samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And adaptation to structural change to the economy will mean putting capital into new businesses to replace those whose business models are no longer viable. Failure of risk transfer markets in things like directors’ and officers’ indemnity and – yes – business interruption would have a cooling effect on this necessary investment. So if a protection gap were to emerge through the reactions of insurers and insured to what they have learned about contract uncertainty, we should worry about the wider impact that that might have on economic recovery. I do see a risk of a protection gap. The pandemic has highlighted risks around unintended exposures in insurance contracts and unexpected links across risk areas under extreme circumstances. Most acutely on business interruption insurance – where we have seen vastly different interpretations of how policies should respond to the restrictions placed on businesses as a result of Covid-19, and the sums involved have perhaps militated against either insurer or insured settling for a compromise outcome to claims. The high profile of disputes over business interruption claims has done nothing to dent the popular caricature of an industry that is happier to accept premiums than to pay claims. This matters: it could have an impact on demand for policies, if businesses perceive them not in practice to offer the cover they need – not just in business interruption, but in indemnity policies that cover non-specific perils.

Taking into account the key rate decisions and other assumptions of our baseline forecast, we expect inflation to range within 3.5–4.0% by the end of 2020. Moving forward, the monetary policy pursued will keep annual inflation close to 4%. Second. Household inflation expectations decline but stay above the lows registered in April 2018. However, the perception of inflation by households is gradually changing. We see that inflation expectations are forming now at the level that is lower than the one observed amid comparable price dynamics in late 2017 – early 2018. This is largely associated with the recent trend for average inflation to be much lower than before. The inflation volatility range has also 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  narrowed. However, inflation expectations remain sensitive to changing prices of individual goods and to one-off events. In our policy, we take into account the fact that we need more time to fully anchor inflation expectations. Business price expectations decreased in the first half of the year and have remained generally stable during the last few months. Mid-term inflation expectations of analysts and professional market participants are close to 4%. Third. Monetary conditions are easing and this process will continue mainly due to the earlier key rate decisions. OFZ yields stay at their lowest levels for the last few years after the October key rate decision. Interest rates in the deposit and credit market are going down.
Davíð Oddsson: The commercial banks are more resilient Opening statement by Mr Davíð Oddsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, on behalf of the Board of Governors at a Press Conference on the occasion of the publication of the Bank’s Financial Stability 2007, 25 April 2007. *  *  *  In its analysis published in Financial Stability at the beginning of May 2006, the Central Bank of Iceland’s finding was that the financial system was broadly sound, but more challenging waters lay ahead. Two main causes of concern were identified: macroeconomic imbalances and uncertainty about the commercial banks’ refinancing of their foreign borrowing. Refinancing was successfully completed. However, macroeconomic imbalances increased. A year ago the focus was on short-term risks on the liabilities side of the financial companies’ balance sheets, but now it has shifted more to the long-term asset quality. The most pressing economic policy task is to restore stability. The conclusion of large investments in the aluminium and power sectors will automatically reduce imbalances, but other adjustment has been slower than expected. Increased foreign debt service has delayed the unwinding of the current account deficit, which will hardly be brought down to a sustainable level without a substantial contraction in demand. The latest forecast in Monetary Bulletin in March 2007 indicates that such a contraction lies ahead, as growth of investment and private consumption slows down.

Debt service has not risen by the same proportion, due to rising  BIS Review 41/2007  1  incomes and easier credit terms, and arrears are at a low. However, some borrowers have stretched their capacity to the limit and the most indebted group has seen its debt grow substantially as a proportion of income and assets in recent years. Conditions will not need to change much to cause them serious difficulties. The bulk of household debt is in the form of CPI-indexed mortgage loans, making low inflation critical. Household debt in foreign currency was very low, but has been increasing. High levels of foreign currency-denominated debt could prove questionable for households with no income in foreign currency. Since house prices are currently buoyant, they are likely to rise by less than general inflation or even fall in nominal terms. Household equity could shrink under such conditions. Business profitability appears to have been strong in 2006, in spite of a massive increase in financial expenses from exchange rate losses on foreign borrowing, higher interest expenses and a substantial increase in interest-bearing debt. Debt of listed companies grew as a ratio of equity and the same is probably true of other businesses. Higher debt levels leave them more vulnerable to a contraction in the economy. Equity prices have soared in Iceland in recent years. One explanation for the increase may be that Icelandic companies were undervalued by the markets, for example by international comparison, and another that bold investment ventures have driven up their value.
If, over the coming years, we manage to come up with ways of releasing part of the equity in homes, this could raise the supply of available housing, reduce the pressure on state long-term care institutions and hospitals while guaranteeing better living standards for our elderly. This, of course, needs to be done carefully, sensitively and in a well-regulated environment. Once again, we believe that financial institutions can have a key role to play here. The rental market is another area where we believe we need to act, with due consideration of the trade-offs involved. Any measures that are too restrictive could take us back to a previous situation where the rental market was utterly dysfunctional. On the other hand, we should not shy away from reforms that facilitate a better functioning of the market. We need more legal clarity about the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants. We also need to have this market operate in the formal economy, with rent contracts duly registered. Stabilising this sector will be beneficial to our economy’s competitiveness, whilst also helping to address social inequalities. Although loan-to-value (LTVs) ratios range from 60% to 90% (and lately we have observed a shift to the upper bound) the banks have largely kept to their cautious approach when extending credit for buy-to-let purposes. We think that their prudence bears witness to the maturity of our financial institutions, though more caution in mortgage credit for secondary residences is called for.

How far such clauses would help is unclear. Bonds issued under UK, but not US, law – currently these account for just under 50% of the stock of emerging market eurobonds – generally include such clauses already. But their widespread adoption looks unlikely, not least because of the reluctance of the G7 to incorporate such clauses into their own debt contracts. More productive in the short run is likely to be the promotion of regular contacts between debtor countries and their creditors in good times, well before any crisis occurs. State-contingent debt where returns are related to the price of major exports is another possibility. (5)  Avoid, at all costs, the defence of fixed but adjustable exchange rate pegs when they are no longer consistent with internal and external equilibrium. Thailand shows the cost of a prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to defend its exchange rate. Brazil shows that there is life after a fixed exchange rate. It is much too early to conclude that emerging markets have little option but to adopt the dollar as their currency. 6  Feldstein, M (1999), “A self-help guide for emerging markets”, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 93-109. BIS Review 95/1999  6  To these five imperatives, I have refrained from adding the mantra of better banking supervision. Of course, banking supervision should always strive to be better.
Limitation on who can access the payment system and inconsistent operating hours can add extra links and delays into the end-to-end transaction chain. The ambition is for payment systems to be open for longer and available to more payment service providers. These steps should make national payment rails more interoperable and reduce frictions for existing payment firms. They could also make the market more competitive:  Page 5  ultimately improving the experience for consumers and businesses. In the UK, we led the way in 2017 by becoming one of the first central banks to expand access to non-bank Payment Service Providers. Along with a number of other central banks, this year we are undertaking a further review of our access approach, benefitting from the CPMI self-assessment framework. [13] The review will help the Bank to determine whether the current direct access requirements remain proportionate in light of our objectives and new trends in the payments landscape. Around the end of this year, we aim to publish a discussion paper presenting our initial findings and inviting industry input. Alongside reviewing our formal access requirements, we continue to develop our renewed RTGS service to reduce the technical or operational barriers to joining and enable a wider range of participants to join. And we are considering longer operating hours as part of our forward looking RTGS roadmap beyond 2024: again benefiting from the framework published by the CPMI.

And alongside the Roadmap actions per se, there have been tangible changes that are already paying dividends. Nearly three quarters of payment system operators surveyed by CPMI have either implemented or have concrete plans to implement the latest financial message standard (ISO 20022) by 2025. [5] The Bank of England joined that club last week by moving CHAPS, our high value payment system, to ISO20022. Several jurisdictions have extended the operating hours of their high-value payment systems to near 24/7, including countries as far apart as India, Mexico, Switzerland and indeed South Africa. Over the last two years, several countries have expanded access to their payment systems to new types of financial institution: including Japan, Switzerland and Singapore. Others, such as United States, have developed new guidelines for more transparent and risk-based assessment of account requests. And recent figures[6] show that two-thirds of cross-border transactions that take place via the Swift network reach end beneficiaries within one hour. The private sector is also investing in better infrastructure: almost $ was invested in paytech start-ups last year. [7] Recent survey suggested that 94% of financial institutions are planning to invest in their payment technology in the next 3 years. [8] Africa has a place among the leaders in payments innovation, from new mobile payment technologies with M-Pesa to CBDC with eNaira in Nigeria. The Pan African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), launched last year, is expanding rapidly: it has nine central banks and 41 commercial banks live on the system.
In the past, in carrying out its oversight role, the Board had tended to rely mainly on examination report of the Bank of Thailand and that of the bank’s internal auditors to identify problems created by managements and to follow up on their resolution. However, with increasingly rapid and complex business developments, this process needs to become more forward-looking, so that preventive measures or prompt corrective action can be taken to cap any problems before it can affect the bank’s soundness. Supervisory agents cannot do this job alone. The oversight of Board of Directors is needed as they are much closer to the institution and its on-going developments. For this reasons, regulators worldwide have shifted their supervisory framework to mandating that the Board of Directors take lead responsibility for overseeing the process of risk management which ensures that the banks have internal prompt preventive and corrective procedures. Supervisors or regulators role would be confined to setting the broad framework, to be supplemented with area-specific examination to help provide additional independent crosscheck. For this reason, the Bank of Thailand has called on bank directors to take on an even greater responsibility. And some of you may well be contemplating what you must do in order to discharge this broader responsibility. Today presents a good opportunity for me to discuss with you the important principles underlying governance and responsibility of bank directorship. The Bank of Thailand has drawn out 10 key principles as follows.

Once the risk management Committee has been established, the Board will be able to control risks through this Committee and define types of risks that have to be closely monitored. In addition, the Committee would also responsible for setting up measures to deal with those types of risk, including the process on risk assessment and control. The contingency plan is needed to control risks in timely manner and minimize those risks to be at the acceptable level. This includes the reporting process on risk status to the Committee and Board of Directors with simple and clear message. With such practices, the Board of Directors could fully monitor risk management with appropriate decision, supporting by the Risk Management Committee. On the division of responsibility between the Board and the Risk Management Committee, the Committee should have authority to directly oversee all risks arising from normal course of business, while the Board of Directors should be responsible for approval of the risk management policy framework proposed by the Risk Management Committee, such as approval of aggregate exposure limit to FX risk, and individual limit by transactions and traders; maximum value at risk for interest rate risk; on credit risk, setting aggregate, individual, as well as group large exposure limit to certain types of credits and borrowers, or certain groups, to prevent over concentration. BIS Review 25/2006  3  On top of setting proper risk management framework and risk limits, the directors should also be on guard against situations where normal risk management cannot fully cover.
Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Advancing financial literacy towards rebuilding financial resilience post-pandemic Keynote address by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the National Financial Literacy Symposium (NFLS) 2022, Kuala Lumpur, 11 October 2022. *** Assalamualaikum w.b.t and a very good morning, Tan Sri Dr. Rahamat Bivi Yusoff, Chairman, Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, Emeritus Prof. Datuk Dr. Norma Mansor, President, Malaysian Economic Association and our guest speaker today, Ms. Caroline Siarkiewicz, Chief Executive Officer of The Money and Pensions Service United Kingdom, distinguished panellists and guests. Let me also take this opportunity to thank the teams from Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia and the Malaysian Economic Association for jointly organising this Symposium. It is my great pleasure to be speaking to you here this morning. Allow me to start by reflecting on the theme today – "Advancing Financial Literacy Towards Rebuilding Financial Resilience Post-Pandemic". Indeed, the pandemic has revealed the importance of financial resilience, and the need for all of us represented here today – from the public sector, civil society, financial industry, business, academia, and international organisations – to support Malaysians in rebuilding such resilience as we emerge from the crisis. When Bank Negara Malaysia published our 1H 2022 Financial Stability Review recently, it included the findings of our Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey for 2021.

Each government must keep its own house in order. In addition, the European Commission and all governments are responsible for ensuring that the fiscal policy of all euro area countries is constantly surveyed and monitored in line with the Stability and Growth Pact. We always made publicly the point that governments must live up to their responsibility. FTD: Now that the markets are losing confidence in Italy and Spain, can Europe still manage this crisis? Trichet: Naturally the Europeans can manage the issue. It is not a question of technique. It is a question of will and determination. And the situation, at the level of the euro area as a whole, is more sound than in the equivalent advanced economies. For example at the end of the year the euro area will post around 4 ½ % of GDP public finance deficit when the US and Japan will post around 10 %. FTD: The ECB argues against private sector involvement in the second rescue package for Greece on the grounds that, in international terms, this is not usual in such cases. But even the International Monetary Fund is now in favour of involving private bondholders. Why is the ECB still resisting such a move? Trichet: If you read carefully what the IMF writes, you will see that it is much more prudent. In any case you know the position of the Governing Council on Greece, which I repeated in our last press conference.
John C Williams: The economic outlook Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 5 March 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery Thank you so much for this award. It’s a genuine honor to be recognized in this way. And allow me to add my congratulations to all the other organizations and individuals that have been commended this evening. The work that you’re doing—particularly in the area of corporate social responsibility—is so important. On Tuesday, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/2 percentage point.1 This action was in response to the evolving risks the coronavirus poses to the U.S. economy. Tonight, I’ll use my remarks to provide more context around that decision and about our response as we look ahead. But before I give this evening’s remarks I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. Economic Outlook To start, let me emphasize that the fundamentals of the U.S. economy remain strong. We’ve seen continued solid job growth, unemployment is at a historically low level, and we entered 2020 with very good momentum. After a year that was characterized by uncertainties, global growth appeared to be stabilizing, and geopolitical risks receding.

And monetary policy was well positioned to support the economic expansion and the achievement of the Fed’s goals of maximum employment and price stability. Risks to the Economy However, during the past month the outbreak and subsequent spread of the coronavirus has brought with it new risks to the economic outlook. This is first and foremost a human tragedy, and my deepest sympathies are with those who have lost loved ones. The virus and the necessary scale of the response to address the public health challenge will have near-term effects on the global economy. These repercussions have been especially strong in the hardest-hit countries, including China, South Korea, Japan, Italy, and Iran. We are now also hearing reports that some businesses here in the United States are being affected by supply disruptions and weakening demand. As people take precautions, we’re seeing concerns around the tourism and travel sectors, in particular. Disease outbreaks require a multifaceted approach, and the coronavirus is no different. This is primarily a public health issue, which will be fought on the front lines by doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals. Governments will also need to step in to support the healthcare response, and, if needed, to provide targeted relief to affected industries and workers through fiscal measures. Monetary Policy Central banks like the Federal Reserve also have an important role to play in addressing the economic effects of the coronavirus, ensuring that financial markets function effectively and providing support to the economy.
  systemic risk should be contained via the creation of resolution mechanisms for financial institutions as well as promoting more resilient market infrastructures, such as CCPs for clearing and settlement of derivatives products. The financial crisis also gives us the opportunity to think about Central Banks fundamental task: the making of monetary policy. Amongst the many questions currently asked in academic and policy making circles I will select four: 1/ – the mandate: recent proposals have been made to assign monetary policy additional financial stability objectives, possibly by amending Central Banks mandates. I see those proposals as misguided. First, adding a financial stability objective at the same level as price stability could weaken the latter. Second, if price stability is not a sufficient condition to ensure financial stability, it is certainly a necessary one. And, finally, current mandates seem absolutely appropriate to allow Central Banks to fulfil all their responsibilities. Looking, more specifically at the Eurosystem we have a “hierarchical” mandate, giving clear and unambiguous priority to achieving price stability; and, once this objective has been met, it allows us to pursue other goals. Financial stability easily fits into the set of those “secondary” objectives. This clear priority was understood by the markets. It was most apparent in our decision to raise policy rates in July 2008. It was essential to give us the necessary leeway to act decisively later – when the financial system was in danger of paralysis – without compromising our credibility.

It reminds us if need be that crisis management is a difficult and potentially long lasting task and that we should always keep in mind that our policies have effects not only the current course of events but also through the expectation of the private sector that they may be repeated in the future. It is therefore timely to reflect upon the past, present and future course of Central Banks’ actions. I – The seeds of financial instability It is paradoxical that the crisis took place after a protracted period of nominal and real stability. In particular, inflation had remained low and remarkably stable for nearly two decades. This unprecedented degree of price stability mostly reflects a combination of central banks’ credibility and the effects of a benign economic environment. This macroeconomic stability has however not prevented deep imbalances – macroeconomic and financial – to grow in parallel, reinforcing one another. The abundance of savings in the world, specifically in emerging economies, prevented real long term interest rates from rising and stimulated the pace of credit expansion, especially in the US. Indeed, when policy rates were raised in 2004 in the US and late 2005 in the euro area, long term rates responded much less than in previous interest rate cycles and the yield curve flattened unexpectedly. Over the same period, financial markets have gone through deep structural changes. Financial innovation and extensive financial engineering fuelled a “search for yield” through increased risk taking.