samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Just as importantly, our interactions with markets give us a window through which to gather information about developments in financial markets. We refer to this as Market Intelligence (or MI). The purpose of MI is to ensure that the Bank’s policy decisions are made and implemented with a detailed understanding of the financial market context in which the Bank operates. The way we go about MI is changing – as set out in a Review we have published today – and I will take the opportunity to talk you through what I see as the key points. A recurring theme throughout these remarks is that the days when “constructive ambiguity” was seen as a helpful foil for central bankers are behind us. In today’s complex and globalised financial system, Governors’ eyebrows and fireside chats are no match for a clearly communicated framework in which information will be gathered and decisions made. 2. The way we were: a brief history of money & liquidity provision  Let me begin with a little historical perspective. The Bank of England was founded in 1694 during a time of war with France and was tasked with arranging a £ million loan to the government. This was funded by members of the general public, and “Dividend Day,” when payouts were made to the public, is still immortalised in a painting that hangs in the Bank today.

As Figure 2 shows, the membership of the Bank’s Sterling Monetary Framework has increased from 70 in 2007 to 139 and counting. And the collateral we will accept in our regular operations now extends from AAA bonds all the way to own name raw loans. Changes such as these provided the basis for Governor Mark Carney’s declaration that the Bank of England is “open for business.” I think changes made since 2007 indicate that we are also “open about our business.” The Winters Report highlighted that ambiguity around the Bank’s published liquidity insurance framework is rarely constructive. And the Bank is committed to providing clarity around the circumstances under which it would provide liquidity in the event of market-wide or large idiosyncratic stress: •  The Bank’s Red Book 7 clearly sets out the aims and objectives of the Sterling Monetary Framework with regard to the provision of liquidity insurance. •  Each SMF participant has a “relationship manager” and we aim to give them clarity about the circumstances in which they can expect to borrow. •  We have improved our external accountability by producing an Annual Report overseen by the Bank’s Court which assesses how the framework has performed relative to its objectives. But hardwiring the lessons learned from the last crisis into our operations will not necessarily provide the agility to provide the liquidity insurance that may be required in the future.
Early in my tenure I visited Brooklyn P-TECH and met with a dedicated and focused group of young students learning IT skills for middle-skill jobs. This partnership between IBM Corporation, the New York City Department of Education, the City University of New York, and the NYC College of Technology, provides an instructive model. It takes kids from high school through an associate’s degree with corporate support and real-life experiences. And it’s working. Their first class of 91 students entered the program in September 2011 and 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  almost all have since earned their high school diplomas and about half have earned an associate’s degree in a STEM field. IBM has hired 23 graduates and continues to offer paid summer internships.1 In a few weeks, I will be visiting Per Scholas, a tuition-free workforce training program in the Bronx and in other parts of the country. It seeks to break the cycle of poverty by providing free technology career education, training, placement, and advancement services to people in underserved communities. Approximately 90% of Per Scholas trainees are people of color, with the large majority representing Black/African American and Hispanic/Latino individuals -- groups with historically low representation in IT and the financial services industry. This workforce program is unique in that it seeks to re-train adult workers for successful careers as technology professionals and works with employers in crafting unique training programs for their business.

Low interest rates reduce borrowing costs, making it easier for indebted Norwegian firms and households to weather a demanding period. As the situation normalises, low interest rates will support a faster rebound in activity. This may reduce the risk of unemployment becoming entrenched at a high level. Chart: Activity will pick up gradually This chart shows the projections from the monetary policy meeting on 6 May and the projections published in early March. As we can see, the outlook for the Norwegian economy changed markedly in the course of a few weeks. Uncertainty about the economic outlook is unusually high. We have assumed that the containment measures will be gradually scaled back and that activity in the Norwegian economy picks up ahead. But it will nonetheless take time for activity to return to its pre-pandemic level. Chart: Unemployment is expected to decline Unemployment has risen to a very high level. Many of those now out of work have been furloughed temporarily. As containment measures are scaled back, many of these employees are likely to return to their jobs. Nevertheless, there is reason to expect that a number of businesses will have to close, with furloughed employees made redundant. Our assessment is therefore that it will take time for unemployment to fall back. Chart: Prospects for low wage growth High unemployment affects the prospects for wage growth. Unemployment is at a historically high level, profitability has declined substantially in much of the business sector and oil prices have fallen.
If this big run up in debt was not used to finance a surge in spending, where did it all go? The answer to this question lies in developments within the housing market. House prices trebled in the ten years to 2007. And mortgage debts were accumulated to pay for the housing that had become so much more expensive. The conventional wisdom that the sharp increase in household debt was associated with the house price boom of the past decade is well founded. But what is less often appreciated is that much of that rise in household debt was matched by a comparable increase in the value of financial assets held by households. The value of housing assets purchased by households did increase, through additions and improvements to the housing stock. But the main counterpart to the rise in borrowing was increased saving. To make this point more concretely: while households accumulated an additional £ of debt between 2000 and 2008, they also acquired over £ billion of financial assets over the same period. 2 What was going on? To caricature things only a little, older households (or rather those trading down within the housing market) benefited from selling homes at much higher values. They were the winners. The big losers were younger households (or those trading up), paying more for those houses and accumulating higher debts. The money borrowed by young families ended up in the bank accounts of older households. That money wasn’t used to fuel a spending boom.

And the global nature of the economic downturn further highlighted the need for a rebalancing of trade flows between countries with large current account surpluses and deficits. Both adjustments are likely to occur only gradually and each has the potential to derail the recovery. I want to spend a little time today considering a third factor that will shape the recovery: the extent to which households need to rebuild their balance sheets following the big increase in household debt. Spend, spend, spend? Much has been said about the increase in household debt, both in terms of its role in the build up to the financial crisis and the extent to which it may dampen the recovery. The theme of much of this comment is that our current economic difficulties are a payback for past excesses. Households, it is said, were seduced by easy credit and rising asset prices, leading to a debt fuelled spending boom. As a result, we now face a period of retrenchment as we make amends for our former spendthrift ways. Like much conventional wisdom, these views contain a kernel of truth. But their repetition has led to exaggeration and distortion. Separating fact from fiction is vital when forming a view on the economic outlook. Consumer spending accounts for two-thirds of total demand in our economy; decisions made by consumers up and down the country will be critical in determining the strength and sustainability of the recovery.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Economic recovery is continuing in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 15 December 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen As we have just announced in our press release, the Swiss National Bank is raising its target range for the three-month Libor by 0.25 percentage points to 0.50–1.50%. This change will take effect immediately. The SNB intends to hold the rate in the middle of the target range for the time being. Economic recovery is continuing as expected. It has grown stronger and is more broad-based. The SNB has raised its forecast for economic growth in 2005 and now expects the increase in GDP to reach just over 1.5%. For 2006, it projects growth of a little more than 2%. The National Bank anticipates average inflation for 2005 to remain at 1.2%. On the assumption that the three-month Libor remains unchanged at 1.0%, it forecasts annual inflation of 0.8% in 2006 and 1.2% in 2007. By raising its target range, the Swiss National Bank is adjusting its monetary policy to economic developments, which are proceeding as expected. The SNB thus ensures that the inflation outlook remains favourable. Despite the increase in the interest rate, the monetary policy of the SNB remains expansionary and supports the upswing. As economic recovery progresses, the SNB will continue to gradually adjust its monetary policy.

In this way, we aim to ensure that price stability is not endangered in future. The monetary policy decision The economic and monetary situation has developed in the way we anticipated. The inflation outlook prior to today’s decision was largely in line with the figures presented at the last monetary policy assessment. For 2006, however, we forecast a slightly higher level of inflation to that presented in the last assessment. This is due to revisions made to certain figures that point to a higher rate of utilisation in the economy. In view of this inflation outlook, what is the justification for our decision to increase the target range for three-month Libor by 25 basis points? While we anticipate falling rates of inflation next year, this decline is not relevant in terms of monetary policy. Recent inflation levels of over 1% are probably largely due to the rise in oil prices which began in the first half of 2004. At the time, we decided not to take this increased inflation into account in our monetary policy decisions, due to the fact that its consequences could not be neutralised through monetary policy measures. It seems logical, therefore, not to take account of a decline in inflation attributable to subsiding oil prices, particularly since this drop also results from a statistical effect. A number of inflation components are likely to persist at a low level, even in 2006.
And even though substantial fiscal consolidation would not by itself bring the external imbalance down to a more sustainable level, it would improve the prospect for a smoother adjustment to that outcome. The general risk inherent in these imbalances—the risk of more adverse growth outcomes and asset price volatility—reinforces the importance of sustaining the strength and resilience of the U.S. financial system. Our financial system today is in substantially stronger shape than it was even in the recent past, and the major institutions now appear to be managed so that they are less vulnerable to the type and magnitude of shocks they’ve experienced in the past couple decades. What is important of course is that they are as well positioned to deal with the full range of potential future risks. This requires continued investments in risk management and controls to match the increasing complexity of these challenges, and it requires a cushion of capital and liquidity large enough to capture the potential risk of losses in a less favorable macroeconomic environment. The increase in the flexibility and resilience of the U.S. economy over the past two decades has a lot to do with the increased openness of the U.S. economy. And sustaining this flexibility, which is so important to our capacity to adjust to shocks, requires that we continue to support the process of openness and economic integration. We jeopardize future income gains if we are unable to sustain support in the United States for what has been a relatively open trade policy.

In hindsight, more micro-data would have detected increasing systemic vulnerabilities in the residential property market, as well as increasing exposures among economic agents throughout the economy. To this end, more granular data would overcome the limitations of aggregated data in detecting vulnerabilities that are concentrated in selected segments of the economy and financial system. While these challenges in totality may appear to be rather daunting, I strongly believe they are surmountable, especially with greater collaboration amongst statisticians, compilers and end-users of data. It is with this in mind that the Regional Statistics Conference was envisioned, organised and realised. On behalf of the Local Organising Committee, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all our key partners in making this conference a reality. Special thanks to the ISI and its SEA Regional Network for choosing to have this inaugural regional conference in Kuala Lumpur. I would also like to thank Tan Sri Andrew Sheng; Professor Dr. Pedro Silva; and Mr. Agus Sudjianto, as well as all paper presenters for sharing their thoughts and experiences at the conference. As part of our effort to encourage more involvement of young statisticians in statistical conferences and to recognise their participation in this conference, we will confer the Young Statistician’s Award of the ISI-RSC 2014 at the end of this conference. There are 26 entries for 4 prizes under this award. The winners will be announced at the closing ceremony on Wednesday afternoon.
It was mainly rising energy prices, higher interest rates, falling stock markets and a sudden downturn in corporate investment that resulted in the almost simultaneous and abrupt slowing of global economic activity in the latter part of last year. Weaker demand led in turn to stock adjustments and thereby to a further downward effect on orders and production. At the same time, the falling share prices muted private consumption. On top of this, the terrorist attacks will entail a short-term loss of production and probably also postpone an upturn. The cyclical downturn is following the normal pattern in many respects and is therefore not particularly surprising. Its course has been accelerated, however, by the collapse of the excessive optimism which had accompanied the technological breakthroughs that gave rise to the notion of a new economy. For a time there was no end to the hyperbole about the blessings that the new facilities for information and telecommunication had in store. Expectations of rapidly rising profits and incomes pervaded households and businesses in many parts of the world, perhaps above all in the United States. Investment and consumption rose. So did share prices. Production plans were revised upwards. In time, imbalances arose in the American economy between investment and saving, as well as between current and more fundamental stock market valuations.

On one hand, the United States, central and eastern Europe and - until the recent SARS epidemic - East Asia have been showing greater vigour. On the other hand, there has been economic stagnation in Japan, very modest growth in the euro-zone and a very disappointing performance in Latin America. Second, in contrast with the usual pattern in recovery phases, certain variables are showing no signs of improvement. Let me mention two: first, investment, despite the low level of interest rates, perhaps because of overcapacity in certain sectors, but mainly because of an overall lack of confidence in the recovery; and second, employment, which, particularly in the case of the US, continues showing signs of weakness. Third, macroeconomic policies have generally been more expansionary. Interest rates are at historically low levels, both in nominal and real terms, in most countries, and this applies also to the longer segments of the yield curve. Overall, fiscal policies are clearly expansionary, although the room for manoeuvre available to different countries in this regard varies greatly. Fourth, the current-account imbalances among the largest economies were exacerbated during the recession and the early stages of the recovery and their geographical distribution does not bode well for their correction. One particular reason for concern is that the huge US current-account deficit coincides with the role of the US as the only locomotive of the world economy in recent years.
The first reform is to improve how we write our reporting instructions. We think we can make our instructions clearer and easier for recipients to work with, meaning smoother and quicker processing and less variability in how they are interpreted. The second reform is integrating various reporting processes – breaking down barriers between external and internal reporting, between different steps of the reporting process, and between different levels of data within the process. But third and most foundational is the wider development of common data standards. This underpins the other two reforms. And we believe it can help firms and other users make the best use of data, well beyond our collection processes. Common data standards  Let me first explain what I mean by common data standards. These are simply collectively adopted rules and methods for describing and recording data. They mean standardising the format and labelling used to identify and organise data.

In this particular case, we may find that no single player feels incentivised or powerful enough to develop a standard that others will coalesce around, in sufficient numbers such that the benefits outweigh the costs of development. The resulting lack of commonly adopted data standards is not a new phenomenon, or one that is at all unique to the UK financial system. But it is in greater focus for regulators now, in the UK and elsewhere, because of the increased amount of data that we need to collect, its increased complexity, and the increased demands we want to make of that data. The potential for market failure here means there can be a role for the public sector. Again, the LEI gives us a clear example of this role. Prior to the financial crisis, the private sector had tried and failed for 20 years to create a universal, global standard to identify legal entities. It took the intervention of US and international financial authorities for the identifier to become a reality. Our Transformation Plan sets out our approach to move this agenda forward9. We are convening and coordinating an industry group that will look in depth at the development and adoption of data standards. We will help set the agenda for the group by giving our views about the use cases, like CRE, that interest us most. Our data collections themselves can be one useful tool for promoting the development and adoption of standards.
Ardian Fullani: Economic and monetary developments in Albania in 2010 Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Parliament presenting the Annual Report of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 9 June 2011. *  *  *  Dear Madam Speaker, Dear Members of Parliament, It is a pleasure for me to be here today to present the Bank of Albania’s opinion on economic and monetary developments of the past year. Pursuant to legal requirements and our institutional commitments to enhancing the central bank’s transparency and responsibility, in this presentation I will share with you the main highlights on Bank of Albania’s activity over 2010. This activity, in its entire spectrum, aimed to fulfil our mission and legal obligations, and reflect the Parliament’s recommendations for 2010. Let me begin my presentation with a brief overview of our conclusions. During 2010, the Albanian economy experienced an overall positive performance. The economic activity posted growth, while the macroeconomic stability and financial health indicators improved. Economic growth reflected mainly the foreign demand for Albanian products and services, affirming, above all, the dynamism of our private sector. It was also supported by a sustained macroeconomic environment, with downward risk premia and improved liquidity indicators. In particular, reflecting developments in the financial and real sector of the economy, as well as our monetary policy, consumer price inflation remained in line with our 2010 target.

Also, during this year:   The economy’s external position improved;    The ratio of budget deficit and public debt to GDP dropped;    Financial stability consolidated;    Financial intermediation expanded further; and    Interest rates and risk premiums in financial markets decreased. On the other hand, 2010’s developments underlined the need to continue and intensify structural reforms, which are pre-requisites for a sustainable and long-term economic growth. First, the new agenda of structural reforms should aim at establishing the requisites for a more balanced and sustainable growth in the long run. Greater orientation of Albania’s economy to export and overall higher competitiveness of our products in international and domestic markets dictate the need for continued structural reforms at macro- and microeconomic levels. Second, macroeconomic stability consolidation requires more work in the future. The greatest lesson that the recent global financial crisis taught us is that prevention is better than cure. Maintaining the country’s internal and external balances requires further development of decision-making architecture and macroeconomic coordination, as well as economy and market supervisory and regulatory mechanisms. Analytical forecasting and decision-making skills of public and private economic agents should also be further improved. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Third, ensuring the country’s financial stability requires coordinated action by all supervisory and regulatory institutions, and a greater attention by private agents of the market.