samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Third, the Bank should not take decisions that discriminate between different companies and sectors. There may well be  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  good reasons for discriminating in some circumstances but that is a decision properly reserved to elected politicians. By buying gilts we leave the private sector to decide in which directions the money we create should percolate through the economy. Any positive impact of asset purchases will benefit all companies, large and small, through its impact on overall demand. Our programme of gilt purchases has helped large companies to reduce their reliance on the banking system and obtain finance directly from equity and corporate bond markets. In fact, the majority of Britain’s largest companies can borrow more cheaply in capital markets than the average of the largest six banks. Smaller and medium-sized companies (SMEs), however, are constrained to borrow through the banking system. And there is special concern about their ability to obtain credit – I share that concern based on my experience of meeting many such firms during visits to all parts of the United Kingdom and hearing reports from the Bank’s regional agents. We have made this point repeatedly at hearings of the Treasury Committee in Parliament. Over the past year the stock of SME borrowing has shrunk by around £ billion or 5%.

Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to the Institute of Directors, St George’s Hall, Liverpool, 18 October 2011. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Surrounded by the magnificent architecture of St George’s Hall, we are reminded of the benefits and the costs of exposure to the world economy. Built at the peak of Liverpool’s mercantile fortunes, the Hall, and the other magnificent buildings of the cultural quarter, exhibit the prosperity derived from openness to trade. Indeed, tonight is the anniversary of a grand banquet held here on 18th October 1860 to celebrate the opening of the public library and museum building that stands opposite. Its construction had been financed by the guest of honour at the banquet that evening, William Brown, whose statue stands in the Hall today. Brown had profited from transatlantic trade both as a merchant and by establishing a bank which financed trade – at the time a risky business. In those days, finance and trade supported each other, and the city prospered. But the subsequent history of St George’s Hall, which fell into neglect in the last century, illustrates Liverpool’s vulnerability to changes in the rest of the world. The British economy too has enjoyed the benefits of globalisation. Now we are seeing some of the costs, as they play out in a global financial crisis.
Actually, one essential objective of macroprudential supervision may be to "regulate" (not in the legal sense, but economically) the aggregate level of risk appetite inside the financial system. This unavoidably involves some degree of discretionary judgement and intervention. Combining the two components of macrosupervision (systemic and macroeconomic) with the two approaches (automatic and discretionary) produces an interesting classification, which is presented in the table below:  BIS Review 37/2009  3  Purpose Systemic risk  Adjustment to macroconditions  Mechanisms • buffers (capital and/or liquidity) • Loan to Value ratios Automatic  • accounting framework • stress tests  Discretionary  • pillar II of Basel 2  • time varying ratios  capital  • dynamic provisioning  • discretionary adjustments to capital ratios, provisions or margin requirements  Institutional challenges The discretionary approach to macrosupervision raises important institutional issues. First, who makes the judgment? And should that body be independent or not? There is a good case for putting Central Banks in charge. If one takes an historical perspective, it is striking that the mandates and missions of Central Banks have taken major turns following financial crises. Central Banks have an informational advantage (or at least no disadvantage) in judging the cyclical position. They have an incentive to act, because macroprudential supervision alleviates the burden on monetary policy, and because they need monetary transmission mechanisms to work. So they clearly should have a pivotal role in the process. But they are not alone in caring about financial stability.

In particular, stricter discipline is observed in Switzerland in terms of compliance with credit conditions, and price swings have been considerably less extreme. Moreover, there is no evidence to date of any upsurge in speculative trends on the Swiss property market. At present, neither a general property bubble nor any general mortgage problem could probably be said to exist. Although the banks have largely drawn the correct conclusions from the real estate crisis of the 1990s with regard to lending in Switzerland, it is still essential – given the losses on the US real estate market – to carefully assess risks when granting loans (including mortgages) in Switzerland too. BIS Review 150/2007  1
I stress their importance because they promote a multilateral cooperation framework agreement and set minimum requirements for achieving the rapid and consistent conclusion of the cooperation agreements between deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). These cooperation agreements will address operational cross-border challenges, 1 such as ensuring that depositors in EU branches of institutions headquartered in other Member States are treated similarly to depositors in the home Member State. The H2C (home-host cooperation) project, which has just been extensively presented is also a remarkable new step towards finding and experimenting with solutions to shared problems, and this must be encouraged. It is an example of the constructive cooperation between DIS operators or authorities despite their diverse regulatory or operational approaches. 1  2  These guidelines concern (i) the modalities for repaying depositors by local DGS at branches of banks established in other European Member states, (ii) the modalities for the transfer of contributions from one DGS to another in the event of a credit institution ceasing to be a member of a DGS and joining another DGS, and (iii) modalities for mutual lending between DGSs  BIS central bankers’ speeches  From a regulatory perspective, there is the example of the FSB Key Attributes that have been applied through the Crisis Management Groups, with relevant authorities holding discussions to find ways to tackle the recovery and resolution of GSIBs.

In Europe, we have gone further with our second Directive on DGS (Directive 2014/49/EU) that harmonises the reimbursement of covered deposits within 7 working days and with the ongoing negotiations for the establishment of a Single DGS for European Member States participating in the Banking Union. Is a single DGS a prerequisite for a genuine Banking Union or is it the final stage to be implemented when everything else has been harmonised? In all events, the European stance will be prudent, favouring the establishment a European Scheme based on a re-insurance approach. It is not only standards that matter but practices too Common standards alone are not sufficient because day-to-day work on financial stability requires practical solutions that cannot be implemented in isolation by a single jurisdiction. This does not mean that everything must be unified but bridges must be built between stakeholders, in accordance with their legal remits and constraints. At the European level, we pushed forward this approach through European agencies such as the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) to help implement the standards consistently and ultimately by the creation of the Banking Union. The latter is wholly dedicated to the practical exercise of supervision, resolution and, at a later stage, deposit insurance. More specifically, we welcome the completion of the cooperation agreement guidelines prepared by the EBA and mentioned in the last panel today.
You were driving, and one of your friends asked you, “When will we make a turn?” If you have a GPS navigator or open up Google Maps, you might be able to say with precision, “In 2.5 kilometers.” When talking about a policy course, the answer might be, “In the next two or three quarters, if things go according to plan.” In real life, we policymakers do not have the luxury of having a GPS navigator, not to mention the fact that this said turn could be moved closer or further away without giving any warnings in this volatile world. What we do have, however, are indicators we observe from our surroundings, and indicators of road conditions and possible storms ahead of us. Similarly, the MPC considers a number of factors when formulating a policy decision—not only the current state of such factors, but also their longer-run trends and expectations of risk scenarios going forward. For a small open economy in an increasingly volatile world, MPC’s decisions will have to be data dependent. In my address to you this morning, I will share with you the factors that the MPC considers when making policy decisions. Since the main objective of a flexible inflation targeting framework is to attain sustainable economic growth while preserving price and financial stability, I am going to take inflation, growth, and financial stability each in turn. 1/5  Ladies and gentlemen, The first factor that the MPC takes into consideration is inflation.

12.07.2017  Congressional Hearing of the Governor of the Banco de España before the Commission investigating the financial crisis in Spain and the financial assistance programme  Luis M. Linde Governor  Thank you Madam Chair, Ladies and Gentlemen. I appear before this Commission following the summons received from the President of the Congress of Deputies in connection with the publication drafted and released by the Banco de España on 16 June entitled “Report on the Financial and Banking Crisis in Spain, 20082014”. The plans to draft a report on the economic and financial crisis that first broke in Spain in 2007-2008 were considered some time ago in the Banco de España, justifiably so given that this crisis has been the worst the Spanish economy and financial system has undergone in recent decades. The Parliament’s decision last February to set up this Commission confirmed for us the advisability of drafting the Report, understanding that it could be a suitable contribution by the Banco de España to the Commission’s work. Although some of its effects have continued to the present day, the crisis may be deemed to have ended or been brought under control, in general terms, in 2015.
More generally, by emphasising principles in the rules - that an AMA must be credible, that it must adequately capture the  4  BIS Review 45/2003  risk of extreme events, that it must be used by banks in the daily management of their operational risk and not just for regulatory capital purposes - enhanced disclosure and transparency may actually result in more consistency in the application of advanced approaches than detailed quantitative criteria. Conclusion The Committee will need to spend the next few months discussing these three themes internally and with the industry to refine the qualifying criteria for the AMA, to determine how best to allocate operational risk capital, and to ensure a level playing field in the application of the operational risk framework. As we conclude today’s conference, I think all of us have a better sense of the work that is ahead for both bankers and supervisors. At the same time, it’s clear from the issues and themes that you’ve been discussing at this conference that we’ve moved beyond a discussion of the principles behind the rules and to a focus on preparing for their implementation. This seems appropriate, since we expect that, given the very good progress that we have noted in banks preparing to adopt the New Accord, supervisors and the industry will be ready to implement the new rules by the end of 2006.

Joseph Yam: Basel II - back to the future Opening remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Seventh Distinguished Lecture: “Basel II: Back to the Future”, Hong Kong, 4 February 2005. *  *  *  Let me first extend a warm welcome to all of you to this seventh HKMA Distinguished Lecture. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce our speaker, Governor Jaime Caruana, and our discussant, Mr David Eldon. Basel II, or the New Capital Accord, or whatever we might call it, has been on the minds of bankers and regulators for around five years now. This new framework of capital adequacy standards for banks, issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, is an important step forward in the field of regulation. By making capital requirements more risk-sensitive, Basel II will bring banking regulation more into line with the way that banks themselves manage risk. It will also give banks the incentive to improve their own risk management. Basel II will help make banks stronger, and it will improve the safety, stability and efficiency of financial systems. The title of Governor Caruana's lecture today, "Back to the Future", might for a moment give the impression that Basel II is the stuff of science fantasy. There is no doubt that it is a highly complex matter, and that it has – literally – required the recruitment of physicists and rocket scientists by the regulators and banks tasked with its implementation.
The sinking of the "interest rate island" would trigger substantial waves of redistribution from debtors to creditors, the financial system would come under pressure, and cyclical setbacks would be inevitable. The view that a weaker franc might even compensate for structural shortcomings of the Swiss economy must also be rejected. Looking at the economy as a whole, we notice that the Swiss export sector in general is highly competitive. It is exactly the export-oriented companies that are the main driving force behind productivity gains in Switzerland. If, however, the domestic sector, which is less exposed to direct international competition, does not follow suit, growth prospects are limited. The continued improvement of economic policy conditions, in particular the strengthening of competition in the domestic industry, is the key to a sustained high level of prosperity in Switzerland. It is, therefore, justified in taking priority in terms of economic policy. Without doubt, we are today confronted with an unstable economic situation worldwide. However, the economy cannot be improved by targeting a specific exchange rate. Given the limited prospects of success, the described inflationary risks and the risk of giving away the interest rate bonus, exchange rate targeting as a monetary policy strategy clearly must be rejected. 5. Conclusions  For more than three and a half years now, Europe - and in its midst Switzerland - have been living with the euro as deposit money. It has led to fixed exchange rates and a uniform interest rate level in the euro zone surrounding Switzerland.

Hence, the offered exchange rate is generally unattractive, and visitors will almost always be better off converting their money at a bank or using their credit cards. Historically, parallel currencies have only prevailed in those countries that no longer had a sound currency of their own. As long as the SNB continues to pursue a policy that aims at maintaining price stability, the Swiss franc will remain a widely accepted and trustworthy currency. There is no reason to expect it to disappear. By contrast, the declining significance of the Swiss franc as a denomination of foreign bonds in recent years is not primarily due to the creation of the single currency. This trend had already been observable long before 1999. It can be seen as a return to a situation in which the importance of the Swiss franc is more in check with Switzerland's economic size, as compared with its former extremely over-proportional weighting as an investment currency. Certainly, the launch of the euro has not enhanced the attractiveness of Swiss franc bonds, mainly because the market liquidity of euro bonds has grown significantly since 1999. On the other hand, the Swiss franc has gained in stature simply because it is a member of the dwindling family of international currencies. For this reason, we expect it to maintain a role as an instrument of portfolio diversification. 3.2.
Active asset management could also become less viable in a low for long world. Lower asset returns put active asset managers under pressure relative to passive funds given the higher costs of active management. We are already seeing this: since 2007, the share of index tracking US equity funds has increased from about 20% to 50% of US equity assets under management. It is not yet clear what the impact in financial stability terms might be of greater passive asset management, though some research19 suggests further acceleration of this trend could result in more volatile markets with greater vulnerability to swings in sentiment. 18 The Bank’s 2017 exploratory scenario considered how the UK banking system might evolve if recent  headwinds to bank profitabiity persist or intensify. It incorporated weak global growth, persistently low interest rates, stagnant world trade and cross-border banking activity and increase competitive pressure on large banks from smaller banks and non-banks. See Bank of England (2017a). 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  Financial stability challenges of low for long: households and corporates  One of the main drivers of the downward shift in the trend real rate is demographics. An ageing population is likely to lead to an expansion of both sides of the household balance sheet. Even allowing for longer working lives, increased longevity is likely to lead to a longer period in retirement and possibly longer in morbidity. Households will need to accumulate more wealth over their working lifetimes to fund this.

Before we make any decisions in this regard, we will continue implementing monetary policy in line with our current goals and approaches covered in the draft Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2022–2024. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The results of the Review will be taken into account when preparing the Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2023–2025. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
However, high initial costs combined with the strong position of cards in terms of low costs, extensive networks and a reliable circle of customers at the banks who are used to handling cards present strong barriers to such genuinely new payment services. Remember that M-PESA’s success is based on the fact that only a small part of the population had bank accounts and that cards were unusual. The situation in Sweden is entirely different and as far as Sweden is concerned I do not think that the threat to cash (or cards) comes from a genuinely new product. One alternative to building an entirely new payment service is to further develop an existing service. This could relate to a new way of initiating card payments, for example by using mobile phones. In this way the new service would benefit from the advantages of scale and network effects provided by the existing service. The initial investment would also be lower as the infrastructure is already in place. The barriers to such payment services are lower than for genuinely new payment services and it is probable that development of this type would primarily be pursued by the existing players on the payment market, possibly in cooperation with an external party such as a mobile operator. Swedbank and Payair are currently running a pilot project in Uppsala on the initiation of card payments by mobile phone. Such solutions may reduce card usage in the retail sector if they are perceived to safe and easy to use.

As well as building collaborative ties across the world, we are also creating partnership closer to home. There is a huge upside in tapping the considerable potential in fintech development in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Bay Area. The Bay Area has a population of over 66 million and a GDP of over $ trillion. With the deepening of the financial sector and the expanding cluster of technology talents and industrial base, the Bay Area is going to become one of the main engines of growth for China and a very fertile ground for innovation in financial services and fintech. 9. Recognising the importance of cross-border collaboration in the Bay Area, the HKMA, as a start, has signed a Fintech MOU with the Office of Financial Development Service (“OFDS”) 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  of the Shenzhen Municipal Government. Now, I am pleased to announce that, in pursuing our commitment to collaboration, Hong Kong and Shenzhen will jointly launch three fintech initiatives: (i) A fintech competition; (ii) A soft-landing scheme; and (iii) A talent development programme. Fintech Competition 10. Together with the Shenzhen OFDS, we will organize a fintech competition that is open to participation by Shenzhen and Hong Kong financial institutions. It offers total prizes of more than $ million for the winning fintech products or solutions. I am sure the awards will provide a strong incentive for financial institutions to innovate, either by themselves or in partnership with fintech firms.