samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Further, Malaysia has a strong external position with more foreign currency assets than foreign currency liabilities. Foreign currency borrowings only account for less than 3% of total Federal Government debt. 16. I also need to stress that a flexible exchange rate continues to be relevant as it allows the country to absorb external shocks. It also allows the MPC to set the policy rate based on Malaysia’s domestic growth and inflation outlook, rather than be constrained in having to follow the monetary policy of other advanced economies. 17. Now, we know that exchange rate movements create winners and losers. No doubt, the dollar strength will raise the cost of imported goods, including food prices. Imported inputs account for less than 20% of production cost. We understand that the increase in prices especially in food prices, are a concern for many. And although the exchange rate impact to inflation is not one to one, it partly contributes to the rising cost of living as higher commodity prices and supply disruptions affect domestic prices. Various measures are being implemented to lessen the impact of this increase in prices. These include social assistance, stabilisation of prices and access to discounted necessity goods. 18. On the other hand, ringgit depreciation is also expected to benefit export-oriented sectors which employ more than 30% of the Malaysian labour force. In fact, Malaysia’s exports have increased by 30% this year supported by several factors, including exchange rate valuation gains.

In addition, there is now a broad consensus on risk measurement approaches. The main point that is still undecided and which continues to occupy the Committee members is the setting of the so-called “output floor” for banks that apply internal models. Let’s be clear: I read and hear the banking industry, and French banks in particular, giving its advice for negotiations on this point. A little restraint would not go amiss, and it is not our intention to defend corporate interests. If an output floor of 75% is not acceptable, it is because this floor – and consequently the standardised approach – would become the constraint for half of the international banks. I must stress that our goal is to  finalise Basel III, based on improved models that remain risk sensitive, and not to move onto Basel IV, which would use the standardised approach. Therefore, an agreement must be reached on a lower output floor along with a tightening of controls over the banks’ internal models, much like the targeted review of internal models (TRIM) that was approved for the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the results of which we are more than willing to submit to peerreview. This stance is shared at the very least by other European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, and by the European Commission. International cooperation on financial reforms is a common good that has been extremely precious during these past eight years and is crucial to our future.
Even if inflation expectations continue to be low and there are certain signs that the economy is functioning more efficiently, the growth rate will have to be brought into line with the long-term potential. That we shall do in good time. We can thereby contribute to good, stable growth in the Swedish economy for a long time to come. Figure 1. GDP growth and inflation in Sweden, forecasts for 1999 Per cent 4.0 3.5 3.0  GDP growth, forecasts for 1999  Inflation, forecasts for 1999  4.0 3.5  Riksbank forecast  3.0  Consensus forecast  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  Consensus forecast  1.5  1.5 Riksbank forecast  1.0 0.5  1.0 0.5  0.0  0.0 Autumn 1998  Spring 1999  Autumn 1999  Autumn 1998  Spring 1999  Autumn 1999  Sources: Consensus and the Riksbank  7  BIS Review 111/1999  Figure 2. Contributions to GDP growth Percentage points; 1999-2001 forecast (main scenario) Final domestic consumption  3.5  3.5  3.0 2.5  3.0 2.5  Net exports  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.5  -1.0 -1.5  -1.0  Stock building 1995  1996  -1.5 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Sources: Statistics Sweden and The Riksbank  Figure 3.

It is seldom possible to demonstrate clear effects of interventions and that could not be done on this occasion, though the depreciation was broken during the day in question. Later in the autumn the krona appreciated again. BIS Review 111/1999  2  It seems to me that two main factors lie behind the krona’s appreciation in the past twelve months. One is a normal rebound from last autumn’s excessive weakening. This happened during the winter and was particularly pronounced because the euro’s introduction at the beginning of the year had made some investors concerned about the krona. The other factor is the increasingly clear picture of a strong economy with a budget surplus, low inflation and high growth. Moreover, the higher growth in Sweden compared with the euro area has influenced appraisals of the respective levels of interest rates. Specific events and statements may have played a part in the timing of the appreciation but it seems to me that the crucial influence has come from more fundamental economic considerations. The discussion of monetary policy has also acquired a new dimension. The procedure with the new Executive Board from the beginning of this year enables Board members to differ from the current majority view of inflation prospects and monetary policy measures. Board members have in fact differed on a number of occasions, as is clear from the published minutes. On two occasions, divergent opinions have also been registered regarding the level of the repo rate.
I would like to reiterate: •  that all European banks now have unlimited access to short-term liquidity, denominated in both euro and dollars, at a fixed rate;  •  that in all countries there are guarantee mechanisms enabling banks to ensure their financing and therefore to maintain their credit activities;  •  that banking systems are all being recapitalised at equivalent or higher levels than those prevailing before the crisis;  •  and lastly, that macroeconomic policy instruments are still available and could be used if economic activity were to decline durably. Moreover, for the past two months we have witnessed a reversal of the oil and food shock which strongly penalised economic growth during the first half of the year. Prices are now falling. If this trend continues, or even if it just stabilises, we can expect a gradual but marked  4  BIS Review 130/2008  slowdown in inflation. This should spontaneously give households extra purchasing power, contributing to a possible pick up in consumption. Together, these developments could stabilise the economy and allow a recovery in economic growth during 2009. We cannot, of course, predict a precise date or forecast the extent of this recovery. However, in my opinion, the prospect of a significant recovery in economic growth in 2009 is not being sufficiently taken into account, either by analysts or markets.

We are ensuring that these earnings are reported using the strictest standards. In all likelihood, this trend – of lower but positive profits – should continue for the rest of the year. Third, our banks have regular sources of income. They are universal banks. This sets them apart from banks in some other countries that depend exclusively, or for the most part, on the financial markets. Our banks have sound and revolving sources of future profits. This is a vital asset at a time when it is difficult to raise capital by issuing shares on the market. Lastly, the “manoeuvrability” of our banks remains excellent and they are now ready to play their role in the possible restructuring of the international financial sector. These facts give me reason for confidence. Beyond the sometimes serious tensions and incidents that have affected the recent period, our banks may be justly proud of the progress in terms of productivity and innovation that they have made in the last two decades, which now positions them to cope effectively with turmoil that may occur in the future. 2  BIS Review 130/2008  Public policy during the crisis Over the past two weeks, we have witnessed a marked change in public policy with regard to financial institutions. Having hitherto been exclusively geared to providing liquidity, public intervention is now also aiming to support banks’ financing and own funds. This shift in stance is significant. The problem of liquidity remains crucial at this stage of the crisis.
In the case of banks, for example, it is important for correspondent and custodial customers to develop comfort that the bank will be able to function normally in the new century. Banks and other firms need to develop strategies for conveying appropriate information efficiently to these constituents. In response to a flood of Year 2000 questionnaires from their customers, some banks in New York are beginning to hold forums to convey information and build confidence that they are addressing the problem. Another practice we are seeing is organizations declining to fill out questionnaires regarding their Year 2000 readiness unless the firm asking the questions discloses the same information. It is clear to me that this sort of market discipline is going to become a powerful force in the coming months for firms that are perceived to be lagging and failing to disclose. A solid program of self-disclosure is the best available approach to ensuring that all parties are willing to share information. Of course, supervisors and regulators may also need to develop mandatory disclosure programs or to interpret existing disclosure requirements to cover Year 2000-related issues. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission has progressively strengthened its efforts to require meaningful disclosure by all types of firms. Clearly, supervisors considering increased transparency need to act rapidly to ensure that any new requirements will become effective in time to be useful to market participants. An important challenge in considering either voluntary or mandatory disclosure is the question of what information should be disclosed.

On top of that, as we said in our press notice last Thursday - announcing that we had not changed interest rates - we recognise “that deterioration in the international economy could increase the risks of inflation falling below the target”. That is still not the most likely outcome in the eyes of most of us and given the real world uncertainties we can anyway never sensibly tie our hands. But there is no doubt in my mind that recent international developments have at least reduced the likelihood that we will need to tighten policy further. BIS Review 71/1998
Debt convertible into equity on the downside would also be helpful in that it would be a dampening mechanism – equity capital would be automatically replenished, but only when this was needed. Transparency There were many areas where a lack of transparency contributed to a loss of confidence, which intensified the crisis. One particular area was the case of over-the-counter securities such as ABS, CMBS, RMBS and CDOs and their associated derivatives. There was a lack of transparency in a number of different dimensions. A.  Valuation. CDOs and other securitized obligations were complex and difficult to value. This reduced liquidity, pushed down prices and created increased uncertainty about the solvency of institutions holding these assets. B. Prices. The lack of pricing information led to a loss of confidence about accounting marks. Sometimes identical securities were valued differently at different financial institutions. C.  Concentration of risk. Because there was no detailed reporting of exposures, market participants did not know much about the concentration of risk. This led to a reluctance to engage with counterparties, which, in turn, pushed up spreads and reduced liquidity further. The SCAP exercise was an example where increased transparency helped to generate a better outcome. We disclosed our stress test methodology and the results for each of the nineteen largest bank holding companies. This transparency increased confidence and made it easier for the banks to raise more capital.

Ladies and gentlemen, We find ourselves, today, at a juncture where governments and central banks alike have promptly stepped in globally to counter the negative impact of the coronavirus pandemic through social, economic, fiscal and monetary policies. The unprecedented mobilisation of the authorities 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  in a complex and determined manner has largely ensured the proper functioning of markets, and of the economic and social mechanisms. In this regard, enhancing the response capacity to adverse situations is essential, and this goal can also be achieved by strengthening corporate governance, supervision, and risk management in the financial sector. These are the key coordinates of the new twinning programme as well. The twinning project we are launching today has a wide scope, not only for the banking sector, but also for the entire financial market in the Republic of Moldova. It aims to be beneficial for both the National Bank of Moldova and the National Commission for Financial Markets of the Republic of Moldova, by strengthening institutional capacity and governance, as well as developing the regulatory, supervisory and operational frameworks for enhanced functionality. From my perspective, the National Bank of Romania has gained over time, after 1990, with the support of its partners in the European Union – including the support of De Nederlandsche Bank, which I would like to mention explicitly – a solid experience and expertise.
Aside from the risks inherent to the short-run performance of the economy, there are doubts regarding the medium-term effectiveness of the measures adopted to try to resolve the international crisis, the potential protectionist actions by governments and a possible deflation in developed economies that may delay decisions to consume and invest. Global imbalances are still present, and there is also the risk of high global inflationary pressures in the medium term if the large fiscal and monetary stimulus packages in the developed world are not properly managed. Domestically, we cannot rule out that, facing a relief in global uncertainty, the magnitude of the macroeconomic impulse under way, deriving from the combination of clearly expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, translates into a strong push to domestic output and demand. Nor can we rule out that the measures taken by the government to smoothen the functioning of credit markets, to stimulate investment and to cushion the impact on the labor market of the cyclical situation, facilitate a faster response of the economy to said macroeconomic stimulus and a rapid recovery of expectations. Final considerations I would like to end this presentation with some reflections about the economic situation we are going through and the prospects for our economy. The worsening of expectations and the higher uncertainty at the global level are grounded on the change in macroeconomic conditions.

As usual, the baseline scenario described above reflects the events that are believed to be most likely to occur with the information available at the closing of this Report. Logically, different events will lead to different macroeconomic conditions and, therefore, an MPR path that will also differ. Currently, the level of uncertainty is definitely higher than normal and, after assessing the probability of alternative scenarios, the Board considers that the balance  BIS Review 65/2009  5  of risks for growth is biased downward, and is unbiased for inflation. The main risks are associated, once again, to the complex global economic outlook. In the past few weeks, some signs of stabilization of the crisis in developed economies have begun to show up, with a marginal recovery of manufacturing output, exports and confidence indicators in different economies, particularly in Asia. It is possible that these signs may be just another stage in the volatility shown by the markets in the past several quarters, and new stressful situations may arise that could worsen the already precarious situation of the world economy. Meanwhile, if the rebound of stock markets and the reduced risk aversion are solid indications that uncertainty is fading out, a more widespread recovery of global output and demand may be seen in the short run at the global level. The materialization of some of these risks could have important implications on the domestic economy, mainly consumers and entrepreneurs’ expectations possibly taking longer than predicted to improve, or the economy quickly recovering from its current state.
17  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Price stability vs. financial stability Current situation in Switzerland  18  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Price stability vs. financial stability Current situation in Switzerland  Low reference rate remains necessary  19  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Price stability vs. financial stability Current situation in Switzerland  Low reference rate remains necessary  20  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Price stability vs. financial stability Current situation in Switzerland  Low interest rate environment promotes ... Low reference rate remains necessary  • ... a build-up of imbalances: 2000:  Mortgage loan volume  * 100 = 110%  2017:  Mortgage loan volume  * 100 = 145%  GDP  GDP  • ... risk appetite among banks  21  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Should the interest rate tool be used to curb excesses on the credit market? NATIONAL BANK ACT Article 5: Tasks 1 The National Bank shall pursue a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole. It shall ensure price stability. In so doing, it shall take due account of economic developments.

Zdeněk Tůma: EU enlargement and monetary integration Remarks by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the 3rd ECB Central Banking Conference “The New EU Member States: Convergence and Stability”, Frankfurt, 21-22 October 2004. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It has been only recently since we had become members of the European Union. It is only natural that, once the immediate effects of the enlargement have subsided, policy-makers´ attention should shift towards the next step - monetary integration of the twenty-five current EU member states. The first thing to be considered when discussing European monetary integration is how the different countries will go about adopting the euro. There is no universal strategy that can be used by all new EU member states. The euro may either be adopted rapidly, or after a longer interim period. In the pre-EMU period, the emphasis can be put either on ensuring the low inflation required by the Maastricht Treaty domestically, or on importing it by fixing the exchange rate. The key factors that determine which strategy to adopt are, in my opinion, the size and flexibility of the domestic economy, the current monetary-policy regime and its credibility as well as the state of public finances. Specifically, small countries that have lived with fixed exchange-rate regimes for the last ten years, and have thus developed economies flexible enough to compensate for fixed exchange rates will most likely benefit from faster adoption of the euro.
Currently, potential output for this group of economies is thought to be at around 1.5%, a significant drop from the 2% growth estimated in the pre-crisis period. At the same time, the 2  percentage of wealth held by the richest 10% of the population of the United States, France or the United Kingdom has risen by between 5 pp and 9 pp in the last 25 years. 3  Moreover,  far-reaching  transformations  such  as  globalisation, the digital revolution and demographic trends are all shaping the world economy today, and will continue to do so in the years to come. Against this backdrop, tax and transfer systems can play a crucial role in providing sound public finances, increasing potential output and delivering sustainable and inclusive growth. However, meeting these goals poses some significant challenges. And not only because of the intrinsic distortionary nature of taxation and the different existing trade-offs among these three dimensions, but also because 2  See Chapter 3 of the April 2015 World Economic Outlook. 3  See Alvaredo, F., L. Chancel, T. Piketty, E. Saez and G. Zucman (2018), World Inequality Report 2018, Harvard University Press. 2  some of these global phenomena, in particular globalisation and the digital revolution, can adversely affect the capacity of governments to collect taxes. As recently stressed in a newspaper article, the challenge is to define a system where taxes target rents, preserve incentives and are hard to avoid.

Losses in investors’ confidence could erupt much more quickly and spread across markets in a matter of days. Unfortunately, the economic and social costs of the new crises also increased substantially. I think we can safely say that the Fund, like anybody else, was caught by surprise by the virulence of the turmoil that hit Asia in the 90s. When Thailand and even more so Korea were on the verge of financial collapse the Fund looked very much like those generals always ready to fight the previous war. Not even its financial means were adequate, and governors were rushed to decide a speedy 45 percent increase in quotas in January 1998 to supplement the rapidly depleting Fund resources. It didn’t take the Fund long, however, to react, to pick up the challenge and, all things considered, to come out of that difficult situation relatively unscathed. No-one should claim that everything went smoothly, though, or that no mistake has ever been made. From the side of the Fund, too, it was a particularly bumpy trial and error process. Quickly restoring market confidence became the name of the game. How? This is the difficult question. I shall not elaborate on the design of the various programs over that period. A very extensive, at times quite critical, economic literature on this matter, with pieces signed by the best pens in the profession, is readily available for those of you interested in more details.