samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I shall conclude by talking about a third ambition: the ecological transition. To achieve this, our financial institutions will have to play their full part in fighting global warming. I would like to take the opportunity here to commend the climate leadership of France, which is at the forefront of efforts in Europe and the world. Despite the Covid crisis, our principal financial institutions willingly volunteered to carry out their first climate resilience tests. The exercise revealed that their exposure to transition risks is on the whole “moderate”, and that it will be even better controlled if the transition is orderly and not delayed. Green finance also represents a huge opportunity for development. In short, the sooner the financial sector starts, the smoother the transition will be, with financial institutions playing an active role rather than just being followers. Thank you for your attention. i  Top 6 France: 15.6%. Top 4 France: 14.8%. To between 13.2% and 11.3% compared with 15.6% at the end of 2020.  ii

With a humble beginning of establishing the first Islamic bank in 1983, Islamic finance in Malaysia has evolved to become a comprehensive domestic Islamic financial system, comprising the Islamic banking institutions, the takaful industry, the Islamic money and capital markets. Malaysia’s Islamic banking sector grew 20% annually since 2001 in terms of assets and as at the end of June 2010, the share of Islamic banking assets in the total banking sector has expanded to reach 20.9 percent as compared to 6.9 percent a decade ago. Malaysia also remains the world’s largest sukuk market, accounting for more than 60 percent of global sukuk issuances. Islamic finance prospers in Malaysia because it is competitive, innovative and in sync with what the market want. Recent developments of Islamic finance that strengthen its resilience Significant milestones achieved in the recent decade in the area of international financial infrastructure provides further support for sustainable and orderly development and continued growth of Islamic finance. In 2002, the Islamic financial Services Board or IFSB was established with the role as an international prudential standard setting body for Islamic finance. The IFSB has been instrumental in developing and issuing global prudential standards and guiding principles for the industry. Further efforts to ensure sustainability of Islamic finance in this new and more challenging environment include the formation of a Task Force on Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability by the Islamic Development Bank and IFSB.
We discussed this topic in meetings with Mr. Shuvalov, and we have now drafted a bill which is being readied for submission to the state Duma. The main features of this bill include: - Creation of a registry of leasing companies - Determination of the minimal capital of leasing companies - Increase in transparency of leasing companies 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  In our view it is extremely important, and already now being taken into account, that the leasing portfolio is valued at 3.2 billion rubles. This is a very large number, and, of course, it is important that this industry, which is important to the economy’s development, is sustainable, transparent and adequately regulated. The series of drafted laws has passed the first reading in the state Duma, and now there is serious work to be done in preparing them for the second reading. The most important of these is the introduction of a unified system for evaluating business reputation, management qualification requirements and requirements for the founders and owners of non-bank financial institutions. Such requirements are already defined in the banking system, and it’s very important to increase the responsibility of the owners and management of financial organisations for their sustainability and good governance, and in our opinion it is very important to bring in similar norms for non-banking organisations too. Another draft law currently in the Duma, and now particularly important, aims to improve the effectivity of regulation in the fight with insider trading and market manipulation.

It is really a great honor to have representatives from the central banks of the EU member states as well as from the candidate countries attending this conference, especially having in mind that on the last day of the conference some of them will have presentations and share their experiences in the domain of payment systems. Ladies and gentlemen, Now, allow me to declare the seventh conference on payment and securities settlement systems open! I would like to wish the chairman Mr. Michiel van Doeveren and his colleagues a successful conference. I hope the weather will be fine and you will enjoy the beauties of Lake Ohrid, and in the afternoon and in the evening, you will have the opportunity to visit the city of Ohrid, which is one of the best preserved material and spiritual legacies witnessing the millennial existence of our culture and historical heritage. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
For example: •  their financial markets are typically more volatile than those in advanced economies, and so is their GDP growth, which at the same time is higher on average than in advanced economies;  •  these countries are also typically experiencing stronger credit growth, as their financial sectors are in the process of catch-up;  •  they usually have lower credit ratings and shallower government bond markets, which in some cases implies a lack of high quality liquid assets, a lack of adequate collateral etc. Saying that, I must stress that this difference does not apply to some; my country is a testimony to this;  •  the countries face a whole range of home-host issues, as many globally significant financial institutions operate branches or subsidiaries in those countries. These are just examples of features which could possibly interact with the Basel III framework in emerging economies in a way that was not originally intended. As I see from the topics covered by your workstream, you touch on all these aspects, so there is a chance  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  that the paper that will emerge out of your contributions and out of the discussions you will have today will be useful for regulators in EMSEs and for the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as well. Hopefully, today’s workshop will help you with this.

The first one is of a general nature, while the second lies in differences in the relationship between the size of the financial sector and the size of the real economy in the most developed economies and the emerging ones. As to the general difficulty, I strongly believe that the world is becoming more fundamentally uncertain. Alignment and coordination of regulatory tools and policies can only take us so far. There is no guarantee that rules and harmonisation will produce the right outcome, that the new rules will be significantly better than previous ones, or that in the fundamentally highly uncertain world the “right” set of rules exists at all. Therefore, it is surprising to me that we are so focused on the design of the, hopefully, right set of rules and often also on limiting the space for their diversification. After all, diversification is a tried and tested strategy for dealing with fundamental uncertainties. The push for harmonisation at the expense of space for diversification is leading individual sovereigns to take a different approach, namely, that of insulation and buffering. This itself is not such a bad thing. After all, taking as a benchmark the maritime world, in which the rules of shipbuilding are fundamentally clearer, more certain and more effective than the current rules of financial market regulation, big ships are constructed with watertight compartments to contain any flooding if the hull is breached.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with the Financial Times Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, conducted by Mr Lionel Barber, FT Editor, and Mr Ralph Atkins, FT Frankfurt Bureau Chief, on 10 December 2008 in Frankfurt, published on 15 December 2008. *  *  *  FT: Mr Trichet, this has been the Eurozone’s first real crisis. How do you think the authorities have coped? Mr Trichet: I’m not sure it is really the Eurozone’s first crisis, because you remember we also had the bursting of the internet bubble, and we had to cope with the oil and the commodity price shock. Moreover, we also had other sets of difficulties here and there, including when we were told in 2004 by some large countries that we had to unravel the Stability and Growth Pact. So I would say we had to face up to a series of circumstances that were certainly not easy. But it remains true, of course, not only for us but for all the authorities in the world – central banks, executive branches and perhaps also parliaments – that we now have to cope with a truly exceptional situation. In that sense I would say that we are all being tested. In a way the ECB is being no more or less tested than the Federal Reserve, because these exceptional circumstances are calling for exceptional decisions and responses by a large number of central banks.

John C Williams: Inflation targeting - securing the anchor Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bank of England Research Workshop on "The Future of Inflation Targeting", London, 9 January 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery  Introduction Good afternoon, and happy new year. Monetary policy frameworks are complex, technical, and rarely make it into the public consciousness. But they are of vital importance to economic prosperity. And as we stand on the brink of a new decade, it is critically important that we understand how the frameworks central banks choose influence economic outcomes, both today and in the future. When Andy Haldane invited me to be on the panel, he posed the provocative question: What will monetary policy frameworks look like 30 years from now? As a policymaker, I try to avoid making predictions for the future. But given that I will assuredly be an ex-central banker in the year 2050, I think I’m safe to have free rein! That said, I should still give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. In my remarks today, I’ll discuss how the monetary policy landscape has evolved, and what that means for inflation targeting in 2020, 2050, and beyond.
We need measures, and the possibility to follow them up, to ensure a system that is sustainable in the long term As I said earlier, the new data means that we have taken several further steps towards seeing the risks associated with household debt. However, I would like it to make it clear that there is still a long way to go. We still do not have the entire picture. An important area where we need more data is the asset side, where we have information on the overall situation in the household sector but not broken down at the individual and household levels. In order to be able to follow developments it is of course also important to have long, continually updated time series. The analysis of the new data that we now have access to shows, all in all, that households in general are highly indebted in relation to their incomes, and this applies above all to low and middle-income earners. It also applies irrespective of where the borrowers live and how old they are. The analysis also shows that many borrowers do not reduce their debts over time and that those who do reduce them very slowly. I find this situation worrying. It is not mainly those with high incomes and those who can be assumed to have considerable wealth that have the largest debts in relation to their incomes. To a rather large extent it appears to be those who probably have less financial scope to manage potential shocks.

Considering the dramatic price increases on the Swedish housing market in recent years, this is a completely reasonable claim. The higher housing prices are, the greater the loan required to finance the purchase of a house or flat. Finansinspektionen’s mortgage survey shows that the debt ratio for new mortgage borrowers averages 370 per cent, which is a higher debt ratio than for existing mortgage holders. On the other hand, I do not think that the difference between new mortgage borrowers and those who have owned their homes for some time is as big as I had perhaps expected. This is because people who have owned their homes for a while have had the opportunity to reduce their debts. The fact that the difference is not bigger could indicate that the households reduce their debts at a relatively slow rate. Let me return to this a little later. The debt ratio is highest among low and middle-income earners One conclusion of the government’s inquiry “Over-indebtedness in a credit society” is that the highest debt ratios are to be found among those with the highest incomes. This is the picture you get if you look at the population as a whole, that is if you also include individuals who have an income but no debts. This means that the inquiry really shows that low-income earners do not take loans to the same extent as high-income earners. If we instead look at debts in relation to incomes only for those individuals who have debts we get a different picture.
Incidence in annual CPI inflation (*) (percentage points)  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 -2  -2 01  02  03  04  Fuels (3,97%) Food ex. fresh fruits and vegetables (23,5%)  05  06  07  08  Fresh fruits and vegetables (3,77%) Other (68,76%)  (*) Between parenthesis CPI basket weights. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau. The upward trend of international prices of foodstuff has not replicated the intensity of 2007 and the weather-related problems of last year were left behind with the change of season. Nevertheless, Chile faces this year a new climatic shock that is already affecting the prices of perishable goods and electricity, associated to the “La Niña” phenomenon. The challenge of monetary policy is to allow the adjustment in relative prices avoiding undesired second-round effects. For this purpose, we have adopted a flexible inflation target framework. The inflation objective is to keep inflation most of the time close to 3% with a tolerance range of plus/minus one percentage point. We implement this framework adapting monetary policy to having an inflation forecast near 3% in about two years. This time horizon gives enough flexibility to allow for the full effects of monetary policy to take place and for transitory inflationary shock to vanish without the need for monetary policy action. It also incorporates the output costs of disinflation.

As explained in Mishkin (2008): “given that financial market disruption can pose significant risks to the macroeconomy, risk management is crucial in formulating the appropriate response of monetary policy… the design of monetary policy ought to reflect the public’s preferences, especially with respect to avoiding particularly adverse economic outcomes.” Furthermore, he adds that “the most likely outcome – referred to as the modal forecast – for the economy may be fairly benign, but there may be a significant risk of more severe adverse outcomes. In such circumstances, the central bank may prefer to take out insurance.” In other words, the Fed is preventing large and disruptive consequences of the current credit crisis in the economy. In emerging market economies the main risk is inflation, that is, the propagation of inflationary shocks to high and persistent inflation. Indeed, past experience shows that when  10  BIS Review 39/20086  inflation goes up there is an increase in indexation practices, which make inflationary shocks more persistent or more difficult to fight. In addition, the persistence of relatively high inflation is likely to diminish the degree to which expectations are anchored. On the one hand, inflation expectations may increase, making it costlier to bring it back down. On the other hand, medium and long term inflation expectations are likely to become more sensitive to shocks, introducing undesired volatility to the economy with the associated costs of said volatility.
Many worried that the prices of essentials would keep rising. And many people thought businesses were taking advantage of the inflationary environment to increase profits. People should not have to worry about inflation in this way. I am afraid monetary policy cannot make the shock to our national real income go away. But what monetary policy can – and must – do is to make sure that the inflation that has come to us from abroad does not become lasting inflation generated at home. Homemade inflation will not make us any better off as a country. Those with weak bargaining power will fall further behind. That is why we have increased Bank Rate. This works through the cost of living in a different way, of course: by increasing the cost of credit, including rates on many mortgages. As mortgagors gradually have to pay higher rates, say as exiting fixed-rate deals are replaced by new ones with higher rates, their money left over for spending on other things will fall. Page 10  Chart 4: Average-quoted rates on new mortgages have risen in 2022 Average-quoted rates on two-year fixed-rate mortgages  As this chart shows, new mortgage rates are materially higher than they were a year ago, though they have come down from the elevated levels we saw in the autumn. This means that about 1 in 10 households will see their mortgages go up this year.

It comes at an appropriate time because four years after the crisis, global imbalances remain unsustainably high. The sum of the current account balance (in absolute terms) of the major economies are projected to remain close to 2.5% of world GDP in the next few years. This is less than their pre-crisis peak (over 3% of world GDP), but still twice as high as in the early 1990s, before the acceleration in financial and real globalization. It is now of foremost importance to implement the Framework effectively, and to fully live up to the expectations that the G20 process raised internationally. The G20 Cannes Summit will provide a litmus test. Multilateral surveillance of domestic policies of systemic countries to ensure their orientation towards medium term stability and sustainability is being strengthened in the IMF as well. The recently conducted first round of IMF spillover reports, the Consolidated Multilateral Surveillance Report to the IMFC and the current triennial review of IMF surveillance can be seen as useful steps towards a broader and more comprehensive framework. 3. Strengthening governance in the euro area  The need to strengthen discipline is understood strongly on our side of the Atlantic, so that the euro area can do its part in contributing to global stability. The earlier economic governance framework has proved to be insufficiently binding while lacking appropriate comprehensiveness.
Finally, the procyclical leverage of financial intermediaries is tied to systemic risk, suggesting that the leverage of financial intermediaries is a key factor behind economy-wide financial crises. Once again, a potential “macroprudential” regulator – one that is attempting to reduce the risk of a financial crisis but also attempting to stabilize the macroeconomy – would face a risk-return tradeoff: Allowing a buildup in financial intermediary leverage as the economy grows can assist in achieving macroeconomic objectives such as full employment, but risks a more severe downturn if such leverage growth becomes excessive. Making those judgments is inherently difficult. The benefit of being a money issuer Society demands money for many purposes. Money provides a good way for people to store value safely, and it can be used as a means of exchange. These are classic and enduring features of money. For the purpose of this talk, by “money” I mean a broad definition of money – what some would call “money-like” assets that can provide the monetary functions of storing value and serving as a medium of exchange. Those include both short-term government debt and short-term borrowing by financial intermediaries, especially borrowing that is designed to be extremely safe, such as repurchase agreements, or repos. A repo is a fairly modern instrument that I’ll describe in a bit more detail, as repos played an important role in the buildup of intermediary leverage and the issuance of private-sector money-like instruments during the lead-up to the crisis of 2007–09.

In their model, banks fund illiquid assets with liabilities payable on demand and provide an important form of insurance for depositors. So long as the demand of depositors for currency withdrawals are relatively uncorrelated, the bank provides a safe place for housing one’s savings while earning a rate of return higher than that available to people simply by storing currency. However, coordination failure, such as an instance when everyone thinks that everyone else will withdraw their deposit today, can give rise to instability and lead to bank runs. That general theory has been extended in many ways. One of the lessons of that work is that deposit insurance (backed by the government’s money creation power) and discount window access can mitigate or even eliminate bank runs. So why did we experience a crisis in 2007, one in which we in the United States did not observe widespread instances of depositors lined up outside of their banks demanding currency?3 During the decades from 1933 to 2007, and especially since the rapid growth of the market intermediated financial system in the 1980s, the financial system in the United States has grown in complexity and in reliance on financial institutions that aren’t commercial banks. Those institutions intermediate corporate bond markets, money markets for short-term credit, stock markets in which firms can issue equity claims, and derivative markets. All of these markets rely on non-banks such as dealers, finance companies, insurers, and many other types of specialists.