samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The effect that stored value, whether smart card or computer based, has on monetary policy will in large part turn on the extent to which it shifts the money supply out of the banking sector. When stored value is issued by banks, this is not a real risk. As Governor Edward Kelly noted in a 1996 speech before a cyber-payments conference, bank liabilities incurred through issuing stored-value cards should be included in the statistical reports that banks must currently submit to the Federal Reserve Board. In addition to monetary policy concerns, other factors could trigger the need for the Government to resolve the issue of bank versus nonbank issuance of electronic value. For example, as I noted earlier, banks are subject to extensive regulation and supervision at least in part to ensure the safety and soundness of the payments systems. If nonbanks begin to take significant market share away from BIS Review 26/1998  -4banks because of an inherently lower cost structure, that raises serious questions about a level playing field and whether banks can ever fairly compete. If nonbanks begin offering through the Internet many of the payment services, or alternatives to the payment services, now offered exclusively by banks, it raises a real question about the ultimate value of a bank charter, and what it really means to be a bank. It could be argued, for example, that there is no such thing as a nonbank issuer of e-money -- but only supervised bank issuers and unsupervised bank issuers.

On February 2, 1998, Senator Bennett, Chairman of the Banking Committee’s Subcommittee on Financial Services and Technology, introduced the Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law of 1998 (S. 1594) which is aimed at facilitating the use of electronic authentication by United States financial institutions. The bill establishes the right of a financial institution to use electronic authentication if it has entered into an agreement with any counterparty or has established a banking, financial, or transactional system using electronic authentication and the use of the electronic authentication would be valid according to the relevant agreement or system rules. Under this bill, financial institutions would be exempt from state law regulations governing the registration, licensing, or use of electronic authentication as well as from any state law limitations or impositions of fees in connection with electronic authentication services. Absent compliance with state laws, however, use of electronic authentication by financial institutions would not be eligible for the state law presumptions or benefits, including the presumption that an electronic signature is the equivalent of a manual signature. Moreover, financial institutions remain subject to supervision by the appropriate banking supervisor which may, by regulation or order, preclude a financial institution from using electronic authentication in its business if it determines that such use would not be consistent with safe and sound BIS Review 26/1998  -8banking practices, or if such use would threaten the safety and soundness of the institution, subsidiary or affiliate.
As a working assumption, we estimate that it will oscillate around these values throughout the projection horizon. Inflation As I mentioned at the beginning, after being under 2% annually almost the entire second half of 2017, headline inflation has been rising this year, to approach 3% in recent months. Although part of this rise is explained by the more volatile CPI items and the peso depreciation, inflation of the basket components that are more sensitive to the activity gap (ie. services and non-tradables) has increased gradually but steadily over the course of 2018 (Figure 7). In terms of projections, the drastic fall in fuel prices results in a downward revision to CPI inflation this year and next, ending 2018 and 2019 barely below 3%. Towards 2020, once these effects fade out, the CPI inflation will be around 3%. The CPIEFE—total CPI excluding food and energy componentes—inflation, in turn, will approach 3% in the first half of 2019, to later stay in the neighborhood until the end of the projection horizon (Figure 8). Monetary policy About monetary policy, the same as in September, the Board considers that the evolution of macroeconomic conditions makes it necessary to gradually withdraw the current monetary stimulus. Key in this judgment is our assessment of the size of the capacity gaps compared with the magnitude of the monetary stimulus: while the former has decreased, monetary policy is still very expansionary.

12  December  Figure 5 Real annual contributions to gross fixed capital formation GFCF (*) (percentage points)  16  16  12  12  8  8  4  4  0  0  -4  -4  -8  -8  -12  -12  -16  -16 09  10 11 Housing  12  13 Other  14  15  16 Mining  17  18 19 20 Non-mining  (*) For 2017 mining investment is estimated using information available from companies' uniform coded statistical report FECU. Housing investment uses household investment figures in the National Accounts by institutional sector. The GFCF component "Other" is treated as a residue. To report forecasts for 2018, 2019 and 2020, Central Bank forecasting models and sectoral sources are used, including the Corporation of Capital Goods' investment plans and survey. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
We, of course, can and do actually affect the third main area of uncertainty – the nominal demand side of the economy – by setting short-term interest rates. But here, too, we have to rely to a considerable extent upon judgement, given the uncertainties  BIS Review 2/2001  3  •  about what is currently happening to demand, given the lags and contradictions in the data and the fact that they are in many cases subject to later revision;  •  about the strength and persistence of the underlying forces driving demand looking ahead; and  •  about the sensitivity of the various components of demand to changes in the level of interest rates. It can’t be said too often that the operation of monetary policy is an art rather than a precise science, although practising that art needs to be – and is – informed by as much science as we can bring to bear. For what it is worth, at the time of our last forecast in November, our central projection – on the assumption of 6% interest rates – was for output growth of around 2½% over the next couple of years, with RPIX inflation remaining modestly below target this year but rising to 2½% in 2002. There was, of course, a good deal of uncertainty around that central projection, as there always is, for the reasons that I’ve tried to explain.

But on the basis of that forecast the short answer to the question: can our steady economic progress be maintained, over the next couple of years anyway, is a cautious “yes”. Since that forecast was completed things have gone in different directions. The prospect for external demand has somewhat weakened and so too has the oil price. There are mixed messages relating to tightness in the labour market, but earnings growth has so far remained reasonably well contained - as it must continue to do. On the domestic demand side, private consumption growth has remained stronger than we had supposed, while the growth in private investment has been weaker; meanwhile it is not clear that underlying public sector demand has – at least yet – picked up as rapidly as planned. The exchange rate has fallen, and so, too, have market interest rates. I would not venture to suggest how these – and all the other developments we look at – will influence our next forecast in February; and it would be pointless to anticipate possible future policy decisions. I would be surprised if they radically altered the broad prospect of relatively steady progress over the next two years. But I can assure you of one thing: if the prospect – or the balance of risks around it – were to change significantly – either in the context of our February forecast or subsequently – we will promptly react to that change.
The result is lower activity and lower welfare. Norges Bank Economic perspectives 15 february 2018  In the distant past, the central bank was to safeguard the value of the country’s monetary unit in terms of a precious metal. This was later replaced by fixed rate regimes. Various forms of fixed exchange rate regimes are still in use in many countries. However, since 1990 an increasing number of countries have chosen to link monetary stability to a numerical inflation target. Since the financial crisis, all of these countries have maintained their inflation targeting regimes. This reflects their overall positive experience with this framework. It did not get in the way of a powerful response to the financial crisis. With a floating exchange rate and a credible inflation anchor, monetary policy could be geared to stabilising the economy. In Norway too, inflation targeting has functioned well. Inflation has remained low and stable since it came down in the early 1990s (Chart 13). We can now look back on a quarter century of stable prices. At the same time, employment variability has been lower since 2001 than in previous periods despite the shocks to the Norwegian economy. 1)  Chart 13 Inflation in Norway. Four−quarter change.

Christian Noyer: Publication of Bank of France’s Financial Stability Review “The future of financial regulation” Remarks by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the publication of Bank of France’s Financial Stability Review “The future of financial regulation”, London, 4 September 2009. *  *  *  It's a pleasure to welcome you here, in London, on the eve of a very important G20 Ministerial meeting and to introduce the latest issue of our Financial Stability Review. It is also a privilege to have such a distinguished panel for this introduction and I want to express my gratitude to all. The Review is about the Future of Financial Regulation. Our hope was to help and contribute to the international discussions and the publication of this Review could not be timelier. The financial crisis has taught us some very hard lessons. While there are many causes to the crisis, including, maybe, macro economic policies, it is also clear that it forces us to reconsider the way we regulate and supervise the financial system. That is what we are doing, and this will take a significant part in tomorrow's discussions between G20 Ministers and Central Bank Governors. At stake is the scope of financial regulation, its nature, and its objectives. The scope of financial regulation We entered this crisis with many unregulated entities playing a major role in the financial system.
7 And, more recently, 9% of the UK banks’ pre-crisis stock of CRE lending was written off between 2008 and 2014 compared to 0.4% for mortgage lending. Over the past two years, commercial property prices have risen strongly by 18%. Up to the second half of last year, the market seemed to be “simmering” if not “bubbling”. Unlike in previous cycles, however, a much greater proportion of CRE activity has been financed by equity investors, in large part overseas investors, rather than by UK bank lending. The share of equity finance in UK CRE transactions in 2015 is estimated at around 55%, compared to around 30% in 2007 and a peak of around 80% in 2010. So the direct risks to major UK banks from this sector are not as high as one might assume. The fact that there is less UK leverage in the sector does not mean however that a sharp correction in CRE prices poses no financial stability risks. Property is an important source of collateral for UK corporates, SMEs in particular. A sharp drop in CRE values could constrain their access to credit. Recent research by Bank staff found that a one pound rise in the value of a company’s property is associated with around a five to ten pence rise in investment. 8 More broadly, Bank staff estimate that around a quarter of business investment is related to commercial property.

Rae, G (1885) The country banker: his clients, cares, and work from an experience of forty years, Jon Murray. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s recent economic and financial market developments Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the technical meeting to promote regional cooperation in the framework of Vienna Initiative II, Tirana, 3 October 2013. *  *  *  Dear representatives of supervisory authorities, I take this opportunity to thank you for your participation in the first regional meeting on the Vienna Initiative. The performance of EU and regional economies over the last few years have clearly demonstrated that in Europe’s highly interconnected markets, the financial tensions, regardless of their origin, go beyond local or regional boundaries. The euro area sovereign crisis, which started as a localized episode in the euro area periphery, evolved gradually into a European predicament involving almost all European Union (EU) members, heavily affecting non-EU member countries in the CESEE region as well. At the core of the transmission mechanism of financial pressures from EU to non-EU countries are large euro area banking groups, which operate throughout the continent with their branches and subsidiaries. In a matter of months, the sovereign-bank vicious cycle encompassing the euro area was exported to non-EU host countries, first through lower risk tolerance and second through interruption of lending to our economies by euro area banks that operate in our region through their branches and subsidiaries. In some countries, lending dampened in the form of the so-called deleveraging, i.e. reduction of lending by EU bank subsidiaries to non-EU host countries, through the simultaneous reduction of their foreign liabilities.

Cecilia Skingsley: A year of negative interest rates. Where do we stand now? Speech by Ms Cecilia Skingsley, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Danske Bank, Stockholm, 7 April 2016. *  *  *  Thank you to Christina Nyman, Ulf Söderström, Charlotta Edler, Marianne Sterner, Emil Brodin and Anders Vredin for useful comments and assistance. Thank you for inviting me here today. I intend to talk about three issues: Is it possible to conduct a national monetary policy in a complicated international environment? How has Swedish monetary policy been conducted in recent years? What considerations should govern our choice of future path? Is it possible to conduct a national monetary policy in a complicated international environment? I believe that most people will recognise the description of growth and the recovery following the global financial crisis as being a disappointment in most countries. In many cases the setbacks have been severe and prolonged, for instance, in southern Europe, while in other cases growth has been positive but low. Many central banks, wishing to live up to their price stability commitments, have implemented more far-reaching and long-term measures to stimulate monetary policy than have previously been imagined as possible. So how did we get to where we are now, with such low interest rates? In the long run, it is structural factors such as the conditions for growth and the willingness to save that determine the level of the real interest rate.
Speech  Embargo 20 September 2018, 5.30 pm  Third Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture Introduction of Otmar Issing, ETH Zurich  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Zurich, 20 September 2018 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2018  Page 1/4  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you all to the third Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture. In this Lecture Series, the Swiss National Bank pays tribute to academics whose research is of particular relevance for central banking. This year, we are expressing our appreciation of an outstanding monetary policy theorist and practitioner, an independent mind and a leading voice in economic affairs. From this description, you may doubt that I am talking about just one person. But I am. That person is, of course, Otmar Issing. Professor Issing’s life has been extraordinary and widely admired. His scholarly activities and policymaking contributions have been both impressive and mutually reinforcing. His publication list includes numerous articles in scientific journals and periodicals. His collected speeches and articles in the library of the Bundesbank amount to 21 volumes of about 10,000 pages. His textbooks have shaped the understanding of monetary theory and policy of entire generations of students, myself included. While there are many reasons for the SNB to honour Otmar Issing with this Karl Brunner Lecture, three stand out: his role as chief architect of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy strategy, his tireless commitment to price stability, and his significant influence on general economic debate.

We are also aware of the important role that the Development Bank of Zambia and others institutions that provide long term finance can play in this process. It is for this reason that the Bank of Zambia monitors the performance of these institutions to ensure that  2  BIS Review 53/2010  they are financially viable to be able to play this important role. Rather than thinking of Government recapitalising these institutions, we should think more in terms of developing the capital markets to enable these institutions raise resources for long term financing from the private sector. On the issue of the foreign exchange market, I wish to emphasise that we have a flexible exchange rate regime that has served us well after doing away with exchange controls in the early 90s. The exchange rate of the Kwacha against other international currencies has enjoyed relative stability since 2003 when the interbank foreign exchange market system (IFEM) was introduced. With this system, the Bank of Zambia intervenes in the market mainly to smoothen fluctuations and to build international reserves. The exchange rate is expected to be driven by economic fundamentals such as the terms of trade. An attempt to fix the exchange rate would have disastrous effects especially when the fundamentals suggest that the rate should depreciate as this would wipe out all the reserves we have struggled to build over the recent past.
To counteract the risks to our price stability objective, we first recalibrated our policy stance last December and then unveiled another comprehensive set of measures at our last monetary policy meeting in March 2016. In discussing our recent monetary policy measures, it is essential to consider the global environment in which they were taken. This environment was characterised by subdued growth, historically weak trade developments and low inflationary pressures reflecting sharp falls in energy prices. The more recent developments have been affected in particular by the outlook for emerging markets contributing to global financial market volatility in the second half of 2015 and again in February this year. In this respect, these developments are analysed in the box in the Annual Report entitled “Financial stress in emerging market economies” in order to understand their impact on the euro area economy. This is against the background of the discussions carried out in international fora, most recently at the meeting of G20 ministers and central bank governors, as well as at the BIS meetings in February in Shanghai. Risks to the global outlook and global financial stability will feature prominently on the agendas of the various meetings in the context of the IMF and World Bank spring meetings next week.

Therefore, the ECB strongly welcomes the Commission’s proposed regulations, which strike the right balance between the need to revive the European securitisation markets and yet maintain the prudential nature of the framework. Timely adoption of the final rules is essential for creating regulatory certainty for issuers and investors alike, thus supporting the revitalisation of the market. The ECB’s contributions to regulatory initiatives at international level Let me now turn to the international regulatory agenda, also in response to the call by ECON to receive more information on these issues. As I argued before, initiatives at European level are not taking place in isolation. Last November, the Financial Stability Board finalised the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) standard for large, complex, global systemically important banks. TLAC is an important milestone in overcoming the “too big to fail” problem. It now needs to be implemented in the European framework. To further reduce risk-taking and strengthen the resilience of the banking system, the finalisation and implementation of the leverage ratio and the strategic review of the capital framework should be matters of priority. The Basel Committee concluded its work on the definition of the leverage ratio, the trading book requirements and is working to conclude the revision of risk-weighted assets framework both for the standardised approach and for the use of banks’ internal risk models before the end of the year. Swift legislative action on the key unfinished parts of the Basel III agenda will provide clarity to the financial system and support the latter in financing the recovery.