samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Second, as I have already discussed, we have developed a toolkit for analysing how far different levels of financial resource can support the Bank’s operations under a range of severe but plausible shocks. And, third, we are in the process of designing a tiered, enterprise-wide framework of limits and thresholds, consistent with the resources available to the Bank, which (i) imposes macro-level limits that protect our capital base and (ii) sets a series of early-warning thresholds. These thresholds will not immediately constrain live non-discretionary operations, but they will flag buildups of risk concentrations and trigger internal discussion and review on whether the increase in risk is warranted by policy objectives. That could lead to adjustment of policy parameters, changes to the Bank’s financial resources or use of alternative Bank policy levers to mitigate the underlying risks. At a more granular level, nested within these balance sheet wide thresholds, the first line has discretion to impose hard limits on particular discretionary operations where it is feasible to do so (eg. on the Bank’s limited own-funds foreign exchange reserves operations). 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  (v)  Challenging new policy initiatives  One of the most profound changes to private sector risk management practice since the financial crisis has been the near-universal introduction of processes to ensure that the business and risk implications of new and sometimes complex products are fully understood before they can be launched.

A primary focus of the new Prudential Regulation Authority will be on determining whether the business models, governance and systems and controls of firms will enable them to satisfy the public interest in financial stability in future states of the world. That requires both a macro and micro prudential view, and for the two to come together to reach forward-looking judgements on whether financial stability is likely to be preserved in a range of plausible future outcomes. This range of outcomes is important, and it also underlines the need to build up the role of stress testing. Such testing is an important mechanism for describing the forward-looking view though it should continue to evolve from a binary pass-fail world into one where it is a toolkit to test a range of possible future states of the world and thereby judge the wider resilience of firms. The PRA will exercise judgement in the supervisory actions it takes, so that firms are likely to be able to meet its objectives, policies and rules over the medium term horizon. Firms will need to demonstrate to the PRA that they are robust to a variety of states of the world, including unanticipated stress scenarios. However, since it is not possible for any forecast to cover all possible outcomes, there will always be some probability of firms failing.
Christian Noyer: Spheres of influence in the international monetary system Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Round-table 1 “Fragmentation Risk in Financial Services: A Retreat From Globalization?”, 21st Conference of Montreal, Montreal, 8 June 2015. *  *  *  For many casual observers, there is a close link between money and geopolitics. Historically, money is an attribute of the Sovereign. It can easily be seen as an instrument to project power and influence. There are numerous instances over the last two millennia where monetary power has been used to finance military expansion or, more simply, to assert and exercise government authority. I would not go as far as Michael Bordo and Angela Redish who state, in a recent paper, that “the chronology of monetary history is driven by warfare”; but there is some historical truth in their assertion. Today, however, we live in a regime of fiat money with independent Central Banks in most advanced and emerging economies. Money is not supposed to serve any other purpose than help the economy to function and stabilize through its three main – technical – attributes: as a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. Yet, the language of geopolitics still permeates the discussion on the international monetary system. Eminent authorities, for instance, casually talk about “currency wars”.

So it was absolutely right to counteract this danger by lowering interest rates and to generally loosen monetary policy in order for us to bring inflation to a level below, but close to, 2%. The ECB has now bought government bonds and other securities amounting to € trillion. Interest rates have been at zero for years. You are offering banks unlimited credit, as long as they can back it with appropriate collateral. The official motivation for taking all these measures was to bring the inflation rate up to just below 2%. That is the ECB’s inflation target. But inflation is currently at 1.5% and the ECB has fallen short of 2% for years. So what is the point of it all? Again, we had to respond to the risk of deflation; and we have come nearer to our aim of maintaining an appropriate level of inflation over the medium term. Our actions have had an effect: lending to households has been boosted just as much as lending to companies. So we have seen an overall rise in the propensity to invest. The negotiated wage agreements also show that our measures are having an impact. Wage growth in the euro area stands at more than 2%, and it is even slightly higher in Germany. That will push up prices. But it is slower than we had thought. Why? The level of economic growth is one factor, but another is the labour market.
Just as importantly, we have published our assessment of the most significant technical risks to financial stability from disruption to cross-border services in a disorderly scenario – things like ensuring clearings services can continue between the EU and UK, or that UK and EU insurance contracts will continue to be able to be serviced. And we have worked with other authorities in the UK and EU to mitigate those risks as best we can. This work has been largely successful: in our view most risks to financial stability that could arise have been mitigated – although, particularly in the absence of further actions by EU authorities, some potential risks to financial stability, primarily to EU households and businesses, remain. And it’s important to note that financial stability is not the same as market stability; a disruptive Brexit could still be expected to bring significant market volatility. Of course, shocks can also be operational, with operational disruptions having the potential to cause harm to consumers and market participants, and cause instability in the financial system. The Bank and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) have been focussing on this recently, with a programme of work to build the financial sector’s operational resilience10.

After all, collectively these enhancements to our current regime may not solve another important problem evident within some large financial institutions – the apparent lack of respect for law,  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  regulation and the public trust. There is evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many large financial institutions. Whether this is due to size and complexity, bad incentives or some other issues is difficult to judge, but it is another critical problem that needs to be addressed. Tough enforcement and high penalties will certainly help focus management’s attention on this issue. But I am also hopeful that ending too big to fail and shifting the emphasis to longer-term sustainability will encourage the needed cultural shift necessary to restore public trust in the industry. One alternative strategy for dealing with too big to fail is to reduce the size of large banks by imposing size limits. While I understand the motivation, it is important to recognize that imposing size limitations might not be a very efficient means of making the financial system more stable. First, it could sacrifice some socially beneficial economies of scale and scope, especially to the global clients of large financial institutions, depending on how the size limits were implemented. Second, the resulting benefits in terms of reducing systemic risk might be quite small.
Numerous pundits explained that the euro would not come into being, then, that it would not be launched on schedule and, finally, that it would not work. A year and a half after the introduction of the single currency, it is worth assessing the results and the prospects of this major change in Europe. A. The euro is already a great technical and operational success  •  A successful launch  The changeover to the euro was an enormous technical challenge. It proved to be a total success. From the early morning of the very first day, everything went smoothly: the euro money market, the decentralised implementation of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy and the functioning of the large-value payment systems. •  A clear, efficient and flexible operational framework  The Eurosystem’s monetary policy is based on robust arrangements, mainly involving the use of three instruments: –  weekly tenders (or “main refinancing operations”);  –  overnight marginal lending and deposit standing facilities;  –  sizeable amounts (more than  billion) of interest bearing minimum reserves which exert a stabilising effect. This well-designed framework has in practice confirmed its efficiency and flexibility to accommodate various market situations and liquidity configurations. •  A successfully decentralised implementation of the single monetary policy  The Eurosystem’s operational framework is based on decentralisation. The decision-making power is held by the ECB’s governing bodies, while monetary policy is implemented in a decentralised manner by the National Central Banks (NCB).

Hervé Hannoun: The Banque de France’s view on gold and comments on the euro  Speech by Mr Hervé Hannoun, First Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, at a dinner organised by Goldman Sachs on the occasion of the Financial Times Gold Conference held on 26 June 2000. * * *  Introduction: silver and gold Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and privilege for me to be speaking here in the Hôtel des Invalides in front of such a distinguished audience. The organisers gave you the opportunity to visit Napoléon’s tomb. So let me, as an introduction, highlight some historical facts, which may not be so far away from the topics I intend to discuss later. Two hundred years ago, the First Consul Napoléon Bonaparte created the Banque de France with himself as one of the shareholders. At the same time, Napoléon built a monetary regime based on a bimetal system (a combined gold and silver standard) that prevailed throughout the 19th century. At that time, many currencies in the world were based on a gold standard, while a few had a silver standard. France had defined the Germinal franc - which remained absolutely stable for almost 120 years - with respect to its weight in both silver and gold. One Germinal franc was equivalent to 5 grams of silver and to 322 milligrams of gold; the famous 20 franc coin, called the Napoléon, was issued at that time (with a weight of 6.45 grams).
James McAndrews: Rising household borrowing Remarks by Mr James McAndrews, Executive Vice President and Director of Research of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the CFA Society of Stamford, Stamford, Connecticut, 5 March 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’ website. Good evening. It’s a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak with you today on the subject of the economy, and especially the household sector. As is always the case, my remarks reflect my own opinions, not those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System. National economic conditions From the end of the Great Recession in mid-2009 through mid-2013, real gross domestic product (GDP), or the aggregate value, after adjusting for inflation, of all the goods and services produced within the borders of the United States, grew at a rather tepid 2¼ percent annual rate. Then, in the second half of 2013, the pace of growth moved up a full percentage point to around 3¼ percent. Roughly half of this increase in the growth rate of real GDP stemmed from a strengthening of consumer spending. While I will discuss the factors behind this improvement in consumer spending in more detail in what follows, the main driver appears to be the substantial stabilization in household balance sheets that has occurred over the past few years.

1   The EU should continue and complete institutional reforms, by finalising the Banking Union, the aspects regarding the operationalisation of EDIS (European Deposit Insurance Scheme), by setting MREL (minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities) for banking groups; moreover, the EU should move towards a fiscal union without debt mutualisation, should leave less room for discretion and comply with rules once they have been adopted, it should clarify the fine balance between the consolidated microprudential supervision of banks and national accountability in terms of resolution.  But maybe the most important factor for the cohesion and coherence of the European project is the success in safeguarding the four fundamental freedoms: the free movement of capital, goods, services, and above all persons within the Union. A Union that would waive these principles would no longer be the Union that was established in 1957 and that Romania joined 10 years ago. As regards Romania:  Romania has accomplished a lot in the past ten years: nominal convergence, real convergence in part, financial stability, it has gained market confidence and has implemented structural reforms.  In order to carry on with real convergence, Romania has to exploit its growth potential and to get as close as possible to full employment.  With a view to achieving these goals, we should focus on a number of issues related to real convergence which were less debated in the first ten years.
It should be recalled that, after several years in which limited progress was made in euro area institutional reforms, it is now more than a year since the European Commission took the initiative to re-open the debate, with the reflection paper on the deepening of the economic and monetary union. This debate revealed a variety of views on the role to be played by national responsibility and solidarity between Member States in the institutional framework of the euro area in order to achieve greater stability and prosperity. At the summit of heads of state and government of the euro area countries in June 2018, a number of agreements were reached for progress in institutional reform and to address several urgent challenges. Thus, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will act as the common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and its role in the design and supervision of assistance programmes will be strengthened, with a possible review of the instruments at its disposal. During the last stretch of the year, the Eurogroup is to work on these two initiatives, with a view to their being adopted at the December summit. The Eurogroup should also continue to discuss other possible elements for completion of Economic and Monetary Union. In particular, definition of a roadmap for the creation of a 12/14  European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) with sufficient shared fiscal backing would be desirable.

The format will be the following: after her presentation we will allow three questions from the media and three from our guests. Madame Lagarde, s’il vous plait…the floor is yours. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Going forward, the access to financing for healthcare, education and retirement will reduce the need for high levels of precautionary savings, and thus strengthen further domestic demand in the economy. The fourth imperative relates to ongoing efforts to expand financial inclusion. Financial inclusion has been, and must continue to be, a key component of Asia’s overall strategy to achieve balanced and equitable growth. Indeed, in the advanced economies, there is a now greater focus and attention on expanding financial inclusion to support the strength of recovery. Emerging Asia has achieved remarkable progress on this front. The period of higher growth has been accompanied by lifting millions out of poverty. Asia however still remains the home of two-thirds of the world’s poor. Therefore, much still remains to be done. The imperative is to arrest the widening income disparities and in inequality through providing more households and small businesses with meaningful access to financial products and services, thus bringing them into the economic mainstream. Another is ensuring that as Asia develops, households, particularly in the lower income groups, do not become financially excluded because financial products and services become increasingly unaffordable or complex, or due to practices of financial institutions which increase barriers to access. Finally, Asia is now building on the progress that has been made in strengthening the resilience of our financial systems. Authorities in Asia are at various stages of translating the global financial reform measures into local standards.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Banking turmoil - three blessings and a funeral Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Eurofi High-level Seminar 2023, Stockholm, 28 April 2023. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to address you at this Eurofi seminar in Stockholm, and I would like to extend my warmest thanks to David Wright and Didier Cahen. This speech, as the two previous ones, seems like a perfect opportunity to take a first look at the lessons to be learnt from the banking turmoil of 2023. As I have the privilege to speak after my friends Pablo Hernández de Cos and Klaas Knot, my task is made simpler: they have already covered a lot of ground, and hence I will be able to speak still more freely, and to call my speech "Three blessings and a funeral". Let me start with the funeral, at least the one that we can welcome, but which, unfortunately, is not final. It should be the condemnation and the funeral of mismanagement. Indeed, blatant mismanagement of the risks and of the business model in some banks explains first and foremost the recent turmoil. As Pablo said in Washington, "jumping straight to discussions about the regulatory and supervisory implications of recent events is akin to forgiving banks for not fulfilling their primary responsibilities".1 To put it even more bluntly, when some people act like reckless drivers on the road, they are the ones who are guilty, not the police.
The reduced potential growth calls for closer attention to the determinants of longerterm growth. Although the incidence of monetary policy is mild, every central bank must be able to monitor the developments affecting the future path of the economy to ensure a more effective monetary policy. 21. Among Chile’s future growth possibilities is the fact that closing the output gap would allow boosting growth in a stable manner from just less than 2% in recent years to a 2.5% to 3% range. As I mentioned before, this is grounded on a better external scenario, the fading of some sectoral factors that have slowed down the pace of growth, a more expansionary monetary policy, and the lack of macroeconomic growth constraints. This requires more dynamic exports, domestic demand and investment. 22. A more significant increase in investment that brings it closer to its historical rates, coupled by increased factor mobility, would boost growth to a sustainable rate of around  3.5%. This would require revitalizing mining investment, better investor expectations in the rest of the economy, favorable financial conditions, and the elimination of bottlenecks that hinder the reallocation of resources toward more competitive areas. A smooth operation of both the labor market and the capital market is essential for this. 23.

REMARKS ON THE CHILEAN ECONOMY Mario Marcel 1/ Governor, Central Bank of Chile April 2017  1. The last few months have brought mixed signals for the Chilean economy. Recent data suggest the global outlook appears more favorable, particularly for emerging economies. On the one hand, activity data and expectations in advanced economies have been more upbeat, marked by better than expected performance by the manufacturing sector and a more positive outlook following years of stagnation. As a result, deflationary risks have dissipated, as inflation is expected to return to more normal levels. The Federal Reserve (Fed) has continued to normalize monetary policy and monetary authorities in Europe and Japan appear to have set aside the possibility of additional stimulus measures. Markets have incorporated these changes in their expectations avoiding any serious disruptions. Along with better signs in advanced economies, activity in China has remained relatively stable, which contrasts with what had been observed one year ago. 2. In this context, there has been a generalized increase in willingness to take on risk in financial markets, increasing stock market indices, reducing sovereign risk premiums and increasing capital flows to emerging markets. Commodity prices have also benefitted. Copper, our main export product, has been trading at prices near its two year highs and prospects for the next few years have improved, which has had a material impact on the Chilean terms of trade.