samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the last few months, we have seen slight upward price movement with both headline and core inflation rates turning positive since the fourth quarter of last year. Currently, headline and core inflation for February 2010 are at 3.7 and 0.3 per cent respectively. The turnaround was due to a combination of the base effects from oil prices and the pick-up in domestic demand. Looking ahead, with the firming economic recovery, inflationary pressure is expected to increase further, with core inflation forecasted to surpass the midpoint of our target range of 0.5–3.0 percent by the end of the year. Thus, it is clear that in the near term, policymakers need to perform a delicate balancing act that would at the same time ensure a continued growth momentum, the anchoring of inflationary expectations, and the containment of potential financial imbalances. In light of the solid fourth-quarter GDP figures and January’s economic indicators, the current extraordinary accommodative monetary policy stance will be of less need for the Thai economy. Furthermore, an over-extended period of low interest rates can lead to heightened inflation expectations or financial imbalances such as asset price bubbles, as this crisis has vividly demonstrated in many countries. To this end, the timing of monetary policy normalization will be important so that it will not jeopardize economic recovery particularly as private investment has yet to pick up enough pace. Thus, I would like to assure you that, we will put our best effort in considering its timing carefully.

Our latest economic projection as of January 2010 suggests an economic expansion of 3.3–5.3 per cent in 2010 and 2.8–4.4 per cent in 2011, with an increasing role of private investment replacing government expenditure, which will gradually subside since the need for continued fiscal stimulus wanes as the economic growth becomes self-sustaining. Here, I would like to point out that this projection is due for a revision in April. With the stronger-than-expected performance in the last quarter of 2009, it is highly likely that these numbers will be revised upward. Ladies and Gentlemen, Having pointed out a fairly positive outlook, I will now turn to the second topic of my talk: the key challenges going forward and I must quickly add that looking ahead there are both external and domestic uncertainties. Policymakers therefore will have to be watchful and well-prepared to implement appropriate policy to ensure continued growth momentum amidst these challenges. First, the global economic recovery, particularly those of the industrialized economies, remains fragile and subject to downside risks. In spite of the higher-than-expected growth in the fourth quarter of 2009, the US economy is still beset by high unemployment, continued deleveraging, and weak financial institutions. All of these will have dampening effects on domestic demand, especially consumer spending – the main growth driver for the US economy. At the same time, concerns on the Eurozone’s sizable fiscal deficits especially those of the peripheral economies may trigger another round of confidence problems.
While this may be a legitimate view, technology will nevertheless have an important impact on the kind of services that brokers are offering their corporate clients and what clients are prepared to pay for such services. In many emerging markets, the technology revolution is starting to gain more traction in the delivery of financial services, including insurance, following greater stability in internet connections, advancements in security and payments infrastructure and strengthened data protection frameworks in these markets. Correspondingly, brokers need to strategically review the strength of their value propositions in this changing environment and actively seek to lift their own services by leveraging on technology. These four reasons are just a few that should prompt the insurance broking community to reevaluate their business and operating strategies going forward. All of them – the fallout from the global financial crisis, Asia’s growth trajectory, the focus on climate risk, and more entrenched technological revolution in the delivery of financial services – are converging to re-define expectations, possibilities and risks in the insurance broking sector in a profound way that will determine if a firm will thrive or be marginalised in the coming decade. Going forward, brokers will be expected to play a far more significant role in delivering innovation and choice by developing deep knowledge of the industries that their clients operate in, and working with insurance providers to bring new products into the market that are meeting the changing needs of businesses.

It is therefore our hope that the MOU we are signing today will assist in not only fostering stronger trade relationships between Zambia and China but to also avail our staff a multi cultural awareness which would assist them both in their official work and in developing their social networks. We also hope that staff will have opportunities for higher education in China and other South East Asian countries where the Chinese language is spoken. Allow me to mention here that, already three bank employees are currently pursuing Phd programmes in China under the Chinese Government scholarship programme. With the introduction of this initiative, it is my hope that more of our staff can be offered scholarships to study in China. In conclusion, let me appeal to the members of staff who will be enrolled on the programme to take the course seriously bearing in mind the resources that the bank is investing into this undertaking. To this effect I urge the human resources department to enrol employees who are committed to learning the language. I also wish to thank the Chinese International School in Zambia for accepting our proposal and we look forward to a further cooperation with other Chinese institutions in order to foster the relations of our two countries. Lastly, I want to thank you, Your Excellency, for finding time to witness this great occasion. I thank you all for your attention. 2  BIS Review 175/2010
So perhaps we played a part in turning around the sentiment of international finance last year. BIS Review 120/1999  2  And let me say this also: knowing well my close colleagues who fought this battle together with me, it would, I think, be difficult to find stronger believers in the free market than those of us in the Hong Kong Administration. A few names will, of course, spring to your mind immediately, but my response is that we work in the real world and not in ivory towers. The fact of the matter is that free markets can sometimes fail. Free markets can sometimes behave in a manner very much against the long-term interests of society. When this occurs, if those of us in the Administration hide conveniently behind the banner of free markets and do nothing, we are failing in our duties. And to those who accuse us of betraying the philosophy of positive non-interventionism, let me ask this question: why do you think Sir Philip Haddon-Cave used the word “positive” when he coined the phrase? International finance But perhaps enough has already been said on that subject. Let me now move to the longer-term structural issues of concern to our monetary and financial systems. As I said earlier, we need to ensure that we come out of the crisis stronger rather than weaker. We need to identify structural defects, if any, and address ways of correcting them, not necessarily limiting ourselves to our own systems, given the globalisation of financial markets.

This means a greater regulatory burden for all and greater inconvenience to market participants, and possibly implications for the legal and institutional arrangements for regulation. Fourth, this approach may involve tighter rules for the markets. The critics may again say that this will further erode market freedom. But should we be so dogmatic? In any case, it is all a matter of degree. In the end, it is the public interest that counts. Is there, for example, anything wrong in restrictions against the holding of large dominating positions in any particular market, or against the taking of market moving activities? The purpose of a market is price discovery. There is no objection for buying low and selling high, and I would wish anybody who is attempting that the best of luck. But there is no legitimate reason for anybody to be operating in a market in a manner that has the sole aim of moving the price in order to make a profit. Tighter rules aside, it is interesting, and indeed slightly worrying, to note that stronger forms of restrictions and controls have been gaining currency among some monetary authorities or regulators in the past two years. These range from restrictions on domestic credit to some forms of exchange controls. This response is quite understandable and may be a reflection of the failure of the international financial architecture to accommodate the needs of small markets. But it is also regrettable, given the enormous benefit that international capital has brought to the region.
However, despite the label, too big to fail, the magnitude of these externalities does not depend simply on size. The extent of the externalities also depends on the particular mix of business activities and the degree of interconnectedness with the rest of the financial industry. One significant element is the importance of the services the firm provides to the broader financial system and the economy, as well as the ease with which its customers can move their business to other providers. Another element is the extent to which the firm’s structure and activities create the potential for contagion – that is, the potential that a problem at one firm could spread more broadly through the financial system. Contagion might occur along several different pathways, including the direct losses imposed by failure on the firm’s counterparties, the impact of the failure on the asset prices held by other leveraged financial institutions, or a loss of confidence spreading to other firms with similar business models. The presence of large negative externalities creates a dilemma for policymakers when such firms are in danger of failing, particularly at a time when the wider financial system is also under stress. At that point in time, the expected costs to society of failure are very large compared to the short-run costs from providing the extraordinary liquidity support, capital, or other emergency assistance necessary to prevent catastrophic failure.

After all, collectively these enhancements to our current regime may not solve another important problem evident within some large financial institutions – the apparent lack of respect for law,  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  regulation and the public trust. There is evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many large financial institutions. Whether this is due to size and complexity, bad incentives or some other issues is difficult to judge, but it is another critical problem that needs to be addressed. Tough enforcement and high penalties will certainly help focus management’s attention on this issue. But I am also hopeful that ending too big to fail and shifting the emphasis to longer-term sustainability will encourage the needed cultural shift necessary to restore public trust in the industry. One alternative strategy for dealing with too big to fail is to reduce the size of large banks by imposing size limits. While I understand the motivation, it is important to recognize that imposing size limitations might not be a very efficient means of making the financial system more stable. First, it could sacrifice some socially beneficial economies of scale and scope, especially to the global clients of large financial institutions, depending on how the size limits were implemented. Second, the resulting benefits in terms of reducing systemic risk might be quite small.
Personally, I am encouraged that we have not seen a tidal wave of public announcements declaring large-scale affiliations among banking, brokerage and insurance firms. Passage of the Act may well lead to a few more mergers among larger firms specializing in different financial service sectors and aiming to take advantage of perceived synergies and cost advantages. But we shouldn’t be surprised if the Act has only limited immediate structural impact. This view is based on several observations:  3  BIS Review 32/2000  •  On the commercial bank/securities side, the Act to a great extent reflects structural reality. Following the liberalization of the rules governing so-called Section 20 subsidiaries in 1996, several dozen securities firms were acquired by bank holding companies over the 1998-99 period. There are now 51 active securities affiliates, most of them in this district. I think that most bank holding companies that want to engage in securities dealing are doing so already. •  On the insurance side, many banks have been engaged in agent activities for some time, particularly following the Supreme Court’s 1996 Barnett Bank decision. However, it remains unclear whether more than just a few banks have real interest in underwriting insurance. Moreover, many insurance firms are mutual companies, which would prevent mergers and acquisitions, at least until they became stock companies.

In January of this year, the Committee released a paper on the range of  BIS Review 32/2000  6  current practices in banks’ internal ratings systems. As the Committee builds on this work to develop operational proposals, we will be focusing on the need for banks to have robust standards and procedures governing the assignment of internal ratings, as well as the need for the Committee to establish appropriate supervisory guidelines. In this vein, we will be working to ensure that disclosure practices regarding internal ratings systems play an important role in the ongoing supervisory validation of these approaches. External ratings Of course, I also expect that a revised standardized approach will be a critical element of the new capital adequacy framework. As you may know, last June’s consultative paper described a revised standardized approach building on the current Accord by tying risk weights to external credit assessments, such as credit ratings. In other words, OECD membership would no longer be relied on for setting regulatory capital for sovereign or bank claims. For example, loans to similarly-rated banks located in OECD and non-OECD countries would receive the same risk weight. Industry participants have expressed support for the use of external ratings as an alternative to the current OECD/non-OECD distinction. Comments have also been received in favor of incorporating greater credit risk differentiation into the standardized approach, particularly for credit exposures to corporate entities. Some respondents have suggested that this might be achieved by introducing additional risk buckets into the framework.
Brian P Sack: Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve’s role as liquidity provider Remarks by Mr Brian P Sack, Executive Vice President of Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the New York Association for Business Economics, New York, 9 June 2010. *  *  *  In my remarks today, I had intended to focus on the Federal Reserve’s experience with the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or the TALF. This facility, which is scheduled to end later this month, was the last of the Federal Reserve’s special liquidity programs, and those programs were then expected to enter a period of inactivity. It had therefore seemed to be a good time to reflect on our experiences with the TALF, and more broadly on the role of the central bank as a liquidity provider. However, the context for this talk has shifted importantly with recent developments in financial markets. In particular, investors’ concerns about sovereign risk in some European countries, with the attendant pressures on financial firms with exposures in those areas, have put renewed emphasis on liquidity provision and led the Federal Reserve and five foreign central banks to reestablish dollar liquidity swap lines. Accordingly, I will begin today with some remarks on recent financial market developments and the role of the liquidity swap lines. I will then turn to the TALF program, providing a review of its performance and assessing the benefits that it provided.

The sector composition of the three Scandinavian stock exchanges provides an illustration. The Oslo Stock Exchange is heavily dominated by the energy sector, which is practically absent in Stockholm, Copenhagen and the two other Nordic exchanges. Norway has small traditional industries, but the IT and telecom sector is comparable to the other countries’ in relative size. The different sector composition of the stock exchanges also illustrates the potential for diversification by investing across the Nordic countries. The differences in industrial structure imply that international economic developments will affect the Nordic countries differently. Most notably, an oil price shock will have the opposite effect in Norway than in the other Nordic economies. In 2001, the petroleum sector in Norway accounted for around 20 per cent of total investments, 45 per cent of exports, 24 per cent of GDP and 35 per cent of central government revenues. The government net cash flow from the petroleum sector has increased in recent years. Since 1995, the fiscal surplus has been invested in the Government Petroleum Fund. The size of the Fund has increased rapidly in the last few years, and will reach close to 100 per cent of GDP towards the end of this decade, according to estimates from the Ministry of Finance. By investing a substantial part of petroleum revenues abroad, the Government Petroleum Fund limits the effect of the current account surplus on the exchange rate. GDP growth in Norway has been relatively high since 1990, also when excluding the petroleum sector.
Furthermore, the average rate over the four years after we had switched to inflation targeting equalled 3.6%. Second, Russia’s banking sector was resilient and had a capital cushion since we had mostly completed its resolution by that moment. Both corporate and retail lending were expanding, with mortgage loans demonstrating record-high growth. The stable banking system and low inflation were the basic factors enabling us to implement large-scale anti-crisis measures. This was not just a combination of circumstances, but rather the result of many years of work. If we had not stuck firmly to the course for lowering inflation to our target and had not removed weak and unsteady players from the market, we would not have accumulated the safety cushion to provide support to households and businesses. This is the first crisis in Russia’s contemporary history when the banking system did not need additional capitalisation and had no risks to financial stability which might have arisen without the earlier resolution of banks. During this period, households’ and businesses’ incomes plummeted, and this slump was totally unexpected. Russia needed urgent measures to provide direct aid, on the one hand, which was ensured by the Government, and to cut costs, on the other hand. This was needed so that people could use their remaining incomes, savings and the financial aid from the Government for daily expenses and maintaining their life quality, and so that companies could cover their cash gaps, pay wages, and ultimately rescue their business.

Elvira Nabiullina: Bank of Russia’s 2020 Annual Report Speech by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the State Duma’s plenary session on Bank of Russia’s 2020 Annual Report, Moscow, 15 June 2021. * * * Good afternoon, Mr Volodin. Good afternoon, esteemed deputies. Today, I present the Bank of Russia’s Annual Report for 2020. First of all, I would like to thank the deputies for the detailed review of our report at the meetings of the working groups, parliamentary parties, and State Duma committees. You really performed a significant amount of work despite your schedule of the spring session being very tight. Taking this into account, I will therefore do my best to shorten this speech. Nonetheless, I would like to focus on key topics. Last year was abnormal, and we will remember it for a long time. The pandemic entailed huge losses, and many families lost their loved ones. As we needed to protect people’s lives, we had to impose serious restrictions, and they inevitably affected the economy. Our main task last year was to mitigate the aftermath of the pandemic for households and businesses. I would like to emphasise that the financial system, the financial sector, helped us overcome the consequences of the pandemic. There are two main reasons why the financial system was able to help all other sectors of the economy, rather than itself needing financial aid, as before. First, we started 2020 with relatively low inflation, specifically 3% as of the beginning of the year.
It will need increasingly to pivot from design of new international standards to ensuring consistent implementation across jurisdictions. It will need to be prepared to speak out loudly when standards are not being met. Where standards have been met, it will need to encourage national authorities in one jurisdiction to recognise and defer to equivalent regulation and supervision in another. And it will need to monitor and address risk throughout the system. Of course, while I think and hope we can continue and indeed reinforce the international governance that has been developed, it is not a given that we will succeed. It is very much in everyone’s interest to ensure that we do. If we cannot ensure consistent application of international standards, the result is very unlikely to be more unconstrained global financial activity of the sort we saw before the crisis. Rather it is likely to be the further rolling back of financial globalisation to the detriment of the global economy as national regulators feel compelled take local action to protect their own jurisdictions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Intensive supervision It is not all about new approaches to regulation – to how you set the rules. It is also about new approaches to supervision – to how you apply those rules, day to day. From the outset, a key element of the international reform agenda has been more intense and more internationally co-ordinated supervision of systemically important firms.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  When leaning against the wind of the credit cycle, macro-prudential authorities do, like their monetary policy colleagues, still need to find the optimal path. To use the words of the UK Chancellor, their objective is not to ensure “the stability of the graveyard”. How they balance cost and risk, where they set the trade-offs, will depend in large part on how confident they are about the underlying resilience of the system – in other words how well they have done on the first impulse. International governance The second big change I want, therefore, to highlight is the development since the crisis of much stronger international governance. This stems from the creation, at the April 2009 G20 London summit, of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). And, equally important, from the decision at the Summit that the FSB should report directly to the G20 Leaders and Finance Ministers to give it the necessary “clout”. Working with the standard setting organisations like the Basel Committee, the FSB has provided the drive and coordination to reform and develop global standards for bank capital, liquidity, and resolution. If one remembers the best part of a decade that it took to develop and reach agreement on the Basel 2 capital standard, the progress made and international agreement reached over the past 5 years has been extraordinary.