samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In both periods, during the run up to the financial crisis and its aftermath, most forecasters were mistaken about future growth rates and inflation rates by relatively large amounts. Both surveys of professional forecasters exhibit significantly less dispersion than the Survey of Consumer Expectations – even when focusing only on “sophisticated” respondents with high education and numeracy. This suggests that there may be some scope for the sort of mechanisms I described, which may induce the “fundamental” heterogeneity in beliefs to be suppressed in surveys of professional forecasters. Consequently, household surveys may add important information on “fundamental” heterogeneity of beliefs relative to professional surveys, as the latter may reflect, in part, relativistic payoffs or shared information sets which produce an excessive consensus of views. Thank you for listening to me today; I would be happy to take some questions on our research on inflation expectations. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  References Armantier, O., S. Nelson, G. Topa, W. van der Klaauw, and B. Zafar. 2012. “The Price is Right: Updating of Inflation Expectations in a Randomized Price Information Experiment.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 543, revised January 2013. Armantier, O., W. Bruine de Bruin, G. Topa, W. van der Klaauw, and B. Zafar. 2011.

From the Bank of  BIS Review 50/2009  1  Zambia’s point of view, the objective of financial stability remains key in all our activities. Financial stability depends to a large extent on the existence of robust risk management systems of financial institutions. It is therefore, important that risk management systems should keep pace with financial innovation. I have no doubt that the banking sector will rise to this challenge. Once again, thank you for the opportunity to witness this important event. 2  BIS Review 50/2009
Jean-Claude Trichet: The euro after two years: European competitiveness in a globalized global world Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Banque de France, to the Swedish National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce, Stockholm, 6 April 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and an honour for me to be invited to speak at this meeting of the Swedish National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce, today in Stockholm. I am particularly happy to express my views on the already successful existence of the euro and Monetary Union, and the conditions and prospects for its further success. As you all know, within nine months, on 1st January 2002, the euro will become a reality across Europe as euro banknotes and coins are introduced. This will be the largest monetary change over the world has ever seen. However, it should be recalled that for all economic, monetary and institutional purposes, Monetary Union was created on 1st January 1999. Then, a decisive event in the history of Europe occurred. The euro was born and the irreversible nature of this change has convinced an increasing number of economic players that the success of the euro is necessary for Europe. It is a keystone of the European single market, which will ensure prosperity in Europe for the benefit of the rest of the world.

BIS Review 28/2001  3  Even more importantly, the euro zone is not devoid of mechanisms conducive to an appropriate policy mix. As a matter of fact, monetary policy alone cannot ensure price stability without the appropriate fiscal discipline at the overall EMU level. Indeed, for my part, I would mention three economic justifications for the Treaty provisions that gave rise to the Stability and Growth Pact: –  First, by co-ordinating the fiscal policies of the Member States of Monetary Union, the pact ensures a good policy mix within the Euro area. This is essential for monetary policy, to counterbalance the fact that Europe does not have a significant federal budget, just as it has no federal government. Close mutual surveillance and co-ordination of fiscal policies are the responsibility of the “Euro Group” and of the Ecofin Council. Adherence to the medium-term objective of achieving budgets that are “close to balance or in surplus” means that individual countries must first rely on themselves to withstand possible economic downturns which affect only their own economy, while ensuring a balanced policy mix throughout the euro zone. –  Second, the pact helps to prevent well-managed economies from having to bear an unjustified risk premium by setting up a penalty system for excessive deficits. –  And lastly, the stability and growth pact allows us to disprove the assertion that the euro area has no automatic stabilisers in the event of asymmetric shocks to a member economy.
Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, At this point, I hope we have concisely and clearly laid out the monetary policy vision for Thailand that can serve as a basis for your investment decisions, reassessment of the risks, and, ultimately, your continued partnership in the Thai economy amid these troubled times of global uncertainty. On that note, let me conclude my talk here. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The U.S. was not alone in this shortcoming, but given our position in the global financial system, we especially should have done better. We’ve taken important steps through new legislative mandates and a broader effort to rethink our regulatory and supervisory framework. In particular, systemically important banking organizations must now hold amounts of capital and liquidity that are better aligned with their risk profiles. Other changes have also been implemented, such as central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives contracts, that should make the global financial system more resilient and robust. Although this effort remains very much a work in progress, I think it will enable us to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past decade, and enable us to take a more proactive stance toward mitigating potential future vulnerabilities. Of course, we at the Fed are not alone here. Since the recent financial crisis, central banks worldwide have been engaged in a broad rethinking of how to better fulfill their mandates. Let me close with a final thought. The largest problems that countries create for others often emanate from getting policy wrong domestically. Recession or instability at home is often quickly exported abroad. Equally important, growth and stability abroad makes all our jobs at home easier. This illustrates the externalities in the work we all do, with more effective fulfillment of our domestic mandates helping to bring us collectively to a better place. Thank you for your kind attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
One important reason is, of course, the above, namely that the weakness of the krona is the other side of the dollar's strength and reflects the international  BIS Review 34/2001  3  financial unease. We can't do very much about this, no more than can the Canadians or Australians who are in the same situation. Another reason is that we have a price stability target and not an exchange rate target and trying to maintain both with the aid of the repo rate is not an easy task. In many cases the targets are in total conflict with one another. We in Sweden have chosen a floating exchange rate and will therefore have to accept that the exchange rate floats. If the Riksbank were to intervene on the market now and then, we could easily cause speculations as to what exchange rate we might have as a target. The forecasts as to when the Riksbank might intervene and the positions it might take would then become a part of stockbrokers' daily work. This is not a good thing, as it increases unease on the market, rather than reducing it. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that every central bank may need to intervene under certain circumstances, either by buying or selling currency, e.g. to restore some order to a market that has become unbalanced or to even out sudden large flows. In both cases, one should of course state the purpose of the intervention.

If the substantial optimism regarding the future that is reflected, for instance, in the development in savings proves partially unwarranted, the problems may become even more difficult to handle at a later stage. Although the focus is on the USA at the moment, concern over developments in Japan has increased recently. Here there appear to be both severe problems in the real economy and in the finance sector, as well as political difficulties in dealing with these problems. In the insurance sector there are a number of major life insurance companies that are insolvent in the technical sense, as they have promised pensioners a return that they are unable to deliver. A large part of the insurance companies' assets are of course traditionally invested in low-yield treasury bonds. The Japanese 10-year bond rate is currently around one and one-third per cent. The Bank of Japan has declared that it intends to continue with its zero interest rate policy for the foreseeable future and the market expects to see prices falling rather than otherwise during the coming year. If interest rates and inflation were to gradually rise, which at the moment does not appear likely, this would of course further erode the value of Japanese pension money, as the bonds stock in the insurance companies would fall in value.
On an international scale, financial cooperation initiatives, such as the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (AIF) would also complement domestic endeavors in channelling intraregional savings to needed projects. 8. This leads me to the second of the preparatory work, which is improving supportive framework for private financing. The Mekong river is made up of small tributaries flowing towards the same end to form a large fertile river. The benefits we receive from the confluence of these small tributaries as opposed to one waterway are incomparable. Likewise, strengthening domestic capital markets would help allocating available savings to the most productive use, thus, facilitating real sector’s economic activities and supporting economic growth. 9. A deep and liquid financial market could reduce business over-reliance on bank financing channel. On the other hand, it could also serve as a less-expensive alternative source of funds for local entities. The initial stepping stone towards a well-developed financial market is to improve the cross-country interconnectedness of local financial markets. Financial connectivity could be enhanced by linking capital and bond markets, creating regional exchange trading system, as well as developing a network of payment and settlement system. Another important step is to streamline rules and regulations to facilitate cross-border movement of capital. Such a process can be achieved through promoting flows of capital among member countries via reducing regulatory obstacles to stimulate foreign participation and outward investment. Currently, Thailand allows non-residents of ASEAN to issue both foreign currency-denominated and local currency bonds. The derivative market also serves investors to hedge against financial risks.

In fact, Newton has left us with more than one insight. Newton surmised that once inertia is overcome, an object achieves momentum and acceleration, but not without force being applied first. In a similar way, the same areas of corporate inertia today can be harnessed to drive the momentum of tomorrow. But only through a combined force of action and leadership can we truly achieve this. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
After the licensing of Popular Bank, with Albanian capital, the number of banks increased from 15 to 16, and a preliminary license is granted to Union Bank, which is expected to raise the number of banks to 17 over 2005. The system assets have further increased by 14 percent while there was an increase of banking products and an expansion of their network. During this year there will be sold the public shares of both the Italian Albanian Bank and United Bank of Albania, which will lead to an increase of effectiveness and banking competition, paving the way to the processes of selling, merging and acquisitions towards a new consolidation of the banking system. The lending activity increased by 38 percent where one can distinguish inter alia the significant growth of medium-term and long-term loans compared to short-term loans. The map of coverage of the country with the banking system has further expanded, including new areas ever covered before. At the end of 2004, the total number of branches reached 88, or 11 branches more that the end of the previous year, while the number of agencies recorded for the first time a full three-digit number, 100 and the number of the employed people increased by 26 percent. BIS Review 44/2005  1  The high increase of the number of branches relative to agencies shows that banks are not interested only in providing the service of collecting deposits but also in providing other products like crediting to the economy.

These developments, besides their positive contribution in enhancing the financial intermediation speak for a better perception of the investing potential from banks, in Albania. An outstanding development is mainly related to the client service, which is accompanied through electronic terminals by the increasing number of electronic cards in circulation. Banks offer already debit and credit cards in co-operation with international companies such as Visa and MasterCard. Six banks provide the ATM service and the number of ATMs reached 108 by the end of February 2005. The banking system results to have a profit level, which has been increasing to Lek 5.1 billion. Return on equity (ROE) was estimated at 21 percent while problem credits represent only 4.2 percent, from 4.6 percent in the previous year. On the other hand, for the rest of the financial sector the FSAP reports indicates many problems, which simultaneously contain many themes including essential issues such as their supervision. Although, due to their small dimensions, these problems do not present imminent risks for the time being, they still should be carefully examined and resolved. Returning to the assessments made under FSAP in other countries similar to Albania (I mainly refer here to South East European Countries, SEEC) and to many other financial reports referring to this region, we realize that these problems are similar and these countries suffer more or less similar symptoms. If one has a look back at the history, it realizes that it can not happen differently.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue with the basic direction of these forecasts. The fundamental dynamic behind the recent rise of SWFs will not disappear over night. As I mentioned, estimated excess reserves are very large. 12 In all likelihood, at least some of these excess reserves will be transferred to SWFs in coming years. Moreover, even if global imbalances were to unwind quickly, for instance in association with a sharp and protracted recession in the United States, the power of compound return will continue to be a substantial source of growth for SWFs that already exist. Fourth, SWFs have so far been initiated predominantly in the Middle East and in Asia. Slide 8 shows that these two regions account for 77 percent of the assets of the largest SWFs. Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that 16 percent of the assets of the 14 largest SWFs are held in developed countries. 13 Fifth, SWFs will increasingly attempt to diversify their holdings. They will do so gradually, given the prevailing size and liquidity constraints. Like central banks, SWFs have traditionally been investors in highly rated fixed income assets. Going forward, SWFs will increasingly look for investments in equity markets, both public and private ones. Several of these investments have recently produced headlines in the global financial press. Slide 9 depicts some of them. 3.

One way of looking at these questions is in terms of the stock of assets available for purchase. There is currently a large outstanding stock of government bonds which could be purchased. And if the state contingent effects of QE are driven by the need for holders of safe assets to exchange them for deposits, then it must always be possible for the central bank to purchase more assets. In other words, the central bank would need to own a high proportion of safe assets for that to become a constraint. But if negative shocks continue to arrive from time to time before any reversal of the stock of asset purchases takes place, and hence the stock owned by the central bank continues to rise, the odds of this situation arising go up. This effect may become more likely if the equilibrium real interest rate remains low for a prolonged period. Expanding the range of assets purchased is another way for central banks to create more headroom. The Covid crisis has seen a further broadening of the range of assets that central banks stand ready to purchase. In part, this has reflected another objective of central banks and governments, given the scale of the crisis and its economic effects, namely to direct and target funds to the corporate sector, and thus supplement the more normal role of banks and financial markets. But it also reflected a need to act on a broad front in terms of ensuring liquidity gets to the places where it is needed.
Kristina Persson: The economic situation in a monetary policy perspective Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at a conference by Sveriges Kyrkokamerala förening, Sundsvall, 11 June 2002. *  *  *  First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation to participate in your congress and for the opportunity to expound the Riksbank’s views of the Swedish economy at the present time. By way of introduction, I intend to discuss the role of monetary policy on a more general level and then to present the Riksbank’s view of the economic situation and inflation prospects on the basis of the most recent Executive Board meeting, where we decided to leave the repo rate unchanged. I shall also describe the risk scenario and how we see developments beyond the forecast horizon. In conclusion, I shall briefly touch on an issue that I have personally been interested in for some time, namely the economic aspects of a potential Swedish membership of the Eurosystem. The role of the Riksbank Let me first clarify the Riksbank’s tasks and explain how monetary policy decisions are taken, i.e. how monetary policy strategy is formulated. The Riksbank has had a statutory duty to maintain price stability since 1 January 1999. We have chosen to put this in operational terms by means of setting an inflation target.

The recent developments of inflation have reflected the statistical impact of the comparison to a relatively low prices base in 2009, the more full transmission of exchange rate depreciation on consumer prices and the administrative increase of energy, since January 2010. The later factor provided an effect of about 0.5 percentage points on inflation level, being the main reason of exceeding the level of 4%. On the other side, the increasing tendency of food goods inflation is owed to the global conjuncture of goods prices, which is revealing a gradual monthly increase since the half of 2009. Our analysis recommends that the increasing trend of inflation owes mainly to supplying factors, which are estimated to manifest an uneven nature and a short-term action in time. The Bank of Albania expected these developments, being factorised on our projections regarding inflation and communicated timely and in terms of transparency to the public. In medium term period, the growth under potential of the Albanian economy owing to the slowdown of the domestic and external demand, shall establish an environment of low inflationary pressures, which are expected to balance the pressures deriving from the supply direction. This assessment is also supported by the sustained developments and at low historic rates of the long-term component of non-tradable goods inflation, as the most directed transmission of inflationary pressures generated from the internal demand in economy. The rates of both key inflation and of the non-tradable goods in February pointed to 1.1 and 2.3%, respectively.
But, absolutely crucially, we also face a nasty shock to costs from rising commodity prices and sterling’s depreciation. That is going to push up UK inflation over the next few months, creating a risk of upward pressure on pay and higher inflation expectations. The MPC’s strategy to date has been clear: to offset part but not all of the shock to demand, consistent with an overriding determination to maintain medium-term inflation expectations anchored to the 2% target. The path of rates will depend on judgments about the balance of those risks to the inflation outlook. And, in the context of my remarks today, that is different from a “mopping up” strategy involving simply reducing rates enough to offset estimates of the effect of the demand shock plus some insurance on top of that. Central bank liquidity policy: the Social Contract If monetary policy has been constrained in alleviating the consequences of the financial turmoil, so too, for different reasons, has central bank liquidity policy in many centres. For over a century – coincident with the development of central banking – there has effectively been a Social Contract between the banking system and the authorities. On one side of the Contract, commercial banks have been permitted to profit from maturity transformation, turning liquid savings into illiquid loans. Commercial banks’ ability to do this relies on their deposit liabilities being a universally acceptable means of payment, money. But maturity transformation – borrowing short to lend long – is risky; it relies on confidence.

BIS Review 77/2008  3  This could not have been more important. It has made innovation in central banks’ liquidity provision imperative during the turmoil. And, when we regain peacetime, reforms will be needed to avoid a recurrence of this problem. Open-market operations (or auctions) against wider collateral, and the Bank’s Special Liquidity Scheme launched on 21 April, should both be seen in that light. Such measures need to be constructed so that they do not interfere with the implementation of monetary policy, which depends on the central bank’s net supply of reserves matching demand in the economy so as to stabilise (risk free, or secured) overnight money market interest rates broadly in line with the policy rate. The monetary part of central banks’ market operations is simply the injection of reserves. The other characteristics – counterparties, maturity, collateral etc – are essentially nonmonetary interventions. In most circumstances, central banks want to make them as neutral as possible, so as not to interfere with relative asset prices in the economy. When markets break down, however, central banks may need to calibrate their interventions to contain the spillovers to the economy. Thus the SLS is designed to underpin the liquidity of the banking system, and so confidence in the system as a whole. Taming the credit cycle But can we, the authorities, do more to avoid the system getting into such a fragile state in the first place? We really must consider how to do that.