samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This has prompted greater international collaboration across the world to contribute towards a greater understanding of the implications of this trend. Underpinning this is also the high level of professionalism and integrity of statisticians at national and international agencies. It is in this recent two decades, that the global economic and financial environment has become more interconnected, more complex and more competitive. It has resulted in greater economic and financial integration and more intricate interconnectivities. At the same time, the world has also become more unstable and less predictable with frequent shocks and crises. This new and more challenging environment has significant implications for business and for public policy. Economic agents need to have an appreciation of the multi-faceted shifts in their environment in order to form the appropriate assessments and make informed decisions. For policy makers, it highlights the importance of having reliable, relevant and high-quality statistics to support and pave the way for sound policy decision making. For statisticians, the challenge is to continuously improve the statistical science towards facilitating the foundation to build a better future. My remarks today will be from the perspective of a central banker. Timely and high quality statistics is one of the important prerequisites for central banks to effectively achieve our goals of monetary and financial stability, and of fostering the development of a sound and progressive financial sector.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Statistical science for a better tomorrow Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the International Statistical Institute Regional Statistics Conference 2014 “Statistical Science for a Better Tomorrow”, Kuala Lumpur, 18 November 2014. *  *  *  Introduction It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this inaugural International Statistical Institute Regional Statistics Conference. This conference takes place at a time of major transformative change in our region and in the world. The contribution of statistics in this new and rapidly changing environment has become of even greater importance. In this increasingly complex world, the availability of high quality statistics is vital in facilitating decision making for both the private and public sectors. The world is also seeing greater demands for higher levels of transparency. This has become key for building trust and confidence regardless of the line and nature of business. The statistics community has responded to these changes. Immense progress has been achieved in developing the methodology for generating consistent economic and financial statistical systems. In a world that has also become more globalised, such progress has brought great benefits to businesses and policymakers in terms of the availability, comparability, and broad consistency of economic data across countries. For any economic and financial community, detailed and comprehensive data are highly important to understand the implications of the developments taking place.
The headway made in the vaccination process allowed for a gradual easing of social distancing measures and for a recovery in demand, underpinned by the powerful economic policy response. However, the recovery was partially hampered by three factors. The first of these factors was the various waves of the pandemic, although the ensuing disruptions to economic activity became progressively less severe. Conversely, the other two – namely the sharp rises in the prices of certain goods and the global supply chain disruptions (bottlenecks) – have gradually become increasingly important constraining factors. These have proven more persistent and severe than expected and have become even more acute following the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the measures adopted in China to counter the latest outbreak of the pandemic. Although these three factors are global in nature, their impact has been very asymmetrical across countries, given the differences in productive systems, access to vaccines, economic policy response and degree of energy dependence. As a result, the recovery was particularly strong in the United States, where activity in 2021 H1 already exceeded its pre-pandemic levels. This higher buoyancy also led to inflationary pressures emerging sooner and more forcefully. By contrast, the euro area did not return to its pre-pandemic level of activity until late 2021. In 2022 Q1, GDP in the United States and the euro area stood 2.8 and 0.5 percentage points (pp), respectively, above their 2019 Q4 levels.

Figure 10: CPI in Developed and Emerging Figure 11: Core CPI in Developed and Markets Emerging Markets (Annual Percentage Change)  (Annual Percentage Change)  5  8  4  Developed Countries  7  4  Developing Countries  6 3  5  2  4  1  3  Developed Countries  2  2  Developing Countries (rhs) 0  1  Source: Bloomberg, CBT. 0409  1208  0808  0408  1207  0807  0407  1206  0806  0406  1 1205  0409  1208  0808  0408  1207  0807  0407  1206  0806  0406  0 1205  -1  2. 3  Source: Bloomberg, CBT. Monetary policy response  After making brief remarks on inflation developments, I would now like to touch on the policies pursued by the Central Bank in this period. Anticipating that inflation would decrease sharply following the last quarter of 2008, when the global financial crisis deepened, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) has focused on alleviating the harsh impact of the global financial crisis on the domestic economy and financial stability. Throughout this process, the CBRT has delivered sizeable cuts in shortterm interest rates, while providing liquidity support to financial markets by following a countercyclical monetary policy.
Inventories fell substantially in the first quarter, partly due to the rebound of mining exports, but there is also less disposition to keep inventories in other sectors. Business confidence in the industry, as measured by the Indicator of Business Confidence (IMCE), has declined significantly and the domestic-demand-related sectors are below neutral, as of last May. The lower growth in final demand and the larger increase in exports have also translated into a faster reduction of the current account deficit, which closed the first quarter at 3.1 percent of GDP (3.4 percent in end-of 2013). At trend prices, the current account deficit has also been adjusted substantially (figure 4). Despite two quarters of economic slowdown, the unemployment rate is still low by historical standards. Some deterioration has been seen in salaried job creation, counteracted by a surge in self-employment. Vacancies are also growing less. At any rate, nominal wages showed an acceleration, but this becomes a moderation when expressed in real terms. Since last October, the Board has cut 100 basis points off the policy rate, helping to reduce short-term interest rates and also long-term financing costs, on occasion to record-low levels. For instance, interest rates on Central Bank indexed bonds at 5 and 10 years are in historical minimums, while the nominal rates of the same bonds are near them (figure 5).

Stress tests show that the banking system’s capital levels are still sufficient to absorb the materialization of a severe stress scenario, although if such conditions occur it would affect profits somewhat more than was assessed in previous IEFs. The less favorable stage of the cycle could imply higher credit risks. On one hand, those households more exposed to the cycle would take a turn for the worse in their repayment behavior should the labor weaken significantly. On the other hand, the deterioration in the past year of some economic sectors in the commercial portfolios could intensify if the slowdown becomes sharper. Thus, the level of provisions set aside in each case is one important element that could cushion the impact of such risks. As I said, funding costs are low, with near record-low long-term real interest rates. However, one cannot rule out a reversal or new episodes of volatility. Thus, it is still important to diversify by sources and maturities of external and internal credit. A large segment of the banking industry has advanced in that direction, but some smaller banks continue to depend heavily on local wholesale suppliers. Some reflections to wrap up. Final remarks We have been seeing a rise in inflation for some months that has taken y-o-y figures up past 4 percent. The forecasts in this Monetary Policy Report indicate that this is a temporary development associated with the depreciation of our currency, and private expectations corroborate this, as a normalization of inflation over the coming months is foreseen.
At the Banque de France and the ECB we have been conducting extensive listening exercises and the issue has been frequently raised by the general public. Moreover, to what extent financial stability concerns should figure in monetary policy decisions is a perennial debate. Most central banks have a separation principle in which monetary policy and financial stability, to be dealt with by macroprudential policy, are kept entirely distinct. This clear division of responsibilities has worked well but I think recent developments have tipped the balance in favour of more integrated approach. First, we are no longer in a linear world. When r* is very low, there is a fundamental asymmetry created by the effective lower bound on interest rates. We have created substitute instruments to compensate for the impotence of conventional monetary policy at the effective lower bound but these instruments, although still effective, have some adverse side effects on excessive risk taking. Second, the macroprudential instruments we actually have, while remaining the first and main line of defense, are insufficient to address the whole range of financial stability concerns. We should not be Panglossian, in the phrase of Charlie Bean vii. Consequently we must accept that financial stability concerns have to be a factor in the setting of other instruments, and in particular monetary policy. This is the more integrated approach that I want to plead for. This does not imply a systematic (mechanical) reaction to financial stability indicators, and it is very different from the leaning against the wind strategy.

Peterson Institute for International Economics, 13 April 2021 How to revisit central banking and financial stability? Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr), Déborah Guedj (deborah.guedj@banquefrance.fr)  Page 1 sur 9 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be with you today, and I extend my warmest thanks to Adam Posen for his kind welcome speech. As you know, we are living a period of great uncertainties. Yet in this deep mist, one thing is clear: the Covid crisis has increased expectations among the general public about what central banks can and should do, and hence relaunched the debate about their objectives, be it climate mitigation or the fight against inequalities. Admittedly, this is a sign of great confidence: central banks are clearly the victims of their own success in their central roles of price stability. However, as Benjamin Franklin reportedly said: “There are many roads to success, but only one sure road to failure; and that is to try to please everyone.” These additional expectations run the risk of growing confusion and disappointment. Today I will first elaborate on our inflation objective. Although the title of today’s lecture invites us to “revisit” central banking, inflation targeting is and will remain the principal edifice in the shared estate of central banking.
Climate change is further amplifying the risks of extreme weather events and sea level rises, where wildfires, droughts, heatwaves, torrential rain and coastal flooding would bring to mind grey rhinos, and not just black swans. Here in Asia, home to many densely populated megacities, such natural disasters can inflict even greater damage. 5. Already, half of the top ten countries which are most impacted by climate risk 1 in terms of fatalities and economic losses, are located in emerging Asia. A large proportion of these countries’ population and economic activities are concentrated along coastlines and low-lying areas, which make them highly exposed to extreme weather and rising sea levels. Moreover, many of these countries are also heavily dependent on agriculture, forestry and fisheries for livelihoods, and which are most vulnerable to climate change. 6. Yet, Asia remains under-prepared and under-protected against natural disasters. Currently, less than 10% of Asia Pacific’s catastrophe losses are insured, compared to 40% in developed countries. United Nations has estimated that economic losses due to catastrophe events in Asia Pacific are set to rise, and could exceed $ billion annually by 2030. Against this backdrop, countries will face a widening protection gap, if no intervention measures are taken. ASEAN and its governments must act today, and chart a sustainable course to ride out the brewing storm. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  7. So far, disaster risk financing initiatives in Asia have largely been limited to raising funds on an ex-post basis, or post disaster response funding.

Unusual though they may be, ladies and gentlemen, negative interest rates are nonetheless necessary in the current situation if we are to fulfil our mandate against the backdrop of low interest rates worldwide. At the same time, low interest rates do give rise to certain challenges. Negative interest therefore also attracts criticism. That said, we are convinced that the benefits clearly hold sway. Our assessment centres on the fact that we take an overall view, and seek to serve the interests of the country as a whole. From the perspective of savers and pension funds, the present situation with low interest income is, of course, difficult. You might think that the SNB could simply remedy this. But let us assume that we were to raise the SNB policy rate to zero in the current situation. The economy would cool down dramatically, inflation would fall well into negative territory, and unemployment would rise. In such an environment, there would be scarcely any increase in longer-term interest rates. Furthermore, we would probably soon have to lower our policy rate again given the economic slowdown and lower inflation. Hence any gains in income for savers and pension funds would not be sustainable. From the banks’ perspective, negative interest rate payments to the SNB are a cost factor. We are aware of the burden this represents. That is why in September we adjusted our calculation of the exemption thresholds in such a way that the payments made by the banking system have nearly halved.
1  2  Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/ files/2016/ARRC-roundtable-slides.pdf); Money Market Liaison Committee Sterling Money Market Survey; European Central Bank Euro Money Market Survey. BIS central bankers’ speeches  This view has been formalised in numerous studies that have found the leverage ratio was a better predictor of bank failure during the crisis than the risk-weighted capital ratio (Chart 5) 2. And recent studies (such as Fender and Lewrick (2015) and Grill, Hannes and Smith (2015)) suggest that a calibration of 3–5% maximises the benefits to society in the form of greater financial system resilience relative to the impact of higher bank funding costs. However, despite my belief in the utility of the leverage ratio, I also recognise that no regulation is perfect. And that if we policymakers spot opportunities to minimise regulation’s adverse impact on the liquidity of core financial markets without compromising the positive effect on resilience, we should take them. Reducing unintended consequences The FPC actively seeks out these improvements – a process we refer to as “snagging” in reference to the process by which a newly constructed building is checked for protruding nails and screws which could snag and tear one’s clothing. (If only all architects were so diligent.) As a result of one such snagging exercise – our annual statutory review of the leverage ratio Direction – this month we made the decision to exclude central bank reserves from the exposure measure of the leverage ratio framework.

And the price of repo in sterling markets has increased approximately in line with its US counterpart, as measured by the increase in GC repo rates relative to 3-month OIS swaps that carry similar economic risks (Chart 3). Alongside this there has been a deterioration in perceptions of overall sterling secured market function over the past year or so, which participants note has coincided with pressure to reduce balance sheet size due to regulatory reporting requirements – in particular the leverage ratio (Chart 4). Some of this impact may be transitory: as dealers and others adjust to the new arrangements they may find ways to transact more efficiently while staying within the letter and spirit of the regulation. As the paper describes, opportunities for netting could be further increased were a greater proportion of repo transactions to be centrally cleared – around 10% of US Dollar repo transactions are currently cleared centrally, compared with 45% in Sterling, and 65% in Euro. 1 Dealers may improve the optimisation of their balance sheets across the whole group, better allocating leverage headroom in one part of the business to more leverageconstrained activity in other parts of the group. And over time new approaches to intermediation could emerge – some exchanges are exploring platforms to allow end users of the repo market (such as pension funds) to transact directly with one another. However, such innovations and adjustments will only ever provide a partial offset to the underlying changes.
The Committee currently is in the final stages of preparing a paper on how the supervisory review of capital can be implemented effectively. The third pillar of the new capital adequacy framework, market discipline, will serve to reinforce capital regulation and other supervisory efforts to promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems. The Committee, in January of this year, issued a paper on bank disclosures, covering banks’ capital structures, risk exposures and capital adequacy. Currently, our Transparency Group is considering whether it is possible to establish a set of core disclosures that would bolster market discipline. This will involve drawing upon our existing disclosure recommendations, and reviewing the extent to which disclosure in new areas - the internal ratings-based method, external ratings or internal assessment of other risks - might be appropriate. I hope that this overview has given you a sense of the key points the Committee has learned from the consultative process, and where we are headed. In the near-term, we are completing our work and expect over the next few months to make progress in a number of areas, including greater risk differentiation in the standardized approach and the development of supervisory standards for internal ratings. As we continue to fine-tune the new capital adequacy framework, we also are striving to avoid getting bogged down in secondary issues that could slow down the overall process. As I have often remarked, the perfect cannot be the enemy of the good.

The second factor contributing to rising intra-regional trade is the reform efforts and liberalization policies undertaken by the Asia-9 economies. These reforms which came out of the collective efforts of government and the private sector, include significant trade reforms and progressive liberalization and opening up of markets to greater trade and foreign investment. The outward oriented policy has allowed East Asian firms to be well integrated with the global trading system and ready to participate actively in intra regional trade when the opportunities arise. As important are the structural reforms that encompass the legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms to provide a conducive environment for foreign investors. We have also strengthened the banking and financial sectors so that they are in a position to provide efficient financial services in support of intra regional trade. International standards and best practices are also being adapted in many disciplines such as in the areas of governance, accounting, and taxation to ensure credibility and transparency to our foreign counterparts. These constitute important ingredients of East Asia’s success stories. But most important is the willingness of the governments to open up their economies and the understanding of the business sector on the need to cooperate with their foreign counterparts. Against this background it is interesting to note that growing intra-regional trade has not been the result of the rise in exports to final destination markets in the G3 countries alone, but also the result of stronger domestic demand growth in the region itself.
Bruno Gehrig: Monetary policy in a changing world  Speech by Prof Dr Bruno Gehrig, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank at the 3rd Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research (Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Finanzmarktforschung, SGF), held in Zurich on 7 April 2000. *  *  *  The title of my speech may sound somewhat ambitious. It signals all-encompassing breadth and profound depth. These are demands that I will hardly be able to meet. What follows are a few reflections on selected aspects of monetary policy by a practising economist. I should like to begin with a brief historical review leading to the 1990s, which have become known - and justly so - as the decade of successful disinflation. Then I will turn to the changes in monetary policy concepts. Following these rather retrospective remarks, I should like to deal with topics of broad general interest in today’s discussion - under the headings “independence”, “new economy” and “asset prices”. 1. A brief historical review  In a historical dimension, central banks are comparatively young institutions. While payment instruments can actually be traced back to prehistoric eras, central banks have emerged only very gradually over the last 300 years.1 When one considers that the Bank of England was founded when Johann Sebastian Bach was nine years old, one might even regard central banks as somewhat “baroque” institutions. Indeed, the original missions of central banks must strike us as highly bizarre. “A money-raising machine”!

This call is more than merely a short-lived fashion. There are two especially valid reasons for the formerly rather reserved central banks to communicate openly and in good time. For one thing, transparency - in particular, ex post transparency - is an indispensable precondition for accountability and thus also a necessary correlative to independence. Beyond this, transparency is an effective means of gaining the confidence of the public and the markets. Central banks depend much more on this confidence in fulfilling their mandate than other institutions. For another, the increased significance attached to transparency derives from the central role played by expectations, also in macroeconomic processes. If the efficiency of forming expectations in the financial markets and in the real sector can be improved with greater transparency, this serves to enhance the productivity of an economy. Transparency, however, should be optimised rather than maximised. Individual demands can occasionally be quite unrealistic. In my view, this even applies to ex post transparency, which is basically less problematic. Accordingly, I do not see any merit in the popular practice which has gained ground in various countries to publish the minutes of board meetings. Board members, too, are only human. Like anyone else, they respond to incentives. My fear is that publication will lead to a certain amount of window talk and probably also to critical discussions being held outside the recorded meetings.