samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This explains why I was pleased to accept to participate in this conference, whose purpose is indeed to take stock of what has been achieved since Malta joined the EU in 2004 and, more importantly, to reflect on what still remains to be done. Where have we come from? In order to appreciate the nature of the challenge that membership implied, it is first necessary to recall where we were coming from. Suffice it to point out that the European Commission’s response in 1993 to Malta’s application had been highly critical. It concluded that, “The adoption of the acquis communautaire … depends on a thoroughgoing overhaul of the Maltese economy’s regulatory and operational systems.” The first steps in the reform process were taken in the mid-1990s. These included the liberalisation of the financial system and of the import tariff regime, the gradual easing of exchange controls, the partial deregulation of interest rates and the introduction of value added tax and of lower direct taxes. When the membership application was reactivated in 1998, however, the economy still needed significant restructuring. Further reforms were, therefore, launched once accession negotiations commenced in 1999, including a further dismantling of trade restrictions and the privatisation of State-owned enterprises. This, however, was still not enough. The vulnerability of the Maltese economy was exposed in 2001 by the mounting competitive pressures from emerging economies and by two major external shocks, the bursting of the dot.com bubble and the events of 9/11, which together had an adverse impact on the manufacturing and tourism sectors.

The way forward Going forward, therefore, it must be realized that in a monetary union the effects of institutional rigidities, inappropriate policies and inefficient practices on prices, costs and competitiveness will inevitably become visible in the shape of lower income levels relative to the other members of the union. Given that a sizeable income gap already exists with the euro area, removing the remaining impediments to faster growth is, therefore, a policy imperative. Two elements of an appropriate response to this challenge emerge spontaneously from an analysis of the current macroeconomic situation. Attention has already been drawn to the over reliance on consumption as a driver of growth since 2005, highlighting the need to devote more resources to investment. In Malta’s case, this must continue to take the shape predominantly of FDI because of the implied technology transfer and access to markets. Attracting further FDI, however, will require a determined effort because when the current recession is over the global marketplace will be characterised by fewer, but more costefficient suppliers and a slow-growing demand; a large pool of unemployed labour, implying downward pressures on wages; and an increased tendency for investment to shy away from relatively expensive locations. A review of Malta’s investment promotion strategy should, therefore, be undertaken that takes this scenario fully into account. Private investment must be supported by appropriate levels of public investment, mainly of an infrastructure nature.
Aznan bin Abdul Aziz: Banking and ESG revolution – going beyond aspirations Closing remarks by Mr Aznan bin Abdul Aziz, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the AICB-ABM 2nd Malaysian Banking Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 27 June 2023. *** Y Bhg Tan Sri Azman Hashim, Chairman of the Asian Institute of Chartered Bankers; Y Bhg Dato Khairussaleh Ramli, Chairman of the Association of Banks Malaysia, Vice Chairman of AICB and Group President and CEO of Maybank Group; Esteemed guests, ladies and gentlemen Assalamualaikum and Salam Sejahtera It's past 5 pm. And I have the unenviable job of keeping you from leaving after a highly productive and packed day. It is simply incomplete to adjourn without the regulator relaying its thoughts and expectations . I understand that the day started with a focus on where we, as a country, are in the climate journey. We know that 2050 is THE Year – the earliest point by which Malaysia aspires to reach Net Zero GHG emissions. Many significant policies are now either in place or are due to be finalised soon to get us to 2050. These include key frameworks and roadmaps for Malaysia to transition such as the Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategy (LT- LEDS), Nationally Determined Contributions Roadmap (NDC Roadmap) and National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR). These policies will enable yourselves and your clients to better align your transition plans.

Financial institutions must both be innovative in developing relevant and effective financing solutions, and facilitate innovation by supporting green technologies or nature-based solutions that may be the key to unlocking a green future for Malaysia. Adequately addressing the needs of your clients requires addressing the needs of the future industries that your clients will be operating in. The Bank is working actively to enhance the green ecosystem to support the economy's transition. This includes refinements to our regulatory and supervisory approaches, facilitation of products and services, engagement and capacity building as well as efforts to bridge data gaps. We look forward to continuing close collaboration with the financial sector via the Joint Committee on Climate Change (JC3) and other key stakeholders to further the climate agenda. Finally, I would like to thank AICB and ABM for facilitating this important conversation. Thank you. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Delaying euro adoption would thus not only postpone the benefits of the single currency but could also place Malta further behind the other new Member States, many of whom are expected to have adopted the single currency by 2008. Three of them, in fact, have already joined ERM II and could be candidates for euro adoption as early as 2007. What is ERM II and what is the rationale behind it? ERM II is an arrangement in which a formal rate of exchange is established between the euro and the national currency of each participant in the mechanism. This rate is called the central parity rate. The rules require that at the time of entry, the lira is fully pegged to the euro. This means that the current peg to a three-currency basket, in which the euro carries a 70 per cent weight, will have to be terminated by then. Participation in ERM II without a unilateral change in the central parity rate is obligatory for all new Member States, though deviations within a standard band of +/- 15 per cent are permitted. This obligation reflects the role of ERM II as a test of economic convergence and as a signalling tool which supports that convergence. The idea of a "test" rests on the premise that a high degree of exchange rate stability against the euro is only sustainable if the country's economic structures have converged significantly towards those of the euro area.

It is lined with a number of potential worries and difficult considerations, not least for central banks. But the situation in the financial markets is currently much more stable than it was during the crisis and the risk of setbacks has declined. One can say that the ice is safer. BIS Review 25/2010  5  Clearer signs of a recovery in the economic statistics As I have mentioned, there is a further overall reason that we are now on firmer ground. The economic statistics that have been coming in have been mainly positive. Confidence in the future development of the economy has also taken a sharp upturn in Sweden, the United States and the euro area (Figure 4). Our assessment is that the situation in the world economy is continuing to improve. In most countries the economy is growing again and world trade is beginning to pick up after the abrupt slowdown in connection with the acute crisis (Figure 5). New figures have been published by Statistics Sweden since our most recent forecast was published. These show that GDP at the end of last year was lower than we had estimated. At the same time, for instance, confidence indicators have continued to strengthen. However, the Executive Board will weigh up and assess the new information at our next monetary policy meeting on 19 April. Figure 4 Increasing confidence according to purchasing managers index  Note.
And its potential growth is at the top of the class of the major advanced economies. An important driver of that dynamic has been FDI. Since the establishment of the single market in 1992, the UK has been the top recipient of foreign capital in the EU. 6  And now set out in the Treaty of the EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 7  Compared using business creation rates scaled by relative GDP. 8  For a further discussion of these points, see: Carney, M (2014), Speech at the Trades Union Congress Annual Conference, September. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Evidence suggests that the openness of EU economies to foreign investment has improved firm-level productivity both through technology transfer and enhanced management practices (Chart 12). This has likely been complemented with labour flows leading to better-matched skills. Broadly speaking, the evidence suggests that UK has successfully harnessed the benefits of openness afforded by its EU membership while avoiding some the drawbacks of reduced flexibility from which some continental European economies suffer. 3.2  Role of EU in UK stability  If the impact of EU membership on openness and dynamism is relatively clear, its effect on stability is more complex. Greater dynamism makes a given burden of debt easier to service, enhancing resilience to shocks. And the common rules and diversification afforded by EU membership bring the potential for financial stability benefits. But there have also been challenges.

From this real and financial openness flow two important consequences for the UK economy and for the Bank’s objectives. 2.1  Openness and dynamism  The first is dynamism. Cross-border integration of goods, services, labour and capital markets increases an economy’s dynamism through increased specialisation, enhanced competition, and greater possibilities for diversification and risk-sharing. Greater openness boosts the size of markets that UK households and firms can access. In turn, trading in larger markets spurs innovation and promotes the adoption of new  3  Per capita growth in the UK was fastest in the G7 1973–2008. Including the period since the crisis, the UK falls to second, after Japan. 4  See, for example, Lipsey, R G and Lancaster, K (1956), “The general theory of the second best”, The Review of Economic Studies, 24 1. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  technologies from abroad. It also intensifies competition and drives efficiency improvements not least by allowing firms to exploit economies of scale. The openness associated with the free movement of labour can help better match workers with firms, alleviating skills shortages and boosting the supply side or the potential growth rate of our economy. And greater openness can enhance the allocation of capital by better matching lenders with borrowers, potentially financing growth-enhancing investment. Foreign Direct Investment has particular benefits. By creating stable and long-lasting links between economies, it assists economic integration and boosts dynamism by establishing channels for technology transfer and skills improvements. The impact of openness on dynamism is not unambiguous, however.
It would of course be unfortunate for the continued international discussion if the conclusion of the Swedish experiences were that when the policy of leaning against the wind was attempted in practice, it led to a very poor, or even catastrophic, result. Because this is not the case. 1  See, for example, Visco (2014) and Yellen (2014). 2  See, for example, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2013), Borio (2014), Carney (2013), Smets (2013), Stein (2013) and Woodford (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Before I continue, I would like to make it clear that my purpose here today is not to justify every single decision the Riksbank has made. It is natural that different observers make different assessments regarding economic developments and thus reach slightly different conclusions regarding what exact policy should be conducted. With hindsight, it is clear that monetary policy could have been somewhat more expansionary if we had known that inflation would be as low as it is now. This is a natural and unavoidable consequence of the fact that monetary policy has to be based on forecasts, which are uncertain. However, most of the recent criticism has gone far beyond discussing this type of difference in assessments. Instead, it has claimed that the policy conducted by the Riksbank was wrong on a more fundamental level. This is the type of criticism I intend to focus on here.

“The results of the policy have been devastating for the Swedish economy” The picture that critics like to paint is of a high repo rate pushing down demand and creating a more or less deflationist situation in the Swedish economy. This is something that some international analysts in particular seem to have latched onto, interpreting the situation in Sweden today to be similar to that in Japan in the 1990s.19  16  See, for instance, Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2013). 17  See, for example, Jansson (2014). 18  In some cases, the critics have also had diametrically opposed views. Paul Krugman appears to think that Sweden has probably already had a housing bubble for some time, and that as it is too late to do anything about it, the Riksbank should not conduct a policy that leans against the wind (see Andrén Meiton, 2014). Lars Svensson, on the other hand, appears to think that there is no great risk of a housing bubble building up (see Svenska Dagbladet newspaper, 2014a) and that a policy that leans against the wind for this reason is not needed, but is harmful. 19  See, for instance, Krugman (2014a, 2014b) who as well as likening Sweden to Japan, has also characterised monetary policy in Sweden as an example of ”sadomonetarism”. Among Swedish critics it is less common to make comparisons with Japan.
Before getting to the substance, I should say first that the Bank is releasing a text comprising a few bullet points around which I shall frame my remarks; and second, that I am speaking for myself this evening and not for any of the policy committees, domestic or international, of which I am a member. Speaking notes Part 1: Prudential regulation of financial firms: rules versus discretion •  Bank of England is once again the prudential supervisor of banks. And this time of building societies and insurance companies too. •  Prominence given in public debate to the Bank absolutely not adopting a ‘tick box’ approach, but instead a ‘judgment-based’ approach. This has been widely applauded. •  In fact, market practitioners tend to be schizophrenic about it. For a couple of decades at least, they have called for ‘certainty’ whenever any specific, isolated policy area is being reformed; ie clear and complete rules. But taking the resulting monstrous rule books as a whole, senior practitioners rightly condemn the ‘tick box’ regulation that almost inevitably results. •  And leaders of firms have hardly stopped their staff from making a living finding ways around rules: endemic regulatory arbitrage was at the heart of so-called ‘shadow banking’ in the run up to the crisis. •  Step back to consider the public policy purpose. Contrast prudential supervision with securities regulation as traditionally conceived. Latter works on basis of: write rules; check compliance with those rules; punish breaches.

But neither the markets nor the public was comfortable with the degree of secrecy on these matters in the past. •  It does, though, pose the question of what happens when a firm ‘fails’ a stress test. And at this point, I need to broaden these remarks to the international scene and how that is affecting our relationships with business. Part 3: Policy in a global setting •  This country believes in free trade and open financial markets. Our financial system is highly integrated with the global system. •  That means that some firms domiciled or operating in the UK are global, and many are international. Creates a huge need for a level playing-field internationally. That is a common interest of business and the authorities:  •  Business: want to be able to compete more or less anywhere on equal terms with local, indigenous firms and with international firms from other countries. •  Authorities: want good standards on top of that. Not only because we need them at home. The UK/London needs good standards abroad too: problems in the international financial system almost anywhere in the world will blow through London and the UK to a greater or lesser extent. And vice versa. Financially, we’re the opposite of an island. •  Up to a point we can mitigate that by measures such as HMG’s planned ‘ring fencing’ of retail banks, which has the effect of separating domestic intermediation from the entrepôt. But the non-ring-fenced banks matter for stability too!
Until 1992, only primary dealers, as designated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, had direct access to the interdealer brokerage platforms.6 Owing partly to the advent of direct bidding in Treasury auctions and the effects of the Salomon Brothers bidding scandal the year before, the interdealer brokers expanded access beyond primary dealers to all entities who were netting members of the Government Securities Clearing Corporation (now the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, or FICC). Over time, other entities also gained effective access to the platforms through their prime brokers, who themselves had direct access. In more recent years, interdealer brokers have granted access to an even wider range of participants, including participants outside the FICC netting membership. A third change is the availability of close substitutes to on-the-run Treasuries, which, as noted above, account for the great majority of trading in interdealer markets. Historically, onthe-run Treasuries had a limited number of close substitutes as a highly liquid, credit-riskfree, dollar-denominated fixed-income instrument. Today, however, dealers and investors can transact in a variety of instruments that closely resemble the risk and liquidity properties of on-the-run Treasuries, including Libor-based interest rate swaps and overnight index swaps. Moreover, Treasury futures, which have existed for several decades, have become an increasingly widely used close substitute as well. Throughout this history, the Treasury market has retained one of its most important attributes – its superior liquidity. However, the concept of financial market liquidity is a notoriously difficult one to define.

At this point, monetary policy must broaden its scrutiny to involve every important aspect from the external environment, domestic economic cycle as well as structural features important for the future monetary policy stance. The bottom line is that in a dynamic external environment we must take care about structural bottlenecks, regardless of whether they are related to the transitional stage of our economies or induced by the global crisis. I have tried to tackle some of them, which I believe will be discussed further on the high level Governors panel or additionally elaborated in the next sessions within the research papers. As I mentioned at the beginning, this is a broad topic, which is very important for the monetary policy transmission effectiveness. Therefore, I appreciate your attendance and contribution to our Conference, in sharing experiences and broadening our overall knowledge on these issues. I wish you interesting conference and fruitful discussion! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
These  4  BIS Review 68/2008  two features of the operational framework in combination with the large scale temporary refinancing operations have certainly helped the Eurosystem to effectively mitigate funding liquidity risk for counterparties when interbank markets stopped functioning properly. In order to understand better the specific role which ABSs fulfil in the implementation of our monetary policy, let me just remind you of some key elements of our collateral framework. The Eurosystem has a broad definition of debt instruments and against this background a wide range of public and private securities, including asset-backed securities, can potentially become eligible if they fulfil all the other eligibility criteria. Indeed, compared with the traditional concept of other central banks in the world, the Eurosystem accepts a large volume of high quality ABSs, and has done this well before the outbreak of the financial market turmoil. In addition to the general eligibility criteria, such as the denomination in euro and compliance with our minimum rating threshold, some specific requirements apply to ABSs: (i) only the most senior tranche of an ABS structure is eligible; (ii) ABSs must be backed by assets that have been legally acquired by the special purpose vehicle (SPV) in a manner that the Eurosystem considers to be “true sale”, and (iii) the issuing SPV must be located in the European Economic Area (EEA). There are no special restrictions on the underlying assets backing the transaction, with one exception, namely that underlying asset pools may not consist of credit derivatives.

In particular, the current recession differs from past episodes in that its origin is not economic, so the fall in activity is not caused by problems in specific sectors or markets, but rather by the interruption of the normal functioning of businesses and activities to combat the spread of Covid-19. This implies that the economic measures adopted should seek to ensure that companies and individuals survive this period of confinement, avoiding more permanent damage. The key to mitigating the effects of the pandemic is to get credit flowing to businesses and allow them to cushion the major drops in their cash flows. Several measures have been implemented with this in mind, with some elements in common. First, central banks, along with lowering their benchmark rate to its lowest possible, have established special bank financing programs, conditional on their increased lending. Some examples are the programs of the Bank of England (Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs, TFSME), the European Central Bank (Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations, TLTRO), and the Central Bank of Chile (FCIC). Second, governments have committed resources that serve as guarantees for loans, which in the Chilean case are the FOGAPE 1 guarantees (Table 1). In Chile, the sum of both programs is equivalent to just over 15% of GDP, comparable to the resources that have been committed in Brazil, but far above what has been done in other Latin American countries, such as Peru, Colombia, and Mexico.