samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Hence, it is not surprising that both factors played a major role in bank loan availability, not only according to the assessment of banks in the bank lending survey, but also according to the assessment of firms in the new survey. However, in addition to such demand-related factors, firms are of the view that factors related to the supply of credit also played some role in the deterioration of bank loan availability. In their view, banks’ willingness to lend decreased, which may suggest that lending restrictions were in place. The situation in the largest euro area countries Let me now touch on some of the main results for the largest euro area countries. While overall developments are most important for the ECB’s monetary policy, it is also worth examining the considerable heterogeneity across different countries in the access to finance of SMEs in the first half of 2009. Regarding turnover and profit, SMEs in Germany and France were above the euro area average, in the sense that fewer SMEs reported a net deterioration. SMEs in Italy were around the euro area average, but those in Spain were far below the average. The economic situation is clearly reflected in SMEs’ assessment regarding the deterioration in the availability of external financing. Again, SMEs in Germany and France reported a smaller deterioration in the availability of bank loans than the euro area average.

Singapore is the gateway to Asia’s bond market 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  7 . Singapore is well-positioned to serve Asia’s growing financing needs. We are a developed pan-Asian asset management centre with more than 600 asset managers and over SGD 2.7 trillion of assets under management, of which 20% is invested in fixed income strategies such as Asian or Emerging market debt. These include global fund managers such as Schroders, PIMCO, BlackRock as well as our local fund managers such as Fullerton and UOB Asset Management. Let me share a few highlights of our bond market: a. Issuances volumes grew at a compound annual growth rate of around 9% over the last five years to reach SGD 186 billion (USD 129 billion) in 2016. b. 60% of corporate bonds issued in Singapore are in foreign currencies including G-3 and Asian currencies, which encompass the RMB. c. 70% of issuers are repeat issuers, returning to tap Singapore’s bond market, after the favourable experience with their maiden issue. Let me zoom in on three pillars of strength:  I. International capital for Asian companies Singapore offers an excellent ecosystem for Asian companies to raise international capital. Asian corporates, including Chinese and Indian companies, looking to regionalise and 8.  globalise are increasingly looking to international bond markets to raise capital and to diversify funding sources. a. Over 50 international and regional banks locate their debt capital markets teams here in Singapore.
The value of the Fund and its investment returns will therefore swing in tandem with equity and bond prices. This may draw a veil over the progression of the Fund’s underlying earnings. In the long run, it is the Fund’s cash flow that makes a permanent contribution to our national income. Put in simple terms: The cash flow is cash in hand, while the prices we measure in market values vary with shifting market sentiments. The cash flow is more stable than the market values as expressed by exchange listed prices. The Fund’s cash flow is therefore a good cross-check for measured capital returns. Chart 12: Cash flow from the GPFG and petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget The cash flow is commensurate with the actual level of petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget of about 3 percent of the Fund’s capital. This is reassuring because it implies that the Fund’s capital is not being depleted. The fall in yields in recent years has provided one-off price gains in bond and equity markets. Looking ahead, low long-term interest rates will feed through into lower returns. It is doubtful that equity prices will continue to advance at the same pace as seen in the past couple of years. The most likely scenario is still one where the Fund’s real return will approach 3 percent in the longer term. Above all we should recognise that future returns on the Fund are uncertain.

In order to prevent deflation and recession, the central banks of major advanced countries have implemented extraordinary measures to keep both short- and long-term interest rates low. The medicine has worked. The US economy in particular is on the road to recovery, and there are signs of some revival in manufacturing. Financial market participants see opportunities, not just problems. However, there are also signs of renewed turbulence in a number of emerging economies. Volatile capital flows are creating problems. High debt growth and rising house prices may constitute a risk. The recovery abroad is fragile. The key policy rate is also low in Norway. Our inflation target is slightly higher than that of other European countries. As a result, inflation and nominal interest rates in Norway will also be slightly higher. But prospects for a persistently low interest rate level internationally will inevitably also have consequences for Norway. The real interest rate in a small open economy such as ours cannot in the long run differ substantially from that of our closest trading partners. Given the prevailing long-term interest rates abroad, it will likely take a number of years for interest rates in Norway to move up towards a level that was previously considered to be normal. Banking regulation When the drafters of the Constitution gathered at Eidsvoll, there were no private banks in Norway. Norwegian businessmen who needed credit had to borrow from friends or acquaintances or travel to Copenhagen or Hamburg to raise loans. This was expensive and cumbersome.
If we get it right – and a lot of effort goes into ensuring that we do – the outcome of our short term deliberations should be a degree of monetary stability that will create the right climate for you to take the long term decisions on which your economic success depends. BIS Review 11/2005  3

Jan Frait: Monetary macroeconomics and central banks in turbulent times Lecture by Mr Jan Frait, Deputy Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the MEKON 2023 conference, organised by the Faculty of Economics, VSB-Technical University of Ostrava, Ostrava, 17 March 2023. *** I'd like to thank the conference organisers for inviting me to the place where I began my academic career in late 1990 and which then became my ticket to the board of the central bank ten years later. The knowledge I gained from my discussions here at the Faculty, specifically in the Department of Economics, has always been a foundation stone for me in making monetary policy decisions. At conferences, central bankers these days tend to give presentations in which they show charts to explain what's going on in the economy and what we can expect to see in the near future. But for this conference, for the first time in my professional life as a central banker, I have opted to give a straight lecture. This will hopefully better enable me to convey to you my longerterm view of the relationship between academic monetary macroeconomics and monetary policy-making. I will try to support this intention by not citing any literature – neither my own, nor that of my favourite economists, nor that of economists whose relevance I have doubts about.
This is probably partially because, over time, there are smaller variations in wage growth than there are in inflation, and partially because wage agreements provide important information on future  2  See J. Johansson, S. Palmqvist and C. Selander, “The CPI will increase more rapidly than the CPIF over the next few years”, Economic Commentary no. 5, 2011, Sveriges Riksbank. 3  Hourly wage costs are estimated to increase above hourly wages by 0.2 per cent per year. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to disregard this difference. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  wage growth. Over the last 14 years, the Riksbank has had an average forecast error of 0.4 percentage points in its spring forecasts of the next year’s wages. However, the error has been significantly larger in certain years. Wage increases in the years ahead will ultimately be determined both by the final agreements and by economic developments. There is a risk that the rapid improvement of the labour market will push up wage increases faster than we have calculated. This applies to both agreed wages and wages over and above agreement. There are signs that matching on the labour market may have deteriorated. Labour market shortages are increasing rapidly, even though unemployment is still relatively high (see Figure 12). The Beveridge curve, which shows the connection between unemployment and vacancies, also indicates impaired matching. On previous occasions when the vacancy rate has been at the current high level, unemployment has been just below 6 per cent.

This consists of three parts: an expenditure ceiling entailing that the Riksbank annually sets up an upper limit for nominal government expenditure for the next three years, a surplus target requiring public finances to have a surplus of one per cent of GDP over an economic cycle1 and a stipulation that municipal and county council budgets may not have deficits. This framework has worked well. Unlike many other countries, Sweden was able to enter the most recent financial crisis with a large public finance surplus. Secondly, the monetary policy regime has been changed. Instead of a fixed exchange rate, we now have a floating exchange rate and an inflation target. After the fixed exchange rate was abandoned in November 1992, the Riksbank decided in January 1993 on a new “nominal anchor” in the form of an inflation target of 2 per cent, to apply from 1995. The new monetary policy regime has worked significantly better than the old one with the fixed exchange rate. Inflation has decreased considerably since the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 3). In addition, this has not been at the cost of lower average GDP growth than previously. On the contrary, since the mid-1990s, GDP growth has been higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Thirdly, and perhaps not as widely-known, wage formation has improved since the mid1990s. The changes had already started by the early 1990s.
It is not easy, therefore, to reconcile the revised earnings data with other information on the labour market. And these data really matter for the MPC’s assessment of the UK economy. I can promise you that the Bank, the Treasury and the Office for National Statistics will, as a matter of urgency, be working together to try to understand what is happening to earnings. Decisions on interest rates must take into account not only those factors which I have highlighted this morning - the international economy, the possibility of a credit crunch and uncertainty about the trend in earnings growth - but also a wide range of other information relevant to the outlook for inflation, including the behaviour of the monetary aggregates, which are still growing quite rapidly, and the fall in sterling’s effective exchange rate. Over the next two weeks more important data will become available, including the first estimate of GDP growth in the third quarter, a CBI Industrial Trends Survey and the monthly report from our regional Agents. At our next meeting on 4 and 5 November, the MPC will take into account all of this information, and occasions like today are part of the process by which we obtain more information and exchange views with those most directly affected by our decisions. BIS Review 86/1998

This calls for increased innovation on the part of the financial sector in developing products to support a growing economy. Ladies and Gentlemen, in conclusion, may I simply state that as we consolidate macro-economic stability, we are committed to achieving the necessary economic growth that will have a bearing on poverty levels in the country. In this regard, we see the future of the Zambian economy as one which  BIS Review 72/2006  5  is highly diversified through resuscitating the industrial base to enable increased value addition and employment creation. We strongly believe that increased value addition is key to sustained development. I would like to urge you all and those in the private sector that are not with us to take advantage of the immense investment opportunities in our country. Let me once again thank you for inviting me to share my thoughts on this important topic. I thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 72/2006
In the first quarter of 2013, the global economy was weaker than expected. The recession continued in the euro area. In the US, the recovery remained hesitant and in China, economic activity lost strength. In Switzerland, real GDP rose significantly in the first quarter. However, we expect a perceptible weakening in growth for the second quarter. Overall, we still anticipate growth of 1.0–1.5% for 2013. The risks for the Swiss economy remain high. They continue to originate, for the most part, from the international environment. A weakening in global economic momentum cannot be excluded. Further developments in the euro area financial and sovereign debt crisis remain uncertain. Tensions can reappear at any moment on global financial markets. Domestically, there is a risk that the imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets will grow, given the sustained period of exceptionally low interest rates. Global economic outlook I would now like to outline the outlook for the global economy and Switzerland in more detail. I will then look at monetary and financial conditions and the SNB’s monetary policy. In the first quarter, the growth of the global economy was weaker than expected, across the board. In many emerging markets, particularly China, economic activity lost strength. In the euro area, the recession continued, and in the US, the recovery remained hesitant. The only advanced economy to gain significant momentum was Japan. However, in the quarters ahead, global growth is likely to firm up gradually.

While there are several factors that contributed to the subsequent economic recovery, many believe that our monetary policy conduct was certainly among the crucial ones. During this six-year span, we have had episodes of both deflationary and inflationary scares. It was not a long time ago that the talk on global deflation made headline everywhere. For a brief period, we pondered what policy actions we should take if the core inflation rate were to breach our lower target. Then the surge in oil prices during the past couple years steered our worry in the opposite direction. The fact that we have been able to keep inflation in check all these years alongside the sustained economic expansion has convinced us of the decision that we made six years ago. One attraction of inflation targeting as a policy framework is its inherent forward-looking aspect. Forecasts of future inflation play a crucial role in our policy decisions. Looking ahead 18-24 months into the future greatly reduces the risk that our policy rate will fall behind the curve. The framework of inflation targeting is also flexible enough to accommodate secondary policy objectives. This is often referred to as “constrained discretion.” As long as inflation forecasts are within  BIS Review 114/2006  1  the target range, monetary policy can be used to avoid undesirable volatility on output. In addition, the framework’s focus on long-term price stability, as opposed to short-term one, gives an extra room for maneuver.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Changes in the management of foreign exchange reserves I now come to my third and final topic. Two important new developments have occurred in the SNB’s investment activities this year. The SNB has enlarged its investment universe, moving into both Chinese government bonds and shares of companies in emerging economies. These developments took place in view of the level of our foreign currency investments, at over CHF 570 billion, as well as our ongoing efforts to diversify our placements of them as broadly as possible. Investment in Chinese government bonds In July 2014, the SNB communicated that it had been granted a renminbi investment quota by the People’s Bank of China (PBC). The investment quota amounted to RMB 15 billion, or somewhat more than CHF 2 billion. This made it possible for the SNB to invest in the market for Chinese government bonds, which is the fifth largest in the world, for the first time. Experience so far has shown that the market is sufficiently liquid and that trading and settlement of transactions works smoothly. As is the case for our other investments in the Asian region, the operational side is handled by our Singapore branch. As it continues to open up, the Chinese bond market is likely to become even more attractive for foreign investors in the future. For instance, in July 2015, the PBC announced that public sector investors, which includes central banks, are to be granted unlimited access to the Chinese bond market.

So far there has been little sign of significant deterioration in these areas. But as you know, bad debts are a lagging indicator of the state of the economy. The most reasonable assumption is that bad debt provisions and charge-offs will increase, though we do not yet know to what extent. •  Provisions may also increase as a result of a decline in property prices and collateral values caused by SARS. The value of bank premises may also be affected. Some of these effects may prove to be short-lived. Others may take longer to emerge, as in the case of the impact on asset quality. The overall impact on earnings is thus difficult to quantify. As of now, and assuming that the SARS problem does not drag on for too long, most banks seem to think that the adverse effect on profits will not be too severe. It bears repeating that the balance sheets of the banks remain strong. We have updated our stress tests to take account of the SARS outbreak, and these continue to show that the banks can withstand a great deal of pressure from a variety of sources. We do not expect that this will actually be put to the test in practice, but it is comforting to know that the banks are more than adequately capitalised in case of need. What can the banks do to limit the potential downside risk from SARS?
∂γ  ∂∆ What role does higher bank capital play in reducing the likelihood of financial crises ( ) or their severity (∂k )? ∂k  At least for the likelihood of crisis, subsequent evidence has tended to be rather ambiguous. Historical evidence, using aggregate economy-wide covariates, has reached the perhaps surprising conclusion that bank capital ratios have virtually no predictive power for the occurrence of financial crises in major advanced economies (Jordà et al (2017)). That is,  ∂γ ∂k  is indistinguishable from zero. This result holds both in the full  sample (1870-2013) and in the post-WWII period. Micro-econometric studies on the link between bank failure and bank capital have found a more tangible relationship, however. For example, Vazquez and Federico (2015) find that US and EU banks with stronger 12  This echoes and extends findings from earlier research by Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and Lowe (2004) and Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2011), which found credit gap measures to be key determinants of crisis risk. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  pre-crisis capital and structural liquidity positions were less likely to fail. Berger and Bouwman (2013) report a similar finding using a longer-run data set of US banks.

Another element is to ensure banks have sufficient loss-absorbing liabilities which can be “bailed-in” in the event of failure, to prevent losses being shouldered by tax-payers. The Financial Stability Board has agreed standards for such Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) for global systemically-important banks (G-SIBs). These standards are to be phased-in over coming years, to reach a minimum level of 16% from 2019, and 18% from 2022, of the resolution group’s risk-weighted assets, as well as 6% and 6.75% on a leverage exposure basis, respectively. Macroprudential Reform  These new or augmented microprudential standards have been supplemented with a set of new macroprudential measures. These focus on safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole (Tucker (2009), Bank of England (2009, 2011)). The most significant of these reforms have focused on three areas: macroprudential capital buffers; stress-testing; and shadow banks. Historically, capital standards have been static requirements. As part of Basel III, a new time-varying component of banks’ capital was added – the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB). This recognises that 4  And a number of countries, including the UK, introduced leverage ratio capital requirements in the aftermath of the crisis. 5  For LCR, see BCBS (2013a): http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf; for NSFR, see BCBS (2014b): http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  risks to the financial system vary over the credit cycle, typically being highest at its peak and lowest at its trough.
Higher interest rates therefore mean higher disposable income and could provide room for some increase in consumption. Chart: Higher debt ratios in all age groups We have experienced a period of sharply rising house prices and debt. The price of entry into the housing market has increased. The 35–45 age group has shown the largest increase in debt ratios, measured in percentage points. Debt ratios in both this group and the somewhat younger groups now average around three times post-tax income. These groups have a high marginal propensity to consume. The elevated debt level in these age groups amplifies the cash-flow channel. But young and middle-aged households are not the only groups to borrow more than previously. A somewhat larger share of total household debt is now in fact held by the older age groups. More debt among the older households reflects the fact that older adults are also active in the housing market and are taking on more debt. To the extent an interest rate increase now curbs growth in household consumption more than previously, it is because many households have taken on substantial debt, not because there has been a noticeable change in the distribution of debt. Chart: Higher interest expenses for many households Since there has been a broad increase in debt ratios across age groups, many households will feel the effects of higher lending rates. The chart shows the effect of a one percentage point rise in interest rates on disposable income for the different age groups.

Three-month Nibor is a so-called reference rate, used as a basis for the pricing of many financial contracts in Norway, such as loan contracts and interest rate swaps. In its capacity as a reference rate, Nibor is a key element linking the key policy rate with the interest rates facing households and enterprises. Chart: … and on to mortgage rates The interest rates paid by households and enterprises on their bank loans are set to cover banks’ costs as well as to provide a return on equity for the banks’ shareholders. A large share of banks’ costs consists of the cost of wholesale loans to fund retail lending. Prices for these loans will typically be formulated as a premium on top of three-month Nibor. Changes in Nibor will thereby affect banks’ funding costs and lending rates for households and enterprises. Reference rates are used to hedge against future changes in the general interest rate level. The pricing of bank bonds can serve as an example. When the interest rate on a bond is set at the reference rate plus a fixed risk premium, both the bank’s interest expenses and the bond purchaser’s interest income will depend on the level of the reference rate – and thereby on the general interest rate level. When the two parties agree to the contract, they can then focus on the contract’s specific conditions, such as the credit risk associated with the issuing bank. Internationally, Libor and Euribor are important reference rates.