samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Domestically, financial conditions showed early signs of normalizations, with lending increasing from month to month, low interest rates and credit standards that were more expansionary during the fourth quarter of 2009 than during the preceding quarter (figure 3). The value of the peso has fluctuated significantly since December, partly owing to global phenomena, but largely due to domestic factors. After continuing with the process of  2  BIS Review 61/2010  appreciation that began in early October, the peso peaked at the beginning of January. It then depreciated sharply, driven by increased tensions in world financial markets and by changes in the hedging strategies used by pension funds. The depreciation trend reversed during the course of February due to a decline in external tensions and a change in pension funds’ purchase flows. After the earthquake and tsunami, the peso experienced further fluctuations due to changes in private expectations about how the reconstruction would be financed and how insurance claims would be paid. The importance of idiosyncratic factors is apparent in multilateral indicators that measure the peso’s movements with respect to the dollar and other currencies, which are showing smaller variations than those of the peso/dollar exchange rate (figure 1). Annual CPI inflation returned to positive territory earlier than what had been foreseen in December (figure 2). Core measures, in particular the CPIX1, continued to display low month-on-month variations.

According to the survey of damages from the earthquake and tsunami delivered by the government on March 23, the cost to replace the destroyed capital stock amounts to 20.94 billion US dollars. Following the reasoning described above, this figure is the equivalent to the gross value of the lost capital stock. How then can we estimate the net value of the capital destroyed? Estimates in our national accounts indicate that between the years 2000 and 2008 the net value of the capital stock was around 63 percent of the gross stock. Applying this percentage directly, we estimate that the damage to the net capital stock, consistent with the figure disclosed by the government, is 13.2 billion US dollars. If we consider that the net capital stock amounted in 2009 to an estimated 435 billion US dollars, the aforementioned loss is equivalent to nearly 3 percent of the total. Therefore, given a loss of 3 percent in the net capital stock, the Board estimates that during this year the level of trend GDP will fall 1.0% to 1.5% because of the catastrophe. The magnitude of the short-term impact of the natural disaster depends on the share in national GDP of the hardest hit regions, the sectoral composition of production by region and the duration of downtime in productive processes, among other factors. In 2008, Regions VI, VII and VIII produced nearly 16% of national GDP, mostly concentrated in the manufacturing sector. As for the labour market, the three regions generate almost one fifth of national employment.
Government has also set a financial access target of 50 percent by the end of 2009 under the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). The holding of this Conference is therefore, consistent with our aspirations to increase levels of financial access in the country. As earlier alluded, the aim of this Forum was to bring together practitioners and regulators of microfinance to learn from each other in order deepen and broaden financial services provision. In this regard, the forum has a number of eminent persons who will share with us their unique experiences. 2  BIS Review 46/2009  Ladies and Gentlemen: This FIA programme is customized and among the issues that will be addressed include the following: 1. Emerging best practice in microfinance;  2. Self-help group models for microfinance, which may be viable for countries in our region;  3. Microfinance product development knowledge and risk management strategies; and  4. Specific micro-credit practices for agricultural-related businesses, which is relevant for most our countries’ strategies to diversify into agriculture. Distinguished Participants: We consider the timing of this workshop appropriate given the impact of the on-going global financial crises. I therefore, call upon all of you to take advantage of this unique opportunity to learn and share experiences, so that we can come up with efficient and effective ways of advancing financial inclusion in our respective countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen: At this point, kindly allow me to call upon our Guest of Honour, Honourable Ms Chileshe Kapwepwe, MP, the Deputy Minister of Finance and National Planning to deliver the key note address and to officially open this Conference. Honorable Minister Sir! BIS Review 46/2009  3
18 documents some similar results from a recent IMF (2008) exercise, showing that the cumulative output loss in outright recessions, as well as in milder slowdowns, on average tends to be almost twice as much if preceded by a financial crisis. The results of Furceri and Mourougane (2009) suggest, moreover, that part of this output loss is permanent; they find that the typical OECD financial crisis knocks around 2% off potential output, which rises to 4% for deep crises. These findings suggest that financial crises can have a material impact on both the dynamics of the business cycle and on the underlying equilibrium growth path. The literature on the “broad credit channel” and the “financial accelerator” points to an amplifying effect of changes in firms’ financial health on their cost of capital. In particular, when borrowers have less collateral they face a higher external finance premium to compensate lenders for the increased monitoring costs (see e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999). But the quantitative magnitude of the effect in this type of model is usually relatively modest. And the banks in this class of model are simple or non-existent, and any incentive or information problems relate to the borrower, rather than the financial intermediary. Instead, it seems likely that the adequacy of bank capital and the associated phenomenon of financial sector de-leveraging are likely to play a central role. Capital is essential because it is the means by which intermediaries persuade creditors that they will almost surely get their money back.

But just as there is evidence that increased financial intermediation is often a Good Thing, so there is also evidence from numerous past credit/asset price boom-bust episodes that a juxtaposition of rapid credit expansion and sharp asset price increases is often a harbinger of a painful bust to come. So everything hinges on whether the underlying developments are sustainable or not. The mistake of (most of) the economics profession, along with many others, was a failure to see what was really going on beneath the surface and to understand how disruptively things could unwind. But, as I shall explain, I believe that the standard tools of economic analysis, far from being proved redundant, can shed useful light on what went wrong. Macroeconomic antecedents The proximate causes of the present crisis undoubtedly lie within the financial markets. But it is worth dwelling briefly on the macroeconomic environment in the years preceding the crisis, which was conducive to the formation of what proved to be an unsustainable credit bubble. BIS Review 101/2009  3  The Great Moderation To begin with, this period was characterised by an unusually high degree of macroeconomic stability, with steady growth and low and stable inflation in most of the advanced economies; see for instance Fig. 4, which shows performance in the G5 countries before and after 1992 2 . There are three broad explanations for this “Great Moderation”. First, it could just have been a happy accident, if this was a period characterised by unusually small, or a benign sequence of, shocks.
Second, it can also provide perverse incentives for financial firms to grow bigger, more complex and more interconnected simply to secure public support and finally take on more risks. To answer these concerns, the policy response has focused on the issue of ‘too- big- to- fail’ institutions. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has proposed that global systemic financial institutions should be better capitalized and be submitted to higher capital surcharges, proportional to their contribution to systemic risk. It has also recommended a tighter supervision of these institutions, notably by setting up Crisis management groups in charge of monitoring that these institutions develop appropriate resolution and recovery plans. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  It may be useful at this point to step back a little. The TBTF problem was not born with the crisis. The official recognition of a TBTF policy and the coinage of the term itself date back to 1984 during the testimony before Congress of the then US comptroller of the Currency on the government rescue of the bank Continental Illinois. Afterwards, a further 11 banks were identified as TBTF in an article in the Wall Street Journal. The fact that continental Illinois rescue led to a subsequent decrease in market discipline for these banks has been confirmed by several academic studies. The last crisis however gave rise to two important developments in the TBTF problem.

The second remark is that removing anticipations of state support/bailouts is a process that may take time and which must be handled with extreme care. The unexpected imposition of losses on some type of creditors to resolve problems in some banks can lead to shifts in expectations of public guarantee for other institutions, and create contagion and funding stress at other banks. The case of Cyprus was a perfect illustration of this. The difficulty is to guide the evolution in expectations over time, and avoid abrupt shifts that would increase financial instability and ultimately undermine the objective of the reforms. This ‘transition problem’ is in my view critical, and has been overlooked in many discussions. This conference is organized so as to facilitate exchanges with the audience. Therefore, I encourage you to be fully involved in the discussions and wish you fruitful debates. I now leave the floor to Augustin Landier from Toulouse School of Economics, one of the organizers of this conference with Regis Breton and Laurent Clerc from the Banque de France Financial stability directorate, who will chair the first session of the conference. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Four Rs: Creating the conditions for long-term sustainable growth in the life annuity sector – speech by Charlotte Gerken | Bank of England 2. PPF7800 Index March 2023 update 3. Risk Transfer Report 2023 - Hymans Robertson 4. Pension Trustees: The Planning Puzzle | Charles Stanley (charles-stanley.co.uk) 5. Defined benefit bulk annuity market favours full scheme transactions as funding levels improve (xpsgroup.com) 6. Report of the Member Options Working Party - Actuarial profession 7. Illiquid assets throw UK pensions off balance - Risk.net 8. Asset managers cut debt in pension scheme investing strategies | Financial Times (ft.com) 9. Shifting up a gear – WTW 10. Insurance supervision: 2023 priorities (bankofengland.co.uk) 11. Who’s concentrating? Trends in the life insurance sector and the need for strong reinsurance and investment risk management − speech by Charlotte Gerken | Bank of England 12. Why private equity sees life and annuities as an enticing form of permanent capital | McKinsey  Page 10  13. UK pensions implosion could end with a deals boom | Financial Times (ft.com) 14. Buy-in and buy-out volumes £ in the first half of 2022 - Hymans Robertson 15. bulk annuity provider ESG index - WTW (wtwco.com) 16. Insurance Stress Test 2022 feedback (bankofengland.co.uk) 17. The groups are due to report in early Q2. The inputs from these groups will be a consideration amongst others as we work through potential proposals and their workability. 18.

More broadly, the long-term implications for the UK economy of these arrangements bear examination. Within the objectives of the Solvency II reforms, it is not clear that the incentives of third-party capital providers are aligned with UK insurers’ role in making investments in UK based long-term infrastructure and productive assets. Both the PRA and insurers need to think about the opportunity cost of funded reinsurance – in terms of UK direct investments foregone – as well as the benefits and risks. Greater interconnectivity with wider financial markets Related to that point, the third area I would like to touch on is a key aspect of the changing  Page 6  pensions and insurance landscape. One industry estimate, suggests that the UK life insurance industry could onboard more than £ of pension liabilities – and associated assets – over the coming decade[13] [14]. This is a big structural change in the control of long-term investments in the UK, and the decisions that insurers make now will have long term consequences for the performance and development of the broader economy. In line with the Government’s objectives for Solvency II reform, insurers’ investment strategies have an important role in supporting sectors that require certainty of funding over the long term, including education, social housing and infrastructure, and where financing the transition to net zero such as via renewable energy infrastructure and technologies requires patient and deliberate commitment. Making such investments can also generate a competitive advantage in a market where ESG credentials are increasingly valued by trustees[15].
BIS central bankers’ speeches  The core inputs to the analysis are firm-level measures of dividends and equity prices. The average dividend-price ratio in each industry segment is shown in Table 3. The mean dividend-price ratio across the panel is 2.6%. But there is a fairly significant degree of crosssectoral and time-series dispersion. For example, dividend-price ratios are almost twice as high in the energy and utilities sector as the health and pharmaceuticals sector. And mean dividend-price ratios were two thirds third higher in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Table 3 Mean dividend-price ratio for firms in each industry segment Consumer  Energy & Utilities  Financials  Health  IT  Industrials  Materials  S&P  1.94  2.82  3.19  1.87  1.69  2.55  2.22  FTSE  4.12  3.96  2.63  1.38  2.92  3.81  3.16  To estimate (9), we require a selection of quantitative inputs. Taking these in turn: (a)  Company-specific risk premium  Following Miles (1993), the company risk premium is modelled based on firm-specific characteristics, in particular the company beta and the level of gearing: (10)  where .21 Betas are estimated using daily return data for firms listed on the S&P 500 and FTSE, together with daily data for the indices themselves.22 Mean estimated betas are shown in Table 4. These average below one for both UK and US firms.

4  BIS Review 31/2007  Extending the New Silk Road to the world Ladies and Gentlemen, While the New Silk Road is enhancing linkages between Asia and the Middle East, both regions have always extended the Silk Road to the rest of the world to participate in the these exciting developments on this route. Indeed, global investors and the international financial community are already drawing the benefits from the increased diversification of asset classes while riding on the dynamism of the two regions. As Islamic finance expands further, reinforced by the activities on the New Silk Road, there will be greater convergence towards ethical or socially responsible-type of investments (SRI) in the global financial community. Islamic investment guidelines share significant similarities with the SRI principles. The focus of Islamic investment not only involves the avoidance of riba-free activities but also extends to include issues related to ethical values, such as fair trade and environmental protection. Furthermore, the prospects of increased stability for financing flows and the focus on the role of real sector economic activities have ignited interest in utilising Islamic finance for sustainable development. This overwhelming gathering of so many issuers and investors here today provides some indication of the growing interest in Islamic finance, reinforcing the potential increased activity on the New Silk Road. We all have a part in the making of the New Silk Road into a vibrant source of wealth and prosperity in the global economy.
As a result of these decisions, the Federal Reserve is currently adding $ billion in longer-term securities each month to its holdings, in addition to reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency MBS and agency debt securities into agency MBS.1 We have bought about $ billion in Treasury securities since January and about $ billion in agency MBS, excluding reinvestments, since mid-September, bringing the total par value of the Federal Reserve’s SOMA (System Open Market Account) portfolio to over $ trillion.2 The FOMC’s current asset purchase program has some key differences from earlier policy initiatives. In the past, when announcing previous programs to change the size or composition of its balance sheet, the FOMC communicated an expected total size of each program and an anticipated date by when it would be completed. Under the current asset purchase program, the FOMC has announced only the monthly pace and composition of purchases and noted that purchases will continue until there is a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. The Committee has also indicated that, in determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, it will take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of its purchases as well as the extent of progress toward its economic objectives.

Speech  Embargo 19 September 2019, 5.30 pm  Fourth Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture Introduction of Raghuram Rajan, ETH Zurich  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Zurich, 19 September 2019 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2019  Page 1/4  Ladies and gentlemen I am very pleased to welcome you all to this year’s Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture. This occasion marks the 30th anniversary of Karl Brunner’s death. In the Karl Brunner Lecture Series, the Swiss National Bank pays tribute to academics whose research is of particular relevance for central banking. Today we are celebrating the outstanding contribution made by Raghuram Rajan, the Katherine Dusak Miller Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago. We are honoured that Dr Rajan has accepted our invitation to deliver this lecture. Raghuram Rajan was born on 3 February 1963 in Bhopal, India. He started his career with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi. Following the decision to leave the sphere of electromagnetic fields and waves in favour of the oscillations of the economy and financial markets, Raghu joined the doctoral programme at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he received a PhD for his thesis ʻEssays on Banking’. Four years later, at the age of just 32, he became a full professor of finance at the University of Chicago. Exceptional academic Raghu is an exceptional academic.
This may be justified with regard to countries where the economy is still on its knees, to avoid slowing down a recovery. But in a country that is doing as well as Sweden there is less reason to wait before introducing the new regulations. Moreover, the Swedish banks already meet many of the requirements. The adjustments would be relatively minor. 4  A more detailed description of the Basel III regulations and the Riksbank’s view of them can be found in the speech by Stefan Ingves on 2 February 2011 – “Basel III – much-needed regulations for a safer bank sector”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  But it is not just a question of when the regulations should be introduced. It is also a question of the levels for the capital adequacy requirements, which will be higher than currently agreed levels. They will include the cyclically-based capital requirement now being prepared, and which is expected to be in the interval of 0 to 2.5 per cent. They will also include the extra capital requirements that large banks that constitute a particular risk to the financial system will need to fulfil. The four major Swedish banks are systemically-important in the Nordic-Baltic region and will most likely be covered by these rules. In total, thus, the capital requirements will be raised. In addition, these are minimum requirements and there is nothing to prevent countries from voluntarily choosing higher levels if they consider it necessary.

Constantinos Herodotou: Address - Annual General Meeting of the Association of Cyprus International Financial Firms (ACIFF) Address by Mr Constantinos Herodotou, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, at the Annual General Meeting of the Association of Cyprus International Financial Firms (ACIFF), Nicosia, 10 February 2022. *** It is my pleasure to address the open session of the Annual General Meeting of the Association of Cyprus International Financial Firms (ACIFF) today and present the current situation of the Cyprus and European banking sectors as well as the challenges ahead. I will also try to shed some light on the trends and developments in the banking industry. Let me start with an update on the Cyprus banking sector. We are now almost a decade after the peak of the Financial Crisis in Cyprus and looking at our banks' key financials, we observe a significant balance sheet derisking and an improvement in their loss absorption capacity. This is despite the shocks caused by the on-going pandemic. Specifically, the capital position of our banks, measured through the common equity tier 1 ratio rose from 14,2% at the end of 2014 to 17,2% at the end of September 2021. This is well above the EU average of 15,7%. In addition, during the same period a noteworthy clean - up from non-performing loans has taken place, where troubled loans in the banking sector have been reduced from 28,3bln euros in 2014 to 4,3bln euros in October 2021. Nonetheless, the NPL ratio in the Cyprus banking sector is still high, ca.