samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It has long been known that projects usually end in failure not because they are bad but because somebody does not understand what his or her role in the process involves, or even why this process exists. Communication improves the level of understanding and acceptance on the part of all stakeholders. It helps create commitment observed in diasporas, and also creates room for internal motivation. It was as early as at the beginning of the 21 century that public administration in Singapore knew the art of project implementation, which institutionalised the role of communication in project planning. 1 p.m. Lunch with a friend. Global brought him a small gift from his weekend family trip to an exotic country. It was a real bargain, and it only took a few minutes to arrange for the trip on the way home from the Friday visit to a modern art gallery. Both Global and his wife are lovers of modern art. All they had to do was to get in touch with their virtual travel agent and they could both go through the offers displayed on the screen in his car, consulting an e-expert. They decided to go for the most exotic trip, which was also quite affordable. Global competition does its job. Their only concern was not to miss the plane. Global and his friend do not waste their time ordering meals, as an e-waiter has already sent suggested menu to their communicators (in Global’s case, consulted with his e-dietician).

And, as with all the other denominations in the new series, it is narrower and shorter than the previous note. The theme of the 100-franc note is Switzerland’s humanitarian tradition, and the key motif is water. Both are reflected in the note’s core design elements. The hand and the globe are the main images on the front of the note. The hands are scooping up water, and isobars are depicted over the globe. Page 1/3  Berne, 3 September 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference on new banknotes  The back of the note shows an irrigation channel, or ‘suone’, feeding glacial meltwater down a cliff face to the fields below. A suone is a method of transporting water from high altitudes to lower-lying areas for irrigation purposes. In the past, such irrigation channels were used for land cultivation, especially in the Valais region. The image of a suone symbolises the treatment and distribution of water – a major component of Switzerland’s humanitarian and development aid effort. The key motif also plays an important role on the security strip, which features a network of waterways over the map of Switzerland, together with a list of the country’s longest rivers. The remaining security features, such as the transparent Swiss cross or the shimmering globe, are the same as those on all denominations of the new series – you will already be familiar with these.
Ardian Fullani: Analysis of economic and financial developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 24th Conference of Banking Supervisors from Central and Eastern Europe, Tirana, 12 April 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, Allow me to first wish you a warm welcome in the 24th conference of banking supervisors from Central and Eastern Europe, which this time is taking place in Tirana. The Bank of Albania considers this forum as very important and a platform where participants may exchange their institutions experiences with each-other. This forum is a modern highway that allows for a rapid convergence of our supervision practices with the best standards. Let me now continue with a summarised analysis of economic and financial developments in Albania over the last two years, focusing on some concrete issues requiring more attention by the banking industry and the supervisory authority in the future. The Albanian economy was characterised by positive developments during the pre-crisis period. Annual economic growth was on average 6 per cent, with admirable and stable core macroeconomic indicators. Growth relied on a firm strengthening of internal demand components while funded by internal resources, mainly through rapidly increasing loans to the private sector and loans for investments. The banking sector, which dominates the domestic financial system, has also undergone a significant transformation in recent years. This is due to the entrance in the market of renowned European banking groups, expansion of banking infrastructure and upgrade of customer services.

Today, there are no signs of a financial bubble, but we are ready to act, if necessary, by implementing macroprudential measures, in the framework notably of the Haut conseil de stabilité financière (High Council for Financial Stability – HCSF) that you created via the Banking Act of 2013. For instance, at our eighth meeting held on 15 March 2016, we issued a warning about the office sector in the Paris area. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  2. Monetary policy thus contributes greatly to our economy, but it can’t do everything. It cannot be the only game in town. It is vital that Europe and France seize this opportunity now. In France, growth is expected to be both robust and inadequate: Robust, as it should remain in 2016 at least at the 1.2 percent level observed last year. But inadequate, as it will probably linger a little below the euro area average of 1.4–1.5 percent. For growth and employment, three essential actions are necessary: reforms in France; private and public investment; the coordination of economic policies in Europe. First, in France, orderly and sustained reforms are needed to rebuild confidence. Keeping our public deficit and our debt under control is a contributing factor: the good figures published on Friday (deficit reduced to 3.5% in 2015) are another reason to strictly respect our European commitments by bringing it below the 3% limit in 2017.
I would pray that you, after reading the Exter Report, may not complain that Central Bank has not done enough to Sri Lanka economy and economic welfare of the public in terms of the mandate given to it by the public. The Central Bank’s all powers and functions center around two objectives. Those are the securing of economic and price stability and financial system stability with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of the productive resources of Sri Lanka. This is not the forum for me to define technically each objective as there is no single accepted definition. However, those objectives in nutshell mean securing stability of the economy. Economic and price stability means the economy running on a sustainable growth path with a supportive low rate inflation. Financial system stability means financial institutions and markets operate without bubbles or contagious failures where the trust of the public in the financial system is maintained, stability of the Economy, prices and the financial system are inter-dependent. The stability of the Economy helps the public to make and keep their plans for the future which ultimately encourages and promotes development of productive resources of Sri Lanka. This is what will promote living standard of the public by increasing production, employment and real income. This is what the MLA has empowered the Central Bank to do. Thus, you may understand the enormous national interest entrusted to the Central Bank.

Caleb M Fundanga: Enhancing access to finance in Zambia Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the Access Bank Zambia Limited Acacia and Longacres branches and the Visa Debit Card, Lusaka, 16 February 2010. *  *  *  Your Excellency the High Commissioner of the Republic of Nigeria in Zambia, Ms Marcus Folake Bello; The Chairman of the Board Access Bank Zambia Ltd, Mr Caleb Mulenga; The Group Deputy Managing Director, Access Bank Plc, Mr Herbert Wigwe; The Managing Director, Access Bank Zambia Ltd, Mrs Mukwandi Chibesakunda; Members of the Board of Directors for Access Bank Zambia Ltd, present; Management and Staff of Access Bank Zambia Ltd; Colleagues from Bank of Zambia; Distinguished Invited Guests; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen. It is my privilege and honour to officiate at this important launch of the Longacres and Acacia branches of Access Bank Zambia Limited. As the Central Bank and regulator of the banking sector, we are always pleased to be associated with the achievements of the institutions that we regulate, particularly where these developments lead to increased access to banking services as well as convenience for the Zambian public. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a well known fact that bank branch expansion programmes play an important role in increasing access to the banking services.
1  2  Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/ files/2016/ARRC-roundtable-slides.pdf); Money Market Liaison Committee Sterling Money Market Survey; European Central Bank Euro Money Market Survey. BIS central bankers’ speeches  This view has been formalised in numerous studies that have found the leverage ratio was a better predictor of bank failure during the crisis than the risk-weighted capital ratio (Chart 5) 2. And recent studies (such as Fender and Lewrick (2015) and Grill, Hannes and Smith (2015)) suggest that a calibration of 3–5% maximises the benefits to society in the form of greater financial system resilience relative to the impact of higher bank funding costs. However, despite my belief in the utility of the leverage ratio, I also recognise that no regulation is perfect. And that if we policymakers spot opportunities to minimise regulation’s adverse impact on the liquidity of core financial markets without compromising the positive effect on resilience, we should take them. Reducing unintended consequences The FPC actively seeks out these improvements – a process we refer to as “snagging” in reference to the process by which a newly constructed building is checked for protruding nails and screws which could snag and tear one’s clothing. (If only all architects were so diligent.) As a result of one such snagging exercise – our annual statutory review of the leverage ratio Direction – this month we made the decision to exclude central bank reserves from the exposure measure of the leverage ratio framework.

The model-based predictions can be interpreted as the probability that the economy is in a precrisis period. The chart shows estimated crisis probabilities for the US, Spain, Norway and the UK. The band reflects various combinations of explanatory variables and trend estimation methods. 3 The dataset covers the period from 1970 to 2013, with a total of 27 events defined as crises, of which 11 are associated with the financial turmoil in 2008–2009. As you can see from the chart, the estimated probability of a crisis increased markedly in the years ahead of the financial crisis in 2008–2009, although the UK is the exception in that context. Crisis probabilities also increased in the US ahead of the US Savings and Loan crisis, in the UK ahead of the UK’s small-bank crisis and in Norway ahead of the banking crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. All these episodes featured rapid growth in credit and rising real estate prices. 2  See Anundsen, A.K., F. Hansen, K. Gerdrup and K. Kragh-Sørensen (2014): «Bubbles and crises: The role of house prices and credit», Norges Bank Working Papers 14/2014. 3  The indicators are incorporated in growth form or as deviations from estimated long-term trends. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The empirical results support our choice of key indicators of financial imbalances. Household and corporate credit, house prices and banks’ wholesale funding ratio are statistically significant in the models and clearly influence the estimated probability of a crisis.
Second, the reform proposals I have discussed are fundamental questions which, ultimately, cannot be decided on by a representative of the SNB but by voting citizens. In our democracy, they are the ones who have the final word, either indirectly through their representatives in the Federal Parliament or directly at the ballot box – for instance next Sunday – and that is how it should be. And this brings me to another point which is very dear to my heart. Although the SNB is independent, its power remains limited. Through the Federal Constitution and the National Bank Act it is firmly bound into our democracy and our constitutional state. Numerous control mechanisms guarantee this, and of these, I would like to make particular mention of the fact that, every year, the SNB must render account to the Federal Assembly as to how it has fulfilled its statutory tasks. This accountability report is published, so that the general public is also informed about the SNB’s activities. We do not do this merely because we are obliged to, but also because we are convinced that rendering account is important. We attach great importance to increasing the understanding of the general public in monetary policy matters, since we are aware that basic trust in the monetary order and its institutions will only be justified and lasting if we communicate in a candid and comprehensible manner. Otherwise, the valuable culture of stability which characterises our country would probably suffer. Despite the restrictions, central banks enjoy wide-ranging powers.

The Governing Council supports the steps taken by the Commission to maintain the functioning of the framework, including the implementation of excessive deficit procedures and the issuing of early warnings, where required. Furthermore, I should also like to stress that it is the implementation of structural reforms at the micro level that ultimately raises the production potential in the euro area. By improving flexibility in the economy and making the euro area more resilient to external shocks, structural reforms will also reduce the high level of unemployment. The slow progress in structural reform is one of the key factors currently hampering a recovery in confidence. Against this background, the Governing Council welcomes the recent communication by the Commission on the implementation of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. Renewed momentum in the process of structural reform will not only be crucial to foster confidence among consumers and investors in long-term growth and employment opportunities in the euro area, but it should also have a positive effect on spending and investment decisions in the short and medium term. Finally, I should like to mention that after four years of practice with our monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council has considered that it is the appropriate point in time to take stock of our experience so far and to reflect on the various elements of the strategy. All this does not necessarily imply that we see a need for any changes.
More generally, we have concluded that making the capital requirements more risk sensitive will help ensure that borrowers are charged a more appropriate price for their debt, and limit the build up of unsustainable volumes of debt. This seems to us a better system than the current, extremely risk-insensitive framework of risk weights, where in the sovereign context nothing short of a rescheduling results in any change in capital requirements for exposures to OECD sovereigns, while for non-OECD sovereigns the charges are completely invariant. It is worth noting here that a similar kind of argument applies in the context of public disclosure by banks, which is also one of the key planks of the proposed new Accord. There is a risk that in some circumstances there are drawbacks associated with this, since disclosure could make a troubled bank’s position worse at a difficult moment. But overall, we think the likely behavioural changes induced by greater transparency offer more benefits than risks. By this I mean that the prospect of having to disclose more about positions to the market will reduce banks’ willingness to take on highly risky positions in the first place. BIS Review 132/1999  2  Benefits and drawbacks of complexity A number of other commentators have questioned the effectiveness of introducing greater complexity into the Basel rules, on the grounds that the framework will always be inadequate to cope with innovation and arbitrage.

In the case of Romania, I could say we have already taken important steps towards joining the banking union: no public funds were resorted to after the crisis outbreak to support the banking system and now its liquidity and solvency ratios are well above the prudential thresholds. While the NPL ratio has declined from a peak of around 22 percent in 2014 to 4.8 percent in February 2019, profitability returned and credit growth has started to pick up. Indeed, we have to be aware that there is a fragmented banking landscape in Europe and a danger of further fragmentation, as well as other threats facing the financial system. Yet, whenever I see a problem, I say to myself that it is our job to address them. This means we should stand ready to deal with all the challenges that need to be overcome. Whenever things seem to look bad in the EU, I remember the words of Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the EU project: “Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”. Time has proved him right and I trust his words will always remain true. Besides, we need to value that Europe is united in diversity. Diversity is an outstanding asset for Europe, and it should not be regarded as a permanent liability. In trying times it is essential to capitalise on what unites us. And many things already created bridges between us well before the creation of the EU.
At the same time, what was presented then was by no means an extremely tight monetary policy – despite the fact that inflation was at its highest in over a decade and inflation expectations were clearly above the target level. As usual we looked both at how inflation and the real economy would develop. And the forecast for the repo rate presented was such that inflation was expected to be back on target within two years and GDP growth was expected to fall initially but to then rise to a good long-term level. We know what happened next; the Lehman Brothers investment bank went bankrupt in midSeptember, the financial markets ground to a halt and this changed the game rules. The circumstances for monetary policy changed and we were given an example of a different decision-making situation where both developments in inflation and developments in the real economy called for the same decision. During the autumn we cut the repo rate in three stages by a total of 2.75 percentage points. This meant a departure from the monetary policy we have normally conducted and which is characterised by more gradual changes in the interest rate. Before I talk about our most recent interest rate decision I shall discuss in slightly more detail how the financial crisis has affected monetary policy and how other measures by the Riksbank have been activated.

As I have already implied, it was not possible to draw any more precise conclusions on an exact figure, but their conclusion was that an inflation target of between 1 and 3 per cent is a good choice. If it is lower than 1 per cent, it can have a negative effect on economic growth. However, if it is above 3 per cent, it is too high for most people to perceive prices as being stable. This is why countries with an inflation target have often chosen a measure of inflation of around 2 per cent, which was of course also the case in Sweden. Must the inflation target be defined in terms of the CPI? One question that often arises in the debate on monetary policy is whether it might not be better to replace the target for the CPI with a target for some other measure of inflation. One suggestion that came up during the autumn, for instance, when energy and food prices rose  2  BIS Review 2/2008  substantially, was that the inflation target should only apply to domestic inflation – that is increases in prices of goods and services produced in Sweden. Energy prices and many food prices are determined on the world market in any case and are outside the reach of the Riksbank. This is true, but the price of, say, rice in our shops is not the same as the world market price of rice.
Since the G20 summits of London and Pittsburgh in 2009, the regulatory effort that has been undertaken is unprecedented, in particular in the banking sector: by increasing both the quantity and quality of banking sector own funds, the Basel III reform has considerably enhanced the robustness of banks; in addition, it ensures better account is now taken of the diverse risks to which banks are exposed, thanks to the introduction of two new liquidity ratios for bank cash levels. But beyond Basel III, we should finalise measures that target non-banks. We must ensure a balance between financing channels. The priority has now shifted from the solvency of banks, which has improved substantially, to the liquidity of the shadow banking sector, particularly funds and asset management companies that are exposed to the risks of sudden panic-driven runs. We have to make sure that this internationally agreed regulatory framework is implemented everywhere with consistency. Unilateral deregulation would be nothing less than a lose-lose scenario with serious consequences for the stability of the global financial system – we would be paving the way for the next financial crisis – as well as the competitive landscape for US, British and European banks. As Bank of England Governor and Financial Stability Board Chair Mark Carney advocated in Washington in April, what we need is: “the combination of robust international standards and greater trust as a consequence of transparent implementation and intensive supervisory cooperation”.

Despite some recent easing, tightness in financial conditions still persists and the tightening of business loan lending standards continued – albeit at a slower pace – during the second quarter. We predict that bank lending rates for consumer loans would follow gradually, as the lagged effects of cumulative easing of 950 basis points since November 2008 would start to ease credit conditions towards the last quarter of this year. However, the current unfavorable labor market conditions are expected to restrain the recovery in consumption, and therefore domestic demand conditions would continue to support disinflation. The fiscal discipline is crucial in maintaining low levels of medium and long-term interest rates for the recovery of both consumption and investment. The implementation of a credible fiscal framework would bring down risk premiums further, and hence lead to a permanent fall in longer-term interest rates. This, in turn, would foster investment and labor demand, and thereby support the recovery process, providing the Green Shoots with the breathing room. Therefore, the determined execution of the medium-term program to ensure fiscal discipline and debt sustainability would have an expansionary rather than contractionary impact on economic activity. In sum, while Turkish economy contracted sharply during the recent crisis, its well capitalized and sound financial system is likely to support the economic activity along the recovery. In fact, recent GDP releases suggest that economic activity in Turkey displayed a solid rebound in the second quarter.