samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A number of factors have contributed to this outcome, including flight to safety flows, the presence of the Eurosystem on the secondary market, the hunt for yield by investors, and the success of the first European common debt issues. Liquidity indicators also displayed good resilience. For instance, the depth of the secondary market for French government negotiable securities, measured by the average volume of daily transactions (excluding Eurosystem purchases), has remained at a historically high level,albeit at 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  an increased transaction cost, more pronounced for non-core sovereign debt markets, but at levels far below those of previous crises. The ownership structure of European debt securities has also contributed to and reflects this resilience. According to data from the ECB1, non-residents of the euro area were holding a significantand stable 44% of euro area government debt at the end of 2020,willing to invest in EUR, via highly liquid securities. Among residents, long term investors are prominent investors : the central banks were accounting for 21% of total outstanding debt, for the euro area, investment funds, insurance corporations and pension funds were holding about 11%, while other monetary financial institutions or banks for 19%. b) Let me now turn to the repo market and its resiliency during the Covid crisis. Under normal market conditions, the repo market is very liquid since large banks dedicate specific balance sheet capacity for this activity.

A high leverage ratio makes the financial system, and in effect the whole economy, more sensitive to fluctuating asset prices. The present downturn in Norway was not triggered by moving asset prices, but rather by the international downturn. Still, the effect of the international downturn on our economy is probably stronger than it would have been with a better regulatory framework. A consensus is emerging internationally that new tools are needed in order to make the financial system more robust with respect to macroeconomic fluctuations. Moreover, the financial system should help dampen rather than amplify or even cause fluctuations. The new tools – macro-prudential policies – are needed regardless of the monetary policy regime in place in any given country. For Norway, as a small EU outsider, it is hard to see any better option than inflation targeting. Indeed, it has been a strength in the current downturn to have a credible inflation targeting regime in place. We have tried to have a long-term perspective on attaining the target. This was especially important when the economy was hit by a supply shock, and we needed to trade off reaching the inflation target and closing the output gap. Inflation was below target until last year. Now, hit by a demand shock and looking ahead, we know that a trade-off is absent – the economy needs stimulus. But in the face of an unusually high degree of uncertainty, and given an unusually large shock, I believe that it is sensible to continue to be patient.
In the particular case of the EU, and with a view to at least partially offsetting the costs of deglobalisation and to ensure a more robust and resilient EU economy, in my view strategic autonomy policies should be accompanied by a substantial deepening of EU integration, particularly in those areas where integration is less advanced. In this regard, structural policies are needed at EU level to promote the integration and interconnection of EU markets - particularly energy markets - and to strengthen the single market, which will not only make it more resilient to shocks but will also increase competitiveness. Not only in the energy market, but also by promoting a genuine single market for services. Moreover, joint financing mechanisms must be put in place to safeguard this common effort without weighing too heavily or too unevenly on national public finances. Joint financing arrangements would enable EU institutions to finance large-scale programmes subject to a common quality standard and to evaluate their compliance in a homogeneous manner. Finally, it is essential to make progress in extending risk-sharing mechanisms - public and private - in the EU. This should be done in three ways. First, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) needs to equip itself with a permanent macroeconomic stabilisation capacity. Second, it is essential that the Banking Union be completed with the construction of an EU deposit guarantee system.

And third, progress in building the Capital Markets Union is essential to increase the resilience of the EMU to macro-financial shocks, better spread the costs of asymmetric or idiosyncratic shocks, reduce the risks of financial fragmentation, and provide a more favourable environment for private investment. At present, the relatively small size of equity markets and the substantial national bias in asset portfolios limit risk sharing in the area. In addition, a deeper Capital Markets Union can improve the channelling of abundant aggregate savings into investment in infrastructure, energy and innovation, areas where private investment is crucial. In this regard, a key element for a truly deeper and more integrated EU capital market would be a sufficient volume of pan-European safe assets. An EU safe asset would become a common benchmark for investors, allowing security prices across the EMU to better reflect the risk of their fundamentals. It would also facilitate the development and integration of the area's financial markets, and movements in search of credit quality would no longer produce cross-border flows to countries considered safer. It would also boost the confidence of international investors in the European project, helping to strengthen the international role of the euro. All this is particularly relevant in a context of geopolitical tensions and asymmetric shocks. 6  The consequences for monetary policy Let me now turn to the third part of my talk: are all these recent global developments relevant for the conduct of monetary policy?
ASEAN+6 or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) This FTA builds on the existing five ASEAN Plus One FTAs. Negotiations have been going on for some time but the pace has picked up recently as rising trade tensions have underscored the importance of enhancing economic integration to build resilience When it is signed, RCEP will be the world’s largest trading bloc in terms of population, covering nearly 3.5 billion people, and accounting for a third of the world’s GDP. Second headwind – tightening global financial conditions. As the Fed continues to raise interest rates and unwind its balance sheet, global liquidity conditions will tighten and financial market valuations will come under further pressure. Asset revaluations will be keenly felt in EMEs, which have benefited from large investor inflows driven in part by investors’ search-for-yield in the post-GFC period. In Emerging Asia, some economies will face higher financing costs, rising external debt burdens, short-term capital outflows, and heightened currency volatility. We have already seen some signs of these pressures. They are to be expected – as part of the normal adjustment to the normalisation of global financial conditions. ASEAN is well placed to deal with these pressures as well as contagion effects from EMEs in other parts of the world First, economic fundamentals in ASEAN are stronger. Growth is good – it is close to or above potential across the ASEAN-4 (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines). Inflation has been subdued. Current accounts are in surplus or only a small deficit.

As Rabbie Burns wrote, “O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us To see oursels as others see us!”  1  BIS Review 111/1999  The real test of the MPC is whether it aims continuously to meet the inflation target. For that reason, the Monetary Policy Committee must be setting a policy for all seasons. Some of you may say that it is all very well to set a policy for all seasons, but what about a policy for all regions, or parts of the UK? Many critics disapproved of the recent increase in interest rates. Indeed, the Scottish Council Development and Industry (SCDI) itself described the decision as “disappointing”. It also described the rise as “premature”; we would describe it as pre-emptive: prompt action to head off inflationary pressures in the future and so lower the level at which interest rates might otherwise need to be set. The SCDI said that “Scottish business is regaining confidence after a tough period, but this announcement [of a rate rise] will dent that confidence”. Yes, it has been tough – indeed remains tough – for some industries, especially agriculture, tourism and parts of manufacturing. But there has not been an overall recession. GDP growth in the UK, over the previous twelve months, reached a trough of 1.3% in the first quarter of this year, and has been rising since then.
In this context, the parallel commitments of the major political parties to the continued provision of free health services for all and to prudent fiscal policies are not easy to reconcile. Much the same can be said of higher education, which is characterized by a student subsidy system that is probably unique. The University of Malta and MCAST have together been allocated Lm15.5 million for 2007, compared with no less than Lm8 million budgeted for students’ maintenance grants. Funds that would permit these institutions to offer better quality programmes, and in the process hopefully raise the number of science and technology graduates from its current inadequate level, are instead paid to students regardless of their financial means. Changes needed in the pattern of resource allocation This generous approach to the management of public finances has meant that recurrent revenue, although higher year after year, has often not been able to keep up with recurrent expenditure. For example, in 2005 expenditure amounted to 41% of GDP, roughly matching revenue at 42%. As a  1  A recent paper on public sector efficiency in the new EU Member States gives Malta a relatively high score in terms of public sector performance that measures outcomes. However, when performance is related to the inputs used to gauge the efficiency of the State, Malta ranks 21st in a pool of 24 countries including all 10 new Member States, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and a number of emerging market economies.

The adjustment of costs and relative prices, albeit with some delay compared with what would have been desirable, has ultimately placed the Spanish economy in a much more competitive position. The reduction in unit labour costs has allowed virtually all of the losses in competitiveness that had built up in the first ten years of the euro to be absorbed. The process has not, however, been free from difficulties, since it was initially based, as I stated earlier, almost exclusively on job destruction. From 2010, the contribution of the adjustment in wages progressively became more prominent, a trajectory which stepped up following the 2012 labour market reform. The gains in competitiveness and Spanish firms’ greater export-geared thrust are providing for the growing penetration of our products in foreign markets, against a background of increased geographical diversification and higher goods and services exports. The marked decline in imports during these years also reflects the gains in competitiveness, although the weakness of domestic demand has likewise helped contain purchases from the rest of the world. Set against these developments, the least favourable aspect of our foreign trade continues to be the high dependence on imported energy. As a result of the foregoing, our economy posted – for the first time since 1997 – a balance of payments surplus, i.e. net external lending, of 1.5% of GDP. This trajectory will foreseeably continue over the coming years, meaning that Spain’s high level of foreign debt will be declining.
So far, over 140 firms have signed up for the scheme, and have borrowed over £ in total, some of which has already matured. Firms’ borrowing capacity in the scheme is more than three times that level (Chart 10), helping to underpin confidence – and complementing the Government-run schemes, including the Coronavirus Business Interruption and Bounce Back Loan (BBL) Schemes, which together have lent a further £ Central bank facilities are generally designed to support, rather than replace, market mechanisms – and here too the CCFF has brought benefits. First, CP issuance under the scheme has been at least three times larger than the size of the pre-Covid-19 sterling CP market – and nearly three quarters of CCFF firms have set up a CP programme since applying. So the CCFF has helped to deepen the CP market, with potentially lasting benefits. And, second, the normalisation of conditions in core markets, coupled with the restart of the MPC’s sterling corporate bond purchases on 7 April and similar schemes operated by the ECB and Federal Reserve, has allowed many larger firms to return to private debt markets, reducing the need of some to draw on schemes like the CCFF. Indeed, UK firms’ debt issuance has been running materially ahead of the average in previous years (Chart 11). In addition to the CCFF, the Bank also opened the borrowing window for the new Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (TFSME) on 15 April.

It just happened to be the prevailing capital ratio among US banks at the time the first Basel capital accord was struck. More recently, the Basel Committee has explored the costs and benefits of higher capital ratios (Basel Committee (2010a)). Using conservative estimates of the benefits, that study suggests an optimal capital ratio in the region of 13–14%. One area of conspicuous conservatism is the study’s assumption that higher capital will not lower banks’ equity and debt-servicing costs. Reworking the arithmetic to include these and other effects, Miles et al (2011) calculate an optimal capital ratio closer to 20%. These studies are technically complex. A simpler way of posing the question is to ask what it might take to avoid a repeat crisis performance under the new rules. The average risk weight for a global bank is 40%. This means that a 10% capital ratio in risk-weighted terms translates into bank leverage of 25 times equity. So even once Basel III is in place, an unexpected loss in the value of a bank’s assets of 4% will be sufficient to render it insolvent; much less than that to render it illiquid. For me, that argues for bolstering further banks’ capital defences over the medium term. Basel III is a good starting point, but may not be the right finishing line. Leaning against that are those arguing “equity is expensive”. They seem to me to have two unassailable arguments on their side. One is tax. The other is state subsidies.
This working partnership paves the way for the financial services industry and the academia in Malaysia to work with the University of Nottingham, one of the top ten universities in the United Kingdom. The combination of academic excellence from the University of Nottingham and in-depth market knowledge of the financial services industry will spur greater innovation in financial services, leading to higher value added products and services. All of us can agree that the University of Nottingham is not new to us, as it is among the first foreign universities to establish a campus in Malaysia. It is also known as the university of choice by many Malaysians for its academic excellence and its forte in research. The University has also produced many prominent Malaysian leaders including the Deputy Prime Minister, YAB Dato' Seri Najib Tun Abdul Razak. Ladies and Gentlemen, Top-tier financial institutions are known for their commitment in research and development to enhance innovation, especially in process and product innovation to drive competition. In the process, such financial players will be able to better position themselves to be part of the global financial community. Bank Negara Malaysia encourages and supports a strong culture of research and development in the financial services industry in Malaysia in both the conventional and Islamic finance. We believe that the encouragement and support is important to ensure a wider range of high quality financial products and services to meet the changing demands of a progressive and dynamic Malaysian economy.

The challenge is to enhance efficiency and reduce costs, respond to market and regulatory demands and, most of all, gain competitive advantage through innovative products and services. Ladies and Gentlemen, The success of this IBBM-University of Nottingham collaboration will depend on the active involvement and support from the financial services industry. I therefore, encourage the industry to play a proactive role in supporting the activities organized by the Financial Services Research Forum. In concluding, I look forward to seeing greater collaborative efforts between the academia and the industry in research and development for the financial services industry. On this note, I am pleased to officially launch the collaboration between IBBM and the University of Nottingham , in the Financial Services Research Forum. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 63/2006
These characteristics of the crisis shape the two principal challenges that financial systems face today: reviving the flow of credit to economic agents, and the orderly restructuring of the financial system. Let us analyse these two issues separately. The first and most immediate aim is that credit and liquidity should once again flow unimpeded towards companies and consumers. The resolute action of European central banks and governments since October has meant that illiquidity strains have largely been resolved in the financial sector. However, credit to companies and consumers has been checked by banks' mistrust, by the increased risk profile of borrowers and by the sharp decline in demand resulting from the slowdown in economic activity. The deceleration is proving particularly acute and credit growth has fallen from a rate twice that of nominal GDP before the crisis to around 5%. And the prospect is that this trajectory will continue on the immediate horizon, with credit growth dipping to a zero or even negative rate. That generates a perverse effect which feeds back into the difficulties of both those demanding and supplying financing, making a global approach necessary: just as it is inconceivable that the current difficulties of the financial sector may be resolved if the downward spiral of the Spanish economy is not curtailed, nor may it be assumed that the current situation can be plausibly overcome if the flow of credit were to seize up.

The Federal Reserve is also standing up programs to support the flow of credit to households, businesses, and state and local governments, so that they can weather this storm and continue to do their work, both now and when normal life resumes.7 Last week, we announced more details on these programs, which altogether provide additional funding of up to $ trillion.8 These programs are executed with the full support of the Treasury. We are also deeply committed to providing transparency around matters such as usage, eligibility, governance, vendor selection, and fees for these programs. The actions by the Federal Reserve, while sharing some similarities with those undertaken during the financial crisis, are specifically designed to deal with the unique economic challenges posed by the coronavirus. Our efforts supporting the provision of credit include a number of programs aimed at different 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  parts of the economy and work through different channels. One set of programs supports the availability of credit to businesses—importantly, including small and medium-sized businesses— through loans, commercial paper, and corporate bonds. The second set of programs targets the availability of credit to states and municipalities. But we cannot act alone: fiscal policy is also playing a critically important role. In particular, it can do what monetary policy cannot: provide for the public health response and transfer income to those most affected by the outbreak.
The varied practices across the globe suggest the viability of different SRO models with their attendant benefits and limitations that may be appropriate to one jurisdiction while not necessarily to others. But what is common is that the notion of exchanges as frontline regulators has not been radically changed nor dismantled. 18. In Singapore’s context, when we review the role of the MAS vis-à-vis an SRO, a key consideration is who is better placed to make that assessment of risk-return tradeoffs in the strategy to support a sustained thriving marketplace. A stringent set of entry or policing criteria can limit growth and development; a loose set of criteria can undermine long-term confidence of market participants including investors and companies. On either end, the exchange’s own shareholders and other stakeholders including the investing public will be worse off. In addition, we have to consider who is in a more nimble position to manage the different types of risks posed by market participants on the exchange itself including early detection and preliminary investigations. 19. I should emphasise that these do not mean that concerns over potential conflict of interest especially with respect to the listing function are unfounded. Hence the MAS regularly reviews the extent to which the SRO functions – listings, member supervision and surveillance – should reside with the exchange.

The Government has launched the SkillsFuture initiative last year, to allow all Singaporeans to acquire a mastery of skills and to be better prepared for future jobs. This can be helpful to financial market professionals such as our trading representatives as example. 48. The Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF) has worked with SGX to conduct a survey polling some 1,200 trading representatives last year for their feedback on their training needs and professional development. IBF has also organised extensive consultations with multiple stakeholders such as Securities Association of Singapore (SAS) and the Society of Remisiers of Singapore (SRS), as well as arranged focus group discussions with individual remisiers and dealers. 49. As a follow up to these consultations, IBF will be introducing a new set of competency standards to help trading representatives acquire competencies to service their clients better. IBF will also be working closely with the SGX Academy, SRS as well as the larger brokingfirms to have in place a wide offering of training programmes to be made available to trading representatives 50. MAS will continue to support the various training initiatives. All learning and development programmes formally recognised by IBF will receive at least 50% funding subsidy 2 2 from the Financial Sector Development Fund (FSDF). In addition, trading representatives who are prepared to undergo the IBF Standards certification programme will receive 70% funding subsidy. You might be aware that the SkillsFuture Credit has already been rolled out early this month. Trading representatives can use the $ Credit for eligible training programmes.