samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, the establishment of the Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand (AFET) by the Ministry of Commerce was a major step in the right direction. The futures market aims to provide an efficient and effective mechanism for the management of price risks. By buying or selling futures contracts - contracts that establish a price level now for items to be delivered later - individuals and businesses have access to insurance against future adverse price changes. Futures market is a continuous auction market whereby prices should reflect the latest information about supply and demand conditions. This price discovery mechanism allows producers to be better informed when making their production plans. Even for small producers who may not actively participate in the futures market, the transparency and the availability of the futures prices in the public domain should enable them to negotiate and obtain fair prices for their produce. Since AFET opened for trading in May 2004, the daily average turnover for a rubber sheet in the AFET rose almost 8-fold in 2 years to 400 contracts. This increase may look impressive, but if we look across to the futures exchanges in the neighboring countries, we find that the Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM) registers daily turnover for rubber sheets at 20,000 contracts while the Singapore Commodity Exchange (SICOM) sees around 8,000 contracts being traded daily. Given our prominence as the world’s leading producer, it came as a surprise to me that Thailand remains a mere price-taker in the world’s agricultural produce markets.

For the time being the crypto ecosystem is by very far not large enough to threaten the dominant role of mainstream finance. But this may evolve going forward, if we look beyond the current setbacks faced by the sector. So we consider that it is important to keep an eye on it. 2/ The second reason for our interest is the two-sided impact the tokenisation of finance might have on the functioning of our financial system, both in terms of efficiency and stability. From an efficiency perspective, a case in point is the recourse to DLT which underpins the development of tokenised finance. It has actually a largely recognised potential to enhance transparency, with a better tracking of transactions and ownership, but also cost-efficiency and availability around the clock. But it brings also a risk of fragmentation of processes, if the underlying blockchains are not interoperable and cannot also smoothly interact with legacy, centralised, clearing, settlement and payment systems. This interoperability for the time being remains to be ensured. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  From a stability perspective it is clear that currently the crypto ecosystem is not large enough and interconnected enough to threaten the stability of the whole financial system, as shown by the modest impact on mainstream finance of the May/June crypto assets market turmoil in the wake of the Terra-Luna collapse and more recently the impact of the collapse of the FTX crypto-conglomerate.
www.perjacobsson.org/lectures/101213.pdf 4 See Kydland, F. and E. Prescott (1977) “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans”,  Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), pp. 473–92 and Alesina, A. and L. Summers (1993) “Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative evidence”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25(2), pp. 151–162. 5 See Nicholas Bloom (2009), “The Impact of Uncertainty Shock”, Econometrica, Volume77, Issue3, Pages 623–  685 6 The final version is scheduled for publication on 22 February 2019. 7 Press conference given by Mario Draghi, 24 January 2019. 8 “ECB Monetary Policy and the Resilience of the Eurozone”, Columbia University, New York, 19 April 2017,  speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France. 9 Address given by Mário Soares on the European Community of the future (Lisbon, 19 October 1990). 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

Süreyya Serdengeçti: Derivatives markets - Turkish Derivatives Exchange Speech by Mr Süreyya Serdengeçti, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, on the occasion of the opening of the Turkish Derivatives Exchange, İzmir, 3 February 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen and Distinguished Guests, It is indeed a great pleasure for me to address you today on the occasion of the opening of the Turkish Derivatives Exchange, which is the beginning of a new era for the Turkish economy. Today, I will focus on the changing process of the Turkish economy within the framework of uncertainty and risk factors. I will also talk about the development of derivatives markets within this process, including their functions in the economy and especially in monetary policy. My remarks will be based on a macro framework rather than a micro one. Dear Participants, When we look at the Turkish economy, it can clearly be seen that risk management and derivatives markets, where risk is managed, as well as the institutionalized risk management culture established in the economy have failed to reach a satisfactory level and yet are still weak both in financial and real sectors, although this had constantly been on the agenda since the 1980s. The questions that should be asked at this point are that why risk management principles could not be established in our economy in a modern sense until now and why functionality in the derivatives markets could not be achieved in the proper sense.
To the contrary, by providing an explicit capital incentive to pursue internal models, the Basel framework effectively provided a subsidy to complexity. Conceptually, that is difficult to justify. Complexity has externality-type properties, making risk more difficult to monitor and manage, not less. Rather than subsidising it, there is a conceptually coherent case for taxing complexity within the regulatory framework. A degree of progress has already been made on this front. For example, the capital surcharge to be levied on the world’s most systemically important institutions has been calibrated with half an eye on the complexity and connectivity of banks’ balance sheets. 25 And the recovery and resolution plans being drawn up for these same firms may, as a by-product, simplify corporate structures in banking. But there is a case for tackling complexity directly and at source. Recent events have re-demonstrated the problems that arise in risk-managing large, complex financial firms with multiple models and management information systems. They make the world’s largest banks, arguably, too big to manage. At present, no explicit regulatory charge is levied on  24  Financial Services Authority (2010). 25  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  17  those complexity externalities. Doing so would help protect the system against failure, while providing explicit incentives to simplify balance sheets. What is true within firms is also true across them. Cross-system complexity has exploded over recent decades due to the growth in opaque, intra-financial system chains of exposure.

There is no scope for any mechanical adjustment of asset prices or bubbles. The central bank's reaction will not be stable but shift with its judgment and, counter to substantial parts of the literature, I do not believe that it is productive to discuss these issues directly in terms of the central bank's reaction function, for instance as modifications of a Taylor rule (Svensson 2003b, 2005). Asset-price movements and asset-price bubbles may directly threaten financial stability and cause the financial-stability constraints on monetary policy to bind. Thus, the central bank may want to respond to asset price developments that increase the risk of financial instability in the future. Again, in many realistic situations, the difficulty in making such judgments will be very great and there will be insufficient information for taking such preemptive action in many cases. Now, is there any reason to modify this view of monetary policy and financial stability given the experience of the financial crisis so far? Let me approach this question by asking what the causes of the financial crisis are, what the role of monetary policy is in causing the crisis and whether a different monetary policy was warranted and could have prevented or reduced the size of the crisis. 4.
CoCos or contingent capital issuance instruments that count as additional Tier 1 and satisfy our conditions amounted to another € billion. Internal capital generation, either by retained earnings or by extra provisions, and we calculated the provisions that are above what would have been the normal trend of evolution of provisions because indeed, as you well know, since last year banks have been increasing provisions just preparing for the exercise and the two things together amount to € billion. And then the other measures, asset sales and others, amount to € billion. This is a measure of the front-loading by the banks in preparing for the exercise, which is important to highlight because capital increases or increases in extra provisions done last year indeed reduced the numbers that the exercise could detect in the end. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The stress test itself, it’s also important to highlight that the severity of the scenario in the adverse case was indeed higher than in previous exercises. In fact, if we compare with previous exercises, taking the metric of the GDP drop in the adverse scenario, after two years in this present exercise the GDP on average would drop by 5.1%, whereas in previous exercises it dropped by 3% or 4% only. And this exercise had a third year which was not present in the previous exercises, so that the overall drop in GDP in the adverse scenario over the three years comes to 6.6%.

Macro-prudential policy needs to be operational soon, but some difficult hurdles remain to be overcome. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  An important challenge for the design of a new regulatory framework will lie in finding an appropriate balance: on the one hand, the regulations will need to be sufficient to effectively reduce the risk of financial crisis; on the other hand they should not be so stringent as to impose unnecessary costs on the financial sector. It is a matter of finding just the right level of regulation. Handling the interactions between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy poses further challenges. During the recent financial crisis, we observed the difficulties of conducting monetary policy in a non-stable financial environment. Interest rate signals from the central banks were sometimes dwarfed by contradictory events in the markets. Conversely, financial stability is dependent on smooth and predictable monetary policy. Thus, policy makers must always keep in mind that the increased use of regulatory tools will inevitably affect monetary policy in different ways. Regulations will affect the interest rates that firms and households meet and this is something that the central bank needs to take into consideration when setting the policy rate – in much the same way as monetary policy has to take into account changes in interest-rate spreads due to changes in financial conditions. A key element in handling the interactions between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy will be putting an appropriate governance structure in place.
The second key challenge is on the external front as the global environment remains uncertain. The lingering euro debt crisis and fragile US recovery continue to weigh on global growth. Policymakers are still grappling with deep-rooted long-term problems, and policy response has been met with mixed success. The recent improvement in market sentiments is a welcomed relief and some tail-risk events may have been averted. Nonetheless, a full recovery is not yet in sight, which adds to uncertainty. Given this backdrop, it is important that the Bank of Thailand remains alert, and retains sufficient policy space to act if and when necessary. The third key challenge is that of a recent surge of capital inflows, whose causes are both domestic and global in their origin. On the one hand, the relatively robust growth momentum in Thailand has been a “pull” factor, attracting portfolio inflows from those seeking to benefit from better economic prospects. At the same time, the low interest rate environment and subdued growth in major economies have helped “push” investors to search for higher risk-adjusted returns elsewhere, particularly in emerging economies including Thailand. The exchange rates of these recipient economies have appreciated as a result, leading to concerns in some quarters about the prospect of growth momentum. In Thailand, some have called on the MPC to lower the policy interest rate to ease the pressure on the baht. A few have gone further to question the suitability of inflation targeting regime for Thailand.

There was a spirited public debate whether such rate increases would invite more capital inflows. But we viewed that other factors, such as the strength of the domestic economy and high risk appetite of international investors, played a larger role in inducing capital inflows than a gradual increase in the policy rate. Our concern for medium-term financial stability was also a key element of policy deliberations at the time. Subsequently, things became more challenging as the Thai economy suffered domestic setbacks. As the boost from the government’s temporary stimulus measures dissipated at the start of this year, domestic demand slowed down markedly. At the same time, domestic credit growth was still quite high, stock prices continued to advance, and activity in the housing market remained brisk. Moreover, portfolio capital inflows continued and the baht was appreciating. This presented a dilemma and was an example of the difficulties posed by policy spillovers. Against the backdrop of weak global demand, we cut the policy interest rate. We contemplated the use of certain prudential measures, including those on capital flows, in order to complement domestic monetary policy as well as offset some of the impact of capital inflows on domestic financial conditions. But since the QE tapering talk began in earnest in May, the global financial environment changed dramatically, and with it the nature of the policy trade-offs. The communication by the Federal Reserve about possible tapering of its bond purchases was a key turning point for global financial markets. Financial conditions suddenly tightened in response.
Gent Sejko: The need for a retail payments market and infrastructure, and promoting financial literacy Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, to the 5th meeting of the National Payment System Committee, Tirana, 1 October 2019. * * * Dear Minister Denaj, Dear members of the National Payment System Committee, Dear ladies and gentlemen, Please allow me, at the outset, to express on behalf of the Bank of Albania our sincere appreciation for your continuous commitment and collaboration to achieving common objectives in the field of payments and beyond. The collaboration and discussion of development alternatives among the main market actors is considered as one of the main pillars for the success of the undertaken reforms. In this light, since 2015, the Bank of Albania has organised the National Payment System Committee (NPSC) to support and contribute to increasing the security, stability and efficiency of the national payment system in Albania. These objectives are rather important for the implementation of our monetary policy and for the financial and economic stability of Albania, by building up firm foundations for development and welfare. I would like to highlight that the NPSC is set up based on best international and European Union practices. It is a strategic, consulting and communicating entity, whose decisions support the activities of the participating institutions in the area of payments.

The Bank of Albania has been intensively involved in financial education over the years and this long-standing experience has clearly identified the need for a coordinated initiative at national level up to the upgrading this objective to a reform level of crucial importance for the country. For this purpose, the Bank of Albania, driven by the requirements of other authorities, and of market stakeholders, considered as indispensable the drafting of a National Strategy for Financial Education that you are also going to address in this meeting and the real outcomes in this regard are expected to become materialised very soon. We are confident that such a strategic document – tailored for the local financial education context – would help through joint and coordinated actions and resources of various stakeholders in increasing effectiveness of objectives for cultivating a financial literacy in the Albanian society. I invite, therefore, all the participating institutions to engage and contribute actively to this 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  initiative. Concluding, I sincerely hope that this NPSC meeting will actively discuss and deliberate on various issues that need to be addressed about relevant topics. Thank you for your attention! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Something that further fuelled the slowdown in productivity during the second quarter this year was the low holiday absence in June, which we assess to be a temporary effect. Our forecast is that productivity will once again accelerate, but increase at a slower rate than it has in recent years. If one looks at the forecasts for the labour market and productivity together, one can also see that companies’ costs in production are expected to increase more rapidly than in recent years. Unit labour costs are rising according to our assessment, by 4.8 per cent a year, but the rate of increase will then fall back as productivity begins to increase more rapidly once again. Expectations confirm the picture of increased cost and inflationary pressures If I very briefly summarise the domestic situation, the wheels of the Swedish economy are turning at a good pace. We have a high level of utilisation of economic resources and cost pressures are increasing. Something that supports this picture is that both households and companies have adjusted their inflation expectations upwards, according to various surveys. And if one instead measures inflation expectations by looking at the difference between nominal and real bonds, the results point in the same direction. … is counteracted by slightly weaker international developments International developments appear to provide some counterbalance to the slightly stronger Swedish economy. Although we are counting on international growth being good, it will probably be lower than we predicted in June.

Striped bars/broken lines refer to the Riksbank’s forecast. 7  7  Sweden The world  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 -3  -3 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Sources: the IMF, the OECD and the Riksbank  10  BIS Review 132/2007  6. Tighter labour market Thousands of persons. Broken lines refer to the Riksbank’s forecasts. 4800  4800 Labour force Employed  4700  4700  4600  4600  4500  4500  4400  4400  4300  4300  4200  4200  4100  4100  4000  4000  3900  3900  3800  3800 81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  7. Percentage open unemployed Per cent of labour force. Broken line refers to Riksbank’s forecast.
In the light of these developments, the Executive Board decided at its monetary policy meeting on 26 April to leave the repo rate unchanged at 4 per cent. I would like to spend the rest of my time here discussing the conditions for economic growth in the near future – both here in Sweden and abroad. The American economy is a decisive factor There is still great uncertainty over how quickly confidence in the American economy will return and what spread effects this will involve for the rest of the world. The slowdown in the American economy was preceded, as we know, by a long and pronounced economic boom. Great optimism over future growth prospects, based mainly on expectations of gains in efficiency from IT, led to a substantial increase in investment, a strong growth in consumption and rising share prices over several years. The growth in investment and rise in share prices were particularly strong in IT-related sectors. The high level of domestic demand could not be met with American goods and services, but spilled over to create a considerable deficit on the current account over several years. At the same time, there was a strong expansion of credit. Both households and companies have greatly increased their level of indebtedness, while rising asset prices have increased household wealth. This development has been reflected in a considerable deficit in savings.

This is partly because these can cause instability in both the real economy and prices when the bubble bursts and partly because the stability of the banking system could be threatened. Measures to avoid financial imbalances being built up are thus motivated on the basis of both of the Riksbank's objectives; to maintain price stability and to promote a safe and efficient payment system. However, the question is how effective the interest rate is as a weapon – perhaps other means can be utilised. Examples of such measures are monitoring the financial institutions and making capital adequacy requirements of them. The analyses made by the Riksbank in its Financial Stability Report are also aimed at drawing the attention of the banks and other authorities to any problems and they thus play a role in this context. BIS Review 39/2001  3  How great are the problems created by the imbalances in the USA? Is there a risk that the imbalances in the American economy are so great that the process of adaptation back towards a balance will dramatically intensify and prolong the economic slowdown? It can be noted that none of the ten major economic analysts of the American economy assesses that the USA will suffer a recession during the next few years. Firstly, it is probable that the growth potential that can be created by developments in technology is far from exhausted. There should thus be good reason for at least some of the optimism that has comprised a basis for earlier developments.