samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Survey of Consumer Expectations So a second important example of data innovation at the New York Fed is the Survey of Consumer Expectations, which we introduced to the public just last month. Consumer expectations of future economic outcomes are crucial inputs to the policy process, but we felt that our standard measures of these expectations were quite limited. The primary goal of this new national survey is to collect timely, rich, and high-quality information on consumer expectations about a wide range of household-level and aggregate economic and financial conditions. The survey covers expectations about inflation, price changes for specific goods, home price changes, future wage growth, future quits and layoffs, and residential mobility, as well as expectations of household income, spending, taxes, and credit access. The SCE has two advantages over existing surveys of expectations: It collects information about consumers’ expectations and decisions on a broader range of economic and financial topics, and it does so in a way that captures respondents’ beliefs more fully. The objective is to measure an individual’s beliefs about the likelihood of future outcomes, thereby capturing how certain or uncertain the person is about future events. In some cases, we do this by eliciting a “density forecast,” where respondents are asked to assign a percent chance to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  different values (or intervals) for the outcome of interest.

To receive an LOLR credit, a bank must on the one hand be systemically relevant and, on the other hand, be solvent and able to furnish sufficient collateral. Without collateral, the National Bank cannot grant any credit. This fundamental principle is enshrined in the National Bank Act. By disclosing our terms to the banks in advance, we are eliminating any possible misinterpretation of the liquidity risks and helping to ensure that preparations are in place for a liquidity crisis which can never be ruled out altogether. This is what we refer to as “constructive clarity”. Conclusion To sum up, I would like to reiterate that the situation of the Swiss financial system is stable. However, this gratifying conclusion should not allow us to rest on our laurels. Maintaining a stable financial system in the long term calls for constant efforts to prevent and cope with crises. While this challenge must primarily be met by the private sector, the authorities can, should and must support its efforts. Financial Stability Report 2004 (424 kb)  BIS Review 39/2004  3
Thailand needs to modernise its industrial base and requires government initiatives to introduce improvements in areas of management and production technology. Education and labour skill developments also need to be given top priority, along with research and development of Thai products. These will enable Thailand’s productive sector to serve as the main engine for economic growth in the future. 2. The prevailing social and economic problems at present partly reflect the lack of integrity in public and private sector management. The Bank of Thailand urges the introduction into the national agenda the specification for implementation of good governance at all levels. In the long run, this will serve to reduce risks to future social and economic developments. 3. The authorities must develop a financial infrastructure that can support a balanced development benefiting capital formation, liquidity management and risk protection on business and income in all business sectors namely agricultural, industrial and service sectors. We need to develop markets for financial products that are necessary to complete the structure of Thailand’s financial market. We also need to promote the use of financial instruments, such as derivatives. The Bank of Thailand will have an important role to play in overseeing the provision of such financial services. Ladies and gentlemen, At the end of the Second-stage expressway at the Rama IX exit there is a large billboard. In it there is a Chinese saying. It reads in Chinese "bu dan xin jin bu huan man zhi dan xin mei yan jin bu."

Moreover in the European Union, where the ECB lacks a formal bank regulatory role, Caruana said he sees no need for changes in the system. “We are talking about national supervision with very good contact with national central banks, which are part of the euro system. This is a structure that is working now, and I don't think the Basel II will affect this structure. Certainly it makes it extremely necessary that supervisors and banks have a good relationship and risk-focused supervision, but this is already there.” *  *  *  New Basel Committee head opens door to rules delay A top global regulator thrashing out new banking rules left the door open on Monday to delay the “Basel II” accord, which will force sweeping changes in how banks set aside capital for unforeseen hazards. In an interview with Reuters, Jaime Caruana, the new chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, defended the controversial accord, saying he was more concerned with getting it right than with meeting the committee's self-imposed deadline of end-2003 for a final draft. The committee would decide at its next meeting in mid-October whether it would be possible to meet the original timetable, he said. “There are some concerns that the tight timing that we have may jeopardise the quality we have in the accord,” he said in his first major interview since taking over the committee in May. “The first consideration is going to be the quality of the accord.
Overly stringent regulation normally leads to more expensive financial services, which affects resource utilisation. The stringent regulation of financial markets in the 1960s and 1970s gave us a relatively stable financial system, but at the expense of efficiency. On the other hand, deregulation brought about developments on financial markets which created a “seemingly efficient” system, but which gave rise to major risks to stability. The development over recent years has shown just how closely interlinked the tasks of the central banks are. For example, the emergence of a situation of financial instability also has  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  repercussions for both inflation and resource utilisation. This illustrates that it is not possible to conduct monetary policy and financial stability policy completely separately. Differences in time horizons give rise to trade-offs We can also describe the central banks’ conflicting objectives in terms of different time horizons. For monetary policy, the time horizon is usually two to three years, which is reasonable in light of how the business cycle usually varies. However, we know from experience that financial imbalances and risks in the financial system are built up over a much longer period of time, which can include several business cycles. These longer periods are usually described in terms of so-called financial cycles. There is no established method of measuring the financial cycle, but lending rates, credit terms and asset prices are common indicators.1 So, the financial cycle has its up- and downturns just like the regular business cycle, but is often more protracted.

After a spectacular period of sustained growth during the 1980s, the Japanese economy has stagnated over the past six years, as Japan has struggled to overcome the fragility of its financial system in the aftermath of the infamous Japanese financial bubble. A constraining factor for much of this time has been a widespread resistance to the use of public funds to strengthen the financial system which has, in turn, constrained the financial system in its extension of domestic credit. Japan has been reluctant, too, given the size of its public debt, to use fiscal policy to stimulate the domestic economy. There is now evidence of a change of heart on both these fronts. Japan - which has an extraordinarily strong external position - was never at the eye of the storm which struck Asia around the middle of last year. But if, as I expect, these policy changes now lead to somewhat stronger domestic demand growth, and greater confidence BIS Review 5/1998  -2-  in Japanese financial institutions, that will make a crucial contribution to the stabilisation of the region as a whole. The storm struck essentially the ASEAN Four - Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia - spreading subsequently to South Korea and intermittently battering Hong Kong and elsewhere. It is still not wholly clear - to me at least - quite why the storm suddenly struck. Most crises of this sort have their origins in some evident macro-economic policy failure.
And, second, when ranking firms’ contributions to the achievement of net zero, look forward as well as back – giving weight to the calibre of their emissions-reduction plans, and their performance over time against those plans. Divestment is a powerful tool, and should remain squarely in the toolkit. But it should be used as a credible threat to reinforce incentives, not an indiscriminate ‘quick fix’. A strategy of engagement works best when the message is big, unavoidable and credible. Here we face a slightly different challenge. The Bank of England’s voice has influence. But the CBPS is not a huge facility. £ may sound like a lot. But it’s small in the world of global capital markets – accounting for just 6.5% of the sterling corporate bond market, 0.5% of total sterling traded assets and a vanishingly small share of global holdings (Table 1). Table 1: The CBPS in context  16  A worked example is given in Section 3 of the Discussion Paper. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  What’s more, we are not currently making active purchases, because the MPC’s target stock for the CBPS was reached last year. That means the only scheduled purchases are reinvestments, averaging around a billion pounds a year in the near term. So it’s clear we can’t rely on buying power alone. Table 2: Selected investor frameworks17  But we can still use our position to take a lead, working closely with other like-minded central banks and investors.

Foreign money instead of our own money The final proposal is considerably less challenging in theoretical terms, but is highly explosive politically. Is there any reason why Switzerland should maintain an independent currency for its relatively small territory and conduct its own monetary policy? Since Switzerland has close economic ties with other currency areas, and the central banks in question also pursue stability policies, the idea of importing monetary policy from abroad would not be so far-fetched at first glance. After all, there are examples such as Denmark and Hong Kong which voluntarily and unilaterally peg their money to foreign currencies, even though they still mint their own coins and print their own banknotes. They hand over their monetary policy de facto to a foreign central bank and have often had quite good experiences with this approach. However, as soon as we look at the situation a little more carefully, surrendering monetary policy autonomy appears considerably less favourable from a Swiss point of view. First, our country has had good experience with its independent monetary policy, and this differentiates us from countries where the adoption of foreign monetary policy has brought a real gain in terms of stability. Second, structural and economic differences continue between the currency areas, irrespective of all the interrelationships, and these are decisive for the effectiveness and apportionment of monetary policy. Equally, the preferences of the general public as to how the central bank should react to given challenges vary from one country to 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  another.
Hopefully, by focussing on the key risk areas, it should reduce some of your regulatory burden. We recognise that this process has to be transparent, in that we need to explain to the banks what the new supervisory framework involves and what standards are expected of the banks. The examination checklists issued by the Japanese FSA are a good example of this approach. I know that some of the Japanese banks feel that the HKMA could do more along these lines in the area of transparency, and this is something that we have very much in mind. We will be publishing soon a framework document that explains the risk-based approach, and we are currently engaged in the major rewrite of all our supervisory guidelines. The aim is to put them into a common format and to make the text more user friendly and easier to read. This is a big task that will take about a year to complete in full. In the meantime, all our existing guidelines are available on our website, and individual guidelines in the new format will be added as they are produced. I hope that you have found useful this assessment of the state of the Hong Kong banking sector, and the current position of the Japanese banks within it. Let me stress again that we greatly value the presence of the Japanese banks in Hong Kong.

While financial transparency among Mainland companies is by no means perfect, lenders are now at least better equipped to identify those companies that have sound underlying businesses and good management. The long saga of GDE is now drawing to a close. The banks have, I believe, managed to negotiate the best deal possible, and the last remaining step is for the banks to review and sign the detailed documentation to put the restructuring into effect. I understand that when the documentation is sent to the banks, they will have plenty to read. But I hope that they will try to do this as quickly as possible and that we can avoid any last minute problems and delays. There is unlikely to be any opportunity for renegotiation of the deal, and if it were to collapse at the final stage, the banks would certainly be worse off. So far I have been concentrating on the position of the Japanese banks. Let me now review the more general state of banking in Hong Kong after the Asian crisis. The first point to make is that the local Hong Kong banks have survived the crisis in good shape. Although one or two banks lost money, most banks remained profitable and actually managed to improve their capital ratios during the period as their risk assets declined and their capital base expanded.
Chart 6: UK external position % GDP 700  Gross  Net  % GDP 30  600  20  500  10  400  0  300  -10  200  -20  100  -30  0  -40 L  A L A 2000 2007 Other Loans Currency and deposits  BIS central bankers’ speeches  -50 2000 2007 Equity Debt Securities  This period of net borrowing increased the country’s net external liabilities to 25% of GDP from around 10% at the turn of the century (Chart 6). Much of this was accounted for by higher borrowing by the government, with HMG’s external liabilities trebling to reach around 9% of GDP. The country’s gross external balance sheet doubled in size, reaching 6 times national output by the time the crisis struck. And there was an important mismatch in the maturity of those external assets and liabilities. Net, the UK borrowed short term, through deposits with and short-term loans to the banking sector, with the counterpart assets being long-term and equity-like. 17  Annex 2: Monetary policy and long-term forward rates This Annex summarises recent work in the Bank for Paul Tucker’s speech to the Society of Business Economists on National Balance Sheets and Macro Policy: lessons from the past.

To counteract the risks to our price stability objective, we first recalibrated our policy stance last December and then unveiled another comprehensive set of measures at our last monetary policy meeting in March 2016. In discussing our recent monetary policy measures, it is essential to consider the global environment in which they were taken. This environment was characterised by subdued growth, historically weak trade developments and low inflationary pressures reflecting sharp falls in energy prices. The more recent developments have been affected in particular by the outlook for emerging markets contributing to global financial market volatility in the second half of 2015 and again in February this year. In this respect, these developments are analysed in the box in the Annual Report entitled “Financial stress in emerging market economies” in order to understand their impact on the euro area economy. This is against the background of the discussions carried out in international fora, most recently at the meeting of G20 ministers and central bank governors, as well as at the BIS meetings in February in Shanghai. Risks to the global outlook and global financial stability will feature prominently on the agendas of the various meetings in the context of the IMF and World Bank spring meetings next week.
Examples of this include the introduction of the steam engine and the telegraph at the beginning of the 19th century, the building of the railways somewhat later and the internal-combustion engine and electric motor in the 20th century. These changes usually follow a similar pattern of growth and structural transformation. The transitional phase initially involves a period of crisis, which is expressed in company closures and rising unemployment. After this, productivity and growth increase. Some industries expand rapidly and are met by expectations of large profits. The demand for labour is unevenly distributed and matching problems arise. Wage differentials increase. In many ways the “new” economy can be regarded as one in a row of structural changes taking place in society. It is thus more appropriate, in many respects, to talk of a blend of new and old, rather than a new economy. In comparison with the steam engine, the railways and electricity, today’s IT developments may be perceived as marginal. But, while there is considerable exaggeration in the discussion of the importance of IT, I would still say that today’s change process could be compared to these events. Computers and the Internet allow us to gather information easily, cheaply and rapidly, as well as facilitating contacts between buyers and sellers at almost all levels. IT affects a number of areas, such as financing, stock management and procurement. This often involves a dramatic reduction in costs.

we can buy too few imported goods for what we export. This could be corrected by strengthening the krona through a stronger nominal exchange rate or by price increases on goods subject to competition being kept lower than those in other countries. It is sometimes claimed in the economic debate that non-recurring effects of deregulation and increased competition could be utilised by the Riksbank altering its price stability target from 2% to a lower figure. However, this would involve temporary effects influencing the target formulation, which would erase the stability in the target formulation that has an intrinsic value. It is still possible to strengthen purchasing power with an unchanged operational target formulation by a nominal appreciation of the krona. It has sometimes been claimed that the “new economy” could lead to completely new economic relations. I see no reasons for such a change. It is more likely that technological developments lead to reality approaching the simplified assumptions that form the basis of many economic models, such as a large measure of competition and low transaction costs. Thus, most of the models the Riksbank uses today would function equally well or better if structural changes were to occur more rapidly in the future. Nor do I see any reasons why the Riksbank’s intellectual framework on monetary policy would need to be fundamentally changed if we were to have a period of strong growth in productivity.
This justifies the need for effective regulation and supervision of the operations of banks and non-bank financial institutions compared to other business operations. Further, with the increase in non-bank financial institutions, their level of risk has also risen. Accordingly, the sheer size of the sector is of systemic importance, hence, effective and efficient regulation and supervision is required to stem any systemic risks. Ladies and Gentlemen I am happy to note that this workshop is addressing, in greater details, issues relating to the regulation and supervision of the non-bank financial sector, so as to ensure that the financial sector is safe, secure and efficient. As I conclude therefore, I wish to urge the workshop participants to participate actively in the deliberations and use this opportunity to tap from the vast experience of the resource persons. I have every reason to believe that this workshop will provide you with the opportunity to share experiences and enhance your knowledge of issues pertaining to regulation and supervision of the non-bank financial sector. With these remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my honour and privilege to declare this regional workshop officially open. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 12/2005

This has always been one of the guiding principles for calibrating the stance of the National Bank of Romania’s monetary policy, as well as for developing and employing our policy tools. We must continue on the road ahead keeping in mind that past achievements in terms of convergence, however large, do not guarantee future success (the middle-income trap is a real danger). For a sustainable economic convergence, we have to maintain a long-term perspective and implement coherent policies and reforms. Moreover, having ambitious but, at the same time, realistic anchors (such as the EU accession was for Romania before 2007) does help, as it gives purpose and direction to policymakers and society as a whole. What we need in order to move forward on the convergence path towards euro adoption is, first of all, to understand there is no substitute for a coherent economic policy mix, which should remain so even in electoral years. Secondly, it is important that Europe remains united. As I recently stated in a speech held in Bucharest, whenever things seem to look bad, I remember the words of Jean Monnet, one of the EU founding fathers: “Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches