samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So we know firms and workers aren’t entirely homogenous. Not every worker is suitable for every job. Nor was every job eligible for the CJRS scheme to begin with. But the fact that vacancies should have picked up so strongly, while there were millions still on furlough, does suggest that the early phase of the recovery might have been quite uneven – that the jobs lost in the downturn may not have not been the first to come back during the upswing. The broad distribution of vacancies across sectors provides some supporting evidence for this. One way to measure labour-market mismatch is to look at the sectors in which there are vacancies and those in which unemployed people last worked.11 If there’s a good correlation between the two – if the people looking for work have experience in the sectors in which firms are looking to hire – mismatch (on this particular measure) is low. When there’s a poor correspondence between available workers and available jobs the measure is high. In Chart 17 the blue line is the standard measure, in which “available workers” are defined as the unemployed. The orange line broadens the concept to include those on furlough as well. This is a relatively crude measure as the sectors we use are pretty broad12. But, for what it’s worth, this measure of  See also Haskel (2021) “Will the pandemic “scar” the economy?” speech given in online webinar at the University of Liverpool Management School.

On this issue, the draft of the new Bank of Thailand Act has stipulated this condition. Even though there is a need to review the draft in order to make it more effective, the Bank of Thailand strongly endorses the importance of this Act because it will provide for an up to date framework for the development of the Thai monetary system in the future. In data dissemination, the Bank of Thailand has improved the process of data collection and dissemination to ensure that they are complete, correct, and expeditiously published, such as the improvement of the M3 data, the report on buying-selling of foreign currency especially the forms F.T. 3 and F.T. 4, as well as random checks on the correctness of the report. At this point, we would like to note that the purpose of this random check is not to emphasise the use of penalties but to create awareness amongst the financial institutions the importance of data reporting to the Bank of Thailand, so that the Bank of Thailand can have an up to date database for policy decision-making. On the external data, for the first time there has been a survey and announcement of the International Investment Position (IIP), in order to correctly monitor foreign currency exposure of the Thai economic system. Also, Thailand is the 21st country ranking in the world, in compliance with the International Monetary Fund's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).
This is important as the Islamic banking institution has, to a large extent of its portfolio, long-term assets that include long-term Islamic housing mortgages and long-term Islamic financial instruments. These two asset classes constitute approximately 80% of their portfolio. This over-concentration warrants the need to have effective risk mitigating techniques and instruments as to avoid any potential adverse consequences that could occur in volatile market conditions. On major importance is the elimination of uncertainties from a particular transaction. The need for Islamic hedging instruments in the Islamic financial services industry has therefore become increasingly important. Thus far, significant progress in this area has yet to be made. It is hoped that this seminar will be able to generate new ideas that can be implemented to support the requirements of the Islamic financial services industry players. Ladies and Gentlemen, As the Islamic finance is undergoing transformation, the financial infrastructure and product development must be complemented by the ability to manage risks by market participants. This becomes particularly important as the growing and changing needs and expectations of consumers occurs as a result of increased education levels and growing wealth. Corporate customers have become more performance-oriented and are demanding both competitively financial products and world-class financial advisory services. Consumers too are becoming increasingly discerning and have become more involved in their financial decisions, demanding a broader range of products and services at more competitive prices through more efficient and convenient channels.

Refinements in the structure and content of the GLDP are expected to be introduced in the subsequent sessions and will include, among other things, new areas such as geopolitical and economic trends, corporate entrepreneurship and innovation, diversity and inclusiveness, culture and corporate social responsibility. The US part of the Summer program will also be changed. The change will bring participants closer to distinguished faculty from such renowned institutions as Stanford, UC Berkeley and UCLA. 2  BIS Review 11/2006  Let me now conclude my remarks. Leadership is all about a vision for the future, setting the strategic direction for the organization and having the ability to translate the vision into results. This involves having the ability to promote the shared vision and energizing the organization to produce the results. As I have earlier mentioned to one of the groups of the GLDP program "The quest for leadership excellence is a journey and not a destination." When we talk about enhancing leadership capability, we are talking about leaders who are continuous learners, who strive for cutting edge excellence, leaders who have strong convictions and beliefs and yet having humility and recognizing the need to reinvent themselves and in doing so become dynamic leaders pushing the frontiers of excellence and having the courage to take on the new challenges. Thank you. BIS Review 11/2006  3
18  BIS Review 11/2004  Chart 27. Debt and interest expenses Per cent of household income 200  12  8  4  Interest expenses (left-hand scale)  Debt (right-hand scale)  150  100  50 0 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  Conclusion To sum up: The operational target of monetary policy is inflation of close to 2½ per cent over time. Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to variability in output and employment and inflation. Norges Bank has not defined an exchange rate target. A flexible exchange rate enhances stability in output and employment. A structural feature of open economies like the Norwegian economy - with a national currency - is that the exchange rate fluctuates. The forward exchange and options markets have provided companies with greater scope for hedging against foreign exchange risk. An economic turnaround has occurred, with a soft landing after the long period of high cost inflation in Norway and low activity in the global economy. But inflation is too low. The appreciation of the krone through 2002, a change in trade patterns and external economic developments have contributed to low import price inflation. Domestic competition also appears to be exerting downward pressure on inflation. As a result of both changes in the international division of labour and increased domestic competition, there is idle labour and available real capital in Norway.

Share of global exports Per cent 16  16 US  12  12 Germany  8  8 Japan  4  4  China  0  0 1983  1987  1991  1995  1999  2003  Sources: IMF, EcoWin and Norges Bank  In recent years, China has become an important player in international trade, and the country is now the world’s fourth largest trade nation. The Asian economies and the rest of the world have become more integrated. Technological advances and a sharp fall in prices in the IT and telecommunications sectors have exposed a number of services that were previously sheltered to competition from low-cost countries. Indian companies service three million customer telephones for companies in the US and the UK daily. European airlines are transferring ticket settlement to India. US companies are outsourcing accounting services to India. Analytical activity in investment banks and development divisions in ITC companies are also being moved to India. Norwegian engineering companies are buying cheap engineering services in India and China. EU enlargement this spring, with ten new members, is also influencing the division of labour in Europe. BIS Review 11/2004  3  Chart 4.
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Beyond the turmoil – rules, supervision and infrastructures Speech by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the opening panel at the SPIN 2009 Conference, Rome, 15 June 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to participate in the opening discussion at this conference. The organisers, in choosing the title of the panel, have given us the challenging task to look beyond the current turmoil surrounding rules, supervision and infrastructures. This is certainly not easy as we cannot yet speak of an end to the difficult period facing both the financial and real sectors of the economy. However, looking beyond the turmoil and start implementing the lessons we have learned is exactly what is needed at this point in time. Against the background of the crisis up until now, we have to draw the right conclusions and begin designing the future of the financial architecture, including new rules and improved supervision and oversight. This needs to be done now before the window of opportunity – which will not remain open forever – closes. However, before looking beyond the turmoil let me take the opportunity first to examine the performance of market infrastructures in the current crisis. Developments in the financial markets and the fate of specific institutions have been at the heart of the public debate.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  While such a decision remains possible, the choice of medium-term operating framework is now a genuinely open question and is likely to be become a key issue for the Bank as it considers the future design of the SMF. Whatever decision the Bank makes about its medium-term monetary policy framework it is likely that the floor system will be retained for some time after Bank Rate is increased from its current level. Conclusion The SMF defines how the Bank interacts with markets, when implementing monetary policy and providing liquidity insurance. It is important that we are open and accountable for the operation of the SMF. The MMLC itself and the new SMF annual review process help us achieve that aim. In recent years we have transformed the SMF, and we believe for the better. But reform of the SMF is an on-going process. As my remarks today have made clear, that process is incomplete: further changes to support liquidity insurance are in the pipeline and the Bank needs to keep under review its tools for implementing monetary policy. The Bank is both open for business and open to outside views, and we always welcome feedback from MMLC members or other interested parties on any aspect of the SMF, including at the forthcoming Open Forum. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
For example, the BIS was one of the first to emphasise that low and stable inflation does not necessarily imply macroeconomic stability and a reduced risk for financial crises, see for example Borio and Lowe (2002) and White (2006). However, contributions were not only made by the BIS in this context. Rajan (2005) is another example. 19 I discussed this case in a speech last year, see Jansson (2016). 12 [20]  difficult to attain. Sooner or later, confidence in the inflation target would be lost, bringing us back to the problems I just outlined. More fundamental problems with a monetary policy that focuses on financial stability There are also other reasons why a monetary policy that focuses heavily on attempting to counteract the accumulation of financial imbalances may be problematic. I have just addressed one of these, namely that fairly large rate rises may be required to slow down, for example, a rapid increase of debt. Even if the effect of this on inflation is not considered so important, it is more difficult to disregard that the effect on output and employment could be significant. The issue can also be considered from a more general perspective. Thinking about it, it would be quite strange if the main way of preventing financial crises was to hold monetary policy tighter than could be justified by basic economic prospects.

This was an attempt to show the combined effects of short-term interest rates and the krona on inflation. The underlying thought was that if the krona strengthened, interest rates could be lower and vice versa. This was something that the Index could only illustrate roughly. The risk with such an index is that it can be interpreted too mechanically, as shown by experience from New Zealand and elsewhere. When the exchange rate weakens it tends to be used as an argument for raising the interest rate. In this context, MCI is a very good example of the risks of oversimplification in monetary policy. That which is of greatest importance as regards the exchange rate is precisely the same as with deregulations and asset prices – to evaluate each situation in the context of our objectives and our guiding principles. The important question is always why a certain movement in the exchange rate has occurred. If we know – and that is not always the case – we can perhaps say something about how long the movement might last. This can in turn guide us in how we use interest rates. There are central banks which now and again have to devote most of their communication to discussing the latest movements on the foreign exchange market. This is not something we should try to emulate. It is not the situation in which the Riksbank finds itself nowadays. But this has not always been the case.
However, people should exercise some caution before utilising such cyberpurse facilities. Regardless of how the system may be presented, the purse operator is in effect acting very much as a bank, in particular by holding your money in a sort of deposit. Even if you initially acquired the digital cash or credit for free (through a loyalty or bonus point scheme, for example), the accumulated “savings” represent value which you would doubtless wish to protect. Customers will want to be assured that the money or credit points are in safe hands. Regulators, too, may desire to verify that no banking activity is taking place that is unlawful, although they will first need to ascertain the location of this virtual operation (a task which is itself almost a contradiction in terms) so as to identify what is the applicable jurisdiction. Although in most of these schemes the maximum sum which anyone may hold in a purse may, for the moment, be quite modest, and so the scale of potential losses limited, we need to establish the foundations of prudent behaviour and regulation in preparation for the time when the sums may be much larger. Thus far I have been looking at the phenomenon of e-banking and e-payments largely from the regulatory point of view. I would like to turn now to examine whether there are any noteworthy implications for the key central bank responsibility of monetary policy. I want first to consider possible implications for the physical currency.

Imports performance incurred the same development declining by about 8 percent in annual terms. External economy developments are accompanied by the maintenance of high trade deficit rates, which affect the imbalance of the demand to supply ratios for foreign currency in the economy. Nevertheless, the maintaining of the exchange rate flexibility, the correcting tendency of trade deficit and the attraction of savings denominated in ALL, as higher interest rates and of low inflation, serve to relaxed and prudential volatilities of the exchange rate and to a strong position of ALL in the short-term and medium-term period. Monetary indicators of July have reflected the more relaxed dynamic of financial intermediation. External sector highlights of the economy have affected the negative paces of the foreign currency component of money stock. However, banking system carried out the intermediation to increase lending in ALL extended to private and public sector with positive paces. Thus, while monetary supply picked up at slower annual paces, about 4.4 percent, M2 aggregate maintained high paces of the annual growth at 9.7 percent as at July. The slowdown of lending pace to economy in foreign currency and the lower supply of foreign currency inflows from external sector have led to a negative annual pace of deposits growth denominated in foreign currency of the system. Lending to private sector increased by 15.8 percent in real annual terms, relative to 17.9 percent in June. Lending to business provided the main contribution on the monthly growth of credit, a constant phenomenon, which this month appeared particularly more emphasised.
There has been no conflict between low inflation and high economic growth, as previously claimed by economists. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The guidelines and the financial crisis The financial crisis in 2008 put our economic policy guidelines to a severe test. The interest rate cuts that followed from the inflation target led to a reduction in households’ annual interest expenses of around NOK 40 billion, or around 4 per cent of their disposable income. The krone depreciated and acted as a buffer. The burden on leveraged companies was eased and investment projects became profitable in an environment of lower interest rates. Altogether, monetary policy made a substantial contribution to Norway’s resilience to the crisis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Well anchored inflation expectations made monetary policy effective – the reduction in Norges Bank’s key policy rate was perceived as a decline in the real interest rate. Other central banks experienced that there was little scope for reducing the real interest rate to a sufficiently low level. This downturn contrasts sharply with the downturn in the 1980s when the interest rate had to be maintained at a high level to defend the krone exchange rate. At that time, there was a lack of confidence in both monetary policy and fiscal policy. The costs were substantial. Unemployment increased, in line with that experienced in some European countries today. When the financial crisis reached Norway in 2008, we were in a much better position.

The financial crisis highlighted the need to strengthen the current framework. Regulation of the financial sector must secure financial stability, but at the same time protect the public against losses. This is now on the agenda in Norway and in other countries. I would like to highlight three main aspects of the new regulations that are now underway: First, the financial crisis revealed that banks held insufficient capital, excessive short-term market funding and inadequate liquidity buffers. The new Basel III framework sets out stricter requirements. Second, the new framework includes macroprudential tools that can be applied when necessary. Banks may be subject to additional capital requirements if credit growth in the wider economy is excessive. Third, the authorities must acquire tools that enable banks to be wound up in an orderly manner. Owners and creditors – not taxpayers – must bear the losses. The interest rate on banks’ funding will then reflect the risk they take rather than an implicit government subsidy. The outlook Despite some concerns regarding financial stability, the Norwegian economy must be characterised as strong. Productivity fell somewhat through the downturn, but has picked up again. Compared to our neighbouring countries, unemployment in Norway is low, around 3 per cent of the labour force. In 2010 the return on our oil fund was close to 10 per cent, and the capital has passed 150 per cent of mainland GDP. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the twelve months since January 2010, oil prices have risen to over USD 100.
It surpassed the $ billion mark in just two days, making it the fastest growing ETF in history. 14  For instance, Expedia, Tesla and Microsoft. 15  See “Understanding digital bubbles amidst the COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence from DeFi and NFTs”. Y. Maouchi, L. Charfeddine and G.E. Montasser (2021), Finance Research Letters. 16  The idea behind this strategy is to incentivise investors to lend their crypto-assets to a pool that helps provide liquidity to decentralised finance systems, while offering potential investors the highest possible returns at all times. To simplify somewhat, this strategy is structured around smart contracts that select which environment each of the pooled assets will be sent to at any given moment to optimise economic returns for their rightful holders. 5  where they start posing serious threats to global financial stability17. A message that we also conveyed in our latest Financial Stability Report18. Such risks are diverse in their origin. First, they may arise as a result of a limited understanding by investors on the actual features and implications of these assets on the part of investors.19 By way of example, a recent research from the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) showed that around 20% of crypto-asset owners assumed an equivalent level of customer protection as with traditional banking products.20 An OECD study reached similar conclusions for the Asian market.21 In general terms, given their volatility and complexity, crypto-assets are not appropriate for retail investors.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers led to the financial markets ceasing to function normally. Certain markets did not function at all. The banks became unwilling to lend to one another, which, among other effects, manifested itself in the steep increase of the interest rates that the banks had to pay when they borrowed from one another. (Figure 1) Figure 1 Ted spread Difference between interbank rate and treasury bill, 3 month maturity, basis points  Sources: Ecowin and Bloomberg. The Swedish banks were quickly drawn into the crisis in the autumn of 2008. They certainly did not have any great exposures towards the markets and institutions that were worst impacted. But they were still affected by the global shortage of confidence. The Swedish financial markets also functioned much less efficiently than normal. Two factors exacerbated the problems for the Swedish banks: the large degree of market funding and the high exposure towards the Baltic countries. More than half of the banks’ funding consists of borrowing on the financial markets and less than half consists of deposits from the public. Furthermore, a substantial share of the banks’ funding is place in foreign currency. In conjunction with the crisis, a shortage of dollars arose around the world and, when this shortage became acute, the Swedish banks were also affected. They then faced problems in obtaining funding, particularly with longer times to maturity. These problems rapidly became serious.