samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To be more concrete, let us take the example of Open Banking. The regulatory framework set out by the second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) has lifted the technical and legal barriers to accessing payment account data. The immediate consequence has been the development of a new ecosystem offering consumers a wealth of new services. However, we have also imposed high data protection requirements at the European level, in particular in the rules governing access to this information. Second principle: in order not to be mere spectators of change or react to it too late, we must fully take on the prospective observation, experimentation, and operational commitment. In the area of payments, the recent BigTech initiatives with a global impact have once again brought the current inefficiency of cross border payment solutions to the forefront. However, the issues of financial stability, monetary policy and sovereignty raised by these projects should encourage us to operationalise our efforts to promote more efficient payment systems where appropriate by considering an operational involvement of central banks, based on the consistent and coordinated use of new technologies. As regards infrastructures, we have taken an interest in blockchain technology since its early stages. We were the first central bank to develop, regarding the specific use of SEPA creditor credentials, a decentralised register system based on a blockchain protocol, the “MADRE” register. Of course, this is only a first step, which does not exhaust an extremely vast and diversified field of experimentation.

The idea is to mobilise all employees, in order to bring out the innovations that are most suited to our missions and then have them implemented by “intrapreneurs", who are bestowed with great autonomy, comparable to that of start uppers, for the development of their project. Our first intrapreneurship programme will enable us, I hope, to benefit within 9 months to a year from artificial intelligence tools to conduct our supervisory missions. All of these initiatives are as vital as they are exciting. They are the DNA of our institutions, and I am convinced, the reflection of that of the French and European ecosystem. Thank you for your attention. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Among these, particularly financial dollarization, which can be described as the combination of asset and liability dollarization, has gained ground in recent years in many emerging countries, including Turkey. I can cite the following factors, which I am going to examine under the two main groups, as influential on dollarization: namely the macroeconomic instability and the market imperfections. In the context of macroeconomic instability, inflation is the most important issue to be considered: dollarization is a rational response of economic agents to inflation uncertainty that reduces the confidence in domestic currency. In this regard, dollarization is technically explained through the higher expected volatility of inflation-relative to that of real exchange rate by the portfolio approach. 1  De Nicolo, G.; Honohan, P.; Ize, A. (2003); “Dollarization of the Banking System: Good or Bad?”; IMF Working Paper; WP/03/146. BIS Review 124/2006  1  Also, the issue of high and fragile public debt structure along with high budget deficits has considerable impact on dollarization. In the case of “time inconsistency”, when governments create inflation in order to decrease the real burden of the debt, the risk premium of the debt denominated in domestic currency tends to rises. In essence, this pushes governments to borrow in foreign currencies, and hence gives rise to dollarization.

On August 9, 2007, the large French bank BNP Paribas announced that it had suspended activity in three of its funds so it could more precisely assess their value. The problem was stated as follows: “The complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the U.S. securitization market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality or credit rating.”  1  I would like to thank my colleagues Meg McConnell, Jamie McAndrews and Brian Peters for numerous useful comments and suggestions on these remarks. BIS Review 81/2010  1  Central banks immediately responded to the evaporation of liquidity in the standard manner. For example, the Federal Reserve issued a statement on August 10 indicating it was providing liquidity for the orderly functioning of markets, and in that statement the Federal Reserve emphasized that “As always, the discount window is available as a source of funding.” One week later it reinforced this statement with a 50 basis point cut in the discount rate and the addition of 30-day term loan to complement the standard overnight discount window loan. At that time, the discount windows of Federal Reserve Banks were only open to depository institutions. Standard monetary economic theory and previous experience were consistent with the notion that depository institutions could act as intermediaries to pass liquidity through to the rest of the financial system. Indeed, in many earlier episodes the mere fact that this backstop liquidity was present had been sufficient to calm financial markets.
Out of this was born price stability defined as low single-digit inflation, usually derived from the consumer price index (CPI inflation). 1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In an inspirational group of economists here at the Faculty, we paid limited attention to the fresh trends in American academia and central banks at the time, and mainly discussed various historical views of money and monetary policy. After all, we weren't experiencing any great moderation around us at that time. In particular, the second half of the 1990s was quite wild in the macroeconomic and financial sense in the Czech Republic and many other small open economies. The Great Moderation phenomenon manifested itself here later as a "temporary calm before the storm" between 2003 and 2007. Then the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) came and put a definitive end to the idea of a Great Moderation. The Global Financial Crisis was no great surprise to me and my colleagues at the CNB. This is evidenced by the fact that in 2004 we were one of the first central banks in the Western world to set up a team for analysing risks to financial stability. The pitfalls of mainstream macroeconomics Just after the GFC, a heated debate erupted about the merits of mainstream macroeconomics. By that we mean the NKM presented in DSGE models. I will thus refer to it as NK-DSGE throughout my lecture, although today this term covers a wider range of approaches than it did 10 or 15 years ago.

Following the Asian financial crisis, efforts have focused on five main areas, namely, to enhance the effectiveness of regional economic and financial surveillance, to improve the arrangements for regional crisis management that is reinforced by regional support mechanisms, to develop the regional financial infrastructure including the bond market and the payments and settlement system, to strengthen regional financial stability, and finally, to pursue capacity  BIS Review 74/2010  3  building collaboratively, so as to enhance the effectiveness of the Central Banks in the region. The priority for Asia going forward is to accelerate regional financial integration. To ensure this takes place in an environment of regional stability, strengthening cooperation is also aimed at managing the risks and vulnerabilities of the region. In 2006, the East Asian Central Banks have established a monetary and financial stability committee as a forum to discuss the risks to regional macroeconomic and financial stability. In addition, the ASEAN+3, a subset of this group, has already taken concrete steps to multilateralise the Chiang Mai Initiative into a more advanced and robust framework for the effective pooling and utilisation of liquidity support in the region. While the Asian region is highly diverse, in these key areas of cooperation and collaboration, the Asian region has demonstrated its cohesiveness in coming together to deal with the challenges that the new environment presents to us. Conclusion Let me now conclude. The world has changed and will continue to change.
Carney, Mark (2018), From protectionism to prosperity, speech given at the Northern Powerhouse Business Summit, Gateshead, 5 July. Carstens, Agustín (2018), Global market structures and the high price of protectionism, speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 42nd Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25 August. Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer (1999), Does trade cause growth?, American Economic Review, 89 (3), pp. 379–399. International Monetary Fund (2006), World Economic Outlook, April. International Monetary Fund (July 2018), G-20 Surveillance Note, G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meetings, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 21/22 July. International Monetary Fund (October 2018), World Economic Outlook, October. OECD (2016), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2016, Issue 2. Ricardo, David (1817), On the principles of political economy and taxation, London: John Murray. Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner (1995), Economic reform and the process of global integration, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995 (1), pp. 1–118. World Trade Organization (2017), World Trade Report.

Free trade also has its losers. People working in industries that are structurally weak face the risk of losing their jobs if opening up the market means domestic providers are pushed out by more efficient competitors from abroad. The same applies to companies operating in such sectors and their owners, as they can also suffer heavy losses in this scenario. Anyone who sees free trade as a threat to their livelihood is naturally going to reject it, irrespective of the fact that they stand to gain as a consumer and their country as a whole will benefit. While there is now scarcely any debate as to whether free trade leads to greater prosperity overall, the criticism is instead increasingly centred on inequality in the distribution of these prosperity gains. In phases of rapidly advancing globalisation, the distributional effects are particularly pronounced and apparent. For instance, China’s integration in world trade and its subsequent elevation to the leading trading nation is likely to have markedly accelerated the pace of structural change in some countries, negatively impacting on specific industries and sections of the population. 3 However, the rise of certain companies and sectors, and the decline or even disappearance of others, cannot be put down to international trade alone. The impact of technological progress in driving structural change is at least as strong. 4 Free trade thus often finds itself cast in the role of scapegoat for what is in any case a perpetual process.
Given the current crisis in public services, their necessary modernisation and mobilisation are not incompatible with performance and management; and spending on the future - from education to investment - has a better multiplier effect on long-term growth. Page 2 sur 15 Ladies and gentlemen, dear teachers and students, I am very happy to be with you again today, in this very important place of teaching and knowledge. I had the honour of speaking here in January 2020, on the then much disputed question of low interest rates. Two months later, the Covid crisis erupted, which not only rebuilt the consensus on these low rates, but also called into question all our forecasts and many of our common points of reference. Since then, we have been living under the continuous pressure of an emergency situation, in a permanent present that masks our structural challenges. I understand and share the suffering. But one day, we will overcome for once and for all this Covid ordeal: this is both an obvious wish for this new year, and a necessity. It is time for us to talk at last about the fundamental choices for Europe and for our country, and to do so, we must take a longer-term view. ** I. A perspective that must go beyond the short term  As regards the short-term economic situation, I will therefore just make three remarks: a) The French economy is currently proving resilient to Omicron and to the fifth Covid wave.

Each of our monthly surveys confirms this, including that of the beginning of January: GDP has returned to its pre-Covid level since last August, earlier than expected and earlier than our European neighbours; the fifth health wave should not prevent significant growth in 2022, i.e. 3.6% in our forecast. The French economy should therefore return to its previous growth pathi by 2023 and Covid should leave few scars on the French economic fabric. Overall, the Covid crisis has been well managed economically by the public authorities. These very successes justify firmly resisting today a return to "whatever it takes": entrepreneurs are not meant to be subsidised for life. Page 3 sur 15 b) Due to this recovery in particular, companies are undoubtedly experiencing supply difficulties. They have little impact on the volume of activity (excluding the automotive sector), but push up prices, including those of manufactured goods. At 3.4% year-on-year at the end of 2021 (2.1% excluding energy and food), inflation in France is at its highest level since September 2008. This "hump" is bigger and longer than expected, but it should remain temporary: inflation in France should gradually decrease throughout the year, falling back below 2% by the end of 2022. This is a high-quality forecast; it is obviously not a dead certainty. We are keeping a very close watch on the economic data. Should inflation prove to be more persistent, rest assured that we will be willing and able to adjust our monetary policy more quickly, to ensure a return to our 2% objective.
In this way, the intended shifting of funds toward lending in the country may be conducted even by those banks that have a lower capital adequacy ratio. These measures are not administrative. The decision to conduct funds shifting to private sector credit in the country will be decided by the bank itself. As in any other case, the bank should balance all the factors affecting risk, costs and benefits from such a shift. The implementation of the above measures requires amending the existing regulatory framework, which will be temporarily applicable (ad hoc). After that, banks should gradually return to complying with the existing regulatory framework, as regards the methodology for calculating capital requirement. In this way, we preserve, at any time, the necessary stimulus in banks to lend prudentially. Focusing on the need to address non-performing loans, we deem that it represents a concern both for the banking industry and the Bank of Albania, not so much for the stability of the system, as for the costs that this phenomenon brings to banking activity, consumers and related services. Also, public authorities may take measures in this regard. I take this opportunity to iterate the need for settlement of public sector’s liabilities to private entities. This would positively contribute to settling a part of liabilities that these companies, or connected ones, have to the banking sector, hence mitigating the level of non-performing loans.

Instead, the industry must continuously evolve to meet the needs and preferences of its consumers which are rapidly changing. It must proactively and strategically position itself to offer products via diverse and innovative delivery channels to reach out to different segments of the population with varying levels of financial knowledge. In this regard, under the LIFE Framework, the Bank envisions the market share of regular premiums/ contribution products sold/ marketed via non-agency channels to exceed 30%. Currently the ratio is 14%, and this statistic provides compelling evidence that the industry must double its effort to reach the target of 30%. Similarly, for us to expand the penetration rate to reach 75% by 2020, the industry must add and expand the reach of its non-agency channels. Throughout the world today, financial inclusion has been identified as an important area of focus to achieve a more balanced and sustainable economic growth. Societies that are adequately empowered and supported by suitable financial tools can assist in helping them cope during temporary period of emergencies. Empirical evidence showed that microinsurance customers can be as valuable as a company’s any other customers. This is where the industry can play a major role to develop suitable microinsurance/ takaful products that would enhance the social safety net of this underserved segment enabling them to get back on their feet and become financially independent even after experiencing an adverse event. Yet many in the industry appears uninterested in microinsurance/ takaful for reason that it is a loss making venture and uneconomical to pursue.
Therefore, our macroeconomic forecasting and monetary policy analysis models prescribe an important role to the exchange rate. Furthermore, in financially euroized economies, such as ours, exchange rate movements tend to have financial stability implications. Rapid depreciation increase NPLs, while prolonged periods of appreciation tend to impose financial risks and encourage further euroization. In designing the appropriate monetary policy response, we have to distinguish between trend movements driven by fundamentals, and short term volatility driven by sporadic factors or market imperfections. Inflation targeting central banks should strive to avoid leaning against trend movements in the exchange rate. As long as these movements are in line with fundamentals, these trends represent structural adjustments that do not move the economy away from equilibrium. On the other hand, short term exchange rate volatility is normal in a fully flexible exchange rate regime. The reaction of central banks should depend on their impact on inflation, which in itself depends on the intensity and duration of such volatility. The stronger the duration and the higher the intensity of the shocks, the bigger would be the expected impact on inflation, the greater the risk of rapid shifts in inflation expectations, and the higher the need for a systematic reaction of monetary policy. 3. Exchange rate movements and the Bank of Albania reaction to them  The above mentioned facts have guided our reaction to the recent appreciation of the exchange rate in Albania. The trend appreciation started around the second half of 2015, but it gathered considerable pace in 2018.

I am confident CIFF would embed a culture that places unequivocal commitment to professionalism and ethics that would raise the prestige of the Islamic finance industry and its practitioners. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Conclusion This year is the 20th anniversary of the Asian Financial Crisis and close to the 10th anniversary 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  of the Global Financial Crisis. Anniversaries such as these are opportunities to pause, reflect and ponder on the past, present and future. There are many lessons to be learnt from recent episodes, and let us not repeat them. For if we do, only misery and hardship await us. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

The next steps will be determined more by the newest indicators of economic developments and prospects than they have been in the recent past. At its next meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee will probably assess whether and how the Icesave referendum results and the newly published capital account liberalisation strategy will affect monetary policy in the near future. The strategy divides liberalisation into two main phases, with Phase I dedicated to unwinding offshore króna positions by allowing owners to exit through auctions or by investing in the Icelandic economy. Only when these measures have generated acceptable results can controls on residents’ capital outflows be lifted. If conditions are right, the latter phase could proceed relatively quickly, but if not, it will be executed more gradually. It is difficult to say how long Phase I will take, as its duration will depend on a number of uncertainties, such as access to foreign credit markets. But it is important for near-term monetary policy that Phase I be designed to minimise potential negative effects on the exchange rate and the foreign exchange reserves, at least at first. It is only in Phase II that the interest rate differential with other countries begins to assume much greater importance as regards exchange rate developments. In the recent past, monetary policy has been an element in the larger economic policy formulated by the Icelandic authorities in co-operation with the International Monetary Fund. The key features of that policy have been exchange rate stability, fiscal sustainability, and financial system reconstruction.
This includes adopting the European Commission’s risk reduction package which, among other things, implements some of the remaining Basel III reforms and further strengthens prudential rules in the banking sector. At the same time, we need to establish a European deposit insurance scheme and a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. Ambitious progress towards a fully fledged capital markets union would also create more effective channels of private risk sharing in the euro area and reduce the need for fiscal stabilisation. The Five Presidents’ Report3 also emphasises the need to strengthen our union from an economic, fiscal and legitimacy perspective. And in a world tempted by protectionism and ring-fencing, completing Economic and Monetary Union is perhaps more urgent than ever before. Conclusion Allow me to conclude. The euro area has certainly faced its fair share of challenges in recent years. But things are clearly improving. In the euro area, the economic recovery has evolved from being fragile and uneven into a firming, broad-based upswing. The ECB’s monetary policy measures have been supporting this recovery. We have established four criteria to confirm a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with our definition of price stability in the medium term that would warrant a scalingback of the current degree of monetary policy accommodation.

For example, haircuts policy might be circumvented by banks substituting towards unsecured finance. So any quantitative calibration of the effects of a haircut-based policy rule is necessarily tentative. Nonetheless, the model simulations are suggestive – and, at least qualitatively, encouraging. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Chart 1: Aggregate haircuts and probability of a systemic liquidity crisis 1  Probability of a systemic liquidity crisis  0.9 Baseline  0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3  Weak  0.2 Tough  0.1 0 25  20  15  10  5  0  Initial aggregate haircut (h) Baseline 'Weak' haircut-dependent liquidity requirement 'Tough' haircut-dependent liquidity requirement  Source: Gai, Haldane and Kapadia (2011). This financial network set-up can be used to assess a number of other topical policy issues. These include:   Central clearing: Central clearing of financial transactions tackles the complexity of, and concentration within, the financial system at source. The dense knitting of the financial web is unravelled and replaced with a simple hub-and-spokes topology. This will tend to reduce the liquidity hoarding incentives of investors, so making for more resilient funding markets in the event problems strike. Provided the central clearing house is beyond reproach, this topology also reduces the contagious consequences of individual bank stress: liquidity cascades are headed-off at the clearing house. The proviso is important, though. Robustness of the central clearing basket becomes more important as more eggs are placed in it.