samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is mainly because the French economy has preserved and strengthened its competitiveness over a long period that we have, in the past four years, enjoyed growth that is robust and more rapid than that of the other large European countries, while also maintaining a large current account surplus. The multipartisan strategy of low inflation and competitiveness, conducted consistently and tenaciously over a long period, must be steadfastly pursued in the single currency context. Fourthly, the gradual change in the mindset governing our perception of economic phenomena The objective of durable, sustained and non-inflationary growth, which could force unemployment down to its low tidemark, could be more easily achieved if Europe and France gradually adopted an open attitude towards the important “factors of production”, namely labour, capital and technical progress. For a long time, persistent mass unemployment, the structural causes of which were poorly understood, led to the adoption of certain neo-Malthusian attitudes: efforts to reduce the available workforce in order to curtail unemployment, spurning productivity-enhancing investment thought to contribute to higher unemployment and, finally, wariness towards technical progress, which was seen as a potential destroyer of jobs. Little wonder that after seeking to limit the available workforce, capital stock and technical progress, Europe and France saw that their non-inflationary growth potential was still not as high as they would have wished, despite the significant advances made in recent years. Fortunately, a profound change in perspective is underway in Europe and France, and we are discarding neo-Malthusian attitudes.

3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  We are publishing the first issue of the report today and are going to release it on a regular basis, eight times a year, prior to the quiet period. We hope that this material will be interesting and useful to a wide range of readers. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
In my view, three other major prerequisites are needed in order to foster robust, sustainable growth and durable job creation, namely : the continuation and strengthening of a policy designed to keep in check unit production costs, the improvement of the competitiveness of the economy, through ambitious structural reforms and lastly, the completion of a fully integrated European capital market. Raising the potential output growth and enhancing the competitiveness of the economy: If Europe wants to secure sustainable growth at levels that are as high as possible, the key variable is potential output growth. The level of potential output growth can firstly be raised thanks to investment: business leaders are completely free to invest wherever they want in Europe or elsewhere in the world. It is thus important that we create economic, legal and fiscal conditions that are as favourable as possible to investment in Europe. The investment appeal of Europe is crucial in this respect : the more we invest, the fewer inflationary pressures we will have, and the stronger potential output growth will be. BIS Review 60/2002  1  Another way of raising potential output growth is to increase the quantity of available labour and to boost gains in labour productivity: the fast transformation of information systems is likely to accentuate the structural transformation of the economies.

Peter Pang: Sukuk as a viable fund-raising and investment instrument Opening remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA-BNM Joint Conference on Islamic Finance, Hong Kong, 14 April 2014. *  *  *  Dato’ Muhammad Ibrahim, distinguished speakers and guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. Good morning. It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to this Islamic finance conference jointly organised by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), with the support of the Treasury Markets Association. I am particularly grateful to Dato’ Muhammad Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of BNM, who leads a delegation of Islamic finance experts from Malaysia to share with us their experience and knowledge on a wide range of matters concerning sukuk, from the latest developments of the global sukuk market to the practical issues in structuring sukuk products. 2. This conference marks the third Islamic finance-related event organised in collaboration with BNM within the past year or so, following an Islamic finance workshop held in March last year and the first meeting of the Joint Forum on Islamic Finance between Hong Kong and Malaysia held last December. This series of events is a testament to our determination to deepen co-operation with Malaysia in the development of Islamic finance. 3. The theme of today’s conference is “Sukuk as a viable fund-raising and investment instrument”.
The big banks’ published plans on strategy and capital-building envisage a further improvement in their capital situation. According to these plans, and measured in terms of loss-absorbing capital, by the end of 2014, Credit Suisse and UBS are likely to have already met the risk-weighted capital requirement of 13% which will apply from 2019. Moreover, these plans will lead to a substantial increase in their leverage ratios by the end of 2014. The SNB acknowledges the big banks’ progress to date and recommends that they consistently and fully implement their plans, in order to further strengthen their resilience and, in particular, to improve their leverage ratios. Improving the leverage ratio is all the more crucial given the growing importance of this indicator as a measure of banks’ resilience. Credibility of model-based risk-weighted assets The risk weighting of assets plays a key role in determining the capital requirement for a bank. All of the bank’s on and off-balance-sheet positions are multiplied by a risk weight. The riskier the position, the higher the weight. The figure for risk-weighted assets (RWA) represents the sum of these risk-weighted positions. Required capital, in turn, is defined as a percentage of RWA. There are two different approaches for setting risk weights. Under the standardised approach, risk weights are prescribed for broad asset classes. Under the model-based approach, by contrast, banks can use their own internal models to determine the risk weights for different assets.

The credibility of RWA based on banks’ internal models is increasingly being called into question by market participants, analysts and authorities worldwide. It is widely accepted that a bank’s risks can, in principle, be more accurately quantified using the model-based approach than using the standardised approach. Yet banks’ internal models are extremely complex and can vary widely between banks, owing to the use of different model choices and model parameters. This can result in different capital requirements for banks with a similar asset structure. This makes it difficult to accurately assess a bank’s resilience, and to compare one bank with another. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  To increase the usefulness and credibility of the model-based approach, in-depth analyses need to be carried out to determine whether and to what extent the model-based approach and the standardised approach lead to differences in RWA. The standardised approach does have shortcomings. Yet, since it is independent of bank-specific modelling assumptions, it provides market participants with an additional point of reference for assessing both the level of and changes in model-based RWA. Differences between the two approaches must be well explained and have a sound economic rationale. If the analysis does not reveal any substantial inexplicable differences, this will strengthen market confidence in the modelbased approach. Otherwise, appropriate measures should be considered. This could, for instance, entail setting a floor for some model-based RWA, such as that recently introduced for banks in the US.
As temporary support measures have expired, the fiscal stimulus has gradually petered out and, with the economy expanding faster than previously forecast, public finances have also recovered faster than expected. The accelerated pace of the economy provides an opportunity to reach a structurally adjusted fiscal balance at an earlier stage than expected. However, although the current fiscal policy framework may be relatively transparent and predictable, it does not seem to provide a sufficiently strong incentive to take advantage of unexpected fiscal windfalls in a counter-cyclical fashion. Consequently, monetary policy has been forced to carry a larger share of the burden of adjustment than would be desirable from the standpoint of an optimal policy mix. As inflation hits social groups differently, fiscal policy can be effectively used to support the most vulnerable groups in the economy. However, as the immediate impact of inflation on the fiscal balance is positive - as revenues are in practical terms price-indexed during times of high inflation - it is important that fiscal policy resist the temptation to allow increased revenues to feed into expenditures more than is necessary. From the standpoint of the monetary authorities, while providing support to vulnerable groups, the fiscal authorities could prioritise tightening the fiscal stance and take advantage of the strong economic growth to close the budget deficit. The war in Ukraine still poses significant risks to the global economy. However, as the global energy and food crisis is resolved and monetary and fiscal stimulus is withdrawn, the prospects for global disinflation improve.

That is why, as I explained in my letter to the Chancellor, we believe that a slowdown in the economy this year, creating a margin of spare capacity, will be necessary to dampen price and wage pressures and ensure that we fulfil our remit by returning inflation to the target. And growth is now slowing quite sharply – broad money growth is falling, business surveys point to particularly weak output growth in the second quarter and growth is likely to remain subdued for the rest of the year. Where Bank rate will ultimately need to move to bring inflation back to target is impossible to judge now. Decisions on Bank Rate will be made one month at a time in the careful way that the MPC has developed over more than ten years. But there should be no doubt that the  BIS Review 79/2008  1  MPC is prepared to take whatever action is needed to return inflation to the 2% target and to keep expectations of inflation in the medium term anchored to the target. The fact that growth and inflation are heading in opposite directions has led some commentators to question our monetary framework. Target growth not inflation is the cry. I could not disagree more. This is precisely the situation in which the framework of inflation targeting is so necessary. Without it, what should be a short-lived, albeit sharp, rise in inflation, could become sustained.
The baseline scenario reflects those events believed to be the most likely to occur with the information at hand at the closing of the Reports. There are risks, however, that, if materialized, could reshape the macroeconomic outlook and thus alter the course of monetary policy. About the external scenario, it is still early to know how the policy rate increase in the United States will affect the global economy. A first look shows that the markets have taken it calmly, stock prices rose and the dollar lost some value against the other currencies. Of course the way this process will unfold is an important source of risk, especially because of existing differences between what market expectations suggest and Fed’s statement about how fast and how far it will raise the rate. Plus there is divergence in the monetary policy among the developed countries and its potential effects on the global value of the dollar. To the extent that this continues, the pressures for a more appreciated dollar will persist, affecting commodity prices and our own currency. In China, an abrupt adjustment is now less likely, but doubts remain about how its economy will contribute to the recovery of global activity and commodity prices, especially now that they are rebalancing growth toward consumption and services. Finally, the complex situation in Brazil and the need for further tightening in some Latin American economies continue to pose a major risk. A worsening of the economic outlook in the region would affect external demand and possibly financing conditions facing Chile.

It is estimated that the share of foreign trade of the Euro area will be only about 10% of GNP in comparison to about 30% for Germany today. And over the long term, the Euro should become almost as widely used as the US dollar is today. One conclusion to be inferred from this is the following: since Turkey has close trade, service and financial links with Europe, and as the only country connected to Europe in a Customs Union (CU), which I hope will evolve over time towards full membership, the EMU will create completely new conditions in Turkey’s international and European relations. Therefore what will happen in Europe will be decisive for Turkey in the years ahead. It will be a challenge for the Turkish authorities, as well as for bankers and businessmen. One of the most important prerequisites for a successful monetary union is a sufficient degree of economic convergence among the potential members. From that standpoint the degree of convergence among the EU countries is remarkable, particularly as regards the convergence criteria; stable prices, stable exchange rates, low long-term interest rates and healthy public finances. In addition to these criteria, the Maastricht Treaty requires that all member countries in the EU must grant independence to their central banks before the Monetary Union and the establishment of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The reason behind the requirement of independent national central banks is that fixing exchange rates and unifying currencies requires a common monetary policy.
Eddie Yue: Opening keynote - "Scaling up sustainable finance in Asia" conference Opening keynote by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the ASIFMA "Scaling up Sustainable Finance in Asia" conference, Hong Kong, 17 March 2023. *** Alice, Diana, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Good Morning, Let me start by thanking ASIFMA for inviting me to this Sustainable Finance Conference. It is my great pleasure to share with you Hong Kong's vision and the concrete steps being taken to strengthen our leading role in green and sustainable finance. As we come into Spring after a colder-than-usual winter, this is a good time to talk about the advances that happen when the right ecosystem is combined with the right opportunities. In the financial world, green and sustainable finance brings extraordinary opportunities. And if we are looking for the best ecosystem for these opportunities to flourish, Hong Kong is the place. The climate challenge to Asia is huge, and urgent. Meeting this challenge will require substantial investment – some $ trillion over the next three decades based on market estimates. China alone will require more than 100 trillion yuan. The multi-trillion-dollar funding need can hardly be met by the public sector alone, and climate finance plays a crucial role here. It helps the public sector raise funding from the market to finance climate projects and initiatives. It also mobilises private capital to directly fund climate actions.

We are the first Asian jurisdiction mandating climate-related disclosure across the financial sector by 2025, in line with the global framework set by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. We also made an early commitment to adopting new standards promulgated by the International Sustainability Standards Board. Hong Kong adopts the Common Ground Taxonomy jointly developed by China and the EU. We are now exploring the development of a green classification framework on the basis of the China-EU taxonomy, in order to provide the necessary disclosure and guidance to inform capital allocation and encourage market discipline. The HKMA has set clear rules – for example by formulating clear supervisory requirements and integrating climate-risk into the supervisor-driven stress-testing framework. The various regulatory requirements help build climate resilience into our banking and financial sector. In the process, financial intermediaries such as banks also act as facilitators to help the real sector adapt and transition, in line with global consensus and commitment to achieving carbon neutrality. Second, on data. Currently, there is a lack of accessible, standardised data and analytics support in the market. It presents a challenge, not just for climate risk management but for other purposes such as portfolio assessment and business development. We are working with other regulators and the private sector to address these issues, by improving data accessibility and developing a data repository and analytics capability for the industry. We are making good progress.
The vigorous productivity growth has been another positive surprise in the performance (Figure 5). At the start of the 1990s there were no indications that this would be the case. Why then would the Government have appointed a productivity delegation? The firm productivity gains have, of course, been crucial for the increases in real wages. But they also have meant that companies have not needed to hire new staff on the same scale as before, which has contributed to the weak employment growth in recent years. We really do not know why productivity has improved so strongly even if there are a number of hypotheses according to which the IT explosion, deregulation and increased global competition are significant explanations. For the Riksbank, it is important to understand this better if we are to be able to produce accurate forecasts of inflation. Of even greater importance, of course, is to do what is possible through economic policy to ensure that the positive performance can continue. In the long run higher real wages presuppose increased productivity. Two problem areas However, not everything has been as positive. Labour supply has not developed as well as one might have hoped. There are currently large groups outside of the labour market and employment has increased at a slower rate than is desirable over the past ten years.

This crisis could generally be described as a dramatic end to almost twenty years of stabilisation policy problems. The Swedish economy had been characterised by an unsustainable rise in costs, which had originated in price and wage increases that constantly came on a collision course with the fixed exchange rate. The result was repeated devaluations, modest economic growth, poor productivity growth and more or less stagnant growth in real wages. The performance was markedly weak both compared with earlier periods and in relation to other countries. During the crisis years the situation was aggravated further. Unemployment increased fourfold in the course of a few years and the central government finances deteriorated dramatically. Interest rates rose unchecked and the interest rate differential vis-à-vis Germany occasionally came to several percentage points. Favourable results Today, a little more than ten years after the crisis, the situation is completely different. The new focus of stabilisation policy – which involved crucial changes in the framework for both fiscal and monetary policy – has meant that inflation now remains relatively stable around the target of two per cent (Figure 1). The lower inflation rate has not been associated with weaker growth in output, rather the opposite. GDP growth has averaged roughly half a percentage point higher a year in the past decade than in the two previous decades, and the fluctuations in the real economy also appear to have lessened (Figure 2).
Clarity is also needed concerning liquidity commitments to off-balance sheet vehicles, and the magnitude of assets that may be  BIS Review 3/2008  3  re-intermediated back onto the balance sheets of euro area financial institutions. The process of improving clarity, which started when Q3 2007 financial statements became available, will be advanced further when institutions publish their annual audited accounts for 2007 as a whole. Given the uncertainties, the adjustment process in the financial system in the coming period may be challenging, and we have to be prepared to the materialisation of risks at any time. That being said, there are mitigating factors, including a broadly favourable economic outlook, the largely sound balance sheets of households and firms, and the generally sound capital positions of core financial firms. This should not, however, provide any grounds for complacency given the heightened uncertainties. In a fluid environment where financial system conditions may unexpectedly change, prudence is of the essence both for policymakers and financial institutions. Concerning the role of financial institutions and supervisory authorities in coping with the financial turmoil, I would submit three observations. First, given the underlying factors of the financial stress, and in order to re-establish confidence within the financial system, it is crucial to promote a widespread consistent valuation of complex structured products as well as an adequate disclosure by banks of all their exposures, in particular related to the US subprime mortgage sector.

The repatriation of funds will be even larger if we compute the amount over a longer period. Such arrangements are extractive in nature, and will have longer term implications for the development of a strong domestic industry. We need higher reinvestment by insurers to support the protection and risk management needs of our population and businesses. Intra-group reinsurance arrangements have also resulted in unnecessary outflows when such risks are well within the capacity of the onshore market. A handful of insurers have continued to disregard arrangements that have been put in place to optimise onshore capacity, ceding large amounts to group reinsurers. This is not an acceptable behaviour. It must change. Going forward, we expect insurers to review these practices and fully support optimisation arrangements. In parallel, more must be done to develop domestic underwriting expertise, especially in specialist risks. More must be done to create high income jobs. More needs to be done to improve remuneration packages at entry and middle levels, to attract young talents and retain expertise. The data we collated is stark. It is a clear conclusion. The data points to a prolonged underinvestment in talent, with fewer than 1 in 10 of the industry workforce today having any form of professional qualification. From another angle, the industry has yet to realise its potential, in part due to a lack of long-term commitment from domestic shareholders. The industry needs domestic shareholders that have a long term outlook and can support the deepening of our market.