samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, if we describe the entire chain, from the Swedish Social Insurance Administration beginning the payment process until Ingrid actually has the money in her hand, there is a fairly substantial amount of infrastructure, infrastructure communications and payment flows required. In addition to the basic infrastructure of electricity, telecommunications and post, the computer systems at the Swedish National Debt Office, the banks, the Riksbank and the Bankgirocentralen are used to implement ordinary, simple pension payments. In order for Ingrid the pensioner to receive her pension, the social insurance office sends a payment order to the Swedish National Debt Office and one to the banks the Swedish Social Insurance Administration uses to execute its payments. It is the Swedish National Debt Office’s job, in its role as bank to the central government, to pay pension money to a number of banks as instructed by the social insurance offices. These banks in turn distribute money to the pensioners’ accounts in their own banks, if the pensioners have bank accounts there. For those pensioners who have accounts in banks other than those with which the Swedish Social Insurance Administration has an agreement, the money is forwarded to these banks through Bankgirocentralen. The pensioners who do not have a bank account at all are instead given a payment slip that can be redeemed at any bank or at Svensk Kassaservice. The Swedish National Debt Office makes the payment of pension funds by temporarily, over the day, using its credit with the Riksbank.

Under pressure from the market, a number of countries have therefore initiated far reaching multi-year programs, which at least partly address structural problems. Moreover, the way the EU as an institution deals with public finances will change. As many European officials have pointed out, in 2004, it was not Greece or Portugal but Germany – together with France – that undermined fiscal discipline by successfully averting sanctions foreseen under the Stability and Growth Pact. Now, the EU and in particular the big countries are openly advocating measures to amend and significantly strengthen the institutional mechanism in order to enforce fiscal discipline. 5 In this context, the member states of the EU are faced with a fundamental issue. The public debt crisis has shown that interdependence between member states of a monetary union is strong. 6 Going forward in reforming the institutional set up of the EU, the core question is to what degree EU member states are ready to further relinquish sovereignty. How centralised or federal should the EU be? This discussion bears remarkable resemblance to the early years of the United States. At the time, an intense debate took place around the full assumption of the Revolutionary War debt of the states by the national government. The debate pitted the Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton against James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.
Finally I will highlight the expected benefits associated with moving towards a strong banking and financial union in the euro area. Banking sector’s deleveraging From a policy perspective it is useful to think about banks’ deleveraging as arising from two possible sources: demand factors and supply factors. Although somewhat artificial, this distinction may be instructive in guiding the appropriate policy response. Typical demand factors are the lack of profitable opportunities for investment or the presence of deleveraging forces arising in other sectors of the economy. Supply factors are related to banks’ insufficient balance sheet capacity to hold assets. This can arise from capital shortfalls or funding strains – or both. Banks can address capital shortfalls and funding strains by adjusting the asset and/or liability side of the balance sheet. Asset shedding is the most far-reaching solution. If balance sheet pressures arise from funding strains, banks may decide to sell the most liquid assets and non-core assets that can be liquidated in a short space of time. On the other hand, if deleveraging pressures are mainly related to capital positions, banks have an incentive to shed more capital-intensive assets to induce the largest reduction in risk-weighted assets. Abrupt adjustments of the asset side of the balance sheet can lead to a credit crunch, if they are made by many banks simultaneously.

My overall assessment in April was therefore that the repo-rate path from February was still appropriate. This entails a very expansionary monetary policy with a negative real repo rate for most of the forecast period. As I have mentioned, we saw indications at our meeting in April that the fall in growth at the end of last year was temporary, and we revised up our assessment of growth in the first quarter of this year. Since the monetary policy meeting we have received quite a lot of new information. For example we now know that Swedish exports of goods increased slightly during the first quarter after the steep fall in the fourth quarter of last year. According to Statistics Sweden’s figures, employment was higher and unemployment lower than in our most recent forecast. The National Institute of Economic Research’s Economic Tendency Survey also showed a large increase during the first quarter and the retail trade index, which rose strongly in February, continued to rise in March. All in all, new information received since the most recent monetary policy meeting shows no tendency to revise the forecast for Swedish growth during the first quarter. Still, I will wait to make an overall assessment of the new statistics until our next monetary policy meeting in July. Monetary policy in uncertain times I have described my views of the situation in Sweden and abroad.
Rigid parameters, imposed by multilateral agencies and sometimes by rating agencies and the market also contribute towards reinforcing these conventions. Current and future conditions are likely to be highly complex and varying and therefore not lending itself to rigid rules. In an environment that will continue to remain challenging for some time, this Conference provides an important opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues from Asia’s perspective, thereby contributing to the international discussions and understanding of the issues and their business and policy implications. Asia’s experience will also provide additional insights in contributing towards the solutions for building a more resilient international financial system. I wish you an engaging and productive discussion. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

However, we can talk in terms of a radical change in the Swedish economy in one important respect with regard to the relationship between growth and inflation. Inflation expectations in Sweden seem to have stabilised around 2%, which indicates that the target for price stability has attained high credibility. During the 1970s and 1980s, inflation amounted to 8% on average. This means that wage-earners, landlords, central and local government and entrepreneurs now calculate with quite different nominal price increases than previously in their budgets and their pricing decisions. However, this is not an expression of a new economy but rather indicates a return to the conditions that existed in the first two decades after the Second World War. Developments during the Korean War clearly show the importance of low inflation expectations for the development of the economy. The well-based expectations made it possible to restore the economy to a rate of inflation of 3% a year after inflation had risen to 20%. The return to low inflation could take place without any dramatic restraint and without mass unemployment. Comparisons between this year’s wage development and wage development during the previous high inflation period are a strong illustration that high nominal wage increases do not have a positive correlation with real wage increases. While real wage increases this year are expected to total around 3%, wage earners have periodically experienced reductions in real wages in the period 1975 to 1995 and on average only slightly over a half per cent increase.
Luis M Linde: Introduction to Christian Noyer Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, introducing Christian Noyer at the Foro de la Nueva, Madrid, 28 June 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is an honour and pleasure for me to introduce to you today, here at the Foro de la Nueva Economía, my colleague and friend Christian Noyer, the Governor of the Banque de France. With the presence of Governor Noyer, the Foro de la Nueva Economía continues its tradition of inviting distinguished international personalities from the world of administration, business and politics, to promote the exchange of ideas on matters of particular interest to society. I will begin my brief description of the career of Governor Noyer by emphasising something in his curriculum vitae: Christian Noyer is a good friend of our country. The Spanish government has recognised this, by awarding him the Gran Cruz de la Orden del Mérito Civil. With a legal training – he studied law at Rennes and Paris – Governor Noyer subsequently graduated from the Institut d’Études Politiques and the École Nationale d’Administration, the school for senior civil servants and top corporate executives. His professional career began in 1976, when he joined the Treasury in the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance, where he held various positions relating to debt management, regulation of the financial industry and the management of public corporations.

We are also looking into how to better capture risks associated with banks’ trading book positions in credit derivatives and highly structured and complex products. The AIG has established a working group that is following up on the Committee’s July 2005 trading book guidance. This working group, in consultation with the industry, is in the process of identifying possible principles for the implementation of so-called incremental default risk charge for trading book capital, and will be exploring other issues related to the measurement and modelling of risk in the trading book. And work is also going on outside the auspices of the Basel Committee. Many of you are probably aware that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the UK Financial Services Authority, in conjunction with other supervisors of major credit derivative dealers, have encouraged the industry to focus greater attention on sound risk management practices and the infrastructure of the credit derivatives markets by improving controls around assignments, reducing confirmation backlogs and increasing the use of electronic matching platforms. Other supervisors are reviewing bank stress testing practices and potential risks arising from banks’ private equity activities and exposures to hedge funds. The Basel Committee supports these efforts, and members will continue to keep each other informed on the results of their reviews. Private sector initiatives The public good of financial stability is not just of interest to supervisors and public authorities, but also to the financial sector.
Annual wage growth1) and unemployment2) Per cent 8  8 Annual wage growth  6  6 4  4 Unemployment rate  2 0 1993  2 0  1995  1997  1999  2001  1) Average for all groups, including the cost of additional vacation days 2) Registered unemployed and on labour market programmes as a percentage of the labour force  Sources: TRCIS, Directorate of Labour and Norges Bank Fafo og Makt- og demokratiutredningen 6. september 2002  High wage growth affects the exposed business sector in two ways. First, it erodes earnings and reduces employment. Second, monetary policy has to be tightened. This leads to an appreciation of the krone, with a further reduction in earnings and employment. BIS Review 50/2002  7  Annual wage growth in enterprises in the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry 8  8  Salaried employees1)  6  6 Total employees1)  4  2  2 0 1993  4  0 1995  1997  1999  2001  1) Includes costs of additional vacation days  Sources: TRCIS and Norges Bank Fafo og Makt- og demokratiutredningen 6. september 2002  It is combined wage growth for all groups that influences the outlook for inflation. However, substantial wage increases for some groups can trigger wage spirals. Wages for salaried staff in the business sector have exhibited sharp growth over several years.

While efforts can be made to strengthen the legal and supervisory framework, from the financial industry perspective, strong understanding of risks and effective application of risk mitigation, including commensurate application of the AML/CFT measures are critical for the meaningful conduct and practices of financial institutions. This is particularly important in the conduct of CDD and transaction monitoring that will facilitate strong financial intelligence and reporting, to achieve the enforcement objectives. Authorities are committed to continuously enhance the current legal and supervisory framework. At the same time, financial institutions and other reporting institutions must be robust in their current practices and compliance. Technological Development Everyone agrees that technological advancement is moving at a pace far greater than ever before. For the financial industry to maximise the overall benefit of this progress, we must acknowledge both the advantages and the risks of such rapid technological advancement while keeping abreast with the latest innovations. New devices, software, applications and inventions will continue to emerge. The challenge is for us to keep pace and ensure that industry players understand the potential benefits as well as the risk they bear. As the financial industry evolves into digital, it is inevitable that the industry becomes vulnerable to various new threats and risk factors, especially in the domain of financial crimes and terrorism financing. In the effort to mitigate these risks, it is important that we embrace technology and use it to our advantage in order to strengthen our defences against financial crimes and terrorism financing.
Let me get on to more interesting subjects. Changing yourself is sometime easy and sometime difficult depending on how you manage to tackle the psychology of it. But changing other people is always difficult especially if they are well entrenched, rich, and will not let go of their apparent present prosperity even though they are heading for disaster sooner or later. I am of course talking about changing our banks which we are trying to do through three main approaches: competitiveness, good governance and transparency. Although fully half of our banks will probably be directly controlled by foreign banks, and will have the home supervisory body help making sure that the banks are performing prudently in so far as it can be done remotely from their home base, we still have the problem of supervising the rest of the banks by ourselves. Of course, in nearly all banks there are now major foreign investors who at least will ask piercing questions. But we still have to apply local standards adapted to local conditions, and the best way is to have the host supervisors do a good job. BIS Review 29/2000  2  To ensure competitiveness from all the banks and to enforce an early start by Thai banks, we have already allowed sub-branches or service-points to be opened freely, and so network opening is really rather free and only the account-keeping function needs permission for expansion.

Default rates for consumer finance ABS and SME collateralised loan obligations have also remained low, well below 1%, throughout the worst financial and economic crisis we have experienced. As regards covered bonds, credit quality is ensured by a double recourse (on the underlying assets and on the issuer), which is in fact comparable with the double protection that exists in our standard repo operations. Overall, the decisions announced last week were taken with a view to underpinning the firm anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations, in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. We expect the two purchase programmes to effectively complement the TLTROs in enhancing the functioning of the monetary policy transmission and in providing further monetary accommodation given that we have now reached the lower bound. The newly decided measures, together with the TLTROs, will have a sizeable impact on our balance sheet, which is expected to move towards the dimensions it used to have at the beginning of 2012, and the Governing Council stands ready to take further action if needed, in compliance with its mandate to maintain price stability. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, it is time for me to conclude. My bottom line is also my starting line. Investment is rightly said to be today’s demand and tomorrow’s supply. Yet investment in Europe is falling short. If we don’t manage to get investment going again, we will weaken the economy in the short run and undermine its prospects in the long run.
Our today’s decision on the key rate will support this trend, increasing the attractiveness of deposits and the propensity to save. Lending still continues to expand at a fast pace. In July, the annual growth rate in corporate lending remained close to its six-year high. Growth in mortgage lending has slowed down somewhat after the conditions of the subsidised programme were changed, but is still close to its peaks as well. Unsecured consumer lending remains a matter of our great concern as annual growth rates in this segment continue to rise still, including due to the base effects. If the current trends persist, we admit the possibility of additional macroprudential measures to cool down this segment of the credit market, besides those provided for beginning from 1 October. Monetary conditions continue to adjust to our decisions. At our next meetings, we will consider changes in interest rates and in credit and deposit activity and assess whether these changes are sufficient in order to create such monetary conditions that would help bring inflation back to 4% and stabilise it at this level. As regards the risks to the forecast, their balance is still significantly shifted towards proinflationary ones. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The key demand-side risk is persistently elevated inflation expectations, fuelled by, among other factors, the still high inflationary pressure in the global economy.

In all cases, an indispensable ingredient of success has been an honest acknowledgement of the problem accompanied by the genuine desire of all the social partners to work out an effective solution in the national interest. In the current circumstances, sitting on the fence is not a responsible option. Not only does it become an uncomfortable position to maintain, but it also becomes less credible with time. There is indeed the danger that anybody who is not willing to be part of the solution will be perceived to be part of the problem. I, therefore, feel obliged to call on all the social partners to adopt a long-term perspective and sign up to a substantial reform package which would lay the foundations for renewed growth and sustainable development. A thriving economy is the best social policy. BIS Review 67/2004  5
Therefore, a widening of the collateral set accepted for monetary policy purposes should probably only be considered if this measure would substantially help a significant number of banks and if the set of assets were very narrow. In this case the lack of collateral obviously seems to be more of a systemic issue, and the central bank should consider taking action. In this respect, let me underscore two features of our collateral framework that have served us well in the recent period. First, access to funding is available to a broad set of counterparties. And second, the Eurosystem – whilst requiring high-quality standards – accepts a broad range of public and private fixed-income securities, as well as nonmarketable assets. Hence, sufficiency of collateral has not been an issue for the Eurosystem, even at the peak of the refinancing needs during the turmoil. Finally, moral hazard is a potential issue in individual banks’ emergency liquidity assistance. But here, it is up to the central banks and supervisors to ensure that in particular senior management and equity holders, and possibly debt holders, pay a sufficient price for the rescue. This issue has been discussed at length in the literature, the bulk of which convincingly argues that moral hazard issues can be taken into account in a satisfactory way in the design of the rescue mechanism.

As a result, a growing number of places in the region have either recovered or are close to recovering the jobs that were lost during the Great Recession. More troubling, however, is that Puerto Rico’s economy remains exceptionally weak; activity and employment on the Island continue to decline. Our economists will elaborate on these trends this morning. Private for profit institutions in the higher education landscape The important role of post-secondary education is undeniable given the key role that human capital plays in economic growth. However, the higher education landscape comprises different types of post-secondary institutions that provide different educational experiences. One such group of institutions – private for-profit institutions – have progressively become more visible in the U.S. higher education market. For-profit institutions and their growth in the market for student loans and federal need-based aid is the subject of the special topic in today’s briefing. Analysis done here at the New York Fed reveals that enrollment in for-profit colleges showed explosive growth nationally during, and for some time after, the Great Recession. Interestingly, this growth in enrollment has leveled off perceptibly as the economic recovery has taken hold. These patterns suggest that workers who were displaced from their jobs during the Great Recession chose to enroll in two-year and less-than-two-year colleges, mostly in for-profits but also in public community colleges. Now, with improved labor market conditions, individuals have less reason to get a short-term degree or may have returned to the labor force. Stark patterns are also observed in the market for student loans.