samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The FOMC has not specified how large the balance sheet should be at that point, other than an expectation that the level of reserve balances will be appreciably below that seen in recent years, but larger than before the financial crisis. My colleague Lorie Logan spoke in May on the many technical drivers of this ultimate level, which include the mode of policy implementation that the FOMC chooses in the longer run, possible increases in recent years in the financial system’s demand for reserves and Federal Reserve reverse repo liabilities owing to new financial regulations and other factors, and the long-term evolution of demand for paper currency.10 Let me spend a few minutes discussing the importance of gradualism and predictability. Gradualism The case for gradualism in reducing the Fed’s securities holdings rests on evidence, as well as potential risks, that an overly fast flow of securities into private hands could be disruptive to market functioning, as well as the FOMC’s confidence that it can adjust its policy stance as needed through changes in the federal funds rate. In particular, there is evidence that the agency MBS market, due to the nature of its trading conventions, is prone to dislocation when market participants expect large transitions in central bank agency MBS flows.11 Such concerns can be self-fulfilling: if market participants are concerned that an abrupt shift in flow might be disruptive, they might, for example, withdraw from liquidity provision.

In a January 2009 speech, The Crisis and the Policy Response, Chairman Bernanke provided extensive detail on the eventual normalization strategy, as envisaged at that time, including his expectation that the balance sheet would be reduced “to the extent necessary at the appropriate time.” 7 See Potter, Money Markets at a Crossroads: Policy Implementation at a Time of Structural Change, April 5, 2017,  for an assessment of the efficacy of these tools. 8 The Policy Normalization Principles and Plans indicates that the Committee did not anticipate selling agency  mortgage-backed securities as part of the normalization process, although limited sales might be warranted in the longer run to reduce or eliminate residual holdings, and that the timing and pace of any sales would be communicated to the public in advance. Portfolio projections released in July 2017 do not include sales of any type over the forecast horizon. 9 Statement Regarding Reinvestment in Treasury Securities and Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities, September  20, 2017. 10 Logan, Implementing Monetary Policy: Perspective from the Open Market Trading Desk, May 18, 2017. 11 Kandrac, The Costs of Quantitative Easing: Liquidity and Market Functioning Effects of Federal Reserve MBS  Purchases (2014). 12 The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Council considered this topic in its third-quarter 2017 meeting, including the  potential impact of changes in central bank policy abroad. See the August 1, 2017, presentation by TBAC to the U.S. Treasury.
That underlying balance sheet strength has meant, despite some sharp gyrations in their share prices, the cost of UK banks funding themselves has scarcely budged since the referendum. That means the cost of credit to companies and consumers should not be expected to rise either. And nor, with balance sheets strong, is there any reason for banks to constrict credit to customers. This time the credit rug will not be pulled. So while the past few weeks have been a drama, there is no reason to expect this to turn into a crisis, or at least a financial one. Second, even though the economy is unlikely to crash, it is likely to slow, perhaps materially, in the quarters ahead. While companies and consumers might not be slamming on the brakes and going into reverse, as in 2008, some are likely to be going down a few gears, perhaps even moving into neutral. External economists expect the UK economy to tread water over the  15  Carney (2016). BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  next few quarters. That means the amount of slack in the UK economy is likely to begin steadily rising in the period ahead, perhaps causing unemployment to rise. The main reason for that likely slowdown is uncertainty. And with uncertainty having risen sharply, caution may once more become the watchword for companies and households, as it has for most of the period since the crisis. This increases the incentive to delay making and executing plans.

8 Even those in a job, secure or otherwise, may not be working as much as they wish. Around three and a half million people, or almost 10% of the working population, say they would like to work longer hours (Chart 7). In 2007, that number was two and a half million. The number of extra hours these people would like to work – around 12 hours per week or 35% of the average working week – is also material. Even if these survey numbers overstate the actual number of extra hours people might wish to work, they leave a sizable fraction of the working population not unemployed, but under-employed. When it comes to the pay of those in work, the picture is also a subdued one. Chart 8 plots mean and median weekly earnings growth for full-time UK employees, in nominal and real terms. Nominal earnings today are around 7% higher than in 2009. But in real terms earnings are still around 5% below this peak. This is the longest period of flat or falling real wages since at least the middle of the 19th century. Although the recovery of the past few years has been jobs-rich, it has been notably pay-poor. Finally, let’s look at household wealth. As with employment, the headline gains here have been impressive, with aggregate net wealth increasing by almost £ trillion since 2009. Chart 9 breaks down these wealth gains by asset type – pensions, property, financial, physical.
How would the Federal Reserve explain to the US public that, from the kindness of its heart, it was helping a little country in Europe whose banks have no noticeable influence whatsoever on the US financial system? I don’t think we should have any illusions about this matter, regardless of how strong our current cooperation is with the Federal Reserve. When there is a crisis, we must be prepared to deal with matters ourselves. This is my absolute conviction after almost thirteen years at the Riksbank. So what is the solution? If a bank in a crisis situation does not have any dollars of its own or is unable to obtain any on the market, and if the Riksbank does not have any to lend, naturally an uncomfortable situation will arise for that bank. It will be unable to fulfil its commitments (that is, pay what it  5  Banks are unwilling to take large currency risks, among other reasons because this requires large amounts of capital. So, to the extent that they purchase currency on the market, it is assumed that they will be able to mitigate currency risk by lending to customers. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  has promised to pay others), which normally results in liquidation. This is hardly a risk that a well-managed bank wishes to take. Naturally, it could turn to the Ministry of Finance or the Swedish National Debt Office and apply for assistance under the Swedish Support to Credit Institutions Act.

‘Hard law’ and ‘Soft Law’ We cannot expect misconduct to never occur in financial markets – history has taught us that there will always be individuals prepared to do the wrong thing if there is a reward. But we can reduce the frequency and severity of misconduct and we can increase the likelihood that it will be detected and punished. Given how quickly financial markets evolve and the practicalities of regulation, this can best be achieved by a combination of ‘hard law’ (legislation and regulation by the official sector), ‘soft law’ (codes and standards defined collectively by market participants), and culture (norms and practices created by firms’ Boards and management). The authorities obviously have a role to play. Regulators must introduce rules and regulations to enforce minimum standards of conduct, hold individuals to account for their actions, and put in place incentives to promote good conduct. But hard law is not enough. Even in jurisdictions with a preference for ‘hard law’ solutions, issues of interpretation and norms arise. Regulators cannot police every market practice, especially in fast moving markets, nor can they dictate a firm’s culture. However, authorities can use their convening power to bring together market participants to solve collective action problems, set expectations on behalf of broader society about expected behaviours and provide incentives to encourage adherence to voluntary market standards. This is where industry leadership is vital.
Since then, over 35 programmes covering an additional 17 job families have been accredited. In the coming months, the accredited providers will roll out over 100 programmes covering 38 job families, including Compliance, Anti-money Laundering, Risk Management, Trade Finance, Product Control, Deal Processing & Settlement, Investment Advisory, Private  BIS Review 81/2008  1  Equity and General Insurance Underwriting. We now have 93 certified competency-based assessors, who can provide the assessment of candidates. On the demand side, 470 individuals have undergone the FICS accredited programmes. A total of 49 financial institutions have benefited from the FICS accredited training or assessment programmes. Apart from sending staff or programmes run by the lead providers, I am pleased that several financial institutions have adopted FICS for their in-house programmes. I encourage more financial institutions to make use of the FICS framework and the grants available to step up their training. Last year, IBF introduced an additional set of standards on life insurance–relationship management. IBF will continue to review and expand the scope of the standards when new needs are identified. Please let us have your suggestions. Another important milestone was also reached when we appointed the pioneer batch of 11 Financial Industry Certified Professionals (FICPs) in October 2007. Our FICPs are professionals who exhibit high standards. I am delighted that so many of our top professionals have stepped forward for this accreditation. You will serve as role models for our young.

For example, in order to understand why the huge liquidity that the ECB brought into the banking system did not lead to stronger credit growth, granular data were needed, which will enable to better understand what drives the aggregates, and thus enabling the monetary policy to be more effective. All the statistical points indicated so far in one way or another are links within the G-20 statistical initiative, which, although not a formal framework for us, is a guideline we adhere to. In addition, this initiative is in synergy with other important international statistical standards, as well as European statistical requirements, which we, as a central bank, strive to follow. One such initiative is SDDS plus, as the third and highest pillar of the IMF’s statistical standards. I can proudly say that we, as a state, have shown a willingness to join this initiative, which is currently involving only 14 countries, actively working together with the SSO and the MoF to prepare all the requested data, thus preparing for accession to this highest standard are in the final stage. An additional aspect that brings new challenges to statisticians is the digitization process, which is also gaining momentum in the financial industry. Digitization and innovation of financial services imposes new challenges for their statistical monitoring and measurement.
Linked to this shift, a property debt overhang is leading businesses with such property exposures to experience more constrained access to finance, something that, other things equal, will take time to work through. Our evidence tends to support this dichotomy between the position of companies where commercial property is either the source of their business or the source of their security for borrowing, and those where there is no such dependence. The conclusions I draw from this are that as well as our part in creating the right incentives for credit to be on offer, there is a need to extend the work done by Kate and her colleagues, to consider information flows in terms of particularly of credit assessments, and the issue of whether some types of commercial property are acting as a restraint or access to finance. It is also consistent with comments I hear from businesses and banks that the “distribution” capacity of SME lending lags a long way behind the mortgage market. In conclusion, we are determined to put behind us the legacy of issues that have called into question the capital position of banks during the crisis. We are approaching the sixth anniversary of the start of the crisis, so this is hardly overly hasty action. The resilience of the financial system is our objective, but this is not just for its own sake but also to support the economy and credit creation.

How should we view financial bubbles, what causes them and what can we do about them? What drove the latest bubble, what can we learn from it and what is needed more generally to make stock markets function more efficient? BIS Review 50/2002  1  Nothing new about periods of undue optimism One important lesson is that in a deregulated world, waves of excessive due optimism can arise and result in pronounced financial cycles. In the 1990s there were several periods of financial turbulence. One was Sweden’s own bank and currency crisis about a decade ago. At the same time there were problems in other countries and turbulence in the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). That was followed by the crises in Asia and Mexico, the problems with the major hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, Russia’s suspension of payments, the IT bubble and, most recently, the difficulties in Latin America. Further back, there have likewise been periods of excessive optimism and financial crises. Here, briefly, are the most spectacular items in Sweden’s economic history. •  The first real financial crisis in Sweden occurred back in 1857. It mainly involved the real estate market and obliged the government to support the banking system for the second time in our history. The first occasion had been in 1668, when the Palmstruch Bank was taken over by parliament and ultimately became what we now call the Riksbank.
Now that the UK Government's fiscal energy measures have been announced, the more comprehensive, integrated assessment that will be embodied in our November forecast can resume its central place in our analysis for, and communication of, monetary policy decisions. The EPG has capped the expected average energy bill at £ for the next two years, a substantially lower level than the earlier Ofgem price cap mechanism would have implied given the evolution of wholesale gas prices. Steps have also been taken to help firms. Higher gas prices will now increase the (indirect) government subsidy to energy users, rather than the utility bills they pay. This shifts the main macro risks stemming from gas price rises away from higher headline inflation and a squeeze on household real incomes towards greater pressure on the fiscal deficit and ultimately the public finances more widely. Ensuring that this shift – in concert with other fiscal policy actions – does not bring the longer-term sustainability of the public finances or respect for the wider institutional  3/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  framework for macroeconomic policy into question remains key: both in and of itself, but also because maintaining the credibility and integrity of that framework supports the effectiveness of monetary policy in pursuing its own objectives. In this context, it is welcome that the role played by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in scrutinising the Government's fiscal plans will be resumed in the forthcoming budget statement.

While at first read this looks like a rare piece of good news, viewed through the lens of efforts to return inflation to target it is a mixed blessing. Indeed, the association with the mid1970s is not reassuring in that respect. Tight labour markets support wage growth, currently running at rates above those we typically deem as consistent with the inflation target. Crucially, the low unemployment rate reflects a fall in labour market participation to a significant extent. In other words, people are choosing to stop working or looking for work. The reasons for this rise in 'inactivity' are still being explored, but the after-effects of the pandemic on health are probably a key driver. Aside from the impact of long Covid, the backlog of operations and lengthening of waiting lists in the health service owing to the pandemic, the rise in mental health issues, and an increased need to provide at-home care for family members have all weighed on labour force participation. This is an area where we need further work, since the UK appears to be something of an outlier relative to its advanced economy peers. Another supply-side driver of labour market development is migration. Understanding the impact of Brexit and new government policies in the area are key. Demand issues are also now beginning to exert an influence. As the economy slowed through this year, vacancies have turned. Employment has stagnated and is now showing tentative signs of falling.
6  See, e.g., the Swedish Competition Authority 2002a, 2002b and 2000:2. 7  Swedish Competition Authority, in cooperation with the Pensioners’ National Organisation. BIS Review 39/2005  5  this reduction being compensated for in other areas. We can also see how productivity in Sweden has grown stronger than what is usual at this stage of the business cycle. In the current debate there have been claims for some time that the Riksbank is responsible for the fact that employment has not risen faster, by not having lowered the policy rate earlier and by more, which the presently low inflation would have permitted. Like other forecasters, the Riksbank underestimated the effects on inflation of the increasingly strong global competition and productivity growth. It cannot be ruled out that employment could have been somewhat higher today if we had been able to better foresee the developments, but we are talking about small differences and far from the figures that have been mentioned in the debate. It is important to remember that the repo rate is unusually low today, which means that monetary policy is already expansionary and thus not an obstacle to consumption and investment. The main reasons behind the weak employment are rather to be found in supply factors that the Riksbank cannot influence; among other things, the incentives to start businesses and hire staff as well as the willingness of people to accept employment, move and look for new jobs.

Mugur Isărescu: Opening speech – conference “Investment and Investment Finance in Romania” Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the conference “Investment and Investment Finance in Romania”, organized by the National Bank of Romania and the European Investment Bank, Bucharest, 13 February 2020. * * * Vice President McDowell, State Secretary Gyorgy Attila, Distinguished audience, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me and the Board of Directors to welcome you at the National Bank of Romania, to the conference dedicated to Investment and Investment Finance in Romania. This conference has been organized by the European Investment Bank in partnership with the National Bank of Romania. In fact, this partnership has had a long standing as a pillar for progress and investment in Romania. Please allow me to express a heart-felt welcome and to extend my warmest thanks to Mr. Andrew McDowell, Vice-President of the European Investment Bank and to Ms. Debora Revoltella, Chief Economist of the European Investment Bank, for their continuous support and deep commitment to develop investments in Romania, and, moreover, for being trusted partners and friends. I am glad that we have decided to co-organize this conference here in Romania, at the central bank, as this year we honour two landmarks with historic importance. One is the National Bank of Romania’s 140th anniversary and the other is the 20 years’ celebration of the day (February 15th 2000) when the EU formally started the accession negotiations with Romania.
•  Have refined our rules to allow less complex ETFs which make limited use of derivatives to be reclassified as Excluded Investment Products (EIP) – these can be sold more easily to retail investors. 50. 80% of AUM of SGX-listed ETFs are now classified as EIP ETFs that investors can purchase as easily as they buy individual stocks. Third consumer initiative: spur competitive pricing for life insurance products 51. MAS worked with industry and CASE to create a new online portal, compareFIRST. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  •  Will enable retail consumers to easily compare key features of life insurance products offered by various insurance companies  •  Since its launch in Apr, compareFIRST has registered healthy interest, with over 180,000 visits to portal and more than 110,000 product summaries downloaded. •  Consumers and industry have provided positive feedback on convenience and ease of use of compareFIRST. 52. (DPI). MAS has also worked with industry to make available Direct Purchase Insurance  •  DPI offers consumers access to selected term life and whole life insurance products sold without commissions or financial advice  •  More than 200 DPI policies have been sold in first three months of launch, with a further 100 applications pending approval by insurers. 53. compareFIRST and DPI have spurred more competitive pricing for life insurance products. •  Some insurers have lowered prices of both their DPI and non-DPI insurance products, since introduction of these initiatives. Fourth consumer initiative: enhance financial education 54.

Essentially an Asian growth story:  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Rise of Asian middle class and growing affluence has generated demand for variety of financial services, including wealth management and insurance  •  Growth of Asian corporates has driven demand for offshore lending, foreign exchange trading, capital market activities, and risk management. 60. Some highlights in past year:  •  Assets under management (AUM) rose by 30% from $ trillion in 2013 to over $ trillion in 2014. •  Foreign exchange trading, measured by average daily turnover volume, increased by 40% from a year ago to reach $ billion in October 2014. •  Offshore non-life insurance, measured by gross written premiums, grew 8.8% yearon-year to $ billion in 2014. •  Corporate debt issuance grew 13% in 2014 as outstanding debt reached $ billion. Infrastructure financing space becoming more active. 61. Singapore already serves as important infra financing hub, with 60% of infra financing transactions in ASEAN led by project finance teams based in Singapore. •  MAS working closely with industry to develop toolkit for standardised public-private partnership contractual clauses. This will: o  o •  enhance bankability of infra projects; and facilitate subsequent capital market refinancing  Aim in coming years is to enhance infra financing ecosystem: o o  Work with MDBs to increase supply of bankable projects Facilitate greater institutional investor participation in infra assets. RMB market has taken off well. 62  Singapore currently second largest offshore RMB hub in world.