samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, as many have noted, the current bankruptcy laws were not designed to resolve systemically important financial institutions. Although firms have worked within the existing bankruptcy framework for purposes of resolution planning, revisions to bankruptcy law could be a means of facilitating the orderly bankruptcy resolution of a major financial institution. However, the devil is, of course, in the details. The bills that passed the House earlier this year include many helpful changes regarding current bankruptcy law. They may help facilitate the resolution strategies of most of the systemically important financial institutions. Notably, however, these proposals do not include a credible source of backstop liquidity. Congress recognized the importance of such a facility in the OLF. Any bankruptcy regime without one may lack the scale and speed needed to bolster market confidence and may not be as effective in preventing contagion, particularly with respect to a systemically important firm. Conclusion In conclusion, I believe the legislative and regulatory reforms to the financial system over the last 10 years have made the system more flexible and resilient. At the same time, it is entirely appropriate to revisit these reforms now and assess their efficacy. In doing so, though, let’s keep my aphorisms in mind and not risk history repeating itself. I say this because the American public 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  does not deserve to have history repeated. Improved resilience should permit financial institutions to weather another shock and, if needed, fail under the Bankruptcy Code as contemplated by the living will process.

These effects are of similar magnitude than results obtained for the programmes conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom.6 According to these studies, what matters is the extent to which and for how long central banks’ holdings reduce the availability of assets by removing them from the market. This implies that we can continue to exert downward pressure on the yield curve by keeping our stock of asset holdings at a high level for a prolonged period. Let me first state the obvious: even if we reduce the monthly flow of net purchases, we will continue to increase the size of our balance sheet. And let me add as a second consideration for 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  later: in any case, the Eurosystem will remain in the coming years a major buyer of eurodenominated bonds thanks to our reinvestment commitment, which we took in December 2015 and which was perhaps not widely enough noticed: the repayments that we will obtain when bonds reach their maturity date will be fully reinvested, thus keeping the size of our asset holdings unchanged. Most importantly, our monetary policy is based on a set of instruments [slide]: it is not a solo, but a quartet. On top of QE, we play with our policy interest rates, our forward guidance and the provision of liquidity to financial institutions. 2/ Perhaps the most unconventional policy is the use of negative interest rates.
Intermediation among non-residents The third set of characteristics involves the provision of intermediation among non-residents. The Eurodollar market provides efficient intermediation among non-residents. For example, it allows for Eurodollar bonds to be issued by non-US entities and bought by non-US investors. To an increasing extent, the offshore RMB market is functioning as a platform for RMB financial activities conducted by non-residents. The pool of RMB deposits in Hong Kong, being deposits of mainly non-Mainland individuals and corporates, is exceeding RMB 800 billion. Adding to that is the dim sum bond market, which has a size of RMB 260 billion at present. Offshore RMB bonds are being issued by Mainland Chinese entities as well as multinationals, and they are being bought by offshore investors. At the same time, banks in Hong Kong are extending RMB loans to customers, with the outstanding amount of such RMB loans currently stands at close to RMB90 billion. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As the market deepens and a greater variety of RMB products become available offshore, we will eventually see more RMB intermediation within the offshore markets, especially as non-Chinese residents become willing borrowers of RMB. However, for that to happen, work on different fronts needs to be pursued and market efficiency furthered through innovative solutions and active participation by different market players.

Eddie Yue: The development and future of the offshore Renminbi market Keynote address by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Euromoney Global Offshore RMB Funding Forum 2013, Hong Kong, 8 May 2013. *  *  *  Tony (Shale)1 Richard (Morrow),2 Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Good morning, and thank you all for coming. I’m honoured that Euromoney has invited me to speak at the Global Offshore RMB Funding Forum for the second year in a row. I recognise many familiar faces in the audience today, and I note the presence of a wide range of panellists who will no doubt examine the offshore RMB market from every possible angle and perspective. Here in Hong Kong – the world’s premier offshore RMB business centre – we have had a front row seat to watch the offshore RMB market take shape over the past few years. Since I last addressed this forum in May 2012, this market has continued to expand and evolve at a dizzying pace, which will provide for an interesting and timely dialogue today. However, before we get into what will be a spirited discussion, I want to use my role as the opening keynote speaker to take a step back and gain a broader perspective of developments to date. I also want to look at the macro context, which is likely to play a major role in shaping future developments.
Total ESG assets in the region more than doubled, from about $ billion in 2019 to about $ billion in 2020. 12 Of the record $ billion global inflows into ESG funds last year, Asia attracted about $ billion. 13 But we need to do much more to allocate the capital that is necessary to support Asia’s transition to a sustainable future. As a centre for green finance in Asia, Singapore will play a purposeful role in this effort. We will do this in two ways: as the platform for developing green financing solutions customised for Asia; and 2/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  as the channel through which global capital is directed at meeting Asia’s transition needs. There are three areas where we need to intensify efforts: broaden the range of green financing solutions and markets; improve the consistency and transparency of ESG reporting and disclosure; and build knowledge and capabilities in sustainable finance. BROADEN GREEN FINANCING SOLUTIONS AND MARKETS Let me begin with broadening green financing solutions and markets. I will highlight three strategies that Singapore is focusing on. First, facilitate the issuance of more established green financing instruments, such as green bonds and green loans. Bonds and loans are a familiar and key source of financing for corporates of all sizes. Green, sustainability, and sustainability-linked bonds and loans enable corporates to raise financing as they take up green projects, invest in green assets, or move towards more sustainable business practices.

12 Morningstar, 2021, Global Sustainable Fund Flows: Q4 2020 in Review. 13 The Business Times, 2021, ESG magnates pour money into China and its Asian peers. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
Cautious optimism does not entail a naïve expectation that the “land of milk and honey” is just around the corner. Historical experience teaches us that the cocktail of an economic  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  downturn and a financial crisis is usually associated with a prolonged recession and losses of jobs and welfare. Most structural reforms take time to generate positive effects, and some of the countries in distress are still saddled with rigidities in the markets for goods, services and labour. High nominal rigidities, for example, induce a pattern of adjustment to shocks that falls disproportionately on employment and production volumes. Countries must progress with a deep-seated structural reform agenda to address the existing rigidities, reduce costs to firms, and to increase competitiveness. To prevent – and indeed reverse – job losses, the downward adjustment of both prices and wages need to be stronger in those areas where unemployment is still high, and where this adjustment has not taken place due to structural or institutional factors. If this goes hand in hand with a continued consolidation of public sector budgets, then the cautious optimists will be vindicated through a chain of reduced uncertainty, renewed investor and consumer confidence, better access to funding and a return to robust and sustainable growth. Reforms at the European level  Domestic reforms are important, but we also have work to do at the level of the euro area and the European Union.

While some degree of forbearance may be unavoidable and even appropriate under the right conditions, it is at best a temporary measure. It is critical that forbearance not become institutionalized,  2  BIS Review 10/2001  but be tied directly to actions by both bankers and supervisors to address underlying problems. •  Governments are not good long-term asset managers. Prolonged government holding of impaired assets is not likely to enhance their value, nor aid in the restoration of market liquidity. •  Governments are not good commercial bankers. Delayed privatization of nationalized banks always means higher future costs, and usually inhibits fundamental reform. •  Government-directed lending means future fiscal losses. Similarly, efforts to stimulate credit growth by nonmarket forces in the context of a banking crisis at best buy additional time, and usually dig a deeper hole. •  Foreign investment in domestic financial sectors can yield important benefits. Foreign direct investment in the banking sector can provide much-needed capital resources, technology and knowledge transfer, and a more diversified capital and funding base in the event of future economic instability. •  Financial sectors are only as healthy as their borrowers. Without corresponding corporate sector restructuring, financial sector rescue efforts are likely to be necessary in the future. •  Strong financial systems depend on a reliable and credible legal system. In the absence of a strong legal system, borrowers lack appropriate incentives to repay. •  There are no "quick fixes" to financial sector problems.
(2017), “The treatment of global firms in national accounts,” Central Bank of Ireland Economic Letter No. 2017-1; Avdjiev, S., Everett, M., Lane, P.R. and Shin, H. S. (2018), “Tracking the international footprints of global firms”, BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March; also Lane, P.R. (2020), op. cit., and Di Nino, V., Habib, M. M. and Schmitz, M. (2020), “Multinational enterprises, financial centres and their implications for external imbalances: a euro area perspective”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB. 4. See Lane, P.R. (2020), op. cit. 5. See Pastoris, F. and Schmitz, M. (2020), “Box 5 Euro area-US current account asymmetries: the role of foreign direct investment income in the presence of multinational enterprises”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB. 6. See Lane, P.R. and Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. (2018), “The External Wealth of Nations Revisited: International Financial Integration in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis”, IMF Economic Review, Vol. 66, No 1, International Monetary Fund, pp. 189-222; and McQuade, P. and Schmitz, M. (2017), “The Great Moderation in International Capital Flows: A Global Phenomenon?”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 73, pp. 188-212. 7. See also Di Nino, V. and A. Ekstam (2020), “What value added in the trade balances of euro area financial centres?,” ECB Working Paper Series, No. 2506. 8. See Lane, P.R. (2015), “Risk Exposures in International and Sectoral Balance Sheet Data", World Economics, Vol. 16, No 4, pp. 55-76. 9.

A coordinated approach across the EU could be a win-win situation, as it would reduce the statistical reporting burden of MNEs by removing the need to fill in questionnaires from 27 Member States in more than 20 languages. Sixth, further sectoral detail is needed to allow for an adequate analysis of risk exposures and account for the activities of purely internationally oriented entities. To this end, the ESCB feasibility study on establishing new data for foreign-controlled corporations in the balance of payments and the financial sector accounts is very welcome. Ideally, such data would be available for both financial and non-financial accounts. With regard to the need for a harmonised recording of SPEs in cross-border statistics, the definition provided by the dedicated task force of the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics and the provision of operational recording guidance are welcome steps. These developments will be helpful in ensuring the availability of internationally consistent statistics, with a separate breakdown for SPEs in due course. Within the EU, other important initiatives include the Early Warning System on large corporate events and the Asymmetry Resolution Meetings, which the ECB and Eurostat have set up as part of the regular statistical production rounds to reduce bilateral asymmetries in the measurement of foreign direct investment. Seventh, I would like to take this opportunity to highlight the importance of climate change as a fledgling field for macroeconomic statistics.
Much has already been done by way of strengthening fiscal and macroeconomic governance of the euro area. In EU jargon we talk about the “six-pack” and the “two-pack”, of which the former entered into force already in December 2011, and on the latter a final agreement was reached just last week (“trilogue agreement” on 20 February). These packages of legislation included the reform of both the preventive and corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the new minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, the new Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), and a stronger enforcement mechanism through new financial sanctions, under both the SGP and the MIP. The two additional regulations that are just about to be adopted will further strengthen surveillance of euro area countries. Rather than talk about what has already been achieved I would like to sketch out the further improvements that are in the pipeline, in particular in the area of financial regulation and supervision. One of the structural flaws that exacerbated the crisis was that supervisory policies often failed to prevent excessive risk-taking in the financial sector. Supervisory decisions at the national level did not always take their potential effect across national borders into account. More fundamentally, supervisory decisions were “microeconomic” in nature, concentrating on the financial health of individual institutions rather than on systemic impact at the “macroeconomic” level.

It is our sincere hope that this global forum will be rewarding and may the collective wisdom derived from the deliberations lead to more collective actions that will be to our increased mutual benefits. Let me once again express our appreciation to Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri Abdullah Badawi for his presence here this afternoon and for accepting to deliver the keynote address at our Forum today. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 30/2007
In assessing the current state of the U.S. economy, there are divergent signals, with weakness in some spending and production indicators, but robustness in a number of labor market indicators. In the fourth quarter, investment spending for both equipment and structures fell, and net exports and inventory investment were drags on growth. These developments partly reflect the slowing of global growth and the impact of the dollar’s appreciation since mid-2014. This weakness has been particularly evident in U.S. manufacturing. However, the latest ISM non-manufacturing index suggests the possibility of a slower pace of growth also in the  1  Matthew Higgins, Jonathan McCarthy, Paolo Pesenti and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  services sector, which has been relatively robust. Consumer spending growth – which had been a brighter spot for most of 2015 – also slowed notably in the fourth quarter. In contrast, the U.S. labor market has remained healthy and supportive of growth. Over the course of 2015, payroll employment increased an average of about 228,000 per month. Although the January increase of 151,000 was below last year’s pace, other aspects of the report were strong. The January data indicated substantial gains in wages and hours worked, which implies healthy real income growth for the household sector. Moreover, the amount of slack in the labor market continues to diminish based on a number of measures. The unemployment rate declined to 4.9 percent.

In addition, the fiscal 2016 budget package passed at the end of last year, which extended a number of tax breaks and eased caps on spending, means that fiscal policy should provide a moderate stimulus this year. I believe that these positive factors should be sufficient to offset weakness in manufacturing and business-fixed investment. Putting this all together, I expect real GDP growth of about 2 percent in 2016, slightly below the average pace of growth in this expansion, and a bit above my estimate of the potential growth of the U.S. economy. If this materializes, then we should see some further reduction in the unemployment rate to around my estimate of the rate – about 4¾ percent – that I view as consistent with stable inflation over the long term. Turning to the outlook for inflation, headline inflation on a year-over-year basis has begun to rise as the sharp falls in energy prices in late 2014 and early 2015 are removed from the calculations. However, inflation still remains well below the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent objective. As the FOMC has noted in its statements, this continued low inflation is partly due to recent further declines in energy prices and ongoing impacts of a stronger dollar on nonenergy import prices. Although energy prices will eventually stop falling and the dollar will stop appreciating, these factors appear to have had a more persistent depressing influence on inflation than previously anticipated.
Table 2 looks at this average ratings difference for a sample of banks and building societies in the UK, and among a sample of global banks, between 2007 and 2009. Two features are striking. First, standalone ratings are materially below support ratings, by between 1.5 and 4 notches over the sample for UK and global banks. In other words, rating agencies explicitly factor in material government support to banks. Second, this ratings difference has increased over the sample, averaging over one notch in 2007 but over three notches by 2009. In other words, actions by government during the crisis have increased the value of government support to the banks. This should come as no surprise, given the scale of intervention. Indeed, there is evidence of an up-only escalator of state support to banks dating back over the past century. 5 Table 3 takes the same data and divides the sample of UK banks and building societies into “large” and “small” institutions. Unsurprisingly, the average rating difference is consistently higher for large than for small banks. The average ratings difference for large banks is up to 5 notches, for small banks up to 3 notches. This is pretty tangible evidence of a second recurring phenomenon in the financial system – the “too big to fail” problem. It is possible to go one step further and translate these average ratings differences into a monetary measure of the implied fiscal subsidy to banks.

But if this effort is unsuccessful, past evidence and present experience pose a big question about existing banking structures. Against that backdrop, it is understandable that restrictions on scale and activity are part of today’s debate about solutions to the systemic pollution problem. $ billion may not just be the question; it may also be part of the answer. Conclusion We are at the start of a great debate on the future structure of finance, not the end. Some fear that momentum for radical financial reform will be lost. But financial crises leave a scar. This time’s sovereign scar should act as a lasting reminder of the criticality of reform. Today’s crisis has stretched some state’s sinews to the limit. Both literally and metaphorically, global finance cannot afford another. The history of banking is that risk expands to exhaust available resources. Tail risk is bigger in banking because it is created, not endowed. For that reason, it is possible that no amount of capital or liquidity may ever be quite enough. Profit incentives may place risk one step beyond regulation. That means banking reform may need to look beyond regulation to the underlying structure of finance if we are not to risk another sparrow toppling the dominos. Today’s financial structure is dense and complex, like a tropical rainforest. Like the rainforests, when it works well it is a source of richness. Yet it is, as events have shown, at the same time fragile.