samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover,  BIS Review 5/2010  11  foreign-currency-denominated loans (Chart 6) posted a fast-paced growth and any rapid and excessive depreciation of the domestic currency would have generated negative chain reactions across the banking system. Hence, the central bank’s policy on forex market intervention was further steered in this new environment by the philosophy that a high volatility of the exchange rate is detrimental to the inflation target as well as to the financial soundness of the real and financial sectors. A small emerging economy with a significant openness is exposed on an ongoing basis to the threat of capital movements likely to adversely affect the stability of the financial market, the foreign exchange market in particular. Firstly, the NBR’s interventions in the foreign exchange market were meant to avoid an excessive weakening of the domestic currency, while also linking the level and the pace of the depreciation to the progress in the current account adjustment. With this goal in mind, the central bank monitored the developments in the real effective exchange rate of the domestic currency, along with the pressures on external competitiveness stemming from wage bargaining. Secondly, foreign exchange market interventions were calibrated in line with developments in foreign currency reserves. The foreign currency reserves resulting from market interventions during the overappreciation period, to which added the funds received under the financing arrangement concluded with the IMF, the EU and other international financial institutions, enabled the central bank to support the domestic currency; despite these interventions, official reserves stood constantly at safety level.

Its stability and proper functioning depend directly on the adoption of far-reaching reforms to heighten the integration of the participating national economies. We can take hope from the fact that European leaders have understood that banking union is key to the reform process and have, through the creation of the single supervisory mechanism, paved the way for its full operationality. The challenge now is to complete the project as soon as possible by setting in place a single resolution mechanism, in order to optimise the capacity of the single supervisory mechanism to contribute effectively to strengthening monetary union. In the coming months we must step up the required preparatory work. It is not a simple project. It will undoubtedly keep us busy – in both the official and the private sector – for some time. But it is an exciting undertaking in view of its importance for Europe and for Spain. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
I insist on the fact that this measure is the most unconventional because for most people, nominal interest rates are positive. It is true that negative interest rates have their limitations; I have already stressed them in the past.7 And at our Governing Council’s meeting in Tallinn last June, we clarified these limitations in our forward guidance stating that we do not intend to lower our deposit facility rate below its current level of –0.40%. But slightly negative interest rates have their virtues, even if they are not very popular among bankers. First, by removing the zero lower bound constraint on expectations of future short-term interest rates, they contribute to easing financial conditions by lowering rates along the curve, with a positive impact on the demand for credit by firms. Second, the negative deposit facility rate (DFR) positively interacts with asset purchases. Indeed, the portfolio rebalancing effect of QE is reinforced by the negative DFR, as banks with excess liquidity holdings have a stronger incentive to reduce these holdings and put their reserves to work. The truth of the matter is that we have not so far seen significantly detrimental consequences of negative rates on the profitability of banks, notably thanks to the favourable fact that the slope of the yield curve has remained positive. 3/ Our forward guidance provides further indications as to the future path of our monetary policy; and by steering expectations, it has an impact on the yield curve.

I also believe that more can be done to deploy technology to untap the large business opportunities in trade, which includes the integration and digitalisation of trade finance as well as e-commerce. Let me now conclude. The issue of sustainability is a matter of grave concern for the global community. If sustainable development takes a backseat, the global landscape in the future will look very different. We might see the gains that we have built and enjoyed over the decades erased. The clock is ticking, and the world has to act now. On its part, Islamic finance must contribute towards generating solutions to this challenge. In this endeavour, steadfast commitment from the Islamic finance industry to innovate; to embrace fintech; to invest in talent; and to play a greater role in international trade is crucial. Islamic finance must be a force for global good, proving that the sustainability agenda isn’t just good for the world, but is good for 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  business. It must prove the dictum “doing well by doing good”. This is what Shariah calls us to do – to benefit the people and planet; and bringing greater prosperity to the ummah. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
It recommended the introduction of limits on the proportion of new mortgages at high LTI ratios. The momentum in the housing market cooled and the limits have not so far been reached. It is impossible to say how much this was a result of the Committee’s action; a number of other important factors were also in play. But it is an example of the FPC’s approach to adjusting policy to respond to changing risks. And it is also an example of the Committee taking a broad view of financial stability that goes wider than direct risks to the banking system. A further example of how macroprudential risk can develop outside the banking system is the lending and investment that happens through financial markets rather than through banks. To take one example, the global asset management sector has grown by 60% since 2003 and is now a similar size to the global commercial banking system. This will probably be one  2  6  The July 2015 FSR identified the following major risks facing the UK financial system: the global environment notably Greece and China; market liquidity; UK current account deficit; UK housing market; misconduct; and cyber risk. BIS central bankers’ speeches  of the new frontiers of macro (and micro) prudential regulation. The FPC is exploring whether there are significant risks from changes in these markets and in particular how asset managers manage liquidity to meet redemptions in times of stress. There is also work underway on this internationally.

They then concluded it was for someone else to address macroprudential risk. The trail of macroprudential policy goes rather cold at this point. The prevailing view seems to have been that if the regulation and supervision of individual firms was right and if central banks had the necessary Tiberius-like instruments to intervene in crises, sufficient stability could be ensured. It was the realisation in the last years of the last century that an ever more liberalised and globalised financial sector was generating ever more difficult financial crises that led to the reawakening of interest in macroprudential policy. This was led by Andrew Crockett, then the General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements and a former Executive Director of the Bank of England.
In this case it is quite possible that it will need to be raised by more than  15  8  Monetary Policy Report 1, 2011, pages 17–19, Norges Bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  0.25 percentage points at one or more meetings and that it will need to be increased to 4 per cent already next year. Resource utilisation In my overall assessment, resource utilisation is more or less normal at present and with the present forecasts it will be higher than normal and rising towards the end of the forecast period. This also indicates the need for a higher repo-rate path than the presented path. The Riksbank uses several different measures of resource utilisation. According to these measures, the GDP gap, for example, will be approximately –1 per cent in the first quarter of 2011. My own assessment is that it will be a little higher than this, more or less zero. The level indicated by the so-called RU indicator also supports the claim that resource utilisation is largely normal. The RU indicator, which has been developed by the Riksbank and weighs together a large number of indicators to form a summary measure of resource utilisation, reached a normal level already in the fourth quarter of 2010. Several other measures also indicate that resource utilisation is normal (see Figure 19). Unemployment, on the other hand, is still higher than normal.

The Bank of Albania, in the light of priority to comply with budget deficit and fiscal consolidation objectives, suggests that the implementation of the budget 2017 should regard the following: - In the event the budget revenues are less than the planned level and the difference is higher than the contingencies foreseen in the budget, then the Government should take additional measures to comply with the budget deficit levels. This implies the reduction of budget expenditures commensurate to the level of unrealised income. - In the event the budget revenues are above the planned level, and the difference stems from faster than projected economic growth, such revenues should be saved, by proportionally reducing the budget deficit. - In the event the budget revenues are above the planned level and the difference stems from the improved fiscal management, such revenues may be spent, affecting neither the budget deficit nor the fiscal consolidation intensity. 4.2 Structure of financing and public debt The way the budget deficit and public debt are financed is as important as their level. The financing structure of the Albanian debt was and remains stable. The domestic debt is shifting towards longer-term maturities, and its sensitivity against short-term volatilities on interest rates is downward. In parallel, the external debt is mostly in concessionary terms and has long-term maturity. Nevertheless, the Albanian public debt showed an increasing trend of financing from external resources. In the last decade, the share of external debt to total debt increased by 16 percentage points.
Investment spending, in theory and in practice, is highly procyclical and more volatile than GDP. In general, this holds for the CESEE region, as well. Therefore, there is no doubt that significant part of the observed slowdown in investment demand in the CESEE region after the crisis is cyclical in nature. In addition, simple analysis of relative volatility of investment points out to a decline in volatility of investment in the period after the crisis, which could be an indication of an unsustainable investment boom in CESEE region before the crisis. 3  Table 1: Pro-cyclicality and relative volatility of investment Correlation between y-o-y change in investment and GDP  Volatility of investment relative to GDP*  Volatility of investment in CESEEE relative to EU28**  2001-2008 2009-2017 2001-2008 2009-2017 2001-2008 2009-2017 CESEE 0.93 0.93 5.20 3.99 2.02 1.29 EU28 0.89 0.98 3.38 3.31 *std.deviation of the y-o-y change in investment relative to std.deviation of the y-o-y change in GDP *std.deviation of the y-o-y change in investment in CESEE relative to std.deviation of the y-o-y change in investment in EU28 Source: Eurostat and NBRM calculations. Nevertheless, the observed slowdown in investment activity is persistent which might have negative impact on growth potential of CESEE region. Investment flows define capital dynamics by renewing and augmenting capital stock, which in turn is one of the determinants of potential growth. Lower investment also implies faster depreciation and lower maintenance of capital stock.

Second, for those companies that external finance seems to be important caveat, the main causes are related to the inadequate collateral, high costs and complex procedures. Both notions bring to the fore  10  the need to discuss the state of play and the potential for financing with alternative instruments through capital markets. Chart 12: The most important limiting factors for external financing (Average 2015-2017, % of the total number of surveyed companies) Region insufficient collateral or guarantee Baltics  interest rates or price too high reduced control over the enterprise  CEE  financing not available at all SEE  too much paperwork is involved there are no obstacles  EU28  0.0%  20.0%  40.0%  60.0%  80.0%  100.0%  Source: Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), EC and ECB. 4. Capital markets in CESEE – potential source for finance Although greatly used, the traditional sources of finance, such as government financing for infrastructure, or financing through domestic banks of SMEs might be either limited in size, or constrained by some structural impediments. Hence, these sources might not be sufficient to close financing gaps. In this context, capital markets can have significant role for bridging the existing gaps. Benefits of developed capital markets are well known.
If that view were to prevail the main effect would be to inhibit the development of the euro as an international trading and portfolio currency, reducing one of the single currency’s major benefits to both investors and borrowers within the euro area itself. In practice in today’s world of globally integrated markets and liberalised capital flows there is very little prospect of being able to impose artificial constraints on the international use of the euro. There will inevitably be active euro markets in all the major financial centres, including London. And it is in the interest of financial activity right across Europe that there should be. Like trade in goods, trade in financial services is a positive sum game, so that London’s success is not a threat to other European financial centres. As a major interface between Europe and the rest of the world I have little doubt that euro-activity in London will mean more rather than less euro activity in other European financial centres like Frankfurt, Paris, Milan, Amsterdam or Brussels. And conversely I have little doubt either that what is good for those centres will be good too for the City. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I have said enough to persuade at least some of you that British hesitations about participating in the euro from the outset are not just plain obstinacy!

Regarding the concept of compound interest, however, the percentage is very close to the average observed in the OECD countries (46%) and in the EU members (44%). Nonetheless, this should serve as no consolation, since this average means that over half the interviewees do not understand a basic financial concept such as compound interest rates. The need to reinforce the general public’s financial literacy is also patent in some of the results on knowledge, holding, acquisition and use of financial products. Firstly, as far as knowledge of financial products is concerned, the Survey asks interviewees whether they have heard of the following products: (i) savings accounts, pension schemes, investment funds, shares and fixed income (all savings vehicles); (ii) life insurance and medical insurance; (iii) means of payment such as credit cards; and (iv) debt products such as mortgages and personal loans. It can be concluded from the results that there is less knowledge of savings products than of debt or insurance products. Shares and pension schemes are well known (around 90% have heard of them), but only 73% of interviewees have heard of savings accounts and term deposits and only 78% of fixed income, while the percentage of those who have heard of life and medical insurance, credit cards, mortgages and personal loans is, in all instances, higher than or equal to 95%.
It should be bipartisan in nature so that the plan is viewed as sustainable across the political cycle. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Meanwhile the crisis in the eurozone has resulted in a sharp slow-down in economic growth in Europe and tighter financial conditions globally. It has hurt U.S. consumer and business confidence and is already a material drag on U.S. growth. Economic momentum in many other regions of the world has also slowed somewhat and this is also restraining the demand for U.S. exports. Assuming that Congress avoids the fiscal cliff and European leaders successfully manage through their challenges, there are solid grounds for expecting that growth will gradually strengthen in coming years. U.S. banks are healthier and credit conditions, while still tight, are gradually easing, the housing sector is showing early signs of recovery, and households appear quite far along in the deleveraging process. On the inflation side, we have succeeded in delivering inflation very close to our 2 percent price stability objective. Over the past year or so, price trends have been a bit stickier than one might have anticipated given the large amount of slack in the economy. To some degree, this likely reflects earlier upward pressures on commodity prices, the anchoring exerted by stable inflation expectations, and the stickiness of nominal wages. With gasoline prices now falling sharply and upward pressures from apparel prices now appearing likely to dissipate, I expect that inflation will decline a bit in coming months, falling somewhat further below our 2 percent objective.

In its meeting in April, the Monetary Policy Committee noted that “labour market data on quantities were signalling a tighter position than the price [earnings] data”. At that time, the Labour Force Survey and claimant count BIS Review 103/1998  –7–  measures of unemployment had both fallen below their previous troughs recorded in the spring of 1990, and were still declining. This position was evident across all categories of unemployment, as can be seen from chart 2 which shows the various measures of joblessness reported in the EPI’s Employment Audit. In addition, employment and total hours worked were rising quite strongly; recruitment intentions were at their highest level for nine years, with the level of vacancies at Jobcentres, and the average duration of these vacancies, both well above their 1988/89 peaks; and survey measures of recruitment difficulties were also at high levels. The underlying rise of the Average Earnings Index had increased to 42% by the beginning of 1997, but was little changed by the end of the year. If I had been asked to deliver the third Annual EPI lecture, rather than the fourth, the main question you might have expected me to grapple with would have been why earnings growth had not at that point risen by more, given the 1.0 million fall in unemployment and the 1.4 million rise in LFS employment since the end of 1992.
Jean-Pierre Roth: More growth a must Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Economic Forum, Thun, 27 May 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Since the mid-1970s now, economic growth in Switzerland has been significantly lower than that of other industrialised nations. In terms of per capita GDP among OECD countries, Switzerland lost its leading position during this time, falling back into the main field. Economic growth is vital, however, for the sustainability of our social security institutions. Demographic shifts will cause the ratio of pensioners to contributors to double in the next 30 years, with the result that tomorrow’s generation will be faced with a heavy burden – one that could be considerably lightened by higher growth rates. The soft growth in Switzerland is primarily attributable to the lack of competition in the domestic market. There are numerous known ways to boost growth which have proven successful in many other countries. So far, however, Switzerland unfortunately has neither grasped the importance of implementing these measures, nor does it have the political will to do so. Stronger economic growth can only be achieved by opening our domestic market to competition, contributing to the attractiveness of Switzerland as a business centre and strengthening our human capital.

This translates into a more competitive and more innovative financial system, one that is more flexible and resilient, with weakness in one part of the system more likely to be offset by a capacity for expansion elsewhere. And, because their overall risk profiles are likely to differ from banks, the greater importance of non-bank financial intermediaries, and of the capital markets more generally, offsets some of the potential concern associated with consolidation in the banking system. Within the universe of non-bank financial intermediaries, there are other material changes worth noting. Let me highlight three. First, the role of the major investment banks in the United States as market makers and providers of liquidity in a broad range of foreign exchange, securities, and derivatives markets has continued to grow over the past decade, as has the international importance of these firms. These institutions are now key participants in the domestic and international clearance and settlement processes associated with these activities. Second, a sustained period of rapid growth in the major mortgage GSEs has left us with two very large financial institutions, whose balance sheets and associated off-balance sheet positions today account for a much larger share of the U.S. mortgage market than was the case a decade ago. This means that the credit and market risks associated with the home mortgage business in the U.S. are now in some respects more concentrated. It means that the actions taken by the GSEs to manage interest rate risk can have a substantial impact on interest rate volatility.