samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is important to note, however, that the main focus of an investment policy evaluation rests in the model of the Central Bank's actions. Having been responsible for the areas of Capital Markets, Currency, Operations Desks, and Corporate and Sovereign Credits, I am confident in concluding that there is a consensus in the world today that the Central Banks that have been assigned a multiplicity of functions and targets are doomed to fail. Successful Central Banks are those that have price stability as their only mandate. In this regard, I would like to emphasize that competence, seriousness and patriotism are a legacy of Arminio Fraga's administration at the Central Bank. There is no doubt that the implementation of a floating exchange rate regime and of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil at a critical moment for the Brazilian economy in 1999 are a hallmark in the history of Central Banks in emerging economies. The substantial improvement in transparency and credibility that has taken place over the past three years has been incorporated into the working structure of the Brazilian Central Bank. Arminio, thank you for the loyalty and professionalism you showed in the transition process. Although there are many instruments a government can use to implement its economic policy, the task assigned to the Central Bank is to keep the rate of inflation at a low level, mostly because the Central Bank has only one instrument, which is monetary policy.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Economic environment and the introduction of the minimum exchange rate Now I’d like to discuss the motivation for introducing the minimum exchange rate. The rate was not implemented to stimulate exports, but rather to ensure that the appropriate monetary conditions prevailed and that the SNB could fulfill its mandate of price stability. The European sovereign debt crisis escalated dramatically in the summer of 2011. It became increasingly evident that, in addition to Italy and Spain being engulfed by the crisis, France also was potentially exposed. At the same time, the debt-ceiling negotiations in the United States and the consequent downgrade of the U.S. by Standard and Poor’s added to the tension. During these months, the Swiss franc appreciated rapidly against all major currencies. This development is shown in Figure 5 for the exchange rate of the Swiss franc against the euro and the U.S. dollar. The increase in the value of the franc, which reflected market panic rather than economic fundamentals, drastically tightened domestic monetary conditions. With annual inflation already close to zero, Switzerland risked falling into a deflationary trap. What policy options were available? The massive Swiss franc appreciation left the SNB with few options to combat the restrictive monetary conditions. As a result of the response to the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, our policy rate was already at the lower bound.
When we look back at how things went in a few years’ time we should be able to continue to say that, despite the uncertainty abroad, “Sweden was OK!”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  17  18  BIS central bankers’ speeches

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  References Broadbent, Ben (2012), “Productivity and the allocation of resources”, speech given at Durham Business School, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2012/599.aspx Cairncross, Sir Alexander and Cairncross, Frances (1992): “The Legacy of the golden age: the 1960s and their economic consequences” (Routledge) Chancellor of the Exchequer (2012): Letter to the Governor of the Bank of England, reaffirming the remit of the MPC, available at: http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/open_letter_from_chx_to_boe_22032011.pdf Furceri, D and Mouragane, A (2009), “The effect of financial crises on potential output: new empirical evidence from OECD countries”. OECD Economics Department Working Papers no. 699. George, Lord Edward (1999): “Annual Cornwall Lecture”, available at: www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/.../1999/speech62.aspx King, Sir Mervyn (1997), “Inflation targeting 5 years on”, speech given at the London School of Economics, available at: www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/1997/speech09.pdf King, Sir Mervyn (1997), “Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in practice”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 39, Issue 1 (p81–97) King, Sir Mervyn (2004), “The institutions of monetary policy: the Ely Lecture 2004”, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2004/208.aspx King, Sir Mervyn (2012), remarks given at the Panel discussion on “Challenges for the Future”, Federal Reserve Board Conference “Central Banking: Before, During and After the Crisis”, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech556.pdf International Monetary Fund (2009), “What is the damage? Medium term output dynamics after financial crises”, World Economic Outlook, October, chapter 4, pages 121–151.
The consumption basket in HICP is narrower than in CPI due to the fact that areas for which statistics are not yet harmonised have been excluded. The differences between HICP and the different measures normally used by the Riksbank are generally rather small. Another difference is the target level. The Riksbank works with a definite central target surrounded by a symmetrical interval. Previously, the ECB’s target was for inflation to be below 2 per cent. It was at the ECB Governing Council’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy in May this year that the target of keeping inflation close to 2 per cent was specified. With this, the ECB has become more precise in its definition. Compared with the Riksbank, the difference in target level is small and should not make any great difference in practice. The most significant difference in target definition is that the ECB’s target relates to inflation for the euro area as a whole, while the Riksbank’s target applies of course to Sweden only. The ECB’s policy implies therefore that the rate of inflation in individual Member States can be both higher and lower than 2 per cent without constituting neglect of the ECB’s target. This is also the case in reality, as shown clearly by the inflation outcomes that have been measured. The same applies to Sweden but on a smaller scale; inflation can be different in Norrbotten and Skåne. When formulating monetary policy, the ECB attaches special importance to monetary aggregate and credit variables.

A central rate that is overly weak would therefore provide stimulus to the Swedish economy that could lead to higher inflation than in the other participant countries as well as unemployment at a later stage when the impact of the weaker competitiveness makes itself felt. With an overly strong rate, the risk instead is of lower inflation than in the other countries, initially having a negative impact on growth and employment. This line of reasoning also clearly demonstrates the connection to fiscal policy. A weaker exchange rate requires tighter fiscal policy and vice versa. In practice, it is not possible to base the choice of the central and conversion rate only on model estimates of what is a desirable longterm rate. It is also important to take into account expected developments in the coming years. It is not in the interests of either Sweden or the other involved countries to have problems arise during the period of Swedish participation in ERM2. In this respect, the economic climate is a factor that demands attention. Previous experience also indicates that negotiations of a central rate would be influenced by the rate that has prevailed between the krona and the euro in recent years. Recent market assessments have been in an interval between 8.50 and 9 kronor per euro, as I mentioned earlier. Monetary policy strategy in ERM2 If Sweden were to join monetary union, the responsibility for ensuring a balanced development in our economy would essentially lie with the government and the Riksdag.
That makes monitoring the economy closely, and setting policy to support it, more important than ever. At present, the largest clouds on the economic horizon in the UK come from: the effects of rising numbers of Covid cases across the UK and the accompanying policy measures taken to contain them; risks to business activity and jobs in the light of these public health developments; and the effects of moving to new trading arrangements with the EU at year-end. This unholy trinity of risks give good grounds for caution. Some degree of caution is desirable - in how we socialise, shop and work - to prevent the spread of this awful disease. But we need at the same time to prevent healthy caution morphing into fear and fatalism. Pessimism can be as contagious as the disease - and as damaging to our economic fortunes. Avoiding economic anxiety is crucial to support the on-going recovery. This has important implications for how businesses and policymakers act and communicate. The Fall and Rise of the UK Economy Let me start by running through the fortunes of the economy so far this year. The early months saw a collapse in UK economic activity unprecedented in its speed and scale – a fall in GDP of around a quarter in a matter of weeks. This recession was unique in its source as well as its speed and scale. An extreme shock to public health required extreme public health measures, restricting the flow of goods, services and people.

This figure, more than any other, underlines the gravity of the shock the UK economy has faced this year. The better news is that the economy began its recovery from this dramatic fall earlier, and has since recovered far-faster, than anyone expected. The speed and scale of the UK’s recovery has surprised to the upside, persistently and significantly, for at least the past four months. Back in May, the Bank expected GDP to be around 18% below its pre-Covid level on average during the third quarter. Consensus forecasts by professional economists were, at the time, weaker still. Four months on, we now expect GDP to be around 3-4% below its pre-Covid level by the end of the third quarter. In other words, the economy has already recovered just under 90% of its earlier losses. Having fallen precipitously by 20% in the second quarter, we expect UK GDP to have risen by a vertiginous 20% in the third quarter – by some margin its largest-ever rise. Put differently, since May UK GDP has been rising, on average, by around 1.5% per week. The pace of recovery has varied, starting slowly in May, picking up pace rapidly during June and July and is then expected to have slowed a little during August and September. Even if our GDP nowcasts for August and September come to pass, there remains an average recession-sized gap between output and its pre-Covid level.
IMF (2019), Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery, World Economic Outlook, April 2019 2. IMF (2019), Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers, World Economic Outlook, October 2019 3. IMF (2019), The Dynamics of External Adjustment, External Sector Report, July 2019 4. IMF Country Report No. 19/29, Albania 2018 Article IV Consultation, January 2019 5. IMF Country Report No. 18/39, Bosnia And Herzegovina 2017 Article IV Consultation, February 2018 6. IMF Country Report No. 19/83, Bulgaria 2019 Article IV Consultation, March 2019 7. IMF Country Report No. 19/46, Republic Of Croatia 2018 Article IV Consultation, February 2019 8. IMF Country Report No. 19/160, Czech Republic 2019 Article IV Consultation, June 2019 9. IMF Country Report No. 18/252, Hungary 2018 Article IV Consultation, August 2018 10. IMF Country Report No. 19/32, FYR Macedonia 2018 Article IV Consultation, January 2019 11. IMF Country Report No. 19/293, Montenegro 2019 Article IV Consultation, September 2019 12. IMF Country Report No. 19/37, Republic Of Poland 2018 Article IV Consultation, February 2019 13. IMF Country Report No. 19/278, Romania 2019 Article IV Consultation, August 2019  16  14. IMF Country Report No. 19/238, Republic of Serbia Staff Report for The 2019 Article IV, July 2019 15. IMF Country Report No.

Meanwhile, aggregate current account deficits of advanced economies rose slightly, underpinned by renewed fiscal easing in the United States. 3 Chart extracted from the IMF External Sector Report, 2019. 4  Chart 3 Current account and fiscal balances in Euro Area and USA USA  Euro Area  Current account and fiscal balance, as % of GDP  Current account and fiscal balance, as % of GDP 4.0  0.0  2.0  -2.0 -4.0  0.0  -6.0  -2.0  -8.0 -10.0  -6.0  -12.0  -8.0  -14.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019  -4.0  Fiscal balance  Fiscal balance  Current account balance  Current account balance  Source: IMF, WEO October 2019, database  The dynamics of the balances is not always indicative on how appropriate the external position is. The deviation of the current account from its fundamentals and desirable policies provides for additional substantial information on the correction needed. According to the IMF (2019), 35–45 percent of overall current account surpluses and deficits were deemed excessive in 2018.
Because of the use of the hash function, a digital signature allows the receiver of a message to determine whether the message has been altered since it was digitally signed. State legislation in this area tends to address either electronic signatures (23 states) or digital signatures (16 states), but not both. States with legislation on electronic signatures differ on the question of what qualifies as an electronic signature. Several states have taken the UCC Article 1 approach and recognize any form of electronic mark intended to serve as an electronic signature. Other states, however, require that several conditions be met before an electronic signature will be legally enforceable. Generally, for these states, in order for an electronic signature to be effective it must: (1) be unique to the person using it; (2) be capable of verification; (3) be under the sole control of the person using it; (4) be linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is changed the signature is invalidated; and (5) conform to regulations adopted by the Secretary of State. Digital signature statutes typically provide for the promulgation of regulations governing the implementation and use of a digital signature infrastructure. The digital signature infrastructure contemplated by these statutes involves a trusted third party, usually a certification authority or CA, whose job is to confirm that the private key used by a sender to sign an electronic message is in fact the private key of the purported sender.

•  Would it be necessary to promote a certain tactical flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy, so that central banks might carry out adjustments in terms of objectives as well, not only instrument-wise? Such an approach would diminish the predictability of monetary policy, but would allow, when need be, for financial stability considerations to prevail over the inflation objective. •  Is the reassessment of the desirable level of inflation suitable? How low is too low? The same as for capital inflows, we can ask ourselves in the case of price stability as well: how much of a good thing is too much? •  Will the policy instruments which have been resorted to in the context of the global crisis become an integral part of the new conventional framework? If macroprudential tools are here to stay, the future of non-conventional monetary policy instruments is less certain. Will the central banks keep using these instruments or will they abandon them at some point in time? I fully share the belief of the Governor of Banco de España Luis Linde (2013) that monetary policy – conventional or not – cannot solve the ultimate causes behind the loss in investors’ confidence or the tensions in financial or banking markets; in fact, its main role is to provide time to adopt the necessary measures to reform and/or adjust. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  How much room for trade-off among different goals is available?
Major changes to the access arrangements to settlement accounts raise both policy and practical questions for the Bank – and could have implications for market participants and fellow regulators too – so it is right that they should be considered as part of the development  9  See Davey and Gray (2014). 10  Further information on the planned extension of RTGS opening hours http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/paymentsystem/extending.aspx. 11  The Bank stands ready to act as a settlement agent for payment systems recognised under the Banking Act or whose access to settlement in central bank money is otherwise judged by the Bank to be likely to reduce the risk of widespread disruption. There are currently 6 payment schemes for which the Bank acts as settlement agent (as well as the CREST securities settlement system) and there are around 40 settlement account holders in RTGS. BIS central bankers’ speeches  can  be  found  here:  5  of a broader blueprint. Targeted extensions in access could bring benefits in terms of innovation. But we need to think through the implications for stability, market structure and costs. The final theme of the blueprint is the role of the Bank. The Bank developed the RTGS infrastructure itself, and is responsible for the maintenance and development of all elements of its hardware and software. The Bank is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of RTGS, although these running costs are in turn charged out to its users on a full cost recovery basis.

From today’s vantage point, it is easy to forget how revolutionary the introduction of RTGS was back in 1996. Before RTGS, all interbank payments were subject to some element of settlement risk – the risk that a bank would fail between the time it promised to make a payment, and the time it delivered on that promise. By allowing banks to settle high value transactions between each other, electronically, in real time, RTGS eliminated settlement risk on the largest payments flows – the ones most likely to threaten financial stability by bringing down the system if they failed. But that is not the only innovation that RTGS has delivered over the years. As the financial system has evolved, RTGS has been regularly updated, introducing a raft of new functions and risk mitigants to respond to changing demands. Today, we are announcing that the Bank has completed, or agreed steps that will complete, all the actions in response to the Deloitte report 4 published in March last year following the RTGS outage in October 2014. Looking forward, as we celebrate RTGS’ twentieth birthday during 2016, it is again time to ask fundamental questions about the shape of the Bank’s settlement operations. The way payments are made has changed dramatically in recent years, reflecting changes in the needs of households and companies, changes in technology, and an evolving regulatory landscape. The range of payment providers is growing rapidly.
Firms must have a safe and sound process for addressing all aspects of this transition. They also need to select alternative rates that are robust and resilient, in line with current best practice. At the Fed, we’ve been thinking about this risk across all portfolios, 5/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  from small community banks to the largest institutions. Our focus so far has been on outreach and education. We have been encouraging examiners to raise awareness with their supervised institutions, and we’ve provided them with some tools to enage in this discussion. We’ve also been reviewing our own contracts that use reference rates to make sure we’re walking the talk. Anecdotally, the largest financial firms seem to be more aware of the challenges than smaller ones. Last September, the UK Prudential Regulation Authority and FCA sent a “dear CEO” letter to the heads of large banks and insurance companies to seek assurance that their senior managers and boards understood the risks of LIBOR transition and were taking appropriate action ahead of end-2021.22 As the larger firms prepare for the transition, they are beginning to work on the operational challenges the transition will present. You all know that those kinds of system changes are never simple or straightforward. The potential death of LIBOR is causing everyone in the market a lot of grief, and everyone goes through the five stages of grief at their own pace.

Now the time has come—I would argue it came a while ago, but in any case it’s here now—the time has come for every firm with LIBOR exposure to actively grapple with the risks that are coming your way whether you like it or not. The way forward for the vast majority of LIBOR-based instruments is rapidly becoming clear. It’s easy and tempting to justify inaction by criticizing the available solutions as imperfect or as just too hard to do. But inaction at this point in the LIBOR transition is short-sighted and futile and only extends the uncertainty. We need decisive action by everyone in the market to avoid damage to individual firms and the financial system. 1 Raymond Check and Thomas Noone assisted in preparing these remarks. Mr. Held would like to thank his  other colleagues at the Federal Reserve who provided comments and corrections. 2 2019 Outlook: Trends in the Capital Markets 3 See for example the FSOC’s Annual Reports for 2013 and 2018. 4 See Introductory Remarks by Federal Reserve Board of Governors Vice Chairman for Supervision Randal K.  Quarles at the Alternative Reference Rates Committee Roundtable, July 19, 2018 5 Second Report of the Alternative Reference Rates Committee, March 2018 6 Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, 22 July 2014 7 Principles for Financial Benchmarks Final Report, July 2013 8 Information on the ARRC, including  its announcements and publications, can be found at  www.newyorkfed.org/arrc.