samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
those caused by fluctuations in economic activity. This applies both to the development of productivity and the labour supply. At the same time, distinguishing between processes that are lasting and those of a temporary nature is one of the most important aspects with regard to the discussion of a country's capacity for long-term growth. Let us then study the determining factors one by one. Signs of a better growth in productivity My third slide shows the development of labour productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked, together with an estimated trend (Figure 3). We see that productivity growth varies strongly, but also that it shows a tendency to increase over time, particularly during the 1990s. This is a marked difference compared with developments in the 1970s, when the trend was instead a downward one. During the 1980s the actual productivity growth levelled out at a low level and was often around 1 per cent or below - with the exception of a few individual years. During the 1990s, on the other hand, there was a rapid increase and productivity growth stabilised at a level above 2 per cent. We don't know exactly what was the driving force behind this development. But allow me nevertheless to indicate some factors that may have played an important role. The economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s probably played a not so insignificant role in raising productivity growth during the first half of the 1990s.

Productivity growth (GDP per hour worked) 1981–2001 Per cent  4,0 3,5 3,0  4,0 3,5  Trend Actual  3,0  2,5  2,5  2,0  2,0  1,5  1,5  1,0  1,0  0,5  0,5  0,0  0,0  -0,5  -0,5 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 16/2003  7  Fig. 4. Public sector’s share of total hours worked, 1981–2002 Per cent (sliding average) 32,00  32,00  31,00  31,00  30,00  30,00  29,00  29,00  28,00  28,00  27,00 27,00 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Source: Statistics Sweden  Fig. 5. Labour productivity in trade and industry excluding telecom products, 1994–2000 Per cent 6,0  6,0  Trade and industry Trade and industry excl. 32 according to SNI 92  5,0  5,0  4,0  4,0  3,0  3,0  2,0  2,0  1,0  1,0  0,0  0,0 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  8  BIS Review 16/2003  Fig. 6.
The coronavirus crisis generated significant turbulence in financial markets when it surfaced in February and March. The leading central banks eased their monetary policy stance, and many made use of the standing US dollar swap lines to enhance the provision of global US dollar liquidity. Investor sentiment improved substantially beginning in late March on the back of large-scale fiscal and monetary support programmes launched in many countries, including Switzerland. Bolstered by these programmes and the eventual relaxation of public health policy restrictions, financial markets continued their recovery until late summer, and economic activity also picked up considerably. However, developments in recent days and weeks have made it clear that the coronavirus crisis is not over and that uncertainty remains high. In Switzerland, the SNB has repeatedly reaffirmed its expansionary monetary policy. In so doing, it has made an important contribution in terms of immediate crisis management. Some of the instruments the SNB has marshalled to manage the coronavirus crisis are well known. The negative interest rate on banks’ sight deposits held at the SNB and our willingness to intervene more strongly in the foreign exchange market help counter upward pressure on the Swiss franc. Taken together, these measures have helped shield Switzerland’s economy from additional strains that might otherwise have been exerted by foreign exchange markets, including further downward pressure on inflation. Other instruments are new or have had to be reactivated. One of the new instruments is the SNB’s COVID-19 refinancing facility (CRF).

The CRF, which was set up at the end of March 2020, and the loan guarantees provided by the Swiss federal government have together contributed significantly towards ensuring the continued supply of credit and liquidity to small and medium-sized enterprises. One of the instruments that has been reactivated is US dollar swap lines between central banks. These swap lines, which were established in late 2007 during the Global Financial Crisis, were used to counter a sharp rise in US dollar funding costs. 1 Finally, the SNB resumed monetary policy repo transactions in the Swiss  1  US dollar swap lines have been operational since 2007. From spring 2012 until early March 2020, there was no demand in the US dollar auctions conducted by the SNB. Page 2/13  franc money market, after a hiatus of eight years, with the aim of keeping secured short-term Swiss franc money market interest rates close to the SNB policy rate. The focus of today’s speech relates to this last point – to the role of the money market in the implementation of our monetary policy. Why did we choose to shine a spotlight on the money market? The role of the money market For one thing, examining the workings of the money market is in keeping with the original aim of this event.
This period has included a global financial crisis, a global pandemic, and in the UK the decision to leave the European Union. Monetary policy has had to adapt to this world of larger shocks, in an environment where the trend to sustained lower equilibrium interest rates around the world has made the so-called effective lower bound a very pertinent issue. As a first observation, therefore, the task of monetary policy has moved from being a choice (albeit not an easy one) on a single dimension (the official interest rate) to a more multi-dimensional choice which also involves decisions on which tools to use, and which tools to develop – have “in the box” – for possible future use should the need arise. There are important issues of substance here. Close to the lower bound, the transmission of policy tends to be less effective – not redundant or worthless, but nonetheless less effective. But this does not make monetary policy pointless or unnecessary. There are also important challenges to signalling that follow from this greater element of multidimensionality of decisions. So-called toolbox decisions should not contain signals on preferences for the actual setting of policy. In other words, central banks should develop and maintain a broad range of tools and seek to communicate this in a manner which avoids being interpreted as a signal on immediate or future preferences on policy setting.

Both monetary and fiscal policy are inherently counter-cyclical, and arguably never more so than when we face a shock of the scale of a global pandemic. But at the core of the argument for central bank independence is the evidence from the past that without an independent institution operating monetary policy the overall effects of economic policy were dangerously pro-cyclical at times, leading to bad outcomes. In the face of what may be the deepest recession since 1709, with a collapse of economic activity alongside very low inflation, the question we ask ourselves is what should an inflation targeting central bank do in this situation? The lessons of history don’t change. The answer is to respect our remit and our target, no good will come of ignoring that. The logic of counter-cyclical policy is that all the tools should be applied to raise activity and support employment and the welfare of the public, all of which is consistent with an inflation targeting monetary policy. In practice, doing so has meant using tools to keep financial conditions sufficiently accommodative to offset as best we can such a large shock. This has been essential to support the flow of credit to businesses, which has been very substantial, and has called on both the monetary policy and financial stability tools of the Bank of England. This has also helped to lessen any longer term economic damage from the pandemic, resulting from longer term unemployment and business failures.
This has contributed to the development of a deeper and more liquid, efficient, transparent and effective sukuk market. Challenges in the development of the global Islamic capital market While much has been achieved, much remain to be done. Let me turn to some of the challenges and initiatives taken to address them. A vital ingredient for the development of capital markets, including the Islamic capital market, is the creation of a secondary trading platform for the capital market instruments. This will provide investors with the flexibility in managing their liquidity requirements. In this respect, more needs to be done in terms of the creation of a continuous supply of Islamic papers and instruments that would promote the secondary trading of instruments and add greater depth to the market. There also needs to be greater diversity in the type and maturity of the sukuks in the market for Islamic financial institutions and portfolio managers to manage their funds effectively. As part of the efforts to address these issues, the Malaysian government regularly issues sukuk with different maturities in order to create a benchmark yield curve. Since the year 2000, the government has developed an  BIS Review 74/2007  3  auction calendar for both the conventional and sukuk government issues. In 2005, the government commenced issuing shorter term Islamic treasury bills and longer-dated sukuk, with a maturity of 10 years, to further diversify the instruments available to investors.

Connectivity among centralised Shariah advisory authorities The final point is on increasing connectivity among centralised Shariah advisory authorities to promote mutual respect and knowledge-sharing. Islam has flourished with a strong foundation of knowledge, wisdom and tolerance among its scholars. Differences in ideas and open discourses to assess the veracity of knowledge – have always been practiced in many Islamic societies. While achieving consensus is ideal – full appreciation of differences in circumstances and considerations is equally important and necessary. I have observed over the years that the implementation of Islamic finance varies from one jurisdiction to another. Rightly so, this reflects the different stages of development and diversity in local customs, market conventions and cultural norms. I believe through frequent and constructive dialogue, Shariah boards and advisory authorities will become more appreciative of the many differences in business and economic environment – that lead to different Shariah interpretations. Concerted efforts to cultivate greater understanding of the variations in fiqh interpretations and approaches to Islamic finance development are positive steps towards harmonisation that can deliver certainty of Shariah implementation in the global Islamic financial system. This roundtable meeting organised today is just a starting point of a long journey. It is my hope that this meeting offers a productive networking opportunity for all of us to identify common issues; explore mutually beneficial opportunities; and implement positive changes in our financial systems.
(2009b), “Flexible inflation targeting: Lessons from the financial crisis”, speech held in Amsterdam, 21 September 2009, www.riksbank.se. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010a), “Policy expectations and policy evaluations: the role of transparency and communication”, Economic Review 1/2010, 44–80. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010b), “Inflation targeting after the financial crisis”, speech held in Mumbai, 15 February 2010, www.riksbank.se. Sveriges Riksbank (2009), Monetary Policy Report, October 2009, www.riksbank.se. Sveriges Riksbank (2010a), Minutes of the Executive Board’s Monetary Policy Meeting, 10 February 2010, www.riksbank.se. Sveriges Riksbank (2010), Monetary Policy Report, February 2010, www.riksbank.se. 12  BIS Review 22/2010

Lord Mayor, over the past year you have brought the global economy to Mansion House, you have opened its doors to many who would not otherwise have thought of entering, especially from the Asian community, and you have gone out of your way to meet young people from our financial firms. You have raised money for disabled children and you have promoted Cornwall - next Tuesday is “Cornwall Day in the City” with, I hope, free pasties for everyone. And tonight all of us here would like to pay tribute to your work since you became Lord Mayor, and to thank both the Lady Mayoress and you for the splendid hospitality - Cornish produce in fact - which you have extended to us all this evening. So I invite you all to rise and join me in the traditional toast of good health and prosperity to “The Lord Mayor and the Lady Mayoress”, David and Tessa Brewer. BIS Review 61/2006  3
Published assessments of policy impact can improve public understanding of, and debate about, often difficult distributional choices. 9  When it comes to monetary policy, the position until recently has been rather different. There has been no particular clamour for published assessments of the distributional impact of monetary policy. Why? Because monetary policy has benefitted from, not one, but two “Get Out of Jail” cards. Both have their origin in Milton Friedman’s 1968 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, half a century ago. 10  The first follows from the neutrality of monetary policy with respect to real variables over the longer run. 11  Typically, this neutrality is associated with the total level of resources in the economy, such as employment or output – the vertical long-run Phillips curve. But neutrality applies, with no less force, to the distribution of resources in the economy, whether between sectors or regions. In theory, monetary policy ought also to be neutral in its longer-run impact on economic inequality. 9 10 11  For example, Ball et al (2013) and Büchs et al (2011). Friedman (1968). Patinkin (1987) traces the history of thought relating to the neutrality of money. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  The second Friedman point is that the monetary policy tools of the trade should be simple and singular – for example, the money supply or short-term interest rate. These instruments are levied at an economy-wide level.

First, calibrating the weights on current and permanent income (wealth), 𝛼 and 𝛽; second, determining which variables other than income and wealth affect well-being, 𝑋, and with what weight, 𝛾; and, third, calibrating the curvature of the utility function with respect to its arguments, ∅. That is a lot of free parameters. One approach to pinning down these parameters would be to calibrate them using past studies. This might be a decent approximation but is not ideal if past behaviour might be a poor guide to behaviour in today’s very different environment. This factor is likely to be relevant at times of financial crisis and exceptional movements in monetary policy, for which there is no precedent. While no approach can fully get around these problems, we use an approach that places fewer arbitrary restrictions on people’s preferences. Instead these preferences are revealed, courtesy of empirical estimation, and then used to parameterise a social welfare function. This involves direct estimation of the parameters in Equation (1) using our sample of households. 32  Estimating (1) requires a measure of household well-being. The Wealth and Asset Survey began asking households about their well-being or “happiness” from 2010-12. Specifically, households are asked to rate their well-being on a scale of 1-10, based on four questions based around satisfaction, happiness and 33  anxiety. We use an average of some of these well-being scores when estimating (1).
The budgetary plan projects maintaining the weight of public investment as a percentage of GDP, following the cuts seen in recent years; that said, the cuts would be prolonged in the case of the State. Likewise, the envisaged revision of pensions is set at 0.25%, in line with the floor set in the draft law defining the sustainability factor. As in previous years, the main challenges surrounding the budgetary projections arise from the course public revenue may take; despite the projected gradual recovery in activity and some re-balancing of the attendant growth factors, revenue will remain considerably influenced by the greater relative weight of exports and by the moderation of wage income, which will limit the response by public revenue to greater activity. To conclude, I have a comment on public debt and its implications for the fiscal drive still to be made. On official projections, the public debt/GDP ratio might rise to 98.9% in 2014 and stand above 100% in 2015, beginning to turn down in subsequent years. Placing public debt below the ceilings set by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Stability Law will, in any event, require that high primary surpluses be maintained over a prolonged period of time. This is the indicator that best illustrates the scale of the challenges still ahead for us. It also highlights the importance of successfully seeing through fiscal consolidation and structural reform, so that the ongoing reduction in budgetary imbalances may combine with an improvement in our potential growth.

The book has been the first one to include a full set of statistical and historical data showing key indicators in the economic and monetary areas for the countries in South-East Europe, starting from the establishment of central banks in the 19th century to the end of World War II. The book has proven ever since its value and utility. Last year in Vienna, there was a proposal regarding further research work based on the information contained within the balance sheets of the central banks. Looking closer at the structure and the evolution of these balance sheets over time provides experts with useful insight as to how monetary policies have changed and have been implemented, how the main 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  operations have evolved, what profit the central banks have made and to what extent central banks have been able to secure and preserve their independence. I trust that the South-East European Monetary History Network could further capitalise on both the researchers’ experience of compiling the statistical and historical data series and the cooperation among central banks. The National Bank of Romania has always shown interest in monetary and banking history. In that respect, we are currently re-organising/redesigning the NBR Museum – which you are going to visit after lunch – aiming to bring to the visitors’ attention both pieces of history and the role of the central bank in shaping the economy, thus shaping history.
In fact, at end-2021 a third of the banks under our direct supervision did not meet their internal targets for gender representation at board level. But, as I said, it is not just a matter of gender. The board of directors needs to have the appropriate knowledge diversity to be able to deal with the challenges facing the financial industry. I am thinking, for example, of digitalisation strategies and climate risks. This does not mean that members need to be experts on these topics, but they do need to have sufficient knowledge to understand these challenges in order to make sound decisions. At the end of 2021, only around a fifth of the largest euro area banks had sufficient IT expertise at board level. Increasing this ratio will be key if banks are to successfully navigate the digital era.1 Second, the involvement of board members is crucial. Members should exercise their duties responsibly and uphold professional standards. They should devote sufficient time to reading and understanding all the documentation in order to be well-prepared for their meetings. They should also have the opportunity to seek clarification in advance, if necessary, to ensure that they have sufficient knowledge to support or challenge decisions. Finally, as I mentioned earlier, independence is of course essential. Institutions should have a sufficient number of independent directors to contribute to decision-making in an objective manner and to ensure a neutral attitude within the board.

17.04.2023  Participation in the Governance Workshop “Diverse and effective boards in a changing and competitive landscape” ECB and the Florence School of Banking and Finance Florence Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Thank you for inviting me to speak here today. I am very pleased and honoured to participate in this event. The oversight role of the board of directors is one of the core elements of good corporate governance and a key area of supervisory focus. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) deals with heterogeneous structures and different management approaches, which has made it necessary to design an open supervisory framework. Sound oversight is ultimately achieved by striking the right balance between challenge, involvement and independence. First, by challenge I am referring to board members’ ability to participate in discussions. In this regard, non-executive members should be able to improve the quality of the debate and have the opportunity, the capacity and the ability to question the decisions made by the executive members. In order to do so, they need to have reliable, timely information. Without it there can be no meaningful discussion or effective decision-making processes. But challenge is not at odds with the support that the board of directors needs to provide to senior management. Diverse knowledge is a relevant issue in this context. This is not just a matter of gender, although there are still banks that do not have diversity policies or internal targets for gender diversity at board level.