samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Many other tradable goods have to go through several steps before reaching the final consumer and pass-through of their price changes is probably more gradual. Based on past experience – notably the big falls in the value  In the latest monthly data services inflation was (just) higher than 2%. But there’s a case for measuring these “contributions” relative to past averages, to take account of trends in relative prices. On that basis, because services inflation is well below average, more than all the overshoot in aggregate inflation can be attributed to the goods side. In general, one should be careful in using these “contributions”, or at least make sure not to treat all else as equal. Over the medium-to-longer term, inflation is determined by monetary policy (and the credibility in the regime) not by individual components of the CPI, with relative prices determined by real forces (e.g. the relative demand for goods and services). So over time, assuming the inflation target is on average met, the true “contribution” of a rise in one particular component is likely to be zero – the counterpart is simply weaker inflation in other prices. 15  20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  20  of sterling in 2009 and 2016 – rises in import prices driven by exchange-rate depreciations seem to take longer – perhaps up to 2-3 years – fully to feed through.

Averaged over that period average inflation has been only a fraction lower than it was before the pandemic, despite a cumulative decline of around 4% in the level of output. If that amounts to a simple matter of “overheating” – if the economy really can’t cope with aggregate demand growth any stronger than minus 2½-3% a year – then one can only conclude that the UK economy’s supply performance has been chilly at best. The reality is more nuanced. I’ve highlighted three contributing factors. By protecting individual jobs the furlough scheme has had the effect of matching lower labour demand with lower supply. In the second quarter of this year this was worth around 2-3% in terms of aggregate output. Prices of many tradable goods have risen sharply. In some cases this reflects specific supply-side problems. Also important has been the general shift in demand, away from services and towards goods, caused by the pandemic. Within the UK, those shifts – regional as well as sectoral – have caused a degree of “mismatch” in the labour market. At least during the early part of the recovery, available jobs haven’t perfectly matched available workers (including those on furlough). There’s a good case that all three of these things will prove temporary. We know the furlough scheme is being wound down, restoring a significant degree of supply to the labour market. As far as tradable goods are concerned, it’s unlikely the pandemic-related shifts in demand will continue if the threat of the illness itself recedes.
Exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro area has declined, while it would continue to exist vis-à-vis the US dollar even after integration. The as yet more flexible labour market ushered in by the transition period II of the Bilateral Agreements I is the flagship of Swiss economic policy. It keeps unemployment and the resultant national costs low in the long term and strengthens the incentives for individual performance. It is essential to translate openness and flexibility, also with respect to internal structural reforms and external relations, into autonomously implemented reforms and a practical global orientation. BIS Review 49/2004  1

During this period one could say that the central banks’ original task of guaranteeing the value of the means of payment was neglected as other tasks, primarily affecting demand in the economy, were perceived as more important and more interesting for monetary policy. The consequence was that the nominal anchor was relinquished and to establish it again proved to require considerable effort. Let me before I discuss the other important component of an efficient payment system – financial stability – say something about the most common approaches to attaining price stability. There are currently two predominant means of trying to ensure that inflation remains at a low and stable level. One is to tie one’s own currency to the currency of a country with a long tradition of low and stable inflation. The fixed exchange rate thus becomes an intermediate target through which one hopes to attain the ultimate target – price stability. The other means is to allow the exchange rate to float and to give the central bank the task of acting more directly to attain low, stable inflation – what is known as inflation targeting. The changeover in monetary policy made by Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s meant that we switched from the first method, fixing the exchange rate, to the second, targeting inflation. The reason was quite simply that the fixed exchange rate had not functioned very well as a means of keeping down inflation and establishing a nominal anchor in the economy.
I feel strongly that we should leverage our competitive advantage as the key producer to ensure the success of our futures market. Our main producers should be able to play an active role in the determination of the world prices – that is; AFET prices should be used as the world’s benchmark. I believe we are well-placed to achieve that goal. Ladies and Gentlemen, Now it is time to channel our energy and effort into making AFET a successful futures market for agricultural products, especially in the international arena. The next key question then is “How”? This task is indeed a challenge and if we all agree on this part, I think the best approach is for us to focus on one product at a time. I propose that AFET conduct an in-depth study into each of the products currently listed on the exchange and evaluate their chances of success. AFET can then prioritise whether they should first concentrate on smoked rubber sheet, block rubber, tapioca starch or white rice. Commodity Trading normally involves reference prices based on a certain futures exchange. For instance, market participants prefer to use futures prices from the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange as a reference for white sugar while benchmark prices for rubber products are currently determined in the Tokyo Commodity Exchange and Singapore Commodity  BIS Review 14/2006  1  Exchange. It is worth noting that there are no well-established reference prices for white rice just yet.

3 while the contracts for white rice are rarely traded. I cannot help but feel that the existence of the price support scheme may have contributed to this apparent lack of interests in rice futures trading. As of last Friday, only 3 contracts for white rice were traded and the open interests were only for 60 contracts equivalent to 300 metric tonnes. For a country that exported 7.6 million tonnes of rice last year-the highest volume in its history, I believe our rice futures market has high potential to grow, if conditions are right. The government guaranteed prices are set once a year and thus, do not incorporate new information into the price. On the contrary, futures contracts are traded on a daily basis and these prices are said to be the best predictor of prices in the future – pricing in all currently available information. Players should be encouraged to hedge their produce through the futures market rather than through a static price-support scheme. In the medium term, the price-support scheme should be eventually phased out so that our producers would be freed to stand on their own feet. It is crucial that we implement the change gradually to enable those involved to adjust. I feel that we should strive in this direction - it is only then would our producers be able to respond to competition in the global market place. These days, many agricultural-related products in Thailand are subject to price ceilings.
6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Historical examples of sharp intraday changes in U.S interest rates have tended to be associated with important economic events, such as major monetary policy announcements. There does not yet appear to be consensus by market participants around a single cause of the volatility on October 15. To be sure, a number of factors likely contributed, including concerns about the global macroeconomic outlook and the unwinding of positions by leveraged investors. Indeed, such concerns probably help explain why a modest surprise in U.S. retail sales could trigger such a strong reaction around 8:30. Publically available positioning data in the futures market does indicate that investors who take positions for purposes other than hedging had accumulated a large base of short positions in shorter-term interest rate futures contracts over the preceding months, and that that aggregate position unwound sharply in the weeks around October 15. Yet these factors are less convincing as explanations of the round-trip in yields witnessed more than an hour after the data release. Activity in this event window also appears unconnected to any other piece of incoming information. As a result, many market participants and members of the official sector have questioned whether recent changes in the structure of the Treasury market can help explain the move, and some have focused on the potential role of electronic and automated trading.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  deploy their balance sheets for holding Treasury securities and other fixed-income assets allows them to serve as shock absorbers, particularly during times of volatility. Automated trading firms, on the other hand, typically do not end the day with significant long or short net exposure, despite the fact that they often conduct a substantial volume of gross transactions.9 As a result, automated trading firms do not face the same level of capital constraints under the traditional way of thinking about capital requirements.10 However, for the same reason, they also may not be capable of serving as shock absorbers during periods of heightened volatility, as traditional market makers are thought to do. Thus, while the market may have come to rely on automated trading firms as suppliers of very-short-term intraday liquidity, market participants still rely on traditional market makers with balance sheet capacity to supply liquidity over longer-term horizons. Electronic trading, including automated and high-frequency trading, has likely had a number of benefits. For one, technological advances have supported market efficiency by increasing the pace at which price discovery is disseminated across financial markets. It may also have reduced transaction costs, both through the economies of scale that large technology investments produce, and perhaps through the maintenance of narrow bid-offer spreads that automated market-making arguably makes more likely.
A positive example is the Swiss labor market. Unencumbered by a history of pervasive unionization, Swiss labor market flexibility has continuously been strengthened. Today, it is comparable to Anglo-Saxon standards. Against the backdrop of our two countries’ differing legal, political and economic traditions, let me now turn to what strike me as significant lessons with regard to our respective relations with Europe and, more specifically, with EMU. Structural reform and EMU The United Kingdom is currently harvesting the fruits of its growth-boosting liberalization policies implemented during the past 20 years. A dynamic market economy yields strong and stable output  1  See e.g. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, D. Kahneman (editor), Cambridge University Press, 1982. 2  Rising current account deficits, increasing unemployment and inflation led to the collapse of the Sterling. The UK requested for IMF assistance and the BoE secured a stand-by credit from other central banks, among them the SNB. Negotiations with the IMF were protracted. Fund officials were determined to ensure that UK officials had in place a set of policies that promised a drastic decrease in public sector borrowing in order to achieve a deceleration of inflation and an improvement of the balance of payments. An agreement was reached in December 1976. Immediately afterwards, confidence in the pound was restored. See e.g. The International Monetary Fund, 1972-1978: Cooperation on Trial, Margaret Garritsen De Vries, IMF, 1985. 2  BIS Review 24/2004  with low unemployment and monetary stability.

The price of entering goes up, or the Bulgarian thorny road to the euro Yes, some new EU members are still keen to join the Eurozone. Especially in Bulgaria, the desire is understandable: the country has held a fixed exchange rate visa-à-vis the euro since the common currency’s inception. Just like Denmark, Bulgaria has outsourced its monetary policy to Frankfurt, but unlike Denmark, it would also like to become an official member of the club to enjoy all the benefits of using one of the most prestigious world currencies. On paper, at least, Bulgaria appears to be an ideal candidate: unlike many of the current members of the Eurozone, it actually fulfils the key Maastricht criteria. But the idea of Bulgarian membership is not an appetizing one to many technocrats at the ECB and to the representatives of some Eurozone member states. So, for many years, Bulgarians have been tacitly discouraged from applying to ERM II, the antechamber of the euro. This year, however, they tried their luck: perhaps they felt that the conditions would never get any better than under Bulgarian presidency of the EU and Jean-Claude Juncker’s vocal emphasis on how the euro should become the currency of the entire Union. Complicated negotiations followed, and their result is of key importance to all EU member countries outside the Eurozone. It’s not enough that Bulgaria fulfils the important Maastricht criteria: new criteria were thought up specifically to make the Bulgarian path to the euro as difficult and humiliating as possible.
After all, in essence, they amount to no more than being sure that you really do know your customer. 4  BIS Review 47/2002

Obviously this can delay the whole process - a point to which I will return later. This is only a very short description of the mechanics of a workout and hardly does justice to what can be an enormously complicated exercise involving banks with widely different levels of security as  BIS Review 45/1999  2  well as non-bank creditors whose interests also need to be taken into account. But I hope that I have given you enough to illustrate the central principles of the process: a willingness by the debtor to recognize that there is a problem and to approach the banks to seek assistance, matched by support and forbearance by the banks and a willingness to work together to reach a solution by consensus. That solution may not be the optimum one for every individual bank but the objective should be that each bank is at least better off than it would be in a liquidation and is treated fairly vis-à-vis others. In the course of preparing this speech I have had the benefit of talking to a number of market participants about how effectively the workout process in Hong Kong and the HKAB Guidelines are working. It is fair to say that there are varying shades of opinion on this point, but there is general agreement that the Guidelines have made an important contribution in codifying what is expected of banks in Hong Kong. It is equally true that there may be room for improvement in the workout process.
Chile)  3.2 2.2 1.5 10,0 5.6 2.7  2.6 2.1 1.7 10.5 5.1 3.6  -2.6 -4,0 -5.2 9.1 0.1 -2.2  2.7 1.6 3.5 10.1 7.1 6.0  2.3 0.8 0.8 8.5 4.2 3.7  3.3 1.4 1.9 8.8 5.1 4.3  20  44  62  79  89  89  101  156  234  340  330  320  WTI oil price $ LME copper price $ (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on investment banks, Consensus Forecasts and International Monetary Fund. Figure 5 Contribution to annual GDP growth (variación real anual, puntos porcentuales) Economic activity  Aggregate demand  8  8  25  25  6  6  20  20  4  4  15  15  2  2  10  10  0  0  5  5  -2  -2  0  0  -4  -4  -5  -5  -6  -6 -10  -10  07  08  09  10  Financial and entrepreneurial services (1) EGA Mining & fishing Manufacturing Construction Communication & transport Retail Residual (2) GDP  -15  07  08  09  10  -15  GFCF Change in inventories Government consumption Private consumption Exports GDP  (1) Includes financial services, insurances, housing leases and services provided to firms. (2) Includes agriculturalforestry, housing property, public administration and personal services (i.e., education, health-care and other services).

10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Table 3 Inflation (annual change, percent) 2008  2009  2010 (f)  2011 (f)  2012 (f)  Average CPI inflation December CPI inflation CPI inflation in around 2 years (*)  8.7 7.1  1.6 -1.4  1.4 2.8  3,0 3.3  3.0  Average CPIX inflation December CPIX inflation CPIX inflation in around 2 years (*)  8.4 8.6  2.8 -1.8  0.5 2.3  2.7 3.1  3.1  Average CPIX1 inflation December CPIX1 inflation CPIX1 inflation in around 2 years (*)  7.8 7.7  2.8 -1.1  -0.7 -0.1  2.0 3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  (f) Forecast. (*) Inflation projected at fourth quarter of 2012. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Gráfico 9  Inflación IPC (*) (annual change, percent)  10  EEE: Expectativas de inflación (porcentaje)  10  7  7  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  5  5  2  2  4  4  0  0  3  3  -2  -2  2  2  -4  -4  1  1  06  08  10  IPoM Sep. 2010 IPoM Dec. 2010  12  02  04 06 08 10 At December 2010 One year ahead At December 2011 Two years ahead  (*) Gray area, as from the fourth quarter of 2010, indicates forecast.
If it should suddenly become difficult or very expensive for the bank to borrow money, it may experience difficulty in meeting its payments. The terms for the more long-term lending are largely restricted. In such a situation the Riksbank can help to manage the bank’s financing problems by granting liquidity assistance. But we only do this on condition that the terms I recently mentioned are met and if our assessment is that the stability of the financial system would be jeopardised if the bank in question failed. Another fundamental function that it is important to mention in this context “to keep the different tasks separate” is that the Swedish banks can borrow overnight from the Riksbank against collateral at an interest rate of 0.75 percentage points above the repo rate. They always have this possibility and this is not what we mean by liquidity assistance. But what if the bank suffering problems does not have larger assets than liabilities? Should the Riksbank provide liquidity assistance? No, in such a situation it is a question for the government, not the Riksbank, to decide. What the Riksbank can do is provide additional liquidity under certain conditions. We do not have the task of managing a bank’s problems with its creditworthiness. Even in this hypothetical reasoning it is important to point out, that in principle all those who have deposited money in the bank are protected by the deposit guarantee in the event that a Swedish bank should default.

Put simply, if you run macroeconomic model simulations with a Taylor rule, you will eventually encounter the ZLB and face the decision of what, if anything, to do about it. This tension is evident in research papers on monetary policy rules from this era, in which 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  authors either sidestepped the ZLB or ignored it altogether. In fact, I’ll plead guilty as charged when it comes to my own research during this period. At the same time, a small cadre of researchers at the Fed and in academia started to take the ZLB head-on and explore its effects in macro models.4 Research on the ZLB quickly made its way to policymakers. The ZLB was analyzed in a note to the FOMC in the summer of 1998 and discussed at the subsequent FOMC meeting in July. 5 That discussion led to interest at the Fed in having a research conference to provide a broad set of views and perspectives on the ZLB. This convergence in interest between researchers and policymakers resulted in a Federal Reserve conference on “Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Environment” held in Woodstock, Vermont, in October 1999. The conference proceedings were subsequently published in a special issue of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking in November 2000.
I’m glad to note the warm market response to our new grant scheme. Since its inception in May, nearly 30 applications from green and sustainable debt issuers have been approved and more than 40 are in the pipeline. 18. To further strengthen our green and sustainable finance ecosystem, the HKMA and the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) co-established the Green and Sustainable Finance Cross-Agency Steering Group last year, with an aim to coordinating cross-agency 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  market development efforts on this front. In July this year, the Steering Group launched the Centre for Green and Sustainable Finance, which coordinates the efforts of financial regulators, Government agencies, industry stakeholders and academia in capacity building; and at the same time, helps improve data availability for the financial industry. 19. With these ongoing efforts and our strong commitment to green finance, Hong Kong’s role as a regional green and sustainable finance hub has been taking shape. But we should not stop there. I encourage all of you to continue to build on our strength as the leading financial centre in Asia to capture the enormous opportunities in this growing space. With our natural advantage to be the “green” gateway for China, we believe that Hong Kong can continue to contribute to this important transition in the region. Closing 20. I began my speech by highlighting the complex and far-reaching nature of the challenges arising from LIBOR cessation. Meeting these challenges would require tremendous efforts from all of us across the financial markets.

Property prices have risen recently, and in particular the prices of residential property in metropolitan regions. In contrast to the 1980s, we do not see the same broad price increase across the whole of Sweden, as was the case then. Likewise, the causes of the rising prices appear to be low interest rates, a high rate of new occupancies and low construction activity rather than speculation. This indicates that there are currently no major risks of a fall in residential property prices. However, there is every cause to observe developments carefully. New construction always takes place with a considerable time lag and experience shows that many projects are not ready and do not come onto the market until after a turning point has occurred, at which point things can quickly deteriorate. With regard to commercial property, the development has been more moderate. Again, it is mainly in the metropolitan areas that prices have risen due to high demand. The level of new construction continues to be low and most premises today are already leased before building commences. One way of analysing the extent to which speculative tendencies are inherent in property prices is to place the direct yield in relation to risk-free interest.2 At the end of the 1980s, the risk-free interest rate was considerably higher than the direct yield on properties, which suggests that people bought properties on the expectation of future price rises and/or significant rent increases. Today, the situation is different. Direct yield levels appear reasonable in relation to risk-free interest.