samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Other concerns could include the burdens and deadweight losses associated with reserve requirements, the implications of the framework for the efficiency and resilience of money markets and government securities markets, and the framework’s ability to help support the efficiency and resilience of payment systems. 20  For example, a large supply of “money-like” assets provided by the official sector could crowd out some shortterm private sector liabilities, reducing the amount of maturity transformation in the financial system and improving financial stability. See, for example, Mark Carlson, Burcu Duygan-Bump, Fabio Natalucci, William R. Nelson, Marcelo Ochoa, Jeremy Stein, and Skander Van den Heuvel, “The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability: Some Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion Series, no. 2014–102, November 2014. 21  Maintaining a large balance sheet in normal times may be perceived as a “slack” variable that invites policymakers to use it for non-monetary policy objectives. See, for example, https://www.philadelphiafed.org/ publications/speeches/plosser/2010/09–24–10_swiss-national-bank. 22  For a discussion of footprint considerations in the design of the Federal Reserve’s overnight reverse repo operations, see Joshua Frost, Lorie Logan, Antoine Martin, Patrick McCabe, Fabio Natalucci, and Julie Remache, “Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy Tool: Some Design Considerations,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 712, February 2015.

Simon M Potter: Money markets and monetary policy implementation Dinner address by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for the Bank of England-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference on Money Markets and Monetary Policy Implementation, London, 16 November 2015. *  *  *  I would like to thank Deborah Leonard and Antoine Martin for their excellent assistance in the preparation of these remarks and colleagues in the Federal Reserve System and global central bank community for their insightful comments and suggestions. Introduction It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to give the address at tonight’s dinner. I would like to start by thanking the Bank of England for hosting this conference on money markets and monetary policy implementation. It’s hard to think of a better place to discuss these topics than just steps away from the historic Lombard Street, described in Bagehot’s classic book on money markets.1 I also want to thank all of you for actively participating in today’s discussions. One thing I particularly enjoyed about the event was the interaction among market practitioners, central bankers, and researchers. I think the diversity of perspectives that these groups bring contributes to a fruitful dialogue that can help lead to more informed choices and decisions. I will come back to this point.
On that front we are well advanced in implementing in the UK a programme of reforms to regulation that is unprecedented in scope and effect. To give some examples of reforms and progress: capital requirements for globally systemic banks have increased ten-fold; and since the crisis, major UK banks’ leverage has roughly halved; they have cut the share of total funding accounted for by short-term wholesale funding from nearly 30% in 2007 to 10%; reduced trading assets by a third and cut inter-bank exposures by two thirds. Second, we need to address, through time, the risks that build up in the financial cycle. Financial cycles – the build-up of credit and risk driven largely by the dynamics of the financial system and its interaction with the economy – are generally longer than the “economic” or “business” cycle. The upswing of the financial cycle in Bricks and Mortals lasted from around 1980 until the early 1990s. The last cycle was longer and more powerful. The FPC needs to identify, assess and mitigate risks building up over the cycle both in the financial system and in the economy as a whole. Or to put it in the terms of Alastair’s warning, to make sure that as memories fade, confidence returns and the dynamics of the financial cycle become more powerful we do not simply make the same mistakes again.

There is a growing tendency towards mortgage payment problems for households with low debt-servicing capacity and creditworthiness. But so far the decline in the housing market has not had major spillover effects on either the wider US economy or the global economy. Developments in international financial markets were marked by unrest during the winter months. Equity prices fell markedly, but are now close to the levels prevailing in February. Short-term interest rates in the US are now expected to remain unchanged in the period to summer, but to fall somewhat during the latter part of autumn. In the euro area, there are prospects that interest rates will stabilise at around 4 per cent. Interest rates are expected to rise gradually in Sweden and to peak in the UK in the course of summer. Buoyant growth in the global economy has contributed to very high prices for oil, gas and other commodities. Oil prices have averaged USD 59 per barrel so far this year, or close to USD 6 lower than the average in 2006. In the past week in particular, oil prices have increased markedly owing to the uncertainty surrounding the situation in the Middle East. Global demand for oil continues to grow, while production growth forecasts in non-OPEC countries have been revised downwards recently. Oil futures prices one to two years ahead are just below USD 70 per barrel. Commodity prices rose sharply in the first six months of 2006 and have since remained at a high level.
Its recovery or wind-down must not be allowed to jeopardise the stability of the economy as a whole. For this purpose, the regulations stipulate requirements for resolution planning. For example, by end-2019, systemically important banks in Switzerland have to prepare ‘emergency plans’ demonstrating that they will be able to continue their systemically important functions in Switzerland without interruption in the event of a crisis. The second pillar also specifies requirements for loss-absorbing capacity. Systemically important banks must hold sufficient financial resources to cover losses in a crisis or to finance the costs of a separation of systemically important functions. Banks can use so-called  Page 9/14  ‘bail-in’ instruments for this purpose. These are essentially debt securities which can be converted into equity or written down in the event of impending insolvency. 20 These measures are especially designed to counter the de facto obligation by the state to provide assistance in the event of a crisis. The organisational arrangements facilitate an orderly separation of the central functions within a reasonable timeframe. Furthermore, creditors are to participate directly in the default risk. The intention is to ensure a bail-in by creditors rather than a bail-out by the state in the event of a crisis by predefining the criteria for when debt securities are converted or written down. The Swiss regulatory approach is thus aimed at tackling the fundamental causes of ‘too big to fail’. This was also the conclusion reached by the Federal Council in its 2015 evaluation report.

Speech  Embargo 6 September 2018, 6.30 pm  After the storm: ten years on, how weatherproof is the Swiss banking system today? University of Lucerne  Fritz Zurbrügg Vice Chairman of the Governing Board * Swiss National Bank Lucerne, 6 September 2018 © Swiss National Bank, Berne, 2018 (speech given in German)  *  The speaker would like to thank Till Ebner and Rita Fleer for their support in drafting this speech. He also extends his thanks to Nicole Allenspach, Jürg Blum and Jacqueline Thomet, as well as SNB Language Services. Page 1/14  Ladies and Gentlemen Almost exactly ten years ago, on 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest US investment bank at the time, filed for bankruptcy. The ensuing storm engulfed the global financial markets with a ferocity and magnitude that took all market observers by surprise. The collapse of Lehman Brothers made it clear that many financial institutions could not withstand such a buffeting without government support. The financial crisis spilled over rapidly into the real economy, resulting in the deepest global recession since the Great Depression. We all have our own personal memories of this difficult period. Many of you are probably thinking of 16 October 2008, the day on which the Swiss authorities stepped in to support UBS with a comprehensive package of measures. Back then, I was working at the Federal Finance Administration.
The increased volume of foreign exchange transactions, the process of internationalization and market-determined prices have all increased the market risk that the banks are exposed to, and this, in turn, has increased the need to introduce risk measures aimed at protecting banks’ capital. For this purpose, regulatory studies are jointly conducted by the Central Bank and the Treasury, and commonly accepted risk measures, such as limits on net open foreign exchange positions, and capital adequacy ratios, have been introduced in addition to credit limits and other measures consistent with EU standards. Another practice followed to make supervision more effective and obtain better evaluations of banks’ real financial standing is consolidated supervision. Authorized independent bank auditors play an important role in the bank supervision process. Each bank in the sector must obtain an independent audit report every year. These reports are prepared by authorized independent auditing firms operating in accordance with the commonly accepted international accounting and auditing principles. Another important feature of the Turkish banking system, and not a new one, is its deposit insurance scheme. It was first introduced in 1933 and redesigned in 1983 with the establishment of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. This Fund’s main source of income is a premium paid by banks, equal to a certain percentage of their savings deposits. In 1994 a new Decree came into effect and all banks’ deposits, whether denominated in Turkish lira or foreign currencies, were fully insured by the Fund.

This means that this year investment will fall short of projections, with an annual growth rate that is now estimated closer to 1 percent (4.1 percent in December). It also inputs first-quarter data available, as well as the downward revisions to investment in 2013 and the turn of 2014 shown by the latest survey of the capital goods corporation CBC. Another factor behind the lower growth forecast for the immediate future is the upward correction to inventory levels, meaning that this source of expansion will provide a smaller impulse. The baseline scenario also estimates that, as has been occurring for some quarters, private consumption will post a moderate slowdown, grounded on a looser labor income and a stable borrowing trend. This year, growth will go from less to more. Such a trajectory assumes that investment will stabilize, due to several elements coming together. On one hand, the CBC survey shows an increase in investment plans in engineering works in the second half of 2014 and for the period 2015–2016. On the other, there is housing construction that should continue the trend of last year, considering that the supply of homes is still low, housing sales are strong, and financial conditions (i.e. credit cost and volume) remain favorable. Meanwhile, the fiscal budget for 2014 is expected to be more in line with historical patterns, implying greater public spending with respect to 2013, especially investment. Machinery and equipment imports have been stable for some months.
The banks we allow to access our markets need to meet the high standards we expect and be capable of being effectively supervised. What does responsible openness mean? Sam Woods set out the three pillars of responsible openness in 2019 (and, also built upon this in his Mansion House speech3 last November). 1. First that we should engage strongly in international standard-setting processes and make sure that we are at the forefront of implementing those rules in a thorough way; 2. Second that we adopt practices and structures which promote strong collaboration with colleagues in other jurisdictions; and 3. Third, that we are open to hosting cross-border business in the UK – but only if it is resilient and appropriately controlled and governed, and if we have sufficient visibility of and influence over the necessary supervisory outcomes. My policy colleagues take the lead on our work in international standard setting. As we have reinforced many times now4, we have absolutely no intention of weakening prudential regulation in the UK. The changes that we introduced post 2008, have stood the banking sector in very good stead, for example in enabling it to withstand the stresses posed by the Covid pandemic in 2020. This statement sets out our expectations on the second and third of these pillars.

The Bank also issued its own notes which, due to the implicit backing of the government, circulated as currency with the public. At this stage, the Bank was far from being the nationalised, policymaking body we know today. Rather, the Bank was a quasi-private bank conducting its business for quasicommercial ends. Other banks at the time were engaged in similar commercial pursuits, including often issuing their own notes. Except, of course, they lacked the government as guarantor. This made for a competitive, and at times rather antagonistic, relationship between the Bank and the commercial banks. This strained relationship lasted for the whole of the 18th and a good chunk of the 19th centuries. Was the Bank friend or foe, collaborator or competitor? The commercial banks did not know. And the Bank – private in name but public in finances – was itself in a state of mild schizophrenia. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  These psychological flaws were exposed in the middle of the 19th century. By then, the Bank had been granted monopoly rights to issue currency. Quite literally, this cut the commercial banks out of a lucrative money-making scheme. This did little to ease competitive tensions between the Bank and the banks. This tension bubbled over in the famous case of Overend and Gurney Bank. In the early part of the 19th century, Overend had grown rapidly to become the largest discount house in London.
Some have proposed a more active role for monetary policy in addressing financial imbalances (Taylor (2010), White (2009)). Others have suggested using new macro-prudential tools to rein in credit excesses (Borio and Lowe (2002), Bank of England (2009), Kashyap et al (2010)). Others still have proposed a radical root-and-branch reform of the structure of banking (Kay (2009), Kotlikoff (2010)). Evaluating the merits of these proposals requires a conceptual understanding of the causes of the credit cycle and an empirical quantification of its dynamic behaviour. What is the underlying friction generating credit booms and busts? Are credit cycles distinct from cycles in the real economy? And how have they evolved, both over time and across countries? Answers to these questions should help frame public policy choices for curbing the credit cycle. To fix ideas, Section 2 sketches a model of the credit cycle. In this model, a lack of information provides incentives for banks to expand their balance sheets to boost profits and signal their ability to investors. This gives rise to a coordination failure, as banks collectively risk-up. That, in turn, generates a systematic credit boom and subsequent bust when risk is realised. Sections 3 and 4 present some empirical evidence on the credit cycle. Across countries and across a sweep of history, credit cycles are both clearly identifiable and regular. Typically, they presage banking crises. In their frequency and amplitude, credit cycles are distinct from the business cycle.

Andrew G Haldane: Curbing the credit cycle Speech presented by Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, at the Columbia University Center on Capitalism and Society Annual Conference, New York, 20 November 2010. *  *  *  The speech was prepared by Messrs David Aikman, Andrew G Haldane and Benjamin Nelson. The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England. We are grateful to Piergiorgio Alessandri, Richard Barwell, Salina Ladha, Roland Meeks, Victoria Saporta and Alan Taylor for comments. Thanks to Vijay Balle and Clare Rogowski for excellent research assistance and to Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor for making their data available to us. 1. Introduction  Credit lies at the heart of crises. Credit booms sow the seeds of subsequent credit crunches. This is a key lesson of past financial crashes, manias and panics (Minsky (1986), Kindleberger (1978), Rogoff and Reinhart (2009)). It was a lesson painfully re-taught to policymakers during the most recent financial crisis. This time’s credit cycle has been particularly severe and synchronous. In 2006, private sector credit across the UK, US and euro area rose by around 10%. During 2009, private credit in these countries fell by around 2%. 1 The knock-on consequences for real growth were equally severe and synchronous. Peak to trough, G7 real output fell by 3.6% during the Great Recession. In response, there have been widespread calls for remedial policy action. These proposals come in various stripes.
(3) ROA is calculated as earning over assets; the leverage ratio as equity over assets. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on data from the SBIF; CMF; and Suseso. Now, regarding potential trade-offs associated to the Chilean regulatory framework: Has the Chilean regulatory framework in place be repressive? The evidence shows that Chile’s banking strength have not undermine its financial development under different perspectives. The Chilean financial system has evolved significantly in recent decades, and its contribution has been key in the economic development of the country and the construction of a more prosperous, healthy and modern economy. Today, the Chilean financial sector is one of the most developed in the emerging world. In five decades, it has gone from being almost exclusively made up of traditional banks, to include several other market participants, such as Pension Funds, General Fund Administrators and Insurance Companies, among others. The Chilean financial system relatively outperforms with respect to other comparable countries in dimensions such as market capitalization, number of branches per inhabitant, and participation in domestic credit. On the other hand, the banking system in particular is positioned among the strongest in the reference group of emerging countries according to comparable international assessments. Page 7 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019 High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation?

International Capital Flows in the Post-crisis World, September 2019 CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE  The Chilean banking industry  Main changes in the Chilean banking industry Change  Concept  Characteristics  Advantages  Challenges  New GBL  New solvency requirements (B3)  Reduces gaps with international standards  Bank’s capacity to comply with new standards  Regulatory environment  Revision of Compendium of Accounting Regulations  Changes if financial statement reporting requirements  Greater importance to the financial statement; reduces asymmetries in financial statement reporting  Maintaining the quality and timelines of financial information; measures for mitigating operational risk  Emerging risks  Cybersecurity events  Vulnerability of digital platforms; temporaray suspensión of services  Mitigation strategies at the industry level  Greater investment cybersecurity  Integration of retail financing  Parent banks absorb nonbank card issuers  Wider coverage of consolidated debtor information  Incorporation of new debtors in credit risk models  Oversear bank subsidies  Acquisition of Banks overseas  Diversification of business models  Different regulatory framework; large overseas investment by local parent banks  Expansion into new business areas  Source: Financial Stability Report, first half 2019, Central Bank of Chile. Let me add one more thing regarding the use of CBM by several EMEs, which have targeted the banking system, rather than the general resident-non-resident relationship, as is usually done by capital controls. The Figure below, for example, based on De Crescenzio et al.
William C Dudley: Reflections on the economic outlook and the implications for monetary policy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at Fordham Wall Street Council, Fordham University Graduate School of Business, New York City, 23 September 2013. *  *  *  Thank you, Dean Gautschi, for that kind introduction. It is a pleasure to be here today at Fordham University and I thank the Fordham Wall Street Council for hosting me. This morning my remarks will focus on the U.S. economic outlook. I am also going to discuss a new tool that the New York Fed will begin to test – an overnight, fixed-rate full allotment reverse repo facility. I want to dispel any misconceptions about why we are doing this testing. The introduction of this facility is not a precursor to a change in the stance of monetary policy. Instead, the goal of this new facility is to improve our control over overnight interest rates to aid us in the implementation of monetary policy. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and opinions and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. Let me start by summarizing my main points regarding the economic outlook. In my view, the economy is slowly healing.

The long-run average of the two inflation measures will be the same, and if the Riksbank aims to stabilise CPIF inflation around 2 per cent then CPI inflation will on average also end up at the target. Deviations between both measures were not expected to be too great or lasting, and if they were to occasionally differ and CPI inflation were far below the target, then this could be dealt with by clear communication from the Riksbank. So it was thought at least. However, even though the “long term” in this case is not so long that we will all be dead, to paraphrase Keynes, it is long enough for the difference between the CPI and CPIF to pose problems. Interest rate developments over the past few years have led to major deviations between the CPI and the CPIF, both upwards and downwards (see Figure 3). The period of cuts which began in December 2011, and which is currently the longest continuous period of  8  See Johansson (2015) for a description of how interest rate changes impact the Swedish CPI and a review of the methods used for measuring costs for owner-occupied housing in different countries. 9  See Palmqvist (2013). 10  See Reserve Bank of Australia (1998) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1999). 11  In 2003 the United Kingdom decided to rename HICP CPI.