As this discussion illustrates, the literal-but-symmetric interpretation of the MINIMAX approach to robust monetary policy would imply very ‘activist’ policy responses in the face of uncertainty. In this framework, from having their foot to the floor with the monetary accelerator, policymakers might have to switch in short order to stamping on the monetary brake. Unsurprisingly, on my reading, that characterisation also finds little sympathy in policymaking circles. In the interests of avoiding tail outcomes, such activism threatens to induce volatility into monetary policy, financial markets, the economy and inflation in other circumstances, which is both costly and hard to communicate. But the research on monetary policy and uncertainty as a whole has influenced the discussion and conduct of policy in practice. I would pick out a number of lessons that have been drawn.  The magnitude and evolution of uncertainty and risk can, do and should influence monetary policy decisions.  Not all uncertainty is the same. The way uncertainty influences monetary policy decisions depends on the circumstances and the nature of the uncertainty – its source, its persistence, its magnitude – that is being faced  Monetary policy should not be paralysed in the face of uncertainty. If policymakers were to wait until all uncertainty is resolved before taking decisions, they would wait forever.  At the same time, there is no general rule that says policy responses should either be attenuated or more activist in the face of uncertainty.

But corporate governance rose to prominence only in the last two decades, starting with the UK’s Cadbury Report in 1992. Since then, there has been a continuous stream of reforms in the UK to strengthen corporate governance, culminating in the UK Corporate Governance Code, which operates on a “comply or explain” principle. Corporate governance reforms in the US took a slightly different trajectory, leading to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Unlike the UK Code, Sarbanes-Oxley is enshrined in legislation and compliance is mandatory. 5. In Singapore, our corporate governance journey began in 2001, with the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance. Since then, the Code has undergone two reviews to take into account changes in our corporate landscape as well as international developments. The most recent review was conducted by the private sector led Corporate Governance Council in 2010. MAS accepted all of the recommendations of the Council, with minor modifications, and issued a revised Code of Corporate Governance earlier this year. Key changes to the Code focused on strengthening Board independence, enhancing remuneration practices and disclosures, clarifying the Board’s responsibility in risk governance, and providing further guidance on companies’ engagement with shareholders. Going beyond the rules 6. Rules on corporate governance – mandatory or otherwise – have been considerably enhanced in most major jurisdictions. Yet, rules alone cannot assure us of high standards of practice. The recent financial crisis has exposed significant shortcomings in the governance of companies. We have seen monumental failures in risk management, a spate of accounting scandals and outright fraud.