In the worst case, this may even lead to a situation with a more fragmented and nationally-oriented regulatory and supervisory system. To paraphrase the quote from Mervin King: global banks would still be national in death, but less international in life. That would, in my view, be a step backwards. I do of course realise that it is unrealistic to ask for the creation of an international institution with supranational powers to deal with distressed cross-border banks. So, in the absence of a common global regime the best we can do is to try to develop a common international approach to crisis management and resolution. If we cannot do it as one, at least we need to make sure that we can do it similarly and in a coordinated fashion. So we need to embark on an even bolder agenda than the present supervisory reforms. Here, we may draw some inspiration from the last century. After the war we created the IMF to provide some basic rules for the monetary system, recognising that the system is interlinked and that problems in one country may also create problems in others. In the 1980s we agreed on the Basle Accord with joint supervisory rules for the internationallyactive banks. Recognising now that supervisory convergence hinges on agreement on crisis management and resolution, I think that it is time to address this issue in a serious way. I see  BIS Review 134/2009  3  this as a necessary step for Europe, given our single market.

Moreover, it reduces the costs for triparty repos related to collateral management, settlement and legal charges, and allows trading to be executed regardless of the location of the collateral. Non-discriminatory, risk-based access to and by market infrastructures is an important element of the new international regulatory framework. With market participants increasingly moving to central clearing, the business  15  Triparty interoperability is especially relevant for standard interbank operations/repos, which are cleared at CCPs and where CCPs use standardised baskets of eligible collateral (also referred to as general collateral (GC) baskets). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  case for triparty interoperability is growing. Furthermore, the new CPSS-IOSCO principles for financial market infrastructures were specifically strengthened to facilitate access and interaction between such infrastructures. Some of the key parties involved in this triparty settlement interoperability initiative have started to show signs of retreating in past months. While the ECB understands the complexity of establishing a triparty interoperability model and the substantial efforts and in particular the investment costs required to make it work, it would like to strongly urge all parties to continue to work together. Interoperability will bring important benefits – by allowing a more efficient use of collateral by bringing together separate pools of liquidity. The ECB remains ready to continue to support the triparty settlement interoperability initiative and to help bring the project forward. Concluding remarks Let me conclude. The resilience and proper functioning of market infrastructures is of paramount importance to ensure well-functioning money markets.