samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is now clear that the financial sector had not been fully able to manage the risks and that supervision of the financial sector needed to be improved. A more moot point is whether central bank monetary policy contributed to the build-up of financial imbalances.2 Had central banks been so focused on stabilising inflation that they ignored the financial imbalances that were building up? Had the Great Moderation given rise to overconfidence in the ability of monetary policy to steer the economy? I believe that both these questions will become increasingly important in the period ahead. I also believe that they need require further analysis, although one lesson to be learned in any event is that financial stability cannot be taken for granted. We can also establish that the recovery after the crisis has been slower than many expected. Output per capita in Sweden and in several other countries is only between 1 and 5 per cent higher than before the break-out of the financial crisis (see Figure 1(a)). Another example is labour productivity. In Sweden, for example, labour productivity is around 5 per cent higher than in 2007, which is a slow rate of increase in a historical perspective (see Figure 1(b)). Once a financial crisis has broken out, it can hence take a very long time for the economy to recover. 2 See also Billi and Vredin (2014) and Rajan (2005). 4 [23]  Figure 1.

Global real interest rate and Swedish real interest rates from a historical perspective 3(a ) Global real interest ra te  3(b) Swedish real interest rates  6  10  Real interest rate, 2 years Real interest rate, 5 years Real interest rate, 10 years  Global real interest rate, 10 years, weighted average (GDP)  8  5  6  4  4 3  2 2  0  1  -2  0  -4  87  91  95  99  03  07  11  15  87  91  95  99  03  07  11  15  Note. Per cent. The broken trend line has been calculated using the HP filter. Real i nterest ra tes a re ca l culated as nominal government bond yi elds minus actual i nflation. The calculation of the global rea l interest ra tes includes the euro a rea (as of 1995), Ja pan, Ca nada, the United Ki ngdom and the Uni ted States. Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Japanese Statistics Bureau, Ma crobond, OECD, Offi ce for National Statistics, Statistics Sweden and Statistics Ca nada  Falling global real interest rates can be caused by secular stagnation... Research provides several different explanations for the falling trend in global real interest rates.3 The explanation that has probably received the most attention recently is the theory of secular stagnation, developed by the American economist Lawrence Summers.
How does monetary policy function? Monetary policy affects the economy through a number of channels. Let us make a stylised review of what happens if the central bank raises the key interest rate. In the short and medium term, this will result in a rise in the real interest rate. Normally, the exchange rate will also be strengthened. Prices for imported goods are an important part of the consumer price index (CPI). An appreciation of the krone reduces prices for imported goods measured in NOK. This is often called the “direct exchange rate channel to inflation”. The rise in real interest rates reduces consumption and investment demand. This is the “real interest rate channel to aggregate demand”. With a stronger exchange rate, domestically produced goods and services will be relatively more expensive than competing foreign products. Demand for domestically produced goods will decline. This is the “exchange-rate channel to aggregate demand”. The reduction in aggregate demand will in turn cause a reduction in price inflation. This is the “demand channel to inflation”. Price inflation and wage inflation are both affected by changes in inflation expectations. Some firms set prices for several periods. In wage formation, expected price changes will figure prominently in the calculation of expected future real wages. When monetary policy is credible, expectations regarding future inflation will be dampened by a rise in the interest rate. A change in expectations will in itself contribute to curbing future price inflation. Thus, the expectations channel amplifies the effect of monetary policy.

This policy would in practice be unsustainable because it does not provide the answer to how monetary policy should respond to wage - and cost-driven unemployment. This would mean ignoring the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s. If economic agents feel confident that inflation will remain low and stable, and take account of this in their behaviour, inflation will move more quickly towards the target. The interest rate will then need to be adjusted less each time inflation has to be brought back to the target. This will also result in more 2 stable developments in output and employment. Developments in financial markets after inflation targeting was introduced indicate that market participants are confident that we will keep inflation low and stable. This is reflected, for example, in the long-term interest rate differential between Norway and the euro area. The interest rate differential currently stands at around 1 percentage point, which corresponds closely with the difference in monetary policy objectives. Confidence among financial market participants is an important asset if it proves necessary to use monetary policy to sustain the level of economic activity. It also lays the basis for lower interest rates over time. We do not have to pay an additional risk premium because there is uncertainty about inflation. Maintaining a firm monetary policy over time is therefore highly valuable in itself.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Developing Malaysia’s payment system landscape Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Payment System Forum and Exhibition 2015 “Moving Forward with e-Payments”, Kuala Lumpur, 3 November 2015. *  *  *  Welcome to the 2015 Payment System Forum and Exhibition 2015, with the theme “Moving Forward with e-Payments”. This year is another important step in our effort to develop our country’s payment system landscape. It marks the mid-way point of our journey to transform our country’s payments infrastructure into one that is highly efficient, secure and competitive as outlined in the 10-year Financial Sector Blueprint from 2011 to 2020. I will focus on 3 areas in my remarks today. •  First, I will provide you with an update of where we are in our migration path five years since we launched the Financial Sector Blueprint, and what we have done and achieved so far. •  Second, I will share with you some thoughts on how collaborative efforts among various stakeholders in the payment value chain can leverage and thrive on epayments as a strategic tool in today’s increasingly dynamic and competitive environment, and  •  Third, I will outline the opportunities that can be realised in relation to the Financial Sector Blueprint targets with specific emphasis on key priorities for 2016.

However, property markets in many other countries had experienced substantial price increases over a number of years, followed by a dramatic fall in connection with the crisis. Obvious examples of this are the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain. It is probably therefore more correct to talk about a North Atlantic property bubble. 1  1  The concept of “the North Atlantic real estate bubble” was introduced, as I understand it, by Paul Krugman and Robin Wells in “The Slump Goes On: Why?” in the New York Review of Books, September 2010. BIS Review 149/2010  1  Developments in the United States may have been the trigger, but problems had already built up in many other countries, too, and not only in the property markets. …as a result of a long period of macroeconomic stability? What was the driving force behind this process? Macroeconomic factors probably played an important role. The global macroeconomic environment in the years prior to the crisis was characterised by low interest rates, low and relatively stable inflation and high and relatively stable growth. In brief, there was an awful lot that looked awfully good – so good that this period was given its own name: “The Great Moderation”. It is perhaps not so surprising that in this environment of low interest rates and an apparently new era of macroeconomic stability households and financial institutions became over-optimistic and took on too much risk. Households were happy to borrow and financial institutions were happy to lend.
When I say this, you should also remember that many decision-makers are involved in the implementation process, both internationally and in Sweden. Furthermore, the Riksbank is not responsible for the main part of the new regulations – so this is not something we can decide on. On the other hand, we can and should participate in the debate. Regardless of our conclusions, it is important that we have an open and realistic discussion on the development of the Swedish economy and or possibilities to counteract potential risks before we are saddled with a new crisis. The discussions currently underway in the EU on how the costs of a crisis should be allocated show how difficult it can be to sort out problems after the fact – and this applies to an even greater extent as regards extensive cross-border banking operations. We should thus learn from this and discuss how we can avoid ending up in such a situation right from the very start. Finally, I would also like to add that there are a number of important areas that Basel III does not deal with. These include how we should handle banks that encounter problems, what approach we should take to systemically-important participants and how we should solve the challenges set by cross-border banking. These are areas that remain to be regulated and which will be keenly discussed in the future, both in Sweden and in the EU. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In this respect, I would like to thank Ambassador Maître, the Swiss Government, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and its Bilateral Assistance and Capacity Building for Central Banks (BCC) program for supporting research activity at the Bank of Albania. This 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  cooperation has been a significant instrument for improving our research work and exposing it to academic and international research community. Our cooperation will continue in the future to improve research methodologies and products. We are currently working with SECO toward the optimization and institutionalization of research agenda and research implementation in central banks. These important issues will be discussed in a jointly-organized workshop with all BCC partners on capacity building for central banks, in Tirana in spring 2020. Dear ladies and gentlemen, Our SEE Research Workshop has become a cherished tradition for Bank of Albania and central banks of the SEE region. It is a great pleasure, and we are very happy to see that the workshop continues to generate interest beyond the SEE region and central banking community. The list of participants has expanded to include speakers from academic institutions in the EU, the US and South-Eastern Asia, as well as from international financial institutions. Your participation is contributing to broadening and enriching our network and we hope that discussions will help our researchers to improve their work and strengthen their research recommendations.
The table shows the economic outlook as assessed by the Executive Board prior to the interest rate decision 15 days ago. The figures and conclusions are from the Inflation Report that was presented on the same day as the interest rate decision. Norges Bank projects strong growth in private consumption, while real growth in general government consumption will probably decline. This partly reflects high wage growth in the public sector, which swallows up a large share of government budget allocations. Mainland investment is exhibiting sluggish growth, while petroleum investment is expected to be high next year. Mainland GDP growth will pick up through the projection period, averaging 2¼ per cent in 2004. It appears that this year's wage settlement will result in the highest real wage growth in this generation. The results of this year's wage settlement suggest that the social partners considered the labour market to be very tight this spring. Wage growth will remain high for the next two years and contribute to robust growth in household real income. The inflation outlook for the next two years is marked by two opposing forces. High wage and cost inflation will on the one hand sustain high prices for Norwegian produced goods and services. On the other hand, the pass-through from the appreciation of the krone will result in a temporary fall in prices for imported goods. If the krone remains at the level of the past few months, the effect of the appreciation of the krone will be greatest towards the middle of 2003.

If inflation is low and stable, an appreciation of the krone will lead to a scaling back of business and industry to increase the room for more activity in the sheltered sector. Such exchange rate movements will typically come in waves. As petroleum revenues are being phased in, real interest rates will tend to rise. There will be a tendency for the krone to show a real appreciation, accompanied by a deterioration in competitiveness. The real krone exchange rate may move more in the short term than is necessary in the long term. The krone may be expected to depreciate at a later stage because higher real interest rates, combined with expectations of a depreciation of the krone, contribute to convergence between the expected real return on capital invested in Norway and in other countries. Moreover, there may be additional fluctuations in the krone exchange rate if market expectations concerning the use of petroleum revenues deviate from what is actually the case. Given today's exchange rate, it would appear that foreign exchange operators have already priced in an increase in the use of petroleum revenues. The cyclical divergence between Norway and other countries is reflected in forward rates in Norway, the US and Germany. Forward rates are expected short-term interest rates that can be derived from long-term bond yields. Market expectations point to interest rates of about 6½ per cent in Norway in the long term. Interest rates above 6 per cent are expected in the US, and a little below 6 per cent in Germany.
Issues raised by Malta’s prospective participation in ERM II During the ERM II phase, which for most new members would start soon after EU accession, the Maltese lira will be fully pegged to the euro and the exchange rate would be allowed to fluctuate by up to ±15% around a central rate to be agreed with the European Central Bank (ECB). A major issue, therefore, concerns the level of the central rate and the size of the fluctuation bands. Although the central rate could be re-aligned if it cannot be sustained within the chosen bands, the initial determination of this rate is crucial because it signals to the market what the authorities consider to be the appropriate level of the exchange rate. Determining the appropriate central rate, however, is not an easy task. While the available evidence suggests that in the current economic environment the Maltese lira exchange rate is sustainable at prevailing levels, the Central Bank is nevertheless undertaking the necessary econometric work in order to estimate an equilibrium rate. The choice of the fluctuation bands is equally important. A narrow band has the advantage of limiting exchange rate risk and contributing to the Bank’s credibility in the area of monetary policy. A wider band, on the other hand, would ease pressures on the monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to maintain the exchange rate within the agreed bands.

In the meantime, the Bank and the National Statistics Office are working to establish a common direct reporting database which will permit the dissemination of balance of payments related data to the ECB and EUROSTAT. The steady flow of information between the ECB and the national central banks is equally important from the point of view of transparency and effectiveness. The latter requires that ECB decisions be communicated in each Member State as early as possible. For this purpose, the Central Bank’s communications facilities will have to be upgraded. In particular, the Bank must have an archiving system capable of receiving, storing, retrieving and sending working documents to the ECB. Such a system is being developed. Conclusion Joining a common currency area clearly involves a complex and multifaceted process with implications of both a substantive and technical nature. This has become particularly evident as the emphasis of the Bank’s preparations has shifted away from legislative issues to the implementation phase. Much useful work has already been done, the Bank has been considerably strengthened as a result and we are fully in step with the central banks of other accession countries. Looking immediately ahead, the Bank’s integration within the ESCB now requires it to be represented on all the decision-making organs of the ECB. In fact, the Bank has already been invited to nominate a representative to sit on each of the twelve committees of the ECB in an observer capacity as from April.
To shed further light upon this we need to go through the causes for the development in the number of hours worked in recent years. The number of hours worked in the economy is determined partly by the number of persons working and partly by average working hours, i.e. how many hours each person works. One factor that has clearly pulled down the average working hours in recent years is the rise in sick leave. It is uncertain to what extent this is an effect of a transitory nature. Various studies have shown that the amount of short-term sick leave taken tends to increase when the situation on the labour market improves and unemployment declines. If sick leave is divided up according to length, it can be seen that the longterm sick leave has increased most over the past years. To the extent that this development is the result of incentive effects, the increase may be of a more structural nature, which means sick leave will not automatically decline when the economic situation deteriorates. In the general debate it has been implied that changes in various institutional factors accounted for this interpretation, e.g. that the rules for qualification for early retirement pension had become tighter and the remuneration level in sickness benefit had been raised. Another important factor here could be that the percentage of older people on the labour market has increased somewhat recently. Is an increase in sick leave the only explanation for the decline in average working hours? No, it is not.

As for supply, identifiable news about future productivity is rare – we don’t often see things that cause people to reassess their forecasts of trend growth. In any case, it’s often assumed that any changes in underlying supply are sufficiently gradual that demand changes along with it, without the need for any prompting from monetary policy. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  But the point we were trying to get across, when  Chart 2: Demand and the exchange rate  we used that phrase, is that Brexit has the capacity to move these things both significantly and, to an unusual extent, independently of each other. Today I want to pick out a couple of aspects of this. One involves supply. As I say, economists often presume that changes in an economy’s underlying productivity occur only slowly. If so, it’s unlikely that any particular event – Brexit included – could change one’s view of short-term trends in underlying supply growth. Sources: ONS, BIS, and Bank calculations. But in one respect, at least, a sharp reduction in the degree of openness could have a more immediate impact. Suppose, plausibly, it results in a sudden shift in the demand for domestically produced output, away from what we’ve been exporting and towards goods and services we’ve hitherto been able to import.
14  Figure 9 Employment (annual change, percent)  6  6 AFP (1)  4  4  AFC (2)  2  2 Total employment  0 Salaried employment  -2  0  -2  -4  -4 15  16  17  18  (1) Number of employed pension fund (AFP) contributors, (2) Number of unemployment insurance (AFC) contributors. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, National Statistics Institute (INE) and Superintendence of Pensions. Table 1 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent) 2017  2018 (f)  2019 (f)  2020 (f)  Sep.18 MP Dec.18 MP Sep.18 MP Dec.18 MP Jun.18 MP Dec.18 MP Report Report Report Report Report Report GDP Mining GDP Non-mining GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Nominal gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  1.5 -2.0 1.8 3.1 1.8 -1.1 2.7 -0.9 4.7 -1.5 20.6 21.6  4.0-4.5  4.0  3.25-4.25  3.25-4.25  2.75-3.75  2.75-3.75  4.6 4.1 5.0 3.8 4.9 6.2 -2.2 20.3 21.7  4.7 4.0 5.5 3.6 4.8 7.3 -2.8 20.2 22.0  3.7 3.7 4.5 3.4 4.2 4.4 -2.6 20.5 22.1  3.8 3.9 6.0 3.3 4.1 5.0 -2.7 20.9 22.6  3.3 3.7 3.9 3.6 2.8 2.8 -2.7 20.5 22.4  3.3 3.6 3.9 3.5 2.8 3.0 -2.8 20.8 22.8  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

By 2020, although the increase in level is notorious compared to the previous projection, its rate of annual variation compared to 2019 is not so different, as it remains a little over 3% (Figure 5). Regarding consumption, it has lost some dynamism most recently, but is forecast to resume growth at a pace aligned with GDP. This is based on the growth shown by the wage bill, when considering the National Statistics Institute’s (INE) revised salary information, the evolution of the hours habitually worked and the employment growth obtained by inputting the effects of the immigration flow of recent years. Plus, imports of consumer goods are still high. In the fiscal area, we use as a working assumption that in 2019 the economy will receive a boost consistent with the approved budget. From then onwards, we assume that the structural deficit will follow the path of gradual descent defined by the authority (Table 1). External scenario On the external front, the baseline scenario expects a reduction in the next two years of the momentum that the Chilean economy will receive from abroad, although it will remain positive. On the one hand, after reaching the peak of this growth cycle in 2017 and 2018, in 2019-2020 the expansion rate of our trading partners’ activity will be reduced. On the other hand, in the last few quarters the relevant financial conditions for the emerging economies began to normalize, a process that will continue in the next two years.