samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Time and again, the ECB had to act to prevent an unduly sharp fall in  economic activity and head off the risk of deflation. Deflation, which is a widespread and ongoing fall in prices, may lead consumers to postpone spending and firms to slash 3  investment. Both factors lead to a reduction in aggregate demand, lower output, higher unemployment and further downward pressure on prices. This is arguably as dangerous a situation as spiralling inflation. In late 2008, the ECB faced a situation in which firms, households and governments were carrying excessive debt, at the same time as the banks had to reduce their own leverage. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the immediate problem was a shortage of liquidity and the breakdown of the money market. This threatened the health of the euro area economy as a whole, with declining output, rising unemployment and weaker inflationary pressures. In response, between October 2008 and May 2009, the Governing Council  lowered key interest rates by 275 basis points, bringing the rate on the main refinancing operations down to 1.0%. Many of these measures were taken in concert with the major central banks around the world. Under normal economic conditions, such a reduction in short-term interest rates is quickly transmitted to bank lending and deposit rates. In turn, lower interest rates encourage  households and firms to consume and invest more, supporting aggregate demand directly. Moreover, lower interest rates on euro-denominated assets lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate of the euro, stimulating exports.

This brings me to my second proposition. Because of the existence of the zero lower bound, it is far easier for monetary policy to fight inflation by raising interest rates than to combat deflation by lowering them. Although central banks world-wide have used a range of non-standard measures to stimulate economic activity and push inflation up to the target, in practice, this has proven to be extremely difficult. Moreover, as I pointed out earlier, the institutional set-up of the euro area rules out the easiest policy option to raise inflation, namely the monetisation of budget deficits. Furthermore, in the euro area as a whole, monetary policy was, for a long time, “the only 6  game in town”. With many sovereigns weighed down by excessive debt burdens, there was no space for fiscal policy to play its part in supporting monetary policy in stimulating the economy. Rather, in many countries, the necessary focus on austerity measures meant that monetary policy and fiscal policy were operating at cross-purposes. Unfortunately, those euro area countries with space to manoeuvre chose not to do so. To sum up, monetary policy can influence nominal economic variables. In the long run, however, it cannot influence real economic variables, which depend on the economy’s endowments of factors of production and the efficiency with which they combine to produce output. This highlights the importance of structural reforms to ensure that the economy operates as efficiently as possible.
We should then gradually move towards compulsory transparency based on a “comply or explain” principle. Article 173 of the French Energy Transition Law – as it sets the Environmental Social Governance (ESG)-Climate approach as a new market standard – could usefully serve as a reference studied at the European level. 2/ Beyond the "snapshot of risks", the NGFS is working on a "video of risks", with long-term forward-looking stress tests to assess the dynamic effects of climate change on the economy and financial stability. The NGFS is currently developing economic scenarios based on climate change that could be used to conduct stress tests. Meanwhile, the ACPR has conducted a survey on banks and insurance companies to evaluate how they integrate physical and transition risks in their risk management. The results will be published by early 2019. They will be a good point to assess the progress made so far by the industry towards taking both risk factors into account. I would at this stage suggest caution on some NGOs’ analyses concluding that French banks have a “fossil energy bias”. Their large exposures to the oil and gas sector have indeed decreased between 2015 and 2017. This survey will also be valuable as inputs in designing the new framework needed to perform stress-test exercises and assess climate risk across the French financial system as a whole. III. Financing transition opportunities Like any good pilot, we want our plane to “gain some altitude”.

The potential for Islamic banks to progressively chart into this new territory would need to be supported by a state of readiness in terms of the capabilities of the industry to venture into a  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  diversification into such business offerings. In preparing for a business landscape with different complexities, talent development in Islamic finance will need to be accorded with an even greater priority. Existing talent needs to be equipped with the necessary skills to support the expansion into areas of specialisation that include investment intermediation. Stronger knowledge in the value propositions of the investment instruments require a greater understanding on the risks associated with business ventures in the respective growth areas, including in the non-traditional markets. This would require determining the viability of such business and investment proposals. Additionally, at the management level, and the directors and Shariah scholars of Islamic financial institutions need to be adequately equipped with the necessary knowledge so as to have an understanding important for steering the business to the new directions of the industry. To realise the vision of a highly competent and high performing workforce in the Islamic financial sector, of equal importance is the standards of quality of the education programmes in Islamic finance and to raise the level of professionalism of Islamic finance practitioners. The Finance Accreditation Agency, an international and independent quality assurance and accreditation body for the financial services industry that was established in Malaysia in 2012, has raised the bar for Islamic finance talent and professionals.
First, the authorities must become better at gathering and analysing information about conditions in the financial sector and the rest of the world in order to be able to better assess the risks of future crises in the financial system. One of the problems has been that the risks have developed during periods when the financial sector has appeared to be in excellent health, at least on the surface. This points to the importance of two things: We need a more transparent financial sector and we need ongoing research and development work to produce indicators that are better at revealing that systemic risks are developing, as well as other types of analytical tools. However, this is not only about discovering and understanding the risks, it is also about counteracting the development of the risks in a more concrete way. This is why we also need effective corrective tools that enable the authorities to better influence risk behaviour in the financial sector and thus reduce the risk of crises in the future. This includes, for instance, finding ways to ensure that the assessments of the authorities have a sufficient impact on the risk behaviour of the financial players. Apart from effective communication, we also need to think about whether we have the "teeth" needed to put sufficient pressure on the players to make them change their behaviour. For example, the possibility to im-pose an extra capital adequacy requirement on particularly large and complex (and therefore systemically-important) banks has been discussed.

Bartering is a complicated and time-consuming process. Someone who wants to sell an item has to find a buyer who wants that particular item at that particular time. And the buyer must also be able to offer something in exchange that the seller wants. The need for a third item that could serve as an intermediary in the bartering process thus arose at an early stage in the history of civilisation. Metals of various kinds, especially silver and gold, soon acquired a central position as a currency for trade as they are relatively durable and easy to transport and divide. An important step in the development process was taken when people began to use the metals to mint coins. This made it possible to use an authorised stamp that guaranteed that the metal content and weight were correct. The next logical step was taken when people realised they could use pieces of paper to represent the value of a metal coin. In other words, notes that could be exchanged for metal coins on request. This made handling and transportation even easier and worked as long as the public accepted the notes as a means of payment and had confidence in those who issued them. A further stage in the development process was reached when it became possible to issue money without the back-up of reserves in the form, for example, of gold and silver.
Central Bank of Chile September 2019  “From Weakness to Strength: The Journey of the Chilean Financial System and its Next Steps” ChileDay – September 10 and 11th, 2019 – London, England Mario Marcel Governor of the Central Bank of Chile The Chilean financial system has changed notably in the past four decades. While in the early 1980s it was at the center of one of the worse economic and social crises in history, now it is a major source of strength, providing resilience to the economy in the face of external shocks. So, how did this happen? What is the source of such resilience? What new challenges lie ahead? That is the purpose of this presentation. In a nutshell, we can argue that the regulatory changes that followed the crisis set a new framework that, far from preventing financial development facilitated it in a way consistent with economic development. Some key reforms –most notably pension reform—facilitated the emergence of new actors, making the financial sector more diverse, deep and forward-looking. Many pieces of evidence and tests in our semi-annual Financial Stability Report, have demonstrated over recent years that the Chilean financial sector is currently well equipped to face external shocks, providing key support to the flexible exchange rate regime by reducing the exposure of the business and financial sector to FX fluctuations. Similarly, the development of long-term capital markets secure local currency financing to investment projects and to the government itself.

We believe these policy actions, as well as those announced by the Minister of Finance in order to promote Chile as a Regional Financial Center, should greatly contribute to a more resilient financial sector, wider cross-border use of the Chilean Peso and a greater participation of non-residents in our FX market.   The Strategic Planning 2018-2022 of the CBC includes a thorough review of its FX regulation. Current FX regulations require most FX transactions to be executed through the “Formal Exchange Market” —which is comprised by banks and some stockbrokers— and to be reported to the CBC. These two elements have remained largely unchanged since the capital account was opened 20 years ago. Back then, re-imposing capital controls could not be ruled out, and that rationale underlies the somewhat cumbersome structure of the FX regulation. Currently, while capital controls are still part of the regulatory toolbox, re-imposing them could only be considered during an exceptional situation. Therefore, the CBC has decided to streamline its FX regulations and reduce the burden of compliance to the private sector, whenever possible, without affecting the quality of the statistical information or the capacity to act in an extreme scenario. The first part of this process, eliminating some of the existing reporting requirements, is about to be put out for public consultation. Page 13 of 20  Central Bank of Chile September 2019    Modernizing FX transactions goes beyond a review of existing reporting requirements and the structure of the regulation.
As regards the first of these goals, we want to build on the major integration projects that have come before and promote the emergence of European initiatives that can strengthen Europe’s payment market. Right now, just one initiative looks capable of providing a satisfactory response to the challenges: the European Payments Initiative, or EPI. With this initiative now under way, we feel that it is vital for EPI to make good on its promises. On the experimental front, the Banque de France is currently conducting a programme exploring the use of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) to settle interbank transactions, to assess to what extent and under what conditions such a currency could make the settlement of financial-asset transactions safer and more efficient, while at the same time preserving the fundamental role of central bank money in the proper execution of these transactions. The Banque de France is also playing a very active role in the Eurosystem work, under the aegis of the ECB, on a retail digital euro. An ECB report published in October 2020 said that the Eurosystem should get prepared for the swift introduction of a retail digital euro should the need arise. The Eurosystem held a public consultation that closed in late January, attracting over 8,000 responses. The input from this will inform the meticulous examination of the reasons, consequences and prerequisites for the potential introduction of a CBDC that we are conducting.

B. Fostering “co-opetition” between established players and new entrants Innovation is often associated with FinTech firms and challengers, such as the start-ups that build success from an ability to focus their business and cut costs for a specific service or link in the payment chain. Yet commercial banks, which have traditionally been a major force in payments, also play a key role in innovation. Likewise, the main card schemes helped to drive the emergence of new payment methods, such as contactless payments and mobile payment terminals. Through partnerships, acquisitions and incubation projects, but also by harnessing in house R&D, established participants have expanded their service offerings to add new solutions, while developing competition and cooperation with new entrants. “Co-opetition” relationships are a  deep-rooted feature of the payment industry and are proven to generate value. The challenge now is to nurture them over the long run, taking care to ensure that relationships with BigTech firms are included. This is because the potential network effects enjoyed by BigTech payment solutions and the upstream payment chain positions of these firms could create risks of competitive distortion, particularly in situations where these participants also provide hardware or software components. Users could find themselves effectively captives of an ecosystem and left with no choice in terms of payment service, or at least be influenced by BigTech firms to use their services at the expense of competitors.
For instance, the recent Level 3 assessment by CPMI-IOSCO on the implementation of the PFMI5 by ten CCPs (including SGX-DC) helped to identify gaps and shortcomings which CPMI-IOSCO expects to be addressed by the CCPs and their respective regulators by the end of the year. As outstanding issues are addressed and the progress tracked, regulators should also have greater confidence in undertaking their equivalence assessments of CCPs that their domestic market participants can access. This can then provide greater certainty to global market participants. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Improving market access for CCPs Singapore, as with other jurisdictions, will be commencing our clearing mandate next year thereby enhancing the role of CCPs as a risk mitigating tool. However, a clearing mandate cannot be effectively implemented if access to CCP remains an issue for counterparties, particularly smaller players. We share similar concerns to those that have been expressed by ESMA. In this regard, it is noteworthy that ESMA has looked into possible ways to improve CCP access and has, for example, proposed indirect clearing arrangements which strikes a balance between having an appropriate level of indirect client protection and counterparty risk. I hope today’s forum will allow MAS and other regulators to learn from ESMA’s insights. To enable a wider range of market participants – including those based outside Singapore - to have direct access to CCPs in Singapore, MAS will allow our CCPs to introduce self-clearing and remote clearing memberships.

In 2007, GDP growth averaged 3.8%, the result of some easing in domestic demand and an improvement in the contribution of net external demand to output growth. Against this background, the slowing trajectory on which the Spanish economy embarked during 2007 was consistent with the tailing off of some of the impulses behind the buoyancy of spending in previous years, and with the maturing of the business cycle. Undoubtedly, the raising of interest rates by the ECB – from end-2005 to June 2007 – and the increasingly subdued rises in house prices began to temper consumption and residential investment decisions as early as 2006. This gradual loss of momentum in domestic demand continued in 2007, but  BIS Review 44/2008  1  was not reflected on a similar scale by GDP, owing to the offsetting effect of net external demand. Adding to this domestic adjustment dynamic was, from summer 2007, the effect of international financial market instability. This translated into a deterioration in agents' expectations, and made itself felt in some spending components – consumption and, above all, residential investment – as early as late 2007, but more clearly in the opening months of this year. However, the weakening in consumption is based on comparison with the relatively high end2007 figures, with growth close to 3%, held up by the dynamism of disposable income.
Or should we view them as or straws in a wind that will increase in force and respond by strengthening our walls and perhaps leaning a bit in the other direction? Conclusion Journalists frequently ask people in my dismal profession: “What keeps you awake at night?” They do so, of course, not out of interest in the sleeping patterns of central bankers but because they want to know, quite reasonably, what we fear the next disaster, the next great crisis, will be. And, of course, at any given time there are vulnerabilities and unknowns that one is concerned about more than others. 28 According to the FPC core indicator which tracks the mean over the median (that is, the average of the top half of the distribution). It is also true in the sense that the proportion of borrowers with high LTIs and high LTVs have been rising. 29 Leveraged lending typically refers to loans to non-investment grade firms that are highly indebted (debt of more than four times EBITDA) or are owned by a private equity sponsor. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  I might have talked today about the rapid and extensive evolution of market-based finance in recent years such that it now accounts for nearly half of the international financial system. It carries different and perhaps lesser risks than the banking system. But we know much less about how it might respond in stress and have fewer policy tools to address vulnerabilities.

The level of debt, in contrast, seems to matter much less as an indicator of a turn in the financial cycle, though it does seem to matter as an indicator of the extent of the correction and the consequent damage to the economy.24 We also have a wide range of other economic and financial indicators, such as asset prices and credit conditions. We can estimate how far these are above or below an equilibrium value to help us make an assessment of where we are in the financial cycle. And, of course, macroprudential policy makers need to apply their judgment. The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England uses all of these approaches to make its assessment of the level of risk or, to put it another way, where we are in the financial cycle. And we use that assessment to inform our stress test of the core banking system so that the test becomes more severe, with higher losses and greater stress, when we judge the risks in the financial system are getting higher. But we would, in my view, benefit greatly in this area from a better understanding of how the expectations of the future that inform financial sector risk-taking are formed, the ability to use that understanding in modelling the financial cycle and better real-time information on the evolution of expectations.
underestimating the regulatory capital needed further to a calculation using the sophisticated models allowed by Basel II and III. On the more technical side, there appears to be agreement on the definition and calculation of the ratio, the treatment of derivatives and repos, and operations with CCPs. But doubts remain over its final calibration and how it affects certain business models, specifically those most centred on retail activity. The Banco de España has supported the setting of this leverage ratio in Pillar 1 on the understanding that it can be a good prudential tool, once correctly calibrated. In this respect, the monitoring period prior to its entry into force will provide information and experience. Although European regulations envisage that countries may apply this ratio as they deem fit until its harmonisation in 2018, it is not the intention of the Banco de España, in principle, to bring forward its application. As regards liquidity, Basel III has added new regulatory requirements: a short-term liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), and a long-term requirement, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The short-term liquidity coverage ratio is designed so that banks may have an asset buffer with which to meet their maximum foreseeable liquidity or funding needs over a period of at least 30 days. As what is involved is a safety margin, this ratio might at times of stress be below 100% of such maximum foreseeable needs, which is the level demanded once the requirements come fully into force.

Caleb M Fundanga: The importance of multi-cultural awareness and language learning Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia, Lusaka, 22 December 2010. *  *  *  The Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Zambia, H.E Mr. Li Qiangmin The Chairperson – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr Li Tie The Deputy Governor Administration – Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula The Deputy Governor Operations – Dr Austin Mwape The Principal – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr. Tan Haitao Distinguished Teachers from the Chinese International School in Zambia Colleagues from the Bank Members of the Press Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen It gives me great delight, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to this important signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia. The MoU that we are about to sign today provides a framework for the provision of Chinese language lessons to members of staff at the Bank of Zambia. Your Excellency, the Bank of Zambia attaches great importance to the need for staff to learn other international languages. In the process of both economic globalization and diversity of culture, language has become more and more important.