My message to you is: Don’t let last month’s temporary spike in SOFR, or hope for the creation of some other replacement reference rate, become an excuse for delaying your transition away from LIBOR. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: like death and taxes, the end of LIBOR is unavoidable, and we must do all that it takes to prepare for a LIBOR-less future.9 And the existence of LIBOR is only guaranteed for another 807 days.10 Conclusion I’ve talked through a lot of important issues this afternoon, and I greatly appreciate your attention. The events I’ve described are an apt reminder of the importance of well-functioning financial markets and the vital role the Federal Reserve plays in providing liquidity. They are also a demonstration of our ability to act swiftly and effectively to execute our monetary policy implementation goals and keep the federal funds rate within in the target range. Thank you. 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Monetary  Policy Implementation, October 11, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Statement Regarding Treasury Bill Purchases and Repurchase Operations, October 11, 2019. 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Monetary  Policy Implementation, October 11, 2019. 3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Monetary  Policy Implementation and Balance Sheet Normalization, January 30, 2019. Further details were announced in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Balance Sheet Normalization Principles and Plans, March 20, 2019.

The resolution frameworks, in step with the text of the Directive, are structured in three phases: prevention; early intervention; and resolution in the true sense of the term. 1.- In the preventive phase, recovery and resolution plans must be designed. Recovery plans are drawn up by the banks themselves and should include a series of actions relating to the institution’s capital and liquidity in order, should the case arise, to restore its financial equilibrium. Supervisors must revise these plans, identifying potential impediments to their proper application. Resolution plans are agreed by the resolution authorities and seek to establish a catalogue of actions that the authorities might take in situations in which a credit institution is close to non-viability. 2.- For the early intervention phase, supervisors are entitled to take measures before a bank’s financial position deteriorates irremediably. These measures have helped bolster conventional tools, such as limiting dividend pay-outs. These new measures include most notably the possibility of altering a bank’s business strategy or the power to call for legal changes in a bank’s structure. 3.- The third, resolution phase is what leads to the reorganisation of a credit institution, making use of specific mechanisms. Most prominent in this connection has been the socalled bail-in, involving rescuing a bank from the inside, as opposed to the traditional publicsector bail-out. A bail-in entails the possibility of cancelling – or converting into capital – the entitlements of specific shareholders and creditors of credit institutions in a position close to insolvency.