samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With these conditions met, we can achieve better automatic stabilisation of future economic shocks, as the participants in the economy will understand how monetary policy will act going forward and be able to adjust their expectations accordingly. If the private sector instead perceives the scope for monetary policy as being limited or the policy as being hard to grasp, credibility for the inflation target may be jeopardised, particularly in a situation in which these limits are perceived as longterm. Proposals for tools that could be used to provide better possibilities for counteracting a recession include: • • • • • • •  Raised inflation target Make up strategies for better automatic stabilisation of the economy after shocks Quantitative easing used systematically in the implementation of monetary policy Forward guidance Coordination with fiscal policy under special circumstances Fiscal policy stimulation measures funded with central bank money, socalled helicopter money Acceptance of low inflation  We shall now examine the arguments behind these proposals. Raised inflation target Firstly, it must be said that the proponents of this idea do not usually mean raising the inflation target in the current situation. Rather, if the inflation target is to be raised, this should be from a normal level, when inflation has been close to the target for some time and monetary policy has become somewhat normalised.

Bernanke (2020) has an alternative proposal that is based on this kind of target only being introduced temporarily when monetary policy is limited. However, here too it is important that this is communicated in advance – the measure will then have the maximum effect as it contributes to increasing the central bank's ability to stabilise the economy and thereby affect the participants’ expectations. One counterargument is that, if expectations are instead backward looking, the make-up strategies will lead to unnecessary variations in GDP and interest rates. Our inflation target, which focuses on the day's inflation, is forgiving as old misses are ‘forgotten’. As it is difficult to make inflation forecasts, the outcome for inflation will often deviate a bit from the inflation target and it is important to be clear about this in advance, to avoid giving an incorrect impression of great precision in the Riksbank’s ability to stabilise inflation. Quantitative easing as a permanent part of the monetary policy toolbox Purchases of financial assets have, in various times, been part of the implementation of monetary policy. For example, earlier, the Federal Reserve  10 See Nessén and Vestin (2005) for an academic discussion of this monetary policy strategy. See Clarida (2019) for a discussion in the current US context. 13 [25]  used non-remunerated reserves, together with direct purchases or sales of government bonds, to regulate the amount of central bank reserves in the system and thus ensure that the federal funds rate ended up close to the target for the policy rate.
Denny Kalyalya: Regulatory framework for microfinance institutions in Zambia Keynote address by Dr Denny Kalyalya, Deputy Governor - Operations of the Bank of Zambia at the 2nd AFRACA Microfinance Forum, Lusaka, 3 and 4 April 2003. *  *  *  Honorable Deputy Minister of Finance and National Planning, The Secretary General of the African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA), The Chairperson, The Honorable Member of Parliament and Chairperson for Economic Affairs - Labour, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Your Excellencies, Representatives of International Organisations, Distinguished Invited Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour for me to be given this opportunity to address this important workshop and share a few words with you this morning. I therefore wish to sincerely thank AFRACA and Micro Bankers Trust, the organizers of this workshop, for extending this invitation to me. Ladies and Gentlemen, AFRACA’s decision to host this workshop in Lusaka has come at an important time for us when, as a country, we are working towards finalisation of the development of a regulatory framework for microfinance institutions in Zambia, with a view to foster balanced growth in our financial sector. Our staff will therefore listen extra attentively to the deliberations of this workshop so that we get as much information and ideas as possible to assist us in this very important exercise. It is also our hope that, you, the participants, will share your views and experiences freely at this workshop.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Since I have been given the floor I now wish to take this opportunity to briefly share with you the Zambian experience with regard to the microfinance market. Despite its land-based wealth, Zambia faces very significant development challenges. The rapid structural adjustment process that took place during the 1990s has had a harsh impact on our people, with the result that poverty is now widespread in our country. Currently, a significant number of the 10 million or so Zambians strive for survival on far less than one US dollar a day and like in many other African countries there are high HIV/AIDS rates and indebtedness which have contributed to persistent low economic performance. Thus, our government’s focus with assistance from cooperating partners has to increasingly be on poverty alleviation via income generation and micro enterprise stimulation, using small business development and microfinance as mechanisms to improve household standards. Following the structural adjustment period, particularly from the early 1990s, affordable and publicly funded rural financial services have collapsed. A private microfinance movement, though still in its infancy, has had to emerge offering modern microfinance services. Today in Zambia we have an interesting blend of microfinance institutions that are private sector, for-profit firms, and non-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although expansion is much slower in rural areas, growth is evident along the line of rails and the peri-urban areas of our country.
2022 Paris Europlace International Finance Forum – Paris, 12 July 2022 Central bank digital currency (CBDC) and bank intermediation in the digital age  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 sur 7 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to be with you today, thanks to Paris Europlace. In light of the current geopolitical context, the theme of this session appears particularly relevant: European strategic autonomy is not absent from our sight as central banks. We notably ensure that our banking system remains robust in times of great uncertainty – namely the war in Ukraine, and its economic consequences: the spur in inflation, the deterioration of the macroeconomic outlook, and the normalisation of interest rates. In this context, let me pay tribute to the solidity and performance of the French banking system: French bank’s CET1 amounts to 14.9 % in Q1 2022; while their RoE increased over a rolling 12-month period at 7.6 % in Q1 2022, and corporate risk remains manageable for sure. However, this collective strength should not mean any complacency, especially in the face of the triple digital revolution unfolding before our eyes in the financial sector;i new tokenised assets, new players, and new “decentralised” market infrastructures aim to remodel the financial system from the ground up. Against this background, central banks are increasingly considering the creation of a digital form of their currencies. And let’s face it: the idea sometimes raises doubts, and even fears, among commercial banks.

Building on our experiments with the private sector on a ‘wholesale’ CBDC to be ready for the future By comparison, the topic of a wholesale CBDC is less contentious and of less concerns to stakeholders; but it should not be perceived as less important. We central banks have been very proactive here, as demonstrated by the “wholesale CBDC focus” of the BIS Innovation Hubs. The Banque de France is at the forefront here, and we have especially identified two critical use cases for improving the payments ecosystem.  First, the tokenisation of securities. A wholesale CBDC could be used for the settlement of such securities issued on DLT, which is essential to prevent market and liquidity fragmentation. This technology also streamlines the information flows in financial markets, from trading to exchange procedures and settlement.  Second, a wholesale CBDC could enhance cross-border and crosscurrency settlements. Over the past year, we have successfully completed the first phase of our experimentation programme, comprising 9 experiments, hand in hand with the private sector and with other public actors. Thanks to these experiments, we have developed a direct technical expertise including two key innovative assets born in the Banque de France:  A proprietary DLT technology, called DL3S. This blockchain has been entirely designed by the Banque de France in order to meet the needs and expectations of market participants as a permissioned blockchain with efficient delivery and settlement services, using CBDC.
Let me delve into some aspects of these pillars. In terms of regulation and supervision of the financial system, the causes and effects of the crisis of 2008-2009 have taught great lessons to policy makers around the world. Suffice is to mention the changes that are being effected in the United States and the Eurozone, such as the Dodd-Frank Act and the instauration of a European banking authority. In Chile, our financial system was not involved in the practices that originated the crisis in the developed world, because our legislation does not allow it. Even so, we are permanently reviewing our legislation in light of the experiences and best practices in place today in the world. Another significant aspect has to do with our foreign exchange policy. In recent weeks the peso has appreciated against the dollar, prompting some sectors to demand intervention by the Central Bank. I think that some clarification is in order. In the first place, I reaffirm the validity of a flexible exchange rate for the Chilean economy. Our economic history is full of examples in this area. So far, the scheme that has yielded the best results for economies similar to the Chilean is a floating exchange rate regime. When policy makers sought to artificially control the value of our currency, imbalances were generated that ended up being very costly for the country. The adoption of exchange rate flexibility in 1999 has allowed us to wade subsequent complex moments.

The measures included in this plan would have a positive impact of 0.2 pp on the average GDP growth rate. situation, use of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) funds and financing conditions that, while somewhat tighter than in previous quarters, remain favourable. Turning to the inflation forecasts, in step with the paths of the corresponding futures markets, the upward pressures of the energy component are expected to peak in the second quarter of 2022 and then decelerate. The inflation projections rest on two assumptions: (i) that, in line with the information from the EBAE, the pass-through of higher intermediate costs to final prices will only be relatively moderate (albeit more forceful than envisaged in the December projection exercise); and (ii) that the second-round effects will be limited, i.e. scant feedback effects between inflationary pressures on prices and wages. Inflationary pressures will be partly alleviated by the measures contained in the National Plan to respond to the economic and social consequences of the war in Ukraine.4 Furthermore, these projections do not yet include the possible changes in prices on the electricity market that are currently being negotiated in the European Union. Against this backdrop, the projections see inflation standing at 7.5% in 2022. It will then fall in 2023 to around 2%, thanks, above all, to the moderation of the energy component. Underlying inflation will not start to decline until end-2022, once the upward pressures on firms’ costs associated with energy prices and bottlenecks have corrected.
If I plug a destination into my new GPS device, it asks whether I want the quickest route, or the geographically shortest route, or a route that meets some other criteria. The quickest route is likely to involve highways, but may cover more miles. The shortest route may take side roads that reduce distance and save gas, but take substantially more time. And, of course, you may run into traffic or construction that forces you to adapt your route. When setting monetary policy there may be a variety of paths you can take to reach the destination. For instance, aggressive pursuit of accommodative monetary policy by the Fed and stimulative fiscal policy by Congress and the Administration might get us more quickly to our desired destination – but could enlarge the deficit or risk igniting inflation expectations. Alternatively, aggressive pursuit of less accommodative policies – that is, removing monetary and fiscal stimulus sooner rather than later – could result in a more extended period of  1  Of course, the views I express today are my own, not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee (the FOMC). BIS Review 62/2010  1  underutilized resources; or worse, significantly increase the length of the journey to our ultimate destination. Right now, we are far from our destination, and the rest of my remarks will focus on selecting among the alternate routes to our objective.

Jean-Pierre Landau: Bubbles and macro prudential supervision Remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Landau, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France 1 , at the Joint conference on “The Future of Financial Regulation”, organised by the Bank of France and the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Paris, 28 January 2009. *  *  *  Looking at the future of financial regulation is specially challenging in the current juncture. Right in the midst of the crisis, we cannot be sure that we fully understand its ultimate causes, its roots, and its dynamics. Furthermore, we do not want to be fighting the last war. We need a vision on how the financial system will evolve in the future, something very difficult to figure out right now. And yet, there is a strong political demand for orientations and measures to fix the problems and make sure they never happen again. This demand is fully legitimate, considering the social costs that the crisis is imposing on our societies, and more specifically, the financial burden taken on by tax payers. I have chosen to present some remarks on bubbles and macro prudential supervision. They should be seen more as a work program than a full-fledged answer to the many questions raised for the future. I will deal with three issues: what are we trying to achieve? What are the main challenges? Which are the proper instruments? What are we trying to achieve? Here, we have two certainties, and many questions.
The remarkable success of the Central and Eastern European countries of achieving EU membership after a thorough transformation and rapid growth of living standards undoubtedly holds a lot of recommendations and lessons for the South Eastern European countries. These countries had similar, maybe even more advanced starting positions than the other transition countries, but South Eastern Europe is now lagging far more behind in terms of progress towards the EU. However, we should bear in mind that the main reason for this is definitively the political instability and war conflicts in the region, which understandably prevented faster economic transformation and reforms. Luckily, it appears that political support for EU accession and the determination to pursue EU membership, including all the necessary economic and political reforms, are strengthening. In analyzing the economic developments in the region of South Eastern Europe, some notable differences with the CEE countries appear. South Eastern Europe has much lower pace of reforms and lower growth rates. Related to this, capital inflows in the region have been much smaller and have shown a much bigger dispersion among countries, ranging from 834 USD per capita in Albania to 3,932 USD per capita in Croatia, cumulatively in the period 1989-2007. 12 Credit expansion has been high, but has still to reach rates and length of the one seen in more advanced transition countries. Consequently, there have been less demand pressures as well as comparatively lower inflation than in the other countries, although inflation has been rising recently.

That reflected continuing strong demand growth in the emerging market economies coming up against inelastic supply, augmented in the case of some foodstuffs by the development of bio-fuels and poor harvests. Of course, you have experienced many of these developments at first hand. This time last year, DEFRA’s measure of farm-gate prices had risen by 25% over the preceding twelve months, while the Economist food index had increased by around 55%. For much of last year, the MPC sought to balance these two forces: the turmoil in financial markets, pushing down on growth and inflation; and the rise in commodity prices, also pushing down on growth, but up on inflation. The latter proved to be the dominant force through the first part of the year, pushing CPI inflation up to 5.2%, well above our 2% target. Then, in September, an economic winter of unusual severity arrived. The global economy experienced the equivalent of Jevons’ sunspot – the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Investors  BIS Review 19/2009  1  had assumed the US authorities would never allow a bank the size of Lehman’s to fail. The resulting shock fatally undermined confidence in a number of similar institutions. You will remember the period in early October when bank share prices fell precipitously and a number of financial institutions around the world were rescued or closed.
This is because, on one hand, acute uncertainty and instability continue to plague international financial markets, while the freeze persists in what were the key funding markets until 2007; and, on the other, the real economy has entered a sharp downturn manifest in a widespread synchronised recession affecting both developed and emerging countries. The global dimension of this crisis and the interaction of the difficulties assailing the financial system with those of the real economy are shaping an outlook of unprecedented complexity. Accordingly, there is the risk of entering a vicious circle in which the difficulties of one sector feed back into those of another, aggravating problems and making them harder to resolve. The seriousness of the situation has compelled economic and monetary authorities in many countries to adopt some extraordinary measures, including bailing out what are often very large financial institutions. International difficulties remain in this field and the disclosure of further losses related to complex structured products cannot be ruled out. This is forestalling any end to the climate of uncertainty and lack of confidence. In recent months, central banks have adopted a wide range of measures, some of which are unconventional. Particular emphasis was placed on supplying the system with the necessary liquidity for it to continue to function.

This retail banking model was under debate before the financial crisis broke out in summer 2007, and many analysts considered it obsolete. However, it has proved to be more resilient in the current situation than the originate-to-distribute model which was used intensively in certain banking systems, and lies in fact at the heart of the crisis. Other considerations aside, since the institutions hold on to the risks originated, the perverse incentives associated with the originate-to-distribute model have not been generated in the extension of credit and in its subsequent monitoring. A second factor why the international financial crisis did not directly impact the Spanish banking system has been the Banco de España’s prudent regulation and supervision. I can offer two widely known and acknowledged examples. The first refers to supervision of credit institutions. The broad scope of this supervision acted as a deterrent for the creation and use of certain off-balance sheet vehicles. The second example refers to the area of regulation and, in particular, a system of provisions characterised by very demanding specific-purpose provisions and, especially, dynamic provisions. Under this latter type of provisioning, which has been in force in our system since mid-2000, latent risks and losses in upturns must be recognised, with the result that their build-up on banks' balance sheets has an immediate effect on institutions’ income statements. Obviously, the above-mentioned measures have not been sufficient to isolate Spanish institutions from the financial crisis.
To listen as often as we speak; to try and better understand the issues people tell us matter to them, rather than the issues we tell them ought to matter to them; to close that gap between “us” and “them”. With the fortunes of the economy uncertain, the value of this grassroots intelligence has never been greater. So where is the UK economy at this critical juncture? Overall, the picture is a reasonably reassuring one. The UK economy has grown for 17 consecutive quarters. Output has increased by around 2% over the past year, just a little below its historic trend rate. Employment in the UK is at its highest rate since 1973. Unemployment is currently at its lowest since 1975. Confidence among businesses and consumers remains solid. And inflation, which had been below its 2% target for three years, has bounced back sharply recently. Nonetheless, the UK economy clearly does face a number of important challenges. Consumer price inflation (CPI), at 2.9%, is currently well above the government’s inflation target of 2%. It is likely to move further above that target during the course of this year, probably reaching 3%. Meanwhile, growth in the UK has slowed fairly sharply since the end of last year, as higher prices squeeze households’ purchasing power in the shops. Activity in the UK economy remains below its long-run potential. And, of course, all of this is before the full effects of Brexit have been felt.

Page 1 of 4  Central Bank of Chile July 2020  •  Moreover, CLS improves the liquidity management of the financial institutions, particularly the banks that settle directly into the system, using an efficient multilateral net mechanism. •  Additionally, due to the high standards of currency eligibility and the efficiency of the operative process of settlement, when a currency is part of CLS it gives a strong signal of financial development. At the same time, important international players that only traded if the payment is performed through CLS can incorporate the Peso into their portfolios, thus increasing market competition. •  Finally, the CLS settlement of the Peso will improve the transparency of the currency markets’ transactions, incorporating over-the-counter transactions into an infrastructure, according to the international recommendations and principles. IV. Private sector involvement in the CLS system  •  An important part of the risk reduction and liquidity saving benefits is faced by the financial institutions participating in the system and, therefore, passing through to the rest of the financial markets, and ultimately to the users of the financial products, currency derivatives, and foreign exchange (FX) transactions. •  Moreover, as a financial market infrastructure, CLS interacts with other financial institutions, particularly with banks. At CLS, banks play different roles, such as Settlement Member, correspondent or Nostro service provider, and liquidity provider. •  The timely involvement of banks in the process is essential, considering the start of the implementation phase by the end of this year.