samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And while the actual tasks performed by the Bank’s branches have changed since the network began expanding in the 1830s, the end goal remains unchanged: to support and serve local economies in order to back local initiatives and provide assistance in coping with economic and financial risks. From the time of its creation until the First World War, operating in an economy with relatively few banks and in which few people had bank accounts, the branch network of the Banque de France aimed at facilitating payments and supporting the regions during economic shocks by offering discount refinancing solutions. France’s economy has changed enormously since the 19th century. GDP per capita has grown by a factor of more than 20 since 1800 and by more than seven since 1914.9 Our banking and financial system has also been greatly modernised and now offers payment and credit solutions that are much faster and less costly than in the past. Reflecting these dual economic and financial transformations, the way in which the Bank performs its task of serving the regional economies has evolved. Our service to support local economies have expanded and now extend to households, especially the most vulnerable people, and companies, particularly the smallest  8  Leclercq, Yves, 1999, La formation d'une banque centrale: la Banque de France (années 1830 - années 1850), Revue économique Vol. 50, pp. 151-174 9 Source: Our world in data, Maddison Project Database 2020, see Jutta Bolt and Jan Luitten van Zanden, Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy.

Maintaining a stable currency safeguards purchasing power over time and ensures the currency’s continuity across the territory, so that every individual can spend that currency anywhere and at any time and enjoy the same ability to purchase necessary goods and services. Back in the 18th century, France's authorities found themselves unable to guarantee this stability. After the bankruptcy of the John Law note-issuing bank in 1720 and several other  2  failed attempts to set up a central bank,5 the hyperinflation fuelled by monetary financing of the Revolutionary Wars and the ensuing default on two-thirds of France’s public debt in 1797 had destroyed confidence in the currency.6 The most pressing task facing the Consulate government was to rebuild the foundations of that trust, which it did by authorising the establishment of the Banque de France in 1800 and anchoring the value of the franc through the creation of the Germinal franc in 1803. In establishing the Banque de France, France set up a central bank that was capable, because it was trusted by the French people, of offering an “elastic” money supply, to use the economic jargon, that is, of adjusting the money supply to suit the needs of the economy. In this way, the foundations for an active lender-of-last-resort policy were laid very early, providing a means to combat financial crises and thus support the economy.
MAS will shortly announce the members of the panel. We will solicit feedback from the public before the panel begins its deliberations and after it has made its recommendations. I appreciate that some of the proposals will impact businesses and representatives. I urge the industry to take a long term view from the customer’s perspective. The aim of FAIR is to bring about a higher quality of financial advisory services and better outcomes for customers, and by enhancing customer trust, promote sustained growth of the financial advisory industry. MAS will work to ease the transition for those most affected by the changes. Conclusion Since its inception in 1962, LIA’s key objectives have always been to promote high standards and best practices in the life insurance industry, ensuring quality financial advisory services and raising public awareness and understanding of life insurance. We see LIA as a key partner in facilitating the FAIR process and developing the insurance industry. I congratulate LIA on your golden anniversary and wish you many more fruitful years ahead. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

It has proved powerful in the past, and it is crucial that it continues to do so. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6
The risk of excluding entire product groups is that prices in these groups may have changed in a more lasting manner. CPIF excluding energy is an often used index in Sweden. The columns in Figure 4 show how energy prices have contributed to CPIF inflation. The contribution from energy prices has at times been fairly large (just over a percentage point). But one can also see that it does not vary as much from month to month if it is expressed as an annual percentage change. A positive contribution in one month tends to be followed by a positive contribution the next month, too. 7 [19]  Figure 4. CPIF inflation and energy prices Annual percentage change. 4.0  105.1  3.5  104.9  3.0  104.7  2.5  104.5  2.0  104.3  1.5  104.1  1.0  103.8  0.5  103.6  0.0  103.4  -0.5  103.2  -1.0  103.0 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  CPIF / CPIF excluding energy (index = 100 year 2000), right Contributions to CPIF, oil-related products Contribution to CPIF, electricity Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  The solid line in the figure is a different way of showing the same thing. The line shows the ratio between index figures for the CPIF and the CPIF excluding energy.

Finally, I would like to close my remarks by thanking our speakers, discussants, the chairpersons, as well as the Bank of Albania's staff for dedicating your time and efforts to this important activity. I kindly invite you to actively participate in and conduct a very lively and fruitful debate. I truly believe that the productive discussions which will certainly take place during these two-day workshop, will contribute to strengthening further cooperation among researchers, and between the institutions. Thank you! 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
That would be a change with profound economic consequences. Central Bank Digital Currencies  The rapid decline of cash, the rapidly changing nature of payments and, potentially, of the assets used to make payments, raise the question of whether central banks should leverage new technologies to provide new electronic forms of central bank money – the creation of Central Bank-issued Digital Currencies (CBDC) – as a complement to existing physical banknotes? A CBDC could ensure that the public has continued access to a risk-free form of money issued by the central bank. It could also potentially be designed in a way that contributes to a more resilient, innovative and competitive payments system for UK households and businesses. But, while CBDC poses a number of opportunities, it also raises challenges for the way in which we maintain monetary and financial stability. The potential benefits to financial stability could include more access to and utility of central bank money, including greater public access to a risk free asset enhancing a resilient payments infrastructure. There could also be positive benefits to monetary policy, such as more direct control of the monetary transmission mechanism. But for all the opportunities, there are also some significant potential implications.

There have been some unsavoury practices in this space: “flash loans” being used to manipulate prices in the market; bots being used to front-run retail trades. With decentralised governance, who do you approach to recover lost accounts or reverse accidental transfers of money? Existing regulatory frameworks will need to be adapted if DeFi becomes a reality. Regulations crafted to manage risks in a world of intermediaries are ill-suited where intermediaries are replaced by smart contracts. Enforcement is more challenging when control or governance is dispersed across the blockchain. MAS will follow Web 3.0 and DeFi developments closely, deepen our understanding, and seek to harness the benefits while managing the risks. We will work with both the financial industry and the broader ecosystem to find the right balance. It will be a learning journey. Regulatory Sandbox Plus And what better way to learn than by experimenting? We will facilitate experiments for blockchain and DeFi innovation through regulatory sandboxes. Five years ago, MAS launched the FinTech Regulatory Sandbox, to support live experimentation of technology innovations. Two years ago, we enhanced it with Sandbox Express, so that businesses can begin market testing of low risk activities in a pre-defined environment faster. MAS will enhance its regulatory sandbox with Sandbox Plus.We will broaden participation to early adopters of technology, in addition to first movers. We will provide financial grants to first movers of innovation, to support their technology, human capital, and market development.
A slowdown in economic activity is not solely caused by interest rates. Other factors that deserve to be mentioned are the contractionary impact of fishing quota cuts, the downturn in the IT sector which is closely linked to global trends, and fluctuations in power-intensive development projects which are unaffected by domestic interest rates. Cutting interest rates now would have a limited immediate effect on the supply side of the economy, while high interest rates act with full force on the demand side where they serve to reduce inflation and domestic demand, which will contribute to improved macroeconomic balance and low inflation. Iceland’s currency options I have outlined various aspects of the Central Bank’s monetary policy. As I mentioned, Iceland has not taken part in European currency cooperation. Various currency framework options that Iceland ought to consider are often named in public discussions. A detailed account of most of them was given in the Central Bank’s 1997 report on the EMU. It is frequently said that Iceland ought to adopt the Euro as its currency, either unilaterally or through associate membership of the EMU. I strongly warn against simplifying the options available to us in this respect. Even if associate membership were being offered, which does not seem likely, it seems fair to assume that any country which was interested in it would need to fulfil the Maastricht Treaty requirements for EMU membership.

BIS Review 50/1998  -8-  Employment growth in the EU area has been weak and unemployment in many countries has been high for a long time compared, for instance, with the United States. Labour force mobility is also lower than in the United States. But we also know that the Member States differ considerably. Some, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have been comparatively successful in generating new jobs. Others have done considerably worse. The remedies chosen by the successful countries vary, too. Some have adopted highly decentralised solutions and extensive deregulation. Others have sought to build up a consensus and make minor changes in some public systems. The question of how labour markets in Europe work and how they can be improved is already very much a part of the European agenda. There have been political initiatives in a variety of contexts in recent years, including national action plans for employment. These plans include the analysis of labour market laws, effects of tax systems and business conditions. Processes are being built up, inspired by the Maastricht Treaty’s successes with budget policy. The annual employment guidelines require each Member State to present a national action plan with a view to improving people’s employability, entrepreneurial spirit, flexibility and equality. These national action plans are to be specific, with goals and time schedules, so that they can be evaluated. Good examples are to be highlighted so that other countries, if they wish, can adopt them.
But since there is no unique “European Social Model”, I will then explore how differences in economic institutions, reflecting different cultural values and social models, may explain the divergence in the growth performance of European countries. Finally, I will focus on the other important dimension of  BIS Review 43/2007  1  economic performance and a central policy objective: price stability. I will demonstrate the crucial role of the institutional frameworks for central banking and fiscal policy implementation in ensuring the preservation of price stability and the sustainability of economic growth. II. Economic performance, markets, institutions and values: a simple conceptual framework  Before addressing the issues I have raised, it will be useful to define the various concepts more precisely and to specify a simple framework that describes their likely relationships and potential effects. Needless to say, the aim is not to formulate a comprehensive theory but to sketch out a conceptual structure that can help organise our thinking and analysis. This is illustrated in slide 3. The economic performance of a country or economic area will be measured by its trend rate of economic growth and its ability to preserve price stability. These indicators of macroeconomic performance are the aggregate outcome of market mechanisms and forces and of the effects of economic and monetary policies. Economic institutions, as well as other types of institutions (e.g. legal) underpin the functioning of product, labour capital and money markets.

There is evidence of increasing wages in some occupations, but wage growth in general continues to be very modest at about 2–1/4 percent per year. That is a long way from the 3 to 4 percent benchmark implied by productivity growth and our inflation objective. Indeed, over the past three years, the unemployment rate has fallen by a percentage point per year; yet real wage growth has barely budged. It’s hard for me to imagine a full labor market recovery without genuine improvement in compensation growth. But am I wrong? Has the wage Phillips curve completely broken down? Some claim the answer is no – you just have to look at the right measure of unemployment. Alan Krueger, Judd Cramer and David Cho, among others, have shown that the relationship between real wages and the short-term unemployment rate during this cycle has been in line with historical norms, whereas the historical spike in long-term unemployment exerted minimal pressure on real wage growth. 10 Of course, the short-term unemployment rate is now close to its pre-recession level. So their model implies nominal wage growth should be returning to something close to the fundamentals implied by productivity growth and inflation. My staff’s research comes to a somewhat different conclusion. Using models similar to those Michael Kiley presented here this morning, 11 they find that pools of potential workers other than the short-term unemployed, notably the medium-term unemployed and the involuntary part-time work force, substantially influence wage growth at the state or metropolitan statistical area level.
At the same time, unlike in most jurisdictions, we have already had for more than a year very advanced legislation on resolution that has been applied in the process of restructuring our financial system and that has entailed a significant saving of public funds. That said, it is true that some specific aspects (especially associated with the deductions introduced for regulatory capital) could be specially demanding for certain Spanish banks,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  which are already responding in their strategic plans. More generally, the pressure exerted by the market on the availability of capital (beyond the new minimum regulatory requirements) requires an on-going effort to preserve capital and, specifically, to maintain prudent cost containment and dividend policies. Also, it is clear that the productive specialisation of our economy and its dependence on bank financing make it vulnerable to any adverse impact of the new regulation on the ability of banks to finance the real economy. To counter this, all we can do is take advantage of the timetables established to ensure our institutions gradually adapt to the new requirements and, above all, work at the same time to promote the development of our capital markets in order to increase their capacity to intermediate the economy’s financial flows. All told – and I will finish here – the main challenge we face, as I have already mentioned, is the persistent fragmentation of European markets (despite the recent improvement) and the consequent link between sovereign risk and banking risk.

Market data were vital inputs to objective decision making – but they could not answer the ‘whys’ and ‘what ifs’ essential to effective tool design. Key aspects of the intervention – including the range of assets we offered to purchase, the size of daily operations, launch timing and duration of the facility, and pricing – relied on detailed and ongoing qualitative, as well as quantitative, market intelligence. [11] In terms of the intervention tool itself, we would have much preferred to rely solely on collateralised lending. But this wasn’t viable, for the simple reason that there was no-one either willing to, or  Page 8  capable of, borrowing from us at sufficient speed to staunch the firesale dynamic. The LDI funds themselves needed less leverage not more. The pension funds that invested in the LDI funds had collateral, but many lacked the ability to borrow, and anyway were too numerous and preoccupied in time-consuming processes aimed at reaching formal decisions as to whether to recapitalise their investments to act at the speed required. We had many ways to provide liquidity to the banks,[12] but they were already flush with liquidity, and no better placed than we were to pass liquidity on, either to pension schemes or LDI funds. [13] In the circumstances we faced, therefore, a buy/sell tool proved the only way to stop firesale dynamics in a timely manner (Figure 3). This is clearly not where we want to be in the steady state.
Or, alternatively, it assumes that the cost of moving policy more vigorously to create greater headroom above the zero lower bound is justified in risk management terms – that the cost of a tighter policy setting than required is justified by benefits of avoiding the risk of having to use exceptional policy tools at the lower bound. I have however seen little evidence in the UK that monetary has a consistently asymmetric impact in normal 20  times. As to the risk management argument, I do think the experience of the last 10 years shows that there are policy tools which, while not the primary instrument, remain available close to or at the zero bound. It was partly for this reason that the MPC’s recent statement on the unwinding of QE made clear that QE remained a weapon in the Committee’s armoury. 21  20  Such evidence that exists for other economies suggest the opposite is true – that monetary policy has greater impact when it is raised than when it is lowered. Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) 21 As it stated in the June 2018 MPC minutes: In the event that potential movements in Bank Rate are judged insufficient to achieve the inflation target, the reduction in the stock of assets could be amended or reversed. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  A sharper tightening of policy has also been suggested to avoid financial stability risks.

I have noted before the much greater degree of attention to the supply side given by the post-crisis MPC 4  relative to its pre-crisis predecessors. This is clearly accounted for by the much greater inability to forecast the evolution of supply and its impact on inflation (Charts 3 & 4). 2  Mark Carney’s recent speech illustrates that bank rate might have risen by 2-3 percentage points between August 2013 and the end of 2014 if the post crisis MPC’s had followed the reaction function of its pre-crisis predecessors. And the important role that forward guidance played in preventing financial markets and real economy agents acting in expectation of such tightening. 3 Miles (2015) 4 The rate of mentions of ‘supply’ and ‘productivity’ in the minutes of MPC meetings in the past decade has been about twice that in the decade prior to the crisis.
Having given at our last policy meeting the assurance that we would continue this as long as is needed and at least until the beginning of next year, means that we have given the assurance to the banks that the easing policy will continue for quite a long period of time. Having said that, what we need to look at now is not the theory. We have to be pragmatic, and look at what works and what does not work. The objective of so-called additional measures would be to act where parts of the credit market are not working, the transmission mechanism is not working. A central bank may consider that at a certain point it is appropriate to intervene directly in these markets. At the moment, we have some signs that the transmission mechanism, in terms of interest rates in almost all segments of the credit market, works relatively well. All money market segments have seen interest rates go down very significantly. It is interesting to note that if  2  BIS Review 29/2009  you take the 3-month reference rates, there is only 30 basis points difference between the euribor and the dollar libor, and no difference vis-à-vis sterling, so that in practice the transmission is quite efficient in the euro segment. Finally, the possibility for corporates to issue securities – short term or long term – seems to have revived significantly since December.

CN: What has been designed by various countries – bearing in mind the structure of their economies and the relative importance of the automatic stabilisers – is probably the right balance between what needs to be done to stimulate global demand and the necessity to retain the credibility of the fiscal policy and budgets over time. It is especially important in European countries where we have the feeling that the so-called Ricardian effects can play a role. So if we were to give the impression to citizens that public finances were to deteriorate by too much and for too long consumers might increase their savings ratio to prepare themselves for tax increases in the future that they might regard as inevitable, or the reduction of benefits and pensions. So you have to keep the right balance between long term credibility and immediate stimulation. As far as we can judge, that balance is probably appropriate. That will have to be reviewed according to future economic developments. A related issue is the fact we all agree that a condition for the revival of the global economy is that financial systems everywhere are stabilised and that stabilisation is convincing the markets. I have the impression that we are a little more advanced in that regard in Europe than in the US. It is clear that the US authorities are making every effort to reach that goal, but that is probably as important as the size of the stimulus itself if we want to stabilise the economy.