samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In order to safeguard this informal, implicit independence, the CBT was established as, and still is, a joint stock company, in which the state and  BIS Review 57/2007  1  other local entities hold shares. This structure was by no means a coincidence, but of deliberate design aiming at minimizing government intervention. However, in today’s world, the relationship between ownership structure and central bank independence has become less significant. Nowadays, the most independent central banks are wholly state-owned and the central bank independence involves much more than just ownership. The early years of the establishment were the years in which autonomous functioning of the CBT was at the forefront. The central bank operations were respected and at times demand for short-term credit by the governments was then resisted. The outcome was low inflation. The basic aim of the Bank was to support the economic development of the country. To this end, the Bank’s main operational tools were to set rediscount rates, regulate money markets, execute the Treasury operations and take, jointly with the Government, all measures to protect the value of the Turkish currency. During and after the Second World War, central banking underwent drastic changes in the world in line with the gradual global economic and political transformation. The scope of the central bank’s mandate to manage and control the circulation of currency was extended. Its responsibility now ranged from issuing banknotes, functioning as a lender of last resort, achieving and maintaining low inflation to being the guardian of financial stability.

That is why we dropped 6 zeros from the currency during the implicit inflation targeting period. Meanwhile, economic agents adjusted to floating exchange regime and the short-term interest rates were set as the only policy instrument. And finally we established the Communication Department, which is a must for IT implementations. Having fulfilled the necessary groundwork, the Central Bank adopted fullfledged IT in 2006. At the beginning of my speech I said that the divorce between paper money and the gold was the reason for some countries setting up central banks anew and broadening the mandates of the existing ones. We must then ask why people are willing to hold and use paper money. This is a very important question, and the answer is they expect the future value of the money to remain stable because the future price level will remain stable. This is a matter of great trust. But to whom do the people trust? They trust to the body, which is responsible for the stable prices: the central banks. Therefore the bottom line of the inflation-targeting regime is the management of the expectations. If expectations are anchored to the target, wage earners and price setters will behave in such a way that, at the end of the period, the target will be reached. Then the question is, how can we anchor expectations? The answer is: by building credibility through delivering what is promised. Once this is achieved, the volatility in interest rates, inflation and output would be lower. How do we build credibility?
For the time being, bank profitability has only somewhat declined due to interest rate cuts, lower fees and higher provisions to weather such an adverse situation. However, it remains uncertain how the pandemic may affect credit portfolios in the most vulnerable sectors.8 It is therefore particularly important to monitor the portfolio quality indicators for the various Latin American banking systems, which in 2020 accounted for more than 50% of profits at Spain’s two largest banking groups, and which during the previous European sovereign debt crisis played a countercyclical role for the Spanish banking system. The worsening of the pandemic in Latin America since late 2020 points to heightened uncertainty in the short run. The next six months will be a race between new strains of the virus emerging and the vaccination campaigns, which in Latin America are progressing but gradually. Among the factors supporting the region’s continued recovery in activity is external demand, which may also benefit from new stimulus programmes passed in the United States and better price performances for certain commodities. The IMF forecasts GDP growth for the region of 4.1% in 2021, albeit again with notable differences across the economies.9 In the medium term, the crisis poses a series of significant risks and challenges, some global in scope and others more specific to Latin America. 7  Mainly credit support programmes, moratoria on payments by the most vulnerable borrowers and government guarantees.

These could be generated, for example, by a failure of a large and complex financial institution through payment and settlement  BIS Review 91/2001  3  systems and securities markets. We have also considered that the traditionally expressed arguments in favour of separating prudential supervision and central banking would not be very convincing in the specific euro area conditions. For instance, the concern of conflicts of interest with monetary policy and a lack of domestic accountability should not be overstated in our setting where monetary policy is centralised and supervision remains national. Still dispersed retail markets Despite the progress I have mentioned, the markets for retail financial services are still defined quite strongly along national, or even local, lines. In these markets, for instance, interest rates are based on local competitive conditions, as you know very well. However, this does not mean that there is no international competition. The fact that this Association has now existed for thirty years is a clear sign that financial institutions have already been international for a long time. Internationalisation of retail operations Until now, branches and subsidiaries abroad have been preferred to large-scale mergers as a strategy for entering foreign banking markets. The establishment of foreign branches and subsidiaries has increased steadily in the euro area. For example, the number of foreign branches of German banks in the European Union is now 59, almost double that of 1995.
Further information can be found online here: http://www.tnongroup.com/ 2 See Mark Carney https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/50-note-character-selection-announcement 1  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  It turns out the same thinking can be applied to a company’s workforce. Instead of equity capital you have human capital, and instead of investing in financial assets you are investing in people. A diverse portfolio makes a company more resilient, and so too does a diverse workforce - delivering better outcomes for individuals, communities and the company. As we look ahead, changes in society mean the workforce of the future will be markedly different from that of today. Recent surveys have found that just short of half of 18-24 year olds identify as something other than exclusively heterosexual or homosexual3, and a similar proportion of Millennials view gender as a spectrum4. These individuals are in and entering the workforce now. If we are to reflect the society we serve and in so doing attract the best talent, we need to make sure they know that they can bring their whole selves to work: that they belong. So the case for a diverse workforce is clear5. What many of us struggle with is how to attract, develop and maintain such a workforce. Unfortunately, diversity does not, in our experience, emerge organically at the workplace. It needs to be nurtured from recruitment to development and promotion. And it must be underpinned by an inclusive work environment for it to be sustainable.

Out and proud – a note-worthy cause Speech given by Sarah Breeden, Executive Director, UK Deposit Takers Supervision  LGBT The Network of Networks (TNON) breakfast, Bank of England 25 July 2019  I would like to thank Zane Jamal, Nick Strange and Eoghan McArdle for their help and assistance in preparing this speech 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  I am very pleased to welcome you all here to this cross-industry employee Network of Networks (TNON)1 event at the bank for banks that is more famously known as the Bank of England. Being a bank for other banks is just one of our roles. For many people, we are known best for printing Sterling banknotes. On that theme, I am sure that many of you are aware that just last week we announced that the new face for our next 50 pound note will be Alan Turing - father of computing and artificial intelligence, the basis of our modern economy, and a gay man persecuted for his sexuality2. The response to this news from the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender plus (LGBT+) community has been incredibly positive. Speaking personally, I was thrilled to hear it given my role as executive sponsor of the Bank’s LGBT+ and Allies network. Building on this positive momentum, I want to use my opening remarks today to set out what more we can do to support this community.
Although uncertainty has increased, and economic activity abroad so far has been slightly weaker, the Swedish economy has developed largely in line with the outline we sketched in July. Moreover, the repo rate is still low. Swedish banks are stable The Riksbank has two main tasks. The first is to conduct monetary policy with the objective that inflation shall be low and stable. The second is to safeguard financial stability. The Riksbank therefore closely monitors developments in the financial markets. During the summer we have extended out monitoring as a result of the international turbulence. Swedish banks are still financially strong. They currently have good access to funding on all of the markets they normally use. The Riksbank’s stress tests also show that they have a good capacity to manage increased loan losses. But as the Swedish banks obtain funding largely through market borrowing in foreign currency, they are of course vulnerable to problems abroad. We currently have daily contacts with the banks and we have access to data on their funding. So far, there is nothing to indicate that it will be necessary for us to lend money to the banks. Next decision is on 6 September We are currently working hard on new analyses and forecasts for the monetary policy meeting on 6 September. I have today attempted to outline events during the summer and the issues I consider we will discuss at our next monetary policy meeting.

The full implementation of this fiscal rule will contribute to a reduction in the risks to financial stability associated with fiscal volatility and commodity cycles. On the subject of the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy, the existing balance of risks allows for a gradual lowering of interest rates to take place, however monetary policy should still remain moderately tight. This is due to the need to maintain inflation at a level close to the target, and to reduce inflation expectations in the medium term, taking into account the internal risks and potential volatility of external factors. The steadiness of changes to interest rates, and the attendant high level of predictability in monetary policy, leads to a reduction in the risks posed to financial stability. 2) On capital flows and global risks For the most part, the situation in Russia reflects overall improvement in sentiment on global markets in the context of a revival in economic activity in the leading economies. We have begun to see clear signs that economic dynamics are being restored not only in the U.S., but also in the Eurozone, where the economic situation has been unstable for a long time. In general, the indices of economic activity PMI for both the leading economies and the global economy as a whole currently sit at 6-year highs. The upward swing of the economic cycle is gaining momentum. These conditions have led to increased optimism of global market participants and growth in capital inflow on the markets of emerging economies.
And to protect the system from risks we think are low but prove not, banks are subject to a simple, minimum leverage ratio, which is robust to model risk. Regulation has made banks less complex and more focused. Business strategies that relied on high leverage, risky trading activities and wholesale funding are disappearing, as intended. Trading assets have been cut in half, and interbank lending is down by one-third.38 Not least due to new global liquidity standards, banks have changed their funding models and now hold substantially more liquid assets relative to the liabilities that can readily run. In the UK, such contingent liquidity has increased tenfold since the crisis. An anti-fragile system requires ending Too Big to Fail. But higher capital and liquidity requirements are necessary but not sufficient. Banks must also be able to fail without systemic consequences. A decade ago, large complex banks operated in a “heads I win tails you lose” bubble. They privatised profits in the run-up to the crisis before socialising the losses when the music stopped. The complete loss of confidence in private finance that crystallised in the autumn of 2008 could only be arrested by public support over the following year that totalled $ trillion in bail-outs, government guarantees of bank liabilities and special central bank liquidity schemes.

Take synthetic credit derivatives, which were supposed to complete a market in default risk and thereby improve the pricing and allocation of capital. Financial alchemy appeared to have distributed risk, parcelling it up and allocating it to those who wanted most to bear it.11 However, the pre-crisis system had only spread risk, contingently and opaquely, in ways that ended up increasing it. Once the crisis began, risk quickly concentrated on the balance sheets of intermediaries that were themselves capital constrained. And with the fates of borrowers and lenders tied together via hyperglobalised banks and markets, problems at the core spread violently to the periphery. A truth of finance is that the riskiness of an asset depends on who owns it. When markets don’t clear, agents may be surprised to find what they own and for how long. When those surprises are – or are thought to be – widespread, panic ensues (Chart 3). 8  Such naïveté is striking given that evidence of disequilibria abounds in markets for goods and labour. In goods markets, there is ‘sluggishness everywhere’. Left to themselves, economies can go for sustained periods operating above or below potential, resulting, ultimately, in excessive or deficient inflation. Yet efficient market forces ‘should’ bring about changes in prices sufficient to equate demand with potential, leaving inflation as a purely monetary phenomenon. In labour markets, there is ‘rigidity everywhere’. Rather than fluidly adjusting to equate the demand for labour with its supply, periods of deficient labour demand can persist, sustaining mass unemployment and joblessness.
Economic statistics are the most important source of information, but they are published with a lag and some of the figures are revised frequently. In autumn 2002, Norges Bank established a regional network as a tool to gauge the level of activity in the Norwegian economy. The network consists of companies, organisations and municipalities throughout Norway. In the two rounds of talks in connection with Inflation Report 2/03, 450 contacts were interviewed. We will be having six rounds of talks each year with business and community leaders concerning financial developments in their enterprises and industries, with about 200 visits in each round. The selection of contacts represents the production side of the economy, both industry-wise and geographically. In the course of 2003, the number of contacts in the network will rise to about 1000 persons, who will be contacted once or twice a year. The Department of Economics at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology is responsible for the network in Trøndelag county and conducts contact meetings. Official statistics and current market information will continue to be the main basis for our assessments, but due to the time lag and revisions of statistics, supplementary information is useful. The regional network provides up-to-date information on the state of the Norwegian economy. Regular communication with local contacts in Norway's business and community life provides us with information that supplements available official statistics.

We may not yet have seen the full effects on the krone exchange rate of the interest rate reductions that have been implemented. At the same time, the krone can be influenced by fiscal policy and the outlook for wage growth. Norges Bank’s Executive Board sets the interest rate with a view to achieving the inflation target of 2½ per cent. The inflation target is also a vehicle for monetary policy’s contribution to stabilising output and employment. When setting the interest rate, the Executive Board seeks to achieve a balance. The objective of stimulating growth in the Norwegian economy and achieving the inflation target is weighed against the risk of new pressures building up in the economy over the long term. Since December 2002, we have judged that to achieve this balance it was appropriate to reduce the interest rate to a low level. At the last monetary policy meeting on 13 August, it was decided to reduce the interest rate to 3.0 per cent. With an interest rate of 3.0 per cent, the Executive Board’s assessment remained unchanged, i.e. that the probability that inflation two years ahead will be lower than 2½ per cent is greater than the probability that it will be higher. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 38/2003  5
Thorsten Beck, Tao Chen, Chen Lin and Frank M. Song (2016), “Financial innovation: the Bright and the Dark Sides”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 72, pp. 28– 51. 3 See, notably, Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, Thorsten Beck, “Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and  cause”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 46, Issue 1, August 2000, pp. 31–77 and Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, Finance and the sources of growth, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 58, Issues 1-2, 2000, Pages 261–300. 4 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The aftermath of financial crises”, American Economic Review 99,  No. 2, 2009, pp. 466–472. Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor (2012), “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008”, American Economic Review, 102 (2): pp. 1029– 1061. Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef (2013), “An International Look at Growth of Modern Finance”, Journal of economic perspectives, 27, pp. 73–96. Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi (2015), “Why does financial sector growth crowd out real economic growth”, BIS working papers, 490. 5 Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring, “Disaster myopia in international banking", Essays in International  Finance, No. 164, 1986. 6 See notably Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes and Ugo Panizza, “Too Much Finance? ", Journal of Economic  Growth 20, 2015, p. 105–148. 7 Private non-financial sector debt as share of GDP, Q1 2017. Sources: Eurostat data, Federal Reserve, Banque  de France calculations. 8 Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, “Systemic banking crises database", IMF Economic Review, Vol.61, No.

2,  2013, cited by Taryk Bennani, Laurent Clerc, Virginie Coudert, Marine Dujardin and Julien Idier, “ Politique macroprudentielle, prévenir le risque systémique et assurer la stabilité financière", Pearson, 2017, p.118. 9 See IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2015 and see Patrice Ollivaud and David Turner, “The effect of the global  financial crisis on OECD potential output", OECD, Working Papers, No. 1166, 2014. 10 See in particular “The impact of financial reforms”, Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 21, April  2017. 11 Basel Committee, Basel III Monitoring Report, September 2017. 12 See reports by the Basel Committee’s Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) and Long term Economic  6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Impact Group (LEI). 13 Financial Stability Board, Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms, August 2016,  2nd Annual Report. 14 Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2016, May 2017. 15 See US Department of the Treasury, “A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities", June 2017. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
I would like to highlight today three important pieces of work of the TMA: (a) the TMA has conducted a thorough review of the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) fixing mechanism and presented to the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) recommendations to enhance the transparency, robustness and governance of the HIBOR fixing mechanism. These recommendations were subsequently accepted by the HKAB and endorsed by the HKMA in February 2013 for implementation. Under the new regime, the TMA has taken over from HKAB as the administrator of the HIBOR fixing mechanism with Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Limited serving as the calculating agent. (b) Another landmark achievement was the launch of CNH HIBOR. Having undertaken more than one year of pilot trials, the TMA officially launched in June 2013 the CNH HIBOR fixing, which is the first offshore RMB interest rate benchmark in the world. This is a very important piece of market infrastructure which will facilitate the development of a whole array of offshore RMB credit and interest rates contracts and products; and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  (c) The TMA is also an important player in professional training. In close collaboration with the HKMA, the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers and the Hong Kong Securities and Investment Institute, the TMA has participated and contributed to the design of a new professional competency framework for practitioners in the private wealth management industry.

Good progress has been made and we expect the new competency framework can be rolled out within the next few months. 5. I would like to thank the TMA and its committees for their tireless efforts in joining hands with the HKMA and others in the “platform building” work. Measures that make Hong Kong more competitive as a wealth and asset management centre 6. It is not easy to come up with an exhaustive list of factors that affect Hong Kong’s competitiveness as a wealth and asset management centre in Asia. There are some factors such as air quality, law and order, cost of doing business, international school places, etc that have a major effect on individual firms’ decision to locate or expand operations in Hong Kong and not elsewhere, but these factors apply across the board and are not confined to the financial services sector. What I propose to do now is to highlight a couple of key “soft” infrastructure that is uniquely important to Hong Kong’s future development as the wealth and asset management hub in Asia: (a) as we all know, the existence of an inheritance tax or estate duty, even at low rates, is a material impediment to the development of wealth and asset management businesses. Back in 1998, the HKMA started to lobby the HKSAR Government to abolish the estate duty in Hong Kong in order to foster Hong Kong’s development as a wealth management centre.