samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Fluctuations in the exchange rate can be an important source of such trade-offs, as they can exert pressures on consumer price inflation without proportional effects on activity.27 A simple way to represent formally how the policymaker optimises the trade-off is in “linear-quadratic” form – a set of linear constraints describing the behaviour of the economy, and quadratic preferences that penalise deviations of inflation from its target and output from its potential. The relative weight the policymaker places on output stabilisation, relative to inflation stabilisation, is often denoted 𝜆 – or ‘lambda’. A lambda of zero would imply no weight on the stabilisation of real activity – so-called “inflation nutter” preferences. A positive lambda implies a willingness to strike at least some trade-off between output and inflation stabilisation; a higher value indicates that relatively more weight is given to output stabilisation, so that more of the effects of any shock flows through to inflation. In this framework, the value of lambda should vary over time in light of the nature and persistence of the shocks hitting the economy and features of the economy. The MPC’s remit explicitly builds in such flexibility. It recognises that in exceptional circumstances, when shocks to the economy may be particularly large, persistent or both, the MPC is likely to be faced with more significant trade-offs.

Increased demand for dollar assets lowers their return, creating an incentive for firms to borrow in dollars. The liquidity and safety properties encourage this further.15 In turn, companies with dollar-denominated liabilities have an incentive to invoice in dollars, to reduce the currency mismatch between their revenues and liabilities. More dollar issuance by non-financial companies and more dollar funding for local banks makes it wise for central banks to accumulate some dollar reserves. Given the widespread dominance of the dollar in cross border claims, it is not surprising that developments in the US economy, by affecting the dollar exchange rate, can have large spillover effects to the rest of the world via asset markets. As Hélène Rey has put it,16 and as Arvind Krisnamurthy and Hanno Lustig echo in their paper for this symposium, the global financial cycle is a dollar cycle. In part, that arises because movements in the US dollar significantly affect the real burden of debt for those companies (especially in EMEs) that have borrowed unhedged in dollars, and tend to reduce the dollar value of companies’ collateral.17 Both result in tighter credit conditions and, in the extreme, defaults. Fluctuations in the dollar also significantly affect the risk appetite of global investors. As discussed by Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan earlier today, these risk spillovers can have a significant impact on receiving economies, especially in EMEs where global risk perceptions interact with country-specific risks.
The bigger the balance sheet becomes, the more a future rise in interest rates will squeeze the Federal Reserve’s net interest margin. Some worry that this exposure to higher short-term rates could conceivably affect the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy credibility in the future. Some market participants might worry that the Federal Reserve could become reluctant to raise short-term rates in a timely way because this would constrain the amount of revenue that it would earn and remit to the Treasury. I am confident there is nothing to worry about on this score. Even if the Federal Reserve was not obliged to act in keeping with its dual mandate – which it is – with its assets skewed toward longer-duration securities, the Federal Reserve would have every incentive to ensure price stability over the long term. It is true that the larger the size of the balance sheet, the more likely it is that the Fed would ultimately sell assets back into the market, potentially at prices that could result in losses. Although some fear that such losses could compromise the Federal Reserve’s independence, there is no reason why this should be the case, providing we stick closely to our mandate at all times. To date, the Fed’s actions in responding to the crisis have resulted in abnormally large profits that might reasonably be set against any subsequent losses.

Focus groups and surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve System suggest this contraction is the result of three distinct factors – a decline in demand for credit, a tightening of lending standards, and a weakening of credit quality due to lower collateral values and cash flows. 1 Which is the most important is difficult to discern. However, surveys of small-business owners indicate that much of the weakness in lending to this sector reflects lack of demand. The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) Small Business Optimism Index, for instance, asks respondents to indicate their single most important problem from a standard list. For some time now, the response “poor sales” has been the most frequently cited problem. In contrast, relatively few respondents cite “financial and interest rates” as the most important problem (Chart 13). A caveat to this is that credit constraints could be inhibiting the formation of new small businesses – something that surveys of existing firms would not capture. Although credit availability has begun to improve, the decline in collateral values remains a significant impediment. For example, housing prices have declined so far that nearly one quarter of homes are now worth less than the value of the mortgages that finance them. Lacking sufficient collateral value, such homeowners cannot take advantage of the fact that conforming mortgage rates are at their lowest level in history and refinance their mortgages.
For the Bank of England, the answer to that question is clearly set out in the statutory objectives laid down for us by Parliament7: our mission is to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary stability, defined by the Government as low and stable inflation with a target of 2% (and subject to that supporting the Government’s economic policy and growth and employment objectives); and financial Available on the Society of Professional Economists’ website. Peter was the managing editor of OxRep. 4 “The unemployment problem in the 1980s”, Derek Morris and Peter Sinclair, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 1 no. 2 (1985). 5 “Monetary policy normals, future and past”, William Allen and Peter Sinclair, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 241 no. 1 (2017) 6 “Quantitative easing is not as unconventional as it seems”, Peter Sinclair and Colin Ellis, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vo. 28 no. 4 (2012) 7 Specifically, in the Bank of England Charter 1694, the Bank of England Act 1998 and the Banking Act 2009. 2  3  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  stability, defined as the resilience of the UK financial system as a whole so that it can serve UK households and businesses in bad times as well as good. What makes the Bank of England the right institution to deliver those objectives?

The establishment of the credit bureau is likely to increase credit business, lead to more competitive pricing of credit facilities and lower credit loan defaults and delinquency rates. To address the concerns over the treatment of credit data, MAS would follow two broad principles. 1  Refers to the submission of customer’s payment histories on their credit facilities. Positive data refers to timely payment (i.e. a good customer) and negative data refers to overdue payments. 2  BIS Review 7/2002  First, it is important that individuals have access to their own credit files and to have any inaccurate information corrected. Any dispute resolution process should be timely and effective, and should also be covered in the Consumer Banking Code that ABS is currently working on. Second, it is also important that individual privacy is respected and customer data are not misused for purposes other than what they were originally intended for. A good starting point is the principle of reciprocity on data usage, which all participating members to the bureau will need to adhere to. High standards of confidentiality is also expected of both the bureau operators and participating members. The ABS will continue to work with MAS to ensure that these principles are observed. The launch of the consumer credit bureau will mark the beginning of a new risk management process in Singapore. It will further bolster the integrity and transparency of Singapore’s financial sector.
Reforms in the banking system need to be accompanied by structural reforms in other parts of the economy. However, this can only be possible if the economy is growing sustainably. Within the context of limited fiscal space, there is a need for the appropriate environment to encourage investment and stimulate growth in the private sector. Going forward, we need to enhance Malta’s competitive position in order to attract a higher volume of capital investment in the future. A strong education and skills base, an upgraded infrastructure and a clean and sustainable source of energy are essential elements that would pave the way for future investment. The financial sector provides an important contribution to output and employment growth in Malta. Going forward, the sector also has room for expansion in a range of activities that link it with the domestic economy in the sense that value is added in Malta by engaging the services of financial experts, lawyers, accountants and so on, but catering to demand abroad, such as in the Mediterranean region and beyond. For example, the recently announced initiative to create space for a new commercial activity in the form of facilities for Islamic banking is consistent with this vision for Malta. Enhancing our competiveness requires a constant search for new areas of activity as well as strengthening and refining the currently successful ones. It is the only way that we can ensure that the standard of living can keep increasing and that the value added of the Maltese economy can keep advancing. Thank you.

All the curves start from a common point of 100 in 2008. Setting the Maltese economy aside for a moment, several considerations stand out. The real GDP of the Euro area has yet to return fully to its 2008 level, and the same can be said about the United Kingdom. In fact, the Euro area economy is currently 1.9% smaller than in 2008, while the British economy is 0.5% smaller. The Euro area average is composed of countries recovering at different speeds. For example, Germany is a top performer in the Euro area, though its economy has lagged somewhat behind the United States. In fact, German output is currently 4.8% higher than in 2008, while in the U.S. it is 6.5% higher. Where does Malta fit in all this? As the Chart shows, Malta compared favourably throughout the crisis and the aftermath. The contraction at the trough in 2009 was relatively moderate. The path taken in the recovery has been stronger – in fact consistently stronger – than in the other economies shown in the Chart. Output is at present 12% higher than in 2008. I believe that a number of factors have shaped the course taken by the Maltese economy. Malta passed through a liberalization and restructuring experience that saw the exit of inefficient entities and businesses mostly prior to E.U. accession in 2004.
SEB's market shares in the same period amounted to 24 per cent in Estonia and 15 and 29 per cent in Latvia and Lithuania respectively. 4  IMF (2009) World Economic Outlook, June. 5  Eastern European Consensus Forecast (2009), August. 2  BIS Review 105/2009  the public sector increased by more than 35 per cent in the year prior to the outbreak of the crisis, and in the private sector by over 30 per cent (see Figure 7). As, however, nominal interest rates remained low, the high level of inflation entailed negative real interest rates, which further fuelled the expansion of credit. Even though credit began to expand from a very low level, the rate of development was startling and it did not take long before the debts of the companies in relation to GDP reached levels only slightly below the level of private sector indebtedness in Sweden (see Figure 8). Household indebtedness did not increase quite as much (see Figure 9). As all three countries had also in various ways tied their currencies to the euro with the aim of eventually joining the European Monetary Union, they were not able to use monetary policy to restrict demand. The interest rate weapon was limited to the aim of maintaining the fixed exchange rate. At the same time, fiscal policy was expansionary and accelerated development. Unlike the other countries in the Baltic region, the Baltic states thus entered the global financial crisis with several underlying weaknesses.

This is one of the reasons why the Swedish krona has weakened against the euro. In the period since the beginning of the crisis to the present date, the krona has depreciated by approximately eight per cent against the euro. However, the fall has been even sharper over the last 12 months, reaching 18 to 19 per cent in March 2009. Rapid downturn in the Baltic states It became increasingly clear that the rate of growth in the world was beginning to slow down already in 2008. But it was not until the autumn, when the global financial crisis really took hold, that the situation seriously deteriorated. At present, the global economy is in recession and GDP is expected to fall by one per cent this year. World trade is expected to fall by over 12 per cent. 4 GDP is expected to fall in our region too – by 5 per cent in Sweden, which is slightly more than the figure for our Nordic neighbours. Development in Germany is somewhat weaker than in Sweden, while zero growth is expected in Poland. The situation is much worse in the Baltic states (see Figures 2 and 3), where GDP is currently expected to fall between 15 and 20 per cent this year. 5 This means that the crisis in the Baltic states is unparalleled compared with previous crises. The labour market has also weakened dramatically throughout the region. This is evident not least in the Baltic states where unemployment has now reached almost 17 per cent.
For example, Thailand is the largest source of imports for seven of the nine ASEAN countries, excluding Thailand. The only two countries, where it is not Thailand, are Brunei, where it is Malaysia, and Singapore, where it is Malaysia, but if you are talking about links from a trade standpoint with other countries, it turns out it is Thailand. In terms of investment, the largest source of direct investment to the region is Singapore contributing about 60 percent of total intra-ASEAN FDI flows in 2020. However, a large share of that is not from Singapore itself, for example, when Taiwan firms invest in other countries through their Page 7 of 8  subsidiary in Singapore. Excluding Singapore, the next country on the rankings is Thailand contributing about 24 percent of total intra-ASEAN FDI flows (about one-fourth). We can see that both trade and investment linkages are very strong in Thailand. Furthermore, if we think about a country as a good production base, one thing we might think about is the degree of labor access. A place where labor from different places can move has the potential to act as a centralized production hub. Again, the country with the highest number of ASEAN migrants, not surprisingly, is Thailand because we have a lot of workers from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. According to the United Nations in 2019, the number of intra-ASEAN migrants in Thailand is about 3.5 million compared to Malaysia, the second place, which is around 2 million.

Between May 2000 and March 2001, the BIS sold 220 tonnes on behalf of the SNB. For the first 120 tonnes, the SNB paid the BIS a fixed commission while the performance risk resided with the SNB. For the next 100 tonnes, the BIS agreed to pay the average price of the AM and PM London gold fixing plus a small fixed premium. In April 2001, the Governing Board decided that there was no reason to continue to sell through the BIS. The SNB now had the necessary professionals, know-how, trading resources and contacts to the international gold market to trade directly. Two types of selling operations were subsequently pursued: spot sales in the market and sales programs with price caps. Over the next three and a half years, 730 tonnes were sold directly in the spot market. For these sales, the SNB used 25 counterparties in four different continents. In an effort to receive consistently competitive pricing, the Governing Board allowed the SNB traders to become two-way participants in the market. In other words, traders were allowed to buy gold on an intra-day basis up to two thirds of the daily allocated sales volume. Overall, the sales had to be conducted within a clearly defined corridor which was structured around daily sales volumes of approximately one tonne (Figure 5). Typically, the Bank of England was used for the physical settlement of these operations. Apart from spot operations, 350 tonnes were sold through option programs.
The key to realising the higher return is to adhere to the strategy also in times of heightened uncertainty, as we did through the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. An official framework for rebalancing back to a set allocation to equities has now been established. This will help ensure that this strategy is carried out during the next period of high volatility in financial markets. Chart: Lower costs Management costs for equities are higher than for fixed-income securities. The cost of managing many small shareholdings is higher than managing a few large ones, as is the cost of managing investments in emerging markets in relation to developed markets. Overall management costs as a percentage of the GPFG have nonetheless fallen over time. We have exploited its size to realise economies of scale. In the past few years, costs have been reduced also in krone terms. This is partly due to reduced use of external managers. Costs for external services, such as IT, custodian and settlement services, have also been lowered. Relative to the size of the GPFG, management costs are modest. Norges Bank continuously seeks to achieve efficiency gains without impairing the quality of investment management. In 2012, management costs came to 0.05 percent of the GPFG. Chart: Transparent and professional management Norges Bank meets international and national transparency standards relating to investment management. We have high ambitions with regard to transparency. Yet, we must weigh different considerations.

There will be significant deregulation of the economy – in key sectors like financial services, healthcare, and energy – unleashing animal spirits and new investment. The disinflationary drags from oil and commodity prices will fade and lift producer prices while a tightening labour market will feed faster wage increases. In response to higher growth and higher inflation, the US Fed will hike interest rates faster than previously forecast. The US Dollar will strengthen against most major currencies. The most recent data give some support to the reflation story. The OECD’s monthly leading indicators for October show signs of rising growth momentum – not just in the US but in other advanced economies as well. We are seeing an incipient upswing in the global manufacturing cycle. Inventories have been drawn down significantly. Purchasing managers’ indices have recorded sharp improvements in many countries. But how realistic or sustainable is the growth resurgence scenario? The broad elements appear probable – there are indeed grounds for some optimism. But there is considerable uncertainty over the details, and there are several risks on the horizon. The market’s exuberance in recent months does not seem to have accounted for these uncertainties and risks. Perhaps realising this, the market has begun to retrace some of its steps in more recent weeks.
Second, the speed and intensity of normalisation has been a prudential process, guided by the new information and harmonised with the fiscal policy direction, as well as with developments in the financial market. In this view, I would like to highlight that the reaction of our monetary policy has been - on one hand sufficiently strong to guarantee the return of inflation to the target, within a reasonable time horizon, and - on the other hand – sufficiently gradual, in order to have the least possible impact on both economic activity and financial stability. In addition, I would also like to emphasise, that the normalisation speed in Albania has been lower than that implemented by our trading partners, due to the fact that fiscal policy has followed a consolidating trend throughout 2022, while the strengthening of the exchange rate has restrained the imported inflationary pressures pass-through to the domestic market. In absence of these factors, the increase in interest rate would have been faster and more aggressive, with negative consequences on both consumption and investments of private sector. Third, the monetary policy, even in presence of normalisation, continues to retain the overall accommodative stance for the growth of consumption and investments. Nevertheless, it provides better financial conditions for a more balanced performance of demand and aggregate supply in economy in the future. The monetary policy has been transmitted smoothly across financial markets.

However, in parallel with them, it also reflects the appropriate reaction of monetary, financial and fiscal policies, as well as the fruits of the continuous structural reforms that we have undertaken in the real and financial sector of the economy. 2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In this context, allow me to elaborate on the main directions and results of the work of the Bank of Albania throughout 2022. The augmented intensity and the expanded base of inflationary pressures during the past year dictated a change in the monetary policy stance. In fulfilment of our legal mandate of price stability, the Bank of Albania undertook a normalization of the monetary policy stance. The rise in the interest rate to 2.75% as at end of 2022 from 0.5% at the beginning of 2022, led to the realisation of this normalisation. In parallel, we have intensified communication with markets and public, re-affirming our will to take all the necessary measures for inflation return to the target and to clarify our monetary policy strategy. This strategy is based on three important principles: First, the normalisation of monetary policy stance was and remains necessary for inflation to return to the target in a steady manner. The purpose of this normalisation was to curb the pass-through of rising international prices to the overall and steady surge in prices in the Albanian economy. In this context, it remains in line with the reaction of the other central banks.