samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To be sure, the highest level of policy integration would logically involve building a genuine fiscal union, as well as completing the Single Market; but that would surely require more ex ante convergence and resolution of legacies from the past. My view is that we should leave the door open to further integration for countries that are willing and ready to consider it. I will come back to it, but first I would like to highlight what I consider to be the most urgently needed part of EMU reform, namely. 8  Peter Kenen, Currency unions and policy domains, Princeton University, November 2000. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  II. How to set up a strong institution to fully coordinate national fiscal and structural policies. This institution is what would enable us to achieve the second level of integration, i.e. full coordination of national policies. In economic terms it would help internalise negative externalities (e.g. demand spillovers, or financial contagion) from asymmetric economic shocks across jurisdictions, as well as optimize positive externalities between fiscal and structural policies. In political terms it would help make the Euro area more than the sum of its parts. Jean Monnet famously declared that “nothing is possible without men, but nothing lasts without institutions”. I am convinced that establishing a strong institution led by a euro area Finance Minister would contribute to cement further integration of economic policy.

The United States has an extraordinarily flexible economy with a strong entrepreneurial bias that generates new opportunities, jobs and income. Our higher education system is second to none and the country remains a magnet for talented people around the world. The United States has better demographics than most developed countries and some very impressive institutions – such as the U.S. Army – that provide a pathway upward for all based on merit regardless of background. America’s place in a fast-adapting world economy and the prosperity and economic strength of our nation will depend upon the choices we make. In this fundamental sense our economic destiny is in our own hands. Let’s get at it. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11
The ECB’s actions are heading off an increase in financing costs which, potentially, would have significantly curbed the national fiscal authorities’ capacity to support the economy. The ECB’s measures have complemented those adopted both by national governments (in particular the public guarantee programmes backing loans) and by the prudential authorities (aimed at allowing financial institutions to use some of the capital buffers built up in recent years). This has proved key to smoothing the flow of financing to the economy during the crisis.4 Let us not forget that, in addition to the response of national fiscal policies, on this occasion there has also been a genuinely pan-European response to the crisis, in which the creation of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund has been to the fore.5 This fund adds significant elements for sharing the economic recovery effort, some of which unprecedented, such as the large-scale issuance of supranational European public debt to finance reforms and investments in the Member States most affected by the pandemic. In conclusion, let me simply reiterate the major role we central banks have played and must continue to play in overcoming this crisis. Set against high uncertainty and a still-fragile economic situation, monetary policies need to continue contributing to maintaining favourable financing conditions that allow the recovery to take firm root. The road ahead will not be free from setbacks and difficulties.

The novelist William Makepeace Thackeray called it “as grand a painting as ever figured on the walls of any academy, or came from the easel of any painter.”6 In 2005, was voted Britain’s greatest painting in a BBC poll.7 The quote – “Light is therefore colour” – is from an 1818 lecture by Turner. It refers to his innovative use of light, shade, colour and tone – one example of his unquestioned contribution to the visual arts in Britain and beyond. Turner rarely signed his paintings, so the signature on the banknote was taken from his will. It is fitting because, in that document, he bequeathed his paintings to the nation – a wider contribution to British society. Most Turners are not locked away in private collections or spread to the four winds. They are free for the British public to see across some of our greatest museums. And finally, Turner’s legacy endures. From his influence on art for more than two centuries, to the prize that bears his name and celebrates British contemporary art – indeed, to this magnificent gallery, the Turner Contemporary. It is fitting we are here in Margate, where Turner visited frequently throughout his life. This gallery stands on the original site of Mrs Booth’s seafront guest house, where Turner stayed whenever he visited.8 More than 100 of his works were inspired by the East Kent coast, and he held that “the skies over Thanet are the loveliest in all Europe.” ***  6  P. Ackroyd, Turner (Vintage, 2006) p. 136.
The fact that the Fed needed to take those actions provides a stark illustration of the significant gaps in our regulatory structure, gaps that must be eliminated. Among those holes was the absence of effective consolidated oversight of certain large and deeply interconnected firms; the collective failure of regulators – including the Federal Reserve – to appreciate the linkages and amplification mechanisms embedded in our financial system; and the absence of a resolution process that would allow even the largest and most complex of financial institutions to fail without imperiling the flow of credit to the economy more broadly. Addressing these shortcomings will require important reforms in our country’s regulatory architecture. We entered the crisis with an obsolete regulatory system. For one, our regulatory system was not structured for a world in which an increasingly large amount of credit intermediation was occurring in nonbank financial institutions. As a result, little attention was paid to the systemic implications of the actions of a large number of increasingly important financial institutions – including securities firms, insurance conglomerates and monolines. In addition, many large financial organizations were funding themselves through market-based mechanisms such as tri-party repo. This made the system as a whole much more fragile and vulnerable to runs when confidence faltered. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the Fed and other regulators, here and abroad, did not sufficiently understand the importance of some of these changes in our financial system.

It is the Bank of England, through its operations in financial markets, purchasing government securities of a given duration, typically from non-bank financial institutions such as life insurance and pension funds, whose accounts are credited with the proceeds such that the asset purchases are financed through the creation of central bank reserves held on the accounts of commercial banks at the Bank of England”. And that explanation, it was hoped, would provide the general public with the confidence needed to encourage them to spend. You can be the jury in deciding how well this might have been achieved. There was a different explanation, and conversation, with the public that could have been had. It might have gone something like this: Q: “Andy, is QE money-printing?” Andy: “Yes. And when you get some, make sure you spend it.”  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  I fully accept that this would be the wrong side of the over-simplifying line for some people. But if doing so delivers the desired policy outcome – building public confidence to support spending – that may be the better side of the line on which to err. Just saying. (b) Conversation At the Bank’s first Open Forum in 2015, Gillian Guy, Chief Executive of Citizens Advice, said something that has stuck with me. In a panel discussion on the role of finance in society, all panellists agreed on the need for improved public understanding of finance.
There is also the fact that in different markets, prices are high by historical standards, which could see abrupt reversals if global financial conditions tighten more than foreseen. Inflation in the developed world continues to draw our attention, as it has remained low despite stronger activity and higher energy prices. In addition, elements of uncertainty persist, in fiscal matters and commercial policy in the United States and political issues in Europe, compounded by growing geopolitical risks in Asia and the Middle East. In any case, we cannot rule out that, given the results of recent quarters, greater global growth may be observed, which could boost trade and trigger a more significant increase in global investment. In the emerging world, like in recent years, the main source of risk remains the Chinese economy. On one hand, it still needs to resolve many imbalances in several crucial markets. 6  In addition, the nation recently began a monetary adjustment that is not free of risks, and there is uncertainty about the direction that the reform agenda will take after the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and its impact on the economy. In any case, its growth deceleration has been somewhat milder than anticipated, so maybe its dynamism will hold longer. The baseline scenario assumes that the copper price will decline gradually in the coming quarters. However, we do not rule out a sharper reduction because part of the recent increase may be related to financial phenomena.

Globally, actual and expected demand have increased, output has been contained and inventories have seen some depletion. The baseline scenario of this Report adjusts the projection for the average price of Brent and WTI upwards, placing it at around USD 59 and USD 56 per barrel in 2018 and 2019. The combined effect of higher copper and oil prices and adjustments in the prices of other exports and imports have led to an improvement in the terms of trade, particularly this year. Thus, considering the period 2017-2019, the terms of trade will accumulate an increase of around 10%, which compares with the 7% estimate of last September. Turning to our activity and demand projections, the baseline scenario assumes no major changes from September. This year, the economy will grow 1.4%, inside the range expected in September. For 2018, the growth projection in the 2.5% to 3.5% range is maintained. Part of the improvement with respect to 2017, particularly during the first half of the year, owes to the low comparison base of the mining sector. This same scenario assumes that non-mining GDP will have a more paced recovery. The gradual return to higher GDP expansion rates leans on a favorable external scenario, the end of the adjustment of mining and housing investment, the absence of significant macroeconomic imbalances and a clearly expansionary monetary policy stance. A working assumption is that in 2018 the economy will receive a fiscal impulse in accordance with the approved budget.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Financial markets and the ringgit - our journey forward Opening remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Financial Market Association (PPKM) Annual Dinner "Financial Markets and the Ringgit: Our Journey Forward", Kuala Lumpur, 18 November 2016. * * * It is my great pleasure to address the members of the financial market industry at the Financial Market Association of Malaysia’s annual dinner. This dinner regularly held towards the end of the year, has developed its own unique tradition and camaraderie. Another year is passing by and we find ourselves in a very familiar situation; heightened volatility and uncertainty, low growth and low interest rates. The specificities or circumstances behind these may be different and indeed some of these developments were considered highly unexpected or even irrational. Hindsight, which gives us 20/20 vision, does not necessarily provide us with a better understanding. The global markets continue to be imbued with financial market and policy uncertainties. To add to this, are the evolving geopolitical uncertainties and challenges arising from Brexit and the impending changes following the recently concluded US presidential elections. 2016 is turning out to be a year of many surprises, something that policy makers tend to be uneasy with. I hope 2017 will bring less of these, but then for financial market players, surprises, volatilities and uncertainties are not totally undesirable as they also bring along lucrative trading opportunities.

Chea Chanto: Opening remarks at the BIS Advanced Reserve Management workshop Opening remarks by H.E. Chea Chanto, Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia, at the Advanced Reserve Management Workshop, Siem Reap, 21 April 2009. *  *  *  -  Mr. Eli Remolona, Chief Representative, BIS Asian Office,  -  Mrs. Miranda Tam, Deputy Chief Representative, BIS Asian Office,  -  Mr. Jean-Pierre Matt, Head of Financial Analysis of BIS Head Office,  -  Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,  Good morning! Today, I have the great pleasure and honor to be invited to deliver some opening remarks for the BIS workshop on Advanced Reserve Management. This is the first time that the BIS organize such a workshop in Cambodia and I hope there will be more opportunities to join together in the future. Taking this opportunity, I would like to express my warmest welcome to the BIS resource speakers from BIS Head Office and BIS Asian Office and central bank participants from the Asia and Pacific region to this workshop as well as to Cambodia. I sincerely appreciate the BIS for their selection of the ancient capital city of Angkor in Siem Reap province as the site for this workshop. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Let me share with you a brief outline of Cambodia’s economic development in recent years.
William J McDonough: Future challenges for bankers and bank supervisors  Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the 106th Annual Convention and Financial Services Forum of the New York State Bankers Association, held in New York on 6 April 2000. *  *  *  I am pleased to be with you today to discuss the new world that bankers and bank supervisors alike face in the wake of historic financial reform and continuing technological and financial innovation. Clearly, these are exciting, heady times. The American banking system has just posted its eighth consecutive year of record earnings, exhibiting substantial resilience and strength in rebounding from the troubles of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In doing so, banks have contributed substantially to, and benefited enormously from, the longest economic expansion in our nation’s history. Simply put, most people in our country have never had it so good. And yet even as we celebrate our good fortune, we must bear in mind that this very prosperity exposes the seemingly unstoppable US economy to certain very real risks. Today I would like to discuss the important issue of maintaining sound lending practices at this critical juncture in the extraordinary economic cycle we are enjoying. I’ll also address the impact of technology on banking, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, and conclude with an update on the effort to revise the Basel Capital Accord.

Without question, the Accord  5  BIS Review 32/2000  was a milestone achievement - for the first time, supervisors in G-10 countries were able to use a common yardstick for assessing banks’ capital adequacy. But the Accord has a number of serious shortcomings. It does not adequately differentiate among degrees of credit risk and, as a result, banks have had incentives to take on higher risk exposures within broad risk categories. Banks have also tended to engage in transactions that lower regulatory capital requirements without reducing economic risk. For example, through asset securitization a bank may physically transfer assets off its balance sheet, but still retain some or even all of the associated risk. In addition, it has proved difficult to incorporate into the Accord’s simple risk-weighting scheme the innovations of the last decade in the way banks manage and mitigate risk. As credit risk management techniques advanced, and as the importance of managing operational risk has been increasingly recognized, the long run relevance and efficacy of the Basel Accord has been eroded. In June of last year, the Basel Committee released a Consultative Paper laying out its vision for a new, more refined capital adequacy framework - one that more accurately distinguishes degrees of credit risk, and that is appropriate for banks of varying levels of sophistication.
We allow third country branching, under certain conditions outlined in our 2014 Supervisory Statement. 11  The key factors which have determined the  PRA’s stance towards non-EEA branches are the equivalence of the supervisory regime of the home state, and arrangements for resolution. Second, information sharing is fundamental. Even if two countries have exactly the same set of rules, if they cannot share information on the financial positions of different entities within a global financial group, they cannot clearly gauge and manage the risks that the firm may be running on a consolidated basis. We have seen a few examples of the value of such cooperation in recent years. The FSB and Basel Committee have developed a number of guidelines on information sharing, which have helped foster trust, cooperation and enhanced dialogue between international regulators. These include supervisory and crisis management colleges and supervisory assessments. The EU has further enshrined  10  A global code for the foreign exchange market, put together with support from central banks, will be launched in May as the first globally consistent code of conduct for these markets. 11 ‘Supervising international banks: the Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to branch supervision’, SS10/14, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2014/ss1014.pdf. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  these practices through legislative requirements in the CRR and BRRD for supervisors and resolution authorities respectively. The Bank is a staunch supporter of these mechanisms.

Second, one would also like to ascertain whether the presence of an implicit subsidy does lead to higher risk taking, and the quantitative importance of this effect. The third question has to do with regulation, i.e. : “what can be done to address this issue?” It seems that there are three main approaches: •  Some regulatory measures try to eliminate possible symptoms of the implicit subsidy. For instance, proposals on restrictions on bank market activities have been justified by the objective of limiting the implicit subsidy to non-traditional banking activities. •  Another approach is to directly target the underlying cause of the problem, for instance by making easier the resolution of problems at large banks without resorting to taxpayer money. Some progress has been achieved in the US (through the Orderly Liquidation Authority), and in Europe (through the Recovery and Resolution Directive). •  A third approach, illustrated by the G-SIBs framework, is to offset the implicit subsidy with additional capital and bailinable debt requirements the so called TLAC or other regulatory measures. Concluding remarks To conclude, I would offer two remarks which you may want to keep in mind. The first remark has to do with the comparative advantage of too-systemic-to-fail institutions, and in particular of global systemically important banks. In reaction to the crisis, many regulatory reforms have been put in place on capital and liquidity, credit exposure to counterparties, supervision, and trading activities.
Chart: Market value of the Fund The Fund is among the world’s largest funds. Performance fluctuates in step with developments in global financial markets. Nevertheless, the most conspicuous feature (see chart) is not the fluctuations, but the sharp, virtually continuous rise in the Fund’s market value. The stable growth of recent years is due in part to large transfers from the Ministry of Finance in autumn 2008 while equity markets declined. The krone exchange rate also weakened through the crisis, serving to mitigate the impact on the value of the Fund, as measured in NOK. Chart: Return on the Fund Returns over the past two years have been good. After a return of more than 25 per cent in 2009, the return in 2010 was about 10 per cent. This must be seen in the context of weak performance in 2008. Following substantial losses during the financial crisis, the Fund has more than recouped these losses. Chart: Excess return on the Fund  4  Rising Prices on the Menu, Finance&Development, Mars 2011, Vol. 48, No. 1, IMF (Hebling, T and Roache S.)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The figures for excess return – the return on the Fund in excess of the benchmark indices – also reflect the financial crisis. Substantial losses in the second half of 2008 have been more than made up for by the Fund’s favourable performance since then. Since 1998 the annual excess return on the Fund has been above 0.3 percentage point.

This systematic monitoring framework is then augmented by careful deliberation of the policy measures that integrates analyses from both our supervision and monetary policy groups. So far, our experience with such approach has been positive. Let me now turn to the second issue: Should the implementation of macroprudential policy be based on discretion or subject to rules? To me, this is a complex and is still an unsettled issue. On the one hand, given the complex nature of how financial instability develops, regulators may understandably wish to retain some degree of freedom in choosing the timing and instrument to address the sources of risks as they emerge. In this sense, there appear to be good cases for the use of discretion. On the other hand, there is also a danger that discretionary prudential measures can add to the multitude of shocks and exacerbate rather than absorb them. Therefore, a sound practice of macroprudential policy should at least be partially governed by rules, in order to minimize the chance of adverse outcomes and to ensure that policy is consistent with the promotion of long-term financial stability. As you can see, there are strong validities on both sides. The third issue is the international dimension of macroprudential policy. As I see it, going forward, the major source of risk to financial stability in Asian emerging markets is likely to be external.