samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This new context has had several consequences: •  both inside and outside the euro area, the reputation of the euro as a solid currency has fostered the holding of euro-denominated banknotes, which has doubled in a few years, now representing the largest banknote circulation in the world;  •  the so-called “home bias” in asset holdings has decreased further, both inside the euro area vis-à-vis assets issued in other Member States and outside the euro area vis-à-vis assets issued in the euro area. This has increased globally the demand for euro-denominated financial assets;  •  the integration and competition in the banking and financial markets that has been fostered by the euro speeded up the development and the spreading out of financial innovation throughout the euro area, affecting money and credit developments in different ways. Let me just mention some of them. 6  2    One is the rapid pace of expansion in the activities of the so-called “other financial institutions” or OFIs. OFIs are not part of the money-creating sector and are neither insurance companies nor pension funds. In particular, they include financial vehicle corporations that purchase, pool and repackage as marketable securities loans that are “securitised” by banks, thereby reducing the growth rate of loans to the private sector. The expansion in OFIs’ activities is to a certain extent mirrored in the development of their monetary assets: which is now quite significant and amounts to around 10.5% of M3.

However, the corporate sector faces major challenges down the road. Against a backdrop of lower expected cash flows and higher debt, the solvency position of some firms has worsened, especially in the case of those operating in sectors more adversely affected by the pandemic that are still facing some restrictions. Thus, with the crisis stretching out, concern has now shifted from liquidity risk to the deterioration of the solvency position of firms. Therefore, economic policies should now focus on supporting viable businesses whose solvency has worsened as a result of the COVID-19 shock, given that the potential liquidation of these firms would be a drag on economic recovery via different channels. First, due to the loss of employment and capital that follows the closure of any company. Second, firms’ solvency problems may end up affecting the health of lenders if these problems are significant and widespread within the corporate sector. And third, in extreme scenarios, the ability of of some banks to provide new lending could be affected, generating negative financial loops. We should take into account as well that a high level of corporate debt, even if not leading to defaults, can still be a drag on investment in the following years, lowering productivity and economic growth, as the experience from the global financial crisis indeed shows.
Yves Mersch: The future of Europe’s financial market infrastructure – the Eurosystem’s Vision 2020 Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Sibos conference, Singapore, 14 October 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, members of the panel, The beauty of innovation is that it never ends. Even the best ideas can be enhanced and complemented. The Eurosystem, the euro area’s network of central banks, has developed two major innovations in the field of financial market infrastructure over the past 15 years: TARGET (now TARGET2) and TARGET2-Securities, or T2S. Both platforms have significantly improved the way payments and securities are processed in Europe. However, as we look to the future, we see room for further enhancements and consolidation. As we think about where we want to go next, I should stress that our vision for market infrastructure integration is not, nor should be, ours alone. Following the success of our collaboration with the market during the development of T2S, we intend to take the same approach going forwards – to work together with the market to identify what its needs are and to draw on the expertise in both the public and the private sectors. Through collaboration we will define where European market infrastructure should be heading. As we think about future innovation, allow me to look briefly at past innovations. The digital camera, the mobile phone and the internet were three revolutionary innovations of the last century.

In other words, just as new apps are constantly being developed for smartphones, so too will we be able to add new functionalities to the platform to meet emerging market needs and requirements. These functionalities will benefit from being designed for a single, harmonised platform. As we consolidate the financial market infrastructure in Europe, another area requiring further attention is that of collateralisation. With increased regulation following the financial crisis, collateral requirements are higher than ever. This is why it is so important that banks and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  financial institutions are able to manage their collateral in an efficient way and why the optimisation of liquidity-saving measures presents such a benefit to market participants. With T2S, it is now possible to have a single, centralised, pool of collateral, making it much simpler and faster to move collateral from where it is to where it needs to be. This then brings to the fore the issue of harmonising our own collateralisation techniques and procedures. As we look to the future, the Eurosystem will seek to drive harmonisation forwards, particularly as regards Eurosystem operations for the mobilisation of marketable assets, as well as the handling procedures for non-marketable assets. We live in a fast-paced world, and customers have come to expect instant services in all aspects of life, including from their banks.
It is a well-known phenomenon that long-term unemployed have greater difficulty in obtaining jobs, for several reasons. A person who finds  17  See, for instance, Sveriges Riksbank (2012c). 18  According to the Swedish Public Employment Service, there are four groups who have a relatively vulnerable position on the labour market and who find it difficult to get a new job if they become unemployed: those born outside Europe, people with less than upper-secondary school education, people in the age group 55–64 and people with a physical disability which reduces their capacity to work. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  themself outside of the labour market suffers not only personal loss and a feeling of isolation, they also find that their skills become outdated after a while, which makes it more difficult to get a new job. A high rate of unemployment over a long period of time can become entrenched and requires a very large demand for labour so that the long-term unemployed can find work. One says that unemployment becomes persistent. The longer unemployment has been high, the more difficult it is, the longer it takes and the larger the labour demand that is needed to bring down unemployment. The fact that unemployment has been high for a long time and that long-term unemployment has increased, is also an argument now for a more, rather than a less, expansionary monetary policy.

4  non-renumerated reserve requirement of 40% with a holding period of a year on capital inflows into the bond market and high-yielding deposits. It worked, and monetary transmission through the interest rate channel was restored. As a result, we also avoided the build-up of significant carry trade positions with the associated risk to financial stability. We see such instruments as temporary and only to be used as a third line of defence. Furthermore, it remains an open question whether they will be seen to be more in the nature of macroprudential tools or as infringements on our treaty obligations to maintain free capital movements. We are hoping that everybody has learned the lessons of the crisis where large and volatile capital flows played a key role.3 In concluding, let me come back to the IMFS and ask what I have said about the plight of SOFIEs means in terms of desirable reforms. First, we need to continue to adapt IMF surveillance and facilities and other parts of the GFSN to modern realities. Second, we need to further reduce financial regulatory flaws and gaps at the regional and global level regarding capital flows and cross-border banking. Third, we need to try to find ways to make central bank swaps a more transparent and reliable part of the GFSN. Finally, international organisations and treaties need to accommodate but monitor SOFIEs’ use of macroprudential and capital flow management tools. With time, we might develop a new consensus on the rules of the game.
Concerning capital stock, data reveals that the capital stock in the region constitutes only one third (35%) of the capital stock in the countries of the European Union. This calls for raising investment ratio and closing investment gaps. These gaps are particularly wide in infrastructure, looking at the average rank of 70.5 for the region compared to 16.7 for EU152. However, there is also a great scope for improvements in ICT infrastructure, as a cornerstone of the new economy, in order to accelerate digital transformation of the economies. As for productivity, it remains low, about 1/3 of the EU average. In the last five years before pandemics, the average GDP growth of the region was 3%, with TFP  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  contribution of merely 0.3 p.p. To increase productivity, the region must tackle structural and institutional obstacles that inhibit efficient allocation of resources. The evidence suggests that institutional reforms in emerging economies are associated with about 1 p. p. a year higher total factor productivity growth compared to "normal" years3. So far, FDIs in the tradable sectors are one of the traditional venues that increase productivity that implies not only tapping additional external sources for growth financing, amidst low domestic savings, but also transfer of know-how and technologies. However, pandemics led to significant deceleration of FDIs and trade flows, flagging up many vulnerabilities of international trade and production that caused dilemmas about future globalization trends that are of key importance for small WB economies.

Yet, according to IMF estimates, the shock intensity would have been three times higher without unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy support, both in terms of speed and scale, preventing a more devastating outcome and long-term scarring to the economies. Given the lessons learned from the global financial crisis, that is recognizing the risk of self-fulfilling cycles, central banks this time responded quickly, providing ultra-accommodative support such as policy rate cuts from already historically low levels, regulatory flexibility to prevent credit crunch and some of them even experimented with non-conventional tools. In this crisis episode, monetary policy was not perceived as "the only game in town" and since the very beginning, it was coupled with unprecedented fiscal stimulus. Average fiscal stimulus in the region amounted around 6% of GDP, which was twice as low as the global fiscal stimulus, but still on a comparable level with middle-income economies. Consequently, the pre-pandemic fiscal consolidation was ceased and the fiscal deficit hit a record high of 7.7% of GDP. Overall, during this crisis episode, policy response in the region was swifter, bolder and better balanced. Looking forward to the policy front, one of the lessons learned from the global financial crisis is that the policy support should not be rollbacked prematurely. Thus, the main challenge is how to provide further support for the recovery stage, but without further creation of vulnerabilities on the other fronts.
Two key issues remain: how to fund the backstop at a sufficiently high level to be credible, and how to create a swift decision-making process to deal with emergencies – if we need 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  weeks, it is useless. The euro area also needs a system for providing liquidity to financially sound banks after resolution – one that is provided by the Eurosystem and secured by a highquality public guarantee. I’m fully convinced that once we have a credible and efficient mechanism for resolution, it will be much easier to reach a pragmatic compromise on deposit insurance, probably with a focus on liquidity sharing between national guarantee schemes. Let me add two thoughts on substance: First, on anti-money laundering. In this area, I am convinced that we need to enhance our approach by building on a network of national authorities and EBA that should ensure an effective single anti-money laundering supervision. This means that EBA should have the legal and human capacities to foster convergence of practices on the best standards, based on clear European mandates. It should go as far as including effective breach of law reviews and a capacity to directly intervene in some cases with European-wide impact. Second, what we have managed to achieve for banks can serve as an example for financial markets.

We have a great deal of work to do on these three issues in the months ahead, and I am confident that when bold reforms in these areas are undertaken, we will have achieved the necessary quantum leap in euro area governance. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 97/2010
I have been impressed by how they have focussed on products in which they can add value and exploit their comparative advantage – whether a company in Northern Ireland exporting wall heaters to the newly rich of Shanghai and Beijing, a manufacturer in the North-West exploiting a patent for paint which is resistant to very high temperatures, or a company in the Potteries passionate about the plates they make for the hotel and restaurant trade. And if you want a digger, why look further than a JCB? Proof that vehicle assembly in the West Midlands can be successful. All of them – as all of you – are working in a highly competitive environment. It is indeed much harder to run a business than to run a central bank. But seeing those companies at first hand has made me even more convinced that our duty is to ensure that you do not experience the macroeconomic instabilities of the past and that we keep inflation on track to meet our 2% target. Stability is in your interest just as much as mine. Speeches on monetary policy rarely whet the appetite for a good meal, and I apologise for that before the splendid dinner your Chamber is about to serve. But tonight has been an opportunity to share our analysis of the economic situation with you. I hope you will understand the reasons behind our decisions to raise interest rates over recent months, even if it goes against the grain to support them.

While the overall macroeconomic stability is sound, pockets of risk remain. In response, the Bank of Thailand took on a number of actions including implementation of new limits on credit card and personal loans to address problem of household debt; establishment of debt clinic to help restructure debt for individuals with multiple creditors; and tightening up of mortgage loan underwriting standards to curb speculation in the housing market. Along the same line, on the back of strong economic performance and ample liquidity, the Monetary Policy Committee raised the policy rate in December of last year largely to preempt potential build-up of financial vulnerabilities from investor’s “search-for-yield” behavior and underpricing of risk during prolonged period of ultra-low interest rate. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me now turn to the resilience supported by having diversified growth engines, which in turn enable the Thai economy and its agents to mitigate adverse events. While I previously stated at the beginning of my talk that drivers of growth have become more balanced, structurally—being a small open economy—export performance still plays an important role as the main growth driver. But, looking closely at our export portfolio, you would find that it is well-diversified and can provide cushion against marketspecific or product-specific risks. This is because Thailand has established export ties with over 80 countries; and exporters have become less reliance on major economies. Just over ten years ago, exports to G3 economies made up around 40 percent of total export value while those to ASEAN economies stood at 21 percent.
On this anniversary occasion, it is my duty to mention that the far-reaching and beneficial reform our institution has undergone for the past two decades, the reconnection with the European System of Central Banks, would not have been possible without the various types of support from other central banks and international financial institutions. During its transformation and consolidation process, the National Bank of Romania became a top ranking institution, capable of meeting the European standards and providing assistance to other central banks. Looking further ahead and taking into account the activity it has performed for the past 130 years, I would like to emphasise that the National Bank of Romania stands firmly committed to fulfilling its mandate as a guardian of price and financial stability in Romania. Our efforts will focus on committing ourselves, together with the Government of Romania, to pursuing sound and stability-oriented policies, so that we can overcome the current challenges. Attracting European funds plays a major part in the sustainable development of Romania, as saving will remain insufficient in our country for a rather long time. The National Bank of Romania will spare no effort and will make recourse to its entire expertise in order to speed up this process.

Mugur Isărescu: 130th anniversary of the National Bank of Romania Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Gala Concert of George Enescu Philharmonic Orchestra, Bucharest, 5 September 2010. *  *  *  Mister President of Romania Your Excellencies Distinguished audience Dear guests and friends of the National Bank of Romania Please allow me to welcome Mr Jean Claude Trichet, the President of the European Central Bank, our honoured guest here, at the Romanian Athenaeum, to the final act of our anniversary event. I would also like to greet President Ion Iliescu and Mr Emil Boc, the Prime Minister of Romania. I appreciate your honouring our invitation. My thanks go also to you all, governors, representatives of central banks and international financial institutions, and to all our Romanian and foreign guests. We are very happy to have you here with us this evening. We celebrate the 130th anniversary since the establishment of the National Bank of Romania, the 16th central bank in the world, according to the most widely accepted chronology. The birthday of our institution is on 29 April 1880, a day on which the Law on the establishment of the NBR was published in the Official Gazette. The commissioning of the Bank required a longer process that spanned over the entire 1880. On 5 September 1880 – precisely 130 years ago, the Bank’s Board held its first meeting.
This means that this year investment will fall short of projections, with an annual growth rate that is now estimated closer to 1 percent (4.1 percent in December). It also inputs first-quarter data available, as well as the downward revisions to investment in 2013 and the turn of 2014 shown by the latest survey of the capital goods corporation CBC. Another factor behind the lower growth forecast for the immediate future is the upward correction to inventory levels, meaning that this source of expansion will provide a smaller impulse. The baseline scenario also estimates that, as has been occurring for some quarters, private consumption will post a moderate slowdown, grounded on a looser labor income and a stable borrowing trend. This year, growth will go from less to more. Such a trajectory assumes that investment will stabilize, due to several elements coming together. On one hand, the CBC survey shows an increase in investment plans in engineering works in the second half of 2014 and for the period 2015–2016. On the other, there is housing construction that should continue the trend of last year, considering that the supply of homes is still low, housing sales are strong, and financial conditions (i.e. credit cost and volume) remain favorable. Meanwhile, the fiscal budget for 2014 is expected to be more in line with historical patterns, implying greater public spending with respect to 2013, especially investment. Machinery and equipment imports have been stable for some months.

During this period we were steadily reabsorbing the spare capacity created by the recession, and this was reflected in a gradual improvement in the labour market - in a net increase in employment of 1.7 mn people since the end of 1992, and in a persistent fall in unemployment to - as I say - the lowest rate for nearly 20 years. Meanwhile, underlying consumer price inflation has averaged 2.7% over the past 5 years, the lowest rate since the early 1960s - and it has been exactly on target - at 2½% - in each of the past 3 months. About 2 years ago it began to become evident that demand and output growth, in the economy as a whole, was picking up speed. And as we moved into and through 1997, it became increasingly obvious that unless we acted to tighten monetary policy, in order to moderate the rate of growth, we risked overheating, particularly in the labour market, where reports of shortages not just of skilled but even of unskilled workers, were becoming widespread. The situation was seriously complicated by an increasing imbalance between the domestic and the internationally exposed sectors of the economy. Domestic demand for goods, and particularly for services, was unsustainably strong, and large parts of the economy were doing very well on the back of that - though they didn’t make too much of a song and dance about it.