samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
European Central Bank: Press conference on the chosen design for the New ECB Premises Introductory statements by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice President of the European Central Bank, to the press conference on the chosen design of the international urban planning and architectural design competition for the New ECB Premises, Frankfurt, 20 January 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, We have invited you today for the presentation of the chosen design proposal in the international urban planning and architectural design competition for the New ECB Premises. In our introductory remarks we would like to do the following: first, to briefly recall the main steps that have led to the outcome of the competition. Second, to present the chosen design proposal in some detail. And third, to explain what happens next. Afterwards, we will be happy to answer further questions, as will the chosen architect when it comes to technical questions on the design proposal. The decision of the Governing Council / the conclusion of the competition Last Thursday, on 13 January 2005, “the Governing Council chose the design for the ECB’s new premises out of the 3 revised design proposals of the 3 prize winners of the international urban planning and architectural design competition.

But there is a clear difference between the path of adjustment desired by the surplus countries, which are faced with the need for a longer-term structural shift away from reliance on exports, and the path of adjustment preferred by the deficit countries, which are under greater near-term pressure to reduce the burden of debt in both private and public sectors. Tensions between the two groups were evident at last week’s IMF meetings in Washington where all the talk was of currency conflicts. Such conflicts are, however, symptoms of a deeper disagreement on the appropriate time path of real adjustment. Since surpluses and deficits must add to zero for the world as a whole, differences between these desired ex ante adjustment paths are reconciled ex post by changes in the level of world output. And the risk is that unless agreement on a common path of adjustment is reached, conflicting policies will result in an undesirably low level of world output, with all countries worse off as a result. The international monetary system today has become distorted. The major surplus and deficit countries are pursuing economic strategies that are in direct conflict. And there are  2  BIS Review 136/2010  some innocent victims. Those emerging market economies which have adopted floating currencies are now suffering from the attempts of other countries to hold down their exchange rates, and are experiencing uncomfortable rates of capital inflows and currency appreciation. So there is more to this issue than a bilateral conflict between China and the United States.
In Italy, for instance, output fell by more than 5% in 2009, while unemployment peaked at almost 13% in 2014. These figures are alarming, but they tell us little about the people who lost their jobs, their homes and their future. Taking all this suffering into account, the crisis turned into a tragedy. As for its causes, I admit that the story I’ve just told is far too simple. Of course, it was not the failure of a single investment bank that caused all this mayhem. The full story is much longer and much more complex. However, no one can deny that banks played a crucial role. It became obvious that they can pose a huge risk to financial stability and the economy. But at the same it’s an inescapable truth that we need banks. Or, to be more precise, we need the services they provide. Why we need banks Who does an investor turn to when she needs money to start or expand a business, when she needs to hedge risks or wants to acquire another company? Who does a saver turn to when he wants to deposit money? Who does a family turn to when it needs a loan to buy a home? Here in Europe, all of them would most likely turn to a bank. Banks provide a vital service to the economy. Without them, the economy would not work. All this leads us to a crucial question: how can we ensure that banks reliably serve the economy?

We have put that portfolio under the management of a separate company at arms length from the HKMA to ensure that there is no conflict of interest between our shareholdings and our daily operations as a regulator. Our intention is to sell off these shares very gradually in a way that will have no impact on the markets. This may well mean holding on to them for some time. Meanwhile, the markets have stabilized, and the Hang Seng Index has, like other markets, been enjoying something of a resurgence over the last few weeks. Hong Kong’s Economic Strengths  I believe that in the future we shall be able to look back on our actions in August and September as a resounding reaffirmation of our resolve to maintain our fifteen-year record of currency stability through the linked exchange rate. The link was introduced in October 1983 at a time of uncertainty over Hong Kong’s future and declining confidence in the Hong Kong dollar. The link has survived successive political and economic shocks, both global and regional. It is not only weathering the current crisis, the greatest test so far: it will, I believe, come out of the crisis more resilient than ever, fortified by the technical refinements to our currency board system and, more important, be strengthened by the clear message that we have given about our determination to maintain it. The link is the lynchpin of our monetary system and a vital factor in our prosperity.
The combination of this war chest and coordinated G7 central bank action helped ensure markets functioned normally as the financial system absorbed a result that had been assigned a 10% probability hours before. And it meant we could credibly and immediately demonstrate to the public that we were well prepared. We are buttressing the system via substantially higher bank capital. The capital of major UK banks has tripled and the requirements for the most systemic global banks have increased ten-fold. Tier 1 is now at 16.5%. Capital that would have been adequate for banks to withstand any of the 20 largest historic banking crises – and in the judgment of the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee, a Cliff Edge Brexit – and still lend to the real economy. 22 23  Kouzes, J and Posner, B (2010) ibid 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  By using multiple stress tests, we are spending less time trying to predict what could go wrong and more time being ready for the worst that could happen when things do. And we are burying. The cornerstone of an anti-fragile financial system is literally planning for failure. Remember: plan beats no plan. That means resolution plans for banks; Crisis Management Groups for 30 GSIBs; and having banks building sufficient internal resources to recapitalise themselves if something goes wrong. Large UK banks have already built their Total Loss Absorbing Capital to 25% of Risk Weighted Assets.

To summarise, probably all of these factors have had some significance in stabilising the world economy. However, one must remember that 20 years is a short period when analysing economic cycles. Perhaps the current downturn will give us reason to reconsider the conclusion that the fluctuations have declined? In this context one usually mentions the importance of the extended period of high growth in some emerging economies. First and foremost China, but also India, has had an increasing significance for the world economy over the past decade. If domestic demand can be sustained in these countries, despite declining economic activity in the United States, Japan and Europe, it may lessen the downturn for the world as a whole. However, their growth opportunities should slow down as the economies enter a more mature phase. In the long term, they cannot support world growth. 2. Sweden  As each economic cycle is to some extent unique, one can never say exactly what will happen in any phase of a cycle. There is quite simply no such thing as a typical economic cycle. But it may nevertheless be interesting to look at how different variables can vary in the economic cycle in Sweden. As Sweden is a small, open economy with a large export sector, we are very much affected by what happens abroad. It is therefore often claimed that Swedish economic cycles are "imported”.
Riley, R, Rosazza Bondibene, C and Young, G (2015), ‘The UK Productivity Puzzle 2008-2013: Evidence From British Businesses’, NIESR Discussion Paper. Rodrik, D (2011), ‘The future of economic convergence’, Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper, RWP 11-033. Billett, I and Schneider, P (2016), ‘Bitesize: Exploring UK sectoral productivity’, Bank Underground blog post, available at https://bankunderground.co.uk/2017/01/19/bitesize-exploring-uk-sectoral-productivity/. Song, J, Price, D, Guvenen, F, Bloom, N and Von Wachter, T (2015), ‘Firming Up Inequality’, NBER Working Paper No. 21199. Stoyanov, A, and Zubanov, N (2012), ‘Productivity spillovers across firms through worker mobility’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, p.168-198. Summers, L (2013), IMF Fourteenth Annual Research Conference in Honor of Stanley Fischer, 8 November. Syverson, C (2016), ‘Challenges to Mismeasurement Explanations for The U.S. Productivity Slowdown’, NBER Working Paper No. 21974. Tuuli, S and Batten, B (2015), ‘Back to the future: why we’re optimistis in the secular stagnation debate’, Bank Underground Blog post, July, available at https://bankunderground.co.uk/2015/07/02/supply-sidesecular-stagnation-and-the-future-of-innovation/. Weale, M (2014), ‘The UK productivity puzzle: an international perspective’, Speech to Mile End Group, Queen Mary, University of London, 8 December. 42  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  42

2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  In effect the benefits of deep and liquid markets – ease of price discovery, minimisation of basis risk, tight bid/offer spreads – have outweighed the fact that Libor may not be a perfect match to users’ underlying needs. Whilst users of Libor clearly benefit from this concentration of liquidity, the flipside is that it makes the adoption of alternatives to Libor a very challenging task. These network effects are reinforced by market convention, accounting practices, and the frictional costs of changing firms’ systems and risk models. And use of Libor is perpetuated by the need to hedge and manage legacy positions. Overall, there is substantial inertia in the use of Libor. The case for change The financial system’s Libor dependency matters for two reasons. First, as I have argued, in many applications users would be better served by a near risk-free rate: the bank credit component of Libor is in these cases neither necessary nor appropriate. Derivatives markets in particular could be more effective if there were liquidity in alternative reference rates. The prospect of improved market effectiveness might not, on its own, justify change. A second factor adds powerful impetus to the case for change. As the Governor emphasised, the truth is that the term deposit markets which underpin Libor fixings are no longer a liquid source of bank funding. Even a reformed Libor will need to rely on expert judgement to supplement transactional data. That is not a desirable state of affairs.
Very significant valuation losses this year As a result of a rapid increase in inflation this year, the Riksbank and other central banks have raised their policy rates. The level of interest rates today is significantly higher than at the start of the year. The value of the bonds in the Riksbank's monetary policy-motivated asset portfolio has therefore fallen considerably; Table 1 shows that the value has decreased by SEK 59 billion this year, corresponding to one per cent of GDP. Table 1. Changes in value of Riksbank’s monetary policy assets this year Government bonds Municipal bonds Covered bonds Corporate bonds Total  −32 −6 −21 0 −59  Note. SEK billion. Refers to change in value up to 30 November 2022. 31 The Riksbank's accounts actually follow a hybrid of these two principles. If the market value of an asset is less  than the acquisition value, the difference is recognised as a loss, but if the market value exceeds the acquisition value, the difference is transferred to a revaluation account without affecting the Riksbank's reported result. Kjellberg and Åhl (2022) describe this in a little more detail. 17 [30]  During a large part of the purchasing programme's history, interest rates were surprisingly low. The acquired assets have then increased in value and the Riksbank's financing cost has often been slightly lower than we expected at the respective purchase occasion.

I will leave this for the presentation by Kate Sweetman, the main author of this study. Broadly, the Asian Leadership Index demystifies that attributes leaders in Asia must develop if they are to engage the people they lead. The Asian Leadership Index does not propose a new leadership model. Rather, it identifies a number of areas for behavioural change that are needed based on the attributes that respondents indicated are currently missing in their leaders, reinforced with suggestions on how leaders might move forward with greater influence and impact. In conducting this research, it is hoped that it generates thinking on these leadership issues and contribute towards the development of the new generation of effective leaders in Asia. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
On the other hand, there are countries, such as Chile, where changes in costs are regularly passed on to consumer prices, because markets for foodstuff are globally integrated and competitive. Hence, a large part of the inflationary shock has been already absorbed. However, we have continuously witnessed a flow of bad news on commodity prices, and inflationary shocks keep hitting us, but the benefits that the flexible inflation targeting regime brings in terms of price stability and credibility must be maintained. There is no doubt from the developing countries’ perspective that this is an important conquest and cannot be abandoned, least of all in these difficult times. The world economy is in a very complex situation. It is far from the disastrous 1970s, but we are in the presence of a slowdown with high risks of inflation. We are at a moment in which monetary policy is put under a serious stress test that will be crucial in identifying future refinements in the policy frameworks. Particularly important in the US and industrial countries is the interaction between price and financial stability. From a policymaker’s point of view, we must ensure that all the benefits achieved during the great moderation phase are preserved. It would be irresponsible to return to times of instability while searching for short-lived gains. References Ahmed, S, A. Levin and B.Wilson (2002), “Recent U.S. Macroeconomic Stability: Good Policies, Good Practices, or Good Luck?”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Financial Discussion Paper 2002-730.

In the international regulatory front, we recently assumed the chair of the Asia Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and sit on the IOSCO Executive Committee. We have also assumed the chair of the EMEAP Working Group on Banking Supervision, which will facilitate the region’s discussion on implementation of Basle II. We are committed to regional and international co-operative efforts that help to foster a stable global financial system. In that regard, we contributed actively to initiatives of other forums such as BIS, FSF, IAIS and FATF, in the areas of financial stability, regulation and supervision, corporate governance and antimoney laundering. VI  Ensuring business continuity  In the area of Business Continuity Management (BCM), MAS conducted several exercises last year to ensure the effectiveness of our BCM plans. We also inspected BCM plans of major financial institutions (FIs) and found that FIs are generally prepared. For example, during the recent blackout, affected FIs continued operations smoothly on back-up power and activated their incident management process to verify that their buildings and operations were functioning normally. The blackout had minimal impact on the financial sector. VII  Accounts  Let me now move on to the MAS’ financial statements. MAS’ total assets grew 16.8% during the year ended 31 March 2004 to $ 179.7 billion. The Currency Fund’s assets, at the financial year-end, exceeded the $ 14.6b currency in circulation, providing 110% asset backing.
This was the case with Barings, in which I was also heavily involved. There is therefore nothing new about bank resolution. Why have a resolution regime for banks? Why do we need a special resolution regime for banks? The first reason is that at the point when actions have to be taken to deal with a bank in difficulty, there will inevitably be a considerable amount of uncertainty about how bad that bank’s problems are. This is because the scale of the problem will depend on how the future unfolds. But we will know at that point that if the authorities don’t act, the problems of the institution will quickly get much worse, and a deposit run may well ensue. The second reason for a special resolution regime is that the process of resolution itself must not add to the uncertainty and loss of confidence. Put  BIS Review 157/2009  1  simply, it has to be fast and decisive. Most bank resolutions happen over weekends. My overwhelming guiding principle is that by no later than first thing on Monday morning we must be able to tell depositors that their money is safe and its new home is …… There is a simple test of this – the answer to the depositor’s question “Is my money safe?” must be yes – no hesitation or qualification can be added. Normal corporate insolvency procedures are therefore inadequate for banks for a number of reasons.

In order to enhance delivery channels of retail banking, the Bank of Thailand will allow and encourage commercial banks to use customer contact points other than their own branches and sub-branches by means of alliance with post office branches and telecom companies’ service points, for instance. Moreover, banks can capitalize on lower capital charge for performing retail loan portfolios if they pass both small size test and non-concentration test, with risk weight of 75 percent for loans to retail customers or SMEs and only 35 percent for fully collateralized housing loans. These are the risk weights proposed by the draft Basel II Accord. However, for those who fail to adapt, these forces of change may inflict threats raised by more intense competition from non-bank players and existing foreign banks. The competition is particularly intense in consumer credit segment with mushrooming non-bank credit institutions that offer more relaxed lending conditions for consumer credits, with faster services - some applications are approved within half an hour. Moreover, if qualified existing foreign bank branches or office of international banking facilities choose to upgrade their status to subsidiary, they will be allowed to have some branches, inserting more competitive pressure on the existing players. Despite low household debt of less than 30 percent of GDP in Thailand, the rapid growths of personal credit and credit card advances, in particular, are a potential source of our concern, especially for low-income customers.
This year, Thailand must stay focused on ensuring post-flood recovery and restoring confidence. The damage of the floods was severe. Economic activity contracted by 9 percent year-on-year in the final quarter of last year and the economy barely grew over the year as a whole. However, the impact of a one-time shock of this kind will likely be temporary and there is no doubt that Thailand will recover strongly. Indeed, notwithstanding some slight delays associated with the need to import machinery and the processing of insurance payouts, the recovery process is well under way. We expect that growth will rebound to 4.9 percent in 2012 (figure from MPC January Meeting), boosted mainly by post-flood spending of both the private and public sectors. In 2013, momentum is expected to pick up, resulting in an expansion of 5.6 percent. This optimistic outlook reflects key fundamental strengths in Thailand’s economy. First, Thailand’s human capital remains intact and strong, ready to support business expansion. Second, the corporate sector continues to enjoy healthy balance sheets from accumulated savings and profits. This strong financial position will enable future investment and restoration. Third, Thailand’s financial sector is well positioned to provide the financing necessary to facilitate the investment cycle. Although the new Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) fee will detract from banks’ bottom line, the impact should be marginal and manageable.

Threats to the global outlook began to intensify, driven primarily by the euro sovereign debt crisis and signs of continued fragility in the US economic recovery. Domestically, the devastating floods in the fourth quarter of last year caused severe disruptions to our agricultural and manufacturing industries in affected areas. With upside risks to inflation deemed to be contained, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) agreed that there was room to address the heightened risk to growth and the policy rate was reduced by a total of 50 basis points over two meetings. The current rate of 3.00 percent was judged to be accommodative for domestic recovery as well as supportive of long-term economic stability. This is the story up to now. While the overall environment is improving, one cannot afford to be complacent. The events over the past few years has reminded us that things that seem under control can get out of hand very quickly. So, let me take you farther down the road of 2012–2013. I would like to focus on two key issues. The first concerns future challenges facing Thailand. The second then addresses the Bank of Thailand (BOT)’s policy focus, going forward. First, on the challenges. On the external front, uncertainties surrounding the global recovery remain substantial. Major advanced economies are still grappling with structural weaknesses in their economies. Most prominent is the substantial debt-overhang. In the euro area, this is mainly in the form of sovereign debt. In the US, the problem lies primarily with private sector debt.