samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I have kept a copy of it, and I often refer to it for inspiration in the past twenty years. Fortunately for me, but not perhaps for others, the advice is so highly classified that it will probably never see the light of day. But it should be all right for me to quote from your covering letter to Sir John, where you said: “I have put in all the points of substance that I wanted to make, and I hope and believe that they will stand the test of time.” They certainly did. And so did your suggestion that it might be desirable for the Exchange Fund in time to adopt “more of a feature of a Central Bank”: hence the HKMA, which was formed ten years after the advice you gave. Of course, we also had the privilege of your involvement over the period from 1990 to 1997 as a member of our board, the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee, and in your occasional trips to Hong Kong. So, ladies and gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that I now invite Charles to speak in our first session of this HKIMR first Summer Workshop. 2  BIS Review 38/2003

The earlier spike in inflation largely reflects the effects of the rapid reopening of the economy, which pushed supply and demand in extreme ways. In fact, we are now seeing some of the pandemic-related spikes retrace, including prices for lumber, used vehicles, and rental cars. This process of adjustment may take another year or so to complete as the pandemic-related swings in supply and demand gradually recede. As the economy gets through these highly unusual dynamics, I expect inflation to come back down to around 2 percent next year. One reason I expect inflation to moderate is that measures of underlying inflation and longer-term inflation expectations have been relatively stable during this period of otherwise volatile inflation readings. There are two important aspects of longer-term inflation expectations: their level and their sensitivity to economic conditions and, in particular, to inflation. In terms of the level of inflation expectations, survey- and market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have reversed the declines of the past several years and are now around levels seen seven or eight years ago. They currently appear to be well aligned with our 2 percent long-run inflation goal. A second issue is how well anchored inflation expectations truly are, and whether there is a risk that they could drift higher in response to the elevated rates of inflation we have been experiencing. A group of economists at the New York Fed took a closer look at recent behavior of 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  inflation expectations from the Survey of Consumer Expectations.
But it can have a stabilising effect in the short run, particularly if inflation expectations are well-anchored so that temporary changes in inflation are not perceived as permanent. However, this means that a conflict may arise between the short run and the long run. A central bank prefers inflation expectations to be stable and low, as this is best in the long run. The central bank may then prefer to conduct a policy that is perceived as sufficiently tight for inflation to remain low, as this creates low inflation expectations. But once inflation expectations are low, it may be tempting to allow the market to be ”surprised” by a more  1  Phillips actually studied the relationship between wages and unemployment, but later studies indicated a similar relationship between inflation and unemployment, Phillips, A. W, (1958) “The relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money wages in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957”, Economica, 25, s. 283-299. 2  Friedman, M, (1968). “The role of monetary policy”, American Economic Review, p. 58, 1–17. 2  BIS Review 38/2009  expansionary policy that leads to lower unemployment, as it takes time before individuals and companies adapt their behaviour. In this way the central bank risks finding itself in a vicious circle of periods where inflation is allowed to soar, followed by periods where inflation expectations have to be brought down again at a large cost to the real economy.

Jacqueline Loh: Integrating Asia’s capital markets Keynote address by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ASIFMA (Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets) Annual Conference 2014 “Developing Asia’s Capital Market”, Singapore, 5 November 2014. *  *  *  Mark Austen – CEO, ASIFMA Ashley Alder – CEO, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and my fellow keynote speaker Fellow regulators and central bankers Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen 1. It is my pleasure to join you this afternoon at the ASIFMA annual conference held in Singapore. 2. We have a very ambitious agenda ahead of us. The title of the conference, “Developing Asia’s Capital Markets”, certainly does not do full justice to the breadth of topics covered in the breakout sessions and roundtable discussions over these two days. These topics are very wide ranging indeed, from traditional equity and debt markets, to foreign exchange, investment banking, fund management, financing of Asia’s infrastructure needs, market infrastructures; as well as specific geographic markets China and India. Each segment not only aims to address opportunities and challenges in each market or asset class, but also opportunities and challenges across markets and asset classes. 3. Accordingly, I will focus my remarks on integrating Asia’s capital markets as a natural pairing to the conference theme on developing Asia’s capital markets. I. Economic dynamism and wealth creation in Asia  4.
Mean squared gaps (output) Production  Higher  6.0 4.0  Main  Per cent  -1.0  Lower  -2.0 -3.0 -4.0 -5.0  0.20  0.40 CPIF  0.60  08  0.80  c. Mean squared gaps (hours)  09  3.0  10  11  12  f. Hours-worked gap 2.0  4.0  Hours  12  0.0  2.0 0.0 0.00  11  e. Output gap 1.0  8.0  10  Per cent  1.0  Higher  0.0 2.0 1.0  -1.0  Main  -2.0  Lower 0.0 0.00  -3.0 0.20  0.40 CPIF  0.60  Main  08  0.80  Lower  09  10  11  12  Higher  To determine which repo rate path is most appropriate, a comparison must be made of the forecast for inflation and resource utilisation for alternative repo rate paths. Such a comparison is presented in Figures 2.13–2.15 at the end of Chapter 2 of the Monetary Policy Report. I present a similar comparison here in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the consequences of alternative repo rate paths for the forecast for inflation and resource utilisation. The different repo rate paths are shown in panel a. In the middle is the main scenario’s repo rate path – the repo rate path that the Executive Board majority chose at the meeting in February.

Inflationary pressure stability is clearly illustrated by low rates of core inflation of non-tradable goods one during this period, being reflected also in checked expectations of economic agents of the market. Meanwhile, after a long non-inflationary period and confirming Bank of Albania forecasts, the annual change of consumer prices revealed a slightly increasing tendency over the second quarter of 2009. The annual inflation marked 2.3 percent in June, reflecting a more complete pass-through of exchange rate deprecation effect on consumer goods prices. The Bank of Albania estimates that this factor may play a higher role in the future for determining these prices, comprising premises for short-term and medium-term shocks on price level. In the face of these developments, the Albanian economy continued to be featured by low public and private savings rates even during the first half of 2009, associated with further enlargement of current account deficit and upward pressures on exchange rate performance. Simultaneous reduction of exports and imports, respectively by 19.6 and 6.3 percent on annual level, made the trade deficit contract by 1.3 percent during first five months of the year. However, reduction of emigrants’ remittances by about 8 percent during the first quarter and the service account deterioration, made the current account deficit record an annual growth of 5 percentage points of GDP during this quarter. Though this deficit goes for financing, to a large extent, the capital and intermediate goods of import, its sustainability deserves a greater attention.
Sabine Lautenschläger: One year of SSM Speech by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at an international conference on “One year of SSM effective and efficient supervision in a volatile world?”, organised by the Institute of Law and Finance, Frankfurt am Main, 2 November 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me thank the organisers of this conference, and especially Professor Schneider, for their kind invitation. I very much welcome this opportunity to share our experience of one year Single Supervisory Mechanism, in particular as our first year anniversary is only two days ahead of us. Back in November 2014, in a speech for the start of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), I compared the new system, the SSM, to an athlete at the start of his career. We only had a short period of training before going into our first competition. Today, almost one year later, we have gained experience and won some contests. Let me mention some figures to give you some insight into the sport we practice: The SSM directly supervises 122 banking groups. From January 2016 onwards this number will increase to 130. The balance sheets of these banks count for 25 trillion euro in assets and 82% of the banking business done in the euro area. Overall, the ECB issued more than 1.200 supervisory decisions last year; our planning cycle for the first year included more than 8.000 activities.

CONCLUSION Let me conclude. The climate crisis demands urgent collective action to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The world is probably on the cusp of the greatest economic and societal transformation since the Industrial Revolution. The coming green revolution will involve all segments of the economy and society – governments, businesses, and individuals will all need to do their part. Everyone must contribute. Every bit counts. It is in this spirit of collective action that MAS is publishing a sustainability report, to account for what we are doing together with the financial industry, and in our own right, to help remake a greener world and secure a more sustainable future. 8/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  We want to be the change we want to see. 9/9  BIS central bankers' speeches
Competition also facilitates the work on holding back inflation. The EMU has particular importance for the scope of the trade. Many economists have tried to estimate this gain by looking at the way fixed and floating exchanges respectively affect trade, and they have found very little difference. However, a single currency is not the same as a fixed exchange rate. There are considerable practical and psychological differences. Professor Andrew K. Rose at Berkeley in the USA, together with some other economists, has instead compared trade within monetary unions with trade between countries outside of the monetary union, and made adjustments for facts such as monetary unions often sharing the same language, culture and other regulatory frameworks. When Professor Rose presented such a study for Sweden some time ago, he claimed that EMU could increase trade and integration by as much as 30-50 per cent over the course of a few decades. This could lead to an increase in Swedish welfare of over ten per cent in the long term. Rose himself admits that the figures are uncertain and other economists believe in much lower figures for trade gains. So what about the disadvantages? Giving up one’s own currency entails also giving up some of the right to self-determination in economic policy. The instrumental rate would no longer be set in Stockholm, but in Frankfurt and would reflect the economic situation in a large monetary area.

Savings in the USA 12  12  10  10  8  8 6  6 Savings ratio Sparkvot  4  Forecast Prognos  4  2  2  0 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003  0  Source: US Department of Commerce  2. Unemployment in the USA, the euro area, Germany and France 14  14  USA Euroområdet Euro area Germany Tyskland  12  12  Frankrike France  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2 1993  2 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Eurostat, Federal Labor Office, National Employment Office  3. Euro area inflation Percentage 12-month change 3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0 0.5  1.0  HICP  0.5  Underlying inflation (HICP excl. energy and unprocessd food)  0.0  Ap r- 0 0 Ju n00 A ug -0 0 O ct -0 D 0 ec -0 0 Fe b01 Ap r- 0 1 Ju n01 A ug -0 1 O ct -0 D 1 ec -0 1 Fe b02 Ap r- 0 2  0.0  Source: Eurostat  8  BIS Review 37/2002  4. Number of employed in total, excl.
We believe that the numerous reforms enshrined in the medium-term PFM Reform Program, such as strengthening macro-economic forecasting infrastructure, strengthening commitment control, enhancing fiscal transparency and introducing fiscal rules will help prevent potential fiscal slippages and be conducive to further strengthening of fiscal discipline. Continuation of prudent fiscal policy leading to stabilization of the public debt will provide room for prolonged accommodative monetary policy, i.e. keeping the main policy rate at its historically lowest level for an extended period, thus providing further stimulus for economic recovery. This is even of crucial importance considering the implemented exchange rate targeting strategy in our case. Reestablishment of fiscal buffers may be needed in the context of the new forthcoming global cycle of lower liquidity and higher interest rates. In addition, budget forecasts underpinned by sound macro assumptions will be an important input in the medium-term macro-forecasting process of the central bank with positive effects over forecast quality thus further enhancing the quality of the monetary policy decision making. Allow me to take this opportunity to also point out that last year’s monetary policy objectives have been achieved, despite the political uncertainty present at that time. Monetary policy remained accommodative, amid moderate inflation of 1.5% in the first four months of 2018, strong external position and gradual stabilization of market expectation. In March 2018, the main policy rate was reduced to 3%, which is historically lowest level.

That could be due to the fact that the degree of rigidity of the economy would augment in practice under the economic “stress” of the much more rapid changes of their environment. The fact that total factor productivity, which is one of the proxies for the pace of structural transformation over years has dropped from 0.7% before 1995 down to 0.3% 4 after 1995 seems to give some credit to this conjecture. - Finally, let us not forget the demographic change occurring on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, Europe’s long term growth performance has also been constrained by the low rate of population growth and the ageing of its society. Since the mid 1990’s, population in the euro area has been growing at a yearly rate of just 0.4% compared to 1.1% in the US. However, what is worrisome is that at the same time, the gap in population growth has been even larger with regard to growth in the working age population the working age population grew on average by 0.3% per year in the euro area over the period 1996-2006 compared to 1.4% in the US , which manifests that Europe has a more acute problem of population ageing. The need for further structural reforms in Europe This brief assessment of the underlying causes of Europe’s relatively disappointing longerterm growth performance provides a mixed picture of the European economy.
Virtually all of the net credit since the crisis has been from the bond markets and the size of assets under management has increased by 60% to $ trillion. Real markets don’t just happen. They depend on the quality of the market infrastructure. That means hard infrastructure, the plumbing of markets that determines the mechanics of markets; and soft infrastructure, like standards and codes that define how market participants should behave. Robust market infrastructure is a public good. But like many public goods it risks being undersupplied. If taken for granted the infrastructure that supports markets won’t keep pace with their dynamism; just as it failed to do so in the run-up to the crisis. We all have a responsibility to stop this from happening again. That’s why I am delighted that so many people are here today, joining those that have already participated in panels in Manchester and Cambridge. I am also very pleased that we will be hearing from many others who are attending parallel forums in Birmingham and Edinburgh. And that people are already sharing comments, ideas and thoughts on social media. For the first time, people who connect with markets from all sides and in all ways are being brought together. Not just bankers, traders and regulators; but companies, investors, workers, academics, judges, trade unionists and journalists. That’s important. Because we all rely on markets and we are all affected by them. And because everyone who connects with markets can help rebuild the real markets we need.

But I do say that it would be unwise - as some have implied - to set monetary policy on the basis of the worst possible outcome, even if one knew what that would actually mean in policy terms. At the time of our last Inflation Report published in November the MPC's collective view of the most likely outcome for the UK, looking over the next two years, was for growth at around trend with inflation close to target. But we were - and we remain - acutely conscious of the uncertainties and risks around that prospect. And we review the position intensively both at our regular monthly policy meetings and in the context of our quarterly forecasting round. And in that context, I give you my assurance that, despite the fact that we have not changed interest rates now for over a year, we stand ready to do so at any time if and when we see the risks to our central expectation beginning to crystallise in either direction. Mr President, let me conclude by suggesting once again this year that yes, we can keep the UK economy moving forward, but I don't pretend that it will be easy. Sadly I am attending this dinner for the last time as Governor this evening, so I will not be accountable to you for how we get on.
8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  have been able to keep risk weights low, which has meant that they have not had to maintain so much equity. New frameworks are being established on the basis of these insights. Here, I will briefly explain what Basel III – the new regulatory framework for the banks – entails. I will also briefly discuss the thinking behind macroprudential policy, which has become something of an in-word in recent years. Basel III increases demands on the banks The most important areas of the global Basel III Accord deal with the quantitative demands for capital and liquidity being placed on the banks. The banks are to have sufficient equity… As financial crises can lead to considerable losses, the Basel Committee maintains that the banks need substantial resilience. So capital requirements are being increased in Basel III, above all for Common Equity Tier 1.10 The minimum requirement for the banks’ equity is being set at 4.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets – more than double the requirement under Basel II. A capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent, added to a counter-cyclical buffer, has created a stronger shock absorber than previously existed. I will return to the counter-cyclical buffer when I discuss macroprudential policy. The capital adequacy requirement can also be complemented with a pure gross solvency measure, meaning that equity may not fall below 3 per cent of total assets.

In this situation, the Swedish authorities implemented a series of measures:   The Swedish National Debt Office issued extra treasury bills and, in practice, let the banks exchange their mortgage bonds for more liquid government securities.   The government and the Riksdag extended the deposit guarantee and quickly passed laws enabling support to the banking sector.   In addition to the repo rate cuts we implemented, the Riksbank provided liquidity in several ways. We lent money for longer periods, eased the policy for collateral and introduced more counterparties to supply more liquidity to the banking system. We created swap lines with the Federal Reserve and ECB to meet the banking system’s need for foreign currency. We also contributed to crisis management in neighbouring countries by creating swap lines with Iceland, Latvia and Estonia. Finally, we also extended emergency loans to Carnegie and Kaupthing Sverige. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Riksbank no doubt considers that Sweden’s crisis management was successful. And other analysts have also shared this assessment – including, for example, Goodhart and Rochet in their review of the Riksbank’s work carried out last year.2 Unlike other central banks, we have also been able to phase out our crisis measures. The crisis has cost enormous amounts The crisis entailed huge costs, both for society as a whole and for the tax-funded public sector. Andrew Haldane, Executive Director of Financial Stability at the Bank of England, has shown that the crisis cost UK taxpayers just over 1 per cent of GDP.