samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a first step, we will disclose the Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (WACI) of our equities portfolio relative to market benchmarks. Carbon intensity measures the carbon emissions per unit of revenue of the company. The WACI is derived from the carbon intensity of revenues of each of the companies in the portfolio, weighted by the relative size of the investments in those companies. MAS’ equities portfolio has a lower carbon intensity than its market benchmarks. As at end-March 2021, the WACI for MAS’ Emerging Markets equities portfolio was 30% lower than its benchmark while the WACI for MAS’ Developed Markets equities portfolio was 3% lower than benchmark. We will continue to monitor MAS’ portfolio WACI over time and seek to understand the impact of our portfolio actions on WACI levels. A SUSTAINABLE ORGANISATION Finally, as a corporate citizen, MAS is accountable for reducing and reporting its own carbon footprint. We aim to build a sustainable organisation and have advanced on two fronts: measuring our carbon footprint; and developing strategies to reduce our footprint. MAS has substantially established its carbon profile across Scope 1, Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions. Scope 1 emissions, namely from sources controlled or owned by MAS, are negligible. Scope 2 emissions, namely from purchased electricity to power our office premises, have been on a downward trend. Scope 3 emissions, namely from corporate activities such as air travel, currency operations, and waste incineration, account for most of our carbon profile.

Ravi Menon: Being the change we want to see - a sustainable future Speech (via video conference) by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch of the Inaugural MAS Sustainability Report, 9 June 2021. * * * Good morning, and welcome to the launch of MAS’ inaugural Sustainability Report . How the world responds to the climate challenge will determine the future of generations to come. To avoid the most severe effects of climate change, global greenhouse gas emissions must come down 45% by 2030 and reach net zero around 2050 to keep global warming to within 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This is what 195 countries resolved as part of the Paris Agreement in 2016. Concerted action is necessary for the world to make the transition to a sustainable future. There is a renewed sense of urgency and commitment to the climate agenda. Despite the pandemic, 2020 witnessed numerous commitments to carbon neutrality and net zero emissions – by governments, corporations, and financial institutions. The United States has rejoined the Paris Agreement. The stage is set to translate long-term ambitions into tangible policies and early actions. Singapore is firmly committed to doing its part in the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Earlier this year, the government launched the Singapore Green Plan, which sets out a comprehensive road map towards sustainable development, a green economy, and net zero emissions.
The negative effect that further depreciation would have had on consumption and investment would therefore have been stronger than the stimulative effect on the traded goods sector. The latter effect comes with a lag in any case, and the real depreciation of about one-third, which had already taken place, was sufficient for that. Second, a large fiscal deficit had opened up and had to be financed domestically, as the sovereign was cut off from foreign markets. The capital controls facilitated this. Third, the capital controls gave monetary policy more scope to focus on the domestic economy, as interest rates would otherwise have had to be higher in order to defend the currency. Fourth, the capital controls provided the shelter needed to restructure domestic balance sheets, rebuild the financial sector, and develop a better framework for economic and prudential policies that would be suitable for a postcapital controls environment. These stabilisation gains of the capital controls were greatest to begin with but have faded with time as balance sheets have been repaired and Iceland has recovered. The economic costs of the controls work in the other direction: they increase over time as lost business opportunities accumulate, as support to domestic asset markets begins to feed bubbles, and as risk diversification in domestic balance sheets decreases.

In Iceland’s case, this was partly mitigated through the liberalisation of capital inflows in October 2009 and legislative provisions that authorise the Central Bank to grant exemptions from the capital controls,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  provided that the balance of payments effects are not negative. But that does not change the big picture. Furthermore, the potential distortion stemming from the combination of free capital inflows and restricted capital outflows has materialised recently, as carry trade and other forms of capital inflows have increased following the announcement and subsequent execution of the resolution of the old banks in a manner that fully mitigated the negative balance of payments effect. This has created appreciation pressures that are not counteracted by outflows, as would have occurred under normal conditions. Finally, in the long run, comprehensive capital controls are inconsistent with Iceland’s membership of the EEA and thus the EU internal market. You might then ask: why have we not just lifted the capital controls? This is where the twist in the tale comes in. The problem is that our own success in preserving Icelandic asset prices and fostering the recovery of the economy has created the conditions for a stronger currency but has also, in some sense, preserved the obstacles to swift and orderly liberalisation of capital controls.
Since the financial crisis all major advanced economies have been in a debt trap where low growth deepens the burden of debt, prompting the private sector to cut spending further. Persistent economic weakness damages the extent to which economies can recover. Skills and capital atrophy. Workers become discouraged and leave the labour force. Prospects decline and the noose tightens. 1  At market prices. In PPP terms it is third largest after China and the US. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As difficult as it has been, some countries, including the US and the UK, are now escaping this trap. Others in the euro area are sinking deeper. This relative performance underscores the importance of policy and institutions, particularly those that share and transfer risks. Building institutions at a time of reform fatigue may not be easy, but it is essential. Before I draw out this crucial point, I would like to quickly review how we got here. 2. Setting the debt trap  Building the debt that now weighs on our economies was the work of a generation. In the decade before the crisis, private financial balances became unsustainable. UK households borrowed 4% of GDP year after year; Irish households at more than twice that rate. Household debt peaked close to 100% of GDP in the UK, and 120% in Ireland. 2 This borrowing was largely for consumption and real estate investment rather than businesses and projects that would generate the earnings necessary to service those obligations.

By making it safer and fairer we can put in place the conditions for it to thrive. But whether or not it thrives will rest on the efforts of individuals and organisations to re-establish the system’s reputation for integrity. While regulators will fix the mechanics of benchmarks in markets ranging from LIBOR to FX, only private individuals and institutions can reform the behaviour that has made such changes necessary. Changes to the structure of compensation will better align the incentives of bank staff and their shareholders, but not every risk can be anticipated. Even if such a package could be devised it would not internalise the impact of individual actions on systemic risks, including on trust in the banking system. For the system to operate with integrity, penalties for misconduct cannot be seen as a cost of doing business. Rather, banks must recognise that only exemplary behaviour can confer social licence to global financial capitalism. More fundamentally, integrity cannot be legislated, and it certainly cannot be bought. Only a perspective which takes into account the wider implications of actions can guide proper behaviour. And while regulators can promote competition, end the subsidy enjoyed by institutions that are too big to fail, and determine the appropriate split of remuneration between fixed and variable elements to limit risks to financial stability, only society, not regulators, can determine whether the absolute and relative levels of compensation are acceptable. 3.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution could differ from its three predecessors in terms of scope, scale and speed. Scope Thus far, each wave of technological change has increased the importance of cognitive tasks relative to noncognitive ones. In other words, machines have largely substituted for human hands not heads. Workers have been able to improve their skills and take on newly created sets of cognitive, higher value tasks – tasks beyond the cognitive limits of machines. Rapid improvements in computing power, the increased availability of big data and advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning mean smarter machines are already replacing a broader range of human activities than before, reaching well into the range of “heads”. New technologies may increasingly provide intelligence, sensory perception, and reasoning which previously only labour could provide. Technological optimists  10  believe future automation will move beyond substituting for the ‘routine-manual’ human tasks th  technology performed in the late 20 century to almost the entire spectrum of work. 11  It may be left to people to provide “hearts” – that is, tasks that require emotional intelligence, originality or social skills such as persuasion or caring for others. And if new forms of bespoke mass creativity are made possible by the new global economy, human “hands” may once again take over (a form of cottage industry going full circle). 12  One thing that could be different is the effects of demographics. An ageing population  will lead to greater demand for care and a straight decrease in labour supply.

15 Frey, C B and Osborne, M (2017), ‘The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation?’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 114, pp. 254-280. 16 Defined as roles with over 70% chance of automation. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  However, this estimate does not take into account the heterogeneity of tasks within jobs, focusing instead on just the key tasks within each occupation. Each job usually has some components which cannot be automated, even if many of its central components can be. Indeed, evidence increasingly suggests that while large parts of many jobs will be subject to automation, relatively few jobs will be completely automated. 17  Felten, Raj and Seamans (2017)  18  show that recent  advances in technology can be used to predict future changes in the task structure of occupations, lending further support to the argument that technological advancement will likely change the nature of many jobs rather than eliminate them completely. The more extreme estimates are often based purely on technical feasibility of automation with limited consideration of economic feasibility. For example, it may be possible to automate the pouring of drinks in bars, but doing so may not present a cost saving over hiring bar staff to do the job let alone the ancillary benefit of being able to tell them your troubles. Taking these additional considerations into account reduces the share of jobs at high risk of automation to some 10% in the UK and 15% in Ireland.
A simple instruction and visual tool showing a running total as probabilities are assigned to bins leads to a negligible number of cases in which probabilities do not add up to 100 percent. 24  Following the approach described in Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009), we fit a generalized beta distribution to the bin responses of each individual respondent whenever the respondent assigns positive probability to three or more bins. When respondents only assign positive probability to one or two bins, we fit a uniform or a triangular distribution, respectively. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  such as the mean, are less prone to outliers than are one-off answers to point expectations, resulting in smaller cross-sectional dispersion.25 Eliciting probabilistic beliefs and density forecasts presents a number of challenges: much research is still needed on the best way to elicit such beliefs – for example, with regard to the format of the questions; the number, width, and location of bins; whether to tailor bins to individual respondents; and how to estimate the underlying continuous densities. The elicitation of such beliefs involves many survey design choices, and the extent to which the findings depend on the way in which the information is collected is not yet fully known. In line with earlier findings in the literature, our research shows that survey respondents are able and willing to provide density forecasts.26 In our experimental surveys, fielded as part of RAND’s American Life Panel, we observe negligible non- response rates to the bin probability questions.

Let me qualify my view by saying that the reality is much more complicated. So let me go quickly over some salient details of the euro crisis and its current impact on Asia. A great deal of uncertainty, much of it induced by lack of policy clarity, surrounds the euro crisis. This is reflected by how global FX markets have been in turmoil as investors fled euro and Asian emerging markets assets for safe havens. The Thai baht was not spared from this turbulence and experienced high volatility and bouts of weakening pressure. However, investors eventually returned to emerging markets in Asia as yields in advanced economies moved lower and Asian fundamentals improved amid slowing inflation pressure. In Thailand, government bonds, in particular, have proven attractive. In fact, foreign participation in both bond and equity is now above pre-Lehman levels. However for equity, the rate of return was  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  slow of late; net inflows were negative last year but are now slightly positive for the second half of this year. Amid all this turbulence, all this back-and-forth, the baht fluctuated in tandem, first depreciating in the first quarter of the year up until July and then appreciating somewhat. This trend was punctuated by bouts of volatility each time euro policy faced implementation difficulties once push comes to shove and member nations have to make the difficult tradeoff between national interests and supra-national interests. But back to the question of how the euro crisis will play out.
This situation has nothing to do with the appeal of our bank secrecy, as many believe, but with the abundance of savings and the high degree of price stability. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the average interest rate on three-month Swiss franc deposits – 1.4% – has been less than half the rate for euro deposits. If Switzerland were to give up its monetary independence by pegging the franc to the euro or by joining the euro area, Swiss interest rates would increase to European levels. Since higher interest rates mean lower asset prices, lower levels of investment, and also higher mortgage rates, the Swiss are, understandably, not keen on giving up their national currency. A major decision of this kind would have to be approved in a public referendum in Switzerland; the prospect of EU and euro membership in the near future is thus highly unlikely. Conclusion Having chosen the option of free trade and free movement of capital, Switzerland is, in many respects, better prepared than others to take advantage of the greater opening of borders brought about by globalisation. To be sure, this is no easy ride, as international competition always necessitates painful adjustments, and Switzerland is no exception in this respect. Given our openness, we are immediately affected by a slowdown of the world economy. On the other hand, as in the current circumstances, we can take full advantage if worldwide business activity is healthy. When we take stock of the last few years, the bottom line looks favourable.

During the past three decades, the  2  BIS Review 85/2006  Swiss franc has been an essential factor in the development of the Swiss economy. However, it has never been a reason for our exporters to sit back and relax. On the contrary, the Swiss franc has put pressure on them to become more efficient and to specialise in those product areas in which we have a real competitive edge. Consumers have also profited from the strong Swiss franc in that the prices of imported goods have fallen significantly. A currency that is accurately priced enables the economy to benefit from improvements in its terms of trade triggered by productivity increases. That is why Switzerland is a firm believer in flexible exchange rates. Another advantage of a flexible Swiss franc is that changes in the international monetary system have little bearing on our currency, which is largely determined by economic realities in Switzerland. Consequently, the launch of the euro in 1999 – probably the most important event on the monetary scene in recent years – did not lead to the disappearance or the destabilisation of the franc as feared by some. Though the euro – to all intents and purposes – is accepted as a means of payment in Switzerland, there are not more euros in circulation now than there were French francs, German marks or Italian liras prior to monetary integration.
In this way, we can assess the relevance of vulnerabilities on the mortgage and real estate markets for financial stability, and decide on any need for action. Of course, we are continuously developing our risk monitoring. Thus, we regularly review the range of indicators and the stress tests we use, taking into account new research findings as 6  7  Cf. Aldasoro, I., C. Borio and M. Drehmann (2018): Early warning indicators of banking crises: expanding the family, BIS Quarterly Report, March 2018. With a focus on Switzerland, cf. also Jokipii, T., R. Nyffeler and S. Riederer (2020): Exploring BIS credit-to-GDP gap critiques: the Swiss case, SNB Working Papers, 19/2020. Cf. emi.snb.ch/en/emi/HYPO (consulted on 30 August 2021). Page 5/12  well as experiences gained in other countries. Significant progress has been made in recent years in terms of the data available in Switzerland, particularly with the aforementioned Hypo_B survey on newly granted mortgage loans. However, there are still no corresponding data in Switzerland on outstanding mortgage loans. Please allow me to appeal to the researchers among you here: As of this year, Hypo_B survey data in aggregate form are also available to the general public. With this step, we would also like to make a contribution to new research in the field of financial stability – and we look forward to the results.

Today, I want to talk with you first about the Fed – what we do and why we do it. Then I’ll provide some thoughts about the economic outlook nationally and locally. How the economy performs is important in many ways. At the personal level, for example, it affects your family’s finances and students’ job prospects at graduation time. Collectively, it affects the potential of our nation to confront and deal with the many challenges we face. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee, also known as the FOMC. What the New York Fed does By way of introduction, I will briefly review what the New York Fed does and what makes my job so interesting. I am vice chair of the FOMC, which meets eight times a year in Washington to set interest rates and make other decisions about monetary policy. The members of this committee all strive to set policy to advance the mandate given to us by Congress to promote the maximum level of employment consistent with price stability. Sometimes we have different views on the specific policy choice at hand, and you should view this as completely appropriate: these are hard questions – particularly at times like this. In fact, I think we make better decisions as a committee because we don’t all think alike.
The recent crisis raised many issues for which clear solutions, or even consensus, have yet to emerge, including on the propensity for home bias in the policy responses, suitable approaches to cross-border resolutions, and the significant challenge of coordinating policies across different legal and institutional frameworks. This is an area where the legal framework remains highly fragmented. A sustainable solution will require legal reforms in particular, to provide certainty and clarity in dealing with crises. As events in the current global environment have demonstrated, central banking has become significantly more challenging. The issues confronting central banks today are far more diverse and complex, prompting the re-examination of the role of central banks, the capacity to manage and contain risks to monetary and financial stability, and the governance  BIS Review 113/2009  1  arrangements and the policy instruments that are needed to support the effectiveness of central banks. The new Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 which was passed by Parliament in July this year represents the culmination of more than two years work to address the issues and challenges that are confronting Central Banks in this rapidly changing environment. The Act elaborates extensively giving greater clarity on the mandates for which we are accountable and providing enhanced powers to undertake these mandates. In the principal objective of promoting monetary stability, it is recognised that price stability is to be achieved in an environment of sustainable growth of the economy.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Current challenges confronting central banks Opening and keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the SEACEN-BNM Banking and Financial Law School 2009 "Current Challenges in Central Banking – Legal Perspective", Lanai Kijang, 24 September 2009. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to speak at the 5th Banking and Financial Law School 2009, jointly organized by the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre, the Institute of Bankers Malaysia and Bank Negara Malaysia. The theme for this year's Banking and Financial Law School on "the legal perspective of the current challenges in Central Banking" has particular relevance in the present environment. Indeed, global attention is now focussed on an overhaul of the financial architecture in the efforts to address the fundamental weaknesses that have surfaced in this recent global financial crisis. The current policy debates cover a wide ranging set of issues that include far-reaching regulatory reforms to strengthen the foundations for financial stability, institutional arrangements to achieve more efficient functioning of financial markets, effective coordination of financial stability measures and greater clarity of central bank mandates in promoting monetary and financial stability. The theme of this conference also has special relevance to us at Bank Negara Malaysia, as our new Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 will come into force later this year.