samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To the extent that these platforms operate across geographical borders, appropriate arrangements for cooperation among national supervisors must be in place. The third thrust is to move derivatives trading to platforms where appropriate. This will help to improve price transparency. Singapore is a major centre for exchange-traded derivatives in Asia. We are well placed to move more derivatives trades to organised platforms, but the extent would have to take into account the local context, such as product characteristics and participant profiles. The fourth thrust is to report trades. Mandatory trade reporting enhances supervision of derivatives markets by addressing information gaps. For this to be effective, regulators need timely access to relevant data that can be aggregated. This requires cross-border supervisory cooperation on data access and harmonisation of reporting requirements and standards. But national concerns have led to some jurisdictions setting up their own trade repositories, which could make data aggregation more challenging. MAS is assessing the need for a local repository and the appropriate regulatory regime to avoid duplication. In recent months, there has been a notion in some quarters that as tighter regulations are proposed for OTC derivatives in the US and EU, activity will flow to centres in Asia that are purportedly less tightly regulated. This is mistaken. Leading centres in Asia – like Singapore, Hong Kong, and Australia – are very much part of the G20 initiative and there is no room for regulatory arbitrage.

For the institutions that are socially responsible and work for the benefit of all citizens, the most important indicator for measuring the success in achieving their strategic goals, is the quality of the policies. One of the biggest and toughest tasks of the HRM function, is probably managing the knowledge and building the expertise of intellectual force of the institution, through continuous training and professional development. In order to be effective, organisations must be able to understand that human capital alone will not create value. People have to be motivated and managed by the use of good human resource practices and given the opportunity to develop and use their skills to create valuable goods and services. If the knowledge cannot be embedded in goods and services that are in demand, then this human capital will have no value to the organization. I hope that this workshop will contribute for creating better environment for capacity building in all our countries in the region. Also, it is my strong belief, that this meeting of the coordinators, apart from being useful for exchange of information in the process of prioritizing and creating the future visionary training programmes, will lead to strengthening of the regional cooperation among national authorities. Let me finish my address by quoting Mr. Gary Matthews, Consultant with UK Government’s Investors in People, which I believe reflects the actual economic rationale of training and development of human capital: “People are the only asset that appreciates, through training and development. All other assets depreciate”.
I believe that the best we can do, at least at this stage, is to pay close attention to incoming data in the forecasting process, and examine how consistent they are with historical relationships. We have to deal more successfully with the fact that forecasts of economic developments can never be completely accurate and still allow monetary policy to be forward looking. Final words Let me now conclude. When discussing financial and monetary stability, we must remember that we have come a long way. The world economy shows strong growth coupled with low inflation and monetary policy has contributed to this development. However, there are interesting, though somewhat difficult, challenges ahead that must be met if we are to preserve this bright picture of the world economy. BIS Review 65/2000  6

But, at the same time, I do not think that cross-country differences in Monetary Union, which raise the potential for persistent divergence of economic performance, can or should be ignored. Looking forward, the financial crisis and its impact on the functioning of financial markets in some countries has led to a situation in which cross-country heterogeneity owing to differences in monetary policy transmission may be more pronounced than before the crisis – at least if effective remedial measures are not taken. This new environment has posed, and will continue to pose, challenges to the single monetary policy. How is the ECB dealing with these challenges? Since the start of the financial crisis, the ECB has implemented a set of non-standard measures, taking advantage of the range of instruments available within the Eurosystem’s framework for the implementation of monetary policy. Foremost among these measures has been the adoption of a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment in the ECB’s monetary policy operations. In conjunction with the flexible nature of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework, these measures allow banks to obtain funding even in the face of market dislocation.5 This has avoided a disorderly deleveraging of bank balance sheets and the associated potential for a fire sale-driven, vicious downward spiral in asset prices and bank capital. In the face of the sovereign debt crisis these non-standard measures, supplemented by targeted asset purchases under the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme, have addressed and contained the country-specific impediments to monetary policy transmission.
Page 1  The economic landscape: structural change, global R * and the missing-investment puzzle − speech by Andrew Bailey Given at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum  Page 2  Published on 12 July 2022  Andrew Bailey discusses new research which looks at the global factors that have affected the trend real interest rate over the past sixty years or so. Speech Introduction Thank you. It is a pleasure to speak at this event hosted by the OMFIF. In challenging times like those we are currently facing, the independent platform you provide – which brings the public and private sector together to discuss issues relating to central banking, economic policy and public investment – is more important than ever. The dominant theme for central banks around the world currently is the very elevated level of inflation. The Bank of England is certainly no exception, with UK CPI inflation reaching 9.1% in May, and projected to increase further to slightly above 11% by October. In view of continuing signs of robust cost and price pressures, including the current tightness of the labour market, and the risk that those pressures become more persistent, the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee voted to increase Bank Rate by a further 0.25 percentage points at its latest meeting in June. This was the fifth increase in rates since December, taking Bank Rate to 1.25%.

Jon Cunliffe: Macroprudential policy – from Tiberius to Crockett and beyond Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at TheCityUK, London, 28 July 2015. *  *  *  Historians still argue about the exact causes of the financial crash of AD 33 that rocked the Roman Empire. The commentators of the day did not unfortunately have, let alone record, the vast amounts of data that we have become used to today. But in a world still painfully extricating itself from the crash of 2008, the key features look eerily familiar, as a number of modern day commentators have observed. An extension of credit across the empire, a sudden deleveraging, debtors failing and bank closures in a number of Roman provinces, the total drying up of liquidity in the financial system and widespread panic. The remedies look familiar too. The Emperor Tiberius was not able to rely on a modern independent central bank with the ability to print money to staunch the crisis. But notwithstanding that immense shortcoming, Tiberius took effective action, injecting into the system a huge amount of liquidity stored in coin in his treasury, setting interest rates at zero for a three year period – an early example of forward guidance – and doubling loan to value requirements for property loans. He also executed those he thought most responsible: though some might advocate that today, I think in that respect at least we have moved on from AD 33.
Phase II (from 1 April to 31 July 2014) Action 1: Appointment of panel of auditors for conducting independent valuations The most critical and sensitive task that had to be undertaken during the initial stage of the consolidation process is the preparation of an accurate status and valuation report of all Category B NBFIs. To fulfill this task, the Central Bank appointed 9 qualified external audit firms, referred to as “Panel of Auditors”, to conduct independent and professional audits and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  to undertake and complete information memoranda (IMs), due diligences (DDs) and valuation exercises in respect of the financial institutions that are to be merged or sold. Such reports are expected to be prepared under the highest standards in terms of professionalism and ethics, accepted norms and best practices. In order to ensure independence and objectivity of such reports, the Central Bank has decided to meet the expenses on professional fees to the auditors. Valuation of business were done based on 3 agreed methods, namely, price to earnings, price to book value and residual income approach which is for negative net worth companies. In addition, “Dispute Resolution Committee” comprising 4 members from the Panel of Auditors was appointed to resolve issues relating to DDs and valuations.

Opinions in the Union presumably differ from time to time about the practical application of this commitment but the basic requirement is that policy focuses consistently on stability. The Riksdag has left the door open for Sweden’s participation in the monetary union at a later date and stated that in connection with such a move it can be relevant to join the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). In this perspective, too, it is an advantage if the krona is more or less stable. Monetary policy in the euro area is to have the primary objective of price stability. We do not yet know just how the European Central Bank (ECB) will formulate its target but it is unlikely to differ from the norm that has applied in Germany since the mid 1980s. This means that inflation is not to exceed a medium-term level of 2 per cent. In practice, therefore, the differences in this policy field between the ECB and Sweden will probably not be so great as to have any real consequences for the exchange rate. With policy focused on price stability both in Sweden and in the monetary union, there should be good possibilities of a stable exchange rate between the krona and the euro. This is supported by the path of the krona relative to the German mark in recent years. As measured, for example, by the long-term interest rate differential with Germany, confidence in Swedish economic policy has been high since 1996.
The overall macroeconomic climate is not the problem, in fact it has been rather favourable. I might add that the macroeconomic environment has been rather favourable in Sweden too. The period from 1999 has underlined that confidence can be achieved outside EMU. HICP inflation in Sweden has actually been lower than in the euro area, our price developments have also been in line with our inflation target, as have inflation expectations. The interest rate differential between Swedish and German bonds has been firmly in the low decimals and has even for a short period of time been negative. If overall macroeconomic conditions have been favourable, both in the euro area and in Sweden, the real issues and problems are not in macroeconomic policy, but on the structural side, in product markets and in labour markets. In the euro area the recent fall in productivity in the business sector and increase in unit labour costs seem to reflect a high degree of labour hoarding, that is to say a refusal to cut staff when faced with lower demand, and thus poor reallocation of employment. There might be good reasons for this, such as high costs for finding and training the right personnel in a competence driven economy, but it nevertheless indicates that wage flexibility needs to increase. And despite this overstaffing, wage growth has not slowed down. Similarly, studies from the OECD and recently published research highlight that the important differential in growth between the US and Europe is the poor employment growth in Europe.

And during the downturn of 2001 and 2002 Europe still underperformed the US and Sweden. This is the reality, and of course on a very simplistic level it makes poor publicity for EMU prior to the Swedish referendum. Yet I believe that it would be a mistake to blame monetary policy or indeed EMU itself for this disappointing performance. On closer inspection EMU as such has achieved its major objectives during the first three and a half years of existence. Most importantly price stability has been successfully achieved. Headline HICP inflation was below the stated maximum target level of 2 percent in 1999 and slightly above in the following years. However this was achieved under rather adverse conditions: during 2001 and the beginning of 2002 prices were very much affected by the triple impact of animal disease (affecting meat prices), oil prices and the changeover to euro coins and notes. Core inflation, excluding the most volatile food prices and energy, has been reasonably close to the 2 percent level 1999-2002. Inflation expectations also appear to have been firmly anchored close to 2 percent. Now there has of course also been quite a high degree of divergence inside the area, with inflation ranging from over 5 % in the Netherlands to 1.8 % in France in 2001 (and even lower figures in Germany during 2002). This has created differences in real interest rates, but not wide enough to explain the overall lag in productivity or growth. None of those caveats can explain the euro area's poor performance.
This can be traced back to the enactment of the Islamic Banking Act in 1983 and the Takaful Act in 1984 which facilitated the birth of the first full-fledged Islamic banking institution and takaful operator. Prior to this, Islamic finance was very niche. Its relevance was mostly limited to the provision of custodian services such as the pilgrimage fund as managed by Tabung Haji. There was no appeal to the wider market, then. Since the early 1980s, we have witnessed a significant transformation of Islamic finance in Malaysia. Over the years, this sector began to offer a wider range of solutions to cater for the evolving needs of the national economy and the local communities. Islamic finance now makes up a significant and growing share of the domestic market. The share of Islamic banking assets more than doubled from 12.9% in 2007 to 28% in 2016. Takaful penetration has now reached 14.6% of the population. Globally, Malaysia has established itself as a leading hub for Islamic finance. In the global sukuk market, we hold a share of more than 50% of the global outstanding sukuk. To cater for the growing size and sophistication, the legal foundation for Islamic finance has undergone several enhancements over the years. The Shariah Advisory Councils – or the SACs – of the Securities Commission and Bank Negara Malaysia were established roughly twenty years ago to promote greater Shariah certainty. They since have played an increasingly important role in the ascertainment of Shariah for matters of Islamic finance.

For instance, landmark judgments may not only re-shape policies, but also lead to improvements in risk management practices or fairer outcomes to the customers. The series of legal cases involving the sale and purchase contract (Bai` Inah) highlight several important lessons in this regard. For Islamic banking institutions, the decisions have led to further enhancements to the legal documentations for Bai` Inah contracts itself. In the context of Islamic finance, the task of upholding legal certainty is even more complex, for two reasons. First, Shariah principles and requirements must be infused into the law of the land from the religious sources. Secondly, these prescriptions – written many centuries ago – must be applied to the context of modern finance. For brevity, I will refer to these two aspects of legal certainty as Shariah certainty. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  My remarks today will focus on the importance of legal certainty in the development of Malaysia’s Islamic finance industry – with a particular emphasis on Shariah certainty. I will begin by reflecting on the past, before sharing some thoughts about some considerations for the present as well as future. Looking at the past, Islamic finance has developed rapidly in Malaysia over the recent decades. To a large extent, this progress is attributable to the certainty provided by the legal framework for Islamic finance in Malaysia.
Svante Öberg: The current economic situation Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Kulturens hus, Luleå, 18 August 2009. *  *  *  It gives me particular pleasure to come to Luleå to talk about the economic situation. This is because my father, Folke Öberg, was born and raised in Luleå and he began working at the Riksbank here in 1930. This is also where he met my mother, Margareta. In the 1930s they moved to Stockholm, where my father began working at the Riksbank’s head office, where he was employed until his retirement in 1972. The local offices that the Riksbank previously had in each county, including here in Luleå, have long been closed down and activities are now concentrated in Stockholm. What I intend to say here today can be summarised in three points: •  The deep recession has hit bottom, but the recovery will be weak. •  New information received over the summer tends to indicate a slightly stronger GDP growth than we have forecast, but the labour market is continuing to weaken and inflation is low. •  Monetary policy is aimed at dampening the economic downturn. The repo rate was cut to an all-time low of 0.25 per cent in July and is expected to remain at this low level for the coming year. In my speech today I will present the Riksbank’s assessment of economic developments both in Sweden and abroad.

These imbalances stand out as one of the most serious vulnerabilities faced by the domestic economy, as they are the main channels whereby the potential halt in external financing feeds through into exchange rate depreciation. Chart 6  Deposits and loans in foreign currency  non-financial corporations lei billion  households  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  deposits in foreign currency loans in foreign currency net position 2008  2007  2006  2005  deposits in foreign currency loans in foreign currency net position 2004  40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70  lei billion  Source: National Bank of Romania  BIS Review 5/2010  9  These developments reinforced each other, so that during 2005–2007 there were periods when inflation expectations coexisted with a markedly stronger domestic currency. Under the circumstances, the central bank was faced with a serious dilemma in terms of the newlyadopted monetary policy regime. Policy rate hikes, required for bringing expectations in line with the inflation target, attracted further foreign capital, which entailed the appreciation of the leu. Along with policy rate changes given the coexistence of upward pressures on the domestic currency and inflationary pressures, the central bank also increased required reserves in order to dampen capital inflows. Required reserves for foreign currency-denominated liabilities were gradually raised from 20 percent at the onset of 2002 to 40 percent in early 2006 (Chart 7).
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Only two other states can claim they surpassed previous peak employment levels: Alaska and North Dakota. Readers of this speech abroad – say, in Washington or New York – might think our growth last year came only from the burgeoning oil and gas patch. They would be right to describe it as burgeoning: 30,000 jobs were added in oil and gas and the related support sector last year. Texas now produces 2.1 million barrels of oil per day, the same amount as Norway; we produce 6.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas a year, only slightly less than Canada.4 With 25 percent of U.S. refinery capacity and 60 percent of the nation’s petrochemical production located in Texas, we most definitely benefit from both upstream and downstream energy production. 4  Texas compares with some international producers of oil and gas as follows: Natural gas Crude + natural gas liquids (trillion cu ft, annual) (mb/d) World  84.60  119.39  United States  8.58  22.47  Canada  3.38  6.91  Texas  2.13  6.71  Norway  2.13  3.85  Mexico  2.95  1.72  SOURCE: Energy Information Administration. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  And yet other sectors gained more jobs than the oil and gas sector and its support functions in 2011: 58,000 jobs were added in professional and business services, nearly 46,000 in education and health services and more than 41,000 in leisure and hospitality.

It is my opinion that we should run that risk only in the most dire of circumstances, and I presently do not see those circumstances obtaining. So much for forecasting and monetary policy. Let me now walk you through an overview of the Texas economy to set the stage for a broader discussion of what I believe continues to bedevil a lasting recovery and more efficient job creation in the United States. I will use some slides to illustrate key points. The National Bureau of Economic Research, the arbiter of when recessions begin and end, dates the onset of the Great Recession as December 2007. The economic performance of Texas since December 2007 can be summarized with the chart projected on the screen. It depicts employment growth in the 12 Federal Reserve districts. In the Eleventh Federal Reserve District – or the Dallas Fed’s district – 96 percent of economic production comes from the 25.7 million people of Texas. As you can see by the red line, we now have more people at work than we had before we felt the effects of the Great Recession. All told in 2011, Texas alone created 212,000 jobs.3  3  According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the nation went into recession in December 2007 and came out in June 2009. According to the Dallas Fed’s Texas Index of Coincident Indicators, Texas went into the recession in August 2008 and came out in December 2009.