samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The picture you get is of successive upwards revisions to inflation and successive downwards revisions to growth, with the energy price shock the principal driver of both (Chart 7). By the time of the August 2022 MPR, the MPC was forecasting a recession starting in the current quarter and lasting throughout 2023, with a peak to trough fall of GDP of 2.1%. But because the fiscal and financial markets shocks post-date the most recent forecast it wouldn’t make sense to extrapolate this trend of forecast revisions forward as a starting point for our November forecasts. Chart 7: MPC’s inflation forecasts and MPC’s annual GDP growth forecasts  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. In the August MPR we had already noted that that the risks around our projections from both external and domestic factors were exceptionally large, given the very large rise in wholesale gas prices and the consequent impacts on real incomes for households and on inflation. The MPC’s initial assessment of the Energy Price Guarantee, first made at the time of the September MPC, is that it will significantly reduce the degree of uncertainty around the outlook for UK retail energy prices over the period of the Guarantee and therefore also for CPI inflation. As a result the Guarantee means that CPI inflation is expected to rise by less in the near term, peaking at a little under 11% in October, lowering and bringing forward the expected peak in inflation, relative to the MPC’s August forecast.

These include most notably a lack of funds for saving, cost, distance from the nearest branch, a lack of education and the absence of the financial infrastructures needed to improve the availability of financial services. It is indeed here where new technologies can contribute decisively to overcoming or lowering these barriers. Technology can reduce many fixed costs, traditionally associated with the development of financial services, while providing for a greater adaptation of supply on the basis of each society’s idiosyncratic characteristics. Unsurprisingly, then, the technological proposals linked to financial inclusion hail from different areas. We can find them in traditional financial institutions, in the new fintech companies, in telecommunications corporations and in the large technology consortiums known as bigtech. As to scope, one of the activities concentrating the bulk of the initiatives is payments. Thus, in the past decade we have seen so-called mobile money – i.e. transactional services offered mainly by mobile operators – become commonplace. Adding to these, more recently digital wallet solutions have emerged with multiple functionalities and specific proposals for international remittances. Aside from the progress in payment solutions, developments on intermediation markets are providing for improvements in the financing of those groups with a greater degree of financial exclusion, such as microenterprises and small agricultural producers. However, these developments are not spontaneous or uniform from one country to another.
Therefore, a more appropriate solution would be for them to be able to transfer the ownership of their assets in exchange for debt repayment with the option to repurchase those assets back at a later date. As such, this scheme will remove debt burdens that would incur otherwise if they still have to hold onto the assets and loans. These examples provide some concrete illustrations of how we, at the Bank of Thailand, have tried to respond flexibly and pragmatically to the changing circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis. Part 3: Future Plans Let me now turn to the third part of my remarks today, which is what is next? One thing that we would like to do is a move from short-term and blanket measures such as a debt moratorium to longer-term and more targeted solutions such as debt restructuring. Moratoria are good responses to something that is short, severe and broad. However, as we have seen in discussing the economic outlook, this crisis is likely to be long. The recovery is likely to be very uneven, thereby requiring a longer-term and more targeted approach. Hence, we would like to encourage a move from a solution of having debt moratoria in response to waves of infections that are causing a lockdown to more lasting solutions such as debt restructuring. On this light, we have recently announced a series of initiatives and regulatory incentives to encourage banks to undertake debt restructuring, which is important as a lasting solution to the problems that we are facing.

As they stand, the current technical proposals put forward for consultation by the Basel Committee do not respect this commitment: they must therefore be revisited. Second, we should be careful not to oversimplify the regulatory framework and loose the risk sensitivity. Adjustments to the internal models approach should not amount to imposing the standard approach on all, either explicitly, or implicitly by applying poorly calibrated “output floors”. *** Let me conclude with some words on the strengths of the Paris financial centre itself: robust banks and insurance companies, a dynamic asset management industry, strong financial market infrastructures, a highly skilled labour force. And you can be assured of three points: 1. First, French authorities, including the Banque de France, attach utmost importance to making sure Paris is one of Europe’s strongest financial centres. This is crucial for employment, for investment, as well as for the strength of the euro area economy as a whole. 2. In addition, we are already making every effort to build an innovation ecosystem: through the recent and efficient ACPR-AMF cooperation on FinTechs; through our support for the development of new tools – such as ESNI on securitization and Euro GC+ on repos, or our upcoming project to test interbanking information sharing processes based on blockchain technology; and also through our partnerships with many French universities renowned for their excellence and their Masters in Finance. 3.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  23  Table 1: Approximate number of estimated parameters for a typical large international bank(a)(b) Probability of default  Loss given default  Number of models  Range of parameters  Retail mortgages  10–15  10–15  40  400–600  Credit cards  10–15  3  15  100–140  SME retail  10–15  3  6  40–50  Wholesale  5–15  5–15  100  500–1500  SME corporate  5–15  5–15  2  10–30  (a) Number of parameters required to determine credit risk capital charges under the internal ratings-based approach. (b) The number of parameters used to estimate PD and LGD, as well as the number of models used for each portfolio, have been estimated based on a large representative UK bank, so they are a broad approximation only. To calculate the range of total parameters we have assumed that half the models are used to estimate PD and the other half are used to estimate LGD. Table 2: Risk-based capital versus leverage for major global banks Variable  Model 1  Leverage ratio  –0.37 *** (0.13)  Risk-based capital ratio  Model 2  Model 3  –0.16 (0.11)  –0.35*** (0.13) –0.07 (0.11)  Notes: For all models, the dependent variable is “failure”. Standard errors are shown in brackets.

Although their profitability continued to decline in the first half of 2020, this development was driven by a further narrowing of the interest rate margin. There has been hardly any increase in value adjustments and write-downs. Moreover, domestically focused banks are not reporting any significant rise in impaired loans at present. Despite the  Page 2/4  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  economic downturn, mortgage lending volume and residential property prices have also continued to increase over the last six months. However, this does not mean that domestically focused banks will remain unaffected by the economic consequences of the pandemic. Experience shows that there is typically a lag before the impacts of recessions on banks become evident. In the baseline scenario, the profitability of domestically focused banks is likely to come under further pressure. First, the anticipated deterioration in credit quality is expected to lead to increased value adjustments and write-downs on loans to Swiss companies. Second, the interest margin is expected to narrow further due to the persistent low interest rate environment. While domestically focused banks should remain profitable in aggregate, against this background, some of them are expected to incur losses. Uncertainty about the future course of the coronavirus pandemic remains high. In this context, the increased vulnerability of the domestic mortgage and residential real estate markets presents an additional risk factor for the banks.
It is inevitable that economic growth needs to slow down to bring aggregate demand and supply back into balance. The risk of the major advanced economies entering a recession in 2023 is high. The latest Consensus Forecasts has US and Eurozone GDP growth for 2023 coming in at 0.5% or less. Two recent polls by Bloomberg place the probability of recession in the US and the Eurozone in the next 12 months at 50% and 80% respectively. The Asia-Pacific economies are at lower risk of a recession but they will see a spill-over from the broader global slowdown. Exports from the region are already declining. The key question is: how deep and prolonged will the downturn be? That will depend on how high and persistent inflation is. For if inflation turns out to be stubborn, central banks will have to tighten monetary policy more and for longer than currently anticipated by markets. The good scenario is a short and shallow downturn, maybe even a technical recession – a “soft landing”. What are the signs of hope? First, output gaps in the major economies are relatively modest and bringing aggregate demand and supply into balance may not require much more policy tightening. Second, the recent moderation in global food and energy prices will help to ease overall inflationary pressures and help to prevent inflation expectations from rising. In fact, long-term inflation expectations appear to be well anchored.

Ardian Fullani: Cooling down the liquidity situation in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 6th Vienna Economic Forum, Regional Cooperation – Challenges and Chances: "20 Years after the fall of the Iron Curtain", Vienna, 9-10 November 2009. *  *  *  The argument the organisers have found is very relevant, particularly when it comes to central banks of the Western Balkan. Actually, as far as I am informed from my colleagues, constrained liquidity (especially in foreign currency) and lending tightening are two fragile points, which may put us in a difficult position in the months to come. This set of two arguments carries over a dual problem: the short-term one, which puts banking system stability at risk, while providing its own implications even on the economic activity and on macro stability in a broader sense. The second problem is related to the financial support of the country’s economic activity in the future, given the recent years, when lending to the economy has constituted one of the main contributors in this regard. So far I deem that we have been effective in short-term management of these problems. Similarly to the European Central Bank and other central banks of the developed countries, we (the central banks of our region) have succeeded in supplying the market with ample liquidity, combining a variety of operational tactics and instruments.
Furthermore, while the reserves are expected to intermediate capital flows in the short run, we must not forget that the floating exchange rate framework is an important adjustment mechanism that can buffer volatile capital flows. Lastly, Malaysia’s external debt cannot be judged based on the aggregate level alone. Onethird is denominated in ringgit and is not subjected to valuation changes from exchange rate movements, limiting the risk of currency mismatches. The remainder are subject to prudential management and hedging requirements. What is more important is that more than half of the total external debt is skewed towards medium- to long-term debt, while shortterm debt poses limited claims on reserves. Taking all these factors into consideration, Malaysia’s external debt remains manageable. As we can see, the reality is far different from the perception. It is important that conclusions are made based on facts rather than perceptions and sentiments. Without us delving into the details and without the availability of critical information, the probability is high that our perception and sentiment would be inaccurate. Because of this ‘reality gap’, the central bank needs to show its presence in the market when it is needed. Part III – Ringgit Exchange Rate and Interventions For this reason, interventions by central banks on the odd occasion becomes necessary. Interventions can take different forms. Many of you may focus on market or operational interventions. Indeed, this is important to ensure the market has sufficient liquidity in stressed conditions.

Consequently, lower oil price reduces foreign exchange earnings of the country and government’s revenue from the oil industry; Second, there is this perception, even among FX dealers and traders, that the offshore market knows how to correctly price or is better at valuing the ringgit. Despite its opaqueness and suspicious pricing, the offshore market is perceived to be better, bigger and deeper than the onshore market, and that its price discovery process is more robust in indicating the direction of the ringgit. As a result, the onshore market is looking offshore for guidance on the direction and pricing of the ringgit. Third, there is also the perception that the onshore market lacks the necessary liquidity, and with the decline of the offshore market, this negative perception has been driving the ringgit exchange rate weaker. The lack of liquidity has been attributed to the inability for our forward FX volume in the onshore market to replicate the offshore market; Fourth, the significant non-resident participation in the onshore bond market is the main reason for the market’s liquidity. Consequently, the market perceived that the reversal of NR holdings will have negative bearing on the ringgit and market liquidity; And last but not least, the gross misperception on the adequacy of the reserves. There is this perception that reserves of less than USD100 billion is not sufficient to provide comfort to investors. Accordingly, market pessimism reaches new levels when it falls below the threshold.
In doing so, it will also contribute towards enriching further the diversity of players and strengthening the institutional infrastructure of the Malaysian Islamic banking system. The continued growth of Islamic finance in Malaysia The international economic and financial environment is expected to remain very challenging with several major economies now in recession and continued uncertainties prevailing in the international financial system. In spite of this, the Asian economies are still growing, albeit at a more modest pace. The dominance of domestic demand and increasing regional economic integration have enhanced the prospects for Asia to sustain a modest pace of growth. In this challenging international financial environment, it is encouraging that Islamic finance has continued to demonstrate its evolution and strong growth. Islamic finance has now become a new vehicle contributing to increasing the financial linkages not only within Asia but also with the rest of the world thereby facilitating cross-border allocation of capital globally. Indeed, a number of international financial centres have recognised Islamic finance as an integral part of their financial system in order to complete the suite of financial products and services being offered, and therefore are actively developing this segment. The Islamic finance industry has not only continued to grow but it has also been able to present a higher level of dynamism. The key indicators of the Islamic banking sector continue to record a progressive pace of development. The Islamic banking assets have expanded by 23% to RM234.9 billion compared with a year ago.

To optimize the business potential, Islamic financial institutions need to develop their niche strengths and leverage on Malaysia's resources to extend the operations to both the regional and global market. As a foreign Islamic banking subsidiary, the potential to provide greater market access in the domestic economy and improve the overall financial inclusion is also important. This includes the offering of new financial products to the different domestic economic segments. Concluding remarks On this occasion of the official launch of HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad, let me take this opportunity to congratulate HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad on the initiative to establish its own of the Islamic banking subsidiary and for its commitment to contribute to the success of Islamic finance. By allocating dedicated resources in the Islamic subsidiary in Malaysia, HSBC Bank will enhance its potential to contribute to the advancement of Islamic banking business going forward. I wish HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad every success in its endeavours. BIS Review 146/2008  3
Indeed, I think these additional communications vehicles can provide further clarification and  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  increase the effectiveness of the types of additional accommodation that I have advocated in recent months, as well as earlier in 2010. Consequently, I am an enthusiastic supporter of these enhancements to Fed transparency. Let me conclude by saying that I do not see these enhanced communications vehicles as being inherently “hawkish” or “dovish.” Participants may well have differing views on the appropriate stance of monetary policy in the particular economic circumstances of the moment. In being more explicit about our framework, we would not eliminate these differences of opinion. But we would further discipline the parameters of our discussions and clarify the judgments that lie behind our policy decisions. As the central bank in a democratic society, the Federal Reserve has an obligation to articulate what it is trying to achieve with monetary policy. I believe that these latest communications efforts are an important step in further increasing such accountability to the public. The Committee equally respects both legs of the dual mandate, and I feel these communications enhancements will help articulate the ways in which we will seek to achieve both objectives. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. References Evans, Charles, 2011, “A risk management approach to monetary policy,” Remarks delivered at the Ball State University Center for Business and Economic Research, Muncie, Indiana on December 5.

Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, 1971, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Indeed, their continuation would have entailed an increase in the vulnerability of the Spanish economy and the eventual correction would have been even more severe. Cyclical upswings followed by downswings are a normal feature of all economies, although the fact that Spain has recorded high growth rates without interruption for fourteen years may have led agents to forget the existence of this type of cyclical disturbance. Before addressing the central theme of my speech, it would be useful to answer the question why the industrialised countries have suddenly found themselves in such a complicated situation. Part of the answer (the other part being the regulation and supervision failures in many countries) relates to the strong increase in corporate and household debt in numerous countries in recent years, which led, in the presence of highly favourable financial conditions,  BIS Review 117/2008  1  to a significant appreciation in the value of financial and real assets. Some economists and institutions have argued that monetary policy was too lax and that central banks should in future pay attention not only to inflation, but also to other financial developments, such as credit, when taking their decisions. In some cases, these favourable financial conditions were harnessed to expand residential and productive investment (as in Spain), while in others consumption was also boosted by the ready availability of financing, leading to a spectacular reduction in household saving ratios, as in the United States.

But with growth slowing, I anticipate the unemployment rate to increase from its current level of 3-1/2 percent to around 4-1/2 percent over the next year. Turning to inflation, I expect cooling global demand and supply improvements to result in declining inflation for goods. These factors should contribute to inflation slowing further from its current rate to around 3 percent this year. While services inflation is still a sticking point, I expect overall inflation to come back down to 2 percent in the next few years as further tightening of monetary policy realigns the balance between demand and supply. Conclusion I'll close by saying that the monetary policy gear is turning. But it will take time for supply and demand to come back into proper alignment and balance, so we must keep moving. While the route ahead is still uncertain, I am fully confident we will return to a sustained period of price stability. 1 John C. Williams, Peeling the Inflation Onion , remarks at the Economic Club of New  York, delivered via videoconference (November 28, 2022); John C. Williams, A Bedrock Commitment to Price Stability , remarks at the 2022 U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce National Conference, Phoenix, Arizona (October 3, 2022). 2 John C. Williams, A Steady Anchor in a Stormy Sea , remarks at SNB-FRB-BIS High-  Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, Switzerland (November 9, 2022).