samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We understand that some banks may have concerns about reporting ongoing investigations, for fear of litigation risks. But we don’t want to create a potential loophole such that “bad apples” could just get around the Scheme by leaving one firm to join another firm once an investigation commences. To strike a balance, the industry guidelines set out factors that banks should take into account when exercising judgement on whether or not to share information about ongoing internal investigations. To ensure transparent and fair treatment to the job applicants, they will be provided with an opportunity to be heard in case of any negative information. 14. I would like to emphasise that the MRC Scheme is a very important milestone of our efforts to enhance bank culture. And this is one of the earlier efforts among major international banking centres to tackle the “rolling bad apples” problem. We certainly look forward to collaborating with the industry to ensure smooth implementation of the Scheme. Phase 1 of the Scheme covering senior positions will formally start in May 2023. But I would strongly encourage banks to start sharing and reporting any misconduct information as soon as they are ready to do so. Talent pool for the financial sector  15. So that’s the part on conduct and risk culture, or what I normally referred to as the efforts on the “mindset” of bank employees.

Speeches 29 Jun 2022  Opening Keynote Speech at ASIFMA Compliance Asia Conference 2022 : Building the right talent pool for Hong Kong Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority Ladies and gentlemen, Good Morning to all of you, 1. Let me start off by thanking ASIFMA for inviting me to this Compliance Asia Conference. With the COVID situation finally settling down, it’s the right time to re-direct some of our fire-fighting energy back to more forward looking topics. And I think revisiting some of the issues about talent pool for the financial industry is indeed a good starting point. 2. For many of us, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 is already a distant memory. Most of us may have forgotten the main factors leading to such a painful experience. Just to name a few issues contributing to the crisis: risk takers were not facing the consequences of taking undue and excessive risks; and no proper mechanisms were in place for shaping or influencing the behaviour of financial practitioners. As a banking supervisor, the HKMA cannot afford to forget those lessons. Instead, we have been working hard, even throughout the pandemic in the past two and a half years, to close those gaps. More recently, the HKMA has made good progress in cultivating sound bank culture and preventing “bad apples” from rolling among financial institutions. I would like to take this opportunity today to share with the audience our latest developments on those fronts.
The latest figure for the three-month moving average of M3 growth, covering the first quarter of 1999, was 5.2%. This was 0.2 percentage point higher than in the previous three-month period, covering the period December 1998 to February 1999. The Governing Council also noted that the annual rate of growth of total credit was broadly stable at 7.5% in March 1999. In line with the assessment it had made on the occasion of its previous meetings, the Governing Council took the view that recent monetary trends should not be seen as a warning signal with regard to the future evolution of inflation. As we have emphasised in the past, the monetary data in early 1999 may be affected by the special circumstances related to the changeover to Stage Three of EMU. In addition, the three-month moving average of M3 growth remains relatively close to the reference value of 4½%. As regards financial indicators, I should like to stress that recent developments in bond yields in the euro area were accompanied by some decoupling of yields from those in the United States, as differentials between euro area long-term interest rates and comparable rates in the United States have widened. As regards the evolution of the world economy, recent developments tend to confirm the picture of a mild overall improvement in the external environment beyond the euro area. As before, however, the main features range from continuously strong growth of the US economy to continuously weak output in Japan.

A capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent, added to a contra cyclical buffer, will create a stronger shock absorber than previously was the case. This contracyclical buffer is built up when times are good to then provide a safety margin during downturns. The capital adequacy requirement is also complemented with a pure leverage ratio measure, meaning that equity may not fall below 3 per cent of total assets. Under earlier frameworks, other capital, of lower quality, could have accounted for a large part of capital adequacy. This applies to both Additional Tier 1, i.e. other instruments that cover losses while the bank is active (going concern), and Tier 2, which is to say financing instruments that can cover losses if the bank should fail (gone concern) – for example, unsecured debts with long maturities that cannot be redeemed. The crisis has shown that, above all, it is Common Equity Tier 1 that can be counted on when the tide turns for the worse. All in all, the banks’ capital position will be strengthened considerably compared with previous regulations, contributing to the boosting of confidence in the individual banks and in the system as a whole. …clear measures for liquidity… In the autumn of 2008, we saw how a lack of confidence in the financial markets rapidly led to liquidity problems. So one priority for increasing financial stability has been to ensure the banks are able to manage liquidity problems in the short and long terms.
Indeed, one of the key benefits of globalisation over the past several decades is that the freer flow of goods and services, people and capital, ideas and information, has served as a vehicle for the transmission and diffusion of new technologies across borders. Other things equal, this should have accelerated catch-up between countries operating at and inside the technological frontier. 65  Other things, however, have not been equal. Penetration rates of new technologies, once adopted, tell a different tale. They suggest that, over time, there has been a divergence between frontier and non-frontier countries. In other words, the intensity with which new technologies have been used has expanded more rapidly in frontier (especially Western) economies than in non-frontier (non-Western) ones. This will have retarded catch-up between the two blocs. It is a less encouraging story about the diffusion of innovation. With the intensive and extensive margins of diffusion pushing in opposite directions, which has won out? It seems to have been the forces of divergence: slower rates of penetration of new technologies have more than counter-balanced faster rates of adoption across countries. This has shown up in levels of productivity between frontier and non-frontier which, since around 1980, have if anything diverged. Chart 7 illustrates that. It compares levels of productivity across 44 countries since 1950 relative to the frontier country (the US). Convergence prior to 1980 has given way to divergence subsequently.

Since at th  least the middle of the 19 century, the Bank of England has become one of the key institutional safeguards against recession risk and financial crisis. 41  Indeed, today, those roles are defined in statute. Non-state institutions have also played an important role in protecting those facing the adverse side-effects of economic change. This included many religious, philanthropic and charitable organisations and citizen th  movements that emerged from the 18 century onwards, often as a direct response to hardship brought about by technological change. These institutions offered, and many continue to offer, a combination of financial, housing, training and emotional support to those in need. 39  Clark (2009). Figures refer to government command of output as a percentage of GNP in England. Other 19th century legal changes that supported individuals from adverse side-effects of economic change included recognition of limited liability companies and constraints on the ability of courts to sentence debtors to prison. 41 Anson et al (2017), for example, discuss the emergence of the Bank of England as lender of last resort. 40  11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  To mention one, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) was founded in 1844, at around the time of Engels’ pause. It was established explicitly to meet the housing and social needs of young men who had moved from rural towns and villages to find work in factories in the cities.
This means that more people have to change workplace or sector, which in turn requires considerable adaptability. More jobs have to be created in, for example, the services sector, perhaps in completely new firms. Consequently, high growth does not necessarily imply increased job security in the traditional sense. Instead, high growth may reflect rapid change and high productivity growth, and that more jobs are disappearing in some parts of the economy at the same time as new jobs need to be created in other areas. This pattern has been observed in the United States in the debate on jobless growth. 4  BIS Review 65/2004  This trend is reinforced by firms’ increased possibilities to outsource parts of their production to other countries, a phenomenon that has recently been getting more and more attention in the economic debate. Several studies from the United States, where outsourcing is considered especially extensive, show that the direct effect on employment is fairly small. However, there is an indirect effect since the pressure to change increases, i.e. the need for staff decreases in some sectors but rises in others. In such a time of rapid structural change, the cost of low labour-market mobility increases, while it becomes more important that new firms and jobs are created. More people will find themselves in a transition between companies and between sectors, and sometimes between residential locations.

Furthermore, the fact that open unemployment has not fallen more during the 1990s’ economic boom indicates that the labour market does not function satisfactorily. Another sign that the unemployment problems are structural in nature is the big differences between regions and between occupational categories. In spite of a single monetary policy for the entire Swedish economy, unemployment figures in some regions are double those in others, while the proportion of people receiving benefit from their unemployment fund is twice as high in some occupational categories as in others (see Charts 3 and 4). These differences seem to remain over long periods, indicating low mobility in the jobs market. Another possible indication of such shortcomings is that the same vacancy ratio today is combined with somewhat higher total unemployment than 15-20 years ago. At the same time there is a large, growing need for mobility in the labour market. A comparison of different sectors’ employment growth during periods of expansion and contraction shows that many sectors suffer from job losses in both upturns and downturns, while others see jobs created both in upturns and downturns. The old cyclical pattern, where jobs are shed during a slump and are then created once the economy turns around, no longer appears to hold true. Jobs that are lost in a slowdown are being replaced, especially in manufacturing, to some degree by increased productivity and information technology. Growth is leading to new jobs but in different areas than before.
It is true when the companies say that here the effects are felt with a time lag of one to two quarters. So, if in the European economy the second quarter is positive, here it is to give effect in the third and fourth quarters. Some industrial sectors in the country registered growth in the first half of the year, and those are mainly related to the new foreign facilities, while many sectors still have no growth. We expect these facilities to experience the benefits of the recovery in the European economy in the second half of the year. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Mr. Bogov, there are ongoing opinions that as long as we stand “glued” to the fixed exchange rate, the economy cannot get a meaningful flywheel. Have you been thinking about this issue, or you stay firmly at your position – the exchange rate will not be changed? First, economic theory and practice have shown that economic growth does not depend on whether the exchange rate is fixed or floating. Economic growth depends on economic policies and factors of production. So, completely different factors, other than the exchange rate, affect economic growth. It is irrelevant whether the exchange rate will be fixed or floating, it is important that it is realistically determined. In Macedonia, the exchange rate is on an adequate level, all our analyses show that. Not just our analyses, but the IMF analyses show that, too.

Even with an agreement in place that might reduce the probability of a default by Bear, we decided that independent of that outcome, it was important to get assured liquidity to primary dealers by Monday morning, to address the accelerating process of deleveraging and tightening liquidity seen in the financial system. On Sunday morning, executives at JPMorgan Chase informed us that they had become significantly more concerned about the scale of the risk that Bear and its many affiliates had assumed. They were also concerned about the ability of JPMorgan Chase to absorb some of Bear’s trading portfolio, particularly given the uncertainty ahead about the ultimate scale of losses facing the financial system. In this context, we began to explore ways in which we could help facilitate a more orderly solution to the Bear situation. We did not have the authority to acquire an equity interest in either Bear or JPMorgan Chase, nor were we prepared to guarantee Bear’s very substantial obligations. And the only feasible option for buying time would have required open ended financing by the Fed to Bear into an accelerating withdrawal by Bear’s customers and counterparties. We did, however, have the ability to lend against collateral, as in the back-to-back nonrecourse arrangement that carried Bear into the weekend. After extensive discussion with my colleagues at the New York Fed, Chairman Bernanke, and Secretary Paulson, and with their full support, the New York Fed and JPMorgan Chase reached an agreement in principle that the New York Fed would assist with non-recourse financing.
Mr Lee comments on what Singapore and other Asian countries are doing in post-crisis Asia  Speech by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Monetary Authority of Singapore and Deputy Prime Minister, at the Credit Suisse First Boston Investment seminar, held in Singapore on 26 October 1999. *  *  *  Pre-crisis Asia: a mirage? The Asian crisis swept through the regional economies like a huge tidal wave. The euphoria from more than a decade of boom in East Asian economies was abruptly punctured. Overnight, headlines switched from the “Asian century” to the “Asian disease”. Some analysts questioned if the earlier prosperity had been real, or just a bubble. Others attributed the crisis to fatal flaws in the Asian model, which was masked by a classic asset bubble. Asia would not recover, and investors would not return, until these deep flaws were corrected. This pessimism was exaggerated. The transformation of Asia in the last few decades was no mirage. It had sound fundamental underpinnings. Countries maintained high savings and investment rates. Education levels were rising. Economic policies generally became more liberal, outward oriented, and welcoming to foreign investments. Asia had all the ingredients for the takeoff that we witnessed. True, the crisis was a major setback but, compared to a decade ago, the regional economies are still way ahead in terms of development and already, most of them are beginning to bounce back. Undoubtedly, the economies did have serious problems that contributed to the crisis.

Traded goods’ inflation – a portion of which are imported and the rest are directly affected by global prices – increased substantially compared to the previous two years. Its contribution to headline inflation was about 73 percent in 2009. 1.5.2  Bank of Albania’s monetary policy  The weakening of economic activity and domestic inflationary pressures, our forecasts for a contained inflation in the future and the anchored expectations of economic agents provided room for pursuing an easing monetary policy in 2009. This policy was materialized in two interest rate cuts by 0.5 percentage points each in January and October 2009 to 5.25 percent, and in the continuous injection of liquidity required by the market and the economy. By means of this prudent monetary policy, the Bank of Albania aimed at creating appropriate monetary conditions for a balanced and long-term development of the country. The key interest rate cuts were instantly passed through to the short-term interest rates in the interbank market, which declined and were less volatile than in 2008. On the other hand, these movements were not fully and instantly transmitted to the interest rates on banking loans and deposits. As in all other countries, the increase of the liquidity premium, the higher uncertainty and the deterioration of the banking system’s financial results were amortizing factors for the easy monetary authorities’ measures. However, our monetary policy and our interbank market operations managed to successfully avoid a detrimental contraction of banks’ balance sheets, something that many emerging countries had to go through.
There is no doubt that the special features of the Nordic-Baltic region complicate agreements on joint crisis management, and the design of cooperation in this matter will be crucial. *** Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great honour and privilege to host this conference on issues which are highly topical not just in our region but also in Europe and globally. The conference has brought together  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  prominent speakers and an audience who have great potential to provide different viewpoints in the discussions. In the light of today’s topic, let us also consider the values that have made the Nordic-Baltic region so successful. Let us consider how to preserve and build upon these values and possibly share them with the rest of Europe. And finally, let us not exaggerate the difficulties of cooperation; let us not underestimate the rewards of success or the risks that stem from inaction. Building the foundation for the future of Nordic-Baltic finance is not for the fainthearted. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Similar direct effects could be identified in connection with productivity: Phelps found that “acceptance of competition” by the public has a strong impact on productivity, meaning that in countries where a majority of people state that competition is helpful rather than harmful, productivity in the economy is higher. Similarly, the more people value the opportunity to use initiative in their job, the better the productivity performance of the economy. Although this is a partial analysis, these findings provide some striking evidence of direct linkages between values, institutions and economic performance. An understanding of deeply held values, attitudes and preferences may thus help in explaining some of the differences in productivity and labour utilisation between Europe and the United States. However, more work is needed to test the robustness of the empirical results and to better understand conceptually the linkages between values and the “intermediate” determinants of economic performance such as productivity and labour utilisation. Moreover, differences within Europe are significant and need to be taken into account. V.  Economic performance of European countries: the influence of social values and economic culture  Indeed, Europe is “united in diversity”, as a suggested motto of the European Union states. A comparison of the growth performance of the US and European economies masks considerable diversity, on both sides of the Atlantic, but especially among European countries, as Chart 7 shows. A diversity of growth rates among the members of large monetary unions, such as the euro area and the US, is not unusual.
Measures that raise trade barriers typically would protect lower-wage, import-competing jobs, but would also weigh on the prospects for jobs in the more efficient export sector, which tend to be higher-paying. The outcome would be countries producing more where they have a competitive disadvantage, and less where they have a competitive advantage—the exact opposite of what we should be aiming for. For example, in the United States, one of our largest manufacturing exports is aerospace parts (which requires skilled labor) and one of our largest imports is apparel (which requires less skilled labor). These second-round effects would also likely hurt productivity growth. Scarce resources would be used less efficiently and trade protection would likely lessen the level of competitive pressure that helps drive innovation. Moreover, lower productivity growth would likely lead to a slower improvement in a nation’s living standards over time.7  Better Approaches to Deal with Globalization Rather than protectionism, a better policy would be to help domestic workers and companies compete more effectively, rather than compete less. We need additional mechanisms that allow us to more fully capture the benefits from liberalized trade and to more proactively mitigate its costs. Ideally, policy should also better address job losses and income inequality from automation and other technological advances. How we respond should depend on regional and industry circumstances. These include the nature of trade impacts, the skill sets and location of the workers that have been affected, and the amount of resources that can be mobilized to facilitate adjustment.

Does that imply that consumers would shrug off a downturn in the housing market? Not necessarily. The rise in house prices has meant that households have taken on a lot of debt, and higher interest rates will mean they have less money to spend on other things. While there are few signs of obvious financial stress at current interest rates, given the strength of the current jobs market and the current housing market, this could change, especially if several of these factors weakened at the same time and the economic climate deteriorated sharply. That’s a long way from our central forecast, but uncertainty about how consumers might react to higher interest rates has been an important reason for tightening policy gradually since last November. We have also avoided springing surprises. I think that’s important: people are more likely to believe what we say, if our behaviour is reasonably predictable. But we wouldn’t be doing our job if we didn’t constantly revise our views in the light of new information and new research. That is why every month has to be a fresh decision. And why I can honestly say that I don’t know, any more than anyone else, where rates will be in a year’s time. Compared with a year ago, interest rates have risen from 3.5% to 4.5%. But the international outlook is clearly stronger now, the domestic economy is buoyant, and inflation remains low.