samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have a vision, we have teams of responsible professionals who work every day to achieve the goals set by the SDDS Plus, we have excellent interinstitutional cooperation... And all this, which is also necessary to build and develop modern and quality statistics, guarantees us that we will succeed to the end. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

I am not going to cover that in any detail tonight you will be relieved to hear, save to make a few points relevant to the current context. First, we do think that the impact of QE is most pronounced in conditions of market instability, as we saw in March last year. Second, we think that a larger part of the impact of QE comes from the initial announcement of the stock of assets to be purchased, rather than the subsequent flow of purchases. As a reminder, the current round was announced last November when things looked bleak on the Covid front. This begs a pertinent question: what impact do you get from continuing purchases in market financial conditions, and particularly at a time when inflation is rising as it is? The reason in my view is that QE does have an effect in stable conditions, and it is an important one, though I should emphasise on the second part of the question that because we regard the current upturn in inflation as transient, our view on the continuing role of QE is conditioned by our forecast in August that had inflation returning to target within an acceptable period of time. One channel through which QE operates is to keep rates further along the curve down relative to where they would be otherwise. In that sense, the transmission mechanism is somewhat different to a change in Bank Rate, though the outcomes will likewise be seen in activity and inflation.
Systemic financial events with spillovers to the real economy have been a persistent feature of the economic environment, and both financial market participants and policymakers have grappled with the challenge of how to reduce their incidence and to minimize their severity, longevity and impact on the broader economy. There is a lot we do not understand about these challenges, but we know more today than we once did. In the case of the crises of the late 1990s, despite the broad-based nature of the financial market turmoil, in countries where capital cushions in the financial sector were strong relative to risk, where there was a greater diversity of institutions in the financial system to absorb the losses, and where monetary authorities were in a position to provide liquidity to restore confidence, the financial and macroeconomic impact of the crises was relatively modest. Where those conditions did not exist, the damage was acute. The U.S. economy appears to have become more resilient to financial shocks. Over the past two decades, the U.S. economy has experienced several episodes of significant financial market strain. These episodes were associated with spikes in risk perception and significant market volatility within financial markets, but none proved exceptionally damaging in terms of the overall macroeconomic impact. The mild impact of these episodes on the real economy contrasts with financial events such as the “credit crunch” that exacerbated the 1990-91 recession.

The prospects for future stability will depend in part on how effective supervisors are in adapting policies in response to the ongoing evolution in markets. Financial institutions face strong incentives to monitor and limit their risk profile and the risk-taking of their leveraged counterparties to some efficient level where benefits balance costs at the margin. This is good for the firm and also good from society’s perspective. Private pools of capital have the capacity to use extensive leverage to amplify returns. This leverage can be acquired in a variety of ways: through repurchase agreements and reverse repos, through secured financing and securities lending and through derivatives and structured financial products. The ability of funds to take on risk and leverage is constrained by two external sources of discipline the returns required by their investors, and the terms on which their dealers/financers are willing to extend credit. In other words, the fund is constrained by the willingness of outsiders, collectively, to take exposure to the fund. The willingness of banks and investment banks to take on exposure to hedge funds is in turn influenced by the capital and supervisory framework that applies to those institutions and the discipline imposed on them by the market. The effectiveness of market discipline in constraining the risk-taking behavior of financial firms, however, may be compromised by the presence of market failures of the type mentioned above.
It can create uncertainty as to how the inflation target is defined in practice. Until one year ago I myself sat “on the outside” and monitored the Riksbank’s policy making. And I must confess that I thought it was a little unclear which measure of inflation the Riksbank actually used in formulating its policy. This was connected with the prominent role the CPIX had played in the Riksbank’s analysis and rhetoric. The CPIX – how it began The CPIX is a measure of inflation that has been around a long time. It was included in the predecessor to the Monetary Policy Reports, “Inflation and Inflation Expectations in Sweden”, which was first published in October 1993. At that time the measure was known as UND1 and as now it was adjusted for the direct effects of indirect taxes and subsidies and mortgage interest expenditure. At that time the krona had recently depreciated heavily and this had an impact in the form of a one-off increase in import prices. The measure therefore initially made adjustments for changes in import prices as well. The reason given then for adjusting for interest costs was that the financial turbulence in autumn 1992 had led to temporary effects on inflation. Some years later other reasons made it important to adjust for interest costs. During the second half of the 1990s the Riksbank cut the repo rate substantially, from almost 9 to below 3 per cent.

At the same time, when looking at accumulated unit labour cost changes we observe that a number of economies which lost cost competitiveness also experienced a loss of market shares, less gains in job creation and/or deteriorating current account position. Despite the decline in the euro area average unemployment rate over the last few years, unemployment remains too high in several countries and regions of the euro area. In these countries and regions, wage increases should not fully exhaust productivity gains in order to provide incentives for firms to create additional jobs. In this respect, sufficient wage differentiation is also required to improve the employment opportunities for less skilled workers where there is high unemployment for this category of employees. The extent to which an increase in nominal wage growth leads to upward pressure on inflation depends crucially on trend labour productivity growth. Under normal circumstances, stronger labour productivity growth would justify an increase in nominal wage growth, thus allowing wage earners to participate in economic growth without adding to inflationary pressures. But for the same reason, without sustained improvements in labour productivity higher nominal wages would not lead to improvements in real purchasing power, but fuel inflationary pressures. Importantly, industries are characterised by different productivity developments. Therefore, wage setting should allow for sufficient wage differentiation and agreements in one industry or sector can not readily be transferred to others. BIS Review 52/2007  1  Those are the reasons whey the Governing Council calls for a high level of responsibility from social partners.
The key is that measures designed to put public finances on an even keel and improve competiveness are made credible and therefore implementable. In some cases, such as Greece, stronger institutions are also needed to ensure that tax revenues are safeguarded in the future. The main responsibility for this of course lies with the politicians in the respective countries. In parallel with this long-term work, the support measures designed to resolve the acute difficulties need to continue. Hopefully this will help us to reduce the widespread financial unease. All in all, however, it will still take time to resolve the debt crisis in Europe. Slow growth in the euro area, but no recession Real fiscal-policy improvements are thus required in several of the euro countries in the period ahead in order to stabilise sovereign debts. We therefore expect growth to be weak in the euro countries over the next few years, although the picture varies from country to country. Germany is a locomotive for growth in the euro area. It is important to remember that the euro area is still managing to get along, even though growth in the area as a whole is not so strong (see Figure 8). The United States – weak recovery with bright spots The situation in the United States is, like that in Ireland, the result of an overheated housing market and dramatic falls in housing prices in combination with structural problems.

In both dimensions, I believe this kind of long-term approach is the hallmark of a high-quality financial system. Concluding remarks 27. I hope these reflections have shed some light on Hong Kong’s distinctive qualities as an international financial centre. It is resilient – our institutions and markets remain safe and sound in good times and bad. And it offers huge opportunities to local and global participants, driven by the Mainland’s continued financial liberalisation, as well as developments in fintech and green finance. 28. My team and I are committed to upholding these qualities. We will continue to reinforce Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre of the highest quality. This journey has no end – and we will rely as always on strong support from everyone that we work with, including many of you. I am confident that, by working together, we can continue to build on Hong Kong’s unique foundation – and enhance our position as one of the world’s pre3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  eminent financial centres. 29. It only remains for me to thank the Hong Kong Management Association for having me here tonight; to thank you all for your attention; and to congratulate the winners of the Quality Award – your achievements are rightly honoured today. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
The responsibility of the central bank for the payment system is therefore often expressed as a task to maintain financial stability. The repo rate is not an efficient instrument for counteracting problems in the payment system. If such problems threaten to arise, it is entirely different types of measures that need to be taken. The monetary policy stance takes into consideration the outlook for inflation and the real economy, but does not consider financial stability. So if the repo rate is not a good tool for financial stability, how can we protect ourselves against financial crises? In my experience, much can be achieved if the authorities and the financial participants together draw up effective preventive measures and plans for good crisis management. One clear and positive conclusion from the crises in the past twenty years is that good crisis management can save large amounts of money and reduce disruptions to society. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that bad crisis management aggravates crises, partly by spreading uncertainty among the general public and the financial market agents. This may sound abstract, but in practice entails creating good laws, regulations and supervision. Sometimes, acute banking problems may nevertheless arise and may mean it is necessary to close down a bank. When a bank needs to be closed, a difficult balance arises, between the owners' interests and the savers' interest, which are both safeguarded in law. One very current example of this dilemma in Sweden is the case of Custodia.

Put simply, a balance sheet produced under US GAAP is twice as small as its equivalent using international standards. And capital appears twice as high. This creates confusion. Le Figaro – Will the United States implement Basel III? Christian Noyer – We’ll be monitoring developments very closely. I have no doubts about the commitment of the US administration and the Fed. 2  BIS Review 152/2010
In DLT, the term ‘atomic settlement’ is used in this context. Settlement in DLT systems raises issues similar to those for settlement in an RTGS system, just the other way round. Central bank money existed as a secure means of payment before the introduction of the first RTGS systems; what was lacking for a long time was an appropriate settlement mechanism. This was provided by RTGS systems introduced from the 1980s. With DLT, the situation is reversed: A secure settlement model in the form of atomic settlement is designed to be in place from the outset. The unresolved question with DLT systems is which means of payment are the most appropriate. 5  By ‘conditional’ we mean a secure settlement based on the principle that the delivery of assets occurs if and only if payment is made (‘delivery versus payment’, or DvP). Page 7/11  The SNB is open to DLT and the token ecosystem and its potential for efficiency gains and risk reduction. At the same time, however, DLT can introduce new risks into the system. It could fundamentally change the role of financial intermediaries, and thus the architecture of today’s financial system. If we are guided by the three principles, it should help limit the risks. Token transactions require stable-value, generally accepted means of payment. We will now show you which private and government-issued forms of money qualify under principle 1 within the two-tier financial system.

See: http://www.ellsbury.com/gne/gne-042.htm. 4 In 1946, King George VI appointed Turing an Officer of the Order of the British Empire for his wartime services, although the details of his work remained secret for many years. 5 Turing, A (1936), ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp. 230-265. 3  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  Having imagined the concept of a computer, Turing helped turn it into reality. He played a vital role in the design and development of early electronic computers after the war, continuing to contribute key ideas such as implementing functions by flexible programing rather than pre-set built-in electronic components. Working first at the National Physical Laboratory in London and later at the Computing Machine Laboratory at Manchester University, his insights led to the creation of the Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) in 1950 and the program for Ferranti Mark 1, the world’s first commercially available electronic computer. A visionary as well as a revolutionary, Turing recognised that “This is only a foretaste of what is to come and only the shadow of what is going to be”. True to his nature, Turing himself began to suggest some possible directions. His interests in neurology and physiology led him to ask whether computing machines could be capable of mimicking the faculties of the human mind, including the ability to learn.
Market-based finance has grown rapidly and not been subject to the same regulatory scrutiny as banks. And as monetary  Page 9  policy makers gradually implement QT, financial markets will adjust, perhaps in unexpected ways[26]. This is a key motivation for our upcoming non-bank exploratory stress scenario, and an ongoing area of focus for us and international counterparts. How we work – and the need for diverse policymakers Finally I’ll say a bit about the different ways the two committees work, and how you might fit in. As I said, the MPC is older with more measurable objectives. That is reflected in the kinds of analysis it uses. It has a well-established forecasting process, which takes in new data to update its projections for the economy. Supporting the forecast are many models, some of them fancy ‘general equilibrium’ setups that account for interaction between different parts of the economy[27]. Of course that’s not to say there are no unsettled questions in monetary policy, but there is a good deal more theory and practice around its conduct. The FPC is not quite in the same position. We certainly receive lots of in-depth analysis from Bank staff, often drawing on data and models. But our objective is harder to measure, and we have fewer models that tie everything together. Partly that’s because the ‘science’ of financial stability is still in its early years. We need to focus on worst-case outcomes, so have less data to work with than monetary policymakers.

Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 22 February 2007. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here! I came here for the first time one year ago, as newlyappointed Governor of the Riksbank. A year passes quickly, and now it is once again time for me to summarise the past year and at the same time report on how the Executive Board of the Riksbank views the prospects for the economy and inflation. Before I begin, I would like to welcome the fact that the Committee has decided to hold this hearing at a later date in relation to the publication of the Riksbank's report. Of course, this means I risk having to answer even sharper questions than usual, but it’s all in the line of duty. It is also important that these hearings are held under the best possible conditions. My most important message today is: •  We have now begun to publish our own forecast for the repo rate. This means that we have taken a further step towards increased clarity and openness in monetary policy. •  Inflation rose last year, but was still below the target. One of the main reasons is the substantial productivity growth. Understanding which mechanisms lie behind the strong productivity has been, and is, an important task for the Riksbank. •  The economic prospects are bright.
Medical inflation has been on a rising trend with millions of ringgit spent in Malaysia on healthcare expenditure each year. Old age and urban poverty are also on the rise with many exhausting their lifetime savings within the first five years of retirement. These are structural issues that have deep implications on the industry. It should be discussed and debated intelligently. To my mind, the focus of debate therefore should be on how to improve the productivity of agents, and ensure that they are well supported through training and continuing professional development and given all the assistance to provide quality advice and services to the public. More should be done to educate consumers on the benefits of insurance and the advantages of purchasing insurance while one is young and healthy. In this regard, the industry should come together and address the reasons for the low take up of annuity products despite the tax relief and incentives provided by the Government in 2012. Initiatives should be pursued to expand affordable product offerings for lower income groups that are most vulnerable to income shocks or unanticipated expenditures. Another area that is becoming significant because of medical inflation is ensuring that medical and health insurance provides adequate protection and remains affordable through well designed products, proper underwriting and effective control of claims costs should be a priority. The issues I had outlined are formidable and these cannot be accomplished without concerted effort by all of us here.

With pressures on their capital and new capital expensive where it is available, banks are likely to attempt to increase their margins and to slow down new lending, thereby reducing their capital requirements, for example by tightening non-price terms and conditions on new loans. One factor which regulators are watching carefully at present is the impact of the shift this month to the Basle II system of capital requirements for European banks. While Basle II improves on its predecessor and removes many undesirable incentives, it retains some procyclical features and any transition needs to be managed carefully. 8 The impact on expectations and confidence The other channel by which the financial market turbulence is likely to have macroeconomic effects is by prompting more cautious behaviour by households and firms. This might simply reflect uncertainty about the future. Firms may temporarily postpone investment because of greater uncertainty about the future path of demand. We saw an effect like this after 9/11 for example. But it might also reflect a revision by households and firms about the sustainable path of income and wealth in the coming years. The change in expectations may reflect the higher costs of borrowing and a higher risk of unemployment. Again a reduction in confidence about future growth may lead directly to lower consumption and investment. It is also likely to affect equity and property markets. Potential buyers may decide to wait before purchasing if they sense that there is a chance that prices may fall. Such behaviour can be self-fulfilling.