samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, China currently has either very low inflation or deflation, which normally points to devaluation pressure rather than revaluation pressure (a need for real depreciation). Finally, China and other the Asian economies that are trying to prop up the value of their currencies are the main purchasers of US Treasury bonds. So, in a situation where the US government finances are deteriorating, the Chinese exchange rate regime is actually helping to depress US long yields and indirectly bolstering the US recovery. My conclusion is that China in the short term should retain its fixed exchange rate until such time as its financial system has undergone more substantial reform, which is something that nevertheless must be done in the coming years. In the long term, however, a floating exchange rate appears unavoidable for a country that is on the way to becoming one of the world’s leading economies. It is only in the much longer term, when China is highly integrated with the world economy, that fixed exchange-rate cooperation can become a possibility once again. This conclusion brings me back to the main line of my argument: Europe can gradually be enlarged to become a relatively big currency area that includes all the countries, from Ireland in the west to Estonia in the east, where the long-term microeconomic gains outweigh the recurring but temporary macroeconomic costs.

A typical example is a financial crisis situation in which a macroprudential policy authority wishes to reduce the capital buffers of banks in order to stimulate lending while, from a microprudential perspective, it would instead be desirable to see the banks strengthening their balance sheets with more equity. So, there is a need to coordinate these policy areas too. Also, the knowledge about individual institutions generated in microprudential supervision work is important to understanding risk build-up at systemic level. Wind strength is also affected by other policy areas Not only is there a strong link between monetary and macroprudential policy and a need to coordinate macroprudential and microprudential supervision – the need to lean against the wind is also affected by other policy areas. Fiscal policy has a significant influence on borrowing and lending incentives. However, other policy areas can also come into play, such as housing policy when it comes to household indebtedness. There is thus a limit to what can be achieved by macroprudential policy, or monetary policy for that matter, which depends on other policy areas. The opportunities and limitations of macroprudential policy – the example of the Swedish household sector I will now be much more specific about the opportunities and limitations of macroprudential policy by focusing on a concrete example. By now, it is well known that, for a number of years, the Riksbank has seen substantial risks associated with household indebtedness.
As Marvin Goodfriend will discuss, part of this was due to appropriate market pricing of credit risk, but other aspects reflected segmentation in the money markets that was exacerbated by a pronounced lack of dollar liquidity. Some of this decline in money market functioning was not reflected in the effective fed funds rate as it was measured at that time. 7 The situation today is very different for a number of reasons. The Federal Reserve has the authority to pay interest on reserves. Many countries that run a “corridor” system of monetary policy implementation have had this authority for a long time and could transition from reserves scarcity to a state of more plentiful supply of liquidity while maintaining adequate control of their interest rate, as I noted was the experience for the European Central Bank. In addition, the Desk has augmented an old tool, reverse repurchase agreements, or RRPs for short, that allow an expanded set of counterparties to invest with the Federal Reserve either at a fixed interest rate or up to certain quantity. 8 With the advent of interest on reserves, RRP, and the Term Deposit Facility mentioned previously, policymakers have more tools for influencing market interest rates, and sterilization is no longer necessary to control rates with large amounts of excess reserves. Perhaps the most important development is the successful liftoff of the federal funds rate in December.

So far, 21 APG Typologies Workshops have been held since the APG’s formation in 1997, where the last Workshop was held in 2018, jointly with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) in Russia. These Workshops have contributed to a better comprehension of prevalent money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) threats in the region, by allowing members to understand latest trends, identify key red flags as well as sharing of information on possible counter-measures to respond to the threats. This has assisted members to take the hard decisions to prioritise, apply resources and put in place systems to effectively tackle financial crimes. With so much benefits, the APG is committed to continue holding the Annual Typologies Workshop so that members could keep abreast with the latest ML/TF trends and typologies. As you can see in the agenda, this year’s Workshop aims to discuss two key areas that were approved by the membership earlier. These two topics namely, Digital ID/e-KYC and Financing and Facilitation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, are timely given the current development in our region. Allow me to touch briefly on these two topics. Digital ID/e-KYC The rapid technology advancement in the last decade has led to significant innovations in the financial sector. Then came the COVID-19 pandemic, which has accelerated the need for financial institutions around the world to shift their operations onto the digitalised platforms. Digital ID/e-KYC is one such innovation and the authorities have responded accordingly.
France has already said that it will take a few liberties with the European deficit limits. Shouldn’t the fiscal straightjacket on Member States be loosened? This has been a little bit overstated, because the security figures are quite low in the budgets, and it is not prohibitively expensive to strengthen security. Of course, it is relevant from a fiscal  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  point of view, but the amounts are not very high. By contrast, if we include the cost of national defence under security, then the figures are potentially higher. However, it should be emphasised that this is not the source of France’s fiscal woes: it also has a well-known structural problem. How can we counter the surge in nationalist and populist currents in Europe from an economic perspective? By delivering the prosperity and economic security that was promised when we created the euro area. Today, we have the same level of economic output as we had eight years ago. The crisis caused significant economic and social pain, notably in the countries that experienced a drop in their living standards. Inequality has risen as a result of unemployment. This is unacceptable socially and has political consequences. There is no obvious willingness to integrate the euro area further. We are at a turning point. Integration at the financial level is progressing, but the European project as a whole needs to be further deepened.

This is necessarily work-in-progress, as it will take several years of learning and adaptation by MAS, financial institutions, and market participants. But achieving this is an important part of ensuring that Singapore remains a resilient, competitive, and dynamic financial centre. Thank you very much. My colleagues and I will be pleased to take any questions that you may have. BIS Review 33/2003  3
In these cases, the Federal Reserve will disseminate information by issuing written guidance, or by communicating its high-level findings from horizontal reviews of bank operations which may help the industry adjust its practices. I will leave you with two brief final points. •  First, we all need to assume that managing legal and reputational risk will remain a challenge going forward. It is highly unlikely that the rapid pace of innovation and crossborder expansion will slow down, and further legal and regulatory changes are always to be expected. •  But second, and to end on a positive note, I do think that the interests of the private sector in maintaining the long-term integrity of franchises - and the official sector - in ensuring integrity of market practices - significantly coincide. This should encourage continued collaboration and dialogue and a more transparent and effective approach to the setting of expectations and developing of standards. Thank you very much. BIS Review 76/2006  5

Chart 4: Pre-crisis euro-area output gaps(a) Per cent of potential GDP 7 Revisions between 2007 and 2013 Current estimate  6 5 4 3 2 1 0  France  Germany  Ireland  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, April 2007 and April 2013. (a) Data sourced from April 2007 and April 2013 IMF estimates of the output gap for each country in 2007. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: Spreads of 10-year sovereign bonds over Bunds Percentage points 7 Euro launch  6 5  Italy  4  Spain  3 2 1 0 -1 1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  Source: Bloomberg. Chart 6: Domestic demand and GDP Indices: 2000 = 100 140 Domestic demand  GDP  Germany  Germany  Spain  Spain  130 120 110 100 90 80 70  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  Source: Eurostat. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Chart 7: Nominal unit labour costs Indices: 2000 = 100 160 Tradables(a) Germany  Non-tradables Germany Spain  150 140  Spain  130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60  2002  2000  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  Sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
8 [20]  Could confidence in the inflation target have been maintained with a less expansionary policy? As I noted, some analysts would probably argue that it is important to defend the inflation target, but that this could have been done with a less expansionary policy, where the repo rate would not have needed to be cut below zero. This is a view that I have greater understanding for. However, there are many arguments against it. The expansionary policy conducted by the Riksbank has indeed led to inflation turning upwards and to long-term inflation expectations being once again at or very close to 2 per cent (see Figure 11). But the upturn in inflation has been bumpy and fragile and there are some signs that it has slowed down in recent months. Moreover, the upturn has to a fairly large degree been based on the krona being relatively weak and its sustainability rests on the assumption that the krona will not appreciate too rapidly going forward. It is very probable that developments would have looked quite different with a higher repo rate. And in this context the significance of a repo rate that is only half a percentage point higher should not be underestimated. It is not particularly difficult to imagine a scenario where the krona in such a case would have strengthened, possibly quite significantly, economic activity would have slowed down and inflation and inflation expectations would have turned downwards.

Nessén, Marianne (2016), Discussion of ”The case for unencumbering interest rate policy at the zero bound” by Marvin Goodfriend”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25-27 August. Rachel, Lukasz and Thomas D. Smith (2015), “Secular drivers of the global real interest rate”, Staff Working Paper No. 571, Bank of England. Rogoff, Kenneth (2016), “It would be wrong to abandon the policy of negative rates”, Financial Times, 11 October. Rosengren, Eric S. (2015), “Changing economic relationships: Implications for monetary policy and simple monetary policy rules”, speech on 16 April, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Skingsley, Cecilia (2016), “Should the Riksbank issue e-krona?”, speech at the FinTech conference in Stockholm, 16 November, Sveriges Riksbank. Turk, Rima A. (2016), “Negative interest rates: How big a challenge for large Danish and Swedish banks?”, IMF Working Paper WP/16/198, International Monetary Fund. 13 [20]  Figure 1. Good GDP development in Sweden after financial crisis Index, 2007 Q4=100  Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Office for National Statistics and Statistics Sweden Figure 2. Inflation fell early in Sweden Annual percentage change  Note. The CPI for the US and the HICP for others. Sources: The Bureau of Labor Statistics, Eurostat and Statistics Sweden. 14 [20]  Figure 3.
Figure 2: Contribution to End-Year CPI Inflation (Percentage Share)  Average of 2004-2006  2007  Food* 24%  Others 30% Food* 41%  Others 49% Energy 17% Tobacco** 10%  Tobacco** 10% Energy  * Food: Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages ** Tobacco: Tobacco products and Alcoholic Beverages Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Another major factor slowing down the disinflation process in 2007 was the adverse developments in energy and administered prices. The crude oil price in December 2007 was nearly 50 percent above the levels registered at the end of 2006. This development, together with the changes in special consumption tax on fuel products, led to a significant rise in prices of fuel-oil products in 2007. Meanwhile, another energy item, housing water prices, which is administered by municipalities, edged up in the last quarter of 2007, partly owing to the drought conditions. Overall, 1.6 points of the headline inflation resulted from the energy price hikes, where the contribution of administered component outweighs that of the oil price (Table 1). While food, energy and tobacco products displayed significant increases in 2007, the fast pace of disinflation in services and core goods excluding food, energy and tobacco in 2007, confirms that supply side shocks were mainly responsible for the breach of the uncertainty band (Figure 3). 2  BIS Review 20/2008  Figure 3: Subcomponents of CPI (Annual Percentage Change)  20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0  2006  Energy  Food*  Tobacco**  Goods Excl.

As for the financial tensions that have shaken the Spanish economy in recent weeks, holding resolutely on a course towards fiscal consolidation is a pre-requisite for dispelling the mistrust stifling the economy. Therefore, the potential short-term costs will be amply offset once it becomes apparent that the efforts made are yielding results. The State and Social Security budgets for 2012 are pivotal to this strategy. Fortunately, while they have not yet been approved, many of the measures they envisage have already been implemented, thereby preventing precious time from being lost in adjusting the fiscal imbalance. In this respect, it should be stressed that cutting the budget deficit requires an unprecedented structural effort. The measures that have to be adopted must reduce debt in an environment in which the interest burden will be growing and where the double-dip in economic activity will affect tax revenue and some cyclical expenditure. In light of these conditioning factors, the consolidation strategy must obviously use all the instruments available, on both the expenditure and revenue sides. As regards revenue, various measures have been adopted affecting, above all, the direct taxes households and firms pay. A reduced rate has also been introduced to bring undeclared assets out into the open. Here, although the macroeconomic forecast for 2012 may be realistic, there are risks of slippage in projected revenue.
It does so by offering to supply additional reserves (or UK government debt in some operations) against a wider range of collateral and at longer maturities than would be necessary just to set Bank Rate.2 During the financial crisis, the provision of liquidity insurance to the banking system caused an expansion in the Bank’s balance sheet from around £ in 2006 to around £ in early 2010. Charts 1 and 2 below show the evolution of the Bank’s balance sheet through the crisis. In addition the Bank provided liquidity through a collateral upgrade in its Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) introduced in April 2008. That involved swapping £ of treasury bills in exchange for high quality but temporarily illiquid private sector collateral (as is conventional for a collateral swap, this was done off-balance sheet). A significant expansion of the balance sheet was certainly the right thing to do in the face of the biggest ever global financial crisis – as Walter Bagehot wrote as early as 1873, “to avert panic, central banks should lend early and freely to solvent firms, against good collateral and at high rates.” But such a huge expansion in the balance sheet was by no means simple to execute, nor risk-free. Like any other business, especially one in the public sector, the central bank needs to protect its own balance sheet. The consequence of a significant loss could be to damage credibility, threaten independence and impair the central bank’s ability to discharge its statutory responsibilities.

I am pleased to now introduce the first President and Dean of the Asia School of Business, Professor Charles Fine. Professor Fine is the Chrysler Leaders for Global Operations Professor of Management, and a Professor of Operations Management and Engineering Systems, at MIT Sloan. He has served as a Professor at MIT Sloan for over 30 years, and has teaching experience as a visiting faculty at the Stanford Business School, the Harvard Business School and the Indian Business School. His research focuses mainly on supply chain strategy and value chain roadmapping. His work has supported the design and improvement of supply chain relationships for companies in the electronics, automotive, aerospace, communications, and consumer products industries. Kindly join me in welcoming Professor Fine. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
They can insist upon higher standards of financial reporting and transparency, facilitating better risk assessment of the counterparties and borrowers. And, on the more technical level, they can also ensure that the risks arising from the payments system infrastructure - especially the wholesale payments system - are minimised, reducing the danger that a failure of one institution will set off a chain reaction among other financial institutions that are its direct creditors. The importance of strengthening our defences in all these various ways against systemic financial disturbances can hardly be over-emphasised. Over the past 15 years something like 150 of the 180 or so member countries of the IMF have experienced significant banking sector distress, in many cases amounting to full-blown crises. Some Bank of England estimates of the costs of financial instability suggest that banking crises have over the past 25 years caused a cumulative loss of output of as much as 15-20% of GDP in the countries concerned. But finance is, as I say, inherently a risk business. And however much effort we put in to accident prevention - however vigilant we are - we have to recognise that accidents will occur. So we have to be prepared to limit the damage that they may cause.

Finally borrowing countries are being increasingly encouraged to develop, in the current less febrile environment, an ongoing dialogue with their major external creditors in the expectation that this would help to identify emerging concerns and possible responses at an earlier stage and to promote a more constructive reaction on the part of those creditors when storms begin to gather. Now, all of these steps are steps which countries themselves can take to reduce the risks of domestic or external macro-economic shocks leading to financial instability, which in turn would be likely to amplify the effects of the initial shock. But with the best will in the world such shocks will no doubt continue to occur. And alongside all this work on what countries can do to help protect themselves, a major review of the terms and conditions of the IMF facilities is taking place, designed to increase the effectiveness of the financial help that the IMF can give to its member countries when they do run into difficulties. This is not an easy issue on which, I know, people hold strong views. We have to try to strike a sensible balance between excessively onerous and excessively liberal conditions attaching to IMF support. On the one hand, if IMF conditions - whether preconditions attaching to quasi-automatic support in the event of sudden capital outflows or adjustment conditions attaching to the Fund’s more traditional facilities - if in either case the conditions were too demanding, countries may be deterred from seeking the Fund’s help.
From that perspective, stablecoins of potential large size and reach may pose additional challenges of system-wide importance, to competition policy, financial and monetary stability. II- Public policy challenges, in particular for central banks, and how to address them. 1- In that context, various courses of action are available to the public authorities. The first would be to ignore crypto-assets. But even if the volumes in play remain small and do not represent a threat to financial stability, the risks that I mentioned earlier must be addressed. This is all the more true for stablecoins which raise the most serious issues and deserve attention and responses before they possibly meet a significant market demand. The second course of action would be to ban crypto-assets outright because of these same risks. Several countries have already gone down this route, including China in 2013 and Russia in 2017. A third option, and the one that has so far been the preferred response in Europe and France to innovations with the potential to change the payment services market, is to establish appropriate regulations that make it possible to reconcile two key imperatives: - First, address the risks that I mentioned - Second, preserve the potential for technological innovation offered by cryptoassets To that end, should we reconsider or reaffirm the two current core features of our payment systems (see: the role of central bank money in payment systems-CPSS 2003)?

Shifts in consumption patterns, such as the growth of e-commerce, are fueling a steady decline in the use of cash in transactions, while the use of electronic payment instruments and systems is increasing, rooted in the current surge in global digitalization, along with the development of internet-based technologies and multifunctional technological devices. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  However, the decline of cash payments needs to be put into context because, if the downwards trend is undisputable – the volume of banknotes returned by the public to cash processing firms fell by over 10% between 2012 and 2017, -banknotes still dominate face-to-face transactionsparticularly small-value ones. Banknotes remain the main payment instrument in Europe by number of transactions, accounting for 79% of the latter in the euro area and 68% in France (54% and 28% respectively in value). The increase in the use of electronic payment instruments and systems is developing along four different pathways. First, the sophistication of internet technologies and devices for transactions: the number of channels used to initiate and accept payments has increased significantly. Contactless payments and mobile payments are some examples. Second, the availability of payment services at any time: payment services are becoming more available, ignoring physical borders and time constraints to satisfy customer demand for instant, continuous and uniform payment services, as economic agents become ever more mobile. Instant payments in Europe are for example designed to be executed in less than 15 seconds compared to the duration of 24H to 48H for traditional payment orders.