samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the other end of product spectrum, equal, if not more, emphasis needs to be given by the industry in extending coverage to low-income individuals via microtakaful. There is little doubt that the ability and commitment of takaful industry to deliver such value proposition that allows for the benefits of growth and development to be experienced across all communities will resonate strongly with the values espoused by takaful. This in turn could go a long way towards elevating the importance of takaful in the eyes of the public and further widening the industry’s growth prospect. With this aim in mind, it is critical for industry players to leverage on the readily available channels to reach to the masses and employ agents and bancatakaful to the fullest to maximise its potential. The third dimension of growth which is integral to the nation’s high income agenda relates to the opportunities to be harnessed under the initiative to consolidate Malaysia’s position as an international Islamic financial centre (MIFC). As industry is well aware, the MIFC initiative seeks to enhance the international dimension of Malaysia’s Islamic finance. The prospect is most compelling for the takaful industry. Malaysia is already at the forefront in the development of takaful, particularly family takaful, compared to other market.

Building on our strengths, experience and achievements, the Malaysian takaful industry with the highest number of takaful and retakaful operators, is well-positioned to seize the enormous opportunity to export takaful benefits to the estimated 1.5 billion Muslims around the world whom are currently underserved by the insurance industry. This presents a huge window of opportunity for our takaful operators to accelerate their regional and global orientation and move up the global value chains. It is therefore important for strategic international partners such as ING to explore all possible avenues to elevate the business potential of takaful internationally. A critical factor that will determine the success in taking the industry to the next level of development is the existence of players with the right quality and calibre, as well their readiness in terms of capacity and capability to formulate and execute successful strategies in response to new market opportunities. In this rapidly evolving environment, responsiveness to consumer needs is a crucial test that defines success. The takaful industry in Malaysia has never been about Shariah conformity being its only value proposition. With consumers becoming increasingly discerning and the market being more competitive, factors such as innovative product design, price competitiveness, transparency and service quality have all been important determinants in winning and securing customer loyalty. The ability of takaful operators to deliver such value propositions has been, and will continue to be, amongst the key success factors to successfully position takaful in Malaysia to appeal to both muslim and non-muslims, whether corporates or individuals.
The combination of unbridled faith in financial markets prior to the crisis and the recent demonstrations of corruption in some of these markets has eroded social capital. When combined with the longer-term pressures of globalisation and technology on the basic social contract, an unstable dynamic of declining trust in the financial system and growing exclusivity of capitalism threatens. To counter this, rebuilding social capital is paramount. Financial reform is now helping. Globally systemic banks are simplifying and downsizing. Some are de-emphasising high-profile but risky businesses that benefited employees more than shareholders and society. Authorities are working feverishly to end too-big-to-fail. The structure of compensation is being reformed so that horizons are longer and rewards match risk. Regulation is hard-wiring the responsibilities of senior management. And new codes are seeking to re-establish finance as a true profession, with broader societal obligations. A welcome addition to these initiatives would be changes to the hard and soft infrastructure of financial markets to make them dynamic and fair. Through all of these measures, finance can help to deliver a more trustworthy, inclusive capitalism – one which embeds a sense of the systemic and in which individual virtue and collective prosperity can flourish. 21  8  Sir Richard Lambert’s Review was commissioned by the Chairmen of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, Nationwide, RBS, Santander and Standard Chartered in response to the recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. See http://www.bankingstandardsreview.org.uk/.

Indrajit Coomaraswamy: Inaugural speech Inaugural speech by Dr Indrajit Coomaraswamy, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 4 July 2016. *  *  *  Deputy Governors, Mrs. Ramanathan, Senior Management, colleagues, it is a great privilege and honour to be here with you as the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka is one of the great institutions in this country and I am acutely aware that a primary responsibility, arguably the primary responsibility of the Governor is to uphold its reputation and credibility. And I can assure you that I will do my utmost to do so at all times. Of course, I can’t do this on my own. I need the cooperation of each and every one of you to maintain this as one of the great institutions in the country. You know my parents went abroad when I was about eleven years old so I had much of my secondary and university education abroad. But as I was doing my degree and thinking of what I should do in the future – of course I had been abroad for many years, but I did come back every year for my summer holidays so I kept in touch with Sri Lanka – and there was no doubt in my mind as to what my career should be and that was to be as a staff member of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The Central Bank had such an awesome reputation.
During the previous year, this appreciation was 2.8 percent. The lek-foreign currency interest rate spread, though downward during three latest years, continued to be at positive levels. Economic developments during 2006 have sustained a stable domestic currency. The lek’s appreciating pressures have been concentrated mainly on July-August and December. Besides the seasonal entry of foreign currency, which is the main factor of the lek’s appreciation over this period, the key interest rate increase has also been reflected in the market. The high foreign currency supply over this period has been absorbed partly by the Bank of Albania’s interventions, in respect of the target on the rise of net international reserve and in compliance with the country’s overall macroeconomic program. 7. Monetary policy instruments  Fixed-price one-week repurchase agreement is the main instrument employed during 2006. According to the liquidity situation, the Bank of Albania has switched from repurchase agreements to reverse agreements, while the maturity term has changed from weekly to quarterly. This spectre of movements has been imposed by seasonal factors, by the budget behaviour and by the need to reveal certain monetary policy signals. To meet longer-term needs of the market for liquidity during the four last months of 2006, four Treasury bill outright purchase transactions were carried out, at a total nominal value of ALL 3.2 billion.

During 2006 the Bank of Albania started examining the prerequisites and implementation conditions over a mid-term period (year 2009), of a new monetary policy regime. In this context, analyses are carried out about the possibilities of improving the legal infrastructure for the creation of such conditions in compliance with international standards in this area. Also, the possibility of improving the organic law of the Bank of Albania has been considered, coinciding with the prediction of its alteration as a mid-term priority of the National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA. It is forecasted that these alterations will stipulate clearly the competences and procedures for the decision-making process of the Bank of Albania and the transparency of this process, which constitutes also a substantial precondition for the compilation and implementation of an effective monetary policy. In the framework of the legal reforms undertaken by the Ministry of Justice for the amendment and improvement of the Civil Procedure Code, the Bank of Albania has been  12  BIS Review 80/2007  fully committed to cooperating with the banking sector for the completion and accuracy of mandatory execution procedure of executive titles. The Bank of Albania proposals have aimed at improving the legal base on the application of procedures for the execution of acts that constitute executive titles. The main purpose is to cut the time for the execution of those acts, aiming to increase security in the lending activity, thus reducing the credit risk the banks are faced with.
The truth is that neither we, nor they, nor anyone else, can know with any great certainty precisely where demand is in relation to capacity in the economy as a whole. Still less do we know where it is likely to be over the next couple of years - and that is the more relevant consideration, given the time it takes before changes in interest rates have their full effects. Monetary policy is not a precise science - we’ve never pretended that it is. But it can’t be just a matter of sweeping, broad brush, impressions based upon partial information either. What we have to do is to make the best professionally-informed analysis we can, of all the sources of information available to us, relating to every sector of the economy and every part of the country, and then constantly review and as necessary modify our judgements, month by month and quarter by quarter, in the light of the flood of new information as it becomes available.

•  The implementation of the Banking Supervision Application Project, aimed at supporting banking supervision and providing a framework for supervision with the view of having a safer financial sector. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, in order to promote greater access by the population to banking and financial services, the following have been implemented: •  Establishment of an automated electronic clearing house in 1999 (to speed up processing cheques from 4-10 days for local and country checks to 2-5 days, respectively), enhancing the security of cheques and introducing machine-readable cheques. •  Establishment of a direct debt and credit clearing system (DDACC) and a realtime gross settlement system (RTGS) called Zambian Interbank Payment and Settlement System (ZIPSS) in October 2001 and June 2004, respectively. The DDACC system has facilitated the transfer of money by electronic means for payment of bills and salaries while RTGS allows a speedy, safer and large value clearing facility. Commercial banks have also set up a foreign currency cheque clearing system. •  The adoption of the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP). This is a framework which aims to promote the development of a stable, sound and market-based financial system that would support efficient resource mobilisation necessary for economic diversification, sustainable growth and poverty reduction. Currently, key recommendations of the FSDP are under implementation. For example, the creation of a Credit Reference Bureau will improve the information available to credit providers in order to enable them to make better credit decisions.
NBIM now has a staff of around 600, with about half working outside Norway, while Norges Bank Central Banking Operations has a staff of 340. Today, NBIM and Central Banking Operations are two virtually independent operational areas at Norges Bank. The Governor is the chair of the Executive Board and at the same time general manager of Central Banking Operations. Under a resolution of the Executive Board, NBIM is to have its own chief executive officer with a specific job description, mandate and separate lines of reporting to the Executive Board. The Executive Board’s total board time and the number of items for consideration have increased considerably in recent years. This pertains especially, but not exclusively, to investment management matters. In 2015, the Executive Board appointed two new committees, an Ownership Committee and a Risk and Investment Committee. This has strengthened the Executive Board’s work on responsible investment and investment strategy, risk limits and large real estate investments. As you know, in January 2016, the government also appointed a new Deputy Governor, with special responsibility for investment management matters. The supervisory and control structure has been strengthened, among other things by establishing an internal audit function for the Bank and an Audit Committee solely comprising external members of the Executive Board. Moreover, since 2010 Norges Bank’s Supervisory Council has reported supervisory results directly to the Storting, and in addition an external auditor was appointed for the Bank.

The arrangement will be phased out in the course of autumn. Norges Bank eased its collateral requirements to facilitate banks’ borrowing access in the central bank. That will be reversed. Moreover, we have earlier announced that Norges Bank will reduce the share of banks’ access to loans from the central bank backed by bank bond collateral. The interest rate is now extraordinarily low. The Executive Board considered raising the key policy rate at the monetary policy meeting on 23 September, but decided to leave it unchanged. Norges Bank has previously noted that if developments continue as expected, it may be appropriate to increase the key policy rate earlier than projected in the June Monetary Policy Report. 3. The financial crisis and economic policy – lessons  In Norway, there is a division of roles in economic policy. Wage formation, the tax system and economic regulation should contribute to well functioning markets and promote the efficient use of labour and other real economic resources. The government budget – growth in public spending – influences the real exchange rate and the size of the internationally exposed business sector in the long term. The fiscal rule enhances the predictability of petroleum revenue spending in the Norwegian economy even when the budget is actively used from one year to the next to stabilise economic developments and even when the automatic stabilisers are allowed to operate. A smooth phasing in of petroleum revenues dampen krone fluctuations and reduce the risk of abrupt and major shifts between internationally exposed and sheltered industries.
History of investment policy at the SNB At the SNB, the move towards a sustainable investment policy aimed at optimising risk and return began as early as the 1970s. At that time, the management of foreign exchange reserves focused exclusively on the highest possible level of security and liquidity. Imagine a situation whereby, until 1978, a residual term of only three months was a legal requirement. As a result, foreign exchange reserves consisted primarily of short-term US dollar investments, particularly US treasury bills. This led to considerable concentration risk. At the same time, the potential return was extremely low. Despite narrow statutory provisions and market-related limitations, the SNB tried to make use of the existing room for manoeuvre as regards returns. However, it was not until after the partial revision of the NBA in 1997 that strategic importance was attached to the generation of returns. This became possible because of the abolition of the maximum residual term of one year for foreign exchange reserves, which had applied until then. A further important step towards a sustainable investment policy was the entry into force of the fully revised NBA in 2004. Although, at the time, the changes to investment policy did not attract much public attention, they were very important for the SNB’s investment activities. Within the monetary mandate, investment policy was defined as one of the SNB’s core tasks for the first time. Moreover, most statutory restrictions with regard to investment instruments were removed.

The current development of the interbank market in Albania does not fulfil these assumptions yet and therefore, it makes the work of the Bank of Albania difficult in carrying out this essential function. Year 2002 recorded the start of the interbank market, the same year when the indirect instruments were introduced by the Bank of Albania to conduct its monetary operations. The Bank of Albania has attended the developments of the interbank money market in the last five years. During this period the trading volume has been fifteen folded, climbing from a daily average of 130 million lek in 2002 to a daily average of around 2 billion lek in 2007. Also there has been an increase in the maturity of the traded funds, from only trading overnight back in 2002 to trading up to three months in 2007. Also there has been an increase in the maturity of traded funds, from only trading overnight back in 2002 to trading up to three months in 2007. From the beginning of this year, we have been able to publish the fixed interest rate indexes, TRIBOR and TRIBID, which is hoped to promote the development of the interbank money market. However, we have to admit that this development has been a very slow one. During the last five years, the lek liabilities of the banking system have increased by 135 billion lek, which makes the increase in the trading volume of interbank market by a daily average of 1.9 billion lek, only a peanut in a big cake.
Indeed over the past decade international and national institutions have often made forecast errors in the same direction, underestimating inflation and overestimating growth in advanced economies (Chart 6). This has led to an overly accommodative policy. If we want to avoid repeating the same bias, we should be more alert to this issue. Macroeconomic policies Another way in which advanced economies are affected by globalisation is through its unbalanced nature. Globalisation is very advanced in trade and economic activity. In the financial area, however, globalisation is more limited, in the sense that EMEs are characterised by an excessive demand for and an insufficient production of high quality  4  4  L. Bini Smaghi (2011) “The challenges facing monetary policy”, Bologna, 27 January. BIS central bankers’ speeches  financial assets. Many EMEs are net savers and export capital to advanced economies. This is the result of various factors, not least the lower degree of globalisation of their policies and institutions. This limited globalisation can be seen particularly in the lack of independent monetary policies and the pegging of exchange rates, which leads to the accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves and to misaligned prices (Chart 7). As a result of these imbalances, interest rates in advanced economies may be lowered artificially, to a level which may create problems for their pursuit of price and financial stability (Chart 8). Again, in most of our macro models the interest rate which affects global financial markets (the so-called r*) is anchored on the US economy.

And also what new in this crisis is the implicit linkage through reputation risk as noted earlier, that is, banks became obligated to rescue failing SIVs even when there were no explicit contractual obligations to do so. Against this background, what then can regulators do to address the interactions and the feedback problems. This is not going to be an easy task, but let me try to frame the discussion into a context. First, it is clear that systemic risk is endogenous. Risk is first encouraged by procyclicality and once the tipping point is reached, the interactions within the system takes over, turning financial fragility into systemic risk. From the current crisis, it is clear that the scope and intensity of systemic risk are related closely to three factors: (1) the collective behaviour of market participants that contributes to the positive feedback loops; (2) the underlying structure of markets and market practices which dictate the manner through which the interactions of feedbacks are propagated throughout the financial system; and (3) the authorities’ own responses. Therefore, to address the problem, we need to focus our efforts on all of the three areas. First, on the collective behaviour of market participants, the key objective must be to tame or dampen the positive feedbacks through right incentives and better regulation. For example, regulation to disallow capital reduction for credit risk transfer off-balance sheet could have discouraged the originate-to-distribute model.
So we must always ask if we have seen anything that would move us away from our current viewpoints  2  2  See Evans (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  and forecasting methodologies – and if things have changed significantly, we must ask if achievable paths for our policy goals or the channels through which monetary policy works have been altered in any substantive way. These considerations would include questions about whether we are facing structural economic change that lowers the economy’s potential output, substantial financial impediments holding back demand along the lines stressed by Reinhart and Rogoff, global financial stress, and the like. A good portion of these concerns are related to appropriate risk-management considerations. Fourth, policymakers must make a decision regarding the stance and course of monetary policy. They must ask if their forecasts are consistent with their medium- and long-term policy objectives, and if not, what then is the best response for monetary policy to influence the trajectory of the economy and inflation in order to meet the FOMC’s objectives? That is a very quick summary of the necessary steps for effective monetary policymaking. Where does credibility come into play in all of this? Since no policymaking process can be perfect, some errors will naturally arise. At the forecasting stage, no one has a perfect crystal ball. Forecast errors will be made, and these errors could have an impact on credibility.

Second, assessments of global imbalances and implications for currency valuation need to adopt a “broader view” that takes into consideration not only current account imbalances but also capital flows which have become much larger than current account flows; taking a narrow perspective of current account imbalance alone could lead us to a policy misstep. And third, central banks should have a collective voice on how much central banks can do, and to what extent further monetary easing can prop up the economy facing with structural challenges and trade disruptions. When we think about policy space, we must not look at the zero lower bound, effective lower bound, or the optimal size of central bank’s balance sheet. We must also be aware of the “financial stability lower bound”: how much additional financial stability risks we are willing to take. This is so that the financial market would have a realistic view of monetary policy and not expect central banks to engage in excessive easing that might result in long-term financial instability. Preparing for the new macroeconomic thinking in the world of bilateralism This brings me to my third and last issue which is the importance of multilateral framework and international cooperation in a world that is becoming more and more polarized, both geopolitically and economically. Multilateral frameworks that have worked so well for us in the past recently got challenged by gravitation towards inward-  4  looking policies and bilateral economic relationships, and that has sent shockwaves to emerging nations on the periphery.