samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The decision that had to be made then was how best to design monetary policy to cope with the transition from a high to a low-inflation economy while, at the same time, creating suitable conditions for returning to a fixed exchange rate regime. CPI was deemed to be the best known measure of inflation and this was one reason why it was very suitable in a situation where confidence in stable prices was to be attained. An inflation rate of two per cent was considered to be well in line with inflation in the rest of the EU and this was adopted to create a basis for stabilising the nominal exchange rate of the krona in relation to the European currencies. By monetary policy strategy I mean the entire framework used to comply with the ultimate objective that monetary policy is intended to achieve. Besides operationalising the target, this concerns, for instance, how the system is to be designed to enable the central bank to influence interest rates and how open and clear monetary policy is to be. It is also about taking decisions on any intermediate objectives and the time horizon in which fulfilment of the objective is to take place. The decision on monetary policy strategy fundamentally rests on conceptions of how the mechanisms operate that permit the central bank to determine the value of money – what is known as the transmission mechanism. For the most part, however, there is little knowledge of these very complicated mechanisms.

Eva Srejber: The transmission mechanism Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Umeå University, Umeå, 15 May 2001. *  *  *  The Riksbank has a statutory duty to maintain price stability. However, it has the power to decide how to operationalise monetary policy and the monetary policy strategy that is to guide the monetary policy decisions. In the annual assessments of the performance of the Riksbank made by the Riksdag Finance Committee, both the objective and the strategy adopted have won acceptance. Monetary policy is governed by an inflation target expressed as the annual rate measured by CPI is to be limited to 2 per cent with a tolerance interval of ± 1 percentage point. However, the decision to define price stability as a reduction in the value of the krona by two per cent per year in relation to the basket of goods and services consumed by Swedish households is by no means self-evident. In principle, another rate of price increases, other weighted combinations of goods and services, financial assets or currencies could serve as the anchor in relation to which the value of the krona is to be kept stable. When the inflation target was adopted in 1993, conditions did not favour a return to any form of fixed exchange rate.
for the supervision of banks, insurance companies, securities trading, payment systems, accounting and auditing, corporate governance and money laundering. These standards were established to create a joint foundation in all countries that will form a basis for safe and efficient financial systems. The IMF and the World Bank have assumed the task of evaluating the extent to which the countries fulfil the requirements according to these standards and also to assist them in addressing the shortcomings that are found. So far over 60 countries, or one-third of the members of the IMF and World Bank, have been assessed. In addition, many countries have performed "self-assessments" voluntarily. The increased implementation of international standards is a very positive development as it demonstrates that the countries are genuinely striving to improve their regulations and supervision and thereby also the financial systems. It is not only beneficial for the countries themselves but also for the international community, as it makes it possible to avoid the weaknesses that can otherwise spread in the international network The development of regulations through, for instance, the EU as well as other initiatives including a new, major currency in Europe will help enhance the efficiency of the financial and capital markets. It will affect mortgage institutions primarily in terms of their borrowing costs. As a third point, I would like to mention the balance sheet adjustments that have followed the share price bubble and which have been having an impact in the financial markets.

Challenge 3 - The effect of balance sheet adjustments In the wake of the fall in share prices, we have thus far seen the effects on housing finance in the form of low interest rates, which have enabled households to increase their indebtedness at a slowly rising interest ratio. As the interest ratio has risen marginally, this in turn has led to a continued increase in residential property prices in several countries, including Sweden. The lower expectations of future earnings that have resulted from the stock market decline has so far not markedly reduced housing finance demand in Sweden. Thus far, the effect of the low interest rates appears to be the dominant factor. As the balance sheet adjustments come to an end, the geopolitical uncertainty abates and the economy continues to recover, risk aversion will decrease, which in turn will lead to a normalisation of market rates. Consequently, this will dampen household demand for housing finance. On the other hand, expected earnings flows will rise in tandem with the rise in economic activity. The ability of mortgage institutions to find "cheap" financing will also be affected by the normalisation of interest rates. Investors will return to riskier investments as risk aversion declines. Furthermore, rises in long-term interest rates will reduce the value of the bond holdings that were acquired by investors during the current risk aversion period. Consequently, mortgage institutions will face challenges in the time to come on both the demand and supply sides.
That includes adopting correctly aligned macroeconomic and macroprudential policies, leaning into the wind by buying part of the inflows into foreign exchange reserves and, in the limit, deploying selective capital inflow management tools. The FX risks of banks and private sector entities need close monitoring and prudential limitations. Third, the design of the financial sector in small, open economies: The financial sector has to be smaller than it has been in countries like Iceland, and international activities must be restricted as long as such countries are not part of a credible multilateral safety net. The idea of building international financial centres in countries like Iceland and Ireland is dead – for the time being, at least – as it is not safe under the current framework. Fourth, the EU framework for cross-border banking: It was very much this framework that facilitated the cross- and off-border expansion of the Icelandic banks through the so-called European passport. It was and is deeply flawed, and it contributed in a significant way to both the Icelandic banking crisis and the crisis in the eurozone. The basic problem is that the freedoms are not matched by public action and frameworks at the EU and EEA level. Bank size relative to country size was tacitly assumed to be a matter of no concern, and FX risk was largely ignored.

First is Patrick Honohan, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, who took office in September 2009 and has played a key role in dealing with the crisis in Ireland. Then we will hear from Geir Haarde, Prime Minister of Iceland in the autumn of 2008, who oversaw both crisis management during the banking collapse and the design of the economic programme with the IMF. Our final speaker is Franek Rozwadowski, who until recently was the resident representative of the IMF in Iceland. It is well known, both in this country and among scholars of the international financial crisis around the world, that almost 90% of Iceland’s banking sector failed in the first week of October 2008. What is probably less well known is that at that point, Iceland was already on its way into a recession after an unsustainable boom and serious overheating during 2005–2007 and a currency crisis in the first half of 2008. The banking collapse and the associated wealth loss and further currency depreciation made the recession significantly worse, of course, as did the recession that hit the global economy in the fourth quarter of 2008. That autumn, two separate but interrelated sub-stories of the recent Icelandic saga converged in a tragic grand finale. These are: 1. Iceland’s boom-bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open, and financially integrated economies. This is a story that has played out many times around the globe, and many of its elements have been seen before in Iceland.
Ravi Menon: An economic history of Singapore – 1965–2065 Keynote address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore Economic Review Conference 2015, Singapore, 5 August 2015. *  *  *  It is always wise to look ahead but difficult to look further than you can see” – Winston Churchill. Everything about the future said here is pure imagination. It does not represent in any way a forecast or projection by MAS or by me. My intention is merely to paint a plausible scenario for Singapore. I can only be sure that someone reading this in 2065 will view it as totally lacking in imagination or realism or both. Professor Euston Quah, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. This year, Singapore celebrates 100 years as an independent nation. The Global-Asian Economic Review, or GAER, is relatively young, at 25 years old. But the GAER comes from a long tradition that goes back to the very beginnings of Singapore. •  It began life as the Malayan Economic Review in 1956, was renamed the Singapore Economic Review in 1969, and took new birth as the Global-Asian Economic Review in 2040. •  As the leading journal on economic issues that lie at the intersection of the world and Asia, the GAER’s evolution has mirrored that of Singapore itself – starting life as part of Malaya, becoming independent, and then expanding its vision to become a Global-Asian entity limited neither by geography nor history.

6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  For the first time, these inflows exceeded the income repatriated abroad by MNCs operating in Singapore. •  Gross National Income (GNI) per capita became the more relevant measure of Singapore’s income and standard of living than just GDP per capita. The 2020s and 2030s saw the proliferation and convergence of several technological trends that transformed economies and societies globally. •  Rapid progress in digital and mobile technologies, coupled with advanced biometrics and global wi-fi access, made payments virtually costless and highly secure, precipitating an explosion in the growth of digital commerce and digital finance. •  Advances in cloud computing, big data analytics, smart sensors and learning machines transformed the provision of consumer and business services, including financial, legal, auditing, consultancy, and logistics. •  They also spurred a transformation in the provision of social and public services such as telemedicine, online learning, and congestion control, substantially enhancing efficiency and consumer welfare. Singapore was well-positioned for the pervasive digitisation of the global economy that occurred in the 2020s and 2030s, mainly due to two key initiatives that it embarked on in 2015 in the drive towards productivity-led growth: •  The first was the concerted national effort to build and deepen skills at all levels through extensive worker retraining programmes and subsequent introduction of the teaching of digital technology across the education system.
Øystein Olsen: Monetary policy in turbulent times Address by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME)/BI Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, 20 September 2012. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. Central banks the world over are now conducting monetary policy in what must undoubtedly be called turbulent times. My address today will focus on how and why new tools of monetary policy are being deployed internationally and our response to these developments here in Norway. The economic situation in Norway is quite different from that of surrounding countries and we have been able to operate within the established monetary policy framework. Chart: GDP growth Growth in the global economy has been weak since the 2008 financial crisis and has affected some countries more severely than others. Countries with large imbalances when the crisis began are now facing formidable challenges. The imbalances have been self-reinforcing. Higher pricing of risk has resulted in increased yields on the government bonds of countries with a high level of debt. Fragile government finances have become even weaker. A decrease in the value of government bonds has also generated uncertainty concerning the position of banks. Banks have had to consolidate their balance sheets and have curtailed lending to firms and households, amplifying the decrease in economic activity. Heavily indebted countries are now working to make banks more robust and strengthen government finances. Cost competitiveness must be restored.

Using balance sheet policy, the central bank seeks to influence longer-term interest rates and thereby funding costs in a more direct manner. 3 Purchases of government or private sector bonds are intended to depress yields and push up securities prices – the so-called portfolio effect. 4 Studies from the past three or four years indicate that the portfolio effect has been in operation in both US and UK markets – bond prices have increased and long-term yields have fallen as a result of quantitative easing. 5 The aim is to achieve lower long-term yields in order to boost lending and investment. In addition to the portfolio effect, the new use of the balance sheet can have a signal effect: central banks that engage in large-scale purchases of securities to pull down long-term yields are sending a signal that the key rate may be kept low for a long period. In this sense, balance sheet policy also contributes to anchoring expectations and supporting monetary policy communication. It is not easy to say what the situation would have been without these measures. However, it is likely that central bank bond purchases have curbed the decline in output in the UK and the US. Chart: Central bank balance sheets, stylised These measures, by their nature, have an impact on central bank balance sheets – in terms of both size and composition. 2  See the Federal Reserve’s “Monetary Policy Report to the Congress”, February 2012, http:// www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mpr_20120229_part1.htm.
Another method of raising potential growth would be to invest so heavily that the productivity of the labour force increased sufficiently to allow one worker to support one pensioner in the future. Capacity for renewal To summarise, much has changed recently in the Swedish economy. The external framework is currently characterised by a substantial fiscal policy and monetary policy stability, which facilitates planning and decision-making for both households and companies. These fundamental conditions, together with a marked increase in openness to the world around us, give reason to believe in a continued favourable development in productivity. At the same time, one should remember that many markets in Sweden still show clear signs of poor competition. This involves considerable costs. I believe that the Swedish economy has considerable unutilised potential for stronger development if we concentrate on this, i.e. how we shall increase the "speed limit" in the economy. It is not enough to have good macroeconomic conditions; a policy for growth is concerned more with microeconomics than macroeconomics. It is a question of creating good incentives for individuals and people to behave in a rational social manner in their roles as economic agents. What is profitable and attractive behaviour for the individual should also be profitable for the whole. This takes me into the field of politics, which is not part of the Riksbank's responsibilities. However, this is a field where I have been very involved in my previous career roles.

The high productivity figures in Sweden were partly connected to the rise in the telecommunications products industry, but a rise in total factor productivity has also been seen in other parts of Swedish trade and industry, mainly in the engineering and pharmaceuticals industries. Despite the fact that the importance of IT is now being played down, the extensive use of computers, networks and the Internet in Sweden will make a positive contribution to productivity. Efficiency gains should arise, for instance, when tax authorities, social insurance systems, municipal services, etc. move over to Internet-based self-service. The connection between IT use and internationalisation of trade and industry appears particularly strong, with increasingly advanced networks of specialised sub-contractors. It appears that the countries which had good productivity growth during 1995-2000, such as the USA, Finland, Australia and Sweden, all had trade and industry that opened up to international exchange more quickly than other OECD countries, parallel with an increase in IT use. Challenges The question is whether these improved conditions are enough to provide Sweden with stable, good growth over the next five to ten years. Can we trust that the problems of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are definitely over? Or are there other institutional or structural changes which the economy need to undergo? Some of the growth during the 1990s was probably a temporary effect of the economy making a recovery after having been so hard pressed at the beginning of the 1990s.
As a result of the Maastricht convergence criteria, the central banks of these countries were increasingly aligning themselves with the Bundesbank. Exchange rates between the affected currencies, as well as exchange rates to the Swiss franc, consequently stabilised. This phase of low exchange rate volatility continued in the years immediately following the launch of the euro. The most recent period of exchange rate volatility against the euro has its roots in the international financial and debt crisis, which rapidly evolved into a euro crisis. Doubts about the viability of some euro area member states’ sovereign debts caused markets to lose confidence in the euro. As in past crises, the mounting uncertainty triggered substantial upward pressure on the Swiss franc. Why Switzerland doesn’t have the euro Considering its close economic ties to the euro area, why didn’t Switzerland ever seriously contemplate joining the single currency? Politically and legally speaking, the answer is simple: a country can only join the Eurosystem if it is already an EU member state. Swiss voters and cantons rejected accession to the European Economic Area in a referendum in 1992, and in 2001 followed this up by voting against a popular initiative favouring a “Yes to Europe”. These decisions settled the question of whether Switzerland should join the EU for the foreseeable future. Quite apart from these political and legal factors, the economic case for joining the euro had always been weaker for Switzerland than for many other European countries.

Tarisa Watanagase: Thailand's weathering the global downturn Address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a Luncheon with EU Ambassadors, Bangkok, 3 February 2009. *  *  *  Your Excellency Ambassador Hotek, Excellencies, Honourable Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to join this luncheon gathering of prominent Ambassadors of the Council of European Union in Thailand, under the presidency of Ambassador Ivan Hotek of the Czech Republic. Indeed, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to Ambassador Hotek for his kind invitation for me to update Excellencies from the EU countries on recent economic developments in Thailand and the prospects for 2009. Let me begin with the overview of Thailand's economic performance. The Thai economic performance was satisfactory for 2008 as a whole. GDP is estimated to grow by around 3.6 percent, driven by the growth momentum during the first three quarters of the year. Notably, from October 2008 onwards, economic developments have been deteriorating. During the fourth quarter of 2008, exports weakened considerably, falling by 9.4 percent from the same quarter of the previous year. Since October, exports showed large reduction in manufacturing products, especially high-technology products. On the domestic side, demand as well as consumers' and investors' confidence have deteriorated as evidenced by several indicators reported by the Bank of Thailand, including the Business Sentiment Index, which fell to the lowest level at 34.4 in November last year.
The key elements are the National Reform Programs which cover, for each country, the commitments taken over a 3-years cycle as regards structural reforms. EMU, with a single monetary policy and 13 governments responsible for budgetary policies, requires an institutional fiscal framework. It has to be simple, easy to implement, and able to ensure that fiscal policies are sound and sustainable, to avoid free-riding behaviours as well as neo-ricardian effects. The most widely-discussed surveillance process, because it is the most binding one, is the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The Pact may be defined as the “users instructions” for the obligation, defined in the Treaty, for EU Member States, to achieve a medium-term budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus, while maintaining the ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) at within 3 % and the ratio of gross government debt to GDP at within 60 %. Member States which do not respect these ratios face an “excessive deficit” procedure which may lead the Ecofin Council to take a series of measures which range from simple recommendations to financial sanctions. In 2005, the European Council agreed to reform the SGP. The important role of the SGP in terms of budgetary discipline is confirmed. The reform sets out the criteria for the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure and allows for more leeway in the timeframe for correcting excessive deficits. It does not, however, diminish the binding nature or the efficiency of the Pact.

Two key pieces of legislation that were recently enacted to support these outcomes are the Credit Reporting Agencies Act 2010 and the Personal Data Protection Act 2010. The Credit Reporting Agencies Act 2010 governs the operations of private credit bureaus and provides for the development of a regulated and structured credit information sharing industry. The Personal Data Protection Act 2010 on the other hand regulates the collection, processing and handling of personal information for commercial purposes by data users and provides safeguards for the data subjects against the abuse of such information for improper or unauthorized purposes. The operationalisation of these laws are currently in progress and we look forward to a productive exchange of experience during the course of this workshop which will benefit our own efforts to build a conducive environment for the orderly development of private credit bureaus. Despite the compelling public benefits provided by credit registries, regulators face considerable challenges in educating consumers to appreciate how credit reports can help enhance their access to credit and improve the terms under which credit is provided. The role of regulators in public outreach is particularly important in the initial stages of building credit reporting systems to promote public confidence and wide participation. A common frustration that has emerged from the more pronounced emphasis on credit reports in lending decisions has been that access to credit increasingly depends on an individual’s credit history, and yet, one can only build a credit history if credit is granted.