samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the opposite extreme it sometimes seems that the only alternative is for the central bank to be simply another arm of government, subservient to finance ministers and their officials. Now I don’t know how many of you would recognise yourselves under either of these extreme categorisations. I guess not very many. I have to confess that - however attractive this definition of independence might appear as a central banking career option - if this really were the choice to be made, then, as a citizen of a democratic society I would have to choose the non-independent alternative. But, of course, the real debate is much more subtle and extends across a much narrower part of the spectrum between these polar extremes. The real debate is in fact well described by John Exter, the Federal Reserve Board official, who advised on the establishment of the Central Bank of Ceylon, as it then was, and stayed on to become its first Governor. In his Report - published in November 1949 - Exter presented a draft bill accompanied by a commentary. It is still well worth reading.

If the telecom industry is excluded from the figures for trade and industry, productivity increased by only 1.9 per cent during the period 1995-2000, compared with a growth of 2.8 per cent if it is included. This sector has now greatly declined in importance and there is apparent confusion over its future development. Given this, the average rate of wage increase should not exceed 3.5 per cent over the coming years. In conclusion, it may be worth pointing out that if Sweden joins the Eurosystem, there will be other factors affecting the nominal wage cost scope. This is because the ECB's inflation target may be even more ambitious than the Riksbank's. In this case, and if productivity growth remains unchanged, a lower rate of increase will be needed for nominal wage costs. Summary I shall conclude with a summary. The realignment of stability policy has contributed to wage formation functioning better than previously in the two most recent wage bargaining rounds. The rate of increase in nominal wages has approached reasonable levels, while wage earners have experienced large increases in real wages. This development is underpinned by a good development in productivity. When we look ahead, the picture is more worrying. Profits are under greater pressure. It is not certain that productivity growth can remain as high as it was during the latter part of the 1990s. Given these factors, and taking into account international developments, there is a need to bring the average rate of wage increase down to, or even below, 3.5 per cent.
David Carse: Banking in Hong Kong after the Asian crisis  Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at a Luncheon Meeting of the Ginyukai, held on 21 August 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here to address this luncheon meeting of the Ginyukai. Although I meet Japanese banks on an individual basis quite frequently, I see them as a group less often than I used to before the Asian crisis. In my earlier days in Hong Kong, we used to meet regularly at the numerous opening ceremonies and receptions of Japanese banks who were setting up new offices in Hong Kong. Over the last two years however I have been dealing with the voluntary revocation of the licenses of many of these same banks as they depart the Territory. This is a much sadder task than cutting the ribbon at an opening ceremony. The figures tell their own story. In March 1997, there were 91 Japanese authorised institutions in Hong Kong. This includes some banks with multiple authorisations, for example as licensed banks and as deposit-taking companies. By June of this year, the number of authorised institutions had dropped to 35, a decline of 60%. The reasons behind this decline are varied. Some of the Japanese banks were forced to cut their overseas operations, including those in Hong Kong, because of critical balance sheet problems and heavy losses.

While financial transparency among Mainland companies is by no means perfect, lenders are now at least better equipped to identify those companies that have sound underlying businesses and good management. The long saga of GDE is now drawing to a close. The banks have, I believe, managed to negotiate the best deal possible, and the last remaining step is for the banks to review and sign the detailed documentation to put the restructuring into effect. I understand that when the documentation is sent to the banks, they will have plenty to read. But I hope that they will try to do this as quickly as possible and that we can avoid any last minute problems and delays. There is unlikely to be any opportunity for renegotiation of the deal, and if it were to collapse at the final stage, the banks would certainly be worse off. So far I have been concentrating on the position of the Japanese banks. Let me now review the more general state of banking in Hong Kong after the Asian crisis. The first point to make is that the local Hong Kong banks have survived the crisis in good shape. Although one or two banks lost money, most banks remained profitable and actually managed to improve their capital ratios during the period as their risk assets declined and their capital base expanded.
Chile)  3.2 2.2 1.5 10,0 5.6 2.7  2.6 2.1 1.7 10.5 5.1 3.6  -2.6 -4,0 -5.2 9.1 0.1 -2.2  2.7 1.6 3.5 10.1 7.1 6.0  2.3 0.8 0.8 8.5 4.2 3.7  3.3 1.4 1.9 8.8 5.1 4.3  20  44  62  79  89  89  101  156  234  340  330  320  WTI oil price $ LME copper price $ (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on investment banks, Consensus Forecasts and International Monetary Fund. Figure 5 Contribution to annual GDP growth (variación real anual, puntos porcentuales) Economic activity  Aggregate demand  8  8  25  25  6  6  20  20  4  4  15  15  2  2  10  10  0  0  5  5  -2  -2  0  0  -4  -4  -5  -5  -6  -6 -10  -10  07  08  09  10  Financial and entrepreneurial services (1) EGA Mining & fishing Manufacturing Construction Communication & transport Retail Residual (2) GDP  -15  07  08  09  10  -15  GFCF Change in inventories Government consumption Private consumption Exports GDP  (1) Includes financial services, insurances, housing leases and services provided to firms. (2) Includes agriculturalforestry, housing property, public administration and personal services (i.e., education, health-care and other services).

Having both the public and 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  private sectors on the same platform would help to cement the shared responsibility mindset and synergise our efforts in addressing the ML/TF/PF risks. Finally, let me thank the APG Secretariat for coordinating this Workshop. Special thanks as well to all speakers, moderators, and participants that took their time to be with us for the next three days. With that, I wish all of you a successful and productive Workshop ahead. 1 RUSI, 5 years of growth of Public-Private Partnership to Fight Financial Crime, August 2020 2 FATF Guidance on PF Risk Assessment and Mitigation 3 UK National Risk Assessment of Proliferation Financing 4 Mitigating the Unintended Consequences of the FATF Standards  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is ongoing and there is still some way to go. In the process, there will be arguments, frustrations and inevitably pushback. No doubt the new standards and regulations will lead to some changes in the behaviour and business models of banks. However, I do not for one moment believe that regulators and regulatory measures alone can possibly redress all of the problems stemming from the misalignment of interest amongst the various stakeholders in banking. Regulators can set standards and provide some external checks and balances. But there is no substitute for internal governance and controls that are designed to achieve the desired behavioural change across the entire firm. In this context, it is crucial that we have buy-in from the owners, directors and management of the banks. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  21. Only when the public sector and the owners, directors and managers of banks share the same goals and objectives can we induce the desired outcomes on a sustainable basis. Only when shareholders cease to put unreasonable pressures on bank management to keep on improving RoEs can regulators feel comfortable that the bank is not incentivised to take the short-term view on business growth and profitability. Only when bank management is not rewarded based on short-term financial performance can we be less concerned that bank managers will take excessive risks for near term bonus or share option value.

In fact, the pilot program of Uruguay (“e-Peso”) was not blockchain-based. d. There are different policies being explored and there is no “one size fits all” answer. e. Nevertheless, countries could largely benefit form sharing their experiences. Page 10 of 11  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  ***  Page 11 of 11
Real asset prices and total loans in proportion to GDP 270  1,6  240 1,4 210 180  1,2  150 1,0 120 90  0,8 1970  1975  1980  1985  Real asset prices, index 1980 = 100 (left scale)  1990  1995  Loans in proportion to GDP (right scale)  There are a number of reasons why an expansion of credit leads to rising asset prices and vice versa. The value of an asset can be defined as the present value of the future income the asset is expected to generate. So rising asset prices can be said to mirror expectations of future increases in income, which in turn strengthens both the propensity and the possibility of borrowing. That implies increased demand for credit. On the supply side, rising asset prices increase the availability of credit in that borrowers are in a better position to pledge collateral. The prospect of rising income and cash flows also implies that borrowers will be more able to service and repay debt. As long as this process is based on reasonable assessments of the future, all is well and good. Problems arise when asset prices and the provision of credit both rise unduly, so that the expectations on which they are based become unrealistic. Looking back, this is evidently what happened in numerous cases. The head of the US Federal Reserve has labelled it “irrational exuberance”, a phrase that is now a byword. A bubble will burst sooner or later.

I should like to stress the importance of international cooperation between authorities in different fields, particularly now that problems in one country tend to spread to other countries more quickly than before. The Riksbank accordingly participates in the work of the Group of Ten, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and so on. The recurrent crises in financial markets clearly show that work on strengthening systems is a continuous endeavour and that much remains to be done. Banks and other financial institutions have admittedly done a great deal to improve risk management, not least as regards loan portfolios. But the pace of developments in the financial sector is so rapid that neither financial institutions nor authorities can rest on their laurels. It should also be realised that the extensive work in progress on reinforcing the financial system does not mean that in future the system will be completely immune to problems. Moreover, our knowledge of phenomena of this type is limited. It may be asked whether it will ever be possible to predict financial crises. The models with leading indicators that are being tested at present tend to be too blunt. They sound the alarm about things that never happen and are silent about those that actually occur. The authorities must therefore focus on doing everything so that banks and other financial systems have such good systems for risk management that the probability of financial crises is reduced to a minimum.
Based on this premise, what should be the strategy, from the perspective of statisticians and users, to ensure the availability of new and appropriate data on a timely basis to meet future needs of users? 4. How can data compilers and users play a greater role inidentifying new data needs of a high income and high value added economy? 5. How can statisticians play a more proactive role in advising or communicating with users on the availability of appropriate data for analysis and surveillance to avoid the redundancy of data collection? These questions are by no means exhaustive but I hope our distinguished speakers and discussants today will address some of them. The speakers and discussants today represent a wide spectrum of group of compilers and users of statistics, who have vast experience in conducting significant research in many areas that uses national and international statistics. Through their presentations and discussions, we hope to learn from their knowledge and thinking on relevant issues in the field of statistics. We are also honoured to have two international speakers from the IFC who will talk about the international best practices in data management and country experiences in data sharing and communication of statistics. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank them in advance. I would also like to record our appreciation to the representatives from various national organisations for chairing the sessions and sharing their views on the topic that we had identified.

Moreover, growth in the world economy is expected to remain relatively resilient, benefiting mainly from sustained growth in emerging economies. This should support external demand for euro area goods and services and thereby investment. This outlook is also reflected in the September 2008 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. The exercise projects average annual real GDP growth in a range between 1.1% and 1.7% in 2008, and between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009. In comparison with the June Eurosystem staff projections, real GDP growth figures for 2008 and 2009 are lower. In the view of the Governing Council, the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic activity is particularly high at the current juncture and, generally, downside risks prevail. Risks stem particularly from renewed increases in energy and food prices, which could dampen consumption and investment. Moreover, downside risks continue to relate to the  BIS Review 105/2008  1  potential for the financial market tensions to affect the real economy more adversely than currently foreseen. The possibility of disorderly developments owing to global imbalances also implies downside risks to the outlook for economic activity, as do concerns about rising protectionist pressures. With regard to price developments, annual HICP inflation has remained considerably above the level consistent with price stability since last autumn, standing at 3.8% in August according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 4.0% in June and July 2008.
The greater concentration and interconnectedness in the global financial system may also have increased the magnitude of a potential crisis. The greater risk tolerance of market players is ultimately a logical consequence of the exceptionally long and stable period of calm in the financial markets. Market participants have had no reason of late to keep their risk-taking in check. Basically, anyone who held back felt they were missing the opportunity to generate high returns. Even the short-term corrections in the financial markets in February of this year and May of the previous year did not result in a change of attitude in this regard. On the contrary, the low impact made by these corrections and the ability of the markets to absorb them may have served as a confirmation for those operating a high-risk strategy to continue, and as an indication for the more risk-averse to take greater risks. The risk appetite is also fairly high in the Swiss banking sector at present. In our Financial Stability Report, we indicate for instance that the domestically oriented banks – Raiffeisen, cantonal and regional banks – are currently incurring a relatively high interest rate risk. At the same time, the big banks have also exhibited an increased risk tolerance in recent years. Although Credit Suisse Group’s overall risk has declined in the past year, following the sale of Winterthur, both big banks have significantly increased their risk-taking in the banking business; particularly their exposure in trading and in foreign lending business.

The reliability of the mark-to-model approach, however, relies heavily on assumptions and on the availability of reliable data. Data on tail events (events that occur rarely, but have major repercussions) would be particularly beneficial for the calibration of models. There is, however, by definition hardly any data on such events. This begs the question as to whether the dangers associated with tail events are being correctly assessed using the available models, or whether model risks pose a problem. Thirdly, it is unclear whether the finance industry’s capital buffer – in the form of equity capital – is adequate to weather particularly bad storms. Like airbags in a car, equity capital is only rarely called into action. Yet, the more serious the accident, the more generously the bags should be filled with air. In the current economic environment, many market participants are highly leveraged, in other words, they have a low ratio of debt to equity capital. Low levels of equity capital can be compared to a thin airbag – they only protect against moderate shocks. It would only take a loss of 2–3% of the balance sheet total, for instance, for Swiss big banks to use up all their equity capital. Of course, a loss of this magnitude is highly unlikely. After all, the Swiss big banks are well-diversified, have sophisticated risk management models in place and have high risk-weighted capital ratios. This notwithstanding, such a loss cannot be ruled out.
José De Gregorio: Monetary policy and pass-through to interest rates Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Honorable Chamber of Representative’s Economic, Promotion and Development Commission, Santiago, 16 March 2009. The Spanish original prevails. *  *  *  Mr. President. I wish to thank you and the Economic, Promotion and Development Commission of the Honorable Chamber of Representatives for inviting me to speak about how our monetary policy decisions affect the country’s financial and lending conditions. The global economy is enduring terribly uncertain times, which have implications on our country’s prospects for growth and inflation. Thus, we share your preoccupation for evaluating how monetary policy actions – one of the main stabilizing tools we have available as a country – ultimately affect the cost of borrowing faced by households and firms. Monetary policy, in the context of an inflation target and a floating exchange rate like the one operating in Chile since 1999, is an important mechanism for smoothing out the business cycle. Periods of weak output and demand performance, which reduce the medium-term inflation outlook, lend themselves to countercyclical monetary policy actions that cushion the negative effects on consumption, investment and employment. This is what the Central Bank of Chile is presently doing, acting resolutely to moderate the effects that the global crisis – the worst we have seen in decades – is having in Chile.

In fact, while obviously important, the decisions that we adopt as the Central Bank Board at the monetary policy meetings are not the only element shaping the credit conditions within the economy. Also of first order is the market’s perception of how the monetary policy will be managed in future months and years. This leads us to be extremely cautious in our communication, in order for the decisions we make to be perceived with the adequate persistence. The monetary policy that the Board has been implementing in the past few months clearly illustrates this phenomenon. Despite the fact that the MPR was held constant at 8.25% in the last months of the past year, thanks to the way we communicate our decisions and to the  BIS Review 35/2009  1  incorporation of an explicit bias the MPR level expected by the market six months ahead dropped significantly, pulling down the deposit rate at longer terms. Subsequent reductions to the MPR that have been applied this year have gone beyond market expectations, reducing financing costs (figure 1). To succeed in communicating properly, transparently and credibly is then key for monetary policy decisions to cause the impact that is needed. This is what makes monetary policy effective, and it is why the Central Bank has maintained a systematic policy of communication and transparency, through the presentations we make as Board members, with our Monetary Policy Reports, and with the transparency mechanisms we have for our policy decisions.
Svein Gjedrem: Economic perspectives Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank, Oslo, 12 February 2009. *  *  *  Introduction The poet Øyvind Rimbereid from Stavanger – his works already awarded a place in the Norwegian literary canon 1 – has been nominated for this year’s Nordic Council Literature Prize for the collection of poems entitled Herbarium. The poem “Tulip” starts with the tulip bulb market bubble in the 1600s. A futures market for tulip bulbs had emerged in Holland when growers discovered that infecting the tulip with a virus could produce stripes and beautiful colours. In a short time, bulbs were trading at 25 times the normal value before the market collapsed. A hundred years later, a tulip bulb cost less than one per cent of the price before the collapse. 2 In the words of Rimbereid: “ The year 1635 and on pollen-yellow paper flutter tulip bulbs grown in places unknown to most. Or grown only in the signature on the bill of exchange of a seller who himself has bought a signature from a seller with money that itself exists only as a signature.” 3 Downturn in the global economy In September 2008, the turbulence in financial markets erupted into a full-blown global crisis. Just before, it had appeared that the US government rescue of the mortgage corporations Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would calm the markets.

And this would benefit the banks in general, not just the select few with a large market share. In fact, our research indicates that with reasonably conservative assumptions regarding growth and inflation over the three years from 2003 to 2005, the profitability for the average bank in our sample would get back to the average return on assets over the past ten years by around 2005. Obviously, the improvement in the economy would need to materialise for this to happen - and I cannot predict whether it will or not. But at least the banks can take comfort from the fact that the current difficult operating environment may to a large extent be due to cyclical factors, which should eventually reverse. I would stress that this does not mean that banks should simply sit back and wait for the rising tide of the economy to lift them up, or that they should ignore the opportunities that may arise from merger and acquisition. Bank-specific factors will still matter in terms of explaining variations in performance across banks, even if their relative importance was less pronounced after the Asian crisis. Among these bank-specific factors, operational efficiency, as measured by the ratio of non-interest expense to total assets plays the most significant role in determining profitability, at least for the banks in our sample. Surprisingly, the effect of credit quality seems to have diminished over time, perhaps reflecting improvements in the banks’ ability to manage credit risk.