samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
6  BIS Review 62/2008  Figure 8: Consumer Loans (Annual Percentage Change) 60  450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0  50 40  Automobile  30  Housing (right axis)  20 10 0 -10  03/08  01/08  11/07  09/07  07/07  05/07  03/07  01/07  11/06  09/06  07/06  05/06  03/06  01/06  -20  Source: CBT. The sharp slowdown in the second half of 2006 created some slack in the economy. The recent methodological change in national accounts led to a limited upward revision in our output gap measure and hence did not change the inflation outlook. Looking ahead, we expect a continued moderation in economic activity and non-farm employment on the back of rising precautionary saving due to global and domestic uncertainties (Figure 9). Figure 9: Private Consumption Expenditure and Non-Agricultural Employment* Private consumption (Million YTL, 1998 prices)  18000  16000  Non-agricultural employment (thousand, right axis)  15500  17000  15000  16000  14500 15000 14000 14000 13500 13000  13000  07Ç3  07Ç1  06Ç3  06Ç1  05Ç3  05Ç1  04Ç3  04Ç1  03Ç3  03Ç1  02Ç3  02Ç1  01Ç3  12000 01Ç1  11000 00Ç3  12500  00Ç1  12000  *Seasonally adjusted Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. Accordingly, demand and capacity conditions are expected to continue to support disinflation (Figure 10).

Therefore, the materialization of upside risks would require further tightening of the monetary policy stance, while downward surprises in food and energy prices would be perceived as an opportunity to bring inflation back to the target in a shorter period. Figure 15: Inflation Alternative Scenarios  Forecasts,  Base  Scenario  Medium Term Target  Base Scenario  Pessimistic Scenario  Optimistic Scenario  and  12  10  Percent  8  6  4  2  12  2011-I  2010-IV  2010-III  2010-II  2010-I  2009-IV  2009-III  2009-II  2009-I  2008-IV  2008-III  2008-II  2008-I  2007-IV  0  BIS Review 62/2008  A protracted period of rising food and energy prices have led to significant breaches in inflation targets since the adoption of the inflation-targeting regime and consequently increased the stickiness in inflation expectations, as economic agents have become more backward looking. Under normal conditions, supply shocks are expected to alter relative prices rather than the underlying inflation trend. Nevertheless, the fact that several longlasting shocks appeared concurrently has increased the risks to price setting behavior. As a matter of fact, recent studies by the Central Bank reveal that economic agents have been increasingly grounding their expectations on past inflation figures. In this respect, recent developments in the pricing behavior and the underlying inflation trends are of particular concern. It may be necessary to pursue a tighter monetary policy should the price setting behavior deteriorate.
Discussions with banks suggest both the incentives and operational preparedness for large scale interbank unsecured transactions is low. 25 The decrease in reserves is generally matched by an equal increase (as measured by market value) in securities under most assumptions. See Leonard, Martin, and Potter, “How the Fed Changes the Size of its Balance Sheet,” July 10, 2017, for a discussion of some technical factors that could result in the values not being exactly the same. From an LCR perspective, reducing agency MBS holdings can affect banks’ measured LCRs to a moderate extent because agency MBS are Level 2 HQLA and are counted with an 85 percent weighting. 26 Quarles, “Liquidity Regulation and the Size of the Fed’s Balance Sheet,” May 4, 2018. 27 See Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) – Executive Summary and Bech and Keister (2017) 28 Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools, page 73. 8  nonfinancial corporations, receive lower runoff rates, as the LCR rule considers these types of lenders to be “stickier.” In particular, borrowing from the FHLBs, the predominant lenders in the federal funds market, is one example of LCR-favored wholesale borrowing. So, if banks were becoming more interested in improving their LCRs, they might seek out, and pay up for, loans from the FHLBs and other LCR-favored lenders. Recent data indicates that LCR-related demand has pushed up the effective federal funds rate at times, notably in June.

The monetary base has risen by unprecedented proportions as we tried to prevent a collapse of broad money and credit as happened in the US during the Great Depression and today in Greece. And central bank balance sheets have risen across the industrialised world, as shown in Table 2. That expansion has reflected both money creation through asset purchases and lending against collateral. All major central banks have created new ways to lend against collateral.5 Far from their image as conservative creatures, are central banks at risk of throwing their traditional caution to the wind and ignoring the limits on monetary policy? Two limits are relevant in current circumstances. First, no matter how much liquidity is thrown at the banking system, lending and the economy will not recover if the banking system is inadequately capitalised and suffering from excessive leverage. That is why the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee has placed weight on the need for the weaker UK banks to raise capital. It is not surprising that the more strongly capitalised banks in the UK are expanding lending and the poorly capitalised banks are contracting lending. Second, there are limits on the ability of domestic monetary policy to expand real demand in the face of the need for changes in the real equilibrium of the economy. I do not believe that the present problems in the United Kingdom stem only from a large negative shock to aggregate demand.
Joseph Yam: Can the euro be a benchmark for Asian monetary co-operation? Remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the keynote discussion: “The euro: a stabilising factor of the international monetary system. Can the euro be a benchmark for Asian monetary co-operation?” before the Paris Europlace Financial Forum: the euro markets in a global investment strategy, Hong Kong, 21 March 2005. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be here this morning to take part in this keynote discussion on the euro hosted by Paris Europlace. One of the great benefits of living in an international financial centre is the opportunity to share something of the life and culture of other parts of the world without leaving one's own city. We have always been fortunate in Hong Kong in our enjoyment of the fruits of European and particularly French - civilisation. We are currently enjoying, as part of "The Year of France in China", the superb Impressionism exhibition at the Hong Kong Museum of Art: together with all of the excellent performances in our international Arts Festival, and the growing popularity of al fresco dining, this is helping to create a very European atmosphere in Hong Kong this spring. And, from what I see on the streets, I do not get the impression that the strong euro is having any effect on sales of European fashion.

While the lack of economic convergence among Asian economies may make an Asian Monetary Union a more challenging prospect, it is interesting to note that quite a number of governments in this region have already chosen to sacrifice some monetary policy autonomy for exchange rate stability. Hong Kong, Mainland China, and Malaysia choose to fix their exchange rates against an external currency, the US dollar, while other regional economies operate managed floats. There are indications that some economies are considering using the renminbi as a reference currency in their currency regimes, although a hard peg to renminbi is still not possible until full convertibility is achieved. It might  2  BIS Review 19/2005  also be the case that, while Asian economies are more diverse than European economies, they are flexible in ways that can compensate for the loss of independent monetary policy, for example, in their high degree of price flexibility and fast adjustment to economic shocks. It may seem premature to turn now to the technical issues surrounding Asian monetary union, but the devil is in the detail. The first set of technical issues involves the exchange rate arrangements themselves, including the transitional arrangements prior to the introduction of a single currency. For example, would Asia adopt a basket peg or choose an anchor currency? If a basket, what would be the weights for individual currencies, and would the basket include external currencies, such as the US dollar?
The success of the transition will also depend on our ability to broaden the sources of financing: we should not rely solely on green bonds. We also need more green loans, and more green financing in general, accessible to individuals, SMEs and start-ups. Mobilising this capital raises also some qualitative challenges. An orderly scaling up of green finance requires keeping markets away from green washing practices. The emergence of a new ecosystem of financial “good products”, such as green, social, impact or Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) bonds would appear to be great news. But we should be cautious not to create a confusing diversity of definitions that could undermine the reputation of green markets and impede progress. An EU-wide standard based on high level common principles regarding the management of the funds and impact assessments, articulated with a common green taxonomy is critical to protect market integrity. It would certainly make sense to build, notably on the two most widespread standards: the Green Bond Principles (GBP) and the Climate Bond Initiative (CBI). Page 5 sur 6 2 / Central Banks must also send out the right signal and lead by example in their investment and disclosure policies. We at the Banque de France have adopted in March this year a Charter on Responsible Investment for the management of our own funds and our pension portfolios: this means allocating them to socially and environmentally responsible investment funds.

With respect to disclosure, we are going to disclose in March 2019 the climate-risk exposures of our own funds and pension portfolios. We are also working to adopt in the near future a TCFD-like reporting which would fit the specificities of central banks. Regarding the role of monetary policy, some voices have been calling for a “green quantitative easing”. But monetary policy has to be broad based and remain neutral to ensure proper functioning through its transmission channels; it cannot be targeted towards achieving specific social or sectoral impacts. However, this does not preclude the Eurosystem from buying green assets when they fall in the remits of the eligibility criteria of its purchase programmes. For instance, the ECB currently holds around EUR 79 billion viii of eligible green universe bonds from both the public and the private sector, which is already significant. It does not mean though that monetary policy should ignore the question of climate change. Within our price stability mandate, I really believe further analytical work is needed to better understand the medium to long-term impact of climate change on intermediate monetary policy objectives and ultimately on our monetary policy strategy. To this end, a substantial research agenda remains before us and I hope the NGFS can play a role in helping to bridge the “knowledge-gap” in that area.
By studying such indexes and comparing with CPI, the Riksbank can obtain a view of the temporary effects of economic policy that should not lead to monetary policy changes. However, this means that the Riksbank should be able to say in advance that inflation will deviate from the two per cent target due to such temporary effects that I have spoken about. 2. Should the Riksbank have other objectives besides inflation? As regards stabilisation policy, the Riksbank has one task by law, namely to strive for a stable price level, that the Riksbank interprets as two per cent inflation. The Bank does not aim at constant prices primarily because prices and especially wages display inertia in a downward direction. It would therefore be difficult to change relative prices and relative wages if the price level was constant on average. The Riksbank would also be forced to carry out a deflationary policy on repeated occasions, if constant prices were the objective. Moreover, we know that quality improvements, which are reflected in rising prices, are not measured in a correct way by different price indexes. A particular (low) measured inflation can in fact correspond to price stability, if consideration is taken to technical development continually improving the quality of goods and services. Monetary policy operates with a considerable lag. The current view is that a monetary policy change has its maximum effect six to eight quarters afterwards. This involves a considerable difficulty with respect to carrying out monetary policy as well as evaluating the policy carried out.

Market participants do not anticipate a rise in key rates in the US, the euro area and the UK until the end of 2010. The interest rate differential between Norway and trading partners has increased. The krone exchange rate has remained fairly stable through winter, although it is somewhat stronger than projected in October. The krone is expected to remain at about the current level to the end of the third quarter and then gradually depreciate somewhat thereafter. BIS Review 38/2010  1  Growth in the Norwegian economy came to a halt in autumn 2008, and Norway entered a downturn in early 2009. The decline appears to have ended in the second quarter of 2009. Capacity utilisation is lower than normal, but the downturn seems to be relatively mild. Activity has been underpinned by substantial interest rate cuts combined with higher public spending and high oil investment. Fiscal policy was very expansionary in 2009. Petroleum revenue spending increased sharply, and by close to 3 per cent of mainland GDP. Revenue spending will rise further this year. Our projections are based on information from the final budget and the projections in the National Budget for 2010. In line with this, the level of the structural, non-oil budget deficit is maintained at this level to the end of the projection period. According to the fiscal rule, the fiscal deficit should be reduced to about 4 per cent of the capital in the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) when the economy resumes a normal level of activity.
In these situations deflation need not be the bugbear to economic development that it is often made out to be. On the other hand, if we move forward a few years to the period during and after the First World War, we do see large shocks - falling GDP combined with very high inflation, followed by severe deflation at  BIS Review 37/2003  1  the beginning of the 1920s. This was when Sweden experienced its most severe economic crisis, rather than during the 1930s as was the case in the USA and Germany, for instance. If we move forward to the post-war period, this was a unique time of high and constant growth. During the period following the Second World War and up to the 1970s, standards of living rose at a record rate throughout the world. An interesting fact is that although growth in Sweden during this period was higher than it had been at any other time, it was nevertheless rather low in an international comparison. Many European countries, including our Scandinavian neighbours, grew at an even more rapid rate. However, from the 1970s the problems increased. Growth waned and inflation rose. We managed to temporarily stimulate growth by means of substantial devaluations, but there was no proper follow-up and the economy overheated, only to turn around entirely at the beginning of the 1990s, resulting in extensive problems for the financial sector. Since then we have had a decade or so with better growth and more balanced developments.

There has also been some further deregulation. For instance, state monopolies have been abolished and freedom to establish new companies with regard to, for instance, transport, communications and energy has been introduced. Changed competitive conditions thus affect productivity growth, but they can also affect price developments more directly. Despite the fact that we gained much stiffer legislation on competition in 1993, developments in this field appear to be moving slowly. Swedish prices remain higher than in other countries in several areas without explanations for this in the form of differences in VAT rates and wage levels. Increased competition can contribute to price levels converging, but this assumes that the relative price changes will be accepted and it can entail, as in the 1990s when electricity and telecommunications were deregulated, such large price reductions in some sectors that our inflation rate will be lower than that of other countries. Special interests and consumer interests Limits to competition are a clear example of how special interests dominate over general consumer interests. There are many examples of this in various areas of the Swedish economy, and in particular the construction sector. This means that we allow inefficiency to remain, which reduces growth and the development of most people’s standard of living. One interesting and very recent example of how special interests have declined concerns pharmaceutical prices.
A further jump in wages in 2002 amplified the imbalances in the economy and fuelled the rise in prices for goods and services produced in Norway. This is why monetary policy has been tight. Chart 10. The real interest rate Per cent 10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  Average  2  0  0  -2  -2 -4  -4 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002  Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  The real interest rate, i.e. the interest rate adjusted for inflation, rose in 2000 and was thereafter somewhat higher than the average for the past 30 years. With the reduction in the key rate this winter, the real interest rate is no longer particularly high. The tight monetary stance is reflected in the strong krone. Is there a risk of prolonged stagnation? The US has been the driving force in the world economy. The US economy has historically been very resilient. Growth tends to pick up rapidly after short periods of contraction. Most likely this will prove to be the case this time as well. A positive aspect is that confidence in the financial system has not been impaired. There is some evidence of a recovery in investment. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of a fairly long period of stagnation in the global economy. Low interest rates in the US and Europe are a reflection of this risk.

Norman T L Chan: Focus in Hong Kong on treating customers fairly Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Treat Customers Fairly Charter Launching Ceremony, Hong Kong, 28 October 2013. *  *  *  Welcome to the Treat Customers Fairly Charter Launching Ceremony. I am pleased that representatives from 22 retail banks in Hong Kong gathered here today to sign the Charter, pledging to implement the five high-level principles set out therein. 2. A customer-based, customer-oriented corporate culture is what we always applaud and hope for. This is true regardless of industry. However, not every industry or company is able to achieve this, particularly when they are under the pressure of increasing market competition and the need for profit-maximisation, it is not uncommon for some companies to adopt sales and marketing practices that may undermine consumers’ interests. It has therefore led to the development of different consumer protection mechanisms in modern societies to address such issues, for instance, Hong Kong has established the Consumer Council in this context. Nevertheless, the international community is increasingly concerned about the interests of financial consumers in recent years. In late 2011, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has announced a set of high-level principles for protection of financial consumers. It is now in the process of developing effective approaches for implementing the principles with a view to promoting the principles to G20 members. 3.
Fiscal and monetary policy responded aggressively, and in my view appropriately, to avoid what would have been a much more severe outcome, absent action. There will be a time when these aggressive actions need to be reversed, but first we need to get the economy on a much more solid footing. Even with a relatively robust recovery, it will take several years before we attain full employment and an inflation rate close to a long-run expectation of 2 percent. Taken together there has been clear room for – and indeed an imperative for – policy actions like those the Federal Reserve has been pursuing.5 Going  5  For additional perspective, see Vice Chair Janet Yellen's remarks of January 10, where she discusses the rationale, design, and effectiveness of the Federal Reserve's asset-purchase program; and concerns about inflation or adverse imbalances resulting. The text is available on the Board of Governors website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110108a.htm. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  forward our focus must be on policies that return the economy to a place that meets both elements of the Fed’s mandate. Thank you. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches

This will require banks and supervisors to undergo extensive trainings to learn these new concepts and techniques;  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches    Fifthly, given the scarce availability of qualified human resources, banks and supervisors will face the challenge of attracting and retaining staff with appropriate skill sets;    Sixthly, meeting the additional regulatory requirements relating to Basel III implementation will require banks to reassess their existing regulatory reporting and compliance structure to ensure its adequacy. This is important given the extended transitional timeline for implementation, during which some banks are required to participate in quantitative impact studies while others will have to prepare for full implementation within specified timeline. We also have to keep in mind that new rules are still evolving in certain areas based on the results of quantitative impact studies and thus may require further adjustments in the current regulatory requirements;    Lastly, and the most important step to be taken by banks, is adopting the robust governance structure that best suits their business model and risk profile. The Board of Directors should have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and be able to exercise sound and objective judgment about the affairs of the bank. The senior management should ensure that the bank’s activities are consistent with the business strategy, risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the board. This is the cornerstone on which any effective risk management framework, sound incentive structure and robust governance arrangements must be built.