samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are working hard to build a diverse workforce because we believe it will allow us to build trust with the people we serve, and help us to make better decisions. We are striving to create a workforce that reflects the diversity of the society we serve, and we think diversity and inclusion go hand in hand. In order to achieve this, we have several initiatives in place that address various areas of diversity and inclusion. This year we renewed our diversity targets, set for the end-February 2028. These include the proportion of staff we want to be of a Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic background, and female, at various levels. We also considered how we expand our public commitments beyond gender and ethnicity. Our ultimate aim is also to work towards ensuring appropriate representation for other protected characteristics, such as disability and sexual orientation. At this point, as with many other organisations, we do not feel there is sufficient data available internally to support this and are working to address this over the next few years. This is an issue we have also noted in many other organisations in the financial sector, where data on the progress on diversity and inclusion across the sector is fairly limited. Firms have been recently contacted about participating in the pilot survey on diversity and inclusion.

Even though the analysis of the cumulative impact and the interactions between regulations is still in its early days, vigilance is required to ensure that the implementation of reforms does not result in a reduction of financial activities, such as market making that are vital for preserving market liquidity, financing investments and firms and ultimately the real economy. The foreseen banking structures reform and European Financial Transactions Tax (EFTT) are cases in point. In both projects, an appropriate approach should strike the right balance between limiting risks associated with trading activities and the need to preserve financial activities that are useful if not essential to the development of the real economy. Doing so would be fully compliant with the overarching objectives of the Capital Markets Union. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Having better integrated markets within the European Union (EU) would also mean the emergence of more reciprocity issues as regards macroprudential policies. At the macro level, authorities should then closely review the potential additional vulnerabilities and risks attached to the CMU both at the domestic level and on a cross-border basis. Authorities will also have to strengthen their analytical framework and possibly complement their macroprudential instruments which are mainly bank-based at the current juncture. I will conclude with some remarks regarding longer term work, namely how to harmonize further domestic legal regimes and the institutional architecture. The Commission’s green paper has identified some areas for longer term work, including the need for further harmonization of insolvency regimes, securities laws and tax regimes.
Not to act, however, would be to squander the lessons of the past decade and mortgage our futures. It is simply not an acceptable option. We face today probably the best macroeconomic environment in decades to put our economies on a sound economic and financial footing to meet the surprises we will inevitably face in the new century. The opportunities provided by rapid technological change are available to all in the global marketplace. The flexibility and adaptability we build into our respective economies today will ultimately determine the success we are able to achieve for the generations that follow us. The challenge could not be more important. 7  BIS Review 29/2000

Infrastructure Asia harnesses the networks and collective capabilities of public sector agencies and private sector firms across the region to meet Asia’s infrastructure needs by (i) connecting partners in the 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  ecosystem; (ii) building capacity in demand markets; and (iii) providing top-level project advisory to improve bankability. Infrastructure Asia provides an open platform for Chinese (including Shanghai-based) infrastructure developers and financial institutions to partner players in Singapore in regional infrastructure projects. b. Furthermore, as infrastructure demand and foreign investments along the Belt and Road region increase, we expect a boost in demand for commodities and growth in commodity trade. Singapore’s strategic location in the crossroads of key trade flows has enabled commodity traders in Singapore to capture such opportunities. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (“SPDB”) opened its first overseas commodity centre in Singapore in October this year, providing global commodity businesses with commodity-related financial services and solutions. c. Singapore banks are also embarking on BRI collaborations with Shanghai banks. UOB signed a MOU with SPDB in September this year to serve companies hoping to tap on BRI opportunities, providing financial solutions covering investment advisory, cross-border RMB transactions, syndicated loans, project and trade finance, and cash settlement. OCBC Bank signed its second MOU with Bank of Shanghai in April this year, leveraging each other’s strengths, networks and platforms to support customers in their BRI expansion plans, including access to OCBC’s funding and risk management solutions for Bank of Shanghai’s corporate clients.
The need to focus attention on the level of economic activity is of course well understood by the academic community. It is now standard practice in the literature on monetary policy to assume that the authorities seek to minimise a social loss function, defined in terms of the deviation of the level of output or unemployment from their equilibrium values, and in terms of the deviation BIS Review 103/1998  –6–  of inflation from its desired value. But if this is so obvious, why, in discussions of the economic conjuncture and economic policy, is so much attention placed on growth rates rather than on levels? Why are commentators and pundits so concerned with whether economic growth is going to be above or below its trend rate, or even whether it is likely to be above or below zero? That is not what matters for economic policy nor, more importantly, for social welfare. An excessive focus on growth rates of output and employment, rather than on their levels, may reflect a rather natural, but dangerous, optimism about the degree of spare capacity in the economy. After all, is not the belief that we could always achieve lower unemployment without an increase in inflation the mark of a kinder, gentler, altogether more civilised approach to economic policy? Or is it simply wishful thinking?

Are the 16 million unemployed people in the European Union merely an equilibrium, on the one hand, and a statistic, on the other? But for most people the labour market is the market where – for better or worse, in sickness or in health – they sell their time and their skills at a market price. That price determines, in large part, their opportunities and economic welfare. Wage rates have a much greater significance in influencing the distribution of real incomes than do the prices of almost anything else. As a result, the labour market cannot be divorced from broader social and political considerations. If their terminology and language are sometimes insensitive, what do economists have to offer by way of ideas about unemployment? The prize for the most important idea and most insensitive terminology surely goes to Milton Friedman for the concept of the natural rate of unemployment. I shall discuss shortly the significance of this idea for monetary policy. But for a more elegant advocacy of a similar position it is necessary to delve further back in history. This month sees the 75th anniversary of the publication of what Milton Friedman described as John Maynard Keynes’ best book: A Tract on Monetary Reform. It is undoubtedly one of the most persuasive polemics ever written on the subject of monetary policy. To coincide with publication in December 1923, Keynes gave a lecture to the National Liberal Club in which he talked about “the triple evils of modern society”.
The measures recently announced by the European Central Bank (ECB), aimed at containing the risk of the euro area running an excessively low inflation rate over a prolonged period, likewise contribute to bolstering the growth outlook for our economy and assisting the adjustment under way. But let us not forget that the crisis – complete with double-dip recession – in the Spanish economy has had a most severe impact on employment and income levels, and has caused a most pronounced setback in terms of real convergence with Europe. Merely restoring pre-crisis levels of well-being will take several years. Evidently, here, maintaining the reform drive is crucial for speeding the process of recovery of the levels of economic prosperity lost due to the crisis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  2. Banking sector: situation following the reform  The Spanish banking sector has concluded a far-reaching transformation, entailing the cleanup, restructuring and recapitalisation of the most vulnerable banks, all resulting from the transformation of the former savings banks. The consequences of this reform have been reviewed on various occasions, so I need not detail them here. Allow me merely to summarise the three key elements of the process. i)  Firstly, the reform has driven an intense restructuring and re-sizing of the banking industry, enabling its excess capacity to be corrected. Of note has been the integration of savings banks into existing or newly created banking groups, which has enabled the number of credit institutions to be reduced by over 30.

Hence, to estimate the direct cost to the taxpayer of the aid provided to banks, we should first consider the amounts paid out by the FROB to these banks, add this to the expected cost of the APSs extended by the FROB (at Banco de Valencia and Caja Sur) and of other guarantees and coverage offered by it in connection with resolution processes, and subtract the amounts recouped or expected to be recouped. That is to say, we should firstly calculate the funds paid out by the FROB to purchase shares or contingently convertible bonds, which amount to € million, adding these to the estimated cost of the APSs and other guarantees granted in resolution processes which, on the latest valuations available, account for € million. From this amount it would be necessary to subtract the recovery of the amounts disbursed through the redemption of convertible bonds subscribed by the FROB or the disposal of the FROB’s shareholdings in the banks receiving aid. Here, the € million from the sale of  2  As at 30 April 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  NCG and the return of the aid granted to Banca Cívica by Caixabank3 should be recorded. Further, the convertible bonds subscribed by the FROB in Caja3 (absorbed by Ibercaja), CEISS (absorbed by Unicaja) and Liberbank, are highly likely to be redeemed before 2017, entailing the return of € million.
The credit default swap premium indicator, showing the markets' concern for the banks' solvency, which according to many experts is the most significant individual diagnostic statistics, started to decline. Especially the CDS premium (commercial debt securities premia) dropped significantly. The progress with the guarantees, although gradual, is also encouraging, with more banks issuing bonds even without utilization of guarantee (government) being registered. The LIBOR spread also shrunk, and it is expected to "continue to narrow gradually compared to the period before the measures were undertaken" (this primarily pertains to England). Many banks continue to face with deleveraging and rebalancing in order to lower the dependence on financing through the central banks. The stronger capital and financial position of the banks will be possible in a period of several years. In wider terms, the financial system remains to be under acute clench, tension. The real economic sector bears the consequences. The unemployment increases. The business financing is getting harder and more expensive. The economies' growth decreases. Also the so-called emerging economies started to feel decline in the growth. It seems that we are entering into recession. The central banks of the developed economies transfer the focus of their measures from the inflation control to recession prevention. BIS Review 18/2009  3  What conclusions can be derived from this crisis? 1.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Some thoughts on the new economy Speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research’s (MIER) 30th Anniversary Dinner, Kuala Lumpur, 26 September 2016. * * * Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honoured to speak here at the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research’s (MIER) 30th Anniversary Dinner. I would like to commend MIER on the institute’s continuous efforts in expanding economic knowledge, and the commitment to research over the past 30 years. Today, we meet at a time where the global economy is becoming increasingly dynamic and challenging, underpinned by complex global interlinkages and shifting trends. The challenges posed to policymakers are immense. The rapidly evolving world also necessitates swift, yet pragmatic policies in order for us to remain ahead of the competition. Against this backdrop, a deep understanding of the core issues is absolutely critical in supporting evidence-based policy responses; not only to manage risks but also to better leverage on opportunities. Tonight, I will be sharing some thoughts about this “new world economy” that we are in, and along the way, share some policy insights and research ideas for the many economists and policy thinkers in this room. Global macroeconomic environment is becoming increasingly challenging The periods of strong global growth have become something of a distant memory to us. Global growth for the past 5 years has averaged 3.5%, well below the pre-crisis average of 5.1%.
Over the next few months, the data are likely to be dancing particularly vigorously under the influence of the reversal of the VAT cut, a turnaround in the stock cycle and even the effects of the recent cold weather. Added to that, the MPC is acutely aware that initial data releases are often later heavily revised, and there is uncertainty over the timing of fiscal consolidation. The patience of UK households is likely to be sorely tried over the next couple of years. There is little scope for growth in real take-home pay, which may remain weak even as output recovers. It is clear that inflation is likely to pick up markedly in the first half of this year, a message reinforced by this morning’s news that CPI inflation reached 2.9% in December. The continuing pass-through of the earlier significant depreciation of sterling, while part of the necessary rebalancing of our economy, is offsetting to some extent the downward pressure on inflation from the large amount of spare capacity. And the rise in VAT back to 17.5% means that CPI inflation is likely to rise to over 3% for a while, or even higher for even longer were energy prices or indirect taxes to increase further. Although such price level effects do not constitute a continuing source of inflation, and hence should be temporary, they remain in the official measure of inflation for a full year.

Whether for time-sensitive transactions as part of the often intricate choreography of global financial stability operations or for more routine official payments, the insights developed and experiences with the policies, environments, and constraints of other central banks provide the Federal Reserve with enhanced capabilities to formulate and execute policies. The dedication, skill, and expertise of this staff transform on a daily basis the abstract principle of safe, confidential, and reliable service provision into an operational reality. So, to the current and former staff here today, I pay tribute to your service to the global official community, to the Federal Reserve, and to the U.S. You are worthy heirs to the legacy of Benjamin Strong, Montagu Norman, and other early giants of central bank cooperation. The evolving risk environment in cross-border payment operations Even as we hold this commemoration and celebrate the legacy of central bank cooperation in this most tangible of forms, the evolving risk environment in cross-border payment operations requires us as central bankers to continually rededicate ourselves, in word and deed, to the mission of providing safe, confidential, and reliable services to each other. As we are all no doubt aware, risks in cross-border payment operations have undergone major shifts in recent years, with cyber threats in particular emerging as one of the most critical security issues facing our community.
The basis for this was the Bank’s task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system – what we in practice define as financial stability.10 In 1997 the Riksbank began publishing its assessment of the stability of the financial system, in the form of the Financial Stability Report, published twice a year. It was one of the first central banks in the world to do this. The special Macroprudential Policy Division at the Riksbank’s Financial Stability Department has as one of its tasks to assess the need for specific macroprudential policy measures. The Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Department has long conducted macroeconomic analysis to provide a good guidance for interest-rate decisions, which are based on macroeconomic analyses and forecasts. The analysis of financial stability, combined with the monetary policy analysis, provides good grounds for understanding the repercussions between the financial and real economy, which is essential for successful macroprudential policy. In recent years the cooperation between the Financial Stability and Monetary Policy Departments at the Riksbank has intensified. There are also clear links between monetary policy and macroprudential policy. Both policy areas ultimately aim for a stable macroeconomic development – macroprudential policy by limiting systemic risk and monetary policy by keeping inflation low and stable and stabilising the real economy. But they also affect the conditions for one another (see Figure 10). 9  Sveriges Riksbank (2012), Financial Stability Report 2012:2.

They are also to consult with one another prior to decisions on applying macroprudential tools. The committee does not offer any suggestions as to which macroprudential tools are needed or how they should be divided between the authorities. My assessment is therefore that the Financial Crisis Committee’s proposal, which means that both the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen will become macroprudential bodies, does not fulfil the important criteria regarding decision-making powers, independence and accountability. And nor does the proposal appear to be in line with the ESRB’s recommendation. …and differs from the practice that is emerging in Europe Moreover, the Financial Crisis Committee’s proposals differ from the structures emerging in other EU countries. Two models are predominant in this context, and both of them are in line with the ESRB’s recommendation. Either the responsibility for macroprudential policy is given to the central bank, as in the United Kingdom, or it is given to a number of authorities, with the central bank playing the leading role, expressed for instance in the form of a chairmanship or right of veto, as in the case of Germany. If the council’s solution is chosen, the council normally also confers the right of making recommendations regarding macroprudential measures.
And had Jane been living in the euro area today, in Germany for example, she would only have been able to invest for the long term at a negative interest rate – the 30 year bund yielded minus 0.27% in August. Nominal interest rates do vary through time of course. Since the Napoleonic wars and outside wartime, UK long term nominal rates moved mainly in a 2-5% range until the decades of inflation following the Second World War, during which they rose above 15%, before falling back as inflation was brought under control. They have been falling ever since. The fall in long rates is a phenomenon that has been building since the late 1980s, gathering pace after the financial crisis (Chart 1). During the past couple of months, UK long nominal rates have dropped to around, and sometimes even below, 1%. They have not been this low in the past 200 years. The same is true, more generally, for other advanced economies. 1 See Avery Jones (2019). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Some of this likely reflects low current and expected inflation. But it is a great deal more than just an inflation story. Long term real rates – in the United Kingdom and in other advanced economies – are extremely low and indeed are negative. I want to look briefly today at why we are in a period of low interest rates and why we might expect it to persist – ‘low for long’ in other words.

Financial sector debt in  advanced economies  advanced economies Per cent of GDP 400  Japan UK Mature markets  US Euro area Per cent of GDP 250  350  230 210  300  190 170 150  250  130 Excluding financial sector debt  110  200  90  Including financial sector debt  70  150 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017  Source: IIF Global Debt Monitor. 50  Source: IIF Global Debt Monitor. Moreover, debt in emerging markets grew much faster than GDP between 2011 and 2016. Chinese debt-to-GDP ratios have risen particularly sharply and are now very high. Whilst the growth rate of the aggregated global debt stock has moderated more recently, the level remains high by historical standards – as one might expect in a low for long world. While this may not in itself cause or presage a correction, it could well amplify one, making the global economy more vulnerable to adverse macro-economic shocks26. 26 Research suggests that it is the growth rate of debt rather than its actual level that is the leading indicator of financial  crises. Bank of England work based on 130 downturns in 26 advanced economies since the 1970s suggests that a rapid build up of debt is the best early warning indicator of a recession. See for example Bridges et al (2017), Carney (2019b) and Schularick and Taylor (2012).