samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In terms of financial stability – my own focus – it is vital that the risk manager in the CCP, which means the heart of the CCP, should have a clear and independent line to the group board, so that they cannot be lent on by the affiliated exchange to reduce or shade initial margin requirements or collateral terms or portfolio investment policies in order to generate more turnover. This will matter more than ever during a period in which there is likely to be more than one CCP clearing some markets. In the same spirit, the core risk management functions of CCPs should not be outsourced. Regulators have been slow to embrace this. But I am glad to say that it does get some recognition in the EMIR text, perhaps not as unambiguously as is warranted in my view. 2. Global CCPs and access  The efficiencies and risk management advantages of multilateral netting across a variety of products make it likely that the world will have a few global CCPs. There must be broad access to these CCPs, provided always that that can be made consistent with maintaining the integrity of risk management (including default procedures). The benefits of putting over the counter (OTC) derivatives trading through CCPs cannot be confined to a few currencies or markets. That is not what the G20 mandated; and, in any case, it would not be in the interests of global stability.

That is why, the primary surplus is the targeted variable and we set our goals high in order to increase the credibility of the policies, which aim to reduce the ratio of public debt to national income. The high primary surplus target convinces economic units of the possibility of debt rollover as well as reducing public debt, improving expectations and generating confidence. Positive expectations lead to a decline in the risk premium and, as a result, real interest rates and contribute to the stability of the New Turkish Lira. This process is likely to directly affect growth. The most convincing proof of this is the implementation of tight fiscal policy in Turkey for the last three years and the realization of record high growth rates. Now let me touch upon a subject that I frequently come across in the print media and peoples’ comments, which shows there are mixed opinions on macroeconomic policies. In the scope of the entire Turkish economy and the definition of various economic variables such as growth, employment, inflation, debt stock, foreign trade statistics and current account balance, a fact determined not only technically, but also in practice, is that macroeconomic policies cannot affect all these variables  BIS Review 36/2005  15  directly and at the same time. Therefore, setting a figure for each economic variable and defining these as targets is not correct practice within the framework of the market economy.
While other factors were also at play, it is clear that something of this kind took place in the spate of local troubles that snowballed into what we now call the Asian crisis. Private capital inflows, attracted by high short-term returns, fuelled Asia’s economic boom. The Thai baht crisis of July 1997, which many initially dismissed as a local blip, snowballed into a regional crisis when a sudden reversal of these flows took place following a rapid and wholesale reassessment of emerging market risk. In one way or another, the crisis has affected nearly every emerging market and has slowed growth throughout the world. Stampedes of this kind take little account of the economic fundamentals behind the markets: there were ongoing problems in many Asian economies, but there was no macroeconomic reason why there should have been such a sudden and wholesale withdrawal of funds at this particular time. To quote the US Deputy Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers: ‘Financial crises have elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy, like bank runs. Everyone expects failure or everyone expects everyone else to expect failure, leading to a rush to be the first one out and thus causing failure.’ The Asian financial crisis, in which untold and unnecessary damage has been caused by such behaviour, is a classic illustration of this. 10. Widespread volatility resulting from financial panic and herd behaviour is one of the more worrying aspects of international capital flows because small fires can spark off major conflagrations.

Traditionally – and this is true of the industry globally – financial institutions dealt with business transformation through a simple hire-and-fire strategy: hire from the market people with the skills to do the new emerging jobs and fire those in jobs that have become less relevant. This strategy will no longer work. The combination of deep domain skills, broad lateral skills, and the digital skills of the future does not often come in a package. The superior strategy is to continually train, upskill, and transform the existing workforce. This calls for a comprehensive workforce transformation strategy that is closely aligned to the business strategy. All the industry CEOs that I have spoken to understand this well. Together, let us build an agile and responsive training ecosystem that will transform the financial sector workforce. Let me now invite Mrs Josephine Teo, Minister for Manpower, to deliver her keynote address. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
But if severe shocks hit the economy, other areas of economic policy must play a key role. When the pandemic hit Norway, we cut the policy rate to zero. At the same time, fiscal support measures were implemented on a scale unprecedented in modern Norwegian history. The aim was to cushion the downturn and support households’ and firms’ income. Chart 6 Economic downturns are countered by rate cuts Norges Bank policy rate. Percent 1.75  1.75  1.5  1.5  1.25  1.25  1  1  0.75  0.75  0.5  0.5  0.25  0.25  0  0  –0.25  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  –0.25  Source: Norges Bank  The actions taken could not, however, prevent a situation where a large number of workers were suddenly out of work. The risk that the pandemic would leave lasting scars on the labour market was an important reason why we kept the policy rate at a historically low level for more than a year. Now that we can look at the years 2020 and 2021 in the rear view mirror, we can see that employment in Norway picked up more quickly than expected (Chart 7). Employment exceeded the pre-pandemic level in autumn 2021, and the same degree of monetary policy stimulus was no longer needed. We have now raised the policy rate twice, and we have signalled a further rise.

Caleb M Fundanga: Catering for the un-banked population in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of Stanbic Bank Limited’s Mazabuka branch, Mazabuka Town, 10 October 2006. *  *  *  •  The incoming Member of Parliament for Mazabuka, Honourable Gary Nkombo,  •  The Regional Managing Director of Stanbic Africa, Mr. Clive Tasker  •  The Town Clerk, Mr. Chingangu  •  The District Commissioner, Mr. Chinda  •  Traditional leaders here present; Chief Mwanachingwala, Chief Mwenda, Chief Hanjalika, Chief Nalwama, Chief Monze  •  The Chairman of Stanbic Bank (Zambia) and all Board members present  •  The Managing Director of Zambia Sugar Plc, and Managing Director of Stanbic Bank (Zambia) Ltd  •  Stanbic Bank Management and staff present  •  Distinguished invited guests, ladies and gentlemen  It is an honour and privilege to be invited to officiate at this important occasion. Today I join the Bank’s Board Chairman in thanking the people of Mazabuka for the effort and support that has been extended in establishing this Stanbic Branch, which I believe is the first in Southern Province. Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen, I have keenly followed the progress and growth of Stanbic Bank in the last few years and I must say that as Governor of the Central Bank, it has been very gratifying to witness the progressive strategies of a privately owned commercial bank.
After depreciating at the beginning of 2004, the króna remained fairly stable until it appreciated noticeably towards the end of the year. It continued to appreciate in the New Year and is currently higher than it has been since early 2000. The exchange rate of the króna has a widespread impact on the Icelandic economy. It directly affects the prices of imports and exports of goods and services. The combined value of Iceland’s imports and exports in recent years has been equivalent to 75-80% of GDP. The real exchange rate may be defined as the development of domestic prices or unit labour costs relative to trading partner countries, based on a given reference year and measured in the same currency. A rise in the real exchange rate implies that prices or labour costs in Iceland have increased by more than among trading partner countries after adjustment for changes in the exchange rate, i.e. the competitive position of domestic sectors has deteriorated. When it was decided to launch the large-scale investment projects for the aluminium industry that are currently under way, it was perfectly clear that the real exchange rate of the króna would rise considerably, as the Central Bank repeatedly pointed out in its public statements. In particular, the real exchange rate would be driven up by a rise in the nominal exchange rate caused by heavy capital inflows. If inflation could not be kept under control, the real exchange rate would also increase as a result.

From August to the end of February the DMBs had disbursed 14,500 mortgage loans, for a total of 158 b.kr. In the opposite direction, pension funds’ loans to members contracted over the same period by 6 b.kr. and lending by the HFF by 59 b.kr. The transfer of mortgage lending to the banking system is beneficial and will strengthen it in the long run. However, the timing of this development during a strong expansionary phase is inappropriate. Given the way that events have unfolded, a review of the role of the Housing Financing Fund and the legislation governing it has become very necessary. Excluding their direct foreign operations, the DMBs’ foreign debt amounted to 1,200 b.kr. at the end of January, and had grown by 561 b.kr. over the previous twelve months. The lion’s share of this debt is long-term, which is a great improvement from the times when the banks were overdependent on short-term borrowing for their funding. Their foreign assets have grown as well, but not in pace with their debts. Foreign assets of DMBs amounted to 590 b.kr. at the end of January, having grown by 312 b.kr. over the previous twelve months. Iceland’s external debt, which is largely comprised of the banks’ foreign debts, is one of the weakest links in its economy. All the agencies that issue sovereign ratings for Iceland identify this as a risk and warn that increased indebtedness could lead to a downgrading of its credit ratings. The banks therefore bear a great responsibility in this respect.
Under fixed exchange rate regimes, a particular exchange rate serves as the instrument. Under monetary targeting regimes, the instrument is typically the quantity of central bank money in the banking system. 1 The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has used all of the above-mentioned instruments in its recent history. During the Bretton Woods period of fixed exchange rates, the SNB intervened in foreign exchange markets to keep exchange rates stable. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s until 1999, the SNB adopted a monetary targeting strategy. During this period, the SNB used the level of bank reserves as operational target. From 1978 to 1979, the SNB temporarily abandoned  1  Since the quantity of money is directly related to its price, using the quantity of money as the instrument is fundamentally equivalent to using a short-term interest rate. BIS Review 30/2006  1  the strategy of targeting bank reserves in favour of targeting the exchange rate. Since the introduction of the new monetary policy framework in 2000, the SNB has used the three month CHF Libor as its operational target. 2 The precise sequence of the monetary transmission mechanism depends on the instrument which is used. I will assume that the monetary policy instrument is a short-term interest rate. This reflects common practice for central banks with floating exchange rates. Bond prices and the exchange rate Short-term interest rates alone have only limited direct effects on the economy.

But, as Otmar Issing (2005, p. 70) recently put it, central banks must ensure that they do "not end up merely executing the expectations developed in the market". The information about expected future developments reflected in market prices must be continuously cross-checked against a wide range of monetary and economic indicators in what amounts to a “checks and balances” approach to monetary policy. 8  See also Mervyn King’s speech at the Jackson Hole Symposium 2005, where he warned about unstable inflation expectations, "It may be risky to infer from the observation that inflation expectations are stable that all is well. There will be times when large and persistent shocks occur, and it would be unwise to count on inflation expectations remaining stable when actual inflation starts to deviate substantially from its recent range". 6  BIS Review 30/2006
In this respect, should the recovery in domestic economic activity turn out to be faster than expected, the limited monetary policy tightening implied in the baseline scenario could be implemented earlier than envisaged. The fact that inflation will rise in the forthcoming period due to base effects and public price adjustments, poses an important risk factor through its potential impact on inflation expectations. Several adverse factors such as food and oil price increases, base effects and administered price hikes have brought about upward movements in inflation since the last quarter of 2009. Although these factors are temporary, they are likely to cause headline  16  BIS Review 31/2010  inflation to stay at elevated levels for some time. It is crucial that economic agents fully understand the temporary nature of these developments while forming their medium- and longer-term expectations. Under the assumption that resource utilization would remain low, labor market conditions would have an adverse impact on consumption expenditure, and fiscal policy would generate a gradual depressing effect on the economy, these temporary factors as well as other one-time cost push pressures would not lead to a significant deterioration in general pricing behavior. Currently, the annual rate of increase of services prices and core inflation are consistent with medium-term inflation targets, and no serious risk of pass-through is observed. Therefore, it is foreseen that policy rates would be maintained at low levels for a long period.

Distinguished Members of the Press, Let me underline that the rise in annual inflation observed in the last quarter of 2009 can be attributed to several temporary factors, rather than a deterioration in the general price setting behavior. In fact, core inflation indicators in the last quarter pointed to an underlying inflation trend of around 4 to 5 percent and remained consistent with medium-term targets. Although annual inflation in core measures increased modestly with the expiry of tax incentives on durable goods, seasonally and tax adjusted data indicate that the underlying trend of inflation did not deteriorate (Figure 8). Furthermore, the inflation diffusion index, calculated by using the difference between the share of items with increasing prices and the share of items with falling prices in the CPI, hovered around historically low levels (Figure 9). These observations indicate that the increase in inflation in the last quarter of 2009 is mainly due to temporary developments, and to factors beyond the immediate control of monetary policy, rather than the main components of inflation. Parallel to these developments, inflation expectations for 12 months ahead that followed a downward course throughout the year increased slightly in the last quarter; whereas inflation expectations for 24 months ahead remained relatively flat (Figure 10).
We developed an organisation that provided strong careers for individuals and ensured they worked as teams. It’s been a very important effort, this organisational development. And the third thing I want to mention that is very important to the MAS is its growth of professional expertise. MAS is a little different from some other parts of the government because it requires greater depth of expertise. We need serious specialists – people who spend years developing expertise and in particular fields of our responsibility. That too is behind our credibility, because you need some expertise to have credibility. Through the years we have developed outstanding professionals – Ng Kok Song, Mrs FooYap Siew Hong, who served us for 39 years, Ms Teo Swee Lian and many others. Our present Managing Director, Mr Ravi Menon, is another example, someone who grew up as a professional within the organisation. We have to keep developing professional expertise in each of the areas that we engage in. When you add it all up, MAS is now one of the best regarded central banks and financial regulators in the world. And it is because of our people. Our people are very well regarded 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  internationally and as an organisation we punch above our weight. That comes from years building up our organisation and building up our people. Finally I want to thank all the staff – our pioneers as well as current staff, in all the roles that you perform in, in various areas in MAS.

Some of you have been through a few or even several departments in your career. I want to thank all of you for making MAS what it is today. I hope this Gallery is a testament to your work in building up an MAS that has credibility, at home in Singapore and all over the world. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
In this case, flexibility means the possibility of third parties voluntarily 5  Garrido, I., P. Moreno and X. Serra (2012), “El FMI y los acuerdos regionales de financiación”, Boletín Económico, March, Banco de España, and (2016), “The new map of international financial institutions”, Economic Bulletin, January, Banco de España. 6 Johannes Linn (2018): “Recent threats to multilateralism”, Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies 9, 86–113. 7 https://www.bundesbank.de/en/press/speeches/policy-evaluation-assessing-the-effects-of-post-crisis-financialsector-reforms-799146 8 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/07/31/pp073117-collaboration-between-regionalfinancing-arrangements-and-the-imf  6/8  adhering to a plurilateral agreement in due course (making the agreement multilateral in essence), while maintaining peer pressure to avoid free riding.9 Furthermore, the new global governance system should recognise that both regionalism and multilateralism are compatible, as some problems are of a local nature and are better tackled locally. Regionalism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, both approaches can support and complement each other, generating synergies that strengthen the global financial safety net. Indeed, bilateral and regional agreements have in many cases brought about improvements in the multilateral trading system. E-commerce is a good example of this.10 In this regard, the European Union, for example, should maintain its proactive approach to preserve the rules-based global trade system.

Solvency II is a one-time opportunity for us to embed policyholder protection and put in place the foundations required for the UK insurance industry to remain profitable, resilient and a key part of the UK’s economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
It is, of course, difficult to calculate these costs. Some surveys have indicated that an average production loss resulting from a bank crisis could be around 15-20 per cent of GDP. According to some calculations, the collapse of the Swedish bank market cost around 5 per cent of GDP in terms of a loss in output. Seen from society’s point of view, the individual agents’ incentives are not sufficient to take protective measures against crises that affect the financial system as a whole. The shareholders can never lose more capital than they have put in and individual depositors find it difficult to monitor a bank with widespread operations. There are, to use economic terminology, considerable negative externalities. In addition to the consumer protection aspects, this is a decisive motive for having a financial safety net in the form of special regulation, supervision and a deposit guarantee. It is also the reason why central banks have the possibility to provide liquidity support in the form of emergency liquidity assistance. Such emergency liquidity assistance shall in principle only be granted if the institution in question has temporary liquidity problems, but is essentially robust and if there are systemic contagion risks. It was exactly this risk of domino effects in the rest of the financial system that meant that Northern Rock, which can hardly be said to be of critical significance to the bank system, became the object of a number of measures taken by the British authorities.

The role of central banks after the crisis From a central bank’s perspective three lessons can be drawn that appear to be crucial for its future role in crisis prevention and resolution. First, in a financially integrated market like the euro area, contagion risks are large with financial instability rapidly spreading to other market segments. Second, the sudden materialisation of financial instabilities can lead to strong recessionary forces that carry downside risks for medium-term price stability. This has taught policy makers that “cleaning” rather than “leaning” against financial imbalances can simply become a very costly strategy. And third, a stable macroeconomic environment with stable prices – though being a necessary condition – is not a sufficient one for the preservation of financial stability. Neither the implemented “ex-ante” policy measures by national authorities nor those by central banks were enough to deal with the build-up of risks and imbalances that led to the current crisis. So, what does this imply for the future role of central banks as stability guardians and their role as crisis managers? The future role of central banks: financial stability and supervision The importance of financial stability for central banks has been acknowledged in the European Treaty. Article 127/5 reads: “The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system”.