samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the baseline scenario of the Eurosystem June staff projections, output declines by a staggering 13% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter. As lockdown measures are being eased across euro area countries, a cautious recovery in activity is currently taking place. But adverse effects on household income and production can be expected to persist for a considerable period of time. Such protracted effects are clearly visible in the most recent Eurosystem staff projections. Given the current exceptional degree of uncertainty, these projections were organised around three scenarios that differ with respect to the severity of the economic fallout from the pandemic in the euro area (see left chart on Slide 2). All scenarios assume that the substantial support from monetary, fiscal and labour market policies is sufficient to avert adverse financial amplification channels. While the severity of the contraction differs substantially across scenarios, none of the three trajectories is in line with a full recovery of real GDP by the end of 2022 to the levels projected by staff in March. In the severe scenario, our staff projections suggest that the level of real GDP at the end of 2022 could remain 9.6% below the March 2020 staff projection path. In effect, both the nature of the shock and the length of the ensuing downturn make it likely that the economy will experience important structural shifts. Disentangling the effects of these shifts on demand and supply, and hence on medium-term inflation, is inherently difficult.

In 2019 we expanded the geographical scope of this initiative to the "Montevideo group" made up of the central banks of Colombia (Banco de la República), Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.With all these central banks of Latin America and some others which joined Morocco, from the African continent, we organized what was going to be the 3rd meeting of central banks to promote female leadership “Fostering Women's leadership in Central Banking”. Unfortunately, in March 2020 the pandemic broke out and this event had to be cancelled at the very last moment. The work initiated by so many central banks and the questions addressed are not the result of a fad or political ideologies. The matter of female leadership and gender diversity is an economic concern of global importance, which, according to the World Economic Forum, after the pandemic, has suffered a setback with respect to the progress that was previously made: “gender equality is still almost a century away from being achieved with the current rate of change.” For this reason, studies and research such as those which are going to be presented here today and tomorrow assessing the challenges and evaluating the policies that lead us to the path towards gender equality, are of the utmost importance in order to accelerate the necessary change. Several central banks have also included the topics of diversity and inclusion in their research agendas, and the webinar features several good examples of those.
Asian financial deepening has been faster than in the EU or US, while it starts from a lower base. The Asian bond market today, as a share of GDP, is higher than the EU. BIS Review 130/2009  5  On the regional level, several initiatives have been undertaken to promote intra-regional trade and investment since as early as the 1990s. For example, in 1992, an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was launched for intra-ASEAN tariffs to be lowered to 0-5% under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), with a target of establishing a tariff-free free trade area by 2015. Also, an ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) was signed in 1995 to eliminate intra-ASEAN restrictions to trade in services and facilitate free flow of services by 2015. Furthermore, in 1998, an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) was adopted to promote greater flows of capital, skilled labour, professional expertise and technology within the region. These various initiatives have been further accelerated post-Asian crisis, with various free trade agreements (FTA) rapidly emerging between ASEAN and the North East Asian economies, namely China, Japan and South Korea. Recently in April this year, the FTA between ASEAN and China was broadened to encompass the removal of investment barriers from just restrictions in trade-in-goods since 2004 and in services since 2007, thereby creating the world's largest free trade area with a population of 1.8 billion and gross domestic product of USD2 trillion.

14  BIS Review 130/2009  For example, in the latest World Bank's Doing Business in 2010, Malaysia ranks first in the category of ease of getting credit. Baele, L, A Ferrando, P Hordahl, E Krylova and C Monnet, 2004, "Measuring Financial Integration in the Euro Area", ECB Occasional Papers, No. 14, April. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 1999, "Financial Integration and Asset Returns", Discussion Paper No. 2282, November. International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2002, "Chapter 3: Trade and Financial Integration", World Economic Outlook: Trade and Finance, September. EMEAP Task Force Report on Regional Financial Cooperation in Asia (2006). BIS Review 130/2009  15
Page 8/8  Challenges confronting the pension system – options and limitations of monetary policy Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank PK-Netz conference, Berne, 31 October 2019  Chart 1  31.10.2019  Challenges confronting the pension system – options and limitations of monetary policy | Thomas J. Jordan | © Swiss National Bank  Chart 2  31.10.2019  Challenges confronting the pension system – options and limitations of monetary policy | Thomas J. Jordan | © Swiss National Bank  Chart 3  31.10.2019  Challenges confronting the pension system – options and limitations of monetary policy | Thomas J. Jordan | © Swiss National Bank  Chart 4 and 5  31.10.2019  Challenges confronting the pension system – options and limitations of monetary policy | Thomas J. Jordan | © Swiss National Bank  Chart 6  31.10.2019  Challenges confronting the pension system – options and limitations of monetary policy | Thomas J. Jordan | © Swiss National Bank

In addition, the yield on ten-year Confederation bonds attained a new historical low. This shows that the demand for safe investments remains high. Over the past few months, as before, movements in the Swiss franc mainly reflected the changing risk assessment of market participants. Following the ECB’s announcement in early September that it would purchase unlimited quantities of bonds of crisis-hit euro area countries under certain conditions, the upward pressure on the Swiss franc lessened. The M1, M2 and M3 monetary aggregates, which measure the amount of money held by households and companies, have increased substantially over the past few months. For this reason, some fear that we are heading for high rates of inflation. However, this is not the case. The inflation forecast for Switzerland continues to be low. At present, the inflation rate is still in negative territory. Inflationary pressure remains minimal because of the strong Swiss franc and the relatively unfavourable global growth outlook. Moreover, the underutilisation of production capacities in Switzerland is restraining the inflation outlook. Surveys on inflation expectations show that households and companies continue to assume that prices will remain stable, also in the medium term. Given the current low interest environment worldwide, enforcement of the minimum exchange rate is necessary to ensure suitable monetary conditions in Switzerland. Global uncertainty will persist for the foreseeable future and drive demand for secure investments.
Petroleum activities and the Norwegian economy Per cent of GDP 18  18 Net cash flow from petroleum activities  16 14  16 14  12  12  10  10 Oil investment  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002  Source: National Budget 2003 and Norges Bank  4. The Government Petroleum Fund 1) Per cent of GDP  150  150  125  125  100  100  75  75  50  50  25  25  0  0  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  1) When expected return is used. Source: National Budget 2003, National Budget 2002 and Norges Bank  BIS Review 13/2003  7  5. The fiscal policy rule prevents large unexpected changes in the impulses from use of oil revenues Per cent of GDP for Mainland Norway  10 8 6  Structural non-oil deficit  4 2 0 2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  Source: National Budget 2003  6. Return on oil vs petroeleuml fund 600  Value index for oil price and Petroleum Fund in USD (1.2.1986=100)  500  Petroleum Fund 400 300  Oil 200 100  fe b. 86 fe b. 87 fe b. 88 fe b. 89 fe b. 90 fe b. 91 fe b.

The slowdown in global growth has been more pronounced and spanned a longer period than we had expected. The Norwegian economy has also felt the effects of this. Norges Bank has therefore lowered the sight deposit rate from 7 to 5.5 per cent since 11 December, most recently on 5 March. The interest rate differential has narrowed. Since mid-January, the krone has depreciated, partly reflecting expectations of lower interest rates. Monetary policy has been relaxed. There is uncertainty associated with developments in many of the factors that will influence inflation ahead, among others the exchange rate. This implies a gradual approach to the conduct of monetary policy. Increased spending of petroleum revenues will have implications for Norway’s industry structure. High demand for goods and services that require domestic resources, necessitates higher employment in the sheltered sector. This labour has to be recruited from the exposed sector, or through the natural increase in the labour force finding its way to the sheltered sector. Even if employment and output in Norwegian manufacturing industry fall, developments for Norwegian enterprises may not necessarily be only negative. Some enterprises may be at the cutting edge of technology, and increase their efficiency in pace with the rise in costs in Norway. Others may relocate labour-intensive activities abroad. The scaling back of manufacturing still involves a risk. It makes the economy more vulnerable; the foundation for learning, innovation and development may be undermined when a smaller share of the business sector is exposed to intense international competition.
The reactions and comments regarding a couple of our speeches in the early summer indicated that some analysts perceived them in a way that was not intended. The speeches were interpreted as though they pointed forwards although we had provided information on changes in our way of signalling and said that we did not intend to make any forward-looking comments that would provide clues regarding the next interest rate decision. Some concluding reflections on communication The fact that our message had not entirely come across is partly due to some market agents not understanding what we actually had communicated. But it is also partly because we have not been sufficiently clear in our communication. I believe this is quite simply a learning process. We at the Riksbank and those we want to communicate with – the general public, journalists and market analysts – must learn to understand one another. In this respect we will try to improve. One step in this direction is the decision to name the Executive Board members in the minutes of the meetings. In this way it is possible to follow how each member has reasoned. A further step that we recently decided on is to also publish forecasts for the repo rate and a small number of key variables at the monetary policy meetings held between the publication of the Monetary Policy Reports. If, for example, we had published a new interest rate path in May, I believe that the market would have been less surprised in June.

It was clear in September that the labour market had tightened further. The increase in the number of persons employed had been around as large as we were expecting in the June Report. However, the number of people in the labour force had not increased at the same rate we expected then. This meant that unemployment was also lower than we had predicted. Given these signs of a tighter labour market, it was fairly reasonable to believe that wages would increase more rapidly in future than they had done in previous years. But we could note that this was not yet visible in the statistics. The picture painted by the National Mediation Office’s statistics shows very moderate increases. But as I pointed out at our September meeting, it is probable that this picture will change when the new central wage agreements signed in the spring begin to make their mark in their respective sectors. And just as for developments in the labour market as a whole, this is something we follow closely. As I have just noted, it is now clear that an increasing number of people are working. It is normally the case that when many new people obtain work towards the end of an upturn phase of the economic cycle, the work is a little less efficient, that is, productivity growth declines. And this is just what we have seen during the first half of this year.
What is clear in those early editions is the decidedly international flavour of a London investor’s interests – from tramways in Buenos Aires to copper mines in Portugal. Since then, London has been a truly international financial centre. In 1913, at the twilight of the last great wave of globalisation, 71 foreign banks had London offices. A century later, there are nearly four times as many. Today, almost twice as much international banking activity is booked here as anywhere else. London is the home of global markets as well as global banks. Almost half of all turnover in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives takes place here. London’s share of global foreign exchange turnover is almost as high and it remains a major hub for trading in gold. UK insurance companies have around 10% of the global market.2 Extending the net further, the UK is home to the third largest “shadow banking system” with assets of $ trillion.3 The emergence of London as a financial centre in the nineteenth century owed a lot to the UK’s position as the world’s greatest trading nation. Britain accounted for as much as a quarter of world trade and produced around a tenth of global GDP.4 Over the following  1  At around this time there were 701 accountancy firms operating in the City, and over 2000 firms of solicitors. See David Kynaston’s book “City of London: The History” (Chatto & Windus, London, 2011). 2  See “Fund Management September 2013” published by TheCityUK, available at http://www.thecityuk.com/research/ourwork/reports-list/fund-management-2013/.

The second risk is that the United States will not rise to its fiscal policy challenges, which could hamper the continued strengthening of the global economy. Let me discuss these risks in more detail. A third risk that is often discussed concerns the slowdown on the Chinese property market. I shall not go into this in any great depth here; I shall merely note that if property prices were to fall uncontrollably, China has the scope to implement fiscal and monetary policy stimulation, in that they have a low national debt of around 25 per cent of GDP and a high policy rate of almost 7 per cent. 1 The debate on the Chinese economy is otherwise often fairly categorical. It concerns either overheating or an imminent crash. If we look back at earlier developments, we can see that they have successfully managed to avoid both of these extremes. My assessment is that there is good scope for them to do so this time, too. The euro area – prolonged deleveraging In the euro area, it is mainly the Greek debt that has received attention. But, as well all know, other euro area countries have also suffered debt problems; for instance, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Italy also has a high national debt, but this is a problem it has had for a long time. The following figure shows how public debt as a percentage of GDP has developed in these countries and the IMF’s forecast until the end of 2017.
Initially however, these effects may be hampered by practical issues such as different product standards. Laws and regulations that enforce common standards can thus be used to lay the ground for a further increase in competition. The possibility to create supervisory bodies means, for instance, that unwanted practices such as price dumping in certain markets now become more difficult. As for preparations in the above-mentioned aspects, the ambitious program outlined in the EAC Development Strategy bodes well. Another type of institution building concerns the common monetary policy and how it is to be handled. As is well described by for instance Alexandre Lamfalussy, the task of institution building in the European monetary unification process was formidable (Lamfalussy, 2006). A number of vested interests meant that a lot of things could have gone wrong. That the project was successful after all is attributed to “the exceptional convergence of several facts and influences” (p.2). Naming but a few, importantly, the initiators of the project were heads of state. Also, the central bankers were entrusted by the politicians, in issues concerning central banking, to play a major role in the forming of the Maastricht Treaty. Although this important document left open a number of issues, it was clear on the independence, institutionally as well as financially, of the European Central Bank and the national central banks within the European System of Central Banks. Furthermore, it made clear what the convergence criteria were for accession to the Euro area.

However, not least because of experiences in recent history, it is widely acknowledged that the stabilisation of aggregate demand through changes in public spending is not an easy task. Preferably, policy makers should refrain from fine-tuning, not least against the backdrop of inside and outside lags that distort the timing of such policies. It is far more important to ensure that the government budget is balanced over the course of a business cycle. Over the last couple of decades, monetary policy has been geared towards price stability, thereby also indirectly contributing to stabilising demand. Given the success in regaining price stability, Uganda being one of many examples, it seems sensible to take a closer look at the guiding principles that have been important factors in making this possible. Using inflation targeting regimes by independent central banks as a special case, four advantages of this strategy can be singled out as illustrated in a recent study (Schmidt-Hebbel and Mishkin, 2006). First, the nominal anchor should be based on the institutional set-up and not on individual policy makers, this to ensure consistency. Second, a credible commitment as just described produces stable expectations of a continued focus on the long-run. Third, transparency reduces uncertainty about the tools and goals of monetary policy. Finally, without a target, a lack of accountability might undermine the central bank’s independence.
The government projects public spending to increase in real terms by around 0.25% per annum (on average) between 2019 and 2022, compared to +1.1% in 2017–2018. Achieving this significant change is necessary and will require additional efforts, which are not yet specified. Public expenditure needs to be made more efficient, in particular on social protection spending, which include pensions and unemployment benefits and which constitute the bulk of the difference between French and German public spending ratio, as can be seen on the graph. [slide 11] Second, I would like to emphasise the interaction between labour market and education reforms. Ambitious labour market reforms have been implemented, aiming at increasing employment flexibility. The negotiation space given to social partners for decision-making, especially at firm level, has been widened. This could reconcile efficiency and worker protection, as we see it in Northern Europe. Staff-representation obligations have been simplified by the creation of a single representative body instead of three, which enlarges the negotiation field and hence eases compromise. Finally, the uncertainties of labour disputes have been eased with a cap on severance pay in case of abusive lay-off and a new type of collective layoff by mutual consent. [slide 12] To yield its benefits, increased flexibility on the labour market requires greater adaptability of skills through a better-functioning lifelong training and apprenticeship system. Without adaptability of skills, the higher layoff rate due to increased flexibility could push up structural unemployment, as unemployed workers deprived from appropriate skills may not find a new job.

If we want to preserve the present global expansion, if we want to encourage reforms and hence increase potential growth, we need to maintain an open international environment, a rule-based multilateral order. [slide 16] I stress it here in the United States, as a dedicated European speaking to close historical allies: we have many common challenges, politically and economically. To avoid disaster, we should resolutely build common solutions. Believe me: France is taking its part of the task, today more than ever. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches