samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, there is no sign of a potential wage-price loop that could be at play. This imperative to anchor inflation  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  expectations helps explain why the ECB raised key interest rates by 125 basis points in total over the last two policy meetings. As Christine Lagarde stated, the appropriate pace of future rate increases will be decided on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Indeed, as she has repeatedly emphasised, it will remain data-dependent in all scenarios. As the current drivers of inflation fade over time and the normalisation of monetary policy works its way through to the economy and price-setting, inflation will come down back to 2%. When will that be? Will it be necessary for the Eurosystem to significantly tighten its monetary policy? First, let me just note here that ECB projections released in September have significantly revised up their inflation projections and inflation is now expected to average 8.1% in 2022, 5.5% in 2023 but 2.3% in 2024. Second, market participants are not for the time being pricing in a strong tightening of ECB policy rates, with central expectations for the terminal rate being slightly below 3%. To conclude this rapid overview of the current macroeconomic situation in the euro area and its monetary policy implications, let me stress first that the change of course of monetary policy underway brings with it multiple dimensions that will need to be revisited, including the TLTRO operations, the remuneration mechanisms of banks reserves, and more broadly our operational framework.

Denis Beau: The current macroeconomic situation in the euro area and monetary policy issues Keynote address by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) Conference "The Future of the Euro Area: Navigating Uncertainty", Paris, 5 October 2022. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be talking to you today at this OMFIF Conference. I would like to express my warmest thanks to David Marsh for organising this event and for the invitation. We are here today to discuss and think about the future of the euro area. But, as Machiavelli once wrote: "to predict the future, one needs to know the past, because the events of this world have at all times links to the times that preceded them". In this respect, reflecting on the history of the euro, it stands out as a remarkable success: More than two decades after its inception, the euro is recognised and used globally, including outside its own borders as a means of payment, a store of value and a means of trade. The internal value of the single currency has been remarkably stable, with inflation averaging 1.7% between its inception in 1999 and 2021, compared with 4.9% during the two decades before 1999. The euro has helped to better protect the purchasing power of European citizens which has increased by 15% since 1999. The euro is also a great success in the area of payments.
4  BIS Review 23/2003  The last interest rate reduction reflected expectations of low inflation as a result of the strong krone and low international price inflation. Global economic developments are still sluggish. Low interest rates and tax cuts are being used in a number of countries to sustain activity. It is uncertain when economic growth will become self-driven. Since the Inflation Report was presented on 5 March, key rates have been reduced in the euro area, Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand. Growth is also slow in the Norwegian economy. Developments in parts of the business sector are marked by a high cost level, low profitability and the global downturn. Investment may be lower than projected in the Inflation Report. On the whole, developments over the past few weeks point to a more moderate rise in prices in the period ahead. Norges Bank reduced its sight deposit rate by ½ percentage point to 5 per cent on 30 April. According to Norges Bank’s overall assessment, with an interest rate of 5.0 per cent, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be lower than 2½ per cent is greater than the probability that it will be higher. BIS Review 23/2003  5

Philipp Hildebrand: Lessons from the financial market turbulence Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Jefferies prize-giving ceremony, Zurich, 27 August 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The current financial crisis is probably the most complex since the 1930s. The extent of international cooperation in overcoming it is greater than ever before. An important part in these activities is being played by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which was founded in 1998 and to which Switzerland has belonged since 2007. Six months after the start of the crisis, in April 2008, the FSF published a series of recommendations for enhancing the resilience of the international financial system. There are three main advantages to cooperating internationally in this way. First, it is easier to focus more clearly on identifying solutions. Second, it ensures that particular attention is paid to maintaining a level playing field when establishing regulatory measures. Third, it creates considerable pressure for any recommendations issued to be implemented in practice. The current crisis has shown that the Swiss banking system remains vulnerable to major shocks. As part of its statutory mandate to contribute to financial stability, the SNB has been monitoring developments since the start of the crisis very carefully. The lessons learned by the SNB from the crisis tie in with the recommendations of the FSF.
The Bank’s primary one is, of course, to ensure that the UK financial system serves UK households and businesses. This includes protecting the UK real economy from being sideswiped by global developments. As much as possible, we must do so in a manner that keeps cross-border markets open. When these responsibilities come into conflict, we have to work with others to build resilience at home and abroad in the most efficient and cooperative way possible. The pillars of responsible financial globalisation eroded prior to the global financial crisis. Regulation became light touch and ineffective. Looming risks in the financial system were ignored. Markets were fragile and unfair, plagued by numerous instances of misconduct and limited market discipline on large firms. And few participants were exposed to the full consequences of their actions as governance and compensation arrangements focused on the short term. 1  For example, Britain accounted for nearly 20% of the world’s manufacturing by the mid-19th century. At the end of the 19th Century, the UK accounted for as much as a quarter of world trade and produced around a tenth of global GDP. Today, those shares have both fallen under 5%. For details on how the historical estimates are calculated, see ‘The UK at the heart of a renewed globalisation’, speech given by Mark Carney, 24 October 2013, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech690.pdf. 2  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  The resulting cost to our citizens has been tremendous.

In the economic and tax spheres, some kind of common cyclical insurance mechanism is also needed, to cut adjustment costs for countries experiencing asymmetric shocks, and help is needed to design a fiscal policy more tailored to the euro area as a whole so that, in the event of a severe crisis, monetary policy will no longer be the only tool available to uphold aggregate demand. In future, further progress must also be made in the capital markets union, which is essential to achieve greater capital market integration, fortify banking union and strengthen the private mechanisms for efficient allocation of financial resources and the risks associated with their investment throughout the European Union. Conclusions As you can see, the Banco de España’s Annual Report provides an ambitious analysis and diagnosis of the Spanish economy. The main conclusions drawn in the Report, which was prepared in the first half of the year, remain essentially valid, despite the apparent growing deceleration of the global, European and Spanish economies: -  First, the need to take advantage of a level of economic growth that is still above potential to speedily and determinedly address the necessary fiscal consolidation process. In this respect, guaranteeing the financial sustainability of the public pension system is particularly important, in view of the medium-term implications. For this purpose, a comprehensive package of measures to address the effects of population ageing on the economy is essential.
This sharp deceleration is certainly worrying news, that should move us all, from political and economic venues, to combine our best efforts to restore the dynamism of the Chilean economy, especially considering that, as is our conviction, Chile has all the necessary tools at hand to ensure higher growth and thus improve the welfare of its inhabitants. In this context, the Central Bank has used monetary policy decisively and consistently with its mandate, always directing its efforts to achieving the price stability objective. We are also aware that monetary policy tools, however powerful, can smooth, but never flatten out, the economy’s cyclical fluctuations. What are the elements behind this weak economic growth? Our research identifies some factors that to some degree were expected – we have mentioned them in earlier Reports – and some unexpected ones, with effects that are yet to be assessed with accuracy. The expected factors include external developments. Chile is a small, open economy and, as such, is affected by the vagaries of the world economy. In this sense, and beyond the severe negative effects of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, we must recognize that during the past decade the Chilean economy was blessed with a benign international scenario, with extraordinarily advantageous commodity prices and financial conditions. Notwithstanding, lately the high commodity price cycle has come to an end, hitting commodity-exporting countries including Chile. Meanwhile, although international financial conditions are still good, the process of monetary policy normalization in some large developed economies is expected to begin soon.

Indeed, the unfolding of our monetary policy measures will ensure that financial conditions will remain very favourable, shielding the economy against the external headwinds and laying out the conditions for the build-up of domestic price pressures. At the same time, we are attentive to the possible side effects of the present monetary policy measures. These need to be carefully and continuously monitored. The ECB strategy review In January, the Governing Council decided to launch a review of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. After more than 16 years, it was time to conduct a thorough review taking stocks of the profound structural changes that have intervened since the 2003 strategy exercise, and reflecting on what these changes and new trends mean for our framework. This process is expected to last one year and it will be conducted by the Eurosystem and the ECB staff. We will also reach out to academics, Members of Parliament – including the European Parliament – representatives from the civil society and business, and seek the opinion of financial market participants on selected issues. The scope of the strategic review will be comprehensive. That means that we will look at the quantitative formulation of price stability, together with the approaches and instruments by which price stability is achieved. We will also reflect on how other considerations, such as financial stability, employment and environmental sustainability, can be relevant in pursuing the ECB’s mandate.
Growth potential and opportunities Over the last three years, the financial advisory industry saw total premiums transacted increase by an average annual growth of 21%. While this is from a low base, the industry is on a sustained growth trajectory, which suggests that financial advisers are adding value and successfully distinguishing themselves from alternative channels for the distribution of insurance offerings. We are pleased to see a further three new financial advisers added to the industry this year. The industry has only begun to scrape the surface in harnessing the potential that exists for financial advisers to make a substantial contribution in helping Malaysian households improve their financial management and prepare for income shocks. This potential is striking. Every year, more than two million life and family takaful policies are sold, 69% of this by tied agents. More than 40% of the Malaysian population still do not have any form of insurance, and a large proportion of those who do are likely to be significantly under-insured. This is supported by a recent study commissioned by Bank Negara Malaysia which found that 79% of more than 1,000 respondents surveyed did not have enough financial buffers to sustain living expenses beyond 3 months. Malaysian of retirement age and older are particularly vulnerable. Based on statistics from the Employees Provident Fund in 2011, more than 70 percent of contributors who were 54 years old at the time had savings of only RM50,000 or less accumulated for retirement. Only 30% of these contributors were still working.

We believe there is a need for financial advisers to possess a larger body of financial and technical knowledge, that includes a deeper awareness of latest developments in the industry and opportunities available, and to be able to apply this knowledge to a client’s advantage. Other core competencies that need to be given greater emphasis include effective communication and problem solving skills. The second priority is to identify and address the barriers that are preventing qualified parties from entering the industry, and the constraints that are limiting the ability of financial advisers to recommend the best solutions to their clients. We are close to making an announcement on revised minimum entry requirements for financial advisory business. The Bank is also currently working on measures to create a more level playing field with respect to product offerings among the insurance intermediaries. The Bank and the Securities Commission will also continue to coordinate closely in facilitating the ability of financial advisers and financial planners to provide advice on a broad range of financial solutions. In this respect, further enhancements are expected to be made to regulatory processes to improve efficiency and further ease the regulatory burden on the existing players. The third priority is to improve the alignment between the interests of consumers and financial advisers. We believe how incentives are structured have an important role in shaping the quality of advice that a consumer receives.
In particular, it recognised how important it was to preserve the country’s good monetary health – and this was long before the law made price stability a priority goal within the SNB’s policy. Since then, and even during the most turbulent phases of the 20th century, the determination to ensure monetary stability has emerged as a guiding principle for the National Bank’s activity. In its quest for stability, the SNB strove to apply the rules of the gold standard consistently, accepting the Federal Council’s decision to devalue the Swiss franc in 1936 reluctantly, as a trial imposed upon it from outside. Also, when Switzerland found itself isolated in the Second World War, the SNB tried to avoid repeating the mistakes made during the First World War so as not to further aggravate an already difficult situation through monetary instability. Preserving domestic stability and maintaining the country’s ability to meet international payments were thus accorded priority. After the War, the new order established at the Bretton Woods conference was intended to ensure international monetary stability. However, this goal was not achieved. In Switzerland, the disequilibrium in the balance of  BIS Review 71/2007  1  payments became even more exaggerated, and the fight against inflation called for the joint efforts of the Federal Council and the National Bank. In 1973, the National Bank decided to stop intervening on the foreign exchange market and to float the Swiss franc.

A World Bank survey2 also indicated that most businesses do not innovate, and even among those that do, the focus is mainly on process or incremental innovation. If innovation is so important, why has Malaysia not innovated enough? I believe the answer lies partly in the “innovation paradox” – innovation is a complex process that requires a whole-ofeconomy approach. A study by Harvard3 found that as much as 80% of national innovation capacity can be explained 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  by the number of scientists and engineers, the stock of knowledge that the society has accrued, the public policy environment and the maturity of business clusters. Importantly, it requires strong interaction between these individual parts; the innovation system is only as strong as its weakest link. Indeed, Malaysia has been persistent in strengthening its foundations for innovation, but we must do more. We must do more to attract quality investments to promote a more innovative economy, including to do so more deliberately and thoughtfully. That is why the Government’s commitment to adopt the National Investment Aspirations as a framework for determining the quality investments which Malaysia must attract is key. Industry and academia must also work together so that research can be better oriented toward serving the needs of the economy, and so that policy support and funding can be directed at areas with the greatest commercial and social potential. Finally, our spending on education, while it is high relative to peers, the returns have not commensurate with the investments made.
Earlier on I mentioned the importance of governance in the work of the PRA. It is one thing that can help generate robustness in the face of these uncertain developments. Good governance should lie at the heart of every organisation. It is not just about the role of the board but includes management, controls, oversight and management information. Good governance encourages better business practices and outcomes. Of course, well intentioned people can make sub-optimal structures work – just as good structures can be run poorly. But a better structure gives a firm a better chance of avoiding a big business mistake and of surviving an unexpected shock. Insurance retains highly talented and competent individuals. However, I have observed that the sector can be a bit of a “closed field”. I hear some firms – not all – talk of the difficulty in being able to appoint successful executives and even more difficulty in finding qualified, independent non-executives. Insurers also talk about the challenges of attracting young and  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  ambitious individuals to supply the talent of the future. These people issues become particularly relevant in an environment under the Solvency II regime when the system of governance will be given even more prominence. I hope that the new Senior Insurance Managers Regime will be seen as both appropriate and proportionate to the needs of the industry and policy holders alike.

To be clear, the Senior Insurance Managers Regime should not be operated in such a way so as to put good people off. The desired outcome is that of effective governance, not enforcement. Insurance innovation and regulation Preparedness for what tomorrow’s world may bring will likely involve a degree of change – greater risk-awareness, ensuring good governance, collaboration with the regulator – but is the insurance industry capable of that change? The insurance industry has been founded upon taking the long term view. This is a concept that perhaps evokes a perception of consistency rather than innovation. However, the UK industry has traditionally not shied away from changing with the times, with the London market being a particular example. Already, in response to changes on the horizon, we are seeing shifts in business models. Insurers are refreshing their product offerings, altering operational structures and enhancing distribution channels. The PRA has an important role to play in this so let me return to the subject of regulation. To be clear, regulators have no intrinsic reason to stifle innovation. Far better to supervise a successful, profitable, innovating enterprise than a declining out-dated one. Underpinning that view, I would say that there should not be a prohibitive trade-off between insurers’ ability to innovate versus their ability to manage risks. Instead, the PRA will need to work with its regulated entities closely and early in the process of innovation.
As you will be hearing from Mr. Tillman Bruett, Financial Inclusion is simply described as the extension of financial services, at affordable costs, to reach those that are classified as the “unbanked”. These are people who have little or no access to formal financial services generally, not only as a result of the lack of financial education, but also due to their rural and isolated locations or low incomes. The purpose of the many Financial Inclusion strategies that are being implemented around the world, is to connect these “unbanked” people with the formal banking system, to enable them benefit from the various financial services that are available, and thus help equip them with the confidence to make informed financial decisions. Financial Inclusion has the potential to play a very important role in Samoa’s economic development. Traditionally, much of the efforts of the Central Bank of Samoa (like most other central banks in the world) have been concentrated on promoting financial and economic stability, on the “macro” level. Unfortunately, there has not been enough attention given directly to developing and promoting the “micro” sector of the economy, which accounts for the major part of the population. Reflecting the leading roles increasingly played by many overseas central banks, in driving Financial Inclusion in their economies, the Board of the Central Bank of Samoa recently approved for the Bank’s mandate to be expanded to include Financial Inclusion.

BIS Review 31/2008  9  Chart 5: OECD FDI regulatory restrictiveness index, 2006 OECD regulatory restrictiveness score 0.4 0.3 Less restrictive  More restrictive  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1  Belgium Germany UK Italy Netherlenads Ireland France Japan US Korea Portugal Czech Rep. Slovak Rep. Denmark Spain Austria Norway Sweden Poland Hungary New Zeal. Turkey Switzerland Finland Greece Canada Australia Mexico Iceland  0.0  Source: OECD  Chart 6: Real long-term interest rates(a) in the UK and the US, 1987-2007 US  UK  Per cent 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1  1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 (a) Nominal yields on 10-year government bonds minus the 12-month rate of inflation. Source: Bloomberg, International Financial Statistics, Bank calculations. 10  Chart 7: Nominal exchange rate adjustments since 2002(a) and current account balances(b) Appreciation against the $ 80 Australia Euro Area Norway 70 60 Canada Switzerland 50 40 UK Russia Singapore 30 20 China Kuwait 10 0 -10 -20 Mexico Other Middle East oil exporters -30 -10 0 10 20 30 40 Current account balance (% of own GDP), 2007 Source: IMF, Bank calculations. (a) February 2002 to January 2008. (b) Estimated current account balance in 2007. BIS Review 31/2008