samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That was badly neglected around the western world in the years running up to the current crisis. (And it remains a risk going forward.) Resilience sounds, and is, highly desirable. But it is not a free good. There are trade-offs. And here lies an important contrast with monetary policy. No one seriously believes that there is a trade off in the long run between, on the one hand, inflation and, on the other hand, growth and employment. While a monetary authority can pump up nominal demand to enhance output and employment in the short run, in the long term the impulse is dissipated in a higher price level, with the economy’s real equilibrium determined by real factors alone. But in the financial stability arena, there is a long-run trade off. An economy with a repressed financial system is unlikely to experience financial instability, but it would have plenty of other problems. In consequence, the authorities have to set standards of resilience suited to tail events without impairing the wider functioning of the economy. But we also need to be equipped to raise the required standard of resilience in the light of changing circumstances, notably if we judge the world to have become more threatening than previously foreseen. That is the basis for macroprudential policymakers, such as the UK’s FPC, being able to deploy “cyclical” instruments, as I shall describe later.

During the quarter ending September 2010, developments in commercial banks’ nominal interest rates were mixed. The weighted average lending base rate (WALBR) continued its downward trend, falling to 19.8% from 20.9% in June 2010. Similarly, the average lending rate (ALR) fell marginally to 26.8% in September 2010 from 27.9% in June 2010. However, the 30-day deposit rate for amounts exceeding K20 million and the average savings rate (ASR) for amounts above K100,000 remained unchanged at 5.6% and 4.7%, respectively. Real sector developments Developments were favourable in the real sector during the reviewed quarter. This was reflected in increased output of metals (copper & cobalt), beer, soft drinks and cement. Further, international arrivals also increased during the period under review. Agriculture The stock of maize grain held by major millers in the country rose by 124.6% to 101,807.0 mt as at 29th September 2010 from 45,336.7 mt as at 30th June 2010. In terms of holdings by province, Lusaka contributed 51,117.1 mt (50.2%), Copperbelt 26,644.0 mt (26.2%), Southern 19861.0 mt (19.5%), Western 4,050.0 mt (4.0%), and Northern 35.0 mt (0.03%) respectively, while Eastern province accounted for 100.0 mt (0.1%). Data on maize stocks from Central province was not available at the reporting date. Mining During the reviewed quarter, copper output increased by 16.4% to 232,554.87 mt. This output was also 30.5% higher than the 178,140.1 mt of copper produced in the third quarter of 2009.
François Villeroy de Galhau: Monetary policy in the face of the Covid crisis Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, to the Société d’économie politique, Paris, 25 May 2020. * * *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very happy to join you today for this discussion, which although virtual, will be very real in terms of the strength of the ideas put forward. And I would like to extend my warm thanks to your Chairman Denis Ferrand for his kind invitation. The crisis we are living through is without precedent, in terms both of its brutality and its scale. In the face of this unparalleled storm and the uncertainty it is creating, central banks have responded and innovated, and they need to remain alert. These actions are sparking debate, and raising profound questions about monetary policy. In these troubled times, I think I should start with a reminder of the two anchors that moor our decision-making. I shall then turn to our current strategy, in order to clarify the order of priority for our objectives, and therefore for our tools. I. Two vital and permanent anchors: the mandate and independence In these turbulent times, the ECB is held fast by two crucial and permanent anchors: its price stability mandate and its independence.

The first concerns the low inflation rate, the second the significance of inflation expectations and the third the expansionary monetary policy. Inflation below target – several reasons for this Let’s start with inflation: Why is it so low now and therefore also far below the target? What are the reasons for this? 2  The Figure shows the period 2010–2012 as a whole, although there were several wage bargaining rounds during this period. 3  For natural reasons, there are no wage data available for 2015 yet. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  On an overall level, one can say that the low inflation is explained by the weak international demand in recent years and the weak domestic activity. This development reflects the fact that the recovery following the financial crisis has been unexpectedly sluggish – perhaps less so in Sweden than in many other countries. The low inflation is not just a Swedish phenomenon. It has also fallen or developed surprisingly weakly in many other countries in recent years, and other central banks have also found it difficult to attain their inflation targets. In Sweden, companies appear to have found it unusually difficult to pass on their cost increases to prices. There are also signs that inflation may have been held back by increased competition and uncertainty over the development of the economy. Furthermore, electricity prices have been unexpectedly weak over the past year. In addition, the oil price fell heavily during the second half of 2014.
The problem that has been with us for some time now is the sectoral (and associated regional) imbalance within our overall economy. The domestically-oriented sectors have, for the most part, been doing relatively well, whereas those sectors that are exposed to competition within or from the Euro area have been under considerable pressure. Domestic demand growth has remained relatively robust into this year, but we too are affected by the US slowdown and by the associated weakening of equity prices. And we have had a new problem of our own in the form of Foot and Mouth Disease, the effects of which have gone a good deal wider than just the agricultural sector. These new developments were likely to have a dampening effect on demand pressure within the overall economy, both through their direct impact and through possible damaging effects on confidence. Given the fact that we started from a position in which inflation was below target (and expected to remain so for some period ahead); and given only modest upward pressure – at least so far – on wages and earnings growth, despite the continuing tightness in the labour market; we judged that we needed to reduce interest rates – by ½% – earlier this year in order to meet the inflation target further ahead. And we have made it clear that we will continue to monitor the downside risks very closely, in the context of course of all the other developments affecting our economy.

We will be hearing from leading voices in the field on: Macroeconomics of Climate Change Blended Finance Transition Planning Nature-Related Risks Let me briefly share what the NGFS is doing in each of these areas, to set the backdrop for today's Workshop. Macroeconomics of climate change Both the physical and transition dimensions of climate change will significantly impact output, inflation, labour markets, and the long-term growth potential of economies. 1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The NGFS is seeking to develop the tools necessary for central banks and regulators to make sense of how climate change will affect the macroeconomy and financial system. This includes work on: identifying relevant climate-related data; developing analytical frameworks and models; understanding the implications for monetary policy; and designing climate scenarios for stress testing. The NGFS has brought together an expert network of statisticians and data scientists on climate-related data. They will help member central banks and supervisors build up capacity on climaterelated data such as adverse climate events, carbon emissions, energy intensity, and so on. This will include building climate data directories and setting up green finance data hubs in central banks. The NGFS is developing theoretical frameworks and quantitative models to evaluate the impact of climate change on the macroeconomy. Policymakers need to better understand the channels by which physical risks and transition efforts can affect the economy.
This rigour is sometimes misinterpreted as being not proportional or not in line with qualitative supervision. But common concepts and methods have helped and are helping us to put in place the fundamental pillars of a truly European supervisory approach. Some stakeholders had grown fond of some habits and customs. Those customs had to be abandoned to make room for a new common approach, as the objective of the SSM is not to preserve 19 national approaches but to foster convergence towards best standards of supervision. It is not my intention to only look back at our past achievements. We cannot lean back and hope for easy wins in the years to come. There are still a lot of challenges ahead of us, which we have to face and address. Firstly, there are issues for which we still lack a common approach. For example, what are our supervisory expectations regarding banks’ liquidity risk management? What contingency planning do we expect from banks for outsourced services? To answer these questions, we will establish common administrative practices via the already described process of collecting national and international best administrative practices, of benchmarking concepts and by taking into account the lessons learnt from the crisis. Second, we need to further refine our benchmarking by using the knowledge we gained last year. Last year, we had to be tough on banks and on us to collect a lot of harmonised quantitative as well as qualitative information.

One important step led to a common methodology for the supervisory review and evaluation process, the core of supervisory activities and the basis for the capital level the SSM expects a bank to hold according to its individual risk profile. Starting with 19 different supervisory practices and information levels, it was pivotal to set a basis of quantitative as well as qualitative information about individual banks and the differences in national banking systems. We can now reap the fruit from  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  having a single European supervisor by moving our capacity for benchmarking to a European level. But it was not only a busy year, it was a very special year, too. Everything we decided, we decided for first time. Everything we did set a precedent. Thus, everything had to be discussed in the Supervisory Board of the SSM, consisting of the representatives of the 26 national supervisory authorities as well as of 6 ECB representatives. We formulated supervisory policies in all major areas, for example large exposure limits, the fitness and properness of board members, conditions for changes in qualifying holdings, prerequisites for capital reductions and issuances, model approvals, capital and liquidity waivers, IPS etc. We also discussed and agreed on concepts and processes for supervisory planning, onsite inspections, risk analysis, reporting of banks. Integrating 19 national supervisory cultures and traditions with a wide range of administrative practices demanded and still demands organisational and methodological rigour.
This has naturally affected analyses of the Riksbank’s behaviour and resulted in a somewhat new type of discussion about monetary policy and, not least, the Riksbank’s communications. That brings me to the next point. 2. New Executive Board means new conditions  Transparency desirable The new Riksbank legislation has altered the conditions for how the Riksbank operates and communicates externally. The strong statutory independence makes it extra important that openness is practised as much as possible and that what we do can be examined and evaluated. These are basic arguments in the interests of democracy. The law makes the Executive Board collectively accountable for running the Riksbank as well as for its monetary policy decisions. The Board concluded that the important discussion ought to be held in session, not in corridors, and ought also to be minuted in such a way that it can be assessed. Having established this, the way in which we should communicate externally more or less presented itself. Each Board member should be answerable for her/his opinion. The members’ individual responsibility is thereby clarified. So when one of us makes a speech, it is not normally a joint monetary policy signal but the expression of a personal opinion. I willingly admit that this was accompanied by purely practical considerations to do with the difficulty of coordinating six strong wills before every speech or interview. There probably are not many other collective decision-making assemblies that publish their members’ positions so openly or so soon after decisions have been made.

The debate is focussed once more on the risks of overheating. The setting for our activities is evidently liable to change at short notice. I shall begin, as usual, by talking about what has happened since we last met and commenting on the public debate. One of the changes this time has to do with the set-up for the Riksbank. New legislation from the beginning of this year has given the Riksbank a more independent status and a new managerial structure. So I shall also be saying something about the new conditions for the Riksbank’s communications. Finally I shall be looking ahead and commenting on our appraisal of the coming years. In doing so I shall consider a matter that has attracted a lively discussion recently: has the trade-off between growth and inflation in Sweden changed? This is an issue we have had to consider carefully in recent years. 1. Monetary policy in the past twelve months  Weaker international course in the wake of the crisis The international financial markets were very turbulent last autumn after Russia’s suspension of debt payments and the problems with the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. Analyses at that time suggested that the financial turmoil would have considerable global consequences for the real economy. The Riksbank judged that even with good domestic demand and a weaker exchange rate, the slacker international trend would cause inflation in Sweden to be below the target in twelve to twenty-four months’ time.
Christian Noyer: Current policy debate challenges – a euro area perspective Welcome address by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the 4th Bank of FranceDeutsche Bundesbank Macroeconomics and Finance Conference, Paris, 24 May 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues, It is a great pleasure for me to speak in front of such a distinguished audience. As you might know, this is the fourth time that the Banque de France and the Deutsche Bundesbank have jointly organised a conference of this type. It is held every other year, alternately in Germany and in France. The fact that these two institutions sponsor an event of this nature sends a clear signal to the community of researchers: it illustrates the importance of research for the conduct of monetary policy. This is especially relevant at the current juncture as our understanding of the interactions between financial markets and the real economy remains incomplete. The work of outstanding quality presented during this conference could help influence the design and the conduct of monetary policy. The programme of this conference is very rich. It covers topical subjects that are of the utmost importance from the point of view of current policy debate. Let me take as an example the topic covered this morning: unconventional monetary policy, which have been my bread and butter as a member of the ECB Governing Council for the already six years.

As a result, the Swiss economy has benefited from far more favourable monetary conditions than Germany, for example, which is subject to the same interest rate regime as those euro area countries in the process of convergence. Furthermore, the interest rate bonus has remained, partly because of the heterogeneous economic development of the euro area. Even if the international significance of the Swiss franc diminished, its unique character should strengthen in view of the increasing complexity and diversity of the euro area. The markets have correctly assessed this process. The development of the euro area also presents a challenge to the Swiss economy. In this context, Switzerland's monetary autonomy will remain a significant asset. BIS Review 16/2005  1
Accordingly, the goods group inflation should be realized at about 3 percent in order to achieve the 2006 target. However, the acceleration in price increases in the items that is not under the control of the monetary policy, such as fresh fruits and vegetables, oil, basic metal and gold, reduces this possibility. At this point, it is meticulously emphasized that price increases in the said items are to a large extent temporary and that monetary policy will not react strongly as far as the secondary effects remain limited. Another basic risk relating to the upcoming period is the difficulty in foreseeing the global risk appetite and the course of international liquidity conditions. The improvement in the quality of current account financing and favorable developments in public finance in the recent period are considered to increase the endurance of the economy against likely shocks. However, it is a fact that any shock that may come from the said direction in the current situation carries with it the potential to affect our economy unfavorably. In case of such an event, our aim will be to ensure the consistency of inflation with the medium-term targets. In this context, by diffusing the policy reaction over time, the impact of exogenous shocks will be eased without any harm to price stability. Distinguished Guests, Price stability is a sine qua non precondition with respect to macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth. Significant steps have been taken in this direction. The CBRT will continue to fulfill its tasks in carrying these achievements forward.

The projection that total demand for domestic goods will remain relatively limited due to the negative contribution of the foreign demand, despite the stable increase in domestic final demand throughout 2006, underlies these findings (Graph 25). 18  BIS Review 67/2006  Graph 26. Inflation and Output Gap Forecasts (Constant Interest Rate) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3  Forecast Range*  2 1  ± 2 Uncertainty Band  Output Gap  0 -1 -2 7:03  7:02  7:01  6:04  6:03  6:02  6:01  5:04  -3  * The probability of inflation staying within the forecast range is 70 percent. ♦ The path ‘consistent with the target’ which is announced in 5 December 2005 ‘’General Framework of Inflation Targeting Regime and Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy’ and constitutes the base for the principle of “accountability”. • 2006 end-year point target. ♦ The path consistent with the 2007 end-year target, under contemporary data set. In Graph 26, the forecasts that have been produced under a main scenario are presented - in which the current stance, the short-term outlook and the assumptions relating to the fundamental variables the framework of which are given above -are faithfully preserved; however, the policy interest rates are maintained as unchanged for one year starting from today. In contrast to the previous scenario, the path of policy interest rates has not been determined by a medium-term approach, but has been handled as an exogenous assumption.
On the foreign exchange market, the Swiss franc came under increased upward pressure for a brief period after the Brexit vote. This pressure abated again, not least due to the Swiss National Bank’s willingness to intervene on the market. While the pound sterling continued to lose value over the summer months, other key currencies, including the Swiss franc, moved sideways within a narrow range (cf. chart 3). Heightened uncertainty in the run-up to the US presidential election was once again reflected in growing demand for safe-haven currencies on the foreign exchange market, leading to slightly higher Swiss franc exchange rates. Following the US election, the US dollar appreciated on a broad basis. The strengthening of the currency occurred against the backdrop of the rise in US interest rates mentioned earlier. The dollar gained approximately 3% in trade-weighted terms after the election. The recent developments in the US also had an impact on other currency areas. Currencies in emerging economies in particular came under pressure and, as a group, weakened by around 4% against the US dollar. On a trade-weighted basis, the Swiss franc has changed little from its end-June level. Nevertheless, Swiss franc exchange rates moved in different directions. While appreciating more sharply against the yen than against the euro and pound sterling, the Swiss franc weakened against the US dollar and currencies of commodity-exporting countries. Overall, the Swiss franc is still significantly overvalued. The market environment remains challenging and fraught with global economic and political risks.

Financial services are a critical tool to help people step onto the economic growth ladder and create a brighter future by tapping their own creativity in creating jobs and incomes. It can also be instrumental for broader human development, by letting clients invest in themselves and seek protection from shocks and bad fortune. It is however, gratifying to note that following the survey, commercial banks and other nonbank financial institutions in Zambia have increasingly become receptive to lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and have in this regard established departments dedicated to small and medium enterprise lending and introduced financial products specifically designed to meet the financing needs of these businesses. In working with Banking on Health, banks have shown interest in learning about the private health sector, a sector whose business characteristics were largely unknown to banks. However, banks can still misunderstand the risks, overestimate the costs, and underestimate the potential returns of lending to sectors, such as the health sector. In addition to the structural barriers in the financial sector that limit access to finance, many private health care providers have limited financial and business-management skills and often struggle to prepare a bankable loan applications or business proposals. It is difficult for commercial banks to assess the credit risk of a loan without the financial statements and business plans to support the loan application.