samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This should also help to reduce pressure on the rental market, where there is evidence that from being at the lower end of cross-country rent-to-wage ratios, we have moved relatively quickly to being close to ratios found in the most expensive European cities. Besides the impact that this rise could have on our capacity to attract foreign workers, we need to consider its impact on Maltese tenants, which in turn will impact on the broader costs of doing business and, consequently, competitiveness. We believe that, going forward, if we continue to grow at the rates observed in recent years, we will need to have a much more dynamic housing market. But before discussing private provision, let us discuss social housing. Recent developments have reinforced the case for replenishing our social housing stock. However, this expansion needs to be accompanied by a change in approach. In recent years, most of Malta’s benefit system has been changed so as to create clear incentives to shift from benefit dependence to participation in the formal labour market. The only area where this is not happening yet is social housing, where the tendency remains that, once allocated, social housing tends to become a lifetime entitlement. We need to change this so that social housing schemes act to activate individuals and empower them rather than encourage passivity. Such a transition could itself be helpful in financing the expansion of social housing.

See Anne Case and Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st  Century, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017, in which they document declining life expectancy for middle-aged, less-educated non-Hispanic whites in the United States since the year 2000. 2 United Nations, World Populations Prospects: Key Findings and Advance Tables, 2015 Revision. 3 Antonin Bergeaud, Gilbert Cette, and Rémy Lecat, Productivity Trends in Advanced Countries between 1890 and  2012, Review of Income and Wealth, Volume 62, Issue 3, pp. 420–44 (September 2016). 4 Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War,  Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2016. 5 Carlos Carvalho, Andrea Ferrero, and Fernanda Nechio. Demographics and Real Interest Rates: Inspecting the  Mechanism, European Economic Review, Volume 88, pp. 208–26, 2016; Etienne Gagnon, Benjamin K. Johannsen, and David Lopez-Salido. Understanding the New Normal: The Role of Demographics. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016; and Gauti B. Eggertsson, Neil R. Mehrotra, and Jacon A. Robbins, A Model of Secular Stagnation: Theory and Quantitative Evaluation, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 23093, 2017. 6 Shigeaki Fujiwara, Yuto Iwasaki, Ichiro Muto, Kenji Nishizaki, and Nao Sudo Fujiwara, Developments in the  Natural Rate of Interest in Japan, Bank of Japan Review, October 2016; Kathryn Holston, Thomas Laubach, and John C. Williams, Measure the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants, Journal of International Economics, Volume 108, Supp. 1, pp. S59-S75. (2016).
Today, the SNB is no longer in the spotlight with regard to its gold policy. This makes my task today easier than President Roth's seven years ago. I have no newsworthy information to present to you regarding our gold policy. Instead, I will briefly reflect on six commonly held arguments related to commodities and, more specifically, to gold. The point of considering these arguments is not to either reject or confirm them definitely but rather to illustrate the likely speculative nature of long-term gold price forecasts. Since it was freed from central bank intervention, the gold market has been quite volatile. Historical evidence as well as analytical considerations suggest that price volatility will likely remain an important feature of the gold market. First argument: gold is a commodity like any other Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, gold has lost its role as an anchor for the international monetary system. Does that mean that it has become a commodity like any other? Before trying to analyse fundamental differences or similarities between gold and other commodities, lets look at what prices tell us: At first sight, gold and other commodity price cycles indeed look similar: the  1  For a detailed overview of SNB's sales program, see Hildebrand (2005), SNB Gold Sales - Lessons and Experiences, Institute for International Economics, Washington. BIS Review 61/2006  1  boom in the gold market since 1999 clearly has parallels in other commodities as well.

Vahur Kraft: Challenges facing Estonian economy in the European Union Speech by Mr Vahur Kraft, Governor of the Bank of Estonia, at the Roundtable “Has social market economy a future?”, organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Tallinn, 19 August 2002. *  A. *  *  Introduction, review of the early 1990s and comparison with the present day  First of all, allow me to thank Konrad Adenauer Foundation for the organisation of this interesting roundtable and for the honourable invitation to speak about “Challenges of Estonian economy in the European Union”. Today’s event shows yet again how serious is the respected organisers’ interest towards the EU applicant countries. I personally appreciate highly your support to our reforms and convergence in the society and economy. From the outside it may seem that the transformation and convergence process in Estonia has been easy and smooth, but against this background there still exist numerous hidden problems. One should not forget that for two generations half of Europe was deprived of civil society, private ownership, market economy. This is truth and it has to be reckoned with. It is also clear that the reflections of the “shadows of the past” can still be observed. They are of different kind. If people want the state to ensure their well-being but are reluctant to take themselves any responsibility for their own future, it is the effect of the shadows of the past.
This requires effective cooperation with foreign authorities in a crisis, for which, in turn, the global resolution plans are an important prerequisite. As regards emergency plans, both Swiss big banks have introduced significant measures by setting up Swiss subsidiaries which combine systemically important functions in one entity. The key point here is that the Swiss units must be sufficiently independent from the rest of the bank, both operationally and financially. Both big banks have to implement their emergency plans by end-2019 at the latest. FINMA is responsible for the definitive assessment on whether the plans allow systemically important functions to be maintained in practice. Domestically focused banks  I would now like to turn to the domestically focused banks. For these banks, the mortgage and real estate markets still represent the greatest source of risk. Growth on these markets has remained fairly constant over the last six months, and at a relatively low level. At the same time, imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets have fallen slightly overall, owing to developments in fundamentals. Despite this most recent development, the risks that have been building in the Swiss banking sector since the beginning of the low interest rate period in 2008 remain considerable. Thus, imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets are still approximately as high as they were in 2014, when the sectoral countercyclical capital buffer was set at 2%.

Under the new membership drive, ACIHK, traditionally consisted of practitioners drawn from the foreign exchange and money markets, has recruited new members from other treasury markets. In particular, with the support of the HKCMA, many of you working in the debt origination as well as trading sides have now joined the ACIHK. The number of ACIHK members has by now grown to over 1,800. As part of the training and accreditation programme for ACIHK members, two new courses, one on dealing and the other one on debt securities, have been developed together with the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the University of Science and Technology respectively. The HKCMA has provided very useful contributions in designing the debt securities course, which commenced last November. Secondly, “product”. Here I’m not referring to the wide array of financial products that are offered to the investors, which should best be left to individual financial firms to develop. What the TMF and the HKCMA can help is to seek to develop the necessary infrastructure so that new products can be launched in Hong Kong. For example, the TMF, together with the HKCMA and the HKMA, have been seeking to develop the HK dollar repo market in Hong Kong. For the repo market to kick off, we will need the necessary repo settlement facility operated by the Central Moneymarkets Unit. As a result of  BIS Review 6/2005  1  this effort, an efficient and highly automated platform for repo settlement has been made available since December 2004.
On the one hand, the crisis has resulted in a more expansionary monetary policy stance in some countries. This has probably contributed to the rise in commodity prices in recent months, and to the rise in energy prices, in particular. On the other hand, the expected economic slowdown associated with the crisis should dampen inflationary pressure. However, the aggregate effect of the crisis on inflation is far from obvious. The crisis has thus increased the uncertainty surrounding the inflation outlook. Consequently, central bankers are currently challenged not only on the financial stability front; they also need to be extremely alert to developments on the price stability front. 8  BIS Review 71/2008

Joseph Yam: Hong Kong Institute of Bankers Beijing Representative Office Address by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the inaugural ceremony and dinner, Beijing Representative Office of the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers, Beijing, 10 June 2005. *  *  *  Chairman Liu, Vice Governor Xiang, Mr Sullivan, Ms Li, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the Institute of Bankers for inviting me to attend this inaugural ceremony of its Beijing Representative Office. On behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, I would like to extend our warmest congratulations to the Institute for making a major step in its development. As we all know, the savings rate in Mainland China is among the world’s highest, accounting for more than 40% of its GDP. The effective channelling of private-sector savings into fixed-assets investments is a major function of the financial system. Such is also an important responsibility of the many employees engaged in the normal workings of the financial system. The proper functioning of the financial sector, with effectiveness in financial intermediation, is crucial for the promotion of economic growth and development. Mr Deng Xiaoping once said, “Finance is very important; it is the core of modern economics.” Presently Mainland China relies preponderantly on the banking system in intermediating funds. Last year bank financing remained the most important channel for raising new funds for the non-government non-financial sector, accounting for over 90% of total funds raised.
In a speech on economic prospects in July 1957, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had recently become Prime Minister after the resignation of his predecessor following an unsuccessful military excursion in the Middle East, said: “Indeed, let us be frank about it: most of our people have never had it so good. Go around the country, go to the industrial towns, go to the farms, and you will see a state of prosperity such as we have never had in my lifetime – nor indeed ever in the history of this country. What is beginning to worry some of us is, is it too good to be true? – or perhaps I should say, is it too good to last? … Our constant concern today is, can prices be steadied while at the same time we maintain full employment in an expanding economy? Can we control inflation? This is the 3 problem of our time”. Some of you may think that it is the problem of our time too. CPI inflation has now risen above 3%, the highest rate since the MPC was set up. Although I believe we are better equipped to maintain stability now than fifty years ago, largely because we have a monetary framework based on an inflation target and clearly defined responsibilities for the Bank of England, we should perhaps look in more detail at how the MPC has worked before coming to a final judgement on the likelihood of continued success.

For those judgements to command respect, it is vital that the Committee demonstrate their determination to react to all signals about the outlook for inflation. It is common – both in the press and within central banks around the world – for discussion of the inflation outlook to be dominated by an analysis of so-called real changes in the economy such as movements in demand or supply and changes in the relative prices of imports or energy. It is true that, in trying to stabilise inflation in the short-term, the MPC will take those events into account. But we know that, beyond the short-term forecasting horizon of up to around three years, inflation has nothing to do with these developments. It is, in the old adage, the result of too much money chasing too few goods. That is why money growth rates and inflation rates are well correlated across countries and over long time horizons. Many of the great economists of the past from David Hume to Milton Friedman emphasised the link between money and the price level in the long run. 13  At present the Chief Executive is Jeff Llewellyn. BIS Review 43/2007  7  Why, then, does money not play a more prominent role in discussions of the outlook for inflation and monetary policy? Monetary developments can reflect two different causes: changes in the demand for money and changes in the supply of money. They have very different implications for inflation.
On the other hand, trying to maintain an artificially depreciated exchange rate, especially in contexts of growing financial integration, can only foster speculation and capital inflows, as it increases expected appreciation. Any exceptional measure must be applied only in extreme circumstances and for a limited period of time, once every other instrument has been reasonably exhausted. References Borensztein, E., O. Jeanne, and D. Sandri (2009). “Macro-Hedging for Commodity Exporters.” CEPR Discussion Paper 7513. Caballero, R.J. (2009). “Sudden Financial Arrest.” Mundell-Fleming Lecture prepared for the IMF 10th Jacques Polack Annual Research Conference. Calvo, G., L. Leiderman, and C. Reinhart (1993). “Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors.” IMF Staff Papers 40: 108–51. Calvo, G., L. Leiderman, and C. Reinhart (1994). “Capital Inflows to Latin America: The 1970s and the 1990s.” In E. Bacha (ed. ), Economics in a Changing World, proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of the International economic Association, Vol. 4, London: McMillan. Cowan, K. and J. De Gregorio (2007). “International Borrowing, Capital Controls and the Exchange Rate: Lessons from Chile.” In S. Edwards (ed. ), Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices and Consequences, NBER and The University of Chicago Press. 6  BIS Review 72/2010  De Gregorio, J. and A. Tokman (2005). “El Miedo a Flotar y la Política Cambiaria en Chile.” Economía Chilena 8(3): 29–54. Kamil, H. and B. Sutton (2008). “Corporate Vulnerability: Have Firms Reduced Their Exposure to Currency Risk?” IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, Western Hemisphere, chapter 5, October.

As the FOMC concluded in its most recent statement: “The Committee anticipates, based on its current assessment, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time following the end of its asset purchase program this month.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  But this sentence should not be viewed as an iron-clad commitment unaffected by economic and financial developments. The statement goes on to say: “However, if incoming information indicates faster progress toward the Committee’s employment and inflation objectives than the Committee now expects, then increases in the target range for the federal funds rate are likely to occur sooner than currently anticipated. Conversely, if progress proves slower than expected, then increases in the target range are likely to occur later than currently anticipated.” In other words, the FOMC’s monetary policy actions and the timing of lift-off will depend on how the economic outlook evolves, particularly with respect to the labor market and inflation. In considering the appropriate timing of lift-off, there are three important reasons to be patient. First, the Committee is still undershooting both its employment and inflation objectives. Unemployment is too high and inflation is too low. Thus, monetary policy needs to be very accommodative in order to close these gaps relative to the Committee’s objectives.
While in Ireland only two banks participated in the tests, in Spain all listed banks and savings banks took part and information was provided on the exposure to risks, real estate risk in particular, with a notably greater degree of detail and transparency than in other countries. But what is to be done when markets forget or investors’ doubts resurface? Once again in these cases, the medicine should be more transparency. This is why, in late November, we took the initiative of explaining again the situation and we once more laid bare Spanish banks, and savings banks in particular. We have asked banks to explain in detail their situation to the market. In particular, the Banco de España has given instructions to the related banking associations to ensure that institutions disclose standardised additional information on a quarterly basis to the market on their exposure to the real estate development and construction sector, detailing the percentages of doubtful loans, the related collateral and the provisions set aside to withstand their potential impairment. They also have to give details of their retail mortgage portfolio, including the related LTV ratios and the percentages of doubtful assets. Finally, they must assess their market funding needs and the short-, medium- and long-term strategies they have implemented. All this is necessary because when reality is perceived as being worse than it actually is, the best possible response is to explain it in the finest detail. A further lesson drawn from the conduct of markets is that they do not like uncertainty.

Thus, the Executive Board decided to leave the repo rate unchanged. However, the decision we made in December was not clear-cut. Factors supporting an unchanged repo rate - as I see it - were mainly that new economic data indicated that the upswing was proceeding as expected, not least internationally, and that this in due time was likely to affect both growth and inflation in Sweden. What advocated a rate cut was that our forecasts were below target in the short term. Moreover, a new factor in the balance of risks in December was signs that domestic cost pressure may be lower than expected; these signs included unexpectedly robust productivity growth, the fact that underlying inflation adjusted for energy prices had risen less than expected during the year and the weak growth in the labour market. However, these signs were still fairly new and I personally found reason to await further information to confirm this picture before I was prepared to take action. Thus, at the meeting, I stressed the importance of monitoring that economic activity was strengthening as expected and also monitoring how supply conditions were developing in the period ahead in order to ascertain whether a repo rate cut in February would be warranted. As I see it now, the data that has been received since December has largely confirmed the picture of international and domestic economic activity that was presented in the Inflation Report. We are some way into a cautious upswing both in the world economy and the Swedish economy.
In contrast, in the emerging economies, GDP growth is strong. These countries account for almost half of the world’s GDP and for almost 70 per cent of the world’s growth this year. China is expected to continue to grow by almost 10 per cent per year, and India by about 8 per cent over the years ahead. In the two other BRIC countries, Brazil and Russia, growth in the range of 4–5 per cent is expected (see Table 1). Differences around the world are also extensive in terms of inflation. In the United States and the euro area, inflation has risen in recent years, primarily as a result of rising energy and commodity prices, but underlying inflation excluding these prices is still low. In the BRIC countries, on the other hand, inflation is high, and the monetary policies of these countries are now being tightened to avoid overheating (see Table 2). However, there are also risks in international developments. The greatest risk for us in Sweden is probably whether the fiscal problems in certain euro area countries will lead to renewed turbulence on the financial markets. Greece, Ireland and Portugal have already received assistance from the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but it remains unclear whether Greece, in particular, will be able to repay its debts. Furthermore, the possibility that Spain may also encounter difficulties in managing its problems cannot be ruled out.

“We’ll see”: 摸 石 頭 過 河 The point is: Forward guidance can be a complicated monetary policy tool. I had an interesting discussion about this two weeks ago with a couple of the members of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). They noted that Chris Giles of the Financial Times has devoted a substantial amount of thoughtful attention to the discussion of forward guidance. In Giles’ Money Supply blog post of Oct. 2, 2013, he wrote: “Forget triggers, thresholds, knockouts and long lists of conditions. Paul Fisher, the Bank of England’s head of markets, says everyone is wrong to think forward guidance is complicated. The policy was summarized in a single simple sentence of the [Bank of England’s] explanatory document, he said in a speech today. This is the sentence,” and I’m quoting Giles quoting Paul Fisher: “In essence, the MPC judges that, until the margin of slack within the economy has narrowed significantly, it will be appropriate to maintain the current exceptionally stimulative stance of monetary policy, provided that such an approach remains consistent with its primary objective of price stability and does not endanger financial stability.” To a central banker, that may have seemed about as concise a Delphic statement as possible.