samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is important they provide, as they have so far, economy-wide insurance to support businesses and households during these troubled times. That has been the approach of the MPC so far and it will continue to be its approach if new risks arise. At the same time, it is important the unexpectedly positive progress the economy has made so far this year is not overlooked. The economy has recovered further and faster, and has shown far-greater robustness and resilience, than anyone expected. This positive news has received less attention than it deserves, both on its own terms and because of what it may tell us about the economy’s resilience to future shocks. My concern at present is that good news on the economy is being crowded-out by fears about the future. This is human nature at times of stress. But it can also make for an overly-pessimistic popular narrative, which fosters fear, fatalism and excess caution. This is unhealthy in itself but, if left unaddressed, also risks becoming self-fulfilling. I have a Rooseveltian fear of fear itself. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  13  If the economy were sat on a psychiatrist’s sofa, the diagnosis would not be especially difficult. A propensity to dismiss good news and dwell on bad? To catastrophize about the future? The sense of events being beyond our control? These are the psychological symptoms of anxiety. And collective anxiety is as contagious, and could be as damaging to our well-being, as this terrible disease.

This is a small change, well within normal variations from one year to the next. Government revenues - and thus the budget surplus - would increase by almost 1% of Norway’s annual GDP. If the increase in petroleum revenues is used in Norway, it corresponds to almost half of the annual growth in the non-oil economy in a normal year. If the private sector of the economy is also expanding, and the economy is already close to capacity, this policy would swiftly lead to strong pressures on the resources in the economy. This would result in a rise in wages and prices, and would also lead to unstable conditions in the foreign exchange market. The Government Petroleum Fund shall serve as a buffer against short-term fluctuations in oil revenues. As large portions of the revenues from oil activities accrue to the state, fluctuations in oil prices and oil revenues will primarily result in changes in allocations to the Petroleum Fund. Since all of the capital in the Petroleum Fund is invested abroad, such changes will in principle not influence  1 2  See Auerbach et al (1993). See Report to the Storting No 1 (2000-01), the National Budget for 2001. BIS Review 105/2000  4  the level of activity in the economy. This makes the Norwegian economy more robust to fluctuations in oil prices and thus less dependent on oil, even in the short run. Some of the petroleum revenues are therefore used to finance central government budget expenditure.
Let me begin my discussion on how to achieve that by looking at the current trend towards bank downsizing in the euro area. The trend towards downsizing banks Financing of the real economy in the euro area has historically taken place through banks. The euro area therefore requires and has a large banking sector. The aggregate balance sheet of euro area banks is around 270% of GDP, whereas in the US, where capital markets are deeper, it is only around 70% of GDP. The euro area banking sector, however, expanded rapidly in the years before the crisis from already high levels. From the start of the expansion in 2005 to its peak in 2012, banks assets increased by more than 60 percentage points of GDP. This was associated with the development of unsustainable bank business models. Banks relied too much on debt to finance their lending, and that debt depended too much on wholesale market funding and too little on deposits. The crisis has brought those business models to an end and triggered a process of structural change in the banking sector. European banks have entered a period of secular deleveraging and restructuring. Bank balance sheets declined by around 20 percentage points of GDP in 2013 alone. Loan-to-deposit ratios fell from 142% in the first quarter of 2008 to 117% at the end of last year, and I expect these ratios to continue to fall. Credit growth has consequently been very weak.

These efforts will all contribute to a more resilient system, one that is better able to withstand the effects of a major decline in asset prices or deterioration in credit. Are there other tools that policy makers and market participants could use to address this risk? Some policy makers have argued that public disclosure of information could help reduce the risk of future systemic financial crisis, by preventing the buildup of "excessive" leverage or concentrations of risk. The principal focus of attention, as in the immediate wake of the failure of Long Term Capital Management, has been on two quite different types of public disclosure. The first is information that would make it easier to evaluate the overall leverage or risk profile of major hedge funds and their counterparties, and thereby judge their vulnerability to a sharp movement in asset prices. The second is information about the actual positions of individual funds or institutions: information that would make it easier to identify concentrated exposures to specific risk factors, and thereby assess more accurately the potential impact of the failure of a major fund or institutions on the market as a whole. These pose very different challenges and offer different benefits. There are a number of crude measures of overall risk profile that, if disclosed to the market, would give counterparties information they do not now typically get about the risk of failure of the fund.
Jean-Pierre Danthine: After the crisis – improving incentives in the financial sector Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Founding event of the School of Finance, University of St Gallen, St Gallen, 20 May 2011. *  *  *  I would like to thank Gero Jung, Peter Kuster, Pierre Monnin, Angelo Ranaldo and Marlene Amstad for their help and comments. Introduction It is a great pleasure for me to be here for the inaugural ceremony of the new School of Finance at the University of St. Gallen. Naturally, finance has been an integral part of the University for a long time, but I am sure that today’s ceremony represents both a new step forward and the realisation of a new objective. These are certainly warranted if we consider the need for improving financial decision-making made clear by the recent financial crisis. I will take this opportunity to reflect on three fundamental questions that have come to the forefront during this episode. The first issue I would like to address is the question of risk and risk-taking in banking. While there is evidence that the excessive risk-taking that led to the last financial crisis was at least partly attributable to knowledge or competence problems, another important element was the misalignment of the incentives of the various stakeholders of financial institutions. This is particularly apparent in the case of institutions that were deemed too big to fail.

Let me show you the hidden side of Switzerland. You will see that modern Switzerland is adjusting rapidly to the changing reality of the world economy. Let's consider a few facts: •  With 7.5 million people, Switzerland is indeed a small country. Although we have no natural resources, we have a highly developed economy and a GDP per capita that clearly exceeds the European average. Contrary to the situation among some of our neighbours, our population is still growing, thanks to immigration. Our foreign population now represents about 20% of the total population and 25% of the labour force. Despite strong immigration, our unemployment rate – 3.5% – is relatively low. •  Switzerland remains a slow-growing country when compared to the United States. Our weak growth performance is due in part to the full employment, the relatively high level of personal income and the limited scope for domestic investment. However, in recent years, the Swiss economy has been doing better than its neighbouring countries in terms of growth and employment, and also in terms of price stability. Obviously, the fact that we are not a member of the European Union is not an obstacle to our development. •  Switzerland is increasingly becoming a service-producing country. The flagship of our service industry is the financial sector, which expanded markedly in the 90s and now accounts for 15% of our GDP – more than the machine tool industry and the chemical industry together.
We believe that citizens and businesses can only benefit fully from the fundamental principles of the free movement of goods, services, capital and people if they are also able to transfer money as rapidly, reliably and cheaply from one part of the European Union to another, as is now the case within each Member State. Despite the introduction of the euro, however, there is still a clear gap between the service levels of domestic and cross-border retail payment systems in terms of quality, efficiency and pricing. The substantial disparities between domestic and cross-border services ought now to be reduced, and should ultimately disappear. In order to encourage the development of cross-border payment systems enabling the public to benefit more fully from the single currency, the Eurosystem has drawn up a set of objectives for cross-border retail payments in the euro area. These will be detailed in a separate press release which will be issued in the coming days. The Eurosystem calls on the banking and payment service industry to fulfil these objectives by 1 January 2002 at the latest. Finally, I would like to inform you that we also discussed issues related to fraud prevention. I would like to emphasise that the ECB shares the concerns of the European Parliament, the EU Council and the Commission about the protection of the Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other detrimental activities.

We must replicate the sprint success of Wells over longer distances, taking our lead from Scotland’s Liz McColgan, who memorably won gold in the 10,000 metres last time the Games were held in Scotland, before going on to win the New York, Tokyo and London marathons. To understand how we – and by “we” I mean the UK, the Commonwealth and the world – can win the economic marathon, I want to draw on three less athletic, but nevertheless great, Scots, each of whom points us to an essential ingredient of economic success: the right policy framework; an open trading system; and fair and effective financial markets. In all these respects, the UK is leading the way. The right policy framework The UK’s current policy framework has its origins in the work of William Paterson of Skipmyre, Dumfriesshire. More than three centuries ago Paterson proposed the establishment of the Bank of England to “promote the publick Good and Benefit of our People…” 1 At that time the public good meant financing a war with France. Over the ensuing centuries, as objectives evolved, Paterson’s bank would have many guises including government banker, lender of last resort, bank supervisor and monetary authority. Today, having learned the lessons of the crisis, we understand that the Bank of England can best serve the public good by maintaining monetary and financial stability. Let me briefly explain how we are pursuing those objectives which are building blocks of a balanced and sustainable expansion.
New spending cuts have been planned to consolidate the government finances so that the countries after a few years can take the next step and peg their currencies at the prospect of euro entry. However, this does not allay all concerns on the path to the euro. It is not sufficient either, for instance, to simply save so that a deficit during a boom exactly meets the criterion of 3 per cent of GDP. Firstly, the Stability and Growth Pact contains a requirement to keep budgets at least close to balance over an economic cycle. But most of all there must be margins in the budget to cope with situations when developments in a country are weaker than in the euro area as a whole (which was pointed out in the Swedish official report before the euro referendum, Stabilisation Policy in the Monetary Union (SOU 2002:16), and in the Riksbank’s statement on this). Otherwise there is a risk that the new member states will end up in Germany’s or France’s current situation - saving despite the fact that the slowing economy has needed stimulation. For this reason deficits during a boom should be considerably lower than 3 per cent so that a margin exists when the economy is put to a harder test during slowdowns. On the whole there is concern that the pressure to put government finances in order will lessen when the objective of joining the euro is postponed. The future will tell whether the saving plans are really implemented as intended.

Where development needs are identified through FIDE Forum’s screening process, it should be able to refer candidates to the existing director education programmes provided by ICLIF, or work with ICLIF to develop new ones to respond to an unmet need. To my mind, this clarity of role and purpose will significantly enhance the potential impact and influence of FIDE Forum and ICLIF, to the overall betterment of the industry. As members of FIDE Forum, directors have a critical role to play in setting its priorities and in driving future initiatives to ensure that FIDE Forum remains relevant and continues to add value. In this respect, members should be active in giving their views, including providing inputs to concept members, engage in propagating the common interest of the industry and enhancing the good image of the sector. Conclusion The Malaysian financial sector has taken important strides to strengthen boards, in particular through the ongoing education and increase in supply of top-quality directors. The success of ICLIF’s FIDE Programme and the industry-led initiatives by FIDE Forum in pushing frontiers in developing, sourcing and attracting board-level talent would very much depend on the collective efforts of all. It is from this perspective that the FIDE Forum should be commended for initiating this effort. I encourage the industry to continue to use FIDE Forum as a platform for promoting board-level talent management and through it, to build an effective partnership with ICLIF as the centre of excellence for directors’ education in the financial sector.
There is no rule book that’s good for all seasons, let alone all time. So the new system hardwired in the duty to look up and out and to adapt. The financial crisis had laid bare a failure to do that across advanced economies. Regulation hadn’t kept pace with the risks the system faced, from over-inflated housing and financial markets in the United States to a commercial real estate boom in the UK. Nor had it kept pace with the way the system worked; with securitisation, SIVs and CDS. The result is worth etching in our collective memory. A near collapse of the financial system and a sideswiping of the global economy of epic scale. In the UK alone, a million more people unemployed. And lost income over time equivalent to a bill of £ for every person in Britain. 3  1  The Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee identifies, monitors and takes action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system. The FPC is not authorised to take action that is “likely to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term”. 2 The FPC has specific powers of Direction over the Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority and the ability to make Recommendations (including on a ‘comply or explain’ basis) to both authorities.

GROUND BREAKING CEREMONY OF THE NEW BARCLAYS BANK ZAMBIA PLC HEAD OFFICE  SPEECH BY DR. DENNY H. KALYALYA GOVERNOR – BANK OF ZAMBIA  THURSDAY, JUNE 6, 2019 LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  GROUND BREAKING CEREMONY OF THE NEW BARCLAYS BANK ZAMBIA PLC HEAD OFFICE FUNDED BY THE ABSA GROUP LIMITED, SPEECH BY DR. DENNY H. KALYALYA, GOVERNOR – BANK OF ZAMBIA – 6 JUNE 2019  The Absa Group CEO, Mr Rene van Wyk; The Director, Bank Supervision Department, BoZ, Ms. Gladys Mposha; The Director, Economics Department, BoZ, Dr. Francis Chipimo; The Deputy Group CEO and CEO Absa Regional Operations, Mr Peter Matlare; Deputy CEO, Absa Regional Operations & Chief Operating Officer Absa CIB, Mr Temi Ofong; The Barclays Bank Zambia Board Chairperson, Ms Chishala Kateka; The Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director, Mrs Mizinga Melu; Executives from Absa Group; Representatives from Sunshare; Staff from BoZ; Management and Staff of Barclays Bank Zambia Plc; Distinguished Invited Guests; and Members of the press. It is my great pleasure to officiate at this ground-breaking event of Barclays Bank Zambia Plc New Head office. Distinguished Guests, the construction of the new Head office for Barclays Bank Zambia Plc, which will be rebranded as Absa Bank Zambia from next year, is a demonstration of the efforts and commitment by Absa Group Limited to become a Pan-African organisation, that is interested in the sustainable development of the financial sector and the economies of the countries they operate in.
And we will reserve the right to set double leverage limits or apply 4  capital add-ons for group risk if we are not satisfied .   We will expand capital and liquidity reporting requirements to assess whether firms are allocating financial resources appropriately in relation to risks across jurisdictions and currencies.   And we will use the Senior Managers Regime to ensure somebody is responsible for making sure submissions are up to scratch. In doing this, we are getting to grips with an important geofinancial issue, and showing how we as a home supervisor can ensure that cross-border banks do not present excessive risks to financial stability. The host with the most  The PRA is also responsible for the host supervision of around 170 international banks from over 50 jurisdictions. This includes every single foreign Global Systemically Important Bank and is more than any other EU country. International banks’ UK banking sector assets amount to more than twice UK annual GDP  3  This does not mean we favour a ‘sum of the parts’ approach to setting group capital requirements. For our proposals, see CP 19/17: Groups policy and double leverage and CP 20/17: Changes to the PRA’s large exposures framework. 4 Market discipline already imposes some constraints on the amount of double leverage a holding company can use. Credit rating agencies, for example, take double leverage into account when determining the credit- worthiness of holding companies.

Overseas regulators (as host  2  See The PRA’s approach to the implementation of the systemic risk buffer: Statement of Policy; 5 December 2016. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  EMBARGO: not for release before 19:30 on Wednesday 4 October 2017  authorities) use their own rules to set requirements for the subsidiaries in their territories. They might consider these businesses to be systemic on a local basis. They might measure financial transactions under different accounting rules, apply different prudential approaches to assessing risks, or restrict capital transfer to the UK parent. Therefore, a UK bank’s overseas subsidiary might be required to have an outsize portion of its group’s capital. Back at home, the parent might fund the subsidiary’s higher capital requirement by raising debt externally. This is known as ‘double leverage’ and firms use it because debt is generally cheaper than equity. But servicing double leverage relies on flows of dividend income which are uncertain and at the discretion of local boards and supervisors across the group. Or the parent might be incentivised to under-allocate resources to unregulated but risk-taking entities within the group. We need to be mindful of the risks this can create, and so today we are announcing a new approach, to 3  ensure that UK banking groups are at least as strong as their parts . Subject to our consultation:   We will expect firms to demonstrate to us that they can manage the cash-flow and other risks associated with double leverage.
On the other hand, there are those who reject these arguments and argue that the reduced effectiveness of monetary policy at the ZLB and during a credit crisis makes this the only effective macroeconomic policy weapon at the current juncture. Whatever the resolution of this debate, however, the traditional arguments against activist fiscal policies seem likely to still obtain once normal times return. 2. The choice of monetary instrument. Given the above, monetary policy is likely once more to take on the primary role in short-term aggregate demand management once normal times return. But the apparent effectiveness of asset purchases at altering longer-term yields opens up the possibility that they could become part of the monetary toolkit in normal times. We argued in Section 3 that despite its apparent effectiveness, there were good reasons to return to exclusive reliance on a shortterm policy rate in normal times and after any asset purchases during the crisis have been appropriately unwound. 3. The monetary transmission mechanism. The crisis has brutally exposed the limitations of conventional macroeconomic analysis ignoring the role of financial intermediaries. While the existing literature contained a strand focussing on the role of financial frictions – including those on the broad credit channel – they generally focussed on those that arose from the behaviour of borrowers. The crisis has illustrated the need to take seriously the incentives facing the intermediaries themselves.

Fiscal policy is also a vital partner in the delivery of our own programs, supplying the financial support necessary for the extraordinary scale of the credit facilities we’re operating. An International Response The Federal Reserve is not unique in taking bold actions. Central banks around the world are working to support their economies and stabilize their financial systems. There has been close alignment at the international level about the monetary policy and other actions needed to tackle this period of extraordinary economic pain. Given the central role of the dollar in the global economy, the FOMC has instituted new and enhanced programs to facilitate the ability of other central banks to provide U.S. dollar funding in their countries.9  Bold Action The economy is under distress in ways we’ve not experienced in our lifetimes. At the New York Fed we are working tirelessly—leveraging our experience, expertise, and ingenuity—to address the economic and financial challenges posed by the pandemic. This crisis requires innovative thinking and bold action. My colleagues and I are dedicated to doing our utmost to lessen the impact of the crisis on families and businesses in our communities, and to restore our nation’s economic prosperity as quickly as possible. Related Content New York Fed Actions Related to COVID-19 Federal Reserve Board of Governors: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 1 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, March 3,  2020; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, March 15, 2020.