samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to the Global Competition Index, Turkey became one of the countries that increased its competitive power at the most in 2006 and drawing ahead by 12 rows, ranked 59 within 125 countries 1 . Maintenance of this growth and establishment of a sustainable growth process are indispensable requirements for an increase in social wealth, which is the final objective of all economic policies. Therefore, today everyone should focus on the things to be done for the sustainability of the growth process in our economy rather than the daily market transactions. When successful country samples regarding growth and development processes are considered, we see that there are certain phases in the growth process. These phases are growth based on factor accumulation; increase in efficiency; research and development activities and innovations respectively. Turkey is currently going through a process of growth based on increase in efficiency. However, ensuring the permanency of growth in the medium and long-term necessitates focusing on the research and development activities besides increases in efficiency and going through a process of growth based on innovations. Dear Guests, It is obligatory for the private sector to establish medium and long-term strategies rather than shortterm ones, in order to last long within the domestic and foreign competition environment that is gradually becoming more challenging owing to both the changing domestic dynamics and the increasing openness.

The BoA has progressed in reforming the banking system towards international standards, with the aim of the developing and refining the country’s banking infrastructure. AIPS, inaugurated in early March 2004, can be considered as the backbone of the whole banking system infrastructure. The BoA wishes to bring its central bank closer to that of the European Central Bank. Therefore, changes and amendments of the Bank’s regulations are aimed towards achieving this goal. BIS Review 49/2004  1
Other surveys of economists and market participants of longer-run inflation expectations, such as the Blue Chip survey and the New York Desk surveys, yield similar results. 6 Another form of relevant sensitivity analysis is the response of interest rate to economic shocks or news. As discussed in Swanson and Williams (2014), responses of yields to  news can be distorted when short-term interest rates are at or near the effective lower abound. 7 Armantier et al. (February 2022). 8 There is a literature that aims to extract inflation expectations from breakeven inflation rates; see Breach et al (2022) and references therein. These measures of inflation  expectations tend to be even more stable than breakeven inflation rates, including during the current episode. 9 As discussed in Mertens and Williams (2021). 10By Mankiw, Reis, Wolfers (2003) and ReisTerms (2022). continuing to and use our site, you agree to our of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. 11 Note that the five-year-ahead survey was conducted in July 2021, November 2021, and monthly starting in January 2022. The dashed lines in Figures 2 and 3 indicate  periods when this survey question was not asked. 12 Armantier et al (May 2022, October 2022). 13 The University Michigan survey of inflation over the next 5-10 years also shows a rise in deflation expectations this year. 14 A similar pattern is seen in aggregate uncertainty for one-year-ahead inflation expectations. 15 Armantier et al. (October 2022). 16 Armantier et al.

In this period, there were a total of ten devaluations or "technical adjustments" that entailed devaluation, often with the aim of bringing costs back under control. The objective of keeping inflation stable was set aside. Repeated devaluations eventually led to expectations that the authorities would not in the future stand by their promise of a fixed exchange rate, and that if price and cost inflation became too high, it was expected that the krone would be devalued again. The social partners began to take higher inflation into account in wage demands and price setting. The last devaluation came in 1986. Subsequently, the interest rate was used to maintain a fixed krone exchange rate in order to bring price and cost inflation under control. We again chose a fixed exchange rate and other countries' inflation as a nominal anchor. Economic policy was influenced by the experiences of other countries that had dealt with the problem of inflation earlier, such as the US and Germany. The decline in inflation in Norway thus came in the wake of the fall in inflation abroad. Historical data seem to suggest that after turbulent periods, inflation gradually reverts to a low and stable level and that over time domestic inflation is determined by external inflation. However, inflation in a country with its own national currency is not something that just drifts in with the wind from abroad. It is the monetary policy choices we make in Norway that determine price developments here.
Temporarily high inflation is needed to reduce unemployment One consequence of high unemployment over a long period of time and of unemployment tending to become entrenched at higher rates, is that inflation will be higher for a given rate of unemployment. This means that a sufficiently large demand for labour to bring down the high unemployment towards a long-run sustainable rate will lead to higher inflation than normal for a period of time. It is therefore important to allow inflation to overshoot the target for a number of years. This would be a necessary cost that should be weighed against the gain of bringing down unemployment. As inflation on average has fallen below the target, an inflation rate above the target would at present also have the advantage that average inflation over a long period would come closer to the target, something that would contribute to avoiding the unnecessarily high average unemployment that earlier policies have caused. According to Prospera’s surveys, inflation expectations have stabilised at 2 per cent from 1997, despite average inflation being lower. Inflation expectations would thus probably be stable even if inflation were to overshoot the target for a period of time. Summary: Monetary policy too tight My conclusion is that monetary policy in Sweden is and has been too tight.

It is worth inquiring into the causes of the world economy's resilience in the face of these shocks. Firstly, it is probably indicative of the greater microeconomic flexibility of both the developed and the emerging economies. It appears the structural reforms of recent years, aimed at increasing the adaptability and responsiveness of economies to adverse effects, are beginning to bear fruit. Consequently, it is crucial to further such reforms, especially in times of plenty, when their cost is lower, so that when lean times arrive the economy has the spontaneous adjustment mechanisms in place to reduce the cost and duration of the crisis. Secondly, from the macroeconomic policy standpoint, the recent economic slowdown shows the importance of having sufficient fiscal and monetary policy leeway to be able to react to adverse disturbances, meaning in turn that prices and public finances should have performed favourably during economic upturns. Fortunately, on this occasion, the slowdown found the main economies in a relatively balanced inflationary and budgetary situation. This was conducive to a monetary policy response (which was more intense in the United States, in step with the sharper reduction in the pace of activity in this country) and to the operation of the automatic stabilisers, without jeopardising the long-term fundamentals. The notable exception is Japan. Here there is no further room for additional stimuli on the demand side owing to the economic and financial problems inherited from previous years. And this has led to the economy going into recession for the third time in ten years.
John C Williams: A time for bold action Remarks (delivered via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 16 April 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery  Introduction Thank you for the kind introduction. Hello, from my apartment in Manhattan. It’s a pleasure to be able to join you today, even under these extraordinary circumstances. I hope that wherever you are watching, you and your loved ones are safe and well. The outbreak of the coronavirus and the global pandemic have created an unprecedented situation. Today, I want to talk about what that means for the economy and financial markets, and how the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Federal Reserve System as a whole, are responding to the challenges before us. My colleagues and I are dedicated to doing everything within our power to support the functioning of financial markets and help put the economy on a strong footing once this crisis is behind us. Before I continue, let me give the Fed disclaimer that the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. The coronavirus pandemic has created circumstances we have never experienced before in our lifetimes. There’s hardly a community in the world that remains unaffected.

The New York Fed The New York Fed has important and unique responsibilities in supporting liquid and wellfunctioning financial markets. Working alongside our colleagues in the Federal Reserve and other agencies, we are taking rapid and significant actions to supply liquidity and to stabilize critical parts of our financial system. We are conducting large-scale repo operations to assure ample liquidity in money markets.3 In addition, at the direction of the FOMC, we are purchasing sizable quantities of U.S. Treasury securities and agency residential and commercial mortgagebacked securities to improve functioning in these critical markets.4 To put the current situation in context, we are running more open market operations, for greater sums, than at any time in our history.5 The Federal Reserve is also making liquidity available to key intermediaries to support market functioning and to keep credit flowing. These actions include offering term loans to depository institutions through the traditional discount window, and the establishment of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility.6 These strong and timely actions averted a potential shutdown in the flow of credit and are providing funding and stability at a time of extraordinary volatility in markets. Although stresses in financial markets will not entirely abate until the pandemic is behind us, we have seen material improvements in measures of liquidity and market functioning in key parts of the U.S. financial system. Our work is not done.
While the jury is still out on what institutional arrangements for delivering simultaneously monetary and financial stability are appropriate, there is doubt as to whether institutional changes, politically attractive as they may be, are the right answer. Today Andrew will give us his insights on the subject. He is particularly qualified to do so, being responsible for the running of the central bank of central banks. Some of you may feel that this subject matter is a little arid. I am aware of the fact that those in the private sector have, particularly at this time of the year, more practical and "profitable" issues occupying their minds. But the achievement of monetary and financial stability is central to any successful economy and therefore important to the general conduct of business. It is also a burning issue in this region, where the experiences over the last few years have underlined its importance, and the consequences of failure. Knowing Andrew, who has an admirable ability to present technically complex issues of money and finance in the simplest of terms, I am sure you will find the subject refreshingly interesting. Andrew Crockett has been General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements since 1994. To pursue the classroom metaphor that I used at the last lecture to describe how central bankers get on with each other when they come together at meetings, Andrew’s job is to be the "class prefect" or "captain", who maintains order and prevents us from banging our heads too hardly at each other.

Even so, targeted fiscal and monetary stimulus measures should support growth at close to 7% this year. •  Against this backdrop, overall growth in Emerging Asia will remain firm, at 6% this year. Banks in Emerging Asia will therefore not do badly. There are, however, downside risks that they need to watch. First, the divergence in monetary policy settings among the G3 economies could pose risks to financial stability that could also potentially hurt growth. The anticipated normalisation of interest rates in the US against continuing quantitative easing in the Eurozone and Japan will be reflected in sharp movements in exchange rates and bond yields. This is not a prediction, it is already happening. The scenario of a “double whammy” posed by a rise in US interest rates and a strong US Dollar could expose vulnerabilities among some Asian borrowers. •  Rising interest rates will increase the debt servicing burden of Asian households and corporates, especially those who have taken on high levels of debt at low rates. •  Asian corporates with large unhedged dollar borrowings could face increasing stress as a strengthening dollar undermines their ability to repay loans. Banks in Emerging Asia could face higher non-performing loans. They could also face reduced US Dollar funding if there are large capital outflows from Asia. But their liquidity and capital positions are generally sound and they should be able to weather this. What matters is the medium to long term, and here the outlook for Asia remains sanguine.
There are a number of reasons that a financial conditions framework is likely to be useful when evaluating the economic outlook and the conduct of monetary policy. Most important, monetary policy works its magic through its effect on financial conditions; it does not operate directly on real economic variables. That is because the level of the federal funds rate influences other financial market variables such as money market rates, long-term interest rates, credit spreads, stock prices and the value of the dollar, and it is these variables that influence real economic activity. 1 This means that if the linkage between the fed funds rate and this broader constellation of financial indicators is not stable or completely predictable, then knowing what is happening to the fed funds rate is not sufficient to predict economic activity. The instability of the linkage between the fed funds rate and financial conditions indicators means that these indicators provide additional information about real activity and also are relevant in deciding the appropriate fed funds rate target. In contrast, if the transmission mechanism from the fed funds rate to financial conditions and onward to real economic activity were completely predictable, then there would be no need to focus on financial conditions as an intermediate target variable. The level and path of the fed funds rate matters, but it also matters how this gets transmitted to the real economy through the financial sector.

3  2  See The Brave New Business Cycle: No Recession in Sight, William Dudley and Edward McKelvey, January 1997, Goldman Sachs Economic Research Group. 3  Adding financial intermediation to these models has become a very active area of research. See, for example, the recent work of Vasco Curdia and Michael Woodford in “Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 385. 2  BIS Review 23/2010  Events of the past decade confirm that financial conditions matter and that the fed funds rate is not a sufficient statistic with which to assess the impact of monetary policy on the real economy. Of course, this is not news to the Federal Reserve, which has explicitly taken financial conditions into account in its conduct of monetary policy. This is evident in the transcripts of the FOMC meetings that are publicly available and the numerous references to financial conditions in the FOMC minutes that go back more than a decade. An analysis of the FOMC minutes over the past decade indicates that references to financial conditions have been frequent, especially recently. Exhibit 1 illustrates the percentage of paragraphs in the minutes (excluding the directive and some other paragraphs associated with administrative matters such as the election of the chairman) that mention the phrase “financial conditions.” As can be seen, there have been frequent references over the past decade. One peak occurred in 2000 when the stock market peaked and began to deflate.
I have since had reason to go through what happened when confidence was restored in the Swedish economy and economic policy. Despite the decision on budget consolidation essentially being taken by the Government and Parliament in autumn 1994, it took some time before various figures believed it would succeed. The first international recognition of our policy came from the European Commission in spring 1995. I accompanied Göran Persson to Brussels and gave an account of Sweden’s convergence programme to Giovanni Ravasio, who was one of the leading economists at the Commission. Each member state of the EU was to draw up a convergence programme that would show what policy they intended to conduct to achieve stable public finances, low inflation and low interest rates. The Swedish convergence programme was aimed at achieving balance in public finances in 1998, and had the broad support of all of the parties in Parliament with the exception of the Left Party. Ravasio was convinced that the programme was sustainable. 4  BIS Review 21/2006  It was possible to see in the financial markets that the interest rate differential between Swedish and German long-term bonds began to decline in spring 1995 when the Swedish convergence programme had been decided and even more so in autumn 1995, when it had been approved by the EU’s finance ministers. For the Riksbank it took until the beginning of 1996 before short-term interest rates began to be cut. The krona was still weak during 1995 and inflation was close to 3 per cent.

In the last Inflation Report, it was the Executive Board’s assessment that the projections conditional on the market’s interest rate expectations seemed to provide a reasonable balance between the objective of bringing up inflation, while avoiding excessive growth in output and employment. The previous Inflation Report, from July 2004, stated that “the most appropriate alternative now seems to be that the interest rate should be kept unchanged for a longer period than indicated by market expectations.” After this, we saw that interest rate expectations fell. By communicating our view concerning interest rate expectations, Norges Bank seeks to influence interest rate expectations. The objective is for interest rate expectations to be consistent with economic developments where inflation is on target over time and output is stable around its potential level. Most often, however, there will be a number of ways to achieve this. We need some references that provide some indication of whether a given interest rate path is reasonable. It is natural to turn first to monetary policy theory. In the theoretical literature, the trade-off between price stability and stability in the real economy is often described as a problem of minimisation, where the central bank wants to minimise a loss function, which includes variations in output and variations in inflation. The central bank shall then choose the path for the interest rate ahead that minimises the expected discounted “losses” in all future periods. In practice, no inflation-targeting central bank uses a loss function of this kind directly.
34  Including measures of banks’ Conditional VaR or CoVaR (NYU Stern School of Business (2009), and Brunnermeier et al (2009)). These are statistical measures of an institution’s VaR conditional on other institutions in the network simultaneously facing stress. 35  Simon (1962). BIS Review 53/2009  15  The answer lies in the structure of complex systems. Hora’s watches are designed as ten sub-assemblies each comprising ten elements, which are combined into ten larger subassemblies, ten of which then constitute a whole watch. Tempus, by contrast, assembles his watches part by part. The result is that, whenever Tempus is interrupted – in Simon’s parable by a telephone call ordering more watches – his work is lost and he must start again. Hora suffers the same fate much less frequently, due to the sub-assembly structure of his watches. The differences in the robustness of these equally complex structures are dramatic. If the probability of interruption is 0.01, Hora will complete 9 watches for every 10 attempts. By contrast, Tempus completes 44 watches for every million attempts. The probability of horological collapse is lowered from 0.999956 to 0.1. The secret of the structure of Hora’s complex watches is that they are “hierarchical”, with separate and separable sub-structures. Simon discusses how a number of other networks, both social and physical, exhibit this hierarchical structure. This is no evolutionary accident. For many networks, hierarchy emerges naturally. It is the product of a process of Darwinian selection in which it is only the hierarchical structures that survive to maturity.

I say once a month, but we meet more frequently than that when needed, as we have done for example over the past few weeks. What are some of those threats as I speak here today? We are, of course, still working our way through the implications of the dreadful events in the United States last month. Uncertainty about the near-term outlook increased quite markedly following the attack, and this - together with the  BIS Review 83/2001  1  possibilities of supply-chain and market disruption, particularly in the US - contributed to some sharp adjustments in equity values. A number of sectors most closely affected by the terrorist attacks - in particular air travel and insurance - were badly hit. More recently, equities have rallied somewhat, suggesting that some of the earlier concerns may have been overdone. But the market is still clearly lower than it was at the start of September. These factors have potentially important implications for the inflationary outlook, and therefore for monetary policy. The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee - in common with a number of other central banks around the world - reduced interest rates last month, citing in our press release the increased risks of a further slowdown in world growth. Interest rates were cut by a further quarter of a per cent following our meeting last week, and you will be able to read about our reasoning for this decision when the minutes are published on 17 October.