samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The objective is to equip market participants with better information, let them take responsibility for making their own decisions and to judge the quality of the corporate governance of companies. But a disclosure-based approach can only work well if it is backed up by a robust enforcement regime. This is key to maintaining the confidence of market participants in the disclosure-based regime. In recent years, our regulatory authorities have acted decisively in the face of breaches by market participants, such as in the cases of ACCS, Citiraya and China Aviation Oil. Equally important for a disclosure-based regime is the raising of the bar on corporate governance standards themselves. Singapore’s approach here is a flexible one, recognising the need to cater to a range of companies of different sizes and resources. It comprises a balance of mandatory rules, captured in our legislation and listing rules, and best practice recommendations in the form of the Code of Corporate Governance. Listed companies are required to either adopt the best practice recommendations or to disclose instances where they have not done so and provide explanations for these – in other words companies must “comply or explain”. We will keep both our legislation and best practice codes up to date through regular refinement, so that they stay relevant to a changing environment. We will also keep close watch on developments internationally, to see if they might be relevant to the Singapore environment.

Monetary policy shall also underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. • Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. Fafo og Makt- og demokratiutredningen 6. september 2002  Norges Bank’s mandate reads as follows: Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. 2  BIS Review 50/2002  Monetary Policy Regulation (2) • Norges Bank's implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. Fafo og Makt- og demokratiutredningen 6. september 2002  Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. The first paragraph of the mandate sets forth an objective. The last paragraph specifies what Norges Bank shall do. The first sentence in the mandate refers to the value of the krone. Stability in the national value of the krone implies that inflation must be low and stable. Low and stable inflation fosters economic growth and stability in financial and property markets.
It seems that pricing mechanism doesn’t price properly the guarantees given by CGC. We ought to work on this. On the part of CGC, we need to response quickly to the banks when guarantees are being called upon. An ideal situation is akin to an irrevocable undertaking where once a guarantee is called upon, it will be made good immediately. Second, to intensify promotion and awareness program on CGC products and services. CGC needs to work closely with the trade associations and generate more media exposures through radios and TVs. Make CGC a household name among the SMEs. Third, expand further advisory services, its reach and contents. Not all SMEs require financing, some might need more “hand holding”, and rather than access to financing above. Lastly, come up with new and specific guarantee products for new growth area, start-ups and young entrepreneurs. Existing guarantee products might not be suitable to meet the needs of these groups. CGC should embark a study on this matter and come up with an action plan. Before I end my speech, I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations and appreciation to the Board, Management and staff of CGC for 40 years of service to the Malaysian SMEs. It is our greatest wish that CGC will continue to walk and grow alongside our SMEs in our effort to make our country prosperous. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

I want to build on that track record to do the same for our new tasks because in everything the Bank does, I and my colleagues are conscious that we are accountable to you. The Bank of England has changed radically since that Bank Holiday Monday in 1997 when Eddie George and I sat in the Bank contemplating our new role, unaware of the roller coaster ride on which we were about to embark. The Bank will change again next year with its new responsibilities. But some things don’t change. Here again is Mr. Montagu Norman: AUDIO INSERT: “I would sum up the vital characteristics of the Bank as experience in affairs, cooperation on all sides, independence of judgement. But you know these three things – experience, cooperation, independence – are no good unless people have confidence in you. I like to believe that the Bank, with its long history and tradition, stands high in public esteem. But only by service to the community can that esteem be maintained through times good and bad.” That’s true not just for Montagu Norman’s day, but for today too. The present crisis is far from over, as events in the euro area illustrate weekly. Our own economy is still not back to health. Although inflation has fallen back in recent months, it is still too high. And despite efforts to stimulate the economy, the recovery is proving slower than we had hoped. It will come.
These policies included: privatisation and limiting the role of the state in the economy; increasing the flexibility of labour markets; opening-up to foreign investments; liberalisation and eliminating barriers to competition; combatting corruption and other forms of public sector inefficiency, etc. The lessons from the previous crises and the EU accession experience are the major factor why emerging Europe is showing such resilience and flexibility now. These are the main reasons why the region has been weathering the current crisis relatively better than the rest of the continent. The case of Bulgaria: using growth to save for a rainy day By way of illustration, let me focus on the experience of Bulgaria. My country went through a severe banking and financial crisis in 1996–1997, when one third of the banks went bankrupt. There was hyperinflation and the confidence in the national currency vanished. That prompted the introduction of a very conservative monetary regime, the currency board, in July 1997. After that, inflation and interest rates went down swiftly and sustainably. Since then the Bulgarian economy has been growing in an environment of practically non-existent exchange rate risk, with highly flexible labour markets, hard budget constraints and fiscal discipline. The ratio of public debt to GDP fell from 105% in 1997 to 16% in 2010. The currency board arrangements are and will be our main anchor of stability and predictability till the euro adoption.

As stated on previous occasions, the provision of liquidity and the allotment modes for refinancing operations will be adjusted when appropriate, taking into account the fact that all the non-standard measures taken during the period of acute financial market tensions are, by construction, temporary in nature. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. In the first quarter of 2011, the euro area recorded strong real GDP growth of 0.8% quarteron-quarter, following the 0.3% increase of the fourth quarter of 2010. Recent statistical releases and survey-based indicators point towards a continued expansion of economic activity in the euro area in the second quarter of this year, albeit at a slower pace. This easing reflects the fact that the strong growth in the first quarter was partly due to special factors, which will cease to play a role in the second quarter. Hence, it is appropriate to look through such short-term volatility and to emphasise the positive underlying momentum of economic activity in the euro area. Looking ahead, euro area exports should be supported by the ongoing expansion in the world economy. At the same time, taking into account the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  favourable level of business confidence in the euro area, private sector domestic demand should contribute increasingly to economic growth, benefiting from the still accommodative monetary policy stance and the measures adopted to improve the functioning of the financial system.
It is thus important to try to find out to which degree an observed covariation in interest rates depends on restricted monetary policy autonomy in small countries according to this definition or on synchronised economic circumstances. Unfortunately, this is also difficult. 6 Weaker interest rate channel but stronger exchange rate channel? One interesting hypothesis in research into monetary policy and globalisation is that globalisation has not necessarily led to a weakening of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, as could spontaneously be suspected, but rather that the impact has changed character. More specifically, monetary policy’s interest rate channel can certainly be expected to become weaker as financial integration increases, as domestic actors find it easier to smooth their consumption over time by borrowing abroad. On the other hand, the exchange rate channel may become more effective. One reason for this is that the increased integration has also made it more common for domestic actors to hold foreign assets. When the exchange rate changes, the value of these assets also changes. The central bank can therefore also influence demand in the economy this way. An interest rate rise that strengthens the exchange rate leads to a decrease in the value of these foreign assets – a wealth effect that strengthens the normal exchange rate channel with reduced exports and increased imports. Some analysts claim that it cannot be ruled out that the net effect of a weaker interest rate channel and stronger exchange rate channel has been to make monetary policy more efficient, rather than less.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Developing Malaysia’s payment system landscape Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Payment System Forum and Exhibition 2015 “Moving Forward with e-Payments”, Kuala Lumpur, 3 November 2015. *  *  *  Welcome to the 2015 Payment System Forum and Exhibition 2015, with the theme “Moving Forward with e-Payments”. This year is another important step in our effort to develop our country’s payment system landscape. It marks the mid-way point of our journey to transform our country’s payments infrastructure into one that is highly efficient, secure and competitive as outlined in the 10-year Financial Sector Blueprint from 2011 to 2020. I will focus on 3 areas in my remarks today. •  First, I will provide you with an update of where we are in our migration path five years since we launched the Financial Sector Blueprint, and what we have done and achieved so far. •  Second, I will share with you some thoughts on how collaborative efforts among various stakeholders in the payment value chain can leverage and thrive on epayments as a strategic tool in today’s increasingly dynamic and competitive environment, and  •  Third, I will outline the opportunities that can be realised in relation to the Financial Sector Blueprint targets with specific emphasis on key priorities for 2016.
After all, the value of paper money rests on only one thing – trust. Trust in the ability and determination of those setting interest rates to maintain the value of money. Central to that is the independence of the Bank of England. An independent central bank has, over time and around the world, proved to be a cornerstone of the arrangements necessary to underpin trust in paper money. So, Chancellor, I welcome your intention to introduce a proper process for making appointments to positions on the Monetary Policy Committee. I welcome too, Chancellor, the announcements you made tonight about the shape of a new framework for financial stability to be embodied in a Banking Bill. I particularly welcome the new responsibilities for the Bank of England and associated reforms to our governance. We now have the chance to put in place a set of reforms that provide a coherent framework for banking regulation. It is an opportunity we must not throw away. I can assure you all that the Bank of England will devote time and resources to meeting the new responsibilities which the Chancellor plans to give us. Lord Mayor, shortly after assuming office, you were quoted as saying, “I think like a lawyer. I’m very prudent, very risk-averse”. What a pity you weren’t running a bank a year or two ago! But in a difficult year for the City you have provided leadership and thrown yourself into the enormous workload of your office.

A normalisation of risk premia in relation to the particularly low risk premia prevailing in recent years has its advantages. But the adjustments seem to be marked by overshooting and considerable volatility. We do not know how long the turbulence will last or what consequences will be for the real economy. So far the turbulence has not led to any major reassessments of the global growth outlook among most observers, although it seems obvious that it will have a negative effect. The turbulence has increased the risk that the problems that were initially linked to one segment of the US residential mortgage market will have consequences for the real economy in the US and the rest of the world. This has led to a fall in short-term interest rate expectations, particularly in the US. Long-term interest rates have also declined, reducing funding costs for solid borrowers. Interest rate expectations have also fallen somewhat in Norway. Developments in the krone exchange rate In recent weeks, developments in foreign exchange markets have also been marked by the turbulence. For example, there has been a substantial reduction in carry trade, resulting in an appreciating tendency for low interest rate currencies and weakening tendency for high interest rate currencies. Let us take a closer look at developments in the krone exchange rate and the importance of the krone exchange rate for monetary policy.
The resultant oversupply of space contributed to one of the most severe downturns that the commercial property industry has ever seen. Since then, other asset classes have outperformed commercial property in most years. Many institutional investors have responded by continuing to reduce their property holdings. Property companies have suffered; we have seen some high profile failures and reschedulings. The banks have suffered very sizeable losses on commercial property. Construction companies and associated professions such as architects and designers have suffered from the reduced workload on commercial property. And we must not forget the  BIS Review 11/1997  -2-  valuing and surveying professions; the upturn in insolvency-related work was not sufficient to offset lower turnover and the corresponding heavy pressure on fees. 6 Possibly the only ones to benefit from the downturn were tenants fortunate enough to sign new leases in an environment of falling rents. The modest extent of subsequent development has probably meant that even these ‘beneficiaries’ have had a more limited choice of accommodation. 7 Other factors have also made the market very challenging, especially for investors and lenders. These have included the speed of building obsolescence and growing pressure on companies to manage property resources more effectively. Several initiatives aimed at enhancing the market’s efficiency and attractiveness made little headway in the first half of the 1990s. These included efforts to enhance liquidity, to develop property derivatives, and to improve information on the very sizeable part of the market that is not ‘prime’.

And notwithstanding my rather jaundiced remarks above about forgotten lessons, some of the risks involved in commercial property are now better understood. This could simply mean that this cycle will repeat history but in a less pronounced way than last time. Perhaps I should at this point recognise the VAT changes announced in the last budget. These have caused a strong reaction from the property industry. They have caused a halt to a number of major deals. I do not know how the matter will be resolved and will not speculate whether the impact will be lasting. More of that no doubt in coming weeks. But are there any other new influences which could bring about a different - and better - outcome than the last cycle? There are at least four other important factors which arguably did not exist in 1989. They may all make the market less volatile in the years ahead. Let me be a bit visionary. 18 The first of these is a low inflationary environment. The political constituency for low inflation is now almost certainly stronger than at any time in living memory. There is a real prospect that a low inflation environment can be sustained into the future. This is a profound change and should help to smooth the path of future economic cycles. This environment is likely to mean slower growth in nominal rents and also less volatile capital values. The emphasis will continue to change from capital gain to running yield.
This growth projection and its composition are generally consistent with the baseline scenario of macroeconomic projections for Spain published by the Banco de España in mid-December and with those of most analysts (see left-hand panel of Chart 7). However, I would like to point out the two risks which I consider most significant for the macroeconomic scenario of the Budget. BANCO DE ESPAÑA  7	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  First, the macroeconomic projections of the Budget include an adjustment to the budget deficit clearly exceeding that expected by other analysts (see right-hand panel of Chart 7). In particular, the deficit target for general government as a whole stands at 1.3% of GDP in 2019, which is a reduction of 1.4 percentage points (pp) with respect to the envisaged final figure of 2.7% for 2018. By contrast, the projections of the Banco de España and of most analysts, as reflected by the Consensus Economics Forecasts, put the deficit for 2019 above 2%. Therefore, if the greater fiscal efforts required to meet the deficit target for general government as a whole included in the Draft Budget, amounting to 1.3% of GDP, were included in the projections of other analysts, their economic growth estimates for this year would be liable to a risk of downward revision.

Second, as I noted when looking at the macroeconomic scenario, the overall economic slowdown is becoming stronger, particularly in the euro area, which poses downside risks to the macroeconomic scenarios of the Draft Budget and of the Banco de España. I now review the main courses of action defined by the Draft Budget for budgetary policy in 2019. 2  Draft State and Social Security Budget for 2019  Meeting the deficit target of 1.3% of GDP for general government as a whole included in the Draft Budget depends largely on the projected growth of taxes and social security contributions. On official estimates, the additional revenue would be sufficient to finance a significant portion of the proposed increase in the spending of the State (observing the ceiling set by the Council of Ministers), the social security system and regional and local government. Regarding the behaviour of government spending, many, albeit not all, of the measures in the Draft Budget, were included in the budgetary plan published by the government in October 2018, which moreover provided the expected broad outline of the budgets for the rest of general government. The budgetary plan projected an increase in overall government expenditure in 2019 of 3.1% (in National Accounts terms), below nominal GDP growth for that year, thus allowing a corresponding reduction of the budget-deficit-to-output ratio.
 Third, we will have to look more closely at the economic activity and the cycle. In this tightening phase, unlike the phase of normalisation, the assessment of the state of the economy and projections for growth and employment will play a greater role. In case of a recession – even if it should be limited and temporary 8  Page 9 sur 14  -, we would be certain to face calls to stop the tightening. This would miss the point: to bring inflation back to target, a recession is neither necessary nor sufficient per se. A more relevant discussion will be the assessment of the slope of the Phillips curves. The current and rapid increase in core inflation has led some observers to suggest that the flat Phillips curve paradigm of past decades is now obsoletev. What is more likely is that price-setting in the economy is state dependent, with firms reacting by more and quicker to large shocks so that the Phillips curve is non-linear and convex. In any case, we cannot bet that a steeper Phillips curve will entirely do the job, allowing for a fairly “immaculate” disinflation.  Last but not least, we will need a benchmark to measure the degree of tightening. The real interest rate calculated with actual headline inflation would provide misleading signals. A better gauge is provided by medium-term forward real interest rates: they should be at least positive on all but the shortest maturities.

That said, I wouldn’t conclude that we are not at risk of coordination failures. Let me share two reflections in this regard: 1. Our collective “doctrine” on monetary policy, in the G7 and G20, remains valid: that we central banks target domestic price stability and not exchange rates. But it implies as a counterpart an in-depth and confident dialogue, in Washington, Basel and elsewhere, on our intentions: there should be mutual predictability of policy making. We will achieve the closest to a cooperative solution if we avoid significant surprises between policy makers. As Jay Powell rightly said in 2019 in Paris “Pursuing our domestic mandates in this new world requires that we understand the anticipated effects of these interconnections and incorporate them into our policy decision making.”ix Lael Brainard reiterated this welcome statement no later than yesterday: “The combined effect of concurrent global tightening is larger than the sum of its parts. The Federal Reserve takes into account the spillovers of higher interest rates, a stronger dollar, and weaker demand from foreign economies into the United States, as well as in the reverse direction”. x  2. But there can be market misperceptions of policy intentions or overshooting, and exchange rates can become fundamentally misaligned. Under such circumstances, there were G7 interventions in the past. Several of them were 12  Page 13 sur 14  effective, which we shouldn’t forget.