samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When the krona appreciates, this has both a direct effect on inflation, which is pushed down when import prices fall, and an indirect effect in that the demand for Swedish-produced goods and services is affected negatively. Strong krona contributes to low inflation The possibility for monetary policy to steer the exchange rate is limited, but there is nevertheless reason to believe that the krona has become stronger than it would otherwise have been because of our leaning against the wind. If foreign exchange market participants see an increased difference between the yield on a Swedish treasury bill and the yield on foreign equivalents, the Swedish treasury bills and thus the Swedish krona will be more attractive and therefore more expensive – that is, the krona will appreciate. Although it is difficult to see clear links between observed exchange rates and interest rate differentials, a positive interest rate differential usually coincides with a strong krona (see Figure 1). The difficulty in seeing clear links is due to expectations having considerable significance for trade on the financial markets. The market rates and the krona rate do not change when the Riksbank makes its repo-rate decisions, they change when market participants’ expectations of future repo-rate decisions change. Figure 1.

On the other hand, the benefit appears small, quite simply because the effect on indebtedness appears small. 13  8  See Svensson (2013a). BIS central bankers’ speeches  Risks linked to household indebtedness should instead be managed by means of measures taken in other areas. The mortgage cap probably already has some impact. Finansinspektionen has also introduced a risk weight floor for mortgages and notified that it intends to raise this, which in practice will increase the banks’ costs for mortgages. The Swedish Bankers’ Association’s recommendation to draw up amortisation plans in line with Finansinspektionen’s notified requirement may also have an effect.14 Nor is there any shortage of ideas for further measures, including the introduction of countercyclical capital buffers, which they now use in Norway. Underneath all this is a problem of a more structural nature, namely a supply of housing that has grown slowly and a housing market that is not functioning efficiently. This has most likely contributed to pushing up the price of housing and consequently indebtedness. Neither monetary policy nor measures in the field of macroprudential policy can resolve this type of structural problem; they must be managed with entirely different measures. Do marginal differences in the repo rate play a role? In the same way as one can question whether a repo rate that is a few tenths of a percentage point higher or lower plays any role with regard to risks linked to household indebtedness, one can also question whether it has any significance for inflation and unemployment.
Brian P Sack: Preparing for a smooth (eventual) exit Remarks by Mr Brian P Sack, Executive Vice President of Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference, Arlington, Virginia, 8 March 2010. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to speak today. In my remarks, I will provide an update on the progress that the Federal Reserve is making toward preparing for a smooth exit from the extraordinary policy actions that were taken in response to the financial crisis. 1 I should note up front that I will not be providing any information about the likely timing of policy tightening; those decisions will be made and communicated by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Instead, I will focus my comments on the policy tools and strategy that are likely to be used whenever that exit becomes appropriate. I will also discuss the preparedness of financial markets for the Fed’s exit, in order to assess how financial conditions may evolve as the exit approaches and gets under way. When the time comes to tighten monetary policy, the Federal Reserve will be embarking on a tightening cycle like no other in its history. First, this tightening cycle will have two policy dimensions, in that the FOMC will have to decide on the path of its asset holdings in addition to the path of the short-term interest rate.

Simon Potter: The Foreign Exchange Global Code - lessons learned and next steps Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2017 FX Week Conference, New York City, 12 July 2017. * * * I would like to thank Christina Getz and Jamie Pfeifer for their excellent assistance in the preparation of these remarks and colleagues in the global central bank and FX community for numerous insightful comments and suggestions. Good morning. It is a pleasure to return to FX Week USA, and I would like to thank FX Week for the invitation. Foreign exchange (FX) market participants play important roles in their interactions with the New York Fed. They act as FX trading counterparties of the New York Fed and they provide information on market conditions to support the Desk’s monitoring of financial markets and transmission of policy. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today. Before I begin, I would also like to note that my comments today reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. However, remarks on the expectations for FX counterparties reflect the policies of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. At this event two years ago, I highlighted the important role the FX market plays in facilitating the flow of capital across the globe in support of international trade and investment.
Be that as it may, the direct fiscal costs of capital injections into domestic banks, losses on government guarantees, the blanket guarantee of domestic deposits, and the refinancing of the Central Bank are estimated to have amounted to onethird of year-2010 GDP. The net might turn out to be somewhat lower, however; for instance, there will be some recovery on the collateral of CB lending to failed banks. Gross government debt went from under a third of GDP before the crisis to a peak of one GDP, and net debt rose from around a tenth to two-thirds. As a result, there was no fiscal space to save banks 10 times GDP, and attempting to do so would have bankrupted the country. Indeed, Iceland had to embark on a medium-term fiscal consolidation programme even as output was still contracting, in order to stop government debt from reaching an unsustainable level and to rebuild the external confidence needed for the sovereign to regain market access. The overall fiscal effort (measured by changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percentage of potential GDP) amounted to 10 percentage points 2010–13, more than that of Ireland during the same period (although Ireland will overtake Iceland if the expected effort for 2014 and 15 is added).

Már Guðmundsson: Preserving the credit of the sovereign through a financial sector meltdown – the case of Iceland Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the International Monetary Seminar 2013 “Sovereign risk, bank risk and central banking”, organised by the Bank of France, Paris, 8 July 2013. *  *  *  I would like to thank Banque de France for inviting me to speak at this interesting seminar. This session is on resolving sovereign debt crises and the relative roles of the public and private sectors in that process. My comments will obviously be based on my own country’s experience during the financial crisis, which is a case of a sovereign debt crisis being avoided in spite of the meltdown of a large part of the financial sector and the country’s deepest recession since the interwar period. That result was achieved by relatively good fiscal position prior to the crisis, by a refusal – based on need rather than stubbornness – to rescue private cross-border banks with public money, and by on-going medium-term fiscal consolidation that was an important part of the economic programme developed in cooperation with the IMF. The bottom line is that all sovereign obligations have been honoured; the sovereign has maintained investment-grade credit ratings and market access.
This would bring huge potential benefits for all Member States in terms of enhancing financing for the real economy, managing risks and pooling the resources of investors from European and elsewhere. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusion Let me now conclude. What we are aiming for in Banking Union is to create a system that is truly European and not just an inter-governmental framework for national authorities. We have seen that a Banking Union would have made a real difference during the crisis – and for this reason, there is no pressing reason to carry on with national arrangements that have not functioned effectively. I believe that this message has made its way into the SSM legislation. The elements are there for a truly European approach to supervision. And I hope that it will also translate into a strong Single Resolution Mechanism, to be launched as soon as possible. The SSM and the Single Resolution Mechanism are complements and we need progress on both these fronts. As Victor Hugo once remarked, “you can resist an invading army; you cannot resist an idea whose time is come.” I believe that Banking Union is just such an idea. But it now depends on us – as policymakers, as commentators, as citizens – how it is turned into reality. If we are anything less than wholly ambitious, then we will have learned nothing from this crisis. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Global GDP growth has averaged between 3.0 and 3.5% – a sub-trend outcome that we have not been able to break out of since 2011. This is significantly lower than the average of 3.8% that we witnessed before the global financial crisis, between 1990 and 2007. There are some broad themes that have shaped economic outcomes during the last five years. In the advanced economies, there are accommodative monetary policies, fiscal consolidation, and deleveraging. In the emerging economies – a shift toward domestic demand, credit expansion, and a buildup in debt. In both advanced and emerging economies, we have seen slower growth in the key drivers of long-term prosperity – namely trade, investment, and productivity. Everywhere, the pace of structural reforms has been slow. Outlook for 2017 – renewed optimism, higher uncertainty What does 2017 hold for the global economy? Let us consider first what financial markets are saying. Since late last year, the markets have been pricing in higher growth, higher inflation, and higher interest rates. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Long-term bond yields have risen sharply in the advanced economies. Equity prices have surged. This reflation story has been particularly accentuated in US stock and fixed income markets. Reflecting this, the US Dollar has appreciated sharply, rising to its strongest level against the major currencies since 2003. The market narrative goes something like this: The new Administration in the US will inject a substantial fiscal stimulus – based on reduced corporate taxes and higher infrastructure spending.
However, I would like to briefly address an aspect of macroeconomic and institutional framework, which has been an important determinant of the extent and magnitude of the national authorities’ response to the crises: the exchange rate regime. A quick glance at the current developments in the region and broader allows us to draw the conclusion that the countries adopting a fixed exchange rate regime have been affected by the global crisis proportionally higher. Moreover, they have been more constrained in terms of responding to the crisis. By contrast, countries adopting a free floating exchange rate regime have been affected by the crisis more mildly and smoothly, and they have preserved higher independence in their economic policies for the mitigation of crisis effects. Obviously, this is not occasional: the free floating exchange rate regime is an important political, economic and institutional investment of emerging countries. Their sacrifices in terms of building reliable monetary and fiscal policies, enhancing public confidence in the respective currencies and national financial institutions are rewarded with the flexibility this regime provides to macroeconomic policies in coping with the crises. Exchange rate volatility mechanism is precisely a mechanism that allows the economy to absorb various shocks. The free floating exchange rate regime, devotedly adopted by the Bank of Albania, allows the Albanian economy to withstand these shocks at minimum cost. Let us leave this mechanism operate smoothly, without excessive reactions from the market or its agents. Any smooth moves towards the exchange rate equilibrium will be in the Albanian economy’s own interest.

Any hasty short-term reactions, like the ones we have been attesting to over the course of the present year and in the early days of this week, bring about individual financial cost to those undertaking them, as well as financial cost to the economy. No economic agent is stronger than the foundations. The high volatility and uncertainty in the foreign exchange market do not have any real base. The euroisation of the economy is a visionary idea, not only for Albania but for the entire region as well, since its final aspiration is the membership into the European Union. It encourages the domestic and the regional market, and the European authorities, to speed up the convergence process. However, convergence in the Euro area is a derivative of continuous structural reforms and strengthening of financial systems, wherein the stability of  BIS Review 119/2009  1  the currency is of prime importance. There can be no European integration without a longterm equilibrium of the national and European currency. In the long run, the exchange rate will inevitably reflect the sound foundations of the Albanian economy, which are to remain so. The past years’ equilibriums remain real indicators of the potentials of the Albanian economy. In the long run, we remain deeply convinced of the benefits the free floating exchange rate regime brings about. It will be the passport to and the best support to the Albanian economy in its path to European integration.
However, fiscal performance in 2009 was weak, mainly due to the global economic crisis, which reduced domestic revenues. Despite this, Government remained within the programmed domestic financing for the year. 1  December-2009 inflation revised to 12.0% in the Budget Speech for 2010 presented to Parliament on October 9, 2009. BIS Review 53/2010  1  Distinguished Members, the financial sector has remained resilient despite the effects of the recent global financial crisis. Currently, the Zambian financial sector is characterized by high liquidity levels, reflecting tighter lending standards in the wake of the lessons from the global financial crisis leading to marked decline in private sector lending. As a result, the demand for the relatively risk free Government securities has increased causing a decline in yield rates on Government securities. The decline in Government securities yield rates and relatively low inflation experienced since the beginning of the year should contribute to a decline in banks lending rates and thus stimulate borrowing by the private sector. I am aware that the high interest rates in the country pose a very big challenge for our manufacturers to borrow for recapitalisation and expansion of their businesses. Access to finance is essential for the economy to grow and therefore it is necessary that we find ways that could reduce the cost of borrowing to allow key sectors to expand. Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to reiterate that the economic fundamentals point to a reduction in lending rates.

Caleb M Fundanga: Review of Zambia’s economy Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia Association of Manufacturer’s Annual General Meeting, Lusaka, 16 April 2010. *  *  *  The President of ZAM – Mr Chance Kabaghe The Vice Presidents (North and South) – Mr Sebastian Kopulande and Mr Eugen Appel The ZAM Executive Committee Captains of Industry Ladies and Gentlemen I feel greatly honoured to officiate at this Annual General Meeting for the Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM). The Bank of Zambia and the Zambia Association of Manufacturers have a long standing relationship which is intertwined in more ways than one. I am sure that without making appropriate policies to support key sectors such as manufacturing, we would be robbing the country of the development that it deserves. I am reliably informed that ZAM has been going through restructuring in the last two years and has achieved a lot in terms of the establishment and making itself relevant not only to its members but to the Government and other stakeholders. It therefore gives me pleasure to stand before you to discuss issues that are pertinent to manufacturing. I am hopeful we will be able to understand the challenges and identify plausible ways of overcoming them for the sector to forge ahead and make a meaningful contribution to the economy. Mr President, the performance of the Zambian economy in 2009 was favourable.
But, they do little to reduce investors’ incentives to run at the first sign of trouble. Worthwhile as the steps taken thus far are, we have not come close to fixing all the institutional flaws in our wholesale funding markets. The tri-party repo system and the money fund industry that plays a crucial role financing collateral through it are both still exposed to runs. In fact, in each of these areas, one could argue that the risks have increased compared to prior to the crisis. That is because the Dodd-Frank Act raised the hurdle for the Federal Reserve to exercise its Section 13.3 emergency lending authority and because Congress has explicitly precluded the U.S. Treasury from guaranteeing money market mutual fund assets in the future. With extraordinary interventions ruled out or made much more difficult, this may cause investors to be even more skittish in the future. This is why it is essential to make the system more stable. Turning first to the issue of tri-party repo reform, there is still considerable work to do. In particular, the risk that investors will run at the first sign of trouble persists. That is because the costs of running are very low relative to the potential costs of staying put. The potential costs of staying are elevated in part because investors often don’t have the capacity to take possession of the collateral or liquidate the collateral in an orderly way should a large dealer fail. Both aspects result in run risk, fire sale risk and potential financial instability.

The growing reliance on short-term wholesale funding to finance longer-term assets increased liquidity and maturity mismatch risk. This was particularly dangerous because many of the assets being financed were structured-credit products, some of which were opaque, difficult to value and illiquid. Short-term funding of longer-term assets is inherently unstable particularly in the presence of information and coordination problems. It can be rational for a provider of funds to supply funds on a short-term basis, reasoning that it can exit if there is any uncertainty over the firm’s continued ability to roll over its funding from other sources. But if the use of short-term funding becomes sufficiently widespread, the firm’s roll-over risk increases. In this situation, there is a strong incentive for each lender to “run” if there is any uncertainty that could undermine the borrower’s ability to continue to roll over its funding from other sources. This is the case even if the provider of funds believes that the borrower would remain solvent as long as it retained access to funding on normal terms. Of course, this insight is not a new one. Prior to the establishment of a lender of last resort and retail deposit insurance for banks – which came with the quid pro quo of prudential regulation – bank runs were a regular and disruptive feature of our financial system. These innovations solved the coordination problem and stabilized this source of funding.
However, to date, I am pleased to note that one issue has been resolved with regard to the plight of the visually impaired that they were sometimes denied access to own ATM cards and internet banking. The Association of Banks in Malaysia (ABM) together with its council members have worked with the NCBM (National Council of the Blind) and as a result have now reached a solution that enables access to such services by the visually impaired individuals. This is indeed a positive step to move forward. However, there are other immediate needs that have not been addressed. For the banking industry, examples of such needs are: •  lower bank counters for wheelchair-bound customers  •  “Talking ATMs” for the visually impaired  •  availability of sign language interpreters for the deaf  •  the need for OKU-friendly bank website to enhance their accessibility to e-banking services, which would augur well with the initiative by Bank Negara Malaysia to promote the usage of e-banking. Banks are encouraged to provide websites which are W3C compliance. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international body that provides standards to enhance the web accessibility, enabling people with disabilities to participate equally on the Web, such as providing alternative text for images to allow accessibility by the visually impaired, providing text transcript to allow audio information accessible to the hearing impaired, and many other services.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Developing skills for a constantly changing environment Governor's Acceptance Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, for her Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of Nottingham, University of Nottingham, Malaysia Campus, Selangor, 21 January 2006. *  *  *  It is indeed my great honour to receive this honorary degree from the University of Nottingham, one of the premier universities in the United Kingdom . It is particularly special to receive this award at the University of Nottingham Malaysia campus, being amongst the first overseas campuses of world-class institutions of higher education that have established a presence in Malaysia. Malaysia and the United Kingdom have a history of close bilateral relations, reinforced by strong economic and financial linkages that span over a period of 200 years. This relationship is particularly evident in the field of education. The British are also known for being pioneers of strong cross-border higher education strategic alliances and partnerships. In Malaysia , we have seen such joint programmes between local and British institutions of higher education since the 1980s. Malaysia values this synergy and partnership with Britain and continuously looks forward to opportunities to further deepen this relationship on a wider range of areas for the mutual benefit of both countries. Significant new trends continue to shape both the global and our domestic economy. The modern world is experiencing continuous dramatic change.