samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But I do want to remind ourselves to stay vigilant and ensure that implementation is seen through, as this work has not yet been completed. For example, initial margin requirements on non-cleared derivatives, which guard against the overuse of embedded leverage in derivatives, are still being phased-in in a number of jurisdictions including Hong Kong. At the same time, while derivative transactions that are intended to be cleared has increased five-fold in the past four years in Hong Kong, according to data from our Trade Repository, there is more room for further standardisation. Finally, solutions such as deference mechanisms, which helps eliminate cross-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, are still works-in-progress between the HKMA and our overseas counterparts. As we embark on further deepening of the derivatives markets in the Asian region, the high standards set up by regulators and by the industry over the past ten years should be well respected, and strengthened regulations on margins, clearing, and transparency should be taken seriously as safeguards against potential risks. Let me close by saying a few words about our host today. ISDA has been instrumental in promoting standardisation of documentation and practices in derivatives markets. In the process, it has played a key role in navigating the industry through post-crisis reforms. ISDA is and will continue to be an important platform for consensus building and knowledge sharing. I’m certain that ISDA will remain a valuable partner for everyone in Asia as we continue to overcome the challenges I discussed today. I look forward to more fruitful collaboration going forward.

4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
With this infrastructure, the Desk has been able to purchase large volumes of securities in a rapid manner, as required by the policy decisions made by the FOMC. Indeed, over the period since the FOMC’s decision to expand the SOMA portfolio, the Desk has purchased about $ billion of Treasury securities. 7 That total includes about $ billion of purchases out of the intended $ billion expansion of the portfolio, and another $ billion of purchases associated with the reinvestment of principal payments on agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. 8 In terms of the monthly pace, the purchases so far have been  3  See Brian Sack. 2010. “Managing the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet.” Remarks at the 2010 CFA Institute Fixed Income Management Conference, Newport Beach, California, October 4. 4  The list of primary dealers. 5  This information is included in a monthly purchase schedule published by the Desk. 6  The methodology for comparing the relative value of the securities at the offered prices is based on a spline fitted through the prices of Treasury securities. 7  These changes are measured since the November schedule published by the Desk, which was the first schedule of operations to come out after the FOMC decision. All data on policy operations are through Friday, February 4, 2011. 8  The purchases associated with these two components are combined in the monthly schedule. To arrive at the totals reported in the text, we allocate the purchases so far this month proportionally across the two components.

Risky asset prices such as equities have risen at a rapid pace, and credit spreads and measures of credit availability have continued to ease. These changes have been driven to a large extent by the improvement in the economic outlook and, in turn, will help to promote the economic recovery going forward. The decisions taken in the second half of 2010 affecting the size of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio have provided support to that process. To be sure, economic fundamentals will ultimately exert the strongest force on financial conditions, as can be seen by the rise in Treasury yields even as the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet. But the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet actions have helped to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. Characteristics of the SOMA portfolio The set of asset purchase programs launched by the Federal Reserve, including those initiated at the peak of the financial crisis and the more recent actions, have changed some of the basic characteristics of the SOMA portfolio. I thought it would be useful to review those changes and to discuss their implications for the conduct of monetary policy. The most obvious effect of the purchase programs has been on the size of the SOMA portfolio. If the intended asset purchases announced in November are completed, the size of the domestic portfolio will reach approximately $ trillion by mid-year – considerably larger than the $ trillion portfolio that would be in place in the absence of the asset purchase programs.
The ECB also provided an opinion on the MiFID II proposal.5 As you know, the MiFID II proposal extends pre- and post-trade transparency requirements from equity instruments (MiFID I) to additional asset classes such as bonds, structured finance products, derivatives admitted to trading or traded on a regulated market, a multilateral trading facility or an organised trading facility and derivatives considered eligible for central clearing. The aim is to enhance price formation and to support the evaluation process of such instruments. The requirements cover pre-trade transparency – i.e. the provision of quotes and market depth to market participants ahead of a trade – and post-trade transparency – i.e. the timely publication of the prices and volumes upon trade execution. These mandatory transparency requirements represent a major change, especially for the fixed income market. For brevity, I will only address the issue of post-trade transparency. As we have known since the publication of the seminal work of the Austrian economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek, prices reveal information that is dispersed among the numerous individual members of an economy. As a consequence, market outcomes are directly influenced by the time and degree to which prices and volumes are disclosed to the public. In reality, different markets are subject to different transparency regimes and disclosure requirements, which are a consequence of the existing heterogeneity among both financial assets and market participants.

Indeed, the SDDS is a global benchmark for disseminating macroeconomic data to the public. So far 64 countries have subscribed to the SDDS. BIS Review 170/2010  1  The GDDS, on the other hand, was launched in 1997 for member countries with less developed statistical systems. This system gives member countries a basic framework for a broader national statistical development strategy, addresses the full range of issues critical for compiling and disseminating data, and makes explicit plans for improvement to align national procedures with best practices. Until now, the number of participating countries in GDDS is 106. Both standards share several common features, and have successfully contributed to enhancing the range, quality, and timeliness of country data available to the public. They have also been instrumental in providing better information to underpin the operations of international financial markets and economic policy assessments in general, and thus facilitating public and private decision making. May countries that have participated in GDDS be able to eventually join the club of the SDDS. This is what Saudi Arabia has planned for. Dear Participants, This 5-day workshop is to expand on many data-related issues and standards, including the ones that I have just talked about. Some of the important topics which would be covered over the next five days include: 1. IMF's key data dissemination initiatives  2. Essentials of SDDS and its subscription  3. Essentials of standardized report forms  4. Development details of statistical bulletin tables proposed by the GCC monetary union.
Re-estimating the scale of the productivity puzzle using more plausible estimates for trend productivity growth in these two sectors reduces the size of the productivity shortfall by up to 2 percentage points – that is from around 9% to 7% – with the majority of that difference reflecting slower underlying productivity growth within the energy extraction sector. Extrapolating from the past may also be misleading if some businesses were operating at above normal levels of capacity utilisation prior to the recession. If that were the case, some of the subsequent slowdown in productivity growth would simply reflect the need for companies to adjust to more sustainable operating levels. And that indeed appears to be the case, with business surveys pointing to above average capacity pressures in both the manufacturing and services sector prior to the recession. The implied required adjustment may account for around a further 1% point of the productivity shortfall.8 Taking account of changes in productivity trends within key sectors of the economy and of the position of the economy prior to the start of the recession may account for around one third of the productivity shortfall. But even if we combine both of these factors with the impact of the likely upward revision to GDP, this still leaves a sizeable productivity puzzle – of around one half of the productivity shortfall – to explain. The third explanation is that underlying productivity growth has been weakened by the impact of the financial crisis.

We have digital-driven lifestyles, and so we must strive to preserve shared values that promote societal well-being.” I think we would do well to keep these goals in mind in our efforts to strengthen governance, risk and controls in the era of disruption. On that note, let me welcome you once again to the Conference and wish you productive discussions ahead. Thank you very much. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Philipp Hildebrand: Banking regulation – changing the rules of the game Speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Twelfth Annual International Banking Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, 25 September 2009. I would like to thank Jürg Blum, Rita Kobel, and Signe Krogstrup for their valuable support in drafting this speech. I also want to thank Bertrand Rime for helpful comments and discussions. *  *  *  Introduction I want to thank the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for the kind invitation and the opportunity to speak to you this evening. It is a privilege to be here. A year ago, we were in the midst of a perfect financial storm. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in midSeptember, the imminent collapse of the global financial system became a distinct possibility. To avert such an outcome, a bold and unprecedented international policy response was needed and promptly initiated. In the US as well as in Europe, several of the world’s largest financial institutions required public capital injections, and their nondeposit liabilities had to be guaranteed. A number of countries were forced to expand their deposit insurance programs. In some cases, governments or central banks purchased or guaranteed bank assets. 1 In spite of the rapid policy response aimed at stabilizing the global financial system, the broader economy was heavily hit. Trade and industrial production literally fell off a cliff.

Strong and bold entrepreneurial and political leadership is now required to see the necessary changes for the financial system through, as demonstrated today by the G20 leaders in Pittsburgh. Clearly, there are many areas in financial regulation that can and in many cases should be improved. Given what is at stake, there is clearly a need to prioritize. I have briefly laid out to you this evening where I see those priorities. Thank you for your hospitality and patience. BIS Review 115/2009  5
Finally, let me turn to our work with the Treasury on central bank digital currency, or, to put it more plainly on the issuance by the Bank of England of a digitally native pound sterling. Our plan  Page 8  remains to issue a consultative report around the end of year setting out the next steps that we propose. Over the past few days, I have had a few comments both to the effect that the collapse of FTX shows that we need to get on and issue a digitally native pound – and to the effect that FTX shows that we do not need do so. My initial reaction to both points of view was that there really was no connection between FTX and our work on a digitally native, general purpose form of Bank of England money, for use by households and businesses in making payments. But on reflection, I think I understand the comments better. FTX in particular and the crypto ecosystem in general are emblematic of these new technologies and the possibility that they might revolutionise financial services and the forms that money takes in our economy. For some perhaps the lesson is that tokenisation and digitalisation of finance should not take place in unregulated space and, moreover, needs to be underpinned by a robust and reliable of digital settlement asset.

Page 1  Reflections on DeFi, digital currencies and regulation speech by Jon Cunliffe Given at Warwick Business Schools’s Gilmore Centre Policy Forum Conference on DeFi & Digital Currencies  Page 2  Published on 21 November 2022  In his speech Jon Cunliffe reflects on recent crypto market developments. He goes on to talk about the work that authorities are doing on the regulation of crypto stablecoins and our work on a potential central bank digital currency. Speech I had intended today to talk about the work the Bank of England, is doing with the Treasury, the FCA on the regulation of crypto stablecoins and our work on a potential central bank digital currency in Sterling. That remains the bulk of what I will talk about today. But between beginning to draft these remarks and delivering them today, we have seen what is probably the largest – and certainly the most spectacular – failure to date in the crypto ecosystem, by which of course I mean the collapse of the crypto trading platform FTX and most of its associated businesses. So I thought it might be worthwhile to start with a brief look at the FTX implosion to frame some of the points I intend to make on regulation of the use of crypto-related technologies to provide financial services and on why, as a central bank, we are actively exploring the issuance of a digitally native Pound sterling.
Mervyn King: Through the looking glass – reform of the international institutions Text of the Inaugural International Distinguished Lecture by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to the Melbourne Centre for Financial Studies, Melbourne, 21 December 2006. * 1. *  *  What does globalisation mean? Humpty Dumpty said to Alice, “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”. So let me explain first what I mean by “globalisation”. In his excellent book Why Globalization Works, Martin Wolf remarks, “Globalization is a hideous word of obscure meaning, coined in the 1960s, that came into ever-greater vogue in the 1990s”. I think of globalisation as a process of increasing international economic integration accompanied by political agreement on the rules of the game which govern that process. The rise of China and India as trading powers is an example of increasing integration. And the accession of China into the World Trade Organisation is an example of the application of the rules of the game. Globalisation is the driving force of many of the most significant changes in our economies. But it is far from a new phenomenon – it is as old as the human race itself. The European settlement of Australia represented the globalising forces of migration and capital flows over several centuries. To me one of the most poignant symbols of globalisation is the Australian War Memorial at Hyde Park Corner in London.

That will allow clear messages to be delivered about whether countries are living up to their commitments. A remit should be set annually. It will play two roles: it will give the IMF a clear mandate to guide its surveillance activities and it will give the shareholders a yardstick against which to hold the IMF staff accountable. Greater independence for staff should be accompanied by greater accountability. (d)  What are the constraints of history? The Bretton Woods conference at which the IMF was established was attended by the governments of just 44 countries. Yet even that was fraught. It would be vastly more difficult to agree a complete new treaty with 184 countries. The IMF has much of the infrastructure and expertise that will be needed to do the job I have described – and an annual budget of $ billion to do it. That is why it makes sense to attempt to reform the IMF that we have inherited rather than to build a new institution. But the inherited governance structure of the IMF and other institutions complicates matters. The founders of the post-war settlement encumbered several of the new international institutions with unwieldy full-time resident boards. And the distribution of voting rights no longer reflects the economic and political weight of member countries. The task of agreeing on a new system will be enormously difficult. But if we fail, the influence of the institutions will diminish further, possibly irreparably. Reform of IMF surveillance and voting rights of member countries complement each other.
As a rule, these estimates coincide. Norges Bank places considerable emphasis on the transparency and communication of monetary policy. Norges Bank’s analyses and the background for the Bank’s interest rate decisions are published regularly. The inflation outlook is presented three times a year in Norges Bank’s Inflation Report. Further assessments are presented every six weeks in connection with the Executive Board's monetary policy meetings. The Bank also reports on the implementation of monetary policy in its annual report. If there are significant deviations between actual price inflation and the target, the Bank will provide a thorough assessment in its annual report. Particular emphasis will be placed on any deviations outside the interval +/- 1 percentage point. Transparency about the intentions, strategies and implementation of monetary policy make it easier for economic agents to evaluate monetary policy. If monetary policy is predictable, an important source of uncertainty is reduced and the interest rate that is necessary to achieve the inflation target - all other thing being equal - is lower. A predictable monetary policy can thereby contribute to enhancing the efficiency and impact of monetary policy. Even though there is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between transparency and predictability, some degree of transparency is probably a precondition for achieving monetary policy credibility. BIS Review 74/2001  9  In Norway at least it appears that transparency in Norges Bank's interpretation of the mandate and in the implementation of monetary policy has contributed to a somewhat more predictable monetary policy.

However, there have also been episodes where bubbles have accumulated in these markets, in the form of sharp increases in asset prices, while inflation has been low. The situation in Japan in the 1980s is an example. Price increases in property and financial markets may have a considerable impact on wage growth and consumer price inflation after a period. When the bubbles burst, the result may be an economic downturn. In this way, developments in financial and property markets may be a source of a more unstable inflation environment. In principle, it would be appropriate to use the interest rate to counter this. In practice, however, it is difficult to assess whether price trends in property and financial markets are sustainable. When Norges Bank concludes that the key rate should be changed, the change will in most cases be made gradually. This is because there is normally uncertainty about the situation in the economy, 2 potential disturbances to the economy and how fast an interest rate change will affect price inflation. But we will not always take a gradualist approach. A rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate is appropriate if monetary policy credibility is threatened. If special circumstances prompt Norges Bank to apply a different time horizon than two years, the Bank will provide an assessment of this. We will also do so if developments in financial markets or the property market warrant particular attention.
The expectation of lower interest rates in the future lowers yields on bonds and thereby fosters more favorable financial conditions overall. This will allow the stimulus to pick up steam, support economic growth over the medium term, and allow inflation to rise. These first two conclusions featured in my paper with Dave Reifschneider from 2000. In that paper, these ideas were described as modifications of an otherwise standard Taylor rule for monetary policy. The “forward-looking adjustment” to the Taylor rule illustrated the idea of moving in advance of a downturn to provide timely stimulus. The “backward-looking adjustment” illustrated the idea of keeping interest rates lower for longer. Finally, policies that promise temporarily higher inflation following ZLB episodes can help generate a faster recovery and better sustain price stability over the longer run.5 In model simulations, these “make-up” strategies can mitigate nearly all of the adverse effects of the ZLB. One particular benefit is that such strategies can be highly effective at keeping inflation near the target on average, thereby anchoring inflation expectations at the desired level. The Gravitational Pull of the ZLB But why are these measures so important close to the ZLB? The Fed has two goals: maximum employment and price stability. Our goal for prices—as I’m sure you’re aware—is two percent. The short answer is, in order to achieve our goals. The long answer centers on inflation and inflation expectations. I’m going to give you the long answer! In the last decade it’s proven particularly challenging to keep inflation at our two percent goal.

4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches