samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We want debt investors to be able to price risk effectively by being clear about where they rank in the creditor hierarchy and to give them confidence that we can stick to the hierarchy in applying losses and that we will not be picking winners and losers within a class. Counting as MREL senior debt issued out of operating companies without subordination looks like a recipe for undermining that confidence. (b) Bail-in execution We also want to be clear as a resolution authority how we will conduct the resolution in a way that preserves value and distributes it fairly, ensuring no creditor worse off protections are met. To that end, we have thought hard about the valuation capabilities we need firms to have so that we can value losses and recapitalisation needs in an effective and timely way. We have just consulted on a set of principle level 12  requirements and expect to finalise policy in this space in the next few months. We believe that the bail-in valuation for a large cross-border firm is not something that can be fixed over a weekend. Valuation on that timetable will inevitably tend to overshoot on the estimation of losses, not least because a significant driver of the valuation will be the reorganisation that follows the bail-in and the restructuring costs and disposal valuations associated with that.

It is no exaggeration to say that the world count on the leadership of the OECD in many fronts such as those that we are going to discuss today: financial inclusion, capital flows, migration, among others. This is the fifth edition of this Conference organised by IEMed, with the support of the Banco de España, to discuss economic and financial matters in the Mediterranean region. The first and third editions took place in Barcelona, in 2014 and 2017, the second in Rabat in 2015 and the fourth in Tunisia in 2018, on those occasions with the support and hospitality of Bank Al-Maghrib and the Central Bank of Tunisia. Past editions of this conference had provided useful exchanges of ideas between different actors with interests in the economic and financial developments in this region. I firmly believe that forums like this are particularly relevant to shape public policy in times of change as those we are witnessing today. The deep-rooted transformations in economic and financial relations globally force us to re-think the design of economic policies in order to better contribute to the progress of our society. In particular, these forums are instrumental for central banks in its role of providing guidance for economic policies that are not in their mandates. Let me add that in order to exert this role of assessing public policies, central banks need to be granted with political and operational independence, in order to provide recommendations free from political pressure or vested interests.
Recent economic data are consistent with a positive underlying momentum of economic activity, while uncertainty remains elevated. Our monetary analysis indicates that inflationary pressures over the medium term should remain contained. Overall, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. Inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations is of the essence. Overall, the current monetary policy stance remains accommodative. The stance, the provision of liquidity and the allotment modes will be adjusted as appropriate, taking into account the fact that all the non-standard measures taken during the period of acute financial market tensions are, by construction, temporary in nature. Accordingly, the Governing Council will continue to monitor all developments over the period ahead very closely. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Following the 0.3% quarter-on-quarter increase in euro area real GDP in the third quarter of 2010, recent statistical releases and survey-based evidence confirm that the positive underlying momentum of economic activity in the euro area remained in place towards the end of 2010. Looking ahead at 2011, euro area exports should benefit from a continued recovery in the world economy.

In a well-functioning financial system, there is a stable relationship between changes to central bank rates and the cost of bank loans to firms and households. This allows central banks to influence overall economic conditions and maintain price stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But the euro area financial system has become increasingly disturbed. There has been a severe fragmentation in the single financial market. Bank funding costs have diverged significantly across countries. The euro area interbank market has been effectively closed to a large number of banks and some countries’ entire banking systems. Interest rates on government bonds in some countries have risen steeply, hurting the funding costs of domestic banks and limiting their access to funding markets. This has been a key factor why banks have passed on interest rates very differently to firms and households across the euro area. Interest rates do not have to be identical across the euro area, but it is unacceptable if major differences arise from broken capital markets or the perception of a euro area break-up. The fragmentation of the single financial market has led to a fragmentation of the single monetary policy. And in an economy like the euro area where about three quarters of firms’ financing comes from banks, this has very severe consequences for the real economy, investment and employment. It meant that countries in economic difficulties could not benefit from our low interest rates and return to health. Instead, they were experiencing a vicious circle. Economic growth was falling.
This is to enhance market access and business networking, and also to widen the customer base and to generate new sources of businesses in uncharted territories;  •  fifth, liberalising the foreign exchange administration rules to allow multilateral development banks and multinational corporations to issue ringgit denominated instruments in our domestic bond market. In further liberalising the market, I am pleased to announce that resident and foreign issuers will now be able to raise foreign currency-denominated bonds, in particular, Islamic bonds, in the Malaysian capital market. The foreign issuers eligible to take this opportunity are the sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, multilateral development banks, multilateral financial institutions and multinational corporations, while resident issuers are the local MNCs. This represents part of Bank Negara Malaysia's continuous efforts to promote the development of the Malaysian bond market, and to enhance Malaysia as a centre of origination, distribution and trading of sukuks. The issuance of foreign currency denominated bonds will also provide additional flexibility for both residents and foreign investors to diversify their investments into non-ringgit investments in Malaysia . In taking the MIFC initiative to the next phase of development, I am also pleased to share with you some of the current work-in-progress to this agenda further forward. The International Islamic Bank (IIB) and International Takaful Operator (ITO) will be allowed to be set up as a branch in addition to a subsidiary as currently stipulated under the domestic banking and takaful legislation.

Svein Gjedrem: Ten years of inflation targeting strategy in Poland compared with the experience of other countries Presentation by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference "20 years after the collapse of the socialist economy. Transformation, economic growth and convergence in Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries ", National Bank of Poland, Warsaw, 5 June 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to speak at your conference. It is a pleasure for me to be here in Warsaw on this occasion. Norges Bank was given an inflation targeting mandate in 2001. Inflation expectations have been well anchored around the 2.5 per cent target rate in recent years. We practice flexible inflation targeting. The credibility of our inflation target has enabled monetary policy to support a stable economic growth path. However, like other countries, Norway was hit by the international economic downturn that followed the financial crisis. The estimated growth rate for 2009 is minus one percent. Preceding the downturn, we went through a long period of low CPI inflation. Headline CPI in Norway is strongly affected by fluctuating energy prices. An inflation measure that instead includes trend energy prices, CPIXE, illustrates how the inflation rate gradually has been approaching our target of 2.5 per cent. In this – until the fall of 2008 – rather benign macroeconomic environment, rising property prices, high credit growth and a low saving ratio posed a policy challenge – as in many countries.
The path for domestic and external interest rate does not imply any considerable changes in the krone exchange rate. Moreover, the Executive Board pointed out that the objective of bringing inflation back towards the target and anchoring inflation expectations implies a continued expansionary monetary policy. It is likely that continued high growth in output and employment will result in a gradual pick-up in inflation. The interest rate will therefore be set so that monetary policy gradually becomes less expansionary. Projections are uncertain. The uncertainty surrounding the interest rate forecasts is illustrated in the fan chart and indicates that monetary policy reacts to disturbances to the economy. This contributes to increasing the uncertainty surrounding future interest rates, but at the same time contributes to stabilising economic developments. Monetary policy cannot fine-tune economic developments, but it can prevent the largest effects from occurring when the economy is exposed to disturbances. In some situations, it may be appropriate to hedge against particularly unfavourable developments. In the baseline scenario, the interest rate is gradually raised to a more normal level. Norges Bank continuously assesses the effects of interest rate changes and other new information concerning economic developments. Thank you for your attention.

The earlier spike in inflation largely reflects the effects of the rapid reopening of the economy, which pushed supply and demand in extreme ways. In fact, we are now seeing some of the pandemic-related spikes retrace, including prices for lumber, used vehicles, and rental cars. This process of adjustment may take another year or so to complete as the pandemic-related swings in supply and demand gradually recede. As the economy gets through these highly unusual dynamics, I expect inflation to come back down to around 2 percent next year. One reason I expect inflation to moderate is that measures of underlying inflation and longer-term inflation expectations have been relatively stable during this period of otherwise volatile inflation readings. There are two important aspects of longer-term inflation expectations: their level and their sensitivity to economic conditions and, in particular, to inflation. In terms of the level of inflation expectations, survey- and market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have reversed the declines of the past several years and are now around levels seen seven or eight years ago. They currently appear to be well aligned with our 2 percent long-run inflation goal. A second issue is how well anchored inflation expectations truly are, and whether there is a risk that they could drift higher in response to the elevated rates of inflation we have been experiencing. A group of economists at the New York Fed took a closer look at recent behavior of 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  inflation expectations from the Survey of Consumer Expectations.
The Albanian banking sector bore a considerable part of the financial bill of the pandemic and provided a continuous financial support to enterprises and households. In addition, the banking system carried out its function without jeopardising the main parameters of its financial soundness: the level of liquidity; profitability and capitalisation. Nowadays, the public considers our banking system a safe destination to hold their savings; enterprises find a source of funds, services and consultancy, while the economy finds a promoter of development and absorber of shocks. In parallel with these main directions, the Bank of Albania has worked and has achieved successful results in other fields as well, among which I find it appropriate to highlight: The payment system, which is already operating within a legal and regulatory framework in full compliance with the EU standards and with a payment infrastructure in an ongoing modernisation process. Here, I mention the approval of the new Law on the Payment System, which transposes the relevant directive of the European Union and paves the way for increasing the number of actors and strengthening the market effectiveness. Also, in 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  January 2022, the Bank of Albania has started operating the complete infrastructure for the processing and settlement of euro denominated payments within Albania. This development will result in lower costs and considerable reduction of the time for the realisation of payments, with a considerable benefit to both the Albanian enterprises and households.

In my view, this process should be supported through: the regulatory approach to in-formalised activities; completion of the financial infrastructure which reduces costs on formal activities; and coordinated initiatives with the public sector. The Bank of Albania should pay a crucial role in the financial education field, in compiling and implementing the national strategies and promoting the increase of financial literacy in Albania. This should be considered vital to the long-term growth of the society’s welfare. In addition, the Bank of Albania will continue the work to increasing financial inclusion of the population. Modernisation of the payment system and the increased level of electronic payment is already a starting point of this process, next the utilizing of this opportunity for providing access to both payment and financial services which in turn affect they economic development of the country. Meanwhile, being aware on the role and importance of structural reforms, the Bank of Albania will continue to contribute – through advises and attention on public interest – in their progress. I believe that these reforms will boost productivity, unlock growth potential and build on the premises for a rather fair distribution of their results to the society. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The forth priority is the support to European integration. Even though the opening and speed of this process will depend, on a large extent by our European partners, our task as an Albanian authority is to proceed with neither delay nor hesitation.
The Mork commission submitted its recommendation to the Ministry of Finance in October. In February, Norges Bank was requested to assess whether the relationship between expected return and risk for equities and bonds has changed, and whether there is reason to adjust the equity share in the fund’s benchmark index. Norges Bank submitted its advice to the Ministry of Finance today, recommending an increase in the equity share to 75 percent. Chart: Covers of four Discussion Notes Norges Bank’s advice and my remarks today are based on a set of analyses conducted by Norges Bank. These analyses have been published in the form of four Discussion Notes.1  EXPECTED RETURN Let’s start by taking a closer look at expected bond returns. After several years of high bond returns owing to the fall in global interest rates, there are strong indications that returns will be low ahead. Chart: Yield and future returns Empirical studies show that current bond yields provide a good estimate of the nominal return on a broad bond portfolio over the next five to ten years. This is illustrated in the chart, which shows a close correlation between the return on US government bonds and the level of yields six years previously. Chart: Yields on US inflation-linked bonds It is the real return that is of relevance for the fund. For a bond portfolio of high credit quality, the expected real return can be estimated from the yield on inflation-linked bonds.

But now that the fence is up, we need it to do its job. It is of course a twenty-first century, modern fence – not a medieval stone wall, and as part of this it was electrified by Parliament in order to discourage attempts to  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  climb over it: the legislation empowers the PRA to use a group restructuring tool to require a banking group to sell its ring-fenced bank or other parts of its group. Hopefully the prospect of electrocution will discourage any blatant attempts to climb over the fence. But there is still perhaps the possibility of wicked burrowing under the fence, passing things through it or even perhaps using a drone to create mischief. We are therefore setting up a border patrol of PRA staff who will police the fence. The patrol will ensure there is compliance with restrictions on activities performed by the ring-fenced entities and independence from the rest of the group. In particular, we will closely monitor governance arrangements, seeking evidence that ring-fenced banks can identify conflicts of interest and are able to make decisions on their own. We will set capital and liquidity for the ring-fenced banks, and more generally keep an eye on the risks they face. Let me move to my second example: accountability. As with the ring-fence, we and firms have gone to great lengths to bring in the Senior Managers Regime here in the UK.
0 1998 2000 02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  Sources for both charts: Bank of International Settlements  What do these actions have in common? What guides the choice of macroprudential policy tools and their calibration? Is there a unifying framework that articulates success for macroprudential policy? There are several reasons why defining a unifying framework for macroprudential policy is more complex than for monetary policy. First, the gravitational pull of monetary policy is greater because its performance is easier to monitor. But whereas the objective of monetary policy—price stability—is readily and frequently observed, the objective of macroprudential policy—financial stability—is most easily defined in its absence. Financial stability is the opposite of the financial instability of bust, crises and panics.6 Second, macroprudential policymakers deploy a large number of very different tools in order to address a wide range of systemic risks. 5 See ‘True Finance – Ten years after the financial crisis’, speech by Mark Carney given at the Economic Club of New  York, 19 October 2018. 6 While most definitions of financial stability are based on its absence, a positive definition of financial stability would be the sustainable provision of financial services, and confidence in the financial system to withstand future shocks without major disruption to those services, where these are integral to the real economy’s pursuit of strong and sustainable economic growth.

Being a senior manager in finance now brings the responsibility and accountability that befits what the best in the industry have long recognised: finance is a true profession. The Bank of England’s role in markets has been comprehensively overhauled. We’re replacing constructive ambiguity with open for business when we provide liquidity to markets. We’re working with others as One Bank to develop markets that support financial stability and the real economy. We’ve revamped our governance and we’re holding ourselves to the highest standards of accountability, including the Senior Managers Regime on top of parliamentary and public scrutiny. So a huge amount has already been completed to make markets fairer, more resilient, accountable and effective. These reforms are essential for the UK to remain the leading international financial centre. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  They are essential not least because the size of the UK-based market-based financial system could increase from six to nearly 15 times UK GDP by 2050. But the journey isn’t finished. Today is a chance to take stock and reflect: not just on our achievements but on what we might have missed, overdone, or simply got wrong. Given the complexity and scale of financial reform, it would be remarkable if every measure were perfectly constructed. Or if they all fit seamlessly into a totally coherent, self-reinforcing whole. Authorities must have the courage to listen, the honesty to admit our mistakes and the confidence to set them right.
Brunnermeier et al (2009) use this framework to motivate levying a tax – a “Pigouvian tax” – on institutions posing systemic risk externalities. This tax would be set at levels which offset the effects of the bank’s actions on wider society. A number of academics have since proposed measures along broadly Pigouvian lines (Archarya et al (2010)). Rather remarkably, policy reforms in practice have followed closely in the spirit of these proposals. In 2010, the FSB announced its intention to introduce a “systemic surcharge” of additional capital on the world’s largest banks. In July 2011, the Basel Committee published a methodology for measuring systemic importance based on indicators of bank size, connectivity and complexity, with additional capital of up to 2.5% depending on this score. In November 2011, the FSB endorsed this methodology and announced the 29 systemicallyimportant entities to which it would apply. This framework will be finalised this year, before being phased-in from 2016. Legislation is already in place, or is being drawn up, to implement the systemic surcharge in the United States and Europe. These proposals are clearly a practical step in the right direction. By boosting levels of capital in the system, the probability of big bank failure will be reduced. You would have got good odds back in 2007 that something as seemingly elliptical as a Pigouvian tax on systemic risk would have found its way onto the regulatory statute books. Now we have it. “We are all Pigouvians now”, even if most of us cannot spell it.

Whether they do so in practice depends on loopholes in, or omissions from, the ring-fence. And each of the existing proposals has open questions on this front. For example, the Volcker rule separates only a fairly limited range of potentially risky investment bank activities, in the form of proprietary trading. The Vickers proposals mandate only a limited range of basic banking activities to lie within the ring-fence, namely deposittaking and overdrafts. And the Liikanen plans allow a wide range of derivative activity to lie outside of the investment banking ring-fence. It could be argued that these loopholes are modest. But as the history of the Glass-Steagall Act demonstrates, today’s loophole can become tomorrow’s bolthole, today’s ring-fence tomorrow’s string vest. At a minimum, this suggests the need for full and faithful implementation of the spirit as well as the letter of the Volcker, Vickers and Liikanen plans if risk cross-contamination is to be avoided A larger question-mark still hangs over whether these proposals will lead to a sea-change in the allocation of resource to retail and investment banking. The cultures of investment and retail banking are quite distinct. Retail banking relies on forming long-term relationships, while investment banking is inherently shorter-term and transactional. Housing these subcultures under one roof makes achieving the necessary separation of cultures and capital a significant operational headache. At a minimum, such a separation of culture and capital is likely to require entirely separate governance, risk and balance sheet management on either side of the ring fence.