samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition to the medium and long-term benefits of such a strategy, defining the plan early on would generate greater certainty and trust in public policies, which is particularly important against the backdrop of the monetary policy normalisation I have described. In any event, the course of the war in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions and retaliatory measures have laid bare the EU’s vulnerabilities and dependencies in key sectors, such as energy, as well as the disparities between Member States in their exposure to such tensions. A challenge of this magnitude underlines the importance of a joint response to common risks. The response to the war in Ukraine must, once again, be more Europe. To address this common challenge, more emphasis has been placed on European “strategic autonomy”. This episode has shown that pan-European structural policies that foster the integration and interconnection of European markets – including energy markets – and strengthen the single market4 will not only generate greater resilience to shocks, but also drive competitiveness. In this respect, joint funding arrangements should be established to safeguard this common effort and avoid any excessive or highly unequal impact on national public finances. Common funding arrangements would allow European institutions to finance large-scale programmes based on shared quality standards and would provide for a uniform approach for assessing programme execution. Headway must also be made in the expansion of the public and private risk-sharing arrangements in the EU.

A European safe asset would become a common benchmark for investors, allowing equity and bond prices across the euro area to reflect their fundamental risk more clearly. It would also facilitate the development and integration of the euro area’s financial markets, while flight-to-quality movements would no longer imply cross-border flows to countries considered to be safer. And it would boost international investors’ confidence in the European project, helping to strengthen the international role of the euro. All of which is especially relevant against a backdrop of geopolitical stress and asymmetric shocks. Such resolute progress in completing the monetary union would structurally reduce the risks of financial fragmentation and ensure the smooth transmission of monetary policy, which in turn would support our monetary policy action. 5  For instance, public and supranational investment (NGEU funds) will only be able to meet a small proportion of the investment required in the energy transition, estimated by the European Commission as more than € billion per year over the next decade. 8
On this front, we are happy to see that RMB lending business is developing progressively, with outstanding RMB loans reaching 60 billion yuan at end-July 2012, nearly four times the level of a year ago. So, is the wider use of RMB a continuing trend? Well, I would say the scope for further development is clear, and it will be very much up to how corporates and banks can get more engaged in the new business of RMB. Third question: does the development of offshore RMB business in other financial centres pose a threat to Hong Kong? This question, I have to say, suffers from the fallacy of “zero-sum” thinking. As more corporates and investors worldwide are becoming interested in conducting their business transactions and investments in RMB, it is natural to see financial institutions in different parts of the world providing RMB services to meet the demand of their customers. This does not necessarily mean that RMB businesses are being diverted to other places. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Indeed, such developments will mean that banks in Hong Kong will not be dealing only with each other locally, and there will be new business opportunities to conduct RMB businesses with counterparts overseas. For instance, as a global hub for RMB liquidity and financing, Hong Kong is well placed to channel customer and wholesale RMB deposits towards corporations and financial institutions in other parts of the world. In fact, we are already seeing such a trend.

th  Chart 6: Real wage growth slowest since mid-19 Century 10-year moving average, per cent 4  3  2  1  0 Forecast -1 1850  1865  1880  1895  1910  1925  1940  1955  1970  1985  2000  2015  Source: Thomas, R. and Dimsdale, N. (2016) "Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.3", Bank of England, based on average weekly wages and the CPI; and November Inflation Report. Such high income inequalities are dwarfed by staggering wealth inequalities. The proportion of the wealth v  held by the richest 1% of Americans increased from 25% in 1990 to 40% in 2012. Globally, the share of wealth held by the richest 1% in the world rose from one-third in 2000 to one-half in 2010.  vi  The picture in the UK is complex but in general suggests relatively stable but high levels of overall inequality, with sharper disparities emerging in recent times for the top 1%. When combined with low growth of incomes and entrenched intergenerational inequity, it is no wonder that many question their prospects. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  For example, a common measure of the distribution of income, the Gini coefficient, shows that inequality rose sharply during the 1980s and has more or less plateaued ever since (Chart 7). That suggests a large structural shift during the Thatcher era, followed by a more modest series of adjustments thereafter.
This decision proved once again the flexibility of our operational framework and contributed to maintain a normal functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanisms and to mitigate strains on interbank markets. It allowed avoiding strong and potentially pro-cyclical threshold effects of credit rating agency unilateral decisions. 2)  Then, the launch of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) on the 10th of May marked a new step of the Eurosystem’s response to the financial crisis. This measure consists in intervening in the euro area’s public and private securities secondary markets to ensure depth and liquidity in markets that have been affected by severe disruptions. The objective of this program is to address the malfunctioning  BIS Review 84/2010  3  of securities markets and to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism. These interventions were sterilized as liquidity injected was exactly drained, thus fully neutralizing the effects in the banking system. This historical and exceptional type of intervention has stemmed from the spillover of increased financial market volatility, liquidity risks and market dislocations. 3)  Additionally, the ECB reactivated, in coordination with other central banks, the temporary liquidity swap lines with the Fed and resumed US dollar liquidity providing operations in order to alleviate pressures on funding in dollar. The reactivation of this measure followed the revival of strains on foreign exchange markets and highlights the central role that cooperation between central banks has taken in recent years in order to preserve cross-border operations and financial stability at the global level.

Thomas Jordan: The Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy in turbulent times Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Geldmarkt-Apéro of the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 19 March 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The financial market crisis has now widened into a global economic recession, and the Swiss economy is feeling the full impact. The SNB has taken prompt and decisive action in response, and substantially relaxed its monetary policy. In mid-March, as a result of the sharp economic downturn since December 2008, a further major expansion of monetary policy became necessary. However, the SNB was already operating a de facto zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), and the natural limits of conventional monetary policy had been reached. The SNB therefore took three unconventional measures: increasing the number of transactions in repos with longer terms, purchasing Swiss franc bonds issued by private sector borrowers, and buying foreign currency on the open market. In implementing these unconventional steps, the SNB has demonstrated that, even in an environment of zero interest rates, it still has a number of tools at its disposal which allow it to react flexibly to any undesired tightening of monetary conditions. In this context, it is important not to misinterpret the foreign currency measures as the start of a “beggar thy neighbour” policy.
Optimal solutions may vary according to the business model of the CCP (including its ownership structure), according to the CCP’s risk profile (including the types of products cleared – i.e. cash products or derivatives), and according to the size and concentration of exposures within clearing members (including the extent of indirect clearing). Regulators may wish to keep a certain degree of flexibility when they make their final recommendations. We also need to be cautious when drawing analogies between CCPs and banks. CCPs have in fact a fundamentally different business model and liability structure. CCPs are not leveraged and they do not actively take risk: barring the default of a member or an operational incident, their net risk exposure at any point in time is always equal to zero. Another major difference is the limited extent to which CCPs are expected to cover their exposures via their own funds, as the concept of “bail-in” is directly built into their risk management. Indeed, coverage is achieved to a very large extent via pre-funded resources provided by the clearing members themselves. Bail-in is a new concept for banks, but not for CCPs. In addition, CCPs can rely on contractual arrangements to allocate losses among their members. The statutory tools implemented by banking supervisors for ensuring the  8  See footnote 2 above. 9  http://www.bis.org/press/p150311.htm. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  resilience of banks may therefore not be appropriate for CCPs, and we should be cautious about any comparisons we make. They could be misleading.

Furthermore, in order to represent any meaningful part of the default waterfall, “skin in the game” would need to increase dramatically, thus completely changing the size of CCP balance sheets and their business models. This could even defeat the purpose of mandatory central clearing by pushing CCPs to dramatically increase the cost of clearing, or to compromise on their risk management in order to retain profitability. In sum, it seems reasonable that an increase in prefunded resources, should it become necessary, should be mainly borne by clearing members. Strengthening CCP recovery capabilities via specific recovery tools. An alternative conclusion to our current discussions could be that cover 2 is an appropriate standard for ensuring CCP resilience in a pre-recovery phase, but that more reassurances are needed to ensure CCPs can adequately cope with a recovery situation if they face tail losses. Let me stress that, here too, it is too early to state whether and, if so, what additional guidance regarding recovery capacities will be needed. However, let us think about the ways in which authorities could improve CCP recovery tools if the need did arise.13 In a recovery situation, a significant amount of additional funding could come from ex post cash calls on non-defaulting clearing members, also referred to as “default fund top-ups” or “emergency assessments”. This could provide CCPs with ample resources to avoid a complete depletion of their capital, and would share the funding burden across the whole clearing membership.
However, increases in catastrophic risk events can provide both an opportunity and a threat to insurers. There is an opportunity for growth in underwriting new products. But the combination of concentrated exposures to large catastrophe losses, inadequate risk management and/or the potential for mis-pricing could undermine the sustainability of businesses. The insurance industry is already taking steps to stay ahead of the climate curve on the liability side with the establishment of Flood Re; ClimateWise forums; more sophisticated underwriting techniques; the development of climate change products and carbon offsets. However, it is worth bearing in mind that, even though the full impacts of climate change often may not be visible in the short term, it is well worth insurers being alert to the emerging risks, including those emanating from policy makers. But insurers, as long term investors, are also exposed to changes in public policy as this affects the investment side. One live risk right now is of insurers investing in assets that could be left “stranded” by policy changes which limit the use of fossil fuels. As the world increasingly limits carbon emissions, and moves to alternative energy sources, investments in fossil fuels and related technologies – a growing financial market in recent decades – may take a huge hit. There are already a few specific examples of this having happened. The Bank of England has been carrying out analysis to better understand these risks.

Into the unknown Over the past 25 years we have seen: the introduction of the Euro; break-up of the Soviet Union; a shift from West to East; the introduction of the world wide web to ordinary life; and smart technology – so what will happen over the next 25 years? As an ex-forecaster I can tell you confidently that the only thing we can be certain of is that there will be changes that no one will predict. I did not think, some six years ago, when sat at the table of the Monetary Policy Committee for my first meeting, that Bank Rate would continue to be 0.5% this far down the line. One can never be sure what tomorrow will bring and interest rates is a case in point. The low level of real interest rates today is, in large part, a product of spare capacity in the real economy and low levels of growth and productivity across the developed world. This presents a number of issues for insurers who rely on interest income from their assets as part of their basic business model, especially where these returns back contractual guarantees. Without making any implied comment about monetary policy, just looking at today’s yield curve, it is not plausible for insurers to expect high nominal or real rates of return in the near future from low-risk assets. Firms relying on high income streams from their assets may find themselves taking ever greater risks to their balance sheets.
It is estimated that at a temperature rise of two degrees Celsius, $ trillion of global financial assets could be at risk of a write-down in value. [4] https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/harnessing-the-power-of-finance-for-a-sustainable-future  5/13  14/10/2020  “Harnessing the Power of Finance for a Sustainable Future”- Keynote Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, MAS, at the Finan…  As for transition risks, it is estimated that up to $ trillion of assets across the energy, industry and building sectors globally could become stranded by 2050. [5] Financial institutions cannot aﬀord to ignore these risks. MAS has co-created with the financial industry a set of Guidelines on Environmental Risk Management. These Guidelines are distinct from those in other jurisdictions in two ways: First, they cover environmental risks beyond climate change – such as pollution, loss of biodiversity, and changes in land use. These risks can interact with climate eﬀects to compound environmental degradation and depress asset values. Second, the Guidelines extend beyond banks to include insurers and asset managers, and are calibrated to each sector’s business activities. The Guidelines set out expectations for financial institutions to assess, monitor, mitigate and disclose environmental risks. Financial institutions should adopt sound methodologies and tools to identify and assess the environmental risks relevant to them. They should monitor their exposures to geographies and sectors with higher environmental risks, and the carbon intensity of customers and investee companies.

https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/harnessing-the-power-of-finance-for-a-sustainable-future  8/13  14/10/2020  “Harnessing the Power of Finance for a Sustainable Future”- Keynote Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, MAS, at the Finan…  A study by UBS estimates that close to 40% of family oﬀices plan to allocate most of their portfolios sustainably in five years’ time. [8]  This trend will be bolstered with the transfer of wealth to the millennial generation. An estimated $ trillion is expected to change hands to the next generation by 2030. [9]  Several studies suggest that millennials desire to invest in companies with good ESG track records. [10] According to a survey by Morgan Stanley, 90% of millennial high net worth investors want to tailor their investments to their personal values. [11] As a leading wealth management hub in Asia, Singapore can play a strong role in wealth planning solutions that support sustainable development in Asia. MAS launched last year a Green Investments Programme under which we will place $ billion of our funds with asset managers with a strong green focus. The aim is to grow the pool of asset managers that are committed to deepen green finance activities and capabilities in Singapore. We have short-listed several asset managers with a view to appointing the successful applicants early next year. Singapore has also begun anchoring providers of verification, review and rating services.
To some extent, the resulting amount was taken as guidance for successive allotments carried out in the format of variable-rate tenders, which were reduced in size, in parallel with a temporary easing of tensions at the shortest end of the money market term structure. More generally, at times of market stress, a central bank has to operate in an environment characterized by an extreme level of unrest, in which interest rates are much more volatile than usual, and the martingale property loses its power to tie interest rates to the desired level. In such conditions, central banks can act quickly only if they have access to timely and accurate information. Indeed, differences in the speed, frequency and magnitude of interventions by central banks during financial turbulences can be due not only to structural distinctions in the banking sectors or in the operational frameworks and policy principles of the central banks, but might more simply reflect differences in information sets. Let me at this point briefly recall some of the main sources of information of interest for the Eurosystem in the current turmoil. Market intelligence. Over the last few months we have extensively used market information and activated our regular communication channels with the banking and financial industry. Particularly useful in this context has been the work of the Money Market Contact Group, a discussion forum on issues related to euro money market gathering representatives of the central banks of the Eurosystem and of the commercial banks from all over Europe.

Thus, in order to satisfy the banking sector’s demand for liquidity buffers on particular days and for fulfilling reserve requirements earlier in the maintenance period, the ECB has (1) occasionally provided liquidity to the market through exceptional operations, 2 and (2) it has changed the time patterns of liquidity provision within the reserve maintenance period. In addition, from the start of the market turmoil the ECB has intensified its communications with market participants so as to indicate its alertness and readiness to act in order to reduce the volatility of the very short term interest rates around the target rate and to contribute to the smooth functioning of the money market. For instance, last Friday we published a press release pointing out that the ECB’s Governing Council has noted that market participants are concerned about conditions in the euro money market in connection with the upcoming end of the year; and announcing the decision to lengthen the maturity of the main refinancing operation settling on 19 December 2007 to two weeks so that it matures on 4 January 2008. In this refinancing operation, we will aim to satisfy the banking sector’s liquidity needs for the entire two week period, covering both the Christmas holidays and the end of the year. This example provides a good illustration of the importance that the ECB has attached in recent months to intervene in money markets through a combination of flexible liquidity management operations and regular communications.
From a small base in the early 2000s estimates now suggest they (High Frequency Traders) account for up to three-quarters of equity trading volumes and around 40% of FX. 9  4  For now, however, every regulated financial institution must separately meet legal and regulatory requirements to establish customer identities. This adds cost and reduces choice, but safeguards privacy. 5 In 2015, total loans originated by peer-to-peer lenders were $ billion in China, $ billion in the US, £ billion in the UK and € billion across Europe. At least in the UK, there are signs that the rate of growth for new lending has slowed recently; down from 100% to 30%. 6 NESTA survey evidence suggests that around 55-60% of peer-to-peer business borrowers were refused bank credit while other SME firms have assumed they would not be offered bank credit. 7 In 2014, only around 10% of Chinese adults accessed credit from a financial institution and less than one third have a credit score. A number of organisations have been authorised by the government to provide alternative credit scores, including Ant Financial, which since it launched in 2015 has amassed 190 million users and made more than 400 billion yuan of microloans. Although they require no guarantee or collateral, default rates are currently reported to be less than 2%. 8 This shift has not been uniform, however. For example, while just over a third of US Treasuries are traded electronically, this figure is much smaller for UK and German government bonds.

12 In recognition of the serious implications of a withdrawal in correspondent banking services for growth, financial inclusion, and the stability and integrity of the financial system, the FSB is working to advance a four-point Action Plan to address the recent decline. For an update on this work see: http://www.fsb.org/2016/12/fsb-publishes-progress-report-and-2017-workplan-to-assess-and-address-thedecline-in-correspondent-banking/ 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Seizing this opportunity means considering fundamental rights such as privacy, and practical constraints such as the costs of storage and handling. Ultimately it is for governments and citizens to decide whether – and how – to ensure the benefits outweigh the costs. Third, and relatedly, there are fundamental issues around data protection to consider. Traditionally, financial institutions have sought to protect and use their own customers’ data under well-established legal and regulatory frameworks. In contrast, social media firms regularly collect and sometimes share extensive data from their users (with their consent). 13  The FinTech future envisages the gathering of a broad range of  financial and non-financial data from, and sharing across, a wider set of parties. A more intense debate can be expected about whether there are appropriate frameworks for the gathering, storing and sharing data both domestically and cross-border. Now turning to the most important financial stability risks. 4.