samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The output gap moved to positive territory earlier that in most OECD countries  Wage growth in Iceland averaged above 7% during the pandemic, a somewhat faster pace than over the preceding decade and much faster than in main trading partner countries. Recently, short-term wage settlements have been concluded that imply that the fast pace of wage growth will continue at least for the coming year. Wage and ULC growth in Iceland has been much faster than among peers  This is worrisome for medium-term inflation prospects, since the buffers that existed in the decade prior to the pandemic, and allowed faster wage growth for several years without commensurate inflationary consequences, have been depleted. The depressed level of relative unit labour costs following the GFC, fast expansion of tourism services exports in 2015 - 2017 and a current account surplus had allowed the króna to appreciate, with moderating impact on inflation. As the buffers are depleted, the relationship between wage growth and inflation is likely to be much less benign in the period ahead than during the pre-pandemic period. The fiscal and monetary dimension of the response to pandemic and war Three factors are likely to have determined the fiscal and monetary response of different countries to the pandemic: i) fiscal and monetary space at the outset, ii) the severity of the outbreak and iii) structural factors that affected the economic impact of the outbreak and restrictions imposed to contain it. On the first two accounts, Iceland was in a relatively good position.

The characters that made it through to the final shortlist were:   Mary Anning    Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace    Paul Dirac    Rosalind Franklin    Stephen Hawking    Caroline Herschel and William Herschel    Dorothy Hodgkin    James Clerk Maxwell    Srinivasa Ramanujan    Ernest Rutherford    Frederick Sanger    Alan Turing  The shortlist epitomises the breadth and depth of scientific achievement in the UK. Their work covers both the theoretical and the practical, and spans from the smallest building blocks of the universe to the nature of life itself. 1  Characters must be non-fictional and deceased. We also need to ensure that a suitable, easy to recognise, portrait of the person is available. 2 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/people/banknote-character-advisory-committee. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Rosalind Franklin’s and Frederik Sanger’s revelations about DNA, for example, furthered our understanding of the biology of life, and Dorothy Hodgkin’s discoveries about the structure of insulin and vitamins better enabled us to preserve it. Mary Anning’s palaeontological discoveries helped us understand the history of life on earth, while Caroline and William Herschel and Stephen Hawking opened up the heavens. Srinivasa Ramanujan’s pioneering research transformed modern theoretical mathematics. More practicably, the ground-breaking work of James Clerk Maxwell, Ernest Rutherford and Paul Dirac on electromagnetism, radiation and quantum mechanics laid the foundations for telecommunications and nuclear physics.
This provides a comprehensive legal environment under which effective risk and profit sharing activities can take place, encompassing all aspects of Islamic financial transactions, from its prudential and business conduct requirements to the legal treatment of Islamic banking assets upon its resolution, to be fully consistent with the distinctive elements of the respective Shariah contracts employed in these transactions. This legal framework will also further enhance the capacity of the regulatory and supervisory framework for the Malaysian Islamic finance industry to evolve in greater alignment with the international regulatory and the supervisory standards and best practices issued by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) to govern the specificities of Islamic financial transactions. To complement the efforts to strengthen the regulatory law for Islamic finance, Malaysia has also established the Law Harmonisation Committee in 2010 to undertake objective reviews on other relevant laws and recommend legislative changes to ensure that the laws in the country would allow for Islamic financial transactions to take place effectively and efficiently. Another important dimension in fostering the further development of risk and profit sharing instruments is the need to ensure the institutional soundness of the Islamic financial institutions and their enhanced ability to assess risks in the real sector. This underscores the imperative of robust risk management capabilities to manage new risks peculiar to risk and profit sharing contracts and the adoption of strong governance, transparency and disclosure practices within the Islamic financial institutions to meet the due diligence requirements for determining the viability of business and investment proposals.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Finance and the real economy – fostering sustainability Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Regional Lecture Series on Islamic economics, finance and banking: “Finance and the real economy – fostering sustainability”, Jakarta, 19 December 2012. *  *  *  I am most honoured to be invited to deliver this inaugural lecture of the Islamic Development Bank Regional Lecture Series. I am also most delighted to be back here in Jakarta. I would like to thank the Islamic Development Bank for the invitation, and Bank Indonesia for kindly hosting this event. For more than three decades now, the Islamic Development Bank has had an important role in promoting economic growth and development in so many parts of the world, and associated with this, has been its role in fostering the development of Islamic finance. It has supported the building of key international financial infrastructure that has been important for the orderly global development of Islamic finance and for safeguarding financial stability. The Islamic Development Bank has also supported research and education efforts in this area, while its strategic interests in financial institutions in different jurisdictions have been an important catalyst for their establishment and expansion.
First, collective decision-making appears to give more weight to the better and less weight to the worse committee members, as judged by their scores when playing the game as individuals, than would be implied by taking the mean of individual performance. The best player had some influence on the decisions of the group of which they were a member. And the impact of the worst player was offset by majority voting. In other words, the median score of the players in the individual rounds was significantly above the mean, implying that the average was being pulled down by a minority of relatively bad players. Second, there was also evidence from the experiments consistent with the hypothesis that committees enable all members to improve their performance by sharing information and learning from each other. And it was striking that the performance of committees was on average somewhat better than that of the performance of the single best player on the committee when playing alone. So in terms of group decisions, it appears that the whole is different from - and generally better than - the sum of its parts. Producing the perfect design of a committee structure that would make the best decisions is a task with no simple answer. But the MPC embodies several features that seem desirable. First, there is a clear objective given to the Committee from outside, in this case by the government. Second, the members are chosen for their technical ability.

8  BIS Review 34/2002  Chart 1: average committee scores over time1  A ve rag e s core 80 70  Tre nd  60 50  Score  40 30 20  In d iv id u a l games  10  In d iv id u a l games  C o m m it t e e games  0 0  1  2  3  4  5  6 7 8 9 10 G a m e Nu m b e r  11  12  13  14  15  16  1  Players are scored according to their ability to keep inflation close to a pre-specified target and to minimise output fluctuations across each of the sixteen, ten period games. The Chart shows the evolution of scores over time: • For the individual games, numbers 1-4 and 13-16, each diamond represents the mean individual score across the 170 participants. • For the committee games, numbers 5-12, the diamonds represent the mean score across the 34 committees. In these stages, the five members of the committee vote in each period and the ‘majority’ - or more precisely - the median interest rate is set. Each committee is then scored according to this median outcome.
The measures included most notably the currency swap lines opened by the Federal Reserve and the main central banks, including the Eurosystem, which helped ease the shortage of dollars. The G-20 also launched initiatives to raise funds for the financing of international trade and to increase the funding of multilateral development banks. Export credit agencies and their countercyclical measures contributed to easing the problems. Against a background of high uncertainty, exporters sought to guarantee with hedging instruments operations for which previously they required no insurance whatsoever, but the supply of private financing was strongly depressed and its cost rose notably. The difficulties of raising external wholesale funding and the need to shore up their solvency ratios led Spanish banks to reduce their financing for export transactions. The impact on medium- and long-term transactions (those CESCE could insure) was notable. Hence, CESCE’s activity declined given that without financing there can be no insurance. The risk perceived by foreign institutions in their transactions with Spain also increased. This led to a squeeze on the financing provided by some foreign banks, reflecting Spain’s sovereign downgrade. The increased risk perception lessened foreign banks’ capacity to accept guarantees from Spanish banks, even in the short term. As to the long term, foreign banks restricted guarantees to Spanish companies to participate in international tender procedures, or more generally, the financing of Spanish companies’ long-term projects.

When cyclical developments in Norway and abroad again converge, interest rates in Norway will be closer to the level abroad. The krone will then also return to a more normal level. The effects on the krone of the extraordinary situation in the oil market will also pass. References: Frøyland, E. and R. Nymoen (2000): “The output gap in the Norwegian economy – different methodology, same result?” Economic Bulletin 2/2000, Norges Bank Olsen, K., J.F. Qvigstand and Ø. Røisland (2003): “Monetary policy in real time. The role of simple rules”. To be published in BIS papers. Bank for International Settlements
Change in consumer price inflation in percentage points 0 -0 .1 -0 .2 -0 .3 -0 .4 -0 .5 År  -0 .6 1  2  3  4  Source: Norges Bank JB 7. februar 2003  Effects on consumer price inflation of a persistent appreciation of 5 per cent of the import-weighted krone exchange rate.

In terms of actual measures – something that Antony also wants me to talk about – I would refer you to the eighty recommendations in the Report of the Focus Group on Financial Services published in January 2007 as Hong Kong's response to the Eleventh FiveYear Plan of the country published in 2006 and as Hong Kong's input to the National Finance Working Meeting in 2007. As you may be aware, the implementation of our overall strategy and many of the detailed recommendations involve the relaxation of controls in the financial systems on the Mainland. While the benefits of financial liberalisation are clear, so are the risks to financial stability, as the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the current turmoil in the developed financial markets demonstrate so vividly. Here there should be a strong emphasis, to quote the Premier again, on gradualism, controllability and the ability to take initiatives at the right time. And in the context of pursuing the complementary, mutually-assisting and interactive relationship between the two financial systems, financial liberalisation should not be seen as helping Hong Kong. We welcome support from the Mainland in discharging our legal responsibility in maintaining the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre, but I hope I have convinced you that in developing our strategy and our recommendations, we very much have the national interest foremost in our minds.
William C Dudley: Panel remarks at Bank Indonesia-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joint International Seminar Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bank Indonesia-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joint International Seminar, Bali, 31 July 2016. *  *  *  Linda Goldberg, Jonathan McCarthy and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. In my remarks today, I will focus on why global growth has been so anemic following the financial crisis and what we can do about it. I think it is fair to say that the global recovery following the financial crisis has been disappointing. Growth is below pre-crisis levels for the United States, Europe, Japan and China. For example, in the U.S., real GDP growth has averaged only about 2.2 percent per year over the period from 2010 to 2015, below the pre-crisis average of 2.4 percent from 2003 to 2008. This slower growth performance has been accompanied by relatively low inflation rates – persistently below the objectives of the monetary policy authorities in the United States, Europe and Japan. As I see it, there are many causes for these persistent shortfalls in growth, and they vary across regions and countries. Let me focus on the reasons for the United States in the post crisis period. Growth has been weaker than expected for many reasons.

The financial crisis was a searing experience that damaged household and business confidence in a profound way – with a more lasting effect than the typical economic downturn. The housing bust created both a large housing supply overhang and a large number of households that were underwater on their mortgages. Households needed to repair their balance sheets and bring down their debt service burdens to more manageable levels. Higher levels of unemployment further depressed demand. Credit availability contracted. The tightening of credit standards occurred quite broadly – in housing credit, consumer credit cards and business lending. Some of the credit supply restrictions were imposed by banks that needed to repair their balance sheets, deleveraging by building up capital and working down their bad assets. Fiscal outlays were not high enough to compensate for the contractionary impulse from these first three sources. The crisis led to a significant deterioration in the U.S. federal budget deficit and put pressure on state and local budgets. After the federal budget deficit reached around 10 percent of GDP at the peak, fiscal consolidation occurred at the federal level, as well as at state and local levels, restraining economic activity instead of supporting growth. Productivity growth has also been quite low. In the period before the crisis (2003 to 2008), U.S. nonfarm productivity growth averaged 2 percent per year. Since 2010, productivity has been closer to 1 percent. While some of this decline can be explained by lower capital spending, the decline is difficult to fully explain.
But, at the same time, this must be done in way that ensures the financial system retains sufficient dynamism so that it can allocate capital efficiently to support innovation and economic growth. The crisis revealed a number of significant weaknesses in the global financial system. First, many leading financial institutions at the core of the system did not have enough high-quality capital to be able to retain access to private funding markets in the face of the large credit and mark-to-market losses. In particular, they often held grossly inadequate capital against their trading book exposures and the counterparty credit risk generated by activities such as their over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives business. Second, individual firms and the system as a whole had inadequate liquidity buffers to withstand marketwide disruptions. Indeed, there was widespread overreliance on short-term funding to finance long-term illiquid assets. This was especially evident among the major securities dealers, which depended on tri-party repo funding to finance much of their securities inventories, and in the so-called shadow banking system, in which entities such as structured investment vehicles and conduits were dependent on short-term funding to finance their long-term assets. Banks that had provided liquidity guarantees to these shadow banks were in turn exposed to runs on those entities. Third, a lack of transparency exacerbated uncertainty about the creditworthiness of many institutions. Some of this was due to the complexity of the assets – collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), in particular, were very hard to value even in normal times.

Thus, enlargement has become an important aspect of the EU policy. Distinguished guests, Almost in every meeting on the EU and the Turkish economy, I am faced with questions such as "What can Turkey contribute to the EU, in other words, what will be the advantages of the EU from Turkey's membership?" or "What does Turkey expect from being a full member of the Union?". But, there are no easy and quick answers to these questions. Therefore, my answer will rather be a long one. Apparently, there are very strong arguments in favour of Turkish membership such that Turkey will bring the Islamic world and the Western world together or a larger EU with Turkey will certainly be a much bigger power playing an important role in the world. Apart from political aspects, it is clear that the debate on the Turkish membership is very much related to the economic structure of Turkey. Hence, I want to make one thing clear: although membership is a political decision in essence, my answers to the questions I mentioned will focus mainly on economic aspects. Having this in mind, now I’d like to start with the notion of competitiveness on a global level and its implications for both Turkey and the EU. The 20th century has been a new era in terms of diminishing borders in trade and means of production and led to increasing competition all around the world.
The integration and efficiency of the euro money market is measurable through various indicators such as: –  high trading volumes (around  billion per day in the overnight interbank market);  –  virtually non-existent quotation differentials between financial centres;  BIS Review 61/2000  4  –  a high proportion of cross-border transactions, be it on the “unsecured” deposit market, the repo markets or the interest-rate swap market;  –  minimal recourse to the Eurosystem’s standing facilities (which means that liquidity adjustments are mostly made on the market). •  Rapid growth of the euro-denominated bond markets  While full integration has clearly been achieved on the money market, obstacles still remain on the bond market, partly reflecting differences in tax regimes and in market organisation and practices, although a good deal of harmonisation has already taken place. However, issuers have rapidly shown great interest in the euro as illustrated by the fact that issuance in euros exceeded issuance in dollars in 1999. The important point to highlight on this subject is not so much that the level of issuance in euros surpassed the amount in dollars, but that the new-born euro bond market has been able to absorb such an increased volume without any disruption. The euro is already a technical and operational success. I will now try to demonstrate that the euro has the potential to also be a complete strategic success in the future. B.

Christian Noyer: After the global crisis, which models of growth? Keynote speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the CIGS (The Canon Institute for Global Studies) – EHESS (Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales) International Symposium “After the global crisis, which models of growth?”, Tokyo, 3 October 2011. *  *  *  Let me begin by saying I am delighted to be here with you today. I am of course conscious that the world is experiencing major economic turbulence and that Japan has suffered this year a series of particularly cruel catastrophes. As you know, I have profound admiration for your country, and we French wish to show our solidarity with you in the face of these ordeals. I would like to warmly thank the organisers of this symposium – which should be fascinating – for giving me this opportunity to speak to you. I thank the Canon Institute for Global Studies and its Chairman, my friend Governor Fukui. I also thank the France-Japan Foundation of the EHESS and its Director, Sebastien Lechevalier. In 2009, the Banque de France was one of the first institutional sponsors of this Foundation, whose objective of promoting greater intellectual and cultural exchange between Japan and France is highly commendable. Our two countries have much to learn from each other and a great deal to gain from deeper collaboration. I do therefore strongly welcome this initiative.
The euro is relying now on a more than 20-year old solid track record of stability: it is backed by a soft power based on the respect of international rules, multilateralism and openness. The euro is also at the centre of broad international trade links. It is at least a credible complement to the dollar as a safe asset. II. Promoting the international role of the euro as a pillar of monetary cooperation From the inception of the euro and during the last two decades, the Eurosystem adopted a neutral stance with regard to the development of the international role of the euro. It does not belong to the Treaty’s objectives: the euro was created for internal purposes, to avoid exchange fluctuations within Europe and accelerate economic convergence between Member States, not primarily to act as an international currency. Economic developments since 1999 have alleviated concerns voiced at that time about a potential loss of monetary policy control in case of a swift internationalization of the euro. A stronger international role of the euro would now be associated with more monetary policy autonomy  Page 5 sur 7 and reduced impacts of exchange rate shocks on inflation. After a decade in existence, by the time of the GFC, the euro had become the second most used currency globally. But since then its growth has stalled. Today it still accounts for roughly 20% of global currency holdings in central banks as well as just short of 20% of global debt and global loans.

In this context, the idea of a global currency did not prosper in the academic debates – and even less so in policy discussions. One recent exception stands out, to which I would like to pay a special tribute. In 2010, Michel Camdessus launched the Palais Royal initiative. This initiative sheds light on the shortcomings of the International Financial System, in particular its global governance and an overreliance on a single central currency. The initiative suggested a greater role for SDRs and enhanced cooperation between the World Bank, the IMF and the G20. However, other major projects have in parallel been assigned higher priority for instance the successful creation and development of the euro - or have been dictated by necessity - for instance the strengthening of the global financial safety net (GFSN) induced by the great financial crisis and then the Covid crisis. That said, there have been significant progress such as the increase of IMF resources, the two special drawing rights (SDR) allocations (including the last one of 650 billion USD in 2021) and the creation of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) on the 1st of May by the IMF, which will help deliver the G20 commitment to rechannelling at least 100 billion USD of this allocation to the countries in need. 2. The dangers of a fragmented financial system  Page 3 sur 7 But there are dangers ahead.