samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In that respect, we have an obligation to understand the risks relating to climate change and the channels through which they might affect the pursuit of our main aims. At the same time we need to make sure that the participants in the financial system are equally aware of those risks. However, in my opinion, central banks are not the ones who are to be expected to take the lead fighting climate change, since their instruments are not as efficient as the ones government can employ to fulfill that task. In addition, if faced with a conflict between maintaining price stability and/or financial stability, and fighting climate change, central banks would and have the obligation, to give priority to price stability and financial stability as their primary mandates. With today’s conference we, at the Croatian National Bank, are appealing to banks and other financial institutions to reflect on how to incorporate climate risks into their business strategies and make their business-making more robust and resilient to hazards connected with climate change. We would also like to encourage banks to seize the opportunities brought about by transition towards low-carbon and nature-neutral economy. Finally, and equally important, we want to note that we do not save nature only by switching to low-energy lightbulbs or choosing a hybrid or electric car but also by investing consciously. Banks could have a noticeable positive influence if they were to finance environmentally friendly projects and make green investments.

As we have seen in recent times, financial centres are important nodes in ensuring that the world economy continues to function well. They need to be responsive to the dynamic market place in order to perform their critical roles to sustain growth by ensuring that capital is channeled to the most productive uses. 13. Singapore as a vibrant and cosmopolitan Global City is well-positioned for businesses to connect to Asia and international markets. Over time, we have established the necessary infrastructure, global connectivity and pool of expertise with the requisite knowledge, understanding and experience of local conditions in Asia that can add value to companies entering the region. 14. As a financial centre offering a full suite of financial services, Singapore stands ready to play a wider developmental role in promoting Islamic finance in response to rising regional demand for Shariah-compliant products and services. MAS has worked closely with the industry and other government agencies to ensure a levelplaying field between Islamic and conventional finance such that Islamic finance is not disadvantaged for tax and regulatory purposes where the economic substance and risks are similar. 15. Many market players are already leveraging on Singapore’s strengths and capabilities to raise capital, create infrastructure and real estate funds and conduct wealth and asset management activities. For instance, the Islamic Development Bank and City Development Ltd have tapped our capital markets to raise Shariah-compliant Singaporedollar funding.
It is not easy to grasp the concept of operational risk, although the Basel Committee’s definition is a good start: “risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or external events”. Although public opinion associates operational risk with dire consequences for specific institutions, you and I know that it is present in all banks’ daily operations, and in all their areas, from the most traditional to the most complex. Given the relevance of operational risk, it is not surprising that both supervisors and the leading banks are making an increasing effort to measure its impact. Only if progress is made in such measurement will it be possible first, to conduct analyses of the impact that strategic decisions (expansion in new areas or regions, rationalisation of expenses, outsourcing, etc.) may have on the operational risk profile and, therefore, on the possibility of introducing corrective measures aimed at improving this risk profile. As things stand we are still far from achieving - in technical terms- a satisfactorily broad and deep measurement of operational risk. This is why the Basel Committee, by setting for the first time an explicit capital charge for operational risk at banks, has done so avoiding, in the most advanced alternatives, mechanistic formulas that may curb operational risk management developments in the coming years.

It is only through operating properly as business concerns, basing their management on professional criteria relating to economic and financial rationale, that savings banks can continue creating value for society and for their regions. Let me turn now for a moment to the Spanish experience. Our “cajas de ahorros” are also very old financial institutions and our story has been a successful one. When I explain the characteristics of the Spanish financial system, and in particular the prominent role of savings banks, some of my foreign counterparts ask about potential problems of fragility and inefficiency and my answer is always the same. Not only are they neither fragile nor inefficient, but they are also as profitable as their banking counterparts, and they are increasing their market share year after year. They are a major contributor to making the Spanish banking sector an efficient and competitive one. I earlier drew a distinction between macro and micro efficiency. Savings banks in Spain have made significant contributions to the macroeconomic efficiency of our system. In bolstering efficiency at firm level, certain factors, which I shall now refer to, should be given particular consideration by savings banks. Any management action geared to cost-rationalisation should pass a careful and thorough cost/benefit analysis so that certain elements of their long-term strategy or their risk profile should not deteriorate. Let me mention a few of these elements. Investment in new technologies Efforts to improve efficiency must be compatible with the challenges posed by new technologies.
Fourthly, our financial system is solvent and well regulated, which limits the possibility of appreciation bubbles being created by the prospect of inexpensive financing from abroad and abundant credit. We will continue to face important adjustments in the global economy, with exchange rate tensions in all the economies of the world because rigidity among the most important currencies persists. Recovery of the global economy will be gradual and will vary greatly from country to country. This situation presents a national task, which we must each take on board from our own perspective. In the Central Bank we are paying particular attention to the evolution of the exchange rate because we recognize that there has been rapid and substantial appreciation and we must be watchful that this does not hinder the vigorous growth of our economy. That growth will be long-lasting provided that we ensure stability. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 135/2010

Nevertheless, interpretation of the quarterly estimates is difficult in view of the sizable fluctuations in final demand and the fact that the main factor impacting on GDP momentum are changes in inventories. Other indicators, such as the consumer confidence index, company expectations, labour demand and the continued low level of inflation expectations, appear to indicate a more modest level of economic momentum. Despite the uncertainty with respect to the GDP estimates, the information currently available to us indicates that economic recovery has accelerated over the past few months. Fourth-quarter indicators point to a continuation in the economic upswing. Although export growth is slowing, international demand remains robust. This momentum is increasingly shifting into the domestic sector, where it is acting as a stimulus. Gradually, the utilisation of industrial production capacities is improving. Meanwhile, companies expect demand to pick up over the next few months. There were signs of a recovery in corporate investment in the third quarter. Over the next few quarters, a high utilisation rate of technical capacity in industry and a more favourable sales outlook  BIS Review 86/2005  1  are likely to provide greater support for investments in equipment and a gradual increase in labour demand. As a result, the disequilibrium in the labour market is likely to diminish. In the last quarter, private consumption remained strong. Since employment can be expected to increase over the course of 2006, consumer confidence should strengthen. By contrast, the stimulus provided by construction investment is likely to subside next year.
Figure 4 Lending rates (weekly data, percent) Consumer loans, 3 or more years  Commercial loans, 30 to 89 days  Mortgage loans  40  40  20  20 6.5  6.5  35  35  16  16  6.0  6.0  5.5  5.5  30  30  12  12  5.0  5.0  25  25  8  8  4.5  4.5  20  4  20  Jan.08  May 08  Sept.08  Jan.09  May 09  Jan.08  May 08  Sept.08  Jan.09  May 09  4  4.0  Jan.08  May 08  Sept.08  Jan.09  May 09  4.0  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

The risks for success inherent in a bold pre-emptive strike are bigger. The famous notion of “acting ahead of the curve” presupposes having solid confidence in one’s own forecasts. Notably the fact that the Federal Reserve has lost this confidence in the late 1990s and that it has refrained from taking big, bold steps, has apparently turned out to be the right strategy. In an environment of increased uncertainty, a tendency to take small, careful steps makes sense. It is hardly possible to chart the ideal course that way, but there is a good chance that deviations remain limited and can be corrected within a reasonable time frame. In Switzerland - perhaps with a time lag - we are also affected by such uncertainties. This is the case even though the factor of a declining natural rate of unemployment cannot play a central role in this country. Economists in Switzerland would certainly be well-advised to critically analyse the  3  A useful overview can be found in Davies 2000. BIS Review 35/2000  6  hypotheses and phenomena propagated as “new economy” - not with preconceived ideas, but with an open mind. 5. How relevant are asset prices? A topic which is related to the “new economy” is the phenomenon of extreme price fluctuations of individual assets. Even previously, the bitter lessons learned on the heels of the recession in Japan had stimulated a discussion of whether and how asset prices are important for monetary policy.
Table 5: UK Catapults vs. German Fraunhofer Dimension Age Number of centres Industry projects per year Annual budget Annual budget (% of nominal GDP) Employees  UK Catapults 7 years (from 2011) 10 600 £  German Fraunhofer 69 years (from 1949) 72 6,000 – 8,000 € billion  0.01%  0.07%  > 1,400  24,500  Sources: catapult.org.uk, Ernst and Young (2017), Comin, Trumbull and Yang (2011) and fraunhofer.de/en Notes: UK Catapults have delivered around 4,100 industry collaborations in total to date, which equates to around 600 per year. Their funding was £ over a five-year period, which equates to around £ per year. Table 6: UK and German bank lending to businesses Dimension % of total bank assets % of nominal GDP  UK 6% 23%  Germany 18% 49%  Sources: Bank of England, Deutsche Bundesbank, ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. Note: UK data refer to lending to non-financial corporates by UK resident monetary financial institutions (MFIs) for 2018Q1. German data refer to lending to enterprises and the self-employed by Germany resident Banks in 2018Q1. Table 7: British Business Bank vs. KfW Dimension Age Total assets Assets as a share of annual nominal GDP Employees  British Business Bank 4 years (2014) £  KfW 70 years (from 1948) € billion  <0.1%  16%  144  6,284  Sources: British Business Bank, KfW Group, ONS, Eurostat and Bank calculations. 41  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  41

Norman T L Chan: Responding to the financial crisis – financial reform impacts and regulatory regime changes Opening remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asian Financial Forum 2010, Policy dialogue: “Responding to the financial crisis – financial reform impacts and regulatory regime changes”, Hong Kong, 20 January 2010. *  *  *  1. “It has often been said that history, especially financial crisis, tends to repeat itself. Notwithstanding the disturbingly frequent occurrence of seemingly similar financial crises, I am inclined to believe that history does not repeat itself because, upon close scrutiny, no two crises are exactly the same. It may be more correct to say that mistakes will be punished by the market. If people do not learn from their mistakes, then the market will continue to repeat its punishment. The only difference between the major financial crises is that the punishment is getting more and more severe, if not violent.” 2. “Going forward, I can see two possible ways to learn more about the financial markets. One is to learn from past mistakes and do something now. The second is to wait until the next disaster strikes and try to do something there and then.
Only one merger has taken place so far, between DBS and POSBank. But I know that all the banks are alive to the competitive trends, and are continually reassessing their position. It is a dynamic situation, and the present configuration is unlikely to be permanent. Regulatory cooperation and harmonisation The second dimension of financial integration is the trend towards greater regulatory cooperation and harmonisation. Starting in the 1980's, a series of international fora were created for regulators and policymakers to share experiences, cooperate with one another, and harmonise regulations and  2  BIS Review 45/2001  policies. Among the multilateral initiatives, the efforts of the Basle Committee and IOSCO are probably the best known. The Basle Capital Accord of 1988 helped to increase the capital held by internationally active banks, and to create a more level playing field for banks under different regulators. The new Basle standards now being finalised will remedy the weaknesses of the 1988 Accord, and enable banks to set aside capital in accordance with the riskiness of their assets. IOSCO has provided securities regulators globally with a useful platform to exchange views and enhance cooperation on issues relating to the regulation of the securities markets. It has developed a common set of objectives and principles of securities regulation, which enhance mutual understanding among securities regulators and commissioners. IOSCO has also been actively involved in promulgating standards of public disclosure, and facilitated cross-border capital raising and listings. The Asian crisis has added impetus to the harmonisation of regulatory standards.

Stefan Ingves: The Riksbank and monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Göteborg, 23 May 2006. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation. It is always a pleasure to have the opportunity to come and talk about monetary policy and our work at the Riksbank - but I shall refrain from commenting on whether it is always a pleasure for the listeners. I hope that you will in any case get a picture of our view of the economy and inflation prospects and of our method of how we conduct monetary policy. I shall begin with a rough outline of what I intend to discuss in my speech and the main conclusions: First, I shall describe my view of the current monetary policy situation. A brief summary of my conclusions is: •  The upswing in the international economy appears to have been slightly stronger than we envisaged in the February Inflation Report. •  With regard to Sweden, the statistics received since the Inflation Report was published indicate that the economy has developed approximately in line with our assessment, although inflation temporarily rose more rapidly than anticipated as a result of developments in energy prices. •  Our earlier monetary policy considerations from February and April still apply to a large extent. Monetary policy will need to be less expansionary in future.
3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  One is that the current extent of world trade isn’t entirely novel and should in some ways be seen as a recovery. World trade had grown very strongly under the classical gold standard, during the second half of the 19th century. The same goes for the capital flows that financed these exchanges. The catastrophes of the world wars, and the intervening Great Depression, put all that into reverse. Partly as a natural consequence of economic contraction, partly thanks to outright protectionism, trade volumes fell sharply between 1914 and 1950, even relative to world GDP. Chart 2: Costs of trade fell sharply in 1970s  Second, although the conditions for a revival began 2  to be laid during the 1950s it wasn’t until the 1960s and early 1970s that trade costs started to fall, and trade intensity to rise, in earnest. In this first phase of (re-)globalisation, during the 1970s and 80s, much of the growth in trade occurred between developed economies. Third, there was a further and very marked rise in trade intensity during the 1990s and the early part of the last decade, as developing economies entered the world trading system. Source: Jacks , Meissner, and Novy (2011)  Finally, you can see clearly how world trade has stalled, relative to GDP, since the financial crisis a decade ago. This is to cut a long and complex story very short.

Most would have been saved, however, and the simulated path of aggregate wages in the sector would now be materially higher, by around 1¼% of household consumption. 3  Details of this “no-globalisation” simulation are available on request. With a sufficiently simple production set-up it turns out that, if productivity in one sector grows sufficiently fast to produce a relative price decline of 1% a year, then in a closed economy its share of employment will fall by (1-σ) a year, where σ is the demand elasticity of substitution between the two goods. This makes sense: the greater the elasticity the bigger the response to demand to the drop in price for the good experiencing more rapid productivity growth; if, in particular, σ>1, employment would actually rise. As it is, the UK data suggest the σ for clothes is 0.44, plus or minus. We have fixed the rate of real price deflation in clothes at 1¼%, matching the observed rate before 1975 and after 2008, so the simulated “ no-globalisation” change in the share of clothing employment is -1.25 x (1-0.44) =-0.7% per year, relative to aggregate employment. The simulation also assumes the same skill-mix and therefore the same relative wage (compared with the national average) as in 1975 . 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Chart 7: Aggregate gains to consumers much  That’s a sizeable number – around £ But bear  larger than income losses, even assuming lost  in mind two things.
With hindsight, the right answers to these points seem clear: in general terms, a stable value for money should be the most precious output yielded by monetary policy; and, to achieve this, a wise mixture of simplicity, transparency, commitment and sound judgment, and, overall, a good measure of forward-looking behaviour should all be included in the monetary authority’s toolbox. You will recognise in this list of tasty ingredients some of the basic elements used in building up Basel II, for it pursues a goal, namely financial stability, which at least in some of its most fundamental aspects may not be much different from that pursued by monetary policy. Just as the economics profession concluded that over the relevant horizon price stability was essentially all about monetary  BIS Review 34/2005  7  conditions, we on the Committee believe that the stability of the banking industry is all about risk awareness and management and adequate shock absorbers. Consequently, Basel II seeks to give due regard to the greater importance of managing bank risk and capital for the purpose of achieving higher levels of financial stability, but I am personally in little doubt that Its benefits will also be felt in monetary policy spheres. Thank you very much. 8  BIS Review 34//2005

21 I have previously discussed the financial risks that occur on the Riksbank’s balance sheet when we have large bond holdings. 22 These risks in combination with the Riksbank’s weak earning capacity constitute an argument in favour of a smaller balance sheet in the long run. This is the best way of safeguarding the Riksbank’s future capacity to fund its own operations and conduct an independent monetary policy. 23  Reasonable for the Riksbank’s balance sheet to shrink in the long run The Riksbank’s balance sheet has grown rapidly in recent years, partly because we have purchased government bonds for monetary policy purposes, and partly because the foreign exchange reserve has been strengthened. In other countries, arguments have been put forward indicating that central banks should perhaps continue to hold large bond holdings even in the future when monetary policy has been normalised. In my opinion, these arguments are of limited relevance to Sweden and the Riksbank. On the other hand, there are arguments indicating that the Riksbank should mitigate its financial risk by winding down most of its bond holdings when monetary policy is normalized. My assessment is that the best way of winding down the bond holdings with as little market influence as possible is to hold the bonds in the portfolio until they mature. Over the next decade, the Riksbank’s bond holdings will then develop approximately as shown in Figure 6. The repo rate and the rate path will thus be the main monetary policy tools when monetary policy has been normalized.
Our challenge in the coming years will be to consolidate this Board, in order to enhance our assessment of risks threatening the stability of the Chilean financial system. Lesson number two is that, in the face of threats to financial stability, preventive actions work best, seeking to anticipate the problems. The costs of a crisis of this nature are high and long-lasting, so even at the risk of being mistaken, we’ll rather be safe than sorry. Still, the interest rate as an instrument is neither sufficient nor necessarily effective in preventing financial imbalances to develop. More focused instruments are needed – ranging from financial regulation to given the market clear signals of the risks –, which permit to take direct action on the problem. Given the nature of the regulation and supervision framework of the Chilean financial system, every now and then this policy will call for close coordination between the Central Bank and the Superintendences. Lesson number three is that, during episodes of financial stress, the Central Bank also requires using a battery of instruments – aside from the short-term interest rate – to help stabilize the economy. During the crisis of 2008–2009, the Central Bank of Chile introduced new tools to inject liquidity into the economy and enhance the effectiveness of its monetary policy making. Also, in 2008 and 2011, we intervened in the forex market, obeying both to a prudential motivation (i.e., accumulating more international liquidity) and to a conjunctural one: the evolution of the real exchange rate.

It should be noted that the FX Global Code applies not just to market participants, but to market infrastructure providers as well; it thus encompasses all relevant foreign exchange market actors. While the FX Global Code is classified as self-regulation, the SNB expects its regular counterparties to implement the new code and to abide by the agreed rules. Page 3/5  Berne, 15 June 2017 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Page 4/5  Berne, 15 June 2017 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Page 5/5