samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
•  The published Allsopp analysis included a challenge from the major central banks to the major market participants to develop a new settlement mechanism. In short, find a solution or we will find one for you! I recount this history to highlight the magnitude of the achievement CLS represents. The establishment and growth of CLS is undoubtedly one of the most significant accomplishments in global financial markets in the post-war period and a major breakthrough in managing settlement risk in an over-the-counter market. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  The largest part of the achievement, of course, is the difficult job of making it happen. CLS was actually the third major concept for FX settlement. It succeeded because the industry collectively got firmly behind CLS and because of the hard work of the many people in the CLS organization, whose commitment and efforts continue to this day. Let me highlight three dimensions of CLS’s success. First, its growth and its scope. When it went live in 2002, CLS began settling FX transactions in just seven currencies with 39 settlement members. Today it settles in 17 currencies with 63 settlement members and 16,000 third party users. Volumes and values of transactions settled via CLS have also expanded significantly. Today CLS is settling average daily values of nearly $ trillion and average daily volumes of 1 million transactions. On its peak settlement value day, March 19, 2008, CLS settled over 10 trillion U.S. dollars equivalent. Second, adaptation to a rapidly changing foreign exchange market.

As global competition intensifies, Thailand can neither simply keep growing on the back of capital accumulation nor dwell on massive production of low value-added goods. Desirable product features such as high quality and consistency are needed to sustain export competitiveness, and to maintain linkage to the global arena with clear focus on market awareness and adaptability. Recently, there have been positive signs in some industries such as jewelry, garments, and food, where production technology has been upgraded to increase competitiveness of these industries and to move them up the value chain. Unfortunately, while such developments are encouraging, they have not been adequately spread out to other industries. By the time these adjustments are completed, it may have been too late, probably rendering losses in a number of industries. What we need now is a national agenda that comprehensively looks at competitiveness of all parts of the real sector. Industries that can no longer compete in the world market will have to be gradually phased out. Other industries that depict competitive edge and growth potential in the global arena will warrant further plans to upgrade technology, increase added values, and develop marketing strategies. These plans will have to be implemented through a concerted national effort so as to ensure better resource allocation along with greater value creation. Reforming the real sector would however need to be complemented by strengthening of the financial sector. A notable example of such a strategy is the establishment of the Thai Asset Management Corporation or TAMC.
However, with less than three years of being fully transparent about our future policy intentions, it is too early to draw a conclusion regarding macroeconomic stability. An intermediate objective of communication is to provide a better understanding of the Bank’s reaction pattern. One test of this to consider the volatility of market interest rates on the day Norges Bank decides the interest rate. If the new communication approach has been successful, one should expect that the interest rate decisions are more predictable. Chart 5 shows the magnitude of market rate changes on the day the interest rate is decided. We see that volatility in market interest rates has on average been smaller after we started publishing our interest rate forecasts. Although one cannot exclude the possibility that the reduction in volatility is caused by other factors than policy communication, it seems that our reaction pattern has become somewhat better understood. One internal effect of publishing interest rate forecasts is that it provides discipline in the internal decision process and good incentives for the staff. I have observed how transparency has changed the motivation and discipline of the economists within Norges Bank. By publishing our own interest rate forecast, each sector expert will see how his or her judgment might affect policy. Moreover, by following the principle that what is communicated externally should reflect the internal decision process, we need to think extra hard about what we do internally. Transparency makes the public better capable of evaluating the central bank’s analyses and policy assessments.

How should we ensure the integrity of the advisers and avoid groupthink? I welcome more research on these and other issues related to the role of the staff. Good decisions require qualified people, an appropriate incentive structure, and a good decision-making process. In addition, good decisions become more effective if they are communicated well. Transparency generally improves both the quality of communication and the decision-making process. My ambitious goal is that Norges Bank shall be at the forefront in terms of communication and decision-making processes. Thank you for your attention. 8  BIS Review 132/2008  BIS Review 132/2008  9  10  BIS Review 132/2008  BIS Review 132/2008  11
Finally, I am concerned about a potential interaction between the financial uncertainty associated with the tapering program and the political uncertainty about fiscal negotiations in the US in the coming months. To close our conference, tomorrow we will have a policy panel where three distinguished economists: Guillermo Calvo, Vittorio Corbo, and Maurice Obstfeld, will share their thoughts on the end of QE and its consequences for emerging markets. We have navigated through challenging times in recent years. The decisive action of policymakers worldwide has spared the global economy from further trouble. In many cases policy has had to go ahead of research. But we should take time to think hard about these events; their causes; their mechanisms; and the benefits and costs of the policies being implemented. This will allow us to finish the course and to derive important lessons for the future. I am confident that the discussion of the next two days will help us advance toward this goal. I would like to finish this presentation by thanking Claudio Raddatz, Diego Saravia, and Jaume Ventura for putting together an exciting program and all of you for coming to participate and share in the discussion. Thank you References Bianchi, J. (2011) “Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pp. 3400–3426, December 2011. Dell’Ariccia, G., Laeven, L., and Suarez, G. (2013) “Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy’s Risk‐ Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States,” IMF Working Paper 13/143, International Monetary Fund.

Ooi Sang Kuang: Expanding ASEAN-EU economic links - the role of the euro Closing remarks by Mr Ooi Sang Kuang, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Euro Conference - “Expanding ASEAN-EU Economic Links - The Role of the Euro", Kuala Lumpur, 15 July 2005. *  *  *  Yang Berhormat Dato' Mustapa bin Mohamed, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Mr. Klaus Regling, Director General, European Commission Your Excellency Ambassador Thierry Rommel Excellencies Distinguished speakers and guests Ladies and gentlemen, Indeed, we have come to the end of a very fruitful set of discussions at this Conference. I was pleased to note that the tone of our discussions has underscored that the bilateral spirit of cooperation between ASEAN and the EU is intact and strong. I sensed a unanimous recognition that it is only by continuing to work together and cooperate with each other that we can reinforce this positive partnership to perpetuate continued shared prosperity. Against the background of strengthening our partnership, I sensed the acknowledgement among participants that we do have a dynamic partnership, but that there remains more to be done to foster greater symmetry in the relationship for increased wealth creating possibilities. I believe the Conference has set in motion how the prevailing economic and financial developments as well as prospects in ASEAN and the EU can contribute further to the agenda of taking our partnership forward.
3  2  See The Brave New Business Cycle: No Recession in Sight, William Dudley and Edward McKelvey, January 1997, Goldman Sachs Economic Research Group. 3  Adding financial intermediation to these models has become a very active area of research. See, for example, the recent work of Vasco Curdia and Michael Woodford in “Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 385. 2  BIS Review 23/2010  Events of the past decade confirm that financial conditions matter and that the fed funds rate is not a sufficient statistic with which to assess the impact of monetary policy on the real economy. Of course, this is not news to the Federal Reserve, which has explicitly taken financial conditions into account in its conduct of monetary policy. This is evident in the transcripts of the FOMC meetings that are publicly available and the numerous references to financial conditions in the FOMC minutes that go back more than a decade. An analysis of the FOMC minutes over the past decade indicates that references to financial conditions have been frequent, especially recently. Exhibit 1 illustrates the percentage of paragraphs in the minutes (excluding the directive and some other paragraphs associated with administrative matters such as the election of the chairman) that mention the phrase “financial conditions.” As can be seen, there have been frequent references over the past decade. One peak occurred in 2000 when the stock market peaked and began to deflate.

Transparency enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy by helping to guide the expectations of economic agents and bring them into line with policy objectives and actions. For these reasons, the ECB has striven to be as transparent as possible, communicating clearly, and by a variety of means, its policy objective, its strategy, its assessment of the economic situation, and its view of the outlook for price stability and associated risks. There is no doubt, however, that communication is a challenging task. I can assure you that we at the ECB – in light of the mandate that was assigned to us by the Maastricht Treaty and the trust and credibility we have earned from more than 313 million citizens – take this challenge very seriously. *** Chairman, Governors, Professors, dear friends, I have on behalf of the Executive Board and Governing Council of the ECB to thank all of you for having accepted our invitation and for having contributed so actively to the discussions. The ECB considers important to permanently guard against complacency and to remain open to criticisms and suggestions, to take regularly stock of the advances of academic research. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 110/2006
Shaping the global governance structure At their summit in Pittsburgh last September, the G20 leaders “…designate[d] the G20 to be the premier forum for our international economic cooperation”. As an effective and powerful group, the G20 featured prominently in the broad international efforts to stabilise the global economy in late 2008 and early 2009. Without its prompt and comprehensive action, the consequences of the crisis would have been much worse. Among the G20 measures of 2009 were the efforts to strengthen confidence in international financial institutions, the IMF in particular, to permit it to play an effective role in tackling the crisis. Indeed, the G20 increasingly uses the IMF as an instrument of its policy implementation. 4  The membership of the G20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Korea, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. The G20 was formed as a new forum for cooperation and consultation on matters pertaining to the international financial system. It studies, reviews, and promotes discussion among key industrial and emerging market countries of policy issues pertaining to the promotion of international financial stability, and seeks to address issues that go beyond the responsibilities of any one organization. 5  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organisation of 186 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.

2  BIS Review 44/2010  In addition, real interest rates in Norway fell markedly through the 1990s from high levels. This was because the fixed krone exchange rate regime maintained through the period managed to bring down inflation and inflation expectations. Moreover, growth in public spending was rapidly reduced once business sector activity had recovered. Economic shift Over the past decade Norway experienced an economic shift. The cost level began to rise. This was related to the sharp improvement in Norway’s terms of trade at the time and a gradual pickup in growth abroad. Prices for Norwegian exports such as oil, gas, metals, minerals, fish and freight, rose markedly, while prices for imported goods fell. From 2003 to 2008, terms-of-trade gains alone pushed national income up by more than 20 per cent, or a good 4 per cent per year. Institutions and mechanisms had also been put in place to manage the sharp increase in income. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global, and the fiscal guidelines were established with the express purpose of making the mainland economy less susceptible to fluctuations in the oil price. Improved terms of trade, higher revenues and increased government spending contributed to a stronger krone and a shift in real resources towards sheltered sectors. At the same time, the fiscal rule provided a basis for growth in business sectors other than the oil industry and the public sector through the decade.
At the same time, financial flows were gradually liberalised and a global financial system emerged, with the active participation of global banks and investment firms. In addition, foreign direct investment inflows have increased tenfold since 1993. The opening up of the current account and the subsequent expansion of trade and financial flows enabled many countries to raise their development status. In this vein, GDP per capita in low and middle income countries doubled in constant terms from 1995 to 2016, while extreme poverty was notably reduced. The Spanish experience since the mid-1980s, when we joined the European Union, constitutes a canonical example of the benefits that the opening up and liberalisation of an economy can bring about in terms of growth and economic modernisation. The need to reform the global governance model However, we should admit that the multilateral system that emerged from Bretton Woods has been sluggish in adapting to a changing world. A world in which emerging economies play a greater role in the global economy than they did in the past. This has undermined some of its legitimacy, causing disaffection among some of its members and impairing the consensus needed for agreements to be reached at international level. The emergence of the global financial crisis in 2008 highlighted the need to rebalance representation on global fora in order for effective concerted action to be achieved.

Pablo Hernández de Cos: Signature of the banking protocol for the financial inclusion of the elderly Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation, Madrid, 21 February 2022. * * * First Deputy Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning everyone and many thanks to the Ministry for inviting me to speak. The Protocol presented here today concerns an issue that is affecting many aspects of our lives. I am of course referring to the accelerated digitalisation of our societies, a phenomenon which has clear benefits for citizens. Indeed, national and European public authorities are firmly committed to accelerating this process and for example, the Next Generation EU funds are centred precisely on driving digitalisation. There are also clear benefits for the financial sector overall and the banking sector in particular. The new digital channels give instant and continued access to financial services, without the need to visit the bank. It is hardly surprising, then, that digitalisation is a key financial inclusion strategy in many emerging countries. From the standpoint of financial stability, which, as we all know, is essential for guaranteeing citizens’ well-being, digitalisation also has important benefits. It leads to efficiency gains that help reinforce the soundness and resilience of the banking sector.
Though they looked and felt like chaos, these dynamics were in fact manifestations of a new network order. The second key robustness result concerns the “long-tailed distribution” of connected networks. The degree of a node measures the number of links to other nodes. So the degree distribution could be thought of as a histogram of the number of links for each node. For a network whose links are randomly configured, this degree distribution would be symmetric and bell-shaped; it would have a fat middle and thin tails. 5  For example, Allen and Gale (op.cit). 6  For example, May and Anderson (1991), Albert et al (2004), Kinney et al (2005), Watts (2002). 7  For example, at the Bank of England by Nier et al (2008) and Gai and Kapadia (2008); and by Battiston et al (2009) and Gallegati et al (2008). BIS Review 53/2009  5  But many real-world networks do not exhibit these properties, including the internet, biological food webs and epidemiology networks. 8 Instead these networks have been found to have a thin middle and long, fat tails. There is a larger than expected number of nodes with both a smaller and a larger number of links than average. Some financial networks, such as payment systems, have also been found to exhibit long tails. 9 Long tails have been shown to have important implications for network robustness. In particular, long-tailed distributions have been shown to be more robust to random disturbances, but more susceptible to targeted attacks.10 Why?

But, looking beyond that, the US economy is underpinned by its robust financial system, by continuing rapid underlying productivity growth, and by strongly supportive monetary and fiscal policies, so that most forecasters anticipate US growth of 2 ½ - 3% this year and somewhat more next. There's even been a better tone in equity and credit markets since mid-October, and some signs of a recovery in ICT investment. On that basis - and notwithstanding the recent disappointing performance of the Eurozone particularly the German - economy - that suggests a reasonable prospect of a continuing but relatively slow pick-up in the rate of growth in our major export markets. And we should also be helped by the recovery of the euro against both sterling and the dollar through the past year. This moderately positive external environment should, looking forward, bring a gradual pick up in external demand and help to stabilise, and subsequently improve, the prospects for business investment in the UK. So the key question on the domestic front remains what is likely to happen to consumer demand: will it fall away abruptly - as some people fear - or will it moderate more gradually as others expect? The truth is that no-one can know the answer with any great confidence - those who claim to know with certainty are always the ones to be wary of in the forecasting business.
For them, one of the major advantages of joining a monetary union is stronger economic growth thanks to lower transaction costs and reduced exchange rate risk. Moreover, for countries that have historically experienced high and volatile inflation and thus high interest rates, adopting the euro brings a fall in nominal and real interest rates, thereby reducing government and private debt burdens. Given these positive effects, why has Switzerland not embraced the euro or, at least, pegged the franc to the euro? To my mind, there are four main reasons for this. •  The first is that retaining our own currency, within the framework of flexible exchange rates, gives us the freedom to choose the level of domestic inflation. •  Secondly, monetary independence allows a better reaction to country-specific shocks. •  Thirdly, monetary integration would lead to higher interest rates in our capital market. •  And finally, any tentative move to peg the franc to the euro, as long as Switzerland is not at least in the process of becoming an EU member, would destabilise rather than stabilise our currency. Let me review these points in detail. 2  BIS Review 46/2006  Choice of monetary policy goal The European Central Bank's main task is to guarantee price stability in the euro area. The ECB achieves this by, in its own wording, "aim[ing] at maintaining [consumer price] inflation below, but close to, 2% over the medium term". The National Bank Act defines the SNB's main task, too, as the achievement of price stability.

No doubt, however, that a point target can also be attractive, as it is clearer and constitutes a stronger anchor for expectations. Given the SNB's excellent track record with regard to price stability – twelve years of inflation below 2% – we can benefit from firmly anchored expectations without having to accept the unnecessary constraints that a point target would imply. The third subtlety is that, while the SNB defines price stability as inflation of less than 2%, the ECB, which has more or less the same definition, aims for a rate close to 2%, and the Bank of Israel has an inflation target of 1 to 3%. Why is it that the three central banks have different views as to what exactly constitutes price stability? There are several considerations here, but the most important is the historical perspective. For central banks that have faced relatively high and volatile inflation levels in the past, a comparatively high inflation target is already ambitious. Only once expectations have been anchored, can further steps towards price stability be envisaged. This is true for Israel, where keeping inflation between 2% and 3% is a huge step forward as compared with historical records. For the ECB, which still has to cope with adjustment difficulties (such as higher inflation in countries that are catching up, like Spain or Greece), an inflation rate "close to 2%" seems reasonable. Monetary independence thus allows a country to choose the level of inflation it finds appropriate.