samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This campaign succeeded thanks to the support of Jean Claude Trichet, Cristián Noyer, Tim Geithner and especially Jean-Pierre Roth. As a result of this campaign, aside from Chile, countries like Norway, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Israel and New Zealand were able to also integrate the discussion on the global economy. Those meetings gather central bank governors of the main economies of the world, and are a great opportunity to be updated on the evolution of the global economy and strengthen the networks for interaction across central bankers. Internationally, I must also mention the great recognition that has the work of our Central Bank in other central banks and in international forums. Dear Board members, executives and all the staff: I want to tell you all that I am deeply grateful for having had the opportunity to serve my country from this position. It has been a true privilege, especially for the opportunity that provided me to strengthen this institution and in this way to contribute to build the great reputation that this institution has today in the country and elsewhere. Traveling abroad as the Governor of the Central Bank is a great satisfaction because of the way our country is seen and respected. I have been the recipient of frequent praise for our country and for this Central Bank, which is the merit of each and every one of you.

We have also advanced in a technological leveling project and we have implemented three-year periods for strategic planning. I am also proud to have presided over the Central Bank during a period where the average annual inflation rate was 2.8%, and was most of the time within the established tolerance range and where the functioning of internal and external payments was totally normal. These are the objectives set forth by our Constitutional Organic Law. Unfortunately, the unusual increases in the prices of foods and energy pushed annual inflation above 7% toward this year’s end. This should be a transitory rise in inflation that will fade away in coming quarters, conditional to annual inflation expectations remain anchored around 3%. It is not pleasant to leave the Central Bank with such a high inflation figure. But I understand that it is a circumstantial development that is part of the job, and that the highly qualified Board and staff will take the appropriate decisions to achieve the objective to return inflation to 3% within the habitual policy horizon. We have applied an effective monetary policy that has become a powerful countercyclical tool, in light of the experience of recent years. But it would be of little use if we did not rely on the responsible fiscal policy that Chile has applied. 2  BIS Review 149/2007  During my term, I was lucky to work with two top-level finance ministers, with whom I always had very fluent communication in the subjects of common concern.
Yet despite all that change the three key benefits of financial co-operation identified by Strong and Norman remain at least as relevant today as they did a century ago:  -  First, more central banks than ever before value the safe, confidential, reliable access to overseas reserve currencies, assets and payments offered by their peers. Safe – because central banks are free from insolvency in their domestic currency, are rigorously focused on minimising operational risk, and settle all payments in central bank money. Confidential – because central banks treat the information they receive with the greatest discretion, and are not subject to commercial incentives or conflicts of interest. And reliable – because central banks understand the policy priorities of their peers, and stand ready to provide the highest level of continuity of service. Today the Bank of England provides banking services to over 150 central banks and international financial institutions around the world – ten times more than in 1917. Those services include sterling payments, call and term deposits, and custody of securities and gold. The Bank’s gold repository remains the most active central bank service in the world, reflecting the United Kingdom’s lasting role as the pre-eminent wholesale gold trading centre. -  Second, access to central banking services underpins the international monetary system. Although the major economies no longer maintain fixed exchange rates, the international trading system relies  6 7  A version of the original March memorandum is held in the Bank of England Archives.

That is why it is so important to co-operate, as Strong and Norman clearly recognised at a previous critical switching-point in world affairs. Of course, the concept of co-operation can be pushed too far. During his time in London in 1916, Strong reported an ‘astonishing suggestion’ during a dinner with the British press ‘that the Reserve Bank System was really the Bank of England, and that if we would only promote the right kind of relationship, we ought to be able to consolidate the English and American system, and in some way or other work out a complete cord. This caused some amusement, but was roundly cheered. I did not find the gentlemen present at the dinner particularly well posted in regard to the American financial system.’  I am not so misguided as to repeat that suggestion here today! But I will end with Norman's comment to Strong as they were formulating their principles of central banking in 1921: ‘if ever you should feel downhearted just you remember that, economically speaking, there is only hope through a community of interest and co-operation between all central banks.’ Thank you – and I look forward to sharing the rest of this Commemoration with you. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7
And I would stress that many of the issues raised by the attributes of, and thought processes within, hedge funds themselves are shared increasingly by securities companies and other types of financial institution including banks. Overseers of financial stability take note! A third group of new players is the non-financial groups who straddle finance and the real economy. I could mention industrial giants like GE. We need to understand their implications, and any new vulnerabilities they may cause. Next I want to highlight the rating agencies. The new holders of financial assets find that understanding the credit risks inherent in the assets they hold has become more difficult. So they outsource credit evaluations to the rating agencies, as third party specialists who benefit from economies of scale. Indeed in the case of collateralised debt obligations whole categories of assets are dependent on their rating. But this can give rise to particular vulnerabilities. What happens if there is a rating downgrade? Did the investors in Parmalat bonds rely on the fact that they were rated investment grade? Changes to ratings will be known to all at the same time. And this could trigger mass exodus either by holders of rated assets or, in cases where banks themselves are rated, by depositors or other counterparties. Of course the rating agencies provide valuable services and information. And their increasingly public significance raises calls for them to be regulated. In my view, attempts to do so could actually create additional moral hazard, particularly in today’s compensation orientated society.

Despite the increase of light vehicle sales, overall consumer spending has been sluggish. While growth of retail sales in February was reasonably strong in nominal terms, it was considerably less impressive when the large increase of gasoline prices that occurred that month is taken into account. Based on data for the first half of March, gasoline prices are continuing to move higher which will further sap consumers’ real purchasing power. And growth of business investment spending, which was quite strong in the second and third quarters of 2011, entered the new year with little forward momentum. To put the recent pace of growth into perspective, we believe that the economy’s long-run sustainable growth rate (what economists call the potential growth rate) is around a 2 ¼ percent annual rate. We need sustained growth above that rate to absorb the substantial amount of unused productive capacity. Thus, our recent growth rates are barely keeping up with our potential. Although the sharp decline in the unemployment from 9 percent last September to 8.3 percent in February suggests we are doing better than that, it is important to recognize that about half of that decline was due to a declining labor force participation rate. In fact, had the labor force participation rate not declined from around 66 percent in mid-2008 to under 64 percent in February, the unemployment rate would still be over 10 percent. Also, it appears that productivity growth has slumped recently.
This G-SIFIs loss absorbing capacity is a complex matter, involving the need to clarify or determine a long list of questions, for instance: its characteristics, minimum amount, intragroup distribution and triggers for it, enforceability of bail-in; regulatory limits on loss absorbing holdings, and disclosure. Let me underline that a shared view on the characteristics and levels of this “loss absorbing capacity” is critical for a “level playing field” among G-SIFIs. Also, we must avoid any approach that might be considered as an additional layer of differentiated capital requirements, a sort of differentiated “Tier 3” requirement. As I mentioned before, determination of the appropriate levels of GLAC must be dependent on the complexities and risk of the activities developed by each institution. The approach currently being worked out in the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, in terms of both identifying characteristics and specific levels or of “eligible liabilities” is, in our opinion, a correct approach to the problem. Now, my last point, the discussion in Europe regarding the European Union bank recovery and resolution directive and the entry into force of the bail-in arrangements included in that directive. Although still under discussion, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive bail-in is to be introduced in a sequenced way. Bail-in of regulatory capital instruments will be applicable from the moment the Directive is transposed, while bail-in of senior creditors can be postponed to 2018, depending on each Member State.

The value of the Petroleum Fund, measured as a percentage of GDP, will rise in the years ahead. On the other hand, Norway, like many other countries, is facing substantial fiscal challenges. The expected dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of persons over the age of 67 to persons aged 20 to 66, will  BIS Review 34/2005  5  rise sharply in the years ahead. The National Insurance Scheme’s spending on old age and disability pensions, based on the current social security rules, is increasing. The return on the Petroleum Fund can only cover a small portion of this increase. According to Ministry of Finance calculations, a funding requirement equivalent to 6 per cent of GDP will still be uncovered in 2060 given an oil price of NOK 230 (2005-kroner), or around USD 35 per barrel. Oil futures 6-7 years ahead are now higher than this. If oil prices remain as high for the foreseeable future, the funding requirement will be somewhat lower. To base decisions on this, however, would be a very risky strategy. Even though Norway’s petroleum wealth is substantial, it is our human resources that account for most of our national wealth. Even a small increase in the “return” on human capital might generate considerable gains. The return on this capital partly depends on our pension schemes and the application of social security rules. These should be designed in such a way that they provide incentives and opportunities to work. Labour market legislation must also promote production and employment.
This development is primarily demand-driven, fuelled by strong growth in the global economy, and in emerging market economies in particular. More recently, oil prices have increased further as political unrest in North Africa and the Middle East has led to uncertainty regarding future oil supply. Norwegian manufacturing industries are also benefiting from high commodity prices. Increased profitability for many firms and rising real disposable income may boost the demand for labour. With the prospect of continued high commodity prices and falling import prices, Norway’s terms of trade should hold up in the period ahead. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  This, together with a tight labour market, may fuel wage growth. Looking ahead, cost inflation is most likely to edge up. On the other hand, high net immigration may have a dampening impact on wages. In 2010, the population rose by 62 000, an increase of 1.3 per cent. Low unemployment and a relatively high wage level have made the Norwegian labour market attractive to job seekers of foreign origin. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Going forward, continued high labour immigration is expected to result in solid growth in the labour force. At the same time, improved terms of trade will led to higher activity in the Norwegian economy. Capacity utilisation is expected to revert to a normal level in the second half of 2011. In the coming years, output in the mainland economy is expected to increase at an annual rate of 3–4 per cent.

The SNB is taking an active part in these reform efforts. It is represented on the relevant committees and plays a supportive role by participating in discussions with market participants, as well as with Swiss and foreign authorities. Reforms have been implemented at international level, particularly as far as the Libor is concerned. They focus on standardising the interest rate calculation by the panel banks and making it more transaction-based. However, volume in the market segment underlying the Libor remains low. At national level, the main emphasis is on the replacement of the TOIS fixing. 1 The TOIS fixing is a panel-based reference interest rate for the unsecured call money market and is used  1 TOIS stands for Tomorrow/Next Overnight Indexed Swap. Page 3/7  Berne, 15 December 2016 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  for interest rate derivatives. Despite extensive reform efforts, no stable long-term solution has been found. Underlying trading volume continues to be very low and other banks are unwilling to report interest rate conditions. For this reason, the TOIS fixing will be abandoned as of end-2017. SARON, the reference interest rate for secured call money, will be used in its place. SARON was launched by the SNB in cooperation with SIX in 2009. We are confident that it will establish itself as a key Swiss franc reference rate. Further work will be coordinated by a working group comprising financial sector representatives. Key information on this topic is publicly available on the SNB’s website.
The increase in pre-crisis bank CEO salaries can be fully explained, arithmetically, by high and rising returns on bank equity.13 Javier Gabaix and Augustin Landier have shown that levels of CEO pay generally are well-explained by their market capitalisation – the bigger the market cap, the bigger the bonus.14 But what drove those behaviours in the first place? It was a classic financial arms race, a case not so much of “keeping up with the Jones’s” as “keeping up with the Goldmans”.15 From the early 1990s onwards, league-leading firms began posting high returns on equity. Those firms with lower relative returns, who languished in the league, found themselves with sand kicked in their face. They felt obliged not just to keep pace but to leapfrog, to shake their tail feathers. The lower their rank, the greater these market pressures.16 Facing these competitive pressures, the best-response strategy for languishing banks was simple – gear-up. They added to their waistlines to compete with the dominant male in the pack. Like Hardin’s cattle herdsmen, they multiplied their numbers. Leverage delivered an instant leapfrog in returns on equity, a conspicous display of rich plumage. High equity returns also added fuel to the parallel race in financial sector pay. With equity-based remuneration contracts increasingly dominant, high equity returns added directly to pay packets. And with remuneration committees and pay consultants using relative pay as a reference, an arms race in remuneration took hold. As wages and equity returns ascended, the races in pay and returns joined forces.

The aim of these collateral swap facilities is twofold: first, balance sheets of financial institutions become more liquid, and second, the prices of the collateral are indirectly supported, as fire-sales of such assets accepted as collateral become less likely. An attractive feature of collateral swaps is that they leave the amount of central bank money unaffected. They support liquidity in the banking system without driving short-term money market rates below the policy target. Furthermore, the size of these operations can, potentially, be very large, since there are almost no limits as long as the Treasury provides the securities or the central bank can issue its own bonds. The single most far-reaching action by a central bank in the crisis so far, however, was the Federal Reserve’s decision to facilitate the takeover of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan, in that it took over risky assets in significant quantities. By stepping in, the Federal Reserve put an end to a disorderly de-leveraging process on the part of highly interconnected financial institutions, and probably made a crucial contribution to defusing the third and most recent wave of the financial market crisis. Given its open access policy with respect to counterparties and the broad collateral base, it was not necessary for the SNB either to increase its range of counterparties or to expand its list of collateral. 7 Neither has it been necessary to introduce a facility for swapping illiquid for liquid assets, so far. How should we assess the impact and success of central bank actions so far?
A further important similarity between the emerging market experience and that of the peripheral euro area countries is that the external debt is denominated in a currency which the national authorities do not completely control. In emerging markets, so-called “original sin” – that is, a lack of credibility created by poor macroeconomic discipline in the past – implied that external debt was overwhelmingly denominated in US dollars. 8 In the euro area, debt is denominated in euros. Although this is obviously the currency of euro area countries, the single monetary policy aims at price stability across the euro area and thus cannot take account of national priorities deriving from fiscal or financial weaknesses in peripheral countries. By implication, neither in the emerging markets nor in the euro area periphery can the real value of the external debt burden be eroded by inflation or devaluation. Any attempt to devalue would simply raise the domestic burden of the external debt. Of course, this was precisely the point: by issuing debt in a currency which they could not control, the national authorities in the euro area “tied their own hands”. Before the crisis, they obtained a credibility gain that would lower overall funding costs and thus reduced the probability of a crisis. But when a crisis occurs, the external value of the debt burden cannot be reduced by devaluation. Differences between euro area and EME experiences While many of the experiences of the euro area periphery and the EMEs are similar, there are also important differences.

Second, the financial tensions led to a disruption of domestic financial intermediation, with severe consequences for both private and public financing. In Greece, the banks – which were reasonably strong in a “stand-alone” sense – were undone by revelations about the weakness of public finances. In Ireland, causation ran in the opposite direction: the bloated and failing domestic banking system imposed an intolerable burden on what, prior to the crisis, had been a superficially strong fiscal position. Regardless of the causation, the consequences were the same: as confidence eroded, the inflow of foreign capital dried up. Subject to a “sudden stop” in external financing, 4 the European sovereign debt crisis – itself inextricably linked with problems in the financial sector – erupted, forcing Greece and Ireland to seek financial assistance from the European Union and IMF. 3. What can we learn from the emerging market crises of the past thirty years? The developments I have just described might give those of you living in emerging economies a sense of déjà vu. And indeed it has become commonplace to draw comparisons between recent events in Europe and the periodic financial crises seen in emerging market economies (EMEs) over the past three decades: Latin America’s debt crisis in the 1980s; the Mexican tequila crisis of 1994; the Asian financial crisis in the second half of the 1990s; and the Argentine crisis of 2001. Extensive economic literature has analysed these events and identified important roles for many of the phenomena I have just described.
Around a fifth of the required investment in the renewable energy, energy efficiency and low emission vehicle sectors will need to come from green bonds. 5  If this is indicative  of the need for green finance generally, we’ll need to scale that $ up by a factor of ten. More broadly, annual infrastructure financing has totalled around $ trillion each year. That still leaves an annual gap of more than $ trillion compared to a $ trillion annual infrastructure need. Even more importantly, only around 10% of these infrastructure projects are estimated to have been low-carbon. 6  So  whilst progress is encouraging – and provides valuable momentum – at current rates of issuance we are in danger of falling behind the investment path required to meet 2 degree targets. So what more can be done? In one sense, the TCFD benefits of increased disclosure, data and analytical capacity will ultimately bring to bear the discipline of market pricing across both green and ‘brown’ assets and issuance and help deliver the shift in financing required. However, as discussed earlier, the climate scenario analysis that would support 4  Total green bond issuance only represents only around 1% of the global bond market, based on: SIFMA (2017) “2017 Fact Book”; and Climate Bonds Initiative (2017) “Bonds and Climate Change, The State of the Market 2017”. 5 Based on OECD (2016), “A quantitative framework for analysing potential bond contributions in a low-carbon transition”.

Lim Hng Kiang: Singapore Exchange Beijing Representative Office Opening speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Minister for Trade and Industry, at the Launch Ceremony of the Singapore Exchange Beijing Representative Office, Beijing, 21 April 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Congratulatory remarks I am delighted to be here with you this evening to commemorate the opening of the Singapore Exchange Beijing Representative Office. First, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Chinese Government and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission for the generous support of the Singapore Exchange’s efforts in China. Establishment of the Singapore Exchange Beijing representative office The setting up of the Singapore Exchange’s first overseas representative office in Beijing underscores the exchange’s commitment to China. This representative office will further strengthen existing links between our two business and finance communities under the broader China-Singapore partnership framework. Chinese listings on the Singapore Exchange The Singapore Exchange started serving the fund-raising needs of Chinese companies since 1997, and it has seen strong interest in the recent years. Encouraged by the Chinese government’s "go out" policy and also boosted by the economic strength of the Chinese economy, Chinese companies have increasingly taken significant steps to regionalise and internationalise their businesses. Many Chinese companies have chosen Singapore as a springboard into the region and the Singapore Exchange as a fund-raising platform.