samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, with the growing international exchange in almost every economic domain, maintaining taxes in Sweden at a higher  3  BIS Review 77/1999  level than in the rest of the world will become increasingly difficult. But there is reason to deliberate the type of tax cuts that would benefit the Swedish economy most in connection with good growth. Tax reductions with positive supply-side effects — instead of the cuts being discussed, which mainly stimulate demand — would increase the possibilities of combining the good growth with persistently low inflation. Tax and expenditure ratios in 1998 Per cent of GDP 70  70 Tax ratio Expenditure ratio  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0 Sweden  Euro-10*  * Euro-11 excluding Luxembourg  Källor: Europakommissionen och KI  Interaction with labour market trends Let me now leave monetary policy’s interaction with fiscal policy and consider its relationship with the situation in the labour market. What forms does this interaction take? Monetary policy’s chief contribution to employment lies in the creation of economic stability and clear rules for wage formation. A monetary policy that is predictable and operates with a clear inflation target provides good guidance for wage negotiations. The lack of a properly functioning stabilisation policy was presumably one reason why wage formation did not work in the 1970s and 1980s. The rules of the game were unclear to the labour market organisations.

Petar Goshev: Central banking in Macedonia – a brief review of the first 60 years Welcome speech by Mr Petar Goshev, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the opening ceremony of the 60th anniversary of central banking in the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 20 October 2006. *  *  *  Honorable President of the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, Honorable President of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Ljubisha Georgievski, Honorable President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Nikola Gruevski, Honorable former President of the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Kiro Gligorov, Honorable Ministers former and present, Distinguished representatives of the judicial, public and cultural institutions of the Republic of Macedonia, Your Excellencies, Distinguished leaders of religious communities' Honorable Mayor of the City of Skopje, Dear colleagues, leaders of the banking and business community, Dear friends from other countries, colleagues governors, representatives of central banks and other international financial institutions, present here tonight from four continents, dear Malcolm Knight, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish you all the warmest welcome to this event, that is so important to all of us! On October 19, 1946, on the basis of a "Decree for merging of public sector credit enterprises", of the federal state of that time, and a Decision of the Macedonian authorities of that time, "Makedonska Stopanska Banka" merged with the National Bank of the former Federal Yugoslavia.
Operational risk has become a much greater concern for CCP supervisors and regulators in recent years and we increasingly need to see higher standards of resilience in the face of operational and cyber risk. Recovery and resolution regimes for CCPs need to take more account of threats to CCPs from this direction. Whether this should mean more loss absorbing capital at CCPs, access to member resources in the event of non-default losses or some combination of the two is a matter of ongoing discussion. But given the role CCPs play in the financial system, we need to think more about how we would resolve a CCP that had suffered a major operational failure, without entry into insolvency. Similar issues arise in the context of the resolution of systemically important banks. Having published guidance on resolution strategies for CCPs in 2017, the Financial Stability Board’s FMI Cross Border Crisis Management group is now focused on two issues that remained outstanding; namely the adequacy of financial resources for resolution and the treatment of equity in resolution. Bank resolution  The Lehman Brothers episode with which I started today exposed brutally that insolvency is not an option for large cross-border banks that perform critical economic functions. One of the main objectives of the post crisis reforms has been to put in place bank resolution regimes that enable the authorities to stabilize a failing bank by bailing in its debt holders to restore solvency and regulatory capital.

Losses from the tear-up of positions would still be expected to be allocated in the order contractually agreed in the rulebook without discrimination between counterparties. But the discretions exercised by the resolution authority, such as the scope and price of the partial tear-up or the speed of replenishment of the depleted default fund would be taken with objectives to protect financial stability and subject to public law safeguards. In taking these actions the resolution authority would have the advantage of being able to coordinate and exchange information with other domestic and foreign authorities and with the wider market in a way that the CCP would not. This ability to coordinate could be crucial to the orderly management of a systemic event particularly if defaults were impacting multiple CCPs. An important aspect of stabilising the CCP and the wider market would be to maintain sufficient certainty around the losses that could be incurred in the resolution. A CCP’s rulebook provides its members with assurance ex ante about the point at which and the extent to which they will be exposed in the event of a clearing member default. It protects them from discrimination in the allocation of losses. Resolution authorities should similarly respect the CCP rulebook in the allocations of loss. If, in extreme circumstances, it proves necessary for the resolution authority to deviate from the rulebook, CCP members should be compensated for losses borne in excess of what would have been incurred had the rulebook been followed.
Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Road map for monetary and financial sector policies in 2007 and beyond Speech by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Central Bank International Conference hall, Colombo, 2 January 2007. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Your Excellencies, Members of the Monetary Board, Deputy Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome to all of you and wish you a very happy new year. As we mark the new year 2007, we thought it would be appropriate and timely for the Central Bank to enunciate its policies as well as the rationale therefor, so as to enhance policy predictability and transparency. We shall also take this opportunity to indicate our policy targets and share our latest available information in relation to the economy, upon which our analysis and targets have been based. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka was established in August 1950 under the Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949, and the Act sets out two inter-dependent core objectives. These are the attainment of the economic and price stability and the maintenance of the financial system stability. Today, the Central Bank follows a monetary targeting policy framework in conducting monetary policy to attain Economic and Price Stability, i.e., to achieve a sustainable, low and predictable level of inflation. Such an outcome, among others, is a prerequisite to achieving sustainable economic growth and development.

Some of the Primary Dealers who are dealing outside the Scripless Securities Settlement System could have caused potential threats to the system. This may have been particularly due to the fact that using SWIFT was considered to be an expensive method of transferring data. Therefore, the Central Bank has now introduced a low cost method of transferring data using the Wide Area Network connecting them with the Central Bank. Accordingly, all Primary Dealers are now urged to use this method to ensure retail transactions are not proceeded outside the system. Two new laws, namely the Prevention of Money Laundering Act No. 5 of 2006 and the Financial Transactions Reporting Act No. 6 of 2006 have been enacted last year to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing and to strengthen the reporting mechanism for financial transactions. Arising from such initiative, the Financial Intelligence Unit has already been established to investigate and take action to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The work of the FIU will be further expanded during the year 2007. In line with the global trends, we will be taking steps to further promote corporate governance in the financial sector by implementing several measures. Mandatory corporate governance rules covering important areas of corporate governance principles will be introduced in place of the existing voluntary codes.
In Chile, we are under the process of simplifying our FX regulation, as well as improving our Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs), including the FX dimension to them. Thus, the Central Bank of Chile is currently working to allow the clearing of USD denominated large-value payments through its Real Time Gross Settlement payment system. Also, it is developing a Trade Repository for OTC derivatives, and it is about to issue the regulation for FX clearinghouses. Finally, the onboarding of the Chilean Peso into the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) System is a priority for the Central Bank of Chile. These measures may contribute to increasing the likelihood of issuance of local currency bonds overseas. Now, let me address some of the concern raised regarding new vulnerabilities, in particular at the non-banking sector. A reasonable concern is to what extent the low level of FX-risk at the banking sector in Chile have pushed for higher FX-risk in the non-banking sector? Our assessment is that the rising vulnerabilities observed in the nonbanking sector can be associated to the stronger bank regulation, but it does not correspond to the evolution of FX risk. In fact, the evolution of the non-banking sector reflects mainly issues of information asymmetries and the fact that some of these institutions can take advantage of payroll direct charges to enhance their consumer credit business. While non-bank lenders (NBL) provide commercial loans, their main business is to lend to households in the form of consumer and mortgage loans.

The learning and effectiveness of the framework can be understood not only with the expectations anchored to the target, but also in the low volatility of interest rates in exchange for a (covered) higher FX volatility. Page 11 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019 High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation? International Capital Flows in the Post-crisis World, September 2019  Monetary policy framework and its effectiveness Overall, the Chilean economy appears to be best prepared to face external shocks than before the GFC, except on the fiscal front  CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE  FX misalignment (2)  Pension funds (3)  Cap. Adequacy Index  International reserves (5)  Gross public debt (3)  Inflation deviation to target (4) 2007-2008 average  2018  (1) A larger number indicates a better relative position. All the variables measured at the level of the respective period in relation to the average 2001-2018. (2) Measured with the percentage of companies in the corporate sector whose currency mismatch exceeds 10% of the value of their assets; (3) As a percentage of GDP; (4) Difference between average inflation for the period and the Central Bank's target; (5) Corresponds to the ratio between the sum of international reserves and sovereign funds, and short-term residual external debt discounted direct foreign investment. Source: Central Bank of Chile. *** References Cerutti, E., Claessens, S., and Laeven, M.L. (2015), “The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence,” Working Paper No. 15/61, International Monetary Fund.
The second response to the crisis drives us to equip ourselves with new tools that mitigate the effects of future crises, because experience tells us that, even assuming that all the preventive measures conceivable today are adopted, it will never be possible to do away once and for all with economic crises. The third response to a crisis does not involve preventing or adopting tools to manage future crises, but looking for the right way to manage the current crisis from which, need I remind you, we have not yet emerged. I make this distinction between the three types of response that an economic crisis always elicits so that my following remarks may be better understood. Firstly, I think that most of the huge efforts deployed to date at the global and European level in response to the crisis have focused on avoiding or mitigating future crises. Yet much less time and imagination has been used in designing and agreeing on measures to emerge from where we are. I am certain that we are now much better prepared to prevent the recurrence of a crisis such as the present one, but the problem is that we still do not know how to exit from it.

The credibility provided by the inflation target is a prerequisite for monetary policy to be able to respond so aggressively to the fallout from the crisis. And with inflation being above target almost consistently over this period, it is hard to argue that monetary policymakers have somehow been fixated by inflation. But the forward guidance provided by the MPC makes that support explicit. The primary objective of monetary policy remains the 2% inflation target. The sanctity of that objective is guarded by the two price stability knockouts. But subject to those knockouts and the knockout pertaining to financial stability, our guidance clearly signals the Committee’s intention to maintain a highly stimulatory stance of policy until the economy returns to something closer to normality. Abstracting from the precise details of the thresholds and knockouts, the message to businesses and families should be clear. The MPC intends to keep interest rates low until we have seen a sustained period of strong growth, rising incomes and higher employment, as long as that does not pose risks to either price stability or financial stability. To be clear: that is no different to the approach underlying our policy over the past five years. But forward guidance provides a framework and a language in which that intention can be made plain. A closely related issue is the policy trade-off currently faced by the MPC.
23  For example, a money market mutual fund could choose to restrict its investments only to overnight reverse repurchase agreements provided by the Federal Reserve if it believed these instruments would continue to be supplied in the far future. 24  See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140917c.htm. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusion I want to conclude by saying a few more words about the value of engaging broadly with the public, with market participants, with researchers both in central banks and in academia, and with our global central bank counterparts. The issues we will have to tackle are important and complex, and there is much to gain from different points of view. Market participants can provide a deeper understanding of financial market dynamics and shed necessary light on the impact and limitations of monetary policy on a practical dimension. As we saw today, researchers can provide empirical analysis as well as models that help us think about the impact and effectiveness of different tools or policies. Whether they work in central banks or academia, they provide a perspective that we need to take into account when thinking about our long-run framework. And, of course, we can learn from our peers in policymaking and on markets desks at other central banks. We may have tried things that worked very well, or did not work so well, and comparative experience can be extremely valuable.

Simon M Potter: Money markets and monetary policy implementation Dinner address by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for the Bank of England-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference on Money Markets and Monetary Policy Implementation, London, 16 November 2015. *  *  *  I would like to thank Deborah Leonard and Antoine Martin for their excellent assistance in the preparation of these remarks and colleagues in the Federal Reserve System and global central bank community for their insightful comments and suggestions. Introduction It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to give the address at tonight’s dinner. I would like to start by thanking the Bank of England for hosting this conference on money markets and monetary policy implementation. It’s hard to think of a better place to discuss these topics than just steps away from the historic Lombard Street, described in Bagehot’s classic book on money markets.1 I also want to thank all of you for actively participating in today’s discussions. One thing I particularly enjoyed about the event was the interaction among market practitioners, central bankers, and researchers. I think the diversity of perspectives that these groups bring contributes to a fruitful dialogue that can help lead to more informed choices and decisions. I will come back to this point.
Before I conclude, let me briefly turn to the issue of accountability, which – as I said in my introduction – is essential to secure and reaffirm trust in the central bank. For the ECB, accountability to the people of Europe is not only a matter of good accountability practices. It is important for the central bank of a currency union to reach out to the whole euro area, to people in all parts of Europe and to spread trust in our currency, our institution and our policies. As I mentioned, the ECB is accountable to the people of the European Union and – as that Union is a representative democracy – to the European Parliament, which is the only European institution elected by popular vote. Our President regularly visits Parliament to report on and explain the ECB’s policies. The Governors of the national central banks in the Eurosystem have similar hearings before their national parliaments. In addition, we have a continuous dialogue with all relevant institutions involved in the European political process, such as the European Commission, and we have regular exchanges with the finance ministries of the euro area Member States. We also regularly report on and publish our monetary policy decisions. This panel today is one such occasion. Especially in times of crisis, when policies become less conventional and more complex, it is all the more important to carefully explain our decisions.

Compared with standard practices, non-standard instruments of policy are arcane tools which are difficult to describe and interpret. Today I will try to illustrate how the ECB has fulfilled its mandate in an environment in which our traditional instruments have been tested to their limits. As you know, this situation led us – and many other major central banks – to vastly expand our toolkit of policy initiatives. Communication and the accountability of policies involving non-standard measures need to be intensified during a crisis such as the current one. In this vein, I will explain how to interpret the latest decision to conduct outright monetary transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets for sovereign bonds. I will conclude with some remarks on the democratic accountability of the central bank in these testing conditions. Mandate and strategy of the central bank A central bank receives legitimacy when it is assigned a clear mandate by the people in its jurisdiction. A mandate is a simple statement of duty. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for example, assigns the ECB the pursuit of a “primary objective of price stability over the medium term”. This formulation establishes – at nothing less than international Treaty level – a hierarchy of priorities. First, the ECB has to ensure that price stability is accomplished over the medium term. Price stability is, by the way, the most important contribution that monetary policy can make to achieving high levels of economic activity and employment.
The government campaign – “Thailand Investment Year 2008/2009” is a spearhead project to make Thailand stand out as the investment destination for foreign investors. The campaign’s key missions include restoring investor’s confidence with more proactive marketing activities, strengthening infrastructure to accommodate for expansions, channeling investment into strategic industries for the future, as well as improving investment-related services. Recently, a good feedback on the international level has been reported by the media. In the “Doing Business 2009” survey of 181 countries by the World Bank, Thailand just ascends 6 ranks to the 13th place where investors are provided with convenience in doing business. Thailand made key improvements in areas such as protecting investors, ease of paying taxes, and trading across borders. Apart from these efforts to induce external capital, it is also necessary to support investment through domestic saving promotion scheme in an anticipation of narrowing investment-saving gap in the future. Furthermore, the ease and coverage of financial access can also be enhanced further to facilitate efficient flow of funds. Outside the realm of government policy, we stand to gain from a greater role of private sector. In this regard, I would like to commend the BCC’s effort throughout the years. A programme like “Thailand Means Business 2008” which BCC will hold in both Thailand hotspots like Bangkok and Chiang Mai, as well as abroad like England, Hong Kong, and  BIS Review 119/2008  3  Singapore, is a great help for attracting foreign investment into Thailand and enhance the country’s capacity and potential.

Sound economic fundamentals continue to provide support for favourable growth and collective efforts should be focused on raising the economy’s potential output in order to achieve price stability and sustainable growth in the long run. 2  BIS Review 119/2008  By old book, growth comes from utilization of the country’s resource endowment with available technology. However, with the advent of global economic and financial integration, growth is no longer constrained by endowment. In today’s world economy, outsourcing for inputs abundant in other countries and exchange of technology and skills allow for lower production costs and greater potential to grow. Potential output in this era is thus free from conventional hindrance. From the Bank of Thailand’s latest research, the Thai economy has a potential output growth rate of around 5.5 to 6.0 percent per year from 2008 to 2015. This is based on an assumption that investment can grow at the same rate as the economy, and therefore, the ratio of real gross investment to real GDP needs to increase from 22 percent today to 28 percent within the next 8 years. Prior to 1997, Thai economy grew satisfactorily on the back of high level of investment as well as increasing utilization of labor. During this period, sufficient capital formation allowed for an increase in labor productivity. However, in the post crisis era, potential output gradually declined as real investment did not fully resume its pre-crisis level, which was 31 percent of real GDP.