samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the other hand, the second pattern is consisted of huge trade deficits, which are covered much more by remittances from abroad than by foreign investments (e.g. Macedonia, Albania). However, the dilemma appears whether these high current account deficits are sustainable. Regarding the economic history, despite the fact that in certain areas Macedonia was a pioneer in the implementation of reforms in South Eastern Europe, under the influence of negative external and domestic shocks it had relatively low rate of economic growth of averagely 2.7% in the 1997-2007 period. This resulted in a relatively low level of real convergence of 25.7% of GDP per capita in the euro-zone (23.6% in 1996). The use of the exchange rate as an anchor for inflation expectations has been effective until now, producing low and stable inflation rates. In circumstances of high import dependence and relatively slow implementation of structural reforms aimed at increasing the export potential, contributed to the maintenance of high trade deficit, which was mainly financed by high private transfers. However, the transition process in Macedonia is specific because of the relatively slower process of real convergence and the continuous real depreciation of the Macedonian Denar. Namely, according to some research, 14 there has been an absence of the BalassaSamuelson effect in Macedonia, that is the productivity in the tradable sector compared to foreign partners rises with relatively lower rates. This was a result of the absence of big foreign companies and the loss of important foreign markets, particularly after the independence.

This is particularly troubling for the countries on a fixed exchange rate regime or currency board, which do not have the exchange rate flexibility as an instrument for handling inflation. Another part where there might be trouble is the exchange rate criterion. Now it is the floaters that could have bigger difficulties, particularly if the current developments continue and capital keeps to flow in these countries, thus making pressures for nominal appreciation. As far as the budget deficit criterion and the interest rate criterion are concerned, it appears that in these areas there will be less difficulties in fulfilling the Maastricht criteria, under the assumption there will be maintenance and strengthening of fiscal discipline. Of course, not all is bad and unreachable as far as Maastricht criteria are concerned. These countries are not giving up and they stand ready to increase their efforts in order to achieve their goals. While it appears that most transition countries have postponed their euro-zone entry a little bit due to the abovementioned difficulties, there are also two remarkable success stories from the transition countries. We already have Slovenia which has been in the eurozone since last year. In addition, we have Slovakia which got a positive opinion by the European Commission on fulfillment of criteria and is getting ready to adopt the euro in the beginning of next year.
Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4 Cost pressures a) Transportation costs and bottlenecks (1) (standard deviations)  b) IMCE: Cost expectations (1) (2) (diffusion index)  Manufacturing  100  Freight/amount imported Supply Chain Pressure Index (2)  5  Construction  Trade  4 3  80  2 1 60  0 -1 -2  10  12  14  16  18  20  40  22  17  (1) Standard deviations from average. (2) Global Supply Chain Pressure Index. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on microdata of Chile's National Customs Service and New York Federal Reserve. 18  19  20  21  22  (1) Value above (below) 50 indicates expected expansion (contraction). (2) Dashed horizontal sines show historical averages between January 2004 and November 2022. Source: Icare/Universidad Adolfo Ibañez. 11  Figure 5 Activity indicators (index, 2019Q3 = 100, deseasonalized series)  GDP  110  Non-mining GDP  100  90  80  70 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

6  “Accredited investor” refers to an individual with net personal assets exceeding $ million or a corporation with total net assets of more than $ million. 7  “Qualified investor” means an individual with net personal assets exceeding $ million, a corporation with total net assets of more than $ million, a collective investment scheme that is marketed only to accredited investors, or a collective investment scheme that is not marketed in Singapore. 8  Brooks, C. and H.M. Kat, 2001, “The Statistical Properties of Hedge Fund Index Returns and Their Implications for Investors”. BIS Review 52/2002  3  To enhance disclosure in prospectuses for offers of investments (including hedge funds), Part XIII of the SFA which came into effect in July this year introduced new prospectus checklists, prospectus registration procedures and advertising regulations. A prospectus must contain all material information that a reasonable investor would require to make an informed investment decision, such as the investment objective and specific investment risks of a fund, the fees and charges, and the track record of the fund manager. For the market to exercise discipline on prospectus disclosure, prospectuses that are lodged with MAS are posted on the MAS web-site for public comment for a minimum two weeks. We view this as an advance in speed and efficiency. As a safeguard, MAS may refuse to register a prospectus if it does not satisfy the disclosure requirements or if its registration is not in the public interest.
Activity in the Swedish economy slowed in the closing months of last year. The tendency was most evident in export sectors but it looks as though consumption also became more subdued. This is to some extent desirable. Earlier last year, growth in Sweden was so high that a continuation would presumably have pushed inflation up and thereby threatened economic stability. The signals received during January and February also point to domestic activity being somewhat weaker than calculated earlier. The change is not dramatic, however. The growth rate seems to falling back towards the level — between 2 and 2.5 per cent — that the Riksbank identified earlier as being what the economy can achieve in the longer run without generating higher inflation. Turning to price tendencies, some increase has been noted in the rate of underlying domestic inflation (UNDINHX). This indicator excludes changes in interest expenditure, taxes and subsidies, and prices  BIS Review 20/2001  3  of imported goods. The increase is not alarming and it should be borne in mind that in recent years underlying domestic inflation has been exceptionally low. The downward price effects from deregulations, for example, have been greater than we expected initially — and presumably than we can count on in the future. So how will domestic inflationary pressure develop in the future? Will it continue to creep up? Wage agreements that have been concluded to date are admittedly in line with what we allowed for but in an international perspective they are on the high side.

Instead of the slowdown turning upwards after one or, at most, two quarters in the V scenario, this would take another two quarters or a total of about a year. The pessimistic scenario — the L Then there are one or perhaps several pessimistic scenarios in which the imbalances in the U.S. economy undergo a painful correction that paralyses the economy or delays the recovery for a very long time. This path can be described as a capital L; the economy loses speed and then fails to get going again, proceeding instead at a snail’s pace. One assumption behind scenarios of this kind is that measures of economic policy are not capable of reversing the trend. In the L scenario, the higher productivity growth is checked, corporate investment is cut back and consumer confidence is muted by falling share prices, thereby accentuating the downward path. In a negative spiral, share prices, investment and consumption all decline at the same time as worried investors abroad become averse to placing their funds in the U.S. economy. The problems are accentuated by the saving imbalances. When money ceases to flow into the United States, the dollar falls. The relatively limited size of foreign trade means that a correction of the massive current-account deficit takes time. The United States has to invest less and save more. Moreover, the debt position of households and firms now seems to be more tangible and perhaps more troublesome.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Financial stability Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the Forum Financier Belge, Brussels, 26 November 2003. * A. *  *  Introductory remarks  It gives me great pleasure to be here in Brussels and to address you in this very well-known forum at the kind invitation of Governor Quaden. The topic I shall be talking about today, namely “financial stability”, is obviously very broad and challenging. My main topic of discussion will be the probable consequences the profound changes currently taking place in the financial sector will have on financial stability and on the policies of the Eurosystem in this regard. The main reason why I am talking about this topic - and why we at the ECB are following the issue - is that the stability of the banking sector and the financial system at large is of the utmost importance for the Eurosystem, as it is for any central bank. It is the precondition for a successful conduct of monetary policy and the maintenance of smoothly functioning payment systems, which are major responsibilities of a central bank. I would like to focus on three specific developments: the increasing importance of financial markets in general and market volatility more specifically, financial innovation, and the process in hand to increase the integration of financial systems across countries.

Materialization of such risks will not only disrupt vital financial services but will also undermine the security and confidence in the financial system. In fact, the scale and sophistication of cyber-attacks is already on the rise. Examples include data breach at Target of 70 million credit card users, a cyber-attack on Equifax compromising data of 143 million customers, and the hacking of over 100 million customers’ data at Capital One Bank. No wonder, cyber risk features as a key concern in different industry surveys. For instance, respondents to the Bank of England’s Systemic Risk Survey of 2H-2018 quoted the risk of a ‘cyber attack’ as the second major threat to the system, only behind the Brexit induced political risk. The growing threats of cyber risk need to be reflected in banks’ operational risk capital charge. Incidentally, the Basel Committee has revised its operational risk methodology by replacing the existing three techniques with a simplified Standardized Measurement Approach and expects that its implementation, due by January 2022, will increase capital risk charge for operational risk by 18% for a group of banks currently using Standardized Approach of the old regime. While it is not clear how much of the increase in operational risk charge is driven by the recognition of growing cyber threats, greater capital allocation for operational risk is a step in the right direction, given the increasing significance of such low probability but high impact risks. However, reliance on capital alone will not suffice.
Moreover, longer-term measures of volatility have generally increased alongside shorter-term measures, as this chart which plots 2-year implied volatilities alongside 3-month volatilities suggests (Chart 2). We have also witnessed some very large moves in financial markets over the past six-months. Here I am going to draw on two examples – the 15 October increase in US Treasury yields following the publication of unexpectedly weak US retail sales data, and the 15 January appreciation of the Swiss franc following the SNB’s decision to remove its peg to the euro. The events had different drivers, but there are some common themes I would like to draw out. What unites the 15 October and 15 January episodes is that the immediate intra-day reaction to the news was unprecedented. The intra-day change in 10-year US bond yields was 37 bps, with most of this move happening within just an hour of the data release. The intraday range represented nearly eight standard deviations, exceeding the price moves that  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  happened immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. On 15 January, the Swiss franc appreciated by 14%. The intraday range was several times that number, and market participants continue to debate the highest traded value of the franc on the day. Such events could imply that a number of major asset markets may have become more sensitive to news, so that a given shock causes greater volatility.

The argument would be that the apparent change in ability of markets to digest news is a mirage: the statistical analysis would prove to have captured a transient trend, and that intermediaries were never prepared to stand in the way of large market moves, during good times or bad. On this view, the reduction in balance sheet and the move towards electronic structures have been correlated with, but are not a cause of, the events we have seen. And the fact that the spikes in volatility have been visible in equity as well as bond markets, where market structure has not undergone as profound change as FICC markets, would be taken as supporting evidence. This view would caution against over-interpreting a few isolated case studies, where excessive market conviction – that the next move in US rates would  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  definitely be up; and the Swiss peg was immutable – led to highly crowded trades accentuating the price moves and the impact on volatility. But this is not the interpretation I lean towards. Not least because we hear from market participants that, far from biting in extreme circumstances, these are issues that FICC businesses are grappling with on a daily basis. An eight standard deviation move in US Treasuries, on weaker-than expected US retail data, lies outside the bounds of what could be considered a transient trend. Consolidation and electronification have plausibly combined to accentuate the sharp moves seen last autumn and this January.
We therefore explicitly look at many  2  BIS Review 40/2002  other indicators and analyses in the context of our two-pillar strategy, and we do not try to hide the complexity of monetary policy-making behind the production of a single Governing Council forecast. The projections reflect the expert judgement of Eurosystem staff and we prefer to keep this distinct from the judgement of the Governing Council regarding the overall assessment of the risks to price stability. Therefore, our decision to clearly separate the production of the projections from the analysis of the Governing Council is fully transparent as it honestly reflects the decision-making process within the ECB. As regards communication, we have always taken an approach that ensures a high level of transparency and clarity of our message. Our monthly press conferences are key in this respect. The timeliness and detail of our communication is without comparison. At the same time, we have not changed our view regarding the publication of minutes. We fear that, given the multi-country context in which the Governing Council works, published minutes - or a procedure in which dissenting views of Council members are published (even without mentioning names) - could lead to undue pressure on national central bank governors to deviate from a euro area perspective. This cannot be in the interest of the euro area, no more than if the Governing Council were to end its approach of speaking with one voice.

Wage moderation is a key factor in favouring the expansion of employment and in helping to create the conditions for a sustainable increase in the potential growth rate of the euro area economy. Current estimates for trend potential growth in the euro area are in the order of 2-2½%. There is much scope for raising potential growth in the euro area. The ECB will make its contribution by focusing on maintaining price stability in the medium term. But other policy actors also have to take up their responsibilities. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for 2002, which have just been approved in Seville, place the emphasis quite rightly on the need for further structural reforms in the euro area. I understand that this view is also shared in the draft resolution. The future welfare of euro area citizens will also depend to a large extent on the prudent conduct of fiscal policies. The solidarity pact of our monetary union requires all participants to maintain a mediumterm perspective in compliance with the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. This implies that budgetary positions in all countries should be close to balance or in surplus over the business cycle as a whole in order to allow sufficient room for a smooth functioning of automatic stabilisers. We have seen some worrying developments in fiscal policy in some countries over the last few months.
Reflecting the strength of the US dollar, the Sing dollar, along with most other major currencies, depreciated against the US dollar in the first half of this year. However, the Sing dollar appreciated against the euro, the Australian dollar, pound sterling and some of the regional currencies over the same period. The external environment has since strengthened. The industrial countries except Japan are enjoying strong economic growth. The regional economies have shown more vigour and resilience than was expected. Against these positive developments, Singapore’s GDP rose by 5.4% in 1999. The economy grew further by a robust 8.4% in H1 2000. Both external and domestic demand have expanded strongly. Real non-oil domestic exports grew by about 12% in the first six months of 2000, boosted by the continued strength of global electronics demand. The turnaround in the regional economies has underpinned strong service exports and boosted the commerce and transport and communications sectors. Domestic consumption has grown steadily in tandem with labour market conditions and overall sentiment, while investment spending has recovered strongly on the back of a surge in investment in machinery and equipment. Despite the robust economic recovery, inflationary pressures remain subdued. CPI inflation was 0% in 1999, rising moderately to average just 1% in the first six months of 2000. (Based on the old CPI basket before the revision introduced early this year, measured CPI inflation in 1999 would have been slightly higher at 0.4%.)

As one of four non-G7 financial centres represented on the Forum, we play a useful role in providing insights and perspectives from the region on financial market developments. We participated in the FSF’s work on Offshore Financial Centres. We also hosted a meeting of the FSF earlier this year during which the three FSF reports were adopted. Singapore also participates actively in IMF initiatives to enhance transparency as a means to minimising risks to the global financial system. In particular, we are in general compliance with SDDS (Special Data Dissemination Standards), including the new requirements for more detailed breakdown of data on official foreign reserves of member countries. We also release regularly the IMF’s assessment of our Singapore economy and policies; the latest report was based on the annual consultation that ended in June of this year. MAS annual accounts Assets & liabilities On MAS’ annual accounts, total assets increased by $ billion to $ billion as at 31 March 2000, of which $ billion was in the form of foreign assets and $ billion in our holdings of Singapore Government Securities (SGS). The increase in SGS holdings reflects a conscious effort to build up our portfolio of SGS to engage in more repo transactions for our money market operations, thereby broadening the range of money market instruments that we use. On the liabilities side, there was a reduction in deposits of banks by about $ billion, reflecting the repayment of deposits previously placed by POSB with MAS prior to its merger with DBS.
Countries in Asia in turn import intermediate goods from, for example, Sweden. Sweden is thus exposed not only to the direct effect but also to indirect so-called third country effects because the downturn in the United States affects Asia and other parts of the world. When we at the Riksbank produces forecasts for Swedish exports we take into account both direct and indirect effects. The forecasts are based on growth on the Swedish export market and take into account the growth in imports in the recipient countries as well as how much Sweden exports to the respective countries. The latest forecast for Swedish exports and the growth of the Swedish export market is shown in Figure 2. Swedish exports grew rapidly in 2010 and during the early part of this year, but already in the July Monetary Policy Report it was stated that growth was expected to enter a calmer phase. Since then, demand abroad has weakened which, in combination with the recent international financial turbulence, led us in September to believe that exports would grow even more slowly than previously calculated. This is because Swedish exports consist to a large extent of investment goods and in times of unrest companies in Sweden as well as abroad often choose to postpone their investments, which has a negative impact on Swedish exports.

For Swedish companies, falling share prices in Sweden and abroad thus  4  6  This relates to an increase from over SEK 100 billion to over SEK 577 billion (Statistics Sweden, 2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  have negative effects on both domestic and foreign sales. Falling share prices also make it more difficult to fund investments by issuing new shares, which reduces capacity utilisation. Figure 6 Share indexes and Swedish consumer confidence in the economy The stock market index January 2006=100 180  40  Sweden (OMXS) Euro Area (EuroStoxx)  160  30  USA (S& P 500) Emerging Markets (MSCI) Consumer Confidence  140  20  120  10  100  0  80  -10  60  -20 -30  40 04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Note. The left axis is the stock market index and the right axis the value of the households’ confidence indicator. Sources: Reuters Ecowin and the National Institute of Economic Research  Households’ and companies’ expectations of the future It is assumed that movements on the stock markets reflect the market participants’ expectations regarding profits in the future. The development of the stock exchange is therefore related to the prevailing economic climate and to the households’ and companies’ expectations regarding the development of the economy.