samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These projections are conditioned by a series of factors. First, they assume that the external economic and financial setting will remain favourable to support Albania’s economic growth. Second, they do not envisage potential shocks, which, if materialised, would cause our economy or inflation to diverge from the expected trajectory. Third, the projection for the return of inflation to target assumes that the exchange rate will be more stable in the periods ahead. Based on the above, we judge that the balance of risks remains skewed to the down side. In accordance with these projections, the Bank of Albania deems that the current policy mix is adequate. The fiscal policy is and should remain committed to lowering the debt level and diminishing fiscal vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the monetary policy should maintain the accommodative stance. The convergence of inflation toward the target implies that the intensity of the monetary stimulus will be diminishing over the medium-term; yet, it does not imply a change in the nature of the monetary policy. Lastly, our philosophy as well as the supervisory and regulatory measures will continue to balance the needs for promoting development vis-à-vis guaranteeing the stability of the banking sector and safeguarding the savings of Albanian citizens. But, our duties as policy makers go further than this. With a view to accelerating the pace of development and enhancing its sustainability, the structural reform agenda needs to continue. Let me now list some priority aspects.

The MPR is likely to be held at its technical minimum over the next 24 months; FCIC funds are provided over a 4-year horizon, and even short-term liquidity facilities will remain in place until early 2021. 16. Still, some challenges remain on three fronts: a. Lending to large corporations. For a number of years, big corporations have been tapping international and domestic corporate bond markets. They faced the Covid-19 crisis with rather sizeable cash holdings from bond issuing in the first quarter and the drawdown of bank credit lines. Yet this liquidity will not last forever. Reactivating the corporate bond market is key to prevent largescale corporations from crowding out SMEs from access to bank lending. The government and the CMF have adjusted regulations to speed up bond issuing and the Central Bank asset purchase program is likely to trickle down to corporate bonds, but more government action may be needed in order to reduce risk over these assets. b. Expanding non-conventional tools. Right now, the Central Bank has limited reach in the asset market, since the Constitution forbids it from buying Treasury bonds even in the secondary market as well as nonfinancial corporate bonds. A Constitutional reform is making good progress in Congress to remove the first constraint. c. Recovering private consumption and investment. Consumer and firms’ expectations have plummeted in the last eight months, responding to the social crisis, first, and to the risk-off mood of the Covid-19 pandemic, later. Private consumption and Investment are expected to drop 6% and 12% this year.
6 Seven awkward questions, 17/01/19 - https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/sam-woods-secondary-competition-objectivefive-years-on 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  That is the purpose of the Consultation Paper (CP) we’re launching today: we want to ensure there are ‘no surprises’ from the regulator whether you’re a new bank, a mid-tier bank or on the path between the two. We want to give you the map that gets you up the mountain. To be clear, not all firms will aspire to reach the summit, and that’s just fine. Many will find a sustainable position part way up. But we hope – for those firms with lofty ambitions – that over time the mountain can accommodate many more firms at increasingly high altitudes. The Covid-fog Now, when we embarked on writing this CP – to draw together all the various expectations of growing firms into one coherent guide – we didn’t expect the next major test of the banking sector to come so soon and on such a scale. But I am pleased to say that the banking industry has risen to the challenge of the Covid stress - both in terms of maintaining critical services to customers, and in helping to support individuals and to fund businesses large and small through their period of stress. The crisis is by no means over, but the first phase has shown the capacity of the sector to contribute to the greater good.

12 An early, working paper version of this research can be found in Marcelle Chauvet and Simon Potter,  Forecasting Recessions Using the Yield Curve, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, number 134, August 2001. 13 Brier scores measure probabilistic forecasting accuracy as a function of the distance between a probability  estimate and the actual outcome. For details on origin and calculation see “Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability,” Monthly Weather Review 78, no. 1, 1950. 14 See Michael D. Bauer and Thomas M. Mertens, Economic Forecasts with the Yield Curve, Federal Reserve Bank  of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2018–07, March 5, 2018. 15 Tetlock does discuss ambiguity aversion. Formalizing its role and that of asymmetric loss functions, seen for  instance in the work of Hansen and Sargent, is a good example where formal modeling can make significant advances over less structured judgmental approaches when it comes to decision-making based on forecasts. 16 The minutes to the July 31-August 1, 2018, FOMC meeting report on a Committee discussion about monetary  policy options at the zero lower bound. Although participants generally agreed that their current policy toolkit could provide significant accommodation, participants saw an apparent secular decline in neutral real interest rates as leaving less scope than in the past to reduce the federal funds rate in response to negative shocks, meaning spells at the ZLB could become more frequent and protracted than in the past.
The Real Estate Finance Law, which aims at creating a market for real estate financing, under which specialized joint-stock companies will be established, in cooperation with real estate developers, has been approved to enable beneficiaries from owning real estate in easy ways that protect the concerned parties’ rights under SAMA’s supervision and control. The Finance Companies Control Law has been approved. A committee named: (Finance Violations and Disputes Settlement Committee) has been formed. Its powers include, inter alia, settlement of violations, disputes and private and public rights lawsuits, arising from the application of the provisions of the Finance Companies Control Law and the Financial Leasing Law. The amendment of the official working days from Sunday to Thursday, so that the weekend would be on Friday and Saturday, has been approved. Terrorist Crimes and their Financing Law, stipulated under the Anti-Money Laundering Law, has been approved. The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques – may Allah protect him – is very well known for his devoted concern with citizens and their needs and his keenness for enhancing the level of their well-being and providing a decent livelihood for them. He issued his kind directives to take necessary measures for addressing and alleviating the poverty level, supporting social security, approving salary and cost of living allowance increases, turning employees on wages item into state employees, addressing housing problems and supporting specialized development funds.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques – may Allah protect him- has paid great attention to economic affairs. He has presided the Supreme Economic Council since its inception. Under his instructions and guidance – may Allah protect him- a number of resolutions, aimed at raising the level of economic performance and paving the way for sustainable growth, were taken. A rapid review of the Royal Orders and Resolutions of The Council of Minsters pertaining to economic and financial affairs, issued during the last nine years, will reveal a huge quantum. Some of which are the following: the resolution to inaugurate the largest integrated economic city in the Middle East (King Abdullah Economic City), establishment of other economic cities in different parts of the Kingdom, establishment of a developed financial center in Riyadh city, that includes all financial institutions, setting up a National Anti-Corruption Commission, and establishment of an independent government authority concerned with the development of Saudi non-oil exports, called the Saudi Export Development Authority. The formation of two committees, one in Jeddah governorate and another in Dammam city, to settle disputes and violations set forth in Article XX of the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law, was approved.
There is also a risk that that monetary policy is left too loose too long. If only one of those risks existed we should certainly have set monetary policy too tight or too loose. BIS Review 133/2010  13  I think it is entirely plausible that after the economic turmoil of the past few years the risks of inflation being appreciably above or appreciably below the target level a few years ahead are higher than before. That is what the probability judgements made in the MPC’s Inflation Report show. Chart 17 shows that in August the MPC thought it a rather low probability event that in 3 year’s time the rate for inflation would be within ½ of 1% of the target. There was thought to be a near 80% chance that inflation would be either above 2.5% or below 1.5% – with risk either side being roughly equal. Since the financial crisis actual inflation has also become much more variable. Between 1997 and 2007 the annual rate of inflation was within 0.5% of the target for 66 months out of 132 – 50% of the time. Since the start of 2008 inflation has been within that range for only 30% of the time. Most of the time it has been above 2.5%; but it has not been all one way traffic – for some of last year inflation was below 1.5%. It is inconceivable that you can get monetary policy exactly right.

To my mind this was because regulators and governments bought completely the view that “equity capital is scarce and very expensive” – which in some ways is a proposition remarkable in its total incoherence (as shown with clarity and precision by Admati, De Marzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) and with wit and humour by Merton Miller (1995)). I believe there is a need to break out of the way of thinking that leads to the “equity is scarce and expensive” conclusion. That would help us get to a situation where it will be normal to have banks hold very much more capital that had been assumed in recent decades to be acceptable. And that change would be a return to the past. Having higher bank capital will make the job of monetary policy (which has now to deal with the after-effects of massive instability in financial markets) much easier. Using limits on gearing to help maintain financial stability and monetary policy to help maintain price stability is an efficient allocation of instruments to goals. But it makes little sense to expect this extra bank capital to be in place immediately. Curbing lending and dealing with a debt-fuelled asset price boom is not the problem for today. Higher capital needs to be in place by the time that does emerge as a problem.
It also applies to the field of tax policy, in both financial and non-financial sectors of the economy, which might also have contributed to the build up of imbalances and financial vulnerabilities that later on worked as amplifiers of the financial strains. Monetary policy, and the extent to which policy interest rates could be used to “lean against the wind” of financial market excesses in an effective manner, which is consistent with the preservation of price stability over a longer term horizon, has also been under debate. But the area which has been under the spotlight, as the financial crisis unfolded, has been the one of macro-prudential policy. The global financial crisis has disclosed the scale of the potential fallout from the failure of large financial institutions. It has revealed the fragility of the financial system to features and trends that cut across institutions, markets and infrastructures, namely in the form of financial imbalances. And it has illustrated the amplitude of the consequences of the adverse feedback loop between the financial system and the real economy. In a nutshell, it has shown the potential devastating effects of systemic risks materialising in various forms. While a range of risks and vulnerabilities were identified in the run-up to the crisis, the translation of these risk assessments into policy action was generally missing. Macroprudential policy aims at filling this gap.

In recent years, however, this sort of consideration has not played such a prominent role. There are several interrelated explanations for this. Monetary policy thus far has been aimed to a great extent at establishing a regime of low inflation and engendering understanding for it. In practice, the scope is also limited for monetary policy decisions of a fine-tuning character by the uncertainty that prevails, inter alia, about future developments and by the degree of credibility for the low inflation policy. 2. Uncertainty and Credibility There are various kinds of uncertainty that in practice play an important part in monetary policy and are also important for the speed and scale with which changes in interest rates are made: - One type of uncertainty has to do with the economy’s basic mechanisms.. Which model of the economy shall we use for our analysis? A major problem here in recent years has been that the shift to low inflation and a flexible exchange rate by itself can change the relationships in the model. - A second type of uncertainty concerns the interpretation of new information that is constantly coming in. It is important in this connection to assess what effects an interference or a shock have, which, inter alia, is linked with whether it is permanent or temporary. - Finally there is uncertainty about the effect of the measures that the Riksbank can take--in practice, changes in the instrumental interest rates.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches

First, large Malaysian banks with nationwide and regional and international presence that are able to compete with global financial players;  b. Second, banking institutions with nationwide presence that are able to offer a broad range of financial products and services; and  c.  Third, specialist niche players delivering specialised value added products and services for specific segments of the market. Ladies and Gentlemen: The financial services industry has evolved considerably over the recent period. New emerging trends have provided us with new opportunities in our quest to create a dynamic financial system that will best serve our economy. In striving towards high performance and world-class standards in the industry, we look forward to working with you in this dynamic and challenging environment to achieve this common goal. Let me now conclude and wish you a most productive Summit. 6  BIS Review 28/2004
Ravi Menon: Resilience, integration, opportunity – the ASEAN story Opening address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Merrill Lynch Asian Stars Conference 2011, Singapore, 18 May 2011. *  *  *  Mr Brian Brille, Mr Peter MacDonald, Mr Richard McCormack, distinguished speakers, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Resurgence of Asia 1. According to estimates by the late British economist, Angus Maddison, two thousand years ago, India had the largest GDP in the world. China was close behind. Together, they accounted for more than half of global GDP. Asia ex Japan was 75 per cent of world GDP. And this was at the height of the Roman Empire in Europe, which accounted for just 10 per cent of global output. Over the next 1,800 years, the two Asian giants remained the largest economies in the world, with China pulling ahead of India about 500 years ago. For much of this period, Asia ex Japan was typically about three times larger than Western Europe. 2. Then came the Industrial Revolution in Europe. By the start of the First World War, Europe and America accounted for more than half of global GDP, with the combined share of India and China falling to less than 20 per cent. By 1950, the share of India and China fell to less than 10 per cent. Asia less Japan was only about 15 per cent. 3. Since then, the story has been of Asia’s resurgence.

The road ahead may not always be smooth as financial globalization has yet to unveil its full impact on the global economy and emerging markets. But this should not prevent us together from having a pleasant journey towards the more prosperous future. 4  BIS Review 107/2007
The majority of countries with relatively strong GDP growth rates prior to the crisis also experienced a relatively strong downward adjustment, in some cases undoing much of the welfare gains that were achieved since the launch of the euro. Some might see this as evidence that the assumptions of the neoclassical growth model need to be qualified – that absent credit-driven growth, there is no reason to believe that euro area economies should converge towards similar levels of productivity, or even rates of productivity growth.12 Indeed, endogenous growth models allow for persistent divergences as some forms of capital exhibit non-diminishing returns. Yet, I think it is too early to draw such a conclusion. The neo-classical assumptions have not yet been properly tested, simply because capital did not flow where the marginal return would have been highest. What the euro area needs, in my view, is to “re-run” the convergence process, but with the appropriate conditions in place to ensure efficient allocation of resources, and the right framework to make convergence sustainable. Let me explain in more detail what that might entail. To begin with, catching-up economies have to address the immediate after-effects of the previous misallocation of capital. The pre-crisis inflows into the non-tradable/services sector were associated with real exchange rate appreciation, rising unit labour costs (ULC) and increasing dependence on external financing. When the financial cycle turned, however, capital flows quickly reversed.

This reflected the incomplete nature of financial integration prior to the crisis – based largely based on short-term debt – and in turn unwound the channels for potential risk sharing within the euro area. A study on risk sharing published in 2008 had found that “monetary union has facilitated risk sharing, although the level of risk sharing is still much below the level found among U.S. states”.13 However, a study using a similar methodology in 2013 found that risk sharing through capital markets had virtually collapsed during the crisis.14 With external financing drying up, the catching-up economies faced the risk of a “sudden stop”. They therefore had to pursue both fiscal and structural policies aimed at achieving an internal devaluation so as to restore external balance. And they have been rather successful: since 2009 Greece has almost entirely reversed the ULC growth it experienced in the precrisis period, while good progress has also been made in Spain, Ireland and to a lesser extent Portugal. All the catching-up economies have also experienced remarkable improvements in their current accounts15, ranging from an almost 11 percentage points of GDP correction in Spain to a 16 percentage points of GDP improvement in Greece. However, while internal devaluation may improve the sustainability of the external position, it does not in itself produce sustainable convergence. Indeed, there is a risk that, if unit labour costs (ULC) adjust mainly due to falling wages and the current account closes, policymakers may lack incentives to address the underlying productivity problem.
This is particularly relevant when it comes to similar financial products that can be packaged as an insurance product, a banking product or a securities product as same business can be undertaken by either a bank, investment bank or an insurance company. A key implementation issue is how to delineate the double gearing and how to make available capital to deal with risks of both insurance and securities products. As far as the EU is concerned, the financial conglomerates directive has already been issued and they are expected to comply with them. USA’s umbrella supervisory provisions are included in the Graham Leach – Bliley Act. In Sri Lanka, we still have not come to terms in dealing with a consolidated or a group-wide financial conglomerate. X. Proper definition of capital  How do you identify new capital instruments such as hybrid capital and perpetual debentures? Should it be Tier I or Tier II? One needs to be cautious here as hybrid capital can disappear given its derivative nature. Currently, there is a wide disparity between the Basel II preparation processes in Europe, USA and Asia. The issue of treating hybrid capital is significant as many Asian banks are moving towards synthetic securitization in producing hybrid capital and exposing their portfolios to credit risks, especially when equity participation has been synthetically securitized.

Its governance structure is based on DBS’s credit model risk policy which sets out the minimum principles and standards for the oversight control and management of all credit risks models in the group and the roles and responsibilities. Several committees have been set up at the board level and at group credit level to identify and manage risks. In terms of modeling, the model owner will design, select and parameterize the key elements of the model. The model implementation is also by the model owner who will work closely with the model users and performance monitoring unit. Above them, are the model validators who are under the oversight by a Group Credit Risk Committee. The Board’s Risk Management Committee sits above these groups. It is a tightly knitted process which is transparent throughout the DBS group and they are moving progressively, using internal rating in the management of credit risks. Despite using several internal rating models and regardless of the types of the models used, DBS continuously review the risks which need to be mitigated using its practical knowledge throughout the group. So the commonsense approach prevails there too. Countries like Sweden have also begun addressing issues of Basel II implementation. Their case is much more difficult than ours as they have spread among few of the Nordic countries in a significant way.