samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, at the same time, transition countries and previously strictly-regulated countries inspired by planned economies such as China and India are playing an increasingly important role in the world economy. While the adjustment towards market conforming economies is moving at a rapid pace, there is still a long way to go until conditions in the domestic markets are the same as those in the old industrial nations. Fixed exchange rates, undeveloped credit markets and a high level of domestic saving in emerging economies can, for instance, delay price adjustments and thereby push down both short-term and long-term interest rates in the international capital markets. Increased competition from low-price imports coupled with low import prices for clothes, for instance, have already kept inflation down for several years in many parts of the world and contributed to the interest rates determined by monetary policy being very low. There is thus some risk that demand for credit and asset prices in many countries have been pushed up by expectations of lower interest rates in the future than is sustainable in the long term. We thus find ourselves in a situation where the inflation rate has been pushed down by increased competition from low-inflation economies at the same time as asset prices and indebtedness have increased rapidly. A dilemma ensues here.

There is widespread incertitude regarding the potential effects of such a shock on financial markets, since the resilience of the new financial securities and intermediaries to this type of shocks is yet to be tested. ; (4) deeper distortions and tensions created by severe global imbalances, which might result in an increase of protectionism and a disorderly correction of international parities to sudden changes in capital flows financing those imbalances, affecting financial markets and asset prices; and (5) the ever present geopolitical perils. The Chilean economy The Chilean economy has reaped the benefits of the dynamic world economy through a very significant terms-of-trade improvement that accumulates 70% since 2002, and through a strengthening of markets for our exports. Part of the better terms of trade goes to foreign owners of mining projects in the form of profits and dividends, but a substantial fraction stays in Chile in the form of greater profits and dividends paid to companies owned by nationals (including the State as the owner of the copper corporation CODELCO), increased tax collection and better salaries and bonuses to workers producing the commodities. The expansionary effects of this gain in terms of trade become larger as it is believed to be more permanent. The favorable external conditions, the stronger fiscal impulse – associated to the more permanent portion of the copper price increase – and the good financial conditions are behind this solid expansion, leaving behind the unexpected deceleration experienced by the Chilean economy in the third quarter of last year.
In other words, fulfilling the convergence criteria in a sustainable way ensures that the country can integrate smoothly into the monetary union, without a risk of disruption for the Member State itself or the euro area as a whole. The convergence process and the fulfillment of the criteria are therefore •  not used to exclude countries by putting up extra hurdles for them to pass;  •  they are used to ensure that their inclusion occurs smoothly and to the mutual benefit of the country in question and the euro area as a whole. IV  Once a country is able to fulfil these legal and economic criteria in a sustainable manner, it joins the euro area. However, the adoption of the euro is not the end of the story. It is merely the end of the beginning. Indeed, joining the euro is not in itself a recipe for success. Countries need to pursue the right policies in order to thrive in the euro area. Joining the EMU removes the national instrument of nominal exchange rate adjustment. This implies increased flexibility of national economies and increased responsibilities for the co-ordination of the national economic policies of the member states, because they have to compensate for the elimination of this adjustment channel.

Iceland would join the euro area once it fulfils all the convergence criteria. At that point, the Central Bank of Iceland would become part of the Eurosystem, its governor would have a seat at the table of the ECB’s Governing Council, and Iceland’s economy would be considered in taking monetary policy decisions for the enlarged euro area as a whole. Thank you very much for your attention. 6  BIS Review 17/2008
Table 1: 2009 Inflation path consistent with the end-year target and the uncertainty band March  June  September  December  11.70  10.80  10.50  9.50  Path Consistent with the Target  9.70  8.80  8.50  7.50  Uncertainty Band  7.70  6.80  6.50  5.50  Uncertainty Band (Upper Limit)  (Lower Limit) In case end-of-quarter inflation figures breach the band specified in Table 1, the Central Bank will disclose the reasons for the deviation in the quarterly Inflation Report, together with the measures already taken as well as those to be taken to attain convergence to the target. Thus, the Inflation Report will also have an important role as the main tool of the accountability mechanism. In case the end-year inflation deviates more than two percentage points in either direction, the Central Bank will draft a detailed letter to the Government and share this letter with the public. At this point, it should be emphasized once more that the Central Bank does not have any targets for quarterly basis and the official target announced is the end-year inflation target. Therefore, it should be underlined that the end-of-quarter figures specified above have been set only to facilitate the accountability mechanism and should not be perceived as interim targets. Inflation forecasts and monetary policy stance With the adoption of the inflation-targeting regime, medium-term inflation forecasts started to be included in Inflation Reports issued since 2006.

(iii)  Meanwhile, the Central Bank has implemented a set of measures since October, with the aim of abating potential problems in the Turkish financial markets that may arise from global developments. Within this scope, foreign exchange buying auctions were suspended as of 16 October 2008 in order to keep the liquidity, which is permanently withdrawn from the foreign exchange market through foreign exchange buying auctions, in the system, and hence, to further enhance the liquidity conditions of the Turkish banks. In addition to the suspension of the foreign exchange buying auctions, the Central Bank started to inject foreign exchange liquidity into the market through foreign exchange selling auctions as of 24 October 2008 as unhealthy price formations were witnessed due to a decrease in the depth of the foreign exchange market. The daily amount of the foreign exchange to be sold via auctions was set as USD 50 million, which could be raised on the days of the auction when deemed necessary. It was also announced to the public that depending on developments in the foreign exchange market, the daily auction amounts might be changed and the auctions might also be suspended, when deemed necessary. As a matter of fact, after the auctions held on two working days, the Central Bank suspended the foreign exchange selling auctions on 30 October 2008 as a result of easing concerns pertaining to the depth of the foreign exchange market, which was also facilitated by favorable developments in the global markets.
Second key area: thoroughly reviewing the incentive schemes for cross-border investments, notably by promoting further convergence of tax and regulatory regimes. Third area: expanding the supply of financial intermediation services, be it in the form of new savings products – more long-term and risk-oriented – or new market initiatives in green bonds or private placement for instance. Fourth area: making sure that vital financial activities and risks for European economies are properly controlled. This requires in particular relocating certain activities in the European Union, such as euro-denominated clearing activities that are systemically important for the euro area. The second reform at the European level is a macroeconomic ambition: a better euro area policy-mix. This would help offset the short-term pain of national structural reforms before achieving the long-term gains. Let me be crystal-clear: we should not abandon the existing rules that apply to each Member State, including the Stability and Growth Pact: rules are necessary, but they are not sufficient. What we currently lack is a common direction, despite the progress brought by the European Semester method. A proper euro area policy-mix requires a collective economic strategy, whereby Member States “seal a deal” involving each country. Let us aim, until the end of 2017, for an obvious progress: growth and employment will be stronger in Europe if we combine more structural reforms where they are needed – in France and Italy for instance –, and more fiscal or wage support in countries with room for manoeuvre – for example, Germany and the Netherlands.

With great respect for the 6/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  principle of subsidiarity, the finance minister would need to be: first, institutionally strong, by being both the Economic Commissioner and the President of the Eurogroup; second, democratically legitimate, by being accountable to the European Parliament in an adequate format; third, technically supported, by relying on a European Treasury – which would be largely based on the expertise of European Commission staff – and on an independent advisory Economic Policy Council, and coordinating the European Stability Mechanism and the crisis management framework; and finally, internationally recognised as the economic spokesperson of the euro area, alongside the ECB President for monetary policy. In the longer term, as mutual trust between euro area countries increases, a last step will have to be considered to complete our common investment capacity: a genuine euro area budget, led by the finance minister. This would be a powerful tool. However in no way is this euro area budget to be confused with a one-way “transfer union” – and here I understand the German fears. It should potentially benefit all – not only the weaker – euro area countries, and would be rooted in increased economic convergence. The euro area budget would be used to finance certain “European public goods” such as digital technology, the energy transition or the integration of refugees. It could also include a European-wide unemployment insurance scheme.
Through our strategic plan, we will also increase the transparency of our work on financial stability. We will publish the results of regular bank stress tests. As with monetary policy, we also intend to publish more of the research and analysis underlying our policy choices. Over  21  See King (2005). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  time, the financial sector will be better placed to anticipate our responses and as with monetary policy, increased transparency will make us not just accountable, but also more effective. Conclusion The first Mais Lectures launched the fight against inflation. With time and increased confidence policymakers would win that war only to lose the peace. As a consequence, George Osborne’s 2010 lecture heralded the return of prudential supervision and the introduction of macroprudential policy to the Bank of England. Today’s challenge is to create a macroeconomic environment that provides the basis for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, the economist’s equivalent of a land fit for heroes. This evening I have sketched how the Bank of England intends to makes its contribution. I am in no doubt that those who come after me will add to our collective knowledge of how best to coordinate the Bank’s vast array of policy levers to achieve our fundamental mission. An open and confident Bank will welcome such advice and criticism. Why? Because the need for broad macroeconomic management is not just an intellectual curiosity, but rather a reality that will persist for years to come.

Willem F Duisenberg: New economy, financial markets and monetary policy Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the meeting of the Zürcher Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft, Zurich, 19 May 2003. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here to address you this evening, and I should like to start by thanking the Zürcher Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft for inviting me to do so. Being trained economists, you all know that in the course of the past century, monetary theory has faced significant challenges from various angles - the Keynesian revolution, the neo-classical synthesis, the monetarist counter-revolution, the emergence of new classical economics with the introduction of the concept of rational expectations, and real business cycle theories. Similar to the experience of monetary theory, monetary policy has had to cope with major challenges as well. We all know that the economic and financial environment in which monetary policy has to operate is continuously changing. During the past few years - as has been rather obvious - these changes have included the discussion about a “new economy” and, driven by the interrelated processes of financial liberalisation and financial globalisation, the growing importance of financial markets. You may wonder why someone should raise the topic of the “new economy” again, as it has been discussed so extensively by many, including myself, on many an occasion before. Is this not a topic which has actually become rather “old” by now; another chapter in the history books of economic science?
Policymakers must support the global reform agenda, to help build a more resilient global financial system, while taking into account local and regional circumstances. In particular, as Asian economies undergo rapid transition, policymakers will have to evolve their financial systems to meet the rapidly changing needs of their economies. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As the systems become more complex and more plugged into the global system, the risk to financial stability will increase. 10. Indeed, post-crisis, central banks and regulators are focused on financial stability and the need to be proactive with regards to the risk of asset bubbles. Many parts of Asia in particular are vulnerable to property bubbles, not only because of current liquidity conditions, but also because many investors believe that in a growing economy, the property market can only move up. Many have forgotten how the property markets in the region slumped during the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis. 11. As I mentioned earlier, risks can build up rapidly. Hence, not surprisingly, there has been much debate on the types of policy tools to address potential asset bubbles. In my view, there is no single tool that works best in all situations. We need a combination of tools that addresses the different facets of the issue. These tools should be simple and easy to understand. More importantly, for these tools to be effective, the intention of the authorities has to be clearly communicated. Policymakers must leave no doubt of their resolve to tackle the potential build-up of risks.

A deep understanding of risks provides the foundation for stability and growth. The research and educational activities of EDHEC-Risk Institute will help enhance our understanding of risks, and the development of talent. We welcome EDHEC-Risk Institute to our research and financial community in Asia. Your presence adds to another important strand in the deepening relationship between France and Singapore. I congratulate EDHEC-Risk Institute on the opening of its Asian centre, and wish Professor Amenc, Professor Ducoulombier and your colleagues every success. 19. 4  Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches
Unlike many other central banks, the Riksbank did not buy any government bonds or covered bonds, but these possibilities were discussed. One important lesson from the crisis is that new measures require considerable preparation. After the crisis, we therefore decided that it is a good idea to make practical preparations for a crisis even during normal circumstances by supplementing the Riksbank’s toolbox with a limited securities portfolio in Swedish krona. This ensures that necessary systems, agreements, routines and knowledge are already in place if it becomes necessary to quickly implement extraordinary measures. Given that we now have a repo rate close to zero and we are discussing which unconventional measures might be appropriate if inflation does not rise towards two per cent, it is good that the Riksbank has created the possibility and knowledge to manage a bond portfolio. This means that we now can quickly and simply purchase and sell bonds, something that would previously have taken us much longer. So, in technical terms we are prepared to increase the size of the portfolio if and when it should prove necessary. The general public’s use of cash is declining One important item on the liabilities side of the balance sheet is outstanding banknotes and coins. The Riksbank has the monopoly on issuing banknotes and coins in Sweden and is responsible for supplying the country with cash. The size of this item depends on the demand from the general public for cash.

In brief, the principles entail the dividend level remaining stable, the majority of the profit shall be paid as a dividend, and that the calculation shall not take into account developments in the government budget. In concrete terms, this means that 80 per cent of the average results in the past five years (adjusted for exchange rate effects) shall be paid as dividend to the government. The majority of the profit has been paid to the Treasury. The fact is that if we include the two extra dividends of SEK 20 billion each paid at the beginning of the 2000s, the Riksbank has paid somewhat more than its profits in dividends during this period. The smallest dividend paid during the period is that paid in spring 2014, SEK 3.3 billion. Losses await If we instead look ahead, we see that the Riksbank will probably make losses over a couple of years. The results for 2014 (which have not yet been established) were still positive, but if interest rates rise in the way that the National Institute of Economic Research forecasts, it will be some time before the Riksbank can show a profit again. It looks as though the bank will have losses in the years 2015–2018 amounting to around SEK 5 billion a year. 6  The Riksbank regularly makes forecasts for the bank’s dividends to the state as part of the National Financial Management Authority’s work on planning the state finances.
In 2021, 1  Firms are understood to be highly indebted when their ratio of net financial debt to (gross operating profit + financial revenue) is higher than 10, or they have positive net financial debt and zero or negative earnings. 4  households’ gross disposable income (GDI) grew by 2.2%, although it was still 2.8% down on 2019. From the onset of the health crisis to end-2021, households’ aggregate net wealth rose by 9.8%, assisted by the increase in value of their financial and, above all, their real estate assets, and by their relatively stable debt levels. Overall, households’ bank debt-to-total asset ratio fell, particularly in the lower net wealth deciles.2 Nevertheless, in the first net wealth decile, debt continues to far exceed the value of assets (by around 50%), thus signalling the financial vulnerability of this segment. Also, households significantly increased their saving rate during the pandemic. The accumulated savings could serve as a cushion, at least in part, in the face of a potential deterioration in their real income. But the increase in saving was uneven across households, concentrated among those with the highest purchasing power. In the housing market, house purchases in Q1 were 22% higher than in the same period of 2019. Meanwhile, new residential mortgage lending has risen, standing at its highest levels since 2010.

22  The most affected sectors include some whose margins would be hardest hit, such as wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles, land transport, fishing and agriculture. The degree of financial vulnerability is also expected to rise by more than the average in some sectors in which the impact on sectoral margins is comparatively smaller, such as basic metals manufacturing, or publishing, cinema, television and radio. This is largely because some of the firms in such sectors were already hovering around the thresholds determining vulnerable status before the shock. 15  The results show that the greater adverse impact of these scenarios on the sector’s solvency would take the form of a worsening of the credit quality of loans to the private sector, leading to greater impairment losses on business in Spain and less capacity to generate net income from foreign business. Moreover, the simulated interest rate hike entails a slight reduction in the value of the bond holdings on banks’ balance sheets. At the same time, higher interest rates push up net interest income, by improving the net interest margin on loans to the private sector and making investing in debt securities more profitable, whereas the cost of deposits responds more moderately. Overall, the adverse scenario would have a negative impact of 1.8 pp on the aggregate CET1 ratio of Spanish banks as a whole, while the impact under the severe scenario would be as high as 3 pp.