samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Surely many of us would find it intensely irritating to go back to needing a laptop to check our bank balance rather than doing it through the app on our phones, or indeed – if we jump another generation back – to have to go into a branch to arrange a payment, although branches are still very important for many 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  customers. Regulation should not block these advances, and should actively keep pace with them – for instance we need to have the ability to adapt the calibration of liquidity regulations if it turns out that app-based deposit outflows have a different shape from branch-based ones. And as new players emerge we need to make sure that our regulation is not creating unnecessary barriers to entry and thereby impeding healthy competition. But sometimes the system adapts for bad reasons – the profit motive drives firms to find the weaker parts of the system and channel business into them. We need to be sufficiently fleet of foot to respond to these shifts before they create serious problems – in short, regulation should be future-facing and keep fit for purpose. 5. Consistency. Firms and the public need to be confident that the regulatory framework is stable, that prudential rules are based on clear evidence, and that supervisory judgements are impartial and consistent.

The Act amended the PRA’s objectives to incorporate ring-fencing, and set out the basic structural aspects of the regime (in particular about the scope of the ring-fence), while leaving much of the framework to be established via statutory instruments from the Treasury. The statute also detailed matters related to ring-fenced banks’ governance and policies which the PRA should make rules about. The PRA also implemented further details of the regime (e.g. systems and controls requirements, capital requirements for ring-fenced banks, independence requirements, access to payment systems) via rules. To be clear, I am not focused here on the question of whether or not the SMCR or ring-fencing are a good thing, about which people will argue for decades. Rather, I am focused on the legislative style which Parliament adopted in order to introduce them – how this style compares to other models, and which model seems to fit best the principles set out above for a future financial services framework in the UK. 1 2  See Annex 1 The 2000 Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) established the current domestic UK framework for financial regulation 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  To my mind, if we look across the four main legislative styles adopted by Parliament in the last couple of decades – those for delivering FSMA, SMCR, ring-fencing and the EU model – the one that fits the principles best is the approach used for SMCR: 1. Robust prudential standards.
Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid: Keynote address - Islamic Financial Market Forum Keynote address by Mr Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Standard Chartered's Islamic Financial Market Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2023. *** CEOs, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Assalamualaikum w.b.t and a very good morning. The Financial Sector Blueprint 2022–2026 sets out what BNM's development priorities are for the financial sector over the next five years. In its third iteration, Islamic finance remains a top priority. One of the thrusts, "Advancing value-based finance through Islamic finance leadership" is aimed at spurring growth that is progressive, sustainable and inclusive. This also intends to strengthen Malaysia's value proposition as an international gateway for Islamic finance which will be a reaffirmation of the "Malaysia as an Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC)" agenda. Since its inception in 2006, the MIFC agenda of "Internationalisation of Islamic finance" has offered a platform for Malaysia to position itself as a centre for the offering of Islamic financial products and services in international currencies to the global and domestic financial community. Many of our early initiatives and efforts were to build the foundations and to create the necessary critical mass for participating financial players, which would increase the scale of activity and financial services offered. Malaysia aimed to attract global players as well as to enhance the capacity and capabilities of the domestic financial institutions.

We have a great deal of work to do on these three issues in the months ahead, and I am confident that when bold reforms in these areas are undertaken, we will have achieved the necessary quantum leap in euro area governance. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 97/2010
It can create uncertainty as to how the inflation target is defined in practice. Until one year ago I myself sat “on the outside” and monitored the Riksbank’s policy making. And I must confess that I thought it was a little unclear which measure of inflation the Riksbank actually used in formulating its policy. This was connected with the prominent role the CPIX had played in the Riksbank’s analysis and rhetoric. The CPIX – how it began The CPIX is a measure of inflation that has been around a long time. It was included in the predecessor to the Monetary Policy Reports, “Inflation and Inflation Expectations in Sweden”, which was first published in October 1993. At that time the measure was known as UND1 and as now it was adjusted for the direct effects of indirect taxes and subsidies and mortgage interest expenditure. At that time the krona had recently depreciated heavily and this had an impact in the form of a one-off increase in import prices. The measure therefore initially made adjustments for changes in import prices as well. The reason given then for adjusting for interest costs was that the financial turbulence in autumn 1992 had led to temporary effects on inflation. Some years later other reasons made it important to adjust for interest costs. During the second half of the 1990s the Riksbank cut the repo rate substantially, from almost 9 to below 3 per cent.

If we were to be in exactly the same position as in April, but with the difference that we had already decided to phase out the CPIX – would we have made different forecasts for the repo rate and for the CPI? No, we would not. Our target has not changed. We considered the  BIS Review 73/2008  5  rate at which the CPI approached the target according to our April forecast to be reasonable on the basis of our task. It is also important to put the phasing out of the CPIX in a broader context. The Riksbank conducts a policy of flexible inflation targeting. This means, for instance, that we can let it take a couple of years before the CPI reaches 2 per cent in our forecast if we consider this to be justified by, for instance, temporary shocks. The long-term difference between the CPI and the CPIX is calculated, as I have mentioned earlier, at roughly 0.3 percentage points. The flexibility of our monetary policy means that this type of deviation does not need to have any immediate consequences. But it is of course important that deviations from the inflation target are not too large and that it is clear that the CPI will reach 2 per cent. Otherwise we jeopardise the credibility of the inflation target. The current situation involves factors that have much greater significance for which future interest rate developments we believe to be reasonable than the difference between the CPI and the CPIX.
This is an important point, and one that must be given serious consideration. It is my view that the global financial system needs to move toward addressing potential credit problems preemptively before these problems have time to grow from minor disturbances to major disruptions. A more risksensitive capital framework should help ensure that banks hold appropriate capital behind high-risk credits in the first place, and thus reduce the tendency for accentuating the need for capital after problems arise with such loans. Credit risk mitigation techniques Greater recognition of the benefits of risk mitigation techniques - such as collateral, guarantees, credit derivatives and netting - also is at the forefront of the Committee’s work in revising the Accord. In January of last year, the Committee held consultations with over 50 banks and industry associations within the G10 on their methods for mitigating credit risk. We are now evaluating how to incorporate the risk-reducing benefits of the best of these practices, while at the same time addressing potential risks that remain from their use. As we finalize our proposals for making capital charges reflective of risk mitigation techniques, we are striving to find the right balance between recognizing a material reduction of risk with a structure that is applicable beyond internationally-active banks to both domestic and non-G10 banks. While we recognize that the treatment of credit risk mitigation techniques might differ in some respects between the standardized and the internal ratings-based approaches, we want to ensure a high degree of consistency between the two.

Progress in revising the Accord Let me take a few moments to tell you how our work on the Basel Accord is progressing. The Committee began a fundamental review of the Accord in 1998. The release last June of the Consultative Paper reflected our vision for a new capital adequacy framework and we asked for comments from the broad marketplace. 1  BIS Review 51/2000  We knew that our first Consultative Paper would not be a perfect framework for all banks. That is why we have been so keen to obtain feedback from a wide variety of sources including financial institutions, central banks and supervisors, representatives from non-G10 countries and other market participants. The formal comment period on the Consultative Paper ended on 31 March. We are very pleased and encouraged by the response, and are now in the process of considering more than 200 comments received. The commentators have sent us a strong message that they endorse our overall goal of developing a capital framework comprised of three pillars - minimum capital standards, supervisory review and market discipline - that is more risk reflective and appropriate to banks of varying levels of sophistication. Internal ratings-based approach Based on our evaluation of the comments received, I can tell you that we are more committed than ever to an internal ratings-based approach.
Net capital inflows into the euro area continued to be the main factor supporting annual M3 growth, while the annual rate of change of loans to the private sector remained weak. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) stood at 0.3% in October, broadly unchanged since the beginning of the year. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was –2.9% in October, following –2.8% in September and –2.9% in August. Overall, weak loan dynamics for non-financial corporations continue to reflect their lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. Since the summer of 2012 substantial progress has been made in improving the funding situation of banks. In order to ensure an adequate transmission of monetary policy to the financing conditions in euro area countries, it is essential that the fragmentation of euro area credit markets declines further and that the resilience of banks is strengthened where needed. The ECB’s comprehensive assessment before it adopts its supervisory role under the single supervisory mechanism will further support this confidence-building process. It will enhance the quality of information available on the condition of banks and result in the identification and implementation of necessary corrective actions. Further decisive steps to establish a banking union will help to restore confidence in the financial system.

At the same time, unemployment in the euro area remains high, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and the private sector will continue to weigh on economic activity. This assessment is also reflected in the December 2013 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP declining by 0.4% in 2013 before increasing by 1.1% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015. Compared with the September 2013 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the projection for real GDP growth for 2013 has remained unchanged and it has been revised upwards by 0.1 percentage point for 2014. The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area are assessed to be on the downside. Developments in global money and financial market conditions and related uncertainties may have the potential to negatively affect economic conditions. Other downside risks include higher commodity prices, weaker than expected domestic demand and export growth, and slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation increased in November 2013 to 0.9%, from 0.7% in October. The increase was broadly as expected and reflected, in particular, an upward base effect in energy prices and higher services price inflation. On the basis of prevailing futures prices for energy, annual inflation rates are expected to remain at around current levels in the coming months. Over the medium term, underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued.
Under British Chairmanship, efforts have been made to increase the effectiveness of the meetings of the IMFC which represents all countries around one table. Private finance and public funds The second main area in which further progress is required is the resolution of crises. The problem would be easier to solve were it possible to distinguish between two rather different sources of crises – a liquidity-based problem caused by a currency or maturity mismatch in a country's national balance sheet despite a sustainable macroeconomic and debt position; and a fundamentals-based problem which means that the debt burden is unsustainable or the exchange rate or other key macroeconomic policies need to be altered. In the former case, the provision of liquidity support by the international community might help to bridge to a position in which the country could re-engage with its private creditors. In the latter case, the main requirement is not liquidity support but a change in macroeconomic or debt management policies. Recent crises have seen examples of both types of problem. Liquidity runs typically occur because of a co-ordination failure among creditors. There are two solutions to this co-ordination problem. The first is a lender of last resort that is able to provide liquidity support quickly and on a large – indeed, potentially unlimited – scale for a short period to enable the affected country to meet its obligations.

So far, the "middle way" seems a statement of the obvious – namely that there are limits to IMF lending and that there is merit, for debtors and creditors, in having clarity about those limits. The other side of this coin is that, on occasions, there will be countries that have run up unsustainable debt burdens, or face severe liquidity pressures, and who have little alternative but to restructure or reschedule their debt. Perhaps this is why the international community has moved significantly in the direction of giving "private sector involvement" a greater role in the resolution of financial crises than was typically the case in the late 1990s. The IMF communiqué in Prague last year, the G7 Finance Ministers statement last month, recent joint work by the Bank of England and Bank of Canada, and, significantly, speeches by the new Managing Director of the IMF, Horst Kohler, have all emphasised the need to move further in the direction of greater private sector involvement. As one example the Report of the G7 Finance Ministers to the Heads of State and Government only last month stated that,  6  BIS Review 71/2001  "While the IMF has an essential role to play, official resources are limited in relation to private financial flows.
Central bank independence revisited  Central bank independence revisited Keynote address by Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the “Symposium on Building the Financial System of the 21st Century: An Agenda for Europe and the United States”, Frankfurt am Main, 30 March 2017 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to speak to you today on the subject of central bank independence. Independence has been granted to central banks in order to shield them from short-term political influence when fulfilling their mandate of ensuring price stability. It is largely undisputed that an independent central bank with a clearly defined mandate is better able to keep inflation lower and more stable. In the post financial crisis era, however, central banks in many countries have been entrusted with powers and responsibilities going beyond their traditional monetary policy mandates. Central banks have, for example, started acting in the areas of macro- and microprudential supervision and crisis management. Also, while remaining within their monetary policy mandate, some central banks adopted unconventional monetary policy measures. Critical voices claim that central banks have been over-stretching their mandates, blurring or even crossing the line into fiscal and economic policy. Central banks are accused of influencing the distribution of income and wealth and subsidising the financial sector at the expense of society as a whole – policy areas which traditionally require more democratic legitimacy and control. This has re-opened the debate surrounding the legitimacy, and the precise scope, of central bank independence.

Nor does it apply to the contributory role of the ECB with regard to financial stability under Article 127(5) of the Treaty, as the ECB is not the policymaker in this field. I will conclude my remarks at this point, and I am happy to turn the floor over to the workshop presenters and participants to further elaborate on these themes. [1]This correlation does not imply that independence is causal  for low inflation. In particular, societies with a high degree of inflation-aversion may find it more natural to grant their central bank a high degree of institutional independence. On this, Posen, A., “Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics”, in O’Brien, R. (1994) (ed), Finance and the International Economy: in memory of Robert Marjolin, Oxford University Press. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the short historical sample reflects the fact that the notion of independent monetary policy is of limited interest in periods of fixed exchange rates regimes (as was the case during the gold standard or under the Bretton Woods regime). [2]Beyer, A., Gaspar, V., Gerberding, C., and Issing, O. (2013), “Opting Out of the Great Inflation: German Monetary Policy after the Break Down of Bretton Woods”, in Bordo, M. D., and Orphanides, A. (eds), The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking, University of Chicago Press. [3]Balls, E., Howat, J., and Stansbury, A.
Indeed, regardless of whether decisions are taken by a general Bank Board or a specialized Policy Committee, the ‘ideal’ system for decision-making should encompass the following basic properties: a)  diversity of opinions  b)  regularity  c)  separateness  d)  staff independence  e)  openness  f)  dealing with uncertainty  Diversity of opinions is a consequence of the basic lesson we have learnt from the history of monetary policy. Milton Friedman said in 1968: ‘The first and most important lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy can do – and it is a lesson of the most profound importance – is that monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source of economic disturbance’. This implies that relative smoothness in practical decision making seems to be desirable for any monetary policy practice. In this regard, international experience and experimental research1 have shown that decisions taken by a ‘decision-making body’ seem to be superior ex post to decisions taken by an individual, as the latter are more vulnerable to sudden changes in monetary policy stance. It is argued that a significant improvement in policy conduct can be associated with policy makers learning from each other’s decisions. Regularity means not only that the decision-making body should meet on a regular basis, but in particular that the decision-making process should be taken in a standard framework and should be based on a standard set of policy documents.

But I will leave the Bank of England in the good hands of my successor, Mervyn King, when I step down in June, and I have every confidence that he will, by the time of your next dinner, have a positive story to tell.
Our educational programme, comprising school visits and curriculum materials, has developed dramatically over recent years and is now reaching around a third of schoolchildren across the UK.39 This economic and financial knowledge is crucial. We hear a lot these days about our knowledge-based economy and with good reason. Like human evolution, our economies are evolving in ways which give prominence to digital over physical assets. Intellectual property (the brain) is often more important than physical property (the body), and software (neurology) is often more important than hardware (biology), in driving growth in our companies and economies.40 The rapid emergence of a knowledge-based economy has important implications for educational institutions. They were designed, in the UK in the 19th century, as factories for the manufacture of knowledge on an industrial scale. At the time, they worked well. In an increasingly knowledge-based economy, this suggests these knowledge-factories will become even more important in the future than they have been in the past. 39 40  Carney (2018), Haldane (2018b). Unger (2019). 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  That is the right answer but for the wrong reasons. What will be needed in future is not improved knowledge-factories producing more knowledgeable students. What will be needed instead are creativity-academies producing a more creative workforce. In future, we will not need people simply to get from A to Z - Alexa is faster and cheaper at doing that. We need people who can navigate everywhere.

It is a knowledgeable squirrel, if not as knowledgeable as the squirrels in the remake of the film Charlie in the Chocolate Factory that were taught by film-producer Tim Burton to crack nuts on demand. Yet squirrels live identically to their ancient ancestors. They have evolved at a snail’s pace, as have snails. That is because squirrels and snails lack imagination. Squirrels cannot imagine a world where nuts are delivered courtesy of a complex international supply chain, much less set about creating that supply chain. Nor are they likely to write a Roald Dahl novel involving oompa loompas or become the next Tim Burton. 5  Tegmark (2017). What life means to Einstein, Saturday Evening Post October 26, 1929, http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/wpcontent/uploads/satevepost/what_life_means_to_einstein.pdf. 6  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  Imagination is a uniquely human attribute. And it is an attribute that moved humans from the evolutionary slow lane to the neurological superhighway. Human progress was no longer constrained by sinews but by synapses, no longer tethered by biology but neurology. As my namesake (but no relation), the evolutionary biologist J B S Haldane, put it: “the world shall not perish for lack of wonders, but for lack of wonder”.7 It is not just evolutionary biologists that have recognised the importance of imagination in powering societies. Economists have too.