samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The quota have also been doubled to THB 3,000 million for next year. I am confident that the subsequent sessions in this two-day forum will offer you a clear picture on the opportunities and prospects this region has to offer. While the private sector works hard to “Move Up”, “Move Out” and “Move In”, the focus of the public sector is on infrastructure, both physical and intangible, to raise the competitiveness of the economy, elevate its workforce capability and enhance its return on capital. Recognizing the short lived, though timely, nature of consumption-led stimulus, the government is embarking on a major infrastructure investments in logistics, communication, water management and transportation. A strong and efficient logistic system will significantly help reduce transportation and logistic costs which are major impediments to our longer term growth. These projects will help unlock the bottleneck and raise overall competitiveness as well as crowd in private investments. Infrastructural projects will also strengthen Thailand’s position as a hub for our Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) neighbors, and is expected to accelerate the integration of these economies as we approach the 2015 ASEAN Economic Community. Projects such as the North-South and East-West corridors will further facilitate integration as well as efficiency of transportation and logistics in the region. As the Western economies progress in the recovery from the global financial crisis, we in Asia should step up our preparations to avail ourselves of the benefits once the global economy is back on its track.

They have again been at the centre of public debate in recent months, partly as a result of the performance of the euro area economies over the past few quarters, and partly as a result of uncertainties and concerns deriving from the ratification process for the Constitutional Treaty. In this context, doubts have even been raised about the sustainability of the single currency. There are four key questions that should be addressed regarding this matter: •  Are growth and inflation divergences a real problem in a monetary union? •  And, if so, how serious is the problem for the euro area? •  Are these divergences likely to get worse or likely to be self-correcting? •  What can be done to reduce these divergences and at the same time foster higher growth for the euro area as a whole? It is worth recalling that growth and inflation divergences between member countries are a natural, inevitable phenomenon in any large monetary union, as evidenced by the experience of a long-established one, the United States. And, in general, they may reflect both structural and conjunctural factors that affect differently the monetary union’s countries or regions. Differences in economic structures and/or in market adjustment mechanisms across member countries imply that common or global shocks and common policies will have different effects on their economies. Moreover, growth and inflation differentials may also reflect the impact of asymmetric shocks, fiscal policies and diverging productivity and wage developments.
The ability to make retail payments reliable is crucial for the effectiveness of the financial system. As discussed earlier, we have come a long way in developing a reliable way of transacting electronically – through solutions such as credit cards, mobile transfers and prepaid balances. Central banks are now carefully monitoring newer developments, particularly digital currencies based on the use of a distributed ledger. Digital currencies have tended to be volatile and subject to speculative hoarding. This raises the potential for runs on the digital currency, triggered for instance by a loss of confidence in the currency itself or a third party provider like an exchange. This risk is likely to be augmented where the digital currency is not backed by an issuer, and where there is no lender of last resort function. If digital currencies are widely used, such a shock could have systemic repercussions. At the same time, some of these concerns may be addressed if the digital currencies used are issued by a central bank. Many policymakers are studying this option. In addition to facilitating payments, cash has been a powerful instrument for central banks to build trust and credibility with the public. The notes issued by central banks provide us with a direct and tangible link to the people – making it a key branding tool. Trust and confidence in the central bank are crucial for us to effectively deliver our mandate.

These are potential reforms to the international monetary and financial system (IMFS) and how small, open and financially integrated economies (SOFIEs) can preserve monetary and financial stability in a world of global financial integration and large and volatile capital flows. Both of these are unfinished business and the road ahead is foggy. The post-war global economic order was initially based on the principles of free trade in goods, current account convertibility, and monetary stability through fixed but adjustable exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Open capital accounts were the exception, however. At the time, trade integration was seen to be more important for economic progress than financial integration. It worked well for a long while, and some call the period from 1950 to 1970 the golden years. Yet there were inherent flaws in this set-up that contributed to its demise in the early 1970s, not least the well-known Triffin dilemma regarding the conflict between the domestic economic objectives of the country providing the main reserve currency and the required international supply of that currency. In this case it was the US dollar. Then capital accounts were opened up, with strong momentum in the 1980s and early 1990s. Capital controls were increasingly undermined by technology and financial innovation, and strong arguments were being made to the effect that open capital accounts would bring significant benefits. After all, ongoing real economic integration at a global level demanded at least some degree of global financial integration.
I want also to touch upon some of the macroprudential challenges posed by the increase in market based finance. A forthcoming Bank staff paper will explore these issues in more detail. Market liquidity Before I talk about liquidity I need first to make some distinctions. Liquidity is a very broad term and people mean very different things by it. There are three concepts of liquidity. Monetary liquidity; funding liquidity; and market or asset liquidity. Monetary liquidity captures the looseness of monetary conditions – it is underpinned by the stance of the monetary policy authority. Funding liquidity is the ease with which banks and other non bank financial intermediaries can raise funding. And market liquidity refers to the ease with which one asset can be traded for another. All three concepts are tightly related. I am going to focus largely on market liquidity today. Market liquidity is in itself a very good thing. It allows investors to transact at a reasonable size at or close to prices prevailing in the market prior to the trade. It contributes to markets that are “effective” – by which I mean both fair and resilient. Liquid markets play an important role in the financing of investment in the real economy. Bonds account for virtually all credit growth since the crisis in the US, UK and euro area. So if market liquidity is a very good thing, can you ever have too much of a good thing? Surely any reduction in market liquidity is unwelcome.

Tarisa Watanagase: Thailand’s economic outlook and challenges under the volatile financial environment Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Herald Tribune and Citigold Wealth Management Economic Forum 2007, Bangkok, 19 September 2007. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be here today to give a keynote address at the economic forum hosted by the International Herald Tribune and the CitiGold Wealth Management. I also like to thank the hosts for this important opportunity to share with you my perspectives on the Thai economy moving forward, especially in the global environment of greater financial volatility and uncertainties. I believe that the media, local and international, provides a very important two-way avenue for the central bank to communicate our views and the rationale underlying our policies to the public at large, and to receive feedbacks, positive as well as negative. The topic of my talk today is “Thailand’s Economic Outlook and Challenges under the Volatile Financial Environment.” I will divide my address into three parts. First, I would like to highlight the key risks stemming from the recent global developments and outlook. In this connection, I would briefly touch on the implications of the US sub-prime market on the Thai economy. Second, I like to focus on recent key economic developments in Thailand and the outlook for 2008.
So what’s on the docket for monetary policy in 2016? The answer is that it depends on how the incoming data weighs on the outlook, and how changes in the outlook influence our views on the appropriate setting for monetary policy. What I can say is that our expectation at the December FOMC meeting was for further interest rate hikes in 2016 and beyond. Participants anticipated that the federal funds rate would likely continue on a gradual upward path. Over the longer term, FOMC participants expected that the federal funds rate would eventually reach 3 to 4 percent as inflation rose back to our 2 percent objective and the headwinds from the financial crisis that had been restraining economic activity fully dissipated. Even though this path is shallow relative to previous tightening cycles, the median federal funds rate path of FOMC participants in the December Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) is well above the path implied by the federal funds futures market. Should this be a concern? Does this imply that there is a significant risk of an abrupt future spike in short- and long-term interest rates as market rates realign to levels more consistent with the median FOMC participants’ projections? I don’t think so for several reasons. First, the SEP projections are modal forecasts – that is, what the participants believe is most likely to happen – whereas those embodied in market prices are a mean – that is, an average across all possible outcomes.

He said this: “Where once the poor were commonly seen as passive victims, microfinance recognizes that poor people are remarkable reservoirs of energy and knowledge. And while the lack of financial services is a sign of poverty, today it is also understood as an untapped opportunity to create markets, bring people in from the margins and give them the tools with which to help themselves.” I believe we will continue to see massive changes in rapid bursts. In the process, the goal should be to help as many people as we can emerge stronger and more productive members of the human ecosystem. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
We have recently conducted a survey of the financial institutions to check their readiness to conform to the credit risk guidelines under the New Accord. I have been reported that many plan to be ready for the standardized approach, while others are working towards the IRB approach, this is a welcome news. More importantly, financial institutions have all started the effort to strengthen risk management in their respective institutions with some notable progress so far, and we look forward to more progress to come. I would like to take this opportunity to commend all of you for such efforts. After all, the BIS capital requirement only serves as a cushion of losses or failure of an institution whereas it is the risk management that reduces the chance of failure. The significant progress you have made in the area of risk management deserves our full support and commendation, particularly so as this is a very difficult time for the financial industries. Ladies and gentlemen, Coming back to the issue of preparation for the New Accord, one can see that significant challenges remain ahead. I will now turn to these challenges. First, the technical and infrastructure aspects. It is important to build up a deep understanding of the technicality of approaches and methodology underlying the New Accord. Moreover, it is critical to achieve in-depth knowledge of risk management and the impact of such developments on business model of the financial institution. Therefore the task ahead is very challenging, far beyond just acquiring software that would crank out numbers.

At the moment our legislation lags behind global practices. We understand what an urgent topic this is, and in order to make our economy more attractive to investors there should of course be effective mechanisms in place to counter insider trading and market manipulation. The next important issue is the bill concerning a financial Ombudsman for the rights of consumers of financial services. Recently at the State Council Presidium there was discussion about rights protection for consumers of financial services, and, of course, a financial Ombudsman could be one of the instruments used to increase the effectivity of consumers’ rights protection. We propose to bring this in gradually. And here, too, I hope I can count on support for this project from the Ministry of Finance and the government and state Duma as a whole. These bills are in the process of being finalised before submission to the state Duma. Firstly, for us it is important that a bill toughens liability for false statements in the financial sector. We are carrying out major work on improving the cyber resilience of financial organisations and combatting cyber attacks. So it is important for us, taking into account the benefits of digital technology development for the financial sphere, to provide an adequate level of security and protection from risks. Therefore it is necessary to amend the law in order to establish legal requirements for the protection of financial organisations’ information and to combat theft of their clients’ funds. We are now working on drafting this bill, too.
Because they are based on value-at-risk (VaR) calculations, and reflective of recent historical market conditions and correlations, they do not necessarily provide an effective measure of vulnerability to loss under more severe conditions of market stress and illiquidity. Stress tests must be designed and applied to compensate effectively for these limitations. Designing an appropriate set of stress tests that can capture the underlying pressure points and concentrations across a broad range of relationships with many different hedge funds is not easy, but it’s necessary. BIS Review 70/2004  3  And, the results of these tests need to inform judgments by the firm on the scale of exposure that it is willing to take to individual funds, groups of funds with similar strategies, and to hedge funds as a whole. Moreover, firms need to find ways to consider assessments of their stress-level exposures to hedge funds in tandem with stress tests of their own market risks to inform an overall judgment on the extent of capital market trading-related risks that the firm is taking on - especially in relation to low probability but high impact events. Third, and especially in light of the current competitive climate, we believe it is appropriate for dealers to have more exacting standards for the overall due diligence process, and to adjust credit terms on the basis of those higher standards. This is particularly important in those cases where there has been innovation in the manner in which credit is extended.

For example, it is much more common today than in 1998 for hedge funds to seek arrangements that provide contingent credit and thus provide the hedge fund with protection against the need to liquidate positions too rapidly. Similarly, many hedge funds are today seeking to base margining agreements, including initial margins, on the results of VaR calculations that incorporate the effect of netting across multiple products. While both of these developments have their basis in sound risk management principles, firms extending such credit should carefully examine the impact of these and other innovations on their potential exposures to hedge funds in stress conditions, and set the terms for such credit accordingly. A reinforced due diligence process also is critical in assessing the operational capabilities of the hedge funds, the quality of their risk management process and execution and compliance infrastructure. This may sound self evident, but it is not as common as one might think. Timely access to forward looking measures of risk by hedge fund counterparties is obviously important for assessing the risks in firms’ exposures to hedge funds as a group, and for assessing the impact of hedge funds’ activities on a firm’s own positions. To the extent that information is not made available, and there seem to be a number of legitimate reasons why hedge funds may resist providing it and are sometimes successful in doing so, then it makes sense for the dealer to reduce the exposure it is willing to take to that fund.
There may also be reason to make changes that span both life and non life, but that is not the point I want to emphasise here. Let me be clear, none of this means that the UK should or will create a low regulation, high risk, anything goes financial centre and system. We have an overwhelming body of evidence that such an approach is not in our own interests, let alone anyone else’s. That said, I believe we have a very bright future competing in global financial markets underpinned by strong and effective common global regulatory standards. I want to finish with one further important area, that is, how the rules are applied – supervision as we call it – and how we can be sure that this application of rules is effective across borders, and particularly between the UK and the EU. It is of course critical that rules are applied effectively, and that there is co-operation between the authorities in different countries. With this in mind, we already have 36 MoUs agreed between the Bank of England / PRA and supervisors across Europe. They ensure supervisory co-operation will be deeply engrained in the relationship. And let me welcome the content of the joint declaration on financial services that was contained in the UK-EU trade agreement.

The shift was towards managing the consequences of greater openness with much more emphasis on the stability of the financial system and its ability otherwise to do harm, both domestically and internationally. What was needed was not just openness, but safe openness. This emphasis was never more evident than during and after the global financial crisis. There was a moment at the height of the financial crisis when it might have been natural to consider forfeiting the commitment to an open financial system in the face of damaging international linkages. That did not happen to our great relief – the G20 nations stood firm to the principles of Bretton Woods and committed to significantly reforming the international financial system and its regulation, by raising global standards for regulating the system and reinforcing the institutional structure. The Covid crisis has been the first big test of those reforms – and it has been a big test. The scorecard to date is encouraging – by no means perfect, but the core of the system has stood up well, which is needless to say a huge relief. In order to preserve this public good of an open world economy and now also an open financial system, has required a commitment to institution building both internationally and domestically. Bretton Woods created the IMF and World Bank, and slightly less directly the GATT and then W TO.
Andrew Bailey: Tackling climate for real – the role of central banks Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at Reuters Events Responsible Business, 1 June 2021. * * * The Bank of England’s mission is to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability. Our understanding of how we can best deliver that stability, and what factors are relevant to it, evolves with time. This is unsurprising as our economy and financial system are not static, so neither should be how we go about fulfilling our mission. The UK economy and financial system have undergone significant transformations in recent decades – as examples of this, services have risen and manufacturing has declined as a share of output1, debit card transactions have overtaken cash transactions2, and the share of activity in the financial system accounted for by non-banks has risen3. These types of structural shifts have had broad effects, including in our world on the transmission of monetary policy and the resilience of the financial system. We have taken action in response; for example after the financial crisis we increased capital requirements for banks so the financial system could act as a shock absorber rather than amplifier – the benefits of which we have most recently seen in the response to Covid-19.

(2021) estimates that $ of the $ of economic damage caused by Hurricane Sandy (New York, 2012) was attributable to climate change driven rises in sea-levels 7 See Chapter 6 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2020Opens in a new window 8 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate ChangeOpens in a new window (2006) 9 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  9 See Government announcement of climate considerations being embedded across UK principal financial  regulatorsOpens in a new window 10 Dietrich, Müller, and Schoenle (2021) – ‘The Expectations Channel of Climate Change: Implications for Monetary  Policy’ 11 Monetary policy in the intangible economy - speech by Jonathan Haskel, University of Nottingham, February  2020 12 See ‘It’s not easy being green – but that shouldn’t stop us: how central banks can use their monetary policy  portfolios to support orderly transition to net zero’ speech by Andrew Hauser and Options for greening the Bank of England’s Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme discussion paper  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches