samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Matching Adjustment allows insurance companies to recognise as capital up-front a part of the income they expect to earn on their assets in the future, as long as they can show that the cashflows they expect to receive from those assets closely match the payments they have undertaken to make to their policyholders. 10. This would be the case if insurers were to agree to reinsurance contracts with collaterals such as asset backed securities and collateralised loan obligations, non-GBP illiquid assets and FX exposure. 11. McKinsey’s Private Markets Annual Review | McKinsey  , Exhibit 4. 12. As a reminder, firms must comply with the PRA’s Restriction of Business rules and ensure that it does not carry on any commercial business other than insurance business and activities directly arising from that business. 13. SS3/17 'Solvency II: Illiquid unrated assets' 14. Four Rs: Creating the conditions for long-term sustainable growth in the life annuity sector – speech by Charlotte Gerken 15. Solvency II | Eiopa 16. SS1/20 Solvency II: Prudent Person Principle  Annex

Undoubtedly, since the unification of our country by His Majesty King Abdulaziz, May God bless him, it has been witnessing stability, thanks to God. However, the enactment of the Homage System will impart further stability in accordance with a clear institutional system, The Kingdom's fundamentals of governance will also be enforced, and this will be positively reflected upon the security and welfare of our Homeland. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, At present, we feel and reap the fruits of your efforts in the Supreme Economic Council in the field of regulating and restructuring all sectors of the national economy. Since the foundation of the Council in 1999 (1420H), the national economy has recorded an average annual real growth rate of 4.2 percent, exceeding population growth rate of 2.5 percent. The private sector recorded a continuous growth during the last six years and its average annual real growth amounted to 4.6 percent. In 2005, the Saudi economy continued achieving distinguished results that exceeded the average annual real growth of that period. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.5 percent as compared to a growth of 5.3 percent in the preceding year; the real domestic product of the private sector and government sector grew by 6.6 percent and 7.2 percent respectively. The State budget registered a surplus for the third consecutive year amounting to Rls 218 billion, with a wise expansion in the public expenditure, apart from what has been allocated to repay a notable amount of the public debt.
Financial markets are more likely to cry wolf, making Paul Samuelson’s observation fifty years ago that “the stock market has predicted nine of the past five recessions” as relevant today as it was then.3 For what it is worth, market-implied probabilities of a recession in the US are around 20%, nearly three times higher relative to this time a year ago (Chart 4). There are multiple definitions of what constitutes a global recession. Some have used a benchmark of global GDP growth falling below 2½% or 3%, whilst the IMF uses a definition of a fall in global GDP per capita.4 On the IMF’s definition, there have been four global recessions since WWII: in 1975, 1982, 1991 and 2009. 2  See: Baker, S, Bloom, N and Davis, S (2015) Measuring economic policy uncertainty, NBER Working Paper No.21633 From Samuelson’s 1966 column ‘Science and Stocks’ in Newsweek. 4 This is equivalent to global GDP growth falling below the current rate of population growth of 1%. 3  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Chart 4: Market-implied probabilities of a US recession have risen Per cent  100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0  1973  1978  1983  1988  1993  1998  NBER recessions  2003  2008  2013  2018  Fed recession indicator  Sources: Federal Reserve Board; NBER.

17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Table 2: GDP losses from a 10 percentage point increase in tariffs on US trade would be substantial29 GDP impact (peak impact over three year period, %)  US  UK  EA  World (PPP)  Trade war  - 2½  -½  -1  -1¼  Tighter financial conditions  -1  -1  -¾  -½  Greater uncertainty  -½  -¼  -¼  -¼  Permanent tariffs  -¾  0  -½  -½  Total  -5  -1¾  -2¼  - 2½  Notes: Bank calculations. There are signs that concerns about such possibilities are beginning to cascade through economies via reduced investment and demand. Consider the UK as a leading indicator of a nascent global trend. UK business investment has fallen 3.7% over the past year despite the ongoing expansion, high business profitability and accommodative financial conditions. With fundamental uncertainty about future market access, UK investment hasn’t grown since the referendum was called and has dramatically underperformed both history and peers (Charts 12 and 13). Chart 12: The recovery in UK business investment has stalled since the EU referendum  Chart 13: UK business investment growth has fallen below other advanced economies  Indices: peak in GDP = 100 180 Average  Four-quarter growth (%) 20 Range of G7 countries excl.
In multi-regulatory and multi-supervisory systems like what is still prevalent in our part of the world, it is necessary to ensure that the regulatory and supervisory burden be shared by all who are responsible for regulating and supervising banking and financial institutions. This will also provide an opportunity to mitigate concentration of regulatory risks. In multi-regulatory regimes, it is particularly relevant to ensure that appropriate CG principles are laid down, so that all regulators are aware of the principles behind these governance rules that are introduced in the interest of the wider financial system stability. BIS Review 24/2007  5  In promoting sound CG, it is also necessary to develop an effective legal framework that specifies the rights and obligations of the institution, be it a bank or a finance company or other, its directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The regulators, on their part, should initiate action to build capacity in CG at various levels, including the chairmen, the boards of directors and senior management of banks and financial institutions. The legal framework should also provide for disclosure requirements, facilitating the enforcement of the law. Further, it is essential to encourage an effective financial news media, which deals with the importance of CG and educate the public. They should play a more responsible role in disseminating accurate information to the public and initiating a meaningful discussion on the subject. Conclusion The developments in Corporate Governance that are taking place all over the world are increasingly complex.

Or does it represent more of an opportunity? Europe must show that it is a prosperous and secure area. In the short term migration will have an economic impact in the form of a fiscal expansion with some positive impact on growth. Germany’s fiscal situation is likely to deteriorate by around 0.3% to 0.4% of GDP in 2016 and 2017. This deterioration will be weaker in other countries. In the long term we will also have to look at the impact of the refugee crisis. This population is different, and care will have to be taken in integrating the migrants into the labour market, especially in Germany. In the medium term, from a demographic point of view, it can be a positive factor. The key issue is that of integrating migrants into the labour market in line with their profiles. All of these economic aspects are known and straightforward. From an economic perspective, this situation is not insurmountable; it is above all a political issue. The more integration we achieve at the economic level, the more it will be accepted politically. But all of this cannot be done in a day. Europe needs a young and well-trained workforce. We can create an opportunity out of a tragic situation, but it is not going to be easy. It is possible for a country to organise migration, and we have already done so in the past. The issue of security to combat the threat of terrorism will become a major challenge for governments in the months to come.
The really hard question for us is could we - or should we - attempt to protect those businesses most affected by the strong exchange rate even if that meant putting the economy as a whole at significant risk of rising inflation. The reality is that, were we to do so - notwithstanding our specific mandate from the Government - we would not succeed in protecting even the suffering sectors except possibly in the very short term; and in the medium to long term our overall economic performance - in terms of growth and employment would - on all past experience - almost certainly be worse. As it is, Mr President, the recovery in the world economy, and the extraordinary efforts of UK businesses themselves to cope with the hostile international environment, are already resulting in a stronger net external trade performance. That in turn is contributing to the recovery in our own economy, particularly in manufacturing output growth, and to the more encouraging news in recent surveys. To the extent that this improvement in external demand persists, it will help to ease the exceptional pressures on the most internationally-exposed sectors, and contribute to a better balance within the UK economy. But it needs, of course, to be accompanied by corresponding moderation of the growth of domestic demand - after the offsetting stimulus of a year ago - if we are to maintain overall stability. That essentially is why interest rates have had to rise since last autumn.

Mr George discusses national and regional economic prospects in the light of the external environment  Speech given by Mr E A J George, Governor of the Bank of England, to the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce & Industry and Prince’s Trust on 26 January 2000. *  *  *  Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen, It seems only a very short time ago that I last had the pleasure of visiting Northern Ireland - in fact it was in May 1998. Time flies when the world about us is changing fast as it certainly has been in so many respects in the intervening period. Let me start with the world economy. We were already then in the grip of the financial shock that had started in emerging markets in Asia in 1997. But that shock intensified through 1998 - spreading to Russia and parts of Latin America and elsewhere - and at one point, following the collapse of the US hedge fund LTCM, threatening to engulf the financial system of the industrial world. The economic consequence of this financial turmoil was a sharp slowdown in the world economy to around half its longer-term trend rate of growth. It could have been far worse. The slowdown could have turned into an actual downturn had the industrial countries - led by the United States and the United Kingdom and closely followed by the Eurozone and Japan - not succeeded in stimulating their own, domestic, demand.
It’s therefore worth taking some time to think about what we as the prudential regulator and the insurance industry have already learnt from the current crisis –including how the Solvency II regime has responded. None of us knows how the full effects of the coronavirus pandemic will unfold. Our aim at the Bank, alongside colleagues at the FCA and within government, is to build a bridge across the economic disruption created by the pandemic and help UK businesses, consumers and the financial sector to the other side. Insurers will need to be on the front foot in identifying the potential impacts on their longer-term business models in order to meet changing customer expectations. Covid-19: what role has Solvency II played in the industry’s response? I have talked previously about the principles of Solvency II that the PRA supports - a whole balance sheet, market consistent approach to regulatory solvency, and focus on good governance and risk management 1. The adequacy of firms’ capital and risk management during this global, systemic event is certainly being tested. The information we have from the largest UK insurers shows the industry was well-capitalised going into this crisis and has so far remained so, with aggregate solvency ratios around 150% 2. But given the exceptional uncertainty generated by the current crisis, we expect insurers to increase their monitoring of the additional risks presented by Covid‐ 19, and where necessary to update their risk and capital assessments accordingly.

These lessons are helpful when it comes to thinking about the future UK regulatory landscape. For example, some early observations. Solvency II was written to facilitate insurance business by eliminating significant differences between Member States’ regimes and thus aims for uniform rather than dynamic application. We could think about measures that would improve the PRA’s ability to supervise firms through a cycle. An alternative could have been for firms to hold additional regulatory capital during more benign times, buffers which the PRA could then allow to be released during a market down-turn. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  This would be similar to the effect of the symmetric adjustment. At present, buffers held in excess of the solvency capital requirement (SCR) are determined by each insurer’s risk appetite to avoid breaching the SCR, and are thus less likely to be used in a stress. In relation to internal models, we could review the balance between assessment against tests and standards and supervisory judgements concerning calibration of the overall capital requirement. Ultimately, the extent to which the UK’s regulatory framework is similar to or different from EU regulation after the implementation period is a political choice. But as Solvency II is based on the same principles as the preceding UK regime, revolution is less likely than evolution.
This applied both internationally and in Sweden. It was partly due to the confidence crisis suffered by the business sector as a result of corporate scandals in the United States and a number of large-scale bankruptcies. This contributed to a new stock market fall. The threat of war in Iraq and the ensuing outbreak of war for a time created greater uncertainty over the global economy than usual. The lack of clearly positive economic signals once the acute stage of the war was over, contributed to an increasingly pessimistic view of the economic situation during the first half of 2003. The weaker economic activity was also reflected in the Riksbank’s inflation and growth forecasts, and the repo rate was cut by a total of one percentage point during spring and summer 2003. During the second half of 2003 the views of economic activity became slightly more optimistic again. It now appears that economic growth in Sweden and the United States during 2003 was largely as we had expected at the beginning of the year. In Sweden, investment showed a much poorer growth than expected during 2003, but this was counteracted by good growth in consumption, in both the private and public sector, and by favourable developments in foreign trade. One could therefore say that the Riksbank, in common with other analysts, became overly pessimistic in connection with the Iraq war, at least with regard to the view of economic growth in the United States and Sweden.

[18]  Chart 3 Returns correlations of bitcoin vis-à-vis selected financial assets (yearly rolling correlation)  Sources: Bloomberg, S&P Global iBoxx, CryptoCompare and ECB calculations. Notes: The data are for the period from 1 January 2016 to 16 June 2023. Cryptos as a means of gambling and circumvention But the very instability of unbacked cryptos does make them appealing as a means of gambling. And their use as such has been facilitated by the establishment of a centralised market structure that supports the broader use of crypto-assets. [19] Crypto exchanges have become gateways into the crypto ecosystem, often providing user access to crypto markets in conjunction with other services like wallets, custody, staking[20] or lending. Off-chain grids or third-party platforms have offered users easy and cost-effective ways to engage in trading and  speculation, while stablecoins are being used to bridge the gap between fiat and crypto by promising a stable value relative to fiat currency. [21] Besides gambling, crypto assets are also being used for bypassing capital controls, sanctions and traditional financial regulation. A prime example is bitcoin, which is used to circumvent taxes and regulations, in particular to evade restrictions on international capital flows and foreign exchange transactions, including on remittances. [22] These practices may have destabilising macroeconomic implications in some jurisdictions, notably in developing and emerging markets.
I am indebted to the Secretariat of the Basle Committee, the staff of the BIS, as well as to my colleagues at the Bank of Spain, for choosing speakers who will encourage a lively conversation on these two themes. In my own remarks this morning, I would like to open with some thoughts first on the implications of “Basel II” for banking supervision worldwide. While much has been said about its sophistication, I believe that many have overlooked key principles in Basel II that are relevant to all supervisors and all banks in all markets. In that regard, it is important to remember that Basel II’s success depends on a broad range of other preparations and measures that we undertake to strengthen safety and soundness; in the second part of my remarks, I will offer some views on the other mechanisms, that lie at the heart of a sound system of supervision more generally. As I will mention, many of our safety and soundness goals are more easily achieved when supervisors apply these mechanisms more consistently: this makes it critical for the Basel Committee to continue to expand its ties and seek greater cooperation with the broader supervisory community. Finally, I would like to close with some brief thoughts on the rules that govern transparency and disclosure in our jurisdictions and on our responsibilities as supervisors to encourage their continued advancement. With that overview, I would like to share some thoughts on the implications of Basel II for supervision, which is my first topic. 2.

The legal and judicial system must make the rights and responsibilities of both banks and their counterparties clear and enforceable so that banks and borrowers can make the most effective use of collateral, guarantees, and other measures to secure credit. Third, we must confirm that the banking industry is developing a sense of a “culture” of risk management. This is perhaps the hardest criterion to define. To a great degree, Basel II is intended to create incentives for the banks to renew their focus on a risk management culture. At a minimum, countries that seek to apply Basel II must ensure that their banks view risk management not as an exercise in complying with external requirements, but rather as a means for pursuing opportunities responsibly. We must all understand as well that risk management is an art, not a science: it is a way to approach business decisions, but it does not provide automatic answers. Its successful application requires that we constantly improve our skills and our expertise. It demands the use of the best tools and best data available to support our analyses. And ultimately, it requires that we apply our best human judgement to all significant decisions. All of us can take immediate steps to strengthen our financial and supervisory infrastructure along these three areas. We must ensure the effectiveness of our supervisory systems. We must improve the transparency of our markets. And we must promote the development of sound risk management cultures.
Mervyn King: Reform of the International Monetary Fund Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, 20 February 2006. *  *  *  Sixty years ago delegates from around the world were gathering on Wilmington Island in Savannah, Georgia, to celebrate the baptism of the Bretton Woods twins, the International Monetary Fund, or, simply, “the Fund” and the World Bank, “the Bank”. India was represented by Sir Chintaman Deshmukh, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, and Britain by John Maynard Keynes, Lord Keynes as he had become. The two men got on well, as can be seen from their official reports on the Savannah Conference. As Sir Chintaman wrote later: “this meeting remains memorable mainly as the occasion when the Indian delegation worked in effortless accord with the British delegation under Lord Keynes and there were many occasions when there happened to be agreement between us on the need to take some steps which would increase the utility, independence and creativity of the international bodies". 1 In his speech at this first meeting of the Fund, Keynes drew an analogy with the christening-party in The Sleeping Beauty, which, as Chairman of Covent Garden, he had seen danced at the reopening of the Garden only two weeks earlier.

Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Macro-prudential supervision Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the CEPR/ESI 13th Annual Conference on “Financial Supervision in an Uncertain World”, European Banking Center at Venice International University, Venice, 25-26 September 2009. *  *  *  Introduction 1 The recent financial crisis has produced a broad consensus on analysis and policy action in at least three areas, namely the need: i) to gain a better understanding of systemic risk; ii) to strengthen the macro-prudential aspects of financial supervision; and iii) to deepen central banks’ involvement in it. The establishment of a new body to conduct macro-prudential supervision at EU level – the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – is one element in a comprehensive set of initiatives and responses in this field. My remarks today focus on the future work of this body and consist of four parts. I’ll first consider the origins, purpose and structure of the ESRB. In second place, I’ll discuss the concept of systemic risk, and how it can be monitored and assessed effectively. I’ll examine some analytical tools for systemic risk analysis in the EU and look at how these tasks could be organised in the context of the ESRB. In the third part, I’ll cover the ECB’s experience in conducting financial stability surveillance in the euro area and reflect on the vulnerabilities that we (and other authorities) identified before the crisis.