samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In 1933, Section 14(g) was added to the Federal Reserve Act to empower the Board to prescribe specific regulations regarding a Federal Reserve Bank’s foreign relationships, and in that same year the Board issued Regulation N – Relations with Foreign Banks and Bankers – which specifically addresses the Board’s “special supervision” over this area that is required by the Act. As originally drafted in 1933, Regulation N required, among other things, the consent of the Board prior to entering into any negotiation or agreement with any “foreign bank or banker.” In 1941, Congress expanded the Reserve Banks’ 14(e) authority to include holding foreign accounts for institutions other than its own foreign correspondents and agencies; this was done by adding “foreign banks or bankers, or foreign states” to the account eligibility list. The Board subsequently amended Regulation N to cover relationships with “foreign states” as well. Overall, the regulation provides a basis for the Board’s role in 6/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  overseeing the New York Fed’s foreign official account activities. 8 Economic historians have cited several factors for this situation, including regulatory restrictions on foreign  branching by U.S. banks, prohibitions on U.S. banks from offering dollar trade financing, and until 1914 the absence of a central bank with market making authority. Inertia from the long-standing dominance of London banks and the pound sterling under the gold standard is also cited.

It should also be noted that the New York Fed’s long experience as the FOMC’s selected bank for 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  open market operations on behalf of the Federal Reserve System confers on it a trusted level of competence, experience, and reliability with foreign official account holders. The same New York Fed front office personnel that purchase and sell Treasuries for the Federal Reserve’s own portfolio also execute trades on behalf of foreign official account holders. Moreover, the same New York Fed personnel that perform back office operations for the Federal Reserve’s own portfolio also perform back office operations for the transactions of foreign official account holders. This consolidated transactional platform used by both the Federal Reserve and its foreign official account holders means that the global official community can be assured that the quality of the services it receives from the Federal Reserve meets the same standards as the Federal Reserve sets for the servicing of its own portfolio. Choreographers of central bank operations Let me now spend a moment discussing the people behind our account services. In doing so, I wish to recognize staff past and present who have played and continue to play a vital role every day in processing critical transactions on behalf of the global official community. Your experience in the daily management of the accounts of other central banks produces unique operational knowledge and expertise.
For good reasons, the Chilean economy is open commercially and financially to the world, and, because of the nature of its exports, is strongly affected by shocks coming from abroad. In the past we have benefited from the external situation. We have also felt the consequences when the external situation has deteriorated. We cannot isolate ourselves from these external impulses, and it would not be a good idea to do so. The important thing, however, is that we have developed a policy framework that allows us to absorb and mitigate these shocks in the best way possible. Chile needs to keep a robust macroeconomic and financial policy scheme that helps it overcome effectively these external disturbances at the lowest possible cost for the country. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Part of this scheme is the autonomous central bank with clear-cut objectives: low, stable inflation, and the normal operation of internal and external payments. Our monetary policy is oriented at attaining an explicit inflation target over a medium-term horizon, by applying an independent monetary policy that contributes to stabilize the business cycle. Its complement is a floating exchange rate regime. Another important element is responsible and predictable fiscal policy making, as reflected in its governing rule. Add a sound financial system, with proper regulation and supervision. Plus ever growing commercial and financial integration. The fact that the deterioration of the developed economies has not hit our exports so hard is the result of this diversification of external markets, among other factors.

The reserves accumulation carried out by the Bank in the past few years, as well as management thereof – details are provided in an Appendix – should suffice to confront extreme episodes. Chile also has sovereign wealth funds that could help alleviate the financing needs in case of increased external tensions as well. The foreign funds of institutional investors can also act as stabilizing agents in this sense. On the other hand, we must always bear in mind that any intervention has associated costs. First, it can blur the objective of the Central Bank: inflation or exchange rate target. In our case, we have dealt with this problem by carrying out transparent, sterilized interventions, with a publicly known timetable that does not conflict with the formulation of monetary policy. In addition, our communication has been straightforward in stating that the objective of our monetary policy is price stability. Second, an intervention entails a significant financial cost for the Central Bank and the country. International reserves are invested in highly liquid assets abroad, whose yield is lower than the interest paid on the debt securities in pesos that are used to sterilize the purchase. In the current scenario, in which external-domestic interest rate differentials are significant and expected to remain so for some time, the financial cost of holding reserves is substantial and negatively affects the Bank’s balance sheet continually.
See Panetta, F. (2022), “A digital euro that serves the needs of the public: striking the right balance”, introductory statement at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 30 March and ECB (2022), “Digital euro – Privacy options”, presentation to the Eurogroup, 4 April. 4. Panetta, F. (2022), op. cit. 5. Consumers are already increasingly turning to non-cash payments. Only 20% of the cash stock is now used for payments, down from 35% 15 years ago. See Zamora-Pérez, A. (2021), “The paradox of banknotes: understanding the demand for cash beyond transactional use”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB, Frankfurt am Main. 6. We are accustomed to using private and public forms of money interchangeably. Euro banknotes and coins are legal tender in the euro area, and cash is the only form of public money to which everyone can have direct access. Confidence in private money – bank deposits, credit cards and e-payment solutions – rests on the ability to convert it, at par, into public money. This allows payment systems to run smoothly and commerce to flow. 7. Panetta, F. (2021), “Central bank digital currencies: a monetary anchor for digital innovation”, speech at the Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, 5 November. 8. Panetta, F. (2021), “The present and future of money in the digital age”, lecture at Federcasse’s Lectiones cooperativae, Rome, 10 December. 9.

Speech  The digital euro and the evolution of the financial system Introductory statement by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Brussels, 15 June 2022 I am pleased to join you here today to discuss the progress we have made in our digital euro project. A digital euro would enable Europeans to use public money for digital payments throughout the euro area – just like they can use cash for physical payments. Bringing central bank money into the digital era is a logical step as payments become increasingly digitalised. And this is critical for two main reasons. First, we need to preserve the role of public money as the anchor of the payments system in order to ensure the smooth coexistence, the convertibility and the complementarity of the various forms that money takes. A strong anchor is needed to protect the singleness of money, monetary sovereignty and the integrity of the financial system. Second, a digital euro would contribute to our strategic autonomy and economic efficiency by offering a European means of payment that could be used for any digital payment, would meet Europe’s societal objectives and would be based on a European infrastructure. We will design the digital euro in a way that makes it attractive to users, who would like to use it to pay anywhere.
Our monetary policy has to navigate these obstacles in order to ensure appropriate monetary conditions for the Swiss economy. At our September monetary policy assessment, we decided to leave our expansionary monetary policy stance unchanged. The SNB policy rate is unchanged at –0.75% and we remain willing to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary. At our quarterly monetary policy assessment, we also adjusted the method we use to calculate the negative interest rate we charge on banks’ sight deposits at the SNB. This adjustment takes into account the fact that interest rates could remain low around the world for a long time to come. We want to limit the burden our negative interest rate represents for banks and the economy, as long as this is compatible with steering monetary conditions in Switzerland. Climate change: a major economic challenge In addition to these economic and political uncertainties, the global environment faces other longer-term challenges, such as those relating to climate change. This evening, I’d like to focus on the economic and financial risks that emanate from global warming and associated climatic events on the one hand, and from measures implemented to support the transition to a low-carbon economy on the other. I shall also explain how, within the scope of its monetary policy mandate, the SNB factors these risks into its deliberations and actions. Economists began to view climate change as a major challenge in the 1970s and this topic has since been the subject of numerous studies.

For banks, this would erode the creditworthiness of debtors. In the area of mortgage lending, the adoption of stricter environmental standards could also diminish the collateral value of non-compliant real estate. 7 As you can see, climate risks may be of interest to central banks on a number of fronts. Each central bank tackles these challenges in its own way, depending on the profile of the economy in question and the institutional framework within which it operates. Countries are affected differently by climate risks due to their geographic location and economic structure. I am thinking in particular of countries that are partially below sea level (e.g. the Netherlands), those that are highly exposed to extreme weather events (e.g. droughts, storms, floods) and economies in which carbon-intensive industries (e.g. steel and cement) are strongly represented. Similarly, the institutional framework of each central bank will determine its room for manoeuvre in discussions on climate change. Some, for example, are responsible for microprudential supervision and also function as bank resolution authorities. They have to evaluate the soundness of each bank’s balance sheet, and this includes assessing banks’ exposure to climate risks. In Switzerland, this role is assigned to the Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). Other central banks advise the government and are expected to take a position on issues that go beyond pure monetary policy (e.g. fiscal or energy policy). This is not the case at the SNB. The SNB’s mandate is clearly defined.
It also suggests that if the Treasury were to take steps to shrink the illiquidity premium by, for example, improving secondary market trading in TIPS, this would shift the cost-benefit analysis more firmly in TIPS direction. A change in the TIPS illiquidity premium can have a notable impact on ex-ante cost analysis. For example, at the time this speech was written, the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate was approximately 1.10 percent, compared to the SPF forecast of 2.50 percent. This is in contrast to the end of our sample period, which showed them to be about equal. This means that today TIPS issuance is not very compelling. But it is important to emphasize that this shift has occurred at a time when the preference for liquidity is especially strong, benefitting nominal Treasuries versus TIPS. When the market turmoil subsides and this illiquidity premium shrinks, one might expect TIPS to again move ahead on an ex-ante basis. So, at this point, the TIPS versus nominal issuance debate is inconclusive. But that’s before we have included some of the other considerable – although more difficult to quantify – benefits associated with TIPS issuance. Let me now discuss some of these other benefits. Inflation hedge for households First, TIPS offer a benefit to investors because they have less risk than any other asset class. With virtually no credit risk or inflation risk, TIPS are one of the safest of investments. 4 For investors that want such safety, TIPS offer significant benefits.

As the title of my speech suggests, today I am going to lay out the reasons why I, along with my colleagues Jennifer Roush and Michelle Steinberg Ezer, believe that the benefits of the TIPS program exceed the costs of the program. Before saying anything more, let me emphasize that the views I express today are my own and those of my co-authors and, therefore, may not represent the views of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee. Also, let me note that Jennifer and Michelle are the main authors of this paper. I have ridden along on their coattails. My main contribution was to slow down completion as I had to fit in my very modest contributions around the unfolding financial crisis! Finally, you may be wondering why this is my first speech since I have become president – an odd subject to choose, perhaps, given the ongoing financial crisis? The answer is a simple one, our paper and this conference have been in train for a long time. It is just a coincidence that the conference and my becoming president of the New York Fed have happened to arrive at about the same time. The logic of issuing inflation-protected securities is straightforward. Wouldn’t some investors pay a premium – that is, accept a lower expected return – in exchange for guaranteed, full compensation for inflation? Because the United States and a number of other countries decided that the answer was likely to be “yes,” they developed an inflation-indexed government debt market.
It is obvious that, even after so many years of operating the exchange rate link under the currency board arrangement, the rationale behind the HKMA’s occasional presence in the foreign exchange and money markets, whether or not involving the exercise of discretion in the use of its monetary armoury, does not seem to be clearly understood. Certain of its actions in the markets have been subject to all sorts of interpretations. Yet there is a practical need for the HKMA to be in the markets performing its other functions which do not have any implications on the management of the exchange rate. One example is the investment management of the fiscal reserves. When fiscal surpluses are transferred from the Government’s accounts with the banking system to the HKMA, a shortage of interbank liquidity would be created if the money is not somehow recycled into the banking system. This is sometimes misinterpreted as the HKMA conducting open market operations of a discretionary nature, akin to a central bank engaging in discretionary monetary management, whilst the intention of the HKMA’s presence in the market in the performance of these other functions is, as a rule, to ensure that the monetary base is not affected. There is a need, therefore, to have the circumstances in which the clearing balance of the bank system, the crucial part of the monetary base, will be affected clearly set out for all concerned to see. These are outlined as an annex to this speech. Conclusion 46.

Mr. Erçel considers the European financial markets and their implications for Turkish institutions Speech given by the Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Gazi Erçel, in Istanbul on 23/10/97. The EMU will be the most important change in the international monetary system since the creation of the IMF at Bretton Woods. The creation of a new currency, the Euro, is in fact a historical event for the European Union (EU). It marks a new quality in the process of European unification because it is the final point and coronation of efforts since 1958 to create one big market in Europe. The success of the Euro area will, of course, depend on the future development of the value of the Euro. The Euro, as we all know, has to compete with two strong international currencies: the US dollar and the Japanese yen. According to one school of thought, the Euro will have a stable value. That is because the high stock of assets in Euro, held by official or private foreign holders and which were converted from national currencies, in particular from Deutsche Mark, will not be switched into other currencies. Besides, once the Euro is introduced, there could be a significant switch of foreign exchange reserves out of US dollars and into Euro. This could give a boost to the exchange rate of the Euro against the US dollar over time.
Figure 4 GDP growth in selected regions and countries (1)  Monetary policy rates in the world  (annual change, percent)  (percent)  15  15  10  10  10  10  8  8  5  5  6  6  0  0  4  4  -5  -5  2  2  -10  -10  0  0  07  06  08  09  10  Latin America  Asia exc. Japan  U.S.  Eurozone  Japan  Jan.07  Jan.09  Jan.11  Chile Emerging ec. (2) Developed ec. (3) Survey for emerging ec. (4) Survey for developed ec. (4) Survey for Chile (4)  (1) Regions weighted by PPP as in April 2010's WEO. (2) Simple average of reference rates of Brazil, Chile, China, India, Israel, the Korean Rep. Mexico, Peru, Poland and Turkey. (3) Simple average of reference rates of Canada, the Eurozone, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. (4) Averaged responses of analysts surveyed by Bloomberg during May of 2010, indicating expectations for September and December of 2010, and March and June of 2011. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on respective country's statistics bureau, Bloomberg and IMF.

But the monetary policy of the Banque de France was backed by the people. Historically, what matters is that all future euro area countries, including France and Germany, cooperated very closely from the very outset to ensure convergence. Today, people throughout Europe are convinced of the importance of price stability. And they are also aware of the fact that being addicted to inflation is like being addicted to a drug that over time has extremely negative effects: stagnation and the destruction of jobs. FOCUS: Nevertheless, many experts are expecting prices to rise significantly again in the near future ... Trichet: We have made it very clear that we always take the decisions necessary to guarantee price stability over the medium term: an inflation rate below, but close to, 2%. Observers and market participants are fully aware of this. It is precisely because of the challenges posed by price stability that we stand ready for action at all times. I call that “credible alertness”. FOCUS: At the moment, the markets are addicted to cheap money – to low interest rates. Politicians, bankers and stock market traders have already become too used to this situation, and as a result the risk of inflation is on the rise. How do you intend to change this? Trichet: You can be sure that the European Central Bank will continue, as before, to maintain price stability. Keeping inflation expectations solidly anchored – in line with our definition of price stability – protects us against the materialisation of both inflationary and deflationary risks.
changes in the relative prices of exports compared to imports: this is the theme of today’s conference. The subject chosen is highly topical, following the very sharp drop in commodity prices, in particular oil prices, between mid-2014 and early 2016, the effects of which on exporting countries had been underestimated, both by the countries themselves, but also by the international financial community. Thus, the economic growth forecasts for sub-Saharan Africa made by the main international organisations were revised downwards only very late. In January 2016, the IMF still expected Sub-Saharan Africa to grow by 4% in 2016 and by 4.7% in 2017, but the forecasts in the October 2016 global economic outlook were only 1.4% for 2016 and 2.9% for 2017, almost solely as a result of the recession in the oil economies. The Ivorian economy is another illustration of the importance of the terms of trade for economies focused on commodities. After experiencing exceptional growth over the last three years, partly driven by the good performance of cocoa prices, contrary to that of other commodities, activity appears to have slowed down, in the wake of the downturn in prices. The subject is also of major importance for central banks because the challenge here is to find how to implement appropriate counter-cyclical policies in the face of large-scale shocks that monetary policy cannot deal with either on its own or in the long run.

To this end, the functions of the Asian office have evolved and expanded over time – from organisation of meetings and seminars to conducting research, to providing dealing and banking services. And the office has grown from a start-up staff of six to its current 33. We are celebrating this occasion in this lovely restaurant above the Star Ferry – which is an icon in Hong Kong and a symbol of quality and value-for-money service. The BIS Asian office is also a "STAR" entity. The word "STAR" has been chosen carefully and with good reason – each letter of the word symbolises and embodies the excellence of BIS' activities: S:  Surveillance – The Asian office is clearly a star performer in its surveillance work on regional economic and financial developments. This is self-evident from reading the background notes prepared on the region for various BIS and regional central bank meetings. T:  Topical studies and research – The Asian office, with its pool of economists and financial experts, is well placed to conduct research. Under the auspices of the Asian research programme initiated in 2006, many topics that are of interest and relevance to Asian central banks have been, and continue to be, explored and developed. The BIS has made important contributions in this area, with its research providing useful information and insight for policymakers in the region.