samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, it is useful for the ECB to draw on the experience of all central banks in Europe and their long-standing close contacts with the market participants. In short, the Eurosystem is organised in a way that ensures the efficient formulation and implementation of a single and coherent monetary policy for the euro area as a whole. At the same time, it draws, to the extent appropriate, on the existing resources and expertise of the national central banks. Structural reform needs in the euro area: improving market integration and competition Ladies and gentlemen, let me now address economic areas where structural reforms are needed to further enhance the functioning and the economic prospects of the euro area. I should like to start by referring to one of the most important structural differences between the euro area and the US. Regarding the degree of regulation, the US is currently more flexible than the euro area. For instance, higher rates of turnover in the US labour market are a signal that employers enjoy greater flexibility in tailoring their staff numbers to production needs. Flexibility of factors of production, including labour, facilitates the introduction of new technologies, allowing firms to organise their production processes more efficiently and to improve their competitiveness. Moreover, flexibility lowers the adjustment costs associated with economic shocks. The greater market flexibility in the US is connected with a relatively low degree of labour and goods market regulation as compared with the euro area.

The ECB will continue to foster the orderly functioning of money markets and the intermediation of funds by the banking system by taking appropriate measures, be they standard or non-standard. At the same time, the medium-term orientation of our monetary policy provides a clear and unambiguous signpost that will allow us to pursue a credible exit strategy from the current conditions of very low interest rates and extraordinary short-term liquidity support as the economic situation normalises. 2  BIS Review 49/2009  Fiscal policies The economic downturn, discretionary fiscal measures to stimulate economic activity and government intervention to support the financial sector have had a substantial impact on public finances. According to the European Commission’s January 2009 interim forecast, which is cited in the ECB’s Annual Report, the euro area general government deficit was expected to increase from 1.7% of GDP in 2008 to 4.0% in 2009 and 4.4% in 2010, with ten euro area countries forecast to be above the 3% of GDP reference value in 2010. More recent information indicates an even stronger fiscal deterioration. The current focus of fiscal policy on economic recovery is certainly warranted; but this should not undermine the integrity of the EU fiscal framework. Especially in challenging times such as these, it is crucial to preserve the public’s trust in the sustainability of public finances.
The impetus to growth will therefore increasingly need to shift to domestic demand, which is already enormous, and which has been growing quickly in recent years. For the medium and longer terms, dynamic and far-reaching economic transformations will be set in motion by China's accession later this year to the World Trade Organisation. As a result of accession, China's trade flows are projected to double between now and 2005. There will be profound changes in the financial landscape, including an increased presence of financial institutions. BIS Review 88/2001  1  All this is, as I have pointed out before, good news for Hong Kong. It will, we estimate, increase our annual GDP by around half to one per cent, just through the resulting increase in re-export trade. It should additionally provide a great boost to our professional, mediatory and service industries. Those who despair about Hong Kong's future viability should perhaps reflect on the opportunities that our position as China's international city will bring post-WTO accession. Yet it is understandable that the focus of attention should currently be on immediate problems rather than on future benefits. The rapid deterioration of the external environment now threatens to prolong the cyclical downturn in Hong Kong, engulfing the vigorous, but all too brief, resurgence last year. Growth this year is likely to be in negative territory again, and price deflation is expected to persist. Such a prolonged downturn is unprecedented in Hong Kong's recent economic history.

They have maintained, and in many cases increased, their strength during a prolonged period of financial crisis, at a time of far-reaching change to the banking industry worldwide and important regulatory reforms at home. A large part of this programme of reform has aimed at enabling our banking system to build further on its strengths and to channel them more efficiently. An important theme in the reform programme is the removal of barriers to competition with the aim of driving efficiency and energy in the banking sector. One of the outcomes has been the considerable progress made recently towards the consolidation of banks into institutions of a size and scope that can make them more capable of deploying their strengths in an increasingly globalised environment. The complementary theme in the reform programme is improving and expanding safety measures, not with the aim of sustaining weak institutions, but in order to prevent systemic contagion should a bank run into difficulties and to provide a greater measure of protection to the small depositor. In 1999 we clarified our role as lender of last resort, a measure of some importance in times of economic or financial uncertainty. We have made progress in implementing our risk-based supervisory approach, which is intended to produce a more focused and accurate assessment of the areas of greatest risk to individual institutions - and to take pre-emptive actions.
Their compilation shows, as expected, that the value of central banks' holdings has also decreased rapidly and often more in relation to the size of the economy than here in Sweden. However, as I just mentioned, the Riksbank's capacity to bear risk and handle losses is weaker because its seigniorage is so small.44 Some central banks will be able to continue to finance their operations even if they are now making very large losses. Of course, the Riksbank's financial position is not improved by other central banks also making losses. However, it shows that our losses are part of international development. There may also be reason for central banks – especially those governed by the EU Treaty – to create a consensus on how long-term earnings capacity and financial independence are to be managed. 43  See Bank of England (2022a and 2022b). 44 Central banks' losses should therefore be related to their interest-free capital. 23 [30]  Asset purchases and current monetary policy In conclusion, I would like to address two questions where some see a link between our asset holdings and current monetary policy: Is the rapid increase in inflation this year due to the Riksbank's asset purchases having been too large and lasted too long? And should the Riksbank not actively sell assets when monetary policy is now being tightened to bring inflation down? I think the answer is 'No!' to both of these questions.

Financial institutions which book prescribed OTC derivatives in Singapore are required to report such trades to a trade repository licensed by MAS. The reporting framework will be up and running next month, starting with interest rate and credit derivatives. The degree of standardisation of contracts in these asset classes is higher, so starting with these contracts will provide for a smoother phase-in. We have received feedback from the industry on operational difficulties in obtaining customer consent in order to report counterparty information to trade repositories. We are looking to amending legislation to address this issue. Ending too-big-to-fail The high-profile, public rescue of many large, systemically important financial institutions in the last crisis has galvanised a powerful resolve to end the “too-big-to-fail” problem. But this has proven to be one of the most challenging tasks facing global regulators. To be sure, the FSB and Basel Committee have made good progress on several fronts. •  First, they have identified a list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). •  Second, they have set out additional loss absorbency requirements for G-SIBs to reduce the probability of these institutions failing. •  Third, there is ongoing work on a resolution framework to minimise the cross-border negative externalities that can be created by their failure. At the same time, major jurisdictions are embarking on plans to reform banking structures in a bid to end “too-big-to-fail”.
Figure 3 Real annual contributions to GFCF (*) (percentage points)  16  16  12  12  Housing  8  Non mining  8  4  4  0  0  -4  -4  Other  -8  -8  Mining  -12  -12  -16  -16 09  10  11  12  13  14  15 (e)  16 (f)  17 (f)  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. (*) Mining investment in 2015 is estimated using available FECU information up to the third quarter, and Codelco's investment plan. Housing investment uses information from the Chilean Chamber of Construction and National Accounts by Institutional Sector. Other contributions are taken as residues. For 2016 and 2017, forecasting models from the Central Bank and sectoral sources are used, such as the Capital Goods Corporation's investment plans and surveys. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 GDP: Total, natural resources and other  Domestic demand by components  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  8  8  15 GFCF  NR 6  6 4  10  2  -2  -2 14  15  5 0  -5  -5  -10  -10  Total 0  Domestic demand  0 2  0  10  Private consumption  5  4  Other  13  15  -15  -15 13  14  15  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2 Trading partners' GDP (*)  Terms of trade (*)  (annual change, percent)  (index, 2008 = 100)  8  8 140  140  6  6 130  130  4  4 120  120  2  2 110  110  0  0 100  100  -2  -2 00  04  08  12  Sep.15 Report  16  90  90 09  Dec. 15 Report  11  13  15  17  Mar.16 Report  (*) Dashed lines show the forecast included in respective Monetary Policy Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
At the same time, cost factors, which gained strength in recent quarters, have begun to ease, despite persisting at high levels (figure 2). The activity gap remains high and inflation continues to be exceptionally high, both signs that the adjustment process of the Chilean economy is yet to conclude. In fact, the projections that I will present to you in a few minutes continue to assume that the economy will contract further and that the annual change in GDP will be negative next year. 2  Expectations for inflation are still high too. Two-year measures remain above 3%, but with some moderation in the margin. In the one-year horizon, expectations have declined somewhat more, to between 4.5% and 6% in the surveys to experts. This compares with the values between 7% and 8% that we published our September Report (figure 3). On the cost side, the decline in global transportation fares, the reduction of bottlenecks and the continued normalization of global supply chains deserve a line. At the same time, international commodity prices have eased. In the November Business Perceptions Report, companies perceived more limited cost increases, although the volatility and level of the exchange rate were still a factor of concern. The cost expectations (IMCE) of the trade and manufacturing sectors also show a significant decline in recent months (figure 4). In terms of activity, as I mentioned, the data for the third quarter generally confirm that the economy continues its adjustment process.

In a context of more contractionary monetary policies in the developed world, the prospects for world growth have fallen again. The central scenario foresees that the U.S. and the Eurozone will enter a recession in 2023. Our trading partners will thus grow 2.1% next year (2.6% in September). Commodity prices are still expected to take a downward path from their current levels. Copper will trade at average prices of $ and 3.45 in the next two years, while oil will trade around $ in the same period (figure 14). 6  Monetary policy At our monetary policy meeting yesterday, we decided to keep the benchmark rate flat at 11.25%. We also communicated that the policy rate will remain unchanged until the state of the macroeconomy gives signs that the process of inflation convergence to the 3% has been consolidated. Monetary policy has made a significant adjustment and is favoring the resolution of the imbalances still present in our economy. Nonetheless, inflation is still very high and its convergence to the target is still subject to risks. Regarding future movements of the MPR, the boundaries of the MPR corridor that we present in this Report reflect some scenarios where the pace of the process of inflationary convergence gives way to either earlier or later adjustments of the rate compared with the assumptions in the central scenario. One important factor is the assessment of inflationary persistence, which owes to either the magnitude and sign of new inflationary surprises, or to the degree of adjustment of expectations.
François Villeroy de Galhau: New Year wishes to the Paris financial centre New Year wishes to the Paris financial centre by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), Paris, 4 January 2022. * * * I would like to start by extending, on behalf of the Banque de France and the ACPR, our warmest wishes, to you, our partners in our daily work: elected officials, financial professionals, entrepreneurs, associations and members of the media. May this year be as happy as possible for you and yours, and may your projects be fruitful, despite this Covid ordeal that has lasted too long, and despite all the uncertainties of 2022. My first wish is obviously that we finally overcome this pandemic, and that we escape from the pressure of this emergency and return to the fundamental choices for Europe and our country, in the long term. The 20th anniversary of the euro, which we are currently celebrating, invites us to do so. The euro is without doubt the most concrete success of European integration; it is “Europe in the citizen’s pocket", at the service of the 340 million Europeans who use it across 19 countries. Moreover, the euro enjoys unprecedented popular support: 74% of French citizens and 78% of Europeans are now in favour.

I would like to finish with the structural projects, on which I hope we will be able to make progress this year: the efficient firefighters of the crisis must gradually hand over to the architects. This is what I would like to see for France, centred around our two major medium-term economic challenges: insufficient potential growth, associated with the lack of skills and workforce available to businesses; and excessive public debt and current expenses. We must also strengthen our architecture in Europe: this year we must finalise regulations for traditional players (banks with Basel III, insurance with Solvency II), but also regulate new activities: cryptoassets and decentralised finance. The Banque de France and the ACPR will actively contribute to this within the framework of the French Presidency of the European Union. This French Presidency will have served the euro well in its 20th year if it also makes progress on two as yet unfinished imperatives, the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union. They are indeed a prerequisite for better channelling European savings towards the ecological and digital transformations, as I mentioned earlier. Indeed, happy New Year 2022 to Europe, to our dear country and especially to each of you! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
One consequence is that the credibility of the institution will eventually suffer, and this will negatively affect its efficiency to the detriment of the membership as a whole. The second is that by granting too many resources under too uncertain conditions the financial soundness of the IMF will be jeopardized. The financial soundness of the Fund may well constitute in itself the topic of another speech. Let me just tell you that, although the IMF financial situation remains strong, recent developments in markets and in Fund lending have increased the risks for the institution. Shareholders of the Fund, through the Executive Board, have the responsibility that the Fund takes sensible decisions. They have an equally important responsibility to safeguard the credibility and soundness of the institution. This can best be done by ensuring that, to the extent possible, the game is played according to the rules. To best pursue its mandates, the Fund must not only be competent and financially sound, it must also be able to preserve its own independent judgment. With this caveat, I would have no problem sharing the very widespread belief that if the Fund did not exist, we would have to invent it. 4  BIS Review 69/2004

We have given some thoughts to this issue, and to execute the idea, one solution would be for the Fund to set up a new department that will handle only crisis cases involving exceptional financings. This new department will take over the responsibilities of crisis management and resolution from the area departments and will have the responsibility for designing the rescue package and acting as coordinator between creditor Governments contributing to the rescue package, other creditors in the private sector, IMF management, and the country concerned, to push through the rescue program. In this model, a separate Resolution Board will also be set up to approve, monitor, and supervise the implementation of the rescue package, of which membership will come directly from representatives of Governments contributing to the rescue package, key IMF members, and IMF management. The IMF Executive Board will vote to provide IMF’s contributions to the package but would have no other involvement. This is to separate the decisions on surveillance and lending. BIS Review 24/2006  3  This simple model of separation illustrates three benefits that can add to the current process. First, there will be clearer accountability within the Fund in terms of duties, responsibilities, and decisionmaking for its works on surveillance and crisis resolution. Second, there are benefits of resource pooling which will allow the Fund to handle crisis cases with all available resources and with the program design structured under a common set of guiding principles.
Depending on the development of the political situation, the global economy may thus recover at a faster or slower pace than we anticipated, and the exchange rates might be subject to major fluctuations. In this case, the National Bank would have to review its monetary policy. In the short run, the price of oil will also have a considerable influence on inflation. If it continues to erode, measured inflation might fall below zero for a few months. Should this situation arise, it is important to bear in mind that it cannot be equated with sustained - and thus economically dangerous - deflation. On the contrary, a low oil price level would create a positive supply shock and, under the current circumstances, would impact favourably on production. Inflation would be dampened temporarily. We also keep a close watch on the development of the money supply M3 in order to assess the medium-term inflationary risks. Following a phase of low, or even negative, growth rates, M3 is now expanding at a somewhat faster pace. So far, however, there has been no excess supply of liquidity in the economy, and the money stock M3, therefore, does not point towards inflationary risks at present. Finally, I would like to make some closing remarks about the imminent introduction of euro notes and coins. For about three years now, the euro has existed as deposit money. It has led to fixed exchange rates and a uniform interest rate level in the euro area countries.

Rumors abounded and the shorting of the Hong Kong dollar ahead of the weekend had become a weekly affair. In the first half of August, Hong Kong’s GDP growth for the first quarter was revised down to - 2.8%. Wall Street was down sharply. The yen fell to over 147 against the US dollar. On the approach of the long weekend in the middle of August, rumors of a devaluation of the RMB and/or the abandoning of the Hong Kong dollar’s link with the US dollar intensified, risking the creation of panic and a breakdown of confidence in the currency. Fact number five: there had been much selling pressure on the Hong Kong dollar in the first half of August. In accordance with the discipline of the currency board arrangements, the HKMA would have had to sell foreign reserves and buy Hong Kong dollars passively. This would have created a serious shortage in the Hong Kong dollar monetary base, thus sending interbank interest rates sharply higher and the stock market sharply lower. Given, however, the need to fund the budget deficit for this financial year, the opportunity was taken to switch some of our accumulated fiscal reserves held in foreign currencies back into Hong Kong dollars, leaving the monetary base and therefore interbank interest rates largely unchanged. The amount of Hong Kong dollars absorbed in this manner was large, exceeding the $ billion accumulated by the hedge funds.