samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, we ask you to authorise the Central Bank to promptly block websites advertising illegal financial operations, among other things. We have already forwarded the respective bill to the State Duma and look forward to your support. In order to reduce the chances of the public getting trapped by illegal lenders, since last year, we have been working together with Yandex on a joint project aimed at labelling websites of legal trustworthy microfinance organisations registered with the Central Bank with special symbols. We are discussing similar projects with other search engines. Development of the Mir card Currently, as many as 59 million cards have been issued; the share of the Mir card has been growing both in issue volumes and cashless operations. Countrywide, people use cards on a daily basis; in more than half of Russian regions, transport cards, and in some regions, also 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  social cards are attached to the Mir card. We hope this trend will continue. Mir cards are accepted in member states of the Eurasian Economic Union and Turkey (last year we told you we were conducting negotiations). In the near future, we are planning to ensure that these cards are accepted in non-CIS countries popular with Russian tourists, and to expand their acceptance in CIS countries. The development of cashless payments is not restricted to the use of Mir cards. Last year, we completed the development of the Bank of Russia’s special project, Faster Payments System (FPS), which we launched early this year.

Clear communication reduces the risk of confusion, volatility, and spillovers, and helps others prepare for challenges that may lie ahead. Experience has demonstrated that transparency in monetary policy can both increase its effectiveness and reduce unintended consequences. Shared Insights and Analyses 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  That is why the perspectives we gain through ongoing dialogue with our counterparts are so valuable. Across the globe, many central banks—including the Federal Reserve—are moving to unwind the highly accommodative policies they put in place at the start of the pandemic. And we are doing this at a time when the economic implications of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine remain highly uncertain. As we all take these steps, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has provided an indispensable venue for sharing insights, analyses, and concerns. By engaging with each other, we are able to stay ahead of the trends and issues that affect other economies and their financial markets. And that is true not only when it comes to policy development and execution, but also in understanding economic and financial developments across the globe. A particularly apt example of the value of dialogue is the BIS’s Consultative Council for the Americas, which I’ve had the pleasure of chairing since 2020. Agustín, Julio, Roberto, and our colleagues from Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico are participants in meetings of the Council. Suffice to say, we’ve had a great deal to discuss over the past two years.
Davíð Oddsson: The challenges of globalisation for small open economies with independent currencies Opening address by Mr Davíð Oddsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a conference on The Challenges of Globalisation for Small Open Economies with Independent Currencies, Reykjavík, 1 June 2007. *  *  *  On behalf of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland I welcome the cooperation between the Bank and the International Monetary Fund on organising the conference that is now commencing. In fact I consider the theme of this conference very apt and take the liberty of stating that a better location for such discussion could hardly be found. This claim is not only based on the fact that Iceland is currently staging a kind of practical experiment in this field. While it can be argued that such experiments are taking place in many other countries, the advantage of Iceland’s experiment is that its economic developments happen to have been quite notable over the past few years. Certain aspects of recent events raise significant questions for this conference. There is no question that Iceland was a relative latecomer to the top league of active market economies: for a long time, Iceland’s rules and norms did not qualify it for inclusion. But Iceland’s economic framework has been completely transformed in the space of a relatively few years and its business world has undergone enormous upheavals at the same time.

As if this was not enough, public sector involvement in housing finance was reformed around the same time; this structural reorganisation had unexpected multiplier effects when the recently privatised commercial banks eagerly followed that lead and ran ahead along the same path even faster than the policy makers had expected. At the same time, Icelandic banks and financial institutions have been establishing their influence in neighbouring foreign markets and, to some degree, more distant ones. The banks have expanded rapidly and are now very large relative to Iceland’s domestic economy, and in fact by any measure. Their international activities have also created a new situation that has sometimes been called “the problem of explaining the Icelandic economy”. Although I feel that this problem is overstated because it must surely be temporary, it cannot be denied that the Icelandic currency itself, and its small size, are recurrent themes. The economic factors I mentioned earlier have driven strong inflationary pressures in Iceland, which have partly appeared in the form of higher measured inflation, but have to some extent been contained by Central Bank policy rate decisions, which in turn have affected the exchange rate of the Icelandic króna, at least for some while now. And in combination, these two factors have raised yet another question that is relevant to this conference. That is to say, these special conditions have inspired new investors, the carry traders, to venture to our shores.
The corresponding figure for the United States is just below 1 per cent, or USD 100 billion.3 Eurostat has calculated the figure for the EU as a whole at 0.7 per cent, or EUR 90 billion.4 But these figures are only the direct public costs of keeping the financial system more or less on its feet. The real social costs of the crisis are significantly higher. Financial crises lower output and the growth path. In addition, a part of the effect is permanent, even if it is difficult to say how large a part. A historical estimate of the cost of financial crises, calculated as a present value, is about 60 per cent of GDP. For the global financial crisis, this figure is considerably higher.5 The banks are playing an important role in the sovereign debt crisis The banks are also central to the problems that succeeded the global financial crisis, which is to say the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. As I mentioned, several governments in Europe were forced to manage problems in the banking sector, often at great expense. Those countries with domestic property bubbles were hit particularly hard. But financial exposures to the United States and the other countries most affected by the crisis impacted the banking systems of several countries. These stresses led to financial problems in many European banks and countries, and, eventually, to the current sovereign debt crisis.

Then I made the remark that a separated responsibility for monetary and macroprudential policy, without any coordination, could result in a game between authorities, which could lead to an outcome not desired by any of the authorities. In the United Kingdom, sole responsibility has been given to the central bank. A Financial Policy Committee is to be set up alongside the existing Monetary Policy Committee. Such a solution of course means that the coordination between these two almost parallel committees, although each with a different focus, becomes an important issue. In the EU, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has been set up at the ECB in Frankfurt. Central banks and supervisory authorities are represented on the ESRB, but the central banks have the majority of the votes when decisions are made. In Sweden, Finansinspektionen and we at the Riksbank set up the Council for Cooperation on Macroprudential Policy in January this year. This council will discuss the assessment of risks in the financial system as a whole and discuss appropriate risk-prevention measures. The Council will also discuss analyses and the development of tools and methods in the area of macroprudential policy. The Council is a temporary solution while awaiting a more permanent distribution of the responsibility for macroprudential policy. At present, the Financial Crisis Commission is working with this issue. The recently appointed inquiry on capital adequacy regulations will focus specifically on responsibility for the future counter-cyclical capital buffer.
For an overview of environmental, social and governance investment principles, including negative screening practices, see Boffo, R. and Patalano, R. (2020), “ESG Investing: Practices, Progress and Challenges”, OECD, Paris. 39. See Schoenmaker, D. (2021), “Greening monetary policy”, Climate Policy, Vol. 21, No 4, January. 40. Although the ECB’s private sector asset portfolio is sizable relative to other central banks (the Bank of England’s CBPS portfolio currently totals approximately GBP 20 billion whereas the size of the ECB’s CSPP portfolio amounts to EUR 278 billion at amortised cost as at 4 June 2021), the ECB’s CSPP portfolio is far smaller than the PSPP portfolio, which stands at EUR 2.4 trillion at amortised cost as at 4 June 2021. 41. Evidence regarding the capacity of the market to correctly price green bonds is currently still mixed. Some papers point to the existence of a positive carbon premium whereby investors demand a compensation for holding securities issued by carbon-intensive companies. See, for example, Alessi, L., Ossola, E. and Panzica, R. (2019), “The Greenium matters: greenhouse gas emissions, environmental disclosures, and stock prices,” Working Papers in Economics and Finance, No 2019-12, Joint Research Centre, European Commission. However, when a premium exists, it seems to only reflect the transition policy risk. See Van der Ploeg, F. (2020). “Macro-financial implications of climate change and the carbon transition”. ECB. In addition, some other papers find either a negative premium or no or little premium. See, for example, Tang, D.Y. and Zhang, Y.

In terms of actual measures – something that Antony also wants me to talk about – I would refer you to the eighty recommendations in the Report of the Focus Group on Financial Services published in January 2007 as Hong Kong's response to the Eleventh FiveYear Plan of the country published in 2006 and as Hong Kong's input to the National Finance Working Meeting in 2007. As you may be aware, the implementation of our overall strategy and many of the detailed recommendations involve the relaxation of controls in the financial systems on the Mainland. While the benefits of financial liberalisation are clear, so are the risks to financial stability, as the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the current turmoil in the developed financial markets demonstrate so vividly. Here there should be a strong emphasis, to quote the Premier again, on gradualism, controllability and the ability to take initiatives at the right time. And in the context of pursuing the complementary, mutually-assisting and interactive relationship between the two financial systems, financial liberalisation should not be seen as helping Hong Kong. We welcome support from the Mainland in discharging our legal responsibility in maintaining the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre, but I hope I have convinced you that in developing our strategy and our recommendations, we very much have the national interest foremost in our minds.
Although CDS premia for European banks have been going down in the last few months, their level is still considerably above previous years as well as that of Swiss and US banks. Finally, as my colleague Thomas Jordan has explained, the global economic outlook remains modest. For Europe, in particular, we have revised our short-term forecast downwards again slightly. For Switzerland, the National Bank is expecting moderate growth. Economic conditions remain comparatively good, which – in conjunction with the low level of interest rates – is boosting the continued strong momentum in the mortgage and real estate markets. I will speak about developments in this market in more detail later on. To sum up, the risks in the banking environment remain considerable. First, the risk of an escalation of the European debt crisis is not insignificant. Second, imbalances are building up in the Swiss real estate market. This goes hand in hand with an increased risk of significant price corrections in the medium term. Greater resilience of the big banks The situation of the big banks has improved since the last news conference, as both institutions have further increased their resilience. This increase was particularly pronounced at Credit Suisse. According to the bank’s most recently published data, it increased its holdings of loss-absorbing capital by roughly three-quarters in the second half of 2012. In addition to retaining profits, this increase is mainly attributable to the capital measures announced in July, which have already been implemented to a large extent.

It is estimated that 1 out of 9 jobs in Norway are linked to the oil industry. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Fiscal rule It was established at an early stage that Norway’s oil and gas resources belong to the Norwegian people. The tax system for the petroleum industry was designed to make sure that the bulk of the large revenues, the economic rent from the petroleum sector, would accrue to the state. Petroleum companies pay a surtax of 51 percent of profits, on top of the normal corporate tax rate of 27 percent. The government also has direct ownership shares in the most profitable oil fields. However, policymakers’ handling of Norway’s newly discovered petroleum wealth got off to a rather bumpy start. During the first 25 years of oil production, Norway experienced two deep recessions. Both downturns were rooted in hugely optimistic income expectations. In the 1970s, the public sector was the big spender, and the government had to tighten policy later on. In the 1980s, a credit-fuelled consumption boom in the private sector led to necessary cut-backs after the oil price plunge in 1986. These two episodes of turbulence made clear how vulnerable a small open economy is to terms of trade disturbances, as well as to short-termism and exuberant expectations. To prevent the same mistakes from being made again, fiscal institutions were set up in the 1990s. Among the most important of these are the oil fund and the fiscal rule.
Norwegian businesses are losing market shares partly because of the strong krone. The international division of labour is shifting, and in the face of major restructuring it is a disadvantage for Norwegian business and industry that costs are high. In 2003, both employment and investment fell, although investment picked up somewhat towards the end of the year. Efficiency-enhancing measures will probably continue to mark developments in the business sector this year. This will curb demand for labour and investment growth. Strong competition has resulted in substantial restructuring. In Norway and other countries, manufacturing production is being moved to countries with lower costs. Petroleum investment is also rising this year and investment growth may continue to be strong in 2005. Petroleum investment has traditionally had a considerable influence on cyclical developments in Norway. If investment in 2005 is as high as estimated in the most recent investment intentions survey for oil and gas operations, petroleum investment will make a strong positive contribution to the Norwegian economy. Oil price developments have mixed effects on the Norwegian economy. Persistently higher oil prices contribute to higher petroleum investment and increased activity in sectors affected by petroleum activities. A sharp rise in oil prices, however, has restrained global economic growth and affected demand for our other export products. Increased petroleum investment and exploration activity offshore are providing an impetus to the business sector in the North-West. This is reflected in an increase in incoming orders to the shipyards, following a long period of sluggish activity. The willingness to invest is rising.

It is my firm belief that fulfilling its primary objective to maintain price stability is not only the best service which the ECB can deliver to the citizens of Europe, but also the most appropriate way of fostering the legitimacy of our new institution. In the first few months of the euro’s existence we have indeed provided an internally stable currency, although the public perception of this accomplishment has often been confused by too much attention on developments relating to the euro’s external value. In this context, allow me to reiterate that the ECB’s monetary policy objective is the internal value of the euro and that in the longer term the euro’s internal strength will also be reflected in its external value. Our task of maintaining price stability will certainly be made easier as the ECB acquires a track record and further builds up its credibility with the markets inside and outside the euro area. In my view, this process will be greatly facilitated by a monetary policy strategy oriented towards guaranteeing price stability in the medium term, rather than responding to short-term considerations. I should emphasise that it is the ECB’s independent status which will continue to allow it to stand above day-to-day pressures, to pursue a stability-oriented policy to the benefit of all citizens without the interference of short-term political objectives and to ignore short-term market developments if they are deemed to be excessive.
Looking forward, we continue to expect inflation rates in the euro area to be in line with price stability over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, thereby supporting the purchasing power of incomes and savings. After today’s decision we consider risks to price stability over the medium-term to be broadly balanced. This takes into account the latest economic data releases and survey information, which add clear further evidence to the assessment that the euro area is experiencing a significant slowdown, largely related to the effects of the intensification and broadening of the financial turmoil. Both global demand and euro area demand are likely to be dampened for a protracted period. A cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis confirms this view. Monetary expansion is moderating further, supporting the assessment that inflationary pressures and risks are diminishing. All in all, the level of uncertainty remains exceptionally high. The Governing Council will continue to keep inflation expectations firmly anchored in line with its medium-term objective of inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. This supports sustainable growth and employment and contributes to financial stability. Accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. Regarding fiscal policies, the Governing Council welcomes the European Council’s reconfirmation of its full commitment to sustainable public finances. In this respect, the current economic situation calls for particular prudence with regard to the adoption of extensive fiscal stimulus measures, taking into account the particular fiscal situation in each country.

For this reason, while we must continue to work on the principle that “no single model fits all”, there is much that we can learn from each other, and this process of fruitful exchange will, I am sure, continue long into the future. I congratulate all of you on the excellent discussions you have had, and the BIS for organising such a productive meeting. And I wish you all a very pleasant time in your well-earned relaxation this afternoon. 2  BIS Review 71/2004
A basic challenge for the authorities dealing with cross-border banks is how to find an acceptable formula for sharing the burden and the costs of a crisis. Goodhart and Schoenmaker have in their paper suggested a number of keys that could be explored to create such a formula, for example the relative size of GDP, the ECB capital ratio, and the relative amount of bank assets in the country. As pointed out by Goodhart and Schoenmaker, the first question to be asked is whether one would want a general solution where all countries contribute according to some fixed key, or more specific burden sharing arrangements, where only the directly involved countries participate according to a more flexible key, presumably taking into account the geographic spread of the bank’s business. To achieve the latter, it would be necessary to find some commonly agreed criteria for assessing a bank’s systemic relevance to the financial system of a country. Merely using market shares as a criterion will probably not be adequate as other aspects, such as the bank’s relevance to the payment system, clearing and settlement, involvement in inter-bank securities markets and so on would also be important in this respect. At the same time, in a constantly changing banking landscape, it would be difficult to find criteria that are so clear-cut that assessments will not be “up for negotiation” in a sharp crisis scenario.

Before the introduction of SIC, payments in Switzerland were first offset against each other through a system of eight clearing houses. The net positions were then settled through the banks’ sight deposits at the SNB. This system was extremely cumbersome, costly and fraught with large credit and systemic risks. In SIC by contrast, all payments are settled individually and directly via sight deposits at the SNB. Thus, the payments are final and irrevocable – just like cash payments. SIC is extremely efficient and has drastically reduced credit and systemic risks. It is one of the most secure and cost-effective systems in the world. Nowadays, SIC forms the backbone of Switzerland’s payment system. Not only interbank payment transactions, but also payment transactions between PostFinance and banks as well as cashless retail payment transactions are essentially carried out via SIC. In addition, the international foreign currency settlement system, Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), is linked to SIC. SIC, together with the trading platforms of SWX/Eurex and the securities settlement system SECOM of SIS, forms the Swiss Value Chain, Switzerland’s integrated financial market infrastructure. The SIC payment system is of utmost importance for financial stability and the implementation of the SNB’s monetary policy. Our  BIS Review 67/2007  1  monetary policy instruments are tailored to the palette of integrated SIC functions within the framework of the Swiss Value Chain. Initially, the SIC turnover in terms of value amounted to CHF 100 billion per working day; it currently stands at CHF 180 billion.