samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As far as the effectiveness of the policy goes, the impact depends on what those who have sold the gilts do with the money we give them in return, and how banks, businesses and households respond to the resulting movements in asset prices and money holdings. It is quite possible that the impact of a given quantum of purchases will be different at different times and be sensitive to the prevailing economic conditions. But that is also the case with changes in Bank Rate, where the effects can be equally uncertain. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Tracking the impact of the new round of purchases is also harder than before. Market participants have increasingly come to anticipate our actions, so that asset prices tend to move ahead of our decisions. That makes it difficult to isolate the impact on asset prices of policy changes from the myriad of other things driving them. The fact that UK government bond yields have fallen about a quarter percentage point more than those in Germany and the United States since the late summer is, however, at least consistent with the effect we expected. In any case, so far we have seen little to suggest that the effect on nominal demand will be markedly at odds with that of our first round of purchases. But it is still rather early to draw firm conclusions one way or the other.

In addition to regulators of the country in which the CCP is headquartered, these include foreign regulators. These regulators may be interested parties for many reasons. For example, their currencies may be used in settling the obligations of the CCP, they may have counterparties to the CCP that are headquartered or do significant amounts of business in their country, or they may have FMIs that are linked to the CCP. I want to emphasize that effective cooperative oversight is essential. Otherwise, the risk is that the system will become overly fragmented, with a proliferation of national CCPs. In this case, many of the risk-reducing benefits from CCPs could be lost or severely attenuated. That is because fewer offsetting positions would likely be cleared through any particular CCP and this would reduce the scope for reducing large gross exposures into much smaller net positions. The second safeguard is to ensure fair, open and safe access to global FMIs around the world. It is important, for example, that global CCPs have rules that are not exclusionary or that unnecessarily entrench the position of whatever dealer, firm, or FMI is currently dominant in the market. The third safeguard is to establish rules to ensure that, if a major market participant were to fail, a CCP can liquefy its collateral quickly so that it can meet its obligations in a timely way. But this also needs to be done in a way that would not disrupt financial markets or the CCP’s participants.
"The Risk Controllers: Central Counterparty Clearing in Globalised Financial Markets" 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  These reforms are of course interlinked. If banks depend more on CCPs to manage their counterparty credit risk from derivative exposures, they need to be sure that CCPs are resilient and can absorb default shocks, especially at times of market stress. And CCPs – which exist to reduce risks faced by their member banks – depend on the resilience of their members. CCPs have a major interest in resolution regimes being in place that would allow their members to fail without triggering default and disruption. Central clearing  The financial crisis exposed complex and opaque webs of bilateral derivatives contracts both between financial firms and with real economy end users. These were often poorly collateralised or not collateralised at all. As asset prices fell sharply and concern about counterparty credit worthiness grew, bilateral margin calls acted as one of the main amplifiers of stress. Increasing and more unpredictable margin calls generated more selling pressure, further price falls and greater uncertainty. Instruments primarily designed to reduce risk, acted in the crisis as an amplifier of risk. Greater central clearing reduces systemic risk in derivatives markets and increases the resilience of the derivatives network. It replaces the complex web of bilateral trades with a more efficient network in which firms can offset positions to reduce the overall counterparty credit risk in the system.

We, as the National Bank, within our competencies, will continue to support the savings in the future period as well, by further maintenance of the macrofinancial stability and prudent regulations, maintaining a safe and sound banking sector, contributing to maintenance of the confidence in the financial system, which is a key prerequisite for domestic savings. Finally, let me congratulate you all the employees in the banking sector in the Republic of Macedonia on the World Savings Day, 31 October, and wish you a success in future by attracting more deposits and their efficient channeling in productive investments that will bring 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  benefits to the society as a whole. Thank you! 1 Measured by the share of the total deposits of the non-financial entities in the GDP. 2 Measured by the share of total gross loans of non-financial entities in GDP. 3 IMF Regional Economic Issues, Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe – How to Get Back on the Fast Track,  May 16. 4 Refers to the total domestic savings calculated as a difference of GDP and consumption, expressed as a  percentage of GDP. 5 Slovenia and the Czech Republic are exception. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
3  BIS Review 7/2000  Chart 2: The Lamfalussy minimum standards  Lamfalussy standards • Well-founded legal basis • The risk must be known and understood • Clear division of responsibility • Exposure limits • Settlement is to be completed even if the largest participant experiences problems • Objective and publicly-disclosed admission criteria • Operational, reliable technical systems • Satisfactory back-up routines  The Lamfalussy minimum standards are still viable but, as mentioned above, some adjustments have been necessary in the light of what has been experienced since they first appeared in 1990. A proposal for revised standards is currently being evaluated in the BIS3 and a final version is expected to be available some time next year. I have pointed out these requirements because they are also relevent for us in Norway. If there should ever be any link to TARGET,4 our interbank systems would be expected to meet similar requirements. Moreover, we must assume that foreign bankers will demand that our systems satisfy international requirements. We could probably discuss whether these requirements are equally relevant for all portions of the NICS-system,5 but I think that in a given situation involving a link-up with an international system, we will have only one choice - full implementation of the requirements! In the proposed system for licensing interbank systems, emphasis will be placed on evaluating whether the systems fulfil such international requirements. 3. Risk and efficiency in the Norwegian payment system  3.1.

It should be possible to develop better routines to reduce the need for collateral. A review of traffic patterns (in particular, for government payments) combined with other appropriate measures (such as exposure limits and collective collateral) should make it possible to reduce the collateral requirement substantially. Changes in the rules for collateralisation are the other promising area for achieving noticeable gains. Present regulations hamper ongoing changes in the amount that can be pledged in favour of Norges Bank. Banks are unable to alter the collateral which has already been furnished (the previous day) in favour of Norges Bank. If it turns out on the day of settlement that too little collateral has been furnished, banks are not able to increase the amount of collateral - even though they have securities available in the VPS.13 This sluggish system - resulting from the Act relating to the Norwegian Central Securities Depository - prevents banks from adjusting their collateral throughout the day. It goes without saying that this is not an optimal situation, which we have already pointed out. The matter is under consideration in the VPS legal commission, and we are hoping that a solution is imminent. Let me now turn to the responsibilities and roles of the central bank and the banks in the payment system. 4. Responsibilities and roles in the payment system  The primary responsibility for the development of the payment system lies with, and must lie with, the banks. Self-regulation is still the rule.
 The demographic problem: the equivalent of approximately 30 percent of the labour force in Romania and of 13 percent of the total population work abroad (from 3 percent in 2005). This is Romania’s lost GDP. 2   Moreover, even now, when Romania’s economy reports above potential growth rates, the country continues to record negative birth rates. The ageing of the population affects potential GDP; and it is not only about ageing – ageing is doubled by a high rate of people at risk of poverty (around 40 percent in 2016).  According to in-house studies that refer to a panel of 6 Central and Eastern European countries and cover the period from 2005 to 2016, a 1 percent increase in the share of population aged 65 and above triggers a 1.3 percent decline in potential GDP.  Real convergence is measured not only in quantitative terms, in cold figures, but also in qualitative terms. For instance, over 90 percent of the population owns a house, but housing quality is the lowest in Europe (about 30 percent of the individuals have no access to basic sanitary facilities and around 70 percent live in overcrowded dwellings).  The living standards and the wage differential further account for emigration waves even amid the high economic growth. This is a deeply uneven growth at both interregional and intergenerational levels, which is unbalanced in terms of structure and which reinforces inequalities within the society (the Gini coefficient stood at 38 percent in 2015).

 Completion of important files, such as the prudential treatment of banks’ exposures to sovereign risk (the bank-sovereign link), EDIS (European Deposit Insurance Scheme), euro area reforms.  2020 budget – better use of resources.  Aligning the budgetary provisions of the NATO with those of the EU. Exemption of the rise in military expenditure, for NATO countries that are EU Member States, from the EDP (excessive deficit procedure) rule and from the MTO (medium-term objective).  Monetary policy normalisation and fiscal policy sustainability. 4
Ms Hessius speaks about the monetary policy and growth conditions for Sweden’s economy  Speech given by Ms Kerstin Hessius, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank at the Chairmens’ Conference of the Västmanland’s Local Authorities Association on 27 August 1999. * * * The whole speech The bright picture of the Swedish economy that has been coming to the fore in recent years now seems to be becoming increasingly distinct. Growth is stable and employment is rising, accompanied by price increases that are moderate. It is important now that this bright picture can become permanent and that the work of creating good conditions for long-term economic development continues. Today I shall be considering the economic situation in Sweden and the rest of the world, with some discussion of the conditions for consolidating the favourable trend. Functions of the Riksbank Ever since Sweden abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime in November 1992, monetary policy has been conducted with its sights on inflation. Sweden was one of the first countries to adopt an inflation targeting strategy. In many respects, the period with the inflation target has been characterised by good results in the Swedish economy. Interest rates and inflation have fallen to levels that are historically low and, after the crisis in the early 1990s, growth has been comparatively high and stable.

As a rule, foreign funding, excluding equity and reserves, did not exceed 10% of all sources of financing of the banking sector. There has always been a difference amongst individual banks, a reflection of the different strategies for funding and acquiring sources, yet the overall importance of foreign funding is not in its percentage, but in its long-term nature. This is the premise on which the good business relations between parent banks and subsidiaries is based. When the crises stroke the relative importance of domestic deposits in financing the claims on Macedonian borrowers actually increased. In the Republic of Macedonia the ratio of loans to domestic GDP is still 47–50%, while the ratio of deposits to domestic GDP is around 55%. These ratios in the developed world tend to be above 100%, which shows the potential for growth. Similarly, the ratio of household debt, including mortgages, to household disposable income, is around 25%, substantially lower than most countries at a similar level of development, also offering opportunities for the banking sector. Regulatory capital allocation, on average, is 17%, more than two times the legal minimum of 8%. The high capitalisation of banks means they have the capacity to take losses and do not need to evergreen existing loans, but lend to new customers that are more likely to borrow. Strong capital ratios are one of the bright spots of the Macedonian economy. The Macedonian banking sector comprises 16 banks.
•  Through the work of our business line specialists, we are developing a better understanding of the businesses you all are engaged in, including improving the dialogue with the front office and getting to know those business leaders. This has given us a much improved window into your strategies – into how you are thinking about the changes you will make and need to make in the face of increased regulation, increased regulatory pressure, competition and future economic growth. Areas where work remains Of course, there are many more areas where progress is being made, but those are the ones that I would highlight for you today. And, while I tend to be a “glass half-full” kind of person, I am also a realist and recognize the tough road ahead to continue implementing the kinds of changes needed across the system to achieve the end state of a more resilient, better managed and less complex financial system. In this regard, I’d highlight four areas where additional work is needed across firms and supervisors/regulators: 1. Resolution planning  2. Coordinating supervision across global organizations  3. Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (AML/BSA) compliance  4. Culture of firms and the system  1. Resolution planning  I noted earlier that resolution planning was an area where progress had been made – and it has.

We also need to make supervisory colleges more effective, including: •  Constructing the colleges with the appropriate members reflecting the key jurisdictions based on the scale or criticality of activities;  •  Ensuring robust dialogue between supervisors and firms in college settings;  •  Providing direct and candid feedback to firms and supervisors following from the interactions; and  •  Agreeing on key messages to firms or areas of supervisory focus to ensure consistency across home and host supervisors. I don’t mean to suggest that coordination isn’t underway already – because there is – but there are many reasons to be hopeful that even more progress will be made in the near-term. •  There are efforts such as those of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG) to promote enhanced information sharing and collaboration among supervisors. •  I’m particularly excited about the recent opening of the BIS’s Data Hub – a move designed to provide a more efficient and practical mechanism for supervisors – and eventually central banks and other relevant bodies – to share information on global banks’ activities and exposures. 3. AML/BSA compliance  A third area I wanted to touch on is one that I raised last year – AML/BSA compliance.
In the event of an adverse oil price shock, a good core inflation measure will only rise by the amount of second round effects on other goods prices. There are effectively two transmission channels from a rise in headline to a rise in core inflation. Higher headline inflation can adversely affect longer-term price expectations. Rising headline inflation can therefore give rise to expectations of higher prices across the board. Alternatively, consumers can attempt to compensate their oil price related purchasing power losses by demanding higher wages. Such consumer behavior can trigger adverse wage- and price-setting behavior which would require a response from monetary policy authorities in an effort to preserve price stability. 5. Monetary policy implications  The response of monetary policy to oil shocks is therefore a function of the extent to which higher oil prices feed through to higher core inflation rates. In the event of a mere spike in headline inflation in the aftermath of an adverse oil price shock, it would be unwise for a central bank to force a reduction in aggregate demand to lead headline inflation back to its target. Instead, the appropriate policy stance is to “look through” the temporary rise in headline inflation. On the other hand, a central bank must remain vigilant and look out for possible signs of second round effects from a rise in oil prices. Despite high and volatile oil prices, there are few signs of underlying inflationary pressures building up in the world economy so far.

Beyond these demand and supply driven factors in support of a price level shift hypothesis, the growing importance of oil as a financial asset class is an additional factor to consider. Beginning around the time of the bursting of the technology bubble in the spring of 2000, the futures market for oil became a relatively sought after financial asset class. Increasingly accommodating global monetary conditions throughout much of the world economy may well have facilitated this process. This asset allocation shift is reflected in a marked increase in the liquidity of oil futures contracts together with upward trending prices (see Figure 6). There is some evidence that hedge funds have been particularly active in the oil futures market. In a recent study, the BIS notes a high correlation (0.8) between the weekly oil price changes and changes in long positions of non-commercial traders of oil futures.1 Market estimates suggest there could be a single digit dollar per barrel speculative premium on the oil price.2  3. What does market tell us? Oil price development in the past decade has been characterized by short-term spikes in the spot price ranging from 11 to 40 USD per barrel for WTI crude. Meanwhile, futures prices remained well anchored around 20 USD per barrel. The recent run-up in oil spot prices however was part of a shift of the entire curve. Market estimates of the long-run marginal cost of oil nearly doubled and now stands  1  BIS Quarterly Review, September 2004, p 6.
While local rates have not responded only to changes in external rates – reflecting also the actions of local monetary policy –, a rise in international interest rates could result in increased costs of corporate financing. At the same time, it could generate portfolio adjustments by the agents involved, helping in the interest rate hike and causing greater volatility in the markets. As of the second quarter, Chile’s corporate financial sector showed no material change from end-of-2013, although debt is high and profits are low by historical standards (figure 10). All in all, the debt-to-GDP ratio maintains a slightly positive trend. In the context of slower economic growth, we cannot rule out less favorable indicators coming in for more recent periods – not available at the closing of this IEF Report. Meanwhile, the exchange rate depreciation has not eroded significantly the profits of currency-mismatched firms. In the residential real-estate market, prices continue on the rise, while in the office- space sector vacancies have increased (figure 11). Market indicators point to strong growth in housing prices in the Metropolitan Region, as demand continues to be strong – despite the ongoing phase of the business cycle – and depleted inventories. A change in these factors could result in slower growth in prices, so one must not extrapolate past trends into investment and funding decisions for projects in the sector.

It is likely that this is due in part to the various support measures introduced by the Confederation, the cantons and the SNB. Moreover, despite the difficult economic situation, the supply of credit to Swiss companies is working well. The solid capitalisation of Swiss banks plays an important role here. Page 1/4  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  The SNB’s baseline scenario assumes that the global economy will start to pick up again in the coming quarters. Uncertainty about the future course of the coronavirus pandemic, however, remains high. What do these developments in the national and international environment mean for the current situation of Swiss banks? Globally active banks  The situation for the globally active Swiss banks Credit Suisse and UBS has hardly changed since the SNB’s assessment in June. They are proving to be in robust shape despite the difficult environment. First, the risk situation at the two banks has stabilised. This can be seen in risk-weighted assets, for example, which have fallen again somewhat at both banks following an increase in the first quarter. Second, Credit Suisse and UBS continued to deliver solid results in the second and third quarters thanks to their diversified income structures. While provisions for credit risks have increased compared to pre-crisis levels, they are significantly lower than those of their international peers. In addition, trading business and wealth management at both banks benefited from the rapid recovery in the financial markets.