samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And for banks, whose short-term debts are the money used by the real economy, the effect is compounded. Depositors want a stable liquid store of value for a rainy day. They don’t want equity. So they understandably take some persuading to swap their rainy day fund into bank equity. 6 Regardless of its cause, the evidence that higher capital requirements can push up bank funding costs can’t be ignored. The costs will be borne by real borrowers – in higher cost of funds, and real savers – in lower returns. In theory, monetary policy may be able to offset the overall effect of that on inflation. But it can’t alter the fact that the costs will be higher of matching lenders with borrowers, capital providers with capital seekers, and risk takers with risk hedgers. 4  Miles et al (2012) presents a central estimate that the reduction in the volatility of equity returns and riskiness of debt offsets about half the increase in funding costs that would, other things equal, result from switching debt to more expensive equity funding. 5  Elliott (2013) sets out areas of disagreement in the debate about the economic costs of higher bank capital requirements. 6  The low risk anomaly, whereby lower risk stocks generate no lower and in some cases even higher stock returns than higher risk stocks, is documented for banks by Baker and Wurgler (2013). The impact of depositor liquidity preference is discussed in Kashyap et al (2010).

Gent Sejko: Address on remittances of the Albania diaspora Welcome address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the high-level meeting on the remittances of the Albanian diaspora, Tirana, 14 December 2018. * * * Your Excellency, Minister Majko, Dear guests and colleagues, It is a special pleasure to open today’s meeting, which takes place after a year of intensive coordinated effort between our institutions toward the achievement of common objectives in relation to remittances of the diaspora, and other important issues. Today, a year after the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, I have the pleasure of noting that the materialization of these efforts has been reflected in the undertaking of a number of commitments and projects in pursuit of the objectives set out below. The importance of remittances to the Albanian economy, to family welfare and to development in general is highlighted in many communications of the Bank of Albania. In this context, during 2018, the Bank of Albania engaged its resources in developments aimed at creating the necessary prerequisites for an efficient channelling of such incomes into the Albanian economy. International initiatives in the field of remittances underline the importance of reducing the costs and increasing the efficiency of remittance services, thus implying the need to intervene in the retail payment market, in both remittance-sending and remittance-receiving countries.
Luis M Linde: Role and situation of Spanish banks and the outlook for the Spanish economy Closing remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the II National Congress on “The Present and Future of the Mortgage Market. A Second Chance for Consumers and Entrepreneurs”, University of Granada, Granada, 10 April 2015. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking Miguel Olmedo and Inmaculada Sánchez for inviting me to participate in the closing session of this II National Congress on “The Present and Future of the Mortgage Market. A Second Chance for Consumers and Entrepreneurs”. The relevance and scope of the matters addressed in this Congress more than justify a debate on the adaptation of the law and financial system regulations to social reality. A balance must be struck between respect for property rights, the efficient functioning of the financial system and protection of the socially excluded. A second chance The so-called “second chance” legislation seeks to provide individuals with the possibility of a “fresh start” after a financial, business or personal failure, without being indefinitely saddled with a debt which they may never be able to repay. Second-chance mechanisms are considered to be positive for debtors and also for society since, among other things, they are a deterrent to the black economy and promote an enterprise culture. Among the main changes approved, I would highlight Royal Decree-Law 1/2015 of 27 February 2015.

The new series of targeted refinancing operations (dubbed “TLTRO 2”) should improve medium-term funding conditions for banks and foster bank lending to companies and households. 1  INSEE: Indicateur de climat des affaires et de retournement conjoncturel. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  3/ Structural policies Moreover, monetary policy is not the only game in town. It is supported by structural reforms that increase potential growth, particularly in countries with a high unemployment rate. History has shown that ambitious reforms can contribute durably to growth. Sweden in the 1990s and Germany a decade later have demonstrated that structural reforms enhance employment rates, potential growth and resilience. They also reduce labour market duality, and provide more opportunities to new entrants in the labour market, particularly young people. In the wake of a severe crisis, Sweden and Germany rebuilt their economic models and, as a result, have been better able to weather the latest downturn. Indeed, a number of European countries are conducting major reforms to bring high and sustainable growth back. Those reforms are particularly challenging when it comes to the labour market, but they are needed. We need to improve labour flexibility and reduce the duality in the labour market between permanent and temporary contracts, which generates both high structural unemployment and inequality. The most emblematic example is Spanish reforms. Their results are impressive, especially when we consider the very difficult economic situation in the country during their implementation.
Denis Beau: After the crypto-winter, the spring of crypto-assets regulation and supervision Keynote speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the World Bank Global Payments Week 2023 "The Future of Payments", Marrakesh, 18 May 2023. *** Dear colleagues from the World Bank, Ladies and Gentlemen, According to some commentators, in a context of cascading bankruptcies (i.e. Terra /Luna, Celsius, Three Arrows, Genesis, BlockFi, FTX), the crypto ecosystem may have entered a so-called "crypto-winter". I don't know if this winter is going to last but I believe that it should be seen as "spring time" by regulators and supervisors, whose initiatives should be burgeoning. Recently, many countries have indeed sped up their regulatory work within their jurisdiction. However, we have also seen variances in combining three regulatory approaches: banning crypto-asset activities; containing and isolating them from traditional finance and the real economy, which implies banning certain specific aspects and practices (e.g. advertising); regulating the crypto-asset market, either by assimilating crypto-assets to traditional financial assets and applying the corresponding existing regulatory regime, or by adopting a dedicated regulation (e.g. on stablecoins). With the exception of China, the world's major economies and currency zones have developed or are in the process of adopting a combination of the last two approaches, based on the principle of "same activities, same risks, same rules".

However, they do not benefit from the same regulatory safeguards that aim to put a limit on those risks and to ensure that they are properly recognised, monitored and managed. Moreover, crypto-asset infrastructures and activities, beyond expanding outside the regulatory perimeter, have done so by including products, services and practices that carry certain specificities. From a risk perspective, these specific features may either amplify traditional vulnerabilities or introduce new ones, and should fall within the scope of regulation and supervision. Let me illustrate this point with two examples. The first concerns financial integrity risk. Attention should be paid to this risk for two reasons: first, because, as shown by our supervisory experience at the ACPR, AMLCFT controls by service providers appear to be difficult to grasp and master, and are sometimes not performed in the crypto ecosystem, and second, because investors have the possibility of using and holding crypto-assets pseudonymously. The second concerns cyber risk. It is currently the number one operational risk for financial players, and it has the ability to jeopardise the stability of the entire financial system. The exposure of the crypto ecosystem to this risk could be exacerbated by its technical specificities, including the recourse to blockchains, and the introduction of new points of vulnerability such as bridges between blockchains and so-called oracles that feed data into blockchains. In my opinion, the repeatedly successful cyberattacks aimed at crypto players are a warning signal that should capture the attention of regulators and supervisors.
As a result of the turbulence on the financial markets, however, the impact of monetary policy was weaker than normal in 2009. The Riksbank responded to these problems by complementing monetary policy with extensive lending to the banks. So, what was the nature of the forecasts and assessments that formed the basis for the monetary policy decisions? The repo rate was cut to 1 percent and the repo-rate path was adjusted downwards in February In February, it appeared that the downturn in economic activity, in Sweden and abroad, would be more severe and would happen much more quickly than previously assessed by the Riksbank. At the monetary policy meeting on 10 February, the Riksbank therefore decided to cut the repo rate by a whole percentage point to one percent. The repo-rate path was adjusted downwards and a further repo-rate cut during 2009 was indicated (see Figure 1). 1  For a more detailed description of how one can assess monetary policy see Lars E.0. Svensson, “Assessing monetary policy”, speech at Uppsala University, 13 March 2009. 2  For a more detailed description of the arguments behind my reservations see Lars E. O. Svensson: “Why a lower repo-rate path?”, speech at Umeå University, 24 February 2010. BIS Review 32/2010  3  The Monetary Policy Report from February 2009 presented forecasts based on the Report’s main scenario and alternative forecasts based on the repo-rate path adopted at the meeting in December 2008.

Shocks may, for example, occur that make it difficult to quickly bring inflation to the target without creating major fluctuations in the real economy. One may then choose to let the outcome for inflation deviate from the target. This deviation is then deliberate and represents part of a compromise between stabilising inflation and stabilising resource utilisation. So, how should one assess monetary policy? Two approaches can be used. The first is to assess monetary policy a couple of years after the monetary decisions concerned, so that inflation and the real economy have had time to react to the monetary policy measures, and to use all the information available at the time of the assessment, that is including the information that has become available after the decision was made. This is, in other words, an assessment after the fact, or what can be called an assessment ex post. Although it may be very interesting to analyse the shocks that occurred after the monetary policy decisions were made, it is practically self-evident that monetary policy could have been better if the shocks that occurred later had been known at the time the decisions were made. An assessment after the fact is not therefore necessarily the most relevant form of assessment. A more relevant approach is to put ourselves in the position of the decision makers at the time the decision was made and to try to assess the decision given the information that was then available. In other words.
If there are fresh shocks to global energy and food supplies arising from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine or a significant overheating of the domestic labour market, inflation  may end up being higher and more persistent. TAMING INFLATION MEANS SLOWER ECONOMIC GROWTH  The outlook for a gentle easing of inflationary pressures globally is also premised on strong monetary policy actions by central banks. Monetary policy dampens inflation by reducing aggregate demand to be in line with aggregate supply. In most countries, this is achieved through higher interest rates that dampen consumption and investment demand. A slowdown in economic growth is necessary to restore macroeconomic stability and balance. The central banks of the major economies have been tightening monetary policy. The US Federal Reserve has raised interest rates three times since March 2022. The European Central Bank has yet to raise rates but has indicated it will do so this month. The Bank of England as well as the central banks of Canada, Australia and others have also been withdrawing monetary policy accommodation. Central banks are expected to further tighten monetary policy substantially over the next 6 months. Global economic growth in 2023 is likely to be slower. Tighter financial conditions, coupled with a squeeze in real incomes as a result of rising prices, will exert a drag on growth. It is difficult to forecast the extent of the growth slowdown next year given the complex interplay of multiple factors. It may be more instructive to think of possible scenarios.

In China, the constancy in high household saving rates masks two striking, but broadly offsetting, factors: a 10 percentage point fall in household’s income share; and a 10 percentage point rise in household’s saving propensity (Ma and Yi (2010)). Much of the rise in saving propensities appears to be precautionary. Facing “three mountains” in the future – education, pensions and health care – Chinese consumers have taken the high (saving) road. In the US, the fall in the household financial balance correlates strongly with the path of household net worth (McKelvey (2010), Chart 13). This correlation emerged strongly during the 1980s, with the simultaneous rise in net wealth and fall in saving. This correlation has remained strong as net worth has reversed recently due to falling house and equity prices. What lies behind these movements? Lax monetary policy has been suggested by some (Taylor (2007)). Financial liberalisation is a second plausible candidate. This had the effect of loosening constraints on the supply of housing credit and thereby boosting housing demand and prices in the US. It also enabled households to mobilise and withdraw the accrued equity in their property to finance spending. Estimates of housing equity withdrawal for spending rose from under 2% of personal disposable income in 2000 to around 4% at the peak in 2005 (Greenspan and Kennedy (2007), Chart 14). Micro-level data support this story.
In this way, we ensure that SARON and the other secured short-term money market rates remain close to the now positive SNB policy rate. To absorb liquidity by way of open market operations, we will use two proven monetary policy instruments: SNB Bills and repo transactions. Participants in the Swiss franc money market are familiar with both instruments. We have used repo transactions regularly in previous years. SNB Bills are debt certificates issued by the SNB, typically with a term of up  1  Further information is available in the ‘Instruction sheet governing interest on sight deposits’. Page 1/2  Zurich, 22 September 2022 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  to one year. We last used SNB Bills for the implementation of monetary policy in 2011 and have since conducted tests to ensure operational readiness. We expect the volume of SNB Bills issued to increase within a short period of time on the back of the weekly auctions. The new interest rates on sight deposits apply as of tomorrow. The open market operations to absorb liquidity are being conducted with immediate effect. To ensure that our monetary policy is being implemented effectively, we will subject the instruments used to regular review. Further adjustments may be made if necessary. Page 2/2

My view has been that the further appreciation of the Swedish krona has risked leading to impaired target fulfilment, and this has been the motivation behind my stance in favour of a lower repo rate path than that decided upon. Am I not concerned that a lower repo rate path would lead to excessive inflation, considering how inflation has increased recently due to higher energy and commodity prices? It remains to be seen how permanent these increases will be. In our most recent forecast, which assumed the stabilisation of these prices, underlying inflation, even in the main scenario, was estimated at less than 2 per cent for most of the forecast period (see Figure 2). On the basis of this forecast, there is thus scope for a more expansionary monetary policy. One matter that I intend to address at the next monetary policy decision is the wide gap between CPI inflation and CPIF inflation that we saw in January and February. This gap is partly due to a detail, related to mortgage costs, in the calculation method used, which also results in higher CPI inflation over the rest of the year than was forecast in the monetary policy report in February. However, in my opinion, the underlying inflationary pressure in the economy is still low, which, for example, is reflected by the low outcome for CPIF inflation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Monetary policy has to be forward-looking, as its influence on the economy is subject to a time-lag.
Prudential Regulation Authority (2020), Supervisory Statement 2/16: The Prudential Regulation of Credit Unions – https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2016/the-prudential-regulation-of-credit-unions-ss 7  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  I mentioned earlier the scale of ring-fencing in the UK banking sector. As would be expected from such a significant change to the UK’s financial landscape, we have seen some wider impacts, in particular in the nature of competition for mortgages and the compression of lending margins in this market. Sam Woods mentioned in his speech to the Building Societies Association in May last year8 that mortgage risk-weights for large firms using internal models have been declining significantly over the last decade. And the average modelled mortgage risk-weight in the UK is lower than in many other jurisdictions. We have therefore been reviewing the implications of this, with an eye both to the safety and soundness of the larger firms using IRB models for mortgages, and to the competitive impact on other mortgage lenders using standardised risk weights. Our review includes the desirability of mortgage risk weight floors. And it is relevant to note in this context that others have already gone down this path – both Finland and Sweden have implemented portfolio floors at 15% and 25% respectively. Our hope is that in combination with other measures, including stress testing and the refined Pillar 2A approach I mentioned earlier, we might reduce unwarranted benefits from internal models.

The credibility of this strategy, which calls for absolute rigorous compliance with the short-term objectives set in the 2012 draft Budget law, will determine whether economic agents regain their confidence in our economy, which is the key to a sustained recovery of activity. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Thomas Jordan: The Swiss economy and global economic outlook Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 14 June 2012. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank (SNB) will maintain the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro and will enforce it with the utmost determination. It remains prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. Even at the current rate, the Swiss franc is still high. Another appreciation would have a serious impact on both prices and the economy in Switzerland. The SNB will not tolerate this. If necessary, it stands ready to take further measures at any time. The target range for the three-month Libor remains at 0.00–0.25%. Essentially, the SNB’s conditional inflation forecast is unchanged from its March forecast. It is based on a threemonth Libor of 0.0% and continues to assume that the Swiss franc will weaken over the forecast horizon. For 2012, the forecast shows an inflation rate of –0.5%. For 2013, the SNB is expecting inflation of 0.3% and for 2014, of 0.6%. Consequently, in the foreseeable future, there is no risk of inflation in Switzerland. The SNB expects that the global economy will only recover slowly. While the emerging economies make a major contribution to global growth, momentum in the advanced economies will remain subdued.

Overall, the economy in the euro area stagnated. As in the last monetary policy assessment, we assume that the global economy will continue to recover slowly. This will be driven by globally expansionary monetary policy and strong domestic demand in the emerging economies. In the euro area and the US, developments are likely to be more subdued. Here we assume that the European financial and sovereign debt crisis will gradually ease. However, risks in this respect remain high. In particular, the difficult situation in Greece and Spain has already led to a significant deterioration in the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  confidence of households and companies in the euro area. As a result, the economic situation remains vulnerable. These high risks are also affecting the financial markets. Following a temporary recovery at the beginning of the year, the situation on the financial markets at present is again tense. A substantial correction has taken place on the share markets. By contrast, investments perceived to be safe, such as US, German or UK government bonds, recorded all-time low yields and correspondingly high price gains. Real yields on these investments are in negative territory for most maturities, measured in terms of inflation expectations. In addition, interest rates on money markets are at record-low levels worldwide. Swiss economic outlook In Switzerland, real GDP rose faster than expected in the first quarter.