samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Second, our OMT programme is limited to the short end of the yield curve – i.e. to maturities of between one and three years – as the Eurosystem’s other monetary policy instruments have also traditionally been aimed at this period. The third distinction between the OMTs and the SMP is the transparency of our actions, through the publication of relevant information on OMT interventions. A fourth way in which the programmes differ from one another is that, under the OMT programme, we are not only able to buy government bonds, but also to sell them again, and their valuation is based on market prices rather than on final maturity. Fifth, we announced that our OMT interventions would be ex ante “unlimited”. We have no doubt that this strong signal was required in order to convince market participants of our seriousness and decisiveness in pursuing the objective of price stability. At the same time, however, the design of OMTs makes it clear to everyone that the programme is effectively 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  limited, for one by the restriction to the shorter part of the yield curve and the resulting limited pool of bonds which may actually be purchased. OMTs – in the event that they are conducted – will not give rise to any inflationary risks. For every euro that the Eurosystem spends on government bonds, one euro will be withdrawn from the money supply in the euro area.

Scope of monetary policy and acting within the ECB’s mandate I will now come to the first of two points to which the rapporteur has requested we pay particular attention: the “scope of monetary policy”. This includes the question of whether we are acting within our mandate. Our mandate is clearly formulated in Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: to maintain price stability. According to primary EU law, the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem are already permitted to purchase government bonds in the financial markets in the context of their monetary policy tasks (Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank). While the Treaty clearly states the objective the ECB has to pursue, it describes just as clearly what the ECB is not allowed to do. Article 123 of the Treaty prohibits monetary financing. In particular, we are not allowed to buy any government bonds directly, i.e. on the primary market. Government bonds can only be purchased if they are already on the market and traded freely. The market mechanism – the basic principle Member States have to follow to finance themselves independently – should apply. We therefore also interpret the prohibition of monetary financing as being comprehensive insofar as ways to circumvent it are addressed. It is not possible to purchase newly issued government bonds at certain times.
I think it’ll be awhile before it gets to Fed presidents. But I know… President Dudley: Well, there are some people in Washington that would like to make us conduct monetary policy by a rule. Maureen O’Hara: And there you go, a robot can do it. President Dudley: We don’t think that’s such a good idea, by the way. Maureen O’Hara It’s an interesting challenging, and particularly here I saw some numbers the other day that the high school graduation rate in New York state is somewhere in the 70 percentage points. And again, as you think about the technology creating winners and losers, you know, obviously we’re in education, all of us are committed to education, you know. Is that kind of crucial to the technology solution? What do we do with the people who don’t? President Dudley: Well, I think – I mean look, I think education is absolutely essential. Giving people the skills they need to sort of navigate in the 21st century economy. And the second thing we need to do a better job is actually retraining people so that the only education you get shouldn’t just be when you’re 18 to 22 years old or 25 years old. We need to have a better system where people can sort of retool themselves. I think a third thing we can do is a better job of matching the skills that people get in universities to the business needs.

Having said this, I do not mean that there is no hierarchy between the two objectives. I call for strong complementarity, not for a merging of objectives. To be more explicit, I consider that a monetary policy strategy that targeted asset prices would be a mistake. As central bankers, we need to avoid confusing economic agents; our role is to anchor expectations and ensure business continuity. 4. – There are still challenges to be addressed to provide authorities with the necessary policy toolbox for financial stability For it to be more effective, we still face a number of challenges in order to achieve an optimal macroprudential regulatory framework. First, we have to complete the regulatory framework for banks, by finalising the Basel III reform: I strongly wish and hope that we can reach a fair and 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  reasonable agreement soon. A revision of the European Macroprudential Framework is currently underway at the European Commission level. Moreover, decisive progress should be made to better provide macroprudential authorities with policy tools properly designed to address financial risks beyond banking. Market financing, shadow banking, Fintechs, pension funds, financial innovations are all part of the scope of macroprudential policy, insofar as they have the potential to pose a financial risk to our economies. Our next issue is less the solvency of banks than the liquidity of non-banks.
Joseph Yam: Financial market developments in Hong Kong Remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Euromoney 40th Anniversary Gala Dinner, Hong Kong, 16 July 2009. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be able to share the honour at this evening's Euromoney awards dinner with so many excellent recipients. And it is a particular honour to receive the award for "Outstanding Contribution to Financial Markets". This is a threefold honour. First, because it is awarded by Euromoney, a publication – or rather an institution – with a particularly strong relationship with central banks and markets in this region. Secondly, because the award is presented to the HKMA as a whole, as a recognition of the hard work of staff from all parts of the organisation who have helped develop financial markets. And thirdly, because the award highlights an area of our work that usually receives less acknowledgement than it should: the development of financial markets not just through encouraging product innovation, but also through laying down the infrastructure to enable markets to function and grow. It is, I think, entirely appropriate that this evening's event is being held in a restaurant on top of the Star Ferry Pier – as we are from time to time reminded by the swaying of the structure and the occasional battering from the ferries themselves. Transport links are a good analogy for financial infrastructural links. They involve both local and international networks.

At a meeting of the Association of African Central Banks held in Dakar, Senegal, in August 2010, it was generally recognized that African central banks should adopt policies which should ensure a move towards macro prudential surveillance of the whole financial system and ensure that there are early warning signals and adequate remedial measures to deal with any crisis. Sub regional financial developments Your Excellency, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, as you are aware, the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) is spearheading efforts to establish the Eco as the single currency, with a West African Central Bank and common monetary and financial policies for the Zone. However, as a result of the recent financial crisis, member states could not meet the macroeconomic convergence criteria which are part of the requirements, and a decision was taken by Heads of State and Government to postpone the launch of the single currency and the establishment of a West African Central Bank to not later than 1st January 2015. In spite of these difficult conditions, the West African Sub region has shown remarkable resilience to the onslaught of the crisis mainly due to the region’s low integration with global financial markets. However, in the post crisis period, indications are that economic growth would continue to remain robust, averaging around 7 percent for countries of the West  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  African Monetary Zone.
In some ways it is a good thing if the stress-testing part of our regime 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  (Pillar 2) takes more of the strain, because it results in buffer requirements which should be more useable in a stress than Pillar 1 minima. And our Pillar 2A regime should capture concentration risk and any other aspects not captured by Pillar 1. But we should test ourselves on this, not least given that firms’ published CET1 ratios derive from Pillar 1 requirements. One way to do this is to compare the risk-weight level to some other crude benchmarks – such comparisons do not raise major worries, but nor do they suggest that risk-weights should be any lower (see Chart 7). Another way is to explore more sensitivities in our stress-testing, and in particular to examine where non-linearities arise for higher levels of house price falls than those we assume in our main scenarios. A number of safeguards exist in this area: our moving of firms away from ‘Point in Time’ modelling approaches; the leverage ratio; and (further down the track) the Basel 3.1 output floor. But despite this, we should be very cautious about any significant further moves down in Pillar 1 risk-weights for UK mortgages – in part because this exacerbates level-playing field issues given standardised risk-weights do not move in the same way, a point which will not be lost on the vast majority of the BSA’s members.

For the path of the Swedish economy in the coming years, no other single factor is therefore anything like as important as the total wage trend. The picture of the negotiations that are now beginning is mixed and tensions do exist. Since the previous survey in September, all the interviewed groups’ expectations of the annual wage rise have been revised upwards for all time horizons. Wage expectations are highest among the employee organisations. Moreover, the wage demands that have been presented are higher than before the previous round of negotiations. It is evidently becoming more difficult to find people with the appropriate competence for the jobs that are advertised. This presumably makes the risk of future wage drift greater than in previous years. All this could be a sign that we are approaching a situation where, bit by bit, aggregate wage costs in the Swedish economy start to accelerate, albeit from moderate levels. •  When it comes to judging inflationary pressure in the coming years, a central concept is total resource utilisation. The available amount of unutilised resources is crucial for the domestic generation of inflationary pressure, at least as long as inflation expectations are parked around our 2% target. In the coming years it is highly probable that, for the first time in a long while, our estimates of total resource utilisation - the output gap - will show that the gap has closed and the economy has reached or even moved above the capacity ceiling.
It is not the case that I personally believe that the risks associated with household borrowing constitute an immediate threat to the economy, or that housing prices are dramatically overvalued and that a rapid downward adjustment is on the cards. But I do believe that there are risks further ahead if household borrowing continues to increase at a much higher rate than incomes for an additional extended period. And if monetary policy continues to be too expansionary for too long, these risks will increase even further. I also believe that this is roughly the view of the majority of the members of the Executive Board. It is not possible to exactly determine at what level household borrowing will reach the “critical point”. As long as economic activity is favourable, the labour market is improving, incomes and wealth are increasing and the households have confidence in the future everything is hunky-dory. But in a different economic situation with increasing uncertainty on the labour market the behaviour of the households may change; they may begin to consolidate their balance sheets. This would reduce their consumption and reinforce the downward tendencies in the economy. The higher the debt burden the greater the risk of significant consequences. If housing prices fall in such a situation, households’ assets will be undermined while their debts will still remain. Households would therefore want to amortise rather than borrow, which would dampen demand.

The conclusion is that however good the decisionmaking material is, it can never be comprehensive or unequivocally interpreted. I have mentioned previously that developments in the financial sector and the effects on the real economy cannot be easily captured. I have also, in connection with the discussion on household borrowing, mentioned how we can assess effects in the longer term. Since we cannot make meaningful forecasts for an unlimited period of time, we must restrict the forecast horizon. But this is not set in stone in the sense that it should prevent us from considering problems that may arise in a few years’ time. Moreover, there are risk scenarios that are difficult to capture in terms of forecasts. Even if your ambition is to base the monetary policy decision on what are termed unbiased forecasts, in which upside and downside risks are balanced, you should be aware of the  10  For a description of how decision-making data for monetary policy decisions are prepared, see the speech “The monetary policy decision-making process” by Irma Rosenberg held on 13 June 2008. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  difficulties involved. In practice, however, such forecasts have difficulties in capturing everything perfectly. In practice, you may wish to guard against some outcomes that you consider to be particularly harmful and that should therefore be avoided at all costs.
We must also take care with the resilience of “shadow banking” firms and structures characterised by liquidity transformation and leverage.4 And we must take account of the network of exposures and behavioural influences of funds, long-term institutions, brokers etc. They are all connected by markets. I find it is helpful to distinguish between those markets whose role is to provide essential support to banking and insurance, and those markets that directly deliver the financial system’s core functions to the rest of the economy. For example, the overnight wholesale money markets are vitally important, because banking could not operate without them. They are effectively part of the payments system infrastructure, and have long been of concern to central banks. The financing markets, notably repo, fall into the same broad category, although the authorities could have been closer to the securities lending markets over the past decade. There is a lesson in that. Some other markets, typically in the past more distant from the attention of the financial stability authorities, may matter in their own right to end users. That is especially relevant where a significant proportion of the intermediation of savings/investment occurs via capital markets rather than via bank balance sheets. In the USA at least, some securitisation markets probably pass that test. In the UK, I would guess that the equity and corporate bond markets do so. The integrity of those core capital markets is vital. Such markets must be resilient to shocks.

Its first order challenge would be to reach a judgment on whether the financial system was undermining its own resilience by getting carried away in extending credit in an environment of rising asset prices and optimism about future output levels. The FPC would need neither to obstruct an improvement in the underlying performance of the economy, nor let the party get out of control. But that is what Taking Away the Punchbowl is about. The same difficult judgments would face a combined monetary-and-macroprudential decision maker. And a separate monetary policymaker would have a shared interest in the downside risks to inflation not being exacerbated by the prospect of a credit bust following an unchecked boom. In those kind of circumstances, we should be helped by the tempo of the two endeavours differing. The FPC is less likely to make frequent course changes. That is reflected in its meeting routinely on a quarterly basis, contrasting with the MPC’s monthly meetings. So, as in the relationship between monetary policy and fiscal policy, the MPC will be able to take into account perturbations to aggregate demand from the FPCs interventions. Both committees are part of the Bank of England, so the executive of the Bank will ensure that there is a common information base. FPC members are invited to the monthly briefing for MPC members. And vice versa, consistent with MPC members already being free to attend the internal financial stability briefings established over the past year or so.
Four years ago in the run-up to the Paris Climate accord, the Bank called for improved financial disclosure of climate-related financial risks in order to break the Tragedy of the Horizon.29 Just two years ago, the TCFD led by Michael Bloomberg made its final recommendations to the G20 Leaders Summit in Hamburg.30 Since then there has been a step change in climate reporting by the private sector. On the demand side, current supporters of the TCFD control balance sheets totalling $ trillion and include the world’s top banks, asset managers, pension funds, insurers, credit rating agencies, accounting firms and shareholder advisory services.31 On the supply side, the TCFD report published last week showed that four fifths of the 1100 G20 companies surveyed were now disclosing climate-related financial risks and three quarters of users of the information had seen a marked improvement in the quality of disclosures.32 In the future, to achieve a carbon-neutral economy, disclosure must become mandatory. Before it does, we need to get it right. Over the next few years, the current iterative process of disclosure, reaction and adjustment will be critical to ensure that these market standards are as comparable, efficient and decisionuseful as possible. Disclosure is just the start. Analysis needs to go beyond the static to the strategic. The nature of climate risks mean that the biggest challenge is in assessing the resilience of firms’ strategies to transition risks. Transition risks result from the huge adjustments required to create a low-carbon economy.

Over the past decade, the proportion of total payments made in cash has declined from two thirds to one quarter.4 The digital economy is more inclusive, offering easier and more cost effective routes to market for firms both large and small, and greater access for consumers both near and far. This new economy is placing new demands on finance. Consumers and businesses increasingly expect transactions to be settled in real time, checkout to become an historical anomaly, and payments across borders to be indistinguishable from those across the street. While there have been some notable successes, the UK system has a way to go before it meets these expectations. Thus far, most innovation has happened around payment initiation – the method used to instruct a payment – such as credit or debit card, banking app or mobile wallet. There have also been some advances in the networks – or rails – that underpin some of these apps. For example, the Faster Payment System (FPS) launched a decade ago has made payments quicker (within two hours) and more cost effective by encouraging direct bank-to-bank transfers. While mobile app PayM uses FPS to facilitate direct bank-to-bank payments between individuals via text, it requires both the sender and recipient to be signed up to the third party service.
And, I regularly visit different parts of our District so that I can meet with local businesses, community development professionals, and the people who live and work here. This on-the-ground intelligence is valuable to me and helps inform my view of the region and the economy, which, in turn, plays an important role in shaping my outlook on policy. Let me now talk a bit about job growth in our region. Job growth in the region Nationally, the labor market has added 2.4 million jobs over the past year. And, the strong jobs reports released over the past two months have helped allay concerns that arose earlier this year that job growth was beginning to stall. Indeed, these reports reinforce my view that labor market conditions continue to improve. Turning to conditions closer to home; job growth in our region has generally been somewhat below the national pace. One important exception is New York City, where job growth has been strong, despite the relatively sluggish performance of the financial services industry. In the past, the City has counted on job growth from Wall Street to fuel economic growth during recoveries and expansions. This time around, however, job gains in the securities industry have been meager. Instead, the City’s job growth has been quite widespread in sectors outside of finance. One that is especially noteworthy is the City’s burgeoning technology sector, which has been creating jobs in industries such as internet publishing, online shopping, and scientific research and development.

Jarle Bergo: Monetary policy, cyclical fluctuations and competitiveness Address by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the Norwegian Association of Economists, 5 September 2002. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 7 August and on previous speeches. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss the relationships between monetary policy, cyclical developments and competitiveness. There has been some debate about monetary policy this summer. Part of this debate has focused on the role monetary policy can and should have in smoothing fluctuations in the real economy and safeguarding competitiveness in the Norwegian business sector. Some have maintained that we place too much weight on reaching the inflation target. Statements like this should be discussed in the light of what monetary policy can be used for and of the broad effects on the economy of various monetary policy objectives. Only when we have clarified our options, can we discuss whether the emphasis on the inflation target is “too great”, “too little” or “just right”. I hope to be able to offer some clarification today. I think it will also become clear that Norges Bank in its implementation of monetary policy consciously seeks to avoid unnecessary disturbances in the real economy.