samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If we were to systematically conduct monetary policy in this way, we could be accused of contributing to the persistency of unemployment.12 At the same time, it is important that we maintain the credibility of our inflation-targeting policy. Ultimately, it is a question of actually delivering an inflation rate close to the target, seen over a longer period of time. If one looks at what is known as CPIF inflation, which excludes the effects of interest rate adjustments, this averages 1.8 per cent from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2011. These statistics do not indicate that the Riksbank one-sidedly reacts to an upside inflation risk. The periods when inflation has deviated from the target have had their explanations. One example of this is the period at the beginning of the 2000s when productivity rose substantially and unexpectedly at the same time as import prices fell. We, like all other analysts, overestimated inflation in our forecasts at that time. With hindsight, the interest rate could have been somewhat lower. But you don’t have the benefit of hindsight in advance. The Riksbank plays an important role in stabilisation policy, not least given that fiscal policy decisions have longer lead times and therefore risk coming at the wrong part of the economic cycle. But, at the same time, monetary policy cannot fine tune the economy either; we like all others have incomplete knowledge of the starting situation in the economy and we must base our decisions on forecasts.

Michael C Bonello: The adaption of the euro Welcome address by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, , during the concert held to mark Malta's membership to the euro area on Saturday, Valletta, 12 January 2008. *  *  *  You have joined us here today to mark a major milestone in our country’s economic history. During more than two millennia the Maltese people have used many different currencies in circumstances most often reflective of Malta’s status as a dependency of some larger and more powerful nation. The adoption of the euro, however, is a change of currency with a difference. This time it has taken place because Malta, out of its own choice, has joined fourteen other sovereign Member States of the EU in an economic and monetary union designed to complement the Single Market, a venture that could rightly be described as an epoch-making development in the history of our continent. For Malta, as for the other new members of the euro area, the euro offers the prospect of enhancing the economy’s potential to grow faster. The elimination of exchange rate risk and currency conversion costs should result in increased trade, while the low interest rate and inflation environment of the euro area should make for reduced business costs and greater macroeconomic stability. Combined with the fiscal discipline associated with monetary union, this should translate into higher credit ratings and improved investment prospects.
Discussion of this level has been attributed to Nordhaus (1975). Others, including the UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gasses (1990) have suggested that two degrees could be a point beyond which the damage caused by climate change may become non-linear. 13  See IPCC (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Climate change and financial stability There are three broad channels through which climate change can affect financial stability: –  First, physical risks: the impacts today on insurance liabilities and the value of financial assets that arise from climate- and weather-related events, such as floods and storms that damage property or disrupt trade;  –  Second, liability risks: the impacts that could arise tomorrow if parties who have suffered loss or damage from the effects of climate change seek compensation from those they hold responsible. Such claims could come decades in the future, but have the potential to hit carbon extractors and emitters – and, if they have liability cover, their insurers – the hardest;  –  Finally, transition risks: the financial risks which could result from the process of adjustment towards a lower-carbon economy. Changes in policy, technology and physical risks could prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of assets as costs and opportunities become apparent. The speed at which such re-pricing occurs is uncertain and could be decisive for financial stability. There have already been a few high profile examples of jump-to-distress pricing because of shifts in environmental policy or performance.

24  The IPCC gives a range of budgets for future emissions which depends on assumptions about other climate drivers and the level of risk of temperatures going >2 degrees that society is willing to accept. It sets these in the context of existing fossil fuel reserves. See table 2.2 in IPCC (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  If that estimate is even approximately correct it would render the vast majority of reserves “stranded” – oil, gas and coal that will be literally unburnable without expensive carbon capture technology, which itself alters fossil fuel economics. 25 The exposure of UK investors, including insurance companies, to these shifts is potentially huge. 19% of FTSE 100 companies are in natural resource and extraction sectors; and a further 11% by value are in power utilities, chemicals, construction and industrial goods sectors. Globally, these two tiers of companies between them account for around one third of equity and fixed income assets. On the other hand, financing the de-carbonisation of our economy is a major opportunity for insurers as long-term investors. It implies a sweeping reallocation of resources and a technological revolution, with investment in long-term infrastructure assets at roughly quadruple the present rate. 26 For this to happen, “green” finance cannot conceivably remain a niche interest over the medium term. There are a number of factors which could influence the speed of transition to a low carbon economy including public policy, technology, investor preferences and physical events.
The Centre will also groom a pipeline of talent in green finance across the career spectrum— from the undergraduate to the executive education levels. The Centre has strong support from our financial industry, which will play a key role in steering the Centre’s focus towards market-oriented outputs. I would like to thank the founding partners— Bank of China Limited, BNP Paribas, Fullerton Fund Management, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Schroders, Standard Chartered Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and UBS AG. MAS will continue to promote a vibrant green finance research and talent development ecosystem. We will look to anchor more centres of excellence with diﬀerent strengths and focus areas — to provide a diversified pool of research and talent in green finance. CONCLUSION People across the world – and in Singapore – are increasingly concerned about climate change and environmental degradation. And they want to do something about it. Climate change is becoming a rallying cry to inspire people to step up to a higher cause, to take collective action for the common good of our planet. The looming climate crisis poses not just an existential challenge to be overcome but also an economic opportunity to be seized. The coming revolution in sustainability has the potential to remake the world, cleaner and greener, creating new value and new jobs. Let us harness the power of finance to help create such a world, and a sustainable future.

I hope my remarks, which are based on a whitepaper we published earlier today, will offer a complementary perspective to the type of work already underway by other supervisors and regulators, including the UK regulators (FCA and PRA), the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), DeNederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), and other institutions like the Financial Stability Board and the Group of Thirty (G30). I am focusing my remarks today specifically on “misconduct risk,” but the conceptual arguments and framework apply more broadly to financial sector risk management in general. Please note that the views I express today are my own and they do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.1  Misconduct Risk A primary goal of bank regulators and supervisors is to support the sustained provision of financial services to households and businesses in a fair and transparent way. In order to do this, we examine financial institutions, individually and collectively. We assess safety and soundness to ensure firms have the appropriate risk identification and risk management processes for prudent banking. We hold them to standards that require them to be resilient to a broad range of potential risks such as credit, market, liquidity, and operational risk. One specific risk is employee “misconduct risk.” We define this as the potential for behaviors or business practices that are illegal, unethical, or contrary to a firm’s stated values, policies, and procedures.
Bill Dudley’s recent proposal for certain staff to be paid partly in “performance bonds” is worthy of investigation as a potentially elegant solution.21 Senior manager accountability and new compensation structures will help to rebuild trust in financial institutions. In a diverse financial system, trust must also be rebuilt in markets. That is why in the UK in June, Chancellor George Osborne and I launched the Fair and Effective Markets Review.22 Far from seeking to constrain markets, the Review is seeking to restore true and competitive markets with open access to all and competitive prices. Behaviours that aim to undercut market mechanisms, such as collusion, the misuse of confidential information, or the manipulation of market prices and benchmarks, must be stamped out. The Review has already recommended that further market benchmarks be brought within the scope of UK regulation, alongside a criminal charge for manipulation of such benchmarks. In that respect it complements the FSB work to reform and strengthen benchmarks internationally.23 The Review is now consulting widely before reporting next June. It is asking questions about deficiencies in two major areas: market structure and conduct. The Review is examining where structures exist that encourage excessive concentration, raise potential conflicts of interest or expose benchmarks to the potential for manipulation. And it is considering where voluntary codes of conduct seem inadequate, poorly understood or simply provide individuals with justification to judge their actions by the exact letter of the code rather than by more generally accepted norms.

Corporate bonds and securitised loans account for only 7%. Chart 5 shows that in each of the US, UK and Europe, the period since the crisis has seen the stock of outstanding bonds move towards the stock of outstanding bank loans. 9  See FSB (2014e). 10  Chart 6 shows the post-crisis collapse in European securitisation issuance, which has been particularly concentrated in residential mortgage-backed securities. 11  Bank of England and ECB (2014) is a consultation paper on the development of such a model of securitisation. The EBA is also consulting on the same issue, see EBA (2014). 12  Menon 2013. 13  Shanmugaratnam (2013). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  times. There is a disconnect between developments in real economies and the degree of financial risk taking. It is particularly notable how the search for yield has compressed liquidity premia across markets. This is unlikely to be sustainable over the medium term because it exists against a backdrop of much-reduced market-making activity.14 Fundamentally, liquidity has become more scarce in secondary fixed income markets. It just appears that it hasn’t. The reasons for the changes are clear however. New prudential requirements have reduced incentives for banks to warehouse risk positions. Dealer inventories in fixed income have declined by 70% since the pre-crisis period, while the stock of fixed income assets outstanding has doubled. And the Value-at-Risk in banks’ trading books has retreated to 2002 levels.
We could return to a system similar in spirit to that used before the financial crisis, in which the supply of reserves in the banking system was kept relatively scarce, and the interest rate was set by adjusting reserves on a frequent basis through open market operations. Alternatively, we could continue with the system that we’ve been using since the crisis, in which bank reserves are abundant and the federal funds rate target is achieved through adjustments to administered rates. This approach is working very well at controlling interest rates and has proven to be easy to communicate and adaptable to changing market conditions.8 The Fed will be looking closely at these options in the coming months and will subsequently make a decision on the future operating framework. And, as is our standard practice, we will be sure to communicate our thinking and decisions on this issue as soon and as thoroughly as practicable. Global Dimensions of U.S. Monetary Policy So far, I have described the economic and monetary policy outlook from the perspective of the U.S. economy and policy. This should not be surprising given that the Fed’s mandate—as defined by the U.S. Congress—concerns domestic economic conditions. Of course, that does not imply that one can view the U.S. economy and our policy actions in isolation from global economic and financial developments. Far from it. In today’s highly interconnected global economy and financial system, international developments affect the U.S. economy, and our policy actions in turn impact the rest of the world.

The settlement of a payment by Swish takes place on a platform known as “Betalningar i Realtid, BiR” (payments in real time), which is owned by Bankgirot. Swish payments are thus settled in money issued by a commercial institution and therefore differ from other payments that are settled in central bank money. Another difference between BiR and RIX is that BiR is accessible 24 hours a day, every day of the year, “24/365”. The average transaction in BiR is much smaller than the average transaction in RIX, which is a natural consequence of the payments made with the Swish app being small. However, there are no technological limitations preventing larger payments being settled instantly. But there will then be high demands on the safety of the settlement procedure, and settlement should then be in central bank money. 4 The Riksbank has decided to extend the opening hours for RIX from 0700-1700 to 0700-1800 with effect from  October. 5 Almost all central banks own and operate payment systems with the same kind of functions as RIX. These systems are referred to as “Real-Time Gross Settlement” (RTGS) systems or ”Large Value Payment Systems” (LVPS). 6 Instant payments is the most common term; other terms include “real-time payments” or “faster payments”. For a more detailed description, see The quest for speed in payments, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2017. 7 See Payment patterns in Sweden 2018, Sveriges Riksbank. 3 [8]  ... and in the future?
Estimated term premium Percentage points 3.0  Term premium, Swedish National Debt Office (10 year) Term premium, The Riksbank (10 year)  2.5  3.0 2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.5  -1.0  -1.0 99  01  03  05  07  09  11  13  15  Note. The Swedish National Debt Office's estimate is based on swap rates while the Riksbank’s estimate is based on government bond rates. Sources: Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank  9 One uncertainty factor is how well these methods can capture changes in the interest rate’s n ormal level. There  are some signs that the fall in the estimated term premium has been caused by a decline in interest rate expectations, rather than by an actual change in the premium. 10 In this assessment, it is actually not a question of only the premium, but also of a difference in valuation between Riksbank certificates and government securities, where the market has valued government securities higher in the past year. The interest rate on government securities with a maturity of one week is now almost 0.4 percentage points lower than the repo rate despite them referring to the same maturity.

5 [12]  So far, interest rates and the Riksbank’s costs have been lower than expected As the statistical estimates of the term premium are uncertain in many ways and have several possible sources of error, I think we obtain a clearer picture of the effects of bond purchases on the Riksbank’s balance sheet by studying different interest rate scenarios. Let us begin with the situation in February 2015 when we started purchasing bonds. The interest rate on five-year government bonds fell to just under zero after our monetary policy announcement. But Chart 4 shows that those of us on the Executive Board of the Riksbank as well as the money market participants in Prospera’s survey thought at the time that the repo rate would be brought back into positive territory towards the end of 2016 and then continue to increase. One can say that the Riksbank purchased government bonds that gave a return of approximately zero but that were expected to be funded according to the repo rate forecast. The chart shows that the Riksbank therefore expected to make a loss, as the funding costs were expected to be higher than the yield. 11 Chart 4. Actual and expected interest rate developments Per cent 3  3 Repo rate Survey MPR February 2015  2  2  MPR October 2016  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 12  14  16  18  20  Note.
But the terms of trade  Page 6 of 14 shock could remain large if European countries need to replenish their gas inventories at a still elevated price for the winter of 2023/2024. In any case the terms of trade shock means a decrease of real income for the French economy and hence is a key driver of the slowdown in GDP growth expected for 2023. I.3 Measuring more specifically the energy shock Regarding the energy shock, which is useful to consider since we can more easily look at its distribution between economic agents, we can estimate it by applying the oil and gas price changes between 2021 and 2022 to the quantities of energy imported in a reference year, here 2021. Such a computation leads to an extra energy bill for France of 1.9% of GDP in 2022 compared to the previous year, or 47 billion euros. Note that, given the current exceptional volatility of natural gas prices, this estimation is very sensitive to price assumptions and the reference year. At the time of our previous projections last summer, gas prices expected in future markets for the last months of the year were much above the actual levels  Page 7 of 14 recorded since then. This explains why our estimate has fallen to € from € a few months ago.

Beyond the comparison of this current terms-of-trade shock across countries, it is also instructive to compare this shock for a country like France with the period to which the present situation is often compared: the 1970s oil crisis. Page 5 of 14  The terms of trade shock in France this year is expected to be the second largest since 1974, the first oil price shock. In 2022, for the whole year, the shock would amount to -1.4 GDP percentage point versus -2.8 GDP percentage points in 1974 during the first oil shock. Our estimate for 2022 is in line with other estimates published by Insee and the Ministry of Finance of around -1.5 GDP percentage point. The shock related to import prices is of similar magnitude in 2022 and 1974 but there are some differences in the composition of the shocks. In 2022 it is not only the price of energy that increases but also the prices of many other imported goods (non-energy commodities, intermediate goods etc.). At the same time export prices rose more in 2022, reflecting the more widespread diffusion of price increases to globally traded goods. In addition, the price of services, especially transport services, also partially offsets the negative shock to goods prices resulting from the surge in energy prices. There are many uncertainties regarding 2023. If the levelling off of world commodity prices is confirmed and the global economic slowdown also weighs on imports, the terms of trade shock will diminish in 2023.
To make these kind of situations more predictable, and also more easy to resolve, it would be desirable to strengthen the existing framework with a final objective to have comprehensive framework for the restructuring of sovereign debt. Technical assistance The IMF has unique competence through its ability to combine scientific knowledge and institutional skills with longstanding experience of work in individual countries. This competence often applies to 'narrow' areas that a particular country (normally) only seldom requires help with. This includes advice and support regarding how to build up a functioning supervisory authority or how to manage a banking crisis. It is crucial to make the utmost use of this competence. The IMF has untapped potential What I have said so far, that the Fund’s mandate and main instruments for achieving it are essentially appropriate, is hardly controversial. Most people agree on this in theory. In practice, however, it is  2  BIS Review 43/2005  more difficult. When it comes to the crunch, we member countries do not always allow the IMF to effectively carry out the functions that we have given it a mandate to perform. In my opinion, the IMF could play a more important role than it does today. But that is not principally due to its mandate and instruments as such but because we as members do not allow it to fulfil its potential. Wherein lies the untapped potential? In which of the IMF's main fields could the organisation play an even stronger part?

There is also a strong catastrophe risk ecosystem to support ILS issuances, with the leading catastrophe modelling firms with ILS expertise present in Singapore, and research institutes such as the Earth Observatory of Singapore and the Institute of Catastrophe Risk Management, to support data and modelling needs. Singapore also aims to serve as the Asian knowledge centre for new and emerging risks. b. Singapore is well recognised as a premier asset management centre in Asia, with deep capabilities across both traditional and alternative asset classes. As the gateway to alternative capital providers such as pension funds, family offices, and hedge funds in Asia, ILS fund managers are increasingly assessing Asian investors through Singapore. c. Singapore has a deep debt capital market, with a broad range of bond offerings to provide collateral for and to support innovative ILS products and structures. SGX, a dynamic stock exchange, can facilitate bond trading. 13 Second, Singapore has ready corporate, regulatory and tax frameworks to facilitate ILS issuances: a. ILS instruments can be issued and regulated in Singapore via the Special Purpose Reinsurance Vehicle (“SPRV”) regulations, which allows sponsors to readily securitise insurance risks in Singapore. b. To provide tax neutrality for ILS vehicles, Singapore offers the Approved Special Purpose Vehicle (“ASPV”) scheme. 14 Third, MAS has taken steps nurture the growth of the ILS market in the region. a. MAS launched the ILS grant scheme in Jan this year, which will fund 100% upfront issuance costs of catastrophe bonds in Singapore, up to $ million.