44  250 58  230 50  Terms of trade  -1.4  1.3  -3.0  -1.0  -3.8  -0.4  1.7  (annual change, percent) -4.2  -0.2  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, based on a sample of investment banks, Bloomberg, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Figure 11 Housing price indicators (*) (index, base 2008=100) 160  160 Metropolitan Region, CBC  140  140  120  120  CBC CChC  100  100  80  80 10  11  12  13  14  15  (*) CBC indicator calculated by the Central Bank of Chile using stratified methodology. CChC indicator calculated by the Chilean Chamber of Construction using hedonic methodology. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Chilean Chamber of Construction (CChC). Figure 12 Vacancy rates and rental prices (percent; UF per year / m2) 12  7 Rental prices(*) (right axis)  8  6 Vacancy rate  4  5  4  0 10  11  12  13  14  15  (*) Values for class A and class B, weighted by surface. Source: CBRE. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 13 Household indebtedness (DTI) and financial burden (FIR) (percent of disposable income) 80  20 FIR (right axis)  60  15  DTI  40  10  20  0  5  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  0  Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF, SuSeSo and SVS data.