samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thanks to your hard work, and thanks to the cooperation and support from many supervisory agencies and central banks, we are confident that the New Accord will represent the best possible framework. In last summer’s consultations, the industry acknowledged the many improvements in the proposals that we have achieved to date. At the same time, public comments identified a number of technical concerns related to the treatment of credit-related losses and of some of the most sophisticated financial instruments and activities. We took these comments to heart and spent the next several months developing solutions. In October 2003, the Committee agreed in Madrid on a breakthrough plan to resolve these issues by the middle of this year. I must say that I have been pleasantly surprised by the progress the Committee has made in the extremely short period of time since then. Just three weeks ago, for example, we published three detailed technical notes outlining changes to the proposals. These covered revisions to the treatment of expected and unexpected credit-related losses and of securitisation exposures, as well as principles on the recognition of operational risk capital across home and host jurisdictions. I’d like to share with you the latest information on each of the areas addressed in the technical papers and in the press releases. EL/UL First, let’s turn to the New Accord’s treatment of expected and unexpected losses, or “EL” and “UL” as we say in Basel.

Home-host operational risk capital The third paper published in January laid down key principles regarding the cross-border recognition of operational risk capital charges for those banking organisations that use the advanced options. As you know, one of the improvements of the New Accord is that it will “unbundle” operational risk from other risks and apply a separate capital charge for it. This reflects the emerging view among leading banks and supervisors that we should evaluate and seek ways to reduce losses arising from  4  BIS Review 12/2004  failures in processes, systems, people, or external events. While operational risk is not as readily quantified as these other exposures, the Basel Committee has noted genuine progress among leading institutions in measuring and controlling it. Assigning an explicit capital charge was intended to support these private-sector efforts and to reward firms that develop better measures of operational risk. For the most sophisticated institutions, the “advanced measurement approach” - or “AMA” - is the ultimate expression of the Committee’s goal to incorporate banks’ own sense of risk into the capital framework. Because the AMA is not subject to supervisory “floors,” the Committee expects it to serve as a true catalyst for innovation. The January technical note on operational risk addresses an issue that banks raised concerning the allocation of AMA capital across the subsidiaries of an internationally active banking organisation. Many banks questioned whether operational risk capital requirements should be calculated on a consolidated, institution-wide basis rather than on a legal entity basis.
William C Dudley: The recovery and monetary policy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the National Association for Business Economics Annual Meeting, New York City, 15 October 2012. *  *  *  Good morning. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak at this NABE (National Association for Business Economics) conference today. Having spent more than 20 years as a business economist working in the private sector before joining the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2007, I feel right at home here today. My remarks will focus on the economic outlook. I do this with some trepidation, of course. In the private sector there are two adages about forecasting that underscore the need to be humble in this endeavor: First, forecast often. Second, specify a level or a time horizon, but never specify both, together. But more seriously, despite the difficulties in making accurate forecasts, we still need to understand as best we can why the economy is performing the way it is, what that implies about the economic outlook, and, how policymakers can respond to generate better outcomes. We live in a highly complex and uncertain world, but we need to make as much sense out of it as possible.

After all, on the other side of the ledger, the policy response following the crisis has been much more aggressive than is typical. On the monetary policy side, the Federal Reserve cut short-term interest rates close to zero, communicated that short-term rates were likely to stay exceptionally low far into the future, and undertook a series of large-scale asset purchases in order to ease financial conditions further. On the fiscal side, in 2009 the Congress and Administration enacted the largest fiscal stimulus program in history and some of these fiscal actions were renewed (e.g., extended unemployment compensation benefits) and new initiatives undertaken (e.g., the payroll tax holiday) once it became clear that the recovery was faltering. Also, there were significant  1  These lessons are evident in surveys of past financial crises and are examined in detail by Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff in their superlative book, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  policy actions taken to strengthen the banking system, including forcing banks to recapitalize so that they would have the capacity to sustain their lending. So why has the recovery disappointed? One possibility is that the negative dynamics of a post-bubble environment are even more potent than had been appreciated. Feedback loops may be more powerful and frictions may be larger. In the U.S. case, this is particularly germane with respect to housing and mortgage finance.
The Swedish banking system is special It is thus important to put the Swedish banking system into perspective. The total domestic and foreign assets of the four major banking groups amount to 400 per cent of Sweden's GDP. In other words, out banking system is huge. Relatively speaking, it is on a par with the banking system in the United Kingdom, for example. The Swedish banking system is also highly integrated, which means that problems in one bank can easily lead to a crisis of confidence for the entire system. If we were hit by a financial crisis, the costs to society could thus be very high. With this in mind, I intend to focus in more detail on two vulnerabilities in the Swedish financial system that are interlinked. The first is the indebtedness of the Swedish households. The second is the banks’ funding in foreign currencies and their dependence on the currency-swap market. The Swedish mortgage market has structural weaknesses An issue that has been widely discussed recently is the indebtedness of the Swedish households and the risk of a fall in housing prices. Experience in several countries has shown that indebtedness and the development of housing prices are the main explanations of why some countries are hit harder than others during economic crises.

It is not unusual for one to be turned away at customers counters on account of the lack of basic facilities due to for instance power failure or link failure when these can be mitigated where there are proper contingency plans in  2  BIS Review 111/2009  place. The Bank of Zambia will therefore ensure that sound business continuity plans are in place when evaluating new applications. Ladies and Gentlemen, as we develop these well meaning products, I wish to appeal to the service providers to ensure that investment in such infrastructure is complemented by investment in financial literacy. We need to ensure that we are providing individuals and communities with the level of financial education needed to grasp both the benefits and pitfalls of their easier access to financial services. This will in part minimize the risks associated with such innovative products as people will only make better judgments about their financial affairs if they understand the risks and returns associated with the product and services at their disposal. It is also apparent that financial illiteracy is more costly as people who make poor financial decisions will inevitably end up with a far lower standard of living than was otherwise achievable. Mr. Chairman, I wish to conclude by applauding Celpay’s initiative to host the first ever mobile conference in Zambia. The deliberations and recommendations of this conference will be keenly followed as the need to leverage access to financial services through the mobile phone is of paramount importance.
In addition, this framework needs to be reinforced by a Shariah framework to ensure that all financial transactions are Shariah-compliant. Islamic financial operations would thus need to be based not only on best practices, but also satisfy the tenets of the Shariah. For Islamic banking and finance to be sustainable, compliance with Shariah principles alone is not sufficient. Over the long run, customers and businesses demand for quality in the products and services that Islamic finance offers. This is the challenge for Islamic banking and finance, to be able to provide a comprehensive range of Islamic financial products and services that are not only innovative and competitive but Shariah compliant. Let me now turn to the development of the takaful industry. Takaful as a system of Islamic insurance, is based on co-operation and mutual help for the good of the society at large. Although takaful has been in the market for more than 20 years, it has yet to make significant inroads. It should however, be noted that although the conventional insurance market is deeply entrenched in several of the Muslim countries, the percentage of the Muslim population that are insured is relatively low. The market penetration level is very low, notably less than 5 per cent in many Muslim countries. In Malaysia, the level of market penetration in terms of takaful certificates in force over the total population is only 3.8 per cent compared to a market penetration for conventional insurance of 34.7 per cent.

BIS Review 43/2003  1  The key constituents within the Islamic financial system, which includes the Islamic financial institutions as well as the capital and money markets need to be firmly reinforced by the legal and regulatory framework that adequately address the unique characteristics of the industry. These intradependent key components ultimately form the enabling environment for the Islamic financial services industry to effectively play its role as an efficient conduit for mobilising resources and channelling them to productive purposes. The absence of any one of the components could reduce the effectiveness and efficiency and could affect the viability and sustainability of the system. While the Islamic banking system plays an important role in mobilizing deposits and providing financing, the development of the capital market allows the corporate sector to source their long-term financing needs based on Islamic principles. In addition, it would increase the range of Islamic financial instruments available to meet the demand of the Islamic investors. In the absence of a comprehensive Islamic financial system with financial services based on Shariah principles, the development of Islamic banking and finance would be hindered. The government would need to assume an important role in the development of the Islamic financial system. The role of the government is, amongst others to provide the enabling environment and put in place from the outset, the necessary infrastructure through the formulation of a comprehensive set of legal and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance.
Therefore, I think that we now need to implement a compatibility triangle to boost Europe’s growth and revive the European project. 1. The European monetary union has been a successful answer to the “impossible trinity” challenge The first triangle I’d like to dwell on is the famous incompatibility triangle derived from the MundellFleming model of the 1960’s, also known as the “impossible trinity” or the “trilemma”. This triangle has been used to argue that it is impossible to reconcile fixed exchange rates, full capital mobility and national autonomy of monetary policy. early as 1982, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa coined the term “ inconsistent quartet”4 (quartetto inconciliabile), thereby enlarging the impossible trinity to a fourth goal, free trade – a pillar of the Treaty of Rome. Let me quote here an analysis by Banca d’Italia 5: “At first sight this may appear to be a puzzling choice, since from the strictly analytical standpoint the inconsistency between the other three elements holds regardless of the presence or absence of free trade. But in a deeper economic sense, taking trade into consideration was essential, since the costs and benefits of different positions along that three-way trade-off depend crucially on the degree of trade integration.” And as Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa wrote in 1988: “ In the long term, the only solution to the inconsistency is to complement the internal market with a monetary union.

To me, the solution is obviously for euro area countries to refuse the status quo and amend the “Euro framework” towards enhanced policy cooperation. Let me outline what I see as the possible way forward. 3. To boost European growth, this new trilemma has to be turned into a “growth triangle” We have to get Economic Union moving forward again, thanks to what I call the “growth triangle”. The peculiarity of this triangle is that it is not an incompatibility triangle but a compatibility triangle. This means that the three goals can and have to be pursued at the same time to deliver economic gains. These goals, or levers, are: national structural reforms; the Financing Union for Investment and Innovation; and a euro area policy-mix based on a better coordination of macroeconomic policies. They can be implemented quickly, as at least many of 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  them do not require changing the Treaties. As a central banker and steadfast European, this is what I believe is needed for a “better Europe”. But of course, the decision does not fall to us but to political leaders. Our responsibility as the Eurosystem is to deliver a monetary policy that is in line with the mandate entrusted to us, and to make proposals for improving the efficiency of other economic policies. The first point of my growth triangle is: national structural reforms. They are a prerequisite for each country to regain credibility in Europe and for unleashing our collective economic growth potential.
This concern was at the forefront of UK and international prudential regulators’ minds and motivated the various interventions they made at the time to make clear that regulatory buffers could and should be used.6 So today and in the spirit of John Dewey, I want to reflect on the lessons from the Covid stress so far for the prudential framework for banks and in particular for the regulatory buffers within it. What we worried about during the early Covid stress With hindsight, this banking system resilience is evident. But during the stress of March and April 2020, we were concerned that it was, to use the words of the Chair of Financial Stability Board, Randal Quarles, “a close run thing”.7 One concern was a potential decline in capital ratios at the time. There were two effects in play. First, banks were increasing provisions as their expectations about the state of economy and credit quality declined. This affected capital resources. Second, capital requirements were increasing. This was because risk weights in some parts of the capital framework are sensitive to current market conditions, which had worsened; and total assets were increasing, as firms drew down pre-existing credit facilities. Third, liquidity requirements and resources were sensitive to market conditions too. Mechanisms designed to capture potential liquidity needs related to derivatives activity produced estimates that were too low going into the shock and then increased rapidly after the shock had crystallised.

Opening Remarks Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand  ASEAN Banking Cybersecurity Conference 2019 Crystal Hall, 3rd Floor, The Athenee Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand 6 September, 2019  TBA Board of Directors, TBA members, Members of ASEAN banking community, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be here with you this morning, and I would like to thank TB-CERT for inviting me to speak at this event. Technology and the internet have undeniably become integrated into our daily lives. Customers’ behaviors continue to evolve and adapt to the technological progresses. In response, new technologies are developed to serve and accommodate customers’ ever-evolving needs. A prime example is the invention of smartphone over a decade ago, which has completely transformed our ways of lives and increased people’s connectivity to unprecedented levels. The banking industry, too, is undergoing massive digitalization, from the user-facing tools like mobile banking apps to backend infrastructure and essentially everything in between. These developments are the key drivers behind the convenience and productivity that we all enjoy today. But, inherent to any invention, these technological revolutions come with their own form of risk: cyber risks. The more “digital” banks become, the more channels for potential points of attacks from cyber criminals, who are constantly evolving to exploit new loopholes. Even when these loopholes are identified and patches are issued, delayed updates could also pose potential risk. We have repeatedly witnessed that the various—and many times severe—cyberrelated incidents often revolve around financial institutions.
Until recently, heated discussions have been held about this matter and various views have been put forward both on the implementation of a tight fiscal policy and setting the primary surplus as the target, as well as its level. Some people even suggested that a tight fiscal policy could hamper growth. For this reason, let me briefly remind you of the effects of tight fiscal policy and, within this context, of the primary surplus target of the economy. As it is known, in countries like Turkey with a high ratio of public debt to national income, which possessed lax fiscal discipline in the past, expectations towards the ability of debt roll-over are the main determinants of economic developments, especially the dynamics of inflation and growth. For this reason, the main target of our fiscal policies has been to reduce the ratio of public debt stock to national income gradually and to equip public finance with a sustainable structure. Lowering the ratio of public debt stock to national income depends on mathematically higher growth rates, lower real interest rates, the stable course of the national currency and the primary budget surplus due to the effect of foreign currency borrowing on the debt stock. Primary surplus is the only one of these variables, which can be controlled by authorities under the current economic conditions.

Ravi Menon: Enabling FinTech for good Opening remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Leaders' Session at Inclusive FinTech Forum, Kigali, 21 June 2023. *** His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, His Excellency Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I am delighted to be part of this remarkable session bringing Africa and Asia together on the theme of Enabling FinTech for Good. There is much we can do together, and Singapore is proud to be part of this effort. Since coming here a couple of days ago, my colleagues and I have been struck by the energy and vitality of this place. Technology is transforming the world of finance. FinTech presents both opportunity and risk. We want to harness these opportunities while managing the risks. In Singapore, when we began our FinTech journey 8 years ago, we set four guiding principles for the use of FinTech: to increase efficiency; to manage risks better; to create new opportunities; and most important to improve people's lives. Eight years later, these principles continue to guide us. As we walked our FinTech journey, we learnt along the way. Two critical enablers have proven decisive in getting us to where we are: first, building foundational digital infrastructure second, fostering connectivity and collaboration Let me say a few quick words about each of them.
Furthermore, by replacing 12 currencies, in particular the German mark and the French franc, the euro was used immediately as a reserve currency by central banks and became part of a currency basket (for example in Morocco) or a solitary anchor for the exchange rate policy of some countries (like Estonia, Bosnia and Bulgaria). Nevertheless, two-thirds of world reserves are still held in US dollars compared with less than 15 per cent in euros, although since the euro’s introduction there appears to have been a gradual shift in the composition of the reserves of large economies such as Russia, and even China, towards an increased share for the euro. All this points to larger income to the euro area from external holders of the euro, a small but not insignificant gain given that estimates of US seignorage income from external holders of the dollar is estimated at almost 1 per cent of GDP. The euro is also bound to increase the efficiency of euro area financial markets. The use of the euro in the international debt market has increased compared with the joint share of its preceding currencies. The share of international bonds denominated in euros and issued by non-euro area residents has increased to about 30 per cent, compared with 20 per cent for the currencies that preceded the euro.

Furthermore, China currently has either very low inflation or deflation, which normally points to devaluation pressure rather than revaluation pressure (a need for real depreciation). Finally, China and other the Asian economies that are trying to prop up the value of their currencies are the main purchasers of US Treasury bonds. So, in a situation where the US government finances are deteriorating, the Chinese exchange rate regime is actually helping to depress US long yields and indirectly bolstering the US recovery. My conclusion is that China in the short term should retain its fixed exchange rate until such time as its financial system has undergone more substantial reform, which is something that nevertheless must be done in the coming years. In the long term, however, a floating exchange rate appears unavoidable for a country that is on the way to becoming one of the world’s leading economies. It is only in the much longer term, when China is highly integrated with the world economy, that fixed exchange-rate cooperation can become a possibility once again. This conclusion brings me back to the main line of my argument: Europe can gradually be enlarged to become a relatively big currency area that includes all the countries, from Ireland in the west to Estonia in the east, where the long-term microeconomic gains outweigh the recurring but temporary macroeconomic costs.