samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Bank also issued its own notes which, due to the implicit backing of the government, circulated as currency with the public. At this stage, the Bank was far from being the nationalised, policymaking body we know today. Rather, the Bank was a quasi-private bank conducting its business for quasicommercial ends. Other banks at the time were engaged in similar commercial pursuits, including often issuing their own notes. Except, of course, they lacked the government as guarantor. This made for a competitive, and at times rather antagonistic, relationship between the Bank and the commercial banks. This strained relationship lasted for the whole of the 18th and a good chunk of the 19th centuries. Was the Bank friend or foe, collaborator or competitor? The commercial banks did not know. And the Bank – private in name but public in finances – was itself in a state of mild schizophrenia. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  These psychological flaws were exposed in the middle of the 19th century. By then, the Bank had been granted monopoly rights to issue currency. Quite literally, this cut the commercial banks out of a lucrative money-making scheme. This did little to ease competitive tensions between the Bank and the banks. This tension bubbled over in the famous case of Overend and Gurney Bank. In the early part of the 19th century, Overend had grown rapidly to become the largest discount house in London.

It is now widely acknowledged as the missing policy link during the pre-crisis period, the essential bridge between monetary policy and regulation. As I discuss below, this bridge is now being constructed through new frameworks in the UK and internationally. 11  Goodhart and Crockett (1970). 12  Crockett (2000). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Bank tomorrow So where does all of this leave the Bank today and, indeed, tomorrow? In the light of the crisis, we are moving to a wholly new structure for financial policymaking in the UK. In many important respects, this can be seen as building on the lessons of history. To illustrate that, let me set out some of its main features. First, there is to be a radical shift in the organisation and approach to supervising individual financial institutions. The UK will move to a so-called “twin-peaks” regime. That means in practice separating the safety and soundness aspects of the regulation (so-called prudential) from the consumer protection aspects (so-called conduct). The prudential part will from next year sit in the Bank of England in a new Prudential Regulatory Authority, or PRA. This is much more than deck-chair rearrangement. Accompanying this change will be a rootand-branch change in our approach to supervision. There will be a focus on the big risks – the Barings of yesteryear, the RBS of yesterday. Supervision will be front-foot, testing for stress before it strikes and visits to the zoo need to be cancelled.
Encik Abu Hassan Alshari Yahaya: Continuing efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing in Malaysia Keynote address by Mr Encik Abu Hassan Alshari Yahaya, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Compliance Conference 2014, Sesana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 17 September 2014. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure and honour to welcome all of you today to our annual Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Conference. Today’s line up of programme and most importantly, your presence here today underscores our continuing efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing in Malaysia and the critical importance of the role that financial services industry contributes in supporting regulators, government and law enforcement to tackle and mitigate the threats. I am pleased to note that today we have close to 350 participants representing banking, insurance, takaful, investment and securities industries in Malaysia. I also would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to all the speakers and moderators for your willingness to share knowledge and views for the two concurrent sessions that we will be having later this morning. Money laundering is a serious global problem Money laundering is a serious global problem. At the global level, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the extent of money laundering to be at 2% to 5% of global GDP.

For instance, maximum penalties under general offence that normally applies for non-compliances with requirements under Part IV of the AMLATFA (that is on reporting obligations by the reporting institutions) have been increased from RM250,000 to RM1 million. Cooperation and collaboration among regulators, supervisors, law enforcement authorities and reporting institutions are vital for an AML/CFT regime to be effective Needless to say, preventing and deterring money laundering and terrorism financing is only possible if there is a working partnership between all the law enforcement authorities, regulators, supervisors and the private sector. Without that, our efforts will be futile. Hence, for an AML/CFT regime to be sound, cooperation and collaboration is not an option but a vital requirement. Having said that, it is important for me to stress that having a comprehensive AML/CFT framework alone is not enough. What is more important is how effective are our implementation and its impact in reducing money laundering and criminal activities. At the end of the day, the test is on how good we are in achieving the ultimate objective of an effective AML/CFT regime, that is to ensure that the financial system and the broader economy are protected from threats of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, thereby strengthening financial sector integrity that contributes to the safety and security of the country. Before I end my speech, let me recap the following key points: i. Crimes and money laundering could pose significant threat to our financial system, economy and society;  ii.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Charting a path for the future Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the National Public Sector Accountants Conference 2017 "Charting a Path for the Future", Penang, 15 August 2017. * * * Thank you for the invitation to speak today. My congratulations to Jabatan Akauntan Negara Malaysia and Persatuan Akauntan Sektor Awam Malaysia on the successful organisation of the 28th National Public Sector Accountants Conference. In two weeks’ time, we will be celebrating our 60th year of independence. Our nation has come a long away – economically, socially and politically. Faced with the challenge of the new and the unknown at the dawn of our independence, our nation has risen to the occasion time and again. We have persevered. We have adapted. We have transformed. We have grown from strength to strength despite the many challenges. This boldness of spirit is something that has driven us from the very first moments of our nationhood. Upon the proclamation of our independence in 1957, Tunku Abdul Rahman had imparted these important words: “From henceforth, we are masters of our destiny, and the welfare of this beloved land is our own responsibility.” These last six decades have been a journey committed to this endeavor. Where rubber and tin once dominated, we now have an integrated, open and diversified economy. Where roads once laid bare, now stands world class infrastructure.

However, we should not forget that the real economy and the financial economy are largely two sides of the same coin. Without one, the other would not exist. Financing is a key element for economic activity, and channelling such financing is precisely where we need the banking sector. We have once again been able to witness this owing to COVID-19. As you will recall, the financial sector was declared an essential service during the lockdown. And, for example, without banks’ active participation, it would not have been possible to successfully structure the ICO guarantees programme. Naturally, mobilising the resources needed for this transformation, which the law estimates at around € billion, will necessarily involve public-private investment formulas in which banks will no doubt play a key role. As you can imagine, financing these public-private investment needs is reason enough for the banking system to become involved. But initiatives such as the climate agreement signed on the occasion of the COP25 and the launch of FinResp (Centre for Responsible and Sustainable Finances) show that the sector is clearly committed. How can the financial economy contribute to switching the real economy towards full decarbonisation? The response is straightforward: through correct risk measurement. When banks manage their risks properly, they are promoting the effective allocation of available economic resources, by distinguishing between those projects more likely to succeed and those not viable in the medium term.
Erdem Başçi: Recent economic and financial developments in Turkey Speech by Mr Erdem Başçi, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the press conference for the presentation of the October 2011 Inflation Report, Ankara, 26 October 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Unlike former press conferences held to present inflation reports, today I would like to start my presentation by explaining a five-point action plan entailing price stability, interest rate policy, foreign exchange reserves policy, required reserves policy and financial stability. We are living through a period marked by global developments that call for taking timely, and if necessary, daily counter-cyclical measures against capital flows. Therefore, with the Monetary Policy Committee’s decision of October 20, 2011 we achieved the flexibility needed to effectively implement the two-objective and three-instrument monetary policy on a daily basis. After briefly mentioning the outlook for our primary objective of price stability, I will summarize how and in which direction the three instruments will be employed from now on. Lastly, I will also briefly talk about the positive impacts of decisions that have already been or will be taken regarding financial stability. Firstly, I will talk about price stability. We expect inflation to rise significantly in the upcoming months due to recent excessive depreciation of the Turkish lira, the base effects from unprocessed food prices and the recent adjustments in administered prices.

As seen on the slide, inflation followed a flat course during the third quarter as these two effects largely offset each other (Chart 7). However, exchange rate developments ended up being more dominant which led inflation to exceed the forecast range presented in the July Inflation Report. In the third quarter, exchange rate developments led to an increase in the underlying trend of core inflation indicators as well (Chart 8). This was mainly triggered by the increase in prices of core goods, while the underlying trend of services inflation remained relatively modest (Chart 9). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Distinguished Guests, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data indicated more robust economic activity in the second quarter of 2011 compared to the outlook presented in the July Inflation Report. Therefore, the output gap estimates of this period were revised upwards. Private sector consumption and investment expenditures became the main drivers of growth in this period. While exports followed a weak course amid developments in the global economy, imports recorded a significant decline following the slowdown in domestic demand due to the policy measures adopted. Thus, the net external demand made a positive contribution to growth on a quarterly basis for the first time after a long stretch. In other words, the composition of growth started to change in the desired direction (Chart 10). Owing to the lagged effects of the contractionary reserve requirement and liquidity policies, domestic demand continued to lose pace in the third quarter.
It is only towards the end of the period that the 2% target is marginally exceeded if the repo rate is not increased. A notable problem in the assessment of inflation concerns the future development of wages: it is difficult to predict, yet its significance for future inflation is crucial. Our wage forecast is in line with those of other observers; at the same time, we see a higher wage outcome as the biggest risk for inflation. A lower wage outcome would provide room for quicker growth and higher employment. The decision to defer an increase in the interest rate is naturally based on our assessment of inflation in the coming years. It also enables us to collect additional information. At the same time, the conditions will be better for getting people in general to accept the step we are taking, which is ultimately essential for the Riksbank’s legitimacy and credibility. Neither did we see a need at present to make our mark by raising interest rates. There appears to be confidence in the Riksbank’s commitment to maintaining low inflation and the results of surveys and other work we do to see how various economic agents are assessing future inflation give no cause for concern. In connection with the publication of the Inflation Report we made it clear that the repo rate will need to be increased in the future if there is no new information that clearly alters the perspective.

3 ISPVs are the vehicles central to the structure of insurance linked securities which provide (re)insurers an alternative, capital markets-focussed form of risk transfer to traditional reinsurance products. It is a growing and particularly innovative market, often able to offer (re)insurers more attractive terms. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Solvency II reform  Even though insurance regulation is fun, I would love to finish this speech without a long technical section on Solvency II. The good news for you here in the room is: we will set it all out in our report to the TSC, so I will spare you the detail. When it comes to Solvency II, it pays to see the woods for the trees. Let me briefly address a couple of myths. First, there is simply no evidence to suggest that the introduction of Solvency II has crushed the profitability or growth of UK insurance companies. Over the two years following the introduction of SII, assets in the UK insurance sector grew by more than 10%. Returns on equity for larger UK insurers have remained steady at above 9%, close to the levels seen on average since 2010. And UK life insurers’ average credit default swap premium fell from 70 basis points on 1 January 2016 to 47 basis points on 6 February 2018. Second, there is no convincing evidence that Solvency II has driven up prices for UK insurance policyholders.
Recent surveys by MacroMarkets and by Fannie Mae indicate that households expect negligible gains in home prices over the next few years, with many expecting that prices will continue to decline. Macroeconomic consequences The ongoing weakness in housing has made it more difficult to achieve a vigorous economic recovery. Housing has inhibited economic activity through a number of channels. First, the strong rebound in residential investment that typically powers economic recoveries following deep recessions has been absent. For example, nine quarters following the ends of the mid-1970s and early 1980s recessions, residential investment had climbed by 65 percent and 55 percent, respectively, above the level at the corresponding troughs. In contrast, during this cycle, there has been no rebound. In the third quarter of 2011, residential investment was still somewhat below the level in the second quarter of 2009. Second, by eroding household wealth, the decline in housing prices has contributed to greater weakness in consumption. For most American households the family home is by far the largest tangible asset, a buffer against misfortune, and often a significant savings vehicle to fund retirement.4 Since home values peaked in 2006, homeowners have lost more than half their home equity – about $ trillion – and expectations of future gains have also declined. At present roughly 11 million households are in negative equity with the aggregate amount of negative equity estimated to be roughly $ billion.5 Third, the weakness in home prices has reduced credit availability.

I have always stressed that the phasing-out would be timely and gradual. It must be timely, because one should exit neither too early, nor too late – any ex ante bias is not justified. The phasing-out must be gradual, because the situation is improving only gradually and downside risks remain. Last Thursday we took a decision to initiate the gradual phasing-out of some of the extraordinary liquidity measures, as they will not be needed to the same extent as in the past. This will avoid distortions associated with maintaining non-standard measures for too long. It is important to avoid a situation in which banks are heavily dependent on exceptional central bank financing. In the context of a stabilisation in the money markets, incentives have to be strengthened for banks to restructure their balance sheets through recapitalisation. In addition, a timely and gradual phasing-out should help activity in the money market and strengthen peer monitoring among banks. It was against this background that the Governing Council decided to adjust the design of some of our refinancing operations. We will continue to fully accommodate banks’ liquidity needs at fixed interest rates in all our main refinancing operations for as long as is needed – and at least until mid-April next year. We thereby continue to provide liquidity support to the euro area banking system so as to facilitate credit provision to the euro area economy. But as regards our one-year operations, we decided to not engage in further one-year operations beyond the December operation that was already announced.
Secondly, the more advanced approaches of Basel II are calibrated to the environment of the G10 countries, with significant acceleration of capital charges as the probability of default ratings deteriorate. To the extent that this inappropriately amplifies economic cycles by inducing the systemic misperception of risk in emerging economies, this can exacerbate a credit crunch during periods of weak economic performance. 2  BIS Review 99/2008  Thirdly, the anticipation of lower regulatory capital requirements and hence, a competitive cost advantage, provides a strong incentive for banks especially in the developed countries to move towards the more advanced approach under Basel II. This could result in an uneven competition between the domestic and international foreign banks operating in the domestic financial system. Capability gaps in the adoption of the more onerous approaches under Basel II may place domestic banks at a competitive disadvantage in such countries. These considerations have meant that for many emerging economies, the translation of the Basel II framework to suit the local environment needs to be approached carefully. The Basel II text provides a range of options which can be considered by national supervisors to rebalance the calibration of Basel II to reflect the local environment. It is also important that Basel II is implemented as part, and not in isolation of, the overall financial sector development programme. This has been Malaysia's approach.

The highly fragmented banking system and relatively weak risk management systems within the domestic financial institutions which prevailed in Malaysia prior to the financial restructuring and reforms that were undertaken from 2001 would have rendered the implementation of Basel II extremely difficult, if not impossible to achieve without risking disruptions to the intermediation process. The financial reforms that were undertaken to strengthen the underpinnings of our banking system are therefore instrumental in facilitating the smooth transition to the adoption of Basel II in Malaysia without adverse market outcomes. In the more recent period, the Asian region as a whole has made significant strides towards strengthening market structures and institutional arrangements for financial stability. Two developments deserve mention, in view of their important contributions towards mitigating some of the concerns surrounding Basel II for emerging economies. First, in the decade following the Asian crisis, the emerging economies in Asia have extensively developed their bond and equity markets. Measured in terms of market capitalisation, East Asia's equity markets have more than trebled since 1997. The bond markets in the East Asian region have also seen significant growth during this period with significantly improved liquidity conditions in these markets. There is therefore now a more diversified structure in the financial system. Second, within Asia, the regional cooperative framework has been substantially strengthened to support financial sector development, surveillance, crisis management and capacity building.
One example is the interest rate fluctuations, which have shown up in the own homes item in the CPI. During 1996-97 in particular, the CPI was relatively far below not just the targeted rate but also the lower tolerance limit. To a fairly large extent, this was because the Riksbank lowered the interest rate markedly with a view to ensuring that the target would be met a little later on. In the period 1993-98 the Riksbank tried to explain how effects of this kind would be handled. But not everyone considered the policy was sufficiently clear. The Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament), for  BIS Review 98/2000  2  example, assessed the Riksbank’s performance solely in terms of the CPI outcome even though there had been long periods when monetary policy had focused on other indicators that exclude transitory effects. In the best of all possible worlds one would prefer to use an indicator of inflation that excludes all those effects one wants to disregard. Unfortunately, there is no such indicator that suits every situation. For example, a tax increase may, under certain circumstances, need to be excluded as a transitory effect. In other cases, however, tax increases should be taken into account when formulating policy because they are a part of the inflation process. Against this background, in 1999 the Riksbank declared that in connection with every monetary policy decision, any grounds that existed for modifying the policy’s target variable would be clarified.

Households’ gross disposable income fell by 8.8% year-on-year in the first half of 2020. In parallel, lending to households has fallen off in recent months as a result of the decline in new lending business. The reduction has been more marked in the consumer credit segment, while new financing for house purchases fell less sharply. Overall, although the moratoria on loans, which affect 7% of the outstanding balance of lending to households, have checked the decline in lending to this sector by reducing the volume of loan  5  repayments, its year-on-year growth rate dipped to -0.8%, compared with the 0.3% increase in February. This has entailed an increase in the financial pressure borne by households. Thus, for the household sector as a whole, the debt-to-gross disposable income (GDI) ratio rose by almost 4 pp in the first half of the year to 95%. Once again, the intensity of this increase in debt will foreseeably ease to some extent with the GDI data for Q3. The increase in household saving not earmarked for debt service (a consequence of the heavy decline in consumption) appears to have been channelled to bank deposits, which posted a year-onyear increase of 7.1% in July. However, updated information on the distribution of this saving within the household sector is not available, making it difficult to assess to what extent this development is softening the greater degree of financial pressure for certain groups of households.