samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are already in discussions with international organisations such as the International Finance Corporation on how to leverage their expertise on this. 18. Apart from these three initiatives, the HKMA helped to issue Hong Kong Government’s inaugural $ billion, 5-year green bond under the Government Green Bond Programme earlier in May. (i) We have seen strong demand for this issuance, attracting orders exceeding $ billion, allowing the green bond to be priced at a tight spread against the US Treasury at issuance. The issuance has helped to set an important new benchmark for potential green bond issuers in Hong Kong and the region. (ii) The deal has attracted interests from a diverse group of conventional and green investors. Orders were received from over 100 global institutional investors, and 50% of the Green Bond was distributed to Asia, 27% to Europe and 23% to the United States. By investor type, 29% was distributed to banks, 30% to fund managers, private banks and insurance companies, and 41% to sovereign wealth funds, central banks and supranationals. Based on some rough calculations by our Joint Global Coordinators, about half of the investors participating in our deal could be loosely defined as “green investors”. 19.

Eddie Yue: Hong Kong - the Asian hub for sustainable finance Opening remarks by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Euromoney’s 2nd Asia Sustainable & Responsible Capital Markets Forum, Hong Kong, 25 June 2019. * * * Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. I would like to thank Euromoney for inviting me to speak at this 2nd Asia Sustainable and Responsible Capital Markets Forum today. It is indeed an honour to have this opportunity to talk about this important topic, especially here in Hong Kong, where we place a high priority on and direct much effort towards developing our sustainable finance platform. 2. I understand that we will have a very comprehensive programme today, covering not just the potential of sustainable finance in the region and the role of different stakeholders, but also exciting developments of green bonds and other innovative products. Allow me then to focus my remarks on the bigger picture and on three areas in particular: (i) First, the potential for sustainable finance in Asia; (ii) Second, Hong Kong’s role as Asia’s hub for sustainable finance; and (iii) Third, some of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)’s latest initiatives on this topic. Potential for sustainable finance in Asia 3. The effects of climate change are already visible around the world: more severe weather events, infrastructure damage, problems with food security, water resources, and even human health. No country or community is immune.
Victoria Cleland: The road to enhanced payments Speech (virtual) by Ms Victoria Cleland, Executive Director for Banking, Payments and Innovation of the Bank of England, at the Central Bank Spring Meetings, 31 March 2022. * * * It is a pleasure to be joining you today. And to have an opportunity to highlight the importance of a crucial, but in the past too frequently overlooked, element of central banking – payments. The ability to make payments safely and effectively is essential to each and every one of us. And has been for millennia – from the pre-historic communities exchanging seashells and grain to the vast number of electronic payment methods we have today. Effective payments are essential to both trade and commerce: research consistently finds that improved payment methods have a multiplier effect on economic growth.1 The Bank of England, in line with many central banks, plays many roles in the payments industry: as an operator, overseer, user (through our customer banking function) and catalyst. Today my focus is through the lens of the operator of the critical public infrastructure that underpins the functioning of all UK payment systems: the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) service. I will describe how RTGS can help us maintain stability and promote innovation in the context of rapidly changing user needs; and how collaboration between central banks and other public authorities, the industry and the international community can deliver far-reaching benefits.

This comprises the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia as the highest authority in the ascertainment of Islamic law for Islamic financial business; and a Shariah committee setup in each Islamic financial institution to advise the management and the board on all matters relating to Shariah issues that are specific to the institution. Currently, we are in the midst of revising the Shariah Governance Framework to further strengthen it by providing, among others, greater clarity on the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of the board, Shariah committee and key organs involved in instituting a robust Shariah compliance risk culture. Through the governance, 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  application of Shariah will be more closely integrated with the business and risk strategies of Islamic financial institutions. These efforts, and many more, have culminated in an unparalleled growth in the Islamic banking market share which grew six fold over the last 20 years. Islamic banking system now comprises over 30% of the overall. Takaful has also grown in acceptance, registering double digit growth rates outpacing the conventional counterpart for the past few years. Ar-Rahnu, Islamic investment accounts are becoming more familiar products among Malaysians. We have also become and have maintained a position among the world’s largest sukuk issuers. Islamic finance is thriving and competitive. Islamic financial institutions should consider the wider impact of their activities Beyond this, Islamic finance is also spearheading initiatives in sustainable finance with Islamic banking institutions championing the implementation of Value-based Intermediation (VBI).
Today, growth is low in many countries that are also overwhelmed by high unemployment, especially among the youth. The general situation of lack of internal demand when some external markets start also to decelerate, explains that investment is still almost 20 per cent below what it was in 2007 which affects our potential growth. A declining demography and insufficient progress in total factor productivity, further limit Europe´s growth capabilities and make it more difficult the absorption of the existing high unemployment. Such dynamics thwart the deleveraging process of sovereigns and households, and complicate the return of bank balance sheets to financial health. 4 In my view, the legacy of the crisis constitutes still a vulnerability for the transition process to a more effective and robust EMU. It stokes scepticism, which itself impedes the solutions to  1  Constâncio (2013), “Fragmentation and rebalancing in the euro area”, Joint EC-ECB Conference on Financial Integration, Brussels, 25 April 2013. 2  See Schoenmaker and Wagner (2011), “The impact of cross-border banking on financial stability”, Duisenberg School of Finance – Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 11–054/DSF 18. 3  See Shambaugh, Reis and Rey, “The euro’s three crises”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012, pp. 157–231. 4  See Constâncio, “Growing out of the crisis: Is fixing finance enough?”, speech delivered at the Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the US and World Economies, Washington D.C., 10 April 2014. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the crisis.

A summary of the results has for some time now been published in our quarterly Business Cycle Signals report. The enclosed study explains the objectives and the methods underlying these company talks. You will also find the latest issue of the Business Cycle Signals in your press kits. Both of these sources of information are, of course, also available on our website. Page 5/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Fritz Zurbrügg. Page 6/6
Pablo Hernández de Cos: Signature of the banking protocol for the financial inclusion of the elderly Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation, Madrid, 21 February 2022. * * * First Deputy Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning everyone and many thanks to the Ministry for inviting me to speak. The Protocol presented here today concerns an issue that is affecting many aspects of our lives. I am of course referring to the accelerated digitalisation of our societies, a phenomenon which has clear benefits for citizens. Indeed, national and European public authorities are firmly committed to accelerating this process and for example, the Next Generation EU funds are centred precisely on driving digitalisation. There are also clear benefits for the financial sector overall and the banking sector in particular. The new digital channels give instant and continued access to financial services, without the need to visit the bank. It is hardly surprising, then, that digitalisation is a key financial inclusion strategy in many emerging countries. From the standpoint of financial stability, which, as we all know, is essential for guaranteeing citizens’ well-being, digitalisation also has important benefits. It leads to efficiency gains that help reinforce the soundness and resilience of the banking sector.

However, as I have mentioned in the past when referring to public policies in general, the different social and economic transformations that we advocate and support have transitory costs and affect the public at large in different ways. The digitalisation phenomenon in banking is a good example of these adverse and uneven effects. Something that will deliver great benefits for society overall in the medium term may, nevertheless, entail costs and lead to frustration, inconvenience or even exclusion for certain population groups, as a result of the difficulty or inability to adapt to these changes. These are real problems, as the testimonies we have received from many members of the public in recent months show. Some of these individuals are here with us today and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for putting together this information and bringing it to the attention of the authorities. As I say, these problems are real and, as such, require real solutions. The Protocol that the banking sector is presenting here today must, of course, be part of the solution. It provides specific answers for individuals with fewer digital skills or difficulties in accessing these new channels and thus require more support and assistance in the digital transition. Naturally, we will have to analyse the practical implementation and sufficiency of the protocol in the coming months.
Nevertheless, to ensure visibility of the implementation of reforms, the Basel Committee has been regularly publishing information about members’ adoption of Basel III. We will continue to do this so as to keep all stakeholders and the markets informed, and to maintain peer pressure where necessary. It is especially important that jurisdictions that are home to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) make every effort to issue final regulations at the earliest possible opportunity. But simply issuing domestic rules is not enough to achieve what the G20 Leaders asked for: full, timely and consistent implementation of Basel III. In response to this call, in 2012 the Committee initiated what has become known as the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP). The regular progress reports are simply one part of this programme, which assesses domestic regulations’ compliance with the Basel standards, and examines the outcomes at individual banks. The RCAP process will be fundamental to ensuring confidence in regulatory ratios and promoting a level playing field for internationally-operating banks. It is inevitable that, as the Committee begins to review aspects of the regulatory framework in far more detail than it (or anyone else) has ever done in the past, we will find aspects of implementation that do not meet the G20’s aspiration: full, timely and consistent. We are going to find parts of the framework that have been implemented only in part, or late, or inconsistently. The financial crisis identified that, like the standards themselves, implementation of global standards was not as robust as it should have been.

The idea is both to regain investors’ confidence in securitization assets, which we must admit still suffers from the US subprime crisis, and to encourage banks to deleverage loans portfolio from their balance sheet to refinance the real economy. By encouraging this new type of securitization, the European Commission is mindful to avoid another subprime crisis. Indeed, rebalancing the financing mix of the EU economy as promoted in the CMU initiative is a valuable objective provided a rightly calibrated regulatory and risk framework is in place. These are some of the challenges to tackle in the years to come. And let me wish you a fruitful conference. I now leave the floor to Jean Tirole. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Ben Broadbent: Central banks and digital currencies Speech by Mr Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy of the Bank of England, at the London School of Economics, London, 2 March 2016. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. I would like to thank Robleh Ali, Victoria Cleland, Grellan McGrath and other colleagues at the Bank for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. Introduction Hello! This morning I’m going to talk about money. This should be a routine topic for a central banker, particularly one whose job title includes the word “monetary”. It’s nonetheless ground on which one treads with a bit of trepidation. That’s partly because some of the big questions involved – what money is, why it exists, how and by whom its supply should be governed – seem to evoke very strong opinions. Even the great economist John Hicks, formerly of the LSE, confessed in the 1930s to some nervousness about expressing his views about the matter: “It is with peculiar diffidence and even apprehension that one ventures to open one’s mouth on the subject of money”. It’s also because my particular focus – so-called “digital” currencies, including the possibility of a central bank variety – is an area of active interest and research, including at the Bank of England.

12 While we recognise that there could be further changes pending the finalisation of IBA’s proposal, there was broad consensus within the Committee that we should keep building on the strong momentum generated over the past year. Let me share with you four key takeaways of the SC-STS, arising from these latest developments. 13 First, the proposed extension of LIBOR discontinuation means that SOR will end when LIBOR ends in mid-2023. This has two benefits: One, it will allow about 70% of existing stock of legacy SOR cash products [6] or about $ of bilateral and syndicated loans to mature before the new deadline. This is a good development, as financial institutions will have a smaller stock of legacy transactions to manage. Two, the extension provides time to do more to actively transition legacy SOR contracts to SORA, and to deal with the most challenging legacy transition issues. We seek to complete this transition as an industry by no later than end-2022. Stopping new use early 14 Second, it must still be the case that we stop adding to legacy SOR exposures as soon as practicable. Hence: There was unanimous support within the SC-STS to cease the use of SOR in new cash market products by April 2021, as originally announced.
It is now two and a half years since the Great Recession ended and the recovery began. Yet, despite both accommodative monetary policy and fiscal stimulus, the pace of improvement has been painstakingly slow. Real gross domestic product (GDP) is only just  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  back to where it stood at its pre-recession peak. Employment growth is barely enough to keep pace with the natural growth in the labor force and the unemployment rate remains extraordinarily high. However, recent news about the performance of the economy has been more promising. Motor vehicle sales have returned to their upward trend following supply disruptions caused by last spring’s horrible Japanese tsunami. U.S. manufacturing is expanding – boosted by the recovery in the automotive sector, as well as growing worldwide demand for materials and equipment in the energy, mining and agricultural sectors. Consumer spending outside of autos appears to be rising at a moderate rate, and employment growth, although still tepid, is showing signs of improvement. Initial unemployment insurance claims are down and layoffs have fallen, contributing to a decline in the unemployment rate of 0.5 percent over the past quarter. So, the economy is looking somewhat better than it did a few months ago. But this does not mean we are seeing a massive surge in economic activity. The data shows only modest improvement in growth to rates that are near or just somewhat above the economy’s longer-run potential. Moreover, the pace of economic activity needs to accelerate further to boost confidence.

Let me emphasize that under this policy proposal, core inflation reaching 3 percent is only a risk – and not a certainty. Indeed, simulations of standard models suggest that core inflation is likely to remain below 3 percent even under a policy of extended monetary accommodation. But the economy may behave differently than expected. Still, 3 percent inflation is a risk that we should be willing to accept. If, contrary to most evidence, the natural rate of unemployment is higher than 7 percent, then under this policy inflation will rise more quickly and without any improvements to the real side of the economy. In such an adverse situation, the inflation safeguard triggers an exit from what would be evidently excessive policy accommodation. And it would do so before inflation expectations would be in much danger of becoming unhinged. We would not have the desired reductions in unemployment, but then again, there wouldn’t be anything that monetary policy could do about it. We would suffer some policy loss in that a 3 percent inflation rate is above our 2 percent target. But we certainly have experienced inflation rates near 3 percent in the recent past and have weathered them well. And 3 percent won’t unhinge long-run inflation expectations. We are not talking about anything close to the debilitating higher inflation rates we saw in the 1970s or 1980s. Most importantly, we would also know that we had made our best effort.
But the pessimist is inclined to point to the weakness of private sector saving, which could induce more cautious consumer behaviour especially if unemployment continues to rise; he points to a possible overhang of past investment excesses; and he points to the US external deficit which will at some point need to be corrected. These adjustments might take place gradually over time, in which case the US might face a more protracted period of relatively slow growth; or, if you are really pessimistic, the adjustments might be more abrupt implying a possible period of negative growth and global financial instability. The recent somewhat erratic recovery of US stock markets from their earlier gloom suggests that they are beginning to side with the optimists; some of the survey evidence of consumer and business confidence on the other hand still supports a rather more pessimistic view. For what it is worth, and given the strong policy response in the US, I am modestly optimistic, but I recognise the downside risks. The outcome is obviously the major uncertainty surrounding the global economic prospect, and policymakers elsewhere can only monitor, continuously and very closely, the emerging evidence and react to that in the light of its likely impact on their own situation.

The FISC, therefore, has contributed significantly, over the last 20 years, to making information systems more efficient and dependable through their research activities and technical co-operation programmes which have been extended to Asian countries such as Sri Lanka. Of particular interest to banks would be the security guidelines on computer systems and audit guidelines for information systems of financial institutions, which they have issued. Some of these can be used as guidelines by our banking industry. Government and the people of Japan have contributed immensely to the development of this country for many decades in the past in different fields and their support in sharing their knowledge on financial information system with the Sri Lankan financial sector is greatly appreciated. In this connection I wish to thank the FISC who has devoted so much of its time and effort to bring in expertise in this area to market participants in Sri Lanka’s financial system. This would also provide a good forum for our banks to exchange ideas on specific security features adopted by the FISC. I have no doubt that this Seminar will provide an excellent opportunity for useful interaction amongst participants, and I would like to convey my best wishes. BIS Review 50/2004  1