samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Dependence on one or a few products leaves the economy susceptible to external shocks. (vi)  In the financial sector, the key lesson is that liberalisation of the industry is not tantamount to relaxing of regulatory and supervisory measures. In fact the legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks should be strengthened to deal with any excesses arising from entry of institutions with poor management or governance practices due to the attractive liberal environment. (vii)  Legal and operational framework requires continuous reviews to remain relevant in this technologically fast moving world. Ladies and Gentlemen After learning the lessons from the past 40 years, the following are some of the challenges we have to confront: •  Achievement and maintenance of price stability, i.e. low and stable single digit inflation;  •  Maintenance of a stable and competitive exchange rate;  •  Diversification of the economy and the export base;  •  Enhancing economic policy credibility. Policy reversals tend to undermine gains made in achieving macroeconomic stability; and  •  Sustained reduction of fiscal dominance (deficits) to contribute to low inflation, lowering of interest rates and release more funds for lending to the private sector. Turning to the question of where we go from here, I wish to state that all indications are that the economic outlook for Zambia, in the medium and long-term, is favourable. This is premised on the continued favourable performance of a few sectors, such as agriculture, mining and tourism.

The confidence indicator has risen for both the manufacturing and construction industries as well as for trade and services industries. New orders in manufacturing have picked up, mainly in the export market but there has also been a clear improvement in the domestic market. Monthly data for foreign trade in goods also indicate an increasingly bright picture for exports. Like the developments elsewhere in the world, the Swedish purchasing managers index for October also showed a positive development. New data for retail sales point to continued relatively strong rises. At the same time, the NIER’s consumer survey for October provides somewhat mixed signals. Households have become slightly less optimistic about the Swedish economy and unemployment, while their expectations regarding their own finances have improved. As regards the labour market, we noted in the October Inflation Report that there were signs of an improvement in the situation. The strengthening of domestic demand and the announced measures in the Budget Bill were judged to lay the foundation for a rise in employment in the period ahead. However, the change in methods in the labour force surveys means that developments in the labour market are particularly hard to interpret at present. Employment growth appears perhaps to have been somewhat stronger than we expected in October. Developments in the number of new job vacancies and redundancy notices also point to an upturn in the labour market. In addition, the NIER’s latest quarterly business tendency survey contained a number of positive signals regarding companies’ hiring plans.
Ten years ago – on 1 January 1999 – it was introduced in the then 11 countries of the euro area. Ten years is a short time in history. But it represents a good opportunity to talk about successes and challenges – the subject of my address tonight. I wish to consider this theme by asking three questions: 1. How successful is the euro? 2. What is the euro’s role in the current financial market turbulence? 3. What challenges lie ahead for the single currency? I intend to refer to a series of current issues relating to the global financial market turbulence and economic developments in the euro area. The first question: How successful is the euro? The euro is a stable currency and is an important contribution to the completion of the Europe’s single market. That’s why it is a success. After all, it helps to secure prosperity in the participating states. Stability of the euro Let me first of all consider the theme of stability. Before the euro was set up there were reservations about the stability of the future single currency, including in Germany. The first ten years have shown that these fears were unfounded. The euro is just as stable as its most stable predecessors, which were merged into it. That applies of course also to the Deutsche Mark. “The euro will be as strong as the Mark”, it was said. That promise has been kept.

Overcoming this problem requires the implementation of a broad array of measures aimed at stimulating human capital formation, providing for the creation of new companies promoting the development of new products and combating rigidities in the different markets. On the other hand, there has recently been an improvement in the use of the labour factor, suggesting that labour market reforms and wage moderation have yielded some benefits. However, much room remains for further progress, since the unemployment rate is still high and the number of hours worked and the employment rates for specific groups (women, youths and older individuals) are too low. On the fiscal policy front, budget balances have recently seen what was in part an unexpected improvement. This is because the pick-up in activity has given rise to more vigorous growth in certain tax receipts than was foreseen a year ago. The increase in revenue is therefore essentially transitory, therefore the authorities of these countries would be mistaken to become complacent and believe that budgetary consolidation has become a less pressing task. On the contrary, it is necessary to maintain sufficient control of spending in the economic upturn so as to speed up the correction of budgetary imbalances. This objective is vital for creating a stable macroeconomic environment and increasing the headroom available to tackle the challenges posed by population ageing in the future.
The inadequate financial buffers held by banking institutions against risk, a growing disconnect between the creation of credit and its use for productive economic activity and a highly interconnected system of financial intermediation ultimately combined to give rise to risks that disrupted credit flows to the economy. Over time, these trends were substantially amplified. The global reform agenda has made important progress in efforts to reduce the fragility of the financial system and to strengthen its resilience. Substantial work has already been advanced and largely completed on the development of global liquidity standards, the adoption of leverage ratios, and the significantly strengthened capital regulations which are important components of the reform effort. Greater focus has also been placed on strong supervision, effective resolution regimes and arrangements for the oversight of systemically important financial institutions. While the effective implementation of these reforms is crucial, the world continues to seek more enduring solutions that will place financial institutions firmly back in the service of society. In some countries, fundamental structural changes are being pursued to reduce the complexity of banking and to protect banking services from such higher risk-taking activities. The challenge however, is how this might be achieved in a sustainable manner without undermining growth and development, and erasing the important efficiencies in financial management.

Since its establishment in 2002, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has introduced prudential standards for the Islamic financial services industry in the areas of capital adequacy, risk management, corporate governance and Shariah governance. Nine countries have implemented these standards and 19 more are expected to implement them within the next few years. The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has also contributed to the issuance of more than 80 standards in the areas of accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Shariah for the international Islamic financial industry. Further progress on two fronts remains important. The first is to continue to evolve a more refined distinction within prudential and financial reporting frameworks to reflect the different nature and profile of risks under risk-sharing contract arrangements. The second is the need to accelerate efforts to further strengthen the infrastructural underpinnings for the development of the overall Islamic financial system. While the broad regulatory principles and standards developed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis can be applied to most Islamic finance transactions, a broad-brush application of these rules would limit the ability of Islamic financial institutions to implement the more unique risk-sharing contract arrangements. The stage of development of the overall financial system in which Islamic finance operates must also be considered to ensure that the effective application of global standards can be achieved without unintended consequences, given the prevailing associated constraints.
This weakness is consistent with survey indicators of 9  For example, Guiso, L, Sapienza, P and Zingales, L (2013), 'Time Varying Risk', NBER Working Paper 19284. Guiso et al use a survey of Italian investors and find that the proportion of individuals unwilling to take any financial risk had increased from 18% in 2007 to 42% in 2009 and put this down to emotional response (fear) triggered by a scary experience. 10 See Nagel, S and Malmendier, U (2011) ' Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk Taking?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol126(1), pp373-416. Kunreuther, H., R. Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Slovic, B. Borkan, and N. Katz (1978). Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. Wiley Interscience. Bernile, G., Bhagwat, V., & Rau, P. R. (2017) 'What doesn’t kill you will only make you more risk-loving: Early-life disasters and CEO behavior', The Journal of Finance, Vol.72(1), pp167-206. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  investment intentions which remain subdued and elevated uncertainty, as detailed in the February 2017 Inflation Report. 11  By the end of the forecast, the level of business investment is around 20% lower than in the Monetary Policy Committee's May 2016 forecast. Our latest estimate of year-on-year business investment growth in the fourth quarter of 2016 is already around six percentage points weaker than our projection in May.

Ultimately, the outlook for business investment, like the outlook for the economy more generally over the forecast period, depends largely on how households and businesses react to Brexit and on the process that accompanies it. The central case outcome in the February Inflation Report is that the economy will gently slow as higher inflation squeezes households' real earnings. But that's not the only conceivable scenario. There are, however, both upside and downside risks. So as the Committee has made clear, we will be looking closely at the incoming evidence, particularly on pay growth, labour market slack, household consumption, inflation expectations and the impact of the lower level of sterling on consumer prices. Conclusion  I want to conclude by saying a little about why all of this matters to the Bank and our role in issues surrounding investment and productive finance. As I noted at the outset, it was the great financial crisis of 1825 – when the country, according to one contemporary commentator, was within 24 hours of returning to barter and a run on the Bank of England was only halted by a last minute shipment of gold by Nathan Rothschild – that led to the establishment of Bank of England branches in Birmingham and elsewhere. That crisis was due in part to the constraints on the UK’s under-developed banking system.
It had responsibility for the CHAPS system, providing high-value, same-day settlement with a minimum value of £ (equivalent to around £ in today’s prices).5 Today there is no minimum value, but CHAPS settles around £ billion every working day, representing 93% of non-cash payments in the UK. Around 40% of CHAPS payments originate from organisations based overseas, reflecting the UK’s strong links to the global economy. Bringing CHAPS into the Bank When RTGS was established in 1996, it became the settlement infrastructure for CHAPS, increasing financial stability by ensuring the highest value payments were settled real time in central bank money. The CHAPS Co Clearing Company Ltd (CHAPS Co) continued to operate the CHAPS scheme from a member perspective until last year. Bringing CHAPS in-house marked an important milestone in our ongoing work to make CHAPS and RTGS safer, more secure, more accessible, and in line with international best practice. Until last year, the UK was unusual in that a private sector company (CHAPS Co) was responsible for the governance and rulebook6 of the high-value payment system, while the Bank provided the underlying settlement infrastructure. In 2017 the Bank’s analysis concluded that there were structural constraints in this model. Given the status of RTGS as critical national infrastructure, CHAPS Co could not be given the full range of information on RTGS that it would need to identify and manage risks across the whole payment system.

In closing, once again, I would like to express our deepest appreciation to the Yang Berhormat Dato' Mustapa Mohamed, Minister of Higher Education for gracing this occasion and for accepting to witness INCEIF partnership with nine institutions of higher learning. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 125/2006
However, it cannot be ruled out that the strength of activity will lead to higher wage demands and to greater price-setting autonomy on the part of companies. Adding to these upside risks to inflation is the possibility of fresh oil price increases. In the expected setting of robust economic activity, wage moderation will remain an essential ingredient for containing inflationary expectations, which would help prolong the upturn. In the opening months of 2007, the ECB has continued closely to monitor these risks and, in general, economic developments in the area, so as to ensure that inflation expectations remain in line with the definition of medium-term price stability. The Spanish economy As indicated, the Spanish economy continued its long upturn last year, moving on a mildly accelerating path throughout the year. It posted a year-on-year rate of 4% in 2006 Q4, and 4.1% in Q1 this year. The buoyancy of activity is proving greater than forecast in early 2006. The recovery in the euro area has boosted exports, following their sluggishness in previous years, especially in 2005, and has supplemented the main factors that have been underpinning the expansion of the economy. There was some re-balancing in 2006 of the relative contributions of domestic expenditure and of net exports to GDP growth, following three years of progressive divergence between these two components. Overall, the contribution of net external demand improved, despite which the net borrowing of the nation increased once more, to 7.8% of GDP.

Achieving fiscal surpluses in expansionary phases, as established under the new budgetary stability laws, not only proves suitable for easing demand pressures, but also for retaining sufficient room for manoeuvre in the face of potential deviations from the scenario of economic dynamism and, naturally, for further restructuring public finances in order to absorb the future consequences of population ageing. This is, unquestionably, the main challenge for public finances in the medium term. The agreement reached last year under the Toledo Pact also addresses the goal of ensuring the sustainability of the pensions system, although the measures adopted are still of limited scope. It should be recalled, however, that the high growth of public revenue has a difficult-to-estimate temporary component that is linked in part to the strength of the real estate sector. Accordingly, budgetary consolidation may require an additional effort to control primary spending. The collaboration of regional and local government is vital in this connection, as they are responsible for major spending components such as public investment, health and education. This consolidation strategy should, moreover, be compatible with an improvement in the quality of public finances, since that is essential for raising incentives and for helping overcome the shortfalls in education, innovation and productivity.
There has been growing evidence that Green and ESG investments may not lead to a sacrifice in returns. On the contrary, some ESG investments could actually enhance long term sustainability and improve risk-adjusted returns for investors. As the manager for the Exchange Fund, the HKMA takes a long term view and sees Green and ESG investments as an important driver of value in the long term. In this connection, the guiding principle that the HKMA will adopt going forward is that priority can be given to ESG investments if the long term return is comparable to other investments on a risk-adjusted basis. More specifically, the HKMA has taken or will take the following measures to support Responsible Investment: ___ (a) we have already incorporated ESG factors in our credit risk analysis of bonds; we have required our external managers of the Hong Kong equity portfolios to comply (b) with the Principles of Responsible Ownership promulgated by the Securities and Futures Commission in 2016; we have invested two tranches of $ billion each in the Managed Co-lending Portfolio (c) Programme (MCPP) run by the IFC. A substantial part of the MCPP will target sustainable investments across emerging markets; (d) we will further grow our green bond portfolio, through direct investment or investment in green bond funds; (e) we will participate in ESG-themed public equities investments through external managers in passive or active mandates targeting ESG benchmark indices; and (f) we will accord green accreditation as a predominant factor in investment in buildings in our real estate portfolio.

This stands in stark contrast with the mystique and opaqueness which characterized earlier central bank communication. For a long time central banks have focused predominantly on their interest rate policy. Considerably less attention has been devoted to their liquidity policy which used to be carried out somewhere in the basement of the monetary policy temple, far away from the spotlight of the announcement of interest rate decisions. This year, liquidity policy has moved into the spotlight and has taken over the lead role at the forefront of the monetary policy scene. The current situation also highlights the close interaction between price stability and financial stability and that the focus of policy makers today is on crisis management. The challenge in the coming months and year is to pursue a dual approach consisting of short-term action and long-term solutions. We must constantly be on the alert to put out fires when and where they emerge, while studying the causes of the current crisis and finding the right long-term remedies in the form of new rules and systems so that we do not repeat the same mistakes. As the French saying goes, there is no point in putting a band-aid on a wooden leg. 2  Ecklund, Gunhild (2008), Creating a new role for an old central bank: The Bank of Norway 1945-1954, Series of Dissertations No. 2-2008, BI Norwegian School of Management. 3  Sejersted, Francis (1994), On the so-called “autonomy” or “independence” of central banks.
For example, if we are in a period of “secular stagnation”— characterized by chronic excess global savings and aging populations—then one would expect r* to remain persistently low. 3 But, if we are in a world of abating headwinds as we recover from the financial crisis, then one would expect r* to rise over time. This lack of clarity about the environment increases the degree of uncertainty about the level of r*. Despite all these uncertainties, one still has to have a viewpoint. In the current circumstances, I would judge that r* over the medium term is likely to be somewhere around 1 percent. Although that is higher than the estimates from some models, I have nudged up my estimate because financial conditions are still easy and fiscal policy will likely be quite stimulative in 2018 and 2019.4 If the neutral real interest rate is around 1 percent, there is still some distance to go before monetary policy actually gets tight. At the FOMC’s 2 percent inflation objective, my estimate of r* implies that the federal funds rate would need to rise to around 3 percent for monetary policy to be considered neutral. Of course, as the factors that influence r* change, my estimate of r* will also move around over time. 2/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Whether monetary policy will need to move to a restrictive setting depends crucially on how low the unemployment rate can go without inflation climbing meaningfully above 2 percent.

These include: 1) Determining the appropriate long-term implementation framework for U.S. monetary policy, and 2) deciding whether the strategic framework underlying monetary policy decisions needs to be adjusted to mitigate the risks associated with getting pinned at the effective lower bound for short-term interest rates.9 For the first issue, I see two options: return to the “corridor”-type system that was in place prior to the financial crisis, or remain with the framework that has been in place since the crisis— namely, a “floor” system. In a corridor system, reserves in the banking system are scarce, and the federal funds rate is set by adjusting the supply of reserves through open market operations to balance demand and supply at the FOMC’s target range. In contrast, in a floor system, reserves are abundant, so that the interest rate the Federal Reserve pays on excess reserves, or IOER, is the primary tool used to control the federal funds rate. In my view, the case for retaining the current floor system is very compelling for a number of reasons. First, it is operationally much less complex than a corridor system.