samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The CBT foresees that inflation will follow a fluctuating course significantly above the target and then reassume a decreasing trend in the last quarter of the year once the temporary factors taper off and come back to levels consistent with targets in the first months of 2011. In the last part of my speech, I would like to mention about the general framework of the monetary policy exit strategy that we shared with the public yesterday. As you all know, recently, one of the most discussed issues in monetary policies has been “exit strategies”, which include the withdrawing measures taken during the global crisis and normalization operations of monetary policies. We believe that the exit strategy of the CBT will be simpler and easier as no need for radical measures arose and the balance sheet structure was not damaged during the crisis period. I would like to handle the exit strategy of the CBT in two groups as foreign exchange and Turkish lira. The basic principle of the CBT on foreign exchange liquidity is that the Central Bank, which is the lender of last resort for Turkish lira and has broad flexibilities related to Turkish lira liquidity management, is not be considered as the lender of last resort for other currencies. For this reason, the banking system has to be much more discreet and prudent in its management of foreign exchange liquidity.

Meanwhile, the rapid rise or high levels of unemployment rates in many countries affect the total demand adversely by reducing household expenditures. The persisting uncertainties about exit strategies from the extraordinary monetary and fiscal measures are another factor pose risk to the permanence of recovery. The ever-growing budget deficits and swelling public debt stocks driven by the expansionary fiscal policies adopted especially in developed countries became an important risk factor as they push long-term interest rates up and affect private demand adversely. Meanwhile, sharp rises are observed recently in the risk premia of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy with high debt stocks as concerns over the sustainability of their current budget deficit are elevated. After summarizing the stages that the crisis has gone through since mid-2007, I would like to talk about the reasons for the emergence of the crisis from the viewpoint of the main theme of this conference; i.e. “the issue of governance”. There is a consensus over the fact that in the pre-crisis period, markets developed, deepened and grew more complex at an astounding pace but the institutions responsible for inspection and supervision failed to keep up with this change. Moreover, Basel II regulations made credit rating institutions a part of the regulation process; and complex derivative products and risk assessment methods spurred over-borrowing. In the pre-crisis period, the accommodating monetary policies adopted by central banks of developed countries in the form of the low interest rate-high liquidity led to moral hazards in financial markets.
At time T1, when real wage W1 drops relative to the peak value W0, the cumulative real wage gap is the area A (equal to the real wage gap). At time T2, when real wage drops even further, the cumulative real wage gap is the sum of areas A and B. At time T3, the real wage starts to increase, but as it remains below the peak value, the cumulative real wage gap further deepens (A+B+C). At time T4, when the real wage increases above the peak reference value, the cumulative real wage gap starts to shrink (A+B+C+D). The growth of real wage makes the cumulative real wage gap to close at time T5 (A+B+C+D+E) and to enter into the positive territory at time T6 (A+B+C+D+E+F). The cumulative real wage gap for the above 6-period model is described in the chart. Therefore, equation (2) can be written as follows: 𝑁 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑁 = ∑𝑁 𝑛=1(𝑊𝑇𝑛 − 𝑊𝑇0 ) = ∑𝑛=1 𝐴𝑛 where 𝐴𝑛 is the real wage gap between 𝑇𝑛 and 𝑇𝑛−1 , expressed as area. If a new recession comes at T7 (not shown in the figures), the new peak value for the real wage is the one recorded at T6.

As I see it,  3  See “Hedge Funds Regulation in Europe – A comparative study”, European fund and asset management association, November 2005 and “The regulation and distribution of hedge funds in Europe – Changes and challenges”, Pricewaterhousecoopers, June 2005. 4  In Italy the minimum limit for investment is EUR 500 000, in Ireland it is EUR 250 000 and in Spain it is EUR 50 000. 6  BIS Review 116/2006  such regulation could result in liquidity disappearing from the markets where the hedge funds operate just when it is needed most. Increased disclosure of funds’ risks, on the other hand, could help the market to function efficiently. If the hedge funds’ risk positions can be assessed externally, market discipline ought to improve. I consider that both LTCM and Amaranth are good examples that transparency rather than regulation is the problem. As I have already mentioned, LTCM was a very large fund and at the same time had heavy loans. The fact that the banks concerned accepted such a high level of indebtedness is in itself remarkable – one explanation was probably confidence in the prominent figures behind LTCM, who included Robert Merton and Myron Scholes. However, the banks did not have any overview of the fund’s size and total risk position. In their own interest, they should have required greater disclosure, and the authorities should have required this of the banks. With regard to the positions in Amaranth, there are similar questions.
Because this would call for greater variation in employment and growth, an outside observer would, all else equal, infer a lower value for lambda. This is when different views regarding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy become relevant. Those who regard the impact of monetary policy on the economy as relatively rapid may be more inclined to 22  See e.g. Blanchard, O, Cerutti, E and Summers, L (2015), “Inflation and activity – two explorations and their monetary policy implications”, NBER working paper No. 21726. 23 At root this is because, in aggregate, retailers whose costs rise adjust their prices only gradually, perhaps reflecting strategic, competitive concerns, or because many importers, over the short term at least, hedge their foreign exchange exposure. See Box on page 28 of the November 2015 Inflation Report for a review. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  12  act in response to shocks whose effects are relatively short-lived. All else equal this would tend to produce a shallower observed relationship between inflationary shocks and output gaps – a lower lambda. If, on the other hand, monetary policy is viewed as operating with a substantial lag, it may be that the more enduring influences on inflation are the ones that weigh most heavily in the monetary policy decision. In this case, this would tend to produce a steeper observed relationship between inflationary shocks and output gaps – a higher lambda.

This is as should be expected because society, through Government, has chosen the degree of inflation control and provided guidance via the remit on how it should be achieved. Second, the nature, scale and persistence of the shocks affecting the economy matters for the trade-off that is pursued at any given time. Consider the case of commodity price shocks. For the most part, these pass through to the level of consumer prices relatively quickly – changes in petrol prices being one example. Once these shocks have been reflected in the price level, the inflation rate, which is the change in the price level, would typically return close to its baseline path. In this case, monetary policy makers may be more inclined to ‘look through’ the direct, temporary effects of commodity price shocks on inflation, which means they do not intend to engineer output gaps to offset the inflationary effects in response. Because, over the short term, inflation would be allowed to vary while the real economy remained relatively stable, an observer would thus infer a higher value of lambda. This may be less the case for inflationary shocks of a more persistent nature, such as those arising from movements in the exchange rate. 23  When shocks have persistent effects on inflation over the policy horizon,  the monetary policymaker may have to balance them with surfeits or shortfalls of activity around potential.
Chart 7 shows how this has affected the rate of inflation in goods prices in the UK, which has picked up significantly in recent years – whether measured in terms of manufactured products at the factory gate or the goods which enter into the consumer basket. Chart 7 – UK goods price inflation Annual percentage change in prices 10 Manufactured goods producer prices 8  CPI goods inflation  6 4 2 0 -2 -4 1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  Source: ONS One of the key challenges facing the MPC and other monetary authorities around the world is judging how far this surge in energy and commodity prices has yet to run and how farreaching its consequences might be. The tendency so far in many countries, including the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  UK, has been to treat this phenomenon as a series of one-off shocks. But the driving force behind it – strong growth in Asia and other emerging market economies – is proving quite persistent – as Chart 8 shows. Chart 8 – Emerging market growth remains strong Annual percentage growth rates of real GDP 10  Advanced Economies *  8  Emerging & Developing Economies *  6 4 2 0 -2 -4 1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  *: 2011 and 2012 growth rates are IMF forecasts.

This builds up a knowledge profile of the area, and enables underwriting and pricing of risks. Insurers and governments are also able to detect droughts and floods, and their potential impact on harvests early, enabling a quicker response. And in the event of a disaster, the before and after images allow insurers to perform loss assessment and support quicker release of claims to the affected farmers. No need to send loss surveyors to inspect damages in-person, which can be costly and time consuming. Big data analytics is at the core of Singapore’s own Natural Catastrophe Data Analytics Exchange (Nat Cat DAX). Nat Cat DAX is led by ICRM, in partnership with MAS and the industry. It will aggregate a variety of data sources including economic loss and exposure data as well as drone and satellite data to create a comprehensive database of Asia Pacific natural catastrophe risk. The consortium has commenced industry data collection efforts in Taiwan and Jakarta, and is also using satellite imagery to extract information on building features. I understand a more detailed update of its preliminary findings will be shared later in this conference. Product innovation Second, product innovation. We are seeing new forms of insurance products and solutions, such as index-based and parametric insurance. Unlike traditional insurance which indemnifies actual losses, parametric insurance solutions make pay-outs based on catastrophe events hitting certain pre-defined parameters such as hurricane wind speed or earthquake magnitude. This removes the need for loss adjusters to survey the extent of losses.
This will contribute significantly towards making the banking sector in Europe more robust and creating a level playing field. Second, a Single Resolution Mechanism will hopefully be proposed by the Commission in the second half of this year. In the meantime, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive should be adopted by the middle of this year, which will provide a better framework for coordinating resolution of cross-border banks and provide national authorities with new resolution powers. These new powers – like writing down capital instruments and bailing-in creditors – should help ensure that the financial sector, rather than taxpayers, bears the burden in future bank resolution. Third, the creation of a common backstop is already underway with the on-going discussions on direct bank recapitalisation by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This is an important tool for the near term to help break the bank-sovereign loop and exit the crisis. In the longer term, the fiscal backstop to the Banking Union could perhaps replicate the successful arrangements we see in the U.S. where the Treasury provides a credit line to the FDIC, which is repaid over time through additional levies on the financial sector. Fourth, the establishment of a common system of deposit protection will begin with the adoption of the Commission’s proposal on deposit guarantee schemes, expected by mid2013. This provides a harmonised framework and should help shore up confidence in national schemes – particularly, in my view, if there is a “depositor preference” rule in situations where banks are resolved.

Second, a single framework for banking supervision. Third, a single mechanism for resolving banks, funded by levies on the sector itself. Fourth, a common backstop in case temporary fiscal support is needed. Fifth, a common system for deposit protection. 1  Harold James, Making the European Monetary Union, pp. 313–315. 2  Padoa-Schioppa, T., “EMU and banking supervision” Lecture in the London School of Economics, on 24 Feb 1999. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  How would Banking Union have helped during the crisis? To illustrate why these elements are so important, it is helpful to think through how a genuine Banking Union in Europe could have helped both prevent and mitigate the crisis. Preventing the crisis Turning first to prevention, one of the key causes of the crisis was the unacknowledged buildup of large private financial imbalances in the period from 1999 to 2008. They were unacknowledged because the governance framework that existed in Europe was focused exclusively on fiscal policies via the Stability and Growth Pact. This reflected the prevailing belief at the time that the private sector was composed of fully rational agents and was essentially stable and self-correcting – hence only the public sector could create instability. This was of course a fiction: the private sector was where some of the largest imbalances were concentrated.
Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Leveraging remittances for sustainable development goals - a call to action Keynote address by Ms Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Global Forum on Remittances, Investment and Development 2018 Asia Pacific "Leveraging Remittances for Sustainable Development Goals: A Call to Action", Kuala Lumpur, 8 May 2018. * * * It is my great pleasure to welcome you to Kuala Lumpur and the Global Forum on Remittances, Investment and Development 2018 Asia Pacific. We host many regional and global events here in this building. From time to time, we are reminded at these events that not all challenges are created equal. Some challenges inspire hope for the improvement of countless lives beyond our own borders, and create not just opportunities but a need for us to come together across social, economic and cultural boundaries to advance the development agenda. This Forum is such an occasion and Bank Negara Malaysia is honoured to be among partners who are working together to build a better future for economic migrants the world over. Beyond remittances: Migration and economic unfreedom To provide some context for the discussions that will follow over the coming days, it seemed fitting to draw on the work of Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen nearly two decades ago. In his magnum opus “Development as Freedom”, Sen described how a particular childhood incident shaped his views on the concept of development.

Remittances have significant potential to deliver such opportunities to millions of migrants in their home countries. Let this Forum serve as a call to action, based on an honest search for better understanding and a genuine commitment to pursue individual and collective solutions. With much at stake, we cannot afford not to. Thank you. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 23 July 2021. * * * Good afternoon, We have made the decision to raise the key rate by 100 basis points to 6.50% per annum. Our today’s decision is based on the updated macroeconomic forecast that was significantly revised. The growth of the Russian economy sped up in the second quarter, and inflationary pressure turned out to be higher and more persistent than forecast. Some sectors are already demonstrating signs of overheating. Inflation expectations also continued to go up. Given the observed trends, we have revised our inflation forecast upwards by one point. This year, it will equal 5.7–6.2%. The important step in our policy, which we have made today, is needed to bring inflation back to the target. We expect inflation to slow down to 4.0–4.5% next year and stay close to 4% further on. Nonetheless, our policy will not contain the steady rates of economic growth. I would now dwell on the factors behind our today’s decision. I will start out with inflation. As of 19 July, inflation was 6.5% in annualised terms. This is considerably above the target and is close to five-year peaks. High growth rates are driven by both temporary and steady factors. According to our estimates, steady factors dominate at the moment.

Replenishing their inventories, companies substantially increased their demand for commodities worldwide. Russia is a major producer of key commodities. High demand for Russian exports spurs economic growth this year. As companies complete their inventories, the effect of this factor will be tapering off gradually. The growth of oil export quantities will also be supported by the easing of the OPEC+ oil production cuts in response to the recovery of demand. Taking this into consideration, we have raised the oil price path in our forecast by 5 US dollars per barrel in the next three years. According to our preliminary estimates, the expansion of oil output under the new OPEC+ agreements will add about 0.1 pp to GDP growth this year and 0.2–0.3 pp next year. Another important growth driver is domestic demand, including both consumer and investment demand. Considering these trends, we have revised our economic growth forecast for this year upwards from 3–4% to 4–4.5%. After the recovery, the economy will expand at a pace close to its potential. We forecast that GDP will equal 2–3% in the next two years. The possibility to achieve higher economic growth rates will depend both on the expansion of production and logistics capacities and on labour resources, their expertise and performance. T hird. Monetary conditions have been progressively adjusting to the earlier increases in the key rate, but are still accommodative.
Ladies and Gentlemen, in order to achieve efficient allocation of resources and to promote savings and investment, there is need to achieve and sustain low and stable interest rates. As earlier indicated, it is worth noting that lending interest rates have trended downwards in the recent past owing to the reduction in inflation. Low and stable interest rates would create conducive credit conditions, which would improve accessibility and availability of credit to the productive sectors. This would result in expansion in investment, increased production as well as enhanced value addition. This ultimately leads to sustainable economic growth required to accelerate poverty reduction in our country. Mr. Chairman, another aspect of the Bank of Zambia mission is that of ensuring financial system stability. As you may be aware, financial system stability is very critical to the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. As a matter of fact, monetary policy would not be effective in pursuing the inflation objective if the financial system were not stable, as monetary policy actions are transmitted through financial institutions. In this regard, the Bank of Zambia will continue with its efforts of ensuring stability in the financial sector. A stable financial system plays a catalytic role for financial institutions to provide the financial products that will contribute to the development of the insurance business. In this instance, the Bank will continue to support local financial institutions in their efforts to mobilise increased savings particularly domestic, which should go towards sustained financing of the future productive activities in our economy.

The bumper maize harvest this season has helped to ease pressure on food prices and to keep food inflation and thus overall inflation low. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, with respect to developments in the money market, commercial banks lending interest rates have also been coming down, though not as fast as the decline in inflation and yield rates on Treasury bills. Commercial banks nominal weighted average lending base rate declined from 29.8% in 2004 to 27.6 % in 2005. As at June 21, 2006, the weighted average lending base rate stood at 21.6%. Clearly, there is an urgent need for commercial banks to do more to reduce lending rates in order to influence a substantial expansion of private sector credit. Lower lending rates will contribute to the reduction in the cost of doing business in Zambia. In the current environment of low inflation, sustainable lowering of lending rates by commercial banks should be a logical course of action. The next issue I would like to address is that of the appreciation of the Kwacha against major currencies. The appreciation has occurred mainly due to the higher supply of foreign exchange on the market than demand. The key factors underlying the increased foreign exchange supply include: 1. Increased copper output and exports as well as record high prices of the commodity. The volume of copper exports has in recent years registered sustained growth, increasing from 353,000 metric tons in 2003 to 423,000 metric tons in 2005.