samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is against this background that we have, for example, resisted suggestions that we raise the volume of Exchange Fund paper issuance in order merely to satisfy the market’s appetite. We would much prefer to see other issuers coming forward. We are anyway constrained by our currency board arrangements only to increase the outstanding quantity of Exchange Fund paper to reflect interest payments or in response to enduring inflows into Hong Kong. Another aspect of debt market development which merits some discussion is the potential for retail activity. It is worth reminding ourselves that, although in several countries retail investors have historically been loyal direct holders of government or municipal paper, invariably for long-term investment rather than trading, only in the United States has there been much direct retail interest in the corporate paper market. We have been happy in Hong Kong to provide the means for the small investor to access Exchange Fund notes or Mortgage Corporation notes by listing them on the Stock Exchange, but one should acknowledge that bond markets as a whole tend to be dominated by professionals, trading on an over-the-counter basis, and we should not be surprised, therefore, if retail activity is relatively modest. This does not mean, however, that the man in the street has no need in his wealth portfolio for instruments in this section of the risk-reward spectrum.

Thus, although overall private sector issuance may increase as a means of closing the sector’s financing gap, there is some evidence - perhaps not conclusive - that this may be at the cost of some hardening of yields relative to government yields, at least for lesser names. Of course, in some cases the increase in yields may just be the more straightforward consequence of a rising level of corporate gearing. There are also indications that increased debt market activity may have been more evident in the floating rate sector than for longer-dated fixed rate issues, where it may have been difficult to establish appropriate new benchmarks. Thus, although crowding-in may be occurring, the process is more complex than the simple like-for-like substitution of corporate for government paper. Another consideration for certain investors is that they increasingly have to accept that a strategy based simply on purchasing the paper of top-rated issuers such as governments or multinational organisations may no longer be feasible or economic. Yet, if they are going to embrace lesser-rated paper in their portfolios, they may need to shift their approach towards a somewhat more sophisticated 1  BIS Review 57/2000  portfolio strategy, which permits the holding of lower-rated paper at prices which appropriately reflect the risks, with the risks balanced across the whole portfolio. This may necessitate changes in the ways in which fund managers are instructed to address their task and in the tools which they need to perform it.
Ardian Fullani: The western Balkans – from regional cooperation to EU membership Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the conference “The western Balkans: overcoming the economic crisis – from regional cooperation to EU membership", Brussels, 9 December 2009. *  *  *  During the last 20 years the region has undergone significant structural changes, which have fueled economic incentives and economic growth. In the early stages of transition a fast and significant transformation in the labor and later in the capital market reoriented all factors of production toward more productive sectors. This contributed to higher total factor productivity and consequently fast economic growth. The final stage of transition was dominated by a robust financial deepening process fueled among others from EU based capital inflows. This financial intermediation busted credit growth and consumption yielding to absorption led growth model in the region. In the aftermath of crises our policy choices are limited. From a broad prospective the region should chose a new philosophy, different from the boom-bust model of the last decade. I strongly believe this must be the focal point of the Regional Policies. The current crisis pointed out several problems in our growth models. The so called catching up process was a model of unsustainable consumption behavior rather than sustainable long run equilibrium. Despite the overall fiscal consolidation and relatively high rate of growths, it resulted in increasing macroeconomic imbalances mostly evidenced in the fast enlargement of current account deficits.

It is small firms (those with fewer than 50 employees) that have most stepped up their entry into foreign markets, although their contribution to total exports remains small compared with larger companies. At the same time, the number of regular exporting firms (i.e. those that sell their products abroad for four years running or more) has risen in this period by 32%. This increase has been particularly notable in target markets with high growth potential, such as North Africa, Asia and North America. The decision by a firm to begin to export entails fixed costs of a significant magnitude. This would suggest that, once these costs are assumed, the firm tends to remain in the market chosen. It also points to the fact that the broadening of the base of exporting firms might be predominantly structural in nature, as attested to by the fact that the persistent recovery in domestic demand since 2014 does not appear to have had a negative bearing on the number of regular exporting firms. 3/6  The Spanish productive system’s greater export orientation has boosted business investment. The evidence is that exporting firms have higher investment/capital ratios, whereby the broadening of the export base is estimated to have contributed to the buoyancy of investment in aggregate terms. As a result, the behaviour of investment during the recovery has been more favourable than that arising from the course of aggregate demand.
Looking around, I am delighted to see many friends from corporates, banks, fund management firms and other industry professionals sitting here, keen to learn more about sukuk. I am sure that the experts gathered here today will be able to shed light on how sukuk can be a viable fund-raising tool and an attractive investment instrument. Before that, allow me to take this opportunity to say a few words, from a policy perspective, on why developing an Islamic finance platform is important for Hong Kong, and our plans in building this platform. What’s in it for Hong Kong to develop Islamic finance? 4. Islamic finance has become increasingly important in the global financial market, registering exponential growth over the past few years. Compared with a size of only $ billion in 2008, the global Islamic financial industry has expanded remarkably to an estimated $ trillion by the end of 2013, representing an annual average growth rate of 21%.1 According to market estimates, there is huge potential for further growth, with Islamic financial assets expected to reach $ trillion by 2020.2  5. A major growth area for Islamic finance is the sukuk market. Ten years ago, new sukuk issuance was only a modest $ billion. In just ten years’ time, annual sukuk issuance has already surpassed $ billion, amounting to $ billion in 2013 which was more than 20 times higher than the figure in 2003.3  6.

I note from the very elaborate programme for this meeting that you will in the next three days cover a wide spectrum of issues some of which will focus on factors that constrain SMEs access to finance and some of which will focus on what needs to be done to change this situation. The meeting is, therefore, an opportunity for us to face a number of challenges that characterize this sector. These will include revisiting strategies and approaches to SME financing currently in use as much as it will require a review of current institutional arrangements through which finance is directly delivered to SMEs, on one hand, and those which indirectly obstruct or facilitate this flow of resources, on the other. However, I believe that probably the greatest challenge before this assembly is to attempt to narrow the gap between analysis of the problem and the implementation of measures and actions that work. Meetings, workshops, seminars, etc. on SME financing are plenty at national, regional and international levels. Some of you have had the opportunity to attend several of these meetings in the past. Indeed, some of you have become experts at talking about the subject. Barely two weeks ago, the Bank of Zambia held a financial sector forum here in Lusaka at which views of various stakeholders on what needs to be done to address binding constraints to the SME sector were considered. The fact that the discourse on SME financing continues underpins two significant positions.
Rolling regressions suggest the effects of unionisation on pay were largest during this period. If we look at the sectoral level, similar effects are seen. Sectors of the UK economy with higher levels of unionisation have seen smaller falls in their labour shares (Chart 20). Over the past few decades, a sector like administration and support activities with under 10% unionisation rates has seen its labour share decline, while a sector like education with a unionisation rate close to 50% has seen its labour share rise. (c)  Automation  A third factor potentially affecting the pay power of workers is the degree of automation in the workplace. The easier and cheaper it is to replace human with machine, the lower is likely to be the wage bargaining power of workers relative to companies. Increased automation and the dawn of a Fourth Industrial Revolution could, then, result in slower pay growth and workers receiving a smaller slice of the income pie. 19  Recent research has confirmed that intuition. The IMF has found a significantly negative effect of automation on labour’s share. 20  Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) look at the influence of multi-purpose industrial robots  on pay growth across different sectors of the US economy. They find that one extra robot per thousand workers lowers wages by 0.25-0.5%. At 71 robots per 10,000 employees, the UK’s degree of robot automation lies well below France (127), Spain (150), the US (170) and Germany (301) (Chart 21).

Figure 6 Inflation indicators  Incidences on monthly inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (percentage points)  12  12  0.8  0.8  10  10  8  8  0.6  0.6  6  6  0.4  0.4  4  4  0.2  0.2  2  2  0.0  0.0  0  0  -0.2  -0.2  -2  -2  -0.4  -0.4  -4  -4 06 07 CPI  08  09  10  11  CPI minus foodstuffs and energy  11  Apr. Jul. Oct.  Fresh fruits & vegetables (2.90%) Fuels (5.70%) Foodstuffs X1 (17.77%)  CPI  Meats (3.55%)  (*) In parentheses, shares in CPI basket. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
And yet, in many parts of the world, monetary policies remain somehow permissive. The reason for this paradox can be found in the dilemma faced by many countries, which maintain some link between their currencies and the US dollar, in order to prevent an unwanted appreciation of their exchange rate. However, according to Mundell’s  BIS Review 63/2008  1  incompatibility triangle, a country cannot tie its currency to another currency and simultaneously conduct an independent monetary policy, when capital flows freely between countries. As a consequence, many emerging economies are currently led to partially "import" the US monetary policy although their situation and position in the economic cycle are fundamentally different. This situation could be very unstable and dangerous. First, real exchange rate appreciation – which is bound to occur anyway – takes place through increased inflation rather than nominal exchange rate appreciation. Indeed, inflation in many emerging countries is currently accelerating. Second, at the world level, we might be piling up inflationary pressures, which could develop further in 2009-10. There is an explosive mix of rising commodity prices and permissive monetary policies, which could create an ongoing spiral, and, if it were allowed to develop, would specially hurt the poor countries, most of which are net food importers. It is our common and joint responsibility to do everything in our power to avoid such an outcome. Let me now turn to another major challenge: the impact of financial innovation on the conduct of monetary policy.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Malaysia - encouraging savings in a dynamic economy Opening remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the launching of the Merdeka Savings Bond, Kuala Lumpur, 2 January 2004. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my honour and pleasure to welcome you to the launch ceremony for the Merdeka Savings Bond. The launching of this bond marks another step forward in our efforts to enhance the diversity of financial products for Malaysian consumers. In this more dynamic environment, the Malaysian economy has continued to expand with per capita income rising to exceed levels prior to the Asian financial crisis. This growth has been supported by comprehensive pro-growth policies and the development of a much stronger banking sector that is able to better manage new risks and challenges. As a trade-oriented economy, external developments will continue to be important in affecting our growth prospects. In order to reduce our vulnerability to adverse external developments, increased attention has been given to promoting domestic demand. Policy strategies have therefore been directed at promoting domestic consumption and investment. Low interest rates, together with policies to increase disposable incomes, have led to higher consumption and a recovery in private investment. These trends have been important in sustaining growth. As a high savings country, Malaysia has the potential to promote a higher level of consumption without undermining the prospect for financing of private investment from domestic sources.
ONS, KLEMS and authors' calculations, see Appendix A.1 to Bailey et al. (2022) for more details. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a consensus yet on what exactly lies behind this observed relationship. A growing literature shows that there are barriers to intangible investment, for example because intangible assets cannot be easily used as collateral. [24] Thus, the tightening of financial conditions following the global financial crisis could have disproportionally hindered the development of intangible-intensive industries, with potentially long-term consequences for productivity growth. [25] However, intangible investment has recovered in recent years, while productivity growth has remained weak. Could it be, perhaps, that the barriers to intangible investment benefit investment by low-productivity firms? Or are other factors at play? Other recent studies have highlighted the impact of the intangible economy on competition. Intangible technologies tend to require large upfront investments, what economists call fixed costs. This may give firms with high-intangible adoption a competitive advantage and make it difficult for new innovative firms to enter the market. In that case, entrenched incumbent firms may have fewer  Page 15  incentives to innovate, potentially slowing innovation adoption in the long run. [26] However, the UK data do not seem to provide strong evidence in favour of this second mechanism, compared with research studying the United States. While the US literature reports a decline in business dynamism and an increase in market power alongside the rise of intangibles, business dynamism seems to have been less affected in the United Kingdom.

It is fairly understandable that certain EU member states support the current, rather non-transparent way of modifying the institutional set-up: it is the only way for them to maintain or even strengthen the draconian mix I just described. 2  BIS Review 165/2009  Given that European integration is taking place in this “European” way (in the bad sense of the word), it is no wonder that standard democratic politics has not left the national level: all formally EU-wide ideas are always translated in each individual member state into the local political context; there are no true EU-wide political parties, no true EU-wide politicians, no true EU-wide media. The debate in EU institutions rarely follows the lines that we are used to in standard political debates, such as whether we want more freedom or more redistribution. Instead, most time is spent, as I said, on procedures and institutions. The official efforts at gradual political integration thus give the impression of squaring the circle. These awkward traits in politics at the EU level then lead to some perverse implications. On the one hand, measures which would help Europe to retain a strong economic position – and here I mean especially liberalisation of markets and trade – take years or even decades to implement: the single market for services still does not exist and even the single market for labour still has fundamental exemptions.
In effect, the mere existence of a digital euro would offer a fallback solution in the event of geopolitical tensions. Moreover, when carefully designed, a digital euro could be a catalyst for innovation at a wider scale in that it could support intermediaries’ role in developing new types of services on top of it while enjoying Pan-European reach. 1  Negroponte, N. (1995). “Being Digital”, Vintage International. Random House, New York. Cunliffe, J. (2022) “Some lessons from the Crypto Winter” (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2022/july/joncunliffe-speech-on-crypto-market-developments-at-the-british-high-commission-singapore). 2  1  A digital euro does, however, exhibit a number of non-trivial risks as well. If, for example, anonymity was to be allowed as a means to provide the highest possible level of privacy, we would be compromising our commitment with fighting money laundering and the financing of criminal activity. What’s more, this setup would put into question the effectiveness of the tools to limit the use of digital euro as a store of value, a point on which I will come back later. In that respect, a balance needs to be struck between minimizing the Eurosystem’s and intermediaries’ involvement in the processing of users’ data and still ensuring compliance with the law. A digital euro is likely to increase as well the Eurosystem’s general operational responsibilities over the payments channels irrespective of the role it ultimately intends to play in the settlement of these transactions.

We have a vision, we have teams of responsible professionals who work every day to achieve the goals set by the SDDS Plus, we have excellent interinstitutional cooperation... And all this, which is also necessary to build and develop modern and quality statistics, guarantees us that we will succeed to the end. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
It should also be noted that the New York Fed’s long experience as the FOMC’s selected bank for 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  open market operations on behalf of the Federal Reserve System confers on it a trusted level of competence, experience, and reliability with foreign official account holders. The same New York Fed front office personnel that purchase and sell Treasuries for the Federal Reserve’s own portfolio also execute trades on behalf of foreign official account holders. Moreover, the same New York Fed personnel that perform back office operations for the Federal Reserve’s own portfolio also perform back office operations for the transactions of foreign official account holders. This consolidated transactional platform used by both the Federal Reserve and its foreign official account holders means that the global official community can be assured that the quality of the services it receives from the Federal Reserve meets the same standards as the Federal Reserve sets for the servicing of its own portfolio. Choreographers of central bank operations Let me now spend a moment discussing the people behind our account services. In doing so, I wish to recognize staff past and present who have played and continue to play a vital role every day in processing critical transactions on behalf of the global official community. Your experience in the daily management of the accounts of other central banks produces unique operational knowledge and expertise.

In order to achieve a harmonized application of legislation at European level and to support payment initiation and account information service providers, the European Banking Authority (EBA) adopted an opinion on obstacles in early June 2020. within the meaning of Art. 32 (3) of the regulatory technical standards for in-depth identification of the customer and common and secure standards of communication1. The opinion highlights a number of technical or organizational obstacles that payment service providers, which maintain accounts, pose to the new services and which should be removed. Examples of such obstacles include the unavailability of all procedures for performing in-depth identification of the customer when using the new services, requiring manual entry of the IBAN on the payment account from which payment is initiated or requesting account information, repeated in-depth establishing the identity when initiating payment, the need to provide prior consent to the client to use the new services, etc. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Improving the security of electronic payments is the second major aspect of PSD2. In September 2019, the requirements for payment service providers to apply a procedure for indepth identification of the customer when the payer accesses his payment account online, initiates an electronic payment transaction or performs another remote action that could occur risk of payment fraud. These requirements have started to apply to credit transfers made through the Internet and mobile banking platforms.