samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, we will need to analyse this situation in spring. This is the only exception requiring further analysis. Nonetheless, we consider that the banking system is ready for the termination of this regulatory easing. Simultaneously, we are aware that, despite the recovery trend, the aftershocks of the pandemic will be affecting both the economy and banks for a while longer. Therefore, for banks to be capable to continue lending, we are going to partially release the buffer for unsecured loans beginning on 1 July. A particular amount of this release will be determined in the next few months, after we update the estimate of loan losses. Nonetheless, our preliminary estimate shows that the amount of this release may be more than 100 billion rubles for the banking system in general. This would be substantial support to banks. However, I would like to draw your attention to several aspects in this regard. First of all, the release of buffers is not a signal that unsecured lending may be expanded recklessly. These funds are released for a particular purpose of aiding banks in loss recognition during the period when the regulatory easing is being gradually terminated for them. Moreover, we will be monitoring the situation in the unsecured consumer lending market which is now actively bouncing back.

A priority will be given to those projects that will contribute to the well-being of future generations. We are interested in the development of green finance instruments. However, it is also vital to assess the actual risk level for investors. We are well aware of the fact that a lot of Russian companies are highly carbon-intensive. Therefore, it is necessary to assess their risks taking into account, among other factors, the introduction of carbon taxes in the European Union and other countries. Global investors are already altering their strategies. Moreover, banks themselves need to factor in climate risks in their operations. This is a serious challenge to the economy, the financial system, and the regulator. We should learn how to adequately assess not the risks that have been accumulated before. We are differentiating risk assessment in regulation relying on actual data showing how these risks materialised. We should assess future risks and model these future risks, building these stress scenarios. In our opinion, we may not blindly lower the requirements for these green instruments, but we should develop an approach helping an investor understand that a particular project is really a green one and assess the level of its sustainability and risks that may arise, as well as how they differ from those inherent in socalled non-green projects. This is an issue to be addressed in the course of our joint work. We have already made a certain progress towards better information transparency.
What new infrastructure or architecture is needed for collecting and assimilating these views? And how do we ensure they balance diversity and deliberation so as to be representative of the general public’s views? These are deep questions, but they are not new ones. They have been debated by philosophers and political scientists for thousands of years. Alternative models of representative decision-making have been tried and tested throughout the course of history. This experience contains some useful lessons for central banks, and other public institutions, seeking to strengthen the infrastructure linking them to wider society. Let’s start at the very beginning. The birthplace of democracy is, for many, ancient Greece. Around 2,500 years ago, the city-state of Athens pioneered a particular form of representative decision-making when it came to judgements on some of the most complex, societally-significant, issues of the day. The centrepiece of this decision-making infrastructure was a public body – a Council of Five Hundred, or boule. The boule comprised individuals drawn from the general public by random selection (or sortition). They served for a year. The purpose of the boule was to debate key issues affecting public life and devise policy proposals. These were then taken to a public assembly for discussion, where a wider set of the general  39  Wagner and Vinaimont (2010). 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  public participated, often running into the thousands. For a small number of positions requiring specialist skills, public officials and experts were elected or appointed.

But given the importance of the issue, we have to move ahead because the consensus is building that the status quo cannot be maintained, as it helps neither banks nor supervisors. Hence the title of my speech today: Strengthening bank capital: Basel III and beyond. The Basel III reforms themselves deliver two of the four characteristics that I said were essential – higher quantity and quality of capital. They are important, but not enough on their own. It is the Committee’s current and future work programme on implementation and consistency that will ensure that the full benefits of the regulatory reforms of bank capital can be achieved. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Trade among the expanding emerging economies now account for more than half of the world trade. This growing demand in emerging economies is also generating investment opportunities. In this environment, Islamic finance has an important potential to facilitate trade and investment flows that will be mutually reinforcing. In evolving Malaysia as  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  an Islamic financial hub, our aspiration is to be a hub that is linked to a network of other financial hubs. In so doing, it will enhance our economic linkages with other parts of the world. The increased internationalisation of Islamic finance would thus influence the patterns of global financial and economic integration, and in particular facilitate the revival of financial and economic integration between the countries along the old silk road from Asia to Turkey and the Middle East, and Africa and to the more established financial markets and developed economies. The start of this decade has already witnessed the shifting of trade activities to the emerging economies, which now account for 63 percent or $ trillion of world trade as at end-2011, an increase of 17 percent from a decade ago. While the Islamic banking sector has been important in intermediating cross border financial flows, the sukuk market has become an important segment of Islamic finance that offers a distinct platform upon which international inter-linkages are fostered. The sukuk market has demonstrated its ability to effectively intermediate funds across borders, contributing towards the efficient allocation of funds in the global financial system.

Caleb M Fundanga: Measures to improve financial regulation and supervision of the financial system in Zambia Remarks by Mr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the United Nations Working group meeting on the world financial and economic crisis, New York, 3 May 2010. *  *  *  The Co-Chairpersons of the Ad hoc Open Ended Working Group on the World Financial and Economic Crisis Distinguished Delegates Ladies and Gentlemen It is a great honour for me to address this important meeting on the impact and ramifications of the global financial crisis on economies across the globe. I am particularly encouraged by the fact that the discussions pay particular focus on the issues of financial sector reform and how we can best ensure that the financial sector plays its rightful role in facilitating innovation, enterprise, growth and development. Chairperson, although the worst effects of the economic recession appear to be behind us, the negative effects are still being felt, particularly in the advanced economies where unemployment is likely to remain stubbornly high. According to the most recent forecasts by the IMF, the global economy is projected to record positive growth of 3.9% in 2010, after contracting by 0.8% in 2009. However, these growth rates mask significant differences in economic growth across the world, with emerging and developing countries on the whole posting much stronger growth rates than the developed or advanced economies.
Weimar Germany in the 1920s is one well-known example. Post-revolutionary France, in the 1790s, is another. There are more recent instances in some emerging economies. Hyperinflations of this sort are essentially fiscal events. Chart 1, taken from the well-known book about financial crises by Reinhart and Rogoff4, shows that waves of formal defaults on governments’ debts have broadly coincided with waves of rapid inflation. Nor do you have to go to such extremes, or away from these shores, to find episodes in which the nominal anchor has been abandoned (if only for a time) in the face of big increases in government spending. Britain 4  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  suspended the gold standard during the Napoleonic wars and again at the onset of the First World War. Prices rose significantly, particularly during WWI, and yields on government debt did so as well. But the relationship between debt and inflation isn’t a simple one, nor is it readily apparent in the long-term UK data. For example, if there was “monetary finance” during these two episodes it’s not something that endured because, in both cases, Britain restored the original price of gold after those wars had ended. If rising price levels had conferred any fiscal benefit while they were being fought, that was then reversed, via deflation, once peace was established. Any long-lasting reduction in government debt had to be achieved by running a tighter fiscal policy.

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Changes and challenges concerning the insurance industry in Malaysia Keynote address by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 23rd Pacific Insurance Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 29 October 2007. *  *  *  Let me start by joining my colleagues from the Malaysian insurance industry in extending a very warm "Selamat Datang ke Malaysia" to all the guest speakers and conference delegates from abroad. It is my earnest hope that you will not only benefit from the deliberations during the conference, but also find time in between your short stay here to discover Malaysia and experience our rich diversity in colours and culture. I am indeed honoured to be with you this morning to officiate the opening ceremony of the 23rd Pacific Insurance Conference – the first to be held in Kuala Lumpur in the conference's 44-year history. I must congratulate LIAM for its efforts in organizing this prestigious conference involving insurance leaders from the Asia Pacific Region. The conference theme "New Solutions for Traditional Challenges: Winning Ideas from Industry Leaders" is most appropriate as the changing financial landscape poses significant challenges to the insurance industry in the Asia Pacific Region. It is indeed timely therefore that the life insurance fraternity has come together to share critical insights and perspectives of key challenges ahead and map out new strategies to capitalize on the opportunities while avoiding the pitfalls.
In the UK, the Financial Policy and Prudential Regulation Committees of the Bank of England annually test the core banking system against a very severe but plausible stress – a scenario in which banks have to withstand a combination of ‘tail risk’ domestic and global economic and financial market shocks.20 The scenario for the 2019 test, announced this week, includes a deep recession in the UK with GDP falling by 4.7 % from peak to trough, house price falls of 33%, falls in commercial real estate prices of 41%, recessions in the Euro Area, the US, and China and market stresses including a 41% fall in equity prices and a nearly 400bps widening of investment grade spreads.21 Last year, alongside the annual stress test, we also developed a worst case, disorderly Brexit economic scenario to give us confidence that the core banking system could withstand the losses and stresses that such a scenario would generate. We have also tackled the features of the financial system that amplified and spread the stress of the original losses. The systemic banks at the heart of the system have been capitalised to a higher standard, not because they are more risky but because of the impact on the rest of the system if they fail. In addition resolution regimes are being implemented to enable banks to fail safely, without disrupting the critical economic functions they provide – and without the taxpayer having to cover the losses.

Such an outcome may not be what we expect to happen or what is likely to happen but rather the worst possible case. The risk has not been generated by the financial sector. But, if it occurred, it would almost certainly lead to a correction in UK asset prices and losses for UK banks. The task of the FPC has been to ensure that such a correction, were it to occur, would not lead to a UK financial crisis. We have tested the banking system to equal and greater stresses to give us the confidence that while losses would occur, unlike 10 years ago, the system would have the capital to absorb them. We have required the banks to hold liquidity, in the currencies that they would need, to withstand a liquidity stress greater than that experienced in the financial crisis. And the Bank stands ready to provide liquidity in all major currencies. And, with other UK authorities, we have ensured that regardless of the Brexit outcome there should not be disruption to the provision of financial services in the UK by EU firms. The Financial Stability Reports of the FPC over the past 18 months have set out the actions that have been taken. The Record of the Financial Policy Committee’s February meeting, published earlier this week, makes clear the Committee’s assessment that the core of the UK financial system is resilient to, and prepared for, the wide range of risks it could face, including a worst case disorderly Brexit.
Inflation has varied slightly more in the past few years. In a period of increasing cross-border labour flows, substantial technological advances, changes in competitive conditions and new trading patterns, we may, with our very open economy, have to accept a somewhat greater variation in inflation and deviations from the target, as we have witnessed over the past two to three years. An overall assessment implies that the interest rate in the baseline scenario gradually increases to a more normal level. The projections are based on the assumption that interest rates in Norway and abroad will rise somewhat faster than may be implied by today’s forward rates. Since the previous Inflation Report, the upward movement in Norwegian and international long-term interest rates has become more pronounced. Exchange rate movements are difficult to project. In Inflation Report 1/06, the path for the interest rate in Norway and abroad was assessed to be consistent with an approximately unchanged krone exchange rate. The high rate of economic growth implies that price and cost inflation will edge up after a period. Inflation measured by the CPI-ATE is projected to increase from today’s level of around 1¼ per cent, up to almost 2 per cent at the end of 2007. There are prospects that inflation will increase further and be close to the target of 2.5 per cent three years ahead. With a gradual reduction in unemployment, Norges Bank expects wage growth to edge up.

In the next 10 years, gas production could rise to at least the same level as oil production, measured by energy content. High oil prices have led to a strong increase in activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. Many projects have been launched to increase recovery from fields in operation. A number of companies have revised up the long-term oil prices that are used as a basis for investment decisions, but they are still moderate compared with futures prices. Further out in the projection period, developments in petroleum-related investment become highly uncertain. It is assumed that overall activity will decline somewhat when the Snøhvit and Ormen Lange projects are completed, but high oil prices are expected to contribute to maintaining investment at a relatively high level throughout the projection period. The Government Pension Fund – Global, previously called the Government Petroleum Fund, will increase substantially in the years ahead. The fiscal rule entails a gradual phasing-in of petroleum revenues into the economy, approximately in pace with the expected real return on the Fund, which is estimated at 4 per cent. On the basis of our assumption in the March Inflation Report for developments in oil prices (oil futures prices), the fiscal rule allows for an increase in petroleum revenue spending of more than NOK 30 billion from 2006 to 2009. If the Norwegian economy continues to exhibit solid growth, it will nevertheless be in line with the fiscal guidelines specifying that petroleum revenue spending is lower than the expected real return for a few years.
The core element in the package of measures was the stabilisation fund, which took over illiquid assets from UBS totalling almost USD 40 billion. The SNB funded 90% by granting the stabilisation fund an interest-bearing loan. For its part, UBS provided the stabilisation fund with equity corresponding to 10% of the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  transferred assets. 1 Moreover, to strengthen UBS’s equity, the Swiss Confederation subscribed to mandatory convertible notes in the amount of CHF 6 billion. 2 By April 2009, the illiquid assets had been transferred to the stabilisation fund from UBS. Subsequently, the portfolio was managed and reduced. The main goal was complete repayment of the loan to the SNB. Sales as well as principal repayments and interest payments did indeed result in a gradual repayment of the SNB loan. By mid-August 2013, the loan had been fully repaid. Finally, in November, UBS purchased the stabilisation fund by reimbursing the SNB its contractual share in the fund equity. At this point, the stabilisation fund assets were entirely liquid. The conclusion of this transaction was a major and exceptional achievement. To strengthen the financial system, the SNB had stated, in autumn 2008, that it was prepared to finance the takeover of assets up to a value of USD 60 billion by the stabilisation fund. For the success of this undertaking it was important that we could handle our balance sheet flexibly. This package of measures enabled both investors and savers to regain confidence in UBS.

As a result, an inflationary bias may be generated. This inflationary bias is ultimately anticipated and incorporated into agents’ expectations, and, therefore, into price-setting and wage bargaining. The upshot is higher inflation without hardly improving the level of output and employment in the economy. This means monetary policy loses its effectiveness and the commitments to price stability cease to be credible. 2/9  Figure 1 INFLATION RATES 1970-1994  25  1994-1998  %  5  20  4  15  3  10  2  5  1  0 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 EURO AREA  %  0 94  95  96  97  98  SPAIN  The independence of the Banco de España, along with the new monetary policy framework based on direct inflation targets, was decisive in bringing inflation down and in fulfilling the Maastricht requirements in a short period of time.2 In this regard, the Spanish experience in relation to EMU accession meant a qualitative leap forward in terms of credibility, communication and transparency, which facilitated the anchoring of inflation expectations to a new regime of price stability, providing a focal point for collective wage bargaining, the setting of regulated prices, etc. The task of taming inflation did not fall entirely on the shoulders of the Banco de España, as Spain showed a strong and credible political will to lower inflation that helped bring about the anchoring role of the whole European institutional setting.
Conversely, in a sharp downturn with higher bank losses, it may be appropriate to reduce both the key policy rate and the countercyclical buffer. The countercyclical capital buffer is not a stabilisation policy instrument. The buffer is more likely to vary over longer credit cycles than follow the normal business cycle. Furthermore, knowledge and experience of macroprudential regulation is incomplete and at an early stage. 8 And we know from experience that financial market participants often find ways to evade regulations. 9 Taking the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances into account will therefore continue to be one of the criteria for an appropriate interest rate path and an important element in a robust monetary policy framework. 8  For a review of our currently limited experience of macroprudential instruments, see for example Smets, F. (2013): “Financial stability and monetary policy: How closely interlinked?” Lecture at a conference arranged by Riksbanken. 9  Jeremy Stein, member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, has pointed out that it is more difficult to evade the interest rate: “while monetary policy may not be quite the right tool for the job, it has one important advantage relative to supervision and regulation – namely that it gets in all of the cracks... changes in rates may reach into corners of the market that supervision and regulation cannot.” See Stein, J. (2013): Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses. Speech at a research symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

The insurance premium banks pay for the deposit guarantee bears little relation to the risk the bank takes. In addition, since investors can expect that the authorities will come to the aid of banks in distress, they may be satisfied with a lower return. The result is an underpricing of risk, potentially leading to excessive risk-taking. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Low equity ratios reduce loss-absorbing capacity and, at the same time, strengthen the incentive to take risks. While owners cannot lose more than their equity stake, there is a potential for high returns on the equity capital they have invested. Banks’ owners lack incentives to take full account of the risk imposed on creditors. To avoid a situation where banks hold inadequate equity capital, banks are subject to capital requirements. Each bank should hold capital in proportion to its risk exposure. This is the basis of microprudential bank regulation. But even if each individual bank appears to be solid on its own, the banking system as a whole may be vulnerable. Risk in the system has several sources. Externalities between banks are one important source. Banks are exposed to one another and can inflict losses on one another directly. Banks can also inflict substantial losses on one another if they have shared exposures outside of the banking system. This was clearly evident during the financial crisis. When a bank is forced to sell off assets, these assets fall in value.