samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The housing market model developed at the Bank aims to unwrap and model these within-system interactions and use them to help explain cyclical behaviour (Baptista, Farmer, Hinterschweiger, Low, Tang and Uluc (2016)). Specifically, the model comprises households of three types:   Renters who decide whether to continue to rent or attempt to buy a house when their rental contract ends and, if so, how much to bid;    Owner-occupiers who decide whether to sell their house and buy a new one and, if so, how much to bid/ask for the property; and    Buy-to-let investors who decide whether to sell their rental property and/or buy a new one and, if so, how much to bid/ask for the property. They also decide whether to rent out a property and, if so, how much rent to charge. The behavioural rules of thumb that households follow when making these decisions are based on factors such as their expected rental payments, house price appreciation and mortgage cost. These households differ not only by type, but also by characteristics such as age and income. An important feature of the model is that it includes an explicit banking sector, itself a feature often missing from off-the-shelf DSGE models. The banking sector provides mortgage credit to households and sets the terms and conditions available to borrowers in the mortgage market, based on their characteristics. The banking sector’s lending decisions are, in turn, subject to regulation by a central bank or regulator.

Remote communication has not yet displaced human contact completely as the medium for doing business; indeed, face-to-face contact has survived much more extensively than some had predicted; and, to the extent that it is necessary or desirable to get people round a table in order to expedite some project, Hong Kong, because it is small, is one of the easiest places in which to do so. •  A third factor supporting the "can do" culture is the general quality and spread of people who are on tap to help get things done: Hong Kong has a good critical mass of expertise in all areas of financial and related services. Of course, I am not deaf to the difficulties sometimes expressed about finding extra people at a particular time with particular skills, but this is almost inevitable in a growing economy. Even then, some relief is normally available through drawing in temporary resources from outside Hong Kong if the occasion demands. •  Finally I would cite the work ethic. People work for long hours and with much loyalty in Hong Kong. Of course, this is not enough in itself. It is productivity that counts, but that is probably where Hong Kong scores; I don't have the impression that many people are passing the day gazing idly out of the window. The corollary of high productivity is that, as I noted earlier, by international comparison a lot of people here receive high salaries, but they certainly earn them. Otherwise they would not hold onto their jobs.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Economic volatility in the Year of the Rat Speech by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a seminar on “Economic Volatility in the Year of the Rat, Fight or Flight”, organised by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, Bangkok, 6 March 2008. *  *  *  Thank you and good evening, Let me begin first by thanking the FCCT for the invitation. It must have been a long while since I last visited or spoke at a FCCT event, so it is good to be back. Tonight’s topic is economic volatility in the year of the Rat. According to Chinese astrology, Rat is an auspicious animal, and the year of the rat is usually a year of plenty, bringing opportunity and good prospects. So, I think we have a good start. And judging from what has been happening, this year looks to be interesting and challenging both for the markets and policymakers. At this time, we are seeing widespread fears of recession in the US, a deepening of the credit problem, and stubbornly high oil prices. These developments are definitely a negative setting for the global economy and financial markets. Tonight, my talk will focus on global economic volatility and possible implications for Thailand. And I want to do this by offering a perspective on how we see things developing from a financial regulator’s point of view. First, the US economy. Latest economic data from the US are not positive.

I am hopeful for two-days of productive workshop interactions. I invite you to join the panels of presentations and become part of the fruitful comments and discussions! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
A further risk is that the krona’s depreciation may persist even if activity becomes stronger. That could generate inflationary impulses. All in all, however, the Executive Board of the Riksbank considers that the spectrum of risks is asymmetric, so that inflation somewhat below the main forecast is more probable than a higher rate. With the risks taken into account, inflation in the coming years is forecast to be around two tenths of a percentage point below the targeted level of 2 per cent. At the same time, the margins are so small that we have decided not to adjust the repo rate at this time. In this context it is worth recalling that in the initial position the repo rate is already lower than the instrumental rates in many other  BIS Review 26/2001  3  industrialised countries, at the same time as the krona is very weak. That makes it advisable to wait somewhat longer to see in which direction developments appear to be moving. Next monetary policy meeting on 26 April In conclusion it can be noted that the picture of both real economic tendencies and price movements that is described in the main scenario seems to be relatively favourable. After a rapid expansion for a number of years, an adjustment is now foreseen that involves a levelling off with low and stable inflation. But while it may seem that we consider everything is fine in the Swedish economy, it must be said that prospects for the U.S. economy are difficult to assess.

But the events of the past five years have raised questions about how central banks manage the trade-offs between price stability, output stability and financial stability in order to meet our overall macroeconomic objectives. Throughout the era of inflation targeting, the importance of the trade-off between output and inflation stabilisation in the short term has been well understood. Monetary policy was seen as aiming at a target for inflation in the long run, which was to be achieved by bringing inflation back to target over a suitable time horizon so as to avoid excessive volatility of real variables such as output and employment. Optimal monetary policy was seen as a choice of how best to navigate the short-run trade-off while ensuring that the long-run objective was met. Failure to deliver price stability is costly, as UK experience amply demonstrates. Chart 1 shows the variance of inflation and of the output gap in the UK, using quarterly data for two periods.1 Contrast the performance in the 35 years up to 1992 with the first 15 years of inflation targeting. Better policy can take some credit for this improvement, as the anchoring of inflation expectations led to a huge reduction in inflation volatility. It was tempting to think that we had moved onto the “Taylor frontier” – which maps feasible combinations of the smallest variances of the output gap and inflation.
However, today I would like to return instead to the subject of liquidity regulation. 1  One important pre-requisite is that the authorities have access to up-to-date and accurate information about financial firms, on which they can base shared assessments of the position of individual firms and the likelihood of a crisis affecting the financial system as a whole. The information needed includes, inter alia, a firm’s group structure, capital, liquidity asset holdings, large exposures, and its involvement in markets and in payment, clearing and settlement systems. This information can be collectively thought of as a ‘Fact Book’ on a firm. In some countries much of this information is already available. The FSA recently published a paper outlining the information that the UK authorities collectively deem it necessary to have in a financial crisis, and asking for firms’ cooperation in making available a limited amount of additional information that is not already collected on a routine basis. 4  BIS Review 79/2005  The potential willingness of the authorities to supply discretionary—as opposed to routine—liquidity in a crisis is likely to give rise to moral hazard, because in the real world, faced with incomplete information, it is difficult or impossible to identify ex ante a ‘pure’ liquidity crisis. By, for example, relaxing normal criteria on collateral quality authorities may move from the injection of liquidity to what is effectively the provision of risk capital.

Sir Andrew Large: Financial stability - managing liquidity risk in a global system Speech by Sir Andrew Large, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the Fourteenth City of London Central Banking and Regulatory Conference, London, 28 November 2005. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Much is written today about the search for yield. Much is said about the factors that underlie it: accommodative monetary policy; savings gluts; and financial engineering which multiplies the opportunities for increasing leverage. And much, too, is said about new instruments, such as those involving credit risk transfer, or new players, such as hedge funds, that trade them. However, my main concern today is not with the search for yield as such, nor with market innovations or new players. Rather, it is with the financial vulnerabilities to which they could give rise, and what can be done to mitigate those vulnerabilities. Because it seems to me that the search for yield also highlights some less benign aspects of today’s financial system: the opacity of markets in some new instruments; the difficulty of knowing the real value of assets and contracts; reliance on models that have not been tested in the full range of economic conditions; the uncertainties over behaviour of new participants in the markets should events turn adverse; and the difficulty we have in judging just how deep markets will prove to be should a substantial number of investors decide simultaneously to try to realise their investments.
In fact, non-residents only hold 29% of government securities which should include the Sukuk or MGII. Furthermore, most of the outflows by non-residents arise from the sale of short-term bonds associated with short-term views while investors of Malaysia’s long-term bonds have remained steadfast in their investment holdings. We also observe since October 2015 the non-resident portfolio flows has becomes positive. In 2015, as part of our effort to improve transparency, we have embarked on an initiative to gather statistics on the ultimate beneficiary owners of Malaysian bonds and sukuks to give the market a clearer picture on the types and behavior of investors in our market. Preliminary data showed that of the total non-resident holders of Malaysian debt securities, 70–80% were stable long-term investors while the remaining minority was short-term investors. We are now looking at measures on how we can enhance the disclosure requirements of our bond holdings to be even more transparent so that our financial market would be on par if not better than the best practices adopted by advanced markets. Over the years, we have liberalized the foreign exchange administrative rules to promote competitiveness and reduce cost of doing business, attract foreign investors and create business opportunities for our local players. Ringgit bonds were allowed to be traded freely offshore, with some restrictions placed on ringgit funding and FX derivatives markets to contain speculation, with the aim to ensure financial stability. An unintended consequence of this liberalization was the emergence of offshore transactions relating to Ringgit such as NDF and NDIRS.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Insights from the financial market in 2015, expectation and direction going forward Opening speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Annual Dinner of Persatuan Pasaran Kewangan Malaysia (PPKM), Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2015. *  *  *  This annual dinner is an important event for it presents an opportunity for us and the market to reflect upon all the challenges in the financial market, and draw lessons as we move into the new operating year. The year 2015 has been a very interesting year for all of us here, industry players and regulators alike. During the year, we witnessed significant capital outflows as markets responded to the global economic developments. In particular, every commentary or data release hinting at policy normalization in the US was met with gyrations in financial markets. Emerging currencies, felt the brunt of such volatility, especially commodity exporting countries given the significant decline in commodity and energy prices and moderation in growth for the China’s economy. For Malaysia, we saw ringgit weakened as much as 18%, while in the bond market, we saw relative stability even though yields went up by 30 to 50 bps given by the negative sentiment in the domestic and global markets. Insights from the financial market in 2015 In the midst of all the global economic uncertainty and financial market volatility, I would like to highlight some observations and comments.
However, this comparison is not entirely valid, for two reasons. Firstly, the new regulations entail much stricter requirements regarding what is accepted as Tier 1 capital. In future a much larger share of this capital must be of the highest possible quality. This “common equity Tier 1 capital” is made up of equity capital and withheld profits (the red part of the columns in the figure below). This capital can immediately and without complication be used to cover losses. In addition, one must have additional capital – what is known as other Tier 1 capital – of good quality, which can also be used to meet losses in going concern (orange colour in the figure). One must also have further capital in the form of, for instance, subordinated loans (yellow colour in the figure). This part of the capital differs from the other two in that it can only be used once the bank has gone bankrupt. Secondly, one will to a greater extent assume that the asset values are overestimated. So the risk adjustments in the value of the assets that I mentioned will be much tougher. Quite simply, one will now assume that the values of many asset classes are more inflated than was previously assumed. So despite the increase in Sweden being only around 2 percentage points for Tier 1 capital, it actually entails a much tougher minimum requirement. But above all, it means that the global minimum level is raised substantially. Especially with regard to common equity Tier 1 capital.

But before I go into these issues, I would like to briefly describe the background to the reform package. Financial system close to total collapse in autumn 2008 The global financial system was close to a total collapse in autumn 2008. The large rescue packages implemented by central banks and other authorities around the world succeeded in preventing an even worse financial crisis than the one we experienced. One hardly dares speculate as to what might have happened if the rescue packages had not succeeded in restoring confidence in the banking system, because without confidence developments can be quick and drastic. The most classic example of this is a bank run. This means that the bank’s customers become concerned for their savings and rush to the bank to withdraw them in time. But the money isn’t in the bank, it has been lent out. Which is the whole point, of course. At the same time, the banks are unable to renew their loans in the market as they mature, which means they cannot meet their obligations to deposit customers or creditors in the market and they collapse like a house of cards. And without banks the financial system cannot function. If not even the most basic functions can be upheld, people will not receive their wages and will not be able to pay their bills. The economy will grind to a halt. But even though we managed to save the financial system through rescue packages, the costs of the crisis have been immense.
For a long time we have observed the increasing prominence of China and other emerging economies in the global economy. These countries also weathered the crisis well and have helped to restart economic growth in several western countries. However, the global trade imbalances that accumulated prior to the financial crisis are still present. Several countries must sharply reduce public expenditure to bring rapidly rising government debt under control. This may have a dampening impact on growth ahead. High commodity prices could also depress activity. Chart: Consumer prices Strong growth in demand for energy and commodities from emerging economies has led to a marked rise in the price of oil, grain and other commodities. In addition, unrest in North Africa and the Middle East has fuelled uncertainty concerning the supply of oil ahead. Food and energy represent a large share of consumption in many countries and inflation has therefore picked up. Nevertheless, in most advanced economies long-term inflation expectations are relatively stable and consumer price inflation is being dampened by low capacity utilisation and high unemployment. Chart: Actual and expected key rates Key rates are near zero in many countries. Through 2010 interest rate expectations in other countries fell, but have picked up in 2011. The ECB and Sveriges Riksbank recently raised their key rates. Rising inflation has led to monetary policy tightening in several emerging economies. Chart: Output Activity in the Norwegian economy has gained a firm footing. Capacity utilisation appears to be close to a normal level.

In 2010 Norges Bank had to maintain high liquidity in the banking system to keep short-term money market rates close to the key policy rate. To dampen demand for central bank liquidity and promote increased activity in the money market, Norges Bank’s Executive Board approved changes in the system for managing liquidity in the banking system in December 2010. Under the new regulation, only a certain amount of banks’ deposits – a quota – will bear interest at the key policy rate. Deposits in excess of this quota will bear a lower interest rate. This will give banks a stronger financial incentive to redistribute liquidity among themselves, making the Norwegian money market function more effectively. The new system is expected to take effect from 3 October of this year. 3. From financial crisis to debt crisis  Chart: General government gross debt The experience of recent years has shown the costs of financial instability in many countries. Global economic growth has recovered, but the effects of the financial crisis are still visible and will be so for some time ahead. Financial crises tend to be followed by debt crises. Fiscal policy was used actively in most countries to dampen the effects of the financial crisis. The mistakes of the 1930s were not to be repeated. But as a result, weak public balances became even weaker. On top of this, some countries provided substantial government funding to banks. Government debt quickly mounted.
As a result, in the long term, two different uses of the CBDC could exist side by side: one for payments between financial sector players (a socalled “wholesale” currency) that uses blockchain technology and all its possibilities, notably smart contracts; and another for the general public (a so-called “retail” currency) that is simpler and better suited to retail transactions. In this respect, financial institutions are much more digitally mature than private individuals as they already access central bank currency digitally via the bank accounts they hold with the central bank. In addition, following on from the questions raised by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, on the idea of creating an international digital currency in response to the dominance of the US dollar, I think there would be some advantage in moving rapidly to issue at least a wholesale CBDC, as we would be the first such issuer in the world and would thus reap the benefits of having a benchmark CBDC. 2/ The issuance of a CBDC can generate significantpositive externalities by increasing the productivity of the financial sector and by extension the economy, and by shoring up confidence in the currency and in the financial system. But, in parallel, it is vital that we examine the potentially negative externalities that a CBDC could generate for liquidity, profitability and bank intermediation. In particular, we need to look very closely at the risks linked to large-scale and/or sudden conversions of bank deposits into central bank money.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Central bank digital currency and innovative payments Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), at the ACPR, Paris, 4 December 2019. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, One of the great things about the conferences organised by the ACPR is their sense of timing: they always come in the middle of heated debates. Today is no exception with the issue of the challenges faced by life insurance in a low interest rate environment. By way of introduction, let me agree with and sum up Bernard Delas’s message of this morning: French insurers are resilient and thus have the capacity to make the necessary dual adaptation. First, the rates paid on life insurance policies need to be lowered this year from last year’s average of 1.8%. Next, insurers must actively restructure and diversify their offering for savers, while at the same time paying very close attention to the quality of advice they offer. If, as a complement – and only as a complement – regulatory adjustments are needed to facilitate this change in life insurance, then we are ready to support them. I would like to turn now to the topic for this afternoon which is dedicated to innovation. Allow me to both restrict and extend the scope of the subject: restrict it to the field of payments which has seen a proliferation of innovations over recent years.