samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is aimed at adopting best practices in this area, and at implementing the recommendations given by specialized assessments of international financial institutions that assist this process. Allow me to state once more that the Bank of Albania is completely committed to provide all the necessary assistance for strengthening the capacities of the Deposit Insurance Agency in Albania, in view of its very important mission. I wish good proceedings to this seminar. 3/3

Both of these programs provide important insights into the role of the central bank as a provider of liquidity, leading to a few observations and to a few questions that I believe warrant further exploration in considering future policy actions. 1 Liquidity swaps with foreign central banks The second half of 2009 and the early part of 2010 were marked by substantial improvements in financial markets, ranging from short-term funding to longer term risk assets. There was good reason for those improvements: Efforts by the government to stabilize markets and support financial institutions were successful, and a virtuous circle appeared to be under way in which increasing optimism about the economic outlook and improving conditions in financial markets fed upon one another. The gains in asset prices were dramatic, with broad equity indexes reversing most of the declines experienced in late2008 and early 2009 and with some measures of short-term funding spreads returning to pre-crisis levels. However, more recent developments have demonstrated that conditions in financial markets can change abruptly. These developments have been widely discussed at this point, and I will not go through them in detail, except to highlight the two broad themes in play. First, investors have become concerned about the fiscal positions of some European countries, leading them to re-price sovereign risk for those countries and to question whether austerity measures and other supporting efforts will prove sufficient to restore market confidence.
First, our forecast presupposes that it will be possible to manage the debt crisis in Europe so that the acute problems can be resolved. There is a risk that the problems will continue and that the debt crisis in Europe will get worse, which may lead to weaker economic activity in Sweden and abroad. If this proves to be the case, monetary policy in Sweden will have to be more expansionary to mitigate the effects of the more severe crisis. Conversely, it is possible that political agreements will be reached fairly soon and that the financial unease will subside more quickly than we expected. This could lead to stronger economic activity in Sweden and abroad than expected, and it will then not be necessary for the repo rate to be so low. Secondly, the outcomes for inflation abroad have been surprisingly high recently, despite falling commodity prices and weaker economic activity. There is therefore a risk that the situation abroad will be characterised by economic stagnation and high inflation, so-called stagflation. Central banks abroad may then be faced with a very difficult balancing act. The risk of further weakening economic activity will reduce the scope for raising policy rates to  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  combat inflation, which may result in inflation continuing to be high. All in all, there is therefore a risk that inflation abroad may not fall to the extent we expect. This will lead to higher inflation in Sweden too through higher import prices.

Subdued demand for exports As I mentioned in my introduction, Sweden is a small, open economy with a high degree of foreign trade. Our exports are affected by the level of demand abroad. We expect the BRIC countries to grow at a much faster rate than the United States and the euro area in the period ahead. One way for Swedish companies to adapt to this is to try to export to the rapidlygrowing countries to a greater extent. We can see that this is something that is already happening when we look at how high a percentage of our exports go to different parts of the world (see Figure 10). However, this is a process that will take time; the BRIC countries still account for only a small proportion of Swedish exports. If the trend we have seen over the last 10 years continues for  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  another 10 years, then the BRIC countries will have increased their share of Swedish exports to 15 per cent of the total, but they will still not have reached even half of the share of the euro countries. Europe and the United States will thus continue to be very important export markets for Sweden for a long time to come. The conclusion is that weaker growth in Europe and the United States will have a negative impact on exports, even though new markets are gaining ground. Growth in Swedish exports will therefore be subdued going forward (see Figure 11).
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) payment system, led by the Reserve Bank of South Africa, was launched in 1996. Following the initiatives by the World Bank and the Center for Latin American Monetary Authorities (CEMLA), the Western Hemisphere Payments & Securities Settlement Initiative was launched in 1999. In 2004, the World Bank and the regional central banks launched the Commonwealth Independent States Payments and Securities Initiative to develop the payment systems in the former Soviet Union countries. In 2005, the Arab Payments and Securities Settlement Initiative was launched with the cooperation of 22 members and with the support of the Arab Fund. These are some of the successful regional initiatives. All these initiatives have a common vision to ensure that reforms result in efficient and effective payment systems built on international best practice. Within that vision, they assist individual member countries to prepare domestic payment system development strategies and define a coordinated regional approach to ensure safe cross border payments, taking into consideration the implications for trade and investment activities. Another common feature of these initiatives is the availability of well functioning real time gross settlement systems operated either by central banks or, in some cases, by other operators. This is the platform that links the central banks in the group. These regional initiatives have also built institutional capacities within the national economies, as well as in the region, to sustain continued payment system development.

The amount of $ billion has been fully subscribed by a diversified group of investors. They include not only banks, but also institutional investors and fund managers. The participation of these latter groups is especially welcome as a sign of the potential breath of the investor base for good  BIS Review 47/2003  1  quality Hong Kong dollar debt securities. The opportunity has been taken to offer more choices to investors. These are explained in the technical note attached to the press release. The CEO of HKMC will be happy to explain these to you and answer any questions that you may have, later in the press briefing. What I would like to do here in conclusion is to thank HSBC, the Lead Manager of this MBS issue for marketing it so effectively. I would also like to thank the Senior Co-lead Managers, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Bank of East Asia, International Bank of Asia, Mitsubishi Securities (HK) and Co-lead Manager, BNP Paribas for their staunch support. The HKMC team has enjoyed working with all of you towards this successful result, and we look forward to your continuing active participation in future HKMC issues. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 47/2003
To help rebuild that foundation, financiers, like all of us, need to avoid compartmentalisation – the division of our lives into different realms, each with its own set of rules. Home is distinct from work; ethics from law; the individual from the system. 20 This process begins with boards and senior management defining clearly the purpose of their organisations and promoting a culture of ethical business throughout them. Employees must be grounded in strong connections to their clients and their communities. To move to a world that once again values the future, bankers need to see themselves as custodians of their institutions, improving them before passing them along to their successors. In the UK, two important initiatives are in train to help accomplish these ends. The first is a new regime for regulating the senior-most managers of banks. That regime, proposed by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and now being established by the Bank of England seeks to reverse the blurring of the link between seniority and accountability that has developed over the years. Its underlying principles are relevant across the financial sector. People who run major firms should have clearly defined responsibilities and behave with integrity, honesty and skill regardless of whether they work for global investment banks, regional building societies or insurance companies. We are now considering a similar regime for senior persons in the insurance sector. This does not mean applying the banking regime indiscriminately. For one thing there is no statutory provision for applying a “reverse burden of proof” in insurance.

The FSB is developing proposals, for the G20 summit in Brisbane, on total loss absorbing capacity for institutions, so that private creditors stand in front of taxpayers when banks fail. In addition, we are working with industry to change derivative contracts so that all counterparties stay in while resolution of a failing firm is underway. Second, creating fair and effective markets In recent years, a host of scandals in fixed income, currency and commodity markets have been exposed. Merely prosecuting the guilty to the full extent of the law will not be sufficient to address the issues raised. Authorities and market participants must also act to re-create fair and effective markets. In the Bank of England’s view, changes to both the hard and soft infrastructure of markets will be required. Examples of the former include reforming the calculations of benchmarks such as Libor or the daily foreign exchange fixes. The upcoming FSB report on these issues, co-chaired by the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) Martin Wheatley and the Fed’s Jeremy Stein, will be decisive in this regard. Consideration should also be given to increasing pre- and post-trade transparency in a host of fixed income markets and accelerating the G20 pledge to move the trading of all standardised derivatives onto electronic exchanges and platforms. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Such changes are vital, but they cannot anticipate every contingency or discipline every miscreant. The scandals highlight a malaise in corners of finance that must be remedied.
Starting from appraisals of global economic  The inflation puzzle International developments ■  ■  ■  etc  BIS Review 24/2001  Development of GDP Interest rates and exchange rates Oil prices  Swedish economy ■  The krona  ■ ■  ■  etc  Development of GDP Productivity Utilisation of resources Wages  Other ■  Inflation expectations  Inflation ■  Taxes and subsidies  3  developments, various international prices, for oil for example, the exchange rate, interest rates and what is happening in the domestic economy, we estimate a picture of economic activity and resource utilisation in Sweden. Normally it is resource utilisation that is crucial for inflation. To this we add an assessment of inflation expectations as well as estimates of factors with effects that may be more or less transitory, such as changes in interest rates and taxes. The combined result is a forecast of inflation. The large model is made up of a number of relationships, The equations for calculating exports are one example. Swedish exports are estimated as a function of, for example, global economic developments and the path of the krona’s exchange rate or some other measure of relative prices. But as some important relationships are not particularly stable, we have to make judgements on the basis of other experiences. Sometimes, moreover, there are grounds for supplementing a model-based calculation with more specific information. There may be indications that investment activity, for example, will be higher than historical relationships indicate.

And as Alf Henriksson, if my memory does not fail me, said on some occasion, making forecasts is difficult, particularly about the future. It calls at least for knowledge of what has happened and is now happening in the economy, as well as of various economic relationships that can be used to interpret the available information. One approach involves assessing the factors that affect prices and trying to identify simple relationships between them and inflation. Such calculations are a part of the material that is presented to the Executive Board as a basis for decisions. If they add up to a uniform picture, the calculations presumably say something about the direction in which inflation is moving. Our main assessment, however, uses methods that are more complex. Like other economic observers, we endeavour to construct a picture of economic developments in the coming years that is coherent and consistent. We do this with the aid of what economists call a model: a computer spreadsheet for processing economic data. This largely guides the presentation of our assessments in the Inflation Report (Chart 1.The Inflation Puzzle).
We can, and have, and I hope will, take account of the exchange rate in our tactical approach to monetary policy. But with the best will in the world, what we cannot sensibly do, is to ignore the strength of domestic demand in order to shelter the exposed sectors. That would put the whole of the economy at risk to accelerating inflation - including those sectors we were seeking to protect. And it would not be of much help to them in anything other than the short term. The monetary policy option is - as I say - not whether or not, it is sooner or later, and ultimately less or more. The elements of hope that I can hold out to you - and central bankers can never give guarantees on this kind of thing - are first, that as we move into the euro process the markets will become increasingly persuaded that the ECB will, in fact, be committed to the stability of the new currency, as I am sure it will: and, secondly, that relative monetary conditions will change as activity picks up on the Continent and domestic demand moderates in this country. Our present exchange rate dilemma, Mr. Chairman, illustrates rather well the conflicting arguments about the euro project itself. The strengthening of sterling and its effect on the exposed sectors of the economy point up very vividly the very real advantages of the exchange rate certainty across the European Union area which only the euro can provide.

First, it requires the active involvement of many different stakeholders, in particular Government agencies and very often a variety of NGOs, as well as financial institutions with specialized skills and knowledge. Second, the state of economic and social development of a society is an  BIS Review 88/2010  1  important determinant on the level and quality of financial inclusion. Third, what constitutes acceptable level of inclusion, in terms of access to finance, protection of personal rights and liberties, or assurance of retirement and healthcare benefits varies from one jurisdiction to another. For the reasons that I mentioned, there is no uniform global benchmark that can be used as a successful model for financial inclusion programs. Success stories and experiences are dispersed and often go unrecorded and to further the cause we need to reveals this situation. The financial inclusion agenda requires a systematic and internationally-recognized set of financial inclusion indicators that is meaningful and capable of assisting us in formulating developmental policies. Furthermore, enormous efficiency gains from the availability of such indicators can both reduce the cost of research and implementation as well as increase the effectiveness of the delivery and execution of the policies. Lessons learned in using financial inclusion data in the Malaysian context Let me to briefly share some of the lessons we have learnt in terms of using data to improve the policy formulation process, and develop a more efficient and inclusive financial sector.
In going beyond profit, VBI is set to be one of the drivers for Islamic financial institutions to assist entrepreneurs to grow their businesses. This would require an understanding of the entrepreneurs’ specific needs and circumstances prior to recommending a particular product or service, rather than focusing on a predetermined range of services. Islamic financial institutions are also expected to assist and guide businesses to adopt sustainable business practices. The financing model for businesses and SMEs will be more holistic; including provision of environmental-friendly business solutions, entrepreneurship training and consulting services. This model can better assist aspiring businesses to improve efficiency and reduce costs, which will lead to greater sustainability. Before I end my remarks, I would like to emphasise that the practice of Islamic finance is not and should not be exclusive to Muslims. Many of its underlying ideas, the pursuit of economic justice and risk sharing align with traditional and conventional economic thinking. Mutual insurance companies which derive from risk sharing, limited-purpose banking which moves away from interest-based or fractional banking and equity financing, are all ideas consistent with Islamic finance principles, and are practised across the world without any reference to the religion. Indeed, Islamic finance is for all. I hope that today’s programme will lead us to a step closer in bridging Islamic finance and businesses.

If existing players and Fintechs did not both know how to innovate, and often innovate together, it’s the Bigtechs that would ultimately reap the rewards. 2. Promote the integration of Fintechs into the regulatory framework In response to these transformations, our role as public authorities is twofold: to continue to safeguard financial stability and therefore trust, but also to act as a catalyst for innovation – two roles that are far more complementary than they are contradictory. Financial stability without innovation would be a form of dying conservatism; innovation without trust would be a fleeting fad. We therefore want, clearly, concretely and firmly, to facilitate the entry of new players into the regulated arena. To this end, at the end of last year, we adopted the Fintech Charter,iv and today we want to update you on how we have lived up to our commitments. -  Between January and August, the ACPR’s Fintech-Innovation Unit  received 107 contact requests from new project initiators. In 90% of cases, a first response was given within two weeks, with an average response time of six days.
Chart: Total credit-to-GDP ratio Systemic risk also arises from the interaction between the financial system and the real economy. Financial crises tend to occur following a period of mutually reinforcing increases in credit, property prices and demand for goods and services, culminating in a bubble that reaches bursting point. Each individual loan makes a scant contribution to overall risk, but gradually, as debt burdens increase, the economy becomes more vulnerable to shocks. This chart shows that Norway has also experienced periods of especially strong credit growth that have been interrupted by financial crises. The subsequent losses in the real economy have been substantial. Banking regulation must therefore include a macroprudential perspective. The purpose is to dampen the build-up of systemic risk and ensure that the banking system as a whole is resilient to shocks. In a number of countries, frameworks are now being established for macroprudential regulation, along with efforts to put policy instruments in place. Preferably, such instruments should focus directly on the sources of systemic risk. This is the principle that is applied when taxes are imposed directly on environmentally hazardous products. In the financial system, however, this is difficult to accomplish in practice. Systemic risk has numerous sources. The financial system and its interaction with the real economy are complex, and problems spread across borders. The financial crisis was a clear reminder of this. New sources and forms of systemic risk may also arise. It is difficult to imagine instruments that can fully prevent financial crises from developing.

The countercyclical capital buffer is held to lean against the financial cycle, which is longer than a normal business cycle. Economists at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) find that the average length of the financial cycle in advanced economies is around 16 years.5 The length of the business cycle, on the other hand, is 8 years at most. The difference is illustrated in the chart. Twenty years passed from the start of the banking crisis in 1988 to the financial crisis. Capital adequacy requirements are only one of several factors influencing bank lending margins and rates. And bank lending rates are only one of many factors that are given weight when the key policy rate is set. Our knowledge and experience of macroprudential regulation is at an early stage. Financial market participants can find ways to circumvent regulation. Taking into account the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances will therefore continue to be one of the criteria for an appropriate interest rate path and an important element of a robust monetary policy framework. Payment system Norges Bank’s role in monetary policy is laid down in the Norges Bank Act. The Act also assigns responsibility to Norges Bank for promoting an efficient payment system.6 The payment system and the systems for settlement of securities and foreign exchange  5  Drehmann et al. “Characterising the financial cycle: don't lose sight of the medium term”, BIS WP 380, June 2012. 6  Section 1 of the Norges Bank Act.