samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In August, to operate within a more symmetric interest rate corridor, we lowered the overnight lending rate from 12 to 11.25 percent, and the rate on borrowing facilities for primary dealers via repo transactions from 11.5 to 10.75 percent (Chart 3). In this period, we provided the CBRT funding primarily from one-week repo auctions (Chart 4). Thus, the average funding rate came close to the one-week repo rate. Yet, taking into account the geopolitical tensions and the financial market volatility, we have fortified our tight monetary stance with a tight liquidity policy since September. Accordingly, the BIST overnight repo rates, that neared the one-week repo auction rate in July and August, has lately followed a course close to the upper end of the interest rate corridor. While we had measured rate cuts, we have maintained a tight monetary policy stance by keeping the yield curve nearly flat in this quarter as well. The spread between 5-year market rates and the BIST Interbank Overnight Repo rates has been at negative levels as of October (Chart 5). In addition, as we have tightened our liquidity policy recently, short-term rates have risen substantially. Thus, we are able to keep the yield curve on a nearly flat course. On the other hand, the spread between long and short-term rates continues to hover below its historical levels (Chart 6).

Despite waning external demand, exports continue to support the balanced growth. The macroprudential measures and our tight monetary stance have had positive implications for the core inflation trend. A sizable amount of the significant first-half increase in core inflation indicators was reversed in the third quarter. Annual core goods inflation continues to slow down as the negative effects from exchange rate changes diminish. Moreover, falling oil prices restrict the inflationary pressures on energy items. However, elevated food prices cause inflation to hover significantly above the target. We expect significant disinflation for 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the upcoming year. The continued decline in cumulative exchange rate effects, the return of food inflation to the average level of previous years and the fall in commodity prices, especially oil, will be the main factors contributing to disinflation. Moreover, we believe that the tight fiscal stance set out in the Medium Term Program (MTP) will support the decline in inflation. 1. Monetary policy and monetary conditions  Distinguished Guests, The Central Bank implemented a front-loaded and strong monetary tightening in the first quarter of 2014 and then lowered policy rates gradually amid reduced domestic and external uncertainty in the second quarter. During the third quarter, we firstly cut the one-week repo auction rate from 8.75 to 8.25 percent, and the overnight borrowing rate from 8 to 7.5 percent in July.
The current effort of FSB to survey unintended consequences of reforms on emerging market is welcomed. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Before ending this note on Basel III, let me touch on Thailand’s own take on these developments. For Thailand, we aim to adopt the Basel III framework in accordance with Basel Committee timeline. After industry consultation, we believe that Thai banks will be well placed to implement the Basel III framework as their capital positions are well above the minimum requirements of 8.5%. The Basel III framework will help strengthen the bank’s capital and risk management. One of the major improvements of Basel III from Basel II is consideration on cyclicality, with requirement for conservation and countercyclical buffer. However, we believe that prudential measures, such as conservative provisioning designed to be countercyclical, should also be given due credit for achieving the same aim when implementing Basel III buffers. This would help avoid the double requirement on capital maintenance. Of course, we strongly support a better treatment of trade financing, to ensure that Basel III is supportive of stable economic growth. On the last note, let me turn to a key trend in Asia, “regional economic and financial integration”. Asia faces a challenge of steering a balance between liberalization and strengthening regulation. ASEAN Economic Integration under AEC, which sets the landmark date of 2015, has progressed substantially on the free flow of goods and services, as well as direct investment. Financial sector integration is also set to speed up.

But as investors understand better that Emerging Asian economies are on a strong footing, they are becoming more discerning. And contagion effects from other EMEs will then reduce over time. More importantly, the ASEAN growth story remains intact. ASEAN is poised for continued healthy growth over the medium term, on the back of macroeconomic stability. The ASEAN-5 economies – Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore– are expected to grow at close to 5% per annum over the next 5 years. This is higher compared to Latin America (2.8%) and Eastern Europe (3.3%). ASEAN’s resilience stems from fundamental drivers that support the region’s growth in a mutually reinforcing fashion Rising Middle Class: Rising affluence of the middle class will spur consumption, including a range of modern services – especially finance and insurance, professional services, tourism, healthcare and education. Urbanisation: Rural-urban migration and the expansion of cities will spur sizeable demand for infrastructure. Integration: ASEAN’s growing integration – increasingly powered by technology and ecommerce – will allow the region to reap complementarities and synergies to sustain growth over the long term. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 lays the pathway for a highly integrated region, well connected to other parts of a dynamic Asia. More than short-term volatilities, ASEAN’s prospects will depend on how well it executes closer integration and structural reforms to increase efficiency and productivity. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
63  See the Box ‘Changes to Section 5 of the Inflation Report’ on page 49 of the May 2013 Bank of England Inflation Report. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  correlated (Chart 15). 64 So too, often more dramatically, have been its forecast errors for real wages and productivity. To some degree this is understandable, as the MPC adapts to the unfolding landscape. 65 But can we do much better? We must. This brings me to my final point. The Bank is about to embark on what will be, in the area of research, a cultural revolution. To caricature slightly, Bank research in the past was typically used to nourish and support the Bank’s policy thinking and framework. Relatively rarely was it used to challenge that prevailing policy orthodoxy, at least in public. That is about to change. As part of its strategic plan, the Bank has decided to cut the umbilical cord. In future, it will carry out, and publish externally, research covering the whole waterfront of policy issues it faces, monetary, financial and regulatory. Through new publications, we will put into the public domain research and analysis which as often challenges as supports the prevailing policy orthodoxy on certain key issues. This research will hopefully act as spur and springboard for new policy thinking, and perhaps in time policy change, on key central bank issues of the day, whatever they may be. It will act as another bulwark against hubris, over-confidence and groupthink.

Andrew G Haldane: Central bank psychology Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the “Leadership: stress and hubris conference”, hosted by the Royal Society of Medicine, London, 17 November 2014. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like in particular to thank Rashmi Harimohan, Jeremy Franklin, Michael McMahon and Nick Mclaren for assistance in preparing the text. I would also like to thank John Barrdear, Rob Elder, Bob Gilhooly, Chris Hackworth, Jeremy Harrison and Gareth Ramsay for their comments and contributions. 13 September 2007 will be seen as a red letter day in financial history. It was the date news broke of Northern Rock seeking emergency liquidity from the Bank of England, prompting the first run on a UK bank in over a century. It also fired the starting gun on what subsequently became known as “The Great Recession”. That very day, the Bank hosted a conference. In a painful irony, its theme was “The Great Moderation”. The Great Moderation described the long-period of pre-crisis macro-economic calm, with stable growth, stable inflation and stable banks. 1 This view held that central banks, while not eliminating boom and bust, had moderated macro-economic undulations. It also held that financial innovation, while not eliminating risk, had scattered it to the four winds. As Great Recession abruptly replaced Great Moderation, it was clear a grave analytical and policy error had been made.
Domestic demand, on the other hand, was growing strongly, so strongly in fact that we faced the danger of overheating in the economy as a whole despite the dampening effect of the appreciation on domestic costs and prices and despite the restraining effect on aggregate demand of the prospective worsening of the external trade balance. That was the background to the tightening of monetary policy from the middle of 1997 designed to moderate the pace of overall demand growth. We were of course well aware of the pressures on the internationally exposed sectors, and we made full allowance for the twin effects of the strong exchange rate on the price level and on aggregate demand in making our projections of future inflation. But if we had held off from tightening policy to moderate the pace of the overall expansion at that stage – in order to try to protect the exposed sectors – the chances were that inflation would have accelerated, and that we would then eventually have had to bring the economy as a whole to an abrupt standstill in order to bring inflation back under control. That would not have helped anybody. By the late summer of last year these conflicting pressures in the economy appeared to be beginning to ease. Domestic demand growth was indeed moderating – as it needed to do; and the exaggerated strength of sterling’s exchange rate was diminishing as the approach of the introduction of the euro appeared to generate increased confidence in the new currency.

Fintechs, leading players in the digital revolution The digital revolution has ushered in a new wave of players, activities and services that first swept into the payments sector, and then spread gradually to all financial services. Some of you, the Fintechs, are living proof of this: more than half of all payment and electronic money institutions received their licence between 2018 and 2021, in other words since European regulations relaxed the conditions for market entry.i Fintechs are here to stay: to give just one example, according to an ACPR study published in July,ii online banks and other 100% digital payment players doubled their customer base between 2018 and 2020, and in 2020 alone captured 35% of new retail current accounts. The rise in interest rates should help them on the crucial path towards profitability – which  Page 2 of 5 is necessary for everybody, even though situations vary widely, depending on the business model. The digital revolution is leading to a major restructuring of the financial landscape, at the point where these new players and the existing ecosystem meet. According to an ACPR survey published in January,iii all banks and insurers questioned said they had set up partnerships with innovative players. Legacy banks and insurers are thus being forced to operate with a more open structure, exploring new distribution channels and offering new products. I welcome this wholeheartedly: no Maginot Lines and no trench warfare.
Finance by all, for all Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England Remarks at Women in Banking and Finance 22nd Annual Awards, London Friday 14 June 2019  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth for her assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Jenny Pye, Katie Williamson and Paul Wright for their help with background research and analysis. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  It is an honour to join you today to celebrate this special occasion. The Women In Banking and Finance (WIBF) network is a place to connect with colleagues, share knowledge and like today, celebrate success. In that spirit we have already connected at the reception and will conclude by celebrating your success, so let me take up a bit of the middle to share some knowledge that the Bank has gained as it seeks to improve diversity and inclusion at the heart of finance. Let me start by reflecting on the state of the UK financial services industry. Over two million people across the UK work in the sector. It makes up over 10% of the economy and runs a trade surplus of £ billion, greater than all other exporting industries combined. Financial services contribute enough taxes to fund the NHS.1 Most fundamentally, finance serves households and businesses at home and abroad. Last year, the UK financial system channelled £ billion in finance to UK businesses and helped 700,000 households to purchase homes.

7 See: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/econome. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  That being said, an economics education is certainly not a prerequisite to a career in the Bank. The Bank offers on the job training for all ages to entice diverse talent. Our Future Capability programme is aimed at pupils keen to get their careers started after leaving school. Almost 90% of our 2018 Future Capability intake were from a state school and over half were female. Historically, one impediment to improving diversity in central banking has been the lack of diversity among economics graduates. Just under a third of students studying economics to A-level and undergraduate level in British Universities are female.8,9 To enable the Bank to hire from a broader set of disciplines and train them as economists and technical specialists we have introduced an in-house Central Banking Qualification (CBQ), in which graduate hires can earn a Masters Degree in Central Banking. This means that only half of our graduates study economics, with the remainder plucked from the sciences, business and the humanities. In recent years, our graduates have come from 40 different universities, a six-fold increase in the past decade. In the Bank’s September 2019 intake, we expect that almost half – 46% – of graduates will be female. This is the most diverse outcome since we began recording the diversity of graduate intakes. Last year, the Bank won the TARGETjobs 'Most Popular Graduate Recruiter in Banking, Insurance and Financial Services’ for the second year running.
The function of money as a unit of measurement was also undermined. An example of this is described in the local history books for the coastal districts of Karlsøy and Helgøy in Troms, northern Norway. At that time, accounts were sometimes kept in silver, or in goods such as cod liver oil, large saithe or flour. 8 Inflation also resulted in the transfer of assets from creditors to debtors: the real value of the fishermen’s debt to merchants in Bergen decreased. This marked a historic shift. The fishermen were of course happy to see their debt diminish. Creditors, however, lost money, which probably did not increase confidence and a willingness to lend the next time someone needed a loan. 6  Davies, Glyn (2002): A History of Money from Ancient Times to the Present Day, University of Wales Press, page 200. 7  Bordo, Michael D. and Eugene N. White (1990): “British and French Finance during the Napoleonic Wars”, NBER Working Paper No. 3517, also published in Bordo, Michael and Forrest Capie (Eds.) Monetary Regimes in Transition, Cambridge University Press, 1993. 8  Bratrein, Håvard Dahl (1989-1994): http://karlsoy.com/bygdebok/. BIS Review 136/2008  Karlsøy  og  Helgøy  bygdebok,  Karlsøy  kommune,  3  3. The promise of a stable value of money against gold and silver  I have given examples of how easily monarchs succumbed to the temptation of an apparently free lunch by exploiting opportunities for raising seignorage revenues. In times of political instability, they sometimes had no choice.

Depending on its design, such a rule book would either be permanently outdated and incomplete, because legislators cannot keep up with the rapid pace of innovation within the financial sector with meticulous regulation, or would have to regulate so rigidly that it would impose excessive restrictions on the functioning of the financial system. As is often the case, the most sensible option is in the middle. We need regulation based on principles which adapts to changes in banking and we need a supervisory authority that is capable taking action. Allow me to elaborate. •  Good regulations must be adaptable. They must be just as applicable to different business models as they are to different sizes of institution – they must fit large and small institutions alike. Good regulations must adapt to changing circumstances without legislators having continually to improve on them. Accordingly, the rules must provide room for discretion in individual cases. •  Good regulations must, however, also ensure a minimum level of planning and legal certainty for banks; that is the only way in which banks operate properly and provide their financial services over the long term. This holds particularly true of Europe, where banks play a greater role in financing the real economy than the capital markets.
They concluded from the evidence of the crisis that at least five stylized facts should be reflected in macro-financial models: coexistence of bank and bond finance, substitution from bank to bond financing, increasing credit spreads, stickiness of equity prices and endogenous procyclicality of bank leverage. 5 In the pre-EMU economic modelling world, therefore, there was no need to counter financial imbalances and financial instability as the financial sector did not play a crucial role from a macroeconomic perspective. Similarly, under the assumption of self-equilibrating markets, there was no need to monitor macroeconomic imbalances and disequilibria on the labour, product or financial markets. With an assumed stable private sector, apart from exogenous shocks, the only source of instability acknowledged were governments and their fiscal profligacy. This supported the decision to elevate only governance of fiscal policies to the European level. With the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that this architecture was unstable. Like the neglected build-up of financial imbalances and high indebtness that led to the crisis, the initial design of the European Monetary Union was a victim of the economic thinking then dominant. A few lessons have to be drawn now. Lesson number one: the greater integration of euro area financial markets implied that our economies became more prone to contagion. Financial integration run ahead and European-level financial supervision was non-existing.

Thus, we have made limited progress in closing the substantial output gap that was created during the recession. A similar conclusion is drawn from an assessment of labor market conditions. Although the unemployment rate has declined by about 2 ¾ percentage points since peaking at 10 percent in October of 2009, a significant portion of that decline reflects the substantial decline of the labor force participation rate over that period. It should also be noted that since the previous business cycle peak at the end of 2007, the decline of the labor force participation rate has been more than accounted for by a decline in participation of people in the prime working age of 25 to 54. The inflation data are also consistent with this overall picture of an economy operating well below its full potential. Total inflation, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator, has been quite volatile in recent years due to sharp fluctuations in energy prices. Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components and thereby may be a better guide as to underlying inflation, slowed from around 2 percent in early 2012 to just above 1 percent in mid-2013. In recent months it has shown signs of stabilizing, but remains well below the FOMC’s expressed goal of 2 percent for total inflation. Fortunately, inflation expectations remain relatively stable at levels somewhat above the current inflation rate. This stability should help prevent an undesirable further drop in inflation relative to our 2 percent objective.
Imposing such structure facilitates the pursuit of the strategy’s interrelated roles, namely the promotion of an efficient internal decision-making process and the creation of a clear external framework for the presentation and explanation of policy decisions to the public. The first pillar of the strategy, which assigns a prominent role to money, reflects the fundamentally monetary origins of inflation over the medium to longer term. The prominent role of money is signalled by the announcement of a reference value of 4½% for the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3. It is crucial to recognise that we do not interpret the first pillar as either an intermediate monetary target or solely in terms of the reference value. The first pillar embodies a thorough analysis of the components and counterparts of M3, which always takes place in the context of other indicators. The aim of the analysis is to extract information contained in the monetary and credit data that is required by monetary policymakers to take decisions. In consequence, the analysis naturally focuses on the information content of money regarding the outlook for price developments considering both inflationary and deflationary risks. The first pillar therefore represents an approach within which monetary developments are the main determinants of the evolution of the price level over the medium term. We are aware that the conditions needed to give a prominent role to money are not as favourable elsewhere in the world as they are in the euro area.

I will return to the important issue of transparency in a moment, when I discuss the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. With regard to accountability, let me simply highlight that, drawing on the successful experience of several central banks, in October 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB decided to publish a quantitative definition of price stability. This definition of price stability as an annual increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2% provides a clear yardstick against which the public, its elected representatives and agents in the media can hold the ECB accountable. The ECB’s monetary policy strategy Within this institutional framework, how should price stability be maintained? This question is addressed by the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. It is obvious that the development of the ECB’s strategic framework drew heavily on the experience of euro area NCBs prior to Monetary Union. This is one area where the experience of national central banks was extremely influential and important. Prior to the introduction of the euro, several central banks, including the Banque de France, assigned a prominent role to money within their monetary policy strategy. Some announced intermediate monetary targets, while others adopted monitoring or reference ranges for monetary growth. At the same time, other euro area central banks emphasised the role of inflation forecasts as the key monetary policy indicator. Of these, several proceeded to announce direct inflation targets, as became fashionable in the 1990s.