samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The euro speaks clearly about Europe’s diversity through the architectural motifs of the euro banknotes as well as through the cultural symbols on the national sides of the euro coins. For Romania, as a euro area hopeful, thorough preparation in order to fulfil all criteria, with no exception, is crucial. As I stated before, it is important to define a target (horizon). Even if changed, the target must exist so that the commitment to implementing reforms does not wear off. The creation within the NBR of a committee for preparing euro adoption in February 2010, to whose meetings we have invited ever since October 2010 representatives of the Finance Ministry, is a solid proof for the fact that we care about are strongly interested in the future of our country within the euro zone. Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance to ensure coherent policies and a sustained reform pace to render our endeavour sustainable so as the euro adoption becomes certain as close as possible to 2015. Getting back to the Euro Exhibition, which has arrived in Bucharest shortly after Estonia, the 17th country to join the euro area, I want to underscore once again the ECB’s efforts to raise awareness of Romanians and other EU citizens about the single currency, as well as its history, role and symbols. From today until the end of May, Romanians have an opportunity to find out more about the currency we strive to adopt.

It also seeks to enhance regional connectivity by reducing behind-the-border non-tariff trade barriers and promoting consistency in regulation across all the member countries. Singapore views the TPP, along with the RCEP, as complementary tracks that will lead towards increased regional integration, and eventually, to a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific. The recent decision by Japan to join the TPP will further reinforce the TPP as a platform for broader economic integration across the Pacific. With Japan’s inclusion, the TPP’s membership has now expanded to 12 countries. This represents nearly 40 per cent of the global economy and one-third of world trade. As you all know, joining the TPP is a key element of the three-arrow strategy embodied in Abenomics. The prognosis for Japan has improved considerably compared to six months ago. After stagnating for much of last year, the Japanese economy rebounded strongly in the first quarter of this year, with GDP growth of 3.5 per cent on a pick-up in consumer spending. Growth forecast for the whole of this year has been progressively raised, with room for further upward revision. Sentiments have improved strongly since the announcements of aggressive monetary and fiscal policy measures to revive the Japanese economy. The sharp depreciation of the Yen has also helped to boost expectations for GDP growth and corporate profits. One example of this is Toyota Motor. It has reported consolidated operating profit of 1.3 trillion yen for the 2012 business year, about 3.7 times that of the previous year.
We at the central bank stand ready to analyse the new  8  BIS Review 111/2006  capital requirements’ effects on financial stability, in particular in situations when there is volatility in the macro economy and banks’ credit losses may increase. There is also the issue of implementing the new international accounting standards, IAS. A highly controversial but also interesting development is that the standards promote a higher degree of market-related valuation of many more categories of assets and liabilities in banks and other institutions. Banks are already used to market valuation for highly tradable assets, but the new standards go further and request banks to value also non tradable assets and even liabilities to assumed market prices. In general, and although I recognize the problem of market-valuation of items for which there is no ongoing market, I support the idea of more transparent and market-oriented valuation. I accept that it may lead to more fluctuations in the banks’ balance sheets and also in their profits and losses. Although the financial strength of a bank in the long run will not be affected by using the new accounting principles there is a risk that the analysts and other readers of the financial reports will not understand the difference between the reported temporary results and the underlying issues. They may then panic because of seemingly bad short-term bank results or become excessively optimistic over temporary good results.

Until now, the channels for cross-border flows are only open to current account items such as trade, and to direct investments under the capital account. Portfolio investments under the capital account into and out of China are mainly confined to designated channels and are subject to quotas, for example, the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme with quotas totalling $ billion, and the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme with quotas of $ billion. It can be reasonably expected that a further opening of the capital account would entail liberalisation of these channels and the addition of new avenues. These would result in an increase in cross-border capital flows. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  7. Although it may not be easy to provide a precise estimate of the magnitude of the flows, given that China’s economy is the second largest in the world, and taking into account the size of both its domestic savings and its capital markets, one can probably say that the size of capital flows resulting from China’s capital account liberalisation would likely be felt in the global financial system. 8. From the perspective of Chinese savers, given their high level of savings and the fact that their investment options are mostly limited to domestic markets at present, there would be a desire on their part for investment diversification into international markets. The resulting investment flows, as they are liberalised, could be substantial for individual markets where these funds flow into. 9.
This largely reflected a slowdown in the high pace of growth of overnight deposits, presumably reflecting the unwinding of the influence of some special factors related to the start of Stage Three and the introduction of the euro. As the February figures were somewhat higher than those observed in late 1998, the three-month moving average of M3 growth covering the period from December 1998 to February 1999 still increased by 0.2 percentage point to 5.1%. The Governing Council does not regard current monetary trends as constituting a signal of future inflationary pressures, taking into account that the rate of growth of M3 is still close to the reference value of 4½% and considering that it may to some extent mirror the specific environment related to the start of Stage Three. The Governing Council noted that the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) rates of increase for the euro area have now been below 1% for several months, and even though some increases are likely to be seen in coming months owing to the reversal of energy price trends, the more lasting effect on the outlook for future prices comes from the economic environment. Indeed, reflecting the economic environment, many projections for future consumer price increases in the euro area have been revised downwards. In our current assessment of the situation, it appears unlikely that HICP increases will be out of line with the Eurosystem’s definition of price stability.

3  BIS Review 39 /1999  Question: Mr. Duisenberg, I just want to ask if you could elaborate a little bit on the convincing structural reforms that you said you would like to see from euro zone governments and also if you feel that by cutting the rates in such a large step that you actually reduce the pressure on these governments to make these reforms? Duisenberg: We hope that the contrary will emerge over time. Convincing structural reforms relate to the following: We, and most other observers, are very convinced that the phenomenon of an unacceptably high rate of unemployment across the euro area, but particularly in the larger countries in the euro area, is due to structural factors and to inflexibility in markets for labour and in markets for goods and services and that monetary policy is neither the cause of that structural unemployment nor is it the solution to it. The solution to that problem has to be found in measures of a convincingly reformist nature in the labour and in the goods markets and we do hope that taking the monetary policy stance we have taken today will in the ensuing months increasingly focus the attention of policy-makers and the public on the real causes of the unemployment problem, because it will demonstrably become clear that monetary policy is not the answer to solve those problems.
Yet while, as I have already said, much progress has been made in improving the resolution toolkit, the Banco de España needs to continue to be equipped with instruments to enable the performance of its supervisory tasks to be quick and simple rather than complicated and slow. For this purpose it would be desirable to transfer a significant part of the powers of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness in relation to sanctioning, licensing, etc., to the Banco de España, in line with what the IMF has been suggesting for some time. Also, the FROB needs to be authorised to assume the powers of the shareholders in general meeting in relation to banks taken under official administration and legal requirements that delay asset and liability transfers need to be eliminated. As for the Banco de España, it should equip itself with supervisory instruments to ensure that problems can be promptly corrected and it should distance itself from a legalistic system that envisages official administration only as the very last resort, when all legal requirements have been violated. Also, although the Banco de España’s professional and collegiate decision-making structure – one of its valuable traditions – must be maintained, it needs to be documented further and made more systematic, and the information that has begun to be supplied on the Banco de España’s website needs to be expanded.

The drop in fuel prices will also help to contain the inflationary pressures and will contribute to sustain disposable income (Figure 5). A second transmission channel relates to the worsening of financial conditions. The global increase in risk perception and deep adjustments of financial prices restrict access to goverment and corporate funds. This has driven various central banks to take action to ensure the proper operation of the markets. In Chile, among other measures, the CBC Board adjusted the operation of liquidity programs it has been applying since November 2019, included corporate bonds among eligible collateral for all the liquidity operations in pesos offered by the Bank and launched the purchase of banking bonds from the open-market operations system (SOMA) participants for an amount in UF1 equivalent to up to USD 4 billion. At our Monetary Policy Meeting yesterday we also communicated that we will raise the amount of this bank bond purchase program to up to USD 8 billion. And for the outstanding balance (USD 5.5 billion) the maturity constraint for eligible instruments will be eliminated. The steep drop in companies’ activity because of social isolation of workers and clients and their inability to carry on their normal tasks has resulted in a significant increase in their financial needs, as they must continue to cover their costs in a context of heavy loss of income.
Thus, a kshaped recovery would, ultimately, translate into lower global growth rates. The multilateral approach is now more important than ever given the global nature of the current crisis, but also because of the challenges ahead in the near future. These include the increasing digitalisation of our economies and the policies to combat climate change, which are also global in nature and therefore require a global response. Accordingly, the time is ripe to give fresh impetus to multilateralism. Certainly, some recent developments invite optimism, but without falling into complacency. First, international financial institutions have stepped up resolutely to strengthen the global economy at a critical time for the world. The IMF has provided sizeable new financing to a record number of countries and has promoted a new general allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of USD 650 billion, the largest issuance in history. This allocation, which is expected to be implemented by the end of August, would provide substantial liquidity support to all IMF members. In addition, the IMF – in response to the request made from many international quarters – is exploring options for the voluntary channelling of SDRs from better-off countries to the more vulnerable IMF members. Second, very soon after the start of the pandemic, the G20 launched an initiative, known as Debt Service Suspension Initiative or DSSI, to provide temporary bilateral external debt relief to the world’s poorest countries.

The risk otherwise is that we will create new problems that may lead to low growth further on and new difficulties for monetary policy to reach the inflation target. I am concerned about Sweden’s position as one of a handful of countries in Europe that has not succeeded in getting a functioning macroprudential policy into place. With such a large financial system and the obvious major vulnerabilities present in the Swedish economy, our focus should be on urgently adopting measures. Valuable evaluation of monetary policy We thus have an unusual time behind us that has required unusual measures over the past year. Under such circumstances, it is natural to wonder, for example, how well the inflation target is functioning and which areas monetary policy should be responsible for. It therefore seems appropriate that the Riksdag Committee on Finance has just published its latest assessment of monetary policy.6 First and foremost, I would like to say that it has been a privilege to have my work reviewed and assessed by people with such impressive academic and practical credentials in the area of monetary policy as those possessed by Messrs. Goodfriend and King. Assessments are a key ingredient in every kind of work to improve operations and this assessment contains many reasonable opinions and suggestions for discussion and further work. We will do this over the spring, before submitting our consultation response in April.
It turned out that the investors are insufficiently informed on the nature and the risks of the complex financial instruments; wrong incentive of the financial assets managers arising from the reward system based on generated earnings; the problem of objectivity of the rating agencies which provide credit rating for the financial instruments on issuer's request. Furthermore, it turned out that also there have been nonignorable problems at a micro level in the area of risk measurement and monitoring, arising from the application of statistical models which do not take account of the infrequent events,  BIS Review 127/2009  1  and after a longer period of high instability, a priory produce perceptions for globally lower risk level. Within the microeconomic reason behind the financial crisis, we came to the highly frequent issue of "shadow banking system", as an expression of the liberalistic approach for as higher deregulation as possible. All these macroeconomic and microeconomic reasons, in environment of higher financial system complexity, created systemic risks which occurred in the last quarter of 2008. Distinguished! It is an axiomatic truth that the financial system functioning relies upon trust. Practically, it is a must, illustrated by this crisis, as well. It turned out that it is easier to undermine the trust rather than to restore it. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers bankrupted. The avalanche of losing the trust accelerated in the complex and closely connected modern financial system.

The Basel Committee will take into account an appropriate group of indicators, such as the indicators of profit and credits, as a way of ensuring the creation and utilization of the capital buffers. The Committee will endorse a manner of determining the provisions which will be based on the future expected losses. -  Development of recommendations for reduction of the systemic risk related to rehabilitation of the internationally active banks. -  The group of Governors and responsible persons for the supervision, supported the below mentioned principles for directing the supervisors in the shift toward a higher level of capital in the banking system:  -  On the basis of the framework for counter-cyclical capital buffers, supervisors should require from the banks to strengthen their capital through a combination of the measures for maintaining the capital including activities for restricting the excessive payments of dividends, of purchase of own shares and compensations for the senior executives. -  Compensations for the senior executives should correspond with the reasonable undertaking of risks and long-term sustainable operations, based on the principles of granting compensations to the senior executives issued by the Financial Stability Board. -  The banks will be obliged to react promptly towards increasing the level and the quality of the capital in accordance with the new standards, in a way that will support the stability of the national banking systems and broader economy. These changes are expected to strengthen significantly the stability of the financial system.
At the time, the Riksbank had neither the mandate nor the desire to be the lender of last resort, that is the body that the banks can turn to when they suffer a shortage of liquidity. The Riksbank was instead more like a bureaucratic, state-owned commercial bank that competed with the privately-owned commercial banks. There was, however, a growing realisation in the UK and other countries that it was important to have a liquid credit market and that the central bank could play an important role in safeguarding the stability of the banking system. One of the people who developed these ideas was Walter Bagehot, who was appointed edi-tor of the journal The Economist in 1860. The experience of countries that did not have a central bank, for example Switzerland, also pointed to the need for a central bank to safeguard the stability of the financial system. In connection with various bank crises in Switzerland the banks had tried to protect themselves by reducing lending, which in effect only made the crises worse. BIS Review 135/2009  5  In Sweden, it was not until the Riksbank Act of 1897 that the Riksbank was given an explicit role to stabilise the payment system. When Sweden and the rest of Europe were infected by the crisis in the USA in 1907, the Riksbank was prepared and maintained liquidity in the system. The crisis of 1907 was also, by the way, the event that hastened the formation of the US central bank, the Federal Reserve.

It is the inflation target that is the economy’s nominal anchor. The future size of the Petroleum Fund depends on oil price developments. The fiscal guideline ensures that we only use the return on wealth that has already been accumulated. This makes policy robust to changes in oil prices and ensures that petroleum wealth will be of benefit both today and in the future. The government invests petroleum wealth in foreign securities through the Petroleum Fund. Government wealth is thereby more diversified. These investments have no impact on the Norwegian capital market. The Norwegian government’s most important assets are the Government Petroleum Fund, assets in the National Insurance Fund and government direct ownership interests in enterprises. The Petroleum Fund’s equity investments are distributed across many countries, and all equity holdings are less than one per cent of a company’s total value. The National Insurance Fund's investments are mainly confined to Norway. As a result, changes in the value of the Fund's equity portfolio primarily reflect developments in Norwegian business and industry. The Fund has larger ownership interests in individual companies than the Petroleum Fund, and wider fluctuations in value. The government has substantial direct holdings in individual enterprises. In general, concentrated ownership requires a more strategic ownership approach and gives rise to higher risk than diversified ownership. The capital market serves as an intermediary between the government as investor and enterprises seeking capital. This market makes it possible to separate the government's choices from companies' choices.
They seem to perceive that raising equity is, in some sense, costly. Perhaps they are right. But, equally, it is possible that these perceptions are distorted – for example, because the cost of equity is mistaken for the total cost of banks’ capital, or because managerial and shareholder incentives are linked to equity rather than asset returns, as outlined earlier. Either way, the MM hypothesis needs to be objectively reassessed in a banking context. And until then, stress tests need to be administered with a healthy dose of realism. Lesson 5: The plumbing worked With so much having gone wrong during this crisis, it is easy to overlook what has gone right. Well-functioning payment and settlement systems – the plumbing of the financial system – are one such unheralded success. To my knowledge, there are no examples of these systems collapsing under the strain of the financial crisis. This is no small achievement. Pressures on participants within payment systems have been acute. And volumes flowing through these systems have picked up sharply during periods of volatility in asset prices – for example, in the foreign exchange settlement system CLS (Chart 8). The robustness of these systems is no fluke. It is testimony to the efforts made over the past twenty of so years, initially by central banks, to proof these systems against systemic risk. These developments included the introduction of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) in payment systems, delivery-versus-payment (DvP) in securities settlement systems and payment-versus-payment (PvP) in foreign currency settlement systems.

Basically the FSB considers that while crypto-assets do not pose a material risk to global financial stability at this time, given the relatively small size of this market, vigilant monitoring is (a) necessary in view of the speed of developments and data gaps. The FSB has developed a framework, in collaboration with the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, to monitor the financial stability implications of the developments in crypto asset markets. Noting that crypto assets raise a host of other issues that I will explain shortly, the FSB also considers that further international coordination is warranted. Illicit activities risk: As many of these crypto-assets are so designed that anonymous email accounts can be used for trading and transfers without a central clearing agent, they effectively bypass the existing regime in combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and other illicit activities. The ease with which crypto-assets can be transferred across national borders has made it even more attractive to criminals in (b) laundering their proceeds and income. For the banks and other regulated financial institutions, it is proving difficult, if not impossible, for them to comply with the statutory or supervisory requirements in respect of know-your-customer (KYC) or ascertaining the source of funds. This was why the HKMA issued a circular in 2014 to banks in Hong Kong advising them to be mindful of the need to comply with all relevant KYC and anti-money laundering (AML) requirements in their dealings with crypto-assets.