samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That is why financial reform will have to go hand in hand with fiscal reform. Fiscal reform will reinforce confidence. In the current situation, we have to – and we do – stand firm on these principles. Speculation on more and more elevated sovereign risk has been one factor behind spreads being driven to very high levels. This is why it was very important that the heads of state and government declared on 11 February 2010 that they were ready to “take determined and coordinated action, if needed, to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole”. I said, on behalf of the ECB, that I approved of this important statement. In this respect let me stress the following: Loans are not transfers, and loans come at a cost. They come not only at a financial cost; they also come with a strict conditionality. This conditionality needs to give assurance to lenders, not only that they will be repaid but also that the borrower will be able to stand on its own feet over a multi-year horizon. In the case of Greece, this will require courageous, recognisable and specific actions by the Greek government that will lastingly and credibly consolidate the public budget. Other countries in the Union and elsewhere have gone through times that were no less difficult, and they have emerged from a determined adjustment stronger and more competitive than in the past. These countries have demonstrated that a clear U-turn in national policy governance is achievable.

Jean-Claude Trichet: Lessons from the crisis and steps towards economic stability Keynote speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), at the 9th Munich Economic Summit, Munich, 29 April 2010. *  *  *  Sehr geehrter Herr Bundespräsident, lieber Horst Köhler, Sehr geehrter Herr Chrobog, sehr geehrter Professor Sinn, Meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren, ich danke den Veranstaltern dieser Konferenz recht herzlich für die Einladung. Besonders dankbar bin ich für die Gelegenheit, im Anschluss an meinen langjährigen Freund Horst Köhler sprechen zu dürfen. Wir sind uns über einen langen Zeitraum hinweg in verschiedenen Positionen immer wieder begegnet und haben oft sehr eng zusammengearbeitet. It has always been an enormous pleasure to talk with him and to work with him. Both of us were engaged in the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty. That is where we met nearly twenty years ago. We were also heavily involved with the handling of the European Monetary System crisis in 1992/93. I remember that episode very well. It was a defining moment not only for the monetary integration of Europe. It remains in our memories as a vivid example of what close and friendly cooperation can do in very exceptional and demanding circumstances. In my remarks today I would first like to reflect on the lessons that I believe we can draw from today’s financial and economic crisis.
Our future will be secured if we remain relevant. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Vítor Constâncio: 2012 Bernácer prize award ceremony in honour of Nicholas Bloom Speech by Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of the Awarding Ceremony of the Germán Bernácer Prize for Promoting Economic Research in Europe to Nicholas Bloom, Madrid, 24 September 2013. *  *  *  I wish to thank Marie Hoerova for the help in preparing this text. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to be part of this session to award the 2012 Germán Bernácer Prize to Nicholas Bloom, Professor of Economics at Stanford University. Nicholas Bloom has made influential contributions to the academic debate in two broad areas, both of which are of great relevance for central bank policy-makers. First, his research on the effects of policy and economic uncertainty on business cycles helped us understand better some of the key contributing factors to the protracted slump in output during what has become known as the Great Recession. Second, his research on the determinants of good management practices at the firm level provided important insights on how to support long-term economic growth and competitiveness, including in the European context. The financial and economic crisis that started in the summer of 2007 brought about unprecedented challenges for central bank policy-makers. Some well-accepted paradigms and widely used models have come to be questioned. It is of course the fact of life that central bankers operate in an ever-changing and, to use one of the keywords from Professor Bloom’s research, uncertain world.
So, let’s say I buy a stock, and then that stock has to be transferred to me through some entity that actually clears and settles that stock transaction. The entity that actually manages that stock transaction – you selling stock to me, or me selling stock to you – that’s a financial market utility. They have to be robust as well. And one of the things the Dodd-Frank Act does is it allows the Federal Reserve to have some oversight capacity to make sure that those financial market utilities are sound. So, there are definitely things that could be changed. I think you could definitely relax the regulatory burden on smaller banking organizations because I don’t think they pose a systemic threat to the U.S. financial system. I think you could take a look at certain regulations like the Volcker Rule to see if they could be administered in a less aggressive way. 3 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  So, it’s not in my mind a question of Dodd-Frank or no-Dodd-Frank. I think it’s a question of better financial reform legislation. Dr. Olajide Oladipo: Thank you. Just like you said, the economy is picking up now, and at the same time, we are experiencing a kind of upward trend in interest rates. I wanted to ask you, do you think the current movement in interest rates is politically-driven? If not, what is the business reason for the upward movement?

One thing I would say if you do do it, you better have a mechanism in place to make sure that those large securities firms that are left actually are well-regulated, well-capitalized, have enough liquidity, and have access to a lender of last-resort. One of the problems that we had in the financial crisis is there wasn’t a good method to lend to securities firms. By law, the Federal Reserve discount window – this is the facility that we have open to commercial banks – were not allowed to have that discount window open to securities firms. So, in the crisis, we had to do extraordinary lending activities to securities firms. We need a better lender of last resort backstop for securities firms. If you decide to repeal Glass-Steagall and separate commercial banks from securities firms, that’s not something that I would recommend, but if you were to do that, make sure you have a way of backstopping the securities industry, too, so if a big securities firm gets in trouble it doesn’t threaten the entire financial system. Dr. Olajide Oladipo: Thank you. I’ll be expecting questions from students, too. Audience Member: Not a student. President Dudley:  9 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  But you’re a student of something, right? Audience Member: My concern is MWBEs. I feel that the racist element within our capitalization has not allowed us to participate in the economy on an equal level by having access to capital. The government’s asking for 30% on major projects.
In addition, we have been open about our response pattern, our analyses of economic developments and our assessment of monetary policy performance. Others are bound to judge the Bank in a critical light, not least this assembly. I hope and believe that you will find that our words and actions are compatible, and that in retrospect it will not be difficult to see the rationality in what we do, although it may on occasion seem surprising then and there. If we manage this, confidence in monetary policy should take firm hold and strengthen ahead. The basis for interest-rate setting and the present economic situation  By way of conclusion, I would like to address the basis for interest-rate setting and the present economic environment. The projections and analyses in the Inflation Report, in conjunction with our continuous assessment of the inflation outlook and developments in the money and foreign exchange market, form the basis for our decisions concerning interest rates. In the last Inflation Report published on June 20, price inflation was projected at 2½ per cent in 2003 on the assumption that interest rates remain unchanged. Norges Bank's assessment of the economic outlook was last presented in  BIS Review 74/2001  11  connection with the Executive Board's monetary policy meeting on 8 August. Both the analysis in the Inflation Report and developments since its publication indicated that at today's interest rate level, it is likely that the inflation target will be reached in the course of two years.

Another important factor is that productivity growth in the US is expected to secure sound profit trends over the longer term, with the decline in corporate investment turning up slightly next year. Although business and industry have been sheltered so far from the slowdown in the world economy, the Norwegian economy may gradually be more strongly affected. Slow growth in the world economy may lead to lower demand for Norwegian produced goods and curb the pressures in the Norwegian economy. In addition, slower growth in the world economy may push down imported price inflation, which may imply that price inflation will be lower than we have projected. Our forecasts provide an indication of the scenario we consider to be the most likely, given that key variables such as interest rates, the exchange rate, public demand, wage formation and oil prices are in line with our assumptions. If these variables deviate from our assumptions, the real economy and nominal developments may also show a different path. BIS Review 74/2001  13  The Norwegian economy is balancing on a tightrope. It will not take much to throw the economy off balance. While the overall global situation suggests that consumer price inflation may be somewhat lower than anticipated in the period ahead, the domestic economic situation points in the opposite direction. Growth in domestic labour costs may turn out to be higher than estimated.
First, I will summarize the recent inflation developments, and then compare the short term forecasts in the October Inflation Report with the actual inflation data regarding the fourth quarter of 2011. There were a few developments in the interreporting period which led inflation to deviate significantly from October forecasts. More-than-envisaged increases in unprocessed food prices were an important cause of this deviation. The ongoing depreciation in the Turkish lira amid the deterioration in the risk appetite was another factor leading to a deviation in short-term forecasts (Chart 8). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 8. October 2011 Inflation Forecasts and Realizations  * Shaded region indicates the 70 percent confidence interval for the forecast. Owing to the lagged effects of the exchange rate pass-through, core inflation indicators remained at elevated levels during the final quarter (Chart 9). This mainly stemmed from soaring core goods prices, while the moderate course of the underlying trend of services inflation indicated a benign outlook in terms of second round effects (Chart 10). Chart 9. Chart 10. Core Inflation Indicators SCA-H and SCA-I  Prices of Core Goods and Services  (Seasonally Adjusted, 3-Month Average, Annual Percent Change)  Source: TurkStat, CBRT. (Seasonally Adjusted, 3-Month Average, Annual Percent Change)  Source: TurkStat, CBRT. We see that economic activity remained robust in the second half of 2011, despite a slight deceleration. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data pointed that domestic demand proved stronger in the third quarter of 2011 compared to the outlook presented in the October Inflation Report (Chart 11).

The downward slope of the current yield curve signifies a tight monetary policy stance (Chart 6). Additionally, loan interest rates have recorded a notable increase since October (Chart 7). As a consequence, loan growth rate declined to more reasonable levels towards the yearend (Chart 3). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 6. Chart 7. Yield Curve*  Consumer and TL Business Loan Rates*(Percent)  Calculated by the return on bonds quoted on the ISE  *Flow data. **4-week moving average. Bonds and Bills Market using the Extended Nelson-Siegel (ENS) method. Source: CBRT. Source: ISE, CBRT. Overall, the last quarter of 2011 was marked by ongoing tightening in monetary and financial conditions and a pronounced deceleration in loans. 2. Macroeconomic Developments and Main Assumptions  Having climbed to 10.45 percent at end-2011, inflation was significantly above the target. As you all know, the Article 42 of the Central Bank Law stipulates that in the case of a significant breach of the inflation target, we are required to report to the Government and announce to the public the reasons behind the breach of the target and the necessary measures to be taken. I would like to announce that we will publish the Open Letter that will be sent to the Government today on our web-site at 12 a.m. Now, I will touch upon the macroeconomic outlook and our assumptions which constitute the basis for our forecasts.
Some growth epochs have seen secular stagnation, others secular innovation. Understanding the  1  Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009). 2  Measured at purchasing power parity exchange rates and, for the moment, not on a per capita basis. 3  Summers (2014), Vox-EU (2014). 4  Hansen (1938). 5  For example, Gordon (2012, 2014), Summers (2014), Cowan (2014). 6  For example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), Mokyr (2014), Arthur (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  determinants of these growth phases – sociological and technological – provides insight into the forces of secular stagnation and innovation operating today.7 What follows is a cocktail of economics, history, sociology and psychology. For those seeking a common denominator, it is sitting between your ears. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman says the brain has two ways of thinking (fast and slow). 8 The same may be true, and for many of the same reasons, when understanding growth (fast and slow). The short history of growth Let me start with the short history of growth. This is shown in Chart 1 which plots (log) world GDP per capita back to 1750, the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Save for wars, it suggests a straight-line growth path over the past 250 years or so, averaging 1.5% per year. That means each generation has been around a third better off than its predecessor. Growth has driven secular rises in living standards, generation by generation. While steady, growth has not been constant.

Inequality may retard growth because it damps investment in education, in particular by poorer households. 57 Studies show parental income is crucial in determining children’s educational performance. 58 If inequality is generational and self-perpetuating, so too will be its impact on growth. US evidence suggests striking, and rising, differences in educational attainment across different socio-economic groups. Prior to 1970, rising high school completion rates permanently raised the productivity of US workers. Latterly, those improvements have stalled and, for some, have reversed. The US is slipping down the international league tables of educational attainment. 59 There is evidence the UK could be following suit. The UK is currently below average for literacy and numeracy skills across OECD countries. 60 Between 2003 and 2011, although the proportion of adults with literacy skills increased from 44% to 57%, those with numeracy skills decreased from 26% to 22%. 61 To put that in perspective, 17 million adults in England have numerical skills only equal to those of a primary school child. Even without these headwinds, human capital may be set to grow less rapidly in future for demographic reasons. In the second half of the 20th century, population growth added two percentage points to global growth each year (Chart 15). Since 1980, that has fallen to around 1% per year. By 2050, it is predicted to have halved again. That would translate, pretty much one-for-one, into lower trend growth rates. 62 A third secular, sociological headwind concerns short-termism.
Such private industry interference is less pronounced in the area of monetary policy. In addition, only “undue” political influence is prohibited. Recital 75 also explicitly refers to the notion of the “operational independence” of supervisors. In addition, Article 19 of the SSM Regulation does not contain an explicit prohibition on the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs) accepting instructions, unlike Article 130 of the Treaty with respect to the ECB and the NCBs. In the SSM context, Article 19 of the SSM Regulation only imposes such a prohibition on the members of the Supervisory Board and its steering committee. The drafting of Article 19 of the SSM Regulation reflects the legal situation in some Member States, where the NCAs are bound by the instructions of the respective ministries. [40] Article 19 of the SSM Regulation requires only that the ECB and the NCAs “act independently” while carrying out their supervisory tasks under the SSM Regulation. [41] Third, the principle of personal independence does not apply to the members of the ECB’s Supervisory Board (apart from the specific rules applicable to the Chair[42] , Vice Chair[43] and the ECB representatives[44] ). There is neither a legislatively protected minimum term of office for them, nor a limitation of the grounds for dismissal by the appointing authority.

The other quality that helped make our things turn out well, aside from being very proactive, is that we were also practical and flexible regarding the policy response. We adjusted our response when things did not work as we would like them to be. An example is when the initial soft loan facility went out. It had very low interest rates to ease the burden on the borrowers, but it was not very attractive because the interest rates were not high enough to compensate banks for the credit risk. As a result, the credit was not flowing through that channel. We responded and adjusted by launching the additional measures I have discussed previously. I think that flexibility of response is another thing that helped get us to where we are today. Page 2 of 8  Aside from expanding credit, another important measure that we put out recently is to address the existing debt burden that the borrowers face. One important measure that we announced last year was on long-term debt restructuring to encourage banks to restructure their debt on a more sustainable basis. We had recognized our initial take on Covid-19 that the crisis would be very severe but short. Therefore, the measures we came out with were blanket, broad-based, and very large. We then realized later that Covid-19 would be staying with us for a very long time, and thus, the measures must be more targeted and longer in terms of their response.
As we firmly believe in the need for strengthening inter-regulatory cooperation and collaboration, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Central Bank, Securities and Exchange Commission and Insurance Regulatory Commission on risk based consolidated supervision where the Central Bank will be the lead regulator. As we have reiterated on many occasions, market driven consolidation will be facilitated with the objective of promoting strong and dynamic banking and non-bank financial institutions to meet financial needs of the economy more effectively, while safeguarding the stability of the financial system. The performance of Licensed Finance Companies (LFCs) and Specialised Leasing Companies (SLCs) slowed down significantly during 2018 due to low credit growth, declining profitability and increasing nonperforming loans. The slowdown in the sector was also a result of moderate economic growth and the impact of natural calamities, such as floods and drought conditions that prevailed in 2017 and the first half of 2018. Policy measures taken to curb excessive demand for vehicle imports also impacted the sector significantly. Several regulations were introduced to strengthen non-bank financial institutions during 2018. A financial customer protection framework was introduced to protect customer interests and to strengthen customer confidence in the sector. 26  A new capital adequacy framework for LFCs and SLCs was implemented with a view to fostering a strong emphasis on risk management and to encourage ongoing improvements in the risk assessment capabilities of the sector. In terms of the new framework, companies with assets over Rs.100 billion are required to maintain higher capital adequacy ratios.

Fintech, as it is known, seems to be the next big thing. It’s true that, in continental Europe, fintechs still account for just a small share of the markets for banking, payment services and asset management. Still, over the past years, they have received a lot of attention and a lot of funds. Fintechs are on the rise. They have entered the markets, and they are competing with banks – at least in some parts of the value chain. The question is: where will this innovation take us? Is it the end of banking as we know it? Will it create new risks? As I said before, it is hard to guess how innovations will evolve and easy to get it wrong. That said, let us take a very brief look at some potential futures. Scenario one: banks might embrace the digital trend and team up with fintechs. For banks this would be one of the more benign outcomes. And it seems to be happening right now. Scenario two: fintechs might break up the value chain of banking. Banks would end up losing revenue, market share and direct contact with clients. The result might be a more fragmented market where some players operate outside the scope of regulation and supervision. Scenario three: banks might still end up being crowded out. At the same time, however, the fintechs could be swallowed up by big tech companies, such as Google, Amazon and Facebook. The market would become more concentrated, less competitive and less diversified.