samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me give two examples of what is being done: •  As regard prudential supervision, I would only mention the fantastic work which has been achieved by the Basel Committee under the leadership of Bill McDonough, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in the field of banking supervision. I trust that the new accord will permit a better and more appropriate handling of this extremely important domain as regards financial stability. I am also happy that the concept of “dynamic provisioning”, which is anticyclical by nature, has been recognised by the Basel Committee as a useful concept. •  As regards accounting standards, it seems to me that we should also inject in the present meditations in the US, in Europe and at a global level the concern for financial stability. Let us beware of changes that would increase the procyclicality of accounting rules. Let us favour changes that would simultaneously help fair accounting and diminish procyclicality. In that regard, it seems important to me to design accounting practices which would try to take into account of the time horizon of institutions and market participants. Otherwise, we would take the risk of driving all financial institutions and market participants to shorten their time horizon down to a day-to-day basis. This could be a recipe to favour inappropriate market functioning and foster herd instinct in time of excessive volatility. 2.

There are economies of scale in the beta function. We see commercial managers that are providers of beta-exposure that are up to 15 times the size of the Government Pension Fund. Yet we are able to perform these tasks more cost-efficiently in-house. Hence we believe we now are sufficiently large so as to harvest most of the benefits of scale. Economies of scale are more elusive when it comes to active management. On the one hand the excess return potential is reduced because there will be a higher degree of market impact. On the other hand, size can be an advantage in obtaining access to information and in active positions where the objective is to reap the benefits of being a liquidity provider. The setting for the Government Pension Fund with its long investment horizon is well suited for such an objective. All of the passive investment (enhanced indexing) is done internally both for equities and fixed income. On the active side however, we use a large number of external managers. The split differs between equities and fixed income. On the fixed income side, most of the active risk is taken internally while the opposite is the case for equities. In total, about 60 per cent of the active risk stems from external managers. The guiding principle behind this choice is an assessment of expected returns after costs, and a strong belief in diversification among managers. There is no favouring of internal (or external) managers.
Transparency eased communication: an account of the factors behind the revision  In our Monetary Policy Report, the interest rate forecast is accompanied by a separate chart, shown here, that shows the revision since the previous report due to changes in exogenous factors. By carefully explaining the reasoning behind the revisions of our interest rate forecasts, financial market participants and other interested parties can make their own judgment as to whether the revisions seem justifiable. In general, interest rate forecasting has worked well. As market expectations tend to react to economic news largely in line with the Bank’s response pattern, there is little doubt that the contingency of the forecasts is well understood. BIS Review 113/2010  3  Interest rate forecast and exit strategy  Another advantage of publishing our own forecast for interest rates is that the exit strategy is an inherent part of the Bank’s communication. A key element of any exit strategy is that policymakers must guide expectations. An exit that takes markets by surprise can lead to major reassessments of the yield curve. Publishing explicit interest rate forecasts is a very direct way of guiding financial market participants’ expectations. Historical perspective I The decline in world trade during the crises of 1929–1933 and 2008–2010  The third lesson is the need for multilateral cooperation and collective action. As the global economic and financial crises unfolded, joint, massive and unprecedented policy responses were put in place around the world so as to avoid another Great Depression.

But openness is not only a requirement in itself but also a necessary condition for monetary policy to work. It does not work unless the Riksbank and the objective of our activities are supported and legitimated by the people. And this requires that we are open and clear. It should be easy to critically examine how monetary policy is conducted and how well we live up to our principles. Most people probably agree that the Riksbank’s openness has contributed to a good monetary policy debate in recent years. Openness and clarity contribute to monetary policy functioning better But it is not only democratic reasons that have led to the Riksbank and most other central banks becoming more open and clear. Another important reason is that we have quite simply regarded it as a means of more easily achieving our objective and of making monetary policy more efficient. There are three main aspects I would like to emphasise in this context: •  Firstly, it will be easier to communicate that the interest rate decisions made are really aimed at achieving low and stable inflation. This provides greater credibility and helps to anchor expectations around the target. It was an important reason why the Riksbank began to publish its inflation forecasts and other material on which decisions are based early on in the new inflation-targeting system.
As a first pragmatic step, for host supervisors, it is necessary to establish an intermediate holding that consolidates all financial activities, in order to submit systemically important players to requirements. Agustín Carstens elaborated yesterday on the "segregation" and "inclusion" approaches. In addition, regulation of big techs in finance should go beyond traditional regulation of finance. Let me explain: big techs pose at least three new challenges. That of competition - as they are already much more concentrated than existing financial institutions, and the network economy tends to establish "the winner takes most" rule. That of data protection and privacy, of course. And finally, that of operational risk and cybersecurity. However, in each of these three fields - competition, data protection and cybersecurity - there is no international body, unlike in finance. And the national - or European - authorities that do exist are still hardly used to cooperating with each other. To develop cross-border and cross-domain cooperation, the scope is wide but essential: the OECD, the BIS and the FSB can and must be sandboxes. As a beacon of hope, Europe is showing the way on all these common challenges.

But let us not only write reports and elaborate ever more sophisticated thoughts, let us act, starting with comprehensive and effective regulation in the US, as has been done in Europe, and as the UK is on its way to doing with its proposed new set of rules that would bring a broad range of cryptoasset activities into the scope of financial services regulation. This is obviously good news, as long as this proposal ensures consistency with existing legislation, notably in Europe. To that end, I suggest the FSB to monitor closely the implementation of its own recommendations on cryptos, as the Basel Committee does on banking regulations. More broadly, big techs did not make the breakthrough in traditional banking activities that many had expected: why is that? Regulatory constraints certainly stand as a first explanation, especially since they were tightened following the great financial crisis. Both lending and deposit-taking are highly regulated in most advanced economies, and big techs tend to set up partnerships with banks in these countries rather than create a fully-owned subsidiary for instance. In addition, the low-rate environment that prevailed until recently may have been unfavourable to new banks – as their business model relies strongly on the value of sight deposits –, and an ageing population in advanced economies may have preserved loyalty to incumbent banks and insurance companies which benefit from high public trust.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Pressing tasks needed to improve Spain’s economy Address by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the “XXVII Reunión del Círculo de Economía”, Sitges, 3 June 2011. *  *  *  Good morning. Let me first thank the Círculo de Economía for kindly inviting me to participate in this forum. Had you invited me in March last year to talk about the foundations for a new economy in the 21st century, I would surely have focused on what I see as the main challenges facing us this century. Firstly, population ageing, which will affect not only the developed countries but also other emerging nations such as China. Secondly, the growing inequality that has appeared in some countries along with the positive effects of globalisation. Thirdly, the pressing need to use natural resources – and energy resources in particular – rationally. And finally, I would have taken the opportunity to discuss the changes under way worldwide in financial regulation to avoid a repetition of the crisis we have experienced. But I’m not going to talk about this, as in April last year the Greek sovereign debt crisis broke and, since then, the euro area has been immersed in a crisis still to be resolved and which might have very serious consequences not only for its members but for all Europeans and for the world economy as a whole.

But, funding is only one aspect of a micro-business. Prior to as well as subsequent to funding, there are a large number of other requirements that have to be satisfied. First and foremost, anyone desirous of starting a micro-business should have a good knowledge of the market in which he would sell his products. A feature of the market is that it is driven by the consumer who is considered the sovereign. If the consumer does not need a product, no one could force him to buy it, even when it is supplied free of charge. Hence, the goods and services that are produced by micro-businesses should always meet the requirements of the consumers. How can a micro-entrepreneur identify the market requirements? What proxies can he use for that, if he does not have direct information on the same? A problem which he would face in this respect is that he has to produce for the future. Hence, any information relating to the past may be a poor guide for that. This is not a problem unique only to micro-businesses. It is equally relevant to big producers as well. But the advantage for such big business firms is that they have the benefit of the results of consumer preference surveys conducted by various institutions. Such survey results are expensive and beyond the financial capacity of micro-businesses. Yet, without the benefit of such results, it would be a pure gambling for a micro-business to get into the production of these goods and services.
It provides the possibility of  BIS Review 36/2005  3  calibrating systemic risk and developing tools that could potentially be deployed to reduce such risk, and will include scenario analysis and macro-stress testing. In reality, it is unlikely we will converge on a single model which captures systemic risk in its entirety. But by developing and calibrating a suite of models we hope to make some progress towards gauging fragilities and frictions in the financial system better – how likely they are to arise; on what they depend; and, ultimately, what pre-emptive mitigating action might be feasible. This could put financial stability analysis on a more similar analytical footing to monetary policy – albeit with a greater amount of uncertainty regarding eventual outcomes. With time we can review the outputs of this research work. We can then operationalise those that are relevant and robust to help decide our ongoing activities. In other words, the outputs of this R&D activity could become inputs to prioritising our day-to-day risk reduction activities. ii)  Ongoing Activities: Organising Principles  In the meantime we have to address the real risks of today. How are priorities to be set? Financial stability is an area where there are so many things we could do. So we need to have a set of organising principles to help us prioritise and focus. I’d like to describe the process we go through in addressing the difficult decisions – how much to do, and how far to go.

This adds objectivity to what is in many senses a subjective process. Here is an example:  4  BIS Review 36/2005  MATRIX: ORGANISING PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY  Sources of Threat Credit Risk Activities  Assessment of Threats Financial Stability  Market and Liquidity Risk  Infrastructure (including Payment Systems)  International Architecture  to  Risk Reduction Preparation for and Managing a Financial Crisis  The matrix is a common sense map, which enables us to visualise why something is being done, and where it fits into the overall financial stability effort. The specific activities and deliverables that are located in each of the boxes can be scrutinised to see if they meet our objectives or if they should be discontinued. This helps us decide on the level of resource and the nature and qualities of people we need. It also helps with budgeting, and provides a basis for motivating good performance. To explain the relevance of the boxes let us look first at the columns: sources of threat. Our desired end objective is to promote financial stability by seeking to prevent threats from crystallising, or at least to reduce their impact. Then we will look at the rows – the different types of activity we undertake: the means if you will to achieve our ends. ii)  Sources of Threat  First, the columns: the sources of threat.
But, at a broader level, the momentum behind global trade reform has clearly waned in recent years. This has occurred even though there are a number of areas that would benefit from further reform, such as agriculture and services. That momentum needs to be rekindled and reaffirmed. Although advanced economies historically have tended to lead the way, it is important that large emerging market countries now play a greater role. This is appropriate given their growing prominence in the global economy. There are many approaches to dealing with the costs of globalization, but protectionism is a dead end. Trade restrictions address the symptoms and not the underlying problems, and they introduce other costs and distortions. While such measures might generate a temporary boost to growth from greater domestic production and consumption, these would likely be offset by a range of other costs. Over time, such measures would retard productivity growth and thereby shrink the economic pie. As an illustration, import substitution models that were pursued by many emerging market economies following the Second World War eventually led to poorer economic outcomes. Such was the experience in Brazil, which helped trigger the reforms of the early 1990s. 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  In assessing the benefits and costs of trade, it is important to understand that a nation’s trade balance reflects much more than its trade policy. Just as important are the country’s saving and investment spending proclivities, which are affected by many factors, including tax and fiscal policies.

Encik Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid: Welcoming remarks - Islamic Finance Rendezvous Series Welcoming remarks by Mr Encik Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Islamic Finance Rendezvous Series, Bayan Lepas, 14 January 2019. * * * It is a pleasure to be here this morning. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I would like to express our appreciation to the state government of Penang for hosting this inaugural Islamic Finance Rendezvous Series; and to the Chief Minister of Penang, YAB Tuan Chow Kon Yeow and YB Dato’ Haji Abdul Halim bin Haji Hussain for gracing this event. I would also like to welcome the businessmen and entrepreneurs joining us this morning. A recent survey we did revealed that almost 60% of SMEs were not aware of the availability of Islamic business financing facilities. Indeed, most SMEs adopted conventional financing. Some may still have the misconception that Islamic finance is only for Muslims. Today, we hope to dispel this and create more awareness about what Islamic finance is and has to offer. We have assembled a number of industry experts and leaders for this, and I would like to extend our thanks to the Association of Islamic Banking and Financial Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM), the Malaysian Takaful Association (MTA) and other partners for your support and commitment to organise this programme. Islamic finance has evolved from a niche market into the mainstream Allow me to give an overview of where we are in Islamic finance.
But the Czech Republic has a higher GDP per capita than Portugal (or Greece, for that matter, and many other countries in the euro area) and is getting closer and closer to Spain, a solidly developed country according to all measures. The Czech Republic also has a human development index comparable to that of Austria and Italy. In fact, living standards in the Czech Republic have been higher than those in Portugal for at least a quarter of a millennium, since the start of the industrial revolution (with the possible exception of a couple of decades centred on 1990). But once a country enters the euro area, it is almost automatically treated as a developed country, even in the eyes of the markets. Personally, I find that rather confusing. In practice, therefore, we observe that some nominally “emerging” countries (such as Poland, Israel and Singapore) have been dealing with exactly the same issues as the nominally developed ones. At the same time, some nominally developed countries (such as Greece) are dealing with problems typical of developing countries, issues including incomplete land registries and an insufficient basic ability to collect taxes. This confusion in taxonomy complicates our discussion a great deal, especially in the years of the crisis and its aftermath. The question at the beginning of the crisis was: who in Europe will prove to be most vulnerable to shocks? Many believed it would be Central and Eastern European countries.

The oil companies have therefore enjoyed stable operating parameters over the last 15 years, although this sector is also faced with the challenge of finding new solutions in response to the sharp shifts in market conditions that we have witnessed recently. This will once again require forward-looking strategies and willingness to compromise. 5  BIS Review 20/1999  The government’s supervisory tasks are substantial. Confidence in the banking system in critical situations may also be contingent on the government’s willingness to provide financial backing. There is a fundamental conflict between these two roles and the government’s role as bank owner. People must be confident that the government does not conceal its own mistakes when intervening in the face of a crisis in the banking system should this again prove necessary. It is virtually impossible to establish such confidence if the government is also responsible for the crisis through its ownership. State ownership in the banking industry has been maintained with a view to ensuring stable national ownership. It seems that, in practice, most comparable countries attach importance to having large financial institutions with a national anchor, but most of them avoid state ownership and the associated conflicts of interest. We should also be able to do this. However, I would like to stress that a greater number of foreign financial institutions could also be advantageous. Foreign institutions will normally be larger and more diversified than Norwegian institutions. This could generate better and cheaper services in the Norwegian market.
Inflation is still negative and even below earlier projections. Unlike developed countries, Chile is entering this recovery phase with a strong financial system. Our banking system has, on average, similar or better solvency levels than it had in the years leading to the external financial crisis. This should allow the financing of investment and consumption during the economic recovery phase. Meanwhile, the market for bonds and commercial paper has become ever more important as a source of funding for larger firms. Risks remain, however, and the return to sustained growth in Chile and the world is not a done deal. In particular, macroeconomic packages need to be continued until the recovery is well established. Emerging economies and commodity exporters deal with their own tensions. Most recently, these have centered on the appreciation of their currencies, largely dependent on the US dollar. In Chile, with a floating exchange rate system, the peso is not spared the effects of the world events. Certainly, we will have to continue monitoring the exchange rate very closely. In particular, we will have to figure out its policy implications in order to ensure a persistent closing of the output gap and the return of inflation to the target. We foresee, as stated in the Monetary Policy Report, that the MPR will be kept low for an extended period, to reduce pressures on the strength of the peso and open the way for a sustained recovery of private demand.

The decoupling of the peso from the global trend of emerging currency strengthening with respect to the US dollar that began in mid-July, coincided with the building up of carry trade positions that used the peso as funding currency, and with increased dollar exposure of institutional investors. These aspects may have been favored by the low level of the monetary policy rate and the adoption of complementary monetary policy measures. Later, some of these operations eased, and the peso aligned itself with the path of other emerging markets’ currencies (figure 13). Considering the nominal exchange rate at the closing of this Monetary Policy Report, the real exchange rate (RER) is within the range of values believed to be consistent with long-term fundamentals, so the baseline scenario uses the working assumption that, over the long run, it will be close to where it stands today. This level is nearly 6% lower than at the statistical closing of the September Report, and thus has an important effect on the projected path of inflation in the coming months which will be taken into account in future policy decisions. 4  BIS Review 9/2010  Labor cost pressures show no significant changes. Y-o-y growth in nominal wages has continued to fall, responding to the drop in inflation. Real wages deflated by the CPI have increased but, if the implicit deflator in non-natural resource GDP is used, they fall. The annual variation of unit labor costs increased because of the sharp cyclical fall in measured labor productivity.