samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the other hand, policies are possibly more short-term oriented and large policy errors more likely. Investors may therefore demand a higher risk premium. In direct democracies, the speed of reform is typically slower. Grid-locks are possible through referenda and therefore more common. On the other hand, political stability in direct democracies tends to be higher and economic policies typically have a more long-term orientation. As policy changes take more time to be introduced, the risk of large policy errors tends to be smaller. Over the long-term, investors appear to be willing to pay a premium for higher stability. Beyond differing parliamentary systems, our two countries’ political structures are organized along different principles. Whereas the political process in the United Kingdom can be broadly characterized as top down, Switzerland’s federalist structure implies a bottom-up political process with a great deal of political autonomy for our nearly 3000 communes and 26 cantons. It is interesting to note that there are at least some tentative signs of converging trends: In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair’s government has initiated constitutional reforms by establishing the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly in 1998 and by advancing the Regional Assemblies in England. In Switzerland, a number of centralization proposals are debated such as directly enhancing the power of the federal government or alternatively, merging a number of cantons with the aim of ending up with larger and fewer regional authorities.

It will call for changes to how financial institutions internally oversee and manage technology risks, both within and across their business activities, invest in hard and soft infrastructure and having much deeper collaboration across institutions and agencies. Socially responsible finance will also require institutions to carefully consider how technological innovations may create new forms of financial exclusion or raise difficult ethical questions. Clear guidance on acceptable conduct by staff and relevant parties will be needed. This in turn, will require financial institutions to reflect on their core values and risk appetite. In short, managing technology risks is not just an operational matter. It is a strategic one with high stakes for individual institutions, as well as the industry and the economy more broadly. Our response should be commensurate with these stakes. Beyond measures taken at an institutional level, there is a pressing need for the financial industry, and indeed even the nation, to provide an enabling and secure framework for technological innovation; and educate and empower the public to take advantage of innovations. For example, the need to formulate a cohesive, coherent and comprehensive national strategy on cyber security is an urgent need. We can only play our intended role to support the broader economy if we are attentive to both strategic and operational considerations of risk. Developing a safe, sound and vibrant financial system through innovation and technology Bank Negara Malaysia is committed to play a facilitative role to enable innovation to flourish.
Much has been said about how the banking system has remained broadly resilient to date, and how banks have not been “part of the problem” in exacerbating the economic crisis. This is in no small part due to the fact that banks entered the pandemic on a much more resilient footing that during the Great Financial Crisis, thanks to the initial set of Basel III reforms, and the ongoing cooperation among Basel Committee members over the past year. In addition, the unprecedented range of fiscal and monetary measures taken by jurisdictions around the world to support the real economy have largely shielded banks to date from losses. 1/3  Yet in order to safeguard global financial stability, it is crucial to lock-in the benefits of the outstanding Basel III reforms by implementing them in a full, timely and consistent manner. Doing so would ensure that the regulatory fault lines of the global banking system – most notably with regards to excessive variability in risk-weighted asset, the gravity of which remains as important today as it was pre-pandemic – are adequately fixed. These reforms benefited from an extensive consultation process with a wide range of stakeholders. The finalised standards took on board many of the comments received from stakeholders and reflect the differences in views among our members. They are a compromise by their very nature. I should further note that the majority of the adjustments made in the finalised standards reflected the views of different European stakeholders.

Perhaps the most important dimension of this experience was the doubling of productivity growth, from about 1.5 percent a year in the two decades up to 1995 to more than 3 percent a year in the decade since. Productivity growth is important because it is the primary driver of long term gains in living standards. And this acceleration in the United States seems more remarkable in part because most other large mature economies experienced a slowdown in productivity growth during the same period. This doubling of productivity growth in the United States can be broken down into several important elements. One was rapid improvement in the productivity of the relatively small part of the economy that produces information technology, including computers and computer software and telecommunications equipment. Also important was very substantial growth in investment in information technology by the rest of the economy. And alongside these changes, U.S. firms became significantly more efficient in their use of equipment and labor. The sources of these improvements in productivity are varied and complex. Economists do not fully understand what drove them, but they seem to agree on several contributing factors. We experienced a very large and positive technology shock, a dramatic increase in innovation, which improved the power of technology, reduced its cost, and made possible a revolution in production and business processes. The skills and knowledge of the United States workforce played a critical role in contributing to the extent and spread of innovation.
Titles of the boxes are shown on the slide. I strongly recommend that you read these boxes, which will be published on our web-site shortly. Now, I would like to convey the main messages of the report. Firstly, I will touch upon the global economy and then move on to the monetary policy. The last quarter of 2012 was marked by an improvement in the risk appetite (Chart 1). Concrete steps taken towards the resolution of the Euro area problems as well as the favorable news regarding the US and Chinese economies were the leading developments that fed into the risk sentiment. On the other hand, quantitative easing policies were sustained amid the persisting sluggish growth outlook in advanced economies. Continued monetary easing at a global scale accompanied by increased risk appetite led to an acceleration in portfolio flows towards emerging economies (Chart 2). We are of the opinion that all these developments once again highlighted the importance of a flexible monetary policy framework. Chart 1. Global Risk Appetite  Chart 2. Portfolio Flows to Emerging Economies (Billion USD)  Source: Credit Suisse, Bloomberg. Source: CBRT. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  1. Monetary policy and monetary conditions  In this period of extraordinary global circumstances, the policy framework designed by the CBRT plays a great role in confining the adverse impacts of global shocks in Turkey. Particularly the year 2012 was marked by the fruitful implementation of our policy mix.

Comparison of October 2012 and January 2013 Inflation Report Forecasts Inflation Forecasts  Source: TurkStat, CBRT. Output Gap Forecasts  Source: CBRT. The same slide presents the revision in the output gap forecasts. We revised the output gap upwards for the first quarter of 2013 due to recent acceleration in capital inflows and credit growth. However, we assumed that the policy measures would drive the output gap and credit path closer to the October forecast in the second half of the year. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  We can summarize the main message of the forecast regarding the monetary policy as follows: a cautious monetary policy stance should be maintained to keep inflation close to the target at the end of 2013. It is important that the CBRT does not disregard excessive volatility in credit and exchange rates, for macro financial risks to be contained. It should be kept in mind that keeping credit growth at healthy and reasonable levels will support both price stability and financial stability. In fact, notwithstanding the recent faster-than-expected growth in credit, we envisaged that credit growth would hover around 15 percent. I would like to once more underline that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, assumptions regarding the monetary policy outlook underlying our inflation forecasts should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBRT.
We know too that 11  export prices rose strongly last year, much faster than those of domestic-facing firms . At a rough guess, and relative to that in the non-traded sector, this will have pushed up the rate of return in the 12  traded sector by 2-3 percentage points .   Second – and this is in sharp contrast to the early 1990s – there is only limited spare capacity in the economy, including in its more tradable sectors (Chart 10 again). One would certainly expect net export volumes to improve this year. But one would also expect a greater share of the response to the depreciation, compared with the early 1990s, to come via stronger investment, less of it from  11  While export prices rose 12% in the year to 2016Q4, gross output prices across the economy as a whole, excluding the government sector, rose by around 4½% (by gross I mean including the cost of imports). With exports worth around one quarter of gross output, this would imply output-price inflation in the rest of the economy of less than 2%. 12 Higher prices boost profits, and disproportionately so, given the operational gearing. On the other hand exporting firms will also be paying more for their imports, on which they rely more than others. To work out the overall impact on profits you need to net out the extra cost of imports.

We’ve done this by passing the rise in both export and import prices through the UK’s input:output tables and used the same definition of tradables and non-tradables as before. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  higher output in the tradable sector. There is less room to raise output but more of an incentive to add to that capacity.   Third, and despite these incentives, growth of overall business investment in the UK was relatively weak last year. Early official estimates say it shrank slightly in the year to Q4, by around 1%. (This compares with positive growth of 2% or so in the Euro area.) And although those estimates are particularly prone to revision, the various survey indicators also subsided in 2016 (Chart 12). This last point is the critical one. The world economy is looking better than it has done for some time. Against this backdrop, and given the existing capacity constraints, the fall in sterling provides a powerful incentive to invest in the UK’s tradable sector. All else equal, it would make sense for existing exporters to expand; for domestic-facing firms to think about entering new markets; and for multinationals to shift production to the UK. Yet some caution would also be understandable. All else is not equal. While much is at stake, no-one can be sure about the eventual outcome of the Brexit negotiations.
Can non-interest rate policies stabilize housing markets?. Evidence from a panel of 57 countries. BIS Working Paper no 433. Lim, C.H., F. Columba, A. Costa, P. Kongsamut, A. Otani, M. Saiyid, T. Wezel and X. Wu (2011). Macroprudential policy: what instruments and how to use them? Lessons from country experiences. Working paper 11/238, International Monetary Fund. Peek, J., E. Rosengren and G.M.B. Tootell (2015). Should U.S. Monetary Policy have a Ternary Mandate?, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, mimeo. Tovar Mora, C.E., M. Garcia-Escribano and M. Vera Martin (2012). Credit growth and the effectiveness of reserve requirements and other macroprudential instruments in Latin America. Zhang, L. and E. Zoli (2014). Leaning Against the Wind: Macroprudential Policy in Asia. Working paper 14/22, International Monetary Fund. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Banking integration In banking, the key achievement is the establishment of the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF). •  ABIF provides a platform for Qualified ASEAN Banks to enjoy greater market access and operational flexibility. •  Banking liberalisation under the ABIF can be done on a bilateral basis and customised accordingly. •  Two ASEAN countries can agree on specific areas to be liberalised based on the Qualified ASEAN Banks’ commercial interests. ABIF will complement the broader economic integration of ASEAN. •  As ASEAN economies develop further, their corporates will expand their operations into the region. •  The banks who have been servicing these corporates in their home markets are well placed to follow their customers and support them as they regionalise. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  •  ABIF will provide them an enhanced vehicle to do so. More importantly, ABIF will be a vehicle to help grow a group of strong pan-ASEAN regional banks with the scale and the capability to compete alongside the global banks. As ASEAN becomes an economic powerhouse, so must our ASEAN banks. Looking ahead, a key priority for banking integration will be to help banking groups with operations in several ASEAN countries to share and transmit information across borders. •  For banks with pan-ASEAN operations, the segregation of data and systems in multiple countries due to data on-shoring requirements may hinder effective group risk management and raise data security concerns.
Beyond equivalence assessments, we will consider the formation of supervisory colleges for our CCPs should they be deemed as internationally active. Putting recovery and resolution plans in place Allow me to share a final set of remarks on recovery and resolution plans. Even as we continue to strengthen the resilience and accessibility of CCPs, we must continue our efforts to ensure that recovery and resolution plans for CCPs are in place. There have been greater focus and thought given to arrangements to deal with default risks but it should also be recognised that other risks such as custody and investment risks can also pose a threat to a CCP's viability. Hence, in line with the CPMI-IOSCO report on Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures, MAS expects and will place priority to ensure our CCPs have clear arrangements to enable custody and investment losses to be allocated in a way which allows CCPs to be solvent and can continue to provide its critical services. At the same time, there must be appropriate governance arrangements and incentive structures to promote prudent risk management on the part of the CCP. Such arrangements can include providing transparency to member firms, having “Skin-InThe-Game” (SITG) contributions from the CCP, and putting in place oversight structures to oversee such safeguards.

For instance, the recent Level 3 assessment by CPMI-IOSCO on the implementation of the PFMI5 by ten CCPs (including SGX-DC) helped to identify gaps and shortcomings which CPMI-IOSCO expects to be addressed by the CCPs and their respective regulators by the end of the year. As outstanding issues are addressed and the progress tracked, regulators should also have greater confidence in undertaking their equivalence assessments of CCPs that their domestic market participants can access. This can then provide greater certainty to global market participants. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Improving market access for CCPs Singapore, as with other jurisdictions, will be commencing our clearing mandate next year thereby enhancing the role of CCPs as a risk mitigating tool. However, a clearing mandate cannot be effectively implemented if access to CCP remains an issue for counterparties, particularly smaller players. We share similar concerns to those that have been expressed by ESMA. In this regard, it is noteworthy that ESMA has looked into possible ways to improve CCP access and has, for example, proposed indirect clearing arrangements which strikes a balance between having an appropriate level of indirect client protection and counterparty risk. I hope today’s forum will allow MAS and other regulators to learn from ESMA’s insights. To enable a wider range of market participants – including those based outside Singapore - to have direct access to CCPs in Singapore, MAS will allow our CCPs to introduce self-clearing and remote clearing memberships.
The first authorised in Bulgaria providers of the two new payment services started their activities in 2020. In conclusion, we can sum up that the trends in Europe are related to the development of a single European payments infrastructure based on common standards and instruments, aiming to ensure a pan-European scope and reach. Instant payments, which are in a process of introduction also in Bulgaria, open banking, and the increasing use of mobile technologies are topical issues both in the country and in the European Union, issues that we will continue to talk about. The payment services in Bulgaria are evolving in line with the dynamic processes in Europe, gathered around digitalisation, new technologies, and the ensured security of the payment process. 1 Contactless Payments on consumer off-the-shelf devices (COTS) and Software Based PIN Entry on COTS 2 Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) 3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive (EU)  2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (RTS on SCA and CSC) 4 www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/payment-services-and-electronic-money/eba-working-group-on-apis-  under-psd2 5 Opinion of the European Banking Authority on obstacles under Article 32(3) of the RTS on SCA and CSC 6 www.eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Ravi Menon: Data and technology for climate action Keynote remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at COP26 Investor Action on Climate Webinar, 29 June 2021. * * * Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Why are we here? Three reasons: First, climate change is the defining crisis of our time – it is already happening, the worst is yet to come, and there is much at stake globally for lives and livelihoods. Second, finance has a key role to play in supporting the world’s transition to a greener and more sustainable trajectory. Third, to enable green finance flows and address climate related risks, we need trusted, timely, and relevant data. I take it we are all on the same page on the fact of climate change and the role of green finance, so let me focus on issues relating to data – which is a critical foundation for the green economy architecture the world needs to build. Financial institutions need accurate, granular data to assess and manage the environmental risks in their portfolios. What kind of data? For example: geographical, climate and weather-related data on their assets as well as along the supply chain; data on firms’ carbon footprint, historical carbon emissions, and pathways to reduce emissions over time; data on energy use and efficiency of physical assets, such as real estate; and data to monitor customers’ compliance to ESG standards and to measure the impact of transition activities on the climate.
Cochrane (2003) describes these considerations, as does the excellent article on the subject presented by Bianchi and Melosi (2022) at the conference in Jackson Hole last year. To add to that, everything is complicated further by the first problem described above, i. e. the CNB's large balance sheet, or the huge liquidity of the banking sector. I agree with Professors Mandel and Dvoák (2022) who stated in their article "Current global inflation" that Milton Friedman's view that restrictive monetary policy is not dependent on the support of fiscal policy and can be effective in its own right was formulated for a situation where there was an appropriate amount of bank liquidity. In a monetary  4/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  system with huge excess liquidity and induced high inflation, a reduction in the state budget deficit plays a key role in the fight against inflation and significantly eases the position of the central bank. Therefore, defeating inflation in the long term is conditional on coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. If fiscal policy records increasing budget deficits, monetary policy will find it very hard to ensure low inflation on its own, in a system with such a huge liquidity surplus and a willingness of banks to buy bonds. That is why I said at the press conference after each of our monetary policy meetings that reducing the country's debt is a further key condition for lowering inflation.

Our policy rate is still in a positive territory at a level of 1.25%, alternative instruments are available for targeted actions, the level of foreign reserves remains comfortable and the banking system stable with NPLs ratio of only 3.4%, despite the pandemics shock and closure of a bank in the midst of the pandemics. Of course we have to be vigilant, and not only of conventional side effects of "too loose for too long" stance, but also of the possible adverse feedback  1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  loop between real and financial sector, as well as of the so called "zombification" risk. As complacency is not an option, shielding against those risks asks for further strengthening of the financial safety net, which will remain one of our priorities. Thus, although still overwhelmed with the current challenges and the need for further policy support, we must not remain oblivious to the pre – pandemic strivings to increase the potential to grow faster, but in a sustainable and inclusive way. This requires gradual shifting of the focus back to the pre-crisis structural bottlenecks such as the quality of institutions, strengthening the rule of law, investing in human capital and in the potential to innovate, as well as to new structural hurdles that will be left as a legacy of the pandemics, which might not be even well known at the current juncture. Clearly, we as central banks cannot play a main role in these segments, but perhaps a supporting one.