samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Timothy F Geithner: Key challenges in risk management Keynote address by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the RMA/Risk Business KRI’s Global Operational Risk Forum, New York, 13 January 2005. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today. I want to talk about the mix of forces at work on the broader macroeconomic front and what that may imply for risk and for financial stability. By many measures, the economic landscape looks reasonably good. The qualified optimism that now seems to prevail about the global expansion is reflected in low risk premia, unusually low credit spreads, low and quite stable inflation expectations, and low actual and implied volatility. But the global economy faces a set of pressing macroeconomic policy challenges. How should we think about the risks presented by these broader macroeconomic forces, and their implications for the sustainability of this recent period of stable economic performance, and low volatility and risk premia? The U.S. expansion has proven quite resilient. We enter the new year with what appears to be a pretty solid underlying pace of growth. Core inflation is moderate, and various measures of inflation expectations suggest confidence in the outlook for price stability. Estimates of structural productivity growth remain high, although there has been some moderation recently. The pace of global growth has moderated a bit, but most forecasts anticipate a quite strong and broad based expansion.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Global rebalancing, asset prices and policy responses Opening remarks by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Fifth High-Level Seminar of the Eurosystem and Latin American Central Banks, Madrid, 10 December 2010. *  *  *  Good morning and welcome again. More than three years after the global financial system started to show serious signs of instability and two years after being on the verge of a global economic and financial meltdown, the world economy seems to have avoided that risk, backed by a strong and coordinated policy response. Nevertheless, the strengthening has been uneven and the risk of economic and financial instability is still persistent and significant in some regions, like the euro area. Indeed, it is hard to emphasise sufficiently the challenges ahead and how crucial the present juncture is for the future of our Monetary Union. On the contrary, Latin American economies had learned the lessons from the severe financial and economic disruptions they experienced in the not so distant past, and the challenges they currently face are more similar to those that characterised the period of strong growth prior to the financial crisis. These very different sets of present circumstances make today’s exchange of mutual experiences and policy discussion particularly interesting. The title of today’s Seminar was chosen almost a year ago, but it couldn’t be more timely: Global Rebalancing, Asset Prices and Policy Responses.
90  80  80  70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  Jan.06  Jul.06  Jan.07  Jul.07  Jan.08  Jul.08  Jan.09  (*) Corresponds to volatility index VIX. Source: Bloomberg. BIS Review 76/2009  9  Figure 5 Projected world growth (annual change, percent) Subprime crisis erupts  4.0 3.5  2 1 0  2.5  -1  2.0 1.5  Lehmann, AIG, etc. 3  Lehmann, AIG, etc. 3.0  Bear Stearns goes bankrupt  4  Bear Sterns goes bankrupt  -2 07  May Sep. 08  May Sep. 09  -3  May  08  (a) Projections for 2008  Apr. Jul. Oct.  09  Apr. (b) Projections for 2009  Source: Consensus Forecasts. Figure 6 Projected growth for Chile (annual change, percent) 6  Subprime crisis erupts  5  Bear Sterns goes bankrupt  Bear Stearns goes bankrupt  6 5  Lehmann, AIG, etc. Lehmann, AIG, etc. 4  4  3  3  2 1  2  0  1  -1 07  May  Sep.  08  May  Sep.  (a) Growth projectoins for 2008  08  Apr. Jul. Oct.  09  Apr. (a) Growth projectoins for 2009  Source: Economic Expectations Survey, Central Bank of Chile.

Fourthly, our financial system is solvent and well regulated, which limits the possibility of appreciation bubbles being created by the prospect of inexpensive financing from abroad and abundant credit. We will continue to face important adjustments in the global economy, with exchange rate tensions in all the economies of the world because rigidity among the most important currencies persists. Recovery of the global economy will be gradual and will vary greatly from country to country. This situation presents a national task, which we must each take on board from our own perspective. In the Central Bank we are paying particular attention to the evolution of the exchange rate because we recognize that there has been rapid and substantial appreciation and we must be watchful that this does not hinder the vigorous growth of our economy. That growth will be long-lasting provided that we ensure stability. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 135/2010
Under CRD IV, national authorities shall take account of other variables in addition to the credit-to-GDP ratio.2 The four key indicators are also in line with the new Norwegian regulation, which states that the basis for the buffer decision from Norges Bank “shall contain an overview of the credit-to-GDP ratio and the extent to which it deviates from the long-term  1  The trend is estimated using a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter (lambda = 400000) extended by a forecast. The mean is for the entire period in the chart. 2  Articles 135(1)(c) and 136(3)(c) of Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  trend, as well as other indicators, and Norges Bank’s assessment of systemic risk that is building up or has built up over time”. Under the regulation, Norges Bank shall take account of guidance from the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The ESRB is currently working to formulate guidelines for setting the buffer rate. Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet are actively participating in this effort. Once the guidelines are in place, recommendations from the ESRB on methodologies and benchmarks for setting the buffer rate will be included in the basis for the buffer decision. In line with the recommendations from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the regulatory framework, there should not be a mechanical relationship between developments in the indicators and Norges Bank’s advice on the buffer as relationships in the economy are too complex. The advice will always be based on qualified judgement.

In the case of solvent institutions, we have known theoretically since Thornton (1802), and probably over a century, as a practical policy, how to deal with that vulnerability in a domestic setting: with central bank LOLR operations, later complemented by deposit insurance. In the current setting, it is far from guaranteed that this process can be replicated at the international level. Of course, in normal times and with developed capital markets, banks can use foreign exchange swap markets to convert domestic liquidity into foreign exchange liquidity speedily and relatively cheaply. However, this process broke down almost completely during the global run on cross-border non-US bank liabilities in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman collapse. In a situation like this, the home central bank’s ability to assist banks to acquire the foreign liquidity denied them on the market and thus avoid a failure of banks to deliver on their foreign currency payments is limited by the size of its reserves or the willingness of the central bank issuing the international currency in question to help. Although the provision of foreign currency liquidity through reserves was clearly important during the crisis, most studies seem to support the conclusion that the dollar swap lines made the crucial difference, especially when they were uncapped vis-à-vis some key central banks. To a significant degree, this was the domestic LOLR process replicated at the international level. Does this mean that we have the solution? At the conceptual level, yes, but at the practical level, maybe not.
Thomas Jordan: Challenges for the SNB in extraordinary times Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Berne, 20 June 2008. *  *  *  Around the world, the effects of the financial crisis on the implementation of monetary policy and the composition of central banks’ balance sheets are becoming more and more apparent. On the one hand, conventional monetary policy has all but exhausted its options, and unconventional measures are being increasingly used. On the other hand, some central banks are having to manage the illiquid assets which they took over in an effort to stabilise the banking system. Both of these situations also apply to the Swiss National Bank. Therefore, after giving a brief assessment of the developments in the international financial markets, I will turn my attention to the unconventional monetary policy measures being taken by the SNB. I will then move on to discuss the SNB StabFund. To conclude, I will look at the risks facing the SNB that are associated with these activities. Situation in the international financial markets Although the first few weeks of the year saw stock markets around the globe experiencing their lowest levels in many years, the surprisingly positive results from the US banking sector in mid-March prompted a turnaround in market sentiment. Stock markets have since been recording strong price gains. Other financial market segments also saw a significant recovery.

Purchase of foreign currency The aim of our buying foreign currency is to prevent an appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro. This is the key component of our unconventional monetary policy. It is important to emphasise that we do not engage in foreign exchange interventions in order to  BIS Review 77/2009  1  bring about a depreciation of the Swiss franc, but to prevent any further appreciation of the franc in its role as a safe haven currency. Therefore, the reproach we occasionally hear that the SNB’s policy is encouraging an international depreciation race is unjustified. A look at exchange rate movements shows a clear appreciation of the Swiss franc during the course of the financial market crisis (cf. chart 1). So there can be no question of the SNB conducting a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. We give ourselves a great deal of latitude with regard to our foreign exchange interventions. There is no fixed threshold beyond which we become active; we simply decide in accordance with the situation at hand. And markets should not become used to a certain level of intervention. We feel that this approach promises the highest possible impact, which in turn will allow us to phase out the strategy more easily when the time comes. Furthermore, we do not comment on the volume of our foreign currency purchases. The purchases of foreign currency have fulfilled their purpose – and with these I am referring to our first unilateral interventions in the foreign exchange market since 1992.
In the United States, however, the upward shift in productivity growth has led to a development along the lines I discussed earlier, with growing expectations of future profits and incomes, steeply rising share prices, extensive new issues and credit growth. Massive investment in the corporate sector has been accompanied by rapidly rising purchases of durable goods. The private sector’s financial balance has deteriorate rapidly and become increasingly negative. That in turn has enlarged the deficit on current account. In Sweden, the Stockholm Exchange has been driven by the stock-market boom in the United States, not least in the IT and telecom sectors, but credit growth has been more moderate. Neither has investment risen as rapidly as in the United States. The private sector financial balance has not undergone such a marked negative swing and for several years the current account has shown relatively large surpluses. So in crucial respects the course of events in Sweden in the second half of the 1990s differs from that in the United States. Against this background, in this period the Riksbank has not found any grounds for sizeable departures from the rule of action. 5. Conclusions  So what conclusions can be drawn about how monetary policy ought to react when the economy is exposed to different types of shock? I have discussed two types of shock: price effects from deregulations and an upward shift in productivity growth.

Finally, and crucially, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, we are working with Fed colleagues and other agencies to help put the nation’s financial system on a firmer footing. Yet, much remains to be done and we are determined to keep at it. I recognize fully that there can be no return to pre-crisis business as usual – whether on the part of the financial sector or on the part of regulators like ourselves. All in all, there is a lot to keep my colleagues busy. National economic conditions Now, let me update you on national economic conditions. Put simply, growth in 2011 has been disappointing. We entered the year with some momentum, spurred by fiscal and monetary policy stimulus. U.S. economic output grew at a 3 percent annual rate from mid-2009 through 2010. While hardly a blistering pace, it was sufficient to reduce the unemployment rate by a half percentage point during 2010. Then, during the first half of 2011, growth slowed so much that the unemployment rate rose back up to 9.1 percent. Growth slowed partly because of temporary factors. As these factors have subsided, growth has picked up. But the consensus expectation for 2.4 percent annualized growth in the third quarter is still disappointing. Looking forward, I regard continued modest growth as the most likely outcome. This sluggishness convinces me that other, more persistent factors must also be holding back growth.
This is all clearly beneficial for growth, so we may conclude: the more quality social capital there is the higher growth will be. In this lecture I will not elaborate the concept of social capital any further. My intentions are to focus narrowly on the issue where I think my comparative advantage may be, namely central banking, and its role in promoting social capital. It is not very common to associate central banks with the development of social capital, but I would argue that by forcefully pursuing its functions the central bank is increasing social capital especially in transition economies. Central banks are usually associated with two main functions: macroeconomic stability or more precisely price stability which today is considered the principal mandate of a central bank and financial stability, which is usually narrowed down to banking system stability. Not all transition central banks are responsible for banking supervision, but most are. First let me explore the idea of increasing social capital by pursuing price stability. Today, most transition economies have managed to have relatively modest inflation after the initial outburst of inflation and even hyperinflation. But it is worth remembering that inflation is always a constant threat, it is never dead, only tamed. Central banks must continuously send a credible message that complacency will not set in and that price stability is their main long-term objective. People must always be reminded that inflation is a tax.

SPEECH DATE:  3 April 2020  SPEAKER:  Governor of the Riksbank Stefan Ingves  VENUE:  www.riksbank.se  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  The Riksbank’s measures to mitigate the effects of the corona crisis on the economy These last three weeks have been some of the most dramatic Sweden has experienced in modern times. On 10 March, we told the Parliamentary Committee on Finance that the assessments described in the Monetary Policy Report from February had become entirely irrelevant.1 We already knew then that the Swedish economy would be affected by the coronavirus. What we did not know, however, was the force and extent of the impact. Our message then was that the Riksbank was ready to act to mitigate the negative effects on the economy. Since then, we have spoken to both companies and banks, and we have implemented a number of measures. Today, I’d like to talk about what we have done and how the measures are contributing to the ongoing economic crisis management effort. “Everything has changed in two weeks” “Everything has changed in two weeks” This was one of the quotes from the companies we have interviewed on account of the corona pandemic2. The fact is that the situation is changing so rapidly that it is difficult to form an idea of exactly how bad things are in the economy.
The EPG will be tasked to come up with bold and practical ideas on how to revitalise and strengthen ASEAN. Singapore's prospects are bright 9. Given the favourable external environment, the outlook for Singapore is good. In the first nine months of this year, we have generated more than 78,000 jobs, almost 7,000 more than the whole of last year. Inflation has stayed low. This year, we expect GDP growth to be around 5%. Next year, growth should be between 3% and 5%. BIS Review 83/2005  1  10. Singapore's financial sector has grown strongly, averaging 5.4% over the first three quarters of the year, slightly higher than the overall expansion in the economy. This was supported by robust contributions from fund management and continued growth in the Asian Dollar Market. 11. Relations with our neighbours have strengthened considerably. Economic cooperation has further deepened. Singapore is the fourth largest investor in Indonesia. In February, we signed the IndonesiaSingapore Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA), which serves to establish a framework for investors to operate in stability and confidence. 12. Political ties between Singapore and Malaysia have improved. Trade and investments across the Causeway continue to grow strongly. Malaysia is Singapore's biggest trading partner and Singapore was the second largest group of foreign investors in Malaysia last year. Temasek Holdings acquired 5% of Telekom Malaysia. In turn, Khazanah Nasional teamed up with Telekom Malaysia to take a 30% stake in M1. Such cross-border investments will further intermesh our two economies. 13.

Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Beyond the turmoil – rules, supervision and infrastructures Speech by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the opening panel at the SPIN 2009 Conference, Rome, 15 June 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to participate in the opening discussion at this conference. The organisers, in choosing the title of the panel, have given us the challenging task to look beyond the current turmoil surrounding rules, supervision and infrastructures. This is certainly not easy as we cannot yet speak of an end to the difficult period facing both the financial and real sectors of the economy. However, looking beyond the turmoil and start implementing the lessons we have learned is exactly what is needed at this point in time. Against the background of the crisis up until now, we have to draw the right conclusions and begin designing the future of the financial architecture, including new rules and improved supervision and oversight. This needs to be done now before the window of opportunity – which will not remain open forever – closes. However, before looking beyond the turmoil let me take the opportunity first to examine the performance of market infrastructures in the current crisis. Developments in the financial markets and the fate of specific institutions have been at the heart of the public debate.
Perhaps the most interesting example is the development of quality credit data which has enabled financial institutions to make informed and responsible lending decisions in a timely manner and to be able to mitigate serious problems such as fraud. These data have also assisted Bank Negara Malaysia in performing its macro- and micro-surveillance duties and in its policy-making role. The data in this case came from the development of a comprehensive credit registry system. The availability of such data also allows individuals with good payment track records to make a more credible case for access to credit, and helps overcome the limitation of inadequate collateral. Another example is the collaborative project with the Department of Statistics Malaysia to conduct the Baseline Census of Establishments and Enterprises in 2005. The data gathered from this initiative enabled the policy-makers to have a much more detailed profile of the SME and micro-enterprise segments of the economy. The insights gained led to a new understanding of the SME business landscape, and the launch of a national strategy for SME development. Specific strategies could be developed, and the availability of data helped in having more constructive dialogue between different stakeholders. We also note that relatively new policy areas for financial inclusion require better data that enable validation of policy stance, or in some cases change in policy direction.

Rachel Lomax: Current monetary policy issues Speech by Ms Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Hull & Humber Chamber of Commerce, Hull, 22 November 2007. I am very grateful to Gareth Ramsay for his help in preparing this speech, and to several other colleagues at the Bank of England for useful comments. *  *  *  Tonight I want to talk about the current issues confronting the Monetary Policy Committee. It’s hard to tell the story of an economy as open as the UK without starting with global developments. That’s not a point I need to labour here in Hull, the Gateway to Europe, and home to a brand new World Trade centre. And it’s never been more true than today. The past 4 years have seen the fastest growth in the world economy since the early 1970s 1 . But even more striking than its pace has been the change in the balance of global growth, with emerging economies contributing nearly three quarters of the increase in world output 2 . This has become even more pronounced over the past year, as Chinese growth has picked up even as the US economy has slowed. The world’s economic see-saw has tilted. That’s the new reality behind two dramas that have held the world’s attention since last August: the turmoil in financial markets; and the renewed surge in energy prices. Both these developments are highly unusual and very recent. No-one knows how they will play out.