samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The krone depreciated by about 13 per cent from its strongest level in January 2003 up to summer 2003. In autumn 2003, the krone showed a tendency to appreciate against the euro. This partly reflected  BIS Review 34/2004  3  lowered market expectations concerning an interest rate increase abroad and expectations that interest rates might rise earlier in Norway than in other countries. At the same time, the euro appreciated in relation to other currencies. Changes in the krone resulted in an unintended tightening of monetary policy. The krone depreciated again in December, however, owing to low inflation figures and a reduction in interest rates. The interest rate reduction was probably of considerable importance as it eliminated the excess return on NOK investments. The krone has again appreciated since last winter. Parallels can be drawn with the situation towards the end of 2002. The current high oil prices and expectations that oil prices will remain high for a long period may have been important for the appreciation of the krone. When there is considerable uncertainty with regard to future developments in oil prices, market participants may hedge against risk by investing in NOK. As mentioned earlier, the Petroleum Fund acts as a buffer against wide fluctuations in the krone exchange rate as a result of petroleum revenues. An increase in petroleum revenues will normally also result in higher capital outflow from the Petroleum Fund. The market may at times have a tendency to underestimate this stabilisation mechanism.

And the costs of taking this route would be unacceptable. References Bernanke, Ben S., Vincent R. Reinhart and Brian P. Sack, 2004, “Monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound: An empirical assessment(external),” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 1–78, available by subscription. Eggertsson, Gauti B., and Michael Woodford, 2003, “The zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy(external-pdf),” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 34, No. s1, pp. 139–211. Federal Open Market Committee, 2005, Meeting transcript(external-pdf), February 1–2. Krugman, Paul R., 1998, “It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 137–206. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997, “Optimal inflation targets, ‘conservative’ central banks and linear inflation targets,” American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 1, March, pp. 98–114. Taylor, John B., 1979, “Estimation and control of a macroeconomic model with rational expectations,” Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 5, September, pp. 1267–1286. Woodford, Michael, 2003, Interest and Prices: Foundations of Monetary Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Werning, Ivan, 2011, “Managing a liquidity trap: Monetary and fiscal policy (external),” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 17344, August. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Cyber risks thus present an enormous potential for insurance players – not just to capitalise on this insufficiently tapped space, but more importantly, to play a vital risk management role for the wider society: •  Increasing awareness of cyber exposures, as well as the forces of regulatory change, will underpin the rapid growth of cyber insurance. It is estimated that the cyber insurance market will grow 30% per annum to $ billion in annual premiums by 2025. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Companies are increasingly focusing on cyber security issues. 63% of boards today actively address computer and information security, up from 33% in 2012. The sharp increase is likely driven by the recent high-profile and well-publicized cyber incidents. •  Governments are also gearing up to address the problem. There is a trend towards stringent data protection regimes that are backed by increasing levels of liabilities such as more notifications and significant fines for data breaches. US, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia are among those already enforcing, or looking at, new laws, while the European Union is looking to harmonise pan-European data protection laws across the EU member states. As technology and the users – or abusers – of technology get smarter, the extent of and impact from cyber breaches will correspondingly rise. Businesses must prepare for this new era of cyber risks with cyber insurance as a critical component in a comprehensive risk management strategy.

To further the development of cyber insurance in Singapore, the MAS is supporting the Cyber Risk Test-bed project. This will promote both the demand for and supply of insurance coverage, as well as tackle the difficulties that arise when nurturing new and emerging lines: •  On the supply side, a lack of loss and claims data that underpins an effective and accurate risk pricing model. •  On the demand side, a lack of awareness as cyber risk is new and emerging, and exposures are therefore difficult to understand and quantify. •  Finally, insufficient technical expertise to underwrite such complex risks. Led by the NTU-Insurance Risk and Financial Research Centre (IRFRC) in collaboration with the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), the insurance industry and corporates, the industry-wide cyber insurance test-bed project seeks to address the limits of insurability of cyber risks in three ways. •  First, the common data sharing platform encourages pooling of not just insurers’ claims data, but also corporates’ potential loss data simulated through hypothetical events. •  Second, it helps corporates understand their potential exposures and losses. •  Third, the players on the platform can come together to establish industry standards on clear-cut definitions of cyber risks, coverage limits and terms and conditions. Today, I am very pleased to announce SCOR as the first founding member to join the Cyber Risk Test-bed Alliance. We remain in close discussions with a number of insurance players, and look forward to the industry’s active participation on this strategic project.
3  Pier Carlo Padoan, A Shared European Policy Strategy for Growth, Jobs, and Stability, February 2016. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Member States would be free to join, and the Convergence Fund would be allocated to financing common goods such as European infrastructure investment or refugee settlement. In a second stage, this budget could become a stabilisation instrument, centralising a welldefined set of policy instruments, such as a European layer of unemployment insurance. The third and final stage of fiscal integration would only be achieved if agreement can be found both on financing (direct revenue-raising capacity and common debt issuance) and on the desirable level of business cycle synchronization. This perspective would be a powerful incentive for national discipline and commitment as shown during the march to the Euro. How to set up a legitimate institution with a genuine administrative capacity? Further integration and democratic accountability should progress together, as discussed in my recent article with Jens Weidmann. We need to enable the European economic administration to be more efficient, while establishing strong enough political legitimacy to ensure balance between liability and control. These institutional changes obviously require a new Treaty. First, we need a legitimacy-enhancing appointment process. The Finance Minister could thus be appointed for a five-year period by the European Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the president of the EU Commission.

Just as central banks need to gradually unwind monetary accommodation when the crisis has passed, so must fiscal policy return to a more sustainable trajectory. Targeted fiscal policy measures can support monetary policy and macroprudential policy in achieving their objectives. Tax or expenditure measures have the advantage of being able to either alleviate or accentuate the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies on specific groups of people or sectors of the economy. To help cool an overheated property market, fiscal measures such as transaction taxes on property purchases can be a useful complement to macroprudential measures to curb excessive demand. In the current conjuncture of high inflation, fiscal policy has the versatility of being tighter overall to help ease demand pressures while providing targeted support for the most vulnerable groups. INTEGRATED POLICIES AS APPLIED IN SINGAPORE Before I conclude, let me say a few words about the Singapore experience. Singapore does not have a formal integrated policy framework but there has been an intuitive coherence across monetary, fiscal, and macro-financial policies. This has helped to secure both price stability and financial stability through various crises. Close consultations on the state of the economy across the respective policy-making bodies and a common ethos of prudence has helped to achieve this policy coherence without resorting to formal policy co-ordination. Monetary policy is centred on managing the exchange rate to ensure price stability over the medium-term. It is set by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS).
From a central banker’s standpoint, the role of asset prices in general and of inflation-indexed bonds in particular in the process of setting monetary policy is mainly related to their information content on future economic activity and inflation. As you have already probably noticed, the Governing Council of the ECB sometimes refers to the information delivered by the changes in the inflation-indexed bond yields both in its introductory statement and in its comprehensive assessment of recent economic and financial developments, as presented, for instance, in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. To elaborate further on this, I will develop three points. First, I will describe the information content of inflation-indexed bonds and explain why this information is relevant for central banks. Second, I will highlight some of the main drawbacks and potential biases that may alter this information content. Third, I will briefly review the other indicator variables that we also use in our cross-checking exercise at the euro area level. Finally, I will conclude my presentation by raising the issue of what I call the  1  Robert Shiller: “The Invention of Inflation - Indexed Bonds in Early America”, NBER Working Paper N°10183, December 2003. 2  In the year prior to the introduction of the indexed bond, the inflation rate was at 69.2% in Brazil, 22.2% in Chile, 19.7% in Colombia, 34.8% in Argentina, 16,1% in the UK in 1974 and still at 14% in 1980.

This points out to a sort of “circularity problem” whereby it is unclear how informative the information extracted from asset prices actually is. Consider for instance the stable break-even inflation rate at a level close to but below 2% in the euro area. Then suppose that, as sometimes observed on other financial markets -as the money market for instance- for any reason, the market for indexed-bonds is indeterminate in the sense that the market is unable on its own to determine an ex-ante equilibrium price. Thanks to the existence of a central bank, an equilibrium price may however be set if issuers or price-makers believe the central bank will commit to price stability as defined by a year-on-year increase of a consumer price index at around 2% over the medium run. The indexed-bond price will then be set on the basis of the actual conventional bond prices and the long-term nominal anchor defined by the central bank, factoring in certain margins or premia. This clearly indicates the central bank’s credibility, and a stable break-even inflation rate will reflect this aspect. But what else can we draw from this information to take a monetary policy decision? This might be another illustration of what some economists have recently named the “credibility paradox”. On the one hand, the information variable of the central bank is consistent with its definition of price stability: therefore no cause for concern.
Ravi Menon: Bending the curve of nature loss Keynote remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Chair of the Network for Greening the Financial System, at the COP15 Finance and Biodiversity Day, Montreal, 14 December 2022. *** Ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured and delighted to be able to address you on this important occasion of COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The world is getting painfully acquainted with the impending climate crisis. There are promising efforts at mitigating this crisis, though far from what is necessary to avert disaster. But the planet faces a second crisis –– nature and biodiversity loss. The nature crisis is no less threatening than the climate crisis. But it is much less appreciated and much less is being done to mitigate it. We assiduously measure and seek to grow our physical and human capital. We speak of the importance of social and political capital. But we fail to appreciate let alone measure natural capital – the world's stock of natural resources, comprising soils, air, water, plants, animals, and minerals. These are assets that sustain our food supplies, underpin our economy and society, and enable human life. We are collectively depleting our natural capital and degrading the ecosystems that support it. We are consuming more resources than the Earth can produce in a year. At current rates of consumption, we use up 1.6 Earths' worth of resources. By 2050, our annual resource use will rise to 2 Earths' worth.

Bandid Nijathaworn: The current financial crisis, lessons learned, and future implications Keynote address by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 11th SEACEN Conference of Directors of Supervision of Asia-Pacific Economies, Bangkok, 29 July 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Speakers, Participants, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to be giving this morning’s keynote address for the opening of the eleventh SEACEN Conference of Directors of Supervision of Asia-Pacific Economies under the theme: “The Current Financial Crisis, Lessons Learned, and Future Implications.” This forum gives us an excellent opportunity, at this crucial juncture, to discuss the recent global financial crisis and to share amongst ourselves the experience as well as the lessons learned, so that we can further strengthen and improve our financial systems and supervision. Looking at the agenda, it is certain that the discussion in the next two days will be a most valuable one. So far, the SEACEN economies, one way or another, have all been affected by the current global financial turmoil. As central bankers and regulators, we are faced with the important task of putting in place future regulation, and the obvious place to start is to ask the questions whether the crisis could have been prevented or mitigated in the first place, and how the lessons learned from the current crisis can be used to prevent the next crisis. These are not easy questions to answer.
Thereby, public authorities have allowed moral hazard to prevail and a deficit of market discipline to arise in the banks. This problem must be addressed. And this is also what much of today’s debate is all about. One tool that could facilitate this is contingent capital – or dilution of ownership through contractually enforced debt-to-equity conversions when a bank runs into trouble. Such contingent capital can buy time or even reduce the need for governmental injections. No wonder this idea is currently being contemplated by banking regulators across the globe. The difficulty lies, however, in finding trigger mechanisms and other features that would cover a multitude of distressed situations while, at the same time, being difficult to game. Also, it is hard to see how contingent capital solutions would work for mutual banks and other forms of cooperatives, as these banks do not have common shares. So, while contingent capital may reduce moral hazard and, in some situations, maintain a bank as a going concern, it is not a silver bullet. Some banks will fail in spite of their equity being propped up by the conversion of debt instruments. So there will still be a need for economically savvy behaviour by public authorities. But when push comes to shove, such behaviour is very difficult to accomplish in practice. The main reason is that, in most jurisdictions, there are still significant shortcomings in the framework for the public management of banks in distress. Many governments are left with a general bankruptcy law as their only tool.

The first lesson is to perform a thorough due diligence to clarify the extent of the problem in the troubled bank. But, in line with my previous principle, ideally you need to do this fast. Once you have a firm grasp of the bank’s difficulties, its time to carefully assess your support options. This assessment will, of course, include direct costs, but indirect consequences for the financial markets and the overall economy should also be taken into account. The second lesson is to opt for the least-cost solution. This may sound obvious, but many examples show that the lesson is not always heeded by decision-makers. In some cases, a least-cost solution means a state guarantee against losses on assets or a funding guarantee. But when that does not suffice, brokering a private solution – such as a takeover from another, sounder bank – is another option. This usually also includes some elements of guarantee in order to sweeten the deal for the acquiring bank. But guarantees may skew the incentive, so you need to tread carefully. Such skewed incentives are, in fact, good examples of the indirect costs you need to weigh in your assessment of alternative solutions. If neither of these solutions is possible, you are simply left with one single option – injecting capital into the bank. Textbooks in economics typically describe the functioning of central banks as lenders of last resort.
Gold plays virtually no part in our or other modern economies. But I do not think it was an accident that so many associated gold with the Bank. Gold remains for many a powerful symbol of stability. And stability is what the Bank of England is for. There have been major changes to the Bank over the last year or so. With the passing of the Financial Services Act in April last year, Parliament gave us very significant new responsibilities and wide ranging powers. More than ever now, stability remains at the heart of what we do. As we set it out in our new objective, the Bank’s core purpose is: “to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability”. I want to focus today on the financial stability part of that purpose: what are we trying to achieve and how do we go about it? And how does it fit in with the other main part of that core purpose, maintaining monetary stability – or to put it simply, controlling inflation? A little bit of history might help to provide some context. The Bank’s current arrangements for the setting of monetary policy date back to 1997. At that time, I was involved, at the Treasury, with the implementation of the reforms that gave the Bank of England operational independence on monetary policy. Our thinking in those days was very much dominated by the need for simplicity and clarity – “one instrument for one target”.

We aim to address that through the actions of the MPC and the FPC. The first aims to balance supply and demand and so steer the economy to keep control of inflation. The second aims to preserve financial stability by ensuring the underlying financial system is resilient by identifying risks and taking action to prevent them crystallising. The stress test of the major UK banks towards the end of the year will assess the resilience of the system to a major crash. The steps taken last week are insurance against the possibility of a sustained boom in the housing market leading a substantial increase and concentration in household debt that could make a crash more likely and more severe. And finally, just in case despite this speech, I am deluged with requests to visit the Bank’s gold vaults, I am afraid there are very good security and safety reasons why we cannot offer this. But I can recommend that on your next trip to London you visit the outstanding Bank of England museum just off Threadneedle Street. It is free. And you will be able to try to pick up one of our two bars of gold. Most important of all, there is an excellent game that will allow you to try your hand at maintaining monetary and financial stability. Because stability is what the Bank of England is for. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The rate of economic growth outside the United States is also looking better. Although there are pockets of weakness and potential sources of vulnerability, the overall rate of global growth has accelerated significantly and looks as if it’s now running at the strongest levels in four years. The broad measures of U.S. consumer price inflation are very low. Inflation expectations as reflected in surveys and in the Treasury inflation-protected securities, although higher than current rates, still suggest an outlook of very modest future price increases. Deflation risks worldwide appear to have diminished, and there are some signs of accelerating price increases in some economies. Overall, however, despite the sharp increases in energy and commodity prices, the inflation outlook globally appears quite benign. At the core of the U.S. economic experience of the past decade is a significant and sustained acceleration in productivity growth. This offers the prospect of more rapid growth in income over time, both for the United States and for the rest of the world. In the economics profession, there is a debate about whether we are in the midst of a secular trend characterized by lower GDP volatility and general price stability, which some have called the “great moderation.” As important as the question of the extent of this moderation in macroeconomic volatility is the debate over its source. It’s undoubtedly the result of a combination of factors, including better economic policy, innovation and globalization, plus simple good fortune in the form of smaller shocks.

5 de octubre de 2017  Presentation of the III Seminar in Economic History Banco de España Luis M. Linde Governor  Good morning and welcome to the Banco de España for our III Seminar in Economic History. The Seminars in Economic History organised by the Banco de España were launched three years ago, in 2015. The first one was held on the occasion of the retirement of Pedro Tedde de Lorca, who for many years was the member of the Directorate General of Economics and Statistics in charge of the Economic History programme and that, by the way, has been recently elected as a member of the Spanish Royal Academy of History. Last year, in October, we celebrated the second edition of the Seminar. The main purpose of these seminars is to bring together economic historians from academia and economists from the Bank to engage in research into economic episodes of the past with relevance for the economic problems of today. For many years the Banco de España has devoted substantial resources to research in economic history. This tradition goes back to the mid-1960s when a project was launched to publish, in one volume, a series of essays tracing the origin and development of the Banco de España, one of the oldest banks of issue, originally established in 1782 as “Banco de San Carlos”. The result was El Banco de España. Una historia económica and Ensayos sobre la economía española a mediados del siglo XIX, both published in 1970.