samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Scheme was designed to reinforce the transmission of the August 2016 cut in Bank Rate to 0.25%, thereby helping to lower the effective lower bound from 0.5% to close to 0%. It also led to a significant increase in the size of the Bank’s balance sheet, again via the APF, peaking at £  Acting in support of liquidity  While operations to meet our monetary policy remit might take the biggest share of our balance sheet, they are by no means the full extent of it. The Bank is the sole provider of sterling central bank money – the most liquid sterling asset. Because of this, our balance sheet has an important role to play in financial policy, through the provision of liquidity insurance. The core business of a commercial bank is to lend money by making loans to households and firms; to facilitate this it often needs to borrow money, by taking in retail deposits or by seeking funding from investors  7  There were also some smaller-scale initial purchases of private sector assets, partly financed by Treasury bill issuance; in August 2016 the MPC also voted to purchase £ of corporate bonds. 8 The APF itself currently holds £ of gilts and £ of corporate bonds, as well as the loans created via the TFS. For an overview of the estimated effects of QE and the mechanisms through which it works, see Haldane, A. G., Roberts-Sklar, M., Wieladek, T. and Young, C. (2016), “QE: The story so far”.

Finding the right balance Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking  Society of Professional Economists Annual Conference, London 28 September 2018  With thanks to Amy Lee and Tom Smith for their assistance in preparing these remarks and to staff across Markets and BPFR and elsewhere in the Bank for their many contributions, as well as to my colleagues on the MPC and among the Governors for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Introduction It’s an honour to be invited to talk here for the Society for Professional Economists (SPE) today, and I’m very grateful to Bloomberg for the opportunity to speak again in their fantastic HQ. Although I’ve spoken many times at the Society’s events over the years either in my previous role at the Treasury or in in my ongoing role as President of the SPE this is the first time I’ve spoken at the Society in its new guise as the Society for Professional Economists and in my role as the Bank of England’s Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking. This week is national inclusion week in the UK. And in that spirit I do think the SPE’s new moniker, which Kevin Daly has championed, is more inclusive and speaks to a wider group of economists. That is borne out by the excellent turn-out today. At the same time we need to improve diversity in today’s economics 1  profession, in central banking and in finance more generally.
In EU Member States, between 2002 and November 2005, 202 cases of the restructuring of companies related to offshoring were publicly announced, which resulted in the transfer of nearly one hundred thousand jobs. Over that period, offshoring stood behind nearly six per cent of all cases of publicly announced restructurings of companies in the EU. So far, the scale of the phenomenon has not been large. However, offshoring as a strategy of increasing competitiveness is becoming more and more common and includes not only the manufacturing of products but also - increasingly - services. Table 2. Offshoring in EU member states Countries to which job transfer took place  Number of jobs liquidated in the EU between 2002 and 2003 due to transfer of jobs  Number of jobs liquidated in the EU between January and November 2005 due to transfer of jobs  China  3361  3077  India  9458  5470  Asian countries  3786  3271  Czech Republic  780  3890  Hungary  1110  772  Poland  120  2676  33151  31942  8  Source: European Restructuring Monitor , own calculations  Numerous analyses show that the process of offshoring is bound to grow and increasingly affect services 9 . For example, between 1980 and 2002 the trade in goods and services grew at 6.9%.

In the March 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  23 statements, the FOMC also announced it would start to purchase agency commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) to smooth market functioning in that market that helps to finance multi-family housing. For more on the deterioration of CMBS market functioning, the Fed purchases and their impact on the CMBS market during this period, see Woojung Park, Julia Gouny, and Haoyang Liu, Federal Reserve Agency CMBS Purchases, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, July 16, 2020. 9 FSB Sets Out Action to Maintain Financial Stability during COVID, July 15, 2020. 10 John C. Williams, Rising to the Challenge: Central Banking, Financial Markets, and the Pandemic, Remarks at  the 16th Meeting of the Financial Research Advisory Committee for the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research (via videoconference) (July 16, 2020). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
There are some very good arguments for that. II. Economy  The best argument lies in the Estonian economy. Regardless of the lingering global uncertainties, economic growth in Estonia has been strong - 5.8% in 2002. That means a growth figure approximately 4% higher than that of the euro area. It could even be said that during the last two years Estonian economy has had to face something akin to a positive external shock as the EU membership became more and more of a certainty and the risk margins correspondingly lower. And there was also a parallel negative economic shock - the continuing weakness of external markets. All that has meant certain advantages - for instance, lower interest rates and significant inflows of foreign direct investment, but there are also certain risks involved. Estonia's high economic growth of the last year and a half is mainly based on high domestic demand. High domestic demand, a continuously strong inflow of foreign investments and a lower than expected export growth have resulted in a significantly high current account deficit - an estimated 14% or more of the GDP by end-2003. Of course, it could be argued that the present external imbalance is, to a certain extent, 'an attendant phenomenon of success'. FDI inflows having been strong through the entire transition period, reinvested earnings and dividend payments have become increasingly important among the factors determining the current account balance in Estonia.

They proposed a vision which is now shared by all stakeholders, contributed to a constructive review of the banking community’s deliverables and cooperated with the European Commission to address legal and regulatory impediments. While the design phase of the SEPA project is almost completed, the next challenge is to ensure that migration towards the SEPA is well-organised and delivered. Because the starting point in each  BIS Review 53/2006  3  country is different, migration plans to the SEPA will primarily have to be organised locally. This should naturally lead to a further involvement of the Eurosystem’s central banks at national level, at least to help co-ordinating the efforts of the wide range of stakeholders. For example, the Banque de France and the French banking federation have created a national committee dedicated to the implementation of the SEPA. This committee gathers representatives of banks, different categories of users – public administration, corporates, retail business and citizens – as well as members of the French Parliament. It is in charge of coordinating works relating to the migration towards the SEPA. Having held its first meeting in April 2006, the committee foresees to adopt the French migration plan by October. 2.3. Overseeing payment systems  As overseers, the central banks of the Eurosystem have also contributed to the objectives of European financial integration, technological progress and higher resilience of the financial system.
The economy grew rapidly in the early years but the communist system, plus upheavals like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, led to inefficiency, backwardness and chaos. In 1977, after Mao Zedong died, Deng Xiaoping returned to power. He made a decisive break with Maoist dogma, and launched far-reaching market reforms under the slogan "Reform and Open Up". The profit motive, and the new social attitude that to get rich was glorious, unleashed huge energies and transformed the lives of hundreds of millions of Chinese people. By producing widespread benefits across the country, Deng's reforms became entrenched and irreversible, even though they are still far from complete. Deng had accomplished what successive reformers and modernisers had tried and failed to do for a century. 2  BIS Review 19/2003  UK Post-war Britain offers a third example of a remaking of an economy, although on a smaller compass. Emerging from the post-war reconstruction of Europe, Britain shared in the world economic boom of the 1950s and early 1960s. But by the mid 1960s, the "English disease" had set in. The country was plagued by militant trade unions, poor management, and unsustainable state welfarism. Industries that had once been world leaders fell behind. British governments were trapped in a cycle of stop-go policies, chronic balance-of-payments difficulties and sterling crises. The heavy involvement of the state in economic activities and transfers had led to a dead end.

To maintain the social compact, a balance needs to be struck between pushing through needed changes without delay, and spacing them out to reduce the political pain. Thus the Meiji reformers' slogan was fukoku kyohei, meaning "rich country, strong military". Their objective was not just better lives for individual Japanese, but a strong Japan taking its rightful place among the nations of the world. This assertion of Japan's role in world affairs led to the Pacific War. Margaret Thatcher believed in a strong Britain too, but hers was a very different model. She famously declared that "there is no such thing as society", only individuals, and that people must look to themselves rather than the government. But she went too far down this path. When she persisted in implementing the poll tax in 1990, the people revolted, and even her own party turned against her. The Iron Lady was out. In Singapore, consensus building is especially important as the remaking is to lead to an economy more reliant on private enterprise and individual effort. This can only work if Singaporeans feel that the system is fair to all, and benefits everybody over the long run. Hence we have worked hard to strengthen the social and political consensus in support of our remaking plans. We involved and consulted Singaporeans as widely as possible. We worked in partnership with both the employers and the trade unions in policy deliberations.
The index is currently about 6 percentage points above its average value over the period 1970–2014.4 As recently as 2009, it was around 2 percentage points below. The index has been above current levels in only 5 of the past 44 years. On this measure, the UK economy is in fine fettle. The current reading of the index chimes pretty well with survey measures of confidence, for both households and firms. Measures of business confidence picked up during 2013 and the first half of 2014 to reach series highs, while measures of consumer confidence rose above their long-run average levels at the start of 2014. Chart 2 constructs the same ecstasy index back to 1870. It suggests that, while current levels of the index are less unusual, they are edging up towards historic highs. In only 42 of the past 144 years has the index been above current levels. So far, then, so good. The UK economy appears to be healthier than on average in the past, if perhaps not quite yet ecstatic. Certainly, it appears to be firmly on the front foot. Reasons to be fearful In keeping with Thomas Carlyle’s stereotype, let me now add three flies to the ointment. These are features of the UK economy which paint a more sobering picture. In particular, let me offer three reasons to be fearful: •  Annual real wage growth in the UK – average weekly earnings growth adjusted for consumer price inflation – is currently running at close to minus 1%.

Chart 7 plots the path of real GDP following five UK recessions and subsequent recoveries: the 1930s, the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s and currently. The fall in GDP during this time’s crisis is little different than in the 1970s and 1980s and smaller than in the Great Depression. 5  Again, the value for 2014 is an estimate based on projections consistent with the August 2014 Inflation Report. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The subsequent recovery in output has been materially slower than in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s – and slower even than in the 1930s. As a result, the cumulative loss of output from this time’s crisis will very likely be larger than followed the Great Depression. Nonetheless, once you allow for the longer lags, the growth in GDP over the past two years has not been greatly dissimilar to previous recoveries. And if you believe the MPC’s growth forecasts, that recovery is set to continue in the period ahead. At a global level, the IMF’s recent World Economic Outlook paints a not dissimilar picture. Although global growth was revised down, it is expected to pick up from 3.3% this year to 3.8% next and 4.0% the year after. In other words, the IMF also foresees a slow march back to growth normality, albeit at potentially somewhat lower trend rates. So why might this time be different? One illuminating piece of evidence comes from looking at how forecasts for real wages, productivity and real interest rates have evolved during the recovery.
The crisis exposed several structural weaknesses both in the domestic economies of Asia and in the global financial architecture. Recognising the growing interlinkages and risks, a range of new initiatives both nationally and regionally, together with the parallel development of sound institutions and good governance, were introduced post-crisis to strengthen the resilience of the Asian economies and minimise regional systemic risks in order to ensure a more sustainable economic development. In retrospect, the Asian crisis marked not a halt, but the start of an even greater presence of Asia in the global landscape. Following the crisis, Asia has undertaken wide-ranging financial reforms, aimed at developing more stable, resilient and efficient financial systems. This included restructuring as well as institutional development to strengthen the resilience of the financial sector. Amongst others, sound regulatory regimes have been established, prudential regulations strengthened, corporate governance and financial disclosure improved, and deposit insurance introduced. As the domestic financial systems strengthened, the environment for the banking sector has become increasingly more competitive through gradual deregulation and liberalisation. In addition, efforts have also been focused on developing the capital markets, in particular the bond market, which has also reduced over-reliance on the banking sector as a source of financing for large businesses. This has prompted the banking sector to broaden access to credit to other economic agents. Overall, what were once bank-dominated financial systems has become more diversified and competitive with strengthened governance, disclosure and regulation.

It would also shift the composition of intra-regional trade from intermediate inputs for the production of goods for final demand to the traditional markets, to a more balanced composition with increased share to meet final demand within Asia. First, as the emerging economies, in particular Asia, gain importance as growth centres, the cumulative markets of Asia as export destinations will expand over time. The rapidly rising Asian middle income class will increase final demand for goods and services. Second, Asia can leverage on its immense diversity as a source of economic complementarities. The “Flying Geese Model” illustrates how Asia had, in the past, harness the diversity of the. Going forward, similar emphasis can be adapted beyond merely for the production of goods for final demand outside Asia, and draw on the different comparative advantages of the Asian economies. Financial integration as a third strategy The third strategy is the promotion of deeper financial integration. This is important for further advancing the economic development of the region. Financial integration is generally associated with capital mobility and refers to the extent to which an economy's financial system is interconnected with other financial markets. A fully integrated financial system will be one in which potential market participants, both in the banking sector and financial markets, adopt a single set of rules, have equal access and are treated equally.
In our assessment, the supply capacity of the economy is expected to be around 1¾% lower than it otherwise would have been in the absence of Covid by the end of our forecast period. But, of course, there are risks on both sides of this assessment. The third point is that, although those sectors which are growing may require new capital, elevated uncertainty is expected to continue to reduce investment other things equal, weighing on the capital stock and productivity growth. I have just used the phrase “other things equal” to describe the likely path of investment. However other things ought not to be equal going forward in my view. I mentioned earlier that we have had a decade or more of slower growth and weaker productivity growth. And, as Chart 5 shows, although business investment did recover from a low base following the global financial crisis, it too was weak in the period prior to the Covid pandemic. This was only partially offset by growth in government investment, which has also generally been weak over the same period (Chart 6). The effect of this weakness in investment can also be seen by looking at capital services – a measure of the value of the flow of services which are derived from the capital stock, including machinery, equipment, software, structures, and land improvements. This may better capture the drivers of supply growth than looking at growth in investment alone.

I would caution against over-interpreting the detail of this chart, as there are several ways to represent aggregate supply and demand, and thus the output gap. But, detail notwithstanding, it is clear that while a gap has opened up between demand and supply during the Covid pandemic, the overwhelming feature is the coincident hit to both demand and supply. That stands in marked contrast to the more pronounced impact on demand following the global financial crisis, and persistent period of spare capacity thereafter. As well as the Covid shock, the behaviour of supply and demand also reflects the nature of the policy response, and in particular the so-called furlough scheme (the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme). By temporarily supporting jobs, this scheme has avoided a much larger spike in unemployment, which would other things equal have resulted in a smaller fall in supply and a much wider margin of spare capacity. For a monetary policy maker interested in the output gap and how it will evolve in the recovery from Covid, it is clear we need to focus on the recovery of both supply and demand. More so than usual, the recovery from Covid requires a recovery of the supply side. Some of the effects on supply directly related to restrictions on activity and voluntary social distancing are likely to be temporary, and should start to reverse as the health outlook improves and along with the vaccination programmes enable restrictions to be eased.
23.06.2023  The Spanish banking industry: developments and challenges against a backdrop of uncertainty 40th APIE Seminar (Spanish Financial Press Association) Santander Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  I would like to thank the Spanish Financial Press Association (APIE) for once again inviting me to take part in this event, thus giving me the opportunity to share with you the Banco de España’s view of developments in the Spanish banking industry and the challenges ahead. To set this analysis in context, I will first outline the economic outlook and the most recent decisions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB). The global and European context Global economic activity has performed relatively favourably in 2023 to date, supported by a notable easing of energy prices and fewer disruptions to global value chains. Moreover, the services sector has continued to benefit from the end of the health crisis, while strong labour markets and fiscal policy support have helped sustain the strength of activity. That said, some signs of weakness have also been discerned in the most recent period, especially in manufacturing. In the euro area, GDP contracted slightly in the last two quarters. In particular, 2023 Q1 saw private consumption decline and net exports make a positive contribution, mainly as a result of the contraction in imports prompted by weak demand and lower energy consumption. According to the latest Eurosystem projections, in Q2 growth will recover to around 0.3% quarter-on-quarter, although the most recent data suggest that this figure could be somewhat lower.

Caleb M Fundanga: An appeal to the Zambian microfinance industry to offer affordable financial services Opening speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the 8th Annual General Meeting of the Association of Microfinance Institutions of Zambia, Lusaka, 7 July 2006. *  *  *  •  The Chairperson;  •  Senior Government Officials present;  •  His Excellencies, member of the diplomatic corps present;  •  Members of the Association of Microfinance Institutions of Zambia (AMIZ);  •  Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen  It gives me great pleasure and gratitude to be amongst you this afternoon to officiate at the 8th Annual General Meeting of the Association of Microfinance Institutions in Zambia. Mr Chairperson, as you are aware, micro-lenders are credit providers to people with limited or no access to traditional credit sources. It follows therefore that the primary impact of microfinance in Zambia has been the broadening of access to formalised financial services particularly to many people both in urban and peri-urban areas. The microfinance sector in Zambia has grown rapidly in recent years in terms of the number of service providers as well as outreach which is currently estimated at over 60,000 persons.