samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But one of the roles of, and indeed justifications for, regulation is to ensure that firms also take sufficient account of the interests of others who would be adversely affected by their failure: their own borrowers and depositors, for example, but also the customers of other banks that would suffer losses if a particular bank were to get into difficulties. In other words, one purpose of regulation is to align private choices with public welfare maximisation. Hitherto, public authorities have placed much emphasis on capital requirements as a way of achieving this reconciliation. Indeed, one reason for imposing capital requirements is to limit the risk of liquidity problems, by giving the market a level of assurance over the solvency of a firm. But this emphasis on capital has perhaps overshadowed the importance of direct liquidity requirements. Analytically, liquidity is a more difficult area. But arguably the case for prudential liquidity requirements in some form is just as strong as for capital. Liquidity cushions are a first line of defence: in times of stress they can buy time, and where organisations are solvent they can help to prevent liquidity problems turning into solvency ones. I will return to this later. But besides regulation, the public authorities—specifically central banks—have a crucial role as the ultimate providers of liquidity. They therefore need to ensure that they are properly equipped to carry out this function.

If you think about the expansion of markets in which banks participate, both as principals and as intermediaries, and the fact that at times of stress investors would be likely to place a premium on “safe” assets and ultimately on cash, then it soon gets you back to thinking about the robustness of arrangements that enable banks to satisfy unexpected spikes in cash demand, perhaps in unexpected locations. Markets rely on this in order for them to function with confidence. 2. How has the world changed? I said that Bagehot would recognise the modern role of central banks. However, the firms that comprise the financial system are much altered since his day. So I should like to make a few observations both about how this has affected firms’ own liquidity management, and crucially how the public authorities might react. Firstly, concentration in the global financial system has increased, with a relatively small number of global firms—banks and non-banks—representing a significant fraction of the system. These firms often employ centralized liquidity management. And they are increasingly strongly interconnected, within and across borders, and via new markets for risk transfer as well as more traditional channels. Participation in risk transfer markets does more than just create new links between firms: it also creates a new potential demand on firms’ liquidity in the form of margin calls. Moreover, this additional demand may be positively correlated with other liquidity risk that firms face in the event of market stress.
A forum, such as this, is one good example of how as a community, we recognise companies that have done well in their CG disclosures and practices. Companies with good CG are characterised by a sense of mission to hold themselves to high standards of accountability, transparency and sustainability, which are in turn critical to a thriving capital market. Good CG in companies stands for doing right and doing good so as to do well over the long run. Conversely, companies that fall short in their CG practices will hurt investor confidence. Failings in larger institutions can also undermine system-wide financial stability. There have been recent public commentaries on companies flagged for corporate transgressions. Some reports are accompanied by calls for more forceful regulatory actions, or further tightening of CG standards. So allow me to briefly describe the regulatory framework for CG in Singapore. The MAS, as the statutory regulator, is responsible for a sound framework within which market discipline and enterprise can thrive. In regulating and developing the capital markets, we seek to be balanced. On the one hand, to allow for growth and appropriate risk-taking and on the other hand, to curb potential abuses and wrongful acts. The Singapore Exchange (SGX), as the frontline market regulator, administers the SGX Listing Rules. The SGX is responsible for ensuring that the market operates in a fair, orderly and transparent manner.

Attention therefore was given for banking institutions to accord a special focus on providing financial services to SMEs, in particular in strengthening their facilities, outreach and services to SMEs. Today, all commercial banks have dedicated SME divisions and Bumiputera Development Units that are responsible for providing lending as well as ancillary support and advisory services to the SMEs. The commercial banks also have a specific client charter for SMEs, providing the necessary information to facilitate SMEs in applying for financing. The strategy to provide increased access to financing is also reinforced by the provision of information and financial advisory services to SMEs. In 2005, Bank Negara Malaysia established Laman Informasi, Nasihat dan Khidmat (or the LINK), as a one-stop centre for SMEs to obtain information and raise matters on access to financing directly with Bank Negara Malaysia. The LINK has dedicated staff that provides financial advisory services including for dealing with problems of obtaining financing and for restructuring of existing loans. To date, about 11,000 SMEs have sought assistance from the LINK. Another important initiative in disseminating information to the SMEs is the establishment of the SMEinfo Portal, an information gateway for SMEs. The Portal provides comprehensive information required by SMEs, including details on the Government's financial and non-financial assistance, financing products for SMEs by the financial sector, training programmes as well as advise on how to start and manage a business. The Portal also provides a platform for SMEs to advertise their products  BIS Review 13/2007  1  and services.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Reform of the financial sector Opening remarks by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Third Conference on the reform of the financial sector on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of Expansión, organised by Expansión and KPMG, Madrid, 13 May 2011. *  *  *  Let me first thank Expansión and KPMG for kindly inviting me to take part in this forum on the reform of the financial sector. Financial system reform is under worldwide scrutiny by multilateral agencies, governments, central banks, supervisors and even public opinion. Their interest is understandable, as the unprecedentedly acute economic crisis in recent years did indeed originate in the financial system. The concern to identify the errors that led us to crisis and, above all, to prevent it recurring is therefore not surprising. The response to the crisis is largely taking shape in the international arena, given that the main factors at its root have a global reach. Also, many of the measures needed to prevent its recurrence can only be implemented if they are tackled in a coordinated fashion by the main world economies. In recent years we have also witnessed changes in world economic governance of a speed and on a scale that would have been inconceivable a short time ago.

The banks borrowed the foreign currencies abroad and on-lent them to customers, avoiding open exchange risk exposures. However, when the krona was attacked and the fixed exchange rate subsequently had to be abandoned, banks were doubly affected. Foreign counterparties, perceiving the banks’ weakened position, reduced or withdrew credit lines. This forced the banks to demand either early repayment from customers or loan conversion into domestic currency. This led, in turn, to sharply increased loan losses because, at short notice, borrowers were unable to raise the larger amounts in krona that were needed to repay the foreign currency loans, which the krona’s depreciation had made much more expensive. Neither had the supervisory authority, the Bank Inspectorate, adjusted. It continued its traditional formal supervision, ensuring that reports, permits et cetera were formally correct, rather than supervising the actual risks. The authority was also somewhat complacent about risks (to be frank, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance should share the blame for this) since BIS Review 65/1998  -3-  Sweden had not experienced a financial crisis since the 1930s. Lacking relevant crisis experience, the authorities did not perceive that the 1980s could pave the way to a new financial crisis. The decade was, after all, characterised by sustained economic growth, rising bank profits and extremely low loan losses. The financial weaknesses I have described so far are quite similar in Sweden and Korea. However, some differences should also be noted: •  In Sweden, banks had built up good capital reserves.
Yet efficient market forces “should” eliminate these disequilibria by having wages adjust to ensure full employment always and forever. Monetary Policy is not only a response to these rigidities; it is made effective by them. In capital markets, there is ‘momentum everywhere’. From bonds to equities to currencies and commodities, past winners seem to enjoy further winning streaks, while past losers persist in trailing behind. 4 Yet efficient market forces ‘should’ eliminate these predictable movements before they become apparent. *** The belief that markets always clear had two dangerous consequences. 5 First, if markets always clear, they can be assumed to be in equilibrium; or said differently “to be always right.” If the received wisdom is that the market is efficient, then bubbles can neither be identified nor their potential causes addressed. Such thinking dominated the (non)reaction to US subprime and housing booms. Consider that many market participants find it more profitable to anticipate each other’s behaviour than to divine the fundamentals. 3  For a review of this broader phenomenon, see Padoa-Schioppa, T (2010), “Markets and government before, during and after the 2007-20xx crisis”, The Per Jacobsson Lecture, June. 4  Asness, C, Moscowitz, T and Pedersen, L (2013), “Value and momentum everywhere”, Journal of Finance, LXVIII, No. 3, June. 5  See also Turner, A (2010), “Market efficiency and rationality: why financial markets are different”, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures, London School of Economics.

An online portal for registration will open tomorrow morning, with attendance determined shortly thereafter by a ballot. 11 Debate on social media is already underway, 12 and there will be live webcasts available on the day. The Open Forum is open to everyone, because the UK’s markets matter for everyone. Our goal is to discuss the prospects for market functioning, where regulations might overlap or conflict, and whether enough has been done to build the real markets the UK deserves. Markets that merit social licence and reinforce social capital. In the best traditions of Harvard, we should use the compass of Veritas, so that, when we too are dust, others can build on our legacy, as so many have on that of Southwark’s John Harvard. 11  See www.boeopenforum.co.uk. 12  See #BoEOpenForum. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
I say “have” advisedly, rather than “do”, because, now that we are in our third year of “One Country, Two Systems”, I am pleased to find that the number of foreigners that I encounter who still seriously misunderstand our system has dwindled away. I would not anyway criticise those who did, or still do, have mistaken understandings of Hong Kong’s constitutional position. After all, Hong Kong is a small territory, a third of the way round the globe from here, and it would be conceited to assume that everybody should know the intimate details of our situation. Anyway, for the avoidance of doubt, let me tell you that Hong Kong enjoys complete constitutional autonomy in its monetary and financial policies. And I can assure you that this autonomy has been fully respected by the Mainland authorities. They are, indeed, as anxious as I am to preserve a stable and prosperous financial environment in Hong Kong. I hope you will forgive me for spending all this time talking about Hong Kong and its currency rather than about the euro. I have done so with a purpose, namely to illustrate the extent to which observers may often be mistaken about the direction of policy or the status of a currency. This is the source of much frustration to those of us trying to preserve financial and monetary stability.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me take this opportunity to say a few words about the phenomenon of Corporate Social Responsibility. Corporate social responsibility has become an integral part of conducting business in most internationally acclaimed and world class organizations and institutions, of which the Bank of Zambia is striving to become. The acknowledgement of the importance of corporate social responsibility, in my view, has come about as a result of most corporate bodies realizing that they actually have more than just a little responsibility towards the communities in which they exist and do business. After all, these same communities cannot be distanced from any economic activity, just as one cannot live without the other. Let me, in this regard, take this opportunity to urge all Commercial Banks, Non-Financial Banking Institutions and other corporate bodies that are involved in community work and corporate social responsibility to please continue assisting the needy. There are numerous projects that are in dire need of assistance. And to all those corporate bodies that are actively engaged in corporate social responsibility programmes, allow me to commend you and urge you not to relent in your efforts to bring the communities you serve closer to you. Distinguished Guests I hasten to add that the Bank of Zambia has not been alone in this project to restore the MUKUYU TREE. The Bank has partnered with the Kabwe Municipal Council leadership with whom we have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This MOU outlines the accountabilities of the various parties.
Figure 7(a) foreign currency reserve in relation to GDP and to the Swedish banking system’s foreign funding and Figure 7(b) foreign currency reserve as a proportion of the country’s short-term debts in foreign currency 2016 7(a ) 15  7(b) 100  Reserves to FX funding Reserves to GDP  342  90  322  80  12  124  70  66  60 52  9  50 41  40 6  36  30  26  20  0 0  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  14  18  9 10 6 7 8 8 3 4 4 4 4 5 1 1 2 2 2 3 3  IRL CYP NDL GRC MLT BGR FRA DEU BEL GB SWE prel FIN EST ESP ITA SVN CAN AUT SVK AUS SWE SGP NOR HKN JPN CHE CZE ISL KOR  10  3  Note. Fi gure 7(a), per cent. Foreign funding refers to Swedish banks’ (including Swedish subsidiaries but excl uding foreign s ubsidiaries) market funding and deposits i n foreign currency. The broken part of the l ine represents the Riksbank’s forecast based on the reduction of the currency reserve proposed i n the draft. Figure 7(b), countries marked in grey belong to the euro a rea. Sources: IMF, Statistics Sweden a nd the Riksbank. Conclusions for monetary policy I opened by noting that these are unusual times in the Swedish economy.

Thomas Jordan: Structures of a new financial system Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Volkshochschule Zürich, University of Zurich, Zurich, 15 April 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Well-functioning financial systems are fundamental for long-term economic growth. They enable capital to be allocated efficiently and facilitate trade in goods and services. However, financial systems also harbour major risks. The recent financial market crisis clearly revealed the vulnerability of our globally integrated financial system. Wrong turns taken in the past few years together with government rescue measures have led to a situation that is, from a liberal perspective, untenable. All this underscores the urgent need to make financial systems more robust and to minimise the risks faced by governments and by national economies as a whole. It will not be possible to banish crises forever, since we cannot be sure what the origins of the next crisis might be or when exactly it will occur. Building a more robust financial system therefore represents a major challenge. The key role that banks play in the economy combined with their high level of vulnerability clearly underline the necessity of effective bank regulation. Greater stability and security, however, do not automatically mean less efficiency or growth. On the contrary, the creation of an intelligent and stabilising framework is a basic prerequisite for the efficient functioning of the financial system.
It became evident that these markets bear risks both for the individual financial institutions (microprudential) and for the financial system (macroprudential). Namely, OTC derivatives are traded bilaterally between banks, other financial institutions and  BIS Review 90/2010  5  corporations. They are not traded through the stock exchange, making difficulties in discovering where the last risk is located, i.e. who bears the last risk. Another set of tools should find a solution for the systemically important financial institutions, extremely complex question, extremely important for the systemic stability of the financial sector. Except for the general agreement about the need of adequate harmonization of the prudential regulation, as the systemically important financial institutions are almost all “crossborder” by their nature, so far no higher consensus on solutions regarding this matter has been reached. In the current discussion, basically there are two distinctive approaches, starting from three key features of the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs): their size, complexity and inter-linkedness. According to one of the approaches, no institution is too big, complicated or linked to fail. In this sense, there are proposals to limit the size of the banks and to separate commercial from investment banking, disintegrate conglomerates by living wills, etc. Some argue that “this reasoning is controversial as the effectiveness of these measures depends on the specific features of a relatively small number of SIFIs; different countries will probably come up with different solutions”.

We have also been conducting several initiatives to help raise awareness of the importance of this issue, including workshops and meetings with the industry to learn more about how the sector is coping with climate change. Despite all these efforts, there are still obstacles and methodological challenges to overcome. These include the longer and uncertain horizon that must be applied to assess these risks, and the finalisation of a common taxonomy enabling us to distinguish what is "green" and what is "brown". I am sure our outstanding speakers today will help us to shed light on these issues, and I look forward to the discussions this morning. As I mentioned earlier, the slogan of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP25, is “Time for Action is now”, so I believe it is time for me to stop talking and move to Lord Stern´s presentation. Thank you very much. 9  Single Supervisory Mechanism. 5/5
July monetary policy report Continued recovery in the world economy as a whole… We pointed out in the July Monetary Policy Report that growth in the world as a whole was good. The forecast was that GDP growth in the coming years would be just over 4 per cent a year, which is higher than the historical average. The emerging economies, including the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), acted as motor (see Figure 1). We also noted that inflation was relatively high in many countries, but that energy and commodity prices in the world market, which rose substantially last year and had pushed up inflation, had levelled off or fallen slightly this year (see Figure 2). …but the recovery in the United States and euro area is sluggish However, the international outlook was divided. The recovery in the United States and the euro area was expected to be slow (see Figure 3). GDP growth in the United States was expected to be just over 2 per cent this year and to only gradually return to more normal levels of around 3 per cent. Unemployment had fallen only marginally from the peak levels noted in the most acute phase of the financial crisis. The impact of energy and commodity prices on inflation had been surprisingly large in the United States, which had led to inflation being relatively high (see Figure 4).

Government bond yields 10 year maturity, per cent 20  20 Germany  18  Greece  18  16  Ireland  16  Italy  14  14  Spain  12  12  Portugal  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: Reuters  12. Government bond yields 10 year maturity, per cent 6.0  6.0  5.5  5.5  5.0  5.0  4.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  USA  2.0  2.0 1.5  Germany  1.5  1.0  Sweden  1.0 0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0 06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: Reuters  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  13. Stock market developments Index, 1 January 2006 =100 180  180 Sweden (OMXS) Euro area (Euro Stoxx) USA (S& P 500) Emerging markets (MSCI)  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40 04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: Reuters  14.