samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, it considers that the economy posted healthy growth in 2018, driven by investment, an impulse that is expected to continue in 2019. Externally, growth in the main economies has shown a sharper-thanexpected deceleration, which has led its authorities to implement further economic stimulus packages. The main difference with respect to December’s baseline scenario was seen in local inflation. Measured by the benchmark Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculated by the National Statistics Institute (INE) based on the updated basket and new methodology, annual CPI variation is significantly below the forecast. This differential between forecast and actual inflation occurs in a context where activity and demand have behaved as expected, which in this Report is explained by a lower-than-expected peso depreciation pass-through, favorable supply factors in some markets and greater capacity gaps than had been estimated until now. Said gaps do not originate in weaker demand, but in the labor force effects of massive immigration to the country, an issue that the Bank has brought up in its presentations to this Commissions for some quarters now. In this context, our projections yield that the convergence of inflation to the 3% target will take almost a year longer than we estimated in December. This provides room for the withdrawal of the monetary stimulus to proceed at a slower pace than was announced before by the Board. This scenario plays out in a context of greater uncertainty in the world economy, where global financial markets remain very susceptible and more negative scenarios may occur.

To be clear, the question here is not about whether CCP margin is to “blame” for the dash-for-cash. The question is did the system have enough liquidity ready in the right places to respond to derivative market volatility without adverse consequences for financial stability. Whatever we conclude, our policy response will need to take into account the whole story- including the essential role that margin played in preventing panic. We don’t want to return to the pre-Lehman world of a spaghetti bowl of counterparty credit risk. 4. Conclusion  So going back to my original questions. First, what has the experience of March and April told us about the reforms we put in place post-2008 to make the global financial system simpler? A: The headline answer is: It worked. When it comes to the crucial goal of preventing panic fuelled by a spaghetti bowl of bilateral derivatives exposures, the new system held up despite unprecedented stress. Second, where do we go from here? A: I have two recommendations:  First, we need global regulatory cooperation in order to avoid reverting to fragmentation and spaghetti. Trust based on proportionate, informed reliance. Second, if we want the simpler system to keep working, global regulators need to stay ahead of the curve and keep the system under review. We cannot ignore the fire the financial system experienced in March and April last year just because central banks did a good job putting it out. We need to look behind the walls and address any faults in the wiring.
Measures such as bank levies or the taxes on bank transactions, etc., may be very close to crossing that “red line”. The global crisis has not changed the fact that financial development is a powerful driver for economic growth. Let us not make the banks a scapegoat! Thank you for your attention! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

First, the NPL ratio dropped from above 20 percent at end-2014 to almost 6 percent presently, making it the largest adjustment in the EU over a relatively short time period. At the core of this adjustment were conservative requirements for provisioning NPLs, our hands-on supervisory approach, and a fiscal facility that was conducive to the development of the secondary market for NPLs. Second, the share of leu-denominated loans in the total stock of loans has increased from one third prior to the crisis to two thirds nowadays, with the benefit of reducing contagion risk and improving the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy. However, it would be risky to press ahead too fast. In the case of the ECB, while the tapering of its QE has already started, an upward move in the interest rate is not likely to happen soon. As for peer countries such as Poland and Hungary, their macroeconomic conditions do not seem to 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  warrant a start of the tightening cycle this year either, with still below-target inflation. As long as real interest rates remain negative all over Europe, straying too far away from our regional peers in terms of policy rate would invite disproportionate appreciation pressures, which – while helpful in terms of inflation – would not be a welcome development, given Romania’s increasingly negative external imbalance.
Svensson (2013b) says on the other hand that a lower repo rate would entail a lower debt ratio. But in his model there is no real reason to be concerned over household indebtedness, regardless of how the repo rate affects the degree of household indebtedness. For example, he does not allow for households’ interestrate expectations becoming unjustifiably low if the repo rate is cut. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Supervisory measures can have direct effects on financial risks and imbalances by limiting the possibilities of particularly vulnerable households, companies or banks to take certain decisions. However, the measures may also have indirect effects on risks and imbalances, or side effects on the economy by affecting the cost of capital or the general demand situation. An example of a measure that probably first and foremost has direct effects is the mortgage cap. This affects primarily a small group of highly-indebted households and can be expected to contribute substantially to preventing financial imbalances arising. But the mortgage cap scarcely has any major effects on the general demand in the economy, or on the cost of capital for a typical household. An example of a measure that can affect the cost of capital is higher risk weights on mortgages. Such a measure would probably lead to an increase in mortgage rates in relation to other lending rates. And higher risk weights would probably also push up average lending rates at a given repo rate, at least in the short run.

For example, its efforts over the past two years to promote market functioning and minimize contagion were critical in preventing the strains in our financial markets from resulting in even more severe damage to the economy. These “lender of last resort” interventions on the part of the Fed, including facilities such as the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), as well as programs such as the foreign exchange reciprocal currency agreements, are examples of the rapid and responsive application of basic central bank tenants to the unique challenges we faced as this crisis evolved. Indeed, in many ways, the crisis has underscored why the Federal Reserve was created almost a century ago: to provide a backstop for a banking system prone to runs and financial panics. BIS Review 6/2010  1  Where it proved necessary and feasible to do so, the Fed also used its emergency lending authority to forestall the disorderly failure of systemically important institutions. These actions truly were extraordinary – well outside the scope of our normal operations, but our judgment was that not taking those actions would have risked a broader collapse of the financial system and a significantly deeper and more protracted recession. Faced with the choice between these otherwise unpalatable actions and a broader systemic collapse, the Fed, with the full support of the Treasury, invoked its emergency lending authority and prevented the collapse of certain institutions previously considered to have been outside the safety net.
At the end of his speech, referring – with an irony that shows a keen sense of human nature – to how the public might change its future perception on his activity, Professor Issing added: “I can only hope that in my modest case the reversal of the sequence of events does not end where the news on Napoleon started”. For me, a European of Latin origin living at the gates of the Orient, this excerpt does not reflect the so-called German rigidity whatsoever, but rather a healthy, accommodating sense of humour, which is part, I hope, of the new European culture. Turning back to the euro area tensions generated by the situation in Greece, the future definitely holds new surprises in store for us. One never knows who the next ogre may be… No matter how much uncertainty surrounds any prediction, I would rather conclude my presentation today on a positive note, by recalling the words of Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the EU project, who thought that “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”. I only hope that policymakers in Europe have learned their lessons well enough from treading the desert of the crisis so that it has taken us closer to that Promised Land Professor Issing was mentioning.

Some of the steps then involved:   gradually lowering the MRR rate to 7% on average (from 0% to 10% depending on the source of funding);    making it easier for credit institutions to renegotiate credit conditions;    expanding the range of acceptable collateral;    adjusting risk weights down to the requirements of the Capital Requirements Directive (e.g. retail exposures previously risk-weighted at 100% and exposures backed by eligible residential mortgages and risk-weighted at 50%, started to be weighted at 75% and 35%, respectively);    prohibiting the distribution of dividends during the crisis period (for 2008 and 2009, for 2010 selectively);    getting commitments by the foreign banks to keep their exposures to their subsidiaries, etc. Our bank supervision was not influenced by short-term political considerations. The BNB’s measures were then often seen by some politicians and entrepreneurs as being too strict and unnecessarily conservative, even “hampering the economic growth”. Especially during 2005–2007, optimism was dominating. But we never gave in to pressure. If regulators do not stay countercyclical in both “good” and “bad” times, the effects of future negative shocks are amplified. That lesson, which is only now being learned in many West European countries because of the current crisis, has been a milestone of supervision for many years in Bulgaria. With respect to bank regulations and the supervisory tools and practices, today Bulgaria is rather advanced, and not a “catching-up” economy.
The second main focus of the Allsopp review is the stark imbalance between the coverage, timeliness and quality of statistics on the services sector relative to those on manufacturing. Suppose you were interested in studying the economic behaviour of the UK textiles industry - which accounts for around one-third of one percent of UK output. The good news is there’s plenty of coverage in the national accounts, although you have some decisions to make. Are you interested in clothing, or carpets and rugs? And if clothing, are you interested in knitted and crocheted garments…or work wear…or outerwear?…or indeed underwear? Each of these has its own data set: the array of sub-categories is truly impressive. However, suppose instead that you were interested in the retail sector, and wanted to know, for example, how much the large supermarket chains have contributed to GDP in recent years, or what inroads they have made into the non-food market. No dice. Although the retail sector nowadays accounts for over 5% of UK output - so it is nearly 20 times the size of the textiles industry - more detailed data are not produced for the UK national accounts. The need for better service sector statistics goes well beyond any interest we might have in detail for its own sake. In the UK, early estimates of GDP rely heavily on measuring output. Since the service sector accounts for more than 70% of UK output, the quality of early GDP estimates is inextricably linked to the quality of service sector statistics.

ONS needs to be proactive in measuring activity in new sectors, even if it is not straightforward - as it often won’t be. For example, bricks-and-mortar retailing is tangible and growing rapidly, but how does it compare with developments in internet sales? People can now make some purchases via mobile phone text message. How can we measure that? Allsopp recommends a greater capacity within the ONS for considering these issues. Improving the quality of macroeconomic data is a first order issue for monetary policy makers. So Bank of England staff will play an active role in supporting these developments. 6  BIS Review 71/2004  But it is just as important for the ONS to maintain the quality of its current output during this period of major transition. Again, we will be working closely with the ONS to ensure that the transition is made with minimal impact on day-to-day policy. How well placed are we to respond to more challenging times? We live in highly uncertain times. This year rising oil prices and a significant slowdown in the housing market have awoken bad memories of the 1970s and 1980s. The MPC will be doing very well if it can achieve the same stability over the next decade as we have enjoyed over the past ten years. But an important legacy of the past decade is that policy makers enjoy a degree of credibility that would have seemed unimaginable a generation ago.
These include better risk management, a modern range of products offered to customers, or the development of new distribution channels, to name just a few. Regional integration within the EU, however, means that the application of a uniform bank or insurance licence (i.e. taking up activity in any Member State under a licence obtained in the home country) may cause certain asymmetry in the availability of data and a conflict of interest between supervisors of the host country on the one hand, and institution owners and supervisors from the home country on the other. Such conflict may occur as a result of transformation of foreign bank subsidiaries, operating under local laws and fully supervised by the supervisory authorities of the host country, into branches supervised by foreign supervisory authorities. Individual foreign bank branches operating in the new EU Member States frequently constitute a vital element of the banking system, both in terms of the value of assets and deposits, operations on the domestic interbank market and the share in settlements in the payment system. Therefore, they are described as institutions of systemic importance for the domestic market. At the same time, they are not always equally important components of an international banking group, in terms of their size and the profit generated. In such a case, a relatively low importance of an institution may result in less focus on its supervision, both by the foreign bank and the supervisory authority of the home country in which the given bank has obtained its licence.

28 The original Bretton Woods system was established after WWII and consisted in a formal commitment of its participant countries to maintain foreign exchange rates, determined against a gold parity, at a specific level, with acceptable deviations not exceeding 1 percent. The system ceased to exist in 1971, after president Nixon had taken a decision that the US would no longer exchange dollars for gold according to the parity determined. The nature of the reactivated Bretton Woods, often called Bretton Woods 2, is well conveyed in the motto used by the authors of this concept: “(…) if I had an agreement with my tailor that whatever money I pay him returns to me on the very same day as a loan, I would have no objection at all to ordering more suits from him” (Jacques Rueff, 1965, after Dooley et al. (2003). 27  Taking into account the fact that China has already used USD 60 billion of its foreign exchange reserves for capital injections to two commercial banks, the People’s Bank of China has a level of reserves that exceeds USD 900 billion. 28  A series of articles on the topic was commenced with the work of M.Dooley, D.Folkerts-Landau and P.Garber „An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System“, NBER Working Paper 9971, September 2003.
That made me very proud. Thank you. I am grateful to Jamie Bell, Alan Castle, Rashmi Harimohan, Jonathan Haskel, Bob Hills, Karen  Page 6  Jude, Nick McLaren, Rhys Phillips, Huw Pill, Andrea Rosen, Michael Saunders, Martin Seneca, Fergal Shortall, Silvana Tenreyro, and Laura Wallis for their assistance in helping me prepare these remarks.

This may indicate that there is a relationship between the degree of openness and deviations from target, although Canada is an exception. It should also be noted that the figures for the twelve-month rise in consumer prices are considerably more volatile here than in other countries. We see from the figures that consumer prices in Norway, even when tax changes and energy products are excluded, are more volatile than indices in other countries where these products are included. Developments in recent years have also been influenced by the pronounced favourable disturbances to which the Norwegian economy has been exposed. Developments in Norway’s terms of trade provide an illustration. As consumers, we enjoy the benefits of falling prices for many imported goods. As a nation, we benefit from a fall in prices for the goods we import relative to prices for the goods we export. Norway’s terms of trade have improved. The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices is particularly strong. However, there have also been terms-of-trade gains in the mainland economy. The situation in Norway differs from that of our Nordic neighbours. Although the domestic economy is partly insulated from oil price fluctuations through the oil fund mechanism, terms-of-trade gains have been a challenge to monetary policy in Norway. Low imported inflation has put downward pressure on our rate of inflation. At the same time, our currency has remained strong, partly reflecting an improvement in Norway’s terms of trade.
Recognizing the strong literary traditions of the Lotos Club, I would also note that I had the fortune of reading some of the great works of Middle English, including Chaucer. I also enjoyed being on both the freshman wrestling and golf teams—even if it was an odd pairing and our teams were not very good. In contrast to Columbia, the city seemed much less attractive. From my perspective as a naïve 17-year-old from suburban Massachusetts, it seemed outright dangerous and dirty. The danger was driven home immediately. One of my roommates was robbed his first day during a walk through one of the nearby parks. He didn’t understand, nor did I at the time, that certain places near Columbia weren’t very safe, even during daylight hours. While you could avoid the crime by being careful where you went in the city, there was no avoiding the pollution. During this period, New York City still had considerable manufacturing activity, many apartment buildings burned low-grade oil and incinerated trash, and this was before the days of automobile catalytic converters. This confluence meant that grit was 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  everywhere, and even for the non-fastidious—which I admit I was one—showers were an absolute necessity on a daily basis. Sometimes it was so bad that you couldn’t see across the Hudson River, which was just a few blocks away! In order to understand the situation the city faced in the 1970s, we have to look back a decade earlier.

According to the survey of damages from the earthquake and tsunami delivered by the government on March 23, the cost to replace the destroyed capital stock amounts to 20.94 billion US dollars. Following the reasoning described above, this figure is the equivalent to the gross value of the lost capital stock. How then can we estimate the net value of the capital destroyed? Estimates in our national accounts indicate that between the years 2000 and 2008 the net value of the capital stock was around 63 percent of the gross stock. Applying this percentage directly, we estimate that the damage to the net capital stock, consistent with the figure disclosed by the government, is 13.2 billion US dollars. If we consider that the net capital stock amounted in 2009 to an estimated 435 billion US dollars, the aforementioned loss is equivalent to nearly 3 percent of the total. Therefore, given a loss of 3 percent in the net capital stock, the Board estimates that during this year the level of trend GDP will fall 1.0% to 1.5% because of the catastrophe. The magnitude of the short-term impact of the natural disaster depends on the share in national GDP of the hardest hit regions, the sectoral composition of production by region and the duration of downtime in productive processes, among other factors. In 2008, Regions VI, VII and VIII produced nearly 16% of national GDP, mostly concentrated in the manufacturing sector. As for the labour market, the three regions generate almost one fifth of national employment.
To conclude, I should like to join the Chairman of the National Securities Market Commission in expressing my sincere and deep gratitude for the work and effort over the past eight years of all those persons and institutions who have collaborated directly or indirectly on the Financial Education Plan. Thank you very much your attention and I hope you will enjoy this event. 5/5

At the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. Broadly in line with this assessment, the December 2013 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area foresee annual HICP inflation at 1.4% in 2013, at 1.1% in 2014 and at 1.3% in 2015. In comparison with the September 2013 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the projection for inflation for 2013 has been revised downwards by 0.1 percentage point and for 2014 it has been revised downwards by 0.2 percentage point. The risks to the outlook for price developments are seen to be broadly balanced over the medium term. Upside risks relate to higher commodity prices and stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, while downside risks stem from weaker than expected economic activity. Concerning the staff macroeconomic projections, let me inform you that the Governing Council has decided to publish more details as of December 2013. You will receive this material today after the press conference. Turning to the monetary analysis, data for October confirm the assessment of subdued underlying growth in broad money (M3) and credit. Annual growth in M3 moderated to 1.4% in October, from 2.0% in September. This moderation was partly related to a base effect. Annual growth in M1 remained strong at 6.6%, reflecting a preference for liquidity, although it was below the peak of 8.7% observed in April.