We will always face inappropriate behaviour, but we are confident that Malta’s financial system can withstand the shocks generated by such behaviour, given constant vigilance. Precisely because the economy is everybody’s business, it is in everybody’s business that we do not underestimate the critical importance of the technical competences required to understand and manage the challenges and opportunities that change inevitably implies. It is an aspect of  contemporary reality where words matter, where words are performative, where they have practical consequences, where – therefore – it is critical that we know what we are talking about. In this address today, my colleagues and I have highlighted some of the issues we face as we deal with change within our remit and within perspective of our main institutional objective, namely to maintain price stability within the framework of our enthusiastically committed membership of the Eurosystem and our participation in the formulation and implementation of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Central Bank of Malta’s Mission Statement, declares that amongst our institutional obligations, we must “contribute effectively to the stability of the financial system by identifying and assessing systemic risks and imbalances, and making the appropriate policy recommendations”, and that “we must formulate and implement a macro-prudential policy to fulfil the tasks of the Bank as the national macro-prudential authority”. We will continue to do so with all the energy, consistency and competence required. Page | 11

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