samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
4  BIS Review 56/2008  •  New capital regulations based on the Basel I model were implemented. In the new regulation there was a more appropriate relationship between loans granted (risks) and capital, instead of deposits and capital. •  Banco de España was empowered to issue accounting regulations for banks. It duly laid down new prudent accounting rules, in particular regarding loan classification and loan loss provisioning. Since then, the authority to establish accounting standards for banks has proven to be one of the most powerful tools at our disposal. •  Supervisory reporting was established. This is an essential element of supervision which allows for proper monitoring of the situation of banks. •  The Central Credit Register was introduced in the sixties, with all credit institutions required to report regularly to it. This database is exploited for supervisory purposes and will play an important role in Basel II supervision. It can also be used by the banks for credit risk management purposes. •  Since the seventies Spanish banking supervision has paid particular attention to obtaining "first-hand" on-site assessments of developments, to complement its continuous and close monitoring of every institution. •  The growth of the financial markets called for more transparency and better regulation of external auditing. A new law was passed making the external audit of the annual accounts compulsory for every company above a certain size, and for all financial institutions regardless of their size.

The broad adoption of financial technology or fintech could dramatically lower the cost of banking services. Not only will this enhance financial inclusion, it could potentially also help mobilise untapped savings, enable more efficient financial transactions, and make credit more readily available and affordable to small businesses. Emerging Asia fares poorly in financial inclusion even among emerging markets. •  Less than 15% of Asian SMEs have bank credit lines, compared to 24% in Latin America and 28% in Eastern Europe. •  In Indonesia, for example, only about one out of every three persons aged 15 and above has an account with a financial institution. Ironically, Emerging Asia’s relative under-development could turn out to be an advantage. The innovative adoption of digital technology by the financial industry is enabling these economies to leapfrog into more advanced channels for providing banking services. •  A growing number of Asian customers, especially in countries like China and India with rapidly developing technology infrastructure, are using mobile banking apps for payments and funds transfers, even before customers in more advanced economies. •  In India, bank accounts can be linked to biometric identity cards issued under the national Aadhaar initiative, enabling millions who otherwise lack the formal documents required to open a bank account to have access to basic banking services. Of course, technological innovations pose threats as well as opportunities to Asian banks. As in the US, a number of fintech entities in Asia are making inroads as lower-cost alternatives to banks.
In the primary market, government’s demand for funding is reflected in the increased yields of government securities. However, the trajectory of yields retained its trend, showing low inflation expectations by market agents. As regards the economy’s performance outlook, our projections and assessments suggest a continuation of economic growth, in terms relative to those of the first quarter. Composition of aggregate demand is expected to be different to the one of the first half of the year: private sector of the economy is expected to be more vivacious in the second half, while the contribution of the public and external sectors are expected to be more moderate. Size and speed of the private sector recovery shall define the stability of economic growth in the future. In spite of assessments for increased aggregate demand, economic activity in Albania is expected to remain below its potential, thus conditioning the continuation of spare  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  capacities in the economy in the period ahead. Subsequently, inflationary pressures originating from the aggregate demand are expected to be contained. In addition, foreign prices effect is expected to be more moderate in the upcoming months while inflation expectations of economic agents continue to be within the target band. Consumer price inflation is expected to continue its downward trend in the next months, gradually approaching the Bank of Albania target. Taking into consideration the information above, the Supervisory Council concluded that inflationary pressures in the medium term are contained.

For purposes of comparison, the dash-dotted green curve shows the inflation forecast of the September monetary assessment, which was also based on a three-month Libor of 2.75%. The new forecast indicates that inflation will rise in the first half of 2008. It is likely that it will breach even the 2% level. However, this increase will be temporary and will be chiefly due to the rise in oil prices. After that time, inflation will settle at around 1.5%, with a slight upward trend at the end of the period. The slowdown in the international economy explains the downward revision in the inflation outlook for 2009 and 2010. Naturally, any forecast is uncertain, and at present both upside and downside risks are greater than usual. Consequently, we will continue to keep a close watch on developments in the financial markets, the international economy, oil prices and the Swiss franc exchange rate, in order to assess their impact on the inflation outlook and to be in a position to react swiftly should the need arise.
So as not to overstay my welcome, and given that next week several meetings involving these European institutions are to be held, I propose that we assume that these meetings will eventually see the adoption of the decisions needed to turn the markets around. This assumption about what the European institutions will do allows me to conclude my address by talking exclusively about our national problems. What must Spain do to emerge from the crisis? As I said at the outset, the conjunction of three economic crises, and in particular the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis, mean that precise economic policy implementation is extremely difficult at present, although the diagnosis as to what must be done is relatively simple and widely known. At present, what is most important is to promptly pursue an ambitious reform of our labour market institutions, while continuing to make headway on two key fronts: budgetary consolidation and financial system restructuring. In the past two years significant steps have been taken in both these areas, but to achieve fully satisfactory results, perseverance with the path of reform is needed. Starting with the reform of the labour market institutions, certain measures have been taken recently. But the truth is that, since the outset of democracy, Spain has not been capable of making any meaningful progress in this area, whereas most European countries have used the past three decades to reform their labour systems, in order to achieve higher levels of flexibility and job protection, i.e. greater “flexicurity”.

Stories of destitution among retirees is one but many of the sad stories, I would like you to avoid. Guard the assets that you have acquired in your working life jealously, because retirement does not give you multiple chances to make amends when you make unsound business decisions. It is for this reason that the Bank, through Human Resources Department, has engaged Future Search a Consultancy firm to give you tips on how to live in retirement, I urge you to attend the upcoming workshop. I therefore wish you God’s blessings as your pursue the challenges of life in retirement. Thank you. BIS Review 1/2007  1
In that case, the proportion of lending at higher LTI multiples could increase sharply, leading to an increase in the cohorts of highly indebted households and as a consequence greater macro-economic and macro-financial vulnerability in stress. So we introduced the policies to insure against a material loosening in underwriting standards that would lead to a significant increase in the number of highly indebted households. The action was a major development for the FPC in that it addressed directly a credit related vulnerability on borrower as opposed to lender balance sheets. The Committee debated vigorously at the time whether such action fell within its responsibilities or whether it should confine itself more tightly to the risks and resilience within the financial system. It concluded, rightly in my view, that acting to prevent the possible sharp increase in highly indebted households was part of its statutory responsibility.12 We made it very clear at the time that our objective was to address aggregate high indebtedness, not house price growth. The Committee set out at the time in detail the reasons for the policy and its cost-benefit analysis. But it is important we continue to develop the analysis and evidence of why the policy makes sense and what impact it has had – to ensure we remain confident that the cost-benefit analysis stacks up.

In the second half of last year, it was already growing at an annualized rate of 6 percent. Indeed, we were forecasting that 2010 growth would be around 5 percent as early as last September. The figures up to February 27 – as shown in a box in the Report –, indicated that the midpoint of the growth range could be closer to 6 percent than to 5 percent. Compared with our trading partners or with the average growth forecast for Latin America, this figure is around two percentage points greater. Expansionary monetary policy has played a key role in our economy’s strong performance. Nonetheless, our country was then hit by another shock. On February 27 we suffered one of the worst natural disasters in history that took a tragic toll on our country, causing loss of life, numerous injuries, forced displacement of large numbers of people, and huge material damages. Although the prospects of our country’s progress have not been compromised, this  BIS Review 61/2010  1  new scenario poses important challenges in every aspect of national life, including the conduct of monetary policy. The immediate reaction of an economy to a natural disaster is highly uncertain. Historical evidence tells us little because such events are, luckily, very rare. Therefore, the evaluation of data released since the disaster must be done with extreme caution. In fact, output data for March and April will reveal very poor performance. The reaction of the economy to a natural catastrophe in the medium term is somewhat clearer.
It is therefore to be expected that the impact of low interest rates on profitability will, on average, be greater for these banks than for others with a different business focus. Stabilised interest margins of domestically focused banks I shall therefore concentrate on domestically focused banks in the following remarks. The profitability of these institutions has fallen – in some cases significantly – since the beginning of the low interest rate period, primarily due to declining margins on interest business. The average interest rate margin fell substantially between 2008 and 2014, as this chart illustrates (slide 7). However, the chart also shows that interest rate margins have stabilised since the introduction of negative interest. Furthermore, current business figures from domestically focused banks suggest that they have absorbed the negative interest rate relatively well to date, despite growing pressure on their liability margins. Negative interest has thus so far not caused a further erosion of banks’ profitability. At first sight, this result seems remarkable. How can it be explained? First: Overall, negative interest has hitherto had no material direct cost implications for domestically focused banks. This is due to the fact that the SNB grants an exemption threshold before the negative interest rate is applied. In practice, negative interest is only  Page 6/10  charged on sight deposits that exceed 20 times the minimum reserve requirement. The sight deposits of most domestically focused banks are below or at this threshold.

Trading business mainly consists of purchasing and selling securities on behalf of clients or for the bank’s own account. The current low interest rate environment can affect these three pillars in different ways. On the one hand, lower interest rates could plausibly benefit commission and trading business. Customers might be inclined to shift their portfolios into riskier investments, which would be conducive to earnings in these business areas. At the same time, a decline in interest rates leads to one-off valuation gains on securities in the balance sheet. On the other hand, it is likely that exceptionally low interest rates negatively impact banks’ interest rate margins. Put simply, the interest rate margin is the difference between banks’ interest income and interest expense, shown as a percentage of banks’ assets. To better understand the relationship between the interest rate level and interest rate margin, it is worth looking at the composition of the latter. The interest rate margin can be divided into three components, namely the asset, structural and liability margins (slide 4). The asset margin is the difference between the interest rate charged on loans and a market interest rate of equal maturity. The liability margin is the difference between a short-term market interest rate and the interest paid on deposits and other sources of financing. And finally, the structural margin is the difference between longer and short-term market interest rates – essentially the compensation the bank receives for maturity transformation.
In our efforts to achieve the desired outcomes, we are cognizant of the need for our leaders at all levels of the organisation to demonstrate the right behaviours to reinforce our desired culture of trust, integrity, collaboration and innovation. When speaking about leadership here, I should add that this is not defined by one’s position, but rather the values that one upholds in doing what is right and in the best interest of the organisation. Times have changed, and a job for life is no longer the goal to aspire to in a career. Rather, our job is now to be life-long learners, and to facilitate that same learning for others. A continuous learning mind-set is what will ultimately differentiate an outstanding career from a mediocre one, and ensure that we can adapt, thrive and be productively and purposefully employed whatever unfolds in the future of work. I hope that as CEOs, CLOs, Heads of L&D and academia, we will be the agents of change to help steer our organisations towards a work environment and culture that will survive and thrive amid the future challenges to come. Today’s event is a step in that direction. Let us learn from distinguished experts and one another today. Let us reimagine organisational learning. Most of all, let us strive together to build a strong, competent and well-rounded workforce. Thank you and I wish all of you a productive and stimulating day ahead. 1 The Future of Jobs Report 2020 by the World Economic Forum 2 OECD (2019).

These include critical thinking and analysis, problem-solving, and skills in self-management such as active learning, resilience, stress tolerance and flexibility. For any organisation to grow and sustain change, strong, wellrounded leadership is critical. Not all these aspects can be gained through formal learning alone. It has to be reinforced through robust on-the-job mentoring and organisational-wide coaching culture. Finally, culture is at the heart of any organisation’s ability to transform and remain relevant. Ron Kaufman once said that when you “convince people, you will win their minds. Inspire people and you will win their hearts”. For organisations seeking to transform and become more adaptive and innovative, culture change is often the most challenging part of the journey. Any attempt to drive transformation is unlikely to succeed if there is resistance to the call for action. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  As an organisation, Bank Negara Malaysia has also had to assess and reflect on how we work, and consider better ways to instil the desired norms and corporate culture. What we have consciously nurtured over time has been a strong collaborative culture. What we want to keep getting better at is to be open to experimenting more, learning from mistakes quicker, and deepening our coaching and feedback culture. Our policy mandates are stress-tested internally by a work culture where colleagues are encouraged to speak up and challenge one another so that we reduce blind spots.
In part this reflects a significant spike in economic policy uncertainty and the related risk that protectionism could prove more pervasive, persistent and damaging than previously expected. As I will discuss in a moment, these headwinds are now restraining business investment globally and could push down on the global equilibrium interest rate, exacerbating concerns about limited monetary policy space. Long-term government bond yields have fallen sharply alongside the falls in expected policy rates. US 10year yields are near three-year lows, and 10-year gilt yields and German 10-year bund yields are their lowest ever. Around $ trillion of global debt is now trading at negative yields. As material as these global developments are, the UK outlook hinges on the nature and timing of Brexit. The UK economy contracted slightly last quarter and surveys point to stagnation in this one. Looking through Brexit-related volatility, it is likely that underlying growth is positive but muted. The biggest economic headwind is weak business investment, which has stagnated over the past few years, despite limited spare capacity, robust balance sheets, supportive financial conditions and a highly competitive exchange rate. There is overwhelming evidence that this is a direct result of uncertainties over the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU, and it serves as a warning to others of the potential impact of persistent trade tensions on global business confidence and activity. The UK economy could follow multiple possible paths depending on how Brexit progresses with material implications for the stance of monetary policy.

In recent weeks, the perceived likelihood of No Deal has risen sharply as evidenced by betting odds and financial market asset pricing (the UK now has the highest FX implied volatility, the highest equity risk premium and lowest real yields of any advanced economy). In the event of a No Deal No Transition Brexit, sterling would probably fall, pushing up inflation, and demand would weaken further, reflecting lost trade access, heightened uncertainty and tighter financial conditions. Unusually for an advanced economy slowdown, there would also be a large, immediate hit to supply. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) would need to assess to what extent that reflects temporary disruption to 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  production, with limited implications for inflation in the medium term, or a fundamental destruction of supply capacity because of the abrupt change in the UK’s economic relationship with the EU. As the MPC has repeatedly emphasised, the monetary policy response to No Deal would not be automatic but would depend on the balance of these effects – on demand, supply and the exchange rate – on medium term inflationary pressures. In my view, the appropriate policy path would be more likely to ease than not, using the flexibility in the MPC’s remit to lengthen the period over which inflation is returned to target. But much would depend on the exact nature of No Deal and its impact.
There may be several reasons for this. Calculated forward rates will usually reflect market expectations concerning the future interest rate path. Market interest rates may, however, be influenced by extraordinary supply and demand factors that do not have a bearing on the outlook for underlying economic developments or monetary policy. But market participants may also have a different perception of the interest rate path that is required to stabilise inflation at target. The difference can also be ascribed to the downward pressure exerted on long-term interest rates in many countries by extraordinary conditions in international capital flows. Possible challenges of an explicit forecast of future interest rates To what extent a central bank should publish an interest rate forecast has been the subject of discussion in international economic literature. 4 The discussion has arisen as a result of the different solutions chosen by different central banks for different reasons. It has been argued that the central bank might feel too bound by a previously announced interest rate path. Publication of the Bank’s interest rate forecast might impose constraints on monetary policy, making it more difficult to adjust the interest rate to changes in economic developments. The interest rate path may be perceived as a straightjacket, preventing the central bank from pursuing the policy it considers to be appropriate at any given time. In addition, if the central bank should deviate from the previously published interest rate forecast, the Bank might be accused of misleading the market. Confidence in the central bank may thereby be undermined.

The inflation target and the Industrial Agreement together contributed to this development. This underlines the importance of the inflation target as a nominal anchor for the Swedish economy. 6 [16]  Diagram 3. Swedish real wages from 1970 Index, 1970 =100  Note. The broken line marks 1995, the year when the inflation target entered into force. Sources: The National Mediation Office and Statistics Sweden  Thirdly, the fiscal policy framework has contributed to the successful consolidation of Swedish public finances and these are now in a very good state. This has increased market confidence in Sweden's ability to keep its public finances in order. The difference between Swedish long-term market rates and those in other countries can be seen as a measure of this and of confidence in the Swedish economy as a whole. At the beginning of the 1990s, the long market rate in Sweden was quite a lot higher than the European and American rates. Confidence in the Swedish economy was low and most people believed that the rate of inflation would remain high. During the thirty years that have passed, the interest rate differential has shrunk and for quite some time the long-term interest rate in Sweden is at roughly the same level as in Germany. 7 [16]  Diagram 4. Government debt and interest differential Central government debt as a percentage of GDP and interest differential on 10-year government bond yields  Note. Share of GDP and percentage points difference.