samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the case of banks, there is also an increase in their external debt. It is worth noting, however, that this has not been associated to larger currency mismatches in the banks’  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  balance sheets, nor to increased credit in foreign currency to firms whose income is in pesos. The maturities of such debt have been extended, contributing to the solid situation of the banking industry, despite the increase in lending activity. Finally, on aggregate, the indicators of international solvency of the Chilean economy – such as the net international investment position and the current-account deficit – remain stable with a marginal improvement of the liquidity position. Overall, in the scenario we estimate today to be the most likely, the Chilean economy will operate in a favorable context. Risks persist, however, that must be taken into careful consideration, both because of their implications for monetary policy making and because of their associated risks for our economy’s financial stability. Now let me make a few remarks. Final remarks The Chilean economy has recovered strongly from the 2009 recession, and the different variables are beginning to converge to their estimated equilibrium levels. Output gaps are closed, unemployment is down, and trend inflation remains below the lower limit of the target’s tolerance range, but gradually approaching three percent. Thus, the monetary policy rate should be around its neutral level, neither increasing nor reducing aggregate demand with respect to its trend.

(2) Percentage of respondents who believe that inflation will rise "much" in the next twelve months. (3) Number above (below) 50 points denotes higher (lower) costs three month ahead. Fuentes: Adimark, Banco Central de Chile y Universidad Adolfo Ibañez/Icare. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Table 1 Economic growth and current account (annual change, percent) 2009  2010  2011 ( f )  GDP National income  -1.7 -1.9  5.2 15.7  6.0 - 7.0 6.9  Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation T otal consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports  -5.9 -2.9 -15.9 1.9 -6.4 -14.6  16.4 11.5 18.8 9.3 1.9 29.5  8.5 9.2 11.9 8.3 7.1 11.0  1.6  1.9  0.0  2012 (f) IPoM IPoM jun. mar. 11 11  CF may. 11  Current account (percent of GDP) (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Table 2  World growth  (annual change, percent) Average 00-08  2009  2010 (e)  2011 (f) IPoM IPoM jun. mar. 11 11  CF may.
There are several key benefits of issuing the Islamic Monetary Notes under this structure. It provides Islamic financial institutions an additional instrument to manage liquidity risk on a short-term basis. It is also a financial instrument whose structure has been widely used for retail banking and syndication products in the Middle East. Finally, it provides an opportunity for new investors to invest in Islamic financial papers in the Malaysian market, thus diversifying the investor base. As part of the initiative to be linked to the global Islamic financial markets, this instrument will be promoted to the international financial market. Islamic Derivative Master Agreement (IDMA) Recognising the importance to develop Islamic hedging products for Islamic financial market to mitigate investment risks, Malaysia has introduced the first global Islamic Derivative master agreement to document Islamic derivative transactions. The effort is initiated by Bank Negara Malaysia and driven by the financial industry via the Persatuan Pasaran Kewangan Malaysia. The implementation of the agreement is expected to improve the risk management practices, balance sheet management, increase fund mobilisation efficiency and enhance their investment banking capability of the Islamic banking institutions. With the introduction of IDMA, the rights and obligations of contracting parties are clearly stated, thus creating an environment that is more transparent. As IDMA also incorporates best practices in market conduct, this document serves as an important catalyst for the future linkages between financial markets that offer Islamic financial market instruments.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Presentation of the 2016 Annual Report of the ACPR Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), at the press conference, Paris, 29 May 2017. * * * I am pleased to welcome you today for the presentation of the 7th activity report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), with Bernard Delas, Vice-President of the ACPR, Rémi Bouchez, President of the Sanctions Committee, and Edouard Fernandez-Bollo, Secretary General of the ACPR. As you know, the ACPR and its 1,046 staff members have a broad field of action. The ACPR guarantees the stability of our financial system, through the supervision of banks and insurance companies, but it also guarantees the protection of French customers and savers. First of all, I would like to mention our essential involvement both at the European and the international level. I will then present the results of the main French banking and insurance groups, before addressing four major challenges that strongly shape the ACPR’s action: low interest rates, digital finance, customer protection, the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. * * *  I. The ACPR’s action at the European and international level At the European level, the ACPR has taken an active part in furthering the deployment of the Banking Union.
The loss function can be written as  , is the forecast where π is the forecast for inflation, π* is the inflation target and deviation between actual resource utilisation in the economy and the long-run sustainable, or  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  “normal” level of resource utilisation.1 The first term represents the central bank’s target of stabilising inflation and the second its ambition to stabilise the real economy. The parameter λ represents the importance the central bank gives to stabilising the economy in relation to stabilising inflation. If λ were zero, this would mean that the central bank does not care at all about developments in the real economy, but merely tries to bring inflation as close to the target as possible. If λ is large, this means that the central bank places great emphasis on stabilising the real economy in relation to stabilising inflation. The term loss function comes from the fact that the larger the deviation, or “gap”, the further away we are from where we want to be, and thereby the greater the “loss”. In this theoretical description the central bank’s task is described in slightly more detail than the general wording of “finding a suitable balance between stabilising inflation and stabilising the real economy”.

The mean squared gap analysis makes it easier for the central bank to explain why it chooses a particular monetary policy – what it means more specifically by a “well-balanced” policy. It can also provide support when assessing monetary policy. But however good the tool is, the step from theory to practice is not without complications. I intend to discuss some circumstances that in various ways complicate things when taking this step. Arguments in loss function less clear in practice than in theory One such circumstance is that although the variables included in the loss function – inflation and resource utilisation – are in theory unambiguous and well-specified, in practice it is far from evident how they should be measured. Resource utilisation can be regarded as a summary of developments in the real economy and shows to what extent labour and real capital are being used at a particular time. It normally states use in relation to the level sustainable in the long run, which is often regarded as a “normal” level. One complication is that it is not possible to directly observe how high the level of resource utilisation in the economy is, and nor is there any generally-accepted view of this should be calculated. Different measures can give fairly different results and it is therefore difficult to determine to any great degree of precision the level of resource utilisation at any given time.
Inflation is well above that target for a multitude of reasons, which will not be itemised here. These contributing factors have been discussed numerous times by the Central Bank, in verbal and written form. Suffice it to say that enormous investments, radical changes in the domestic financial markets, ready access to inexpensive credit from abroad, and – last but not least – the substantial increase in disposable household income, especially in the past year, have played their part. Critics maintain sedulously that the Central Bank’s tools are weak, that its policy of restraint is ineffective, and even that its inflation target is a failed experiment. The Bank rejects this. It can be considered established that, were it not for the Central Bank’s tight monetary policy, inflation would have been much higher than it has indeed been – with the concomitant strain on households and businesses. It is not the Central Bank’s objective as such to keep interest rates high – indeed, the Bank is of the opinion that it is disadvantageous if the policy rate is high for a sustained period of time. Inflationary pressure has been greater than forecasts indicated – and more than was easily dealt with – and as a result, it has proven difficult to contain inflation. It took a while before the impact of the Central Bank’s restraining measures was sufficiently felt, but considerable changes took place over the past year, when policy rate decisions made themselves felt more strongly in all areas of the credit market.

It encourages introduction of new types of payment services and sophistication of customer 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  protection and security. Also, much attention is paid on evaluation of SEPA-regulation and further integration via implementation of Pan-European instant payments solution. The innovations in the field of financial market infrastructures are expected to bring synergies between TARGET2 and T2S, which is in the scope of the Eurosystem’s Vision 2020. At the national level, we made significant progress towards fulfilling the European standards in the payment area. A new Law on payment services and systems implementing PSD and some articles of PSD2, E-money 2 and Settlement Finality Directive was drafted with the EU support via IPA project. In the field of payment systems oversight, the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures were adopted. Furthermore, we aligned our methodology for collecting payment statistics data with the EU regulation on payment statistics. Last but not least is the recent project to enhance euro cross-border payment infrastructure by establishing an alternative payment channel via the Macedonian Interbank Payment System (MIPS) RTGS system, which was connected with the TARGET2, via Banca d’Italia. I am very glad that all these issues will be discussed by eminent experts from the Bank for International Settlements, European Commission, De Nederlandsche Bank, Banco de Portugal, Commerzbank, Euroclear, ProgressSoft as well as domestic financial institutions.
Confining myself to this latter consideration, without a recovery in employment it will prove costlier to further budgetary adjustment, since the increases in revenue will be limited and because turning expenditure around will require an additional effort to offset the necessary increase in unemployment benefit payments. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In any event, budgetary policy is key in circumstances such as the present. As I stated earlier, we are in the middle of a sovereign debt crisis. There is no doubt that the Spanish economy’s vulnerability has a significant fiscal component, although our difficulties are compounded by the persisting downturn – and its dreadful impact on employment – and the still-high dependence on external funding. The budget deficit ended last year at a level of 8.5%, far off the 6% target set in the Stability Programme. And the year-end public debt/GDP ratio was 68.5%, more than 30 pp up on 2007, before the international financial crisis broke. In turn, the deficit targets have been set at 5.3% for 2012 and at 3% for 2013, which entails a most significant budgetary effort. It is crucial, however, to rigorously meet these targets. Attaining them is vital for restoring credibility in the Spanish economy, and here the overall interests of all economic and social agents and all levels of government converge. A high degree of unity and consensus among the respective parties will be pivotal to success in the arduous task ahead.

We are in a different place with insurance: we consider that the levels of capitalisation secured under the current regime are consistent with our objectives, and therefore, unlike in the banking case, we see a low risk to those objectives in allowing firms plenty of time to adapt to the new standard. European legislators foresaw this and therefore (very sensibly in my view) included within the Directive transitional measures which allow firms significant breathing space as they adapt to the new regime. As a safeguard, the benefit from the transitional deduction from technical provisions (TDTP) is capped to make sure financial resources cannot drop below those required under the current UK regime as a result of using the transitional. The practical expression of the stance I have just described is therefore that the Bank will allow full use of transitional measures by those firms that qualify to use them, and that the transitional asset created by the TDTP will qualify as Tier 1 capital. This is consistent with the approach being taken across Europe, and I was glad to see Gabriel Bernardino’s recent comments on this topic. He said: ‘‘It is also fundamental that market analysts and investors understand that Solvency II adjustments and transitional measures are a legitimate part of the regime.
The emphasis put on deepening the single market, the setting of indicators allowing comparisons of best practices among the Member States, the fact that the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines will examine the structural issues closely: all these developments are going in the right direction. Two weeks ago, the Stockholm European Council confirmed these orientations and even added key issues such as ageing in the EU and the role of biotechnology in the European economic growth. All European countries must resolutely carry on the structural reforms they have already initiated. It must be acknowledged that a lot has already been done, in particular with implementation of the single market. However, continental Europe is still experiencing levels of unemployment that are too high, despite the fact that the jobless rate has been declining significantly in most of its economies for three years. According to the IMF and the OECD, around 80% of this unemployment level appears to be structural, that is, generated by our own burdensome rules and regulations. EMU certainly stimulates structural reforms in the labour market. With increased capital mobility and a better functioning single market, firms will become more and more sensitive to overall labour cost differentials and business regulations in choosing a particular location in the euro area. They will therefore exert a considerable pressure for appropriate reforms. b/ In addition to structural reforms, a strong emphasis will continue to be put on competitiveness. Pre-euro economic policy meant monitoring the balance of payments and the foreign exchange and interest-rate markets.

For example, the 1-year forward rate, 9 years ahead has declined sharply over the past year, falling from around 5 percent in December 2013 to just under 3 percent currently. What can explain such a large shift in forward rates at such a long time horizon? Third, when U.S. monetary policy is normalized, how fast should we raise short-term interest rates? In other words, what is the appropriate path back to the long-run equilibrium real federal funds rate, shallow or steep? In my view, the paper reaches five major conclusions – conclusions that I find myself broadly in agreement with: •  There are many factors that influence the level of the equilibrium real short-term interest rate. Real potential GDP growth may be one factor, but the real equilibrium rate is also affected by financial conditions, uncertainty and risk aversion, financial market performance (e.g., bubbles and busts) and the degree of restraint exerted by the stringency of banking and financial market regulation. •  There is little evidence supporting the so-called “secular stagnation” view that the equilibrium real short-term rate will persistently remain near or below zero. •  The equilibrium real short-term rate is non-stationary. Thus, it will not necessarily revert back to some long-run average value. •  U.S. and global markets are integrated to a significant degree. As a result, the equilibrium real short-term rates both here and abroad will tend to move together.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Recent economic and financial developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the half-yearly media news conference, Berne, 14 June 2007. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank is raising the target range for the three-month Libor with immediate effect by 0.25 percentage points to 2.00–3.00%. With this move, the National Bank is ensuring that inflation prospects remain favourable. The SNB intends to hold the rate in the middle of the target range for the time being. Switzerland's economy is in excellent shape. Indeed, the economy is developing even better than expected back in March. For 2007, the National Bank now expects real GDP to grow at a rate of close to 2.5%. The healthy economy in the neighbouring countries and exchange rate developments have been contributing factors. Together with a renewed rise in oil prices, this has led to a slight deterioration in inflation prospects – even after today's increase in the interest rate. Assuming that the three-month Libor remains unchanged at 2.50%, the National Bank expects an average annual inflation rate of 0.8% in 2007, 1.5% in 2008, and 1.7% in 2009. Consequently, forecast inflation continues to rise. However, at present there is considerable uncertainty with regard to the assessment of the inflation outlook. On the one hand, structural changes in the economy still have a dampening effect on prices.

On the contrary, the significant contraction of domestic demand, in particular for imported durable goods and inventories, spontaneously and quickly undid the incipient external deficit of the second half of 2008 and interest rates in Chile dropped. The Chilean economy has continued to show a very solvent net external position. BIS Review 93/2009  3  Figure 2 CPI and selected inflation measures (annual change, percent) 0  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  01  02  CPI  -2  Mar-03 Mar-04 Mar-05 Mar-06 Mar-07 Mar-08 Mar-09  CPIX  CPIX1  CPI minus foods and energy  Sources: National Statistics Bureau (INE) and Central Bank of Chile. As we have pointed out on earlier occasions, persistent movements of the exchange rate may have inflationary consequences that must be taken into account when deciding on the monetary impulse. Anyway, our floating regime admits intervening in exceptional cases, whenever an overreaction of the exchange rate is detected that is giving misleading signals to the financial markets. In addition, although there is no obvious misalignment of the current real exchange rate from its long-term fundamentals, the present inflationary scenario may accommodate a nominal depreciation that does not compromise our price stability objective. In fact, imported inflationary pressures influence medium-term inflation, so if the recent appreciation of the peso persists, inflationary prospects will certainly moderate, which, as I just stated, has implications on the conduct of monetary policy.
Lars Nyberg: Monetary policy and house prices Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish Investment Fund Association, Stockholm, 19 May 2010. *  *  *  I would guess that all of us here have at least two things in common. One is that our professional life in recent years has largely revolved around dealing with the effects of a global financial crisis. The other is that we would rather not do it again. Most of you represent the investment fund branch or unit trust investors in one way or another. And a reasonable guess is that recent years have been turbulent for many of you. It is fairly natural that the Riksbank should have been in the eye of the storm during the crisis. Our main tasks are to safeguard financial stability and to keep inflation low and stable, at the same time as contributing to stabilising production and employment. Managing the effects of the crisis and carrying out our statutory tasks in the best possible way has required a number of creative and unusual solutions. And it is not all over yet. The financial markets have recently been shaken up once again. Now the problem is mainly due to Greece, but to some extent also other EU countries such as Spain and Portugal, having serious problems with their government finances. The Swedish banks are not directly exposed to the countries in southern Europe to any great extent.

To conclude on this estimate of effectiveness, the IMF – regarded as an objective judge of the relevance of economic policies – was unequivocal in its assessment at the last G20 meeting in Shanghai at the end of February, saying, “The ECB’s asset purchase programme has supported the recovery by improving confidence and financial conditions [and] monetary policy should remain accommodative”. 3) What about the risks? I talked earlier about the risks of doing nothing: we need to take action in order to bring inflation back up towards 2%. That said, we also need to keep a close eye out for any possible negative side-effects of our monetary policy, notably for financial stability. We are actively monitoring the financial cycle, including in France where the task falls to the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (High Council for Financial Stability), set up in 2013: I will be taking part in its 8th meeting at the Finance Ministry tomorrow. For the time being, there are no signs of any bubbles forming in the main financing markets: on the whole, developments in the equity markets appear in line with corporate profit forecasts, while evolutions in bond yields also seem consistent with the outlook for inflation and growth. Nor are there any signs of excessive credit growth in the financial system. Nevertheless, we remain vigilant over all aspects of the current macroeconomic and financial environment.