samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At this stage we also saw the establishment of the National Shariah Advisory Council (SAC), the highest authority on Shariah matters related to Islamic Finance. A tax neutrality policy was introduced for Islamic financial instruments and transactions which has benefited our players, consumers and the development of Islamic finance as a whole. The policy, which was later emulated by many countries around the world, ensures neutrality to tax treatment between Islamic and conventional financial products and services, a move which enhances the attractiveness of Islamic financial products as competitive alternative to conventional banking. The most recent development of Malaysia’s legal infrastructure for Islamic Finance was the enactment of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009. Our Central Bank of Malaysia Act accords formal recognition to the dual financial system practised in Malaysia and our mandate to develop Malaysia as an international financial centre. The Act formally recognizes the SAC as being the highest authority on Shariah issues related to Islamic finance transactions, and the role of the SAC as a consultative body to the Malaysian judiciary system. Most critically, SAC’s rulings are binding on the courts and arbitrators. This referral system preserves the sanctity of Shariah rulings and the consistency in the interpretation and application of Shariah principles for Islamic finance transactions in Malaysia. For adjudication purposes, a dedicated judge in the commercial division of the High Court has been assigned to preside over litigated cases on matters relating to Islamic finance.

Towards this end, the legal practitioners should work together to create a network to foster its development. This might involve the setting up  4  BIS Review 102/2010  of a specific association of international groupings of Islamic finance legal practitioners working together towards harmonisation of practices at the international level. Thank you. BIS Review 102/2010  5
There is a tendency to loosen the country's traditionally strong fiscal stance, fuelling inflation and impeding market-based measures to reduce it, as fiscal expansion, among other things, increasingly conflicts with the global and regional trend of monetary policy tightening. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  It is, of course, worth noting the efforts of the Ministry of Finance and the current caretaker government in controlling the negative fiscal trend and achieving a budget deficit for 2022 within the nominal convergence criterion. Such a result, however, cannot be sustained without the adoption of a regular budget that is sufficiently disciplined, or in other words, guarantees the achievement of a budget deficit for this year and over the medium term firmly below 3% of GDP. Therefore, the solutions to the current problems in the process of joining the euro area can be sought along two lines: political consolidation and fiscal consolidation. By political consolidation I mean finding a sufficiently stable formula to form a regular government with clearly defined and broadly supported priorities, including, of course, the country's membership in the euro area. I hope the issue receives a sufficiently convincing response after the elections on April 2. Fiscal consolidation will be a logical consequence of political consolidation. It must provide strong enough guarantees, and not only within an annual but also within the medium-term horizon, for restoring the fiscal position of the country and fulfilment of the convergence criteria.

This certainly will bring new challenges for the BNB and commercial banks to deal with, as this will require changes to their timetables and the relevant calibration of the resources earmarked for this purpose. Let me sum up in conclusion. The current issues relating to inflation and the legislative programme must be considered in the wider context of the needed political and fiscal consolidation. Otherwise the measures in these spheres will remain sporadic and ineffective. The BNB and commercial banks have been systematically and consistently working on the issues within their competence concerning the euro adoption, but they are prepared to calibrate the tasks and the resources for their performance should the target date be changed. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
In ten weeks representatives of 196 countries will gather in Paris at the COP21 summit to consider the world’s response to climate change. It is governments who must choose whether, and how, to pursue that 2 degree world. And the role of finance? Earlier this year, G20 Finance Ministers asked the Financial Stability Board to consider how the financial sector could take account of the risks climate change poses to our financial system. As Chair of the FSB I hosted a meeting last week where the private and public sectors discussed the current and prospective financial stability risks from climate change and what might be done to mitigate them. I want to share some thoughts on the way forward after providing some context beginning with lessons from the insurance sector. 9  Few business leaders list climate change as a near-term pressing risk. See, for instance, PWC’s annual survey of CEOs (www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-agenda/ceo-survey.html) and the Bank of England’s Systemic Risk Survey (www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/srs/srs2015h1.pdf). 10  Even credit ratings typically only look out to 3-5 years. 11  For instance, IPCC (2014) Conclusion SPM 2.1 notes that “cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond”. The Stern review observes that “many greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, stay in the atmosphere for more than a century” (See The Stern Review of the Economic Effects of Climate Change (2006)). 12  The Cancun Agreement in 2010 committed governments to “hold the increase in global average temperature below two degrees”.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Climate change is the Tragedy of the Horizon. We don’t need an army of actuaries to tell us that the catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most actors – imposing a cost on future generations that the current generation has no direct incentive to fix. That means beyond: •  the business cycle; 9  •  the political cycle; and  •  the horizon of technocratic authorities, like central banks, who are bound by their mandates. The horizon for monetary policy extends out to 2-3 years. For financial stability it is a bit longer, but typically only to the outer boundaries of the credit cycle – about a decade. 10 In other words, once climate change becomes a defining issue for financial stability, it may already be too late. This paradox is deeper, as Lord Stern and others have amply demonstrated. As risks are a function of cumulative emissions, earlier action will mean less costly adjustment. 11 The desirability of restricting climate change to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels 12 leads to the notion of a carbon “budget”, an assessment of the amount of emissions the world can “afford”. Such a budget - like the one produced by the IPCC 13 – highlights the consequences of inaction today for the scale of reaction required tomorrow. These actions will be influenced by policy choices that are rightly the responsibility of elected governments, advised by scientific experts.
The changes that we have seen include action under both Pillars I and II of the Basel framework. The numbers I gave for minimum capital requirements (the change from £ to £ represent Pillar I. I mentioned earlier that Pillar II was not consistently or rigorously applied before the crisis. Between 2008 and today the Pillar IIA capital requirements for the major UK banks have risen from £ to £ This increase in capital required is additional to the impact of Basel III and the resulting increase in core capital requirements of around 7 times I set out above. The PRA’s approach to supervision emphasises the use of judgement on a forward-looking basis, and the use of Pillar II is evidence of that. A further important element of the new framework of supervision is so-called Asset Quality Reviews (AQRs), undertaken either by or at the request of supervisors like the PRA. AQRs are designed to assess the more structural features of loan books as well as their performance, including whether forbearance is being applied by the lender. The granularity with which AQRs are undertaken can vary with their purpose, but there is always a fairly high level of intensity in terms of the closeness of the inspection. In the best of all worlds, supervisory initiated AQRs should not reveal anything that isn’t already known. I will just say that experience shows that we are not there yet. Basel III requires more and better quality capital in banks.

The level of capital was therefore wrong – too little capital was required, and the appearance of strong economic conditions before the crisis appears to have provided a justification for even lower capital, under Basel II. What I have described was the application of the Pillar I element of the Basel regime, namely the minimum capital requirements on the common approach. As I noted earlier, Basel II introduced the three pillar approach, with the second pillar enabling supervisors to set additional capital requirements on a firm specific basis. The second pillar was however not consistently or rigorously applied prior to the response to the financial crisis. In 2008, the major UK banks had a Pillar II capital requirement £ (equivalent to 10% of then Pillar I capital requirement). In summary, the system was flawed both in terms of the definition of capital – the quality – and the quantity required to be held. The first step in response to the financial crisis was agreement in July 2009 to significantly increase capital requirements against market risk via the so-called Basel II.5 package – addressing the widely recognised undercapitalisation of risk in banks’ trading operations. Building on that improvement the next step, was the agreement on, and now introduction of,  2  http://www.bis.org/press/p060524.htm. 3  Data Source: The Banker and Bank of England calculations. Sample comprises: Deutsche Bank, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Barclays, Citigroup, UBS, BAML, BONY, Commerzbank, ING, JPM, LBG, RBS, Santander, State Street, UniCredit, Wells Fargo. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Basel III.
It is of course also possible that regulatory changes and levels of compensation have had some 1 significance for the rise in sick leave. The next diagram shows that if the figures for sick leave are divided up according to duration, it is mainly the long-term sick leave that has increased in recent years (see diagram 2). The number of persons who have received sickness benefit for one year or more increased by an average of 26.8 per cent during the period 1999 to 2001. One explanation for this development may be that the rules for qualifying for sickness pension, which is often preceded by 2 a very prolonged period of sick leave, were made more stringent in 1997. There are also studies that show a connection between changes in the levels of compensation for sickness or other rules in the national insurance system, and behaviour with regard to reporting sick. For instance, when the system of no compensation on the first day of sick leave was abolished and sickness benefit was raised in the 1980s, sick leave increased, and when the rules were made stricter and the benefits less generous in the 1990s, sick leave declined. Incentives connected with the interactions of unemployment insurance with sickness insurance may also play a part in the increase in the number of persons reporting sick.

Arthur Yuen: Welcome remarks - HKMA Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Technology Forum Welcome remarks by Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Regulatory Technology (RegTech) Forum (Excerpt), Hong Kong, 22 November 2019. * * * 1. First of all let me welcome you all to this AML/CFT Regtech Forum, which we intend to be the first in a series. 2. In particular let me thank everyone for the very positive response and participation of key stakeholders including the FinTech Association of Hong Kong, experts, academia, other regulators as well as our partners in government bureaux, Companies Registry, Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and Hong Kong Association of Banks. 3. Let me start with a question that speaks to why we are all here today: how effective are we, really, in our important role in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing? We all recognise the efforts of the banking sector over many years – and continuing today – in helping to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This has recently been praised by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which gave us a very good score card in its Mutual Evaluation Report on Hong Kong. 4. But, despite the mutual evaluation result, no system is perfect and most of the challenges we face – money laundering from fraud, tax crimes and corruption to name but a few – are global in nature.
Fraziali Ismail: Climate action in the Malaysian financial sector Keynote address by Mr Fraziali Ismail, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the International Greentech & Eco Products Exhibition & Conference Malaysia, virtual, 20 October 2020. * * * To date, there is a genuine buzz in global climate action. The Paris Agreement, with 197 signatories, provides a pathway for nations to step up their climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. The UK for example, is committed to a ground-breaking target of net zero carbon emissions by 2050. There is zero budget natural farming in Andhra Pradesh in India, the great pivot to natural farming in China, the wide spread adoption of electric buses in public transport urban fleets all over the world, including Malaysia. Seventy two central banks and supervisors around the world, including Malaysia have come together via the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) to pursue climate action. This coalition of the willing has initiated several initiatives such as identification of best practices on supervisory and macrofinancial dimensions of climate-related risks. The issue is clearly now being mainstreamed in discussions at international and state levels, among regulatory agencies, at board levels across industries, in schools, and the list goes on. But while the hills are covered, there are mountains ahead. Green financing is still lacking; green investments remain under funded.

This is part of the priorities of the members of the Joint Committee on Climate Change over the next 12 months to pave the way for the adoption of disclosure standards by the industry in the immediate future3. This will not only contribute towards lowering information asymmetry, but will also assist external stakeholders to hold financial institutions to account for their climate risk commitments. Leveraging Malaysia’s value offering – opportunities in sukuk  2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The capital market can play a critical role to address the financing gaps not only in green, but social and sustainable sectors. The SRI Roadmap for the Malaysian Capital Market issued in November last year aims to create a facilitative SRI ecosystem and chart the role of the capital market in driving Malaysia’s sustainable development. The sukuk market, which is a high growth segment in Islamic finance, has an important role in supporting the growth of the green technology sector. Malaysia continues to be at the forefront of green sukuk, which is the preferred mode of investment for those that prefer investments with a positive environmental impact. We can certainly tap into the sukuk market to fund activities or technologies that support a low-carbon and climate resilient society. Conclusion I am not asking us to reinvent capitalism at this conference – there is simply not enough time for that if we are to meet our Paris Agreement commitment!
The euro has experienced a similar episode recently. This situation seems to be about to correct itself, now that more and more signs point to a closing of the growth gap between the United States and continental Europe. Thus, the potential appreciation of the euro is more than ever a topical question. This potential clearly reflects the economic soundness, dynamism and strengths of the euro area, supported by the structural reforms under way. As these winning cards, if I may say so, are now materializing more and more clearly, I am confident that market participants will soon share our analysis. 5  BIS Review 52/2000

We have made constant and joint efforts so that the conclusions and recommendations left by ALSAI become a useful, guiding, helpful, and corrective tool. In view of the insofar experience, this combination is an essential component in the work of audit institutions. I have believed and still do believe that auditing is a key instrument, which serves to further perfecting public sector governance. The ALSAI has contributed and will continue to contribute to identifying various problems facing public institutions, divergences from legal and regulatory framework, with subsequent financial effects, and their correction, in accordance with legal requirements and international standards. Focusing on the future role of ALSAI, I am confident it will increase the contribution to perfecting the three main dimensions – oversight, analysis, and vision – of public governance. More specifically, •  With regard to the oversight dimension, the great dilemma is whether public entities are accomplishing their mission in detecting and preventing corruption;  •  With regard to the analysis dimension, the great dilemma is whether these institutions are making responsible decisions about economic policies, development programmes, operations and the achieved results;  •  With regard to the long-term vision dimension, the great dilemma is whether the right directions and future challenges facing auditors are properly determined.
In my view, the experiences of including indebtedness in the balance when making monetary policy decisions in Sweden are therefore not particularly positive. Swedish monetary policy leaning against the wind The Riksbank has recently been much clearer about how the risks linked to housing prices and household indebtedness have affected the monetary policy decisions.2 The risks have  1  The minutes of the monetary policy meetings in 2005 and 2006 show that the Executive Board took into account the then very rapid increase in household indebtedness and housing prices (see, in particular, the minutes of the monetary policy meetings in April 2005 and February 2006). At the monetary policy meeting in December 2009 I myself mentioned developments in household debt and housing prices as a reason for not cutting the repo rate. 2  In the summary of the Monetary Policy Report published in October 2012, it is explained that the repo-rate path “is expected to go hand in hand with households’ debt ratios not rising”. The introduction to the Monetary  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  been allowed to justify a higher repo rate than the prospects for inflation and resource utilisation would have indicated. Thus, one can say that the Riksbank has practised what is known in central bank contexts as leaning against the wind, to counteract a potentially harmful growth in debt.

On its part, the Bank of Zambia, working with several stakeholders, including Bankers Association of Zambia, has over the years made progress in modernising the payment system. The information technology which serves as a major platform for modern payment systems to operate has also advanced. These developments have set the stage for the development of innovative payment systems capable of serving consumers in a cost effective way. Further, the growth of the number of players as well as the increasing number of initiatives require a robust supporting legal infrastructure to govern the payment system. To this end, the National Payment Systems Act No.1 (NPSA) was enacted in 2007. The NPSA empowered the Bank of Zambia to develop and implement the national payment systems policy so as to promote the efficiency, stability and safety of the Zambian financial system. The Bank of Zambia thus designates players wishing to provide payment services such as money transfer services, mobile banking and other payment services. This process has strengthened the capacity of the BoZ to monitor transactions and to ensure that only safe and efficient institutions are allowed to provide payment services. Distinguished Guests, allow me to conclude by congratulating Ecobank Zambia Limited for the innovative products that we are launching today. We hope that our people can send and receive money conveniently, safely, and at a reasonable cost. I also wish to call upon all banks and financial institutions to emulate Ecobank by introducing such products which contribute to increasing access to banking services for the Zambian people.
And indeed, some stable coin issuers seek to lend their ‘stable value’ pledge maximum credibility by ensuring that their tokens are fully backed by bank deposits or banknotes in the anchor currency. The Facebook-affiliated Libra project has attracted a lot of attention in recent weeks. Libra can be classified as a stable coin, as its value is supposed to be kept stable against a basket of official currencies. Libra’s creators have sought to underpin this claim by fully backing their stable coin with a reserve of assets (including government bonds) in the relevant currencies. However, there is no guarantee that Libra will be converted – proportionally and at any time – into the currencies in the basket. Libra is thus its own unit of account and a private currency. Libra and the Swiss franc stable coin I mentioned earlier represent only a small part of the spectrum of possible stable coins. Irrespective of their precise structure, such stable coins share one core characteristic: they are pegged to stable currencies in order to minimise fluctuations in value. Stable coins therefore hold greater promise for widespread deployment as a payment instrument and store of value than today’s crypto tokens. This is why it is important that we analyse and classify stable coins rigorously from a regulatory and monetary policy perspective. First, on the regulatory front, it is essential that we are clear about the economic function of stable coins.

Yet, at around 1%, they are still close to the long-term average inflation rate. Interest rates, too, have remained very low across all maturities in the past few quarters. Mortgage rates have declined further, reaching a new low in October. Government bond rates have also fallen to new lows. My colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will discuss developments on the financial markets in more detail. Despite falling mortgage rates, mortgage lending growth slowed again. At the same time, real estate prices continued to rise. However, as in 2013, price momentum is weaker than in previous years. This suggests that the measures to contain developments on the mortgage and real estate markets are starting to have an impact. Yet the imbalances that have built up on these markets in recent years remain the same. It is still too early for an all-clear. The SNB will continue to monitor the situation closely. My colleague Jean-Pierre Danthine will discuss this topic in more detail in his presentation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Since the last monetary policy assessment, the Swiss franc has moved closer to the minimum exchange rate, and has thus strengthened against the euro once again. At the same time, both it and the euro have depreciated against the US dollar. Overall, the exportweighted real external value of the Swiss franc is virtually unchanged compared to last year, and thus continues to lie considerably above its long-term average. The Swiss franc is still high.