samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The decisions that we make affect the whole economy, and ultimately serve the good of the people of the United Kingdom. And, making these decisions effectively relies on good data. This isn’t new: the Bank has been collecting data in one form or another since its foundation in 1694. But while data have always been important, the pace of change in technology has unlocked much greater potential. Across public and private sectors alike the possibilities of leveraging data on a massive scale or in innovative ways are being explored – in health and consumer tech, in finance in the form of fintech, and regtech and suptech for regulators like the Bank.1 As well as providing new opportunities for individual firms, the use of data in fintech – to better price and allocate capital and to monitor the uses to which it is being put – has the potential to support productivity growth across the wider economy.2 3 It is often said that “data is the new oil” fuelling a new industrial revolution. While the transformational potential is similar, there are differences from oil which mean that the nature of that revolution will be very different. Unlike oil, data are “non-rivalrous”, meaning more than one person can use the same piece of data at once. Once in the public domain it also becomes by definition “non-excludable”, meaning you can’t control who does and doesn’t have access.

So, as well as delivering the highest levels of resilience, we need to make sure we take this once in a generation opportunity to facilitate innovation for many years to come by expanding the functionality of the renewed service. Whether that is ensuring that the new RTGS can interact with Distributed Ledger Technology, or developing hooks to allow third party operators to synch the movement of funds on the RTGS ledger with movements across other ledgers, we expect to deliver a platform that enables the future generation of financial services. Across all of these services, the data that are used, and the way that they are formatted and presented to users, is vital. And because the standards we are implementing are used internationally, there is a critical need to ensure we implement them well. 5  See previous footnote. For numerous examples, see Haldane, A (2018), “Will Big Data Keep Its Promise?”, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/speech/2018/will-big-data-keep-its-promise-speech-by-andy-haldane.pdf 7 The Real-Time Gross Settlement service is the infrastructure that holds accounts for banks, building societies and other institutions. The balances in these accounts can be used to move money in real time between these account holders, this delivers final and risk-free settlement. 8 As set out in Carney, M. (2018), “New Economy, New Finance, New Bank”, Mansion House Speech 2018, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2018/new-economy-new-finance-new-bank-speech-by-mark-carney.pdf.
The structure and condition of the financial system at any given time is determined by historical factors, economic and market conditions, the regulatory environment, technology, and culture and ethics. The Central Bank and the regulatory environment are also part of the financial system. The public sector can affect developments in the financial system through the regulatory framework, through transactions with the system – not least through the Central Bank – and by affecting culture and ethics. At present, the system is shaped by the financial crisis and the responses to it, including the capital controls. It is a relatively homogeneous system dominated by three domestic-oriented banks with similar business models and risk profiles. The capital controls, implementation of international regulations, and more stringent Icelandic regulations on foreign exchange risk all affect the banks. The capital controls will be lifted, but much of the regulatory environment will remain. Risk in the financial system has diminished markedly in recent years as resilience has grown, which can be seen in capital adequacy and funding; furthermore, liquidity relative to the scope of operations is much greater than before the crisis. The three largest commercial banks’ combined capital amounted to 669 b.kr. at the end of 2015. The banks’ equity ratios have risen by nearly a third since 2010, from 21% to 28%. In real terms, their equity has increased by 180 b.kr. over this period. Furthermore, the banks’ foreign exchange imbalances have been reduced, and the regulatory framework prevents excessive risk-taking in foreign currencies.

These developments and the banking crisis contributed to the currency crisis that struck in the first half of 2008. The Bank’s two publications on post-capital controls monetary policy and prudential rules have stood the test of time, as many of the proposals in them have already been implemented. We now intervene in the foreign exchange market with the aim of smoothing out fluctuations due to temporary capital flows and mitigating short-term exchange rate volatility. We no longer have a free-floating currency, but a managed float. We have adopted prudential rules that severely limit the banking system’s ability to take risk in foreign currencies. We have established a Financial Stability Council and a Systemic Risk Committee in order to monitor financial system risk more effectively than we did previously, and we are developing prudential rules and macroprudential tools to respond to systemic risk. This will also support monetary policy. One important step remains, however: to develop policy instruments that can be applied so as to curtail carry trade-related capital inflows when such inflows interfere significantly with the transmission of monetary policy along the interest rate channel, as was the case last summer and autumn. Analysis of the options available has been underway in the recent term, but these mainly involve a tax or a special reserve requirement. In both instances, statutory amendments would be necessary.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Developing effective leaders in Asia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of the Iclif’s Asian Leadership Index, Kuala Lumpur, 1 April 2014. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to welcome you here this morning for the launch of Iclif’s Asian Leadership Index. The Asian Leadership Index, is part of an important stream of global research on the expectations on leaders in today’s world. The world is rapidly changing, and is becoming more challenging. Effective leaders must act in full recognition of the fact that their best followers will demand more of them. This is because in many cases their expectations of leaders have shifted in an age where information flows have intensified and where travel has removed all our known boundaries. The Asian Leadership Index is a substantive, broad-based research on Asia. The focus on Asia is because the region is becoming increasingly more significant in the global landscape. And yet, there exists little, if any, systematic study of leaders doing business in Asia.

This type of experiences is precisely the one that makes us be very cautious when confronted with massive capital inflows, because a reversal could trigger drastic output adjustments. Later on, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Latin America was again the recipient of substantial capital inflows, which has been thoroughly analyzed in Calvo et al. (1993, 1994). At that time there was also an increase in the current account deficit. Today, considering the forecasts for 2010–2011 contained in the WEO of April 2010, no net inflows are expected for regions as a whole, but what is expected is a reduction in the current account surpluses of emerging economies. Although this scenario has not evidently materialized, it presents risks that have to be considered. Finally, while in the current setting inflows have been offset by similar outflows, we cannot disregard the possibility of sudden gross outflows or sudden stops of gross inflows, generating severe adjustments in the current account with high costs in terms of output. Traditional policy options The first line of defense against massive capital inflows is exchange rate flexibility. Frequently exchange rate rigidities and unsustainable defenses of parities that are away from their fundamental value give way to speculation against the foreign exchange regime. The literature on speculative attacks shows how an exchange rate that is inconsistent with the rest of the policy actions can trigger massive capital outflows that end up forcing its abandonment. The same rationale applies to inflows.
), 2001, ‘Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy: Towards Greater Stability’, HM Treasury, page 10: ‘Although there are many reasons for the UK’s poor inflation record in recent decades, one key factor was poor institutional arrangements. Monetary policy, if set correctly, should be a stabilising force for the economy. However, serious mistakes were made, which often meant that inflation was higher and more volatile than it would otherwise have been. This, in turn, created substantial economic instability that harmed the long-term performance of the UK economy. Many of these policy mistakes were made because the aims and procedures of monetary policy were not properly defined’. 14  For example, Lomax, R., 2004, ‘Stability and statistics’, speech to the North Wales Business Club dinner November 2004, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Winter 2004, vol 44, number 4. 4  BIS Review 46/2006  maintaining stable inflation. But that does not mean that we can always smooth out quarter-to-quarter, or even year-to-year, fluctuations in demand and output to the extent some commentary implies. In terms of the political economy of monetary policy making, it is important for the central banking community to get that across and accepted. If we fail in doing so, and the public believes that central banks can deliver more than is realistic, there will at some point down the road be disappointment, conceivably putting in jeopardy the real achievements of monetary policy in delivering price stability. Of course, these strictures apply most of all to ourselves.

Reflecting the achievements of this university, our models have a well-defined steady state equilibrium for the real economy; well-defined steady state nominal properties, typically an inflation rate; and forward-looking rational expectations, that is to say modelconsistent expectations. The second of these characteristics means that a nominal target is always achieved in the medium-to-long run. And the third means that the model’s agents know that; ie they know now and behave – set wages and prices – accordingly, so that in these mainstream models the target is achieved over cyclical frequencies too. Typically, nominal things enter via inflation expectations, and they are pinned down in the stylised, model economy by a policy rule of the kind I sketched earlier, expressed in terms of an official interest rate (the price of base money). But just in case it were thought that the “problem” of models promising the policymaker success stems from the crime of ignoring money quantities, I should make it clear that that is not so. It would not make a fundamental difference in policymakers’ modern-macro models if nominal stuff entered via a money quantity, with the policy rule being specified as a money-supply growth rate. So-called velocity shocks to the demand for money would cause deviations from an inflation target in the short run, but everything would ultimately settle down nicely – because that assumption would be built in to the model’s long-run properties (in this instance via a demand-formoney equation that was imposed as stable over the long run). I’m exaggerating a bit.
We have already seen positive benefits just from the supervisors working more closely with the Bank over the past couple of years. And last summer, when the Bank and HMT launched the Funding for Lending Scheme (the FLS) it received policy support not just from the MPC, but from the FPC, the FSA and the DMO. I think it may have been a world first for such a wide group of policy acronyms to be working together to implement a single initiative! I should also mention the creation of the Financial Conduct Authority, a new institution formed out of the old Financial Services Authority (and not part of the Bank), which will be responsible for ensuring that relevant markets function well. In doing so, it will aim to advance the protection of consumers, the integrity of the UK financial system and promote effective competition. It will be responsible for the conduct regulation of all financial services firms, and the microprudential regulation of those financial services firms not supervised by the PRA, for example, asset managers, hedge funds, many broker-dealers and independent financial advisers. Developments in the real economy Whereas those institutional arrangements are new and exciting, the economic data have been disappointing for some time, notwithstanding some improvement in the most recent indicators. Since the trough in output in mid-2009, GDP has averaged just 0.3% per quarter.

So we can’t just leave it there. •  That gives UK a massive incentive to achieve good outcomes in international standards for financial regulation. •  So far in this argument, so good – business and the authorities together pointing in the same direction. Ie business will happily live with what I’m calling ‘good’ standards provided they are applied evenly everywhere that matters. •  But two issues remain. First, business is frustrated by the time it takes to reach such international agreements. They want speed. They make the compelling point that they can’t determine their business models and plan their strategies until they know the regime under which they will function. •  The international community finds that hard. Contrast yesterday’s world of a small handful of central bank governors deciding bank-capital standards on their own: a world of G5 or at most G10. Today’s world is G20 plus. And, as capital markets have become more important, securities regulators are rightly also at the table – and finance ministries too given the social and political issues. The result is a big table. (FSB Plenary – c.70). •  By prioritising an international playing-field that is as level as possible and as sound as possible, speed is sacrificed. •  Second issue – some key policy discussions end up being away from home, away from the Westminster Parliament. Mainly global in fact. •  That global process is pretty transparent – consultative papers, speeches and so on.
He argued that shareholder primacy acted as a disciplining device on management. Inefficient management would be reflected in a lower share price, making the company an attractive target for a more efficient competitor. In other words, it was possible to create a market in corporate control which could drive out company inefficiencies. The shareholder-centric model also appeared efficient from a risk allocation perspective. If control rights were placed in the hands of the party shouldering greatest risk – shareholders – this provided the strongest possible incentives to safeguard the fortunes of the company. The shareholder-centric model appeared to be a recipe for higher economic returns at the lowest possible risk. This was an awe-inspiring combination. By the 1980s, corporate success and the level of share prices had, in effect, become synonyms. 13 Corporate governance today The UK Companies Act 2006 can, in some respects, be seen as a natural evolution of this historical trajectory. It arose out of the work of The Company Law Review Steering Group, appointed by the government in 1998. 14 Two fundamental issues arose. First, should the law expect companies to consider responsibilities broader than shareholder maximisation? And second, should the law attribute specific responsibilities to company directors? It concluded that directors’ duties should not be recast to include a wider set of stakeholders. Giving directors pluralist duties risked turning “company directors from business decision makers into moral, political or economic arbiters”.

Philipp Hildebrand: Swiss monetary policy Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Annual Meeting of the IFZ (Institute for Financial Services Zug), Zug, 1 June 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Having successfully pursued a strategy of money supply targets for around 25 years, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) decided to adopt a fundamentally new monetary policy approach in 1999. Although it integrated some of the important elements of inflation targeting, it did so less strictly, thus allowing greater flexibility. Money stocks and credits continued to play a vital role in the new concept. Unlike the European Central Bank, the SNB chose not to make the monetary analysis a separate pillar in its concept. An important distinction to inflation targeting is that monetary policy focuses on maintaining price stability in the medium to long term, while inflation targeting is generally oriented towards short-term and, in some cases, variable inflation targets. The SNB's monetary policy uses an inflation forecast as a central indicator and sets its operational goal in the form of a target range for the three-month Libor. A monetary policy that is geared to the medium and long term affords leeway for a certain degree of stabilisation of the real economy.
See: http://www.fsb.org/2012/06/fsb-report-global-legal-entity-identifier-for-financialmarkets/ 12 For example, in the charity sector, being able to quickly establish the identity of other international organisations, and cross-check with permissions granted under sanctions licenses, should make sure that humanitarian funds go to the correct recipient quickly. Likewise government could have the ability to more closely track contract awards and also make it easier to bring SMEs into tendering processes by establishing an accurate picture of smaller firms and their identities. It will also help financial institutions to improve existing AML checks, by being able to identify the full range of entities involved in the payments chain, which will provide a broader social benefit globally by helping stop fraud and terrorism. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  Because of the benefits the Bank sees in LEIs, our consultation response outlined that we will make them a mandatory feature of transactions between financial institutions in CHAPS. But in order to unlock the LEI’s full potential we need to encourage the adoption of LEIs amongst all those who use payment messages, not just within the financial services industry, but in all sectors of the economy, including corporates. The opportunity of the infrastructure upgrade as part of RTGS Renewal, and similar opportunities in future, could provide the appropriate levers to encourage this broader take up of LEIs - to maximise the benefits of this public good.

21 Second, MAS is studying whether existing incentives for funds and fund managers, which have been successful in attracting traditional asset managers to set up in Singapore and to grow over time, are suitable to anchor VC funds and VC fund managers here too. We recognise that VC funds and fund managers are typically smaller in size and headcount than traditional asset managers. But they contribute in a different way, by supporting entrepreneurship and innovation in Singapore and the region. We will take this into account in assessing the requirements for VC funds and fund managers to qualify for our incentives. Conclusion 22 Innovation will drive Singapore’s economic future. It will disrupt existing business models, but it is how consumers get better value, how new firms can scale up and grow internationally, and how we create quality jobs for our people. 23 This innovation village is part of this ongoing journey. It will, I am sure, nurture a new generation of technology entrepreneurs in the FinTech space. I congratulate Marvelstone once again for the successful launch of LATTICE80. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. As regards fiscal policies, many euro area governments are faced with high and sharply rising fiscal imbalances. If not addressed by a clear and credible exit strategy, this could seriously risk undermining public confidence in the sustainability of public finances and the economic recovery. The very large government borrowing requirements carry the risk of triggering rapid changes in market sentiment, leading to less favourable medium and longterm interest rates. This in turn would dampen private investment and thereby weaken the foundations for a return to sustained growth. Moreover, high public deficits and debts may complicate the task of the single monetary policy to maintain price stability. The Governing Council therefore calls upon governments to communicate and implement in a timely fashion ambitious fiscal exit and consolidation strategies based on realistic growth assumptions, with a strong focus on expenditure reforms. Tax cuts should only be considered over the medium term, when countries have regained sufficient room for budgetary manoeuvre. In this regard, the recent ECOFIN Council conclusions, which call for consolidation to start in 2011 at the latest and to go well beyond the structural benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per annum, represent the minimum requirement for all euro area countries. The success of fiscal adjustment strategies will also depend crucially on the transparency of the budgetary procedures and the reliability and completeness of government finance statistics.

Furthermore, increases in indirect taxation and administered prices may be stronger than currently expected owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years. Turning to the monetary analysis, the annual growth rates of M3 and loans to the private sector declined further in September, to 1.8% and -0.3% respectively. These concurrent declines support the assessment of a moderate underlying pace of monetary expansion and low inflationary pressures over the medium term. In the next few months, the annual growth rates of monetary aggregates will most likely be affected downwards by base effects that are associated with the intensification of the financial turmoil one year ago. More fundamentally, however, the growth of M1 and M3 continues to reflect the current constellation of interest rates. While the narrow spread between the rates on different short-term deposits fosters shifts in the allocation of funds to the most liquid assets contained in M1, the steep slope of the yield curve also encourages such shifts from M3 to longer-term deposits and securities outside M3. The annual growth rate of bank loans to the non-financial private sector turned slightly negative in September, with annual loan growth to both non-financial corporations and households declining further and being negative. At the same time, the monthly flows of loans to households remained positive and even increased, while those of loans to nonfinancial corporations were negative. In the case of households, the latest data provide further confirmation of a levelling-off at low rates.