samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This option makes the bank harder to manage but supervision is a very effective tool against speculators. On a more micro side, we have been putting good governance into our financial institutions. By good governance, we mean transparency, competitiveness and good internal management. Bank directors BIS Review 86/2000  2  are now required to have no more than three directorships in other limited liability institutions so that they can spend enough time running the bank. Of the 70 people who did not qualify, 50 have now complied and we are working on arranging for the rest to be compliant as soon as possible using the traditional amicable Asian way of trying to change things. We are also working on getting the major shareholders not to vote for independent directors so that minority shareholders are better represented on the board. One government bank has done this and the new private commercial bank to be set up at the end of this year has agreed to do so. Seeing that it could be done or how it could be done, we expect the remaining private commercial banks to follow suit in next year’s annual shareholders’ meeting or at other relevant times. Audit committees are now a requirement and many banks have nomination and compensation committees to reduce the power of the major shareholders in the management of the bank. Nearly all banks have risk management committees or at least asset and liability management committees, which is preferable to having no risk management at all.

In summary on our financial institutions’ developments, they are going ahead very fast and they will have good rules to perform to, but I must admit we are coming from way off, and have a long way to go before we are competitive in our own country let alone abroad. Ladies and gentlemen, So far I have talked at some length about the macroeconomy, good governance and developments in our financial institutions. Even if all the things I have outlined about Thailand were to happen, many people think that the economy would still be prone to instability unless the central bank is also revitalized. I am inclined to agree with them. For some reasons not yet identifiable, and that worries me because a good change normally only can happen when the problems have been clearly identified. But in any case, there were signs that the Bank of Thailand somehow has been sidetracked into the crony capitalism of the rest of the economy, a development whose job it is of the central bank to try and prevent. It was obvious therefore that the Bank of Thailand had to be restructured into an organization that would be effective and neutral. Extensive work was therefore done employing re-engineering concepts using consultants as necessary. The six management levels have now been reduced to two, with people of different capabilities at the second tier depending on the importance of their work. At the operating level, there are also only two levels.
Employment, total hours worked and unemployment all tend to be highly persistent, so a rise in unemployment means – based on history – that it will be higher a year from now. That said, the UK labour market has adjusted relatively quickly to large shocks in the past (Broadbent, 2012). In normal times, around 9% of workers change jobs every year, but the tendency to persistence provides evidence from the past of the effects of a mismatch between the skills of job seekers and those required by hiring firms. As I noted earlier, some of the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic employ more young and low-skilled workers, who may find it hard to move between sectors (Haldane, 2020). That difficulty will be amplified if the jobs involve different tasks. Bank staff have analysed the task content of different jobs to quantify the extent of task reallocation required in various scenarios. In a relatively extreme scenario where the pattern of consumer spending is unchanged from 2020 Q3, staff estimate that the extent of the task reallocation over coming years would be higher than in the recent past, but much less than occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. That was a period of 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  significant structural change during which the share of employees working in the manufacturing sector fell from 26% to 16%. There are two important points I would emphasise here.

At some point, as global economic activity begins to recover, we will again need to act to restrain the growth of domestic demand, but that is a problem for the future. Given the present international economic environment, and given the present advanced stage of our own economic cycle, if the outturn over the next couple of years is anything close to this – that is about the best we can realistically hope for. 7  BIS Review 19/1999
Price  operations through a new fiscal  stability is interpreted to mean low,  framework, aimed at strengthening  stable and predictable levels of inflation,  fiscal sustainability in the medium-term. which is conducive for fostering  This framework is embedded in the IMF-  sustainable long-term economic growth  EFF arrangement. and employment in a country. Price stability is instrumental in keeping nominal interest rates low, thereby enabling an economy to exploit its growth potential, while both consumers and producers can make economic decisions with confidence and certainty. These efforts will complement the expected improvements of the Central Bank with regard to two key policy frameworks in relation to monetary policy. a. The conduct of monetary policy will  Therefore, modern central banks  be strengthened through the move  predominantly focus on achieving price  towards a flexible inflation targeting  stability as a pre-condition for  (FIT) framework. sustainable growth. b. A properly designed and widely In this context, I would like to indicate  accepted framework for exchange  that the Central Bank and the  rate management will also be  government are working towards  introduced to establish a market-  establishing a well-designed  based exchange rate system in the country. Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  11  The broad-based reform actions under  towards new frameworks, such as  the EFF arrangement with the IMF will  inflation targeting. complement these efforts.

Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  At the same time, we will continue to actively engage in liquidity management operations in the money market to guide  14  the short-term interest rates within the  economic analyses for the purpose of  desired path. formulating effective policies, while  In order to ensure the effective implementation of monetary policy, we  improving the transparency of monetary policy and policy communication. expect to introduce certain measures  At the same time, in the process of  with regard to OMOs, such as  making more informed policy decisions,  introducing fixed rate and variable rate  we look forward to enhancing statistical  auctions, and fine tuning auctions after  inputs by introducing new indices on  examining their need and feasibility in  property prices as well as modifying  line with other country experiences and  wage indices, while improving the  market needs. We will evaluate  coverage of existing surveys to better  alternative instruments to strengthen  track developments in the private  OMOs. sector. Reflecting these measures, inflation is  The Central Bank will continue to  expected to remain at mid-single digit  communicate policy decisions among  levels in the medium-term.
Instead, imbalances in the labour market would be counteracted by means of a counter-cyclical policy. Substantial emphasis was placed on the importance of wage formation for developments in employment. Only when wage growth dropped below the level of our trading partners did unemployment begin to fall and the manufacturing sector began to pick up. Thus, the fixed exchange rate policy was not introduced in order to strengthen the internationally exposed business sector. On the contrary, it was a breach in the approach whereby monetary policy and “exchange rate policy” had been oriented towards safeguarding these sectors. The fixed exchange rate was an intermediate target for achieving low and stable inflation. The exchange rate remained stable until the autumn of 1996, partly because wage growth was low and aggregate demand did not contribute to pressures in the economy. Gradually, the krone began to fluctuate more. The experience of the last half of the 1990s showed that monetary policy cannot fine-tune the exchange rate. Developments in international financial markets provided fertile ground for more pronounced fluctuations. And more fundamentally, when labour market pressures rose and incomes policy failed, exchange rate developments were no longer providing signals for wage formation and fiscal policy. High petroleum revenues, fiscal slippage and expectations of increased use of petroleum revenues contributed to this. Therefore, the exchange rate was no longer suitable as a nominal anchor. The introduction of new guidelines for economic policy in March 2001 and the conduct of fiscal policy have altered the interplay between economic policy components.

There will be a waiver of three months’ guarantee fee for loans with tenor of one to three years and a waiver of six months’ guarantee fee for loans with tenor of more than three years. Lastly, let me thank once again the senior representatives of the 21 banks for participating in today’s Signing Ceremony. We stand ready to work with the banking industry to jointly promote this project which is so meaningful for the SMEs and the local economy. Thank you! BIS Review 170/2010  1
However, the fall in interest rates of recent years and the longer average debt maturities (currently standing at more than 15  See, for example, Box 1 of the analytical article “Recent developments in financing and bank lending to the nonfinancial private sector. First half of 2022”, Banco de España. 10  eight years) limit the short-term impact. Overall, if the current expectations for rising interest rates are incorporated, the public debt burden in Spain will increase from 2.2% of GDP at end-2021 to 2.6% in 2024. The role of monetary policy in combating inflation should be complemented by an incomes agreement As I have reiterated on numerous occasions, the outlook for our economy is highly influenced by the risk of a price-cost feedback loop, which, if it materialised, would have very adverse effects on external competitiveness, resulting in further losses in terms of jobs and growth. To avoid this, it is essential that economic agents (essentially firms and households, but also general government) internalise the loss of income caused by the rise in the cost of imported commodities. As I mentioned earlier, the pass-through of inflationary pressures to wage settlements has so far been very contained, and profit margins have remained stable.

It has also triggered some pass-through to other goods and services: it is estimated that a 10 pp increase in food commodity prices ultimately has a 0.4 pp impact on headline inflation (HICP) after one year. 7. Underlying inflation has risen significantly, amounting to 4.9% in August in Spain (4.3% in the euro area). In August, 43% of items saw inflation of more than 4% (over 50% in the euro area). In Spain the contribution to this increase was particularly high in the case of restaurants, cafés and the like, accommodation services and motor vehicles.5 “Recreation, hospitality and tourism” contributed 1.6 pp to headline inflation in Spain, compared with 1.1 pp in the euro area.6  1  For instance, at the end of summer 2021 gas prices and, therefore, electricity prices, were expected to correct downwards sharply from spring 2022. However, according to the futures market, this correction is now not expected until 2023. 2  See J. M. González-Mínguez, S. Hurtado, D. Leiva-León and A. Urtasun (2022). “De la energía al resto de componentes: la generalización del fenómeno inflacionista”, Artículos Analíticos, Boletín Económico, Banco de España, forthcoming. 3  Fertilizer and natural gas prices are very closely related. In addition, the war has represented a further shock to agricultural commodities, as Russia and Ukraine account for high shares of the corresponding international markets. 4  This behaviour does not differ from that observed in prior episodes of rising prices, such as the 2008 global food price crisis.
It is titled “The World Business Cycle and Expected Returns”, which has been accepted for publication in the premier European finance journal: the Review of Finance. In this paper, Priestley and co-author Ilan Cooper use a novel and interesting measure of the business variable, namely the ratio of capital to output. This ratio is a good predictor of return on financial indices, both equity and bond returns and credit spreads, across time and across markets. The paper by Cooper and Priestley demonstrate neatly a central element of modern financial economics: expected returns on financial securities vary over time, and tend to move with the business cycle. This fact is highly relevant for a long-term investor such as the fund, and is one of this conference’s central topics. Since its inception in 1998, the mandate of the fund has prescribed a strategic fixed equity share; at 40 percent in the initial years, increased to 60 percent some years ago. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  A fixed share may sound trivial. It is not. The average portfolio of all investors cannot be rebalanced. As the risk premium varies over time, equity values swing. Equities are more volatile than bonds, and the equity share of the combined market portfolio of bonds and equities fluctuates substantially. Rebalancing as we do implies taking on more risk just when risk is already perceived to be high. When the value of equities fall more than that of bonds, rebalancing means that we would sell bonds and buy equities.

Øystein Olsen: Promoting high-quality research in financial economics Closing remarks by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norwegian Finance Initiative (NFI) conference 2012, Oslo, 20 June 2012. *  *  *  In 2011 Norges Bank established the Norwegian Finance Initiative – NFI. Through the NFI we aim to promote excellence. Excellence in research, in curiosity and in criticism. One objective of NFI is to contribute to a qualified debate in Norway on the fund, its strategy and its management. Top-quality research at academic institutions in Norway is a necessary condition for this. The fundamental idea of the NFI is to provide incentive programs that will lead to long-run structural improvements in research and teaching in financial economics. Over the past year, we have introduced seven programs, directed at both students and faculty of financial economics at academic institutions in Norway. One important program involves co-sponsoring positions and hiring of outstanding academics. In this way the Norwegian Finance Initiative can help academic institutions in Norway build the infrastructure needed to sustain a lively research culture. Another NFI program is the publication bonus. The publication bonus has been established by the Norwegian Finance Initiative to provide incentives for existing faculty to go the extra mile to produce high-quality, high-impact research. The program also signals to young scholars the value their institutions place on this level of achievement.
Prices for Norwegian exports, such as oil, gas, metals, minerals and fish, rose markedly, while prices for imported goods fell. In the seven years leading up to the financial crisis, the volume of mainland GDP expanded at an average annual rate of 3.4 per cent. Exactly ten years ago today, Norges Bank was charged with the task of setting the interest rate with a view to keeping inflation low and stable. At the same time, new fiscal policy guidelines, also known as the fiscal rule, were implemented, charting a course for petroleum revenue spending. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, which is now called the Government Pension Fund Global, was designed to prevent fluctuations in oil prices from feeding through to the mainland economy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A decade of inflation targeting The inflation target for monetary policy provides a sound anchor for inflation expectations. Over the past decade, CPI inflation has varied to some extent. Underlying inflation has naturally been more stable, but has been both higher and lower than the target. If we look at the ten-year period as a whole, inflation has been 2 per cent, that is to say close to the target. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Still, over the past ten years, the conduct of monetary policy has been tested. During this period, we have gained insight into the functioning of the Norwegian economy under an inflation-targeting regime. Let me touch upon some of these insights.

This development is primarily demand-driven, fuelled by strong growth in the global economy, and in emerging market economies in particular. More recently, oil prices have increased further as political unrest in North Africa and the Middle East has led to uncertainty regarding future oil supply. Norwegian manufacturing industries are also benefiting from high commodity prices. Increased profitability for many firms and rising real disposable income may boost the demand for labour. With the prospect of continued high commodity prices and falling import prices, Norway’s terms of trade should hold up in the period ahead. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  This, together with a tight labour market, may fuel wage growth. Looking ahead, cost inflation is most likely to edge up. On the other hand, high net immigration may have a dampening impact on wages. In 2010, the population rose by 62 000, an increase of 1.3 per cent. Low unemployment and a relatively high wage level have made the Norwegian labour market attractive to job seekers of foreign origin. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Going forward, continued high labour immigration is expected to result in solid growth in the labour force. At the same time, improved terms of trade will led to higher activity in the Norwegian economy. Capacity utilisation is expected to revert to a normal level in the second half of 2011. In the coming years, output in the mainland economy is expected to increase at an annual rate of 3–4 per cent.
This background is important in order to be able to assess how the Riksbank’s balance sheet should develop over the longer term and be able to relate to the discussion in other countries. Central bank balance sheets were quite different prior to the financial crisis, both in composition and size. We can expect countries in which monetary policy steers towards similar future inflation targets to have comparable interest rate levels. The balance sheets may, however, look quite different. My main message today is that the monetary policy arguments for a large balance sheet are, in my opinion, not particularly strong in the Swedish context. Indeed, there are also risks associated with maintaining a large balance sheet. The most likely scenario is therefore that the Riksbank’s balance sheet will, in a future normal situation, be substantially smaller than it is today. There is no “normal” balance sheet Figure 2 shows what various central bank balance sheets looked like just over a decade ago, prior to the global financial crisis. The most striking feature of the figure is that balance sheets looked different in different countries. In some countries, for example the United States and Canada, the central bank had a lean balance sheet, the size of which was determined in practice by the demand for banknotes in the economy. The asset side was dominated by domestic government bonds while the liability side was dominated by issued banknotes.

The risks he discusses are mainly linked to central banks that buy assets other than government bonds. The more the central bank involves itself in risk and capital allocation in the economy, the greater the risk of it being exposed to political pressure with respect to how it should conduct its policy. And more generally, the larger the central bank’s balance sheet, the greater the risk of politicians wishing to utilise the resources in a specific way. Plosser’s arguments are important, but they are not particularly applicable to the Riksbank’s current situation. The Riksbank has only purchased government bonds, and we have spread our purchases fairly evenly on the outstanding bond stock in order to affect the general level of interest rates rather than specific bond prices. And despite the Riksbank’s balance sheet having grown rapidly in recent years, it is significantly smaller in relation to GDP than in many other countries. As far as the Riksbank is concerned, I consider the financial risks to be more problematic. The large bond portfolio means that the interest rate risk on the balance sheet has increased. The bonds we have purchased have an average maturity of 5 years, but are funded with Riksbank certificates with a maturity of one week. If the interest rate rises, the funding costs will therefore increase while the return on the bonds already purchases remains unchanged. In addition, the expected return on the Riksbank’s bond portfolio is low.