samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
6  Farmer and Hepburn (2014). 7  Hansen and Sargent (2010). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  doing so for the next 12 quarters. Japan has had no equivalent period of sustained growth at or above its pre-crisis rate in the past 25 years. As for deflationary threats, one guide is found in market measures of medium-term inflation expectations. At the 3–5 year horizon, consensus inflation expectations in Japan have averaged around 1% over the past 15 years. In the euro-area, inflation expectations have recently fallen to around 1.8% on deflationary fears. In the UK, meanwhile, inflation expectations have remained relatively stable at around the 2% target throughout the crisis period. Financial markets, at least, do not appear to be fearful of deflationary ghosts in the UK. A second uncomfortable scenario, the flip-side of the first, would be if inflationary pressures instead took hold. Again, it is important not to dismiss this risk out of hand. Monetary policy is in unknown territory. The most extraordinary dose of monetary medicine perhaps everwitnessed has been administered to a patient now whistling their way around the hospital ward. An over-reaction to the drugs cannot be ruled out. There are already some signs of the economy’s pulse quickening. The confidence fairy is back, after six years in rehab. Levels of consumer confidence are now above 2007 levels, retail spending is rising at its most rapid rate since 2004 and levels of job security are at their highest since at least the 1990s.

Andrew G Haldane: The corridor of uncertainty Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Chief Economist and Executive Director, Monetary Analysis and Statistics, Bank of England, at the Scarborough Business Ambassadors’ Dinner, Scarborough, 18 June 2014. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Gareth Anderson, Andrew Bailey, Maria Barriel, Charlie Bean, Venetia Bell, Stephen Burgess, Matt Corder, Shiv Chowla, Jeremy Franklin, Jack Leslie, Bob Gilhooly, Varun Paul, Jon Relleen, Matt Roberts-Sklar, Jumana Salaheen, Matt Trott, Martin Weale and Tom Wise for comments and contributions. It is wonderful to be back in Scarborough. I say back because many of my earliest and fondest childhood memories were of summer holidays spent here. Being a cricket fan, the Scarborough Festival – the cricketing jamboree held at the end of August each year since 1876 – has always held a place in my imagination. Alas I have never been, but am hoping one day to break my duck. I want to discuss the economy and the role of monetary policy in supporting it. And with apologies to the non-cricketers in the audience, to do so I will borrow a cricketing metaphor – the “corridor of uncertainty”. The corridor of uncertainty is every bowler’s dream and every batter’s nightmare.
The banking market in Hong Kong is of course a very international one, with a total of 182 licensed banks, 151 of which are incorporated outside Hong Kong. 81 of the largest 100 banks in the world are licensed in Hong Kong. Collectively they provide a wide range of banking and other financial services, not just for Hong Kong but for the region as a whole. The banking sector of Hong Kong is reputed to be amongst the most efficient and profitable in the world. 9. Hong Kong’s debt market, which has developed quite rapidly in the past eight years, is also playing a significant role in the region. Financial intermediation through the debt market is still relatively underdeveloped in the region, but the prospects are good. As the very substantial savings of the region is increasingly institutionalized through the establishment of provident funds and pension funds, the demand for debt securities would grow, perhaps much faster than that for banking and equity instruments. At the same time, the huge investments envisaged for the development of the physical infrastructure in the region will require much debt financing, thus increasing the supply of debt securities. With the first class infrastructure in our newly developed debt market, Hong Kong is in a very favourable position to take advantage of these good prospects. 10. Hong Kong’s equity market is of course one of the largest and most liquid in the world, and, notwithstanding recent volatility, is the favourite market for institutional investors and for those wishing to raise funds.

Caleb M Fundanga: Overview of Zambia’s banking sector Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Bank of China (Zambia) Limited, Lusaka, 13 April 2007. *  *  *  • His Excellency – the Chinese Ambassador to Zambia; • Vice-President of the Bank of China – Head Office; • Chairman of the Board of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; • Managing Director of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; • Distinguished invited guests; and • Ladies and gentlemen Let me first express my sincere gratitude for having been invited to speak on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited. Ladies and Gentlemen, during the last ten years, the performance of Bank of China has been satisfactory with total assets steadily increasing to K391.4 billion in December 2006from K6.4 billion in December 1997 and total deposits increasing to K294.2 billion in December 2006 from K2 billion in December 1997. On this basis, Bank of China had grown to become the eighth largest bank in Zambia albeit operating with only one branch. Bank of China (Zambia) is a 100% subsidiary of Bank of China which went through a successful initial public offer (IPO) and has resulted in Bank of China being a top tier globally listed bank. Over the same period in Zambia, the overall financial performance and condition of the banking sector has been satisfactory.
6 Whatever the merits or demerits of its conjunctural points, the letter made no mention of an objective of low and stable inflation, or of the fiscal sustainability that is a precondition for monetary stability. Indeed, it is striking that, in this country, price stability was not energetically promoted by the mainstream academy. Rather, the case was made by what seems to have been a relatively small group of public intellectuals, 7 together with a few academics and officials. Drawing on the work of US macroeconomists, UK policymakers reached four broad conclusions that have endured: that macroeconomic policy should not assume that there was a long-term trade off between inflation and output; that microeconomic policy should be assigned the task of improving the supply side of the economy; that only monetary policy could achieve and maintain price stability; and that medium-term fiscal discipline was needed for any monetary regime to be credible. 8 Elements of that were controversial at the time. And views within the official sector on the acceptable rate of inflation covered a broad spectrum. By the early-mid 1980s, some were apparently prepared to settle for inflation of around 5%, or at least were concerned about the output costs of further disinflation. Others, notably Eddie George, argued that inflationary expectations could be stabilised effectively only if inflation were lowered below that. 9 Whilst affirming a commitment to reduce inflation further, 10 politicians did not resolve these debates by articulating a medium-term goal for inflation.

In its early years, the MPC published a collective document on the monetary transmission mechanism. 30 And, as part of its evidence to the Select Committee’s “Ten Years On” enquiry, we recently submitted a collective document on how the economy has developed over the past decade. 31 Much of it is uncontroversial. One issue has, though, come to the fore recently: money. Money is a good example of how the political economy context affects the outward form of policy regimes. In the euro area, it was vital for the ECB to do what it could to inherit the credibility of the Bundesbank, and so it was understandable that the special place of money in the Buba’s communication strategy was adopted by the ECB. I had first hand evidence of this when I was a member of the Monetary Policy Sub-Committee of the EMI during the mid-late 1990s (and so before the UK had decided not to join EMU). A colleague from one of the national central banks said to me after one of the deliberations, “Of course you guys have the better arguments about monetary strategy, but we will back the Bundesbank. Their policy record has been outstanding for a quarter of a century. Yours has been good since 1992, around five years, which just isn’t long enough”. In the UK, it was almost the other way round given the series of failed attempts to base monetary policy on a money target during the 1980s.
As universal banks seek to expand fee and commission income in distributing investment products, there may be a risk that some banks or their frontline staff could become overly keen to market products to customers without sufficient regard to the customers’ own circumstances. Closer to home, the Lehman Minibonds episode has reminded us of the need for banks to take great care in the marketing and distribution of investment products to customers. It is for this reason that some have argued that the banking industry should revert to a simpler model of basic banking and leave the rest to brokerage houses and financial advisors. 7. The Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent international debate have prompted us to reflect on whether universal banking still remains an optimal model of banking for Hong Kong. Our answer is “yes”. But, this is a qualified “yes” because we believe that banks must take two appropriate steps to address the potential concerns that I have just highlighted: (a) Banks should offer their retail customers a high degree of protection with adequate regard to their interests or experience in investing in securities or other structured products. That is why the HKMA has required banks, in selling investment products to customers, to adopt extra investor protection measures on top of those promulgated by Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission.

In light of the poor consumption and investment levels, which have reflected in the decline of imports by 8.1% during this period, this tendency has improved the external position of the Albanian economy further. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Albania’s trade deficit shrank 32.5% in January. The developments in the external sector of the Albanian economy reflected in improved foreign currency demand and supply ratios, contributing, in turn, to a stable exchange rate. The Albanian government pursued an accommodating fiscal policy in the first two months of 2013, expressed in the increase of public expenditure and widening budget deficit. Budget expenditure increased at an annualised rate of 1.3% in January and February. This increase was reflected in both current and capital expenditure. Amidst the sluggish economy, budget revenues continued to contract, registering an annualised fall of 0.8% over the months under review. This performance of public expenditure and revenues increased the fiscal deficit by about 5.1%. Reflecting upon the expected economic and financial developments, the Bank of Albania has been pursuing a stimulating monetary policy. Through the constant key rate cuts and liquidity injections into the banking market, the Bank of Albania has aimed at ensuring more appropriate monetary conditions to meet its inflation target in the medium-term period. The financial market evidences low liquidity and inflation pressures, which, in turn, have enabled the pass-through of monetary easing into the money and primary market.
Mr Ardian Fullani: Towards a solid, sound and efficient banking system in Albania Greeting address by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 5th anniversary ceremony of the privatisation of the National Commercial Bank, Tirana, 18 October 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Today I am honoured to see in this jubilee meeting how the National Commercial Bank has grown and consolidated and together with it the whole banking system in Albania. I am delighted to consider that after a long restructuring period the banking system is now taking its proper role in the economy, that of the provision of free funds to the growing needs of the Albanian business and consumer, improving at the same time the number and quality of services. For this reason, I am honoured to have the opportunity of taking the floor in this meeting, to address and discuss jointly with you some present and future issues, which, I estimate, are important for the further enhancement of the banking system contribution to the country’s economic development. Allow me to start discussing first about the work we are doing as Bank of Albania to create a favourable climate for the business and economy development. Monetary policy followed during the recent years in succession has targeted to further reduce money price in order to give aspiration to the economy, while we have been successful in keeping inflation under control.

Now that the MPR is at 5%, it is approaching the range that has historically been thought of as neutral. Still, a high degree of uncertainty surrounds the true neutral interest rate. There are many definitions and methodologies to determine what would be the interest rate consistent with inflation being at the target and the economy operating at full capacity. Although this is not the moment to get involved in a lengthy discussion over the level of the neutral rate, I think some observations are in order. On the one hand, the neutral rate is not a fixed number. It changes with the state of the economy and can even fluctuate in the short run. On the other hand, in an open economy the neutral interest rate depends not only on domestic factors such as the long-term growth rate, but also on external variables. The world is going through a period of low interest rates and in the short term the neutral interest rate is likely to be somewhat below previous estimates (figure 16). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  I also want to point out that the objective of monetary policy conduct is not to attain a neutral rate, whatever its level is. The monetary policy interest rate (MPR) fluctuates around this neutral rate in order for the monetary impulse to be consistent with achieving the target. Accordingly, just as there are periods during which the MPR is below the neutral level, there are times when it is above.
This ‘fire sale’ pressure can matter. It can help to drive asset prices down and tighten credit conditions during downturns. It is therefore striking that, the more illiquid (that is, difficult to trade) are the assets held in an open-ended fund, the more aggressively its investors withdraw their funds as the prices of the assets held in the fund fall. See ‘The FPC’s assessment of the risks from leverage in the non-bank financial system’, Financial Stability Report, November 2018. See FSB, ‘Policy Recommendations to Address Structural Vulnerabilities from Asset Management Activities’, January 2017. 15 See IOSCO, ‘IOSCO Report: Leverage’, Consultation Paper, November 2018. 16 See FSB, ‘Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2018’, February 2019. 13 14  17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  17  When a fund holds assets traded almost instantly on exchange – like blue-chip equities – investors tend to sit on their hands. At the other end of the spectrum, investors in open-ended funds holding commercial real estate – which, on average, takes 298 days to sell – take out 0.6% of their money for every 1% fall in the value of their funds. Investors in corporate bond funds behave similarly (Chart 18).

Denis Beau: Digital finance, market disruption, and financial stability Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Bank of France Toulouse School of Economics joint conference, Paris, 12 November 2018. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you all today, for the tenth edition of the Banque de France and Toulouse School of Economics joint conference. This year, we have decided to shed light on how digital-based financial innovations are affecting the robustness and efficiency of the financial system. It is a good time to talk about digital finance and market disruption for at least two reasons: - 2018 is both the 10th anniversary of the Lehman bankruptcy and that of Nakamoto’s paper underlying Bitcoin. - those events have unleashed regulatory and market developments and innovations that should contribute to both strengthen and change the role and structure of financial intermediation. As a result, we see a complex set of interactions, involving competition and cooperation, which are developing between “old” and “new” players and which are likely to coexist in the intermediation space going forward. “What does that mean in terms of financial stability?” and “how does this coexistence affect central banking?” are two questions open for discussion at today’s conference. But for the time being, let me quickly follow two leads. I. Promises of digital finance: redefining financial intermediation? First point: The digitalization of finance is prospering on the ground of cutting-edge technologies.
If I can summarise, MAS is essentially: discouraging retail investment in cryptocurrencies; facilitating stablecoins through sound regulation;  5/11  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  allowing tokenised bank deposits; and experimenting with CBDCs. Last week, MAS published two consultation papers that illustrate our differentiated approach to digital currencies. The first proposed regulatory measures to reduce the risk of consumer harm from trading cryptocurrencies. Naturally, this attracted much media and public attention. The second paper set out regulatory measures for stablecoins in Singapore. Informed players in the industry paid close attention to this. MAS expects all stablecoins and tokenised deposits issued in Singapore to meet a minimum standard with regard to the surety of its value. This will be done through regulatory requirements on the quality of backing, redemption at par, and base capital. These measures will help position Singapore as a credible hub for sound and wellregulated stablecoins with value-adding use cases. Just as the heat of Fire reshapes objects into new forms, we want to reshape money through our experiments with tokenised deposits and CBDCs. The platform for our explorations in programmable money is Project Orchid, which has introduced the concept of "purpose-bound money". Purpose-bound money enables senders to programme conditions on a digital Singapore dollar that may be used by its recipients. Rather than debate the pros and cons of retail CBDCs, we have taken the approach of asking ourselves what are the purposes we want to achieve with programmable money, and working from there.

Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, London, 16 June 2010. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, May I join the Lord Mayor in welcoming you, Chancellor, to your first Mansion House Dinner? You have set a rapid pace in your first month in office, not least in your announcements this evening. In previous years I have sometimes set this gathering a quiz question. Tonight I want to reverse the process by providing the answer and asking you for the question. The answer is 23, and later I shall ask you – to what question is 23 the answer? Over the past year, there has been no slackening in the pace of economic and political upheaval. The financial crisis that began in 2007 is not yet over. Much of the recent market volatility reflects concerns about the ability of governments to service their own debt and provide assistance where necessary to weakened banking systems, especially in the euro area. Such risks have the potential to derail recovery and we cannot ignore them. At home we face the challenge of ensuring recovery while rebalancing the economy, reducing the fiscal deficit, and reshaping the structure and regulation of our banking system. In playing its part to meet this challenge, the Bank of England has two priorities.
2  Our best response is to continue strengthening regulation and supervision regimes aimed at avoiding future crises. And central banks have a crucial role to play because there are clear complementarities between financial and monetary stability, which, as is the case of Chile, are often formally recognized in central banks’ official mandates. Before referring to what we have done on this matter in Chile, let me briefly describe our experience with the Global Financial Crisis and our macroeconomic policy response to it. While we were still enjoying the commodity boom of the 2000s, we were hit by the spillover effects of the crisis and its aftermath, namely the tightening of domestic lending conditions, capital outflows, a reduction of the external demand for our exports and a decrease in the price of copper, which is still the main source of external income for the Chilean economy, and in particular an important source of revenues for the Treasury. The price of this critical commodity fell more than 60 percent in just five months. Exports fell almost 20 percent in two years, a strong shock for an economy where exports accounted for more than 40 percent of GDP. A similar drop experienced public revenues, with those coming from copper production falling 23 percent in 2008 and 50 percent the following year. Despite the severity of the shocks, economic performance and the resilience of the financial system have been better than in comparable situations in the past.

An additional strength of the Chilean economy in the context of emerging countries, which I think is very important for the topic to be discussed during these days, is the relevance of institutional investors, particularly pension funds. Their role in financial stability has gone well beyond the development of derivatives markets. They have contributed to the deepening of capital markets, portfolio diversification, and the development of new financial products, among other features. Moreover, with their peso-denominated liabilities and large foreign position, which is around 35 percent of GDP in the case of pension funds, they have facilitated the conduct of monetary policy being an important source of liquidity in foreign currency when needed. Acknowledging this, the financial regulation has gradually expanded the scope of possible investments for institutional investors, including raising the limits for investments abroad. Let me finish by thanking the distinguished group of economists that have joined us to present and discuss issues concerning monetary policy and financial stability. I would like to thank also Alvaro Aguirre, Markus Brunnermeier, Diego Saravia and Catalina Larraín for putting together the program, and Paloma Navarro and Carola Besa for helping with the organization. 6