samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is of course important to ensure that the e-krona does not have negative consequences for monetary policy or financial stability. As I explained at the start, all of  14 For more information on this, see Armelius et al. (2,020). 15 See, for instance, Ingves (2020). See also the Riksbank's consultation response regarding the new Sveriges Riks-  bank Act (2019). 16 The banks would still have access to central bank money as they have money in accounts with the Riksbank. 8 [35]  these areas are interconnected and therefore we and others have analysed them. 17 This is an exciting field of research, and more analysis is needed, although it is nevertheless possible to draw some conclusions. With regard to monetary policy, it must be possible to distinguish between an ekrona with or without interest. An interest-bearing e-krona would not have any major consequences for monetary policy in Sweden. Sometimes people believe it would be easier to set very low negative interest rates with an interest-bearing ekrona, but this is not true. The policy rate’s lower bound is currently determined by there being cash for households to hold instead of having money in an account with a bank. Similarly, the banks have cash as the only alternative to holding money in accounts with the Riksbank. 18 However, holding large amounts of cash entails certain costs, such as for transport and insurance, and we therefore can set the policy rate a little below zero.

Savings have been partly re-nationalised as a consequence of financial fragmentation. This is a trend that, if left unchecked, can be fatal to the Single Market. Completing the Banking Union is key to halt it, and I welcome EU leaders’ resolve to swiftly agree on a Single Resolution Mechanism. Finally, Europe should remain open to the world. Further progress on bilateral or regional free trade agreements, and cooperation in implementing the new financial regulatory standards, are the best signal in this respect. Conclusion Let me draw to a close by re-emphasising that crises, despite their negative consequences, can have positive effects. They can galvanise efforts and focus minds. They can drive change and bring about progress. They can pave the way for innovative solutions. But to secure these gains, cooperation across national borders is crucial, in other words, there must be a willingness to work towards common goals and to learn from each other and resist protectionism. This spirit will be essential to tackle the challenges still ahead of us, not only in the euro area but also at a global level. It is often claimed that the Chinese and Japanese word for crisis, wēijī or kiki (危机 or 危機), is made of the two characters meaning “danger” and “opportunity”. While there can be no doubt that wēi means “danger”, I would rather understand jī as meaning the critical moment when things have to change – the ancient Greeks’ kairos. This critical moment has now arrived for Europe. Europe has emerged from the danger zone.
If Norges Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market instead of changing the interest rate, foreign exchange market participants may receive ambiguous signals, and complicated game situations may arise between the market participants and the central bank. However, interventions may be appropriate if the krone exchange rate differs substantially from what is reasonable on the basis of fundamentals, and exchange rate movements also reduce the prospect of achieving the inflation target. Although the krone may fluctuate in the short term, it will tend to stabilise over time when inflation is low and stable. When inflation has been higher in Norway than among our trading partners for a longer period, the krone has tended to depreciate. When inflation in Norway is expected to be broadly  3  The basic balance is normally defined as the current account surplus minus net long-term capital outflows. BIS Review 47/2004  3  in line with that of other countries, the exchange rate will usually also return to its normal range following periods when the krone has been particularly strong or particularly weak. The real exchange rate The real exchange rate may be measured in a number of ways, for example, by relative consumer prices and relative labour costs between Norway and its trading partners, measured in a common currency. The real exchange rate measured by relative labour costs in a common currency is an expression of the cost competitiveness of Norwegian companies.

We therefore need to encourage innovation but also ensure that people trust innovations. At the Banque de France, we have taken various steps to promote innovation. First, we appointed a start-up correspondent at the national level [Maurice Oms], and we will soon have start-up correspondents in the regional French Tech capitals. The Banque de France’s innovation laboratory, the Lab, is working with numerous actors in the field. This year, we inaugurated a new site in Singapore, one of the epicentres of the Fintech industry. And recently, Paris was selected alongside Frankfurt to house the European branch of the BIS’s Innovation Hub. At the ACPR, we are doing our utmost to facilitate contact with Fintechs at all stages. First, there 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  is a single point of entry: the Fintech-Innovation Unit. Since 2016, it has met and advised between 100 and 150 project leaders per year, to help them flesh out the initial outline of their project before potentially submitting it for approval. The approval procedure has also been simplified with the creation of a digital portal, and we have adapted certain procedures to recent developments: introduction of a streamlined post-Brexit procedure in 2019, and of a simplified procedure for a large number of payment service providers (PSPs) in 2020. On top of this, in our day-to-day supervision, we apply the regulation using a proportional approach. For example, for small establishments, we allow a single individual to hold more than one key positions.
Tarisa Watanagase: Prospects and challenges for the Thai economy in 2010 Dinner talk by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the British Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 30 November 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank the British Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to be here tonight. It is my pleasure to join you once again at this prominent annual gathering. Last year we had a fruitful discussion on “What determines the future of the Thai economy”. If you may recall, I imparted on the audience some words of wisdom for all policymakers, which is to smooth short-term pain, and to achieve long-term gain. Last year’s speech took care of the latter part, in which the key message was a call for collective efforts to raise the economy’s potential output in order to achieve sustainable long-run prosperity. We, however, did not spend much time on the former part as we were yet to witness the complete fallout from the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Today, we all know that our get-together last September was at the onset of the greatest economic contraction over the last 60 years. The collapse of Lehman Brothers on Sep 15, 2008 created a gigantic shockwave in the world financial markets with its ripples subsequently evolving into an economic tsunami that wiped out so much economic wellbeing all over the world.

I think the consensus at present, as reflected in the recent discussion at the LegCo Financial Affairs Panel, is that neither the current volume and nature of complaints nor the deficiencies in existing arrangements would justify the creation of such elaborate machinery. The second option would be to give the HKMA a clear mandate to arbitrate and resolve consumer complaints and the powers to impose sanctions. This option could go some way towards addressing the current gap between the expectation of bank customers and what the HKMA can do for them under its existing powers. However, I think there is a consensus that this is not the right time for the  BIS Review 39/2002  3  HKMA to be given such a role. It would require a considerable increase in resources and some form of cost recovery from the banking industry, and it would also require addressing concerns about conflict of interest between different branches of the organisation - a problem that is not insoluble, but which would nevertheless require some careful thought. This, at least for the time being, does not seem to be the preferred option. The weight of opinion seems, then, to fall on the third option, which is to rely mainly on the industry itself to ensure that complaints are properly handled. There are three things which banks can do in helping to promote self-regulation: •  First, AIs should strictly follow the Code of Banking Practice, which is issued by their own industry associations.
If the Central Bank had not maintained a tight monetary stance and not raised the policy rate as it has done, it is almost certain that the economy would be swept into a familiar spiral of inflation, currency depreciation and wage rises, benefitting no one but harming us all, as historical experience has taught us. One of the fiercest critics of Central Bank monetary policy has been the Confederation of Employers. They have dismissed the Bank’s monetary policy as having no effect, while claiming that inflation excluding the housing component of the CPI has been only 2½% for some time, and then infer that monetary policy has had no impact on that development, however they manage to reach that conclusion. The Confederation of Employers has suggested monetary policy reforms along the following broad lines: First, to relax the inflation target; second, to remove house prices from the target CPI; and third, to impose a corridor for Iceland’s policy rate differential with abroad, e.g. the European Central Bank. The Central Bank does not consider that any of these proposals would improve monetary policy implementation. On the contrary. Easing the inflation target is highly inadvisable. That would probably drive up inflation expectations of households and businesses and anchor inflation at a higher rate than would be tolerated in neighbouring economies, with correspondingly bad consequences. We should not set less ambitious goals than others. The Central Bank has previously declared its firm support for including house prices in the CPI on which the inflation target is based.

The Central Bank has pointed out how the small amount of outstanding Treasury bonds in the market hinders policy rate changes from being transmitted with the necessary weight. Price formation in the bond market is imperfect. The Bank has aired the idea that the Treasury should issue bonds with the explicit purpose of maintaining an active bond market. Of course, such a suggestion must be qualified by the fact that the Treasury is on the verge of eliminating its net debt and has no need to borrow. The Central Bank’s standpoint, however, is that given the significance of domestic capital markets, the importance of facilitating the impact of monetary policy measures and long-term strategies for Treasury funding, it is in the Treasury’s interest to maintain a smooth bond market, even though it has no direct funding requirement. One example of Treasury issuance on such principles is Norway, which has had even less need to borrow than the Icelandic government. Claims have been heard that the Central Bank’s monetary policy is either impotent or wrong, and that the Icelandic króna is the root of macroeconomic instability. The Central Bank has pointed out that one consequence of globalisation and Iceland’s integration with global capital markets, coupled with the exceptionally intense upswing experienced in recent years, has been that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has altered. In this climate, the impact is transmitted with greater force to the exchange rate, and only later to domestic demand, as I mentioned earlier.
Furthermore, given the complexity of formulating monetary policy and getting accurate projections, the role of the media and other financial commentators is not devoid of risk to the central bank’s credibility particularly, in challenging economic times. It is therefore, important for central banks to ensure that where projections on the future path of key macroeconomic variables are provided, these have to be set out in conditional forms and linked to incoming information with an assessment of the balance of risks. Mr. Chairman, turning to the role of the legislature, it is important to note that legislative oversight of monetary policy has a long history in many countries. In this respect, the USA provides a good case in point of a country with strong legislative oversight over the central bank’s operation. Congressional oversight of the Federal Reserve goes back to the founding of the central bank in 1913. However, the nature and purpose of oversight has changed overtime. Since 1978, the Federal Reserve has been subject to biannual oversight hearings before the Senate and House banking committees. Several other countries have similar arrangements where the central bank periodically appears before a committee of parliament. Parliament in New Zealand also has a role in monitoring the Bank's conduct of policy. By statute, each Monetary Policy Statement is referred to Parliament's Finance and Expenditure Committee. That Committee, with the assistance of its own professional adviser, can choose to extensively scrutinise the extent to which policy was, and has been, conducted consistent with the Policy Targets Agreement.

I see it as a “strategic square”, the four parts of the system to be solved for delivering a European strategy: i) Cross border payments shortcomings, ii) BigTech’s global projects in the financial sector (including stablecoins), iii) The developing European Payment Initiative and iv) The potential Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). •  Indeed, the current digitalization triggers at least two important risks. o The risk (in red) that BigTechs, leveraging on their global reach, will build private financial 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  infrastructures and “monetary” systems, competing with the public monetary sovereignty since they will position themselves as issuers and managers of a universal “currency”. CBDC could then be issued but at the “backend” of this “currency”. o The symmetric risk (in blue) that some jurisdictions judge that the only way to respond to the otherwise overwhelming private payments’ wave would be to issue and spread on a domestic but also a global basis, “their” CBDCs. This could, if not sufficiently coordinated within the global financial community, set precedents as to the features of the CBDCs and their articulation with the private projects, with no say for other central banks. The way forward for Europe (in green) could be different and could rather disseminate central bank money in a retail form with the intermediation of the private sector and ensure interoperability between EPI and other non-European payment solutions. 2.
Süreyya Serdengeçti: Inflation targeting – performance and challenges Opening speech by Mr Süreyya Serdengeçti, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Conference on Inflation Targeting: Performance and Challenges, Istanbul, 19 January 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to welcome you all. It is a great honor for me to open this conference entitled “Inflation Targeting: Performance and Challenges”. I am very pleased to host such distinguished guests and I’d like to thank you all for joining us here in Istanbul and share your knowledge and experience on inflation targeting. The inflation targeting regime has been adopted by a growing number of countries, especially by emerging market countries, in the last fifteen years. As economic and political conditions of emerging market countries have generally been considered as vulnerable and unstable, these countries perceive inflation targeting as a credible and a safe “way out”, after the successful experiences of industrialized countries. Turkey is now the newest member of the club. We have studied the experiences of more than 20 industrialized and emerging market countries as we were working on the general framework of the inflation targeting regime for Turkey. Along with these experiences, historical, socio-political and economic dynamics of the Turkish economy have been taken into account to create a model that is specific to Turkey. I believe that those countries who will adopt this regime in the future will benefit from our experience as we did from others.

I want to conclude by repeating my warm welcome to you all. I hope that you enjoy both the conference and your stay in Istanbul. Thank you very much. BIS Review 19/2006  5
Do this increase in unemployment and the decline in the employment rate have anything to do with monetary policy and the introduction of an inflation target or are there other explanations? Unemployment and the employment rate When a large shock like the 1990s crisis occurs, there are tremendous demands on both policy and flexibility among firms and individuals. If one looks at the developments in employment (or unemployment) since the 1990s crisis, one may wonder whether the labour market has really recovered, despite the fact that 13 years have passed (see Figure 5). There may also have been structural changes in the economy that make it difficult to return to the low unemployment levels we had prior to the crisis, for instance, as a result of the strong competitive pressure that globalisation entails. In the long term, it is the way the labour market functions (structural factors) that determines unemployment and the employment rate. How quickly an unemployed person can return to work depends on several factors. Some people may find that their skills have become obsolete when one technique has been abandoned in favour of a more modern technique, such as typographers being replaced by IT people. In this case, training is one opportunity that can lead to a new job after some time. Hopefully, it will also lead to a job with a real wage that is at least equally as high as the previous wage. The greater this possibility, the more probable it is that the employee will return to work.

At the same time, we signalled that there would probably be a need to increase the rate later in the year. Growth in the world economy and in the Swedish economy is robust and our assessment is therefore that inflation will increase gradually towards the 2 per cent target, reaching it a couple of years from now (see Figures 1 and 2). However, this development assumes that the repo rate will be increased, as otherwise inflation will exceed the target. Current monetary policy Despite the fact that inflation has been clearly below target for some time, the Riksbank increased its key rate twice during the winter, by a total of 0.5 percentage points. Perhaps some people may wonder if this was really necessary; we are still in a situation with high unemployment and we cannot as yet see any inflationary pressures stemming from wages – one of the most important factors behind rising costs/prices in the economy. However, it is not today’s inflation that determines whether we shall increase or decrease the interest rate; it is the future inflation rate. The Riksbank’s forecasts and decisions refer in particular to inflation  BIS Review 43/2006  1  a couple of years ahead. We assume that it will take roughly this long before interest rate changes have a full impact on demand and thus on inflation. The Riksbank does not wish to achieve an inflation rate of 2 per cent at all costs. This is neither possible nor desirable.
This weakness is consistent with survey indicators of 9  For example, Guiso, L, Sapienza, P and Zingales, L (2013), 'Time Varying Risk', NBER Working Paper 19284. Guiso et al use a survey of Italian investors and find that the proportion of individuals unwilling to take any financial risk had increased from 18% in 2007 to 42% in 2009 and put this down to emotional response (fear) triggered by a scary experience. 10 See Nagel, S and Malmendier, U (2011) ' Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk Taking?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol126(1), pp373-416. Kunreuther, H., R. Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Slovic, B. Borkan, and N. Katz (1978). Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. Wiley Interscience. Bernile, G., Bhagwat, V., & Rau, P. R. (2017) 'What doesn’t kill you will only make you more risk-loving: Early-life disasters and CEO behavior', The Journal of Finance, Vol.72(1), pp167-206. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  investment intentions which remain subdued and elevated uncertainty, as detailed in the February 2017 Inflation Report. 11  By the end of the forecast, the level of business investment is around 20% lower than in the Monetary Policy Committee's May 2016 forecast. Our latest estimate of year-on-year business investment growth in the fourth quarter of 2016 is already around six percentage points weaker than our projection in May.

Saudi banks have benefited greatly from the Universal Banking Model permitted by SAMA and offer a range of financial services including investment management, mutual funds, brokerage, and other services. During the past decade, the volume of business of Saudi banks has grown at a phenomenal rate. In the ten years period 1996-2005, the banks’ assets grew by 213 per cent, deposits by 224 per cent and capital and reserves by 248 per cent. During this period the profits for the banking system showed strong growth and the return on equity averaged well over 20% and return on assets was over 2%. The strength of Saudi banks is further underlined by their average risk-based capital adequacy, which has been high according to Basel capital adequacy standard, and averaged 18% during the past decade. If we review our long history of foreign investment in the financial sector since early 1950, a number of foreign banks were granted licenses to open branches in the Kingdom. In 1976, there were 12 banks in the Kingdom including 10 foreign banks. To Saudize the banking system and benefit from foreign expertise of the banks operating in the Kingdom, the government invited foreign banks to convert their branches into Saudi-foreign joint stock companies with an equity share of 40% for the foreign partner. Technical Management Agreements were also entered into to manage the new banks by the foreign partners.