samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Do some policy options make it easier to lift the controls than others? Which comes first, lifting the controls or deciding the currency issue? At what exchange rate should so-called offshore krónur be converted if Iceland establishes a currency board or adopts another currency unilaterally? Is it possible that capital account liberalisation will wait until – or even beyond – accession to the EU? These questions are not easy to answer, and exhaustive answers are beyond the scope of this report, but a few points can be made nonetheless. The most desirable option must be to lift the controls before deciding the currency issue. First of all, Iceland needs to lift them – for its own sake and due to international obligations – and the process has already begun. Second, it appears clear that either the controls must be lifted before Iceland adopts another currency or establishes a currency board, or onshore and offshore krónur must be converted at the same exchange rate. Any other course could be considered default, with severe repercussions for Iceland’s future access to foreign credit markets. Third, the EU regulatory framework assumes that capital controls will be lifted prior to membership. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  If liberalisation proves so difficult that Iceland cannot achieve it without outside assistance – which hopefully will not be the case – the most straightforward solution would be to refer the problem to the EEA, as free movement of capital is provided for in the EEA Agreement.

The conditions for an optimal currency area have probably not yet been met. But the currency union will develop further. For large parts of the Swiss economy, the euro facilitates business. The Swiss export sector benefits from lower transaction costs. Currency devaluations, which were previously implemented by some European countries so as to improve their competitiveness, are now a thing of the past. In addition, Swiss monetary policy profits from the existence of a large economic bloc in Europe that pursues similar goals as Switzerland in terms of monetary policy. The exchange rate of the Swiss franc is likely to remain more stable against the euro than it used to be against the former currencies of the EMU members. However, exchange rate fluctuations must still be reckoned with, as the events after the terrorist attacks in the US demonstrated. As a result of the introduction of euro notes and coins, the euro will be used increasingly as a means of payment in the tourism sector as well as in foreign trade. However, the euro will not become a parallel currency. In Switzerland, employment and loan contracts will continue to be concluded mainly in Swiss francs. The same applies to domestic payments. The SNB's monetary policy concept will remain unchanged: in other words, the SNB will continue to conduct an independent monetary policy oriented to price stability and the needs of the Swiss economy. As a consequence, Switzerland is likely to retain its lower interest rate level. Exchange rate targets are incompatible with the SNB's mandate.
Differences in productivity growth and wage growth across Norwegian manufacturing enterprises show that workers tend to accept lower pay increases in enterprises with low productivity growth.5 This can provide companies with more time to adapt and curb the impact on unemployment. Unemployment will vary over the business cycle, but there will always be job-seekers who are temporarily without work. Fluctuations around the trend level of unemployment can be an expression of the level of frictional and structural unemployment. If restructuring and job changes become more common, the number of unemployed will also increase as a result of job changes. If economic activity is high, most job-seekers will rapidly find a new position. Job-seekers with skills for which there is less demand must seek employment for a longer period. In periods of major structural changes in the economy, this group may increase. When there are few unemployed of this type, wage growth tends to be high. Even if Norway fares favourably in relation to many other countries, the Norwegian labour market also has its weaknesses. Wage growth now probably accelerates at a higher level of unemployment than it would have ten and twenty years ago. Many are also channelled from unemployment to social security benefits, and benefits may be an obstacle to returning to the labour force. Sickness absence also rose for a long period, but has decline markedly over the past six months, partly reflecting tighter requirements concerning individual follow-up.

The first signs of the effects of the interest rate cuts appeared in the foreign exchange market. The interest rate differential against other countries narrowed. It became more attractive to borrow and less profitable to invest in the Norwegian krone. The movement in the krone exchange rate was reversed and it depreciated through 2003 and into 2004. However, the impact on the krone exchange rate has been considerably dampened because external interest rates have remained low. High prices for oil and gas and other export goods also contributed to an appreciation of the krone last year. The depreciation of the krone in 2003 contributed to restraining the fall in prices for imported goods. The effect occurred gradually. Companies and importers may have preferred to observe changes in the exchange rate over time before changing their selling prices. After several expensive wage settlements and a short period of a strong krone had weakened profitability in the Norwegian business sector, the depreciation of the krone contributed to curbing the decline in activity and employment. There is nevertheless uncertainty as to the magnitude of the impact of short-term exchange rate fluctuations because companies engage in currency hedging. There are different ways to hedge against currency fluctuations. Some enterprises buy intermediate goods in the same currency in which they sell their products. Other companies raise a loan in the same currency as that of the company’s assets. In addition, companies can hedge against currency swings in the forward exchange market and options market.
It cannot therefore be argued with great conviction that it is possible to identify one particular interest rate forecast that provides the indisputably “best” trade-off in monetary policy. More often than not, there will be a number of possible interest rate paths that might be said to provide a reasonable balance in view of the uncertainty involved. The results of this trade-off are presented in the Monetary Policy Report in the form of a chart that presents central projections for the interest rate, inflation and capacity utilisation in the economy. The formulation of a precise inflation target, our projection for the interest rate 3-4 years ahead and our desire to achieve a balance between output and inflation stability may perhaps give an impression of excessive optimism with respect to managing the economy and invite a repeat of earlier attempts to fine-tune the economy. But it is important to bear in mind the lessons drawn from the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. high stabilisation policy ambitions may lead to wide fluctuations in the economy, with high and variable inflation. In our conduct of monetary policy, we must not underestimate the uncertainty surrounding the decisions taken. Even if Norges Bank publishes an interest rate forecast, this does not mean that the interest rate will follow this precise path throughout the projection period. Forecasts of inflation, output, the interest rate and other variables are based on an assessment of the current situation and a perception of how the economy functions.

Growth in demand is still robust, and investment in the petroleum sector has increased further. Solid growth in other countries and high prices for Norwegian goods are still generating strong positive impulses to export-oriented mainland enterprises. A number of factors are buoying up growth in household demand this year. As a result of a continued increase in employment and rising wage growth, household real disposable income is growing at a faster pace this year than in 2006. Households are optimistic regarding their own financial situation and the Norwegian economy. Growth in housing investment nevertheless appears to be slowing. This may partly reflect rising construction costs and a growing share of capacity in the construction sector  BIS Review 97/2007  1  being used for commercial buildings. The favourable trend is also reflected in Norges Bank’s regional network, which so far has reported continued solid production growth in most sectors. Capacity utilisation has reached a high level as a result of strong activity growth. Employment has risen as rapidly as in the years prior to the cyclical peaks in the 1980s and 1990s, and unemployment is now at a very low level, measured both in terms of the number of registered unemployed and according to Statistics Norway’s labour force survey (LFS). Enterprises report a shortage of qualified labour, and many positions are vacant. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has not been higher since the 1980s.
In Bulgaria popular and political support for further deepening European integration “remains above the EU average, despite, and probably, to some extent, because of recent developments,” Radev said. "It is becoming a rational rather than an emotional choice, and this is good news." All original text can be read here. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

For this purpose, all participants, faculty members and facilitators of ICLIF programmes will automatically be accredited as members of the Alumni Association. With the rapid changes taking place in the financial and corporate landscape in the country and the greater integration in the region and the world, networking among leaders and captains of industries is most valuable in contributing towards greater understanding and in increasing the potential for collaborative efforts that are of mutual interest. The establishment of the Alumni Association represents an important part of ICLIF’s commitment to provide a platform for members to maintain active networking and productive collaborative alliances. It is also in line with our philosophy that leadership development is a continuous journey. The Alumni Association would thus provide a forum for continuous sharing among its members. Alumni members will also receive automatic notification and invitations to all ICLIF programmes and activities that will be organized in the future. As the members of the Alumni are spread across the region, ICLIF will leverage on Information and Communication Technology to help members stay connected. To facilitate networking opportunities, a special section has been created on ICLIF’s website to cater for the activities of the Alumni Association. This would include the facility to disseminate information among its membership, including the publication of an alumni directory, highlights of important events and latest developments that may be of interest to its members. The Centre will serve as the secretariat to support all activities undertaken by the Alumni Association.
A case in point is the SNB’s decision to introduce the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro in September 2011, and then discontinue it earlier this year. As mentioned, in enforcing the minimum exchange rate, the SNB intervened heavily in the foreign exchange markets, and did not refrain from taking on significant balance sheet risks, particularly in 2012. At the time, interventions were necessary to counteract upward pressure on the Swiss franc resulting from substantial capital inflows and a lack of outflows due to flare-ups in the European debt crisis. Towards the end of 2014, the minimum exchange rate again came under increasing market pressure, requiring renewed interventions by the SNB. This time, however, the international environment was very different. While expectations of an interest rate rise in the United States were mounting and the dollar was appreciating, from mid-year onwards there were signs in the euro area of further monetary policy easing, and the euro started to weaken across the board, pushing the EUR/CHF exchange rate close to the CHF 1.20 per euro floor. On the back of these developments – also reflecting the collapsing interest rate differential – Swiss franc investments again became relatively more attractive. Given these circumstances, and in view of quantitative easing in the euro area, the continuation of the minimum exchange rate policy would have meant a permanent, potentially uncontrollable expansion of the SNB balance sheet.

Philipp Hildebrand: Key factors for the Swiss economy – financial market regulation in Switzerland Speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Swiss Economic Forum, Interlaken, 4 June 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website. *  *  *  The financial system is the life blood of our economy. Key measures to increase the resilience of the financial system have already been implemented in Switzerland. However, they have not addressed the fundamental problem, which is that systemically important banks cannot at present be allowed to fail. The commission of experts set up by the government to examine ways of alleviating this problem published its interim report a few weeks ago. The report proposes measures in the areas of capital, liquidity and organisational structure. This approach is in line with the key points on the Financial Stability Board’s agenda. The interim report is an important milestone in the efforts to address the “too big to fail” issue. Naturally, we still face considerable challenges. Moreover, cross-border solutions are required for the “too big to fail” question. The commission’s proposals represent a constructive step towards global cooperation. If the key points on the Financial Stability Board’s agenda are not implemented in the major financial centres, we will ultimately be left empty handed. One of the few positive aspects of the financial crisis has been the unprecedented international collaboration to combat the crisis and the endeavours to cooperate internationally on regulatory reform.
•  This includes prices of everyday items like food. •  Cost of restaurant food is up 2.5% while hawker food price is up 2.2% compared to year ago. 19. In other words, man-in-the-street (or aunty-in-the-food-court) is not experiencing negative inflation on a broad scale. Monetary policy 20. MAS’ monetary policy decisions in H1 this year attracted fair amount of interest. •  Our monetary policy statements in Jan and Apr have explained rationale. •  But let me take opportunity to elaborate on context of our decisions. 21. In Jan, MAS reduced slope of $ policy band. •  Came as surprise to market because it was outside our usual cycle of policy announcements in Apr and Oct.  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  •  Many wondered why MAS could not have waited till scheduled policy review in Apr. •  Some even wondered if there were going to be more such off-cycle moves in future given greater uncertainty and volatility in macroeconomic numbers. MAS had to adjust policy off-cycle in Jan because of significant change in inflation outlook for 2015 22. We did not take decision lightly. Considered two factors carefully. •  Was decline in inflation likely to persist through 2015? •  Was there a downside to waiting till Apr to adjust policy? Answer to both questions – yes. 23.

Thus, emerging market central banks must be prepared for policy contingencies ahead. At the core, monetary policy must continue to safeguard price stability, while taking into account concerns about economic growth and financial stability. The Bank of Thailand, on our part, will do our best to steer the Thai economy and financial system through the global turbulences, to ensure the continued well-being of the Thai people in years ahead. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Banks are obviously faced with solving a complex equation: i) maintaining a positive contribution to net income from financial services and retail banking as risk-related costs rise, ii) controlling the risk profile of corporate and investment banking activities, while maintaining a good profitability level, iii) coping with the impact of the aftershocks of the crisis on banks’ balance sheets. In this regard, let me stress liquidity management, as market conditions remain tense, with the attendant consequences for management of hedging transactions more generally. On this last point, I should add that their diversified business model means that French banks are not among the most dependent on market financing. Therefore, the leading French banking groups were able to manage their liquidity needs effectively, even during the periods of greatest tension on the markets. Yet, the tightening-up of access to liquidity in the wake of the crisis did show how critical risk management has become. 3. As crisis conditions persist, I should like to talk about the main thrusts of the supervisory authorities’ actions. We have always maintained that the practical implementation of the new Basel II solvency ratio would primarily ensure that banks measure their risks more accurately both in ordinary times as well as during crises. The new Basel II framework has been a reality in France since the beginning of the year. It is noteworthy that a large proportion of French banks use “internal-ratings based” approaches to credit risk.

French banks were affected through several channels: •  First, through their direct exposures to American households in the subprime category or through indirect exposures in portfolios of structured financial instruments, such as residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) that are in turn exposed to subprime risks. As was the case for the rest of the banking system in Europe, indirect exposures accounted for much greater amounts than direct exposures and therefore for the  BIS Review 82/2008  1  bulk of the losses; the lessons that this situation holds for more refined risk management need to be learned quickly. •  Secondly, through exposures to securitisation vehicles (conduits or structured investment vehicles) and particularly through liquidity lines, which need to be managed more rigorously going forward. •  Thirdly, through exposures to assets taken back from securitisation vehicles, or even collective investment schemes, that ran into liquidity problems; this type of reintermediation needs to be given more consideration in terms of capital requirements. •  Fourthly, through their exposures to monoline insurers, which insured some products and were themselves hard-hit by the crisis and thus epitomise “wrong-way” counterparty risks, which need to be assessed more carefully. •  Finally, though exposures to leveraged buy-outs, or more generally by credit-riskrelated costs on the most vulnerable companies, which are starting to rise. Consequently, French banks have not escaped the overall slowdown in net banking income growth affecting major international banking groups.
The events range from small random informal gatherings to large-scale highly organised events to celebrate women’s advancement while highlighting the need for continued vigilance and action. A good number of Governments around the world, have made commitments to promote gender equality, by among other things, taking initiatives to integrate gender perspectives into national budgets or development plans in order to reflect the differentiated needs of women and men. Zambia is no exception. In Zambia, it is recognised that the creation of the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development, is a deliberate effort by the Government to ensure that the needs of women are addressed. Through the Ministry we are able to recognise the strides that have been made by women in national development and we look ahead to the challenges that are before us as we strive to achieve our goal of gender equality. In addition, Zambia is a signatory to the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. This declaration calls for the equal representation of women and men in the decision making process of member states at all levels. I must concede here that, although we have made significant strides as a country in women representation, more still needs to be done. We are however encouraged that there are a good number of women with potential and ability to rise above any form of challenge.

I have in mind here, financing models used in most Asian countries such as the Grameen Bank model in Bangladesh which has demonstrated that women’s potential to contribute towards poverty reduction can be unlocked through provision of finance at community level. Indeed the Grameen Bank model has also proved that women have a good habit of paying back their loans. It is also fitting that women’s potential to contribute to development should be acknowledged and their potential to drive change should be recognised. Although women are yet to gain equality, they are helping to move their families and communities out of poverty. With a little more support, so much more could be achieved. It is my hope that access to finance by women will be enhanced through this exhibition. I am however, pleased to note that, today, more financial institutions are providing financial services to women in Zambia. More women and girls are learning to read and write. We also see throughout the country that women are discovering a new level of economic independence. They’re contributing more to their families and communities. They’re gaining access to credit and jobs that can give them a decent standing of living. This is desirable and should be encouraged. As I conclude, let me extend my gratitude to all the participants and resource persons and commend all the institutions that have taken part to organise both the workshop and exhibition.