samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I would now like to discuss three questions in particular. The first is whether CSR is a stable concept or one that is still evolving? This concept broadly stems from that of sustainable development, which is defined as development that meets present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own. Its blueprint was set out at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (the first Earth Summit). It is based on the principle of development that is economically efficient, socially equitable and ecologically sustainable. CSR, whose initial objective was accountability, still largely appears to be an evolving paradigm closely linked to the current transition towards a new economic model. BIS Review 132/2008  1  In this respect, Rio brought to the fore the need for an ISO standard at the company level in order for companies themselves to take account of their impact and change their processes as part of a preventive approach. The UN addressed this dimension and brings together, under its aegis, the initiatives of the major companies that adhere to a relatively general charter. The Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (also known as Rio Plus 10 or the Second Earth Summit), largely focused on companies wishing to take centre stage in the protection of the planet and adopt a proactive role. The ethical dimension of CSR lends strength to the questions of stakeholders and employees as to how their funds are used.

As a result, when the bubble deflates, it can take the financial system with it. In contrast, because most equities are held on an unleveraged basis by investors, such as pension and mutual funds, a sharp decline in equity prices will not typically threaten the entire financial system. A comparison of the consequences of the technology stock market crash in equities versus the mortgage debt market crash strongly supports this thesis. Although the wealth loss was roughly comparable, the bursting of the housing bubble had a much greater negative effect on the financial system and the macroeconomy. In this cost-benefit analysis, the central bank must understand that it will make mistakes. On one hand, it may fail to temper bubbles that turn out to be disruptive when they collapse. Or, on the other hand, it may try to temper price movement that it thinks are bubbles but are not bubbles at all. The costs of these types of errors much be weighed against the potential benefits of tempering an asset bubble and limiting the damage from its subsequent collapse. 9 So what are the tools with which the policymaker should respond? As I see it, there are three broad sets of tools available: 1) The bully pulpit; 2) macroprudential tools; and 3) monetary policy. Let me now discuss each of these in turn. The first tool available is to simply lean against the wind of conventional wisdom by speaking out about the dangers associated with the incipient bubble.
And, notwithstanding the legitimate debate about the NorthSouth divide, unemployment is at around its lowest rate in every individual region of the UK for some 20 years. It’s not the Holy Grail but there’s no doubt that things are better than they were. But sadly that is not - indeed cannot be - true for everyone. Even in a stable macro-economic environment, economic progress depends upon structural change with some industries and individual businesses declining while others develop to take their place. That process of structural change is, of course I understand, immensely painful for those businesses that run down and for those people who lose their jobs as a result, even if they are able to find new activity or employment in an economy BIS Review 110/2000  2  operating close to capacity. What is more, these structural pressures have been aggravated over the past few years by the strength of sterling’s exchange rate against both a range of weakening emerging market currencies following the financial crisis which started in Asia three years or so ago and against the weakening euro. The hard choice - and it is a hard choice - for macro-economic policy, or more specifically for monetary policy, in this context is could we - or should we - seek to protect the suffering sectors or failing businesses even if that meant consciously putting at risk the stability of the economy as a whole?

The net effect of particular forms of intervention may enhance the capacity of the private sector to create wealth and employment - I imagine that most people would generally regard public health and education services, for example, in this way, or forms of regulation that enable markets to function more effectively. But even then there are questions of degree. And other forms of intervention may be more likely to reduce the wealth-creating capacity of the private sector by, for example, blunting incentives either to provide or to take up employment. That is not, of course, to say that they are in any sense necessarily wrong, merely to point out that here again choices to be made, the difficulty often being to know where to strike the balance between conflicting objectives. The question of relieving poverty needs to be addressed within this framework. Our social conscience may say that we should lean more towards redistribution in favour of the poorer sectors of our community generally, or in favour of those who are particularly disadvantaged in one way or another and goodness knows there are endless causes that in themselves are worthy of our collective support. 3  BIS Review 110/2000  But it is important to recognise that in doing so, we could reduce the wealth and income generating capacity of the economy as a whole, and so reduce our ability to provide rising living standards to all sectors of society, including rising absolute living standards of the poorer sectors we were seeking to help.
BIS Review 21/2010  Chart 11a: Options-implied weight on falling consumer prices 5-7 years ahead per cent  US CPI <0%  Chart 11b: Options-implied weight on inflation rising by more than 5%, 5-7 years ahead per cent  40  40  35  35  30  30 25  25 US CPI >5%  UK CPI<0%* EA CPI <0%  20  20  15  15  10  10  EA CPI >5%  5  5 UK CPI>5%*  0  0 Nov 2007  Feb May Aug Nov 2008  Feb May Aug Nov 2009  Feb  Nov 2007  Feb May Aug Nov 2008  Feb May 2009  Aug  Nov  Feb  Sources: Bloomberg, RBS and Bank calculations  Sources: Bloomberg, RBS and Bank calculations  Chart 12: Central banks’ balance sheets as a percentage of GDP(a)  Chart 13: UK M4 money growth compared to wider measure of money growth(a) Perc entage c hanges on a y ear earlier 25 M4 Wider meas ure of broad money (a)  20 15 10  M4-IOFCs  5 0 -5  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  Sources: Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Federal Reserve, Thomson Datastream, www.measuringworth.org and Bank calculations. (a) Bank of England balance sheet data: end-February 1914–66, end-year 1967–2008. UK GDP: annual data (nominal). Federal Reserve balance sheet data: endyear 1914–81, end-July 1982–95, end-year 1996–2008. US GDP: annual data (nominal).

Despite the role of seasonal factors, this slowdown is more apparent compared to that of recent years (Chart 3). Accordingly, the exchange-rate-adjusted annual credit growth rate is expected to converge at around 25 percent by year-end, as envisaged. In the baseline scenario presented in the July Inflation Report, global economic activity was assumed to continue to improve gradually; however, it was also highlighted that downside risks on the global economy were growing stronger. Indeed, right after the publication of the Report, risk perceptions deteriorated rapidly and debt problems in the euro area further intensified changing the baseline scenario. In response, we introduced a comprehensive package of measures to contain the potential adverse effects of these developments on financial stability and economic activity. The objective of these measures was to supply liquidity to markets in a timely, controlled and effective manner in the event of financial turmoil that may be driven by developments in the global economy. Moreover, we opted for a modest cut in the policy rate in order to contain the risk of recession in domestic economic activity that may be posed by escalating global economic problems. Moreover, Turkish lira required reserve ratios were adjusted in order to extend the maturities of liabilities of the banking system (Chart 6). The mounting uncertainties facing the global economy since the July Inflation Report and accelerating capital outflows from emerging economies called for a series of measures intended to contain fluctuations in the foreign exchange market.
How can they be managed more effectively? For a relatively long period of time, they have been vital to our country. According to a Bank of Albania survey on the first quarter of 2008, about 26% of Albanian households living in the territory of the Republic of Albania are recipients of remittances from abroad. Households’ geographical distribution indicates that 59% of recipient families live in the rural areas while the rest in the urban ones, receiving about 66% and 34% of total workers’ remittances, respectively. Remittances represent the most important component of rural families’ monthly income, accounting for about 40%. The largest part of workers’ remittances (about 70%) for the first quarter of 2008 was used for non-productive purposes. About 48% was used for consumption, which entails meeting households’ everyday needs for food, clothes, furniture, etc., 16% for construction and reconstruction and 10% for education and medical purposes. Around 19% of remittances are used for investment and savings, providing evidence for their economic impact on Albania. Despite these figures, their future prospective is yet unclear. The integration of Albanians into their host countries, their economic and financial situation and other similar reasons have a negative impact in the long term. Our analyses and assessments show that the difficult economic situation the developed economies have been experiencing, expressed in the economic slowdown, unemployment growth and increase of inflation, has also provided its impact on the performance of remittances which have grown less this year relative to the previous years.

For analogy purposes, I would like to bring an example: It is now for two years that the Bank of Albania has been organizing the yearly competition “The Governor’s Award for the best diploma thesis”. Last year, the third prize went to a student of the University of Shkodra for a very original thesis which introduced the potentials and opportunities of the Puka Region, the development of mountain tourism and the positive macroeconomic impact it will bring to the region. This paper was assigned a prize for the originality of the topic chosen to be explored and the economic impact its presentation may have. The thesis did not only seek to present a profitable business opportunity, but also make an assessment of the positive impact this investment would have on the life of the community. The positive influence on the latter is crucial for important strategic investors. We awarded this paper not only for its original exploration by a passionate student from Puka, but also to increase public awareness and promote this new and modern mentality. When a single student manages to produce this much, a university, a local community and all of us together have great potentials to achieve even more. I brought with me today a copy of this thesis. Dear participants, I tried to briefly discuss some issues that I personally find vital and benefiting for you and the Bank of Albania.
Svein Gjedrem: Hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs Introduction by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a public hearing before the Storting's Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs, together with Mrs Kristin Halvorsen, Minister of Finance, and Mr Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, Director General of The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, Oslo, 13 February 2009. *  *  *  Government finance fund and government bond fund The crisis in the banking sector was initially a problem of liquidity. In October and November, there was considerable turbulence and fear was spreading among banks. Credit premiums were high. The situation has improved. The improvement is to a considerable extent the result of action taken by the authorities. The swap arrangement whereby banks can exchange covered bonds for government paper has been important. The arrangement is oriented towards larger banks, and a number of banks have made use of this facility, in an amount so far totalling more than NOK 70 billion. Norges Bank has proposed an extension of the arrangement to provide banks with funding at 5-year maturities. Maturities so far have been up to 3 years. The extension is important to ensure that maturity dates do not all fall within a short period. The arrangement provides banks with Treasury bills. Banks have used these as collateral for loans, sold them or kept them as liquidity reserves. There has been high demand for Treasury bills.

Norges Bank is nevertheless of the view that higher demand for the best bonds will have a positive effect. This will reduce the pressure on banks, and it may result in a shift in private demand towards bonds with a lower credit rating. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 17/2009  BIS Review 17/2009  3  4  BIS Review 17/2009
A survey of more than 31 European countries also shows that there is a high degree of job satisfaction among Norwegians.17 Demographic developments will have a dampening impact on demand for public services and social security disbursements over the coming years. The number of elderly among pensioners, i.e. 80 years and older, will not grow and the post-war generation will only start drawing on social security in the next decade. There will still be pressures for higher public spending. Demand for services we have chosen to let the government provide, for example health services, increases markedly when revenues rise at the pace they are rising today. Growth in government revenues – among others the return on the Government Pension Fund which is rising rapidly – also raises our expectations. At the same time, this is also a period of strong growth in demand for labour in the business sector. With the exception of part-time employees who want to work more, there are now few idle resources in the labour force. We cannot expect a substantial increase in the supply of foreign labour. Workers from other countries, such as Sweden and Poland with families and the largest share of consumption in their home country, have increased production capacity in Norway, but it now appears that the supply of foreign labour is starting to become more limited. Other inward labour migration does not generate higher value added per capita. Immigrants that become permanent residents make the same contribution to increasing demand as to increasing production.

Last month, AMRO presented its first set of Economic Review and Policy Dialogue reports at a meeting of ASEAN+3 Finance and Central Bank Deputies. AMRO’s ability to deliver such comprehensive reports within such a short time of becoming operational speaks well of the quality of its leadership and staff. 24. Singapore is very pleased to serve as the base for AMRO’s operations. We are fully committed to supporting AMRO – in matters both financial and administrative. As AMRO expands over the next few years and builds up its capabilities, we look forward to active engagement and collaboration. To be effective, AMRO must be independent and objective in its assessments, and candid about risks and vulnerabilities. I am happy to note that, in its surveillance reports, AMRO has sought to clearly identify policy risks and areas for improvement in the ASEAN+3 economies. It is critical that AMRO sustains this effort and develops an effective consultation process with ASEAN+3 economies. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conclusion 25. The journey of regionalism as represented by the CMIM is an ongoing one. Today’s official opening of AMRO is an important milestone in that journey that we can all take pride in. On behalf of my colleagues in ASEAN+3, I would like to congratulate AMRO and its director, Mr Wei Benhua, on your strong start and wish you every success. Let me also extend our warm wishes and full support to Mr Yoichi Nemoto, who will take over from Mr Wei as AMRO director later this year. 26.
Of course, monetary policy does not react mechanically to monetary developments, but rather responds to the information in monetary aggregates that is relevant for maintaining price stability over the medium term. To make best use of the informational role of money, however, we have to address numerous and increasing challenges. 3  It is worth noting that not everybody is convinced that globalisation has played an important role in the flattening of the Phillips curve. For instance, Frederic Mishkin, Axel Weber and Donald Kohn emphasize the uncertainty surrounding the quantification of this globalisation effect, and Laurence Ball even questions this effect on theoretical grounds. Part of these doubts comes from the apparent lack of robustness of the result indicating that domestic inflation has become more sensitive to global output-gap fluctuations, which tends to weaken the case for the globalisation explanation of the flattening of the Phillips curve. 4  Benati L. (2007), “Long-run evidence on money growth and inflation”, forthcoming in the ECB Working Paper Series. BIS Review 103/2007  3  One major difficulty is identifying in real time the nature of monetary developments and their implications for future price developments. The challenge of monetary analysis is to see through the noise in monetary data to recover those underlying trends which are relevant for monetary policy decisions. Meeting this challenge has not been straightforward in recent years in the euro area. First of all, short-run monetary developments are often affected by transitory shocks.

In doing so, it has blurred the information content of many important variables or indicators relevant for the monetary policy maker, making monetary policy probably more complex in a context of increased uncertainty. Economic theory usually distinguishes between parameter and model uncertainty. In the presence of parameter uncertainty, i.e. when the policy maker is uncertain about the impact a policy instrument has on the economy, economic theory suggests that it is optimal to respond more cautiously than would be the case in the absence of uncertainty (this is the well-known Brainard conservative principle). By contrast, model uncertainty would require more active monetary policy, the idea being to insure oneself against particularly bad outcomes. I will leave it to your wisdom to guess in the present circumstances which of these two approaches would be preferable. Thank you for your attention. 5  Bordes, C., Clerc L. and Marimoutou V. (2007): “Is there a break in equilibrium velocity in the euro area?”, Banque de France, Notes d’Etudes et de Recherche n° 165, February. 4  BIS Review 103/2007
Chart 1 Tariffs and Global Value Chain Participation2  (Value added weighted average over countries and sectors percent) 50  6 5.5  45  5 4.5  40  4  35  3.5 3  30  2.5  Average GVC participation  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  2  1995  25  Average tariffs (right scale)  Source: Source: IMF, WEO April 2019  Global external imbalances have been at the forefront in the macro - discussions and risk assessments. One of the first steps when scrutinizing external positions and imbalances is the current account position. Current account imbalances can be healthy or a sign of  2 Chart extracted from the IMF WEO, April 2019. 2  macroeconomic and financial stress. In many cases, current account imbalances can be entirely appropriate, even necessary. For instance in converging economies, with vast investment opportunities, they benefit from foreign funding, and can afford to accumulate debts (by running current account deficits), provided they can repay them out of future income. Sometimes, however, external imbalances can point to macroeconomic and financial stress. Economies that accumulate external liabilities on too large scale may become vulnerable to sudden stops in capital flows that force abrupt cuts in spending–making financial crises more likely.

35  Beyond age 18, there was in parallel a rise in both numbers and attendance at universities. For over six hundred years from 1209, England had only two universities – this one (Oxford) and the other one (Cambridge). It was not until the formation of University College London in 1829 that their duopoly was th  broken. And it was not until the 20 century that some of the other main cities – Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Bristol, Birmingham and Sheffield – established their own universities. 36  Today, there are around 130  universities in the UK as a whole. Participation rates in higher education have also undergone a secular rise and, latterly, a revolution. The share of young people attending university has increased from just over 3% in 1950 to over 8% in 1970, over 19% in 1990, 33% in 2000 and 49% by 2016. 37  Having been less than 5,000 in 1920, the number of first  degrees obtained at UK universities had increased to over 365,000 by 2016. 38  Through the rapid rise in school and university attendance, there was a revolution in cognitive skills in the workforce. That provided the human capital necessary to turn new technologies and machines into higher levels of productivity among companies, higher wages among workers and, ultimately, higher living standards among societies. Put differently, higher cognitive skills reduced the odds of a lengthy recessionary period of technological unemployment for many individuals and societies.