samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The two cities are situated in different regions and their real economies have different clientele. With capital account controls still in place on the Mainland, the further opening up of Shanghai, such as the development of its Free Trade Zone, will lead to closer and more extensive business, trade and financial links between the two cities, meaning more business opportunities. In 2000, there were 23 flights a day between Hong Kong and Shanghai. In 2013, this had increased to 75, clearly demonstrating that the continuous growth of Shanghai will result in more business exchanges with Hong Kong and creating a win-win situation. 9. Indeed, the launch of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect on November 17 resonates with my assertions here in several ways. Last week, Vice-Premier Ma Kai told the visiting delegation of the Hong Kong Association of Banks that the scheme was not only a 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  milestone for financial co-operation between Hong Kong and Shanghai, but also a strategic move towards the Mainland’s capital account convertibility and the opening up of its capital market. Furthermore, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect adds another important channel for the circulation of renminbi between onshore and offshore markets. It is also a strong vote of confidence in Hong Kong’s development as an international financial centre, reaffirming our unique role as the offshore testing ground for the Mainland’s financial liberalisation. Zero-sum vs positive-sum 10.

Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 8 September 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Dombrovskis. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We continue to expect them to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. Regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, we confirm that the monthly asset purchases of € billion are intended to run until the end of March 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. Today, we assessed the economic and monetary data which had become available since our last meeting and discussed the new ECB staff macroeconomic projections. Overall, while the available evidence so far suggests resilience of the euro area economy to the continuing global economic and political uncertainty, our baseline scenario remains subject to downside risks. Our comprehensive policy measures continue to ensure supportive financing conditions and underpin the momentum of the euro area economic recovery.
Knowledge of the size of this uncertainty can in itself be relevant for those who wish to form an idea of how the repo rate will develop in future. There are various methods that can be used to form an idea of how great the probability is of the repo rate being within a particular interval at a particular time in the future. We made an analysis in a box in the last Inflation Report as to how this kind of uncertainty interval can be calculated and presented two different methods 4 . In the first method, the implied forward rates are calculated for various points back in time. A study is then made of how well the implied forward rates have anticipated the actual development of the repo rate. Based on the “forecasting errors” it is possible to calculate the uncertainty interval around the forecast given by the implied forward rate path. The method is thus retrospective. Unsurprisingly, the calculations show that the spread of the deviations (the standard deviation) increases with the length of the forecast horizon (see Figure 4). This illustrates the uncertainty about macroeconomic developments in general and that the probability for unexpected disturbances arising in the economy increases with the length of the forecast horizon. 2  See also the Separate Minutes of the Executive Board, No. 4, 2006. 3  See also Nyberg, L., “House price developments and monetary policy”, speech at Evli Bank, 19 December 2005.

Loan growth in July increased to 11.8 percent while deposits including bill of exchange grew by 1.9 percent. Liquidity in the system remains adequate, with loan/deposit ratio excluding interbank transactions at 90.1 percent in July. On asset quality, gross NPL ratio edged downward to 6.4 percent in June. These numbers show that the performance of the Thai banking sector is quite robust, and is well positioned to support the economy. Fourth, a more difficult picture to assess is the impact of the turmoil on the economy and how this would translate into the impact on the banking sector. So far, notwithstanding the less helpful global environment, the Thai economy has performed relatively well, with growth averaging 5.7 percent in the first half of this year. But going forward, market participants expect the economy to become more affected by the slowing global economy. Our own forecast also sees growth to be less buoyant in the second half of the year, reflecting a more adverse impact on exports. But overall, the momentum of growth should not be too adversely affected given the support that growth could gain from domestic demand which is being supported by high farm income, continued credit availability, and supportive fiscal policy. Moreover, lower oil prices and monetary policy that focuses on inflation should provide a stable price environment conducive to domestic demand and to export competitiveness. Also, continued current account surpluses, lower external indebtedness, and high domestic savings have made the economy’s financial conditions more stable, by reducing its dependency on capital flows.
The implications for monetary policy will depend on the relative magnitudes of these effects. In my view, and I am not pre-judging the views of the other independent MPC members, the economic outlook has deteriorated and some monetary policy easing will likely be required over the summer. The Committee will make an initial assessment on 14 July, and a full assessment complete with a new forecast will follow in the August Inflation Report. In August, we will also discuss further the range of instruments at our disposal. These judgments will benefit from the Bank’s joined-up approach. For example, the PRA’s direct line of sight of banks, building societies and insurers, and the FPC’s oversight of systemic risks, allows the Bank to understand better the net impact of any monetary actions on financial conditions, and ultimately businesses and households. As we have seen elsewhere, if interest rates are too low (or negative), the hit to bank profitability could perversely reduce credit availability or even increase its overall price. There are also interactions between prudential rules and the provision of credit in the face of large macro uncertainty. The Bank of England is well positioned to understand these interactions and will work across its policy committees to maximise the coherence and effectiveness of their efforts. I can assure you that in the coming months the Bank can be expected to take whatever action is needed to support growth subject to inflation being projected to return to the target over an appropriate horizon, and inflation expectations remaining well anchored.

I first made reference to the New Silk Road at the 2nd World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF) on "Unleashing the Potential of Emerging Markets" in Islamabad, Pakistan in November 2006. It is my pleasure today to share some thoughts on the potential role of Islamic finance in strengthening the New Silk Road. My remarks will focus on four areas that is the emergence of the New Silk Road; how the linkages on the New Silk Road have built on the comparative advantages of Asia and the Middle East; how Islamic finance is able to foster the linkages along the New Silk Road; and finally, how we can extend the New Silk Road to the rest of the world to advance global economic stability and prosperity. The emergence of a New Silk Road Today, signs that a New Silk Road is flourishing are abundant. The economic and financial linkages between Asia and the Middle East are growing. While the world trade has on the average expanded by 10% over the period 2001-2005, Asia's trade with the Middle East has increased on the average by 24%. More than half of the exports from the Gulf states 1 goes to Asia and more than one-fifth of its imports are from Asia. The Gulf is the major supplier of fuel to Asia, while Asia in turn supplies manufactured goods and food to the Gulf. Recent trends in investment activities have been equally significant.
Figure 2 The Riksbank’s balance sheet total SEK billion 900  900  800  800  700  700  600  600  500  500  400  400  300  300  200  200  100  100  0 Jan-07  0 Jul-07  Jan-08  Jul-08  Jan-09  Jul-09  Source: The Riksbank. Central banks in other countries have also expanded their balance sheets. Owing to the nature of the crisis and the structure of the financial systems in different countries, the central banks have implemented different measures and to a different extent. However, common to them all is the fact that their balance sheet totals increased dramatically immediately after the US investment bank, Lehman Brothers, filed for bankruptcy in September 2008 (Figure 3). 2  BIS Review 160/2009  Figure 3 Central banks’ balance sheet totals Percentage of GDP 30  30 The Riksbank ECB  25  25  Federal reserve  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0 Jan-07  0 Jul-07  Jan-08  Jul-08  Jan-09  Jul-09  Sources: Respective central banks. How has the work on our two main tasks affected the Riksbank’s balance sheet? Let me begin by discussing monetary policy and then move on to financial stability. Monetary policy The target of monetary policy is to maintain inflation at 2 per cent. The Riksbank normally steers the short-term interest rate to attain this target.

The Chatroom will provide speedy and timely feedback when new technology or solution is being contemplated, thereby reducing the risk of abortive work by the parties concerned and expediting the rollout of new fintech applications. Second, tech firms may have direct access to the Sandbox. Tech firms may test out their innovation by seeking feedback from the Chatroom without necessarily going through a bank. Third, we understand that our fellow regulators in Hong Kong, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Insurance Authority (IA), will shortly be launching their own sandboxes. Following discussion among the HKMA, SFC and IA, we have agreed to link up the three sandboxes through a common interface so that there can be a single point of access by the stakeholders for fintech solutions covering more than one sector. (C)  Facilitating Virtual Banking  We believe that the time is ripe for Hong Kong to try out virtual banks. In some jurisdictions, it has proved to be technically feasible and commercially viable for virtual or branchless banks to operate. A virtual bank operates on a different model of service delivery and may help promote financial inclusion as they normally target small customers, be they individuals or SMEs. Our view is that the emergence of virtual banks in Hong Kong would also provide additional impetus to the application of fintech in Hong Kong and offer a new kind of customer experience in mobile and digital banking.
The estimated impact on output would be, of course, negative, dampening real GDP growth by 0.1 to 0.8 percentage points in the first year; in subsequent years, the average cumulative impact suggested by these models would be roughly neutral (-0.3 to 0.2 percentage points in the second year; -0.1 to 0.4 percentage points in the third year). Needless to say, these estimates are surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty related to the model specifications and other factors, for instance, the assumed initial cyclical position of the economy, the nature of the oil price shock, and the possible existence of non-linearities in the transmission of the oil price shock to the economy. More importantly, these (and other comparable) simulations are based on the assumption that the monetary policy stance is given; that is, the central bank’s interest rates are assumed to be kept constant and not to be adjusted in response to the impact of the oil price shock on inflation. Of course, this assumption is made for the purpose of isolating the “pure” impact of the oil price shock. In reality, monetary policy has an important role to play in influencing the effects of oil price shocks on the economy. Oil price shocks present policy-makers with difficult choices as they simultaneously pose upside risks to inflation and downside risks to growth. In responding to oil price shocks, it is essential to understand that policy-makers cannot offset the real effects of oil price increases.

With regard to inflation targeting strategies, it has been acknowledged that if financial imbalances accumulate and there is, for example, substantial uncertainty about the sustainability of asset price movements, it is not advisable to strictly pursue an inflation forecast for consumer prices over a horizon of one to two years. In such circumstances, it may be better instead to set interest rates with a view to a time-frame extending well beyond conventional forecast horizons. The ECB’s monetary policy strategy has some features that can become quite useful in this respect: •  First, from the beginning, the ECB has adopted a “medium-term orientation”. This implies that policy is not set for a time horizon of one or two years. Rather, the ECB pays due attention to the need to take into account the entire horizon over which monetary policy and macroeconomic shocks impact on the state of the economy. This lengthening of the policy horizon helps to trace out the likely macroeconomic impact of a financial misalignment. •  Second, the monetary policy strategy of the ECB is broad-based implying that a whole range of several indicators and models are employed and cross-checked, thus making the assessment and policy response to financial imbalances robust. In particular, the commitment to monitor and assess money and credit developments - besides being instrumental in identifying longer-term risks to price stability in general - may help to guard against ignoring asset price bubbles.
Risk indicators for the banking sector Risk indicators  EBA-defined prudential range  2014  2015  Romania* 2016 Mar.17  14.56  16.72  17.55  17.72  17.84  17.15  15.7  14.56  16.72  17.55  17.72  17.84  17.15  14.3  20.71  13.51  9.62  9.36  8.32  7.96  4.5  55.61  57.72  56.34  56.79  59.13  59.37  45.0  11.90  8.43  6.36  6.37  5.90  5.85  2.9  -14.44  11.89  10.10  11.19  12.13  12.14  7.0  55.76  58.46  53.19  61.36  55.45  54.80  61.5  78.18  74.34  75.77  75.26  76.30  117.5  8.17  8.15  7.86  7.88  7.80  14.2  Jun.17  Sep.17  EU Jun.17  Solvency Tier 1 capital ratio  CET 1 capital ratio  >15% [12%-15%] <12% >14% [11%-14%] <11%  Asset quality Non-performing loan ratio  Non-performing loan coverage by provisions  Ratio of restructured loans and advances  <3% [3%-8%] >8% >55% [40%-55%] <40% <1,5% [1,5%-4%] >4%  Profitability ROE  Cost-to-income ratio  >10% [6%-10%] <6% <50% [50%-60%] >60%  Balance sheet structure <100% [100%-150%] 82.49 >150% <12x Debt-to-equity ratio [12x-15x] 8.91 >15x *) includes only banks, Romanian legal persons, according to EBA methodology best bucket intermediate bucket worst bucket Loan-to-deposit ratio for households and non-financial corporations  Source: NBR, EBA 7  Figure 9.

The global fall in interest rates reflects the emergence of a considerable savings glut, especially after the countries in Asia joined the world market in earnest after 2000. The decline in interest rates is thus an international phenomenon, driven by falling inflation, lower growth and increased global saving. Interest rates in Norway cannot diverge too far from global rates. An excessively strong krone would then lead to a fall in activity and deflation. The main task of monetary policy is to maintain the value of money by keeping inflation low and 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  stable. Inflation targeting is forward-looking and flexible so that it can contribute to high and stable output and employment and to counteracting the build-up of financial imbalances. Monetary policy cannot assume primary responsibility for financial stability. But as we are now in the process of raising the policy rate somewhat, this could also help curb debt growth. Will debt be reduced? It is easy to imagine that house prices will just continue to rise – as they have done for more than 25 years. Rising income and government wealth have gone hand in hand with rising house prices and higher household debt. But Norway’s experience from the years after oil was discovered, and in particular from the years following the banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, cannot serve as reliable guidance for what we can expect in the future.
Benign economic and financial conditions in recent years have kept credit losses at low levels. Combined with buoyant returns from capital market activity, the profitability of major financial institutions has been strong. And capital levels are high. But as highlighted in Financial Stability Reports by the Bank of England and others, this benign environment has encouraged an increase in risk-taking and a “search for yield” which has lowered the compensation for bearing credit risk and market risk to very low levels. The vulnerability of the system as a whole to an abrupt change in conditions has consequently increased. Against this background, I would like to focus my comments today on some of the implications for the management and reduction of risks to the financial system as a whole. More specifically, how can the public policy goal of promoting systemic financial stability be best achieved? I will not provide a fully comprehensive answer to this question but will touch briefly on four aspects; improving the assessment of vulnerabilities that might threaten stability; developing appropriate buffers for capital  1  Financial System Risks in the UK – Issues and www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2006/speech280.pdf  BIS Review 77/2007  Challenges  (John  Gieve)  (July  2006)  1  and liquidity within the financial system that take due account of the changing nature of risks; strengthening the core market infrastructure; and lowering legal uncertainty.

3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Indeed, these investors may choose not to enter emerging markets in the first place - standstills would pre-empt the inflow rather than precipitating the outflow. But the behaviour of longer-term investors needs also to be weighed. They would stand to gain from country runs being forestalled. Their incentives to flee are thereby diminished. The net effect might be some change in the composition of the developing countries’ capital stock, with fewer fleet-of-foot, skittish investors and a greater number of longer-term, sticky investors. This change in capital stock ought to be advantageous from the welfare perspective. Third, might standstills worsen contagion between markets, the like of which we saw following Russia’s debt moratorium in 1998? Contagion appears to be a fact of life in a world of cross-border capital flows. The question is: would articulating a role for structured standstills worsen contagion? It is not clear that more coherent crisis-management framework would increase the incidence of standstills; it might reduce their cost. And to the extent that contagion is sourced in investor uncertainty, it might to some extent be mitigated by the proposals I have outlined. So, to summarise, there are good reasons to think that a world of structured standstills might alter investor behaviour and the international flows of funds. It is difficult, however, to believe that these changes would be damaging to the international capital market mechanism - indeed, some would clearly improve its functioning. Sovereign defaults will continue to occur periodically.

On its  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  own, however, such a policy will raise difficult political questions about the capacity of the weaker sovereigns to pay for any recapitalisation of their banks. Bank and sovereign solvency concerns are inextricably intertwined. In the end, the underlying solvency concerns require countries to adopt compatible policies so that they can credibly service their internal and external debts. What does this mean for our own economy? Our objective must be to steer the UK economy slowly back to a position of more normal interest rates and lower budget deficits. With a lower level of sterling and a credible plan to reduce the fiscal deficit over the medium term, we were on track. But the problems in the euro area and the marked slowing in the world economy have lengthened the period over which a return to normality is likely. 2011 has been the year of the reluctant recovery. Growth has disappointed, both here and abroad. Business and consumer confidence have fallen sharply, not only at home but also elsewhere in Europe and the United States. And the level of world trade in goods has stagnated. A slowing of the world economy, especially in the euro area, is a threat to our strategy of rebalancing and recovery of the UK economy. Despite the more competitive level of sterling, the recovery in our trade position is at risk of stalling.