samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Preliminary indications are that the majority of the banks were ready for the installation of the RTGS application software on 29 March 2004. The installation of the software is being done in a phased manner, i.e. on first-ready-first installed basis. This is to ensure that the project schedule is not held back unnecessarily. •  It is also important to remind all banks that every bank is required to comply with the minimum technical infrastructure specifications for both the Perago RTGS client configuration and SWIFT connectivity prior to the installation of the application software. This will enable timely installation of the Perago RTGS application software, bilateral key exchange (BKE) for SWIFT connectivity and commencement of the pilot project. RTGS training for commercial bank staff •  The RTGS training facilities have been installed, tested and are currently running in the Bank of Zambia In-Service Training Centre. Training for the Bank of Zambia staff has been finalised. Training for commercial bank staff is scheduled to commence on 16 April 2004. This training will involve Perago RTGS Server Applications Technical Operations Training for  6  BIS Review 27/2004  the IT area staff and Perago RTGS Entry training for the business area staff. This programme covers training for transaction capturers, authorisers, and systems administrators and operators. •  As earlier communicated to commercial banks, a number of training sessions have been devised because the training facilities can only accommodate 12 participants at a time.

Update on the microfinance regulations •  The draft microfinance regulations, which are aimed at providing a legal framework for regulation and supervision of microfinance institutions, are currently being reviewed by the BoZ and are scheduled to be submitted to the Minister of Finance and National Planning during the second quarter of 2004. Polymer notes •  As most of you must have heard, through the media, there are public concerns about some features fading on the polymer banknotes of K500 and K1,000. While we have also noticed a number of them, we wish to inform you that fading is a definite and expected feature of these notes as they approach the end of their useful life. However, we also feel that being a new concept, the notes could still be subjected to undue stress testing due to public curiosity. However, we are also not ruling out premature wearing of the notes. We are therefore doing everything possible to ensure that subsequent consignments do not suffer similar setbacks. In the meantime, we wish to make an earnest appeal to all the banks to assist the Bank of Zambia in ensuring that faded notes are quickly taken out of circulation, in the same way as soiled banknotes have been handled in the past. The Bank of Zambia is also going to set up mechanisms for enhancing the process and pace of siphoning faded notes from circulation.
Koh Yong Guan: The economic outlook and monetary policy in Singapore  Statement by Mr Koh Yong Guan, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, delivered at the MAS Annual Report 1999/2000 Media Conference in Singapore on 27 July 2000. *  *  *  Introduction We have had an eventful year as we supported Singapore’s recovery from the Asian crisis and persisted in our efforts to liberalise the financial sector. The economy turned in an impressive performance in 1999 compared with the year before, showing clear signals that we have emerged from the crisis. Having weathered the crisis, the economy is now more resilient and better prepared for external shocks. Let me first highlight some pertinent points on our outlook for the domestic economy as well as our monetary policy stance. The economic outlook and monetary policy In July last year, MAS had noted that the Singapore economy was picking up faster than expected, although recovery had not extended to all sectors. Manufacturing had posted strong growth in the first half of 1999, but construction, commerce, and most financial services remained weak. The economy was still operating below potential, and the inflation outlook was benign. MAS therefore took a neutral exchange rate policy stance, to reinforce the government’s cost reduction measures and facilitate economic recovery. The trade-weighted $ remained roughly unchanged over the past year, fluctuating within its usual band, although the $ bilateral exchange rates varied significantly against individual major currencies on account of volatility in the global currency markets.

Professor John Taylor, currently a Treasury under-secretary in the Bush Administration, has formulated a simple rule for interest setting that has come to be named after him and been widely recognised. With the Taylor rule, the instrumental rate varies around an equilibrium rate with a correction for actual inflation’s relationship to targeted inflation and resource utilisation (GDP growth’s divergence from an estimated trend). Given that the economy is in equilibrium, inflation is 2 per cent and the output gap is zero, in Taylor’s version of the rule for the United States the nominal instrumental rate is 4 per cent. Divergences in resource utilisation or inflation prompt the central bank to raise or lower the instrumental rate, depending on the size and direction of the deviations. The Taylor rule is popular for several reasons; besides being relatively simple, it seems to give a relatively good account of monetary policy in many different countries. In that way it has contributed to a better understanding of how monetary policy is conducted. To date, however, no central bank has explicitly stated that it has chosen to base its monetary policy on the type of rule John Taylor advocates. BIS Review 24/2002  3  One result that a money supply target and the Taylor rule have in common is that monetary policy’s responses to the various shocks to which an economy is constantly being exposed are systematic and predictable.
Banking services should be provided in accordance with the clients’ financial literacy, in any case highlighting, the benefits and the risks that customers may incur as they use your bank products. In the context of its role as the supervisory and regulatory authority of banking operations, the Bank of Albania will continue to carefully monitor and address the challenges facing this  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  activity. Our regulatory framework and supervisory and operational activities will be adapted to provide all the necessary support for the banking activity to be safe and have multiple benefits for the banking industry, customers, and the economy in general. The professional and continuous communication with you will be at the basis of our activity, to identify together the best solutions that address your needs and those of other interest groups. Dear bank managers, In conclusion, I would like to bring to your attention one of the biggest lessons learned from the crisis of the latest global financial system, which I think remains applicable for Albania: concentration on short-term time horizons is counterproductive to both individual financial institutions that engage in them, and the overall financial system and economy of a country. In this context, I invite you all to be farsighted in your analyses and decision-making processes with regard to the future of the economy of Albania and its banking industry.

If the increase in oil prices is sustained, the expected decline in annual HICP inflation rates to below 2% later in the spring could be less pronounced – and inflation rates during 2002 could turn out to be somewhat higher – than we expected in late 2001. Beyond the shorter term, in the light of current expectations of a gradual economic recovery in the euro area, upward pressure on prices from aggregate demand should remain contained. However, this outlook for inflation is fundamentally dependent on continued wage moderation. In this respect, there is some cause for concern with regard to ongoing wage negotiations. The economic downturn in the euro area in 2001 also presented challenges for fiscal policy. Since some countries came close to the 3% limit for the deficit to GDP ratio, the experience of 2001 clearly  2  BIS Review 26/2002  demonstrated the need for all countries to undertake consolidation efforts in good time to ensure a fiscal position close to balance or in surplus before the start of a downturn. In order to prevent problems like those experienced last year from recurring in the future, it is vital that the commitments made to achieving balanced budgets by 2003-04 be firmly followed up in the Member States concerned. Finally, I would like to highlight the need for structural reforms aimed at improving the functioning of product and financial markets. If implemented vigorously, these reforms can increase euro area growth potential and employment on a sustainable basis.
My concerns arise from the fact that, while during the first G20 summit meetings, there was widespread consensus on the necessity of ensuring that no segments of the financial system are left outside the scope of the regulatory framework, over time, this resolve has dwindled and attention has mainly been focused on banks. Given the interconnectedness of markets, it is essential that investment banks, hedge funds and other institutions are also subject to adequate regulation. In particular, the supervisory authorities must have adequate information on the activities of these institutions in order to be able to evaluate vulnerabilities and possible contagion effects. The second line of action relates to the strengthening of the supervisory authorities, beginning with their independence. Only institutions independent not only of political authorities but also of market participants can have the clarity and the power to take measures to reduce the cyclicality of credit and financial activities. There are, therefore, concerns regarding the developments in the current  15  See, for instance, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, “Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector”, December 2009. 16  For example, in September 2008 the ECB announced higher transparency requirements, including the need for regular surveillance reports by rating agencies. In early 2009 it increased the rating requirement for newly issued ABSs to AAA at issuance and discontinued the acceptance of double-layer securitisations. In November 2009 it announced the eligibility requirement that, as of 1 March 2010, at least two ratings must comply with the minimum rating threshold applicable to ABSs.

I would like to convey my sympathy to our colleagues of the IFS, 10  who had the opportunity to work in close collaboration with him, and to the academic community in general for this loss. Finally, let me express my gratitude to the organisers for making this conference possible and to all of you for attending. I wish you a very productive meeting and a pleasant stay in Madrid. Thank you very much for your attention. 11
The case for “transparency about transparency” is the case for honesty in economic policy. Some progress has been made. Pilot transparency reports on the UK and Argentina have been produced by IMF staff. Other pilot reports are to come. Australia has published a self-assessment transparency report. The need now is to make the production of Transparency Reports an integral part of the Article IV process. There is no reason for further delay. Transparency Reports should always be published. I very much hope that the IMF will make rapid progress towards the regular production and publication of Transparency Reports on each country. This practical measure could do a great deal to enhance the performance of all economic actors involved in the international capital market. 6. Conclusions  Unrestricted capital mobility and the absence of an ILOLR are not a recipe for a stable international financial system. Short-term interbank flows are the Achilles heel of present arrangements, leading to both currency and maturity mismatches. Throw in a predilection of emerging markets for pegged exchange rates and you have a dangerous cocktail. Purist solutions – whether of an ILOLR or a return to permanent capital controls – are, for good reasons, unlikely to be pursued. What is needed now are some practical steps forward. Central to any such programme is the need to monitor and manage the national balance BIS Review 95/1999  8  sheet. The objective cannot be to eliminate the risk of financial crises. The middle way will not do that.

Figures from the Institute of International Finance suggest that the same picture is true for a larger group of emerging markets, with 81% of the decline in private net capital flows to the 29 most important emerging market economies accounted for by bank lending. Liquidity runs, although not the sole cause of problems, did play a major part in recent financial crises. Such runs reflect mismatches in the national balance sheet. Such mismatches can occur in either the public or private sectors. Examples of the former are Mexico and Argentina in 1994, where short-term official dollar denominated debt exceeded foreign exchange reserves. Examples of the latter are Thailand, Korea and Indonesia in 1997, where the private sector had borrowed short in order to lend long. Either maturity or currency mismatches create the potential for sudden reversals of capital flows on a huge scale. In the technical jargon, such markets are subject to multiple equilibria where a small event can cause a shift from one benign equilibrium state to another which is accompanied by rapid capital outflows. The possibility of a rapid shift from one equilibrium to another explains, in the words of Maurice Obstfeld, “why capital markets can appear to impose too little discipline before the crises arise, and too harsh a discipline afterwards”.3 If this diagnosis is correct, two observations follow. First, capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment should be encouraged.
Financial institutions can and must assert the much needed leadership in a world where the continued neglect of equitable development and a rapidly deteriorating environment is displacing communities, raising social and political tensions, and putting future generations at grave risk. Finance still holds the trust of society and substantial influence over economic agents. But this is a privilege earned, and demands that financial institutions behave ethically, and act in the best interest of the communities they serve. The role of technology to revolutionise finance There is no question that technology will lie at the very heart of these imperatives for the financial system. This has been true for decades, only the order of its impact is now, arguably much greater. After all, the world’s first ATM in 1967 transformed the relationship between people and money and making finance more accessible. Today, fintech signals the next phase in the transformation of finance. Fintech holds enormous potential to enhance competition, increase productivity, address unfulfilled consumer demand and fundamentally change the way institutions provide financial 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  services – in ways we may not even have fully discovered. Similarly for Islamic finance, adoption of technology could present significant opportunities to reduce the cost of financial intermediation and expand access. For example, distributed ledger technology could enable automated execution of contracts through the use of digital protocols, or smart contracts, which can simplify complex Shariah contractual processes.

Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus: Shifting tides - future of finance Opening remarks by Ms Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the MyFintech Week 2019 "Shifting Tides: Future of Finance", Kuala Lumpur, 17 June 2019. * * * I would like to welcome all of you to the inaugural MyFintech Week and Financial Industry Conference hosted by Bank Negara Malaysia. This event is being held at a time that brings together two important mileposts for the Malaysian financial services industry - the beginnings of an exciting era of digitalisation and a new chapter in the development of the financial sector as the current Financial Sector Blueprint approaches the end of its horizon in 2020. "Shifting tides: Future of finance" was deliberately chosen as the theme of the event for a reason. For much of history, human civilisation could not reasonably explain how ocean tides occurred. It was only through the discovery by Sir Issac Newton and the dedication of scientists over many centuries that we are able to understand it today. Like ocean tides, the future of finance may be hard to fathom at the beginning. Yet it offers many opportunities and risks. Perhaps most importantly, it also underscores the heavy responsibility and ownership that we collectively bear to build a financial system that is safe, reliable and truly serves the needs of the people. In my remarks today, I will discuss what this entails in order to develop a financial system for all Malaysians.
The Riksbank’s intellectual framework According to the textbook model of macro economics, there is a level of production (GDP) that keeps the economy in balance, i.e. actual and expected inflation are in line with the target level, profit shares and wages are stable, etc. This level of production is often called the potential or long-term sustainable level of production. Despite the fact that the economy is balanced, the potential production level does not remain constant; it normally grows over time. The reason is, quite simply, that technical developments enable a higher production level to be achieved with the same amount of production factors, and that the production factors themselves often show an increase trend. The actual inflation rate can deviate from the target rate (and the expected rate) if the production level of the economy, for some reason, deviates from the potential level. It is often said that there is a positive or a negative production gap. A positive production gap means that the actual production is higher than the potential level. In this case, of course, the resource situation is strained; bottlenecks begin to arise in the economy. The reverse applies with a negative production gap. As the production gap is usually seen as a measure of the demand pressure in the economy and the demand pressure in turn affects inflation, monetary policy is in many respects a case of choosing a steering interest rate that will lead to the smallest possible production gap.

In fact, G20 members last month, endorsed the implementation of AEOI and promised to do so by end-2018. The AEOI Standard requires financial institutions in one jurisdiction, with customers who are tax  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  resident in another jurisdiction, to automatically provide the tax-relevant customer information on a regular basis, to the customers’ home tax authorities. Singapore’s approach to enhanced tax transparency 21. The global trend on enhanced tax transparency is in line with Singapore’s commitment to combat cross-border tax offences, in order to protect our integrity and reputation as an international financial centre. We have taken several significant steps to strengthen our EOI framework, such as entering into international agreements and making the relevant legislative amendments to facilitate international cooperation. 22. In May, Singapore joined the G20, EU, OECD member jurisdictions as well as other financial centres in endorsing the OECD’s “Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information In Tax Matters”. Endorsing this Declaration demonstrates Singapore’s commitment towards enhancing international tax compliance. This Declaration is consistent with our principles for AEOI: (i)  Firstly, implementation must be done under a robust framework of law so as to maintain confidentiality and legitimate use of information exchanged;  (ii)  Secondly, there must be reciprocity in terms of the scope of information exchanged between jurisdictions; and  (iii)  Thirdly, AEOI must be endorsed and implemented among all financial centres to provide a level playing field. 23.
Page 3/8  Zurich, 22 June 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  The renewed increase in our policy rate is therefore necessary to bring inflation back to the range consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis over the medium term. We cannot at this stage rule out the necessity of further monetary policy tightening to achieve this objective. It is also important in this regard that the ample liquidity assistance we provided to Credit Suisse in March does not influence our monetary policy stance. My colleague Andréa Maechler will address this specifically when she sets out how we implemented our monetary policy over the past quarter. Allow me to return briefly to the subject of rents. Policy rate increases lead to a rise in mortgage rates and thus also in the reference interest rate for rents. This makes it possible for some rents to be increased, which can in turn temporarily result in higher overall inflation. However, this feedback effect must not be taken as a reason for refraining from necessary policy rate increases. For without a more restrictive monetary policy, there would be a danger of inflation becoming entrenched and much stronger rate increases being required in the future. Today’s further tightening of our monetary policy is therefore also appropriate from this perspective. Ladies and gentlemen, I now hand over to Martin Schlegel. The SNB published its latest Financial Stability Report this morning. I would like to present the main points to you now.

At this late stage in the crisis, they thus played an important role in the package of measures. AT1 capital instruments actually contain specific features that are intended to absorb losses in the early stages of a crisis so that a bank can stabilise its situation through its own efforts. However, these features were not applied. In particular, Credit Suisse refrained from cancelling interest payments on these instruments despite incurring losses over a prolonged period of time. Such a measure would have provided immediate financial relief for the bank. At the same time, however, Credit Suisse would have exposed itself to the risk of negative market reactions – and thus also to the risk that refinancing would have become even more difficult and expensive. Third, customers withdrew deposits at an extremely rapid rate, especially last October, and then in particular in March of this year. Credit Suisse’s liquidity buffers were still able to cover the considerable outflows in October. In mid-March, however, its liquidity was no longer sufficient to cover the exceptionally rapid outflows. A contributory factor in this regard was that a significant portion of the liquidity held was needed for operational purposes. In addition, the collateral prepared by Credit Suisse was insufficient to cover the outflows using the SNB’s existing liquidity facilities. The liquidity assistance made available on the basis of emergency law, ELA+, thus created the necessary time window until a comprehensive solution to the crisis of confidence could be worked out.