samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thirdly, with Asia’s relatively strong economic growth and favourable demographics, investible assets from the institutional and private wealth segments are set to grow. In a 2011 report published by Cerulli Associates, institutional investable assets from Asia ex-Japan are expected to triple from $ trillion in 2006 to $ trillion by 2015. Total wealth from the private wealth segment is also expected to increase. In its recent Wealth Report, 6 Julius Baer expects the number of high net worth individuals in Asia to more than double over the  4  Risk Roadmap: Hedge Funds and Investors’ Evolving Approach to Risk (2012). 5  IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2012. 6  Julius Baer Wealth Report 2012. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  next three years to almost 3 million. As Asia grows in wealth, there will be more capital requiring active and customised fund management expertise to take advantage of the investment opportunities in Asia. Asia’s strong fundamentals will support the valuations of Asian assets, which will draw a growing interest from institutional investors around the world looking to diversify and generate returns. According to Preqin, 7 46% of Asia-Pacific hedge fund investors intend to invest opportunistically in Asia-Pacific hedge funds, whilst 31% of Asia-Pacific hedge fund investors are looking to increase their longer-term allocations to Asia-Pacific. Deutsche Bank also noted in its 2012 Alternative Investment Survey that North America and Asia are currently the most sought after investment regions, with investors planning to allocate approximately 26% of assets to Asia.

Lim Hng Kiang: What’s next for hedge funds? Keynote address by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the SkyBridge Alternative (SALT) Conference, Marina Bay Sands, 17 October 2012. *  *  *  Mr Anthony Scaramucci, Managing Partner, SkyBridge Capital Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. A very good morning to all of you. I am very pleased to join you at the inaugural Asian leg of the SALT conference. Global outlook As we move into the last quarter of 2012, the world economic outlook remains uncertain. Advanced economies continue to encounter headwinds as deleveraging, fiscal consolidation and a still-weak financial system act as a drag on growth. With US and Europe facing economic difficulties, Asia will not be immune to a global slowdown given its heavy reliance on trade. This can be seen by Asia’s slowing growth in the last two quarters as weak demand in the G3, especially the Eurozone, exerted a sharp drag on exports from the region. 1 The IMF has recently revised its growth estimates downwards. Global growth is now expected to be 3.3% in 2012 and 3.6% in 2013. 2 However, this is dependent on the assumption that there will be sufficient policy action to ease financial conditions globally and that recent policy easing moves in emerging market economies will gain traction. Overall, global growth is expected to remain muted for an extended period.
The credibility of RWA based on banks’ internal models is increasingly being called into question by market participants, analysts and authorities worldwide. It is widely accepted that a bank’s risks can, in principle, be more accurately quantified using the model-based approach than using the standardised approach. Yet banks’ internal models are extremely complex and can vary widely between banks, owing to the use of different model choices and model parameters. This can result in different capital requirements for banks with a similar asset structure. This makes it difficult to accurately assess a bank’s resilience, and to compare one bank with another. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  To increase the usefulness and credibility of the model-based approach, in-depth analyses need to be carried out to determine whether and to what extent the model-based approach and the standardised approach lead to differences in RWA. The standardised approach does have shortcomings. Yet, since it is independent of bank-specific modelling assumptions, it provides market participants with an additional point of reference for assessing both the level of and changes in model-based RWA. Differences between the two approaches must be well explained and have a sound economic rationale. If the analysis does not reveal any substantial inexplicable differences, this will strengthen market confidence in the modelbased approach. Otherwise, appropriate measures should be considered. This could, for instance, entail setting a floor for some model-based RWA, such as that recently introduced for banks in the US.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: Swiss banks from a financial stability perspective Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the media news conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 20 June 2013. *  *  *  As my colleague Thomas Jordan has explained, economic and financial conditions for the Swiss banking sector continue to be challenging. Against this background, I would like to examine the situation at Swiss banks from a financial stability perspective, looking first at the big banks and then moving on to a discussion of domestically focused banks. Big banks: strengthening resilience Over the past year, the Swiss big banks have substantially improved their capital situation. Risk-weighted capital ratios have been raised markedly, and both banks are now very well placed in an international peer comparison. Moreover, with its capital-building, Credit Suisse has also raised its leverage ratio considerably. Measured in terms of loss-absorbing capital – defined as Common Equity Tier 1 capital plus high-trigger contingent capital instruments – leverage ratios at the big banks are now at roughly the same level. However, given the prevailing risks in the environment and the losses incurred in the recent crisis, the SNB still considers current leverage ratios at the Swiss big banks to be low. In addition, a number of comparative studies imply that, in terms of leverage ratios, UBS and Credit Suisse are currently below the international average.
•  Principle 2: The board of directors should approve and oversee the bank’s strategic objectives and corporate values that are communicated throughout the banking organization. •  Principle 3: The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability through the organization. •  Principle 4: The board should ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management consistent with board policy. •  Principle 5: The board and senior management should effectively utilize the work conducted by the internal audit function, external auditors, and internal control functions. •  Principle 6: The board should ensure that compensation policies and practices are consistent with the bank’s corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategy, and control environment. •  Principle 7: The bank should be governed in a transparent manner. 4  BIS Review 24/2007  •  Principle 8: The board and senior management should understand the bank’s operational structure, including where the bank operates in jurisdictions, those that may impede transparency (i.e. “know-your-structure”). It is very clear today, more than ever, that Regulators also have a key role to play in achieving good Corporate Governance. In general, all regulations, in the Banking System, are intended in one way or another, to enforce prudential requirements on key areas of affairs of institutions to mitigate identified risks. Regulations on ownership, related party transactions, fitness and propriety tests for directors are directly based on modern Corporate Governance principles.

All in all, as of today, Codes of Best Practice on Corporate Governance set out principles within which values and governance rules should be set by the management of the institution, and in the final analysis, good Corporate Governance is looked to as being a key tool to be used in the overall risk management of institutions, irrespective of the nature of the business carried out by the institution. Why is good governance in the banking and financial system more important than any other sector? The Banking and financial sector is easily distinguishable from the others. A few distinguishing features stand out: •  Unlike normal business entities which are funded mainly through shareholders’ funds, banks’ business involves funds raised mainly through deposits. The business of raising public deposits places greater fiduciary responsibilities on the institution and its managers, since depositors’ funds need to be safeguarded in a special way. 2  BIS Review 24/2007  •  Banks perform as financial intermediaries by lending and investing the funds mobilized and funding economic activities of others. •  Banks are the agents of the payments system where they facilitate payments domestically and internationally, through various instruments such as bank accounts, fund transfers, credit cards, etc. •  Banks are able to undertake all such business operations as a result of public trust and faith in the stability and soundness of the banks in particular and the system in general.
This measure was also designed to safeguard monetary stability, which was jeopardised by the massive inflow of speculative funds. Maintaining the internal balance in a highly unstable international environment was the main focus of the monetary policy decisions in the years that followed. In Switzerland, price stability has been ensured since 1994, but it was only ten years later that it was also made a statutory goal of our policy. Central bank autonomy This constant pursuit of monetary stability would not have been possible if the National Bank had not been able to act independently – an essential advantage – since the day it was founded. The principle of central bank autonomy is widely recognised nowadays. Price stability can be better ensured if the institution responsible for conducting monetary policy has a clear mandate and can act independently of third-party instructions. This realisation has led to many central banks being granted independence during the last 20 years. In Switzerland, the debate on the status of the future National Bank took place at the end of the 19th century. In 1897, a project for the establishment of a state bank located in Berne and placed under the direct control of the Federal Department of Finance was adopted by parliament, but the proponents of an independent note-issuing bank to be domiciled in Zurich launched a referendum, and the law was rejected in a popular vote.

Through its actions, it will continue to uphold the trust which has been placed in it thus far. 4  BIS Review 71/2007
This implies either that U.S. monetary policymakers think that the equilibrium real short-term rate is currently depressed, or that they judge that a monetary policy stance more inertial than the Taylor 1999 standard is more appropriate for the FOMC to achieve its mandated employment and inflation objectives. My own view is that it is a bit of both. Lingering headwinds related to the financial crisis suggest that r* is temporarily depressed. In addition, there are some reasons to be cautious in how early and fast one should raise short-term interest rates. In particular, inflation is projected to stay for some time below the Fed’s objective of 2 percent for the PCE deflator and marketbased measures of inflation compensation are depressed currently. Also, as I have noted elsewhere, I believe that the risks of lifting the federal funds rate off of the zero lower bound a  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  bit early are higher than the risks of lifting off a bit late. This argues for a more inertial approach to policy. That said, it is important not to overemphasize uncertainty to justify a policy of persistently low short-term interest rates. There are also risks from too much policy inertia. An inertial approach works well as long as inflation expectations stay well-anchored.

I will point out two particular areas for such cooperation. 2  BIS Review 141/2008  First, Hong Kong can be used as a platform for pilot schemes for further expansion of crossborder fund flows. The use of Hong Kong as a financing platform has played an important role in Mainland's economic development and a continued and expanded use should be made going forward. In addition to the well developed platform for Mainland enterprises to list on the Hong Kong's stock exchange, consideration could be given to facilitate SMEs to raise funds through bond issuance with credit enhancement in Hong Kong. At the same time, Hong Kong can serve as a platform for more investment outflows from the Mainland, which would improve investment choices for Mainland investors. For instance, financial instruments issued in Hong Kong could be allowed to be listed on the Mainland, or Mainland investors could be allowed to use their own foreign currency deposits to invest overseas through Hong Kong. Second, Hong Kong can be a testing ground for the international use of the renminbi, a process closely related to Mainland's capital account liberalisation. The renminbi business scheme in Hong Kong, which is supported by a clearing arrangement provided by the People's Bank of China, has developed steadily since its launch in early 2004. It has now extended from personal banking to bonds issuance by Mainland financial institutions. Renminbi deposits in the Hong Kong banking system have also risen significantly over the last few years.
One point on which I don’t agree with Franco Bruni’s analysis concerns his judgement on changing the objective of monetary policy after the failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. Bruni writes: “…the objective became only that of saving the credit system from the collapse. This last change of objective is of great conceptual and political importance, it has a significance that could prove to be, so to speak, historic. And yet it has never been officially declared, particularly by the ECB”. The proof that he provides for the above remarks is the decision to reduce interest rates from 2% to 1.5% in March this year, a step which, in his opinion, was not justified by the trend of the economy, but by the problems facing Europe’s banking system. There is a misunderstanding here that needs to be quickly clarified, also in view of the ensuing discussion on macro-prudential supervision and on the powers of the central banks in question. From the outset of the crisis in August 2007, the ECB has pursued a policy of separation between, on the one hand, the interest rate decisions, based solely on the priority objective of price stability and, on the other hand, the decisions concerning the instruments used to pump liquidity into the system in order to tackle the difficulties being encountered by the market.

It can be confirmed from this that the ECB reports with the same intensity and frequency as the US central bank. This does not mean that the quality of interaction cannot be improved, but this depends, to a large extent, on the European Parliament. BIS Review 82/2009  5
Reducing the diversion of resources to deal with uncertainty and volatility allows resources to be directed toward more productive uses and, in so doing, promotes long-term growth by increasing the resource base available to the economy. We have seen in high-inflation economies how the transfer of resources away from productive activities and into financial transactions geared toward dealing with inflation uncertainty can negatively affect growth. We have also seen how a proliferation of tax code dodges can decrease the available resource base. If individuals must spend more time engaging in financial maneuvers because of uncertainty, then more of the economy’s productive capacity is transferred to the activity of handling transactions. An expansion of the financial sector that stems from an increasing number of people employed to handle distortions arising from inflation and its attendant uncertainty is growth that diverts resources better employed elsewhere. By contrast, an expansion of the financial sector that stems from growth of productivity is growth that offers benefits to all. The same basic principle applies to the foreign exchange market. Foreign exchange rates are fundamentally determined by market forces and should be free to fluctuate as a vital adjustment mechanism for the global economy. However, excessive volatility, like price instability, can diminish resources otherwise available for productive growth. The economy in which we live and work is a global one, and becomes more so every year.

However, a basic understanding of the concept of Islamic banking should provide a basis for determining an appropriate regulatory framework for Islamic banking. Of particular importance to Zambia is an arrangement where borrowers can borrow without paying interest. Lending rates are very high in this country, thus making borrowing for capital investments prohibitive. This is one issue we have been grappling with for a long time. Therefore, an arrangement where borrowers can access funds for investments without paying interest, offered by Islamic Banking is worth exploring. Mr. Chairman, over the past two years, we have noted with delight that financial institutions in Zambia are beginning to rise to the challenge by broadening the scope of their financial services beyond the traditional customers to include previously unbanked segments of society. Ladies and gentlemen, the need to foster an enabling environment cannot be overemphasized. In this regard, the Bank of Zambia will continue to ensure stable macroeconomic policies and development of appropriate financial sector regulations that will facilitate financial inclusion. Ladies and Gentlemen, the introduction of Islamic banking would come with its own challenges. For us at Bank of Zambia, this entails further strengthening of our supervisory capacity. We would welcome this challenge and hope to rise to the occasion by providing adequate supervisory infrastructure and an environment for conducting good business.
The other scant quantitative indicators that are still available for the quarter, such as new car registrations or the retail trade index, on the demand side, and the industrial production index, on the supply side, tend to confirm the loss of momentum in activity. Among the confidence indicators, the August PMIs show signs of moderation in both services and manufacturing. Manufacturing, in particular, evidences the decline in new (both internal and external) orders. Industrial activity has continued to be weighed down by global supply problems (which are affecting the automotive sector above all) and by the escalation of input prices since 2021 H2 (which have affected a very high number of products). Economic projections have been revised down notably for growth and up for inflation The latest ECB projections for the euro area, in contrast to those published in June, include, in particular, new developments in the gas market. First, gas prices were revised up in accordance with developments in the gas futures markets. Second, and for the first time, a degree of gas supply rationing, albeit moderate, is assumed. This would be more significant in the countries that are more heavily dependent on Russian imports, which could even see some production cuts in the winter. By contrast, demand for gas is expected to decline. Euro area economic activity is expected to slow in the coming quarters, as a result of the loss of purchasing power stemming from higher-than-expected inflation, the decline in confidence and, in general, greater uncertainty.

The European Commission is currently reviewing the European fiscal rule framework. In my view, this review should include simplifying the framework, by establishing a public expenditure growth rule and a debt-to-GDP ratio anchor, and reinforcing the capacity to build up fiscal buffers in good times for use in crises. In the case of Spain, shoring up the sustainability of public finances calls for a medium-term strategy. This should be based on immediately setting out a multi-year fiscal consolidation plan for implementation once the economic impact of the pandemic and of the war in Ukraine has been overcome. The plan should have broad political consensus and be accompanied by an efficiency review of public spending and the tax system, including all tiers of general government. Defining the plan early on would generate greater certainty and trust, which is particularly important against the backdrop of the monetary policy normalisation I have described. The course of the war in Ukraine has laid bare the EU’s vulnerabilities and dependencies in key sectors, such as energy, as well as the disparities between Member States in their exposure to such tensions. A challenge of this magnitude underlines the importance of a joint response to common risks. The response to the war in Ukraine must, once again, be more Europe. These common decisions must apply both to short-term measures, to address potential energy supply problems in the years ahead (in line with the recent European Commission proposals), and to medium and long-term reforms.
I expect real GDP to grow modestly this year as tighter monetary policy continues to take effect, with growth picking up somewhat next year. In addition, we are beginning to see some signs of cooling in the labor market. I expect slow growth will likely lead to some softening, with unemployment gradually rising to about 4 to 4-1/2 percent over the next year. Conclusion In conclusion, inflation is still too high, and we will use our monetary policy tools to restore price stability. I am confident that we will attain and maintain a sufficiently restrictive stance to bring inflation down to our 2 percent longer-run goal. And now, I look forward to our discussion. 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement on Longer-Run Goals  and Monetary Policy Strategy, adopted effective January 24, 2012; as reaffirmed effective January 31, 2023. 2 John C. Williams, A Steady Anchor in a Stormy Sea, remarks at SNB-FRB-BIS High-  Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, Switzerland, November 9, 2022. 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Global Supply Chain Pressure Index. 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve issues FOMC  statement, March 22, 2023. 3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  5 Board Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Summary of Economic Projections,  March 22, 2023. 6 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Plans for Reducing the Size of  the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet, May 4, 2022.

Indeed, throughout this period of high inflation, one of the bright spots is that various measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably well anchored and consistent with our 2 percent target.2  Imbalances Endure Our most important policy tool is the setting of the target range for the federal funds rate, which influences demand for goods and services by affecting borrowing costs. So far, tighter monetary policy from the Federal Reserve and central banks around the world is helping to bring a better balance between supply and demand. Inflation has declined in a number of sectors, particularly for many categories of commodities and goods. In addition, the supply-chain bottlenecks that had constrained the supply of goods have largely dissipated. For example, the New York Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has declined to a level that indicates supply pressures are now actually somewhat lower than normal.3 I hear the same from business leaders from around the Federal Reserve's Second District, who confirm that supply chains have improved considerably. At the same time, data on rents for new leases provide early signs of slowing inflation for shelter. This is important because shelter inflation had been a significant driver of higher inflation over the past year. However, despite the moderation of inflation, imbalances endure, with overall demand still exceeding supply in the economy. This is seen in the inflation rate for core services excluding housing, which has been running around 4-1/2 percent since last August.