samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, last year we conducted a survey to landscape the development of the fintech sector and to assess the opportunities and barriers for innovation. The results of the survey indicate that about 90% of all respondents are aware of the benefits that digitalization of financial services brings, about 70% invest in digital transformation, payment services in particular, while regulation and market size seem to be the two main obstacles for faster fintech development. Regulatory barriers mainly refer to data protection, money laundering and payment system areas. The latter will be addressed with the new Law on Payment Services and Payment Systems that transposes the European regulation in the payments area, including PSD2. The Survey has served as a base point for the preparation of the first National Fintech Strategy to be adopted at the begging of next year. We expect that the new regulatory framework and more broadly, the implementation of the Strategy, will bring and make the new “inside out” for the Macedonian payment industry. Apparently, the digital age is propelling innovations in the financial area and changing profoundly the habits and preferences of consumers. I have no doubt that these innovation waves will continue. To maximize benefits and contain risks that might come to the surface, regulators, including central banks have to be part of the innovation waves to meet consumers’ needs in the payments landscape of tomorrow.

The main reasons for changing payment habits include the increased convenience of the electronic payments, for example increased limit on the amount of contactless payments, the perceived risk of infection from banknotes, governments’ recommendations to use cash less, as well as more difficult access to and lower acceptance of cash at the points of sale. This trend in payments is unlikely to be reversed. Almost 90% of the respondents stated that they would continue to use cash less once the pandemic is over. Similar trends in payment habits can be observed in our country as well. Consumers have shown strong preferences for using cashless instruments such as cards. For example, the number of payment transactions initiated on the virtual point of sale last year doubled and continued to raise at double-digit growth rates this year. Also, the volume of contactless card payments increased by about 50% in 2020 and this trend has continued this year. Obviously, advancement in technology opens the doors to innovative digital services, but to unlock its true value for businesses and consumers, we as regulators have a role to play. In this context, clear example is the Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2) that opened up EU payments market to higher competition, by establishing a level playing field for traditional players and new entrants, while providing higher protection for consumers. The new concept of open banking was conducive to richer payment landscape with numerous new entrants (third party providers) and numerous new customer-centric services.
How can we maintain and underpin credibility? The following seem to be ingredients. Being very publicly committed to anchoring medium-term inflation expectations in line with a clear target, above all else. Inflation outturns being, on average, in line with the target. And being seen to be committed to the essentially technical job of professional economic analysis of conjunctural conditions and the underlying structure of the economy. Typically moving our policy rate in steps of 25 bp seems to have been useful in conveying the break with the past. Perhaps because it conveys that things are ‘under control’. The counterpart to that is being understood to be ready to do whatever it is necessary to maintain well-anchored inflation expectations. Policy strategy, risk management, and communication If the key tasks are anchoring inflation expectations and, with less weight, stabilising demand conditions, how do central banks go about their policy job? At the Bank of England, in both our published projections and our policy decisions, we emphasise the risks around the ‘central outlook’. And although some of the presentation is different, that is on the same page as what former Chairman Greenspan called the ‘risk management’ approach to policy. In my experience, it is not sensible to respond to all possible risks, even some that would have a big impact if they crystallised. Take, for example, global imbalances. If they were to unravel abruptly, with a big fall in the dollar against the euro, aggregate demand in the euro area might fall for a while.

First, we just do not know enough about the underlying structure and properties of the economy. Quite apart from the change in monetary regime, the extent and variety of the structural change underway in the real economy is profound: for example, labour market reform domestically, and the opening up of labour markets across the European continent, which has materially increased inward migration to the UK; the new technology and the price transparency it brings; China and India. In consequence, in the UK for the moment we do not really know whether the short-run trade off between excess (or deficient) demand and inflation has changed; whether the short-run Phillips curve has become flatter. Second, the data we use give us an unavoidably imperfect read on what is going on. Not infrequently in my experience we debate the various possible explanations for some puzzle in the data, only to find that a year or so later the data have been revised and, as it turned out, there was no puzzle. For that reason, the Bank of England is putting considerable resources into researching data uncertainty 14 . Where does that leave us? I should like to say that we can ‘rough tune’ but not fine tune. Rough tuning is important, as we do need to keep aggregate demand and supply broadly in line as a condition for  13  Balls, E. and G. O’Donnell (eds.
As proved by the experience gathered from the `30s to the `60s, it can provide financial stability at the expense of future productivity and living standards. To quote Andrew Crockett again, “We should be careful that greater safety in banking is not purchased at the cost of reduced efficiency or additional risks elsewhere in the system”. Second, proper functioning of markets requires adequate rules. To me, it seems that something was wrong not only with markets themselves, but with the way they were regulated. Regulation did not pay enough attention to problems that may appear when markets operate. Andrew Crocket explained that the “market mechanism failed because of perverse incentive, asymmetric information and conflict of interests”. This means that, as Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa described it a few years ago, this crisis is not only a failure of markets, but also a failure of governments and regulators. In my view, free markets work properly given a set of good rules. It is natural for human beings to make free choices. It is the regulators` duty to design rules that always preserve this freedom while preventing, for as long as possible, the accumulation of problems from asymmetric information, perverse incentive and conflict of interests. The two approaches of regulation – the one up to the `60s and the one before the outbreak of the current crisis – are a proper basis for understanding what good rules might mean. III.

The financial system in the aftermath of the crisis  The financial industry is supposed to be the lubricant of the economic engine and ensure its smooth and efficient functioning. To grasp the sheer scale of its task, just imagine the billions of savers and investors whose interests have to be matched by the financial system, each of them having a particular behaviour, often driven by emotions. In doing so, financial institutions use specialized resources to assess and manage risks, including complicated mathematical models. Just think of the many Nobel prizes that were awarded for achievements in this field. The complexity of financial intermediation explains some of the seemingly peculiar features of the financial system as, for instance, the fact that the volume of transactions on the forex market is many times larger than what would be required by the actual exchange of merchandise. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The major positive contribution of the financial system is its ability to deal with asymmetric information problems. Adverse selection and moral hazard are issues emerging from asymmetric information. They are a cost to society, as they hamper lending. Financial system expansion has been the natural solution of the society in order to overcome asymmetric information problems. Financial institutions put their capital at risk and derive income from the spread between lending and deposit rates. In doing so, they use specialized resources to assess credit risk and discipline the borrower.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy from a historical perspective Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference to mark the 100th anniversary of the Association of Norwegian Economists, Oslo, 16 September 2008. The text may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by offering my congratulations to the Association of Norwegian Economists on its 100th anniversary. One hundred is a respectable age. In Norway, the introduction of a university degree in economics was certainly an important stimulus in the first part of the last century. In the period since the Second World War, major changes in society have increased the demand for expertise in the field of economics. And economists are constantly gaining new insights. This also applies to the field of central banking, even though one of the fundamental central bank responsibilities – to safeguard the value of money – was as important 100 years ago as it is today. Monetary policy in Norway has changed considerably over the past 100 years. The government, with the support of the Storting, has now defined an objective for monetary policy of low and stable inflation. Norges Bank sets its interest rate with a view to achieving price stability. This has not always been the case. Monetary policy in Norway  Norges Bank was established in 1816 and was placed directly under the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The government had no control or influence.

Dr Abbas is also the recipient of several awards from several governments and from the Islamic Development Bank, he received the Annual Prize for Research in Islamic Economics in recognition of his service in advancing the knowledge in Islamic finance. He has published books and research articles on a wide range of areas including microeconomic theory, mathematical economics and Islamic economics. During his tenure at INCEIF, Dr. Abbas will also engage in research and consultancy in on Islamic finance, including guiding academic research and supervising dissertations and theses of INCEIF students. He will also present lectures abroad organised by INCEIF as part of the efforts to strengthen the international alliances that have been established with INCEIF BIS Review 9/2010  1  from other centres of learning in other parts of the world. His appointment as the inaugural holder of INCEIF Chair of Islamic Finance would certainly give INCEIF the opportunity to raise its capacity to become a world class learning institution dedicated to Islamic Finance. Dr Abbas valuable knowledge and insights and his extensive experience in both academia and at the IMF, will benefit and enhance the knowledge and expertise of INCEIF graduates as well as the academia and financial community. Since its establishment in 2006, INCEIF has grown from strength to strength and has been recording a steady increase in the number of students for its three programmes, the Chartered Islamic Finance Professional or the CIFP, Masters in Islamic Finance and PhD in Islamic Finance.
Philipp Hildebrand: Developments in the international financial markets and managing the Swiss National Bank’s assets Introductory remarks by Dr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 16 December 2004. * 1. *  *  Developments in the international financial markets  Looking back at the year gone by, it becomes evident that two opposing price movements have dominated the markets: the strong depreciation of the US dollar on the one hand and the sharp rise in oil prices on the other hand. Developments in the bond and equity markets were, by comparison, rather restrained. In the past few weeks, the dollar has continued its downtrend that commenced three years ago, at which time the greenback was still worth over CHF 1.70. Given the structurally inflated US current account deficit, the sustained downward revision comes as no surprise. However, the fact that the revision to date has been relatively one-sided vis-à-vis the European currencies and the Canadian dollar is problematic. Major Asian currencies have either remained completely pegged to the dollar, such as the Chinese renminbi, or joined the dollar in its slide - at least to some extent - like the Japanese yen. This was only possible, however, at a price, namely huge dollar-buying efforts on the part of the central banks and governments in question. As a result of this asymmetric trend, European exporters are currently bearing the brunt of the additional competitive pressures stemming from the weaker dollar.

Rachel Lomax: Stability and statistics Speech by Ms Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the North Wales Business Club, Llandudno, Wales, 23 November 2004. I would like to thank Simon Hayes and Jens Larsen for research support and Spencer Dale, Mark Cornelius and colleagues at the Bank of England for helpful comments. *  *  *  “The first time we saw the MPC we were given the folder of all the statistics they had which was something like a foot high. We found it hard to believe that they all read that stuff but they claimed they did.Statistics seem to be their life blood…” Chairman, House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs, HL Paper 176 - II. The past decade has been a time of unparalleled stability for the UK economy. It is more than twelve years since the United Kingdom experienced a single quarter of negative GDP growth. Consumer spending, investment and output have all shown a degree of stability over the past ten years which is unmatched in any decade since the war - indeed in the twentieth century. Inflation has been impressively stable too, as well as lower on average than at any time since the war. And, to complete the story, employment has grown steadily, and unemployment has fallen to a 30 year low. A stable economy has created a much better climate for business. So no wonder soaring oil prices make people nervous.
There is thus a significant risk that the collapse of a Swedish bank would have major, negative consequences for the entire Swedish banking system and for the economy as a whole. It is important for a central bank to manage these risks in such a way that they can never threaten financial stability. A reasonable consequence of this is that a systemically-important bank should be subject to particularly stringent capital requirements. The study that the Riksbank published at the end of last year shows that increasing capital ratios is an effective way of safeguarding financial stability, at the same time as the economic  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  costs of this – in terms of lower GDP – are not necessarily significant.6 Sweden’s historical experience of low capital ratios is also bad, which is demonstrated not least by the banking crisis of the 1990s, and this has led to a gradual improvement. At the end of November last year, the Riksbank, the Ministry of Finance and Finansinspektionen issued a joint press release in which they declared how much capital they believed the four major Swedish banks should have. The capital ratio should be at least 10 per cent by 1 January 2013 at the latest, and at least 12 per cent by 1 January 2015.7 I would like to emphasise that it is very important that the banks reach these levels. However, we should not make this sound more dramatic than it actually is. The Swedish banks are already well-capitalised (see slide 9).

I wish you an interesting debate. Thank you for listening. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
In the case of Malaysia, an additional capital requirement is required to cushion inventory risks of underlying assets and to cover the potential equity position risks that are embedded within the partnership contracts. This is also reinforced by the requirement on the appointment of board representatives in the invested entities under the partnership contracts so as to serve as a safeguard for the interest of the Islamic financial institution thereby allowing for continuous monitoring and surveillance. Islamic financial institutions are also allowed to transfer the risk to investment account holders under Mudharabah, i.e. profit sharing and loss bearing contract, if the institution can demonstrate the appropriate disclosure and governance practices that would ensure an effective risk transfer. Islamic banks are also permitted to set aside a portion of income derived from assets funded by Mudharabah contracts, in the form of profit equalization reserves (PER) to sustain stable and competitive returns. Several of these requirements are based on the international standards that have been issued by IFSB. The implementation of IFSB standards across jurisdictions will be key in the continued robust expansion of Islamic finance. While the above measures facilitate the managing of risks peculiar to Islamic finance, the legal, regulatory and supervisory infrastructure also needs to keep abreast with the evolution and rapid transformation taking place in the industry. As part of this infrastructure, there needs to be an integrated crisis management framework to ensure that any emerging crisis in the Islamic financial system will be promptly managed.

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, At this point, I hope we have concisely and clearly laid out the monetary policy vision for Thailand that can serve as a basis for your investment decisions, reassessment of the risks, and, ultimately, your continued partnership in the Thai economy amid these troubled times of global uncertainty. On that note, let me conclude my talk here. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
However, it is also conceivable that the full impact of the supply shocks has not yet become evident on growth and inflation. To sum up, the oil price and its effects on growth and inflation are a significant source of uncertainty that we are grappling with in our assessment of growth prospects and the inflation outlook. Low long-term interest rates In the financial markets recent developments have been characterised by a continuation of low longterm interest rates and a stable krona. The low bond yields are somewhat puzzling. Even though corporate earnings have continued to increase in line with the continued strengthening of international economic activity, investment in many countries has not picked up to the same extent. While the willingness to invest has been relatively low in industrialised nations, regarded from a cyclical perspective, saving has also been high in certain oil-producing countries and in several Asian economies. The combination of a restrained willingness to invest and a high saving rate could, in other words, have contributed to the low bond yields. In addition, however, interest rates around the world in recent years may have been depressed by more transitory factors such as temporarily low risk premiums, effects of changed rules for pension saving and Asian countries’ build-up of their foreign exchange reserves. A fast rise in bond yields cannot be ruled out when these conditions normalise. That in turn could have repercussions for the real economy, partly through the effect on housing prices, household wealth and consumption.

Ladies and gentlemen, in today’s forum, we have arranged two panels, chaired by Eddie Yue and Arthur Yuen respectively, to elaborate on and discuss the initiatives and measures I have just mentioned. It would be useful for us to receive your comments and feedback. These initiatives and measures require persistence, dedication, and collaborative efforts of all the stakeholders: regulators, industry practitioners, international bodies, environmental groups. We must all work together. Thank you very much. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Equally, the ECB did not shy away from bold measures to curtail tail risks and to restore the monetary policy transmission. Over the last year euro area financial fragmentation has fallen significantly, capital flows have reverted to stressed countries and financing costs for corporates have converged somewhat across countries. These measures had the overarching purpose of ensuring price stability over the medium term. For the euro area, this is not merely lip service to the primary objective stated in the EU Treaty. It is, instead, the yardstick against which to measure the success of the ECB policies and to build credibility. In fact, inflation expectations remained firmly anchored throughout the crisis. By contrast, policy interest rates in Japan in the early 1990s remained at higher levels for longer, which, together with a lack of reforms in other areas, contributed to protracted economic weakness and falling prices. Eventually, inflation expectations became unanchored and made stabilisation more difficult for monetary policy once it was at the zero lower bound. Some commentators would go further and argue that central banks should loosen the belt in the deleveraging process to actively stoke high inflation.11 I disagree with this line of reasoning. Although surprise inflation would reduce the real debt burden in the short run, it would sow doubts about the central banks’ ability and willingness to control inflation in the longer run. Ultimately, it would undermine efforts to implement structural changes and prudent policies.

Our prudential work has also broadened to consider the impact of climate-related risks to the UK banking sector. We have now completed our initial engagement with the industry and are synthesising our findings. We expect to publish these later this year. From our prudential work, it is clear that consideration of the financial risks from climate change has significantly evolved over the last few years. There is a transition in thinking underway as climate is increasingly seen as a core strategic risk issue, rather than a matter solely for those managing firms’ ‘corporate responsibility’ strategies. As I will come to later, while this transition in thinking is encouraging, and the direction is correct, we need to make sure the speed of progress is sufficient. 2  Carney (2015), “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability”, speech given at Lloyd’s of London, September 2015. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  3  The second element relates to the Bank’s financial stability objective. As discussed elsewhere , financial stability risks could arise from a late and sudden transition to a lower carbon economy. An abrupt transition could particularly impact carbon-intensive sectors. And as I said earlier, by the time climate change becomes a clear risk to financial stability, it may already be too late.