samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I see it, this was partly because our policy framework provided such clear arguments for our actions – inflation would turn out to be below the target if the interest rate was not reduced. During the past year the Riksbank’s appraisal of economic activity and inflation prospects has been revised about as much as and more or less concurrently with the opinions of other observers. The sizeable changes in economic assessments are thus something we have in common with others. Individual economists and analysts have naturally voiced views or criticism from time to time but I at least have not encountered more concerted criticism of our economic and inflation assessments. (Figure 1). The path of the krona last autumn generated more heated discussions. The Riksbank saw the depreciation as essentially connected with the international financial unrest. This made investors more averse to risk, with effects that hit small markets in particular. Other observers attached greater weight both to what they perceived as a lack of clarity in monetary policy and to structural problems in the Swedish economy and Sweden’s position outside the euro area. The risks in the latter respect were presented in a rather lurid light. As regards interventions, the Riksbank has been very restrictive in recent years but early last October we found they were called for. The marked depreciation of the krona did not reflect the fundamental situation in the Swedish economy.

It is seldom possible to demonstrate clear effects of interventions and that could not be done on this occasion, though the depreciation was broken during the day in question. Later in the autumn the krona appreciated again. BIS Review 111/1999  2  It seems to me that two main factors lie behind the krona’s appreciation in the past twelve months. One is a normal rebound from last autumn’s excessive weakening. This happened during the winter and was particularly pronounced because the euro’s introduction at the beginning of the year had made some investors concerned about the krona. The other factor is the increasingly clear picture of a strong economy with a budget surplus, low inflation and high growth. Moreover, the higher growth in Sweden compared with the euro area has influenced appraisals of the respective levels of interest rates. Specific events and statements may have played a part in the timing of the appreciation but it seems to me that the crucial influence has come from more fundamental economic considerations. The discussion of monetary policy has also acquired a new dimension. The procedure with the new Executive Board from the beginning of this year enables Board members to differ from the current majority view of inflation prospects and monetary policy measures. Board members have in fact differed on a number of occasions, as is clear from the published minutes. On two occasions, divergent opinions have also been registered regarding the level of the repo rate.
I insist on the fact that this measure is the most unconventional because for most people, nominal interest rates are positive. It is true that negative interest rates have their limitations; I have already stressed them in the past.7 And at our Governing Council’s meeting in Tallinn last June, we clarified these limitations in our forward guidance stating that we do not intend to lower our deposit facility rate below its current level of –0.40%. But slightly negative interest rates have their virtues, even if they are not very popular among bankers. First, by removing the zero lower bound constraint on expectations of future short-term interest rates, they contribute to easing financial conditions by lowering rates along the curve, with a positive impact on the demand for credit by firms. Second, the negative deposit facility rate (DFR) positively interacts with asset purchases. Indeed, the portfolio rebalancing effect of QE is reinforced by the negative DFR, as banks with excess liquidity holdings have a stronger incentive to reduce these holdings and put their reserves to work. The truth of the matter is that we have not so far seen significantly detrimental consequences of negative rates on the profitability of banks, notably thanks to the favourable fact that the slope of the yield curve has remained positive. 3/ Our forward guidance provides further indications as to the future path of our monetary policy; and by steering expectations, it has an impact on the yield curve.

These effects are of similar magnitude than results obtained for the programmes conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom.6 According to these studies, what matters is the extent to which and for how long central banks’ holdings reduce the availability of assets by removing them from the market. This implies that we can continue to exert downward pressure on the yield curve by keeping our stock of asset holdings at a high level for a prolonged period. Let me first state the obvious: even if we reduce the monthly flow of net purchases, we will continue to increase the size of our balance sheet. And let me add as a second consideration for 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  later: in any case, the Eurosystem will remain in the coming years a major buyer of eurodenominated bonds thanks to our reinvestment commitment, which we took in December 2015 and which was perhaps not widely enough noticed: the repayments that we will obtain when bonds reach their maturity date will be fully reinvested, thus keeping the size of our asset holdings unchanged. Most importantly, our monetary policy is based on a set of instruments [slide]: it is not a solo, but a quartet. On top of QE, we play with our policy interest rates, our forward guidance and the provision of liquidity to financial institutions. 2/ Perhaps the most unconventional policy is the use of negative interest rates.
Self-fulfilling expectations from economic agents and price setters would, in turn, help deliver the objectives of monetary policy. Economists believed that by stabilizing consumer prices, financial assets would also behave in a stable and predictable way. The crisis painfully reminds us that behavior in financial markets is not always rational and lack of confidence in the markets can spiral out of control, sending shockwaves throughout the economy. Escalating asset prices and their sudden burst affected significantly the behavior and balance sheets of the economic agents and challenged the stability of the financial system. In this respect, the concept of financial stability was seen as a byproduct of monetary stability. Micro-prudential supervision was focusing on the soundness of individual financial institutions, with the belief that this was sufficient to ensure aggregate stability of the financial system. Again, the recent financial crisis made it clear that micro-prudential supervision was insufficient to detect and address buildup of risks in the entire financial system due to externalities, herd behaviors, common exposures and pro-cyclicality in financial system activity. Moreover, financial institutions of systemic importance proved to be “too big to fail” and measures were needed to deal with existing systemic institutions on a global and local level. Recovery and resolution powers of financial institutions are being strengthened. Limiting systemic risk, both in its time and structural dimension, is the objective of macroprudential policy.

Successful further cooperation along these lines is in the interests of us all. BIS Review 77/2010  1
Durmuş Yılmaz: Food prices and inflation Speech by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Central Bank of Argentina 2008 Money and Banking Conference “Financial turbulence – impact on developed and emerging economies”, Buenos Aires, 1 September 2008. *  *  *  Dear Guests, It is a great pleasure and honor for me to address such a distinguished audience on the issue of “Food Prices and Inflation”. The current level of food prices constitutes a major risk to households, in particular those living in developing countries. I’d like to thank the Central Bank of Argentina to organize this conference and dedicate a special session on this issue at this juncture. Dear Guests, The second half of 2007 was not an easy period for central bankers – and so far 2008 has been even more challenging. We are currently facing significant inflationary pressures on a global scale due to record high increases in commodity prices. The surge in inflation rates has become a major challenge that threatens price stability in many countries. Average inflation throughout the world has been rising rapidly. Inflation in developed countries has reached its highest level of the last eighteen years. For the first time in many years, inflation figures of the developing countries are in two digit levels. Moreover, the financial turbulence that has started in the second half of 2007 and the subsequent credit crunch are adversely affecting economic activities. Growth rates have been slowed in many countries.

The recent Basel standard, published at the end of 2022, which regulates banks' exposure to crypto-assets is also a very encouraging first step in shielding the banking sector from contagion risks. 2.3 Pursuing regulatory efforts and harmonising supervisory practices [Go to slide 6] Regulatory efforts must therefore be pursued and new initiatives have already been identified: regulations on Artificial Intelligence, open finance data sharing, and electronic identification. It is clear that we are walking a tightrope: we must not restrict financial innovation in order to benefit from the contributions of digital finance and big techs, while anticipating the possible bypasses that these players will no doubt exploit, to the detriment of financial stability. To this end, the community of regulators has a clear guideline: "same activity, same risk, same rules". With this objective and this guideline in mind, what regulatory changes concerning big techs can we hope to see to ensure financial stability and fair competition with other players? First, the strengthening or introduction of a prudential framework and requirements harmonised at the European level regarding payment services and non-bank loans, which are the areas where big techs are developing more specifically. Second, the introduction of a new framework for the non-financial conglomerates that are developing in the financial sector (also known as mixed activity groups).
Eva Srejber: Should monetary policy subdue inflated high debts and asset prices in an inflation-targeting regime? Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Adam Smith Seminar, Thun, Switzerland, 28 June 2006. References for the speech can be found on the Sveriges Riksbank’s website. *  *  *  Introduction Today I intend to discuss how central banks should react to debts and asset prices that increase at a rate which is not sustainable in the long term. When the Riksbank decided at the beginning of the year to raise its policy rate, saying that one of the reasons was the rapid rate of increase in household borrowing and house prices, this was perceived by some people as meaning that we had introduced a new objective for monetary policy. However, this is not the case. Our focus then – as on other occasions – was on inflation developments. Another factor was that we also wanted to avoid further pressure on the rate of increase in house prices and debts and thereby reduce the risk of a large fall in demand and a low inflation rate in the future. How should central banks behave in a situation like this, when models and forecasts indicate an inflation rate that is on target, while there is some risk that sharply rising house prices and debts will jeopardise the target later on? There is no common view on this issue among either central banks or academics.

Thus, the price stability policy has in general been successful. In many countries this is due not only to monetary policy, but also to fiscal policy. A common fiscal framework within the EU, and in Sweden’s case supplemented by a clearer national fiscal framework, have contributed to more orderly public finances. In Sweden this has led to a gradual decline in the central government debt as a percentage of GDP. We can look back on a decade of GDP growth where the annual average has been a half a percentage point higher than during the 1970s and 1980s. Inflation has been close to target, which can be compared with an average annual inflation rate of around 8 per cent during the two decades 1975-1995. …but asset prices are fluctuating considerably However, at the same time as inflation has been low and stable around the world since the mid-1990s, there have been substantial fluctuations in asset prices. The fact that debts and asset prices appear to vary more now than they did 10-15 years ago should, at least in part, be due to the deregulation and evolution of the financial markets. In efficient markets, it is the price system that provides guidance to ensure that resources are steered to where they will provide the greatest benefit. For instance, equity prices in industries with considerable growth potential should rise as a result of profits being expected to increase there.
That will have consequences for trade balances and activity in both emerging markets and industrialised countries. Second, falls in equity prices around the world have reduced household wealth. And third, the sudden increase in risk aversion in financial markets is changing the balance sheets of financial institutions and some fear that this may lead to a credit crunch. The reduction in capital flows to emerging markets started over a year ago when concerns about the foreign currency exposures of a number of countries led to withdrawals of funds and a liquidity crisis in Asia. That liquidity problem was compounded by macroeconomic and structural problems which varied from country to country. But the net effect was that capital flows to emerging markets in Asia fell from over $ bn in 1996 to only about $ bn in 1997. That retrenchment has continued during 1998. Why does this matter? In the absence of other sources of finance, a reduction in net capital inflows has to be matched by a corresponding improvement in the current accounts of the emerging market economies. To achieve such a rapid turn-round in the current account required significant depreciations of their currencies and deep recessions. The counterpart to the improvement in the current account of the countries affected is a larger trade deficit, or smaller trade surplus, in the rest of the world.

As I see it,  3  See “Hedge Funds Regulation in Europe – A comparative study”, European fund and asset management association, November 2005 and “The regulation and distribution of hedge funds in Europe – Changes and challenges”, Pricewaterhousecoopers, June 2005. 4  In Italy the minimum limit for investment is EUR 500 000, in Ireland it is EUR 250 000 and in Spain it is EUR 50 000. 6  BIS Review 116/2006  such regulation could result in liquidity disappearing from the markets where the hedge funds operate just when it is needed most. Increased disclosure of funds’ risks, on the other hand, could help the market to function efficiently. If the hedge funds’ risk positions can be assessed externally, market discipline ought to improve. I consider that both LTCM and Amaranth are good examples that transparency rather than regulation is the problem. As I have already mentioned, LTCM was a very large fund and at the same time had heavy loans. The fact that the banks concerned accepted such a high level of indebtedness is in itself remarkable – one explanation was probably confidence in the prominent figures behind LTCM, who included Robert Merton and Myron Scholes. However, the banks did not have any overview of the fund’s size and total risk position. In their own interest, they should have required greater disclosure, and the authorities should have required this of the banks. With regard to the positions in Amaranth, there are similar questions.
One of the things economists like to focus on is return on investment. For the modest investment the Bank has made to develop EconoME - £ - we hope to reach over 130,000 young people directly by 2020, with a multiplier effect through word of mouth and social media. And we know that our efforts will complement and reinforce those of the PSHE Association, Young Money, Economist Educational Foundation, NowTeach, Speakers for Schools and many other initiatives that are improving mathematical and financial literacy and inspiring students to broaden their horizons. We know our contribution depends on the support of teachers and influencers. That’s why we’re so grateful for your help in informing, educating and inspiring your students. 4  One was along the lines of: if a litre of cola costs £ how much would a third of a litre cost? Around 60% of adults in England and Northern Ireland were able to answer this correctly (see Bhutoria et al, 2018). 5 Disney and Gathergood (2011). 6 ING – Economics Network (2017). 7 Haldane (2017). 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  References Bhutoria, A., Jerrim, J. and Vignoles, A. 2018. “The financial skills of adults across the world. New estimates from PIAAC”, available at: https://johnjerrim.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/piaac_working_report_march_2018.docx. Disney, R. and Gathergood, J. 2011. “Financial literacy and indebtedness: New evidence for UK consumers”. Available at: https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cfcm/documents/papers/11-05.pdf. Gathergood, J. 2013. “Personal debt and psychological health”, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan. Haldane, A. 2017. “Everyday Economics”.

Such understanding would be enhanced by greater focus in academic research on analysis of the intricate interactions in complex financial systems. The appropriate benchmark for the financial system is whether it is providing appropriate financing to the real economy in a stable and sustainable way. Thereby, and thereby only, will it make a valuable contribution to our economy. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. Friedman, M., 1948. A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability. American Economic Review, 38(3): 245–264. Ilzetzki, Ethan, Enrique G. Mendoza and Carlos A. Végh, 2010. How Big (Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers? NBER Working Papers 16479. IMF, 2008. World Economic Outlook. Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries, October 2012. Jordan, Thomas J., 2011. Auswirkungen der Staatsverschuldung auf die Unabhängigkeit der Geldpolitik. 21. Internationales Europa Forum Luzern. Luzern, 8 November 2011. Jordan, Thomas J., 2012(a). Kein Ende der Schuldenwirtschaft ohne Stabilitätskultur. NZZ Podium, Zurich, 28 February 2012. Jordan, Thomas J., 2012(b). Speech given to the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank. Berne, 27 April 2012. Klomp, Jeroen and Jakob de Haan, 2010. Inflation and Central Bank Independence: A Meta-Regression Analysis. Journal of Economic Surveys 24: 593–621. Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott, 1977. Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85(3): 473–91. Poterba, James M., 1994. State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics. Journal of Political Economy 102(4): 799–821. SECO, 2012. Evaluation der Stabilisierungsmassnahmen 2008–2010. Die Volkswirtschaft 5-2012. Summers, Lawrence H., 2007. The State of the US Economy. Presentation at Brookings Institution Forum, 19 December 2007. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13

The increasing integration of the Albanian economy and the financial system in particular caused the global crisis to be reflected early in our country. The main channels the Albanian economy was exposed to were:   2  Decline of exports;  BIS Review 78/2010    Decline of remittances and other foreign currency inflows;    Increased uncertainty in the financial institutions; and, in response to the latter    Review of almost all economic agents’ business plans. This impact was reflected in low growth rates and shaking of some macroeconomic balances in 2009. According to the Statistics Institute, GDP grew 3.1 percent in annual terms in 2009. The slowdown of GDP growth reflected the contraction of activity in industry and construction, while the services sector’s value added remained the key contributor to economic growth. Given the difficult circumstances in which economic activity took place and compared with other regional countries’ experiences, the preservation of the economic growth rate at positive levels is an encouraging development. However, its slowdown and the new macroeconomic balances need due attention by all economic agents in their projections for the future. Albania’s economic development outlook also requires greater support from the private sector, while the contribution of the public sector to economic growth is expected to decline. The data on aggregate demand show that the contraction of private consumption and the fall in investment were determining factors in the slower growth of demand at home.
Indeed, you might think of our task as a classic budgeting problem. In our case, we have a bundle of rules which deliver a certain level of resilience at a certain cost. What we are asking is whether a simpler bundle could deliver the same level of resilience for small firms at lower cost. The simpler regime will also need to be assessed against the Basel core principles for effective banking supervision.9 These are different to the Basel standards which apply to internationally active banks. The principles are an international benchmark for measuring the quality of supervision of all banks. We will design the simpler regime to be consistent with them. Before moving on to talk about what the simpler regime might look like, I need to address the fact that reducing small firms’ compliance costs from complexity might introduce another sort of problem if it erects new barriers to growth. The problem is that, whilst the costs of complying with a simpler regime will be lower for small firms, some small firms want to grow.

In the Law, the National Bank of Macedonia was defined as an institution of the single monetary system of former Yugoslavia, with a status of a legal entity. Established as such, it was independently executing the projections of the credit policy for the Republic of Macedonia. However, the setting of the monetary, credit and foreign exchange policies was still within the competence of the National Bank of former Yugoslavia, but a growing number of the decisions of its bodies were adopted by a consensus of the representatives of the republics and provinces. Five years later, in 1977, the National Bank of Macedonia earned new competences: bank licensing, conducting international payment and credit operations. It was also given more rights and responsibilities with respect to maintaining banks' liquidity. These functions and competences remained almost the same in the following 15 years. The third period, period of complete monetary independence, followed by the constitution of the independent state - Republic of Macedonia, is definitely the most important period in the central banking from all aspects. This is a period of sweeping transformations, which constitute the NBRM as an institution with all explicit attributes of an independent central bank, hence as one of the key attributes of the statehood of the Republic of Macedonia.