samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is estimated that the number employed will increase by 3.5 per cent this year, which would be the strongest rise recorded in the post-war period. The number of vacancies per unemployed has never been higher. There is a shortage of qualified labour in many industries. Although unemployment has fallen sharply, wage-earners’ share of corporate value added has been reduced, from around 75 per cent in the late 1980s to 70 per cent at the end of the 1990s, and now stands at below 65 per cent. Solid productivity growth and high prices for export goods and goods supplied to the petroleum sector have contributed to the reduction in  BIS Review 141/2007  1  the wage share over the past few years. The ample supply of labour has probably had a dampening effect on wage growth. Increased globalisation may have provided greater opportunities for Norwegian enterprises to relocate production to other countries if labour costs become too high. This probably places some restraint on wage demands among workers in sectors where enterprises have such opportunities. Historically, a high wage share has tended to be accompanied by low unemployment. Developments in recent years have provided the basis for strong growth in employment while the wage share has fallen. Wage-earners and enterprises have both fared well. Low prices for imported goods have resulted in a subdued rise in consumer prices and a substantial increase in wage-earners’ real wages. High export prices have contributed to holding down the rise in enterprises’ real wages.

It had an impact on the UK through a number of different channels – global financial markets, the financial health of our banks and other financial institutions, world trade and economic activity, and through business and consumer confidence. Because the shock was much bigger than earlier shocks the MPC had faced, the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  policy response was more dramatic, featuring deep cuts in interest rates and direct injections of money into the economy through Quantitative Easing. In my view, this was entirely right and appropriate given the risks of a deepening recession and deflationary pressures. Chart 4 Strong emerging market growth to continue Annual percentage growth rates of real GDP 10  Advanced Economies *  8  Emerging & Developing Economies *  6 4 2 0 -2 -4 1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  *: 2011 and 2012 growth rates are IMF forecasts. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook  However, the trends in the global economy have now turned around. As Chart 4 shows, global growth in both the advanced economies and emerging and developing market economies – dominated by Asia – has recovered to rates very similar to our experience before the recession. And the upward pressure on global energy and commodity prices we saw before the recession have resumed.
Earning the trust of the Gen Y market, and offering them a unique product or service, will no doubt be the biggest and most important challenge for the financial advisory profession of today if it is to remain relevant tomorrow. This leads me to the second major challenge facing the industry, that is the digital revolution. Less than a decade ago, digital investment platforms and robo-advisors were barely heard of. Today, they form a booming global industry, with a projected asset growth worldwide of 68% by 2020 – amounting to USD2.2 trillion. Recently, a private wealth management company based in Labuan launched the first ever Shariah-compliant robo-advisor in Asia. Fueled by technological advancements, robo-advisors are capable of completing tasks such as fact-finding and calculation of risk profiles much quicker and at a much cheaper cost. Third, increasing financial complexity. Over the years, financial institutions have introduced many innovative products to serve various needs and risk appetites. Yet, a nation-wide survey commissioned by Bank Negara Malaysia reveals that financial literacy remains relatively low in Malaysia. Even the most sophisticated consumers suffer from “choice fatigue” from the vast array of financial products that are available in the market. An opportunity thus exists for financial advisers to help consumers address these challenges by conceptualizing and packaging recommendations in a manner that would be at once holistic and digestible. With a new paradigm looming on the horizon, financial advisors must reinvent through innovative business models, new delivery channels, and an openness to continuous learning.

I began today’s speech with Confucius, and I’d like to close with another pearl of wisdom from his analects – “The man who moves a mountain begins by carrying away small stones.” As today’s theme suggests, our work for the future begins now. This includes resource training, 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  accreditation, recruitment strategies, designing new business models and forging relationships with a new generation of consumers. Indeed, the trusted financial advisers of tomorrow are closer than we think. In fact, I honestly believe the trusted advisers of the future are already amongst us here today. With that, I wish all of you a fruitful and engaging conference ahead. Terima kasih. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
I welcome the intention for ADB to launch a review of its Long-Term Strategic Framework and the fact that this has been preceded by the work of the Eminent Persons Group convened by the President last year. I am also happy to see emphasis being given in the Report of the Eminent Persons Group to financial sector development and financial integration in the region, among other operational priorities. I certainly hope that this emphasis in the Report will be reflected, through the review process, in the Long-Term Strategic Framework. I feel also that such a strategic review should cover the governance structure of the ADB as well, in order better to reflect the new economic realities and the Asian heritage of the ADB. Hong Kong looks forward to contributing appropriately to this review process and seeing a new long term strategy developed for ADB that would reflect the consensus of its members and stakeholders. Thank you. BIS Review 44/2007  1

With greater certainty over the provenance of the data, financial institutions and corporates are better able to mitigate the risks of greenwashing. Third, data for monitoring commitments. Technology solutions can help financial institutions and project owners in monitoring and meeting their commitments to ESG targets. FinTechs are providing financial institutions with good data and analytics to assess and benchmark ESG performance against peer companies. Intensel, a winner of the MAS Global FinTech Hackcelerator last year, uses artificial intelligence to analyse climate data and satellite imagery and assess the physical risks faced by assets to floods, typhoons, storm surges, and extreme heat. Fourth, data for reporting. FinTechs are offering tools to automate the reporting process, while being nimble enough to adapt to various standards, such as the Sustainable Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Matter Analytics, another winning solution at last year’s MAS FinTech Hackcelerator, offers reporting solutions that help asset managers, asset owners and banks automatically generate customised and comprehensive impact reports for their clients. The technologies are promising, but that is not to say there are no challenges in this space. First, the ESG landscape continues to evolve. Taxonomies are still being defined and harmonised. These are important efforts that will take some time. Disclosures and reporting requirements are also being formulated by governments and regulators. But financial institutions cannot adopt a wait-and-see approach. They should not look at ESG only from the lens of regulatory requirements.
The Swedish economy has coped relatively well This is a general outline of the international picture. Although the world economy has begun to recover, there is no doubt that it is facing fairly major challenges over the coming years. But what is the situation here in Sweden? Well, in many ways things look rather good. The Swedish economy appears to have coped fairly well in the crisis. Although production fell more in Sweden than in many other countries, the recovery has been much quicker. The situation now looks much more stable than in most other places. One important reason why we have managed so well is, I believe, that it is not so long since we experienced a crisis here in Sweden – both in the bank system and the economy as a whole. The crisis at the beginning of the 1990s was much more isolated than the recent crisis and can in many ways be described as “home made”. But we nevertheless managed to learn some important lessons from it. Stable frameworks provide security… Perhaps the most important lesson is that both monetary policy and fiscal policy need stable long-term frameworks. The previous crisis therefore led to a number of changes in this direction, many of them through decisions made here in the Riksdag. Unlike the situation in the previous crisis, monetary policy is now conducted by an independent Riksbank with an inflation target.

Mark Carney: Speech at the Mansion House Bankers and Merchants Dinner Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London at the Mansion House, London, 12 June 2014. *  *  *  Introduction My Lord Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen. A year ago when my predecessor Lord King delivered his final Mansion House speech, he noted “clear signs that a recovery in the UK, albeit modest, [was] underway.” That recovery was due in no small part to measures he and his colleagues had initiated including extraordinary monetary stimulus, recapitalisation of the banking system and innovative support for lending. The task a year ago was to secure that recovery in the face of continued domestic frailties and ongoing international weaknesses. At home, unemployment and underemployment remained elevated, productivity growth was anaemic, and debt levels were high. Abroad, the European crisis had moved only from its acute to its chronic phase and financial markets were demonstrating their fragility during the “taper tantrum”. With this backdrop and with real wages around 10% below their pre-crisis levels, it was not surprising that consumer confidence, though improved, remained low. Business confidence was similarly shaken by past shocks and current scepticism about the ongoing strength of demand. The Bank responded to these challenges.
Cash is used and valued for a variety of reasons, and not just out of habit or reluctance to adopt new technology. Cash can be used everywhere and is less dependent on technical infrastructure. Cashless payments are likely to become more important over time. I am nevertheless convinced that the future of cash, and thus of our new banknote series, is bright. Today, our full attention is focused on the new 100-franc note and the rest of the new banknote family, which is now complete. Thank you all very much for your interest. Page 4/4

The American and British experiences underscore that recovery is not possible without a meaningful and transparent re-capitalisation of the banking system, and that households need to de-lever before they have the confidence to consume again. 1  60,000 jobs per month in the UK is roughly the equivalent of monthly increases in US non-farm payrolls of 300,000. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The question now is whether such progress is sufficient for durable, strong and balanced recoveries over the medium term. Growing pessimism The pessimists would argue that it isn’t. Their case starts from the observation that advanced economy growth rates remain below pre-crisis trends, despite the scale of the fall and years of emergency monetary stimulus. More fundamentally, pessimists point to the pre-crisis period when (retrospectively) loose financial conditions did not generate a boom in output and associated inflation. They ask: could stagnation be the new normal? Today I want to consider two possible explanations for why advanced economies may have entered a low growth phase. First, on the demand side, they could be in a persistent liquidity trap, making it difficult for resources to be fully utilized, and second, there may have been a persistent deterioration in the supply side such that full utilisation of resources is consistent with slower growth. 1. Persistent liquidity trap  A liquidity trap occurs when the short-term nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound.
But Beauty comes in a package along with the Beast, and the Beast in this case is the single monetary policy - the single, one-size-fits-all, interest rate. The trouble is that it may not in the event suit the domestic monetary policy needs of the different individual Euro-area countries. And if you don’t find that instantly repulsive I suggest you ask yourself how, at this particular juncture, we could keep the economic porridge - if I may mix my fairy stories - at just the right temperature if we were obliged now to have German-level interest rates. Now you can’t just hope the Beast will never appear. I don’t know of any serious analysis that doesn’t acknowledge that tensions could arise between the domestic policy needs of BIS Review 14/1997  -2-  the different member countries - as a result of different cyclical positions, or different fiscal policies, or as a result of external shocks which affect some member countries more than others, or as a result of structural changes in one member country as against another. The risks, like the potential benefits, are, as I say, real. You might more reasonably hope that Beauty’s Beast will turn into Prince Charming - and that all their problems turn out to be little ones. But I have to tell you that it was always at this point in the story that I began to wonder if my mother was making it all up!

Mr. George weighs up the pros and cons of European Monetary Union Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E.A.J. George, at the Bankers Club Annual Banquet held in London on 3/2/97. I’ve been a follower of Jim Wolfensohn for the past 20 years, and it is a great pleasure to follow him again this evening. I first came across him when he was an extraordinary investment banker reputedly flying the world with his cello strapped securely in the adjacent seat. His eventual appointment to the Presidency of the World Bank was inspired. He brings to it an outstanding professionalism. But - as you have heard this evening - he brings to it also a broad humanitarian vision and total commitment to the World Bank’s task of improving the lives of people in those parts of the world that still need outside official help with their reconstruction and development. President Wolfensohn’s canvas tonight has been global. My own focus will be on Europe, and in particular on European monetary union - though it’s fair to say that EMU could well have significant consequences for the global economy. This country is widely regarded elsewhere in Europe as being bloody-minded and even obstructive about monetary union, largely because there is indeed an intense, and often impassioned, debate going on here about the pros and cons. And so there should be. It’s a momentous enterprise, with potentially enormous implications for Europe’s political and economic future.
As in all countries, changes in the central bank interest rate are transmitted to the economy with a considerable lag. Monetary policy therefore needs to be forward-looking and the inflation forecast based on the best available methodologies. If the scenario is that inflation will head beyond the Bank’s target, the Bank will raise its interest rates, while it will reduce them if inflation is tending below the target. Let us first look at the macroeconomic forecast, which of course is a major consideration for future inflation. The main assumptions are that the Central Bank’s policy interest rate, currently 5.3%, will remain unchanged for the forecast period, which is a standard forecasting assumption, and that the exchange rate will be 3% weaker than in the February forecast, with a reference value of 124. However the exchange rate index has continued to rise [i.e. the króna weakens] and currently stands at 128. Another assumption is that fiscal policy will not deliver a stronger demand impulse than has already been decided. In other words, the fiscal stance will be relatively neutral, apart from a considerable increase in public sector investment this year and a contraction next year. This implies that the Treasury balance will not be disrupted by discretionary measures on the expenditure and revenue side. Public consumption is expected to be below the historical average.

A 2½% increase in public consumption is expected for both years. Gross fixed capital formation, however, is expected to grow by 10¾%, mainly as a result of investments connected with the aluminium industry. Forecast investment in residential housing is 3%. Exports will increase by 2% this year and 4% next year, according to the forecast, due to the increased fishing quotas that I mentioned earlier. Growth of imports is expected to be 4½% this year and 7% in 2004. Despite higher forecast output growth this year, unemployment is expected to be a quarter of a percentage point higher than was forecast in May, at 3¼%. Estimated slack in the labour market this year has been revised upwards. However, unemployment is expected to head down to a figure of 2½% next year. Although higher output growth is expected this year and next year, the output gap is forecast to become slightly negative. A revised estimate now shows a slightly negative output gap last year, which will widen even further in 2003 since output growth is below estimated growth of potential output. The output gap is expected to turn marginally positive next year, when output growth will exceed potential. However, it is important to bear in mind that the evaluation of the output gap is highly uncertain, due to the non-observable nature of potential output. These data do show, however, that good balance is expected in both 2003 and 2004. The Central Bank forecasts inflation up to two years ahead.
And there has from the beginning been clear evidence of the anticipated broadening and deepening of euro financial markets more generally, reflected, for example, in increasing issuance of euro-denominated commercial paper, corporate bonds and equities. (If you would like chapter and verse on all this I commend to you the Bank of England’s half-yearly publication, “Practical issues arising from the euro” - available free from our public information department.) I am happy to say that the City of London has played a positive role in this process of euro market integration: it is in fact the greatest contribution that we can make to the success of the project from outside the Eurozone. And it runs in parallel with the distinct, but closely related, pressure for broader international integration of financial markets which is currently reflected in a whole series of market initiatives to unify trading platforms and both clearing and settlement systems, in which both London and Paris are, of course, very much involved. I have no doubt that increased financial market efficiency has an important part to play in improving overall economic efficiency - the question is how best we can bring it about. Jean-Claude and I would also agree, I suspect, that the introduction of the euro has contributed to the increasingly positive macro-economic performance of the Eurozone economy, taken as a whole, over the past couple of years.

But had we joined at the outset the presumption must be that over the past two years we would have lived with both a lower exchange rate and lower interest rates during a period when we have in any case been operating close to productive capacity and growing at above trend. The likelihood therefore is that we would then have experienced something of an inflationary boom - as they have, for example, in Ireland though I am not sure one can generalise from the Irish experience. The subsequent weakening of the euro since the beginning of last year has not made things any easier for us. Just as, I suggested earlier, the euro is substantially undervalued in terms of the medium-term “fundamentals”, so in the same terms sterling is on most calculations substantially overvalued against the euro. To lower sterling to a more sustainable level in present conditions would again require an easing of monetary policy which would destabilise our overall domestic economy; and this in turn would tend to set in train a process that would lock in a subsequent real UK exchange rate appreciation within the Eurozone (albeit from an initially less uncompetitive level). That might help reduce sectoral imbalances in the short term, only for them to re-emerge. And in the meantime the whole of the economy would have been exposed to accelerating inflation, which we would be powerless to address through national monetary policy.
It is important that this critical issue be well understood. The public must be absolutely confident that the Fed can meet its monetary policy objectives of low and stable inflation and sustainable economic growth. Before I begin to get into these issues in earnest, let me note that, as always, the views I put forward today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. Turning first to the outlook, the economic contraction appears to be waning and it seems likely that we will see moderate growth in the second half of the year. The economy should be boosted by three factors: 1) a modest recovery in housing activity and motor vehicle sales; 2) the impact of the fiscal stimulus on domestic demand; and 3) a sharp swing in the pace of inventory investment. In fact, if the inventory swing were concentrated in a particular quarter, we could see fairly rapid growth for a brief period. Regardless of the precise timing, there are a number of factors which suggest that the pace of recovery will be considerably slower than usual. In particular, I expect that consumption – which accounts for about 70 percent of gross domestic product – is likely to grow slowly for three reasons. First, real income growth will probably be weak by historical standards.

Because banks no longer seek to lend out their excess reserves, there is no increase in the amount of credit outstanding, no redeposit of the excess reserves, no increase in economic activity and no risk that excessive credit creation will fuel an inflationary spiral. 2  That rate is unlikely to spur too much lending right now given the constraints on credit availability, but at some future date it undoubtedly would be too low once the recovery is sufficiently advanced and credit conditions improved. 3  For a more detailed discussion of monetary policy implementation under a regime in which the central bank pays interest on reserves, see: Todd Keister, Antoine Martin, and James J. McAndrews (2008), "Divorcing Money from Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Vol. 14 (2), 4156; and Todd Keister and James J. McAndrews (2009), "Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves?" Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 380. 4  BIS Review 94/2009  For this dynamic to work correctly, the Federal Reserve needs to set an IOER rate consistent with the amount of required reserves, money supply and credit outstanding consistent with its dual mandate of full employment and price stability. If demand for credit exceeds what is appropriate, the Federal Reserve raises the IOER rate to reduce demand. If the demand for credit is insufficient to push the economy to full employment, then the Federal Reserve reduces the IOER rate, recognizing that the IOER rate cannot fall below zero.