samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The EU Member States’ constitutions, on the other hand, tend more towards the principle of proportional representation, which some consider to be in favour of universal programs designed to benefit various groups and thus higher government spending. 25 It is common knowledge that, in an effort to avoid the pitfalls of unsustainable budget policies, the Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact lay down the conditions necessary for safeguarding budget discipline within a monetary union. The Pact’s underlying philosophy in the budget field is that countries must structurally pursue breakeven budgets or a budget surplus, in order to then allow automatic stabilisers to function without any restriction. This institutional setup, comprising constraints of an almost constitutional nature in the field of budget policy, is different from that in the United States where tax regulations are in some ways more flexible, although they have been much altered in recent decades. It has been repeatedly proposed to introduce a break-even budget rule in the United States, but it has not happened yet. Another example of the importance assigned to discretionality over regulations in the United States can be seen in the fact that, while the overall debt is nominally subject to a ceiling approved by Congress, that ceiling is in fact regularly modified, thus in actual fact it is not binding at all. For example, the deficit targets established in the 1985 Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman Act) were abundantly breached and later relaxed.

Thus, while the euro area shows a unique institutional setting – in contrast to monetary policy, fiscal policy is far from being single – national governments have agreed to common rules which ensure that the euro area remains an efficient and stability-oriented single economic area. 4  BIS Review 61/2001  Conclusion Let me conclude by saying that the single currency and the establishment of a new European institution responsible for monetary policy in the euro area complemented the process of economic integration that started half a century ago in Europe. This process and the institutional build-up, together with clear and coherent policy goals and an efficient allocation of the respective responsibilities, are transforming the euro area into an increasingly unified economic entity which, in many respects, resembles the US. Although most of the required structural reforms still have to be implemented, it cannot be denied that substantial progress has been made. The introduction of the euro has been and will continue to be a powerful catalyst, contributing to greater competition in the economic and the political sphere, thereby further enhancing the welfare of the citizens in the euro area. Ladies and gentlemen, political leaders throughout Europe have recognised the need for structural changes in both taxation and expenditure policies and regarding the deregulation of product and labour markets.
The problems with inflation were then accentuated when the financial markets were deregulated. Prices and wages rose steeply and Sweden was caught in wage-price spirals. The occurrence of price bubbles made investment decisions more hazardous and led to weak productivity. A high level of inflation became a permanent feature of our economy. As monetary policy at that time was focused on maintaining a fixed exchange rate, fiscal policy ought to have been tighter. Bit by bit, there was a growing awareness across party political lines that in the longer run this economic policy strategy was not viable, a perception that had already dawned on most countries in our part of the world in the early 1980s. It was now that low inflation in Sweden came to be seen as a necessary condition for achieving stable and sustained growth and thereby high employment. This was clearly expressed officially for the first time in the Budget Statement in January 1991. Combating inflation was given pride of place on the economic policy agenda. The final policy objectives were the same as before but the perception of the conditions that were needed to attain them had changed. This realignment of stabilisation policy occurred, however, at a time when the earlier policy’s negative consequences had begun to leave their mark. Due to the high level of costs in manufacturing, for example, economic growth in Sweden was weak. In addition, a rising real interest rate coincided with a period when the tax reform made savers and investors more sensitive to interest rates.

Opinions in the Union presumably differ from time to time about the practical application of this commitment but the basic requirement is that policy focuses consistently on stability. The Riksdag has left the door open for Sweden’s participation in the monetary union at a later date and stated that in connection with such a move it can be relevant to join the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). In this perspective, too, it is an advantage if the krona is more or less stable. Monetary policy in the euro area is to have the primary objective of price stability. We do not yet know just how the European Central Bank (ECB) will formulate its target but it is unlikely to differ from the norm that has applied in Germany since the mid 1980s. This means that inflation is not to exceed a medium-term level of 2 per cent. In practice, therefore, the differences in this policy field between the ECB and Sweden will probably not be so great as to have any real consequences for the exchange rate. With policy focused on price stability both in Sweden and in the monetary union, there should be good possibilities of a stable exchange rate between the krona and the euro. This is supported by the path of the krona relative to the German mark in recent years. As measured, for example, by the long-term interest rate differential with Germany, confidence in Swedish economic policy has been high since 1996.
The Central Bank’s tight monetary stance has, on the other hand, brought results, as last November inflation dropped below the target of 2½ %. Old theories reappear Recently there has been extensive discussion concerning the Central Bank of Iceland, its policy and objectives. Now that inflation has been subdued, old theories to the effect that the Central Bank should pursue multiple objectives have once more come to the fore. The Bank is to ensure full employment, it should have specific exchange rate objectives and ensure economic growth. These views reflect considerable over-estimation of the power of the Central Bank and the instruments at its disposal. It is also an oversimplification to focus exclusively on interest rates, as many people do, and expect that further interest rate reduction will solve all the problems. The Central Bank has, over the past two years, cut its rates thirteen times, and the bank’s policy rate is currently 5.3%. While this is naturally a higher rate than in the Euro zone, the problems which have to be grappled with there include long-term economic stagnation and high unemployment, and the future is by no means bright. In Norway, on the other hand, the Central Bank rate is 6%, to take an example of a neighbouring industrialised country. The Central Bank of Iceland’s real policy rate is currently around 2¾% considering future prospects, which is slightly under current estimates of the equilibrium interest rate.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Ethics and trust in finance Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the 6th "Ethics and Trust in Finance" Global Prize ceremony, Paris, 15 January 2018. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, It is with great pleasure that I welcome you all to the auditorium of the Banque de France for the 6th "Ethics and Trust in Finance" Global Prize ceremony. I would particularly like to welcome Angel Gurria, Secretary-General of the OECD, and Professor Paul Dembinski, the Co-chair of the prize. The venue that you have been invited to today sends a message in itself: as the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution is backed by the Banque de France, some might have a tendency to think that the bank and insurance supervisor, as the "guardian of the temple", would only be concerned with compliance with prudential rules, which are collective and compulsory. They might also think that the supervisor would consider that an ethical approach is too poorly defined to be inspected, as each financial institution – and even each professional – has their own perspective on it, and would also consider that an ethical approach leaves them free to look after the interests of their clients. The philosophers among you will have recognised in this divergence between rules and ethics the classic contrast between Kant's "categorical imperative" and Aristotle's "practical wisdom".
How much central bank reserves the private banks had depended, among other things, on how much bank deposits they had on their books, related to the reserve requirements the Federal Reserve applied. The banks’ demand for reserves then determined how much bonds the Fed was obliged to purchase to steer the interest rates to the desired level. This led to the Fed already having a substantial portfolio of government bonds before the financial crisis. Since the level of interest rates in many countries has ended up close to the lower bound, most central banks around the world have made significantly greater purchases of financial assets with the aim of making monetary policy more expansionary. Longer market rates can be divided up into the sum of future expected short-term interest rates plus a premium. If the markets are not frictionless, the size of this premium may partly depend on the relative supply of a certain bond, which is to say the outstanding stock in the hands of the private sector. If the central bank purchases a significant proportion of the stock, the price of the remaining bonds can therefore rise and interest rates thereby fall. When the Riksbank purchases bonds, liquidity is injected into the market – the investor swaps the bond for deposits in a bank and the amount of central bank reserves in the banking system as a whole increases. How effective quantitative easing is depends on how investors and bankers use this liquidity.

In addition to earnings, equity must generate a reasonable surplus so that the Riksbank has profits that can be used to build up equity in the event of losses. The Inquiry’s proposals restrict the Riksbank's equity to SEK 60 billion, calculated only using inflation. As I have said, one interpretation of this is that the Inquiry sees a return to a steady state in which the balance sheet should be small – and, in such a world, a small amount of equity is adequate, assuming that the real interest rate returns to at least 1 per cent and that adjustments to the repo rate are enough to achieve the monetary policy objectives. The proposed act certainly makes it possible for the Riksbank to ask to raise the capital ratio, for example if seigniorage should fall or the real interest rate become lower. The problem is that, if the earnings capacity is initially set to just cover expenditure, there will be no scope to use the profit to build up equity independently. If revenues fall because real interest rates are low, it will not matter if target equity is higher – the Riksbank will make losses until the framework triggers a recapitalisation. When it comes to allowing for a larger balance sheet, the problem is that risks can increase quite quickly – and then, the Riksbank could find itself in a situation where retained profits are not enough to build equity up quickly enough.
This was pointed out by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell in 19072: "...the upward movement of prices, whether great or small in the first instance, can never cease so long as the rate of interest is kept lower than its normal rate". Calculations seem to indicate that the neutral real interest rate for Norway is between 2½ and 3½ per cent and it has probably fallen somewhat in recent years. Monetary policy is functioning It takes time for an interest rate reduction to have an impact on inflation. We are now seeing the effects of monetary policy decisions some of which were taken two years ago. The interest rate has affected inflation via the krone exchange rate and via demand for goods and services. In particular, the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services has picked up. In addition, the reduction in the interest rate has probably contributed to holding up expectations of future inflation even when inflation is low. 2  Knut Wicksell (1907): “The Influence of the Rate of Interest on Prices”, Economic Journal, XVII (1907), pages 213-220. BIS Review 10/2005  3  Norges Bank’s key rate is an overnight rate. The interest rate on deposits and loans with longer maturities will reflect expectations as to future interest rate decisions. As the key rate was gradually reduced, expectations also fell, and banks reduced their lending rates. Monetary policy has had a greater impact because market participants expected the low interest rate to persist over a period.

About overall economy, a more sustainable development should be ensured, relating mainly to better control on trade deficit, supporting the sectors that actually contribute or may contribute to increasing exports in the country. Public authorities should strengthen their commitment to developing the non-bank financial market, which gradually leads to reduction of economic dependence on the banking sector condition and improves access to financing of a higher number of private entities. In this way, a greater opportunity would be provided to the financial system to finance projects in the agricultural sector, which has a high potential for ensuring competitive advantages in the Albanian economy. Allow me to conclude by emphasizing the Bank of Albania’s willingness to contribute, through its policies on monetary and financial stability, to maintaining a better climate of sound development of the financial and banking activity, as a condition for a greater financial support to business development in the country. I think that this forum will make a valuable contribution to setting some concrete development policies and projects, about which, I believe that the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank will offer its own support and expertise. Wishing success to the proceedings of this forum, I thank you for your attention! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
A large financial system can be more readily versatile, i.e. provide investors and those in need of financing with a full range of options to choose from according to their requirements. What does all of this mean for financial stability in the euro area? First of all, I should like to remind you that the financial system of the euro area showed a high degree of stability during last year’s period of financial turbulence as well as during the rather dramatic structural shift connected to the changeover to the euro. In the former case, it is true that there was a significant spillover effect for the euro area markets, but they recovered quickly and without suffering any lasting damage. There was no disruption to any of the basic functions of the financial system, and public confidence in it remained strong throughout. Second, the foreseen structural changes require, as I mentioned earlier, the need for adjustment to be taken seriously by all participants in the financial system. This adjustment appears to have intensified recently: there has been an increase in merger activity, an establishment of alliances and an introduction of new products and services, often based on modern information technology. The process of structural change contains risks, but if these risks are identified early and analysed carefully, they do not present a threat to financial stability. After all, we are talking about decision-making and planning by people who are dealing with risks every day at the highest professional level.

In this regard, the smooth changeover of the financial system to the euro demonstrates the virtues of efficient and careful forward planning. Third, I do not view efficiency and stability of the financial system as being contradictory. In many ways these qualities actually support each other by laying a firm foundation for the financial system. An inefficient financial system, in addition to being costly to society, can be more vulnerable to shocks. At the ECB, we play our part in the evolution of the euro area financial system by providing it with stable monetary conditions. By creating an environment of price stability, we allow private sector agents to focus their attention on the questions that are most relevant to their activities and to take advantage of the benefits of this stable environment, such as the lengthening of their planning horizons. 5  BIS Review 63/1999
After the “sprint” to monetary normalisation started in July 2022, we are now entering a new phase of monetary policy that is more comparable to a longdistance race: it will be longer – above all we must not claim victory too rapidly -, but more gradual and more pragmatic in the pace of the next interest rate hikes. It is clearly too early to tell beyond the 3% that we are expected to reach in March – which is well below the current rate of 4.75% in the United States, or 4% in the United Kingdom – at what "terminal" rate key rates will stabilise. But I believe it is possible to shed some light on the path that we should follow, in order to provide some degree of economic predictability. First, regarding the calendar, it seems to me desirable to reach this terminal rate by summer, i.e. by September at the latest. And our decisions will be guided by the economic data: our central criterion for deciding on monetary stabilisation should be the fairly certain turnaround in the underlying inflation trajectory. It is this underlying inflation that monetary policy can best treat, and which provides the best indication of the medium-term perspective of headline inflation. We have not yet reached that turnaround, that economic "threshold". I would also like to dispel a fear: the disinflation that we are about to carry out will not lead to a recession, given the resilience of economic activity and employment.

It is aiming at preserving and improving the situation of employees and of all our fellow citizens in the euro area. Such a responsible policy directly benefits those who are unemployed by significantly improving their employment possibilities. It benefits all our fellow citizens by supporting the purchasing power of their income, thus preserving the well-being of euro area households. And it contributes to meeting one necessary condition for sustainable long-term growth and active job creation in the euro area, which is price stability. Naturally there are also a number of other factors that are contributing to sustainable growth and job creation, in particular sound public finances and, as I already said, structural reforms that enhance competition, increase productivity and foster economic flexibility in order to elevate the growth potential of our vast euro area economy. Augmenting the growth potential of Europe is a major goal for all of us. Background information Table 1: Compensation per employee growth (whole economy) across euro area countries  2  BIS Review 52/2007  Table 2: Unit labour costs growth (whole economy) across euro area countries  Table 3. Labour productivity growth in the euro area countries  BIS Review 52/2007  3  Table 4. Employment growth in the euro area countries  Table 5. Unemployment rates across euro area countries  4  BIS Review 52/2007
Therefore, the agencies' incentives to do a proper job should be quite enough without regulation. Crisis management – preparedness needs to be strengthened Another issue that I believe needs particular attention is how to achieve better crisis preparedness, which means that I am now switching to talk about crisis management issues. As on numerous occasions in the past, many countries were ill prepared for this crisis and had to rely on ad-hoc solutions for handling it. In the case of the EU, member states quickly had to reach an improvised agreement on a co-ordinated and comprehensive financial support plan. We have had the same situation in Sweden, both when we had a crisis in the early 90s and, more surprisingly, even now. Despite the quite recent experience of a systemic crisis, legislators had not been able to get a proper framework for the management and closure of distressed banks in place. Thus, also this time we had to rely on improvised solutions. Even if these ad-hoc measures often seem to work out pretty well there is no guarantee that they will do so consistently. To let financial system stability become the hostage of improvised political processes is obviously not an optimal order. Experience from previous crises also shows that improvised crisis management measures often come too late, are inadequate, and ultimately turn out to be more costly then they would have needed to be. I would say that British Northern Rock is the perfect example of all this.

Robert Ophèle: Cyber security in the financial sector Opening speech by Mr Robert Ophèle, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Conference “Cyber security in the financial sector”, Paris, 17 June 2014. *  *  *  Emmanuelle Assouan, Frédéric Hervo, Claudine Hurman, Caroline Keribin, Clément Martin and Axel Petitprez have also contributed to the preparation of this speech. Ladies and gentlemen, I am very happy to introduce this conference about cyber-security in the financial sector. This issue could be considered in the first place as very technical, the type of issue that has to be addressed only within a limited forum of experts. This would be an error and on the contrary, it is key that public authorities, including central banks, dedicate sufficient attention to cyber-security, given its system-wide implications notably for the functioning of the financial system. Over the past decade, the financial sector has changed considerably with the emergence of the Internet and the use of new information technologies. The market has been able to innovate and improve the quality, the performance and the efficiency of services such as online banking, mobile payments, and settlement platforms. Public authorities have indeed encouraged dematerialization in the financial sector to foster economic growth and also to reduce the operational risks inherent in previously non-automated processes. For example, the new European regulation on Central Securities Depositories requires using dematerialized securities and promotes automated and straight-through processes in securities settlement systems.