samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The FinTech Adoption Index for services offered by fintech organizations, divided into five broad categories – money transfers and payment services, financial planning tools, savings and investments, borrowing and insurance, indicates that money transfers and payment services are continuing to lead the fintech charge with adoption standing at 50% in 2017 and 88% of consumers anticipating of doing so in the future. This rapid rise in fintech organizations has posed many dilemmas: What are the benefits that fintechs bring to the society, on the one hand, and what are the risks that they create, on the other? Is it the end of banking or are banks going to team up with the newcomers? One of the main concerns in this regard is that while fintech companies increase financial inclusion, facilitate the access to finance and lead to more competitive markets, they can also be conducive to cutting costs and rising risks in the traditional banking segment. Against this background, the FinTech topic has received an increasing attention in the central banking community, including our central bank. We have been closely monitoring the fintech developments, evaluating the benefits and risks that they bring and trying to strike a right balance given the local context. An important step in this direction is the draft law on payments that is expected to provide impulse for new companies with innovative, but safe financial services.

Anita Angelovska-Bezoska: Workshop on fintech - opening remarks Opening remarks by Ms Anita Angelovska-Bezoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the NBRM Workshop on Fintech, Skopje, 28 May 2018. * * * Dear Mr. Jay Tikam, Dear colleagues, It is my great pleasure to open the NBRM workshop on a topic that has been attracting a rising interest by regulators, supervisors and central bankers, i.e. a workshop on fIntech organizations that, by combining new business models and innovative technology, gradually change the shape of the financial services segment. The main idea of this workshop is to become better acquainted with this rather new but very important topic. It has been organized with the support of the European Fund for Southeast Europe, for which we are thankful. Although in continental Europe, fintech companies account for just a small share of the markets for banking, payment services and asset management, still they are on the rise as they are rapidly entering the markets and competing with banks. According to Ernst&Young’s Fintech Adoption Index, one-third of the consumers utilize at least two or more fintech services and they are increasingly aware of FinTech as part of their day-to-day activities.
Accession of new Member States to the EU and EMU Twelve countries from central, eastern and southern Europe are currently negotiating accession to the EU. According to the calendar endorsed by the European Council, new accessions will take place as st from the 1 of January 2004. It provides further evidence, if such were necessary, of the attractiveness of the European framework, which has provided us with both political stability and economic progress for almost half a century. The accession countries have accomplished significant progress in stabilising and strengthening their economies and institutions. Observing the accession countries since the beginning of the nineties, we see the huge improvements that these countries have made, in barely 10 years, on the road towards convergence with the EU. Nevertheless, there is also a general agreement on the fact that the gap in terms of average GDP per capita between the accession countries and the euro area, although diminishing, still remains quite significant. On average, GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity is around 44% of that of the euro area, while in terms of current exchange rates it is only around 22%. The size of the gap, combined with the limited growth differentials between the two groups of countries, suggests that the process of real convergence will be very gradual and will have to continue far beyond the tentative dates for EU accession.

But consumers have to be vigilant, companies and retailers must remain responsible as regards price setting, and competition will play its part in lowering the prices in the short-to-medium term. ·  Second, we must closely monitor the risks of counterfeiting of notes and coins : the communication campaign of the Eurosystem “The euro. Our money” was aimed at familiarising all the European citizens with their new banknotes and coins (and their security features) and, by doing so, it helped them to easily identify the obviously fake banknotes. All institutions concerned, both national and European, are co-operating closely to prevent and fight counterfeiting. The credibility of the Eurosystem and of the single monetary policy, and the successful changeover to the euro are a major achievement. They certainly contribute to the efficient functioning of EMU and to European economic and financial integration, as I will explain now. *  *  *  EMU is a balanced concept fostering economic and financial integration EMU is an economically sound and well-grounded concept The usual criticism … A few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great number of sceptics, in Europe as well as in the rest of the world, that the euro would really be launched. The opinion that the single currency would never exist has of course been disproved by the facts. Nevertheless, objections are still being raised from time to time, on the alleged grounds that the euro area economy is full of major inconsistencies that could endanger and challenge the viability of EMU.
I will take up a number of these measures a little later on. It is also fairly simple to see how inflation relates to the set target, but it is much more difficult to gain an impression of what the target for resource utilisation should be. We express the inflation target as being that the annual change in the CPI should be two per cent, but we do not have an equally well-defined target for resource utilisation. Instead, we usually say that we endeavour to reduce the fluctuations in the real economy. BIS Review 66/2009  1  Resource utilisation is important in a monetary policy context for two reasons. Firstly, it is related to important targets in economic policy, such as a high GDP, a high level of employment and low unemployment. The economic recession we are now experiencing means that GDP will fall by around 4.5 per cent this year, that employment will fall by almost 300,000 persons in three years, and that unemployment will reach approximately 11 per cent in two years’ time, all according to our most recent forecasts in April. The expansionary monetary policy we are now conducting is thus partly motivated by an aim to limit the depth of the recession. Secondly, resource utilisation is important because it is an indicator of future inflationary pressures. But a difficult question is how resource utilisation co-varies with inflation. My impression is that the connection between resource utilisation and inflation has been weaker over the past two decades than it was before.

In this respect, at the international level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) decided to delay by one year (from 2022 to 2023) the implementation of Basel III. In the accounting sphere, certain aspects relating to how the existing regulations should be applied to calculate credit risk have been clarified, to ensure that potential temporary delays  2  in loan repayments by borrowers are not treated as if they were a case of permanent impairment of loan quality. The authorities have also ruled that institutions may make effective use of their available capital buffers to absorb unexpected losses. It was further announced that institutions will have sufficient time to subsequently restore any capital buffers used. In addition, financial authorities have recommended that institutions temporarily eliminate dividend pay-outs and apply prudent criteria in their variable employee compensation schemes, so that they may channel their resources into shoring up their capital positions. All in all, we can say that this response from the prudential authorities, accompanied by the fiscal and monetary policy measures adopted, has enabled the initial impact of the shock to be absorbed. It has prevented the materialisation of a systemic risk in the financial system that would have exacerbated the crisis and made it more persistent. What about the current situation? We are living a recovery that is still partial, full of uncertainty and uneven, both at the country and sectoral level.
I quote: “The surge in lending over the past two years is a cause of concern both for financial stability and the Central Bank’s inflation target … Lending by the credit system as a whole increased by 16% in real terms last year.” Unfortunately these cautionary words had no effect, because on top of the 16% increase in lending in real terms in 2004 came a further 25% increase in lending in real terms in 2005. This must be changed. The Board of Governors of the Central Bank has held productive meetings with leaders of the banking sector to discuss this question among others. Statements have been issued in these meetings boding a more cautious approach in the future. The Board of Governors has no reason to doubt the integrity behind these promises. However, lending has continued to grow in the first months of this year, and at a faster pace than in 2004. The difference in practice is explained by the time it takes to clear promised loans which are in the pipeline. The Central Bank still has faith that these planned improvements will materialise, since a great deal is at stake. In his address last year that I quoted from, the former Chairman of the Board of Governors also said that changes in their activities and strategies have left the banks more exposed to shocks originating in foreign markets. Recently we have seen instances of this.

I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 19/2010
And while central banks no longer seek to spring surprises on the market, our community could not rule them out if circumstances were to evolve where the market misperceived the implications of a central bank’s analysis of the outlook. But perhaps the most important point for the pricing of risk in capital markets is the following. To the extent that a structural story of some kind holds true, the consequent reduction in risk premia, and the associated rise in asset prices, would broadly be a one-off – even if drawn out. In other words, it would not be sensible for market participants both to place weight on the argument that risk premia were lower because there was fundamentally less risk, and at the same time to extrapolate ex post returns on assets into the future. Headline returns would be lower than in the hypothesised ‘old world’ when risk premia were higher; and would be a lot lower than during the period when risk premia were falling to a new, lower level (Diagram A). This may not be completely idle speculation in a market environment where, anecdotally, fund managers have been chasing returns. And, of course, to the extent that past returns have in degree been extrapolated into the future, the effect might be an over compression of risk premia. That has to be for you and other market participants to judge.

Responsible investment is an integral part of the investment strategy and includes the exclusion of companies on an ethical basis. In 2016, the Ministry of Finance, at the request of the Storting, introduced two new criteria for ethics-based exclusions: a climate criterion and a coal criterion. Norges Bank has conducted extensive research to collect data and perform analyses to identify the companies that fall under the coal criterion. Based on the results, the Executive Board decided to exclude 69 companies and place 13 companies under observation in 2016. On the advice of the Council on Ethics, the Board also decided to exclude a further eight companies and place one company under observation, while the exclusion of one company was revoked. The exchange of information and division of responsibilities between Norges Bank and the Council on 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Ethics functions smoothly. At the end of 2016, Norges Bank submitted a recommendation to the Ministry of Finance to increase the share of equities in the GPFG. Historically, equities have generated a higher return than bonds, but the return has also been more volatile. A lower return on bonds is the price we pay to dampen fluctuations in the fund’s value. In recent years, bonds have become a more efficient, but also more costly, hedge against security market volatility. Both factors suggest that the bond allocation should be somewhat lower. In addition, Norway’s petroleum wealth as a whole has become more diversified over the past ten years.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Chart 1 Most money held in bank accounts,  Chart 2 Value of bitcoin is very  not as physical cash  volatile  Sources: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2015)19 and Bank of  Source: http://blockchain.info. England  Chart 3 Fractional reserves: Commercial banks’  Chart 4 Central bank holds only liquid assets  liquid assets smaller than deposit liabilities  Source: Bank of England  Source: Bank of England Annual Report 2015  19  From 1997 total money holdings in the UK are given by notes and coin in circulation with the non-bank public plus the sum of households', PNFCs ' and non-intermediate OFCs' deposits (M4x). Prior to 1997 total money holdings are given by total M4 excluding repos and other short-term paper. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: CBDC important when it competes with existing deposits Increased participation NBFI  All firms  Whole economy E-cash Payment of interest, increasing provision of banking services  Closer substitute for deposits  Full-service accounts at CB  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11

At the moment, the disruption of the global value chains globally and the growth of costs are creating interruptions in certain industries and are one of the major risks to the expected economic recovery. Hence, timely monitoring of all risks and their timely identification is a current priority, in order to reduce the burden on the banks' balance sheets. According to the latest EIB survey, some of the banks in the wider CESEE region expect a certain increase in nonperforming loans in the period ahead. Upward shifts are also possible in our country, but for the time being the stress tests show sufficient resilience of the banking system, in conditions of a strong regulatory framework, cautious behavior of banks and signs of economic recovery. The central bank's policy is currently relaxed, thereby contributing to favorable conditions of financing and economic recovery, in circumstances when we have enough comfort in the foreign reserves to respond to possible shocks. Of course, given the uncertain environment, we constantly and carefully follow the trends of all indicators, relevant to the monetary policy. At the moment, almost in all countries, the growth of savings increases the sources of funding for banks and their capacity to support the economy, especially at the points that will meet the new post-pandemic requirements and will increase the growth potential. The transition to a green economy is undoubtedly one of the issues that with the pandemic has moved from the margins to the core of priorities.
References Central Bank of Chile (2003), Modelos Macroeconómicos y Proyecciones del Banco Central de Chile 2003, Santiago, Central Bank of Chile, available in http://www.bcentral.cl/publicaciones/politicas/polit05.htm. Central Bank of Chile (2007), La Política Monetaria del Banco Central de Chile en el Marco de Metas de Inflación, Santiago, Central Bank of Chile, available in http://www.bcentral.cl/publicaciones/politicas/polit07.htm. Bernanke, B. (2008), “Challenges for Health-Care Reform”, speech at the Senate Finance Committee Health Reform Summit, Washington, D.C. Blinder, A. (2004), The Quiet Revolution: Central Bank Goes Moder, New Haven, Yale University Press. Blinder, A., M. Ehrman, M. Fratzcher, J, De Haan and D-J Cansen (2008), “Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence”, ECB Working Paper, No. 898, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Literature. Caputo, R., M Núñez and R. Valdés (2008), “Análisis del Tipo de Cambio Real en la Práctica”. Economía Chilena, april, pp. 61-91, available in http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/revista-economia/2008/abr/v11n1abr2008pp61-91.pdf. Corbo, V. and A. Tokman (2007), “Latin America in a Global World: Challenges Ahead”, Central Bank of Chile, Documento de Política Económica No. 19. De Gregorio, J. (2008), “El Crecimiento Económico de La América Latina: Del Desencanto del siglo XX a los Desafíos del XXI”, El Trimestre Económico, Vol. LXXV (1), No. 297, pp. 4-45. Ehrman, M. and M. Fratzscher (2008), “Purdah. On the Rational of Central Bank Silence Around Policy Meetings”, ECB Working Paper, No. 868. Greenspan, A. (1998), “Income Inequality: Issues and Policy Options”, speech at a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.

BIS Review 92/2008  5  of the speaker. Some of my presentations are not accompanied by a written speech in which case your job is to pick up on the fundamental messages and my job is to know how to best transmit them. Our communications policy requires a fluid relationship with the press. We can hardly amplify our messages if we do not have access to the media. We have a Communications Manager who advises the Bank’s board members and executives on the intricacies of this relationship with the press. It is a complex relationship because it has to be carried on within the limitations imposed by the fact that we are a technical institution and our messages are highly sensitive for the market and for the general public. One principle we rigorously uphold is that all information that is the product of a Board decision or resolution is communicated simultaneously, which means that no media channel can obtain a scoop. There are strict internal rules on this matter and all contacts with Bank executives and staff must go through the Communications Management before following the corresponding course. We are not prolific in giving interviews, statements or press conferences. We speak little, maybe less than the press would like and, although some of you might disagree with me, we try to maintain equanimity in our dealings with the media.
The situation was especially dire in the foreign exchange swap markets, and an acute global dollar shortage became a fact. Banks around the world had severe difficulties refinancing their foreign assets. It was against this backdrop that the Icelandic banks faced illiquidity. A number of other banks would probably have met the same fate if governments all over the globe had not made broad-based rescue efforts. The future will probably reveal just how close the global financial system was to complete collapse during those weeks. But the scope of governmental measures is unprecedented. They involved a dramatic increase in domestic liquidity facilities from central banks; new currency swap agreements between the US Federal Reserve Bank and other central banks, and expansion of existing swap agreements; direct lending to banks from various countries’ foreign exchange reserves; expanded deposit insurance schemes; government guarantees of deposits and wholesale financing; and capital injections. BIS Review 136/2009  1  Rescue efforts were also carried out in Iceland in connection with the banks’ failure. They were somewhat different in nature, however, as the Icelandic authorities did not, on their own, have the resources to rescue the banks, and international support was not forthcoming, even though it could be argued that the three banks concerned were systemically important because of the possibility of a domino effect throughout Northern Europe in the event of their collapse.

Már Guðmundsson: Rebuilding after the financial crisis Statement by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, for experts and journalists on the occasion of publishing of the Central Bank of Iceland’s Financial Stability Report, Reykjavik, 30 October 2009. *  *  *  Early in October 2008, nearly nine-tenths of Iceland’s banking system collapsed when its three large commercial banks – Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing – were taken into special resolution regimes on the basis of the emergency legislation that had just been passed by Parliament. This collapse has caused the entire Icelandic nation economic hardships, which came on top of those caused by the difficult but inevitable adjustment already underway after the overheating and macroeconomic imbalances that characterised the period from 20052007. The crash amplified the contraction in production and employment and aggravated households’ and businesses’ debt problems. The failed banks had their headquarters in Iceland and were majority-owned by Icelanders. But in order to better understand the chain of events, it is important to bear in mind that the banks were only partly Icelandic, in that a large share of their activities took place overseas. For example, about 60% of their lending was to non-residents and about 2/3 of their deposits denominated in foreign currency. It was these international operations and the size of the banks relative to Iceland’s GDP that ultimately proved to be their Achilles heel.