samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We do this through issuing guidelines that lay down the minimum standards that institutions should incorporate in their anti-money laundering systems. We then carry out on-site examinations to check that these standards are being adhered to. This year we introduced a two-tier, risk-based approach towards examinations. In cases where AIs may be at higher risk of money laundering, we conduct more in-depth examinations using specialist teams. This may involve sample testing and visits to branches to look at how controls actually work in practice and to ascertain at first hand the knowledge and awareness of staff. In more routine cases, higher level review of anti-money laundering controls is conducted, generally as part of our normal risk-based examinations. We intend to supplement our own examinations with a system of self-assessment by compliance officers of AIs on risk indicators of money laundering within their own institutions and the quality of  BIS Review 47/2002  1  controls. This will be done using a structured self-assessment framework that we aim to release to the industry later this year. This should help the HKMA to conserve its own resources and direct them where they are most needed. But it should also serve to remind AIs that they have the primary responsibility for making sure that their own house is in order. The HKMA guideline Checking that standards are being observed is obviously important. But it is necessary to ensure that the standards themselves remain effective in dealing with risks.

Banks that deal with corrupt PEPs expose themselves to risk of bad publicity, legal action and possible financial loss;  •  other types of private banking customer - particularly from those jurisdictions where the risk of money laundering is severe or whose business makes them more susceptible to money laundering;  •  correspondent banks - particularly those from NCCTs or other high-risk jurisdictions where there are doubts about compliance with FATF standards. Specifically, AIs should beware of  BIS Review 47/2002  3  so-called “shell banks”, which operate without a physical presence in their place of incorporation; and •  corporate vehicles of various types - including offshore companies and trusts where the objective may be to disguise the beneficial ownership. Business introduced by intermediaries Even with a risk-based approach, the process of identification and verification is an onerous one. It is natural therefore that AIs may wish to rely on the due diligence procedures undertaken by intermediaries who introduce business to them. However, experience has shown that this can expose institutions to risk if the intermediaries do not do their job properly. In particular, in Hong Kong, there have been a number of cases where secretarial companies or company formation agents have opened bank accounts on behalf of shell companies without conducting proper verification of the underlying principals. There are cases of such companies being used as the vehicle for bogus investment schemes. We wrote to the industry on this last year, and the basic message bears repeating.
The total foreign investment of Thai banks amounts to only around 1.2 percent of their total asset, and a small part of this is the investment by Thai banks on CDOs. Banks that have CDO investments have mostly sold them off, and all have made full provision and recognized losses in line with IAS 39. Secondly, Thai banks rely predominantly on local deposits for funding, as opposed to the international wholesale market. This helps make the domestic financial conditions more stable and not affected by the global credit crunch. Liquidity conditions in the Thai system have remained more or less stable, though liquidity tightened marginally due to acceleration in credit growth. The ratio of loan to deposits,  BIS Review 133/2008  3  including bills of exchange, has been stable at around 90 percent, indicating no shortfall in liquidity. Thirdly, the fundamentals of the Thai banking system have strengthened markedly, with robust capital and improved risk management. Banks have had solid profit since 2001, with gross NPL ratio to total loans declining to 6.4 percent and the NPL ratio net of provisioning declining to 3.4 percent as of the end of the second quarter of this year. NPLs are fully provisioned for in accordance with IAS 39. In August, the BIS capital ratio of the banking system increased to 15.5 percent due to higher profit and capital increase.

Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 133/2008
One also has to bear in mind that favourable terms from central banks have helped to improve bank funding. Central banks serve as lenders of last resort and, as economic conditions improve, banks will need to become more self-reliant. However, the timetable for the gradual introduction of the ratio ensures that the new liquidity standard will in no way hinder the ability of the global banking system to finance a recovery. It has taken a lot of time and effort to reach agreement on the LCR. It is, as I said, a deceptively simple idea, but its implications are big and far-reaching. Unsurprisingly, there is much in the detail that required a lot of careful analysis and thought, not to mention a willingness to find a way through differing national perspectives. It is, however, critical that the new ideas such as the LCR (and the other new features of Basel III such as the capital conservation buffer, countercyclical buffer, leverage ratio and NSFR) are implemented if their benefits are to be realised. Against that background, let me now turn to the work we have started to ensure that the Basel III framework is implemented as intended. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  …. to implementation Steady progress is being made. As of January 2013, 11 out of 19 Basel Committee jurisdictions have final Basel III rules in place, including our hosts today, South Africa. A number of non-member countries also implemented Basel III at the beginning of the year, further expanding its coverage.

Basel III has changed that. So even though the LCR is “only 30 days of cash”, its significance should not be underestimated. As you would be aware, the focus of the Committee over the past two years has been on refining the formulation of the LCR announced in 2010. Given this is the first time the international community had developed a global liquidity standard, it was agreed that it should be subject to an observation period, during which it could be adjusted as a result of further analysis and assessment. The aim of the observation process was not to further tighten or weaken the standard: the goal was purely to ensure the calibration was more reflective of empirical evidence and appropriate for implementation as a minimum standard, across the Committee’s 27 member countries and more broadly. The changes agreed to by the Committee focus on three main areas: •  High quality liquid assets (HQLA): A diverse and sufficiently large stock of HQLA is essential to help banks withstand liquidity stress. The revised definition now provides limited recognition of additional assets such as a broader range of corporate bonds, a selection of listed equities, and some highly-rated residential  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  mortgage backed securities (RMBS). Recognising the greater price volatility associated with such assets, their inclusion in the stock of HQLA is subject to a relatively low limit as well as significant “haircuts”.
Standing back from the Covid crisis, and looking at the UK case, there indeed is some evidence that the impact of QE over the past decade has been largest at times of market dysfunction and illiquidity. Of course the available event studies are very few in number. But, if this result proves robust, it suggests that “going big and fast” with QE is particularly effective in these conditions. I should stress that while the liquidity channel of QE appears to have been particularly relevant in terms of impact at a time of market dysfunction, such as that observed in March, the different channels of QE impact are by no means mutually exclusive. It seems likely that each channel operates to at least some extent most of the time, with all of them affecting long-term interest rates and thus economic activity and inflation. But this need not suggest that all the channels are equally powerful and persistent in all states of the world. Implications for the future  What does this mean for central bank balance sheets looking forwards? Again, two points stand out, though I should emphasise their tentative nature. First, a balance sheet intervention aimed solely at market functioning is likely to be more temporary, in terms of the duration of its need to be in place. To be clear, the asset purchases announced by the MPC in March were a response to much more than just market functioning, in terms of the effects of Covid on the outlook for the economy and inflation.

Both the macro and the asset pricing literature seem to have understood the importance of taking time-varying long-run equilibria into account, but a coherent treatment within macro finance models would be desirable. [35] And a third theme is an improved modelling of cross-country interrelations: this pertains to a more refined understanding of the workings of quantitative easing in a currency union, but also to the spillovers of policy-induced yield curve changes across different currency areas. [36],[37] Finally, one question is whether changes in long-term rates that are due to changes in the risk-less rate versus the term premium have similar effects on spending and the economy. On these and other topics concerning the interplay between monetary policy and the yield curve, I look forward to learning from new academic research – including the future contributions of the UCL research community. Thank you for your attention. [1] I am grateful to Wolfgang Lemke for his contribution to this speech. [2] On how to measure the risk-free rate in the euro area appropriately, see European Central Bank (2014), “Euro area risk-free interest rates: measurement issues, recent developments and relevance to monetary policy”, Monthly Bulletin July. [3] Some of the long time series shown in Chart 1 are from Jordà, Ò., Knoll, K., Kuvshinov, D., Schularick, M. and Taylor, A. M. (2019), “The rate of return on everything, 1870–2015”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(3), pp. 1225-1298. [4] Today, I will not discuss the potential non-policy drivers of the secular downward trend in rates that I mentioned earlier.
Mr Gjedrem focuses on the issue of financial stability: experiences and challenges  Speech given by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Central Bank of Norway, at the annual meeting of the Norwegian Savings Banks Association, held in Sandefjord on 21 October 1999. (Shortened version) 1. Introduction  Every day around NOK150–200 billion change hands through the banks’ accounts in Norges Bank. In the course of a week, payments corresponding to our gross national product for an entire year have passed through Norges Bank’s settlement system. These payments involve all types of transaction, from a 10 kroner ice cream purchase to securities transactions where a single transaction may involve billions of kroner. The banks play a pivotal role in the payment system. Deposits are now the predominant means of payment. Payment settlement is the banks’ most important function besides channelling funds from savers to borrowers. In other countries, securities markets are of growing importance. They are taking over an increasing share of banks’ credit intermediation. This may also occur in Norway. Securities are also increasingly serving as collateral in payment settlement. These three elements - payment and settlement systems, banks and other financial institutions, and securities markets - make up the financial system. Every day we experience how dependent a developed economy is on the smooth functioning of this system, i.e. on financial stability. The volume of foreign payments is substantial and on the rise. Banks and securities markets are becoming ever more closely integrated.

For example, the National Payments Systems Act was enacted in June 2007, while Access Bank, the fourth largest bank in Nigeria is expected to open a branch in the country by July 2008, raising the number of commercial banks to 14. 2.6  Capital market developments  The Lusaka stock exchange performed remarkably well, market capitalisation increased by 45.0% to K18,872.9 billion compared to the increase of 13.9% in 2006. The Lusaka All Shares index almost doubled, rising by 92.9% to close the year at 3,533.52 points compared to an increase of 47.7% in the previous year. This robust performance was a reflection of strong macroeconomic fundamentals in the economy and positive investor expectations in the growth and earnings prospects for both listed and quoted companies. Government introduced 7, 10 and 15-year bonds to help deepen the financial markets in 2007. Foreign investments in Government securities rose to K830.5 billion as at December 2007 from K539.8 billion recorded end-December 2005, an indication of the rising confidence in the economy. 2.7  Fiscal developments  On the fiscal front the Government is expected to limit domestic borrowing to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2008. By reducing levels of government borrowing and enforcing prudent budget execution, this should result in greater mobilisation of domestic resources and effective coordination with the monetary authorities. Zambia has articulated its long-term development objectives in the National Long Term Vision 2030, which is aimed at raising Zambia to a middle income status by 2030.
Two factors give Sweden an advantage: the surplus in the public finances and the current account before the start of the crisis (Figure 15). The public surplus has made it possible to conduct an expansionary fiscal policy during the crisis without jeopardising the long-term sustainable development of central government finances, which has mitigated the decline of economic activity. Even in the period ahead, the basically strong public finances will contribute towards a situation in which Sweden will not need to increase taxes and/or decrease expenditure to the same extent as, for example, the United States and United Kingdom in order to achieve the long-term sustainable development of public finances. BIS Review 11/2010  3  Significant uncertainty also as regards the strength of the recovery in Sweden There also exists significant uncertainty as regards the strength of the recovery in Sweden. The lowest point of the recession has undoubtedly been passed, but there is, as yet, no strength in the recovery. Following a decline of over 6 per cent between the first quarters of 2008 and 2009, GDP has only increased by a total of 0.5 per cent during the second and third quarters of 2009. Production in industry and the private service sector has not started to increase as yet (Figure 16). We expect to see fairly strong growth in GDP in the coming years. However, this expectation may turn out to be overly optimistic – the risk of weaker development is also present.

Svante Öberg: The financial crisis and wage formation Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the National Mediation Office, Stockholm, 29 January 2010. * * * Why is the Riksbank interested in wage formation? Wage formation and monetary policy are interrelated. The development of wages affects inflation and inflation affects the development of wages. The target for monetary policy is to maintain a low and stable level of inflation. This job is made easier if wage formation works well. Consequently, it is important for the Riksbank to follow this year’s comprehensive wage bargaining rounds. I will not make any recommendations to the social partners regarding the outcome of this year’s collective bargaining. Instead, I will describe the economic setting for this collective bargaining. This may seem to be an extremely subtle distinction, but it is an important one, nevertheless. We make no normative pronouncements regarding which rate of wage increase may be most appropriate. However, considering the drawn-out recovery and the weak labour market, the scope for wage increases seems to be highly restricted. I would also like to make two points during this introduction. Firstly: I will not be reporting any new view of economic developments beyond that presented in the monetary policy update of 16 December, although a few figures will be updated with the latest statistics. Secondly: The assessments and valuations I make here are not necessarily shared by all of my colleagues on the Executive Board of the Riksbank.
François Villeroy de Galhau: Exiting unconventional monetary policies in an uncertain world Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Euro 50 – CF40 – CIGI Roundtable, Paris, 25 October 2018. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, Bienvenue à Paris. It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Banque de France for this conference on “exiting unconventional monetary policies”. I must say that you have picked the right moment for such a discussion: I have just returned from Frankfurt, where the Governing council of the ECB held a monetary meeting. Like other central banks, we are now pursuing a course of gradual normalisation in an uncertain world. Allow me to begin by giving some highlights on our domestic strategy for the euro area, before elaborating on the challenges that we collectively face at the global level. ** 1. Monetary policy in the euro area: where are we heading? The euro area is experiencing a broad-based economic expansion. Q2 2018 was the 21st successive quarter of economic growth. 9.2 million jobs have been created since 2013 and the unemployment rate has fallen from 12.1% to 8.1%, although this figure is still too high. The output gap was probably closed by the end of last year. Recent survey data on the growth outlook have been somewhat weaker, although less so in France. But our outlook for inflation is still firming.

If the trilemma is in fact a dilemma, then countries will have to choose between monetary independence and closing their capital accounts. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I would question the generality or starkness of this dilemma. For example, I do think that the euro area can determine its own course. Our asset purchase programme has contributed to a spread exceeding 250 basis points between the 10 year yields in the US and in Germany. Likewise, the gap between policy rates in the US and the euro-area is the widest since 2009. More technically, an estimated Taylor rule for the euro area that includes US monetary policy as one of the explanatory factors finds only a very modest co-movement between the two. What is more, countries seem to be arranged along a continuum, with some exhibiting total independence at one end to those with exchange rates pegged to the US dollar at the other. So they don’t have to choose one of the two polar positions but can pick an intermediate position. For example, putting some temporary restrictions on cross-border movement of capital could give some but not complete independence of monetary policy. But is there more that central bankers can do to manage the tensions created by this economic divergence? Put another way, how do we reconcile yet another paradoxical couple: independence and co-operation? In my view, we can and should act to enhance co-operation between central banks, based on four building blocks: Mutual predictability of policy making.
Third, we need to identify and explain a coherent exit strategy through which all of the unprecedented official policy actions can be unwound and which provides a bridge back to stability. 6  BIS Review 32/2009  A joint commitment to a macroeconomic stimulus – the division between monetary and fiscal measures is a matter for individual countries to determine – is required to ensure a growth of nominal demand sufficient to reverse the extraordinarily steep and simultaneous downturn in output around the world. Much has already been done. But the measures need to add up to a collective determination to support an adequate level of money spending, and will need to include actions to help poorer countries borrow either from the IMF or on world capital markets. Without that collective commitment, countries may neglect the beneficial effects that their policy actions can have on other countries, resulting in an excessively cautious approach. The G20 summit in London in two weeks time offers an opportunity and a challenge. The occasions on which the words and actions of policy-makers really matter are probably fewer than many of us care to admit. But this is one of them. And I was encouraged by an unusual sense of determination at the G20 Ministerial Meeting at the weekend to show a collective commitment to deal with our problems. In the UK we are already taking unprecedented action to boost nominal spending. The Government announced a temporary fiscal stimulus in the Pre-Budget Report in November.

Actually, I would like to point out that the Albanian banking system left the crisis in healthy condition and that it guarantees growing stability. Our banking system, during this period, has carried out a considerable amount of work, which has served to consolidate each bank’s position prior, during and after the crisis. Hence, the banks are now able to use again their full lending potential. For the truth’s sake, it must be underlined that the latest figures speak of growth in the order of 10 per cent in annual terms, a figure which should not go unnoticed or be considered as inadequate. I would suggest the same philosophy to the business community. For objective reasons, the concept of free money belongs to the past. By that I mean that a bank loan should be earned, which means unconditional and honest cooperation within the legal and regulatory framework approved by the country’s authorities. Of course, banks are established to lend money, but first and foremost we need to bear in mind that the public deposits’ stability is more important than an individual business loan or bank portfolio. Moreover, the business community needs to recalibrate its position in relation to recent developments both in the national and global economy context. It must aim a higher productivity, primarily through identifying comparative advantages in the framework of global changes. In that regard, it is necessary to adopt new business administration philosophies on capacity building and investment in human resources, governance, internal control, financial and legal expertise, and risk management.