samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With growth at nearly 10% p.a. over the past decade, China’s imports of consumption goods have expanded twice as fast as intermediate goods. Singapore’s economic growth remains sluggish. Real GDP growth came in at 0.8% in the second quarter on a quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted annualised basis. Growth in the first half of 2016 has averaged 2.2% in year-on-year terms. The economy’s performance in the second half of 2016 will not be too different from the first half. But there will be some month-to-month volatility in economic activity and the composition of growth will shift somewhat. The trade-related cluster is showing tentative signs of stabilisation with improvement in certain segments. •  The electronics industry, which recorded positive sequential growth in April and May, shows tentative signs of a patchy recovery. •  The wholesale and sea transport sectors have benefitted from buoyant oil trade. The modern services cluster, which has been a key pillar of growth in the last few years, will see its contribution fall significantly in 2016. •  Financial services, which had grown much faster than the rest of the economy in the last four years, will see growth much closer to the overall economy. •  Professional services – like architectural and engineering services– which are more exposed to the UK and EU, will experience slower growth. •  Info-communication services will see a moderation in growth but will be supported by demand for productivity-enhancing IT solutions in a restructuring economy. The domestic services cluster will continue to see modest growth.

Mr. Singer said that the weak-koruna policy has persuaded Czechs that the central bank won’t allow consumer prices to fall, and removed the risk of a slide into a prolonged period of deflation. Central bankers aren’t worried so much about falling prices as about the threat that consumers and businesses will come to expect prices to continue to fall and will postpones their purchases, weakening economic growth and pushing prices down further. “We were afraid of this problem of postponed consumption and investment,” Mr. Singer said. “But people have realized the central bank is not going to allow a deflationary slide.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Mr. Singer said that retail sales are picking up, driven by higher auto sales, an indication that consumers aren’t postponing purchases in the expectation goods will be cheaper in the future. He cited a decline in the savings rate as another indication that the risk of deflation has been lessened. The central-bank chief said that while food prices may rise at a slower pace in response to a good harvest, he was not worried about that development because people can’t postpone food purchases. Measured according to an EU standard, the annual rate of inflation in the Czech Republic picked up to 0.7% in August from 0.6% in July, and Mr. Singer said he is confident it will rise to the 2.0% midpoint of the central bank’s target range next year, assuming the eurozone follows a “baseline scenario” of a return to modest growth.
Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to the Institute of Directors, St George’s Hall, Liverpool, 18 October 2011. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Surrounded by the magnificent architecture of St George’s Hall, we are reminded of the benefits and the costs of exposure to the world economy. Built at the peak of Liverpool’s mercantile fortunes, the Hall, and the other magnificent buildings of the cultural quarter, exhibit the prosperity derived from openness to trade. Indeed, tonight is the anniversary of a grand banquet held here on 18th October 1860 to celebrate the opening of the public library and museum building that stands opposite. Its construction had been financed by the guest of honour at the banquet that evening, William Brown, whose statue stands in the Hall today. Brown had profited from transatlantic trade both as a merchant and by establishing a bank which financed trade – at the time a risky business. In those days, finance and trade supported each other, and the city prospered. But the subsequent history of St George’s Hall, which fell into neglect in the last century, illustrates Liverpool’s vulnerability to changes in the rest of the world. The British economy too has enjoyed the benefits of globalisation. Now we are seeing some of the costs, as they play out in a global financial crisis.

This is what the FinTech players have sought to do, and this is what banks are fighting back on. Banks will have the advantage of being highly regulated and trusted, that smaller and newer players may find it hard to challenge. The general consensus is that many FinTechs and the established financial institutions will collaborate. There is a natural synergy here: (a) Collaboration with financial institutions enables FinTech players and technology firms to broaden their reach. (b) On the flip side, FinTech solutions present established financial institutions with opportunities to enhance their product offerings or to improve operational productivity. McKinsey estimated that enhancing digital capacity and adopting technologies could result in productivity gains worth roughly $ billion for the global banking industry by 20252. But the competition will remain intense. Large internet-based firms with their massive customer base can be serious contenders for customer mind-share and wallets including in the area of financial services. There is another development that has gained traction. We see the emergence of fully digital banks that operate entirely online with no physical branches, but are able to provide similar services as the traditional brick-and-mortar banks. Fidor Bank, founded in Germany, is one such example. WeBank in China is another. DBS’ Digibank, a mobile-only bank in India, is also completely branchless and in less than two years, have signed up more than 1.5 million 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  customers. All three have different origins and operate very different business models.
Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Gazeta Wyborcza Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Gazeta Wyborcza, conducted by Mr Leszek Baj on 16 May 2014. *  *  *  Gazeta Wyborcza: Is there a recovery in Europe? On the one hand, the growth of the German economy exceeds 2%. On the other, in several countries GDP is contracting, and some of the larger economies, such as the French, Spanish or Italian economies, are still lagging behind. Benoît Cœuré: We are definitely looking at a recovery. This is good news. But the latest GDP figures have confirmed that this recovery is moderate and uneven. At the same time, inflation is low. Is there a risk of deflation in the euro area? We consider the risk of deflation to be very low. But the rate of inflation – 0.7% in the euro area in April – is rather far from our inflation objective consistent with price stability, which is about 2%. For us at the ECB, there are two key questions at the moment. First, what are the risks to economic growth and is there a risk that this growth won’t be sustainable? Second, it will be important to know whether this period of low inflation won’t be excessively prolonged. These are the elements that we will consider when setting our monetary policy. Can the ECB take action then? Is it going to support the European economy and try to push inflation up a little?

WGCR round table 14 September 2018  Remarks by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Key notes  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 sur 3 Ladies and Gentlemen, Cher Benoît, Cher Jean-Paul, Welcome to Paris, The guidance released by CPMI-IOSCO two years ago was one of the precursors in the field of cyber risks. Since then, the level of cyber-threats has obviously increased. According to different public reports, the number of cyber-attacks (700 million in 2017) has increased by over 100% in two years. This is why cyber security will be one of the priorities of the G7’s French Presidency next year. I would like to share with you three considerations and put forward three concrete measures so that these principles do not remain at the conceptual level but actually lead to tangible actions. ** I. Three considerations, or three S’s: Silos / Security of Systems / Speed 1) The first is of a general nature. Considering that “security is a block”, we need to explore how to break the silo within the financial sector, which does not take account of the multiplicity of its stakeholders: the CPMI-IOSCO principles rightly emphasise the need to take into account interconnections, meaning the link between FMIs, between FMIs and their service providers and suppliers. Nowadays, we should also take into account, alongside regulated and supervised participants, the existence of Fintechs, as well as “big techs”.
Inter alia, this cooperation will allow longer-term data requirements of the ESRB to be met. In the future, a key issue in connection with minimising the reporting burden of the financial sector is the ability to exchange relevant datasets. Procedures are in place to ensure that confidentiality is protected. At the moment, however, these procedures are unduly cumbersome. Appropriate ways to exchange the data and protect their confidentiality more efficiently will be considered. Against the background of increasing demand for rigour and quality in systemic risk analysis, it was to be expected that the ECB’s legal powers in the field of statistics would be activated in order to improve the information base that is available, with a focus on the euro area. To some extent, this has already been undertaken by developing enhanced statistics on MFIs, as well as statistics on securities holdings. In fact, the amendment of Council Regulation 2533/98, governing the ECB’s powers to collect statistical information, in 2009 enables the ECB to impose requirements on euro area banks and insurance companies to provide data, also for financial stability purposes. 4. Macro and micro-dimensions of data requirements  The use of the prefix “macro” and “micro” in the context of the new institutional environment may create some confusion on the nature of the work to support systemic risk analysis and related data inputs. There is no such thing like a clear separation of macro – or aggregated – data inputs that are used in macro-prudential analysis from micro-data, i.e.

Second, financial instability can impair the linkage between monetary policy and financial conditions. The central bank may move to a much more accommodative monetary policy stance, but this may not lead to much improvement in financial conditions. We see this clearly in spreads and risk premia during periods of financial stress. Depletion of capital in the banking system or the interaction of frictions and market failures may also lead to constraints on the availability of credit following a financial shock. As a recent U.S. example of the second issue, households with lower FICO scores have had difficulties in refinancing  1  Krishna Guha, Marc Saidenberg and others on my staff contributed to these remarks. 2  As always, what I have to say here today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  their mortgages or in obtaining new mortgages to purchase a home. This stems from worries by lenders about put back risk – that such mortgages might be put back to them by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac should the mortgages become nonperforming. For any given reduction in mortgage rates relative to normal levels, this reduces the support for the housing sector and consumption. Thus, another lesson of the crisis is that monetary policymakers need to be more attuned to how the condition of the financial system influences how monetary policy changes affect financial conditions. Third, the linkage between financial conditions and aggregate demand may also be impaired.
Conclusion The persistently high current account surplus in Switzerland is not a reflection of an overly weak Swiss franc. Rather, this surplus can be explained by three factors. First, statistical distortions mean that Switzerland’s current account surplus tends to be overstated. A considerable percentage of multinational companies in Switzerland are held in free float by foreign investors. If these companies reinvest their profits, they are entirely attributed to Switzerland, even though a large proportion actually belongs to the foreign investors. The higher nominal interest rates abroad inflate the current account surplus in Switzerland. The reported balance is too high because the nominal appreciation of the Swiss franc is not taken into account. Overall, these statistical distortions have the effect that Switzerland’s net international investment position does not steadily increase despite persistent current account surpluses. Second, there are structural reasons for the current account surplus or savings surplus in Switzerland. These include, in particular, the rapidly ageing population. If the statistical distortions are factored out of Switzerland’s current account balance, it shows a savings surplus, which in light of the demographic developments and a well-financed pension system is entirely justified. Third, the size and development of the current account balance in Switzerland are driven by two industries whose net exports are relatively insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations and whose importance for the current account is considerably larger than it is for the economy as a whole.

Liquidity needs to be deployed and invested to generate returns. As the liquidity pool increases, financial institutions should capitalise on this and develop the range of renminbi money, bonds and equity products, which can leverage on the RQFII access. The impact of the Chinese economy on Asia, including Malaysia has been significantly broadbased and encompassing. Financial linkages with China have strengthened. China’s financial markets, already among the world’s largest markets, will be home to a growing number of global Chinese multinational companies with global outreach. The strong interest and commitment to infrastructure building and financing will be a long term theme that will shape Asia and China’s presence in the global markets. There are huge potential that lies ahead and we must be ready to tap the opportunities in all these initiatives. Our financial institutions, corporations and businesses should work together to ensure the readiness of our businesses and economy to keep up with the developments and capture these opportunities. With this, I wish you will have a fruitful discussion and insightful conference today. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
An over-sized and lightly-regulated financial system not only fed on these excesses but actively supported them. And government expenditures had been set on a clearly unsustainable course, based on the false assumption that very high tax receipts stemming from the booming housing sector and exceptional real growth where a lasting feature of the Irish economy. For example, from 1998 to 2010 nominal public wages per government employee increased by more than 90%, significantly outpacing public wage increases in most other euro area countries by 40 or more percentage points. Only Greece saw larger increases than Ireland. 2. The adjustment process  As anyone who has ever undergone the grinding process of recovering fitness will attest, the process can be long and painful. And so it has proved. Domestic demand has shrunk. This was unavoidable as both public and private spending had increased to levels well above the sustainable productive capacity of the economy. Unemployment has strongly increased. Programme milestones I would identify three major milestones of the macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment programme:   2  First, a return to growth, already in 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches    Second, the progressive return to market funding well in advance of the end of the programme in 2013.   Third, reaching a fiscal deficit of 3% in 2015.

I understand the strong desire of the authorities to minimise the costs associated with the banking sector rescue, including costs incurred to date, and those still to come. Let me make some comments in this area. When the programme for Ireland was designed, the costs of the banking sector measures already in place, including the promissory notes, were fully factored in. The annual cash repayments of promissory notes is thus financed by programme resources. That programme is on track. Any deviation from that programme should be considered very carefully indeed. The perceptions that have built-up around Ireland’s successes in the programme should not be jeopardised. It has been hard-won and it is worth fighting for. Therefore, the ECB remains of the opinion that Ireland should honour its commitments stemming from the promissory notes, as foreseen. This in our view is the best way to regain sustainable market access. I frequently hear in the Irish debate the sense that the debt resulting from the bank rescue is not Ireland’s debt. I can understand this sentiment and how many people feel about this situation. But what must be understood, is that in the run-up to the crisis, insufficient domestic policies (banking supervision and economic policies) played a major role in excessive credit growth and risk management failures in the Irish banking sector, the bubble in the housing market and the loss of competitiveness. The ECB has no supervisory responsibilities, despite claims to contrary.
Today, we ask the European Commission and President Van Rompuy, who have been charged with this task, to put forward proposals that go as far as possible in this regard: we need to significantly enhance fiscal and economic governance in the euro area. 2  BIS Review 154/2010  Does global governance simply mean the convergence or merging of the approaches followed by the main international bodies? A lot of changes are happening in this regard: the IMF is in the process of reforming its internal governance, with emerging countries being granted more seats. The European countries have agreed to reduce their representation. With regard to the informal governance of the global economy and finance, the G20 has replaced the G7. This means that henceforth all the emerging countries as well as the industrialised countries with a systemic influence at the global level bear full responsibility for the governance of the integrated global economy. How do you envisage this governance developing in the medium and long term? Governance today is still founded on the notion of sovereign states in a “Westphalian” world, which does not correspond to the new governance needs of an integrated global economy. The big challenge right now is to speed up the move to a system of global governance that fits the new world that we have created over time, in particular over the past 20 years following the collapse of the Soviet empire and the conversion of large emerging countries to the market economy.

We foresee a transition period that will last until the end of 2018. Are you still worried about the capacity of certain countries, such as Ireland and Greece, to reduce their public debt levels? What is certain is that it is very important for all countries, and not just Ireland and Greece, to take measures to ensure medium-term fiscal stability. This is necessary in advanced economies, in the European Union in general and, of course, in the euro area in particular. A feature that is shared by the industrialised countries after the very significant recession triggered by the financial crisis is that they find themselves in a vulnerable fiscal position. The European Central Bank has always defended the Stability and Growth Pact, even when large countries such as France and Germany wanted to relax its rules. BIS Review 154/2010  1  The Federal Reserve System decided last week to inject massive amounts of dollar liquidity into the economic system, a decision which has the effect of reducing the value of the US currency. Has the currency war started? That is, of course, a totally inappropriate expression to use. There are two main topics that need to be tackled seriously. On the one hand, there is the relationship between the major floating convertible currencies of the industrialised countries, such as the dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound sterling.
The set of ongoing and near-term initiatives I just outlined are only the beginning and should be considered a bridge to a broader set of necessary changes to the regulatory framework in the United States and globally. I believe the severity and complexity of this crisis makes a compelling case for a comprehensive reassessment of how to use regulation to strike an appropriate balance between efficiency and stability. This is exceptionally complicated, both in terms of the tradeoffs involved and in building the necessary consensus in the United States and the world. It is going to require significant changes to the way we regulate and supervise financial institutions, changes that go well beyond adjustments to some of the specific capital charges in the existing capital requirement regime for banks. We have to recognize, however, that poorly designed regulation has the potential to make things worse. We have to distinguish carefully between problems the markets will solve on  BIS Review 74/2008  3  their own and those markets cannot solve. We have to acknowledge not just that regulation comes with costs, but that if not carefully crafted it can distort incentives in ways that may make the system less safe. And we have to focus on ways regulation can mitigate the moral hazard risk created by the actions central banks and governments have taken and may take in the future to avert systemic financial crises.

2  BIS Review 74/2008  But the U.S. economy and economies worldwide are still in the process of adjusting to the aftermath of rapid asset price growth and unsustainably low risk premiums. This process will take time. As we continue to work with other central banks to ease the adjustment now under way in the U.S. economy and globally, we are working to make the financial system more resilient and to improve its capacity to deal with future crises. We are working closely with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with banking supervisors in the United States and the other major economies, and with the U.S. Treasury to strengthen the financial foundation of the major investment and commercial banks. We have encouraged a significant increase in the quality of public disclosure. We have supported efforts that have brought a very substantial amount of new equity capital into many financial institutions. These efforts will help mitigate the risk of a deeper credit crunch. And even as the Federal Reserve has worked to mitigate the liquidity pressures in markets by implementing a new set of lending facilities, we have worked with the SEC and others to ensure that the major institutions are strengthening their liquidity positions and funding strategies. We are also initiating important steps to strengthen the financial infrastructure.