samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The most recent surveys show that expectations five years ahead are now at around 1.9 per cent a year. Inflation expectations two years ahead have been below those five years ahead ever since 2012. The most recent surveys show that expectations two years ahead are now at 1.3–1.4 per cent a year. Together with measurements five years ahead, the picture is that the credibility of the inflation target on the whole has increased thus far this year. Expansionary monetary policy to stimulate inflation The Riksbank’s aim is to bring the rate of inflation back towards the target of 2 per cent. Monetary policy is therefore very expansionary today in the sense that the Riksbank’s policy rate, the repo rate, has been cut in several stages and is currently at –0.25 per cent. The repo rate is expected to remain at this level at least until the second half of 2016. Furthermore, the Riksbank decided in February and March this year to purchase government bonds to a value of SEK 40 billion. The repo-rate cuts and bond purchases contribute to pushing down market rates. Figure 6 shows how the repo rate has developed since 2010. The purpose of cutting the repo rate and buying bonds is thus to bring up inflation. Lower interest rates contribute to increasing demand in the economy. It becomes more attractive for households to consume and for companies to invest. Higher demand also makes it possible for companies to raise their prices.

In recent decades, the sectors exposed to international competition have led the way and set the standard, as it were, for the rest of the labour market. I firmly believe that the outcome of this system has been positive. The Industrial Agreement has played an important role. In other words, the inflation target and the Industrial Agreement have worked well together. The inflation target contributes to smoothly-functioning price-setting and wage formation The role of the Riksbank is and always has been to be responsible for monetary policy. Monetary policy is conducted with the aim of ensuring that the annual rate of inflation is 2 per cent. It is important to have a benchmark for expectations in the economy and thereby lay the foundations for efficient price-setting and wage formation. Its purpose is to enable economic agents to plan long-term, for instance, with regard to wage negotiations. In other words, the inflation target makes it easier for households and companies to make good economic decisions. It creates the conditions for good economic development with long-term economic growth. The benchmark of an inflation target of 2 per cent was established in 1993. Prior to that, a fixed exchange rate acted as the anchor for wage formation and price-setting. At that time, inflation in Sweden was linked to that in competitor countries. However, increases in wages and prices in Sweden became too high, at the same time as real purchasing power hardly increased at all. These were the problems that a new inflation-targeting policy would remedy.
However, the upward pressure on the equilibrium interest rate will lessen as the creation effect takes hold. 36 The experience of past episodes suggests that, in the first instance, the returns from the Fourth Industrial Revolution are likely to flow more to the owners of the new capital than to the workers who use it – leading to Engels’ pause in real wages. Owners of capital tend to be wealthier to begin with and evidence suggests that those with higher wealth have a higher propensity to save increases in income (this idea goes back to Kalecki (1954) and Marx before him). Increases in job polarisation and skills premia, which also shift income towards the top of the distribution, are likely to add to this effect. Globally, inequality could also increase as a result of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which would further lower the equilibrium rate in open economies like the UK and Ireland. 37 Summers (2016) has argued that rising market concentration may also have been an important cause for the fall in the equilibrium interest rate over recent decades. See http://larrysummers.com/2016/03/30/corporate-profits-are-near-record-highs-heres-why-thats-aproblem/. 38 Measured as the proportion of people working part-time would who prefer a full-time job. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  This excess supply of labour available to work on non-automated tasks represents a shift along the Phillips Curve, imparting modest disinflationary pressures. For the UK, each additional percentage point of labour market slack is estimated to reduce annual wage growth by one third of a percentage point.

News conference  15 December 2022, 10.00 am  Introductory remarks by Andréa M. Maechler In my remarks, I will talk in more detail about the implementation of today’s monetary policy decision, which Thomas Jordan has already touched on. I will start, however, by giving you an overview of how we have steered interest rates since the switch to a positive SNB policy rate in September. The switch from a negative to a positive SNB policy rate required us to make an adjustment to the implementation of our monetary policy in the money market. The new approach comprises two elements: reserve tiering – that is, tiered remuneration of the sight deposits that banks and other financial market participants hold at the SNB – and reserve absorption. This approach has proved successful. Following our monetary policy decision on 22 September, secured short-term Swiss franc money market rates moved quickly towards the new SNB policy rate (cf. chart 1). We are also continuing to see solid activity among participants in the money market, which ensures a robust basis for the calculation of SARON. From the outset, the market responded favourably to the deployment of our monetary policy instruments to absorb liquidity. On the very day of the monetary policy assessment in September, we started conducting repo transactions on a daily basis and issuing SNB bills on a weekly basis (cf. chart 2). In this way, we were able to reduce the liquidity supply in the money market sufficiently to allow us to steer interest rates effectively.
Figure 7 shows model simulations of the effects on the CPIF and unemployment, according to the main scenario’s repo rate path and according to the repo rate path I voted for, under the assumption that foreign interest rates will be lower  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  than in the forecast, particularly towards the end of the forecast period.14 My preferred repo rate path, which goes up to 3.25 per cent at the end of the forecast period, gives a lower unemployment forecast than does the main scenario’s repo rate path. It may seem that the target fulfilment of the CPIF forecast is worse, as it lies above 2 per cent towards the end of the forecast period. However, my assessment is that this is an overestimate of inflation. Inflationary pressures are influenced by resource utilisation, and it can probably be expected that the level of resource utilisation that is consistent with unchanged inflationary pressures will actually rise during the forecast period. In deep recessions, it is usual for the functioning of the labour market to be impaired initially, as typically the jobs that have disappeared differ from those arising once the economy has recovered. However, eventually it does start to function normally. In that case, perhaps inflationary pressures will be significantly lower towards the end of the forecast period than is shown by these simulations.

(2001), “Independent Review of the Operation of Monetary Policy in New Zealand: Report to the Minister of Finance”. Sveriges Riksbank (2001), Inflation Report 2001:3. Sveriges Riksbank (2004), Inflation Report 2004:2. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Indeed, in the aforementioned article, the German Minister of Finance also refers to the need to have a common insolvency framework for all euro area banks, while acknowledging the existence of national barriers, which would have to be eliminated to avoid a fragmented financial market. Financial union Allow me in the final part of my address to look beyond the Banking Union and refer to the Financial Union. I earlier signalled the importance of introducing a genuine deposit guarantee scheme, eliminating national barriers and harmonising specific regulatory areas. But other elements are also needed to further progress towards a true Financial Union. In this respect, developing deep and integrated capital markets will undoubtedly help strengthen the euro area’s capacity to cushion itself against macrofinancial shocks. Naturally, I am talking about the Capital Markets Union (CMU). This is a project that will complement the Banking Union, promoting a cross-border financial sector enabling economic agents to mitigate national asymmetric shocks. The Capital Markets Union project was launched in 2015 with the aim of “unlocking funding for European growth”, i.e. promoting not only the development but also the integration of European capital markets with a view to diversifying the funding sources available. However, the project has languished until recently. Testifying to this is the fact that the year scheduled for its launch was, originally, 2019. Evidently, this goal has not been achieved. That said, the importance of this project has but increased since 2015, particularly in the context of Brexit.

In this respect, we do not think there is any risk of deflation in the euro area, or inflation for that matter. Furthermore, the United States may be substantially below its long-term growth potential, whereas the euro area is relatively close. Le Figaro – Nonetheless, the dollar is sliding and we seem to be moving away from the close cooperation seen between central banks during the crisis... Christian Noyer – First, everything does not come down to the dollar. For example, there are emerging countries that, by not being sufficiently flexible in their exchange rate policy, have monetary policies that are inappropriate and create risks to inflation and growth. Moreover, while each central bank is pursuing a policy appropriate to its country’s situation, nobody wants to move away from the goal of consistency. We are all committed to ensure a framework for balanced growth, and that commitment remains just as strong. As reiterated at the last meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank Governors, no one should or can manipulate their currency. Le Figaro – Is the euro not the real victim of recent foreign exchange developments? Christian Noyer – The euro is not the only currency that floats against all other currencies. Let’s not be so self-centred! The idea that the euro is arguably the adjustment variable for the rest of the world seems strange to me. Le Figaro – Will the G20 be able to make headway on monetary policy issues given that the climate is, to say the least, tense?
Let me first explore some features that make financial market infrastructures different from other financial institutions: •  Service continuation (“critical services”) is more important in the case of FMIs. They are utilities at the heart of the financial system. Their smooth operation is essential for all other types of financial service. •  In most cases, there are only a few, if any, substitutes or alternative providers. •  Unlike banks, FMIs have ex ante loss allocation rules that they can draw on for the purpose of recovery. •  Not all FMIs are exposed to credit risk (but they are still systemically important). •  The size and composition of their balance sheets (e.g. rarely subordinated debt instruments) is different, which makes bail-in as a recovery or resolution tool difficult. •  To the extent that the use of a CCP is mandatory, it is absolutely essential that the relevant clearing services are preserved regardless of the circumstances. In conclusion, the recovery of CCPs in order to maintain service continuation is much more important for CCPs than for other financial institutions. That’s why the PFMIs require CCPs to be able to allocate any losses that are not already covered by regular risk management. [slide 8] So if the recovery of CCPs is so vital, is there any scope for resolution at all? I think there is, for a number of reasons: First of all, the attempt to recover may simply fail: the ex-ante recovery plans may prove inadequate ex post.

The regulatory approach by CPSS-IOSCO is therefore non-prescriptive and aims to provide guidance that should help FMIs to choose the appropriate (mix of) recovery tools. This approach, however, might need to be adapted over time. Evolution of global clearing structures [slide 11] Let me now turn to the fourth known unknown, which is the optimal design of the global clearing structure. 2  See Financial Stability Board. “Consultation Paper: Feasibility Study on Approaches to Aggregate OTC Derivatives Data”, 4 February 2014. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  [slide 12] Such a design depends on numerous factors and questions: •  How many CCPs do we need at global level? •  How many markets should a CCP serve? •  What are the implications of competitive clearing where there are several CCPs serving the same trading venue? •  Should CCPs be linked and how? Should links be limited to cash-market CCPs or also apply to derivatives and commodities CCPs? •  What degree of tiering is optimal and how should participants get access to CCPs when needed? This question has gained in importance with the establishment of the clearing obligation. [slide 13] What we see today is a globalisation process that has triggered a trend towards global clearing with increasingly large global CCPs. Moreover, it appears that many banks prefer indirect access to clearing services so as to comply with the clearing obligation. Client clearing seems thus to be dominated by a few large global intermediaries.
The ECB was requested by ECOFIN to provide the necessary analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support, and to draw on technical advice from the national central banks and supervisors. This is a clear recognition of the important role that central banks have gained over time in monitoring financial stability. The Commission proposals specify in detail the new institutional arrangements concerning the establishment of the ESRB and the involvement of the ECB. The ECB/Eurosystem will provide its views when formally consulted according to the Treaty provisions. Indeed, further work is needed to clarify and optimise the details of the institutional framework for the ESRB as well as for the new European Supervisory Authorities for micro-prudential supervision. Sound institutional arrangements are a crucial pre-condition for the effectiveness of these supervisory reforms in general and the establishment of the Risk Board in particular. In this context, let me mention two key elements to be defined by the forthcoming legislation. One is the arrangements for the exchange of micro-prudential information among national supervisors, the new European Supervisory Authorities and the ESRB (subject to specific confidentiality agreements). In order for the ESRB to perform its functions, it should have the power to request any information it deems necessary (for example, exposures of large and complex financial institutions to structured products). 3 The other key element is that a risk warning needs to be translated into appropriate supervisory action.

Final remarks While the ESRB has a better chance of achieving its mandate now than it would have had earlier this decade, its tasks will be difficult and its challenges considerable. In particular regarding the issuance of risk warnings, the credibility of the ESRB will rest upon the minimisation and balancing of so-called type I errors and type II errors. Type I errors entail the possibility of identifying those risks that subsequently do not materialise, while type II errors relate to the possibility of failing to identify risks that subsequently do materialise. Identifying a long list of potential systemic risks to financial stability could minimise the  BIS Review 115/2009  11  probability of making type II errors but may lead to accusations of “crying wolf”. The opposite could lead to an important risk to the EU financial system being overlooked, which if it materialised, could harm the ESRB’s reputation. Both the rigour of the checks for potential sources of risk and vulnerability, and the quality of the risk assessments (based on the information made available to the ESRB) should have a substantive influence on the credibility and effectiveness of the Board’s work. Addressing the type I-type II error trade-off by selecting which risks merit risk warnings can only be done by combining a comprehensive and strict monitoring of all potential sources of risk with a well-informed and detailed risk assessment.
The temptation to go back on it is extremely dangerous and would increase the risk of another financial crisis. In this respect, the current situation in the United States is worrying. Generally speaking, the measures that will be effectively adopted and implemented by the new administration and the competent government agencies regarding financial and banking regulation still have to be clarified. There is a possibility that the regulations already finalised in Basel such as the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) or the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) could be called into question. Unilateral deregulation would be nothing less than a lose-lose scenario with serious consequences for the stability of the global financial system as well as the competitive landscape for US and European banks. In view of this, the integration of a possible agreement on Basel III into European standards should be finalised while keeping a close eye on what the other major countries will do, starting, as you will have understood, with the United States. We must also avoid regulatory arbitrage. For non-bank players, significant progress is required on liquidity management by funds and asset management companies, on fintechs and more generally on the major digital platforms, which, if they carry out financial activities, will have to comply with similar regulations sooner or later. As for the financial markets, the decrease in market liquidity must be explained, and in doing so we must also consider the role of high frequency trading and its highly debatable social utility.

Caleb M Fundanga: Broadening access to mortgage financing in Zambia Opening speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the re-launch of the Pan African Building Society (PABS), Lusaka, 24 July 2007. *  *  *  • The Shareholders of PABS; • The Board of Directors of PABS; • Senior Government Officials present; • The Deputy Governor-Operations and Registrar of Banks and Financial Institutions; • The General Manager of PABS; • Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen. It gives me great pleasure and gratitude for having been invited to speak on this occasion of the re-launch of the Pan African Building Society. Ladies and Gentlemen: Today marks an important day in the calendar of Pan African Building Society which brings on board new shareholders. The Bank of Zambia is happy to note that this development has turned around the financial condition of Pan African Building Society. Ladies and Gentlemen, as you are aware, there is shortage of housing in Zambia and therefore the demand for housing finance is increasing. It follows therefore, that the primary challenge of housing finance institutions in Zambia is the broadening of access to mortgage finance particularly to many people in urban areas. Due to the prevailing macro-economic stability that the country is experiencing, we have seen substantial growth in the housing finance industry in recent years. For instance, in the last four (4) years to December 2006, the mortgage portfolio of the building society industry has grown five fold.
We look forward to engaging with our oversight bodies and those appointed under the CARES Act to ensure that the American people understand the steps we are taking on their behalf as faithful stewards of the public trust. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

It should not be assumed that the central bank might take action beyond the limits outlined. But this does not mean that it cannot assist in the search for solutions, as far as they do not involve extending further credit. If the problems of individual banks multiply, there is a danger that liquidity may dry out throughout the entire system. In such a case, the central bank would basically be able to supply the market with the necessary liquidity. However, it may then come into conflict with the requirements of a policy geared to economic stability. Consequently, the short-term benefits of an easing of monetary policy should be weighed against the longer-term risks. I would like to sum up my thoughts as follows: 1. Three factors are of prime importance to the competitiveness of a financial centre: economic stability, political stability and the “human factor” (i.e. professionalism, motivation and mentality). Although these factors can each be viewed separately, it is the interaction between them that really counts. 2. Economic stability, in the sense of a balanced development of the economy as a whole, is made possible by the existence of an appropriate economic framework. This is created first and foremost by monetary policy, fiscal policy and competition policy. Economic stability provides the financial services industry with a favourable climate in terms of low inflation and interest rates, moderate tax levels and appropriate exchange rates. 3. Favourable economic conditions are planned and implemented as part of the process of social coexistence.