samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The information we use comes from many different sources. The bulk of it consists of official statistics from Statistics Sweden, the National Institute of Economic Research and so on or their counterparts in other countries. We also take a close look at the assessments of other forecasters in Sweden as well as elsewhere. In addition, we try to collected as much information as possible on our trips in Sweden and abroad. I set great store by a continuous dialogue with a number of colleagues about what is happening in their parts of the world and their thoughts about monetary policy. Monetary policy is obviously not a matter of applying an exact science. As our Governor and I have both talked about earlier in this building, domestic inflationary pressure has been unexpectedly low in recent years, for example. The historical relationships suggested that domestic inflation would be higher. Part of the explanation seems to lie in deregulations and increased international competition making prices increases in the traditional manner more difficult. There are also signs that the low and stable inflation expectations I mentioned earlier have aided us. We now believe, moreover, that resource utilisation has not been quite as high as our earlier calculations suggested. All in all, the economy seems to have been functioning more efficiently than we and most other observers expected earlier. Examples of other forecasting problems are not hard to find.

This reflects a number of developments. First, the influx of workers from abroad, including from the European Union accession countries. The precise figures are very uncertain, not least because people come and go a lot, but recent research 4 estimates that 2005 probably saw the largest ever entry of foreign workers to the UK, totalling around 400,000 – equivalent to around 1.5% of total employment (although outflows have probably risen, too). In addition, older workers are increasingly likely to stay in work – people above pensionable age accounted for a quarter of the growth in the work force over the past year; and Government policies are encouraging people on benefit back into work. The result has been that the labour force participation rate, the number of people in work and the number who are unemployed have all been rising at the same time – a fairly unusual combination. A faster growing labour force potentially raises the amount the economy can produce. Rather like raising the economy’s speed limit, it implies that it can grow faster without hitting supply constraints and generating inflationary pressure. That may be the situation right now. In any event, putting all this together with the impact of energy-related price movements, I do not read the fact that inflation is currently above target as convincing evidence that the economy is overheating. 4  “Foreign labour in the United Kingdom: current patterns and trends”, John Salt and Jane Millar, Labour Market Trends, Office for National Statistics, October 2006.
These adverse effects arise because public debt absorbs funds that could be put to more productive use and alters the overall financing conditions of the economy, distorting private investment decisions. Moreover, in adverse situations, high indebtedness detracts from the stabilising capacity of fiscal policy. In addition, sustaining high public debt requires maintaining primary surpluses over a prolonged period, which may call for higher levels of taxation or lower levels of productive expenditure. Lastly, one of the key possible adverse effects of high debt is the greater vulnerability of public finances to changes in investor or market sentiment. According to simulations performed in studies published by the Banco de España, under credible assumptions, the process of reduction of Spanish government debt will be very gradual; indeed, several decades may elapse before the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 60%, which is the benchmark set in the current European fiscal rules framework. In consequence, it is crucial that advantage be taken of the current favourable economic setting to complete the fiscal consolidation process and create budgetary headroom in order to be in a position to address future downturns. The work remaining should take the form of a medium-term programme setting out the measures required to meet the budgetary objectives, together with prudent macroeconomic and public revenue forecasts. Reducing the vulnerability of Spanish public finances is even more important considering the medium and long-term challenge posed by population ageing (see Chart 13).

Ardo Hansson: Celebrating the tenth anniversary of Estonia’s accession to NATO and EU Opening speech for Europe Day by Mr Ardo Hansson, Governor of the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank), at the Seminar on the impact of the European Union on Estonia, Eesti Pank, Tallinn, 9 May 2014. *  *  *  Today we are celebrating Europe Day. We have just passed the tenth anniversary of Estonia’s accession to the European Union, though the move towards Europe had started when the country regained its independence and linked the Estonian kroon to the German mark. To people in Estonia, being part of Europe means democracy, freedom, security and well-being. Closer integration with the European Union has been driven by the desire to ensure that these benefits are maintained. These core European values remain more in the background in our everyday life as we take them for granted, but events in Ukraine have given a sharp reminder of their importance. Accession to the EU has increased Estonia’s influence on the world. Estonia’s voice is heard better in Europe than ever before and Estonia is involved in setting the joint economic policy of Europe and the euro area. This gives us the power to affect processes ourselves, and the responsibility to do our work as well as possible and to answer for the results. As the central bank of the Republic of Estonia and a member of the Eurosystem, Eesti Pank has also contributed to the sustainable development and increased prosperity of the Estonian economy.
If, for instance, the annual interest rate for government bonds is higher for long durations than for short ones, this could be interpreted as the market expecting the repo rate to be raised. One problem when interpreting implied forward rates in this way is that they do not solely measure expectations of the repo rate. They may also contain premiums that can be regarded as compensation  2  BIS Review 6/2007  for differences between securities with regard to duration, credit risk and degree of liquidity. Estimating the size of these premiums can be complicated and can be done in different ways. 5 It is therefore not possible to calculate market expectations of repo rate developments in a clear-cut manner, which may create confusion. Another problem is that the implied forward rates may vary substantially in the short term. The question is therefore when market expectations should be read. A further problem that is sometimes highlighted is that there may be a risk of the central bank allowing itself to be steered by financial market agents when inflation forecasts are based on implied forward rates. 6 Personally, I am convinced that this is not normally any great problem. When we have had a different opinion from the market, we have said so. On these occasions we have also influenced market pricing. This was the case, for instance, with the monetary policy decisions we made in December 2005 and June 2006.

Irma Rosenberg: Riksbank to introduce own path for the repo rate Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Danske Bank, Stockholm, 17 January 2007. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here and speak about monetary policy. The Riksbank is constantly working on improving the bases for monetary policy decisions and its communication. As part of this work, we on the Executive Board of the Riksbank decided yesterday that we will publish our own views on what is a suitable development of the repo rate in connection with the presentation of the inflation forecasts. 1 I intend to devote my speech today to explaining why we have made this decision and also to mention some other changes we are making in connection with this. However, I will not on this occasion discuss the current economic situation. The Riksbank is considered by many experts to be one of the most transparent central banks in the world. 2 We were amongst the first to introduce a numerical inflation target and to publish our inflation forecasts and the minutes from our monetary policy meetings. This is so that the general public will understand the reasons for our decisions and also to enable our monetary policy to be evaluated. It further enables accountability and gives legitimacy to an independent central bank like the Riksbank. Now we have decided to publish our own forecast for how we believe the repo rate will develop.
At the same time, the high productivity and relatively good corporate profitability can be expected to be reflected in favourable wage growth in the period ahead. Altogether, this means that the prospects for good for firm growth in domestic demand and employment over the coming years. 2/4  Compared with the assessment in June, we today have somewhat more expansionary monetary policy. The budget bill that was presented in September also suggests that fiscal policy, particularly in 2006, will be slightly more expansionary that we anticipated then. That indicates that we might have to revise up our growth forecasts for the Swedish economy somewhat in the years ahead. All in all, this means that growth appears able to remain firm in the coming years. Gradually, however, growth should slacken somewhat, which is in line with a normal cyclical pattern with a normalisation of growth in investment and productivity. Less expansionary economic policy is also expected to contribute to somewhat lower growth in 2007 and 2008. Capacity pressures to rise gradually As regards developments in the labour market, the assessment of the current tendencies has been made more difficult by the change in methods in the labour force survey. With this reservation, it can nevertheless be said that there are signs that the situation in the labour market is improving. According to the National Accounts the number of hours worked began to rise in the second quarter this year.

However, it is also conceivable that the full impact of the supply shocks has not yet become evident on growth and inflation. To sum up, the oil price and its effects on growth and inflation are a significant source of uncertainty that we are grappling with in our assessment of growth prospects and the inflation outlook. Low long-term interest rates In the financial markets recent developments have been characterised by a continuation of low longterm interest rates and a stable krona. The low bond yields are somewhat puzzling. Even though corporate earnings have continued to increase in line with the continued strengthening of international economic activity, investment in many countries has not picked up to the same extent. While the willingness to invest has been relatively low in industrialised nations, regarded from a cyclical perspective, saving has also been high in certain oil-producing countries and in several Asian economies. The combination of a restrained willingness to invest and a high saving rate could, in other words, have contributed to the low bond yields. In addition, however, interest rates around the world in recent years may have been depressed by more transitory factors such as temporarily low risk premiums, effects of changed rules for pension saving and Asian countries’ build-up of their foreign exchange reserves. A fast rise in bond yields cannot be ruled out when these conditions normalise. That in turn could have repercussions for the real economy, partly through the effect on housing prices, household wealth and consumption.
Ardian Fullani: Monetary & financial stability policies – lessons from the crisis Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 8th International Conference of the Bank of Albania: "Monetary & Financial Stability Policies – Lessons from the Crisis", Tirana, 17 September 2009. *  *  *  Honourable Mr. Prime Minister, Dear Governors, Distinguished guests, I feel deeply privileged to open the proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the Bank of Albania entitled: “Monetary & Financial Stability Policies – Lessons from the Crisis”. I hope the proceedings will help the participants better realize the issues facing the global economy during this period and draw the proper lessons. I am personally convinced that the prominent speakers’ reputation is a guarantee in this regard. Before I invite the guests to discuss the features and lessons drawn from the global and regional crisis according to their viewpoints and experiences, allow me to say a few words on this conference. The topic chosen to be dealt with in this conference is at the forefront of the institutions’ agenda, responsible for macroeconomic policies and financial system surveillance at a national and international level. The panic that followed the Lehman Brothers’ failure almost a year ago transformed the turmoil in the U.S. mortgage loan market into a genuine globalwide financial crisis.

These are characteristics that are important to society, but that the individual user does not necessarily prioritise in their choice of payment solution. The question is whether something important will be lost if cash dies out and we do not introduce CBDC? Is central bank money crucial to confidence in the monetary system? Could CBDC provide more than cash can offer, in the form of a greater range of uses and more innovation? Chart 5 Central bank digital currency in Norway Declining cash use is not the only motivation for Norges Bank’s research into CBDC. The precautionary principle is also an important factor. We want to be prepared to be able to introduce a CBDC if the payment system develops in a different direction than we can foresee today. We must take account of changes in the payment solutions offered, including different forms of money. Libra will not be the last initiative of this kind. We must also take structural changes in banks’ payment infrastructure into account. We must think through the effect these changes may have on competition, contingency solutions and national governance and control of the payment system. Norges Bank’s research has now been in progress for almost four years. The prospective introduction of a CBDC is still some way off. The lack of urgency reflects our view so far that there is no acute need to introduce a CBDC. The introduction of a CBDC could have considerable consequences in a number of areas. Our decision must be well-informed.
The monetary policy response to climate change will depend on the nature of the shocks, their intensity and their expected duration. 8 According to our assessment, the overall threat posed by climate risks that are capable of affecting Switzerland’s economic and financial stability appears to be moderate at present. Nevertheless, these risks and the assessment of associated exposure could change, which is why the SNB remains vigilant. This is all the more important as our country is not an island – Switzerland’s economy and financial system are closely interconnected with the rest of the world. The SNB participates in dialogue at both national and international level. The SNB and FINMA regularly discuss climate risks of relevance to the Swiss financial sector. In addition to this, in April 2019, the two institutions joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). This network, which currently has 46 members, was set up to promote the sharing of best practice in handling climate issues and support the development of climate risk management in the financial sector. It also aims to enhance the role of the financial system in enabling the transition to a low-carbon economy. The NGFS’s work is carried out in three dedicated workstreams. 8  •  The first, in which FINMA participates, looks into the implications of climate risks for the microprudential supervision of the financial system, and banks in particular.

3) Wider inflation differential against trading partners The Asian crisis has resulted in reduced international consumer price inflation. General pressures in the economy have had only a marginal impact on price inflation in Norway. Consumer price inflation hovered around 2.5 per cent throughout 1998, which was well below the level anticipated by most observers. The fall in import prices has been the main factor restraining the rise in prices. The Asian crisis has probably had a dampening impact on international price inflation. The direct effect of the crisis has been a fall in the prices of goods produced in Asian countries and the indirect effect has been a slowdown in global demand and intensified price competition across countries. As a result, commodity and producer prices have also fallen. The widening of the inflation differential projected by Norges Bank has occurred as result of reduced inflation in other countries. Wide sectoral differences in price developments Although inflation has remained stable in Norway, there are wide differences in price developments among various sectors. Services prices have shown the sharpest rise, moving up by BIS Review 10/1999  –4–  as much as 7 per cent in 1998. The main explanatory factor is that the high level of wage growth has a greater impact on this sector as labour costs account for a substantial share of total costs. The rise in the consumer price index is being restrained by subdued or zero import price inflation.
As the MPC has signalled, a low for long interest rate environment will likely be with us for some time. The MPC’s new guidance that any adjustments in rates, when they come, will be limited and gradual helps provide confidence to households and businesses that the MPC won’t take risks with the recovery. This in turn helps make the attainment of the inflation target more likely. At the same time, policymakers across the Bank’s statutory committees are fully aware that an environment of relatively low and predictable interest rates could encourage excessive risk taking in financial markets and by households.22 This puts a tremendous burden on both microprudential supervision and macroprudential management. Moreover, the nature of a rapidly evolving global economy reinforces these pressures. Sustained imbalances across countries, intense capital flow volatility and powerful disinflationary forces driven by the integration of the other half of humanity into the global economy will buffet our economy and financial sector for years to come. The Bank can help turn those challenges into opportunities. Through the coordinated use of the Bank’s tools, risks to monetary and financial stability can be mitigated. Through changes to the hard and soft infrastructure of markets fair, open and competitive markets can be re-built. Through ideas and engagement, the global financial system can be reformed to secure an open, resilient system in which all countries have confidence and in which British businesses can thrive.

There are just 30 or so mentions of COLR on the web. One possible starting point is how we have learned to think about bespoke liquidity-support operations. After explicitly recognising that occasionally liquidity support operations can end up providing de facto risk capital if the recipient deteriorates, the late Eddie George offered some thoughts on this in 1993; 29 “central banks are not in the business of providing public subsidy to private shareholders. If we do provide support, we will try to structure it so that any losses fall first on the shareholders and any benefits come first to us. And any support we provide will be on terms that are as penal as we can make them, without precipitating the collapse we are trying to avoid ……… We look for a clean exit. The company may be required to run down or restructure its operations, under our surveillance, to the point where it can do without our support.
In order to clarify how we interpret the mandate conferred on the ECB by the Treaty, the Governing Council has announced a quantitative definition of its primary objective. Price stability has been defined as a year-on-year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%. This has to be maintained over the medium term. As the wording ‘increase’ makes clear, deflation – that is, a persistent fall in the price level – would not be consistent with price stability. It would not be possible for us to announce where exactly we would draw the dividing line between price stability and deflation. This is partly for reasons that have been described as the measurement bias in consumer price indices. For the United States it was estimated that measured consumer prices tend to slightly overestimate actual inflation. A bias may also exist for the euro area HICP, although its exact magnitude is as yet unknown and needs to be explored further. To maintain price stability, the Governing Council has chosen a stability-oriented monetary policy strategy. The chosen strategy is forward-looking in nature and also ensures as much continuity as possible with the former strategies of the NCBs. In this respect and with regard to the overriding objective to maintain price stability in an environment of flexible exchange BIS Review 60/1999  2  rates, our strategy is broadly similar to that of Sveriges Riksbank, although there are important differences.

If exchange rate developments pose a significant threat to price stability in the euro area, all other things being equal, monetary policy will have to respond. Of course, all other factors that impart information on price developments will also be taken into account before an interest rate decision is taken. Monetary policy decisions and the outlook for price stability In December 1998 the Governing Council announced that the interest rate on the main refinancing operation would be 3%. In the first quarter of 1999 the Governing Council kept this rate unchanged. After an in-depth review of recent monetary, financial and economic developments, the Governing Council decided at its meeting on 8 April to set the interest rate for the ECB’s main refinancing operations at 2.5%. In addition, the interest rate on the marginal lending facility was lowered to 3.5% and the interest rate on the deposit facility to 1.5%. These rates were left unchanged at the meeting of the Governing Council last week. The decision to lower interest rates taken at the first meeting in April has to be seen in the context of the stability-oriented strategy. The decision has thus been taken from a forwardlooking perspective, focusing on the medium-term trends in inflation and the compatibility of these trends with the Eurosystem’s definition of price stability. By adhering to this strategy, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy contributes to creating the economic conditions which are essential to exploiting the considerable growth potential of the euro area and to reducing uncertainty about future economic developments.