samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The downward slope of the current yield curve signifies a tight monetary policy stance (Chart 6). Additionally, loan interest rates have recorded a notable increase since October (Chart 7). As a consequence, loan growth rate declined to more reasonable levels towards the yearend (Chart 3). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 6. Chart 7. Yield Curve*  Consumer and TL Business Loan Rates*(Percent)  Calculated by the return on bonds quoted on the ISE  *Flow data. **4-week moving average. Bonds and Bills Market using the Extended Nelson-Siegel (ENS) method. Source: CBRT. Source: ISE, CBRT. Overall, the last quarter of 2011 was marked by ongoing tightening in monetary and financial conditions and a pronounced deceleration in loans. 2. Macroeconomic Developments and Main Assumptions  Having climbed to 10.45 percent at end-2011, inflation was significantly above the target. As you all know, the Article 42 of the Central Bank Law stipulates that in the case of a significant breach of the inflation target, we are required to report to the Government and announce to the public the reasons behind the breach of the target and the necessary measures to be taken. I would like to announce that we will publish the Open Letter that will be sent to the Government today on our web-site at 12 a.m. Now, I will touch upon the macroeconomic outlook and our assumptions which constitute the basis for our forecasts.

It limited the extension of bank credit in Singapore dollars to non-residents except for economic activity, and buttressed this with some restrictions on interbank Singapore dollar derivatives, such as currency and interest rate swaps and options, which might have helped financial players to leverage or hedge their positions. This policy made it harder for would be speculators to short the Singapore dollar, and signalled unambiguously our disapproval of such speculation. This framework served us well. That we encountered very few speculative attacks in practice perhaps showed that the policy was effective. The strength and stability of the Singapore dollar instilled confidence and kept inflation low. Price stability provided the foundation for sustained economic growth, which in turn provided the basis for continued strengthening of the Singapore dollar. We benefited immensely from this virtuous cycle. Over the past two decades since 1981, the Singapore dollar has risen steadily by more than 70%, on a trade-weighted basis. Domestic inflation has been among the lowest in the world, averaging 2.0% per annum compared to 6.5% for the OECD countries. In real terms, GDP growth averaged 7.6% a year, while GDP per capita in 2000 was two and a half times the level in 1981. Financial supervision MAS’ second responsibility is oversight of the financial sector. MAS was an integrated supervisor long before this became internationally fashionable. When it was formed in 1971, MAS was responsible for both monetary policy and the supervision of banks.
To sum up, to the extent that the new economy is a reality, its supply-side effects can be expected to make price tendencies somewhat more subdued than otherwise. If the effects are not transitory, they could pave the way for a less tight monetary policy. At the same time, demand is normally affected as well and there is a risk of this getting out of step with the stronger growth. 3. Conditions in Sweden  One approach to the question of whether the new economy could also show up in Sweden involves looking at conditions in Sweden for some of the factors that are generally considered to have played an important role in the United States: the IT revolution, increased competition and the macroeconomic environment. 3.1 One question is how Sweden compares with the United States in terms of the technologies that are considered to drive the process. Although there is a lack of fully comparable statistics, it is hardly controversial to say that IT use in Sweden is high - higher than in many other countries in Europe and possibly much the same as in the United States. The per-capita level of Internet subscriptions is one of the highest in the world, on a par with the United States, and so is the number of PCs per capita. In certain respects Sweden is even ahead of the United States. In per-capita terms, mobile phones are used more in Sweden than in the United States and most other European countries.

Chairperson, in conclusion, I wish to take note of the commendable step that Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited has taken to build its own offices here in Zambia after a long presence in the country. I am hopeful that this initiative will create a more expansive and customer-friendly environment for your customers. I congratulate you for this milestone. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 88/2009
This development has caused some analysts to talk about “the missing deflation”.5 The so-called Phillips curve, which shows the relationship between the rate of inflation and economic activity, appears to have flattened compared with before.6 One possible explanation for this development is that the monetary policy conducted in recent decades around the world – where independent central banks have primarily focussed on attaining low and stable inflation – has gradually succeeded in anchoring inflation and inflation expectations. This has meant that the Phillips curve has stabilised in a situation with low average inflation. It is not entirely clear why this would also have contributed to reducing the slope of the Phillips curve, but we cannot rule out the possibility that if expectations are anchored better, price-setting and wage formation will be less sensitive to changes in economic activity. So, even if a monetary policy aimed at keeping inflation low and stable was perhaps not the main explanation for the Great Moderation, it is possible that it made an enduring impression in the form of a flatter Phillips curve. We cannot know whether this phenomenon is temporary or permanent. But if it is the case that we have had a fundamental change in the way the economy functions, it is also possible that this should lead to the central bank adapting, at least to some extent, the policy it conducts. A flatter Phillips curve implies that inflation has become less sensitive to the domestic demand situation – that it varies less with cyclical phases.

We will discuss with each affected bank individually why it is not fully provisioning for loans which have been non-performing for several years. Only if the results of this structured dialogue do not convince us will we consider Pillar 2 measures. We have followed this path before, for instance with our recommendation on dividend distribution policies and the Asset Quality Review. The addendum to our guidance on non-performing loans explains our methodology and is currently the subject of a public consultation. This consultation will increase transparency for banks, and the public, and it will help to ensure a level playing field. So, while it is ultimately up to the banks to deal with NPLs, we supervisors play a role too. It’s our job to address vulnerabilities in the banking sector. NPLs are probably the single biggest challenge – and of course they are a drag on the entire economy. And while I am convinced that the ECB has led the way with its work on NPLs, we are not the only ones who can and should take action. European finance ministers agreed, in July this year, on an action plan to tackle NPLs. Also, national governments can help to resolve the NPL problem by reforming their legal and judicial systems. In some countries, it can take quite a long time to recover NPLs in court. This is something that can only be addressed at national level by national governments. NPLs are a joint problem, and we need to make a joint effort to resolve it.
Small depositors Given the prospect of mergers and rationalisations, it is natural that many bank customers are apprehensive and worried about how they will be affected. A merger will result in rationalisation of branch and ATM networks, which will inconvenience some customers. But overall, customers should have access to more branches and ATMs after the merger, even though not every existing branch and ATM can necessarily be retained. And because a larger merged bank can operate more efficiently and realise revenue synergies, it should be able to provide better service and greater choice to customers. Of course the bank will have to handle the implementation carefully and sensitively, giving customers adequate notice of changes and helping them to adjust. It is in the bank’s own interest to do this, and I am sure they will make every effort to do it well. Unfortunately this does not mean that as a result of a merger, every bank service will become cheaper or free. This is not possible, not because of mergers, but because of competition. Competition will force banks to watch their bottom lines more closely, and to make each service and product break even. It will become harder for banks to continue cross-subsidising services that they used to provide for free or below cost. That was a luxury that they could only afford in a protected and languid market where profits came easily, a state of affairs which was unsustainable in the long run.

I am very sure that if, as is pretty likely, one of you will be back here in 40 years talking about economic policy challenges, it will be about something that is now hard to imagine. 8  See G20 Leaders' Communique Hangzhou Summit, http://www.g20.org/English/Dynamic/201609/t20160906_3396.html. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  11  I guess that in the end, that is why despite my enduring affection for the Arts, I do not miss my first profession. The challenges of economic policy making are constantly changing; the learning, it seems, never stops. And though one never gets one’s forecast right, the rewards to good policy are great. Thank you. Figure 1 Illustrative breakdown of some of the factors affecting the appropriate real policy rate  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  12
Instead of expressing its goal of maximum employment in purely technical and macroeconomic terms, the Fed has come out in favour of collective efforts to combat poverty. Maximum employment may be a legitimate Fed goal alongside price stability, but the plan phrased in this way marks a departure from the previous world in which the Fed isolated itself from political influence. The ECB is unlikely to follow the same path as the Fed when it completes its monetary policy review. It is prevented from doing so by European law and by the limited appetite of EU citizens to reduce social disparities in this way. Instead, central bankers are increasingly voicing support for climate protection. This comes in the wake of a speech given by the former Bank of England governor Mark Carney, who in 2015 drew attention to the risks to financial stability from climate change and the responsibilities this implies for financial regulators. The ECB, however, is going even further: Christine Lagarde says she wants “to explore every avenue available in order to combat climate change”. In a sense it’s understandable that central banks are subscribing to broader government policies, whether at national or EU level. After all, it’s something that’s written into the laws governing their activities. One might also accept that if they want to maintain their influence, they need to move with the times and embrace the values that are increasingly driving world affairs. However, there are many big risks associated with this approach.

As I said at the start, in the second part of my address I will talk about our main macroeconomic and monetary policy considerations during the coronavirus crisis. From a purely technical perspective, this crisis has been fascinating and inspiring. It also took us completely by surprise. Its main feature is that it was a typical exogenous shock: it hit the economy from the “outside”. 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  The GFC was caused by endogenous economic processes linked with huge levels of subprime lending, widening imbalances and unprecedentedly high risks building up in the financial sector, whereas the coronavirus pandemic is more like the plagues of Egypt. It has often been said that this crisis has drawn a sharp dividing line between the sectors and industries which have profited unexpectedly and sometimes even wildly from it, and those which have been hit extremely hard or even wiped out by it. Unlike typical cyclical crises, which tend to have a synchronised effect on most industries, this crisis is characterised by contrasting impacts. This feature has manifested itself in relatively smooth flows of employees between industries, so structural unemployment has stayed quite low. I should add, though, that strongly expansionary fiscal policy has been a major mitigating factor. At the price of sharply rising public debt, fiscal expansion has made it easier for the private sector to adjust structurally at the microeconomic level.
This would successively reduce the Riksbank’s possibilities of influencing domestic inflation prospects with the repo rate. The SEK/EUR exchange rate Another item in the discussion in financial markets is the rate at which the krona would be converted if Sweden were to join the euro area. There may therefore be reason to also say something about this. Arriving at an appropriate conversion rate is not a simple matter. It involves trying to pin down many complex economic relationships and assessing the future long-term paths of various central variables. Estimates of the long-term equilibrium exchange rate For several years now we have been engaged at the Riksbank in analysing the krona’s fundamental value and the likely path of the exchange rate in the somewhat longer term. This work has been needed quite apart from the question of future ERM membership, for instance as a contribution to assessments of the exchange rate’s importance for inflation prospects. The study results provide information about the direction and approximate strength of the krona’s future trend. An assessment of the appropriate value for the krona in the event of ERM membership can start by considering what the exchange rate would be if the Swedish economy were in macroeconomic equilibrium. This is a situation were resources are fully utilised without generating higher inflation and the level of external debt is such that the economy can cope with it in the longer run.

Experience shows that in the process of arriving at a reasonable central rate, the factors which are considered include the country’s macroeconomic situation, various indicators of its competitive position, the exchange rate’s historical path and its average levels in recent years. When other currencies have been linked to the exchange rate mechanism, this has usually been done either at or fairly close to the prevailing market rate. ERM membership could stabilise exchange rate expectations A factor of importance for participation in the euro area is the krona’s stability. Membership of ERM2 could also facilitate Sweden’s entrance to the monetary union. It may therefore be appropriate to say something about the timing of an adherence to ERM2. This, as I mentioned, is a matter for the Government to decide. In the Spring Budget the Government has declared that participation in ERM2 is not being considered at present. The choice of an entry date presumably depends in part on the duration of ERM membership that other countries expect from Sweden before qualifying for participation in the euro area. Another central consideration is whether ERM membership as such can contribute to exchange rate stability and smooth the path to the euro area. In my opinion, ERM2 membership could help to stabilise exchange rate expectations if and when it is clear that Sweden does intend to join the euro area. That in turn would simplify the krona’s conversion into euro.
Natural to raise the repo rate 2010–2011 Purchasing Managers’ Index in the manufacturing sector  Lending to households and companies  An index over 50 indicates growth  Annual percentage change  GDP  Inflation  Quarterly change in per cent calculated as an annual rate, Seasonally-adjusted data. Annual percentage change  6  CPIF excluding energy CPIF CPI  4  6 4  2  2  0  0  -2  06  08  10  12  14  -2  Note. Forecasts from April 2011. Sources: Institute for Supply Management (ISM), Swedbank, Statistics Sweden and Sveriges Riksbank  18 [20]  Figure 3. Troubling situation at turn of year 2014-2015 Inflation  Annual percentage change  Inflation expectations Annual percentage change  Note. Measured using the CPIF (left) and the CPI (right). Sources: Statistics Sweden and TNS Sifo Prospera  Figure 4. 2015–2017 – inflation rises towards target again Inflation  Annual percentage change  Inflation expectations Annual percentage change  Note. Measured using the CPIF (left) and the CPI (right). Sources: Statistics Sweden and TNS Sifo Prospera  19 [20]  Figure 5. The development of services prices indicates that the Phillips curve works Annual percentage change  Note. Broken lines represent mean values since 2000. Source: Statistics Sweden  Figure 6.

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They will also conduct peer reviews of national supervisors and issue recommendations on the basis of the outcomes. In the regulatory area, they will be able to issue non-binding guidelines on the implementation of EU law. The second pillar – macro prudential supervision The second pillar is the establishment of a new European body responsible for macro prudential supervision. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will be mandated to identify and assess systemic risks on a European-wide basis. Having a common body that provides a “birds-eye view” of financial system risks will help to avoid repeating the mistakes made during the current crisis, where both regulation and supervision focused too much on individual institutions and markets. Also, by looking at risks arising from macro economic trends, as well as from developments within the financial system, the ESRB can identify threats to financial stability coming from both endogenous and exogenous factors. On the basis of its analysis, the ESRB will issue specific risk warnings as well as recommendations for policy action to address the identified risks. These will be directed to those institutions that have the power to take corrective action. This could include memberstate governments or authorities, the European Commission or other EU bodies. Warnings and recommendations will not be binding. Instead they are expected to be followed on a “comply or explain” basis. On a case-by-case basis the ESRB will decide if warnings and recommendations should be disclosed to the public.

To address these problems the European Commission last fall initiated a fundamental overhaul of the EU supervisory structure. A group chaired by the former head of the IMF, Mr. Jaques de Larosière, was mandated to come up with proposals for needed reform. The recommendations made by the group were broadly embraced by the EU member states and we are now at that stage in the process where final details are being negotiated. The new supervisory structure will rest on two pillars. The first pillar – micro prudential supervision The first pillar consists of several initiatives to strengthen micro prudential supervision in the EU. Regulatory measures at the EU level shall ensure strengthened and more consistent  BIS Review 134/2009  1  supervisory powers at the national level. Supervisory colleges will be mandatory for all the major cross-border firms in the EU. Differences in national laws will be indentified and removed. All these reforms will take place within the new European supervisory network, the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). The main element of this reform is the transformation of the three existing EU supervisory committees into independent EU authorities. These authorities will form a central hub of the European supervisory community and will be equipped with both regulatory and supervisory powers. The day-to-day supervision will still be a national responsibility and carried out on a decentralised basis. The new authorities are therefore primarily to be seen as a complement to the national regulators and supervisors and not as a replacement.
Norges Bank is therefore in the process of establishing a clear organisational divide between the investment division for real estate and other investment divisions. A management team for the real estate division has been established and we will appoint a division head in the course of the year. Large real estate investments will be subject to consideration by an investment committee. The largest investments will also be subject to approval by Norges Bank’s Executive Board. The integrated structure for the management and reporting of GPFG performance and risk will be continued. Moreover, the Ministry proposes increasing the number of central bank deputy governors from one to two, and that both function as members of the Executive Board. The Executive Board will in that case aim to establish a risk and investment committee for investment management. The committee will comprise one deputy governor and two of the Executive Board’s external members. The committee will strengthen and improve the Executive Board’s work on overarching risk management of the GPFG, the framework for the GPFG’s real estate management and decisions relating to large real estate investments. The GPFG is a long-term and responsible owner. Our work on responsible investment is an integral part of the investment process. As of this year, the Council on Ethics issues recommendations on company exclusion directly to Norges Bank. Norges Bank’s Executive Board will on the basis of these recommendations assess exclusion against other tools in the exercise of ownership. The aim is to establish a unified chain of tools.

In 1999 the GDP growth rate is expected to be rather more than 3 per cent. This implies that in 1998 and 1999 growth will be stronger than the increase in potential output, for which the annual trend is estimated to be just over 2 per cent. That means that today’s surplus capacity will be activated by degrees. It is difficult to tell how quickly this will happen. The Riksbank considers that the output gap -- a way of attempting to gauge unutilised capacity in the economy as a whole -- is currently about 2 per cent of GDP. With the growth rates envisaged above, the gap would then close some time in 1999. Other information with a bearing on when inflation might be likely to accelerate was also included in the inflation report. Estimates of structural unemployment and thereby, indirectly, of the level of unemployment that can be combined with stable, low inflation, suggest that risks of inflation also exist less than two years ahead. The rate at which capacity utilisation rises may likewise play a part. A rapid reduction of unutilised resources might generate inflationary impulses even though there is still a capacity surplus at total level. Risks in the wage negotiations Wage formation is particularly relevant at present because the settlements that are due in the coming six months will cover a large part of the labour market. Labour shortages are not yet being reported from more than a few sectors, but experience shows that the domino effects can be substantial.