samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
All three layers – national, regional and global – must complement and reinforce one another. Well-designed, they can operate as a package, offering a comprehensive suite of financial options to countries in need. AMRO – The focal point of regional surveillance 20. Let me now turn to AMRO, the emerging focal point for regional surveillance underpinning the CMIM. AMRO was set up to perform three important functions:   to conduct surveillance and contribute to the early detection of risks in the region;    to facilitate the implementation of remedial action; and    to inform the decision making of the CMIM. 21. These functions help to ensure that any activation of the CMIM mechanisms will be predicated on informed and independent judgement. 22. AMRO will give ASEAN+3 authorities a new and vital perspective as it considers the impact of global developments on ASEAN+3 as a region. AMRO’s surveillance toolkit will be based on its own in-house capabilities, access to policymakers in ASEAN+3, and regular dialogue and exchange of information with the IMF and other international financial institutions. We envision AMRO emerging over time as an authoritative interpreter of economic and financial developments in the Asian region. 23. AMRO’s progress since its establishment in May 2010 has been remarkable. It commenced operations just a year later, in May 2011. It has since conducted a number of surveillance visits in the region.

And so, in May 2000, the Finance Ministers of ASEAN+3 gathered in the idyllic city of Chiang Mai in the highlands of northern Thailand, to discuss the establishment of a network of bilateral swap agreements. Thus was born the Chiang Mai Initiative. By October 2003, thirteen bilateral swap agreements had been successfully concluded, with a combined total size of roughly $ billion. 5. In May 2007, ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers agreed to transform these bilateral agreements into a multilateral agreement that would also provide a platform for mutual surveillance and dialogue. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, or CMIM, thus came into being in March 2010, with a war chest of $ billion. The CMIM operates as a common US dollar liquidity pool. A member state facing balance-of-payments or external liquidity problems can swap its local currency for US dollars from this pool. The size of the swap can be up to a fixed multiple of its contribution. 6. Today marks another important milestone in that journey – the opening of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office, or AMRO. AMRO is not just any research outfit. It is a critical component of the emerging regional architecture, based on mutual co-operation, surveillance and solidarity. Singapore is delighted and honoured to host AMRO. 7. But before I say more about AMRO, I want to touch briefly on the role of regional safety nets, and how they complement global safety nets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Why regional financial safety nets matter 8.
This success has been achieved through ambitious professional and theoretical work which is one of the Bank’s main focuses. We became aware that other central banks following the same kind of policy had noted and commented on how carefully Iceland had prepared for the introduction of inflation targeting. It is aimed to strengthen the Central Bank’s research and theoretical work still further, and it is worth pointing out that the new legislation specifically states that it should undertake economic research relating to its tasks. Inflation targeting establishes itself Inflation targeting policies have established themselves in recent years, with a correspondingly large reduction in the number of countries which apply policies based on fixed but adjustable exchange rates, or exchange rates within a fluctuation range. The reason is not least that it proved increasingly difficult to adhere to a fixed exchange rate policy in a world of deregulated capital movements. It could be said that prevailing opinion identified only two possible exchange rate options: a floating exchange rate or a completely fixed one, for example through membership of a currency union, unilateral adoption of some other currency or establishment of a currency board. The new policy has produced good results and is applied in countries including Sweden, Norway, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, along with several countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. It can also be argued that the European Central Bank partly follows the same kind of policy.

Simon M Potter: Models only get you so far Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and New York's First Annual Joint Research Day on Quantitative Tools for Monitoring Macroeconomic and Financial Conditions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 22 February 2019. * * * Accompanying Figures of the speech. As prepared for delivery It is a pleasure to deliver the lunchtime address during the Atlanta and New York Fed's first annual research day on quantitative tools for monitoring macroeconomic and financial conditions.1 My remarks will focus on some insights from the book Superforecasting by Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, with respect to how we interpret, use, and evaluate the results from our quantitative tools.2 If you have read the book, subtitled "The Art and Science of Prediction," you will probably be aware that it is much less mathematical than the discussions we have been having today, but at the same time is more complex in how it articulates the role of forecasting in good decision-making. Before I continue, I should note that these remarks reflect my own personal views and not necessarily those of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System. The insights in Superforecasting grew out of a forecasting tournament sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).
However, that seigniorage is dispersed among all the assets of the Central Bank and cannot be identified for the purpose of paying out to the government. Instead, what is explicitly recorded in the books of accounts is the interest income which the Bank earns on the assets it has created. All costs of the Bank are charged to this interest income and the net surplus is ascertained. That surplus is not automatically paid to the government, since Exter has made specific provisions regarding the appropriation of the profits of the Bank. In terms of these provisions, there is an order of priority for the appropriation of profits of the Bank. First, profits should be applied to pay any outstanding amount carried to a Monetary Adjustment Account on account of (a) extraordinary currency issue (b) expenses and interest payments on the issue of Bank’s own securities and (c) any interest paid on commercial bank reserves in that unlikely event of the Bank’s raising the statutory reserve ratio to 100 percent to fight a very high inflationary situation. Second, anything remaining after the first appropriation, a reserve should be created to a value of at least 15 percent of the domestic assets of the Bank. 6  BIS Review 92/2007  Third, if any profits are left out after the above two appropriations, the remaining profits can be paid to the government. In terms of the above provisions, the payment of profits to the government is the third and last priority on the scale.

There is no shortage of awareness of this point, whether at the policy or the technical level within the government. At the practical and business level, the banks also have a role in making use of the channels that are opened up: it is gratifying to note that banks are playing their role effectively and with enthusiasm. BIS Review 116/2009  3  Ladies and gentlemen, Monetary Authorities and bankers come and go. But I have no doubt that HKAB and HKIB, and the spirit of co-operation that they embody, will go on for ever. I have no doubt that you will continue to promote the prosperity of Hong Kong and the wellbeing of all who live here for many years to come. I wish my successor, Norman Chan every success, and all of the happiness that I have enjoyed as Monetary Authority. As for myself, in two days' time I shall move from this very public role into the role of private citizen, with all of the pleasures and responsibilities that entails. This is an unfamiliar, possibly challenging position for me. But I have never been known to decline a challenge, and I look forward to the freedom to plan my own days and see more of family and friends, many of whom are here this evening. I wish all of you the very best of health, happiness and success. 4  BIS Review 116/2009
An interest in macro prudential policy is part of what Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa has called the “genetic code” of central banks. Throughout their history central banks have aimed to ensure the overall soundness of the financial system and this followed naturally from their basic functions. Three historical developments were the key to this. In the beginning central banks were first and foremost banks – and like any bank they needed to consider the soundness and creditworthiness of their clients as well as factors in the general trading environment that might cause them losses. Second, over time, central banks developed a monopoly over ultimate liquidity, the means of final settlement, and they facilitated the settlement of inter bank payments through the rediscounting of commercial bank assets and the collection of reserves in the form of bank deposits. Third, as commercial bank money progressively developed into a larger share of the money stock, the value of money became dependent on the soundness of commercial banks. In this environment the concern of the central bank for the orderly functioning and stability of the banking system arose from the need to maintain the public goods of a stable means of payment, a unit of account and a store of value. This included last resort lending when commercial banks suffered from liquidity strains. This historical development meant that by the end of the nineteenth century, or by the early years of the twentieth at the latest, central banks’ concern for financial stability was an already well-established part of their function.

The excesses, which were particularly evident in the stock markets, are the most notable expression of the interaction of the belief in the “new economy” with developments in financial markets. However, the growth in debt markets also played its role. The introduction of the euro and the start of the single monetary policy seem to have had a strong, positive impact on the possibilities for corporate issuers both financial and non-financial - to resort to corporate bond issuance as a financing source. In addition, this process was fuelled by the surge in mergers and acquisitions, as more and more companies prepared to grasp the opportunities of the new dynamic environment. Furthermore, issuance activity by certain sectors linked to the “new economy”, such as the telecommunications and high-tech sectors, promoted the development of certain segments of the bond markets, for example the market for high-yield bonds. 2  B. van Ark, “Measuring Productivity in the “New Economy”: Towards a European Perspective”, De Economist 148, No.1, 2000, pp.87-105. 2  BIS Review 23/2003  We all know where all this optimism about the “new economy” led to. Since March 2000, we have seen both a substantial decline in stock prices and rising financial imbalances. I shall now discuss the aftermath of the boom and burst period that we experienced in financial markets.
It provides a clearly defined framework for guiding monetary policy decisions and for explaining these decisions to the public. Let me briefly recall the principal features of our strategy. First of all, the ECB has given itself a forward-looking, medium term-oriented strategy aimed at fulfilling its primary objective: price stability. The first element of the strategy is the quantification of what the Governing Council understands by price stability. This is defined as an annual increase of below 2% in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area. This definition serves to anchor inflation expectations and provides a framework against which the Eurosystem can be held accountable. It clearly emphasises the euro area-wide focus of monetary policy. Short-term fluctuations in the inflation rate are not under the control of central banks. Therefore, it was also announced that price stability is to be maintained over the medium term, imparting a medium-term orientation to the strategy as a whole. In order to fulfil its primary objective, the ECB's monetary strategy relies on two pillars. The first pillar assigns a prominent role to money. A central bank has a natural interest, but also a comparative advantage in analysing monetary developments, because money is - if I may say so - the central bank's "output". There is broad empirical evidence of a long-term stable relationship between money and prices and good leading indicator properties of money in the euro area.

Neither a purely monetary approach nor a purely non-monetary approach to the analysis of risks to price stability is able to deliver the best possible results for monetary policy. In the beginning, we were sometimes criticised for "not having decided" between a strategy clearly based on a purely monetary objective and one based on pure inflation targeting. However, I strongly believe that we have made the right decision, as we have only one primary objective: price stability. We have also decided in favour of a robust strategy in order to achieve our objective. This enables us to use a variety of approaches, involving different analytical frameworks and indicators, which are relevant for our primary objective of price stability in our decision-making process, and to cross-check the results. This approach provides the best possible basis for monetary policy decisions. So far, both pillars have given broadly similar indications with regard to the primary objective of price stability. However, this does not necessarily have to be the case. Let us suppose that both pillars were to point in different directions. Would it really be better if only one of these signals were available? This would undoubtedly make the decision process easier. But, seriously, faced with uncertainty - and that is an essential characteristic of the world we live in - I do believe that it is advantageous to take more than one approach into consideration and not to rely on a single analytical framework. That is basically the rationale for our two-pillar strategy.
The changes made to the NSFR compared with the original proposal primarily aim to ensure that the measure better captures the funding structures that proved to be weak during the crisis. For example, the requirements have been tightened for operations that are typically associated with investment banks. Another change is that also funding with a maturity of between six and 12 months may to a certain extent be included as part of a bank’s stable funding. However, the aim of the NSFR is still to ensure more stable funding at the banks. Other new regulations will also increase the safety margins In addition to the work with Basel III, the Basel Committee is devoting a lot of resources to completing the review of a number of other regulatory frameworks. These frameworks are not usually seen as a part of Basel III, but this work also began as a result of the financial crisis. For various reasons, these frameworks will perhaps have less direct impact in Sweden than Basel III. But they are important from the global point of view and will indirectly benefit Sweden by increasing the safety margins in the global financial system. For example, one element of this work concerns an updated framework for the capital requirements of the banks’ trading books. A similar review is also underway for the capital adequacy framework for securitised loans and other assets. Many major international banks have large trading books and considerable exposures to securitised assets.

This Banque de France view is now widely shared by the central banking community  1. Concerning gold holdings:  The ECB’s decision in July 1998 to hold 15% of its reserves in gold, taken from the gold stocks of the national central banks, was generally seen as a positive signal in a market hitherto inhibited by fears that governments might decide upon new gold sales. This was evidence that gold remains an important element of global monetary reserves. 2. Concerning gold selling and gold lending:  The Banque de France and the Bundesbank have been a driving force behind the 1999 joint statement on gold, which is fully consistent with our traditional position. And I quote: –  “The undersigned institutions will not enter the market as sellers, with the exception of already decided sales. –  The gold sales already decided will be achieved through a concerted programme of sales over the next 5 years. Annual sales will not exceed approximately 400 tons and total sales over this period will not exceed 2,000 tons. –  The signatories of this agreement have agreed not to expand their gold lendings and the use of gold futures and options over the period.” (End quote.) The so-called “Washington Agreement” has clarified the intentions of the Eurosystem as well as of the Sveriges Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of England with respect to their gold holdings.
A good illustration of this is the industrial worker’s wage in 1975 and 1994. In 1975, an industrial worker earned 27 kronor per hour on average while in 1994 the hourly wage was SEK 95. However, if 1975’s hourly wage is recalculated at the 1994 price level, the 1975 wage was worth SEK 107 in 1994. Thus, twenty years of trade union struggle when nominal wages rose by an average of 6.9 per cent per year, resulted in a decline in real wages of 12 kronor per hour in 1994’s prices. However, it was not just trade union policy that failed. It was just as much a failure for the Government’s stabilisation policy. How could it have been so bad? Stabilisation policy activism The large devaluation of 16 per cent that the newly-appointed Palme Government carried out in October 1982 was what could be called an offensive (aggressive) devaluation, on top of that that had taken place in 1981. Through the 10 per cent devaluation in 1981, the real cost situation had been somewhat normalised and the competitiveness of Swedish industry restored. Now Sweden was to get off to a flying start. This was also the case as there was an upswing in the USA at that time and an exceptional long boom.

Tarisa Watanagase: Thailand’s economic outlook and challenges under the volatile financial environment Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Herald Tribune and Citigold Wealth Management Economic Forum 2007, Bangkok, 19 September 2007. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be here today to give a keynote address at the economic forum hosted by the International Herald Tribune and the CitiGold Wealth Management. I also like to thank the hosts for this important opportunity to share with you my perspectives on the Thai economy moving forward, especially in the global environment of greater financial volatility and uncertainties. I believe that the media, local and international, provides a very important two-way avenue for the central bank to communicate our views and the rationale underlying our policies to the public at large, and to receive feedbacks, positive as well as negative. The topic of my talk today is “Thailand’s Economic Outlook and Challenges under the Volatile Financial Environment.” I will divide my address into three parts. First, I would like to highlight the key risks stemming from the recent global developments and outlook. In this connection, I would briefly touch on the implications of the US sub-prime market on the Thai economy. Second, I like to focus on recent key economic developments in Thailand and the outlook for 2008.
28  It is difficult to say, definitively, whether these strategies  have improved the efficiency with which asset markets function, given that fundamentals are unobservable. But that is not an unreasonable conjecture. A second strand has assessed how central bank communications affect professional forecasters. The evidence suggests they have a good understanding of how monetary policy behaves. 29  Central bank  communications have been crucial to that understanding. For example, this improved after the Fed began giving press conferences in 2011. 30  And central bank communications have been found to contain  information that can help predict future policy decisions. 31  A related literature has looked at the impact of monetary frameworks and communications strategies in shaping inflation expectations and in influencing inflation dynamics. Generally speaking, this points towards the announcement of formal inflation targets having helped anchor the inflation expectations of financial market participants, companies and consumers around these targets. 32  A third strand has looked at the role of the media in intermediating central bank messages. Studies have examined the factors that influence how the media intermediate central bank messages. 33  There is mixed  evidence on how well the media performs this task. There is evidence the media leads to a better understanding of the ECB’s monetary policy. 34  But in the US and Germany, there is evidence the media may  sometimes impair communication and bias opinion.

Mr. George speaks on the advent of the euro, and its possible impact on Europe and the Mediterranean region Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E.A.J. George, at the FT Euro-Mediterranean Capital Markets Conference in London on 26/3/98. I’m delighted to take part in this conference which has been organised by the British Government during its term of Presidency of the European Union to promote and strengthen financial and economic ties within the partnership between the European Union and its Mediterranean neighbours. It is a very happy accident of fate - to me as a central banker at least - that this country should hold the EU Presidency at this particular time, as Europe prepares to take the definitive step to monetary union. Earlier this week in Frankfurt the Council of the European Monetary Institute finalised its “convergence report”, which we published yesterday, at the same time as the parallel report by the European Commission. The Commission also published its recommendation to EU Finance Ministers and Heads of Government that 11 EU member states should move to monetary union, in a first - tidal - wave, from January 1st next year. Without seeking to anticipate the decision to be taken by the Heads of Government under Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Presidency in Brussels during the first weekend of May, the odds are that monetary union will go ahead on that basis. It is an historic moment.