samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Under such circumstances, the central bank’s unambiguous commitment to attaining its objectives is an indispensable anchor. A credible central bank with a clear commitment to price stability can, and must, provide such a haven of trust and confidence within the complex and uncertain web of interrelations in a modern economy. This is precisely what the ECB is seeking to do. Our track record over the past, almost six, years shows that we have been rather successful. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 66/2004  7

Equity financing is a key driver of innovation: it is better suited to the uncertainty and offers long-term returns associated with innovative projects. The euro area is seriously lagging behind in this respect: equity only accounts for 80% of GDP, compared with 122% in the United States. Integrated capital markets also require effective supervision. Here again, milestones have been reached thanks to the outcome of the recent review of ESAs towards enhancing their role. Concerning the supervision of financial markets, ESMA will as a first step contribute to furthering convergence of supervisory practices. Yet in the longer run, the scope of its direct supervisory powers should be expanded starting with the supervision of wholesale markets. Regarding the insurance sector, a particular attention was paid to strengthening the supervision of cross-border activities through EIOPA. I welcome also the enhanced EBA role on AML-CFT issues, an area where progress in the European framework is absolutely needed. Finally, the Capital Markets Union needs robust market infrastructure. Thanks to EMIR II, Europe has given itself powers – via ESMA – to directly supervise third country CCPs which have a systemic footprint vis-à-vis the EU. This being said, EMIR II is not the end of our journey. Much more needs to be done regarding either the role of the ECB or ESMA’s prerogatives over EU CCPs.
There then remains only 1 per cent of the debt of 170 per cent, that is, the net debt service required in the long run to keep the debt ratio constant is only 1.7 per cent of disposable income.16 With this reasoning, a debt ratio of 170 per cent is sustainable with a considerable margin. Figure 3 Capital over assets for households, some large listed companies and Swedish banks Per cent 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0  Sources: Dagens Industri (capital/assets 2011 for listed companies and Swedish banks) and the Riksbank (household net wealth/assets). surplus of disposable income in a “left-to-live-on” analysis – which is described in footnote 17 – is around 58 per cent. The current value of this surplus is then around 1 000 per cent of disposable income. When these figures are compared with a debt of 170 per cent and added to real and financial assets of 510 per cent, households’ leverage ratio and debt-servicing ability undoubtedly appear to be pretty good. 15  Isaksen, Lassenius Kramp, Funch Sørensen and Vester Sørensen (2011). 16  A high mortgage rate after tax could be 5 per cent. A long-run level for the repo rate of 4 per cent plus an historically-high spread of 3 percentage points gives a mortgage rate before tax of 7 per cent and after tax of approximately 5 per cent ((1-0.3)x7=4.9).

One of our colleagues did not meet these high standards recently. Our newly appointed Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking, Charlotte Hogg had previously not disclosed a relevant family relationship, as was required under our staff Code of Conduct. For those who have questioned whether we “get it”, we do. We know this honest mistake was also a serious mistake – one that was compounded by the fact that Charlotte Hogg had overseen the development of our new Code. We were clear upfront that there must be consequences for both her and the Bank. Our minimum response would obviously be what we would expect to see in the firms that we supervise. Let’s be absolutely clear about this baseline. In analogous situations in the private sector, we expect:   Evidence that the firm is taking the matter seriously;    Proportionate consequences for the individual, including some form of disciplinary warning and possibly some impact on remuneration; and    A wider review of lessons learned if there was any evidence that there was a systemic problem. 9  See page 16, Financial Reporting Council (FRC), “Corporate Culture and the Role of Boards: Report of observations”, July 2016. See Footnote 7 for details. With appropriate modifications to reflect the fact that it has a very different range of functions to a commercial bank and is accountable to a different range of stakeholders, including Parliament.
As you are aware, the comment period for the third consultative paper (CP3) closed at the end of July. If you have seen the “comments on CP3” page of the BIS website, you will not be surprised to hear that we have received over 200 responses. I must admit that this is more than we had expected, even if it is below the 250 responses we received on the second consultative document two years ago. Obviously, not all of the comments are mutually compatible, nor would it be feasible to incorporate them all. However, there are some substantive issues which have been raised, and I will mention some of these briefly in a moment. But just let me say first that the Committee is taking the comments very seriously and working extremely hard to resolve the issues that have been raised. What is most important to the Committee is the quality and consistency of the new Accord, and we are clear that this cannot be unnecessarily constrained by deadlines and timetables. Michelangelo once said that, having seen an angel in a block of marble, he carved until he set it free. From most of the letters of comment received by the Committee this summer, it seems that the industry sees an angel in the proposals and wants to carve away at the text until it’s been set free.

I should also stress that no formal decisions have yet been taken in this respect. As you probably know, the Committee will meet next month for the first time since the comment period closed. I can assure you that we will continue to do our utmost to ensure that you - the industry - can take advantage of the benefits of the new Accord at the earliest possible opportunity. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 42/2003  5
Advocates of the secular stagnation hypothesis argue that this is a result of underinvestment in capital; others point to declining business dynamism, excessive household debt that leads to the misallocation of resources, and some attribute it to measurement errors given the expansion of the digital economy. And then, there are those who question the productivityenhancing-value of recent technological innovations. What is the value of an Apple Watch as compared to the invention of the internet? It is indeed a challenge to comprehend this rapidly changing complex system that we operate in, let alone diagnose it. We need to humbly recognise the boundaries of our understanding for now, but at the same time relentlessly expand the frontier of thinking and conduct robust deliberation on the implication for public policy formulations. The last paradox, one that is familiar to many policymakers, a disquieting calmness. In the financial markets, the VIX – a standard indicator to measure volatility in the global financial markets – is at its lowest in the last two years. In fact, it is close to the all-time low of below 10, last seen just before the global financial crisis. Yet, a quick scan of financial news would reveal significant uncertainty in the global economy, amid an ongoing series of policy adjustments in major economies, volatile commodity price movements and geopolitical tensions. To a large extent, this paradox is an outcome of the combined policy efforts by central banks and governments worldwide to maintain stability since the global financial crisis.

During my brief remarks this morning, I’d like to highlight three related topics that I believe are relevant to you as community bankers: the critical role that community banks play in the U.S. economy, particularly at the local level; trends in small business lending; and recent efforts to enhance the efficiency of the regulatory and supervisory framework. My comments today are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The critical role of community banks Let me begin with some thoughts on what we seek to achieve through supervision. A core objective for safety and soundness supervision is to ensure that supervised entities are resilient. That is, a firm should be able to continue to operate and provide financial services across a wide range of economic and financial conditions. Supervisors and regulators can support this objective through our focus on stronger capital and liquidity, comprehensive risk management and robust governance and controls. All of this makes firms resilient to unexpected shocks and allows them to continue to serve their customers and communities. Resilience, however, is not the end objective. Rather, we seek to ensure that banks of all sizes contribute to the sustained and efficient provision of credit and other financial services to consumers and businesses that support the growth and stability of the economy. Community banks play a distinctive role in the provision of financial services, offering a wide range of products and serving specific segments.
This prevention is geared to establishing instruments whose effects are as broad-based as possible, in other words, instruments that are independent of the specific causes that lead to crises. One general pattern in financial crises is that market and investor confidence plays a central role. 2 In general, when a bubble is being formed, soaring price trends are initially explained in “rational” terms. In the recent crisis, for instance, developments in the US housing markets were, for a long time, regarded as a logical and unproblematic consequence of state support measures or of innovation in the form of new financial products, as well as the constant inflow of capital from Asia. 3 However, when the first symptoms of a crisis become evident, the focus moves directly to other aspects. Which market participants are exposed? How heavily are they exposed? How can one’s own assets be safeguarded in the best possible way? The irrational optimism of the previous period is followed by a rapid loss of confidence and then by a flight to security. A broad-based loss of confidence of this kind can sometimes result in serious liquidity problems, even for fundamentally well-backed banks, thereby triggering far-reaching second-round effects. 4  2  Cf. Akerlof/Shiller (2008): Animal Spirits. 3  Cf. Reinhard/Rogoff (2008): Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison. 4  Cf. Acharya et al (2009): Manufacturing Tail Risk. A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.

The developments in the EUR/CHF exchange rate depend on the foreign currency demand and supply between the euro area and Switzerland, Romania having no influence on its quotation. The EUR/RON exchange rate is relatively stable and it reflects the favourable performance of fundamentals. The recent depreciation of the RON against the CHF is therefore entirely attributable to the appreciation of the CHF versus the EUR, USD and other currencies, as a result of the Swiss National Bank removing the 1.2 floor, following the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing decision. The NBR’s intervention to bring the CHF/RON exchange rate back to the 14 January 2015 level is not possible, as the international arbitrage does not allow that only the CHF/RON exchange rate be influenced, while keeping unchanged the exchange rates of the leu versus the other currencies. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In order to reverse the impact on the CHF/RON exchange rate following the Swiss National Bank’s decision, the leu would have to appreciate versus the euro to approximately RON 3.7 per euro. This EUR/RON exchange rate level could be maintained only temporarily, as pushing the EUR/RON exchange rate down to a level much lower than that perceived by the market to be correct would require considerable foreign currency sales (amounting to EUR billions) not only for achieving this objective, but also for enabling the systematic interventions necessary for subsequently maintaining this exchange rate. This intervention by the NBR would have short-term effects and significant economic consequences.
However, we expect growth rates in China and India – the most important countries in emerging Asia in economic terms – to remain below potential in the near term, due to prior monetary policy tightening, high inflation, and sluggish external demand. Looking at the US, recent data suggest that the situation has improved slightly. However, this should not hide the fact that economic growth in the US is likely to remain sluggish. As you may know, unemployment is still high and the fiscal environment remains contractionary. For the euro area – Switzerland’s most important trading partner by far – the economic outlook has deteriorated since last autumn. Uncertainty  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  about an escalation of the sovereign debt crisis is undiminished. As a result, the euro area is likely to face a mild recession in early 2012. This short overview shows quite plainly: we still live in a world with substantial downside risks. Thus, the global economic situation might turn out to be worse than described above. One possible risk is a more pronounced slowdown in emerging market growth. This would reinforce the downturn in European countries. Another risk is that fiscal consolidation in the US may exert a greater drag on growth than projected today. But the main risk is – without doubt – a further escalation of the European debt crisis. Were such a risk to materialize, the consequences for the international financial and banking system – and in turn for global activity – would be severe.

Swiss economic outlook What does the economic outlook for Switzerland look like, given a baseline scenario with a world economy on a weak growth path as described above? After two years of fairly robust recovery, we expect the Swiss economy to slow considerably in 2012. The situation remains very challenging for Switzerland. On the one hand, the still very strong Swiss franc is weighing on export performance. Firms are suffering from compressed margins. If the difficult exchange rate situation persists, companies may consider relocating production capacity to other regions. On the other hand, the slowdown in external demand, as expected in our global baseline scenario, will likely weigh on investment spending and labor demand in the quarters to come. Although some recently released indicators point to a slight stabilization, we project the Swiss economy to grow only weakly over the next few quarters. Moreover, as mentioned before, there is a very high degree of uncertainty regarding the global outlook. This is also true for the Swiss economy, which depends particularly on economic conditions in the euro area. If the risk scenario of a further escalation of the debt crisis were to materialize, economic activity in Switzerland would suffer a much more pronounced slowdown than just described. Such a development would lead to a severe risk of deflation. Current Swiss monetary policy Given this highly uncertain outlook, the SNB is – more than ever – committed to enforcing the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination at any time.
On the other hand, in line with my comments above, this objective could be made more symmetric, by clarifying that the degree of tolerance of above-target inflation deviations is the same as for below-target deviations.13 Also, in the current low inflation environment, with interest rates close to their lower bound, the inflation target should take into account the need for a sufficiently large buffer above zero, to provide more scope for conventional interest-rate policy. Irrespective of the final outcome, I am sure that the result of this review will strengthen the effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area and its capacity to achieve its aims in the macroeconomic environment of the coming decade. I should like to conclude with a final reflection on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy going forward. Experience in recent years suggests that appropriate interaction between these policies may decisively contribute to each of them achieving their objectives more efficiently. As I have attempted to emphasise, the ECB’s monetary policy action in response to the economic consequences of the pandemic has been rapid and decisive. Moreover, we are prepared to add further monetary stimulus, if necessary. Fiscal policy action has also been forceful. It is important that this action be maintained during the recovery, in a more focused way, and, if necessary, even increased.

At last week’s 4th ASEAN Informal Summit in Singapore, ASEAN leaders launched an Initiative for ASEAN Integration or “IAI”. It is intended to narrow the divide between the older and newer members of ASEAN and enhance ASEAN’s competitiveness as a region. It is a framework for the more developed ASEAN members to help those members that most need help, and in so doing make ASEAN prosper. To kick it off, Singapore is offering a package of IT training and assistance in human resource development to Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, while China, Japan and South Korea have also offered assistance that falls within IAI’s broad framework. Of course, ASEAN’s future depends as much on external factors as it does on these direct initiatives to promote intra-ASEAN trade and investment, and build up the economic strength of individual members. Our economies are highly dependent on international trade, and it is in our interest to work together actively for a freer, more stable and secure global trading environment. ASEAN therefore needs to support an open, stable multilateral trading system under the WTO, and the early launch of a new round of trade negotiations. Strong multilateral rules are the foundation for world trade, and protection against anarchic bilateral and unilateral trade policies. Small countries could not survive without them; even large economies would be much poorer off in a tit-for-tat environment. Hence ASEAN strongly supported the candidacy of Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi for the Director Generalship of the WTO.
Banks should establish sustainable long-term relationship with the businesses to enhance consultancy and lending, especially with regard to the small and mediumsized enterprises. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusions In conclusion, I would like to highlight that the current economic and financial situation in Albania requires maintaining the financial intermediation rates and addressing non-performing loans with priority. Collaboration with other public authorities has been successful; also, concrete action is expected to be taken on settling outstanding payments to private companies, and approving the proposed legal amendments on collateral execution. Today, the Bank of Albania proposed some additional measures aimed at inducing banks to lend more. These measures, which will be soon reflected in the regulatory framework, have a countercyclical nature and are in general temporary. This element, and the needed control mechanisms that accompany such measures, will encourage banks to respect the obligation to credit prudentially and soundly. Given that, at present, crediting has additional risks, the banks management and shareholders should ensure that these short and medium-term risks are covered by adequate capital. The outcome of these measures would improve if businesses understood and used them properly. To this end, the relationship between businesses and banks should be base only on transparent and professional collaboration. This should be better reflected in the media and transferred to the public. The Bank of Albania will assess the impact of these measures and monitor their implementation on regular basis.

In consultation with other important stakeholders in this  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  process, legal amendments to the Civil Procedures Code and to the Civil Code have been drafted. These amendments aim to accelerate the obligatory collateral execution, avoiding procedural delays caused by bank debtors. More specifically, the proposed amendments address the following: •  Courts do not take measures to secure charges/sues, when the bailiff actions are rejected;  •  Courts do not take measures to secure charges and do not suspend the execution of collateral, when the debtor requests the invalidity of the executive title, arising from a bank credit;  •  Reduction by 50% of the initial price of the immovable property, placing an acceptable average for the debtor and the bank, and making clearer the value (price) of the item with which the second auction begins. We are informed by the Ministry of Justice that these amendments are in process of finalisation and this legal package will be sent for approval to the Council of Ministers and then to the Parliament of Albania. I take this opportunity to iterate the need for these legal proposals to be approved by the Assembly of Albania at an earlier time possible. Improvements in the legal framework and collateral execution practice would provide public authorities with new spaces to boost lending in Albania. 2 – Monetary policy pillar I mentioned earlier that Bank of Albania’s monetary policy has been easing recently, undertaking 6 consecutive key interest rate cuts.