samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, these are important risk factors that should seriously be taken into account. Dear Guests, I would like to draw your attention to credit cards regarding the household indebtedness issue. As it is known, in general, the credit card is a payment instrument that enables its owner to purchase goods and services at member businesses without using cash. Moreover, if credit card users wish to withdraw cash or to delay their credit card payments for a determined period, the relevant amounts spent turn into credit and thus the credit card becomes a credit instrument. Institutions issuing credit cards incur POS (Point of Sale) machine investment and membership to national and international payment systems expenditures, and they are exposed to liquidity risk due to unforeseen cash withdrawals. Consequently, banks tend to determine higher credit card interest rates than those of consumer credits due to their higher risk exposures, namely the higher credit risk because of weak collateral structure and liquidity risk because of unforeseen cash withdrawals. A survey of country practices also reveals that credit card interest rates are determined higher than interest rates set for consumer credits. Therefore, it is in the interest of credit card users to meet their short-term credit needs via consumer credits rather than their credit cards. Moreover, the interest rates applicable to credit card transactions differ significantly from bank to bank.

Esteemed Guests, Before concluding my speech, I would like to thank you for your participation. I hope our assessments and analyses will help the participants of the financial market to undergo a better decision-making process. BIS Review 68/2006  5
But labour, and wages in particular, is playing a significant role as a driver of inflation. It's quite extraordinary because there have been more people employed, the average hours have been up, wages are increasing – we had 5.2% growth for the first quarter in the compensation per employee –, and the output is where it is: stagnant. So, there is an issue of unit labour cost –in other words, productivity – which clearly has an impact on inflation as well. We will continue to really monitor and dissect as well as we can this entire enigma of the labour market – which is, as I said, playing a critical role. It's especially important because many services which are playing a large part in our economy are labour-intensive, and wages in that respect play a key role. That is partly, by the way, the reason why we have – I was going to say upgraded, but it's not upgraded–, but why we have increased our projection for core inflation in both 2023 and 2024. My first question: I was a bit surprised by how strong this revision of the core inflation projection was. Could you elaborate a bit on the reason? Is that all due to wages, wage expectations, or are there other reasons behind that? My second question is about the decision today. Was it unanimous? Could you maybe give us a bit of a flavour about the discussion?

The new technologies are making lending more efficient, for example by enhancing the way in which information on consumer behaviour  3/4  and requirements is managed, facilitating new data management processes, or by applying automation processes to loan origination, thus speeding up its management. As these new firms make their entry, a new map will be drawn for this financial sector. The most recent trends highlight the importance of collaboration and strategic agreements between new and established firms, to harness the competitive advantages of each: the new technologies of the new firms and the sector experience and knowledge of the established ones. And here I conclude. It is now time for a toast to celebrate your 60th anniversary, in the hope that the National Association of Specialised Lending Institutions will continue its fruitful work for many years to come. I now pass the floor back to your president, who has the pleasurable task of proposing the toast. 4/4
Based on what we know and understand today, I would suggest that risk-weighted capital requirements, broadly as proposed under Basel II, probably remain the most rigorous way to address banks’ tendencies to incur excessive risks and, ultimately, to ensure adequate capital levels. However, we must address the serious short-comings of the risk-weighted approach, which have become so powerfully manifest during this crisis. What Basel II needs, therefore, is a safeguard to provide the financial system with additional protection against the negative consequences of these short-comings. I want to stress that a safeguard of this kind is needed in addition to the improvements to Basel II that are currently under way as a result of the recent FSF Report to the G7 ministers and governors. 16 Which brings me back to the obvious and simple response to excessive leverage: The imposition of a limit on banks’ leverage as a complement to the risk-weighted approach reflected in the current Basel framework. The regulation of banks’ leverage is usually referred to as a “leverage ratio”. Specifically, the idea is to set a lower limit to the capital-to-assets ratio of banks. Let me stress again that this instrument is not meant to and should not replace Basel II. There is no reason to eliminate the benefits of risk-weighted capital requirements. The leverage ratio should be applied as a complement to the risk-weighted approach as reflected in the current Basel framework. That means we would have two independent measures of capital adequacy.

We remain flexible and ready to make adjustments to our operations as needed to ensure that monetary policy is effectively implemented and transmitted to financial markets and the broader economy. Conclusion I’ll conclude with this: The coronavirus poses evolving risks to the U.S. economy. Our policy action this week positions us well to support the economic expansion. We are carefully monitoring the effects of the coronavirus on the U.S. economic outlook and will respond as appropriate. Our focus remains trained on serving the American people by pursuing our dual goals of maximum employment and price stability. Once again, thank you for this evening’s award. 1 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, March 3, 2020. 2 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation,  October 11, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Statement Regarding Treasury Bill Purchases and Repurchase Operations, October 11, 2019. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
It would be rather strange if such differentiation were to make it more difficult for us to 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  provide liquidity to EU than to third-country CCPs. This does not mean that we would seek to substitute our judgement for that of EU or thirdcountry CCP supervisors: their primary responsibility to guarantee the resilience of CCPs, and more broadly the stability of our financial system, cannot and should not be questioned. But we need a set of safeguards so that our concerns are appropriately taken into account in the regulation and supervision of CCPs. I see three such safeguards: The first is adequate information on the operation and risk management of CCPs clearing in euro, and the capacity to assess how they would fare in times of market stress, including through stress testing. A second is meaningful involvement in the supervisory process, to ascertain that CCPs’ compliance with prudential and operational requirements provides sufficient guarantees from our perspective as a central bank. And third, we should be able to adopt requirements to address critical central bank concerns. For instance, it would be our prerogative to determine when CCPs should hold central bank accounts for deposit and settlement purposes, and to require targeted enhancements to CCP liquidity risk management when necessary in exceptional market environments. Everyone should be clear that our ability to carry out our mandate and, where appropriate, to provide liquidity to CCPs, relies on enshrining these safeguards in our regulatory framework.

Such cooperation with other authorities has been enshrined by the CPMI and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) as Responsibility E of the Principles for Financial Markets Infrastructures (PFMI). Given the stakes involved, blind trust is not enough. I would argue that we must strike a balance 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  between facilitating market integration through cross-border access and safeguarding the ability of authorities to fulfil their statutory tasks and objectives. Finding this equilibrium is, of course, a challenge and I welcome the work carried out by the Financial Stability Board, at the behest of the Japanese G20 presidency, to address potential regulatory causes of market fragmentation.3 As I see it, fragmentation is not always caused by overlapping regulations, but often by a failure to cooperate. Mutually acceptable solutions can and should be found to meet the legitimate expectations of all the authorities involved. The scope of these solutions may differ depending on the degree of interconnectedness. At the European level, for example, where financial markets are highly interdependent and integrated, it is clear that the cross-border stability implications are significant and in many ways exceed those of our banking sector. Supervisory coordination at the EU level should reflect this close nexus. Unfortunately, however, the competence for CCP supervision remains almost exclusively national.
That of course is cold comfort to the manufacturing businesses that were most affected, and to the regions - including the North West, where there is a relatively high concentration of manufacturing business. And you were severely affected last year too by the impact of Foot and Mouth Disease on agriculture and tourism. The frustrating thing for us has been that there was very little that we at the Bank could do through monetary policy - or indeed that the Government could do - to address the problems at source. That’s fairly obvious when we’re talking about the weakening of demand in the other major economies. Some people have suggested that we might have done more to weaken the exchange rate particularly against the generally weak euro - by cutting our interest rates more aggressively, but it really isn’t as simple as that: exchange rates don’t respond predictably to relative interest rates certainly in the short term; if anything in recent conditions cutting them further could even have had a perverse effect. What we were able to do, given that inflation was under control, by cutting interest rates as we did last year, was to try to compensate for the external weakness by stimulating domestic demand growth here in the UK. Given the weakness of business confidence, and therefore investment, reflecting the external pressures, that meant essentially stimulating consumer demand.

This move by the HKMC to issue USD denominated bonds fits very well into the efforts by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to promote the development of a safe and efficient financial infrastructure for Hong Kong, based on a multi-currency, multi-dimensional platform. In Hong Kong’s banking system, we have around $ trillion in HK Dollar deposits. Our banks also have the equivalent of over $ trillion in foreign currency deposits. About 70% or $ billion are US Dollar deposits. The loan-to-deposit ratio for Hong Kong Dollar deposits is 87%; the equivalent for US Dollar is only around 26%. We reckon that a significant portion of the sizable US Dollar deposits is held by retail investors and some would wish to diversify and look for investment products to increase their return. One could of course look for opportunities overseas but, as an international financial centre, Hong Kong should also try to provide more such investment products locally. In the past there have been very few local issues of US Dollar retail bonds, and the most recent one appears to have been issued as far back as in September 2003. Today’s HKMC US Dollar bond issuance would help to meet part of such investment demand. Perhaps in times to come there will be more foreign currency bond issuance in Hong Kong. This bond issuance would add to the diversity of financial intermediation channels and complement the HKMA’s effort to promote the development of a multi-currency, multi-dimensional financial system in Hong Kong.
At the macro level, they have been used to simulate and reproduce the way stars produce energy, using a nuclear fusion reactor here on Earth, an approach that has the potential to provide clean energy for billions of years (Turrell (2013)). Simulating the processes powering stars is modest by comparison with ABMs which aim to model the entire universe. In 1985, one of the first comprehensive computational models of the universe was published, with over 32,000 particles representing known matter (Davis et al (1985)). As estimates put the number of 80  protons and neutrons in the Universe at 10 , this ABM was impressively parsimonious (Penrose (1999)). These models have generated important insights, including the role of “dark matter” in the evolution of galaxies. Not all applications of ABMs are, however, large in scale and universal in application. A 1987 paper called “Why the Brazil Nuts Are on Top” used an ABM with agents of different physical sizes to explain how mixed nuts segregate over time when shaken, with Brazil nuts generally rising to the surface (Rosato et al (1987)). This research was not as nuts as it sounds. It has since found real-world applications in industries such as pharmaceuticals and manufacturing. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  14  Figure 6: Segregation of nuts  Figure 7: The universe  Source: Sae Rpss (CC-BY-SA-3.0). Nuts (image available here). Source: NASA Headquarters - Greatest Images of NASA (NASA-HQ-GRIN) (public domain). Spiral galaxy in the constellation Coma Berenices (image available here).

It has fat-tails, with the probability  25 20  mass of big rises or falls larger than implied by a normal distribution. For example, the  15  probability of a 10% movement in house prices  10  in any given year is twice as large as normality  5  would imply. 0 -5  Capturing these cyclical dynamics, and fattailed properties, of the housing market is not straightforward using aggregate models. These models typically rely, as inputs, on a small number of macro-economic variables, such as incomes and interest rates. They have  -10 1846 1866 1886 1906 1926 1946 1966 1986 2006 Source: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2016); Bank calculations. Notes: The chart shows the Hodrick-Prescott trend in annual house price growth data (where lambda=6.25). Data during WWI and WWII are interpolated. a mixed track record in explaining and predicting housing market behaviour. One reason for this poor performance may be that the housing market comprises not one but many sub-markets - a rental market, sales market, a mortgage market etc. Moreover, there are multiple players operating in these markets - renters, landlords, owner-occupiers, mortgage lenders and regulators – each with distinctive characteristics, such as age, income, gearing and location. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  27  It is the interaction between these multiple agents in multiple markets which shapes the dynamics of the housing market. Aggregate models suppress these within-system interactions.
So, even without any improvement in the trade deficit, the growth of final domestic demand will have to moderate to prevent GDP growth rising above trend and putting pressure on the supply capacity of the UK economy. Indeed, if the trade deficit is to be reduced, then domestic demand growth will have to fall below the growth of total output for a while. So by the time of the September MPC meeting much had changed from earlier in the year. New data showed that final domestic demand was growing faster than expected. The data on the housing market – for the UK as a whole not just the South East – as well as credit indicated that the strong consumption growth over the past year might persist. And house prices, I should add, enter our decisions, because of their implications for future consumption, not because we are trying to target house or indeed any other asset prices. Unemployment was still falling: the Labour Force Survey measure of unemployment had reached its lowest rate since the series started, while the claimant count had fallen to its lowest level since 1980. The Bank’s regional Agents had also noted tightness for both the skilled and unskilled. Oil prices had risen sharply during the year. These factors led a majority of the Committee to vote for a modest rise in interest rates of twenty-five basis points in order to keep inflation on track to meet the 2½% target. The task now is to continue looking ahead.

Only a further sharp rise in sterling, and further falls in commodity prices, could maintain these rates of decline of import prices and their benign effect on retail price inflation. And we see that these effects are now coming to an end. Import prices are beginning to rise, partly because of the recent rise in oil prices, but also because the rate of decline in other prices is slowing with sterling no longer appreciating as fast as it was. BIS Review 111/1999  2  It was possible to allow domestic spending in the economy to grow rapidly in recent years because the appreciation of sterling led to weak net trade. In real terms, the deficit in trade of goods and services has deteriorated sharply. But just as the one-off effects of lower import prices will not continue to hold down retail price inflation, so the rapid growth of domestic spending is itself unsustainable. In 1998 the increasing trade deficit reduced output growth by more than 2%. So modest output growth in the economy as a whole was consistent with rapid final domestic demand – that is spending by households, governments and business on consumption and investment. But the pace at which the trade position is deteriorating is itself now moderating, and final domestic demand grew at 4½% in the first half of 1999.
The combination of those 3 trends is translating into activities and services that first swept into the payment sector and are now spreading more broadly. Among them, socalled decentralized finance, DEFI, is emerging as a crypto-based alternative to traditional finance, where the provision of services is claimed to be disintermediated and their governance decentralized, and is enabled notably by permissionless blockchains, smart contracts and decentralized apps. Digital innovation therefore acts as centrifugal forces: they aim to create a movement of decentralisation that runs counter to the traditional architecture of the monetary and financial edifice, centralised around trusted institutions –the central bank, credit institutions and market infrastructures-. Second, these decentralisation forces might have a two-sided impact on the functioning of our financial system, both in terms of efficiency and stability. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  From an efficiency perspective, they can bring in particular more transparency, costefficiency and availability around the clock. But they bring also a risk of fragmentation of processes, if the blockchains are not interoperable and cannot also smoothly interact with legacy, centralised, clearing, settlement and payment systems. From a stability perspective, it is clear that currently the crypto ecosystem is not large enough and interconnected enough to threaten the stability of the whole financial system, as shown by the modest impact on mainstream finance of last year's turbulences, in the wake of the Terra-Luna and FTX conglomerate collapses. But these collapses did have significant negative spillover effects within the crypto ecosystem.

So, what about the question I raised earlier on about whether the two financial systems of the country have a working relationship that maximises the mutual benefits of the two jurisdictions and therefore is in the best interests of the country? If you want an honest answer from me, it would I am afraid not be one in the affirmative. There seems to me considerable scope for a co-operative, complementary and interactive working relationship between the two financial systems, in which, as I said earlier, relative strengths are exploited and relative weaknesses addressed, and synergies maximised. The further question then is how such a working relationship should best, and realistically, be developed. It is quite natural to think that developing such a relationship between the two financial systems could be left to the market. While this is theoretically possible, it assumes that market forces are allowed to work freely across the two financial systems, which is not always the case. In merchandise trade, this is by and large true, and as a result the two economic systems specialise in areas in which they have respectively comparative advantage in producing. But in the provision of different services, as in the case of financial services, there are restrictions limiting the working of market forces, for example, restrictions on access of service providers to the other system and restrictions on the mobility of the user of services across the two systems.