samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The draft resolution also suggests that the balance of votes within the Governing Council should be published anonymously. As I stated in my last testimony, I have some doubts whether this would give more clarity to the markets or more transparency than is the case now. In any event, I believe it is crucial that we continue to place the emphasis of our communication on the economic rationale behind monetary policy decisions, rather than on a pattern of differing views in the Governing Council. To conclude my statement, I should like to briefly refer again to the euro cash changeover. With a single currency, our citizens now have a common symbol of European identity which they use in their daily lives. Indeed, the euro has created the foundations that may stimulate further integration - in both the political and the economic and financial fields. In this sense, “the euro, our money” can provide a new and more solid basis on which to build an “ever closer union”. BIS Review 40/2002  3

In particular, increased trade openness and stronger international competition from low  2  BIS Review 74/2007  cost suppliers in emerging economies has resulted in lower prices of imported goods and limiting pricing power of domestic firms. In addition, higher international wage competition in labour markets, as well as upward pressure on productivity growth (albeit this is difficult to distinguish from effects of technological developments), have provided downside risks to inflation. On the other hand, higher commodity prices due to stronger demand for energy related commodities and industrial raw materials pose an upside risk for inflation. Secondly, the monetary policy transmission mechanism has been changed by financial globalization. Policy interest rates influence short-term interest rates. But recently, the response of long-term rates to changes in the policy instruments has become less apparent. This raises concerns of whether central banks’ monetary policy is becoming less effective, particularly given that savings and investment decisions are more influenced by long-term rates. Additionally, the conduct of monetary policy has become harder in light of financial globalization. A policy rate increase to tame inflationary pressures may induce further capital flows, thus bringing more liquidity into the domestic market. Thirdly, domestic financial stability is to a greater extent affected by global liquidity conditions. For instance, growth in cross-border financial flows increasingly influences domestic asset prices. However, this effect can be broken down into two main scenarios. The first is through changes consistent with fundamentals.
The repo-rate path chosen by the majority does not meet the well-known necessary but not sufficient condition for a well-balanced monetary policy formulated by the Deputy Governor of the Norwegian central bank Jan Qvigstad (2005). Applied to inflation and unemployment, this condition means that the inflation gap (the difference between inflation and the inflation target) and the unemployment gap should have the same sign. As the inflation gap is negative and the unemployment gap is positive for the majority’s repo-rate path for most of the forecast interval, this condition is not met. With a lower repo-rate path, on the other hand, the gap for both would be reduced and target attainment for both inflation and unemployment would thus increase. The fact that monetary policy is not well-balanced for the majority’s repo-rate path is clearly demonstrated if one uses mean square gaps to measure target attainment as in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the forecasts for the CPIF and unemployment that are compatible with the main scenario’s repo-rate path and the higher and lower repo-rate paths published in Chapter 2 of the Monetary Policy Report in February. Panel b shows that the repo-rate path of the main scenario does not meet the Qvigstad condition. Neither is it effective, as a lower repo-rate path stabilises both inflation and unemployment better. Figure 8 shows the main scenario’s repo-rate path and the lower path that Karolina Ekholm and I advocated at the meeting.

Lars E O Svensson: For a better monetary policy – focus on inflation and unemployment Speech by Mr Lars E O Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Luleå University of Technology, Luleå, 8 March 2011. *  *  *  The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily shared by the other members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank or the Riksbank’s staff. I would like to thank Joanna Gerwin, Karolina Ekholm, Pernilla Meyersson, Marianne Nessén, Lars Nyberg, Stefan Palmqvist, Cecilia Roos-Isaksson, Ulf Söderström and Staffan Viotti for our discussions and their views. Hanna Armelius, Hans Dellmo, Lina Majtorp and Pernilla Wasén have contributed to this speech. Sweden’s economy has grown dramatically following a severe downturn (Figure 1). GDP is now more or less back to the level it was at three years ago (Figure 2). Since the summer of 2010, the majority on the Executive Board of the Riksbank has tightened monetary policy by raising the repo rate. According to the Riksbank’s forecasts for the years ahead, CPI inflation will be higher than the target of 2 per cent over the next few years (Figure 3). However, the fact that CPI inflation is higher than the target is due to the Riksbank’s own repo-rate increases. If we instead measure inflation using the CPIF index, which adjusts for the effects of these repo-rate increases, the forecast is on average lower than 2 per cent.
At the close of 2015, recorded total net funds assigned to supporting the Spanish financial system were € million, € million of which relate to public funds provided by the FROB and € million to private funds provided by the DGS. Naturally, these figures will vary depending on the recoverable value of the assets currently owned by the FROB and the DGS. In terms of the comparison with other developed countries, there are various metrics to evaluate the fiscal cost of public aid. The most general one is the outstanding balance of accumulated public debt. In gross terms, Spain’s public debt as a consequence of assistance to the financial sector was 4.7% of GDP in 2015 and 4.6% in 2016, in line with the average for the euro area. However, in terms of net debt assumed by the public sector (accumulated liabilities minus the value of publicly owned assets), the euro area average stood at end-2015 at 1.8% of GDP and at 1.9% in 2016. Greece and Ireland are the countries that have assumed most net public debt (around 20% of GDP), followed by Slovenia and Portugal (7-8% of GDP). In Spain’s case, this figure in 2015 was 3.7% of GDP, and it had risen to 3.8% in 2016. Conclusions I should like to conclude by summarising the reflections contained in the Report on the conduct of the Banco de España.

In line with the reforms being rolled out in various European countries, it was moreover decided to extend deposit guarantee coverage from € to € As from 2009, the difficulties in the financial system intensified. In March that year the case of Caja Castilla la Mancha marked a turning point, as it highlighted how necessary new arrangements were to address the restructuring of ailing institutions. Given the constraints on savings banks (duly detailed in the Report), a strategy was adopted between 2009 and 2011 turning on two pillars: to assist the restructuring of the system through voluntary  6/14  mergers and the resolution of less viable institutions; and the strengthening of solvency through the clean-up of institutions’ balance sheets and the shoring up of their capital. As regards the first of these pillars, two measures are worth noting: the creation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB), and the reform of the institutional protection scheme (IPS). The FROB was created in June 2009 to support restructuring and voluntary integration processes, including financial support, in the main, through the acquisition of “participaciones preferentes” (preference debt instruments) or, where appropriate, through managing bank interventions. Later, in February 2011, the FROB was reformed following the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, which increasingly hampered access by banks from various countries, Spain among them, to the wholesale funding markets, and which had led to the Greek and Irish programmes in May and December 2010.
A specific department known as Consumer and Market Conduct Department was established in 2006 to spearhead the initiatives. These initiatives included financial education at schools and for the general public; greater disclosure requirements about the features of financial products and the associated risks; the Financial Mediation Bureau to provide an avenue for redress; the Credit Counselling and Debt Management Agency to assist individuals in financial distress; and a public service centre at the Central Bank and all its branches to provide information and advice. The market conduct regulations also give the regulator powers to oversee fees and charges to ensure the quantum is reasonable for the services provided. These measures are broad enough to provide consumer protection in relation to branchless banking in general terms. However, they may be less effective in addressing some of the unique aspects of branchless banking, such as disputes with non-bank agents located in remote or rural locations. Perhaps this forum could consider some of these aspects. Collaboration in terms of sharing best practices, standards and regulations would reduce the cost as well as expedite the development of more inclusive financial sectors. We need to be mindful of the fact that for effective collaboration to take place, we must have common goals to bind our work. In this case, that common goal is the development of more inclusive financial sectors, by making available a broad range of financial services to the poor and micro enterprise segments of society and the economy, as well as those living in remote areas.

Micro-financing has increased from RM151 million in 2000 to RM2.2 billion in September 2009, representing an annual average growth rate of 34%. The Bank also reviewed its existing legislation, and this year the new Central Bank Act of Malaysia 2009 came into effect a week ago, on 25 November 2009. One of the changes introduced as part of clarifying the mandate of the Bank was to explicitly articulate the Bank's developmental role in having a more inclusive financial sector. Let me briefly summarise the initiatives taken by Bank Negara Malaysia which are supportive of branchless banking activities. Given the extensive network of physical branches and ATMs in the country, branchless banking has not yet experienced significant take up. Nonetheless, the use of e-money for tolls and parking bays has increased significantly, and a number of operators are seeking to expand the market. In terms of addressing the policy concerns, measures were taken to put in place the payment infrastructure, promote a broad product range to cater for the different payment needs of consumers and business sectors and the formulation of a transparent and cost-effective  BIS Review 162/2009  3  pricing framework to provide the incentive structure that would spur the adoption of electronic means of payments. Another important measure relates to the setting of common standards to address the interoperability of systems including standardising the payment messaging format to enable the wider acceptance of electronic payments.
Is there not the danger, Mr. Duisenberg, that this process is about to begin again and that, after a certain period, owing to a lack of willingness in Europe and in Germany, in particular, to bring about structural reforms, the whole rigmarole will begin once more and you will be forced, yet again, to cut interest rates? Duisenberg: Well, we do not see that danger arising from the level which we now have reached. We hope that our call - as I expressed it today - to governments to pursue a reform-oriented policy, to adopt structural reform measures in all markets, that that policy will get a new incentive from the measures we have taken today. If they do not do that - and it will take time, I admit that before you can pursue and effect policies like I have in mind - if they do not do that, then indeed monetary policy is no alternative. Question (translation): Those who are not au fait with the intricacies of monetary policy, by that I mean Joe Soap , the man on the street, could get the impression that Oskar Lafontaine was right in making his demands. Has your decision anything to do with his resignation or could it be interpreted in another way, as a welcoming gift for the new Federal Minister of Finance in Bonn?

Narrow mandate and independence as foundation In general, regulatory policy comprises all measures which a government puts in place to create appropriate framework conditions for the longer-term development of the economy. If, in doing so, the government follows sensible principles, it creates conditions in which the economy can optimally develop its potential and the prosperity of the population increases over time. An essential component of good framework conditions, and of good regulatory policy, is price stability. In the absence of price stability, the smooth functioning of an economy is inconceivable. Inflation as well as deflation hinder the steering role of prices in ensuring that labour and capital are used as productively as possible. Inflation also reduces household purchasing power and especially impacts the more vulnerable sections of society. In order to ensure price stability in the long term, two principles of regulatory policy are key: - First, price stability must be the fundamental guiding principle of monetary policy - and second, a central bank must be independent from politics. Both of these principles are today reflected in the legislation of many countries. In Switzerland, the independence of the central bank is enshrined in the Federal Constitution. This means that the SNB may neither accept nor seek instruction from politics or other quarters. The Constitution also states that the SNB shall pursue a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole.
Resilience and innovation in post-trade Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets & Banking  The Association for Financial Markets in Europe 12th Annual European Post Trade Conference, London 8 May 2019  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Introduction I’d like to start by paying tribute to Simon Lewis and his nine years of tireless service as CEO of AFME, which he has announced will be ending this autumn. I’d like to wish him every success for the future. I’m delighted to be here at today at the AFME post-trade conference. This is my first AFME European Post Trade conference, but I believe it’s your 12th. There has been a lot of change in the European post-trade1 space over those 12 years. Post-trade has traditionally been a little in the background – a part of the financial system we might refer to as plumbing – sometimes out of view, but absolutely critical for functioning. Today, various developments have brought post trade to the fore, and made it an increasingly exciting space to be involved in. I’m going to focus on technological developments and also resilience, two themes which resonate with my responsibilities at the Bank and my priorities for 2019. The Bank’s involvement here spans two levels – of soft and hard infrastructure. On soft infrastructure we can think of the Bank’s regulatory approach, led by our policy committees – FPC and PRC, and the Financial Market Infrastructure Board, and the rules it makes and standards it sets.

We have now finished our ‘Plan Analyse Design’ phase of the programme, meaning we have defined its scope, with input from the payments industry. We’re on track with the next phase of the Programme, where we are running a competitive procurement process under the Official Journal of the European Union to appoint a Technology Deliver Partner to work with the Bank on the design and build of the settlement engine, the foundational part of this core financial infrastructure. Increased operational resilience is at the heart of the renewed RTGS service – which aims to offer best in class resilience. We are building on today’s functionality with increased resilience and strengthened end to end risk management, to enhance our ability to identify, mitigate, and respond to the most significant risks, including cyber risk. In this context, I’d like to highlight that CHAPS members have recently commended GFMA’s work14 on developing a ‘Cybersecurity Profile’ to us, in our role as systemic risk manager for CHAPS. Additionally we are recognising the changing environment in which RTGS operates – the demand for faster, simpler, cheaper and more flexible ways to pay. And we are ensuring the new system will be a flexible, innovative sterling settlement system fit for the future, contributing to a more diverse and resilient payment landscape. I’m going to highlight some of the ways we are delivering this. We are exploring whether the new service could facilitate synchronised settlement.
5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  Productivity growth in the UK has consistently surprised to the downside since the crisis, averaging 0.5% per year since 2010 or around 1.5 percentage points below its historical average. We would expect weak productivity in turn to have been reflected in lower pay growth. Consistent with that, the fall in productivity growth since the crisis largely explains the (second) downward shift in the Phillips curve (Charts 6 and 7). Since 2012, the Bank’s forecasts have consistently over-estimated productivity growth, on average by just under 1 percentage point per year (Chart 10). This suggests a sizable fraction of the Bank’s negative forecast errors for wages might plausibly be explained by downside surprises to productivity, alongside the effects of a lower than expected NAIRU. Had the Bank known a decade ago how weak UK productivity growth (and how much lower the NAIRU) was likely to be, its forecast errors for wages would have been smaller. We can confirm this by re-running our pay equations substituting in the actual outcomes for inflation, the unemployment gap and productivity growth, in place of the forecasts for these variables at the time (Chart 11). The fitted values for wage growth now track actual wage growth reasonably closely. With perfect foresight about its determinants (productivity, unemployment and the NAIRU), there would have been far less systematic over-estimation of pay growth during the lost decade.

The BIS has the long tradition of being a very good avenue for global central banks and regulators to address common issues like these. And it is clear the visionary decision to set up the BISIH will serve to provide a valuable focal point for the central banking community in the many years to come. 20. In this regard, we would like to express our full support to the BISIH to continue promoting collaborations among central banks and delivering ideas and insights that would help the global banking system move with technological developments in an efficient, secure and sound manner for the benefit of the community at large. Lastly, I wish this Summit a great success. Thank you very much. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
When Chairman Bernanke first talked about a possible timeline for tapering in May last year, there were strong market reactions globally and all EMEs experienced significant sell-off. The market then calmed down somewhat for several months before we saw another round of EME sell-off in January this year. The question that is most talked about now in the financial and central banking community is the pace of the Fed’s exit and its impact on EMEs going forward. Were these two rounds of EME sell-off merely isolated market over-actions or are they warning signals on the turbulence that awaits the EMEs when US interest rates normalise? 2. To assess what may lie ahead, it is useful to look back and try to understand what happened in the past five years during which the global monetary and financial environment was dominated by the UMP of the US and other advanced economies. In 2009, the market expectation was basically that QE would last for a year or so, i.e. “low for a short while”. The expectation then changed to “low for long”, and then “low for very long” and later to “low forever”. Of course “low forever” was never the intention or prediction of the Fed, but many market participants just positioned themselves as if QE would last for a long, long time. This sentiment encouraged the dollar carry trades or so-called one-way bets. So it was not surprising that Chairman Bernanke’s remarks on tapering in May/June last year had washed out a great deal of such one-way bets.

But how do we explain the episode of the sell-off this January when the market already knew in December that tapering would proceed? 3. Conceptually, it is not very difficult to understand the spillover effects of the UMP on EMEs in the five years after 2009. There was the first phase of spill-over, which entails a period of heavy capital inflows, through the banking and bond market channels, to the EMEs. This was a “happy” phase of the spill-over of UMP because the EMEs basically enjoyed apparently pleasant outcomes in investment, consumption, job creation and economic growth. At the same time, EME currencies appreciated and their foreign reserves increased. However, this period also saw the build up of vulnerabilities in the EMEs. The inflow of capital, including the carry trade in search of yields, created easy monetary conditions, which encouraged rapid credit expansion amongst the households and corporates. While domestic consumption and investment became buoyant, most EMEs experienced a significant deterioration of their current account positions. Needless to say, inflationary pressure and overheating in the asset markets also built up in most EMEs. This was why some EMEs, Hong Kong included, have introduced macroprudential measures to tackle the spill-over  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  effects of the UMP of advanced economies. While it is too early to tell whether these macroprudential measures were effective, the EMEs seem to be entering the second phase, which I would call the “unhappy” period, of the spill-over.