samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For a start, we can rightfully boast that as a country we have achieved single digit inflation for the second year in a row and we have had no financial institution failures in the recent past. These successes are the result of monetary and fiscal policies that have changed the economic landscape of Zambia. We have been fortunate that the successes have come at a time when we are seeing renewed economic interest in Zambia. Investments in mining and other sectors have significantly increased, and more importantly, the Eastern Province has not been left out. Ladies and Gentlemen, we have been following the developments in Eastern Province with keen interest; hence our visit to see for ourselves what is going on. I must say that we are impressed with what we have been able to find out. It is clear that income levels have risen in the region and this has been driven by the boom in agriculture. This is an encouraging development. One of our primary concerns as policy makers is to ensure that development is not restricted or concentrated along the line of rail. We therefore urge you to use your enhanced income levels to invest in capital equipment so that your productive bases are sustainable. As a country, we are blessed with land and water resources. However, it is only in the recent past that we are beginning to see the value of what we have through improved agricultural output.

Financial institutions in general need to offer structured financing that best suits the Zambian economic landscape. It is only through such activities that we will see further developments in the whole Zambia rather than the few areas along the line of rail. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we have come to Chipata not only to tell you what we expect of you but also to listen to what you expect of us. I therefore declare this meeting open and invite you to make your contributions. I thank you! 2  BIS Review 15/2008
Along with the aforementioned risks linked to cyber threats, financial innovation, in particular that aimed at the most vulnerable population segments, can cause situations of over-indebtedness, market abuse and fraud. This process must then be accompanied by financial education actions, the strengthening of consumer safeguard measures and the development of data privacy policies. But we should not lose sight of the speed at which these innovations develop. Such speed poses difficulties for setting regulations in place since, on many occasions, their implementation can only come about when the use of certain practices has become widespread on the market. Hence, the use of formulas such as sandboxes or innovation hubs may help the regulators act more nimbly while creating an environment in which innovators can better anticipate regulatory trends. Lastly, and before giving way to the panellists, the true protagonists of this debate, I would mention the importance of international coordination and cooperation. Many of the challenges surrounding financial inclusion and the use of new technologies are common to all countries. This is why the role of organisations such as the IMF, with the Bali declaration, and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, with the Maya declaration, is pivotal to boosting the use of new technologies in this field. We should also not forget the role that global companies such as the bigtech can play. Indeed, financial inclusion is one of the essential elements highlighted by Facebook in its proposal for a global means of payment, its socalled Libra.

The financial crisis showed that the entry of foreign banking groups into a domestic market, besides advantages, it is also associated with elements of risk, which must be addressed duly and timely. Third, the countries in our region have different needs for investments, highlighting those in road infrastructure, energy and health care. Also, demographic developments, including migration, and slowing population growth trend, have brought about increased costs of public pension schemes and other elements of social protection. Therefore, despite fiscal consolidation efforts, budget deficits have been present and steady all the time. During the financial crisis period, public authorities were committed to overcoming the situation. Almost all governments of the countries in the region were committed to implementing fiscal stimulus policies, aimed at increasing the support to the real economy and the financial system. Monetary policy followed an easing trend, cutting the interest rates and satisfying the interbank market needs for liquidity. Back to Albania’s case, I would like to emphasize that our experience in absorbing the impacts of the crisis proved successful. Albania, I think, is one of the countries that:   Did not experience any bank failure or capital injection by the state;    Courageously withstood the crisis of confidence in the banking system, where financial intermediation was never interrupted;    The economy continued to grow in positive terms, albeit at a slower pace;    Inflationary expectations remained anchored throughout all time.
Challenges for financial markets Speech given by Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Authority Board  Association for Financial Markets in Europe Annual dinner, London Thursday 3 November 2016  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  I am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak tonight at the annual dinner of the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). The Bank of England has throughout its history had a close association with financial markets and with the institutions that support them. Indeed, the Bank was instrumental in the creation in 1914 of one of AFME’s distant ancestors – the quaintly named Accepting Houses Committee. The outbreak of the First World War and consequent disruption of international payments threatened to bring down the London markets and the international merchant banks that supported them. The Bank enabled a moratorium on war disrupted payments and offered to purchase the war disrupted bills. One contemporary historian of the City hailed this as “the greatest evidence of London’s strength as a financial centre that could have been desired or dreamt of”. 1  Over the following century, the Accepting Houses Committee became the forum of the City’s most influential merchant banks; its members enjoyed the implicit backing of the Bank of England. The Committee eventually became part of the London Investment Banking Association which merged with the European part of SIFMA to create AFME in 2009.

Given the size and scale of the concentration of financial market activity in the UK, that is particularly true for the Bank of England. The events of eight years ago are receding into time. But I very much doubt that the generation of regulators that lived through the great financial crisis will revert to their pre-crisis tolerance and ignorance of systemic risk. And I very much hope that our successors do not forget those lessons either. The regulatory reforms now being implemented will not in practice prove perfect in every specific. There will be places where reforms aimed at one part of the financial sector will cut across changes made elsewhere. And where reforms have both an unintended and an undesirable effect greater than their benefits. The Bank has made very clear that we will look carefully at hard and clear evidence of such effects. Where justified we are prepared to adapt the reforms. In this respect, I would point to the changes we and the ECB have championed to the EU regulations on securitisations. And to the change the Financial Policy Committee recently announced to exclude reserves held by banks at the Bank of England from the application of the UK leverage ratio capital requirement. We will offset this elsewhere to ensure that the overall stringency of the capital requirement is not weakened. But while I can envisage that there might be specific and targeted change based on clear evidence, I do not envisage wholesale changes to the reforms.
There are many ways we can protect ourselves from scams, but in my mind, they boil down to three steps, what we call “3S - Spot, Stop and Share”: Spot – Look out for signs of scams. Question, investigate and enquire to ensure that you are about to engage in a legitimate transaction; Stop – If anything looks doubtful or suspicious, it’s probably a In such cases, stop engaging with the suspected scammer. It is important that you do not provide any banking or payment details; Share – Share your knowledge of scams with friends and family, and help protect others by reporting scams to relevant authorities so that they can take action. This 3S concept is also in line with the theme of the virtual exhibition which is ‘Semak Sebelum Diperdaya’. I hope that the information and safety pointers from this exhibition can help the public avoid being scammed. This exhibition can be accessed through the website of the Museum and Art Gallery of Bank Negara Malaysia at https://museum.bnm.gov.my/fce. In closing, always remember that scammers will evolve their tactics to fool and ensnare customers. I hope that through this virtual exhibition, all of us will be more aware and better equipped to protect ourselves against scams. We can surely succeed in beating scams, but this requires collective efforts and action by all, and not just of the authorities. All of us can do our part to raise awareness and share relevant information on scams with others, being vigilant ourselves while also helping others do so.

An important aspect in dealing with financial scams is in raising public awareness, including of scam tactics used by criminals and the steps that the public can take to avoid becoming victims of financial scams. In this regard, BNM, the financial industry and law enforcement agencies will continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness of awareness programmes and improve on the dissemination of information to the public. Various educational and awareness initiatives have been implemented across multiple channels and platforms, including online webinars, as well as the sharing of reminders and advisories on how the public can protect themselves against financial scams. We encourage the public to visit and follow the Amaran Scam Facebook page at https://facebook.com/amaranpenipuan. That said, the effort to combat financial crimes requires the support of all parties. Each of us as consumers are responsible and have a role in protecting ourselves from scams. Online banking users must protect their personal and banking information, and to never disclose such information to any individual or to key it into suspicious websites. Users should also be vigilant and ensure that their devices, such as mobile phones, run up-to-date software and operating systems. They should ensure that their devices are secure, free from suspicious apps which might carry malware and spyware. This means being careful with what you install on devices used for online banking transactions.
Technological innovations that increase productivity in the economy may rapidly lead to general optimism and a broad economic upturn. Since the 1800s, we have seen waves of optimism and largescale investment in railways, shipping, hydroelectric power stations and now, most recently, information technology. Upturns may also be driven, or amplified, by demand-side factors in the economy. During an upturn, income growth is high in both the enterprise and the household sector. The value of property and securities, and thus the collateral for new loans, rises. Financial and other enterprises are upgraded by credit rating agencies. Banks record low losses and solid results and can increase lending without weakening capital adequacy. Demand for credit can easily be met by obtaining financing on favourable terms in both domestic and foreign money and capital markets. As a rule, it is also easier to raise equity during economic upturns. 7  See Bank for International Settlements (2001): 71st Annual Report. Basel  BIS Review 86/2001  5  Under these circumstances, credit risk may be underestimated and not priced into margins. The financial industry may share in the generally prevailing optimism, and strong competition may lead to a contest for market shares. In this way, banks contribute to building up risk in the financial system. The loans with the highest risk are probably those granted at the peak of the economic cycle. Households and enterprises often have a relatively high debt burden at such times, and loans are secured by inflated property and asset prices.

Finally, Iceland’s current account deficit relative to GDP is presently the widest in the world. And while it is forecast to shrink next year, the deficit will remain large and eventually have to be settled. Funding the accumulated deficit will leave the economy highly dependent on investors and creditors in the markets, with precious little scope for manoeuvre. Thus the Icelandic economy is exposed to potential shocks which may prove tough to tackle. The Treasury is in a strong position and has achieved much in recent years. But according to a familiar pattern, the Treasury may be less willing than usual to proceed cautiously at this stage of the  electoral term, and it too is showing signs of easing which may drive demand and stoke the flames of inflation. Such criticism must of course be qualified by the Treasury’s impressive record in paying down its debt in recent years to establish a completely new and favourable balance of interest flows from which Iceland will benefit for a very long time. Recently the Treasury’s deposit in the Central Bank has amounted to around 100 b.kr., earning it handsome interest revenues. The Government has announced that it has agreed to Central Bank proposals for almost doubling the foreign reserves, which will be followed by talks on strengthening the Bank’s capital position. There were no specific reasons for these measures, which are merely aimed to adjust the Central Bank’s position to reflect Iceland’s rapidly expanding economy and financial sector.
The ECB has been asked to assume responsibility for this mechanism, and to mould the existing national supervisory authorities into an effective and efficient federal supervisory team. We are making good progress on this front, and the SSM should become fully operational in the last quarter of 2014. Before we take on this task, we want to get an adequate view of what we will be supervising. In the coming months, the ECB will therefore undertake a balance sheet assessment. The importance of this exercise cannot be overestimated. This comprehensive exercise will encompass three steps: First, a supervisory risk assessment to review, quantitatively and qualitatively, key risks, including liquidity, leverage and funding. Second, an asset quality review (AQR) to enhance the transparency of bank exposures by reviewing the quality of banks’ assets, including the adequacy of asset and collateral valuation and related provisions. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Third, a stress test to examine the resilience of banks’ balance sheet to stress scenarios. These three elements are closely interlinked. The comprehensive assessment will conclude with an aggregate disclosure of the outcomes, at country and bank level, together with any recommendations for supervisory measures. This comprehensive outcome will be published prior to the ECB assuming its supervisory role in November 2014, and will include the findings of the three pillars of the comprehensive assessment. We will not publish any preliminary or intermediate results and I am quite surprised about the noise you hear these days in all directions about the possible outcome of the exercise.

The Single Resolution Mechanism contains three essential elements: First, a single regulatory framework. This will be established with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The trilogue of the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission is currently ongoing and from an ECB perspective a desirable trilogue outcome would contain two elements. First, bringing forward bail-in to 2015 as markets will anticipate bail-in anyhow. Having the rules in place earlier will give investors’ bigger security. Second, the flexibility and scope for national solutions should be somewhat reduced so that market participants will have sufficient confidence about the rules of the game in Europe. The second element of the single resolution mechanism is the single resolution authority and the third, a single resolution fund, funded by contributions from the financial industry. The last two elements are currently in the legislative process and we strongly support the envisaged timeline for their entering into force (1 January 2015), as it ensures that the establishment of the Single Resolution Mechanism would follow shortly after the effective start of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Private banking union The “private banking union” in the US is created by its integrated financial market, which includes both the banking sector and capital markets. In the banking sector, the US has genuinely nationwide banks, which allows them to better diversify risk.
The cost of this stigma increases as we move from management buffers, to releasable regulatory buffers, to usable regulatory buffers with no consequences, and finally to regulatory buffers with consequences – and use is 11 See Bank of England’s May 2020 interim Financial Stability Report (chart B.14). 12 And, in our liquidity frameworks, banks’ liquid asset buffer requirements are intended to be usable in stress and do not  trigger any explicit regulatory consequences if dipped into. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  often disclosed. Moreover, firms might believe that ratings agencies or supervisors would take a negative view of a firm which dipped into its regulatory buffer. All of these factors can limit practical buffer usability. Another problem is that, in stress, firms may be particularly cautious and prefer to conserve capital or liquidity to meet uncertain future needs. There may be a tension between conserving capital to provide additional individual bank resilience, and supporting the economy – especially if there is uncertainty about the timeline for the restoration of buffer levels after a recovery – even though supporting the economy would provide a better outcome for banks as illustrated a moment ago. The policy question and the opportunity to explore it If a regulatory buffer is not practically usable in the sense that banks do not want to dip into it, then it has little value in helping firms to absorb shocks in ways that keep lending going in bad times.

When the banks’ foreign currency borrowing was not particularly great, this was not a significant problem. However, the growth in borrowing and our experiences from the crisis give us reason to think again. Today, it seems reasonable for the banks to carry the cost of the Riksbank’s foreign currency reserve, in as much as it is needed to meet their liquidity requirements in the event of a crisis. If they were to carry the cost of maintaining a liquidity buffer in the Riksbank, it is likely that the banks would find it profitable to cut back on the riskier areas of their dollar lending. In this case, the Riksbank would also reduce its foreign currency reserve, as the need for a buffer would have decreased. However, the banks should pay a charge to cover the costs of the remaining buffer. The extent to which the banks could imagine reducing the riskier areas of their foreign currency lending, the size of any charge, and how this could be repaid remain to be discussed by the Riksbank and the banks. The rough calculation I made earlier could form a starting point, but I make no claims for it to be any more than that. However, it is essential that this question receives an answer. The present situation is unacceptable in the long run. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11
Christian Noyer: Current issues in monetary policy Speech delivered by Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of a conference organised by l'Université Robert Schuman, Institut des Hautes Etudes Européennes (IHEE) Strasbourg, 6 February 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen,  (Introduction) It is both a pleasure and an honour for me to speak here at the conference of "L'Observatoire des politiques économiques en Europe" in Strasbourg and to have the opportunity to present some of the "current issues" surrounding the Eurosystem and the ECB's monetary policy before such a distinguished audience. For a central bank, it is essential to attain public understanding and acceptance, so the ECB is endeavouring to explain its policy to a broader public. We believe that communication and transparency are key elements of modern central banking. The ECB's monetary policy strategy has been a much-debated issue. Therefore, I should like to begin with this topic. In designing the ECB's monetary policy strategy, the ability to deal with structural changes and with the issue of uncertainty has been of the utmost importance. I shall elaborate on these issues later. Finally, I shall turn to our assessment of the current economic and monetary situation in the euro area. The ECB's two-pillar strategy The ECB has chosen its own strategy to best suit its particular circumstances. The strategy is well equipped to deal with the uncertainties surrounding monetary policy in general and the introduction of the euro in particular.

If other policy areas also play their part, we have reason to be confident about the future of the euro area. Finally, I should like to draw your attention to one particular challenge which will take place this year or, to be more precise, at the end of this year: the introduction of euro banknotes and coins and the general changeover to the euro as the new unit of currency. As far as the Eurosystem is concerned, it is our responsibility to ensure that the printing of around 14.5 billion euro banknotes, representing a value of some EUR 650 billion, and the bringing into circulation of the banknotes and coins, is successfully completed. In order to achieve this, we have planned an information campaign, with the aim of familiarising those living both inside and outside the euro area with the new currency. Beginning on 1 September 2001, euro area banknotes and coins will be frontloaded to credit institutions, which will then sub-frontload them to professional groups (retailers, cash-in-transit companies and the cashoperated machine industry). From the second half of December 2001, the general public in several Member States will receive starter kits containing a mixture of denominations of euro coins in order to facilitate initial purchases in 2002. I am truly convinced that the visible introduction of the euro will be a decisive step in the further integration of the euro area, as well as in increasing the acceptance of the euro by the population of the euro area and abroad. BIS Review 10/2001  5