samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, a more realistic counterfactual would envisage euro area countries being connected by some version of the old Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), with the policies of several countries being in some way related to the policies implemented in particular by Germany and the respective currencies linked to the DM. Arrangements like the ERM imply a strong interdependence of national monetary policies, not a free float with complete monetary independence. In practice, because of the importance of the German economy in Europe and the stability of its currency, the ERM accorded a central role to the monetary policy implemented by the Bundesbank, set on the basis of German macroeconomic conditions. If we think about how such a system would have worked prior to the crisis, we would get to the conclusion that it would have made the divergences between countries more acute than those we have actually seen within the euro area. For example, policy interest rates determined by the Bundesbank on the basis of the outlook for price developments in Germany alone would probably have been lower before the crisis than those determined by the ECB for the euro-area as a whole. Within an ERM regime, lower German interest rates would have been transmitted elsewhere in Europe, including to countries such as Spain or Ireland, where domestic inflation and house price developments would not have warranted such an easy policy stance.

Similarly, long-term rates on bank mortgage loans to households have increased in Greece, Ireland and Spain since the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, while they continued to fall in France and Germany until the end of 2010. Considering the scale of the underlying problems and thus the time it will take to resolve them, the potential for cross-country variation in monetary policy transmission will persist. So the single monetary policy may have different effects in different parts of the euro area, leading to persistent differences in economic performance, even with the single policy stance established by the ECB’s Governing Council. We are already seeing greater variation from country to country than in the pre-crisis period. While the German economy appears to have recovered quickly from the recession – growing 1.5% in the first quarter of this year – in those countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis growth remains sluggish. As a result, current cross-country growth differentials are significant compared with the pre-crisis period. To some extent, these differences are a mirror image of those before the crisis. Those countries which had more buoyant growth during the pre-crisis period are also those that have accumulated large financial imbalances. In the middle of the past decade, the strong growth in household loans fuelled housing and construction booms in countries such as Spain and Ireland. Loan growth rates there peaked at annual rates of around 25%, compared with an area-wide peak of 10%.
It is accordingly conceivable that the Swedish economy will move into a process with accelerating productivity growth but let us wait until that happens before incorporating it in our expectations and policy decisions. Our economy is developing favourably enough as it is. A growth process driven by rising investment and productivity can result in good circles. To some extent, that can be said to have been the case in recent years. It accordingly helps to explain the favourable economic developments in Sweden. Another cause lies in the various deregulations that have been implemented. 1  BIS Review 87/2000  Inflation this year improved by deregulation and competition Thus, it is other positive supply side effects that have helped to achieve the rapid output growth without generating inflationary impulses. The effects have come from the deregulation of electricity and telecom markets, as well as from the EU’s agricultural reform. Meanwhile, the temporarily lower rate of inflation has meant that real wage growth has exceeded expectations and thereby acted as a general demand stimulus. On the whole, however, the effects are of the one-off kind that lower the price level and stimulate demand for just a limited period. But if these effects have a gradual impact on different segments of the economy, their overall impact on inflation may be spread over many years. Another explanation for the favourable overall price trend is the generally stronger competition.

It is now more difficult for firms to raise prices in order to improve profit margins, as usually happens at this stage in a business cycle. To some extent this may also be because firms know that price impulses from that quarter will inevitably cause the Riksbank to raise the instrumental rate. To achieve a reasonable return on capital, firms are obliged instead to make production more efficient. That tends to result in better productivity. The increased oil prices can be cited correspondingly as an example of a negative supply shock. That is not an entirely adequate description, however, because to a certain extent, rising oil prices have to do with the better global activity, which normally leads to a general increase in commodity prices. The oil price increases tend to push prices up and curb output. But so far, the combined impact of all the supply shocks seems to be positive, that is, lower inflation and high demand growth. Larger amount of unutilised resources Yet another explanation for the moderate path of inflation could be that the amount of unutilised resources is larger than we - and many others - counted on earlier. Last autumn, for example, many observers believed, along with the Riksbank, that labour shortages would lead to increased price pressure via higher wages. But our fears have not yet been confirmed.
We need to imbue our young with entrepreneurial instincts and attitudes, through their school education and life experiences. At the same time, the government should cut red tape, create more economic space for private enterprise, nurture high-potential local enterprises and develop a culture tolerant of risk-taking, experimentation and honest failure. A self-renewing, self-sustaining entrepreneurial culture will not emerge overnight, but we are making some headway. Ten Singapore companies made it to this year’s list of Forbes’ Global 200 companies with revenues under $ billion. This ranks among the largest number of companies for any country. A third area of focus is the development of our human capital, both local and foreign. Singaporeans rank highly in technical skills, and our students often top international mathematics and science competitions. But we need to improve our soft skills, such as people skills, management skills, communications skills, as well as cultural and artistic skills. We will also continue to welcome foreign talent to work, live and play here, to add to our talent pool. Fourth, we need to identify, nurture and promote new areas of growth in both manufacturing and services, the two complementary engines of our economy. The continuing emergence of lower-cost locations spurs us to constantly review and refresh our manufacturing value proposition, be it in refining our division of labour, exploiting economies of scale through shared facilities, or undertaking more innovation and R&D work.

A series of factors – first and foremost, in the case of the euro area, the Russian invasion of Ukraine - are responsible for these adverse economic dynamics and for the surge in inflation to levels that we had not seen for decades. Accordingly, central banks, including the ECB, have responded swiftly to the inflationary pressures, tightening financing conditions for both private economic agents and the government. Moreover, these shocks have thrown into stark relief European vulnerabilities in key areas, such as the energy sector, as well as the considerable disparities among countries in their relative exposure to them. And this is happening against the background of an increase in euro area public debt by almost 10 percentage points (pp) of GDP since the pandemic, leading to high debt-to-GDP ratios and high structural deficits in some countries that have shrunk the available fiscal space and represent an important vulnerability. All these elements underline the importance of achieving the correct monetary and fiscal policy mix in order to face this complex context. The current circumstances differ substantially from those prevailing at the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic confronted us with a severe, albeit temporary, exogenous shock, which was probably the biggest supply and demand shock we had faced in decades. In that context, a coordinated fiscal and monetary policy response was absolutely necessary to support the incomes of both households and firms, and to minimise the potential structural damage to employment, productive capacity and economic growth caused by the crisis.
I say this because I see governments taking the problem seriously and devoting significant attention to Year 2000 issues throughout the economy. I support these steps and encourage each of you to urge your government to move in this direction if it has not already done so. As supervisors and regulators, we must continue our efforts to promote solid and transparent programs covering Year 2000 information sharing, testing, and contingency planning. I am convinced that through the aggressive efforts of the global supervisory community and the firms that we supervise, we can build confidence that the financial sector will rise to the occasion long before January 1, 2000, which I might remind you is only 439 days from today. BIS Review 85/1998

If markets on which firms now rely for some of their  We also obtain a great deal of additional information in the course of our own market operations, through our involvement in payment systems and other infrastructure, through our counterparties and contacts, and in other ways. Intelligence of this sort allows us to understand the environment—the products, techniques, and markets—in which firms operate and how they and the markets in which they trade may behave in times of stress. It therefore supports analysis of how stress might spread and how the authorities can most effectively respond; and it helps to identify the appropriate channels for communicating this response. But analysis from intelligence can also provide early warning of symptoms of actual or incipient stress; for example, a high degree of leverage coupled with crowded trades in markets that can be illiquid. The authorities then have time, where appropriate, to publicise any concerns so that firms can take action to prevent the risks from crystallising, and factor them into stress tests and scenario analysis. We provide such analysis regularly in our Financial Stability Review. And were a crisis to develop, an understanding of the ‘systemic conjuncture’ is also required to enable the authorities to assess on a continuing basis the likely systemic impact, and to choose an appropriate policy response. As well as information exchange, strong co-ordination of decision making between central banks, regulators, and ministries of finance, is likely to be essential for effective crisis management.
Your own Chairman, Prof. A D V de Indraratne, chairs such Committee and we have benefited immensely from the insights and advice rendered by such Committee. In a similar manner, I am certain that the research findings that will be presented by you at the conclusion of this very timely conference, together with the professional views expressed at the technical sessions would help policymakers immensely to reshape their policy focus appropriately. In conclusion, let me emphasize our deep commitment to your theme by referring to our own Mission at the Central Bank. The Vision of the Central Bank is that of being a credible and dynamic Central Bank contributing to the prosperity of Sri Lanka. As set out in our Strategic Plan, the term prosperity has a wider connotation: i.e., the enhancement of the quality of life of people through sustainable wealth creation and inclusion of all segments of the society in enjoying the benefits of development. The Central Bank expects to facilitate this process by ensuring price stability and financial system stability while providing prudential and pro-active policy recommendations, as the Advisor to the Government on Economic Affairs. We have, so far, taken a pro-active stance in the delivery of prosperity and we are encouraging the key stakeholders in our country also, to implement the necessary strategies towards such end. We see the Sri Lanka Economic Association as being a key partner in the delivery of prosperity in our country and we commend you for your commitment and dedication.

As we are aware, the world’s focus and attention has been to usher in an economic order that ensures high economic growth and an advanced level of development. In this endeavour, the widely discussed topics include liberalization, globalization, IT revolution, poverty alleviation, trade co-operation, political inclusion, regionalization, and many other buzz topics. Amongst these topics, “inequality and poverty” has maintained an important position, and it has therefore been discussed for years. Let us then ask ourselves the question: What do we really mean by inequality and poverty? Inequality means the lack of or fair treatment in the sharing of wealth or opportunities between different groups in society; and Poverty is the condition of being extremely poor. What do those who are stricken by poverty and inequality feel? Simply, they suffer the lack of material well being and lack of opportunities to succeed. Such feelings are often the root causes of political, economic and social upheaval, tension and revolution. Mr. Chairman, poverty and inequality are very closely linked. There is also ample empirical evidence to suggest that inequality and poverty seriously affect development. Inequality often leads to poverty while poverty hinders development and prosperity. Addressing inequality issues would undoubtedly have a positive impact on poverty alleviation. We would also probably unanimously agree that alleviating poverty is vital, considering its many economic, social, cultural and even more importantly, the human costs.
Lim Hng Kiang: Sharpening risk management capabilities Keynote address by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 43rd Association of Banks in Singapore Annual Dinner, Singapore, 28 June 2016. *  *  *  Chairman and Council members of ABS, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to join you at the 43rd ABS Annual Dinner this evening. The global economy: slower for longer 2. Since I addressed the ABS in 2014, the global economy has continued to recover. But growth has been lacklustre and uneven. Risks remain, not least the prospect of political instability and the possibility of a rise in protectionist tendencies in the major economies. 3. In the near term, the unexpected results of the UK’s EU referendum or Brexit, would very likely continue to reverberate across financial markets around the world. It is a clear reminder of the risks that we face and how financial institutions and regulators must work together to ensure the continued resilience of our banking system and financial sector. •  MAS had been prepared for this possible outcome, and had taken precautionary measures, including keeping in close contact over the past weeks with banks in Singapore, foreign central banks and regulators. Our markets continue to function in an orderly manner and our financial system remains sound. 4. Beyond the immediate market turbulence, Brexit will also have wider economic implications for the region and Singapore.

The rate for New York State, which has been improving since the first quarter, is noticeably lower at 8.3 percent. Puerto Rico, which has had much higher unemployment than the mainland for the past several decades, saw a modest decline in its jobless rate, but at 15.6 percent is still showing little evidence of a recovery. Regional housing trends in New York and New Jersey We focus on housing at today’s briefing because it represents the most important asset that many households own, provides a substantial number of high-wage jobs and is often a key driver of regional as well as national business cycles. I’ll start with a key observation: During this recession, the housing sector contributed less volatility to the regional economy than it did in much of the nation. We have, of course, seen painful losses of homes, construction jobs and housing equity in New York and northern New Jersey. This pattern can be seen quite directly in the construction sector, where many jobs were created during the housing boom, but then were lost as the housing market deteriorated. However, our housing markets tend to be less influential in our economy because we are a relatively mature region. That is, we are not adding population as rapidly as some other parts of the country, so housing construction – which tends to be very cyclical – and associated purchases account for a smaller share of aggregate activity here than it does in faster growing regions.
In such a case, the Council should, still within these first 24 hours, either approve or object to the Commission’s proposal by a simple majority decision. In other words, they cannot amend it, only approve or  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  The Single Resolution Fund Turning to the Fund, the Board’s control of a common resolution fund is an essential element of the SRM. The Fund will be key to ensure adequate resolution financing without drawing on public funds and for taking swift actions, since it eliminates the need for protracted burdensharing discussions for cross-border banks. Although the SRM Regulation set up the Fund, the order by which bank contributions are raised at national level and pooled at EU level are detailed in accordance with an Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer and progressive mutualisation of those contributions into a single fund. According to the political agreement reached, the target level for the Fund will be 1 % of the amount of covered deposits of all banks authorised in the participating Member States. This target should be reached in eight years, with the gradual mutualisation being frontloaded with 40% of the total in the first year. During the transitional period of eight years, the contributions collected at national level will be allocated to separate national compartments corresponding to each participating Member State. These national compartments will be subject to progressive mutualised usage and will cease to exist at the end of the transition period.

Real house prices have almost trebled. The rise in house prices has been considerably stronger than earlier and has spanned a long period. With the exception of a few months in 2003, house prices have risen continuously since 1992. This is the second longest period of rising real prices since 1819. Statistics for earlier years do not exist. 8  BIS Review 28/2007  Norway is not the only country where house prices have shown a strong rise over a long period. House price inflation has been particularly high in Ireland and the Netherlands, but Denmark, the UK and Spain also stand out. The countries where house price inflation has been high are the same countries where economic growth has been strongest. Since prices are rising in tandem in many countries, it is natural to look for common driving forces. With increasing cross-border flows of intermediate goods, capital and increasingly so labour, prices will largely reflect growth and competition in the global economy. If capital or labour becomes too expensive in one country, businesses can relocate production. Prices for fixed factors of production, such as property, will on the other hand reflect income developments in different countries. Consequently, the rise in property prices will tend to be highest in those countries where income growth is highest. BIS Review 28/2007  9  External and domestic interest rates are low in an environment of solid growth. Long-term interest rates have fallen sharply both in nominal and real terms since the beginning of the 1990s.
In the Inflation Report’s main scenario, which assumes an unchanged repo rate, UND1X inflation one and two years ahead is judged to be 1.7 and 2.0 per cent, respectively. As I just said, the uncertainty about future inflation is greater than at the time of the May Report. Considering the Swedish economy’s present cyclical position and the events that have occurred, that is natural. But it does accentuate the importance of the risk spectrum, that is, a combined assessment of various factors that may affect future inflation. Today the Riksbank judges that this spectrum of risks is balanced; the downside risks associated with international developments are balanced by the upside risks from the weak exchange rate and a less favourable relationship between growth and inflation in a wide sense. As developments unfold, that balance can change so that interest rate policy may need to be adjusted in one direction or the other. That would be something the Executive Board would have to discuss as usual at its future monetary policy meetings. I particularly want to underscore that perhaps it is more than usually important to pay close attention to the future course of events. In the light of the analysis in the Inflation report, at yesterday’s meeting the Executive Board decided to leave the repo rate unchanged. 4  BIS Review 86/2001

And compared with other regions, this diversity, though somewhat more persistent, has been on the same scale as the heterogeneity across the different US regions and states, being the United States an example of a monetary union of approximately the same size as the Euro zone, and whose viability is unquestioned. Nobody considers that these divergences would advise California to have a different currency from that of New York or Illinois. What's more, empirical evidence from EMU shows that national business cycles have, with economic and monetary integration, become more synchronised. Admittedly, though, growth and inflation differentials that we should reduce have persisted over this period. However, the solution to this problem should not be sought by questioning what the euro can do to reduce these differences. Rather, we should determine what we should do with other policies to narrow them. This is so since monetary policy can do nothing. The best way in which it can contribute to boosting growth, employment and welfare is to keep inflation anchored for the area as a whole. If, as I stated, we are convinced of the enormous advantages of the Euro, not only in the political sphere but also in economic and social terms, the question to ask is what governments and national parliaments should do to entrench the euro further. And it is here that many major tasks remain. The first, which was promptly identified, was to look after fiscal policy.