samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a matter of fact, after the crisis, forex interventions re-entered the arsenal of many central banks, including some of the previously more purist free floaters. The NBR has never had the luxury of being concerned exclusively with price stability and interest-rate setting in the belief that financial stability and exchange rate stability will follow. With freely moving capital and a significant degree of euroisation, the idea of being able to manage 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  aggregate demand solely via interest rates is clearly an illusion. In the first years after adoption of inflation targeting and prior to the EU accession, Romania saw substantial capital inflows fueling an already fast growing economy. Attempting to contain aggregate demand and anchor inflation expectations only with the interest rate instrument would have entailed additional and more aggressive hikes. This would have been self-defeating, leading to even larger capital inflows and an unsustainable nominal appreciation, boosting foreign currency lending, increasing external sector imbalances, and amplifying financial sector vulnerabilities. I dare say that, when it comes to price stability, just as in the case of economic  convergence, consistency and sustainability are at least as important as the levels of headline inflation rates, especially since non-core components are beyond the influence of the central bank. Moreover, as we all know, economic integration goes hand in hand with price convergence, since prices, along with incomes, also tend to adjust towards EU levels.

Mugur Isărescu: Some considerations of the impact of monetary policy on the economic convergence Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Conference on Europe Economic Integration 2018 "How to finance cohesion in Europe? ", Panel 1 "The role of monetary policy in catching-up", organized by the Central Bank of the Republic of Austria (Oesterreichische Nationalbank),Vienna, 26 November 2018. * * * As prepared for delivery Ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured to join such a distinguished audience. After so many years spent as the Governor of the National Bank of Romania, today’s discussion gives me yet another opportunity to look back at the role that monetary policy has played in supporting nominal and real convergence in Romania. It is almost two decades since the Romania – EU accession negotiations had been opened (back then, in 2000, I served as the prime-minister). Romania has been an EU member for more than 10 years already. Allow me to share with you my view, shaped by the lessons learned over all these years, on the relationship between monetary policy and economic convergence. Let me first make a couple of considerations about economic convergence. First, while the nominal convergence criteria are deeply rooted in the minds of policymakers, the Maastricht Treaty also explicitly stipulates that “a high degree of sustainable convergence” is needed. Yet, this requirement seems to have been overlooked sometimes. Second, practical experience with euro adoption so far has proved that real convergence is also critical for success.
If the Riksbank waits to adjust the repo rate until inflation expectations and inflation have already increased, there is a risk that the delay will be too great. In this type of situation larger interest rate adjustments may be required than if the Riksbank had acted at an earlier stage. This brings me to the current economic situation. However, first I would like to take a brief look back at the events that occurred in connection with the acts of terrorism in September. The Riksbank’s actions following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 After the terrorist attacks in the USA, the entire world was shocked to realise that something so dreadful could happen. The Executive Board made an assessment that the uncertainty caused by the acts of terrorism risked further subduing demand internationally, mainly through the effects on companies’ and households’ confidence in the future, which could result in a more profound and prolonged economic downturn. This was why the Riksbank lowered its interest rate, together with the central banks in the USA, the rest of Europe and several other countries. BIS Review 13/2002  3  Prior to the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, new statistics indicated that the global economic downturn could reach its lowest level at the end of 2001. However the picture was not clearcut. As a result of the terrorist attacks, uncertainty increased even further regarding the time scale for a recovery.

The current effort of FSB to survey unintended consequences of reforms on emerging market is welcomed. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Before ending this note on Basel III, let me touch on Thailand’s own take on these developments. For Thailand, we aim to adopt the Basel III framework in accordance with Basel Committee timeline. After industry consultation, we believe that Thai banks will be well placed to implement the Basel III framework as their capital positions are well above the minimum requirements of 8.5%. The Basel III framework will help strengthen the bank’s capital and risk management. One of the major improvements of Basel III from Basel II is consideration on cyclicality, with requirement for conservation and countercyclical buffer. However, we believe that prudential measures, such as conservative provisioning designed to be countercyclical, should also be given due credit for achieving the same aim when implementing Basel III buffers. This would help avoid the double requirement on capital maintenance. Of course, we strongly support a better treatment of trade financing, to ensure that Basel III is supportive of stable economic growth. On the last note, let me turn to a key trend in Asia, “regional economic and financial integration”. Asia faces a challenge of steering a balance between liberalization and strengthening regulation. ASEAN Economic Integration under AEC, which sets the landmark date of 2015, has progressed substantially on the free flow of goods and services, as well as direct investment. Financial sector integration is also set to speed up.
But clearly, a combination of changes that were to raise the legal retirement age, the minimum number of years necessary to qualify for pension benefits and the period over which pensions are calculated would be optimal for ensuring the system’s viability. Pension reform will not entail a significant improvement in the budget deficit figures in the very short term, but it will exert a powerful influence on the recovery of confidence in Spain’s economy and in its public sector’s solvency, and that will translate into better financing conditions and sounder growth prospects. Therefore, I can but urge that discussions under the aegis of the Toledo Pact take place as promptly as possible, with the widest political consensus, as I believe this may be a key factor for dispelling the uncertainty we have been facing in recent weeks. The fiscal consolidation programme and the measures adopted to reinforce the institutional arrangements of the Monetary Union are fundamental, but they do not suffice to return the Spanish economy to a path of high growth, particularly following the strong adverse impact the recession has had on all the European countries’ potential growth capacity. Consequently, the other centrepiece of the response to the current emergency situation is to adopt a series of structural reforms conducive to the resumption of sustained growth in output and employment.

While the IRB approaches promise greater capital savings in the longer term, the adoption of the standardized approach in the transition is considered a more pragmatic option even for some internationally active banking groups. Under the IRB approaches, banks would need to reach an agreement with the regulator in the countries they operate on the robustness of group internal estimates and validation. The standardized approach is therefore seen to provide the breathing space for a smooth transition to IRB approaches while at the same time allowing banking institutions to avail themselves of the benefits of capital savings. BIS Review 21/2004  3  Different approaches are adopted by regulators Ladies and Gentlemen, While there has been global acceptance of the broad principles of the new accord, differing implementation approaches are being adopted by different countries. In some countries, regulators have opted for the accord to be applied to all institutions while in others selected banks are being mandated specific approaches. Some other regulators have given greater flexibility for banks or have extended the timeline for the implementation of the new accord. These reflect the different considerations and priorities accorded by the various regulators in their policy agenda. In essence, the decision by national regulators are based on a number of common factors, namely, the stage of industry development and market infrastructure, the size and types of institutions involved, the regulatory philosophy and priorities, as well as the economic environment.
1  I would like to thank P. Andrade, P. Antipa, G. Cette, M. Dujardin, O. Garnier, A. Lojschova and B. Mojon for their help in preparing this speech. 2 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2017. 3 See e.g. Blanchard (O. ), Cerutti (E.), and Summers (L.) (2015) “Inflation and Activity – Two Explorations and their  Monetary Policy Implications,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21726, November. 4 Guilloux-Nefussi (S.) (2016) "Globalization, Market Structure and Inflation Dynamics, ” Banque de France  Working Papers 610. 5 See e.g. Andrade et al. (2016) and Arrata and Nguyen (2017) for the euro area. 6 See e.g. D’Amico and King (2013) for evidence associated with programmes conducted in the US and Joyce et  al. (2010) in the UK. 7 See speeches of August 2016 (Handelsblatt conference), September 2016 (annual CERS conference) and April  2017 (conference at Columbia University). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

The members of the Supervisory Board and the steering committee shall act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the institutions or bodies of the Union, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body.” Article 19(2) adds that “the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and the governments of the Member States and any other bodies shall respect that independence.” The following question arises: what is the difference between the ECB’s independence as a central bank and its independence as a bank supervisor? [39] The first notable difference, as already mentioned, is that Article 130 of the Treaty is part of the Union’s primary or constitutional law, while Article 19 of the SSM Regulation is secondary law. This gives the provision shielding the central http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  bank from influence when performing its monetary policy task in Article 130 of the Treaty a constitutional character and takes it outside the scope of the Union legislator’s legislative powers. By contrast, the provisions shielding the bank supervisor from influence are contained in secondary law, which is of a lower rank than primary law and easier to amend. Second, Article 19 of the SSM Regulation should be read in the light of recital 75 of the SSM Regulation, which refers to the importance of the prevention of private industry interference in the supervisory field, in addition to “undue political influence”.
The yield curve of federal government bonds, which is used by banks as a benchmark for the interest rates they set for their clients, has significantly increased for maturities of up to three years, while staying almost unchanged in the long end. The rise in short-term yields reflects both our recent decisions and market expectations regarding the future key rate path. Shifts in long-term yields are minor. Among other things, this is an evidence of market participants’ confidence that monetary policy will finally bring inflation back to the target. I would like to reiterate that these are long-term interest rates, rather than our key rate as such (as is often stated), that determine the affordability of credit for companies’ investment purposes and of mortgage loans. As compared to yields on federal government bonds, interest rates on loans and deposits have responded more slowly and rose less significantly. Our today’s decision is aimed at accelerating this process. An increase in interest rates will help restore households’ propensity to save. Growth in retail and corporate lending is close to its highest rates recorded in recent years. Many borrowers seek to take out loans as soon as possible at lower interest rates. We have raised our lending growth forecast for this year. Mortgage lending will continue to expand fast, while slightly decelerating after the amendments to the subsidised mortgage lending programme become effective. Speaking of unsecured consumer lending, we can already observe the first signs of overheating. This lending segment has been growing faster than we forecast in April.

This came against the background of quite volatile movements in the global currency markets, which included, most notably, a sustained weakening of the US dollar against other currencies. At the risk of stating the obvious, an orderly depreciation of the US against other currencies is in Hong Kong's interests because it means that, because Hong Kong's currency is linked to the US dollar, Hong Kong also becomes more competitive. This larger point may have been overlooked in all of the fuss about the somewhat less significant strengthening of the Hong Kong dollar against the US dollar. With regard to the Mainland's currency, the political pressures from outside for an appreciation of the renminbi exchange rate have been prompted by the considerable attention that is being given in the US to the bilateral trade imbalance between the Mainland and the United States. The arguments for appreciation are that, from the US perspective, Chinese exports are undervalued and therefore unfairly competitive, and, from the Chinese perspective, the substantial capital inflow into the Mainland might carry long-term risks. Leaving aside the arguments about trade, let us look a little more closely at the question of capital inflow and how to manage it. First, to put things in perspective, it should be noted that the Mainland's current account surplus is really very small by international standards perhaps something around one per cent of GDP in the first half of 2003. This is much lower than the corresponding figures for many other economies.
Lucas Papademos: What effects is EMU having on the euro area and its member countries (opening remarks) Opening remarks by Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the ECB Workshop “What effects is EMU having on the euro area and its member countries?”, Frankfurt, 16 June 2005. *  *  *  Introduction When the ECB started organising this workshop a year ago, we thought that addressing the question of the workshop’s title would provide a necessary stocktaking and useful analysis of the effects of EMU on the euro area and its member countries, 6½ years after the introduction of the single currency. Recent developments and debates have shown that the impact of EMU on the euro area countries is a very topical issue indeed. Officials, economists and commentators have sought to analyse the pertinent issues and tried to answer the question of this conference. And some of them have come to conclusions which my colleagues in the Governing Council have called “absurd”, “nonsensical” or implying “economic suicide” – and rightly so. This debate has sometimes risked being fairly long on polemics and rather short on arguments. With this workshop, to which I would like to welcome you all, we can bring to this discussion some solid facts, sound arguments and a better understanding of the manifold issues involved. The debate on these issues has often been couched in terms of two key concepts, “convergence” and “heterogeneity” (which do, however, need clearer definitions), and the relationship between the two.

A CBDC would need to protect against cyber and operational risks, safeguard the privacy of sensitive data, and minimize risks of illicit financial transactions. Additionally, one of the most important aspects in our deliberations is that any form of a CBDC in the future would need to be intermediated. This means that the private sector would need to act as intermediaries in that system, and a direct account approach would not be contemplated. While the Federal Reserve has made no decision on whether or how to issue a CBDC, we are actively conducting technical investigations into both retail and wholesale CBDC design. Project Hamilton, which is a partnership between the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and MIT, has experimented with potential approaches to a digital dollar, with work focused on retail uses and payment channels. In the use case they explored, the Hamilton team was able to demonstrate the potential for usage at scale, which would be a key design element of a retail CBDC. 6 As a complement, and in line with the New York Fed's unique role in the Federal Reserve System with wholesale payments in both domestic payments and foreign exchange, the New York Innovation Center is researching technical aspects related to wholesale CBDCs. In addition to CBDC, the broader digital assets landscape, which includes stablecoins – cryptoassets that are backed by assets such as U.S. Treasury securities to stabilize their value – and unbacked cryptoassets, has grown significantly in recent years, and continues to evolve quickly.
As a personal trust-building device, it may be a good time to rebalance these scales, to start abiding by a “one mouth, two ears” policy - a time, if you like, for a little more conversation and a little less action. 70  Jung et al (2014). 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  Some of this is likely to involve central banks engaging on an on-going basis with a different, and more eclectic, set of partners than in the past. For example, this year the Bank is looking to increase its engagement with state schools outside of London and the South East, who might otherwise not have had any contact with the Bank or anyone else in the public policy domain. I personally have been increasing my engagement with these schools for the past four years. Recently, the Bank’s regional Agents have begun increasing their engagement with charities, social enterprises, faith groups and trades unions, among others, listening to their often very different perspectives on how the economy is faring. This is something the Governor and I have prioritised over a number of years. These events are similar in spirit to the Community Advisory Council run by the Federal Reserve. Personally, I find they provide an incredibly useful window on the world, one which has shaped my view on policy.

In this paper the commission described a total of almost 300 different directives that should be adopted in order to realise full mobility for goods, services, capital and persons within the European Community. Twentyfour of these directives concerned financial activities, including the liberalisation of capital movements. Almost all of these directives also came to be decided within the set time period, and a number of favourable conditions were created for bringing about more vigorous competition between the different EU member states. A lot has also happened in this field and contributed to strengthening developments within the EU with regard to both supply and demand for financial services. The most important driving force behind this development relates to the general internationalisation process, the new communication technology and the deregulation of parts of the government rules and regulations. When the euro was later introduced as the single currency in twelve EU member states, it provided the ‘finishing touch’ that abolished uncertainty over exchange rate developments in a large part of Europe. At the same time, there is some disappointment that it has not been possible to create a market completely without borders for all types of financial activities within the EU even more quickly, and that some obstacles still remain. These obstacles are partly linked to the rules and regulations governing financial activities - and it is therefore in principle possible to influence them. The EU is now working on implementing a financial services action plan, which should be implemented by 2005.
Hence, I require from you that the issue of binding contracts for the execution of repurchase agreements be placed at the top of your short-term agenda. Your legal staff should equally assess both the retail and the Treasury Department products. Judicial and operational assistance will be provided by the Bank of Albania, but on the other side the Bank of Albania will not intervene in solving the liquidity needs in case these needs arise from the non-observance of the law on repurchase agreements. I find it pleasing to confirm that after a general agreement on their usefulness, the package of regulations we brought to you in the first forum, has now become effective. The Bank of Albania is now expecting swift responses, in order to minimize their obligatory enforcement by us. The new regulations increase prudence in the elaboration and protection against foreign currency credit risk. I do not want to fail to disclose our stance that Albania needs a liquid and well-capitalized banking system given the situation we are going through. Regulations on transparency and obligation to disclose are another important part of the last package. BIS Review 120/2008  3  We have now taken steps to a more regulated market and other parties should follow the same steps as well. I refer here to banks’ clients who at present have, can and should be acknowledged of all their rights in relation to the banks servicing them.

I am sure there will be very interesting and fruitful exchange of views and ideas on the major financial stability issues, including those that I have mentioned earlier. Once again, thank you all for being with us today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1