samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this situation the forecasts, including the interest rate forecasts, may be regarded as a wellfounded guess as to which main scenario will receive the support of a majority of the Executive Board members a few weeks later. But there is still a possibility for the Executive board to make changes to the forecasts. The Executive Board can also ask the civil servants to provide further in-depth reports or follow up certain issues. These are then presented 1-2 days later at a follow-up meeting with the Executive Board. Here I would like to take the opportunity to refer to the current round of forecasts. On Monday we will be discussing the Swedish macroeconomic outlook at the second large monetary policy group meeting. This means that we Executive Board members are entering an intense phase of the monetary policy process. The decision-making situation we have had during the spring has on the one hand concerned rising inflation and on the other hand signs of a slowdown in economic activity. In both respects the outcome for Sweden has been slightly worse than we had anticipated in the April Monetary Policy Update. The inflation figure for May was 0.4 percentage points higher than we had forecast in April. A large part of this deviation is due to energy prices having increased more than we had expected. At the same time, growth was lower.

In the case of investments in individual companies, extensive  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  transparency can come into conflict with confidentiality requirements. In order to ensure confidential communication with the governing bodies of the companies in which we have a stake, both parties must be certain that the dialogue is indeed confidential. In 2012, we expanded our collaboration with Norwegian academia. NBIM participated by giving lectures on investment management at several universities and other academic institutions. Our programme, the Norwegian Finance Initiative, has helped support research in financial economics at different levels. This initiative contributes to enhancing the quality of research in financial economics among Norwegian academic institutions and to stimulating public debate on the management of the GPFG. This framework for cooperation is also used within Norges Bank, both in investment management and the development of strategy. Thank you for your attention. I now give the floor to the Chief Executive Officer of NBIM, Yngve Slyngstad. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
At the same time, it is still too early to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of all bank support schemes in improving the longer-term funding of banks and in fostering bank lending to the private sector. The implementation of the bank support schemes has been gradual over the past few months and the evidence is relatively limited. But on one aspect, the facts already speak a clear language: namely that the use of guaranteed debt has been indispensable in providing banks with access to medium and longer-term financing: most –and in some countries even the totality – of the new bank debt issued since October last year has been government guaranteed. Banks should take advantage of the available government support and strengthen their capital buffers, not least with a view to the prospect that the current extraordinary liquidity provision by the ECB will not remain in place indefinitely. This issue relates to the exit strategy to which I will return shortly. The governments’ actions aimed at dealing with the crisis have not been limited to the support of the financial sector. Fiscal stimulus packages across the euro area amount to € billion (1.1% of euro area GDP) this year and a further € billion (0.8%) is planned for  6  BIS Review 65/2009  next year.

It is vital for the sustainability of our economies’ growth performance that this risk should be prevented from materialising. V.  Prospects and exit strategies  What are the prospects for the euro area economy? The latest data show that economic activity contracted sharply by 2.5% in the first quarter of 2009, following a 1.6% decline in the fourth quarter of 2008, and confirm that the pace of economic activity in the first half of 2009 will be much weaker than projected by the ECB staff in March. For the second quarter of this year, however, we expect that the contraction in GDP growth will be less pronounced than in the first quarter. Over the past few weeks, survey data, including indicators of consumer and business confidence, in the euro area and other parts of the world suggest that the pace of decline in economic activity is moderating and that the euro area economy is stabilising. Although economic activity is likely to remain very weak for the remainder of this year – and this is consistent with the level of survey indicators – overall the available information confirms our expectation that the euro area economy will gradually recover in the course of 2010. Needless to say, the emerging encouraging signs leave no room for complacency in view of several risks that lie ahead and the continued high uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook. As central bankers, our core concern is, of course, inflation.
Figure 12 Bank credit to non-financial companies (index, January 2020=100)  120  120  Brazil U.S.  115  115  Colombia  France  110  110  Chile Germany  105  105  Canada  Australia  100  100 01 20  03 Mar. 05 May. Souces: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. Page 15 of 19  07 Jul. 09Sep. Figure 13 Growth in 2020-2021, selected economies (annual change, percent)  15  2020  2021  15  2020-2021 average (*)  -15  -15  Argentina  Norway  -10 S. Africa  -10 Canada  -5  N. Zealand  -5  Australia  0  Peru  0  Colombia  5  Mexico  5  Brazil  10  Chile  10  (*) Chile statistic calculated as the average between the mid point of the growth range forecast for 2020 and 2021. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Consensus Forecasts. Figure 14 Real GDP (billions of CLP, volumes at spliced chained year-before prices)  180  180 Sep.19 Report  170 160  170 160  Effective  150  150 Dec.20 Report  140  140  130 13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20(f)  21(f)  130 22(f)  (f) Forecast. Considers the mid point of growth forecast ranges contained in respective MP Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Source: Central Bank of Chile. Page 11 of 19  Jul.20  Figure 5 Households' consumption (annual change, percent)  30  30  20 10  Durable goods  Services  0  20 10 0  Non-durable goods  -10  -10  -20  -20  -30  -30  -40  -40 17  18  19  20  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 6 Inflation indicators (annual change, percent)  6  6 Goods w/o volatile items  6  5  5  4  4  4  3  3  3  2  2  2  1  1  0  0  5  Services w/o volatile items  1 0 19  Jul. 20  Jul. 6 Last MP Report  5 4  CPI  3 2  CPI w/o volatile items  1 0  16  17  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
There are now no more “Banking” or “Note Issuing” departments as first so clearly expounded in Bagehot’s “Lombard Street” written in 1873. It is sad when one has to move away from what has become an institution of central banking, but we have to move with the time, as so many central banks have had to do in the past decade. Work on reorganising the management side is now fully complete and we are working on reorganising the departments and its work system which will take about another two years. We have of course over the last two years been developing control over the money market. Developing the debt market and improving our supervision examination capabilities. We can truly say that we have very good information in the form of database daily on the money markets in the country and have developed the instrument to fairly effectively control offshore activities. In terms of the debt market, we have developed a government bond market and a yield curve, and our next move is in the area of the private sector debt instruments which we have formally formulated into project, using A T Kearney’s methodology to execute our plan. In the area of examination and supervision, we have now finalised a system where we train and with the assistance of outside authorities certify our supervisors to be of high and uniform-standard apart from changing the method of supervision from individual-based to one of approval-by-peer-groups comprising a supervision and examination committee inside the central bank.

Are we now in such a state that by helping the rich, the people who have money to invest, and the people who have businesses to manage makes sense - can the trickle down effect be the best way to get the poor richer. We are on the verge where free competition would mean that everybody would do better. Give everybody equal chance in business and clear and known rules. Ensure the poor would be able to compete by giving them a good education such as the new 12-year compulsory free education under the new Constitution. Making sure that the poor have a reasonable chance to compete rather than stopping the rich from competing might well be the best strategy in the country where economy has taken off and will not look back and go back into the feudal age. That is a major question facing all of us who wish well for Thailand and weigh heavily as a consideration on every action that we take. Let me end my statement by talking about something much nearer to the immediate pace of the recovery. The amorphous leadership is dragging us, but every moment we are climbing resolutely out of the morass, and soon I could see the day when NPLs, although still there, would form only a small portion of the total economy, and Thailand could raise its head once more as a leading country and hopefully not repeat its mistake of overconfidence, caprice and greed.
Clarity of responsibility is I hope unobjectionable. But this is not clarity in the sense of facilitating witch hunts. Rather, I see clarity as an appropriate allocation of responsibility, as important to creating the right incentives for behaviour and leadership, and of course in areas like remuneration. In the Senior Managers Regime, responsibility at the highest level covers both executives and non-executives. But, of course, they are different and always will be. There is much commentary, that the response to the crisis has muddied the responsibilities of executives and non-executives, with the burden on the latter increasing. I think there is no doubt that a greater formality is emerging around roles and responsibilities, and I’m afraid the burden of work for non-executives has risen, we can’t hide from that. An effective board is at the heart of good governance, ensuring that the appropriate policies are in place in respect of safety and soundness and good conduct. We at the PRA have a strong interest in supporting good governance and the work of board members to deliver it. An effective board is one which understands the business, establishes a clear strategy, articulates a clear risk appetite to support that strategy, oversees an effective risk control framework, and collectively has the skills, the experience and the confidence to hold executive management rigorously to account for delivering that strategy and managing within that risk appetite.

In this regard and despite recent criticism, inflation targeting continues to be the most appropriate monetary regime to coordinate inflation expectations in both mature and emerging economies, not only providing transparency but also taking due consideration of time lags and uncertainties in the process of monetary policy implementation. In fact, the combination of short-term flexibility with the permanent commitment to price stability embedded in the framework makes it particularly suitable to the current environment. While disinflation will possibly be fast in mature economies, creating adequate conditions for monetary counter-cyclical actions in different countries, in emerging economies disinflation will probably be slower, particularly where the authorities have not prevented inflation from escalating recently, or where they did not retain a vigilant attitude. In any case, inflation targeting is the most suited framework to coordinate the public’s inflation expectations, particularly in an environment marked by growing uncertainty. BIS Review 147/2008  3
The only exception is that the steady state three-year growth rate of real credit is set to 15% (𝜙0 = 0.15) in order to reflect the fact that global credit growth has been slower and less volatile than that of the UK in the data. For simplicity, 𝜁 is set to 0. The two country model also has additional variables capturing the effect of foreign banks’ lending in the domestic economy, and the effect of global credit growth on the domestic crisis probability. The effect of global credit growth on the domestic crisis probability is set equal to that of home credit growth ℎ𝐵∗ =ℎ𝐵 , broadly consistent with the result in appendix 1 that a 1 standard deviation change in either has a similar effect. The constant term is also adjusted so that, at steady state rates of credit growth, it is equal to the same value as in appendix 2. In the model variant with full reciprocity, 𝜙𝑠𝐹 = 𝜙𝑠𝐻 = −6, implying that there is no leakage of credit growth when the CCyB is tightened, so that it is equally effective at tempering credit extended domestically by home or foreign banks. In addition, 𝑘1 = 𝑘1𝐻 = 𝑘1𝐹 , so that the effective setting of the CCyB is equal to the setting that the national policymaker chooses (𝑘1𝐻 ). In this case the value of 𝑓 has no bearing on financial stability.

Chart 7: Mutual fund flows to emerging economies seem particularly prone to abrupt stops Gross mutual fund flows (per cent of GDP) during surges and stops in capital flows Advanced Economies  Emerging Economies  Sources: Hoggarth et al (forthcoming), EPFR, IMF World Economic Outlook and Bank of England calculations. Notes: EPFR Global defines institutional investor funds as funds targeting institutional investors only or those with the minimum amount of $ per account. All other funds are labelled ‘retail’. Chart 8 Market-based finance can worsen the trade-off between higher output growth and lower probability of a crisis  Source: Aikman et al (forthcoming). Chart shows the menu of choices available to the policymaker in the market-based finance model described in the appendix in response to a 15pp increase in 3-year real credit growth. The y-axis shows the period 1 welfare cost in the model from higher inflation and lower GDP, converted into the equivalent average loss in 3-year GDP that would leave the policymaker indifferent, were inflation to remain unchanged. Thing Global, Act Local  Speech given by Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking On the 24th October 2016 At the joint Bank of England, IMF & Hong Kong Monetary Authority conference on  Monetary, Financial and Prudential Policy Interactions in the Post-Crisis World, Hong Kong
Weaker growth implies a diminishing risk of inflationary impulses from demand, which normally warrants a less restrictive monetary stance. Conversely, demand that is excessively strong in relation to potential output implies a risk of rising inflation and a need to raise the repo rate. The current discussion seems to be about whether the Riksbank acts symmetrically. In other words, is the Riksbank as concerned about under-shooting the inflation target as it is about preventing inflation from exceeding the target? My answer to that question is definitely “Yes”. The Riksbank aims to keep the rate of inflation at 2 per cent, neither more nor less. The issue of monetary policy asymmetry seems to be linked mainly to two matters. One is the question of monetary policy’s central concern. Is this inflation’s prevailing rate or the rate that assessments point to one to two years ahead? The answer is that the Riksbank is guided by the assessment of future inflation. If inflation is currently running at 2 per cent and the predicted rate (based on an unchanged instrumental rate) one to two years ahead is, say, 1 per cent, then the instrumental rate should be lowered. The reason for this is quite simply that monetary policy acts with a time lag of one to two years. Using the prevailing rate of inflation as a guide would involve adjusting the instrumental rate more frequently and markedly, thereby entailing undesirable economic instability. But how can we be sure that the assessments are always correct? Of course we cannot.

To me, Raeburn’s work provides a fitting visual metaphor for the ideal countenance of a central banker: The Reverend Walker skating forward confidently and with grace upon a notably uneven, rocky surface on an icy, dark, blustery day. An alternative depiction is Edvard Munch’s The Scream from Norway’s Gunderson Collection, now on temporary exhibit at the National Gallery. (There are four versions of this pastel, one of which recently sold for $ million at auction at Sotheby’s. If you haven’t been into Edinburgh to see the Gunderson version, I am sure you read about Sotheby’s record-setting auction.) 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In sharp contrast to Raeburn’s painting of composure, The Scream depicts a panicked form. In an autobiographical epigraph, Munch wrote that he conceived of the painting after a period of exhaustion and despair: “I stopped and leaned against the balustrade, almost dead with fatigue. Above the blue-black fjord hung the clouds, red as blood and tongues of fire. My friends had left me, and alone, trembling with anguish, I became aware of the vast, infinite cry of nature”.1  I am going to conclude by suggesting that the image that best behooves central bankers as guardians of financial stability and agents of economic potential is that of Henry Raeburn’s Reverend Walker. To be sure, central bankers everywhere are fatigued and exhausted and increasingly friendless.
In December last year, the SNB decided for the first time to charge negative interest (–0.25%) on banks’ and other financial market participants’ sight deposits at the SNB. On 15 January – concurrently with the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate – we lowered the interest rate again, this time to –0.75%. This marked interest rate reduction was intended to cushion the blow of Swiss franc appreciation and to counter a tightening of monetary conditions, by making it significantly more expensive to hold Swiss francs compared to other currencies. Negative interest rates have stimulated a lively public debate. This is hardly surprising given that, in this form, such an instrument is something of a novelty that only a few central banks have deployed. 2 Apart from the SNB, the National Bank of Denmark, Sweden’s Riksbank  2  Switzerland has seen negative interest rates before: in the 1970s, negative interest was briefly charged in the form of commission on foreign funds held at commercial banks. In contrast to that period, today’s negative interest rate affects all sight deposits held at the SNB by banks and other financial market participants. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and the European Central Bank have made use of negative interest rates to date. Experience with this instrument is thus relatively limited. Today, two months after negative interest rates were introduced, we can see that the measure is working and having the desired effect on the money and capital markets.

Negative interest is intended to make it less attractive to hold large amounts of liquidity in Swiss francs. It is thus logical from a monetary policy perspective that banks which hold large quantities of Swiss franc liquidity relative to the size of their balance sheets should shoulder a heavier burden. As already mentioned, the introduction of negative interest rates on sight deposits at the SNB has also caused longer-term interest rates to fall. And yet, we have been living through a period of exceptionally low interest rates for around six years already, with even long-term investments bearing virtually no interest. The Swiss are a nation of savers and many people are concerned about low interest rates. I understand this, however we should not forget that what really counts for savers is not the nominal but the real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) interest rate. For some time now, inflation has been very low and now it is even negative. If inflation is negative, the real interest rate is higher than the nominal interest rate. As chart 5 shows, there have often been periods in the past when real interest rates were even lower than they are today. During this challenging phase for the Swiss economy, it is important that the negative interest rate be allowed to take effect and help to bring about a weakening of the Swiss franc. Efforts to circumvent negative interest rates by obtaining exemptions or shifting to cash are not in the interests of Switzerland as a whole in the current climate.
Rose’s (2009) more recent meta-analysis also finds a significant effect of trade on the synchronisation of business cycles. De Grauwe (2000) provides a discussion of how closer integration may affect the likelihood that countries experience asymmetric shocks. On the one hand closer trade links could result in greater specialisation, leaving currency union members more prone to asymmetric shocks. On the other, it could result in more intra-industry trade, increasing the likelihood that countries will experience similar shocks, and thereby helping to align business cycles. 17  4  A high degree of openness also means that the adjustment required to boost net exports is somewhat lower. A much weaker adjustment in prices and wages is necessary to raise net exports by a given share of GDP if both exports and imports are a large share of GDP than if they are a small share, Krugman (1992). However Adrian and Gros (2004) observe that open economies are correspondingly more vulnerable to external shocks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Scotland and the rest of the UK are highly integrated. 70% of Scottish exports are destined for, and 74% of imports into Scotland come from, the rest of the UK (table 3). A word of caution applies here. There is a body of evidence that national borders can influence trade flows, even between otherwise highly integrated economies.18 The high degree of integration between Scotland and the rest of the UK may in part depend on their being part of the same sovereign nation.

There are several key benefits of issuing the Islamic Monetary Notes under this structure. It provides Islamic financial institutions an additional instrument to manage liquidity risk on a short-term basis. It is also a financial instrument whose structure has been widely used for retail banking and syndication products in the Middle East. Finally, it provides an opportunity for new investors to invest in Islamic financial papers in the Malaysian market, thus diversifying the investor base. As part of the initiative to be linked to the global Islamic financial markets, this instrument will be promoted to the international financial market. Islamic Derivative Master Agreement (IDMA) Recognising the importance to develop Islamic hedging products for Islamic financial market to mitigate investment risks, Malaysia has introduced the first global Islamic Derivative master agreement to document Islamic derivative transactions. The effort is initiated by Bank Negara Malaysia and driven by the financial industry via the Persatuan Pasaran Kewangan Malaysia. The implementation of the agreement is expected to improve the risk management practices, balance sheet management, increase fund mobilisation efficiency and enhance their investment banking capability of the Islamic banking institutions. With the introduction of IDMA, the rights and obligations of contracting parties are clearly stated, thus creating an environment that is more transparent. As IDMA also incorporates best practices in market conduct, this document serves as an important catalyst for the future linkages between financial markets that offer Islamic financial market instruments.