samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With firmly anchored inflation expectations, Norges Bank has also been able to give weight to economic stability when setting the key policy rate. Further light is being shed on the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability. Inflation targeting in Norway has become more flexible. At the same time, we cannot overburden monetary policy. In weighing the various considerations, we will in our  8  “Liquidity in the foreign exchange market for EUR/NOK”, Kathrine Lund, Norges Bank Economic Commentaries 3/2011. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  interest rate setting adhere to the primary objective of monetary policy – low and stable inflation. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  17  18  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  19  20  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  21  22  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  23  24  BIS central bankers’ speeches

There is also a strong catastrophe risk ecosystem to support ILS issuances, with the leading catastrophe modelling firms with ILS expertise present in Singapore, and research institutes such as the Earth Observatory of Singapore and the Institute of Catastrophe Risk Management, to support data and modelling needs. Singapore also aims to serve as the Asian knowledge centre for new and emerging risks. b. Singapore is well recognised as a premier asset management centre in Asia, with deep capabilities across both traditional and alternative asset classes. As the gateway to alternative capital providers such as pension funds, family offices, and hedge funds in Asia, ILS fund managers are increasingly assessing Asian investors through Singapore. c. Singapore has a deep debt capital market, with a broad range of bond offerings to provide collateral for and to support innovative ILS products and structures. SGX, a dynamic stock exchange, can facilitate bond trading. 13 Second, Singapore has ready corporate, regulatory and tax frameworks to facilitate ILS issuances: a. ILS instruments can be issued and regulated in Singapore via the Special Purpose Reinsurance Vehicle (“SPRV”) regulations, which allows sponsors to readily securitise insurance risks in Singapore. b. To provide tax neutrality for ILS vehicles, Singapore offers the Approved Special Purpose Vehicle (“ASPV”) scheme. 14 Third, MAS has taken steps nurture the growth of the ILS market in the region. a. MAS launched the ILS grant scheme in Jan this year, which will fund 100% upfront issuance costs of catastrophe bonds in Singapore, up to $ million.
Much is at stake, most notably keeping our achievements alive, preserving our political, economic and social model, and ensuring a pivotal role for a united Europe in an increasingly globalised world. 9/9

This achievement should be saluted as citizens of both  BIS Review 15/2009  1  countries will now be able to pay for goods originating from the other country with the currency of that country, hence eliminating the need for currency conversions by citizens. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, this agreement is also a step towards further strengthening trade and financial cooperation between the two countries. It provides the legal basis for commercial banks, bureaux de change and other financial institutions to freely accept each country’s currency and repatriate it through the banking system with full accountability. The agreement will not only enhance trade cooperation but will also increase cooperation between our two central banks. Furthermore, the agreement provides a platform for sharing information on the bank notes in use by the two central banks. This information exchange initiative should not only end at central banks, but be extended to all economic entities that will use and benefit from this development, especially our hard working farmers who should be paid genuine currencies when they sell their produce. Once again, Governor, let me thank you most sincerely for initiating this agreement. Indeed, the signing of this agreement is a testament of the cordial relationship that has existed between Mozambique and Zambia since the days of the liberation struggle. I must add here that, for us, it marks a key milestone towards enhancing regional integration and macroeconomic convergence. As you are aware, Governor, this is our main goal as member countries of the Southern Africa Development Community.
In fact, the observation that bond yields fail to behave in accordance with the simple “expectations hypothesis” goes back much further, to Macaulay (1938). 4  Gabaix (2012). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  First, forward interest rates in the UK are very sensitive to news from the US, puzzlingly so. Chart 5 I’ve used before. It plots average responses of sterling yields, at two and ten-year maturities, to various bits of economic news. What’s most striking are the significant reactions to surprises in US payrolls releases. The UK is a relatively open economy, prone to shocks from elsewhere. As the largest economy in the world, the US is bound to exert an influence on our economy and the appropriate level of domestic interest rates. But it’s hard to imagine that one learns more about inflationary pressure in this country from changes in US employment than from those in the UK itself. What seems more likely is that that US employment releases have effects on risk appetite, and this then leads to a high degree of co-movement – relative to that in pure forecasts – between forward interest rates in the two currencies. Table 1, which gives the results of simple regressions of changes in UK interest rates on their US counterparts, suggests this might be a more general phenomenon. It shows that forward yields are much more closely correlated across the two markets than spot interest rates. This doesn’t disprove the expectations hypothesis.

Empirically, the behaviour of the economy matters more for interest rates than prior forecasts. In addition, the MPC isn’t solely concerned with inflation anyway, still less its most likely rate at a fixed point in the future. That means that the target horizon for inflation is generally longer than the earliest point at which policy can affect it – there is therefore no single, unique path of interest rates that will do the job. It also means that the horizon itself can vary. I will therefore conclude with something of an apology. For those in the audience wanting me to give a direct and unequivocal promise as to when Bank Rate will change, you will, I’m afraid, be disappointed. I can’t. But you should look on the bright side. If there is any value in listening to people like me, it is to help you with what is the best way to try and predict future interest rates - to forecast the economy yourselves (which is probably more interesting). After all, if the future were perfectly predictable we wouldn’t have to bother trying. References Broadbent Ben, 2014, “Unemployment and the conduct of monetary policy in the UK”, Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 38th Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Campbell John, 1995, “Some lessons from the yield curve”, Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 9, No. 3. Eguren-Martin F. and N. McLaren, 2015, “How much do UK market interest rates respond to macroeconomic data news?”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin.
In the fifth part I shall address the cost-benefit issues that sooner or later inevitably turn up whenever measures to improve resilience are discussed. I shall conclude with a summing-up of my main points. Value: significance and driving forces The main function of banks is intermediation. In its basic form intermediation takes place between borrowers and lenders. Additional intermediation functions are - among many others - making payments and buying and selling securities on behalf of clients. Over the past decades we have seen a huge decrease in the costs of intermediation. This has drastically changed the structure of the banking sector and, at a more general level, the structure of the whole financial sector. Two factors have triggered this change. First, competition in the markets has increased as a consequence of reduced trade barriers and of deregulation. Trade barriers not only in goods but also in services including financial services and in financial assets have been progressively lifted. This has led to rapidly growing interaction among economies, not least in the area of banking and financial services. Countries participating in this process have seen their domestic financial markets become deeply integrated with markets abroad. Distance and location, increasingly becoming less of an obstacle, no longer give protection from competition. This is globalization. Second, technological progress, especially in information technology (IT) and telecommunications, has exerted an all-pervasive pressure to innovate at the level of processes and products and has greatly affected the way the financial sector organizes itself.

A temporary phase, which we are in, of low interest rates makes it more likely that we will return to a situation where savers get a better deal. It is a temporary phase, but there is no doubt that there are consequences for those looking to earn income. This is not a situation that is ideal. But we are still in the legacy of the crisis and I think this policy path is correct. We also always say that, in terms of the speed of the recovery, European fiscal policymakers can do more. Those countries which have fiscal space can do more to accelerate the recovery. Some have said that the continued low interest rates and quantitative easing have had benefits for large investment funds, and for the area of property investments in particular these benefits come at the expense of individual prospective house buyers, or indeed people who end up renting. It’s become an issue here as it has in other parts of Europe. How would you respond to that? The low interest rate environment has many benefits. It helps to create jobs. For those with a 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  mortgage, it reduces the cost of maintaining that mortgage. For highly indebted governments there is a saving in terms of debt service payments. But there is no doubt about it: it does mean that it raises the purchase price of homes.
I think there is little doubt that the current exchange rate is below this new, lower equilibrium rate, as is often the case in a financial crisis. However, there is great uncertainty about how far below equilibrium it is. There is also considerable uncertainty about how much the equilibrium exchange rate will rise in coming years and how much the exchange rate will correct itself. The Central Bank’s newly published forecast assumes that the exchange rate of the króna against the euro will remain close to current levels until well into 2010, whereupon it will gradually rise to about 170 in 2011 and 2012. We hope, of course, that this forecast is unduly pessimistic, and experience tells us that the currency can appreciate swiftly once it gains upward momentum. But it would be imprudent to base plans and policy actions on such a hope. On the contrary: I believe we should prepare ourselves for a protracted episode of weakness. And, like so many other things, there are both pros and cons associated with such a development. BIS Review 146/2009  3  That doesn’t change the fact that we would all have to make a concerted effort to botch things in order to prevent the exchange rate from being considerably higher in a few years’ time than it is today. But then we will have to remember to buy back the foreign exchange that we have used to support the króna in 2008 and 2009.

In view of this, it was decided to impose broad-based capital account restrictions and thereby create the scope for less restrictive monetary policy than would otherwise have been feasible. As is usually the case, there were probably other options available at the time. But because I prefer to focus on the current situation and the road ahead, I would prefer not to spend time rehashing the past and ruminating about hypothetical options. Such speculation cannot change the past. Generally speaking, however, it seems to me that other options would have entailed significantly higher interest rates – initially, at least – and more risk to the exchange rate. But that doesn’t change the fact that, although the capital controls provided a certain temporary shelter, they also entail significant cost and inconvenience, which probably vary directly with the length of time the controls are in place. That cost will ultimately cut into GDP growth for the short term and reduce the level of GDP in the longer term. Understandably, then, we do not wish to maintain the capital controls a minute longer than necessary. Strictly speaking, monetary policy is not based on an inflation target at present – at least, not for the short term – as the interim goal of arresting the fall of the króna and then stabilising it has taken priority. Ultimately, of course, this policy is consistent with the attainment of the inflation target.
And Darell and Arvind are right to say that regulation bears a social cost by increasing segmentation and reducing incentives to compete, search and match in money markets. But it would not be right to then conclude that the framework of regulation that was introduced following the crisis represented a net cost to society. Would it really be desirable to return to a world in which, as Pozsar (2016) put it, the quantities traded were “endless”, and the impact on balance sheet “an afterthought”? The role of the leverage ratio Given that I am a member of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), which has been one of the architects of the post crisis regulatory framework in the UK and put a leverage ratio in place in 2015, you probably won’t be surprised to hear that I support the existence of the leverage ratio. Remember that over the period from 2000 to 2007 around a quarter of dealers held less than enough equity to absorb losses worth 2% of their assets. That was facilitated by an over-reliance on risk weighting, which tended to place too much weight on periods of stability and too little on periods of underperfomance. It’s now clear that in the years before the crisis banks were underpricing the use of their balance sheet, and that the dispersion of rates in money markets probably underestimated the true real marginal cost of intermediation.

For the past couple of years the banks, along with international bodies and fast-food chains, have become the main target for antiglobalisation and anti-capitalist protests. I leave others to muse on the motivation and justification for such actions, but I do note that bank finance for developing countries, and more particularly the question of debt forgiveness, are prominent items on the protest agenda. I also note that this is a subject which has for several years been keenly debated, more soberly, by governments, international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank, and banks themselves. It is a complex issue. One must never lose sight of the fact that bank lending involves a contract between the bank and the borrower, and the parties should be expected to honour that contract. If it is treated otherwise, then the basis for all future relationships crumbles. But in practice the situation is hugely complicated if there is a syndicate of lenders, giving rise to problems of co-ordination and potential free riding, or if the World Bank or IMF are involved, which typically expect to be at the front of the queue for repayments. At the end of the day, commercial banks may decide that a degree of debt forgiveness (possibly disguised as a generous rescheduling) is advisable as the best means of minimising overall losses and, perhaps, preserving longer-term business opportunities with the country or customer in question. But this should be a commercial decision.
That would certainly be workable – we have done something like it before – and there could be changes in the euro zone which might add to the attractions of a move in that direction. However, it is important not to underestimate the costs of the transition and the new boundary issues it would create. The cultures and staffing of the Bank and the FSA have changed a great deal since 1997 and would not be easy to reshape. And there are genuine costs for firms and supervisors in split responsibilities for different parts of complex groups. Personally, I am not convinced there is a clearly superior arrangement to the revised arrangements we have now put in place. It is not clear that any country has done much better than the others despite the differences in regulatory structure. Perhaps Canada has the best claim and that has a system similar in many respects to the UK’s. Whatever the boundaries, in a crisis like today’s I am sure that cooperation between the regulator, Central Bank, and Finance Ministry would be essential. I am pleased therefore that the new legislation makes clear the duty of the Bank to cooperate with the FSA and Treasury. Lesson 3: Tighten international coordination If the tripartite arrangements at home needed to be improved, cross border coordination needs to be transformed if we are to avoid a drift back into a network of national and regional financial enclaves. The failure of Lehmans was a fully fledged disaster for the world economy.

Those technological giants (Alipay and WeChat pay) grew so big to build their own ecosystems, a walled garden where fragmentation of the market happened. The terms platformisation and super-apps were coined there. The state then intervened to retain control over the system and to build a one, common, integrated payments system accessible to everyone. To level the playing field. In countries where cash is almost out of use, and the private sector provides digital payments at scale, the financial stability concerns paved the way for the CBDC entry. This is why Swedes started it - to provide a backstop to private payment rails and to render it as a central point of conversion between private digital currencies – a monetary anchor. But what are the main drivers for developing the CBDC here in the eurozone? What drives the ECB and the CNB to follow this path? Because, in essence, and let me be honest here, if we want to pursue our monetary goals, we do not need a new form of money. By affecting the cost of funds, we can do our monetary job well. So, what is it that drives us towards the CBDC, or better to say, towards the digital euro? THE DIGITAL EURO The main reason behind the digital euro project is the declining use of cash. Cash was the most frequently used payment method at the point of sale (POS) in the euro area in 2022 and was used in 59% of transactions, down from 79% in 2016 and 72% in 2019.
FT: So there is not much room for manoeuvre and very soon you are going to have to think about other non-standard measures? CN: If we feel we need more… We are in a process where three month rates lose a few basis points every day. Market and lending rates are continuing to move nicely downwards. The process has been fuelled by the 275 basis points cut that the ECB has decided. The process is not finished. We need some time for all that to feed through into the economy. FT: So no rate cut in April? CN: We will see. We have proved that we were always ready to act when we felt it was necessary. But we act on the basis of facts and figures, not only macro-economic facts and forecasts, but also on the actual developments in the financial markets. FT: Do this week’s French industrial production figures means things in France are going to get a lot worse than expected by the Banque de France and the government? CN: The figures were bad and I must say that they probably makes our own forecast of a decline of growth of 0.6 per cent during the first quarter maybe a little bit optimistic. But this being said it is difficult to judge what it means without all the analysis.

One could oblige banks to build up buffers using part or all of the increase in the value of securities held so that until you have finally sold the security, have booked the profit, you’ve got a potential profit that you can turn into a cushion. So when you enter a downturn and market values drop, the cushion would be the first defence against that. How it would work exactly still needs to be developed. These are two different types of activities, two different types of cushion. You could have both. FT: Could you imagine the ECB embarking on a large-scale programme of quantitative easing, or would you rule it out? CN: I would not rule out anything and we have not ruled out anything. What I believe we must do – and we keep studying various options – is to look at a few things and see whether we need to go beyond what we have done already. By the way, I consider that we are already implementing a non-standard monetary policy. The fact that we have, first, enlarged the pool of collateral and, second, decided to make the provision of liquidity at all maturities up to 6 months at fixed rates and for unlimited quantities, means we are not in a normal framework. FT Would you call that quantitative easing? CN: It is a way of doing quantitative easing, certainly, because, it means that we can provide liquidity to each institution beyond what they actually need.