samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In re-designing the regulatory framework we certainly need to keep our feet on the ground, and we should also keep our eyes on the horizon, both ahead of and behind us. More urgent, however, is the immediate task of generating an economic recovery. Most of us come from the generation that grew up believing that mass unemployment and world  8  BIS Review 32/2009  recession were things of the past, relevant to the history books but not the textbooks. That assumption is under threat. We must rise to the challenge. BIS Review 32/2009  9

First, we have provided access to central bank liquidity at very favourable terms and over long tenors to help maintain the supply of credit from the banking sector. To this end, we have adjusted the terms and conditions of our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III), which strengthen the incentives for banks to lend to the real economy. For a year, banks will be able to borrow at negative rates, which can be as low as –1% on the condition that they lend to the economy. Largely in response to this recalibration, we have seen a very high take-up by banks. And second, we have launched the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) to ensure the smooth transmission of our monetary policy and to ease the overall monetary policy stance thereby helping to offset the downward impact of the pandemic on the projected path of inflation. The PEPP, launched with an initial envelope of € billion in March, was increased by € billion in June to a total of € billion. We will conduct net asset purchases under the PEPP until at least the end of June 2021 and, in any case, until the Governing Council judges that the coronavirus crisis phase is over. In the current environment of elevated uncertainty, the Governing Council will carefully assess all incoming information, including developments in the exchange rate, with regard to its implications for the medium-term inflation outlook.
Rules or practices in Norway that diverge from other countries will influence the competitiveness of Norwegian-owned bank and is in practice hardly feasible. 12 Other countries will be of the same mind. It is therefore easy, particularly in an upturn, to be drawn into a negative spiral that culminates in a least common multiplier for capital requirements. It is my view that it is important to strengthen cooperation in this area, particularly between Nordic finance ministries and supervisory authorities. We must aim at a common approach to preventing systemic risk. 13 Nordic cooperation is already extensive, but primarily focuses on crisis management of a potential crisis in cross-border banks. Crisis simulation exercises with the participation of finance ministries, supervisory authorities and central banks – 15 participants from 5 countries 14 – illustrate that interests may easily conflict and that coordination is very  9  See Ordonez, M.F. “Speech by the Governor. 2008 International Monetary Conference – Central bankers panel, Banco de Espana, 2008. 10  See article in Financial Times, 4 June 2008, “ A party pooper’s guide to financial stability”. 11  See Kashyap, A.K., R. Rajan and J.C. Stein, “Rethinking Capital Regulation”, 2008. www.kansascityfed.org. 12  In 2006, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway recommended that the highest loan-to-value ratio for home mortgages with the lowest risk weight using the standardised approach under Basel II be lowered from 80 to 75 per cent of sound mortgage lending value. The Ministry of Finance did not follow the recommendation.

Moreover, with the achievement of what constitutes for all practical purposes price stability across many economies, a number of central banks discovered that with it came a new challenge: policy could no longer be directed exclusively to push inflation lower but had to pay at least as much attention to avoid inflation that could conceivably fall too low and thereby undermine the goal of price stability by initiating deflationary tendencies. As has traditionally been the case, vigilance will therefore continue to be the “Leitmotiv” for the world’s central banks. 3. Global Competition and Disinflation  A number of factors have contributed to the striking disinflation since the 1970s.5 Good monetary policy has undoubtedly made an important contribution of which many of today’s leading central bankers have every reason to be proud of. In many cases, a precondition for good monetary policy was institutional independence. Politicians have therefore played an important role as well. They have empowered central banks and freed them from political interference. Fiscal policy probably also contributed somewhat to an improved global macroeconomic environment though the case is not entirely convincing.6 Finally - and this is the point I would like to emphasize today – the global disinflation of the last twenty years has been facilitated by dramatic structural changes in the global economy. These changes are best encapsulated by what is loosely referred to as globalization.
The change in economic policy was particularly revolutionary in the former communist states in Europe, in China and in developing countries that had previously been inspired by the planned economy, such as India, which contributed to these countries becoming increasingly integrated into the global economy. The fact that price stability has become an explicit target for monetary policy has thus played an important role in the slowdown in inflation over the past decade. It is only to be expected, given that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, which is ultimately determined by monetary policy and the confidence it inspires. Independence for central banks, the convergence criteria for EMU membership and a ban on financing budget deficits by printing more money are some examples of measures that have contributed to increasing confidence in the price stability target. In addition, improved communication and increased transparency have led to monetary policy becoming more predictable and more credible. This has resulted in low, stable inflation expectations, which in Sweden have on average remained close to the inflation target in recent years. 2. Increased investment in IT  As I have already mentioned, productivity has developed more strongly than expected over the past year. Unlike the situation during the second half of the 1990s, this upturn cannot be explained by increased production of ICT goods in general and telecommunications products in particular, as these sectors have experienced a sharp fall since 2001.

Benoît Cœuré: A budgetary capacity for the euro area Introductory remarks by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at a public hearing at the European Parliament, Brussels, 2 March 2016. *  *  *  Madam Chair, Mr Chair, Honourable Members of the European Parliament, Ladies and gentlemen, I am grateful to the two rapporteurs and to the two committee chairs for holding this hearing today to advance the public debate on a fiscal capacity for the euro area. We are all well aware that political attention is largely focused elsewhere, but we should not lose sight of the objective of completing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), securing its capacity to absorb economic shocks and creating confidence today in its future economic performance. As I have said elsewhere, if downside risks to the recovery were to materialise, this would not make it easier to respond to the refugee crisis or to counter terrorism. 1 A quick glance at fiscal policies today should further convince us of the importance of this discussion: •  The recovery in the euro area is proceeding at a sedate pace; it is mainly supported by our monetary policy measures and by the low price of energy. At the same time, the global economy is overshadowed by renewed uncertainty and broader geopolitical risks. •  Public finances in many euro area countries are still in a fragile condition.
It is our duty to do so because the effectiveness of each function influences that of the others. In other words, we have to maximise our impact by working together. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  That imperative is the core of our new strategic plan which stresses that our contribution to the public good will be greatest if we work as One Bank. Complementarities might be operational, arising when putting two functions together is more efficient by allowing faster decision making in a crisis, improving the coherence of communication, or taking advantage of the common skills, information or analyses required to operate the policies.6 Or they might be economic, arising when there are strong interactions in the way the policies have their effect, or when one policy affects another. It then makes more sense to have them operated by one institution so that shared analysis and information leads to consistency of decision making and so that trade-offs between objectives can be managed effectively, and in a timely manner, to achieve better outcomes. There are strong complementarities between all four of the core functions of the Bank: monetary policy, markets, macroprudential policy and microprudential regulation.7 Each affects overall monetary and financial conditions and therefore has the capacity to affect the achievement of both monetary and financial stability. They in turn help maintain confidence in the currency, which we also support by issuing high-quality banknotes that people can use with confidence.

William C Dudley: Remarks at the Regional Employment Press Briefing Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2010 Regional Employment Press Briefing, New York, 14 April 2010. *  *  *  Good morning and welcome to the New York Fed’s 2010 Regional Employment Press Briefing. The past few years have been an extraordinary time for policymakers. We have been very aggressive in providing support to the economy and it now appears that we are emerging from a deep and protracted recession. Economic activity expanded over the second half of 2009, suggesting that a recovery has begun. While we continue to receive encouraging news, growth is likely to be muted compared with the early stages of past recoveries. As a result, the unemployment rate is likely to decline over the near term at a very gradual pace, if at all. In the labor market, employment has begun to expand. We hope this is the beginning of a sustained period of job growth. Total employment shrank by roughly 8 million jobs since the peak of the cycle, and the current unemployment rate of 9.7 percent remains unacceptably high. At the regional level, here in the New York-New Jersey region, the labor market was not hit as hard as in many areas in the country, and the pace of job losses in our region has eased.
At the same time, we signalled that there would probably be a need to increase the rate later in the year. Growth in the world economy and in the Swedish economy is robust and our assessment is therefore that inflation will increase gradually towards the 2 per cent target, reaching it a couple of years from now (see Figures 1 and 2). However, this development assumes that the repo rate will be increased, as otherwise inflation will exceed the target. Current monetary policy Despite the fact that inflation has been clearly below target for some time, the Riksbank increased its key rate twice during the winter, by a total of 0.5 percentage points. Perhaps some people may wonder if this was really necessary; we are still in a situation with high unemployment and we cannot as yet see any inflationary pressures stemming from wages – one of the most important factors behind rising costs/prices in the economy. However, it is not today’s inflation that determines whether we shall increase or decrease the interest rate; it is the future inflation rate. The Riksbank’s forecasts and decisions refer in particular to inflation  BIS Review 43/2006  1  a couple of years ahead. We assume that it will take roughly this long before interest rate changes have a full impact on demand and thus on inflation. The Riksbank does not wish to achieve an inflation rate of 2 per cent at all costs. This is neither possible nor desirable.

And it is in this assessment of the timing of the increase that the Riksbank, like several other central banks, has taken into consideration developments in the asset market. Rising prices for household assets in the form of property and shares contribute to increasing household consumption and corporate investment. This effect is partly because monetary policy has been, and still is, expansionary. Property prices – and also share prices – have now risen much more than the general price level (see Figure 3). History shows that both property prices and share prices can fall rapidly and heavily – which many of us remember from the crises in the early 1990s or from the IT crash a few years ago. We also know that these prices are sensitive to interest rate changes. There is thus a risk that property prices and share prices may fall too quickly in connection with an increase in interest rates. Household consumption and corporate investment would then risk declining more than is desirable and contributing to poorer growth in employment. The recent interest rate increases in small stages are aimed at reducing the risk of this occurring. The earlier policy Before I go more deeply into the role of monetary policy with regard to the labour market, I would like to make a brief review of how things worked prior to the introduction of inflation targeting in 1993. During the 1970s and 1980s there were often cost crises and deficits in foreign trade.
•  The start of this decade saw a number of high-profile corporate scandals involving misconduct at the highest levels and breakdowns of internal control and compliance processes. In the U.S., extensive accounting fraud at Enron and WorldCom contributed to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which clearly places new obligations on covered firms. Other countries have not been immune to instances of accounting mismanagement, as evidenced by the example of Parmalat in Italy. •  The events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent emphasis on terrorism were the impetus for the USA Patriot Act, which substantially increased the compliance obligations of banks and other financial services firms. In particular, while firms have long been expected to have knowledge of the people that they do business with, Title III of this act - which focuses on international money laundering - puts an even stronger onus on financial firms to “know their customers” and keep a close watch on how they use their accounts. A combination of these new legislative initiatives and increased public scrutiny has led the supervisory community to place greater emphasis on compliance enforcement. •  Some of this is coming from relatively new sources - for example, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (or FinCEN), after it was upgraded to bureau status at the Treasury Department, has become more active in addressing financial abuses. And various State Attorneys General, such as in New York State, have been particularly aggressive in recent years in pursuing cases in the financial services industry.

If so, then the firm becomes subject to more legal and regulatory requirements, some of which may be inconsistent with those applicable elsewhere. The result of the geographic expansion then is to increase the risk of possible compliance problems and to make the management of a global business that much more difficult. Deregulation within individual countries is also something of a two-edged sword. Clearly it affords greater business opportunities to a firm, but it also raises challenges in managing compliance risk across a firm’s business units. For example, as a result of the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the US, a single firm can now engage in commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance activities. The implication for the compliance function is that it must not only keep on top of issues  BIS Review 76/2006  1  within each of these diverse business lines but also the interactions between them - for example, in policing potential conflicts of interest across the firm. Somewhat similarly, the overall compliance challenge for the firm is more than just the sum of the challenges from financial innovation, from globalization and from deregulation. There are interplays between these developments that add additional layers of complexity to the compliance challenge. Level of scrutiny The second broad consideration I mentioned is the increased level of scrutiny of compliance in the U.S. and in other major financial markets - scrutiny that is driven by major industry and political events that have changed the legal and regulatory environment over the past five years.
To this regard, in 2021, we authorized the use of the Chilean Peso for cross-border transactions, including derivatives settled through the delivery of CLP, opening, and holding of bank accounts by non-residents, and credits to non-residents or persons without a domicile in Chile and deposits or investment abroad by Chilean residents. The Central Bank has also promoted the opening of correspondent accounts in Peso. Clear rules regarding tax reporting of the foreign and local banks on the new correspondent accounts in Pesos, as proposed by the Government through an amendment to the Tax Code, will also play a relevant role in this regard and will allow to operationalize the internationalization of our currency. b) Financial Market Infrastructure. In relation to the second point, a more integrated financial system also requires a consistent and efficient payment and financial market infrastructure environment. Either for local payments in foreign currency or for cross-border payments, it is important to make available to the market the necessary infrastructure for a safer exchange. In recent years, important progress has been made in this regard: (i) new regulation for Large-Value Clearing Houses for transactions denominated in US Dollars (FX transactions); settlement for those transactions in the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system and for 9  operations in US Dollars of local Central Counterparties; and (ii) the operation of the OTC Derivatives Trade Repository.

In other jurisdictions, similar systems implemented more recently are more widely used by the population and as an actual means of payment in stores, not that different from cash or payment cards. 13  Given the increasing importance of digital payments in the economy, we decided to improve the standards for the clearing and settlement of those transactions. Along these lines, earlier this year the Central Bank issued a new regulation for retail payments clearing houses. A number of private entities have expressed their interest in creating retail payments clearing houses and they should be entering into function during 2023. This measure, coupled with new providers of payment initiation services that shall come into the regulatory perimeter under the recently approved “Fintech Law” have the potential to promote competition in the payments system. We welcome the recent approval of the "Fintech" Law, aimed at promoting competition and financial inclusion through innovation and technology in the provision of financial services, which allows the BCCh to regulate new activities related to payments. (v)  Convergence to international standards in regulation and new macro-prudential tools  The BCCh has a broad interest in the stability of the overall financial system, given its mandate of ensuring the normal functioning of internal and external payments and its role of lender of last resort. Certainly, this interest is shared with the Financial Market Commission and a strong coordination between authorities is essential. This coordination has allowed a smooth implementation of the Basel III standards, which will achieve full convergence by 2024.
Profits rose sharply and bad debts were lower. This means that the clouds that have hung over the banking system for the last two years have now lifted. But it would be wrong to conclude that life for the banks will go on much the same way as it did before in the golden years before the crisis. The competitive environment for the banks is becoming increasingly intense. Of course, you can argue that there is nothing new in this. The banking system in Hong Kong has always been competitive, which is one of the reasons it was able to cope with the Asian crisis. But competition in past years was taking place in highly buoyant conditions and within defined limits, reflecting in part the influence of the interest rate rules of the Hong Kong Association of Banks. 1  BIS Review 69/2000  The competitive environment Now things are somewhat different. A number of major players in the market, including some foreign banks, are competing even more intensely than they did before. Some of them have recently increased their presence in Hong Kong or are planning to do so. In some cases, this presence may be in virtual form as banks increasingly offer their services in whole or in part over the internet. This is part of a worldwide trend towards greater competition. But it is happening in Hong Kong at a time when lending growth has still not recovered along with the economy.

They will need to weigh the costs and benefits of direct membership compared with the existing practice of using a settlement bank. The important point is that the RLBs are now in a position to make that choice based on their own business needs. If the RLBs feel that there are any remaining impediments to their joining the system we would be pleased to hear from them. Interest rate deregulation The first phase of interest deregulation also produced a muted response. This is not unexpected nor is it unwelcome. We are trying to avoid “big bang” deregulation that might be disruptive. Some banks have introduced new overnight deposit accounts, which pay interest above the savings account rate. But so far we have not seen any large-scale migration from savings accounts to 24-hour call accounts. This is perhaps not surprising given the ample liquidity in the banking system, which means that the banks have a reduced incentive to bid actively for fresh deposits. This is reflected in the unusually small differential between the interest rate on savings accounts and those on time deposits. For example, the gap between the savings account rate and the one-month time deposit rate was only about 0.5% at the end of August. This reduces the incentive for depositors to forego the loss of liquidity involved in switching into time deposits.