samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That distinction has become the standard framework within which to analyse the optimal constitution of central banks. But such a distinction presumes the existence of a  16  Source: compiled by the Central Bank of Iraq, based on data collected by the United Nations World Food Program. BIS Review 5/2004  11  policy instrument that is uniquely available to the central bank. That instrument is the level of official short-term interest rates. But when interest rates are constrained at their lower bound of zero, the position is much less clear. Indeed, I shall argue that in such circumstances both instrument and goal independence are impossible. Rather when interest rates are at their zero lower bound, policy relies on successful cooperation between central bank and finance ministry. I shall assume that, when interest rates are zero, monetary policy takes the form of open market purchases or sales of government securities using central bank money. A well-known policy prescription, which has become known as unconventional monetary policy, is that the central bank should buy long-term Government bonds rather than the more conventional shortterm bills. The Bank of Japan did indeed follow this prescription. The logic of such a proposal is as follows. Long-term bonds are likely to contain a significant premium to compensate investors for their lack of liquidity - the fact that, in practice, investors face significant costs when switching between bonds and goods.

This assessment has to be seen outside the narrow context of the banking sector. First, it shows that Bulgaria can be a successful and full participant in euro area institutions, given that the Banking Union is the first such institution in which the country has participated; and second, it is a good example of institutional development to be followed in an environment of still serious institutional deficits. In 2021, we also marked one year since the Bulgarian Lev joined the EU Exchange Rate Mechanism. This participation confirms and further proves the currency stability of the country. Another important strategic aspect is the consolidation process continuing in our banking sector. This process follows global trends of seeking to streamline the structure and efficiency of the banking sector in the light of increasing competition and the pressure by new providers of 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  financial services, as well as rising costs of complying with regulatory and legal norms. In spite of the difficult and complicated environment created by the pandemic, in 2021 we saw the biggest acquisition, in terms of size and price, in the Bulgarian banking sector. A deal like this i s the most accurate market evaluation of the condition of the banking sector and its attractiveness to strategic investors. Therefore, the sector stayed in very good shape and so far succeeded through the pandemic.
But the planned reduction in the deficit set out in the Budget plans is comparable with the fiscal consolidation we saw in the mid-1990s, when the public spending share of GDP was also cut significantly as the economy recovered, as Chart 6 shows. Though the latest Budget plans imply a somewhat bigger fall in the public spending share of GDP than in the mid-1990s, this is offset by a smaller rise in the tax burden. Taking tax and spending together, the projected impact is broadly similar. Public borrowing fell by over 8 percentage points of GDP between 1993/4 and 1998/9, compared with a 9 percentage point fall projected in the latest Budget over the next five years. 6 That period of public spending squeeze in the mid-1990s was also accompanied by a significant reduction in employment in the public sector, not dissimilar to the figures currently being discussed in the context of the current spending review. 7 However, the UK economy grew reasonably healthily over that period, with annual GDP growth averaging nearly 3.5% a year in the five years 1994 to 1998. Unemployment also fell because the private sector generated many more jobs than were lost in the public sector. As Chart 7 shows, the private sector created around 2 million extra jobs in the mid-1990s, dwarfing the reduction in public sector employment.

As Chart 11 shows, we have seen two major spikes in CPI inflation within the last two years. And it is possible that another one is in prospect when higher VAT comes into effect early next year, particularly if this is accompanied by a continuation of the recent surge in energy and commodity prices. These repeated episodes risk eroding confidence that UK policymakers remain committed to low and stable inflation, with a knock-on effect on inflation expectations in financial markets, among the business community and the public which could be self-fulfilling. In the depth of the recession in the first half of last year, we could be fairly relaxed about upward pressures on inflation. At that time, the MPC was worried about the opposite trend – a lurch into deflation with prices and wages on a downward spiral. But these deflationary fears have not been realised. Instead, inflation has run above the target and wage freezes introduced to help businesses weather the storm of the recession are coming to an end. The current period of above-target inflation risks being prolonged by monetary policy which is too lax – creating a climate in which higher inflation is not just the product of one-off shocks but becomes more deeply ingrained. 12  BIS Review 134/2010  The economy is now recovering at home and abroad. The world economy is growing above its pre-crisis trend, and domestic spending in money terms is also following the same pattern, as Chart 12 shows.
That decision was shaped by the inappropriateness of leaving the listing authority with the LSE when other competing exchanges are emerging in the UK. We believe that the current arrangements for the regulation and supervision of the securities markets between the MAS and SGX, with an enhanced oversight responsibility for the MAS and  4  BIS Review 14/2001  powers to pursue civil prosecution, will prove robust. But we will continually review the arrangement, keep in touch with international practices, and re-calibrate the roles of MAS and SGX where necessary to ensure effective oversight of the local markets. I would now like to touch on two features of the regulatory arrangement that we have recently reviewed. The first concerns the approval of substantial shareholdings in the SGX; the second, proposed changes in the prospectus registration regime. Approval of substantial shareholdings in the SGX The Exchanges (Demutualisation and Merger) Act requires anyone who wishes to acquire 5% or more of SGX to seek prior approval from MAS. This provision recognises the unique and important role of SGX in providing the infrastructure and marketplace for the trading, clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives in Singapore. Strategic investors As announced previously, MAS will allow suitable strategic investors who can promote SGX's growth and development to acquire substantial stakes of 5% or more in SGX.

In the past, rising demand led in time to growing tensions as the supply side became increasingly strained and this resulted in higher inflationary pressure. Rising inflation normally functioned as a warning to decision-makers that a tighter economic policy was called for. The latest upward phase seems, however, to have been more the harvest of a dynamic interaction of demand and supply. Technological advances have contributed to higher productivity. Aided by the new technology, gradually rising consumer and corporate demand seem to have generated an increasingly rapid expansion of supply and thereby a further stimulation of demand in a sort of expansive circle. The traditional alarm bell — inflation — has not sounded because the domestic cost pressure has been countered by the productivity gains and the appreciating exchange rate. But there have been other alarm bells in the form of asset prices, saving and imbalances. There are a number of historical examples where expectations of rising profits and incomes have contributed to increased demand and an expansion of supply, laying a foundation for an expansive spiral. The clearest instances seem to have occurred before world war one or in the interval between this and world war two. The euphoria over an innovative and favourable beginning has usually led, in the more mature phase of the upswing, to fundamental imbalances in the real economy that have sometimes taken a long time and considerable efforts to rectify.
Financially integrated small and open economies can still be overwhelmed by large and volatile capital flows driven by push factors. It is a world that needs additions to the GFSN, some of which we partly have – such as FX liquidity provisions to internationally active banks through central bank-swaps – but some of which we do not have. The international community is certainly aware of these issues. The IMF has done good analytical work in this area and proposed reforms. Work has been done under the auspices of the G20 looking at potential reforms to the international monetary sytem (IMS), and currently the Eminent Persons Group is working on a report to the G20 to be delivered at this year’s autumn meetings of the IMF. But progress in this area is slow and with current set-ups we are not going to get far without having the main reserve currency country on board. This raises the question that I will turn to next: in the absence of global (or regional) reforms, what will individual SOEs have to do in order to reap the benefits of cross-border financial integration in safe manner? In order to answer this question, we need to understand how cross-border financial integration affects the ability of SOEs to preserve both monetary and financial stability.1 First, a simple theory.

Accordingly, you have instructed the various appropriate authorities and bodies to combat it and reduce its effects on the society, while maintaining the momentum of development achievements. The package of the various procedures, introduced by the government at the beginning of this year, is an appropriate preliminary step aimed at addressing inflation sources that directly affect the society segments who are less able to bear its impacts. As for the monetary policy, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) has taken steps to control excess domestic liquidity by increasing rates of reserve requirements many times. However, because of the dominance of the fiscal policy over the economy, the greater burden falls on reviewing spending priorities and its programming to be in harmony with the absorptive capacity of the national economy and its ambitious development objectives. It is hoped that these procedures, along with reviewing the expansion in government spending, will achieve the targeted goals, and inflation will resume its pace and stabilize at appropriate levels in the near future. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, The world is experiencing a crisis that threatens economic growth and financial stability in several major countries of the world. This crisis has prompted authorities in these countries not only to take unusual measures to protect their financial stability but also to review their supervisory and control regulations of the financial system, while economic policies are being affected by competitive goals, namely, maintaining economic growth, controlling inflation and maintaining financial stability.
This means that the core banking services on which retail and small business customers depend should not be threatened should things go wrong in wholesale financial markets or the global economy. We do not expect most people to notice significant change day-to-day once the new regime goes live. But should we experience again the sort of threats to the financial system we saw during the crisis, ring-fencing will help ensure banking groups are easier to sort out if they get into trouble, and can fail with less impact on the economy and taxpayers. Banks have now largely completed the ring-fencing of their retail operations, and have done so with little disruption to their customers and counterparties. The PRA’s supervisory focus will turn to ensuring the ring-fences that have been established are effective in practice, and remain so. Ring-fencing both broadens the range of regulatory requirements, and increases the intensity of supervision, for the groups in scope. As such, ring-fencing will remain a focus for the PRA – as well as for the banks themselves – in the coming years. How will the next crisis be different? Financial crises generate significant and persistent costs. The Bank of England has estimated that the costs of crises amount to 75% of GDP on average.1 The previous crisis resulted in the Government providing £ billion of capital to RBS and Lloyds to prevent them failing and disrupting the provision of vital banking services to their customers.

While implementation has progressed smoothly, the PRA will pursue instances of non-compliance which could affect our ability to meet our objectives using the PRA’s existing supervisory and enforcement tools, including those available under the Senior Managers Regime. In cases of severe non-compliance, the legislation empowers the PRA to use a group restructuring tool – known as ‘electrifying’ the ring-fence – which enables the PRA to require a banking group to sell its ring-fenced bank or other parts of its group, subject to Government consent. As Sam Woods, the Bank’s Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation and CEO of the PRA, said at Mansion House last month, these powers, and our ongoing supervisory activity, will help ensure the ring-fence does it job.8  Conclusions In less than six weeks, ten years on from the financial crisis, one of the largest ever reforms to the structure of the UK banking industry comes into force. While most will notice little difference on day one, ring-fencing the largest UK banks has involved significant changes behind the scenes. This reform will make the provision of core banking services more resilient, and protect taxpayers from further bail outs. These are real benefits but are conditional on the ring-fence being maintained over time, meaning this will be a continuous process for both the PRA and the banks. 7  Prudential Regulation Authority (2018), The PRA’s approach to banking supervision, (October), Chapter 5. Woods, S., (2018), ‘Good cop / bad cop’, speech available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/sam-woods-mansionhouse-city-banquet.
Sylvester Eijffinger and Petra Geraats 5 have constructed an index that combines the above five dimensions of transparency into a single metric, and they used it for comparing transparency for nine of the major central banks. Negriz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen 6 have extended this work and applied Eijffinger and Geraats’ index to 100 countries. Measured by this index, they found that in 2005 the three most transparent central banks were the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England. Norges Bank was ranked as number 15. The reason why Norges Bank was ranked number 15 and not among the most transparent central banks is, according to Dincer and Eichengreen, the following: 7 1. Norges Bank’s monetary policy models were not public,  2.  the Bank does not publish quarterly economic forecasts, and  3.  we do not publish minutes and voting records from the monetary policy meetings of the Executive Board. As regards the publication of models, Dincer and Eichengreen’s claim is not correct, as we do publish our models (and we did so also in 2005). The lesson I have drawn from this is that central banks should have well designed webpages so that all relevant information is easy to find. Regarding the second reason – that we do not provide forecasts on a quarterly basis – I think this point is overemphasized. We used to publish Monetary Policy Reports (then called Inflation Reports) four times a year until 2001.

That is why financial reform will have to go hand in hand with fiscal reform. Fiscal reform will reinforce confidence. In the current situation, we have to – and we do – stand firm on these principles. Speculation on more and more elevated sovereign risk has been one factor behind spreads being driven to very high levels. This is why it was very important that the heads of state and government declared on 11 February 2010 that they were ready to “take determined and coordinated action, if needed, to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole”. I said, on behalf of the ECB, that I approved of this important statement. In this respect let me stress the following: Loans are not transfers, and loans come at a cost. They come not only at a financial cost; they also come with a strict conditionality. This conditionality needs to give assurance to lenders, not only that they will be repaid but also that the borrower will be able to stand on its own feet over a multi-year horizon. In the case of Greece, this will require courageous, recognisable and specific actions by the Greek government that will lastingly and credibly consolidate the public budget. Other countries in the Union and elsewhere have gone through times that were no less difficult, and they have emerged from a determined adjustment stronger and more competitive than in the past. These countries have demonstrated that a clear U-turn in national policy governance is achievable.
But even if we believe these factors to be important some key questions remain open. For instance, why did this time emerging markets recover relatively quickly from the global shock, while advanced economies stagnated? Was it due to better policies, or to the new relevance of China for their external demand, or to another factor? We need to know more of the ultimate causes of this two‐ speed recovery, and more research on this front would be helpful. 1  IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, May 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Despite the likely role of pull factors, the fact that these phenomena coincided with the timing of the monetary expansion in advanced countries suggests there is a link between them. In fact, many believe that this “push factor” played a major role, and recent research lends some support to this view.2 This afternoon we will be discussing one avenue through which low interest rates in advanced countries may channel capital toward emerging markets: carry trade flows, whose relevance will be addressed in a presentation by Craig Burnside. The likely role of push factors is not a total surprise, since the recovery of advanced economies in the context of a deleveraging process requires a rebalancing of global demand toward emerging economies. This rebalancing needs the right price signals and quantity responses. Two presentations this morning by Philippe Bacchetta and Gian Maria Milesi‐ Ferretti will touch on the topic of global rebalancing and external adjustment to the crisis.

Finally, I am concerned about a potential interaction between the financial uncertainty associated with the tapering program and the political uncertainty about fiscal negotiations in the US in the coming months. To close our conference, tomorrow we will have a policy panel where three distinguished economists: Guillermo Calvo, Vittorio Corbo, and Maurice Obstfeld, will share their thoughts on the end of QE and its consequences for emerging markets. We have navigated through challenging times in recent years. The decisive action of policymakers worldwide has spared the global economy from further trouble. In many cases policy has had to go ahead of research. But we should take time to think hard about these events; their causes; their mechanisms; and the benefits and costs of the policies being implemented. This will allow us to finish the course and to derive important lessons for the future. I am confident that the discussion of the next two days will help us advance toward this goal. I would like to finish this presentation by thanking Claudio Raddatz, Diego Saravia, and Jaume Ventura for putting together an exciting program and all of you for coming to participate and share in the discussion. Thank you References Bianchi, J. (2011) “Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pp. 3400–3426, December 2011. Dell’Ariccia, G., Laeven, L., and Suarez, G. (2013) “Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy’s Risk‐ Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States,” IMF Working Paper 13/143, International Monetary Fund.
Our stock exchange for blue-chips is located in London, our future exchange is associated with the German exchange. While technical and professional know-how are important, integrity, reputation and trustworthiness are more and more of the essence. Swiss banking secrecy has sometimes proved a source of misunderstanding and even tension in our relations with our partners. The objective of our bank secrecy is to protect the private sphere and to enhance the depositors’ confidence in the banking system. It does not aim at encouraging tax evasion or protecting funds of dubious origin. As I mentioned earlier on, an agreement on the taxation of savings has recently been negotiated with the EU. EU deposits with Swiss banks will be subject to a withholding tax whose proceeds will be transferred to the country of origin of the funds. Within this new tax regime no harmful tax competition between Switzerland and the EU will take place despite the presence of bank secrecy. BIS Review 27/2003  3  The importance we give to the integrity of our banking system can also be highlighted by our efforts made to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Switzerland has done much in this area to protect its good name as a financial centre. Six years ago it placed its commitment to the fight against money laundering on a statutory footing. Our anti-money laundering laws serve today as reference for many countries. Let me move on to the National Bank’s monetary policy and the significance of the euro. 5.

Some of these are “left-overs” from the first bilateral agreements, some are new issues which have been raised by either the EU or Switzerland. The EU wanted the adoption of anti-fraud measures and the creation of a tax system in Switzerland which would allow the EU to adopt a regime of exchange of information between tax authorities. On their side, the Swiss sought an improved cooperation in the areas of internal security and asylum policy. The negotiations on seven out of the ten issues have now been substantially completed. We hope that this second round of negotiations will be concluded this year, provided that the right balance can be struck in the overall package. You may well be asking yourselves: why doesn’t Switzerland simply join the EU instead of following the bumpy path of bilateral agreements ? The reason is that there is still no consensus in Switzerland on the question of EU membership. Winston Churchill used to say to his chauffeur: “Drive slowly. We are in a hurry”. These words could apply to Switzerland’s policy on Europe. Eleven years ago the Swiss people voted “no” to entry into the European Economic Area, because many saw this as a first step towards EU membership. Two years ago a referendum aimed at speeding up the process towards EU membership was likewise roundly rejected. Since any further moves would clearly lack political support within the country, EU membership is not on the Swiss agenda at the present time. There are many reasons for Switzerland’s scepticism.