samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will explain why in this era of globalisation, it makes sense to strengthen the linkages between Southeast Asia and India, and how Singapore, a small and open country whose survival is totally dependent on globalisation, can play a role in deepening these linkages. ASEAN since the early 90’s For more than a decade until 1997, Southeast Asia enjoyed remarkable growth. As governments opened up economies, investments flowed in, exports grew, and prosperity was everywhere. People talked about the Asian Miracle and the Pacific Century. Then we met the darker face of globalisation. Euphoria turned to gloom when the Asian Financial Crisis struck. A seemingly minor problem in Thailand rapidly developed into a widespread panic in the region. One country after another succumbed as investors stampeded out, stock markets and currencies crashed, and economies nearly collapsed. In Indonesia, the Crisis triggered deep political and social changes, resulting in a very difficult transition. A new and very different dispensation is only now recrystallising. Even though the Crisis has passed, we have not returned to the status quo ante. The world has changed permanently. Globalisation has advanced even further, and competition is now fiercer. India and China are major new players which totally alter the landscape. From the point of view of other  BIS Review 3/2004  1  Asian countries, they are formidable competitors for investments, but also offer immense new opportunities.

However, similar legislation has been introduced in several European countries, and mortgage bonds regulated according to this legislation on secured bonds have come in various ways to be viewed as more creditworthy than mortgage bonds that are not. It can therefore be claimed that Swedish mortgage institutions should be given the same opportunities to issue secured bonds as mortgage institutions in other countries, which is also the view held by the Riksbank. Swedish mortgage institutions today already observe such strict legislation that they can be viewed as a kind of special company in a securitisation. The potential effects of introducing particular legislation for secured bonds are therefore possibly less in Sweden than in other countries, and it is difficult to see that the legislation regarding secured bonds would entail any dramatic change in the activities of Swedish mortgage institutions. However, there are advantages involved in introducing such legislation. Having legislation that is in line with that of other European countries will contribute to reducing any uncertainty, particularly from foreign investors, regarding the terms connected with owning securities issued by Swedish mortgage institutions. This should reasonably result in a broader circle of investors that are willing to invest in securities issued by Swedish mortgage institutions, and hopefully also  BIS Review 35/2004  1  reduce their borrowing costs. In addition, European central banks currently regard this type of mortgage bond as more creditworthy than mortgage bonds not covered by legislation on secured bonds, when market participants pledge collateral with them.
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2017), ‘Industrial Strategy: building a Britain fit of the future’, BEIS Policy Paper. Espinosa-Vega, M and Russell, S (1997), ‘History and Theory of the NAIRU: A Critical Review’, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 1997 Q2. Gardiner, L (2016), ‘A-typical year?’, article for the Resolution Foundation. Gordon, R (2013), ‘The Phillips Curve is Alive and Well: Inflation and the NAIRU During the Slow Recovery’, NBER Working Paper, No. 19390. Gregg, P, Machin, S and Fernandez-Salgado, M (2014), ‘Real Wages and Unemployment in the Big Squeeze’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 123, pp. 403-432. IMF (2017), ‘Understanding the Downward Trend in Labor Income Shares’, IMF World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3. Krueger, A (2018), ‘Reflections on Dwindling Worker Bargaining Power and Monetary Policy’, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole. Manning, A (2003), Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets, Princeton University Press. Moscarini, G and Postel-Vinay, F (2017), ‘The Cyclical Job Ladder’, Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 10, pp 166-188. Mueller, H, Ouimet, P and Simintzi, E (2017), ‘Wage Inequality and Firm Growth’, American Economic Review, Vol. 107, No. 5, pp. 379-383. Phillips, AW (1958), ‘The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957’, Economica, Vol. 25, pp. 283-99.

While it may still be too early to understand the long-term impact of a fully-remote staffing model on trust, it is interesting to note that over the last few years, a number of large firms that had favored a highly remote workforce, including Yahoo and IBM, had begun to reverse course, asking employees to return to the office to increase personal interaction and collaboration.9 We can perhaps learn by comparing firms that intentionally transitioned to a virtual work environment with limited personal interactions, to those that relied heavily on personal interactions and were forced into a fully remote posture. Indeed, we will explore how proximity impacts trust as part of a panel on trust and decision-making that I’m moderating on December 2 for the New York Fed. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Severed networks. The second dynamic is severed personal networks. Beyond formal networks and hierarchy within an organization, the value of informal networks should not be underestimated. As I mentioned, the financial sector has been quite effective in maintaining core services and operations during the pandemic so far. One hypothesis is that this success reflects, in part, the development of personal relationships, teams, and networks over years, and possibly decades. As people came together during the initial months on the pandemic, it is likely that they relied on their existing networks and leveraged the strength of existing relationships.
This was the case with the Swedish krona and several other European currencies at the beginning of the 1990s. With regard to inflation targeting, I am of course somewhat biased and for obvious reasons find it easier to point to advantages than disadvantages. One advantage is that a central bank which conducts inflation targeting is not tied to maintaining a particular exchange rate relationship, but can be more directly aimed at focussing on what is happening in the domestic economy. Another, partly related advantage – which I believe has been very important in Sweden’s case – is that inflation targeting means that one specific authority is given a clear responsibility for maintaining price stability. During the 1970s and 1980s it was not entirely clear where the responsibility for this lay in Sweden. One could say that the responsibility in practice had been delegated to the social partners, but that the total economic policy tended at the same time to be so expansionary that it became difficult to maintain wage and price increases at reasonable levels. A further advantage of inflation targeting is that the task of monetary policy, in the same way as with a fixed exchange rate regime, is easy for the general public to understand. If I am to try to find a disadvantage with inflation targeting, it could be that it is more difficult from a purely operational point of view for a central bank to steer inflation towards a particular level than to maintain a particular exchange rate relationship.

The bank therefore contributes to ensuring that the mediation of capital in the economy functions efficiently; it is sufficient that borrowers can convince the bank of their creditworthiness, they do not need to convince each individual saver. Similarly, savers do not have to assess the creditworthiness of every borrower; it is enough to be satisfied of the bank's solvency. The banks can also supply payment services for households and companies by using the existing financial infrastructure, such as accounts and various routines for transferring funds between financial institutions. As these functions are central to an efficient economy, it is evident that major problems can arise if financial stability is upset. This is aptly illustrated by, for instance, the crises in South East Asia at the  BIS Review 21/2006  3  end of the 1990s and by the bank crisis that Sweden and other countries suffered at the beginning of that same decade. While the target of maintaining price stability is relatively straightforward and intuitive, it is more difficult to specify the task of promoting financial stability. This task has also been formulated in slightly different ways in different central banks’ regulations. For instance, the Bank of England’s charter says that it is ”responsible for the overall stability of the financial system as a whole”, while the corresponding task in the regulations for Sweden’s Riksbank has been expressed in a more indirect manner: ”to promote the efficiency and safety of the payment system” 4 .
Work by Bank colleagues finds that intense hurricanes, of the type most likely to cause large insurance losses, seem to be getting more frequent and the chance of two or more intense hurricanes occurring close together  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  6  may be higher than previously thought. So improvements in insurers’ risk modelling must be unrelenting. While the ability to re-price annually or to withdraw cover can mitigate risks to general insurers in the short-term, as climate change progresses, they will need to consider the longer-term impacts on their business models. And as the PRA found a few years ago in its review of the sector, insurers need to be wary of cognitive dissonance within their organisations whereby risks that are managed prudently by their underwriters are ignored by the firm’s asset managers, such as in their real estate exposures. 7  Consistent with the tragedy of the horizon, the risks posed to banks from climate change have tended to be beyond their planning horizons. A recent survey by the PRA of banks accounting for around 90% of the UK banking system, found that these horizons averaged four years – before physical and litigation risks would be expected to manifest, and prior to stringent climate policies likely taking effect. There are signs, however, that banks are beginning to treat climate-related risks like other financial risks.

The most frequently acquired product in Spain is the credit card, followed by personal loans. Here, too, there are significant differences in the acquisition of savings products based on educational level and on the level of income, which are less marked in the case of debt products. Thus, in the case of interviewees with a university education, 32% acquire savings products, while in the case of those with primary schooling, only 8% acquire them. By level of income, 43% of those who live in a household with income of over € acquire savings vehicles while only 8% do so in households with income of up to € Finally, the Survey also enables information to be had on the use of financial products: in particular, on one hand, on whether interviewees have saved over the past 12 months and, if so, using which savings vehicle; and, on the other, whether the household’s spending has exceeded its income over this period and, if so, how they financed it the last time this happened. This information shows that, as regards saving, 61% of interviewees have been saving in the past 12 months. The percentage increases in terms of educational level and level of income. One noteworthy feature is that the second most common method of saving, behind the current account, is cash, even in the highest educational and income segments. In particular, 38% of interviewees who save do so in cash. Only 14% do so via a savings account and 11% via a pension scheme.
The popular media sometimes calls Singapore the “Switzerland of Asia”. We have always taken the comparison as a great compliment. Switzerland is known the world over for its stability, prudence, efficiency, and diligence – all attributes that we in Singapore also aspire to. Both Switzerland and Singapore are small trading nations with a shared interest in promoting free trade and maintaining an open, rulesbased global economy. Switzerland is an important economic partner to Singapore. Many Swiss multinationals have a strong presence in Singapore and they are a source of high value-added investments. Similarly, Singapore companies are actively making direct investments in Switzerland. Today, Switzerland is our 5th largest trading partner in Europe while Singapore is Switzerland’s 4th largest trading partner in Asia. As central banks, SNB and MAS share some common challenges. Since the financial crisis, the openness, financial soundness, and strong fundamentals of our two countries have made us highly attractive to global capital, with implications for monetary and exchange rate policies, on which we exchange views. Our two institutions also have to manage a growing pool of official foreign reserves in a global market that is increasingly uncertain. The opening of SNB’s Singapore branch is an important milestone in the strong friendship and good relations between Singapore and Switzerland, and between MAS and SNB. Through this branch, our two institutions will come even closer together and I look forward to new areas of cooperation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We value highly our relationship with SNB.

One key driver is the rapid development of Fintech. While the HKMA has done a great deal in the past few years in promoting Fintech, there is still room to further apply new technology in finance in the coming years. This includes, for example, fostering a better ecosystem for Regulatory Technology (or RegTech) and Supervisory Technology (or SupTech). We are also aware that any new risks associated with the increasing use of technology have to be managed. These include for example cyber and data security. We will work with the industry to address these risks. 6. We are also committed to promoting market development opportunities, especially in strengthening the role of Hong Kong as the gateway to the Mainland’s capital markets, in the Greater Bay Area development, and also in green finance. 7. These are rough times. But my colleagues and I will continue to discharge our duties in a professional manner and do our best to serve the people of Hong Kong. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
We even managed to do so, in certain issues, ahead of time rather than catching up in a crisis induced situation. Yes, there were still business failures - indeed this is an inevitable feature of free markets - but there is little moral hazard for the public sector. Yes, there were still cracks showing up in unregulated areas that require mending, for example recently in equity margin financing, but nothing of a systemic nature or of any threat to the stability of our currency. 10. These strong economic fundamentals of Hong Kong also do not require Hong Kong to get involved in the process of competitive devaluation of currencies recently seen in the Asian region. In the second half of 1997, the Thai baht depreciated by 49%, the Indonesian rupiah by 56%, the Korean won by 48%, the Malaysian ringgit and the Philippine peso both by 35%. Even the relatively strong economies of Taiwan and Singapore had allowed their currencies both to depreciate by 15%. Notwithstanding this, the Hong Kong economy is still expected to grow in 1998 by 3.5% in real terms. Although this is somewhat below the growth rate of 5.2% recorded in 1997, it is a highly respectable growth rate in the light of the circumstances that we face in the Asian region and is higher than most of the economies in the region that have devalued their currencies. Most developed economies would be delighted to achieve such a growth rate in 1998.

If interest rates are kept at a low level over a longer period, price and cost inflation will eventually pick up and longterm interest rates will rise. Rising wage and price inflation reduces the real value of assets and debt. In isolation, this will naturally benefit individuals and enterprises that have a high debt, while others will see a decline in the value of their savings. At the same time, low interest rates could lead to a rise in property prices and other asset prices. A sharp rise in house prices and advances in stock markets imply a substantial shift in favour of those who are already well positioned in these markets. Many young people will find that the price of entering the housing market is too high. 5  Income less net interest expenditure. 9  BIS Review 92/2000  Cyclical fluctuations, income developments and asset prices will show greater volatility in an economy without a nominal anchor. The policy of devaluation and low interest rates in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s contributed to pronounced cyclical fluctuations and sharp variations in property prices. The winners and losers as a result of such instability are to some extent arbitrary. Some will always manage to come out ahead; those who take their profits in boom periods will also be able to secure and withdraw from exposed positions in time. Others - who do not use resources for these activities to the same extent - are often the losers.
In the past few years it has been customary that every regular quarterly economic survey of Eesti Pank includes a reference to the economic standstill in Europe. But today I would like to stress that even as such, at a standstill, Europe's economic power and extensive market suffices for it to remain one of the most important engines of the global economy. It is difficult to overestimate the role of the European Union in the world trade. One can, of course, be ironic about some fruit standards but, meanwhile, the same EU standards and product safety requirements affect the rest of the world. It is worth mentioning once again that 80% of Estonia's  4  BIS Review 26/2004  exports go to the EU member states while 85% of the direct investments made into Estonia are related to the European Union. I think that this calls for no further commentary. Europe's core economic policy goals are embodied in the Economic and Monetary Union. Such goals are stable economic growth and price stability. And this is what we all want. The EMU signifies the common monetary policy and coordinated economic policy. •  Why a common monetary policy and a single currency? The aim of the common monetary policy is to guarantee a low level of inflation (below but close to 2% a year) through a common currency, a common central bank system, and common interest rates.

I would like to stress that being among the first is not an aim in itself but arises from the acknowledgement that Estonian economic fundamentals have stood firm and that our economy will be ready for joining the mechanism in a few years. •  Joining the Economic and Monetary Union is a crucial step for the Estonian economy, which will secure the sustainability of a favourable investment climate and strengthen the prerequisites for a continued long-term and balanced economic growth;  •  The estimates by foreign investors and rating agencies on the reliability of Estonian economy have already taken into account the imminent membership of the EMU, which is evidenced by the interest margins and credit ratings that are already on the levels comparable to the old member states;  •  A prerequisite for sustaining the outstanding reliability achieved to date is as fast as possible changeover to the euro, i.e. becoming a full member of the Economic and Monetary Union. An important argument in favour of a comparatively swift changeover to the euro is Estonia’s current economic situation. What are the grounds for such a claim? In order to evaluate the broader economic impact of joining the euro system and choose the right accession moment, the UK has adopted five 'euro tests'. These are the following: 1. Have the economic structures and cycles of the accession country and the euro zone converged sufficiently for a successful application of the common monetary policy? 2.
2  BIS Review 20/2004  The stronger productivity growth is probably connected with economic activity; at the beginning of a recovery the available production resources are used to a greater degree and it is only when the recovery is secure that investment and new recruitment accelerate in earnest. However, there are numerous indications that productivity has risen more than is usual for the economic situation, a pattern that has been even more evident in the United States. It is conceivable that this development is linked to the factors I mentioned earlier; globalisation, deregulation and increased competition. However, more lasting changes in productivity may also be linked to the large investments in IT and telecommunications at the end of the 1990s. It is possible that the full impact from the investments made and technological advances is first achieved in connection with cost-cutting and rationalisation. We have a special boxed article on this subject in the report, which I can recommend reading. It is not possible to determine with any certainty what has caused the improvement in productivity. However, given this more favourable picture, we have nevertheless anticipated a rather higher level of productivity growth in the near future. The new inflation figures received also indicate a slightly more subdued inflationary pressure than we had estimated. The outcome shows not only that electricity prices have fallen back as expected, but also that prices have increased at a slower rate in general.

Then we will conclude with a panel on the recent global financial turmoil and its policy implications. Once again I extend my warm welcome to all participants. I also want to thank the distinguished participants for their valuable contributions. I hope you enjoy both the conference and your stay in Istanbul. Thank you. BIS Review 144/2008  3