samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Riksbank’s tasks M aintain price stability  Promote a safe and efficient payment system  Presently requires continuous measures to counteract the effects of the international financial crisis We are prepared to act quickly and forcefully when necessary  8  BIS Review 138/2008  M onetary policy and financial stability Tasks that are closely connected…   ”Physical” and ”financial” infrastructure    M anaging risk, saving and borrowing   Investments that can create employment and growth    M onetary policy works via the financial system    M onetary policy is also important for financial stability  It is important for economic growth that the financial system is stable  The financial system The payment system  Bank groups  Lenders and borrowers  Macroeconomic developments and financial markets  BIS Review 138/2008  9  Hiccup in the machinery Interbank rate and the repo rate Per cent 7  7  6  6 Repo rate Three month interbank rate  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 06  07  08  09  Sources: Reuters EcoWin and the Riksbank  M ortgage rates have risen more than the repo rate Per cent 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3 2  2 1 0 Jan-08  Repo rate Interbank rate M ortgages - SBAB M ortgages - averages  1 0  Apr-08  Jul-08  Oct-08  Refers to three-month mortgage rate from SBAB, three-month interbank rate Sources: Reuters EcoWin, SBAB, Statistics Sweden and the Riks and monthly average for three-month mortgage rate for institutions’ new lending.

Besides, credit deceleration, as long as it takes place in an orderly manner, is justified, after the recent rise in private debt ratios (households and non-financial corporations). In this respect, I would like to point out that France's debt ratio is the highest of the major European countries at 147% of GDP in Q3 2022, compared to 119% on average in the euro area. This leaves the third major economic agent: general government as a whole. France's public debt ratio is not only 20 percentage points higher than that of the euro area as a whole (113% of GDP compared with 93% in Q3 2022),1 but it is not decreasing, unlike that of the other major countries of the euro area. Since energy prices are declining, we must now begin to rapidly reduce support measures, while targeting them at those who need them most. Tariff shields may have been useful in the short term to cushion the energy shock, but they cannot alleviate it altogether. Indeed, a lasting victory against inflation cannot be achieved by fiscal measures, but by monetary policy and by strengthening our productive supply. More broadly, the response to this crisis, to this new world, lies above all in a major effort to adapt.
Trade restrictions address the symptoms and not the underlying problems, and they introduce other costs and distortions. While such measures might generate temporary boosts to growth from greater domestic production and consumption, these would likely be offset by a range of other costs. Over time, such measures would retard productivity growth and thereby shrink the economic pie. As an illustration, import substitution models that were pursued by many emerging market economies following the Second World War eventually led to lower long4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  term growth outcomes. This was the experience in India, which helped trigger the reforms of the early 1990s. In assessing the benefits and costs of trade, it is important to understand that a nation’s trade balance reflects much more than its trade policy. Just as important are the country’s saving and investment spending proclivities, which are affected by many factors, including tax and fiscal policies. For example, in the United States, we have a chronic trade deficit because domestic investment spending exceeds our domestic saving. Foreign capital inflows make up the gap. In this process, the foreign exchange value of the dollar plays an important equilibrating mechanism. If the domestic saving/investment imbalance is unchanged, then any reduction in the trade balance from higher trade barriers will be offset by lower exports. The domestic currency will appreciate to cause the trade deficit to widen to accommodate the desired capital inflows.

In today's environment, cultivating a lifelong learning experience is essential to personal and economic success. Lifelong learning involves more than just formal education and training. It encompasses learning throughout the life cycle, at different stages of life and in different learning environments. As individuals, attention to lifelong learning is essential to remain relevant in a highly competitive environment and to enhance our ability to function effectively and in a meaningful way as members of our community. With new knowledge comes innovation, agility and increased productivity that contributes to the overall performance and economic growth process. While it also enables us to adapt to the constantly changing environment, it also increases our capacity to cope with natural emergencies. The challenge then is to embrace the opportunities as they present themselves and to continuously develop new skills and competencies that will be needed to meet current and future demands. The opportunities for learning will be boundless. Technology has also significantly broadened the reach and means for learning, as well as increased learning efficiencies. As you step into this new and exciting world, these possibilities should be fully optimized. In concluding, allow me to offer my congratulations once again to the graduates of the class of 2006. You represent the promise of our nation's future. Indeed, nation building no longer belongs exclusively to the realm of the Government. As professionals, your advancements should not just be confined to those of immediate interest or relevance to you.
The political complexion of Northern Iraq led to the assumption that the currency used there would have value once regime change had occurred. In other words, the value of the Swiss dinar had everything to do with politics and nothing to do with the economic policies of the government issuing the Swiss dinar because no such government existed. As someone might have said, “it’s the political economy, stupid!” Another illustration of this is shown in Chart 5 which plots the Swiss dinar/dollar exchange rate against the values of futures contracts showing how expectations about the political order in Iraq were evolving.

They only move the time-consistency issue one step back - the policy rule may be abandoned, the central banker fired, the contract reinterpreted or rewritten.3 The other approach says that real central bankers do not and need not worry about time-inconsistency; they “just do it”, (Bennett McCallum, 1995). Central bankers should simply resist the temptation to deviate from the time-inconsistent policy, and private agents will eventually come to accept that resolve. Attractive as such a solution may appear to central bankers, it fails to answer the challenge posed by the game-theoretic result of Kydland and Prescott. And it fails to explain why it is that some countries in some periods just do it and others do not. Central bankers who have the determination and strength of purpose to “take the punch bowl away just when the party is getting going”, in McChesney Martin’s memorable phrase, clearly have the “right stuff” - so why don’t they “just do it”? 4 A deeper explanation of how this problem can be overcome requires an analysis of what might be called the “technology of collective decisions”. Individual agents can make contracts because they believe that the legal system is external to both parties to the contract. But it is difficult to write contracts that commit future collective behaviour. Collectively, we can either meet our previous commitments or we can ignore them.
If, for example, country-specific shocks tended to die out pretty quickly, but common, global shocks were more persistent, you might expect to find this pattern. But that difference would have to be pretty stark to generate results of this sort. And there is evidence (much more careful and thorough than I’ve presented here 5) that forward yields in different countries are, in fact, more volatile and more tightly correlated than the simple expectations hypothesis would suggest. Chart 5 UK forward rates sensitive to US payrolls release  Chart 6 Market yields more sensitive than actual rate forecasts to shifts in risk premia  Source: Bloomberg and Bank calculations; sample 2003-  Source: Bank of England and Datastream. 13. 5  Sutton (1997)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Table 1: UK-US forward yields better correlated than spot rates  Changes in yields: UK on US Coefficient* 3-months 0.37 1 year 0.41 1 year 3 year forward 0.54  R- squared 0.12 0.13 0.35  Source: Bank of England and Bank calculations; Note: All coefficients are significant at 1%. Second, swings in measures of risk aversion are more closely correlated with market yields than with actual forecasts of future interest rates. There are, of course, good reasons why changes in perceived risks should affect both. Greater risk aversion can raise the cost of capital, reduce domestic investment and activity, and lower any reasonable expectation of the policy rate.

Following a further depreciation in the currency, rises in administered prices and the prospect of continued weak growth in productivity, inflation was thought “likely to remain above target for much of the forecast period”. But “attempting to bring inflation back to target sooner…would risk derailing the recovery” and it was therefore “judged appropriate to look through the temporary, albeit protracted, period of above-target inflation”. I don’t think this was so exceptional. There is no inflation-targeting monetary authority that behaves so rigidly as to attempt to offset all shorter-term shocks to inflation, no matter the effects on the variability of interest rates and output. As the economist Lars Svensson puts it, “in practice, inflation targeting is always ‘flexible’, because all inflation-targeting central banks not only aim at stabilizing inflation but also put some weight on stabilizing the real economy”. In the UK, this regard for the occasional trade-offs faced by monetary policy, and their implication for the planning horizon, was formally enshrined in the MPC’s remit in March 2013. The Committee is now required to “promote understanding of the trade-offs inherent in setting policy and… [to communicate] the horizon over which it is appropriate to return inflation to the target”. This description of the appropriate horizon is now a regular part of our communication, notably in the newly introduced Monetary Policy Summary that introduces both the Inflation Report and the Minutes of our meetings. What of the current situation?
14  Report, Sept. 14  2016 (f) Report, Sept. 14  (annual change, percent) 3.4  3.9  3.9  3.8  3.9  2.4 1.0 1.6 7.3 5.4 4.1 2.0  2.1 0.8 1.0 7.3 5.4 4.0 1.7  2.9 1.5 1.1 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.4  3.1 1.7 1.0 7.2 6.2 4.4 3.0  3.0 1.7 1.5 7.2 6.2 4.5 2.6  3.2 1.8 1.2 7.0 6.5 4.8 3.3  300 106  310 108  315 106  (levels) 285 101  290 103  305 104  300 101  -0.9  -0.5  -0.8  -0.5  3.5  3.3  3.2  3.8  3.7  3.7  4.4  (annual change, percent) -0.2  -1.1  -1.5  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Bloomberg, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries.

The change in the macroeconomic scenario has also reflected in exchange rate movements, in both nominal and real terms. The CLP posted a 5.8 percent depreciation between the close of this Report and last, mostly during the past few weeks. Although part of this depreciation responded to the global strengthening of the dollar, the rise in the CLP/USD parity exceeded that of other emerging market currencies. This obeyed to less favorable cyclical conditions and a more expansionary monetary policy in the country. It must be noted that Chile’s macroeconomic policy framework includes, among other features, a monetary policy based on inflation targeting and exchange rate flexibility. Thus, during slowdown periods, when the pressure on prices diminishes, policy becomes more expansionary in order to achieve the inflation target, that is, for the inflation rate not to fall below the target range. This boost to monetary policy results in a higher exchange rate, which permits the economy to have a faster, optimal adjustment via the expansion of tradable sectors. In other words, the exchange rate increases are a natural, desired response to the business cycle, lending a helping hand in the economic adjustment. We have been faithful to this predicament, as reflected in the significant depreciation of our currency in recent times. We do not view this as a problem, because despite some unwanted effects in the short term – including higher inflation – it is part of the solution to have the economy reactivate more rapidly and efficiently.
In case the issue of liquidity bills is deemed necessary, the method of issue of the said bills and other related information will be announced to the public in advance by a press release. As always pointed out, the Central Bank deems the stability and development of financial markets as a supporting objective for the effective implementation of policies pertaining to price stability. As a matter of fact, compatible with the floating exchange rate regime, the Central Bank has taken measures towards maintaining financial stability several times in the last four years. Within this context, the Central Bank, the primary goal of which, entrusted to it by law, is to establish price stability, will continue its practices to enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy and liquidity management, also in 2007. Accordingly, the Central Bank may change not only its liquidity management strategy, but also the borrowing and lending interest rate margins in cases of unpredictable changes in market conditions and according to the new needs. Obviously, under the floating exchange rate regime, the Central Bank is able to implement the YTL liquidity policy in a more flexible manner than it can under a fixed currency peg regime and can act more promptly and flexibly to meet the YTL liquidity needs of the banking system. The Central Bank can prevent excessive fluctuations in money market interest rates as long as they are consistent with the inflation target.

The answers to this question as provided in the Inflation Reports published in 2006 were as follows: •  JANUARY 2006: “... a short-term interest rate path remaining constant for the first couple of months in 2006 and displaying a gradual decline thereafter...”  •  APRIL 2006: “...where the Central Bank continues to cut policy rates gradually...”  •  JULY 2006: “... in addition to the measures of June, the Central Bank will implement measured monetary tightening in the rest of 2006 and cut policy rates gradually in 2007...”  •  OCTOBER 2006: “under the scenario that the Central Bank maintains its tight stance until the last quarter of 2007 and cuts policy interest rates afterwards...”  As it is clearly seen above, as long as there was not a significant shock in the economy, the Central Bank acted in parallel to its earlier statements. However it had to revise its monetary policy stance after important shocks such as the market volatilities of May and June. It is more evident in light of these this example that, as it is frequently emphasized in our announcements, the interest rate path, which is used by the Central Bank in producing forecasts, should not be perceived as a commitment to be followed in every case. Hence, the interest rate risk should be assessed by considering the fact that the outlook presented in the Inflation Report is subject to change depending on the data flow, and thus, the policy perspective can be updated whenever necessary.
If now EMU leads to increased competition in the housing loan market, which should be an effect of monetary union, there will also be an expanded need to finance housing loans in way that is economical with capital. It is not unreasonable to believe that securitisation in this perspective will attract increasing interest. Increased competition can accordingly drive forward a growing market for securitisation. However, the causal connection can also be the opposite, namely that improved opportunities for securitisation will increase competition. This is the experience in Australia, where the housing loan market was deregulated in the 1990s. A legislation that facilitates securitisation reduced the previously high entry barriers which existed in the market, cleared the way for new players and reduced costs for the housing loan customers – in fact by as much as a couple of percentage points. Some conclusions Taken as a whole, we seem to be moving towards greater competition in the housing finance sector. New financing forms, new technology and possible EMU membership are driving factors that will together reduce entry barriers and thus increase competition. Since housing loans are standardised products, it is above all price which is the means of competition. The financing issues will thus be at the centre of interest. The traditional Swedish form for housing finance where the entire balance sheet constitutes one body of collateral has many advantages. It is possible that the investors’ demands for collateral in the form of equity may gradually make this form too expensive.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Contribution of global banks to financial stability Opening speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the International Capital Markets and Emerging Markets Roundtable, Institute of International Finance (IIF), Washington DC, 17 April 2011. *  *  *  Let me start by thanking the IIF for giving me this opportunity to present my views on global banks. I will speak from my perspective as Spanish banking supervisor. And I should say from the outset that in my country global banks have not given us the most problems. Indeed, the main message of my intervention today is that we should not fall into the trap of automatically equating “global banks” with “dangerous banks” in terms of financial stability. This may be an intuitive reaction to the crisis. But it would be a mistaken one, in my view. In fact, based on our experience, I would like to give you some examples of how global banks can make a positive contribution to financial stability. Naturally, these are only examples, and I would certainly not presume to have all of the answers on this complex issue. But I hope these examples will be illustrative of the point I am trying to make. First of all, it is true that some global banks have experienced severe problems. We have seen large, complex and interconnected banks and financial companies on the brink of bankruptcy, both here in the United States, and across Europe.
The CPIEFE will decline steadily until the second half of 2017 and will take longer to hit 3% (figure 2). This inflation path relies on two assumptions: first, a fairly stable real exchange rate around its current levels, which are estimated to be in line with fundamentals; second, that although the output gap will exceed the December estimate for some time, it is projected that, for the aforesaid reasons, it will begin to close towards the end of this year. Activity growth ended 2016 in line with the December forecast, although characterized by a steeper slowdown during the year, which is expected to continue well into 2017. On 20 March, the Bank published the first National Accounts figures based on the new benchmark compilation that uses the base year 2013. This change is intended to update the way the evolution of the national economy is gauged, incorporating new estimation methodologies, changes in international standards and new sources of information. The Bank makes these changes regularly every five years, according to the respective international standards set by the IMF and the OECD. The most salient changes are depicted in a box in this Report, and all the details can be seen in several documents uploaded on our website. The new data, which included a very small revision to 2014 and 2015 growth, confirmed the further weakening of the economy in the last quarter of the year, and at the same time modified the growth trajectories of the already published quarters of 2016.

Among emerging economies, the improvement in China’s outlook is worth noting. In the fourth quarter of last year, the Chinese GDP grew 6.8%, so growth for the full year was 6.7%. Conjunctural numbers and financial indicators have been calmer, according to manufacturing output and foreign trade figures. The renminbi is depreciating gradually and the large capital outflows and reserves depletion of 2016 have stopped. Meanwhile, the authorities set the growth objective at 6.5%. Thus, our baseline scenario has revised the Chinese growth forecast upward by 2 decimals. In Latin America, the main economies in the region are still adjusting. In Brazil, consumption and investment are weak, as is manufacturing production in Colombia. Argentina is also undergoing a difficult process and, although more lagging than in other countries, has shown signs of milder deterioration of activity, especially concerning manufacturing output. The Mexican economy could sustain good growth and performance in the labor market until the markets became aware of the potential effects of the US elections on trade and migration. This has resulted in weak investment. In this context, the Mexican authorities have taken steps to strengthen their macroeconomic fundamentals, through policies aimed at consolidating public finances, withdrawing the monetary stimulus to deal with inflationary pressures, and managing the exchange rate to counteract the sharp depreciation that the Mexican peso suffered towards the end of last year. In general, the inflation outlook has continued to improve in the region, opening room for further monetary stimulus.