samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The paper demonstrates that, among employees beginning their career in the expert salary band,4 after ten years the probability of promotion for men stood at 57%, while that of women was just 37% (see left-hand panel). However, the analysis also shows the marked impact of the ECB’s recent initiatives. In contrast with the preceding period, from 2011 onwards the gap between the promotion rates of men and women has been very small (see right-hand panel).5 Nevertheless, despite the ECB’s diversity policy, the gender differences in the career progression of its employees were not eradicated entirely. One important conclusion we can draw from studying promotion processes between 2012 and 2017 is that women are less likely to apply than men. Indeed, women’s application rate is around 40% lower than men’s. Therefore, given that the probability of promotion has been similar for men and women since 2011, women’s lower application rate means that those ultimately applying for these processes have a greater chance of being promoted. 2  Or five salary steps (see left-hand panel). 25 steps after five years and 29 steps after ten years. 4 Salary band F/G. 5 Based on three-year moving averages, the promotion gender gap was positive and statistically significant in each period until 2010, but statistically insignificant in the three-year periods since then. 3  5  This poses the question of whether women’s success at the ECB is down to positive discrimination or merit.

7  The average gender wage gap is a commonly used measure to summarise gender differences in career progression. In recent years, this gap has stood at 17% at the Banco de España (black bar), i.e. the average wage of male members of staff is 17% higher than that of female members. This is the raw gap and could therefore be due to differences in staff’s individual characteristics causing wage differences. The gap narrows from 17.2% to 8.4% when factoring in demographic characteristics (grey bar). Family situation lies behind a portion of this difference. The gap closes to 7.9% if we factor in marital status and parenthood (blue bar). Adding in characteristics such as years of experience and area of activity narrows the gap further to 6.8% (red bar). Taking professional group into consideration, the gap closes completely (green bar). Yet it is important to take into account that, unlike the other individual characteristics that we can assume to be exogenous, an employee’s career history has a significant bearing on their professional group. Once staff members’ individual characteristics have been factored in, a significant gap only remains for women with children. In summary, when considering the underlying causes of the gender wage gap, the two usual suspects are in play: parenthood and movements between professional groups (or promotions). In these times, marked by a sense of urgency to find solutions and answers, I believe central banks must spearhead efforts to analyse and address the major challenges facing society and the economy.
The aim of the CBRT’s road map is to improve the resiliency of the economy to external shocks through (i) maturity lengthening – encouraging banks to shift their non-core liabilities from short-term to long-term; (ii) providing incentives to banks for borrowing and lending directly from and to the Central Bank on times when foreign players are reluctant to engage with banks in Turkey due to heightened volatility in global markets; (iii) bolstering safety-nets – making sure that the banking sector has access to adequate foreign exchange liquidity in times of market stress; (iv) supporting financial stability – providing incentives to banks to improve loan to deposit ratios; and (v) simplifying the monetary policy framework to improve the communication of the monetary policy stance. All but the interest rate corridor simplification step on the roadmap have already been taken and the focus is now firmly on fine-tuning their parameters. Overall, these measures ease the policy tradeoffs posed by the excessive volatility in cross border flows, enabling the interest rate policy to concentrate on the primary objective of price stability. So far the financial market performance of Turkey suggests that the measures undertaken since August 2015 have helped Turkey outperform many peer EM countries. Of course, on the way, Turkey also enjoyed the benefits of lower oil prices relatively more than many EMEs and reduced political uncertainty after the general election result in November 2015.

Turkey, being an energy importing country benefited from lower oil prices in many dimensions. The current account deficit fell from $ billion in June 2014 to below $ billion in November 2015 in 12 month rolling terms. This sharp improvement in the current account balances is also greatly helped by prudent macro-economic polices including monetary, macro-prudential and fiscal policies. Tight monetary policy, well-targeted macroprudential measures and strong fiscal balances have all contributed to lower levels of domestic demand by stabilizing loan growth and reducing risk taking behavior. Going forward, the current levels in oil prices and depressed producer prices in most part of the world due to weak economic activity are expected to lead to further improvements in external balances. Therefore, it is highly likely that Turkey will record a current account deficit of below 4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product in 2016, representing a major achievement in satisfying the norm of the European Union’s Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. Unlike these positive developments in the economy, inflation increased and its outlook worsened in 2015 reflecting the pass-through from the TL depreciation, elevated food inflation, and markedly increased minimum wages. These factors together with some deterioration in inflation expectations led the MPC to revise its inflation forecasts for 2016 and 2017 up to 7.5 percent and 6 percent respectively and postpone the projected realization year of the 5% target to 2018. Going ahead, we see there are three potential developments which would improve the inflation outlook a great deal.
Retail payments  Allow me to turn to a closer examination of the state of the Norwegian payment system. First looking at the retail side of the payment system - where so-called customer payments dominate - there are two factors I would like to bring to the fore: one is the (continuing) sharp increase in electronic services and the other is the stable use of cash. 3 4 5  BIS: Bank for International Settlements. TARGET: Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer (system). NICS: Norwegian Interbank Clearing System. BIS Review 7/2000  4  3.1.1. Transition to electronic payment instruments  If we first look at electronic payment services, we see that the increase in the use of cards is what is most striking. Chart 3: Retail payment services (number of transactions) in 1990 and 1998  Retail payment services (no. of transactions) 1990  1998  444 million transactions  785 million tran sactions  22 %  12 %  25 %  25 % 63 % 53 %  Cards (both c redit a nd de bit card)  Electron ic giro services  Cheques an d other p aper-ba sed payment services  Source: Norges Bank, Annual Report on Payment Systems 1998  The use of payment cards in Norway now exceeds use in most other OECD countries6 and the rate of increase is higher than in many other countries with advanced payment systems - such as Finland and Denmark.

Considering that PC and Internet coverage in Norway is high, conditions should be favourable for developments in this area. In this connection, it will also be exciting to see how banks meet new demands for payment services related to increased trading over the Internet. Based on the above, I would conclude that efficiency in the Norwegian payment system has improved considerably in the 1990s. Factors behind these developments The transition to electronic payment instruments is obviously closely connected with the spread of information technology in Norway in the 1990s. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the correlation between new technology and an increase in efficiency is not automatic. Efficiency is the result of interaction between technology, institutions and users. The following three prerequisites must be in place for an efficient use of new technology: First, system participants must be able to make use of the new technology. Coordination of the Norwegian payment system has been an important factor behind the swift adoption of new electronic payment services by the industry. Second, it is imperative that customers gain quick and moderately BIS Review 7/2000  6  priced access to the new payment services, such as has been the case with the spread of EFTPOS terminals.7 And third - and perhaps most importantly - the payment system must encourage the use of (cost-) effective payment instruments. The public must face correct incentives if their payment habits are to be changed in the right direction.
José De Gregorio: Financial stability, monetary policy and central banking Introductory speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, to the 12th annual conference of the Central Bank of Chile “Financial stability, monetary policy and central banking”, Santiago, 6 November 2008. *  *  *  Welcome to this 12th Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, entitled Financial Stability, Monetary Policy and Central Banking, which will gather a select group of central bankers, experts and academics today and tomorrow. I cannot open this conference without sending my most heartfelt condolences to Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, our former director of Economic Research and creator of this series of conferences, and to all his family, on behalf of the Central Bank of Chile and myself, for the terrible loss of his beloved son Diego. To him we dedicate these two days' work. Like every year since 1997, we are looking forward to two days of intensive work with discussions of the highest technical level, which usually have opened areas for us to develop our research agenda with rigor and relevance, in an ever more complex world. This version of our Annual Conference finds us in the midst of severe global financial crisis. After the Asian crisis, many of us wondered about where the next blow would come from and what shape it would take. The academic literature has analyzed foreign exchange and financial crises in small, open economies.

First there were the first-generation fiscal and currency crises, which gave way to second-generation crises such as the one endured by the European monetary system in the early 1990s, and finally to third-generation ones occurring in Asia. All of them featured a variety of origins and transmission mechanisms. Now we are facing an international financial episode that many concur in labeling as the worst since the Great Depression, which originated in the developed economies, particularly the United States. Its initial symptoms are known: rapid financial innovation, credit expansion and asset price bubble. Its progression and repercussions, however, are unprecedented. On the other hand, our better understanding of the distortions that bad macroeconomic and financial policies can trigger, has made emerging economies in general, and Chile in particular, build a strong position to deal with a very weak international scenario. There is no better moment than this to get together and exchange our visions and opinions, and draw the first lessons from the events unfolding in the world economy. I want to begin with some comments on the present crisis. This episode has several unprecedented aspects stemming mainly from the complexity and sophistication of financial institutions and instruments, in a context of high financial and trade globalization. Of course, some elements have been observed before, such as the loss of confidence in key financial institutions by investors and the general public, and the uncertainty regarding its duration.
One important feature of the current globalisation wave is the integration of China, India and other emerging economies into the world trade system. This development has been strongest in China, whose share of world exports is growing rapidly. The countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have also increased their exports markedly since the early 1990s. India is at the starting-line. Many of these economies have large labour forces that offer their services at very low wages, and these labour resources are available to companies that compete on world markets. Low labour costs and more efficient transport and communication attract labour-intensive production. Production of goods and services is being transferred from high-cost countries to countries like Estonia, Latvia, Poland, China and India. This shift in the international division of labour is now influencing real wage growth in industrialised countries. The risk that a business will have to wind up operations or move abroad is dampening cost pressures, as bargaining power is being transferred from workers to employers. In a number of European countries, wage growth is also being influenced by increased labour inflows from the EU accession states. As Scandinavian consumers, we are benefiting from falling prices for many imported goods. Lower import prices are also ascribable to a shift in our imports towards a higher share of imports from lowcost countries. The change in clothing prices in Norway may serve as an illustration.

SPEECH DATE:  12/04/21  SPEAKER:  Deputy Governor Henry Ohlsson  VENUE:  LO  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  Hidden wealth* Expansionary monetary policy causes asset prices to rise and thereby makes those who own assets wealthier. But this wealth is unevenly distributed among households, and therefore the income from it (capital income) will also be unevenly distributed. Expansionary monetary policy can thus lead to more uneven capital income. At the same time, unemployment decreases when monetary policy is expansionary. This makes labour income more even than it otherwise would have been. As the effects on capital income and labour income counteract each other, it is unclear what effect the expansionary policy has on income distribution in total. But this does not stop higher asset prices leading to more uneven wealth distribution. In this speech, I will highlight a phenomenon that can mitigate this effect. I will start with an example that illustrates what I mean by hidden wealth. The Norwegian oil fund is one of the world’s largest funds. In 2019, the value of the fund was 285 per cent of Norway’s nominal GDP. Norway's revenue from oil operations are added to the fund and the assets are then invested abroad. The nominal return has been a good 6 per cent a year on average since the fund started in 1996. Every year, the Norwegian state may utilise the fund’s average real return.
The devaluation of the denar would cause additional distortions in our economy, because of the following: -  the structure of trade of the Macedonian economy characterises with high reliance of the export on the import of raw materials and manufacturing supplies, low representation of import goods that could be substituted with domestic products (machines and other equipment), weak price ellasticity of certain type of import demand (especially energy products), due to which the devaluation of the domestic currency will not reduce the problem of the structural trade deficit;  -  On the other hand, the negative implications, that can be seen through the transmission effects of the devaluation of domestic currency on prices, further psychological pressures and the opening up of a new cycle of expectations for an additional depreciation of the value of the currency, will certainly appear and they will represent a potential threat for the price stability;  -  Additional unfavorable element is the currency mismatch, i.e. the net indebtedness of domestic economy abroad, which clearly implies substantial negative effects from any possible depreciation of the domestic currency. Therefore, the reaction of the monetary policy, by increasing the interest rate, is directed towards stabilization of the foreign exchange market, further maintenance of the foreign reserves at adequate level and continuation of the policy of stable foreign exchange rate. Obviously, the succesfull maintenance of the external balance imposes the necessity of appropriate and well coordinated measures by all the carriers of the macroeconomic policies.

In this regard, the fiscal policy adjustments are important, also to obtain external financing to support the balance of payments. The NBRM, with the decision made today, for interest rate increase on the CB bills, is making an additional step towards reducing the external imbalance, and for achieving the interim and final objective of the monetary policy, remaining prepared to futher undertake additional measures, if necessary. V.  In the end, one more information. Today, the Council of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia held its 3rd session this year. Among other issues, on this session, the Council has adopted the 2008 Annual Report of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia; the 2008 Annual Report on Managing Foreign Reserves; the 2008 Internal Audit Report. All these documents shall be available on our web site in the following days. BIS Review 60/2009  5
The embarrassing summersaults that various governments had to perform by unceremoniously ditching some of their most sacred and fundamental policies, have also been better understood, by many communities. Now, what is needed is to move forward decisively within this new paradigm. To do so effectively, we have to essentially place some barriers to deal with unsustainable risk taking. The freedom of the wild ass that supported unfettered and reckless economic actions to create things out of nothing has to be dealt with. At the same time, we need to revisit some of the fallacies that developed over the last decade or so, including those that indirectly said: “Don’t worry too much about a few bubbles”; “markets are always right”, “innovation should not be discouraged”; “state intervention is dangerous”, etc. In a way, some of these positions perhaps prompted a kind of an unconscious regulatory anarchy! The resulting subdued regulatory reactions were of course exploited by the greedy market and the rest is history! This time round therefore, the wisdom of such concepts and absolute reliance on them, would need to be critically reviewed. What then should we do? Maybe, we could start by making a “Wish-list”, and then moving towards making a “To-do list” to realize such wishes. What could we wish for? First, perhaps we should wish for effective “immunization” mechanisms to safeguard national financial systems from the contagion effects of globalized viruses and cross border toxic elements.

Prices for domestically produced goods and services rose by 2.1 per cent in the twelve months to July this year. Higher capacity utilisation is providing the basis for higher margins in some industries. Service prices, which showed little rise last year, have increased again this year. In many industries, including the airline industry, where price competition is strong, low profitability has led to an increase in prices. High oil prices have also resulted in price increases, for example in the transport industry. On the basis of the pay increases agreed upon in this year’s wage settlement, combined with the estimates for wage drift and wage carry-over, annual wage growth is projected at around 3½ per cent this year. Lower-than-projected wage growth may be related to the fact that there were few signs of improvement in labour market conditions prior to this year’s wage settlement. Lower-than-projected consumer price inflation last year may also have contributed to restraining wage demands this year. Low wage growth will contribute to dampening the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. Information from Norges Bank’s regional network is important for Norges Bank’s analysis of the Norwegian economy. Information about the state of the Norwegian economy is available earlier than information provided by official statistics, and it is informative to have closer contact with the labour market and business and industry. The situation in Region North, as in the rest of the country, is favourable. In the May round of interviews, all sectors in the region reported continued growth.
The 4% cost is for a 1% rise in banks’ capital as a proportion of risk-weighted assets. 6  BIS Review 100/2010  raised the volatility of the return on that equity falls, and the safety of the debt rises, so that the required rate of return on both sources of funds falls. It does so in such a way that the weighted average cost of finance is unchanged 5. It is absolutely NOT self-evident that requiring banks to hold more capital has to substantially increase their costs and must mean that they need to charge substantially more on loans to service the providers of their funds. There are certainly reasons why the Modigliani Miller result is unlikely to hold exactly. The Modigliani-Miller theorem may not hold for banks because of asymmetric information problems in financial markets. But I will argue that one of the most obvious reasons why it does not hold (differential tax treatment of debt and equity) need not imply that there is a wider economic cost to be paid for higher capital requirements on banks. Indeed, recent research suggests that the Modigliani-Miller theorem might not be a bad approximation even for banks. Kashyap et al find that the long-run steady state impact on bank loan rates from increases in external equity finance is modest, in the range of 25–45 basis points for a ten percentage point increase in capital requirements 6. They also find that the costs of capital requirements are greater if they are phased in very quickly.

I want to briefly describe some ways of trying to calibrate the costs and benefits of higher capital requirements – which do not assume the MM theorem holds. The method I use follows that outlined in the recent Bank of England FSR 7. The methodology followed in the FSR seems to me very sensible. The idea is to calculate the impact of a given change in equity capital – that is an equity for debt swap – on a typical bank’s cost of funding. I assume, as in the FSR, the higher cost of bank funding is passed on in the form of a higher cost of bank loans. To assess what effect that has on the wider economy we then make an educated guess at the effect of a rise in the cost of bank loans on the overall required return on investment. That in turn will affect the stock of capital and economic activity. This impact on economic activity is the cost of higher capital requirements. The illustrative estimates in the FSR indicate that conservative assumptions about effects of higher bank capital on the costs of bank funding and lending generate a marginal cost of about 4% of annual GDP, in present value terms, for a 1% of risk-weighted assets rise in capital. The FSR notes that by relaxing these assumptions the cost may be lower, so that the estimates are probably an upper bound 8. The starting point for my calculations is the case presented in the FSR.