samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some will be directly related to the pandemic and its legacy in terms of the solvency of households and firms, with others stemming from potentially adverse developments on financial markets. Attesting to the latter, for example, has been the increase in recent months in long-term interest rates in different parts of the world. The possibility of tensions on financial markets and a tightening of financing conditions, in a setting in which public and private debt has increased notably, is one of the main risks central banks must tackle, in advanced and emerging economies alike. Thank you. 4  For more details on financing to households and firms against the background of the COVID-19 crisis, see Alves, P., R. Blanco, S. Mayordomo, F. Arrizabalaga, J. Delgado, G. Jiménez, E. Pérez Asenjo, C. Pérez Montes and C. Trucharte (2020). “Recent developments in financing and bank lending to the non-financial private sector”, Artículos Analíticos, Boletín Económico, 4/2020, Banco de España, and Alves, P., F. Arrizabalaga, J. Delgado, J. Galán, E. Pérez Asenjo, C. Pérez Montes and C. Trucharte (2021). “Recent developments in financing and bank lending to the non-financial private sector”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 1/2021, Banco de España. 5  See P. Hernández de Cos (2020): “The European response to the COVID-19 crisis.” Opening address at the Fundación Internacional Olof Palme Conference. 6

Thomas Jordan: Monetary policy and the business cycle Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 75th anniversary celebrations of the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich, 23 September 2013. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Monetary policy contributes to the prosperity of an economy by ensuring price stability in the medium and long term. This makes it possible to put resources to more efficient use, from an economic point of view, and also promotes investment and, with it, long-term growth. Price stability also helps to avoid undesirable distribution effects. Households with lower incomes derive particular benefit from this. Monetary policy can be used to dampen cyclical fluctuations. However, it is not suitable for short-term fine-tuning of the economy. From the point of view of the business cycle, the goal of monetary policy must rather be the reduction of larger risks and the alleviation of extreme situations. An example of one such measure is the minimum exchange rate, which the Swiss National Bank (SNB) set on 6 September 2011 to halt the Swiss franc's upward trend, thus averting a deflationary spiral and warding off the danger of a serious economic crisis. Monetary policy decisions are always subject to uncertainty. It is therefore of key importance that the SNB has a sound decision-making basis.
The US Federal Reserve started tapering asset purchases last year, resulting in a slight, renewed increase in long-term interest rates. Chart 4: GDP for trading partners Growth among our trading partners picked up in the latter half of 2013, particularly in the US. Although euro-area growth has also improved, unemployment and debt levels remain elevated. Emerging economies are growing at a clearly faster pace than advanced economies, but the pace has slackened somewhat. A number of emerging economies have  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  been affected by capital outflows and currency depreciation. The tapering of asset purchases by the US Federal Reserve has likely also contributed to these developments. Countries with large current account deficits are particularly hard hit. Chart 5: Consumer prices abroad Inflation has fallen in many countries over that past few years. Euro area inflation fell to a very low level in 2013, fuelling fears of deflation. However, a portion of the decline in inflation is related to developments in food and energy prices. Furthermore, the decline has been most pronounced in periphery countries. In those countries, negative or very low price growth reflects a need for improving competitiveness. In the core countries, such as Germany and France, inflation has remained on a steadier course. Long-term inflation expectations seem to be firmly anchored in most advanced economies. Chart 6: GDP for Mainland Norway Growth in the Norwegian economy slowed through 2013. The slowdown was most pronounced in the construction and oil supplier industries.

In fact, public accounts kept improving, so that fiscal surpluses, of around 2% of GDP, were achieved in the years previous to the crisis. But the temporary nature of those revenues and the underlying fragility of the fiscal situation became evident when the housing sector started to adjust. As a result of this adjustment and the depth of the crisis, the surpluses have turned into large and persistent deficits, reaching –11% in 2009, a shift of more than 13 percentage points of GDP in just two years. Could this build-up of imbalances have been avoided or mitigated? With hindsight, no doubt it could, but the economic and policy incentives were not there at the right time. On the one hand, financial markets failed to provide enough ex-ante market discipline: European and global investors were eager to finance countries with higher expected short term returns, dismissing underlying vulnerabilities. Investors tend to ride the waves of sentiment, reacting only – but dramatically – when weaknesses become evident. In this way, they act procyclically, inducing large swings in capital flows. Our Latin American colleagues are acquainted with these experiences, because they have suffered this type of “sudden stops” several times over the last decades. On the other hand, economic policies did not respond adequately to the underlying dangers. In a context of apparent economic and financial stability, and with the European project sailing in full swing, complacency was difficult to avoid, and there was little incentive to address – or even assess – underlying problems.
Apart from the cost in net worth, intervention requires withdrawing money used to purchase foreign exchange by placing debt. This debt has an impact on market interest rates, affecting firms’ financial costs and arbitrage conditions, which could end up undoing the direct effects. At the same time, repeated or frequent interventions lose effectiveness: it is essential for intervention to be an exceptional occurrence in order to transmit the relevant information to financial markets. Nevertheless, it is a valid tool, effective in changing the exchange rate and strengthening the international liquidity position. The board of the Central Bank of Chile constantly evaluates the timing and the size of any intervention and in the past few weeks it has certainly been present in our discussions, based on weighing the benefits, costs and the present context. In the Central Bank of Chile we use a variety of methods for assessing the real exchange rate level with regard to its long-term fundamentals and thus we have an ample range of estimates. Our aim is not to determine which is the equilibrium – that is the task of the market –, but rather to detect any anomalous deviation. These discussions led us to the conclusion in our latest Monetary Policy Report that the real exchange rate is within the adequate range of levels, albeit in the lower part of it, and this is confirmed by the most recent appreciation.

José De Gregorio: Exchange rate and export development Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Special Session on Exchange Rate at the Chamber of Deputies and the 23rd National Meeting of Fruit and Vegetable Producers, Santiago de Chile, 6 October 2010. *  *  *  Chile has prospered during recent decades thanks to globalization. Having tried various strategies, we can say we have reached consensus on this matter. For an economy of our size and characteristics, opening up to the rest of the world is essential for creating the competition and efficiency that will stimulate development. Four decades ago, this idea was a voice in the desert in developing economies, but today it is the accepted norm. There is also consensus that monetary and exchange policy should be conducted by an autonomous central bank, and that fiscal policy should be governed by transparent, predictable and sustainable rules. After much trial and error, our country adopted an institutionality that has allowed us to walk through complex international situations with relative stability. Today I would like to discuss how we at the Central Bank of Chile view the challenges facing export development, in particular with regard to monetary and exchange-rate policy. Let me open by explaining the four principles guiding our decisions, so I can clarify some misconceptions with respect to the Central Bank and the exchange rate.
So if a large share of a country’s imports is invoiced in a foreign currency, changes in its exchange rate will mostly show up in changes in the domestic currency price of imports – in other words, pass-through will be higher. For the UK, Gopinath finds that just under half of imports are invoiced in US dollars. 55 There is evidence of threshold effects in exchange rate pass-through. Pass-through of bilateral exchange rate movements that are larger than 5% is around four times larger than that of changes smaller than 5%. See Lewis, J (2016), ‘What can Big Data tell us about the pass-through of big exchange rate changes?’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 579. 54  20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  20  Turning finally to the policy implications, it is critical to recognise that Brexit represents a real shock about which monetary policy can do little. Monetary policy cannot prevent the weaker real incomes likely to accompany the move to new trading arrangements with the EU, but it can influence how this hit to incomes is distributed between job losses and price rises. And it can support UK households and businesses as they adjust to such profound change. On balance, the de-integration effects of Brexit can be expected to steepen the Phillips Curve and to be inflationary. At present, the main question concerns the extent to which this adjustment has been brought forward.

It accounted for one third of international issuance of green and sustainable bonds in Asia. In 2022, we continued to see strong momentum, in particular in the area of green and sustainable loans. The vibrant green bond market is in part a result of the many breakthroughs made by the Government Green Bond programme. Since 2019, the HKMA has assisted the Government in issuing nearly $ billion worth of green bonds targeting both institutional and retail investors. We made use of each issuance to innovate and expand the suite of green bond products in terms of currencies, tenors and distribution channels, thus laying the foundation for other public and private sector issuers in the region. These issuances kept pushing the boundaries. Just over the last few years, we made the world's largest retail green bond issuance, Asia's largest ESG bond issuance, and issued the world's first tokenised government green bond. We will continue to seek new breakthroughs. In the coming five years, planned annual issuance of Government Green Bonds will increase from $ billion to $ billion. The mandate of this programme will be expanded to cover sustainable bonds as well. We will also consider how best to incorporate green and sustainability elements into a new infrastructure bond programme we are developing for the Government.
Now, wearing my hat as a regulator, a “radically open mind” does not mean that financial stability falls by the wayside. The use of digital innovations needs to be complemented by a clear approach to money laundering and financial risks. We continuously work with banks to achieve this. We also ensure that consumers and investors understand the risks associated with investments in these still-largely unregulated products. 18. To do this we need to put in the right guardrails. The basic principle is “same activity, same risks, same regulation”, such that digital assets performing similar functions to traditional products should be subject to similar regulations. This is exactly what we and other regulators in Hong Kong are doing. 19. The HKMA is putting in place a risk-based and proportionate regulatory regime for payment-related stablecoins. The SFC is introducing a framework to regulate digital asset trading platforms. We have issued guidance to banks on what they need to watch out for if they wish to offer crypto- or DeFi-related services, whether for account opening or custodial services. 20. These guardrails will provide a solid foundation with a clear set of rules, on which a vibrant crypto and DeFi ecosystem can be built in Hong Kong. 21. Whether I’m wearing my hat as market enabler or regulator, there is a need to be radically open-minded; to have a welcoming attitude to new ideas, so that we can achieve public good through a fair balance between innovation and stability. “More is More” 22. My second reflection is “more is more”.

Three years ago, at this same event, I said that technology adoption would be a bumpy road. Of course, no one could have guessed how bumpy things would get, but for Hong Kong this journey has also been rewarding and fascinating. Our fintech journey started in 2016, with the Smart Banking Initiatives launched in 2017, and leading up to the “Fintech 2025” Strategy we rolled out last year. 6. In between, we have introduced a Faster Payment System (FPS), which now has 11 million registrations and more than a million transactions a day, and also eight virtual banks with 1.7 million accounts and $ billion in deposits, delivering innovative and inclusive products entirely through digital channels. 7. Last week, we launched the Commercial Data Interchange, or CDI, that makes financial data sharing between banks and data providers more efficient, so that borrowers, especially SMEs, can make use of their own data, such as payment and business-tobusiness e-commerce data, to gain better access to bank loans. We are also one of the few central banking institutions researching and piloting both wholesale and retail Central Bank Digital Currency, or CBDCs. 8. If you ask me whether I anticipated all these developments when we organised the first Fintech Week back in 2016, the answer is definitely no. Technology has been developing incredibly fast, and digitalisation of financial services has been accelerated, and not impeded, by the pandemic. The momentum for our fintech journey is only getting stronger. 9. We will continue on this path of fintech innovation.
The recent reduction of the MPR is part of a necessary adjustment to deal with recent changes in our macroeconomy and, as I said, ensure compliance with our inflation objective. Going forward, further changes to the MPR will depend on incoming information and its implications on the economy’s evolution. Actually, the baseline scenario does not foresee the need for any significant changes in the MPR but, should such need arise, monetary policy has room and is prepared for further adjustments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Over the period, both the real and the nominal exchange rates have depreciated, which is part of the process of restructuring the sources of growth after some time when domestic demand has been the primary driver of such growth. Let me now describe for you our baseline scenario and the main risks we have identified in our reports. Macroeconomic scenario Chile’s third-quarter growth was 4.7 percent y-o-y. Mining grew strongly, boosted by the startup of major investment projects of recent years. Thus, mining exports have increased, helping to reduce the current account deficit. Sectors other than natural resources, meanwhile, continued to post lower growth rates than in 2012 (figure 1). This, together with the revision to growth rates of earlier quarters, confirmed that the Chilean economy has lost some strength compared with last year. On the expenditure side, the slowdown extended to each and every component, including private consumption, which was accompanied with significant inventory depletion (figure 2).

BIS Review 101/2009  1  The Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), charged with regulating the securities markets, broadened its membership to include Brazil, China and India, while the BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) extended their memberships to encompass 9 and 14 new countries respectively, the majority of which are emerging economies. Nevertheless, there is a need now to ensure that a good balance is struck between the legitimate enlargement of these bodies to reflect our economic reality and the effective and efficient mechanisms those organisations have shown so far. For example, the Basel Committee must now find ways of adapting in order to function as a 27-member body, compared with a 13-member body beforehand. I would now like to turn to the work in progress in the areas of prudential regulation, accounting standards and the scope of regulation. As far as prudential regulation is concerned, the primary imperative is to improve the quality of capital and to harmonise its definition. And this move should go hand in hand with the quick and full geographical extension of Basel II because this framework is designed precisely to ensure that requirements are proportionate to risks and indeed it would certainly have helped if it had been implemented as initially planned before 2008. Beyond that, should we add a simple measure to our arsenal that enables us to assess leverage with a view to helping anticipate the formation of asset price bubbles?
They are largely exempt from reporting and disclosure requirements and there are no restrictions with regard to investment strategies, financial instruments or leverage. The term “hedge fund” goes back to the 1950s, when the first hedge funds were established. These funds were designed to be neutral to general market movements. Their investment strategy was to combine short and long positions to hedge some of the market risk and thus to achieve absolute returns in different market conditions. Nowadays, they no longer just “hedge” since they apply a wide range of investment strategies. They make intensive use of short selling and of complex financial instruments such as derivatives. The term “highly leveraged institution” is also of limited value in terms of defining the entity it designates. 2 At a rough estimate, HLIs have an average leverage of 1.4. 3 This is indeed a much higher leverage than traditional investment funds have, for which there are strict restrictions on indebtedness. In Switzerland, for instance, traditional investment funds are only allowed to have a leverage of up to 0.1, and this only on a temporary basis. However, a leverage of 1.4 is low compared to large international banks which have a leverage of ten to fifty. In terms of market share, the role of HLIs is less important than is generally believed although, in the last few years, their activity has grown tremendously. Since 1999, HLI assets under management have increased by a factor of five. An important driving factor has been the increased inflows from institutional investors.

In a system of flexible exchange rates, gold is no longer required for it to perform this function and the gold initiative is therefore unnecessary. Price stability and the stability of the Swiss franc are not determined by the share of gold in the SNB’s balance sheet, but by its monetary policy. It has achieved these goals more effectively than virtually any other central bank: average inflation has remained below 1% for the last 20 years, and never in the history of the SNB has there been such a sustained period of low and stable inflation. Prescriptions on the share of gold in the balance sheet, coupled with a sales ban, would make it considerably more difficult for the SNB to fulfil its mandate in future. For this reason, the gold initiative is harmful. In order to pursue a stability-oriented monetary policy, the SNB needs to be able to supply the Swiss economy with Swiss franc liquidity quickly in periods of crisis. The SNB’s balance sheet expands when liquidity is increased. In the aftermath of a crisis, it is critical that this newly injected liquidity be reduced again, in order to prevent an undesirable rise in inflation. Scaling back liquidity, on the other hand, reduces the balance sheet total. Given that the initiative is calling for gold to make up at least 20% of the SNB’s assets, a temporary liquidity increase would require gold holdings to be increased, too.
29  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  29  Table 1: Estimates for Job Destruction and Creation from Automation (MIT (2018))  Jobs Destroyed  When  Where  Jobs Created  Predictor  2016  Worldwide  900,000 to 1,500,000  Metra Martech  2018  US jobs  3,078,340  Forrester  2020  Worldwide  1,000,000-2,000,000  Metra Martech  2020  Worldwide  1,800,000  2,300,000  Gartner  2020  Sampling of 15 countries  7,100,000  2,000,000  World Economic Forum (WEF)  2021  Worldwide  1,900,000-3,500,000  The International Federation of Robotics  2021  US jobs  9,108,900  Forrester  2022  Worldwide  1,000,000,000  Thomas Frey  2025  US jobs  24,186,240  2025  US jobs  3,400,000  2027  US jobs  24,700,000  2030  Worldwide  2,000,000,000  2030  Worldwide  400,000,000800,000,000  2030  US jobs  58,164,320  PWC  No Date  US jobs  13,594,320  OECD  No Date  UK jobs  13,700,000  IPPR  13,852,530  13,604,760  Forrester  ScienceAlert  14,900,000  Forrester  Thomas Frey  555,000,000890,000,000  McKinsey  Source: MIT Technology Review (2018) - https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610005/every-study-we-could-find-on-what-automationwill-do-to-jobs-in-one-chart/  30  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  30  Chart 6: Wage premium for cognitive skills Real wage level of full time U.S. male workers relative to 1963 2.0 High School Dropout High School Graduate Some College Bachelor's Degree Greater than Bachelor's Degree  1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8  1963  1968  1973  1978  1983  1988  1993  1998  2003  2008  Sources: Autor (2014).

What the UK may lack is some diffusion spokes to accompany these innovation hubs – spokes that could help spread new and existing technologies, new products and practices to the long and lengthening lower tail of companies. To be successful, these spokes would need to be repositories of knowledge and expertise on technologies and their application to companies. And, ideally, these repositories would have regional and sectoral reach to enable them to touch the long tail. The UK’s existing university network would be one institutional solution to this spoke problem. They have regional and sectoral reach. They also have embodied expertise and knowledge. By working in partnership with local businesses, they could serve as repositories of expertise on good company practices – in management, organisation, logistics, robotics, AI and the like. A new set of business parks attached to these universities could serve, not so much as innovation incubators for new companies, but as diffusion clinics for existing ones. This idea goes with the grain of the earlier proposal; it would broaden the scope and purpose of universities. In future, these would develop a broader set of capitals – beyond human capital (in people) to include physical and intellectual capital (in firms). And they would do so throughout the lifecycle of companies, not just in their early years. As it happens, this would also be consistent with Newman’s original conception of universities as diffusion-engines, every bit as much as innovation-engines.