samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
You may take this as an official response, as I have already discussed this issue with our Minister of Finance. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, Before ending, I would like to emphasize again that Thailand has gained significant ground since the aftermath of the 1997 crisis. Macroeconomic stability has been restored, progress has been achieved in financial restructuring and strengthening bank supervision, and external vulnerability has been substantially reduced. At this juncture, however, there is no room for complacency. The key challenge facing the authorities is to maintain macroeconomic stability while accelerating the pace of reforms amidst the global slowdown and heightened market uncertainty. Through careful management of domestic policies, greater regional cooperation, as well as consolidation of restructuring efforts, Thailand and the surrounding region should weather the global slowdown and return to a sustainable growth path. I would like to thank you once again for the opportunity to address this distinguished forum and wish you all the best. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 99/2001

Since then, the Fed has been able to accommodate ongoing deregulation and respond to shocks in the financial sector by focusing on adjustments in the federal funds rate. More recently, the challenges for the Fed have been on the real side of the economy - and here I’m referring especially to a technology shock. While a technology shock that boosts productivity is a wonderful thing, it also has created uncertainty about the proper course for policy. As I understand it, productivity growth rates have not yet begun to accelerate in Europe. However, it would seem to be only a matter of time before the ECB will face the challenge of responding to a comparable technology shock. In any event, I’d say that our recent experience makes a good case study in conducting monetary policy in the face of great uncertainty - an issue of importance to any central bank. Let me start with a brief look at the history of our experience with financial change. In the late 1970s, the buildup of US inflation pushed nominal interest rates up against the legal interest rate ceilings on most bank deposits. As a result, the market began to circumvent the ceilings by creating new instruments, and pressure began to mount to remove them altogether. In 1980, the Monetary Control Act did just that by phasing out the ceilings. Importantly for monetary policy, the act also permitted banks to pay interest on some checking accounts.
It is kept up at the beginning of the period by the fact that unit labour costs, that is, the labour cost per unit produced, has increased relatively quickly in recent years as a result of weak development in productivity. The National Accounts for 2008 point to weaker productivity and a larger increase in unit labour costs than we were expecting at our monetary policy meeting. Moreover, the krona has weakened substantially since the autumn, which is expected to lead to higher imported inflation. You now have to pay more than 9 kronor for a US dollar and more than 11 kronor for a euro. Compared with a basket of currencies belonging to our most important trade partners, what is usually known as the TCW index, the krona has fallen by more than 20 per cent since September. The krona has continued to weaken since the monetary policy meeting. What the weaker GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008, the increased unit labour costs, the weaker krona and other new information means altogether for our assessment of the Swedish economy is something we Executive Board members will have to consider at our next monetary policy meeting on 20 April. I shall now move on to the fourth part of my speech, about current monetary policy in Sweden. The Riksbank has cut the repo rate to 1 per cent and may need to cut it further At the most recent monetary policy meeting on 10 February the Riksbank cut the repo rate to 1 per cent.

I shall now begin with developments in the financial markets. The financial turmoil worsened in the autumn and has developed into a global financial crisis The financial turmoil worsened in September 2008. It has now turned into a global financial crisis. Developments during the financial crisis can be illustrated in several different ways, for instance, through TED spreads. These show the difference between the interest rate the banks pay on loans between one another on the interbank market and the interest rate on risk-free government securities. It is thus a measure of how the banks price credit risk. At the beginning of 2007 and also prior to this, the spread was often between 10 and 20 basis points in Sweden, the United States and the euro area. In August 2007 the TED spreads increased substantially. The large French bank BNP Paribas stopped withdrawals from three of its investment funds, which were exposed to the US subprime market, that is, mortgage loans aimed at households with a poor ability to pay. The reason for this was that it was impossible to calculate what the assets in the funds were worth, as trade in them had largely ceased. At the same time, several other large market participants warned of losses linked to the US mortgage market. The banks began to be unwilling to lend money to one another and interest rates in the interbank market rose substantially.
Market-based finance: a macroprudential view Speech given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee  Asset Management Derivatives Forum, Dana Point, California Friday 9 February 2017  I’d like to thank Lauren Anderson, Leo Fernandes, Katie Low, Pippa Lowe, Christina Segal-Knowles and Carlos van Hombeeck for their assistance in preparing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  In 1849 Thomas Carlyle branded economics as the ‘dismal science’. That was almost certainly unfair. But unfair or not, the tag has undeniably stuck fast; the public’s perception of economists is that it is a gloomy profession. 1  Central banking generally has picked up much of that gloomy reputation, along with a reputation for being pretty unintelligible - and occasionally deliberately so. But within the profession of economists and the community of central bankers in the years since the financial crisis, the prize for gloominess, and perhaps for unintelligibility, probably goes to those of us charged with financial stability and what is now known as macroprudential policy. The root cause lies in what we do – or perhaps more accurately in what we are trying to achieve which is very different to that other core objective of central banks, monetary stability. Those of us pursuing monetary policy are essentially concerned with central probabilities.

On the one hand, this appreciation put Switzerland’s price competitiveness under severe pressure in the short term, and I’m sure I don’t need to go into detail on the practical repercussions for individual companies in a forum such as this. The impact is still being felt at many of your organisations, although Swiss firms have once again proved impressively flexible and resilient. On the other hand, the decision last January was absolutely necessary, given that the euro lost considerable ground against all major currencies as a result of the changed international environment. Waiting any longer would have put the minimum exchange rate under permanent pressure. The minimum exchange rate had become unsustainable. The costs associated with continuing such a policy would thus no longer have been justified. Moreover, had we discontinued the minimum exchange rate at a later date, the impact on the Swiss economy would have been even greater. I am therefore convinced that the SNB’s decision came at the right time. Without this difficult step, we would have compromised our ability to fulfil our mandate of ensuring price stability in the medium and long term. It is precisely by fulfilling this mandate that the SNB contributes indirectly to Swiss competitiveness in the long term. In my remarks today, I will first go into more detail about this contribution. I will then discuss the difference between the short and long-term effects of a strong currency on competitiveness. Finally, I will examine the role of the Swiss franc exchange rate in our monetary policy deliberations.
While individual jurisdictions may be confronted with specific challenges of implementation that may arise from differences in economic and market structures, there is also much in common, particularly among emerging economies, that can be shared among jurisdictions. The period of observation on some of the components of the reform package provided by the Basel Committee is welcomed. It will allow jurisdictions to consider appropriate actions needed to support the effective implementation of the reforms. At the same time, there is an expectation that there will be a willingness by the international standard setting community to adjust or otherwise supplement current prescriptions, frameworks or implementation strategies as more experience is gained under changing market conditions. The effective implementation would also require support for the implementation of the reforms, particularly in the area of capacity building, particularly in the emerging and developing world. Inclusive communication channels with the market and an inclusive process of global consultations will allow us to benefit from the experience of others and, more importantly, facilitate more coordinated policy responses and thus support the orderly adjustments to the new standards. While the evolution of financial stability policies over the recent two years has seen clearer mandates being established for the regulatory authorities, the framework for financial stability both at the national and international levels continue to be a subject of intense discussion.

Niklaus Blattner: Recent financial and economic developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Niklaus Blattner, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Geneva, 17 June 2004. *  *  *  The new National Bank Act obliges the Swiss National Bank to contribute to the stability of the financial system. In performing this task, the National Bank focuses on the stability of the banking sector and of the financial market infrastructure. Implementation rests on three pillars: first, regular analysis and assessment of the banking system (referred to as “macroprudential oversight of the banking sector”); second, oversight of systemically important payment and securities settlement systems (referred to as “system oversight”); and third, if preventive oversight is not adequate, crisis management measures. Today I will be talking mainly about the first and second areas of our activities with reference to the Financial Stability Report 2004. You have already received this document (subject to an embargo). I will also talk about emergency liquidity assistance, which is one of the instruments used to deal with crisis situations. And I will draw your attention to another publication appearing today: the summary of the 2003 statistical yearbook “The Banks in Switzerland ”. While this statistical publication focuses on reporting, the Financial Stability Report ventures into the domain of analysis and evaluation. Macroprudential oversight of the banking sector The Swiss National Bank follows developments in the banking sector from the macroprudential angle.
2  BIS Review 55/2007  4. Fund managers/dealers/traders  Interbank market The tight monetary policy stance adopted by CBSL and its possible continuation would result in increased reliance by banks on the inter-bank call market. Given the self imposed limits by banks on lending to each other, if a few banks attempt to raise a large volume of funds from the inter-bank market , there could be volatility in interest rates. Banks should not often rely on a potentially volatile call money market as an alternative to mobilizing deposits or exploring other funding sources. The heavy reliance by some banks on the call money market drives short term interest rates and make borrowing costs to investors and business community to very high levels. The volatility in the call market also creates uncertainty among the businesses and that adds to inflationary expectations. Forex market Given the current account imbalances, there is a mismatch in foreign exchange inflows and outflows. Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange market is not deep enough to absorb relatively large transactions, though its size and operations have gradually increased. In such a market, huge speculative trades could be rather disturbing and they could move the exchange rate against economic fundamentals. No doubt, forex market is a key source of foreign exchange income to banks. Its price, which is the exchange rate, is determined according to demand and supply forces.

14  Selling dollar rolls when concerns arise about the availability of certain TBA contracts is conceptually similar to making SOMA Treasury holdings available to the market through our securities lending program. One key difference is that the Desk offers settled Treasury holdings to the market through its securities lending program, whereas the Desk only rolls unsettled MBS holdings. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  directive, with the goal of supporting a stronger economic recovery in the context of price stability. References Fleming, Michael (2000). “The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market: Recent Performance and Possible Alternatives.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Vol. 6, no. 1 (April): 129–45. Fleming, Michael (2002). “Are Larger Treasury Issues More Liquid? Evidence from Bill Reopenings.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 34, no. 3 (August): 707–35. Gagnon, Joseph, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache, and Brian Sack (2010). “Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 441, March. Hancock, Diana, and Wayne Passmore (2011). “Did the Federal Reserve's MBS Purchase Program Lower Mortgage Rates?” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 58 (July): 498–514. Krishnamurthy, Arvind, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). “The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2: 215–65. Li, Canlin, and Min Wei (2012). “Term Structure Modelling with Supply Factors and the Federal Reserve’s Large Scale Asset Purchase Programs.” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012–37. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May.
In the short term, the anticipated normalization of the monetary stimulus could lead to a worsening of financial conditions for the emerging world, inducing new episodes of volatility as in recent quarters. Going forward, the effect of increased external demand and higher commodity prices would prevail, with positive effects on economies like Chile that have solid fundamentals. Overall, the risk associated with the complex fiscal and financial situation in the Eurozone is still present and, moreover, heightening of geopolitical tensions in Ukraine could affect commodity prices, as well as confidence in Europe. At the local level, an important part of the economic slowdown of recent quarters is due to a drop in investment. The baseline scenario assumes that this phenomenon will not deepen and for some components it will even be reversed. But there are risks, particularly since the drop in investment in late 2013 was sharper than expected. For example, it is possible that, due to its natural inertia, investment may remain weak for longer than foreseen. Another risk is that a deterioration of the global economy may pull down the copper price below its longterm level, deferring new projects and slowing economic growth. Still locally, inflation of recent months, like the projections included in the baseline scenario, show limited pass-through of the peso depreciation to prices, in line with economic fundamentals.

The convergence of metal prices toward their production costs has been somewhat faster than thought a year ago. In the case of copper, the price forecast for 2014 in this Report has been lowered by more than 10 percent in one year. Other demand components, such as consumption, have posted a more gradual deceleration, in line with still favorable, yet moderating, fundamentals. International financial conditions have also been normalizing, which, while positive over the medium to long term, has caused increased volatility, higher risk premiums and capital outflows in emerging markets, together with a widespread depreciation of currencies vis a vis the U.S. dollar. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In Chile, contrasting with past episodes, the financial effects have been bounded. The risk premium, for instance, is the same or slightly higher than previous values. Unlike other emerging economies, Chile has seen a drop in interest rates in the recent past, and the Central Bank has not intervened in the forex market by selling reserves as have other countries. Nonetheless, consistently with our macroeconomic policy regime, we have seen a substantial impact on the exchange rate. Actually, the Chilean peso depreciation is in the upper half of the group of emerging economies (figure 1). The real exchange rate has also depreciated significantly and is above its averages for the last fifteen and twenty years (figure 2).
The key ECB interest rates remain our primary tool for setting the monetary policy stance. In parallel, we will keep reducing the Eurosystem's asset purchase programme (APP) portfolio at a measured and predictable pace. In line with these principles, the Governing Council expects to discontinue the reinvestments under the APP as of July 2023. The decisions taken today are set out in a press release available on our website. I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions. Economic activity The euro area economy grew by 0.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2023, according to Eurostat's preliminary flash estimate. Lower energy prices, the easing of supply bottlenecks and fiscal policy support for firms and households have contributed to the resilience of the economy. At the same time, private domestic demand, especially consumption, is likely to have remained weak. Business and consumer confidence have recovered steadily in recent months but remain weaker than before Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine and its people. We see a divergence across sectors of the economy. The manufacturing sector is working  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  through a backlog of orders, but its prospects are worsening. The services sector is growing more strongly, especially owing to the reopening of the economy. Household incomes are benefiting from the strength of the labour market, with the unemployment rate falling to a new historical low of 6.5 per cent in March.

So we have got rid of the politically unpleasant adjustment mechanism and have very little instead. Yes, the enlightened founding fathers (such as Otmar Issing) knew many of these things in advance and tried to minimize the free-riding by setting certain safeguards against it. Despite that, I believe many must be bitterly disappointed or shocked that many of these good rules proved to be so time-inconsistent, or dynamically inconsistent. Yes, many good rules have already been breached or are close to being breached (some of the Golden Rules of European law, one should add): •  the no bail-out clause  •  flirting with monetary financing of sovereign debts  •  consideration of something like potentially permanent public support for financial institutions operating on the single market  I believe that these rules are especially dear to this audience. So one has to ask: What are the prospects of the project when to keep it going you need first to breach some fundamental rules that should have created a solid and long-lasting basis for it? It is by definition hard to enforce rules among sovereigns, even when those rules are more important than fiscal or monetary ones – look at the United Nations, for instance.
The real-economy indicator that in my opinion is the most appropriate to focus on is unemployment.22 Monetary policy should thus try to stabilise unemployment around the rate that is assessed as sustainable in the long run. How well are the targets met? Inflation is currently very low. In October, CPI inflation was 0.4 per cent. According to the Riksbank’s forecasts it will be below one per cent as an annual average in both 2012 and 2013. However, CPI inflation is affected by the Riksbank’s repo rate changes and the cuts in recent years have contributed to the low CPI inflation. But CPIF inflation, which gives a better picture of inflationary pressures in periods of large interest rate adjustments, will be around one per cent as an annual average in 2012 and 2013. Thus, inflation is far below the target, whichever measure one uses. According to the National Institute of Economic Research’s assessment of the Swedish economy in August 2012, both CPI and CPIF inflation will be well below the target in both 2013 and 2014, despite the forecasts assuming a much lower reporate path than the Riksbank’s.23 Sweden has the lowest inflation in the European Union. What about developments in the real economy? The outlook is poorer than before for both the world economy and the Swedish economy. Swedish exports have slowed down substantially and growth is now expected to be weaker. Unemployment is very high, 7.8 per cent in September, when seasonally-adjusted, and moreover it is rising (Figure 5).

We were cutting the key rate rather fast, but it was carried out step-by-step. If it were a single but large decrease in the key rate, it would have been a shock for the market. Moreover, it might have turned out to be in error, given that the situation during the acute phase of the pandemic was unfolding in a very unpredictable way. Therefore, we were doing this progressively, although at a high pace. By July, the key rate was reduced to 4.25%. For the first time since the shift to inflation targeting in 2015, the Bank of Russia started to implement accommodative monetary policy, that is, a policy encouraging additional consumer and investment demand. In crisis conditions, as we faced last year, accommodative monetary policy helps the economy return to its potential. However, it might be hazardous to continue accommodative policy after the economy recovers since it might trigger the risks of high inflation and ‘bubbles’ in the financial market. At the end of the year, we were able to see that the economy had started to bounce back, the decline was less significant than forecast, and consumer demand was reviving faster. Therefore, we decided to increase the key rate. Moreover, at the end of 2020, demand was focused on a limited number of products, meaning prices were rising only in respective product groups. As you remember, we discussed all prices for a range of food products.