samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But before the minutes are published it is the majority line that applies when we Executive Board members make speeches outside of the Riksbank. After that we members are each free to describe our personal differences of opinion regarding the interest rate decision. Constant assessment means that we are always prepared for change Let me round off. Today I have talked about the major changes in recent years in the way we produce material used as a base for our interest rate decisions. Some of these have come about because the methods of making forecasts in general have developed, something that also affects other central banks. Other changes have been shaped by the specific conditions that apply in Sweden. The Riksbank’s independent position makes demands on us to be open and clear, what economists usually term transparency. The Riksbank’s decision to begin publishing its own forecasts for the repo rate is a step in the work on increasing transparency and further improving our analysis. 10 The new assumption for the repo rate has led to the Executive Board becoming more involved in the forecasting process. We are constantly evaluating our forecasts to see how successful they are at capturing developments. This also means we are constantly striving to improve our ways of working. If we make any major changes that have significance for our forecasts we will of course let you know.

As many as 14 banks have already joined the system, and 114 more have applied. Our estimates suggest that early next year, 250 banks will have joined the system. At the later stages, only small banks with a basic licence, which need more time to introduce changes, will join. According to our estimates, the introduction of the Faster Payments System will reduce fees for retail remittances more than 2-3-fold. We are currently working to further develop the system and ensure payments for goods and services via the Faster Payments System. Firstly, this will support the trend toward the rise in cashless payments, given that FPS fares for trade and service companies will be lower than those for merchant acquiring services. You may remember that this topic is currently very acute. Last year, we also introduced remote biometric identification for financial services provision. Biometrics is currently collected in branches of 146 banks; by the end of the year, these will be collected in all banks with a universal licence in accordance with regulatory documents. In the near future, biometrics will also be collected in multifunctional centres and used to provide not only financial services, but also other public services in digital format. Given these factors, we expect that the use of biometrics will expand considerably next year. Last year, we launched Masterchain, a blockchain-based project elaborated in association with FinTech Association and market participants; this is an advanced transaction record system. Together with Rosreestr, we have already implemented a masterchain-enabled electronic mortgage project.
The forward effective krone exchange rate two years ahead is close to the average level of the effective exchange rate during the 1990s. Nordic countries – institutional differences EU membership  Monetary policy regime  Sweden  Yes  Inflation target of 2 per cent (+/- 1 percentage points)  Denmark  Yes  ERM II  Finland  Yes  Member of EMU  Iceland Norway  No (EEA agreement) No (EEA agreement)  Inflation target of 2½ per cent Inflation target of 2½ per cent  SG 240802  2  BIS Review 47/2002  Sector composition of NOREX exchanges. June 2002 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Stockholm Industrials and materials Financial services  Copenhagen IT/Telecom Energy  Oslo Consumer goods and services Other  SG 240802  Government net cash flow from the petroleum sector and total capital in the Government Petroleum Fund. Per cent of GDP 120  120  90  Total capital (end of year)  90  Net cash flow  60  60  30  30  0  0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09  Source: Ministry of Finance. RNB 02 SG 240802  BIS Review 47/2002  3  GDP Mainland-Norway and employment.

Rates are considerably lower in Sweden (4.25), Denmark (3.50) and Finland (3.25). Wage developments over the last few years can contribute to explaining the differences. In Norway wage growth has been high over the last five years, reflecting a tight labour market. Looking at data for wage growth from the OECD, the ranking of interest rate levels in the Nordic region corresponds to the ranking of average wage growth since 1998. The Norwegian krone has appreciated by around 15 per cent since mid-2000. Seen over a longer period, the krone has been rather stable. The present level is only around 6 per cent stronger than in 1990. Over this longer period, other Nordic currencies have shown larger fluctuations. Over the last two years, the appreciation of the Norwegian krone has been driven by the wide and increased interest rate differential between Norway and other countries. The interest rate differential reflects high growth in wages and aggregate demand in Norway. There is thus a clear link between cost pressures in the Norwegian economy and the exchange rate. The link works through interest rate expectations driving the krone upwards. The appreciation of the krone has a dampening effect on inflation. At the same time, profitability in the internationally exposed sector is under pressure both due to higher wage costs and the appreciation of the krone. But the krone can move in both directions. It will not appreciate indefinitely. If the krone follows the path of the forward rate, it will depreciate in the years ahead.
These conditions are shaped by developments in the economic program as well as the public debt stock, risk premium, expectations, foreign developments and the behavior of market players in the short-term; while the determining factors in the long-term can be listed as structural reforms and their effects on productivity, net external debt position of the country,  2  18  Alesina, A. ve Perotti, R. (1996), “Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects”, NBER Working Paper, No. 5730. BIS Review 36/2005  cyclical movements in the economy and economic fundamentals such as inflation and growth. To recap, the exchange rate level is not a cause, but an outcome in the floating exchange rate regime. In this framework, the Central Bank operates in the foreign exchange market in two ways. Firstly, it holds foreign exchange buying auctions in order to carry out reserve accumulation. The external debt payment schedule of the public sector and plans for the liquidation of Foreign Exchange Deposit Accounts with Credit Letters in the long-term also increase the importance of the level of the Bank’s foreign exchange reserves under the floating exchange rate regime. Therefore, the Bank holds foreign exchange buying auctions in order to increase the reserves at their disposal at times when the foreign exchange supply gradually increases above foreign exchange demand due to the rise in reverse currency substitution tendency and capital inflow.

In an attempt to maintain growth in the traditional industries, economic policy responded with a series of devaluations. Each devaluation was invariably said to be the final one but the cycle of rising wage  BIS Review 129/1999  2  costs and a devaluation was still repeated again and again. The aim of compensating for the lack of change in Sweden’s corporate sector, which stemmed from the 1960s, simply did not work. If anything, the devaluations meant that the problems persisted and were accentuated. With the lack of investment in new products and the dependence on an increasingly outmoded structure of production, the entire nation’s material standard had to be adjusted. For many years, growth in Sweden was weaker than in the world around us. This example shows how a “new economy” at that time posed problems for the Swedish economy rather than opportunities. The lack of change, because wage formation did not function properly, resulted in an economy that was weaker and more susceptible to inflation. The period clearly illustrates how globalisation, increased competition and new technology can lead to lower growth and higher inflation if changes are not made sufficiently quickly. If the economy is under pressure from strong competition as well as poorly functioning wage formation, economic renewal may lag behind. It is therefore gratifying that the labour market organisations seem to be increasingly in favour of the inflation target policy.
Page 6  That remains my absolute priority – and influences how I see the prospect for both Bank Rate and the Bank’s balance sheet, as I will discuss in a moment. Drivers of the economic outlook But before doing so, allow me to review the three main drivers of the MPC’s economic outlook, as embodied in its recent forecast: international energy and good prices; domestic business and labour market conditions; and the outlook for monetary policy. International energy and goods prices The MPC’s most recent inflation forecast does not make for pretty reading. Inflation is projected to reach double digits towards the end of this year, a significant overshoot of the 2% inflation target. The bulk of this overshoot is accounted for by developments in international goods and energy prices. Bottlenecks in international markets, stemming from a pandemic-induced combination of changes in the global pattern of consumer spending and disruptions to global supply chains, have driven up the price of tradable goods, for which the UK is essentially a price taker. Belying tentative signs these bottlenecks were easing towards the end of last year, the new Covid wave in China and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have exacerbated supply disruptions, prolonging the inflationary impulse. Chart 3: CPI inflation and CPI inflation excluding energy (a)  (a)Energy prices include fuels and lubricants, electricity, gas and other fuels.

Their prospects are being enhanced by the trend in consumer choice towards healthier, Eco-friendly and "social goods". "Social buyers" who are keen to buy goods and services from social enterprises are emerging as a new force. In conclusion, a concerted effort is needed to establish policies and systems to support the growth of the emerging social enterprise sector in Sri Lanka. I hope today’s deliberations will deliver outcomes which will 3  assist social entrepreneurs to lead social change by stimulating economic growth, innovation and the development of social capital. Social enterprises have an important role to play in Sri Lanka meeting the SDGs. Thank you. 4
Despite that initial investor reaction, however, Deutsche was able to keep market access and to successfully issue further capital instruments in the months thereafter. The theme we have encountered in these examples is that many of the decisions taken during times of extreme pressure seem to be affected by (apparent) considerations outside of the immediate financial contract – at least, rejecting options which were perceived to be acceptable when the original contract was struck. Or that the financial consequences of particular decisions were more adverse for the decision maker (or more generally the markets) than anticipated. In that sense they are classic examples of time inconsistency. We have tried to illustrate how acting narrowly rationally when it is perceived to be outside the realm of “what is normally done”, can carry massive risks. The problem that this creates is that when we are dealing with tail events and disaster insurance, it is hard to determine ex ante what such insurance contracts (or options delivering insurance) are worth. How should investors and regulators evaluate these contracts? If the reputation and signalling implications of exercising are too damaging in case of extreme stress, it would be naive to attribute full value to them when determining the risk profile and hence the appropriate capital buffer. It is also worrying from a financial stability perspective if these considerations force possible systemic implications to be more extreme rather than less. Stress tests and contract design considerations So what have we learned?

Given the wide array of market participants, the program’s broad reach was necessary to effectively support the entire market. Let me turn to the program’s achievements. By providing liquidity and a backstop to limit losses to investors, the TALF contributed importantly to the revival of securitized credit markets. Secondary spreads narrowed significantly, and volatility moderated. Moreover, the improvements in the secondary market helped re-start the new-issue market. Issuance of non-mortgage asset-backed securities jumped to $ billion in the first three months of TALF lending in 2009, after having slowed to less than $ billion per month in late 2008. During those initial months that the TALF was in operation, about half of the issuance in the market was financed by the facility, with this degree of support then gradually declining as market function improved. 3 While each of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity facilities was ultimately aimed at encouraging the flow of credit to the economy, the TALF may be distinctive in offering a more direct impact to the consumer. In fact, nearly all of the auto lenders supported by the TALF reported that the facility enabled them to offer more credit to consumers at lower rates. Lenders attributed this impact to the program’s success in re-opening the securitization channel through which roughly half of consumer loans are financed. The TALF also facilitated the first issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities since mid-2008, which provided an important benchmark for pricing and helped establish the higher credit standards now seen in the market.
•  What about the more difficult question of whether monetary policy should be used to lean against the wind. The answer is a more obfuscating “that depends.” Specifically, it depends on the efficiency and efficacy of the macroprudential tools and institutional framework available, a point eloquently made by my colleague Don Kohn recently (Kohn 2015). •  Take the extreme case in which there are no macroprudential tools. In such circumstances monetary policy may be the only means of tackling system-wide financial risks, but it would come at the cost of significant effects on the real economy – precisely because monetary policy “gets in all the cracks.” For example, some empirical work by former Deputy Governor Charlie Bean suggests that setting Bank Rate around 200 basis points higher than it was over the over the period 2003–2006 would have reduced the growth in the ratio of household debt to GDP by just 2 percentage points from 2003–2007 at a cost of GDP growth over this period being 2.6 percentage points lower (Bean et al 2010). •  By contrast, the targeted nature of the tools available to the Financial Policy Committee under the current institutional framework in the UK makes them a natural first line of defence for dealing with build-ups in financial system vulnerability while minimising the knock-on effects to the rest of the economy – as was recognised in the financial stability knockout built into the MPC’s forward guidance.

Attempts to attenuate the financial stability risks from this broad property price boom with targeted macroprudential measures resulted in a large number of measures being applied, even including LTV restrictions on stand-alone car parking spaces, to which the boom had spread. •  If loose monetary policy can lead to a build up of financial stability risks, then the converse must also be true – tighter monetary policy can be used as a means of reducing financial stability risks. Most empirical estimates show that a temporary tightening of monetary policy can be expected to reduce real debt levels – and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  hence the probability of crisis – by discouraging households and firms from increasing leverage in the medium term, even if the transmission (through reduced aggregate demand and a higher interest burden) involves a short-run move in the opposite direction (for example, Goodhart and Hofman (2008)). •  This was recognised in the design of the UK Monetary Policy Committee’s 2013 guidance that it intended to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy until economic slack had been substantially reduced. Recognising the financial stability risks that could emanate from a commitment to maintain low interest rates, the MPC set a “knockout” whereby their guidance would cease to hold if the Financial Policy Committee judged that the stance of monetary policy poses a significant threat to financial stability that could not be contained by the combination of macro and micro prudential policy tools available.
We would have done this earlier, but first it was necessary to complete the process of registering the manor house and the land it stands on. It is worth noting under cost efficiencies that Eesti Pank has added technical support for the Fiscal Council to its list of responsibilities together with the macroprudential supervision and increased requirements for compiling financial statistics. Despite this, the number of people employed at the bank is roughly the same as a year ago, and Eesti Pank remains the smallest central bank by staff size in the European Union. Eesti Pank’s operating expenses fell last year to 17 million euros from the 17.4 million of a year before. Although the central bank’s duty is to keep inflation low and not to chase every possible source of higher revenues, it is good to be able to note that we ended last year comfortably in profit. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusion In conclusion I would like to emphasise again that it is important for stable development in Estonia and for improved public well-being that we remain ready to adapt to a changing economic climate, to react rationally to changes, and yet to maintain the conservative stance on monetary issues that has served us well so far. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

The increasing cross-border trade and investment call for broadening cross-border players. As a result, the Bank of Thailand, together with other central banks in the region are working towards establishing a cross-border banking network through the so-called Qualified ASEAN Bank or QAB framework, which will facilitate qualified banks in ASEAN to increase their presence in another country. The expansion of banking presence through this framework will help increase coverage and service efficiency that are needed for economic integration. The Bank of Thailand is in the process of negotiating bilateral QAB frameworks with Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Turning to the capital market, Thailand is also playing a proactive role to connect capital markets in the GMS by allowing foreign entities – government and private – to raise funds in Thailand. Last year, the Lao PDR launched 11-billion-baht issue (or about $ million) of baht-denominated bonds, which were well-received by the investors. In addition, Thailand has allowed firms from the GMS to be listed on the Thai Stock Exchange with a view to providing global investors with a wider coverage of investment products. Therefore, this will offer firms from the GMS with wider coverage of fund raising. *** On the choice of financial services: In June 2014, the World Bank’s Global Findex estimates that over three-quarters of adults in CLMV countries still do not have access to financial services5. There is room for improvement and we are fortunate to live in an era where technological advancement can do wonders to mankind.
And any shocks that affect inflation in the near-term should have no impact on inflation expectations further out, because people believe we will take whatever action is needed to return inflation to target. And by this measure, the current policy framework seems to be highly credible. There are those who claim that the MPC has never really been tested. In fact, the UK economy has been hit by a number of quite severe shocks over the past five or six years. International financial markets were convulsed by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Russian debt default and LTCM crisis in 1998, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Enron and WorldCom scandals in 2001/2 which dented confidence in corporate governance. Around the same time, we also saw the bursting of the dot.com bubble and a slowdown in world activity. In the past decades, shocks like this would almost certainly have destabilised UK economic activity and inflation. That, after all, is what happened in the 1970s, when the price of oil quadrupled, and then again in 1979 when it more than doubled. Since the late 90s however, medium-term inflation expectations - both as measured by surveys and as implied by financial asset prices - have barely budged. Even this year, when oil prices rose by over 70% to their peak in late October before falling back, and other producer input prices, including metals, have surged ahead, both surveys and financial asset prices show inflation expectations fluctuating around the MPCs inflation target, within a very narrow range.

Although developments in Iceland showed many of the same characteristics as those in some of the other Nordic Countries during the post-liberalisation rapid expansion, such as credit expansion, current account deficit, exchange rate depreciation and so on, Iceland escaped the difficulties suffered by banking systems in some of the other countries. Icelandic bank credit grew very rapidly in the late 1990’s and into the year 2000 and a sizable portion of the credit expansion was financed with credit from abroad. The capital adequacy ratios of banks fell for a while but nevertheless remained comfortably above the minimum required and internationally recognised levels. The year 2001 also turned out to be quite favourable for the banks, a development which continued by and large into the current year. Consequently, the capital position of the banks has improved and all the major banking institutions have relatively strong capital adequacy ratios at present. Loan losses have increased, as was to be expected in the wake of the credit expansion, but nowhere on the scale experienced in some of the other Nordic Countries a decade ago and very much less than they did during the downturn in the Icelandic economy around and after 1990. The conclusion to be drawn is, therefore, that the Icelandic banking system weathered the relatively turbulent post-liberalization boom period of 2000 and 2001 pretty well and is well poised to meet new challenges, including continued rationalisation and intensified competition from foreign banking institutions. In the most recent decades, the Icelandic economy has also seen structural shifts.