samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Following recent deliberations by the National Council's Control Committee, information was published to the effect that an additional part of the SNB's gold stocks might be liquidated to fund another extraordinary distribution of profits amounting to some CHF 10 billion. This created the totally mistaken impression that the National Bank was oversupplied with monetary reserves. Now that half our gold stocks have been sold and the proceeds distributed to the Confederation and the cantons, the SNB holds an appropriate level of monetary reserves in the form of gold and foreign exchange for the conduct of monetary policy. Bearing in mind the economic importance of our country, however, our level of currency reserves does not place us in a leading position amongst the group of the best endowed countries. Far from it, in fact. In 1950, our reserves amounted to 30% of GDP. This percentage has now fallen to 12.5%, situating us in a respectable middle position on the international scale – along with the Scandinavian countries. If we bear in mind that, unlike these nations, Switzerland is also an important international banking centre, we cannot reasonably conclude that our current monetary reserves are excessive. What is more, the law is perfectly clear on who has the final word in this matter. It is the Bank Council – not parliamentary committees – that is authorised to assess the SNB's reserves policy, including any augmentation or depletion of the bank's monetary reserves.

The emerging Asian economies again provided a particularly vigorous growth hub, and the rise in manufacturing production in China stimulated international trade. Consequently, all of Asia – and especially Japan – benefited from the strength of the Chinese economy. The European economy, meanwhile, lacked vigour in the first part of the year. This was due, in particular, to chronic weakness in domestic demand. In early 2005, Germany, France and Italy even experienced a situation of near-stagnation. Although the economic climate recovered subsequently, this improvement was often hesitant. To a large extent, the Swiss economy escaped the European lethargy due to its relatively diversified export markets. Our foreign trade sagged in the first quarter of 2005 but returned to a strongly expansionary course thereafter. Consumption was relatively firm even if the rate of growth remained extremely modest. Investments failed to show the strength exhibited in 2004 because of the hesitations about the soundness of the recovery. Even construction had a difficult start to the year because of the adverse weather conditions – despite the strong support provided by low interest rates. Although this industry subsequently rallied, it was unable to recover the strength it had enjoyed in 2004. For the year as a whole, the Swiss economy grew 1.9%, which was slightly below the figure reached in 2004. In the uncertain economic environment that prevailed in 2005, the Swiss National Bank did not continue with the normalisation of interest rates which it had embarked on in spring 2004.
These are conditions in which it would be very easy for the financial markets, businesses and households to jump to the mistaken conclusion that monetary stimulus will soon begin to be withdrawn. Given the slack in the economy, the Committee is not in a rush. Assuming anchored inflation expectations, an orthodox central bank would not contemplate beginning to withdraw stimulus until the economy had reached “escape velocity”, which I have defined to mean “the economy growing, and being set to continue to grow, at a pace that gradually absorbs the slack in the labour market and within firms”.4 And at that point the central bank would assess the erosion of slack in the economy and thus the extent to which downward pressures on inflation were dissipating. Since my own policy deliberations have been framed in terms of “escape velocity”, I saw real merit in any MPC Forward Guidance being cast in terms of a threshold for real growth. Manifestly, this could not be a measure of slack in the economy; it would be clear what it was and was not. Once passed, it would prompt a rich assessment of slack and inflationary pressures, drawing on the widest possible range of indicators. The Committee decided on a threshold specified in terms of unemployment. The MPC’s threshold is what it says: a threshold for assessing inflationary pressures, although the Committee must maintain that broader assessment month-by-month, quarter-  2  See Woodford (2012), “Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound,” presented at the Jackson Hole symposium.

The UK economy entered the crisis with too much debt in banking, in the household sector, in government and, for the nation as a whole, externally. And the UK entered the crisis with the composition of demand imbalanced – too much public and private consumption, too little net trade. Indeed, aggregate demand had been unbalanced for so long that the economy’s productive capacity was (and probably still is) unbalanced, investment in capital having followed the pattern of demand. For prosperity to be put on a secure footing for the longer term, adjustment is still needed. With one vital exception, engineering structural change in the economy is not the responsibility of the central bank. The exception of course is the safety and soundness of the banking system, which is a precondition for broader monetary stability. An undercapitalised banking system would not be able smoothly to supply sufficient credit to aid recovery as demand picks up, enabling investment in innovations and efficiency. Nor has it been able to do so as much as needed to help capital shift to firms and sectors that are beneficiaries of the new pattern of global and domestic demand. In my view, that may explain some of the weaknesses in productivity growth.9 The Financial Policy Committee required recapitalisation of the UK’s big banks and building societies not simply because that is needed to underpin stability, which it is, but also because a resilient banking system is a precondition for sustained and better balanced recovery.
Heng Swee Keat: Advances in risk management – theory and practice Opening address by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Symposium to mark the opening of RMI’s new facilities, Singapore, 2 October 2009. *  *  *  Prof Tan Chorh Chuan Prof Tan Eng Chye Prof Duan Jin-Chuan Distinguished speakers, guests, ladies and gentlemen Good morning Introduction It gives me great pleasure to join you today at the symposium which marks the opening of Risk Management Institute’s (RMI) new facilities. RMI is Singapore’s first full-fledged research centre dedicated to risk management. RMI was set up three years ago. The timing could not have been more appropriate. Given the spotlight in the current financial crisis on risk management, the shift of economic weight to Asia, and NUS’ standing as a global university in the heart of Asia, RMI has a major opportunity to play a prominent role in research and education on this critical topic. Emerging from the current crisis In recent weeks, confidence has returned to financial markets. More recent forecasts for global economic growth have been revised upwards, including that for Asia. There is palpable relief that the global economy has avoided the abyss. But some players seem to have forgotten that we have just gone through the worst financial crisis since the post-war period. The clean-up of the wreckages will take time.

While we do not yet have evidence of how these reforms will hold up during the next economic downturn, many have been in place long enough that we can begin to evaluate their efficacy. In such an evaluation, we should keep in mind the three goals I mentioned in my introduction. First, we must ensure that the probability of failure for a systemically important firm is exceedingly low. Such a failure can lead to contagion that can damage a broad set of financial market participants, and impede the ability of the financial system to support the economy. The failure of a single systemically important firm—because of its size and interconnectedness—can significantly weaken the entire financial system. We saw this firsthand following the failure of Lehman Brothers. Second, if a systemically important firm does fail, we must have mechanisms in place to minimize the damage to the rest of the financial system. While we can make individual firms stronger, more robust and less prone to failure, I expect that there will still inevitably be failures in the future. In principle, we could make individual institutions completely bulletproof in all possible environments. However, this would require such high levels of capital and liquidity that it would likely make them uncompetitive in their ability to provide financial services to their customers. 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Third, we must keep in place the structural changes that have made the global financial system less vulnerable to adverse shocks.
Overall, despite the moderation in loan growth, the figures on lending do not so far suggest that the heightened financial market tensions led to a sizeable curtailment of credit in the euro area as a whole in the period to November. At the same time, given that credit supply effects can manifest themselves with lags, close scrutiny of credit developments is warranted in the period ahead. The soundness of bank balance sheets, supported by the increase in capital positions, will be a key factor in facilitating an appropriate provision of credit to the economy over time. It is essential that the implementation of banks’ recapitalisation plans does not result in developments that are detrimental to the financing of economic activity in the euro area. To sum up, incoming information broadly confirms our previous assessment. Inflation is likely to stay above 2% for several months to come, before declining to below 2%. As expected, ongoing financial market tensions continue to dampen economic activity in the euro area, while, according to some recent survey indicators, there are tentative signs of a stabilisation in activity at low levels. The economic outlook remains subject to high uncertainty and substantial downside risks. In such an environment, cost, wage and price pressures in the euro area should remain modest and inflation rates should develop in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. A cross-check with the signals from the monetary analysis confirms this picture, with the underlying pace of monetary expansion continuing to be moderate.

Arnór Sighvatsson: Shedding the shackles of capital controls Speech by Mr Arnór Sighvatsson, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the breakfast meeting of Icelandic Securities Ltd, Reykjavík, 7 October 2010. *  *  *  Restrictions on movement of capital to and from Iceland are in contravention of Iceland’s international obligations, including the European Economic Area Agreement. Such controls distort economic incentives, lead to lost business opportunities, discourage foreign investment, are costly and inconvenient for the public and private sector alike, and are a breeding ground for illegal activity aimed at circumvention. There is also the risk that a capital controls regime will be progressively more difficult to enforce over time. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that, in the long run, Iceland’s pension system would benefit from diversifying risk by investing abroad. Indeed, this has become abundantly clear in the current financial crisis. In sum, there are a host of reasons not to impose capital controls, and to lift them as soon as possible if they do exist. In spite of these arguments to the contrary, capital controls were imposed after the Icelandic financial system collapsed, and removing them has taken longer than originally anticipated. It is useful to review the reasons for imposing the controls, as those reasons are the key to understanding what conditions must be met before the controls can be lifted. Why capital controls?
12 The extraordinary interventions that were undertaken using our emergency powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act were warranted and within our authority. However, I suspect that the scale and scope of these interventions went considerably further than envisioned by the public and Congress prior to the crisis. In response, Congress narrowed the scope of Section 13(3) with the Dodd-Frank Act. In particular, Dodd-Frank limits the Federal Reserve’s authority to extend credit through facilities with broad-based eligibility, and constrains the Federal Reserve’s authority to extend credit to a single company. The Dodd-Frank Act also modified the governance that would apply to any future intervention in an effort to increase public accountability. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act addressed the broader issue exposed by the crisis – that some large financial institutions had become “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF). To end TBTF, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act established a process to ensure that any financial firm could be resolved without threatening the viability of the financial system and without putting taxpayer funds at risk. 13 In addition, financial intermediaries designated as systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council are subject to tougher prudential standards and enhanced supervision by the Federal Reserve. The intent behind these measures is to reduce the likelihood of a failure of a large financial firm, and the consequence of such a failure for the financial system, should one occur.

The debate preceding the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 was protracted and intense. Early drafts of reform proposals were careful not to even mention a “central bank” – the 75-year-old scars from the Second Bank’s failed reauthorization battle had still not fully healed. Although there was a strong recognition that the country needed a central bank to forestall and mitigate financial panics, there was considerable disagreement about how it should be structured. Important considerations included what role should be played by  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  private bankers versus government officials, how centralized the new bank should be and the extent of its powers. 1 During this period, the U.S. economy was susceptible to financial panics. Lacking a central bank, the country had no reliable lender of last resort that could provide currency and credit on demand against high-quality assets. Banks had to self-insure against bank runs by holding a high fraction of deposits as cash, and by entering into private liquidity agreements with other banks. Self-insurance was not only expensive relative to the cost of a public backstop provided by a central bank, but it was also limited in its effectiveness. When the business cycle turned down and financial stress intensified, bank runs often ensued as bank customers rushed to convert their deposits into cash. Without a true lender of last resort, cash that banks individually and collectively kept in reserve often proved inadequate to meet demand.
So, in this short presentation I have tried to present you with our understanding of the current situation in the Russian market from the point of view of financial stability. My colleagues will take some of these issues up in more detail. We are ready to answer any questions you may have. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

Inadequate or inconclusive data in areas such as measuring financial literacy, consumer awareness and financial education means that it is difficult to assess the cost and benefit of the proposed policy framework and its impact on financial inclusion. Conclusion Allow me to now conclude my remarks. The successful implementation of policy work in the area of financial inclusion requires the availability of quality data. The fact that this area still remains relatively unexplored, compared to the availability of data for corporate business, financial markets and other more sophisticated aspects of finance, clearly suggests that much work remains to be done. The magnitude and scope of the topic also requires a diverse group of policymakers to collaborate on a long-term basis. The establishment of a working group to improve the quality of financial inclusion data is therefore most timely, and will benefit policymakers in making better and more informed policies, as well as tracking the outcome of policy initiatives. In addition, it may also serve to increase the visibility new issues areas which are currently not being given sufficient priority by policymakers. I would also like to encourage the working group to consider, in the longer term, the development of some form of a composite financial inclusion index. The composite index will  2  BIS Review 88/2010  benefit everyone by providing a broad measure of trends, facilitate comparisons between distinct segments and create a benchmark for policy work in financial inclusion.
Enhancing the framework set out in the Medium Term Program (MTP) through further structural adjustments to strengthen fiscal discipline will support the relative improvement of Turkey’s sovereign risk. Should the goals set out in the MTP are achieved we consider that it may be possible to keep policy rates in single digits throughout the forecast horizon. Increasing budget deficits worldwide continue to pose upside risks to inflation expectations and thus to global market interest rates in the long term. Our medium-term inflation and monetary policy outlook envisage that recovery in global economic activity follows a slow and protracted course, while saving rates keep rising and global interest rates remain at low levels for an extended period. However, huge budget deficits particularly in developed countries, which are triggered by fiscal stimulus packages adopted in the face of the global financial crisis, besides the lack of a clear exit strategy from these policies, create upside risks regarding medium-term global interest rates. Countries with relatively sounder banking systems and prudent fiscal policies would be more resilient against these risks. In this context, I would like to once more underline the significance of fiscal discipline in the current conjuncture. The course of oil and other commodity prices still constitutes another important risk. Shortterm ample liquidity driven by countercyclical policies on a global scale exposes not only the emerging market currencies, but also commodity prices to speculative actions. Therefore, oil and other commodity price developments warrant caution, even in a scenario of a gradual global economic recovery.

Hungary Macaristan Mexico Meksika New Zealand Y.Zelanda Poland Polonya S. Africa G.Afrika S. Korea Kore Turkey Türkiye  900 0.03  700 0.02  400  0909  0107  0 0906  0909  0609  0309  1208  0908  0608  0308  1207  100 0907  200  1.4 0607  1.5  0.01  0506  300  0106  1.6  0509  500  0109  1.7  0908  600  0508  1.8  0108  800 1.9  FX Oynaklığı* Volatility Kur  0.04  0907  2  1000  0507  TL/Kur Sepeti (0,5 euro+0,5 ABD doları) TRY/Basket (0.5 Euro+0.5 USD) EMBI+Türkiye EMBI+ Turkey (sağ eksen)  2.1  *50-day moving standard deviation of daily exchange rate changes. Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. BIS Review 143/2009  9  Distinguished Members of the Press, The second quarter gross domestic product (GDP) release was broadly in line with the outlook presented in the July Inflation Report. Within this framework, the GDP decreased by 7 percent in the second quarter of 2009 compared to the same quarter last year (Figure 22). Meanwhile, the GDP in seasonally adjusted terms displayed a significant upswing compared to the previous quarter bringing an end to the persistent contraction in economic activity observed since the second quarter of 2008 (Figure 23). While domestic consumption demand rose markedly during the second quarter mainly owing to the fiscal stimulus package, external demand remained weak.
Faced with this situation, with the dual objective of easing financing conditions and addressing emerging signs of financial fragmentation among euro area countries, on the ECB Governing Council we approved a package of measures which acted in two main dimensions: asset purchases and liquidity-providing operations. First, through the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), and second, through targeted longerterm refinancing operations (TLTROs). These measures have subsequently been expanded and strengthened (most recently, in December), owing to the persistence of the pandemic and its negative effects on the economy. I would now like to discuss each of these measures in greater detail. The PEPP, a programme for the purchase of public and private-sector bonds, was launched in March 2020. Its flexibility is what sets it apart from the previous asset purchase programme (APP). Thus, whereas the APP is relatively rigid in terms of how the asset purchases are distributed both over time and across jurisdictions, during the most critical months of the pandemic the PEPP has allowed us to concentrate purchases on those countries whose financing conditions have, at any given time, been subject to a greater degree of tightening. 2  Thanks to this flexibility, together with its large initial envelope, the announcement of the creation of the PEPP on 18 March served to substantially reduce interest rates on sovereign debt (especially that of the countries hardest hit by the health crisis at that moment, such as Italy and Spain).

), 2001, ‘Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy: Towards Greater Stability’, HM Treasury, page 10: ‘Although there are many reasons for the UK’s poor inflation record in recent decades, one key factor was poor institutional arrangements. Monetary policy, if set correctly, should be a stabilising force for the economy. However, serious mistakes were made, which often meant that inflation was higher and more volatile than it would otherwise have been. This, in turn, created substantial economic instability that harmed the long-term performance of the UK economy. Many of these policy mistakes were made because the aims and procedures of monetary policy were not properly defined’. 14  For example, Lomax, R., 2004, ‘Stability and statistics’, speech to the North Wales Business Club dinner November 2004, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Winter 2004, vol 44, number 4. 4  BIS Review 46/2006  maintaining stable inflation. But that does not mean that we can always smooth out quarter-to-quarter, or even year-to-year, fluctuations in demand and output to the extent some commentary implies. In terms of the political economy of monetary policy making, it is important for the central banking community to get that across and accepted. If we fail in doing so, and the public believes that central banks can deliver more than is realistic, there will at some point down the road be disappointment, conceivably putting in jeopardy the real achievements of monetary policy in delivering price stability. Of course, these strictures apply most of all to ourselves.