samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Similarly, the 2007–2009 financial crisis, followed by the euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2011– 2012, shed a stark light on the disadvantages of having an economic and monetary union without a banking and financial union. As the crisis unfurled, the gaps in our financial integration led to a fragmentation of financing 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  conditions across the euro area, which in turn exacerbated the negative effects of the shock. Some countries experienced an abrupt deterioration in both government solvency and bank solvency, triggering a vicious circle linked to their domestic sovereign-bank nexus – that is the overexposure of domestic banks to their own national government’s debt. Today, progress has been made in resolving the institutional failings at the root of this fragmentation, with increased oversight and better coordination in fiscal policies and a more homogeneous system of financial supervision. However, financial integration remains a pressing challenge for the euro area, and one on which the future prosperity of the European Union and its citizens depends. Since the crisis, the allocation of savings and investment has remained firmly biased towards domestic markets and vehicles. It is vital that we make progress in this area if we are to channel our savings surplus more effectively towards investment, and in particular towards the financing of European firms, especially the most innovative and dynamic ones whose development will determine our future potential growth.

Denis Beau: Denis Beau: Monetary and financial challenges for the Euro area - what are our options? Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Faculty of Economics and Management, Strasbourg, 28 February 2019. * * * Ten years after the crisis, the ability of the global financial system, and especially the European financial sector, to withstand shocks appears to have been significantly reinforced. This reinforcement is the result of numerous changes which vary in nature: Banks now have more capital and its quality has been improved. Their transformation activities are better regulated and they have larger liquidity buffers. In Europe, the banking sector has also been made more resilient through major institutional reforms, especially the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism under the aegis of the ECB and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Outside the banking industry, the reforms steered by the G20 have enhanced the functioning of financial markets (particularly derivatives markets), improved the oversight and regulation of developments in non-bank financial intermediation (shadow banking), and put in place a framework for monitoring and safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole through the implementation of macroprudential policy. The crisis has also prompted changes in the way financial institutions operate. One of the most visible ones is that risk and compliance functions have now become an essential part of their organisations.
Such manipulation is often well timed and co-ordinated with the advance or reversal of capital flows, since essentially the same market players, acting in the multiple roles of advisors, agents and principals, are involved. One inevitable consequence of this is market panic and overshooting, to the extent of risking a meltdown in the monetary and financial systems concerned. The authorities, obviously, have a responsibility to act to prevent this from happening. Some have been in a better position to do so than others, using market means, particularly those with deep pockets. Some have been forced into closing their markets, albeit temporarily. Others have been quietly happy that they had been a little more conservative in their move towards financial liberalisation. In Hong Kong, where our commitment to maintaining open markets is strong, in addition to our unconventional market operation, we had to introduce measures that have effectively built us a big cushion. The purpose of this cushion is to help us to absorb the spasmodic international financial shock waves of mammoth dimensions that can now be generated by the international financial system. Some others, regrettably, have had to suffer the debilitating consequences of financial meltdown, and to face the often unjust accusation that these were entirely of their own making. Domestic responses by economies in this region cannot on their own address the root of the crisis or lessen the chances of another international financial shock wave.

In view of the extent and risks of the current crisis, fiscal policy will need to consider and prepare the deployment of additional stabilisation measures alongside the automatic stabilisers. In addition to the increased focus on economic policy, business practitioners within the Swiss economy are also challenged. In the case of banks, it is essential that credit shortages for companies and private households be avoided. Moreover, interbank business needs to be strengthened in order to smooth out liquidity imbalances. Companies must enhance their innovativeness and use opportunities for opening up new markets. The Swiss economy has many structural strengths and this prompts confidence that Switzerland will overcome the crisis. BIS Review 5/2009  1
On credit markets, the financial position of banks can also be seriously jeopardised if they are tempted to reduce margins drastically in order to maintain or increase their market share, or if they make insufficient provisions during cyclical upturns. More generally, some of the most widespread management methods are not entirely without risk: •  The accounting practice of marking-to-market most of the assets in credit institutions’ balance sheets renders them more vulnerable to price fluctuations. The spread of market valuation through the concept of “fair value” could make banks’ total assets and profits highly volatile. This is why French prudential authorities have reservations about this method. •  In the same vein, the Asian crisis has highlighted the limits of systematically resorting to rating agencies, which can reinforce the herd behaviour of markets. These ratings, which can never be perfectly accurate and up-to-date, should be taken for what they are: just one of several instruments for risk management. •  The turbulence surrounding the Asian crisis also clearly showed that the models used for managing complex derivatives do not adequately take into account abrupt gyrations in one or several markets. BIS Review 85/2000  4  And lastly, the public authorities must meet new challenges. •  In general, the default of the LTCM fund in September 1998 underscored the risk of contagion between financial systems.

Central banks thus find themselves at the intersection of the various aspects of financial systems, and accordingly appear particularly well-suited to maintaining financial stability. 7  BIS Review 85/2000  Thirdly, in my opinion, the correct answer to the changes underway in financial systems is not to set up vast centralized supervisory bodies at a global or a European level. In this domaine to be close to the credit and financial institutions concerned is decisive for efficiency. I am convinced that establishing a new generation of prudential standards and reinforcing active and close cooperation between decentralised supervisors will be for us the best means to reconcile efficiency with financial stability. To deal with these challenges, given their specific features, central banks are obviously at the heart of the process. BIS Review 85/2000  8
Although the structural balance policy was launched in this decade, fiscal efforts to smooth the copper price fluctuations began in the 1980s, with the copper stabilization fund. In fact, throughout most of the 1990s, the structural balance was near 1%. This countercyclical fiscal policy makes the effective fiscal balance highly correlated with the price of copper. Thus, our fiscal policy has been contributing for more than 20 years to stabilizing the Chilean economic cycle. As a result of the application of the rule, a large amount of resources has been saved in sovereign funds when the price of copper has been high. 4 In the period 2007-2008, 22 billion US dollars were placed in these funds, of which 20 billion – the equivalent to 12% of GDP – came from the accumulation of new funds, and the difference was the funds’ net financial gain. This has had significant implications in the current economic scenario. Since last year, particularly as from September, the world has been enduring the worst recession in the last 60 years and our country, despite being in an excellent position to address these shocks, has not been spared its consequences. But today, our fiscal policy has been able to make an important reactivation effort, thanks to the prudence with which the years of high copper prices were managed. The other critical elements in our macroeconomic policies that favor stabilization are monetary and foreign exchange policies. Although they play a somewhat more subtle role than fiscal policy, they are no less important.

If we manage this, we can also try to influence cyclical fluctuations in, for instance, production and employment. As I said, this sounds simple but we now have to manage the fact that the commodity price rises are on the one hand pushing up inflation and on the other hand dampening growth. A tight monetary policy could contribute to dampening inflation. At the same time, it would restrain real activity in the economy in a situation when economic activity is slowing down. The decision is not made easier by the fact that it is difficult to capture and predict all of the effects of an increase in commodity prices on the economy and – not least – how persistent the price impulses will be. If it is a question of temporary effects on inflation, these need not be counteracted by monetary policy. Sometimes one hears the argument that the Riksbank should not try to counteract price increases that are impossible to stop. One such example is the rising world market price for oil. But even prices we have little possibility to affect, other than to the extent that the exchange rate is affected by monetary policy, are included in the basket of goods that measures consumer prices. This is of course because they affect households’ purchasing power. A price impulse can gain a foothold and have long-lasting effects on inflation regardless of where it originates. And the central bank must parry long-lasting effects, whether the impulses come from wages, food prices, oil or something else.
Over the years, delegates from central banks of 30 different countries have attended the Conference. This growing international attendance makes particular strength of the Conference showcasing diverse experiences from very different areas of the world driven by the common interest in payments and market infrastructures. Equally appreciated is our domestic audience that continues to valuably contribute to the Conference each year. Focusing on current issues in the payment systems, the Conference agenda is each year carefully designed to cover the latest trends and feature the main challenges in the area. Variety of interesting topics has been on the menu so far including the European payment landscape and legislation with a special focus on PSD and PSD2; topics related to payment systems and payments oversight; the EU payment integration initiative known as Single European Payment Area (SEPA); then, innovations; security and efficiency of retail payments. We have elaborated 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  on instant payments, financial inclusion and accessibility of payment services, financial structures resilience and many more. This year’s agenda covers themes related to digital banking, cryptocurrencies and their regulation, the new technologies such as DLT and blockchain – all of them being topics of considerable relevance at the moment, and will only become more important over time. Bracketing this jubilee edition we had the pleasure of hosting many distinguished speakers from various affiliations starting from central banks, through relevant international institutions, commercial banks, clearing houses and custodians etc.

I would also like to express my appreciation to our distinguished panelists for today – Governors and other honorable guests and to thank all esteemed guests, delegates and speakers for contributing to another successful event. Finally, jubilees like this don’t come together over night. Allow me to express my recognition and appreciation to the whole team that each year coordinates the Conference. It is your strong commitment and dedication that we owe our achievements to. I wish you many more years of 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  continued success! Thank you! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Chart 6: Annual growth rate of total debt and post tax Income Percent  20 18 16 14 12  Total Debt  10 8 6 4  Income  2 0 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Chart 10: www.Statistics.gov.uk It is interesting to reflect on whether this increase has been a factor in the recent turndown in consumption. We cannot prove it, but I have been struck by two things. Firstly, has the stabilisation in house prices led homeowners to become more conservative or precautionary in their borrowing habits, realising that they can no longer assume that their debt will be offset by significant increases in house prices? Secondly, could the attitude of lenders have contributed to the downturn, through the withdrawal of credit? To my mind the jury is out as to whether their attitudes have yet had any impact. But I do believe that they could do so over time, as they change their behaviour in response to changes in their perception of risks: and recent press coverage suggests that lenders are looking seriously at their lending policies. Given my interest in leverage, I also spend time thinking about what could happen to consumption in the event of a set of shocks to the economy. In this respect the Minutes of the February 2002 Monetary a Policy Committee meeting - seven months or so before I joined the Bank - are to my mind revealing.

And due to under-investment there is evidence of bottlenecks in the refinery arena which will take time to be rectified. So supply constraints too are for the time being a real possibility. The November 2005 Inflation Report explained that the oil futures curve indicated in early November that the oil spot price would remain around current levels for the next few years. However, there was considerable uncertainty around this. The Report cited illustrative estimates that market participants thought there was a one in four chance that oil prices would be $ per barrel higher or lower in six months time. This is a significant increase from February 2004, when the probability of such a change was thought to be less than one in fifty [Chart 2]. Chart 2: Market beliefs about oil prices six months ahead (a)  Source: Bank of England, November 2005 Inflation Report This shows that although the central case has oil prices essentially flat over the forecast horizon there is still a possibility we will see prices above those of today at some date, with corresponding significance for monetary policy. In the UK it is difficult to say with certainty what proportion of the last year’s rise in CPI inflation (that is from 1.1% in September 2004 to 2.5% in September 2005) was due to oil. But estimates suggest that up to around half the pick up can be explained by oil. The key issue for me is the possible impact of oil prices on inflation expectations.
Thomas Jordan: SNB monetary and investment policy and the impact of the strong Swiss franc Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft des Kantons Bern, Berne, 28 November 2012. *  *  *  The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). As part of measures to combat the financial and economic crisis, balance sheets of central banks around the world have expanded substantially. In 2009 and 2010, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to combat an excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc. On 6 September 2011, it set a minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro, in order to avert major damage to the Swiss economy. Since then, the SNB has enforced this minimum rate with determination and is prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities. This monetary policy is reflected in a very substantial expansion in its balance sheet. It has also altered the importance of the currency reserves and had an impact on the SNB’s investment policy. In view of its mandate, monetary policy has priority at the SNB. Investment policy must be subordinated to the requirements of monetary policy. It is at the service of monetary policy and may not limit its room for manoeuvre. At present, enforcement of the minimum exchange rate has the greatest influence in the management of the currency reserves.

Ladies and Gentlemen: At this point, kindly allow me to call upon our Guest of Honour, Honourable Ms Chileshe Kapwepwe, MP, the Deputy Minister of Finance and National Planning to deliver the key note address and to officially open this Conference. Honorable Minister Sir! BIS Review 46/2009  3
Zdenek Tuma: Present and future challenges for the Czech National Bank Introductory remarks by Mr Zdenek Tuma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the CNB Conference: ”Challenges of EU Accession”, Prague, 1 April 2003. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, It is my pleasure and honour to welcome you here to the Czech National Bank for what I believe will be a very interesting policy-oriented conference. The Czech National Bank is this year celebrating a decade of its existence as the central bank of the Czech Republic. When we look back at that period, we can see many difficult challenges that we had to face in order to facilitate the economic transition and later on to bring our operations into line with best international practices. This experience is similar for all other central banks in the post-communist EU-accession countries. But I do not want to speak about those past challenges today. They are mostly behind us, and our situation is now very different. Therefore, I would like to be forward-looking as any modern central banker should - and to speak about the challenges that we all share at present and, most importantly, about those that lie ahead. As you all know, the accession treaties will be signed in two weeks. This will be a symbolic milestone in the EU integration process, which has been going on in the economic and political sphere for many years.

A payments strategy for the 21st century  Remarks made by Andrew Hauser, Executive Director, Banking, Payments and Financial Resilience  Payment Strategy Forum “Launch of the Final Strategy”, London 29 November 2016  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today at the launch of the PSF’s Payments Strategy st  for the 21 century. I want to start by emphasising that this is not the Bank of England’s strategy – or the UK authorities’ as a whole. And that in fact is its great merit: because it has been drawn up by a genuine partnership of those who actually provide and use retail payments services, with the interests of those users uppermost in their minds. But that doesn’t mean the Bank has been ‘hands off’, or lukewarm over the direction of travel. Quite the reverse. We have a deep interest in, and responsibility for, maintaining the stability of sterling payments. First, through our statutory responsibility for the supervision of the major payments schemes. Second, by ensuring that all material payments either settle in, or are backed by, central bank money – the safest form of settlement asset. And, third, through our role as member of some schemes as a bank in our own right. It is sometimes said that a focus on stability impedes innovation. But there is no reason why that has to be true.
For instance, it is very pleasing that the evaluation gives such high marks to the efforts we have made to improve the analytical base for our forecasts and for monetary policy. Our ambition has been to use the latest and best scientific methods in our analyses and we have therefore continuously updated our working methods. It is therefore particularly satisfactory that the authors observe in their conclusion that "the Riksbank compares favourably with the best central banks in the world". However, we must not rest on our laurels. Conducting monetary policy is associated with great uncertainty, not least because developments in the economy often follow different paths than anticipated. We must therefore always take heed of constructive criticism, continue to hone our analyses and test new approaches with an open mind. However, after this evaluation I feel fortified in my opinion that we are on the right track. Recommendations in the evaluation As I do not have much time at my disposal, I shall concentrate my comments on the recommendations in the report as to how monetary policy and its framework could be improved. Three of the recommendations are aimed at the Riksdag and the Government and concern the forms for the monetary policy debate and the appointment of the members of the Executive Board. As these recommendations are not directed at the Riksbank, I will refrain from commenting on them. With regard to the recommendations aimed at the Riksbank, I shall first comment on some suggestions on which I agree with the authors.

As was observed in the evaluation, this was something that most forecasters missed. The authors put forward two arguments in favour of monetary policy compensating for persistent deviations from the inflation target. The first is based on the assumption that deviations from target may be a sign that the analysis and forecasting models used by the Riksbank tend to over-estimate inflation. Of course, we are constantly working on ways of improving our assessments and trying to learn from forecasting errors we have made. If our analysis and forecasting models do not function satisfactorily, we must attempt to correct the deficiencies. In my opinion, this would be a more natural measure than compensating for forecasting errors by means of an extra expansionary policy. The second argument is based on the idea that it might be beneficial to express the target in terms of a path for price levels instead of in the form of a target for the inflation rate. The difference from an inflation target, which may be considered rather subtle, is that if the inflation target is not met, it is regarded as a “bygone” under the current strategy. This is to say, if inflation is for instance below the target for a long period of time, one does not need to compensate for this by then allowing inflation to be above the target for a period of time. Instead, one looks ahead and aims to bring inflation back in line with the target of 2 per cent.