samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This demographic structure thus not only contributes to enhance the potential of the economy but combined with rising incomes and improved standards of living, has resulted in increases in consumption spending. This resultant  BIS Review 64/2004  1  increase in purchasing power has strengthened domestic demand, making it an important driver of growth in the Asian economies. Indeed, these trends have strengthened the sustainability of consumption-based growth. As part of this process, women have become an important consumer target group with enhanced purchasing power. In fact, in several of the Asian economies, women are emerging as a key target market. This greater capacity for earning, spending, saving and investing requires ability for financial management, and hence the urgency for greater financial literacy. While financial literacy is important, regardless of economic status, it becomes even more important for those that are less privileged. For those that have less to manage, it becomes more vital to manage the finances even more effectively. It is also those that have been under-served by the financial system that need to be more aware of the financial services that they should be able to access, and the benefits that can be drawn from the various options available. They too have the same need for maximising the benefits from their limited resources, and to achieving financial and economic security. Strengthening their financial position becomes even more important for this target group.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The importance of financial literacy among women in Asia Special address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the CitigroupINSEAD Women’s Financial Education Summit 2004, Hong Kong, 2 November 2004. *  *  *  Introduction Asia represents the fastest growing region in the global economy. Of significance, is that more than half the population in Asia are women. The participation of women in the economy would therefore not only enhance their own economic well being but would also contribute towards raising further the economic potential of Asia. Women are already engaged in both the informal and formal sectors and are increasingly emerging as a more important force in the economy. The effective participation, however, needs to be an informed participation. Financial literacy among women becomes an important part of this process, regardless of the income constituency to which they belong. There needs to be a better understanding of their financial rights and responsibilities, and their opportunities for income generation and the associated risks and costs involved. This is particularly important for Asia, where rapid economic and financial transformation is occurring. Financial literacy among women is thus a vital part of this process, not only to promote greater engagement of women in the current economic environment, but also to prepare them for the future. It is my great honour and pleasure to be here today to speak on the importance of financial literacy among women in Asia.
It is no exaggeration to say that this is the beating heart of central banking, it’s where it all comes together. The Bank of England’s mission is to promote the good of the people of this country by maintaining monetary and financial stability, and a key way in which we fulfil this is to ensure people have confidence in the money they use, whether to store wealth or to make payments, and that it is an effective unit of account. At the heart of this is confidence in the value of money, meaning confidence in its monetary value not being eroded by inflation, in other words monetary stability, and confidence in the system and institutions in which it is held and transmitted in transactions, in other words financial stability. A useful practical definition of this meaning of stability comes from a saying by Alan Greenspan, namely that monetary stability is when people’s decisions on spending and investment are not influenced by their concerns and expectations about the value of the money they are using. It is possible to extend that saying to cover aspects of financial stability too, for instance in terms of being concerned about the safety and soundness of individual banks. There are two forms of money in use in the UK – and there is nothing unusual about the UK in this respect. Central bank money is a liability of the Bank of England.

There will inevitably be elements of tough love in such a process, and some disappointed ambitions, but I am confident that out of it will come a robust form of innovation. I hope also that laying out the principles of public interest and how they should be put into practice in the context of new innovation will help to deal with another difficult and perennial challenge of financial regulation. It is in the nature of innovation – and a good thing – that while some ideas succeed, many fall by the wayside. How many people remember Visi On, TopView and GEM? I have to admit I did not until I did some research for today. In the mid-1980s, they were rivals to Windows for the personal computer software market. More precisely, they were briefly rivals, but the rest as they say is history, as were these three rivals. In our world of finance, things can be more complicated, because dealing with failures itself raises public policy issues. There are quite often suggestions that central banks and financial regulators are anti-innovation and lukewarm on competition, because the results will at times be messy as the winners emerge and the losers fall by the wayside. We are not anti-innovation or anti-competition, but we are trying to manage our sphere of influence in order to achieve our public policy objectives, as required by Parliament and serve the public interest continuously. With that in mind, let me apply the framework to the world of payments and digital currency.
We have of course always been fully aware that any discussion of these problems is a sensitive issue. In consideration of the necessary legal adjustments on a constitutional and statutory level, we had no other choice but to lay bare the situation in detail. I should like to underline once more that we do not underestimate the significance of abundant currency reserves. The sky, however, cannot be the limit. It will be in our own interest to exercise the necessary diligence when converting part of our gold holdings into interest-bearing assets. This includes close contacts with institutions with which we entertain friendly relations. BIS Review 106/1999  4  Financial centre Let me conclude with a few reflections on Switzerland as a financial centre. A financial centre is by definition the location in which the various financial market players combine their efforts. Conforming to more recent developments, we no longer talk about regional centres in Switzerland. We rather refer to the Swiss financial centre. In the forefront are of course activities of banks and insurance companies. To these must be added a growing number of further providers of financial services. In keeping with international developments, the dividing lines are gradually becoming blurred. The decisive criteria for assessing the substance of a financial centre are integrity, stability and quality. These depend on various factors of a human and material nature. On a human level, these factors are know-how and mentality.

We do this while never neglecting our obligation with the stability of the payment system. Therefore, in the past several weeks we have also contributed to alleviate liquidity stress. Our commitment is to continue to walk this road to the extent that circumstances so dictate. Our economy is not immune to episodes occurring elsewhere in the world and that is what we have been experiencing. However, we are on a good stand to deal with very adverse environments, and it is the commitment of the Central Bank Board to ensure the best possible performance of the Chilean economy in times of turmoil and uncertainty at their highest. With that in mind, we have established a monetary/foreign exchange policy scheme – as well as an international liquidity position – that will help us soften the potential repercussions of the current problems of the world economy. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 123/2008
In reviewing the design choices, it’s also helpful to distinguish between choices about what the SCAP, CCAR and DFAST stress tests were designed to capture and how the models measure key elements of the stress test calculations. The first and most significant design choice involved what the tests would measure: the SCAP and subsequent U.S. supervisory stress tests measure the impact of the stress scenario on regulatory capital ratios. Other choices were possible, of course. The tests could have focused on modeling the market value of assets or equity (similar to the Capital Shortfall approach developed by Acharya et al. 5 , or attempted to measure the value or cost of debt, or the impact on credit ratings. But regulatory capital ratios were a natural choice, allowing the output of the stress testing exercise to map into the broader regulatory capital regime while addressing the slow adjustment of those ratios during downturns. The focus on regulatory capital ratios resulted in a cascade of additional design choices. To begin, since regulatory capital ratios are based on accounting definitions of earnings and capital, estimating net income and its flow through to regulatory capital became the focus of the stress test calculations. This stands in contrast to approaches that concentrate solely on projecting losses, which were the focus of much of the public discussion prior to the release of the SCAP results. In practical terms, the net income approach involves recognizing that banks will have non-credit-related expenses and earn revenues even during periods of stress.

Philipp Hildebrand: (The) productivity (imperative) Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at Avenir suisse, Zurich, 24 September 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Just a few years ago, the weak growth of the Swiss economy was a dominant topic in public debate. For four years now, the economy has been advancing strongly. Is this merely a cyclical boom? Or has structural change taken place, affecting both productivity and the associated potential growth path? This would have far-reaching implications, not least for monetary policy. A number of factors indicate that structural change is indeed occurring and that this could ultimately result in an increase in the underlying productivity trend. However, time lags and cyclical distortions make it difficult to identify such changes. BIS Review 104/2007  1
at  Barnett, A, Batten, S, Chiu, A, Franklin, J and Sebastiá-Barriel, M (2014a), “The UK productivity puzzle”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 54, No.2, pages 114–28, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q2.asp. Barnett, A, Broadbent, B, Chiu, A, Franklin, J and Miller, H (2014b), “Impaired capital reallocation and productivity” National Institute Economic Review, No. 228, 2014. Dustmann, C, Frattini, T, and Preston, I (2013), “The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 145–73. Gardiner, L (2014), “All accounted for: The case for an ‘all-worker’ earnings measure”, Resolution Foundation Briefing. Goos, M and Manning, A (2007), “Lousy and lovely jobs: The rising polarisation of work in Britain”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 118–33. Goos, M, Manning, A and Salomons, A (2009), “Job polarization in Europe”, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 58–63. Gordon, R (2012), “Is US economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds”, NBER Working Paper 18315, available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18315.pdf Gregg, P, Machin, S, Fernandez-Salgado, M (2014), “The squeeze on real wages – and what it might take to end it”, National Institute Economic Review, No. 228, 2014. Haldane, A G (2014), “The corridor of uncertainty”, speech at the Scarborough Business Ambassadors’ dinner, 18 June 2014, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2014/738.aspx.

Now none of this means that we have closed our minds to the possibility of a more benign relationship between the demand and supply sides of the economy, which would allow us to sustain for a time stronger growth consistently with meeting our inflation target. But we can’t afford to bet the Bank on that happy state of affairs either. When people approach me with the sound-bite “give growth a chance” what I hear them saying is “take a risk with inflation”. But equally when they say “you must take no risks with inflation” I hear them saying “the world will never change”. The truth is that nobody knows with any great confidence. The important thing is to keep an open mind and to monitor intensively all of the data as it becomes available to us, and draw what inferences we can as to how those data affect the balance of risks around the inflation target looking ahead. What is encouraging, Mr Chairman, is that for all these uncertainties and complications the broad prospect for the UK economy - including the Scottish economy - over the next couple of years is for continuing relatively strong growth, with continuing relatively high employment, and continuing relatively low inflation. The monetary policy debate is a narrow one, it is about just how strong the growth, just how high the employment and just how low the rate of inflation. It’s a very long time since any of us could describe the debate in that way with any degree of confidence.
With the benefit of hindsight, I do not think that anybody would now consider that we should have started in any other way than by requiring assets be written down, and then at a later stage, requiring recapitalisation. Balance sheet restatement is not just “one” possible formula for restructuring, but rather a vital ingredient of all restructuring processes. Finally, I understand but do not share the view of those who see a danger in forcing institutions to increase transparency in the midst of a crisis. I am convinced that, in the present situation of general distrust in the markets, suspicion is always much worse than reality, however problematic that may be. Admittedly, despite increased transparency, doubts persist as to the extent to which our banks have cleaned up their balance sheets. And although write-downs have been very intense, unsatisfactory economic performance might make further efforts along these lines necessary in future. Be that as it may, let me conclude by reiterating that such is the speed of change in the economic environment in Spain, Europe and the world in recent months, and even in the last few weeks, that it would be a grave error to establish rigid criteria that rule out the possibility of incorporating fresh financial restructuring tools, if changing circumstances mean that they are required in order to achieve the final goal. That can be none other than to have a set of solid credit institutions ready to effectively meet the solvent demand of Spanish households and firms for funds.

At a minimum shouldn’t we aim for clarity on certain essential features, such as clarity on the rights of digital currency holders and the nature of assets that back a digital currency? Third, are there key activities that are cardinal to the functioning of digital currencies that require special attention from regulators? These may include actions to create, distribute, destroy, or and transfer digital currencies, and may also include key infrastructures, such as the technology that underpins a particular digital currency. To the extent that these critical activities are performed by actors that are not within a regulatory purview, should we fill this potential gap in oversight? Fourth, should we agree on a common approach across jurisdictions on least some aspects of a refined regulatory approach? Digital currencies can be designed to be used across borders. Key parties may be situated across the globe. If we are to reach ubiquity in regulation, or at least something approaching it, isn’t coordination the way to do so? The Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision may address some of these questions, but it’s too soon to know what they will conclude. Last, should we consider other lenses through which to view these activities? Common sense dictates that we begin with an approach that considers protections for holders of digital currencies against unfair losses and the potential for certain digital currencies to present risk to financial stability. Are there other factors for us to consider? This is not easy stuff.
There is generally a tendency towards concentration in infrastructure provision because of increasing returns to scale in a fixed cost business and often powerful network effects. This applies equally in the case of commercial bank provision of infrastructure: ECB survey evidence reveals that the ten largest correspondent banks in euro account for around 80% of correspondent banking payment values; and the top-4 global custodians now account for three-quarters of total assets in custody. Indeed, regulators have been giving increasing attention to the potential systemic spillovers from operational or business failures at major commercial bank providers of infrastructural services. That has led, for example, to the initiative in the US to implement “New Bank”, a dormant shell company to take over the functions should one of the two major clearers in the US Treasury market cease operations. 34 It may be that a competitive environment can be sustained, particularly as the cost of technology falls, lowering barriers to entry, and liquidity bridges and other forms of interoperability are established between systems. But, the jury is still out. Recent evidence on the trading side, particularly in the US, is mixed: some trading platforms, such as Archipelago and INET, have been swallowed up by the incumbent exchanges; others, such as BATS Trading are thriving, keeping the pressure on the exchanges to cut costs and upgrade their services. 35 I suspect what we are seeing is a redefinition of the market on an international scale.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the tax system was reformed, and this entailed a substantial reduction in the opportunities for deducting interest expenditure. Interest rates rose substantially at the same time, and  4  BIS Review 51/2004  the Swedish economy was affected by an international economic slowdown. This had very negative effects on both household borrowing and house prices. Could a similar situation arise today? Although we have seen a rapid increase in both indebtedness and house prices in recent years, the present situation is quite different, with a low-inflation policy and thereby more stable economic environment. Nor have there been any extensive structural changes of a nature that would completely alter the conditions for households’ decisions on indebtedness and property purchases. Monetary policy takes account of other factors than inflation In principle, household indebtedness and developments in house prices could create problems for the payment system. This is something regularly analysed in the Riksbank’s Financial Stability Reports. The conclusion that can be drawn from the most recent report in June is that the risk of the household sector alone being able to create such large losses for the banks as to threaten the payment system is very slight. As I mentioned earlier, the assessment is that house prices over the country as a whole are reasonable. A special study of households in debt was included in the June report, and this showed that, on average, these households were assessed to have good margins for managing rising interest expenditure or increased unemployment.
4 In an RTGS system, each payment is settled individually in central bank money and in real time. A payment is executed precisely if – and only if – the paying commercial bank has sufficient sight deposits. The receiving commercial bank can therefore be assured that it is receiving risk-free money. Payments in the SIC system are thus final and irrevocable and contribute to confidence in the payment system. Settlement in central bank money creates a stable core in the payments system, around which innovative customer solutions and new technologies can flourish. The third principle is that payment systems, payment solutions and forms of money should be integrated as seamlessly as possible (cf. slide 3). This means there needs to be a high degree of interoperability: It must be possible to exchange Swiss francs seamlessly and one-to-one across different forms of money and payment systems. A lack of interoperability leads to frictions which result in higher costs and time delays and thus limit the usability of money. The three principles – a two-tier system, settlement of payments in central bank money, and seamless integration within the ecosystem – are well-established and, at the same time, necessary requirements for a well-functioning payment system. Payments are currently undergoing extensive change, both in Switzerland and around the world. What are the main challenges posed by this transformation? Challenges arising from innovation and change The first challenge is the increased speed demanded for payments (cf. slide 4).

For sure, potential output estimates are chronically unreliable and often subject to substantial revisions ex post. Faced with the despair of failure, we often tend to underestimate our ability to overcome crises – a phenomenon I will return to in a minute. Moreover, recessions often tend to have a permanent effect on the level of potential output. It is much less clear, however, whether the crisis will also leave a permanent footprint on the trend 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  potential growth rate – something Laurence Ball called “super-hysteresis” effects. In fact, on the right-hand side of the first slide you can see that potential output growth had been slowing in the euro area well before the crisis, mainly reflecting a long-term slowdown in total factor productivity (TFP). So the question I would like to ask today is not so much why potential output growth appears to be decelerating in the long run, or whether we are entering a period of secular stagnation – the jury is still out on this. It is whether the crisis, and the persistent shortfall in aggregate demand, has accelerated, or not, the decline in potential growth. The first point to consider is whether the crisis has had a significant effect on labour participation – that is, the size of the total labour force. Hysteresis effects might be caused by unemployed workers becoming discouraged and discontinuing their search for employment, leading them to become detached from the workforce and lose their skills over time.