samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The debt ceiling may be well-intentioned and put in place to protect our children from our own and prior generations’ excesses, but it has been completely ineffectual in stopping rising debt and may be contributing to the uncertainty that is holding up the recovery. U.S. debt held by the public has ballooned to 76 percent of GDP, up from 36 percent in 2007. The U.S. is nearing debt-to-GDP ratios not seen since the aftermath of World War II. In contrast, Mexico’s debt is relatively small, about 30 percent of GDP, although it too has increased, and is up from 20 percent in 2007. Here in Mexico as in the U.S., the recession worsened the fiscal situation by depressing tax revenues while spending rose. That said, the nations’ trajectories are quite different. While the growth of U.S. government debt has temporarily slowed, longer-term factors are expected to push the debt-to-GDP ratio to 100 percent by 2038 from where it will likely continue rising. Mexico’s debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to fall once the recently passed fiscal reform is fully implemented. This era of unprecedented liquidity and low interest rates has presented the U.S. with at least three great opportunities: One was to address the long-term fiscal outlook by reforming entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare. We must create a balanced system that will prevent future liabilities from spiraling out of control.

Between France and Singapore, economic and trade ties are deep and growing. In 2008, total trade between France and Singapore stood at more than eight billion Euros, making Singapore the third largest Asian export market for France, after China and Japan. France, on the other hand, is the sixth largest European investor in Singapore. Some 800 French companies from a wide range of industries including petrochemicals, electronics, telecommunications, aerospace, biomedical sciences, education, and luxury goods are located in Singapore. BIS Review 133/2009  3  French financial institutions have a significant presence here. BNP Paribas is one of Singapore’s earlier Qualifying Full Banks. SocGen celebrated its 30th anniversary in Singapore recently. Credit Agricole would count as the oldest French bank in Singapore, through its acquisition of Indosuez which was set up more than a hundred years ago in Singapore in 1905. Natexis has been here for 27 years, while CIC just celebrated its 25th anniversary in Singapore this year. These institutions carry out significant banking and fund management activities here. There are also insurance firms like AXA with a major presence in Singapore. We appreciate the contribution of French financial institutions. Mr Claude Bebear, Honorary Chairman of AXA, was recently awarded the Public Service Star (Distinguished Friends of Singapore) Medal during our 44th National Day celebration. Mr Bebear is the first representative of the financial sector to receive such an award. This is a special award that recognizes individuals who have contributed significantly to Singapore in business, industry, technology and science.
Central banks are also state institutions, but with greater functional independence provided for in the respective statutes due to its specific nature of operations involving printing of money and conducting monetary policies. The simple reason for the central bank independence is that a Government cannot have one hand to spend through the fiscal policy and other hand to print money to finance expenditure through the monetary policy. Therefore, the clear separation between the Treasury and Central Bank is necessary, otherwise, economies and monetary systems will collapse sooner or later. Therefore, the Central Bank independence and the close co-operation between the Central Bank and the Treasury are highly recognized. I wish to quote from the Exter Report on this matter as the best piece of literature. I quote “….There are, however, many important problems of monetary policy, especially those relating to fiscal policy, on which a central bank must necessarily work in close harmony with the government. On such problems, experience in many countries has shown that a central bank with a degree of independence of the government proper can make economic analyses and hold views which are more detached and objective than those of a government department. Many governments have learned to value and to use the sort of independent and objective advice on monetary and other aspects of economic policy which central banks have been able to give.

Rising commodity prices and buoyant activity in markets that are important for Norway have fuelled growth in the Norwegian economy. We assume that the upturn will continue for our trading partners as a whole. Growth is projected to be somewhat stronger in 2006 than in 2005. Nevertheless, there will still be idle resources, especially in a number of European countries, implying continued low inflation. In recent years, investment in the petroleum sector has increased sharply. Investment growth has generated substantial impulses to the mainland economy. The large development projects relating to Snøhvit outside of Hammerfest and Ormen Lange at Aukra have made a large contribution to the high level of investment. Both these projects also involve considerable onshore development, which may have generated stronger impulses to the business sector locally than pure offshore projects. Investment activity associated with Snøhvit and Ormen Lange will probably decline in the period to completion in 2007. High oil prices have led to a strong increase in activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. Many projects have been launched to increase recovery from fields in operation. A number of oil companies have revised upwards the long-term oil prices that are used as a basis for investment decisions, although they are still moderate compared with futures prices. Further out in the projection period, developments in petroleum-related investment are highly uncertain.
But much has changed in just the past six years as well The fact that the Riksbank and its activities looked quite different the second time I started work there, in 2007 as newly-appointed member of the Executive Board, is not particularly strange. After all, more than twenty years had passed. What is perhaps more surprising is that so much has changed during the past six years. The changes this time do not concern how the work at the Riksbank is conducted, but rather how monetary policy and the role of central banks are viewed in the international debate. Many of the questions to which we previously assumed we had fairly obvious answers have once again appeared on the agenda and are now being keenly discussed. This was not something I had expected and is a pretty good example of how easy it is to take the prevailing situation for granted. The main catalyst for the discussion has, of course, been the global financial crisis that broke out in autumn 2008 and its consequences, which we are in many ways still dealing with. Put simply, one might describe the predominant view prior to the crisis as follows. International economic developments had been favourable over a fairly long period of time. Following the crisis that hit Sweden and some other countries at the beginning of the 1990s, inflation had on the whole been low and stable, while growth had been good and there had been only minor cyclical fluctuations.

As Adam Posen said: “People cannot observe nominal GDP when they go to the store”.16 Of course they cannot observe inflation either, but they nevertheless often have an idea of how prices are developing and can base their expectations on that. The product of real GDP and the GDP deflator will reasonably be somewhat more abstract to relate to. I think that this also sows doubt regarding the possibility to get a target for nominal GDP to really work as a nominal anchor in the way that the inflation target undoubtedly has. It may also be worth bearing in mind that the global financial crisis entailed a shock of a size and dimension that has rarely been seen. Rather than interpreting the slow recovery as a failure for monetary policy, perhaps one should see it as a situation where the shock was so powerful that it would have been difficult for monetary policy to manage it in a different and better way, regardless of what forms the policy had been conducted under and what it had  14  See, for example, Goodhart, Baker and Ashworth (2013), Gerlach (2013) and Posen (2013) for a more detailed description of the arguments against introducing a target for nominal GDP. 15  See also, for example, Bean (2013) and Posen (2013). 16  Posen (2013), p. 62.
The outcome had not been published at the time of the monetary policy meeting, but it was largely as expected. Households in the euro area appear to have been very restrictive with their consumption expenditure. Retail trade turnover fell at the end of last year and it is also possible to discern from survey data that household confidence has declined. As in the United States, more prolonged problems in the financial markets can lead to developments being weaker than in the main scenario. My view in February of developments in Sweden Inflation has gradually risen in Sweden in recent years. On average, measured in terms of the CPI, inflation was 2.2 per cent last year, which is close to the inflation target. The upswing in inflation was partly due to resource utilisation in the economy having increased and cost pressures having risen. Hourly wages increased more rapidly than before at the same time as productivity growth slackened considerably. Inflation has been very low for several years, but in 2007 rising cost pressures were a factor that contributed to inflation reaching the target. Underlying inflation, measured in terms of the CPIX, was however 1.2 per cent as an average for 2007. During the autumn of last year inflation rose very quickly and, measured in terms of the CPI, reached 3.5 per cent in December. Underlying inflation, measured in terms of the CPIX, rose to 2 per cent in December.

I am pleased to announce that MAS will roll over the unutilised portion and augment it with additional funds to make a fresh commitment of $ million for the next 3 years under FSTI 2.0. Let me share with you three key enhancements under FSTI 2.0, taking onboard industry feedback  First, FSTI 2.0 will encourage the expansion of the existing innovation labs and further develop Singaporean talent in FinTech and innovation. The Innovation Lab Grant under FSTI 2.0 will co-fund 50% of the salaries of incremental Singaporean hires for a period of 2 years. Second, FSTI 2.0 will encourage more experimentation and early-stage development of novel solutions in the industry by enhancing the POC Grant. We will double the funding cap of the POC Grant from $ to $ This will support POCs that are larger in scale and more complex in nature. We will also introduce a merit-based tiered funding approach. If your proposal manages to secure unanimous votes from the evaluation panel, you will have access to 70% funding support, up to a quantum cap of $ This is enhanced from current FSTI parameters of 50% funding support, up to a quantum cap of $  Third, FSTI 2.0 will seek to accelerate large-scale adoption of AI solutions in the financial industry while supporting workers through the transformation brought about by AI. We will increase the maximum funding quantum for the AIDA Grant from $ million to $ million per AI project.
Page 4/10  supervisory measures taken in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the capital buffers and liquidity positions of most banks have improved in recent years. Let me conclude this section with two observations. First, crisis resilience requires more than good crisis management skills. Fending off a crisis depends not only on what policymakers do once the crisis has erupted. It also hinges on what has been done to render the financial system as a whole more resilient ahead of a new shock. Second, policy coordination and cohesion matter. Although the SNB has reaffirmed its important role as a crisis manager, monetary policy alone is not a panacea. We mentioned earlier the powerful effect of the concerted efforts of central banks to calm financial markets and instil confidence. The same is true at the national level. The unique nature of the COVID-19 crisis required an unprecedented combination of fiscal and monetary policy. Fiscal policy directly supported households’ and firms’ incomes, while monetary policy supported bank credit provisioning and dealt effectively with the risk of financial market turmoil. The two policy areas complemented each other while remaining within their respective remits. So far, we have discussed how the COVID-19 pandemic shock prompted the SNB to react with a set of timely and targeted policy responses. Let us now turn our attention to a different facet of the COVID-19 pandemic, namely, how it has catalysed digitalisation and what the implications of this development might be for the SNB.

Chairperson, allow me to share with you some of the key regulatory and supervisory issues that the Bank of Zambia is addressing with regards to the regulation of the financial system in Zambia and the need to address the supervisory challenges posed by the global financial crisis. These issues include: the adoption of a risk based supervision (RBS), enhancing the legislative framework, the determination of capital adequacy, the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme, the enhancement of our lender of last resort regime, and the enhancement of cross-border cooperation through consolidated supervision of financial institutions. Risk based supervision is a structured, forward-looking process designed to identify key risk factors to which individual banks are exposed. This approach entails closer interaction with banks and allows early identification of risks as well as close monitoring of the nature and direction of risks as they emerge. The banking industry has recorded notable rapid growth in the last ten years. This growth comes with heightened risk levels. The RBS provides robust mechanisms to ensure that banks have adequate risk management systems to mitigate risks. RBS systematically considers all key functional activities (business lines and operational areas) and, within each key functional area, evaluates the level of risk, quality of risk management, and direction of risk. The resulting risk profile of the bank, which is dynamic, will therefore change during the supervisory cycle. This paradigm shift in supervisory approaches requires a permissive legal and regulatory framework.
We must replicate the sprint success of Wells over longer distances, taking our lead from Scotland’s Liz McColgan, who memorably won gold in the 10,000 metres last time the Games were held in Scotland, before going on to win the New York, Tokyo and London marathons. To understand how we – and by “we” I mean the UK, the Commonwealth and the world – can win the economic marathon, I want to draw on three less athletic, but nevertheless great, Scots, each of whom points us to an essential ingredient of economic success: the right policy framework; an open trading system; and fair and effective financial markets. In all these respects, the UK is leading the way. The right policy framework The UK’s current policy framework has its origins in the work of William Paterson of Skipmyre, Dumfriesshire. More than three centuries ago Paterson proposed the establishment of the Bank of England to “promote the publick Good and Benefit of our People…” 1 At that time the public good meant financing a war with France. Over the ensuing centuries, as objectives evolved, Paterson’s bank would have many guises including government banker, lender of last resort, bank supervisor and monetary authority. Today, having learned the lessons of the crisis, we understand that the Bank of England can best serve the public good by maintaining monetary and financial stability. Let me briefly explain how we are pursuing those objectives which are building blocks of a balanced and sustainable expansion.

Mr. Yam gives a keynote address on the Hong Kong dollar link Keynote address by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr. Joseph Yam, at the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Financial Roadshow in Tokyo on 3/3/98. Introduction 1. I am honoured to be delivering the keynote address of this Financial Roadshow of Hong Kong. I shall, as you are aware, be talking about the Hong Kong dollar link. The Hong Kong dollar has been linked to the US dollar at a fixed exchange rate since October 1983. Notwithstanding what must be the worst financial turmoil in the history of Asia in recent months, and an abundance of events which might have undermined confidence on the Hong Kong dollar in the past fourteen and a half years of the existence of the fixed link, the exchange rate has remained very stable. Indeed, the Hong Kong dollar is one of the two major currencies in the Asian region that have not been affected by the recent tidal wave of devaluations, the other being the renminbi (RMB) of the Mainland of China. Furthermore, it is the only freely convertible currency in the region that has survived the turmoil unscathed. 2. There has been much scepticism expressed on the Hong Kong dollar’s link with the US dollar over the years and in particular in the past few months when one after another the Asian currencies tumbled.
Irma Rosenberg: Current monetary policy – a difficult balancing act Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Nordea, Stockholm, 11 March 2008. *  *  *  At the monetary policy meeting on 12 February the Riksbank decided to raise the repo rate by 0.25 percentage points to 4.25 per cent. I entered a reservation against the decision and considered that the repo rate should be left unchanged. However, it was far from a clear stance. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to explain my reasoning more clearly and the considerations monetary policy has to take into account. I will also comment on some of the statistics received since the monetary policy meeting. In this context it feels natural to briefly comment on some of the criticism we have received, namely that the Riksbank has been altogether too silent about how we view economic developments. It is possible that during the autumn, at the beginning of the financial turmoil, we underestimated the need for the Executive Board members to comment on the developments we see around us. It is also possible that we more generally underestimated the need, even in less turbulent times, to discuss our latest assessment and to relate it to the new statistics received since the most recent monetary policy meeting. All this, that is, our published forecasts and new outcomes, is public information and this link can be made by all those who follow our work.

All in all, activity in the Swedish economy during the final quarter last year appears to have been slightly higher than we expected in February. Productivity on the other hand showed weaker development than in the assessment in the Report. Survey data clearly suggests  4  BIS Review 30/2008  however that a slowdown is occurring in most parts of the business sector and that the increase in the demand for labour is on the point of slowing. The turmoil has once again increased in the financial markets around the world. This suggests that these are complicated processes that can be protracted. The so-called TED spreads, which is the spread between interbank rates and T-bill rates, have risen once more, above all in the United States but even in Sweden and the United Kingdom. Credit spreads are still high. In recent days the spreads on the mortgage market in Sweden have increased. This is linked to the unrest on the mortgage markets in a few other European countries. Credit insurance premiums have risen recently both in the United States and Europe. New reports about losses related to the US subprime sector are being received. Share prices in Europe and the United States have fluctuated somewhat, but are at present somewhat lower than at the time of the monetary policy meeting. The krona has strengthened somewhat, especially against the US dollar.
The appropriate response for us in setting interest rates, therefore, is to try to stay in step and keep pace - not running ahead, but equally not lagging behind. BIS Review 22/2001  3  The third and final area of uncertainty I want to focus on is the underlying strength of demand in the UK economy. The US slowdown may, as I have said, have some dampening effect on other countries, including the UK. The supply-side improvements I have described may enhance our growth capacity. Both these factors could provide grounds for the monetary stance to provide more stimulus to the economy, depending on how events develop. But a third area of uncertainty - the underlying strength of demand in the UK - could point to less need for stimulus. Consumer spending may be slowing somewhat, but it remains relatively buoyant. Retail sales continue to grow and housing market activity may be picking up. Consumer and business confidence remains steady, with new orders holding up well. The easing in sterling has improved our competitiveness in key export markets. Business investment is picking up. The planned increases in government spending are beginning to come through. Employment remains high and earnings are showing signs of some upwards creep as businesses experience skill shortages. All of this is welcome evidence of a healthy and thriving economy, and, with inflation remaining low, it is a performance that can be sustained without immediate risk of overheating.

An improvement in the balance of the economy was also achieved last year from another source - a welcome easing in the strength of sterling which itself had been a reflection of the persistent weakness of the euro. As the euro has recovered somewhat over the past year, and sterling has moved back from its peak levels, this has, at least in degree, eased some of the pressures faced by exporters and by businesses most exposed to import competition. The result is a better balance between the externally-exposed sectors of the economy and domestically-orientated businesses, between manufacturing and services, and between different regions of the country. Two other clouds that had threatened the sustainability of our growth performance also receded somewhat last year. One was the impact throughout the economy emanating from the steep rise in oil prices, which abated as oil prices fell back from their peak levels. The other concern was that share prices had risen to levels which many felt were not sustainable in terms of reasonable expectations of future corporate profits. The fall in share prices during last year was not a comfortable experience falling asset prices rarely are - but it removed some of the sense of unreality.