samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I am rather doubtful myself, for several reasons. First, in the absence of single accounting standards, a comparison between banks belonging to different accounting universes will mean absolutely nothing. Second, that sort of ratio did exist in the United States and proved of no help, precisely in the country where the crisis emerged. Finally, in the present circumstances, it could add to the reluctance of banks to be active lenders in the interbank money market, therefore reducing market liquidity and still increasing the over-reliance of the banking sector on the central bank counterparty. That said, it is essential to enhance the counter-cyclical nature of capital requirements. For instance, implementing a forward-looking provisioning system and an additional capital requirement at the cycle peak would be effective measures to make capital requirements more contra-cyclical. In this regard and especially in the light of the profits announced by the major banking groups and the large payouts to traders, CEOs or shareholders in the form of dividends, I would like to stress that these profits should primarily be used to bolster capital ratios and allow banks to focus on their core task of financing the economy. All in all, I praise international standards in the field of prudential rules.

But during the second half of July, concerns increased again when reports were received of the weak finances in Spanish regions. This contributed to new speculations regarding whether the loan to the Spanish banks is sufficient, or whether it will be necessary to implement a full-scale support package for Spain. Yields on Spanish government bonds with both short and long maturities rose to new heights. Italy was also affected by the unease. At the same time, yields on German and French government bonds remained at extremely low levels. The problematic situation on the bonds markets was discussed by the European Central Bank, ECB, at the beginning of August. After the meeting, ECB Chairman Mario Draghi made it clear that countries needing acute assistance should first turn to the EFSF/ESM and accept support under the terms they stipulate. After interventions might be undertaken by the ECB, within its mandate for price stability, and the ECB will investigate potential measures. It was already clear that potential bond purchases by the ECB would focus on bonds with shorter maturities. Expectations were fairly high prior to the ECB meeting, and Spanish and Italian bond yields had fallen during the days before the meeting. When the ECB did not announce any immediate measures, yields rose quite strongly at first. They have since fallen somewhat again, primarily yields on government bonds with shorter maturities.
2  Exchanges, such as those in the U.S. securities and commodities markets, develop standards that promote efficient and fair trading for activity conducted on the exchange, govern the products traded through the exchange, and set minimum fitness standards applicable to members of the exchange; exchanges thus are able to set rules for their participants that touch on many of the concerns that may be addressed by best practices. That said, even markets that feature a great degree of exchange trading may benefit from a consideration of best practices. 3  The U.K.’s Fair and Effective Markets Review was a critical effort to reinforce confidence in the wholesale fixed income, currency and commodities markets in the wake of serious misconduct seen in recent years. This effort was led by the Bank of England in collaboration with the HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  the process is essential and your commitment to abide by best practice recommendations is vital to well-functioning markets. I will begin by describing what I mean by best practices, follow with a discussion on central banks’ interest in supporting them, and conclude by pointing to some of the challenges in promoting widespread adoption. Before continuing, I would like to note that the views I share with you about best practices today are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.

However, unlike regulations or supervisory standards, compliance with the best practice standards developed by our committees is not mandatory for the broader market. Furthermore, there may be instances where implementation may vary given the diversity of entities in the market and the different profiles of market engagement. This is particularly relevant for the global FX market, with its range of market participants. 21 Central banks play an important role in convening industry stakeholders to develop high standards of behavior that promote fairness and integrity, and in pushing the industry to affirm them. Nonetheless, central banks are not acting as regulators when they sponsor these committees, even when they have relevant regulatory powers. Since best practice standards that are articulated by the committees that we work with are not, in and of themselves, binding, promoting their adoption is both challenging and important. We work on a number of fronts in this effort. We strive to engage a wide diversity  18  See “The Introduction of the TMPG Fails Charge for U.S. Treasury Securities” for more information. 19  The New York Fed has organized workshops and conferences on reforming culture in the financial services industry. Additionally, several executives have spoken publicly on the topic. See here for more detail. 20  The G30, the Basel Committee, the European Systemic Risk Board, and the FSB have issued papers on culture, governance, and misconduct risk. The Bank of England’s Fair and Effective Markets Review called for higher conduct standards for the fixed income markets.
Also, in some countries retail lending rates have increased markedly, while policy rates have decreased. Since mid-2011, the rate charged by the ECB on its main refinancing operations has decreased by 75 basis points but the composite cost of borrowing has decreased by a similar or greater amount in only 20% of cases. In another 20% of cases, it has even increased by more than 25 basis points. The dispersion of lending rates has risen both across jurisdictions and across categories of enterprises. For example, the cost of short-term borrowing for corporates in France is still around the same level as that recorded at the beginning of 2011; by contrast, in Italy, over the same period of time, the cost of borrowing for corporates has widened by almost 100 basis points. In addition, in countries facing economic and financial distress, bank financing conditions are tightening further for small and medium-sized enterprises. This is particularly problematic not least because of the limited access that small companies have to alternative sources of financing. For example, the spread between rates on small and large-sized loans has widened further in the case of Spain and Italy: in August 2012 it stood at 286 bps in Spain and at 188 bps in Italy, the highest levels for both countries since 2003.

The implementation of the SSM and the resolution structure should be closely coordinated, which means that proposals on the latter will be needed in 2013. Yet the exact structure of the deposit insurance scheme will depend also on what reforms are enacted after the recommendations of the Liikanen Report, 3 published last week, that aim to protect retail  2  See “A contribution from the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee to the discussion on the European Commission’s banking union proposals” at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc /Reports_ASC_1210.pdf?490dce9cc2a2bf39b76ae4b06604b0ca  3  See “High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf  4  banking  sector”  at  BIS central bankers’ speeches  depositors from excessive risk-taking by banks with structural measures that would reshape the industry. Common challenges to both the resolution structure and deposit insurance scheme will be to agree on adequate ex ante burden-sharing rules between governments that provide market participants with the right incentives while preserving financial stability, and adequately deal with legacy issues. The final form of the banking union will appropriately reflect these considerations, and we are confident that implementation will start as planned with the establishment of the SSM in early 2013.
And I’m talking about the new, difficult to replicate $ bill that will be released next Tuesday. Please join me in welcoming John Taylor to the podium. 8  For more information about tightening control of inflation expectations by putting a five-year inflation rate, in place of the usual four-quarter inflation rate, in the Taylor rule, see “All in the Family: The Close Connection Between Nominal-GDP Targeting and the Taylor Rule,” by Evan Koenig, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Staff Papers, No. 17, March 2012. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In general terms, the CCyB would be activated and increased by authorities whenever aggregate credit growth was judged to be excessive and associated with a build-up of system-wide risk. The buffer can be reduced during a downturn to help ensure that banks maintain the flow of credit in the economy. Considering that this is a new macroprudential tool, the evidence of implementations is still limited. Notwithstanding that, the number of countries that have developed a policy framework is increasing and the number of jurisdictions that have set a positive buffer level increased significantly over recent years. Until now, around forty countries have been using the CCyB, with heterogeneous effects depending on their local conditions and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, during the Covid-19 crisis, many countries released their countercyclical capital buffers, marking the first time that the CCyB was used widely in a downturn. Among them we can mention France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom (BIS, October 2022). These countries lowered the CCyB either completely or partially. Recent reports from the Basel Committee are also focused on providing empirical evidence regarding buffer usability and cyclicality of the framework. So far, the evidence gathered suggests that although the countercyclical capital buffer may be less effective to contain the build- up phase of the credit cycle. However, it may help to strengthen  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  banks' solvency and mitigate the risk that banks' lending standards amplify an economic downturn as well as all the spillovers implied.
This immediately raises the difficulty of determining when an asset market can be said to be over-valued. And if one does decide to intervene, how can one  5  BIS Review 98/2000  be sure of deflating the bubble in an orderly manner? Just mentioning these two problems often leads those concerned with central banking to conclude that intervention is not advisable. I should like to broaden the argument. In addition to the objective of price stability, as the central bank of Sweden the Riksbank is responsible by law for the payment system and financial stability. Without prejudicing these aims, we should also strive to support economic policy’s other goals, such as high growth and employment. This means, for instance, that we should take pains to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in output and employment. So if we see what we believe to be mounting financial imbalances and judge that in time they will jeopardise a stable economic development, I consider that in principle, at least, there is a case for acting with the repo rate even if we do not perceive a direct threat to the inflation target. The difficulty in practice lies in deciding when an intervention is called for. To some extent, this is made easier by the risks being normally inherent in the growth of credit in the economy rather than in the actual development of asset prices. In conclusion I can mention that the Riksbank has been working on these matters a great deal in recent years.

For my part, there seems to be no reason at present for any appreciable change in the assessment I made in October, namely that a repo rate increase will probably be needed in the future in order to safeguard the continuation of a favourable and stable development, with low inflation and rising output. 7  BIS Review 98/2000
The concrete follow-up measures and timeline for their implementation will be announced on Saturday, 1 PM, as part of the published results. Implementation of the measures will begin on Monday, 15 August 2016. They will be incorporated in the individual bank’s capital management plans, as well as in the supervisory process conducted by the BNB. 3. The results do not necessitate any public support to the banks with state budget funds. The follow-up measures aimed at maintaining or strengthening the capital position of all banks are based entirely on available market solutions and funds from private sources. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In closing, I would like to stress out that the asset quality review and the stress test were not an isolated event but an important step in the 18-month reform plan for the institutional development of the Bulgarian National Bank, which I announced upon my election as a Governor in July 2015. Other key aspects of this plan include significant improvement of the BNB’s supervisory process and the development of an institutional framework that is effective in resolving issues in the banking system. The strict execution of the plan to date has strengthened our disciplined approach and contributed to improving financial results in the banking sector. The markedly high half-year results of the banks are a solid platform for implementing the follow-up measures identified as a result of the asset quality review and the stress test.

Without these measures, the euro area would have been in outright deflation last year and prices would have fallen at an even quicker pace this year. Growth would have been significantly lower. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Second, while our measures were deemed effective, they were also judged to be insufficient in view of the deteriorating outlook for price stability. There was a concrete risk that without increasing the quantitative stimulus, the date by which inflation would settle around levels below, but close to, 2% would once more be pushed back beyond any relevant definition of medium term. Therefore we decided to recalibrate our monetary policy stance. We cut the deposit facility rate further to –0.3%, we extended the envisaged end-date for our monthly purchases to the end of March 2017, while maintaining its conditionality on the inflation outlook, and we announced that we will reinvest the principal payments of our purchased assets once they mature, for as long as necessary. We also decided to continue conducting the main refinancing operations and three-month longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the last reserve maintenance period of 2017. Since our meeting in early December, conditions have once more changed. A moderate recovery of the euro area economy is under way, driven mainly by domestic demand. But downside risks have increased again amid heightened uncertainty about emerging market economies’ growth prospects, volatility in financial and commodity markets, and geopolitical risks.
No other rules for convergence should apply to the new euro adopters than those that have applied to present euro area participants or that would have applied to Sweden if we had voted “yes” to adopting the euro. Indeed, early euro adoption may be entirely beneficial for those new member states that have sufficiently stable and flexible economies and that have followed a course of fiscal prudence for a long time, just as I personally would have considered it beneficial for Sweden had we joined in 2006. Rather, it is in the euro adopters’ own interests to independently consider the risks. Countries that have used exchange rate flexibility should not rush into a system of fixed exchange rates before the conditions are right. If you have not already achieved fiscal discipline, do not enter ERM II nor opt for early euro adoption as leverage on the politicians to bring about such discipline. It is not only a matter of meeting the 3 per cent convergence criterion but also of reaching a maturity in fiscal policy that includes a transparent and predictable fiscal framework with sufficient room for manoeuvre for stabilisation policy. The road to the euro may otherwise become very rocky, and if the euro is eventually adopted, the trade-off between fiscal rectitude and stabilisation needs may become a recurring problem. My advice would be to put your house in order first, and only after that enter ERM II and begin a quick process of euro adoption.

In combination with transparent processes, including recurrent evaluations by national parliaments or in other arenas, this could put pressure on politicians to act. Is the Stability and Growth Pact not sufficient in itself? After all, it is designed to ensure fiscal discipline in the member countries. The answer here is clear; it could have been had the Pact only been followed. But now the situation is different. As the Pact has not been followed by the larger euro countries, there is a risk that the newcomers will take the same attitude. However, this could be a dangerous conclusion. It would be wiser to look at the issue the other way round. Both Germany and France attained the 3 per cent mark for the public deficit criterion by the narrowest of margins despite what was a global upturn. But they clearly did not do enough afterwards in terms of consolidation, despite intense pressure from many of the smaller countries. Today, this is a significant problem not only for the euro area as a whole; the countries themselves are also paying the price in terms of a deeper and longer downturn. This, if anything, is a warning to new euro adopters. Conclusions Having raised these complex issues, let me be very clear about my sentiments. I do not wish to see any new obstacles or separate rules for the new member states; equal treatment is essential.
Developments following the initiation of policy rate cuts have confirmed our projections on the magnitude of the crisis and its impact on economic activity and on inflation outlook, and have justified our policy decisions. This, in return, enhanced  14  BIS Review 68/2010  the effectiveness of the monetary policy decisions on financial variables and expectations. Consequently, in 2009, determining role of Central Bank in shaping market interest rates has improved and hence, market interest rates came down to historic lows by following the monetary policy stance even during periods marked by high global risk perceptions. Furthermore, we observe that our policy rate cuts have also been effective on credit rates as of the second half of 2009. The downtrend in credit interest rates especially accelerated further following the issue of July Inflation Report which presented a solid perspective on medium-term policy, and on the back of the improvement in global risk perceptions, credit markets have witnessed favorable developments as of the last quarter of 2009. Interest Rate Developments Loan Rates  ISE Bills and Bonds Market and CBRT O/N Interest Rates  (Annual, Percent) 30  26  ISE Bills and Bo nds Market Interest Rate (Benchmark , Compounded)  21  CBRT O/N Interest Rate (Co mpo unded)  25 20 15  16 10  11  Housing Aut omo bile Consumer Bus iness  5  6  Source: ISE, CBRT. Source: CBRT. Esteemed Guests, 40.

The two policies I just mentioned – energy and infrastructure – , aside from their incidence in investment, could also result in higher productivity. Regarding employment, a recurrent topic in our country’s policy debates is female participation in the workforce. Despite some increases in recent years, it is still below the average of OECD economies (figure 3). As our population ages and grows at a slower pace, the larger female labor force participation can be a significant ingredient to boost our medium-term growth. Another ingredient could be extending the working life span of individuals, a trend that is gaining importance in many countries as the fraction of population over 65 is growing rapidly and is still able to contribute their bit to the economy. Finally, the challenges relating to increasing labor productivity that everybody recognizes are mainly to improve our educational and training systems. Now, let me describe the macroeconomic scenario that we see as the most likely for the coming quarters, and its associated risks. Macroeconomic scenario Annual headline inflation has remained above 4 percent, but with moderate variations in the past few months. This was more visible in the evolution of the CPIEFE – the CPI excluding food goods and energy prices – reflecting, on one hand, that the pass-through of the peso depreciation to inflation has been a significant development, but declining in intensity as time passes and, on the other, that the weak performance of the economy is already easing the pressure on prices.
Historically, there has been a reasonably strong and stable relationship between unemployment and wage growth – the so-called Phillips curve. As unemployment has fallen recently, this Phillips curve relationship would have led us to expect wage growth to pick up. That, plainly, has not happened. Over recent years, the 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  Phillips curve relationship has been anything but strong and stable (Chart 3). And that same flatness in the Phillips curve has been found in a number of other countries (Chart 4). 1  There are many potential causes of the weak wage puzzle over recent years. Some of these are likely to have been short-lived, such as the impact of low actual and expected levels of inflation globally. Others are likely to have been longer-lived, such as the impact of the financial crisis on slack in the labour market and workers’ willingness to move between jobs in search of a pay rise. A third set of factors are structural in nature. For example, there is evidence technology and globalisation may have weakened the bargaining power of workers, leading to a secular fall in the share of income going to workers in several countries. 2  Another set of longer-term factors arise from the changing nature of work and the shifting relationship between employers and employees. One such shift, which has operated over a number of decades, is the decreasing incidence of unionisation and collective bargaining in the workforce.

News conference on new banknotes  Berne, 3 September 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  Ladies and gentlemen I am very pleased to welcome you to our presentation of the new 100-franc note, the last denomination of the ninth banknote series to be issued. To mark the final milestone in this challenging project, as well as inviting the media we also have some guests here who were heavily involved in developing and producing the new banknote series. It gives me great pleasure to welcome representatives from our suppliers Orell Füssli, Landqart, Sicpa and Kurz. I am going to start by unveiling the hotly anticipated 100-franc note, before showing you the full series, with all six denominations together for the first time. My colleague Thomas Jordan will then review the issuance process for the entire new series, before looking to the future. After that, we will take your questions on the new 100-franc note, and the ninth series in general. We do of course have all the denominations here with us, so that you can take photos of both the 100-franc note and the entire series. Finally, we will round off today’s event with a drinks reception, to which you are all warmly invited. But let’s start by unveiling the last denomination in the new banknote series. Voilà, the new 100-franc note. I’ll now take you through the details of the new note. Like its predecessor, the new 100-franc note is blue.