samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is of course impossible to know how the payment market will look in 5-10 years’ time, but a qualified guess is that instant payments will become increasingly important. New payment products that are introduced can be settled immediately if the client so desires, for instance, through online banks, “point of sale” or e-commerce platforms. Many payments that are now cleared by batch clearing will probably move to instant settlement. For instance, since 2018 it has been possible to make payments by Swish to the Swedish Tax Agency. It is also conceivable that a mixture of batch-based and instant settlement may arise, where payments are settled individually but at predetermined points in time. In the long run, it is not improbable that some of the payments now made separately in RIX will move to other platforms that enable instant payments. It is clear at any rate that the taxonomy used for payments (large-value/retail, instant settlement/batch settlement and time-critical/not time-critical) will become more blurred. The Riksbank is standing at a crossroads here. Should the Riksbank continue to supply solely an infrastructure equivalent to RIX that is primarily suitable for largevalue, time-critical payments during office hours on weekdays and leave the other settlement of payments between financial institutions to the private sector? Or should the Riksbank also supply an infrastructure that enables settlement in central bank money in seconds 24/365? Or to put it a different way: Should the Riksbank's payment system be open all the time? Do we need a settlement service 24/365?

To make it easier for the participants to manage their liquidity, it will be possible to move liquidity within the RIX family from RIXRTGS to RIXINST and vice versa around the clock, which guarantees smooth and cheap settlement of payments.10 The aim is that an institution wishing to become a member of RIXRTGS will not need to be a member of RIXINST or vice versa. If we add the TIPS platform to RIX, it will thus be possible for financial institutions to settle payments in central bank money around the clock. How would TIPS affect the Swedish payment market? If the Riksbank decides to use TIPS to provide a settlement service 24/365, most private individuals and companies will not notice any difference in the short term. However, the institutions participating in RIXINST will need to adapt their message formats and processes to the regulatory framework applying for instant payments in large parts of the rest of Europe. As with all other harmonisation, there will be a balance between a possible need for tailor-made national solutions and the profits that can be reaped from full participation in the EU’s single market. Of course there may be advantages if a market “does its own thing”, but in the long run I believe that Sweden has a lot to gain in adapting to the rest of the EU in this respect. Sweden is ahead of its European neighbours in the journey towards a cashless society, and Swedish banks and FinTech companies are well-equipped to continue launching innovative payment services.
Let me point out first that neither the potential growth rate, resource utilisation nor the inflation propensity in a wide sense is something that can be measured directly. For some years now the Riksbank has been drawing attention to questions of this type, analysing them and presenting detailed accounts in the Inflation Report. Although we have mainly referred to various supply shocks as explanations for inflation’s relatively high rate in the past year, we have also drawn attention to other conceivable factors right from the start. In the Inflation Report last May, for example, we wrote: The risks for inflation connected with domestic demand and the relationship between growth and inflation in Sweden are somewhat more on the upside than foreseen in the March Report. The inflation forecast in the main scenario has admittedly been revised upwards in view of the unexpectedly high domestic inflation but this has been done mainly for the coming year. It is conceivable that the higher registered inflation is partly a sign that resource utilisation is more strained than assumed in the main scenario. (Inflation Report 2001:2, pp. 24–25) Some upward revision of resource utilisation is incorporated in the Inflation Report the Riksbank is presenting today. That was done partly because the underlying rate of price and wage increases has been moving gradually upwards for a time. This resembles our response, though with the opposite sign, when inflation repeatedly turned out to be a positive surprise in the late 1990s.

Indeed, throughout this period of high inflation, one of the bright spots is that various measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably well anchored and consistent with our 2 percent target.2  Imbalances Endure Our most important policy tool is the setting of the target range for the federal funds rate, which influences demand for goods and services by affecting borrowing costs. So far, tighter monetary policy from the Federal Reserve and central banks around the world is helping to bring a better balance between supply and demand. Inflation has declined in a number of sectors, particularly for many categories of commodities and goods. In addition, the supply-chain bottlenecks that had constrained the supply of goods have largely dissipated. For example, the New York Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has declined to a level that indicates supply pressures are now actually somewhat lower than normal.3 I hear the same from business leaders from around the Federal Reserve's Second District, who confirm that supply chains have improved considerably. At the same time, data on rents for new leases provide early signs of slowing inflation for shelter. This is important because shelter inflation had been a significant driver of higher inflation over the past year. However, despite the moderation of inflation, imbalances endure, with overall demand still exceeding supply in the economy. This is seen in the inflation rate for core services excluding housing, which has been running around 4-1/2 percent since last August.
More detailed material on both has been published this morning on our website. 10 In the rest of my remarks today, I want to take stock of progress so far, and explain how our new initiatives will work. Progress in sterling markets: derivatives instruments  As this ISDA audience will know well, by far the largest sterling LIBOR exposures come from derivatives positions – and progress here has been good. Swaps account for the lion’s share of sterling derivatives, by notional value – and last year approximately half of new cleared sterling swaps referenced SONIA. That’s some £ trillion a month. That ratio rose to more than two-thirds in January this year, amidst a sharp rise in trading of expectations on the outcome of that month’s monetary policy decision (Figure 2). That demonstrates the depth of liquidity in the market to absorb additional interest. But we can’t rest on our laurels – SONIA usage still needs to be higher. For some time there has been a sense that progress could be accelerated if a way could be found to overcome the potential ‘first mover’ challenge for intermediaries otherwise keen to switch. For that reason, and following consultation with the industry, the Bank and FCA have strongly encouraged market makers to use SONIA as the standard reference rate for sterling interest rate swaps from 2 March 2020 – that’s next Monday. From then, market makers should consider SONIA first.

An important movement in the last decade has been a much more explicit emphasis being given to the macro prudential aspects of banking supervision by central banks as well as academics and other market observers. What do we mean by macro prudential aspects? I think it has the following four features: •  First, its aims to limit the distress to entire financial systems rather than distress to individual institutions. •  Second, its chief aim is to avoid large and burdensome costs to the economy – such as expensive bank bailouts – rather than aiming to protect more narrowly the depositors of an individual bank. •  Third, it is based largely on the assumption that at least some of the risks faced by the banking system collectively differ from those faced by individual banks. In other words, the risk to the system is not simply the sum of risks to individual banks. •  And, fourth, it aims to examine risks that arise from the interaction of banks as part of a financial system rather than on a bank-by-bank basis. While having sound and sturdy building blocks of the system is essential, it is also essential to understand how they all fit together in a framework and this is where the macro prudential perspective becomes critical. In short, the difference between the two pillars of micro and macro prudential surveillance is between a system-wide health check and ensuring that individual banks are inoculated  BIS Review 106/2006  1  properly from disease.
I am the vice-chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the Fed committee that sets monetary policy to promote its statutory goals of full employment and price stability. Last week, the committee reaffirmed that it currently anticipates that the Federal Reserve’s federal funds rate target will remain exceptionally low – which I understand to mean at its current level – at least through late 2014. The FOMC also voted to provide additional support for economic activity by extending its maturity extension program – popularly referred to as Operation Twist – through the end of the year. This extension means that we will be buying an additional $ billion of longer term Treasury securities, paid for by selling or redeeming the same amount of shorter term Treasuries. This action reduces the supply of longer dated Treasury securities on the market and lowers longer term interest rates relative to where they would otherwise be in the absence of such a program. That puts downward pressure on corporate borrowing costs and mortgage rates, and supports asset prices such as housing and equities – all of which promotes growth. In addition, the FOMC adopted new language to describe its policy outlook, stating that it is “prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.” I will let those words speak for themselves. Local economic conditions Now let me turn to economic conditions in Puerto Rico.

Thanks to deregulation, more Swedes have been able to borrow at a reasonable rate of interest, making it possible for a larger number of people to own their own homes and to better distribute their consumption over their lives. In this respect developments in Sweden have largely followed those in the US and the UK. Of course such deregulation - or rather reregulation - is not problem-free. The fact that a greater number have the opportunity to borrow also implies increased risks in the financial system. But in the absence of risks, growth opportunities also decrease. The important thing therefore is that the risks can be managed in the event of a crisis, which, for instance, requires strong consumer protection. Here Sweden has also been at the fore by being the first to publish regular stability reports for the financial sector, with a view to avoiding any reoccurrence of a systemic collapse similar to that at the beginning of the 1990s. There are now signs on the Continent that the pace of financial market reform has increased. This is partly because the EU Member States, as a part of the Lisbon strategy, have agreed to implement the Financial Services Action Plan. Only last week new steps were taken to harmonise securities trading between the EU Member States through the signing of the Investment Services Directive. This affords both private investors and institutions greater opportunities to trade on exchanges other than those in their own country.
On my flight home from Zurich, I read about a bank with compliance failures; however, I have to say that as a whole, the Mexican banking system is quite healthy. Bank profits rose in 2013 and Mexican banks are well-capitalized, with an aggregate capital ratio of 16 percent as of year-end 2013. While four small banks failed year-end stress tests by the Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) and were asked to boost capital and diversify their portfolios, it was also the first year the regulator fully implemented the stringent Basel III capital rules. The share of nonperforming loans rose slightly; among commercial loans, this was partly due to changes in the accounting methodology, so it cannot fully be attributed to deteriorating credit quality. I am convinced that the biggest problem facing Mexico is not too much credit, but too little. That’s why the recently implemented financial reform is so important; that’s why its core objective is to boost credit. Another advantage that Mexico has is plentiful foreign exchange reserves, about $ billion, and a $ billion standing line of credit with the IMF. Mexico has been amassing more foreign exchange reserves as other emerging market nations have seen them dwindle. While excess liquidity from the U.S. has found its way to all emerging markets, there is a palpable investor commitment to Mexico that sets it apart from the rest. At over $ billion, 2013 was a record year for foreign direct investment in Mexico.

Richard W Fisher: ¡Ándale Pues! Having made the tough choices, Mexico stands to benefit from reforms and navigate Fed’s tapering with relative ease Remarks by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, before the Association of Mexican banks, Mexico City, 5 March 2014. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Thank you, Luis [Robles], for that kind introduction. It is my great pleasure to be here tonight as the guest of the Association of Mexican Banks and reunited with my colleagues from Banco de México. I recently returned from Europe, where I met with leaders from the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Switzerland. I am very grateful to Governor Agustín Carstens for his hospitality. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has enjoyed a long history of cooperation and consultation with the Banco de México. I like to call Banxico our sister bank. Agustín himself spent some time at the Dallas Fed when he was a young man, and we take pride in playing this small part in his accomplished career. For many years, the Dallas Fed’s El Paso Branch has held joint board meetings and informational exchanges with the Banco de México regional board of directors in Ciudad Juárez. Now our branches in Houston and San Antonio are holding similar joint meetings with their Banco de México counterparts.
Activity in the economy will be boosted by strong growth in government spending. The projections are based on the assumption that Norges Bank’s interest rate changes will translate into lower lending rates for households and businesses. At the same time, owing to tighter credit standards in banks, monetary policy appears to be somewhat less effective than normal. Inflation is projected to fall below 2 per cent in 2010, before gradually moving up towards the target towards the end of the projection period as the output gap gradually closes. There is a risk that the structural changes brought about by the crisis may result in persistently lower productivity growth and perhaps higher unemployment. It appears that inflation will remain considerably lower in the years ahead than we expected in December. Both the objective of stabilising inflation around the target and the objective of ensuring stable developments in the real economy suggest that the interest rate should be low. Financial architecture In many countries, banks’ share of GDP has increased considerably over the past few years. This share is smaller in Norway than in other countries and, as a result, the Norwegian economy has been less exposed to the financial crisis. Although banks in Norway have not been as oversized as in many other countries, banking still contributes to fluctuations in our real economy. 4  BIS Review 42/2009  Banking is procyclical. In upturns, loan losses are low, increasing banks’ profits. Access to equity capital is ample, providing the basis for strong lending growth.

In the EU countries that are not using the euro, the effects from monetary conditions in the euro area led to improving macroeconomic environment, loosening financing conditions, and high bank liquidity. That stimulated lending and, in turn, the increase in residential property prices. However, these developments also increased cyclical risks. The Bulgarian National Bank conducted research into Bulgaria’s financial cycle. Our findings showed that we are currently in an upward phase of cyclical risk accumulation. Hence, we activated and then raised the rate of the countercyclical capital buffer. We have so far taken two decisions. In 2018, we set the countercyclical capital buffer rate applicable to credit risk exposures in Bulgaria at 0.5%, with effect from October 1 2019. In early 2019 we raised the rate to 1.0%, with effect from April 1 2020. The rate is applied to the overall credit stock of banks and not to the volume of newly issued loans. We announced that we could increase the rate to a higher level earlier if credit growth significantly accelerates. Our decisions were taken despite the fact that the standard metric of how the credit-to-GDP ratio deviates from its long-term trend remained deep in negative territory. Furthermore, we strengthened the macroprudential powers of the Bulgarian National Bank. The key element here was the introduction into Bulgarian law of a framework of borrower-based measures – requirements such as loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) – in addition to the existing capital-based measures.
•  In lending against a wide class of collateral, the central bank must apply appropriate haircuts, and must be capable of valuing the assets and of managing them in the event of a counterparty default. Our haircuts are published and include various addons for particular risks. And the underlying assets accepted as collateral should have a viable underlying market. BIS Review 144/2009  1  •  As a means of effecting the delivery of insurance, secured loans (repo or collateral swaps) are preferable in most circumstances to outright purchases, as during the life of a loan central banks can update the value of the security, the collateral margins and other terms that control the risk to them. •  Such lending against wider collateral should routinely be for sufficiently long maturities to help forestall panic by avoiding rollover risk for the firms without exposing central banks to risk by tying them in for unduly long periods. •  Permanent facilities providing bilateral liquidity insurance should routinely be made available only to commercial banks (and other authorised deposit takers). They unavoidably need such insurance because their deposit liabilities are money, giving them a vital role, as monetary institutions, in the economy and financial system. •  But such public facilities should not be available to banks where in the judgment of the central bank there are serious question-marks over their viability or solvency. (As I shall discuss later, that need not exhaust our menu for providing liquidity to individual firms in support operations.

Dimitar Radev: Crisis management framework in Bulgaria Summary of statement by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the annual meeting of governors and other central bank representatives from the countries of the Dutch-Belgian constituency of the IMF, organised by the National Bank of Belgium, Brussels, 24 February 2017. * * * The closure of the fourth largest bank in Bulgaria in 2014 put to the test the country’s financial stability. This incident revealed, among other things, serious limitations in our crisis management arrangements in the banking area and, more specifically, the lack of a proper institutional framework to deal with resolution of systemically important banks. Our policy response to the 2014 crisis was incorporated in an 18-month plan adopted in mid2015, defining concrete actions in three priority areas: An independent assessment of: (1) the banks in Bulgaria (through an AQR and stress tests that were completed in 2016), and (2) our crisis management framework (through a still ongoing financial sector assessment, FSAP, by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank); A comprehensive reform of the Central Bank’s banking supervision and regulation framework and practices, based on the Basel Core Principles (BCP); Introducing the BNB’s new bank resolution functions compliant with the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The implementation of the plan helped build sound foundations for our crisis management framework.
Therefore, it is in the interest of all stakeholders to migrate quickly to the SEPA instruments. So what will make industry and/or customers stop using the old products and switch to SEPA? A SEPA migration end-date for credit transfers and for direct debits would make clear that migration cannot take forever. The European Commission in collaboration with the  6  4  ECB, SCT Indicators (see http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/sepa/timeline/use/html/index.en.html). BIS Review 151/2009  Eurosystem is, therefore, investigating the possibility of a Regulation to facilitate the migration to SEPA. The Eurosystem considers a legally binding instrument necessary for a successful migration to SEPA and hence fully supports such regulation. I also see a lot of support for this way forward in the market. Therefore, we should continue our efforts in setting a realistic but ambitious end-date for migration to SCT and SDD to reap the full benefits of SEPA. Conclusion Let me conclude. SEPA is not just about making life easier for European citizens and companies by removing obstacles to cross-border payments. SEPA is also about removing barriers to the single market, making payments more efficient, introducing more competition to the payments industry and speeding up innovation. Hence, rapid SEPA migration would bring tremendous benefits to the European economy as a whole. The single market for goods and services – created with the Maastricht Treaty 16 years ago – now needs a single market for financial services.

On a conceptual level, digitalization is blurring the frontier between the market and informal economy, and leading to the development of “C to C” services; for example, many of us now directly buy our holidays on-line. This disintermediation of services has been accompanied by a significant improvement in their quantity and quality. Yet, travel services are now in large part ‘home production’, and the measured market value added of travel agency services is declining. On a practical level, with the rise of digitalization, new kinds of services can be imported, notably through e-trade, and the location of activities is less easy to determine. Moreover, the fact that 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  these services are not standardized and evolve quickly makes it more difficult to estimate the deflator for service output in national accounting. The concern over output mismeasurement is therefore serious. Yet mismeasurement alone cannot explain all of the slowdown, as it did not suddenly appear in the mid-2000s. 2. Is it also a demand phenomenon? I am very much inclined to say it is. Negative demand shocks are particularly pernicious when interest rates are already low, as there is limited room to spur demand by cutting interest rates. In central banking jargon, we say that short-term interest rates cannot be reduced to the “natural rate”, which is the level where demand equates to potential output and inflation is stabilized.