samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To be sure, the Central Bank is assigned the task of containing inflation with particular acuity on behalf of the public and the authorities, and the Bank is required to wield the weapons in its arsenal whether people like it or not. The Bank attempts to carry out that task as well as it possibly can. In the service of that task, the Bank is granted more independence than are most government-owned institutions. One could ask why this is so. What makes it necessary? The explanation lies not least in the fact that the legislature – in Iceland as elsewhere – has realised that the battle against the disease called inflation could be lengthy and uncomfortable. As time passes, the treatment of the disease could generate unpleasant side effects, and it might be tempting to do away with those side effects in the vain hope that the illness will somehow cure itself. Indeed, we have heard this irresponsible notion expressed in various quarters recently. Anyone who has come down with a persistent illness is familiar with the physician’s demand that the patient complete the course of treatment prescribed to him. If he does not, he runs the risk that the bacteria attacking him will become resistant to the medicine best suited to fight them, with the result that the medicine will work poorly or not at all the next time it is needed. The tactic of last resort under such circumstances is to prescribe a much stronger dose, which inevitably produces much more dire side effects.

Banks should therefore maintain these surpluses in future, or should establish and increase them in line with their risk profile. As before, the SNB will regularly assess whether the countercyclical capital buffer needs to be adjusted due to mortgage and real estate market developments. If the momentum in these markets picks up again, additional measures to limit the affordability risk in mortgage lending should be taken into consideration. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Sir Andrew Large: Financial stability oversight - past and present Speech by Sir Andrew Large, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the London School of Economics, London, 22 January 2004. * 1. *  *  Introduction: Globalisation and the Financial World  The financial system has been in the vanguard of globalisation of economic activities. The past 30 years or so have seen a transformation of the financial scene. Just as the financial world has become significantly more complex with an ever more inter-connected global network across firms and countries, so too has the challenge been transformed for those involved in financial stability oversight. That is my theme tonight. Much of what I am about to say may be familiar. But what I have tried to do tonight is to tie these subjects together - to provide a picture of the whole area we grapple with. So I may have exchanged some depth for breadth in the interest of getting home tonight. I would like first to consider what financial stability oversight is and why it is important. Then, what has changed in the financial market place and the challenges that this has brought. And finally the response of the public authorities to these challenges. 2. What is financial stability oversight? Unquestionably financial stability is a critical ingredient in a high performing market economy, although its definition has been an elusive subject of endless fascination to generations of commentators.

Real effort is needed to try to understand the dynamics of collective, and sometimes irrational behaviour of firms, their clients and counterparties - particularly behaviour that could lead to one-way markets. In a downward market they can be the scourge of stability and destroyer of liquidity. 3. Financial stability and public policy  The business of oversight of, and possible intervention in, the financial system falls to public authorities. The justification for this involvement is accepted by all but the freest of free marketers. 1  Raymond Goldsmith, Comment on Hyman Minsky’s “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capital Processes and the Behaviour of the Economy” in C P Kindleberger and J-P Laffargue Eds, Financial Crises: Theory, History and Politics. Cambridge University Press (1982). BIS Review 5/2004  1  Financial stability can be looked on as a public good. And the costs to society of crises and instability can go well beyond the cost borne by players within the financial services arena itself. Not only is it important in providing an effective monetary transmission mechanism, but collapse and instability can lead to decline in aggregate demand and a rise in unemployment. Research suggests that the average cumulative output loss of a banking crisis in an emerging market economy is nearly 14% of GDP, and up to 25% in developed countries.2 The roles and aims of the public authorities - a combination of supervisors, central banks and government - embrace two interdependent fields.
The Riksbank monitors the financial sector with a systemic perspective. If we hadn’t realised it before, one clear lesson from the crisis of 2008–2009 was that monitoring individual institutions is not enough. We and other authorities around the world learnt that we have to keep our eyes on the connections between the banks and how they are affected, as a whole, by developments on the markets. Among other means, the Riksbank influences financial market participants through the analyses we make and the recommendations we issue in the Financial Stability Reports. Another important role for the Riksbank is being the country’s representative in several forums that set the standards for the financial sector, primarily the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS). At the same time, it is worth pointing out that, at present, the Riksbank does not have any sharper tools than words in the preventive work or macro-prudential supervision. We can warn and recommend, but when it comes to real measures, other authorities currently hold responsibility. It is a difficult task. Always raising a warning when everything seems to be going well seldom makes you popular. Financial stability policy is of great importance for Swedish households Preventing future crises is an important task – as is being able to manage them if they break out anyway. I hope that this speech has clarified why Swedish households are dependent on financial stability.

Ultimately, whether we transform and succeed will depend on our finance professionals taking ownership of their own professional development. IBF will continue to introduce new platforms to help our finance professionals do just this. IBF has recently launched the MySkills Portfolio. This is an online tool which can be a useful resource for individuals to plan and manage their learning. MySkills Portfolio allows individuals to track their training progress and receive programme recommendations based on their training goals. It also functions as a repository of training records. Most of all, IBF is about building a community. Today we celebrate our latest cohort of IBF Fellows and Distinguished Fellows. These individuals have contributed their time and expertise, not just on policy ideas, but also as speakers, trainers and mentors to our young finance professionals. All of you compete vigorously when it comes to business – and that is good. But together we have created something unique here in Singapore’s financial sector: a shared vision for building up our capabilities; working towards the greater good; looking out for one another and bringing people along. And we must bring our people along. This is what will help ensure that our financial sector grows from strength to strength; that we create good job opportunities for Singaporeans; that we build up skills and raise standards across the industry; and that all those who work in the industry enjoy the fruits of growth. Thank you once again for your strong support, and I wish everyone an enjoyable evening.
It’s not mission creep, it’s not a politicisation of our mandate, it is our core business and core duty. As regards the Eurosystem, in addition to our primary objective of price stability, it just happens that environmental protection is among our secondary objectives: but this is only an icing on the cake, if I may put it this way. So I would like to focus today on what I will call the macroeconomics of climate change. I will not spell out everything we do as supervisors: first disclosure of risks, climate stress tests at present and financial institutions’ transition plans tomorrow. I would instead like to talk about what is at least as important – modelling the economic effects of climate change – but  Page 3 sur 8 about which we currently know less. I will first acknowledge a veil of uncertainty, before nevertheless establishing four firm convictions. A veil of uncertainty As we try to understand and figure out how climate change will shape macroeconomic changes, the “veil of uncertainty” is primarily due to future political decisions regarding climate change mitigation. For instance the initial level and evolution of a carbon price, or the amount of green investment and public subsidies will be particularly relevant. This is why we are currently working on several scenarios, both over short and longer term.

This quadrant [slide 4] shows four categories of possible shocks linked to the transition. They can have a positive versus negative impact on supply, and a positive versus negative impact on demand respectively. They are not mutually exclusive, and may combine or succeed one another. Their stand-alone probability is hard to assess at this stage, but there are reasons to believe that the upper-left one (the negative supply shock) is slightly more probable than the  Page 5 sur 8 others. However, given the large range of shocks, their sources and macroeconomic effects – which could include a positive scenario of large green private capex v – [slide 5], we must continue our modelling, in line with our first commitment in relation to the ECB’s climate agenda: we committed in July 2022 to “assess the macroeconomic impact of climate change and mitigation policies on inflation and the real economy”. vi  But being uncertain about the combined macroeconomic effects does not mean being passive or inert on action now. What we can already derive from these scenarios is a set of four firm convictions and prescriptions. 1. A shock that is global and certain >>> an orderly transition - First, climate transition entails structural changes to the global economy that are both universal and certain, with an overall and possibly negative supply shock that will generate frictions and costs in terms of the necessary reallocation of production factors.
In addition, the current repo rate of 3.75 per cent is comparatively low, not least when one considers that inflation is around 3 per cent. The next question is how much importance should be accorded to each of the various factors and which side of the balance carries most weight. As regards the excessively high inflation at present, we have tried to analyse whether there are grounds for supposing that it stems from the Swedish economy having been more “overheated” during the recent upswing than we counted on earlier. The preliminary conclusion I believe can be drawn is that the explanation does not lie there. Most things suggest that inflation ought to fall back next spring as the transitory factors that pushed prices up drop out of the change figures. An alternative approach to whether the high inflation is temporary or more permanent involves looking at the development of by far the most important component of costs, namely wages. In that wage agreements have been completed, it is possible to arrive at a comparatively firm picture of how wages are developing, at least during this year and next. With reasonable assumptions about productivity, most things suggest that unit labour costs should be in line with the inflation target. This presupposes that the registered increase in inflation expectations, above all among labour market organisations, does not show up in wage increases; if that were to happen it would be very unfortunate and face monetary policy with new challenges.

New products, market practices, and especially technologies are going to emerge; some of these might create new risks that were unforeseen when the post-crisis reforms were developed. As unintended consequences come to light and new risks emerge regulators may need to make changes to regulation over time, what I am going to refer to as ‘dynamic adjustments’. Being open to making such adjustments does not mean undermining the objectives behind the post-crisis regulatory framework or changing the level of resilience in the banking system regulations are aiming for. On the contrary, it is by making dynamic adjustments that we can ensure the regulatory framework continues to deliver on the reforms’ objectives and ensures that the resilience that policy makers injected into the system post-crisis endures. To ensure this is the case we will need to follow a set of principles to guide us towards when it is appropriate to make dynamic adjustments. Principles for making dynamic adjustments  What might these principles look like? Here are my current thoughts. Principle 1: decisions about dynamic adjustments should be made with reference to the objectives of the original regulation and/or of regulators. For the Bank, prudential regulation is relevant to a number of our primary and secondary objectives: most obviously the PRA’s microprudential objectives and the FPC’s macroprudential objectives, but also the MPC’s monetary policy objectives given the role banks play in the monetary transmission mechanism. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Principle 2: decisions about dynamic adjustments should be evidence-led.
Although synchronised movements in bond rates is unsurprising given the high degree of substitutability between relatively safe sovereign bonds, synchronisation at the short end of the yield curve is not warranted if cyclical positions differ. Such concerns prompted the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England and the Governing Council of the European Central Bank to push back against the recent upward movements in the short end of the yield curve in our respective policy statements in July. The MPC took this further at our latest meeting by offering explicit forward guidance on the future path of policy rates and asset purchases. The guidance is similar to that already adopted by the Federal Open Market Committee, but differing in details that reflect the different position of the UK economy. In particular, we signalled our intention not to countenance tightening policy until unemployment has fallen to at least 7%. In addition, while our guidance is subject to two price stability overrides similar to those of the Fed relating to internal and external  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  measures of inflation expectations, we have also added a financial stability override determined by our Financial Policy Committee. This guidance is intended primarily to clarify our reaction function and thus make policy more effective, rather than to inject additional stimulus by pre-committing to a time-inconsistent “lower for longer” policy path in the manner of Woodford (2012).

Many member countries of the International Monetary Fund have adopted such a code in the form of signing for following the principles of outlined in a general data dissemination system and, at a more stringent level, a special data dissemination system. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka is a signatory to the IMF’s General Data Dissemination System. The final message In summary, if statisticians are desirous of supporting economic development, they should necessarily produce and supply statistics to meet the requirements of the market. It is essential that they produce such statistics as a readily usable product that could be sold in the market at a price. It is now time in Sri Lanka for the private statistics-producers to enter the vast market of information. The universities in this sense are in an advantageous position, because they have the best human talents with them. It is unfortunate that they sit idly on this vast wealth of resources. It is time that universities in Sri Lanka reorient themselves to gain advantage from the market resources and become financially self supporting. In addition, the universities should train their statistics students to become entrepreneurs of statistics rather than becoming employees of agencies that may plan to hire statisticians. BIS Review 36/2009  3
Access to Markets Third, Southeast Asian economies need to boost external demand by strengthening their access to the major developed markets. In the short term, there is little we can do about the cyclical downturn. But for the longer term, favourable and assured access to key trading partners will allow Southeast Asian countries to maximise benefits from free trade and globalisation, and make themselves more attractive to investors. One basic approach is to promote multilateral trade, and contribute to a successful outcome of the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). But we need to complement the multilateral approach with bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with our key trading partners. This is why Singapore is actively pursuing an FTA strategy. We have concluded FTAs with New Zealand, Japan, and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and hope to conclude agreements with the US and Australia very soon. Singapore’s aim is not just to boost our own trade links with our FTA partners, but also to catalyse broader economic engagement between ASEAN and its trading partners. This is indeed happening. After New Zealand concluded its FTA with Singapore, Australia and New Zealand proposed starting a Closer Economic Partnership Agreement with ASEAN. Last year, ASEAN and China agreed to set up an ASEAN-China FTA within 10 years. Weeks later, Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan proposed a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership, to be modelled on the Japan-Singapore bilateral agreement.

We need to imbue our young with entrepreneurial instincts and attitudes, through their school education and life experiences. At the same time, the government should cut red tape, create more economic space for private enterprise, nurture high-potential local enterprises and develop a culture tolerant of risk-taking, experimentation and honest failure. A self-renewing, self-sustaining entrepreneurial culture will not emerge overnight, but we are making some headway. Ten Singapore companies made it to this year’s list of Forbes’ Global 200 companies with revenues under $ billion. This ranks among the largest number of companies for any country. A third area of focus is the development of our human capital, both local and foreign. Singaporeans rank highly in technical skills, and our students often top international mathematics and science competitions. But we need to improve our soft skills, such as people skills, management skills, communications skills, as well as cultural and artistic skills. We will also continue to welcome foreign talent to work, live and play here, to add to our talent pool. Fourth, we need to identify, nurture and promote new areas of growth in both manufacturing and services, the two complementary engines of our economy. The continuing emergence of lower-cost locations spurs us to constantly review and refresh our manufacturing value proposition, be it in refining our division of labour, exploiting economies of scale through shared facilities, or undertaking more innovation and R&D work.
And arguably, since the crisis, that relationship has become more important to our understanding of inflationary pressure in the economy. Before the crisis the supply side of the economy posed far fewer puzzles. Productivity grew at a relatively steady rate around 2% a year and we had, or thought we had, a relatively clear idea of labour supply. The MPC certainly did not need to give as much attention to the evolution of the supply side of the economy as its present day counterpart. That is not just my recollection as the Treasury representative on the Committee from 2002 to 2007. It is borne out by the minutes – the rate of mentions of ‘supply’ and ‘productivity’ in the minutes of MPC meetings in the past decade has been about twice that in the decade prior to the crisis. As my colleague, Ben Broadbent has pointed out, pre-crisis the MPC could navigate primarily by demand and output. Changes in unemployment lagged changes in demand and output and, in the UK at least, the relationship between pay and unemployment appeared relatively stable. 5  The post-crisis uncertainty over productivity and the dependence of economic growth on labour supply has, as Ben suggests, led the MPC to depend more on the labour market as a guide to spare capacity in the economy and on the relationship between pay and unemployment as a guide to domestically generated inflationary pressure in the pipeline.

1-17 Haldane, Andrew G. (2017) ‘Work, Wages and Monetary Policy’ speech given at the National Science and Media Museum, Bradford IMF (2013) ‘The dog that didn’t bark: has inflation been muzzled or was it just sleeping?’ April World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3 Mishkin, Frederic (2007) ‘Inflation Dynamics’ NBER working paper 13147 Nagel, S and Malmendier, U (2011) 'Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk Taking?’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol126(1), pp373-416 Phillips, A W (1958) ‘The relation between unemployment and the rate of change of money wage rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957’ Economica, Vol. 25, No. 100, p. 283–99 Pizzinelli, Carlo and Bradley Speigner (2017) ‘Matching Efficiency and Labour Market Heterogeneity in the United Kingdom’ Bank of England Working Paper No. 667 Saunders, Michael (2017) ‘The Labour Market’ speech given at the Resolution Foundation, London Stiglitz, Joseph (1997) 'Reflections on the natural rate hypothesis' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 3–10 Yellen, Janet (2017) ‘Inflation, Uncertainty and Monetary Policy’ Speech at the "Prospects for Growth: Reassessing the Fundamentals" 59th Annual Meeting of the National Association for Business Economics, Cleveland, Ohio  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18