samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Since summer 2005, the key policy rate has gradually been raised again to a more normal level in order to prevent inflation from becoming too high. As mentioned, external interest rates are again moving down and the interest rate differential against other countries has widened recently. This may lead to a stronger krone, but there are also opposing forces in the foreign exchange market. In the long run, the krone exchange rate is determined by changes in the terms of trade and permanent differences between domestic and external inflation and productivity. But the krone exchange rate also shows monthly and yearly fluctuations. The krone was strong towards the end of the previous cyclical expansion, but depreciated when interest rates declined in 2003. Thereafter, the krone appreciated again as growth in the Norwegian economy recovered. Over the past two years, the krone has appreciated by close to 5 per cent. Inflation has nevertheless picked up and is now fairly close to 2½ per cent. 3  3  Norges Bank uses different measures of underlying inflation. In January, the twelve-month rise in the CPI-ATE was 1.9 per cent, a weighted median showed a rise of 2.4 per cent and a trimmed mean 2.9 per cent. The twelve-month rise in the CPI was 3.7 per cent following a sharp increase in energy prices. 4  BIS Review 18/2008  The sizeable basic balance deficit may result in a renewed depreciation of the krone.

It has been easy to find employment. Norwegian owners and shareholders have also fared very well. Although the share of value added accruing to wage earners has decreased since the beginning of the 1990s, real wage growth has been high. On average, today’s wage earners earn real wages that are 50 per cent higher than in 1990. This corresponds to annual growth of over 2 per cent. At the same time, employment has risen. Business and labour market conditions have been unusually favourable in recent years. Should export prices fall, productivity growth slacken and foreign workers return to their home country, the wage share and unemployment will increase and business sector profits will fall. Even in the absence of these developments, low unemployment and high profits may be difficult to sustain. Developments will depend on how far businesses – in their search for qualified labour – will bid up wages. The economic policy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s set the stage for invention and innovation and the development of a market for equity capital and loans in Norway. This has resulted in restructuring in the business sector, increased productivity, real wage growth and a high level of job creation, but also very high earnings for successful businesspeople and entrepreneurs. We will probably have to learn to live with our entrepreneurs and capital owners, and they must live with the society that has provided them with favourable business conditions. In Norway, there is a relatively even distribution of income, as illustrated in the chart.
Can one be sure that confidence in the inflation target will not weaken if the interest rate is lowered still more? Perhaps demand can be stimulated deliberately. Timing these matters is still not easy and there is a large risk of cyclical tendencies being reinforced instead of the opposite. But few of us would be prepared to relinquish the 3 possibility entirely. Current challenges So what does this imply in relation to the present situation in Sweden? How should we handle the combination of clearly slowing activity, persistently large uncertainty as to the direction in which we are travelling, an exchange rate that at present is unprecedentedly weak and inflation above the Riksbank’s target? First let me repeat that the initial position is relatively favourable, even though the strong upswing in recent years would have been an appropriate time to press forward with the work of improving our economy’s long-term growth potential. Just a few years ago, not many people would have believed, for instance, that our public debt would fall below the EU average. The remarkably high growth has contributed to this but so has a relatively tight stance based on clear principles for budget policy. Given a downturn of the magnitude most people now foresee, there is a risk of the budget surplus slipping to less than 2 per cent. That need not be dramatic, however. What matters is that the 2 per cent target is met over the business cycle.

Let me therefore underscore that the move was taken just because we were concerned that the confidence we had established in the commitment to low inflation would be eroded when inflation rose rapidly and unexpectedly, clearly exceeding our target, at the same time as the exchange rate weakened dramatically. In many respects this development was confined to Sweden. When we lowered the interest rate in September, the situation was different. It is true that the krona was still weak and inflation above the target, but the terrorist attacks in the United States threatened to almost paralyse an entire world and subdue activity even more. Looking ahead, there are no grounds for ruling anything out. The repo rate depends as usual on our assessment of inflation one to two years ahead. The current assessment is being made against the background, for example, of international economic activity that threatens to be weaker than we foresaw in the Inflation Report in May. By itself, this points to a more favourable picture of inflation. On the other hand there is, for instance, the weak exchange rate. For a time, moreover, inflation has been higher than we counted on. To some extent this has to do with more transitory price increases for certain goods. But even when these are excluded, inflation has continued to creep up. The ultimate conclusion from our assessment is something to which we will be returning in connection with the publication of the year’s third Inflation Report on 16 October.
With backing from the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve established the commercial paper funding facility as a funding vehicle that can purchase new issuance of commercial paper from highly rated businesses and municipalities, and certain issuers that were downgraded after the virus shock. By providing assurances to issuers and investors that retiring commercial paper can be replaced with new issuance, the facility will promote confidence in the market and support the flow of credit to businesses and municipalities. Corporate Credit Facilities (CCFs) At the same time that short-term commercial paper markets were nearly frozen, so too were markets for longer-term corporate borrowing – at precisely the moment when companies most needed a financing buffer. Borrowing rates for investment-grade corporate issuers relative to Treasury securities increased by about 2.5 percentage points in the first half of March, while issuance for companies rated below investment grade came to a halt. In this context, the primary market corporate credit facility (PMCCF) was designed to provide funding for highly rated companies that need access to financing in order to maintain business operations during this period of dislocation. Again with backing from the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve will create a funding vehicle to backstop eligible corporate borrowers for up to four years, at an interest rate that is better aligned with corporates’ underlying credit risk than was available through market-based financing during March.

-  After this first contact, and once the Fintechs had started the actual  authorisation or registration process, the average time taken to ensure their applications were complete and decide on their legal classification was in line with the Charter – two to three weeks depending on the legal status – although  Page 3 of 5 for a third of cases it took longer; this was notably due to the sharp rise in applications (up 20% on last year). -  Once an application had been submitted, the deadline for examining it  was met in 84% of cases, with the average time standing at 12 days – less than the average of 17 days it took for applicants to respond! We are therefore well on the way to meeting the ambitious target deadlines set out in the Fintech Charter. This allows us to respond to the first criticism levelled against us: the lack of visibility over the application procedure and the amount of time they take. We shall continue our efforts to ensure we gradually get closer to our target deadlines, and not just in average terms (we have already met it this year), but for all individual cases. II. In France and Europe, we need to keep pace with the digital transformations under way Our attention is focused in particular on another aspect of the digital evolution: crypto-assets.
There is sometimes a tendency by the authorities to try to solve all problems by more regulation. It is  BIS Review 104/2006  5  true that we could regulate away all the risks in the banking sector – but such regulation would hamper economic development. There must be a balance. Thus for each regulation we introduce we must also conduct a fair analysis of its costs, also non-financial, as well as its benefits, also non-financial. I agree that this is not easy, partly since in most cases you will not find any clearly measurable indicators, but the process of conducting the cost/benefit analysis will in itself help you in your decision. Supervision Good regulation is closely linked to good supervision. Supervisors must be able to build their work on a broad and relevant regulatory framework. Supervisors must also possess the necessary powers and other prerequisites to conduct efficient work. There are at least four important aspects: First, the supervisory authority must have operational independence from industry as well as from politicians. These must not interfere in the operational decisions of the supervisors, e.g. to take remedial measures or to close banks. Such decisions must be taken on purely prudential grounds. Of course, the supervisors are still responsible for their actions and could be criticized afterwards, e.g. in Parliament hearings, but they must be able to perform their operational duties independently. Also the bank, its owners and management should be able to sue the supervisors for malpractice and they may receive compensatory payments.

The public authorities must compensate for these weaknesses by implementing additional rules. For instance, the supervisors may need to require stricter rules for provisioning against loan losses, or to set a higher minimum level for bank capital. An important function of the banking system is to facilitate payments between various agents in society. This is based on the fact that bank accounts provide the basis for all payments except cash payments. Most payments are executed through the payments system infrastructure, such as the systems for large value payments, cheque clearing, securities settlement systems, stock markets, other exchanges and so on. These systems must be efficient and they must also be secure. If not, there is a risk that problems in one part of the financial system will spread to other parts, including to the banks. Many countries have neglected the need for an adequate financial safety net. The safety net includes limited but explicit depositor protection which has to be supported by the necessary legislation, institutions and procedures to conduct an orderly management, resolution or winding-up of problem banks. When bank weaknesses are identified in a country lacking a proper safety net, various problems may occur. The authorities will be reluctant to take adequate and timely remedial action since there are no clear guidelines and since they are afraid of the consequences from non-protected depositors and from other counterparts to the banks.
During this period no one is to be compelled to use euro, though this will be encouraged. Kronor and euro will both have the status of legal tender, so we must be prepared to handle them both during this period. But the discussion of this question should continue. Responsibility for information The retail trade report considers that society must be responsible for information about the new currency system. At the same time the Ministry of Interior and others consider that information at points of sale, for example, is primarily a business responsibility. This makes me somewhat uneasy. I believe we must all be prepared to accept an additional responsibility for information about these matters. Otherwise there is a risk of people feeling they are getting insufficient guidance, with an increased risk of the changeover being arduous for everyone. At the Riksbank we will try to do our bit. Brochures about the new means of payments will be distributed, possibly accompanied by ready-reckoners for the conversion rates. Our Payment System Department is working on this. Price information Retailers will be obliged to work for a period with some form of double pricing. The practical arrangements for this are mainly a matter for the retail trade and consumer interests. Rounding In Sweden we have grown used to having the total sum rounded to the nearest 50 öre.

Mr. Ingves discusses retail trade, EMU and the Euro with respect to Sweden Text of a speech by Mr. Stefan Ingves, a Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, held on 14/4/97. First a word of thanks for the invitation to speak about EMU. Less than twelve months have passed since the Riksbank last attended a meeting of the Swedish Retail Federation with information about EMU. Perhaps some of you were present on that occasion. Whereas the issue of EMU was still fairly new a year ago and not much discussed by most people, the situation today is different. In the interval we have experienced a marked increase both in what people know about EMU and in their interest in the matter. This naturally has to do with the rapid approach of the starting date. Today the move to Stage Three lies fewer than 500 working days ahead. Moreover, there is no mistaking the strength of the political determination in Europe to start on time. This was evident not least at the recent Ecofin meeting in the Netherlands when the EU finance ministers agreed on several important matters such as the stability and growth pact and ERM2. Today I shall be outlining the process leading up to Stage Three of EMU and the changes that we already know will occur. I will also say something about EMU's consequences for retail trade. Before considering practical aspects of EMU, permit me to begin with a look at some general economic features.
I also believe that it may be difficult to raise the target in a situation where inflation undershoots the target significantly, particularly if the central bank has cut the policy rate to the “near zero lower bound”, that is, the level at which may countries are now. Here there is rather a risk that the increase will be perceived as a more or less desperate and in the worst case not particularly credible measure to obtain a little additional help getting out of a difficult situation. Apart from the best time to change the inflation target being in a relatively normal situation, I would also think it would be easier if several central banks did it at the same time. 16  For a definition of secular stagnation and a summary of empirical evidence and policy implications, see Rawdanowicz et al (2014). 17  See, for example, Krugman (2014). 18  See, for example, Hamilton et al (2015) and Rogoff (2015), who say that the world is in the adjustment phase of an unusually large debt cycle, a “debt supercycle”. See also the debate between Bernanke (2015) and Summers (2015). 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Financial crisis has affected the central banks’ analysis and working methods I have given some examples of questions that will probably continue to be argued in the international discussion of how inflation-targeting may need to be adapted and modified.

Yet in 2015, fewer than 5% of French companies and 6% of individuals had some form of cyber-insurance.3 Insurers can and should take inspiration from their own experiences in tackling cyber-risk, and use it to develop a more mature 1  Sources: Fédération Bancaire Française; Observatoire 2016 de l’image des banques, published by BVA and based on a survey conducted in May 2016, and Observatoire 2015. 2 Source: European Commission’s Digital Economy and Society Index. 3 Source: Le marché de la cyber-assurance : la révolution commence maintenant, PwC, January 2016. 3  French and European cyber-insurance offering. Second subject: data and big data, with the spread of connected objects that is triggering an exponential rise in the amount of data available on insurance policyholders. Naturally this represents an opportunity: the traditional business of insurance consists precisely in collecting and exploiting data in order to quantify and put a price on risk. Nonetheless, I would urge insurers to take a responsible approach: we need to strike the right balance between segmentation and the sharing of risk between policyholders – the basic principles of solidarity and risk-pooling that are intrinsic to insurance are at stake. And we must not lose sight of our collective values regarding individuals’ right to privacy. 3. What are the challenges for the French and European economy? Let me just remind you of two basic economic facts: there can be no lasting growth without a rise in productivity; and there can be no productivity without innovation and its diffusion.
The government and the Storting approved additional spending, bringing the overall contribution from fiscal policy to more than NOK 100 billion in these two years. Hardly any other country provided such strong overall stimulus through the use of public instruments during the crisis. The guidelines from 2001 provide a clear long-term framework for monetary policy and fiscal policy and provide for cyclical adjustments in economic policy – in part automatically and in part through judgement. In this way, the guidelines reconcile the need for a flexible approach to macroeconomic management with the gains brought by a commitment to more long-term operational objectives. A decade of inflation targeting Inflation is so low today that most people barely give it a thought. The rate of increase in consumer prices has disappeared from the front pages, where it was a frequent guest in the 1980s. We do not miss inflation. Even though inflation over the past decade has been close to the target of 2.5 per cent, demanding trade-offs have had to be made over the years. The element of judgment in the conduct of monetary policy has been put to the test. Through the years, we have gained insight into the functioning of the Norwegian economy under an inflation targeting regime. Let me touch upon some of those insights. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 9: Krone exchange rate, inflation and Norges Bank key policy rate.

16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  16  Charts Chart 1: The social loss associated with different monetary policy rules under different calibrations of lambda  Source: Bank calculations  Chart 2: The relative performance of level-based and difference-based rules under different relative importance of persistent vs temporary shocks  Source: Bank calculations 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  17  Chart 3: Impact of a persistent risk premium shock that is misjudged to be temporary  Source: Bank calculation  Chart 4: Impact of simultaneous persistent and temporary risk premium shocks (relative weight 2.3 times)  Source: Bank calculations 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  18  Annex: Model specification This model is based on a variant of a model developed by Harrison, Seneca and Waldron. It consists of 5 basic equations. IS curve: 𝑦̃𝑡 = 𝐴𝑦̃𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝔼𝑡 𝑦̃𝑡+1 − 𝐶(𝑖𝑡 − 𝔼𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑡∗ ) Phillips curve: ∗ 𝜋𝑡 = 𝐷𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝔼𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝐺[𝐻(𝑦̃𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡∗ ) + 𝐽(𝑦̃𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑡−1 ) − 𝐾𝑧𝑡 ] + 𝑢𝑡  Potential output 𝑦𝑡∗ : ∗ 𝑦𝑡∗ = 𝐿𝑧𝑡 + 𝑀𝑦𝑡−1  Natural rate 𝑟𝑡∗ : ∗ ∗ 𝑟𝑡∗ = 𝑁𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑄𝑦𝑡∗ + 𝑆𝔼𝑡 𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝜈𝑡  where all capital letters denote functions of underlying parameters, 𝑦̃𝑡 is the output gap, and the risk premium 𝜈𝑡 , the cost-push disturbance 𝑢𝑡 and productivity 𝑧𝑡 follow exogenous autoregressive processes.
The economic theory clearly refers to the fact that the financial system is a relevant factor for economic growth, and the new message, clearly sent by the recent crisis, as the president of the Bundesbank, Weidmann, once said in one of his recent addresses,1 is that there is a need of “well designed regulatory reform”. Otherwise, a financial system which is developed and widely globalized today could become an obstacle for the economic growth. Thus, even though the crisis is still present in our everyday life, the financial institutions have already been facing new banking standards, and the national regulators seek to incorporate them in the national regulation. The debt crisis in the euro area resulted in establishment of new fiscal framework of the European Union and emphasized the need of fiscal consolidation. Fiscal imbalances are not sustainable on a long run, which is a postulate that also applies to the countries of the region, particularly countries where fiscal consolidation is crucial for maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium. Besides the experiences above, during the crisis we also gained many other experiences related to the market sensitivity, the promptness of market response to the changes arising from the development of crisis, and the slow reversible process of regain of confidence among market participants. Lessons and experiences learnt from the crisis should help us face future challenges more successfully. 1  Jens Weidmann, president of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Keynote speech at the Frankfurt Finance Summit, Frankfurt, March 2012.

On this occasion, I will briefly present my opinion on how the region has dealt with the crisis and the lessons learnt, leaving more time for panel discussion and for the presentations of the prominent representatives of international institutions and central banks in the region. How has the region been dealing with the crisis so far? In the recent five years of global economic crisis, generally we distinguish two subperiods. The first wave of crisis broke out in the US economy in the second half of 2007 and was primarily marked by the mortgage credit crisis and the collapse of large investment banks, destabilizing the international financial markets and deteriorating the expectations of economic entities. The second wave of crisis hit Europe in mid-2010 and was recognized as euro area debt crisis, causing new financial market disturbances, lower confidence among market participants, higher costs for financing and need of recapitalization of the banking sector. Apparently, the second wave of crisis broke out in the vicinity of our region. Yet, that the countries from the region get over this period relatively unwounded. One of the potential explanations is the fact that unlike the period of first wave of crisis, the countries from the region faced the second wave of crisis with fewer imbalances in their economies, i.e. better prepared to adjust to the external environment. Facing the outbreak of crisis in the euro area was relatively painless. Yet, it does not mean that the risks have passed.