samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
College graduates finding good jobs I would like to close with a message for the students in attendance today, especially those of you who will be graduating soon. If you started college four or five years ago, you may have heard about the difficult time that graduates have had finding good jobs, perhaps even making you wonder about the value of obtaining a college degree. Indeed, in the years following the Great Recession, unemployment and underemployment among recent college graduates reached highs not seen in decades. So, it wouldn’t be surprising if many of you are concerned about your ability to find a good job after graduation. I want to make two points that should temper these concerns. First, it is not unusual for college graduates to take some time to find the right job when they transition from school to the working world. In good economic times, as well as in bad times, there is often an adjustment period as newly-minted graduates search for a job that best fits their skills and interests. Second, as the job market has continued to strengthen through the expansion, it has gotten easier for those graduating from college to find a good job. 1 While job opportunities for those with a college degree were flat between 2011 and early 2014, demand for college graduates has been on the rise for about two years now.

At the same time, when looking at accumulated unit labour cost changes we observe that a number of economies which lost cost competitiveness also experienced a loss of market shares, less gains in job creation and/or deteriorating current account position. Despite the decline in the euro area average unemployment rate over the last few years, unemployment remains too high in several countries and regions of the euro area. In these countries and regions, wage increases should not fully exhaust productivity gains in order to provide incentives for firms to create additional jobs. In this respect, sufficient wage differentiation is also required to improve the employment opportunities for less skilled workers where there is high unemployment for this category of employees. The extent to which an increase in nominal wage growth leads to upward pressure on inflation depends crucially on trend labour productivity growth. Under normal circumstances, stronger labour productivity growth would justify an increase in nominal wage growth, thus allowing wage earners to participate in economic growth without adding to inflationary pressures. But for the same reason, without sustained improvements in labour productivity higher nominal wages would not lead to improvements in real purchasing power, but fuel inflationary pressures. Importantly, industries are characterised by different productivity developments. Therefore, wage setting should allow for sufficient wage differentiation and agreements in one industry or sector can not readily be transferred to others. BIS Review 52/2007  1  Those are the reasons whey the Governing Council calls for a high level of responsibility from social partners.
In this way, international competitiveness is taken into account when Swedish wages are set. The Industrial Agreement has definitely fulfilled an important function as regards bringing about more controlled wage formation with restrained wage increases. But from a broader economic perspective, it is difficult to see how an agreement between labour market parties could constitute a sufficiently stable anchor for prices and wages in the entire economy, in order to be able to replace the inflation target. As far as I am aware, Sweden would then be the first country in the world to abandon inflation targeting in order to rely on such a system instead. The ways of trying to provide an economy with a nominal anchor that are currently employed are either directly via an inflation target or indirectly via a fixed exchange rate. Important to discuss the conditions for wage formation In recent years, a number of challenges with regard to the system whereby industry sets the benchmark for wage negotiations in the rest of the economy are being increasingly discussed. One aspect addressed is that this standardisation makes it more difficult to change relative wages, which might be called for from the perspective of fairness and distribution. For example, it can be an obstacle to reducing wage gaps between women and men. But the problem has also been highlighted from a macroeconomic perspective. If relative wages are not flexible enough, it could counteract an economically effective distribution of the labour force among professions and sectors.

In such a hypothetical case, we would thus not “give up the inflation target” and suddenly start conducting an entirely different policy and, for example, raise the interest rate. There would still be reason to conduct a policy that is as expansionary as we deem possible, to avoid taking longer than necessary to attain the target. However, one consequence might be that the Riksbank’s communication becomes even more central. The damage in a situation where monetary policy is not made more expansionary, despite inflation being expected to undershoot the target for a long time, will be much less if the general public can be convinced that the target has not been abandoned, but that it is merely a question of taking longer than normal to attain it. Clarifying this would be a difficult but hopefully not impossible task. Often unclear whether the criticism applies to monetary policy or the target Having gone through how I view the current situation and discussed a few related aspects, I would now like to widen the perspective a little and talk about more fundamental issues. More specifically, I thought I would go into why we have the framework we have, with an inflation target and a floating exchange rate, and what benefits this system provides. This is not the first time I have done so, but I  8 Jansson (2016). 6 [17]  believe it is useful and important to remind people of this now and then.
In fact, one of the most visible consequences of financial fragmentation was the strong sensitivity of funding costs to the borrowing agents’ nationality and not just to their creditworthiness. Thus, drawing all the strands together, I think it is reasonable to conclude that the unsustainable accumulation of debt over the previous expansion paved the way for the subsequent credit contraction seen during the crisis. In my view, this contraction reflects primarily the sizable and unavoidable downward adjustment in the demand for credit. However, a number of frictions related to the supply of credit, such as those discussed earlier, have also played a relevant role. 3. Recent developments in bank credit and its determinants  Let me now turn to the recent developments in bank credit. The latest data show that the stock of credit to the private sector in Spain continues to fall, but the rate of decline has tended to slow gradually since the second half of 2013, in parallel with the recovery in GDP. This slow pace of recovery of the credit cycle is consistent with historical regularities during previous similar episodes. In fact, there is a well-established branch in the economics literature that has coined this phenomenon “creditless recoveries”, and there are abundant studies showing that these episodes are not exceptional either in emerging or in advanced economies, especially in the aftermath of a recession accompanied by a banking crisis.

Such bank runs can lead to instability in the financial system. We have not observed such movements in Norwegian banks’ funding for a long time. Both the bank guarantee scheme and banks’ strong financial position have likely played an important role here. With the introduction of CBDC, digital bank runs might occur more easily and with greater speed. Avoiding digital bank runs are therefore an important factor to consider when designing CBDC. In addition to assessing the consequences of the introduction of CBDC, we must also analyse the consequences of a payment system without central bank money. We must ask ourselves 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  whether we can maintain confidence in the monetary system and achieve the goal of an efficient and secure payment system using instruments other than introducing a CBDC. We do not have the answer yet. Norges Bank will decide how the Bank will proceed with its work on CBDC in the first half of next year. We want to be transparent about our work. Three reports have been published so far, and there are plans to publish another report early next year. We hope that this will provide inspiration for continued dialogue with and contributions from a broad set of stakeholders. And already next week – on 9 November – we will be hosting an open webinar about the project. Further to my remarks on CBDC, I would also like to comment briefly on the central bank money we already have, namely cash.
Prevention of financial crimes and terrorism financing is an important element to fortify the agenda of monetary and financial stability of the country. Complying adequately with international standards and best practices is consistent towards instilling confidence among stakeholders on the integrity and credibility of our financial system. More importantly, keeping financial crime and terrorism financing in check helps contribute towards the country’s security and stability, which is an important catalyst to a balanced economic growth and development. Allow me to share some of the ideas and expectations with regard to the responsibilities of compliance officers. As we are all aware, the requirements imposed are now moving towards principle-based rather than that of prescriptive or rule-based. This provides institutions with the authority or freedom to develop their own internal policy that commensurates with their risk and profile while upholding the policy intent. Thus, it is up to compliance officers to support the institutions to develop such comprehensive policies and to ensure they are properly implemented within the institution and by all relevant staff. The compliance office should also be proactive in providing accurate and proper information for their clients, especially the general public, on the intent and requirement of their policies to avoid misrepresentations of regulatory requirements and the institutions’ own business decisions. Compliance officers should be proactive in recommending efforts and initiatives within the institutions and industry that could contribute towards the prevention of financial crimes and terrorism financing.

In doing so, they should exert utmost care not to make wrong or spurious judgements and give false alarms about an impending catastrophe in a central bank. To do their job effectively, auditors should be more knowledgeable of the technical side of the operations of a central bank than its internal technical staff. Moreover, they should arm themselves with knowledge of how other central banks are operating, how some central banks had got into difficulties due to irresponsible behaviour and the emerging global best practices of central banking. Hence, it is a continuing learning and knowledge enhancement process for auditors of a central bank. By any measure, this is not a simple challenge. 2  BIS Review 58/2009  It is only with this superior knowledge base that auditors acquire the capability of making a proper risk assessment of a central bank and play their new role as a “risk-alerter” to the management and legislators. This requirement equally applies to both internal and external auditors of a central bank. The major risks faced by a central bank The policy failure risk, (that is, the inability to maintain the stability of the value of the currency on a continuous basis) and the associated reputation risk (that is, the public no longer trusts the central bank and its action) of a central bank are well known. But, a lesser known risk of a central bank is the “insolvency risk” which could loom over a central bank with or without the presence of the policy failure risk.
The fourth is not an accelerator in substance, but rather a “facilitator” for the first three: in terms of institutions, we would need a euro area Finance Minister and Parliament. These four accelerators are needed, but this does not mean they all have to be implemented at the same time. With the existing Treaty, we can take steps straight away on the first two accelerators, macro and micro, on which I will elaborate. The macro accelerator is a collective economic strategy in the euro area. It is premised on one simple fact: economic growth and employment would be stronger in the euro area if we combined more reforms in countries where they are needed, like France or Italy, and more stimulus in countries with leeway for it, like Germany or the Netherlands. To achieve this, euro area Member States have to seal a deal, which could be prepared and adopted as early as 2018. National reforms are obviously a prerequisite to any enhancement of the Economic Union. I take this opportunity to welcome the successful reforms carried out in the Netherlands in recent years, especially in the labour market. Real GDP is expected to grow here by 3.2% in 2017 and the unemployment rate is likely to reach 4.8% in 2017, close to full employment.

For banks in particular, the majority of the Basel III work – let’s say 80% – has already been done in 2010–2011. However, discussions remain ongoing on the question of the measurement of risk on bank balance sheets. It is in the strategic interests of France and Europe, which has always promoted international rules, to conclude a final agreement on Basel III. We are working hard towards a fair and reasonable agreement. But beyond Basel III, we should finalise measures that target non-banks. We must ensure a balance between financing channels. The priority has now shifted from the solvency of banks, which has improved substantially, to the liquidity of the shadow banking sector, particularly funds and asset management companies that are exposed to the risks of sudden panic-driven runs. Let me conclude my speech by quoting a French Philosopher, who spent many years in the Netherlands: René Descartes. He was both the father of “l’esprit cartésien” – having a clear vision of our aims – and a pragmatist, with this useful principle: “divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible and as might be required in order to resolve them better”1. Indeed, we must not get bogged down by misunderstandings, sterile debates and considerations about which of the intergovernmental or community method to use. But in order to move forward, we should combine a holistic vision and a stepwise approach to implementation.
Becoming a leader does not mean you have made it and have nothing left to learn. Rather leadership is a discipline that involves deliberate practice and continuous learning. 23  In this spirit, policymakers must remain humble as they work to build a more resilient financial system. We must remember that, although we can make financial crises less likely to happen and less severe when they do occur, we cannot abolish them. Something will go wrong again even if we do not know exactly what or precisely when. Accepting this means our best strategy is to create an anti-fragile system that can withstand potential shocks when they happen. To accomplish that we are bridging, buttressing and burying. Bridging by overhauling the way we provide liquidity. The Bank of England is now open for business with a wider range of collateral, to a wider range of counterparties, for longer terms, at lower fees than ever before. Whereas before the crisis, the combination of banks own liquidity resources and their access to central bank facilities covered a mere 10% of short term liabilities of banks prone to run risk, today the figure is more than 100%. The benefits of this new approach were clear around the Brexit referendum. In the run-up to the vote, the Bank undertook extensive contingency planning which included encouraging banks to pre-position enough collateral in our facilities to enable them to draw up to £ billion in liquidity on demand.

An organisation’s purpose can be for the client; such as Amazon’s goal ‘To be earth’s most customer-centric company’; or the greater good, such as the World Bank’s mission to ‘End extreme poverty’, and the Bank of England’s to ‘Promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability’. The leader’s job is to ensure that the purpose of their organisation is always present and anchors its goals, values, and strategy. Like diversity, purpose is not a “nice to have”. Evidence shows that purposeful companies have higher employee engagement, greater customer satisfaction, tighter supplier linkages and better environmental stewardship. The pay-offs to purposeful business are superior share price performance, better operational performance, lower costs of capital, smaller regulatory fines and greater resilience in the face of shocks. 10  Always remember that, as leaders, you will be stewards of the purpose of your organisations. In this sense, leadership is the acceptance of responsibility rather than the assumption of power. True leadership is not an end in itself but rather as a means to accomplishing a worthwhile goal. These are lessons that some in financial services have had to re-learn in recent years. An industry of the scale and importance of finance needs social capital as well as economic capital in order to operate, innovate and grow. To maintain social capital, finance ultimately needs to be seen as a vocation, an activity with high ethical standards, which in turn conveys certain responsibilities.
Several potential reasons have been put forward for the reluctance of banks to use their buffers. Among them, the literature highlights: the stigma of the market, the uncertainty around possible future credit losses and the uncertainty around supervisory expectations regarding the restoration of any reserve provision (Hernandez de Cos, 2021b). In the case of Chile, this new macroprudential took was incorporated in the latest reform to the General Banking Law approved in 2018. Within the framework of the implementation of Basel III in Chile, the BCCh was empowered to determine the countercyclical capital requirement to banks. The General Banking Law gives the Central Bank of Chile the power to determine the activation or deactivation of the countercyclical capital requirement. Once the activation decision has been made, the Central Bank must set its level and deadline for compliance, after a favorable report from the Financial Market Commission. As recommended by the Basel Committee, this requirement can be established between 0 and 2.5% of risk-weighted assets and must be paid entirely with core capital (CET 1), above the minimum capital requirements established by the General Banking Law. In this context, in 2021 the Board of the Central Bank of Chile published a policy framework to implement this Capital Requirement as a macroprudential tool to preserve the stability of the financial system as a whole, rather than the solvency of a particular bank.

In this sense, it reduces the impact of risk materialization on the banking sector and, therefore, on financial stability, avoiding restricting essential services, such as the supply of credit, and protecting the overall economy. The Countercyclical Capital Requirement should be activated or increased before an episode of financial stress materializes, i.e., during periods in which it is assessed that vulnerabilities are incubating in the banking sector that generate systemic impact. This also prevents and mitigates abrupt reductions in credit in the future, thus mitigating the potential amplification of shocks to the rest of the economy. The activation of the Countercyclical Capital Requirement depends on an overall assessment of the outlook for financial stability and not on a specific indicator. All in all, it is a macroprudential instrument that must consider its impact on the financial system, recognizing differentiated spaces for other micro prudential actions and measures. The standardized background set defined by the Central Bank to decide the activation of the Countercyclical Capital Requirement is divided into four steps that feed into each other. First, the regulatory context which is a summary of new regulation or international standards that need to be taken into consideration in the setting of the CCyB. Second, an exhaustive analysis of the current stage of the credit and its drivers. Third, a heatmap reviewing multiple variables that includes indicators for vulnerabilities, risks, and financial and macroeconomic conditions.
Trading volumes in SORA derivatives have continued to rise, doubling in the last quarter, albeit from a low base. In the cash market, adoption of SORA has broadened significantly. We have seen several sizeable SORA-based commercial loans involving early pathfinders such as CapitaLand, Olam, Wilmar and Sembcorp Industries. [3] Our local banks have also launched several business and retail SORA property loan product oﬀerings. Given the strong interest in SORA products, and progress made in kickstarting SORA market liquidity, SC-STS also announced that usage of SOR in new cash products will cease by April 2021. To support this, our key retail banks will lead the way by oﬀering a broad suite of SORA products by end-February 2021. Other banks active in SGD retail and corporate loans will follow suit by April 2021. Another significant development last year, was the industry decision to discontinue SIBOR by end-2024 [4] , to reap the expected benefits of enhanced market eﬀiciency in a SORA-centered interest rate benchmark regime. Implications of Recent ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) Announcement 6 Let me now touch on what many of you in the audience would consider the ‘elephant in the room’. In December 2020, the IBA – or ICE Benchmark Administration, consulted on LIBOR discontinuation timelines across various currency settings. What caught most of our attention, was the proposed 18-month extension till 30 June 2023 of the widely referenced USD LIBOR tenors (the overnight, 1M, 3M, 6M and 12M).

Joseph Yam: Current issues for monetary and financial stability in Hong Kong Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Management Association Annual Fellowship Dinner, Hong Kong, 27 November 2007. *  *  *  Introduction I feel especially honoured to have been asked to speak at this HKMA Fellowship Dinner, one particular reason being that the Hong Kong Management Association and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority share the same initials. I have, ever since the establishment of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in April 1993, felt some what indebted to the Hong Kong Management Association in its acquiescence to our use of that symbol of excellence, the HKMA, no doubt in the hope that we too would in time mature to deserve the respect that those initials command. About fifteen years on, I hope we have not disappointed you. This evening I would like to talk about the monetary and financial issues currently confronting Hong Kong. I have chosen to do so because what is going on around us on the monetary and financial fronts appears, to me at least, to be unusually complex, presenting risks to monetary and financial stability that are perhaps less well understood and possibly less benign than those that we have been experiencing since the economic recovery from the second quarter of 2003.