samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With this regard, the Data Management Group would act as the owner of the project. In addition, as the project itself is very crucial, which could create some wide impacts throughout the organization, the Bank of Thailand realizes its significance and hence assigning a group of high-ranking officials in forms of the Steering Committee to closely monitor the progress along the way. The committee panel is led by the Assistant Governor, Information System while I also serve as the project sponsor to ensure that the data management system project could well progress in accordance with the pre-scheduled plan. As for the roles of financial institutions which are major providers for a good deal of financial data in the system, most institutions have to bear high burden, both human labor resources as well as other expenses for data submission under the current system. With the implementation of the new system, most institutions unanimously provide great cooperation - to create comprehensive data transmission network that could accommodate all data transfer demands in time. Today’s opening ceremony presents the first phase of the financial institution electronic data submission project. From today onwards, financial institutions’ submission of over 200 hard copy and CRF reports would be substituted by merely 41 data sets. Consequently, this would more or less lessen the burden and make it more convenient for financial institutions to report data to the Bank of Thailand.

M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: The Bank of Thailand's new Data Management System Speech by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the inauguration ceremony of The Financial Institutions Electronic Data Submission for the Data Management System Project (DMS), Bangkok, 1 October 2003. *  *  *  The Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance Managers from financial institutions The Managing Director of IBM (Thailand) Company Limited Bank of Thailand’s executives All staff of the Data Management System Project Ladies and gentlemen, It is an honor for me to have such a great opportunity for today’s inauguration ceremony for the Data Management System, or the DMS. The Bank of Thailand has thus far developed the system upon early stage of the project, with full implementation of latest information technology advancement to enhance the efficiency of data management system. Major objectives include the reduction of burden borne by data compilers, excessive data quantity and redundancy in the system, improved management on data collection and compilation procedures to obtain more complete and up-to-date information. In order to achieve such ultimate objectives, the Bank of Thailand therefore has deemed it appropriate to revise the organization structure; that is, with complete transfers of all data management related operations pertaining to all various departments toward a single control center under the Data Management Group. Data management system development project was then initiated, in order to ensure that all Bank of Thailand’s data management routines are well consistent and in accordance with normal standard.
While it is admittedly difficult to forecast developments in the short term, there are some research results that can be used as a starting point for assessing developments further ahead. The Riksbank’s forecasts have primarily been based on these results. 20 Nominal and real exchange rates While the nominal exchange rate shows the number of Swedish kronor per unit of foreign currency, the real exchange rate shows the relationship between Swedish and foreign price levels. Put simply, one can say that the real exchange rate shows how much a given basket of goods costs in Sweden in relation to abroad when the price of the basket of goods is expressed in the same currency. The real exchange rate can change either through the nominal exchange rate changing or by inflation differing between countries. A stronger krona real exchange rate can thus be attained either through a stronger nominal exchange rate or through a faster increase in the price level in Sweden than in other countries. We can use the Economist’s Big Mac index as an example. This index shows how much a Big Mac costs in different countries in the same currency. In 2001 the krona exchange rate against the dollar was at its weakest level so far and oscillated between 10 and 11 kronor. In the United States a Big Mac then cost 2.60 dollars, which corresponded to 26.70 kronor. In Sweden a Big Mac cost 24 kronor.

There are a number of factors behind the downward revision of the inflation forecast, including a new assessment of the development of the Swedish krona. I will go on to explain the background to the Riksbank’s general assessment that the krona is expected to appreciate in the coming period. This is an assessment I agree with. But in the most recent forecast made in December, the appreciation is expected to be greater than was forecast in October. There are a number of factors behind this new assessment, including the assumption that international interest rates will be slightly lower than was previously thought. I did not give so much importance to this particular revision of the krona forecast in the monetary policy decision made in December. Inflation in Sweden is on the whole expected to be lower in the future than was anticipated in October, partly because of lower inflation abroad. The effects of the exchange rate on the economy Let me now leave the recent monetary policy decision and move on to a question that is always topical for the Riksbank; namely developments in the exchange rate. I thought I would begin by talking about why exchange rate developments are important and then discuss the forecasts for the exchange rate. Why are developments in the exchange rate important to a central bank? The answer is that developments in the exchange rate can have major effects on developments in both inflation and the real economy.
On one hand, in the baseline scenario our trading partners will grow 3.5% in 2012 and 3.8% in 2013, one tenth of a point less than forecast in June. This, as aforesaid, because of the downward revisions to emerging economies’ growth. On the other hand, the terms of trade will be less favorable than projected then. The price of oil and fuels will be higher than assumed in June, because of supply-side problems and increasing geopolitical risks in the Middle East. On top of this is – also because of supply-side problems – the increase in food prices in the world markets, especially for grains. The copper price projection does not change from June. Finally, despite the observed calm, the baseline scenario considers new episodes of stress in global financial markets, similar of those of the past year. This, because of the events foreseen for the coming months and the difficulties of advancing towards a more long-lasting solution to the problems in the Eurozone (table 1). In Chile, the greatest news is stronger-than-expected growth in output and demand in the second quarter of the year. Output owes its dynamism to sectors linked to domestic demand, such as construction, trade and services. The better result of the manufacturing industry is also worth noting, which, although growing less than aggregate GDP, still exceeded expectations, also driven by the lines associated with demand, especially investment and specific export-oriented activities. On the expenditures side, inventory accumulation intensified with respect to previous months. (figure iii).

Add to this the discussion in the United States to prevent fiscal adjustments from being triggered in 2013. If attempts to reach agreements are unsuccessful, this economy’s GDP growth could fall significantly and tensions could increase in financial markets. In the emerging world, the biggest risk is a deepening of signs of economic slowdown. On aggregate, the world growth forecast does not divert from the average of the past 15 to 20 years, but this has been sustained by the expansion of the larger emerging economies. Particularly preoccupying is the performance of China, due to its weight in the world economy and its relevance in the evolution of the prices of copper. Should it post a sharper deceleration, global growth would weaken further, with intensified effects on commodity exporting economies like Chile, which are still growing at high rates. Another possibility is for supply-side factors to intensify recent increases in the prices of some commodities, especially fuels and grains. Locally, medium-term inflationary risks are still present. The recent trajectory of the world prices of fuels and some foodstuffs could rapidly pass through to inflation, all the more so considering the current state of output gaps. In addition, if domestic output and demand remain as dynamic even or more so, they can further intensify the usage of installed capacity pressuring inflation away from the target. At the same time, this could also could result in a widening of the current account deficit that could create vulnerability factors in the economy in a complex global environment.
This is a substantial cut and it has been made on the grounds that since the previous Monetary Policy Report was published in October there has been an unexpectedly rapid and tangible downturn in economic activity in Sweden and abroad. So, in order to prevent development being far too weak and inflation too low, a significant reduction in the repo rate was required. The fact that the interest rate needed to be cut substantially is also due to monetary policy not having such a large impact recently as it normally does. With lower policy rates and a more expansionary fiscal policy in Sweden and abroad, we expect to see an easing-off in the slowdown of the economy and a recovery at the end of 2009. In this acute situation, one may wonder whether wage formation is something that we need to discuss just now. Obviously, wage formation is not the most central issue for monetary policy at the moment. At the same time, it is important to be able to stand firm when a storm is brewing. Today, the Swedish economy stands on much firmer foundations than it did in the early 1990s – largely thanks to the lessons that we learned from the crisis at that time and the improvements that have been made in the functioning of the economy since then. I would claim that wage formation has been an important element of this and I intend to explain this in more detail in my speech today.

On the other hand, I have pointed out the importance of inflation and inflation expectations coming down to around 2 per cent ahead of the next round of collective bargaining in 2010. I have been more concerned about the effects of increases in food and energy prices spreading to other prices in the economy. For example, I have pointed out that food prices have increased more rapidly in Sweden than in the euro area and that the business tendency survey has indicated that the retail sector still planned to increase prices. This indicates that price increases in the world market could spread to other goods. The risk of such a development has now declined in that energy and food prices have fallen on the world markets and the plans to increase prices in the food retail sector are no longer so definite. The decline in demand in Sweden and abroad is further reducing the risk of these contagion effects. 6  BIS Review 154/2008  The Riksbank has analysed what is referred to as the persistency of inflation, that is how long the effects of a sudden increase or decrease in inflation endure. We identify two main results for Sweden, which are similar to the results of studies of the euro area. First, there is a degree of persistency in inflation, but it can be regarded as moderate. This result means, in simple terms, that half of the effect of a sudden increase in inflation remains in the next quarter.
Following a two-week dual circulation period during which payments could be made using either euro or Slovak koruna, the euro became the sole legal tender in Slovakia from 17 January 2009 and the changeover was very smooth. Today, the single currency is used in an area that stretches from Cyprus to Ireland and from Portugal to Finland. As you know, the euro cash did not enter into circulation until 1 January 2002, when it replaced the banknotes and coins of the national currencies like, in the case of Italy, the lira. To support the cash changeover, which was one of the largest logistical operations undertaken in Europe, extensive information campaigns were successfully run to acquaint citizens with the visual appearance of the euro banknotes and coins. The euro is widely recognised as a currency of major significance on the international level. Some 12 billion banknotes circulate in Europe and beyond, representing a face value of more than EUR 700 billion. The number of euro banknotes in circulation continued to grow since the initial cash changeover in 2002 and their value has almost tripled since the end of the changeover period. With this success story in mind, we are confidently looking forward to the anniversaries to come, which will be marked by the full consolidation of the euro and its further adoption by new member states. 2. The Euro Exhibition  Today we inaugurate the Euro Exhibition here in Rome.

Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 8 September 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Dombrovskis. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We continue to expect them to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. Regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, we confirm that the monthly asset purchases of € billion are intended to run until the end of March 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. Today, we assessed the economic and monetary data which had become available since our last meeting and discussed the new ECB staff macroeconomic projections. Overall, while the available evidence so far suggests resilience of the euro area economy to the continuing global economic and political uncertainty, our baseline scenario remains subject to downside risks. Our comprehensive policy measures continue to ensure supportive financing conditions and underpin the momentum of the euro area economic recovery.
However, international real interest rates are currently very low, and various factors indicate that they will remain unusually low, at least in the medium term (see Armelius et al, 2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  interest rate would not be restricted by its lower bound too often. During the financial crisis, however, several central banks lowered their policy rate over a short period to nearly zero, which they judged at that point to be the policy rate’s lower bound. And now, seven years later, the policy rates are still at the same low levels in many countries. Based on these experiences, many analysts think that it would be desirable to have an inflation target higher than 2 per cent. 9 This question is perhaps mainly discussed within the research community, though it has also been highlighted by the IMF and some central banks, among others. In the review of the monetary policy framework which the Bank of Canada conducts every five years, for example, an increase in the target is one of the areas to be examined. 10 Unlike the debate in Sweden, the international discussion therefore focuses on the central banks’ inflation targets needing to be raised rather than lowered. Some inflation is desirable for another reason, namely that wage formation can deteriorate when average inflation is too low. The reason is that in practice it has proved difficult to lower nominal wages.

It is a question of dampening these debt and price increases using macroprudential or fiscal policy measures, but also fundamental reforms on the housing market to generate a sustainable and improved balance between supply and demand. But if the Riksbank is so concerned, shouldn’t it then reconsider its policy and raise the interest rate? I hope that it has become clear during my discussion here that I think there are solid and convincing reasons to pursue the policy the Riksbank is currently pursuing, but I would like to repeat them briefly in any case. The inflation target has been a nominal anchor in the Swedish economy and a major reason behind the favourable economic development over the past two decades. For some time now, following the long period of inflation falling below the target, there have been signs that confidence in the inflation target has begun to falter. The Riksbank’s main task is to maintain confidence in the target – a task it does not share with any other authority. The repo rate is a blunt tool when trying to curb increases in household debt and housing prices as it influences so much else in the economy. A considerably higher rate would likely be needed in order to have a substantial effect, but then inflation and growth would be dampened, quite extensively in the worst case scenario. Neither low inflation nor weaker growth would contribute to a sustainable rise in the interest rate level.
This case also highlights the link that must exist between deposit insurance and the LOLR function. Part of the rationale is to prevent and stop runs. But at the end of the day, that only works if bank liabilities are flowing to a central bank that has the mandate, willingness, and capacity to recycle them against collateral and expand its balance sheet as needed. This means that, in the absence of arrangements for currency swaps, it must take place mostly in the same currency in order to work. So the bottom line is that a sovereign default was avoided in spite of an almost unprecedented financial collapse and the worst economic recession since the interwar years. A key to that result was the attempt to ring-fence the sovereign from the collapse of these three cross-border private banks. However, the avoidance of default during such a severe crisis does require the willingness to use the means available to avoid that outcome and the ability to endure the temporary hardship that might come with it. Even if the Icelandic authorities tried to avoid the socialisation of private sector losses in the case of the collapse of the three-cross border banks, the direct fiscal costs of the financial crisis were enormous. In this case, it is difficult to distinguish between the cost of the banking crisis and the recession that would nevertheless have occurred in Iceland in 2009, as a result of the unavoidable macroeconomic adjustment following the serious overheating of the economy in 2005–2007.

My co-authors and I have started with the observation that in the face of truly systemic housing shocks, governments always intervene. It is not hard to imagine why: given the importance of housing to Americans and our economy, at some level of housing market stress, the government faces intense pressure to take action. We cannot eliminate the risk that the government may have to intervene. So we need to acknowledge that risk and establish a system to reduce and manage it, or we will recreate an implicit guarantee that puts the taxpayer at unacceptable risk. In my view, the private sector (and the borrower) must absorb all losses up to an agreed point, with the government absorbing all further losses. The level at which the government steps in must be well known in advance and credible to the market, meaning that there should be no speculation as to when and how the government would intervene. When should the government intervene? If markets believe that the government will intervene sooner than it claims, then this will generate uncertainty, and financial markets will speculate on the timing and nature of the intervention. This uncertainty could have a destabilizing effect, leading to higher losses that the government would ultimately have to absorb. A government guarantee that is unclear or not credible, even if it is explicit and priced, will result in greater costs to the government and, ultimately, the taxpayer. What should parties pay the government for its willingness to intervene?
A credit slowdown stemming from the weakening of the cycle, due to its obvious effects both on the solvent demand for credit and on the riskadjusted supply by institutions, would be another matter entirely. For their part, institutions need to assume fully the new reality in which they will have to operate in the coming years and address it intelligently and decisively. This will require an adjustment of their balance sheets, so that credit flows to the real economy while attention is paid to the greater risk of default which will have to be correctly managed. At the same time, on the liabilities side, it will be necessary to continue strengthening the deposit base as far as possible, since the capacity to finance banking activity through the wholesale markets will be more limited. This adjustment of bank balance sheets must be accompanied by strict cost controls, which are the main mechanism for limiting the impact of the new environment on bank income statements. The economies of scale offered by bank consolidation (widely aired in the media) is one way to tackle this rationalisation of cost structures. In any event, irrespective of the strategy that each institution may decide to adopt, the result should be one of greater efficiency. Finally, if we have to face a period of slower growth in banking activity, with greater uncertainty and lower profits, banks should also endeavour to strengthen their capital base.

These two examples are of course extremely simplistic, and are not realistic parameterisations of the Bank’s actual RSS. In broad terms, the elasticity of the Bank’s RSS is pinned down by three broad considerations. First, the Bank sees merit in allocating some funds regularly against wider collateral, to ensure counterparties remain familiar with the auction structure and continue to participate. Second, the Bank should not undermine the incentives to manage liquidity prudently. And third, the auctions should permit an increased allocation against wider collateral to the system in the face of adverse liquidity shocks and the associated heightened demand for liquidity. While the principles underlying the Bank’s RSS are clear, the precise configuration of the RSS is not revealed to the market, so reducing the scope for firms to game the Bank, and encouraging them to bid according to need. The Bank’s supply curve should be continuous but otherwise need not be linear. In particular the Bank can use the results from each operation to determine the degree of stress in the market and hence adjust the scale of the operations accordingly. Equilibrium The equilibrium point, which pins down the clearing spreads and the share of funds allocated to the two collateral sets, is determined by the intersection of the observed demand curve, and the Bank’s RSS. Chart 7 illustrates that using our hypothetical auction bids from Table 1 above, and three hypothetical linear RSS schedules. In case of intersections such as those given by curves A and B, a unique equilibrium is well defined.