samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
First, large fiscal burdens in many advanced economies have altered the risk profile of the supposedly risk-free assets such as their government securities. As the line between traditionally risk-free and riskier assets becomes blurred, investors would be more willing to search for yields and switch back and forth between assets more easily. Second, although the money used by advanced economies’ central banks to purchase securities has ended up mainly in the banking system for the time being, quantitative easing does help raise investors’ risk appetite. On the one hand, QE is likely to make the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  recovery of advanced economies a bit firmer through improved consumer and business sentiment. With that, investors’ risk-appetite has risen, driving investors to riskier assets, including commodities and emerging market securities. On the other hand, QE drives down yields in advanced economies. The combination of rising risk-appetite and low yields in advanced economies pushes investors to search for higher yields elsewhere and thus makes commodities and emerging market securities more attractive. Of course, we must note here that despite the altered risk profiles, government securities of advanced economies are likely to remain the ultimate safe haven assets. As such, portions of capital flows could reverse themselves very easily when risk appetite wanes. Experiences have shown that the so-called “risk aversion” episode could coincide with large withdrawals of funds from emerging markets back to advanced economies. These fluctuations in capital flows could potentially pose important challenges for emerging markets.

Exchange rate adjustments in the face of large capital inflows, however, are not without costs. An excessively rapid appreciation of the currency could be disruptive to the real economy, since there often are constraints in the adjustments of the real economy, from labor market frictions to pricing behaviors. Here we have a challenge and need to balance well. In general, we would allow the currency to appreciate to the extent that the movements are broadly consistent with the economic fundamentals and that they would not cause undue disruptions in the real sector. Let me note here that I think the Thai economy, over the years, has become more capable in coping with exchange rate movements. We see more risk protection via financial market instruments on the part of the private sector. Exporters, in particular, have been able to diversify in terms of product lines and market destinations. Nevertheless, from time to time there is still a need to dampen the pressures on the exchange rate, and central banks often resort to exchange rate intervention. While such intervention could help contain excess exchange rate volatility, its focus is at the end of the process. In other word, FX intervention is a “passive” mechanism in dealing with capital inflows. By the time of intervention, capital would have already flowed into the economy. Imbalances could have already built up.
I would like to conclude here that, to join the AEC in 2015 both central bank and financial institutions need to have proactive strategies to deal with the changing economic and social environments. The central bank will play an important role in supporting private sectors and ensuring the stability and efficiency of financial system and infrastructures. Concurrently, the financial institutions need to rethink and redesign their business processes and strategies in order to stay at the forefront of highly competitive environment as well as to reap the full benefit of the integrated economic community. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Its soundness has, moreover, been appreciable in all its components. In the case of investment in construction, growth rates of over 5% have been observed. In this respect, residential investment, along with the non-residential building and civil engineering works segments, were particularly buoyant. In the case of housing, the latest available data suggest that this dynamism might run into 2007. Investment in equipment has not only remained the most dynamic component of demand, but it also moved on a rising path in the first half of the year. This facet of the current growth pattern is, perhaps, one of the most favourable points, since it may be interpreted as a renewed effort by Spanish firms to extend and modernise their productive apparatus at a time at which returns are high and the financial conditions for undertaking such spending are still attractive. Evidently, increased export activity and the improvement in the industrial sector in 2006, which I shall address hereafter, are very closely connected to the momentum of investment in equipment. The dynamism of exports is in fact one of the key features of the current economic situation, as it has served to raise the contribution of net external demand to GDP growth and offset the slight slowdown in national demand. The pick-up in goods exports has been driven by the forceful increase in world trade and by the take-off of economic activity in the euro area countries.
Luis de Guindos: Euro area and Spain - current status and challenges ahead Remarks by Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the 1st Edition of the Prize José Echegaray of elEconomista, Madrid, 15 October 2018. * * *  Despite the recent slow-down, economic growth in the euro area remains solid and broad-based, as confirmed by the latest data. Real GDP has expanded for 21 consecutive quarters, growing 0.4% quarter-on-quarter during the second quarter of 2018. In the first half of 2018, growth weakened from the very high rates of last year, reflecting lower exports. In the coming period, however, we expect the economy to continue to grow at a pace above its potential. In fact, the duration and amplitude of the current expansion is still below historical averages, having lasted no more than five years and with real GDP now 10% above the trough in the first quarter of 2013.1 By comparison, on average, growth phases in the past lasted seven and a half years from trough to peak, with GDP increasing by 21% over the same period. While risks to growth have remained broadly balanced, those related to global factors, including the threat of increased global protectionism, rising oil prices and emerging market vulnerabilities, have become more prominent. Volatility in sovereign debt markets and the rise in populism add to overall uncertainty. The ongoing expansion has led to strong employment gains.

For example, the labour participation rate is still low at 58% compared with an EU average of 70%; and the Maltese will have worked seven fewer days this year than the Dutch, who work longest, and three days fewer than the EU average, despite the abolition of the practice of compensation for a holiday that falls on the weekend. Since independence, moreover, successive governments have bequeathed a legacy of welfare schemes and free public services that have not only distorted incentives and encouraged waste and abuse, but are also largely unsustainable. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Government absorbs almost half of the GDP, the tenth highest percentage in the EU. The concept of value for money, moreover, does not always prevail in public sector procurement 1 . Let me mention just two examples of resource misallocation. The first is the absence of fees for government-supplied health care. One can, for example, obtain expensive medicines or have a heart by-pass operation for free, regardless of one’s capacity to pay. Not surprisingly, the budgetary allocation for medicines and surgical materials alone is forecast to increase by 13% next year to Lm21.5 million. The sustainability of the public health system is imperiled by the very manner in which it is financed. Sooner or later, the ability to provide free services to those who truly deserve them will itself come under threat.
Rapid changes in exchange rates*  Duration Value at the Top value (days) beginning  % Change  Standard deviation  Beginning Date  Ending Date  15.04.2002  30.07.2002  106  1.2928  1.6966  31.2  1.11  03.12.2002  09.01.2003  37  1.5200  1.6825  10.7  1.00  03.03.2003  25.03.2003  22  1.5962  1.7548  9.9  1.53  24.09.2003  10.11.2003  47  1.3545  1.5048  11.1  0.80  05.04.2004  24.05.2004  49  1.3076  1.5582  19.2  1.18  20.07.2004  21.09.2004  63  1.4293  1.5388  7.7  0.74  08.03.2005  30.03.2005  22  1.2601  1.3905  10.3  1.14  04.05.2006  26.06.2006  53  1.3167  1.7016  29.2  1.61  (Daily change%)  * CBRT indicative USD selling rate  6  BIS Review 89/2006  In this period of fluctuations, in order to ensure the continuation of the downward trend of inflation, the Central Bank used policy interest rates effectively on the one hand, and took the necessary market measures with a view to stopping the fluctuations in the market on the other. First of all, in order to prevent declining foreign exchange liquidity from increasing volatility in the level of the exchange rate, the Central Bank suspended foreign exchange purchase auctions and intervened directly in the market by selling foreign exchange where deemed necessary.

One of the distinguishing features of the Brazilian economy is its prudential regulatory framework. The vigilant stance of the Central Bank prevented the development of  1  2  See http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3343,en_2649_34349_41966331_1_1_1_1,00.html, 2009. January  12,  BIS Review 8/2009  disequilibria and excesses that emerged in several other economies. We did not let the markets adopt risk taking attitudes that led to the losses and problems that many countries are facing today. In fact, the Brazilian framework is considered a model for prudential regulation and regarded as an example to be followed by other regulatory authorities. That does not mean that Brazil is not being hit or suffering the impacts of the financial turmoil. But the Brazilian government is prepared to react and take all the necessary measures to tackle the crisis. In conclusion, a floating exchange rate is no cure-all remedy for all economic ills. But it is certainly the best regime for a large, relatively closed, economy like ours. If Brazil had not floated the BRL in 1999, it would surely have done so since then, and possibly in more adverse conditions. For all the above, this 10th anniversary is worth celebrating. Thank you very much. BIS Review 8/2009  3
There have been some false starts and business failures in this field, but some potentially more durable systems are now emerging in a number of countries, albeit still mostly in only embryonic form. The concept is of a storage location - or account - somewhere in cyberspace, into which you transfer funds from your bank account or credit card, just as you would draw cash from the bank and store it in your wallet. The BIS Review 28/2000  2  schemes are designed essentially for the retail shopper, who can then make payments from the purse for items purchased over the internet: the purse operator responds to your instructions by transferring funds from your purse to an account of the seller. You may wonder what the advantage of such schemes is supposed to be. Why not simply pay for each transaction by an electronic instruction to your bank or, more typically in the case of most retail internet purchases, by credit card? The answer is that digital cash purports to offer three advantages. First, it may be cheaper than other means for a series of relatively low value retail transactions. Second, it can be used by those who cannot or do not have a credit card - for instance teenagers. Third, it offers a degree of anonymity and perhaps a stronger feeling of security, in comparison to using a bank account or credit card, since account-related personal data need not be passed on to the individual sellers of the goods or services.

But the important point here is that financial innovations, coupled with technological advances in communications, helped to link financial markets across the globe. This globalization of financial services allowed the collapse of major financial centers to spread to the rest of the globe so efficiently. In fact, these very financial instruments which had been earlier used to diversify risks turned out to be the very means for spreading contagion. The spread of the impact of the financial crisis onto the global real economy through the trade channel changed the world’s economic outlook rapidly and dramatically. This had a drastic impact on the inflation outlook, and the threat of inflation has rapidly shifted to one of possible deflation. At the same time, central banks are running out of traditional monetary policy ammunition to fight the slowdown in growth and potential deflation – namely cutting interest rates. Given the increasing influence of external factors on global inflation dynamics, traditional monetary policy which focuses on domestic dynamics of inflation needs to be reconsidered. As a result of globalization, the prices of important commodities and goods tend to move together, making external price shocks a more and more important determinant of domestic inflation. Fluctuations in oil prices and other commodity prices, or even a sustained period of cheaper or dearer exports, can change global inflation dynamics.
The Supervisory  12  BIS Review 154/2010  Council continues to have a mix of administrative and supervisory duties, but its tasks were delimited by the Act of 1985. 40 The Supervisory Council shall supervise the Bank’s activities and ensure that the rules governing the Bank’s operations are observed. The council has its own secretariat, adopts the annual accounts of Norges Bank and approves its budget. The Bank continues in part to be the Storting’s bank. A substantial change has taken place over the past decade in that the Supervisory Council shall no long submit a report on its activities to the Ministry of Finance, but directly to the Storting. This is a partial reversal of the change to the Act that was made in 1949. In my judgement, the tasks of the Supervisory Council could be broadened. Among other things, it should be able to play a greater role in appointments to the Executive Board and Bank management, for example, through a formal right to make recommendations. 41 This could give the Supervisory Council an even greater sense of ownership over the organisation and strengthen their sense of commitment. In central banking circles it is easy to confuse independence, expertise and long-termism with infallibility. 42 Central bank independence in the use of instruments is contingent on central bank transparency and disclosure of the background for its decisions. This provides a basis for evaluating the Bank’s decisions. Moreover, the central bank is accountable.

19  Hermod Skånland writes about the need to hold someone accountable for the hardships of the 1920s: “The government is usually a good target for criticism, but there is little appeal in firing shots at a government that is no longer in office, and through the 1920s there had been so many governments that no single government stood out as more responsible than others. On the other hand, there had been one central bank governor, who had also been a prominent figure. Nicolai Rygg became the obvious scapegoat, open to attack from both the masses and from historians, without any economists springing to his defence. Thus, the myth became established that the economic difficulties of the 1920s were due to parity policy, and that Nicolai Rygg was responsible for them. From there, it was only a short step to a general scepticism towards monetary policy combined with a more specific distrust of central banks and central bank governors.” Hermod Skånland (1998): “Mytedannelsen om paripolitikken” (Myth-making about parity policy), Aftenposten 30 May. BIS Review 154/2010  5  virtually solely responsible – for a policy that became a crucial deterrent to central bank independence for generations of economists and politicians – myself included.” 20 The postwar period of coordination and regulatory optimism Views on economic policy changed considerably from the end of the 1930s. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates against the US dollar was established, with the US dollar pegged to gold.
The downgrade reflects the sharper-than-expected decline in inflation in car prices and accommodation costs in the first five months of the year. The announced increases in the supply of rental units and Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) should help secure a moderating inflation profile in these components in the year ahead. The relatively benign inflation outlook is of course premised on no new shocks to global supply and no reversal in domestic wage momentum. MAS' monetary policy has been proactive and progressive, positioning the economy well in light of shifts in the balance of risks between growth and inflation. Being proactive in tightening monetary policy has allowed us to keep pace with an accelerating inflation momentum. We began tightening monetary policy in October 2021 when core inflation averaged just 1.1% in the preceding quarter. We did not foresee the war in Ukraine or the surge in global food and energy prices but we assessed that inflation was beginning to climb in the aftermath of the pandemic and sought to position monetary policy more appropriately. Starting early has allowed us to take a pause – as we did in April 2023 – to monitor how the Singapore economy evolves and assess whether the disinflation trend continues. 3/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Our progressive tightening of monetary policy has helped to arrest the momentum of price increases and facilitated a gradual decline in inflation.

One, we will broaden the scope of eligible investments to include blended finance structures in which financial institutions in Singapore have been substantially involved. Two, we will give more recognition to concessional capital invested in such blended finance structures. Concessional capital is capital that accepts lower returns or higher risks, compared to other investors, and can help catalyse commercial capital into worthwhile but less attractive green and transition projects. The ability to crowd in capital from other investors is why we want to encourage and give extra recognition to concessional capital. Hence, for every dollar of concessional capital invested, we will recognise it as equivalent to up to $ of investments for the purpose of assessing if the SFO has met its investment requirement. Three, we will recognise grants that SFOs give to support such blended finance structures. Grants have no expectation of income or return of principal. Given its deeply concessional nature, we will recognise as $ for every dollar of grant given to blended finance structures. Second, we will encourage SFOs to invest in climate-related projects. For the purpose of assessing if the SFO has met its investment requirement, we will recognise its climate-related investments – anywhere in the world, and not limited to Singapore. 12/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Climate change is a global problem that is not bounded by national borders. As a low-lying island state, Singapore is particularly vulnerable to climate change. We should thus recognise all efforts made to address climate change issues.
The gravity of the situation only became fully apparent a year later. The government is insisting the local banks are under no threat from the international financial crisis because of their conservative lending. Do you concur with this point of view? Maltese banks are not directly threatened by the financial crisis. Our banks do not hold asset-backed securities associated with the sub-prime crisis. And as the International Monetary Fund confirmed last summer, they are well capitalised and have high liquidity ratios. Maltese banks do not generally borrow from the international money markets to fund lending operations but rely on customers' deposits. It is significant that at the end of September, deposits by Maltese residents amounted to € billion, which is equivalent to one-and-a-half times Malta's GDP. That was an increase of € million since the end of 2007. Our banks, moreover, have very prudent lending policies. They have diversified portfolios and appropriate risk management systems. This explains why the fallout from the crisis has been fairly limited. Like investors everywhere, however, all our banks and other investors are seeing the value of their investment portfolios decline as a result of the generalised decline in asset prices. This will result in lower profits, but since our banks are well capitalised they are able to cope with it. This does not mean there should be room for complacency, particularly at times of unprecedented market dysfunctionality and a looming global recession.

This is evidence that we have not experienced a spike in inflation directly attributable to the euro. A lot of people would tell you that everything went haywire after March... Yes, we have since had an increase in inflation but this is largely attributable to the delayed higher international energy prices and the spike in food and cereal prices. We have been importing inflation, and the way we have administered prices in the energy sector has not helped. We have tried to protect ourselves for too long from market prices, and then when you make changes they tend to be bigger than if you had allowed the gradual movement of prices to take place. To what extent has the introduction of the euro helped to cushion the impact of the financial crisis? Where would we be with the Maltese lira? I was one of those who always expressed the belief that Malta's small open economy in a liberalised global environment and with its own currency was becoming increasingly vulnerable. That is why I was an advocate of EU membership and of early euro adoption. We only need to look at the example of Iceland, which stayed out of the EU, and the financial disaster it is now experiencing. Look at Denmark – an advanced stable country which is also pegged to the euro. Because of this turmoil, the Danish central bank has had to increase interest rates. This is the price of going it alone in times of stress. How much Maltese lira remains in circulation?