samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Similarly, from a longer perspective, in nominal terms, the ratio between private consumption and private national disposable income is close to its historic average. Overall, an increase in the current account deficit could entail unwanted risks, which is particularly important in a context where sudden changes may occur in macroeconomic conditions, which could precipitate difficult adjustments to the national economy. In the past, most of the crises that the country endured were preceded by high and persistent current account deficits, an excessive increase in borrowing, and important currency mismatches. However, today’s economic policy framework is more advanced, including a rule that governs fiscal policy and cushions the impact on public expenditure of both copper price fluctuations around its long-term trend and the ups and downs of the business cycle. It also includes a floating exchange rate regime that puts currency risks under the light allowing an early response to sudden changes in external conditions. And it contemplates proper financial regulation and supervision to prevent the incubation of excessive risk. Accordingly, the Board estimates that it is paramount to closely monitor those factors that are behind the current account deficit, in order to avoid the incubation of imbalances that may affect the future performance of the economy. Another risk factor we have identified is the dynamic of the real estate sector. In mid year, we called the attention to the evolution of real estate prices, with a focus on some districts.

Output, meanwhile, grew 5.7 percent y-o-y in the third quarter of 2012, flat from the previous quarter, but more than expected. The Economic Expectations Survey (EES) of August – available at the closing of the previous Monetary Policy Report – forecast 4.6 percent growth for said quarter. The greater increase was due to better performance in general. However, output’s velocity of expansion dropped from 8.3 to 5.7 percent annualized. In the baseline scenario, the Board estimates that GDP will grow 5.5 percent this year. This projection is higher than the ceiling we estimated in September, with a similar revision as has been made in private forecasts. Still, both our forecasts and private ones have experienced sustained upward revisions in the past year (figure 2). On the domestic spending side, third quarter growth (i.e. 8.0 percent y-o-y) largely surpassed second-quarter figures, however swollen by some specific factors. While every component of expenditure posted higher increases, the large increase in machinery and equipment investment is worth noting: 19.9 percent y-o-y. The acceleration of domestic spending amplified the negative current account balance, which in the third quarter went to 2.9 percent of the GDP accumulated in the last year. The baseline scenario assumes that the deficit will end the year 2012 at 3.8 percent of GDP, exceeding September’s forecast of 3.2 percent. Meanwhile, the national financial system has operated normally in a context of strong investment and favorable external credit conditions.
[52]See Article 5 of the SSM Regulation. [53]Article 13h of the ECB’s Rules of Procedure. [54]On the reciprocity of macroprudential policy measures in the EU, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2016),  Financial Stability Review 2016, pp. 45-46. [55]See, for instance, de Larosière, J. (2009),  Report of the High Level Group on Financial Banking Supervision in the EU, p. 39. [56]Drehmann, M., Borio, C., and Tstasaronis, K. (2012), “Characterising the financial cycle: don’t lose sight of the medium term!”, BIS Working Papers, No 380, Bank for International Settlements; and Rünstler, G., and Vlekke, M. (2016), “Business, housing and credit cycles”, Working Paper Series, No 1915, ECB. [57]See Issing, O., “Monetary and financial stability – is there a trade-off?”, speech at Conference on “Monetary Stability and the Business Cycle”, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, 28-29 March 2003. [58]See ECB (2016), Macroprudential Bulletin, Issue 1/2016, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Chapter 1.  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]

I need not stress that these movements are negative for our recovery prospects and, in general, for an economy such as Spain that is increasingly integrated into the global framework and which in recent years has notably improved its competitive capacity abroad. The United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union is, in my view, a negative phenomenon, although the results in recent European elections appear to indicate a brake on or at least a re-drawing of the lines marking these trends. In any event, in the euro area – where our economy operates – it will be very important to maintain the goals of integration into the financial and banking area and to address the capital markets union project. But it is important, too, that the achievement of a true economic union may go beyond the financial realm. Along these lines, our Annual Report refers to the discussion of possible ways forward towards a fiscal policy that includes common stabilisation elements within the euro area, in a setting, such as the present, in which the high levels of public debt restrict the budgetary room for manoeuvre in a good number of countries. Progress here would contribute to equipping fiscal policies within the area with greater strength and, therefore, to minimising the potential adverse repercussions – economic and social alike – of future crises. Thank you for your attention. 8/8
The HKMA BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  takes the view that an overseas bank that wishes to undertake retail business in Hong Kong should operate in the form of a locally incorporated subsidiary. This is to offer appropriate protection to the retail depositors in Hong Kong and to do that the HKMA needs to have an effective supervisory handle on every aspect of a retail bank’s operation, especially its capital adequacy ratio. We cannot achieve this if the bank operates as a branch in Hong Kong. 17. However, we also recognise that subsidiaries may not necessarily be an efficient model of operation if an overseas bank intends to undertake only corporate or private banking in Hong Kong. For example, a branch can leverage on the capital of the entire bank to finance a loan for a large corporate, which would otherwise be impossible if it operated as a subsidiary with rather limited capital in Hong Kong. Likewise, some private banking clients may prefer to deal with or book their investments with a branch of an overseas private bank rather than a subsidiary of that bank. So the HKMA keeps an open mind on whether an overseas bank operating in Hong Kong should take the form of a subsidiary or a branch. It all depends on the business model of the bank concerned.

Page 3/8  Zurich, 22 June 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  The renewed increase in our policy rate is therefore necessary to bring inflation back to the range consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis over the medium term. We cannot at this stage rule out the necessity of further monetary policy tightening to achieve this objective. It is also important in this regard that the ample liquidity assistance we provided to Credit Suisse in March does not influence our monetary policy stance. My colleague Andréa Maechler will address this specifically when she sets out how we implemented our monetary policy over the past quarter. Allow me to return briefly to the subject of rents. Policy rate increases lead to a rise in mortgage rates and thus also in the reference interest rate for rents. This makes it possible for some rents to be increased, which can in turn temporarily result in higher overall inflation. However, this feedback effect must not be taken as a reason for refraining from necessary policy rate increases. For without a more restrictive monetary policy, there would be a danger of inflation becoming entrenched and much stronger rate increases being required in the future. Today’s further tightening of our monetary policy is therefore also appropriate from this perspective. Ladies and gentlemen, I now hand over to Martin Schlegel. The SNB published its latest Financial Stability Report this morning. I would like to present the main points to you now.
Change in consumer price inflation in percentage points 0 -0 .1 -0 .2 -0 .3 -0 .4 -0 .5 År  -0 .6 1  2  3  4  Source: Norges Bank JB 7. februar 2003  Effects on consumer price inflation of a persistent appreciation of 5 per cent of the import-weighted krone exchange rate.

Per cent of labour force 3) Projection  Sources: TRCIS, the Directorate of Labour and Norges Bank JB 7. februar 2003  Annual wage growth1) in 2002 Forecasts made at different points in time by Norges Bank, Statistics Norway and the Ministry of Finance. Per cent 7 NB  SN  MF  6 5 4 3 2 1  01 Ap r0 1 Ju n 01 Au g 01 O ct 01 De c 01 Fe b 02 Ap r0 2 Ju n 02 Au g 02 O ct 02  Fe b  De c  00  0  1) Statistics Norway: Wages per normal person-year Sources: Norges Bank, Statistics Norway and the Ministry of Finance JB 7. februar 2003  Relative labour costs: deviation from historical average 1970-2003 25  25  20  20  15  15  Local currency  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  Common currency  -15 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  -10 -15  2000  Sources: Statistics Norway, TRCIS/IMF and Norges Bank JB 7. februar 2003  Manufacturing employment, 1970-2001 In thousands employed 45 0  40 0  35 0  30 0  25 0 1970  1 9 75  Source: Statistics Norway JB 7. februar 2003  1 98 0  1 98 5  19 9 0  1995  2000
This is clear from the Asian crisis. The alternative is floating exchange rates. They have the advantage of permitting interest rate adjustments to the needs of the domestic economy. But they also entail exchange rate fluctuations and their drawbacks. The problem of exchange rate regimes is being discussed internationally but a consensus has not been reached. Financial market deregulation, moreover, must be adapted to the financial system of the country in question and supported by a consistent economic policy. To some extent, the developments in Asia probably had to do with an inappropriate sequence of deregulations; that was the case in Sweden in the 1980s and it resulted in problems. Short-term foreign currency loans made the countries vulnerable and subsequently resulted in currency outflows. The forms for deregulation have therefore been considered in the international discussions. The International Monetary Fund will be taking these aspects into account in future evaluations of individual countries. It is important, for example, that deregulations are accompanied by a reinforcement of the supervision of financial institutions and markets, so that any ‘bubbles’ are detected in good time. 2. Strengthening systems A sounder macroeconomic policy improves the conditions for making systems more robust. This is necessary but not always sufficient. A reinforcement of the financial system’s infrastructure is also needed. Such efforts are required both in the emerging markets and in the industrialised countries, as well as at the global level. The emerging markets must build up better systems for oversight and supervision.

At the same time, there has been an ambition to construct any measures so that they do not have larger negative consequences later on, for instance by deterring banks from providing desirable credit. These two perspectives are liable to conflict. The discussion has focused on preparatory measures as well as steps that can be taken in more extreme situations. As regards the preparatory measures, it has been proposed, for example, that bond contracts be constructed so that the renegotiation of scheduled repayment can be authorised by a majority. Another proposal is that capital adequacy standards be constructed so as to limit the proportion of short-term interbank credits from industrialised countries to emerging markets. Recently, moreover, a decision was reached on contingent credits to countries that are judged to have a sustainable economic policy and have nonetheless been hit by a loss of confidence and liquidity. This is intended to reduce contagious effects. The IMF also plans to promote increased contacts between the borrowers in the emerging markets and their private creditors. If a crisis has already occurred—without there being a clause for renegotiation—credit to the country in question can be renewed instead by the lenders acting in concert. The central banks in the countries with the largest bank loans to the crisis area can then agree to try to persuade those banks to prolong the loans. That is what happened in South Korea; the credits were renewed when the banks’ loans had been monitored.
At present we are using stress testing to help us judge how resilient the banking system is to different severely adverse, but plausible, scenarios. A development of this approach would be to use stress testing more countercyclically. Rather than testing every year against a scenario of constant severity, the severity of the test, and the resilience banks need to pass it, would be greater in boom times when credit and risk is building up in the financial system and it has further to fall and then reduced in weaker periods when there is less risk in the system and the economy needs the banking system to maintain lending. Third, macroprudential risk goes wider than the banking system. Risks can arise in other parts of the financial system and in the real economy. A year ago, the UK housing market was clearly developing significant momentum. Prices were growing much faster than incomes. Borrowers were increasingly driven to borrow a greater amount relative to their annual income. The amount of such new mortgages at high loan to income (LTI) ratios – borrowers borrowing over 4 times their annual income – had exceeded its pre-crisis peak. The risk the Committee saw was that if the number of high LTI mortgages continued to grow, there would be increasing numbers of highly indebted households very vulnerable to a change in economic circumstances. This would increase both macroeconomic volatility and systemic risk. The Committee came to the view that this was a macroprudential risk that needed to be insured against.

And if, despite all the extra protection they do fail, we need to ensure they can be “resolved” – by which I mean revived or sold or broken up or wound down – in a way that does the least damage to the economy and that does not require taxpayer bailouts. We are now close to the agreement of an international standard requiring systemic banks to hold a set amount of debt in a form that can be readily “bailed-in” to recapitalise and stabilise the firm if it fails, so that it can be resolved over time without doing wider damage. Macroprudential policy is about more than banks. Other parts of the financial system can drive up booms and amplify busts. Derivatives traded between financial firms acted as an amplifier of the crisis when their values changed very quickly and the firms did not have the resources to compensate each other for the change. We are now shifting bilaterally traded derivatives onto central counterparties where there is better identification and protection against the risks of sudden changes in value. Similarly, minimum standards on lending 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  against securities, another amplifier in the crisis, are being introduced to reduce the impact on firms when the value of those securities changes quickly. Seven years on from the crisis, the contours of the new regulatory framework are clear and in the main agreed; we are well into the implementation of many of its main standards.
This is pushing up hurdle rates on investment, swamping the impact of lower policy rates. Reducing uncertainty would turn a vicious cycle – in which falling equilibrium interest rates eat into policy space, exacerbating downside risks and pushing down equilibrium rates further – into a virtuous one, of rising equilibrium rates, increased policy space, and stronger global growth. “The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the current International Monetary and Financial System”, speech by Mark Carney at the Jackson Hole Symposium 2019. 3  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  III. Transforming payments During Benoît’s time at the ECB, the public provision of money has faced challenges from Bitcoin to stablecoins. The Bank of England has an open mind but not open door when it comes to such innovations. Unlike social media, for which standards and regulations are only now being developed after the technologies have been adopted by billions of users, the terms of engagement for any new systemic private payments system must be in force well in advance of any launch. And there are a host of issues that still need to be addressed – from maintaining the highest standards of operational resilience and managing financial risks, to addressing privacy and anti-money laundering concerns. Like Benoit, we recognise that these initiatives were not conceived in a vacuum; rather they seek to address long-standing problems in payments.

While it may be tempting to conclude this is an isolated incident, there have been others, including the taper and bund tantrums. These could signal a broader problem of discontinuous market liquidity in stress. The solution is not to unwind post-crisis liquidity regulation, a recidivism that would only recreate, with time, the enormous systemic risks of the past. Moreover, the limited systemic consequences of these events should be noted. After all, the riskiness of an asset depends on who holds it. A “crisis” in the periphery is a bad day in the markets; one in the core is an annus horribilis for the real economy. Nevertheless, market infrastructure must evolve to take account of new dynamics. In one of Benoît’s (many) speeches last month, he identified one of the potential problems underlying the repo market stress: that what may look to be sufficient liquidity in aggregate can prove too little if it is asymmetrically distributed – either across institutions or national boundaries. As Benoît noted, this may require central banks to provide more liquidity in aggregate, including by widening access to their balance sheets. Prompted by the potential risks that come with Brexit, the Bank of England has come to a similar conclusion: we are already running weekly auctions in sterling, US dollars and euros that could be used to absorb pressures as they arise.
SGX has taken the lead and attracted more than 50 Chinese companies to list in Singapore. Over 1,000 Chinese companies have set up offices here to tap opportunities in the region. We must continue to sharpen our competitive advantages to draw more Chinese companies to use Singapore’s financial services. We are close to concluding the Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA) with India. This will reinforce the trend of Indian financial institutions and companies using Singapore as a base for expansion overseas, and allow Singapore-based financial institutions to benefit from India’s growth. We saw our first Indian listing this year. Banks such as ICICI Bank and State Bank of India are also serving the large non-resident Indian community and facilitating their fund raising activities from Singapore. BIS Review 72/2004  3  The Middle East has a combined GDP that exceeds ASEAN’s. Post 9/11, the Middle East is increasingly looking towards Asia in order to reduce its dependency on the West. There is a window of opportunity for us to play a bridging role. Singapore will host the inaugural meeting of the Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED) in June next year. To expand our economic space and strengthen political relations, I have visited several countries in the Middle East and will visit more next year. MAS should continue to work with other government agencies to deepen our engagement with the Middle East. The market estimates that of the $ trillion in Middle East private wealth invested overseas, less than 10% is invested in Asia.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Financial Stability and Hedge Funds: Effective and Ineffective Supervision Speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Diskussionsforum «Nachbarn Deutschland-Schweiz: Impulse für die Zukunft», Berlin, 9 November 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The hedge fund industry has grown rapidly over the past few years and it has become an important segment of global financial markets. The possibility to use leverage and a high degree of flexibility are key elements of a broad range of investment strategies which have made the hedge funds industry very profitable. Hedge funds have been an important source of innovation in the traditional asset management industry and they have rendered financial markets more liquid, more efficient and more flexible. Nonetheless, the rapid growth of the industry and the excessive use of leverage may result in potential systemic risks which are relevant to central banks, unlike prudential matters. Overall, industry leverage is difficult to measure. However, several studies suggest that it is lower than at the time of the near collapse of LTCM in 1998. Even so, temporary excessive levels of leverage with single hedge funds can not be ruled out completely. A crisis in the hedge fund industry might therefore spill over to their primary trading partners, the major investment banks.
One is that it normally gives a more realistic picture of future monetary policy. That makes it easier to evaluate our forecasts. It also becomes easier to compare our forecasts with those of other forecasters. The longer forecast horizon makes it clearer how inflation is being influenced by various temporary shocks. The reasons for the changes are to provide a more comprehensive set of data for monetary policy and to improve the pedagogical aspect of the monetary policy message. It is important to point out that the changes in methods do not entail any fundamental change in the Riksbank’s monetary policy strategy. Our interest rate decisions will continue to be guided by the ambition that inflation normally should be returned to target within two years. The new repo rate assumption is a technical forecasting assumption, which should not be interpreted as the Riksbank’s stance regarding which interest rate path it considers to be most desirable. The interest rate path that underpinned the forecast in the October Inflation Report was judged to imply a reasonable development of inflation in the coming years. Our conclusion was that if this development were to continue in line with our assessment at the time, the repo rate would need to be raised in the period ahead. At the same time, we pointed out that there also were different conceivable paths for the future repo rate that could give roughly the same outcome for inflation.

It is also for this reason that we have tolerated a 'deviation interval' since 1995. While inflation has been low, growth in both Sweden and Finland during the inflation targeting period has been good from a historical perspective, and unemployment has fallen gradually from the high levels during the crisis years. There has been a successful consolidation of public finances in both countries and a fall in the central government debt measured as a percentage of GDP. Additionally, fiscal policy in Sweden has become more predictable with the introduction of a rolling nominal ceiling for public expenditure. Moreover, a number of measures have been taken to improve the functioning of the Swedish economy. These include deregulation and changes in the tax and social insurance systems. This has meant that the conditions for a favourable development have improved and confidence in the Swedish economy has increased. At the end of 1996; however, Finland chose a different direction for its exchange rate policy by taking part in the ERM as a preparation for full participation in the EMU from its start in 1999, while Sweden decided in 1997 that it would 'wait and see'. 2  BIS Review 9/2002  However, an unforeseen obstacle over the past decade has been the large fluctuations in the exchange rate.