samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I would also add that we have now clearly outlined the sequencing of our normalisation: first a rise in key interest rates, which will not come until at least through the summer, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure sustained convergence of inflation towards our target – I shall come back to this later; then, and only then, after an extended period, a gradual reduction in the reinvestment of the stock of acquired assets. In my view therefore, we do not need to give additional guidance on the timing or other details of the process until next spring, when we could be more precise about the sequencing according to the latest economic data. Nor do I see any need at present to review the future operational framework of our monetary policy: because this question will only arise once we have actually achieved normalisation, and because the tools of our monetary policy are already well known. The range of tools was expanded considerably over the course of the crisis; we will no longer use them all once we have reached the "new normal", but it is in our interest to keep them all to hand. Clearly, our monetary policy will remain accommodative for as long as necessary to achieve our inflation target. 2 - A better understanding of the path of inflation Of course, our main focus remains price stability. In 2019, the fall in oil prices will have a significant downward impact on inflation.

Other major central banks such as the Fed and the Bank of Japan followed the example of the ECB, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, and also adopted the same 2% inflation target. This “conceptual convergence”2 is remarkable. Incidentally, even though exchange rates are not a monetary policy target, we should note that the euro traded at USD 1.17 on 1 January 1999 and at USD 1.14 at the end of December 2018, with an average rate of USD 1.21 between 1999 and 2018. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  With regard to our mandate, the results are tangible [slide 1]. During the 20 year period prior to the introduction of the euro (1979-98), average inflation in the euro area was at 4.9%, compared with only 1.7% during the 20 years that have followed. What’s more, better controlled inflation means lower financing costs as risk premiums are reduced. Interest rate differentials and sovereign spreads have consequently narrowed significantly [slide 2]. The France-Germany spread fell from an average of 1.9% between 1986 and 1992 – the period of the single market without a single currency, between the Single European Act and Maastricht – to 0.4% in 2017-18. The Italy-Germany spread has narrowed by 3 percentage points. If, theoretically, one of these countries wished to leave the euro, it would in all likelihood experience an immediate at-leastequivalent increase in its public financing costs as well as its private financing costs to households and businesses.
The volume and value of cheques returned unpaid on account of insufficiently funded accounts continued to decrease following the issuance of the directives on dishonoured cheques and direct debit instructions by the Bank of Zambia in the second quarter of 2010. The volume of unpaid cheques decreased by 15% to 4,202 (Quarter 2: 4,929). The public is advised to ensure that they have sufficient funds on their accounts whenever they issue cheques in order to avoid charges. Economic reform programme An IMF Mission was in Zambia from 2nd to 15th September, and 28th October to 3rd November 2010, to conduct the 5th Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. Overall, the mission was satisfied with the programme performance and reached agreement with the Zambian authorities on a set of macroeconomic policies and structural measures for the remainder of 2010 and for 2011. The policies and structural measures would pave the way for the completion of the Fifth Review of the ECF arrangement, subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board. 4  BIS Review 148/2010  Total disbursed poverty reduction budget support (PRBS) in the third quarter of 2010 amounted to US $ million from the World Bank. A total of US $ million mining tax revenue was received while the Bank of Zambia foreign exchange purchases from the market amounted to US $ million. Preliminary data indicate that the quantitative performance criteria under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement were observed as at end-September 2010 and that all structural benchmarks were generally on track.

Budget deficit for 2010 settled to around 3.0% of GDP, reduced by 52% compared to a year earlier. This deficit was funded mainly through the issue of domestic debt instruments. However, deficit financing was a novelty in 2010, with the issue of the first Albanian Eurobond. Its issue, at EUR 300 million, met a part of the public sector’s need for foreign currency and was accompanied by reduction in domestic borrowing. Current account deficit narrowed by 21.5% in 2010, to 11.9% of GDP. This was reflected in augmented private and public sectors savings. Increased exports as a result of invigorated foreign demand, depreciated exchange rate and improvement of trade terms over this period also contributed to it. Notwithstanding the improvement recorded in 2010, current account deficit remains high. As we have continuously stated, the Bank of Albania deems that compilation of structural policies to dampen the external economy misbalance should be a priority. Net flows in the capital and financial account recorded a decline by 11.2% in 2010, leading to current account deficit financing to 87.5%. Excluding privatisations, foreign direct investments were estimated at 9.3% of GDP and constituted the main source of foreign financing of the Albanian economy. Foreign reserve increased by about EUR 178.8 million and its stock of EUR 1.9 billion may cover 4.8 months of goods and services import.
9 For a recent discussion of these issues, see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2020/anna-sweeney-moodys-the-resilience-ofinsurers-in-a-changing-climate 10 For a recent central banker’s perspective on these points, including the case for establishing a global price for carbon, see the speech by Isabel Schnabel of the ECB at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200928_1~268b0b672f.en.html 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  that Mark Carney has called the ‘tragedy of the horizon’.11 But here, too, things are changing. Climate risk doesn’t seem so hypothetical or far off to those gazing at red skies over San Francisco, fleeing their burning homes in the Australian outback, baling out flooded villages in the UK, or contemplating big writedowns in the value of their businesses (as the boards of Ford, VW, BP and Shell, to name but a few, have done). Here, a combination of consumer action, government policy, and financial market pricing are bringing the future into the present. The final issue is the most prosaic, but perhaps also the most important from a financial markets perspective – and that is the historic absence of robust measurement. Measurement of how much pollution specific companies, their supply chains and consumer markets, produce. And measurement of the extent, and efficacy, of remedial action. While financial performance and risk is measured, and audited, to the nth degree, climate risk has historically been a void. What isn’t measured can’t be priced, traded or risk managed. This is perhaps where change has been most profound, as I will discuss shortly.

The measures needed to respond to these issues can only be effective at the European level. Not everything is working well in Europe and it begs a discussion. Italy, as a founding member of the EU and as the third economy of the euro area, needs to be part of it. What do you think of the proposals for reform made by Macron? I don’t want to comment on what the French President says. He has sparked a debate on the future of Europe, and every country should get involved. If European leaders focus only on domestic politics, this inward-looking attitude can only make Europe weaker. A return to the previous era of globalisation without barriers is unlikely, isn’t it? This is indeed unlikely. And that’s good news, since the reason we are experiencing problems today is that globalisation didn’t deliver on its promises. As Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa once said: “Those people who complain that we won’t get back to the pre-crisis path forget that it was the very path that led to that crisis”. We are currently undergoing a very disorderly transition and there is a temptation to turn to nationalist ideas, when one of the great successes to emerge in the aftermath of the Second World War was the creation of an international order based on trust. Change is needed; for instance, we were naive about opening up international financial flows.
These developments are symptomatic of profound changes in the global economy, as world growth has increasingly been powered by resource hungry emerging markets, and as financial markets in developed countries have taken off and, in the process, become more tightly linked to one another. I will talk about both developments, before coming back to discuss the outlook for inflation and growth in the UK, and the implications for policy. Financial crisis The crisis in financial markets last August was triggered by a slump in the US housing market. This, of course, is acting as a direct drag on US activity. Any slowing in the US  BIS Review 22/2008  1  economy stands to affect the UK in the traditional way, through influencing trade flows. The size of this effect will depend on how other trading partners are affected and how policymakers react. But the really striking feature of recent experience has been how the US housing crisis has reverberated through the highly integrated and sophisticated financial markets of North America and Western Europe. Six months after global securitisation markets seized up, in response to uncertainties about the scale and location of losses arising from rising defaults on US sub prime mortgages, some credit markets are still not trading at all, and others remain very illiquid. And each week seems to highlight some new dimension of the ensuing disruption to core financial markets.

As part of the Committee’s general efforts in recent years to enhance its relationships with supervisory agencies outside its member countries, the AIG has itself begun a dialogue with other supervisory agencies. In fact, based on the AIG’s early discussions, the Committee published a paper in August on the “high level principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord”. In this document, we reiterate our view that home and host supervisors will retain their traditional responsibilities in regulating internationally active banks under the New Accord. Nonetheless, the revised capital framework will require an even higher level of cooperation among supervisors. Let me mention areas such as the initial approval and validation of “advanced” approaches to credit and operational risk under Pillar 1; the supervisory review process under Pillar 2; and ongoing assessments of compliance with the requirements for the use of “advanced” approaches. Although supervisors must make practical arrangements to carry out these responsibilities, the Committee wishes to implement the New Accord in a manner that strengthens the quality of supervision across all countries. Moreover, we recognise the special role we can play in helping to ensure that all host supervisors, and especially those from emerging market countries, are able to supervise the local operations of foreign banks effectively. We will continue to work with emerging market supervisors and the World Bank and IMF, as well as with the Financial Stability Institute and others to exchange ideas on ways to strengthen the regulation of both domestic and internationally active banks.
By bringing together a new extensive set of quantitative data and survey responses from an array of global CCPs, clients and intermediaries, we were able to clarify the quantitative picture of the margin dynamics during the ‘dash for cash’. First, this revealed the scale of the shock on margin call. The total initial margin required by CCPs increased by over 70% (roughly $ billion) from the onset of the crisis to its peak in the ‘dash for cash’ period. Daily variation margin calls during the period of most acute stress in March 2020 were significantly higher than average flows observed between January and February 2020, increasing by over 500%, from around $ billion at the onset of the crisis to a peak of around $ billion. To put this into perspective US open-ended funds (OEFs), which represent around half of the global OEF market, saw a similar magnitude of outflows in March, at just under $ billion. Second, we identified significant dispersion in the size of initial margin increases across, and within, asset classes. The increases were most pronounced in exchange-traded derivatives (ETD) products and equity securities. Exchange-traded derivatives accounted for two-thirds of the total required across all asset classes, while initial margin collected by CCPs clearing cash equities increased by the most in relative terms (more than 300%). The differences we saw in margin dynamics across asset classes are partially explained by differences in the size of the shock experienced in each asset class.

James McAndrews: Modern recipes for financial crises Remarks by Mr James McAndrews, Executive Vice President and Director of Research of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, 4 December 2015. *  *  *  Original presentation is on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website: Slides (PDF). The author wishes to thank Tobias Adrian and Thomas Eisenbach for helpful discussions and comments on the text of the speech. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System. Introduction Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his first fireside chat on March 12, 1933, cogently explained the mechanisms that led to the complete collapse of the banking system in the United States earlier that month: “First of all, let me state the simple fact that when you deposit money in a bank, the bank does not put the money into a safe deposit vault. It invests your money in many different forms of credit – in bonds, in commercial paper, in mortgages and in many other kinds of loans. In other words, the bank puts your money to work to keep the wheels of industry and of agriculture turning around. A comparatively small part of the money that you put into the bank is kept in currency – an amount which in normal times is wholly sufficient to cover the cash needs of the average citizen.
Covid and the composition of spending Speech given by Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor, Monetary Policy  Bank of England webinar 12 January 2021  I’ve received helpful comments from colleagues at the Bank of England. I’d like to thank Cristiano Cantore, Rupert de Vincent-Humphreys, Pavandeep Dhami, Federico Di Pace, Riccardo Masolo, Silvia Miranda-Agrippino, Mette Nielsen and Carleton Webb for their help in preparing the speech. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Financial Policy Committee or the Monetary Policy Committee. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction  Good morning. Thank you for making the time to attend this talk. It is dispiriting to have to give it as we enter another national lockdown. But the mass vaccination programme now underway also provides genuine hope that this latest set of measures may be the last. And in the meantime, as far as the economic effects of the pandemic are concerned, we should take the opportunity to learn from what happened in 2020. In this respect I want to focus today on one particular aspect of the experience last year, namely the huge shifts in the pattern of consumer spending. Chart 1 is one place to start. It plots annual growth in GDP, from one fourth quarter to the next, against the same for retail sales1.

Rather than taking a “check the box” approach, organisations should implement an integrated and cross-discipline effort in order to adopt an enterprise-wide program of cyber risk management that is tailored to business objectives, while also maintaining a tolerable level of risk. By taking an integrated approach to the broad objectives of cybersecurity management, organizations can achieve these business and security-focused goals, while also achieving regulatory compliance in an effective and efficient manner. Ultimately, cyber resilience which is the ability to defend, respond to, and recover from a breach, should be the end goal for organisations. Although compliance is rightly prioritized in the highly regulated financial services industry, being compliant should be viewed as a result of having good security practices rather than as a check-the-box exercise that is expected to guarantee security. The focus should be shifted toward conducting good cyber due diligence and assessments, implementing proper detection controls, having effectively enforced third-party risk and insider risk programs and conducting testing such as red teaming in order to simulate the organisation’s response in the event of a serious attack. If such practices are implemented, organisations can stay ahead of industry regulations and embrace innovation, because their response to any new cybersecurity requirement is less likely to demand a dramatic overhaul of their current program. The world today is remarkably different from the world we were living 20 years ago. The world is fast converging in aspirations and ideals because of globalization and technology, and with that comes different risks.
My colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will provide further details on interest rate developments on the money and capital markets. Despite the low interest rates, mortgage growth has continued to weaken slightly in recent months. Notwithstanding this, imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets remain high. My colleague, Jean-Pierre Danthine, will discuss this in greater depth in his remarks. 1  2  In October 2014, Consensus Economics projected inflation expectations of 1.4% for the period 2020–2024; in April 2015, it put these at 1.5% for the period 2021–2025. Long-term inflation expectations are only surveyed on a half-yearly basis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  In light of the uncertainty regarding the future of Greece, the Swiss franc continues to serve as a safe haven currency. In trade-weighted terms, the Swiss franc is still approximately 12% higher than it was at the beginning of the year. Over time, negative interest rates on the Swiss money and capital markets should help to correct the overvaluation of the Swiss franc. The rise in long-term interest rates abroad has also led to a widening of the interest rate differential with these countries of late. As conditions continue to normalise on international financial markets, investments in other currencies should become more attractive; this, in turn, is likely to help ease the overvaluation of the Swiss franc. The slowdown we are now observing in the economy also suggests that the Swiss franc is very unlikely to remain persistently high. Monetary policy outlook I shall now move on to our monetary policy.

Thomas Jordan: Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy decision and assessment of the economic situation Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the media news conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 18 June 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) news conference. As usual, I shall begin by outlining the Governing Board’s monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation. This will be followed by Jean-Pierre Danthine’s presentation of our annual Financial Stability Report and Fritz Zurbrügg’s comments on financial market developments. After that, we will be happy to take your questions. Monetary policy decision Let me begin with our monetary policy decision. The SNB has decided to leave the target range for the three-month Libor unchanged at between –1.25% and –0.25% and interest on sight deposits at the SNB is to remain at – 0.75%. Negative interest rates in Switzerland make holding investments in Swiss francs less attractive and will help to weaken the Swiss franc over time. Overall, the Swiss franc is significantly overvalued. In formulating our monetary policy, we take account of the exchange rate situation and its impact on inflation and economic developments. We will therefore remain active in the foreign exchange market, as necessary, in order to influence monetary conditions. Our new conditional inflation forecast does not differ greatly from the one we presented in March.
Identifying and analysing factors that can give rise to financial imbalances is and will remain an important part of the Riksbank’s work. The Riksbank needs this analysis for several reasons. As I mentioned earlier, the Riksbank has responsibility for promoting a safe and efficient payment system. We must also understand if monetary policy risks contributing to financial imbalances arising. Moreover, a development of the economy that proves to be unsustainable will affect the way in which inflation develops and what type of monetary policy it is appropriate to conduct. The financial stability council will give us a forum where we can and shall openly present our analyses of financial risks and recommendations for supervisory measures. In the recent Monetary Policy Update our forecasts was based on no new macroprudential policy measures being introduced. But how will my view of a suitable monetary policy be affected if such measures are implemented? The answer depends entirely on the measures implemented and their effects. 10  The scenarios shown in Figure 7 should primarily be regarded as an illustration of the different alternatives. The repo-rate path there does not coincide with the one I have advocated at the monetary policy meetings. 11  The Riksbank (2013c). 12  A central element of uncertainty is how the repo rate affects the degree of household indebtedness. The Riksbank’s estimates imply that the debt ratio will increase when the repo rate is cut, but that the increase will be small.

But the large fluctuations in growth rates, capital flows and exchange rates are in themselves problematic and create uncertainty regarding economic developments in the emerging markets. A divided Swedish economy The Swedish economy is dependent on developments abroad, and of course has been affected by the financial crisis and economic downturn in recent years. In an international comparison, overall quantities such as GDP and employment have nevertheless developed well since the financial crisis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  However, behind the overall picture is a divide, where household finances in particular have been strong. Their disposable incomes have increased every year during and since the crisis (see Figure 1). Growth in consumption has also been good. Housing prices and loans to households have increased rapidly, probably partly due to strong households finances and an expansionary monetary policy (see Figures 2 and 3). Developments in the corporate sector have been weaker, which is reflected in weak growth in exports, low investment and only modest growth in loans to companies (see Figure 4).