samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This fact has been recognized by the markets so that, since the onset of the global alarm about the pandemic, in Chile asset prices have fallen less than they have in other comparable economies. As Central Bank, we are actively working to ensure the full implementation and effect of the measures adopted. At the same time, we will be vigilant on how events unfold, ready to deploy all our instruments to support the economy. At this juncture, however, the actions of one institution alone will not do the job. In recent weeks we have been strengthening our coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Market Commission, to align rules and incentives so that the funds flow to the most stressed businesses and households. The challenges we face require intensifying this coordination, including a response from the banking system to measure up to the circumstances, and cooperation of the National Congress to speed up the legal reforms that require urgent implementation. Although this emergency affects the day-to-day lives of many people, if we know how to manage it well, with good policies and collaboration of everyone involved, the impact will be temporary and, as the pandemic is controlled, we can all return to our activities as usual. This will allow the economy to recover its growth rate and leave the period of contraction behind. However, for this to happen, it is essential that those needing help to get through this shock obtain it. Households and businesses must have access to credit at a reasonable cost.

60  60  40  40  20  20  0  0 Will drop significantly  Will drop slightly  Will not change  Source: Business survey, Central Bank of Chile. 11  Will increase slightly  Figure 7 National unemployment rates and extended measures (2)  Total employment (1) (contribution to annual change, percentage points)  4  4  Self-employed  Salaried informal 3  Total employment  3 2  (percent)  20  10 Potential rate( 4)  18  2  Unemploy't rate (right axis)  16 1  1  0  0 Salaried formal  -1  -1  9  8  14  7  12  Labor pressure rate 6 (3)  Other -2  -2 10 18 Sep.  19 19  19 May  19 Sep.  20  5 14  15  16  17  18  19  20  (1) First quarter 2020 uses information up until the moving quarter ending in January. Salaried formal comprises dependent workers with access to social security, i.e. health-care and pension fund associated to their employment. Salaried informal are dependent workers with no simultaneous access to social security or is not guaranteed by the employer. Others correspond to employers, and non-remunerated family services or household help. (2) Considers information up to the moving quarter ending in February.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Knowing Nusantara – money that made the region Opening speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the launch of “Knowing Nusantara: Money That Made the Region”, Bank Negara Malaysia Museum and Art Gallery, Sasana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 26 August 2014. *  *  *  The Numismatic heritage of the Malay Archipelago is as rich as the region itself. There were few other regions that had such a level of trade that has existed in this part of Southeast Asia. Every type of seafarer had been here over the centuries, bringing with them a wide range of currencies. From Chinese copper cash to South American “pieces of eight”, Nusantara has been a magnet for money of all shapes, sizes and materials. When these are combined with the indigenous currency minted in the Archipelago, the legacy is immense. “Knowing Nusantara: Money that Made the Region” explores the coins and banknotes that have circulated in the Malay Archipelago, telling a story that goes back 2,000 years and that continues to evolve. By telling this story, the objective is to create a deeper understanding of the region. The history of the archipelago is largely about contact and the interconnectivity that existed in the region even during that period. Movement between islands and the mainland are mirrored by the encounters between the indigenous and foreign peoples.

In Malaysia, the old British unit of the “shilling” lived on long after it ceased to exist in the United Kingdom. There is no end to the links that can be found between the different countries and their coinage. Nusantara was at the centre of this international network, leaving us with a diverse inheritance of numismatic material. Much of the physical evidence of this global trade has, however, been lost. Evolution is an intrinsic part of the nature of money; coins have been melted down, misplaced or sometimes incorporated into other items such as jewellery; banknotes have been destroyed. We are left with shipwrecks as some of the most useful sources information on the money that was in circulation in our history. What remains is a faint reflection of the millions – literally – of coins that once circulated in the archipelago. Some are of the highest rarity while others may not be. Bank Negara Malaysia has for many decades been a custodian of local numismatic heritage, resulting in an unrivalled collection of Malaysian coins and banknotes. This is a natural role for a central bank to adopt. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We would like to thank the input of private collectors such as Mr. William Barrett, whose passion for Nusantara numismatic material has produced the core of the present exhibition. “Knowing Nusantara” is the first numismatic exhibition of this nature to be held at Bank Negara Malaysia.
And it is the Open Letter system which both allows that more sensible approach to be explained by the MPC and allows the Chancellor publicly to endorse it.” That applies not just to a supply shock, but also to a demand shock that might follow a large movement in asset prices. Both challenges to policy in the future have one aspect in common: they make us think carefully about the consequences of current policy for inflation well into the future. Asset prices raise the question of how far one should err on the side of caution while imbalances are building up. Deflation makes us aware of the risk that the zero lower bound on interest rates might bind in the future. They imply that while, in normal circumstances, monetary policy should focus on meeting the inflation target eighteen months or two years ahead, in practise it may be necessary to look even further ahead about the consequences of present actions. But that should not deflect monetary policy from its task of keeping inflation on track to meet the target in the medium term, in other words achieving price stability. 6. Conclusions  When Lord Kingsdown addressed the LSE ten years ago, he said that departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, offered an opportunity - “An opportunity to demolish the image of the United Kingdom as a second-rate inflation-prone economy”. I believe that opportunity was taken. Today the UK has low and stable inflation. And that has not come at the expense of either output or employment.

Efforts by the Accounting & Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic  2  “The New Silk Road: Asia and the Middle East rediscover trade and investment opportunities”, Research Department, Kuwait China Investment Company (KCIC), January 2011. 3  Ibid. 4  “Economic growth moderates across Middle East”, IMF Survey, May 21, 2013. 5  “World Economic Outlook”, IMF, April 2013. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Development Bank and Malaysia’s International Shariah Research Academy (ISRA) in research and fostering dialogue between Shariah Scholars from various jurisdictions are also narrowing the differences in views on Shariah issues in finance. As work on all these fronts progress, this will encourage greater interest internationally to participate in cross border financing and investment activities. The prospects for cross-border Islamic finance are already very bright. We are beginning to see cross border sukuk issuance within Asia, as well as between Middle East and Asia. As early as 2010, Malaysia’s Khazanah issued a $ sukuk in Singapore, while Japan-based Nomura issued 2-year $ sukuk in Malaysia. Last year, taking advantage of favorable currency swap rates, Singapore listed companies Natural Resources and Golden Agri tapped the Malaysian Ringgit (MR) sukuk market. In the last two years, two GCC firms, Abu Dhabi National Energy Company and Kuwait-based Gulf Investment Corp issued MR sukuk in Malaysia. There is considerable scope to issue more such cross-border sukuk, especially to finance the large infrastructure needs in both Middle East and Asia.
However, it is too early to draw any far-reaching conclusions, as it is a normal cyclical phenomenon for matching to become impaired during the recovery from a recession (see Figure 13). Another risk that I have already mentioned is that the high level of CPI inflation may be influencing inflation and wage expectations. Even if underlying CPIF inflation is low, the CPI is increasing rapidly as a result of interest rate increases. The forecast for CPI inflation is close to 3 per cent over the next three years, and will probably continue to be high for a couple more years. There is thus a risk that the high level of CPI inflation will push up inflation and wage expectations. Wage expectations are closely linked to inflation expectations, which, in turn, are largely determined by the inflation outcome – and wage expectations have increased recently (see Figure 14).4 It is important to emphasise that the high level of CPI inflation is a temporary effect. This is a delayed consequence of the low level of the repo rate during the crisis. When we first lowered the repo rate sharply, CPI inflation was negative for at least a year. Over the last year, the repo rate has successively been raised, which is instead contributing towards increasing CPI inflation. A better measure of inflationary pressures at present is provided by CPIF inflation.

But the result of the wage bargaining rounds was surprisingly negative. The centrally-agreed wage increases for the agreement period 2007 to 2009 were almost 3 per cent per year, which is almost one percentage point higher than during the previous agreement period. Inflation increased and the Riksbank successively raised the repo rate from 3 per cent at the start of 2007 to 4.75 per cent in September 2008. In addition, the financial crisis led the economic conditions to change radically during the agreement period. During the autumn of 2008, it became obvious that the financial crisis would also hit the Swedish economy hard. The Riksbank and other authorities made comprehensive efforts to prevent the Swedish banks from being dragged into the crisis. And, to alleviate the consequences of the crisis, the Riksbank rapidly lowered the repo rate to 0.25 per cent in July 2009. Even so, developments became clearly worse than expected. During 2009, GDP showed the greatest fall since the Second World War, while unemployment rose to almost 9 per cent at the end of 2009. This reaffirmed the conclusion that wage increases had been too high. On average, wages increased by 3.7 per cent during the years 2007 to 2009. The wages agreed for 2010 contributed towards preventing the crisis from being so deep in Sweden In many ways, the wage bargaining rounds in 2010 were the direct opposite of the wage bargaining rounds in 2007.
To begin, how do we assess errors from models intended to capture performance under stressed conditions when those conditions have not yet been realized and might not be in the historical data? How can we assess the uncertainty or margin of error around loss and revenue projections derived from models that can be quite complex, often involving multiple estimation steps? Further, since the final stress test calculations are derived from the combination of projections from many different (often multi-step) models, how do we assess the error around the ultimate calculation of stressed capital ratios? How do we measure correlation in model errors in a tractable and practical way? How much model risk owes to the decision to develop complex models for many individual pieces of the net income and regulatory capital ratio calculations instead of using simpler, “top down” estimation approaches? A final tactical research area involves this last point – the role of simpler, easier to estimate models of net income and its key components. Federal Reserve modeling teams have already developed a set of these “benchmark” models that produce loss and revenue estimates as a comparison to the projections from the more sophisticated and complex production models. Creating more of these models – including multiple benchmarks for an individual loss, expense or revenue component, benchmarks that cover the full range of detailed net income elements, and benchmarks at higher levels of aggregation – would enable more robust assessments of supervisory results both across institutions and over time.

It also has advantage over the rate of shorter maturities, such as 1-day or 7-day, in that it will not impose too much burden on the Bank of Thailand in taking care of the liquidity and maintaining the policy rate. Therefore, other repurchase rates such as 1-day or 7-day will be freely determined by market forces. In sum, the 14-day RP rate will leave room for the short-term rate with flexibility to adjust and move in line with money market liquidity conditions. The policy rate was initially set at 1.5 percent per annum and it was raised to 2.5 percent in June 2001 to realign the money market interest rates. Following the global economic slowdown, the policy rate had been cut twice in December 2001 and January 2002 to help stimulate the economy. The rate now stands at 2 percent per annum. Having the policy rate clearly announced, the Bank of Thailand is able to provide a transparent monetary policy signal to the market. This helps provide a framework for a more effective transmission mechanism. After the adjustment in the policy rate, other rates in the repurchase market will adjust in line with the policy rate. Banks will thereafter adjust their portfolio and change their rates for loans and deposits. The transmission mechanism will work itself out such that this will eventually lead to the desirable result in the real sector. The policy impact usually takes up to 8 quarters in the transmission process.
This is especially important for the UK, which has the largest most internationally active and most complex financial sector in the EU. We are host to more foreign institutions than any other member state. As the Bank of England Deputy Governor with specific responsibility for Financial Stability, I can say that it is crucial that the single market for financial services is supported by a framework of common prudential rules that are fit for purpose and that are consistently applied. This is intrinsic to the ability of the Bank to deliver financial stability in the UK. The importance of this has been very powerfully and painfully underscored by the experience of recent years. Of course, this is true internationally, outside of the EU as well as inside. One of the clear lessons of the crisis is that we did not have strong enough global standards on prudential regulation to support the integration that had taken place in international capital markets and financial services. It is not my subject for today, but there has been a sea change since the crisis with a massive international reform programme to develop and implement prudential standards and regulatory co-operation. At the same time, however, we must not forget that while there can be very material spillover costs to other countries when things go badly wrong, the buck at the very end stops at the national level. We have strengthened the resilience of the financial system.

We can conclude from the results that the activation of the countercyclical buffer in financial cycle upturns gives rise to an easing in credit and GDP growth under the baseline scenario, but, above all, it significantly reduces the severity of the decline in GDP in an economic crisis situation. Moreover, the probability of crises occurring diminishes. These effects would occur with a lag of around two years. The release of the CCyB in crisis periods would mitigate the adverse effects on economic growth, both under the baseline scenario and at the extreme percentile. And, furthermore, its impact would be immediate. 15  In the case of the tools that fall on borrowers, their activation in financial cycle upturns would have similar effects to those of the CCyB. The main difference is that their effects are more immediate: i.e. around one year as opposed to the two years mentioned in the case of the CCyB. This suggests an order for the activation of the different instruments under normal circumstances: the tools that increase banks’ capital requirements should be activated first and, if the risks identified do not abate, the second instruments should then be activated. According to this same evidence, it is found that the release of the macroprudential instruments that fall on borrowers in crisis periods does not significantly impact GDP growth expectations or their distribution. This is perhaps due to the fact that, habitually, it is the banks themselves that restrict these lending standards in contractionary phases.
Such inducements to control the velocity of the monetary base might expose the Fed to intense scrutiny and criticism. The big banks that park the lion’s share of excess reserves with us are hardly the darlings of public sentiment. Raising interest payments to them while scaling back our remittances to the Treasury might raise a few congressional eyebrows. And as to our repo operations, we have never implemented them on anywhere near the scale envisioned. Of greatest concern to me is that the risk of scrutiny and criticism might hinder policymakers from acting quickly enough to remove or dampen the dry inflationary tinder that is inherent in the massive, but currently fallow, monetary base. In the parlance of central banking, the “exit” challenge we now face is somewhat daunting: How do we pass a camel fattened by trillions of dollars of longer-term, less-liquid purchases through the eye of the needle of getting back to a “normalized” balance sheet so as to keep inflation under wraps and yet provide the right amount of monetary impetus for the economy to keep growing and expanding? The first law of holes I have great faith in the integrity and brainpower of my fellow policymakers. I am confident that the 19 earnest women and men that make up the FOMC will do their level best under Chairwoman Janet Yellen’s leadership to accomplish a smooth exit that keeps prices stable and the economy in a job-creating mode.

Both CPI-All Items inflation and MAS Core Inflation forecasts for 2015 were sharply down in Jan this year, compared to Oct 2014 when we last reaffirmed our monetary policy stance •  Oil prices had fallen sharply – from $ in Oct 2014 to $ in Jan 2015 – and assessment was that prices were likely to stay low for at least a year. •  Against backdrop of modest economic growth in 2014 continuing into 2015, wage growth was weaker than anticipated and so was pass-through into prices. 24. Waiting to adjust policy in Apr would have put MAS considerably behind curve and led to excessive speculation about a policy move. •  We decided to adjust both inflation forecast and policy stance in a timely and consistent manner. 25. In Apr, MAS affirmed monetary policy stance. •  This decision surprised some market observers, who had anticipated a further easing of $ policy. We made no change to policy stance in Apr because there was no change to forecasts 26. There was no ground for another shift in policy. •  No reason to reduce slope of $ policy band further, given that core inflation was projected to pick up from Q4 onwards and economy remained close to potential. •  No reason to shift level of policy band, as we did not envisage deflation or recession. •  No reason to adjust width of policy band, which remained sufficient to accommodate volatility in foreign exchange markets.
Figure 14 Households’ debt as proportion of disposable income: the overall effect of an amortisation requirement, halved tax relief and debt-to-income limit of 400 per cent Per cent 220  220 Scenario without measures  210  210  Amortisation requirements, reduced tax relief (15%) and debt-to-income limit (400%)  200  200  Amortisation requirements, reduced tax relief (15%) and debt-to-income limit (400%, exemption 15% )  190  190  180  180  170  170  160  160  150  150  140  140  130  130 05  10  15  20  25  Note. Broken red line shows an estimate of developments over the next 10 years without further measures. Shaded area indicates a feasible lower limit for when the risks are elevated in the economy. Broken lines show an estimated total effect of several measures. “Debt-to-income limit (400%, exemption 15%)” means that 15 per cent of the volume of new loans may have a loan-to-income ratio exceeding 400 per cent. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. 21  In both cases, mortgages have been related to gross income instead of relating total loans to disposable income. In practice, this leads to the requirement being less binding (the mortgages are lower than total loans, and gross income is higher than disposable income). We have however, based the calculation on requirements for total loans in relation to disposable income.

There are several potential measures which could dampen overall indebtedness in the economy, and prevent certain household groups from getting further into debt, for example in the form of changes to mortgage tax relief and loan-limiting measures. I have described several of them today. But also allow me to point out once again that it is vitally important that the mandate for macroprudential policy be clarified. This is a precondition for being able to introduce to the loan-limiting measures. 22  See Guibourg, G. and Lagerwall, B., “How is the economy affected by macroprudential policy measures?”, Economic Commentary no. 9, 2015, Sveriges Riksbank. 23  See http://www.riksbank.se/en/Press-and-published/Notices/2015/The-Riksbank-publishes-the-IMFsstatement-on-Swedens-economy/. 18  BIS central bankers’ speeches  It is essential for the Riksbank to reduce these risks in order to fulfil its main tasks in terms of price stability and financial stability. However, avoiding problems on the housing market and a future economic crisis is something which concerns us all. BIS central bankers’ speeches  19