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We can look at these churn rates on a more disaggregated basis by linking data on worker movements and 40  company performance. Chart 21 plots the evolution of churn rates for firms above and below the  productivity median. Pre-crisis churn rates were systematically (around 20%) higher in high-productivity firms than in low-productivity ones. Ideas and skills recycled more quickly in the upper than in the lower tiers of the productivity distribution. This may have contributed to the long tail problem. Other things equal, one might wish to see higher rates of labour market churn among poor-performing companies as a means of injecting new ideas, experience and skills, speeding-up the process of technological diffusion to them. In practice, the opposite appears to have been the case. The lower tail of UK companies, pre-crisis, had a stickier workforce. Post-crisis, things have changed. Churn rates among high and low productivity firms have converged, with churn rates among higher productivity companies falling sharply. This matches the productivity patterns seen post-crisis, with the slowdown focussed on previously high-performing companies. Slower churn among these companies, and the accompanying slower diffusion, may have contributed to their slowing productivity and them becoming part of that lower tail. A different way of slicing these granular data is to look at where workers are moving to. Again in an ideal world, we might wish to see high rates of worker transition to different points in the productivity distribution, to different sectors and different regions.