samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Within just a few seconds, the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate fell from 1.2020 to 1.2000. Despite SNB offers placed in the trading systems, a few isolated transactions occurred below CHF 1.20 per euro. However, at no time did the best available euro exchange rate in the market fall below the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20. Thus, for a short time, what is known as a segmented market could be observed, in which transactions below the best price were concluded. This situation was remedied within very few seconds, however, by means of arbitrage. How could transactions take place on the foreign exchange market for below CHF 1.20 per euro despite the fact that the SNB was at all times present in the market? The foreign exchange market is a decentralised market. Rather than foreign exchange being traded on a bourse, forex transactions are made directly between market participants. Each bank has its own individual group of counterparties, and, in particular, banks with lower ratings only have a small number of counterparties. The exchange rates below CHF 1.20 per euro were concluded by banks that do not have an agreement relating to limits with the SNB, in other words, by banks that cannot or do not wish to trade with the SNB. The SNB was at all times prepared to buy unlimited quantities of euros at CHF 1.20 per euro. All market participants were at all times aware of this SNB purchase offer, including the banks without an agreement relating to limits.

Bank of France reports industrial output continued to increase in all sectors in February 1997 BANK OF FRANCE, MONTHLY BUSINESS SURVEY, 17/3/97. In February, according to the business leaders surveyed by the Banque de France, industrial output continued to increase in all sectors. The capacity utilization rate rose slightly. Overall demand grew at a moderate pace. There was strong demand from foreign markets, particularly from northern Europe, including Germany and the United Kingdom, and from the United States and Asia. The rise in the dollar and in sterling reinforced the competitiveness of French products. Growth in demand on the domestic market was much more moderate. Order books are deemed to be satisfactory in all sectors, with the exception of the food-processing industry, where they declined slightly and appear to be insufficient. Inventories of finished products are still somewhat above normal levels. In particular, they are considered to be above desired levels in the food-processing, intermediate goods and automobile sectors. In the coming months activity should continue to increase in all sectors, with the exception of the automobile sector. Commodity prices were stable overall. However, price rises were recorded in certain parts of the intermediate goods industry, such as the rubber and plastics, metal-working, and wood-processing sectors, and in the food processing industry owing to the appreciation of the dollar. Intense competition prevented these increases from being passed on to sales prices, which scarcely changed, except in the automobile sector, where they declined. The business leaders surveyed continued to be cautious in their investment plans.
But in general, transparency of process can contribute to confidence. Some indeed argue that you should improve transparency generally to a point where lender of last resort support could be withdrawn altogether. And let the market take the fallout from, and absorb, the shocks as they arise. This I fear gets into the realms of philosophy and political thought, and as a mere central banker I would prefer to go no further! Some countries are less inclined to such opacity. To quote Governor Heikensten of the Riksbank “Those who have lived through a crisis are generally in favour of a transparent process”5  14. Conclusion  I have ranged widely on the many factors which - at least in my view - arerelevant to financial stability oversight. So in concluding, let me try to draw together some of the principal themes in what I have been saying. I am naturally well aware that there are many positive features to today’s environment. But central bankers are sometimes accused of being pessimists and seeing the glass half empty. In our defence I suppose it is our job to think out what could go wrong and to be ready accordingly. The first message to leave you with is that we are concerned about financial stability because of the potential economic and social costs arising from financial instability. Private markets will not always reflect these costs fully and prima facie there is a need for public oversight. Second, the degree of complexity and interconnectedness has increased dramatically in recent years.

And well managed banks have indeed been able to weather the shocks - a real positive from the point of view of financial stability oversight. But on the other hand the added vulnerabilities too are real. So I do not find it surprising that there are calls for public policy response. The consequences of liberalisation and the derivatised world of enhanced risk transfer are indeed formidable. There is the breakdown of the old barriers; with unfamiliar and new players operating in often unfamiliar territory; uncertainty over concentrations of risk and with a more difficult or unpredictable set of behaviours; and newly created networks whose failure could be catastrophic. Spotting threats is tougher: and there is a premium on intelligence from a broader network to cover a multitude of new transmission channels. The tension between globalised players in a world of national supervisors needs to be managed. But let me not leave you with the impression that we are deterred by the task. On the contrary challenging certainly, but hopeless certainly not. After all, the market place itself has to act prudently; to judge potential behaviour of counterparties; to improve risk management techniques; to understand where concentrations of risks reside and what their dangers are. If firms fail to do so they go out of business. And as for the public authorities, we all know the maxim or guiding prayer “Lord let there be failures: but let them be small ones”. No better way of encouraging market discipline!
As you can see on the slide, the BIST overnight repo rates have remained close to the upper bound of the interest rate corridor since October in line with the liquidity policy (Chart 3). The CBRT funding has been made mainly through one-week repo auctions since early 2014 (Chart 4). Thus, the CBRT average funding rate hovered around the 1-week repo rate in this period. As we all know, core inflation trends are following a downward trend. Considering the fall in oil prices and improved expectations that result in favorable developments in the inflation outlook besides this downward trend in the core inflation trend, we decided on a measured cut in the 1-week repo rate from 8.25 percent to 7.75 percent in January. On the other hand, given the elevated volatility in global markets, we kept overnight rates unchanged and announced through the MPC Decision that we would adopt a cautious stance to render the decline in inflation permanent. In this context, we emphasized that we would closely monitor inflation expectations, the pricing behavior and other factors affecting inflation and maintain the tight monetary policy stance by keeping the yield curve flat until the there is a significant improvement in the inflation outlook. Owing to this stance, the spread between 5-year market rates and the BIST Interbank Overnight Repo Rates continues to take negative values (Chart 5). Along with these developments, the yield curve has remained almost flat (Chart 6).

Hence, we believe that domestic demand will remain on a modest upward track in the final quarter. External demand, on the other hand, remains weak due to Europe’s slowing economy and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  geopolitical tensions in neighboring countries. The weak external demand puts pressure on export growth, but the fact that export growth exceeds import growth supports the rebalancing of the economy (Chart 15). Moreover, falling oil prices contribute positively to the current account balance by reducing import expenditures (Chart 16). We expect domestic demand to recover moderately and external demand to remain weak in 2015. Depending on weather and precipitation conditions, the projected correction in the agricultural value-added will be a factor to support growth. However, there are external demand-driven downside risks to growth. Thus, in 2015, demand conditions will contribute to the disinflation process. Although we expect the growth composition to change in favor of domestic final demand, we believe that the current account deficit will continue to improve on the back of the macroprudential measures and the improved terms of trade. As you all know, food, energy and import prices also play a great role in inflation forecasts. Therefore, before moving on to forecasts, I will briefly talk about our assumptions regarding these variables. In the fourth quarter of 2014, oil and import prices remained well below the projections of the October Inflation Report (Chart 17). Accordingly, we revised our medium-term assumptions of oil and import prices significantly downwards.
BIS Review 68/2010  15  42. The second pillar of the monetary measures was the arrangements we made to support the credit markets in view of the permanent decline in liquidity. In this regard, as a result of the increasing net liquidity shortage in the market and the possibility that this shortage may become permanent, the Central Bank started to hold 3-month repo auctions as of June in order to support the smooth operation of the credit mechanism. In October 2009, as it became evident that the liquidity shortage has been permanent, Turkish lira required reserve ratio was reduced from 6 percent to 5 percent in order to support the credit mechanism. 43. Furthermore, irrespective of these measures, we started to purchase government securities from the secondary markets at the end of 2009 on technical grounds in order to maintain operational flexibility and instrument diversity in liquidity management. Accordingly, as of April 15, we have injected 3.1 billion TL to the market against government securities with a nominal value of 3.2 billion TL through pre-scheduled auctions. I would like to underline that even though the outright purchases of government securities coincided with the crisis period, it has no direct relationship with the crisis. 44.

With its very strong and well-regulated banking system coupled with its flexible, effective and fit-for-every-condition liquidity management framework based on its past experience from several crises, Turkey was well prepared for the global crisis. These factors reduced the need for the Central Bank to take additional radical measures, and the Central Bank’s balance sheet structure did not deteriorate during the crisis. Hence, the Central Bank’s exit strategy will be simpler and easier as compared to many central banks. Yet, owing to the importance that we attach to transparency and predictability, we informed the public about the general framework of our exit strategy in our Press Release of 14 April 2010, before putting the strategy into practice. 47. Accordingly, taking account of the recent developments and the normalization in both money and credit markets; we plan to gradually withdraw some of the measures taken in the foreign exchange and Turkish lira markets during the crisis. Hence, measures taken for crisis management will be withdrawn first and the exit strategy in Turkey, like elsewhere, will be a strategy that is cautious, gradual and  16  BIS Review 68/2010  safeguarding financial stability. I would like to repeat that you can find the details of our exit strategy in our press release of 14 April 2010. Distinguished Guests, 48. In the last part of my speech, I would briefly like to mention our foreign exchange policy.
Denny H Kalyalya: Effective banking supervision – a risk based approach Opening remarks by Dr Denny H Kalyalya, Deputy Governor-Operations of the Bank of Zambia; at the workshop on “Effective banking supervision: a risk based approach”, Livingstone, 1 December 2008. *  *  *  • The Chairperson • Resource Persons • Distinguished Workshop Participants • Ladies and Gentlemen On behalf of Crown Agents and the Bank of Zambia, I wish to welcome you all to this important workshop on Effective Banking Supervision: A Risk Based Approach and to Zambia’s Tourist Capital, Livingstone. In particular, I welcome our resource persons from Crown Agents and participants from the region. Looking at the programme, it is obvious that you will have a tight schedule. However, I urge all of you to find time in your busy schedule to visit some interesting places that our Tourist City of Livingstone has to offer, especially the mighty Victoria Falls, which although not at its best at this time of the year, still presents a spectacle to behold. The ongoing global financial crisis has brought tremendous and unexpected challenges to regulatory and supervisory authorities. As you are all well aware, in any economy, more so in market-driven economy, financial institutions play a critical role in the allocation of resources through intermediating between those with surplus resources (depositors) and those in need of resources (investors). Effective and efficient supervision is therefore, crucial to manage risk and avert possible loss to depositors/investors and hence maintain public confidence in the financial system.

This framework should be accompanied by added transparency in all the phases of trading, with financial education assuming a special place. Only in this way would we be able to deepen and expand, in real terms, the financial market, and through it a higher efficiency in implementing economic and financial policies, in mobilising and using national savings, in financial inclusion, in economic activity growth, and in enhancing the welfare of the population in the long run. In the hope that the proceedings of this conference will be characterised by a fruitful exchange of ideas and views by the participants in this room, Thank you for your attention! 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
This would spur hedge funds to disclose more or to obtain a credit rating. Global financial supervision The crisis has set off debate as to whether the global capital market needs a global regulator. I doubt this is workable, or even desirable. A global financial super-regulator requires countries to give up national sovereignty. This is politically unrealistic; witness how carefully the IMF had needed to 2  George Soros in The Crisis of Global Capitalism, Ch. 7 The Global Financial Crisis, p. 136. 5  BIS Review 93/1999  canvas its major shareholders to support its prescriptions and how closely the US Congress scrutinises the IMF’s actions. A more practical, albeit modest, solution is the establishment of the Financial Stability Forum. This brings together both the G7 countries as well as non-G7 financial centres and international organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and the BIS to discuss the vulnerabilities of the world system. The Forum should be able to get best practices and supervisory standards implemented more widely and effectively. The FSF has set up three working groups to study areas of vulnerability highlighted by the crisis: capital flows and exchange rate regimes, highly leveraged institutions and offshore financial centres (OFC). Singapore has been invited to participate in the FSF, together with Australia, Hong Kong and the Netherlands. We are also in the OFC working group. OFCs have attracted considerable attention because of the significant capital flows they generate.

However, unlike Hong Kong, the $ exchange rate could and did adjust down  BIS Review 93/1999  2  relative to the $ in line with its trading partners. This extra degree of freedom helped to soften the impact of the sharp regional slowdown and depreciation of its neighbours’ currencies. In addition, the Government sought to make prompt and direct adjustments to the real economy, cutting taxes and levies, reducing the CPF contributions with the support of unions and workers and building capabilities for the longer term. These measures helped see Singapore through the storm and are now enabling Singapore to recover, together with the rest of the region. Lessons from the crisis When the Asian currency crisis first broke out, many observers blamed the “Asian model”. But then other emerging markets, even the developed world, came under fire. It became clear that the problem was not just Asia, but also weaknesses in the structure of the global financial system. There is general agreement on what the key weaknesses were, but not yet on their solutions. Very broadly, I identify five issues: •  Capital controls – can they help? •  Exchange rate regimes – fixed or floating? •  Hedge funds – what do they imply for global systemic stability? •  Global financial supervision – is this possible? •  Strengthening domestic institutions – a prerequisite to participation in the global system. Capital controls This crisis has prompted a reconsideration of the merits of capital controls.
We, therefore, see the Forum as an important complement to our early warning system, particularly since owing to the rapidly changing structure of the financial system and the idiosyncrasies of the Maltese economy, it has proved difficult to construct a more formal early warning system model. The decision to create the Forum for Financial Stability can also be interpreted as a way of institutionalising current arrangements by enabling a more structured dialogue. Through this channel, the authorities will be able to convey their conclusions and concerns more directly, while market players might wish to offer their views on financial stability issues and their assessment of market developments. The Bank chairs joint committees with the industry in other areas, such as statistics and financial markets, and the experience to date has been very positive. I am sure that discussions in the Forum will be equally productive. The launch of the Forum for Financial Stability is taking place at a time of radical change in the regulatory and supervisory environment, especially in a cross-border context, both at European and global levels. The feedback the Central Bank of Malta and the MFSA hope to receive from the Forum on reform-related issues should, therefore, also prove useful to these authorities in connection with their participation in the work of the European System of Central Banks, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), as well as for the purposes of the technical advice given to Government in the context of EU discussions on such issues.

Nina Stoyanova: The future of money Speech by Ms Nina Stoyanova, Deputy Governor and Head of the Banking Department of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the Manager Magazine Fourth Banking and Finance Forum “The Future of Money”, Sofia, 20 October 2021. * * * Thank you for inviting me to open today’s fourth Banking and Finance Forum on the topic ofThe Future of Money. New technologies are changing the financial sector today and leading to the offering of increasingly diverse and convenient payment products in a highly competitive environment. The policies of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and national regulators are aimed at catalysing this process, to exploit more fully the potential offered by technology and to achieve cheaper, safer and more accessible payment solutions. The dynamics of the processes in Europe is also fully valid for our country. Data on payments processed by payment systems in our country show a significant growth. For the first six months of 2021, the value of payments made through the BNB-operated Real-time Gross Settlement System in BGN (RINGS) increased by 30% compared to the first half of 2020, while for the same period the value of payments in euro through the national component system of the large-value payment system in euro – TARGET2-BNB increased by 65.7%. I would like to touch briefly on some of the recent technological developments in the field of payment services in the European Union and in our country.
Clearly the credit-to-GDP ratio cannot grow indefinitely because otherwise the cost of servicing the debt would end up exhausting the whole of GDP. In other words: What we observe here cannot be the manifestation of a secular trend! As we  1  Since 2000, average growth rates of real supply prices for single-family houses and owner-occupied apartments come to 2.5% and 3.7%, respectively (annual growth rates based on quarterly data provided by Wüest&Partner). 2  Borio, C. (2012); see also Schularick, M. and Taylor, A. (2012)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  will see, making sense of this development is less trivial. To get a broader perspective on this question let us enlarge the picture shown in Figure 2b. Figure 3 provides the international dimension. As is clearly visible, there has been a substantial built-up of credit relative to GDP on a global scale over the last decades. There are some notable differences in the size, timing and scope of this development between individual countries but the general direction is the same. Ominously the upward trend was particularly steep in the run-up to the recent financial crisis in those countries that were subsequently most heavily affected (US, Ireland, Spain, UK). Figure 4 looks at the Swiss data from an earlier starting point.

One can thus rationalize an increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio in economies in the process of catching up with advanced economies. This is a plausible element of explanation for credit developments in the case of a country such as Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. It is, however, much less plausible in the case of mature countries such as Switzerland in the latter part of the period of observation (Figure 3). Other structural changes in credit demand are also conceivable. For instance, it can be argued that the financial liberalization of the 1970s and 1980s (together with related sociological developments) has significantly affected the public attitude towards indebtedness making it much more socially acceptable, in particular with regard to consumption financing. Further structural changes on the demand side, such as demographic transitions or an increase in idiosyncratic income risk could lead to an increase of credit demand for consumption smoothing purposes. It is difficult, however, to connect these theoretical considerations with the realities of developed economies in the last decades. In particular the demographic trends observed in advanced countries (also in Switzerland) would imply a structural shift towards less rather than more borrowing. 3.3. The role of the interest rate  Third, the role of the interest rate deserves special attention when thinking about credit developments. The interest rate is of course an endogenous variable when examining the demand and supply for credit. Yet additional insights are possible when considering it separately.