samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Such fall has been partly undone and is expected to continue to do so over the projection horizon. Trend growth projections are the same as in the previous Monetary Policy Report, that is, between 4.0% and 4.5% in the next two years. Beyond the projection horizon, a gradual return to trend growth figures approaching 5% is expected, to the extent that investment recovers and the general cost structure of the economy continues to reflect the lower energy costs. Annual CPI inflation has been negative since August, and the Board estimates it will become positive over the course of the first half of 2010 and will gradually converge to 3% in the monetary policy horizon, this time the last quarter of 2011. The progressive – yet incomplete – closing of the output gap that is expected in the projection horizon, together with higher commodity prices, explain headline inflation increasing faster than the core measures. Y-o-y changes in CPIX and CPIX1 will stay flat in negative figures for some months longer than CPI, and will converge to 3% later than headline inflation (table 3). Market inflation expectations remain at 3% in the medium term, despite low inflation expected for the next few months (figure 14). Several factors determine inflation’s convergence to the target. In particular, this projection relies on the external scenario steadily adding a boost to economic activity, with the recovering of confidence and global financial conditions gradually normalizing and allowing domestic and international demand to pick up.

The decoupling of the peso from the global trend of emerging currency strengthening with respect to the US dollar that began in mid-July, coincided with the building up of carry trade positions that used the peso as funding currency, and with increased dollar exposure of institutional investors. These aspects may have been favored by the low level of the monetary policy rate and the adoption of complementary monetary policy measures. Later, some of these operations eased, and the peso aligned itself with the path of other emerging markets’ currencies (figure 13). Considering the nominal exchange rate at the closing of this Monetary Policy Report, the real exchange rate (RER) is within the range of values believed to be consistent with long-term fundamentals, so the baseline scenario uses the working assumption that, over the long run, it will be close to where it stands today. This level is nearly 6% lower than at the statistical closing of the September Report, and thus has an important effect on the projected path of inflation in the coming months which will be taken into account in future policy decisions. 4  BIS Review 9/2010  Labor cost pressures show no significant changes. Y-o-y growth in nominal wages has continued to fall, responding to the drop in inflation. Real wages deflated by the CPI have increased but, if the implicit deflator in non-natural resource GDP is used, they fall. The annual variation of unit labor costs increased because of the sharp cyclical fall in measured labor productivity.
To meet the inflation target the MPC sets interest rates to keep nominal demand in line with supply at the target inflation rate. In that way it tries to maintain an overall balance in the economy. But sharp changes in either the exchange rate or the world economy - both of which we have seen over the past three years - mean that overall balance requires swings between external and domestic demand. The MPC can - and did - respond to external developments by changing interest rates so as to influence domestic demand to restore the overall balance. But in so doing the economic see-saw lurched with external demand falling and domestic demand rising. While the MPC can try to maintain stability in the economy as a whole it cannot prevent movements in the see-saw reflecting swings between external and domestic demand resulting from changes in the world economy. And lurches in this see-saw produce damage - as manufacturing and agricultural businesses know only too well, and as domestically-oriented businesses saw in the early 1990s. Of course, the UK is not alone in this experience. So can we learn from others? April is the month not just of showers; it is also the month of the Washington Spring meetings: the meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors from the one hundred and eighty-two member countries of the IMF and World Bank. Early tomorrow morning I shall leave Plymouth, rather as the Pilgrim Fathers, to travel to the New World to take part in those meetings.

Mervyn King: Balancing the economic see-saw  Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Plymouth Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s 187th Anniversary Banquet, on 14 April 2000. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I was delighted to receive an invitation to speak at your 187th Anniversary Banquet. Plymouth people are brave souls. And few are braver than those who choose to listen to a central banker at 10 o’clock on a Friday evening. The more so, when I tell you that our ambition at the Bank of England is to be boring. Not, I hasten to add, at events like this. But in our management of the economy where our belief is that boring is best. Macroeconomic policy has, for most of our lifetime, been rather too exciting for comfort. As Miss Prism told her charge in The Importance of Being Earnest, “Cecily you will read your Political Economy in my absence. The chapter on the Fall of the Rupee you may omit. It is somewhat too sensational”. If the rupee was too sensational, what words could describe the drama of sterling during the past fifty years? Devaluations in 1949 and 1967, eight-week membership of the European “snake” in 1972, and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) which we joined in 1990 and left in September 1992. And now, of course, sterling’s remarkable strength against the new currency of the euro.
We cannot answer all of these questions in a year – so an early priority, with your help, will be to identify the most pertinent areas to focus on. The third theme of the blueprint is access. Access to a settlement account in RTGS is currently open to any bank, building society, broker-dealer or CCP that holds a Bank of England reserves account or any financial market infrastructure whose participation is judged by the Bank to be enhancing to financial stability. 11 Compared with similar systems in other major jurisdictions, access to RTGS is relatively highly “tiered”: almost 90% of the roughly 400 licensed banks and smaller banks choose to settle indirectly through a correspondent bank. In order to enhance financial stability by reducing dependencies between large banks and smaller banks, the Bank of England and CHAPS Co undertook a de-tiering initiative which has resulted in a greater number of banks having direct access to RTGS. There is a question about whether we should go further and encourage or require a much larger number of banks to become direct members of major UK payment systems and have an RTGS settlement account, in order to spread the settlement risk benefits of RTGS more widely. The emergence of a new breed of on-bank payments service providers, regulated by the FCA, has extended that debate further, since it is currently a requirement of a number of retail systems – in particular FPS and Bacs – that direct participants should have a settlement account at the Bank.

Major changes to the access arrangements to settlement accounts raise both policy and practical questions for the Bank – and could have implications for market participants and fellow regulators too – so it is right that they should be considered as part of the development  9  See Davey and Gray (2014). 10  Further information on the planned extension of RTGS opening hours http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/paymentsystem/extending.aspx. 11  The Bank stands ready to act as a settlement agent for payment systems recognised under the Banking Act or whose access to settlement in central bank money is otherwise judged by the Bank to be likely to reduce the risk of widespread disruption. There are currently 6 payment schemes for which the Bank acts as settlement agent (as well as the CREST securities settlement system) and there are around 40 settlement account holders in RTGS. BIS central bankers’ speeches  can  be  found  here:  5  of a broader blueprint. Targeted extensions in access could bring benefits in terms of innovation. But we need to think through the implications for stability, market structure and costs. The final theme of the blueprint is the role of the Bank. The Bank developed the RTGS infrastructure itself, and is responsible for the maintenance and development of all elements of its hardware and software. The Bank is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of RTGS, although these running costs are in turn charged out to its users on a full cost recovery basis.
03.12.2021  A complete institutional architecture for a stronger policy mix “A stronger policy mix for the euro area?” – European Commission webinar organised by DG ECFIN Directorate for Macroeconomic Policies Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  The COVID crisis has tested the European project in unprecedented ways. The policy response, a successful monetary and fiscal policy reaction, informed by a euro area (and EU-wide) perspective, has been unprecedented too. Given the exogenous roots of the crisis, the need to respond with a balanced fiscal-monetary policy mix was clear. And its depth facilitated the adoption of far-reaching political agreements that allowed the incomplete institutional nature of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to be temporarily overcome, in particular through the deployment of some significant pan-European fiscal instruments. To mention the most important, let me highlight the NGEU programme, and also the unemployment scheme SURE. The need for a policy reaction from the aggregate angle was quite clear on this occasion. This is a novelty when comparing with the two previous crises, the GFC and the European sovereign debt crisis, when the endogenous roots of the shock showed a fundamental need for reform and action at the national level, that was only subsequently reinforced by some important steps aimed at pushing forward the overall euro area (and EU) architecture. Let me start by reminding us how we got here.

In this sense, at present the European Fiscal Board is an independent body that advises the Commission on the implementation of the fiscal framework and on the appropriateness of the national fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole, but has no formal role vis-à-vis independent national fiscal councils. It might be desirable for this institution to play a role in coordinating and overseeing national institutions. 3  See Alloza et al. (2021), “The reform of the European Union’s fiscal governance framework in a new macroeconomic environment”, Occasional Paper 2121, Banco de España. 5  Second, improved fiscal rules should be supplemented with supranational fiscal mechanisms for risk sharing. This would increase the scope and effectiveness of fiscal policy in the euro area, enable the smooth operation of the monetary and fiscal policy mix from a wider euro area perspective and help achieve common, long-run objectives, such as tackling climate change. In the current setting, it is more challenging to achieve the effective fiscal stabilisation of the monetary union as a whole than policy coordination between Member States. First, the current rules do not envisage mechanisms for correcting national measures that are judged to be incompatible with the overall desired fiscal stance. Second, having an appropriate monetary union-wide fiscal stance is no guarantee that individual fiscal policies will be adequate for national fiscal sustainability and cyclical stabilisation targets, as has been observed in recent years.
The implication would be that central banks can control broad money more or less directly and as precisely as they do their own balance sheets. In practice, however, as we saw in the introduction, the two have behaved rather differently. I’ll discuss this more fully in a moment. Monetarist objections to IS-LM None of this is fatal for IS-LM. The model can be adapted and expanded to accommodate some of these complications. And, during the debates about inflation control in the 1960s and 1970s, most economists – of all persuasions – would have accepted that Chart 7 captured an important part of the transmission of policy (open-market operations, at least). But the “monetarists” raised a deeper objection – and it concerned precisely this assumption that an increase in the supply of money worked only by lowering the level of interest rates. They argued that it could also affect spending more directly. In essence, if one is at least to preserve the language of the model, their point was that a rise in the supply of money – broad money at least – should shift not just the “LM” curve to the right but the “IS” curve as well (Chart 8). Chart 8: Monetarists argued that money affected spending directly, not just via interest rates and asset prices  Imagine something like Friedman’s “helicopter drop” – a sudden, windfall addition to everyone’s bank account. On its own, if nothing else happened, this would push up household wealth (the “W” term in [1]).

It is also imperative for central banks to continue exploring various policy toolkits to bolster resilience against volatile capital flows and exchange rate in the near future. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Financial System Resilience: Lessons from a real stress  Speech given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee  Investment Association Webinar, London Tuesday 9 June 2020  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  The COVID 19 natural disaster has been the toughest test of the financial system since the global financial crisis 10 years ago. As the implications of the spread of the virus and the policy measures to contain it became apparent, over a few short weeks, we saw an abrupt and savage pricing down of economic prospects and economic assets across the globe. Investors, corporates, banks and households went into a defensive crouch, shunning risk, searching for safer havens, and stockpiling liquidity. Many of the resultant moves were unprecedented. Bank lending surged as corporates drew down on their liquidity facilities. In March, UK banks’ net lending to corporates shot up to £ billion, around 30 times the average monthly lending seen last year. The jump was even more striking in the US, where growth in the stock of corporate lending rose by over $ billion in the first four months of the year, compared to an increase of less than $ billion for 2019 as a whole. In financial markets, the FTSE All-Share index fell over 10% on 12 March, the largest one-day fall since 1987.

And within the banking system, to strengthen even further the core – the globally and domestically systemic banks which provide the key connections in the financial system and with financial markets. We have, as I have noted, further to travel through the economic stresses of the COVID crisis. The extent of the economic damage remains very uncertain. But as far as the initial phase is concerned, the banking system has by and large been able to absorb a very sharp financial market shock and the large prospective losses. In the UK, the desktop stress test carried out by the Financial Policy Committee on the basis of the scenario for the economy in the MPC’s May Monetary policy Report3, indicates the banks could face up to £ of credit losses over the next two years. There is of course great uncertainty about the future evolution of the pandemic, of the health policy measures necessary to contain it and of the consequent economic impact. The stress test scenario is only one possible economic path through the crisis; more adverse paths are possible. But even after the very significant losses indicated by the stress test, considerable resilience remains in the core banking system to deal with more adverse outcomes: the impact of the stress test would exhaust a little less than half of the loss absorbing capital buffers in the system. Liquidity failure, as we learned 10 years ago, can damage the banking system faster than credit impairments.
We are in the process of reviewing the Microfinance Act to suggest amendments for more effective regulation of the sector, including regulation of non-deposit taking micro-credit institutions through an appropriate regulatory framework, and a unified customer protection framework for microfinance customers. We plan to issue further directions, in the period ahead, to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory mechanism for microfinance. Further, we have identified that regulation of the microfinance sector in a holistic manner is difficult because the microfinance institutions (MFIs) are regulated by a number of regulators which are exempted from the purview of the Microfinance Act. Therefore, we will convene an inter-regulatory council comprising of all regulators of MFIs during this year. 24  While we make every possible effort to put other financial institutions in order, we have to put our own house in order. In line with this, implementing an Enterprise-wide Risk Management Framework (ERM) and strengthening compliance in the bank have been identified as one of our strategic priorities. In line with new trends in central banking in the area of risk management, implementation of an ERM framework helps to move away from a ‘silo based’ approach to a ‘whole of business’ approach to risk management. ERM enables the integrated oversight of all risks across all levels, locations and departments using a uniform approach with consistent foundations and organisational arrangements for designing, implementing, monitoring, reviewing and continuously improving risk management throughout the Central Bank.

Road Map: Monetary and Financial Sector Policies for 2018 and Beyond  Delivered by  Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy Governor Central Bank of Sri Lanka 3 January 2018  1. Introduction Your Excellencies, Members of the Monetary Board, Senior Deputy Governor, Deputy Governors and Officials of the Central Bank, Distinguished Invitees, Ladies and Gentlemen, First, let me warmly welcome you to the presentation of this year’s Road Map. Continuing our tradition that was initiated in 2007, today we are pleased to present the eleventh Road Map of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. It is our belief that sharing our future policy direction and actions would help you to plan your business trajectory with more certainty. I hope this Road Map will enhance the transparency and clarity of our policies, which would help you to achieve your targets more effectively. The successful outcomes in your businesses would ultimately help us to implement our policies more effectively for the benefit of both the economy and people of Sri Lanka. The year 2017 was challenging. We have seen economy-wide effects due to inclement weather conditions. The drought and floods disturbed agriculture activities and agro based industrial activities. Spillover effects of these adverse weather conditions impacted the other sectors of the economy as well. As a result, economic growth is expected to be subdued and lower than we projected at the beginning of the year.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Link between financial education, consumer protection and financing inclusion Closing remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Malaysia-OECD High Level Global Symposium on Financial Well-Being, Kuala Lumpur, 1 October 2015. *  *  *  As this year’s Global Symposium on Financial Well-Being comes to a close, I thought it is appropriate to contemplate the world surrounding us. I want to make a short remark on the link between financial education, consumer protection and financing inclusion. Financial education, consumer protection and financial inclusion is a tractable endeavor if we work in a collaborative manner. They are means to a noble end. Properly synchronized it would create a sustainable growth and financial stability, a prerequisite to continuously improve people’s lives. For the full promise of financial inclusion to be realised, financial education is a powerful tool to equip consumers with the financial competence to manage their finances more effectively and improve the overall well-being of individuals and households. It also means that financial education must enable consumers to liberate themselves by equipping them with the ability to make informed decisions thus ensuring their meaningful participation in the financial system.

Improving access to finance and responsible lending by the financial institutions coupled with sensible and prudent use of credit by the borrowers are an imperative for the consumers and for the wider economy. Being financially competent can also act as the first line of defence against falling prey to financial scams or frauds and abusive selling practices. Indeed, financial education initiatives complemented by fair and responsible business conduct are not only essential complements to financial inclusion, they contribute to broader financial stability and consequently improving the lives of members of society. For financial educators and policymakers, the challenge ahead is a daunting one, given the scope of the task and the rapidly changing environment. There has been no time like the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  present, where the financial education and financial inclusion agenda has risen to such prominence at the global, regional and national levels. We should seize this opportunity. The increased visibility of financial education and financial inclusion should at least make our work a little bit easier especially in securing top level commitment to advance this agenda and ensure better alignment among various stakeholders. It is in this context that the global leadership of institutions like the OECD, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) and the World Bank is important to sustain the momentum for greater progress and champion the financial education and financial inclusion agenda.