samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Speaking for France, the ECB can obviously rely upon the ACPR: its well-trained employees and inspectors are fully committed to serve the SSM common good alongside their ECB colleagues. As regards on-site inspections and cross-border missions, further efforts should be made in order to tackle administrative hurdles. But I can already say that the ACPR will aim to double its target of cross-border missions in 2019. Strong cooperation between national authorities and the ECB is needed in banking supervision, but not exclusively. Let’s not forget that a majority of national authorities are competent in other fields of supervision, which matter for the SSM, such as insurance – which is the case for the ACPR. These competences are valuable not only for the supervision of financial conglomerates but also for the development of a more unified single market for insurance. In cooperation with EIOPA, we are committed to preserving it after Brexit. ** Let me conclude. Ten years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, we have learnt three main lessons. First, we need competent, strong and independent supervision. Second, we need a level playing field, at least in Europe, and if possible at the international level, for the implementation of the strengthened rules: without demanding supervision, regulation and the single rulebook could largely remain a paper exercise. Last but not least, we must never let our guard down when it comes to financial stability. Anniversaries have to be a bastion against the temptation to forget and fall asleep.

To conclude, the economic analysis continues to indicate that the outlook for price developments in the medium term is in line with price stability. Cross-checking with the monetary analysis does not alter this picture. Let me also make a few remarks on other policies in the euro area. With regard to fiscal policies, the Governing Council sees continued reasons for concern. Recent information indicates that significant imbalances are emerging in a growing number of countries and that current policies would not be sufficient to attain the consolidation objectives specified in the latest stability programmes. We strongly urge governments to take corrective action in a timely and sustained fashion, where and when necessary. Finally, with regard to structural reforms, the Governing Council welcomed the Presidency conclusions of last weekend’s Brussels European Council. Structural reforms are necessary to meet the Lisbon challenge and thus reap the benefits of higher sustainable growth and employment. As pointed out by the European Council, the pace of reform needs to be significantly stepped up and the critical issue now is the need for better implementation of commitments already made. Ending the political uncertainty and delays surrounding the implementation of sustainable fiscal policies and effective structural reforms would indeed support private sector confidence, which would add momentum to the economic recovery in the euro area, given the supportive stance of monetary policy. We are now at your disposal for questions. 2  BIS Review 20/2004
BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Table 1 International baseline scenario assumptions 2012 GDP growth Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP  2013 (f) IPoM Jun. 14  2014 (f) IPoM Mar. 13  3.4 3.1  3.3 3.0  2015 (f) IPoM IPoM IPoM IPoM IPoM IPoM Dec. 13 Mar. 14 Jun. 14 Dec. 13 Mar. 14 Jun. 14 (annual change, percent) 4.2 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.7  United States Eurozone Japan China India Rest of Asia (excl. Japan, China and India) Latin America (excl. Chile)  2.8 -0.6 1.9 7.7 5.1 3.8 2.7  1.9 -0.4 1.5 7.7 4.6 3.9 2.2  2.5 1.3 1.3 8.2 6.4 4.7 3.7  LME copper price $ Brent oil price $  361 112  332 109  Terms of trade  -4.1  -3.2  2.6 2.7 2.4 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 7.4 7.3 7.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 4.0 4.1 4.1 2.9 2.3 2.0 (levels) 340 310 300 310 101 106 106 108 (annual change, percent) -1.6 0.2 -0.9 -0.5  2.7 1.4 1.0 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.4  2.9 1.5 1.1 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.4  3.1 1.7 1.0 7.2 6.2 4.4 3.0  290 100  285 101  290 103  -1.5  -1.1  -1.5  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries.

There is also the effect of net exports, part of which we saw in the first quarter, resulting from both higher prices in dollars and the reallocation of internal resources derived from the real depreciation of the currency. Add that the developed world will perform better. Finally, there is the impulse coming from public spending, particularly investment, because of the low budget execution of 2013. In the opposite direction point the aforesaid deterioration in business confidence and the downward revisions to the investment project agenda made by the Chilean capital goods corporation for 2014. The 2014 current account deficit forecast is revised downwards mainly because of the foreseen deceleration in investment and a slight increase in savings because of lower private consumption. In the trade balance this is visible mainly in a downward revision to imports. Accordingly, the baseline scenario includes a current account deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP in 2014 (3.6 percent in March). The lower outlook for expenditure also implies that, at trend prices, the deficit will decline further, to 2.2 percent of GDP (3 percent in March) (table 2). The forecast path for inflation rests on several assumptions. For one, in that the passthrough from the peso depreciation to prices will be in line with its historical pattern. In addition, the Board uses as a methodological assumption that the real exchange rate (RER) will remain close to current values, as it is now within the range that is considered consistent  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  with its long-term fundamentals.
To give another example, under the transposition of the second European Payment Services Directive (PSD2) in 2018, third-party payment service providers – which do not hold client funds – are subject to reduced annual reporting requirements. However, this proportionality does not mean being less demanding, especially with regard to the fight against money laundering. The general principle of “same activity, same rule” must apply. Indeed, it is in the Fintechs’ own interest that we should help them to apply the regulatory framework. We also want to help them when new rules are put in place. Under the PSD2 framework, the ACPR was the first European authority to grant authorisations for payment initiation and aggregation services. In total, it has authorised more than 20 actors to offer these new services since 2018. It has also worked to promote the development of open banking, by making sure that all actors can work together on the deployment of APIs. The eight workshops this afternoon, led by experts from nearly all of the ACPR’s directorates, are testament to the focus we place on teaching and informing. But if we can do even better, even more, tell us today. I shall finish by focusing on the ACPR-AMF Fintech Forum which is what brings us here today. Created in 2016, it is a forum for exchange which we try to make as efficient as possible by setting up, where needed, targeted working groups to make concrete progress on key topics.

The 2018 task force on artificial intelligence led to the publication of a first report, and in turn to the launch of experiments with volunteer players, which shall continue in new forms next year. This work is a first step towards the publication of principles of governance for AI algorithms. The working group on remote customer identification led to a number of regulatory changes this year. We are now supporting ANSSI’s efforts to publish a framework so that these changes can be fully implemented. We have also set up two working groups with players from the crypto-asset sector. The first, which published its report last Wednesday, examines all anti-money laundering methods used by digital asset service providers: it highlights the potential of blockchain technology in transaction tracing, and sets out technical avenues for ensuring that electronic transfers meet the transparency requirements recommended by the FATF. The second aims to promote dialogue between digital asset service providers and banking players, to help cryptoasset entrepreneurs get access to the bank accounts and services that they need. II. The digital revolution in payments I would like to turn now to a subject that is closely linked to Fintechs: payments in the digital era. Innovations in the field of payments are disrupting the traditional split between central bank money and commercial bank money. People are using less and less cash, and therefore less and less central bank money, and more and more contactless payments.
The Central Bank interest rate that made the greatest impact on other rates was 17% a year ago, when the Bank held its 2009 Annual General Meeting. As of today, the corresponding interest rate – the average of current account rates and the highest CD rates – is just over 8%. But although interest rates have fallen significantly, it cannot be denied that they are still higher than desirable in view of the slack in the national economy, and they could be lower if the inflation outlook were the only criterion. This is the price we pay for the currency and banking crisis, the lack of credibility in foreign capital markets, and the limited access we have to those markets. Simply put, Icelandic interest rates include a large risk premium. If the capital controls are effective, as they appear to be at present, they obviously provide some scope to look beyond this risk premium. But the controls have not yet been tested by sharp and deep reductions in interest rates and a smaller interest rate differential with abroad than currently exists. Until now, there has been no occasion to take interest rate decisions based on the assumption that no steps will be taken to lift the capital controls in the near future. We hope no such circumstances develop. Strictly speaking, monetary policy in Iceland is not following the inflation target at present.

But no conclusive answer is yet on the horizon – and certainly not now, when so much has yet to be revealed – as the contraction is not over and the effects of the currency crisis and banking collapse are still in evidence. It is clear, however, that 2009 and 2010 would have been difficult for the Icelandic economy in any case, whether the international banking operations headquartered in Iceland had developed or not. This is a most necessary reminder that we must not only clean up the financial market regulatory framework and improve supervision, as I will touch on later, but we must also make efforts to ensure that economic policy prevents macroeconomic imbalances from developing once again. The Icelandic authorities are faced with a host of challenges that are rooted in the circumstances I have just described. I would like to focus on three of these. First, it is critical to allow the economy to adjust without allowing inflation or unemployment to become entrenched. The goal is a situation in which economic slack has disappeared, GDP growth is in line with growth in production, inflation is at target levels, and the external position of the economy is sustainable. Second, we must establish a financial system that serves Icelandic households and domestic business activities and is both economical and relatively secure.
Of  8  6  The implied pace of tightening in the current yield curve between 75 and 125 basis points (bps) is 4 bps per quarter compared to 7 and 5 bps in the November and February Inflation Reports respectively. The average pace of tightening in the cycles since the start of inflation targeting in 1992 is around 50 bps per quarter. BIS central bankers’ speeches  course, even after paying down debt following the crisis, UK households’ indebtedness is high by historical and international measures so there may not be a great deal of room for growth in this area if we want to avoid vulnerabilities building up in the economy generally. The growth in credit since the crisis, however, has been in emerging markets rather than in advanced economies which brings me to the last risk – an unfortunate event from some form of a hard landing in major emerging markets. These are now a large part of the world economy and debt stocks in many emerging economies have grown sharply over the last eight years. This could amplify the stresses many of these economies already face from the inter-related effects of slower emerging market economy growth, much lower commodity prices and a stronger dollar. A more severe slowdown and debt-related financial stress in key emerging markets could well have an impact on advanced economies, including the UK, through a number of channels.

This forecast is premised on a market yield curve in which interest rates rise gradually though to levels substantially below their pre-crisis average. The forecast recognises the risks to this picture from another unfortunate event in the form of a harder landing in emerging markets.6 Secular signals? But while one can still explain the current conjuncture this way, there must be less confidence in the healing story than when I first arrived on the MPC. We have already incorporated a weaker structural picture into our thinking. A few years ago we were expecting a period of above trend productivity growth to recover some of the productivity growth lost during the Great Recession. We no longer expect any catch-up of the lost productivity growth and indeed, productivity growth in our latest forecast only recovers to 1.8%, compared to 2.7% between 1950–2007 and 2.2% in the decade before the crisis. This downgrading of prospects is true more broadly – according to the IMF, potential output growth in advanced economies fell from 2.2% over the period 2001–07 to 1.5% over 2013–14. And the natural rate of interest probably remains around, or a touch below, zero. This is the unobservable underlying real interest rate that is consistent with inflation at target and economic activity at its potential. One cannot observe this “natural rate” directly; it has to be estimated and that is difficult to do with precision.
We are still faced with five challenges and if I may, I would like to consider each of them in turn. 1) The first challenge is to complete the rules for banks’ minimum capital requirements by finalising the Basel III reform. The majority of the work – let’s say 80% – has already been done: its main aspects were approved in 2010–2011 and are now widely implemented. However, discussions remain ongoing on the question of risk weighting in bank balance sheets. The goal is to limit any unjustified variability in the weighting between banks or countries. However, this must not result in a standardisation, as the variability of results is also a reflection of different risk profiles. The risk sensitivity allowed for in banks’ internal models represents a huge step forward, as it ensures that requirements are proportionate to risk-taking. Naturally, we must reinforce confidence in internal models by supervising them closely, as the ACPR has long done and as the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Frankfurt does today. But the task at hand is to finalise Basel III, not to build a new Basel IV based mainly on the standard approach that by definition would not take account of differences between countries and banks. It is in the strategic interests of France, which has always promoted international rules, to conclude a final agreement on Basel III.

This is why the recent regulatory changes on capital in Spain are crucial.9 Banking assets are however opaque, which – combined with the high leverage – make recapitalisation in private markets difficult, especially in crisis periods.10 Therefore, to reduce these problems, high transparency is extremely important: the stress tests and Bank of Spain’s publications on key bank variables are thus indispensable. If, after these exercises to promote transparency, some small groups of banks cannot fulfill the capital requirements, restructuring may be the only solution. Banks are still too highly exposed to real estate assets in their balance sheets and so the new haircuts introduced by the Bank of Spain go in the right direction. Geographical diversification (notably the internationalisation of some banks) and better risk management are also crucial factors, I believe, in addressing the current challenges. But also the strengthening of corporate governance is of utmost importance to avoid excessive risk-taking. In other words, transparency and risk management are important, as I said, but incentives as well! In this sense, the restructuring of some groups of banks may be vital.11 Second, looking into the future, with the crisis behind us, higher bank capital requirements will also play a positive role by reducing incentives for excessive bank risk-taking.12 On that  8  See Iyer and Peydró (2011) and Rochet and Vives (2004). 9  See Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (forthcoming). 10  See Morgan (2002). 11  See Cuñat and Garicano (2010). 12  See Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Acharya and Richardson (2009).
2 Although the legislation is not clear, not only in Sweden but also in many other regions, there is no doubt that central banks have considerable responsibility for the stability and efficiency of the financial system. Both fundamental economic theory and the historical motives for creating central banks indicate this is so. Central banking is about the provision of liquidity One of the most important tasks for a central bank is to ensure that the payment system functions – that there is sufficient money, or means of payment or “liquidity” more generally, so that trade in goods and services can function smoothly. To enable the large volume of goods and services produced – and now also financial products and services – to change owner smoothly, one must have good access to a generally accepted means of payment. The supply of means of payment today consists to a very small degree, and to a diminishing degree, of banknotes and coins. Payments are instead made by transfers between the parties’ bank accounts or using payment or credit cards. But this does not change the central bank's fundamental task – which is still to ensure that the supply of liquidity functions. The central bank can be regarded as the banks’ bank. The Riksbank and other central banks fulfil this task in many different ways. Partly by granting loans to banks during the day and partly be receiving deposits from or giving loans to banks in the slightly longer term, for instance over one or more weeks.

Mr. Yam discusses “Intervention true to guiding policy” Discussion by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr. Joseph Yam, published in South China Morning Post on 24/8/98. The current debate revolving around government intervention in the stock and futures markets to deter currency manipulation brought a feeling of nostalgia to me. It made me recall the many debates on government intervention there were within the administration when Sir Philip Haddon-Cave was financial secretary. I was then, in the late 1970s, a young economist in the Economic Services Branch of the Government Secretariat, with little responsibility and a lot to learn. Those debates were, somehow, rather more healthy and more intellectual. There was certainly less mud being thrown around. But the contrast is understandable. Today, this is a controversial issue. There are interested parties airing their grievances through punchy and articulate expressions of their views on this philosophical issue of interventionism. This is also an issue in which, in a more politicised environment and at a time when the community is enduring the pain of economic adjustment, the politically minded see great political mileage. A government with the whole of the legislature arguably in opposition makes a vulnerable target. It is so easy to wave the banner of free markets and condemn any government intervention, and be seen to be righteous and knowledgeable; notwithstanding that the government concerned has been so successfully running the freest economy in the world.
In other words, I think that it is a wiser basic strategy to concentrate on making sure that the economy does not overheat - which leads to recessions - than to count on large hypothetical improvements in future productivity which, if they do not materialise, will involve loss of credibility and a drastic slowing down of the economy similar to those we have so often witnessed in the last couple of decades. I have also discussed various aspects of fluctuations in asset prices. One encouraging conclusion that I think we can draw in this connection is that the present monetary policy framework in Sweden, with built-in inflation targets, provides a reasonable basis for tackling any problems that may arise. BIS Review 128/1999  6

However, despite improvements in growth witnessed since 1999, significant reductions in poverty will not occur without a significant increase in growth rates to above 7% on a sustained basis. One of the ways in which growth can be scaled up is through the employment of the vast African resources for the development of the continent. Prior to the global financial and economic crisis, the African continent experienced a surge in investment flows in many sectors including mining, manufacturing, tourism, transport and construction. This inflow of foreign capital helped to finance the development registered in Africa over the past decade. The inflow of foreign capital coupled with high prices of commodities on the global market led to high international reserve accumulation in most commodity exporting countries, including those in Africa. However, following the global financial and economic crisis the accumulation of international reserves declined as commodity prices plunged and foreign capital inflows, both private and public slowed significantly or were reversed. This has had a negative impact on the availability of resources to finance Africa’s development. The challenge going forward is recovering, maintaining and sustaining the economic gains and macroeconomic stability that African countries experienced before the crisis hit. In view of the anticipated reduction in aid flows and foreign direct investment, African countries need to give domestic savings mobilisation as much attention as the other foreign sources of development finance.