samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The iBoxx ABF Indices, the benchmark indices for the ABF2 Funds, are transparent and credible and compiled by an independent index provider. They can be easily replicated and customised by the private sector for other fixed-income products and derivatives and represent an important piece of market infrastructure for Asia. Moreover, since bond ETFs are a new product in Asia, in a number of cases, the linkage between the clearing and settlement systems for debt securities and that for equities have to be improved in order to allow the listing and trading of a bond ETF on the stock exchange. 13. Third, the ABF initiative has been a catalyst for regulatory and tax reforms in EMEAP markets, helping to remove market impediments and facilitate financial integration in the region. For example, the PAIF is the first foreign institutional investor to be granted access to China's interbank bond market. Securities regulators in Malaysia and Thailand have recently issued new rules to facilitate listing of ABF2 funds as bond ETFs. Malaysia and Thailand have exempted non-resident investors from withholding-tax, and Malaysia has liberalised its foreign exchange administration rules. Both Malaysia and Thailand opened their domestic bond market to bonds issued by multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank. 14. Fourth, the ABF initiative has helped to standardise and harmonise documentation for this type of exercise.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 2 Monetary policy rates around the world (1) (percent) 9  9  7  7  5  5  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  3  3  1  1  0  0 06  07 Chile  08 09 Developed econ. (2)  10 11 Emerging eco. (3)  (1) Corresponds to a simple average of the reference rates for each group of countries. (2) Includes Euro area, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. (3) Includes Brazil, Czech Republic, China, Colombia, Hungary, South Korea, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and South Africa. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. Figure 3 U.S multilateral nominal exchange rate (*) (index, March 1973=100) 160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60 73  79  85  91  97  03  09  (*) An increase indicates a depreciation of the dollar against main trading partners. Sources: Bloomberg and U.S. Federal Reserve.
Richard W Fisher: Connecting the dots – Texas employment growth; a dissenting vote; and the ugly truth (with reference to P G Wodehouse) Remarks by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, at the Midland Community Forum, Midland, Texas, 17 August 2011. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Thank you, Kirk [Edwards]. It is great to be here in the cool climes of Midland, Texas. I appreciate your having walked our friends today through the operations of the Dallas Fed. You know as chairman of our El Paso Branch board that we operate a well-run business as we provide services to the American people that only a central bank can provide, from making sure you have folding money, to lending to our community and regional banks, to supervising and regulating bank and thrift holding companies so as to protect depositors. As president and CEO of the Dallas Fed, I am responsible for a $ billion bank, accountable to a board of local directors. That board is chaired by Herb Kelleher (you Midlanders will appreciate that Herb’s immediate past predecessors were Jim Hackett, president and CEO of Anadarko Petroleum, and Ray Hunt) and consists of eight other citizens of our district; I am also advised by the private-sector directors of the El Paso, San Antonio and Houston branches of our bank.

For those of you unfamiliar with the expression “Bernanke put,” or more generally, a “central bank put,” this term refers to the concept that a central bank will allow the stock market to rise significantly without tightening monetary policy, but will ease monetary policy whenever there is a stock market “correction.” Given the extent of the drop in the stock market leading up to and following Standard & Poor’s downgrade of U.S. debt, combined with the FOMC’s commitment to hold short-term rates near zero until mid-year 2013, some cynical observers might interpret such a policy action as a “Bernanke put.” My long-standing belief is that the Federal Reserve should never enact such asymmetric policies to protect stock market traders and investors. I believe my FOMC colleagues share this view. Connecting the dots Now, how do you connect the dots between Texas’ record of economic growth and my dissenting vote? Despite the fact that Texas has severely limited social services and an education system that faces great challenges, people and businesses have been picking up stakes and moving to Texas in significant numbers over a prolonged period.3 It should be noted that in the last census, Texas gained population and congressional seats, while California’s population growth and congressional representation was static and New York’s was diminished. Jobs have been created for American workers in Texas in several different sectors, not just in the oil and gas and mining sectors.
There might be arguments in favour of basing the interest rate assumption on external factors, as an exogenous assumption, either by assuming that the interest rate will remain constant through the projection period or that it will develop in line with market expectations. The projections that result from such technical interest rate assumptions do not necessarily provide a reasonable balance between the different objectives of monetary policy. In some cases, both the interest rate assumption and the projections may seem unreasonable. This may raise the question of the purpose of forecasting. However, it provides a starting-point for discussions about how the interest rate path might be adjusted to produce more acceptable results. Alternatively, the interest rate can be treated in the same way as other variables forecast by the Bank. We would then have to try to make projections for inflation, output and the interest rate simultaneously, with the aim of arriving at an interest rate path that provides a reasonable balance between the different objectives of monetary policy. If the central bank has the intention of adhering to this interest rate path, this might be regarded as an interest rate forecast rather than a technical assumption. BIS Review 6/2006  1  Establishing such an interest rate path is not a straightforward matter. Flexible inflation targeting, which is the system we use, means that the deviation from the inflation target and the output gap are both taken into account.

There may be several reasons for this. Calculated forward rates will usually reflect market expectations concerning the future interest rate path. Market interest rates may, however, be influenced by extraordinary supply and demand factors that do not have a bearing on the outlook for underlying economic developments or monetary policy. But market participants may also have a different perception of the interest rate path that is required to stabilise inflation at target. The difference can also be ascribed to the downward pressure exerted on long-term interest rates in many countries by extraordinary conditions in international capital flows. Possible challenges of an explicit forecast of future interest rates To what extent a central bank should publish an interest rate forecast has been the subject of discussion in international economic literature. 4 The discussion has arisen as a result of the different solutions chosen by different central banks for different reasons. It has been argued that the central bank might feel too bound by a previously announced interest rate path. Publication of the Bank’s interest rate forecast might impose constraints on monetary policy, making it more difficult to adjust the interest rate to changes in economic developments. The interest rate path may be perceived as a straightjacket, preventing the central bank from pursuing the policy it considers to be appropriate at any given time. In addition, if the central bank should deviate from the previously published interest rate forecast, the Bank might be accused of misleading the market. Confidence in the central bank may thereby be undermined.
The only conclusion to be drawn is that with their operational reforms, strong communication, successful financing arrangements, building of liquidity and ongoing strong business performance, the banks have largely reclaimed their former position in the eyes of global investors. The authorities, and the Central Bank in particular, focused their efforts on communication about the character and structure of the economy, the current position and outlook, and other relevant information. The Central Bank’s regular Monetary Bulletin includes inflation and macroeconomic forecasts and a detailed analysis of economic developments. Once a year the Central Bank publishes a separate Financial Stability report and a more detailed and comprehensive edition than otherwise was produced in spring 2006 in response to prevailing conditions. It sought to address as many points as possible that had been raised by foreign analysts in the preceding months. The Bank’s financial stability analysis has been described by international reviewers as professional and transparent. It strove to fulfil such expectations a year ago in difficult circumstances. In the Bank’s view this aim was achieved and the report played an important role in explaining the position of the Icelandic financial sector at that time. Another crucial factor was that the Central Bank tightened the monetary stance sharply by raising its policy rate by 3.75 percentage points during the year and signalling clearly to the markets a firm commitment to bring inflation back to target after it had risen substantially as a result of the króna depreciation.

The Bank’s capital was also boosted. The main rationale for increasing the reserves and capital was to strengthen the Bank in performing its functions in a much expanded financial sector, and to address comments from rating agencies and others about the Bank’s inadequate foreign liquidity relative to Iceland’s large foreign debts, which are overwhelmingly in the private sector. There was no other motive behind boosting the reserves and the Central Bank has underlined the importance of not creating moral hazard. Unease in the markets lasted until mid-2006, when it calmed down significantly. By then, the króna had depreciated by one-quarter and around mid-year the real exchange rate was close to the twentyfive-year average. In historical terms it was much more normal than in the second half of 2005, i.e. before the depreciation in the first half of last year. This is an important fact to bear in mind, i.e. that the króna depreciated from an unsustainable and far higher real exchange rate than was compatible with external balance of the economy. The change was actually normal and necessary, and formed part of the pressing external adjustment of the economy. Since the middle of last year, the króna has been fairly stable. It has fluctuated within a relatively narrow corridor which it has only moved beyond in a few exceptional cases. So far this year it has strengthened. Since the beginning of 2007 the nominal exchange rate has on average been 14% weaker than the average for the last quarter of 2005.
Neumark, D (2018), 'Experimental Research on Labor Market Discrimination', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 799-866. O’Donnell, O, van Doorslaer, E, Wagstaff, A and Lindelow, M (2008), 'Analyzing Health Equity Using Household Survey Data: A Guide to techniques and Their Implementation', World Bank, Chapter 12, pp. 147-159. Olivetti, C and Petrongolo, B (2016), ‘The Evolution of Gender Gaps in Industrialized Countries’, Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 405-434 O’Neill, J (1990), 'The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences between Black and White Men', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 25-45. Oaxaca, R (1973), ‘Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets’, International Economic Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 693-709. Olsen, W and Walby, S (2004), 'Modelling gender pay gaps', EOC Working Paper Series, No. 17, Equal Opportunities Commission. ONS (2018), 'Gender pay gap in the UK: 2018', Office for National Statistics. ONS (2019), 'Ethnicity pay gaps in Great Britain: 2018', Office for National Statistics. 39  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  39  Rodgers, W M and Spriggs, W E (1996), 'What Does the AFQT Really Measure? Race, Wages, Schooling, and the AFQT Score', Review of Black Political Economy, Vol. 24, pp. 13-47, Stanley, T D and Jarrell, S B (1998), 'Gender Wage Discrimination Bias? A Meta-Regression Analysis', Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 947-973. TCFD (2019), ‘2019 Status Report’, Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures.

Challenges for policy Turning now to macroeconomic issues, we in the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have had a particular interest in the arrival of the euro, since it was the final step in the transition of the eleven participating countries from closely aligned rates to irrevocably fixed rates, and has therefore consolidated the number of economies where, like Hong Kong, some form of fixed exchange rate arrangement is regarded as both desirable and workable. Of course, I accept that technically the eleven currencies have not been fixed or pegged to one another, but have gone a stage further and been replaced by a single successor. But the critical point is that the euro countries individually have to a large extent, as Hong Kong did to an even larger extent over fifteen years ago, surrendered scope for exchange rate adjustment as an instrument of policy. In the euro case the surrender is not total since, although no member can any longer move relative to the ten other participants, the European Central Bank can of course still pursue an independent monetary policy relative to the rest of the world. Hong Kong is more tightly bound, since we are linked to the US dollar over whose wider value we have no influence. When we pegged the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar in 1983 we did so at a time of crisis and partly because there was, for institutional reasons, effectively no viable alternative available to us at the time.
See Thirteen days in October: how central bank balance sheets can support monetary and financial stability − speech by Andrew Hauser 6. Market-based finance refers to the system of markets (eg equity and debt markets), non-bank financial institutions (including investment funds, hedge funds, pension funds and insurers) and infrastructure (such as central counterparties and payments providers) which, alongside banks, provide financial services to support the economy. See Assessing the resilience of market-based finance 7. See Financial Policy Summary and Record - March 2023 8. See Using leveraged liability-driven investment 9. A regulatory buffer is said to be usable if institutions are permitted to operate normally even if their regulatory ratios decline below it. See Emerging prudential lessons from the Covid stress - speech by Victoria Saporta 10. See Bank staff paper: LDI minimum resilience - recommendation and explainer 11. The 99.8th percentile of a 10-year look-back window of rolling five-day shocks. 12. This might be expressed as a 1-in-100 year (or 99.998th percentile) five-day shock. 13. See Looking through a glass onion: lessons from the 2022 LDI intervention − speech by Andrew Hauser 14. See Further guidance on enhancing resilience in Liability Driven Investment 15. See Using leveraged liability-driven investment 16. See Pension Schemes Act 2021  and Pension Schemes Act 2021  17. See Building financial market resilience: From diagnosis to prescription - speech by Jonathan Hall 18. See Investing in financial stability − speech by Sarah Breeden 19. Including, but not limited to, investment funds, hedge funds, pension funds and insurers.

I am glad to see that almost all selected papers, including the ones by academia focus on the practical issues that are important for the policy formulation and decision making in the central bank. These works serve as the foundation for our understanding of economic and financial phenomena and the interaction of our monetary, macro and micro prudential policies with the economy. It is due to this understanding and knowledge that Bank of Albania crafts its policy response and chose its policy instruments to respond to significant negative shocks that have hit our economy. Recent data suggest that the pandemic has had severe impact on the Albanian economy, which experienced the strongest contraction of gross domestic product in the last two decades, at – 10.2% during the second quarter of 2020. Macro data on labour markets show that compared to the end of 2019, the Albanian economy lost about 50 thousand jobs, equal to an annual decline in employment of 3.6%. As a result of this the unemployment rate increased to 11.9%. Responding to such developments, inflation in the third quarter decreased to 1.4%, from 1.9% in the previous quarter. Despite these negative shocks, the measures taken by the Bank of Albania have provided the necessary monetary stimulus to support the normal functioning of the financial markets and to ensure the flow of credit in the economy. Interest rates for households and businesses are low and liquidity pressures are under control, while the exchange rate appears stable.
Churchill himself said that “a nation that forgets its past has no future.” Our banknotes are testaments to the outstanding achievements of the nation’s greatest individuals; they are repositories of the United Kingdom’s collective memory. That contribution will continue with the new £ which brings together the future, in the form of polymer and the most advanced security features yet, and Britain’s glorious history, in the achievements of Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

The implications of that fact should be remembered when assessing the course of changes in the previously centrally planned economies. The transition in Central and Eastern Europe is inevitably a much more complex and longer-term phenomenon, for which no generalised theory could be available to apply. Such radical transformation requires a feasible strategy implemented with wide political support of the population. Transformation requires some minimum speed, and must start with some “critical mass” of change to secure sufficient impact on the behaviour of economic agents. In individual Central European post-communist countries, the sequence, speed, BIS Review 25/1997  -2-  and forms of individual steps necessarily differed; they had different starting conditions, different degrees of political support of the new governments, and they also applied different strategies. The Czechoslovak case At the start of transformation in 1990, Czechoslovakia had some economic advantages over the other Central and East European post-communist countries. In Czechoslovakia, during the preceding decade, state budgets were mostly balanced, foreign debt was low, and the balance of payments showed no big deficits or surpluses. Inflation was relatively low. Even if there was an inflationary potential (reflected not only in open inflation but also in the forms of hidden and repressed inflation) and the monetary overhang was increasing in the 1980s, its dimensions continued to be considerably lower than in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia, especially the Czech Republic, also had the advantage of a long industrial history, and of well-educated and skilled labour.
Perhaps the most important dimension of this experience was the doubling of productivity growth, from about 1.5 percent a year in the two decades up to 1995 to more than 3 percent a year in the decade since. Productivity growth is important because it is the primary driver of long term gains in living standards. And this acceleration in the United States seems more remarkable in part because most other large mature economies experienced a slowdown in productivity growth during the same period. This doubling of productivity growth in the United States can be broken down into several important elements. One was rapid improvement in the productivity of the relatively small part of the economy that produces information technology, including computers and computer software and telecommunications equipment. Also important was very substantial growth in investment in information technology by the rest of the economy. And alongside these changes, U.S. firms became significantly more efficient in their use of equipment and labor. The sources of these improvements in productivity are varied and complex. Economists do not fully understand what drove them, but they seem to agree on several contributing factors. We experienced a very large and positive technology shock, a dramatic increase in innovation, which improved the power of technology, reduced its cost, and made possible a revolution in production and business processes. The skills and knowledge of the United States workforce played a critical role in contributing to the extent and spread of innovation.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Inflation and economic activity – are we at a crossroads? Summary of a lunchtime discussion by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the “Geneva Financial Center” organisation, Geneva, 28 August 2006. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  While the world economy is experiencing exceptionally vigorous expansion and inflationary pressure is contained, there is still a certain amount of uncertainty. Will the economy turn down again and inflation accelerate? The Swiss National Bank is not working with a scenario of imminent weakness in the global economy, even if the rate of growth slows somewhat. Certainly, the US economy appears to be heading for a soft landing, and economic activity in Europe is also likely to increase less rapidly in the second half of the year. On the price front, the recent surge in inflation in the consumer price index was largely attributable to the cost of goods and services directly linked to energy prices, while core inflation remained at a relatively low level. Given the slowdown in global spending and the normalisation of monetary conditions, inflationary pressures are likely to remain restrained. This assessment also applies to Switzerland.