samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This intertwining of the communication of the European monetary team with the European and national institutions and the full body of the civil societies is currently underestimated. Wim DUISENBERG attends hearings at the European Parliament in Brussels as often as Alan GREENSPAN does on the Hill in Washington. Each national governor explains in his own language (so in total in ten languages), through the lens of twelve different cultures, the same message from the Eurosystem. To improve its transparency and its communication even further, the Eurosystem decided to publish for the first time in December 2000 Staff Economic Projections for the euro area. In terms of transparency and accountability - namely the duty to explain, justify, whenever possible convince, and in any case, being fully responsible vis-à-vis public opinion for decisions taken - I think that the Eurosystem meets the best practices of the main central banks in the world. I.2  Co-ordination of economic policies  A few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great number of skeptical people, in Europe as well as in the rest of the world, that the euro was really to be set up. Many observers pointed to its presumed contradictions and alleged inconsistencies: claiming, for example, that the economic divergences and structural gaps among euro-area countries would be too large to ensure a viable monetary union or that the lack of co-ordination between economic policies would deprive the area of an appropriate policy-mix, and could not be achieved without a political federation.

One consequence of pricing in a single currency in all member countries will be to facilitate buyers of goods and services greatly in making price comparisons, and competition within the EU will certainly become more active than it has been until now. Economic and Monetary Union The EMU has a population of more than 300 million and accounts for 16% of global GDP. By way of comparison, the USA has a population of 280 million and accounts for 22% of global GDP. Exports of goods and services are equivalent to 19% of EMU GDP, while the corresponding figure for the USA is under 11%. Some 19% of total world merchandise exports come from the EMU, and 15% from the USA. Twelve of the fifteen EU nations belong to the EMU. The UK, Denmark and Sweden remain outside it, but their positions differ somewhat. Denmark and the UK have stated reservations about membership, on which they have reached agreement with other EU states. Sweden, on the other hand, has opted to remain outside the EMU, although no special reservations have been agreed upon for them. Denmark is involved in currency cooperation with the EMU, one aspect of which is that the exchange rate of the Danish krone may not deviate from the Euro by more than 2.25% from a defined central rate. Denmark therefore enjoys limited monetary independence.
You can rest assured that payment systems of European countries will cease to be national payment systems sooner or later. As intended by the European Union decision-makers, in a few years cross-border euro payments will be as unified and cheap as is the case for cashless money settlements in national payment systems now. From the point of view of the central bank, SEPA should be beneficial first of all to the citizens of Europe, but it is also to contribute to the development of the payment services market. As politicians refine their visions of united Europe, tax-payers ask questions about the price. In the long term, the balance of benefits and costs of united Europe is undoubtedly favourable. The same pertains to the idea of SEPA. However, it is worth remembering that the final shape of the European payment system should be determined, to the largest possible extent, by the market that will choose the best solution for banks’ clients. The assumptions made in order to streamline and increase the efficiency of cashless turnover in euro are well justified economically across Euroland. However, in countries outside the Euro area, such as Poland, the implementation of SEPA should be subject to a thorough debate in a relevant community.

Christian Noyer: International financial stability Keynote address by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the International ParisEuroplace Financial Forum, Tokyo, 29 November 2010. *  *  *  Although the financial crisis originated in one country, it quickly became apparent that it was truly global in nature. It brought home a simple message: capital markets are closely interlinked around the world and, thus, domestic and international financial stability cannot be dissociated. They really are two sides of the same coin. Today, I would like to reflect upon international financial stability. The views expressed are my own but, as you know, France now holds the Presidency of the G20 and I will try to put my own thoughts in that perspective. International financial instability has increased over the last period. Whether we look at exchange rates, international capital flows or commodity prices, signs abound of more intense volatility. Volatility may not necessarily be a bad thing. To some extent, it is a sign of well functioning financial markets. Movements in asset prices help the financial system to serve as a cushion, an “absorber” for exogenous economic shocks. This is welfare improving since it avoids, or mitigates, adjustment in more rigid goods or labor markets. Volatility may also be driven by fundamentals. For instance, capital inflows to emerging economies partly reflect very favorable long term growth prospects and high potential returns on capital.
Figure 3 CPI Inflation (*)  Core inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Dec. 2016 Report  Mar. 2017 Report  (*) The grey area, starting from the first quarter of 2017, corresponds to the forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. 6. Activity has been somewhat weaker than expected. According to recent data the output gap is currently larger than we anticipated in December. GDP grew by 1.6% in 2016, in line with what was anticipated. However, revised national account data suggests the economy was somewhat stronger towards the beginning of 2016 and weaker towards the end of the year, leaving a low starting point for 2017 and a higher base of comparison for the beginning of the year. The new data also point to weakness in investment-related areas and in sectors that tend to be more persistent, such as business services (Figure 4).

We will then have detailed data on GDP for the third quarter, preliminary data on the balance of payments for the entire 2019, as well as current economic statistics for December and first data on inflation in January. We will adjust our mid-term forecast based on this information. Winding up, I would like to get back to the signal of our future actions. We have said today that we will consider the necessity of a further key rate reduction in the first half of 2020. Noting that, after similar signals in the past, it was twice that we cut the key rate already at the next meeting, namely in October and today, and anticipating your clarifying questions, I would like to point out the following. This wording means that we still see room for a slight decrease in the key rate. But both in February and at the next meetings we will comprehensively assess the reasonableness and relevance of such a decision taking into account the entire range of new data that will be available by that time. Our signal does not imply that we will necessarily lower the key rate in February or in the first half of 2020. A further key rate cut will become possible only if our analysis confirms that this is needed to bring inflation back to the Bank of Russia’s 4% target. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Action 2: Making available the IM, DD and valuation reports to prospective buyers To facilitate making investment decisions, the IMs, DDs and valuation reports that were prepared by the Panel of Auditors for Category B NBFIs were made available to prospective buyers, after signing the Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA). Based on the company valuations carried out by the Panel of Auditors, the Consolidation Unit prepared a methodology to arrive at a realistic and reflective average price multiple, which was informed to the potential investors. We also advised them that a premium or a discount may be applied to this multiple depending on the strengths and weaknesses of the selling NBFI. Further, we informed the Panel of Auditors to continue their service for transaction management and finalisation of deals. In addition, the Panel of Auditors was requested to arrange data room facility for prospective buyers to get more information and clarifications on the DDs and to assist them in their decision making process. Action 3: Preparation of guidelines on the proposed tax benefits His Excellency the President in his Budget Speech 2014 granted special tax concessions for financial institutions involved in the consolidation process. Accordingly, the Inland Revenue (Amendment) Act, No. 8 of 2014 and Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, No. 7 of 2014 have been enacted by the Parliament giving effect to the budget proposal on financial sector consolidation. In terms of these amendments, the Central Bank has been empowered to issue guidelines to provide tax concessions on cost of acquisitions.

At the same time, economists are increasingly being given the opportunity to help governments design new policies and regulations2. And, in this respect, we should bear in mind that carefully designed scientific experiments have been an engine of economic, technological, and social progress. Social experiments have become crucial to ensure that governments implement policies with a proven record of success3, that are based on evidence and not on prejudice or intuition. We are now in a position to create a virtuous circle that begins with the allocation of resources to the compilation of data and the provision of access to them, continues with the evaluation of public policies, and ends with the application of the findings to the design of policies. However, unlike medical trials, social experiments – large-scale, publicly funded randomised controlled trials – have not become the gold standard for the evaluation of public policy interventions. 1  Einar, L. y Levin, J. (2014) "The data revolution and Economic Analysis", Working Paper 19035 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 2  Duflo, E (2017)"The Economist as Plumber" Richard T. Ely Lecture, American Economic review: Papers and Proceedings 2017, 107(5):1-26 3  Heffetz, O y List, J (2021) "Who's afraid of evidence-based Policymaking?" Artefactual Field Experiments 00739, The Field Experiments Website 1  In many cases, critics argue that such experiments are inherently unfair. Ironically, this resistance to experimentation could eventually lead to less progress and even less fairness.
Both approaches have their place in making sense of the dappled economic and financial world. But, to date, both have not been given equal billing. The global financial crisis is an opportunity to rebalance those scales, to take uncertainty and disequilibrium seriously, to make the heterodox orthodox. A profession that has, perhaps for too long, been shackled needs now to be Shackled.

At the same time, an increasing proportion of lending by the banks is to smaller enterprises and households, where the possibility of evaluating the credit risk in a traditional way is poorer than for large companies. Altogether therefore considerably higher demands are made on the banks’ risk management systems than previously. Major investments in knowledge on modern financial economy and IT-based risk systems are required for instance. This development is taking place at the same time as increased competition is tending to squeeze profits and information technology is changing the conditions for provision of payment services. When traditional bank activities shrink and change, the direction of activities has to be reviewed. The banks can for instance opt to take part in the provision of capital in the securities market and generate profits by charging fees for this activity. One strategy may be to offer businesses and private persons all financial services such as advice, insurance and payment services. In order to be competitive, larger banks are then often required, which is a driving force behind the increased frequency of bank mergers and mergers between banks and insurance companies taking place. Another alternative is of course to concentrate activities and become competitive within a particular niche. Small and medium-sized enterprises need for instance to have access to capital via banks which are able to obtain knowledge on the risks associated with lending to these. The possibility of turning to the securities market to have their need of capital satisfied should above all be confined to large businesses.
It is not without some pride that I recall that, in a sense, Sweden was actually something of a pioneer in explicitly focusing monetary policy, with a flexible exchange rate, on a specified target for prices. Back in 1931, after Sweden had been obliged to abandon the gold standard, its government and the central bank declared that the overriding objective of monetary policy would be the stabilisation of prices. More specifically, the finance minister of the day described the task of the central bank as that of, “using all means available, preserving the domestic purchasing power of the Swedish krona”. In this way, the Riksbank became the first central bank to declare price stabilisation as its policy norm with a floating exchange rate. The norm was based on a proposal made much earlier, in 1898, by Knut Wicksell, often regarded as Sweden’s greatest economist at the time. Wicksell’s rule for monetary policy, which stemmed from his extension of the classical quantity theory of money, was simple: “The central bank is to raise the discount rate as long as prices are rising, lower it as long as prices are falling and keep it constant when prices are stable”. In other words, price stability was to be achieved through interest policy. Although the rule applied to the price level rather than to inflation and was not forward looking, it is a clear parallel to the rules of thumb that are used today by those central banks that target inflation.

We have a great consideration on this Association and we hope that its role will further be enhanced in the future, particularly on the principled topics that will characterize the development of the banking system and that of the financial system in general in the years to come. Honored bankers, I hope you share the same opinion with me that we become recently witnesses of a qualitative development of the Albanian banking system. I use the opportunity to express that positive assessments on the banking system have been given also in the report prepared by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund after the completion of their assessment made on the Albanian financial system (FSAP-Financial System Assessment Program). Of course, this is good news. Conclusions of FSAP, of this important international passport, are an indication of our earliest conclusions that the Albanian financial system is characterized by a supervised and effective banking system and by other segments that are still in the first development stages where regulation and supervision remain a priority. Regardless of what I mentioned above, sincerely feeling myself as a part of the banking system I would envisage that it needs better and faster motivation to reach higher contemporary standards in all the aspects of the banking activity. BIS Review 39/2005  1  The banking system has experienced remarkable developments recently.
It may well be in the interest of the candidate countries to make this period as short as possible. Sixth, it is true that any country entering the EMU need to fix the exchange rate. One should not take for granted, however, that the longer the period of the intermediate regime the better, as it is not always true that longer wait produces more information about the proper rate of exchange. It may produce just more noise. Seventh, both further efficient disinflation and strengthening long-term economic growth require completion of certain structural reforms in the candidate countries. There is no way around it. In case of Poland, the liberalization of the labour market and increased participation rate is badly needed. Fiscal reforms must concentrate on rationalising the spending and not just increasing taxes. Privatisation needs to be completed and it should include the banking sector. We have to strengthen competition in fuel and energy sectors. Legal framework needs to be adjusted to be more efficient. The earlier deadline of the entry to the EU could act as a powerful motivating device to complete those reforms. I am a great believer in the deadlines and I think they help to achieve success. Delaying the entry could do more harm then good, as it could weaken the incentive to complete the necessary and often politically costly reforms. Eighth, flexibility of the rate of exchange is a poor substitute for structural reforms.

Thus, emerging market central banks must be prepared for policy contingencies ahead. At the core, monetary policy must continue to safeguard price stability, while taking into account concerns about economic growth and financial stability. The Bank of Thailand, on our part, will do our best to steer the Thai economy and financial system through the global turbulences, to ensure the continued well-being of the Thai people in years ahead. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
It is likely that this is due in part to the various support measures introduced by the Confederation, the cantons and the SNB. Moreover, despite the difficult economic situation, the supply of credit to Swiss companies is working well. The solid capitalisation of Swiss banks plays an important role here. Page 1/4  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  The SNB’s baseline scenario assumes that the global economy will start to pick up again in the coming quarters. Uncertainty about the future course of the coronavirus pandemic, however, remains high. What do these developments in the national and international environment mean for the current situation of Swiss banks? Globally active banks  The situation for the globally active Swiss banks Credit Suisse and UBS has hardly changed since the SNB’s assessment in June. They are proving to be in robust shape despite the difficult environment. First, the risk situation at the two banks has stabilised. This can be seen in risk-weighted assets, for example, which have fallen again somewhat at both banks following an increase in the first quarter. Second, Credit Suisse and UBS continued to deliver solid results in the second and third quarters thanks to their diversified income structures. While provisions for credit risks have increased compared to pre-crisis levels, they are significantly lower than those of their international peers. In addition, trading business and wealth management at both banks benefited from the rapid recovery in the financial markets.

The analysis in the June Inflation Report showed that a reduction in the sight deposit rate towards 3 per cent, combined with some depreciation of the krone, 2 could bring inflation up towards the target two years ahead. More moderate wage settlements in the 3 future would provide a basis for even further monetary policy easing and a weaker krone. Without considerable monetary policy easing, inflation might have remained too low for an extensive period. The short-term nominal interest rate in Norway has now reached a historically very low level. Interest rates have not been lower since the first nine to ten years following the Second World War. The real interest rate is also low, although by no means as low as it was when inflation plagued Norwegian savers in the 1970s and 1980s. The low interest rate must be viewed against the risk of persistently low inflation both in Norway and in other countries. So far, indicators of inflation expectations do not point to any substantial deviation from the inflation target of 2½ per cent. However, if inflation should remain too low for an extensive period, there is a risk that expectations of continued very low inflation will be generated. It may then prove difficult to fuel economic activity by stimulating demand. A marked easing of monetary policy has therefore been appropriate. The inflation target is symmetrical. It is equally important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high.
For 2010, the SNB is currently expecting real GDP growth of about 1.5%. On the one hand, our export industry is exposed to the relatively hesitant growth in European demand. On the other, Switzerland is well equipped for a recovery. Public finances are relatively healthy, the financial positions of both households and corporates are sound, and the labour market is flexible. The risk of deflation has fallen in the wake of the economic recovery. The most recent SNB inflation forecast from mid-March shows that price stability is not threatened in the short term. The SNB has sufficient leeway to maintain its expansionary monetary policy for the time being. However, the forecast also shows that the current monetary policy cannot be maintained over the entire forecast horizon without compromising medium and long-term price stability. Moreover, this forecast is still associated with considerable uncertainties. The most recent financial market concerns that have arisen about the public finances of individual euro area countries represent a considerable risk in this regard. Over the past few years, Switzerland has benefited from the advent of the euro and the associated increase in European currency stability. Any threat to this currency stability would, by definition, have a negative impact on Switzerland, above all if the Swiss franc were to appreciate sharply due to its role as a safe haven currency. The SNB will not, however, allow such a development to turn into a new deflation hazard for Switzerland.

Finally, let me also address the risks of overheating in some parts of the financial markets. We do not currently see compelling evidence of overstretched asset valuations at the euro area level, but we do see that real estate dynamics or high household debt levels in some countries signal the risk of increasing imbalances. Such risks also exist in the Netherlands: they relate to the continued very high level of household indebtedness and the low level of mortgage collateralisation. For this reason, we share the concerns expressed in the warning issued by the European Systemic Risk Board in November 2016 and recognise that there is a case for mitigating measures. That being said, monetary policy is not the appropriate tool for addressing local and sectoral financial risks. Rather, targeted macroprudential policies, which can be tailored to local and sectoral conditions, are the right answer.1  The way forward Against the backdrop of a recovery that is becoming increasingly solid, the benefits of our policy clearly outweigh potential side effects. Also due to the pass-through of our monetary policy, there is now more and more evidence that economic growth is firming and broadening. Incoming data confirm that the cyclical recovery of the euro area economy is becoming increasingly solid and that downside risks have further diminished. Nevertheless, it is too early to declare success. Underlying inflation pressures continue to remain subdued and have yet to show a convincing upward trend.