samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The higher purchase of foreign currency on the foreign exchange market acted towards increase in the NBRM gross foreign exchange reserves. On December 30, 2000 they 1 reached USD 713.6 million, thus increasing by USD 235.5 million compared to the end of 1999 . In 2000, the upward trend of the deposits with the banks continued due to the gradual strengthening of the confidence of the economic agents in the banking sector. Thus, on annual basis (December 2000 / December 1999), the total non-government deposits with the money deposit banks increased by Denar 6,906 million, or by 23.1%. In addition, the foreign exchange deposits registered more intensive growth of 49.1%, while the Denar deposits increased by 13.9%. Analyzed by maturity, both short-term and long-term deposits increased by 27.0% and 4.4%, respectively. It should be underlined that in 2000, the banks’ credit activity registered considerable expansion. Thus, in December 2000 relative to the same month of the previous year the total banks’ credits in favor of the non-government sector (according to the actual balance) increased by Denar 6,042 million, or by 17.2%. A good and close coordination between the monetary and fiscal policy created a room for such an increase in the credits, significant increment in the liquidity of the banks, removal of the credit ceilings by the NBRM and increased banks’ deposit potential. With respect to the currency of denomination, the increment in the total banks’ credits is solely due to the increased Denar credits, whereas the foreign currency placements registered a fall.

This is where a robust carbon market comes in. Carbon credits are essentially tradable certificates that represent the reduction, avoidance, or removal of a certain amount of emissions from the atmosphere. Firms can buy these credits to offset hard-to-abate emissions. To efficiently match the demand for carbon credits with the supply of these credits, we need a robust carbon market. In so doing, a carbon market becomes an important mechanism to channel funds to the emission reduction and removal projects that generate the carbon credits. Adopting a twin strategy of reducing and offsetting carbon emissions is a practical and effective way to reach our climate goals in time. Given Asia’s transition needs, a well-functioning carbon trading ecosystem is particularly relevant to the region’s decarbonisation effort. There are two types of carbon markets: The compliance carbon markets support the trading of emission allowances by entities subject to mandatory targets set by national, regional or international emissions reduction regimes. The voluntary carbon markets, on the other hand, are not tied to emissions trading systems or regulatory requirements. Any company or individual can purchase carbon credits to offset their own carbon footprint voluntarily. In our journey towards a greener world, voluntary carbon markets are expected to play a more impactful role. First, the voluntary market can cater to a wider group of firms and individuals. Emissions trading systems tend to cover sectors with higher emissions and so not all firms participate in the compliance carbon market.
The transmission of monetary policy The Central Bank of Chile’s monetary policy operates largely through its effects on the cost of lending, as it influences the cost of bank financing. The Bank’s main instrument is the monetary policy interest rate, or MPR. It is worth noting that the level which the Board chooses every month for the MPR represents an objective for the cost of overnight lending between banks. In other words, the Central Bank operates in the interbank market, seeing that the interest rate at which banks lend to and borrow from each other overnight approaches the MPR. Therefore, it is important to understand how this interest rate, which operates in a very specific and well defined market (among banks and for a term of one day only), affects the spending and investing decisions made by households and firms even over several years. The explanation for this phenomenon is that, in normal circumstances, what matters is not only today’s level of the MPR, but the whole future path expected by the market for such interest rate. This is what ultimately affects the entire yield structure. In other words, for a five-year loan, for instance, it is more important for the potential borrower to have an idea of how the MPR will be behaving in the next five years that to know its current level. The above has first-order implications on the conduct, implementation and communication of monetary policy.

In the latter area we actually have made major innovations since our Monetary Policy Meeting last Thursday. We now upload to our public website the background information based on publicly available data before holding the meetings where we decide on monetary policy. Today’s scenario: uncertainty and risks Monetary policy is one of many factors influencing the cost of borrowing faced by households and firms. Another factor that has gained significant importance is the perception of risk and volatility that has swept over every financial market. This increased with the worsening of the global financial crisis last September. In general, and despite efforts made by economic policy makers in the main economies around the world, we are still dwelling in an extremely uncertain scenario. This has a number of implications that ultimately affect the conditions and costs of credit to firms and households not only in Chile but everywhere. To begin with, external lending standards for domestic banks have become more stringent. We see it in that, although our banks have been able to access foreign credit sources, these have been at shorter maturities and with larger spreads over external reference interest rates. This is a reflection of the difficulties that continue to haunt the main global financial institutions and their reluctance to embark in new businesses.
In 1998, we established a new department to focus our efforts on actively promoting the industry, identifying areas of opportunity, and profiling Singapore as an international financial centre. The task ahead is daunting. External conditions are presently not favourable. The global economy is slowing down. Southeast Asia is taking longer than we had hoped to implement structural reforms that are essential for sustained growth. Investors are waiting to see how events unfold. There are fewer opportunities for institutions to service our immediate region, whether in offshore lending, mergers and acquisitions, or treasury operations. We can and must look beyond immediate problems, and press on to upgrade our infrastructure and capabilities, so that institutions and investors will have stronger reasons to site activities in Singapore and use our financial markets. Then as Southeast Asia recovers, which in time it will, we will be ready to play our part in its pick up. We have come a long way since 1968 when we started promoting the Asian Dollar Market. As we evolve into a full-service financial centre, it will become more difficult to identify individual projects or areas to pursue. Our approach is therefore to establish a conducive overall environment, within which market forces can operate and private sector innovation can thrive. We have to: ·  develop efficient, comprehensive and world-class infrastructure;  ·  put in place a sound but pro-enterprise regulatory framework; and  ·  attract, nurture and retain top talent, both local and foreign.

In particular, the crisis has already generated an increase in the level of indebtedness of many firms. Thus, it would make sense to assess the possibility of actions to support firms that do not involve an increase in financial obligations, such as, for example, by means of direct assistance or, in some cases through temporary capital injections. 3  Furthermore, for companies that have difficulty meeting their financial obligations, streamlined debt restructuring procedures need to be available to avoid such difficulties leading to the disappearance of heavily indebted firms whose business model is nonetheless viable. And, in parallel, for firms with non-viable business models, an orderly market exit should be available, since this would result in a more efficient allocation of resources. Apart from these short-term actions, an ambitious structural reform agenda is urgently needed, to increase the economy’s potential growth, which was already low before this crisis. And this is also true for European policies. In this case, for example, it is crucial that the European fund be converted into a permanent, common fiscal stabilisation instrument for the euro area. This would allow a joint fiscal response to macroeconomic shocks and provide a larger supply of safe European assets, facilitating the general functioning of financial markets and the specific conduct of monetary policy. Completing the Banking Union is also a priority, with the approval of a fully pooled European Deposit Guarantee Scheme. Further, we must move towards lowering the barriers to a genuine Capital Markets Union.
7  Simulations by Dorich, Labelle, Lepetyuk and Mendes (2015) using a model for the Canadian economy indicate that a target of 2 per cent leads to a result that is almost as good as if the target were raised to 3 or 4 per cent, given that the policy rate can be complemented by quantitative easing as well as active and credible supporting communication. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Major direct impact of interest rate changes makes Swedish CPI unique This direct impact of interest rate changes on inflation is quite unique to Sweden. The reason for the effect is that we include household mortgage costs in the CPI in a slightly different way than most other countries with inflation targets. More specifically, we attempt to measure households’ costs for living in an owner-occupied property, where interest expenditure is an important component.8 The CPI is calculated according to roughly the same principles in Canada, for example, but in practice the interest rate changes have a much smaller impact on the CPI there than here in Sweden.9 In Australia and New Zealand, interest rate changes also previously had a major direct impact on the CPI, but the method for calculating CPI changed in both countries at the end of the 1990s in a way that eliminated such effects.10 They now apply a method which is principally based on following price developments of new housing, a so-called net acquisition approach.

If wage formation places a lot of focus on the current level of CPI inflation, I see a risk that this could create instability in the wage formation system. A situation similar to the one in the 1970s and 80s could then ultimately occur, whereby wage developments varied substantially from year to year depending on the current inflation rate, which also varied extensively. It would therefore be better if wage formation were based on a less volatile inflation measure than CPI inflation.13 A new monetary policy target variable could hopefully take on that role. A band surrounding the target When the General Council of the Riksbank decided to introduce an inflation target of 2 per cent in January 1993, it also decided that there should be a tolerance band surrounding this target of 1 percentage point both above and below.14 The aim was to clarify that the Riksbank does not have the ability to control inflation exactly in the short term, but that it also aims to limit deviations from the target – that it does not intend to “tolerate” deviations greater than 1 percentage point. The size of the interval was determined by what intuitively appeared to be reasonable. It was not possible to rely on any past experience as the monetary policy regime was entirely new and inflation had varied considerably during the old regime which had a fixed exchange rate. The Riksbank expected that inflation would now vary less, but was unsure as to how much.
Playing to form, during the period of the Great Moderation, it was held that central banks and policymakers had successfully moderated destabilising booms and busts in the long term. Financial ‘innovation’, while not eliminating risk completely, had found new ways to effectively distribute risks across diversified agents and borders. Or so it seemed, even though no one fully understood or had enough information to know where the risks ultimately ended up. All of the above lent credence to the deep-seated faith that “this time would be different”, until the extended period of macroeconomic calm was abruptly brought to a jolting halt by the Great Recession. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The future terrain of crises will continue to be fraught with uncertainty and a humbling recognition of our inherent limitations. Policymakers therefore need to proceed with a healthy dose of humility. Much like the harsh, volatile weather conditions at the world’s highest peak, the next crisis will be unpredictable, and likely exceed our capacity to control or prevent. In this post-crisis era, we have seen wide ranging policy and institutional reforms in many jurisdictions. They are important, even critical, to correct past errors and respond to future anticipated challenges. But their implementation, and our reliance on them, should acknowledge the constraints that we face. Contemporary understanding of the sources, drivers and transmission channels of systemic risks remains incomplete. Multifaceted policy frameworks and toolkits designed to curb systemic risks and manage crisis are also still evolving.

In other countries, for example the United States and Norway, costs for owner-occupied housing are approximated to the cost for renting a comparable property – and this is far less affected by interest rate changes. In the euro area and the United Kingdom, the target is formulated in terms of the HICP index (harmonised index for consumer prices) which does not include costs for owner-occupied housing, only operating costs.11 As Swedish CPI inflation has this characteristic, the Riksbank has, since the introduction of the inflation target, calculated several different measures of inflation and has also regularly let inflation indices other than the CPI guide interest rate decisions. The price index which has played the biggest role in recent years is the CPIF, or the CPI with a fixed interest rate. Unlike the CPI, the CPIF is not directly affected by changes in mortgage rates. CPIF inflation, with energy prices also discounted at times, has functioned as a “steering” variable in such a way that the Riksbank has normally aimed for it to be close to 2 per cent within the forecasting horizon. Major interest rate changes lead to substantial and long-term effects on the CPI Despite this, the target has been formulated in terms of the CPI. As interest rates sometimes go up and sometimes down, the idea has been that the differences in inflation according to the CPI and the CPIF will level out over time.
In addition, the Central Bank adopted some non-conventional monetary policy measures, extending the overnight liquidity facility for banks at the MPR to 180 day tenors and cutting the issuance of 1- and 2-year Central Bank bonds. It has been also announced that the MPR will be held constant at this minimum level for a prolonged period of time, and that it will use with flexibility all the monetary policy tools at hand, which goes way beyond setting the MPR every month. Several lessons and challenges arise for the Chilean experience. First, the volatility of inflation has been very large. This could be explained by the severity of the shocks hitting the economy, but this is not so clear when comparing with other countries. Although it was argued that indexation could be resuming and inflation would stay high, the turnaround was impressive, and hence, it is not clear how persistence has evolved, and it is difficult to  9  The output gap is actual output minus potential output; hence, an increase refers to a rise above potential output. BIS Review 113/2009  7  explain with a simple linear adjustment. It could be argued that the change in inflation is due to the impact on inflation of the widening of the output gap. However, the output gap changed little when inflation was rising, and the current decline cannot be explained by the current narrowing of the output gap.

They are connected with, firstly, a faster reopening of borders. In this case, domestic demand may partly shift to imports of tourism services, easing domestic demand-side pressure on prices. Secondly, if the pandemic deteriorates, depending on the pace of vaccination and the spread of new coronavirus strains, the global economy will grow much more slowly. Thirdly, a bumper harvest may cause inflation to slow down. As far as monetary policy prospects are concerned, we are prepared to step up actions needed to bring inflation back to the target. As I have already mentioned, the Board of Directors sees the necessity of further increases in the key rate at upcoming meetings. We will determine the scope and pace of increasing the key rate based on our assessment of the level of sustained inflationary pressure, the timeframe for inflation expectations stabilisation, as well as the forecast 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  of further movements of aggregate demand and supply. Our monetary policy will ensure annual inflation to return to the near 4% target in the second half of 2022. Thank you for your attention! 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
(i) First, a Capital Markets Union should be structured along a clearly defined and articulated framework and focused on a limited set of operational deliverables. As an overall priority, we believe that the initiative should seek to promote equity instead of debt financing for long-term financing. Equity financing is crucial for firms to grow and operate over the long run, all the more since we must pay attention to the high level of indebtedness in Europe with respect to both the public and private sectors, including SME borrowers. The current ratios of debt-to-income are indeed to be adjusted to a more sustainable path. Notwithstanding this primary objective, debt instruments remain an indispensable funding tool. As far as operational deliverables are concerned, we share the view of the European Commission that the development of both Simple, Transparent and Standardized (STS) securitization and Private Placements is achievable in the short to medium run. 2 Securitization is indeed a useful tool to help fund the economy, as a means to free regulatory capital and to create liquid assets, particularly in the context of tightened capital requirements for banks. The CMU could for instance promote initiatives such as that carried out in France, where banks, with the support of the Banque de France, have taken steps to monetize their pools of credit claims. Banks now have the option of structuring these loans into marketable debt securities which are issued by a securitization vehicle (called Euro Secured Note Issuer or ESNI), in order to raise funds over the medium term.

I am pleased to see that the recent euro barometer showed a steady progression in the satisfaction of the Maltese with the adoption of the euro (from 40% in September 2005 to 64% in June 2007). Let me hand over the euro star to Governor Bonello to symbolically flag that the Central Bank of Malta will join the Eurosystem on 1 January 2008. We look forward to welcoming you wholeheartedly into the euro area. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 110/2007  1
The bigger the economy grows over time, the more fiscal resources can be made available. Thus, taking steps that do not hurt long-term productivity growth would seem preferable to steps that reduce the amount of invested  BIS Review 28/2010  5  capital – both physical and human – and/or its quality. I also would be inclined to measures that indicate a credible commitment to long-term budget consolidation, but with a contractionary impulse that phases in only slowly and builds over time. The last challenge I wish to discuss is how to move from a cyclical recovery to a more balanced and sustainable pattern of growth globally. Just as there are substantial fiscal imbalances in several countries that threaten to become unsustainable in the absence of consolidation, so there are large-scale imbalances in the world economy as a whole that raise issues of long-term sustainability. In particular, there continues to be a need to reduce consumption and increase saving relative to investment in the United States, and a parallel need to increase consumption relative to investment in parts of the emerging world. The recent crisis has reduced but not eliminated current account imbalances worldwide. In many cases, the imbalances remain sizable, and they could begin to grow again and ultimately become destabilizing. The case for global rebalancing is compelling when we consider the structural backdrop.

As Jens Weidmann and I wrote last year, the equity financing of businesses, across European borders, must be a priority. Europe is lagging far behind in this area: such financing only represents 67% of GDP in the euro area compared with 125% in the United States. Thus, innovation, which is inherently more risky, is less well financed in Europe. The second project, on which we could make progress after the elections that will take place this year, is a collective economic strategy in the euro area. I know that when the French talk about coordination in Europe, the Germans sometimes think that it may be a new way to wriggle out of reforms. This deadlock must be broken: we need both national reforms and a European coordination. Growth and employment would be stronger in Europe with more structural reforms where they are a priority, such as in France and Italy, and more fiscal or wage support in countries with room for manoeuvre, such as Germany. Regarding reforms, like you, I would like France to pick up the pace; I say it frequently in my own country. But you must not consider that your French neighbour is “unreformable”. France has not been immobile over the past few years: pensions have been reformed, corporate charges have been cut considerably, and deficit reduction targets have been met. In practice, in order for this European coordination to exist, the euro area needs an institution that inspires confidence between countries.