samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Beyond the large number of subsidiaries established in or relocated to Paris since then – at least thirty banks, twenty asset managers, several market platforms for instance –, we should also consider the activities performed through branches in Paris, especially trading rooms and desks, which are sometimes far more significant than the subsidiaries to which they are legally bound. Contrary to other cities, which have attracted one or two kinds of financial services, Paris is the only one to have benefited from relocations on all segments of the financial industry. More importantly still, these moves were not one-off events: the momentum has lastingly shifted from London to continental Europe. We observe a steady shift, which shows no sign of losing steam. Combine this with the strength of some key sectors of our economy; the result is that Paris now stands as the first stock market capitalisation in Europe, ahead of London.3 Whatever your field of activity, you will find in Paris a convenient and safe harbour, with all facilities and fast speed train connections to other major cities, in Europe and  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  beyond. It has also attracted regulatory bodies, which can only be viewed as comforting neighbours after recent turmoil elsewhere. The EBA (European Banking Authority) moved to Paris in the wake of Brexit, thereby joining ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority). Having a "regulatory hub" will facilitate cooperation between European agencies, in a world that requires such enhanced cooperation between authorities.

You may remember that in the quarters that followed the invasion of Ukraine, growth prospects were regularly revised downwards, as our European economy suffered in particular from high energy prices, fear of a shortage in energy sources, and hence general uncertainty - and even worries about how we would get through the winter. Europe reacted swiftly, diversifying its sources of energy supply, and global market prices decreased sharply, especially from the fourth quarter of 2022. In the end, the euro area economy expanded by 3.6% in 2022, still higher than in the US, despite a slowdown in the second half. The likelihood of a recession in 2023 is now very remote, and growth prospects have even been revised upwards, to 1.0% in 20231 (up by 0.5 percentage point compared with December forecasts), before rebounding to 1.6% in 2024 and 2025. Faced with a historic geopolitical and economic shock, Europe has shown remarkable resilience, and greater unity. Euro area inflation further accelerated after the invasion of Ukraine, but the outlook for 2023 and beyond has also recently improved – although with mixed news. On the one hand, the earlier-than-expected easing in energy prices has led to a decrease in headline inflation since October 2022, from 10.6% to 6.9% in March2 – though this level is obviously still far too high. We also expect tensions on food prices, which have soared since 2022, to start fading from the third quarter of 2023, in the wake of the recent sharp decrease on international markets.
Why is it not possible for monetary policy merely to stabilise the real economy or lean against the wind? Such a monetary policy arrangement would be well in line with the new thinking in the international debate that I presented in my introduction, in particular if this were to be taken to its logical conclusion. 12 I intend to return to this debate soon, so let me put this issue to one side for a moment. Conclusion (ii): Fairly significant interest rate rises may be needed to brake the build-up of financial imbalances One issue in which I have gradually revised my opinion in recent years is that of how much a central bank should and must lean against the wind to deal with the build-up of a financial imbalance. Previously, I had a rather strong belief that leaning against the wind relatively moderately could have a good effect, primarily by sending a clear signal that the central bank is concerned over developments and perceives them to be risky. Today, I am more doubtful about this. It certainly seems reasonable that the effectiveness of such a strategy will vary over time and from economy to economy, depending on the exact circumstances, for example regarding market sentiment and debt levels, but overall I am significantly more sceptical than before. I still believe that a certain degree of leaning against the wind, combined with clear communication of the risks, could increase awareness 12 For one example, see Scholes and Alankar (2017).

The stronger the increase in demand in relation to potential production, the greater the risk of prices and wage rising too fast, and vice versa. We must therefore analyse the entire economic outlook, despite the fact that inflation is our target variable. However, the Riksbank cannot affect potential production, i.e. how quickly the economy can grow without causing inflation. This is what structural policy can do. Structural reforms can promote both investments and labour supply and thereby have a favourable effect on the long-term growth capacity of the economy. A good structural policy can, for instance, contribute to a larger number of persons in various age groups choosing to work instead of remaining outside of the labour force. By improving the conditions for wage formation and price-setting, structural reforms can also contribute to increasing the economy’s capacity to adapt to different types of shock. Structural policy can thus be seen as a complement to monetary policy. The better the long-term growth capacity of the economy, the more  1  See the monetary policy memorandum “The Riksbank’s inflation target - clarification and assessment”, 4 February 1999, Reference no. 1999-00351 DIR. BIS Review 17/2003  1  quickly the actual growth rate can be without inflationary pressure arising, which would mean that the Riksbank had to react by raising the repo rate. Structural reforms are thus important from a welfare perspective. A high growth rate in the long term increases the possibility to pay high wages, extend welfare or invest more in infrastructure and education.
In order to prevent a refinancing “cliff” at the end of 2011, the Bank has had bilateral discussions with the main users of the Scheme to ensure that there are credible funding plans in place to reduce their use of it in a smooth fashion. Of the £ of Treasury bills initially advanced, some £ has already been repaid. The Discount Window Facility Alongside the Operational Standing Facilities to cope with short-term frictional shocks, and Long-Term Repos to cope with system-wide liquidity shocks, the Bank’s Discount Window Facility offers large-scale liquidity support for idiosyncratic as well as system-wide shocks. The Discount Window was launched during the heart of the crisis in October 2008. It allows banks and building societies to borrow gilts against a wide range of collateral, at fees reflecting the type of that collateral and the size of the drawing relative to the size of the firm. Although similar in principle, the Discount Window is not intended to be a direct replacement for the Special Liquidity Scheme. It is both shorter-term and more expensive in steady-state, in line with the underlying principles for all the Bank of England’s permanent liquidity insurance operations: that commercial banks should be incentivised to manage their liquidity risk prudently in the market. The terms were also designed to protect the Bank against risk to its own balance sheet. Transactions under the Discount Window facility are intended to be for a maximum 30 days, although they can be rolled.

When Bank Rate was cut rapidly and by more than was anticipated by the market during Autumn 2008, the Bank recorded a large, unintentional surplus. 11 In the permanent regime, it is important that the Bank not be exposed to the risk of a large loss if Bank Rate were to be increased above market expectations. In June 2010, those operations were replaced with a new permanent framework designed in part to reflect these concerns. The operations, pioneered with the invaluable help of Paul Klemperer from Nuffield College, Oxford, are known as “Indexed Long-Term Repos”. The most innovative aspect is that banks can bid to borrow cash against either the normal, “narrow” collateral set – as standard in short-term repos – or a “wider” set of collateral, including private sector securities. Counterparties can submit bids using one or both types of collateral. They can even make a “paired bid”, quoting spreads at which they would be indifferent between the two collateral sets. The Bank of England then allocates a proportion of the operation against wider collateral, where that proportion depends on the spreads offered. The idea is that as the market becomes more stressed, counterparties are willing to pay more to borrow against wider collateral. As the clearing spread rises the Bank, automatically within the auction, lends a greater proportion against wider collateral. The clearing price is the intersection of the revealed demand schedule of the firms bidding and the private supply schedule of the Bank of England.
The probability is thought to be low, but tangible. In other words, most likely the outlook is fine, but it might not be. A cut in rates might be warranted in order to guard against the consequences if the risk has, in fact, crystallised. The policymaker could wait for more evidence, but by waiting they risk being too late to avoid some deviation of output from ‘potential’ and of inflation from target. This is not a free lunch. In keeping with the insurance metaphor, a premium will have to be paid: in the form of accepting a slightly higher probability of inflation rising above target in the near term if the (insured-against) risk has not, in fact, crystallised. In other words, the policymaker faces a trade off, based on a judgment of probabilities and costs. But, in my view, there is more to it than that. Communication matters too. If the policymaker takes out the insurance, they need to be clear (with themselves) about the conditions under which it would be withdrawn, ie the cut reversed. And that state-contingent policy analysis needs to be communicated to the market too. Some economists do not like the idea of ‘insurance’ policy settings, and ask, reasonably, how they square with the type of objective (loss) function I set out at the beginning of my remarks.

We try to discipline ourselves not to claim too much credit for stable growth. And in forecasting, we have to attend to the uncertainties around our projections of the central outlook. Some numbers may serve to underline that. The MPC’s projections are published as fan charts. The fan-chart standard deviation of output growth at around one year is a little under one percentage point; and of inflation at around two years, roughly 0.5 percentage points. This is not a world in which one should get carried away by fine judgments that alter the central projection for demand by 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points. Yet, as the Bank has documented, 15 assuming that credibility is maintained, the effect of a surprise change in the official interest rate, is judged to be small; maybe less than 0.1 percentage point on the annual rate of inflation two years after a 25bp surprise change maintained for one year. Of course, we are not in fact in the business of aiming to make surprise changes in our policy rate. Against a background of credibility, a lot of practical monetary policy making is not about forestalling major lurches in the economy and inflation via large, abrupt changes in the policy rate. Instead, it has to involve careful analysis of the conjuncture, with transparency to the market. But these numbers do perhaps illustrate the importance of our not getting drawn into absurd degrees of detail, and the risk of signalling that we think we can precisely fine tune demand conditions.
In response, the international community has strengthened considerably the frameworks for anti-money laundering (AML) and counter financing of terrorism (CFT) and exchange of information on tax-related crimes. These developments will have implications for the wealth management industry globally. MAS is fully committed to safeguarding the integrity and reputation of Singapore as a clean financial centre:   One, we have a strong legal and regulatory framework on AML and CFT, in line with international standards.   Two, we have a rigorous regime of supervision to monitor compliance by financial institutions.   Three, we will strengthen cross-border co-operation to fight trans-national financial crime.   Four, we will step up vigilance against suspicious flows of funds arising from external developments. Let me give you an update on what MAS has done and will do in each of these areas. A robust legal and regulatory framework Singapore has a robust regulatory framework on AML/CFT. The key legislation is the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act, or CDSA. The CDSA makes it a crime to engage in the money laundering of benefits from a total of 417 so-called predicate offences, ranging from criminal breach of trust, to dealing with property of terrorist and market manipulation. The CDSA makes the reporting of suspicious transactions mandatory for all persons who become aware of such transactions in the course of their work. MAS gives force to the CDSA by requiring all financial institutions in Singapore to have in place an effective AML/CFT framework.

Ravi Menon: A competent, trusted, and clean financial centre Welcome address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the WMI (Wealth Management Institute) Connection, Singapore, 27 October 2011. *  *  *  Mr Ng Kok Song, Chairman of the Wealth Management Institute, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good evening. I am delighted to join you tonight, to celebrate the 8th anniversary of the Wealth Management Institute (WMI). And I want to add a special word of congratulations to the 258 graduates who have recently completed WMI programmes ranging from the Master of Science in Wealth Management to the Advanced Wealth Management Programme. Explosive growth in Asian wealth Across the world, we are seeing strong growth in the creation of wealth.   Globally, the wealth held by high net worth individuals1 has increased by 63 percent over the last ten years.2    As at end-2010, there were nearly 11 million high net worth individuals, compared to 7 million ten years ago. Wealth is growing most rapidly in the Asia-Pacific region, accounting for more than half of the increase in global wealth last year.   There are 3.3 million high net worth individuals in the Asia-Pacific, 18 percent more than the pre-crisis peak. In fact, there are now more high net worth individuals in the Asia Pacific than in Europe and almost as many as in North America.
They are associated with the fact that expanding demand in many industries exceeds their potential to ramp up output and imports. This accelerates price growth as well. As to the product groups where prices rose the most in the second quarter, these are construction materials, furniture, and cars. When people expect prices to rise faster, they decide to make large purchases earlier. To do this, they use both savings and borrowings. Growth in consumer lending again sped up to a quite high rate, which was driven by accommodative monetary policy, among other things. On the other hand, accommodative policy lowered the demand for bank deposits, especially given accelerated inflation. There are also other markets where price growth was rather caused by one-off factors and limited supply. This is tourism, for instance. Only a part of foreign destinations have been reopened, whereas Russian resorts’ infrastructure is still insufficient to accept the entire tourist flow. As a result, prices for tourism services soared, which also sped up inflation in June. Furthermore, May—June recorded a surge in prices for such vegetables as cabbage, potato, carrot and beetroot, which was because 2020 harvest stocks started to end before the new harvest supply. However, the contribution of such one-off factors to overall inflation is smaller than that of steady factors. The increase in prices for these everyday products is very noticeable and significantly impacts inflation expectations.

On 1 July, we returned risk weights for consumer loans to the pre-pandemic level. However, given recent months’ data, we will soon make a decision on additional macroprudential measures to cool down this segment of the retail market. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  I will now speak on possible risks to the forecast. Proinflationary risks continue to prevail. We consider that the main risk is a potential anchoring of inflation expectations at a high level. Fuelled by high inflation expectations, temporary growth might become sustained. There is a slight increase in risks associated with a possible faster normalisation of monetary policies in advanced economies. As a result, market volatility in emerging market economies might intensify, which can affect exchange rate and inflation expectations. There are also certain risks caused by structural changes in the labour market due to the pandemic. The demand for some professions is declining, whereas the demand for others is rising. This is confirmed by data on a record-high increase in vacant jobs. Adjusting to the new needs of the economy requires time for specialist retraining. Consequently, this provokes local staff shortages. The situation is aggravated even more due to the restrictions on the inflow of labour migrants, which affects construction and seasonal agricultural works most seriously. The situation in the labour market might increase companies’ costs. Proinflationary risks associated with the environment in global commodity markets persist. Nonetheless, June—July recorded the first signs of a decline in world prices.
Being the first winners of this competition also carries with it the responsibility for you to implement your business plan successfully and set a high standard for subsequent winners in the years to come. I thank you for your attention! BIS Review 103/2010  3

During the year, the ACP thus developed a more cross-functional mode of operating, thereby responding to the intention that led the Government to merge the former authorities in 2010. The ACP’s College has set out priorities for the supervision of each of the two sectors in a coordinated manner, and the ACP has set up an autonomous and cross-functional research directorate. On the other hand, in line with international and European initiatives, the ACP’s supervisory methods are complemented by the “stress test” approach to ever more complex scenarios and by the monitoring of the systemic nature of certain institutions. Organised by the European authorities (the EBA for banks and the EIOPA for insurance companies) and the Basel Committee respectively and implemented concretely in France by the ACP, these approaches supplement the individual supervision of banks and facilitate the macroprudential supervision of the financial system. The ACP’s supervision methods have also fully taken on board its remit with respect to consumer protection, which is an essential condition for maintaining consumer confidence in the French financial sector. The ACP’s mandate is to promote, in coordination with the AMF – the report of our joint unit will be presented to you shortly – the sound conduct of market players’ commercial practices  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  without hampering responsible financial innovation that is suited to each category of customers. In 2011, the ACP thus took a whole range of measures, of which I will only mention the main ones.
The difference between 3-month interbank rate and expected policy rate (basis-spread)  Sources: Reuters EcoWin and the Riksbank  2.World trade stabilising World trade monitor index, 2000 = 100, seasonally-adjusted data 180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  20  20 0  0 90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Source: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis  8  BIS Review 111/2009  3.Growth in Asia GDP, annual percentage change 15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5 China South Korea  -10  -10  Taiwan Japan  -15  -15 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  Sources: National sources  4.House prices in the USA Index, January 2000 = 100, seasonally-adjusted data 250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0 88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Source: Standard & Poor's  BIS Review 111/2009  9  5.Growth increasing in the world GDP, quarterly change in per cent calculated as an annual rate, seasonally-adjusted data 10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4 Euro area  -6  -6  USA  -8  -8  TCW  -10  -10  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Sources: National sources and the Riksbank  6.GDP Quarterly changes in per cent calculated in annualised terms, seasonallyadjusted data 10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5 July  -10  -10  September  -15  -15  -20  -20 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  Note.

The problems concerning how measures of resource utilisation relate to the normal level are, however, greater. It is difficult enough to measure resource utilisation, but it is even more difficult to measure what its normal level is. Instead we have to weigh together different measures and indicators in a reasonable way. This of course provides greater scope for a wider range of assessments. The financial crisis has, not least, also raised the question of to what extent monetary policy should take financial stability into account. This is an important question that should be analysed further. Let me conclude by saying that it appears that the fiscal policy and monetary policy stimulation measures that are being implemented throughout the world are beginning to have the desired effects. The situation in the financial sector has improved and an economic recovery is now discernable. But it is still uncertain whether the recovery is stable or whether there is a risk that it will come to a halt as soon as the fiscal policy and monetary policy stimulation measures are phased out. Deciding the appropriate time to begin the phase-out of the now very extensive monetary policy stimulation measures is a major challenge. If the phase-out begins too early there is a risk that the recovery will come to a halt. If we wait too long, there is a risk that we will need to increase the repo rate very quickly in order to meet the inflation target.