samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The fifth area concerns the risk of asset managers offering short-term redemptions to investors against potentially illiquid securities. The proportion of assets held in such structures has increased over the past decade. Given more fragile underlying market liquidity, for the reasons I have described, stressed disposals of assets might be harder to accommodate in an orderly fashion. The international securities regulatory body IOSCO, issued recommendations in 2012 that provide a basis for Common Standards for Money Market Funds (MMFs) across jurisdictions, in particular seeking to ensure that MMFs are not susceptible to the risk of runs (in the way that banks can be). More broadly, work continues on putting into practice appropriate policies and standards to prevent the risk of disorderly sales of assets in the face of investor withdrawals. Potential responses (and at this stage we are looking at options in an open way) are to require funds to hold larger liquid asset buffers to facilitate orderly redemption payments to investors, to apply more stringent leverage limits where appropriate, and to require that the redemption terms offered to investors take sufficient account of the risk that secondary market liquidity in the assets they hold could become impaired. These are possibilities, but at this stage very much not policies for the reason that a lot more work is need to properly assess them. Last, central banks can back-stop market liquidity by acting as market makers of the last resort.

Have they been transformed into new puzzles and uncertainties? And what does it all mean for policy going forward? The good news is that the recovery has remained strong. Indeed, after the revisions to the past data in this year’s blue book we now know the economy passed its pre-crisis size in the third quarter of 2013. We can talk now of an expansion rather than a recovery. On the latest data, growth in the four quarters to September now stands at 3% – a little stronger than expected back last November. Growth was particularly strong in the first half of the year and the business surveys suggest that may well be revised upwards. In the latest quarter of this year, growth is reported to have fallen back to 0.7%. The burst of pent up demand that propelled the initial recovery was a little stronger and lasted a little longer than we had been expecting last November. But it does now seem to be fading. Moreover, growth has become more broadly based due to the marked pick up in business investment. The shift of the balance of growth towards business investment that the surveys were pointing to last November, has I am pleased to say come through more strongly than expected. Business investment now looks to have driven around a third of the increase in GDP we have seen over the past year. That has made the recovery more broadly based and more sustainable.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In France, successive governments have reformed pension regimes, introduced measures to reduce labour costs (the competitiveness pact) and increased flexibility in the labour market. These are first steps in an ongoing effort to restore competitiveness and rebuild an export base. These measures must be pursued and amplified. Let me conclude. The last three years have been the most difficult for Europe since the creation of the European Union. It is certainly too soon to say that the crisis is over. Current trends, however, are positive and the euro area looks today much stronger than it did a year ago. Current projections point to a return to positive growth in the second half of 2013 and in 2014. There are numerous signs that efforts undertaken in the last two years are bearing fruit. Significant changes have been made to euro area governance, both by strengthening fiscal frameworks and improving crisis management mechanisms. Much remains to be done. But if we keep on the right track, we will emerge from the crisis better equipped to take advantage of the opportunities offered by our common currency. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

As part of the Financial Market Committee's (FMC) effort to further develop the onshore financial markets, the Islamic Financial Market Subcommittee has been tasked to formulate specific market development initiatives to take us forward. The committee has already started work in 2022 with an assessment on the current state of the Islamic financial market in Malaysia and identifying gaps on potential growth areas. Key areas with gaps that need to be addressed are the general market liquidity, the extent of foreign participation in the domestic market and the vibrancy of the interbank market for derivatives. The Islamic repurchase market registered RM39.4 billion in volume in 2021 or around 1% of the total Islamic money market volume for the year while the derivatives market witnessed a mere fraction of 0.1% of Islamic instruments with the rest being conventional instruments. If we consider that Islamic financing comprises more than 40% of the total, we have a lot of opportunity here. Meanwhile, foreign participation in the sukuk market was less than a third of the conventional bond market and hence, further efforts can be undertaken to boost this. The assessment also observed that the outlook for the Malaysian Islamic financial market in the next 5-10 years is generally positive, pointing towards continued growth and development as well as Malaysia remaining as a major global Islamic financial centre6.
The establishment of temporary credit institutions or bridge banks is emerging as a key resolution tool, but the new resolution frameworks need to address a number of related technical issues, such as the question of who provides the necessary capital and liquidity to the bridge institution, how the bridge bank can use the infrastructure of the failed bank, and how and when it is ultimately dissolved, since bridge banks are temporary entities needing a good exit strategy. Finally, the design of bank levies, which could usefully be collected into resolution funds, is also a delicate area. Mechanisms are under examination both to recoup the losses of the crisis and to create provisions against future events. I believe that ex ante funding is a crucial element, since it may reduce moral hazard and improves the authorities’ ability to react to crises earlier, thus strengthening the credibility of such actions. Levies are valuable revenueraising mechanisms with which to finance crisis measures. Uncertainty remains as to how they would affect the particular problem of moral hazard in the financial sector, and both the rate and the base of levies need to be determined with care, especially if we want to include the aspect of systemic risk as well. However, maintaining a level playing field and coordination between Member States remains in my view paramount in order to avoid a distortion of fund contributions and resolution tools. Challenges ahead – more integration I am confident that the emerging EU regime will appropriately address all these challenges.

Chart: Financial stress arises The red lines in the panel again show a scenario where the central bank does take into account the possible effect of monetary policy on financial stress. When financial turbulence occurs, the economic setback is less pronounced and less prolonged than if the central bank had not taken this risk into account in monetary policy, as illustrated by the blue lines. The benefit gained from keeping the interest rate somewhat higher in the short term is in this case a more stable path for inflation and output over time. This framework is highly stylised. In the actual implementation of monetary policy we are faced with a number of difficulties. First, developments in debt and house prices depend on a number of factors in addition to the interest rate. Second, both the costs and the benefits of leaning against the wind are uncertain. What we do know, however, is that the economic consequences of a financial crisis are so serious that an insurance premium is worth paying. Let me now return to the Norwegian economy and to the trade-offs in recent interest rate setting in Norway. As I said earlier, the key policy rate in Norway has in recent years been kept slightly higher than implied by medium-term outlook for inflation and output, in order to mitigate the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. However, through last autumn, oil prices fell sharply and the growth outlook for the Norwegian economy weakened.
However, the lower dynamism estimated for the last quarter of the year leads us to expect that 2016 growth will be in the lower bound of the range projected in September. Going forward, we estimate that the economy will return to near-potential expansion rates towards the end of 2017, although at a somewhat slower pace than we estimated in September. Abroad, the biggest news has been the changes in financial markets after the US election. The movements that followed took a toll on financial conditions, despite that they are still 1 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  expansionary from a historical standpoint. Last week the Federal Reserve raised the policy rate for the second time, a decision that was widely expected by the markets. The surprise was the confirmation of a slightly faster withdrawal of the monetary stimulus, which has shaken the financial markets in recent days. As for activity and inflation, they continue to show advances in the developed world, while they are tending to stabilize in the main emerging economies. We see some improvement in the terms of trade in the near future. Considering all the above and its effects on the medium-term outlook, the baseline scenario of this MP Report has revised the 2017 inflation trajectory from September downward. This is because core inflation—what we call the CPIEFE (i.e. excluding foods and energy)—is expected to drop significantly, due to the important weight in inflation of import-related prices.

Determination is necessary in order to act in a timely way, because an untimely monetary policy will delay the convergence of inflation to the target or will do so at an unnecessary cost. 9 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  In practice, this means making robust monetary policy decisions in uncertain conditions. Thus, in our last monetary policy meeting we communicated that, in the most likely scenario, a bounded easing of the monetary impulse would be needed. The search for the right combination of prudence and determination is also necessary in the other fields where the Central Bank operates. To monitor the financial sector without restricting its ability to innovate; to develop instruments and facilities that are attractive to the market, and to improve risk management and transparency without compromising efficiency and timeliness. Identifying the new challenges facing the Central Bank and finding the answers that best balance prudence and determination requires organized and systematic efforts. As an expression of it, in the coming months we will develop a new institutional strategic planning exercise. We intend to consult with various players, both public and private, including, of course, this Committee. The purpose of this exercise, of the initiatives we undertake, and the conduct of our regular policy decisions must be particularly explicit. What we ultimately aspire is to continue to strengthen the Central Bank of Chile as an institution of excellence, that our fellow Chileans can trust. Thank you.
In recognition of the rapid spread of the concept of Islamic banking worldwide, Bank of Zambia undertook a survey to determine the extent of the knowledge and demand for Islamic Banking among banks as a way of enhancing the regulatory preparedness. Significant findings were that the extent of the existing knowledge on, and demand for Islamic Banking in Zambia is quite limited and that currently none of the banks offer Islamic Banking services. The results also indicated that 80% of the respondents intend to introduce Islamic banking products in the near future. Further, most banks had received enquiries from their clients on Islamic banking products. I have no doubt that this conference is very timely and that it provides a unique opportunity for stakeholders in the financial sector to share knowledge and experiences on how best to promote financial diversity and inclusiveness to all sectors of the economy by introducing and incorporating Islamic banking. Distinguished delegates, On behalf of Bank of Zambia, I would like to thank our various presenters and panelists for accepting to help facilitate our deliberations over the next two days. I therefore, would like to appeal to all delegates to engage fully in these discussions and make the most of the wealth of knowledge generated in the house. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure and privilege to welcome you to the Islamic Banking Conference and officially open the Conference. 2  BIS Review 131/2008

In addition, there is no previous experience of structural changes of this magnitude, which also require a very long-term perspective, and where the presence of non-linearities and irreversible tipping points are likely, conditioning the methodologies to be used. And there is limited research, and accompanying data, that explore how climate risks feed into the financial risks faced by banks. In this context, many supervisory and/or prudential authorities are opting to use stress tests and scenario analysis. The Bank of Spain is indeed preparing such stress tests for the Spanish banking sector and the results are expected to be published in Autumn. 3  A Pigouvian tax is assessed against private individuals or businesses that engage in activities with adverse side-effects for society that are not internalised by these private agents, as a result of not being an integral part of the costs and prices they face. In any case, recognition should be given to the fact that the efficacy of Pigouvian taxes may have a limit. This is because, at some point, the supply of polluting energy inputs may be so elastic that it absorbs all the taxes levied on them, without affecting demand. At that point, quantitative restrictions could become the best option. 4  As a result, we should accept that efforts to translate climate-related risks into quantifiable financial risks are in their early stages. And we will have to step up our efforts to address these problems and limitations.
While employment in the agricultural sector decreased by 3.6 percentage points compared to the same period last year, employment in the services sector rose by 2.9 percentage points. In this context, the share of the agricultural sector in total employment fell from 38 percent in 2001 to 28.4 percent, as of May 2006. However, taking into account that this ratio was 3.7 percent for EU-15 countries in 2004, Turkey still has a long way to go. Similarly, when we look at the labor force participation rates, we see a significant discrepancy. The labor force participation rate, which fell by 0.7 percentage points and became 48.6 percent in Turkey in May 2006, compared to the same period last year, was around 65 percent for EU15 countries by the year 2004. Meanwhile, a relative improvement is observed in unemployment rates. The unemployed population and the unemployment rate are at their lowest levels since the third quarter of 2001. Compared to the same period last year, the unemployment rate decreased to 8.8 percent from 9.2 percent in May. During the same period, the unemployment rate in sectors excluding agriculture fell by 1 percentage point and became 11.5 percent. Similarly, it can be said that there is a relative improvement in the unemployment rates in urban areas. The unemployment rate, especially among the young population  8  BIS Review 89/2006  in urban areas, decreased by 2.3 percentage points and fell to 19.4 percent from 21.7 percent.

When oil prices are taken as those of the year 2000, it can be said that the ratio of current account deficit to national income is 1.2 percentage points lower as of the first quarter of 2006. Meanwhile, it is expected that the depreciation of the Turkish currency due to recent fluctuations in financial markets, monetary policy tightening and the relative decline in domestic demand will slow economic activity and imports to a certain extent as of the second half of the year. As for exports, the upward trend is anticipated to gain momentum in line with increased foreign demand. In this framework, it is expected that the ratio of current account deficit to gross national product will fall in 2006 compared to 2005. The quality of financing is very important for the sustainability of the current account deficit and for preventing the perception that the current account deficit is a risk. The quality of financing in Turkey has improved significantly, especially due to the favorable impact of the structural transformation process and has enhanced the macroeconomic conditions observed in the last five years. Long-term capital is assuming an increasingly important role in the financing of the current account deficit. By June, 82 percent of the current account deficit has been financed with long-term capital alone. Meanwhile, the ratio of short-term capital to current account deficit stands at 29.4 percent. In addition, foreign direct investments peaked well beyond historic levels and reached a record-high level of USD 17.3 billion in annual terms in June 2006.
But it would gradually be brought back to low levels, so that we were equipped for the next war. A big question in the modern world is what level of government debt/GDP would be needed by countries in economic peacetime if societies wished them to be able to offset economic disasters. The immediate focus is on addressing “structural” budget deficits, with a view to stabilising debt/GDP. But there will be longer-term choices about the level of the debt itself. Those are choices for decades rather than for a Parliament. And they are not choices for central bankers. But I would say this from my own vantage point. The higher the steady-state level of debt society chooses, the more resilient our financial system would need to be. 13  For example, see Bean C R (2009), “Some Lessons for Monetary Policy from the Recent Financial Turmoil”, remarks at Conference on Globalisation, Inflation and Monetary Policy, Istanbul, 22 November, 2009 and Tucker P M W (2006), “Reflections on operating inflation targeting”, at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 25 May, 2006, pp. 4. BIS Review 21/2010  9  Conclusion The title I was given for my remarks today was “Inflation, growth and stability: balancing the Bank of England’s economic priorities”. Our priority as central bankers remains the same: stability. Price stability, as encapsulated in our inflation target, is a necessary precondition for sustainable growth in output and for maintaining “full employment”. That is no less true today than before the current downturn.

Given how much debt banks will need to refinance or repay to the authorities around the world over the next few years, the Bank is keen – as reflected in the recently published minutes of the Chancellor’s Council for Financial Stability – that individual banks agree indicative refinancing plans with their supervisors; and that at least aggregate national conditions be shared amongst international peers. That would help to avoid each bank thinking that it can  2  BIS Review 21/2010  delay its effort, risking an almighty scramble in eighteen months or so when official-facilities will be running off. As household sector saving has risen and as banks have deleveraged, government borrowing has increased very sharply as it helped to absorb the macroeconomic shock. Without too much exaggeration, this can be thought of as a rescheduling of private sector debt facilitated by the only balance sheet currently strong enough to bear it – HMG’s. But, like financial services, the public sector had accounted for an increasing share of measured output in the run up to the crisis. And since a good deal of that was debt financed, this source of support is not unlimited. Indeed, those two sectors have to be part of the process of rebalancing demand and activity in the economy over the years ahead. Overall, the rebuilding of balance sheets and the rebalancing of demand pose a downside risk to the outlook for activity. Effective supply, and inflationary pressures Repair of balance sheets will affect the path of demand. What of supply?
In addition to these measures, the conditions for the Liquidity Support Facility offered to banks under extraordinary conditions were revised. Now, I would like to once more underline that if problems in international markets further deepen and adversely affect domestic financial markets, the Central Bank will continue to take additional measures and to employ other policy instruments. Esteemed Guests, Inflation expectations displayed a downward trend in the first quarter of 2009 in line with decelerating inflation. As the incoming information on inflation and economic activity confirmed our forecasts and vindicated the CBT’s monetary policy decisions, inflation expectations also responded favorably following a low course in the second quarter of 2009. BIS Review 67/2009  9  Though inflation expectations for every term fall compared to the previous Inflation Report period, the decline in short-term inflation expectations appears to be more evident since April 2009 (Figures 15 and 16). Figure 15: 12 and 24-Month Ahead* CPI Figure 16: Inflation Expectations Curve* Expectations (Annual Percentage Change) (Annual Percentage Change) 10  10  9 8  6.86  7 6  8  7.55 6.71  7  6.45  5 12 Months  3  5  24 Months  4 01 04 07 10 01 04 07 10 01 04 07 10 01 04 06 06 06 06 07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 09 09  * Second survey term expectations of the CBT Expectations Survey. Source: CBT.

Forecasts for Inflation and Output Gap Forecast Range*  Output Gap (Base Scenario)  Uncertainty Band for 2009  End-Year Inflation Targets  12 Control Horizon  10 8 6  Percent  4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 4 2008  1  2  3 2009  4  1  2  3 2010  4  1  2  3 2011  4  1 2012  *Indicates a 70-percent confidence interval for the forecast  To sum up, the sharp weakening in aggregate demand has not only led to faster-thanenvisaged rate cuts, but has also required a downward revision in the medium-term inflation forecasts. The revised forecast suggests that the recent rate cuts have lowered the probability of significantly undershooting the end-year inflation target. However, given the tightness in financial conditions and the absence of clear signs of recovery in the global economy, it may be necessary for monetary policy to maintain an easing bias for a considerable period. It should be emphasized that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in monetary policy stance. Therefore, I would like to repeat once again that  BIS Review 67/2009  17  the assumptions on future policy rates underlying the inflation forecast should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the Central Bank of Turkey. 4.