samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We already fund up to 70% of course fees for training programmes. MAS funding support for manpower and leadership development has increased steadily over the last three years, with about $ million set aside for 2014 alone. I would like to urge the industry to tap on these programmes actively. Conclusion To conclude, I would like to commend the IBF Council and staff, past and present, for your commitment over this past 4 decades. Going forward, the responsibility on IBF will be greater, as it delivers the IBF Standards and the various initiatives that will help our practitioners develop the capabilities of tomorrow. I look forward to an even stronger collaboration between IBF and the industry. Let us work together to ensure that the financial sector is one that continues to enable meaningful and rewarding careers for Singaporeans. I wish you all a happy 40th Anniversary and a great evening ahead. 2  The Finance Scholarship Programme (FSP) builds expertise in specialist finance areas such as financial economics and actuarial science while the Finance Associate Management Scheme (FAMS) provides young talent with exposure to other business lines and overseas operations, through a structured fast-track programme. MAS aims to groom at least 200 young Singaporeans every year under FAMS to take on leadership positions in the future. 3  The International Posting Programme (iPOST) supports the posting of high potential Singaporeans for overseas secondments, through which we hope that they return with managerial skills, a deep understanding of global best practices and strong business networks.

It is important that banks adopt a consistent approach to dealing with restructuring requests across the organisation and provide ready access for customers in difficulties to approach the bank to discuss relief. Working together, banks and their customers can help one another to deal with the effects of  BIS Review 21/2003  3  SARs and position themselves for recovery. I am confident that the banks have been taking the right action, and will continue to do so. 4  BIS Review 21/2003
This Centre was established to act as a centralised point of contact to facilitate a rapid and effective response for members of the public and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in matters related to their requirements. Also a Credit Counselling and Debt Management Agency will be launched early next year. The Credit Counselling and Debt Management Agency is being established to undertake credit counselling and loan restructuring for individuals. This institutional arrangement will help consumers who encounter difficulties in meeting their financial commitments. Apart from being a source of information and advice on financial management, the arrangement would represent a more cost effective and prompt means of debt settlement through outof-court procedures. All these measures to enhance financial literacy involve all the parties concerned - the consumers, the financial service providers, the regulators and relevant Government ministries, the corporate and the NGOs. This collective approach reflects the importance of shared responsibility in helping consumers manage their financial risks more effectively. In this regard, the financial institutions who are the first line of contact with consumers, and who bear a major part of the financial risk in the event consumers suffer financial stress, need to play a greater role in helping create more informed participation in the financial system. The dividends in terms of lower non-performing loans and increased profitability makes this a win-win proposition.

To attract foreign investors, the Macedonian authorities offer a favorable tax environment (flat tax system with low rates), undertake the necessary infrastructural investments and create favorable business environment. It was allowed by the fiscal space before the crisis, and although the trend of the public debt is rising, now it is 43% of GDP, still being one of the lowest in Europe and broadly. Government's policies and efforts for attracting FDIs resulted in an establishment of local subsidiaries of several world leading manufacturing companies, especially from the automotive industry. This strategy of products' export diversification helped a lot in time of economic difficulties of our main trading partner - that is Europe. This strategy of strengthening the export base has also contributed to lower trade deficit and CAD (falling to below 2% of GDP), which on turn helped for monetary accommodation under the chosen monetary strategy of exchange rate targeting. This monetary strategy, the NBRM is conducting since the 1995 with fixed exchange rate of Denar, first with Deutsche Mark, and afterward with Euro. It delivers low inflation environment, which is the primary objective of the NBRM specified by law. Having in mind that the exchange rate of the domestic currency has not been changed since 1997, the selected monetary policy strategy demonstrates the high credibility of the central bank. However, this strategy underlines the importance of reserve management function within the central bank. Management of reserves, as we are all aware of, is a complex and timeconsuming business.
At the same time, more prudent transformation ratios (say, loans to deposits), coupled with a lower capacity of banks to attract savings would imply, at least in some countries, that the ability of banks to lend would decrease; but their willingness would not necessarily decrease, since they keep the advantaged standpoint to screen and monitor loans. This means that the implied gap might be filled by actors (insurance companies, pension funds) with greater capacity to attract savings although with limited capacity to lend directly. Securitisation of bank loans can be the privileged vehicle through which the gap is filled. Securitisation is also key when one thinks at impediments to capital relief and at tools to decrease the perilous geographical concentration of assets in banks’ balance sheets. In fact, if the right incentives are given, securitisation markets are the best way to more rapidly guarantee that loans are available for capital markets to invest while decreasing the home bias in banks’ balance sheets and ensure that credit is channeled to the best projects at the minimum cost. That is, securitisation could also have a decisive role in the integration and deepening of European financial markets, by allowing the transfer of risk from the originator to investors of any type located in other jurisdictions, in the context of a still very fragmented banking sector, lacking for instance relevant pan-European banks.

Ong Chong Tee: Financial economics Opening address by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the SKBI Annual Conference on “Financial economics”, at Singapore Management University (SMU), Singapore, 7 May 2012. *  *  *  Professor Arnoud De Meyer, President of Singapore Management University Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Introduction It gives me great pleasure to join you today at SKBI’s second Annual Conference on Financial Economics. Since its establishment in 2008, SKBI has pursued research on topics in economics and finance relevant to Asia and the Singapore economy. A recent working paper on “Testing for Multiple Bubbles” by Phillips, Shi and Yu, for example, sheds light on techniques for identifying asset price bubbles, and has useful implications for the surveillance strategies of central banks.1 I am privileged to join an outstanding line-up of speakers including keynote speaker Professor Sir James Mirrlees. I think some of you may be familiar with his groundbreaking work on optimal tax policy, and his modelling of the key role uncertainty plays in economics. The Mirrlees Review, a recent review of the UK tax system chaired by Sir James, offers invaluable practical lessons on optimal tax design, including specific recommendations for the taxation of savings and wealth. Structural change in the Singapore economy The perfect financial storm of the recent crisis severely disrupted markets and economies, and also shook key tenets fundamental to our understanding of economics and finance.
The drop in the real exchange rate by 45% from the pre-crisis peak played a role in this adjustment, although it overshot, initially causing severe side effects because of the large stock of foreign-denominated debt owed by resident borrowers without any natural hedging in the form of foreign income or assets. As a result, strong emphasis was placed on halting the collapse of the króna. This was achieved in H2/2009. Closing loopholes for capital outflows and adopting measures that allowed the capital controls to work as intended made a big difference in this regard. The economic recovery began once the exchange rate had been stabilised and the inevitable adjustment of domestic demand to a new economic reality was more or less complete. The economy gained resilience through the underlying strength of the sectors that had not been part of the bubble economy — conventional export sectors in particular. Firms in the tradable sector took advantage of the low real exchange rate. The economic upswing began in Q2/2010, when GDP began to grow once again. GDP has grown more or less without interruption since, and in terms of GDP per capita this is Iceland’s longest economic upswing since the end of World War 2  II. Early on, growth was weak in comparison with previous upswings, as it was driven mainly by closing the slack in the economy, as investment was relatively weak at the outset. That changed in 2015, when tourism began to grow at an unprecedented pace, terms of trade improved, and investment picked up.

But it is only since 2009 that macroprudential policies have been applied in a more concerted and calibrated fashion – again to help moderate price increases in the residential property market. Following the Global Financial Crisis, the confluence of low interest rates, firm domestic demand underpinned by sustained income growth, and supply shortages in the residential property markets caused home prices to rise rapidly. This had implications for both price stability and financial stability. As rentals increased on the back of rising property prices, imputed rentals on owneroccupied accommodation accounted for about a third of overall inflation during 2011–2012. CPI-All Items inflation averaged 4.9% per annum during this period. MAS was concerned that this would unhinge general inflation expectations and spill-over into more rapid wage growth across the economy. At the same time, the stock of mortgages surged by about 70% from end-2009 to end-2012, posing risks for financial stability. To be sure, there was little imminent danger. Households’ net asset positions were still strong, with the aggregate household debt-to-asset ratio stable at around 16%. The non-performing loan ratios for mortgages remained low at 0.25%, and the amount of housing loans in negative equity was negligible. But if domestic income growth faltered or if the global interest rate cycle turned abruptly, mortgage financing burdens could escalate. Households’ balance sheets could deteriorate if home prices fell, as much of the increase in household wealth had been driven by a rise in the value of property assets.
WC-FINC aims to reduce the average financial exclusion level in ASEAN to 30% by 2025, and increase the level of infrastructure readiness in ASEAN to 85% (currently at 70%), based on agreed measures of financial inclusion outcomes and preconditions. Particular emphasis is given to capacity building and peer learning. An especially interesting part of this journey has been ASEAN’s incredible diversity which provides a rich and broad canvass for drawing lessons from every country on specific challenges faced and measures pursued to increase financial inclusion. For some of us, the geographic barriers to financial inclusion are the most urgent, for 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  others, cost or knowledge and trust are more significant barriers. In different ways, we all have something to learn from each other’s experience on strategies that worked or did not work so well. This is why we are here today. This Forum on financial inclusion was organised in response to technical assistance requests and learning needs of ASEAN countries based on a survey conducted by WC-FINC last year. There was particular interest in Malaysia’s experience and so we volunteered to host this first Forum, but clearly, we are also eager to learn from others. The Forum focuses on 5 key areas which represent core pillars of a holistic financial inclusion system. The first is the development of a national financial inclusion strategy and monitoring mechanism which are crucial to ensure that strategies are well targeted, coordinated and executed.

It is for this reason that we are gathered here today as stakeholders to share information on the progress to date and to adopt a strategic implementation framework for the work that remains to be done. Distinguished Guests, the tremendous support of the various stakeholders to the agenda of the FSDP cannot go unnoticed. The technical and financial support provided by a number of our development partners, including the Swedish Government, the World Bank, IMF, DFID, the United States Treasury and FIRST Initiative have gone a long way in slowly but surely making this vision a reality. The Bank of Zambia and the Government are, therefore, most indebted to our cooperating partners for helping us build capacity in our financial sector. Honourable Minister, the support of stakeholders from financial and other institutions on the various working groups has also been instrumental in facilitating the implementation of various FSDP activities. Further, the coordinating role of the FSDP Secretariat, anchored by the Bank of Zambia, has been key to the implementation of the FSDP. For this reason, we at the Bank of Zambia hope that the same level of technical, financial, material and morale support will be accorded to Phase II of the programme by all stakeholders. Ladies and Gentlemen, in recognising the critical role played by various stakeholders represented here, the work of the FSDP has, by design, taken a consultative approach in the identification of priority areas, formulation of strategies and the design of implementation frameworks.
This can be attributed to the fact that the economy still has substantial momentum to support growth. Exports and private investment, in particular, are expected to grow on the back of continued global recovery, a high level of capacity utilization, and conducive financial conditions supported by a turnaround in credit extension of the banking sector. Moreover, the economy is now in a much better position to weather external shocks, thanks to an improved external position and the strength of domestic demand. In addition, the Government’s much improved fiscal position should allow the economy to adjust to higher oil prices without interrupting the growth momentum. It is, therefore, our view that the risks to growth from the higher oil prices should be manageable. BIS Review 58/2004  1  On the other hand, the impact of the higher oil prices on economic stability is expected to be more pronounced. Latest data on headline inflation continue to show signs of price acceleration. In August, Thailand’s headline inflation therefore rose by 3.1 percent year-on-year, while core inflation rose by 0.7 percent year-on-year. With a narrowing of the output gap and reported tightening in some segments of the labour market, we believe that there is considerable pent-up price pressure building up in the system that could eventually translate into higher consumer prices. Our inflation forecast points to a higher probability of rising domestic inflation going forward.

The promise of high returns is so tempting that individuals who are in other circumstances perfectly rational and ready even to advise others of good investment outlets get carried by enchanting talks and end up losing their money. 2  BIS Review 82/2009  The responsibility of microfinance practitioners The wide-spread existence of spurious microfinance institutions in the society projects the entire microfinance industry as a fraudulent activity in the eyes of the public and law enforcement authorities. This is not a healthy sign for the future of microfinance industry at all. Microfinance practitioners should put a stop to this unhealthy development by establishing a proper governance structure in microfinance institutions. They teach the poor of the importance of and the need for leading a responsible life. This responsible life includes behavioural traits like being truthful, being honest, being respectful and being exemplary. The cultivation of these qualities in life makes the poor wholesome individuals and that is the ultimate goal of any microfinance intervention in the society. If the microfinance practitioners do not practise what they preach, then, it is a serious lapse of the governance structure of microfinance institutions. Since governance principles are rules of good behaviour and there is no effective way of ensuring their proper practice, the practitioners should make an extra effort to follow them. It requires full commitment and devotion on the part of microfinance practitioners and, in turn, depends on the personal qualities which they have cultivated in themselves.
It’s the combination of the capacity for leverage, the complexity in assessing the risks they present, together with their apparent importance in many markets, that makes hedge funds an important focus of attention from a systemic perspective. For policy makers, the concerns associated with hedge funds range from investor protection, to market practices and potential manipulation, to the potential conflicts and reputational risks they present to the financial institutions they transact with, and to potential risks to the stability of the financial system. I want to focus on the latter set of concerns - those associated with systemic risk. These systemic concerns have two dimensions: First is the possibility that the behavior of hedge funds in periods of market stress could amplify rather than mitigate the shock, induce larger moves in asset prices, or cause broader damage to the functioning of markets when it is most important they function well. Second is the possibility that the failure of a major hedge fund or group of funds could significantly damage the viability of a major financial institution, both through direct exposure to the fund and losses resulting from the impact on other market risks to which the institution is exposed. BIS Review 70/2004  1  These concerns existed before the events associated with Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, but that episode provided a powerful example of both sets of risks, and how the erosion of counterparty discipline can magnify those risks. How significant are these risks today?

This is not a question that can be answered by a clear set of facts that can inform a judgement of probabilities. And of course how the financial system responds to a shock is substantially dependent on the nature of the event. In assessing this question today, there are numerous factors to consider: •  The number of hedge funds, and their total assets under management, have increased dramatically since 1998, significantly more rapidly than total financial assets. Although they still represent a relatively small share of total financial assets, they play a significant role in some market segments. Total exposure of the major bank and non-bank financial intermediaries to hedge funds as a group may be larger today, but that exposure is probably more diversified than in 1998. Market participants seem to believe that average leverage in the hedge fund community, and the extent of leverage for the more highly leveraged hedge funds, is lower than in 1998, but clearly it is difficult to assess these issues with any precision. •  On balance, the quality of risk management by counterparties to hedge funds has, we believe, improved substantially since 1998. This is important, given the gaps revealed in market practice at that point. More on this later. •  Capital in banks and in the parts of the financial system affiliated with banks has increased significantly in absolute terms - that is, the major intermediaries are significantly larger than in 1998.
If the two fall rise and fall together – to the extent nominal interest rates can accommodate movements in nominal income growth – there’s no impact on debt accumulation: whatever proportion of income was needed to service debts beforehand is sufficient after the fact. It’s when income growth falls a lot further  1  Economists call the sensitivity of consumption to a change in its relative price over time the “inter-temporal elasticity”. That coefficient is poorly measured in the data but usually found to be relatively small and significantly less than one. At the same time, a permanent gain in real income should, even it’s expected to arrive only a year from now, prompt an immediate and almost one-for-one response of spending today. So, at least in principle, the positive “income effect” of a prospective drop in prices – holding fixed nominal pay – should be expected to outstrip the negative “inter-temporal substitution effect”. 2  If the appropriate real rate is r* then the central bank would ideally want to set a nominal rate of r*+ π , where the second term is inflation expectations. But nominal rates can’t be lower than zero – or whatever number, e close to zero, constitutes the effective lower bound – so if r*+ π < 0 the actual real rate will be higher than it should be. Note that this can happen either if πe is well below zero or if, as has been the case since the crisis, the same happens to r*.

In closing those gaps, a useful intermediate objective would be to create in the UK a leading-edge diffusion infrastructure, to rival and complement its leading-edge innovation infrastructure. This boost our world (and, with luck, our World Cup) rankings. Inclusive innovation could serve as a conduit to inclusive growth. The UK’s innovation hub would get the spokes it needs to reach every sector, every region, every worker. It would be an industrial strategy for everyone. 58  Haldane (2017). 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  23  References Acemoglu, D (2002), ‘Directed Technical Change’, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4, pp. 781-809. Acemoglu, D, Gancia, G and Zilibotti, F (2015), ‘Offshoring and Directed Technical Change’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 84-122. Acemoglu, D and Robinson, J (2012), Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Penguin Random House. Aghion, P, T, Besley, J, Browne, D, Caselli, R, Lambert, R, Lomax, C, Pissarides, N, Stern, J, van Reenen (2017), ‘Investing for Prosperity: skills, infrastructure and innovation’, LSE Growth Commission Report. Andrews, D, Criscuolo, C and Gal, P (2015), ‘Frontier firms, technology diffusion and public policy: micro evidence from OECD’, OECD Productivity Working Paper Series, No 2. Andrews, D, Criscuolo, C and Gal, P (2016), ‘The Global Productivity Slowdown, Technology Divergence and Public Policy: A Firm Level Perspective, Hutchins Center Working Papers. Baddeley, M (2006), ‘Convergence or Divergence? The Impacts of Globalisation on Growth and Inequality in Less Developed Countries’, International Review of Applied Economics, Vol.