samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
By bringing together senior officials from central banks and supervisory agencies from over 100 countries, this year’s meeting will provide the platform for us to move ahead on the core of the regulatory changes, and to chart the direction for the remaining areas of work. 5. The two themes for this year’s conference – building a more resilient banking system, and creating a stable financial environment for sustained economic growth underscore two key principles. First, the financial system needs to be resilient to avoid destabilizing the economy. Second, beyond resilience, rebuilding the nexus between the financial sector and the real sector is critical to supporting growth and development. This is particularly important in many emerging economies where the pace of financial sector development has not caught up with that of the real economy. 6. Let me now share some reflections on three themes that permeate discussion on financial resilience – microprudential regulations, macroprudential regulations, and supervisory approach. The Basel Committee’s reforms 7. Many banks entered the crisis with too much leverage, too little capital and inadequate liquidity buffers. We need better micro-prudential regulations. Banks need to reduce leverage, have higher quality and quantity of capital to absorb losses, and maintain a higher proportion of liquid assets to withstand shocks in the funding markets. 8. The Basel Committee has agreed on the need for standards relating to capital, liquidity and leverage.

These first set of parameters for core capital has been carefully calibrated after considering the conditions in the various economies, as well as the results of  BIS Review 121/2010  1  the bottom-up Quantitative Impact Studies and the top-down macroeconomic impact of the proposed changes. The phase-in arrangement for the new benchmarks strikes an important balance between strengthening the financial system and supporting economic recovery. Singapore supports the Basel Committee’s reforms, and the further work to be done. 9. Going forward, our key challenge is to ensure robust implementation of these new capital standards. In an interconnected global system, major problems in one part of the system will eventually affect us directly or indirectly, through various channels. All economies, whether advanced or emerging, and whether they had a direct banking crisis or not, have therefore a shared interest in strengthening the resilience of the global financial system. 10. However, as we phase-in these measures, we need to be vigilant that these do not have unintended consequences on credit availability and economic growth, or in reducing diversity in the financial system. 11. In striving towards a convergence in regulatory standards in order to preserve a level playing field across jurisdictions, we should be cognizant that the starting conditions and future challenges of countries differ. For many emerging economies, their priority lies not in re-capitalising banks or reducing leverage, but in continuing the reform of the banking system and in developing deeper capital markets to support future economic expansion.
Denny H Kalyalya: Practical aspects of the risk management implementation process Opening remarks by Dr Denny H Kalyalya, Deputy Governor Operations, Bank of Zambia, at the Risk Management Workshop for Risk Liaison Officers, Alternates and Risk Coordinating Officers, Lusaka, 15 May 2008. * •  The Director – Risk Management  •  Ladies and Gentlemen  *  *  I wish to welcome you all to this second series of workshops organized by the Risk Management Department. This series of workshops is intended to help us all understand the practical aspects of the risk management implementation process as we proceed to apply it to our respective departments. The sessions you are going to have today and tomorrow focus on the first two stages in the risk management process i.e. the Context Establishment and Risk Identification stages. I am made to believe that, during the course of this year, you shall gather again to deal with the practical aspects of the other three critical stages in the approved risk management process, namely Risk Analysis, Risk Evaluation and Risk Treatment. As you participate in these workshops, it is important to bear in mind that senior management attaches great importance to the implementation of the risk management framework. Ladies and Gentlemen: These workshops have come against a backdrop of implementation teething problems. Departments had difficulties in understanding the initial guidance given by the Risk Management Department in its efforts to facilitate the implementation of the risk management framework.

This seems due, in part, to important fundamental improvements in policy credibility and economic performance. It may also reflect confidence that governments will ultimately act effectively to deal with these challenges. And it may reflect the inherent difficulty of assessing the risk in what may seem like low probability but very adverse outcomes. A number of fundamental changes in the U.S. financial system over the past 25 years appear to have rendered it able to withstand the stress of a broader array of shocks than was the case in the past. The core institutions hold more capital against risk. Risk management systems are more sophisticated and the internal control regimes around those systems are more robust. The earnings of many financial institutions are stronger and more diversified. Payments systems are stronger. Innovation continues at a remarkable pace, providing new ways to allocate and manage risk. Confidence in the overall resilience of the financial system needs to be tempered by the realization that there is much we still do not know about the likely sources and consequences of future stress to the system. Uncertainty is inherent in any process of change, but uncertainty is greater because much of the recent innovation has occurred against the backdrop of general economic stability and a sustained period of low credit losses, low risk premia and low implied volatility across many asset classes. This means that some aspects of the financial system today have not yet been subjected to the more exacting tests of macroeconomic or financial stress.
The Committee intends to provide information about its updated view in its August Inflation Report. Guidance, Contingency and Brexit My third example of guidance is associated with another major structural change: Brexit. To put the upcoming regime shift into context, consider what has already transpired merely in anticipation of possible future changes to flow of goods, service, capital and people. On the eve of the referendum, the MPC expected that a vote to leave would prompt the exchange rate to fall sharply, inflation to rise above the 2% target and growth to slow materially. That is exactly what has happened. Sterling fell sharply immediately following the result, and remains some 15% below its late-2015 peak before the referendum was called. Financial markets are valuing today what they expect tomorrow: a relative fall in real incomes as the UK moves toward its new trading arrangements. Inflation rose well above the 2% target, peaking at 3.1% late last year, an overshoot entirely due to the referendum-induced fall in the exchange rate. And UK growth has dropped from the fastest to the slowest in the G7. The economy has significantly underperformed the MPC’s projections ahead of the referendum, which were conditioned on a vote to 11  remain. That deceleration has occurred despite support from a much stronger-than-anticipated euro-area  and global growth and much more supportive domestic financial conditions, with the latter importantly influenced by the timely, comprehensive package of easing measures introduced by the Bank’s policy committees after the vote.

This volatility becomes Vicious when market participants with extensive control or influence over capital flows line themselves up, manipulate the prevailing negative and disturbed public mood, and exploit the discrepancies and vulnerabilities that inevitably arise in a global financial system that is held together by localised jurisdictions. The most vulnerable of these jurisdictions are often those which are held up as models of free-market economics: the small or medium open markets with few or no controls on capital movements and with transparent financial systems that operate according to simple and precise principles. 11. In Hong Kong last summer we found ourselves in exactly this situation. We were a choice target because our options were limited. We are prohibited by law from imposing exchange controls, and, even if we were not, it would be an act of lunacy for Hong Kong, with its highly externally oriented economy, even to consider them. The cornerstone of our financial system is the linked exchange rate between the Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar. This link is maintained by a classic currency board system so transparent and predictable in its responses to market conditions that it was, at least at that turbulent time, vulnerable in one of its central features. Under the currency board’s autopilot mechanism, any expansion in the monetary base causes interest rates to fall, while a contraction causes them to rise.
William L Rutledge: Implementing the New Basel Accord Speech by Mr William L Rutledge, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at The British Banker’s Association Basel 2 / CAD 3 Half Day Conference, London, UK, 13 March 2003. *  *  *  Introduction Thank you and good morning. It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to offer some thoughts on Basel implementation issues - thoughts that will reflect partly my role as the head of Bank Supervision at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and partly my role as a member of the Basel Committee. In that latter capacity, I’d like to begin by offering my thanks for all of the extremely helpful and constructive comments that the BBA has provided throughout the Basel consultative process. In my experience, having a candid dialogue between the industry and the supervisory community is the best way to develop well informed regulatory policy. Given our desire for Basel II to be consistent with the best existing and emerging risk measurement and management practices, getting specific feedback from the industry is particularly critical. It is also critical that we understand calibration issues so that we set appropriate numerical standards; in that connection, I’d like to offer my further thanks to all of the banks represented here that participated in the latest Quantitative Impact Survey. I know that gathering all the necessary data and providing it in the prescribed format was a daunting task.

With respect to the former, in each country or set of countries, processes to establish specific rules must occur to ensure that more local issues are addressed in an appropriate manner. In the United States, as in the EU, that process will be a very formal one. While the national rulemaking is going on, banks and supervisors around the world will also need to think through the practical implications surrounding implementation. To be sure, implementation of the New Accord will require a substantial resource commitment on the part of both banks and supervisors. However, I think it is important to emphasize that the efforts banks will need to undertake to comply with Basel II build, to a very significant extent, on the good work that many large and well-managed banks already have in train to improve their own risk management and measurement approaches. For example, many banks have for some time been devoting increased attention to the tracking of loan performance, and to the more sophisticated assessment of their loan quality. Further, banks have been analyzing their managerial processes - making sure they have the right system of checks and balances, with appropriate use of independent experts who would not gain from overly favorable assessments. Time and effort has also been invested in developing richer and more meaningful data on past, and likely future, credit performance - data that are needed to fuel management information  BIS Review 15/2003  1  and control systems for senior management use.
Page 6 sur 14 The plain lines correspond to the cycle started in 2022, whereas the dashed lines show the previous tightening cycle in 2005. The DFR is growing more rapidly than the MRO did in 2005. But the pace of the pass-through is relatively similar today compared to the previous cycle. Lending rates to NFCs (in red) are increasing today in line with policy rates, just as in 2005. They increased by almost 300 bp from January 2022 to March 2023, which represents 80% of the increase in the DFR over the same period. In-house econometric estimates2 indicate that the final 20% is expected to be passed on to lending rates by endyear. The transmission to lending rates for households might seem a bit slower today: They increased by about 210 bp from January 2022 to March 2023, which is a pace of growth comparable to 2005, despite a much faster rise in policy rates today. (2) Banks also report in the latest BLS3 that the demand for loans --either for firms or for mortgages-- decreased strongly in the first quarter of 2023. (3) Finally, credit standards for firms are tightening. While sometimes difficult to separate from lower demand, the pace of the tightening reported in the BLS is the highest since 2011. Against this backdrop, volumes of loans are decelerating, even though growth in outstanding amounts remains positive [+3.3% in the euro area for mortgages to households and +5.2% for loans to businesses].

2  Estimation of an error-correction model in which the projection of the NFC lending rate depends on the lagged OIS3M and OIS2Y 3 April 2023 euro area bank lending survey (europa.eu), released on May 2, 2023  Page 7 sur 14  By the way, the growth of loans in France remains significantly higher than in the euro area average. Overall, evidence shows a quick and smooth pass-through of ECB decisions to broad financing conditions. But this is only the first part of the transmission to tame inflation. II. Transmission to the real economy and the decline in inflation In the textbook theory, tighter financial conditions moderate aggregate demand. Monetary policy also affect inflation through the exchange rate channel, but this is beyond the scope of my speech today. According to recent ECB work based on a set of models that complement each other,4 our policy tightening is estimated to lower inflation by around 2  4  Darracq-Paries, Motto, Montes-Galdón, Ristiniemi, Saint Guilhem and Zimic, A model-based assessment of the macroeconomic impact of the ECB’s monetary policy tightening since December 2021, ECB Economic Bulletin, issue 3/2023. Page 8 sur 14 percentage points as a mean over the period 2023-2025. But these estimates call for two caveats: - they vary substantially across models, and are lower in semi-structural models, which unlike structural or DSGE models, incorporate more inertia in consumption and less influence of forward-looking inflation expectations.
Thus, fixed exchange rates have never been known to be fixed for very long. Fixed exchange rates are fixed until the day they change, and when they do change, they tend to do so brutally in an atmosphere of crisis, of pain, and of tears. No, I believe that if one really aims at exchange rates that are irrevocably fixed, then one should go all the way, that is, one should opt for monetary union. As long as two currencies are distinct, their relative price might change. So the options boil down to a choice between purely flexible exchange rates and monetary union. Needless to say, since Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, joining the eurozone is not an option worth discussing at this stage. Far from being a second best solution, fixing the franc against the euro would rather cumulate all the negatives, by suppressing our monetary independence, and, at the same time, exposing us to all the dangers of speculative attacks by setting us up, the back against the wall, alone against the market. 3. Our post-euro experience  What has happened since January 1999 has proven very reassuring. Our worst fears did not materialize, and indeed, in some ways, the outcome was even much more positive than we could have hoped for. First, let me briefly sum up our experience with regard to the fears of “euroization” and of the loss of our monetary degree of freedom. As expected, the Swiss franc was not crowded out by the euro.

If investors have doubts about the dollar, there is no need any longer to rush into the Swiss franc, the euro will do just fine. Second, the eurozone, although not quite to the extent of the United States, is largely a closed economy. Movements in the euro are far less devastating than movements of similar magnitude in the Swiss franc or in the German mark. The euro is much more capable than any other currency to take on the role of shock absorber against the U.S. dollar. The eurozone, in some ways, is the large closed economy that the world needed as the counterweight to the U.S. economy. Be it by intent or by chance, the new, two-headed international monetary system, far from being a freak of nature, is a harmonious and balanced construct that should benefit all small open economies, not least Switzerland. There is a third reason why the arrival of the euro has changed the landscape and should fundamentally prove beneficial to the stability of the international monetary system, and that is competition. Even though the U.S. monetary authorities do not have a mandate that is as specifically directed at price stability as the ECB does, investors now have a choice and can vote with their feet. Thus the pressure is on the United States to deliver price stability as well.
James D Rogers: Liquidity forecasting for monetary and fiscal management in West Africa Keynote address by Dr James D Rogers, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the opening ceremony of the Regional Course on Liquidity Forecasting for Monetary and Fiscal Management, organised by WAIFEM, Bank of England and UK Treasury Department, Freetown, 17 April 2007. *  *  *  Director General of WAIFEM, Dr. Chris O. Itsede, Distinguished facilitators from the Bank of England and the United Kingdom Treasury Department, Distinguished Course Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen. 1.0  Introduction  On behalf of the President, His Excellency, Ahaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the Government and people of the Republic of Sierra Leone, it is indeed a pleasure to welcome you all to Freetown on the occasion of the regional course on Liquidity Forecasting for Monetary and Fiscal Management jointly organized by WAIFEM, the Bank of England and the United Kingdom (UK) Treasury Department. l invite you to take some time off your crowded programme to visit tourist attractions and appreciate the recovery the country has achieved since the ruins of the civil war. The smiles are back on the faces of Sierra Leoneans, and visitors now have the peace of mind to savour the beautiful scenery of Freetown.

BIS Review 45/2007  1  Ladies and Gentlemen,  3.0  Problems of liquidity forecasting  Liquidity forecasting is largely forecasting the monetary aggregates to obtain a reliable target of banks’ idle reserves thereby ensuring an efficient management of bank resources through the weekly conduct of Open Market Operations (OMO). Two main components of the OMO forecast come to the fore: the optimal level of demand for total bank reserves (ODR) and the estimated level of supply of total bank reserves on the day of OMO (OSR). FOMO = ODR - OSR t  t  where FOMO = the OMO forecast for the day of trading. In making forecasts of the monetary aggregates, ODR and OSR, in efforts to derive the OMO forecast, the authorities face a number of problems. Permit me to highlight a few of them: •  Difficulty with forecasting base money (monetary base) Since total bank reserves (ODR) must always be consistent with the ultimate objectives of monetary policy, its computation begins with a forecast of the desired demand for and supply of money. However, while the computation of the demand for money is a fairly straight forward affair, that of the supply of money is problematic. Herein lies the concept of the monetary base: the supply of money is a function of the monetary base adjusted by the money multiplier. Too often, some of the components of the monetary base are outside the control of the monetary authorities.
Christian Noyer: Regulation in the face of global imbalances Opening speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the VIth International Symposium of the Banque de France on “Which regulation for global imbalances?”, Paris, 4 March 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen I am very pleased to welcome you here in Paris to the International Symposium of the Banque de France. As you may know, this symposium is a recurrent event – this is the 6th edition – but this year it has taken a particular significance as it coincides with the French Presidency of the G-20. This presidency occurs at a key moment of the reform of governance and regulation of the global economy. Hence, today’s topic “Regulation in the face of global imbalances” was not chosen at random. However, beyond this proximity with the work of the G-20, I hope this symposium will also provide an excellent opportunity for extending discussions beyond this institutional forum, for strengthening relations between central bankers (there are more than 100 in this room), government officials, business managers and leading academics from around the globe who honour us with their presence today and to whom I would like to extend my warmest thanks. The world economy has experienced major developments over the last two decades. These changes have brought progress – strong growth, low inflation, less poverty – but they have also led to crises.

Philipp Hildebrand: Financial stability Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Lausanne, Lausanne, 16 September 2008. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  During the period of financial market turbulence, central banks have gone far with their interventions to stabilize the financial system, taking into account the high costs that can be imposed by a banking crisis onto the real economy. Central banks by themselves, however, cannot guarantee financial stability in the long term. In particular, we cannot exclude that their interventions create incentives for banks to be less cautious in the future. The first line of defence therefore consists of banks having sound risk management practices and holding appropriate levels of capital and liquidity. The Financial Stability Forum has made a series of recommendations in this respect. Given the size of the big Swiss banks in relation to our national economy, we should be especially prudent. For this reason, the Swiss National Bank supports the project undertaken by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) to strengthen capital adequacy requirements and to revise the liquidity requirements for the big banks. As the SFBC has pointed out on several occasions, these measures have to be implemented gradually – to ensure that banks have sufficient time to adapt. These measures will contribute to the solidity and credibility of the Swiss financial centre.