samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Diagram 2  M o n e y M a r k e t Ag e n ts’ In fla tio n E x p e cta tio n s P e r ce n t 5  5  O c t . ’ 94  4  4  O c t . ’ 95 M a y ’ 96  CPI  3  3  N o v . ’96 ’ 96 2  2  F e b .

Relevant government agencies are now required to provide manuals and guidelines regarding permit application under their jurisdiction to the general public. This includes listing of all necessary procedures and the expected timeframe of approval, resulting in predictability of permit acquisition and lower chances of bribery. As such, the efficiency of civil service will be improved and costs associated with time lag minimized. Next is the Royal Decree on Review of Laws and Regulations. The Decree requires that all laws and regulations be reviewed once every five years. This is to ensure that necessary adjustment can be made to accommodate dynamic changes in business practices. The Bank of Thailand alone has roughly 180 laws and regulations under our jurisdiction to be reviewed. Moreover, under this Decree, the general public can submit petition to voice their suggestions to relevant agencies. This will ensure that laws are practical, up to date, and serve public needs. The third law that will enhance productivity is the Payment System Bill, which is meant to replace the old governing laws and regulations that are dispersed under many different authorities. This payment system bill will consolidate fragmented laws relating to payment systems, especially electronics and digital payments, and allow the Bank of Thailand to be the sole regulator in this field.
Competition includes wider factors, for example: the range of firms competing in the market; barriers to entry, expansion or exit; and incentives to innovate and compete. But the two concepts are linked; competition is what drives innovation and ultimately drives productivity and long-term competitiveness. On the other hand, measures designed primarily to make one part of the market more competitive than another, through measures that favour one group of firms over another, will reduce innovation and productivity and be damaging in the long run. So facilitating competition brings the right type of competitiveness. Fresh in the memory is an example of how we have had regard to competitiveness, as required in the 2  Chancellor’s letter to the PRC . We worked closely with HMT, the FCA and industry to design a new, 3  commercially viable framework for Insurance Special Purpose Vehicles (ISPVs). Given growth in the insurance linked securities (ILS) market, this is a good opportunity for the UK as we are one of the first Solvency II jurisdictions to have done this. The framework went live in December 2017 and very shortly thereafter the PRA authorised its first ILS vehicle. 2  In March 2017, the Chancellor of the Exchequer sent a letter to the Governor of the Bank of England recommending that the PRA should have regard to considerations including: competition; growth; competitiveness; innovation; trade; and better outcomes for consumers.

1  We give money to insurance companies trusting that they will make good on their promise to us, in the event that an insured risk crystallises. ‘Trust’ is the key word here, as many people cannot reliably assess whether an insurer will be able to fulfil its financial promise if the need ever arises. It can be very expensive to switch insurers and so people can find themselves ‘locked in’ with the same insurer. And depending on the nature of the contract and claim, it may be months or years before a claim either arises or is fully settled. Even if they do have the right information, it would be unreasonable to expect individuals to be able to exert a strong disciplining effect on insurers. Even the best-informed retail policyholder would not be able to make sure that an insurer holds adequate reserves to pay claims, that it does not grow excessively by taking on too much risk, or that it does not under-price in an unsustainable manner to attract new business. We have seen the significant human cost that can be associated with insurance failures. A prominent example is the fate of over a million policyholders when Equitable Life came to the brink of collapse in 2000. Equitable was forced to close to new business, after it found it could no longer honour its promises on offering guaranteed annuity rates on its products.
It reduces companies’ average costs and so protects their profitability during the period of weak demand. A by-product of this adjustment, however, is that the marginal cost of producing additional output is higher. Although the mothballed capacity can be reinstated, it is likely to be more costly to do so, especially in the short-run, than if the resources were simply standing idle. Assembly lines need to be serviced before being restarted; staff need to be brought back from sabbaticals. As a result, the downward pressure on costs and prices stemming from the latent spare capacity within companies, at least in the near term, is likely to be less. 6 Developments in margins Consider next the mark-up over and above costs that companies include in their selling price. In the past, margins in the UK have tended to fall back during periods of weak demand and vice versa. 7 One possible reason for this is if companies reduce their prices relative to their costs when demand is weak in order to gain market share which they hope to hold onto as demand increases, ie they hope to be able to exploit some degree of pricing power. If successful, the lower profits in the downturn are outweighed by the gains during the upswing. This pro-cyclicality of margins is another reason why inflation in the UK has tended to moderate during periods of weak demand. But margins appear to have fallen by less during the recent recession than expected given the marked contraction in demand.

Namely, during the last global crisis, our economy followed relatively quick and steady recovery from the trough at the beginning of the crisis that was supported by the financial cycle pick up. The banking sector has proven to be sound and stable all these turbulent years, with slowdown of lending relative to the pre-crisis period, yet with moderate credit growth rates supportive to the economic rebound. A related point to consider is the solid ground of the banking system taking into account not only the high capital adequacy and liquidity, but also the relatively moderate level of non-performing loans, especially compared to the peer countries of the region. Besides the high foreign capital in the banking system, cross border effects have remained contained, mainly due to the simple framework of banking operations and strict banking regulations. Last but not least, sound economic recovery also transmits positive spillovers to the financial sector developments. Regarding the economic cycle upward movements, we should underline the strong fundamentals of the Macedonian economy that have been obviously fighting off challenges from the trembling global environment as well as domestic political instability since the beginning of the previous year. The main reasons behind these economic performances were the structural changes in the economy in recent years, which supported export diversification and reduction of unemployment. Improved country’s economic fundamentals are expected to continue providing support to the financial cycle picking up, although both domestic and external risks are still being present.
But what I think this discussion leads to the broader conclusion, given that the euro is to go ahead, that structural reform - in labour markets and welfare systems and in broadening and deepening the single market for goods and services, but also capital markets - in order to improve supply-side flexibility - becomes more crucially important than ever. The need for greater supply-side flexibility was the subject of much of the discussion at the informal meeting of European Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in York last weekend, and I was greatly encouraged by the degree of consensus around the table on this point. The United Kingdom of course will not participate in the first wave of monetary union. That decision, taken last October, was - as I noted earlier - a disappointment to some of our EU partners; but it was a considerable relief to others because UK participation from the outset would certainly have complicated the project - not least because of the substantial cyclical divergence between ourselves and the major countries on the Continent. But in making its announcement the British Government made it clear that it is not opposed to euro membership as a matter of principle. When the time comes - and that will almost certainly not be during the lifetime of the present Parliament - it will make its decision - and submit it to Parliament, and the people in a referendum - on pragmatic, economic, grounds.

IMF (October 2022), «Wage dynamics post–covid-19 and wage-price spiral risks». In IMF World Economic Outlook October 2022. Maćkowiak, B., F. Matějka og M. Wiederholt (2021), «Rational Inattention: A Review», ECB Working Paper 6/2021. Norges Bank (2022) Monetary Policy Report 3/22». Pindyck, R.S. (1991) «Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment». Journal of Economic Literature, Sims, C.A. (2003). «Implications of rational inattention». Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (3). Finansdepartementet (2018) «Ny forskrift for pengepolitikken». meld. nr. 8 (2017-18). Woodford, M. (2003). «Interest and prices». Princeton University Press. Footnotes [1] Fischer and Modigliani (1978) show that in periods of high and variable inflation the level of investment falls and investments shift towards projects with a shorter horizon. Huizanga (1993) shows theoretically that this channel is due to greater uncertainty about the real value of new investments. [2] See Woodford (2003). [3] High and variable inflation also has unintended effects on wealth distribution. The real value of existing debt is reduced at the same time as the value of savings declines. [4] In 2018, the Government adopted a new monetary policy mandate. The main change was a reduction in the inflation target from 2.5 percent to 2 percent. The Government referred to the other changes as specifications and modernisations “to align the regulation with prevailing practice” (Official Norwegian Report no. 8 (2017-2018)).
Bank Negara Malaysia has undertaken a number of initiatives in promoting transparency and good banking practices in Islamic banking  2  BIS Review 35/2002  institutions. To achieve these objectives, Bank Negara Malaysia has adopted an all-encompassing approach which is focussed on strengthening the institutional capacity of the Islamic banking institutions, broadening the range of financial products and services and deepening the Islamic financial markets by intensifying research and development efforts as well as creating awareness in addition to strengthening the regulatory framework for Islamic banking. One aspect that has been carried out by Bank Negara is the introduction of a structured framework in the determination of the rate of return for Islamic banking operations. Previously, there were various modes of framework in the disclosure of the rate of return used by the Islamic banking institutions and it has, to a certain extent, made it difficult to assess the performance of the Islamic banking industry. It also created distortions in the rate of return as the spreads can vary significantly among Islamic banking institutions. The new framework addresses the issue of uniformity as banks are required to observe a single framework, thereby reducing the potential for distortions in the rate of return, and generating a more equitable distribution of income, as well as increasing the level of transparency. On the part of the regulator, it has provided us with better means of assessing the efficiency of Islamic banking institutions as well as their profitability, prudent management and fairness.

2  BIS Review 20/2004  The stronger productivity growth is probably connected with economic activity; at the beginning of a recovery the available production resources are used to a greater degree and it is only when the recovery is secure that investment and new recruitment accelerate in earnest. However, there are numerous indications that productivity has risen more than is usual for the economic situation, a pattern that has been even more evident in the United States. It is conceivable that this development is linked to the factors I mentioned earlier; globalisation, deregulation and increased competition. However, more lasting changes in productivity may also be linked to the large investments in IT and telecommunications at the end of the 1990s. It is possible that the full impact from the investments made and technological advances is first achieved in connection with cost-cutting and rationalisation. We have a special boxed article on this subject in the report, which I can recommend reading. It is not possible to determine with any certainty what has caused the improvement in productivity. However, given this more favourable picture, we have nevertheless anticipated a rather higher level of productivity growth in the near future. The new inflation figures received also indicate a slightly more subdued inflationary pressure than we had estimated. The outcome shows not only that electricity prices have fallen back as expected, but also that prices have increased at a slower rate in general.
If there were a tolerance band, inflation of just over 1 per cent, or below 3 per cent, instead would be “tolerable” if unforeseen events meant that inflation ended up there, but it would not be something to consciously aim for. The idea that many commentators seem to have is that a target range would mean the Riksbank would feel less forced to bring inflation up to 2 per cent, which in turn would mean that monetary policy would not need to be as expansionary and the risks linked to such a policy could be mitigated. Difficult to pursue another policy even with an interval I would like to point out here, without commenting on the pros and cons of a target range in general terms, that this idea appears to be based in part on a misunderstanding of the motives behind the Riksbank’s policy. The reason the Riksbank is eager to get inflation to rise is not that we have a rigid fixation with achieving exactly 2 per cent inflation all the time. It is due to the fact that the period in which inflation has been below the target has gradually become longer, and that long-term inflation expectations have shown a falling trend and still remain below the target.

For the reasons I noted a moment ago when discussing the level of the inflation target – that the interest rate hits its lower limit more easily and it becomes difficult to counteract a recession – it is important to avoid inflation and inflation expectations falling too far and get stuck at a level that is too low. This would be the case even if we had had a target range of 1–3 per cent. Inflation and inflation expectations which creep downwards and get stuck near the lower limit of this range could be  15  The Riksbank (2010). 16  See for example Fromlet (2015) and Lars Jonung in Svenska Dagbladet (2015). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  as problematic as if the inflation target itself had been lowered. It is thus difficult to see that the Riksbank would have pursued a notably different policy even if there had been a target range, or that there would be grounds to adjust the current policy if a target range were to be introduced tomorrow.17 This is probably also the reason why central banks in countries which have a formal target range, such as Canada and New Zealand, usually aim for the midpoint of the range.18 After all, the safest way to prevent inflation and inflation expectations beginning to slide out of the range is to attempt to keep them in the middle of it.
It will be the safest asset as it will have legal tender statusiv and it will be accepted everywhere throughout the euro area. Its basic functionalities will be free for individualsv and it should not be remunerated. But "Cash+" will also provide additional advantages over banknotes: it will allow everyone to use central bank money in e-commerce, for peer-to-peer payments as well as for conditional or "programmable" payments. These considerations have led the Eurosystem – under the auspices of Christine Lagarde and my colleague Fabio Panetta - to launch an investigation phase focused on a digital euro, which should culminate in a preparatory phase by the end of 2023, subject to the agreement of the Governing Council. Based on these preparations, we could then decide on a gradual launch, beginning in 2027 or 2028. Last Wednesday, the European Commission published a draft directive to enable the issue of a digital euro. This legislative proposal is clearly a very good step in the right direction: it ensures that the digital euro will indeed be equivalent to a “digital banknote”, providing a high level of confidentiality, while guaranteeing that it is properly integrated into the financial and payments ecosystem. Let us be clear here: I consider it our duty to develop this possibility for our citizens, however, they themselves will be free to use it or not.

Taking a partnership approach to innovation, our common challenge as Europeans is to leverage – all together – the tremendous potential for innovation opening up before us:   In commercial banking, the phased launch of the European Payments  Initiative (EPI) – which has our full backing – will provide a modern, European payment solution, and what would appear to be a viable solution for circulating the digital euro alongside the commercial euro. French and European commercial banks could also develop tokenised bank deposits with enhanced features. In a remarkable report,vi the BIS recently stated its clear preference for these tokenised bank deposits that will offer greater security, rather than for stablecoins (all of which are issued by non-European players and mostly backed by the dollar). Issuing and trading of financial assets is also being modernised through tokenisation underpinned by new distributed ledger technologies. Page 6 of 6   In addition, in central banking, the development of “wholesale” CBDC  would appear to be just as important as the digital retail euro in extending the anchoring role of central bank money in the tokenised sphere, by securing interbank settlements and financial transactions. The Banque de France has played a pioneering role here through twelve experiments conducted with the private sector: we will be publishing the results this summer. We have demonstrated that wholesale CBDC could facilitate interoperability between different DLT platforms developed by the public or private sector as well as with existing settlement systems.
And this, despite a drop in the cost of capital, mainly due to the lower risk-free interest rate of the economy, but also to banks’ improved risk profile, manifested, among other variables, in higher solvency ratios. By contrast, US banks have managed to achieve very high levels of profitability (in 2018, 11% in the USA compared with 6% in Europe) more in line with the cost of capital (between 8% and 10% in 2018). Our analyses indicate that this is one of the reasons why the market value to book value ratio of US banks significantly exceeds that of European banks, which remains at values below one. 1  Also, a high level of capital entails a stronger link between the personal wealth of the owners and the economic performance of the banks, thus contributing to mitigate the risk profile that the latter are prepared to assume and, therefore, the likelihood that they will overreach themselves and will subsequently require traumatic correction measures. 4/29  Spanish banks are no exception to this European pattern, although their profitability at consolidated level remains above the European average. The breakdown of the return on assets shows that the higher figures of Spanish banks compared with the euro area average are basically due to their higher net interest income. This reflects the fact that Spanish banks have a higher share of their business in less mature markets where margins are higher, such as the Latin American economies.

Strong growth in the world and in China and India are driving a very good terms of trade scenario, together with good access to our products in world markets. Thanks to its openness and to its macroeconomic policy framework, Chile has reaped the benefits of this good scenario both in the sense of reaching average growth close to the trend and in accumulating resources that may permit to prevent a real appreciation while ensuring funding for public spending, should the terms of trade deteriorate. This policy framework permits to prevent episodes of unsustainable expansion and crises that came with terms of trade cycles in the past. BIS Review 87/2007  5
Therefore, problems in one bank can easily undermine confidence in other banks. So the contagion risks are significant. In addition, a standard bankruptcy procedure is rarely a good solution for banks, as banks are central to payments and the first step in a bankruptcy procedure is usually to suspend payments. Whether or not a bank is viable, it can be subject to bank runs. I do not want to judge the viability of the banks in question, but it is clear that some banks in the United States and one bank in Switzerland experienced a run. Customers lost confidence and wanted to withdraw their money immediately. There was uncertainty about whether the banks would be able to survive. This uncertainty can bring down a bank, whether it is justified or unjustified. On 9 March, depositors at Silicon Valley Bank withdrew more than $ billion in one day.5 This represented 19 per cent of its total assets, or 23 per cent of its deposits. In addition, the bank itself expected withdrawals to be around $ billion the next day. No bank can handle such a bank run without help. This is nothing new. Banks need to be regulated Precisely because banks are so important to the economy and at the same time so genuinely unstable, they must be subject to extensive regulation and supervision. Following the global financial crisis of 2007-2010, when several banks ran into problems, global standards for banks were tightened, including through Basel III and the FSB's resolution framework.

It is a “currency without a state”, in which a group of fiscally sovereign countries shares a single currency and a single central bank issuing fiat paper money, yet evidently lacks a clear monetary hegemon. So the euro is not just a different version of the gold standard, as Balczerowicz, de Soto and many others argue. Not least because of the fact that unlike any commodity standard, the euro lacks anything resembling an ultimate numéraire. And more importantly, within the eurozone Germany is not a monetary hegemon anymore. Yes, the German mark and the Bundesbank were clear monetary hegemons in Western Europe in the pre-euro era. And remember, it was argued that the euro would become “the German mark for the whole of Europe” in the many public debates that went on in Germany prior to its introduction. Yet it is evident that it could not and cannot function in this way. Yes, monetary unification in Europe does not make much sense without Germany. This is still true. But my definition of a clear hegemon is: it should have the right to set the rules and to force others to behave accordingly, the right to enforce the rules. And it has to have the right even to breach the rules itself and still not allow the others to breach the very same rules. But this is not true for Germany after the introduction of the euro.