samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To many, financial planning can be a fairly complicated task. Identifying personal financial needs requires consideration of an impossibly wide array of factors, finding the right solutions for them even more so. For years, financial advisers have played the crucial role of condensing the vast technical complexities of finance into practical, reliable advice on a personal level. It is a role whose prominence I am certain can only grow with time, but only if it successfully adapts to a rapidly transforming financial and social landscape. In this connection and before elaborating further on the concept of a trust, I would like to draw your attention to three major trends that are shaping the industry as we speak. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  First, demographic shifts. Malaysia is a relatively young nation. 40–50% of our workforce are aged between 21 to 35, also known as Gen Y. This remains a largely untapped market for financial advisory services, and for a reason – many individuals within this age group are skeptical of, or distrust financial advisers. According to a survey by the Asian Institute of Finance in 2015, only 37% of these individuals had sought advice from a financial adviser. Of this, only 26% trusted the advice they received. This is complicated by the fact that these are highly connected, tech-savvy individuals with broad access to online platforms that act as a primary source of information and advice.

Tarisa Watanagase: Financial globalization and market turbulence Opening remarks by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Bank of Thailand’s International Symposium on “Financial Globalization and Emerging Market Economies”, Bangkok, 7 November 2008. *  *  *  Professors, Distinguished Participants, Fellow Central Bankers, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to the BOT International Symposium 2008 on “Financial Globalization and Emerging Market Economies”. This symposium is the third in a series of International Symposia organized by the Bank of Thailand. From its first meeting eight years ago, this symposium series has been a gathering of prominent academics, policy-makers and market participants to discuss current issues on both monetary and macroeconomic policies from an international perspective of either emerging, regional, or global economies. Over the past several years, a common theme for us as the organizer has been the focus on inflation targeting and its implications on monetary and financial sector policies where appropriate. Through this series of symposia, a body of knowledge has been timely accumulated to be put to great tests from the increasing trend in financial globalization and the accompanying turbulence in recent years. When the topic for this year’s symposium was chosen prior to this current market turmoil, it was not apparent at the time that the turbulence would indeed turn out to be one of the most challenging events since the Great Depression.
In line with this assessment, we are taking steps to increase our understanding of the impact of climate change from a financial perspective and to ensure that banks fully incorporate these risks into their processes and practices. I will now go through the recent and ongoing climate-related initiatives related to our supervisory work. The ECB Guide and climate-related disclosures  2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In November last year we published the ECB Guide on climate-related and environmental risks.6 It builds on the Guide for Supervisors7 of the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), and communicates the ECB’s understanding of a prudent approach to managing such risks to banks, markets and the wider public, with the aim of raising banks’ awareness and preparedness for managing them. In our Guide, we outline our supervisory expectations for how climate and environmental risks should be embedded in all relevant bank processes, from banks’ risk management frameworks to their governance structures, risk appetite, business model and strategy, and, importantly, their reporting and disclosures. Our ultimate goal is to cause banks to make sure their business strategies fully reflect the Paris Agreement – and there is one thing that will be key in getting us there: data. When it comes to tackling climate risk as a financial risk, data are what we are missing the most.

The FSB has set in train two courses of action to prevent an excessive concentration of banking risk off the balance sheets of banks: first, it monitors their size, activities and risk characteristics; and second, it is working on the introduction of measures both for institutions (particularly closed-end money market funds) and for activities (particularly certain forms of alternative funding, such as securitisation or the funds obtained through the repo market or securities lending). Lastly, increasing emphasis will be placed on monitoring the implementation of reforms. One of the lessons learned during the crisis was that international standards must not only be appropriate, but also effectively and uniformly implemented across jurisdictions to avoid situations of lack of competitiveness, regulatory arbitrage or creation of systemic risk. I am sure that, as in previous years, your Meeting will be extremely interesting and informative. There is no shortage of issues and problems. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
However, the establishment of an Euro Area Resolution Fund, funded by ex ante private sector contributions, is an avenue that could be considered. Such a fund could both mitigate the systemic impact of bank failures and help to solve the burden sharing problem, which could allow a swift intervention in a crisis. Naturally, clear, stringent and properly communicated conditions for the use of the fund would be a crucial component of the scheme, outlining that any form of bail-out is to be excluded. On a more fundamental level, moving towards a true euro area regime of supervision and crisis resolution requires a stronger concept of the euro area as a legitimate entity requiring separate treatment. Prior to the crisis, this concept was underdeveloped. Since the crisis, a stronger focus on the euro area has been evident in, for example, the meetings of the European Council in euro area composition and the agreement of the Euro Plus Pact. Ultimately, to give the euro area dimension real impetus requires a permanent political centre of gravity. In my view, institutionalising the European Council in euro area format would go a long way towards creating the specific economic governance concept that the euro area merits. Fifth: involvement of central banks in financial stability Finally, a comprehensive discussion on how to ensure financial stability within the economic governance framework should, of course, also look closer to home and to the proper involvement of central banks.

Prior to the crisis, the lack of an institutional mechanism to translate the financial stability analysis made by central banks and the ECB into policy actions was a major lacuna. In response, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has been set up to monitor and assess macro-prudential risks. Given that the new framework began operating in January this year, it is difficult to assess its effectiveness comprehensively. However, it could be instructive to review ex ante the robustness of the analytical toolbox assigned to the ESRB, and consider ex post whether such a toolbox would have enhanced policymakers understanding of systemic risk prior to the crisis. Before doing so, I should make clear that the purpose of the ESRB is not to predict crises. The academic literature on early warning signal models, developed over the years, suggests that, for a number of reasons, the scope for error in predicting crises is substantial. Either the eruption of a crisis is missed or a period is wrongly identified by the start of a crisis. For this reason, the ESRB’s analytical toolbox is based on early warning models and indicators designed to identify emerging vulnerabilities or imbalances that could lead to financial instability. These models aim to perform three functions in particular. First, to identify the variables which are associated with financial instability.
12.12.2018  Opening of the 14th banking industry meeting: should we reinvent banks or improve their management? IESE Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning. I should like to thank the IESE for its kind invitation to open the 14th edition of the banking industry meeting. This gives me an excellent opportunity to review the progress made by the Spanish banking industry and the main challenges it currently faces. Let me start, however, with a brief explanation regarding the content of my speech. As a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank I am, as of today, subject to a “quiet period”, before a meeting at which monetary policy decisions are due to be taken. Accordingly, my reflections in this speech should not be interpreted as indicating the monetary or economic outlook (see Chart 1). Following the last crisis, Spanish banks have carried out a major balance sheet clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring which, over the last four and a half years, has notably improved the situation of the industry in terms of its basic parameters, such as asset quality, profitability and solvency. Starting with asset quality, between December 2013 and June 2018 the reduction in nonperforming loans and foreclosed real estate assets has been very notable. Also, the return on equity has turned positive again and is above the euro area average, following its collapse in 2012, to minus 25%.

Because of the stagnation in the 1990s, inflation has been particularly low in Europe in recent years. Norway, on the other hand, experienced a long period of economic expansion in the 1990s. Since 1997, price inflation in Norway has been higher than in euro area countries, which is reflected in the higher level of interest rates in Norway compared with the euro area. The effects of monetary policy In theory, Norges Bank has two monetary policy instruments: the interest rate and exchange market interventions. However, in Norges Bank’s experience, extensive and sustained exchange market interventions to influence the exchange rate have yielded poor results. Interventions can often lead to game situations where market operators perceive the central bank’s attempt to influence the exchange rate as an interesting opportunity to make a profit. Events in autumn 1992, at the start of 1997 and autumn 1998 show that exchange market interventions cannot stem the pressure on the krone. Norges Bank does not want to intervene in such a way that these game situations arise. However, the Bank may use interventions to a limited extent if the krone exchange rate moves substantially out of line with what we consider to be reasonable based on fundamentals or in the event of exceptional short-term volatility in thin markets. In such situations, there is less risk of ending up in a game situation against exchange market operators.
Eddie Yue: What quality means to Hong Kong as an international financial centre Opening keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Management Association 2020 Quality Award Presentation Ceremony, Hong Kong, 14 October 2020. * * * Helmuth, YK, ladies and gentlemen, honoured guests, 1. Good evening. It gives me great pleasure to deliver the keynote speech at tonight’s prestigious ceremony. 2. The Hong Kong Management Association and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority are like twin brothers. Not only that we share the same HKMA acronym, but we also share similar beliefs. We both have a deep commitment to management excellence, developing human capital and upholding the highest standards of quality. 3. Ten years ago, at this same event, my predecessor Norman Chan shared his thoughts on how the HKMA – the Monetary Authority, that is – can achieve quality in public service. He said that the community expected nothing short of the highest standards of quality from the HKMA. And he highlighted the importance of professionalism, passion and pride to our organisation. 4. I believe the last ten years have demonstrated the truth of these words. So, tonight, I’d like to build on what Norman said at that time by taking a broader perspective on what quality means to Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Quality in an international financial centre 5. We can all discern quality in products and services.

BIS Review 70/2002  1  The euro area performance since 1999 and Sweden’s situation So what can we say about the state of the Monetary Union, some three years after its inception? Let me first emphasize that three years is a very short time span to evaluate a project of this scale, not nearly enough for anyone to make an authoritative judgement. But, undoubtedly, for those who had great expectations regarding convergence, increased competition and higher productivity during these first three years the euro will have been a disappointment in some respects. Many were hoping that the creation of the euro, with the integration of financial markets, increased cross-border competition and the reduced transactions costs, would usher in a period of higher growth and productivity gains for the euro area. Instead, we have seen a slowdown in productivity and an economic performance steadily below that of the US, and also slightly below that of Sweden and other pre-in countries. Since 1999 GDP growth has on average been 2.3 percent in the euro area against 2.9 percent in Sweden, while overall productivity in the euro-economy according to the OECD has been only 0.6 percent in the euro area 1999-2001, against 1.0 percent in Sweden. So, at least superficially, it does not appear to be the case that Sweden has underperformed because of its non-participation in the euro area. During the economic boom in 1999 and 2000 the euro area lagged behind the US and Sweden in productivity increases.
Also, and in particular, we must determine whether the eligibility requirements are effective for supporting the most vulnerable groups, and whether its design offers sufficient incentives for beneficiaries to join the labour market. An additional matter is the problem of the affordability of rental housing. International evidence shows that policies aimed at increasing supply are the most effective. Some countries have opted to combine the introduction of public guarantees with tax incentives for the private-sector development of rental housing. It is also crucial to ensure legal security for owners. Turning to European economic policies, despite the response during the crisis, there are structural shortcomings in euro area governance that need resolving. From the standpoint of crisis management, resolving these shortcomings would also be important, given that we cannot rule out the fact that the impact of the pandemic on the economy, and its persistence, may be greater than expected. We must persevere with a European response to this crisis. Completing the Banking Union with the approval of a fully mutualised European deposit guarantee scheme would contribute decisively to ensuring financial stability in the euro area, both in the coming months and in the medium term. Deepening the Capital Markets Union project would likewise be crucial. And a further priority is to analyse the suitability of European bank resolution and winding-up regulations to a hypothetical systemic crisis, and to set in place a common procedure for the administrative winding-up of credit institutions.

In the spirit of Abraham Lincoln’s words, who stated that “the best way to predict your future is to create it”, we are all jointly responsible for setting in train the reforms that can obtain a better future for us and the coming generations. Thank you. 10
The start is usually considered to be 3 October 1990, when financial company Nyckeln suspended payments and in its fall took with it both other financial companies and banks. This also had repercussions for the real economy, and Sweden entered a deep recession. The growing public finance deficits, rising scepticism about the prospects to reverse developments, the problems in the financial sector, rising unemployment and the high cost situation all combined to undermine the confidence of the financial markets in the Swedish economy and the currency. A brief postponement of the inevitable In late summer 1992, the situation in the Swedish economy was, to say the least, worrying. The last week of August, that is, almost exactly thirty years ago, the turbulence in foreign exchange markets intensified. Currency began to flow out of the country, market interest rates rose and on 26 August the Riksbank raised the marginal interest rate (the policy rate of the time) by three percentage points to 16 per cent. This was only one of several rate increases in the coming weeks. Finland, which had been particularly affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union, chose to move to a floating exchange rate on 8 September. On the same day, the policy rate in Sweden was raised to 24 per cent and the following day it was raised to 75 per cent. An attempt to reduce interest rates to 20 per cent on 14 September did not succeed.

Firstly, inflation has been low and stable. Measured in terms of the CPIF, it has been at 1.8 per cent since 1995, and volatility has been low. Inflation has been so low and stable that the inflation target has sometimes been questioned. However, the question leads to some circular reasoning and rather reflects the fact that the inflation target has worked well. One purpose of the target is precisely that inflation should be so low and stable that changes in it need not be taken into consideration when planning to consume or invest. However, when inflation has been so low for a long time that households and businesses do not have to think about it, it is easy to see this as a natural condition that has arisen ‘by itself’ rather than as a result of a consistent policy. Diagram 2. Historical CPIF Annual percentage change  Note. Inflation outcomes for the period before 2005 are calculated in accordance with the method used in real time during this period. The red broken line shows the average for the period 1981-1992 (7.4%) and 1995-July 2022 (1.8%). Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. Secondly, real wages have developed positively. From the mid-1970s and about twenty years onwards, wages remained virtually still in real terms, that is, in terms of purchasing power. Although nominal wage increases were high, they were eaten up when inflation rose correspondingly. After 1995, however, we had a clear trend increase in real wages.
BIS Review 49/2010  5  I asked plenty of questions that I don’t have ready answers but I hope enough to force you to ponder into thinking this issue from a multiple dimensions. The good news is we are at a stage of growth in terms of product and service in Islamic finance. That means innovation is still the driving force behind the industry progress. The questions posed today is not meant to deter nor to direct in which direction we ought to be moving – but to provoke new thoughts in moving forward. The fact of the matter is that debt based financing is generally accepted and approved by Shariah scholars and currently forms an integral part of Islamic finance and its structured was tested in our legal system. These instruments have been adopted by the IDB and many Sovereigns to finance infrastructure investments, to promote trade and to meet liquidity needs in Muslim countries. In other words, debt-based financing has been successfully deployed to bring economic benefit to fellow Muslims. There is no doubt that Equity based financing needs to be considered and its usage encouraged. At the same time we must do so with the full knowledge of its full consequence on the entire financial system stability as it currently stands.

Or is it a natural phenomena? Are players in the industry not aware of the benefits? Or are they aware of the benefits, weighed it against the potential risks and decided not to pursue this strategy because of business and operational reasons? First let’s analyze the potential benefit. For example, a Bank enters into a joint venture with a housing developer. The financing of the project in the form of equity can yield a lucrative return when the development is completed and then sold. Margin for profit upon sale can be high, as Bank enters into the development at the earliest chain of production. The Bank can still provide financing for the home purchasers, the difference this time – the homes are the Bank’s own asset. Those are direct impact; there are positive impacts in other key areas as well. What happens to the profit from sales and financing? It gets channeled back to Depositors (giving them higher returns on the deposits). This concept would, completely, according to equity-based financing proponent, move Islamic banks away from mimicking conventional products and would truly operate as the shariah had wanted it. Is this true, are there any other factors to be considered? In terms of risk assessment, such a transaction will necessarily inject greater market discipline among industry players. This business model is premise on a few fundamental assumptions.