samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Given that we are the Bank of England, it would be understandable if many in Northern Ireland were suspicious of our role. But I can assure you that we are most definitely the central bank of the whole of the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland. We pay great attention to events here, and, along with other members of the Monetary Policy Committee, I visit regularly. We have a full time Agency with a team who live and work in Northern Ireland and report back every month on what is happening in the local economy. At this momentous time in the history of Northern Ireland, I can assure you that the Bank will continue to place great importance on its presence here. During my visits, I have discovered some extraordinarily successful companies, many set up during the troubles. As you continue to build the political success and economic prosperity of the new Northern Ireland, the Bank of England will support you wholeheartedly through our efforts to provide a platform of economic stability. BIS Review 114/2007  5

Since the introduction of the MPESA mobile banking service in Kenya, the number of adults with access to financial services has increased from 42% in 2011 to 75% today. Agent banking in Malaysia has provided consumers with an innovative and alternative channel to access financial services, resulting in the percentage of sub-districts served by financial services access point to increase from 46% in 2011 to 96% in 2014. This has enabled 99% of Malaysians, particularly those in rural areas, to conveniently access and benefit from financial services. The microfinance  1  “Global Financial Development Report 2014”, World Bank, 2014. 2  Discussion note “Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth”, IMF, 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  institution Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has extended credit through its 2,500 branches to almost 8 million people, with 60% of them lifted from poverty. The loan recovery rate is higher than 98 percent. The experience in Bangladesh, in particular, dispels the myth that the poor is not bankable. Of proportionate regulation and the global standards The proportionate application of Global Standards for financial regulation is a critical factor in enabling innovative financial inclusion solutions, ensuring its delivery in a safe and sound manner. My remarks today will touch on the following topics: Recent developments in global standards and financial inclusion; Focus areas to advance Proportionality in Practice; and The importance of the Global Symposium to galvanise action.
However, in 1995 and early 1996, inflation expectations according to Aragon Fondkommission’s surveys were significantly above the target, which all else being equal increases inflation and requires a higher rate of unemployment to attain the target (Svensson 2012d). Inflation expectations do not become anchored around the target until the latter part of 1996. The period from 1997 and onwards is therefore more relevant for assessing target attainment and the real economic costs of falling below the target. 4  See, for example, Ingves (2012) and Per Jansson’s comments in the minutes of the monetary policy meeting held in October 2012 (Sveriges Riksbank 2012c, page 21). 5  Chapter 1, article 2 of the Sveriges Riksbank Act (SFS 1988:1385) states that “the objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability”. According to the government bill (Swedish government 1997, page 1), that proposed the act also states that “as an authority under the Riksdag, the Riksbank, without prejudice to the inflation target, should furthermore support the goals of general economic policy with the aim to achieve sustainable growth and high employment”. High employment should be interpreted as the highest sustainable rate of employment. The idea behind the bill is hardly that there is any conflict between “sustainable growth” and “high employment”. See Svensson (2012b) for a further discussion of this. 6  It may be interesting to note in this context that the Riksbank has in principle the same mandate as the Federal Reserve.

We can see this in Figure 6, which shows unemployment along the horizontal axis and CPI inflation along the vertical axis for the years 1976–2012. We can see that during the 1970s and 1980s, there was no systematic relationship between inflation and unemployment. The long-run Phillips curve, the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment, could be said to be vertical. When inflation expectations are anchored, inflation and unemployment are interlinked However, from 1998 and onwards things look different (the red observations in Figure 6). When inflation expectations are anchored to the target but inflation varies, a systematic trade-off arises between inflation and unemployment. The black line shows an estimated long-run Phillips curve for the period, a curve that is not vertical but sloping. The estimated slope is 0.75.10 This means that a one per cent higher average rate of unemployment is associated with a 0.75 per cent lower average rate of inflation. This in turn means that a 0.6 percentage points lower rate of inflation than the target from 1997 entails a 0.6/0.75 = 0.8 percentage points higher average rate of unemployment. The average number of people in the labour force over the past 15 years has been about 4.7 million. 0.8 per cent of 4.7 million is about 38 000.
This is partly because uncertainty increases in the longer term, and partly because I myself will no longer be a member of the Executive Board and nor, by the way, will Lars Nyberg. Other members of the Executive Board may make different assessments of the direction of monetary policy. However, if inflation turns out to be higher than we estimated in the Monetary Policy Report, the Riksbank may need to increase the repo rate faster than indicated in the repo-rate path. It is then quite possible that it will be raised to 4 per cent already next year. Conclusion My overall assessment is that monetary policy has worked well during the more than five years I have been a member of the Riksbank’s Executive Board. The average for CPI inflation in the period 2006–2011 is 1.8 per cent with the current forecast for inflation this year. It is estimated that the repo rate will on average be somewhat lower in 2011 than it was  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  in 2006, which contributes to reducing the average for CPI inflation somewhat during this period. The average for CPIF inflation during these six years is 2.0 per cent, that is equal to the inflation target. The Riksbank has also helped to keep up the level of production and employment during these years. On the other hand, it is my view, with hindsight, that monetary policy was too expansionary in the years preceding the financial crisis.

Some countries have opted for various forms of capital control, although their effectiveness needs to be evaluated based on the objective of imposing them at the first place. Some studies find that capital controls have some compositional effect and could alter the maturity of new investments. So far as reducing the volume of flows, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Unless the authorities have full control over capital accounts, partial restrictions are unlikely to offset the impact of flows, prevent appreciation of local currency and provide more space for independent monetary policy. In principle, flow of capital from advance economies to emerging ones and appreciation of the currencies of the latter over time is a mutually beneficial secular trend, as long as it is supported by strong fundamentals, better growth prospects, and high productivity differentials. Rather than fighting against this trend through over restrictive capital controls or excessive reserve accumulation, there is strong legitimacy in using macro-prudential policies to mitigate the adverse effects of volatility in capital flows, especially those with speculative nature, over financial stability. Several emerging economies have started implementing such measures to limit the credit growth and asset price bubbles. These measures include raising reserve requirement ratios, requiring higher income- and deposit-to-loan ratios, tightening capital adequacy requirements and liquidity ratios, introducing transaction taxes, fees etc.
1 COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University,  accessed June 29, 2020. 2 The impact on lower-wage workers is analyzed in Cajner, Tomaz, L.D. Crane, R. A. Decker, J. Grigsby, A.  Hamins-Puertolas, E. Hurst, C. Kurz, and A Yildirmaz., 2020. “The U.S. Labor Market During the Beginning of the Pandemic Recession.” Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, Working Paper, No. 2020–58 (June). 3 U.S. Census Bureau and Department of Housing and Urban Development, Monthly New Residential  Construction, May 2020, June 17, 2020. 4 An example at the New York Fed is the bi-weekly publication of the Weekly Economic Index. 5 Empire State Manufacturing Survey, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 2020; Business Leaders Survey,  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 2020. The data on small business revenue come from Womply, a software-as-a-service provider focused on customer relationship management. 6 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, March 3,  2020; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, March 15, 2020. 7 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, April 29,  2020; See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, June 10, 2020. 8 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New Measures  to Support the Economy, March 23, 2020.

Joseph Yam: Reflections relevant to the banking profession in Hong Kong Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Joint HKAB – HKIB Dinner in honour of Mr Joseph Yam's retirement as Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 28 September 2009. *  *  *  Peter, friends and colleagues of the banking profession, Not only am I deeply touched by all of the kind and generous words that have been said this evening, but I have also been greatly impressed by the skits and other entertainments put on this evening. I had always assumed that whatever surplus talents bankers may have were always used up on the golf course. Now I know that these talents stretch in other, more cultural directions. Thank you all for such an enjoyable and unforgettable evening. This is a convivial occasion, and the last thing you will want to hear is a long and earnest speech from me. However, this will be my last formal event with you as Monetary Authority. And I think you all know me well enough to expect more than just a few words of gratitude – however heartfelt – for this splendid event. I shall be brief. Much has been said and written recently about the origins, progress and implications of the global financial crisis that erupted with such fury just over a year ago.
Raising official interest rates could be counterproductive if the boom immediately turns to bust, so that the economy is subject to the twin deflationary impulses of an asset-price collapse and the effect of the policy tightening. Indeed, in the unlikely event that the policy maker knows that an asset-price collapse is imminent, monetary relaxation, rather than tightening, is called for. Gruen, Plumb and Stone (2003) show that the information needed to render a LATW policy effective is demanding. Third, a modest increase in interest rates may do little to restrain a credit/asset-price boom that is in full swing. But an increase large enough to materially affect the evolution of asset prices is likely to have a significant adverse impact on economic activity. So the policy maker needs to believe that the (certain) short-term costs of such a strategy are outweighed by the (uncertain) longer-term gains. Moreover, if the key concern is a build-up of debt, higher interest rates could actually exacerbate the problem if the resulting increase in debt service outweighs the reduction in new borrowing. Whatever the merits of the above arguments, the fall-out in the real economy from the banking crisis seems to have made a policy of benign neglect towards potentially unsustainable credit/asset-price booms untenable and, at least in the absence of other instruments, rather tipped the balance towards “leaning” rather than “cleaning”. But that still leaves open the question as to how effective a LATW interest-rate policy would have been in the past and could be in the future.

28  BIS Review 111/2010  Table 3 A Leaning Against the Wind Policy  Policy Rate (% change from 2003Q1) Base  Real Stock of Credit  Real House Prices  (% change from 2003Q1)  (% change from 2003Q1)  Output (% change from 2003Q1)  LATW Base LATW Base LATW Base LATW scenario scenario scenario scenario  United States 2004Q1  1.0  2.9  5.9  5.3  5.5  4.2  4.1  3.7  2005Q1  2.5  4.9  12.2  10.5  13.8  10.0  7.6  6.3  2006Q1  4.5  6.9  19.3  16.4  21.1  14.0  10.9  8.5  2007Q1  5.3  7.0  28.1  23.9  22.2  12.1  12.5  9.0  2008Q1  3.2  3.0  34.7  30.1  16.2  5.0  14.8  10.8  United Kingdom 2004Q1  3.9  5.6  9.7  9.4  17.5  15.3  3.6  3.4  2005Q1  4.8  7.1  21.1  19.7  26.7  18.3  5.5  4.7  2006Q1  4.5  7.1  38.2  34.3  34.7  15.1  9.1  7.3  2007Q1  5.3  7.4  45.3  39.7  43.0  15.0  11.6  9.0  2008Q1  5.3  6.0  55.4  47.2  41.1  5.8  13.7  10.1  BIS Review 111/2010  29  Chart 1 Deviation of Policy Rates from Taylor Rule  5  Percentage points Euro area  4  UK  3  US 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4  -5 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Source: OECD.
Recent priorities Amongst the numerous lessons from the financial crisis were: don’t under-estimate tail risks, do worry about contagion, and liquidity matters. Although the payments systems in the UK (and elsewhere) performed well during the crisis, those insights prompted us to address a number of credit, liquidity, and operational risk issues within our core systems with more vigour than previously, and have shaped much of our recent work programme. Concerns about tail risks and contagion have prompted changes in both the wholesale and retail spheres. In the wholesale sphere, the recent focus has been on tiering. Historically, CHAPS had a very tiered structure, with the majority of payments being made by settlement banks on behalf of their customers, a practice which generated significant intraday credit and liquidity exposures between direct participants and their customers. This model also concentrated operational risks, given that an outage at one of the big settlement banks would have prevented its customers from making payments. These risks would be exacerbated in periods of stress, potentially contributing to contagion as payment services were withdrawn or collateral suddenly demanded. Since the crisis, the Bank, working with the scheme manager CHAPS Co, has acted to reduce tiering. Five banks have become direct participants of CHAPS since 2007, and a further five have given us formal indication that they will do so soon.

Before Turner, landscapes were generally viewed as subjects unworthy in their own right; their role was merely to provide backdrop to the real action. Turner elevated the genre by showing how paint could not only convey the appearance of a place but also capture something of its spirit. Turner also used art to hold a mirror to the technological and social transformations happening around him. Masterpieces such as Rain, Steam and Speed – The Great Western Railway captured the advent of the steam age. The Slave Ship reflected on the moral preoccupations of his times. The artistic developments that Turner pioneered resonated well beyond his lifetime, providing inspiration to the Impressionists and leading Mark Rothko to joke “This man Turner, he learnt a lot from me”. A  contemporary reviewer may have put it best when he placed Turner among ‘the masters whose day is not so much of to-day, as of “all times”’.1 Indeed, Turner’s legacy endures today through his influence on art for over two centuries, to the prize that bears his name to celebrate British contemporary art, to this magnificent gallery, the Turner Contemporary. Soon Turner’s work will feature on another 2 billion works of art – the new £ notes from the Bank of England. 1  The Champion, Newspaper Article, published 7 May 1815. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Banknote design The new £ note celebrates Turner, his art and his legacy in all their radiant, colourful glory.
1 “Poland’s wild ride out of communism remains election faultline”, James Shotter, Financial Times, 2 October  2019. 2 “The legacy of 1989 has been complacency”, Tony Barber, Financial Times, 2 October 2019. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

So indeed the whole stress test was more severe also because of other shocks that were considered in the adverse scenario. Just as an example, in what regards the shock in interest rates that the exercise assumes, we had an increase of the yields of sovereign bonds, which in the first year on average was 152, and the second year another 112, and in the third year also 112. You have then the distribution by country in this slide, and what is above the zero is the shock that we imposed in the scenario, an aggravation of the yields of sovereign bonds. And then below zero you have what happened since last year. And what happened? It was, as you know, exactly the opposite that the yields dropped a lot and so the prices of sovereign bonds increased on average by 12%. So this is just another indication of the severity of the exercise in confrontation with what has happened in reality since last year. Finally just to give you an idea about the drivers that command the impact of the stress test itself alone, of course the first three rows in this table show the increase in revenues, which is normal during the three years, and then the costs that were affecting the profit and loss accounts of the banks, and finally the impact on capital.
In each case, the reforms proposed were the result of careful analysis of the causes of the individual crises and a pragmatic assessment of what was needed to correct the conditions that had led to problems and to restore confidence. And in all cases, the strategy was continually modified and adjusted as conditions changed and as the principals responsible developed a better feel for what was working and what was not. Conclusion Recovery in the Asian crisis countries took time, but it was stronger and more rapid than had been typical in other emerging market financial crises. Barely 18 months after the crisis, for example, Korean GDP had returned to pre-crisis levels, and this was true for all the Asian crisis countries by 2003. Growth has been relatively strong and stable since, though at a pace somewhat below the unsustainable rates of the decade prior to the crises. The countries directly affected by the crises a decade ago are fundamentally stronger. The balance sheet weaknesses have been transformed into strength. Financial-sector reforms have been undertaken on a generally impressive scale. Stronger legal and institutional frameworks have helped create an environment in which enterprise is thriving. Macroeconomic policy has been reasonably prudent, and debt-to-GDP ratios are declining. Exchange rate regimes have become more flexible. These changes have made these economies far more resilient than they were a decade ago. They are much less likely to face the type of crisis, the acute, self-reinforcing panic produced by the balance sheet problems of that era.

Indeed, it is unusual for any economy to experience a change in the production factors of the magnitude and speed that immigration has triggered in Chile in the last three years. It is also unusual for an increase in potential growth to be accompanied by a reduction in the neutral MPR, which in this case has occurred due to the magnitude and persistence of the fall in interest rates in the world. In previous episodes of CPI basket changes, we had not seen so important corrections to the inflation measurement as this latest one. Faced with this unusual configuration of circumstances, the Central Bank of Chile needed to be rigorous in its analysis, clear in its conclusions and quick in its response. It was helped by the research work and the updating of his models that have been progressing for some time. But once all the pieces of this puzzle have been assembled, the Board has preferred acting over postponing a decision. It is an unusual action in the face of unusual circumstances. Central banks today are not prone to surprising the markets and ours is no exception. We do not seek surprises for the sake of them, and certainly we have not concealed anything in our communications of recent months regarding the analysis that we have conducted, nor have we distracted attention away from it. However, after accumulating evidence and reaching a downright conclusion about its implications for monetary policy, we saw few advantages and many more costs in postponing.