samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Per Mr. Yam gives a broadbrush picture of Asian monetary co-operation Jacobsson Lecture given by Mr. Joseph Yam J.P., Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in Hong Kong, on 21/9/97. Introduction 1. Good afternoon. On behalf of the people of Hong Kong, particularly those of us at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, let me extend my warmest welcome to all of you to Hong Kong. For those of you who have visited Hong Kong before, perhaps many times, I hope you are pleased to see that Hong Kong, as a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, remains as vibrant and dynamic as you have known in the past, retaining much of its free market characteristics, under the principle of “one country, two systems”. 2. It is a great honour and privilege for me to be invited to give this year’s Per Jacobsson Lecture. As a Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mr Per Jacobsson led a life that was dedicated to the promotion of both European and later international monetary co-operation. It is only befitting that a lecture held in Asia in memory of this great man should address the topic of Asian monetary co-operation. This is also a subject that has been brought to sharp focus in the light of the recent turmoil in the currency markets of Asia. 3.

But the relevant perspective is that of co-operation and not of “autonomous” infighting between the representatives of free enterprise and those of Hobbess Leviathan-type of government. Against this background let me take a bird’s eye view of some challenges that regulatory and oversight authorities should tackle to facilitate initiatives to resolve the identified issues. A first challenge is the need for a common approach of the regulatory and oversight authorities. This need arises from several factors. For instance, clearing and settlement of securities transactions occur in different institutions located in different jurisdictions. The whole infrastructure underlying these transactions has reached a global dimension. Over the past decades cross-border infrastructures have deployed their activities essentially as a complement to domestic systems, but I expect them start playing a more powerful role at a domestic level as well. The common approach to regulate and oversee cross-border securities clearing and settlement systems, which I have referred to previously, is being worked on. The various standards and recommendations that have been issued recently is proof this. Some may set the accent on the divergences, misinterpretations or on the incompleteness of these standards and recommendations. I do not refute them but I also see the value added of sharing the same language to tackle complex issues. Regulatory and overseers tend to adopt a pragmatic approach where one authority takes on a leadership role and consults with other relevant authorities.
In time, we will consider the case for reducing the 2% threshold to further enhance financial stability. Payments fraud and economic crime are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and the Bank as operator of CHAPS is engaging in initiatives to tackle these threats. The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) has developed guidance on reducing the risk of wholesale payments fraud related to endpoint security.10 The Bank is currently undertaking a number of initiatives to strengthen our position and support our CHAPS Direct Participants in line with CPMI strategy, which includes adjusting our CHAPS rulebook to focus on detection, prevention and response to security issues as I described earlier. 10  https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d178.htm 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  At the level where fraud is most likely to touch on end-users, Vocalink piloted an anti-money laundering tool known as Mule Insights Tactical Solution (MITS)11 for a number of Faster Payments participants. MITS can retrospectively track fraudulent payments as they move between customer accounts, thereby helping to quickly identify and highlight to Payment Service Providers any suspected ‘mule accounts’. They can then take action to block funds and close these accounts, making it more difficult for fraudsters to undertake scams. We are currently in the exploratory phase of a pilot to use MITS on a subset of CHAPS data. The additional insights generated should help participating Direct Participants to better tackle further fraud activity.

We are also focused on how as operator of CHAPS the Bank can support UK-wide efforts to tackle economic crime. The recently published UK Economic Crime Plan12 noted the role that the Bank can play in this regard, including by enabling enhanced payment data through the development of interoperable message standards and by promoting wider adoption of Legal Entity Identifiers. These initiatives will help to promote greater transparency in ownership of legal entities and support detection of financial crime. Minimising impact of incidents  Resilience is key to payments, and we need to be ready to respond to the unexpected. That is why we have not stopped at prevention. We are also proactively thinking about how to respond when incidents occur; how to reduce the impact and any spill-overs to the wider ecosystem; and of course how we can recover quickly (for FMIs this means within two hours under most scenarios as set out in CPMI guidance). Furthermore, like other systemically important systems, we are preparing to meet the Bank’s forthcoming operational resilience policy that will apply equally to the Bank as the operator of CHAPS as it does to payment systems recognised for statutory supervision. Our mandate for promoting the stability of the UK’s financial system means we are not only interested in the resilience of CHAPS, but also the settlement of all payments critical to the economy. In an increasingly fastmoving financial system, being able to guarantee that critical payments settle on the same day is crucial.
Taking these changes together, that is, higher expected growth in the developed economies and lower growth in the emerging world, considering their relative weights, drives our forecast for Chile’s trading partners marginally up for 2014 and 2015, to an average of 3.8 percent (3.7 percent in December). The financial conditions facing our economy have not changed materially since December, while the terms of trade have worsened. Overall, compared with recent years, our external scenario will be less favorable this year. This because, on the one hand, foreign interest rates have risen as has risk aversion towards emerging markets. On the other hand, the price of copper has been falling for some months. In fact, at the statistical close of this Report it had dropped past the barrier of 3 dollars per pound. Our baseline scenario foresees that the pound of copper will trade at an average of 3 dollars in 2014 and 2.85 dollars in 2015 (table 1). As I said before, in the past few months output and demand growth fell short of our forecasts in the previous Monetary Policy Report, particularly in investment-related sectors. Output grew 4.1 percent annually in 2013, with a sharp deceleration during the second half. One determinant was the behavior of sectors unrelated to natural resources, especially those associated with investment such as construction and part of trade and manufacturing. Among the components of demand, gross fixed capital formation posted the sharpest downward adjustment.

Assuming that developments in Swedbank’s and SEB’s other markets continue to be relatively good, however, the bank groups should be able to cover most of the losses from the Baltic region with the earnings from the remainder of their operations. Swedbank and SEB have subsidiaries in the Baltic countries, while Nordea has a branch. According to EU regulations, the authorities in the country where subsidiaries are located have responsibility for their supervision, while the home country authorities have the responsibility for branches and for the bank group as a whole. Around 80 per cent, equivalent to SEK 320 billion, of the Swedish banks’ lending to the Baltic countries is in euro. These euro are lent almost exclusively in the international loan markets by the parent bank in Sweden. BIS Review 11/2010  1  The Baltic economies developed rapidly after these countries gained their independence, although there have been some setbacks. This development was supported by extensive inflows of capital from abroad, particularly after EU membership in 2004. Much of the money came from neighbouring countries such as Finland and Sweden. The average standard of living for the populations in the Baltic countries increased rapidly from 41 per cent of the EU average in the year 2000 to 62 per cent in the year 2008.
This approach clearly showed its limits during the financial crisis. The financial fragmentation of EMU during the financial crisis was partly a result of the initial choices concerning EMU’s institutional architecture – to be precise, its minimalist design which left economic and financial policies mostly at national level. This was maybe due to an overriding faith in the efficiency of financial markets that – even though not shared by all of EMU’s founding fathers – prevailed in Maastricht. It has to be acknowledged, however, that over the following years, financial market integration in EMU and at global level, accelerated at a speed that was hard to grasp in those early days after the creation of Monetary Union. The introduction of the single currency gave a major impetus to financial integration in the euro area. Financial integration was impressive in terms of quantitative indicators but it was not sustainable – it proved to be shallow and reversible. In fact, it even contributed to the rapid contagion in the early days of the crisis.1 We learned the hard way that a single currency requires a financial system that is sustainably integrated and, indeed, as single as possible. Much has been done to correct the initial design failures of EMU. Along with the introduction of the euro, the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan was launched to provide an overall framework for the integration of financial services in Europe.

17 Asdrubali, P., B. Sorensen and O. Yosha (1996), “Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963–  1990”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(4): 1081–1110. 18 Hsu, P., X. Tian and Y. Xu, (2014), “Financial Development and Innovation: Cross-Country Evidence”, Journal of  Financial Economics 112: 116–135. 19 Kremer, M. and A. Popov, (2018), “Financial Development, Financial Structure, and Growth: Evidence from  Europe”, Special Feature A, ECB Report on Financial Integration in Europe. 20 Claessens, S. (2016), “Regulation and Structural Change in Financial Systems”, in The Future of the  International Monetary and Financial Architecture, ECB Forum on Central Banking Conference Proceedings, 188–222. 21 Da Rin, M., G. Nicodano and A. Sembenelli (2006), “Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital  Markets”, Journal of Public Economics 90:1699–1723. 9/9  BIS central bankers' speeches
04/12/2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authorit…  Speeches  Published Date: 26 November 2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at “Growing Timber” MAS-IBF Webinar Series on 26 November 2020 Good morning and thank you for joining us. MAS and IBF are launching today the “Growing Timber” project – a series of monthly webinars and events focused on jobs and skills in the financial services sector. Jobs – the Central Economic Challenge of Our Times  In August this year, at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium discussing the economic challenges facing the world, Senior Minister and Chairman MAS, Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, said: “The central problem is in creating enough jobs in the first instance, and in raising the quality of jobs for more people over time”. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/gearing-up-for-new-and-evolving-jobs-in-financial-services  1/18  04/12/2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authorit…  I can’t agree more: jobs are the central economic challenge of our times. The success of economic policy is not measured by how well financial markets are doing, not by how well companies are creating new products, not even by how fast GDP is growing. The ultimate measure of economic success is this: are we creating enough good jobs for our people?

3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  *** Dear participants, I avail the opportunity for addressing to this Conference and highlighting the importance of sharing knowledge and experiences among us on such an important theme. I would like to conclude my speech by thanking you again for the invitation! 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Last but not least, if Switzerland were to give up its monetary independence by pegging the franc to the euro or by joining the euro area, it would lose its privileged status and, consequently, Swiss interest rates would increase to European levels. Since higher interest rates mean lower asset prices and lower levels of investment, and also higher mortgage rates, the Swiss are understandably not keen on giving up their national currency. Since any major decision in Switzerland has to be approved in a public referendum, the prospect of EU and euro membership in the near future is thus highly unlikely. Given our exposure to global economic and financial shocks, and their arguably smaller importance for the euro area, pegging the Swiss franc to the euro is not a realistic option. Flexible exchange rates give us the room for manoeuvre we need. •  What has our experience been of coexistence with the euro so far? Very positive. Rather than crowding out independent currencies, the euro has stabilised the monetary scene in Europe. In fact, the franc is less volatile today than it was before European monetary integration. The price of the euro in Swiss francs these days is about 3% lower than it was in 1999, in other words, almost unchanged. We did have periods, however, when the franc was under pressure, especially after September 11 and before the outbreak of the war in Iraq. The safe-haven function of the franc then triggered a 10% appreciation in our currency against the euro.

The uncertainties due to commodity price fluctuations also stand out as an important issue for the monetary policy communication and expectations management by the central banks. Structure of the commodity price dynamics is also of great importance for they constitute an input for the monetary policy decisions of the central banks. For example, the sources of the commodity price fluctuations and the nature of the shocks are extremely influential for the determination of the policy responses to these fluctuations. Similarly, not only the level but also the volatility of commodity prices can have a significant effect on the macroeconomic activity. For example, a shock affecting the level of crude oil prices may have a different effect on economy, if it is observed in a period where the volatility of prices is also higher. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Inflation  IV  III  Growth  I  II  As I have briefly mentioned before, an increase in the commodity prices creates downward pressure on the growth prospects, and upward pressure on inflation. In Turkey, the investment incentive package that was announced yesterday will support our economic growth through the supply side, and the tighter monetary policy will eliminate the inflation risks. The sessions on each day of the conference will provide platforms for studies which are of very rich content and great potential benefit for policymakers. For example, macroeconomic effects of the commodity price dynamics and possible corresponding policy responses are among the main themes elaborated during the conference.
But, with accelerating inflation in the economy as a whole, the effect would have been tantamount to real exchange rate appreciation, which would in any event have damaged their competitive position and so provided at best only short-term relief even to them. And it would not in that case be possible to reverse that effect through exchange rate adjustment. The fact is that there are no easy answers or ideal solutions to the one-size-fits-all problem at the Eurozone level, without substantial - and sustainable convergence between our economies, although coping with such tensions as may emerge within the Eurozone - with or without the UK - is likely to be easier in a context of structural, supply-side, flexibility and adaptability in labour and product markets. Now, many people in the Eurozone acknowledge these concerns. But they are inclined to argue that if a country participating in the monetary union were to find itself in an unsustainable situation, and given that it would have no macro-economic way out - through exchange rate adjustment, or independent monetary policy action, or fiscal stimulus beyond the limits of the Growth and Stability Pact - and given limited labour migration or fiscal redistribution at the pan-European level - then it would have an overwhelming incentive to undertake the supply-side reforms which have proved so BIS Review 71/2000  2  difficult to introduce up until now.

Many of them need to use instruments to manage or hedge their RMB exposures. All these RMB related financial services and products can only be developed by the markets and financial institutions because they are closest to their customers and understand their needs best. That is why it is so important for the HKMA to collaborate with our official sector counterparts in Australia to create this private-sector led Dialogue. The first Dialogue was held in Sydney in April last year, which was highly successful. I am very pleased that it is Hong Kong’s turn to host the second Dialogue and I am confident that it will be equally if not more successful. I note that today’s Dialogue has a very rich agenda and I look forward to hearing useful and practical ideas and suggestions on what the private sector can do on its own or in collaboration with the official sector to further develop the offshore RMB markets in Australia and Hong Kong. 8. Thank you very much. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In the future, the Bank might, for example, increase haircuts during “peacetime” if liquidity in the secondary market from a particular type of collateral became impaired; or if the Bank concluded that, as the upswing of a credit cycle developed, risk was plausibly becoming underpriced and so was not properly reflected in the valuations of instruments it was accepting as collateral. Whether or not that would be enough of itself quell a cycle is obviously uncertain; but it would help to protect us against risk and would give a signal. In short, haircut policy matters. Pricing But the Bank does not believe that haircuts can be relied upon on their own to produce the appropriate incentives for banks’ liquidity management. Price matters too. Bagehot said that the rate should be “high”. But since he wrote in the context of the Gold Standard and of domestic financial crises that were typically accompanied by external (or capital account) crises, his notion of a “high rate” was bound up with the central bank tightening monetary conditions to stem the outflows (of gold). But it is clear enough that, although he did not in fact talk of “penalty” rates, the relevant measure for him was the rate charged by the central bank relative to that prevailing in the market in normal conditions, ie before a crisis breaks. The Bank has adopted, and promulgated, a fee structure for its liquidity-insurance facilities that increases as banks’ borrowing increases and/or is made against riskier, less liquid collateral.

Frankly, it has been shocking over the past year or so to discover how many medium-sized banks and building societies did not hold government bonds or other very high quality assets; or, if they did, how many did not have a regular presence in the gilt repo market or even had no capacity to repo at all. Turning up in the core secured-funding markets for the first time for years is an absolute give away of distress. All that has to change. Market-maker of Last Resort What I have said so far could be mistaken to imply that only banking markets matter. That would be misleading. The capital markets obviously matter too. Indeed, the current crisis has illustrated just what a mess can result from liquidity draining out of those markets. Market liquidity is endogenous: participants thinking that it might dry up can contribute to its doing so. In the early phases of this crisis, by virtue of holding large “trading” books that were marked to market, banks and other traders found themselves having to make very large portfolio write downs in the face of sharp rises in liquidity premia in asset markets. As highly-levered institutions, those mark-downs depleted their net worth to the point of imperilling solvency. That caused a retrenchment in the availability of credit, helping to plunge the world economy into recession, and so impairing the value of more traditional loan books, in a vicious spiral. So it would have been better if, somehow, we could have preserved the liquidity of the markets.
Diagram 2:  ”The IT-bubble” 800  800  700  700  Affärsvärlden: IT-index  600  600  Index  500  500  Nasdaq: Nasdaq: Composite  400  400  300  300  200  200  Dow Jones: Industrials  100 0 96  97  98  USA Dow Jones Industrial Average, close daily [index 1996-01-02]  99  00  100  01  0  Sources: Hanson & Partners AB. USA Nasdaq Composite index, close daily [index 1996-01-02]  BIS Review 90/2001  1  One is what has happened to the discussion about the “new economy”. Swedish media are mentioning the subject less and less (Diagram 1). I believe that mirrors how people’s interest in general has waned. And considering how rapidly and extensively prices have fallen for IT and telecom shares, one is inclined to the view that all the talk about the third industrial revolution was really something of a dead end (Diagram 2). That leads on to my other question, namely the part that technological breakthroughs play for corporate profits and thereby for the return on equity. Where did the “new economy” go? Concerning my first question, perhaps it is not so surprising that we now hear less and less about the “new economy” than we did last year. Share prices for IT and telecom companies have fallen markedly. Many people have lost a great deal on their investments. We hear or read about redundancies and cutbacks in this sector almost daily.

Diagram 3:  United States: real profits (S&P 500) 1 00  Trend 1.5% per year  10  1 1 87 0 18 80 18 90 1 90 0 1 91 0 1 9 2 0 1 9 30 1 9 4 0 1 95 0 1 96 0 19 70 19 80 1 99 0 2 00 0 Source: Shiller. The profits of listed companies can, of course, rise comparatively rapidly in the short run. If the profit share moves up from, say, 30 to 35 per cent, this implies a temporary increase in profits of 15 to 20 per cent, spread over the years when the profit share is elevated. Such a temporary increase in the profit share has not been uncommon in connection with technological breakthroughs. It occurred in Sweden in the 1990s and also early in the twentieth century in the era of electrification. 4  BIS Review 90/2001  The profit share followed a rising path up to the end of the 1910s and this was accompanied by higher GDP growth (Diagram 4). It is perhaps hardly surprising that this led many shareholders to believe that profit growth would continue to exceed the historical trend in the longer run. That did not happen. An elevated profit share tends to fall back sooner or later and corporate profits then return to their longterm path.