samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But, funding is only one aspect of a micro-business. Prior to as well as subsequent to funding, there are a large number of other requirements that have to be satisfied. First and foremost, anyone desirous of starting a micro-business should have a good knowledge of the market in which he would sell his products. A feature of the market is that it is driven by the consumer who is considered the sovereign. If the consumer does not need a product, no one could force him to buy it, even when it is supplied free of charge. Hence, the goods and services that are produced by micro-businesses should always meet the requirements of the consumers. How can a micro-entrepreneur identify the market requirements? What proxies can he use for that, if he does not have direct information on the same? A problem which he would face in this respect is that he has to produce for the future. Hence, any information relating to the past may be a poor guide for that. This is not a problem unique only to micro-businesses. It is equally relevant to big producers as well. But the advantage for such big business firms is that they have the benefit of the results of consumer preference surveys conducted by various institutions. Such survey results are expensive and beyond the financial capacity of micro-businesses. Yet, without the benefit of such results, it would be a pure gambling for a micro-business to get into the production of these goods and services.

It is rather a time when we should be having some fun, watching both our ladies’ football teams from the Ndola and Lusaka offices battling it out on the battle field. Thereafter, it will be the turn of the gentlemen to break a sweat in friendly combat. We naturally expect that when the opportune moment is presented, commercial banks and other invited entities will also produce teams comprising ladies and gentlemen – after all the Central Bank of the Republic of Zambia will soon be showing you precisely how it is done. It is now my honour and privilege to officially launch the commencement of 50th anniversary celebrations of central banking in Zambia. Please enjoy yourselves. I THANK YOU. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Kevin Stiroh: A microprudential perspective on the financial risks of climate change Remarks by Mr Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2020 Climate Risk Symposium, Global Association of Risk Professionals (delivered via videoconference), 10 November 2020. * * *  Introduction Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to participate in GARP’s2020 Climate Risk Symposium. As shown by the strong turnout today, attention on climate-related financial risks is clearly growing within finance, both for the private sector and the public sector. Today, I’ll speak about these risks from a microprudential perspective—that is, the impact on specific financial institutions, particularly banks, and how firms are managing those risks. I’ll also provide a short update on some of the work under way through the Basel Committee’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Risks—the TFCR. Before proceeding, I’ll emphasize that I am speaking only for myself and not necessarily the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Risk Management Perspective From a supervisory perspective, a primary focus is to ensure that banks operate in a safe and sound manner and manage risks so they are resilient to a range of shocks. As you know, the core of effective risk management includes identifying, measuring, and managing traditional banking risks like credit risk, market risk, operational risk, or liquidity risks. These risks can materialize from a range of shocks—a recession, a geopolitical event, or a bad actor. And climate change.

8 [13]  … but their cashflows are affected more by interest rate adjustments than before Increasingly higher household indebtedness – in combination with a large share of mortgages taken at variable interest rates – has resulted in their cashflows being more affected by rate changes than previously. Traditionally, we tend to talk about the so-called interest rate channel when discussing the effects of monetary policy on household consumption. Simplified somewhat, the interest rate channel implies that it will be more attractive to save than to borrow when the interest rate is raised – and vice versa when the rate is lowered – which affects consumption. Another effect is that when the interest rate is raised, disposable income for savers increases and decreased for borrowers – and vice versa when the rate is lowered – which also affects consumption. This is usually referred to as the cashflow effect of monetary policy. 9 We can understand this effect by looking at how disposable income is defined: Disposable income ≈ wages + transfer payments + interest income + other capital income – interest expenditure – taxes According to the Financial Accounts from Statistics Sweden, households’ debts are approximately twice the size of their interest-bearing assets. Which is why a rate increase has a negative net effect on total disposable household income. This effect has increased as household indebtedness has grown. What then does an increased effect mean in actual monetary terms? We have studied this as well.
At its peak, the UK government was paying the wages of around a quarter of the workforce (9 million people) and is still doing so for around 4 million workers. Judging the true “employment status” of these furloughed workers, in particular whether they are actively seeking work, is difficult to judge. It is also difficult to gauge how many of these furloughed workers will return to their jobs once the furlough scheme ends. That leaves the current unemployment rate, the likely future unemployment rate and the equilibrium unemployment rate (taking into account the natural frictions associated with people moving job) all highly uncertain at present. This means measures of labour market slack in the economy are also highly uncertain. The same is true, for many of the same reasons, of measures of spare capacity within firms. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  12  With quantities uncertain, one indirect measure of slack comes from looking at the prices of labour, goods and services. These, too, have faced measurement problems and have been distorted by sharp shifts in the composition of employment and spending. 13 Nonetheless, most measures of underlying inflation and costs have been surprisingly resilient over the past year, given the scale of the contraction in activity. For  example, core CPI inflation rates have fallen by only 0.2 percentage points over the past year, while private sector average weekly earnings growth has been roughly unchanged.

If the same is true now, we would expect the recent rapid rise in broad money growth to translate, in time, into higher money spending growth. In fact, the projections recently published by the MPC for UK nominal GDP growth over the next year are already in double-digits. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  16  Another way of interpreting these rises in the money supply is as the financial counterpart of the excess, or involuntary, savings accumulated by households and companies during the Covid crisis. These reflect the combined effects of restrictions on spending at the same time as relatively stable incomes. In the US, these excess savings total around $ trillion and in the euro-area almost $ trillion, although these savings are unevenly distributed across household types. In the UK, the picture is much the same. Excess savings currently total around £ billion for households and over £ billion for companies, with the lion’s share of these savings are in highly liquid bank deposits. This leaves money growth, or accumulated liquid savings, in a very different position than at the time of the global financial crisis (Chart 14). Chart 14: M4 after the Global Financial and Covid Crises  115  Start of episode=100  110  105  100  95  90 t  t+6  t+12  t+18  t+24  t+30  t+36  Quarters  GFC  Covid  Source: Bank of England and Bank calculations.
This year will close at 12%, that is, nearly 2 percentage points above the June forecast. Cumulative surprises in volatile prices and the recent depreciation of the peso explain much of this correction. By 2023, on average, projected inflation is about 1 pp higher than in June, reflecting an RER standing between 3% and 4% above its second-quarter average. In addition, it is assumed that it will remain at these more depreciated levels throughout the projection horizon, ending the period above its 15- to 20-year averages. At the same time, the projection considers an increase in second-round and indexation effects, reflecting the higher persistence of inflation. Current levels and the expected evolution of the exchange rate are important factors behind the correction of our inflation outlook over the policy horizon, which more than compensates for the drop in the world prices of fuels, foods, and other commodities. The central scenario assumes that inflation will converge to the 3% target within the twoyear monetary policy horizon. In this projection, annual CPI inflation will end 2023 at around 3.5%, reaching 3% by the third quarter of 2024. Core inflation will see a slower convergence towards 3%, as a result of the strong persistence already noted and a higher RER (figure 11). This stubborn inflation persistence calls for a more contractionary monetary policy —in both nominal and real terms— than foreseen in June, as is summarized in the new MPR corridor in this Report.

Failure to act promptly will only exacerbate the intensity and duration of the problem, making it more costly to solve. Indeed, the actions that the Central Bank must take to ensure its convergence to 3% in two years’ time depend significantly on the outcome of policies with macroeconomic impact. The 7  ongoing fiscal consolidation process is a key element on the road to restoring economic balances. In fact, the baseline scenario of this Report assumes, first, that the future path of fiscal spending will be as outlined in the latest Public Finance Report, a document that proposes a reduction of the structural deficit to -0.3% in 2026 and, second, that demand stimulus policies such as those we had during 2020 and 2021 are not repeated. The Central Bank is responsible for maintaining low and stable inflation, but doing so efficiently at the minimum costs possible requires coordinated action with the different policies. If the projections presented in this Report prove true, inflation would be approaching a turning point. The pace of price increases will slow down in the coming months and annual inflation will begin to decline.
To the extent that the speculators had to borrow in the interbank market to fund their short Hong Kong dollar positions, the interbank interest rates were high enough to force the currency speculators to abandon the attacks, unwind their short positions, and incur substantial losses. The finely tuned currency board system worked well, but the interest rate volatility was extreme: during one attack, on 23 October 1997, the overnight interest rate shot up to nearly 300%. The stock market took a nosedive, and the HKMA was sharply criticized for relying on this single tool, the interest rate, to defend the Hong Kong dollar. In August the speculators adopted a more sophisticated ploy. They introduced a form of double play aimed at playing off the currency board system against the stock and futures markets. First, to avoid being squeezed by high interest rates, they prefunded themselves in Hong Kong dollars BIS Review 98/1998  -3-  in the debt market, swapping US dollars for Hong Kong dollars with multilateral institutions that have raised Hong Kong dollars through the issue of debt. At the same time, they accumulated large short positions in the stock index futures market. They then sought to engineer extreme conditions in the money market by dumping huge amounts of Hong Kong dollars. This sell-off was intended to cause a sharp interest rate hike, which in turn would have sent the stock market plummeting.

Even where we manage to limit the rise in global mean temperatures to 1.5 degrees, physical risks are likely to dominate the potential impacts of transition. And if instead we continue on our current trajectory, losses just from the impact on productivity could be as high as 13% of GDP.8  In addition, many of the leading studies, including those we used in the NGFS, start from past correlations and so find it hard to put an accurate number on the type of low-probability, high impact events that will become more common. As high levels of warming will be unprecedented, we don’t yet fully understand the delicate balance between the climate, living conditions, ecosystems and the economy - for example, the level at which ice melts might accelerate; or methane stores under permafrost might be unlocked. What is clear is that investment is needed now to help adapt to these inevitable changes. And that we should recognise the gaps in our understanding of how large changes to our climate might affect our economies. Challenges in applying scenarios  While these key themes are clear, I know from our own experience, and from the firms we supervise, that applying the scenarios in practice is not straightforward. The models, data and analytical frameworks are new, and the transmission channels are complex and subject to much uncertainty. The results can be sensitive to input assumptions and type of model used.
And it’s therefore possible that some firms in urban areas are keeping people on furlough even as those in the same sector, but outside cities, are finding it hard to recruit people. Chart 19: Firms in DMP see worse effects of pandemic in urban area13  Sources: Decision Maker Panel, ONS and Bank calculations. 13  Results are based on the question: ‘Relative to what would otherwise have happened, what is your best estimate for the impact of the spread of Covid-19 on the sales/employment of your business in 2022+?’. Locations of companies’ headquarters are allocated to a rural/urban location based on the 2011 Census Rural Urban Classification. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  16  Chart 20a: Restaurant bookings still well down on pre-pandemic levels in London, higher elsewhere  Sources: OpenTable accessed July 2021 and Bank calculations. 7-day rolling averages of year-on-year growth. Chart 20b: Google tracking data suggests recreation spending also weaker in London  Sources: Google LLC "Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports" https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/ Accessed July 2021 and Bank calculations. 7-day averages relative to January-February 2020. Chart 20c: Same for grocery spending  Sources: Google LLC "Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports" https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/ Accessed July 2021 and Bank calculations. 7-day averages relative to January-February 2020.

I will not take the risk and predict the development of the gold price, but one thing is certain: it will remain volatile. Our possibilities to actively hedge the gold risk are restricted by the agreement of September 1999. In particular, we may conduct hedging transactions only in the amount of the sales quota allocated to us for the current year. We are therefore all the more convinced that our strategy of regular sales remains appropriate. The principles that have guided our operations for the past two years – namely fulfilment of our commitments under the central bank agreement, transparency in communication and situationadapted handling of day-to-day business – remain relevant. Management of the free assets The market value of the free asset portfolio – consisting of the as yet unsold portion of the 1,300 tonnes of gold and the proceeds from the already effected gold sales – amounted to Sfr 21 billion at the end of May. The free asset portfolio is managed separately from our other reserves, which will facilitate its transfer to the future beneficiaries once the legal framework has been put in place. As I mentioned earlier on, our possibilities of actively hedging the gold risk against an unfavourable development of the gold price are restricted by the agreement on gold sales of September 1999. However, we limited the risks of a weak US dollar that might reduce the value of our future sales by hedging 35% of the future proceeds in US dollars against the Swiss franc.
Average prices (weighted by transaction)  2001 NOK 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Weighted average price giro transactions  Weighted average price all transactions  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  01  For most services, customer prices are lower than banks’ unit costs. The exception is giro services at the counter. The unit cost for EFTPOS has declined so that transaction prices nearly covered costs in 2001. Prices have fallen because the transaction volume has increased and costs related to developing and introducing the system have been repaid. The price for using a card in a POS terminal has not risen appreciably in recent years. The unit cost for paying bills over the Internet is still high. This is probably because development and introduction costs are still not repaid and because there is excess capacity in the banks' solutions. Customer prices cover less than one-fourth of the costs reported by banks in connection with this service. It appears that banks are pricing this service on the basis of a long-term strategy that low prices during the introduction phase will encourage customers to use new, more efficient payment instruments earlier. If the pricing strategy actually increases use, it may contribute to increasing efficiency in the payment system in the long term because economies of scale will be exploited at an early stage.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Further strengthening of the institutional structure for Islamic banking business operations Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the launch of RHB Islamic Bank Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, 1 March 2005. *  *  *  "Building on the strong foundations of a well-developed, comprehensive Islamic financial system and strengthening its international inter-linkages and thus its global integration, has enhanced Malaysia's potential to be an international centre for Islamic finance. Our first Islamic bank, established in 1983, marked the beginning of the Islamic banking and finance chapter for our country. The opening of Islamic banking windows by financial institutions in 1993 paved the way for a more effective and efficient distribution channel for lslamic banking services to achieve the critical mass on a nationwide scale. These developments have been reinforced by the progress achieved in the establishment of the Islamic financial infrastructure, including the money and capital markets, the regulatory and supervisory structure, and most importantly, the legal and shariah framework. Today marks the emergence of a new era, with the establishment of an Islamic subsidiary of a banking group as Islamic banking in our financial system enters into the third strategic phase of the institutional development of Islamic banking and finance in Malaysia". Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to be here this morning on the occasion of the official launch of RHB Islamic Bank Berhad. Indeed, today, we are witnessing the first transformation of an Islamic banking window to an Islamic subsidiary.
Second, it remains unclear if structural reform measures can make a bank or banking group safer if a culture of excessive risk-taking is not curtailed and if risk governance frameworks are not strengthened. MAS subscribes to the universal banking model on the premise that it is not the separation between risky and non-risky activities that matters as much as ensuring that risk is well managed wherever it is. •  For domestic banks, MAS does not impose any structural measures. The focus is instead on ensuring that their risk management capabilities are commensurate with the complexity of their activities and that capital and liquidity buffers are healthy. •  For foreign banks that have a significant presence in the retail market, MAS will require local incorporation of their retail operations. The banks can choose to subsidiarise their entire operations within the same legal entity or continue to operate its wholesale banking business under a branch structure. There is no retail ring-fence required. Unintended consequences It is imperative that we press on with the regulatory reform agenda and not succumb to reform fatigue. But even as we do so, we need to be mindful of unintended consequences. Inconsistent implementation of rules The first unintended consequence is the inconsistent application of rules across jurisdictions and across sectors. Inconsistent application of rules across jurisdictions leads to the risk of regulatory arbitrage. Take for example, the new capital rules.

Indeed, the University of Malta and other specialized institutions provide training and tuition leading to professional qualifications in all these fields. In addition, Malta benefits from a wide network of Double Taxation Agreements, covering some 40 countries, while investment by both the public and private sectors has provided a modern and efficient telecommunications system and airport facilities (the latter now under Austrian management), good hotels and office space and housing of high quality. These attributes, complemented by Malta’s favorable geographical position and climate, make the island a profitable place to do business from. 4  BIS Review 31/2004