samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This comes to the end of key milestones of our journey, but the actual action is just about to begin. Although I end my address today, our journey towards a more competitive, inclusive, connected and sustainable banking system is not yet concluded. Our journey will be a continuous one as it’s imperative for banks to constantly adapt to dynamic financial needs of the real economy. Policymakers and regulators alike must also be proactively involved and adapt to the changing ecosystem. Although much has been achieved domestically, regionally there is still much to be done. As such, reaching the destination will require dedication and cooperation from all travelers to arrive safely. The key message that I would like to leave with you today is that do not get stuck with maximizing short-term returns or past successes, but we must invest more for the future. I wish you all a safe journey. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Petar Goshev: Macedonia – the crisis, its impact and future challenges Opening speech by Mr Petar Goshev, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the XIV Annual Meeting of ACI Macedonia – The Financial Market Association, Ohrid, 26 September 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Honorable members of ACI – the Financial Markets Association It is an honor to open the fourteenth annual meeting of ACI – the Financial Markets Association held in a year of exceptional challenges for both the global financial markets and the financial markets in the Republic of Macedonia. I would like to address three issues, not for a moment forgetting the key word for a successful functioning of the financial markets – the trust. 1)  What are the reasons behind the current financial and economic crisis? 2)  How and to what extent has the financial crisis spilled over the Republic of Macedonia? and  3)  What are the challenges in the future period? At the beginning, let me address briefly the reasons behind the current financial and economic crisis. The financial crisis could also be compared with an illness of a human organism. In both cases, the finding of a cure first requires identification, and then remedy of the reasons that caused the illness, i.e. the crisis. Observing the events over the several recent years, the reasons behind the current crisis could be divided into two broad categories: macroeconomic and microeconomic.
We should certainly not forget that as the new Member States differ greatly in terms of economic structure, exchange rate and monetary regimes, and in the degree of nominal and real convergence already achieved, they will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis throughout the process leading to the eventual adoption of the euro. In this respect, no single path towards ERM II and the adoption of the euro can be identified. In other words, many strategies may be feasible, provided they are based on sound economic reasoning, conform to the existing institutional framework and contribute to the high level of sustainable convergence which is essential in maintaining the status that the euro has gained in the few years of its existence as a respected and credible currency. We should also consider that the eventual adoption of the euro by a new Member of the EU is the end-point of a structured convergence process in which peer surveillance is called upon to preserve the common interest of all participants. The multilateral nature of the framework means that, at least at the ultimate stage in which full integration into the euro area is debated, decisions concerning one country or one currency are collective decisions. And this simple fact argues for the fundamental principle of equal treatment. So, while each country would be considered according to its specific merits, comparable situations and cases will be assessed on the levelled playing field provided by objective criteria.

We have not stopped to catch our breath after the euro change-overs, and we will not pause for a moment after the enlargement. In fact, the historical process of European integration that was initiated in Rome in 1957 is keeping momentum and will keep us occupied - I am sure - for long. The birth of the euro Sceptics were unconvinced as to whether it was possible to make the euro a stable currency and to successfully formulate a monetary policy for a supposedly diverse currency area. Where do we stand almost six years later? The euro has been firmly and credibly established as a stable currency. The euro area has brought with itself a period of currency stability, low rates of inflation and low levels of medium and long term market interest rates that generations in many countries had never seen before. The introduction of the euro, first, in book-entry form, and, second, in the form of banknotes and coins went extremely well under the presidency of my predecessor Wim Duisenberg to whom I would like to pay homage. The euro has become part of people’s daily lives. In January 1999, the transition to the euro in book-entry form was virtually free of implementation problems, although many people had predicted that such a big project would inevitably be delayed or affected by technical glitches or organisational failures.
Monetary discipline Unlike a fixed rate regime in which a national government can only issue currency if it can provide the backing (such as gold reserves), a floating rate regime allows national authorities to issue currency freely to suit their domestic needs. As we know, national central banks play a crucial role in controlling or influencing the supply of money. By changing interest rates or the price of money, central banks indirectly influence the expansion of credit and thus money  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  supply. Good monetary discipline is clearly needed to ensure that money or credit expansion does not become out of control. The initial experience in the US with the fiat money regime was not at all successful or pleasant. There was runaway inflation, rising from 5.8% in 1970 to 11.2% in 1979, and, as a result, Paul Volcker of the Fed had to introduce drastic measures to combat inflation by pushing interest rates to as high as 19%. It is now widely accepted that the breakdown of monetary discipline will lead to financial chaos with huge shocks to macroeconomic and financial stability. After the recent Global Financial Crisis, we have come to realise how important it is to maintain the appropriate monetary discipline. It has been argued by many economists that one of the contributing factors leading to the Crisis was that the US policy interest rate was set too low for a prolonged period, which further fuelled credit growth and the housing bubble in the US.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In conclusion, I wish to leave with you the following message: the breakdown of monetary, fiscal and market disciplines has contributed to the deepness and severity of the latest crisis in the advanced economies. In my view, there is unfortunately no easy way out or clever solution that could avoid the need and thus the pain of structural adjustments that would redress the imbalances built up in the last decade or two. Going forward, we must realise that we have to restore the 3Ds or three Disciplines, without which the conditions for sustainable economic recovery would not exist. Are we now in an era of awakening? I am not totally sure but I think, or at least I hope, we are. If not, then market forces would eventually push all of us into that position, except that the later the awakening occurs the heavier the price we will have to pay. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In total, the EU-11’s relative position in annual productivity growth worsened by 2.9 percentage points for the period of 2000 to 2003 or by 1.8 percentage points for the period of 1995 to 2000 against the period of 1990 to 1995. The GDP measurement differences I outlined earlier explain at best less than half of this productivity growth gap between the European Union and the United States during the last ten years. Admittedly, we need to be aware of the fact that Europe’s economic performance over this period has been significantly and adversely affected by the terms of German unification. The residual productivity growth gap lies at the heart of the question of why European potential growth has been so weak. To understand the gap, we need to focus on different relative conditions in input as well as output markets. Strongly diverging labour market conditions between the EU and the United States over the decades up to 1995 have led to a massive reduction in EU overall labour input. Rigid labour regulations in Europe restricted labour input and thereby increased the capital-labour ratio which helps explain the higher productivity growth rates in Europe until 1995. From an employment perspective, labour market reforms deserve the high priority they now get by refocusing the Lisbon agenda on “growth and jobs”. 2  See e.g. Nadim Ahmad, François Lequiller et al., ”Comparing Labour Productivity Growth in the OECD Area: The Role of Measurement”, OECD Statistics Working Paper Nr.

On that note, I would also like to take this opportunity to record my appreciation to all steering committee members and the panel of jury of the Royal Award for Islamic Finance 2016, led by Yang Amat Berbahagia Tun Musa Hitam for their unwavering support and commitment. Ampun Tuanku, Demikianlah sahaja sembah ucapan patik, dan sebelum mengundur diri, patik sekali lagi merakamkan ucapan menjunjung kasih, kepada Seri Paduka Baginda Tuanku di atas limpah perkenan berangkat ke majlis pada malam ini. 1 Thomson Reuters estimation, June 2016. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
José De Gregorio: What happened and where are we headed? Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the meeting Visión Económica y Empresarial 2009-2010, organized by SOFOFA and Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago, 23 October 2009. *  *  *  I thank the federation of Chilean industry SOFOFA and Universidad del Desarrollo for inviting me once again to take part in this important annual event. When I was preparing this presentation, I realized I had two choices: one was to analyze the current situation in light of our latest Monetary Policy Report, which I already did in another public seminar and that may overlap other presentations you will hear today. The other was to take a longer perspective and examine how we came to where we stand today, how we sailed through the troubled waters of the world economy and where we are headed. I think this is the perfect audience to take this second option. To begin with, it is important to bear in mind that the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) complies with its mandate of safeguarding price stability via a monetary policy based on a flexible inflation targeting regime. The objective is to keep annual inflation around 3% most of the time. When deviations occur, monetary policy focuses on correcting them over a period of two years. In practice, in our discussions we estimate a path for the interest rate that is consistent with the inflation forecast 24 months ahead converging to the target.

Any hasty behavior, or, on the contrary, being complacent and ignoring the severity of the crisis, could have eroded the effectiveness of the policies and deepened the recession. There will be plenty of time to analyze the phenomena that deepened the crisis, but what is clear is that the confidence crisis exacerbated the effects of the world turmoil on global economic activity. The upside is that the reaction of policies and the responses of firms have set us on the right foot for the recovery of the local economy. The adjustment of demand has put households and firms in a healthy financial position to resume demand growth. The various indicators of demand, expectations and production suggest that the Chilean economy has begun the process of recovery we foresaw for this half. The monthly index of economic activity, Imacec, seasonally adjusted, has been rising since May and the unemployment rate, which at some point was thought to be headed to exceeding 12%, has stabilized under 11%. Also, monetary policy will continue to be expansionary for a prolonged period of time and, as we stated in our last Report, in the most likely scenario, the slow withdrawal of the monetary stimulus will begin during the second quarter of next year. Meanwhile, the Chilean peso has remained somewhat more depreciated that the currencies of other commodity exporters. There are several hypotheses to explain this, including the effect of the monetary policy stance.
• We have also set up a deal making platform called MATCH, or Meet ASEAN’s Talents and Champions) [15] , to connect global capital and the ASEAN enterprise community in 2018. This will help to grow the pipeline of companies that will eventually require listing in our public markets. • Singapore also organises the annual Singapore FinTech Festival (SFF) and this will be combined with the Singapore Week of Innovation and Technology (SWITCH) that is coming up on the 11-15th November, to provide a platform for industry players to gain greater understanding of fintech applications and developments as well as support innovative solutions to find commercialisation opportunities. • SGX is also working with licensed private market platforms to facilitate the listing process for portfolio companies. Such platforms provide PE/VC managers with opportunities to invest or exit, and provide a pipeline of companies that could list on SGX. Such private-public markets partnerships can serve as an engine of growth for our public markets and provide support for enterprises throughout their corporate lifecycle. 28 Đ Đ In keeping up with changes in our public markets, such as the rise of neweconomy start-ups and technology firms, exchanges have continued to innovate to provide product owerings that support the varying needs of these companies. • For example, SGX has joined global exchanges in Canada, Europe, and the US, in introducing the Dual Class Share (DCS) structure to support firms which have shares with diwerent voting rights to raise funds.

19 Đ Đ To support technological adoption and innovation in the financial sector, MAS introduced the FinTech Regulatory Sandbox.Đ The sandbox is also a regulatory innovation for MAS, where we support financial institutions and fintech players to experiment with innovative financial products or services in a live environment, within well-defined boundaries.Đ Upon successful experimentation and exit of the sandbox, entities will then have to comply fully with the relevant regulatory requirements. 20 Đ Đ The sandbox has been well received.Đ Since its launch three years ago, MAS has provided guidance to more than 250 firms, and received more than 60 applications to experiment in the sandbox. iSTOX, a private market platform  leveraging on DLT and owering the trading of tokenised private securities, is the first market operator to enter MAS’ sandbox. 21 Đ Đ The approach that we have adopted requires an extensive review of each application. This is necessary as each sandbox is customised to facilitate meaningful experiments, with appropriate safeguards to contain the consequences of failure. We have learnt along the way that for certain types of activities regulated by MAS, risks can be well managed within certain specific boundaries. Hence, we launched an enhanced version of the regulatory sandbox, Sandbox Express, to complement the current sandbox approach, in August this year. For a start, we have owered three activities under Sandbox Express, including the activity of establishing or operating an organised market, which may be of interest to WFE members.
Chile and global risks Globalization and strong growth of the world economy have opened great development opportunities for the Chilean economy, but at the same time have increased the risks of shocks coming from abroad. The natural question is what should be the policy regime that most adequately could maximize the benefits of interacting with a world that becomes ever more integrated. Here, as elsewhere, the best policy is prudence. This includes macroeconomic policies and institutions that contribute to stability, to keeping a sound financial system and easing the adjustments to less favorable world scenarios. Chile’s present policy regime (i.e., mature inflation targeting regime with floating exchange rate, fiscal policy whereby government spending is tied to the public sector’s permanent income, thus enhancing its solvency before transitory terms of trade improvements, and an efficient system to regulate and supervise the baking system) increases resilience and facilitates the adjustment of the Chilean economy to less favorable external scenarios. This policy framework permits to prevent episodes of unsustainable expansion and crises that accompanied terms of trade cycles in the past. In particular, with inflation expectations well anchored around 3%, the Central Bank of Chile can apply countercyclical monetary policy. Furthermore, the flexible exchange rate helps to make foreign exchange adjustment if and when circumstances so warrant. Final remarks The world economy is headed toward completing its most dynamic five-year period in over thirty years.

With the fund’s current size and equity allocation, this would have resulted in a fall in the value of the equity portfolio of NOK 1700 billion. This is equivalent to 65 percent of GDP for mainland Norway. The financial crisis triggered a deep decline in equity markets, but was followed by a relatively rapid rebound. We cannot ignore the possibility that the return on the fund will be low for many years. In the 1970s, the real return on US government bonds was negative for five years in a row. In equity markets, a long period of high ERPs after the Second World War was followed by a long period of low ERPs in the 1970s. A good understanding and broad-based acceptance of the risk of substantial falls in the fund’s value are, as mentioned, essential to be able to maintain the investment strategy. Experience from the financial crisis suggests that the governance model for the fund is capable of coping with periods of large falls in value. We should, however, remember that the value of the fund in krone terms did not fall to any great extent during the financial crisis because of substantial transfers of petroleum revenues and a substantial depreciation of the krone. A future test of the governance model may prove more demanding. A FUTURE PERSPECTIVE ON WEALTH An assessment of the fund’s equity share should not be exclusively based on an analysis of expected financial market return and risk.
In Norway, a relatively large share of the population is now economically active, after lagging behind our neighbouring countries up to the 1990s. It should be noted that, even though labour force participation is high and unemployment is low, the average employee in Norway works far fewer hours per year than employees in the other Nordic countries. This gap seems to have widened through the 1990s and up to today. The standard working year is short in Norway, and Norway also has a higher percentage of part-time employees than other countries. The opportunity to work part-time has for a long time made it easier for women and young workers to enter the labour market. BIS Review 107/2007  1  There are considerable outflows from the labour market into various social security schemes. Sickness absence is high, and the share of the working-age population on rehabilitation schemes or receiving disability pensions is rising. Many workers choose to take early retirement under the AFP scheme (contractual early retirement) when they reach the age of 62, and this number will probably increase in the years ahead. In Norway, close to 600 000 persons of working age receive social security benefits or pensions. This is equivalent to 25 per cent of the labour force. A disturbing aspect is that disability is increasing among young people. We know from experience that this group tends to remain outside the labour force for parts or all of their lives.

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27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Annex  Chart 1: Number of central banks Number of central banks 200 ECB  150  100  Sveriges Riksbank  Bank of England  50  Bank of Japan  Banque de France  US Federal Reserve 2016  2004  1992  1980  1968  1956  1944  1932  1920  1908  1896  1884  1872  1860  1848  1836  1824  1812  1800  1788  1776  1764  1752  1740  1728  1716  1704  1692  1680  1668  0  Source: Central Banking Directory  Chart 2: Percentage of independent central banks  Monetary policy objectives  Percentages of central banks 100  All aspects  90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 2012  2010  2008  2006  2004  2002  2000  1998  1996  1994  1992  1990  1988  1986  1984  1982  1980  1978  1976  1974  1972  1970  0  Source: Garriga (2016) using index of Cukierman et al (1992). Notes: Central banks with values greater or equal to 0.4 on the index are defined as independent. ‘Monetary policy objectives’ measures whether the central bank’s objective is focused on price stability. ‘All aspects’ also includes variables related to the appointment of the CEO/Governor; policy formulation; and limitations on lending to the government.

Exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro area has declined, while it would continue to exist vis-à-vis the US dollar even after integration. The as yet more flexible labour market ushered in by the transition period II of the Bilateral Agreements I is the flagship of Swiss economic policy. It keeps unemployment and the resultant national costs low in the long term and strengthens the incentives for individual performance. It is essential to translate openness and flexibility, also with respect to internal structural reforms and external relations, into autonomously implemented reforms and a practical global orientation. BIS Review 49/2004  1