samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
20 See Finocchario et al. (2016). 6 [13]  debt. Long queues for rental housing, above all in larger cities, may be contributing towards households feeling forced to purchase homes, which almost always requires taking on debt. There are also factors that are contributing towards the housing stock not being utilised more efficiently and the supply of housing thereby being limited. The current rent-setting system means low rents for existing tenants while reducing their incentive to move. Stamp duties, such as registration of title and mortgage deeds, and the taxation of capital gains on housing sales, make it more expensive to move house and therefore do not promote mobility on the housing market either. In addition, weak competition in the construction sector, an insufficient supply of land for new homes, and comprehensive and complicated planning processes have long impeded housing construction. Housing construction certainly increased a couple of years ago but the fact that the supply of housing was limited for a longer period has presumably contributed to higher housing prices and thereby also to higher indebtedness among households. By way of a simple mathematical example, I would now like to demonstrate how the design of the taxation system can affect incentives to relocate. As the current taxation of detached houses is low 21, at the same time as the taxation of capital gains on sales is relatively high 22, lock-in effects are created when prices have increased as much as they have.

The solution for improving the functioning of housing provision cannot be to force young households deep into debt with all the risks this entails. There are numerous historical examples of how such a development has created problems for both individual households and society as a whole. At an aggregated level, households have relatively high savings and substantial assets. However, since 2007, there is no information on how assets and savings are distributed among households, and consequently neither on how much savings the most indebted households have. Nevertheless, there are signs that the most highly indebted households have significantly fewer liquid assets in relation to their income than households who are less indebted. 27 Better information on household wealth is something that the Riksbank has been requesting for a long time. Structural reforms are needed to manage the challenges on the housing market I am well aware that it is not part of the Riksbank's mandate to manage problems on the housing market and that many of these issues are of a political nature. However, it cannot be disregarded that the housing market is part of Sweden’s economy and thereby affects how the economy functions. The economy becomes more sensitive to shocks if households (and companies) are highly indebted and, consequently, the housing market is of interest to the Riksbank. A poorly functioning housing market affects us all in the long term.
For instance, Komgo – started by a consortium of banks – seeks to improve the operational processing of international trade and make it easier for buyers and sellers to trade. There are also initiatives aimed to streamline settlement across products and currencies. Fnality – another industry consortium – are seeking to build a network of 24/7 high-value payment systems in multiple currencies. There is also exploratory work led by the central banks. Some of you here today have collaborated with market participants to build prototypes of new platforms for wholesale settlement – so-called ‘wholesale CBDCs’. Many of these prototypes used Distributed Ledger Technology to enable interoperability between platforms and offer enhanced functionality. These experiments bring together a diverse range of stakeholders to build end-to-end solutions for use cases such as bond issuance or settling equity trades, extending beyond the pure payments market. I do wonder though whether the term “wholesale CBDC” is a misnomer. Electronic central bank money has been available to financial institutions for decades via RTGS systems. In the provision of central bank infrastructure the key is not the label, but who can access it and what functionality is provided. Here at the Bank of England we are in the process of renewing our RTGS infrastructure to offer a more accessible, functional and resilient platform for digital settlement in central bank money.

This is reflected in two aspects of the design: the fact that a number of measures will phase out naturally; and the fact that the size and scope of the outright purchases for which exit would require either an unwinding or offsetting operations has been carefully calibrated. a.  Phasing out  A degree of phasing out has been built into the exit process through the design of our measures. In the absence of new policy decisions, many of the measures will naturally unwind over time. An overwhelming proportion of the additional liquidity provided during the financial crisis has been offered through repurchase agreements. Once these operations mature, their impact naturally phases out. Another example concerns the agreements with other monetary authorities to provide liquidity in foreign currencies. These agreements are priced in a way that makes it likely that they will face less demand once tensions in the market subside. Hence, here too a “natural phasing out” is envisaged, essentially reflecting lower demand. b. Size and scope of the intervention  We have also carefully guarded against undertaking outright operations of a scope and magnitude that would make them difficult to offset or unwind. Notably, the covered bonds purchase programme is limited in size compared with the overall scale of our refinancing operations and compared with our balance sheet. Its effect on total liquidity can easily, if desired, be neutralised via adjustments to our monetary policy instruments. 3.
As a result, reserve balances fell to one of their lowest levels in a number of years apart from quarterends and were close to some private-sector estimates of where reserve scarcity might appear. Based on a wide range of indicators, and as suggested by the chart, there was no evidence of reserve scarcity on an aggregate basis; indeed, based on the metric shown, rates were little changed on this day. It seems highly likely that we are still on the “flat” part of the curve, where rates move little in response to shifts in reserves. However, it is still possible that the decline in reserves might be putting some upward pressure on rates. Even in the “flat” part, the slope of the demand curve, while small, might be nonzero. This could be true if, for example, the balance sheet costs of the marginal borrower in overnight money markets were upward-sloping with respect to that bank’s balance sheet size. I see this as a reasonable possibility, and therefore I think it might be possible that the decline in reserve balances has pushed up overnight rates a bit over time. 22 Figure 11 provides some evidence of this dynamic; as the level of reserve balances has declined, the spread between the rate of interest paid on reserves and the volume-weighted average federal funds rate has narrowed.

The current inflation rate does not provide sufficient information to determine the level at which interest rates should be set now. Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effects of an interest rate change will occur within two years. Frequent and marked interest rate changes can keep inflation under tight control, but will lead to wide variations in output and employment. This can be called a strict inflation target. Theoretically, we could also have chosen to stabilise output without taking into account variability in inflation. This can be called a strict output target. In Norway, as in a many other countries, we have chosen an intermediate solution. Interest rates are changed more gradually with less impact on output than under a strict inflation target, and inflation is allowed to deviate from the target over a somewhat longer period. This is called flexible inflation targeting.44 A two-year horizon in interest rate setting will also contribute to smoothing fluctuations in output and employment. Two years is therefore normally a reasonable time horizon for achieving the inflation target. The most important monetary policy instrument is the interest rate on banks’ sight deposits in Norges Bank. Short money market rates will shadow changes in Norges Bank sight deposit rate. The shortterm nominal interest rate in Norway is now very low historically. With reduced pressures in the economy and the prospect of an inflation rate below target at the twoyear horizon, Norges Bank has over the past year reduced the key rate on a number of occasions.
Getting institutions right is critical not just for core economic outcomes but for broader well-being. The fundamental challenge is that alongside the great benefits they ultimately bring, every technological revolution mercilessly destroys jobs and livelihoods – and therefore identities – well before the new ones emerge. This was true of the eclipse of agriculture and cottage industry by the industrial revolution, the development of the production line, the displacement of manufacturing by the service economy. 5  We are on the cusp of a Fourth Industrial Revolution, which has the potential to transform fundamentally the nature of both work and commerce through advances in AI, automation and interconnectedness. Our economies are reorganising into a series of distributed peer-to-peer connections across powerful networks – revolutionising how people consume, work and communicate. The nature of commerce is changing. Sales are increasingly taking place online and over platforms, rather than on the high street. 6  Intangible capital is now more important than physical capital. We are entering an age when anyone will be able to produce anything anywhere through 3-D printing, where anyone can broadcast their performance globally via YouTube or sell to China whatever the size of their business via Tmall. Today, I want to discuss how we can apply the lessons from the history of the first three industrial revolutions to the fourth to secure a future that benefits all. Crisis? What Crisis? Some economists wonder what all the fuss is about.

19  That appears comparable with the three previous episodes of  technological revolution, which saw the share of aggregate employment accounted for by the most exposed industries fall by between 10 to 20% over long periods. Some argue that the greater scope and scale of tasks (as opposed to jobs) at risk of replacement by technology means that new job creation might no longer increase overall employment. That is, the destruction effect may outweigh the combined impact of the productivity and creation effects. At the same time, the range of tasks at risk could substantially increase the impact on inequality for several reasons. Most fundamentally, the more new technology substitutes for labour rather than complements it, the more the gains would accrue to capital rather than labour. An unequal distribution of capital means that increasing automation will push up inequality by construction. In the transition, what economists euphemistically call frictions can lead to depressed local or national labour markets, boosting inequality. 20  And if education is unable to keep pace with the changing demand for skills, those who already have the skills to use new technologies will earn even higher premiums. labour competing for lower skilled jobs. 22  21  Job polarisation will increase the supply of  Greater global interconnectedness will reinforce these dynamics. 17  For example, McKinsey Global Institute (2017), ‘A Future that Works: Automation, Employment and Productivity’ suggest that 60% of occupations could see over 30% of their tasks replaced by technology, based on O*NET analysis.
SFIA is partnering the investment community to develop an AI-driven ESG information tool to harness qualitative data at scale to support investment decisions relating to Asian assets. It is already in discussions with several asset managers and financial institutions on a proof of concept. SFIA is a strong addition to Singapore’s ESG eco-system. CONCLUSION The transition to a net-zero economy is the greatest collective endeavour humanity must undertake in the decades ahead. How capital is allocated to support this endeavour will be critical to the outcome. As owners and stewards of capital, you have a great responsibility – to direct investments to activities that promote sustainable development. Together, let us make the future of capital green. 1 Nature Climate Change, 2016, Climate value at risk of global financial assets. 2 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, The cost of inaction: Recognising the value at risk from climate change. 3 Fidelity, 2020, Putting sustainability to the test: ESG outperformance amid volatility. 4 Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, 2019. 5 6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  5 CNBC, 2021, Money invested in ESG funds more than doubles in a year. 6 BlackRock, 2020 Global Sustainable Investing Survey. 7 Wealth-X, 2019, A Generational Shift: Family Wealth Transfer Report. 8 Financial Times, 2018, Asia’s Young Rich and The Challenge for Private Banks. 9 Morgan Stanley Institute for Sustainable Investing, 2017, Why Millennial Investors are Different. 10 McKinsey, 2020, Climate risk and response in Asia. 11 Asian Development Bank, 2017, Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs.

12 Morningstar, 2021, Global Sustainable Fund Flows: Q4 2020 in Review. 13 The Business Times, 2021, ESG magnates pour money into China and its Asian peers. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
Again, we are seeing the two-way flow of talent for the different areas of professional expertise and the workforce leading to an increasingly diversified background of employment in different parts of the world. Malaysian professionals can be found in every continent in wide ranging areas of employment. Let me turn to the participation of women in the economy. About half of the Malaysian population are women and they account for about 47% of the workforce. The representation of women at the professional, managerial and technical levels has increased from less than 30% in 1990 to about 40% currently. Such progress has been achieved given the educational opportunities that have been made available to women. Literacy rates among women is about 90% due to the countries comprehensive and inclusive education system. Female primary and secondary students account for half of total enrolment, while at the public universities, female students account for 55% of the total enrolment. It is this educational foundation which has accorded equality to women in Malaysia . It has enabled women from all walks of life and backgrounds to contribute and participate fully in Malaysia's economic prosperity. Women in Malaysia have also participated significantly in the small and medium enterprise sector of the economy. A significant number of women run family businesses makes up a large part of this sector.

Up to September, Stock Connect captured over 65% of foreign holdings of A-shares; its Northbound daily average turnover doubled year-on-year to RMB42 billion for the first nine months of this year. In just two years’ time, Bond Connect has also quickly gained traction. It now has over 1,300 investors from 31 jurisdictions, and 61 of the top 100 global asset managers. In the first ten months of the year, it contributed to around 40% of the increase in foreign holdings of onshore bonds; its daily turnover increased 2.7 times year-on-year, and now accounts for more than 60% of the overall trading turnover by foreign investors. 10. And like other things we do, we build on the good start and keep working to make the Connect schemes more attractive to international investors. We introduced in June a new arrangement that will enable investors to obtain and hedge in CNY for the Stock Connect. For Bond Connect, we have expanded the settlement cycle, introduced DvP settlement and block trade functionality, and added an additional electronic trading platform. We continuously listen to market participants, and are exploring further enhancements such as expansion of tradable product scope under Bond Connect and launch of its Southbound leg. Huge Inflow into Mainland China’s capital markets 11. Given the much greater ease of investing in the capital markets in the Mainland of China, foreign holdings of A-shares and onshore bonds increased rapidly by 73% and 93% respectively in the past 2 years.
But there is no guarantee that major and lasting damage would not have been done by the types of dramatic exchange rate overshooting that have been witnessed elsewhere in the region. And it is unrealistic to expect that exchange rates would not have overshot, given Hong Kong’s openness and exposure to international capital flows. If Hong Kong’s peg had been abandoned last year, it is likely that the attacks on other regional currencies would have been even more dramatic and widespread, with negative feedback on the region and on our own performance. That Asia — including Hong Kong — now appears to be entering a recovery phase was by no means assured twelve months ago. We might well wonder what conditions we could now be facing had the crisis proceeded to yet another level, with widespread currency collapses along the lines witnessed in Indonesia. Other observers have argued that, from a longer-term perspective, fixed exchange rate regimes are inflexible and stifle growth. Again, I believe that Hong Kong’s experience belies this view. I would agree that, in the absence of the ability to adjust interest rates in response to cyclical conditions, output fluctuations can be larger than would otherwise be the case — at least in response to certain types of shocks. At the same time, though, the certainty generated  5  BIS Review 53/1999  by such a solid and clear-cut anchor reduces the impact of shocks to confidence and other factors that might undermine policy credibility.

Mr Yam discusses the sustainability of monetary and exchange rate policies Speech by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr Joseph Yam, JP, at the International Conference on Central Banking Policies: Leading the Way Towards Sustainable Growth presented by the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority of Macau on 14 May 1999. Dr. Pessoa, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be back in this beautiful city, and an honour to be invited to take part in such an important and timely conference. I warmly congratulate the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority of Macau on having put together a stimulating programme, and on having chosen this splendid new cultural centre for the venue. Apart from the inherent interest of the topics under discussion, the conference is significant in at least two respects. It takes place at a time when we are beginning to emerge from what has been, for much of this region, a period of sharp economic crisis, so that the questions we are addressing today perhaps have more relevance than ever. The conference is also taking place seven months before Macau becomes a Special Administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, on 20 December 1999. Hong Kong, Macau’s neighbour across the Pearl River Estuary, has a much shorter history as a city, but it does have a slightly longer experience as a Special Administrative region under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula.
In 1984, 200 additional barrels were added to the proven reserves in the Middle East, which now stand at 685 billion barrels out of a total of roughly one trillion barrels worldwide.3 Despite great difficulties of forecasting oil prices, monetary authorities cannot shy away from considering different hypotheses. In essence, central bankers have to think about risk and probability weighted scenarios. As I have tried to demonstrate, there is considerable evidence suggesting that oil prices may not rapidly revert to previous average price ranges. The future could, of course, turn out differently. Supply elasticity tends to be underestimated, sometimes dramatically so. Indeed, in the late 1970s, oil prices were projected to rise substantially. As we now know, market forces prevailed. Supply was increased and prices eventually fell. Nonetheless, from today’s vantage point, the hypothesis of a level shift in the equilibrium price range of oil strikes me as plausible. Moreover, given the importance of oil prices to the overall dynamic of the global economy, we need to consider the likely impact of higher oil prices on aggregate output and inflation and what it means for monetary policy. 4. Impact on output and inflation  Oil prices affect the economy through different transmission channels. In the short term, an oil price shock adversely affects aggregate demand. A rise in the price of oil resembles an excise tax and leads to a loss of purchasing power. In the medium term, higher oil prices lead to higher production cost and a reduction in the rate of return on capital.

Before 1995, the correlation between GDP and oil prices was –0.4. During the period 1995 to 2004, the correlation stands at +0.3 (see Figure 3). Against this backdrop, economic developments in China play a crucial role. The integration of China into the world economy is likely to be a historic event. Indeed, its long-term economic consequences strike me as comparable to those associated with the integration of the emerging U.S. economy into the world economy at the end of the 19th century. China has become the second largest importer and consumer of oil behind the United States. The longer-term oil demand effect associated with Chinese growth is potentially vast. The fact that China is poor in natural resources undoubtedly strengthens the Chinese authorities’ resolve to avoid any potential energy shortages. The International Energy Agency IEA estimates that global demand for oil will increase by 2.5 million barrels per day or in excess of 3% this year. This represents the highest increase in global demand for oil during the past quarter of a century. Virtually half of that increase in demand can be attributed to the Asian emerging markets with China accounting for over 32% of the additional demand. Needless to say, China is merely at the beginning of its growth dynamic.