But is there more that we can do to manage the tensions created by these economic 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  divergence? Put another way, how do we reconcile yet another paradoxical couple: independence and co-operation? Obviously the question is not to go back to a world of accords negotiated in hotel suites. But we can and should act to enhance co-operation between central banks. Such co-operation includes four elements: Mutual predictability of policy making. We will achieve the closest to a co-operative solution if we avoid large surprises between policy makers. While trade multilateralism is at risk, monetary and financial multilateralism stands fast, fortunately. This means continuing to favor dialogue and exchange of information among central banks, and to be very clear about our monetary policy regime choice. We should cherish the “great convergence” of policy objectives of the last fifteen years. Among major advanced economies, we now have domestic inflation targeting around a 2% medium-term objective. We are ruling out any currency war, as clearly stated in our unanimous Bali communiqué: ``We will not target our exchange rates for competitive purposes’’. On capital flow management (CFM) measures, we should support the ongoing reflections undertaken within the relevant international bodies and give priority to practical and pragmatic solutions – IMF type – rather than dogmatic purity. Last, I can only quote you, Tharman, and your impressive EPG report: “It is critical that we put in place a reliable Global Financial Safety Net before the next crisis” and co-ordinate its different layers.

We are increasingly confident in the sustained adjustment in inflation back to our objective, with our forecast for 1.7% in each of 2018, 2019 and 2020, vindicating our unanimous decision in June to pursue a course of gradual normalisation. There are, however, growing uncertainties: protectionism could weigh on business confidence and investment; many EMEs are struggling with the US policy-mix – a warranted monetary policy normalisation, having to cope with a less warranted fiscal stimulus; and financial market valuations that remain stretched despite the recent correction. Within Europe, Italian fiscal policy is under investor scrutiny. And there is Brexit, although its direct effect on the euro area macroeconomy is likely to be small. How should we respond to this uncertainty? By combining two apparently contradictory aims, clarity and flexibility:  Clarity – Our first duty as policymakers is to provide markers to help guide economic actors and financial markets in the increasing fog of uncertainties. For our guidance to be reliable, we need to be as clear, credible and consistent as possible. We cannot be clear like a train timetable but more like how a captain sets a course and adapts to the wind and the waves. So our sequence of steps for policy normalisation is very predictable: first, we halved our net asset purchases to 15 billion this month and will very probably end them in December. Second, we set down a guide post with our long-dated forward guidance: we will maintain interest rates at current levels until at least through the summer of 2019.