samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Address – Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries Speech (via video conference) by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries, Brussels-Skopje, 12 July 2021. *** Dear Ministers, representatives of the European Commission, the ECB and Eurostat, It is a great pleasure to be part of this dialogue. It serves as a foundation for important multilateral discussions and accentuates our mutual consensus on the importance of candidate countries to become fully fledged member states. It is for the second time that we meet virtually, an unambiguous reminder that the storm is not over, but fortunately, we are navigating through it on a stronger footing and with greater knowledge than it was the case a year ago. The flattening of the health curve globally inevitably prompted flattening of the recession curve as well. Similar is the state of the Macedonian economy, which has been heading for a recovery. The fast restoration of the global supply chains provided strong and fast impetus to the export sector. Despite the worries for lasting scarring on consumption due to risk aversion and worries on contagion, as the containment measures were lifted, consumers adjusted their behavior swiftly and boosted demand. The recovery has been underpinned by strong, prolonged and well-coordinated accommodative macroeconomic policy mix.

Eddie Yue: Opening keynote speech at HKIB Annual Banking Conference 2020 Keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at HKIB Annual Banking Conference 2020, Hong Kong, 28 September 2020. * * * Mr Patrick Fung, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. I am delighted to be with you here this morning for the annual banking conference of the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers (HKIB). It is great to see everyone in person, and I am grateful to the organisers for the hard work they have put into making this possible. 2. The past year has been a testing time for Hong Kong as it faced challenges on three fronts. We experienced prolonged social unrest of a kind not seen for many decades. Geo-political tensions and trade wars have raised fundamental questions about globalisation. And, as in the rest of the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is causing severe disruptions to our economy and threatening people’s livelihoods. 3. All this turmoil has put our institutions, not least our banks, to the test; they have had to adapt rapidly to constantly changing conditions. Hong Kong’s banking sector has largely met these challenges and continues to be resilient. 4. This resilience stems from the fact that our banks entered the current crisis with some of the strongest fundamentals in the world. Through sheer hard work and by learning from past experience, banks have been able to respond to operational challenges posed by both the pandemic and the social unrest.
Lars Nyberg: It costs to pay – do we use too much cash? Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Finansförbund congress, Bålsta, 28 May 2008. *  *  *  Who pays the price? When we pay for goods we have bought at the supermarket or for the hamburger we eat for lunch we rarely wonder what the actual payment costs. This applies both to when we pay by card and pay in cash. And why should we care what it costs to pay? This is not a cost we ever see. But of course it costs to pay. It uses resources in the economy. Why are there costs in cash? Well, ATMs cost money to fill. And banknotes and coins are transported around the country by cash-in-transit firms which naturally want remuneration for this. Moreover, the costs for the safety of their personnel have increased rapidly in recent years. Card payments also cost money. They require terminals in shops and other places that accept such payments. And card payments require complex computer systems, which must be maintained and developed. Credit cards also involve credit, and credit is never free of charge. If a shopkeeper pays a charge of 3 per cent to the credit card company, which is not unusual, this means an effective annual interest rate of 20 per cent in round figures, given a credit period of 30 days.

But the educational level of the consumer and above all his or her age, does have a substantial effect on the result. A 60-year old consumer will only choose a card over cash when making a purchase of, on average, SEK 179, while a 20-year old consumer would choose to pay by card for a transaction as low as SEK 60. It would appear that young people’s choice is fairly close to a cost-efficient choice from society’s point of view. The study is based on data from 2002, but there is nothing to indicate that consumers’ methods of payment have changed radically since then, although cards have continued to grow in importance. Use of cash is still at a high level in Sweden. The cost of cash management has probably risen more than the cost of card management, calculated per transaction. The costs for increasing security for cash-in-transit and ATMs have been substantial. There are many indications that the gap in socioeconomic costs between cards and cash has widened further and that the cut-off point will therefore occur at an amount lower than SEK 70. In this case, society would benefit even more from a reduction in the use of cash. Make the costs visible An important basic insight is that the costs of different types of payment exist, even if they are not visible. They affect the consumers in that goods and services become more expensive. If these choose less efficient instruments of payment to a greater extent, then the price increases will be greater.
That opinion could determine the rights of countries most exposed to climate change. It could also touch on the obligations of those most responsible for driving the climate crisis. Let’s now focus on Europe and the possible implications of these developments in international law for my own institution, the ECB. Under the Paris Agreement adopted at COP21 in 2015, many countries committed to the long-term goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. [2] To fulfil its commitment as one of parties to the Paris Agreement, the EU last year adopted the European Climate Law. [3] The implications of the Climate Law are significant. Before going into why, let me first explain what the Climate Law does. The Climate Law has three key elements. The first is its objective that the EU reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, with a new reduction target to be set for 2040. The EU should achieve climate neutrality by 2050 and aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter. The second important element is to ensure that we move towards that objective. The European Commission has established a framework for assessing concrete progress and checking whether national and Union measures are consistent with the objective. It will issue regular reports on the conclusions of these assessments. The third and last element is to ensure that we use the most effective instruments to achieve the objective.

In this context, there are several key issues that Malaysia needs to address to face a new world, a world in which trend growth will be lower, capital will be less readily available and at higher cost, competition more intense, short-term capital flows remain volatile and protectionism could rear its ugly head again. Malaysia also has to position itself to seize the opportunities to fully benefit from the growing economic integration and dynamism in Asia. Yet at the same time, Malaysia must be ready to face more intense competition for foreign direct investments (FDIs) and markets from key Asian neighbours. Aftermath of the crisis – emergence of a new world After one of the worst crises in modern history, the global economy – led by the emerging economies, especially China – is now en route to recovery but this revival is yet entrenched and risks remain on its sustainability. The global economy is still fundamentally weak, with the recovery uneven and growth remains highly dependent on policy support of very large fiscal stimulus and aggressive monetary easing around the world. The crisis-affected advanced economies continue to face rising unemployment, weak financial systems, ongoing de-leveraging of households and financial institutions with weak balance sheet. Although financial markets have begun to stabilise following extensive policy support, the progress of financial sector resolution and reforms in the advanced economies is far from complete.
But eventually, the authorities learned that the costs were high. The public pays an inflation tax, the monetary system is impaired and economic growth slows. The economic progress experienced by Norway and other countries in the second half of the 1800s was founded on more than a thousand years of money and credit history. The authorities probably knew that a credible promise of a stable value of money measured in metal was one of the cornerstones of the success experienced by towns in northern Italy during the Renaissance and in 17th century Netherlands They knew that confidence in the promise of a stable value of money could be maintained by relinquishing seignorage and limiting the issuance of money. The opposite was equally true. Kåre Lunden, for example, writes that “after 1387, no coins were minted in Norway for a hundred years”. According to Lunden, the deep crisis in the Norwegian economy between 1350 and 1500 was not only due to the Black Death but also to the absence of a monetary system. 9 Stability in the value of money eliminated uncertainty and doubt among potential investors. Long-term planning became easier. Providers of credit could be reasonably certain that their investment would not be inflated away. They did not have to move their wealth into property or other fixed investment in order to preserve it. The willingness to save and accumulate wealth increased. History had taught the authorities the value of price stability, and the commitment mechanism was a monetary system linked to silver or gold.

They follow current changes in prices, primarily petrol and food prices, and ruble exchange rate fluctuations. The third important factor we took into account is consumer demand. Lending underpins consumption but slowing wage growth constrains a rise in demand. Consumption growth slowed down after a short-term acceleration in November, which was likely associated with preemptive purchases of non-food goods in the run-up to the VAT hike. We can see it from retail sales figures. The rise in consumer activity does not exert pressure on prices. This, among other things, is an important reason of a moderate VAT pass-through to prices. The fourth factor is external conditions. A number of changes which only started to emerge in December, intensified at the beginning of this year. The US Fed and the European Central Bank eased their rhetoric as regards the monetary policy outlook. Improvements were seen in markets’ expectations regarding the negotiations of international trade restrictions. These factors supported emerging market currencies and reduced their risk premiums. We may say that external risks declined in this part. At the same time, geopolitical risks remain in place. Oil prices in the first quarter were higher than projected in the baseline scenario. However, risks are high that oil production will exceed consumption this year. Finally, overall monetary conditions have changed little if at all since the start of the year. Deposit rates have edged higher, while loan rates have stabilised.
Page 1  Reflections on DeFi, digital currencies and regulation speech by Jon Cunliffe Given at Warwick Business Schools’s Gilmore Centre Policy Forum Conference on DeFi & Digital Currencies  Page 2  Published on 21 November 2022  In his speech Jon Cunliffe reflects on recent crypto market developments. He goes on to talk about the work that authorities are doing on the regulation of crypto stablecoins and our work on a potential central bank digital currency. Speech I had intended today to talk about the work the Bank of England, is doing with the Treasury, the FCA on the regulation of crypto stablecoins and our work on a potential central bank digital currency in Sterling. That remains the bulk of what I will talk about today. But between beginning to draft these remarks and delivering them today, we have seen what is probably the largest – and certainly the most spectacular – failure to date in the crypto ecosystem, by which of course I mean the collapse of the crypto trading platform FTX and most of its associated businesses. So I thought it might be worthwhile to start with a brief look at the FTX implosion to frame some of the points I intend to make on regulation of the use of crypto-related technologies to provide financial services and on why, as a central bank, we are actively exploring the issuance of a digitally native Pound sterling.

In just a few years, many new electronic services and gadgets have become natural parts of our lives. This has also influenced how we execute payments. Payments via Internet banking, mobile banking and card payments over the Internet have become the norm. Paperbased instruments such as cheques and mail giros have become less important. Norway is a good example of the transition from a paper-based to an electronically-based payment system. Only twenty years ago, 90 per cent of payments from deposit accounts were made using paper-based instruments such as cheques and paper giros. Today, more than 95 per cent of such payments are made electronically, mostly via payment cards and Internet banking. The first results from Norges Bank’s cost survey were published today. The survey estimates the social costs of using and producing payment services in Norway to around 11 billion kroner, or just under half a per cent of GDP. This estimate covers payment activities by banks, subcontractors, the central bank, households and merchants. The estimate for Norway is quite low in an international context, although estimation methods may vary. How we organise our payment system has consequences beyond the system. Direct debiting and electronic invoicing will, for example, involve substantial savings for businesses. Thus the potential savings for banks and the rest of society of moving towards more efficient payment systems are considerable. Payment cards and Internet banking have not only replaced cheques and mail giros, they have also contributed to a reduction in the use of cash.
Globalisation has also had an impact on the functioning of international capital markets and has created considerable global imbalances. The US trade deficit increased to over 6 per cent of GDP in 2005, while oil exporting countries and East-Asian countries are running large current account surpluses and building up high levels of international reserves. The increased savings of oil exporters as well as of some emerging countries have pushed down international interest rates. Bond yields have been low, and have stayed low even when short-term interest rates have been raised. However, in recent months bond yields have picked up somewhat. Although the world's central banks have pushed short-term interest rates in recent years to their lowest level for a century, this has not led to a significant rise in inflation. Challenges to monetary policy The Government has defined an inflation target for monetary policy in Norway. Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy shall be oriented towards low and stable inflation, with annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. Since summer 2003, the Norwegian economy has experienced a marked upturn. While it took some time for employment to pick up, this is occurring now. Employment is moving up and unemployment is falling rapidly. Although inflation has increased somewhat, it is still low, even 2½ years after the cyclical change.

Remedial actions need to be evaluated in terms of their short-term efficacy as well as their longer-term implications. •  Unbalanced financial systems create vulnerabilities. Financial systems that are unduly reliant on banks for financial intermediation are likely to be more vulnerable and slower to recover from the onset of weakness. Shallow capital markets limit lending alternatives and delay the recovery of financing to the real sector. The challenges can be daunting, but recent experience both within and beyond Asia confirms that a dedicated commitment to financial reform contributes to sustainable recoveries and greater crisisresilience. Just as strong financial systems act as stabilizers when a domestic economy is battered, weak financial systems amplify the scope and reach of the problems, making bad situations worse. Longer-term financial stability While financial sector rehabilitation will remain a key priority for authorities in Asia, longer-term measures need to be put in place to deal adequately with the increasingly complex and dynamic international financial marketplace of the twenty-first century. The threats to financial stability are many, and no one set of measures can be expected to ensure against the recurrence of future problems. Financial intermediation is a constantly evolving activity, involving new risks, instruments, and control challenges. Financial institutions and policymakers alike should continue to upgrade their processes to remain in command of these risks.
I look forward to comments from Robert and Catherine and the audience. Thank you once again for having me here today. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

One indicator that competition is not functioning satisfactorily is that price levels vary even within Sweden. Western Sweden (Halland and Västra Götaland county council) is on the whole cheaper, 8 while the Stockholm region is more expensive than the country as a whole. In terms of money, these differences entail, for instance, that a family with two children in Western Sweden pays SEK 4,300 less a year for food than a similar family in the Stockholm region. Why is competition lower in Sweden? Sweden has more markets with a high level of company concentration. Concentration is higher than in the rest of the EU, particularly within the retail trade, while the difference in the producer sector is not as great. The Swedish Competition Authority has estimated that the higher concentration in the retail trade may explain 2-4 percentage points of the difference in prices between Sweden and the EU. In the everyday commodities market, 3 retain chains (ICA, KF and Axfood) account for 90 per cent of total sales. These chains control both the retail trade and the distribution system, which makes it difficult for new business to establish. Access to shop premises is also a narrow sector, as the right to establish a business is regulated by the local authorities through the planning and construction laws 9 (PBL). Unlike the rest of the EU, Sweden does not have very many low-price retail chains.
Weighted using shares in 2012 nominal GDP. Chart 8: Euro area core/periphery output growth Periphery Core  Percentage changes on a year earlier 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012  -8  Sources: Eurostat and Bank calculations. Notes: Based on data for Vulnerable Euro Area Periphery economies (VEAPS) (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy) and core (all other EA countries excluding Malta). Data up to 2013Q3. 16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 9: Scottish mortgage loans as a share of the UK total 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2%  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  0%  Source CML. Note: Number of Scottish regulated mortgage loans as a share of the UK total. Table 4: Banking sector size as multiple of GDP(a)  2012 Scotland  12.5  rUK  4.3 2007  Ireland  7.1 (b)  Iceland  7.4  Cyprus  6.6  Spain  3.2  UK(c)  5.1  (d)  1.2  US  Sources: Bank of England, ECB, Central Bank of Iceland, Datastream, Federal Reserve and Bank of England calculations. (a) Banking assets of euro area countries are recorded in the country where the parent entity is domiciled and includes all EU assets. Assets reflect gross derivative positions. (b) Iceland data reflects net derivative positions and includes resident banks’ domestic and foreign assets. (c) 2012 UK data taken from the HMT’s 'Scotland analysis: Financial services and banking', for methodology see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206166/banking_assets_vs_gdp_explanatio n.pdf.

10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  (i)  TABLE AND CHART ANNEX  Table 1: Similarity of industrial structures  EA (Core vs VEAPs)(a)  EA (17 countries)(b)  rUK and Scotland(c)  rUK and Scotland (oil on geographic basis)(d)  Energy  0.1  1.0  1.8  10.0  11.5  3.1  Construction  0.6  1.3  0.1  0.7  1.3  0.6  Manufacturing  1.3  6.1  0.7  0.5  4.8  4.5  Finance and insurance  0.3  2.5  0.8  1.4  2.2  3.2  Other  0.3  5.6  1.5  7.4  8.5  5.2  Sum  2.6  16.4  4.7  20.1  28.3  16.6  Canada (13 provinces and territories)  US (50 states + DC)  Sources: Bank calculations; Statistics Canada; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Eurostat; ONS Regional Gross Value Added. rUK and Scotland data are for 2011; Euro Area (EA), US and Canada data are for 2012. Industrial classifications in the US and Canada are NAICS, in the UK SIC, and in the Euro Area they are NACE Rev2. These were consolidated into the five broader industrial classifications to ensure consistency. Notes: The table shows absolute differences between output industry shares in each region and the monetary union as a whole, which are then averaged for each industry in each monetary union.