samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But they found it harder to adjust to the post-crisis ‘Basel 3’ liquidity rules, which gave centre stage to the very instruments they were prohibited from holding, including government bonds, such as UK gilts and US Treasuries, and remunerated central bank reserves accounts. To meet this challenge, the Basel liquidity rules give national supervisors discretion to treat sukuk as High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA), subject to haircuts or other conditions. The consequent increase in demand for sukuk from banks was one factor boosting issuance in recent years. But the proportion of sukuk classed as eligible for regulatory buffers remains relatively modest compared to demand. As a result, while sukuk can provide a reliable medium-term store of value, the relative scarcity of HQLA-eligible stock can give rise to uncertain price movements, especially in stressed markets, reducing the value that is readily realisable, and making it harder for banks to increase their holdings quickly when required. All of this means that Islamic banks can face a somewhat uneven playing field relative to conventional banks when it comes to liquidity management. Unable to use liquid gilts or interestbearing reserves accounts at the Bank of England to meet short-term outgoings, they have tended to hold inefficiently high stocks of cash at zero return, or higher-yielding but somewhat less liquid sukuk. The design and launch of the Bank of England’s Alternative Liquidity Facility That’s where our new Alternative Liquidity Facility (or ‘ALF’) should make a real difference.

The rate of return on the deposit (6) is based on the rate of return on the portfolio backing it, net of hedging and other operational costs; and on maturity the return from the fund is paid over to participating banks, and the principal amount is returned or rolled over. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10
In this regard it is helpful that in a monetary union the parameters within which action can be taken are defined in the sense that the interest rate and the exchange rate instruments are not available to governments, and fiscal policy can only be used for adjustment purposes within the limits set by the Stability and Growth Pact. Given the limited room for manoeuvre, therefore, any adjustments necessary in order for the Maltese economy to achieve the growth rates that will ensure a more rapid pace of convergence and to respond successfully to asymmetric shocks will have to take place in the real economy. And since in a resource-poor and open economy like Malta’s, growth must be predominantly export-led, the focus of policy must be on increasing the country’s international competitiveness. The starting position for addressing this challenge is relatively favourable. In the words of the Commission’s Convergence Report, Malta has achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence; and more recently, the IMF Article IV Mission Report concluded that The economic recovery is gaining traction, owing largely to cyclical strength and some structural change. The economy has indeed been growing at more than 3% for almost three years and broad-based reforms have helped to mitigate structural impediments in a number of areas.

See Michael Joyce, Ana Lasaosa, Ibrahim Stevens and Matthew Tong, “The Financial Market Impact of Quantitative Easing,” Bank of England Working Paper No.393, 2010, and Joseph Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache, and Brian Sack, “Large-scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No.441, 2010. BIS Review 169/2010  3  Sharp fiscal consolidation and very slow growth in the periphery countries would, of course, have some adverse impact on the demand for our exports. But the more significant links are potentially through the financial system. Fortunately, UK banks have done much to improve their resilience over the past couple of years and, even under a very adverse scenario, they should be able to absorb the likely losses on their direct exposures to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain without too much difficulty. There is, though, the possibility of further indirect effects arising through the interconnectedness and cross-border operations of European banks which could amplify the impact. So some adverse effect on the funding costs of UK banks and the supply of credit remains a possibility. Harder to gauge is the potential effect on household and, especially, business confidence. In the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, this was arguably the most significant transmission channel to the real economy. An intensification of the sovereign debt problems in the euro area could therefore administer a blow to the recovery here.
Even though there has been a steady shift towards more service production, we are still lagging behind other advanced economies such as the US and, to a lesser extent, Japan, which have higher production of services per capita. In particular, it is striking that service sector output per capita (in PPP terms) is 33% higher in the US than in the euro area, which is the main reason for a smaller difference in overall GDP per capita levels (26%)[27]. To a large extent this is due to old-fashioned restrictions that prevent competition in many countries in the euro area. The European Commission has estimated that an ambitious implementation of the 2006 Services Directive would have the potential to increase euro area GDP by around 2.5%. The latest estimates show that only around 0.8 percentage point of this has been realised – and this is ten years after the Directive entered into force. Also, bear in mind that these figures significantly underestimate the gains from a wider service market reform, given that some of the most important sectors – for instance health care – are completely excluded from the Directive. Another factor in services that is sometimes overlooked is that of scale. In today’s fragmented service market in Europe, there is insufficient pooling of resources to drive large-scale R&D initiatives, new distribution platforms and to increase competition between market participants. We therefore need to take a step back and consider what can be done to complete the European Single Market for services.

And central banks do not regulate casino visits. As you can see, I could easily spend all of my time today talking about the problems of cryptocurrencies, and of bitcoin in particular. I could talk about how much energy it consumes – at some points last year, the bitcoin ecosystem consumed twice as much energy as Nigeria, an oil giant with 190 million people. By the way, the energy consumed on a single bitcoin transaction until 2017 could power a typical American household for more than three weeks. I could talk about how a seven-fold increase in the value of bitcoin some time ago was driven by the manipulation of a single trader. I could talk about the volatility of bitcoin, which surpasses that of any other commonly traded commodity and which renders bitcoin useless for the vast majority of people. I could talk about the funny thing that bitcoin as a quasi-currency was created to make payments cheap and fast, while in reality it is more often than not expensive and slow. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  But instead, I will stress – and this is my point today – the positive philosophical influence of bitcoin on the conservative world of central banking.
0109  0108  0107  0105  0909  0509  0109  0908  0508  0108  30  0907  0 0507  70  0107  100  0106  110  200  Source: Bloomberg. Source: Goldman Sachs. The course of food prices is another important assumption for inflation forecasts. Contrary to the upward trend in previous years, the seasonally adjusted food prices displayed a decline in the third quarter (Figure 33). This change was mainly driven by the decline in unprocessed prices fuelled by prices of fruits and vegetables decreasing at a faster pace than seasonal averages. Unprocessed food prices had displayed an upswing in the first half of the year. Deceleration in annual inflation in processed food prices continued as well and prices fell compared to the same period of the previous year for the first time in the history of the index (Figure 34). The July Inflation Report envisaged food inflation to be 7.5 percent at the end of 2009 and 6 percent for the following years. However, better than expected outcomes regarding food prices necessitated a downward revision in food inflation to 5.8 percent for end-2009, while the projection of 6 percent was maintained for the following years. 14  BIS Review 143/2009  Figure 33: Food Prices  Figure 34: Food Prices  (Seasonally Adjusted,  (Annual Percentage Change)  Quarterly Moving Average)  2 1,5 1 0,5 0 -0,5  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT.

Figure 28: Total Aggregate Domestic Demand (Seasonally Adjusted, at 1998 Prices, Billion TL) 28 26 24 22 20 18 16 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3* 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  *Forecast. Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Data pertaining to the third quarter indicate that external demand remained weak and the negative contribution of net exports to quarterly growth persisted. The course of external demand will be determined by the outlook of the speed and timing of global recovery. The medium-term outlook for global growth indicates that the GDPs of developed countries would not reach the pre-crisis level for an extended period of time. Within this framework, external demand is expected to continue to suppress aggregate demand for quite some time (Figure 29). 12  BIS Review 143/2009  Figure 29: Actual and Forecast GDP Growth in Developed Countries (Seasonally Adjusted, 2008Q2=100) 104 102 100 98 96 94 92 90  USA  Eurozone  Japan  England  88 86 2  3  4  1  2  2008  3  4  1  2  2009  3  4  1  2010  2  2011  Source: Consensus Forecasts, September. In the June-August period, non-farm employment increased for the first time since the second quarter of 2008, in seasonally adjusted terms.
Marko Škreb: The transition process - it’s all about people, isn’t it? Text of the Jacques de Larosière Lecture given by Mr Marko Škreb, Governor of the Croatian National Bank, at the EBRD Ninth Annual Meeting, held in Riga, Latvia, on 21 May 2000. *  *  *  Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, Let me first of all say how deeply honored and humbled I am to be chosen to deliver this year’s Jacques de Larosière lecture1 on the occasion of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the EBRD. It is a special honor not only for me, but for my country, Croatia, as well. Let me thank you all for this. It is a privilege to deliver this lecture after only two distinguished central bank governors: Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz two years ago and Jacob A Frenkel last year. Which reminds me that right now I am breaking one of the main BIS rules: “Never speak after Jacob Frenkel”. My only hope is that the time lag of one year is long enough for your memories to fade. Making a speech to honor Mr de Larosière is an enormous challenge. I have always been very impressed by his work and his distinguished domestic and especially international career. I met Mr de Larosière for the first time in 1996 (after I became the governor of the central bank) and have managed to stay in touch regularly since then.

Household saving is now rising rapidly from a negative level. Banks’ willingness to lend to households has stabilised after the tightening last autumn. However, they are still tightening lending to enterprises. Banks are increasing their margins and fees, and require higher equity capital levels of corporate loan applicants. At the same time, funding in the securities market is expensive. The Government Bond Fund facilitates funding primarily for enterprises with a moderate or high credit rating. As a result of extensive official measures the banks now have fairly good access to shortterm and medium-term funding. Norges Bank has supplied ample short-term liquidity to banks. Loans with longer maturities have been widely used, and an increasing number of banks are participating in the credit swap arrangement. We see here an overview of various banks’ and mortgage companies’ use of this arrangement as a percentage of their total assets. So far, there are 15 banks and mortgage companies participating in the arrangement. Several participants report that the credit swap arrangement is a good source of funding in today’s market. The government receives, which is reasonable, compensation for making Treasury notes available. The rate has been in the order of a half per cent. With a large volume of Treasury notes in circulation, we see the possibility of the formation of an interbank market for loans in NOK, where government securities are used as collateral. In the event, this would provide the Norwegian money market with greater insulation from the shifting weather conditions in the US dollar market.
The positive developments in domestic production have been also evidenced by the increase of economic tendency indicator, derived from the business and consumer opinions, and by the increased number in employed persons. In annual terms, unemployment rate fell by 1.5 percent to 12.62 percent, being mainly triggered by the increase in the average number of employed persons in the private agricultural sector. Notwithstanding the inflationary pressures of early 2008 – mainly triggered by supply-side shocks – CPI annual inflation was brought back within the Bank of Albania’s target during the second half of 2008. In the second half of the same year annual inflation rates stood close to the central bank’s target – 3.0 and 2.5 percent, respectively, in both quarters. The performance of the inflation rate in the second half mirrored the global effect of the fall in basic commodity prices (mainly foodstuff and oil prices) as well as a more favourable price conjuncture of goods and services in the domestic market as a result of their demand coverage with an ever-growing supply. The return of inflation within the targeted band was not only conditioned by the relaxation of supply-side shocks but also by the adequate monetary conditions which provided room for the balancing of demand and supply-side factors. Monetary policy stance was neutral throughout 2008 and the key interest rate was kept unchanged at 6.25 percent.

More broadly speaking, the RMB is now the seventh most used payment currency according to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), and the ninth most actively traded currency according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 4. To me, the extent and pace of the development of offshore RMB business depends on three key factors. The first factor is the relaxation of controls and restrictions by the Mainland authorities. The second factor is the availability of the necessary financial market infrastructure, such as clearing and settlement systems. The third factor is the awareness and willingness of corporates and financial institutions, especially banks, to develop RMB business opportunities. 5. Since the RMB trade settlement pilot scheme was launched back in July 2009, the Mainland authorities have incrementally removed many controls and restrictions on the flow of RMB out of and into the Mainland. Presently all trade and current account  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  transactions between Mainland China and other parts of the world, as well as inward and outward direct investment into and out of China, can be conducted in RMB. Moreover, some cross-border portfolio investment flows, such as investments into China’s bond and equity markets, can also be made in RMB via the RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) scheme. 6. More importantly, in April this year the Mainland and Hong Kong authorities announced a milestone project, i.e. the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect scheme.
[19] We want to provide people with a product that is easy to understand and easy to use. Contributing to an efficient European monetary and payment system Not only would ensuring the wide accessibility and usability of public money for digital retail payments throughout the euro area help maintain the integrity and stability of our financial system. It would also contribute to an efficient monetary and payment system in Europe. A digital euro would play a role in strengthening the strategic autonomy and resilience of the euro retail payments market. This would also allow us to respond to possible disruptions to the flow of euro payments caused by the materialisation of geopolitical risks. The issuance of a digital euro would support European sovereignty and stability in two ways: first, by contributing to the development of European-governed payment services; and second, by promoting a resilient ecosystem for euro retail payments. For the digital euro to achieve this objective, private and public parties need to work together towards a truly pan-European digital payment solution. Think back to the introduction of euro cash: the changeover was a common endeavour encompassing public and private players. We should aim to replicate this in the digital age. Indeed, financial intermediaries would play a key role in distributing the digital euro. Their experience is essential for us, in particular in areas like the onboarding of consumers, anti-money laundering checks and consumer-facing services.

[20] A digital euro should enhance rather than constrain services and business options so that service providers can enrich their portfolio and develop new products and services around a digital euro to the benefit of their customers. In this light, we are stepping up our engagement with banks and other market stakeholders, including consumer representatives and retailers. We are listening carefully to their views. [21]  Conclusion Let me conclude. We are designing a digital euro that would make central bank money usable for digital payments, giving Europeans a digital means of payment that they can use throughout the euro area for their everyday payments and supporting Europe’s societal objectives. Having digital money issued by the central bank and available to everyone would provide an anchor of stability for the payments market, preserving the coexistence of public and private money that has served us well so far. By distributing digital euro, intermediaries will play a key role. We are working to address at an early stage any possible undesirable consequences that may result from the issuance of a digital euro for monetary policy, financial stability and the allocation of credit to the real economy. Your role as co-legislators will be key to ensuring that the necessary regulatory framework is in place for both public and private forms of money in the digital age. For my part, I will continue to report to you regularly as we progress to the next steps in our investigation phase. I now look forward to our discussion. 1.
Rubin also points out that the president was able, by showing a clear respect for the Federal Reserve's independence, to increase his own credibility and build-up confidence in economic policy in the United States and in the functioning of the financial markets. This is a view I can sympathise with. The question is then how we in Sweden should act to ensure that confidence in our total economic policy is as great as possible. Essentially, this of course means doing the right things. In our case, ensuring price stability in accordance with our own definition. However, I believe that the ways in which the authorities responsible for fiscal policy and monetary policy cooperate can also play a role here. In this aspect I can see clear advantages in the interplay between government and central bank in the United States and the United Kingdom. Maintaining mutual respect for one another's tasks, they have a close cooperation to conduct an overall policy that will benefit their country as much as possible. This is a desirable form of cooperation, particularly for small countries and I believe that we in Sweden have come a long way towards this since the mid-1990s. It would be a negative development if the pattern were broken and we instead slipped into a form of interplay similar to that in continental Europe, where national finance ministers blame their problems on the ECB and where sharp words are regularly aimed in the opposite direction. Thank you.

As part of Singapore's efforts to forge bilateral free trade agreements with strategic partners, MAS has engaged in talks on financial services liberalisation and cooperation, including with Australia, Canada, the European Free Trade Association, Japan, Mexico and the US. 5  MAS annual accounts  Assets & liabilities On MAS' annual accounts, total assets increased by $ billion to $ billion as at 31 March 2001. The main components of the increase were due to a $ billion increase in foreign assets and a $  BIS Review 63/2001  3  billion increase in our holdings of Singapore Government Securities (SGS). As in the last financial year, the increase in SGS holdings reflected MAS' strategy of building up SGS to engage in more repurchase agreement (repo) transactions for our money market operations. On the liabilities side, there was an increase of $ billion in Government deposits with MAS, reflecting mainly increased issuance of SGS through the Authority. Income & expenditure statement For the financial year ended 31 March 2001, MAS registered profits of $ billion compared to $ billion in the previous year. The decrease resulted from translation effects arising from the strength of the Singapore Dollar against major currencies other than US Dollar over the financial year as a whole. 6  The organisation  MAS has strengthened its corporate planning process. We formed several cross-specialisation teams comprising more than 60 staff to evaluate developments and challenges both in the external environment and within the organisation.