samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
China’s rapid industrial expansion, with an average annual growth rate of 8 per cent, has contributed to a sharp rise in, for instance, steel and cement prices. Meanwhile, China is literally churning out cheap manufactured goods, produced mainly by labour with a low level of education and very low wages. To summarise, we assume in the Inflation report that international growth will remain good. Growth in the OECD area is expected to amount to around 3 per cent a year over the coming two years. International price pressure on manufactured goods is expected to rise in future as economic activity strengthens, although not as rapidly as historical patterns indicate. On the other hand, oil price forecasts have been revised upwards for the entire forecast period, mainly as a result of increased demand. Nevertheless, international price pressure is expected to be slightly lower during the entire forecast period than assumed in earlier assessments. BIS Review 20/2004  1  Swedish economic picture remains the same Economic activity in Sweden during the autumn and winter has largely followed the path we anticipated. The downturn that we now appear to have left behind us has been relatively mild, with an average growth rate during the past three years of 1.5 per cent. Important reasons why economic activity did not weaken more than this are the expansionary fiscal policy pursued and low interest rates, which contributed to upholding household consumption. At the same time, the relatively weak krona has contributed to favourable developments in exports.

We make it clear in the Inflation Report that we consider the risks of a poorer development in Swedish and international economic activity to have declined as the recovery has progressed. Experience also shows that it is easy to underestimate the force of an upturn once it has found a foothold. Developments in the labour market in both Sweden and the United States are one factor pointing in the other direction. In addition, developments in the euro area remain sluggish and in the United States there are problems with imbalances in foreign trade in particular. Our opinion is nevertheless that, compared with the picture we present in the main scenario, there is an upside risk for inflation from economic activity in Sweden and abroad, with links to price trends. There are arguments that we could have either overestimated or underestimated cost pressure. Compared with the December assessment, we have revised up our basic view of productivity, although there is considerable uncertainty in this area, given the surprising developments over the past six months. On the other hand, the uncertainty regarding wages has diminished somewhat, as central wage agreements have now been concluded for a large part of the labour market. All in all, our assessment is that the risks in this field are balanced.
High prices for oil and gas and other export goods also contributed to an appreciation of the krone last year. Partly due to very high growth in demand for oil, the average oil price rose to almost 40 US dollars per barrel in 2004. Lately, the price has risen to more than 50 US dollars. Oil futures prices have also risen. Strong demand growth, particularly in the US and China, has resulted in high energy consumption. As a result of strong demand growth in 2004, excess global production capacity, which is largely controlled by OPEC, has now fallen to a low level. Consequently, small disturbances in supply or demand could have a relatively strong impact on oil prices. The Norwegian economy experienced a moderate recession in 2002 and the beginning of 2003. Since the first half of 2003, growth has again been high. It may appear that growth in the Norwegian economy has become more self-driven. In the early phase of the recovery, private consumption, traditional exports and fixed investment in the petroleum sector were the most important driving forces. In the last few years, household demand has been underpinned by low interest rates, high real wage growth and higher asset prices. Real wage growth was relatively high in 2004, although nominal wage growth was lower than it has been in several years. Higher imports from low-cost countries and intensified competition in a number of industries have kept inflation at a low level. These factors have led to brisk growth in household purchasing power.

Caleb M Fundanga: The new K10,000 banknote in Zambia Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the new K10,000 banknote, Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 16 June 2008. *  *  *  • Members of the Press • Official from commercial banks present • Ladies and Gentlemen I wish to welcome you all to the Bank of Zambia. The objective of this Press Briefing is to announce the introduction of the new K10,000 banknote in our economy. The new K10,000 banknote will be put into circulation as early as this week. By showing you the new K10,000 banknote first, we expect that you will, in turn, help us to inform the public about this new banknote. In order for us to help you understand the new K10,000 banknote, we have produced posters and will make a short power point presentation. The posters are showing the main public recognition and security features of the new K10,000 banknote. Let me from the outset inform you that although we are calling it a new K10,000 banknote, most of the features on the banknote are still the same as those on the current K10,000 banknotes. The differences can best be detected by comparing this new K10,000 banknote with the current K10,000 banknotes in circulation.
Page 5/13  But not only nominal interest rates have fallen; real rates have also trended downward globally due to several powerful structural drivers. Four drivers are mainly responsible for the sustained decline in real interest rates: changes in demographics, mostly due to rising life expectancy; a secular decline in productivity growth; the integration of emerging-market economies with high savings surpluses into global financial markets; and a stronger overall preference on the part of investors for safe and liquid assets. These structural drivers are not determined by central banks. The current low interest rate environment makes it harder for central banks to make their monetary policy sufficiently expansionary in times of crisis. To be expansionary, the policy rate must be set such that short-term real interest rates are below the interest rate that balances saving and investment, also referred to as the equilibrium real interest rate. The structural factors mentioned earlier have likely also driven down the equilibrium real interest rate. Many central banks have thus had to cut their policy rates to zero in recent years – or even take them into negative territory – in order to address economic crises. What happens if the Swiss franc’s interest rate differential versus other currencies narrows but the franc continues to be seen as a safe haven? This development pushes up demand for Swiss franc-denominated investments and exerts appreciation pressures on the currency. This is precisely the challenge we have been facing ever since the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007.

I know SWFs themselves are often keen for more transparency from recipient countries on whether and how far they are welcome and the rules of engagement. The UK in recent years has been unusually open to foreign investors and foreign ownership both in comparison to our past and in comparison to most other developed (and emerging) countries today. We have relied on regulation of infrastructure industries and on competition law to prevent the abuse of market power and most of our utilities, much of the financial sector, as well as an increasing number of our leading football clubs have come into foreign ownership. In its latest survey of international direct investment trends, the OECD ranked the UK as having one of the least restrictive regulatory environment for foreign direct investment across all OECD member countries (Chart 5). And the UK has welcomed a number of SWFs to London as a base for international operations. 9  Note though that this distinction between foreign public and private sector owners is not cut and dried. Foreign private sector purchases of football teams or newspapers do not always seem to be driven by the profit motive. 10  Hedge Fund Working Group (2008), "Hedge Fund Standards: Final Report" and Walker Working Group (2007), "Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity". The Large Report recommends a set of best practice standards for hedge funds in terms of disclosure, valuation, risk, governance and shareholder conduct.
•  A McKinsey study estimates that Myanmar will need to invest $ billion in infrastructure up to 2030 to achieve an annual growth of 8%. •  Foreign capital, intermediated through a well-developed banking industry and wellfunctioning capital markets, is a necessary complement to meeting this infrastructure need. And it is not only financing that foreign participation brings, but critical expertise in structuring projects and managing risks. Most important, foreign financial institutions promote competition and innovation, providing the impetus for local institutions to upgrade their capabilities. This has been Singapore’s experience. •  We had protected our local banks from foreign competition in retail banking for many years. •  In 1999, MAS embarked on a programme to liberalise access to Singapore’s domestic banking market. •  The aim was to strengthen our local banks through competition and provide Singaporeans with quality banking services. The strategy worked. •  The local banks built up strong management teams and made significant infrastructural investments to expand their range of business activities and enhance operational effectiveness. •  They are now stronger and more dynamic, with much improved systems of management, risk controls, technology, and expertise. •  Liberalisation provided the spur for our local banks to raise their game and compete with some of the world’s largest banks while maintaining high prudential standards. Why liberalise at a measured pace This leads me to my second point.

All of this in an environment of lower growth, zero rates and stimulus plans. When you were in government you joked that you slept like a baby, in that you woke up crying every two hours. How are you sleeping now? Well. Very well! I wouldn’t wish what happened in 2012 on my worst enemy. The situation now is totally different; back then we were on the brink of collapse. The Spanish economy, the Italian economy, doubts about the integrity of the euro… the situation of the Spanish banking industry was terrifying and contagion was spreading to the Treasury. It was a dramatic situation. I don’t think there is going to be a recession in Europe, that’s very unlikely. But yes, I am worried that we 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  will have two or three years of subdued growth, of below-potential growth. That is what is worrying me at the moment. And that this subdued growth may mean that the price stability objective is not met. Monetary policy is not the philosopher’s stone, it cannot be used to fix everything. Other policies are needed. So do you echo the calls of Presidents Draghi and Lagarde for countries with fiscal space, above all Germany, to boost spending and investment? This is important, yes, but my proposal goes further than that. Our current system of national fiscal policies and national budgets, with a set of rules like the Stability and Growth Pact, is not sufficient.
As a matter of fact, the Central Bank explains, via Inflation Reports and other policy instruments, why and how the monetary policy stance has been reviewed. The main policy instrument of the Central Bank is short-term interest rates. The implementation and communication of the monetary policy decisions in the inflation-targeting regime will continue to be carried out through short-term interest rates. Moreover, as stated in previous policy documents, instruments such as reserve requirements or efficient liquidity management might be used, when deemed necessary. The decision-making process and communication The Monetary Policy Committee (the Committee) will continue to meet once a month in 2008 as well. Meetings will be held according to the previously set calendar and start at 13.00. After making a decision, summary of the decision and its rationale will be posted on the website of the Bank in a press release at 19.00 on the same day. English translation of the decision will be posted on the website on the same day. To enhance the communication of monetary policy decisions, “Summary of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting” will continue to be posted in both Turkish and English on the Bank’s website within eight working days following the meeting. The Inflation Report, which is the main communication tool of the monetary policy, will continue to be published quarterly, and the general evaluation of the Report will be presented to the public with a press conference. The Financial Stability Report will be published twice a year 1 .

This year's conference will feature a very important topic, given the current economic context marked by a sharp increase in energy prices and the uncertainty regarding the war in Ukraine and the related sanctions. As a sad digression, I recall that last year's NBR-EIB conference was on the Eve of the war, on February 23rd. Coming back to the effects that can already be seen in the households' and investors' confidence, there is a deterioration of the economic climate expectations, there are pressures in the economies of our major trading partners and the risk perception towards economies in the region, with impact on the financing costs. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  As we know, this event centers on the EIB's Investment Survey, an excellent country analysis conducted by the Bank. The conclusions of this survey are relevant for both companies and authorities, including the National Bank of Romania, as they capture appropriately the opinions of the real sector on some key issues, such as: (i) the most pressing problems that firms are facing in their activity; (ii) the investment needs and priorities; (iii) challenges raised by climate change and energy efficiency. The survey shows that firms in Romania have become less optimistic regarding investment conditions for the year ahead. While this is a worrying trend, we are rather positive that Romania will be able to overcome the main problem identified, the energy costs, in the near future.
•  He finds that if monetary policy in the US had been appropriately configured to macroeconomic outcomes in the 2000s, the housing boom would have ended in 2003 instead of 2006 and that mortgage debt levels would not have risen so high. 14  1  2  Let me now take up the second and third approaches in more detail. The phrase is taken from Eichengreen and Mitchener’s 2003 BIS working paper on “The Great Depression as a Credit Boom Gone Wrong”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Monetary policy: getting in all the cracks 15 The intellectual underpinning for the second approach is based on the insight that monetary policy has the potential to affect financial stability through the “risk-taking channel”.2 •  Jeremy Stein puts it succinctly – “Monetary policy is fundamentally in the business of altering risk premiums”. 16 Loose monetary policy can heighten vulnerabilities in the financial system by altering both the perception of risk and the tolerance for risk. •  In conventional monetary policy, lower policy rates boost incomes and profits, and enhance asset and collateral values. This reduces banks’ estimated probability of defaults and losses, leading to greater leverage and risk-taking. •  In unconventional monetary policy, large scale asset purchases by central banks depress returns along the entire yield curve. This provides asset managers the incentive to take on more risk, often in a herd-like fashion.

We must always have knowledge about what is driving prices in order to make good interest rate decisions. The recent developments in the commodities markets are one example of this. And it is then important to analyse measures that illustrate these effects. 4  BIS Review 73/2008  A better way of showing the effects of interest rate changes There will also be a need to look at measures that adjust for the direct effects of our interest rate changes in the future. One can argue that this is particularly important these days, now that we make forecasts based on the fact that the interest rate can change. As opposed to the period when we assumed that the interest rate would remain unchanged during the forecast period, the forecasts for the CPI are nowadays directly affected by our policy. However, the CPIX is not the most appropriate measure of adjusting for our own interest rate changes. As I have pointed out, the CPIX excludes many more items than just interest rate changes – including changes in indirect taxes and the effects on mortgage interest costs for home-owners arising from the rising house prices. A better method is to see how the CPI would develop if we merely exclude the part of the change in the interest rate cost arising from the interest rate index. The Riksbank will use this type of measure of “CPI with a fixed interest rate” more actively in the future. This will be published in the next Monetary Policy Report.
They are firmly grounded on actual requirements and stem from the simple fact that climate-related risks are on the rise and need to be tackled seriously by the whole financial sector. Incorporating climate-related risks into ongoing supervision and stress testing This is why we have already asked banks to conduct a self-assessment against the supervisory expectations outlined in our Guide and draw up action plans for aligning their practices to them. The assessment covers 112 institutions, representing 99% of total assets under our direct supervision. All banks have already handed in their self-assessments and are now finalising their action plans. We are currently assessing banks’ submissions and will be challenging them in all of these areas. Where we see that banks are not managing their exposures to climate-related risks in an adequate manner, we can and will draw on the full supervisory toolkit at our disposal to correct that situation. Just as we do for any other material risk. We have already started work on incorporating climate-related risks into our Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) methodology. This year the outcomes of these assessments will not be translated into quantitative capital requirements across the board, but we may impose qualitative or quantitative requirements on a case-by-case basis. We expect that the actions we are taking in 2021 will result in banks being adequately prepared for the full supervisory review which we will conduct in 2022.

For example, extreme weather events – which have been steadily increasing over recent decades3 – can harm borrowers’ ability to repay their debts and thus make the loan portfolios of banks much riskier. These risks can be further heightened if extreme weather events also depreciate the value of the assets used as collateral in those loans. Transition risks, on the other hand, include the financial losses that can directly or indirectly result from the process of adjusting to a low-carbon and more environmentally sustainable economy. This adjustment could be triggered by legislation, such as carbon pricing or the banning of carbon-intensive activities. Even independently from that, consumer preferences could shift towards goods and services that are more climate-friendly. An ECB initial assessment confirms that an abrupt transition to a low-carbon economy would have a severe impact on climatesensitive economic sectors, with consequences for up to one-tenth of banking sector assets if the creditworthiness of the highest carbon emitting firms is reassessed, and affecting more than half of banking sector assets if entire economic sectors are reassessed.4 And preliminary results from our ongoing climate stress test show that without further policy action, companies will face substantially rising costs from extreme weather events. This will greatly raise their probability of default.5 Both physical and transition risks will become increasingly material for banks in the coming years, and ECB Banking Supervision has identified climate change as one of the key risk drivers for the European banking sector.
Very high growth in demand for oil is one of the factors behind record high oil prices. In the first half of this year, the price of Brent Blend fluctuated for the most part between USD 45 and USD 55 per barrel. Oil prices rose further this summer, exceeding USD 60 per barrel in August and September. Oil futures have also increased. 4/7  Little excess production capacity in OPEC countries, combined with the prospect of lower production in non-OPEC countries, has probably influenced oil prices. At the same time, there are prospects of continued strong demand growth in important oil-importing countries, such as China and some other emerging economies. Rising or persistently high oil prices may gradually dampen growth among our most important trading partners. The slowdown may occur gradually and may not be particularly marked, but there are now growing concerns that high oil prices may have a stronger impact on inflation and inflation expectations. Monetary policy easing in response to this may then trigger a more pronounced downturn. High oil prices have a different impact in Norway than in oil-importing countries. A rise in oil prices improves our terms of trade. Other countries perceive this as an externally imposed tax. As a result of persistently high oil prices and expectations that oil prices will remain high, investment in the petroleum sector may reach record levels this year. The investment intentions survey for the petroleum sector points to very high growth.

If we look more closely at household financial wealth, we find that it is spread over various assets, with insurance claims the most important at the end of 2004. By paying premiums into various insurance schemes, mainly life and pension insurance, households earn the right to future disbursements from the insurance companies. These premiums accounted for more than a third of household financial wealth at the end of 2004. The investment instruments perhaps most commonly referred to, securities and bank deposits, accounted for less than a quarter of total wealth. Household gross financial wealth must be seen in the context of the debt accumulated by households as a group. Even when this is taken into account, the household sector as a whole has positive net financial wealth. As a share of disposable income, household net financial wealth increased from the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s. In relation to disposable income, debt was reduced, while household wealth increased. From the end of the 1990s, household debt and wealth have risen in tandem. Net wealth has remained fairly stable at around 50 per cent of disposable income. The rise in household debt must be seen in the context of the strong rise in house prices. From oil to financial wealth Household saving is part of the country’s total saving. As a nation, we can save by investing in fixed assets in Norway or by making financial investments abroad.