samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Collectively, our Cornerstone Members, Global Partners and Knowledge Partner will forge a community of practice to support the green transformation of commercial banks in Asia. 18. Today we are also publishing the Alliance’s first thought leadership paper, in collaboration with the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research. The paper presents a curated overview of the effects of climate risk on financial institutions and financial markets, methods for measuring climate risk, the evolving practices as well as regulatory initiatives that seek to address climate risk. 19. Ladies and gentlemen, we are excited to embark on the transition path with the Alliance members and partners. We are confident that the learning and sharing among peers will encourage cross-fertilisation of ideas and the continued advancement of green finance best practices. Starting from Hong Kong, we wish to create a lasting ripple effect in emerging markets throughout Asia and beyond that will contribute meaningfully to the global effort in tacking climate change through the power of finance. 20. Thank you. 1 Source: ASIFMA https://www.asifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/asifma-fosda-esg-  and-sf-data-challenges-and-opportunities-in-asia-f20201221c.pdf

In addition to tapping the vast growth opportunities that reside within the domestic environment, the enhanced economic and financial linkages between Malaysia and the rest of the world has also opened up the potential for new opportunities by venturing abroad and thereby strengthen the global integration process. On this note, it is my pleasure to congratulate the Commerce Group on this occasion of the official launch of Commerce Tijari Bank Berhad. Significant potential exists for Commerce Tijari Bank Berhad to achieve a quantum leap by leveraging on the integrated financial services and operating infrastructure of the Commerce Group. I wish Commerce Tijari Bank Berhad every success in this endeavour and I look forward to its contribution to the further development of the Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia. Ladies and Gentlemen, Dengan lafaz Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, “Commerce Tijari Bank Berhad”. saya  dengan  sukacitanya  merasmikan  pelancaran  Terima kasih. 2  BIS Review 26/2004
Nevertheless, it is uncertain today how an enlargement will change the EU’s face in the future. How will these countries be integrated? How will the decision-making process inside the EU be affected? And finally, how will the EU enlargement be financed? All these open questions constitute a potential risk factor for the euro. 4. Conclusions  Looking back at the first 14 months of the euro from a Swiss perspective, the most striking observation is the extraordinary stability of the Swiss franc/euro exchange rate. A detailed analysis shows that this stability was due to a high degree of convergence in economic fundamentals and in the monetary reaction of the two central banks. Thus, solid economic reasons have been behind this stability and not some artificial strategy of currency pegging implemented in secret by the SNB. In the future, the exchange rate should evolve depending on the development of the fundamentals - in Switzerland and in the euro-zone - and on the answers to some important political questions. Exchange rate stability, on the scale that has been experienced so far, is not guaranteed to last forever. However, the risk of erratic movements seems limited because the presence of large currency blocks has lowered the attractiveness of the Swiss franc as reserve currency. Nevertheless, I would hesitate today to qualify the euro and the Swiss franc as “sister currencies”. If you have a sister, she remains your sister for life and not just in case of common interests.

We should rather consider these two currencies as travel companions: they share the same objective - a sound macroeconomic development - and follow the same road towards price stability. It is up to their relative fitness to see whether they will continue hand in hand. BIS Review 17/2000  4
Second, we look to normalisation in the accumulation of foreign assets, which has quickened considerably since the middle of the past year in the context of strengthened external, including geopolitical risks. Our medium-term economic growth outlook is essentially the same. 1-1.5% GDP growth in the current year is expected to accelerate gradually to 2-3% in 2021. Having said that, our forecast will largely depend on the timeframes and successful implementation of the national projects along with other fiscal policy decisions. Discussions are currently underway about possible options of spending the liquid part of the National Wealth Fund in excess of the 7% of GDP cap. As we look into such options, it is imperative that we remember the key objective of the fiscal rule, which is to reduce the reliance of the economy, of the real exchange rate and of public finances on a volatile energy price environment so that they all become stabilised in a state equivalent to the oil price cut-off. We have largely delivered on this objective, with the impact of oil price fluctuations on the Russian economy having considerably weakened. Current suggestions are essentially focused on changes to the rule. They could result in either direct or indirect change in the cut-off price, entailing a strengthening of the real ruble exchange rate and undermining competitiveness of our products. Alternatively, the stabilising mechanism of the fiscal rule could be undermined, yet again adding to the vulnerability of the Russian economy to fluctuations in external environment.

As regards monthly growth in prices of non-food goods and services, it held close to or below 4% in annual terms in March-May. Fourth. We factored in that inflation expectations of households and businesses remain elevated against both the inflation target and the minimum levels reached in the opening months of 2018. Inflation expectations show mixed dynamics. Business price expectations continued to decline in April-May. Inflation expectations of households came in at 9.3-9.4% during this period. However, we expect that inflation decline to 4% will bring down inflation expectations of households and businesses. Analysts’ expectations remain anchored at the inflation target of close to 4%. Fifth. Monetary conditions are softening. This is driven by changing expectations of domestic and external financial market players. First, this is enabled by revised expectations as to the path of the Bank of Russia key rate; second, by an adjustment in expectations and yields in the external financial market against the background of changes in major central banks’ rhetoric – which I have mentioned. OFZ yields are declining in this environment, enabling a potential reduction in deposit and lending rates. Between April and May, a number of major banks revised downwards their interest rates on several deposit products; interest rates on mortgage loans were also beginning to trend down. Today’s decision to cut the key rate alongside the signal we have sent out will work to solidify these trends. Medium-term outlook. The outcome of OPEC+ negotiations remains uncertain.
Figure 3 Bank deposit inflows (*) (billions of dollars) 250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0  -50  -50  -100  -100  -150  -150  -200  -200  06  07  08  09  (*) Change in the external liability position of emerging economies' reporting banks. Includes Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Taipei (Chinese province), Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Korean Rep., Singapore, South Africa, Turkey. Source: BIS. 8  BIS Review 72/2010  Figure 4 Price-to-earnings ratio in emerging economies (percentage) 40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  07  Colombia Malaysia  08  09  Chile Korean Rep.  10  Mexico Singapore  Brazil  Source: Bloomberg. Figure 5 Real exchange rates in emerging economies (index, 2007-2010 average =100) 140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  07  Chile Mexico  08 Brazil Peru  09 China Poland  10 Colombia Singapore  Malaysia Korean Rep. Source: Bloomberg.

From a historical perspective, capital flows today are currently not so abundant and no imbalances of income and expenditure are seen that might reveal substantial misalignments. After the recessive period of 2009, slack remains in our economies, and tensions in the near future cannot be ruled out. It is therefore advisable to begin exploring the proper policy responses. In such circumstances, the first line of defense must be an active monetary and fiscal management, within a context of exchange rate flexibility and stable inflationary perspectives. This combination proved very favorable to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability in 2008-2009, and has the necessary elements to also succeed in dealing with a potential period of strong capital inflows and appreciating exchange rate pressures. Additional measures, such as a foreign exchange intervention or controls on capital inflows, cannot be a priori ruled out, and will depend on each economy’s specific circumstances and characteristics. However, in implementing them it is essential that they do not become the cause of macroeconomic imbalances by encouraging massive capital inflows. In fact, distortions often do not originate in excessive appetite by foreigners for domestic assets, but in disturbances resulting from the application of inconsistent policies. On the one hand, exceptional measures cannot be used as a substitute for, say, a more austere fiscal policy or a strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision of banking and non-banking entities.
John C Williams: The joys of spring Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 21st Annual Bronx Bankers Breakfast, Bronx, New York, 10 May 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery It’s an honor to be kicking off Bronx Week, and I’d like to thank Borough President Ruben Diaz, Jr., for the kind invitation. I first visited the Bronx—and first met Ruben—back in November, when I also spent time with students discussing their plans for the future. I was particularly impressed by their talent, energy, and enthusiasm, which is a true reflection of this vibrant and proud community. Today I’m going to share some brief remarks on the national and global economy. I’ll then discuss what that means for monetary policy today and going forward. For me, the most interesting part of this event is hearing and responding to your questions, so please, don’t be shy when I open the floor for discussion. I’ve warned you that monetary policy is on the agenda, so before I go any further, I have to give the usual Fed disclaimer that everything I say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. The U.S. Economy With that out of the way, let me start by saying the U.S. economy is in a very good place.

If, at failure, there is no obstacle to putting the firm into insolvency and paying out covered deposits using the relevant deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) then no MREL is required beyond capital requirements as a going concern. This goes too to the location of TLAC or MREL in groups. There needs to be externally issued MREL wherever, under the preferred resolution strategy, bail-in of external liabilities is likely to occur or where other resolution tools are to be applied. The plan under a single point of entry (SPE) strategy is that only the entity at the top of group is put into resolution on the basis that the interdependencies within a group are so extensive that resolving the different operating companies within a group separately is either impossible or not credible. By contrast where a group is organised in a more modular fashion with limited or no interlinkages between the parts, then the resolution can have multiple points of entry (MPE). It has been convenient for exposition to set up this dichotomy between SPE and MPE. But in practice, many SPE firms will have around the periphery subsidiaries that could be resolved separately or allowed to enter an insolvency without adverse consequences for the resolution of the firm. And many MPE banks are, in practice, collections of SPE strategies. They may be set up to be resolved jurisdiction by jurisdiction. But within jurisdictions the resolution is likely to involve keeping together in resolution the legal entities within that jurisdiction.
Another benefit of a clear framework, which I think has received too little attention in academic circles, but which in my opinion has been important for the favourable outcome, is that it helps bolster both the internal work and the economic discussion. Other considerations than those purely related to inflation have most likely been put to a more rigorous intellectual test than would otherwise have been the case, which I think has been useful. However, the fact that inflation targeting has worked well does not mean, of course, that all problems have been solved and that there are no more issues worth discussing; if that were so, there would have been no reason to arrange this conference. By way of introduction, I intend to describe some Swedish experiences of a problem area in inflation targeting that I see as one of the more significant, perhaps even the most significant - how to deal with the trade-off between stabilising inflation and stabilising the real economy. I will focus in this regard on two of the areas central to this conference how policy is implemented and communicated. The inflation-real economy trade-off Flexible inflation targeting policy It is presumably safe to say that all inflation-targeting countries today conduct what Lars Svensson would call a flexible rather than a strict inflation targeting policy, even though the degree of flexibility  BIS Review 45/2005  1  probably varies somewhat from country to country. In other words, they are not, to use Mervyn King’s well-known expression, “inflation nutters”, i.e.

1  For an overview of what inflation-targeting central banks say about stabilising output, see Kuttner, K.N. (2004), “A Snapshot of Inflation Targeting in its Adolescence” in Kent, C. and S. Guttman, The Future of Inflation Targeting, Conference Volume, Reserve Bank of Australia. 2  BIS Review 45/2005  To some extent, the problems we have experienced probably reflect the fact that most people always prefer lower interest rates to higher ones. But it could also be the case, of course, that the way in which we have dealt with and communicated the flexibility problem has simply not been clear enough, despite our best efforts. One could perhaps see it as a sign that we have been too successful in “anchoring” the simple rule that we introduced at an early stage in an attempt to clearly explain our decisions and to create confidence in the new regime. Discrepancy between word and deed Of course, Sweden is not the only country in which the communication of flexible inflation targeting has caused problems. For instance, at the international level there is more general criticism claiming that the central banks in inflation-targeting countries are biased in their monetary policy communication towards stabilising inflation.2 The criticism is hence not levelled at how inflation targeting is conducted in practice; it recognises that the central banks in inflation-targeting countries do take account of the real economy.
The end users will provide a steady stream of long-term demands for bonds which will complement the dealers’ more traditional short-term horizon. In addition, the portfolio structure of end-users also acts as a countercyclical force to the one-way market of financial intermediaries which is common to an emerging market, and help preempt a massive panic or withdrawal of funds. How are we doing on all these, then? In the primary market, fiscal prudence in the past decades before the crisis had resulted in a very limited supply of government bonds. All this has changed as a result of the crisis. The amount of public sector bond has increased substantially during the past 2 years. Much of this was created by the government taking on the responsibility of fiscalizing the costs of financial sector restructuring incurred by the Bank of Thailand in our cleaning up of the financial institution system. Currently, there is close to one trillion baht in public sector bonds outstanding, amounting to about one fourth of the country’s GDP and the banking system’s deposit base. With even further losses to fiscalize, the supply of government bond is not going to be a constraint for future development. Attempts have also been made to introduce a quarter-ahead calendar of regular issuance. Thus, Mondays were typically reserved for treasury bills, Tuesdays for state-enterprise bonds and Wednesdays for government bonds. This has worked well for a brief period, but now we are back temporarily to waiting for new supplies of bonds.

And even after the crisis has peaked, banks still face the problem of recapitalization. During these times, the process of intermediation suffers. The existence of a deep and liquid bond market allows financial institutions to prepare themselves better for risk management. The authority can require the banks to maintain a higher liquidity ratio, comprising both government and top-rated corporate bonds. The banks can then resolve their liquidity problem on their own by selling these bonds, regardless of their credit standings, which tend to suffer during a crisis. In Thailand, the lack of a liquid bond market meant that the only way to obtain liquidity under pressure was for the banks to come to the Bank of Thailand using their entire loan portfolio as collateral. And as the crisis deepens, these loans were deteriorating day by day. Another benefit of the bond market is that it can attract foreign investments. Foreigners can bring in funds to invest in high quality papers denominated in Thai baht. They are the ones to absorb foreign exchange risk. Without a bond market, Thai companies have no choice but to borrow abroad and bear the foreign exchange risk, themselves. Experience has shown that they have yet to fully develop their skills in doing so. It is our intention, therefore, to expedite the promotion and development of the domestic bond market. The process is very time-consuming, but they are worthwhile for they provide the foundation for a strong and diversified financial market that would be more resilient to future shocks.
Failure in fiscal consolidation would lead us to scenarios involving further contraction and further losses in employment and welfare. The exceeding of the deficit targets last year has highlighted the difficulty of correcting fiscal dynamics in adverse cyclical situations. But it has also revealed the faults existing in the monitoring, early warning and budgetary control procedures then in force, especially for the regional governments, which the budgetary stability law currently before Parliament and which I shall refer to later must correct. In this respect, the experience of the last two years shows how important it is that budgets be prepared on the basis of a prudent macroeconomic scenario and that the measures are suitably designed to ensure their effectiveness. It is also important to have early information available on the budget outturn, so that any deviations can be corrected in time. These principles affect both the Stage Budget, the reason for my appearance here today, and the regional government budgets, which I am not going to discuss, although I do wish to take this opportunity to convey my concern regarding the obsolescence of some of the assumptions on which the latter were prepared during the latter months of 2011. These assumptions need to be updated and the appropriate measures urgently adopted to ensure that the regional governments achieve their targets. Allow me to refer briefly to the delicate cyclical situation that frames the context of the State budget for 2012.

Inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations remains of the essence. Monetary policy will do all that is needed to maintain price stability in the euro area over the medium term. This is the necessary and central contribution that monetary policy makes to fostering sustainable economic growth, job creation and financial stability. All the nonstandard measures taken during the period of acute financial market tensions, referred to as “enhanced credit support” and the Securities Markets Programme, are fully consistent with our mandate and, by construction, temporary in nature. We remain firmly committed to price stability over the medium to longer term. The monetary policy stance and the overall provision of liquidity will be adjusted as appropriate. Accordingly, the Governing Council will continue to monitor all developments over the period ahead very closely. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. After a period of sharp decline, euro area economic activity has been expanding since mid2009. Euro area real GDP increased, on a quarterly basis, by 0.2% in the first quarter of 2010. The available economic data and survey-based indicators suggest a strengthening in economic activity in the second quarter of 2010 and the available data for the third quarter are better than expected.