samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When considering the favourable economic outlook for Switzerland, we must not lose sight of the fact that the latest tensions on the financial markets have increased the downside risks. Should these downside risks materialise and, via an appreciation of the Swiss franc, lead to a renewed threat of deflation, the SNB would take all the measures necessary to ensure price stability. In other words, the SNB would do whatever it takes to fight deflation and safeguard price stability in the medium- and longer-term. Switzerland has an obvious and enormous interest in Europe’s ability to manage through this public debt crisis decisively and ultimately successfully. Europe’s ability to navigate out of the current crisis is also very much in the interest of the United States and indeed the world. When I say this, I don’t mean to refer solely to the potential economic strains as a result of Europe’s public debt concerns. What is ultimately at stake is the vision of the founding fathers of the EU; the vision of a continent living in peace and prosperity and thereby contributing to a stable world order. 1  See Gerfin, Michael and Boris Kaiser (2010), “Auswirkungen der Immigration der Jahre 2002 bis 2008 auf die Löhne in der Schweiz”, in: Die Volkswirtschaft, No. 6. 2  In 2009, annual growth of private consumption amounted to 1.2% in Switzerland, while in the euro area, it contracted by 1.2%. 2  BIS Review 87/2010  Merely upholding this vision will not, however, resolve the debt situation.

Gent Sejko: The importance of media in analysing Albania’s monetary policy Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the end-of-year meeting with the media, Tirana, 20 December 2018. * * * Dear ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to our end-of-year meeting with the media. I would like to thank you for your readiness, objectivity, and seriousness in covering the activities of the Bank of Albania and informing the public about them, throughout 2018. Thanks to you, our analyses and decision-making have been communicated in a thorough manner, mindfully tailored and styled in accordance with the age and profession of the targeted audience. I must note that, in addition to broad geographic coverage, your comments and analyses on the economic and financial developments in Albania have been very professional. At the Bank of Albania, my colleagues and I maintain that the current media reality is an important part of our activity. Our decision-making could not be considered complete without your contribution. Communication is a vital and delicate process for a central bank. I must emphasize that, without your help and objectivity, realisation of Bank of Albania’s decision-making regarding monetary policy and financial stability would have been an impossible mission. Figuratively, I would point out that you are the ones that enable the translation of our analyses and conclusions into an adequate and easy-to-understand message for the general public.
I’d like to discuss this morning why the Basel Committee believes that applying transparency and market discipline approaches in the New Capital Accord will help us achieve our objectives to reinforce the safety and soundness of the banking system. My first point will be that, despite its name, the New Capital Accord is about much more than just capital. It is also about maintaining a level playing field and about strengthening incentives to foster sound risk management through three pillars: risk sensitive minimum capital requirements, coordinated supervisory review and - importantly, given the theme of this conference - enhanced market discipline through greater transparency. The New Accord is therefore much more comprehensive than its 1988 forerunner. Second, I’ll comment on the rationale behind the compound approach followed by the Basel Committee that blends rules, discretion, and market-based incentives. It could be viewed as a portfolio of different policy approaches that allow supervisors to achieve or at least draw close to a kind of efficient frontier. Third, I’ll share with you key issues that the Committee faced in drafting the market discipline component of the New Accord and, specifically, I will mention some of the concerns that arose in our public consultations.

Points in the upper right and lower left quadrants signal monetary and macro-prudential policy operating in the same direction; points in the upper left and lower right, these policies operating in opposite directions. The points are fairly evenly scattered across all four quadrants. This tells us that the right macroprudential/monetary policy mix depends critically on the relative needs of the economy and the financial system. But two arms beat one, hands-down. Institutional arrangements and macro-prudential policy Finally, if macro-prudential policy is a useful addition to the policy toolkit, who should have control over it? Here, a comparison with monetary policy experience is illustrative. Macro-prudential policy faces many of the same dilemmas as monetary policy. The most serious of these is the time-consistency dilemma [Kydland and Prescott, 1979; Chari and Kehoe, 2013]. In the monetary policy sphere, this manifests as a desire to loosen policy today to support the economy when tightening to control inflation tomorrow would be more appropriate. In the macro-prudential sphere, it manifests as a desire to loosen regulation to support today’s growth when tightening to counter tomorrow’s crisis would be more appropriate. In both cases, policy faces an inter-temporal trade-off in its objectives – a myopia trap. The time-consistency dilemma is likely, if anything, to be even more acute when fighting crises than when fighting inflation [Haldane, 2013]. The reason is that credit cycles last at least twice as long as business cycles. The myopia trap for macro-prudential policy is even more painful than for monetary policy.
Conversely, institutions that performed better or were able to weather the crisis were those with a reputation for prudence, sound corporate governance and risk management practices. At the international level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision updated its guidance on Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance in 2010. This update followed the Committee’s decision to revisit the 2006 guidelines in the wake of the financial crisis. The updated guidance reaffirmed the continued relevance and critical importance of the existing principles and highlighted the key areas which merit the most focus. These include the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  monitoring of risks on a firm-wide and individual entity basis. The guidance also emphasised the board’s oversight of compensation structures. Earlier this year, the OECD launched a review of its Principles of Corporate Governance. The review, the first since the standards were updated in 2004, was commissioned to take into account developments that have taken place in the corporate sector and capital markets. In Malaysia, the Securities Commission launched the Corporate Governance Blueprint in 2011 which outlined the strategic objectives for strengthening market discipline among capital market participants. One of the deliverables of the Blueprint was the publication of a revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2012. A key feature of the Code is the emphasis on the role of directors and the need for a strong board composition.

The monetary reserves and Swiss franc assets combine to make up the monetary assets, which are required for monetary policy. In addition to these assets, the National Bank also manages the proceeds from the sale of the surplus gold reserves. The portfolio of these so-called free assets amounts to slightly more than CHF 20 billion. In the management of the monetary assets, monetary policy objectives and restrictions have priority. In compliance with the primacy of monetary policy, the investments are optimised according to security, liquidity and return. Important in this regard are the concentration on liquid investments, in other words readily marketable investments, and on the greatest possible risk diversification by holding different currencies and investment categories. The National Bank’s leeway for investment has extended considerably since the entry into force of the new National Bank Act in May 2004. Risk diversification options in particular were also increased as a result. The concrete investment structure of the different portfolios and their yields are published quarterly in an updated appendix to the Investment Policy Guidelines of the Swiss National Bank. The current investment structure and the risk/earnings profile of the National Bank’s assets, in particular the foreign currency reserves and free assets, can be summarised as follows: The portfolio adjustments made under the new Act aim to increase diversification in terms of currency and investment category. Within the context of the 2004 strategy, the dollar share was reduced in favour of the pound sterling and the yen.
29  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  29  Chart 24: Distribution of pay packets  Percentage of employees 50  40  30  2018  20  2017 10  0 <0  0  >0 & <1  1  >1 to <=2  >2 to <= 3  >3 to <=4  >4 to <=5  >5  Settlement by bucket (per cent)  Sources: Bank of England, Incomes Data Research, XpertHR, Incomes Data Service, Labour Research Department and Bank calculations.

Conclusion  Pay prospects are determined in part by employment, in part by productivity and in part by power. All three have been important in explaining the weakness of pay during its recent “lost decade”. And each is likely to continue to be important for pay in the period ahead. Monetary policy can support the first piece of the pay jigsaw – employment. It has done so significantly over recent years, perhaps to the tune of creating 1 ½ million new jobs. But it can do little over the medium term to support productivity or to reshape the structural forces influencing pay power, the second and third pieces of the pay jigsaw. Doing so relies on policies which shift the supply side of the economy. Longer-term, it is through improved skills, productivity and structural reform and regeneration that pay power for workers can be restored. This underlines the importance of the Government’s Industrial Strategy, whose objectives are to do just that. In its White Paper on Industrial Strategy published last year, the Government proposed setting up an Industrial Strategy Council. 31  This independent body of experts was designed to monitor, and report  publically, on progress towards meeting the objectives of the industrial strategy. Earlier this week, I was delighted to be appointed, in a personal capacity, to Chair the Industrial Strategy Council. I believe it can play an important role in supporting the Government’s industrial strategy, which seeks to increase living standards across the UK, help industry to thrive and boost workers’ pay power.
Tarisa Watanagase: Risk-focused supervision and risk assessment Opening address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Seminar on Risk-Focused Supervision and Risk Assessment, Bangkok, 6 September 2004. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies und Gentlemen, lt is a pleasure for me to be here at the opening of the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative on Risk-Focused Supervision und Risk Assessment. In making this opening address, I would like to personally extend a warm welcome to all the participants and to express my appreciation to the Federal Reserve experts who have kindly agreed to share with us their knowledge und experience on risk-based supervision. This regional seminar is held at an opportune time, about two months after the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the Basel II capital framework. As you all are undoubtedly aware of, Basel II aims to strengthen financial stability by encouraging sound risk management practices at banking organizations. The tools uscd are a more risk-sensitive capital regime (Pillar 1); the application of risk-based supervision (Pillar 2); und improved public disclosures to enhance market discipline (Pillar 3). Of the three pillars, one of the most formidable challenges for emerging market supervisors will be to properly implement the Pillar II risk-based supervisory framework. Since risk-based supervision is the main topic of this seminar, it may be useful to provide a few thoughts on some of the broader regulatory und supervisory implications associated with implementing this framework.

Wc are increasingly moving towards more principles based prudential standards; in addition, we have revamped our supervisory framework to provide a more structured and risk-oriented approach to the on and off-site examination process, while encouraging our front-only supervisors to think analytically. Despite these achievements, we still have substantial work ahead of us. Above all, our experience with risk-based supervision indicates that there is no going back to the mles-based approach of supervision given the dynamic nature of the banking business. And second, building a robust risk-based supervisory regime requires substantial time and resources and it will necessitate a material shift in the way both supervisors and bank managcment think about risk and risk management. I must therefore, commend APEC for this initiative in bringing together bank supervisors from the AsiaPacific region to learn and to share views on this very important topic. It is my sincere hope that all of you take this opportunity to gain insights from our highly experienced and knowledgeable experts as well as from each other on the practical aspects of risk-focused supervision. BIS Review 56/2004  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to declare open the APEC Pinancial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Seminar on Risk-Focused Supervision and Risk Assessment. I wish you all stimulating discussions in the week ahead and a very pleasant stay in Bangkok. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 56/2004
The global crisis actually emphasized the main weaknesses of the Macedonian economy, such as the high concentration of the export in non-propulsive activities, completely dependant on the movements on the international market and, of course, the trade deficit financing through vulnerable and hardly predictable private transfers. The blow these two components suffered from the decrease in the world economy meant significant widening of the deficit on the current account, which reached 13.1% of the GDP in 2008. These trends continued also in the first part of 2009 and together with the decrease in the capital inflows created serious pressures on the foreign reserves. It reflected directly on the confidence in the stability of the national currency. Thus in the first quarter of 2009, the demand for foreign exchange went up by 77% compared to the supply of foreign exchange. The increased misbalance on the foreign exchange market was equilibrated with the National Bank interventions on the foreign exchange market, in the amount of Euro 230 million, only during the first quarter. Moreover, we were forced to undertake measures to adjust the monetary instruments in function of foreign exchange rate stability maintenance. At the end of March, we adopted a decision on increasing the interest rate on the core monetary instrument – the CB bills from 7% to 9%.

The conference  Nearly twenty years ago, Jacob Frenkel made the following observation about the international monetary system: “academics and policymakers have made numerous proposals for reform while, at the same time, the monetary system itself has been in a constant state of change”. This points to another problem that any attempt to reform the international monetary system faces: the world economy and financial markets, and therefore the international monetary system never cease to evolve. Today’s conference is organized around four panel discussions. They will focus on issues that are at the forefront of the current debate on shortcomings of the international monetary system. The first panel, chaired by Axel Weber, will discuss the predominant concerns about the present system. Large global imbalances, volatile capital flows, and rapid reserve accumulation give rise to concerns about vulnerabilities. Are they possible sources of instability, and what reforms, if any, should be considered? As I pointed out earlier, one recurring theme in the debate has been the question of reserve assets. Our second panel, chaired by George Soros, will examine ways to improve the supply of reserve assets. Is a diversification of reserve assets desirable, and if so, should it be actively promoted? Is there a greater role for SDRs in the international monetary system, and if so, what reforms would be required to give SDRs a greater role? Over the past decades, private capital flows have greatly increased. Although capital account liberalization is clearly beneficial in the long run, it entails significant short-run vulnerabilities.
First we need to clear up the misconception that has become widespread, particularly in our country – that the weapon to achieve lasting victory over inflation is not fiscal: it is primarily monetary, and then structural, so as to increase the supply of goods and services. Tariff and fiscal shields can be useful in the short term, but they do not lead to a durable reduction in inflation. And, as we strongly emphasised following our last Governing Council meeting, it is time for national governments to start reducing their support measures rapidly, by making them more targeted, as soon as energy prices start to recede. I shall therefore focus on two subjects here today: (I) what are the channels of transmission of monetary policy today? (II) what are the pointers for our future monetary policy and, to continue with the image of channels and waterways, what navigation locks do we need to go through? 2  Page 3 of 19  I. The channels of transmission of monetary policy today One “historical” channel is less relevant today: monetary aggregates. The monetary aggregates channel is based on the idea that strong money growth fuels inflation: we have all more or less learned Irving Fisher’s money quantity equation (1911)1 and the monetarist theories that have dominated since Milton Friedman (1956).2 However, this channel has gradually become less relevant.

Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France, Centre des professions financières Paris, 17 February 2023 How monetary policy will defeat inflation: channels and locks  Page 2 of 19  Introduction Inflation is currently the number one concern for our fellow citizens and for us. Admittedly it has started to fall back slightly, to around 8.5% in the euro area, and it could have halved by the end of this year. But that will still be too high. Inflation that becomes entrenched at above 2% would be the worst enemy of confidence and therefore growth. The initial causes of this return of inflation are well known, and are primarily external to the euro area: disruptions to global supply chains with the exit from the pandemic, energy prices, Russia’s war against Ukraine... Their indirect repercussions have been felt gradually, first in manufactured goods prices, then in services prices. To sum up, inflation has not only become higher but also more widespread; not just imported but also domestic; not just linked to a transitory supply shock but also potentially persistent. In light of this, no one can seriously deny that monetary policy must respond. Today, therefore, I shall not talk about why the central bank must combat inflation but about how, in the current context, it needs to act to be effective.
Government bond yields 10 year maturity, per cent 20  20 Germany  18  Greece  18  16  Ireland  16  Italy  14  14  Spain  12  12  Portugal  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: Reuters  12. Government bond yields 10 year maturity, per cent 6.0  6.0  5.5  5.5  5.0  5.0  4.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  USA  2.0  2.0 1.5  Germany  1.5  1.0  Sweden  1.0 0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0 06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: Reuters  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  13. Stock market developments Index, 1 January 2006 =100 180  180 Sweden (OMXS) Euro area (Euro Stoxx) USA (S& P 500) Emerging markets (MSCI)  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40 04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: Reuters  14.

It is also a common pattern that a financial crisis is followed by several years of weak growth.2 I also noted at the July meeting that there was a tendency in the United States and Europe towards stagflation, with low growth and high inflation at the same time. Developments over the summer reinforce this image, but this does not mean that things will necessarily continue in the same way. …but developments in Sweden largely in line with the forecasts In Sweden we have received the first preliminary national accounts figures for the second quarter of this year, and new statistics for the labour market and inflation, for instance. GDP growth was slightly higher in the second quarter than we were counting on in July. Seasonally-adjusted quarterly growth came out at 1.0 per cent, against an expected 0.6 per cent. Although both domestic demand and exports were marginally weaker than the Riksbank had forecast, imports, which are a deduction item when calculating GDP, were even weaker. This means that GDP growth was slightly higher than expected. I expressed some concern at the monetary policy meeting in July that the second quarter would be weaker than our forecast in the Monetary Policy Report. This was not the case, which in itself is a good thing. But at the same time, more forward-looking indicators such as the purchasing managers’ index and the National Institute of Economic Research’s economic tendency surveys point to economic activity slowing down. This is something that we have already counted on.