samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Recovery plans have fortunately not yet been tested, and it remains to be seen how they work in practice. Most importantly, however, recovery is not an end in itself, but a means to preserve financial stability. Entry into resolution should be possible if the recovery plan has failed to return the FMI to viability or if its implementation would otherwise compromise financial stability, for  1  See Financial Stability Board. “Consultation Document: Application of the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes to Non-Bank Financial Institutions”, 12 August 2013, and CPSS-IOSCO. “Consultative Report: Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures”, 12 August 2013. See also P. Tucker. “Central counterparties in evolving capital markets: Safety, recovery and resolution”. Banque de France Financial Stability Review, No. 17, April 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  example if the application of a particular loss allocation tool turns out to overexpose certain (groups of) participants. Moreover, resolution may also become necessary if participants do not want to use the CCP any longer and prefer to wind it down. In conclusion, the resolution authorities have the responsibility (and are in a better position than CCPs) to do what is systemically needed in a crisis situation, which may mean in extreme cases that the application of resolution procedures is preferable to the activation of a recovery plan. Of course, much will depend on authorities doing the right thing at the time of the crisis.

But this certainly requires strong supervision, effective cooperative oversight arrangements, and setting up the right incentive structure so that CCPs don’t lose sight of public interest, starting with the interest of their indirect members. Let me conclude. Central clearing will make the global financial system safer. However, it also has the potential to redistribute risk. Its overall systemic effect will thus depend on the incentives for risk-taking and central clearing that accompany risk redistribution. Hence the need for the official sector to provide the right incentive framework ex-ante, produce data that can help understand the distribution of risk, and tightly supervise CCPs in a spirit of cooperation across jurisdictions. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
A superficial reading of David Marsh’s book might give the impression that political integration has taken place over the years as a result of some countries dominating others, distrust between political classes of different countries, threats, truces and fights, etc. It’s interesting to relate history in this way. But we should never forget that the creation of the euro has been the result of an unprecedented democratic and peaceful process in Europe, led over 50 years by leaders who have put the interests of the people of Europe ahead of any other objective. The next ten years Where does this leave us in the next ten years? As the euro enters its second decade, conditions aren’t exactly auspicious, as we are facing the most serious economic crisis since World War II. I’m sure the challenges ahead for the euro will be considerable. The global recession is a challenge not only for the euro area but for all countries. It has had and will have serious repercussions on our economies and on the fabric of our societies. They will be exposed to severe stresses and strains. The specialisation model of the past two decades might no longer be viable. I have the impression that some policy-makers think that their national economies will return to the state of balance which existed before the crisis. They don’t seem to realise that that was actually a state of imbalance, characterised by excessive borrowing by the private sector and excessive leverage by the financial institutions.

But I have every confidence that collectively, the combined effort of AICB and ABS together with the industry would transform the landscape of the Malaysian banking workforce in the coming years into one which is highly skilled and highly qualified. This brings me to the second strategy toward sustaining the competitiveness of talents for the banking sector, which relates to the imperative to increase state of readiness for graduates at entry-level into employability, to bridge gaps and allow for a smooth transfer of academic skills to the work environment. What we should strive towards is a more structured and coordinated approach to training that reduces time to competence for graduates. We need to consider a framework for structured industry-wide internship or apprenticeship programs for new entrants to the industry. The structured internship program for the accounting fraternity can perhaps be a good reference point for the banking sector to consider and emulate. ABS can lead the pack in this initiative by playing a bigger role in the review of FSTEP by making it more relevant and forward working to industry requirements. To achieve these objectives we need to collaborate and work collectively as an industry to work more closely and in partnership with ABS and AICB. Clearly, there is scope for stronger collaboration in workforce development that delivers high value proposition between the banking institutions and the industry’s talent development entities.
Future monetary policy In the main scenario in the December Inflation Report, the 12-month change in the CPI was projected to be 1.2 per cent in December 1999 and 1.4 per cent in December 2000. Inflation’s underlying rate in those months was expected to be 1.7 and 1.8 per cent, respectively. The Riksbank also noted that as the slowdown in international activity could prove to be more marked and more prolonged, the downside risk in the assessment was greater than the upside risk. In recent months the international picture has tended to shift in that direction. Immediate inflationary pressure in Sweden has been lower than the Riksbank counted on in December. The outturn for inflation in December 1998 was 0.3 percentage point below the figure in the Report’s main scenario; around 0.1 percentage point of the difference can be attributed to lower interest expenditure and approximately 0.1 percentage point to lower world market prices for oil. Moreover, underlying inflation has been somewhat weaker than expected. As I mentioned earlier, the Executive Board considered that the prospects for international economic activity and inflation are somewhat more subdued than they were in December and this will probably lead to economic activity and inflation in Sweden being slightly weaker in the next two years than the Riksbank counted on earlier. CPI inflation is accordingly expected to be below the 2 per cent target in one to two years’ time.

But we do this for partly different reasons, as we have different tasks. The risks now building up in the mortgage market concern individual banks. But risks are also building up that threaten financial stability – what are known as systemic risks. Ultimately, the macro economy may also be affected. This means that the division of responsibility is unclear. The problem with the division of responsibility can be illustrated as follows. If we assume that the trend in household indebtedness and housing prices does not slow down, despite all efforts, and continues at an alarming pace. Which authority should be the first to take action and on what grounds? Is it a question of consumer protection or of inflation and resource utilisation? Then the answer is simple. But what if it is a question of risks that threaten the financial system? Or perhaps everything at once? We in Sweden are not alone in struggling with these issues. Around the world there is intensive debate on the management of systemic risk – what is usually known as macroprudential supervision. As I have already mentioned, we in the EU have agreed to establish a European Systemic Risk Board to monitor the build-up of systemic risk in the member states and to recommend measures to deal with it. It is of course necessary that we in Sweden have a framework ready to respond to any such recommendations, in the form of allocation of responsibility and tools.
(1999), “  Do efficient financial markets mitigate financial crises?”, speech before the 1999 Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia, 19 October. [4] The net asset value spread refers to the difference between the price at which exchange-traded fund shares trade and the net asset value of the underlying portfolio held by the fund per share. This may also suggest that exchange-traded fund prices provided more upto-date information, thereby supporting price discovery. See Financial Stability Board (2020),  Holistic Review of the March Market Turmoil, 17 November. [5] Duffie, D. (2020), “  Still the World’s Safe Haven? Redesigning the U.S. Treasury Market after the COVID-19 Crisis”, Hutchins Center Working Papers, No 62, June. [6] It is even conceivable that the market turmoil could have been worse without the more stringent regulatory requirements on dealers, which helped to ensure their resilience during the spring. [7] At the same time, higher cash holdings were associated with substantially weaker performance in 2018-19 compared with previous years, potentially reflecting the high costs of holding cash in a low interest rate environment. [8] Schrimpf, A. et al. (2020), “  Leverage and margin spirals in fixed income markets during the Covid-19 crisis”, BIS Bulletin, No 2, Bank for International Settlements, 2 April. [9] Vivar, L.M. et al. (2020), “  Burned by leverage? Flows and fragility in bond mutual funds”, Working Paper Series, No 2413, ECB, May. [10] Vassallo, D. et al.

This led to a downward movement of the implied forward rate, which we stated that we considered reasonable in the press release in connection with the interest rate decision. At present, the implied forward rate is slightly higher than it appeared immediately after publication of the unexpectedly weak CPI outcome for January. However, in the short term the differences are marginal. The current implied forward rate path entails the repo rate remaining unchanged until summer and then subsequently being increased gradually. We Executive Board members will thus take a stance with regard to which monetary policy conclusions can be drawn from the information received since the end of February at our meeting on 27 April. Let me say a few words here on my own view of the situation. The February Inflation Report contained the forecast that international economic activity would remain relatively stable over the coming years. Since the Report was published, the oil price has risen by almost 10 dollars per barrel which is clearly higher than the forecast in the Report. The forward prices for oil have risen, which indicates that there may also be reason to expect a higher oil price for some time to come. Experiences from recent years are that the international upturn in economic activity has been surprisingly resilient to increases in the oil price. Revised national accounts for the United States have been received, which show that growth was marginally stronger at the end of 2005 than was indicated by preliminary figures.
However, the main reason is that the financial cycle has “gone off the rails” – first through a rapid expansion in credit and debt, and then through a sudden contraction when conditions and expectations have changed. If one had been able to prevent or mitigate the upturn, the economic downturn would not have been so deep. Stabilising the financial cycle is therefore an important part of the general stabilisation policy. There is fairly good empirical support for this description. The more households and companies borrow during an economic upturn, the greater the risk appears to be that the upturn will be followed by a deep recession and a slow recovery.4 The cost to society when financial imbalances are to be corrected is often very substantial. The cost of the global financial crisis has been estimated at between 1 and 3.5 times the total production of goods and services in the whole world during one year.5 One argument put forward after the financial crisis is that it is mainly macroprudential policy that is responsible for stabilising the financial cycle, while monetary policy shall focus on stabilising the economic cycle and inflation. Personally, I am very doubtful as to whether one can make such a division. My doubts are based on both theoretical arguments and assessments of what one can physically achieve with different policy instruments. I will now take up some theoretical arguments, after which I will make the discussion more concrete by giving some examples. 2  See, for example, Borio (2012).

“The EU’s Open Strategic Auto no my fro m a central banking perspective. Challenges to the mo netary po licy landscape fro m a changing geo political enviro nment”. Occas ional Document, IRC Wo rkstream o n EU’s Open Strategic Auto no my. 2  Baldwin, R., Freeman, R., and Theo do rakopoulos, A. (2022). Ho rses fo r co urses: Measuring fo reign supply chain expo sure. NBER No . w30525. 3  M. Khalil and M.-D. Weber (2021). “Chinese supply chain sho cks”. MPRA Paper No 110356. 4  Ciani, A. and M. Nardo (2022). “The position of the EU in the semiconductor value chain : Evidence o n trade, fo reign acquisitio ns, and o wnership”. Wo rking Paper in Eco nomics and Finance 2022/3, April, Jo int Research Centre. 2  Trade in energy goods is a prime example of concentration. In 2020, the EU imported 60% of its energy, with four countries providing 70% of gas imports, of which 40% came from Russia. The consequences of a highly concentrated supply of a key raw material are readily visible today. Last year’s surge in gas prices (which was much sharper in the EU than in the United States), the drastic reduction in supply from Russia and the difficulties in replacing gas with other energy sources have all exerted strong inflationary pressures and have created one of the main risks for the European economy in the short and medium term.
Urban Bäckström: What shall guide monetary policy? Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, to the Swedish Economics Association, Stockholm, 17 April 2001. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me once again to the Swedish Economics Association to discuss various aspects of the Riksbank and monetary policy. I greatly appreciate the opportunity of addressing what can be called a historical and academic forum and conducting a dialogue about economic policy both with the two opponents and with other scholars and students. The inflation target has been monetary policy’s rudder ever since 1993 and I believe most people would agree that on the whole in this period it has functioned fairly well. After a couple of decades of high inflation, we have managed to re-establish price stability. Market players as well as people in general are now more confident in and have a better understanding of the regime and the general formation of monetary policy. It also looks as though the importance of fiscal discipline as a means of supporting the monetary policy regime is anchored in the political system and in Swedish society. Sweden is not the only country where a regime with an explicit inflation target seems to be working well.

If a deregulation stems from political decisions that could not be predicted, or its effects on inflation are calculated to disappear in less than one to two years, it will not elicit a reaction from the Riksbank as long as the rule of action is adhered to. The situation is different, however, if the economy goes through a series of deregulations or the price effects of a single deregulation continue for several years. This may lead to inflation being below the target more permanently, which in turn ought to lead, according to the rule of action, to a downward adjustment of the instrumental rate. The stimulus from monetary policy acts through the usual channels. So all else equal, one can expect a fall in market interest rates, rising share prices, a stronger expansion of credit and so on. General demand rises, employment moves up, unemployment falls and the inflation target is fulfilled. When the price effects have waned, there is a risk, if nothing else intervenes, of inflation rising above the target. To counter this, monetary policy responds by gradually increasing the instrumental rate again. Market interest rates move up, share prices fall and the growth of credit slackens. In other words, the customary transmission mechanism now works in the opposite direction, leading to some fall in production and employment as well as in resource utilisation. Another component of the process is the higher inflation’s limiting effect on household real income, just as the lower inflation benefited household income.
Multipurpose: Consumer can use money paid in advance to purchase goods and services from different retailers determined by the e-money issuers  E-money can be categorized into network-based and card-based depending on how the value is stored. -  Storing value in a network basis requires no physical item to store value but is kept in the service providers' system. -  Storing value in a card-basis is the use of a plastic card with embedded chip to store value. E-money is regarded as non-traditional financial services which lead to new ways of security and control implementation. Furthermore, it may facilitate money laundering activities. That is why in Thailand, we prohibited the transfer money among customers without going through service providers' data system. In addition, the system must be able to trace all activities. A bank should set a maximum limit of e-money that can be used . And, it can only be issued in Thai Baht currency and used in Thailand. IT outsourcing means allowing other service providers to perform on behave of a financial institution IT functions which are normally done by the institution itself. By the advent of rapid changes in technology and competition, financial institutions tend to reduce costs and to improve their services by outsourcing some technology-related functions to third parties both within and across borders. In Thailand, we see a few distinctive characteristics of IT outsourcing services. -  Full scope of IT operations.

In addition, it's not only a supervisor's job to maintain the stability of banking industry but also banker's. Both sides should put efforts together to create a safe and sound environment and should always recognize the significance and effects of technology towards the banking industry. So, working in a proactive and more collaborative manner is the solution for today's supervisors'. BIS Review 35/2005  9
As such it will be important to adopt an appropriate regulatory framework for stablecoins in advance of their launch. If it quacks like a payment system…  Stablecoins pose two unique challenges for regulators:  The first is that we need to decide how to regulate them. Proposed use cases for stablecoins vary. And some stablecoins may appear to do more than one currently regulated economic function. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  But many stablecoin arangements will facilitate the transfer of ‘money’ for buying goods and services – effectively substituting all or part of existing payments chains. While my ability to pay for coffee with my phone may feel innovative, it still ultimately relies on card payment - a payment method that has existed for well over half a century. Stablecoins could mean that in future, when I tap my phone at a coffee shop, I may be able to pay with a token that provides a new payment method entirely – and which would not rely on either my bank or my credit and debit cards. If stablecoins are substitutes for existing payments chains, it follows that they could pose the same financial stability risks as existing payments chains. Failure to regulate them accordingly could leave a stablecoin-shaped hole in our payments regulation. This is why the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England has judged that:  Payment chains that use stablecoins should be regulated to standards equivalent to those applied to traditional payment chains.

When I tapped my phone against an ipad to buy my coffee earlier, my payment may have involved as many as four different non-bank entities – in addition to my own bank, the retailer’s bank, and the payment system (in this case, Visa). It is possible that over time, one of these new entities will become so critical that disruption to it could take down the entire chain. And, if they could disrupt the entire chain, the risks these entities could pose would be comparable to the risks posed by the payments systems we currently regulate for financial stability. To safeguard and future-proof our regulatory framework, we need to move away from a system in which how you are regulated depends on the type of entity you are, towards one in which what matters is what risks you  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  pose. In other words: regulation of payments should reflect the financial stability risk, rather than the legal form, of payments activities. This should cover the entire chain, end-to-end. This may seem obvious: same risk, same regulation. It is hard to argue that regulation should not reflect risks. And a framework that focused on risks rather than legal form would help level the playing field – ensuring that regulation isn’t unfairly applied to one type of firm but not another as a result of their legal structure or status.