samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I should like to thank the members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for the very fruitful exchange of views, both in the context of my presentation of the ECB's Annual Report and on other occasions. This Committee has indeed played an important role in bringing the euro closer to the citizens of Europe. BIS Review 26/2002  3

Section 7 of the Banking Ordinance goes on to say, among other things, that our functions include the following aspects that have a distinct “ethical” flavour: •  taking reasonable steps to ensure that authorised institutions operate in a “responsible, honest and business-like manner”;  •  promoting and encouraging “proper standards of conduct and sound and prudent business practices” ;  •  suppressing “illegal, dishonourable or improper practices”. These specific functions can be related to our general function of promoting the stability of the banking sector. Clearly, if banks are involved in illegal or improper activities (such as fraud or money laundering) this may threaten the reputation not only of the bank concerned but also of the banking system as a whole. This in turn may lead to a loss of public confidence in the banks. I believe however that our functions also imply a broader interest in the concept of “fairness” in the provision of banking services. This is not to say that the HKMA should act as a “consumer watchdog” in investigating and adjudicating on disputes between banks and their customers on matters such as the cost or quality of banking services. But at the same time we should not be indifferent to how banks treat their customers in general. If banks consistently provide a bad or unfair service, this may damage the reputation of the banks and destroy customer loyalty and confidence.
It is assumed in the really negative scenario of the Financial Stability Report that developments in the Baltic countries and the rest of eastern Europe will be much weaker, although that is far from the only reason behind the poor development. Here, too, approximately 40 per cent of the loan losses are expected to come from operations in these regions. In this scenario all of the banks meet the statutory requirement of Tier 1 capital adequacy of at least four per cent. However, it may be necessary to have higher capital adequacy to avoid negative consequences such as funding problems and downgraded credit ratings. In the unlikely event that this very negative scenario were to occur, several banks might therefore be forced to act to strengthen their capital bases. If this could not be achieved solely through private capital injections, there is a possibility for the government to inject capital by virtue of the Government Support to Credit Institutions Act of last autumn. The Riksbank’s assessment is that we, together with other Swedish authorities, are also well prepared to be able to manage the problems that could arise if the situation were to deteriorate to the level of the stress test described in the Financial Stability Report. Let me just clarify that the Financial Stability Report’s test of the financial system’s resilience cannot be compared with the alternative scenarios of a “more probable” nature that are usually presented in the Monetary Policy Reports.

But there are grounds to continue to suspect that labour supply may be behaving differently to the past, to be cautious about moving to tighten monetary policy on the basis of falling unemployment alone and to wait for clearer signs of strength in pay growth. Even after adjusting for one off effects, pay growth is currently still some 2 percentage points below the pace consistent with achieving the inflation target in the medium term. That weakness in pay might go some way in explaining why inflation has been undershooting the MPC’s predictions of late. The instinct to be cautious about tightening monetary policy too early is further reinforced by the constraints that come with Bank Rate remaining close to its effective lower bound. We’ve now seen evidence of a slowing in UK growth, and prospects for the global economy have deteriorated. With the scope for tightening monetary policy substantial, but the scope for loosening it much more limited, the risk of a surprising pick-up in inflationary pressure may be more manageable than the risk of the expansion stalling and inflation dropping further. The latter risk, of course, has and will continue to become less acute the longer the expansion continues. But it remains, for me at least, a concern. Uncertainty remains, old puzzles are unresolved and new ones appear. That is the normal world of the forward looking monetary policy maker.
Strong and Simple Speech given by Sam Woods, Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer, Prudential Regulation Authority  Mansion House, London Thursday 12 November 2020  I am very grateful to Thomas Papavranoussis, Hannah Schraer, and the Strong and Simple team for their help in preparing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction  I am reliably informed that following my last Mansion House speech the chair of one of our banks was so enraged that I had spent ten minutes talking about credit unions that they nearly choked on their beef fillet. This, arguably, did not advance the PRA’s objective of safety and soundness. So it’s a very good thing that this year the Lord Mayor has introduced new safety measures by removing all food from this event. You will, however, still need a strong dose of caffeine in order to make it to the end of my speech. I’m also delighted to join the Lord Mayor in welcoming Nikhil to this event. Nikhil and I have known each other for a long time. I’m sure he will be a great leader of the FCA and I’m confident that with him at the helm the two regulators will continue to work well together. Now, coming back to those credit unions – the reason for the chair’s anger was that I announced that we would bring in a radical simplification of capital requirements for credit unions, but didn’t announce anything on banks.

Ida Wolden Bache: The policy rate has been raised to bring down inflation Introductory statement by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the press conference following Norway's announcement of the policy rate, Oslo, 4 May 2023. ***  Accompanying charts to the speech Chart 1: Policy rate raised by 0.25 percentage point Norges Bank's Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee decided to raise the policy rate by 0.25 percentage point to 3.25 percent. Norges Bank's task is to keep inflation low and stable. The operational target is inflation of close to 2 percent over time. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability. Chart 2: Inflation is too high Inflation is now markedly above the target. In March, consumer prices were 6.5 percent higher than one year earlier. High energy prices are a key driver of inflation, but other goods and services prices have also risen rapidly. Price stability is crucial for maintaining a well-functioning economy. The policy rate is being set with the aim of bringing inflation back to the target of 2 percent. At the same time, we want to avoid a slowdown in economic growth beyond what is necessary to tackle inflation. We have not yet seen the full effects of our past rate hikes. Our March forecasts indicated a policy rate increase to around 3.5 percent this summer.
Developments abroad fed through to the Norwegian economy, translating into a shortfall in funding for banks, weaker demand for our export goods and heightened uncertainty surrounding economic developments. The Norwegian authorities responded to the slowdown in activity with active measures, and the key policy rate was reduced in steps to 1.25 per cent to mitigate the fallout on the Norwegian economy. Fiscal and monetary policy have been effective and the situation in some sectors of the Norwegian economy is improving. The financial industry has been exposed to a liquidity crisis, but the Norwegian banking system did not experience a solvency crisis and Norway escaped a real economic crisis. House prices and equity prices are again on the rise, output moved up in the second quarter and unemployment has been markedly lower through summer than we had expected. There are still risks ahead. Many of our trading partners are struggling with large and mounting public debt and underlying external imbalances. This may give rise to new disturbances that may also influence our economy. 2. Crisis management  The financial market turbulence started in August 2007 after banks started to suffer subprime losses in the US market. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, risk premiums surged in funding markets and equity prices plunged – particularly financials. Today we can observe that the element of surprise at how closely financial markets are interwoven amplified the crisis.

Monetary policy steers inflation in the medium and long term and can in addition contribute to smoothing fluctuations in output and employment. Inflation targeting has served us particularly well in the lead-up to the crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis. After some years of very low inflation earlier this decade, the interest rate was set at a low level with a view to holding up inflation expectations. That was an important contribution. Before the crisis, when it was appropriate to tighten the stance again, the interest rate hikes were effective. Inflation targeting made it possible for us to cut interest  4  BIS Review 119/2009  rates markedly in autumn 2008. Thanks to well anchored inflation expectations, the real interest rate rapidly declined to a low very level. Under the former fixed exchange rate regime, the key policy rate would have been highest when the degree of uncertainty was highest and demand for small currencies such as the Norwegian krone was lowest. Inflation targeting has enabled monetary policy to curb substantially the downturn in the economy. The crisis may show that the real economy of countries with solid state finances, such as Norway, is less severely affected. The OECD notes that financial markets in countries with high public debt may react sharply so that market interest rates rise when fiscal policy is used to stimulate the economy during a crisis. 4 This may reduce the effect of an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.
For example, hybrid working arrangements have become the norm, while the gig workforce has risen sharply in prominence. As a nation, our aspiration to become a high-value economy would necessitate Malaysia to reduce its reliance on a low-cost, labour-intensive economic model- one that discourages productivity enhancements, depresses wages, and perpetuates the creation of low-skilled jobs. This would require two critical factors: First, is the economy and firms that create high skilled jobs. In Bank Negara Malaysia’s recent publication, it is argued that for this to happen, we need to have a conducive ecosystem to attract high quality investments that will contribute towards increasing our economic complexity and thus generate high-value, high-paying jobs. Second, we must also be in a position to provide sufficient number of skilled workers and talents to meet the need of the industries and the economy. In line with our focus today on learning and development, let me spend a bit of time on the second factor, that is on talent development. Joseph E. Stiglitz, the Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences once said, “Development is about transforming lives of people, not just transforming economies”. To thrive in the new economy, policy strategies must tilt towards understanding the ‘future of work’ and future proofing the workforce. The World Economic Forum reports that by 2030 wide-scale investments in upskilling can boost global GDP by USD 6.5 trillion and lead to the net creation of 5.3 million new jobs globally.

Mr. Patrikis discusses global electronic commerce Speech by the First Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. Ernest T. Patrikis, at the 1998 International ACH Conference in Seattle on 9/3/98. I am very pleased to be here today to discuss global electronic commerce. At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, we have a tradition of embracing emerging technologies as a means of fostering the growth of commerce. As early as 1914 the Federal Reserve System was using the telegraph to wire funds across the nation. By 1918, the Federal Reserve Banks had introduced their first dedicated funds transfer network. Today, over 350,000 funds transfers are sent over Fedwire every day with a total value of more than $ trillion. So, electronic commerce itself is not new. What is new is the emerging global network environment and its electronic access capabilities. The promise of this global network has brought electronic commerce to the forefront of public-policy making. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and other international organizations have expressed their belief that “the exponential growth and diffusion of the Internet is quickly making the promise of widespread electronic commerce a reality.
Nevertheless, it is true that there has been substantial capital inflow into the Mainland, leading to a very rapid accumulation of foreign reserves. The Mainland authorities are well aware of the risks of this, in terms, for example, of an asset price bubble that could be quite destabilising to the financial system when it burst. They have, in fact, made quite intense efforts to deal with the inflow through a number of strategies. Under the Mainland's present exchange rate system, the accumulation of foreign reserves is matched by an increase in the renminbi monetary base, which needs to be sterilised if the undesirable consequences of credit expansion are to be contained. The People's Bank of China has been carrying out sterilisation quite actively both through the recently introduced programme of issuing central bank bills and through reducing lending to government and financial institutions. There is scope for securitisation of these loans to produce more financial instruments for money market operations. Another tool available to the authorities is to change the reserve requirement for banks, and indeed this requirement was raised in August from six per cent to seven per cent. Further options include making changes to interest rates to discourage further capital inflow (though obviously this may have undesirable effects on the asset markets) and opening up relief valves in the capital account.

There is also an undertaking that any changes to the content of the letter, and any changes to the delegations, shall be made public. These commitments provide important safeguards of the independence of the HKMA in its day-to-day operations. I should add here that there has never in the past been any instance of the Financial Secretary's overriding or bypassing the Monetary Authority in the exercise of these delegated powers. So we would not expect to see disclosures of this kind very often. Nor would we expect to see frequent changes to the content of the letter or the form of the delegations, for an important part of operational independence is that it should be stable and predictable, and not something that is tinkered with at whim. The Exchange of Letters will, I believe, provide a clear basis for the HKMA to continue to carry out its work with a high level of autonomy in the years to come. Conclusion These will, naturally, be years of challenge for Hong Kong: there have been very few times in Hong Kong when this was not the case. The HKMA, as Hong Kong's central banking institution, has its part to play in helping Hong Kong meet the challenges. It also has its own special challenges. The main challenges in central banking are to maintain a monetary and banking environment that is optimal for stable and sustainable economic growth, and, particularly in the case of present-day Hong Kong, an environment that is conducive to resolving our current problems.
New instruments and techniques for spreading risks probably lead to a general reduction in the risk of serious financial crises. All in all, there are many indications that the real economy effects of the severe stock market fall will be limited. However, at the same time, it is not possible to write off the risk of financial imbalances having accumulated that could create problems in the future. It is possible that the asymmetry in monetary policy, which I have earlier mentioned, where the central banks act rapidly in response to a decline in asset prices, but have been more cautious when asset prices have risen, has contributed to this. 6  BIS Review 43/2002

In parallel, reintermediation by non-banks raises level-playing field questions linked with uneven regulation and supervision across sectors and countries. To discuss these important issues, we are extremely fortunate to gather an exceptional panel today, with: •  Mrs Sheila Bair, Chair of the Systemic Risk Council, former chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), who is obviously a prominent regulator. Dear Sheila, your work to build a more robust financial system, that serves the economy, is particularly impressive and your views on how to make it even more resilient are very sharp;  •  We also have Mrs Barbara Novick, Vice-chair of Blackrock and the author of impactful articles on asset management and public policy; as well as Mr Alain Papiasse, Deputy Chief Operating Officer (COO) at BNP Paribas, representing the group in North America. Barbara and Alain are two top market practitioners with a comprehensive experience in both asset management and investment banking. So, dear Barbara, dear Alain, I hope you will provide us with “insider” and complementary visions of what it really means to finance the economy. •  And finally let me introduce Mr Thomas Philippon, a distinguished academic from NYU, notably specialized in the evolution of the financial industry. Dear Thomas, your research on the financialization of the economy will provide a unique viewpoint by putting in perspective the links that exist between the financial industry and the economy. Thank you all for being with us today. Let me now give the floor to our panelists.
But this advantage diminished since the global financial crisis. Firms may consider moving up the value chain to differentiate products and enhance value. There are two possibilities that exist in Thailand depending on the industry. The industries that are behind need to catch up with the ongoing trend, and industries that have the opportunity, can leap ahead of the trend. In either case, Research and development investment is needed. To address the issues just mentioned, Thailand’s financial sector, which includes my esteemed guests for today and the Bank of Thailand, must set clear directions for our roles. To deal with the structural challenges, the private sectors need support from the financial sectors. They will require long term and low cost funding, from both domestic and international sources. Ladies and gentlemen, your operation of financial institutions with both caution and long term vision has so far contributed to financial stability in Thailand. We would like you to continue placing value in the long term, and providing liquidity for established customers who will definitely return to growth after Thailand’s rebound. Such support creates long term value for your international investors and helps both your future returns, and to usher the economy through the slump. For the Bank of Thailand’s part, we continue improving financial system strength and efficiency.

This means that there are fewer safeguards for non-banks, and risks can grow largely unchecked. With this in mind, let me highlight four areas where I see a need for further regulatory efforts in the nonbank financial sector. First, we need to reduce the risks of mismatch between funds’ asset liquidity and their redemption policies. Funds need to ensure that their redemption policies are closely aligned with the liquidity of their portfolio assets. For instance, funds that invest in illiquid assets, such as real estate or private debt, should have commensurate redemption notice periods to mitigate liquidity risk. At the same time, funds that offer daily redemptions should be required to invest in sufficiently liquid assets and maintain high liquidity management standards to enable them to meet redemption requests under both normal and stressed market conditions. This should be complemented by enhancing the availability and use of anti-dilution liquidity management tools to pass on the costs of redemptions to redeeming investors. Moreover, higher liquidity buffers would be useful to manage increased liquidity needs during periods of market stress, including from margin calls. Second, we must renew our efforts to reform the MMF sector in the EU. After the market turmoil in March 2020, proposals to enhance the resilience of the MMF sector were developed at the international and European level. These focused on removing regulatory threshold effects, strengthening MMF liquidity requirements, and improving the availability and usability of liquidity management tools. [10] In the EU, however, reforms of the MMF Regulation have not progressed to date.