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It is important to have such a tangible point of reference for standards of conduct, but setting the right tone requires more than lofty exhortations for good behaviour. First, lead by example. Management must take time and effort to clearly articulate the firm’s core values and purpose. They have to demonstrate commitment and credibility by “walking the talk” with concrete policies, processes and actions. The firm’s leaders must themselves be seen to be guided by those same qualities they want their staff to emulate. And programmes to build a culture of trust and ethics cannot be a one-off exercise to fend off bad publicity or to placate the regulator. Shaping culture demands a sustained effort. Second, create a safe environment for whistle-blowing. This means providing the necessary mechanisms to challenge, question, and report ethical breaches. •  A number of banks in Singapore have put in place new channels for whistleblowing and enhanced the escalation and investigation processes to facilitate staff reporting. Third, align human resource policies to a culture of trust and ethics. I have already mentioned compensation as being an important way to create incentives for the right behaviour. But the incentives for ethical conduct must go beyond compensation and encompass all HR policies: recruitment, on-boarding, appraisal, training and coaching, promotion, and career development. •  An organisation’s HR policies and practices are the clearest demonstration of its value system, the qualities it regards as important.