samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is important to note that, as from this MP Report, for the purposes of the conjunctural analysis of activity and the measurement of the gap, the concepts of “natural resources GDP” and “other GDP” have been replaced by “mining GDP” and “non-mining GDP”. A box in the Report explains the reasons behind this change. There we note that the sectors that we discounted from GDP until now (i.e. mining, fishery, and electricity, gas and water) are actually more volatile and less persistent. It is also shown that, in general, its relationship with the rest of the economy is limited. However, in line with the change that I have just commented, it is concluded that only the exclusion of mining activity has significant effects in the analysis of the dynamics of the aggregate economy, because of its important effects on the variance of growth. In such circumstances, and considering that broad measures are better to work with than narrow ones, 3  we adopted the distinction between mining and non-mining GDP to substitute for natural resources GDP and other GDP. Moreover, this change allows the analysis in the MP Report to be aligned with the publication of the mining and non-mining Imacec2 that we introduced a few months ago. Returning to the recent evolution of activity and demand, the sectoral composition of nonmining GDP shows better figures for sectors linked to consumption than those related to investment, particularly construction.

Immediately after each meeting, the Bank issues a press release and holds a press conference. The key interest rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment of the inflation outlook two years ahead. Our inflation projections and our views on the balance of risks associated with these projections provide a summary of these assessments. Norges Bank’s inflation projection is our assessment of the most probable outcome of the rise in CPI two years ahead. In setting interest rates we also place emphasis on the probability distribution – or the balance of risks – surrounding the projection. Therefore, we also publish our judgement of the risk associated with our own projections. The phasing in of petroleum revenues has to be counteracted by a tighter monetary policy than would otherwise be the case. This may be accomplished through an adjustment of the interest rate, an appreciation of the krone or both. Small countries have experienced fairly wide exchange rate fluctuations. The Swedish krona has depreciated by more than 10 per cent since summer 2000. The Australian dollar has weakened by  BIS Review 18/2002  1  over 30 per cent since spring 1997. The UK, Canada and New Zealand have also experienced wide exchange rate fluctuations. The Norwegian krone, on the other hand, has been relatively stable. A monetary policy that is oriented towards low and stable inflation will contribute to stabilising aggregate demand and output. As a result, the central government budget will not normally have to be used actively to stabilise the economy.
In Chairman Clayton’s view, “tokens and offerings that incorporate features and marketing efforts that emphasize the potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others continue to contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.”22 In 2018, SEC staff published guidance to clarify that exchanges, investment vehicles, investment advisers, and dealers doing business in digital currencies that are digital asset securities would be subjected to securities laws.23 The guidance makes clear that digital currencies that function as securities will be subject to U.S. securities law, but where we draw this line may not always be clear. Products that blur the boundaries between money and securities are not new. Take, for instance, certificates of deposit. In 1982, the United States Supreme Court analyzed whether a certificate of deposit was a security for purposes of certain U.S. anti-fraud laws. The Court concluded that it was not. In doing so, the Court recognized that the most important distinction between a certificate of deposit issued by a bank—money—and other long-term debt was the comprehensive regulation of the banking system. 24 The Court’s conclusion was a sensible one more than a century after the “wildcat” banking era: Lawmakers could not  have intended to treat money in the banking system like it was something else because there was no need to do so. At least for now, the case does not appear to be as strong for digital currencies.

As I’ve already suggested, current U.S. law does not have direct answers to these questions. Digital currencies can fall into a variety of categories: commodities or securities or other instruments. How a digital currency is classified will depend partly on the functional use of the digital currency and partly on the priorities of various lawmakers and regulatory agencies that have the authority to regulate it. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the primary U.S. authority responsible for implementing U.S. anti-money laundering laws, was one of first authorities to issue guidance in the United States on digital currencies. FinCEN clarified in 2013 that transmitters and exchangers of digital currency are money service businesses under FinCEN regulations, if the digital currency acts as a substitute for real currency or has an equivalent value in real currency.20 Accordingly, any person that engages in the business of transferring or exchanging digital currency is subject to FinCEN requirements to establish an anti-money laundering program, which includes recordkeeping, reporting, and customer identification and verification requirements.21 FinCEN’s early entrance into the field sought to address the fact that digital currencies, like other forms of payment, may be used for nefarious purposes. Fast forward to 2017. Jay Clayton, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal agency that regulates securities, released a statement on digital currencies and initial coin offerings (ICOs).
Is it possible that the two are sufficiently close in their effects that they are in effect perfect substitutes? In that case, it is not clear that having the additional instrument is of much value; the two instruments need to have sufficiently differentiated effects to be useful. Second, to the extent that they are sufficiently independent, is there any danger of a “pushme, pull-you” outcome if the instruments are set by different authorities? To investigate these issues, we employ a standard, though stylised, sticky-price New Keynesian macroeconomic model, augmented to incorporate both physical capital and a simple banking sector. The model is a version of that of Gertler and Karadi (2009), stripped of features such as habit persistence that are inessential for our purposes. The key additional ingredients relative to the standard New Keynesian model are twofold. First, funds flowing from savers to borrowers must be intermediated through a banking system. Banks take in deposits, Dt, from households, on which they contract to pay a given nominal interest rate. Together with their stock of retained profits (bank capital, Bt), these funds are then lent out to finance the physical capital that firms carry through into the next period. The real (gross) return on this lending, Rkt+1, then includes the marginal product of that capital plus any associated capital gains or losses as the price of physical capital evolves, net of the inflation rate.

In this regard, to my opinion, CESEE may feel some stress impact during the process of reforms implementation which will come most likely from: –  deleveraging, in terms of lower “parent” support for liquidity and lending to local economy;  –  cross-jurisdictions similarity in economic and financial cyclicality;  –  cross-border cooperation in supervision;  –  possible capital movements and impact on exchange rate;  –  political process as, in SEE, the EU integration process is determinant;  Nevertheless, there is no option on “holding back” from the reforms for a long time, given the unstoppable process of financial integration and globalization. Hence, an early start of a pacing approach to financial regulatory reform is appropriate. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In the last part of my speech I would like to stop by on the impact on Albania’s financial sector and economy and possible ways to avoid/mitigate negative externalities. The features of our financial system are similar to those of other CESEEs. In fact: –  in Albania, the banking sector dominates the financial system;  –  banking activity is concentrated and controlled by foreign banks (87% of the assets);  –  in total there are 16 banks and the 4 biggest ones possess 68% of total assets. –  home countries are: Austria (1 bank), Greece (3), France (2), Italy (2), Turkey (1), Bulgaria (1).
Countries that are small, and have less developed economic and financial systems, are open  BIS Review 62/2002  1  and liberalized, and that do not have the range of policy options at their disposal, will be highly disadvantaged in this global market place. It is this globalisation process that will contribute towards widening the existing disparities between nations. Against this trend, the current global economic and financial environment has been characterised by increased uncertainty. There is uncertainty in the global economic outlook, financial markets and geopolitical developments. The expected strengthening of recovery in the advanced economies has yet to occur. Financial reporting irregularities and the weakening of the corporate sector has affected confidence, contributing to the increased volatility in the global equity markets. Further risks also remain on the horizon, including those emanating from structural imbalances in some of the advanced economies. These developments have res ulted in unstable and highly volatile conditions in both the asset and currency markets. However, despite the major declines in asset markets, large shifts in financial flows, significant movements in major currencies, financial stress in the corporate and financial sectors in a number of countries followed by overall economic weakness, the East Asian economies have emerged relatively resilient. Going forward, it is recognized that a higher tolerance level to sudden changes in economic conditions and to the more volatile market conditions is necessary. Building such tolerance levels involves enhancing the capacity, strength and resilience of the economy to cope with the external shocks to the system.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Strengthening economic structures and fundamentals Statement by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Joint Annual Discussion of the Boards of Governors at the 2005 World Bank-IMF Annual Meeting, Washington DC, 26 September 2005. *  *  *  As we strengthen our global relationships, there needs to be greater engagement with the entire spectrum of member countries. If we are to achieve a more balanced global growth, greater stability in the global financial system and significant progress in the fight against poverty, there needs to be greater appreciation and understanding of the global issues from the perspective of the emerging and developing economies. In the current environment, the risks to global growth have increased, presenting us with an even more challenging environment to achieve these goals. Should the trend of higher oil and asset prices, and rising interest rates continue, their combined effect could diminish the near-term global growth prospects. In this environment, appropriate policies are vital to ensure that any moderation in growth does not evolve into a fundamental economic slowdown. While countries have strengthened their resilience, international cooperation becomes important in addressing these issues. At the national level, widespread reform efforts have intensified. These have been reinforced by regional initiatives. Of equal importance are reforms at the international level.
The New York Fed The New York Fed has important and unique responsibilities in supporting liquid and wellfunctioning financial markets. Working alongside our colleagues in the Federal Reserve and other agencies, we are taking rapid and significant actions to supply liquidity and to stabilize critical parts of our financial system. We are conducting large-scale repo operations to assure ample liquidity in money markets.3 In addition, at the direction of the FOMC, we are purchasing sizable quantities of U.S. Treasury securities and agency residential and commercial mortgagebacked securities to improve functioning in these critical markets.4 To put the current situation in context, we are running more open market operations, for greater sums, than at any time in our history.5 The Federal Reserve is also making liquidity available to key intermediaries to support market functioning and to keep credit flowing. These actions include offering term loans to depository institutions through the traditional discount window, and the establishment of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility.6 These strong and timely actions averted a potential shutdown in the flow of credit and are providing funding and stability at a time of extraordinary volatility in markets. Although stresses in financial markets will not entirely abate until the pandemic is behind us, we have seen material improvements in measures of liquidity and market functioning in key parts of the U.S. financial system. Our work is not done.

The economic distress and the extraordinary uncertainty about the future course of the pandemic have set off a tidal wave of flows of money away from riskier investments to the safety of cash. This sudden shift led to an evaporation of liquidity and breakdowns in the functioning of key 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  financial markets. This includes the market for U.S. Treasury securities, the cornerstone of the global financial system. These developments, if left unchecked, threaten to starve our economy of the credit that it badly needs during this difficult time. The Response Last month, as the risks posed by the coronavirus became increasingly apparent, the Federal Reserve took swift and decisive action to support the economy and stabilize financial markets. In two unscheduled meetings in the first half of March, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) quickly brought the target range for the federal funds rate to near zero.1 The FOMC also signaled that it expects to keep interest rates at this level until it is confident that the economy has weathered recent events and is on track to achieve the Fed’s maximum employment and price stability goals.2 These monetary policy actions serve two purposes. First, low interest rates make it easier for households and businesses to meet their borrowing needs during this time of economic stress. Second, they foster broader financial conditions that will help promote the rebound in spending and investment needed to return the economy to full strength.
And against the backdrop of monetary policy easing, deposit rates have declined in the corporate segment by 1.3p.p. and in the retail segment by 0.8 percentage point since the beginning of the year. This allows banks to lend at lower rates without losing too much of their margins. But there is a flip side of the coin here too: it affects the attractiveness of deposits versus other forms of savings. This year we have seen a record flow of retail funds into alternative savings instruments, and capital market instruments. In general, this flow does not affect the total amount of savings in the economy, or their availability as a resource base for investments. But banks, when determining their policy on deposit rates, need to take into account this growing competition from the securities market and other instruments. And in the structure of the deposit products they offer, accommodate for the fact that over a medium-term horizon, as disinflationary factors and disinflationary risks are exhausted, a return to neutral monetary policy is inevitable. Now about banking sector profit — in the first 7 months of this year it stood at 761 billion rubles (return on capital — about 13% year on year). That said, of course, it is necessary to consider that more than 70% of this profit was made in Q1, while in Q2 profit fell to 102 billion rubles. It is difficult to make profit forecasts right now.

Moreover, the increasing in competition among commercial banks provides higher incentive for them to serve a wider range of customers, especially SMEs, who once have limited access to raise funds and relied on self-funding in a less-developed market. In another project to ease SMEs access to funds, the Bank of Thailand has set up the SMEs Database to reduce asymmetric information in the market and provide a more favorable business environment. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Bank of Thailand pursues the goal of sustainable well-being, and strong economic fundamentals are requisite to achieving this goal. We closely assess the growth, price, and financial stability in order to ensure our mandate. Meanwhile, to expand the growth frontier we consider thoroughly in all aspects to develop the financial system as a policy instrument, encouraging business to capture the rich opportunity from Thailand strategic location. In the soccer game of the economy, the Central Bank acts as Center Back. In order to safeguard stability during the recent circumstances, we have played a proactive role due to high economic uncertainty. Now that political and economic clarity is higher, the central bank will play a supportive role. At the back we can clearly see the whole field and choose a path to support the team’s offense, especially now that the government has gotten back to its position as the play maker to assist the private sector to reach the goal of achieving growth potential. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The resilience of the Thai economy 1.
From a European employment perspective, the good news is that Europe is catching up in line with the goals of the Lisbon agenda. From 1995 to 2003, the respective growth rates of overall labour input are still 0.9% for the U.S. against a now positive growth rate of 0.7% per annum for the EU-13. Thus, while the relative growth of labour input and measurement differences can explain the GDP growth difference up to 1995, this is no longer true since. The data indicates that instead, GDP growth divergence since 1995 has been influenced much more by changes in productivity growth. Productivity growth as change in GDP per work hour is crucial as it determines wages and – together with labour input growth - the potential growth rate. Productivity growth differential EU – U.S. As you can see from Graph 3, labour productivity growth rates since 1995 have been markedly less in the European Union than in the United States. Previously, the reverse was true for several decades. Graph 4 shows that between 1995 and 2000, Europe lagged behind the United States. Labour productivity grew on average 0.6 percentage points per annum less in the EU-11 than in the United States. After 2000, the situation worsened. Between 2001 and 2003, EU-11 lagged the United States by an average of 1.7 percentage points of labour productivity growth per year.

BIS Review 27/2005  1  measurement issues currently explain between 0.5 and at most 1 percentage point of the growth differential between the EU and the United States.2 We should consider the upper limit of this range as a litmus test to the question of whether there is a structural growth differential between the EU and the United States. In addition to various measurement differences, about one percentage point of the difference in real GDP growth rates between the EU and the U.S. can be attributed to the higher growth rate of labour input in the U.S. for the period between 1980 and 1995. This is attributable to a stronger increase in the working population in the U.S. and a marked relative decline of effective working hours in the EU. Factors causing this decline in individual labour input can be divided into two categories: First, numerous rigidities in European labour markets were introduced over the past decades: working hour restrictions, minimum wage agreements, and other restrictions on the conditions of hiring and firing employees. These restrictions are often valid over a broad range of sectors and geographic areas irrespective of economic fundamentals. Second, changes in taxing labour evolved over time with significant tax cuts realized in the United States.3 In total, overall labour input for the period 1990 to 1995 increased in the U.S. by an average of 1.2% per annum against a decrease of 0.8% per annum in the EU-13. This is pictured in Graph 2.
The measures implemented by Norges Bank were tailored to a situation in which financial markets no longer functioned. Now, banks and companies are again able to obtain funding in the market. The arrangement whereby banks can exchange covered bonds (OMF) for government securities has made a substantial contribution to securing long-term funding for banks. The first signs that the covered bond market was beginning to reopen became evident in spring. The minimum price in the swap arrangement is therefore now being adjusted to the interest rate that seems to be forming in the market. The arrangement can then be phased out in the course of the autumn. Over the past year, there has been a substantial need to provide liquidity to banks. In addition, underlying structural liquidity in the banking system, i.e. liquidity excluding Norges Bank’s liquidity operations, has been negative in recent years. Structural liquidity is influenced by ingoing and outgoing payments to and from the Government’s account in Norges Bank and is expected to increase ahead, primarily because the Government largely finances lending to state banks, payments to the Norwegian State Bond Fund and the Norwegian State Finance Fund by drawing down deposits in Norges Bank. Banking system demand for loans from Norges Bank will then decrease considerably. In most countries, the financial crisis led to a crisis in the real economy. Fiscal policy measures were gradually implemented as it became clear how strongly the financial crisis was affecting economic activity levels. Many governments have accumulated substantial debt.

The regional network provides figures for the same quarter far earlier. In 2008, the regional network was able to provide clear evidence that mainland output fell markedly in the fourth quarter as early as December of the same year. National accounts figures for the fourth quarter were published more than two months later, on 19 February 2009. Employment in Norway has held up well through the downturn. It appears that unemployment will be considerably lower than expected. Seasonally adjusted registered unemployment was 2.9 per cent in August. Over the past year, the level of unemployment has risen most in the counties of Aust-Agder, Sør-Trøndelag, Østfold and Vestfold and least in Sogn, Akershus and Finnmark. Unemployment is highest in Oslo, at 3.9 per cent in August. Unemployment may be low because firms have chosen to retain their employees. Perhaps firms are opting to keep a certain labour reserve because of recruitment problems and high costs experienced during the previous cyclical turnaround. Higher government expenditure has contributed to holding up public sector employment. Unemployment may move up if global developments deteriorate and have a stronger impact on output in Norway. Between 1000 and 2000 new jobseekers from other countries are still being registered each month, even though work permits were no longer required for nationals from new EU countries as of 1 May for work lasting less than three months. The level of registered work permits, however, seems to have stabilised over the past year.