When I last addressed a similar assembly I mentioned that we take great pride in our Bank's history. I noted that we are answerable to the Swedish Parliament, which took charge of our operations for fear that otherwise the king would be too profligate. He was in fact spending too much by waging war on the Continent. So besides being a time-honoured institution, the Riksbank is an early example of independence. My account was immediately challenged, however. Perhaps my English opponent was piqued by the Riksbank's seniority; in any event, according to him we were not taken over by Parliament and nationalised in order to gain control over the monarch. It was a question instead of the nobles in parliament redeeming their pledges and getting the Treasury to carry the future losses they were otherwise likely to incur. So there's truly no new thing under the sun. Many of our problems recur, though today we solve them differently, with other methods. Studies show that in recent decades the work of reforming central banks has tended to follow a clear pattern. A report from BIS, the central bank of the central banks, notes the following characteristics. ·  The move to greater independence and the commitment to price stability entail a desire to focus on core operations and a deeper analysis. There is also a greater need to operate and communicate in ways that are effective and enhance confidence. ·  Internationalisation also has effects, not least financial integration.

[27]ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/ [28]For example, to participate in the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences, developing  countries have to put into practice key UN human rights and International Labour Organization conventions. [29]Bradford, A (2012), “The Brussels effect”, Northwestern University Law Review, 102(1). [30]See European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice (2018), The European Higher Education Area in  2018: Bologna Process Implementation Report, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. [31]For a discussion of these phenomena in the US context, see Inman, R. and Rubinfeld, D.  (1997), “Rethinking Federalism”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall 1997. [32]See ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#_in-place  andustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements [33]Capella-Ramos, J. (2018), “Country-specific recommendations for economic policies under  the 2018 European Semester”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB. [34]For an in-depth discussion of the policies that are needed to increase the international role of  the euro see Cœuré, B. (2019), “The euro’s global role in a changing world: a monetary policy perspective”, speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 15 February. [35]European Commission (2018), op. cit. [36]Case 6/64, Costa v E.N.E.L., judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, p. 594; Case 314/85,  Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, judgment of the Court of 22 October 1987, paragraphs 15–16. [37]Habermas, J. (2008 repr. ), Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory  of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg, MIT Press, p. 144 et seq. ; Luhmann, N. (1993), Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, pp. 150–3. [38]Sermon at St. Winfried Church, Bonn, 26th November 1981.