samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For others, the message is perhaps that the crypto world and its technologies are a very long way from influencing, let alone changing, the way financial services, including payments, are delivered at scale in the real world. It is, as I said earlier, very difficult to predict which technologies will be successful and when and how they might begin to change the way we do things. The bursting of the dot.com bubble in the early years of this century did not herald the end of the development of internet commerce though it took longer than its original enthusiasts imagined and emerged in a very different form, dominated by big tech platforms. Our work on a digitally native pound is driven by the trends we now see both specifically in payments, including the reducing role of cash, and more generally in the increasing digitalisation of daily life. It is motivated by two primary concerns. First, that in a world in which new, tokenised forms of money emerge, enabled by new technology, we remain able to ensure that all forms of money that circulate in the UK are robust, interchangeable without loss of value and denominated our unit of account – the pound sterling. Physical cash plays a role in ensuring that, at present, all forms of commercial bank money in the UK have to be redeemable in cash - Bank of England money - on demand in cash and without loss of value.

This situation amounts to a significant source of vulnerability for the Spanish economy, especially in a context of monetary policy tightening, while also reducing the fiscal space available to address possible future negative shocks. According to the simulation exercises performed by the Banco de España, in order for the public debt ratio to follow a downward path in the coming decades a fiscal consolidation plan will need to be implemented that progressively reduces the primary structural deficit until the total structural balance is equal to zero. Also, the reduction in public debt would be facilitated if the fiscal adjustment were accompanied by ambitious structural reforms, in line with those mentioned in the first part of my address. Indeed, given the extent of the fiscal imbalances, the inflationary environment and the resilience displayed by the Spanish economy, this consolidation plan should be launched in 2023, so that some reduction in the structural deficit is achieved this year. Another reason for this recommendation is that inflation helped to reduce the fiscal imbalance in 2022, but its long-term impact on public finances will be less favourable or even negative. Also, there are some doubts over the extent to which the strong tax revenue growth of recent years will prove temporary. Moreover, we should not waste the opportunity provided by the deployment of European NGEU funds and RTRP structural reforms, which may, in the short term, counterbalance or even outweigh the possible economic slowdown arising from this fiscal consolidation process.
But if one looks closely, one will find that a good portion of this are raw materials, parts, and components produced in one country and sold to another for further processing or assembly for sale to a third country within or outside Asia. The production of goods for final consumption in Asia is still low, with the exception of Japanese and Korean brands. And while China’s imports from ASEAN have increased substantially in the past few years, their consumption is still mainly in food products, raw materials and low value added products. For luxury goods, their being brand-conscious, ASEAN products have not been able to compete well. This will change over time when Asian products gain more differentiation and sophistication. For example, at the moment, Thai palm oil is no different from Malaysian. There can be no mutual trade. But when it becomes part of the national cuisines, trade and exchange could occur. The more value is added, the more Asia will trade with each other for eventual consumption. But for the moment, the emphasis is more on cooperation than integration. So the second question: If this is so, why are there various monetary initiatives going on in Asia? The way I see it is that even though the level of economic integration is presently still not fully advanced, the financial linkage and contagion affect is very high. Part of this may have to do with the fact that Asian countries lend a good deal of money to each other.

However, when the country faces a nationwide economic crisis, a lot of companies would tend to suffer losses at the same time. And they cannot all together tap additional equity in such an environment. This pushed them into defaults. A lot of what seemed, before the crisis, to be long-term foreign borrowings, therefore, suddenly became callable almost overnight. The second problem is that of currency mismatch. Unlike the major countries, the emerging markets in Asia cannot borrow from the international market in our own currencies. In the case of Thailand, when our currency was floated in 1997, it depreciated more than 65 per cent before backing up to the 40’s. Many companies that had US dollar debts were forced to convert to Thai baht along the way, suffering massive exchange losses as a result. It was an important factor, among others, causing the NPL ratio to go so high, peaking at 45 per cent. In future, if the local bond market could be developed, and made attractive to foreign investors, there could be the option of foreign investors taking the foreign exchange risk instead of the borrowers. Liquidity risks will also be less. If foreign investors want out, they can sell the bonds. Prices will fall. But the borrowers who already had the money would not be affected by the sale in the secondary market. The third risk was that of an interbank market breakdown. At the height of the crisis, foreign banks just stopped lending to local banks.
After six years you can go back to the bank and take out 35 532 kroner. The question is: From whom have they taken 15 532 Norwegian kroner?” 23 Vold has called this: “Capitalism’s fundamental mystique – how a krone, by lying idle for a period of time, gives birth to a 10-øre coin”. The poem is of course a few years old – both 10-øre coins and an interest rate of 10 per cent (the rate in the poem) belong to the past. A krone that yields a return does not lie idle, however. It represents resources used to build production capacity. The 10 øre is value added generated when capital is put to work. When our oil revenues are invested as financial assets abroad, we are buying a share of future global value added, which can subsequently be brought home and put to good use here. As an investor, the oil fund in principle faces two alternatives: Should the fund be an owner by investing in equities, or provide loans to companies and governments by investing in bonds? The return in both cases essentially depends on developments in global trade and industry, on the world’s economic future. Even our loans to governments depend on the success or failure of businesses since governments rely on tax revenues. When we provide loans – by buying bonds – the borrower is obliged to pay us interest at fixed intervals and repay the principal at maturity.

I am sure you will all agree with me when I say, in today’s integrated markets when any country catches a cold there will be many others sneezing. In such an environment we are now increasingly aware of contagion risk. Financial security and financial stability… Within this framework, I would like to emphasize the close linkage between financial security and financial stability. In my opinion, financial security can be enhanced by the existence of a smoothly operating infrastructure. This actually is a comprehensive concept and includes the payment system, the technological infrastructure, as well as the regulatory and supervisory framework. Overseeing the payments system is an essential duty of the central banks. In this respect, a basic continuing responsibility of any central bank is to assure stable and smoothly functioning payment  2  BIS Review 76/2007  systems. Linked to this is the lender of last resort function of the central banks. Emergency liquidity assistance, perhaps the most traditional function for dealing with financial instability, is a way out provided by central banks. Central banks can have a calming influence on markets in case of a market disruption simply by standing ready to provide liquidity assistance if necessary. It includes both the provision of liquidity to the financial system as a whole through market operations, as well as emergency lending to individual banks. Altogether these two important functions facilitate the security in the system. Technological infrastructure is another component to secure financial operations.
This uncertainty principal is often referred to by central banks and can be one reason why they are sometimes perceived as “sluggish” in their behaviour. References Andersson, Björn, Vesna Corbo and Mårten Löf (2015), “Why has inflation been so low?”, Economic Review 2015:3, Sveriges Riksbank. Apel, Mikael, Marianne Nessén, Ulf Söderström and Anders Vredin (1999), “Different ways of conducting inflation targeting – theory and practice”, Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Review, 1999:4, Sveriges Riksbank. Brainard, William (1967), “Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 57. Cunliffe, Jon (2017), “The Phillips curve: lower, flatter or in hiding?”, speech, Oxford Economics Society Tuesday, 14 November 2017. De Rezende, Rafael B. (2017), “The interest rate effects of government bond purchases away from the lower bound,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 74, 165–186. De Rezende, Rafael B., and Annukka Ristiniemi (2018), “A shadow rate without a lower bound constraint”, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper 355. Faust, Jon and Eric Leeper (2015), “The myth of normal: the bumpy story of inflation and monetary Policy”, in Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy, symposium organised with the support of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Greenspan, Alan (2003), “Opening remarks”, Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy, symposium organised with the support of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Hansson, Jesper, Marianne Nessén and Anders Vredin (2018), “The storm after the calm – Lessons for monetary policy analysis”, Economic Review 2018:4, Sveriges Riksbank.

Concluding remarks: The expansion of the European Union will have several direct and indirect effects on both the current and the new member states. The European Union is currently facing several complicated economic policy problems. Many of these have originated from the developments in Europe's near past. New member states will bring new problems and new weaknesses to the Union, but certainly they will also intensify some positive developments within the European Union. Joint efforts should help to move future developments within the European Union towards the direction favourable to everybody. What will be the role of the central bank of Estonia, a new European Union member state, in all this? To put it briefly - the same as today, only on an unparalleled scope and in enormous volumes since the central bank will be analysing the whole European Union instead of the small Estonia, and the bank has to participate in making decisions affecting the whole European Union. The principal tasks of the present and also the future central bank are and will be the same as described by the then Governor of Eesti Pank, Jüri Jaakson, about 80 years ago. The cornerstone of each and every economy is a firm monetary unit, which is a gauge of economic values. This monetary unit must not fluctuate, it must not be dependant on random external factors, or else it will lose its value as a stable gauge.
By contrast, ethnic minorities born in the UK boosts earnings by around 7% relative to non-UK born ethnic minorities. UK-born ethnic minorities tend to be more educated and earn more across all the types of qualifications, compared with non-UK born ethnic minorities. (g)  London. Compared to the benchmark (the North), the region in which people live and work plays a  relatively very small role in determining their pay, with one exception – London and the South East. A job there boosts earnings, relative to the North, by 21% and 12% respectively. This effect is present across all four sub-groups. The ‘London effect’ is if anything more pronounced among white women, who earn 26% more. Section 5: Conclusion Let us conclude by summarising some of our main findings and then setting out some of the potential next steps, policy-wise, that flow from this analysis. 32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  32  First, the good news is that, once we control for various job and individual-specific factors, there is clear evidence of progress having been made in shrinking gender and ethnicity pay gaps in the UK over the past quarter-century or so. Based on the results from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, these gaps have shrunk by around half for females, and by a little less than that for ethnic minorities. Second, the less good news is that these gender and ethnicity pay gaps remain large even once various compositional effects are taken into account, at around 10 percentage points.

The rapid growth of recent years has brought the economy to full capacity, the unemployment rate has fallen below 1½%, resulting in substantial wage pressures in certain segments of the market. The sharp expansion has resulted in a rising rate of inflation. In the 12 months to the beginning of October, consumer prices rose by 5.3%. The Central Bank issues inflation forecasts every three months. The latest forecast was issued in July and it envisaged a 3% average rate of inflation in 1999 and a 4% inflation rate from the beginning to the end of the year. A new forecast will be issued in the beginning of next week. The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments has risen. In 1998 it equalled roughly 5½% of GDP. It is expected to be lower in 1999. During the upswing, the Central Bank of Iceland has followed a restrictive monetary policy as reflected among other things in the fact that at present the differential between Icelandic and trade weighted foreign money market rates is well in excess of 5%. The yield on 3-month treasury bills in the market is currently above 9%, and the so-called repo rate of the Central Bank of Iceland is 9%. That can be compared with the repo rate of the European Central Bank of 2.5%. Since September of last year, the Central Bank has raised its interest rates four times, by a total of 1.8 percentage points. In early 1999 it also levied a liquidity requirement on Icelandic credit institutions.
Or is it a natural phenomena? Are players in the industry not aware of the benefits? Or are they aware of the benefits, weighed it against the potential risks and decided not to pursue this strategy because of business and operational reasons? First let’s analyze the potential benefit. For example, a Bank enters into a joint venture with a housing developer. The financing of the project in the form of equity can yield a lucrative return when the development is completed and then sold. Margin for profit upon sale can be high, as Bank enters into the development at the earliest chain of production. The Bank can still provide financing for the home purchasers, the difference this time – the homes are the Bank’s own asset. Those are direct impact; there are positive impacts in other key areas as well. What happens to the profit from sales and financing? It gets channeled back to Depositors (giving them higher returns on the deposits). This concept would, completely, according to equity-based financing proponent, move Islamic banks away from mimicking conventional products and would truly operate as the shariah had wanted it. Is this true, are there any other factors to be considered? In terms of risk assessment, such a transaction will necessarily inject greater market discipline among industry players. This business model is premise on a few fundamental assumptions.

In response to these conditions, the Federal Reserve System took action to support a strong economy and a stable financial system.9 As part of this effort, pandemic crisis facilities were established to restore market functioning and support the flow of credit to households, businesses, and state and local governments.10 The New York Fed was responsible for operating five of these facilities.11 Risk management was a cornerstone of that work, and we used our three-lines-of-defense risk model to build strong risk management into facility operations.12 The first line of defense, the facilities teams, were responsible for understanding and managing their risks. The second line – my group (the Risk Group), the Compliance Function, and others – was responsible for independent assessment and oversight of those risks. And, the third line – our Internal Audit Group – was responsible for fully independent assurance. Just to give a bit more detail about the second line of defense, we are responsible for designing and delivering a set of products, services, and relationships that lead to better plans, decisions, and actions that help the Bank thrive in any environment. We serve as trusted risk advisors, independent risk experts, and enterprise risk guardians.13 In our guardian role, we identify material risk issues and make sure that risks are understood, communicated, and addressed. We provide the stakeholders who are ultimately responsible for organizational success with a clear picture of the Bank's risk profile. In our expert role, we provide independent risk assessments, actionable risk insights, standards, and tools to help businesses manage risks.
The continuation of the current upswing in 2019 will continue to rest on the expansion of domestic demand (see Chart 1). Underpinning this will be: financial conditions that are expected to remain relatively favourable; an improvement in the financial position of households and firms; the gains in competitiveness observed throughout the recovery; and the strength of the employment creation process. It is expected that employment creation will slow this year, partly owing to the lesser pace of activity, but also to the increase of more than 22% in the national minimum wage. In any event, according to the Banco de España’s projections, the annual growth in numbers employed will stand at around 1.6% in 2019, providing for further reductions in the unemployment rate, to around 14% at end-2019 (see Chart 2). All told, there are grounds for a progressive slackening of economic growth in Spain over the coming years. These are, namely: the recent easing in global growth, which is proving BANCO DE ESPAÑA  3	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  FORECASTS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY: COMPOSITION OF OUTPUT GROWTH NET EXTERNAL DEMAND. CONTRIBUTIONS  GDP.

We will be hearing from leading voices in the field on: Macroeconomics of Climate Change Blended Finance Transition Planning Nature-Related Risks Let me briefly share what the NGFS is doing in each of these areas, to set the backdrop for today's Workshop. Macroeconomics of climate change Both the physical and transition dimensions of climate change will significantly impact output, inflation, labour markets, and the long-term growth potential of economies. 1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The NGFS is seeking to develop the tools necessary for central banks and regulators to make sense of how climate change will affect the macroeconomy and financial system. This includes work on: identifying relevant climate-related data; developing analytical frameworks and models; understanding the implications for monetary policy; and designing climate scenarios for stress testing. The NGFS has brought together an expert network of statisticians and data scientists on climate-related data. They will help member central banks and supervisors build up capacity on climaterelated data such as adverse climate events, carbon emissions, energy intensity, and so on. This will include building climate data directories and setting up green finance data hubs in central banks. The NGFS is developing theoretical frameworks and quantitative models to evaluate the impact of climate change on the macroeconomy. Policymakers need to better understand the channels by which physical risks and transition efforts can affect the economy.
This may sound pretty obvious, but I know that there are many of our managers who have no idea how some of our core departments function and cannot intelligently explain our role in the economy. This reflects badly on the Bank with regard to the calibre of its staff. The third point is that your understanding of core and other departments operations for that matter will facilitate staff rotation, a policy to which the Bank is commited. Finally, and most importantly, an understanding of core functions enables you to better understand and appreciate the mission of the Bank. This in turn facilitates a better understanding of the strategic plan. In closing, I wish to say that I know that the Bank has come a long way and has demonstrated marked improvements in the way that it conducts its operations and in the quality of its management. Director – Human Resources will show in his presentation on the change process in the Bank. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 125/2006

Charter schools have provided another source of school choice in education. More research into evaluating the effectiveness of voucher programs and charter schools at raising student achievement would be desirable in terms of informing public policy choices.8 The importance of education is not limited to elementary and secondary levels. In fact, there exists convincing evidence from the child development literature that suggests that educational investments early in childhood have especially large rates of returns in terms of lifetime earnings and other outcomes. Take, for example, the Perry Preschool program for low-income African-American children, a two-year preschool program experiment in the mid1960s. Recent research shows that this program had very large beneficial long-term effects, with participants experiencing higher rates of high school graduation, higher salaries, higher homeownership, more stable family structures, fewer arrests and lower welfare dependence. The large positive economic externalities from these investments in children imply that such programs more than pay for themselves over the long term. Estimates indicate that the aggregate benefits over the life of a child exceeded by eightfold the program’s per-pupil  6  Chakrabarti and Roy (2015). 7  Hoxby (2003), Chakrabarti (2008) and Chakrabarti (2013). 8  Dobbie and Fryer (2011), Dobbie and Fryer (2015), Angrist, et al. (2016).