samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, global financial conditions are still favorable, partly because the main central banks continue to carefully and gradually withdraw their large monetary stimuli, helping to keep interest rates and term premiums low. In addition, capital has continued to flow to emerging markets and the prices of various assets are high. Commodity prices, in general, remained above the levels foreseen in September, especially copper and energy sources (figure 8). The copper price rose 3.5% to USD 3.2 per pound during the period, to settle around USD 3.1 at the closing of this Report. This behavior is common to most metals, in a context of still high pressures coming from financial factors and improvements in some fundamentals. Among the latter, the increase in demand and perspectives is worth noting, something that has occurred thanks to increased global industrial production and the performance of the Chinese economy. This, combined with some stabilization in output, has gradually reduced inventories. Beyond recent movements, the weakening of the US dollar during the year has also been sustaining the copper price. Thus, the baseline scenario in this Report adjusts it to USD 2.95 and USD 2.75 per pound on average for 2018 and 2019, respectively. Regarding oil, the prices of Brent and WTI rose a 2  An abbreviation from its Spanish Indice Mensual de Actividad Económica, literally Economic Activity Monthly Index. 4  significant 20% in the period, to near USD 63 and 56, respectively, explained largely by a somewhat more balanced market.

Figure 13 90-day delinquency rate (percent of loans)  6  12  Clearing houses and family subsidies (right axis)  5  10  4  8  3 Banks  6  Retail  2  4  1  2  0  0 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF, SUSESO and SVS data. 19  Figure 14  Capital adequacy ratio by country (*) (percent)  30  30 Ireland  Sweden  2017  26  26  Luxembourg New Zealand Norway  22  22  Denmark Germany France Czech Rep. Brazil Colombia Belgium Hungary Japan Switzerland México Peru Turkey Israel Canada Chile  18 14  U.S.  U.K.  18 14  10  10 10  15  2011  20  25  (*) Dotted line marks 45-degree angle. Green diamonds correspond to Latin American countries (red for Chile). Source: Central Bank of Chile using IMF (FSI) data.
92 fe b. 93 fe b. 94 fe b. 95 fe b. 96 fe b. 97 fe b. 98 fe b. 99 fe b. 00 fe b. 01 fe b. 02 fe b. 03  0  Annual return Standard deviation  8  Oil 3.3 % 40.5 %  Petroleum Fund 9.9 % 8.9 %  BIS Review 13/2003  7. Return and risk: oil vs Fund - with the Fund’s current equity portion (40 %) Return and risk for combinations of oil and Fund 1 February 1986 – 1 February 2003. Measured in USD. Per cent  Return (geom.annualised)  14 12  Today (80 % oil)  10 100 % oil 0 % Fund  8 100 % Fund 0 % oil  6 4 2 0 0  10  20  30  40  50  Risk (standard deviation, annualised)  8. Annual return in the US Per cent 60  60  40  40  20  20  0  0  -20  Fixed income instruments  Equities  -40  -40  -60  -60 1925  -20  1935  1945  1955  1965  1975  1985  1995  Source: Ibbotson Associates og Datastream  BIS Review 13/2003  9  9. Average return in the US Rolling 10-year periods.

Working from home should be simple and everything should function properly even when a senior official is at home looking after children. Staffing therefore has to be arranged with this in mind. We are also having a drive for more women in managerial posts. Last year we started a mentor programme for female administrators with a view to broadening the base for the recruitment of new managers. ·  Besides altering the ways in which we communicate monetary policy in order to reach a wider public, during these years we have run an educational programme for upper secondary teachers and developed an Internet game called Stargold. At present we are working on an idea for a competition in civics between classes in Sweden's upper secondary schools. 2  BIS Review 51/2001  Evaluating all this is not an easy matter, particularly when one is fully engaged in it. I believe, however, that our efforts to make the Riksbank more transparent have worked well. To use the terminology of the BIS report, we have certainly become more "outward-looking". It has been more difficult to break what the same terminology refers to as "upward-looking". It is not so easy to build up an efficient cooperation and sense of responsibility, unencumbered by prestige, throughout our organisation. It is gratifying that among students in our subject, we are the most popular workplace in the public sector. In the league of all workplaces in Sweden, we rose seven pinholes last year to fourteenth place.
Companies are for now able to cover the rapidly rising labour costs from their profit buffers, but in the longer perspective this will inevitably cease to be possible. Reduced profits threaten the ability of companies to invest in higher productivity and in the human capital needed for more complex and highervalue work. I have often said, and it bears repeating again today, that the key challenge in the development of the Estonian economy is how more complex work than hitherto can be accomplished with a smaller workforce. The rapid rises in wage income and household consumption boosted tax revenues in 2014, which in turn improved the state finances and helped lift the state budget to a small surplus in 2014. Going forward it is important that the government stick to the target agreed in the budget strategy of maintaining a nominal budget balance and building up its reserves. •  Here I should note that the purchases of bonds by central banks and the resulting fall in interest rates have encouraged the belief or the conviction that there is a free lunch to be had and Estonia is denying itself a feed because the Estonian state does not issue bonds. We all know full well that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Even were the central bank to purchase one quarter of the bonds issued by the state, those bonds would still constitute a debt that would have to be paid back eventually.

Philipp Hildebrand: Financial stability Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Lausanne, Lausanne, 16 September 2008. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  During the period of financial market turbulence, central banks have gone far with their interventions to stabilize the financial system, taking into account the high costs that can be imposed by a banking crisis onto the real economy. Central banks by themselves, however, cannot guarantee financial stability in the long term. In particular, we cannot exclude that their interventions create incentives for banks to be less cautious in the future. The first line of defence therefore consists of banks having sound risk management practices and holding appropriate levels of capital and liquidity. The Financial Stability Forum has made a series of recommendations in this respect. Given the size of the big Swiss banks in relation to our national economy, we should be especially prudent. For this reason, the Swiss National Bank supports the project undertaken by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) to strengthen capital adequacy requirements and to revise the liquidity requirements for the big banks. As the SFBC has pointed out on several occasions, these measures have to be implemented gradually – to ensure that banks have sufficient time to adapt. These measures will contribute to the solidity and credibility of the Swiss financial centre.
So whatever is gluing official interest rates to the floor in major economies is proving remarkably resilient. What factors are responsible? Are they temporary or permanent? And what are their implications for financial markets, the economy and monetary policy? There are many factors which explain the extra-ordinary current constellation of yields. Many of these factors pre-date the crisis. Global real rates have been falling for over three decades (Chart 4). They averaged 5% in the 1980s and 4% in the 1990s. So far this century, they have averaged 2%. Currently, they are around zero or slightly negative. At a Parliamentary Committee hearing a few years ago I asserted, boldly, that global interest rates were at their lowest-ever levels. A wise colleague challenged me afterwards: “How do you know they weren’t lower in Babylonian times?” Several exhausted research assistants later I can report that, luckily, I was on safe ground. Interest rates appear to be lower than at any time in the past 5000 years (Chart 5). The explanations for this secular fall in global real rates include excess savings in the East, deficient investment in the West, worsening demographic trends and rising inequality (Haldane (2015a)). Some have interpreted their downward drift as evidence of secular stagnation, in an echo of concerns raised after the Great Depression (Summers (2014)). Whatever the explanation, there has been a further ratchet down in global real rates since the crisis. I wish to focus on two factors which have contributed to this fall: dread risk and recession risk.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Raising awareness of financial knowledge in Malaysia Welcoming remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at Karnival Kewangan 2017, Kuala Lumpur, 13 January 2017. * * * It is my honour to be here this morning for the Opening Ceremony of the inaugural Finance Carnival. The carnival is an initiative formed through the collaboration of various ministries, agencies and financial institutions. It aspires to raise the level of public awareness in three important areas: financial services; knowledge of financial management; and consumer protection. I would like to extend my appreciation to Yang Berhormat Datuk Johari bin Abdul Ghani, Second Finance Minister, who has graciously agreed to join us today in officiating the Carnival. Finance has the power to transform lives The pursuit of financial knowledge is a key economic imperative. It also has the ability to transform lives. In today’s world, the ability and knowledge to save, invest and borrow are essential life skills, be it for individuals or businesses. For businesses, including small enterprises, financial knowledge is particularly important in generating income and to secure financing. Various efforts have been undertaken to improve financial inclusion in Malaysia. The results so far are promising. Currently, the majority of Malaysians (over 90 percent) have access to formal financial services. 92% of adults have a savings account, while 98% of users have performing financing accounts.
As for Hong Kong, our main task is to maintain the various monetary and financial laws that have been put in place before July 1997. Of course, we need to review and improve the legal framework in the light of the developments in the financial markets. The formulation and amendment of monetary laws are proposed by the executive body of the HKSAR and passed by the legislature. (B) Mainland authorities do not interfere in the monetary affairs of the HKSAR. The monetary authorities of the Mainland and the HKSAR are mutually independent and one is not subordinate to the other. The monetary authority in the Mainland does not set up any office in Hong Kong to exercise monetary management. 12. Under the Exchange Fund Ordinance, the Chief Executive of the HKMA, i.e. the Monetary Authority, is accountable to the Financial Secretary of the HKSAR government. According to the Law of the People’s Bank of China, the PBOC is accountable to the State Council and the branches of the PBOC are accountable to the headquarters. As mentioned earlier, although Hong Kong has been subject to a severe ordeal during the financial turmoil, the PBOC and other Mainland government departments have not interfered in Hong Kong’s monetary affairs. Furthermore, our autonomy in the management of Hong Kong’s foreign reserves is an important element in the mutual independence between the two monetary authorities. 13. While maintaining a mutually independent relationship, the two monetary authorities will continue to maintain and strengthen further the existing sound co-operation between the two places.

The Hong Kong dollar and the Renminbi continue to circulate as legal tender in Hong Kong and the mainland respectively. The Hong Kong dollar is treated as a foreign currency in the mainland. Likewise, the Renminbi is treated as a foreign currency in Hong Kong. 15. The Basic Law has provided for the legal status of the Hong Kong dollar. The Renminbi is still not yet freely convertible. However, even if it becomes freely convertible, it will only be one of the many foreign currencies traded in Hong Kong’s forex market. As for the cross-border circulation of the banknotes of the Hong Kong dollar and the Renminbi, this is a natural consequences of the close relationship between the two places. This phenomenon was in existence long before the handover. The legal status of the Hong Kong dollar will not be affected and the Hong Kong dollar will not be replaced as a result. 16. The issuance arrangements for the Hong Kong dollar remain independent. Hong Kong dollar bank notes continue to be issued by the three note-issuing banks under the authorisation of the HKSAR government. Under the linked exchange rate system, the note-issuing banks provide 100% backing in US dollar according to the fixed rate of $ to $ In order to ensure that all the Hong Kong dollar notes and coins in circulation comply with the monetary rule of the Currency Board System, we have improved our coins issuance mechanism so that it operates in exactly the same way as the notes issuance mechanism.
Monetary policy was used in conjunction with fiscal policy and supported with various forms of direct control to pump up demand, when the economy declined and unemployment rose, until inflation and the balance of payments threatened to get out of hand, at which point all the policy levers were thrown into reverse. It was a recipe for short-termism throughout our economies. We gradually learned from experience - perhaps more slowly in this country than some others - that there is no trade-off between growth and stability in the medium and longer term, and that, in managing demand - which of course we continue to do - we needed to pay far more attention to the underlying, supply-side, capacity of the economy to meet that demand. We came to recognise that direct controls merely addressed the symptoms of instability rather than its causes. We realised increasingly that fiscal policy was not well suited to the task of short-term demand management, and needed to be constrained within prudent limits if debt levels were to be sustainable in the medium- and longer-term. And this left a more distinctive and clearly defined role for monetary policy as the primary instrument for maintaining broad balance consistently over time between aggregate demand and underlying supply. All this has become the accepted wisdom just about everywhere. "Stability is a necessary condition for sustainable growth" has become the universal central-banking credo - though that doesn't necessarily make it any easier to achieve!

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Macro-economic policy and monetary stability Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Euromoney Bond Investors' Congress, London, 19 February 2002. *  *  *  Thank you Padraic for that kind introduction and for honouring me with the Euromoney Lifetime Achievement Award. It's nice to be prompted to recall some of the good times - and some of the not so good times in the course of my career at the Bank of England which I think of not so much in terms of achievement but of lifelong learning. We've come a long way since 1962 - both nationally and internationally - from different starting points certainly, and moving in fits and starts, at varying speeds and to varying degrees, in a process of continuing, indeed accelerating, change. But standing back and trying to look through the confusion of short-term events, I would pick out three broad trends for comment this morning. The first relates to macro-economic policy, where the earlier emphasis was very much on short-term demand management designed to manage the perceived trade-off between growth and employment, on the one hand, and inflation and a manageable balance of payments position, on the other.
that is simple, transparent and standardised, to free banks’ balance sheet and thus encourage the issuance of new loans, while offering bond market exposure to borrowers which generally do not have access to such markets, such as SMEs. The potential for development is significant: in the euro area, ABS and MBS issuance is three times lower today than before the 2008 crisis1. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Other actions concern investment vehicles that enable companies to benefit from resources stemming from investors willing to take greater risks. For example, Euro Private Placements (EuroPP), for which a charter was drawn up in 2015, are now complementary to USPPs in the United States and Schuldscheine in Germany. Amounts issued by French companies totalled EUR 2.28 billion in 20182, but have been declining since the peak of 2015 (EUR 4.3 billion) because they do not offer sufficiently attractive interest rates. It is therefore important that market professionals pursue their efforts to promote this type of investment and step up their actions to standardise the market. Conversely, the growth of crowdfunding platforms, albeit modest, is rising in France, even if the economic model for these platforms has not yet reached its equilibrium, with EUR 402 million3 raised in 2018, up 20% on the previous year, and a growing number of funded projects. This development benefited from the regulatory framework for crowdfunding implemented in 2014 and updated in 2016. This French framework should be further relaxed with the PACTE Act.

Reasons behind this behaviour are understandable and related to the fact that the majority of the society acquires information circumstantially, hoping that the actual failure becomes a lesson for the future. One way to eradicate circumstantial learning is the introduction of financial reading at an early stage of education. In this view, I would proudly say that, the Bank of Albania has provided an outstanding contribution. Allow me to briefly make an résumé of our work in this aspect. The first strategic station of financial education provided by the Bank of Albania was needs assessment and identification of training priorities. From this point of view, we assessed that it was indispensable to open the Bank “de facto” to the public. More frequent communications with the market and its important participants, as well as periodic explanations of monetary policy decision-making and risks balance related to inflation and financial stability, are some initiatives that we consider as a very effective education process. I am proud to say that now we have:   A public opinion that builds up expectation as regards our decision-making;    A media sector, which has admirably enhanced understanding, interpretation and expectations related to our decision-making;    A banking sector, which reads accurately and responds with high flexibility to the direction oriented by us;    A qualified public critique, where Bank of Albania finds a mirror of alternative opinions on its adopted decisions and practices.
Banks responded swiftly to this decision of the Bank of Albania by increasing their liquidity. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The supervision of the banking system and assessment of the financial system stability show that exposure to credit risk has increased, as a consequence of increased non-performing loans to outstanding loans in 2011. As a result, loan portfolio quality indicator – non-performing loans to total outstanding loans of the banking system – increased by 4.8 percentage points, settling at 18.8%. Nonetheless, stress-tests have revealed that the banking system is resilient to shocks that may come from extreme deterioration of this indicator. Concerning the foreign-exchange risk, the indicator of open foreign-exchange position of the banking system shows a long position at 3.94% to the regulatory capital. Compared with the maximum regulatory threshold of 30%, this figure depicts a low level of exposure of the Albanian banking system to the foreign exchange risk. As regards exposure to interest rate risk, the spread between assets and liabilities repricsed up to three months, accounted for 5.1% of earning assets, which shows a low exposure to interest rate fluctuations at system level. Moreover, during 2011, the banking system performed positively in terms of compliance with new standards and regulations on operational risk management approved over the year. Issues related to transparency and money laundering prevention were an important part of supervision in 2011. To monitor them, a number of examinations on banks and non-bank financial institutions, including bureaux de change, have been conducted.

Mr Yam looks at the benefits a US dollar clearing system will bring to Hong Kong  Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Signing Ceremony for the US Dollar Clearing System, Hong Kong, on 9 March 2000. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to welcome you all to this afternoon’s signing ceremony. The purpose of the ceremony is for the HKMA formally to appoint HSBC as the Settlement Institution for the new US dollar clearing system that will be developed in Hong Kong over the coming months. When it is fully running - prospectively by the end of the year - this system will enable a wide range of financial transactions in US dollars to be settled here in Hong Kong, many of them on a real time basis. The project marks an important milestone in the development of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure and it should help to consolidate Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre. Developing Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure is, along with maintaining currency and banking stability, one of the three main policy objectives of the HKMA. Financial infrastructure, when it works efficiently, is something that is so much taken for granted that it is barely noticed. It is a far less prominent public issue than currency or banking stability. Yet, without a properly working financial infrastructure, there is little chance of currency and banking stability.