samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Of course, the world is much more complex and risks materialize over long periods of time in response to many factors, and there are important differences between social and private outcomes, but I think it is helpful to think through these types of signals ex ante. By making predictions and assessing whether observed outcomes are consistent with those predictions, we can better understand the complex dynamics in financial institutions and develop better policy. Resource Efficiency Finally, I’ll emphasize that I have focused on one specific type of policy efficiency that looks at the ability to achieve multiple objectives. Alternatively, one could think about efficiency more directly in terms of resources and burden, both on the private sector and the official sector. For example, the Federal Reserve aims to minimize compliance burden while achieving its policy goals.15 That perspective is about allocative efficiency of scarce resources and the deadweight loss associated with the misallocation of those resources. As part of the official sector, we have an obligation to be good stewards of resources and should always try to achieve a given set of policy objectives in the least-cost manner. Conclusions To conclude, I have suggested a simple framework to help distinguish changes in policy to achieve a different level of intermediation and an acceptable level of risk from changes in policy to increase efficiency. The first reflects the preferences of policymakers, and the second should be a standing goal.

9 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Board invites public comment on the  framework that would more closely match regulations for large banking organizations with their risk profiles, October 31, 2018. 10 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010. 11 This assumes the official sector preferences reflect society as a whole and does not consider potential gaps  due to issues such as principal agent problems within the official sector or regulatory capture. 12 Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions, SR 12–17, December 17, 2012. 13 Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Board seeks comment on proposal to simplify its capital rules for  large banks while preserving strong capital levels that would maintain their ability to lend under stressful conditions, April 10, 2018. 14 For a discussion of how rationalization of excessively complicated regulations could “morph” into a more  deregulatory posture, see Daniel K. Tarullo, “Financial Regulation: Still Unsettled a Decade after the Crisis,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(1), 2019 Winter, 61–80. 15 6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  15 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervision and Regulation Report, November 2018. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
Notwithstanding significant demands on labour mobility in the short term, increased competition in previously sheltered sectors will usually result in longer-term employment gains. Responsible wage policies are of crucial importance for the maintenance of price stability and the creation of new jobs. Wage growth has been relatively moderate in the past year. The outcomes of recent wage bargaining in the individual Member States signal that it will also remain moderate throughout the current year, and possibly next year too. What is required is lasting wage moderation which simultaneously ensures consistency with price stability and allows for net employment gains. In times of high unemployment, this means that real wage increases should not fully exploit productivity increases. By accepting these responsibilities, the social partners would be acting in their own interests. Monetary policy needs to, and will, be conducted in such a way that the partners in the wage bargaining process can be confident that price stability will be maintained. Overall, the point which I made earlier in respect of monetary policy also holds for other policy areas: there is no reason for complacency. At the same time, with all the appropriate policies in place, the momentum of sustainable non-inflationary growth could eventually be even stronger than is currently anticipated. This would indeed mean a great step for the euro into the year 2000 and beyond.

Beyond broad effects on growth, it is also clear that the new regulations should neither derail financial systems nor favor some particular business models over others. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Yet, there was, and still is, a need to move from a financial world of excessive risk taking and heavy regulatory arbitrage to a new system of better quality capital and increased risk capture. An implementation of the Basel III package endorsed by the G20 will provide the appropriate foundations for such a system, provided that phase-in arrangements are respected and implementation is coordinated globally. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Let me show you the hidden side of Switzerland. You will see that modern Switzerland is adjusting rapidly to the changing reality of the world economy. Let's consider a few facts: •  With 7.5 million people, Switzerland is indeed a small country. Although we have no natural resources, we have a highly developed economy and a GDP per capita that clearly exceeds the European average. Contrary to the situation among some of our neighbours, our population is still growing, thanks to immigration. Our foreign population now represents about 20% of the total population and 25% of the labour force. Despite strong immigration, our unemployment rate – 3.5% – is relatively low. •  Switzerland remains a slow-growing country when compared to the United States. Our weak growth performance is due in part to the full employment, the relatively high level of personal income and the limited scope for domestic investment. However, in recent years, the Swiss economy has been doing better than its neighbouring countries in terms of growth and employment, and also in terms of price stability. Obviously, the fact that we are not a member of the European Union is not an obstacle to our development. •  Switzerland is increasingly becoming a service-producing country. The flagship of our service industry is the financial sector, which expanded markedly in the 90s and now accounts for 15% of our GDP – more than the machine tool industry and the chemical industry together.

Andrew Bailey: Governance and the role of Boards Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Deputy Governor of Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority at the Bank of England, at the Westminster Business Forum, London, 3 November 2015. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to be speaking at the Westminster Business Forum again. I am going to use my time this morning to set out some thoughts on how at the PRA we are thinking about the role of governance and Boards in the prudential supervision of deposit takers, insurers and major investment firms. We work very closely with Boards, more so than in past approaches to prudential regulation, and I find it a very important, constructive and informative engagement. There is a lot of focus at present on the Senior Managers and Certification Regime which will be implemented by next March, and on the proposal before Parliament to change one element of the test, namely the Presumption of Responsibility. This morning I am going to focus on the substance that underpins the regime. Also, I am not for the most part going to comment on the issue of diversity in Board membership, but not because I think it is unimportant, far from it.
It is the reason I went into public policy. The Bank is not the only body seeking to engage the wider public when discussing economic issues. The Royal Society for the Arts (RSA) has recently proposed setting up Citizen Economics Councils and Reference Panels designed to engage the public in economic policy debates. 50  I strongly support initiatives  of this type. The Bank’s own recent initiatives are seeking to achieve many of the same objectives. (c) Education When it comes to improving education on economics and finance, the public’s views could scarcely be clearer. In surveys, around 80% of UK citizens say they think economics should form a part of the educational curriculum. 51  In the US, it is a remarkable 97%. 52  My own work in schools, and recent research  by the Bank, has confirmed encouragingly high levels of interest and enthusiasm among children and young adults in better understanding the economy. This is a wonderful endowment. If you look more closely at the statistics, it is easy to see why both adults and children feel so strongly. It is also easy to see why we might, unless we are careful, squander that endowment of public enthusiasm about understanding the economy. The risk lies, to some significant degree, in the current structure of the educational system. In many subjects that have an important bearing on everyday decision-making, the educational system ensures broad capture during the early years. The aim is to give almost everyone the everyday essentials of the subject.

This would tend to push water uphill – a countervailing capital flow substitution effect; and    Third, a change in the composition of the global market portfolio as emerging economies account for a larger slice of the pie – a capital flow income effect. By combining these three factors, we can form a proximate picture of the emerging pattern of global capital flows. These projections are based on the same restrictive set of modelling assumptions. Nonetheless, they provide a transparent window on possible emerging patterns. Are the forces of financial deepening in emerging capital markets sufficient to outpace the reduction in advanced country portfolio home bias, lessening the BFSP problem? Or does portfolio reallocation by advanced economies risk swamping embryonic emerging capital markets exacerbating this problem? Chart 13 looks at the ratio of annual average capital flows to G20 emerging markets relative to their market capitalisation over the period 2010 to 2050. It is the analogue of Chart 2, using projections of both numerator and denominator. The highest and lowest annual inflows over the projection period are also shown to capture potential annual variation in capital flows. Chart 14 plots annual gross capital inflows to emerging markets over the same period. 5  Non-G20 market cap is assumed to grow in line with the forecast for total G20 market capitalisation.
Bank estimates based on the impact of historical financial crises in a sample of advanced economies, reported in Brooke et al (2015), suggest that the average cost of a financial crisis has been 73% of GDP, which translates to a cost of roughly £ per capita if a financial crisis had taken place in 2016. 3 The Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee identifies, monitors and takes action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system. The FPC is not authorised to take action that is “likely to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term”. 4 See Figure 1 of my article ‘An evolving financial system: Don’t leave it too late, simulate’. 5 Peak amount of cash support in the form of loans and purchase of share capital. Source: National Audit Office. 2  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Losses that would have wiped out the entire British banking system in 2007 can now be absorbed in buffers of capital.

Brexit  Nowhere has that been more obvious than Brexit. On June 24th 2016, we started contingency planning for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. With our focus on making sure finance can serve the wider economy, our work has had two elements. First, checking that, whatever economic disruption arises as we leave the EU, major banks have the capacity to keep lending through it. We know from our stress tests that banks can withstand an economic scenario for the UK that is worse than the financial crisis. That stress test scenario encompasses even a Brexit scenario based on the very worst case – ‘disorderly’ – assumptions, including: severe disruption at the border, acute economic uncertainty and financial market instability, and sharp increases in inflation requiring interest rates to rise. On that basis, we’ve been able to judge the core of the UK banking system to be able to continue to serve through Brexit, whatever form Brexit takes. The second element of our work has been to ensure that households and businesses using services from EU financial companies can continue to draw on those services after Brexit. 70 branches of EEA banks operate in the UK and provide services to both EU and UK end users. UK households and businesses hold 16 million insurance policies with EU insurers.8 UK investors invest in funds based in the EU. And clearing houses based in the UK sit at the centre of EU and global derivatives markets, helping the financial system to manage and distribute risks.
We remain firmly committed to maintaining price stability over the medium to longer term. The monetary policy stance, the overall provision of liquidity and the allotment modes will be adjusted as appropriate. Accordingly, the Governing Council will continue to monitor all developments over the period ahead very closely. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. After a period of sharp decline, euro area economic activity has been expanding since mid2009. Euro area real GDP grew strongly on a quarterly basis, increasing by 1.0% in the second quarter of 2010, supported by ongoing growth at the global level but also in part reflecting temporary domestic factors. Recent data and survey evidence generally confirm the expectation of a moderation in the second half of this year, both at the global level and in  BIS Review 113/2010  1  the euro area. Nevertheless, while uncertainty still prevails, they continue to indicate a positive underlying momentum of the recovery in the euro area. Ongoing growth at the global level and its impact on the demand for euro area exports, together with the accommodative monetary policy stance and the measures adopted to restore the functioning of the financial system, should continue to support the euro area economy. However, the recovery in activity is expected to be dampened by the process of balance sheet adjustment in various sectors and labour market prospects.

Later in the year annual HICP inflation rates are expected to increase slightly while displaying some volatility. Looking further ahead, in 2011 inflation rates should remain moderate overall, benefiting from low domestic price pressures. Inflation expectations over the medium to longer term continue to be firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. This assessment is also reflected in the September 2010 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual HICP inflation in a range between 1.5% and 1.7% for 2010 and between 1.2% and 2.2% for 2011. Compared with the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of June 2010, the ranges have been revised slightly upwards, largely on account of higher commodity prices. Risks to the outlook for price developments are slightly tilted to the upside. They relate, in particular, to the evolution of energy and non-oil commodity prices. Furthermore, increases in indirect taxation and administered prices may be greater than currently expected, owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years. At the same time, risks to domestic price and cost developments are contained. Turning to the monetary analysis, the annual growth rate of M3 stood at 0.2% in July 2010, unchanged from June. The annual growth rate of loans to the private sector, which has been gradually increasing, rose further to 0.9%, but still remains relatively weak.
As a supervisor and regulator, I have a duty to households and businesses in the UK to preserve financial stability – to protect the UK economy from disruption. So I need to know on an ongoing basis that large CCPs on which the UK financial system relies are robustly regulated and supervised. But that should not necessarily mean I have to do the supervision of non-UK CCPs myself. Indeed if every host authority supervised every CCP that offers services to its banks and other financial institutions it would be untenable. We cannot have 21 different regulators’ hands on the steering wheel when it comes to critical cross-border infrastructure. That would hardly be a good result for financial stability - especially in a crisis, where clear and quick decision-making is critical. The solution is proportionate and informed reliance.8 Informed reliance means that, with sufficient information and a deep cooperative relationship with the home supervisor, I can defer to them to ensure that a CCP is as safe to operate in UK as those I regulate and supervise directly. Proportionate means that for cross-border CCPs that are very important to the UK financial system, I will need more information and even  7 8  BoE calculations. Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure Responsibility E on Cooperation. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  deeper cooperation – and in the event that we are unable to secure this, I may need to resort to supervising the CCP directly.

Banks were stronger. In the UK they were three times better capitalized than at end 2008. And to be clear –very significant government support and central bank interventions were required. I’ll come back to this later. But there is one other reason for the missing panic that I want to focus in on. After the 2008 global financial crisis, the G20 put in place reforms designed to make the global financial system simpler - to untangle the spaghetti bowl of bilateral derivatives trades that had fed the 2008 panic.2 They incentivised - and for many products mandated - central clearing of derivative trades. Global clearing has as a result, grown significantly in the past decade. Today, about 60% of credit default swaps are cleared, as well as 80% of interest rate contracts, up from about 10% and 40% respectively in 2008.3  This brought greater stability to derivative markets by ensuring that if a major financial institution were to collapse, you needn’t worry about a domino effect – with the failing firm’s derivatives contracts potentially threatening the viability of any number of other firms.4 1  Ben Bernanke, Op-Ed at Brookings Institution, 13 September 2018 G20 Leaders’ Statement Pittsburgh Summit, September 2009. 3 Bank of International Settlements Statistical Release, November 2020 4 Although it’s not my focus today, reforms to bilateral derivatives trading have also helped to reduce the chance that bilateral contracts fuel a panic.
Indeed, an incipient change in the direction of our exports towards more buoyant markets is becoming perceptible. Nevertheless, the nation's net borrowing continued to increase, albeit at a slacker pace than in previous years, reaching 9.5% of GDP in 2007, mainly due to the marked and expected deterioration in the income balance. The tendency towards a gradual easing in investment by firms and, above all, by households should help move the current account deficit onto a declining course. The pace of employment generation adapted to the gradual slowing of activity in the second half of 2007, ending the year at a growth rate of 2.5%. This trajectory has continued, somewhat more sharply, in the opening months of 2008. It has particularly affected employment in the construction industry and also, though to a lesser extent, in manufacturing activities, some of which are closely related to the construction branch. In contrast, employment in services is proving far more resilient. Despite this loss of dynamism in the labour market, labour costs began to rise in 2007, when compensation per employee grew at a rate of 3.6%, and have continued to do so in early 2008, with growth in wage settlements to February of 3.5%. It is highly likely, once the effect of indexation clauses (for the deviation by inflation from its official target in 2007) is taken into account, that labour costs will rise by more than 4% in 2008 for almost 70% of private-sector workers subject to a collective bargaining agreement.

Changes are also needed in the collective bargaining framework and in labour hiring, in order to facilitate the adjustment of wages to the new cyclical situation and to smooth the adjustment in employment. Obviously, however, these measures need to be complemented by resolute reforms to the competitive environment in which firms and agents take their decisions through liberalisation and deregulation policies that help reduce the constant growth in profit margins in less competitive sectors and to boost efficiency and productivity. From the viewpoint of the longterm needs of the Spanish economy, all this should be accompanied by improvements in education and in training in order to adapt workers’ skills to the new requirements and to boost their inter-sectoral mobility. Allow me one final reflection not so much on what should be done as on what should not. It is true that the global slowdown is leading many governments to embark on different forms of protectionism, responding to the calls of those economic agents who are demanding help against foreign competitors. It is a mistake to succumb to such calls. Spain should not follow this bad example, since any measures in favour of specific agents solely on the basis of their nationality would ultimately harm other Spanish companies and all Spanish citizens.
May I, at this point, request that we stand and observe a moment of silence in honour of our past late Governors; R C H Hallet, Valentine S Musakanya, Bitwell R Kuwani, Luke Mwananshiku and Leonard Chivuno and many other former employees of the Bank who passed away during the last 40 years. Thank you. It is important to mention here that most of the former Governors have continued playing critical roles in the financial sector and I can proudly say that three of them today serve as chairmen of commercial banks. In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I again welcome you all to this conference, and I urge you to be open and constructive during the deliberations. I thank you. 4  BIS Review 48/2004

Caleb M Fundanga: Innovative financial products on the Zambian market in relation to credit interest rates and the private sector development Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia International Trade Fair Symposium on “Innovative financial products on the Zambian market in relation to credit interest rates and the private sector development”, Ndola, 30 June 2011. * 1.0  *  *  Introduction  Financial development contributes to economic growth in a very significant way and it has been demonstrated that countries with more developed financial systems tend to grow faster. Therefore, the financial sector is key to economic development and policies aimed at developing the sector would be expected to contribute to economic growth. 2.0  The current financial sector policy environment in Zambia  During the 1970s and 1980s Zambia pursued a policy of fixing interest rates for long periods and at relatively low levels, with the ostensible purpose of promoting growth. However, these administrative actions introduced economic distortions into the financial structure of the economy including the following:   The hindrance to economic growth arising from the inefficiency in the allocation of resources (with credit controls and distorted price indicators). These controls resulted in both low levels of domestically generated savings and investment, thereby reducing the economy’s growth rates.   The financial system remained generally under-developed with inefficient lending patterns that failed to achieve their distributional goals.