samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
By and large, they are not currently configured as centres for life-long learning. And nor, in the main, are they institutions providing a balanced educational offering of cognitive, technical and social skills. To meet the needs of the future world of work, that might need to change. The importance of a broad-based, Newman-style, education is likely to be greater than ever. This might criss-cross disciplinary boundaries, as one way of increasing people’s ability to make giant logical leaps. Those skills will be social and technical every bit as much as cognitive, with head, hands and hearts sharing equal billing. Put this way, the future university may need to be a very different creature than in the past. It may need to cater for multiple entry points along the age distribution, rather than focussing on the young. And it may need to cater for multiple entry points along the skills spectrum, rather than focussing on the cognitive. It would, in short, need to be plural rather than singular – a “multiversity”, rather than a university. (b) Intellectual Capital  Multiversities are about spreading future skills across the workforce. Another educational challenge is how to spread future technologies across companies. This is crucial if ideas and innovations are to become GPTs, boosting productivity, pay and living standards. At present, evidence on the diffusion of new technologies across firms paints a rather mixed picture. To understand why, it is useful to recognise that two forces are at work when a new idea is diffusing through the economy.

And growth may even have contributed to the incidence of global conflicts and wars having fallen to their lowest levels, perhaps in human history. 3  That makes growth a gift, one necessary (if not necessarily sufficient) to deliver secular improvements in living standards. And it is what makes a good understanding of the determinants and drivers of growth so crucial for societal progress. By understanding the forces driving growth, past, present and future, we can begin to devise and implement economic policies that support improvements in society. I thought I understood the story of economic growth, its drivers and determinants. But recently I have changed my mind. I have a new story of growth. I think this story carries important implications for understanding the future challenges of technology and for devising the future policies and institutions necessary to meet them. That might require, among other things, a repurposing of successful institutions like this one, turning them from universities into multiversities. The Story of Growth  The story of economic growth often begins with a chart like this one (Chart 1). This plots the path of global economic growth, measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head, over the past 1000 years. And what a story it tells. It is a tale of two halves – or, more accurately, a tale of three-quarters and a quarter. 4  For the first three-quarters of the past 1000 years, the global economy stood still in growth terms.
Having recovered from its low in early 2003, Japan’s equity market also made a marked recovery. The increase in optimism with regard to the economy and the highly favourable earnings situation of companies were major contributing factors to the rise in equity prices in Europe and Japan. The Swiss equity market – as measured by the SPI – is now trading once again at its peak level of September 2000. Looking at the developments since 1995, it becomes apparent that the Swiss equity market has strengthened far more significantly than equivalent foreign markets (cf. graph 1). In the forex market, the dollar’s recovery continued, with the greenback benefiting from the cyclical interest rate lead in the US, which has made dollar investments in all maturities rather more attractive. A number of market analysts believe that the Homeland Investment Act, which offers tax breaks to US corporations if they repatriate their foreign earnings held abroad before the end of this fiscal year, has boosted the dollar. Despite the fact that in the second half of the year the US current account deficit climbed higher still – to over 6% of GDP – and thus reaching an all-time high, the global imbalances did not appear to destabilise the greenback. On the whole, however, the real exchange rates are trending very close to their long-term averages (cf. graph 2). Against the background of a robust global economy, commodity prices rose yet further, with oil and gold being in particularly strong demand.

operational inefficiency, poorly designed accounting practices, legal uncertainty and inadequate supervision, can degrade the performance of national as well as regional financial markets, frustrate exporters, importers and businesses. Further, these conditions can lead to dramatic manifestations of inefficiency and abuse, and challenge the credibility of the central banks in our countries. When the SAARC region trade and investment flows increase, we will not be able to reform the clearing mechanism urgently to accommodate cross border flows. The ACU has reached crossroads, requiring urgent reforms, if member countries are still interested in maintaining the long-established goodwill and regional cooperation through it. 4  BIS Review 79/2007  6. Outline of a policy framework  It is hard to come up with a blue print or reference framework for establishing a regional payments group without deliberating the topic with the SAARC member central banks. Nevertheless, I wish to outline the key elements of such a framework and a road map which can be developed further by task forces or a working group appointed for the purpose. First and foremost, it is necessary to get the commitment and consent of central banks in forming the regional payment initiative. Second, it is necessary to engage in a stocktaking exercise to gauge the effectiveness and appropriateness of the existing payment instruments, payment systems, clearing mechanisms, settlement systems and infrastructure in the region to identify their weaknesses, inefficiencies, safety levels and risks.
The new banks, which are owned by the government, took over domestic banking activities, while foreign operations remained within the old banks, which have been granted a moratorium on payment. The government’s response in October was guided by the overriding aim of guaranteeing continued domestic banking operations and domestic and cross-border payment intermediation under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Following the collapse of the banks, the Icelandic government negotiated a Stand-By Facility from the International Monetary Fund on the basis of an economic programme focusing on three main objectives: first, to stabilise the foreign exchange market and provide support for the appreciation of the króna from its recent exceptionally low levels; second, to formulate a fiscal policy for 2009 and beyond aimed at establishing a sustainable level of debt; and third, to restructure the banking system in a transparent manner consistent with internationally recognised practice. That process is underway. The Treasury was virtually debt-free on a net basis when the crisis struck but will now have to take on large debt, the exact amount of which cannot yet be estimated with any certainty because the government’s total deposit insurance liability is still undetermined. The economic adjustment ahead will be sharp, but if the global economy makes a gradual recovery, Iceland should be well equipped to return to sound economic growth at the end of that adjustment. The assumption concerning global economic recovery is of vital importance, however, and remains shrouded in uncertainty. 8  BIS Review 22/2009

1 Among other important tasks in coming years and decades, the government would need return from financial assets to provide for future pensioners. We can probably expect that productivity and real wages will continue to grow in parallel, and future pensioners would most likely want to take part in that welfare gain. This may imply that government expenditures will increase more than the overall growth in the economy, as the number of pensioners is growing fast and the demand for healthcare also will be higher. Although real wages increase, it will not be easy to raise the tax level. Thus, the government will need return from financial assets to finance the increased expenditure for pensioners. International capital markets have played a crucial role in allowing us to follow the strategy for extraction of petroleum. We drew heavily on borrowing opportunities abroad when the petroleum industry was being built up. We did the same in order to expand welfare schemes and to finance the countercyclical policy of the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. Over the last decade and a half, international capital markets have enabled us to convert national oil and gas resources into equities and bonds abroad in the Fund. The implementation of our investment strategy is dependent on free capital movements. I would like to remind the audience that only some twenty five to thirty years ago we had very rigorous capital restrictions ourselves.
Some issues that were taken up at this meeting were tougher capital requirement for Swedish banks and the need for measures to manage households’ high and growing indebtedness.9 Prior to the May meeting, Finansinspektionen published a proposal for how the new European capital adequacy regulations should be applied in Sweden. The measures presented by Finansinspektionen were mostly already known, but the way they are implemented is of course important. This applies in particular to the implementation of a CET 1 capital requirement of 12 per cent for the major Swedish banks, an increase in the risk weight floor for Swedish mortgages to 25 per cent, and the introduction of countercyclical capital buffers. 9  Other macroprudential policy issues discussed include the risks linked to our large and interlinked banking system, which has a high degree of market funding, and various types of measure related to these risks. You can read more about this in the minutes from the meeting in May. See http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/18209/a/241631. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The Council’s meetings are prepared in the drafting committee, which consists of high-level representatives from the various authorities. The drafting committee has held regular meetings during the spring. Each respective authority has worked intensively on various questions, and there has been a substantial exchange of information and analysis between the authorities under the umbrella of the drafting committee. It has been both useful and educational to hear the other authorities’ views on the stability situation and the need for measures.

It is fairly understandable that certain EU member states support the current, rather non-transparent way of modifying the institutional set-up: it is the only way for them to maintain or even strengthen the draconian mix I just described. 2  BIS Review 165/2009  Given that European integration is taking place in this “European” way (in the bad sense of the word), it is no wonder that standard democratic politics has not left the national level: all formally EU-wide ideas are always translated in each individual member state into the local political context; there are no true EU-wide political parties, no true EU-wide politicians, no true EU-wide media. The debate in EU institutions rarely follows the lines that we are used to in standard political debates, such as whether we want more freedom or more redistribution. Instead, most time is spent, as I said, on procedures and institutions. The official efforts at gradual political integration thus give the impression of squaring the circle. These awkward traits in politics at the EU level then lead to some perverse implications. On the one hand, measures which would help Europe to retain a strong economic position – and here I mean especially liberalisation of markets and trade – take years or even decades to implement: the single market for services still does not exist and even the single market for labour still has fundamental exemptions.
If we can make it function as a temporary reservoir to store the incoming water, and more slowly releasing it to the various users of fund within the country, at the right pace for absorption - if the market selection process can be made such that only the projects with really viable, economic prospects are granted the fund - and, if the foreign owners of fund can be persuaded to hold the instruments denominated in borrowers’ own currency, thereby shifting the position on the foreign  2  BIS Review 48/2002  exchange risks from the borrowers to the investors, then the bond market can be a safer channel for capital flows than the commercial banks. At this point you may disagree that if foreign investors in bonds want out, they will still sell the bonds, causing the prices to be sharply lower anyway. This is true. But price volatility in the bond market is still better than a run on your banks. Therefore an efficient bond market can help lessen the adverse impact that volatile capital flows may have on the financial institutions. A sound financial system is of course a necessary condition for the conduct of monetary policy. The role of non-bank financial institutions Let me now turn to the non-bank financial institutions. What can be your roles in relation to monetary policy? I can offer four suggestions. Number one, you can make yourself an efficient player in the market. The more efficient the competitors, the better the market is.

It allows the intermediation process to proceed uninterrupted when the banks are temporarily in difficulty. But more importantly, it helps with liquidity management. In the case of Thailand, the government throughout the 1980’s had been very disciplined in their fiscal policy. They maintained balanced budgets in most years. As a result, no new government bond was issued, as old ones were being retired. Without a deep and liquid government bond market, growth of corporate bond was also slow. When the crisis erupted, financial institutions that could not seek liquidity from the inter bank market were stuck without liquid instruments in hand. Some of them might have survived had the bond market been more active. After the crisis, the government had to issue massive amount of bonds to cover losses in the financial system. Today, the Thai bond market is therefore much larger, at 38 % of the GDP. We have a much more active market. What does an active bond market mean to monetary policy? I will highlight three points. First is the implication on transmission mechanism. When the central bank wants to change stance in monetary policy, it changes interest rate up or down. But it does not directly change the interest rates along the whole spectrum of the yield curve. It only affects the key policy rate, which in the case of Thailand is the very short-term 14 day rate in the repurchase market.
Loans: Commonplace since ancient times  Source: www.openthemagazine.com  A Mesopotamian clay tablet with debt details from around 3000 BCE  5  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Loans fulfil two basic functions  Borrowers:  Loans enable borrowers to have future income at their disposal now Example: Start-up company Example: Buying a house Example: Government debt  Creditors:  Loans allow creditors to make optimal use of their available capital Example: Investments of an entrepreneur  6  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Part 2: Under what circumstances is lending detrimental to an economy?

Credit risk  8  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Credit as a burden for an entire economy Excesses on the credit market  Debt crisis  c Loss of income and financial assets  Greater uncertainty  Restricted credit supply  Less consumer spending  Less investment  Less innovation  Long and deep recession 9  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Weak recovery  Credit as a burden for an entire economy – excessive risk-taking Macroeconomic environment Upturn Low interest rates Asset prices  Systemic risks  Distorted expectations  10  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Credit as a burden for an entire economy – excessive risk-taking Macroeconomic environment Upturn Low interest rates Asset prices  Systemic risks  Distorted expectations  11  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Credit as a burden for an entire economy – excessive risk-taking Macroeconomic environment Upturn Low interest rates Asset prices  Systemic risks  Distorted expectations  12  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Credit as a burden for an entire economy – excessive risk-taking Macroeconomic environment Upturn Low interest rates Asset prices  Systemic risks  Distorted expectations  13  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Credit as a burden for an entire economy  Macroeconomic environment Upturn Low interest rates Asset prices  Systemic risks  Distorted expectations  14  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Credit as a burden for an entire economy  Macroeconomic environment Upturn Low interest rates Asset prices  Systemic risks  Distorted expectations  15  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Part 3: What role do central banks play in the credit cycle?
The cost to society from the failure of a large, complex firm is proportionally considerably higher than the cost to society of the failure of a non-systemic firm. As a result the capital buffer for the more systemic firm should be higher so that its expected probability of failure will be lower than for the less systemic firm. The SIFI surcharge acts as a penalty for size and complexity, leaning against the funding cost advantage a firm may have because it is perceived to be TBTF. This helps level the playing field for smaller firms and reduces the incentive to seek to become TBTF in the first place. Domestically, we have adopted a more forward-looking approach to capital through the use of stress tests, in particular the annual Comprehensive Capital Assessment Review (CCAR) program. By promoting transparency, CCAR also strengthens market discipline. On the liquidity front, the largest, most systemically important bank holding companies will be required to hold a 30-day liquidity buffer – the so-called liquidity coverage ratio or LCR. The purpose of the LCR is to ensure that such a bank will have sufficient liquid resources so if it were to encounter business difficulties and temporarily lose access to market funding, it would still have some time to address its underlying problems. With a liquidity buffer, banks will not immediately be forced to sell illiquid assets during times of stress.

William C Dudley: Solving the too big to fail problem Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the Clearing House’s Second Annual Business Meeting and Conference, New York City, 15 November 2012. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here today. I am glad to see the progress our city and region have made recovering from Sandy, but obviously significant challenges remain. I am going to focus my remarks today on what is popularly known as the “too big to fail” (TBTF) problem. In particular, should society tolerate a financial system in which certain financial institutions are deemed to be too big to fail? And, if not, then what should we do about it? The answer to the first question is clearly “no”. We cannot tolerate a financial system in which some firms are too big to fail – at least not ones that operate in any form other than that of a very tightly regulated utility. The second question is the more interesting one. Is the current approach of the official sector to ending TBTF the right one? I’d characterize this approach as reducing the incentives for firms to operate with a large systemic footprint, reducing the likelihood of them failing, and lowering the cost to society when they do fail.
increased sectoral granularity and geographical coverage, especially in emerging economies; inclusion of short-term scenarios, incorporating more adverse tail-risk events such as a sudden policy shock; and improved representation of acute physical risk. Blended finance To get to net-zero by 2050, we have to close a large financing gap. According to McKinsey, net zero by 2050 will require about $ trillion of investment per year, but only about $ trillion per year is being invested today. We are more than 35% short of the annual investment required for net-zero. Blended finance will be crucial to unlocking more capital for green and transition projects, particularly in emerging economies. Blended financing structures can alter the risk-return profile of many marginally bankable projects. This can be done through catalytic and concessional funding from the public sector, multilateral development banks, and philanthropic sources to crowd in multiples of private capital. By mitigating a portion of project risks, providing technical assistance, and lending their reputation and expertise, the public sector can help to attract private capital which may otherwise be hesitant to invest. We need to mobilise the financial system to deploy blended finance at scale. The NGFS will contribute to this effort in three ways. We will use our convening power to raise awareness of blended finance and help to bring the relevant parties into the room. We will seek to identify potential regulatory, market or policy barriers that hamper the scaling up of blended finance.

We will provide guidance to central banks and supervisors on how they could potentially address these barriers. The NGFS is working on two blended finance deliverables by COP28. First, a handbook on blended finance. It will draw on key lessons from past case studies on blended finance projects and provide practical guidance on how such projects can be scaled up. Second, demonstrative blended finance projects. The aim is to spotlight projects that have incorporated mechanisms to promote the scaling of blended finance. We will also categorise the key pain points in some of these projects and draw lessons on how they could be addressed. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Transition planning Across the financial industry, the focus is gradually shifting from commitment to action. This means going beyond high-level net zero commitments to designing credible transition plans that will get us there by 2050. Drawing up a credible transition plan requires financial firms to do several things:  baseline their financed emissions; set interim targets based on appropriate science-based sectoral pathways; engage clients on their own corporate transition plans; and monitor portfolio and client progress over time. Transition plans need to be adaptive to changing circumstances while maintaining ambition. There is uncertainty over the path of various decarbonisation technologies as well as climate-related policies such as carbon taxes and emission standards. The assumptions used in transition plans would need to be continually monitored and adjusted as necessary.