samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What has happened in recent years could be described as a global increase in the relative price of energy and commodities, such as food, in relation to manufactured products. Inflation is due to long-term monetary policy, not relative prices Changes in relative prices play an important role for how resources are allocated in a market economy. An increase in a relative price is a signal that resources have become scarce in a particular area in relation to other areas. It is therefore often profitable to invest there. It is exactly this type of market mechanism that appears when interest in mining increases and optimism rises in the parts of Sweden suffering from depopulation. In a corresponding manner, high food prices provide an incentive to begin cultivating previously unused land around the world. There is thus reason to believe that the higher relative price will in the long term increase the supply of commodities, which will then better match the demand for them. However, the adjustment may take time. It remains to be seen whether supply will increase sufficiently to keep an even pace with world market demand. It is therefore difficult to predict how long relative commodity prices will continue rising. But what is fundamental from a monetary policy perspective is that changes in relative prices do not in themselves constitute inflation. Inflation refers to general price levels, or the average of all prices, rising over time. The general price level is measured with some broader measure of prices, such as the consumer price index, CPI.

And lastly, we will do more in the future to enhance the attractiveness of the Paris financial centre: the Government will do its part – the Prime Minister will talk about this later –; the Ile-de-France region and the Paris City too; and the ACPR will examine in a prompt way all applications in its remit coming from financial institutions that are already licensed in another EU member state. Of course, Paris is not the only financial centre in the euro area, but it has everything it needs to be one of the best. It depends on us, on all of us. Therefore, now more than ever, the time has come for Paris Europlace to take center stage. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The major question now is how we can restore confidence in the financial markets so that they can manage on their own. This is a task that authorities around the world have been struggling with for some time now. In my opinion, we need a purge of the international banking system. The problems that are weighing down the banks’ balance sheets must be brought to light. It is only when we see the depth of the losses that confidence can be restored. The great complexity in the current financial system means that this is a much more difficult process than in the Swedish bank crisis of the 1990s. It is difficult to say how long it will take before the programmes currently being implemented in Europe and other parts of the world have the intended effect. Meanwhile, the Riksbank is prepared to do whatever it takes to maintain the functioning of the Swedish financial system. Thank you! BIS Review 41/2009  19

Yes, it is true that corporate HK dollar bond market is small, thanks to the success of the Linked Exchange Rate System which enables our corporations to tap into the much deeper investor pool of US dollar bond markets without much currency risk or hedging costs. But as revealed in a recent report by the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA), Hong Kong is actually the largest centre for arranging Asian international bond issuance, capturing 34% (or $ billion) of Asian international bonds in 2020, followed by the US (18%), the UK (17%) and Singapore (5%). 8. Hong Kong is also well ahead of other major international financial centres in terms of arranging first-time bond issuance, capturing 75% $ billion) of the Asian market versus Singapore (9%) and the UK (5%). Issuers and investors alike are well served by our comprehensive financial ecosystem underpinned by free flow of capital, an internationallyaligned common law system and regulatory environment, and the presence of world-class professional services with talents from all over the world. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  9. All these mean that Hong Kong is well placed to serve as a centre for Asian structured financing just like other financial intermediation that we are doing, as this market continues to mature in this part of the world. 10. The macro trends are also supportive. With the record low interest rates and abundant liquidity in many advanced economies, investors are keen to look for some decent yields for their investments.
The fact that the target has been formulated in this way is because price developments are the only thing that monetary policy can steer in the longer term. Long-term developments in growth and employment are essentially unaffected by changes in the interest rate. They are determined by factors such as productivity and the supply of labour and capital, as well as the way the labour market – and the economy as a whole – functions. It is possible to say that monetary policy can indirectly create good conditions for an efficientlyfunctioning economy by maintaining inflation at a low and stable rate. The pricing and wage-setting systems function more efficiently if changes in general price levels are small and predictable. This makes it easier for companies and consumers to make wise decisions regarding investment, consumption and employment. The development of the Swedish economy during the 1970s and 1980s provides a particular indication of how failed investment and arbitrary distribution of income can result from high and fluctuating inflation. In the short term, monetary policy also affects the economy’s cyclical pattern. When we formulate our monetary policy we therefore try to do so in a way that contributes to the most favourable and stable macroeconomic development possible, without jeopardising the price stability target. In other words, we are not ”inflation nutters”, to use a phrase coined by my British colleague Mervyn King.

Turning next to the new Basel liquidity requirement, the new standard will likely necessitate a significant adjustment in behavior for those banks that historically relied on short-term wholesale funding and those that had negligible buffers but instead had relied on the Federal Reserve and the Federal Home Loan Bank System to be their liquidity backstops. However, the transition costs are likely to be quite manageable because, as was the case for the capital standards, there are many margins available for adjustment. Before I assess the transition costs of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) standard, a few words about what the LCR is intended to do and how it operates. The notion behind the LCR standard is that large, internationally active financial institutions should have a liquidity buffer that enables them to operate for 30 days in a stress environment without having to rely on government support, including central bank liquidity backstops. Banks would have to have sufficient liquid assets that they could sell to be able to meet outflows stemming from deposit withdrawals; bank debt that matures and is unable to be rolled over; and drawdowns from committed credit and liquidity facilities provided to financial firms and other entities. The size of the required liquidity buffer depends, in part, on the maturity of the bank’s assets and liabilities, the stickiness of its deposit liabilities, the amount of irrevocable liquidity backstops and composition of its assets.
This is where the regulatory framework enters in: to place limits on risk and to set capital requirements so as to reduce the likelihood of a run on the banks, leaving taxpayers to pay the bill. How high the requirements must be is always a balancing act, as it is hardly possible — and actually undesirable — to set them high enough to render the banks bullet-proof. We must not allow the banks’ current resilience to blind us to the great challenges facing them. These challenges centre, among other things, on rapid technological advances, increased competition with other financial institutions and companies that offer payment services and loans, increased regulatory burdens, high cost levels, operational risk, cybersecurity threats, and ownership issues. Of course, it is the task of the banks themselves and their owners to take on these challenges, which — as always — represent both threats and opportunities. But the legislature and supervisory institutions also have a part to play. The regulatory burden should not be any more stringent than is needed to limit risk at any given time. Simultaneously, it must be ensured that the regulatory framework extends to all financial market service providers that could contribute to the creation of systemic risk. Maintaining effective consumer protection is important as well; otherwise, there is the risk that justified dissatisfaction will develop — dissatisfaction that will ultimately erode confidence in all financial institutions.

Financial crises have typically been associated with boom and bust cycles in asset prices and credit. Due to sharp growth in house prices and household debt in several countries in recent years, the question of whether monetary policy should be used to mitigate such developments has received increased attention. In the light of these developments, I would like to address four main questions. What do we mean by financial stability, how do we analyse it, how do authorities cooperate in order to support it, and finally, what instruments are available to secure financial stability? What do we mean by financial stability? Despite increasing focus during the last decades, uncertainty about how best to define the concept ‘financial stability’ remains1. In order for households and enterprises to obtain optimal consumption and investment over time there has to exist a well-functioning financial system that can intermediate between savers and borrowers, carry out payments and redistribute risk in a satisfactory manner. This promotes an efficient allocation of real economic resources across different activities and over time. From this point of view, financial stability can be defined as a situation where the financial system is able to meet these requirements, and thereby enhance economic performance and wealth accumulation A more narrow approach is to define financial stability in terms of what it is not, that is a situation in which financial instability impairs the real economy.
Regulatory response In addition to the actions of the macroprudential authorities, there is no doubt that the public sector response has been, overall, countercyclical and expansionary, helping to cushion the impact of the crisis on the economy. This response has been very different from the one to the financial crisis. The unconventional measures taken by central banks and governments have been particularly noteworthy. But regulators and supervisors have also acted decisively in response to the environment of extreme uncertainty besetting us. Unlike in the case of the global financial crisis, international regulators have tried to act as coordinated as possible. This has been essential in order to foster financial stability and maintain a level playing field in an increasingly interconnected world. A large part of this response has focused on enabling the financial sector to supply the liquidity necessary for the business fabric to be able to survive in the short term. In Europe, a range of measures have been taken, including notably the “quick fix” package of banking rule amendments.

This reflects the realisation by the Bank that without world-class employees, its aspiration to be a world class central bank as stated in its vision statement cannot be attained. For the Bank therefore, this programme is important because it is a step taken towards enhancing the skills of our staff to world class standards and is a commitment to attaining our vision. The programme you have come to participate in is unique in two respects. First, this programme is tailor-made or specifically designed for Bank of Zambia staff. Second, it focuses on middle management which is a reflection of the importance that the Bank places on the role that its middle managers play in helping it achieve its vision and mission. The programme has been designed to impart general management knowledge and skills to you our middle managers which will enhance your leadership and managerial abilities. The programme is designed to provide you with the tools that will enable you to contribute effectively towards the management of the Bank and also to prepare you for succession as and when opportunities arise. The first module you will learn is on the Functions of the Board of the Bank of Zambia. This was included to provide you with an understanding of the relevance of the Board to our strategic plan management process and ultimately to your job. Second, you will have a module on good corporate governance.
Besides these measures, with an extensive arrangement made in December, the TL required reserve ratios were differentiated by maturity and the reserve requirement base was expanded to include certain foreign and domestic repo transactions which were formerly not subject to reserve requirement. This arrangement aims to reduce maturity mismatch in banks’ balance sheets by extending the maturity of banking sector liabilities and also aims to encourage long-term capital flows. 46. The ongoing strong course of credits as well as other domestic demand indicators in March implied that additional monetary tightening would be necessary. The CBRT assessed that implementing monetary tightening through reserve requirements, rather than using policy rates, would be more effective in containing macro financial risks resulting from the divergence of domestic and external demand. In this respect, the CBRT decided to deliver a notable hike in the weighted average of required reserve rates on short term liabilities. Accordingly, TL required reserve ratios for sight deposits and short-term deposits/participation accounts and other liabilities were raised. Our measures regarding the required reserves are displayed on the slide. With the last arrangement to be effective as of April 15, 2011 in addition to prior adjustments since October 2010, a total of TL 38 billion liquidity will have been withdrawn from the market. 47. Our measures are expected to have an impact on domestic demand and credits starting from the second quarter. The adopted policy measures ultimately aim to contain macro financial risks by inducing a more balanced growth path for aggregate demand components.

First, the Chinese transition to a more balanced growth path appears to be underway – with stronger consumption and less emphasis on investment. And the Chinese authorities have a range of tools available to support their economy during this transition. Second, despite the intense strain placed on many emerging market economies by the substantial deterioration in recent years in their terms of trade, this stress does not yet appear to have led to the type of financial system breakage that might lead to widespread contagion and large capital flow reversals. In fact, in recent weeks, emerging market equity markets have recovered substantial ground and many countries’ currencies have stabilized. It is also important that the forward momentum in the jobs market persists. The August and September employment reports raised some concerns that the U.S. labor market might be faltering. Those concerns should be at least partially put to rest given the strength of the October employment report, recognizing that the employment news can be volatile on a month-to-month basis. Most noteworthy to me are the strong payroll employment gains in October and the solid 0.3 percent rise in aggregate hours worked. Over the past three months, payroll gains have averaged 187,000 per month, not much below the average payroll growth of 213,000 per month during the first half of 2015. We are now much closer to our goal of maximum sustainable employment than at the start of the year.
To paraphrase Lawrence Summers, it is not enough to explain that globalization is inevitable and that policies that look politically attractive as a response to economic anxiety will only hurt the economy as a whole. Nor is it a politically effective strategy to state simply that economic integration is a necessary and powerful force in raising average incomes, or that technological change may be more important than trade or immigration as an explanation for slower growth in real wages for many Americans. Raising the quality of education and exploring ways to improve the safety net are a necessary part of the solution to this challenge. But these reforms will have a long fuse and they may not yield the hoped-for increase in support. Trade does not appear to be more popular in countries with more generous safety nets, universal health care and highly subsidized higher education than it is today in the United States. The political challenges of sustaining support for global economic integration and fiscal sustainability will be more difficult in the United States because of what has happened to the distribution of income and economic insecurity.

And monetary policy will, of course, continue to be critical, but monetary policy alone cannot provide the elements of the framework necessary to provide an environment for innovation and long-term decisions that will be so vital for future growth. Economic policy, in general, needs to be more forward looking in providing a longer-term framework for stability. On the fiscal policy front, demographic changes confront governments around the world with exceptionally difficult choices. For the United States, these challenges are less acute than for many of the major economies, but they are still formidable in their scale and complexity. Even for the near term - for the period before the increase in number of retirees starts to have a major impact on Social Security and Medicare expenditures - we are running an unsustainably large fiscal deficit. Despite the recent improvements in revenues, the expected trajectory for the fiscal deficit will mean that federal government debt will continue to rise as a share of GDP. The restoration of fiscal rules - such as those that require new tax cuts or expenditure programs to be funded with offsetting policy measures - will help reduce the risk of further deterioration. However, they need to be complemented by a consensus on policy changes that will produce smaller future deficits.
Programme, which focuses on specific life events targeting identified groups such as young adults, low income households and public sector officials. For example, one specific programme which was launched last month in collaboration with the Government  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  aims to reach out to 120,000 individuals from low income households by 2015. The Central Bank also has a customer service centre for the general public to walk-in or call-in if they have inquiries, or need to print their credit report. The CCRIS kiosks use bio-metric identification embedded within the national Identification Card, and the report is produced in less than a minute without any charge. I believe that a holistic approach, combining credit information infrastructure with appropriate financial education interventions and avenues of outreach to consumers, will lead to more prudent financial management behaviours. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the International Finance Corporation for its leadership in the area of credit information reporting, and look forward to continuing to build on our long working relationship. I trust that we will have a productive exchange of ideas to further enhance the roles of credit reporting agencies in the area of risk management and to advance the credit reporting industry as a whole. On that note, I wish you a successful and productive programme, and a pleasant stay in Kuala Lumpur. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2016/redeeming-an-unforgivingworld.pdf?la=en&hash=7B7AC35CC3017FCD8EF5BE7D5F2D0C4EA22C7E05  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  resolution failed, and defaults occurred, it would take the failure of more than the CCP’s two largest clearing members in extreme but plausible market conditions to lead to the exhaustion of the default fund – this is a scenario, in the tail of the tail, which would almost certainly be more severe than those we have seen historically, including in the crisis. The crisis has, of course taught us, that we need to think about events in the very tail of the probability distribution. So we do need to ask what happens when prefunded loss absorbency is exhausted and insufficient to cover losses. Unlike banks, if prefunded resources are insufficient to absorb losses, the CCP does not become insolvent. CCP’s rulebooks, to which all members agree in advance, allow a further series of recovery actions, in a prescribed sequence. A CCP could require its members to contribute more resources, it could reduce its liabilities to some of its members, and ultimately it could “tear –up” (i.e. cancel) all or some of its contracts – in effect the closure of the clearing service. The sequence of ever more draconian actions, reflect the fact that CCPs are not independent risk takers. In fact, they should not be risk takers at all. They are services that, for a fee, manage the risks of derivative counterparty default that their members would otherwise face directly and at far greater cost. Again, the comparison with banks is instructive.