samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Sources: RCP Database (Version 2.0.5), SMHI scenario data and SMHI Klimatologi [Climatology] report series, no. 41  Second, we know that climate change has economic consequences, but their magnitude is uncertain. Climate change affects the economy via physical risks and transition risks. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The physical risks include different types of extreme weather and gradual warming. Storms, heatwaves and cloudbursts will probably become both more common and more serious in a warmer climate. The gradual warming will lead to smaller harvests, changes in ecosystems, melting glaciers and rising sea levels. Such things affect both households and companies. We have already seen serious examples of how the economy can be affected in connection with the drought in Sweden in 2018, the forest fires in California in 2019 and the bushfires in Australia at the beginning of this year. Transition risks are linked to the effects that arise when adapting the economic system to a less fossil-based economy. The effects may be gradual in that policy instruments, such as carbon taxes, lead to structural transformation when carbonintensive sectors lose competitiveness to greener sectors. The effects can also be more abrupt and create unexpectedly rapid movements in asset prices, such as in the value of coal and oil deposits. 3 [18]  To limit global warming to 2 degrees, the IPCC estimates that only around 20–35 per cent of the world’s known reserves of oil, gas and coal can be utilised.

In this scenario, the temperature is expected to rise by between 2.3 and 3.8 degrees, precipitation by between 8.2 and 39.1 per cent and the sea level by between 4.4 and 39.4 centimetres. There is considerable uncertainty, but the direction is clear and very worrying. Figure 1. Increase in temperature, precipitation and sea level in Sweden in two scenarios for global warming. 1 400 1 200 1 000  TEMPERATURE  PRECIPITATION  SEA LEVEL  Change in relation to the mean value (1961-1990), degrees C  Change in relation to the mean value (1961-1990), %  Change in relation to the mean value (1986-2005), cm  +7.9 +5.9 +4  +41.4 +27.1 +17  +66.4 +42.4 +21.4  +3.8 +3.1 +2.3  +39.1 +18.5 +8.2  +39.4 +21.4 +4.4  800 600 400 200 0 1950  1970  1990  2010  2030  2050  Historical emissions Continued emissions (RCP 8.5) Reduced emissions (RCP 4.5)  2070  2090  Note. The left-hand diagram shows the concentration of carbon-equivalent greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in hundreds of ppm in two of the IPCC’s scenarios; RCP 8.5 (continued carbon emissions) and RCP 4.5 (reduced emissions). The right-hand figure shows the change in temperature, precipitation and sea level in Sweden in the two IPCC scenarios. The numbers show the maximum, minimum and mean values. There are substantial regional differences in the effects on the sea level and the table shows the mean value for the regions for each respective scenario and percentile.
The Riksbank assumed that it would soon be necessary to raise the interest rate, but if only inflation had been taken into consideration, it would have been possible to wait a little longer before making this decision. Now the interest rate raise was brought forward to counteract the risk that an adjustment in the property market would cause a large fall in demand and lead to inflation undershooting the target when regarded in a perspective beyond the normal forecast horizon. The influence on interest rate policy was thus marginal, but on the other hand the expansion in household borrowing and house price movements were mentioned frequently in a number of speeches and interviews. I was not at the Riksbank then, but I can imagine that it was no easy decision. The Riksbank was criticised for not bringing up inflation to the target of 2 per cent, that is, the repo rate should not have been raised. But could one just sit by and watch the risks that threatened in the longer term? This was a conflict of interests that soon petered out. The interest rate raises made since then have gone hand in hand with strong economic activity as well as rising inflationary pressures, which have demanded a higher interest rate. Let me now also mention the commercial property market. Commercial property prices rose sharply during the second half of the 1990s and peaked in 2000. During the following four years prices fell.

Our cooperative journey to the SDDS Plus began in 2013, when, after the achieved national consensus on the usefulness of the accession to this standard, we officially informed the IMF of the efforts that we will make in the medium-term period to meet the membership criteria. Then, in the next years, we worked on the production, promotion and publication of the required data.
First, the growth outlook for the euro area continues to point to moderate increases in activity in the coming quarters, likewise subject to downside risks. Moreover, further headway in fiscal consolidation will be inevitable, which does not allow expansionary budgetary policies to be applied in the short term. In these circumstances, it is of great importance that any tax reform should prove conducive to economic efficiency and growth. With regard to private debt, credit may not be expected to recover at the aggregate level until economic growth has done so. Meanwhile, the necessary deleveraging should continue to be compatible with the positive restructuring of credit, as attested to by the latest developments. In conclusion, I would say that economists and, even more so, those of us who work in the monetary and financial field, tend to focus on the short or very short term. But I would like to close my address with a reflection on the medium and long term. The twin engines of economic growth are demographic growth and increased productivity. Our worrying population trend responds to complex economic, social and cultural factors that cannot be rapidly changed. But that does not mean that action should not be taken, as far as possible, to improve this trend. Productivity growth is directly related to capital formation, which is in turn connected to saving.

This over-indebtedness was moreover accompanied by a strong bias towards the construction and real estate development sector and, inevitably in an economy as strongly banked as Spain, this also led to excessive growth in bank lending and excesses in banks’ risk concentration. The relative ease with which these debts built up and their subsequent effects on activity, employment and financial stability were not, in any event, an exclusively Spanish phenomenon. Indeed, these and other similar developments have given rise to widespread initiatives at the international level to strengthen the economic policy tool box, with a new instrument – namely macroprudential supervision – being incorporated to head off this type of situation. In any event, the losses in competitiveness and excessive debt led to a large-scale imbalance in our foreign trade, resulting in a deficit of 10% of GDP in 2007 and requiring the resort to large volumes of external saving to ensure trade financing. But other elements of fragility emerged with the crisis. The worsening macroeconomic scenario and, in particular, the collapse in employment had a most adverse influence on public finances. The characteristics of labour market regulation meant that the effects of the adjustment to the sudden change in the business cycle fell basically on employment, and hardly on wage conditions or on greater hiring flexibility. In turn, the marked deterioration in public finances revealed weaknesses in the institutional workings of the public sector; in particular, the insufficiency of the disciplinary framework in place to ensure compliance with budget targets.
In order to achieve nominal stability, monetary policy must provide a nominal anchor. Since the Second World War, there have been several monetary policy reforms in Norway. In the period between 1972 and 1986, monetary policy was to a limited extent focused on stabilising the rise in prices. During this period, inflation was high and variable. Consumer prices rose almost twice as much as in Germany. At the same time, the value of the Norwegian krone against the German mark was almost halved, contributing to high imported inflation. From the mid-1980s, during and after the credit bubble and the cost shock, it was recognised that a substantial revision of economic policy would be necessary and that the problems created by inflation had to be taken seriously. From 1986 to 1992, Norway operated a fixed exchange rate regime. The fixed exchange rate was the anchor for inflation in Norway. The difference between inflation in Norway and Germany narrowed substantially. Deteriorating competitiveness due to high wage growth would no longer be remedied by means of devaluations. Instead, imbalances in the labour market would be addressed by means of a counter-cyclical policy. Substantial emphasis was placed on the importance of wage formation for employment. Only when wage growth dropped below the level of our trading partners did unemployment begin to fall and the manufacturing sector began to pick up. Thus, the fixed exchange rate policy was not introduced in order to strengthen the internationally exposed business sector.

To maintain competitive strength, wage growth in Norway had to be on a par with wage growth among our trading partners when productivity growth in Norway was on a par with our trading partners. With the current monetary policy regime, the inflation target is the nominal anchor. According to updated national accounts figures, an inflation target of 2½ per cent and trend productivity growth of around 2 per cent imply annual nominal wage growth of about 4½ per cent. Wage growth that is lower than 4.5 per cent contributes to increased employment. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation’s recommendations to its members are based on the inflation target: “It is therefore in the interests of all wage earners to control total wage increases to avoid exceeding the level that is consistent with the inflation target defined by Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish parliament).”  Challenges facing the Norwegian business sector History has taught us that individual companies and individual industries in wealthy countries may be threatened by the emergence of producers from low-cost countries. Nevertheless, the emerging Asian economies have not posed a threat to industrialised countries' economies as a whole. On the contrary, growth in Asian economies has led to lower prices for a wider range of products. These countries have also gradually developed into important markets. We know from experience that competition from Japanese and then Korean shipyards was an important reason behind the downsizing of our own shipbuilding industry.
DORA in particular represents a major and innovative step forward, with the establishment of an oversight framework for monitoring third-party service providers that are identified as critical for European financial institutions. These providers shall be required, under possible on-call duty, to collaborate with client institutions to enable them to comply with their own obligations in terms of IT security and business continuity. As regards crypto-assets, although the size of the ecosystem remains relatively small to date, which limits the contagion effects on traditional finance, the instability of the sector shows that establishing a reliable regulatory framework is necessary to ensure its long-term growth. France has been a forerunner in this respect since 2019 with the enactment of the PACTE law and the 6  introduction of the status of Digital Asset Service Provider (DASP). Europe is also leading the way in this field with the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation, which has just been adopted in its final version. Elsewhere, approaches are still being developed: some countries are hesitating between regulation and an outright ban, while others, such as the United States, are taking a fragmented approach to regulation, which is not always respected by the players. In any case, given the global dimension of this market, it is important that international regulation be implemented as rapidly as possible. In this respect, it is essential that it results from the high-level recommendations drawn up by the Financial Stability Board on crypto-assets and stablecoins.

They are also all 2/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  necessary to ensure a proper balance between markets and regulations, and liability and control at European and national level. The SSM ensures that banks are subject to the same set of rules and supervised on the basis of common standards. This reduces the risks of spillovers from bank failures to sovereigns and provides a common framework conducive to further integration in the banking markets, a process which has been lagging. Since bank failures cannot always be avoided – and indeed this may not be desirable either, as it may undermine market discipline – we need a credible and well-functioning crisis management and resolution mechanism. This is ensured by the second pillar of the banking union. With the setting-up of the BRRD5, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), we have made a quantum leap in the institutional organisation of the EMU. However, the framework is still incomplete. Most notably, it requires a common public backstop to the SRF, which is essential to inspire full confidence in the resolution regime. In addition, it would be desirable to eliminate national divergences in the insolvency and liquidation of credit institutions, and in the implementation of the BRRD through national resolution laws. Allowing these divergences to persist ultimately implies that the geographical location of a failing bank may still influence the outcome of the resolution, which is inconsistent with the idea at the heart of a banking union.
If Parliament had not passed the emergency legislation in October 2008, thereby ensuring that there was a functioning banking system and that domestic deposits were secure, if capital controls had not been introduced in November 2008, if we had not been so successful in repairing domestic balance sheets, if the economic recovery had been weaker and the rate of return on domestic assets had been lower, then the domestic assets of the old banks would have been worth much less, as would the offshore krónur. In this scenario, these positions might have exited Iceland long since, at just a small fraction of the value they had just before the resolution of the old banks. Instead, the domestic assets of the old banks amounted to 25% of GDP and the stock of offshore krónur was estimated at around 15% of GDP. It was clear that free exportation of these positions without mitigating action would have resulted in a new currency crisis, with potentially serious effects on financial stability. That was both economically and politically unacceptable. As a matter of fact, the population had been promised solutions to these problems entailing no negative effect on the exchange rate. The Icelandic authorities have publicised three versions of their capital account liberalisation strategy: the first in 2009, the second in 2011, and the current one in June 2015. It was under the second strategy that the stock of offshore krónur was reduced through a series of auctions.

Bwalya K E Ng’andu: Improving access to finance by the SMEs in Zambia Remarks by Dr Bwalya K E Ng’andu, Deputy Governor (Operations) of the Bank of Zambia, at the Signing Ceremony for a credit line of $ 5 million between NORFUND and BancABC Zambia, Lusaka, 1 December 2011. *  *  *  YOUR EXECELLENCY, THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR, MR ARVE OFSTAD; MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS PRESENT; THE CHAIRMAN OF BANCABC ZAMBIA LIMITED, MR. CHANDA CHILESHE; THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF BANCABC, MR. DANA BOTHA; HEAD OF THE NORFUND SOUTHERN AFRICAN OFFICE, Mr. DEEPAK MALIK; DISTINGUSIHED INVITED GUESTS; MEMBERS OF THE PRESS; LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. Let me begin by thanking BancABC for inviting me to be the guest of honour at this very important event, where we will witness the signing of a credit line worth US $ million between BancABC and the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (NORFUND). It is pleasing to know that the credit line to be signed this morning is specifically tailored to provide financial support to Small and Medium scale enterprises (SMEs). The development of the SME sector and its potential to contribute to aggregate productivity growth, economic growth and development have been stifled by the generally limited access to finance. The credit line to be signed today is an important milestone in improving access to finance by the SMEs in the country. Equally as important as access to finance is the price of financing that is placed at the disposal of SMEs.
However, in acknowledging this growth and the important contribution of mobile banking to extending financial services to the poor, consumer protection should be taken as an integral component of any business model that is developed. To this end, the Bank of Zambia working with other key stakeholders such as the Communications Authority will play its role in ensuring that the provision of an enabling regulatory environment is carefully balanced with the need to protect consumers. Mr. Chairman, the Celpay conference on mobile banking could not have come at a more opportune time when the country is facing numerous challenges arising from the impact of the recent financial and economic crisis. Due to the underperformance of various sectors of the economy during the period of the crisis, provision of financial services was somehow curtailed while non-performing loans has been on the rise. In order to ameliorate the effects of this downturn and further improve financial inclusion, it is imperative to develop cost effective innovative products such as mobile banking. It is therefore expected that this conference will come up with solutions that will enhance the extension of banking services to the poor and at affordable rates. Ladies and Gentlemen, recent statistics on telecommunications indicate that there are about three million subscribers across the three mobile networks currently licensed to operate in Zambia. This extensive coverage obviously offers a great opportunity to enhance the standards of living of our people.

And absent significant intervention from authorities here and in other countries, would have risked tightening financing conditions significantly and made the impact of the pandemic much worse. Tackling the causes of that is today a major area of work both internationally and domestically. For banks, we tested rigorously to ensure safety and soundness, and particularly that banks could support the economy through these very hard times. Indeed, we tested to make sure this support could continue through even harder times, and the answer was positive. This matters greatly because having a resilient system has meant that business lending could be sustained, and mortgage servicing pauses to support households seriously affected by Covid and its economic effects were extensively available and used, all to assist with dealing with the consequences of Covid. It has been the first major test of the post-financial crisis reforms to regulatory standards. In my assessment this outcome mainly passes the test of resilience, accepting both that we have work to do on the lessons from the dash for cash, and that we can never stand still because the positive benefits of innovation also create their own challenges. But, what is meant by the idea of resilience? A resilient financial system has the resources and flexibility to respond to a range of shocks of different sorts. In doing so, it will support stronger growth over the long-run, helping the economy to bounce back and reducing long-term economic scarring caused by the shock.
I would say that market confidence is essential for the stability of the financial system. 1  The Riksbank usually discusses household indebtedness from a financial stability perspective in its twiceyearly Financial Stability Report. See, for instance, Financial Stability Report 2013:2. Sveriges Riksbank. 2  Previously, mortgages were often financed through housing bonds, which had maturities of around 30 years. Today, covered bonds are used instead, where newly issued covered bonds had an average maturity of around 4 years in the autumn of 2013. At that time, the average maturity of the outstanding covered bonds was approximately 3 years. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We saw in the most recent financial crisis that high indebtedness in the household sector can create problems, with some countries suffering a severe fall in house prices. When the value of houses declines, households begin to save more. When savings increase, consumption decreases and thus demand in the economy falls. Ultimately, this can lead to lower production and higher unemployment. We do not want to see this kind of development in Sweden. It is also important to remember that there is interplay between developments in the financial markets and developments in the real economy. If we were to experience a fall in housing prices during a recession and thus similar problems to those experienced by other countries, it is likely that we would suffer both a decline in demand in the economy and that the banks would experience greater difficulty and greater cost in obtaining market funding.

However, the condition for these welfare gains is that there has been considerable confidence in the Swedish state, Swedish banks and the Swedish housing and mortgage markets. Today a large percentage of the market agents investing in Swedish bonds are outside of Sweden. This means that the Swedish financial system is also dependent on how other countries assess the Swedish mortgage and housing markets. It is important that these markets function well so that we can continue to enjoy a high level of confidence on the financial markets. We therefore have a major responsibility to ensure that the vulnerabilities are limited and that confidence remains strong. This is particularly important given the weaknesses that have emerged as a result of the structure of the financial system. The good access to capital and the large increase in mortgages has also meant that the Swedish banking system has grown, and become one of the largest banking systems in Europe. Moreover, the Swedish banking system consists of a few large banks that are closely interlinked. This means that problems at one bank can easily spread to other banks. All this means that the costs to society could be substantial if we were to suffer a financial crisis. 7  See T, Jansson (2014), Households’ amortisation decisions, The analysis group’s memorandums on household indebtedness, No. 4, Sveriges Riksbank. www.riksbank.se. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  How do we attain a better balance?