samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
First, in light of the changing global financial landscape and regulatory environment, continuing to strengthen the financial system is an important agenda for both the authorities and the financial sector. The financial system must remain focused on risk management, as well as be competitive and responsive to customers’ demand for access, and more variety of products and services. Such a financial system is necessary to efficiently support and grow with the economy. Second, given the changing structure of the Thai population, fiscal reform is vital to address the ageing society. At the moment, only one-sixth of the labor force is in the tax base. Tax revenue thus accounts for only 16 percent of GDP, half of that of developed countries. So improving the tax restructure is one of the priorities to be addressed to enhance fiscal sustainability as well as overall social welfare of the country. Third, we need to continue to elevate Thailand’s competitiveness by enhancing our productivity, both in industries and agriculture. Productivity gain in agriculture, which accounts for the majority of population, in particular, will also help increase farm income and reduce poverty. Improvement in productivity, of course, involves a whole range of issues from more effective training, education, investment in research and development, to infrastructure investment – all of which require long-term commitment of both the public and private sectors. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to say that these medium-term priorities are well-recognized by both the authorities and the private sector.

As the Thai economy is getting stronger, returning fiscal and monetary policies gradually to pre-crisis normal levels will not obstruct the recovery path. Rather, it is essential to enhance our economic resiliency and save the policy space for the medium term. For our monetary policy, it has been extra-eased for quite some time and there is less need now. Although the domestic inflationary pressure has been kept in check and we have not observed asset price bubbles at this time, the central bank is well aware of the risks associated with the interest rates that are kept too low for too long. The crisis in the United States was a clear demonstration of how this can lead to a build up of bubbles. And, once bubbles burst, the cost to the economy is devastating. Central banks always face a tough decision, whether and when to take away the punch bowl before the party gets going. That said, we will put our best effort in considering the timing of interest rate increase carefully. On the fiscal policy, normalization is also important. As the economic recovery strengthens, actual revenue collection has already surpassed the target by as much as 2.9 percent of GDP, and fiscal deficit has started to shrink. However, as several new spending plans to enhance social distribution and build new infrastructure appear to be in the pipeline, the fiscal policy challenge is how best to preserve adequate fiscal policy space for future cyclical and structural spending needs.
Conclusion I think it is quite clear that the banking industry can no longer afford to continue conducting business as usual and ignore the issues that I have highlighted. The banking industry must take stock of the external challenges it faces today, including a very difficult economic environment, the impact of evolving technologies and the shift in customer expectations. It must focus on winning customer loyalty, providing value, operating efficiently and resiliently, and attracting the right talent. In addition, the enabling institutions such as educators and regulators need to provide the necessary support if the industry is to succeed in this transformative journey. The industry is clearly at a crossroads and needs to make proactive decisions now to remain relevant in the future. There are two paths that the industry can take. If the banking industry continues to operate the way it has in the past, ignoring the many challenges that it faces today, it would lose its dominant position. Competition Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  - 19 -  will increase from different institutions such as telecom operators, technology companies and FinTech firms, and customers will flock to these solutions, as we have already seen in some markets. Banks, as a result, will be pushed to the fringes of the industry, if not removed altogether. But if the industry manages to evolve, then the picture could be different.

Another example is the execution of payments; transactions that used to take 3 to 5 days to process can now be completed in 3 to 5 seconds, and for less than one-tenth of the original cost. Although banks have generally been slow to innovate, they have sought to stay ahead of the game by partnering with or acquiring FinTech firms. According to a recent PwC report, over 54% of banks surveyed have already established partnerships with FinTech firms, and 82% expect to increase such partnerships in the next 3 to 5 years.7  Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -6-  While banks can potentially manage the onslaught by the FinTech firms, the real challenge will be posed by the Big Techs. What would happen when the likes of Facebook, Amazon, Whatsapp, and Alibaba start competing with banks to provide financial services? These technology giants come with large and captive user bases, low online acquisition costs, and a better understanding of their customers through their utilization of big data. Moreover, they don’t face the same regulations and associated costs that banks do. Tech firms have had their eyes on the banking industry for quite some time. Over 20 years ago, Bill Gates compared banks to dinosaurs that could be bypassed and argued that “we need banking, but we don't need banks anymore.” That was an early warning for the industry.
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Payments and monetary and financial stability Opening remarks by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at a joint European Central Bank/Bank of England conference on “Payments and Monetary and Financial Stability”, Frankfurt am Main, 12-13 November 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure to welcome you to this conference and I am grateful that I can do so also in the name of the Bank of England. The idea of the joint conference was born at one of our regular bilateral meetings and it is wonderful to see the idea come to fruition. You may wonder why we have put payments first, and monetary and financial stability second. This is not only because payments are at the root of a functioning (or not functioning) financial system; payments also require a thorough understanding of the economics of banking, money, financial markets, industrial organisation, and regulation. The diversity of theoretical and policy issues in this field is also reflected in the conference that I have the pleasure of opening this morning. Historical overview Considering the historical evolution of interbank settlement arrangements and central banking functions may help to understand why central banks evolved as the natural candidates for taking the responsibility for financial and monetary stability. 1 Indeed, I would argue that the reason lies in the key role central banks played in payment systems.

Page 10  Annex Chart 1: Bulk Purchase Annuities (BPAs) and longevity swap transactions £ billion) since 2010  Source: Lane Clark & Peacock  Page 11  Chart 2: Projected bulk annuity demand  Source: Hymans Robertson – Risk Transfer Report 2022 Demand is expected to ramp up as the majority of over £ trillion of Defined Benefit liabilities looks to find a home in the insurance market over the next 20 or so years. Projected demand averages c. £ per annum over the next 10 years, compared to a record £ in 2019. Page 12  Chart 3: Assets held in insurance firms’ Matching Adjustment (MA) portfolios at year-end 2020 £ billion)  Source: PRA analysis of Matching Adjustment (MA) Asset & Liability Data submissions by firms as at year-end 2020. Page 13  Chart 4: Matching Adjustment (MA) benefit by asset class at year-end 2020 (basis points)  Source: PRA analysis of Matching Adjustment (MA) Asset & Liability Data submissions by firms as at year-end 2020. Ranked by spread in basis points (lowest to highest) and does not show asset classes where there are limited holdings across the industry. Page 14  Chart 5: Matching Adjustment (MA) versus Market Value  Source: PRA analysis of Matching Adjustment (MA) Asset & Liability Data submissions by firms as at year-end 2020. Note: Assets shown are those in Component A of insurance firms’ Matching Adjustment (MA) portfolios only. See Paragraph 4.5 of Supervisory Statement 7/18 for further details. 1. Solvency II 2.
The more efficiently euro area product and capital markets function, the greater the success of labour market reforms will be in creating employment opportunities. We are now at your disposal for questions. 2  BIS Review 15/2002

Jean-Pierre Roth: Switzerland - a financial centre in the heart of the euro area Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Belgian Financial Forum, Brussels, 16 February 2004. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Switzerland is not a fortress. In relation to the rest of Europe in particular, it is an economy that is very much open to mutual exchanges - notably with regard to trade and finance. It is not by chance that Switzerland has become a major financial centre. This can be ascribed to a number of positive factors, including specialist knowledge, a long-established banking tradition, the quality of the financial infrastructure, and customers’ confidence in the soundness of the country’s financial institutions. Switzerland’s political stability, its high level of savings and the international standing of the Swiss franc have also enhanced the appeal of its financial system. Increasingly, however, Switzerland is not alone in offering such advantages. Moreover, the Swiss financial centre - like all the others - has to face the challenges of globalisation and the fight against financial crime. As banking secrecy does not afford any protection to funds of dubious origin, the Swiss authorities are able to combat money-laundering with a reasonable degree of efficacy. In this area, Switzerland has implemented measures that have received international recognition.
The regulation of financial services created in the wake of the digital wave must be tailored to its specific risks. To this end, we must adhere to two principles of action. The first principle is an absolute guarantee of payment and transaction security. In the framework of its mandate to oversee the security of payment instruments, the Banque de France strives to promote innovative, effective and safe payment solutions. In this respect, it ensures that the emergence of new players and new solutions does not reduce security. Central banks are also trying to take a proactive approach towards the digital transition, to avoid being left behind by the highly technical nature of certain innovations. For instance, discussions are underway at the Banque de France over how to monitor the development of initiatives concerning blockchain technology, both in terms of the possibilities it offers and the issues it raises notably in terms of security. The second principle is a proportionate adaptation of regulations and supervision to address the development of fintechs. The regulation applied to these new players should avoid stifling innovations that may be beneficial to consumers and, more generally, to the economy and society; but at the same time it should also guarantee consumer protection and address issues of financial stability. Specific regulations, allowing for a gradual adjustment of regulatory intensity, might be better suited to preventing the risks generated by fintech firms.

Measures of global economic slack are good predictors of national inflation in advanced countries, as shown empirically e.g. by C. Borio and A. Filardo (2007), “Globalisation and inflation: New cross-country evidence on the global determinants of domestic inflation” BIS WP no. 227; and in New Keynesian open economy models e.g. by R. Clarida, J. Gali, and M. Gertler, (2002) “A Simple Framework for International Monetary Policy Analysis,” Journal of Monetary Economics 49: 879–904. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  driving disinflation, and a notable increase in global shocks. Those global shocks are, however, overwhelming associated with oil and commodity price falls (Figure 1). As is well-known, global factors linked to oil and commodities should not, in principle, have any effect on price stability over the medium-term. They may have a lasting impact on the price level, but not on the rate of change of prices. All things being equal, lower prices for oil should, over time, lead to higher prices elsewhere as disposable income increases and overall demand from consumption and investment rises. In light of this, central banks typically choose to “look through” such global forces until their effect on inflation fades out or until prices reverse. As oil and commodity prices swings have opposing effects on output and inflation, monetary policy usually does not want to overreact and reinforce the effect on growth, in either direction.
Second, we need to reduce the likelihood that systemically important institutions will come close to failure in the first place. This can be done by mandating higher capital requirements, improving the risk capture of those requirements and by requiring greater liquidity buffers for such firms. Although the raging crisis appears to be over, our work is not close to being complete. Making sure this work keeps moving forward and is coordinated internationally is hugely important. Differences in views across countries and regions should not divert the international community from the more important prize – taking the actions collectively that will ensure a robust and resilient financial system. BIS Review 14/2010  4

On Tuesday I spoke about the role central banks have to play on climate change and that, far from representing an entirely new objective, the Bank of England’s work in this space sits firmly within the bounds of our mission to maintain monetary and financial stability.1 We have an important role to play, but it is governments, businesses, investors, and individuals that have the most difficult and impactful decisions to make in driving the transition to a net-zero economy. Today I want to build on those remarks to reflect on central banks’ climate-related work to date and to consider how it will need to evolve if we are going to continue to meet our remit. I will address this by talking about three main areas of our work: firstly, improving the understanding of climate-related financial risks across the financial system and macroeconomy; secondly, developing and embedding climate risk management in the financial firms that we regulate; and finally, seeking to achieve best practice through our operations as a central bank. I will begin with our work to understand climate risks across the broader financial system and the macroeconomy. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) has continued its pioneering work in this space, through the publication of climate scenarios that provide a common starting point for analysing risks to the system2, and the latest version of these scenarios is due to be published soon.
So, in designing a policy to close resource gaps, I am going to take a careful look at the evolution of inflation and inflationary expectations to tell me if I am wrong about my assessment of the real-side shortfalls we need to fill. An explicit state-contingent policy Let me outline how this approach might work in practice. The Fed could sharpen its forward guidance by pledging to keep policy rates near zero until one of two events occurs. The first event would be if the unemployment rate moved below a 7 percent threshold. Reductions in the unemployment rate below this level would represent good progress toward the natural rate of unemployment; depending upon the state of inflation expectations, it might be time to lessen policy accommodation.7 The second event that would commit us to raise rates would be if inflation rises above a particular threshold that is clearly unacceptable. This trigger would be a safeguard against the possibility that our assessments of economic conditions and resource slack are wrong and the natural rate of unemployment is higher than 7 percent. If this were so, our experience from the 1970s suggests that a continuation of the low-rate policy would generate a further unexpected increase in inflation; by adjusting policy according to this trigger, the Fed would begin exiting from what would now evidently be excessive policy accommodation. We would not have the desired reductions in unemployment, but then again, there wouldn’t be anything that monetary policy could do about it.

The forecasts for growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation that FOMC participants have been submitting since 1979 have always been conditioned on each participant’s views of the future path of policy most likely to foster outcomes consistent with our dual mandate responsibilities – what we refer to as the appropriate path for policy. As of last January, our quarterly Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) now include the projected paths for the federal funds rate and qualitative information about the balance sheet that make up these views. I believe this move significantly enhances policy accountability. For example, suppose inflation were running higher than we would like, and the economic projections in the SEP showed it coming down over the next couple of years. In the absence of policy projections, the public would not know whether the FOMC thought inflation would simply come down on its own or whether it thought that a monetary tightening would be required to reduce inflationary pressures. The inclusion of participants’ policy projections will help communicate such judgments. Furthermore, households and businesses will be able to make better informed decisions if they have a clearer notion of future policy rates; the potential for reduced uncertainty could also lower the risk premium embedded in longer-term interest rates. Now, clearly, our forecasts of what rates are going to be three years from now will often be wrong – and sometimes by a good deal.
Most of the research concerning unconventional measures has been focused on quantitative easing of Fed and the research concerning the ECB measures has been scant. A recent empirical investigation on the matter, published in September 20166, deals exactly with the spillovers of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy into the CESEE economies. The empirical investigation employs an event study methodology, assessing whether the announcements of the ECB non-standard measures affected the nominal exchange rate, long-term sovereign yield, stock market indices and portfolio inflows. The findings suggest that ECB measures had moderate impact on all of the variables. Furthermore, the study proceeds with empirical investigation of the effects on the dynamics of cross-border capital flows, distinguishing between portfolio investment and international bank lending. The results reveal that ECB non-standard measures may have enhanced cross-border flows to the CESEE region. We will try to tackle some of the above-stated questions, by observing the most recent data on balance of payments, which can be used as an indication of the dynamics and the structure of the capital flows. We will observe the period before and after the crisis, and in the latter one, in order to observe the most recent changes, we will focus on the last three years, in particular. 6  Ciarlone A. and Colabella A., "Spillovers of the ECB's non-standard monetary policy in CESEE economies", Bank of Italy, Occasional Paper no.351, September 2016. Chart 7: Cumulative financial inflows as % of GDP, changes in p.p.

Chart 12: Interest rates on government bonds in % Spread to German Bonds in pp  Interest Rate on 10 year government bonds 10  14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8  8  6 4 2  0 -2  average (2008-2012)  average (2015-2013)  Difference in pp  average (2008-2012)  2015-2013  Average  SRB  ALB  MKD  SLO  ROM  POL  HUN  LIT  LAT  CRO  CZR  -6 BUL  Average  ALB  SRB  MKD  SLO  ROM  POL  HUN  LIT  LAT  CRO  BUL  CZR  -4  Difference  *The data for all the countries, except for Albania, Macedonia and Serbia is Eurostat data referring to the Maastricht Treaty EMU convergence criterion series which relates to interest rates for long-term government bonds denominated in national currencies. Data is based on central government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residual maturity of around 10 years. For Serbia and Albania –Thomson Reuters data on average interest rate on government securities. Macedonia data refer to the average interest rate on securities at the longest available maturity issued. The continuous debt increase suggests need for further fiscal adjustment, which will be challenging in case of tightening of financial conditions. The presence of ultra-low interest rates in the Euro Area and the abundance of liquidity on the market have not been conducive to faster consolidation.