samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Two particularly important exceptions have been the gradual fixing of the exchange rates between members of the European Union, culminating in monetary union, and the more or less formal policies of the newly industrialised Asian countries and Japan to keep the value of their currencies stable against the dollar. Moreover, the Asian central banks have been accumulating large dollar reserves. For most of the post-war period, the quantity of central bank reserves held by Asian central banks was of the same order of magnitude as the reserves held by the G-7. Over the past 15 years, both Japan and non-Japan Asia have rapidly increased their reserves, which are now nearly ten times as large as the combined reserves of the rest of the G-7. Two thirds of these reserves are in dollars, a much larger proportion than the US share of world output. The counterpart to the Asian bloc’s current account surpluses and acquisition of dollar reserves has been large current account deficits in the US. There is nothing inherently wrong with such ‘imbalances’. In principle, they reflect the use of financial markets to allocate savings from around the world to the most profitable investment opportunities. But there is likely to be a limit to the amount of debt that one country can issue as a result of persistent deficits before investors start to worry about its ability or willingness to repay.

On balance, I believe we have been making progress toward our goals, recognizing that a few issues still cloud the outlook. Most noteworthy is the fact that inflation continues to run well below our 2 percent objective. With respect to the economic growth outlook, the softness in third-quarter real GDP – which according to its initial estimate rose at only a 1.5 percent annualized pace – and the weakness of the manufacturing sector have raised concerns that the U.S. economy may be losing some forward momentum. Sharp reductions in oil and gas drilling activity and a loss of international competitiveness associated with the dollar’s appreciation over the past year have restrained factory output. Judging from historical experience, the impact of the dollar’s recent strength has the potential to be protracted, so that the trade sector probably will continue to be a drag on growth in 2016. Thus, the manufacturing sector is likely to continue to lag behind the rest of economy. But these negatives need to be set against the many positive aspects of the economic outlook. In particular, domestic demand continues to grow at a solid pace as increases in consumer spending, housing and business fixed investment all contributed to the third quarter’s 2.9 percent annualized gain in real domestic final sales. A large decline in the pace of inventory accumulation was the main reason why real GDP growth faltered in the third quarter.
I am sure there will be very interesting and fruitful exchange of views and ideas on the major financial stability issues, including those that I have mentioned earlier. Once again, thank you all for being with us today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

If Singapore did not have political stability, good infrastructure, and a conducive business environment, MAS’ strategies to grow the financial centre also would not have worked as well. In a world where central banks typically keep a distance from the rest of government, it is amazing how closely MAS works with other government agencies in Singapore – macroeconomic surveillance and national economic policies and strategies combating money laundering risks and investigating financial crimes promoting jobs, skills development, and labour market policies advancing technology initiatives ranging from e-payments to digital identity These partnerships have made a decisive difference to the outcomes for MAS, the financial industry and the Singapore economy. MAS has achieved what it has also because of the close partnership it has enjoyed with the financial industry. In a world, where many regulators are aloof at best and hostile at worst when dealing with the industry, the relationship MAS has with the industry is special. To be sure, we are a no-nonsense supervisor, not averse to setting high prudential standards, imposing tough remedial measures, and occasionally shutting down a bank or two. But MAS has always believed that working with the industry, rather than against it, is the best way to achieve our shared objectives: keeping the system safe and growing the business. In this, MAS has been fortunate to have an industry – banking, insurance, asset management, and capital markets – that has actively supported us through thick and thin.
The use of such tools may be helpful in these economies, but it also poses a potential risk to the rest of the world. For example, it could push even more capital flows in the direction of emerging economies like Malaysia. The crisis has also stretched the fiscal position of governments, both in the advanced and emerging economies. In some cases, such deterioration was related to dealing with the effects of the crisis (e.g., from bank rescues) and the low GDP growth post-crisis, in others it reflects the outcome of years of unwise fiscal spending. Whatever the reasons, constrained fiscal positions mean a reduced capacity to support economic activity and a reduced ability to deal with future crisis and shocks. It also means that monetary policy may be called on to do more than it can realistically deliver – a phenomenon we are already witnessing in the advanced economies. A related policy issue has to do with structural reforms. This is a topic that has been much discussed in the post-crisis years. The trans-Atlantic crisis was a blow-up of large imbalances and distortions – both real and financial – built over many  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  years. It reflects policymakers delaying or ignoring needed reforms. The experience has once again provided the lesson that the longer such imbalances are ignored and allowed to pile up, the bigger the mess when the whole pile finally comes crashing down. Structural reforms are certainly needed in many of the crisis affected advanced economies.

But they are also needed in many EMEs, including in Malaysia. They are needed to ensure that economic growth is based on strong foundations and therefore will be more sustained and sustainable. Yet, the pace of structural reforms in most economies has been very slow and has lacked momentum. The main reason behind this inertia is often the stranglehold of vested interest. On this point, let me quote Mr. Travis Kelanik, the founder of the taxi service app Uber, which last week caused the black cab drivers in London to go on strike. He was reported in the Wall Street Journal as saying: “…there’s so much corruption and so much cronyism in the taxi industry and so much regulatory capture that if you ask permission up front for something that is already legal, you’ll never get it. There’s is no upside to them.” Clearly, the taxi industry is not the only one that has this characteristics, nor is it the only one that would be resistant to competition and structural change. Another reason for the inertia is that structural reforms often entail short-term pain even if they do provide long-term gain. Note the protests that have occurred in the crisis-affected economies in response to structural measures that governments in those economies have been forced to implement. The short-term pain makes structural reforms a politically difficult decision. There are sectors of society that would be adversely affected by these reforms and they will not take it kindly. Therefore, it takes political courage.
As noted above, however, in the process of moving from EU accession to ERM II the euro would progressively gain in importance as the reference currency in the currency basket until it finally ceases to function as a foreign currency on joining the EMU. In addition, upon EU accession the Central Bank will be expected to transfer an amount of external reserves, other than the euro and a number of other specified currencies, to the ECB. In order of time, therefore,  the composition of the external reserves of the Central Bank would change to reflect, first, the move towards a 100 per cent peg to the euro, then the transfer of a portion of the non-euro reserves to the ECB, and lastly the adoption of the euro as the national currency. The Bank is currently studying how the necessary adjustments could take place without increasing its exposure to exchange rate risk. Given the implications which the simultaneous move out of euro assets by all acceding countries could have for the international value of the euro, moreover, the Bank - in common with the central banks of the other acceding countries - would co-ordinate these adjustments with the ECB. Operational framework for open market operations and reserve management Upon joining EMU, the Central Bank would act as agent for the ECB in the management of the ECB’s foreign reserve assets and in the implementation of monetary policy.

Ardian Fullani: Albania on the road to EU integration Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the launching ceremony of the Needs Analysis for the Bank of Albania project, Tirana 17 April 2014. *  *  *  Dear Mr. Mersch, Dear Mr. Hamza, Dear Mr. Bajrami, Your Excellencies Ambassadors, Dear guests, The purpose of the programme we are launching today is to support the Bank of Albania in the process of approximation with the EU central banking rules, procedures and standards. This is another step forward in the increasingly closer cooperation between the Bank of Albania, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Eurosystem. I am delighted we have here today the Governor of the Central Bank of Kosovo and Vice Governor of the National Bank of Macedonia, as co-beneficiaries under this project. The Project addresses 13 different fields of central banking, as identified by Bank of Albania and ECB experts, wherein the Bank of Albania needs to make progress to reach comparable benchmarks to an EU central bank. These fields relate to all the main functions of the Bank of Albania, such as monetary and financial stability, operations, financial infrastructure, transparency, accountability and human capital. For the first time, information technology is also incorporated in the project scope, hence reflecting the impact of technology’s evolution on central bank operational systems over the past decades.
With the advance of the euro area economy’s position in the cycle, according to the ECB’s latest estimates, there will be a progressive pick-up in inflation levels to close to 2% in the coming years. Indeed, at its meeting on 14 June, the ECB’s Council reached the conclusion that the progress to date towards a sustained adjustment of inflation has been substantial, which gave rise to a gradual reduction in net asset purchases, duly confirmed by subsequent successive meetings of the Governing Council. The anchoring of long-term inflation expectations, the sound underlying firmness of the euro area economy and the maintenance of a high degree of monetary accommodation offer reasons to believe that the sustained convergence of inflation on the Governing Council’s objective will continue in the coming months, and that it will be maintained even after the finalisation of the net purchase programme, in line with the – very gradual – normalisation of monetary policy announced by the ECB’s Council. Fiscal policy should resume the fiscal consolidation process, given that both the public debt/GDP ratio and the structural deficit are holding at levels some distance off the limits set in the Stability and Growth Pact (see Chart 12). In recent years notable headway has been made in correcting some of the imbalances in the Spanish economy, such as the restructuring of the financial system, private-sector deleveraging, the recovery in competitiveness and the attainment of persistent currentaccount surpluses, and the adjustment of the real estate sector.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Productivity - a collective enigma? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Bank of France - France Stratégie Conference, Paris, 1 February 2017. * * * Welcome to all of you. It gives me great pleasure to be able to open this conference on French productivity, organised in conjunction with France Stratégie. The subject is one that is both topical and of great importance to central banks: productivity is one of the principal drivers of growth, and its dynamics are a strong determinant of potential growth, that which is compatible with price stability. As you can see [ slide], after the major wave of expansion witnessed during Les Trente Glorieuses, which was particularly marked in the case of France, productivity growth in advanced countries has slowed in successive stages since the 1970s. Today, it has fallen back to a pace that is historically weak. What are the common factors behind this slowdown in productivity? And is there anything specific to France? I don’t believe so: if there is one thing that is specific to France, it is the high level of hourly productivity – one of the highest in the world, alongside that of the United States and Germany. So, rather than being a French enigma, the enigma we are looking at this morning seems to me to be more of a collective phenomenon.
In Southeast Asia, some radical Muslim groups tried to turn the region into an Islamic caliphate through terrorist acts, including suicide bombings. This threat remains, despite recent successes by security agencies in foiling attacks in Indonesia and elsewhere. However, the extremists will not succeed in their political and religious goals. More importantly, although terrorist acts may disrupt our economy, its impact pales in comparison to the structural shifts in the international order led by the re-emergence of China and India. China’s reach is now global, in search of friends, influence, markets and resources. India is also seeking to expand its links and influence abroad. The US and Japan will try to co-opt India as a countervailing weight to China. But India, while seeking to balance its relations with all three, will preserve its own independence. Both China and India will compete but they will be careful not to collide. Both desire stability for their continued growth. Japan has adopted a more conciliatory foreign policy under Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. He has eschewed controversial issues such as visits to the Yasukuni shrine. He will endeavour to cultivate ties with China and India while staying steadfast with the US. Nonetheless, there are several potential wildcards in the region. First, the road to denuclearising the Korean Peninsula remains long and difficult. Second, cross-strait relations between Taiwan and Beijing are entering a critical phase.

Goh Chok Tong: Staying ahead of the Asian curve Speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister of the Republic of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at Barclays Asia Forum, Singapore, 1 November 2007. *  *  *  I extend a warm welcome to all of you, especially to those who have not come to Singapore in recent years. I would also like to thank Barclays for organising this Asia Forum as well as this weekend’s Singapore Open. I hope the Singapore Open will grow in prestige as you expand your presence in Singapore and Asia. Singapore’s economic growth rates in the past few years have surprised many, including ourselves. We did not expect to be able to consistently achieve growth rates of above 6% per annum as we are a mature economy. Yes, we have remade our economy but the good growth was also due to the buoyant world economy and a surging Asia. Singapore’s future growth will depend not only on our own efforts but also on our ability to anticipate trends in our external environment and stay ahead of the curve. This morning, I would like to share with you how we see developments in Asia and the challenges before us. Political outlook Let me start with the political outlook. I believe that Asia will remain stable and the regional environment conducive to growth. Post-9/11, the world had to adjust to new insecurities posed by terrorism.
But as the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has seen wages, employment and productivity evolve, we are increasingly of the view that there has been a material labour supply shock for the reasons that I have discussed. So we have been paying increasingly close attention to developments in the labour market. Our forecasts for the next three years, and hence our interest rate decisions, are based on key judgements that: •  the number of people participating in the labour force will continue to rise, reaching 64% of the population later in the year and continuing its upward trend of the past decade;  •  the unemployment rate that the economy can sustain without generating accelerating inflation will return to where it was before the Great Recession (around 5%), and, at around 5½% now, is currently only a little above that; and  •  there is scope for the average hours people work to increase further, reducing by about half the current gap between actual and reported desired hours. In short, and unlike the US and euro area, the economy is likely to be able to sustain a higher level of employment than in the past. The uncertainty is less the direction of that development and more its magnitude. To assess that magnitude and its implications for inflation, we are tracking a range of indicators, including those of the prospective paths for wages and unit labour costs. Actual wage growth, at just 0.6% since a year ago excluding bonuses, is currently very weak.

22  It is the average of real unit labour costs across firms in the economy that matters for inflation. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  need to be mindful of the possibility that it represents part of a longer-term trend towards job polarisation. What matters for inflationary pressures, irrespective of the type of job, is the relationship between wages and productivity, as captured by unit labour costs. Across the economy, wage growth is barely above productivity growth. Unit labour costs are currently soft (growing at only around 1% in the economy as a whole), are below the growth rate necessary to meet the inflation target, and indicate that there is further to go before we reach the new sustainable level of employment. In other words, there is still slack in the labour market that must be used up, and the recent revisions to the profile of UK output up to 2012 seem unlikely to change that assessment materially. That slack is wasteful. And if it were to remain, inflation would remain below the 2% target. The MPC’s current best collective judgement is that, while it has narrowed rapidly, this slack is broadly in the region of 1% of GDP. As this margin of slack continues to narrow, we expect wages to pick up slightly faster than productivity, and unit labour cost growth should increase, consistent with meeting the inflation target. However, the MPC expects it will take the better part of three years for this to happen.
4  ECB (2015), Financial Stability Review, May 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  3. The regulatory challenge As I said, however, CMU is for the longer-term. For the medium-term, SME financing in the euro area will still mainly come from banks. So we need to make sure that there are no unnecessary obstacles to that process. And this brings me to the third challenge facing banks – the regulatory challenge. The regulatory agenda since the crisis has no doubt been essential. Banks had too little capital, too much short-term funding, too high leverage, and created too great a cost for society when they failed. The reforms that have been introduced so far have increased resilience and, in extremis, made banks less costly to resolve. And there is no reason why this should, in principle, diminish the ability of banks to serve the real economy – research suggests, for example, that higher bank capital has no negative impact on lending. 5 But as new regulation accumulates, we know that it can also come with costs as well. In the economics jargon, policymakers always have to be watchful that, in attempting to internalise externalities, they do not inadvertently create new externalities. The possible risks can be summarised under the headings of complexity, clarity and consistency. As regulations have built up since 2009, they have tended to introduce more complexity, and with that comes an inevitable cost in terms of compliance.

Let me be clear: I am not making a value judgement about these regulations. What I am saying is that, if we want banks to adapt successfully to the post-crisis world, we need to give them sufficient visibility about the future. Finally, regulation needs to be mutually consistent. In particular, if we want banks to be bigger players in a more market-based financing mix, we need to ensure that regulation supports that transition and does not unduly impact banks’ ability to transact in capital markets. We know that one side effect of the reform agenda so far has been banks retreating from, or scaling down, certain market making activities. 5  See for example Buch, C., and Esteben, P. (2014), “Do better capitalized banks lend less? Long-run panel evidence from Germany”, International Finance 17:1. 6  Härle, P., Lüders, E., Pepanides, T., Pfetsch, S., Poppensieker, T. and Stegemann, U. (2010), “Basel III and European banking: Its impact, how banks might respond, and the challenges of implementation”, McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, Number 26. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  This is a particular issue for less liquid markets, such as ABS, which depend on market makers that can absorb temporary supply-demand imbalances. It is also one reason why part of the CMU Action Plan is a call for evidence on the cumulative impact of financial services reforms.