samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For businesses, the shrinking and aging labor force will have an impact especially on labor-intensive sectors such as textile, apparel, leather, and wood and furniture, which account for around 7 percent of the value-added in the manufacturing sector. Businesses, particularly those that are labor-intensive, will need to rethink business models and find ways to increase productivity, be it through process automation or focusing on R&D to create higher value-added products and services. Retaining and retraining employees will also have to become an integral part of businesses. Impacts on consumer spending The second implication of demographic shift will be on the market, as consumers’ spending will change, both in terms of value and composition. Thailand’s aged dependency ratio—the ratio between population aged 65 and over to the working age population—is projected to increase from less than 20 percent today to more than 50 percent twenty years from now. This demographic shift 2  would impact the country’s productivity and present a challenge to the country’s fiscal sustainability, as nearly half of Thai people are not enrolled in retirement plans. With the majority of the people having high household debt, low savings, and little financial security, aging population will add more burden to households in the form of increased spending for elderly care. Moreover, people tend to consume less as they grow older. A study by TDRI found that Thais in their 50s will decrease their consumption by more than 20 percent when they are in their 60s.

It is not even self-evident that inflation will return to the target level in the long run if monetary policy is too tight. If we are worried that a long period with a low repo rate will give rise to an unjustified upturn in housing prices and indebtedness, we should perhaps ensure we conduct a monetary policy that means we quickly move towards the inflation target, and that still works even if  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  economic developments are less favourable than forecast in our main scenario. Such a monetary policy could entail cutting the repo rate now to increase inflation and then raising the repo rate slightly faster in the coming period when inflation accelerates (see Figure 7). Admittedly, preliminary assessments within the Riksbank, based on model calculations combined with empirical relationships, indicate that a large repo-rate cut now, followed by faster increases in the future would entail slightly higher risks linked to household indebtedness than if the repo-rate path advocated by the majority is followed. However, the difference in the risk outlook for these two alternatives is almost negligible.
Page 15  Chart 10: MPC asset purchase targets  Balance sheet policies So far, I have focused on the outlook for Bank Rate, consistent with the MPC’s view that this is now the ‘active tool’ for the conduct of monetary policy. But the transition in monetary policy that is underway has broader implications. In particular, it creates scope to start running down the asset portfolios accumulated as a result of quantitative and credit easing policies implemented by the Bank in the past. The impact of these policies over the past decade or so remains controversial. A recent publication by Bank staff surveys the large body of research and analysis conducted on central bank asset purchases. [16] It concludes that, although QE did help the Bank pursue its monetary policy mandate, both the magnitude of its effect and the channels through which it was transmitted are difficult to estimate precisely, and are anyway likely to have varied in both absolute and relative magnitude over time, as the economic context in which they were implemented changed. However one views that evidence, with inflation having risen and Bank Rate moving away from its effective lower bound, the case for employing those monetary policy tools has disappeared, at least for now. The MPC set out its plan for running down the asset portfolios accumulated through QE in its August 2021 Monetary Policy Report. [17] Consistent with that plan, once Bank Rate reached 0.5% in February of this year, reinvestment of maturing gilts in the QE portfolio ceased.

But, going beyond that, the FSB has encouraged and is sponsoring an exercise on effective supervision of SIFIs, Significantly Important Financial Institutions. BIS Review 148/2010  1  A remarkable fact is that although the style of banking supervision varies enormously across the world, almost nothing seems to have been done to get to the bottom of the question of which approaches are the more effective – having an army of on-site examiners, such as for example in the United States; or relying on offsite analysis, which tends to be the pattern in much of Europe. An exercise led by Julie Dickson for the Financial Stability Board is producing an evaluation of what is needed to supervise the largest firms in the world effectively. The idea is that that will either get encapsulated in an FSB code or in a re-draft of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision. 3. Capital and liquidity  The third element is capital and liquidity. Virtually all crises have at their root over leverage in the financial sector and excessive maturity mismatch. We need to overhaul the corresponding policy instruments –capital and liquidity requirements. On liquidity, Basel is introducing an accord for minimum liquidity requirements for the first time; this is about a quarter of a century after it was first contemplated and so rather overdue, but therefore very welcome. There is an awful lot of debate around this still. Many in the industry – in the banking industry – have been resisting it. But this will happen.
Conclusion: policy should be flexible but don’t over-react to low inflation We’ve heard a lot about the risk that deflationary expectations persuade people to defer spending. We’ll no doubt hear it again if inflation were to dip below zero over the next couple of months. But it’s at best a partial point. All else equal, the incentive to save depends not on inflation expectations per se but on how far away they are from the nominal interest rate, i.e. the real interest rate. By any measure – even if you use the near-term household surveys as measure of inflation expectations – the real rate is extremely low, and still negative (Chart 15). The extensive empirical evidence for this “inter-temporal substitution” channel is in any case relatively weak – as the Governor pointed out recently, the more important threat, particularly in developed economies with large balance sheets, is debt deflation. And in that regard, it’s the gap between interest rates and nominal income growth that matters. Notably, nominal income growth has not declined of late. Real interest rates still need to be low. Our inflation target is 2% not zero: what makes the current position “good” is not low inflation per se but the fact that, in this particular instance, it’s been caused by something (a drop in oil prices) that improves real incomes.

Hence, the inflation target is now a more credible nominal anchor for economic agents. To sum it up, today, Turkey appears to be catching up with the Maastricht criterion on inflation. Secondly, the Turkish economy grew by a total of 28 percent between the end 2001 and the first half of 2005. This is the highest rate among the EU countries and the acceding countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, also one of the highest in the world. A closer look into the spectacular growth reveals the fact that the dynamics of growth have been changing as well. These high growth rates have been attained while inflation was coming down continuously, contrary to the widespread belief in Turkey up to 2002 that inflation made growth possible. During this new era, the productivity surge in the economy and the private sector have been the engine of the growth performance. Actually, in the last three years the cumulative increase in labour productivity is about 35 percent. Besides, it is essential to note that exports of goods are contributing to growth with an increasing share. As a matter of fact, the total foreign trade volume has gone up by 120 percent since 2001. This figure is the highest among acceding countries and all members. Turkey is now focusing on maintaining high growth rates on a sustainable path.
Arthur Yuen: Promoting economic and social development in Asia Welcome remarks by Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (on behalf of Mr Norman Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority), at the seminar on "President Jin Liqun on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s Operations and Projects", Hong Kong, 8 November 2016. * * * President Jin, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Good morning. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this seminar on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)’s Operations and Projects, organised by the HKMA Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO). On behalf of the HKMA, I’m honoured to welcome President Jin to Hong Kong to meet with leaders from the financial and business sectors who have an interest in infrastructure project planning and management. I am delighted to see the strong level of interest and the diversity of business leaders represented in the field. AIIB is an important establishment in promoting economic and social development in Asia. Boasting an initial capital of $ billion and a founding membership of 57 countries, AIIB came into operation in January 2016 with a mandate in the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development and logistics. As we are all aware, President Jin has played an instrumental role in shaping up the formation and the guiding principles of AIIB.

Moreover, Hong Kong has expertise in project negotiation, works contracts preparation and management, international law as well as professional arbitration services, enabling us to take part in the planning, implementation and operation of such projects. The steadfast implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative also creates opportunities for Hong Kong to make best use of its strengths as the global offshore RMB business hub and an aspiring infrastructure investment and financing platform. The setting up of IFFO would provide a platform for pooling the efforts of investors, banks and the financial sector to offer comprehensive financial services for various infrastructure projects. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Since the launch of IFFO by the HKMA in July 2016, work has progressed very quickly and significant progress has been made on all fronts. Just last week, our list of partners expanded from 41 to 54, bringing in new additions from the insurance, banking and legal sectors, as well as international business council and corporation which are experts in the infrastructure development field. IFFO is also an active participant at various industry forums promoting the use of Hong Kong’s platform for infrastructure investments and financing both locally and overseas. This morning, President Jin will share with us his views on AIIB’s operations, project planning and management.
8  See Bank of England “Fair and Effective Markets Review – Final Report” (June 2015), which sets out recommendations to help restore trust in the wholesale Fixed Income, Currency and Commodity (FICC) markets including: raising standards, professionalism and accountability of individuals; improving the quality, clarity and understanding of FICC trading practices by firms; strengthening the regulation of FICC markets by UK regulators; and improving international standards in this area. 9  See Carney (2015) “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability”. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  long-term infrastructure assets at roughly quadruple the present rate. 10 Transparency is critical to recognising the risks and seizing the opportunities of this transition. Improved disclosure is necessary to reveal how the valuations of companies that produce and use fossil fuels might change over time. It will expose the likely future cost of doing business, of paying for emissions and of tighter regulation. By doing so, it will build a “market” in the transition to a 2 degree world, allowing firms and market participants to take a view on the transition path. With improved disclosure, climate sceptics and evangelists, techno-optimists and pessimists, alike will be able to back their convictions with capital. The current fragmented reporting practices prevent investors, creditors and underwriters from taking these decisions on a fully informed basis. That’s why, at the request of G20, the FSB established an industry-led Task Force at COP21.

Financial policymakers will not drive the transition to a low-carbon economy. Only Governments can solve the Tragedy of the Horizon. 9 Financial policymakers can amplify the impacts of those decisions, while ensuring the financial system remains resilient during the transition. With respect to climate, our role is to develop the frameworks for markets to adjust efficiently. Financing the de-carbonisation of our economy is a major opportunity for investors. It implies a sweeping reallocation of resources and a technological revolution, with investment in  6  The FSB brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability from the G20 and other major financial centres, international financial institutions and standard-setters. The FSB also conducts outreach with 65 other jurisdictions through its six regional consultative groups. 7  As summarised in the “FSB Chair’s letter to G20 Ministers and Governors on Financial Reforms – Progress on the Work Plan for the Hangzhou Summit” (February 2016), the FSB is working on reducing misconduct risk, including exchanging best practices on governance frameworks and potentially developing a supervisory toolkit or guidance; examining the effectiveness of post crisis reforms to compensation and whether disincentives to misconduct should be strengthened; and sharing national experiences on bank regulators’ enforcement powers.
For example, housing prices rose rapidly in many other countries, and also in countries where central banks did not purchase mortgage  14 [30]  bonds (see Figure 10).25 A more important explanation for the price increase was probably that demand for housing increased during the pandemic, when many began planning for a future where they could work from home to a greater extent.26  Asset purchases should have been concluded earlier However, whatever measures were behind this development, I believe that we could have responded to this information in autumn 2020. I am thinking in particular of our monetary policy meeting in November 2020, when we decided to extend and prolong the asset purchase programme. The main elements of the change were that the framework for the total purchases of assets under the programme was extended from SEK 500 billion to SEK 700 billion and that purchases would continue until the end of 2021 instead of the end of the first half of 2021. At this time, it was still very uncertain how the pandemic would develop and how it would in turn affect the economy. Although the economy had begun to recover after the closures during the start of the pandemic, the spread of infection had gained new momentum in the run-up to the monetary policy meeting and uncertainty in the financial markets increased again.

26 See the article “Rapidly rising housing prices despite the coronavirus crisis” in the Monetary Policy Report in April 2021(Sveriges Riksbank (2021b) 27 See Figures 5 and 34 in the Riksbank (2020b). 28 Based on arguments such as these, I entered a reservation against the decision in November 2020 to extend and extend the asset purchase programme, see Appendix and my comments at the monetary policy meeting (Riksbank 2020c, p. 21-24). 15 [30]  I want to use my (long!) review of the experience of asset purchases since 2015 to try to evaluate whether financial losses are offset by other gains for the national economy. I shall also discuss whether the losses will weaken the Riksbank's financial independence and, in that case, make monetary policy less effective. But let me first focus a little more on the financial losses. How has the Riksbank's balance sheet been affected by the purchase of assets, and how has the value of the assets we have purchased developed? The Riksbank's financial results are now deteriorating Prior to the global financial crisis, the Riksbank's balance sheet was relatively small and uncomplicated. The size of the balance sheet, corresponding to approximately 6 per cent of GDP, was determined mainly by the liabilities side, which was dominated by banknotes and coins in circulation and the Riksbank's equity. On the assets side, these liabilities were matched by the foreign exchange reserve, which consisted mainly of US and European government bonds.
Richard W Fisher: The Texas Jagannatha (with reference to Indian Prime Minister Modi, a Hindu Goddess and Wodehouse’s Big Money) Remarks by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, before the US-India Chamber of Commerce, Dallas, Texas, 4 September 2014. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Thank you, Ashok (Mago). I am so honored to have been invited to join Ambassador (S.) Jaishankar this evening to celebrate the U.S.-India Chamber of Commerce and its many distinguished awardees. Mr. Ambassador, I am delighted you are here in Texas tonight. I am going to give you a few statistics in a moment that I think will make readily apparent the reason for this large audience and why so many Indian entrepreneurs and professionals come to Texas. Then I am going to give you a snapshot of where the U.S. economy is at present and what we are grappling with at the Fed. But first, with your indulgence, I want to briefly speak of the relationship between our two great countries, India and the United States. Time to enhance the U.S.-India working relationship The logic of an enhanced strategic relationship between my country and yours is crystal clear, beginning with a harsh geopolitical reality: You live in a tough neighborhood and need us; we, in turn, need all the friends we can muster in your geographic sphere.

Today, the ISM released its nonmanufacturing index, which registered the highest level in nine years. These reports echo a string of others – including the Beige Book survey of regional economic conditions released yesterday by the Federal Reserve – that underscore the healing that is taking place in the U.S. economy despite our having what is, in truth, a dysfunctional and counterproductive fiscal and regulatory environment. All we need now is for the fiscal and regulatory authorities – Congress and the executive branch – to unleash the animal spirit of business that is well nourished with the feed of cash and ready to roll. Wodehouse’s perspective I happen to share a common bond with Indians: I have long been a reader of P.G. Wodehouse.4 In his book, Big Money, published in 1931, he has a wonderful passage in which a young lad nicknamed Biscuit describes the woman he has fallen in love with: “… when I think that a girl can be such a ripper and at the same time so dashed rich, it restores my faith in the Providence which looks after good men.” Be it Providence or the Fed, the American business community is at present a “ripper” – it looks darned good – and is “dashed rich”. We are poised for a healthy, sustainable expansion. The men and women in this room see it in Texas. I trust they will see it in the whole of the United States.
Usually you would expect faster growth to be accompanied by stronger employment growth, and vice versa (Chart 1) – an empirical fact so robust that 1  economists know it as Okun’s Law. Since the financial crisis, however, this law has, if not broken down, at least started working rather differently than before. Unemployment has fallen far more, and employment growth has been far stronger, than might have been expected given the subdued pace of GDP growth (Chart 2). Chart 1: GDP and employment growth 12  Per cent  Four quarter employment growth Four quarter GDP growth  10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 1972  1  1977  1982  1987  1992  1997  2002  2007  2012  2017  Okun, Arthur M. "Potential GNP, its measurement and significance". Cowles Foundation, Yale University, 1962 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Chart 2: Okun’s Law and the financial crisis 4  Change in unemployment  1971-2010 2011-2018  3 2 1 0 -6  -4  -2  0  2  4  6  8  10  -1 -2 -3 -4 Arithmetically this is accounted for by a fall in the rate of labour productivity growth. Having grown steadily for a number of decades, the level of productivity fell sharply following the financial crisis. That was in line with 2  historical experience.

Global growth still looks solid, albeit a bit less rosy than it did before. The labour market is still robust. I expect GDP growth to resume at a steady but unspectacular pace (Chart 11), and demand to continue to rotate away from consumption and towards trade and investment. Of course all this is conditional on a smooth transition to the eventual post-Brexit arrangements. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Chart 11: May IR central GDP forecast 3.5  Per cent  3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 2013  2015  2017  2019  2021  Given our forecast for productivity growth, however, even this subdued pace of growth is enough to exceed the new, lower economic speed limit, which we estimate to be around 1½%. Unemployment falls to 4%, below our estimate of equilibrium, and a small margin of excess demand opens up. And so we expect wage growth and domestic inflationary pressures to continue the pickup we saw at the end of last year (Chart 12): wage growth eventually picks up to 3½% – which given our productivity growth forecast implies unit wage cost growth of 2¼%.