samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What I suggest on this front is:   There should be greater market transparency, perhaps ideally via a Trade Repository with open access to aggregate data, so that the world can see what is happening in these very important but opaque financing markets. (That would be helpful for market participants themselves).   Financial firms and funds should not be able to lend against securities that they are not permitted or proficient enough to hold outright.   Non-bank financial firms should be regulated in how they employ cash collateral.   The authorities should be able to step in and set minimum haircut or margin levels for the collateralised financing markets (or segments of them). (That would need to be pursued at international level.3 It might be linked to central bank haircuts). Some of those points are aired in the FSB’s report on securities lending and repos published today4 and will, I hope, be explored intensively in the coming months. I will expand slightly on the last point in my list. The amount of leverage available in the system depends, of course, to a significant degree on the haircuts applied in chains of secured financing transactions; leverage is the reciprocal of the haircuts. The resilience of the system is therefore impaired when a bout of exuberance drives down haircuts. The authorities need to be ready to place constraints on that – through minima that either apply continuously or are specially introduced when conditions are overheating.

If this estimate is correct, it would mean that the majority of today’s reserves are unusable and thus have no economic value. The assets have, in other words, become “stranded”. Oil and gas companies are major borrowers on international bond markets and a rapid transition may therefore create financial risks and instability. For banks, the value of collateral can fall and credit losses can rise, which could reduce their capital, impair liquidity and thus weaken the banking system. The insurance sector is related part of the economy that may be hit hard by a rapid transition. Tighter insurance requirements and increased liability could have a very adverse effect on the insurance sector. We can already see that it has become more common for insurance companies not to insure certain climate risks. Figure 2 also provides a description of how the effects of transition risks may spread to the financial sector and threaten financial stability.5 Figure 2. Physical risks and transition risks affect financial institutions and hence financial stability. PHYSICAL RISK  Gradual global warming  Extreme weather events  TRANSITION RISK  Adaptation to less fossilbased economy  Climate taxes  Tougher regulation  Changed consumption patterns  COMPANIES, AGRICULTURE AND HOUSEHOLDS Lower productivity Falling asset prices Lower profits  FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS   Tighter insurance requirements  Investment losses  Credit losses   Increased risk weights  Source: Danmarks Nationalbank (2019)  Third, I would like to highlight the risk of extreme outcomes, so-called threshold effects.
And, in our advisor role, we develop viable ideas and practical options to improve processes, controls, and business outcomes. So, as the facilities were created, staff in my group joined the facilities teams to connect with the real-time information flow and decision making. That's because we knew that the traditional cadence of monthly meetings wouldn't work when decisions were being made by the hour or minute. And to be relevant, we had to accelerate to the pace of our advice to the speed of this environment. Through this close engagement, from Day One, we could see where controls needed further development, and we By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. helped prioritize what was most essential. We also redesigned our risk management toolkit to see and address risks in real time. We started by working with the facilities teams to identify and triage the most significant risks. We partnered with experts across the Bank to cover the spectrum of financial and non-financial risks. Once the facilities were operating, we created facility risk registers to further identify risks, prioritize responses, and track mitigation. We also looked for thematic risks across facilities that we could address in common ways. For several facilities, we more deeply analyzed end-to-end processes to further strengthen controls.

SPEECH  Things That Have Never Happened Before Happen All the Time October 27, 2022 Joshua Rosenberg, Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer Remarks at the Central Bank of Nigeria’s Second National Risk Management Conference (delivered via videoconference) As prepared for delivery  Good morning, good afternoon, or good evening depending on whether you are at the event in person or logging in remotely from another part of the world. I am very grateful to Dr. Blaise Ijebor for inviting me to present today at the Central Bank of Nigeria's Second National Risk Management Conference.1 Let me start by saying that the views I will express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Today, I'd like to share my perspectives, experiences, and learnings to reflect on how we can use risk management to enable us to achieve our goals even in the face of surprises and challenges. The main point I want to make is that, by integrating risk management into plans, decisions, and actions, we can succeed over a wider range of possible futures, not just the future we expect (or hope for). I'll initially highlight a few potential misunderstandings that might prevent us from getting the most out of risk management. The first is that risk management is mainly a way to stop bad things from happening.
This has been reflected in the positive developments in real GDP growth, lower inflation, a downward trend in lending interest rates coupled with a stable exchange rate. It must be stressed here that the Bank of Zambia is optimistic that further progress will be made in lowering inflation to a single digit in the near future as appropriate monetary and fiscal policies continue to be implemented. This will be supported by the effects of the movements in the exchange rate of the Kwacha, which is reflected for instance in the adjustment of the prices of petroleum products and the expected improvement in food supplies following the favourable rainy season. Ladies and Gentlemen, beyond delivering on its core functions of attaining price and financial system stability, the Bank of Zambia recognises the importance of being a good corporate citizen. In this regard, the Bank has for many years been involved in providing financial and material support to the two state universities by sponsoring a Chair at each of these institutions as well as providing educational awards and scholarships to deserving students. In assisting the needy, the Bank of Zambia and its employees have on several occasions made donations to charitable institutions.

Ardo Hansson: Working together for the good of the EU and Estonia Opening speech by Mr Ardo Hansson, Governor of the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank), to the Ragnar Nurkse Lecture for the 95th Anniversary of Eesti Pank, Tallinn, 4 November 2014. *  *  *  Professor Balcerowicz, President of the Riigikogu, Chair of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for being here today to mark the 95th anniversary of Eesti Pank and to honour Ragnar Nurkse, the world's best-known economist from Estonia to date. Eesti Pank was founded when the Republic of Estonia was only a year old and Ragnar Nurkse was a model eleven-year-old pupil at the Tallinn Cathedral School. In the words of Juhan Kukk, the Minister of Finance of the time, founding Eesti Pank as the issuer of the national currency and tying the currency to gold showed the same great “bravery and belief in national and economic independence” as engaging in the War of Independence did. Ragnar Nurkse started his studies in the University of Tartu, but he soon moved to continue them in the School of Economics of the University of Edinburgh and later in Vienna. He was recognised in his home country for his work, as is shown by the worried letter that Jüri Jaakson, Governor of Eesti Pank at the time, sent him in spring 1938. Nurkse was working in Geneva at the time for the League of Nations, the forerunner of the United Nations.
But I expect a strong recovery will take hold here, supported by the improvement in the broader U.S. economy. The Fed’s Policy Response This brings me to the Fed’s policy response. In its December 2020 statement, the FOMC said it would continue asset purchases at the current pace until it sees substantial further progress toward our maximum employment and price stability goals.1 Given what I explained earlier, I think it’s clear that we have made substantial further progress on achieving our inflation goal. There has also been very good progress toward maximum employment, but I will want to see more improvement before I am ready to declare the test of substantial further progress being met. Assuming the economy continues to improve as I anticipate, it could be appropriate to start reducing the pace of asset purchases this year. I will be carefully assessing the incoming data on the labor market and what it means for the economic outlook, as well as assessing risks such as the effects of the Delta variant. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  It is important to remember that even after the asset purchases end, the stance of monetary policy will continue to support a strong and full economic recovery and sustained attainment of 2 percent average inflation.

After this year’s spike in inflation related to the effects of the pandemic—and with inflation expectations and other measures of underlying inflation close to our 2 percent longer-run goal—I expect inflation pressures to moderate over time and for the inflation rate to come back to its underlying trend of around 2 percent next year. It goes without saying that there is still a great deal of uncertainty about the inflation outlook, and I will be watching the data closely in the coming months. North Country I’ve spoken at great length about the outlook for the U.S. economy as a whole. While people’s experiences are influenced by the macro outlook, the local economy often plays a very important role in shaping their economic opportunity. At the beginning of this speech, I referred to the Federal Reserve System’s Second District, which is the region the New York Fed is responsible for. This area includes New York State, parts of New Jersey and Connecticut, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. To better understand the state of the economy and economic growth here, I’ve spent a lot of time this week meeting with North Country business leaders, community organizers, and elected officials. Much of what emerged from these conversations reflects the unique aspects of the North Country economy, which suffered outsize job losses at the onset of the pandemic and continues to experience a reduction in tourism owing to border closures. This area, like many across the Second District and around the country, has its challenges.
And I find increasingly as I travel around the country that local businesses and their representative organisations - including both commercial and industrial sectors and the professional services sectors - are working together, with the local academic community, and with the regional and local authorities, to identify - on the basis of their local knowledge - the particular obstacles, and the particular opportunities, they face, recognising that there is a great deal that they themselves can do through partnership - including public-private partnership - to help create a more positive supply-side environment at the regional and local level. That partnership typically embraces not only issues facing the mainstream economy but extends to direct involvement in activities designed to draw into the mainstream economy communities which for one reason or another are liable to be left on the sidelines, but which, if they are given the right opportunities, clearly can contribute to both the economic prosperity and the social cohesion of the region. And I find that positive approach here too in the West Midlands. It's very much the purpose of this conference - organised by AWM - Advantage West Midlands - alongside the IOD and the ICA. It's the purpose, too, for example, of the West Midlands Regional Finance Forum organised by AWM and bringing together the banks and accountants, representatives of the ethnic minorities and community finance organisations - including Aston Reinvestment Trust, as well as academics and the Small Business Service, with the aim of improving access to finance for business at all levels.

Now I know it hasn't felt like that for everyone - particularly for internationally exposed businesses and their employees and for the regions in which such businesses are more heavily concentrated including the West Midlands with its relatively high concentration of manufacturing businesses. I am well aware that many of them - perhaps many of you - have been having a rough time over the past few years. 2  BIS Review 53/2002  Although the UK economy as a whole managed to avoid recession, UK manufacturing output fell from a peak nearly two years ago by around 7% and employment in UK manufacturing fell by 225,000 people, or some 6%. To put that into perspective, manufacturing output fell from peak to trough over much the same period by over 16% in Japan, by 7½% in the US and by 6½% in Germany; and manufacturing employment fell by 7¼% in Japan, 9½% in the US and nearly 3% in Germany. So the pressures on manufacturing were not confined to, nor did they originate in this country. There are two main reasons for the pressures on the internationally-exposed sectors of our economy. The first is the weakness of much of the global economy as a result of the Asia crisis and its aftermath in the late 1990's, and then, more recently, as a result of the sharp, synchronised, slowdown in the major industrial countries - as reflected in the figures I've just given you.
The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Report on the state of the UK economy Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Chartered Institute of Bankers in Scotland Biennial Dinner, Glasgow, 20 January 2003. *  *  *  Mr President, My Lord Dean, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, May I begin, Mr President, by thanking you and the members of the Council for your great kindness in conferring the Honorary Fellowship of the Institute on me this evening. I very much appreciate the honour it represents - and it is indeed a great honour for a sassenach. But even more than that, for me it symbolises the broader - and very longstanding - fellowship between the Bank of England and the banking community here in Scotland - a fellowship, and indeed a friendship, which I myself have so much enjoyed ever since I first began my regular visits here over 25 years ago. As I move towards my retirement this evening will serve as an enduring reminder of the warm personal and professional relationships - with the bankers in Scotland, including many of you here this evening - that I have been privileged to develop over that time. And I will wear your - in fact I can now say our - splendid new tartan with both pleasure and pride.

A stronger U.S. banking system better protects against future shocks, provides a more solid foundation for domestic growth, and therefore also enhances prospects for growth and financial stability abroad. I look forward to a discussion with fellow panelists and also to engaging with conference participants over the next two days. Thank you for your attention. References Ehrmann, M. & M. Fratzscher (2005). Equal Size, Equal Role? Interest Rate Interdependence Between the Euro Area and the United States, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115 (506), pages 928–948, October. Farhi, E. and I. Werning (2014). Dilemma not Trilemma? Capital Controls and Exchange Rates with Volatile Capital Flows, IMF Economic Review, pp. 62: 569–605. Federal Open Market Committee (2016), Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, Adopted effective January 24, 2012; as amended effective January 26, 2016. Federal Open Market Committee (2016), Policy Statement, January 27, 2016. Fleming, M. (1962). Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange Rates, IMF staff papers, 9 (3), pp. 369–380. G20 (2010), Summit Leaders’ Declaration, Seoul, Korea, November 11 – 12, 2010. Goldberg, L. (2013). Banking Globalization, Transmission, and Monetary Policy Autonomy, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review (Special Issue), pp. 161–193. 7  http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section2a.htm. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  IMF (2105), The IMF’s Approach to Capital Account Liberalization Revisiting the 2005 IEO Evaluation, Independent Evaluation Office, Washington, D.C. IMF (2015), 2015 Spillover Report, Washington, D.C. IMF (2012), The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: an Institutional View, Washington, D.C. Klein, M. and Shambaugh, J. (2015).
The Riksbank is of course always able to lend Swedish kronor, but in my view it is not reasonable that the banks can take liquidity risks on the assumption that the Riksbank will always be at hand if things do not go according to plan. The Riksbank should, potentially, be the lender of last resort, not the lender of first resort. Liquidity regulations in Swedish kronor would also give the banks incentives to extend the maturity of their funding. This is because, all else being equal, a bank that extends the maturity of its funding will reduce its short-term cash outflows and will thus have a higher LCR. We can also view risk-weight floors for mortgages as a complement to the existing regulatory frameworks. The leverage ratio deals to some extent with the problem that the risk weights perhaps do not always reflect the actual risk in the banks’ portfolios, but it does not do so precisely enough. International measures may eventually be proposed, but until then and as  2  6  Financial Stability Report, November 2013. Sveriges Riksbank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  long as household indebtedness constitutes a significant risk we need a sufficiently high riskweight floor for Swedish mortgages. At present, we have a risk-weight floor of 15 per cent in Sweden. As long as household indebtedness increases, there are good reasons for raising this floor to at least 25 per cent.

It also takes into account Malaysia’s aspirations to become a high valueadded, high income economy. Within the global economic landscape, emerging economies will assume a more significant role. While emerging economies will continue to be affected by global developments, most are able to demonstrate resilience and are expected to remain on a growth trajectory. By 2030, emerging economies are projected to account for 60% of total world output, from the current 40%. At the same time, the economies and financial markets in the global economy and international financial system have become more interconnected as a result of greater crossborder trade and financial flows. The continued development and deepening of our financial markets and increased financial liberalisation in emerging economies will reinforce this trend towards greater interconnectivity. More recently, the financial sector has been the target of a renewed focus and priority by the international community. Wide ranging financial reform measures have been introduced in the aftermath of the global financial crisis to address the weaknesses that have surfaced during the crisis. Several changes are also transforming the domestic environment. New domestic sources of growth, the greater role of the private sector in the economy, demographic changes, rising incomes and a growing middle class, and the accelerated pace of urbanisation cumulatively will significantly change the demands on the financial sector.
If the krona continues to develop along the path estimated by the Riksbank and many other analysts, and continues to strengthen in 2002 and 2003, it will help ensure that the economic upturn does not grow into overheating. 4  BIS Review 32/2002  The economic situation and monetary policy It is clear from the minutes of the most recent monetary policy meeting that the Riksbank is painting a fairly bright picture of the Swedish economy in future. The international recovery, particularly in the USA, may become slightly stronger than we believed earlier, and this, combined with a continued weak krona, will benefit Swedish exports. However, developments in Ericsson and the telecommunications industry constitute cause for concern and uncertainty. At the same time, the significance of one single sector should not be exaggerated. Industrial activity in Sweden is continuing to strengthen. Both order intake and industrial production indicate a recovery is on its way. This is also reflected in various confidence indicators. With regard to consumption, there are also signs that a turnaround is on its way; households’ confidence indicators and the demand for banknotes and coins all point in this direction. Retail trade sales have stabilised and there has possibly been a slight upturn at the beginning of the year. This applies particularly to consumption of durable goods. Low real interest rates and the expansionary fiscal policy indicate that consumption will pick up. Developments in prices and wages leave a lot to be desired, as I mentioned in the beginning.

At the same time, we can conclude the opposite with regard to the inflation forecasts (OH 2 inflation forecasts 1998-2002), which we have been forced to revise upwards again and again. If we are right that a recovery is now beginning both in Sweden and abroad, we can conclude that the economic downturn was one of the mildest of the post-war period, partly as a result of resolute stabilisation policy. However, the slowdown in Sweden and the rest of the world during 2001 was unexpectedly severe in relation to the forecasts made in 2000. The fact that forecasters miss turning points in the economic cycle is not unique to this particular downturn, but quite a common phenomenon. I will return to the current situation, but first a look back in time. Historical patterns are repeated Is it possible to learn lessons from history? Both yes and no. If one studies economic slowdowns over the past three decades, one can see that they differ considerably both with regard to causes, sequence of events and recovery. There is no simple, cyclical pattern that is automatically repeated. At the same time, it is clear that what we have experienced now has elements in common with 1 previous cycles. In some industrial nations, including the USA, the economic downturns during the 1990s have become milder compared with the downturns during the 1970s and early 1980s. Deep recessions have been unusual and arisen in combination with major structural problems, such as bank crises.