samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If confirmed, this should serve to improve confidence and preclude the more negative economic scenarios, although it will take time for the attendant effects on activity to become apparent. 2  As regards the euro area inflation outlook, the ECB forecasts a very modest rise this year of 0.3%, with a recovery to 1% in 2021 and 1.3% in 2022. However, these values are well short of the medium-term price stability target, defined as inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The latest flash estimate for the euro area Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, referring to October, shows annual inflation of -0.3%, weighed down by the recent appreciation of the euro, low energy and services prices, and the temporary impact of the VAT cut in Germany. Core inflation held at an all-time low of 0.2% in October, unchanged on September. It is worth noting that 35% of the headline inflation components recorded negative growth rates, and around 70% of the components grew at rates of less than 1%. Consumer expectations have held on a downward path since March, while the metric derived from financial markets (five-year swaps) declined slightly to 1.16%. Meanwhile, the long-term expectations of the Survey of Professional Forecasters held stable at around 1.7%. The situation I have just described is, therefore, one of a fragile and uncertain recovery in the euro area, in which some of the downside risks for our baseline scenario, which were identified just a few months ago, are materialising.

Likewise, in the current environment of low inflation and interest rates verging on their lower bound, the inflation target must take into account the need for a sufficiently high buffer, above zero, granting conventional interest rate policy more room for manoeuvre. Another key aspect will be which tools are to be included in the ECB’s monetary policy toolkit and how they are to interact within the new strategic framework. In this regard, it seems clear that one of the current review’s takeaways will be that, against the backdrop of low natural interest rates and greater constraints on the use of nominal interest rates as a stabiliser, asset purchase programmes and liquidity-providing operations have become part of central bankers’ conventional “toolkit”. One problem specific to the euro area is the so-called “fragmentation” in the transmission of the common monetary policy. This means that governments’ financing conditions vary significantly across countries as a result of, among other factors, the different sovereign risk premia in the euro area. This, in turn, also impacts on firms’ and financial institutions’ financing costs in the different countries. In fact, the cost of government debt in each country usually acts as a “floor” or “baseline” for corporate and bank debt. Consequently, in those countries whose governments’ debt repayment prospects are better and which therefore have more favourable financing conditions, the borrowing costs of firms and households, through bank credit, will be lower.
Allow me to conclude with a somewhat different perspective this time. 10  18  Including road toll funding, cf. National Transport Plan 2010-19, tables 5.2 and 6.6. BIS Review 15/2010  Claes Gill was born in Odda a hundred years ago this year. Many of you will remember Claes Gill as an actor when television was still in its infancy. He lived in New York during the depression in the early 1930s, but was arrested as an illegal alien, brought in for questioning at Ellis Island, deported from the US and sent back to Norway. He wrote his two collections of poems at that time, which have remained his legacy and which were an early expression of Norwegian modernism. The Governor reads a poem by the Norwegian poet Claes Gill, describing the beauty of his home region on the west coast of Norway. BIS Review 15/2010  19

India started introducing Islamic financial products and services last year. It has launched its first Islamic stock market index on the Mumbai stock exchange and also licenced a non-bank financing company to operate on Shariah principles. As more countries cater for Islamic finance, the scope for cross-border Islamic finance increases. We are beginning to see more cross-border sukuk issuance within Asia as well as between the Middle East and Asia. Singapore has benefitted from this favourable global environment for Islamic finance. •  Singapore is the only non-Muslim majority country among the top 15 countries for Islamic finance. •  Islamic assets under management have surged nearly fourfold over the last five years. More than 40% of the Islamic assets in Singapore are managed by our asset management industry. •  15 banks are involved in Islamic banking, double the number five years ago. They hold about a third of the Islamic assets in Singapore. •  The rest of the Islamic assets are in outstanding sukuk and takaful. Singapore has had nearly 30 sukuk issuances to-date, with seven in 2013 alone. The prospects for Islamic finance in Singapore look bright. •  More funds continue to be established here, to meet demand from clients in Asia as well as from the Middle East. •  Several corporations have established sukuk programmes in Singapore to tap the market over the next few years. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We can grow faster when we grow together.
And we expect firms to continue to do this and maintain high levels of prudence in the face of continuing high uncertainty.6 Stress testing: 2021 and beyond In the near future we have two more stress tests coming up using a common scenario: (1) The Bank of England will be using the 2021 biennial exploratory scenario (BES) to explore the financial risks posed by climate change. The exercise aims to test the resilience of the current business models of the  5 6  See Insurance Stress Test 2019: Feedback for general and life insurers (June 2020). See Letter from Sam Woods to insurers on distribution of profits (March 2020). 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  largest banks, insurers, and the financial system to climate related risks – as well as the scale of adjustment that will need to be undertaken in coming decades for the system to remain resilient. Conducting a climate stress test poses distinct challenges compared to conventional macro-financial or insurance stress tests. The Bank is using feedback from last year’s discussion paper to ensure it is effective and that the design is appropriate.7 We are having further engagement with financial firms, climate scientists, economists, other industry experts, and informed stakeholder groups to support this work. We will publish scenarios in June 2021, with initial submissions due by the end of September. Given this time frame we would encourage firms to start developing their capabilities sooner rather than later.

But thanks to that off the cuff remark by a colleague, I have learned that at least one Greek has much more to tell us about ways of thinking about risk. The detailed, fox-like analysis of individual risks and threats and how to respond to them is essential. And it is just as important to step back and ask ourselves, does all that industry add up to an effective defence against what the world could throw at us? Neither the fox nor the hedgehog has a monopoly on wisdom: as we look forward to 2021, the PRA is determined to learn from these and no doubt from other more exotic creatures. Thank you. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7
To begin with, the Central bank is not indifferent to the movements of the exchange rate, in the same way as we are not indifferent to the evolution of unemployment, credit or any other variables relevant to the country’s economic performance. The Bank’s constitutional act mandates that we safeguard price stability and the normal functioning of internal and external payments, but fulfilling this mandate requires us to adopt those measures which will drive the economy to making full use of its resources and maintaining a sustainable balance of payments. Price stability and financial stability are cornerstones of our economy’s performance, growth potential and human well being. I could make a lengthy discourse about how the Central Bank reconciles its mandate with welfare objectives but I think it is enough to observe our track record over the past two years to recognize that if output and employment are recovering so strongly today, it is largely thanks to the flexibility of our monetary policy in facing the worst global economic downturn in almost a century. Our second principle is that we have to evaluate the effectiveness, costs and benefits, of our actions. We must also explain with maximum rigor and transparency our decisions and opinions regarding the main trends of our economy. Our reputation and credibility would suffer if we took any actions without being soundly convinced that they would be both convenient and effective towards achieving our objectives and at the same time inflict the smallest possible social cost.

The results show that the independence index does not have a statistically significant effect on bank efficiency contemporaneously or lagged by one year. Second, they used the loan growth rate as a dependent variable. The result is similar: the index does not have a statistically similar effect on loan growth. These results differ somewhat from others have found. Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) find when the supervisor is independent some measures of bank credit are lower. In contrast, Barth et al (2013b) find supervisory independence is associated with higher bank efficiency. Table 4: Results for regressions of a bank efficiency ratio or loan growth on the RegulatorySupervisory Independence Index Dependent variable Bank efficiency ratio (a)  Loan growth rate  Regulatory-Supervisory Independence  1.083  0.027  Index  (0.992)  (0.022)  Regulatory-Supervisory Independence  0.155  0.004  Index lagged by one year  (0.367)  (0.015)  Observations  30,698  30,698  Adjusted R2  0.737  0.105  (a) Defined as (non-interest expense before foreclosed property expense + amortisation of intangibles + goodwill impairments) as a percentage of (net interest income + non-interest income). Conclusion  In this speech, I have set out a framework for thinking about ideal post-EU institutional structure. The ideal model involves independent regulators with mandates. The evidence backs that independence of prudential regulation increases financial stability with no cost to efficiency.
It is worth pointing out here, which I often and willingly do, that if one thinks that it does not matter that inflation on average is below 2 per cent and at the same time dislikes a zero or negative policy rate – which seems to be a fairly common combination of views – then these are two arguments that contradict one another. If average inflation is below 2 per cent, then a zero or negative interest rate will inevitably become even more common. As inflation today is far too high, this discussion has for the moment disappeared from the agenda. However, as I said earlier, it is not impossible that we might return to a situation in a couple of years where it will reappear. A good and a bad scenario The present economic policy frameworks thus provide favourable conditions for returning to the inflation target within a reasonable time perspective. And there is no doubt that the Riksbank has the tools required to achieve this. When it comes to raising the policy rate, there is no upper bound in the same way as there is a lower bound. Of course, interest rate hikes are associated with costs too, but the difficulties of bringing inflation back to the target are not about binding restrictions but about how quickly this can reasonably be achieved. Even if considerable strains might be imposed on the real economy during the process, there is no doubt that we will do what is necessary to meet the inflation target.

(2021). Several of the world’s large economies are now in a period of slower labour force growth, making it less profitable for companies to undertake major investments. Even if savings are falling, companies’ incentives to invest are declining even further. The prediction is therefore that the global real interest rate will fall for a long time to come. 6 When the inflation target was introduced at the beginning of the 1990s, the Riksbank had support from the then prevailing economic crisis, in the sense that inflation was pushed down to a level close to the target, making the task then ‘only’ to try to keep inflation at this level. 4 [15]  way that companies set their prices and the wage demands that households put forward. The inflation that results from the inflationary price-setting and wage formation confirms expectations and in turn affects the new expectations of future inflation. This gives a new round of effects on price-setting and wage formation, and the high inflation thus becomes a self-generating process. One reason why the high inflation was built into expectations among households and companies was that it was not sufficiently counteracted by the overall economic policy. Instead, this policy became systematically too expansionary. At that time, Sweden had a fixed exchange rate. The idea was that this would have a disciplinary effect on price-setting and wage formation: If Swedish prices and wages increased faster than prices and wages abroad, our competitiveness would weaken, exports would decline and unemployment would increase.
Norhana Endut: Keynote address at the Malaysian Financial Planning Council Keynote address by Ms Norhana Endut, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Malaysian Financial Planning Council, Kuala Lumpur, 5 November 2022. *** It is my great pleasure to be here today at the 9th MFPC Graduation Ceremony. First of all, I wish to congratulate all successful graduates from the Class of 2019 to 2022. I am sure many of you have been waiting for this ceremony as it was postponed due to the pandemic since 2020. The critical role of financial planning is often overlooked. But one lesson that we can take from the recent pandemic and economic crisis is that a sound financial management and planning is critical in weathering the storm. It is your role now as Registered Financial Planners and Shariah Registered Financial Planners to take the stage in helping Malaysians manage and rebuild their financial standing post-pandemic and be prepared for the future. The Malaysian economy has recorded a strong growth momentum following the reopening of all the sectors in the economy this year. Key to this is the improvements in labour market, in particular, income growth. While there are reasons to be optimistic about the growth momentum, next year presents a more challenging outlook to the global economy with rising global inflationary pressures, signs of moderation in growth in several major economies, ongoing geopolitical conflicts and highly volatile financial markets. Malaysia is certainly not insulated from some of these headwinds.

For Africa, Islamic finance has tremendous opportunities to support the nation’s development and economic needs. I end my remarks with these words: “Actions Speak Louder Than Words” Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
We engage in five rounds of talks each year with business and community leaders concerning economic developments in their industries. All of this information provides a basis for our analysis of the current situation. A large share of the overall resources used for analyses and projections of the Norwegian economy is devoted to this work. 4  BIS Review 4/2005  Based on experience and economic theory, we can assume that certain relationships will hold in the long term. There is fairly broad agreement that monetary policy cannot affect the level of output and employment over time. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that output and employment over time are determined by supply-side factors. At the same time, inflation is determined over time by monetary policy. Both theory and experience indicate that in the long term, the real interest rate must be positive and consistent with the growth potential of the Norwegian and international economy. Experience shows that the real interest rate has generally ranged somewhere between 2 and 4 per cent. In keeping with experience, we can assume that wage income, consumption and investment as a share of production are fairly stable over time. Hence, we have some fairly robust reference points for the economy in the long term. In the work on medium-term forecasting, short-term developments are linked to our assessments of long-term developments. In this context, a macroeconomic model can function as a bridge. Moreover, a macro model can ensure consistency between important economic variables.

We should recall that credit in the private sector has not ceased to decline since the financial crisis. Firms only began to increase credit further to the health crisis and to the subsequent shutdown in activity. Indeed, the paradox is that it was after the outbreak of the pandemic that this variable began to indicate that the buffer should be activated, naturally, due to the growth of publicly backed credit and the simultaneous slump in GDP, not because of a real alert. The credit-to-GDP gap is known to emit erroneous signals in circumstances such as those currently prevailing. Consequently, as well as monitoring a series of indicators, the Banco de España has decided to use two specifications for this gap: (i) the standard one defined by the BCBS and (ii) an alternative, tailored to the characteristics of the Spanish economy’s credit cycle. However, the activation of this buffer has recently been justified in some jurisdictions with the aim of creating room for manoeuvre in good times that can then be used in periods of stress. The logic behind the activation of the buffer for this reason is similar to that which was applied in our now-extinct countercyclical provision. Finally, new responsibilities have been assigned to the three sectoral supervisory authorities in Spain, as a result of the implementation of this new policy, including to the Directorate General for Insurance and the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), which have been given tools similar to those I have just described.
If a regional currency is chosen as the anchor, in the same way that the deutschmark was effectively the anchor for exchange rate arrangements leading up to European monetary union, would this be the yen or the renminbi? Alternatively, could Asia move straight to a single currency? It is increasingly argued that, in a world of liberalised markets, the only viable exchange rate system is either a hard peg (like Hong Kong's Currency Board) or a free float. Soft pegs by their nature are vulnerable to self-fulfilling speculative attacks, as was demonstrated in Europe in 1992, Mexico in 1994-5, and Asia in 1997-8. Europe was able to move gradually to a system of fixed exchange rates with capital controls prior to the introduction of a single currency. But the high degree of capital mobility in a number of key Asian economies would make gradual transition in this way more difficult. A further set of technical issues concerns the setting up of, and mandate for, an Asian central bank. This would require agreement on the monetary policy objective, country representation, and decisionmaking process of the central bank. Most important, the institution would need to be designed so that national interests are kept in check in order to deliver efficient monetary policy making at the regional level. The lesson from Europe is that agreement can be reached, but I have to say that the issues are quite daunting.

While the lack of economic convergence among Asian economies may make an Asian Monetary Union a more challenging prospect, it is interesting to note that quite a number of governments in this region have already chosen to sacrifice some monetary policy autonomy for exchange rate stability. Hong Kong, Mainland China, and Malaysia choose to fix their exchange rates against an external currency, the US dollar, while other regional economies operate managed floats. There are indications that some economies are considering using the renminbi as a reference currency in their currency regimes, although a hard peg to renminbi is still not possible until full convertibility is achieved. It might  2  BIS Review 19/2005  also be the case that, while Asian economies are more diverse than European economies, they are flexible in ways that can compensate for the loss of independent monetary policy, for example, in their high degree of price flexibility and fast adjustment to economic shocks. It may seem premature to turn now to the technical issues surrounding Asian monetary union, but the devil is in the detail. The first set of technical issues involves the exchange rate arrangements themselves, including the transitional arrangements prior to the introduction of a single currency. For example, would Asia adopt a basket peg or choose an anchor currency? If a basket, what would be the weights for individual currencies, and would the basket include external currencies, such as the US dollar?
The large post-war cohorts will only reach ordinary retirement age after 2012, but are now nearing the age when they are eligible for early retirement. If they opt to retire under the scheme as it functions today, the number of pensioners under the contractual early retirement scheme will increase by 16 000 in six years. Similarly, the ageing of the population will result in an additional 41 000 disability pensioners. The incentives embedded in pension rules, benefits and taxes encourage early retirement. The pension rules make it costly for companies to recruit older workers. The wage trend perceived by a wage-earner as appropriate over a lifetime may also deviate from the trend in work capacity expected by the employer. The basic problem seems to be that individuals are not sufficiently exposed to the social costs associated with leisure and early retirement. Nor are the right incentives offered to individual businesses. 5. Saving and returns in the Government Pension Fund Our labour force is clearly our most important national resource, but Norway also has substantial petroleum wealth. The state’s share consists partly of the value of oil and gas under the seabed and partly of the financial wealth accumulated in the Government Pension Fund – Global. It is misleading to look upon the cash flow from petroleum activities as income. The appropriate economic perspective is to see the transfer of the cash flow to the Government Pension Fund as a way of transferring capital from one account to another – from petroleum to foreign securities.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  running at about $ billion per month, consisting of roughly $ billion in new investments and $ billion of reinvestments. To meet this pace, the Desk has been operating in the market on nearly every available day. 9 The operations to date have gone well. Participation by the dealers has been strong, with an average offer-to-cover ratio of about 3.5, and the accepted offers have been allocated across a number of dealers and a wide range of securities. Given the robust participation in the operations, the Desk has received competitive and appropriate prices for the securities obtained. 10 Moreover, our purchases do not appear to be causing significant strains on the liquidity or functioning of the Treasury market. It is unusual for the market to have such a large, persistent, and one-sided participant, and we had to worry about how it would adjust to our presence. However, the available evidence suggests that market liquidity is decent at this time. Measures of liquidity, such as trading volumes, bid-ask spreads, or quote sizes, worsened in December, but that pattern appears to have been driven by year-end effects rather than our presence in the market. These measures have recovered since the year-end, moving back toward the levels observed before the start of the purchases. In addition, we do not see signs that the market is facing unusual scarcity of particular Treasury securities.