samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A reference value for the annual increase in the monetary aggregate has been set, currently amounting to 4.5 per cent. In general, however, the interest rate adjustments implemented by the ECB have not been justified on the basis of developments in the monetary aggregate. This has been clear on several occasions in recent years, when the refi rate has been lowered in spite of the fact that the rate of increase in the monetary aggregate clearly exceeded the reference value. The evaluation of the strategy in May also resulted in measures of the monetary aggregate being given a role primarily as indicators of future inflation. Naturally, the Riksbank also follows monetary aggregate and credit variables, even if we have not assigned them special significance when assessing inflation. Therefore, the formulation of policy nowadays is also quite similar in this respect as well. Finally, allow me to point out that despite the similarities in the formulation of policy, it can not be ruled out that price and wage increases in Sweden may sometimes be both too high and too low. The main reason is that the ECB’s policy is targeted at average price increases in the euro area as a whole. Partly as a result of this, there is reason to discuss both the role of fiscal policy and the functioning of the labour market in the event of an introduction of the euro in Sweden.

Lars Heikensten: The Riksbank and the euro Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Society of International Treasurers Convention, Stockholm, 17 June 2003. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and speak on the subject of EMU. Approximately three months remain until 14 September when the Swedish people will vote on whether to participate in monetary union. In the event of a “yes” vote, Sweden will enter monetary union in 2006 and introduce the euro as its currency. The right of determination over our interest rate level will then be transferred to the European Central Bank (the ECB). On the other hand, a “no” vote would generally imply “business as usual” for the Riksbank. Today, I will be speaking about some of the implications for the Riksbank and our operations in the event of a “yes” vote in the referendum. I will begin by speaking about the preparatory phase, that is, from 14 September until 1 January 2006, during which time preparations will be conducted in the Swedish economy for a changeover to the euro, and the krona will join the exchange rate mechanism, ERM2. Subsequently, I will talk on the issue of monetary policy as it will be conducted by the ECB and point to differences as well as similarities with how it is conducted today. Thereafter, I will touch upon the effects of a changeover on our work with financial stability.
Barrdear, J and Kumhof, M (2016), “The macroeconomics of central bank-issued digital currency”, Bank of England Working Paper, forthcoming. Bossone, B (2001), “Should banks be narrowed?”, IMF working paper no. 159. Buiter, W (2009), “Negative interest rates: when are they coming to a central bank near you?”, Financial Times article available at http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/negative-interestrates-when-are-they-coming-to-a-central-bank-near-you/#_ftn1 Carney, M (2013), “The UK at the heart of a renewed globalisation”, speech given at an event to celebrate the 125th anniversary of the Financial Times, London. Diamond, W (1984), “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 393–414. Diamond, W and Rajan, R (2001), “Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial fragility: A Theory of Banking”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 287–327. Goodhart, C (1988), “The evolution of central banks”, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass). Goodhart, C and Jensen, M (2015), “A Commentary on Patrizio Lainà’s “Proposals for Full-Reserve Banking: A Historical Survey from David Ricardo to Martin Wolf”, Economic Thought, Vol. 4.2, pg 20-31. Haldane, A (2015), “How low can you go?” speech given at the Portadown Chamber of Commerce, Northern Ireland. 18  8  Bank of England (2015); see, in particular, section 5 “Response to fundamental change”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Hills, S, Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2015), “Three Centuries of Data – Version 2.1”, Bank of England. Harris, M and Raviv, A (1990), “Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp.

To give another example, under the transposition of the second European Payment Services Directive (PSD2) in 2018, third-party payment service providers – which do not hold client funds – are subject to reduced annual reporting requirements. However, this proportionality does not mean being less demanding, especially with regard to the fight against money laundering. The general principle of “same activity, same rule” must apply. Indeed, it is in the Fintechs’ own interest that we should help them to apply the regulatory framework. We also want to help them when new rules are put in place. Under the PSD2 framework, the ACPR was the first European authority to grant authorisations for payment initiation and aggregation services. In total, it has authorised more than 20 actors to offer these new services since 2018. It has also worked to promote the development of open banking, by making sure that all actors can work together on the deployment of APIs. The eight workshops this afternoon, led by experts from nearly all of the ACPR’s directorates, are testament to the focus we place on teaching and informing. But if we can do even better, even more, tell us today. I shall finish by focusing on the ACPR-AMF Fintech Forum which is what brings us here today. Created in 2016, it is a forum for exchange which we try to make as efficient as possible by setting up, where needed, targeted working groups to make concrete progress on key topics.
I think the set-up in the UK, with both committees living in the same central bank, also allows for more formal co-ordination in the extreme cases when the need is clear. I’ve explained that the gains are larger the greater the scale of cross-policy spillovers. This is a relative point: what matters is whether A’s policy has a significant impact on B’s objectives compared with B’s own policy. In Chart 6, it’s the fact that the white bars are much bigger than the blue on the left-hand side, and conversely on the right, that weakens the case for co-ordination. But, conceivably at least, there could be instances when this isn’t the case – most obviously if 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  B comes to doubt the effectiveness of its main policy instrument. Suppose, for example, that inflation is much too low but the monetary policymaker believes the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates has reduced the room for further easing. Or maybe the macro-prudential authority is concerned that, in the midst of a boom, the financial system might be finding ways round its conventional tools, something that only higher interest rates could address. In these cases there would be clear gains from a more co-operative approach, in which the burden is more evenly shared. If only conditionally, this is exactly what was proposed in the MPC’s guidance about interest rates back in 2013.

There were manifest conflicts of interest, originators and brokers had limited interest in ensuring continued monitoring of products and credit ratings were inflated, conveying a false sense of security. A euphoric bubble thus developed, based, in Alan Greenspan’s words, on “the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy”, and which concealed a massive global under-pricing of risk. Market participants seem to have been aware of the growing risks but were unwilling to retrench. You might recall Citibank’s Chuck Prince’s memorable words during the onset of the crisis that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing”. Market players failed to appreciate the speed at which demand could evaporate and risk aversion could increase. This soon resulted in record-high risk premia, seized-up interbank markets, acute liquidity and credit shortages, bank failures and a widespread loss of confidence. Meanwhile the high degree of financial market integration had created the premise for a simultaneous build-up of systemic risk. Financial institutions did not internalise the costs arising from the too-big-to-fail and too-interconnected syndrome. Central banks had been monitoring these trends, but it turned out that the regulatory tools were not designed to address systemic risk. Neither was the strength of the feedback loop between the financial  BIS Review 67/2010  1  system and the economy fully anticipated. Unfortunately, these all proved to be critical weaknesses.
The Hong Kong SAR Government was facing a “double-play” by the predators – manipulation and profiteering in the money market and stock market through massive short-selling. It was a critical situation – not only were we confronted with a sharp fall in the stock market and great losses to shareholders, there were also systemic risks to our monetary system and financial markets. Classical economics does not differentiate between big and small markets and assumes that market prices will not be manipulated by just a few players. Reality, however, is different from theory. At that time, the market capitalisation of the Hong Kong stock market was only $ billion, a mere 3% of the New York stock exchange’s $ trillion. The predators were unable and hence did not choose to make their move on the big US markets, but were able to plunder Hong Kong’s mid-sized and open market with impunity. 5. However, on 14 August 1998, with the authorisation of the Hong Kong SAR Government and backed by the war chest of the Exchange Fund, the HKMA intervened in the stock and futures markets through market operation to counteract the double-play by international predators. When the market operation was completed by the end of August, the HKMA had used about $ billion to acquire a vast amount of Hong Kong stocks, propelling the HSI from the pre-operation level of 6,700 points to 7,800 points. 6.

In an inter-institutional level, the commitment to be active on AML goes beyond full compliance with the regulatory requirements. We must be mindful of the role we have in the mosaic of the institutions that are relevant on implementing the AML program in the society. Furthermore, we should be sensitive and helpful toward such institutions, especially when we know the difficulties they face in performing their functions. More concretely, I do not believe that the banking industry and other nonbank financial institutions, are giving their maximum contribution, if they suffice with fulfilling rigorously some quantitative mandatory requirements of the law, and not focusing also on some non-mandatory but very important requirements. For example, a very low number of suspicious transactions is currently reported at Anti Money Laundering Directorate (FIU), while the number of reports about transactions above the threshold required by law, is huge. In this instance banks are acting in accordance with the law requirements, but are not in compliance with spirit of the law.
William J McDonough: Risk management, supervision and the New Basel Accord Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at The Bond Market Association: 2003 Legal and Compliance Conference, New York City, 4 February 2003. *  *  *  Thank you, Paul, for your kind introduction. It’s a pleasure to be here today, especially since the important work that compliance and legal officers carry out in their own institutions complements very well the responsibility financial supervisors have to promote safety and soundness across the entire financial services sector. As legal and compliance professionals, the issue you are really addressing is how, and to what extent, your institution is managing risk. To outsiders, this process can appear, superficially, to be formulaic and rules-based. You and I know, however, that corporate governance depends on more than just a company’s compliance with rules. We are all learning that effective corporate governance emerges from the business culture that a company nurtures throughout all of its operations. In recent months, we’ve witnessed what happens when firms fail to develop the commitment to manage risks appropriately. Avoiding the corporate debacles of the recent past requires a clear and consistent message, as well as a transparent pattern of behavior, that must first emerge from the boardroom. It must then filter down to the executive offices, the front offices, and the back offices.

In the past year or so, I think we have made quite good progress in providing this peer perspective on risk management and controls. In such areas as corporate governance, economic capital estimation, and anti-money laundering, I think we have been able to be quite specific on how well a given banking organization measures up to evolving industry standards - including what needs to be done to move up to the top rung of performance. I also recognize that there is a tremendous demand for us to provide even more guidance in these dimensions. In the numerous feedback sessions we have had with individual institutions on the quality of our supervisory process, we have heard that message loud and clear. With the maturation of our organizational approach, I fully expect that we will register further improvements in this dimension. The New Accord’s emphasis on risk management processes This brings me to my second broad theme - how the New Basel Capital Accord supports further adjustments in risk management and supervisory approaches and how it fits with the current focus on corporate governance practices. Since many of you do not hail from banking organizations, I’ll take a moment to summarize the objectives the Basel Committee set for itself in re-writing the international rules on bank capital adequacy. The existing rules, which stem from the relatively simple 1988 Basel Accord, represented an important step in answering the age-old question of how much capital is enough for banks to weather economic downturns.
How much risk a company should take in its core business and in the provision of pensions is obviously a matter for its board. A famous paper in corporate finance 5 finds that, subject to some (admittedly fairly strong) assumptions about tax etc, the market value of a company (measured as the sum of the value of all its financial liabilities, equity and debt) should not depend on its capital structure. Rather, its capital structure affects the risk to equity holders, and so the headline return they should rationally require to compensate for risk. Within this framework, defined-benefit pension schemes can be viewed as deferred compensation and so as entailing a form of indebtedness (in many cases, de facto indexed-linked borrowing) for their sponsors, to be ‘serviced’ alongside their more conventional external indebtedness. Perhaps that has become most obvious when a fund is calculated as being in deficit. It would seem that in recent years there has been a keener awareness of this way of thinking analytically about pension obligations. If there has been an ‘awakening’, maybe it was triggered by a combination of the volatility of the value of equities held by funds, especially when they fell sharply a few years ago; the volatility of the discounted value of their liabilities as long-maturity real rates fell; regulatory requirements governing the closure of deficits; and fluctuations in the net value of funds having for the first time to be reflected in firms’ capital in their financial accounts.

Several years ago, Rich Lyons, Dean at Berkeley’s Haas School of Business, spoke at the San Francisco Fed and talked about culture in a way that has stuck with me ever since. Transforming a culture is a five- to ten-year project; keeping it that way is an ongoing mission that requires strong leadership and consistent action. As a leader of a large organization, I’ve taken that message to heart. I’ve found that a culture based on the principle of open and authentic dialogue, that embraces our diverse backgrounds and perspectives delivers better results. I’ve found that well-defined collective values and direction lead to greater collaboration and innovation. Finally, I’ve found that this work is never a finished project, but an ongoing one that constantly evolves. I started by saying that I feel a sense of urgency in addressing banking culture. So where do I see the priorities for supervision? As supervisors, we need to ensure that bank management and boards are exerting strong and effective leadership with robust governance. That means holding management and boards of directors to high standards in terms of culture and conduct, even when the numbers look rosy. It means ensuring corporate values are clearly articulated and incentives are squarely align with a bank’s strategic goals. It means identifying, communicating, and mitigating risks in a timely and 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  effective manner. It means that employees feel empowered to raise their hands if they see wrongdoing, and that comprehensive fixes are implemented when something goes wrong.
At the Riksbank we are working continuously on, for instance, improving our analyses and forecasting methods to provide the best possible basis for making decisions. Our decision to publish inflation forecasts based on market expectations in the March Inflation Report was an example of this. One can assume that the Ministry of Finance conducts equivalent development work. I believe that an even deeper discussion of what is entailed in the considerations made between inflation targeting and the real economy can be a good thing. During the first years of inflation targeting, the Riksbank sometimes sounded like an “inflation nutter”. However, this stance was abandoned after a few years and since then we have communicated that we also take into consideration financial and real factors. A decision by the Executive Board of the Riksbank in 1999 clarifies our views on these issues. However, we can probably become even better at analysing and explaining the considerations we have to make when conducting a flexible inflation-targeting policy. The Executive Board has held several speeches on this theme over the past year and the aim is to publish some form of joint document on this subject in the near future. BIS Review 39/2005  3  With regard to fiscal policy, it has a stimulating effect on the economy primarily through what are known as the automatic stabilisers, i.e. through systems for taxes and expenditure, which are very extensive in Sweden, being designed to allow some “automatic” adjustment to cyclical developments.

Were, for instance, an asymmetric shock to create unemployment in one region, adjustment could take place through labour moving to another region and/or a change in wages. Furthermore, cooperation over time increases integration between countries. Although the business cycles in countries contemplating forming a union are perhaps not perfectly correlated at the outset, they will likely become more so over time as a result of increased economic integration; the so-called endogeneity hypothesis of the optimum currency area criteria. 3 In turn, this will mean increased efficiency of the common monetary policy. In general, better functioning markets imply greater economic efficiency. In this specific case, the better the markets for capital and labour function, the greater the scope for handling asymmetric shocks. However, simply waiting for optimality might be likened to waiting for Godot; i.e. in vain. Thus, a possible aspect of the issue of optimality is that focusing solely on the illusive goal will obscure the rewards coming from trying to get there. Or as the Swedish poet Karin Boye has put it, “Yes, there is goal and meaning in our path - but it's the way that is the labour's worth.” 4 So, from an economic point of view it boils down to two important questions. First, is the country willing to pay an insurance premium consisting of a slightly less efficient economy, to retain the possibility of pursuing an autonomous stabilisation policy if an asymmetric shock were to hit the country?
Analyzing the countries, only 5 countries of them, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Latvia and Estonia, managed to reduce the debt in the 2015/2013 period. These countries, with the exception of Hungary are less vulnerable when it comes to the government debt as they belong to the so called "lower indebted countries". On the other side, the debt rise in the latest period additionally inflated already high levels of debt and deepened the vulnerable positions of some of the countries in the region (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania). Chart 11: Fiscal indicators, developments in different periods of time Budget Balance, in % of GDP MKD ALB CRO BUL SRB BIH SLO CZR EST HUN LAT LIT POL ROM  40  Debt change, in p.p of GDP  35 30  4  25  2  20  0  15 10  -2  5  -4  0  -6  -5  -10  -8  100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30  MKD ALB CRO BUL SRB BIH SLO CZR EST HUN LAT LIT POL ROM -10 Average 2002-2007  Average 2008-2012  Average 2013-2015  Debt change 2013/2009  Debt change 2015/2013  Debt level 2015 (left scale)  Source: WEO October 2016, database. The analysis of the long-term rates on government debt reveals that after the peak of the crisis in 2009, the interest rates on government borrowing in the region have been declining.

Following their pre-university programmes, Imran aspires to be a Mechanical Engineer, Hajar is keen to read Chemistry while both Ying Xin and Nur Shazlin aspire to be Doctors. I am confident that all of you will do your best and will contribute for the future of the nation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In addition to the Kijang Emas Scholarship award, every year the Bank also awards scholarships to 50 high achieving SPM students for them to pursue their undergraduate studies abroad with the objective of them being part of the Bank’s future talent pool. The Bank has put in place a structured, holistic and collaborative Scholar’s Development Programme to support all of our scholars throughout their studies. The programme aims to develop high-quality and well-rounded scholars with leadership qualities as the next generation of young talent who will be the leaders of tomorrow for the Bank and our nation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches