samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Through it, among other things, we not only influence on the economic agents’ expectations and behavior, but ensure our transparency, as well, which is especially important because the central bank is an independent institution, and independence goes hand in hand with accountability. After all, transparency and accountability are the fundamental principles underlying our operations – they guarantee the preservation of the confidence and integrity of the National Bank. Moreover, the public confidence in us and in our capacity to deliver macroeconomic and financial stability is a sine qua non to our success. The communication of central banks is a dynamic category. Several decades ago, globally, central banks were closed institutions whose communication was extremely complex – clear and close only to certain groups that knew central banking well. As FED’s former Chairman Alan, Greenspan’s once said: “If I’ve made myself too clear, you must have misunderstood me”. But today, we, the central banks, operate in a world of openness and clarity and tend to be understandable in our public speaking. Particularly significant changes in communication have been evident in the last ten years since the beginning of the global economic and financial crisis. And not just through greater openness in communication, but also in the way central banks present themselves in their releases. This is not surprising, since we all, during the crisis, faced with high uncertainty, mistrust, and we started using instruments outside the conventional set of instruments. With regard to these changes, I would particularly emphasize the ECB’s example.

To mitigate the volatility of capital flows and especially short term flows and reap the benefits of capital account liberalization, one should adopt a risk management strategy that involves a system for monitoring and assessing the risks and liquidity of the economy as a whole, including at a sector level. The international community may assist in developing best practices related to reserve and debt management: let me quote for example the more stringent publishing obligations on net foreign exchange reserves adopted within the context of the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) or the IMF and the World Bank initiative to promote good practices in reserve and sovereign liability management. 1.2  Clarify the principles governing crisis resolution and the distribution of roles among actors  I would like to give you my views on two issues at stake which are of great importance and strongly inter-related, i.e. the role of the IMF and the involvement of the private sector. 1.2.1  The IMF should remain at the centre of the process for crisis resolution  Whatever the prevention features, crises will still occur in the future. In that respect, I would like to focus on the roles of the IMF as regards both international lending and crisis management. -  As regards its lending role, in my view, the IMF cannot act as an international lender of last resort. First, it has only limited resources that can not match private capital flows; second, the perception of such a role would increase moral hazard.
Judgement is applied when responding to shocks, and a specific reaction function will only provide a simplified representation of the central bank reaction pattern. Regular information about policy intentions is therefore necessary for the public to learn and revise their expectations. This is also the rationale for forward guidance. In theory, forward guidance may also work as a commitment device and help the central bank stabilise the economy in a more efficient way. 4 The merits of this are debated, and it may be most relevant in a situation where the interest rate has reached a lower bound. Forward guidance about how the central bank plans to reach its targets may nevertheless help establish confidence among agents that the objectives will actually be achieved. Forward guidance may thereby indirectly make an inflation target more credible, and thus contribute to anchoring inflation expectations. For forward guidance to work as intended, there are some preconditions. First, economic agents must indeed understand the announced reaction pattern. A second, and related issue, is that the conditionality of the guidance must be understood. A commonly raised concern is that the public might perceive the guidance as unconditional promises rather than conditional statements. Yet another requirement is that the guidance must affect the agents’ expectations. I will address these issues in more detail when I discuss our experience of forward guidance in Norway. Many central banks started to provide some kind of forward guidance in the late 1990s.

Although circumstances differ, our experience may also be of value to others. Forward guidance in general Up until the 1990s, the code of conduct among central bankers was one of secrecy. Today, however, central banks strive to be transparent. This development reflects a general trend towards greater transparency in modern societies. For some central banks, including Norges Bank, a change from fixed exchange rates to an inflation targeting regime also highlighted the importance of greater transparency. Transparency is necessary for accountability. With accountability the central bank can build credibility and trust, both by showing that the objectives are actually attained in the longer run, and by explaining deviations from targets. Forward guidance, understood as information about future policy intentions, may be viewed as a natural extension of this accountability framework. Economic agents are forward-looking, and hence the future stance of monetary policy matters to them. As Michael Woodford has stated, “For not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current conditions, very little else matters.” 1 In macroeconomic theory, the importance of expectations has been appreciated since the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s. In the early 1990s, theorists started to model monetary policy as setting the interest rate. 2 Central bankers have since had a theoretical  1  Woodford, M. (2005): “Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness,” NBER Working Paper 11898. 2  See Taylor, J.
The Swedish economy appears to be growing at a rate that is reasonable and broadly expected. At the same time, inflation is lower than expected. The prospect that the Riksbank faced last autumn, of inflation two years hence being half a percentage point above the target, no longer seems probable. For monetary policy, the outlook has accordingly changed. The present inflation prospects clearly imply that the need to raise interest rates has disappeared for now. A strict interpretation of the Riksbank’s rule that monetary policy is to focus primarily on the second of the coming two years could even indicate some downward adjustment of the instrumental rate. What the BIS Review 47/1998  -7Riksbank now has reason to consider is whether a minor downward interest rate adjustment would lead to good conditions for a stable economic development in the future. 4. Conclusion Stabilisation policy in Sweden was realigned in the early 1990s and focused on low inflation. The background was our own and other countries’ experience in the 1970s and 1980s. Repeated attempts to stimulate demand, with a view to boosting employment, and accept the associated increase in inflation had failed to produce the intended results. On the contrary, economic activity had become more unstable and growth in the longer term had, if anything, weakened. In recent years the results of the policy realignment have been good in many respects. Economic growth in Sweden has been higher than in the latter part of the 1980s and it has proved possible to combine this with low inflation.

An easing of monetary policy in many parts of the world as well as in Sweden has been an important factor behind the better tendencies in recent months and the more positive forecasts. Even though the statistics show a stronger economic trend, inflation has been in line with the Riksbank’s forecasts. For this reason the repo rate has been kept unchanged since March. 1  BIS Review 108/1999  In August the 12-month rate of CPI inflation was 0.6% and inflation’s underlying rate, measured by UNDIX, was 1.5%. It is changes in indirect taxes and subsidies, together with house mortgage interest expenditure, that are continuing to result in an underlying rate of inflation that is higher than CPI inflation. Economic prospects from 1999 to 2001 We are now moving into a period of strong growth, externally as well as in Sweden. As regards the international picture, the Riksbank judges that annual growth in the OECD area up to the end of 2001 will amount to not quite 2.5%. It looks as though effects of the Asian crisis are now dying away and that emerging market growth will become stronger in the next two years, above all in the crisis-hit countries in Southeast Asia but to some extent also in Latin America and Eastern Europe. In Japan, too, the earlier risk of negative growth has turned into cautious optimism about an upturn. Prospects for the euro area have likewise improved, with a recovery in manufacturing and stronger consumer confidence.
Eva Srejber: Future issues for the housing market in Sweden against the background of Basel II Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the annual meeting of the Swedish Association of Municipal Housing Companies (SABO), Taeby, 8 January 2002. *  *  *  Introduction I should like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and the opportunity to discuss this evening’s theme of future issues for the housing market. At the beginning of May 2001 I gave a talk to SABO Byggnadsförsäkrings AB on the property market and economic trends in Sweden. I then took up the question of why and how the Riksbank monitors the property market. The focus for this evening will be on what the future may hold for the property market and granting of credit for the purchase of property and housing. My talk should therefore be seen (and heard) as a complement to, or continuation of, my earlier talk. My talk this evening will primarily deal with our view of the housing market and the role it plays with regard to financial stability and potential growth. I will then go on to describe the credit granting process and current changes that will affect this process. I will conclude with a look towards future developments. The role of the housing market for financial stability and potential growth Let me begin, however, with brief description of the housing market from the Riksbank’s perspective.

That went well beyond constructive pressure to improve efficiency to destructive agony. We’ve been only too well aware of that - we could hardly not have been; and we’ve not been insensitive to it either. We have consistently taken account of the unexpectedly persistent strength of the exchange rate in both our forecasts and in our monetary policy judgements. But when you come right down to it, for as long as economic conditions between one country and another diverge, whether for cyclical or structural reasons, there is a choice. Countries can either aim to stabilise their respective domestic economies, accepting that that may mean exchange rate volatility, or they can aim to maintain exchange rate stability, accepting that that may destabilise their respective domestic economies. These are the horns of the uncomfortable dilemma we have been on. I have no doubt, in terms of the macro-economy as a whole, that we have been right to persist in aiming to stabilise our domestic economy - the facts speak for themselves. It is possible - even perhaps likely - that our dilemma may now become less acute, at least for a time as the euro strengthens to a more sustainable level. Our best chance of maintaining that happier position - if indeed it occurs - is to persist in domestic stabilisation and structural reform alongside our European partners, but it is difficult to be confident at this stage that the dilemma will not re-emerge. BIS Review 50/2000  2
It would be a step towards greater freedom if we could liberate ourselves from the blind submission to the randomness in economic life, which seems to the individual to be a force of nature. We must seek to master economic forces rather than being mastered by them. To this end, a deliberate, planned and coordinated economy is necessary.” 6  4  In Tore Jørgen Hanisch, Espen Søilen and Gunhild Ecklund (1999): “Norsk økonomisk politikk i det 20. århundre. Verdivalg i en åpen økonomi (Economic policy in Norway in the 20th century)”, Høyskoleforlaget, p. 38. 5  In Agnar Sandmo (2006): “Samfunnsøkonomi – En idéhistorie (Economics – a history of ideas)”, Universitetsforlaget, p. 117. 6  Espen Søilen (2002): “Mot et samfunnsøkonomisk Optimum (Towards an economic optimum)”, in a series of reports by the Committee on Power and Democracy. BIS Review 109/2010  3  Norway was among the countries that went particularly far in developing an economy with a high degree of centralised coordination and control. It may perhaps be said that this work culminated in the 1973 proposal to establish an incomes policy council. The social partners were to undertake a commitment to keep negotiated wage increases within specific limits. The proposal to establish an incomes policy council was logical. It was the last wall in the structure erected after the war.

Such a long balance sheet would have made further monetary policy measures substantially harder. At the same time, we would have jeopardised the fulfilment of our mandate in the long term, since reabsorbing such a huge volume of liquidity once monetary policy began to normalise would have been very difficult. At its monetary policy assessments, the SNB had analysed the costs and benefits of adhering to the minimum exchange rate. On the basis of this kind of analysis, the Governing Board concluded, on 15 January, that a minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro was no longer sustainable, and thus justified, from a monetary policy point of view. If it had ignored the changes in the international environment, the SNB would have jeopardised its credibility. It would have been irresponsible to maintain the minimum exchange rate even longer and thoughtlessly accept the high costs of this policy, without considering its sustainability. Once we had reached this conclusion, swift action was necessary. Holding off any longer would have increased pressure on the minimum exchange rate because of mounting speculation. Had we delayed the discontinuation, the turmoil on the financial markets would have been no less severe. However, the impact on the Swiss economy would have been stronger and the losses on the SNB’s balance sheet would have been greater. Ladies and gentlemen, the decision of 15 January has far-reaching consequences and was anything but easy for me and my colleagues on the Governing Board.
In the last two-three years, turning point in the cycle can be noticed, though its strength and length is not strong enough to create pressures on the core inflation. 14  Chart 17: Output gap in CESEE region and Euro area (percent of potential GDP) 10.0 CESEE  8.0  Euro Area  6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 -2.0  2019  2018  2017  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  -4.0  Source: Authors’ calculation for most of the CESEE countries and IMF WEO Database for Euro Area. The other important concept, which can be linked to prices are the wages, unit labour costs in particular. “Although labour costs only account for some 20% of the cost structure of manufacturing firms, and for 40% in the case of firms in the services sector, these figures rise to almost 90% excluding inputs. Accordingly, when value added deflators, which exclude the cost of inputs, are analysed at aggregate level, changes in unit labour costs (that is, employee compensation corrected for productivity gains) are understood to be a fundamental determinant of future changes in prices” (Bank of Spain, Economic Bulletin, 2/2019).

Yet, cautiousness is needed, as once the profitability breakeven is crossed, prices can respond stronger to the overall cycle and wage pressures. Hence, central banks have to be cautious in accommodating, as not always this is warranted by low inflation. Low prices might be a reflection of a more structural features (competition for instance), or cyclical ones (such as profitability). In the first case, the impact of the central bank is constrained, while in the second case – once the impact of the profitability cushion wanes – the monetary accommodation can add to stronger inflation pressures than acceptable. Chart 20: CESEE GDP deflator, unit labor costs and mark-ups (percent change) 15.0  Mark-up, change in % Unit labour cost, change in %  10.0  GDP deflartor, change in %  5.0  0.0  -5.0  -10.0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Source: Eurostat, SEE Jobs Gateway Database, National Statistics and Authors’ calculation. Conclusion In the last couple of years we have dealt with the issue of the impact of the monetary policy normalisation, of the ECB in particular, on the region. At the current stance, not only that normalisation is distant, but rather stronger accommodative approach is being employed. The prolonged monetary expansion has called for greater vigilance in the context of excessive risk –taking and debt build-up. At the same time, more scrutiny has been put on the causes of the low inflation that might possible disclose a need for cautiousness in providing monetary stimulus.
I am further pleased because the topic of the Oration, “Harmonizing Fiscal and Monetary Policies to deliver sustainable growth and Stability” is one that is relevant and timely, since there are a large number of global and national developments which regularly underscore the vital importance of harmonization of the Monetary and Fiscal policies in countries as well as in regions. Monetary policy and fiscal policy In order to set the backdrop for today’s Oration, let me initially provide you with a brief insight as to what Monetary policy and Fiscal policy entails. Monetary policy is the means by which a central bank seeks to achieve macroeconomic stability. In Sri Lanka, the authority responsible for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy is the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The Monetary Law Act No.58 of 1949 is the legislation under which the Central Bank (CB) was established, and it provides a wide range of instruments that could be used by the Central Bank for monetary management. Developments in the economy and the financial system have led to a gradual evolution of the objectives, and the framework for the conduct of monetary policy. In 2002, in an amendment to the Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949, the objectives of the Central Bank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  were re-defined as “economic and price stability” and “financial system stability”, with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of the productive resources of Sri Lanka.

7 Forecasts are of course subject to uncertainty at the best of times. In the present period of renewed crisis, the risk to the projections is clearly on the downside, mainly because of the clouded outlook for demand in Malta’s main trading partners and the likely spillover from the deflationary fiscal policies being adopted in many countries. The recovery in Europe is also constrained by the deleveraging process currently underway in the banking sector and in the private sector generally. Together with the fiscal tightening, this balance sheet consolidation largely explains why the EC is forecasting only a modest recovery in the euro area and the EU this year, with growth rates of 0.9% and 1.0%, respectively. Lessons learned and the way forward Several lessons can be drawn from the crisis, but two come to mind more readily. The first is that those countries which entered the recession already burdened with imbalances – both internal and external – have performed more poorly than those with sounder economic fundamentals. The second is a universal law that often tends to be forgotten: like individuals, countries cannot afford to live beyond their means indefinitely. Sooner or later, the excesses of the past have to be paid for, often at a high economic and social cost. The recent proposals by the EC to strengthen economic policy coordination and fiscal discipline are grounded in precisely such thinking.
It is made convenient for worldwide usage as it is an internet based platform – the first of its kind in the world with crude palm oil (CPO) as its underlying base commodity. Although Malaysia already has a well functioning and efficient Islamic inter-bank market, the CMH provides a further viable alternative using the commodity murabahah concept. While the CMH will provide another alternative to the already robust liquidity management infrastructure in Malaysia, it will also enable liquidity management in the global financial system. The CMH has a vast potential to facilitate liquidity flows from one financial centre to  BIS Review 98/2009  1  the other. The increased efficiency in the liquidity management across countries will also contribute towards sustaining overall stability of the Islamic financial services industry at the international level. In addition to enhancing liquidity management, the CMH will provide an environment for increased innovation in the Islamic financial industry whereby the financial institutions will be able to provide a wider range of new financial instruments including deposit, financing, investments and hedging. To evolve Malaysia into an international Islamic financial hub, Malaysia has under the MIFC initiative, put in place a facilitative framework for both ringgit and foreign currency denominated sukuk issuance. The recent issuance of the US dollar 1.5 billion 5-year Petronas Emas Global Sukuk on 12th August marks a new beginning for the foreign currency sukuk market in Malaysia.

They do not usually base their forecasts on an unchanged interest rate. The new assumption makes it easier to assess the forecasts, as the conditions are normally more realistic. The fact that we have chosen to make this change can be partly regarded as a result of academic research, and also partly because this assumption appears to have worked well for other central banks that have chosen to base their forecasts on assumptions other than a constant key rate, such as Norges Bank and the Bank of England. Basis for assessment So much for our monetary policy strategy, which is what I believe we should be assessed against. Let me now say a few words about the basis we supply for assessment. The analysis work on which the monetary policy decisions are based is published in the form of Inflation Reports. These contain analyses of the determinants of inflation and forecasts for inflation developments over the coming years. They also contain analyses of why deviations from target have arisen or are expected to arise, given a particular monetary policy stance. The Inflation Reports thus contribute to spreading knowledge about the Riksbank’s assessments and thereby make it easier for external parties to follow and understand monetary policy. Moreover, we want them to encourage discussion of monetary policy issues. So far we have published four Inflation Reports a year, but we have now decided to reduce the number to three.