samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 86/2001  1  In connection with increasing signs in August of a more marked economic slowdown in the rest of the world as well as in Sweden, share prices started falling again. For the krona, which had appreciated in July, this was a negative factor in the same way as it had been during the spring. Early in the autumn the picture of an international economic slowdown became even more accentuated. A number of indicators pointed to a worsening of demand in the United States even before the terrorist attacks. The uncertainty stemming from the attacks was liable to subdue demand in the rest of the world even more. After the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks had cut their instrumental rates on 17 September, on the same day the Riksbank decided to lower the repo rate 0.5 percentage points. An increased risk was perceived of inflation two years ahead being below the target, mainly because business and household confidence in the future might weaken and lead to a slowdown that was deeper and more protracted. The terrorist attacks led to great uncertainty in the financial markets. From what I have now said it will be clear that in recent months monetary policy has taken its cue from declining economic activity. GDP growth has slackened from a level of 3 to 4 per cent in recent years to a rate of between 1 and 1.5 per cent. Meanwhile, since last year the krona has depreciated by around 15 per cent.

At the monetary policy meeting on 5 July, the risk of the inflation target being exceeded in the Riksbank’s normal time horizon of one to two years still existed. The situation was the same as when the interventions began except that the krona’s dramatic weakening had been checked. Resource utilisation was judged to be high, notwithstanding the ongoing slowdown, and there were no grounds for being more optimistic about the krona’s future path in a longer perspective. Moreover, although the substantial price increases in recent months were considered to be mainly transitory, there was a risk of them influencing inflation expectations. There were signs of slackening growth in the euro area and Japan but it was judged that towards the end of the year, developments in the United States would result in a gradual recovery that would spread to other countries. An overall assessment of these factors led to the Riksbank’s decision to raise the repo rate from 4 to 4.25 per cent. Inflation expectations, which according to some indicators had tended to move up in the spring, returned during the summer to a level in line with the inflation target. The exchange rate stabilised. At the monetary policy meeting on 23 August the Riksbank’s forecast was that the rate of inflation two years ahead would be approximately 2 per cent. Against this background the repo rate was left unchanged. It was considered that demand had continued to weaken, both in Sweden and internationally, which should reduce the risks associated with the weak exchange rate.
The ECB’s strategy review is very ambitious; not only does it analyse matters such as possibly adopting make-up strategies for past deviations of inflation from its target, but it also addresses additional topics such as the design and optimal use of the various monetary policy tools; the measurement of inflation; the interactions between monetary policy and macroprudential policy; the institution’s communication policy; and the impact of climate change, digitalisation and globalisation on monetary policy. All these facets and others covered by the strategic review may be relevant when delivering on our price stability mandate. 8  See, for example, Bernanke et al. (2019). See Box 2 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2020, Banco de España, for a description of this announcement and an assessment of its effects on financial markets. 9  10  Indeed, one of this review’s key topics will be the definition of the ECB’s price stability target. The current inflation target, aiming at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2%, may be reformulated. First, it may be necessary to clarify the specific level of inflation targeted, to make it easier for economic agents to understand. Second, making this target more symmetrical could also be possible, clarifying that the ECB would be as tolerant of overshooting as of undershooting.

Our supervisors and actuaries, supported by policy analysts and others across the Bank, are working hard to ensure that the UK industry meets these statutory deadlines and that we can provide you with all of the information you need in advance. The challenge of Solvency II for the industry should not be underestimated. As my colleagues will explain during the sessions today; there is a great deal of work to do, time is short and the responsibility for you to be ready lies squarely with each of your individual regulated firms. I am conscious that there have been claims or rumours in some quarters that the Bank is looking to take the opportunity of Solvency II to raise capital levels across the board. Let me assure you that there is no such intention on the Bank’s part; nor are we looking to subvert in any way what is legally a maximum-harmonising Directive. As always, we will be proportionate and pragmatic in our approach to implementation. I want to say definitively, and I am sure my colleagues will repeat this message throughout today:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  we are not “gold plating” the Directive and we are not front-running the requirements of Solvency II. What is different about the UK, compared with most of Europe, is that we have successfully operated a pillar two regime, with a strong modelling component, for the last nine years.
8  For its part, year-on-year growth in the prices of services and non-energy processed goods, which include processed food, stood at 4.3% in May. 3  of employment.9 Among the factors behind this worse relative performance of the Spanish economy is its specialisation in tourism.10 This sector has been among the hardest hit by the pandemic and, moreover, the recovery in inbound tourism has been slower in Spain. Indeed, the gap with the euro area has tended to narrow in the most recent period, given the improvement in activity in hospitality and leisure. However, there was still a significant gap in trade, transportation and hospitality; construction; and professional and administrative activities; as well as in industry, in part due to the importance of the automotive industry. Conversely, in the sectors that have led the recovery, such as financial activities and public administration, GVA has outstripped its pre-pandemic level in Spain more than in the euro area. From the standpoint of demand components, the difference visà-vis the rest of the euro area reflects the lower buoyancy of services exports,11 residential investment12 and private consumption.13 The role of economic policy in the pandemic crisis Economic policies worldwide have played a key role to mitigate the impact of the health crisis on the income and financial position of households, firms and financial institutions. The monetary, fiscal and prudential authorities have also taken complementary measures, adapting them flexibly to the health situation and the economic effects of the pandemic.

The stage has been set for the transition to SARON, and it is now up to market participants to use the time until the end of 2021 to complete the work that remains to be done. A successful transition from Libor to SARON is crucial for the smooth functioning of the Swiss franc money and capital markets. Importance of climate risks for the SNB’s investment policy  I would now like to say a few words about the importance of climate risks for the SNB’s investment policy. Let me start by summarising this policy. Our asset management is governed by the primacy of monetary policy. In applying its investment policy, the SNB has two main objectives. The first is to ensure that the balance sheet can be used for monetary policy purposes at any time. In particular, the SNB must be in a position to expand or shrink its balance sheet if needed. The second objective is to preserve the value of currency reserves in the long term. A high degree of asset liquidity and diversification is required to ensure sufficient room for manoeuvre in the implementation of monetary policy. As the SNB does not pursue any strategic or structural objectives with its investments, it seeks to achieve the broadest possible market coverage in managing its assets. So what do climate risks mean for the SNB’s investment policy?
This conference has been a success. This conference will also allow RMI to showcase its contribution. This year’s Annual Conference attracted over 300 local and regional participants, registering an increase in the industry’s participation over the previous year. I am optimistic that you can grow this conference into a premier event on risk management in the region and globally. Conclusion RMI’s growth would not be possible without strong support from the university. I appreciate the efforts of Prof Tan Chorh Chuan and Prof Tan Eng Chye in championing the growth of RMI. RMI’s new facilities is a visible commitment of this support. Equally, if not more important, is your support for cross-disciplinary research. Just as we remind financial institutions not to manage risks in silos, research efforts are more productive through interdisciplinary collaboration. By encouraging faculty members from different parts of the universities to work together, and with industry professionals, you do much to advance RMI’s leadership in financial risk management. I congratulate RMI on the opening of its new facilities and wish Prof Duan and your colleagues every success. I wish you a fruitful symposium. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 121/2009

The history of money originates long ago and its developments are closely related to the people that have produced it. Its role is not limited to the economic functions; it is also a historic evidence of the minting or issuing country. It speaks about periods of economic crisis or downturns, of peace and prosperity, of successes and injustices. In this context, we decided to dedicate the First Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania to two main topics, which we think are the gist of its exhibitions and educational activities. 1. Findings, researches and discussions in the area of monetary production and circulation, the history of the economy and banking activity in Albania and Albanian historic territories, which contribute to accurate interpretation and updating of information transmitted to the visitors 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  through Museum collections. 2. The educational role of central bank museums in getting to know the history of money, and banking activities and enhancing financial literacy through exhibitions, education and innovation. For this purpose, we aim, therefore, to bring together foreign central bank experts to share their perspective on the management of central bank museums, collections and educational activities. This conference certainly underlines the commitment of the Bank of Albania to earnestly engage in both research and educational activities. We are very interested in enhancing cooperation with researchers, academia, peer museums, and specialised institutions in economic, historic and cultural heritage research.
Despite a decline in interest rates and a modest increase in capital inflows in January 2001, the damage of the crisis in November 2000 on the banking system, especially on the state-owned banks, increased the vulnerability of the system. In this period, the maturities of the funds obtained from both international and domestic markets gradually got shorter. It was observed that, while external funds began intensifying in overnight transactions, also residents preferred short-term investment instruments. In particular, TL deposits of one-month started to increase and its share in the total deposits rose to 35 percent in February 2001 from 12 percent in October 2000. In February, the unfavorable developments that had occurred on the day before the Treasury auction caused a panic in the already fragile markets. Market confidence in the system was completely lost and the Turkish lira was once more faced with a new currency attack on 19 February 2000. The banking sector purchased US dollar 7.6 billion from the Central Bank, to be settled the next day. This exerted pressure over the exchange rates. In order to alleviate this pressure, the Central Bank did not roll over the repurchase agreements maturing next day and US dollar 6.1 billion that had been purchased the previous day were sold back to the Central Bank. However, the remaining amount of TL caused trouble to the payments system due to the state-owned banks’ daily liquidity needs.

When the banks’ foreign currency borrowing was not particularly great, this was not a significant problem. However, the growth in borrowing and our experiences from the crisis give us reason to think again. Today, it seems reasonable for the banks to carry the cost of the Riksbank’s foreign currency reserve, in as much as it is needed to meet their liquidity requirements in the event of a crisis. If they were to carry the cost of maintaining a liquidity buffer in the Riksbank, it is likely that the banks would find it profitable to cut back on the riskier areas of their dollar lending. In this case, the Riksbank would also reduce its foreign currency reserve, as the need for a buffer would have decreased. However, the banks should pay a charge to cover the costs of the remaining buffer. The extent to which the banks could imagine reducing the riskier areas of their foreign currency lending, the size of any charge, and how this could be repaid remain to be discussed by the Riksbank and the banks. The rough calculation I made earlier could form a starting point, but I make no claims for it to be any more than that. However, it is essential that this question receives an answer. The present situation is unacceptable in the long run. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11
These developments were foreseen by the Central Bank and, after a brief interlude, short-term interest rates began to be reduced again from September 2004.e. No apparent pressure of this kind is expected in 2005 either, provided that the tight monetary and fiscal policies continue to be implemented and the incomes policy follows a course in line with inflation. However, as I have just mentioned, the recent press release “March Inflation and Outlook” needs to be read carefully. Graph 3: Demand Deficit (Total Supply –Total Domestic Demand) 12,0  Excess Supply  10,0 8,0 6,0 4,0 (%)  2,0 0,0 -2,0 -4,0 -6,0 -8,0 2004Q1  2003Q1  2002Q1  2001Q1  2000Q1  1999Q1  1998Q1  1997Q1  1996Q1  1995Q1  1994Q1  1993Q1  1992Q1  1991Q1  1990Q1  1989Q1  1988Q1  -10,0  Source: SIS, CBRT. Although the period of chronic inflation has been left behind, a period of lasting price stability has not yet been entered. As I have occasionally emphasized in my speeches, we are still experiencing a period of “disinflation”. Having said that, the distance covered and the gains attained are significant. Throughout this whole process, inflation dynamics not only changed as a result of the policies implemented, but also the effect of disinflation itself. This, in turn, helped inflation to be pushed down in an irreversible way. Breaking inflation inertia is the first clearly noticeable achievement in terms of the changing dynamics of inflation.

This study being presented today is, therefore, a welcome opportunity to reflect on the progress since 2009. Financial institutions have a role to play in ensuring financial services and products are available at reasonable terms, including fair and practical know your customer (KYC) assessments, the use of alternative collateral and flexible lines of credit to mention, but a few. To enhance income-generating activities from survival level to strong and viable businesses, in particular for women led enterprises, access to credit, banking and financial services and facilities is essential to fully develop small scale to businesses. The firm, robust and sustainable growth can only be founded on strong and viable Small and Medium Enterprises hence the need to financially empower enterprises is cardinal through financial inclusion. This lack of access to finance by our entrepreneurs is a major concern for both, the Bank of Zambia and Government. Ladies and Gentlemen, Allow me to outline some of the measures the Bank has been putting in place to accelerate access to finance for all citizens generally, and in particular for women The Bank of Zambia is the lead implementer of the Financial Sector Development Plan on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Zambia. As you may be aware, the Zambian government formulated the FSDP as a comprehensive strategy for addressing challenges in the Zambian financial sector. Under the second phase of the FSDP, access to finance by the various strata of society, including access based on gender is identified as a key challenge to be addressed.
It became increasingly clear over the course of the year that further monetary policy stimulation was needed. Six months later, in autumn 2014, after rate cuts totalling 75 basis points, the situation became critical as a result of the halving of the oil price in USD. This further dampened the already low inflation, although lower energy prices also benefit demand. On top of this, there were clear signals that the ECB was preparing a powerful stimulation package that would come into operation in spring 2015. Measures taken to improve the prospects for our trading partners are of course also positive for the Swedish economy, but if the negative interest rate differential between Sweden and the rest of the world were to increase, it could contribute to a strengthening of the krona. This would make it even more difficult for us to attain the inflation target. At the beginning of 2015, the initial situation for the Riksbank was problematic. The risks of waiting to see what happened were assessed as greater than those connected to being proactive, as inflation had been low for a long time and inflation expectations were moving in 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the wrong direction. If monetary policy had not been made more expansionary, there was a risk that inflation expectations in the corporate and household sectors would fall further and I did not see this is a path to higher and more normal interest rates. The Executive Board was agreed that further stimulation was necessary.

As a small, open economy, Sweden must in principle accept the international real interest rate as a given. Monetary policy is not able to affect the real interest rate to any great extent in the longer run, but it affects inflation and inflation expectations. In recent years, the IMF and other forecasters have revised down their forecasts for GDP on several occasions. If one looks at real interest rates, these began to fall even before the financial crisis and real interest rates have also fallen during periods of higher growth. Opinions differ with regard to the causes of this slowdown. The more pessimistic line talk about secular stagnation, where savings have increased and willingness to invest has declined as a result, for instance, of the composition of the population, of growing income gaps and weak technological innovations. This has in turn pushed down the interest rate level compatible with normal resource utilisation. The other more optimistic line say that remaining effects from the global financial crisis, such as deleveraging and increased political uncertainty, explain the slowdown but that these effects are transitory. 1  1  See Deputy Governor Henry Ohlsson’s speech on 18 March 2016 “Decision today, consequences far into the future”, for a longer review. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Lower real interest rates and inflation But it is not merely real interest rates that have fallen. In recent years, inflation has also shown a downward trend.
The idea that there was more slack than headline measures of unemployment were suggesting was one that I put particular weight on when I started on the MPC last autumn – in other words that there was more room for the economy to grow without generating inflation above target in the medium term. That was one reason why I voted (in the minority) for no change at the November policy meeting. 14  During the MPC’s annual  supply stocktake in February we made a judgement to revise our estimate of the economy’s equilibrium unemployment rate from 4½% to 4¼%: in other words, a judgement that there was indeed some more slack in the labour market. That left me more comfortable with the balance of risks around the MPC’s central assumptions than I had been previously. At the same time, by the February Inflation Report, annual wage growth in the data had picked up materially relative to what we had been expecting at the November meeting. In November the most recent observation for whole economy regular pay had been of just 2.1% growth (in August). And we were forecasting it to only pick up very slightly over the next six months. But by the February Report it had picked up to 2.4% growth (in November) and we were forecasting a further pick-up to 2.8% over the next few months.

With the depth and diversity of experience represented on both the Board and staff of Financial Mediation Bureau, I am confident that the new Bureau will be well placed to discharge its responsibility in ensuring a fair and equitable resolution process for consumers. The creation of this Bureau represents an important milestone in the enhancement of the consumer protection infrastructure. Consumers are encouraged to make full use of the avenue available to seek resolution of the issues faced by them. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the previous Board of Directors of the Banking Mediation Bureau and Insurance Mediation Bureau for their contributions and dedication in giving selflessly of their time and experience in the operation of the bureaus. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions and support by the Association of Banks in Malaysia, Association of Finance Companies in Malaysia, Association of Merchant Banks in Malaysia, Life Insurance Association of Malaysia, Persatuan Insurans Am Malaysia, Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia, Malaysian Takaful Association, Association of Development Finance institutions of Malaysia, MBF Card Services (M) Sdn. Bhd., American Express and Diners Club (M) Sdn. Bhd. in making this bureau a reality. They have agreed to fund the operational costs of this bureau through levies on individual member companies in order that the services of the bureau can be provided free of charge to members of the public.