samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They are indispensable to avoid any room that may be used for abusive actions that would impair the institution. I therefore request that you take the necessary measures in terms of financial, human and technological capacities in order to ensure the safety of each banking operation. In pursuing its supervisory function, the Bank of Albania will have this matter under close focus and I assure you that any decision that may have hampered the safety of the activity will be handled with utmost stringency by the law. In a broader context, banking activity, in addition to operational risks, is faced with other financial-related risks. We will therefore increase the regulatory requirements for banks to be engaged in an integrated process of risk evaluation and management proportionate to the level of development and sophistication. In a more practical approach, this implies that banks should have specific functional structures that monitor risks in the main activity areas and endeavour to anticipate their possible evolution and impact on banks’ activity. These structures must be  2  BIS Review 174/2010  in place in the largest banks and their products should be an integral part of the decisionmaking process. Dear participants, We are leaving behind a challenging year but other numerous challenges will follow for banking activity. They provide us the opportunity to put our vision into practice, in order to ensure a stable banking activity as a precondition for conducting an efficient intermediation activity with remarkable contribution to economic development at home.

Weathering the challenges requires courage and professionalism. In addition, banking institutions should provide an environment where accountable and professional human capacities are in the service of the public and the institution. I am confident that you will prioritize the foregoing matters in 2011. I wish you success in your work and many wishes for the New Year! Thank you. BIS Review 174/2010  3
However, experience tells us that increased interest rates are seldom enough to break the trend. Optimism can be such that investors are glad to pay the extra interest costs or to accept a correspondingly lower return on assets, as they are convinced that prices will continue to rise. For example, in Sweden in 1989, the direct yield requirement on the commercial property market lay at around 4 per cent, while a risk-free five-year government bond had a return of up to 12 per cent. So the market preferred an unsecured property asset to a covered bond with a return of 8 per cent more! No monetary policy can defeat that kind of optimism. Furthermore, it could be the case that inflation is low despite the strong economic development. If this is the case, monetary policy may need to become more expansionary to attain the inflation target, which, in turn, may fuel financial imbalances. During the years preceding the current crisis, increasing globalisation resulted in a heavy dampening of import prices, which pushed inflation down and contributed to an expansionary monetary policy in many countries. Monetary policy thus fuelled the bubble, rather than counteracting it. If a crisis becomes really serious, as is the case with the present crisis, the conditions for conducting monetary policy become very difficult. The situation became exacerbated when rising risk premiums increased the interest rates affecting households and companies. Falling inflation and inflationary expectations led real interest rates to increase even more.

The high road to a responsible, open financial system Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  Thomson Reuters, Canary Wharf Friday 7 April 2017  I am grateful to Lauren Anderson, Phil Evans, Michael Goldby, Clare Macallan and Iain de Weymarn, for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  I. Introduction  The United Kingdom has been at the heart of the global economy for centuries. Throughout that period, the City has channelled the life blood of the world economy, finance. th  London emerged as the world’s leading financial centre at the end of the 18 century, overtaking 1  Amsterdam, as Britain became the dominant economy. Whereas other major financial centres lost their importance as economic power shifted elsewhere, London has retained its pre-eminence even as the UK’s relative economic weight has declined. 2  This staying power reflects London’s inherent strengths: its people, law, language and time zone. And it testifies to the City’s enduring commitments to markets, openness and innovation. Long experience teaches that an open global economy is not predestined. A responsible international financial system requires:  -  a shared commitment to markets;  -  common minimum standards;  -  high degrees of cooperation amongst regulators; and  -  resilient institutions and markets at the core. Authorities who oversee the largest global financial hubs, like the Bank of England, bear special responsibilities.
In other words, their use has been driven by purely economic and commercial motives. 17. The growing concerns over SWFs and various proposals to restrict either the mode of their investments or areas in which they might invest are signs of a worrying trend of rising investment protectionism, and pose a risk to international financial stability. We are  4  BIS Review 51/2008  sympathetic to concerns in recipient countries and acknowledge that these worries, if left unaddressed, would only increase protectionist sentiments. In our last meeting, the IMFC called on the IMF to play a role in identifying best practices for SWFs. We share the view that as a multilateral platform, the Fund could play a useful role in this area, by allowing issues to be discussed in an open and neutral manner. We welcome the inclusive, collaborative, and voluntary approach taken by the Fund. The principles should focus on governance, institutional arrangement, and transparency and be co-written by the SWFs and for the SWFs, hence would help increase ownership of the best practices, which is critical to its successful adoption. We also welcome the parallel work undertaken by the OECD in drawing up a similar set of guidelines for recipient countries to forestall the risk of protectionism. It is highly important that in drafting such guidelines, the standards for SWFs should not be more onerous than for other large institutional investors. Conclusion 18.

As we said in our IMFC statement last October, reform must go beyond quota and voice. The Fund should rethink the areas where it has a comparative advantage and where it does not. We are glad to note that the Managing Director has taken up the suggestion and made this the focus of the refocusing. Thus, we support the shift in focus in the three broad areas: strengthen analysis on macro-financial linkages, integrating multilateral perspectives in bilateral surveillance, and sharpening the work in financial markets. 14. We welcome the use of these same yardsticks in guiding the ambitious expenditure savings that the Managing Director has proposed. When the IMFC asked for significant expenditure reductions last October, we are aware that some of these reductions have been painful, particularly those arising from the difficult decision to reduce staffing levels at the Fund. It is critical that in managing this process, the Fund does not lose the capacity to deal with emerging issues effectively and with the high level of professionalism that we have come to expect. In that regard, we consider the diversity of the Fund’s staff an important asset that ought to be preserved in the restructuring process. As an international organization, we believe that the face of the Fund ought to reflect that of its membership. More importantly, diversity in terms of expertise, experience, linguistic abilities and cultural backgrounds, helps the Fund leverage on a wider base of knowledge, understand country circumstances and navigate the subtleties of dealing with a diverse membership more effectively. 15.
Quality data is foundational in our fight against greenwashing and in enabling relevant stakeholders to make effective ESG-investment decisions. Third, it helps to catalyse green and transition finance flows. There is a significant gap between ESG data needs and the ESG data available. We need good data on firms' carbon footprint, historical carbon emission trends, and compliance with their respective transition targets. We also need data on the climate-related risks their physical assets are vulnerable to. But the ESG data acquisition process is often manual, tedious and costly. ESG data verification is at a nascent stage. This impacts the credibility of reporting. FinTech can be a key enabler in addressing these ESG data challenges. 5/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Data acquisition. FinTech firms are offering solutions that connect directly via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to sustainability projects, such as waste management systems, to retrieve relevant environmental and energy consumption data more efficiently and directly. Data provenance. Distributed ledger technology is being explored to address the issue of verifiability and traceability in data. Data for reporting. FinTech firms are offering automated reporting tools while staying agile to adapt to various reporting standards. For example, Matter Analytics offers reporting solutions that help asset managers and banks automatically generate customised and comprehensive impact reports for their clients. FinTechs are providing financial institutions with good data and analytics to evaluate and compare ESG performance. For example, Intensel uses artificial intelligence to examine and monitor climate data and satellite imagery to identify financial risks related to climate change.

For central banks, less can mean more. Therefore, our strategy in the Czech Republic is "higher for longer", i.e. to maintain interest rates at higher levels for longer. Regarding government debt, I stated that monetary policy is at its tightest in 20 years and is slowing the economy. A problem arises if the government helps the economy with subsidies, supports and contributions at the same time. This counters our fight against inflation and the economy is not dampened as much as it should be. Therefore, the CNB must consider the following: Should we start competing with the government and dampen the economy by, for example, increasing rates? Should we further push down demand, just to have it subsequently fostered by the government with some kind of supports or subsidies? And so on ... it is a vicious circle. It would be better if both policies were anti-inflationary at the same time. Cochrane (2003) describes these  4/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  considerations, as does the excellent article on the subject presented by Bianchi and Melosi (2022) at the conference in Jackson Hole last year. To add to that, everything is complicated further by the first problem described above, i. e. the CNB's large balance sheet, or the huge liquidity of the banking sector.
Sabine Lautenschläger: Interview with Agence France-Presse Interview by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, with Agence France-Presse, conducted by Agence France-Presse on 22 November 2018 and published on 26 November 2018. * * *  The European economy has slowed down in recent months and external risks are growing. Will the ECB stick to its plan to end net asset purchases next month? The incoming data are somewhat weaker than expected, but economic growth is overall within our projections. I am confident that we will reach our objective of an inflation rate below, but close to, 2.0%. That’s why we should decide to exit the net purchases in December as anticipated. Despite the uncertainties that have increased in the last six months, right now I don’t see anything on the horizon that could change this assessment in the next three weeks. It is time to gradually normalize monetary policy. Will the ECB also be able to raise interest rates before President Mario Draghi leaves next October? Our policy decisions are data driven. Based on the current information I am confident that we will raise key interest rates next year. It might be in the summer or in the autumn, depending on the input we get from incoming data. Isn’t it dangerous to withdraw support from the economy just when the horizon is darkening? The outlook has not changed significantly.

Risks are still broadly balanced and with our monetary policy, in particular with the reinvestment of the maturing assets, we will provide ample support to the economy. Extending the net purchase programme would not bring significant additional benefits, but it would increase negative side effects. The reinvestments will act as a sufficient stimulus. This, in addition to all the other measures we have in place – the targeted longer-term refinancing operations, low key interest rates, the full allotment policy, among others – will ensure that there is still an expansionary, accommodative monetary policy. Will the ECB make changes to its bond-buying criteria in the new year, to maximize the impact of the reinvestments? With regard to the reinvestments, I think we should use well-established, known criteria, such as the capital key and limits on the issuer and the issuance. We should not bind ourselves for a long period of time with regard to the reinvestments, as we cannot exclude the possibility that we will reach our inflation objective earlier than expected or that there will be an increase in negative side effects from our expansionary monetary policy. Is quantitative easing (QE) a tool the ECB could use again in the future, as some current and former Governing Council members have suggested? 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  In the context of a monetary union with many different sovereigns and no fiscal, genuine economic and political union, QE should not be part of the normal policy toolbox.
When this collateral is easily withdrawn, the quality of the loan drops sharply. In cases where the bank’s license is revoked, the bankruptcy estate receives nothing. The rights of depositors and creditors are compromised. In our opinion, collateral should only be taken into account when calculating reserves if the Central Bank has the right to impose a moratorium on operations with it. Similarly, bankruptcy law must undergo improvement allowing honest creditors faster access to collateral acquired under a contract or other assets by court decision. I would like to reiterate that the regulator is of the firm belief that secured lending should not dominate the lending profile. This is precisely how the banking system will contribute to economic development. Lombard loans should not establish themselves as the mainstay of banking business. Banks need to work with clients and examine their business models rather than expect to acquire their assets. I would like to address our priorities in supervision. Over the course of the year, the Bank of Russia reengineered its supervisory activities: it established a risk analysis service (which assesses the quality of loans and the values of securities and derivatives, as well as collateral). We are already seeing certain results. We are now centralising supervision – we have created an ongoing banking supervision service in order to accelerate the use of supervisory response measures and establish a uniform supervisory practice in Russia. We call the model we are pursuing advisory supervision.

It appears, the reforms jointly developed and implemented by regulators in the major countries after the global financial crisis truly bolstered the financial system. The very structure of the global financial markets has undergone dramatic changes over the past decade. The role of global banks and cross-border lending by banks has taken a downward turn. Moreover, capital raising markets (stock markets) saw stagnation and even company delisting. The role of market lending (bond markets) and asset managers, i.e. the markets impacted by regulatory reforms to a lesser extent, has increased. These markets could potentially become more volatile, however. In broad terms, what does all this mean for global growth? In our view, it will not be stable. Average growth rates will be lower than in the early 2000s. The main trend we will see in the coming years will be slow economic recovery and the leading central banks taking a tighter policy stance. This will include increased interest rates and curtailed balances. For financial markets, these dynamics bring about two contradictory trends. On the one hand, economic growth has a positive impact on financial markets and risk appetite. On the other hand, increased interest rates are cooling the markets. Therefore, despite the overall stabilisation, there is a high probability of financial market volatility. What does all this mean for the Russian economy? Our economy will be bolstered by external demand to a lesser extent and will be sensitive to external volatility.
The closer a country’s trade relations were with Ukraine and Russia, the stronger are the direct adverse effects now on growth, of course. However, owing to global interconnectedness, the war is also throwing sand in the gears of countries with few trade links in the region. All of this slows the economy, also here in Switzerland. For the current year, we anticipate that Swiss GDP will grow by 2.5%. This is half a percentage point lower than we expected before the war broke out. Inflationary pressure has risen in Switzerland, too, albeit comparatively moderately thus far. Annual average inflation for 2021 was still at 0.6%; in March 2022 it stood at 2.4%. We define price stability as a situation in which inflation lies between 0% and 2% over the medium term. At our most recent monetary policy assessment in March, we decided to leave our policy rate unchanged at −0.75%, and to maintain our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary. However, we had already stressed in December that we would allow the Swiss franc to appreciate to a certain extent. So how do we put our current monetary policy in context? We intervene in the foreign exchange market when strong upward pressure on the Swiss franc would lead to persistently negative inflation and weigh heavily on the economy. However, we do not react mechanically to every instance of upward pressure.

And the trigger for conversion from debt into equity could be at a margin of comfort away from true catastrophe; say, a percentage point or so above the minimum regulatory capital ratio. Of course, this would entail a structural shift over time in investment portfolios. But the system might be able to manage that adjustment. After all, it managed the all together less desirable adjustment to the development of the existing hybrid capital markets. But demand for contingent capital is, inevitably, uncertain at this stage. As are the terms on which it will be provided. We welcome the growing private sector focus on this. 4  King Mervyn A. (2009), “Speech by Mervyn King, Governor” to Scottish Business Organisations, Edinburgh, October 2009. See also Tucker P M W (2009a), “Remarks by Paul Tucker”, Panel session at the Turner Review Conference, London, March 2009 (pp. 5) and Tucker P M W (2009b), “The repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system: last resort lending, market-making, and capital”, Bank of Japan’s 2009 International Conference, Tokyo, May 2009 (pp. 19). In the academic community, the idea was aired in “An Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities”, Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, April 2009, Council on Foreign Relations. Dudley, William C. (2009) “Remarks by William Dudley” at the Institute of International Bankers Membership Luncheon, New York City, October 2009.
[4] At the same time, we know that capital releases implemented by authorities, such as Countercyclical Capital Buffers (CCyB) cuts, did support lending, even for firms that were not close to breaching their nonreleasable buffers. [5] What does this evidence imply for policy? First, let me recap two key concepts: usability and releasability. A regulatory buffer is said to be usable if banks are permitted to operate normally even if their capital ratios decline below it. In some cases, firms may be subject to some consequences such as automatic constraints on capital distributions, although this is not always the case. [6] A regulatory buffer is releasable when the authorities can reduce it – including down to zero if need be – freeing up the capital resources. In the current Basel framework, only the CCyB is releasable. All other buffers that sit above minima are in theory usable but not releasable, as Sam noted in ‘Bufferati’. And the evidence suggests that firms would rather deleverage than use non-releasable buffers. The CCyB represents an effective tool to ensure firms continue to provide credit to households and businesses during times of stress or when particular risks crystallise. Varying the buffer – both up and down – in line with the evolution of economic conditions, underlying vulnerabilities and the overall risk environment allows jurisdictions to match the resilience of the banking system to the changing scale of the risk it faces. The CCyB is set using a range of indicators as well as forward looking judgement.

To that end, several major reforms were implemented, including: Slide 5: Measures were taken •  a tax reform which lowered tax rates and expanded the tax base,  •  abolition of selective support schemes to companies and industries,  •  an agreement between unions and employers to improve cost competitiveness, and  •  the establishment of the Goverment Petroleum Fund, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund. Slide 6: Two golden decades A long upturn followed. Norway has not experienced a pronounced economic downturn since the crisis around 1990. The reforms introduced during the 1990s have resulted in a fairly flexible labour market, which has allowed labour supply to adjust to changing conditions. In addition, we have been helped by good fortune in the form of favourable terms of trade. The economy was quite robust when the financial crisis hit in 2008, in sharp contrast to our situation 25 years ago. The policy climate in Norway in the early 1990s may have some characteristics in common with what we see in parts of Europe today. While short-term challenges need to be tackled urgently, a time of crisis may also provide an opportunity to implement structural reforms. In the case of Norway, the commitment and the capacity to implement reform was a critical condition for renewed and sustainable growth. The Fund and fiscal policy The Act relating to the Government Petroleum Fund was passed in 1990.