samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And they include importantly, too, an adaptive regulatory framework which has in fact been remarkably successful in maintaining confidence in financial institutions and markets without stifling innovation and risk-taking. All of these factors -- and no doubt others -- help to explain why some 600,000 people are estimated to be employed in finance and other business services in Greater London -- a number which I believe is roughly equal to the total population of Frankfurt. Now you will have noticed that none of these factors has anything to do with the question of the national currency used either here in the UK or in Continental Europe. The main impact of the advent of the euro on financial activity, as I see it, is that it will encourage the development of broader and deeper and more liquid markets, in financial instruments of all kinds, where they are currently fragmented because they are denominated in the various individual national European currencies. The City of London thrives on liquid markets regardless of the currency -- and it will thrive on the euro, whether the UK is “in” or “out”. Measured in these terms the introduction of the euro represents an opportunity for London rather than a threat. I have no doubt whatever that there will be a vigorous euro-euro market in London, come what may, just as there is a vigorous market in euro-DM or euro-francs as well as $ and euro-yen at present.

Frankly it is not clear to me that this is a risk which it would be in the interests of either the UK or the Eurozone to take in today’s conditions. For the time being our best bet, it seems to me, is for both the Eurozone and the UK to continue to pursue macro-economic - both fiscal and monetary - stability in parallel, and to hope that the euro recovers, as I continue to expect that it will. That strikes me as a more reliable path to the sustainable convergence which the British Government has set as the essential economic criterion on which its decision to move ahead to a referendum on UK entry to the euro will be based. 3  BIS Review 92/2000
Let us take as our starting point the following scenario, which has similarities to the economic situation over the past few years. Interest rates abroad have fallen and there are prospects that they will remain low for an extended period. At the same time, higher capital requirements for banks have seemed likely for some time and, in response, banks have increased their lending margins. In this chart, we have used the NEMO model to analyse how these factors affect the economy, including the interest rate. Low interest rates abroad widen the interest rate differential against other countries. This points towards a stronger exchange rate, which will result in lower inflation and output further ahead. At the same time, banks keep lending margins higher than normal for a period in order to build up capital. Higher bank lending margins and lending rates dampen growth and inflation. Both higher lending margins and lower interest rates abroad imply a lower key policy rate in Norway. In this scenario, the central bank reduces the key policy rate, but by less than the decrease in interest rates abroad. As a result, the krone appreciates. This leads in the short term to lower activity and inflation, but a lower key policy rate and slightly lower bank lending rates will gradually result in higher capacity utilisation and higher inflation. Borrowers, however, only experience a limited reduction in bank lending rates because of the assumed rise in bank lending margins. Somewhat lower interest rates and higher output nonetheless result in increased credit growth.

The duty of the central bank in such a situation has been to keep the lid of the jar tightly so that the child is unable to take out cookies at its own pleasure. This is not a popular measure, but central banks throughout the world have been found to keep the cookie jar in tight control for the benefit of the society. Given the above economic costs, inflation is undoubtedly the public enemy number one. 4  BIS Review 55/2007
However, I believe that it will be important to monitor developments in the period ahead to check that new risks do not arise. Figure 11. Decline in lending to households Credit growth, annual percentage change 20  20 Companies Households  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10 99  01  03  05  07  09  11  Source: Statistics Sweden  Conclusions Today, I have discussed three aspects that were particularly important to my assessments and my stance when the repo-rate decision was made in February. Two of these relate to the debt crisis in the euro area. My view is that it is taking too long to improve public finances and that the risks associated with a high level of indebtedness mean that the debt-ridden countries themselves must assume a greater responsibility for resolving their problems. The third aspect relates to the risks that can arise when the real interest rate is low for an extended period of time. This can, for example, lead to overheating tendencies or a too rapid increase in indebtedness. My conclusion is that, in the current situation at least, these risks are limited. This was one of the important reasons why I was able to vote for a repo-rate cut at the latest monetary policy meeting. A lively public debate is currently underway on a couple of the issues I have addressed here.

We will receive further clues as to the current state of the economy before the next monetary policy meeting in April and will then review how this new information affects monetary policy. As I said earlier, in the slightly longer term the Riksbank’s latest forecast is that there will be a gradual recovery in the euro area and the global economy following a weaker 2012. This will of course affect Sweden too. It is expected that resource utilisation will increase, the rate of wage increases will accelerate and underlying inflation will gradually rise as growth improves. The latter is illustrated in Figure 6. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 6. Gradually rising inflationary pressures The CPI, CPIF and CPIF excluding energy, annual percentage change 5  5 CPIF excluding energy CPIF  4  4  CPI  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 06  08  10  12  14  Note. The CPIF is the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Low real repo rate for some time to come We will need to gradually tighten monetary policy when inflationary pressures and resource utilisation increase. The Riksbank’s repo-rate path from February therefore indicates repo-rate increases during the course of 2013 and 2014. Nevertheless, this forecast still means that monetary policy will remain highly expansionary in the years ahead.
The upshot was an unprecedented reduction in investment, with significant effects on the economy’s level of capitalisation. Nonetheless, in late 2009 and early 2010 there was some improvement, especially in household consumption, which began to respond to the major stimulus packages adopted. The slight rise in consumption combined with the positive contribution of the external sector enabled Spain to join in the recovery already under way in other developed countries. The signs of recovery are still very muted and are largely sustained by temporary factors that will tend to peter out in the coming months. The recovery will foreseeably be gradual and take some time to gather the momentum sufficient to generate employment. Accompanying the incipient stabilisation of the economy are certain developments which, while they may be interpreted as the counterpoint of the contraction in domestic demand, contribute to creating conditions conducive to a return to growth. The sharp fall in domestic spending has contributed significantly to altering the dynamics of inflation, the pace of which has clearly slowed to the extent of posting negative differentials with the euro area for most of last year, something unprecedented since the start of EMU. The disinflationary process has continued in 2010 to date, and there have even been falls in core inflation in a setting in which the slowdown in services prices has continued to intensify. It is too early yet to know to what extent this development is in response to a greater sensitivity of cost and price-setting to cyclical conditions.

The non-oil sector exports were valued at about $ billion in 2006 and constituted almost 6.0 percent of total GDP and 13.2 percent of non-oil GDP. During 2006, the national economy continued its remarkable growth for the fourth consecutive year, especially in the non-oil sector which grew by 6.2 percent following its growth rate of 5.2 percent in 2005. The non-oil industrial sector was the fastest growing sector of the economy recording a robust growth of 10.1 percent during the preceding year. The sector has continued its robust growth during the current year. Due to higher economic growth and receipt of higher than anticipated revenues, the fiscal position of the government has improved substantially in recent years. The budget surpluses since 2003 have enabled the government to reduce its domestic debt sharply and increase its expenditure on infrastructure and social sectors. The ratio of domestic debt to GDP has declined from 82 percent in 2003 to 27.9 percent in 2006 which was reflected positively on our public finance and macroeconomic stability. These trends are likely to continue against the oil revenue cushion and fiscal discipline along with continuous expansion of the economy. The foregoing policy initiatives, combined with the recent budgetary surpluses have enabled us to launch a number of key development projects that are designed to develop the county's physical and social infrastructure, especially spending on education and training, diversifying the economy, creating jobs and enhancing growth prospects.
There are always risks to the outlook – on both sides – and to ignore them in either direction would be foolish. What the MPC must do is continually update its assessment of those risks, and set policy in order that, on balance, inflation remains on track to meet the target in the medium term. No one should doubt our determination to meet the target. The inflation target introduced in 1992, and the new regime for monetary policy decision-making introduced in 1997, have shown beyond doubt that monetary policy in the United Kingdom is dedicated to maintaining low and stable inflation. Indeed, for ten years, I was, to my frustration, regularly described as a hawk. But I am neither hawk nor dove. Everyone on the Committee votes according to his or her judgement of the outlook for the economy. I have not changed. The Committee has not changed. Circumstances have changed. When confidence, output and trade around the world collapsed in the autumn of 2008, the balance of threats to the inflation outlook shifted rapidly to the downside. So the Bank of England and central banks in other industrialised countries responded by reducing official interest rates nearly to zero and injecting money directly into the economy. There will come a time when our task will be to manage the exit from such an abnormal degree of monetary stimulus. The MPC will not hesitate to begin to withdraw the current degree of stimulus when we judge that is necessary.

This is all the more important in the context of the “originate and distribute” model given that the effectiveness of the risk transfer instruments on the basis of which the latter has developed requires sufficient liquidity both on the part of agents and markets. It is, incidentally, worth noting that the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and the Basel Committee are working on a revision of the current regulations regarding liquidity. Moreover, concerning risks incurred by some activities such as asset management, it appears necessary to gain a better insight into the transmission channels of these risks between activities carried out for banks’ own account and for third parties as well as the liquidity requirements generated by the latter. More generally, the methods used to assess and capture some risks such as reputational risk and strategic risk, notably in the context of Pillar 2, need to be developed. I would like to stress the very important role that Pillar 2 must play in improving banks’ management practices i) regarding new risks not covered by Pillar 1 and ii) in areas that supervisors deem, specifically, liable to become new sources of vulnerability. In practice, for some activities, there are still no universally accepted standards for risk management. This does not mean, however, that banks’ risk management  BIS Review 11/2008  5  processes in these activities are always sufficiently stringent, but rather that there is a wide range of instruments available for this purpose, each with its advantages and disadvantages.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy from a historical perspective Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference to mark the 100th anniversary of the Association of Norwegian Economists, Oslo, 16 September 2008. The text may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by offering my congratulations to the Association of Norwegian Economists on its 100th anniversary. One hundred is a respectable age. In Norway, the introduction of a university degree in economics was certainly an important stimulus in the first part of the last century. In the period since the Second World War, major changes in society have increased the demand for expertise in the field of economics. And economists are constantly gaining new insights. This also applies to the field of central banking, even though one of the fundamental central bank responsibilities – to safeguard the value of money – was as important 100 years ago as it is today. Monetary policy in Norway has changed considerably over the past 100 years. The government, with the support of the Storting, has now defined an objective for monetary policy of low and stable inflation. Norges Bank sets its interest rate with a view to achieving price stability. This has not always been the case. Monetary policy in Norway  Norges Bank was established in 1816 and was placed directly under the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The government had no control or influence.

•  Figueiredo, Ivo (2007) “Henrik Ibsen: Masken (Henrik Ibsen: the Mask)”, Aschehoug. •  Jonung, L. (2005) “Den skandinaviske myntunionen 1873-1924 – en översikt (The Scandinavian Currency Union 1873-1924 – an overview)”, in Eitrheim, Ø. and J. F. Qvigstad (ed.) “Tilbakeblikk på norsk pengehistorie. Konferanse 7. juni 2005 på Bogstad gård (Norwegian monetary history in retrospect. Conference, 7 June 2005, Oslo)”, Norges Bank’s Occasional Papers No. 37, Norges Bank. •  Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977) “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans”, Journal of Political Economy, June 1977. •  Minsky, H.P. (1978) "The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A restatement”, Thames Papers on Political Economy 78. •  Qvigstad, J.F. and A. Skjæveland (1994) “Valutakursregimer – historiske erfaringer og fremtidige utfordringer (Exchange rate regimes – historical experience and future challenges)”, in Berg, S. A., J. F. Qvigstad and K. Storvik (ed.) “Stabilitet og langsiktighet: Festskrift til Hermod Skånland (Stability and a long-term perspective: Festschrift for Hermod Skånland)”, Aschehoug. •  Schreiner, P. (1982) "Er Ola Nordmann smart nok? Den fulle sysselsetningen i fare! (Is the average Norwegian smart enough? Full employment in jeopardy! )", Universitetsforlaget. •  Snowdon, B. and H. R. Vane (2005) “Modern macroeconomics: Its origins, development and current stage”, Edward Elgar. BIS Review 111/2008  9  •  Steigum, E. (2000) “Samspillet mellom pengepolitikken og finanspolitikken ved et inflasjonsmål (The interplay between monetary policy and fiscal policy under an inflation targeting regime)", in Røisland, Ø. and J. F. Qvigstad (ed.)
Philipp Hildebrand: Developments in the current financial crisis Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Funds and Asset Management Forum, Berne, 2 April 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The financial market turbulence, which began some 20 months ago, has grown into the largest and most complex crisis since the 1930s. The real world economy is now feeling the full force of this financial crisis. We are currently experiencing a very difficult period, although there are a few signs that the global economy could possibly be close to the cyclical trough. However, the route to recovery is unlikely to be straightforward, and the downside risks to growth remain considerable. Throughout the world, governments and central banks have taken steps to stabilise the financial system. In addition, a large number of countries are pursuing fiscal policies aimed at stimulating demand. Central banks have lowered interest rates rapidly and sharply, and, in some cases, taken exceptionally far-reaching measures to alleviate the economic downturn. Cumulatively, these measures will ultimately help to ensure that the global economy returns to a growth path. The Swiss National Bank (SNB), too, has made decisive use of conventional monetary policy tools and innovative, far-reaching monetary policy measures.

Gent Sejko: Global Money Week 2021 in Albania Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the opening ceremony of the Global Money Week 2021 in Albania, Tirana, 23 March 2021. * * * Honourable Minister of Education, Youth and Sports, Honourable Chairman of the Albanian Association of Banks, Dear students, teachers, friends and colleagues, I am pleased to welcome you in the opening ceremony of Global Money Week 2021. For more than one decade, the Bank of Albania has been engaged in this world-wide movement, in organising during the last week of March, educational and awareness activities dedicated to children, young people and students. Global Money Week, already turned into a tradition, is organized in collaboration with the Albanian Association of Banks, and with the valuable support of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports. Due to difficulties arisen by Covid-19 pandemic, the Global Money Week, this year won’t be launched at the premises of the Museum of the Bank of Albania, but virtually, in compliance with the health safety and social distancing measures and regulations. I have already emphasised in my previous comments to this event, that GMW is an world-wide initiative organised by the OECD International Network on Financial Education (OECD/INFE), aimed at raising awareness of the younger generation to become in turn financially responsible citizens in the future. Every year, in March, central banks, public agencies and financial institutions and civil society organisations from around the world organise GMW activities.
The number of people in employment is the highest on record. And unemployment has fallen from its most recent peak of 10½% on a claimant count basis at the turn of 1992/93 to the present rate of 3.7%. That is the lowest for 25 years in the UK as a whole, and just about the lowest in nearly every region. 3  BIS Review 71/2000  This is not just past history. Having come through the global economic slowdown a year or two ago, the economy as a whole is now again growing at well above trend, with inflation a bit below target; and the broad prospect for the next couple of years - on most forecasts, is for continuing relatively strong growth with relatively high employment and relatively low inflation. Our economic progress - and the common approach to economic management that underlies it and which we share with our European partners - provides, in my view, a firm foundation for a continuing positive and constructive relationship between the UK and other members of the European Union, whether or not they are members of the Eurozone. That of course is in the economic interest of all sides. Just as we benefit from a stable and prosperous Europe, so too the Continental European interest lies in a stable and prosperous UK. And that mutual self-interest above all is the thing we all need to hold on to. BIS Review 71/2000  4

The main risk is that inflation expectations stay elevated for a long time. The longer the price growth rate remains high, even if fuelled by temporary factors, the more considerable this risk is. We could already observe this over the recent three months. As regards external conditions, proinflationary risks persist as well. In the first place, they are associated with prices for energy commodities and other commodities. The damper mechanisms protect the domestic market against fluctuations of global prices for commodities. However, an increase in foreign producers’ costs might also affect inflation in Russia. For instance, this happens when we import foreign equipment and vehicles made of more expensive metals. Disinflationary risks are mostly associated with the fact that producer costs might decrease as fast as they have risen. We have recently observed a multifold increase in prices for container shipments. This has pushed up cargo delivery costs worldwide. However, this growth has stopped by the moment. Possibly, even if prices do not decline to pre-pandemic levels, they might adjust downwards considerably closer to their initial level of this year, and later on this will translate into product prices. Another important disinflationary factor is still recovery prospects in outbound tourism. I should focus on the anti-pandemic restrictions that are currently introduced. Last spring, we believed that restrictions would cause a slump in demand, that is, provoke disinflationary risks. This is exactly what happened in the second quarter of 2020.