samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Exchange rates displayed similar fluctuations and movements in the short term, surpassed their immediate levels, but the main tendency did not change. Due to the nature of the floating exchange rate regime and the exchange rate policy, similar movements may also be observed in the future, as a result of similar or different factors. The similar impacts of internal and external shocks on the exchange rate and interest rates and therefore, on the economy, will be weaker and last for a shorter period of time, on condition that the policies and implementations of the program continue without any compromise, the dynamism and the self-feeding nature of the reform process is kept in mind, the related steps are taken decisively in time and macroeconomic foundations get stronger. It should not be forgotten that the macroeconomic foundations, current policies, structural reforms and long-term expectations have an impact on the long-term movements of the Turkish lira. However, as the exchange rate is a variable that bears importance with respect to our economy and is a component of financial stability, the activity in the exchange rates is monitored closely by the Central Bank. It should be kept in mind that such movements in the exchange rate pose a risk as well as causing uncertainty. It is possible to protect us from the upward and downward fluctuations in exchange rates. The techniques for risk aversion should definitely be used. The İzmir Derivatives Exchange provides an important opportunity in this respect.

In other words, the critical point for the Bank is to assure that the impacts of the above-mentioned developments are confined to 2006 and avoid any deterioration in expectations, which stand as a significant determinant of the inflationary process, for the sake of achieving medium-term targets. At this point, I would like to draw your attention to a few important points about the interest rate policy of the Bank and underline some issues once again. Short-term interest rates are the main policy instrument of the Central Bank. The Central Bank makes its policies and interest rate decisions in line with its main goal of achieving price stability and inflation targets. The Bank makes all its policies and decisions in view of medium-term trends rather than daily or shortterm ones, and these policies and decisions are grounded on main trends. In this framework, while making its interest rate decisions, the Bank uses a very wide data set including supply-demand conditions, costs, model forecasts, expectations, domestic and external developments; and evaluates all these data with a forward-looking perspective. This process is certainly a dynamic one, and every new piece of data and development is being closely monitored within the framework of the Bank’s inflation forecasts. Another significant fact about the interest rate decisions of the Bank is that the impacts of these decisions are observed with a time lag. The impact of the decisions on economic activity becomes evident within a period of 3-9 months, while their impact on inflation is observed within a period of 9-18 months.
Delay in the announcement of the new stabilization program prompted the Central Bank to implement a multiple price auction in buying and selling foreign exchange at the end of March 2000, in order to ensure that the exchange rates may be fixed according to the market conditions, avoiding excessive fluctuations. At this point, let me touch on the operations for the state-owned banks. At present, higher overnight borrowing requirement, stemming from the state-owned banks’ structural problems, is putting substantial constraints on the monetary policy actions, making financial markets more fragile. In view of this important issue, the state-owned banks have started to lessen their overnight borrowing from other banks and non-banking institutions in the short-term by obtaining liquidity from the Central Bank through repurchase or outright selling transactions against government papers given by the Treasury to cover their duty losses. A similar process is running for the banks taken over by the Saving Deposits Insurance Fund. The Central Bank and the Treasury are absorbing the excess liquidity from the market through reverse repurchase transactions and through selling government papers. Dear Shareholders, Distinguished Guests and Valuable Press Members; In view of the current economic conditions, the economic literature also indicates that, pursuing a tight monetary policy to stabilize exchange rate right after the emergence of crises has certain setbacks. Although a post-crisis policy implementation can reduce the fluctuations in the exchange rates, the resulting higher interest rates will negatively affect both the domestic debt stock and the real sector.

In 2000, although the inflation targets that were envisaged in the program could not be reached, significant progress was made in the fight against inflation, which reached its lowest level ever in the last 14 years. In addition, the fiscal balance improved considerably, and the structural reforms were underway. Interest rates came substantially down in 2000 as a result of the decreased exchange rate risk and the improved foresight of public. Declining interest rates reduced the cost of the Treasury’s domestic borrowing. Rising domestic debt stock was put under control. After the recession in the economy in 1999, falling interest rates boosted the deferred consumer demand, particularly for durable goods. Moreover, increased demand for credit, driven by the banks’ favorable consumer loans, put the economy back on the growth track. Besides the decreasing tendency in interest rates, the stable exchange rates and the private sector’s renewal investments, directed to productivity increase, also contributed to the growth in the economy. As a result, the GNP grew by 6.1 percent in 2000. However, the economic expectations became confused in the second half of 2000. Starting from May 2000, the gap between the optimists and pessimists in the CBRT’s Business Tendency Survey began to decrease and in November, the pessimist expectations started to gain ground. It is observed in this survey that also the expectations for inflation, employment and exports began to deteriorate in the same period.
Price stability in the medium term is essential not only because it protects the incomes of all our fellow citizens – and particularly the most vulnerable and poorest ones – but also because it is one of the preconditions for growth and job creation. Since the euro came into being 15.7 million new jobs have been created, over one million more than on the other side of the Atlantic. BIS Review 69/2008  1  The euro has been a remarkable success. I don't intend to name and shame those who said that Europe's single currency would be impossible, or that its introduction would be a failure, or that it would be impossible for it to inherit the best previous credibility levels, or that fault lines in its construction would lead to a permanently weak currency. A success indeed. Europeans have achieved what was deemed impossible, what had never been tried. As Tocqueville said: “L’histoire est une galerie de tableaux dans laquelle il y a peu d’originaux et beaucoup de copies”. “History is a gallery of pictures in which there are few originals and many copies.” The single currency of Europe is indeed an original, according to Tocqueville's definition. This is a time for celebration. This is also a time for reflection. The first ten years have been extremely busy for the Executive Board, for the Governing Council, for the ECB and for the Eurosystem. The extraordinary motivation of our staff members is, in my opinion, due to their awareness of, and pride in, making history.

Moving on to the second aspect – the importance of using SARON more actively in financial products and developing a liquid, SARON-based yield curve: To date, Libor has been widely used in financial products, however market participants are now working hard on transitioning to new, SARON-based products. These include derivatives, especially interest rate swaps, which can be used to hedge against changes in interest rates. 1 A SARON-based interest rate swap market was set up back in 2017. Trading activity in this market remains low, however it is expected to pick up once SARON becomes more widely used in cash products (such as loans, mortgages and capital market instruments) and investment products. The SARON1  An interest rate swap allows a contractually agreed, fixed interest rate (e.g. for a period of five years) to be exchanged periodically for a floating interest rate. The floating interest rate portion of the contract is determined by a reference rate. Page 2/3  Berne, 13 June 2019 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  based yield curve will then be able to take over the role of the current, Libor-based yield curve. Yield curves are important benchmarks for market participants and serve as the basis for pricing medium and long-term financial products. And, finally, the third aspect – how should interest payments be calculated for a period of three months, for example? Libor provided a three-month rate which could, among other things, be directly applied to the calculation of interest payments on money market mortgages.
Earlier actions in economic policy – resorting on several occasions to devaluation in the cost crises that arose – as well as losing the battle of the fixed exchange rate were some explanations for this. Alternative strategies for finding an intermediate or direct target for monetary policy were investigated and the Riksbank studies solutions used in other countries. As in the case of Finland, we in Sweden were not used to working in an environment with a floating exchange rate. The last time Sweden had a  BIS Review 9/2002  1  floating exchange rate was for a few years in the 1930s. The general opinion among both politicians and economists was that a fixed exchange rate was the best solution for small, open economies that were very much dependent on other countries. This opinion has since changed – not only in Sweden and Finland, but also in many other countries. Sweden and Finland decided on a new strategy fairly quickly and their respective central banks chose more or less the same path. Monetary policy in both countries was aimed at maintaining price stability through inflation targeting. The formulation of the Swedish objectives, as published in January 1993, was rather more detailed, as we established that CPI inflation should be limited to 2 per cent with a permitted deviation interval of +/- 1 percentage point. Finland chose to formulate its inflation target as a stable, sustainable inflation rate of 2 per cent. The two countries thus had similar ambitions.

2  The General Council of the Riksbank's comments 1997-02-06  BIS Review 9/2002  3  With regard to the labour market, it should be clear that the functioning of the labour market and the high level of unemployment no longer comprise as strong a restriction as they did in the mid-1990s. Unemployment in Sweden has fallen. Several factors have played a role in the decline. One of these is probably the fact that the wage formation system has been changed in a way that contributes to better concordance between productivity and wage growth. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that the labour market still comprises a problem area. A clear majority of the EU member states has now joined the monetary union, which was not evident when the Calmfors Commission made its assessment. The political cost of remaining outside of EMU has thus become greater, and public opinion has become more positive towards membership. I personally think that there are also new arguments that should be considered with regard to the costs of remaining outside the union. For instance, the economists Andrew Rose and Torsten Persson have made in-depth analyses of the effects on trade of a monetary union. There could be reason to believe that the positive effects are slightly greater than was assumed in connection with the Calmfors Commission's report.
Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Advancing financial literacy towards rebuilding financial resilience post-pandemic Keynote address by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the National Financial Literacy Symposium (NFLS) 2022, Kuala Lumpur, 11 October 2022. *** Assalamualaikum w.b.t and a very good morning, Tan Sri Dr. Rahamat Bivi Yusoff, Chairman, Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, Emeritus Prof. Datuk Dr. Norma Mansor, President, Malaysian Economic Association and our guest speaker today, Ms. Caroline Siarkiewicz, Chief Executive Officer of The Money and Pensions Service United Kingdom, distinguished panellists and guests. Let me also take this opportunity to thank the teams from Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia and the Malaysian Economic Association for jointly organising this Symposium. It is my great pleasure to be speaking to you here this morning. Allow me to start by reflecting on the theme today – "Advancing Financial Literacy Towards Rebuilding Financial Resilience Post-Pandemic". Indeed, the pandemic has revealed the importance of financial resilience, and the need for all of us represented here today – from the public sector, civil society, financial industry, business, academia, and international organisations – to support Malaysians in rebuilding such resilience as we emerge from the crisis. When Bank Negara Malaysia published our 1H 2022 Financial Stability Review recently, it included the findings of our Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey for 2021.

This would include not just decisions to purchase products, but also in their day-to-day actions such as in their spending and saving habits. It should also include understanding how we can help consumers avoid making mistakes, such as to fall into scams – not just investment scams and get-rich-  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  quick-schemes, but also scams that use social engineering to trick customers into divulging their banking and payment security credentials. As all of us here would know too well, scams have been gaining significant momentum since the pandemic, and continues to be a sinister threat not just in Malaysia but also in other countries. Recognising this threat, BNM has instructed banks to step up security measures to protect their customers, and is working closely with law enforcement agencies to ensure swift action against perpetrators. But while these measures are necessary, they will not be sufficient without the first line of defence – that is, for consumers to remain vigilant, knowing how to avoid getting duped. This is ultimately a matter of financial and digital literacy. For this, the evidence-backed approach that today's Symposium is committed to in educating financial consumers will be a crucial part of the whole-of-nation approach needed to combat scams. Before I end my speech, I would like to reiterate that financial education is more relevant than ever in the post-pandemic era.
And Singapore’s CapitaLand and the Middle Eastern-owned Arcapital Bank have recently set up a property fund aimed at investing in Japanese real estate, with a target asset size of $ 300 million. 2  BIS Review 47/2005  Second, similarly for the banking sector. I expect to see more Middle East banks and financial institutions set up in Singapore and Asia going forward, and a counter-flow into the Middle East over time. Some Middle East banks are already planning to scale up their presence in Singapore to service Middle Eastern entities interested to operate in Asia, as well as to help Asian corporates to operate in the Middle East. There are similar plans by Singapore-based financial institutions to step up their profile in the Middle East as they seek to tap into Middle Eastern financial flows. Such plans may give added impetus as Singapore concludes FTAs with more Middle Eastern countries, including those which are currently ongoing with Qatar and Kuwait. Third, Islamic finance is an area that shows considerable promise globally. We know the size of the market - around $ 200 to $ 300 billion globally, and growing at about 15% per annum. Efforts are being made in Asian markets, to grow Islamic financial services. For example, Malaysia has been awarding Islamic banking licences to foreign players and encouraging the subsidiarisation of Islamic banking windows. It aims to have 20% of total banking assets to be Islamic by 2010. Singapore, as an international financial centre, is also keen to offer Islamic financial services.

Thus, emerging market central banks must be prepared for policy contingencies ahead. At the core, monetary policy must continue to safeguard price stability, while taking into account concerns about economic growth and financial stability. The Bank of Thailand, on our part, will do our best to steer the Thai economy and financial system through the global turbulences, to ensure the continued well-being of the Thai people in years ahead. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Frankly, it’s too early to tell: we know the final rate of inflation, 2%; but we don’t know yet the « terminal interest rate », or the policy rates that will ensure a timely return of inflation to our target, while seeing no reasons for increased expectations on these. Let me rather give some light on the first part of the journey, the normalisation till neutral rate; for sure it’s unobservable, but this one can be estimated, in the euro area at below or close to 2% according to me. I sometimes use a simple metaphor: as long as it is about lifting off the accelerator, we have to act for sure, in a determined but orderly way, and we should be there by the end of the year. Afterwards, the question could come of pressing the brake, and tightening if needed: but this part of the journey remains today an open question, and will deserve further assessment and reflection, in due time. Let me only stress one last and obvious point of yesterday’s decision: it marks the return of interest rates in positive territory. This historical step brings with it multiple dimensions that need to be revisited: on our operational framework, on our TLTRO operations, on our remuneration mechanisms of bank’s reserves. This is a matter that, as Christine Lagarde said yesterday, we will take up without delay. May I add that with a long view, monetary policy cannot be the only game in town?

Eurofi – Prague, 9 September 2022 Mobilization of the Eurosystem against inflation Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 sur 3 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be talking to you today at this Eurofi edition, although I very much regret that I cannot be in Prague in person today. I extend my warmest thanks to David Wright and Didier Cahen for organising this event. Let me first express my heartfelt sympathy to our British friends: the Queen brought a sense of duty and a sense of stability which will hopefully remain a powerful lesson in this very volatile period. These are indeed times of extremely high uncertainty and difficulty. The European and French economies will face next year a significant slowdown, and we cannot exclude a limited recession. Let me quote, as I did some days ago in Jackson Hole,i two compatriots to give us some light: first, a philosopher – Voltaire – who said that “uncertainty is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd”ii; second, an economist – Olivier Blanchard – with the following words “monetary policy must be closer to art when it is frequently confronted to new, poorly anticipated and poorly understood, contingencies”iii Well, between art and science, how did we deal yesterday with the present uncertainty? We decided to frontload on our monetary policy normalisation.
In financial crises, savers and investors lose money for two reasons: first and foremost, because their pension funds and direct investments such as stocks, bonds and real estate lose value, and also second, because taxpayer money has to be used to rescue banks. Financial crises occur when risks are underestimated and price expectations of investments are exaggerated. This can lead to credit and asset price bubbles which sooner or later burst. When banks do not hold enough equity capital to absorb the losses they incur, they fail. Sovereign money would do nothing to change this situation. Risks can be underestimated and future returns overestimated in a sovereign money system too. Even without recourse to sight deposits, banks can grant loans which are too risky, hold too few provisions for times of crisis and become insolvent if a bubble bursts. Moreover, a key problem in the financial crisis was banks’ heavy reliance on short-term financing from the money market. These interbank loans proved to be a less stable source of financing than private customers’ sight deposits; in fact they dried up at the very start of the financial crisis in 2008. Sovereign money would not help to eliminate this risk of instability either. There are other, far more effective approaches to stave off credit and asset price bubbles than sovereign money. The significant increase in the capital and liquidity requirements for banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis is one such approach.

Just how difficult that would be – and how far sovereign money would complicate our work – can be illustrated by taking the example of our monetary policy during the last financial crisis. Over a very short space of time, we created a vast amount of money; initially to ensure liquidity in the banking system, and thereafter to counter the massive upward pressure on the Swiss franc. This led to a significant expansion of our balance sheet. How would we have proceeded in a sovereign money system? We would probably not have reacted so decisively given the difficulty of reducing liquidity once it has been created in a sovereign money system, which can therefore lead to higher inflation further down the line. A weaker monetary policy reaction would have exacerbated the negative consequences of the crisis for the real economy. Quite apart from that, it is doubtful whether we would even have been able, in a sovereign money system, to react as we did because the initiative limits the number of tools we would 2  As regards the SNB’s shift from monetary targeting to interest rate targeting, cf. Meyer, Hans, On monetary policy in the new year, speech held at the University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, 20 January 2000. Page 6/8  have available. Interventions in the foreign exchange market, which have played a central role in combating the overvaluation of the Swiss franc, would not actually be allowed under a sovereign money system.