samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Cecilia Skingsley: Household debt under the microscope Speech by Ms Cecilia Skingsley, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at SABOs (the Swedish Association of Public Housing Companies) Finance Day, Stockholm, 8 May 2014. *  *  *  I would like to thank Annika Svensson, Marianne Sterner, Jakob Winstrand and Dilan Ölcer for their help in writing this speech and for their views on earlier versions. The issue of household indebtedness is currently under discussion in many different contexts. The Riksbank, for example, has expressed its concern about the development of household debt and the situation on the mortgage market for several years now. 1 The discussions centre on to what extent the increase in household debt that we have seen for some time poses a risk to the real economy and to the stability of the financial system, and on the measures that may be needed to reduce these risks. However, the statistics available to date have not made it possible to conduct all the analyses that we would have liked to conduct to get a complete picture of the debt situation. With the support of the Sveriges Riksbank Act, the Riksbank therefore decided in the summer of 2013 to collect data on individuals’ debts from the eight largest banks in Sweden. This data provides important pieces of the puzzle regarding household debt.

It is hoped that the discussions during the forum will assist in gathering a consensus on the viability of such an initiative where efforts and resources involved may be substantial. Indeed, it should be noted that there is certainly potential in the development of this shared platform, where combined resources and expertise would foster greater efficiency and provide fresh impetus for a more meaningful and far-reaching development of Islamic finance in the international stage. The prospects of such pioneering works with the possibility of international appeal, if successful, would certainly be exciting. Ladies and gentlemen, SSO, at first sight, seems very much the domain of large global players – where opportunities for significant cost arbitrage involved in, say, the relocation of call centres from the UK to Malaysia seem to be very compelling and obvious options. Understandably, the issue of SSO is tread very cautiously by the smaller and boutique players in the industry. Where bottom lines are concerned, an institution's Board may find little appeal in the proposition of outsourcing where the cost-savings involved may seem minimal. However, there are many rewards to be reaped by an institution's successful execution and maintenance of SSO arrangements and a reduction in operating costs may only form part of the picture. The outsourcing of back office operations, say, allows institutions to accord greater focus on their core competencies and core businesses such as the execution of growth strategies or capturing market share.
The pressure exerted by low interest rates does not only affect Spanish banks but is common to most European entities, albeit with differing intensity depending on balance sheet structure and the predominant type of banking business. Hence, the adverse effect on profitability of interest rates holding at low levels is all the greater the higher the percentage of loans extended at a floating interest rate, the lower the percentage of assets recorded at fair value or the greater the proportion accounted for by deposits in the bank’s financing structure. That is to say, the current environment of low rates particularly affects the traditional banking business of financial intermediation, namely that which prevails in Spain. Additionally, it should be borne in mind that the impact of changes in interest rates on bank profitability is not linear. Any reduction in interest rates, in what is an environment with already very low levels, affects bank margins with particular intensity. Indeed, the work performed at the Banco de España shows (see Chart 2) that, for high levels of interest rates, a moderate reduction in the Euribor exerts a positive impact on net interest income, since the stimulus effect (quantity effect) exerted by lower rates on the demand for credit offsets the reduction in the unit return on the loans (price effect).

This, in turn, will mobilise more public and private sector investments through co-financing and greatly enhance the support available to developing members. We are also glad to see that governments are working together and making significant steps in promoting infrastructure development. They include, for instance, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the G20 Global Infrastructure Initiative and Global Infrastructure Hub. These initiatives underscore the commitment by governments from within and outside the region to give infrastructure investment a fresh impetus. By bringing new funds and new ways for development assistance, they will serve to complement the existing efforts by ADB in meeting the region’s vast development needs. As highlighted in the theme for this year’s Annual Meeting, fostering cooperation among development partners – existing and new, private and public, national and multilateral – is crucial for reaping synergy and maximising development impact. ADB has a hailed tradition of cooperating with other partners in delivering results. By working together, we believe that ADB and its partners in the region will go a long way in mobilising funds and building the capacity of developing members in delivering high-quality infrastructure projects. As an international financial and business centre in the region, Hong Kong, China has an active role to play in supporting and promoting infrastructure investment in Asia. Corporates, as well as national and multilateral development agencies including ADB and IFC, have been making extensive use of Hong Kong, China’s deep financial markets in raising funds for infrastructure projects.
Thank you very much. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

A single supervisor builds trust not only between supervisors, but also with shareholders and other stakeholders, including the fiscal authorities that, in the past, were too often assumed to be the shareholders of last resort of their national financial system. The importance of the SSM to uphold the single market serves as a reminder that the objective of having a robust supervisor is not just to make banks safe. The objective is to make banks safe so that they can safely access resources and use them to fund innovation, investment, and growth. Similarly, creating a single supervisor was not an objective per se. But it was necessary so that the integrity of the single banking market is not questioned. What I have said of banking can be extrapolated to other areas of finance, which is one reason why, alongside Banking Union, the Capital Markets Union, championed by Commissioner Hill, also needs to be implemented fully and as quickly as practical. I am not saying “as quickly as practical” for no reason. If we want to restore in Europe the stability that is the premise for a return to prosperity, we need to consider the economic costs entailed by recurrent uncertainty over the operating environment of European firms. Not only does it cause a loss of growth today, but by impeding investment, it may also weaken our potential in a more lasting way.
I am sure it is not true but it conveys a misconceived perception that perhaps we should not ignore. I am not suggesting that the socialist-market economy model, practiced for example on the Mainland of China, with considerably greater influence over and ownership of the financial system by the authorities, and therefore greater attention by operators within the financial system to the public interest, has become the superior model, although I noticed at least some involuntary movement lately of the so-called Anglo-Saxon model towards that direction. “Thou shalt lend”, says the government to banks that have received capital injections from the public purse. It is I think a matter of degree, not so much in the ownership of the financial system, but more in the legal and institutional framework whereby those with the responsibility to protect the public interest can exert the appropriate influence at the appropriate time, whether it is through prudential supervision, conduct regulation, the provision of safety nets or the design of crisis resolution mechanisms. My second issue is a dilemma. This is a dilemma mostly for emerging markets – a dilemma between pursuing financial openness and maintaining financial stability. I support financial openness as a means of greatly extending the universe within which the risk appetite of domestic savings and the risk profile of domestic borrowers can be satisfied. Indeed, for borrowers and investors of a particular jurisdiction, taking financial intermediation into the international dimension should lower borrowing costs and increase investment returns.

Joseph Yam: International financial system – challenging issues Welcome address by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the SIBOS 2009, Hong Kong, 14 September 2009. *  *  *  SIBOS was last held here in Hong Kong in 1991. So it has taken you 18 years to come back to Hong Kong. I wonder what took you so long. A lot has happened here in this free and open international financial centre in the past 18 years that ought to have interested you enough to bring you back here earlier. I can think of, for example, the establishment of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in 1993! Seriously, financial globalisation and innovation have made life here, where there is a high degree of market freedom and ample liquidity, rather challenging, perhaps a little too challenging for the financial authorities. And on a couple of occasions we had to take controversial, remedial action to safeguard monetary and financial stability.
No immediate consequences have been felt so far in the US debt market which remains the most liquid one and the ultimate benchmark for assessing risk. However, a pervasive uncertainty has been created, which might be responsible for the decline in confidence that has occurred over the last weeks. In Europe, on the contrary, sovereign credit risk has had immediate and dramatic consequences. It is difficult to foresee how, in the longer run, markets will assess debt sustainability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But let me challenge some current analyses about debt sustainability in Europe. –  First competitiveness. In the UK, for instance, the effective real exchange rate has depreciated by 23% over the last four years and its exports have grown by a healthy 15%, year-to-year over the first semester of 2011. But Italy, Spain and Greece have done better, with exports growing respectively by 16%, 19% and 37% over the same period, with, of course, no internal exchange rate adjustment. Linking competitiveness with exchange rate depreciation is therefore too simplistic. Improving competitiveness can be achieved by proper domestic reforms with a lasting result. –  Second, the euro is the only major currency area with its external accounts in balance, which is a strong guarantee of long-term solvency. –  Third, the euro area’s aggregate budget deficit will stand at around 4.1% in 2011, less than half that of the UK or the US.

Source: Bank of England 2017 Q2 Credit Conditions Survey (CCS). (a) A positive balance indicates that the changes in the factors described have served to increase credit availability. (b) Question: ‘How have the following factors affected overall secured credit availability to households over the latest three months relative to the previous three months?’ The chart shows responses to the option 'market share objectives'. (c) Net percentage balances are calculated by weighting together the responses of those lenders who answered the question by their market shares. Chart 17. Proportion of new mortgages with (a) no fees  Chart 18. Loan to income distribution of new (a) mortgage lending  Per cent  Proportion of £ fee new mortgages  50 45 40 35  30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2011  12  13  14  15  16  17  Sources: Moneyfacts and Bank calculations. (a) The proportion of £ fee products in each year is calculated relative to the total number of new mortgages offered during the year. The proportion in 2017 is calculated based on data from January to April 2017. Sources: FCA Product Sales Database and Bank calculations. (a) The Product Sales Database includes regulated mortgages only. 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  Chart 19. Major UK banks’ capital ratios  Chart 20.
These monetary policy meetings will be held 8–10 times a year and the minutes will be published with a time lag of 6–8 weeks. Monetary policy matters may, of course, appear on the agenda in the intervals between these meetings, particularly as repo rate decisions are normally made once a fortnight and announced for the coming two weeks. In the normal course of events, however, it is envisaged that repo rate decisions will be based on the discussions at monetary policy meetings. So it is only under special circumstances that monetary policy will need to be discussed more comprehensively in between the meetings specifically reserved for this. For the Riksbank, this is a new procedure. The time when decisions will be announced is also new. In future, monetary policy decisions will be published on Fridays at 9.30am, though there may be exceptions to this rule in certain cases, such as the publication of the Inflation Report. Judging from their newsletters, it seems to me that so far most market players have understood our new arrangements. That is a good thing and also important. There may be situations in which members of the Executive Board reach divergent conclusions. That will necessitate a more formal voting procedure. The outcome will be recorded in the minutes. No mention of a vote indicates that the Board agreed unanimously; otherwise, members with dissenting opinions will be named. Disagreement on the Executive Board is clearly not something that is desirable as such.

The role of quality, and its inter-relationships with operational aspects of a service organisation has been expressed in what has been described as the “service-profit chain” as follows: (i) profit and growth are stimulated primarily by customer loyalty; (ii) loyalty is a direct result of customer satisfaction; (iii) satisfaction is largely influenced by the value of services provided to customers; (iv) value is created by satisfied, loyal and productive employees; (v) employee satisfaction results primarily from high-quality support services and policies that enable employees to deliver results to customers. Superior insights on customer needs will be an important advantage. This will involve recognising the diverse needs of the different customer segments. There is now already a discernable change in the pattern of customer behaviour. There is now an increasing shift towards a customer base that has less need for the standard distribution systems for most banking services. “If you build it, they will come” used to be the by-word for domestic banking institutions. A new branch would naturally attract new customers. Now, while customer relationship is of vital importance, these needs to be addressed in the context of the needs of the younger customers for retail services who do not want the “inconvenience” of a branch. The preference is for services as much as possible over the telephone, ATM or Internet. Writing cheques has become an inconvenience. This new generation of customers have their own ideas of what a bank should be and successful banks need to respond to this change.
The stronger boost to consumption, in a context of earlier closing of the output gap and increased cost pressures, adjusts our inflation projection up. Core inflation will close the year slightly below 4 percent annually. Higher energy prices will continue to dominate the volatile component. Thus, after rising in the second half of the year, total annual CPI inflation at December 2021 will be 4.4 percent. In 2022 and 2023, as fiscal and monetary impulses normalize, inflation will converge to 3 percent and remain there until the end of the policy horizon, that is, the second quarter of 2023 (Figure 17). To sum up, the higher activity forecast for this year is largely explained by the increase in private consumption, responding to the many stimulus measures adopted after the last Report. A significant number of these measures reflect that the fiscal policy is considerably more expansionary than previously expected. The outlook for investment and exports, on the other hand, is more limited, with a tendency to decelerate in the former. Thus, a recovery scenario notoriously biased towards consumption is emerging, which, if maintained or deepened with more procyclical policies, could incubate larger macroeconomic imbalances, a risk that should be duly monitored. IV. Re-estimating the structural parameters of the Chilean economy  The structural parameters correspond to longer-term estimates of different economic variables: namely GDP growth, the neutral MPR, and the prices of selected commodities, which provide context to long-term projections and monetary policy formulation.

Page 25 of 27  Table 3 Structural parameters Long-term copper price  Long-term oil price (dollars per barrel)  (dollars per pound)  Trend non-mining GDP next 10 years  Nominal neutral MPR (percent)  Technical mínimum MPR (percent)  (annual change, percent)  Dec-15/Mar-21  Dec-15/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jul-09/Mar-21  2.7  70  3.25-3.75  3.75-4.25  0.5  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  3.3  60  2.4-3.4  3.25-3.75  0.5  Source: Central Bank of Chile. ***  Page 26 of 27
Given the gaps in traditional information sources, MAS is exploring some unconventional ways in which to gather data about the scale and scope of crypto token related activities. One, the crypto token blockchains themselves can provide a wealth of information – including time stamps, recipient and sender addresses. Two, the Application Programming Interfaces or APIs provided by crypto-exchanges present real-time insights on current flows in the crypto market, including information on the fiat currencies that are being exchanged for crypto tokens. Money laundering A clear and present danger posed by some crypto token activity is money laundering and terrorism financing. Intermediaries dealing in crypto tokens are already required to report any suspicious transactions to the Commercial Affairs Department. In addition, the proposed Payment Services Bill will require intermediaries that buy, sell or exchange virtual currencies to specifically address money laundering and terrorism financing risks. Intermediaries will be required to carry out customer due diligence and put in place controls and processes that are commensurate with their risks. Investor protection Investor protection is another immediate concern arising from the crypto mania. Where the crypto tokens represent ownership or a security interest over an issuer’s assets or any property, or a debt owed by the issuer, they may be regarded as securities under the Securities and Futures Act.

Guarding against Gresham’s Law I have spoken about the good, bad, and ugly of crypto tokens. To be more exact, it is the uses of crypto tokens that assume these qualities. Like Money, crypto tokens can a force for good or bad. Lest we forget, money is not the root of all evil; it is the love of money that is so. The same applies to crypto tokens – it is the enchantment with these tokens as a way to make a quick buck and their abuse for illicit activities that are at the root of our concerns. There is an old axiom in economics called Gresham’s Law, which is loosely interpreted as “bad money drives out good”. We must work together – regulators and the crypto industry – to make sure that bad money does not take hold. And that a new generation of crypto tokens emerges, that harnesses the potential of blockchain technology for social good while mitigating the risks today’s tokens pose. This is a future worth securing and I hope that some of the talents gathered in this hall will help to make it happen. Thank you. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
In other words, it does not seem as though we can expect monetary policy scope to increase that way very soon. It is primarily for this reason that I believe we need to think about how we will be able to conduct monetary policy over the next ten to fifteen years or so. I would like to stress that my discussion is general and looks forward over a relatively long perspective. It should not be interpreted as dealing with contemporary policies. As regards such policies, my conviction is that we will succeed in bringing Swedish inflation up to target and in anchoring the long-term expectations – as I’m sure you know, we are almost there. Preparedness for a different monetary policy playing field But at the same time, we must be prepared for it perhaps not being possible, in the future, to conduct monetary policy in the way and with the impact we have previously been accustomed to. For example, we should include in the calculation that the policy rate will probably be unusually low when the next recession occurs. A recession is certainly not on the cards at the moment, but we know that, sooner or later, one will inevitably arrive. When the financial crisis broke out, we were able to cut the repo rate from a level of almost 5 per cent. The Riksbank’s latest forecast indicates that, in the middle of 2019, the repo rate will be 0.7 per cent.

7 One implication of a relatively stronger exchange rate channel may be that, in the future, it may become even more important to small, open economies. This, in turn, may entail a number of complications, as exchange rate adjustments are sometimes associated with attempts to manipulate the value of a country’s own currency and “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies. However, as I have said, this is only a hypothesis so far, and more empirical evidence is needed regarding how globalisation has affected the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The debate on how much large central banks’ actions affect monetary policy in small countries will continue, as will the general discussion of the effects of globalisation on the possibilities for monetary policy. However, at present, it seems reasonable to assume that the low global interest rate poses a greater challenge when it comes to which monetary policy can be conducted in countries such as Sweden. 6  Caceres et al. (2016) define autonomy-restricting effects of foreign interest rates as the response in the domestic interest rate above and beyond what is justified by domestic economic circumstances. They find that, with this definition, the empirical analysis indicates significantly greater monetary policy autonomy in small, open economies than more traditional estimates suggest. See also Disyatat and Rungcharoenkitkul (2015). 7  See Meier (2013) and Georgiadis and Mehl (2015).