samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They include some reflection whether there is a need for more co-ordination and synergy between our policy dialogues with the IMF and the Commission; how the Commission’s fiscal surveillance (through Economic and Fiscal Programmes, Pre-Accession Economic Programmes, Convergence Programmes) can be deepened and serve more as a commitment device; how far there are lessons to learn about monetary anchors and prudential coordination mechanisms for the EU accession of our region; and how we – including the external actors – can foster stronger domestic anchors in various forms, ranging from medium-term fiscal frameworks to more effective policy co-ordination mechanisms. Finally, we will turn to the issue of capacity-building. This is a question on which we agreed, at this workshop, to already provide some operational input to the CEF as it develops its work programme in this area. There is a long lead-time in the effectiveness of capacitybuilding, although fortunately the CEF had already taken the initiative a few years ago to ramp up its contribution in areas such as financial stability and policy co-ordination, so it has a head-start. In the field of capacity-building, we need to consider: what are the top priorities, and where are the gaps to be filled through initiatives in terms of training workshops, technical assistance, and cross-country exchanges of experience. This will bring us to look carefully at the design and implementation of fiscal policy, among others, and the way policies come together through domestic co-ordination processes.

The simple truth is, unless you are on a train, you don’t have the chance to move forward and will never come closer to your destination: Success. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  5. If you feel that I should not be depicting a rather scary train journey on this auspicious and joyful occasion, then please forgive me and let me try another scenario for you to think about, again using my train journey story. 6. Suppose that you have been bumped off the train once or twice and have found your way back onto the next trains to carry on with the journey. You will gradually realise that there are certain rules and disciplines on the train that determine who get the good seats, who can be upgraded from the economy cabin to the business class and then the first class cabin. There are also rules and booking system that govern who can enjoy a good meal at the dining car and when. So you will come to realise that the train is not a wild jungle filled with animals, or people, trying to eat each other alive. You will also discover that there are some passengers who have got upgraded to the business or first class cabin not just because they are muscular or clever. They are ahead of most other passengers because they possess certain qualities that we in modern time called leadership.
But, despite our efforts, banks regularly lose money in the same old way: while pursuing profits, growth and market share without adequate heed to risk. Unfortunately, they often find clever new ways of doing this, so that it isn’t always easy to see how the same old habits will be repeated. While today’s Committee members are, I’m sure, looking for some respite from the ambitious work programme of post-crisis reforms, we also need to recognise that nobody can guarantee a crisis-free future. Therefore, we must remain vigilant against old risks reemerging in new shapes and forms. I will speak shortly about some of the key influences that have shaped the evolution of the Basel Committee over the years. Before I start, however, I would like to warmly welcome a number of special guests today: •  First let me welcome Peter Cooke. Having headed the Committee for more than a decade, Peter has been our longest-serving Chair – and, probably more than any other person, he was instrumental in laying the foundations for the Committee’s subsequent achievements. Indeed, his contribution is best highlighted by the fact that, for many years, people did not refer to the Basel Committee, but to the “Cooke Committee” and the “Cooke ratio” – although I know Peter is the first to acknowledge that the credit for the Accord is shared by many. Peter – we are very pleased that you and your wife Julia can be with us today.

In this respect, it should further be borne in mind that the maintenance over a prolonged period of time of a strong expansion in domestic demand, driven by substantially generous monetary and financial conditions, entails pressures which, if they build up, may emerge precisely when some of the factors upholding growth begin to show signs of petering out. The foregoing comments indicate that the favourable growth prospects for the coming years cannot be taken as guaranteed over the longer term. The Banco de España has been signalling the fact that the prevailing growth pattern harbours certain risks that may emerge in the form of a deterioration in competitiveness and financial imbalances in the households and non-financial corporations sector. Although the trajectory of the Spanish economy has not yet been hampered by the emergence of these risks, any future deterioration could impair further progress in real convergence. Competitiveness can be undermined on several fronts. The first of these is the maintenance of a persistent inflation differential with the euro area. This differential is partly related to the fact the Spanish economy is ahead in the cycle, but it has also to do with the presence of elements of inertia in wage and price formation in Spain associated with structural shortcomings in certain markets for factors, goods and services. Another significant front is limited productivity growth, which is not only lower than in the United States but also than in most of the European countries.
Christian Noyer: The macroeconomy and financial systems in normal times and in times of stress Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at a conference, jointly organised by the Bank of France and the Deutsche Bundesbank, Chantilly, 9 June 2009. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues It is my great pleasure to address such a distinguish audience to day. As you may know, this is the second time the Banque de France and the Deutsche Bundesbank have jointly organised such a conference. It is held every two years, alternating between Germany and France. The fact that an event of this nature is co-sponsored by the two institutions sends a strong signal to the research community. It also clearly illustrates the importance of research in today’s monetary policy making, given the interplay, which is not always fully understood, between financial markets and the real economy. The top quality work that has been done in this conference will be of great help for policy making. Normal times and times of stress Over the recent months, thanks to the joint actions of governments and central banks, markets have shown gradual signs of improvement. Yet, the functioning of the markets has not been fully restored. At the current juncture, one key challenge is to restore confidence in a context where players are still confronted with numerous sources of uncertainty: uncertain exposure vis-à-vis counterparties, uncertain valuation regarding financial assets or financial risks.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the main policy response has focused on regulation. Indeed, there is a widespread consensus that the cause of the current financial meltdown stems from the failure or even the absence of regulation in important segments of the financial system. But it may also have implications for monetary policy, to which I turn now. BIS Review 74/2009  1  Some implications for monetary policy Central banks have been on the frontline since the crisis unfolded in the summer of 2007. A dramatic change occurred however after the collapse of Lehman Brothers where we had the sentiment that we were moving into uncharted territories: spreads reached unprecedented levels both on the money and credit markets, leading to a worsening of financing conditions across industrialised countries. Without action some important parts of the transmission mechanisms would have been significantly impaired. In such a context, major central banks embarked on unconventional policies by: •  Increasing central bank liquidity;  •  Influencing risk premia on private financial and credit instruments. Such policies are referred to as credit easing policies;  •  Pre-committing to conducting very low interest rate policies for as long as necessary in countries where the interest rate has already reached its lower bound. All these policies are set out as temporary policies and deemed to be used in times of stress only. It is obviously too early to gauge their overall impact.
Figure 6 Inflation indicators  (annual change, percent) 12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4 06  07 CPI  08 CPIX1  09 CPIX  10  11  CPI w/o foods & energy  Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 7 Sovereign risk premiums (*) (basis points) 2.500  2.500 500  500  2.000  2.000 400  400  1.500  1.500 300  300  1.000  1.000 200  200  500  500  100  100  0  0  0  0  ene.10jul.10ene.11jul.11 10 Jul. 11 Jul. ene.10 jul.11 10 jul.10 Jul. ene.11 11 Jul. Ireland  Italy  Portugal  Greece  France  Germany  Spain  (*) Measured using 5-yr CDS premiums. Fuente: Bloomberg. Figure 8 World stock exchanges (*)  (index, 01/01/2008=100; 01/03/2011=100) 120  120 120  120  100  100 110  110  80  80  100  100  60  60  90  90  40  40  80  80  20  20  70  70  08  09  10  11  Latin America Developed markets  Jan.11 Jan.11  Apr.11 Apr.11  Jul.11 Jul.11  Emerging Europe Emerging Asia  (*) Corresponds to MSCI indes in local currency. Source: Bloomberg.

It has been tempting for many to take up this type of loan for home purchases even with a poor debt-servicing capacity. These borrowers were banking on a rise in house prices that would allow them to service the loans once interest payments increased and principal payments fell due. Securities were developed around these loan portfolios. A large number of risk-prone investors who were seeking high returns – and with a similar belief that a continued rise in house prices would secure the collateral values – made it easy to find buyers for these securities. Weak developments in house prices towards the end of 2006 and into 2007 led to rising defaults on subprime mortgages. This resulted in a sharp increase in credit spreads for securities backed by this type of loans. Into spring and the early part of summer, a succession of news releases reported large losses and collapses in funds that had specialised in these investments. It was not primarily the size of the actual losses that led to the collapse of the funds, but a shortage of liquidity. The news of mounting losses prompted a sell-off by investors in these funds. As a result of increased losses and sell-offs, the funds had to sell other, more solid securities in a weak market, which made the losses visible and reinforced the exit of depositors and other creditors. The unfolding of events became increasingly redolent of a classic bank run. The turbulence spread during summer.
For that reason, our approach to liquidity insurance continues to evolve: •  In November 2014 we extended eligibility for membership of the Sterling Monetary Framework to include broker-dealers and Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs), giving non-banks access to our permanent liquidity insurance facilities for the first time. •  The range of acceptable collateral continues to extend: we have started to approve pools of auto loans and invoice finance receivables as eligible collateral for the first time. And we have started work to ensure there are no technical obstacles to our ability to accept equities as collateral should the need arise. 4  The Bank introduced US Dollar repo operations in September 2008, and their usage peaked at the equivalent of $ in October 2008. The Bank also provided a peak of $ to RBS via Emergency Liquidity Assistance. 5  The Bank’s commercial paper purchase schemes opened in February 2009 with a peak usage of £ The corporate bond purchase scheme opened in March 2009, with a peak usage of £  6  Plenderleith (2012) and Winters (2012). 7  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/redbook.aspx. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  The Bank will commence work in the second half of 2015 to assess the feasibility of establishing a Shari’ah compliant facility. By providing an additional highly liquid asset for Islamic banks, such a facility would be a significant step forward in their liquidity management capabilities. •  We are continuing to develop our capacity to lend in currencies other than sterling.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 1: Bank of England Balance Sheet as a share of nominal GDP Per cent 30 25 20 15 10  2010  2000  1990  1980  1970  1960  1950  1940  1930  1920  1910  1890  1900  1880  1870  1860  1850  1840  1830  5 0  Sources: ONS, www.measuringworth.org/datasets/ukgdp/result.php# and Bank calculations. A variant of this chart was originally published in a speech by Andrew Haldane (2009), “Banking on the state,” http://www.bankofengland. co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf. Figure 2: Membership of the Sterling Monetary Framework Sterling Monetary Framework members 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  0  Source: Bank of England. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3: Sterling liquid assets relative to total asset holdings of UK banking sector(a)  Per cent 16 14 12  Narrow Ratio(a)  10  Broad ratio(b) Reserve ratio(c)  8 6 4 2  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  0  Sources: Bank of England and Bank calculations. (a) Data for building societies are included from 2010 onwards. Prior to this, data are for UK banks only. (b) Cash + Bank of England balances + money at call + eligible bills + UK gilts.
However, a positive signal was sent thanks to the agreement reached between the EU Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission at the end of December on the terms of reference of the impact study on long-term guarantees. This study will give impetus to the discussions and I count on the contribution of the institutions chosen by the ACP. Insurance companies must take advantage of the extra time before Solvency II comes into force: in coordination with EIOPA at the European level, we consider that it is already possible and necessary to make use of certain definitive elements in the Solvency II directive, in particular concerning governance and the ORSA (Pillar 2), and reporting to the supervisory authority (Pillar 3). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2.2  In the banking sector, credit institutions must continue strengthening their solvency – a process that is already well underway – and they must intensify their initiatives to adapt to future regulations concerning liquidity. The Prudential Supervisory Authority has organised a series of meetings designed to familiarise the French financial sector with the changes resulting from the implementation of the Basel 3 reforms. In terms of liquidity, the coverage ratio (LCR) is now stabilised. In my New Year address of January 2011, I said that the work on liquidity ratios was unsatisfactory and that it clearly needed to be reviewed. This has now been done.

Michael Gondwe: Importance of the SME sector in Zambia Opening remarks by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the launch of the Soweto branch of Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited, New Soweto market, Soweto, Lusaka, 31 August 2012. *  *  *  •  The Standard Bank Chief Executive for Personal and Business Banking in Africa, Mr Terry Moodley;  •  The Managing Director of Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited, Mr Dennis Kennedy;  •  Distinguished Customers of Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited;  •  Management and Staff of Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited;  •  Distinguished Invited Guests;  •  Members of the Press;  •  Ladies and Gentlemen. I feel honoured and privileged to be amongst you this morning. I wish to thank the Stanbic Bank Management for extending an invitation to me to deliver a keynote address on this important occasion. Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to begin by applauding Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited for opening the Soweto Trader Branch. I commend Stanbic Bank as I observe that the Trader Branch is specifically designed with the Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) sector in mind. This branch opening fully complements the Bank of Zambia which has set Financial Inclusion as one of its key strategic objectives. It is our expectation that the opening of this branch will provide opportunities for the SMEs to access financial services which for a long time have been lacking in this sector.
Unfortunately it is not possible to repeat the outstanding performance observed in macroeconomic aggregates in the labor market. In February 2006, the unemployment rate increased by 0.2 percentage points compared to February 2005 and reached 11.9 percent. Meanwhile, non-agricultural unemployment decreased by 0.6 percentage points compared to the same period last year and came down to 14.8 percent. In the last one-year-period, the number of people working in sectors other than the agricultural sector increased by 829 thousand. The rise in employment can mostly be attributed to structural factors. Non-agricultural sectors have a bigger potential for creating jobs. However, it is a fact that there are structural problems in the labor market, especially in the agricultural sector. Now, let me share these problems with you briefly. The data pertaining to the labor market in Turkey point to a rapid shift of workers from the agricultural sector to other sectors for the last four years. The share of agricultural employment in total employment, which was 38 percent in 2001, came down to 25.1 percent by February 2006. However, when the EU-15 average of 3.7 percent recorded in 2004 is taken into account, it is obvious that 25.1 percent is still very high. Meanwhile, it is expected that the shift from the agricultural sector to nonagricultural sectors will continue and the share of the agricultural sector in total employment will gradually decrease. The decline in agricultural employment prevents a decline in the unemployment rate.

Tanya Sirivedhin: The New Capital Accord and E-Banking Opening remarks by Mrs Tanya Sirivedhin, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the FSI Workshop for SEANZA's Forum for Banking Supervisors, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 3-7 December 2001. *  *  *  Distinguished Resource Persons and Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen: I would like to take this opportunity to personally extend a warm welcome to everyone here today, and to express our deepest appreciation to our distinguished speakers and panelists who have kindly agreed to share with us their knowledge and experience concerning the New Capital Accord and EBanking. I would also like to thank the Financial Stability Institute of the Bank for International Settlements, for their efforts in co-hosting this workshop on frontier issues. As is well known, the New Capital Accord is scheduled for implementation in 2005. Reflecting comments on the second consultative package, the draft third consultative package is scheduled for release early next year. Judging from the comments submitted in May, the new draft promises to be interesting and controversial. This is not surprising since it will mark what will be no less than the beginning of a worldwide revolution in the way financial institutions are managed, and especially how risks are supervised. The sophistication that comes with enhanced risk-sensitive capital charge should be an important incentive to drive financial institutions around the world to upgrade their expertise, organizational structure, database, IT system, and most of all their risk management process.
But now that the height of the global crisis is behind us, and the need for short-term macroeconomic management less pressing, a serious attention should also be given to the agenda of long-term competitiveness and sustainable growth. This calls strongly for structural reforms of the supply side of the economy, where the constraints are particularly binding and a large-scale upgrading long overdue. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Pursuing demand management policies alone can only take us so far – somewhat akin to stepping on the gas pedal without upgrading or modifying the car we drive. Pursuing demand–side policies can also come with a steep price tag, especially when the policy borders on the realm of populism. Such policy would add to micro-level risks by making households undisciplined and addicted to “easy” money, while also add to macro-level risks by stretching fiscal resources without enhancing competitiveness in any meaningful way. The Bank of Thailand views the need to address structural issues to be very timely and pressing. “Lifting barriers to sustainable growth” was indeed the central theme of investigation of the Bank of Thailand Symposium this year, which was held at the Bangkok Convention Center last week, and I hope some of you had a chance to participate in the event. My comment today, however, is my personal view and is not intended to be related to the Symposium.

Regulatory changes, adjustments in the structure of banks, and innovations in the fields of investment opportunities and payments undoubtedly play a major role. Moreover, with receding inflation rates the relative disruptive effect of such instabilities has increased. Certainly, it cannot be excluded that at some point in the future we will again see a phase of greater stability in the demand for money, but in the current environment such a change is not evident. The policy concept implemented by the Swiss National Bank three months ago is made up of the following three elements: an explicit definition - in terms of a figure - of price stability; publication of a three-year inflation forecast; and an operational implementation target in the form of a target range consisting of 100 basis points for the three-month Swiss franc/Libor rate. I need not enter into this in detail before this audience. The decisive test must be in the time path of the ultimate target variable - the price level - which we will achieve on this basis. As regards the concept as such, I should merely like to make two remarks pertaining to misunderstandings. First, the interest rate target defined as a target range is not a substitute for the money supply target of the concept formerly implemented by us. It is neither more nor less than an operational implementation aid with a much shorter time reach relative to the formerly used money supply target.