samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This would help foster value-added characteristics of the Thai economy and increase opportunities for our people, businesses, and everything else that will bring about a better standard of living for all. The two mega-trends I have outlined, when combined with the flood crisis at the end of last year, mean that Thailand needs to quickly upgrade infrastructure to improve competitiveness. In particular, public investment in effective natural resources management system and improved governance of public administration will serve as an important driving force for sustainable economic growth. Evolution of economic activities in line with the changing environment While the immediate obstacles may have changed, the overall challenges that have remained require all parties to formulate a strategic framework and policy space, to enable the Thai economy to stride pass the transitional gateway smoothly. For the public sector, the implementation of policy that promotes investment and enhances competitiveness effectively relating to infrastructure, education, and governance such as reducing corruption and improving political resiliency would be an important impetus to boost Thailand’s position in the competitiveness race. This is because public investment attracts further investment from both private investors and foreign investors, the so-called crowdingin effect. For the private sector, the search for new markets, improvements of production efficiencies, creation of value-added goods and services, and effective risk management are things that the private sector can do to prepare for new challenges.

I also encourage the private sector to learn more about the complexity and risks of various financial products to be able to use them effectively for their businesses. This will help businesses to reduce cost and increase competitiveness, as well as allow the financial sector to play a bigger supporting role for the real sector. For the financial sector, strengthening internal organization and promoting financial system efficiency will be the main factors that allow financial institutions to become more competitive. This will also increase the efficiency of business transactions as well as confidence in the financial system. Policy address Like all policymakers, the BOT faces not only the challenge of policy making but also that of communicating the policy choice to the general public. It is often the case that there is a gap between public expectation of near-term results and what the BOT aims to deliver: a firm foundation for the long-term, the results of which may not be seen for years to come. Upon assessing the changing global environment, risks and social dynamics together, the BOT  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  remains resolute in our commitment to preserve Thailand’s economic resiliency and sustainable growth path. This can only be possible through a common vision among all stakeholders, for that would allow for policy integration and the creation of financial environment that would foster equitable progress and welfare.
This is a challenging judgment for an organisation specialising in tail risk insurance, and with a broad policy remit – but initially we have focused on the public commitments to provide market-wide and firm-specific liquidity insurance through the Bank’s current set of facilities and operations. The scenarios we have so far explored are also consistent with this scope, and include examples of both domestic and international shocks, affecting banks, non-banks and capital markets. Wherever possible these are based on the scenarios used by the Bank’s supervisors in their work with industry, but with typically higher severity: consistent with the assumption that firms should be capable of surviving supervisory stress tests using their own resources. It is only when firms’ liquidity needs go beyond the level that could reasonably be covered by their own resources that the central bank is called upon to act in size: the image of the firefighter in action once again. So what do we do with the results of this work? In the private sector, of course, stress tests are used to inform desired capital levels, and that is certainly something we consider too. But they can also have a wider influence, as we found last year when we ran an exercise to evaluate the potential implications of uncertainty surround different possible outcomes of the UK referendum on membership of the European Union. The results of that work helped to inform judgments on collateral pre-positioning and haircuts, engagement with fellow central banks, and our own supervisory actions and conversations.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Ultra-low interest rates and challenges for central banks Welcome address by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Farewell Symposium for Honorary Governor Christian Noyer, held by the Bank of France and the Bank for International Settlements, Paris, 12 January 2016. *  *  *  Bienvenue à Paris and to the Banque de France (BDF) … I’ve switched to English so as to welcome you all to this new Conference Center created by you, dear Christian. What better way to wish you farewell after 12 years as Governor of the BDF and six years as President of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)? And what better way for me to welcome for the first time this unique community of actors, academics and observers who are together genuinely contributing to a better understanding of monetary policy and financial stability? To quote a few numbers, some 200 VIPs are gathered here, representing more than 80 central banks (CBs), governments and international organizations, as well as about 50 universities, think tanks and financial institutions. It’s no surprise, as Christian enjoyed meeting all of you at international gatherings and research conferences. The Symposium title, chosen jointly by the BDF and the BIS, relates to the prevalence of very low interest rates for the past 7 years in advanced economies and, by contagion, around the world.
And if technological advances continue at a rapid pace, we must all be ready to update our knowledge. 5 [12]  The effects of digitalisation can also be much greater than the effects of earlier industrial revolutions. Online robots and AI have the potential to replace large sectors of the human workforce. Some analysts think that the whole labour market will change fundamentally, and that this will be fairly soon.13 In such a situation, it will not only be groups of employees with different skills that will be polarized. Here I am not even talking about the most dystopic forecast for the future – of an almost omniscient artificial intelligence with its own agenda that takes over the world. Instead I mean a changeover to where many tasks and jobs are no longer done by people. Such a development will create tension between those who own capital in the form of equity and funds and those who do not. This is because the capital owners will receive the productivity gains generated by the machines. Digitalisation can lead to concentrated product markets. There are other problems with digitalisation for market economies. We see already now social networks like Twitter, Facebook and Instagram dominate their respective markets. Few people use search engines other than Google. These companies are not only dominant in their respective fields; they also determine who may market themselves or express themselves on their platforms. In this way, they govern how other companies reach out to prospective customers.

The run on the domestic banks stopped, but at its peak, demand for cash tripled and the Central Bank almost ran out of banknotes. International payment flows were seriously affected, however, not least because of the freezing order imposed by the British authorities on Icelandic banks, but also because of a general distrust among foreign counterparties. Why did the Government give a verbal blanket guarantee for domestic deposits only and not for deposits in the banks’ foreign branches? After all, this distinction probably added fuel to the fire of the so-called Icesave dispute about the settlement of deposit guarantees in Landsbanki’s Dutch and British branches. The short answer is that such a guarantee would never have been credible. As a result, it would not have stopped the run on these deposits and, if attempted, might have bankrupted the Government. At the time, the Central Bank of Iceland’s FX reserves amounted to 2½ billion euros, while the foreign currency deposits in Landsbanki’s Dutch and British branches totalled 11½ billion euros and payment of the EU minimum deposit insurance would have required 4½ billion euros. The sovereign was completely closed off from foreign capital markets at that point. Furthermore, in economic terms, given that these deposits were used to a significant degree to finance illiquid assets in these same countries, such a payment, if possible, would have amounted to a net transfer of resources from Iceland to these countries at a time when Iceland was going through its deepest financial and economic crisis in the post-war period!
This is because while financial institutions need to comply with minimum prudential regulations, such as capital, liquidity and submission of financial data on a regular basis to the supervisory authorities, non-bank financial service providers are typically not subject to such requirements, and in the event of financial distress, depositors may be at risk. In order to address this concern, the regulators need to ensure a sound regulatory regime which is sufficiently accommodative to balance prudence and innovation. This not a simple issue, and this Forum has been designed to explore critical aspects of achieving this fine balance. A second key policy concern relates to undermining confidence in the payment systems. As different intermediaries get involved, there is an increase in the risk of losing transaction integrity, corruption of data or breach of payment settlement terms. The loss of faith in the safety and security of transactions, in particular payment transactions, can result in widespread loss of consumer confidence. Another area relates to policies governing competition as different players position themselves in the branchless banking arena? Issues such as licensing, pricing, alliances with different financial institutions and compliance with prudential regulations need to be considered carefully. The public and consumers may lose confidence if there is no sense of order in how the payment system is evolving, or there is wide disparity in charges and fess.

There is a need for the major stakeholders to align with some form of regulatory approach or framework which would provide a basis for assessing risks, and to implement regulations  2  BIS Review 162/2009  that are proportionate to the risks identified. In this Forum, some of the key elements of such a regulatory framework will be dealt with, such as Know Your Customer, compliance with Anti-money Laundering regulations, Consumer Protection and achieving greater levels of system interoperability amongst service providers. As such, branchless banking will require an inter-disciplinary approach given the different types of expertise needed to drive this important agenda. The third area of policy concern I would like to touch on relates to the issue of accountability with cross-sector regulatory requirements. There must be clarity over the accountability for the integrity of transactions, security of information transmitted, adherence to a consistent set of regulations and proper maintenance of the system. And it is important to note that higher standards of control will also result in higher costs to the service providers. Cross-sector policy issues must be resolved, and clear accountability with respect to the operations of the system must be established. Systems of governance to engage with different legislative requirements, from capital requirements to anti-money laundering regulations, must be in place. Players need to have the requisite skills and knowledge to address issues promptly with different stakeholders, such as customs, immigration, police and international agencies like Interpol.
Mario Draghi: Inauguration of the new ECB premises Speech by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the inauguration of the new ECB premises, Frankfurt am Main, 18 March 2015. *  *  *  Deputy Minister President Mr. Al-Wazir, Lord Mayor Mr. Feldmann, Former President of the ECB, dear Jean-Claude Trichet, Fellow and former members of the Governing Council, Former Lord Mayor, Mrs. Roth, Honorary citizen, Mr. von Metzler, Head of the Jewish Community, Mr Korn, Heir of the Grossmarkthalle architects, Mr. Elsaesser, and Mr. Prix, the famous architect of our new house Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to welcome you all today to the inauguration of the new European Central Bank headquarters. Creating our new home is a project as old as the ECB itself. It began in 1998 with the search for a suitable site. In 2001 we found that site here at the Grossmarkthalle. A year later, an international competition was launched for the best architectural design, which was eventually won by Wolf Prix and his team. And in May 2010 the foundation stone was laid and the main construction works started. Many people, some of them here today, have worked tirelessly over this period to make this project a reality. I would like to thank everybody involved for such tremendous work. The euro, our single currency, has become the most tangible symbol of European integration – a piece of Europe accessible and valuable to each and every one of us.

Finally, there have been concerns expressed that the HKMA’s supervision has become more intrusive and that requests for information are sometimes excessive. This is certainly something we are aware of, however I should point out that we don’t ask for information just for the sake of it. If we ask for some new information, or for an institution to increase the frequency of its reporting, there is always a very good reason for it. I know that we asked for a lot of additional information, particularly following the onset of the Asian financial crisis, but I make no apology for this, as I can assure you it was necessary for our monitoring of the banking sector, and of individual institutions, through the crisis. But having said that, we are of course very well aware of the burden that this places on institutions, and can assure you that we will continue to keep our information requirements under review with this in mind. We are also aware of the need to ensure that our staff deal with the banks with the appropriate degree of sensitivity, that they only make requests which are reasonable, and that they try to explain why particular things are required. This is quite a challenge for us, but it is something we must work on nevertheless. 13. This brings me to the end of my remarks.
But preserving the interests of the EU, its citizens, its businesses, its Member States, means that the agreement with the UK should not undermine what we have managed to achieve in Europe in the economic field: one of our strongest assets is our single market; it removes all internal borders and regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons in the European Union. For the sake of consistency, there is one principle in particular to which we have to stick in preparing the agreement between the EU and the UK: in the single market, you cannot separate access and rules. For the financial services industry, this means that you can hardly expect to obtain a European passport if you do not accept the single market's rules. London is and will remain in the future a global financial centre, but the architecture of the European financial system may have to evolve in this regard. We cannot foresee the outcome of the negotiations – which I hope will be in the interest of both parties – but all actors should as of now undertake all the necessary preparations to avoid any potential “cliffedge” risk. London will and should probably continue to attract and transform savings from all over the world.

The statistics gathered from these talks – for example on firms' inflation expectations, but also on other evidence, such as changes in companies' price-setting behaviour – can be useful in assessing regime changes before they show up in the official statistics. Systematically collecting and evaluating as much information as possible is crucial. However, in a situation of exceptionally high uncertainty, a key challenge for policymakers is to find the right balance between waiting for additional information and not falling behind the curve. This brings me to the third principle for decision-making: determination. Determination The literature provides arguments for both a wait-and-see approach and more aggressive policies, depending, for example, on whether the uncertainty is related to measurement, the effectiveness of policies, or unforeseen developments. In practice, in an environment such as the one we face today, mixed signals on the persistence of inflation might tempt policymakers to postpone further reaction to inflationary pressures until uncertainty about future inflation has receded. Yet uncertainty must not mean indecision. A risk management approach to policymaking sometimes calls for decisive action. At times, the optimal policy decisions may be those that provide insurance against particularly bad, though very unlikely, events. The SNB's tightening of its monetary policy over the past year should be seen in this context. Towards the end of 2021, at a time when the inflation outlook was still relatively benign, we began to tolerate a certain nominal appreciation of the Swiss franc.
So, in brief – if the policy rate is not the only and best weapon, what else do we have available in our arsenal? And which authority should have its finger on the trigger? One of the problems the crisis has brought to light is that there was too little focus on overall risks that could threaten the financial system as a whole – systemic risks. In many parts of the world they are now working on introducing a framework aimed at preventing such risks. This could contribute to preventing imbalances that would have consequences “merely” from a monetary policy perspective, even if this is not the explicit aim. One means of preventing an exaggerated upturn in house prices and lending, for instance, is to cut the permitted loan-to-value ratio – how much it is possible to borrow in relation to the market value of the underlying collateral. Another means may be to introduce an amortisation requirement. Two weeks ago, Finansinspektionen (the Swedish financial supervisory authority) presented a proposal for a recommended ceiling for the loan-to-value ratio for housing of 85 per cent of the property’s market value. Division of responsibility and other problems I asked earlier who should have their finger on the trigger. It is not entirely clear who should have the power of authority to introduce the type of measure I just mentioned. There may be good reasons to delegate this to the central bank, at least with regard to measures that affect the macro economy and are not aimed at individual banks.

These are: whether the UK economy has achieved sustainable convergence with the economies of the single currency; whether there is sufficient flexibility in the UK economy to adapt to change and other unexpected economic events; whether joining the single currency would create better conditions for businesses to make long-term decisions to invest in the UK; the impact membership would have on the UK financial services industry; and ultimately whether joining the single currency would be good for employment. It would then submit a favourable decision to Parliament, and the British people in a referendum. The Chancellor recognised that it was unrealistic to think that a decision could be reached during the lifetime of the present Parliament, which runs to May 2002 at the latest. But he stressed that in the meantime the UK should nevertheless prepare - not only for introduction of the euro on the Continent on 1 January 1999 - which we of course did very effectively - but also for our own eventual participation. The Chancellor’s statement was the first by a British Government to accept the principle of monetary union. It recognised that the single currency will affect us whether we are in fact in or out - and that it is clearly in our own national interest to do all that we can to ensure that the euro is successful.
Of course, it may be the case that the principal understands the difficulty in making these trade-offs concrete and considers it desirable that the central bank nevertheless takes the risks into account in a way that reduces the degree of target attainment a couple of years ahead. But in this case, it is desirable that the principal should make clear that the mandate is worded too narrowly and therefore needs to be broadened. And one question that also arises is to what extent such a broader mandate fits into the degree of independence granted to many central banks. There is some tension between the breadth of the mandate and the degree of independence. A high degree of independence assumes that it is fairly simple to assess whether the mandate is fulfilled, which could be difficult if the mandate is worded so broadly that it encompasses most potential outcomes. “Let the cobbler stick to his last!” Let me conclude by summarising my message today and perhaps unexpectedly I shall begin in ancient Greece. It was said that the famous artist Apelles from Kos one day heard a shoemaker pointing out a mistake the painter had made in his depiction of a sandal. Apelles corrected the mistake, which encouraged the shoemaker, who then continued his criticism of the way the leg of the person in the picture had been drawn.

14  Model estimates of the short-term relation between the repo rate and household indebtedness indicate that the average effects may be relatively small: a 1 per cent lower repo rate over a period of one year, and which gradually reverts, will give rise to an approximately 4 percentage points higher level of indebtedness as a percentage of disposable income. Similar estimates of the relation between housing prices and the repo rate also show small effects – see Sveriges Riksbank (2011) Chapter 2.1.However, estimates of short-term relations might underestimate the total effects of the repo rate on household indebtedness. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and having a potentially better target attainment in the long run is thus very unclear. On the other hand, the costs in terms of poorer target attainment a couple of years ahead are very clear. Other tools than the repo rate could moreover influence household debt more effectively. Various types of tax tools are probably particularly potent, such as tax deduction regulations and property taxation, but at the same time these are the most politically sensitive. So-called macroprudential policy tools are probably more effective than monetary policy in influencing debt in the household sector. Finansinspektionen, which has been given the main responsibility for these tools, has already used several of them and has signalled that it will remain vigilant with regard to risks linked to household indebtedness. This should reasonably have an effect on the monetary policy trade-offs.