samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is worth inquiring into the causes of the world economy's resilience in the face of these shocks. Firstly, it is probably indicative of the greater microeconomic flexibility of both the developed and the emerging economies. It appears the structural reforms of recent years, aimed at increasing the adaptability and responsiveness of economies to adverse effects, are beginning to bear fruit. Consequently, it is crucial to further such reforms, especially in times of plenty, when their cost is lower, so that when lean times arrive the economy has the spontaneous adjustment mechanisms in place to reduce the cost and duration of the crisis. Secondly, from the macroeconomic policy standpoint, the recent economic slowdown shows the importance of having sufficient fiscal and monetary policy leeway to be able to react to adverse disturbances, meaning in turn that prices and public finances should have performed favourably during economic upturns. Fortunately, on this occasion, the slowdown found the main economies in a relatively balanced inflationary and budgetary situation. This was conducive to a monetary policy response (which was more intense in the United States, in step with the sharper reduction in the pace of activity in this country) and to the operation of the automatic stabilisers, without jeopardising the long-term fundamentals. The notable exception is Japan. Here there is no further room for additional stimuli on the demand side owing to the economic and financial problems inherited from previous years. And this has led to the economy going into recession for the third time in ten years.

In other words, the variable cost is negligible today and the fixed cost is reasonable. Today, therefore, we can find powerful computers and the Internet at most workplaces and in many homes. The costs are so low that many have the financial scope to utilise computers and the Internet, at least in industrial nations. This spread also means that the time and cost involved in the telegraph boy’s running around is eliminated. In other words, it is this spread that means that today’s IT most probably has much greater significance than telegraphy had a hundred years ago. Speculation and technology So far during the ongoing technological revolution, we have seen both a powerful rise and a considerable decline in the value at the stock exchange. If we compare this with earlier periods when major technological changes had a breakthrough or became more widely used, we can conclude that the sequence of events has varied greatly. We have had several periods of extensive speculation in connection with breakthroughs for new technologies that have resulted in financial and real shocks. We have also had periods when these changes have occurred more gradually, without any major shocks. One example of the former is the speculation during the early 1920s that resulted in an economic decline. A further example is the international shock we had following the wave of speculation in the then ‘new economy share’ - the railways - in the 1870s. This led to a very weak international development over a period of almost 20 years.
8  Figure 1 Accumulated inflation, February - December 2018  Evolution of CPI and CPIEFE inflation (1) (2)  (percent)  (annual change, percent)  CPI  2.5  CPIEFE  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  1.0  1.0  4.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5 0.5  0.5 0.0  Basket Basket 2013 2018  Basket 2013  Basket 2018  1.5  CPIEFE  1.0  0.0  3.5  CPI  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0 18  Abr. Jul. Oct.  19  (1) As from January 2019 the lines use the new indexes with annual base 2018=100, so they are not strictly comparable with earler figures. (2) Blue (red) diamonds show the annual CPI (CPIEFE) variation using the 2013=100 basket. As from February 2018, they show the annual change that is obtained by splicing the 2013=100 basket series with the monthly variations in the 2018=100 basket. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). Figure 2 Exchange rate and goods EFE (annual change, percent)  6  30  5  25  4  20 TCN (right axis)  3  goods EFE (*)  2  15 10  1  5  0  0  -1  -5  -2  -10  -3  -15 16  16 Jul.

Its commitment is essential, in order for our co-operation to be part of our daily job and add to the efficiency of both institutions and not to remain solely on paper. The Bank of Albania considers the conclusion of this memorandum as a cornerstone which will overwhelmingly affect the enhancement of real competition conditions, in which the banking and financial activity are currently being conducted. It is worth underlining that fair competition promotes the efficiency in the banking business and refines the composition and the functioning of the banking market. The Bank of Albania will make its utmost efforts to make the co-operation deriving from this agreement as concrete as possible and with direct impact on achieving a real, fair and efficient market competition. BIS Review 82/2007  1  I take this opportunity to express the Bank of Albania commitment to carry out all the responsibilities deriving from the law and from this agreement. In addition, allow me to express my appreciation to the Competition Authority and to Ms. Lati for the support granted in the conclusion of this agreement. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 82/2007
In the charts, all the variables are shown as deviations from a baseline scenario, i.e. a path for  6  BIS Review 4/2005  economic developments without such a disturbance. The figures on the X-axis indicate the number of quarters. Increased competition reduces companies’ possibilities for setting prices higher than marginal production costs. This contributes to a reduction in prices. Owing to nominal rigidities, however, it takes time for prices to adapt to increased competition. Therefore, inflation falls gradually. The interest rate is reduced to counter the fall in inflation and to bring inflation back to the target. Lower real interest rates combined with lower price inflation contribute to higher consumer demand. Output increases to meet higher demand. Higher output increases demand for factor inputs such as labour and capital. Therefore, the number of man-hours increases. Investment also rises as a result of lower real interest rates. Increased demand for labour results in a tighter labour market and upward pressure on nominal wages. Lower price inflation has the opposite effect. Therefore, nominal wages may remain relatively stable, while real wages increase sharply. Thus, real marginal costs increase. This will gradually contribute to pushing up price inflation. The prospect of higher inflation leads to a gradual increase in the interest rate. An increase in real interest rates curbs demand. Since increased competition is assumed to be only temporary in this illustration, there will be no permanent effects on output. Therefore, the economy will gradually return to the baseline scenario.

This assessment must also take account of the substantial uncertainty surrounding the calculation of the output gap, and of Norges Bank’s mandate which specifies that inflation shall be 2.5 per cent over time. The inflation gap and the output gap shall normally not be positive or negative at the same time further ahead. If, for example, both gaps are positive, a higher interest rate path would be preferable as this would bring inflation closer to the target and contribute to stabilising output. Depending on the initial situation for inflation and production, it may be difficult to meet these criteria simultaneously. How easy it is to meet these criteria will depend on the disturbances to which the economy has been exposed. There are also other important considerations when assessing the interest rate path. We must assess whether the interest rate path, at least in the next few months, results in acceptable developments also under alternative, but realistic assumptions concerning economic developments and the functioning of the economy. In other words, is the strategy robust? We must also evaluate the consequences for financial stability. Last, but not least, a successful monetary policy requires a reasonably good understanding of the state of the economy and its functioning. I will now discuss this in more detail. Analyses and models at Norges Bank The Executive Board’s assessments of various interest rate paths are based on projections of economic developments, supplemented by other information and discretion.
Global growth momentum has continued to slow down. At the same time, inflation in many countries is markedly above central banks’ targets. Accordingly, numerous central banks have further tightened their monetary policy. In our baseline scenario for the global economy, we expect this challenging situation to persist for now. Global economic growth is likely to be weak in the coming quarters, and inflation will remain elevated for the time being. Over the medium term, however, inflation abroad should return to more moderate levels, not least due to the increasingly tighter monetary policy in many countries. Our scenario for the global economy is subject to significant risks. The energy situation in Europe could worsen again. At the same time, high inflation could become embedded and require renewed stronger monetary policy responses abroad. Finally, the coronavirus pandemic remains an important source of risk for the global economy. Swiss economic outlook  What is the economic outlook for Switzerland? GDP grew at an annualised rate of 1.0% in the third quarter. Economic momentum thus remained similarly modest as in the preceding quarters. While many service industries fared well, there was a renewed slight decline in value added in manufacturing. The situation on the labour market remained positive. Employment continued to rise, and unemployment decreased again slightly. Overall production capacity has been well utilised. Switzerland’s GDP is likely to grow by around 2.0% this year. However, weaker demand from abroad and the high energy prices are likely to curb economic activity markedly in the coming year.

Against this backdrop, we expect GDP growth of around 0.5% for 2023. Page 2/4  Berne, 15 December 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Our forecast for Switzerland, as for the global economy, is subject to high uncertainty. A stronger economic downturn abroad or a pronounced energy shortage in Switzerland would, in particular, have a negative effect. Monetary policy outlook  Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to return to our monetary policy. Inflation has declined somewhat since August. While this development is welcome, it is still too early to sound the all-clear. In fact, the underlying inflationary pressure has increased again, due also to the high level of inflation abroad. In this environment, there is a danger that inflation could remain elevated in Switzerland in the medium term owing to second-round effects. The renewed tightening of our monetary policy is therefore necessary to ensure that inflation returns to the range consistent with price stability over the medium term. It cannot be ruled out that further increases in the SNB policy rate will be necessary to ensure price stability. I would like to conclude by addressing the development of the exchange rate and our activity on the foreign exchange market. Since the beginning of the year, the Swiss franc has appreciated by around 4% on a trade-weighted basis. This appreciation has helped ensure that less inflation has been imported from abroad, thus curbing the rise in inflation.
Certainly I seriously underestimated the scale of the downside risks from a potential financial crisis, and that implied overrating the ability of monetary policy to offset this shock. I will return later to the question of how a more long-term perspective might sometimes alter the desirable approach to policy. Before that, I want to discuss some issues around the MPC’s inflation projections and how we assess uncertainty. The balance of demand and supply The MPC’s projections for inflation, absent external shocks, are determined to a significant extent by our judgements about inflation expectations and about the likely developments in the pressure of demand on supply (this phrase is a better description than the more usual “output gap” – however I will now use the latter as a convenient shorthand). During my stint  4  Large (2005). 5  Gieve (2009). 2  BIS Review 27/2010  on the MPC, the way in which we have chosen to assess the output gap, as reflected in the assumptions underlying our main macro-model, has changed on a number of occasions. Of course, one model has never been the sole guide to our projections – a number of other models are also drawn on as appropriate. And the final shape of the fan charts published in the Inflation Report is the product of the MPC’s judgement including on the insights from these models.

Today I want to pursue a number of monetary policy issues, looking back over the almost nine years I have been on the MPC and seeking to draw lessons from that experience for the very difficult decisions that seem likely to face the Committee over the next couple of years. In particular, I will make some observations about the problems that policymakers inevitably face in assessing the implications for inflation of the pressure of demand on the economy’s supply capacity, and also about the time horizon over which the MPC seeks to bring inflation back to target. A more general theme of this discussion reflects on whether the approach to policy should be somewhat different in the more uncertain economic environment we face today, compared with the relatively tranquil period of the MPC’s first ten years. The pre-crisis period Given the scale of the recent financial crisis and consequent recession, it is not possible to look back over my lengthy period as a policymaker with the degree of satisfaction I would have wished. The big question it seems natural to ask is: to what extent did the conduct of monetary policy contribute to that crisis? Here the real issue must be about the role of policy in the period prior to the summer of 2007. Once the financial crisis was underway, I remain doubtful that monetary policy could have done very much more to alleviate the depth of the recession.
In this context, the risk of disruption or a financial crisis matters because of the potential reduction of necessary financial services and economic activity in the future. As I discussed in a talk at this conference a few years ago, a short-term discussion of the balance between firm resilience and the provision of financial services may be reframed over a longer horizon as a dynamic trade-off between the provision of financial services today and in the future.5 This risk/return framework extends that perspective if one cares about the volatility of those financial services across different states of the world and over time. The idea of multiple objectives suggests a policy trade-off with an efficient frontier. In this framework, an efficient financial sector regime can only realize more intermediation if it accepts a higher risk of financial instability and less intermediation in the future. A second premise is that the official sector can impact outcomes relative to this frontier through a combination of rules, regulation, and supervisory policies. For example, a reduction in loan documentation requirements, risk management reviews and supervisory oversight might allow increased lending in the short-run, but potentially lowers loan quality and increases risk over time. A particular set and calibration of policies is efficient if the only way to increase financial intermediation is to accept higher risk of disruption or crisis. Equivalently, an efficient outcome is one where the only way to reduce risk is to accept less intermediation.

Kevin Stiroh: Policy efficiency in supervision Remarks by Mr Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the conference "Bank Regulation, Lending and Growth", sponsored by The Bank Policy Institute and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, New York City, 1 March 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery  Introduction Good morning. Thank you very much for the kind introduction. I am very happy to participate in this conference on “Bank Regulation, Lending, and Growth,” sponsored by Columbia University and the Bank Policy Institute. The agenda covers a number of important banking issues and I will talk about the idea of policy efficiency from a supervisory perspective.1 Before beginning, let me emphasize that the views I express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Public policy strives to be efficient, but efficiency is not a simple concept, particularly in the context of the supervision of large financial firms where the world is complex, the official sector has multiple objectives, and impact lags are long and uncertain.2 For example, supervisors care about the safety and soundness of individual financial firms, about the provision of financial services to support the real economy, about consumer welfare and financial inclusion, and about financial stability.
He worked on economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, and on coordination of financial policy with the G7 countries. All in all, an impressive job. Currently, John is a member of the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance, which aims at improving the functioning of the global financial architecture and governance. No less fascinating is John Taylor the teacher in both ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ terms. On the one hand, he has given countless speeches, hundreds of lectures, written several Page 3/4  textbooks and developed online courses. On the other hand, he is known for mixing teaching with entertainment. Indeed, John does not hesitate to use special didactic techniques to help students understand or remember material. During his classes, to cite just one example, John enters into a humorous dialogue with Adam Smith, revealing deep enthusiasm and dedication to the job. And by the way, this example is quite remarkable for someone who describes his humour “as mostly deadpan”, so that it generally takes a few lectures before his students are able to figure out when something is actually a joke. Having talked about John’s three occupations separately, I should emphasise how well they interact and stimulate one another. Research is integrated into college lectures; government work has enabled him to understand policy constraints, while this in turn has stimulated research. “Economic research,” John once wrote, “is most exciting and productive when it is policy-driven.” Karl Brunner could not have agreed more.

Speech  Embargo 21 September 2017, 5.30 pm  Second Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture Introduction of John B. Taylor  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Zurich, 21 September 2017 © Swiss National Bank  Page 1/4  Ladies and gentlemen I am very pleased to welcome you to the 2017 Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture. The Swiss National Bank established the Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture Series to pay tribute to academics whose research is of particular relevance for central banking. With this annual lecture, we want to reach a wide audience, including, in particular, students. For this reason today’s event is taking place at the ETH Zurich, which is internationally one of the most renowned academic institutions. I would like to thank the President of the ETH Zurich, Professor Lino Guzzella, for making these fantastic premises available to us. This year, we are paying tribute to John B. Taylor. He is one of the world’s foremost economists. John’s work is characterised by a keen interest in highly relevant questions, from both an academic and an applied point of view. He has made major contributions to economic theory. In addition, by bridging the divide between theory and practice, he is one of few economists to have had a profound impact on economic policy and thus on macroeconomic stability. John is also a very effective teacher. Just let me give you one example. Did you know that Tiger Woods, the famous golf professional, was his student in the introductory class at Stanford?
But here it is important that we all help to see the whole picture: if all agents just take into account their own shortterm interests, there is a risk that the consequences for society as a whole, and thus for all of us, will be unnecessarily large. To increase the incentives to give loans, the Government has allocated several million to share the risk in new lending with the banks. The terms and conditions in this programme will be more decisive for how much the banks lend than those we at the Riksbank decide on. We can offer the banks slightly cheaper financing, but if the unwillingness to lend is based on an assessment that the risk is too high, then other measures are needed. It is then a question of fiscal policy, not monetary policy. The central issue here is that most of the crisis measures have an impact through the Riksbank’s balance sheet instead of the interest rate. Over the past ten years, this type of measure has become increasingly common, both in Sweden and abroad. An important question going forward is to what extent this type of measure will be used to conduct monetary policy in more normal times. The international discussion of the toolbox An intensive international discussion was already under way before the coronavirus pandemic broke out concerning how the monetary policy framework and toolbox need to be adapted to meet the challenges of the future.

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