samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We do not think, act or communicate in the same way today as we did when the inflation targeting regime was new. The driving force behind the changes has come partly from practical experiences, both in Sweden and other countries conducting inflation targeting. Academic research has also played an important role. Before I go into greater detail on how the Riksbank’s strategy has developed and how it looks today, let me begin by describing the background to the establishment of an inflation target in Sweden. Background to the introduction of an inflation target in Sweden On Sunday, 19 November, the Swedish krona will have been floating for exactly fourteen years. The date 19 November 1992 will always have a special significance for the Riksbank, as it was the day that we were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate, under dramatic circumstances and following a dogged defence of the krona against speculation. This happened in the midst of the most serious economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930s – a crisis that can generally be described as a tragic climax to almost twenty years of stabilisation policy problems. The economic policy conducted during the 1970s and 1980s tended for various reasons to be overly expansionary and it proved difficult to maintain price rises and wage increases at a reasonable level.

Irma Rosenberg: Monetary policy and the Riksbank’s communication Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Swedbank, Stockholm, 8 October 2007. *  *  *  Introduction In recent decades there has been a clear trend for central banks to strive for greater openness in their monetary policy. Central banks are now publishing an increasing amount of background material in the form of analyses and forecasts for inflation and other economic developments. The number of countries introducing explicit inflation targets is also growing. Something that is being discussed to an increasing extent, but which not so many central banks have dared to carry out yet, is the publication of the central bank’s own forecast for its policy rate 1 . At the beginning of this year the Riksbank decided to take this step. The purpose was to become even more open and clear regarding the way we conduct our monetary policy. I will begin today by discussing this new system and how it affects our communication. I will also give some reflections on the experiences of the two occasions on which we have published our own interest rate path in connection with the Monetary Policy Reports published in February and June this year. I will then conclude with a few words on the most recent monetary policy meeting in September. The Riksbank’s communication with an own interest rate path Advantages of an own interest rate path What are the advantages of publishing our own forecast for the repo rate?
And banks would have to meet a minimum requirement for both measures. To some extent, such a capital regulatory framework is old news. Historically, capital requirements in most countries took the form of simple leverage ratios. Risk-weighted requirements were only introduced following the first Basel Accord of 1988. The “oldfashioned” leverage ratios were replaced by “modern” risk-sensitive requirements. Some  15  For a discussion of potential short-comings of Basel II, see Robert Bichsel and Jürg Blum (2005): “Capital Regulation of Banks: Where Do We Stand and Where Are We Going?”, Swiss National Bank Quarterly Bulletin. 16  “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience”, Financial Stability Forum, 7 April 2008. 4  BIS Review 158/2008  countries, however, have maintained leverage ratios as essential elements of banking regulation. Notable examples are the US and Canada. Despite being somewhat old news, I am convinced that the introduction of a leverage ratio is fully compatible with the ongoing efforts to strengthen banks’ capital. We must not forget that Basel II aims to secure a minimum level of capital. It’s up to every bank and every national supervisor to exceed this minimum. As the G20 has put it, “regulation is first and foremost the responsibility of national regulators”. 17 6. The pros and cons of a leverage ratio  Let me now highlight the most important benefits of a leverage ratio. Equally, I would like to address the most commonly expressed concerns about a leverage ratio.

I find this neither upsetting nor surprising. If regulation is to be effective, we must expect it to impact on behaviour and restrict action. This will solicit complaints. If it doesn’t, regulation would, by definition, be superfluous. 4. From Basel I to Basel II  For all these reasons, I strongly support bank capital regulation that puts a meaningful limit on banks’ leverage. But what is the best way to restrict leverage? In an ideal world, we would, of course, also want to take into account the riskiness of banks’ assets. 12 As you know, banks can increase their risk not only by increasing their leverage but also by increasing the riskiness of their assets. To compensate for differences in banks’ assets, we would ideally require banks with riskier assets to hold more capital. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has embraced precisely such a risk-weighted approach. More risk, more capital. If we lived in an ideal world, this simple principle would work well. By “ideal”, I mean a world in which risks can be observed by everybody and assessed precisely. What has become abundantly clear in recent months is that we do not live in an ideal world. Banks and the risks they incur are far from transparent. In fact, banks exist because of asymmetries of information. 13 A core function of banks is to “produce information”. For instance, banks screen potential borrowers. Furthermore, banks monitor ongoing lending relationships.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: The Spanish economy after the crisis Opening address by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the “IV Conference on the unique features of Spanish savings banks”/Federación de Usuarios de las Cajas de Ahorros (Federation of Savings Banks Customers), Zaragoza, 11 February 2009. *  *  *  Thank you Mr Chairman, The profound worldwide economic slowdown, which in the industrialised countries has already turned into a rapid and sharp recession, is undoubtedly the most serious since the 1929 Great Depression. In recent months, the collapse of international financial markets has been averted only with great difficulty and we don’t yet know what the final consequences of the events unfolding will be for the real economy. Faced with this situation, all efforts will inevitably focus on attempting to exit the crisis. Internationally, and within Spain, hitherto inconceivable measures have been adopted, such as unlimited liquidity injections by central banks, extensive fiscal stimuli and exceptional support to the financial system. Naturally enough, governments, politicians, central bankers, supervisors and academics are all contributing to these tasks. And it is not surprising, therefore, that all my speeches in recent months have been to analyse the causes of the global crisis and to review the various measures to tackle it.

Along with the effect of the positive factors I mentioned earlier, we should also highlight euro area membership for what it has meant in terms of stability and reducing uncertainty, and the contribution of immigration, which has added notable flexibility to the Spanish economy. Unquestionably, though, a decisive factor in growth from 1999 to 2008 was the extraordinary increase in household and corporate debt. In that decade, Spanish domestic demand growth was double that of the European Union because private agents' debt rose twofold in the 1999-2007 period. As a proportion of gross disposable income, household debt climbed from little more than 60% to 130%, and corporate debt from 270% to almost 600% of the gross operating surplus. 2  BIS Review 18/2009  The problem facing us on emerging from the crisis is that although this swift indebtedness drove the increase in domestic demand and, therefore, in economic growth in recent years, the high level attained will prevent debt from growing in the future at a similar rate to what it did in the past. Moreover, for several years we may well witness a debt reduction or deleveraging process, meaning its effect on domestic demand will be the opposite of what it was in the past, reducing our growth rate. The Spanish economy's main problem, then, is that its future looks very different from its past since the two possibilities I mentioned – devaluation and increased debt – have disappeared.
We are closely monitoring the impact of the recent interest rate reductions in the euro area on Switzerland. Should there be a need for action, the SNB will take the necessary measures. The export-weighted real external value of the Swiss franc remains well above its long-term average. Since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate, it has changed only slightly. Thus, the Swiss franc is still high. The slight inflation differential during the past quarters meant that the real adjustment of the Swiss franc against the euro has come to a virtual standstill. In this environment, the minimum exchange rate remains essential for guaranteeing appropriate monetary conditions. SNB monetary policy To conclude, I would like to mention a number of challenges which the SNB will be facing in the near future. Overall, the environment remains extremely challenging for both the Swiss economy and our monetary policy. With its high level of international integration, Switzerland is strongly affected by global developments, especially those in neighbouring countries. The ECB’s measures to support economic development in the euro area are also likely to have a favourable impact on the Swiss economy in the medium term. Nevertheless, given the low interest rates in Europe and the rest of the world as well as the strong Swiss franc, the SNB’s monetary policy environment will remain highly complex. We will continue to take all action necessary to fulfil our mandate of ensuring price stability, while taking due account of economic developments.

World trade also declined, after having exhibited strong growth in the last few months of 2013, which had raised hopes of a sustained economic recovery. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In the US, GDP declined in the first quarter. However, we consider this to be a transitory phenomenon which can be largely put down to an exceptional cold snap experienced this winter. Growth in the euro area was weak and varied greatly from one country to another. While economic activity continued to pick up in Germany, renewed stagnation in France and Italy gave rise to disappointment. We continue to expect the global economy to firm in the coming quarters. However, the global economic recovery will remain very subdued by historical standards. Compared to the last monetary policy assessment, we now anticipate somewhat slower growth, in both advanced and emerging economies. It is entirely possible, however, that global economic growth will be weaker than we have assumed. The euro area continues to face significant challenges. These include the consolidation of public sector finances as well as the implementation of institutional reforms and reforms to promote growth. In addition, various emerging economies are suffering from structural problems. Should the current geopolitical conflicts worsen, this would also hold back activity in the international economy. Since the major currency areas are in different phases of the monetary policy cycle, there is also a danger of greater volatility in the financial and foreign exchange markets.
As one example, we are paying attention to the possibility that a decline in the size of the balance sheet puts downward pressure on bank deposits. As discussed earlier, in general, balance sheet normalization removes an asset from the private sector that can be held only by banks (reserves) and replaces it with an asset that can be held by anyone (securities). It is possible that, on net in equilibrium relative to a counterfactual in which the balance sheet does not decline, (a) banks will hold fewer reserves; (b) banks will offset some of this decline by holding securities instead, and some by taking in fewer deposits; and (c) non-banks will replace those deposits with securities. The extent (if any) of any such decline in deposit activity on deposit and loan pricing will likely depend on a variety of factors, including the extent to which the decline comes from wholesale institutional deposit activity motivated by interest rate arbitrage. See Ihrig, Mize, and Weinbach, How does the Fed adjust its Securities Holdings and Who is Affected?, September 22, 2017. 20 In fact, following the June 2013 FOMC meeting, the dealer survey revealed a shift in expectations toward a more  accommodative balance sheet stance over time. Prior to that meeting, most survey respondents had seen significant odds that the FOMC would eventually use sales of agency MBS as part of its normalization strategy.

The FOMC also indicated that it anticipates that these caps will remain in place once they reach their respective maximums. Let me spend a few minutes discussing the importance of gradualism and predictability, and how the FOMC’s plan achieves these things. Gradualism To examine the importance of gradualism, we will need to open, once again, the theoretical debate about “stock” and “flow” effects of central bank asset purchases and sales.15 Under the “stock view,” transitions in the pace of central banks’ asset flows should have little direct effect on asset prices. Instead, what matters to asset prices is the present and expected future stock of assets the central bank holds, or is anticipated to hold. The “flow view” suggests instead that the effect on asset prices relates to the pace at which assets are being added or removed from the balance sheet at that time. Many speeches have been given, and journal articles published, about the relative importance of these effects with respect to their impact on financial conditions and the broader economy, a topic that I do not intend to wade into today. 16 Instead, I think it’s important to make a few points on “flow effects” relevant to policy implementation, and in particular related to possible “flow effects” associated with an overly rapid pace. Overly fast flows of securities into private hands can be disruptive to market functioning.
Instead, we focus on two other dimensions of the system of financial regulation: (i) the number of regulatory constraints; and (ii) the extent of discretion around each individual regulatory rule. (i)  The Number of Regulatory Constraints  Although the post-crisis architecture places many regulatory constraints on banks, the key going-concern constraints are risk-weighted capital requirements (RWCR), the leverage ratio (LR), the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). We assess these four constraints, recognising that other aspects of the regulatory system might also impose binding constraints on banks. For example, stress testing can be interpreted as holding banks to a different RWCR standard and a potentially different overall capital calibration (Greenwood et al (2017)). Some have recently contended that this multi-constraint system of financial regulation might be over-identified, with potentially distortionary implications for banks’ business models and behaviour. For example, Greenwood et al (2017) argue that it may be distortionary and unnecessary to have multiple, independent constraints on banks’ behaviour. And Cecchetti and Kashyap (2016) suggest that the LCR and NSFR are strongly overlapping in their impact, so that both may not be needed. These are well-reasoned critiques of the new regulatory framework whose messages should be analysed carefully when evaluating the new framework. They are just the sort of academic challenge to regulatory orthodoxy which was so missing in the pre-crisis period. Nonetheless, it is also worth reminding ourselves why and how such a multiple-constraint framework was arrived at in the first place.

Moreover, as many of you here are accounting, financial and business leaders of Hong Kong, I am sure you will also share my view that enhancing the financial literacy of our citizens is a difficult but worthy task, requiring the collaborations of all sectors of the community to work closely together. You are well positioned to help our public education programme, and we in the HKMA look forward to your continued support and advice. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
It is a great strength of the MPC that regional visits are a key part of the activities of all members of the Committee. And in the four and a half years I have spent as a member of the Committee, I estimate that I have visited around 140 individual businesses and talked to around 100 business groups – across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.1 There are two reasons why I am particularly pleased to speak at today’s lunch. First of all, the East of England is my home region as I live in Essex and have done so for over a quarter of a century now. Second, I am always delighted to speak on a CBI platform as the seven and a half years that I spent as a CBI economist in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was a very important and formative period in my career. I have a great respect for the work of the CBI which remains the pre-eminent business organisation in the UK. That period I spent working in the CBI’s Economics Department about twenty years ago was also a period of major economic turbulence in the UK. I joined the CBI in September 1986, just as the “Lawson Boom” was getting underway. And I was the CBI’s Director of Economic Affairs from 1989 until the end of 1993 as boom turned to bust and the UK economy went through the last major recession before the global financial crisis of 2008/9.

A range of measures will be introduced to accelerate the pace of migration towards e-payments, including driving the adoption of the mobile phone banking and payment transactions, increasing the number of point-of-sale terminals, and introducing a pricing structure that incentivises the use of e-payments. Conclusion Let me conclude by expressing the Bank’s appreciation for all the valuable contributions received from the industry, Government agencies and other stakeholder groups with whom the Bank engaged over the course of this year to develop the recommendations in the Blueprint. In total, the Blueprint sets out 69 recommendations to achieve the vision for the financial sector in 2020. The Blueprint provides the vision and direction to secure a financial system that will firmly support and drive Malaysia’s long-term growth potential and aspirations. It will be our shared commitment that will result in its success. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
40 On the second occasion, at the beginning of 2015, inflation had been below the target of 2 per cent for several years, and the policy rate had been cut to zero, that is, close to the lower bound. In this situation, the Riksbank began extensive purchases of government bonds, which were moreover extended on several occasions over the coming years. This is a measure that reduces maturity premiums, but it can also lead to lower rates on other assets, through the so-called portfolio balance channel. 41 It also has a signalling effect. If the Riksbank counts on the policy rate being low going forward, it may contribute to market expectations of future short-term rates falling. With hindsight, we can see that the government bond purchases actually contributed to a more expansionary monetary policy with lower interest rates and a weaker exchange rate and that inflation therefore returned to the target after a while. 42 The third occasion was in connection with the outbreak of the pandemic last year. On this occasion, we made large bond purchases to retain the low interest rates and we provided various types of liquidity support, including offering the banks loans against collateral at three-month and six-month maturities at the policy rate, we eased the collateral requirements and provided loans to the banks for lending to companies (funding for lending). 43 These measures were important for the functioning of credit granting in the economy, and for the impact of the policy rate on other interest rates remaining normal.

I know that the subject is a sensitive one in Italy... but I would like to say this as a friend: you should agree to examine and discuss the substance of these proposals, before worrying about the very principle of Franco-German discussions, which are often necessary but never sufficient. Rest assured, we very much want Italy to join us at the negotiating table, and you will, I think, find it in your interest to increase public and private solidarity. 1/ The first priority is to increase private risk-sharing. Our starting point here should be the real needs of the economy, and especially those of firms and entrepreneurs. In order to invest and innovate, for example in the digital economy or the energy transition, firms must to be able to take greater risks. This means more equity financing, which has a longer-term horizon, as opposed to debt financing. The euro area is already lagging far behind in this respect: equity financing was equivalent to just 77% of GDP in France in mid-2018, compared with 124% in the United States. And yet we have abundant resources: a savings surplus of around EUR 350 billion in the euro area. [slide] We therefore need to build a “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation” in order to channel these resources to where they are needed. This Union would be a combination of two existing initiatives, first of all the Banking Union, which must at last be finalised.