samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the course of the Review, representatives of the Bank of Russia will hold meetings with business associations, representatives of small, medium-sized and large enterprises, government authorities, the academic and expert community, including professional financial market participants, and citizens from various social and demographic groups. Some of these meetings will take place at the Bank of Russia’s regional branches. Such analysis is conducted by many central banks, in the first place by those having a long experience of inflation targeting. Some central banks carry out such reviews on a regular basis (Canada, Sweden, Norway). The US Fed accomplished its review not so long ago. The ECB completed a similar project in July 2021. As to the Bank of Russia, this is our first experience of such a profound and comprehensive analysis of the achievements of our monetary policy, but we will definitely continue this practice. In the future, the Bank of Russia plans to make 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  such reviews regularly, every five years. The range of topics to be reviewed by our analytical units includes six work streams. Work stream 1. Inflation target format. This topic is obviously drawing the greatest attention. Within this work stream, we will consider once again what format of the target would ensure the highest confidence in it and what inflation rate could be the best measure of price stability. Furthermore, we will analyse whether the Russian economy has formed the conditions for reducing the inflation target. Work stream 2. The operational procedure of monetary policy.

Overall, Switzerland – a small open economy with a highly developed financial sector – is in a position to derive particularly significant benefits from the globalisation of financial markets. It is important to take advantage of these opportunities. Protectionism when foreigners acquire companies and excessive regulation of foreign investment should be avoided. Rather, the sale of Swiss companies below their real value can be avoided through innovation, flexibility and good management, and excessive risks of foreign investments can be limited through more personal responsibility on the part of investors. BIS Review 131/2007  1
Second, the economic and financial context in which French banks are operating is also a source of risks. Indeed, lessons must be learned from the slowdown in the USA, amply illustrated by the housing downturn, which resulted in higher risk in the sub-prime segments of the retail banking market. It should also be acknowledged that financial markets could become more unsettled. If higher risk aversion were to encourage greater use of risk transfer products, this could drain liquidity from some markets and undermine the efficiency of banks' management. From a supervisory perspective, the problem is all the more acute since the growing reliance on credit risk transfer instruments tends to make it harder to assess the type and degree of risk that banks actually bear when, for example, they arrange complex transactions. Third, the regulatory environment for French banks is changing radically as a result of the Basel II accords. Banks that have adopted the advanced approaches to risk management must put models in place – usually as early as January 2008 – for the internal rating and assessment of credit risk, market risk and operational risk. On-site inspection teams from the Commission Bancaire are currently scrutinising these models. Their investigations show that, overall, large banking groups have taken the measure of this project early on, so as to be ready for the deadline of the 1st January 2008, even if some improvements need to be made in certain areas.

The recent competitive environment has actually fostered the gradual transformation of banking activities, with a greater emphasis on the "originate and distribute" business model. With this model, credit institutions arrange financings but quickly offload a substantial portion of their risks, for example through securitisation, and take payment – much more so than in the past – in the form of fees and commissions. But although activity in new products such as LBOs is helping to boost French banks' revenues and earnings, it is also a source of vulnerability. First, in terms of remuneration, fierce competition among credit institutions is not only exerting downward pressure on margins; it is encouraging "covenant-lite" deals – a worrying trend. These complex transactions are also beginning to generate new risks. On this point, there is a tendency towards longer underwriting periods, during which banks bear the bulk of the risk. Banks should also pay attention to the fact that counterparties such as hedge funds are becoming increasingly involved in this type of deals. Allow me two brief asides, if you will. First, with regard to LBOs, let me refer you to the study appended to the Annual Report. On the topic of hedge funds, I would remind you that the Banque de France devoted a special issue of its financial stability review to this subject and that the Commission Bancaire pays close attention to banks' involvement with this type of counterparty.
Diagram 4  Cumulative change in employment 1960-96 T housands 100 10 00  Public employment  800 80 0  600 60 0  Total employment  400 40 0  200 20 0  0  Private employment  -200  -4 00 60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  Source: Statistics S weden  The great challenge Sweden faces in the future development of employment is evident from Diagram 4, which shows that for a long time there has been no net increase in private sector jobs. This is the trend that must be broken. While there has certainly been some increase in employment in boom years, in the subsequent downturns virtually as many jobs have BIS Review 38/1997  -9-  disappeared. The overall increase in employment has come from an expansion of public sector jobs; one million jobs were created in this sector between 1960 and 1990. Now that, for various reasons, the political system has been obliged to arrest the public sector’s expansion, employment has also fallen.

Another issue is whether a mood of mutual understanding can be created about the reform and construction of labour market rules and other measures that can help to reduce unemployment. My intention this evening has not been to present a deeper analysis of the labour market problems, nor to answer questions about what needs to be done. But perhaps I have contributed by raising some of the questions that need to be answered and by defining the function of monetary policy and what it can do. If we are to achieve a lasting return just to something resembling the unemployment figures we have been accustomed to in Sweden, there will have to be a proper discussion of which measures are needed to bring unemployment down. 10  See note 7. BIS Review 38/1997
Bakarudin Ishak: Linking United Kingdom & Malaysia – opportunities and solutions in fundraising and investments Introductory address by Mr Bakarudin Ishak, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Forum “Linking United Kingdom & Malaysia: Opportunities and Solutions in Fundraising and Investments”, organised by TheCityUK, London, 29 September 2015. *  *  *  On behalf of the Malaysian delegation, I am pleased to be here today at this forum with the theme “Linking United Kingdom & Malaysia: Opportunities and Solutions in Fundraising and Investments”. It is a great opportunity to jointly organise this event with TheCityUK which we hope will further enhance Malaysia-UK relationship in Islamic finance and strengthen the investment and financial ties between the two countries. Appreciation note Our utmost appreciation goes to TheCityUK for hosting this Forum and the warm hospitality extended to Malaysian delegates. We would also like to extend our appreciation to Trowers & Hamlins for holding this Forum at its venue. Trowers & Hamlins is Malaysia’s first foreign law firm to be granted a Qualified Foreign Law Firm (QFLF) licence. This allows them to operate independently in Malaysia and advise on international legal issues including on Islamic finance matters. The entry of foreign legal firms will create a symbiotic environment to accelerate the Malaysian legal firms’ capabilities at the international front.

As a result of the Maastricht convergence criteria, the central banks of these countries were increasingly aligning themselves with the Bundesbank. Exchange rates between the affected currencies, as well as exchange rates to the Swiss franc, consequently stabilised. This phase of low exchange rate volatility continued in the years immediately following the launch of the euro. The most recent period of exchange rate volatility against the euro has its roots in the international financial and debt crisis, which rapidly evolved into a euro crisis. Doubts about the viability of some euro area member states’ sovereign debts caused markets to lose confidence in the euro. As in past crises, the mounting uncertainty triggered substantial upward pressure on the Swiss franc. Why Switzerland doesn’t have the euro Considering its close economic ties to the euro area, why didn’t Switzerland ever seriously contemplate joining the single currency? Politically and legally speaking, the answer is simple: a country can only join the Eurosystem if it is already an EU member state. Swiss voters and cantons rejected accession to the European Economic Area in a referendum in 1992, and in 2001 followed this up by voting against a popular initiative favouring a “Yes to Europe”. These decisions settled the question of whether Switzerland should join the EU for the foreseeable future. Quite apart from these political and legal factors, the economic case for joining the euro had always been weaker for Switzerland than for many other European countries.
Thanks to your hard work, and thanks to the cooperation and support from many supervisory agencies and central banks, we are confident that the New Accord will represent the best possible framework. In last summer’s consultations, the industry acknowledged the many improvements in the proposals that we have achieved to date. At the same time, public comments identified a number of technical concerns related to the treatment of credit-related losses and of some of the most sophisticated financial instruments and activities. We took these comments to heart and spent the next several months developing solutions. In October 2003, the Committee agreed in Madrid on a breakthrough plan to resolve these issues by the middle of this year. I must say that I have been pleasantly surprised by the progress the Committee has made in the extremely short period of time since then. Just three weeks ago, for example, we published three detailed technical notes outlining changes to the proposals. These covered revisions to the treatment of expected and unexpected credit-related losses and of securitisation exposures, as well as principles on the recognition of operational risk capital across home and host jurisdictions. I’d like to share with you the latest information on each of the areas addressed in the technical papers and in the press releases. EL/UL First, let’s turn to the New Accord’s treatment of expected and unexpected losses, or “EL” and “UL” as we say in Basel.

Any attempt on the part of the SNB to hedge this risk would increase the demand for francs, which would run counter to its monetary policy objectives. The SNB’s risk profile therefore differs significantly from that of other institutional investors. While the currency risk (orange shading in chart 4) represents 78% of the total risk exposure of our investments, in the case of a representative Swiss pension fund, this proportion is only 16%. Due to its particular risk profile, the SNB is exposed to significant fluctuations in its investment result from one quarter to the next. Given these fluctuations, we exploit all available room for manoeuvre in order to diversify our investments. This allows us to optimise our risk/return profile and maintain the value of our reserves over the long term. To do this, we invest in equities and corporate bonds. Equities are an attractive asset class for the SNB. Their high degree of liquidity ensures the necessary flexibility in monetary matters, while their higher return potential helps to improve the risk/return profile. The SNB differs from other central banks in that it has a relatively high equity exposure (currently 20%, cf. chart 3). Our equity portfolio, which is worth more than CHF 150 billion, is highly diversified. We invest in some 6,700 corporate securities from more than 40 countries. We hold shares in companies which together account for more than 95% of global market capitalisation. Overall, our investments are denominated in some 30 currencies around the world, including those of emerging economies.
All in all, activity in the Swedish economy during the final quarter last year appears to have been slightly higher than we expected in February. Productivity on the other hand showed weaker development than in the assessment in the Report. Survey data clearly suggests  4  BIS Review 30/2008  however that a slowdown is occurring in most parts of the business sector and that the increase in the demand for labour is on the point of slowing. The turmoil has once again increased in the financial markets around the world. This suggests that these are complicated processes that can be protracted. The so-called TED spreads, which is the spread between interbank rates and T-bill rates, have risen once more, above all in the United States but even in Sweden and the United Kingdom. Credit spreads are still high. In recent days the spreads on the mortgage market in Sweden have increased. This is linked to the unrest on the mortgage markets in a few other European countries. Credit insurance premiums have risen recently both in the United States and Europe. New reports about losses related to the US subprime sector are being received. Share prices in Europe and the United States have fluctuated somewhat, but are at present somewhat lower than at the time of the monetary policy meeting. The krona has strengthened somewhat, especially against the US dollar.

This initiative, along with others related to a general improvement of standards and practices in several areas, would contribute to the better functioning of financial institutions and markets, leading ultimately to a full harnessing of the benefits of financial integration. I trust that, with fluent dialogue between regulators, institutions and market participants, we may be able to improve the combination of sound regulation and flexibility that would ultimately lead to a more robust and efficient financial system. I am convinced that this is a most important contribution to the smooth functioning of the world economy. Thank you. BIS Review 31/2003  3
There was apparently supposedly a subway line that was really close to the gold vault, and so they just had to punch a little hole in the subway tunnel and the gold vault was right there. But it doesn’t really actually work that way. So sorry. My point is, there’s a lot of different activities that we do. Obviously in education, Bachelor’s or Master’s, is sort of I think probably a good place to start. The more analytical skills you can get in terms of math and economics and business – those are the skills that are very attractive to us. Training and public policy because that’s what we do, is very important. It’s a great place to work. The typical New York Fed employee joins the Bank and says I’m going to be here two, three years. And then the next stop I ask them how long have you been here? “25, 30 years.” Which I think means that it has – it’s a good place to work. Reasonable pay, good benefits But mainly, a great culture. People are very committed to what we do. People have a strong sense of mission and integrity. I tell people that one of the great things about working at the New York Fed is there’s no moral ambiguity at any day about why I’m going to work. We’re there to serve the public interest, and that’s a nice thing to think about every day when you go to the office.

Moreover, according the IMF’s latest assessment from January this year, the deficits are expected to fall even more slowly than was predicted as recently as September last year.1 According to the IMF, the advanced economies reduced their cyclically-adjusted deficits by an average of less than  1  2  Fiscal Monitor Update, January 2012. IMF  BIS central bankers’ speeches  one percentage point between 2010 and 2011, as shown in Figure 2.2 These deficits are expected to fall by as much or, if you prefer, by as little, in 2012. If we look at the euro area separately, the reduction between 2010 and 2011 was slightly larger, that is 1.3 percentage points. However, it should be noted that a large part of this reduction was due to improved public finances in Germany and not in the countries where such an improvement is needed most. Despite a continued improvement during 2012, the assessment is that public finances in the euro area will, on average, still be in deficit. Consequently, the average level of public debt is expected to increase from almost 90 per cent of GDP in 2011 to 92.5 per cent in 2013 according to the IMF. In order to reduce the level of debt instead, several European countries would need to transform the relatively substantial deficits of today into surpluses over a period of several years. Figure 2.
The Federal Reserve entered this tightening cycle with its overnight policy rate at the zero lower bound and with a large portfolio of long-duration securities. Normalization, therefore, has two parts: increasing the overnight rate, and reducing securities holdings to a smaller size. The FOMC began raising the overnight rate from zero in late 2015, and it began reducing the size of the portfolio late last year. First: overnight rates. Due to the large supply of reserves that has accompanied the Federal Reserve’s expanded balance sheet, we are employing a new and innovative framework to control money market rates. 5 Before the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve followed a wellworn playbook for monetary policy implementation that was based on keeping reserve balances scarce. Nowadays, however, reserves are no longer scarce. Our current framework relies, instead, on providing the market with two overnight investment opportunities to help steer money market rates: interest on reserves (IOR), which is the Federal Reserve’s main tool to control interest rates, and the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility, a secondary tool. The current framework is simple and efficient to operate. In contrast, in the pre-crisis regime, hitting the target federal funds rate each day was a technically challenging exercise. 6 We also have now had more than two and a half years to observe the performance of this framework, 4  These remarks focus on dollar money markets, many of which are linked to LIBOR, and do not discuss the reference rate itself.

23 It is important to note that these new regulatory and behavioral factors are related to liquidity in general and not strictly about reserves held in Federal Reserve accounts as in Regulation D. Banks have many possible means for addressing their requirements under the LCR, and the LCR rule does not impose any specific requirement to hold central bank reserves. 7  have various ways to meet their obligations under this system: their choices are not limited to simply holding more reserves. As a result, reserve scarcity may be accompanied by shifts in market pricing and flows that we might not have seen in the old framework. Finally, the old system provided a degree of stability over time through its ability to reallocate scarce reserves among banks in response to shocks through interbank lending in the federal funds market. This interbank activity largely dried up following the crisis and has not meaningfully returned—in part due to regulatory incentives, but also because banks report that they are now less interested in taking on financial exposure to other banks. 24 As a result, it is possible that a regime of less abundant reserves may now be accompanied by an element of increasing volatility or periodic turbulence in money markets. One new way in which scarcity might manifest itself going forward is through effects related to the LCR. Very generally, the LCR is designed to ensure that banks hold a sufficient reserve of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to allow them to survive a short-term period of significant liquidity stress.
Against this backdrop, the ACPR redesigned its questionnaire on business practices and consumer protection. It can now understand current market practices, as well as trends in products, services and practices. I will now talk about ACPR inspections. They are firstly intended to ensure compliance with the applicable rules and to make sure that errors are corrected before they have consequences for customers. In the worst cases, such errors lead to sanctions. This approach is necessary to punish violations and useful to increase awareness in the profession. ACPR inspections are not however limited to dealing with bad practices on a case-by-case basis. They also identify more general problems that call for changes in market practices or even in regulations. Several examples will be discussed this morning to illustrate the lessons learned from such inspections. For instance, ACPR staff examined distribution channels in which there are a number of intermediaries between the customer and the producer (bank or more often insurer). The questions that we are asking today are simple. But they are important for the sector as a whole. Do all intermediaries provide value added to the customer? How can we guarantee the customer a reliable and efficient chain, irrespective of its organisation? To enhance practices, the ACPR also has a flexible legal tool, the recommendation. I believe that this instrument is useful for prevention. Recommendations are intended to change or guide the behaviour of professionals. It helps them to identify and actually integrate what is expected of them in terms of consumer protection.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Supervision of business practices Opening speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), at the ACPR conference “Supervision of business practices”, Paris, 20 November 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to welcome you today to this new conference organised by the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution and would like to thank you all for coming. This is an opportunity for me to tell you for the first time how important I find this type of event, where the Authority that I chair explains its actions and the principles that guide it. It is also an opportunity for us all to listen to the parties concerned, on a topic that brings us together today – that of the supervision of business practices – on which I would like to put forward three ideas: (I)  First, our supervision of business practices is important for the current mobilisation of the nation. (II)  Second, our supervision of business practices is important for financial stability. (III)  Lastly, our supervision of business practices must increasingly take account of developments in technology and changes in Europe. Our supervision of business practices is important for the current mobilisation of the nation. Many lessons can be learned from the dramatic events of Friday 13 November in Paris and its suburbs, which requires of us a total mobilisation.