samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When that time comes, having reserves to draw on will be a welcome option. France, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand have all established government reserve funds in recent years in preparation for the age wave 15-20 years ahead. Sweden has restructured its four AP funds. Like the Petroleum Fund and the new State Pension Fund, these funds are not pension funds in the usual sense. Annual allocations to the funds are not dependent on growth in government pension obligations in the period. However, one of the main objectives of these funds is to cover some of the increased pension payments in the future. Allocations to most funds are set at around 1-2 per cent of national income every year until the funds’ capital is to be used from 2020 or 2025. One drawback of some of these funds’ structures, such as the French fund, is that they are not financed through increased government saving, but in reality by borrowing. Fund-based pensions The Norwegian National Insurance Scheme is a pay-as-you-go system, where annual payments are financed by current tax revenues. The pension scheme for public employees is not fund-based either. An international comparison shows that pension obligations in Norway are fund-based to a very limited extent. Some other countries base their pension obligations on funds to a far greater extent. This applies for example to Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.

The probability that the cumulative real return over a period of 15 years will be negative would also increase somewhat, although not markedly. I have included this comment because these kinds of assessment are central to the choice of investment strategy for a fund such as the Petroleum Fund. Long-term plan The Petroleum Fund is a very long-term savings plan. The notion of a fund arose in the early 1980s, and the Fund was adopted in 1990 before the government had received any positive net cash flow from petroleum activities. Up to 1995, government investments in petroleum activities were so large that all the revenues were used for investment and to cover budget deficits during the recession around 1990. Now we have ten years of a rapidly expanding Fund behind us. Ahead of us, we still have at least 50 years, and perhaps more, where the Petroleum Fund or the Pension Fund will, I hope and believe, be an important part of the Norwegian economy. Every year,  10  The calculations are based on the market assumptions that formed the basis of our most recent review of the investment strategy for the Petroleum Fund. 7/8  the Storting will have to decide the scale of petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget. There is a long time ahead before the savings plan has been carried through. 8/8
Inflation in the coming years In the course of 1996 CPI inflation decreased markedly and the annual level was somewhat below the lower limit of the tolerance interval. Transitory factors partly explain the drop. Falling house mortgage interest costs, occasioned in part by the Riksbank’s own interest rate cuts, played a large part in the low inflation figures. The trend has now turned and the rate of inflation is beginning to move up. But the main reason for this is that the transient downward factors are no longer at work to the same degree; the increase in underlying inflation is therefore more subdued. In the light of the assessments of economic activity and other factors that affect inflation (e.g. inflation expectations), in the inflation report the Riksbank forecast that annual CPI inflation would be around 1 per cent in 1997 and around 2 per cent in both 1998 and 1999. Some acceleration was envisaged in the latter two years. The assessment carried some reservations. Matters discussed in the report included the risks associated with rising activity, the difficulties in knowing how the supply side would react and the BIS Review 96/1997  -4coming round of wage negotiations. There may be reasons for elaborating on that discussion in some respects. Output gap closing by degrees In the inflation report the Riksbank considers that Sweden’s gross domestic product will grow by around 2 per cent in 1997 and around 3 per cent in 1998.

Tourist arrivals declined by 8.4% in 2009 while the manufacturing industry’s gross value added fell by more than 18%. On the upside, several service activities that have expanded thanks to access to the Single Market have proved quite resilient to the global recession and their performance helped the external balance on goods and services to move into surplus for the first time since 2002. As a result, the domestic recession was less severe and shorter than elsewhere. Malta’s GDP fell by 1.9% in 2009, compared to 4.1% in the euro area, while the peak-to-trough drop in GDP is estimated to have been similarly less pronounced, 3% against 4.7%. A sharp decline in investment acted as a major drag on demand in 2009, but private consumption held up. The reduction in exports was less marked than might have been expected given the severe contraction in world trade such that, together with a steeper drop in imports, net exports contributed positively to GDP. This limited slowdown in economic activity was in turn reflected in labour market trends. The unemployment rate rose moderately in the first half of the year from 6% at the end of 2008 and has stabilized at around 7% since then. On the inflation front, consumer price trends in 2009 again did not fully mirror those in the euro area, converging only during the second half of the year when energy and food prices, which had risen sharply in the early part of the year, decelerated substantially.
The absence of any particular component could reduce the effectiveness and efficiency and thus affect the viability and sustainability of the system. While the Islamic banking system has an important role in mobilizing deposits and providing financing, the Islamic capital market has an equally important role in providing a stable source of long-term funds for financing large investments and development projects as well as for capital and business expansion. The development of the Islamic capital market not only allows for a more balanced allocation of financial and economic resources within an economy but more importantly, ensures greater diversification of risks within the Islamic financial system. This enhances the resilience and robustness of the Islamic financial system to withstand financial shocks and contributes to the overall stability of the Islamic financial system. BIS Review 47/2004  1  In terms of the development of our Islamic financial system, as at June 2004, the assets mobilized by the Islamic banking sector have increased to RM89.1 billion, accounting for a market share of about 10% of the banking system. At the same time, deposits have also increased to RM64 billion, constituting a market share of 10.4% while financing mobilized amounted to RM54 billion to garner 11% of the market share. Product offerings have also increased in sophistication from the deposit products to hybrid products that are able to enhance returns to depositors. A further advancement was made with the introduction of the Islamic variable rate financing mechanism that provides an alternative to the fixed-rate financing.

•  Financing new investment through state bonds could well prove inefficient and harmful for the Estonian economy as a whole, even if the investments are in good projects. The low unemployment and rapid wage rises that we see at the moment  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  would cause a large part of the extra money gained from the emission of state bonds to be lost, as infrastructure projects would cost much more than before. Large state construction projects that can only be temporary in nature would also cause economic and social problems in Estonia, because once the large projects finish, a great number of those working on them would find themselves unemployed, having left jobs in other sectors. •  It must be understood that Estonia already profits from the purchases of bonds by the central banks of the euro area. Financial markets act as a series of communicating vessels, so that when interest rates in one area fall, the effect is passed on to other areas. The lower interest rates in the euro area mean that Estonian companies and households can borrow more cheaply, and were it necessary the Estonian state could also borrow more cheaply. If easier financing conditions spur on the European economy, Estonian exporters will be among the winners, and this is the goal towards which the bond purchase programme is striving.
      21 18 32 18 3933 981 8201 23 198 3 71 $ 389 3 9 3 2983 93 33 813 71 97 321 89 1333 93")-# %87 97 7327 "),# 818 23 1   383  3933 8918 22803 3  971 32898  33 9   8 564 8 8 8 1 8 5 % 8 1  561 8 6 5 8 9561 5 1  8 8 6 8 71 8 1 6561 8 % 861 08 71 8 71 67 8 8645 8 5 1 8  561 && 65 8  5  561 8 598 1  8765 1 868 5 6#8  5  561 1  1  561 8 1  6789:;<=78  98 7888 8 98!6 5 1 8 5 5    2618 7 442 628 15   52126 86 Y2 87 628 6 727   6 628 86  1 7 1 8 $ 1 $ 97 52 62 1 97 52 1 5; 5768 = !97 78 0 2  75 5#652 1 ;;6A 10 6# 5 8A6A 7 O042 & 1 6% 5^ 1 97 52 1 867 97 52 7 69 $ V% !97 K;;# OPS2 1 ; J 89 9657 6978A2   0)*+0+    ? ? ? ? @ A 5EF412

But one day you find out that you have diabetes. If you continue to eat the same amount of cakes, your health will be at risk in the near future. If you want to continue eating cakes, the solution is simply to get a direct medicine that lowers the sugar level in your blood. But what if the effect of the medicine takes a long time to become effective? For his survival, the patient has no option but to reduce the amount of cakes intake. This is exactly what the monetary policy is doing. It is a demand management tool to augment supply measures that take time to make an impact. If the effect of supply-side policy, the direct medicine for supply shock, is limited and rising inflation is a threat to the health of the economy, one must forego the happiness today for a better future tomorrow. Ladies and Gentlemen, You may then ask where the evidence of the demand pressure is. Looking around, everywhere people seem to be tightening their belts and saving for the rainy days. Here, I would like to highlight the readily accessible indicators on capacity utilization and unemployment. Partly due to strong demand for Thai products abroad, the average capacity utilization rate for the first five months of this year was the highest since the 1997 crisis. Meanwhile, despite the unofficial figure of 2-2.5 million labour immigrants, the unemployment rate has been hovering around 1.5% during the past four months.
On the contrary, to the extent that the birth of the euro fosters deeper trade and financial markets globally and a more efficient international monetary system, all countries stand to benefit, particularly an active participant such as the United States. Let me be more specific. In my view, for the United States and the international monetary system, the implication of a growing international role for the euro over the foreseeable future will be most significant with respect to financial rather than trade transactions. It is quite true that the euro may quickly become the currency of choice in the invoicing of trade between companies in the European Union and their foreign counterparts. Companies in regions with strong links to the European Union, such as those in eastern and central Europe, North Africa, and the CFA French franc zone, may also choose to invoice trade in euros. BIS Review 109/1997  -2-  More generally, the euro may well expand its importance in world trade beyond the relative trade weight of the European Union countries, following a path similar to that taken by the U.S. dollar and -- before that -- by the pound sterling. Nevertheless, I would argue that the economic effects of these potential changes in invoicing practices are likely to be limited. Why do I say this? First, to a large extent, the re-denomination of a significant share of world trade into euros will mainly represent a shift in invoicing practices from the use of former European currencies to euros.

Indeed, as the U.S. economy has grown more efficient and internationally competitive in the past ten years, the dollar has retained its strong role in the international monetary system. In short, it seems safe to assume that significant changes in the international role of the dollar and the functioning of the international monetary system would occur only gradually, and surely in a manner that could be easily coped with, given the turnover in capital markets we observe today. But should a different international monetary system ultimately emerge in which other currencies, such as the euro, play an increasingly important role alongside the dollar, there would be benefits for the United States as well. Such a development would, for example, impose greater market-led discipline on the United States and, in the process, help us address our chronic low-savings problem. There is another indirect -- although potentially more important -- way in which EMU may affect U.S. business and policymaking. This implication of EMU has to do with the contribution BIS Review 109/1997  a currency union is likely to make to increasing the efficiency and flexibility of the economies that join it. At least since the publication of the “One Market, One Money” study by the European Commission in 1990, observers and analysts of EMU have paid significant attention to the decline in transaction costs that can be achieved by unifying up to 15 different currencies, and to the resulting gains in efficiency for Europe’s economies. The experience of the United States is useful in this respect.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: The ASEAN Economic Community’s impact on the Greater Mekong Subregion’s economies Keynote address by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Euromoney Conference “The Greater Mekong Investment Forum”, Bangkok, 12 June 2014. *  *  *  Excellencies, Honorable Speakers, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. It is an honor for me to be back here at the Euromoney Greater Mekong Subregion Investment Forum. Let me thank the organizers for inviting me to speak at such a distinguished forum once again. This conference takes place at an important juncture as we are on the eve of the ASEAN Economic Community which will be launched at the end of next year. My remarks today will focus on how the AEC will have meaningful impacts on the GMS economies. Also, I will share with you some thoughts on how we can overcome challenges to capitalize on the region’s growth and prosperity. 2. The GMS has become one of the most vibrant regions in the world, transforming itself into a new investment frontier. The global attention on this region is reflected in the large inflows of foreign direct investment, which have increased dramatically in the past two decades. According to World Bank statistics, the FDI inflows to the CLMV countries over this period increased forty-fold to around 13 billion dollars in 2012.1 This wealth of investment opportunity has been underpinned by the smooth transition to market-based economies, the rich and diverse resources as well as the improvement of intra-regional logistics. 3.

Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent) 9  9  7  7  8  8 6  6 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  MPR  First half June 2014 FBS  June 2014 EES  June 2014 MP2014 Report Forward June MPForward Report  Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 9 Real housing prices  (base index: 2008 = 100)  150  150  140  140  130  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80 02  03  04  05  06  07  CBCh (*)  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  CChC  CBCh RM (*)  (*) Preliminary results. Source: Central Bank of Chile (CBCh) based on data from the Internal Revenue Service (SII) and the Chilean Chamber of Construction (CChC).
The latest business surveys and economic data point towards some moderation of late, which is 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  not specific to France but also seen in other euro area economies. GDP growth in the first quarter could thus prove somewhat softer than previously anticipated. However, the underlying momentum remains solid and broad-based, and we interpret recent data as reflecting a temporary pull-back from the very strong and above-trend pace recorded in the second half of last year. It does not alter the inflation outlook over the medium term horizon that is relevant for our monetary policy. [slide 6] Against this backdrop, we forecast GDP growth in France to remain robust in 2018, at 1.9%, after 2.0% in 2017, and to stabilize at around 1.6%-1.7% per year in 2019–20, which would remain above potential. Thanks to this performance, the output gap is expected to close in 2019. The engines of growth should be more balanced. Household consumption is expected to accelerate somewhat, with significant gains in the purchasing power of households of + 1.5% to 2% per annum. In particular, the tax measures set out in the budget laws should help to boost household income from the end of 2018. Total investment should lose some momentum but remain a significant contributor to output growth. And as exports pick up, the contribution of external trade should turn neutral. [slide 7] The performance on the labour market has been very encouraging as well.

If we want to preserve the present global expansion, if we want to encourage reforms and hence increase potential growth, we need to maintain an open international environment, a rule-based multilateral order. [slide 16] I stress it here in the United States, as a dedicated European speaking to close historical allies: we have many common challenges, politically and economically. To avoid disaster, we should resolutely build common solutions. Believe me: France is taking its part of the task, today more than ever. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
To the extent that such measures work, liquidity risk for intermediaries, and so for traders and investors, is reduced; and thus, the spread in corporate bond yields should decline too. There is some evidence that that has occurred since we introduced the facility in March, although it is impossible to control for the more general improvement in global corporate bond markets. Providing a MMLR facility requires know-how and capital resources. In the UK, the Bank is equipped to offer MMLR when needed in so far as we have the wherewithal to pay for whatever we buy using our money (where, as I described earlier, we can sterilise any monetary effects if we need to). But given the Bank of England’s very small accounting capital, we have acted on the back of an indemnity from the government. The presence of tax payer protection is not enough, however, for central banks to ignore risk. Not only does exposure to reputational risk matter. Central banks should not be involved in providing facilities which it is clear would be likely to result in a transfer of resources to the private sector. That is the realm of fiscal policy. Central banks should stick to central banking. In the Bank of England’s current asset-purchase operations, that is reflected in our remit from the government focusing on high-quality securities, and in the maximum prices (minimum spreads) we set. These considerations need to be weighed very carefully in deciding whether, or how, to operationalise any MMLR policy.

To ameliorate the impact of bank balance sheets shrinking, companies are using technology to experiment with bringing buy-side liquidity into secondary markets. The challenge, as many have observed, is how these solutions can help to maintain liquidity in times of market volatility. 15 Second, companies are staying private for longer. According to McKinsey, in the US which drove the dot-com boom and is driving the “unicorn” and “decacorn” phenomenon, the average age of technology companies going public in 2014 was 11 years, up from 4 years in 1999 13. This has been enabled by the prolonged period of low yields, which has driven institutional investors to seek higher returns from liquidity and credit risk in private markets. McKinsey also found that 150 software companies were able to reach USD 10 billion in value through private financing in 2015, compared to just 10 in 2011. In Singapore, private equity assets under management grew 24% per annum on average for the last five years to over USD 100 billion in 2015. This creates a role for industry bodies like ASIFMA, which are set up around public markets like credit and equity, to support companies on their longer journey in private markets, and introduce the benefits of market transparency and market discipline while the companies remain private. 16 Third, underlying macro trends are supportive of investment continuing to flow from Developed Markets to Emerging Markets. On the one hand, accommodative monetary policies in developed economies will drive an ongoing search for relative yield in emerging markets, including in Asia.
Caleb Fundanga: The cost of capital – wither the Zambian financial markets? Keynote address by Dr Caleb Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Business Conference on “Change and the Paradigm Shift in the Accounting Profession”, Livingstone, 6 August 2010. *  *  *  The President of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants; Mr Chintu Mulendema The Chief Executive of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants; Mr Hapenga Kabeta Distinguished members of the Eastern, Central and Southern African Federation of Accountants Members of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Members of the Press Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen The theme for this symposium portends an important aspect of our daily lives, either at individual or corporate level. We are all, one way or the other, affected by developments in our financial markets. The role that finance plays in an economy is certainly an important one and you do not need to go far back in history for you to appreciate that role. You only need to make reference to the recent financial crises to appreciate the potency that finance has on economic activities. Chairperson, your choice of this topic therefore could not have been more appropriate. This topic is also timely given the current challenges that face many countries in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, some of which seem to be just unfolding in some European countries.

And we are not prescriptive of types of booking arrangement that firms may operate. We do not for example prescribe a certain percentage of risk to be managed locally. Our goal here continues to be to ensure that firms’ manage appropriately the risks that they originate, receive and transfer out of the UK entities. To do that their booking models need to be transparent – to both regulators and firm management – so that they are capable of being understood and followed. And there then should be adequate pre-trade and post trade systems and controls in place to ensure that intended booking arrangements are followed. In practice, this means the international bank should have an appropriate local risk management capability. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  We also make it clear that there should be a Senior Management Function allocated responsibility for ensuring that there are appropriate controls in place to manage its booking arrangements, including remote booking. Where our expected standards are met, firms enjoy greater flexibility as to how they operate their booking, including highly integrated trading operations with the group. However, where they are not met, the PRA may require more local risk management or limit the degree of connectivity that the firm has with the rest of the group so that less risk is brought into, or transferred out, of the UK. This is a good example of where firms can self-assess against standards.