samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One can draw the conclusion from this figure that resource utilisation in terms of the GDP gap has recently  2  BIS Review 66/2009  fallen below the normal level and that we are assuming that it will remain negative over the coming years. There are both advantages and disadvantages in measuring resource utilisation with the aid of the GDP gap. One advantage is that this method does not require any other information than historical GDP data. One disadvantage is that when using this method it is difficult to estimate the trend and thereby the GDP gap at the end of the time series and it is precisely the GDP gap at the end of the series that is the most interesting part. This problem becomes particularly troublesome in a recession like the current one. This is because experiences of previous recessions imply that some of the output capacity that is lost after a fall in resource utilisation never returns when the upturn comes. Quite simply, it is easier to wind up companies than to build them up. To some extent these problems are dealt with in the Riksbank’s calculations, in that the calculation of the trend level of GDP is affected by the outcomes for years of weak GDP growth and by parts of the fall in productivity being assumed to be permanent.

Lending rates for small and medium-sized enterprises, which provide two-thirds of total private sector employment in the euro area, have declined by over 180 basis points. The sharp reduction in bank lending rates has been accompanied by easier access to funding, as recent ECB surveys on bank lending and access to finance have shown. But it is not just lending rates that are more favourable. Bank lending volumes have also been gradually recovering since early 2014. Annual growth in credit to euro area households increased in January to 2.2% and growth in credit to businesses remained at 2.3% – the highest growth rates in more than four years. Market-based funding conditions, too, have improved significantly in response to the corporate sector purchase programme launched in June 2016. While monetary policy has been the mainstay of the recovery, there are other potential sources of macroeconomic stabilisation. Given the heterogeneity of countries across the euro area, the lack of synchronisation of business cycles, and the absence of fiscal transfers between Member States, capital markets play an important role in mitigating the income effects of region-specific shocks. For example, evidence suggests that capital markets and credit markets together help smooth around two-thirds of a shock to regional GDP in the United States, dwarfing the 13% contribution of federal transfers. In comparison, the overall contribution of markets to risk sharing in the euro area has, on average, been limited.
8  The Archbishop offered these comments at an October 12, 2014 panel discussion that was part of the International Monetary Fund 2014 Annual Meetings. A video of that discussion is available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/5426/archbishop‐to‐take‐part‐in‐imfworld‐bank‐panel‐ onethics‐and‐finance. Notably, the Archbishop described his role at the conference as a “lion in a den of Daniels.”  9  Even the skeptics of cultural reform concede that there is “almost universal accord that remuneration structures contributed to excessive risk‐taking in financial institutions and that excessive bonuses paid on anticipated accounting profit at the time of deal origination distorted decision‐making and resulted in asymmetric riskholding.” Paradigm Risk Consulting, To boldly supervise . . . , February 2014. 10  See Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry, supra n.4. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The tests include cyclical convergence and structural flexibility, the impact on investment, the impact on the financial services industry and the impact more generally on growth, stability and jobs. So the UK will not join EMU at the outset. But financial firms in London, whatever their nationality, see the euro as a key part of their business. With our support at the Bank of England, they have been actively preparing for the introduction of the euro. London thrives on liquid markets, regardless of currency. So the introduction of the euro is a major opportunity for London. BIS Review 11/1998  -2-  From the start, London will act as a link between New York and the euro area by providing a full range of euro services in wholesale financial markets. That includes euro payments and settlement, so that anyone who wishes to do so will be able to trade and settle in euro in London from the first day of EMU. But it also extends to euro banking, foreign exchange and derivatives trading, bond and equity issuance and trading, fund management, financial advice and professional support services as well. The City of London is Europe’s leading financial centre and one of the top three global centres, alongside New York and Tokyo. Here in New York, the financial centre is influenced by the size of the domestic economy. That is true of Tokyo as well. But London’s success has historically been due to its international financial business.
We faced the challenge to prepare and submit nine new or appropriately adjusted categories of data, out of which seven are within the competence of the NBRM, and two within the competence of the Ministry of Finance:  1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  -real sector data - statistics of sectoral financial accounts which is actually an overview of the structure of financial assets and liabilities of individual sectors, their mutual exposure, financial flows and, accordingly, possible accumulation of risks;  - financial sector data – statistics of non-bank financial institutions (more detailed data not only for the banking system, but also for the pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds, financial companies, leasing companies), statistics of debt securities and seven financial stability indicators that enable better identification of the risks in the financial system;  - external sector data – data on the currency structure of the foreign reserves, the coordinate direct investment questionnaire and the coordinate portfolio investment questionnaire which provide more detailed findings for cross-border links and the possibility of transfer of the effects from the external shocks to the domestic economy, and  - fiscal sector data – general government statistics and data on gross debt of the general government. Aware of the challenges that the countries faced with and the need for making extremely great efforts to produce them, the IMF allowed, at the time of application for this standard, fulfillment of the dissemination requirements of at least five from the nine mandatory indicators.

Our cooperative journey to the SDDS Plus began in 2013, when, after the achieved national consensus on the usefulness of the accession to this standard, we officially informed the IMF of the efforts that we will make in the medium-term period to meet the membership criteria. Then, in the next years, we worked on the production, promotion and publication of the required data.
Work under ABMI has also focused on establishing the Asian Bond Online to provide comprehensive information on sovereign and corporate bonds to both regional and international investors. 10. Second, is on infrastructure financing: We have recently created the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund or AIF with an initial endowment of almost half a billion dollars and will be issuing bonds to finance its operations. It has already begun lending with a $ 25 million loan to finance power links in Indonesia last year and is expected to carry out about six projects each year throughout 2015 totaling $ 1 billion. 11. The AIF should be complementary to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. With initial groundwork laid in Beijing two weeks ago, it aims to give project loans for infrastructure development. Thailand and 20 other countries in the region are founding members of this bank, which will have an initial capital of $ 100 billion. Once it begins operations in 2015, we hope to see a new wave of infrastructure financing that will enhance connectivity in the whole region. How can we unleash prosperity from regional connectivity? Ladies and Gentlemen, 12. What I have just highlighted are some examples of region-wide initiatives by ASEAN governments and central banks along with those of the Plus Three to spur connectivity. Opportunities are already in store for ASEAN as the world’s seventh largest economy. Combined with the Plus Three countries will turn the whole region to be the world’s largest economy and market.

However, trade flows among the 13 countries, only amount to 10% of global trade, hence there’s much room for further growth especially as our countries are increasingly inter-connected. 13. We from the public sector have created financial highways to link up our vibrant economies and have found ways to finance physical roads and highways. To recapitulate my message: •  2  Financial integration within ASEAN is targeted to support the large markets of goods, services and financial products in the region. Financing economic activities of ASEAN needs not only strong but also interlinked banks and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  financial institutions. Financing opportunities grow significantly when expanding these linkages to the Plus Three countries. Firms can tap on to various modes of financing in equities and bond markets to expand their businesses to match the growing trade and investment flows. •  The other area is on infrastructure development: While the barriers of tariffs have fallen, trade among us cannot flourish if we are constantly facing infrastructural bottlenecks. The ADB has estimated that Asia has a demand for infrastructure to the tune of $ 8 trillion over ten years. This is where the Asian Infrastructure Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank come into play to address these bottlenecks and open up vast potentials for development and trade beyond the AEC to Plus Three. Through this, a new regional logistics-based sector is about to take shape. 14.
It has also been said that it is not self-evident which measure of inflation should be used, that is, that some other index than the CPIF, for instance the CPI, could be appropriate as an operational target variable within the forecast period. Another objection is that monetary policy should also be aimed at maintaining financial stability, which then presumably becomes a separate objective for monetary policy. The objective of price stability and highest sustainable rate of employment could then be neglected for a certain period of time, for instance, to avoid unsustainable financial imbalances building up. A more precise objection is that monetary policy should counteract an unsustainable development in household indebtedness. In this case a sustainable development of household indebtedness will become a separate objective for monetary policy, which can justify neglecting the objective of price stability and the highest sustainable rate of employment. A more concrete variation of these objections assumes that there is a correlation between a low policy rate and the build-up of unsustainable financial imbalances. A normal level of the policy rate then becomes a separate target for monetary policy and can justify neglecting the objective of price stability and the highest sustainable rate of employment. 6 One kind of objection thus concerns the fact that, with regard to price stability, it is not as simple as to merely focus on the CPIF during the forecast period and the CPI in the longer run. It is actually not clear which target variable for inflation should be used.

This is particularly true in the euro area, where the gap between savings and investment is huge: the current account surplus reached EUR 350 billion on a yearly basis in August 2016,  2 which is more than 3% of GDP.i I believe that the solution to closing the gap is not to diminish savings, but to increase productive investment – and savings can be instrumental in doing so. Let me delve further into this issue by answering three questions: what is the evidence? What are the causes? What is the remedy? ** First, what evidence do we have? The total investment to GDP ratio offers a first glimpse of the current investment dearth (slide 4). The 2007-08 crisis caused the total investment ratio to fall sharply. In many countries, it has not yet returned to its pre-crisis level. This is particularly the case in the euro area, where the total investment ratio has dropped by around 3 points since the 2007 peak and has only slightly recovered since. By comparison, the pace of the recovery is significantly faster in the United States. Now, (slide 5) let’s dig deeper into the composition of this investment dearth: real estate and public investment have contributed to the post-crisis decline in total investment, but what matters the most for our economy is the contraction in business investment.
As their employment began to decline, some workers left the area while others remained. Indeed the legacy of the “Big 3” lies not in what was lost, but in what remains in the skills and entrepreneurial spirit of the many talented people that are here today. Some of these talented people started their own companies, while others found different ways to contribute their unique talents to the local economy. As a result, Rochester continues to reinvent itself, and is now much more diverse, with an employment base that is no longer concentrated among a few large manufacturers. The top employers in the region, like the University of Rochester and Rochester Institute of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Technology (RIT), Wegmans, the Rochester General Health System and Paychex, just to name a few, perform a variety of activities, from health care and education to consumer and business services. The process of reinvention and economic diversification, in part, allowed the region to better weather the storm of the Great Recession compared to past economic recessions. For Rochester, the downturn was both shorter and less severe in terms of job loss than for the nation as a whole – a situation quite different from what had occurred before. Though it still lags the nation, the Rochester area has continued to grow at a solid pace through the recovery. This is no small feat, and it certainly is not true for all of Upstate New York.

Broadly speaking, workers who can build skills and remain nimble can do very well in today’s economy, while those who can’t are much more likely to fall into lower-paying jobs and get stuck there. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A skilled workforce that is matched to the needs of employers is also necessary for the economy to grow and prosper. By pursuing its mandated goals of maximum employment and price stability, monetary policy can help labor markets recover by providing incentives for firms to invest and grow. However, monetary policy cannot by itself solve skill mismatches that may exist in the economy. These frictions must be addressed in other ways, such as by workforce development policies. That is, monetary policy can complement workforce development policies, but is not a substitute for these policies. That is why I believe workforce development is so important for the long-term health of the economy. We need to help workers build the skills necessary to adapt to change. This makes workforce development a top priority for everyone involved: workers, their employers, their communities and the public sector, as well as education and job training institutions. We all need to share in the responsibility of helping people increase and maintain their skills. Successful workforce development needs to include what I call the 3 P’s: Partnerships, Programs and Placement. Partnerships entail the cooperative endeavors between local employers and educational institutions to determine the best strategies to help workers develop the skills that employers need.
The figures in Table 1 have been updated with details for 2017. 11 These calculations only show interest payments and ignore effects on interest income. 9  9 [13]  Table 1. Households more affected more by interest rate adjustments than previously Interest payments for a typical housing purchase, SEK per month Sweden Greater Stockholm Housing price (SEK million) Debt (SEK million) Interest rate (%) Interest payments Increase in interest payments (+1%)  2004 1.3 0.8 3.7 1793 485  2017 3.0 2.0 1.6 1814 1161  2004 2.6 1.6 3.7 3452 934  2017 6.0 4.0 1.6 3643 2351  Note. The amounts have been adjusted for tax relief on interest payments. The table does not include amortisations. Sources: Finansinspektionen, Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Rate increases in line with the Riksbank’s forecast are expected to have minor cashflow effects on households as a whole ... In the Monetary Policy Report in December, our assessment was that total disposable household income would slow by about 1.3 per cent in a three-year perspective as a result of rising interest rates. 12 This must be considered a minor effect, especially bearing in mind that rising wages, among other factors, will contribute about 4 percentage points a year to the growth in disposable household income in the coming years. Total disposable income, according to our forecast, will continue to grow at a healthy rate in the years to come, despite rising interest rates.

The estimated interest rate they use in the calculation is on average around 7 per cent, which is some way above a long-term normal level, which can be assumed to be between 4.5 and 6 per cent. 7 Calculations done by the Swedish financial supervisory authority, Finansinspektionen (FI), on a sample of new mortgage holders show that only just over 5 per cent of households have a deficit in their discretionary income calculations if the mortgage rate rises to 7 per cent. 8 There is hence nothing to indicate that the household sector as a whole would encounter significant problems in paying their interest expenses even if interest rates were to rise substantially in relation to their current levels. And, as I said earlier, our forecast indicates extremely limited rate increases in the years to come. But when the rate rises, many households might have to adapt their consumption to cope with the increased interest payments. From a macroeconomic and monetary policy perspective, it is therefore important to understand how household consumption is affected when interest rates change. 7 I have assumed a mark-up on the mortgage rate of 2 percentage points over the interval for the long-term repo rate of 2.5-4 per cent. 8 See Finansinspektionen (2018), “The Swedish mortgage market”.
Importantly in this connection, the Spanish economy has sufficient depth of stability to enable it to weather the impact on household spending of an appreciable house price correction, in the unlikely event that it should occur. The soundness of Spanish credit institutions, underpinned by high solvency levels and comfortable bad debt coverage ratios (a matter to which I will return later in the more general framework of the situation of the financial system), minimises the possibility that downward adjustments in house prices, should they occur, would significantly impair banks’ ability to continue to efficiently finance the spending decisions of firms and households. Moreover, unlike in other countries, Spanish households have not started significantly to borrow against their increased housing wealth to directly finance current consumption plans. In any event, the losses in competitiveness, household debt levels and house prices evidently entail a risk of the expansion being interrupted. The economic policies under national sovereignty thus have the important mission of preventing these risks from materialising and providing a solid foundation for growth. In particular, since monetary and financial conditions will most likely continue to be relatively generous for the needs of the Spanish economy in the foreseeable future, it will continue to be the responsibility of fiscal policy to help establish an overall macroeconomic stance that will contribute to mitigating spending pressure.

Credit denominated in ALL maintained the average annual increase rate, by about 28-30 percent, but the slowdown of lending denominated in foreign currency has led to the decline of credit growth pace. The open market operations of the Bank of Albania met the liquidity needs of the banking system. Bank of Albania has injected all liquidity demanded from commercial banks, by preserving at the same time an accurate time structure of this injection. Notwithstanding the improved liquidity situation, yields rates in primary market have persuaded the increasing tendency of the current months. The increase of risk evaluation from banks is mainly reflected in the determination of long-term yields that is confirmed by the rise of 2 and 5-year bonds yields. The performance of new deposits interest rates denominated in Euro and ALL appears stable during July. New credits interests’ rates denominated in ALL have persuaded the decline in July, while this month recorded a tightening of new loan cost denominated in Euro. At the conclusion, by framing the forecasts for a relaxed inflation and within the target set out by the Bank of Albania for the future, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged. This movement is a continuance of the careful monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Albania during the year 2009, a policy which has aimed the transmission of controlled monetary stimulus and the keeping of inflationary expectations close to the targeted band of the Bank of Albania.