samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If EU regulation and internationally agreed standards diverge materially, it will both create barriers to that activity and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage making it more difficult to ensure UK financial stability. My third example is the European Supervisory Authorities – the European Banking Authority (EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). These were established to provide more detailed common rule making so that the EU Single Market in financial services could be supported by a common rule-book underneath the framework of high-level legislation. This search for more detailed alignment of regulation and standards has I think been a general feature of the post crisis reforms in the EU and more widely. The ESAs are governed by their boards, comprising national supervisory authorities, which are also responsible for the majority of their financing. They set and advise the Commission on the rules and standards – they do not engage directly in the prudential supervision of firms. The European Supervisory Authorities perform another important function. I have talked about common rules, commonly applied. There are of course enforcement mechanisms in the Treaties to ensure member States properly observe the EU legislation. But the need for this in financial services has been especially recognised with the ESAs having the capability to conduct peer reviews and for binding arbitration when one national authority believes another has not properly implemented or applied the rules. This is a powerful mechanism to prevent regulatory arbitrage and the risk of adverse spillovers between member states.

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For instance, in one year the inflation rate of Slovenia and Austria may differ greatly due to changes in taxes or differences in the economic cycle, but the longterm price expectations of people still remain quite similar in these countries. This is logical. In the monetary union, it is natural that there occur differences in the inflation rate across regions, but these cannot last very long. Otherwise, the competitiveness of the country with the faster inflation rate will suffer: in the best case, the country’s economic growth will slow down gradually, but in the worst case the country will have to adjust through a difficult crisis similar to the situation in Greece. One way or another – eventually, this entails a decrease in demand and price growth will be forced back to its “correct” level. For us, not much has changed after joining the monetary union. Inflation in Estonia was affected by euro-area price stability already under the fixed exchange rate system. Though for a short while, Estonia’s inflation greatly exceeded that of Europe, long-term and excessive deviations were corrected by the economy. Otherwise, it would have started pressuring the credibility of the fixed exchange rate. While in the previous monetary system, more fretful analysts might have speculated that the economy would be adjusted through devaluation – the weakening of the currency’s value – which would have allowed inflation to remain higher, luckily this is not an option in the monetary union.

The prices of other goods and services, on the other hand, have been posting quite modest growth rates. Therefore, the inflation expectations of entrepreneurs and consumers have remained close to the historical average. If the price hike of commodities stops, the increase in the euro area’s prices could remain below 2% already next year. However, looking at the data from another angle, we can find proof to arguments which insist that the current euro-area interest rate level is not suitable for guaranteeing the low inflation rate that corresponds to the price stability goal. Although the general public focuses on the debt crisis of certain European countries, the developments of the economy itself have, on the whole, exceeded expectations. Economic growth has remained above average and the utilisation of production capacity no longer resembles a crisis situation. Though unemployment is still high, it is decreasing and the indicators of the industrial and service sectors are posting quite high results from the historical perspective. If we add here the fact that global price rise pressures have been annoyingly enduring and do not show any signs of abatement, the risk of a persistently higher inflation rate in the euro area has increased. Therefore, at the press conference after the most recent meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank it was pointed out that, to withstand this threat, the Eurosystem might increase the price of money in the markets earlier than expected, maybe already in April.
Conclusion (i): It is important not to lose sight of inflation and inflation expectations My conclusion that it is important not to lose sight of inflation and inflation expectations may seem obvious and trivial to many people, but it is nevertheless worth some reflection. Moreover, the international debate that has arisen recently suggests that it may not be so obvious after all. One apparent reason for keeping sight of inflation is that it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to bring it back on target once it has fallen, particularly if inflation expectations have fallen too. I have to admit that I, for one, underestimated these problems. One possible explanation is that I, probably along with many others, had been lulled into a belief that the positive developments in the years prior to the financial crisis confirmed that we had succeeded in tackling the more significant problems and that the inflation target was completely credible and more or less a natural element of the Swedish economy. Of course, that it is important not to lose sight of inflation is easy to say, but it is harder to live up to. Obviously, it was not the Riksbank’s intention for inflation to become as low as it did and for such a long time. 11 We made the best forecasts we could and implemented the policies we deemed to be the most appropriate.

I must admit here that initially this seemed to cause more harm than good – a little knowledge truly did seem a dangerous thing now that we had opened ourselves up to the media. The greater access to central bank officials and information, e.g. through our website, without the full understanding of issues on the part of journalists seemed to fuel erroneous stories. However, our perseverance over time has meant that the level of understanding and quality of questions has improved significantly. As a result, the level of reporting has also improved – although much work still needs to be done. Today issues surrounding the causes and likely impact of the global financial and economic crisis have been covered in a more balanced way with a greater thoughtfulness on the economic linkages and Government policy – as well as with increased reference to related developments around the world. Mr. Chairman, following on from the media seminars, six years ago the Bank of Zambia began conducting seminars for members of Parliament – particularly members of oversight committees such as the Committee of Economic and Labour Affairs and the Public Accounts Committee. Again, what we have seen is a greater appreciation by members of Parliament of the challenges facing the central bank in the implementation of monetary policy in particular and economic policy in general because the central bank is often called upon to comment on the Government’s economic policies as well.
Nonetheless, there is no getting away from the fact that the house price developments and their effects on consumption are an uncertainty factor in the assessment of the future economic situation. 1  See the box “Households’ consumption, debt and saving” in Inflation Report 2005:3. BIS Review 88/2005  3  The debate on the role of asset prices in monetary policy Before I go on to the current monetary policy situation, let me briefly say a few words about a debate that has been ongoing in recent years in both academic circles and in the central bank world and that has some relevance to what I have spoken about so far. I am referring to what role asset prices should play more generally in the conduct of monetary policy. It has been claimed in some quarters that a monetary policy that focuses on keeping inflation low and stable is not enough to guarantee a favourable macroeconomic outcome. This claim is based on the observation that asset prices have fluctuated fairly sharply also under the regime of low and stable inflation. An example is the build-up of the IT bubble in the equity market and the subsequent dramatic decline in that market. Some have even argued that the risk to financial stability increases under a low-inflation regime.

The economic climate has improved in the US and Asia and the Swedish labour market is showing clear signs of a recovery – not least statistics from staffing companies are pointing to a pick-up in demand for labour. Another reason is that an interest rate rise would reduce the risk of the krona weakening further as monetary policy in other countries gradually becomes less and less expansionary. The interest rate differential in relation to the euro area and the US seems recently to have had great significance for developments in the krona exchange rate. A third reason – perhaps the most important – has to do with what I have spoken about here today. My assessment is that house prices and household debt may very well have reached levels at which there is a risk of there arising a self-reinforcing negative spiral with falling house prices and weak demand growth when the business cycle eventually turns down. Even if it were not – as I already pointed out – a case of a correction of an overvalued market, such an adjustment could be comparatively abrupt. In my opinion, an earlier initiated and more gradual raising of interest rates would increase the chances of a more orderly slowdown in the rate of price increases, in roughly the same way as in the UK and Australia.
14 The economy was growing at a solid, if unspectacular, rate. There were signs growth was slowing, albeit gently, towards trend. Meanwhile, price pressures remained weak. Energy prices had fallen, and sterling had risen, in both cases sharply. This had lowered inflation significantly below target. Domestic wage growth was also weak, despite the significant improvement in the jobs market. I was doubtful, then, there would be any significant pick-up in wage pressures, dampening the reflationary process necessary to return inflation to target. With the risks to costs and prices to the downside, my view a year ago was that maintaining Bank rate at its historically low levels was necessary to provide support to the recovery and momentum to the reflationary process. Indeed, given the asymmetry of risks to growth and inflation, my view was that monetary policy should stand ready to move in either direction, with the chances of a rate rise or cut broadly balanced. A year on, in the run-up to the referendum, my view on both the economy and on the stance of monetary policy was essentially unchanged. The UK economy had continued to grow, steadily if unspectacularly. At the same time, there had been accumulating evidence, from surveys and from GDP figures over a period of three years, of growth continuing to slow gently  13  Belfield, Cribb, Hood and Joyce (2015)  14  Haldane (2015). 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  to the point where it was little different than trend.

Percentage of 21-34 year olds living with their parents  1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014  15  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 30 – Share of people living in absolute poverty after housing costs*  Chart 31 – Share of people living in relative poverty after housing costs* Per cent of age group  60  60  Under 16  55  16-65  50  50  45  45  40  40  Over 65  Under 16  16-65  Over 65  35  35  30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  94/95 97/98 00/01 03/04 06/07 09/10 12/13  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. * A household is defined as living in absolute poverty where their income is less than 60% of 2010/11 median income held constant in real terms. 55  94/95 97/98 00/01 03/04 06/07 09/10 12/13  10  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. * A household is defined as living in relative poverty where their income is less than 60% of median income. Chart 32 – Financial market measures of inflation expectations Per cent  3.5  23/06/2016  06/07/2016  3.0  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  2.5  Years  Source: Bloomberg and Bank calculations. * Instantaneous RPI inflation implied from swaps. BIS central bankers’ speeches  23
(b) Data on portfolio equity inflows from the Institute of International Finance. Data on equity market capitalisation from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Chart 3 Emerging market equity prices and gross inflows(a) to emerging markets MSCI EM $ index (LHS) Gross inflows to EM $ 1,400  500  1,200  400  1,000  300  800  200  600  100  400  0  200  -100  0  -200 Q1 1990  Q1 1994  Q1 1998  Q1 2002  Q1 2006  Q1 2010  Source: IMF and Thomson Datastream. (a) Includes portfolio inflows, foreign direct investment and bank flows. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 4 Cross-border asset holdings (1980–2005) 1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Source: Kubelec and Sa (2010) and Bank calculations. Advanced economies  Emerging market economies  Financial centres (Hong Kong and Singapore)  Notes: Widths of links are proportional to the log dollar value of cross-border asset holdings. Each arrow denotes ownership, with the arrow pointing away from the holder of the asset and toward the issuer of the liability. Sizes of nodes are proportional to the log dollar value of the sum of all of the country’s cross-border asset holdings and liabilities issued (i.e. equal to the sum of incoming and outgoing links).

  In South Korea, four sets of measures have been introduced: stronger foreign currency liquidity standards for banks (November 2009); reduced short-term external bank debt and limiting foreign currency bank loans (June 2010); a macroprudential stability levy, planned to be introduced in 2011, on banks’ non-deposit foreign currency liabilities (late 2010); and the reintroduction of a withholding tax on foreign purchases of treasury bonds (January 2011).   In Turkey, the central bank raised reserve requirements, and reduced policy rates, to address accelerating credit growth and financial stability.   In Thailand, a withholding tax was imposed in October 2010 on non-resident interest earnings and capital gains on state bonds.   In Indonesia, the central bank introduced in June 2010 a package of measures, including a one-month holding period requirement for central bank securities. 3. Tomorrow’s BFSP problem  From a public policy perspective, one key question is whether the frequency and amplitude of these global financial ripples will rise or fall in the period ahead. In other words, will  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  tomorrow’s BFSP problem be greater or lesser than today’s? To answer that, we need to return to the global financial footrace. Judging that race involves balancing two powerful forces of financial liberalisation:   Portfolio diversification among advanced economies;    Financial deepening among emerging markets. Plotting the future path of these factors is far from straightforward. But some quantitative thought-experiments can help clarify the balance of these forces.
Mark Carney: Writing the path back to target Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the University of Sheffield Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre, Sheffield, 12 March 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. It is a great pleasure to be in the City of Steel to honour both its historic role in forging the industrial foundations of modern Britain and its current leadership in promoting advanced manufacturing for the post-industrial age. This city has been at the very forefront of innovation for hundreds of years. In the 18th Century Sheffield revolutionalised steelmaking with the discovery of the crucible steel process. By the mid-19th Century the city represented almost half of Europe’s total steel output. Since then, Sheffield has remained fleet of foot through hard work and innovation. The University of Sheffield’s Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre is a prime example of that spirit. No one knows better than you that manufacturing needs to become ever-more productive to prosper in a world of steadily falling prices and relentless international competition. Prices for advanced manufactured goods fell on average by around 1 per cent a year during the decade prior to the crisis.

The pace and degree of these increases will be affected by a variety of factors, including the evolution of foreign prices and our exchange rate, as well as domestic cost pressures. While the MPC can be expected to look through one-off shocks, it may be appropriate to take into account persistent external deflationary forces arising from the combination of continued foreign low inflation and the protracted effects of sterling’s strength on the prices facing UK consumers if those forces were to intensify. Cities like Sheffield have shown that in a rapidly changing global economic landscape, hard work, clarity of purpose, and fleetness of foot grant manufacturing the freedom to write its future. The MPC also faces global risks as it seeks to return inflation to target. But we remain the author of our nominal destiny. The MPC has the responsibility to return inflation to target in a timely manner and we will seek to write the next chapter that does so. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Ravi Menon: Singapore as convenor, catalyst and contributor for climate action Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the launch of the COP-27 Singapore Pavilion, Sharm El-Sheikh, 6 November 2022. *** Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. Welcome to the launch of the Singapore Pavilion at COP27. As we gather in beautiful Sharm El-Sheikh, let us remind ourselves of the task before us: to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050 in an orderly and inclusive way. Singapore is committed to the net-zero by 2050 target and has laid out our plans and strategies to get there. This Pavilion is not just about Singapore's plans to get to net-zero. After all, Singapore's contribution to global emissions is just 0.1%. But as a global city, technology hub, and financial centre, we can play a larger role in the fight against climate change. Singapore wants to be a convenor, a catalyst, and a contributor of solutions for global climate action. This is the broader purpose of this Pavilion. As a convenor, we will bring together partners in industry, finance, academia, civil society and the government, to spark new ideas and forge new collaborations for effective climate action. As a catalyst, we will work with partners to step up the pace of transition in this critical decade, which will substantially determine whether the world gets to netzero by 2050.

2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  One area of promise is the voluntary carbon credit market. It is expected to play an increasingly important role, especially in Asia. The demand for credits will come from sectors where it is quite difficult to reduce emissions due to prohibitively high costs or the lack of proven technology. At the same time, activities like reforestation, mangrove restoration, and the early retirement of coal-fired power plants can potentially generate good carbon credits. We will showcase efforts by Singapore to work with global stakeholders to foster a sound and vibrant voluntary carbon credit market in Asia. This Pavilion is a result of the close partnerships among Singapore businesses, NGOs, academics, civil society groups, and the government. Please also join me in expressing appreciation to the organising team. I wish you a fruitful time at the Singapore Pavilion and at COP27. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Jobs will take a different form too, as financial institutions (FIs) speed up on their digitalisation to cater to the extensive shift in customers’ preferences. We therefore need to keep workers employed as much as possible. We are heartened that some FIs, including large employers like Bank of China, Bank of Singapore, DBS, Great Eastern Life, Maybank, NTUC Income and OCBC are committed to avoid any redundancy exercises where they can. MAS urges more FIs to do their part to support their workers and take a longer-term view in investing in their capabilities. MAS will support workers to reskill in functions which are becoming more digitalised to harness the potential of technology in new and expanded roles. 7. The nature of jobs has evolved rapidly as the use of technology becomes more pervasive in the Financial Services sector, from the design, development to delivery of products and services. Therefore, jobs will need to be redesigned and transformed too, and employees will need to acquire new skills and adapt to new work requirements. MAS and IBF, with the support of Workforce Singapore, have worked closely with our tripartite partners over the years, to reskill and redeploy workers into new or expanded jobs. 8. Thus far, 25 local and foreign FIs have committed to support close to 5,000 employees, of whom 3,000 have embarked on this journey. Of these, 900 have completed their training and are in their new roles.

Our efforts should therefore be focused on jump-starting investment. However, and this was really the crux of my argument, we will only manage to stimulate investment if structural, fiscal and monetary policies mutually reinforce each other. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches