samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate may be appropriate in cases where there is a risk that inflation may deviate considerably from the target over a longer period, or where heightening turbulence in financial markets or a cost- push shock resulting from wage negotiations indicates that confidence in monetary policy is in jeopardy. Financial market confidence in the inflation target provides Norges Bank with greater scope for promoting stability in output and employment through monetary policy. This scope will also increase as the inflation target is incorporated as an anchor for wage formation. We have also indicated that in the event of runaway overall credit growth and a sharp rise in property and house prices as well as equity prices, it may be necessary to reassess the time horizon. It would in general have been possible to achieve the inflation target at a horizon shorter than two years by changing the interest rate more rapidly and more markedly. This might, however, have a greater impact on output and employment. BIS Review 53/2003  1  Norges Bank has based its monetary policy on flexible inflation targeting, where variability in output, employment and inflation are given weight. How do changes in the interest rate affect the economy? Norges Bank’s monetary policy instrument is the key rate. Norges Bank’s key rate affects short-term money market rates, and expectations concerning future developments in the key rate are decisive for banks’ deposit and lending rates and bond yields.

Work is in train on stress testing, on loss allocation and on disclosure requirements, as well as on ensuring consistent application of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) which set regulatory expectations for CCPs at a global level. All of this is important not only in its own right, but also to provide the market – the users of CCPs – with the tools and incentives to monitor resilience and drive effective risk management in CCPs themselves. To encourage competition between CCPs on resilience, not cost. •  At the same time, the first line of defence for a CCP lies in the resilience of its members. Ongoing work to raise the prudential standards for banks on capital and liquidity, among other areas, should greatly reduce the risk of CCPs having to deal with a failing clearing member. And the progress I mentioned before on G-SIB resolution should help to ensure that, where a firm does fail, its payment and delivery obligations to the CCP continue to be met. I should add as an aside that there is more still to be done internationally in terms of removing technical and other obstacles to maintaining continuity of access to CCPs and other FMIs in the context of bank resolution. That continuity is not just essential to the bank in resolution but may also be critical for clients. If there is doubt about continued access to clearing services from a bank in resolution, clients may look to migrate rapidly to another provider.
Adequate investment in infrastructure is crucial to promoting the further growth of the region, spreading the fruit of economic developments and raising the living standards of people in Asia. Given the region’s huge infrastructure needs, mobilising private sector investments is important. Governments and ADB have a key role to play in promoting an enabling environment for private investment. Making this right will enable the region’s vast savings to be efficiently channelled to fund its own investment needs, thus helping the region to realise its full growth potential. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

This initiative has been applauded by local and regional stakeholders, as it will be providing a regular and up to date assessment of the business-cycle, helping adjust and draw economic initiatives by both the public and private sectors that can be more precisely tailored to changing local realities. This initiative was possible because of the maturing relationship through the protocolization of anonymized information exchange between the Central Bank and the Chilean Internal Tax Service. The use of existing administrative records, allowing the identification of the location of economic transactions, has been much more efficient than the traditional recourse to large surveys, both in the timeliness of access as well as the possibility to backward estimate up to a decade of information. Following that, in July, by the joint effort of several institutions, we broadened data availability by gender and regions. Additionally, we managed to facilitate access and data analysis by combining data from different sources in one location using our public Statistics Database platform. We have now begun to publish an “experimental statistics” section that brings together indicators in various areas of interest. The indicators include mobility indexes, based on the number of electronic invoicing issued by a sample of gas stations; a daily retail sales index, which anticipates the activity of the retail trade sector; and the Internet Job Ads Index, first published in 2019, based on the ads posted at the leading web employment portals in Chile.
At the same time, there has to be a global understanding of what regulation means, since regulations could otherwise, given the global interconnectedness of financial markets, be easily leveraged and since fair competition can only be assured when the rules of the game are the same. •  I remain convinced that regulation and supervision must be sensitive to risks. This means that the bank that takes greater risks and poses a greater threat to financial stability must also be subject to stricter rules and/or limitations on its business  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  activities. If our set of rules was to treat different risk profiles in the same way, then we would subject conservative, low-risk banking business with low yields to the same requirements as high-risk business activities, thereby making the former uneconomical. In my view, that would be creating the wrong incentive. •  We need a shrewd supervisory authority that monitors compliance with the rules and supervises banks in a consistent and tough but fair way. It needs to be shrewd because it must be able to use its discretionary powers correctly when regulating matters and weigh different arguments on a case-by-case basis. In this role, supervision must be able to act across national borders, because that is the only way to ensure that large, internationally active institutions, too, are subject to consistent and comprehensive control.

When the Riksbank did not want to do this, Heckscher decided to do something about it. The right to exchange notes for gold had ceased in connection with the outbreak of the war in 1914, but was reintroduced in 1916. However, since an export ban on gold had been introduced in 1914, this did not mean in practice that the gold standard had been re-established. The export ban allowed the gold price to differ between countries and the value of the krona to change against other currencies. This was also the case as the krona depreciated against the dollar. At the US Federal Reserve, the price of one kilogram of gold in the depreciated Swedish currency was SEK 3,600 at the beginning of 1920. At the Riksbank, the price of one kilo of gold was instead SEK 2,480. If the export ban were to be lifted, then a considerable arbitrage gain could be made. Heckscher decided to draw the general public's attention to this fact and did so through an article entitled “The new price revolution” (Den nya prisrevolutionen), published in the daily newspaper Stockholms Dagblad on 11 March 1920.
In a world of low growth, the political rhetoric in some major economies has tended to focus more on the costs and less on the benefits. That is unfortunate, because given the current circumstances of the global economy, it is likely that we need deeper and fairer integration. For emerging economies in Asia and Latin America, the question for us is whether deeper economic and financial integration offers a feasible path towards unlocking sustainable growth of our economies? How do we mitigate the costs and maximise the benefits? The World Bank theme paper for this conference provides a useful starting point for thinking about these issues. I will leave it to the learned speakers today to ponder on that. I will just briefly share my perspective on this issue with respect to ASEAN and Malaysia. Asian regional economic and financial integration The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 contains ASEAN’s vision of regional economic and financial integration over the next 10 years. When it came to formulating the 2025 Blueprint, the issue of the nature of integration has always been central. The fundamental challenge remains on how to use regional integration to leverage on ASEAN’s diversity in terms of economic size and structure, income levels, resource endowments and stage of financial sector development. Here, in the interest of time, l will just focus on ASEAN financial integration. I remember that soon after the Asian Financial Crisis, there was a lot of interest in looking at the European model of a single currency.

Preferential arrangements such as Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ASEAN Free Trade Agreements have a critical role in spurring productivity growth, accelerating structural reforms and creating a diversified, competitive and resilient Malaysian economy. Once again, welcome to this Conference, and thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, for the Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 14 July 2014. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, Allow me to start by congratulating all of you on your election to this House, and you, Mr Chairman, on your appointment as Chair of the committee in the new legislative period. The architects of Monetary Union conceived the ECB as a central bank with a clear mandate and with strong provisions for its independence. But for a public institution in a democratic society, independence can never come without being commensurately transparent and accountable to the elected representatives of the people. Our regular exchanges of views are a key channel for the ECB to discharge its duty of central bank accountability; hence, they plays an essential role in providing the ECB with the necessary legitimacy to fulfil the tasks assigned to it by the Treaties. To underscore our commitment to transparency, the ECB has recently decided to go a step further by publishing regular accounts of the monetary policy meetings of the Governing Council, which is intended to start in January next year. It is in this spirit that I am looking forward to our exchange of views over the next five years.

900 Broadbent, B (2012), “Productivity and the allocation of resources” Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (2020), “Home working set to more than double compared to pre-pandemic levels once crisis is over” Cominetti, N, Henehan, K, Slaughter, H and Thwaites, G (2021), “Long Covid in the labour market: The impact on the labour market of Covid-19 a year into the crisis, and how to secure a strong recovery”, Resolution Foundation, February 2021 Decision Maker Panel (2021), Panel data – February 2021 Felstead, A and Reuschke, R (2020), “Homeworking in the UK: Before and During the 2020 Lockdown”, WISERD Report, Cardiff: Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research Haldane, A (2020), “Is home working good for you?” Haldane, A (2021), “Inflation: a tiger by the tail?” Kim, H and Kung, H (2017), “The Asset Redeployability Channel: How Uncertainty Affects Corporate Investment”, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 30(1), pages 245–280 Ramsden, D (2020), “The potential long term effects of Covid” Tenreyro, S (2020), “Monetary policy during pandemics: inflation before, during and after Covid-19” Vlieghe G, (2020), “Assessing the Health of the Economy”  14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  14
The Relation Between a Central Bank’s Degree of Independence and Inflation 14  ITA  12  SP NZLD  8  UK FRA SWE DEN CDA  6  BEL  4  NLD  10  AUS  USA JPN  GER SWZ  2 0 0  1  2 3 Degree of independence  4  5  Source: SOU (Govt official reports) 1993:20  It should be stressed that an independent position for the Riksbank is not the same thing as a monetary policy conducted without democratic control. The monetary policy objective has been made law by those who are popularly elected. It is making the objective operational  BIS Review 14/1998  -6-  and the ongoing work to secure the goal decided by the Riksdag that has been delegated to the Riksbank. Question 4: Why 2 per cent? The question of how the monetary policy objective should be made operational has several dimensions. By selecting a clear objective for monetary policy, it is possible to monitor and evaluate it in an effective way. This is especially important when the Riksbank is being given an independent status. A clearly defined inflation objective also has the advantage of being able to function as an “anchor” for households’ and businesses’ expectations. This function alone can be an important feature, not least when a regime of low inflation is being established. The objective for the Riksbank’s monetary policy is inflation of 2 per cent annually, as measured by the consumer price index.

In spite of the fact that knowledge and understanding of the Riksbank’s policy have gradually increased, I believe that from time to time there is a need to explain the basis for the policy and some of the principles that guide it today. The purpose of today’s speech is just that. I will endeavour to answer seven of the questions that I have encountered most often in recent years at meetings and in editorials and commentaries and that seem to permeate the discussion of monetary policy continually. By way of conclusion I will comment on an eighth question. Question 1: Why is low inflation good? The experiences of previous decades in Sweden and a number of international examples show that high inflation is associated with economic costs. Moreover significant costs ensue when one is compelled to gear down from high to low inflation – something that sooner or later always happens. It has been shown that high inflation is often associated with sharp fluctuations in the relative prices of goods. Rapid and abrupt price changes create uncertainty about the future for all the actors in the economy. It simply becomes more difficult to make long-range decisions. Households and businesses are compelled in practice to take greater risks and both then demand higher interest and profits. This reasoning is supported by research, which indicates that the growth rate of the economy may be lower, because the increased uncertainty reduces investment activity. In addition the risk of making erroneous investments increases. (Diagram 1.
Our current forecast assumes, for instance, that there will be gradual increases in the repo rate over the coming period. This new assumption does not in itself have any significance for the policy conducted. However, it makes it easier to evaluate our forecasts as they become more realistic and it is easier to compare them with others’ forecasts. It is also important to know this assessment to understand our communication. If the forecast shows inflation as being lower than two per cent a couple of years ahead, this is no longer a reason to cut the repo rate. It may instead mean that there is reason to raise the interest rate at a slightly slower pace than the market is expecting. A further step in our method of making forecasts could be to make our own forecasts for interest rates, instead of using market expectations as a basis. This would require a number of changes in working methods, both for those making forecasts and for us Executive Board members. Personally, I think this would be a natural progression and it is a possibility we are considering. It is not only the inflation forecasts we examine when formulating monetary policy and considering how to set the interest rate in future. Our policy is flexible in the sense that we also look at how the economy as a whole is developing. We have the ambition, within the framework of our price stability task, of also contributing to stable development in production and employment. How do we do this?

There are, of course, areas where developments have not been so positive. This applies in particular to employment. However, the insight that employment in the long term depends on how well the labour market functions is beginning to gain ground. This is where efforts should be made to obtain a longterm solution to the employment problem. The decisive factor is not how the Riksbank sets the interest rate or how expansive fiscal policy is conducted. The idea that there is no conflict in the long term between objectives for good employment and low inflation is otherwise one of the reasons why Edmund Phelps is this year being awarded the Riksbank’s prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel. Now, I do not wish to claim that everything positive that has happened is due to better thought out economic policy. There have also been significant changes in other areas that have contributed to the favourable developments. However, it can be observed that the changeover of monetary policy has given a steadiness and stability to economic policy that was previously lacking. This should be a fairly important factor. BIS Review 101/2006  1  …and a little closer Let me now say something in more detail regarding the developments over the past 3-4 years, as these have been rather special in some ways. At least at first glance, growth, inflation and employment have developed in a slightly contradictory manner in relation to one another during this period.
In some Member States, wage increases significantly exceeded productivity gains and this, in turn, caused unit labour costs to rise substantially. When the global financial crisis hit the real economy in 2009, the budgetary effects of automatic stabilisers in the tax and benefit systems, the fiscal stimulus packages introduced by governments and the support provided to the financial sector led to a sharp deterioration in the fiscal positions of all euro area countries. External and domestic imbalances mounted, especially in weaker euro area countries. This led to severe tensions in financial markets and to the emergence of risks of adverse spillovers to the rest of the euro area. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  One could divide into four categories the ways in which countries could have addressed sovereign debt problems in the past. First, and most naturally, governments pursue a course of fiscal consolidation. Second, as tended to be the case in some countries, central banks can monetise public debt, i.e. finance government debt and deficits by issuing additional money. Third, governments can decide not to honour their obligations and simply default on their outstanding debt. Finally, as occurred in a few exceptional cases, third parties can decide to assume the debt and deficits of their vulnerable counterparts, thus typically transferring resources from economically stronger to weaker entities. European Union legislation clearly rules out the monetisation and bail-out options.

Our governance framework has lost much credibility that must now be carefully reacquired. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Here, particular responsibility rests with the national authorities. In particular, the European governance framework will function best if national finance ministries conscientiously perform their role with respect to multilateral surveillance. The sovereign debt crisis has taught us unequivocally that – in spite of the no-bail-out clause in Article 125 of the Treaty – the euro area countries are not insulated from one another. In an integrated single European market with a single European currency, spillover effects from one Member State to the other should make us all take a strong interest in the pursuit of sound fiscal and structural policies by our European partners. Because of the close integration of the European economies, governments have also set up a European crisis resolution mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism. Its purpose is not, as some have argued, to bail out euro area countries that have failed to pursue sound economic policies. Its stated purpose is to safeguard financial stability if one or more countries endanger the euro area as a whole. Conclusion To conclude, the ECB’s policies have been guided by price stability considerations, with policies targeted at those elements of the crisis that threatened to prevent it from fulfilling its mandate. Responsibility for the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis rests with the governments of the euro area Member States.
Improving our market intelligence, refocusing our financial stability role, and making central services more professional, are examples of ways in which the Bank aims, in all its activities, to pursue standards of excellence, as it has in monetary policy. There is one additional area where change could prove beneficial. After the Monetary Policy Committee decides on the level of interest rates, that decision must be implemented in the money markets. The Bank will be carrying out a review of its money market operations with a view to improving and simplifying them, and reducing overnight volatility in those markets. The Bank’s Markets Director, Paul Tucker, will be consulting the market shortly. For the United Kingdom as a whole, pressing on with reforms to raise productivity is essential to future prosperity. The strategy which the MPC has pursued in recent years - stimulating domestic demand to compensate for weak external demand in the face of a strong exchange rate - carries the risk that there could be a sharp correction to the level of consumer spending at some point in the future. That risk is exacerbated by the continued strength of the housing market and associated borrowing that we have seen in recent weeks. It is possible that such weakness of domestic demand might be offset by an improvement in productivity, although as yet few signs of that are observable. Three lessons from past monetary policy experience are relevant to the present position. First, monetary policy can target only the aggregate price level.

And output has risen in every single quarter since the middle of 1992, something that is true of no other G7 economy. Why were the 1990s so successful? And can that success continue? Four features of our economy lie behind this improved performance. First, the new monetary framework - based on an explicit target for inflation, a high degree of transparency, and, since 1997, independence of the Bank of England made it clear to everyone that monetary policy was, and would continue to be, targeted on maintaining low and stable inflation. Second, a substantial fiscal consolidation turned a deficit of 8% of GDP in 1993 into a sustainable position for the public finances based on a set of clear rules for government debt. Third, a continuing programme of supply-side reforms, over a period of 20 years, made it possible to reduce unemployment without generating higher inflation. Fourth, although the unexpected twists and turns of the world economy did pose real challenges to monetary policy, especially in the latter half of the decade, those shocks tended to average out over time rather than cumulate in either an upward or downward spiral. In other words, the economic surprises alternated between good one year and bad the next, rather than adding up to “one damn thing after another”. In that sense, Lady Luck smiled on us. Of course, we were not alone in enjoying the 1990s.