samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At a time when globalisation may leave many behind in advanced economies,  Page 4 sur 8 when the debate about inequalities is coming back to the forefront – and these are real challenges behind the populist wave –, now is not the moment to give up on our social model. But this ambition must be clear-sighted: in some countries like France and Italy, the high cost of the model and its disappointing performance in terms of growth and employment calls for an acceleration in reforms in the right direction (slide 3). Several European countries, including Germany and Spain, are showing the way forward: they have succeeded in carrying out wide-reaching reforms that are compatible with our shared social model. Progress has been made in all four key areas: Enterprise, Employment, Education and Expenditure reduction. And these reforms are delivering results today: in recent years, GDP and employment have grown much faster in the “reforming” countries, than in France or Italy for instance. II. Beyond our existing assets, we in Europe must put our joint energies into mastering our common destiny. Europe needs all Member States to play their part in the common effort. It needs France, as well as Spain and its constant European commitment. For this to be a success, projects for strengthening Europe have to be carefully selected and prioritized; and we must not only talk about them, we must give ourselves the practical means to achieve concrete results.

As put by José Ortega y Gasset, the famous Madrid-born philosopher: “Life is a series of collisions with the future; it is not the sum of what we have been, but what we yearn to be”. Thank you for your attention. i  European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, July 2016. European Commission, European economic forecast, Autumn 2016. iii Matthieu Bussière, Laurent Ferrara and Juliana Milovich, ‘Explaining the recent slump in investment: the role of expected demand and uncertainty’, Banque de France WP No. 571, September 2015. iv World Bank, Doing business 2017 report. ii
14 In December, the FOMC announced that it would begin to significantly expand its balance sheet through purchases of long-term assets including agency debt, agency mortgage-backed securities and long-term treasuries – the Large Scale Asset Purchase or LSAP program. Other interventions were taking place directed by different agencies and in conjunction with the Treasury. At the same time, fiscal policy was engaging with Congress approving the $ billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program. Policy had entered the “whatever it takes” phase in an effort to keep the Great Recession from becoming something much worse. 15 By the spring of 2009, the various guarantees and backstop liquidity facilities covering different sectors of the shadow banking system were in place. The last element required to deal with the Panic of 2007 was to address the uncertainty over the viability of the large systemically important financial institutions. A horizontal review of the 19 largest financial firms was conducted to assess their capital needs under a “worse-than-anticipated economic scenario” – this was called the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program or SCAP (you can tell that we are fond of acronyms). There were two design features of the SCAP program that were essential for its ability to reduce the uncertainty in financial markets. First, the process was designed to be transparent with both the methodology published up front and the firm-by-firm results published at the conclusion. Second, if a firm was deemed to need capital but was unable to raise it in the  14  See Brian Sack. 2010.

These markets are characterized by what economists call a horizontal long-run housing supply curve. Chart 4 shows the ratio of house prices to estimated replacement costs over time for the four sand cities of Las Vegas, Vallejo, Phoenix and Miami. 4 In all four cities, prices relative to estimated replacement costs largely stayed in a tight range between 0.8 and 1.2 over the 1980s and 1990s. However, by 2002 to 2003, house prices broke out of this range and reached values well in excess of 200 percent of the replacement cost in Vallejo and Miami, and 180 percent of replacement costs in Las Vegas and Phoenix. When the bubble burst in these markets, house prices were likely to drop by a large magnitude. Two factors were important in creating uncertainty over which assets were going to suffer losses given a burst of the housing bubble. The first is that not all housing markets experienced a boom. Chart 5 shows the ratio of house prices to replacement costs for Dallas and Chicago. This ratio never broke above 1.2 for Dallas, and peaked at 1.4 for Chicago. An implication is that the default risk on a mortgage (as well as the loss given default) depended not just on the risk profile of the borrower, but also on the specific location of the property. The second factor contributing to the uncertainty over the value of mortgage securities was the lack of transparency in their design.
Irma Rosenberg: Monetary policy with our own interest rate path Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a lunch meeting arranged by Öhmans, Stockholm, 8 June 2007. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and speak about monetary policy. Today I would like to take the opportunity to talk about some issues that are important to me. I would like to explain why I considered that the repo rate should be kept unchanged at the most recent monetary policy meeting. I shall also comment on some of the views we at the Riksbank have received with regard to our forecast of the interest rate path. But I intend to begin with a few words on the changes in our monetary policy communication which were decided by the Executive Board recently. Changes in the monetary policy communication Since the inflation target was introduced, the Riksbank has tried in different ways to become more open and clear with regard to how monetary policy is conducted. We have gradually published more and more of the background information used for our decisions, in particular the forecasts for inflation and economic developments in general. The decision to publish our own forecast for the repo rate, which we took at the beginning of the year, was a natural continuation of this process. In mid-May we decided to implement some further changes to become even clearer in our monetary policy communication.

Emerging market economies in Asia, Europe and Latin America have accounted for an increasing share of global output. Several hundred million people have been lifted out of poverty. So what went wrong? Or in the words of Rimbereid: “And the cause of the depression? Theories conflict, as if surrounding a virus not yet discovered. Was it due to the far too unrestricted life of share trading? Or was it because the hand of the state constantly interfered with its unnatural contagion? Or did the virus worm its way into the calculating machine itself?” 4  4  6  Øyvind Rimbereid (2008): Herbarium, p.56. (Unofficial translation by Norges Bank’s translators). BIS Review 16/2009  Substantial trade imbalances developed between industrialised countries, particularly the US, on the one hand and emerging market economies, particularly China, on the other. This is partly due to government budget deficits and low private saving in the US since the 1990s, and partly due to export-led growth in China, particularly over the past few years, combined with strong competitiveness and a managed exchange rate. In short, rich countries borrowed and developing countries saved. The imbalances grew when oil and other commodity prices rose markedly. Financial market participants found it too difficult to channel capital. Longterm interest rates were too low, the search for yield too aggressive and compensation for risk-taking too meagre. With long-term loans in ample supply, demand for residential and other property became excessive in almost the entire western world.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: The dollar, the renminbi, and the evolution of the international monetary system Welcoming remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the SEACEN-OMFIF Policy Dialogue “The dollar, the renminbi, and the evolution of the international monetary system”, Kuala Lumpur, 31 May 2017. * * * Welcome to the SEACEN-OMFIF Policy Dialogue. I am privileged to be here as we assemble to exchange views, insights and perspectives on an interesting and contemporary issue. Indeed, the theme on “The Dollar, the Renminbi and the Evolution of the International Monetary System” not only has regional importance but also global implications. The rules, institutions and conventions of the international monetary system are far-reaching. They shape the actions and behavioral responses of players in the global economy. It is for this very reason that I look forward to the diversity of views that will enrich our discussion on this topic today. I shall provide some perspectives on the existing landscape of the international monetary system, the shift that is taking place and the possible implications for Asia. Although there are various elements of the international monetary system, I will focus on the interaction of currencies, particularly as the title indicates, on the dollar and the renminbi. Dollar Dominance The US Dollar (dollar) is unequivocally the dominant currency in the international monetary system. Its influence is, no doubt, prevalent.

1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In recent decades, however, the prime position of the dollar has been unchallenged. Its surpassing of the sterling occurred in the 1920s, although many historians would ascribe the preeminence of the dollar as coming to the fore with the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944. Since then, the “dollar dominance” continued unabated despite the US experiencing various challenges, including the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s and the recession in 1981. Closer to present times, the dominance of the dollar continues to hold even after the Global Financial Crisis, the most damaging crisis since the Great Depression. Although the privileged position of the dollar was not in question, the magnitude of its influence certainly varied across time. It was not linear, consistent nor smooth-sailing. In fact, over the past few years, it was a favorite past time of market commentators to call time on the ‘reign’ of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. A few candidates were cited to supplant the role of the dollar in the past, including the yen, the euro and recently, the renminbi. Necessity for Economic Rebalancing In 1971, the US Treasury Secretary John Connally, famously said to the European finance ministers that the “dollar is our currency, but your problem”. This statement had validity then, as it does now. For emerging markets in Asia, this braggadocio or arrogance rings true.
In the past few years, a large number of Swiss franc loans have been granted in Europe that were refinanced through the Swiss banking system. Then, last October, many Swiss banks were suddenly no longer prepared to continue refinancing to the same extent, which put a considerable strain on the international Swiss franc money market. To solve the problem, we decided to offer other central banks a foreign exchange swap facility. Since 20 October, the SNB has been providing the European Central Bank (ECB) with Swiss francs in exchange for euros through its swap facility. The ECB then allocates the Swiss francs to its counterparties in the euro area through swap transactions. A similar agreement has been in operation with the National Bank of Poland since 17 November. In October, the turbulence in the money market caused the three-month Libor to overshoot the upper limit of the SNB’s target range for a few days (cf. chart 3). We do not, however, consider this a strategy failure. The overshoot was preceded by an interest rate reduction that had come as a surprise to the markets. The three-month Libor cannot be expected to return immediately to the middle of the new target range. Even in periods of calm, the Libor does not react instantly to an SNB interest rate reduction and the associated lowering of the repo rates.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Financial crises and the future of global and Asian banking Statement by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Sasin Bangkok Forum 2012 Plenary Session “Financial Crises and The Future of Global and Asian Banking”, Bangkok, 9 July 2012. *  *  *  Theme: “Strategy for Known-Unknown”. The critical success factors are 3 Cs: Coordination of regulators, Commitment forged by Inclusiveness, and Communal responsibility to restore market mechanism as a pillar of governance and financial discipline. Good morning. It is an honor to join all of you today. I would like to thank Sasin for organizing this forum and for inviting me. Over the past three decades, Sasin has played an important role in grooming business and policy leaders who have been instrumental in building Thailand’s open and competitive economy. Today, we are facing another critical juncture for Thailand and the global economy. This forum has brought together the world’s leaders in public policy, businesses, as well as academia, and is therefore a rare opportunity for dialogue on our strategy going forward. Ladies and gentlemen, This brings me to the topic of my remark today. The future of banking industry at the global level and in Asia is being shaped by three major forces, namely, the fragile global economy, global financial regulatory reforms, and the rise of Asia which faces its own developmental challenges. These forces are interrelated and complex, no one can claim to fully understand the final outcome.
Components of the CPIF with the lowest volatility 1995-2019 Sub-index of the CPIF Standard Average  Weight  deviation Rent  1.0  1.9  9.6  Alcohol, restaurant visits  1.2  2.3  1.0  Personal hygiene (services)  1.3  3.3  1.8  Garage costs  1.3  2.1  0.2  Water and sewerage, refuse collection,  1.3  2.7  1.0  Food (outside the home)  1.4  2.6  5.4  Lottery, pools  20  1.4  1.3  1.1  Alcohol, purchased in store  1.5  1.1  2.1  Fizzy drinks, light beer  1.5  0.9  0.8  Entertainment and recreation  1.6  2.0  3.5  Personal hygiene (goods)  1.7  1.0  1.3  Capital stock 21  1.9  4.6  3.3  Funeral, home insurance, bank, education  2.0  2.8  2.6  Diverse leisure goods  2.0  0.3  0.5  Furniture, carpeting and lighting  2.0  0.2  2.0  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. Note. The calculations are made using monthly data expressed an annual percentage change. The weights for all groups included in the calculation add up to 100. Figure 6 shows the fifteen components with the highest volatility according to the procedure above, aggregated into an index (see dark blue line). The total weight of these goods and services in the CPIF is close to 17 per cent.

Øystein Olsen: Navigating normalisation Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Bank of Thailand – OMFIF High-level Seminar, Bangkok, 9 October 2018. * * * First, let me thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I am very happy to visit the Bank of Thailand and to participate on this panel. The financial crisis demanded powerful economic policy measures. Monetary policy had to take on substantial responsibility, in Norway as in many other countries. As we are hopefully heading for more normal times, it is important to evaluate our policy framework. Our experience is that a flexible inflation targeting regime has helped dampen the impact on the real economy. In recent years, output and employment volatility has been relatively limited despite large shocks to the Norwegian economy. The exchange rate has played an important role as a shock absorber, especially during the financial crisis and in periods when oil prices have fallen. At the same time, the interest rate level abroad places limitations on the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy in a small open economy like Norway. Our economy and economic policy Before I elaborate on this, I would like to give you some background on my country. Norway is a small country with a little more than five million inhabitants. The economy is open; total imports and exports make up about 2/3 of GDP.
They are also likely to result in more business bankruptcies and fewer new firms being formed, though here the evidence is rather more positive, with liquidations rising much less during the recession than one would expect (Chart 7). Finally, as we saw in the eighties, high levels of unemployment can become entrenched if the longterm unemployed are allowed to become disconnected from the labour market. But, as Chart 4 shows, the rise in longterm unemployment has so far been modest, while the exit rate from long-term unemployment into jobs has been broadly flat. So, at the current juncture, some indicators seem to suggest a rather large margin of spare capacity, while others point to a much smaller margin. Now it may be possible partly to reconcile these apparently conflicting observations once one allows for the fact that in some businesses, especially in manufacturing, it may be possible to shut down some capacity temporarily, reactivating it at relatively low cost once conditions improve. To the extent that the survey responses relate to the immediately operable capacity, rather than potential capacity, it would be possible to have simultaneously a modest margin of spare capacity in the short run, but rather more in the long run. Even so, the generic point remains that we presently have only an imprecise idea of the margin of unused resources in the economy.

The temptation to go back on it is extremely dangerous and would increase the risk of another financial crisis. In this respect, the current situation in the United States is worrying. Generally speaking, the measures that will be effectively adopted and implemented by the new administration and the competent government agencies regarding financial and banking regulation still have to be clarified. There is a possibility that the regulations already finalised in Basel such as the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) or the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) could be called into question. Unilateral deregulation would be nothing less than a lose-lose scenario with serious consequences for the stability of the global financial system as well as the competitive landscape for US and European banks. In view of this, the integration of a possible agreement on Basel III into European standards should be finalised while keeping a close eye on what the other major countries will do, starting, as you will have understood, with the United States. We must also avoid regulatory arbitrage. For non-bank players, significant progress is required on liquidity management by funds and asset management companies, on fintechs and more generally on the major digital platforms, which, if they carry out financial activities, will have to comply with similar regulations sooner or later. As for the financial markets, the decrease in market liquidity must be explained, and in doing so we must also consider the role of high frequency trading and its highly debatable social utility.
As a result, creditors, in particular official creditors, are therefore more closely bound into the success of the programme and have a strong incentive to ensure that the programme’s conditions are fulfilled, thereby underpinning its success. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Aside from their role in fiscal consolidation, the European authorities have also offered support to the financial systems of the most adversely affected countries in the euro area. This has been done via EU/IMF programmes to support restructuring and recapitalisation of crisis-hit banks; and through ECB measures, notably its framework for “enhanced credit support”. 11 By introducing a variety of operational facilities, the Eurosystem has ensured that liquidity continues to flow to the peripheral countries, preventing a seizing-up of financing flows in those hardest hit and a significant disruption to the European financial system as a whole. Indeed, one of the most important contributions made by the EU framework has been to ensure that the policy responses to the financial crisis have taken a sufficiently Europe-wide – or at least euro area-wide – perspective. Given that the responsibility for financial supervision and fiscal sovereignty remains at national level in the EU, at the peak of the financial crisis there was a natural tendency for Member States to resort to national solutions. A number of countries succumbed to this temptation, in the process imposing costly externalities on other Member States.

Chart 6 Real residential property prices in selected euro area countries  Note: Quarterly; 1998Q1=100. Source: Hiebert and Vansteenkiste (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 7 Growth in real housing construction works between 2000–2007  Note: Growth rate shown in the chart is the percentage increase between 2000 and 2007. Sources: Haver Analytics and Eurostat. Chart 8 Current account balances in selected euro area countries  Note: 2009; % of GDP. Source: Haver Analytics. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 9 General government budget balance in selected years  Note: % of GDP. Sources: Haver Analytics; European Commission. Chart 10 Consequences of the global financial crisis Household credit growth (annual % ) – General government budget balance (% of GDP)  Source: Haver Analytics, European Central Bank and Eurostat. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Chart 11 Credit growth to the private sector  Note: annual averages of monthly growth rates. Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF. Chart 12 EMBIG spreads in the run-up to the Asian crisis Philippines – Malaysia  Note: in bp. Source: Haver Analytics and JP Morgan. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 13 Sovereign credit ratings of selected East Asian countries  Sources: Moody’s based on a linear conversion of the ratings (with Aaa equal to 100 and Caa equal to 5). Chart 14 Average estimated real effective exchange rate overvaluation as of late 1996  Note: in percentage.