samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this section I show how consumer prices for various groups of goods and services have developed since 1995. This is the type of basic data needed when calculating underlying inflation with the aid of exclusion. Table 1 below shows the fifteen components (or price groups) in the CPIF that have varied the most since 1995, measured according to the standard deviation for the series. 19 The results show that prices of coffee, tea and cocoa have had the most volatile rates of price increase during the period. Table 2 shows the fifteen components that have varied the least. This shows that rents have had the least volatile rate of price increase during the period. Table 1.

In December last year, the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Thailand concluded the bilateral local currency swap arrangements during the visit of Vice President Xi Jinping to Thailand. The Agreement provides for the exchange of respective local currency upto 70 billion yuan or 320 billion baht, to facilitate bilateral trade and investment. I believe this is a crucial role that the public sector can provide to give assurance to the private sector on the availability of their access to the yuan and the baht for their trade and investment needs. In addition, the Bank of Thailand received approval from the People’s Bank of China and China Securities Regulatory Commission to participate in the interbank bond market and securities market here in China. Our investment would allow our asset allocation and diversification to better reflect the increasingly important role of the yuan in international monetary system. Last but not least, I hope that the inauguration of our Beijing representative office will be more than just another success story. I truly hope that the spirit and friendship behind this long-standing relations and successes, nurtured earnestly over centuries, will continue to serve as solid foundations that will lead to even greater and closer future cooperation between our two nations. Let me end by thanking everyone for being an important part of this success. And, with Your Royal Highness’ permission, may I propose a toast to future success and cooperation as well as to your Royal Highness’s good health and prosperity. Thank you.
Against this background my talk today focuses on global capital: its advantages and problems and the remedies for the latter that are being discussed internationally. Let me begin by looking at what has shaped the global financial markets as we know them today. Emergence of today’s global financial markets Today’s global financial markets largely date from the 1970s, when the oil-exporting countries needed to invest surpluses and many western countries had incurred budget deficits that had to be financed. There was thus a need for a more efficient international market for capital. Another factor behind the development of financial markets was that after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the major world currencies started to float in relation to each other. This generated a demand for instruments that would render the exchange rate movements less deleterious for exporters and importers. The evolution of the financial markets has been promoted by rapid technical advances that, besides facilitating international communications and transactions, have aided calculations and made advanced financial instruments available. This has been accompanied by theoretical work on the pricing of risks. A market for risks has accordingly been established. Instruments whereby players could choose a particular level of risk had existed for centuries but could now be made more sophisticated. Before the financial markets could be globalised, moreover, national economies had to be opened up and the existing capital controls abolished. This process got under way in the 1970s and 1980s.

Foreign demand continued to contribute to the expansion of the economy in the first quarter of 2012, albeit to a markedly lower extent. The sluggish increase in exports remains a concern as long as it affects the performance of the economy during 2012. It also provides evidence for Albania’s strong reliance on certain geographical markets or products. The analysis of monetary data suggests that the performance of monetary indicators was in line with the developments in the real economy. Money supply maintained the growth rate of end-2011, recording in March an annualized growth of 8.8%. Our analyses suggest that its growth is in line with the demand of the economy for real money, signalling contained monetary inflationary pressures in the medium run. Lending to the private sector recorded an annual growth of 9.0% in March. Its performance, particularly in the recent months, was determined by the low private sector demand for credit and the cautious bank lending behaviour. Financial markets were liquid and stable. Interbank market rates dropped significantly in April and the trading volume in this market increased. The pass-through of easing monetary policy signals persisted in the lek deposit market as well, as reflected by the lower interest rates. Government security yields in the primary market remained at similar levels to the previous month. Their increase in the first quarter of 2012 reflects the developments in supply and demand-side structural factors, hence signalling no added inflation premiums.
And growth may even have contributed to the incidence of global conflicts and wars having fallen to their lowest levels, perhaps in human history. 3  That makes growth a gift, one necessary (if not necessarily sufficient) to deliver secular improvements in living standards. And it is what makes a good understanding of the determinants and drivers of growth so crucial for societal progress. By understanding the forces driving growth, past, present and future, we can begin to devise and implement economic policies that support improvements in society. I thought I understood the story of economic growth, its drivers and determinants. But recently I have changed my mind. I have a new story of growth. I think this story carries important implications for understanding the future challenges of technology and for devising the future policies and institutions necessary to meet them. That might require, among other things, a repurposing of successful institutions like this one, turning them from universities into multiversities. The Story of Growth  The story of economic growth often begins with a chart like this one (Chart 1). This plots the path of global economic growth, measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head, over the past 1000 years. And what a story it tells. It is a tale of two halves – or, more accurately, a tale of three-quarters and a quarter. 4  For the first three-quarters of the past 1000 years, the global economy stood still in growth terms.

Central banks that also supervise core financial institutions would have the clear benefits of immediate access to vital information and expert assessment from supervisory staff about the health of individual institutions and their systemic implications. This could greatly help reduce the likelihood of any unnecessary delay or even misinformed decision that might hamper efforts to stem a financial crisis. For emerging market economies, the case for central banks to supervise the core financial institutions may be even stronger. This is because, financial markets in these countries are typically not well developed enough to serve as an efficient channel for the transmission of monetary policy. Market interest rates and even commercial banks’ prime rates react only sluggishly to changes in central bank’s policy rate, and often with a long time lag. In these circumstances, the traditional tool of monetary policy alone is unlikely to be enough to maintain economic and financial stability. Since in most emerging market economies, commercial banks are by far the most dominant players in the financial system, central banks with supervisory responsibilities could and should make use of targeted prudential policy to tackle financial imbalances and excessive asset price movements, both of which lie at the heart of all financial crises. This was what we did in 2003 to successfully contain incipient speculative bubbles in the property sector by imposing a ceiling on banks’ loan-to-value ratio of high-end housing loans.
It still took a long time before government oil revenues yielded surpluses that could be set aside for future generations. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund received its first capital deposits in 1996, a quarter century after the government started earning money on oil. Until then, oil revenues had been spent as they were earned – and at times in advance (Chart 4). 4  NORGES BANK  Chart 4 The path to NOK 10 000 billion. In billions of 2020-NOK  1)  Periodic contributions to the GPFG  GPFG value  10000 8000 6000  ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 13 FEBRUARY 2020  10000 Oil revenue spending Government oil revenues Net transfers to GPFG Value gains  8000 6000  4000  4000  2000  2000  0  0  1971-1995  1996-2009  2010-2019  2019  1) GPFG at 30 September 2019. Sources: Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank  The picture changed when the cash flow from oil activities reached new heights around 2000. It became clear that future revenues would be much higher than anticipated. The fiscal rule, introduced in 2001, provided for a gradual phasing in of oil revenues into the economy. By limiting government spending of oil revenues to the real return, the path was paved for building up substantial government financial wealth. In the next years, the cash flow from oil production was far larger than the transfers to the central government budget, mainly owing to high oil prices. Transfers have been smaller in the past decade.

***  10  Figure 1 GDP growth (real annual change, percent)  6  6  4  4 Total  2  2  Non-mining  0  0  -2  -2 14  15  16  17  18  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2 Manufacturing output index  Private salaried hours worked (*)  (annual change, percent)  (seasonally-adjusted levels, weekly average)  12  12  43  45  8  8  42  44  4  4  41  0  0  40  Habitual (right axis)  43 42  Effectivas -4  -4  39  41  -8  -8  38  40  14  15  16  17  18  10  12  (*) Black dashed lines show annual centered moving average of respective series. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
The proposed TARGET instant payment settlement (TIPS) service would offer a series of benefits to the payment service providers. First, it would guarantee pan-European reachability for instant payments. Second, it would give payment service providers the possibility to use their credit lines stemming from their collateralised positions in TARGET2. Third, it would eliminate credit risk, thus leading the way to faster and efficient settlement. Last but not least, it would give payment service providers more choice: they could either connect directly to TIPS or channel their payment instructions for instant payments through their respective ACH. The Eurosystem will take a decision by June 2017 on whether to develop the service, based on the results of the public consultation. TIPS could commence operations as soon as 2018. Conclusion Let me conclude. With the migration of the German market to T2S next week, the time has come to reap the actual 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  benefits of harmonisation in the post-trade area in Europe. But this does not mean we can slacken in our efforts. There is still a need for further and coordinated action in the harmonisation of post-trade processes. There are also gaps that remain in the financial market integration process when it comes to securities issuance. And there is a need for action in instant payment settlement across Europe. The ECB, together with market stakeholders, has to explore how to best take action in these areas. Thank you for your attention.

Experience has taught us, however, that bold visions hardly ever have a chance of being realised. It seems to make more sense to implement what has been recognised as appropriate in small, purposeful steps. Reform of the monetary constitution A monetary constitution comprises all regulations concerning the currency on a constitutional and statutory level. Our present monetary constitution still dates largely from the time of the establishment of the Swiss National Bank almost a hundred years ago. We are currently in the process of adapting it to modern requirements. These endeavours bear a direct relation to the reform of our fundamental law, the Federal Constitution, which was recently brought to an end. A central issue of these reform efforts, to which I shall restrict myself in the following remarks, concerns the severance of the Swiss franc’s link to gold. In actual practice, this link has been outdated for decades. It is, moreover, in direct contradiction to our commitments as a member of the International Monetary Fund. With the severance of the gold link, we will be free to act according to our own discretion with respect to the evaluation and utilisation of our gold holdings. The question therefore arises how to use this freedom of action. In attempting to answer this question, one must bear in mind that monetary reserves are of course indispensable for a central bank in fulfilling its tasks. This is particularly true in the case of a small, open economy with a significant financial sector.
Thus, in markets cleared through a central counterparty, all market participants have just one single counterparty, rather than numerous bilateral business relationships, and the complexity of the financial system is significantly reduced. What is even more important, however, is the fact that, in the event of a bank collapse, a central counterparty guarantees that it will fulfil the commitments it has entered into with respect to the other market participants, thereby eliminating the traditional domino effect. That is why, together with other central banks and supervisory authorities, the SNB is supporting the banks’ ongoing efforts to clear a larger part of the enormous over-the-counter derivatives market through central counterparties. These central counterparties come at a cost, since it goes without saying that they must run a very sound risk management system. For even a central counterparty could be threatened with failure. Since the consequences of such an event would be catastrophic, central counterparties need to command sufficient financial resources to ensure that they can withstand the failure of the largest market participant, even in extreme market conditions. 4. Political responsibility  The SNB is investing substantial resources in actively carrying forward the approaches to solving the “too big to fail” and “too big to rescue” issues that have just been outlined – not just in international bodies like the FSB or the Basel Committee, but also at the national level, in conjunction with FINMA. The reasons for this are obvious.

Philipp Hildebrand: Review of the international financial system Introductory remarks by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 10 December 2009. * 1. *  *  Introduction  At the news conference in June of this year we spoke of a gradual calming in the general financial market environment, although the outlook remains uncertain. Since then we have seen a majority of banks returning to profitability. The horror stories being reported almost daily just over a year ago have now disappeared. It is very tempting just to go back to business as usual. However, we must not forget that – just over a year ago now – the international financial system was on the brink of collapse. Support packages of an unprecedented size were being put together for the banks. Exceptional monetary and fiscal measures were required to combat the dramatic plunge in the global economy – measures which have had to be kept in place to the current time. Only by a narrow margin was a complete collapse of the financial system avoided and the danger of a major depression averted. This experience has clearly shown us all that the principle of sustainability needs to be a much more dominant element in the development of the international financial system than it was previously.
The more we develop such a leadership group, the better our chances will be.”  BIS Review 19/2003  5  Collective response Third, while strong and visionary leadership is necessary, it is not enough. To be effective, the leadership must evoke a response, a resonance from the society as a whole. The society must rise to the challenge of changing itself and establishing a new order. There needs to be broad consensus among the population in support of the changes. In the Meiji Restoration, crucial roles were played by the peasant class that formed the armies and the merchant class that financed the military. In 19th century China, the reformers failed because of infighting within a weak leadership, as well as the advanced state of decay of the entire society. But a century later, Deng Xiaoping's reforms took root as the people experienced the benefits of rapid growth and the widespread improvements in living standards. In post-war Britain, the turning point in the public mood began with a sense of humiliation when the Labour Government had to call in the IMF in 1976, after the Exchequer ran out of money. In Singapore, our previous remakings succeeded because we mounted a strong collective response at independence a determination to beat the odds and survive, in 1985 a sense that if we made sacrifices together, we could make our economy competitive again.

So, as long as New York City keeps adding jobs at such a brisk pace, Fairfield County will benefit. In addition, research indicates that a strong central city is critical for the well-being of its suburbs, meaning that a healthy and growing New York City economy is critically important to Fairfield County. What else can the region do to foster economic growth going forward? It certainly helps for cities like Bridgeport and Stamford to be attractive locations for businesses to locate and grow. It is also important to focus on quality of life issues that make people want to live here – like good schools and low crime, and also amenities ranging from nice parks to good restaurants. Bridgeport has clearly been making progress in this regard, both along the waterfront at Steelpointe Harbor and along Main Street. With New York City’s large and booming economy nearby, and Metro North providing a convenient mass transit link, anything that makes people more inclined to live here – and perhaps even set up shop here – is bound to boost the local economy. And finally, one of the most important ingredients for a healthy urban economy is a well-trained and motivated work force. It cannot be overstated how important it is to help provide residents with the skills and tools they need to be productive and successful, so that they can realize their full potential.
Stefan Ingves: Monetary policy and financial stability – some future challenges Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish Economics Association, Stockholm, 17 May 2010. *  *  *  Every once in a while, developments take a course that turns old truths on their heads and forces new solutions. This is what happened in Sweden in conjunction with the economic crisis at the start of the 1990s, when the policy of a fixed exchange rate reached the end of the road. At that point, we were lucky enough to be able to change track and become one of the very first countries to start to apply an innovation in the field of monetary policy – inflation targeting. In much the same way, the financial crisis, not yet a completely closed chapter, has come to function as a catalyst for reassessment and renewal – not just at home this time, but also on an international level. The spotlight has primarily been focused on the work of maintaining financial stability – but the crisis has also raised the issue of whether there may be lessons to be learned for monetary policy too. Today, I plan to discuss some of the challenges that I believe central banks will face in the future. These challenges exist both in the work on financial stability and in the field of monetary policy – and in the borderland between the two.

The situation one would like to avoid is one in which the upturn is characterised by exaggerated optimism and excessive risk propensity. In such a situation, the fall can be dramatic when something causes this sentiment to turn. Prices fall, participants become more pessimistic and risk propensity decreases among both lenders and borrowers. This may result in an extended period during which participants consolidate their balance sheets, consumption and investment develop weakly, and lending becomes exaggeratedly restrictive. Fluctuations in property prices and credit volumes can thus amplify the fluctuations of the real economy. A fall in prices or expectations of such a fall may also lead to financial instability with possible consequences in the form of increased uncertainty, a credit crunch and stresses on central government finances. This is because a credit-driven imbalance can create a significant credit risk if the banks have filled the asset side of their balance sheets with loans based on inflated prices and with high loan-to-value ratios. The credit risk also depends on the manner in which borrowers’ obligations in the event of a default will be regulated, that is to say whether the bank will be able to claim only the actual collateral or whether it will also have a claim on the remaining loan. An individual bank has no reason to take consideration of anything other than the risk to its own balance sheet and can, in general, ignore the effects on the real economy and financial stability: these are external effects.
This is what lies behind the AMA (Advanced Measurement Approach) proposal: on one hand, recognition of the growing importance of operational risk but, on the other, to allow unrestricted development, without regulatory constraints, of their management techniques. It is difficult to find another area where a regulator is willing to grant such a broad degree of flexibility as the Basel Committee is prepared to do. In turn, its inclusion as a defined regulatory capital heading ensures that institutions will have a strong incentive to measure and control such risks. Risk management and the New Capital Accord To be sure, running risks is an integral part of banking. However, the leveraged nature of banking business, the risks of systemic contagion, the particular weakness of the depositor as a creditor, and the interaction between the real and the financial economy all mean that it does not suffice to expect banks to manage their risks well. There are three additional factors overarching this management of risks. The first is capital: banks should have sufficient capital of good quality to withstand not only expected losses from activity (which should be covered by provisions), but also unexpected losses, so that the continuity of banks may be ensured in normal times and in crises alike. This factor was already of vital importance at the outset of the financial system as such, when there were no additional safeguards, nor any regulation of economic capital. The second and third factors are common ones, as they involve extra surveillance of a bank’s management of risks.

In sum, for the first time after years of crisis, we can discern the possibility of a gradual and sustainable recovery, the outcome of the progress made in correcting the imbalances that we had built up and of the structural reforms undertaken, whose results we are beginning to see. The task is not complete and much work remains to be done, both in Europe and in Spain. Hopefully, however, the progressive perception of the improvement achieved will act as a powerful spur for us to persevere on the road we have taken. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches