samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me just take a few examples. I would like first to talk about the workshops conducted by the ACPR on the use of artificial intelligence in the financial sector as an example of what experimentation can bring, not only to a supervisory authority, but also to the entire ecosystem. Indeed, these concrete experiments enabled the ACPR, based on specific use cases, to examine algorithms from inside, their intrinsic performance, their integration into operational processes, and their control and governance environment. Drawing on this experiment, the ACPR published a report last June outlining what the framework for the proper use of these future tools could look like. This illustrates how experimentation allows us to send the right signals for the ecosystem to realise the potential of new technologies without fearing a delayed and unexpected “backlash” from the Supervisory Authority. The Banque de France’s ongoing programme of experiments on wholesale CBDC constitutes further tangible evidence of our active support for innovation. Among the challenges brought by innovation, there is one of special interest for central bankers: that of preserving the anchor role of central bank money in particular in financial markets. To this extent, the digitalisation trends in financial markets and in payments, as well as the larger role of nonbank financial intermediaries invite central banks to reflect on the way they give access to the safest settlement asset, central bank money. The existence of a digital form of central bank money is obviously not a prior nor a sufficient precondition for financial market efficiency and security.

Promoting sustainable innovation is part and parcel of our mandate for two main reasons: it is a driver of efficiency gains and an enabler of inclusion. 1- There is no need to go back to ancient times and payments with seashells but we just have to take a glance at the situation three decades ago to acknowledge that in the field of market infrastructures and payments, clearly, innovation has been synonym of efficiency progress. The trend towards the dematerialisation of financial assets and means of payment, which has been underway for decades, is a good example. Rooted in the current surge in digitalisation, shifts in consumption patterns such as the growth of e-commerce go hand in hand with an increase in the use of electronic payment instruments, along with the development of internetbased technologies and multi-functional electronic devices. As a result, payment services are  becoming more available, ignoring some of the physical borders and time constraints to satisfy customer demand for instant, continuous, uniform and safe payment services, as economic agents become ever more mobile. However, the ongoing technological transformation triggers possible side and adverse effects from an efficiency and safety standpoint. Let me mention for instance the fragmentation of solutions with limited interoperability, the growing number of interdependent players, the increased exposure to cyber threats and data protection issues, and the possible constitution of monopolies (including technology monopolies).
Increasing specialization brings real economic benefits, but can also leave workers more exposed to shifts in demand for their services, potentially on short notice. These issues are not going away, especially as emerging market economies take on a larger role in the global economy and automation continues apace. If we are to maintain a more open trade regime, globalization must be socially and politically sustainable. For that to be the case, we have to provide greater support to those who are hurt by trade. Policies should include more assistance with job retraining, help with job search and mobility, and broader unemployment support. We need to do more research into what measures have been effective in economies around the world, and we should encourage greater experimentation with new approaches. Getting the balance right between providing assistance and making sure that individuals hurt by trade can get back on their feet and achieve their earning potential will be a challenge, and we need a better understanding of what actually works. More generally, we need to do a better job positioning our workforce to cope with globalization and technological change. This will involve improvements across a range of areas, including not only education and training, but also the business regulatory environment and infrastructure investment that could support greater worker mobility. These measures would also promote higher productivity growth. While the scope and scale of issues differ substantially by country, many of these policy areas may also be relevant in India.

Scarce resources would be used less efficiently and trade protection would likely lessen the level of competitive pressure that helps drive innovation. Moreover, lower productivity growth would likely lead to a slower improvement in a nation’s living standards over time. This negative consequence of higher trade barriers can be illustrated most starkly by the estimates of the costs per job saved through protectionist measures. Researchers that have studied this closely estimate that the costs per job saved from protectionist measures in the United States typically run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars per year. To illustrate, consider the case of import restrictions on Chinese tires. The cost of a job saved was estimated at $ per year while the measures were in place, or more than 20 times the average worker’s compensation.5  Better Approaches to Deal With Globalization Rather than protectionism, a better policy would be to help domestic workers and companies compete more effectively, rather than compete less. We need additional mechanisms that allow us to more fully capture the benefits from liberalized trade and to more proactively mitigate its costs. Ideally, policy should also better address job losses and income inequality from automation and other technological advances. How we respond should depend on regional and industry circumstances. These include the nature of trade impacts, the skill sets and location of the workers that have been affected, and 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  the amount of resources that can be mobilized to facilitate adjustment.
Second, could a different monetary policy with higher interest rates have prevented the crisis? The first question, whether the low interest rate was reasonable given the available information, is the relevant one when evaluating monetary policy. It is more relevant to evaluate policy taking into account the information available ex ante to the policymaker rather than information ex post that was unknown to the policymaker (see Svensson 2009 on evaluating monetary policy ex ante and ex post). 8 During this time, given the information available, there was a genuine and well-motivated fear of the U.S. falling into a Japanesestyle deflationary liquidity trap, and the optimal policy in such a situation is a very expansionary monetary policy. 9 It may be that, in retrospect, the risk of deflation was exaggerated, but it was impossible to know this ex ante. Hence, I consider the expansionary policy very appropriate and, adding some ex post evaluation, one can note that it did not lead ex post to very high inflation and an overheated economy. The second question, whether a different monetary policy could have prevented the crisis, is relevant when assessing to what extent monetary policy can be blamed for causing the crisis, notwithstanding if it was reasonable from an exante perspective. The credit growth and the housing boom in the U.S. and elsewhere were very powerful. However, I believe that somewhat higher interest rates would have made little or no difference.

05.05.2022  Opening remarks 112th Meeting of Central Bank Governors of CEMLA Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon: It gives me great pleasure to welcome you here today in Seville at the opening of the 112th Meeting of Central Bank Governors of CEMLA. Having been obliged to hold this event virtually in the past two years it is particularly gratifying to be able to meet in person, although we cannot consider the pandemic to be fully over just yet. It is a great honour for the Banco de España to organise this meeting jointly with CEMLA. I should like to take this opportunity to thank Governor Villar, Chair of the Governing Board of CEMLA, and Dr Ramos Francia, Director General of CEMLA, for their invitation to hold this event in Seville. This is the second time, after the 2003 edition, that the meeting will take place here in Seville, which, as the former president of Columbia César Gaviria recalled, Octavio Paz described as the most American of Europe’s cities. At a time when international cooperation is more important than ever, CEMLA stands as a magnificent example of a multilateral institution that fosters such cooperation.
The partnership between the European Investment Bank and the commercial banks in Romania ensure the effective transmission mechanism to allocate and distribute the European structural funds to the infrastructure projects, to the development of production capacities of the small and medium enterprises and to the creation of new jobs in the economy. The banks are well capitalized, have an excellent solvency and a superior liquidity, prerequisites for co-financing the companies and the economy. The loan-to-deposits ratio is below 100%, indicating available resources for financing. Nonperforming loans have decreased more than three times, from 22% to about 6%, showing a positive trend in a healthier internal ratings model and a sound balance sheet position, while the lending dynamics for companies is below the European average. We have the potential to accelerate the access to finance to support investments as a base for economic growth, instead of a consumption driven growth. This potential is demonstrated by the low financial intermediation in Romania, around 29%, although this percentage can be misleading, as large corporations usually access financing directly abroad, from the headquarters or from the financial institutions in the countries where they are headquartered. The more prudent lending policies and the risk aversion of commercial banks are factors that could be perceived as a break in financing investments at full capacity; however there is a positive side, too. It is a safe approach to credit as a driver of economic growth, as credit (lat.

In the first seven months of 2018, Romania benefited of 2.7 million EUR in European funds and past experiences show there is a learning cycle in managing European funds and their disbursement increases towards the end of the Multiannual Financial Framework. We expect the investment financing to increase in 2019 and 2020. The European Investment Bank and its investment-financing arm, European Investment Fund, have a pronounced contribution to closing the financing gap of investments in the context of economic downturn, 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  providing the sources for investment finance, the expertise and the support for entrepreneurs. The recurrent themes for Romania’s development needs are as present as ever in the public space, and they should trigger a higher implication on all levels of decision, from the private sector to the public management authorities, to support and extend the investments for sustainable economic growth. The shift from consumption to investments, the reliable and qualitative infrastructure, the deficit of skilled labor and the gap in the transition from education to employment, the good governance and accountability framework in institutional investments, as well as the need to enhance the EU funds absorption rate, all these are, at the moment, the challenges that Romania, faces on its pathway to sustainable growth. In this context, I would like to point out the fact that the results of the European Investment Bank survey are in line with the NBR’s evaluations of the financial sector, the key aspect being the access to finance and sustainable investments.
In other words, we should be trying to prevent banks getting into difficulties in the first place. This requires effective management by the banks themselves as well as careful monitoring by the banking supervisors. The first of these we have tried to address through our recent Guideline on the Corporate Governance of Locally Incorporated Authorised Institutions. This is intended to encourage high standards of management in such institutions and thus help them to deal with the challenges ahead. These challenges also require enhancements to our system of banking supervision. As recommended by KPMG/Barents, we are introducing a more risk-based approach. This aims to be more forwardlooking than the old style of supervision. It focuses more precisely on the various types of risk being run by individual banks, the quantity of such risks and the quality of the system used to manage them. If used properly, it should lead to a less intrusive and less burdensome supervisory approach towards well-managed institutions. We have been developing this approach over the last year and have applied it to a number of the local banks. We intend to roll it out to cover foreign banks next year. It is important that the whole process should be transparent and to assist in this we intend to issue a framework document quite shortly which will outline the new approach. We are also engaged in a major rewrite of our supervisory guidelines to make them more user-friendly and to put them into a common format.

Total lossabsorbing capacity, or TLAC, of the old parent company would be available to absorb losses and could be used to recapitalize the new parent company. But, the task of operationalizing resolution for large, global banks—including achieving full clarity on the roles of the home and host supervisors—is still not complete. It is key that work continues on this front to ensure that a systemically important firm can fail without threatening to topple the rest of the financial system— an important step toward ending “too big to fail.” Third, some of the obvious systemic vulnerabilities exposed by the financial crisis have been remedied. Important changes include mandatory clearing of standardized over-the-counter derivatives through central counterparties, or CCPs; more intensive supervision of systemically important CCPs; and reforms of the tri-party repo system and the money market mutual fund industry. But, even as we reduce or eliminate old vulnerabilities, we must not rest on our laurels, for new vulnerabilities will inevitably take their place. These accomplishments notwithstanding, I have no doubt that the current regulatory framework could be improved. Indeed, the official sector should assess the efficiency and effectiveness of regulations on an ongoing basis. I agree with Vice Chairman Quarles’ observation that there is more we can do to make the regulatory regime more efficient, transparent, and simple— including relief for small banks, greater tailoring based on a firm’s level of systemic importance, and simplifying the Volcker Rule. 5 Some of these changes have already been adopted or are in process.
8/14  Chapter III also describes the measures adopted to support the retail holders of shares and hybrid instruments affected by the restructuring exercises at the banks which moved into the FROB’s orbit (pp. 180-181). The two measures adopted were: 1) to enable the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) to purchase the shares that retail holders of preference debt instruments and subordinated debt had received in exchange for their securities when the shares were not listed (this was the case of Novacaixagalicia and Caixa Catalunya); and 2) to create a committee to establish the criteria that would govern the arbitration to be offered by FROB investee banks to the retail holders of these instruments to resolve cases of misselling. Subsequently (Table 3.4, p. 194), the amount of the instruments issued by Bankia, Caixa Catalunya and Novacaixagalicia is given, along with the arbitration requests received and the awards favourable to customers: overall, arbitration with a favourable award amounted to € relating to almost 300,000 customers. Bearing in mind the doubts over the viability of the euro and over Spain continuing in the single currency, and given the serious crisis facing our financial system, I believe that the restructuring strategy and its financing as set out in the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding was proportionate and has managed to achieve the normalisation of our financial system, as explained in Chapter IV of the Report.

Firstly, our Report indicates that the Banco de España did not adopt measures that could, perhaps, have checked the sizeable increase in credit to the private sector recorded between 2001 and 2007, in particular in the construction and real estate development 12/14  sectors, and in mortgage lending for house purchases. But it should be pointed out that there were then no legal regulations that could have provided for such action and that other measures adopted in those years – the countercyclical provisions and the more severe treatment of the so-called “special-purpose vehicles” – were effective in helping withstand the first crisis, although they did not suffice to protect our banks from the double-dip recession that began in 2011. Secondly, the treatment of the most characteristic problems of the savings banks through the risk-pooling schemes contained in the institutional protection systems (IPSs) did not suffice to resolve the solvency and governance problems of most savings banks; nor was there much success with certain innovations such as equity units with voting rights, with which it was sought to resolve, or at least alleviate, savings banks’ difficulties in raising resources equivalent to capital. Thirdly, it seems clear that the Banco de España estimated that the 2009 recession would have what the economists call a “V” shape, and not a “W” shape, without anticipating the strong impact of the second recession on many credit institutions’ solvency.
I have no doubt at all that the City has the professional and technical capacity, and the self-confidence, to make a major contribution to this process. Let me touch, finally, Chairman, on financial globalisation more generally. As we have seen, the increasingly free flow of capital internationally has the capacity to contribute massively to the expansion of the world economy; but it can become distorted, with the risk of destructive volatility, which in turn can pose a significant threat to financial stability on a world-wide basis. Since the sudden onset of the Asia crisis some three years ago with its global repercussions there has been a 3  BIS Review 49/2000  huge international effort to reduce the risk of volatility. This has involved drawing up codes of best practice - covering everything from fiscal and monetary prudence, external balance sheet and liquidity management and greater transparency, to increased financial regulation as well as higher legal, accounting and corporate governance standards - which national governments particularly in capital importing countries, are being encouraged to apply. It has involved extensive and ongoing reviews of the financial infrastructure and regulatory practice also in creditor countries. And it has involved a continuing review of the role of the international financial institutions in preventing and managing international debt crises.

François Villeroy de Galhau: The digital payment revolution Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Fintech Forum, Paris, 7 October 2020. * * * Mr Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to welcome you here to the Banque de France’s premises this morning. I would also like to welcome those joining us remotely. We are all aware of just how important new technologies are in ensuring continuity and stability in this crisis. My dear Cédric, you’d clearly be the first to say so. I would also like to welcome Alain Clot, President of France Fintech, and of course Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF, with which we have organised this Forum. Your presence among us, Mr Minister, is proof of public authorities’ commitment to Fintechs. And that is my first message this morning: the Banque de France and the ACPR are also fully committed to supporting Fintechs. I shall then go on to tell you how we intend to act in the digital payment revolution. **  I. The Banque de France and ACPR’s support for Fintechs Let’s start with a question I consider particularly important, and on which there should be no shred of ambiguity between us: why do the Banque de France and ACPR regard Fintechs as important? Because they are an essential element for the financial sector: they deliver creativity and they understand new needs rapidly.
Recent financial market turmoil may complicate the transmission of monetary policy in some countries. If it amplifies the downturn in economic activity, it may accelerate disinflation from what is currently projected, although so far this appears unlikely to fundamentally change the outcome. Inflation and inflation expectations have started to decline in Europe and the US. Disinflation may take somewhat longer in the case of Iceland,  given the still strong economic momentum and prospects for higher wage growth than in trading partner countries. Much will depend on the interaction between three markets: the labour market, the housing market, and the foreign exchange market. Monetary policy will have to remain tight until the relationship between the three markets has been stabilized. Stronger counter-cyclical fiscal policies would shorten the time needed to reach the balance and bring inflation to target.

While the US is more advanced in the de-leveraging process, the debt-overhang will be a drag on growth in both regions well into 2012. Dealing with such deep-rooted problems require tough, unpopular, actions at the fundamental level. A critical challenge is in justifying these actions to an increasingly skeptical public. Thus the implementation of the required policies is just as hard, if not harder, than coming up with the solution. The political risks involved in all this is a key source of uncertainty that we must be mindful of. While global financial markets in recent months appear to be coping better with this nagging uncertainty, we are definitely not out of the woods. And the risks are much compounded  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  given the limited room for additional monetary and fiscal stimulus remaining in the advanced economies. Looking closer to home, the rising contribution of Asia to the global economy is reassuring. Despite the slowdown in exports on the back of a softer global economy, domestic demand in many Asian economies remains robust. The expanding role of China and ASEAN’s commitment towards economic integration will offer vast economic opportunities for the region. However, as will be discussed later, taking advantage of such opportunities will neither be automatic nor easy. The key challenge for Thailand is to make sure that we harness the opportunities and incentives generated by this process to achieve fundamental restructuring of our economy and raise our potential growth. On that note, let me turn to the domestic challenges.