samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The underlying rationale is that a person who does not know how to save does not know how to spend money too. •  Beneficiaries were socially mobilised prior to providing funding so as to create solid customers for banks. This provided a permanent resolve to beneficiaries to go through the hard path of moving out of poverty. •  The group lending system consolidated into Development Societies at the village level and People’s Companies at the district level enabled the project to set up very vital networks in the form effective social capital. It also helped the project to ensure the sustainability of the project when both the foreign funding and Central Bank’s patronage were withdrawn. •  Skills and capacity development of the beneficiaries were conducted continuously in order to make them better entrepreneurs and bankable customers. This helped them to receive a continuous flow of funds for meeting their working capital and investment capital requirements. •  The group savings fund set up under each group helped to provide insurance to the beneficiaries in the event of unforeseen emergencies. In this manner, the beneficiaries were taught the vital lesson of self-reliance and self-accountability. •  The forward sale contract scheme introduced along with the project helped the beneficiaries who borrowed for agricultural purposes to enjoy a stable price system for major crops and be free from disastrous price fluctuations. References APRACA, Self Help Groups as Informal Financial Intermediaries, (1992), APRACA Publications, Bangkok.

John C Williams: A New York moment Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at "The Future of New York City: Charting an Equitable Recovery for All", Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 31 March 2022. *** Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I am excited to see many of you joining us here-live-at our building on Liberty Street in downtown Manhattan. It means so much to us to be able to bring people together to discuss the future of New York City in our first-ever hybrid public event. I'd also like to welcome all the guests and panelists who are joining us virtually. This is more than a conference. It's a moment that marks a new era for how we think about living and working in this city. In fact, if you were to wander down these halls, you'd see my colleagues bringing that idea to life. We reopened our doors to all employees last month, and we're so glad to be back and working together in person. For us, this is part of a flexible model that allows for a mix of days in the office with remote work. We believe that being here in this way is best for our employees, best for this city, and best for the Federal Reserve's Second District, which is the region we serve.
At the same time, cost factors, which gained strength in recent quarters, have begun to ease, despite persisting at high levels (figure 2). The activity gap remains high and inflation continues to be exceptionally high, both signs that the adjustment process of the Chilean economy is yet to conclude. In fact, the projections that I will present to you in a few minutes continue to assume that the economy will contract further and that the annual change in GDP will be negative next year. 2  Expectations for inflation are still high too. Two-year measures remain above 3%, but with some moderation in the margin. In the one-year horizon, expectations have declined somewhat more, to between 4.5% and 6% in the surveys to experts. This compares with the values between 7% and 8% that we published our September Report (figure 3). On the cost side, the decline in global transportation fares, the reduction of bottlenecks and the continued normalization of global supply chains deserve a line. At the same time, international commodity prices have eased. In the November Business Perceptions Report, companies perceived more limited cost increases, although the volatility and level of the exchange rate were still a factor of concern. The cost expectations (IMCE) of the trade and manufacturing sectors also show a significant decline in recent months (figure 4). In terms of activity, as I mentioned, the data for the third quarter generally confirm that the economy continues its adjustment process.

The Ministry of Finance will provide additional clarification and detailed explanation of the income tax treatment on more prescribed Islamic financing arrangements including financing through a partnership arrangement, project finance as well as interbank placement of funds6. This is in  6  The tax circular will cover Islamic financing arrangements based on Diminishing Musharaka (financing through a partnership arrangement) and Istisna (project financing) and interbank placement based on Wakala (agency contract) and Murabaha (sale at cost-plus) concepts. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  keeping with our long-standing principle that Shariah-compliant products should not be disadvantaged in terms of regulatory and tax treatment where the economic substance and risks are similar to conventional products. We hope that this will expedite the development of more such financial products in Singapore. Conclusion 18. To sum up, the Middle East and Asia continue to present attractive opportunities. Both regions need to work closer together to achieve greater synergy and accelerate the global growth of Islamic finance. Singapore will play its part in this international effort together with our regional and industry partners. 19. I am glad to see more players from Middle East and Asia participating in this year’s Summit. I hope that you will take up the challenge to work together to spur the development of Islamic finance as a bridge between Asia and the Middle East. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Despite the headwinds from continuing debt-overhang and recent financial distress, European authorities in 2011 judged that the eurozone economy was emerging from recession and headline inflation was at risk to rise persistently above target. The European Central Bank (ECB) responded by raising policy rates in 2011. The ECB soon had to backtrack as output in the eurozone fell again and inflation began to march down below target. Today, the eurozone faces continued economic weakness and an inflation rate that is just about 1/2 percent. As a result, the ECB recently lowered policy rates to the ZLB, has started undertaking additional unconventional monetary policies, and is now encouraging fiscal expansion among eurozone countries that are able to do so. These lessons from monetary history strongly suggest that there are great risks to premature liftoff from the ZLB or near-ZLB conditions. Unless economic conditions are fundamentally strong and the previous impediments to growth have receded sufficiently, the odds remain high that monetary authorities will need to retreat right back into the ZLB. And the costs of being mired in the ZLB are simply very large. The ZLB prevents using our very best policy tools to address negative shocks. The ZLB means that interest rates cannot fall low enough to equate the supply of saving with the demand for investment, which, of course, significantly impedes capital formation, future economic growth, and the health of labor markets.

The enhanced intermediation during this decade has benefitted access to financing, particularly for small and medium enterprises, has also improved, both in volume and efficiency. By leveraging on the distribution networks of commercial banks, enhanced product and risk management capabilities, access to financing by this sector has increased at an annual rate of almost 20% since 2005. The financial infrastructure in Malaysia has also been significantly strengthened. Malaysia has an effective financial safety net that includes a comprehensive deposit insurance system and institutional arrangements that provide avenues for advisory, redress and rehabilitation. Innovations in payment systems and instruments as well as infrastructure for the issuance, trading and settlement of debt securities and the access improved market information has contributed to greater efficiency and has also enhanced the overall price discovery process. To support our liberalisation measures our payment infrastructure has also been enhanced to support cross-border trade settlements in local currency and cross-border liquidity support arrangements for financial institutions. Today, Malaysia also has a deep and vibrant bond market which is the largest in South East Asia, and a comprehensive Islamic financial system that is recognised as among the most advanced in the world. The bond market comprising of the conventional and sukuk market has trebled in size, providing businesses with alternative access to financing solutions including in multicurrency to meet a diverse range of risk and maturity preferences.
Gent Sejko: Do crises change economic fundamentals in SEE Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Conference “Do crises change economic fundamentals in SEE?”, hosted by the Bank of Albania, organised in cooperation with the South East European Studies at Oxford, Tirana, 30 October 2015. *  *  *  Your Excellency Prime Minister, Dear Governor Hamza and senior central bank representatives, Your excellencies ambassadors, Dear guests, friends and colleagues, I am delighted to welcome you to the annual conference of the Bank of Albania organised in cooperation with the South East Europe Studies at Oxford. It is a pleasure to see that this cooperation brings together old and new partners. This has been a tough year full of challenges for the Albanian economy, consequently for the work of the Bank of Albania. The full recovery of economic growth and its further improvement in the future are and remain one of the top priorities of our work for the year. The prolonged crisis has impelled us and homologous institutions across the world to review many of the economic axioms, which we had taken for granted for a long time. It is not by accident that the main topic of the conference focuses on the causality and solutions for long-term problems we are facing during this period. Over the five year period, the Albanian economy has been growing in positive territory, yet, below its potential.

The real sector is showing signs of constant recovery, corroborated by some positive developments in the external economy. I would like to underline that a clearer prospect of the political and economic situation in Greece will have a positive impact over the upcoming period. The Bank of Albania has been continuously monitoring the developments in our Southern neighbour, aware of the various risks that could spill over in the Albanian economy. But, thanks to the precise and duly interventions, especially in the banking sector, these risks never materialised. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The constant easing of the monetary policy seems to be reflected especially in investment indicators, with the domestic and foreign ones showing significant improvement over the first half of the year. On our side, we are happy that these investments were not only due to public sector interventions. There was also a substantial component by the private sector. This makes us believe that well-studied projects by the investors, coupled with an increasingly sound and pro-investment business climate, will serve as main drivers for the economy towards not only higher but also more sustainable growth in the near future. In accordance with the best contemporary practices, the Bank of Albania has endeavoured to enhance the transparency in its communication with the public, not only about the actual decisions but also about our forecasts. The Bank of Albania has constantly conveyed to the economic agents the idea that the monetary policy will remain accommodative and will sustain the revitalisation of the economy.
Large institutions  The implicit subsidy to banks that are perceived as “too important to fail” can be important to banks of any size but is usually seen as bigger for large institutions for which existing bank resolution procedures either do or could not apply. Moreover, most large complex financial institutions are global – at least in life if not in death. So a major international effort is underway to try to work out how best to deal with such institutions, initiated by heads of government at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh in 2009. Much of this work is being led by the Financial Stability Board. Ideas agreed in principle or under consideration include an addition to the Basel III capital requirement of an extra layer of either equity or other loss-absorbing capital, a special resolution regime for large institutions that would allow losses to be shared among creditors as well as equity-holders, and tentative steps towards international harmonisation of resolution procedures on which my colleague Paul Tucker and others are engaged. Some countries have already started down the road of augmenting the Basel calibration with additional requirements of their own for large banks. Earlier this month the Swiss authorities announced just such a requirement for their two current systemically important banks – UBS  BIS Review 140/2010  7  and Credit Suisse.

Efficient operation of a payments system and supervision of the banking sector are two other basic functions of a central bank. These two functions can also be performed in a way that supports price stability targets: indeed, a sound, effective financial sector and payments system are necessary conditions for price stability. Duties assumed by the Central Bank of Turkey in the economy, which aims at price stability, should be consistent with the target. Functions that conflict with the price stability target or which cause difficulties for the achievement of this target should not be assigned to the Central Bank. And this should be the basic theme of the Bank’s medium and long-term strategic planning. BIS Review 37/1998 ˝  -2-  Whether or not those functions assumed by the Central Bank as a result of such factors as the country’s geographic size, history, legal structure and degree of technological development operate as impediments to the achievement of stability targets, can be examined by means of several criteria. Effective use of monetary policy is an absolute necessity for a central bank that takes price stability as its first priority. We must therefore review those functions of the Central Bank that interfere with the effectiveness of monetary policy. At this point, I would like to emphasise the importance of increasing the Central Bank’s control over its own balance sheet, which is one of the main conditions required for the effective implementation of policies, mainly monetary policy, that must be adopted in order to achieve the price stability target.
However, these values are far below the objective of price stability, which is defined as inflation of below, but close to, 2% in the medium term. The latest data, referring to the February estimate, for the euro area’s Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices show a year-on-year increase of 0.9%, the same figure as in January. The smaller drop in energy prices appears to have been offset, in the context of rising oil prices, by moderation in the core component (which excludes energy and food). The latter fell by 0.3 pp with respect to January to 1.1%. This outcome was determined in particular by temporary factors, such as the updated HICP weights, which since January are based on 2020 consumption patterns and which, although they will have a very marginal downward moderating effect on the year as a whole, will have a considerable impact on short-term inflation dynamics, making them difficult to interpret. Also, the pandemic containment measures appear to be changing the seasonal sales calendar in various countries. The situation I have just described is, therefore, one of a fragile, uneven and uncertain recovery in the euro area, where some of the downside risks for our short-term baseline scenario, which were identified just a few months ago, appear to be materialising. Against the current backdrop of uncertainty surrounding both the course of the pandemic and the speed of the vaccination campaigns, the best contribution that economic policy can make is to instil confidence and certainty.

For instance, after a strong pick-up in 2020 Q3, the GDP growth rate returned to negative territory (-0.6%) in Q4 as a result of the pandemic containment measures being reintroduced in most countries. Thus, at end-2020 GDP was still 5% below the level recorded in 2019 Q4. Drawing on the ECB projection exercise conducted prior to the spread of the pandemic (published in  2  See, for example, the October 2020 bank lending survey (BLS). See Menéndez-Pujadas and Mulino (2020) for a summary of the results of the survey for participating Spanish banks. 3  See Alves et al. (2020) and Alves et al. (2021) for further details on the developments in financing granted to firms and households in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. 4  December 2019), at end-2020 GDP was 6.3% below the level forecast for the end of that year. By country, among the four largest euro area economies, the output loss was more pronounced in Spain (9.1%) than in Italy, France and Germany (down 6.6%, 4.9% and 3.6%, respectively). Also of note is the heterogeneous cross-sector impact of the pandemic, which is mainly affecting services. Much uncertainty also persists regarding the intensity of the recovery in the early stages of 2021, in view of the recent course of the pandemic in Europe. The available short-term indicators signal a slowdown in activity so far this year. Should the additional health crisis containment measures endure across the board, a fresh contraction in some countries or sectors cannot be ruled out.
I believe that the Association would be the first to admit that the amount of work required to pull this off has been staggering. As time grows ever shorter, such industry-wide tests may prove impractical for some markets. Many market participants are also considering the role of proxy testing, in which the tests are conducted by a third party, such as a user group, rather than by each institution for itself. Needless to say, there is some risk in such an approach. However, proxy testing may be appropriate where it is not practical for every user of a service to conduct point-to-point testing with every other user. In terms of advice, Year 2000 testing obviously is critical, but each market must consider what is achievable in the time that remains. Internal testing is the most critical, and no institution should be allowed to go forward with a Year 2000 plan that does not allot ample time for internal testing. External testing also is important, and payment and settlement systems in particular should make external test facilities available to participants. The degree of elaborate external testing that can be achieved will then be a function of the time available to adequately plan for such a test. It simply does not make sense to devote considerable resources to a test plan that is not likely to be realized. A key goal of testing programs is to build confidence that systems will work as expected on January 3, 2000.

Critical infrastructure such as transport, water, power and telecommunications systems are also likely to be affected. Nearly all aspects of the economy in every country are therefore potentially at risk because of the widespread dependence on a country’s core infrastructure. The unprecedented scope of the Year 2000 problem means that a critical aspect of the issue is the management challenge. Substantial management resources are needed to coordinate the efforts to assess, repair, and test affected systems prior to the fixed deadline of BIS Review 85/1998  -2-  January 1, 2000. At the Federal Reserve, for example, we have created a number of management positions within our organization that are focused exclusively on different aspects of our Year 2000 preparations. A final point that underscores the need for urgent and sustained action is the increasing focus on the issue by the media, by the public and by market observers such as the rating agencies. Over the course of 1999, the extent of Year 2000 preparations by financial organizations will become the subject of ever more intensive scrutiny. As supervisors, therefore, we must do all we can to support the efforts of market participants to address the problem effectively, and to build confidence among others that this is being accomplished. While we must make it clear that supervisors cannot solve the problem, we can help mobilize others to take the necessary steps.
The baseline scenario of this Report reduces the growth outlook for gross fixed capital formation. This new estimate assumes that mining investment will remain near its levels of 2015. Also, that the boost that the coming into force of the VAT on construction gave to housing investment will be diluted as time passes. Add to this the lower impulse coming from public investment associated with the recently announced fiscal adjustment. Other investments should recover gradually over the projection horizon, to the extent that expectations and external demand improve. Meanwhile, in line with the expected slowdown of our trading partners, exports are also revised downward from December. Manufacturing shipments will be most affected, considering that their destinations are more concentrated in Latin America, and some sectors, such as salmon, have been beset by specific factors. On the imports side, changes are bigger, because we estimate that the adjustment in spending will be greater for tradables given the evolution of the exchange rate. Thus, the current account deficit should reach 2.5 percent of GDP in 2016. This correction reflects both price and volume adjustments. In 2017, the deficit will be reduced to 2 percent of GDP, considering increased exports of copper resulting from the entry into production of some deposits and improved terms of trade. Measured at trend prices the current account deficit will have a similar evolution.

Employment, total, seasonally-adjusted data Labour force, ages 15–64, seasonally-adjusted data. Source: The OECD  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 3. Credit developments in Sweden and the euro area Households and companies, annual percentage change 20  20 Euro area households Euro area companies Sweden households  15  15  Sweden companies  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5 03  05  07  09  11  13  Note. For Sweden, MFI lending to households. Sources: The ECB SDW and Statistics Sweden  Figure 4. Number of occurrences of “household debt” in around 80 newspapers and journals Number of hits 2005-2013 400  400  350  350  300  300  250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0 05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Sources: TNS Sifo and the Riksbank  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5.