samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This greater density is linked to the higher use in Spain of the standard approach when calculating risk-weighted assets and to the very risk profile of the portfolios. In fact, for banks and portfolios for which the IRB approach is used, no appreciable difference in the density of risk-weighted assets is discerned, on average, compared with other Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) banks and countries. In any event, precisely to limit variability between weightings obtained through the IRB approach and the standard approach, the final phase of the Basel III reform includes the socalled output floor. Here, the density of the risk-weighted assets of institutions’ aggregate portfolio may not be lower than 72.5% of that obtained applying the standard approach. Accordingly, this constraint should affect Spanish banks to a lesser extent. However, the set of reforms pending implementation will foreseeably have some impact on banks’ capital requirements in the coming years. In this respect, the bigger the capital buffers Spanish institutions have, the greater their capacity to cushion the impact of the full adoption of the reforms and their pass-through to European regulations. Beyond the need for compliance with regulatory requirements, the level of solvency is particularly significant in a financially globalised world. Thus, there is empirical evidence that the cost of financing with instruments convertible into capital falls significantly the greater 6/10  banks’ level of solvency.

In contrast, most of the market analysts who participate in the monthly survey of inflation expectations, expect an additional increase of 25 basis points for the whole period from now until the end of 2008. BIS Review 120/2007  3  The recent evolution of the exchange rate deserves to be specially mentioned. The Chilean peso has appreciated against the US dollar in the last few weeks, reflecting, in part, the depreciation of this last currency in international markets. This in turn has been the result of the monetary impulse to compensate for narrowing financial conditions in the developed markets and the necessary adjustment of the current account imbalances among the main economic areas. This phenomenon has stressed international financial markets and is a main concern among the economic authorities in industrial countries, especially in the Euro Zone. In Chile, the appreciation of the Chilean peso reduces profits in those tradable sectors that have not been able to adjust their prices in dollars. However, it is important to mention that, thanks to the combination of a fiscal policy, anchored to a structural fiscal surplus and that saves transitory income, and the inflation-targeting monetary policy framework with floating exchange rate regime, the appreciation of the Chilean peso with respect to the US dollar has been one of the lowest among countries all around the world, since the beginning of the US dollar depreciation in international money markets in February 2002.
The adjustments are between 10% and 25% in the number of offices, and between 12% and 18% in staff. Third, to reinforce the viability of the new institutions (resulting from the mergers of several savings banks) with the resources and the management capacity of the savings banks best placed to lead each of the concentration processes. Finally, to ensure in the medium term that the lower number of institutions and the diminished capacity will allow a reasonable level of profitability in step with the risks incurred for the remaining institutions. To round off the adjustment, the legislation governing savings banks was also amended in an attempt to make the management of these institutions more professional and, most notably, opening them up to market discipline and to the possibility of them raising capital (shares) to reinforce their solvency. In short, the central aim of the efforts made by the Bank of Spain since 2009 has been to restructure the balance sheets of banks, and of savings banks in particular. Spanish deposit institutions have made an enormous write-down drive to date, this effort often going unnoticed by certain observers of the Spanish banking system. Overall, provisions totalling € billion which is a 9% of GDP, more than the cost of numerous bank crises experienced by developed countries.

Elsewhere, in credit to construction and real estate developers, bad debts are around five times greater. These mortgage default figures are somewhat more than one percentage point lower than those observed in the early 1990s, when we also had a recession combined with a real estate market crisis. And this is possible with the unemployment rate currently around 20%. The explanation for this is that interest rates on Spanish mortgages are currently below 3%, while in the early 1990s they were around 14%, with an unemployment rate close to 24%. The fact that the average loan-tovalue ratio stands at 62%, with only 3% of mortgages with an LTV above 100%, and the widely rooted wish in Spanish society to own one’s own house explain why the mortgage portfolio is, in fact, the least risky of all Spanish deposit institutions’ credit portfolios. Conclusions I could talk a good deal more about what we have done in Spain to tackle and resolve the problems of our banking system. But I believe it would be much more interesting to listen to your concerns and worries and try to allay them. I shall thus conclude that the steps taken by the Spanish government and Parliament on fiscal consolidation, labour market reform and pensions system reform, along with the changes I have explained to you in relation to savings banks and the strengthening of banking solvency, should – little by little, since confidence takes some time to pick up – afford us greater recognition by international investors.
First, the euro area needs a permanent macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism – with revenue-raising and borrowing capacity – to complement the single monetary policy. Second, it is imperative that the banking union be completed with the establishment of a European deposit guarantee scheme. A common fund, with risk-pooling, would ease the sovereign-bank nexus that proved so damaging in the European sovereign debt crisis and would align financial responsibility with centralised decision-making in banking supervision 4  Such as the important projects of common European interest, which include the development of batteries, microelectronics, hydrogen technologies and cloud services. 7  and resolution matters. It is also essential that the regulatory barriers that are hindering the emergence of a fully-fledged European banking market be lifted. Third, headway must be made in the construction of the capital markets union, so as to boost the euro area’s resilience to macro-financial shocks, better distribute the costs of asymmetric or idiosyncratic shocks, reduce the risks of financial fragmentation and provide an environment more conducive to private investment. At present, the relatively small size of equity markets and the considerable home bias of asset portfolios limit risk sharing in the euro area. Moreover, a deeper capital markets union could help channel high aggregate savings towards investment in infrastructure, energy and innovation, where private investment is crucial.5 Lastly, a key feature for a genuine, more integrated and deeper European capital market would be the existence of pan-European safe assets on a significant scale.

I should emphasise, however, that the Eurosystem projections are built on the assumptions that the sanctions against Russia will remain in place over the full projection horizon, that the intense phase of the war will continue until the end of the year with no further escalation, that disruptions to energy supplies will not lead to rationing in euro area countries, and that supply bottlenecks will gradually be resolved by the end of 2023. 1  The reduction owed to the fall in both the services sector component (down 2.4 points to 50.6, a 15-month low) and the manufacturing PMI (down 3.2 points to 46.1, the second consecutive month in contraction). 1  However, a prolongation of the war in Ukraine remains a significant downside risk for growth, particularly if energy supplies from Russia are suspended and result in rationing for firms and households. Likewise, the war could also further dampen confidence and aggravate supply-side constraints, while energy and food prices could remain persistently higher than expected. A faster deceleration in global growth would also pose a risk to the euro area outlook. Indeed, given the high uncertainty surrounding the outlook, the June projections are complemented by a downside scenario that reflects the possibility of a severe disruption to European energy supplies, leading to further increases in energy prices and production cuts.
There are many other judgements in the forecast where the risks for me are more balanced but similarly uncertain given the sources of uncertainty present. I am not advocating ignoring the forecast in the framing and setting of policy and relying instead on current, spot economic data. But I do support the MPC continuing to be more explicit in recognising the uncertainties inherent in the future path of the economy and in the forecasting process. One consequence of this approach is that I am more sensitive to errors in the short-term forecast than I am to forecast changes further out. A cross-check on the MPC forecast is to compare with other forecasters, which we facilitate by including an annex on other forecasters expectations in every MPR (Chart 9). Because the period running up to the November MPC was marked by particular volatility in financial markets, other forecasts were more likely than usual to be based on different assumptions to the MPR forecasts. Even allowing for that, the differences are noteworthy though also reflective of the uncertainties forecasters have to contend with at present, both on the demand side and the supply side. Bank of England  Page 13  All other forecasts for GDP in each of the three years from 2023 to 2025 were above the MPC’s modal projection. There was a similarly marked difference after the first year of the forecast period for unemployment.

In March of this year, Bank Negara Malaysia established a Reuters page for the RMB/MYR exchange rate for trade-related settlements, with 11 banking institutions offering the facility to Malaysian companies. A cost-effective arrangement is now being finalised to provide the option for exporters and importers to settle bilateral trade obligations in local currency by the middle of this year. This will complement the existing facilities that are already being provided by commercial banks in the settlement of trade in RMB. Bank Negara Malaysia has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2009 to further strengthen the framework for cooperation and collaboration between both authorities, and to promote regional financial integration. This MOU provides the platform for both regulatory agencies to share information, to ensure the enforcement of prudential rules and regulations and to undertake pre-emptive actions  BIS Review 58/2010  1  towards ensuring the sound development of financial institutions operating in both the respective jurisdictions. This MOU also provides an established mechanism to enhance cooperation in areas that will be mutually beneficial for the development of the financial sector in both countries. With respect to the performance of the Malaysian financial sector, it has demonstrated its resilience throughout the recent global financial crisis. Financial intermediation has remained intact with the banking institutions in a strong position to support the economy. This has been reinforced by fiscal and monetary measures to ensure adequate access to financing by all segments of the private sector.
The marvellous thing about Icelanders is that we have never let trivial matters like population undermine our steadfast belief that we can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with other countries in everything that we endeavour to do – if we only take the matter seriously enough. This is the attitude that we should take towards economic policy. In this context, I agree with Icelandic independence leader Jón Sigurðsson when he warned about Icelandic individualism, saying, “Many tend to think of Iceland as being alone in the world and deny that other countries’ experience matters.” It is never stressed often enough or loudly enough that monetary policy is social welfare policy. Economic volatility generally leads to unexpected changes in people’s personal situation – particularly for people with low income. The cost of inflation is more onerous for low-income people and causes purchasing power to fluctuate. Successful economic policy reduces the level of uncertainty in people’s everyday lives, and price stability delivers increased purchasing power and a predictable housing market. Economic 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  stability is a normal and appropriate thing for people to demand – and the principal objective of the Central Bank of Iceland. Successful monetary policy is therefore extremely important for general well-being and reduces the likelihood of poverty, while economic policy mistakes are costly, not least for those with the lowest income. Increased credibility of monetary policy leads to lower interest rates, thereby improving debtors’ situation.

A Big Mac was thus around 10 per cent more expensive in the United States than in Sweden, in Swedish kronor. At the beginning of 2008 the krona had appreciated so much that a dollar cost 6 kronor. In the United States a Big Mac cost 3.60 dollars then, which corresponded to 21.30 kronor, while in Sweden a Big Mac cost 38 kronor. Now a Big Mac was instead more than 40 per cent cheaper in the United States than in Sweden, in Swedish kronor. In terms of a Big Mac, the real exchange rate had thus strengthened considerably, both as a result of the nominal krona rate strengthening against the dollar and as a result of the price level rising more quickly in Sweden. 21  20  See also Lagerwall and Nessén (2009). 21  The price in the United States has increased from 2.60 to 3.60 dollars, which corresponds to almost 40 per cent, while the price in Sweden has increased from 24 to 38 kronor, which corresponds to almost 60 per cent. One usually defines the real krona exchange rate as ExP*/P, where E is the nominal exchange rate (for example, the number of kronor per dollar), P* is the price level abroad and P is the price level in Sweden. It thus shows the price level in kronor abroad in relation to that in Sweden. An appreciation in the krona’s real  8  BIS Review 3/2010  Figure 4 shows the nominal and real trade-weighted krona rate since 1970.
•  Individuals purchasing property are constrained on their total debt service ratio. 36. MAS announced new unsecured credit rules two years ago. •  FIs will not be allowed to grant further unsecured credit to borrower whose aggregate unsecured debt exceeds borrowing limit for 3 consecutive months. •  This limit has been set at 24 times borrower’s monthly income, and will be lowered to 18 times from 1 Jun 2017 and 12 times from 1 Jun 2019. 37. Vast majority of Singaporeans manage their debt well. •  Less than 2% of unsecured credit users affected by industry-wide borrowing limit. •  Nonetheless, this is about 22,000 borrowers who need help to manage down their debt. There are measures to help unsecured borrowers pay down their debts 38. Banks have worked with Credit Counselling Singapore (CCS) to develop a new Repayment Assistance Scheme (RAS). •  Convenient one-stop solution for borrower to work out centralised repayment solution with creditors. •  Lower interest rate of 5% p.a. over repayment period of 8 years for debt in excess of 12 times a borrower’s monthly income. Second consumer initiative: facilitate retail access to simple, low cost investment products 39. Last year I spoke about how MAS was working to improve savings and investment options for retail consumers. Made progress on three fronts. •  introduced Savings Bonds for flexible risk-free returns  •  facilitated access to $ corporate bonds for stable, long-term returns  •  expanded ETF options for diversified equity returns  40.

Andrew G Haldane: The Bank and the banks Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, at Queen’s University, Belfast, 18 October 2012. *  *  *  The views expressed within are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Bethany Blowers, Forrest Capie, John Keyworth, Victoria Kinahan, Emma Murphy, Varun Paul, Richard Roberts, and the staff of the Bank’s archives for their comments and contributions. In the light of the financial crisis, there is much to explain. Doing so is not just important for reasons of accountability to the public. Explaining and understanding errors of the past is absolutely essential if policymakers are to learn lessons for the future. To misquote someone none of you have ever heard of, those who forget the errors of the past are doomed to repeat them. During the course of its 318-year history, the Bank of England has had plenty of crisis experience. And encouragingly, on my reading of history, there is evidence of it having learnt from this experience. In response, radical reform of the Bank’s policymaking framework has been commonplace. There are few better examples than the radical reform of the Bank’s transparency and accountability practices over the past twenty-five years. Those reforms are continuing to the present day. A wholly new framework for financial stability policy is being put in place in the UK, perhaps the most radical in the Bank’s history.
New regulations are being introduced in an increasing number of countries and new tools are being deployed. New institutions are being established to ensure coordination across countries, markets and instruments. A clearer macro dimension has been integrated into banking regulation, based on the recognition that the financial system as a whole can be vulnerable even if individual institutions seem to be solid. Systemic risk entails a risk that the entire financial system could become unstable or, at worst, collapse, with substantial negative consequences for the real economy. The aim of the new regulations is to guard against systemic risk. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As the new regulatory regime has been introduced, another dimension has been added to the discussion. The question being asked is whether the new instruments relieve monetary policy of taking financial stability into account. Experience of the new regulatory regime is still limited, and we have little knowledge about the effectiveness of the new tools. At the same time, a number of central banks are facing a demanding challenge with regard to the practical implementation of policy: how can the economy be brought back on track without laying the basis for new imbalances? My presentation today will focus on financial imbalances and systemic risk. I would like to offer you some insight into some of the issues and analyses in the interface between monetary policy and financial stability that we are now working on at Norges Bank.

When financial turbulence occurs, the economic setback is less pronounced and less prolonged than if the central bank had not taken this risk into account in monetary policy, as illustrated by the blue lines. The gain achieved from keeping the interest rate somewhat higher in the short term is in this case a more stable path for inflation and output over time. The interplay between the financial system and other areas of the economy is complex. This makes it demanding to predict the timing of crises and how they will arise. There is also considerable uncertainty linked to the consequences of a crisis on the wider economy. We may never achieve a fully precise understanding of these mechanisms. On the other hand, we cannot neglect the possible effects of monetary policy on the build-up of financial imbalances. Norges Bank’s modelling tools are continually being developed. Our model apparatus is also shaped by new insights about the functioning of the economy and how we can guard against the risk of financial stress. The aim is continuously to ensure that the models are the best possible support tools for monetary policy decisions. Formalising the framework along the lines I just presented can make it easier to recognise the line of reasoning and help clarify the choices we face. But the ultimate assessment will always be a result of Norges Bank’s professional judgement and incorporate knowledge and considerations that are insufficiently captured in our model. In this respect, the models are simply a tool.
  Growth in Agro-processing has been supported in part by the last two maize bumper harvests, 2010 (2.8 million mt of maize) and (3.0 million mt of maize 2011).   Strong construction activities have stimulated strong demand for manufacture of construction materials particularly cement and cement-related products.   Total cement output by the country’s three manufacturing plants (Lafarge Zambia Plc, Oriental Quarries and Zambezi Portland Plc) rose by 37.9% to 1,126,728 mt in 2010 from 817,223.0 mt in 2009. Further, during the first half of 2011 cement output at 617,115.2 mt was 36.0% higher than the 453,791.0 mt produced in the corresponding half of 2010. C.  Multi-facility economic zones    Zambia’s goal catalyzing industrial and economic development through increased activity in the manufacturing sector has led the country to embark on the development of Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) in selected parts of the country. Among the MFEZs are: –  The Chambishi MFEZ (construction is advanced) being developed in partnership with the Chinese government with a commitment of over US $ billion;  –  Two Lusaka MFEZs (preparatory phases) and one industrial park. One of the Lusaka MFEZs, the Lusaka South, will be developed in cooperation with a Malaysian firm at an estimated cost of US $ billion;  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  –   Solwezi (Lumwana) (preparatory phase). The MFEZs are expected to significantly contribute to employment creation in the country.

  Commercial banks’ average lending rates decreased to 27.9 percent in 2010 from 28.4 percent in 2009. In June 2011, average lending rates stood at 26.0 percent.   In the Government securities market, the weighted average Treasury bill yield rate was 7.7 percent in 2010, from 9.5 percent in 2009. Similarly, Government bonds composite yield rate fell to 12.3% from 15.9 percent in 2009. As at June 2011, the weighted average Treasury bill rate was 10.0 percent, while the composite bond yield rate was 15.7 percent. External sector performance   The external sector recorded favourable performance, as evidenced by an increase in the balance of payments surplus and a rise in the country’s gross international reserves.   The country’s gross international reserves rose to $ million from $ million in 2009. This followed increased receipt of donor funds as well as recovery in the global economy that saw increased demand and international prices for most commodities, including copper.   The Balance of Payments (BoP) recorded a surplus of $ million in 2010. The surplus was attributed to the positive outturn of the current account to $ million in 2010 from a deficit of $ million in 2009. This was mainly on account of an improvement in Zambia’s trade balance, which increased by 312.8 percent to $ million from a surplus of $ million in 2009.