samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the 1990s, housing starts in Norway were fairly low in relation to growth in the number of households. Moreover, population growth has been higher in recent years, largely reflecting  10  BIS Review 28/2007  a high level of immigration. In 2006, the population increased by more than 40 000 and the number of households by roughly 30 000. Furthermore, migration patterns in Norway follow the business cycle. Migration to densely populated areas is now rising. Demands for high standards and new building regulations have also pushed up housing construction costs and thereby house prices. The main determinants of house price inflation have long been income, unemployment, interest rates and residential construction. Over the past few years, inward migration and domestic migration patterns may also have contributed. In the past year, however, house price inflation has been higher than implied by these factors. A large share of the increase in 2006 cannot be explained by previous patterns. Developments since the beginning of the 1990s may have engendered expectations that house prices will only continue to rise. This may have increased house purchases for pure investment purposes and induced younger buyers to enter the housing market earlier than otherwise. The housing market may now be in a state of euphoria. The rise in house prices has been accompanied by a sharp increase in household debt. In Norway, household debt is now almost twice the level of disposable income, and the debt to income ratio is the highest ever.

For example, clothing and footwear, audiovisual equipment, furniture and white goods have shown very strong price declines. Low prices for imported consumer goods, combined with high prices for our commodity exports, have resulted in a strong improvement in Norway’s terms of trade. Since 2002, the terms of trade have  4  BIS Review 28/2007  improved by about 40 per cent. A similar situation has not been seen since World War I, when earnings in the shipping industry and other export industries were exceptionally high for a period. The supply of foreign labour has increased markedly after EU enlargement in 2004. Over the past two years, these labour inflows have accounted for more than 30 per cent of growth in our labour force. Norwegian companies have also been able to be considerably bolder in undertaking new assignments and investments knowing that they can procure labour throughout Europe. In addition to increased labour inflows from Poland, Lithuania and other central European countries, we have long benefited from inflows of labour from Sweden. Many workers are on temporary assignment and their consumption is primarily concentrated in their home country. The Norwegian economy has seen a net capacity increase. Inward labour migration delayed the fall in unemployment in this expansion. It has also reduced bottlenecks in the economy and curbed the impact of the fall in unemployment on wage growth. Labour inflows have also had a dampening effect on wage growth, probably because the wage level of foreign workers is somewhat lower than for Norwegian labour.
8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  8  Chart 3: Firms’ risk appetite for higher LTV and LTI lending has been increasing over the last few years  Lenders' maximum LTVs over time  Lenders' maximum LTIs over time  % of lenders  100%  100%  90%  90%  80%  80%  70%  70%  5.50x 60%  60%  5.00x  100% LTV  95% LTV  50%  4.85x 50%  4.75x  90% LTV 40%  85% LTV  4.49x  30%  30%  20%  20%  10%  10%  0%  4.50x  40%  4.00x  0% 2016  2017  2018  2016  2017  2018  Source: Published criteria Notes: ‘Lenders’ include the large UK banks, Nationwide and a combination of the smaller banks and building societies  Chart 4: The percentage of lending at high LTV and LTI has been increasing over the last 10 years Percentage of lending extended at high LTVs  Percentage of lending extended at high LTIs  35%  40%  35%  30%  30% 25%  25% 20% 85 ≤ LTV < 90  90 ≤ LTV < 95 15%  4 ≤ LTI < 4.5  20%  LTI ≥ 4.5  LTV ≥ 95 15%  10% 10%  5%  5%  0%  0%  2006 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  2006  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  Source: FCA Product Sales Database Notes: ‘Lending’ is whole UK market (all regulated mortgage contracts) for owner-occupied mortgages.

7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7  Chart 1: Since 2010 we have seen a significant fall in mortgage spreads, particularly at higher LTVs Quoted 2-year 75% LTV spreads over risk-free rate  Quoted 2-year 90% LTV spreads over risk-free rate Percentage points  Percentage points  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  Spread  Spread  Risk-free rate  Risk-free rate  3  2y 75% LTV  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  2y 90% LTV  Source: Bank of England, MoneyFacts Notes: Risk-free rate is defined as 2 year overnight indexed swap (OIS)  Chart 2: We have observed a marked shift in the share of new mortgages at high LTV by building societies Major UK Lenders: share of new mortgages at high LTV  Building Societies: share of new mortgages at high LTV  35%  35%  30%  30%  25%  25%  20%  20% 85 ≤ LTV < 90  85 ≤ LTV < 90  90 ≤ LTV < 95 15%  LTV ≥ 95  90 ≤ LTV < 95 15%  10%  10%  5%  5%  0%  LTV ≥ 95  0% 2015  2016  2017  2018  2015  2016  2017  2018  Source: FCA Product Sales Database Notes: ‘Major UK Lenders’ include the large UK Banks and Nationwide.
Rodrigo Vergara: The Central Bank of Chile and the external crisis Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at a special session held by the Honorable Senate to “analyze and evaluate the economic policy measures that have become indispensable to confront the severe symptoms of international recession and with the purpose of becoming familiar with the Contingency Plan announced by the Supreme Government”, Santiago de Chile, 31 January 2012. *  *  *  Mr. President of the Senate, Senator Guido Girardi, Honorable senators. Thank you for your invitation to discuss the international economic situation and the measures that can be adopted in our country to address an external crisis. These instances are important for communicating the vision of the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) on these issues. In the past several years, the advanced economies have gone through a severe crisis. The causes and consequences of the Great Recession of 2008–2009 have not yet been resolved and we are again enduring periods of external stress that put to the test the strength of our economy and its fundamentals. This forces us to carefully evaluate the current environment, its implications on the performance of our economy, and the measures we can implement if deemed necessary. During the past year, the biggest tensions have originated in the frail fiscal and financial conditions of some economies in the Eurozone. This situation has persisted for a long time and no definitive solution is foreseen in the near term.

Central Bank of Chile October 2019  Third Statistics Conference: “Measuring the Economy in the Digital Age” Opening remarks by Mario Marcel, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile October 1-2, 2019 – Santiago, Chile Good morning, It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the Third Statistics Conference organized by the Central Bank of Chile (CBC), on “Measuring the Economy in the Digital Age” that brings together distinguished experts on macro statistics from many agencies and countries around the globe. This conference follows the one on “Statistics for Financial and Monetary Analysis” in 2015 and on “Measuring the Economy in a Globalized World” in 2017 and it is becoming a landmark event for the CBC, and I hope for all participants as well. The conference we are opening today will address the opportunities and challenges that digitalization imposes on us in interpreting and analyzing increasingly dynamic economic and financial phenomena. The Digital Economy Digitization is progressively changing the way we understand our world, by creating new business models and processes, generating new smart products and services, with lower costs and more timely delivery, all of which is reshaping consumer behavior. Major questions are emerging about the ability of our conventional toolkit to measure economic activity in the face of such changes. Digital products, services and means of economic interaction are making the task of identifying economic phenomena more challenging, especially for economic and financial statistics. Traditionally, economic transactions were governed by the interaction between producers and households.
For many years after the second world war in this country, during the 1960s and 1970s, macroeconomic policy - overall fiscal policy and monetary policy operating together and with various forms of direct control - was aimed at juggling what were seen as the conflicting objectives of economic growth and falling unemployment on the one hand and limiting inflation and maintaining a  1  BIS Review 110/2000  manageable balance of payments position on the other. Essentially the policy levers would be set initially at go, to stimulate demand and encourage growth and employment, until the evidence of overheating became intolerable, when the levers were thrown abruptly into reverse, to bring about a juddering economic slowdown. This was the infamous go-stop economic policy cycle which led to the boom-bust economic cycle. While the objective was no doubt to ensure that we never again experienced the depression and mass unemployment of the inter-war period, the effect was to induce uncertainty and short-term economic decision-making, with an increasingly damaging impact on our overall economic performance. And the situation became progressively worse from one economic cycle to the next as each peak produced higher and higher inflation and each trough higher and higher rates of unemployment - with the peaks becoming progressively shorter-lived. It became a classic example of more haste less speed.

This MoU sets a framework of cooperation among OIC member countries in key economic activities, with the objective of enhancing the opportunities for economic growth and development. Today’s Seminar is indeed a testimony to the continued efforts by both the IDB and Malaysia in enhancing the cooperation and deepening of business relationship. As all of us are aware, infrastructure development is a critical component to unlock potential economic activities, thus supporting sustainable economic growth of a nation. Malaysia has placed great emphasis on infrastructure development as part of its economic transformation, diversifying from agriculture to manufacturing and, in more recent years, in the services sector as well. Over the last ten years, the Government of Malaysia has allocated a total of nearly RM100 billion for infrastructure development mainly in transport, energy and public utilities. The Malaysian government has also encouraged the participation of the private sector in the development of infrastructure through privatization and the public-private partnership (PPP) policies. On the global front, the estimated value of infrastructure development is estimated to be USD35 trillion over the next 20 years. For the Asian region alone, a study done by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reveals that the region needs USD750 billion per year over the year 2010–2020 to meet the rising needs of infrastructure development. Out of this, the needs for the ASEAN region have been estimated to be over USD60 billion per year. Considering the vast opportunities of infrastructure projects regionally and globally, Malaysian contractors should seize the opportunity for further expansion of their business.
Three types of stress tests are conducted: Historical: Shocks are applied to the portfolio using asset price movements seen in historical stressed episodes, such as the Global Financial Crisis, 2000 dot-com bust, 1994 bond market selloff, etc. Vulnerability-based: The portfolio is subject to hypothetical scenarios which stress in turn each of the portfolio’s risk factors such as equity, interest rate, credit, inflation, and foreign exchange. Thematic: These are forward-looking stress tests and are designed by taking into account prevailing market conditions and potential risk events on the horizon. 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Depending on the stress test results, MAS will consider appropriate responses and portfolio adjustments when needed. The risk management framework is reviewed on a regular basis to ensure it remains fit-forpurpose. Balanced asset allocation Subject to the liquidity and risk tolerance thresholds, MAS seeks to achieve good long-term returns on the OFR through a balanced asset allocation. MAS invests the OFR in a well-diversified portfolio, probably more diversified than is the case for most central banks. The portfolio is geographically diversified across advanced and emerging market economies, with investment-grade bonds in advanced economies making up the largest share. The portfolio is diversified across asset classes – in cash, bonds and equities. The portfolio has a diversified currency mix, with about three-quarters of the OFR denominated in US Dollars, Euros, Japanese Yen and Pound Sterling, with the US Dollar forming the bulk. Each asset class in the portfolio serves a function.

Between June 2018 and February this year we had 477 mentee applications, of whom 60% were women. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  Culture change takes time: align incentives and provide support at all layers to embed change One of the problems that reviews such as the Treasury Committee’s Women in Finance Enquiry have highlighted is the delta between a board’s progressive, longer-term thinking on diversity and the actions of middle managers who often tend to recruit on a safe, short-term basis. That is why executive leadership and communication on diversity is important. At the Bank, our Chief Operating Officer, Joanna Place has the prescribed responsibility for diversity under the Senior Managers Regime. She is accountable for organisation-wide progress against the Bank’s diversity targets and each and every Deputy Governor is expected to get involved with diversity initiatives. Changing culture requires both leadership and embedded structural change. When the most senior people in the Bank demonstrate our core values - inclusive, collaborative, empowering, decisive and open - in their everyday work, it becomes easier to make the required changes in all layers of the organisation. With our senior leadership stepping up and both promoting and living the diversity agenda, we have been able to embed these values directly into the performance assessments and pay of all colleagues.
I’ll be taking stock on how we are doing with respect to our employment and inflation goals and whether it will be appropriate to continue purchasing longer-dated Treasuries when that program concludes. I think that this will depend on whether we have seen a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  in the interim and any further evidence about the costs and benefits of continuing such purchases. In terms of our monetary policy regime, the FOMC statement noted that the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy “for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.” This is important because in situations such as the one we find ourselves in today, when monetary policy is somewhat constrained because we cannot lower the federal funds rate below zero, one of the most powerful things a central bank can do is to provide guidance as to how it will behave in the future. In this respect, I am pleased that we have drawn a sharper distinction between what we expect the economy to look like in a few years time and how we expect to set policy based on that outlook. In particular, when the Committee extended the period for which it anticipates keeping the federal funds rate at exceptionally low levels – which I interpret to mean the current range of zero to 25 basis points – to “at least through mid-2015,” I don’t think this was due to greater pessimism about the economic outlook.

And they bring to the forefront French scientific expertise and technology: artificial intelligence, cryptography, distributed ledger technology, etc. Regardless of how they are integrated into the financial sector – via cooperation or direct competition with established players – they make the industry more dynamic. This is also true with regard to the entry into financial services of the Bigtechs, which are often less keen on competition. I’m not just saying this to please the Fintechs that are here with us today. It is a deeply-held belief and a commitment, on my part and on that of the entire ACPR. But what, I hear you ask, are you doing concretely to help the Fintechs in their development? Let me start by reminding you that the Banque de France is working with Fintechs on two levels: via its mission of providing services to the economy – to businesses and SMEs – and via its mission of safeguarding financial stability. Our role as a central bank and supervisor, is to reconcile confidence and innovation. If you would allow me to borrow a metaphor from the history of the railroads – which were originally a major innovation in the 19th century, but also one that was not without its risks – our role is to prevent the train from derailing and to make sure the passengers aren’t afraid to get on board. We therefore need to encourage innovation but also ensure that people trust innovations. At the Banque de France, we have taken various steps to promote innovation.
A cross-border crisis situation involves several national authorities, of course, each having different mandates regarding when and how they can intervene. Even more importantly, these authorities may have different objectives to pursue, but are in all cases accountable to national taxpayers and depositors. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Third, and closely linked to the previous two points, the lack of private financing arrangements also poses a significant barrier to effective resolution. Even the best resolution framework needs some funds to finance the measures. However, as long as strong interlinkages exist between supervisory and crisis management policies on the one hand and fiscal policies on the other, cooperation will be hard to ensure among national authorities. As an alternative, there are many possible forms of private financing: one could use the funds of the deposit guarantee scheme, set up an ex ante resolution fund, or ensure that the creditors contribute to recapitalisation. The bottom line is that the lack of such a means ultimately undermines the effective implementation of resolution measures. Initiatives at the global level Work at the international level to address these issues is ongoing and there are some promising developments. The Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) new standard, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes”, adopted by the G20, is a point of reference for the reform of our national resolution regimes. These key attributes aim to enable authorities to resolve failing financial firms in an orderly manner and without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss.

Under such a framework, it would be clear for both banks and the authorities, that measures of increasing intrusiveness would have follow as the financial situation of a bank worsened. An important element of such a regime that limits moral hazard, regulatory forbearance and creditor losses as well, is that authorities are obliged to take over a failing bank before its capital is fully depleted. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Finally, many, including the staff of the IMF, have supported the idea of a European Resolution Authority responsible for crisis management and resolution, probably combined with a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund. This is certainly the most ambitious plan of all, but was always considered as politically challenging and legally difficult to implement. Advancing towards a truly European solution I believe that all these proposals have important elements. In my view, the optimal arrangement for the EU would probably draw on all of these. There should be binding rules for the cooperation of Member States, and measures should be activated according to clear and transparent – although not automatic and not solely quantitative-based – triggers. Indeed, the resolution of a cross-border systemically important financial institution would probably be most efficient if the measures were at least strongly coordinated by one lead authority. Or, if we go a step further in our thinking, the ultimate long-term vision could be to establish one supranational authority, an FDIC-type entity implementing group resolution.
Jean-Pierre Landau: Procyclicality – what it means and what could be done Remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Landau, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Bank of Spain's conference on Procyclicality and the Role of Financial Regulation; Madrid, 4 May 2009. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure and privilege to be in Madrid for this conference hosted by the Bank of Spain and the Financial Stability Institute. I would like to present a few remarks on procyclicality, what it means, what role it played in the current crisis and which policy options are available to mitigate its amplitude and impact on financial systems. What is procyclicality? Strictly speaking, procyclicality refers to the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend during the economic cycle. Increased procyclicality thus simply means fluctuations with broader amplitude. Such a simple description seldom fits the behaviour of financial systems in real life. More likely, following a shock, the path of asset prices and evolution of financial aggregates will display various and highly irregular forms of volatility, with possible non linearities and discontinuities (a good example being liquidity freezes). These are characteristic features of complex systems. "Once such a system is destabilized, it moves away from the linear regime and experience non linear behaviour such as path dependance … sustained oscillations … and regime shifts" 1 . Indeed, financial systems can be seen as complex systems 2 . They are based on interdependence between multiple actors and counterparties.

Guidance, Contingencies and Brexit Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  Society of Professional Economists 24 May 2018  I am grateful to James Benford and Clare Macallan for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Introduction This evening I would like to discuss potential paths for monetary policy during the next, critical phase of the Brexit process. Note the conditionality of the phrase “potential paths.” The actual path for policy will depend on the outlook for the economy which in turn will depend very much on how the Brexit negotiations evolve. Monetary policy is always contingent on the economic outlook. This is broader than it being data dependent. In order to achieve the inflation target, monetary policy needs to adjust not only to news about current 1  conditions but also to any changes in likely future circumstances. While it may be the MPC that sets interest rates, it is ultimately the economy that determines them. Monetary policy will be most effective if agents can anticipate how policymakers will react to changing conditions. But the predictability of monetary policy can break down when there are large structural changes in: -  Supply capacity;  -  Equilibrium interest rates; or  -  Trading relationships. In such circumstances, forward guidance can help anchor expectations and improve the effectiveness of monetary policy.