samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They needed temporarily to look beyond their traditional markets for funding, and unquestionably these conditions put their resources and management under strain. It can definitely be said that those involved passed this difficult test. The funding problem that loomed around this time a year ago is a thing of the past, terms in the secondary market have been normalised and market confidence has been restored. This is to be welcomed. What remains, however, is of course that people are now more aware of the  BIS Review 42/2007  1  widespread risks that the future may hold in store. Global market conditions can change suddenly. Credit access, which in recent times has been exceptionally favourable for Icelandic and other banks, may change suddenly if unexpected conditions arise. It is important to be prepared for such a contingency. At the height of this furore, I would venture to say that the Central Bank made a strong contribution with its Financial Stability report, which was deemed to be professional, candid and in line with international best practice. The Bank’s next Financial Stability report will be published towards the end of April. Although these were not enviable times for financial companies, they definitely learned a lesson from this ordeal and are both more cautious and more aware of external influences than before. Rapid and sweeping changes in the financial sector put a great strain on regulatory agencies, which may face an uphill struggle to keep up with the swift pace of developments.

A reasonable and oft-used benchmark of longer-run inflation expectations is to look at inflation five or more years in the future. Such a forecast horizon is sufficiently long enough for typical business cycle dynamics and the effects of monetary policy on inflation to have played out, although under some circumstances, this may fall short of the “long run” implied by theory. Over the past year and a half, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have been insensitive to the rapid rise in inflation. Figure 1 shows the time series of these measures of longer-run inflation expectations. This includes median expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for inflation measured by the PCE price index 6-10 years in the future; breakeven inflation rates 6-10 years in the future as implied by nominal and inflation-protected U.S. Treasury securities; and the University of Michigan survey of inflation expected over the next 5-10 years.5 Realized 12-month CPI inflation is also shown in the figure for reference. As seen in Figure 1, SPF longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably stable over the past year and a half, while the market-based measure and the Michigan survey rose modestly during 2021 before retracing some of those gains this year. Because the Michigan survey asks about inflation over the next 5-10 years, it is a mixture of short-run and longer-run expectations, which may be related to its modest sensitivity to inflation.
Eight meetings focused on the monetary policy decision, whereas four meetings focused on decisions about issues pertaining to supervision and financial stability. The decisions have been communicated to the public through press conferences, full publication of relevant reports and explanation, on a case by case basis, in accordance with requests by various media outlets. All the reports compiled by the Bank of Albania on the monetary policy and financial stability have been fully submitted, within the envisaged legal time frame, to the Assembly of the Republic of Albania and its Committee on Economy and Finance. In line with the above said, and in accordance with earlier public statements, the strengthening of governance has assumed a key place in the Supervisory Council decisionmaking process. From this perspective, I will now briefly focus on: Establishment of the Audit Committee The establishment of the Audit Committee is an important development with regard to strengthening the internal control at the Bank of Albania, especially the supervisory capacities of the Supervisory Council. The meetings held in 2015 discussed the organisation and functioning of the Control [Internal Audit] Department, the audit universe and annual plan, main findings, risk assessment and effectiveness of the internal control system at the Bank of Albania. Another important aspect of the activity was to monitor the work for the preparation of financial statements in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards.

Ben was among the first to highlight their potential significance for monetary policy. Another example of Ben’s tendency to go against the mainstream is his critique of the use of rational expectations in macroeconomic models. When the rational expectations revolution transformed the field of macroeconomics in the late 1970s, Ben remained sceptical. He criticised the assumption that economic agents form their expectations based on a perfect understanding of how the economy works. These models did not address the question of how economic agents derive this knowledge in the first place. More recently, the literature has begun to develop models with forward-looking agents that have a limited understanding of how the economy works. This research programme is very much in the spirit of Ben’s early criticism. Page 3/4  A final example of Ben’s willingness to challenge the accepted wisdom of the day is his reservations about inflation targeting. When one central bank after another started to adopt inflation targeting in the 1990s, Ben became one of the most prominent critics of this new monetary policy strategy. His concern was that inflation targeting would lead central banks to focus single-mindedly on price stability. In doing so, Ben feared, they might lose sight of their ultimate goal of promoting economic well-being more broadly. Ben is widely recognised as one of the world’s leading macroeconomists. However, his research interests go far beyond that. Ben is a polymath, something that has become rare in modern academia. His writings cross academic boundaries between economics, philosophy, history and religion.
And if, despite all the extra protection they do fail, we need to ensure they can be “resolved” – by which I mean revived or sold or broken up or wound down – in a way that does the least damage to the economy and that does not require taxpayer bailouts. We are now close to the agreement of an international standard requiring systemic banks to hold a set amount of debt in a form that can be readily “bailed-in” to recapitalise and stabilise the firm if it fails, so that it can be resolved over time without doing wider damage. Macroprudential policy is about more than banks. Other parts of the financial system can drive up booms and amplify busts. Derivatives traded between financial firms acted as an amplifier of the crisis when their values changed very quickly and the firms did not have the resources to compensate each other for the change. We are now shifting bilaterally traded derivatives onto central counterparties where there is better identification and protection against the risks of sudden changes in value. Similarly, minimum standards on lending 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  against securities, another amplifier in the crisis, are being introduced to reduce the impact on firms when the value of those securities changes quickly. Seven years on from the crisis, the contours of the new regulatory framework are clear and in the main agreed; we are well into the implementation of many of its main standards.

I hope I will be able to show that while many of the problems we face and the tools we have are familiar, the development of macroprudential policy and the FPC since the crisis is not just old wine in new bottles. There is new and important wine here also. The Bank and financial stability The Bank of England is not, of course, a newcomer to this scene. In the centuries following the Bank’s creation in 1694, the British financial system mushroomed as the industrial revolution took hold and the empire grew. As the financial system grew, so did the incidence of crises and panics that required the Bank – often reluctantly – to intervene. In the financial crisis of 1825 – a crisis attributed by many to low interest rates, abundant liquidity and a  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  search for yield that drove investors into emerging market bonds – England was said by one observer to be “within 24 hours of a state of barter”. To get liquidity into the system and restore confidence, the Bank according to one of its directors “lent money by every possible means and in modes we had never adopted before”. Again, much of this sounds eerily familiar. The Bank since its inception has been at the centre of the response to every financial crisis in the UK.
The nagging concern is whether this determined pursuit of macro-economic stability will be maintained - whether in fact the degree of macro-economic convergence that has been achieved is likely - in the terms of the Treaty - to be “sustainable”. A particular worry is that macro-economic stability, on its own, is not enough. It has not been enough to prevent the progressive emergence of very high, and very different, levels of unemployment in a number of the major Continental European economies. Unemployment has been for some considerable time, and it remains, much the most urgent and important economic issue confronting us in Europe. I do not suggest for a moment that the right answer would be to abandon macro-economic discipline and revert to old-fashioned demand management policies. In anything other than the very short term that would be likely to make matters worse. I share the broad consensus view that Europe’s unemployment problems originate essentially in rigidities on the supply-side of the economy. The point is that unless we are all more successful in bringing down this structural unemployment, through micro-economic policies designed to improve structural, supply-side flexibility, then some countries could find it difficult to continue to live with a common macro-economic discipline without significant tensions.

Imported inflationary pressures remain subdued; inflation in Albania’s trading partners and the rise in commodity prices are at low levels, while the exchange rate is stable. Inflation expectations and the liquidity situation in the economy are in line with the low inflation rates for the period ahead. Indirect available data on economic activity signal for positive growth rates in the first months of the year. Aggregate demand improved, driven by both private domestic and foreign demand, while the consolidating fiscal policy pursued during this period did not contribute to an increase in demand. Incoming data for June have not changed our assessment on the performance of private consumption and investments. While these important components of aggregate demand were upward during the period, their performance remains weak. Their steady recovery continues to be impeded by uncertainties faced by households and businesses and reflected in the greater risk aversion of the real and financial sectors of the economy. The Bank of Albania expects further improvement in private consumption and investments for the rest of the year, reflecting, among others, its easing monetary policy. The pace of recovery of these two indicators will determine the short and medium-term dynamics of the country’s development. Data on public sector performance show a consolidating fiscal policy over the first five months of the year. This policy materialised in a budget deficit of about 68% lower than the previous year. The tightening fiscal policy is evident both on the revenue and expenditure side.
Unfortunately, most of these movements are not driven by facts, but perceptions. In ringgit’s case, I would call it misperceptions. Perception is the thinking we make based on the information that we receive. Everyone thinks. It is our nature to do so. In fact, many of us in this room not only have to think, but we are tasked and compensated to think, decide and act upon our thoughts. It is said that an adult supposedly have to make an average of 35,000 decisions per day. This necessitates us to think fast and decide quickly. But studies have also shown that thinking forces the brain to consume a lot of oxygen, so much so that the process of thinking is tiring for our brain. Such decision fatigue can be paralysing. To ease the decision fatigue, most of us begin looking for mental short-cuts, heuristics and simple rules-of-thumb to ease the cognitive load and cut decision-making time. But as we rely on simple rules-of-thumb to form judgments and make decisions, we leave ourselves vulnerable to errors, manipulations and cognitive biases. Most of the time, this is not done deliberately. The large body of research in neuroscience seems to suggest that these cognitive biases are neurologically hard-wired, afflicting us all either consciously or unconsciously. Let me touch on three instances where our perception and actions have been influenced by these biases. First, take some of the psychological thresholds for example, loan-to-deposit ratio of 90%, ringgit level at RM4.00, and reserves level below USD100 billion is considered as vulnerable.

Real GDP growth has decelerated in 2018 compared with the growth we have seen since the second half of 2014. This slowdown mainly reflects weakness in net trade. Looking forward, global protectionism and weakening conditions in emerging markets represent further downside risks to growth. Internally, the present low savings rate of Spanish households and the need to restore savings in the near term, points to moderation in consumption going forward. Let me point to the three main challenges that the Spanish economy is facing at present, in my view. The first relates to the process of fiscal consolidation. While well advanced, it is still incomplete. The government deficit ratio is still the highest in the EU and it needs to be further reduced to bring the government debt ratio on to a downward path. In fact, adequate buffers need to be rebuilt now, in times of solid growth and favourable financing conditions. This would enable fiscal policy to support the economy in the event of any future shock. Secondly, unemployment remains very high, as does the share of temporary employment. Spain’s unemployment rate remains well above pre-crisis levels and is roughly the double of the euro area rate. This situation calls for further reforms to address the duality of the labour market and more effective active labour market policies to re-integrate young people and the long-term unemployed. Finally, productivity remains low and needs to be raised to maintain economic growth and enable sustainable wage growth.
Because bearing responsibility is not possible without having the relevant powers. Whatever happens ahead, the events in 2014 will not rewrite the BNB’s history of proven success in recent years. It is a fact that, thanks to the consistent efficient work of the central bank, including the banking supervision, during the global financial crisis not a single bank went bankrupt in Bulgaria. In other countries, even in the EU, problems with banks led to public costs running into hundreds of billions of euros. The Bulgarian citizens and taxpayers were saved from all that. The long-standing achievements of the BNB, and BNB’s banking supervision in particular, should not be forgotten or erased easily – even if it turns out that some omissions may have been made in the KTB case. It is also a fact that since June to date the BNB, the government and the commercial banks (under the strong leadership of the BNB) have successfully confined the negative effects on the rest of the banking sector after placing KTB and CB Victoria under special supervision. Making huge efforts, we continue to safeguard the financial stability in Bulgaria. In an extremely unfavourable situation of unprecedented public pressure, ferocious criticisms and direct attacks against the central bank, the BNB has once again managed to do its best. The good news is that this year the BNB has practically stood a real and very heavy stress test. We have passed an exceptionally serious stress test of our independence.

Heightened volatility in global financial markets can be associated with the presence of very low and even negative rates rather than the underlying macroeconomic and external imbalances. In these circumstances, any change in interest rate differential across countries is likely to create greater impacts than otherwise. If this interest rate change takes place in the largest and the most significant economy in the world, then the impact will expectedly be further magnified. The Fed’s start of interest rate normalization has demonstrated that its impact on the global economy and financial markets indeed has been large, giving rise to significant capital outflows from emerging market (EM) economies, large adjustments and volatility in exchange rates as well as widened EM spreads and interest rates. The adverse effects of the Fed’s interest rate normalization has been on average larger than those occurred in previous two financial turmoil episodes, namely the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the US tapering tantrum. However, the disparity between the effected countries has been large too. The plummeted commodity prices as well as other factors led to this outcome as commodity exporters suffered from both the lower commodity revenues and the tightening global financial conditions. Financial markets also differentiated EM countries by policy frameworks and prudent policies. Those having rich and better policy frameworks and prudent policies have withstood the recent global financial turmoil better than the others.
For example, many states have limited the scope of their legislation to specific types of transactions (for example, transactions with the State, medical records, motor vehicle records). However,  BIS Review 26/1998  -6the biggest difference concerns the type of signatures covered, electronic signatures versus digital signatures, and the effect of those signatures on electronic documents. The more general term -- electronic signature -- can be used to describe any letters, characters, or symbols manifested by electronic or similar means and executed or adopted by a party with an intent to authenticate a writing. Examples of an electronic signature include a name typed at the end of an e-mail message by the sender or a digitalized image of a handwritten signature of the sender. A “digital signature” is a subset of electronic signatures and represents a unique way to “sign” an electronic message. A digital signature is simply a string of alpha-numeric characters. It is created by running an electronic message through a one-way hash function (thereby creating a unique digest or fingerprint of the message) and then using public key cryptography to encrypt the resulting message digest. Like all electronic signatures, a digital signature can serve the same function as a handwritten signature in that it can be used to signify authorship or assent. A digital signature, however, also serves an important security function that a handwritten signature and many electronic signatures may not.

Article 2B does not, however, address some rather important aspects of electronic records namely, the admissibility of electronic records in legal proceedings and the use of electronic records to satisfy legal requirements that original documents be retained. Regardless of whether Article 2B ultimately addresses all of these issues, the adoption by all 50 states of Article 2B is still a long way off. Moreover, the principles stated in Article 2B are restricted to the scope of Article 2B. Thus, even when Article 2B is adopted, it will not affect a significant portion of electronic commerce. With that in mind, NCCUSL established a separate drafting committee to tackle electronic transaction issues generally in a new Uniform Electronic Transaction Act. The ETA, although on a “fast track”, is still at a very early drafting stage. Several important decisions, including the scope of the Act, are still being debated. Having said that, the Act is expected to provide for the legal recognition of electronic signatures and records in most commercial transactions, and for the use of electronic records as evidence. In addition to the uniform state law efforts of NCCUSL/ALI, there has been a proliferation of non-uniform United States state laws addressing electronic commerce that are generally referred to as “digital signature” or “electronic signature” laws. There are at least 43 states that have enacted, or are currently considering, electronic signature legislation. These state law initiatives vary considerably.
When the course of medium-term inflation expectations is analyzed, it is observed that the expected inflation continues to remain well below the actual inflation figures although inflation had clearly remained above the target level for quite some time. When considering the period of high inflation levels experienced by Turkey in recent years, one of the most significant achievements of the inflation-targeting regime has been its success in managing expectations in a time of extraordinary shocks. Operational framework for monetary policy Inflation targets Inflation targets have been set jointly with the Government as “point target” since 2006, over the end-year inflation rates calculated by the annual percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for a target horizon of three years. As mentioned above, targets for the next three-year period were announced during the revision in June 2008. Within this framework, inflation targets for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are 7.5 percent, 6.5 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively. Accountability In the first three-year period of the inflation-targeting regime, the Central Bank explained the reasons for deviations from inflation targets and policy measures taken with open letters sent to the Government, and hence meticulously applied the principle of accountability. Gradually, Inflation Reports also became a significant support to the accountability mechanism.

In case of a recovery in the liquidity conditions due to developments in the international markets; (i)  The Central Bank may, with prior notice, resume foreign exchange buying auctions in line with the general strategy of strengthening foreign exchange reserves at times when foreign exchange supply increases compared to the foreign exchange demand. (ii)  The Central Bank might cease to perform its intermediary function in the Foreign Exchange Deposit Market. However, even in such a case, banks will still be able to borrow foreign exchange deposits from the Foreign Exchange Deposit Markets within the predetermined borrowing limits. (iii)  The FX required reserves ratio might be increased. In view of the fact that financial stability is one of the prerequisites for price stability, the Central Bank took the necessary measures in order to ensure the efficient operation of Turkey’s foreign exchange market without facing any liquidity problems. The Central Bank also announced possible additional measures. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that under the current exchange rate regime economic agents operate in an environment of exchange rate risk, they should establish mechanisms that will ensure efficient risk management. Liquidity management While drawing up the general framework of liquidity management, the Central Bank took into consideration following objectives; (i) ensuring that short-term interest rates would remain at or revolve around the level set by the Committee, (ii) ensuring the efficient and stable operation of money markets by preventing excessive volatilities in short-term interest rates of the money market, (iii) ensuring smooth functioning of the payments system.