samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The tighter the jobs market, the harder it is for companies to fill vacancies, the greater their incentive to offer workers higher-paid positions and the stronger the incentives among workers to move into these positions.15,16 More productive firms are better able to offer higher rates of pay. This means more productive firms are also the ones most likely to expand, as they bid-away workers with higher pay offers. Less productive firms, by contrast, are unable to pay-up and are more likely lose workers and shrink. As workers climb the pay and productivity ladder, we would thus expect to see simultaneously higher levels of job moves, and higher rates of pay and productivity growth.17  11  Phillips (1953). For example, Broadbent (2017). For example, Pissarides (2000). 14 Melosi and Faccini (2019). 15 Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2018). 16 Abel, Tenreyro and Thwaites (2018) discuss the role of monopsony power in the labour market. 17 Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2018). 12 13  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  The reverse is true during a slowdown. Then, rates of hiring fall and rates of job transition slow. Workers are either forced off the jobs ladder entirely (“unemployment”) or, in coordination with employers, the labour market outcome results in them moving to a lower rung of the pay and productivity ladder (“under-employment”). Lower-productivity firms expand while higher-productivity firms shrink.

(a) Descending the Jobs Ladder The global financial crisis generated a sharp fall in output. Given that fall, the subsequent rise in unemployment was more modest than expected. Between 2008 Q1 and 2009 Q2, UK output fell by around 6 ¼%, while unemployment rose by just over 2 ½ percentage points. By comparison, in the early 1990s recession output fell by around 2% peak-to-trough, while the unemployment rate increased by over 2.5 percentage points. Chart 15: Forecasts for unemployment Per cent  12 10 8 6 4 2 0  2005  2007  2009  2011  February 2009  2013  2015  February 2010  2017  2019  Actual  Sources: ONS, Bank of England and Bank of England calculations. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Put differently, in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, unemployment rose by less than was expected by most mainstream forecasters, including the Bank. Chart 15 shows Bank forecasts for unemployment in early-2009 and early-2010. Having expected unemployment to peak at over 10.5%, the eventual peak of 8.5% was reached in late-2011. More recently, the “Okun’s Law” relationship appears to have steepened as weak productivity growth since the crisis has seen unemployment fall sharply since 2012 despite more modest GDP growth (Chart 16).
In practice, the opposite happened (Charts 2 and 3). Capital and liquidity ratios have fallen secularly in the UK and US for over a century. Since the start of the 20th century, capital ratios have fallen by a factor of around five in the US and UK. Liquidity ratios have fallen by roughly the same amount in half that time. Taken together, these balance sheet trends indicate a pronounced rise in banking system risk and hence in potential demand for state insurance. They have also affected the returns required by bank shareholders. As banks moved up the risk spectrum, the return required by shareholders has predictably increased. Between 1920 and 1970, the return on UK banks’ equity averaged below 10% per annum, with low volatility of around 2% per year (Chart 4). This was roughly in line with risks and returns in the non-financial economy. The 1970s signalled a sea-change. Since then returns on UK banks’ equity have averaged over 20%. Immediately prior to the crisis, returns were close to 30%. The natural bedfellow to higher return is higher risk. And so it was, with the volatility of UK banks’ returns having trebled over the past forty years. 4  Indeed, contract incompleteness is one of the reasons banks exist in the first place (Rajan (1998)). 5  See, for example, King (2009). 2  BIS Review 139/2009  This regime shift upwards in the risk and return profile of UK banks can be explained by the fall in their capital ratios.

8 See Aiyar, S., Calomiris, C. W., and Wieladek, T. (2016) “How does credit supply respond to monetary policy and bank minimum capital requirements?”, European Economic Review, 82, 142-165, Fraisse, H., Lé, M., and Thesmar, D. (2015) “The real effects of bank capital requirements”, HEC Paris Research Paper No. FIN-2013-988, De Jonghe, O., Dewachter. H.. and Ongena, S. (2016) “Bank Capital (Requirements) and Credit Supply: Evidence from Pillar 2 decisions”, National Bank of Belgium No 303. 9 For detailed evidence on how P2P platforms compete with banks, see de Roure, C., Pelizzon, L., and Thakor, A. (2018) “P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?”, SAFE Working Paper No. 206. 5/6  benefits for the society, including a greater financial inclusion by reducing intermediation costs, which would improve the access to funding of households and SMEs. In any case, at this stage, the ultimate impact of new technologies on the structure of the financial system is highly uncertain as it will depend on different factors including the regulatory treatment of the new players.10 Today´s conference will cover all these issues related to the recent changes in the structure of financial markets and their implications for the banking system. We have the privilege to have as speakers experts in those areas from academia, policy makers, think tanks and the banking industry. I am sure that we will have a very productive debate and that we will improve our understanding of these issues.
Indeed, many of today’s macro models used in policy making embody an assumption that risk premia are either constant or do not exist; and that therefore asset prices, and so wealth and the cost of capital, are influenced only by changes in the expected path of the risk-free rate and in the cash flows expected from investments. For anyone who has spent time in markets, that seems at odds with their experience. It is, therefore, of some moment that some recent research has suggested that, for all major asset classes, the principal drivers of fluctuations in asset returns are shifts in risk premia rather than in expected cash flows19 (ie dividend growth for stocks; the path of monetary policy rates for low-risk bonds; default incidence for bonds carrying credit risk; rental growth for house prices etc). Furthermore, some empirical research now suggests that shifts in risk premia are key factors in macroeconomic fluctuations.20 This is a big deal. We have seen massive shifts in risk premia over the past ten years (Chart 7) – first a compression and then a blow out. Those shifts seem to be associated with capital flows, channelled through banks and shadow banks, that led to an expansion of Global Liquidity. Balance sheets were left at first fragile and then, when the balloon burst, enfeebled. In the case of continental Europe, for example, banks had increasingly borrowed short-term from US money funds, only to suffer a slow-motion run when their capital adequacy came to be questioned.

It means being ready temporarily to raise regulatory requirements above their minimum level when risks from the economic and financial environment exceed anything remotely calibrated into the standards that apply in broadly normal conditions. And it means promptly relaxing those extra requirements once the risk to stability has passed. This is a massive step. No one is pretending that the policy community knows how to cast it in terms of a numerical target or a uniquely useful set of indicators, against which society can monitor us. And that underlines the importance of Parliament itself approving the instruments granted to the FPC, and of our being sufficiently transparent to enable public scrutiny of and debate about our analysis and policy decisions. The Bank/FSA Discussion Paper on macroprudential instruments published last December was a contribution to that.25 Back to current account imbalances: they do matter But that is not all that we, policymakers, should be modest about. If, as I believe, macroprudential policy can prospectively fill a gap, we must not pretend that it can be a cure for everything. Even if we had avoided the worst consequences of seriously suboptimal gross capital flows – a badly overlevered banking system dependent on flighty wholesale funding – there would still have been the problem of unsustainable global current account imbalances. Whether the eventual adjustment would have been disorderly and how costly is hard to tell.
Thus, one of the central factors behind the notion of a break with earlier economic patterns is the development of productivity. In the United States it does look as though productivity growth has improved in recent years. An important reason for this is the investment boom in the 1990s. Corporate investment has almost doubled since 1990 and a very large share has gone into new information technology. In that computer prices have fallen so much, in real terms the level of investment in information technology has risen by a factor of almost twelve. The productivity gains have sustained corporate profits and kept price increases down. The massive investment has resulted in what is known as capital deepening, which amounts to an increased capital input per employee. Many observers therefore consider that the US economy is now capable of expanding at an annual rate of as much as 3% to 3.5% without encountering shortages and an acceleration of inflation. In other words, the speed limit over there has been raised. A similar change could well occur in other countries that utilise the new information technology’s potential benefits. But as far as Sweden is concerned, it cannot yet be said that productivity growth has improved to the same extent. According to the statistics, the productivity trend for Sweden has moved up by around 0.5 percentage points in the 1990s compared with the 1980s.

“Rising Above Disruptions: A Call for Action” Keynote Remark by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob Governor of the Bank of Thailand National Directors Conference 2018 Thai Institute of Directors 21 June 2018, Plaza Athenee Hotel, Bangkok Thailand Dr. Bandid Nijathaworn, Mr. Andrew Sheng, Secretary General Rapee Sucharitakul, Chief executives, Directors, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen. A very good morning to you all. First of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Thai Institute of Directors (IOD) for inviting me to be a part of this exciting and important event. I have always had strong appreciation for IOD’s mission and work to improve director professionalism and corporate governance in Thailand. I would also like to commend the IOD on organizing this year’s conference with a proactive and forward looking agenda that goes well beyond its focus on corporate governance. This year’s conference program concentrates on areas that we need to collaborate to ensure the future success of our country. It is therefore such an honor to be here today to share my thoughts with distinguished directors and key leaders who play an integral role in driving Thailand forward. Ladies and gentlemen,  We are living in an unprecedented period of profound changes where exponential advancement in technologies is transforming everything we know. The speed, scope and impact of this technological change are unlike anything we have experienced before. It is disrupting and transforming the whole value chains, across all sectors in all corners of the globe, at an extremely fast pace.
Nationally, home prices have stabilized and begun to rise modestly after falling roughly 30 percent from their 2006 peak. Housing market conditions still vary significantly across the country with the worst performing counties experiencing annual house price declines of 8 percent or more. This sector is just getting back on its feet, so that even strong gains in the residential investment sector from its current tiny base will provide only a modest contribution to overall GDP growth. In addition, homeowner net worth remains much below its pre-crisis level. The near-term outlook for the business sector is particularly worrisome right now. New orders for nondefense capital goods and information on business plans for spending on new structures both suggest weakness in business fixed investment. Also, many indicators point to sluggish manufacturing activity, including the ISM manufacturing composite index, several regional manufacturing surveys, and August industrial production. Our own Empire State Manufacturing Survey fell deeper into negative territory in September. This manufacturing slowdown stems from several factors, including the slowdown in the pace of growth abroad and uncertainties about how the fiscal cliff in Washington will be resolved. So why has the economy grown so slowly since the official end of the “Great Recession?” There are many reasons, but I would cite five factors as particularly important: •  Access to credit. Although credit availability is slowly improving, it remains impaired, especially for households with less-than-sterling credit histories and for some small businesses. •  Balance sheet repair.

The tax and transfer fee incentives pertaining to purchase of real estate expired at the end of 2003 has helped encourage consumers to take up mortgage, adding extra boost to its growth. BIS Review 22/2004  1  As for the credit card segment, in addition to the factors cited above, some relaxed subscription conditions during the economic slump and early stage of recovery have contributed to high growth of credits in this segment. Findings from studies on the financial services in the banking sector Now, allow me to move on to the assessment of the services provided by the banking sector - what our customers have to say about their needs - what our customers really want. The assessments are based on the studies and surveys commissioned by the Bank of Thailand as part of the formulation of the Financial Sector Master Plan. In order to move forward, we need to have a clear grasp of what is needed and missing in the financial sector, and we found that the following issues are key: •  financial service availability;  •  consumers’ preference of channel of service distribution;  •  expectations on financial services; and  •  factors driving them away from using bank financial services. Quantitative and qualitative gaps in both credit to personal sector and small enterprise sector Quantitative gap: individual customer group Allow me to elaborate a little further on these findings. Financing facility is the most dissatisfied aspect in terms of financial services provided by financial institutions.
Such alliances could benefit from the Singapore manager’s access to local investors as well as the foreign manager’s working relationships with other hedge fund managers. Structures that involve a foreign fund of hedge funds feeding into other funds of hedge funds will also be allowed with good reason and disclosure of all relevant fees and charges. Work has also begun on the third pillar – enlightened investors – which is an essential element of a disclosure-based regulatory regime. The Financial Advisers Act (FAA), which will become operational on 1 October, will create a class of financial advisers who can advise and inform investors on a whole range of investment products. These financial advisers would be able to promote public awareness of more sophisticated products such as hedge funds. As part of the regulatory regime under the FAA, a new code of conduct will be issued shortly to provide guidance on the standards of conduct expected of all persons who provide financial advice  4  BIS Review 52/2002  (including exempt financial advisers like banks and insurance companies). The standards will cover specific responsibilities with regard to hedge fund products such as explaining product features and risks, as well as making investment recommendations to clients. The new regulatory framework under the FAA is expected to raise the quality of advice on investment products and, along with that, investor sophistication. Within MAS, a new division has been set up to provide an overview of investor education efforts across the financial sector.

Allow me to highlight some of our resilient features: •  We continue to have a strong current account position with the current account last year registering a surplus of 9 percent of GDP, or around 35 billion US dollars, thanks largely to a substantial saving on energy imports. •  Our international reserves have been at a healthy level, standing at three times of the short-term external debt we hold. •  Our capital markets are relatively less exposed to the risk of capital flight, with foreign holdings at less than 9 percent of the Thai government and Bank of Thailand bond outstanding, compared with more than 30 percent in some other emerging markets in the region. •  External debt of the Thai corporate sector has been relatively low, hovering around 13 percent of total corporate debt. And, most of the external debt belongs to large corporations which have used the proceeds to finance their investment aboard and are able to manage their exchange rate risks sufficiently well. As a result, the currency mismatch does not pose a threat to the Thai corporate sector, unlike what they experienced during the 1997 economic crisis. Taken together, the strength of Thailand’s external position on many fronts has helped the Thai economy withstand the recent global financial turmoil, and would continue to provide cushions against possible external shocks in the future. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to be complacent with where we stand and fail to anticipate greater challenges ahead.
Today, the applications of Shariah precepts differ somewhat in certain areas. It will eventually be desirable to have some standardisation to enhance consistency and to remove one source of regulatory risk. However, our goal should be to achieve a gradual harmonisation of standards and approaches to regulation, rather than immediate convergence. Even in conventional finance, regulatory approaches and standards differ across different jurisdictions. A flexible, riskbased approach will also allow continued innovation to take place, while ensuring the resultant risks are appropriately managed. Second, we need to develop a wider range of tools to detect and mitigate risks. In conventional finance, work is underway in reviewing shortcomings in capital adequacy and liquidity management in the Basel II framework, as well as the provision of clearing and settlement infrastructure for derivatives. For Islamic Finance, we need to continue to develop instruments that help to mitigate risks. Bahrain’s initiative in developing the Liquidity Management Centre 7 is an excellent example of such an effort. In this regard, I am pleased to announce that the Monetary Authority of Singapore is now in the final stages of setting up a sukuk issuance facility. I had announced, at this May's Islamic  4  MoneySENSE is a national financial education program in Singapore covering three tiers of financial literacy – basic money management; financial planning; and investment know-how. Details on MoneySENSE are available at www.moneysense.gov.sg. 5  Murabaha-based asset financing refers to mark-up asset financing, commonly used in home financing and car financing.

That’s because it’s the job of policy to respond to things that are unpredictable, in order to offset their effects, as best we can. So even if it’s the MPC that sets interest rates, in some narrow sense, it’s ultimately the economy that determines them. And our forecasts are intended not as some reliable guide of a particular policy path, but to help people understand how we see the nature and distribution of economic risks over the future. 1  Broadbent (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 3 Policy decisions better correlated with economic growth  Chart 4 Controlling for growth, IR forecasts uninformative about policy  Source: ONS, CBI, Markit Economics, Bank calculations. Source: ONS, CBI, Markit Economics, Bank calculations. The “excess” volatility of bond yields One way to think about the unpredictability of the future is to look at financial markets. Prices of financial assets are in many ways the embodiment of forecasts: they depend critically on how people think the future will evolve. So every time the price of an asset changes, someone’s forecast has gone wrong, or at least has had to be revised 2. And as you know, asset prices change a lot! In fact, if anything, as the economist Robert Shiller observed many years ago 3, they appear to move too much.
This monograph answers the same questions which have been brought up now. Three current and two former employees of the BNB, who have an important contribution to the Bank's research programme, participated in the preparation of this monograph, though as co-authors in their academic capacity and not representing the BNB. One of the primary conclusions in the monograph is that the Bulgarian economy is highly prepared for the adoption of the euro and for successful operation as a member of the euro area. As regards the BNB, there is a large number of analyses and studies relevant to this topic, most of which are publicly available. The BNB has published studies on topics related, for example, to: transmission of the ECB's monetary policy; measurement of the financial cycle compared to the euro area; the exchange rate and assessment of its equilibrium; measuring the business cycle in Bulgaria and its degree of synchronisation with the business cycle in the EU/euro area; competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy; macroprudential aspects of banking supervision; dynamics and factors of the labour market, investments and the housing market. Additionally, from July 2018 when the real work on Bulgaria's accession to the euro area began, until July 2020 when the decision was made on Bulgaria's entry into the EU's Banking Union and the inclusion of the Bulgarian lev in the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the BNB Governing Council reviewed more than 60 reports and made the relevant decisions on this topic.

In concrete terms: •  the management structure of the Bank of Albania was completed;  •  the Audit Committee, composed of three Supervisory Council members, started its activity;  •  the Inspector General resumed reporting to the Supervisory Council;  •  the Medium-term Development Strategy and Medium-term Budget for 2016–18 were approved;  •  the new organisational structure was approved;  •  the head offices renovation and construction works were completed;  •  and the Museum of the Bank of Albania was launched. These highlights contributed to strengthening good governance, accountability and subsequently enhancing public confidence in the Bank of Albania. The monetary policy intensified the simulating stance during 2015. The Bank of Albania lowered the key rate twice, continued to inject the necessary liquidity in the financial markets and clearly communicated the future monetary policy stance. Our monetary policy was successful in easing the financing conditions in the economy and helped in the return of the Albanian economy to a positive development track. In particular, interest rates on new lek loans and servicing costs of existing credits fell. Lek credit increased, offsetting the continuous fall of the credit portfolio in foreign currency. Also, the share of lek credit in the total credit portfolio has been increasing, from around 28% in 2008 to 43% in 2015. These actions have played a vital role in accelerating the economic growth during the last two years. During 2015, the banking system continued to expand its activity.