samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It thus raised renewed questions on how to make resolution more operational and more trustworthy, facing as said the risk of faster bank runs. We should take this question very seriously, without jumping yet to its conclusions. Let me only share two thoughts at this stage. The first one relates to the resolution of large and even systemic banks. The recent events showed, among other question marks, that the provision of potentially significant amounts of liquidity in crisis time is a key issue to address. We should collectively reflect on how to ensure a credible backstop to existing sources of funding. The framework allowing the ECB to provide a "Eurosystem Resolution Liquidity" remains to be built. The other priority, on the other end of the spectrum, is to shift from resolution "for the few" – really for the too few: two cases in the last 9 years– to resolution "for the many", including small and medium-sized banks. The European Commission proposal on the revised Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance framework is a step in the right direction in this respect: enlarging the use of resolution for smaller banks is an opportunity to further operationalise transfer tools and ensure consistent and smooth market exit of non-viable banks. However, an increased mutualisation between the Resolution Fund and the Deposit Guaranty Schemes is questionable, as having big corporates benefit from the same protection than smaller retail deposits. Let me sum up the three first lessons: an intrusive and effective supervision; a regulation implemented everywhere; and some soul-searching on resolution.

After the (temporary, alas) funeral, let me return to the three blessings. This word is a bit selfcentered, I confess, since I am referring to public policies, and each of them today raises questions: (I) regulation, (II) supervision, (III) resolution. Therefore, how could we revisit each of them? I. Regulation: a plea for an effective implementation Allegedly, if regulation had been more effective, it could have prevented the banking turmoil. For its critics, Basel III was too focused on liquidity and counterparty risks, and not enough on interest rate risk. Well- let me call into question those ideas. Such criticism is ironic: didn't anyone notice that the first blast of turbulence came from a bank not subject to the full set of Basel standards? While the Basel framework applies in its entirety to every single European bank – several thousands of them – , it applies to only 13 banks in the United States, leaving a myriad of regional but sometimes significant banks, including SVB, with much lighter requirements. According to our estimates, and in line with a study carried out by Yale University, SVB's short-term liquidity ratio (LCR) would have fallen short of the Basel requirement of 100%. Another point concerns the allegedly inadequate treatment of latent but not recognised losses in the current prudential framework. First off, we should all bear in mind that all liquid assets included in the LCR are factored in at their fair value. In addition, unrealised losses have to be disclosed in financial statements ensuring transparency.
To complement the ongoing efforts to build the capacity of domestic insurers, the Bank will continue to leverage on strategic initiatives to achieve the desired financial landscape which will also be better able to contribute to the socio-economic objectives of the country, as well as to be better to withstand competitive pressures in the provision of insurance products and services. Consolidation and fostering strategic alliances will have the potential to strengthen the position of the industry to compete more effectively as the market becomes increasingly deregulated and liberalised. In particular, in fostering strategic alliances within the industry, the foreign shareholding limit for new entries in direct insurers has been increased from 30% to 49% to harness the potential for financially strong and internationally known foreign players. This would contribute towards enhancing the development of domestic capabilities, particularly in the areas of technical expertise, innovation and improved operating processes. This will provide an additional avenue for potential foreign partners to  4  BIS Review 76/2006  participate more substantively in the domestic industry through a strategic equity interest in existing licensed insurers. As part of efforts to promote good risk management practices in the financial system, the Bank will also consider introducing differentiated premium contributions to the insurance guarantee scheme fund, based on the risk profile of individual insurers. This is similar to that being adopted for the deposit insurance system in the banking sector.

It is my pleasure to welcome you to this year's dialogue session between Bank Negara Malaysia and the insurance and takaful industries to discuss the challenges and opportunities the changing environment presents. A year ago, the focus of the discussions was on the strategic issues facing the industry as we transitioned towards a more competitive market environment. The emphasis was on the expectations on the industry to deliver a fair proposition to consumers, its relevance in the changing environment and its readiness in terms of capacity, and to support and sustain a successful strategy for growth. While the theme for this dialogue is to focus on how the industry should position itself to meet the new challenges, it will specifically address the transition towards a risk-based and a more self-regulated market conduct regime, and the development of a dual financial system for the insurance and takaful industry. This year, the dialogue has been jointly organised by the industry with the Bank. The industry's active involvement will be important in making this important event a success. This dialogue will provide an opportunity for deliberations on the strategic issues confronting the industry in the changing environment from the different perspectives between the industry and Bank Negara Malaysia . At this juncture, let me take this opportunity to share with you some of the recent economic and financial developments and the major policy initiatives by Bank Negara Malaysia .
Indeed if you were to plot inflation against unemployment on a chart - described by economists as the Phillips’ curve - you would see not a downward-sloping line of the conventional wisdom but a completely flat line. Over the nice decade, the unemployment rate fell from nearly 9% to below 3% on the claimant count measure. Yet over the same period, inflation was broadly constant and never deviated from its target rate by more than 1 percentage point. Not only was there no longrun trade-off between inflation and unemployment, there was no short-run tradeoff either. As a result, both inflation and unemployment were lower than the Monetary Policy Committee had expected. And the inflation figures released this morning, with CPI inflation at only 1.1%, show that inflation has remained low - below the 2% target - despite a tight labour market. The position was very different in the 1980s. Unemployment then fell by a similar amount, from around 11% in 1985 to just over 5% in 1990. But inflation rose from 5 to 9.5%. How should we interpret this reduced sensitivity of inflation to changes in unemployment? Does it mean that the economy can grow faster than before without leading to a pickup of inflation? Or is there a risk that the apparent insensitivity of inflation to movements in the economy is only temporary, and might lead to mistakes in monetary policy if low inflation were taken for granted?

In my address today I shall be pointing out discernible trends in the development of the financial system and how this process is being reinforced by the coming European Monetary Union. In conclusion I shall consider what this requires of economic policy, its decision-makers and various authorities. A financial revolution It is hardly an exaggeration to say that a revolutionary process of financial transformation and development has got under way in the past decade, with consequences that we probably cannot yet fully foresee. Deregulation, globalisation, advanced information technology and new methods for valuation and risk management have initiated a dynamic process in which financial markets, institutions and instruments are interacting. There are clear similarities with the expansion of real economies in the past hundred years; a stream of new, more efficient and specialised production processes and new communication facilities are leading to a growing volume of trade. Basically, the financial trend and its internationalisation are a natural development of the market economy, a logical consequence of persistently rapid economic transformations that call for new financial solutions for households and firms. Challenges for banks The foreseeable developments will alter or at least affect the future role of banks. New trends in traditional banking are already discernible. Competition for bank deposits is growing in that people are increasingly choosing to place assets in securities, either directly or via mutual funds. Specialised agents of various types, such as niche banks, have also entered this field.
This was a rare example of a flash event involving such a major, liquid, currency pair, and occurred during a G20 meeting in Washington DC, prompting our Governors to swiftly make contact with the Bank’s London dealing desk for an explanation. They say markets never sleep; neither did our staff on that particular night! In these episodes, prices moved sharply, before largely reversing – all within a matter of minutes, and to a degree that far exceeded changes in market participants’ perceptions of economic fundamentals. Of course, sharp movements in asset prices are nothing new in themselves. Just look at the tulip mania ending in 1637, and the equity crashes of 1929, 1987, and the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000. What is new is the speed, and the typical near-total reversal. And the Bank’s responsibilities for monetary and financial stability make it incumbent on us to keep up. What has happened? What is clear is that flash crashes are likely just one symptom of material changes in the structure of certain markets and the nature of their participants. Although these changes are ongoing, we need to understand them and their drivers, if we are to succeed in correctly identifying any implications for financial stability. One should be wary of over-generalisation, particularly with an audience such as this, given the substantial diversity in markets across both product types and geography.

Jiří Rusnok: Basel Consultative Group Meeting - welcome speech Welcome speech by Mr Jiří Rusnok, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Basel Consultative Group Meeting, Topic "Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures - Survey of Recommendations", Czech National Bank and Bank for International Settlements, Prague, 4 October 2016. * * * Dear Basel Consultative Group members, Dear experts from all around the world, Dear ladies and gentlemen, Let me warmly welcome you to the Czech National Bank (CNB). We are proud to host the expert meeting on the Basel regulatory reform and its design, using the perspective of emerging markets and developing countries. In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is making reform steps towards more healthy, stable, and resilient banks and financial systems. The latest Basel reform includes more and better bank capital, leverage and liquidity requirements, as well as macro-prudential measures, ranging from G-SIB surcharges to countercyclical capital buffers. The reform effort is successfully underway and new standards are gradually being implemented worldwide, covering advanced as well as emerging markets and developing countries. When designing further details of the regulatory reform, we have to pay special attention to differences in financial systems among countries and regions. Namely, financial systems in emerging markets and developing countries are often shallower and less liquid than in advanced economies. Therefore, emerging market countries can hardly take over all regulatory measures without modifications.
Some export industries were also affected by weak demand in Europe and high cost levels. Growth in household demand was moderate in 2013. Household saving increased further and is now at a historically high level. Unemployment edged up through 2013. Capacity utilisation in the economy is still assessed to be close to a normal a level. Chart7: The krone exchange rate After appreciating over a longer period, the krone showed a pronounced weakening in 2013. Both domestic and international conditions contributed to the depreciation. Signs of weaker growth in the Norwegian economy probably had an impact. An improvement in the economic situation in the euro area may also have contributed. Although the krone has appreciated somewhat thus far in 2014, it is still clearly weaker than at the beginning of 2013. Chart 8: Consumer prices in Norway Inflation has increased. As measured by the CPI-ATE, inflation averaged 2.5 percent in the first quarter of 2014. The krone depreciation has contributed to a faster rise in prices for imported consumer goods. Prices for domestically produced goods and services also rose at a faster pace in 2013, at just below 3 percent in the latter half of the year. The rise in house rents and food prices through 2013 partly reflects a revision of the calculation method for these goods items in the CPI. In the coming months, inflation is projected to edge down, partly reflecting the unwinding of temporary effects.

Chart 11: Household debt and house prices Monetary policy aims to be robust by, among other things, taking into account the uncertainty associated with economic driving forces and the functioning of the economy. In addition, in the conduct of monetary policy we seek to take into account the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. After rising sharply over many years, house prices flattened through 2013. In recent months, house prices have shown a renewed rise. Household debt has increased at a faster pace than household income over several years. A robust monetary policy aims to provide an improved path for inflation, output and employment over time. A lower key policy rate can push up both inflation and demand for goods, services and labour in the short run. On the other hand, a lower key policy rate would have augmented the risk of a further build-up of financial imbalances. A persistently pronounced increase in house prices and debt may lead to a build-up of financial imbalances that may trigger or amplify an economic downturn – with high unemployment as a result. This suggests a gradual approach in interest-rate setting. Robust banks and financial sector regulation are crucial for financial stability. Increased capital requirements for banks are now being phased in. In 2013, the Ministry of Finance assigned Norges Bank the task of providing advice on a countercyclical capital buffer for banks. In December, the Ministry set the buffer rate at 1 percent, in line with the advice issued by Norges Bank.
David Clementi: Debt workouts for corporates, banks and countries: some common themes Speech by Mr David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the INSOL International Sixth World Congress held at the Hilton Metropole Hotel in London on 19 July 2001. *  *  *  Introduction I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak at this, the Sixth World Congress of INSOL International. The Bank has a long-standing interest in insolvency arrangements. As the keepers of the London Approach, we have a direct, if informal, role in corporate workouts. This is in part historical, but it is no accident. Development of a satisfactory framework for corporate workouts is integral to the Bank’s core purposes of maintaining financial stability and seeking to ensure the effectiveness of the UK financial system. The Bank is more commonly associated with the Monetary Policy Committee and the pursuit of monetary stability. But financial stability is an important corollary to this; it is difficult to achieve one without the other. The Bank in particular is closely involved with the design of regulation and financial infrastructure, such as payments and settlement systems, to ensure that these are robust and the system is, as a result, better able to withstand a crisis. Our interest in insolvency arrangements is similar. Without a framework that is predictable, equitable and transparent, designed to maximise value for all interested parties, the costs and wider economic disruption from unnecessary corporate liquidations may be enormous.

If the financial institution does fail, in my view some of the provisions of the Model Law,  BIS Review 67/2001  3  especially those relating to judicial cross-border co-operation, are potentially helpful in providing a starting point for negotiations. There used to be a clear distinction between banks and securities houses, fund management and insurance, and financial institutions of different nationalities. Restructuring could be to some extent contained within one market or one jurisdiction. Now the distinctions between different markets and types of firm have become blurred and the increasing consolidation of financial groups has given rise to a range of large complex financial institutions or LCFIs. Restructuring one of these groups would be far from straightforward. The steps involved with winding up an LCFI have been the subject of recent discussion among central banks. This has involved not only co-ordination and information sharing arrangements but also how the wider risk to the system would be assessed in these circumstances. Winding up a firm on this scale could be a large undertaking in itself. But the wider repercussions in terms of dislocation of markets could be enormous. Thankfully, as yet, we have had little if any experience of restructuring or winding down an LCFI. As with corporates, however, the first step would be an assessment of the long-run viability of the institution prior to the restructuring.
If such an instrument had been in place since 10/11  the inception of the Euro, most countries (and not only the usual suspects) would have benefited from the scheme at one point, without permanent redistribution across countries. Finally, the creation of a common safe asset for the euro area should be explored further. The normal operations of markets and financial intermediaries require a broad spectrum of assets with sufficient liquidity and minimum counterparty risk. This situation is amplified in turbulent times, as investors react to increases in uncertainty by accumulating assets with a low level of perceived risk. Within the EMU, the volume of such assets is insufficient, as only the debt of a small group of countries is perceived as riskless, thereby giving rise to scarcity and financial fragmentation. An improvement in the fiscal position of countries might help expand the number of available safe assets. But a common safe asset will have additional benefits, by contributing to reducing the link between national governments and banks; preventing destabilising cross-border flights to safety in the event of difficulties; and, more generally, promoting a more stable and equitable provision of safe assets for the EMU as a whole. In sum, there is a pressing need to improve the functioning of the EMU before the next crisis hits. Increasing financial integration and introducing fiscal instruments to improve macroeconomic stabilisation are of the utmost importance in achieving this goal. Thank you for your attention. 11/11

The use of permanent on-site supervision, the link between off-site supervision and on-site inspections or the powers of the supervisory authority (if any) in relation to accounting regulations, are simply some examples. Differences between national supervisors also exist regarding the availability of data. To give you an example, Central Credit Registers – which in our experience are a highly valuable source of information for prudential supervision purposes – are not yet available in all jurisdictions. The EBA has played a very important role by improving cooperation between national supervisors and promoting supervisory convergence. But these improvements fall short of the needs of an effectively unified supervisory system. Substantial and swift progress in this field is therefore needed. Let me just finish by making a general comment. It is obvious that the creation of a banking union poses enormous challenges for Europe that will require strong political support and effective cooperation among all authorities involved. The good news is that if we look at the process of European integration from a historical perspective, we realise that this is not the first time that the way forward has been highly complex. And, past experience has regularly shown that the response has always been to deepen integration and increase the transfer of national powers to the Union as the best – and possibly only – way to preserve all the achievements made so far. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Tarisa Watanagase: The prospects of the Thai economy and monetary policy Speech by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (Bangkok) Dinner Talk, Bangkok, 16 March 2007. *  *  *  President Banno, fellow bankers, distinguished business leaders, ladies and gentlemen, good evening. "First of all, I would like to thank the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) for inviting me to speak at this dinner." Japan's relationship with Thailand has a long history and encompasses many aspects – as a trading partner, investor and major contributor to Thailand's economic development. Japan is ranked as Thailand's number one trading partner and investor. In 2006, Japan contributed 16.3 percent to Thailand's total trade, while net foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan constituted 32.6 percent of Thailand's total net FDI inflows. It is therefore my pleasure to be here and share my views on the Thai economy – the outlook and challenges, as well as our monetary policy, with all of you. I would like to structure my talk to cover three key areas. First, I will touch briefly on the overall condition of the economy. Secondly, and in relation to the first one, I will elaborate on recent monetary policy decisions. Finally, before concluding, I will share my views on the prospects and challenges facing the Thai economy. Let me begin with the economy. The past year was one of the more challenging times for Thailand, in terms of both political and economic aspects.

To sum up: the Spanish banking industry has proved resilient to the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic, maintaining the supply of credit to the private sector and an adequate solvency level. It has also been able to swiftly recover its profitability. The banking sector in the new macro-financial climate Despite these favourable circumstances, the recent macro-financial deterioration I described earlier calls for a prudent approach on the part of banks and for close monitoring of the risks associated with the Ukrainian conflict. Indeed, as noted above, these factors have led to a downward revision to the economic outlook published by the Banco de España for 2022 and 2023, as well as a significant upward revision to our inflation projections for 2022. Against this backdrop, our latest Financial Stability Report, published in May, included some simulation exercises on the impact of a potential rise in interest rates or energy prices on the economic and financial situation of Spanish firms, households and general government. I will now turn to the results of these exercises, updated to include the latest developments and market expectations of interest rate hikes. Thus, in the case of businesses, an interest rate hike could drive up the percentage of firms under financial pressure. Specifically, within corporate bank financing, short-term and variable-rate loans predominate, and changes in interest rates therefore pass through relatively swiftly.