samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
and in terms of residential investment, which is slowing somewhat due to a tightening of financial conditions. As I have said, the extraordinary savings accumulated during the pandemic were concentrated among higher-income households, whose portfolios are also more diversified. According to the 2020 Spanish Survey of Household Finances, real assets1 accounted for 88% of the total assets held by households below the 20th percentile of the distribution (with their principal residence accounting for 66% of the total). However, for households in the 90th income percentile, real assets represented 73% of all assets and the principal residence just 34%. Similarly, a very small percentage of low-income households have listed shares or investment funds in their portfolios (less than 3%, compared with 33% and 22%, respectively, of households in the top decile of the distribution). One factor that influences households’ investment decisions is familiarity with financial products. Indeed, as the Bestinver-IESE/CIF observatory has shown, even in a study targeted at people more likely to be acquainted with financial investments, familiarity with savings vehicles and financial decisions vary across income, age and gender groups. These findings are consistent with those of the Banco de España’s latest Survey of Financial Competences. This survey, based on a representative sample of the Spanish population aged between 18 and 79, shows broad differences in the level of familiarity with the most common financial products.

Accordingly, as supervisors we should test principles, theories and procedures against the reality of events in financial systems. Both within and outside Spain, last year provided us with representative cases of weaknesses that leave no room for complacency and which require fresh thought and responses. The rest of my speech will deal with these aspects. Let me begin by noting that no new initiative it is sought to take in this field may be considered in isolation. It must be part of a two-dimensional framework. First is the matter of international coordination, since in markets as interrelated as is currently the case, the stability and behaviour of the system has an international facet. And second is the multi-disciplinary dimension, since, as revealed by the welter of problems I discussed in connection with the ENRON case, it is becoming increasingly evident that no banking supervision model may be expected to be efficient if the rest of the institutional apparatus underpinning the rationale of the market economy does not function properly. Among these institutional underpinnings, there are two which, although they affect all companies, I consider to be of particular importance for the workings of credit institutions and for their proper supervision. The first is the need to reinforce market discipline. On the basis of adequate, reliable and updated information compiled by companies, duly verified by independent auditors and impartially evaluated by analysts and rating agencies, such discipline should simultaneously act as a deterrent to and penalise imprudent, inappropriate or simply mistaken behaviour.
Refinancing for up to 6 years in line with the government's current credit guarantee program  5.5  China  Support for guarantees, increase credit to SMEs, postponement of payments and relaxation of restrictions  --  New instruments, rate cuts and reserve ratio, expansion of credit lines  --  18.3  14.1 (2)  Brazil  Credit guarantees and financing to pay salaries  1.0  More flexibility in regulation of Agribusiness credits, loans guaranteed by Financial Letters, 1-year repos backed by the government, new term deposits with special guarantees, loans backed by debentures, reserve requirements and capital conditional on providing credit to MSMEs, creation of a special line for SMEs, use of real estate as collateral  Chile  Capital increase of $ 3,000 million in the Guarantee Fund for Small Entrepreneurs (FOGAPE)  1.1 (1)  Conditional Financing Facility to Increase Loans (FCIC 1 and FCIC2) and Liquidity Line of Credit (LCL)  Colombia  National Guarantee Fund  7.6  --  --  Mexico  Credits to SMEs (not guaranteed)  0.2  Provision of resources to banks to channel credit to MSMEs and individuals; ease of financing multiple banks guaranteed with corporate loans to finance MSMEs  1.4  Government guarantee program "Reactiva Perú", --in addition to the creation and expansion of other 9.4 funds (*) (1) Corresponds to the value of the guarantee announced to increase the liquidity of the companies.

22  MP Report Jun.20 4.75-6.25 7.7 6.9 8.0 6.6 3.2 11.2 -0.7 17.2 20.6  2022 (f) MP Report Sep.20  MP Report Jun.20  MP Report Sep.20  4.0-5.0 5.6 7.0 8.0 6.8 5.0 8.6 -2.5 16.8 21.8  3.0-4.0 4.1 3.5 4.7 3.2 3.3 5.8 -1.3 17.3 20.9  3.0-4.0 2.7 2.4 4.9 1.7 4.8 2.2 -1.7 18.2 22.2  Table 3 International baseline scenario assumptions  2021 (f)  2022 (f)  MP Report MP Report MP Report Sep.20 Jun.20 Sep.20 (annual change, percent)  MP Report Jun.20  2019 (e) 2020 (f) MP Report Jun.20  Terms of trade Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP Developed economies' GDP at PPP Emerging economies' GDP at PPP United States Eurozone China Latin America (excl. Chile)  -0.6 2.9 2.8 1.7 3.8 2.2 1.3 6.1 -0.7  LME copper price $ Oil price, WTI-Brent average $  272 61  4.9 -3.6 -4.5 -7.0 -2.4 -6.4 -8.7 0.6 -8.3  4.1 -3.5 -4.6 -7.2 -2.5 -6.0 -8.9 1.9 -9.2  250 40  270 41  -0.5 4.2 4.4 3.4 5.3 2.5 4.4 7.3 1.5 (levels) 260 43  MP Report Sep.20  -0.5 4.7 4.9 4.1 5.5 2.4 6.7 7.3 2.0  0.2 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.9 4.8 4.1 6.3 2.9  0.3 4.5 4.6 4.1 5.0 4.1 5.2 6.1 2.9  280 47  275 47  290 49  (e) Estimate. Except for commodity prices. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
The work will stocktake current and emerging post-trade technology solutions, identify key pinch points and barriers to adoption across markets and products, and look at the cost and benefits of different solutions to address these barriers. Conclusion  The post-trade system is a key component of a bigger effective, efficient, and resilient financial system; one much reformed since the financial crisis of eleven years ago. A key feature of the financial system is it is one of multiple interdependencies, and it is this interdependent nature which is why I chose to focus on resilience and innovation today On the face of it, these two concepts are quite different – one referring to the ability to return to a previous state, the other referring to making change. But in practise they are irrevocably linked. An environment that prioritises resilience and innovation is one that ensures post-trade continues to thrive and adapt to technology, finance, and wider changes in the economy, whilst avoiding costly fragmentation. The Bank is playing its part here, with strategic goals on the one hand focussing on the need to innovate and drive change (Fintech; RTGS), but on the other on maintaining resilience (operational resilience; RTGS) – demonstrates that well. That’s why we’re focussing on providing a platform, via the right hard and soft infrastructure, for innovation to flourish. And why we will never slacken our focus on the criticality of resilience. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7

But we do not expect extensive relocation of production out from China in the near term. The bigger force diversifying supply chains is the continued rise of Asia’s middle class. Middle class consumption patterns are boosting and reshaping intra-Asian trade in goods and services Supply chains that used to focus on Asian exports to Europe and America are increasingly diversifying to also meet final demand in Asian markets. This means more regional trade routes and regional ports growing in importance. Last year, 12 of the top 15 container ports in the world were in Asia. As sailors navigating choppy waters would put it: “we cannot direct the wind, but we can adjust the sails." And the wind is blowing towards Asia. Flexible supply chains are more resilient – where production can ramp up or down in line with changing demand and where alternative routes can be used quickly. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is no doubt a rebalancing from just-in-time to just-in-case operations. But while inventories are likely to be somewhat larger going forward, maintaining huge stockpiles is expensive. Smart firms are recognising the value of flexible supply chains and exploring alternative production possibilities from the stocks on hand. A good example of flexible production lines was seen in France earlier this year, where luxury goods manufacturer LVMH shifted its perfume factories to produce hand sanitisers within 72 hours of the government’s call for support.
Eva Srejber: New EU countries - opportunities and risks Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the students of the Blekinge Institute of Technology in Karlskrona, Ronneby, 20 September 2004. *  *  *  It is almost six months now since 10 countries became new EU members, eight of which were central European nations that once were under the control of communist dictatorship. It is said that when Henry Kissinger asked Zhou Enlai, Mao’s right-hand man, to comment on the significance of the French revolution, he replied “too early to say”. As regards the enlargement of the EU, which is one of the biggest events in Europe in our time, it is likely to be many decades before we can take stock of the full consequences, even in the limited area I intend to discuss here today - the economic situation. Nonetheless there is much to say about the dynamics that have been created by the enlargement, changes that were initiated as soon as the EU opened the door to membership in the 1990s and that are now continuing following entry: In the short term the immediate problem for the new member states is to govern their economic policy in the right way, given their objective of not simply becoming members of the EU but also joining the eurozone.

The problem in several central European countries is that their government finances deteriorated drastically at the beginning of this decade. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are all, despite spending cuts, still running public deficits over 5 per cent of GDP this year. Should they peg their currencies so as to meet the convergence criteria, they could in other words risk speculation. In addition, they risk remaining in that precarious situation for a long time before gaining approval to introduce the euro; another of the criteria for joining the euro is, as we know, a maximum public deficit of 3 per cent. The worst scenario would therefore be if the countries, in their euphoria over EU entry, were to peg their currencies at a high exchange rate in order to quickly proceed to EMU. In such a situation, the problems in the countries’ government finances would put downward pressure on their currencies, while the euro introduction would be postponed further into the future for the very reason that the criterion for the government finances was not met as quickly as anticipated. It now appears that the risk of such a scenario has been averted. The four largest new member states, spearheaded by the Czech Republic, have made clear that their government finances must be in order before the process to enter the euro-zone begins.
Interest rates that are high enough to have a noticeable effect on credit growth and asset prices may have strong negative effects on inflation and resource utilization, and a central bank will probably rarely have sufficient information about the likely beneficial longer-horizon effects on inflation and resource utilization for the trade-off to be worthwhile and motivated. 18  16  Walsh (2009) points out that when financial factors cause distortions, these distortions will in general introduce corresponding terms in a loss function for monetary policy that is a second-order approximation to household welfare. Curdia and Woodford (2009) present a model where the second-order welfare approximation is a standard quadratic loss function of inflation and the output gap between output and potential output, but where potential output is affected by financial factors. Then inflation and the output gap remain the target variables, with and without financial factors. The neutral rate in the model, that is, the real rate consistent with output equal to potential output, is then also affected by financial factors. 17  Adrian and Shin (2007, 2009) argue, in a model with a risk-taking channel as in Borio and Zhu (2008), that short interest-rate movements may have considerable effects on the leverage of securities broker-dealers in the market-based financial sector outside the commercial-banking sector. However, new regulation may affect the magnitude of these affects, and the size of the market-based financial sector may end up being smaller after the crisis. In Europe, the commercial banks dominate the financial sector.

In the assessment of the Executive Board, the sight deposit rate should lie in the interval 2-3 per cent in the period to the publication of the next Inflation Report in March 2006, conditional on economic developments that are broadly in line with the projections. In the press release following the Executive Board’s meeting on 2 November, the following factors of uncertainty were highlighted: •  Stronger trade shifts and increased labour market competition may result in lower price and wage inflation and weaker pressures in the economy. In isolation, this would imply less frequent interest rate changes. •  We have little experience of such low interest rates over a long period. There is a risk that an interest rate that is kept low for a longer period may lead to expectations of a persistently low interest rate. This might result in a higher-than-projected rise in output and inflation and would in isolation suggest a faster interest rate increase. •  Developments in the global economy are uncertain. Our projections are based on favourable growth prospects in other countries and continued high oil prices. Different developments in global growth and in oil prices would result in a different path for the Norwegian economy. Interest rate setting must also be assessed in the light of developments in property prices and credit. Wide fluctuations in these variables may constitute a source of instability in demand and output in the somewhat longer run.
The only data relevant for the assessment of the situation in the money market are those on sight deposits and interest rates. We will therefore continue to publish these on a weekly basis. From now on, data on individual balance sheet items and monetary policy operations will only be published in the SNB’s Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Thus, the SNB essentially continues to report on its monetary policy operations in a transparent manner, the only difference being that certain data will be published less frequently. Our Guidelines on monetary policy instruments have been revised accordingly. These will enter into effect on 1 January 2009. BIS Review 157/2008  3  Transaction with UBS On 16 October, the SNB announced that it had concluded an agreement with UBS on the long-term financing and orderly liquidation of troubled assets in the amount of no more than USD 60 billion. To facilitate this transaction, a special purpose vehicle was set up at the end of November called SNB StabFund Limited Partnership for Collective Investments, which is domiciled in Berne. The company is structured as a two-party limited partnership. It comprises a general partner, which bears unlimited liability, and a limited partner, bearing limited liability. Both will be wholly owned by the SNB. The SNB and UBS formed a joint project management team, which is supported when necessary by external specialists. In the meantime, the SNB chose Northern Trust to act as custodian of the securities. We also commissioned specialised agencies to carry out an independent valuation of the portfolio.

Considering the historic dimensions of the money market crisis, the three-month Libor managed to return remarkably quickly to the target range – just one day after the two interest rate reductions of 6 and 20 November the Libor had already moved into the new range in both cases. The turmoil in the money market prompted the SNB to conduct money market operations to an extent that had never before been witnessed. There were days when up to five auctions were held. The volume of the operations varied considerably. On record days, we carried out operations worth over CHF 100 billion. The reason for these sizeable operations can be found in our interest rate management – we first inject large amounts of liquidity into the market and later absorb it again. Until just a few weeks ago, the liquidity actually remaining in the system was not considerably higher than before the crisis. It was not until the SNB adopted a policy of very low money market rates that the sight deposit balances increased markedly. The low interest rate level means that the opportunity costs for banks to hold  2  BIS Review 157/2008  liquidity are lower, thus prompting them to hold more money in sight deposits. The extent of the money market operations also has a major impact on the size of the SNB’s balance sheet. Before the crisis, approximately CHF 20 billion of the balance sheet went towards monetary policy; today, we are looking at around CHF 80 billion.
| Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  SNB has adjusted its approach to implementing monetary policy  Objective  Approach   Keep secured short-term CHF money market rates close to SNB policy rate   Reserve tiering  Reserve absorption  Environment  Large stock of reserves  SARON is the new CHF reference rate 5  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Reserve tiering determines remuneration of reserves …  Banks with reserves exceeding their thresholds Threshold Reserves up to threshold  Reserves above threshold  Remunerated at policy rate (0.5%)  Remunerated at policy rate minus a discount (0%)  Banks with reserves falling short of their thresholds Threshold Reserves  Remunerated at policy rate (0.5%)  6  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  … and creates an incentive for banks to trade reserves  Banks with reserves exceeding their thresholds Threshold Reserves lent to other banks  Reserves up to threshold  Remunerated at policy rate (0.5%)  Remaining reserves above threshold (0%)  Banks with reserves falling short of their thresholds Threshold  Interbank trade  Reserves borrowed Remunerated at policy rate (0.5%) from other banks Reserves  7  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering?

Maechler and Moser (2022) discuss the transition from Libor to SARON. We also remunerated reserves from January 2015 to September 2022. During this period, we paid negative interest on banks’ reserve holdings at the SNB. To reduce the burden for banks, we exempted reserves up to a bank-specific threshold from negative interest. Maechler and Moser (2020) discuss the SNB’s monetary policy implementation in the negative rate environment. Page 4/10  reserve requirement, so that the threshold generally does not match its reserve holdings. 9 As a result, there are two types of banks: those whose reserves exceed their thresholds, shown in the upper half, and those whose reserves are below their thresholds, shown in the lower half. The SNB now remunerates reserves up to the threshold, shown in dark blue, at the SNB policy rate, which is currently 0.5%. In contrast, the SNB remunerates reserve holdings that exceed the threshold, shown in light blue, at the SNB policy rate minus a discount. Currently, the interest rate on reserves above the threshold is 0%. For the remainder of this speech, we will refer to reserves above the threshold as ‘excess reserves’. Let us examine the banks with excess reserves more closely. As we just noted, part of their total reserves would be remunerated at 0%. These banks therefore have a strong incentive to lend some of their excess reserves to other banks, at an interest rate above 0%.
This was especially true in the last recession for the more highly indebted households who cut spending substantially than did less indebted households. That is, the distribution of debt also matters. Similar effects were seen in other countries. And there is considerable evidence that recessions that follow debt financed housing booms are worse. The IMF estimate that for each additional 10 percentage point rise in household debt prior to the global financial crisis, the consumption loss (as a percent of pre-crisis trend) was larger by 2.6 percentage points. Other studies have come to similar conclusions.13 Conclusion Since the 1980s the UK has seen a sharp and very material increase in the credit to GDP ratio and in the stock of household debt relative to income. This was particularly pronounced in the 10 year upswing of the last financial cycle when credit grew over twice as fast as GDP. This surge in credit did not finance an economic boom. Indeed, it showed little in the conventional indicators of economic activity. It comprised in the main secured lending to households for housing, driven by house prices rising consistently faster than earnings. The rise in secured debt and the increase in house prices reflected in part structural reductions in interest rates. Many of the forces that pushed down on rates over the period are long lasting and are unlikely to be reversed. To that extent, they have probably raised the sustainable level of credit to GDP.

In this regard, we have adopted the necessary by-laws which regulate the activity, supervision and management of risks for entities which provide the payment services. In addition, we have maintained a safe and efficient lek-denominated payment infrastructure, and we have expanded the latter with AIPS EURO for the settlement of the domestic euro-denominated transfers in 2022. The operation of AIPS Euro is less costly and time consuming than the previous process. Our estimations show that this system has saved around EUR 10 million to the Albanian enterprises and households in the past year. In response to these developments, the use of electronic payments has considerably increased over 2022, by exceeding the objectives laid down in the Albanian National Retail Payments Strategy. In parallel, I would like to point out that - over 2022 - the Bank of Albania has exercised its legal duties and has fulfilled its institutional engagements throughout the spectrum of  4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  its activity.