samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This time limit applies only to the FROB’s competence to assist merger/SIP processes, not to processes of individual restructuring. At the present date, 38 of the 45 Spanish savings banks (39 including Cajasur, a credit institution awaiting a solution within the framework of the FROB) are involved in merger/SIP processes affecting 92% of savings bank assets. Of the 12 merger/SIP processes, seven are planned with FROB aid estimated at a total of about € billion, and the other five without government assistance. Also participating in one of these processes is Caja Castilla-La Mancha, a credit institution seized by the Banco de España which received total aid of € billion from the deposit guarantee fund (DGF). The merger/SIP plans of these 12 processes have already been authorised by the Banco de España or are at the authorisation stage, except in one case in which three credit institutions are participating in a project still under negotiation but which will not require FROB aid. The operations involving merger/SIP plans with FROB aid envisage cuts of 20–25% in the number of offices and of around 15% in staff, which gives an idea of the scale of the measures proposed to improve bank efficiency. The structure rationalisation measures are an indispensable requirement for receiving FROB aid and are being included naturally in the other planned voluntary operations, since these measures are responsive to the need to achieve more soundness, more efficiency and more economic rationality.

But clearly, a combination of changes that were to raise the legal retirement age, the minimum number of years necessary to qualify for pension benefits and the period over which pensions are calculated would be optimal for ensuring the system’s viability. Pension reform will not entail a significant improvement in the budget deficit figures in the very short term, but it will exert a powerful influence on the recovery of confidence in Spain’s economy and in its public sector’s solvency, and that will translate into better financing conditions and sounder growth prospects. Therefore, I can but urge that discussions under the aegis of the Toledo Pact take place as promptly as possible, with the widest political consensus, as I believe this may be a key factor for dispelling the uncertainty we have been facing in recent weeks. The fiscal consolidation programme and the measures adopted to reinforce the institutional arrangements of the Monetary Union are fundamental, but they do not suffice to return the Spanish economy to a path of high growth, particularly following the strong adverse impact the recession has had on all the European countries’ potential growth capacity. Consequently, the other centrepiece of the response to the current emergency situation is to adopt a series of structural reforms conducive to the resumption of sustained growth in output and employment.
*** As part of this report, I would like to highlight an important aspect for guaranteeing good governance at the institution: the internal audit systems. The internal audit is independent from the management, guaranteed through the Inspector General, appointed by the Parliament. 7/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  Fostering internal control and monitoring systems and procedures In 2018, the operational risk management function – a new function at the Bank of Albania – consolidated and matured. It is based on the international risk management standards as well as on the best practices of central banks. In the last assessment, the level of Operational Risk Management has shifted from ‘ad-hoc’ to ‘managed’, thus overcoming the ‘basic’ level. This assessment exceeds the Bank of Albania’s objective. This year, the project for “Drafting and Implementing the Bank of Albania’s Business Continuity Management Program” continued and is currently in the final phase of its completion. The purpose of this project is to ensure the continuity of critical processes and to restore normal business as soon as possible in the event of a crisis or emergency situation. Audit engagements in 2018 focused on: (i) giving an opinion on the adequacy of internal audits set by the Management for the audited functions / processes, including supporting applications for the activities; and (ii) other not planned audit and non-audit engagements upon special request by Administrators or other external institutions.

The uncertainties associated with such reactions make it very difficult for policy-makers to calibrate the appropriate budgetary path. There is a risk of a cliff effect, beyond which market participants tend to loose confidence in the ability of sovereign states to repay their debts and regain it only after a very long and painful adjustment. The contagion effects we observed last spring suggest that this risk should not be underestimated, raising a series of issues that have not yet been considered in  1  Leeper, E., “Monetary Science, Fiscal Alchemy”, presented at the Economic Policy Symposium organised by the Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 26–28 2010. BIS Review 126/2010  1  full, even in the literature. What kind of scenarios could develop if the sovereign debts of several advanced economies are no longer perceived as risk-free assets? How do financial markets work in the absence of a risk-free rate? Second, the asymmetric distribution of public debt across the world economy has important implications for the adjustment of global imbalances. On the one hand, there is the risk that the protracted and excessive public and external indebtedness of advanced economies could ultimately prove to be – once again – unsustainable. On the other, if debtor countries adjust internal imbalances and lift national savings, who will assume the role of consumer of last resort once played by the United States? This is an oft-posed question in international policy debates. Let me address these two issues in reverse order.
Indeed, the Lord Mayor’s Green Horizon Summit in London this week is a great example of this sort of activity. Our commitment to those mechanisms of international coordination, including working closely and cooperatively with our European colleagues, will not waver with Brexit – indeed we will double down on them. Still, it is reasonable to ask: what will be different? I have a strong interest in this but ultimately it’s for the government and parliament to decide, and the Treasury already has this question firmly in its sights in the 2  form of its Future Regulatory Framework consultation, which was published last month. But as one very small contribution to that debate, I would like to suggest three lodestars to guide us:   first, high regulatory standards – no surprise to find that on my list! More seriously, for the reasons I just gave I do think that is a vital ingredient of our future success;    second, responsible openness. By international standards the UK is very open to financial services, and we will continue to put a huge effort into making this work safely for us and the rest of the world, including those in the EU who want to do business with the UK; and    third, dynamism.

They could, for instance, pay rent for children studying abroad, pay for a holiday home, or pay for services provided by European companies, e.g. mobile telephone services, insurance companies, utilities, etc. People who live, work or study outside their home country will no longer need one bank account at home and another one abroad. The use of payment cards will be more efficient, as consumers will be able to use the same card for all euro payments. This will reduce the necessity for people to carry cash. Innovative services can be offered to consumers irrespective of national borders. The long-term goal of the banking industry is that the SEPA payment instruments will only be used in electronic form. Payments can then be easily combined with other e-services in the case of both individual and corporate clients. These include e-invoicing, mobile or internet payment initiation, airline e-tickets, credit advice or e-reconciliation. As a consequence, consumers will spend less time handling payments. Everything will be easier, faster and cheaper ... in the long term. Payment cards are becoming a favourite payment instrument with consumers, and are increasingly replacing cheques and cash payments. The use of cards is thus expected to grow in the future. Thanks to the creation of a single euro payments area, acquirers will be able to process all SEPAcompliant card payments, even across borders. In the SEPA environment, merchants will be able to choose any card payment processing entity in the euro; this will increase competition and reduce costs.
This means that what happens abroad in terms of desired saving and investment also influences the performance of our domestic economy. This framework provides a simple way to evaluate the recent economic environment and the current economic outlook. When desired investment rises relative to saving on an ex ante basis, then an economy tends to strengthen. If the strengthening persists, inflation may rise to levels above what is regarded as consistent with maximum sustainable growth and full employment. This was the story for much of the 2004–06 period. The Federal Reserve responded to rising trend inflation by tightening monetary policy to keep the economy from overheating. In contrast, when investment falls relative to saving on an ex ante basis, an economy weakens and may slip into recession, as was the case between 2007 and mid-2009. During this period, the Federal Reserve tried to support employment by cutting its federal funds rate target nearly to zero; by creating a number of special liquidity facilities to support the extension of credit; and by engaging in a large scale asset purchase program, buying Treasuries, agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities. An economic recovery requires that desired investment must rise relative to saving. This has happened recently as fiscal stimulus and an inventory cycle have led to a fall in ex ante saving relative to investment. But for the recovery to strengthen further, this process must continue.

When inflation fell back in the early 1990s it became apparent that the investments in real estate had been founded on unrealistic expectations that prices would continue to rise. The property market collapsed and credit institutions were hit by massive loan losses. The bank crisis accordingly accentuated the economic downturn in Sweden. BIS Review 68/1997  -2-  Inflation is also associated with an arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth, often contrary to the ambitions of distribution policy. Referring again to the 1980s, the chief losers from the inflationary economy at that time, with the resultant price fall, were probably not the property speculators but households whose bank savings were eroded by two-digit inflation and whose wages were only subsequently adjusted for inflation. Price stability is the Riksbank’s objective The reason why monetary policy is assigned the task of safeguarding the value of money is basically simple: by adopting an appropriate monetary stance the central bank can choose, or at least strongly influence, the rate of inflation. In the short run price increases are of course affected by many other factors such as the state of economic activity, the direction of fiscal policy, wage formation, etc. But in the long run inflation is a monetary phenomenon. By controlling the supply of money in a wide sense, in the long term the Riksbank can also govern movements in the value of money and in inflation. Interest rate management by the Riksbank cannot, on the other hand, generate economic growth and employment in the longer run.
The mix of self- and multi-lateral insurance arrangements that have arisen in response to recent events and liquidity pressures appears suboptimal – resembling more of a patchwork than a safety net. We need a better global financial safety net with the IMF at its heart and three key additional elements that will make the safety net more effective. •  First, a more reliable and flexible source of funding for the IMF and greater clarity on coordination with Regional Financial Arrangements. •  Second, a stronger mandate for IMF surveillance and stress testing to reduce the likelihood that countries might need recourse to the safety net, and possible prequalification to reduce stigma when liquidity is needed. 16  See Briefing for G20 Meeting, September 4, 2015, Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts. https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/IMF-Note-on-Inclusion-of-EnhancedContractual-Provisions-in-International-Sovereign-Bond-Contracts-Briefing-for-G20-Meeting.docx. 17  See Communique, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting, 4–5 September 2015. https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/September-FMCBG-Communique.pdf. 18  Bank of England staff calculations based on BIS data. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  •  Third, better mechanisms for dealing with debt restructuring and reducing the risk of disorderly spillovers. None of this will be easy. As Hume said “it must, however, be confessed that…all these questions of trade and money are extremely complicated. 19” But there are some important lessons from the experience of central bank reforms since the crisis that, while complicated, show us what might be possible. 19  8  See Hume (1758).

Cross-border capital flows can “run”– just as deposits can “run” for banks. And the majority of a sovereign’s assets – claims on future taxpayers, are both hard to value and inherently illiquid – so, like banks, they are susceptible to runs by international investors, which even if not based on fundamentals, could threaten their solvency by raising borrowing costs. Sovereigns are particularly exposed to run risk or a sudden “stop” if they have borrowed in foreign currency – the so called “original sin” – as large depreciations raise the domestic burden of repaying the debt, particularly if there is a shortage of foreign exchange reserves. In the Euro-area, countries have become painfully aware of the risks of borrowing in a domestic currency that individual sovereign states have no right to issue. But of course, sovereigns are also very different from banks. By definition, their finances are not regulated by any authority, and there is no legal framework for dealing with bankruptcy or resolution, giving them more discretion to default. Instead, we have IMF surveillance (which is weaker than bank supervision) and a complex and often messy process whereby markets and the official sector deal with sovereign debt restructurings. While there are important differences between sovereigns and banks, I think there are enough parallels to draw some insights. 4.
Correlation analysis suggests that, while short-term fluctuations in nominal as well as index-linked bond yields tend to be quite closely synchronised between the euro area and the US, the relationship between euro area and US break-even inflation rates tends to be very weak (see Chart 8). Only in times when inflation expectations react to common global inflationary shocks, for example to strong increases in oil prices, can a closer synchronisation of movements in break-even inflation rates be observed. How would the European economy have developed had the euro not been introduced? We can only speculate, but past experience can be quite instructive. We must not forget that, as a consequence of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the world’s first major oil crisis, the 1970s were a period of monetary disintegration in Europe. Nor should we forget the devaluation of the Italian lira by almost 30% against the Deutsche Mark after the 1992 ERM crises. The exchange rate risk premium, which is  BIS Review 43/2006  7  believed to have been a major determinant of interest rates before the introduction of the euro, would have increased the spreads on government bond yields across Member States with adverse effects on countries with large debt ratios. 14 In all likelihood, therefore, a currency crisis in Europe may well have arisen, with speculative attacks on weaker currencies leading to large devaluations.

Home bias in the debt instrument market euro area countries (annual data) among euro area countries (annual data)  Sources: IMF, Thomson Financial DataStream, Sources: BIS, IMF, ECB calculations. ECB calculations. Note: The home bias of the euro area is computed Note: The home bias of the euro area is computed excluding intra-euro area asset trade allocation. excluding intra-euro area asset trade allocation. Indeed, a simple inspection of the data reveals that European countries increased their holdings of euro area international assets (as a share of their total international portfolio) between 1997 and 2003 (see Charts 5-6). 10 Over this period, the share of intra-euro area allocation increased markedly by 10 percentage points for equity portfolios and by almost 25 percentage points for fixed income portfolios. 10  12 EMU countries consists of the 12 euro area countries. “Other EU countries” refers to Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. “Non-EU developed countries” comprises ten other developed countries: Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and the US. “Emerging markets” is formed by 7 countries: four Asian emerging markets (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) and three Latin American emerging markets (Argentina, Chile and Venezuela). BIS Review 43/2006  5  Moreover, global financial integration was accompanied by a large shift in holdings towards the euro area countries, thereby favouring international risk-sharing vis-à-vis the euro area, particularly with regard to other European countries and, to a lower extent, with respect to emerging markets in equity portfolios (see Charts 5 and 6).
Ardian Fullani: The fight against money laundering Luncheon speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at an Anti Money Laundering workshop, Tirana, 22 June 2005. *  *  *  Dear participants, The subject of today’s workshop is, as you well know, a matter of great concern worldwide. The way we fight money laundering (ML) and counter the financing of terrorism (FT), does not have an impact on us only, but also on our neighbours and any other country with which our citizens and companies perform trade and financial relations. In these last years, to this issue has been devoted considerable time and efforts by you, by Albanian authorities and by international organisations. Besides meeting each other again and exchanging opinions on general issues, I want to use this opportunity to share with you some thoughts about the importance of the existence of a culture against ML in the institutions we represent. I will refer in this case to banks, meaning non-bank financial institutions as well. Following that, any consideration about ML will be valid also for the FT, for which I am convinced that our awareness and that of the public, is complete. With the term “culture” on anti-money laundering (AML), I refer not only to the existence in the bank of structures responsible for AML and its related procedures.

Allow me to close this speech, thanking the co-organisers of this workshop, the Tirana office of FSVC and the Albanian Association of Banks. I thank in particular all the specialists of the commercial banks and of the non-bank financial institutions that took part in this seminar, for their valuable contribution on preventing money laundering in their institutions. I thank particularly the foreign experts, Mr. Farrell and Mr. Burnside, that accepted to share with us their valuable experience. I wish this workshop has also been for them an interesting event. Thank you. BIS Review 49/2005  3
You should make sure that any other reference rate you use meets similarly high standards, and is fully transparent about how it’s calculated, what it’s based on, and exactly how it complies with the IOSCO principles. The ARRC and ISDA also went through an extensive public consultation process in constructing their recommended fallbacks that will kick in when LIBOR becomes unusable. The overriding goal of that process was to minimize value transfer and ensure as much as possible that the transition did not disadvantage borrowers or lenders, or one side of a LIBOR swap. And those are the same https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  4/6  30/09/2020  The LIBOR Countdown Has Not Stopped - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  fallbacks that will apply under the ARRC’s proposed New York legislation. Anyone considering using different fallbacks should likewise keep those concerns top of mind. Making it Official Before I wrap up, I’d like to talk about the role of the official sector in the transition. It might seem at times that our role has consisted mostly of forming working groups and giving speeches where we harangue market participants to just get on with it already—kind of like this one. Of course, as I mentioned, the New York Fed has stepped up by producing SOFR, which is key to the transition.

And at this point, I would like to stress more on why we cannot afford to be complacent with the situation. Most importantly, there always seems to be an unbridgeable gap between what market anticipates and what governments and central banks can really offer at the end of the day. And if history is any guide, it is precisely this gap that creates ripples of disappointment and risk aversion that propagate throughout the global financial market almost instantly. When we look back, not so far in the past, all of us have just witnessed a panic sell-off in global stock markets starting from late July to September. In addition to stocks, almost every type of risky assets was also under tremendous selling pressure across the board, and some  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  market commentators even went so far as comparing this event with the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. And when we look forward, the future is not very promising either due to two major reasons. First is the fact that so-called “milestone” developments toward the resolution of the crises in the U.S. and the Eurozone so far do not seem to address problems at their root causes; rather, issues have been dealt with merely temporarily, one after another. A recent example of this would be the eleventh-hour negotiation in the U.S. in raising debt ceiling limits only to meet the August-second deadline, which did nothing but leave the big elephant standing in the room.