samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So, one reason for the krona’s current recovery is that the markets are once again focusing on Sweden’s long-term, stable macroeconomic policy, which has  2  BIS Review 47/2003  remained in place regardless of EMU. This policy includes the Riksbank’s inflation target and a budgetary framework that has the support of all parliamentary parties. Thus, Sweden will remain outside the euro for the time being, together with its fellow EU countries Denmark and the UK. But as early as May next year the EU will have ten new Member States and around 100 million new inhabitants, the vast majority from Central and Eastern Europe. Of these ten, nine have expressed their desire to join monetary union as soon as they meet the convergence criteria. Contrary to many people’s expectations, several of these countries appear fully capable of meeting the criteria in the next few years. After a decade of reforms leading from planned economy to market economy, inflation and budget deficits have been cut and debt levels have been kept in check in a number of the smaller countries, while for the bigger countries, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, budget consolidation is their last remaining obstacle. So it is not unrealistic that a handful of new countries could introduce the euro as early as 2006-2007, or in any case 2-3 years later.

As the representative of a central bank, I must add that it is interesting to at least toy with the idea of how a global currency and global monetary policy would look. But for the time being this will probably remain no more than an intellectually stimulating vision. At global level, integration needs to go much further, and the economies become more synchronised, if the long-term gains of fixed exchange-rate cooperation are to outweigh the risks. In the long term, it is not inconceivable that a trend will arise towards large regional currency blocs with single currencies, but with flexibility between them. Within these blocs, it will be possible to reap the advantages of integration fully, while the risks will be limited by increasingly similar conditions in the countries taking part in the common currency. Competition between these areas regarding which has the dominant reserve currency may increase gradually. The dollar’s unique position will weaken, just as we are seeing today with a number of Asian central banks planning to increase their assets in euro and reduce those in dollars. Let us hope that there will also be cooperation between the regions, so as to give the world greater stability, development and continued integration. BIS Review 47/2003  5
An important external factor underlying the favourable prospects for inflation is the sharp decline in oil and commodity prices, which is partly associated with developments in Asia. Moreover, domestic sources of inflation, such as those arising from the labour market situation and capacity utilisation, are also relatively moderate at the present juncture. In my opinion, taking a euro area wide perspective, these views are also broadly compatible with current monetary and financial developments. In this connection, please take note that we should soon have new information on monetary developments on the basis of the new statistical reporting framework for money and banking. The environment of significant volatility in international financial markets, particularly stock markets, appears to account for much of the recent decline in long-term interest rates in the euro area to historically low levels, as investors have sought to protect themselves against heightened global risk. Nonetheless, it is notable that the euro area yield curve shifted downwards at all maturities, which to some extent would tend to indicate a further decline in long-term inflation expectations for the euro area as a whole. As we approach the start of Stage Three, we shall need to continue to monitor closely economic, monetary and financial developments within the euro area and in the world economy. This will allow us eventually to set the interest rate for the euro area as a whole.

Both private consumption and investment provided an important stimulus to the growth rate in the first quarter of this year. More up-to-date indicators point towards continued expansion in the second quarter, albeit at a possibly more moderate pace than in the first quarter. The outlook on consumption is supported by higher real earnings growth and declining unemployment, and is reflected in consumer confidence. The evidence for the corporate sector is perhaps more mixed. As compared to the first quarter of 1998, industrial production figures show a somewhat slower rate of increase in the period from April to May, but capacity utilisation has continued to increase and this, combined with low interest rates, should underpin investment. European Commission survey data, such as confidence indicators and the assessment of order books, bear witness to relatively high levels, both with respect to their longterm averages and recent peaks. This can also be taken as a favourable indicator for continued growth in the short term, although some indicators have not improved further since the spring. Unemployment has also been declining, but at a modest pace, and from a high level. In discussing the cyclical uncertainties, one should not forget that work on badly needed structural reforms has not so far made much progress. Considering recent price developments, HICP inflation for the euro area as a whole remained stable at 1.4% between May and July. Both domestic and external factors still appear to be favourable, suggesting that euro area inflation may be expected to remain subdued in the future.
At times, this new measure differs significantly from the traditional M3 measure. The paper shows that this new variable has valuable information content in inflation forecasting exercises. In many ways, the empirical work presented in the paper speaks for itself. Nonetheless, it seems to me, there are at least two factors which limit the extent to which we can draw far-reaching conclusions from the work presented in the Fischer et al. paper. First, the analysis covers the years from 1999 to 2006. This period is characterized by remarkably low and stable inflation. For a central banker, this is good news. Such prolonged periods of low and stable inflation can, however, give rise to distortions in econometric analyses. An accurate evaluation of the information content of a particular variable for future inflation becomes difficult when the volatility of inflation is low. In such a setting it comes as no surprise that the random walk is a hard to beat benchmark. Therefore, when inflation is low and stable for a protracted period, a low correlation between money and inflation should not automatically lead us to conclude that money no longer matters. BIS Review 107/2006  1  Second, the evaluation of the additional value of money in the paper is undertaken based on a forecast horizon of six quarters. As the authors recognize themselves and as I will point out later on, money appears to be particularly valuable to inflation dynamics of medium and long-term frequencies.

8  McKinsey (2005, 2006)  9  King (2006)  BIS Review 107/2006  3  case of the SNB, the flexible nature of the policy framework and the importance attached to money and credit variables means that in an effort to avoid potential long-term financial distortions from emerging, the Governing Board could conceivably tighten monetary policy even if our inflation forecast signals no imminent inflation threat. 5. References  Baltensperger, Ernst, Thomas J. Jordan and Marcel Savioz, 2001. The Demand for M3 and Inflation Forecasts: an Empirical Analysis for Switzerland. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol.137 n.2, pp.244-272. Fischer B., M. Lenza, H. Pill and L. Reichlin (2006). Money and monetary policy: The ECB experience 1999-2006. Friedman, Milton, 2005. A natural experiment in monetary policy covering three episodes of growth and decline in the economy and the stock market. Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.19 n.4, pp.145-150. Issing, Ottmar, 2002. Monetary Policy in a Changing Environment. Contribution to the Jackson Hole Symposium on "Rethinking Stabilization Policy", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Jordan, Thomas J., Michel Peytrignet, and Georg Rich, 2001. The role of M3 in the policy analysis of the Swiss National Bank. In: Klöckers, H.-J., and C. Willeke, eds., Monetary Analysis: Tools and Applications, European Central Bank, pp.47-62. Jordan, Thomas, und Marcel Savioz, 2003. Sind Kombinationen von Prognosen aus VAR-Modellen sinnvoll? Eine empirische Analyse mit Inflationsprognosen für die Schweiz. Quartalsheft der SNB, 4, Dezember 2003. King, Mervyn, 2006. Speech at the Dinner for Kent Business Contacts, Ashford, Kent, United Kingdom. McKinsey & Company.
Since then, we’ve seen more positive readings on China’s economy, in part due to steps the authorities have taken to reignite growth. And financial markets have definitely rebounded from their winter doldrums. Still, we’re not entirely out of the woods regarding risks from a global growth slowdown. Signs of weakness in Japan, South Korea, and some regions of Europe continue, so I am particularly vigilant about monitoring the international data. Trade tensions and ongoing uncertainty regarding Brexit continue to present downside risks. Monetary Policy What does this mean for monetary policy? At last week’s meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee decided to leave the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged, between 2-1/4 and 2-1/2 percent. We also reiterated our patient approach to assessing the need to adjust interest rates in the future. In a nutshell: The economy remains on a path of healthy growth, with a very strong labor market and without the emergence of inflationary pressures. The current setting of policy positions us well to keep it that way. Although my view that we are in the right place in terms of monetary policy has not changed of late, the reasons for it have evolved in line with the economic and financial developments I sketched out earlier in my remarks. The strength of recent data on economic activity, the rebound of growth in China, and the reversal in the tightening of financial markets all imply that near-term risks to growth have receded somewhat.

Christian Noyer: Does Europe face the prospect of a lost decade? Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the International Economic Forum of the Americas, Conference of Montreal, Montreal, 9 June 2014. *  *  *  It is always a privilege to speak alongside Larry. But it is also a challenge. I will make the most of it by referring often to salient remarks made by Larry in recent months. I will address three questions: is the euro crisis over? Does Europe face the prospect of a lost decade? What short-term policy challenges are we facing today? I/ – Is the euro crisis over? Less than two years ago, the euro area was fighting for its existence. Euro pessimists were questioning its ability to survive. Not anymore. Analysts may be questioning Europe’s ability to grow. But the challenges that we are facing are different. They are macroeconomic, not existential or systemic. Thanks, mainly, to the Eurosystem’s actions, financial conditions are normalising. Spreads in peripheral countries have been dramatically reduced. Soon, budgets will be reasonably balanced and there will be no more fiscal drag on the economy. Households and corporates have strong balance sheets. Recent forecasts put German growth at more than 2%, Italy in positive territory, and the outlook for France has improved markedly. Growth of business activity in the euro area in April was the highest in the past three years.
Indicator for the trend in unit production costs in the same monetary unit (base 100 in 1987). A fall in the indicator means lower costs and thus better competitiveness. This remarkable trend in our production costs - made possible by long-run low inflation - is a major achievement of the cross-party economic and monetary strategy pursued by the French government and central bank over a long period. It is important for France and the euro area to maintain and consolidate this strong cost-competitiveness position. Since the introduction of the single currency, it is more important than ever that we very closely monitor the indicator for unit production costs as it determines the competitiveness of the goods manufactured in our economy and therefore the current level of employment. This indicator also determines future employment because it dictates the attractiveness of an investment in our economy compared to elsewhere, particularly outside the euro area. Allow me to lastly make a general remark about our strategic approach to growth. Under the notable influence of new information and communication technologies, a change is underway in the overall attitude of Europeans in general and French people in particular concerning the motors of economic growth and job creation.

I would like to emphasise that the performance of the French economy was above the averages for the euro area as a whole, where 2.4% growth was recorded, and the large countries of the European Union. In parallel to this strong recovery in activity, the current account surplus remained high, with France having the second largest in the world. In 1999, as in 1998, the good competitiveness of the productive sector thus remained one of the main pillars supporting French economic growth. The acceleration in economic growth during 1999 enabled the creation of 375,000 dependent jobs in market services. The number of jobseekers fell by 11.4% and the unemployment rate decreased from 11.5% of the labour force in December 1998 to 10.6% at the end of 1999, the lowest level recorded since 1992. Inflation quickened somewhat, especially at the year-end, whilst remaining within limits compatible with the objective of stability (namely less than 2%) assigned to monetary policy. According to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which is the measure of inflation adopted for the countries of the European Union, the rise in prices in France reached a twelve-month rate of 1.4% in December 1999, as against 0.3% a year earlier. This increase can mainly be explained by the sharp 20.6% annual rise in oil product prices.
I will then discuss the implications of these changes for the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and for the eventual “normalization” of monetary policy when the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) believes it is appropriate to remove the extraordinary levels of monetary policy accommodation that it has provided. Finally, I will discuss some of the considerations that must be taken into account in normalizing monetary policy. As always, these are my views and do not necessarily reflect those of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System. The desk’s role in implementing monetary policy The Federal Reserve (the Fed) has a somewhat more complex organizational and governance structure than most other central banks around the world, so before discussing recent developments in the implementation of monetary policy, I’d like to take a moment to describe roles and responsibilities within the Federal Reserve System and where the Desk fits in. The statutory basis for U.S. monetary policy is found in the Federal Reserve Act, which was enacted just over 100 years ago.

Hence, I very much concur with the conference’s theme of “A Call for Action.” It takes courage to lead a transformative 2  journey into an unknown territory. The collective wisdom shared among directors here will enable all of us to make better informed decisions and lead our organizations, and more importantly, lead Thailand, onto the right path – the path which will rise above disruptions, as the IOD has eloquently put it. As Thailand embarks on the journey for digital transformation, we must focus on three key imperatives of productivity, immunity, and inclusivity. Technological advancement provides tremendous opportunity for us to uplift these three areas like never before. While policymakers and regulators can provide support at the infrastructure level and promote a stable environment conducive for innovation, it is at the firm level that actions can be and must be taken to drive meaningful changes for the country as a whole. First, on productivity: uplifting the country’s productivity is necessary to ensure continued long-term economic growth. Specifically, structural changes due to an aging workforce have hastened the need for our country to improve productivity just to maintain output level. In fact, Thailand’s labor productivity growth has been on a decline. From 2002 to 2017, our annual growth of labor productivity averaged 2.9 percent, a significant drop from an average of 5 percent during 1986 to 2001. In contrast, countries such as China and Indonesia have been experiencing rises in productivity growth.
Prior to the last banking crisis, household debt rose sharply and house prices increased, while at the same time inflation was high. When monetary policy was eased last year, a sharp rise in domestic costs, with the outlook pointing to higher inflation, was accompanied by high credit growth. House prices are now falling, which in the long run will probably contribute to curbing credit growth. Wage growth has been reduced and inflation is subdued. Even though high asset prices and strong credit growth build up in a period of low inflation, these imbalances may influence inflation in the somewhat longer run. In that event, a tightening of monetary policy may be consistent with the objective of maintaining low and stable inflation over time. This will also stabilise developments in production. In order to achieve this, economists have recommended that monetary policy should place emphasis on developments in credit growth and asset prices when extraordinary conditions so warrant. In some cases, this will mean that a somewhat longer horizon than normal is applied in order to achieve the inflation target. The advantage is that substantial deviations from the target would be avoided in the somewhat longer run. If imbalances have been allowed over time to become severe, however, situations may arise where the interest rate should be set lower than implied by the inflation target, in order to prevent financial instability from being triggered. In the Norges Bank Watch report of 25 September 2001, Norges Bank was encouraged to place greater emphasis on asset prices.

This is partly because the after-effects of the financial bubble that burst appear to be more substantial and more protracted than previously assumed. It is expected that a number of countries will reduce their interest rates again, and that the level of interest rates in other countries will remain low for some time. In Norway, price inflation is lower than implied by the inflation target and will remain low in the period ahead. The krone has remained strong, partly due to the fall in international interest rates, weakening the impact of our interest rate reductions. Growth in the Norwegian economy is now likely to be weak. Although private consumption continues to show strong growth and oil investment is providing an impetus to the Norwegian business sector, labour market developments have been weaker than expected in our previous Inflation Report. Employment has fallen and unemployment is on the rise. House prices are falling and many commercial properties are vacant. It now appears that fiscal policy will have a more neutral impact on overall demand, and growth in public consumption and employment is no longer rising. Fiscal policy as drawn up in the Revised National Budget will therefore not contribute to locking in the strong krone. One encouraging development is that wage growth appears to have moderated more quickly than expected. This may partly be explained by the interim wage settlement this year, as in 1999.
To reduce the lock-in effects and increase mobility in the housing stock, a review is needed of capital gains taxation when homes are sold, of property taxation and of the current tax relief on interest expenditure. Housing policy: The fundamental causes of increasing indebtedness need to be addressed. The fact that the housing market is functioning poorly, among other reasons due to the construction of new homes not corresponding to the demand, is an important cause of the indebtedness. It is therefore necessary to introduce measures that create a better balance between supply and demand for housing. Another reason why the housing market is functioning poorly is that the rent-setting system creates housing supply limits and lock-in effects that make it particularly difficult to find housing, particularly for young people and for people who are not yet established on the housing market. More rented accommodation would probably improve the balance of supply and demand. In addition, it is important to have measures that lead to the existing housing stock being used more efficiently. Suggestions in the area are not lacking either. See, for example, the recently published special study on more flexible rent-setting and uniform taxation from Finanspolitiska rådet (the Swedish fiscal policy council). 28 If such reforms are adopted, complaints over the amortisation requirements will also decrease. 28 Finanspolitiska rådet (2019). 10 [13]  “My vision” As you see, I have a strong desire for the housing market to change from the way it is today.

The monetary reserves and Swiss franc assets combine to make up the monetary assets, which are required for monetary policy. In addition to these assets, the National Bank also manages the proceeds from the sale of the surplus gold reserves. The portfolio of these so-called free assets amounts to slightly more than CHF 20 billion. In the management of the monetary assets, monetary policy objectives and restrictions have priority. In compliance with the primacy of monetary policy, the investments are optimised according to security, liquidity and return. Important in this regard are the concentration on liquid investments, in other words readily marketable investments, and on the greatest possible risk diversification by holding different currencies and investment categories. The National Bank’s leeway for investment has extended considerably since the entry into force of the new National Bank Act in May 2004. Risk diversification options in particular were also increased as a result. The concrete investment structure of the different portfolios and their yields are published quarterly in an updated appendix to the Investment Policy Guidelines of the Swiss National Bank. The current investment structure and the risk/earnings profile of the National Bank’s assets, in particular the foreign currency reserves and free assets, can be summarised as follows: The portfolio adjustments made under the new Act aim to increase diversification in terms of currency and investment category. Within the context of the 2004 strategy, the dollar share was reduced in favour of the pound sterling and the yen.