samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Two are linked to the long term, to the past 20 years of the euro that we will celebrate on 1 January: the historical will; the economic results. And two are linked to the very nature of the economic policies being pursued today: the single monetary policy; and the decentralisation of other policies. 1/ First, let me just give you a brief historical reminder: from the outset, it was Italy and France that wanted the euro, much more than Germany. I remember Rome in December 1990 and the Palazzo Montecitorio, where we opened the Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union – chaired as it happens by Guido Carli. We then built the euro together, step by step – and since then, it has been managed much more by the French and the Italians – from Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa to Mario Draghi – than by the Germans. Yes, Frankfurt is in Germany… just as Brussels is in Belgium. But Italy and France now carry much more weight than before in the decision-making, because, in practice, at the time of the franc and the lira, our monetary policies had to more or less conform to Germany’s. We only had one freedom left: the freedom to periodically devalue our currencies; that was also humiliating, and above all left our people financially worse off.

It is clear from this economic integration that the fear of the region’s borders considerably compromising economic development cannot be confirmed. Rather, the diminishing, relative importance of intra-regional foreign trade and intra-regional cross-border direct investment is due more to globalisation and the ensuing increase in the influence of Eastern European and Asian economies than to weakening ties within the Upper Rhine region. Thirdly, the most notable aspect of the relationship between the region’s two currencies since the introduction of the euro in 1999 is its stability. That does not mean, however, that the issue of Switzerland’s ascension to the EU is of no consequence. Having its own currency allows Switzerland to conduct an independent monetary policy that is tailored to suit its needs. Finally, the economic policy can help the region thrive further by removing remaining hurdles, such as those in the labour market and in the exchange of goods and services (Cassis de Dijon principle). A well-integrated economic region is the key to a prosperous future. “Three nations, two currencies, one economic area” - the title of the paper - not only describes the reality, it also maps out the way forward. BIS Review 45/2005  1
BIS Review 116/2006  Figure 1  g g Sweden and the percentage of capital managed Per cent  30  4  20  3  10  2  0  1 Jun-06  Jun-04  Jun-03  Jun-02  Jun-01  Number of funds (left scale)  Dec-05  5  Jun-05  40  Dec-04  6  Dec-03  50  Dec-02  7  Dec-01  60  Percentage of capital managed (right scale) Source: Fondbolagens förening  Figure 2  Market index 400  300  200  100  S&P 500  Jan-07  Jan-06  Jan-05  Jan-04  Jan-03  Jan-02  Jan-01  Jan-00  Jan-99  Jan-98  Jan-97  Jan-96  Jan-95  Jan-94  0  CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index Source: Reuters Ecowin  BIS Review 116/2006  3  Figure 3  Nordic Hedge fund index (NHX) Sweden and the Affärsvärlden general index 200  160  120  80  40  0 Jan-02  Jan-03  Jan-04 NHX Sweden  Jan-05  Jan-06  Jan-07  AFGX  Sources: Reuters Ecowin and Hedgenordic  Initially, the investors consisted almost exclusively of wealthy individuals. Gradually, institutional investors such as pension funds, foundations and insurance companies have also begun to invest in hedge funds. Some time back the market also opened up to small-scale savers, as a number of hedge funds now have lower minimum requirements for the capital invested.

When an economy falls into a recession the central bank cuts its policy rate to boost demand and raise the too low inflation rate. If the recession is really deep, as during the financial crisis, the policy rate may need to be cut substantially. The average level of the policy rate largely depends on how high the inflation target is. If the inflation target is low, the average nominal policy rate is also low. This means that a low inflation target does not give very much scope to cut the policy rate before it hits its lower bound. The lower the inflation target, the more often one can thus count on the policy rate hitting this lower bound. Previously, it was assumed that the lower bound for the nominal interest rate was zero, but recently it has become clear that it is possible to have slightly negative policy rates. Less risk of hitting the “near zero lower bound” The higher the inflation target is, the greater the “buffer” monetary policy has if it is necessary to stimulate the economy – the nominal “close to zero rate” corresponds to a lower real interest rate. When the inflation-targeting policy was introduced in the early 1990s, a target of 2 per cent developed into something of a standard.
Institutional capability and independence  On the institutional side, the question is whether a central bank has the institutional status and necessary independence to carry out any action it sees necessary to fulfil its task. The Governing Council has the unfettered capability to take and implement appropriate policy decisions whenever circumstances warrant, given the ECB’s strong institutional independence. This reflects the maintenance of a clear dividing line in the euro area between the central bank and the fiscal sphere of responsibilities. The fact that the ECB has refrained from purchasing government bonds is in line with this institutional framework. This approach avoids any possibly intricate interaction with other policy actors on decisions relevant for exit, and maintains a clear separation of responsibilities between the central bank and fiscal authorities. 4. Reputation to act when appropriate  Any strategy will only be credible if there is no doubt about the ex ante determination of the institution to implement the required actions. This is the fourth cornerstone. From this perspective, the ECB’s determination to act in a consistent way is beyond any doubt. Over the past decade, our institution has established a clear track record of vigilance and reputation for acting in a timely fashion. Let me give only two examples: in December 2005 the Governing Council, on the basis of its monetary policy strategy, acted promptly to address mounting risks to price stability.

However, the data, or the explanations may not count if they do not reach the public and do not influence their decisions. According to some estimates, by 2025, 463 exabytes of data will be created each day globally. This means huge generation of data that can blur the official statistical information making it difficult for people to read and understand it. Obviously, to bring statistics closer to the public we need to place further focus on aspects such as putting numbers in perspective so that they can be easily understood by the wider public, language simplification, that sometimes is not an easy task for experts that are used to statistical taxonomy, segmentation of the audience (communicate not only to financial analysts and journalist, but to the broader audience, although through different channels), as well as creation of relatable content that considers what matters to the public and at the same time is educational and entertaining4. Along those lines, the National Bank, recognizing the importance of communication, engages in quite an array of activities. At the end, I feel that it is appropriate to conclude my address with the motto of the European Statistics Day 2021 "Statistics, a vaccine to protect democracy and combat the virus of disinformation". 1 "Survey of National Statistical Offices (NSOs) during COVID-19", World Bank and the  United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD), brief, July 6 2020.
News conference  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan Ladies and gentlemen It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. Owing to the coronavirus pandemic, we can unfortunately only meet virtually today. The pandemic is placing a very heavy burden on people across the world, and Switzerland is no different. Our sympathies go in particular to those who have fallen ill themselves or who have lost relatives and friends. In my remarks, I will begin by explaining our monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation. I will then discuss the topic of climate change and the SNB. Fritz Zurbrügg will report on developments in the area of financial stability and the impact of the pandemic on the demand for banknotes. Andréa Maechler will then comment on the situation on the financial markets and will look at the upcoming replacement of the CHF Libor with SARON. We will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions afterwards. Monetary policy decision  The coronavirus pandemic is continuing to have a strong adverse effect on the economy. Against this difficult backdrop, we are maintaining our expansionary monetary policy with a view to stabilising economic activity and price developments. We are keeping the SNB policy rate and interest on sight deposits at the SNB at −0.75%. In light of the highly valued Swiss franc, we remain willing to intervene more strongly in the foreign exchange market.

This resulted in the global economy posting a strong recovery in the third quarter. Nevertheless, GDP remained significantly below pre-crisis levels in most countries. Infection numbers have unfortunately risen again rapidly in Europe and the US since October. In response to this, numerous containment measures have once more been adopted, and the population has become more cautious again when it comes to activities with a higher risk of infection. Recent indicators show that this is once more having a detrimental impact on economic activity. In various countries, this could even result in GDP shrinking in the fourth quarter. However, the effects can be expected to be smaller than in spring given that many countries have opted for less severe containment measures. In our baseline scenario for the global economy, we anticipate that the pandemic will be brought back under control in the foreseeable future, and that appropriate measures will prevent further waves of infection. The economic recovery should therefore regain momentum in the course of next year. The monetary and fiscal policy measures adopted worldwide are providing important support in this regard. However, it is likely that global production capacity will be underutilised for some time to come and inflation will remain modest in most countries. This scenario is subject to a high level of uncertainty, and there are risks on the upside and downside alike. On the one hand, the pandemic or trade tensions could additionally hamper economic activity.
This experience is another example of the advantages to be had from abandoning indexation clauses, which are no more than a legacy of inflationary habits from a past firmly behind us, but whose continuing use has been a source of problems, as the Banco de España has reiterated. Improving our economy’s productivity in the medium and long run will require seeing through other, deeper structural reforms, including most notably sectoral liberalisation, the rationalisation of the public sector’s role in economic activity and improvements to the education system. These are reforms whose introduction needs time and whose effects will be deployed over a lengthy period; but the resolve to adopt them also has positive effects in the short run by improving expectations about our economy’s economic growth, which is particularly welcome in these testing times. Thank you. 6  BIS Review 129/2010

Because we’re determined not to repeat the cycles of the past when bursts of post-crisis reforms would eventually drift into complacency and cohabitation. When the caravan moved on, markets were left unattended to slip slowly into excess and ethical drift. Today we want not only to profile progress made, but also to spur a continual process of review and reform. This isn’t just about fixing the fault lines that caused the last crisis, but also about seizing new opportunities from fintech and market-based finance. It's about building truly global markets, in the UK and elsewhere, and the cross-border governance and cooperation they need to function well. It is precisely because we don’t know all the answers that we’re setting questions before us today: - What more needs to be done? Are there gaps that will ultimately allow markets to go wrong again? - Are there other places where the pendulum has swung too far, preventing markets from serving society as they should? - And are there other changes needed to build the necessary supports over time? We want to hear from those who might question the steps already taken. We welcome new ideas that challenge conventions of how markets should operate, and whose eyes are fixed on the future of markets that will become ever more important. I’m only sorry there couldn’t be more of us here today. We were four times oversubscribed for places.
It is possible that the level of inflation can become negative and that we will thus see deflation in some countries. Deflation for a short period is not a major problem. We even had this in Sweden a few years ago. But if deflation is prolonged, and especially if inflation expectations fall and deflation expectations arise, the situation can become very problematic. The combination of very low policy rates, a weak real economy and the risk of deflation has thus revived the debate about how monetary policy can and should be conducted in the event of a zero interest rate bound. In the 1990s, Japan experienced a long period with a zero interest rate, deflation and, compared with previous decades, weak real economic development. The experience gained in Japan has stimulated extensive discussion and a great deal of research at universities and central banks on monetary policy in connection with a zero interest rate bound. At Princeton University, Ben Bernanke, Paul Krugman and I conducted research on this subject. 3 The Japanese experience and the research conducted on monetary policy with a zero interest rate are now topical again. For Sweden, a scenario with deflation and a zero interest rate is as yet not particularly likely. However, at the Riksbank we must of course be prepared for all eventualities and consider what measures would be possible and appropriate in such a situation. We must also think about how we can minimise the risk of ending up in such a situation.

23 years of experience in regulating and developing the Islamic financial system. ii. strong Islamic financial institutions comprising 12 Islamic banks. Of this, 3 are foreign Islamic financial institutions and 7 are Islamic subsidiaries of banking groups. There are also several Islamic windows of conventional banking institutions which are also lead arrangers of Islamic financial instruments. In the takaful industry, there are 9 takaful operators. iii. a strong Islamic capital market with 89 Islamic unit trust funds, 85 percent of Bursa Malaysia's counters are Shariah approved counters and 46 percent of the corporate bond market are Islamic bonds or sukuks. iv. a well established and comprehensive regulatory and Shariah governance framework in accordance with best practices, together with a tax neutrality policy. v.  a comprehensive legal and Shariah infrastructure. vi. well endowed with the critical mass and a wide array of Islamic products and services. vii. Talent development infrastructure. viii. a vibrant and active secondary market trading of the Islamic money and capital markets equipped with the state-of-the-art technology. We are now at the cross-road in the development of Islamic finance. We realise that we are strong at the domestic level, and we now need to strategise to elevate the industry to the next phase of development. During the keynote address yesterday, Governor has launched Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC) for the offering of Islamic financial products and services in international currencies from anywhere in Malaysia.
Indeed, I will argue that in order to understand how unconventional policy affects the exchange rate at, or close to, the lower bound, it is useful to break down long-term yields into their two main components – the expectations component and the term premium. Slide 3 shows the insights that can be gained from this breakdown. Here I focus on the period 2012 to 2014. During this period, short-term rates barely moved, as you saw on the previous slide, while the long-term interest rate differential was by and large disconnected from exchange rate movements – you can see this clearly again on the left-hand side. But now consider the right-hand chart. Here I plot the exchange rate against the differential of the expectations component of ten-year interest rates as extracted from dynamic term structure models.7 Put simply, it is the same ten-year rate differential as on the left-hand chart, only corrected for the term premium estimate. The correlation during 2012 and 2013 is compelling, at around 0.75. Shortly before the crisis, in 2005 and 2006, the correlation was less than 0.4. Incidentally, the close relationship coincides with a considerable strengthening of central banks’ forward guidance on interest rates. The Federal Reserve, for example, introduced date-based forward guidance in mid-2011 and adopted state-contingent guidance in late 2012. The ECB, for its part, introduced rate forward guidance for the first time in July 2013, one year before it announced its credit easing programme.

For most of the first half of my own working life - through the 1960s and much of the 1970s - the essential emphasis of economic management in the UK was on short-term aggregate demand management, with too little regard to the structural, supply-side capacity of the economy to meet that demand. Monetary and fiscal policy were used in combination to try to maintain an appropriate balance between what were seen as conflicting objectives of growth and full employment on the one hand and price stability and balance of payments equilibrium on the other. Slow growth and high unemployment were typically met with monetary and fiscal stimulus. As the symptoms of imbalance inevitably emerged - in the form of external deficits or accelerating inflation - attempts were made initially to suppress those symptoms through various forms of direct control (for example, foreign exchange controls or credit ceilings or prices and income policies) but as demand pressures built up macroeconomic policies had eventually to be thrown sharply into reverse. This was the go-stop policy cycle that resulted in the exaggerated boom-bust economic cycle, which was for a long time a pronounced characteristic of British economic performance. Such macroeconomic instability was disruptive in itself, but it also had the effect of encouraging short-term attitudes to both financial and non-financial investment, with a corrosive effect on our longer-term, supply-side capacity.
OECD (2013) documents an increase in market income inequality over the period 2007–2010 across developed countries, and reports with respect to the top and bottom 10% of the income distribution that “lower income households either lost more from income falls or benefitted less from the often sluggish recovery.” In general it is likely that adverse income and employment shocks hurt the poor the most, for example because they lack the ability to hedge against these shocks and may lack access to credit markets to smooth them. Even if crises have a neutral effect on income inequality, the poor are much less able to absorb a cut in income (Honohan 2005). 15  For an assessment of the distributional effects of the Bank of England’s asset purchases, see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/nr073.pdf. 16  See Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012). 17  See Abel, Deitz and Su (2014). 18  Yellen (2012). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the system as a whole. That is now reflected in the Bank of England’s responsibility to bring a macroprudential perspective to financial stability policy. Financial reform and rebuilding social capital Central banks’ greatest contribution to inclusive capitalism may be driving financial reforms that are helping to re-build the necessary social capital. In doing so, we need to recognise the tension between pure free market capitalism, which reinforces the primacy of the individual at the expense of the system, and social capital which requires from individuals a broader sense of responsibility for the system.

Pew Research Center (2013), “Economies of emerging markets better rated during difficult times; global downturn takes heavy toll; inequality seen as rising”, May. Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Economic-Report-FINAL-May23–20131.pdf Putnam, R (2001), “Social capital: measurement and consequences”, mimeo. Sandel, M (2012), What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Macmillan Shanmugaratnam, T (2013) “The Invisible Hand of Social Culture”, 6th S Rajaratnam Lecture, December. Smith, A (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Wilkinson, R and Pickett, K (2009), The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do better, Penguin. Yellen, J (2012), “The economic outlook for monetary policy”, Speech to the Money Marketeers of New York University, April. Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20120411a.htm  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches