samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
IMF (2019), Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery, World Economic Outlook, April 2019 2. IMF (2019), Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers, World Economic Outlook, October 2019 3. IMF (2019), The Dynamics of External Adjustment, External Sector Report, July 2019 4. IMF Country Report No. 19/29, Albania 2018 Article IV Consultation, January 2019 5. IMF Country Report No. 18/39, Bosnia And Herzegovina 2017 Article IV Consultation, February 2018 6. IMF Country Report No. 19/83, Bulgaria 2019 Article IV Consultation, March 2019 7. IMF Country Report No. 19/46, Republic Of Croatia 2018 Article IV Consultation, February 2019 8. IMF Country Report No. 19/160, Czech Republic 2019 Article IV Consultation, June 2019 9. IMF Country Report No. 18/252, Hungary 2018 Article IV Consultation, August 2018 10. IMF Country Report No. 19/32, FYR Macedonia 2018 Article IV Consultation, January 2019 11. IMF Country Report No. 19/293, Montenegro 2019 Article IV Consultation, September 2019 12. IMF Country Report No. 19/37, Republic Of Poland 2018 Article IV Consultation, February 2019 13. IMF Country Report No. 19/278, Romania 2019 Article IV Consultation, August 2019  16  14. IMF Country Report No. 19/238, Republic of Serbia Staff Report for The 2019 Article IV, July 2019 15. IMF Country Report No.

What will that entail? Controlling the excesses of finance cannot be achieved only with monetary policy interest rates. We need to expand the concept of leverage to other segments of the financial system, particularly synthetic leverage. I mean leverage which is not easily seen in the balance sheet, because it’s built up with derivatives. It’s not seen but it’s very relevant for banks and for the economy, as we saw during the crisis. 5/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  The obstacles to regulating markets, and not just banks, are not so much technical; the obstacles are more political or ideological. It requires more regulation and supervision by not only central banks, but also in some cases governments. It is politicians that often need to enforce macroprudential measures, and in some countries some governments do not want to use them. Another aspect that is different now is that we have in our economies too much finance. There is a strand of literature showing that after certain limits there are diminishing returns in the expansion of finance. And to tame these imbalances we will also need macroprudential measures. You have talked about the need to reform economics too. What do you have in mind? Big changes are happening, we are going in the right direction, but in my view we are not there yet.
The four major banks regularly monitored by the Riksbank have similar procedures with regard to granting corporate loans. The bank assesses the risk in a particular loan on the basis of two aspects: the customer’s ability to repay and the collateral that can be offered. The customer’s ability to repay is the more important of these two aspects. For obvious reasons, loans without collateral are assessed more stringently. The fact that the banks now focus more on the ability to repay than on the value of the collateral is a lesson learned from the bank crisis in the 1990s. Before a loan is granted, it is necessary to assess the risk of default in the form of a suspension of payments or bankruptcy. This means that the banks consider stable cash flows to be more interesting than whether a project can provide a higher yield than expected. On the basis of the bank’s assessment, the borrower is assigned a risk classification. This classification contains both quantitative and qualitative factors and the risk grade is reviewed annually. The quantitative analysis is based on the company’s profit and loss statements and balance sheets, while the qualitative analysis is based, for instance, on the company’s competitiveness and the quality of its management. When making the decision to grant a loan, the assessment of the customer’s ability to repay is supplemented with information on the specific loan, for instance, the amount of the loan and the collateral the borrower can offer against the loan.

The proposed changes in the capital adequacy rules will apply with effect from 2005, but developments in the capital market could very well lead to the banks’ credit granting being adapted gradually to the new rules in advance of their introduction. It is therefore important for capital-intensive operations to prepare now for a more individualised credit assessment in future. The opportunities for finding competitive financing on the loan market at a low interest rate will be available to those who can convince lenders that their operations will generate stable future income. Higher risks, e.g. in the form of varying income flows will cost more. Looking towards the future I can see two important issues for the industry to consider for the future. The first is the financing of the new construction that is needed, where the effects of the modern credit granting process and the new capital adequacy rules will affect SABO’s operations. It will be a sensitive issue for housing companies in municipalities with high vacancy rates and declining populations, particularly in the light of your own report issued just before Christmas. Previously, municipalities and municipal operations with municipal guarantees have been able to obtain loans on improved terms. In addition to the property as collateral, a municipal housing company has been able to use the municipality’s guarantee as collateral. In future, it is not so certain that this will lead to improved loan terms to the same extent as now.
This can, unfortunately, lead a bank to conclude that it has reduced one set of risks and can therefore afford to take on an additional set of risks. But what if the technology was imperfect, and the sophisticated models were flawed? Overconfidence in risk models can itself become a significant risk. Risk and responsibility There is a popular phrase in the United States among risk management professionals who want to be clear about accountability for risk. We often say that a person, or division, or firm “owns the risk.” Let me explain what I think that phrase means, at least in some contexts. When a business line manager understands that she “owns the risk”—and not, say, the lawyers, compliance professionals, or anyone else—it means that she is accountable to a more senior manager and to the firm for the risk. Presumably, that means she will bring an appropriate focus and attention to issues of risk management. She will not assume that risk management is somebody else’s problem. Sometimes I worry, however, that this phrase—“own the risk”—has become overused and can itself give rise to risk. To be clear, clarity of roles and responsibilities with respect to risk management is critical. Business managers should not be able to outsource accountability for risk management to others. Still, I wonder if it is time to retire the phrase “own the risk” or at least be more thoughtful about its use.

Broadly speaking, the responsibilities of the Federal Reserve System include setting and implementing monetary policy, regulating and supervising certain financial institutions, acting as fiscal agent for the United States Treasury, and helping to maintain financial stability. Not every responsibility is shared by each component of the Federal Reserve System. For example, the Board of Governors regulates financial institutions. The Federal Open Market Committee sets monetary policy. And the New York Fed serves as a fiscal agent for the United States Treasury. But, collectively, these are the functions of the central bank of the United States. The New York Fed, where I serve as general counsel, is one of the twelve regional banks. Its district includes New York City—the financial center of the United States. The New York Fed implements monetary policy pursuant to the directives of the Federal Open Market Committee. Monetary policy refers to the actions taken by the Federal Reserve to influence the availability and cost of money and credit to help promote economic goals. The New York Fed helps to accomplish these goals by, among other things, purchasing and selling securities. And, like other Federal Reserve Banks, we make loans to commercial banks and pay interest on deposits by commercial banks. In addition, the New York Fed manages the operation of wholesale payment services—known as Fedwire® Services—on behalf of the other Federal Reserve Banks. The New York Fed also participates in the regional and international distribution of United States currency and coins.
For these reasons, central banks need to be - and they are - very cautious in identifying and pointing to the existence of a bubble. However, a number of indicators may help us to form an assessment about whether an asset price misalignment or a bubble is under way. A widely used indicator to gauge major stock price misalignments - which I am sure many of you employ in your professional activities - is to compare price-earnings ratios with historical averages. In the housing market, one method is to look at trends in the price-rent ratio relative to the historical averages, or at affordability (price-income) measures. All these indicators can be informative in judging the sustainability of asset price valuations. In addition, a number of researchers have stressed that important complementary information for assessing the sustainability of asset price movements can be derived from monetary and credit developments. In particular, it has been shown that periods of high money and credit growth often give rise to boom-bust cycles in stock and property prices, which then causes high costs in terms of macroeconomic stability. Overall, we have several tools which could help us to detect bubble phenomena. While individual tools are subject to caveats, applying a broad range of methodologies should help limiting the risk of making mistakes in the assessment of asset prices. 4  BIS Review 66/2004  What can central banks do about bubbles?

Oil prices, which reached historical highs in nominal US dollar terms in the last week of October, are a key factor determining near-term prospects for economic activity and inflation, both globally and in the euro area. As I noted earlier, persistently high and rising oil prices have had a visible direct impact on consumer prices in the euro area, and inflation is likely to remain above the upper limit of our definition of price stability of 2% in the coming months. This is a worrisome development, although there is little indication that medium-term inflationary pressures are building up in the euro area. What would be the potential impact of a sustained rise in oil prices on key macroeconomic variables in quantitative terms? For purely illustrative purposes, and using a variety of macroeconomic models, ECB economists have estimated the potential impact of a hypothetical permanent oil price increase of 50% on both inflation and output. According to these calculations, such an increase would add 0.3 to 0.6 percentage points to overall inflation in the euro area in the first year and 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points in the second year, before petering out in the third year (0.0 to 0.1 percentage points).
The imbalances may continue for a period. International capital markets are deep and liquid with an ample supply of credit for US borrowers. If creditors begin to fear a fall in asset prices and withdraw, this may still trigger substantial corrections. This may lead to higher interest rates and perhaps also a fall in US equity markets that spills over to other countries’ financial markets. In that case the dollar will also depreciate. The household debt burden in the US may be another source of instability if households abruptly reduce both housing demand and consumption. The US is not the only source of trade imbalances. They also reflect very low growth in continental Europe and the largely export-based growth in Asian countries. Countries other than the US must therefore also contribute in order to prevent growth in the global economy from faltering. With limited domestic growth capacity and high unemployment, many industrial countries are poorly equipped to cope with a weaker dollar and lower US demand. The challenges are perhaps particularly demanding in Japan and some large European countries. There is also a risk that large imbalances in world trade and low employment in Europe will trigger protectionism, which could reduce growth capacity even further. 2  BIS Review 34//2005  Partly due to very high growth in demand for oil, the average price for Brent Blend rose to almost USD 40 per barrel in 2004. Strong economic growth, particularly in the US and China, has resulted in high energy consumption.

External price impulses via consumer goods are then expected to increase in pace with unit labour costs among our trading partners. With a path for the interest rate and the krone exchange rate in line with the baseline scenario in Inflation Report 1/05, inflation may increase gradually from less than 1 per cent today to close to 2 per cent in mid-2006. Under these assumptions, inflation may stabilise at around 2½ per cent at the threeyear horizon. Developments in line with these projections imply that the output gap will increase to about 1¼ per cent in 2006. As the interest rate is gradually increased to a more normal level, growth in private demand will probably ease, and capacity utilisation may be brought down and stabilise. Developments since the March Inflation Report was presented do not provide grounds for changing this perception of the state of the real economy. The results of the wage settlement so far suggest that wage growth this year will be somewhat lower than projected by Norges Bank. Inflation, on the other hand, has been broadly in line with expectations, and there has been virtually no change in the krone exchange rate. The inflation outlook has not changed substantially since the March Inflation Report was published. At its meeting on 20 April, the Executive Board stated the following: “The Norwegian economy is growing at a solid pace, and capacity utilisation is rising.
Repeated crises and poor support from inflation expectations did not give good results in terms of production growth and real wages. The experiences of the past 10-15 years have been good, however. Fiscal and monetary policy have laid the foundations for better economic growth and wage formation has improved. The social partners have actively contributed to this good development. The results are positive. Growth has been high and real wages have risen, despite the moderate increases in nominal wages. It is of course extremely important that this positive development can continue over the coming years. The economic conditions for next year’s wage bargaining rounds are good and there thus is every reason to believe that wage formation will continue to function well. However, we will of course closely follow developments. The contribution that the Riksbank can make is to conduct a monetary policy aimed at ensuring that inflation and inflation expectations develop in accordance with our target. This in turn means that the social partners can continue to sign agreements based on the assumption that the inflation target will be met a couple of years ahead. Judging from the surveys we make of inflation expectations, monetary policy in this respect has a very high level of credibility. It is the task of myself and my colleagues on the Executive Board to ensure that this remains the case. 4  BIS Review 93/2006  1. Inflation differential rel.

The 1990s also began with a depreciation of the Swedish krona amounting to 20-25 per cent when we abandoned the krona peg to the European ecu in autumn 1992. Unlike the 1980s, inflation was afterwards pressed down to the same level as Germany (see Figure 1). We have even continued strengthening our competitiveness through strong productivity growth and moderate wage increases (see Figure 2). Why did we not succeed in bringing down inflation to the same level as other countries during the 1970s and 1980s? The most important explanations are the history of repeated devaluations, insufficiently tight fiscal and monetary policy, an overheated labour market and deregulation of the credit market with ensuing credit expansion. An important difference compared with the present situation with a clear inflation target is that monetary policy under the regime of that time, with a fixed exchange rate, could not help subdue the overheating as it was detailed to maintain the fixed krona exchange rate. During the 1990s, on the other hand, we succeeded in bringing down inflation to the same level as other countries. However, this required drastic measures. The 1990s began with the most severe crisis in the Swedish economy since the 1930s. Open unemployment rose to a high point of 9 per cent in 1993. This had a dampening effect on prices and wages. In addition, fiscal policy and monetary policy were very tight. The budget consolidation in the mid-1990s was very extensive and interest rates were kept at a very high level during a transition period.
Consensus as to what reforms to undertake and with what content, supported by the findings of sound economic evaluations, would provide economic policy with stability beyond the electoral cycle and, therefore, with credibility in the eyes of citizens and investors, thus multiplying its positive impact. Once more, these principles may also be particularly relevant when it comes to maximising the transformative impact of the European funds our economy will receive in the coming years. Broad agreement on their use, based on constant and rigorous evaluation, would offer most possibilities of bringing about a more prosperous country that provides more and better opportunities for all: for our youth, so they may freely and confidently pursue their plans for the future; for our elderly, so they may face retirement securely; and for our workers, so they may adapt and prosper in an increasingly demanding and competitive world. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  In sum, we need wide-ranging – political, social and also intergenerational – agreements in order to confidently face our future. In our recent history, whenever Spanish society has looked far ahead and resolutely addressed a long-term horizon, the outcome has been greater freedom and prosperity. At the Banco de España we believe that, taking a rigorous and independent view, we can contribute decisively to this objective.

And from then until last year, we had a central bank that had been deprived of the authority to intervene in the functioning of the financial system. But the Central Bank is not alone on the stage. Sound economic policy is a triumvirate comprising the Central Bank, the Treasury, and the labor market partners, all of which must work together to keep the economy in balance. These three members of the triumvirate must act in concert in order to ensure stable prices, stable purchasing power, and low interest rates for the long term. We can do this just like other countries can. We will do it. And the Central Bank will do its part. Sixty years of Central Bank operations should give us a reliable roadmap to the future. We who work for the reunified Bank are champing at the bit in our excitement to take on the tasks that await us. Now let us watch the video about the design of Iceland’s banknote series, in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the redenomination of the Icelandic króna. Thank you  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
2  INTRODUCTION  NORGES BANK  From a not too distant future, let’s return to the present day. We can already see the contours of the digital tools used by Kristoffer and his digital assistant. Technology is advancing at a rapid pace. Every day we rely on new technology as we tap our payment cards on the reader. We also have to adapt to new developments on many other fronts. A shift in production methods and consumption is underway in response to global warming. The world economy is marked by densely interwoven trade flows, but also by uncertainty about the path ahead. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IS CREAKING Throughout history, technological innovation and increased trade in goods and services have been important sources of growth and development. The two driving forces have functioned in tandem. Trade barriers have been reduced in recent decades. Faster transport and advanced communications systems have greatly facilitated access to ever bigger markets. Global value chains have emerged, and service providers can be located far from customers. With free-flowing capital, we can invest globally. Since the 1970s, world trade has grown rapidly (Chart 1). As a percentage of world GDP, international trade has almost doubled. Goods are still the dominant component, but trade in services has been on the rise. A host of new countries have also increased their share in world trade. Substantial technological and economic lags have been reduced. The world’s economic balance has shifted. Chart 1 World trade1) has grown markedly.

Likewise, as supervisors we should strive to avoid financial crises, by applying supervisory tools to mitigate risk accumulations as well as reinforcing banks’ management capabilities; but, at the same time, we should work with a longer-term perspective to complete the institutional framework, in case a crisis still occurs. Thank you. 5/5
The Committee’s approach has, I believe, been consistent with its mandate from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which recognises “that the actual inflation rate will on occasions depart from its target as a result of shocks and disturbances” and that “attempts to keep inflation at the inflation target in these circumstances may cause undesirable volatility in output.” It is almost 100 years to the day since the ill-fated Titanic was launched from Queen’s Island, just across the channel. It may be tempting to see a parallel between the hubris and excessive risk-taking that resulted in its tragic encounter with an iceberg on its maiden voyage, and the hubris and excessive risk-taking that led up to the Great North Atlantic Financial Crisis of 2008. But a more optimistic parallel is provided by rebirth of the old Harland and Wolff shipyard as the Titanic Quarter, the biggest regeneration project in Northern Ireland’s history and the largest waterfront redevelopment in Europe. That serves as a reminder of the ever changing nature of the fabric of the economy, as old industries make way for new. And it also serves as a suitable metaphor for the UK economy more generally, as it begins to re-balance in the wake of the deepest downturn in the post-war period. Thank you!

We would do well to remember, however, that people’s perceptions of the future are often shaped not so much by words as by actions. So, after a series of purposeful decisions by the Government, the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) and the Riksbank, economic policy’s general commitment to macroeconomic stability began to inspire confidence. Economic policy’s credibility gave the Riksbank greater freedom to act The growing confidence accordingly meant in turn that, without jeopardising the objective of price stability, the Riksbank was able to lower the repo rate relatively markedly, from almost 9% to just over 4%. Interest rates for longer maturities also fell. This led, as we have all seen in recent years, not just to higher GDP growth but also to a more uniform development of demand in different sectors. When the cyclical upswing began towards the end of 1993, most of the growth came from the export sector. However, lower levels of interest rates benefited Swedish households and firms by easing the heavily restrictive effect of the high level previously. This contributed to an increase in domestic demand as well and broadened the economic upswing. That can be said to have instigated the considerable reduction of unemployment we have seen in recent years. Neither the Asian crisis in 1997 nor the turbulence in international financial markets in the autumn of 1998 had much of an impact, thanks not least to a monetary policy realignment in many countries. The Swedish repo rate was also cut, to a low of 2.90%.