samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So, Chairman, although Howard took with him responsibility for banking supervision, and some 20% of our staff, to the FSA, the Bank’s essential concern with, and responsibility for, the stability of the financial system as a whole - and its role in promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial sector, including the promotion of the City - remain much as they were. What has more clearly changed over the past few years is the external environment within which we pursue these tasks. And in my remaining remarks I should like to comment on three particular developments - the introduction of the euro, the impact of information technology, and continuing broader financial globalisation which have increasingly preoccupied the Bank in our work in these areas. First, the euro. Whether the UK is in or out of the euro, the Bank has a keen interest in its success as a widely used trading and investment currency - for the contribution that can make to financial stability, to financial sector efficiency, and to financial activity here in the City. Well before its introduction, the Bank played an active role in coordinating the City’s technical preparation for the euro, and in encouraging the City’s professional institutions to work with the European Commission and the ECB in developing the necessary legal and technical framework. The City’s contribution to the successful introduction of the euro is widely acknowledged on the  BIS Review 49/2000  2  Continent.

The Bank has been very intensively engaged in much of this work - with the Treasury in the G7, the G10, the new G20 and the IMF, with both the Treasury and the FSA in the new Financial Stability Forum; with the FSA also in the Basel Committee; and with our central bank counterparts in both the BIS and the ECB. All of this, too, points to the critical importance of coordination and cooperation, nationally between the Treasury, the Bank and the FSA, but also to an ever increasing degree with our various interested counterparts abroad. And in this context, given the international importance of the City, we, together with the FSA, have a particular role to play in engaging the private sector financial community in the consultation process: we have a common interest in the outcome. All of these developments, Chairman, pose major challenges both for market participants and for the authorities. But, for the markets at least, with major challenges come major opportunities. Our job is to help the markets take advantage of those opportunities by providing a stable and orderly financial environment within which markets can function more effectively. It is very much in the interests of the City that we should succeed. We - like you - have plenty to do. BIS Review 49/2000  4
If, however, the central bank still harbours an uncertainty and - for example - still wishes to await the disclosure of figures, it should refrain from making a prior announcement as it would then find itself under a constraint. For if, in response to a signal received, the markets anticipate the interest rate move, the central bank will hesitate, out of concern for its credibility, not to implement the signalled move. This may well result in an endogenous interest rate policy: the central bank becomes, through its own fault, the prisoner of market expectations - an absurd notion. A central bank should inform openly about its long-term designs. At the same time, it should not hesitate to make interest rate decisions, if necessary, which come as a surprise to the majority of market participants. 4. The “new economy” - fact or fiction? The term “new economy” is certainly vague, which may be the very reason why it is popular. Coined in the United States, it is used as a label for several hypotheses which strive to explain the performance of the US economy in the second half of the 1990s. Poorly explained by most conventional macroeconomic models, this economy is characterised by continued high growth rates, unexpectedly robust productivity, and long-running low unemployment, combined with very little inflationary pressure. These attempts to explain the phenomenon termed “new economy” refer to two prominent areas of change.

Such far-reaching ex ante transparency is, however, due to fail because of the uncertainty from which policymakers suffer just like any other market players. As the cornerstone of policy implementation, the interest rate path needs to be revised constantly and optimised conforming to updated information. When we fixed a target range for the first time in December 1999 we simply did not know that as soon as the first quarter of 2000 two interest rate increases would be necessary. The commitment to ex ante transparency must take account of the knowledge and the uncertainty of decisionmakers. Thus, as a rule, it is hardly meaningful to give information with regard to any other planned interest rate moves in addition to the announcement of the current interest rate target. In so doing, the central bank would lose essential room for manoeuvre, immobilise its internal decision-making process and give rise to counterproductive changes in market expectations. For this reason, I am also sceptical with respect to the somewhat softer practice of preparing the markets with a so-called bias statement for a probable interest rate move. Such signals cause expectations to be revised, which is of small avail in the best case, and ties the central bank’s hands, in the worst case. Once a concrete decision - eg to raise the 5  BIS Review 35/2000  interest rate - has been taken, it can be implemented without delay, ie without a prior announcement.
Andrew G Haldane: Capital discipline Remarks by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director of the Bank of England, based on a speech given at the American Economic Association, Denver, Colorado, 9 January 2011. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the interim Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Tamiko Bayliss, Paul Bedford, Samuel Knott, Priya Kothari, Salina Ladha, Vasileios Madouros, Clare Rogowski, Victoria Saporta, Rhiannon Sowerbutts, Marco Spaltro, George Speight, Belinda Tracey, Paul Tucker, Matthew Willison and Peter Zimmerman for comments and contributions. The Basel Committee sets capital standards for international banks. There are now three vintages of these standards: so-called Basel I dating from 1988, Basel II dating from around 2004 and Basel III which was agreed at the end of last year.1 These international capital standards are supported by three pillars. Pillar I defines the regulatory rules, Pillar II provides scope for supervisory discretion, while Pillar III seeks to foster market discipline through disclosure. In countering systemic shocks, three supporting pillars have understandably been felt to be better than one. But the success of international capital standards in forestalling banking distress has been mixed. Basel I regulatory rules were arbitraged due to their risk insensitivity. This gave rise to Basel II with its greater focus on risk calibration. But Basel II buckled under the weight of the recent crisis. Repairs have since been applied through Basel III. Historical experience suggests this is unlikely to be the end of road.

In the absence of abrupt shocks, inflation is expected to drop further and stay within the target band of the Bank of Albania during the time span of the monetary policy action. Risks distribution remains overall symmetric: slower than projected economic growth would lead to a rapid reduction of inflation, while a further consolidation of imported inflation could keep inflationary pressures high for a longer time. At the end of discussions, the Supervisory Council concluded that the monetary conditions remain appropriate for meeting the medium-term inflation target and decided to leave the key interest rate unchanged at 5.25 %. In the near future, the downward inflation trend and shift to the downward section of the risks balance may establish the premises for a revision of the monetary policy. In any case, the future its future position shall factorise the new information obtained, aiming to adopt monetary conditions to respect our objectives. The Bank of Albania remains fully committed to anchor inflation expectations in accordance with its inflation target and to support sustainable and long-term development of the Albanian economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
William L Rutledge: Implementing the New Basel Accord Speech by Mr William L Rutledge, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at The British Banker’s Association Basel 2 / CAD 3 Half Day Conference, London, UK, 13 March 2003. *  *  *  Introduction Thank you and good morning. It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to offer some thoughts on Basel implementation issues - thoughts that will reflect partly my role as the head of Bank Supervision at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and partly my role as a member of the Basel Committee. In that latter capacity, I’d like to begin by offering my thanks for all of the extremely helpful and constructive comments that the BBA has provided throughout the Basel consultative process. In my experience, having a candid dialogue between the industry and the supervisory community is the best way to develop well informed regulatory policy. Given our desire for Basel II to be consistent with the best existing and emerging risk measurement and management practices, getting specific feedback from the industry is particularly critical. It is also critical that we understand calibration issues so that we set appropriate numerical standards; in that connection, I’d like to offer my further thanks to all of the banks represented here that participated in the latest Quantitative Impact Survey. I know that gathering all the necessary data and providing it in the prescribed format was a daunting task.

Rodrigo Vergara: Chile's September 2016 Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 7 September 2016. * * * The Monetary Policy Report of September 2016 can be found at www.bcentral.cl  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate, Mr. Ricardo Lagos-Weber, honorable senators, ladies, gentlemen, I thank you for inviting the Board of the Central Bank of Chile to present our Monetary Policy Report. As it does in September each year, this issue coincides with the Central Bank’s Report to the Senate, presenting our vision of the recent macroeconomic and financial developments in Chile and abroad, together with prospects and implications for monetary policy conduct. After more than two years above the tolerance range, last July the CPI’s annual inflation descended to 4%. The baseline scenario that I will be sharing with you in a minute assumes, as do private expectations, that it will continue to approach the 3% target in the coming months, to close the year at 3.5%. Why has it been so high for so long? We can blame it on the significant depreciation of our peso, driven by the much needed readjustment of an economy confronted with the end of the commodity price supercycle, the end of a very pronounced cycle of mining investment, and a domestic weakening associated with a decrease in the country’s capacity for long-term growth.
Banks also used around $ billion in vault cash to satisfy reserve requirements; however, since vault cash cannot be used to clear Fedwire payments, it has no intraday impact on federal funds trading activity. 4  During the first half of 2016, less than 5 percent of fed funds transactions were interbank transactions, based on the FR2420 data, or about $ billion per day on average. 5  Nonbank financial institutions, such as mutual funds, money market mutual funds, and asset managers, among others, play an important role as lenders in U.S. money markets. The role played by these institutions in the euro area is considerably smaller. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the current U.S. system, the interest rate at which nonbanks lend to banks is determined in large part by the competition among banks. Banks’ borrowings increase the amount of reserves on which they earn interest. The new environment has delivered outcomes that we have traditionally liked, such as a low volatility of market rates. This should not be surprising; if the same counterparties trade with each other day after day, they don’t have a strong incentive to renegotiate the interest rate at which they trade every day, relative to the policy rate. In contrast, if banks trade with each other infrequently, because one happens to have too many reserves on a given day and the other happens to have too few, they will have to negotiate a rate for that trade.

The residual impact of the one-off factors on annual inflation is set to be entirely gone in one year’s time – in the first quarter of 2020. Now, I will say a few words about the economy and the forecast. Economic growth rates remain close to their potential levels. Unemployment is invariably low and close to its natural rate. Having said that, certain economic activity indicators continue to post a mixed performance. The forecast remains essentially unchanged. Given the state of the global energy market over recent months, we have downgraded the oil price path somewhat in the baseline scenario. The assumption has been updated to reflect faster declining oil prices in the course of 2019 – based on the calculation that the average oil price will total $ per barrel (from the previous estimate of $ a barrel). Moving forward, the average price is set to remain at this level between 2020 and 2021. As before, our approach to oil price assumptions is conservative. The oil price volatility we saw in the fourth quarter (from $ to $ a barrel) is an indication of the validity of this approach. The running fiscal rule will ensure that the impact of changing oil prices on economic growth 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  remains limited. We therefore leave our GDP growth forecast unchanged at 1.2-1.7% for 2019, admitting it may rise to 2-3% in 2021 as the Government implements its structural reforms. Changing oil price assumptions have stronger implications for our estimated balance of payments.
Inflation has nevertheless moved up, and is now close to 2.5 per cent. A stronger krone has been needed to keep down inflation. BIS Review 65/1008  13  The real krone exchange rate measures changes in either the price level in Norway relative to other countries or the wage level in Norway relative to other countries. In common currency, the relative domestic price level is now between 5 and 10 per cent higher than the average for the oil age. The wage level measured in common currency is between 15 and 20 per cent higher than the average since 1970. Norwegian wage costs relative to other countries have reached an unprecedented high level. Nevertheless, there is full employment in Norway. So far, our business sector has been able to live with the high cost level. But, it may be that we have not yet seen the full impact. It is primarily through the government budget – growth in general government spending – that the authorities can influence the krone exchange rate and the scale of internationally exposed business. 14  BIS Review 65/2008  Our projections for economic developments are presented in Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy Report. The Report also includes our forecasts for the key policy rate ahead. Norges Bank’s Executive Board has decided that the key policy rate should be in the interval 5-6 per cent in the period to the next publication of the Monetary Policy Report in June, unless the economy is exposed to major shocks.

There are several reasons for this:  4  BIS Review 65/2008  First, labour has flowed into Norway from other countries. The opening of the labour market to the new EU countries has provided us with access to a reserve of labour. Initially, workers came to Norway on short-term assignments. They produced in Norway, but their consumption largely took place in their home country, with an attendant increase in the economy’s net production capacity. An increasing number of workers subsequently moved to Norway and took up residence here, often accompanied by their families. This still increases production, although the higher number of foreign workers who want to settle in Norway also puts added pressure on domestic resources. Per capita output is not likely to increase as a result of this kind of immigration. Access to foreign labour may nonetheless relieve shortterm bottlenecks in some sectors. In 2007, the population increased by about 55 000, with net immigration coming to 35 000. This is the highest rise in the population ever recorded. This trend seems to have continued so far this year. BIS Review 65/1008  5  Second, businesses in Norway have become more efficient in their operations, resulting in lower costs. It has been profitable to hire more employees despite the high wage level in Norway. The business sector has made use of new technology and businesses have been restructured. The many sweeping reforms of the 1980s and 1990s – the fundamental shift in 1 the Norwegian economy – resulted in more efficient markets.
10 A basic idea appears to be that underlying structural trends such as globalisation and digitisation comprise such strong adverse winds with regard to bringing up inflation that it is not worth trying. Instead of aiming to bring up inflation to 2 per cent, which will be difficult and risks causing other problems, one should therefore lower the inflation target, the argument goes. Digitisation and globalisation can affect inflation… It appears reasonable to assume that digitisation – defined as the digital technological developments and its spread to various areas of usage in the economy – will on the whole have a dampening effect on inflation, as it is usually measured. 11 Perhaps the most obvious and direct channel is price developments on certain products in the CPI’s basket of goods, which is affected by the production costs of these products showing a falling trend due to technological advances making advanced electronic components increasingly cheap. This applies, for instance, to mobile phones and computers. This is a development that has been going on for a long time and it may well continue for some time to come. 12  8  Stein (2013). 9  See, for instance, Mitelman (2013) and Schück (2015). 10  For instance, there appears to be a debate in New Zealand on whether the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s attempts to attain the inflation target of 2 per cent risk overheating the economy, see the New Zealand Herald (2015).

Meanwhile, the ecosystem continues to develop and we will probably need a MiCA 2. First, to deal with concerns over "crypto conglomerates", involving  Page 3 of 6 multiple subsidiaries with diverse activities and geographical locations: the FTX collapse has demonstrated that it is not enough to regulate a single sub-entity in a single jurisdiction. In my view, these conglomerates could be subject to transparency obligations – particularly the preparation of consolidated financial statements – while the sharing of information between jurisdictions will be essential to understanding their overall organisation as well as interdependencies between entities. The second deficiency concerns the ecosystem of what is often erroneously referred to as "decentralised" finance (DeFi) – what we prefer to call "disintermediated” finance. The ACPR is pioneering thinking in this area with the publication in April of a document that outlines possible regulatory frameworks for DeFi. The very successful public consultation process ended at the beginning of June. It was widely reported upon and generated almost 40 responses of high technical quality from both French and international players, including "established" players and new entrants. We will be publishing a summary of these responses in the autumn. Overall, these contributions confirm our understanding of this topic and the regulatory avenues taking shape on each of the three DeFi 'floors': (1) ensuring the resilience of the blockchain infrastructure – albeit a public one – through security standards (2) certifying smart contracts, even if this raises a number of operational issues, and (3) regulating DeFi entry points to protect users.
In addition, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, the dispersion of traded overnight rates in federal funds and Eurodollars increased on that day, with a substantial amount of trading activity at fairly low rates. These year-end effects were transitory, and the level and distribution of rates in the federal funds and Eurodollar markets returned to pre-year-end conditions on the following day. Although the effects were transitory and did not adversely affect policy implementation, spending a bit more time on this episode can contribute to our understanding of money market relationships. Why did we see the year-end drop in unsecured rates? Recall that the framework functions by creating opportunities for investors to borrow funds in money markets to earn IOR whenever there are significant differences between market rates and the IOR rate. On quarterends, the actual and perceived marginal balance sheet costs of a number of depository institutions increase as they publish financial statements and calculate regulatory ratios.38 These increased balance sheet costs mean that depository institutions borrowing funds in money markets to earn IOR must do so at a lower interest rate to account for these costs. Further, the reduction in balance sheet capacity can temporarily lower the bargaining power of lenders, again allowing borrowers to obtain funds at lower rates. Many lenders in the federal funds and Eurodollar markets with access to the ON RRP facility responded to these low rates by increasing their use of the facility, as shown in Figure 10.

I will not take the risk and predict the development of the gold price, but one thing is certain: it will remain volatile. Our possibilities to actively hedge the gold risk are restricted by the agreement of September 1999. In particular, we may conduct hedging transactions only in the amount of the sales quota allocated to us for the current year. We are therefore all the more convinced that our strategy of regular sales remains appropriate. The principles that have guided our operations for the past two years – namely fulfilment of our commitments under the central bank agreement, transparency in communication and situationadapted handling of day-to-day business – remain relevant. Management of the free assets The market value of the free asset portfolio – consisting of the as yet unsold portion of the 1,300 tonnes of gold and the proceeds from the already effected gold sales – amounted to Sfr 21 billion at the end of May. The free asset portfolio is managed separately from our other reserves, which will facilitate its transfer to the future beneficiaries once the legal framework has been put in place. As I mentioned earlier on, our possibilities of actively hedging the gold risk against an unfavourable development of the gold price are restricted by the agreement on gold sales of September 1999. However, we limited the risks of a weak US dollar that might reduce the value of our future sales by hedging 35% of the future proceeds in US dollars against the Swiss franc.