samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Preferential arrangements such as Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ASEAN Free Trade Agreements have a critical role in spurring productivity growth, accelerating structural reforms and creating a diversified, competitive and resilient Malaysian economy. Once again, welcome to this Conference, and thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Pablo Hernández de Cos: Remittance flows and their effects on Latin American macroeconomic and financial stability during the COVID-19 crisis Introductory remarks by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to the virtual seminar on “Remittance flows and their effects on Latin American macroeconomic and financial stability during the COVID-19 crisis”, organized by the Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR) and the Bank of Spain, webinar, 27 July 2021. * * * Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me first thank FLAR (the Latin American Reserve Fund) and its president, José Darío Uribe, for the opportunity of jointly organising this webinar with the Banco de España. It will be the first of many and marks the start of close collaboration between both institutions, formalised in a memorandum of understanding in December 2020. The close economic and financial ties between Latin America and Spain are widely known. The interest of the Banco de España in the region has grown, as you know, owing to the internationalisation of Spanish banks since the early 1990s, largely directed towards Latin America. In this process, the region has taken on great significance for the Spanish banking system. Indeed, Spanish banks’ exposures to Latin America account, on pre-pandemic data, for almost one-fifth of the system’s total exposures, and for almost 30% of exposures outside Spain.
This is equivalent to asking about the significance to stability of the pronounced shift in the business model of many large banks to ‘originate and distribute’. If they are not holding on to the loans and other assets they originate, one might draw the inference that bank balance sheets would have shrunk. Nothing could be further from the truth. The balance sheets of the largest and most complex financial institutions (LCFIs) have ballooned. Both in the US and in Europe (including the UK), their holdings of equities and of debt instruments (bonds and loans) have grown more rapidly than the underlying markets (Chart 10). That does not exactly look like disintermediation. 16  In a synthetic securitisation, the SPV still issues ‘cash’ securities to its investors, but rather than investing the proceeds in the credit portfolio, it holds a high-quality liquid asset, which can be a bank deposit. It gains its credit exposure via a credit default swap. In a recent speech, RG Rajan of the IMF attributed the compression in risk premia to a shortage of assets. The growth in demand for synthetic exposures is consistent with that. Rajan, R G (2006), ‘Is there a global shortage of fixed assets?’ remarks at the G-30 meetings in New York, December 2006. 17  World broad money is a weighted average of individual country M2 or closest national substitute, using market exchange rates. 18  Included in the Euro area; partly included in Japan; excluded in the US.

Referring back to the performance of inflation, INSTAT data reveal that consumer prices rose on average 2.5% in the first quarter of 2013. Inflation continues to be determined by food prices; their contribution accounts for about 90% of headline inflation. Moreover, food inflation was offset by the lower inflation of non-food consumer goods. Inflation of this category reflected the downward oil price, following its decline in international markets. Also, the price fall of long-term consumer goods provided downward effects, whereas prices of other consumer goods did not change significantly. From the macroeconomic perspective, inflation continues to reflect the weak pressures from the aggregate demand-side and the absence of supply-side shocks. Below-potential growth of aggregate demand leads to underutilisation of production capacities and generates weak pressures on increasing wages, producer prices and profit margins. Under these circumstances, internal pressures on consumer prices appear weak, as reflected by the low core inflation. On the other hand, imported inflation was subdued due to the low inflation in Albania’s trading partners and the stable exchange rate. The most recent data on the real economy are as at 2012 Q4. According to these data, the Albanian economy grew 1.7% driven by expanded activity in the services, industry and agriculture sectors. The activity of the construction sector continued to shrink. Data on economic activity for the first quarter of this year remain limited. Based on indirect indicators, our analyses point to low economic growth, relying mainly on foreign demand, while the domestic demand components continue their sluggish performance.
During the recent crisis the currencies in “high interest rate countries” such as Australia and New Zealand weakened substantially against “low interest rate countries” such as Japan and the United States, which once again led to a speedy settlement of carry positions. One contributory factor to the inflows of capital to the emerging markets in Asia and Latin America, as I mentioned earlier, is the relatively low interest rate levels in the “old” industrial nations in North America and Europe. The low interest rates in, for example, the United States, make it profitable to borrow dollars in order to invest in other currencies that provide a higher return at given exchange rates. Several of the countries that are now experiencing capital inflows are unwilling to allow their currencies to appreciate against the US dollar despite the fact that the inflows are creating appreciation pressures. This is understandable in the light of experiences from, for instance, the Asian crisis. Exchange rates can be come highly volatile if they are completely adapted to highly volatile capital flows. But at the same time, the unwillingness to allow the exchange rate to appreciate probably strengthens tendencies towards capital inflows, as it enables speculation in carry trade, as I described earlier. Let me now leave the “speculative” element of the foreign exchange market and talk about the more long-term development of the exchange rate.

This will involve curriculum design towards the attainment of professional qualifications and the provision of high quality learning solutions that fulfils the AICB’s CPD requirement for its members. A key focus area for ABS in the near to medium term is in acquiring the necessary capabilities and resources to enable it to carry out its objectives effectively. Central to this would be in developing strong in-house faculty and resources which may include visiting professors and industry subject matter experts. ABS is also expected to anticipate and spearhead cutting edge programs tailored to the evolving needs of the banking industry. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We have high hopes that in the next 5 years, ABS will distinguish itself in the quality of its programs, developing a particular strength in delivering integrative and practice-oriented education and learning in banking and business that combine intellectual know-how with practical applications. In an increasingly interconnected world, our workforce must be empowered with the right knowledge, the tools, the skills and the mind-set to deliver worldclass performance. The value proposition of ABS in adopting contemporary approach to business and banking education that equip students for the real world will be demanded as any expertise in a particular discipline. Ultimately, the aim is to integrate the multidisciplinary nature of the banking industry with modern management and professionalism, in turn developing talents with abilities to combine traditional disciplines as they tackle the challenges of uncertainty and complexity. A monumental task is upon ABS. Its challenging and exciting.
I will say more on the causes of deflationary forces a bit later, but this analysis partly explains why the Bank of England has also been engaged on special operations to support the liquidity, funding and capital positions of the banks through,  8  See for example, FR Glahe, (1977) “Macroeconomics Theory and Policy”, 2nd edition, publ: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 9  The definition of M4 can be found here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/ m4.aspx  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  respectively, the Special Liquidity Scheme, the Funding for Lending Scheme and the capital recommendations by the FPC. What of our ability to influence credit markets directly? I want to argue that it largely reflects how we go about changing the supply of money. On the one hand, to increase the quantity of money in scale, quickly and safely, it is quite clear that gilts are the best instrument to buy: there is a large market and there is no resultant private sector credit risk taken by the public sector. Many financial instruments tend to be priced by reference to the interest rates on sovereign debt and so changing gilt yields will have effects across sterling markets. In addition to buying gilts to inject money, we can consider two other ways to affect credit markets. First we can buy financial instruments outright. If particular markets have become dysfunctional so that general monetary expansion doesn’t help, relatively small amounts of direct purchases may unblock the relevant markets.

This move by the HKMC to issue USD denominated bonds fits very well into the efforts by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to promote the development of a safe and efficient financial infrastructure for Hong Kong, based on a multi-currency, multi-dimensional platform. In Hong Kong’s banking system, we have around $ trillion in HK Dollar deposits. Our banks also have the equivalent of over $ trillion in foreign currency deposits. About 70% or $ billion are US Dollar deposits. The loan-to-deposit ratio for Hong Kong Dollar deposits is 87%; the equivalent for US Dollar is only around 26%. We reckon that a significant portion of the sizable US Dollar deposits is held by retail investors and some would wish to diversify and look for investment products to increase their return. One could of course look for opportunities overseas but, as an international financial centre, Hong Kong should also try to provide more such investment products locally. In the past there have been very few local issues of US Dollar retail bonds, and the most recent one appears to have been issued as far back as in September 2003. Today’s HKMC US Dollar bond issuance would help to meet part of such investment demand. Perhaps in times to come there will be more foreign currency bond issuance in Hong Kong. This bond issuance would add to the diversity of financial intermediation channels and complement the HKMA’s effort to promote the development of a multi-currency, multi-dimensional financial system in Hong Kong.
6/14  In respect of monetary policy, the various ECB measures have allowed financial conditions to be eased considerably, and have acted as a mainstay for the economic recovery in the area, contributing to countering the deflationary trends looming over the region some years back. For the Spanish economy, it is estimated that from 2014 to 2018 the ECB’s measures boosted real GDP by 2.3% and the CPI by 1.4% (see Chart 11). These effects are of a fairly similar magnitude to those estimated for the euro area as a whole (2.3% and 1.7%, respectively). The fiscal policy stance shifted from expansionary in 2015 and 2016 to neutral in 2017, but it will once again be expansionary in 2018 once the various measures included in the State Budget for this year materialise. Over recent years, the reduction in the deficit has been due to the economy’s cyclical improvement and to the fall-off in interest expenditure, while the structural deficit has held at still-high levels, according to the European Commission’s latest estimates. That said, the role of the foregoing factors should, in future, tend progressively to taper off. This has been the case already for oil prices, the course of which has reversed since mid2017, and, to a lesser extent, of external markets, following the recent slowdown. But it is particularly relevant for demand-side (monetary and fiscal) policies. Specifically, it is to be expected that monetary policy will progressively play a less pivotal role.

However, looking ahead, some of these factors will foreseeably lose steam, owing partly to the effects of the appreciation of the euro, in nominal effective terms, and to dearer oil. These effects will give rise to a considerable reduction in the Spanish economy’s net lending vis-à-vis the rest of the world, which is nevertheless expected to remain positive over the coming years. With regard to the labour market, 2.3 million jobs have been generated since 2013. These developments, along with the reduction in the labour force as a result of population ageing, have enabled the unemployment level to be reduced most significantly. The unemployment rate thus stands below 15%, 12 pp down on its 2013 high (see Chart 10), although still far off the level observed in the euro area on average (slightly above 8%). Most recently, the robustness of employment has eased in line with developments in activity, making for continuing and very low growth in productivity, as has been the case since the start of the recovery. 5/14  Strong job creation has been accompanied by a modest increase in wage compensation in the past four years. Chiefly contributing to this has been the high degree of slack in the labour market which dates back to the start of the current pick-up, and the expectations of very low inflation rates during these years.
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the design of EMU had two core elements: an independent common central bank targeting price stability, and a framework to coordinate national fiscal policies. The former was entrusted with monetary policy, while the latter was based on a set of fiscal rules geared towards ensuring that national fiscal policies did not endanger the price stability mandate. This meant that Member States could no longer rely on monetary policy to stabilise asymmetric economic shocks (domestic, or common with highly uneven domestic effects), while the exchange rate could not act as an adjustment mechanism between countries. Instead, they had to rely on additional adjustment channels, such as capital and labour mobility, and, especially, countercyclical fiscal policy. 1  In addition, the set of fiscal rules included in the Treaty acknowledged that the fiscal behaviour of one country would affect the rest of the members and the monetary union as a whole. In particular, unsustainable fiscal policies in one country could generate economic and financial instability across the monetary union and influence the single monetary policy. Thus, the Treaty stipulates that Member States should avoid excessive deficits, and that the European Commission should monitor public finances to identify significant deviations that could endanger the macroeconomic and financial stability of the monetary union. In practice, the Protocol operationalises these principles by means of two quantitative reference values: 60% for the ratio of government debt to GDP and 3% for the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio.

The quantitative limits were defined taking into account the average economic situation prevalent at the end of the 1990s. In particular, annual potential GDP growth of 2% and an inflation aim of around 2%, together with a budget deficit limit of 3% of GDP, would stabilise the ratio of government debt to GDP at 60%. The experience since its approval has shown that the design of the Maastricht Treaty left significant gaps in the governance of the euro area. In particular, these gaps have a significant bearing on the proper functioning of the policy mix. First, due to the simplicity of the framework, the original rules did not take into account that the cyclical position of countries affects the headline deficit. Subsequent reforms tried to address this, at the cost of increasing complexity and relying on (initially praised, but now maligned) unobservable variables. But, in any case, as can be seen in the left-hand chart of slide 3, the experience of recent decades has been one of pro-cyclical compliance with the rules, resulting in undesirable tightening during downturns and insufficient accumulation of buffers during upturns. Moreover, despite its focus on debt sustainability, the framework did not avoid a general increase in debt (as can be seen in the right-hand figure in slide 3), which has, in any case, been a trend common to most advanced economies. Having to deal with multiple objectives (countercyclicality, long-run growth, debt sustainability), fiscal policy, in most cases, failed to deliver satisfactorily on any of them.
Our physical presence gives us the opportunity to better engage with and learn from our communities. Our mission is to make the U.S. economy stronger and the financial system more stable for all segments of society, and supporting local economies is a key part of that. The New York Fed is proud to be an anchor institution of New York City, and we want the city-and all of its people-to thrive. I'd like to share a bit more about why having these discussions is so important for the future of this city and for us here at the New York Fed. And with that, I must give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. The City's Present and Future Native New Yorker John Jay Chapman once said, "The present in New York is so powerful that the past is lost." You can feel that powerful reality when you walk the streets today. Indeed, this city was once an epicenter of the pandemic: we were hit early, and we were hit hard. The virus spread rapidly, leading to widespread hospitalizations and a devastating death toll. During the initial months of the pandemic, one out of five jobs in the city disappeared. In the restaurant industry in particular, 70 percent of jobs were lost. Other industries, such as retail and even health care, experienced outsized losses as well.

John C Williams: A New York moment Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at "The Future of New York City: Charting an Equitable Recovery for All", Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 31 March 2022. *** Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I am excited to see many of you joining us here-live-at our building on Liberty Street in downtown Manhattan. It means so much to us to be able to bring people together to discuss the future of New York City in our first-ever hybrid public event. I'd also like to welcome all the guests and panelists who are joining us virtually. This is more than a conference. It's a moment that marks a new era for how we think about living and working in this city. In fact, if you were to wander down these halls, you'd see my colleagues bringing that idea to life. We reopened our doors to all employees last month, and we're so glad to be back and working together in person. For us, this is part of a flexible model that allows for a mix of days in the office with remote work. We believe that being here in this way is best for our employees, best for this city, and best for the Federal Reserve's Second District, which is the region we serve.
Many new technology companies were not generating a profit and had to rely instead on paying for wages and equipment by issuing shares. For this to be feasible, stock market valuation needs to be high. In this sense there were incentives for managements to trim reports and statements about their firm’s future profits. At the same time, analysts and investment banks, with potential earnings from launching share issues, lacked incentives to take a critical look at these reports, so inexperienced investors did not get the assistance and support they needed. In order to reduce the risk of financial market imbalances, it is important that we have a well thought-out legislative, regulatory and supervisory infrastructure that functions properly and follows changes in the rest of the world. This is a never-ending task that requires the participation of all concerned. Today, households face what are sometimes very difficult risk-management decisions that were not called for or even possible before. Many people still lack the relevant knowledge for this and it may be asked whether people in general can be expected to have such knowledge in the future. Everyone cannot be a specialist in risk management and financial theory. Therefore, I think banks and other financial institutions should become more consumer-oriented, instead of today’s greater focus on products. The increased exposure of households to the stock market calls for tailor-made plans for the life cycle that take all important risks into account.

Sure enough, there are indeed a few cases of inadequate disclosure or mis-selling, which the financial institution concerned should remedy. But there are others where the customer has failed to exercise basic due diligence. These are the most painful letters to read:   of investors who were attracted by headline returns and purchased products without reading any of the product documentation;    of investors who willingly signed blank sheets of product assessment forms without realising what they were buying; and    of investors who insisted on buying risky products even though they were advised that the products were not suitable for them. It is very difficult to help in cases like these. MAS will continue to explore ways to equip investors with core financial capabilities. We are currently studying the feasibility of establishing a financial literacy institute to complement existing MoneySENSE initiatives through talks and workshops to reach a larger segment of the population. We are also reaching out more to students, through the schools. The objective is not so much to instill technical expertise in investment products, but to inculcate good money habits from a young age – being prudent, being alert to risks, being clear about the objectives of investing. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Dispute resolution Even with well-informed consumers, occasional disputes with those who sell investment products will be inevitable. Hence the final area of investor protection is to provide an affordable and accessible dispute resolution mechanism for aggrieved investors.