samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Incidentally, Argentine inflation figures from PriceStats continue to show much higher inflation than the official figures (see http://www.pricestats.com/ argentina-series). From February 2012, The Economist has replaced the official inflation figures for Argentina in its statistical tables with inflation figures compiled by PriceStats. 22  Index manipulation is a demanding enterprise that often resulted in perverse economic incentives, sometimes with entertaining results. After 1945, a stabilisation strategy was one of the cornerstones of the Government’s economic policy, and prices were to be kept stable as a way of navigating through the economic cycle. In July 1948, the Ministry of Trade received an offer to purchase a consignment of part-skim Danish Gouda cheese, a food item that was included in the cost-of-living index. Despite the bargain offer, the import price would have been higher than the selling price, so that subsidies would be necessary to avoid impacting the index. The end of the story was that a consignment of full-fat Gouda was imported, an item that was far more expensive, but that was not included in the index. Lie, Einar(1995): Ambisjon og Tradisjon. Finansdepartementet 1945–1965 [Ambition and Tradition]. The Ministry of Finance 1945–1965], Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, p. 121. A few years ago, the news website TV 2 Nettavisen revealed that the large grocery chains adjusted the prices of goods they knew were included in price tests conducted by the media in order to come out favourably in the tests.

Kołakowski, for his part, did not return to Poland when his visiting fellowship ended soon afterward, but defected and became a leading critic of Marxist theory and practice and one of the intellectual fathers of Solidarity and the fall of Communism. 9  Myhre, Jan Eivind (2012): “Norsk historie 1814–1905: Å byggje ein stat og skape ein nasjon” [Norwegian history 1814–1905: Building a state and creating a nation]. 10  The level of trust in a society is influenced by many conditions. It may be that the recent years’ large migration flows are eroding the trust that has prevailed in Norway earlier. However, immigrants have in fact adopted surprisingly rapidly the level of confidence in their new home country. See also Dag Wollebæk (2013): Truer innvandringen tilliten? [Does immigration undermine trust? ], Article in Aftenposten. Alexander Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden at the Norwegian School of Economics are also working on these issues (see e.g. http://paraplyen.nhh.no/paraplyen/arkiv/2012/juni/tillitstesten/). See also Algan and Cahuc (2010): “Inherited Trust and Growth”, American Economic Review 100 (5), pp. 2060–92, who document a strong causal relationship between trust and economic prosperity. 11  Johannes Steen (1827–1906) was born in Christiania (now Oslo). After completing a higher degree in philology at the University of Christiania in 1848, Steen held a number of positions in the school system and was for many years the headmaster of the Stavanger Latin School. Steen was also a member of the Storting and prime minister.
It is for this reason that – in our opinion – the responsibility for the countercyclical capital buffer for domestic lending must lie with the SNB. The National Bank must be able to decide when the buffer is activated and how high it should be. It goes without saying that it would do so within legally defined limits. The same should also apply to the activation of loan-to-value ratios and affordability criteria for mortgage loans. All of these instruments are closely linked to monetary policy. Within the context of the implementation of the TBTF regulations, the systemically important banks will have to be determined. This is because the more rigorous capital and liquidity requirements are only intended for these banks. And because emergency liquidity assistance is also reserved for systemically important banks, the decision as to the systemic importance of a bank has a direct impact on the SNB in its function as lender of last resort. These decision-making powers, too, must therefore be placed in the National Bank’s hands. This proposed solution should give the SNB the formal responsibilities it needs in order to fulfil its mandate in the area of financial stability in a preventative manner. In many countries, a transfer of banking supervision to the central bank is currently the subject of intensive discussion. In contrast, the National Bank is by no means calling into question the separation of banking supervision and central bank activities with the solution presented here. This separation has worked for Switzerland.

That is why it is equally important to identify the build-up of risks in the financial system at an early stage and to take countercyclical measures to mitigate them. It is in this area – referred to as macroprudential policy – where there are still major deficiencies. The National Bank has the statutory mandate to contribute to the stability of the financial system. In its function as lender of last resort, the SNB plays a key role in managing financial crises. It can provide emergency liquidity assistance to a bank that runs into difficulties, thus preventing the negative impact the bank’s default could have on both the banking sector and the economy. This remedial measure proved highly effective during the crisis. However, emergency liquidity assistance should only be provided in exceptional cases, as it creates false incentives for banks and entails considerable financial risks for the SNB. In order for the National Bank to fulfil its mandate, it is imperative that it also be able to take more preventative action in the future. This is the only way the SNB can guard effectively against future crises. Preventative action is only possible if the National Bank has efficient and effective instruments at its disposal. However, there is currently a glaring deficiency in this area. Up until now, the only precautionary measure the SNB could employ was to issue a warning. Yet experience has shown that warnings alone are not enough.
European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the press conference, held in Frankfurt, 4 April 2002. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I will now report on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. As usual, we examined recent monetary, financial and economic developments. The Governing Council concluded that the current level of key ECB interest rates remains appropriate for the maintenance of price stability over the medium term and, accordingly, decided to leave them unchanged. Starting with the analysis under the first pillar of our monetary policy strategy, the three-month average of the annual growth rates of M3 stood at 7.8% in the period from December 2001 to February 2002, compared with 8.0% in the period from November 2001 to January 2002. The high level of the annual growth rates of M3 continues to reflect the past portfolio shifts to liquid positions. These shifts primarily occurred during autumn 2001, when the economic and financial environment was characterised by high uncertainty. However, in the meantime, some normalisation in the development of M3 has taken place. This is indicated by a significant slowdown in the short-term dynamics of M3 in early 2002, a period in which the annual rate of growth of loans to the private sector has also continued to decline.

Ranee Jayamaha: Governance, risk management and compliance Keynote address by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Seminar on “Governance, Risk Management and Compliance and the Roadmap for Financial Services Industry”, Colombo, 7 February 2008. *  *  *  The Chairman and the Organizing Committee; I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude for being given the opportunity to address a gathering that includes impressive groups of representatives from the financial services industry, risk management professionals, regulators and businesses. As you are aware, the year 2008 has started off with the continuation of some of the challenges that resulted in significant disturbances in world financial markets: the impact of the sub prime market turmoil which originated in the US is still spreading across Europe and other financial markets; the Northern Rock crisis in the U.K. has raised serious regulatory issues; and the large frauds in global banks have highlighted the repercussions of the lack of internal controls and accountability in financial institutions. As in the past, many of these have been due to lapses in governance and risk management practices. Although Sri Lanka’s financial markets have been insulated from these disturbances, they underscore the need for good corporate governance, better risk management and compliance in our financial industry.
In the meantime the United Kingdom will prepare both for the introduction of the euro on the Continent from next January and for our own eventual participation. BIS Review 29/1998  ˝  -4-  The fact is that monetary union will have a major effect on this country whether or not we are a part of it, and it is clearly in our national interest as well as the interest of the participating countries, that it should be successful. We benefit in macro-economic terms from a stable and prosperous Europe just as Continental Europe benefits from a stable and prosperous United Kingdom - and the same mutual interest, of course, applies between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours. We can contribute to that success in at least three ways. Most immediately the Government has undertaken to use its current term as President of the European Union Council of Ministers to promote an orderly decision-making process during the crucial next few months. Not being part of the first wave leaves us free to concentrate on that, and while there are issues - such as the vexed question of the Presidency of the European Central Bank - which only others can resolve, the UK’s role is to give them every opportunity to reach timely decisions. More fundamentally, we can contribute to the success of the euro, even from outside by continuing to pursue policies directed towards macro-economic stability and supply-side flexibility in parallel with those persuaded within the euro area.

Our CBDC experiments, on which I will elaborate in a few minutes, also led us to develop our own permissioned blockchain (called DL3S- Distributed Ledger for Securities Settlement System) in collaboration with an IT provider. We have also drawn on artificial intelligence for various uses, such as a new forex trading tool and supervisory tools. The question that now attracts public attention is whether central banks’ investigation phases will lead to the development of CBDCs. Almost all of that attention is focused on retail CBDCs. At the same time, we can sometimes hear, and not only from commercial banks, that they are “a solution in search of a problem”. iii In my view, this phrase simply misses the point. What we are currently doing is keeping our eyes and minds open on this new way of making “public money” available. In Europe, we are halfway through our  Page 4 sur 5 investigation phase: the Eurosystem will make its decision by the end of 2023, before a potential launch in 2026 or 2027. I am sure President Christine Lagarde will be able to shed some light on the project. Beyond purely technical considerations, a retail CBDC could play an anchor role in the digital world, similar to the role played by banknotes in the physical world,iv and hence preserve the accessibility and usability of central bank money.
The policymaker’s “loss function” in any particular time period is: 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡 ≡ (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋 ∗ )2 + 𝜆(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗ )2 where 𝜋𝑡 is inflation, 𝜋 ∗ is the inflation target, 𝑦𝑡 is output and 𝑦𝑡∗ is ‘trend’ output, so that 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗ is the output gap, and 𝑡 subscripts denote time periods. 13  The policymaker’s objective is to minimise the discounted sum  of these losses over time. In this formulation, a lambda of zero would imply no weight on the stabilisation of real activity – so-called “inflation nutter” preferences. When lambda is positive, in contrast, the policymaker is willing to strike at least some trade-off between output and inflation stabilisation, as directed by the MPC remit. This objective function is optimised subject to the constraints implied by the aggregate behaviour of the economy, including the relationship between interest rates and activity; and the relationship between activity and inflation – the Phillips curve shown in Figure 1. In essence, these suggest lower interest rates raise activity;  14  and higher activity generates higher inflation. Under this simple framework, in certain circumstances, the optimal policy balances inflation overshoots with shortfalls of activity relative to potential, and vice versa for inflation undershoots. (A derivation appears in the Annex.)

32  An expression equivalent to the IS curve above can then be used to define  the natural interest rate, 𝑟𝑡∗ , which is the interest rate that would prevail in the absence of any nominal rigidities: ∗ 𝑦𝑡∗ = 𝐸𝑡 𝑦𝑡+1 −  1 ∗ 𝑟 𝜎 𝑡  Using this, the IS curve can be re-written in output gap form, using the output gap definition 𝑥𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗ and the definition of the natural interest rate to give:  (2)  1 𝜎  𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝑥𝑡+1 − [(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 ) − 𝑟𝑡∗ ]  31  In other words, the simple model here abstracts from all channels of monetary transmission other than the inter-temporal substitution channel. Of course, building in addition frictions and model features, like borrowing constraints and open economy features, can restore the roles of the other channels. 32 In particular, in the simple model, one can show that 𝑦𝑡∗ = 𝜓𝑎𝑡 , where 𝑎𝑡 is the log-level of TFP, assumed to follow an exogenous process. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  18  This says that the output gap is negatively related to the sequence of “real rate gaps” (𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 ) − 𝑟𝑡∗ delivered by monetary policy. For example, when monetary policy delivers real interest rates equal to the natural rate, so 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑡∗ , the output gap is zero at all times.
Since this is the first time that a President of the European Central Bank has retired, I have no way of knowing if this is just standard protocol, or if it is something more. I hope it is not just that you are eager, as you  BIS Review 47/2003  1  said in your invitation, to “facilitate my departure”. I prefer to think that it reflects the warm relationship that has been built up among us during the past few years. I remember when it was first proposed to establish a Eurogroup, or “Euro-X” as it was then called. And I remember that some people said that such a group would be a threat to the ECB and its independence. Frankly speaking, I also had some doubts. I was proved wrong. As I have since said in public on various occasions, the Eurogroup meetings represent a “golden opportunity”; a golden opportunity for dialogue; a golden opportunity to be open, to be frank, to be honest, to criticise, and to listen. If you liken EMU to a house, then we are its family, and the Eurogroup is the dinner table. It is where the family members get together to tell each other what they are doing, to listen to each others advice, and learn to live together, as they must do, responsibly. Each member who joined this family did so on the understanding that his new house would be built on two stable pillars; not just a sound monetary policy, but also sound economic policies.

Indeed over time, I think that the “ECB watchers” have increasingly come to understand and to respect our monetary policy. We have also become better at explaining it. It is an ongoing process. But things are on the right track. Most importantly, we have done our duty. We have maintained price stability. And we have done it in a pragmatic fashion, with a steady hand. There were many who feared that in the early years of EMU, the euro area economy might be a sacrificial lamb on the altar of credibility. According to this view, the ECB would raise interest rates unnecessarily to prove its anti-inflation credentials. The facts do not bear this out. A number of shocks have hit the euro area economy over the past few years. But we did not over-react. We held our nerve. Even in its infancy, the ECB showed itself to be a mature central bank. I am proud to have been its President these past five years. *** I do not retire without some regret. There is a lot that I shall miss. I shall miss my colleagues in the Executive Board. I shall miss my colleagues in the Governing Council. I shall certainly miss the regular meetings and contacts I have with many of you, especially in the Eurogroup. I have to say that I was touched when I received your invitation to this special dinner. And I am touched that so many of you have taken the trouble to travel to Venice to say goodbye.
Indeed, for European banks affected by the most serious operational events, this deterioration has remained over 1.25 pp of CET1 in the last five years, rising to 2.1 pp in 2018. As I mentioned in my introduction, in the case of Spain, potential costs associated with legal risks continue to contribute to operational risk at deposit institutions. The processes linked to past litigation, for example over floor clauses, have had an estimated cost for the sector of more than € billion up to June 2019. Moreover, there are other significant legal processes still pending settlement. In addition, legal risk and certain other factors relating to banks’ conduct have had a significant impact on the reputation of the banking sector, and not only in Spain. In this respect it is important to note that reputation and customer confidence are fundamental to the banking business. In consequence, and also from a purely economic standpoint, given that in the long term litigation costs are far higher than the possible benefits that some banks In 5 See I. Argimón (2017), “Decentralized multinational banks and risk taking: the Spanish experience in the crisis”, Banco de España Working Paper No. 1749. 19/29  may have obtained in the short term as a result of questionable behaviour, banks should strive to reverse this trend, providing their customers with financial products and services suited to their needs and capabilities, and also supplying the key information in a clear and transparent manner.

Levine, Ross 2005. Finance and Growth Theory and Evidence. Handbook of Economic Growth, Chapter 12, pp. 865–934. Swiss Bankers Association 2013. Wealth management – at a global level and in Switzerland. Status report and sector trends. Swiss National Bank 2013a. Banks in Switzerland 2012. Swiss National Bank 2013b. Swiss Balance of Payments 2012. State Secretariat for International Financial Matters 2014. Federal Council notes recommendations of Commission of Experts on market access for financial service providers. Press release. URL: http://www.sif.admin.ch/00488/index.html?lang=en&msgid=52838. Straumann, Tobias 2006. Der kleine Gigant. Der Aufstieg Zürichs zu einem internationalen Finanzplatz. Bankhistorisches Archiv, Beiheft 45, pp. 139–169. Tille, Cédric 2010. Finanzplatz Schweiz. Eine makroökonomische Volkswirtschaft – Das Magazin für Wirtschaftspolitik No. 4–2010, pp. 12–14. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Analyse. Die  7
The independence of a central bank is not a law of nature, nor is it something that can be taken for granted politically. Rather, it exists because the public is convinced that price stability is a sensible objective that can best be ensured over the long term by delegating the responsibility to an independent central bank. This conviction is in turn based on solid scientific evidence. Independence in areas that go beyond a narrowly defined mandate is not democratically acceptable, nor does it have any scientific foundation. If the mandate is interpreted too broadly, or if legislators expand it beyond the core task of price stability, over time this will inevitably lead to public debate. Broader action by central banks might initially be welcomed by politicians and the general public, but that can quickly turn in the opposite direction. Overall, this would ultimately also entail the risk of constraints on the central bank’s independence in conducting monetary policy. Central banks should therefore advocate a narrowly defined mandate, and should not take on any tasks that require political decisions and for which they do not have effective instruments. The institutional framework in Switzerland tallies with these principles. The Constitution and law entrust the SNB, as an independent central bank, with the pursuit of monetary policy in the overall interests of the country. In order to legitimise its independence, the SNB has a clearly defined, narrow mandate that compels it to focus on ensuring price stability while taking due account of economic developments.

We also regard our definition as a particular advantage in the post-pandemic phase, with its heightened uncertainty regarding structural equilibria. Why is this so? And how can three adjustments that have been discussed internationally be put in context against the backdrop of the specific situation in Switzerland and our definition of price stability? The first possible adjustment relates to the level of the inflation target. A credible higher inflation target would lead to both an increase in expected and realised inflation. The consequence would be higher average nominal interest rates, which would reduce the likelihood of the effective lower bound being reached. As a result, unconventional measures – Page 7/16  in our case primarily foreign exchange market interventions – would need to be used less frequently. Why do we not aim for a higher rate of inflation? We do not believe a higher inflation target would truly free us from the problem of the effective lower bound. It would take a significantly higher inflation target to sustainably lift interest rates from the lower bound. However, such a target would no longer be compatible with our statutory mandate to ensure price stability. Furthermore, it would not tally with the pronounced preference of the Swiss people for low inflation. Higher rates of inflation would be neither understood nor accepted in Switzerland. A survey of more than 400 Swiss companies in the first half of 2022 showed a large majority in favour of low inflation, by which they typically mean a rate between 0% and 2% (cf.