samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I mentioned earlier, the National Accounts have recently been revised and the new results indicate a strong growth in both GDP and productivity in Sweden during the period 1993-2002. Such revisions show that there is considerable uncertainty in the statistics and that it is important not to overreact to the most recent figures. When we make assessments of inflation in connection with monetary policy decisions we normally look two years ahead. In this context we also calculate potential growth with the aid of more detailed data. This includes labour market data, for instance, to assess labour force developments with reference to developments in the working population, people in regular education and labour market policy training and the number of people on sick leave or early retirement pensions. A digression on demography Allow me, before I finish, to comment further on demographic developments. One factor that we, like many other countries, will need to grapple is the adverse demographic development that will take place in few years' time. This will entail the percentage of elderly people in the population increasing significantly and resulting in a considerable reduction in labour force participation. Large demands will be made on public finances and the labour supply and growth trends will be subdued. My last slide shows the growth in actual hours worked during the period 1981-2001, together with a calculation for growth during the period 2002-2050 (Figure 10).

The APP guidance At its meeting in December last year, the Governing Council updated its forward guidance on net asset purchase by stating in particular that “From October 2022 onwards, the Governing Council will maintain net asset purchases at a monthly pace of € billion for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of its policy rates; [it] expects net purchases to end shortly before it starts raising the key ECB interest rates.” The forward guidance on net asset purchases since September 2019 differs from that which prevailed until December 2018. The APP is no longer considered as a separate instrument from the interest rate instrument, but hierarchically subordinated to it, both in terms of its purpose (‘reinforce’) and its timing (‘shortly before’). This subordination was a change: from their inception in 2008, the so-called non-standard measures had always been presented, as distinct and complementary and not as an extension of the rate cuts. The main advantage of this new APP guidance was to reinforce the guidance on rates and to support the “low for long” strategy at the time. The coupling of the two instruments strengthened the impact on the whole yield curve. However, given the change in the inflation context (from a situation where inflation has been too low for too long to a situation of uncertainty), the challenge for the APP guidance today is to move from persistence to optionality.
Following practice in the USA, we encourage banks to pre-position collateral with us. It is only prudent to do so. Banks’ boards, as well as their supervisors, should take an interest in this as part of ensuring banks have sensible contingency funding plans. The Bank also holds a monthly auction of funds against a reasonably wide range of collateral. The size of those auctions could be increased to cope with stressed markets, and we are ready to do so where desirable. Access to our liquidity-insurance facilities remains confined to banks, as monetary institutions. But as I noted earlier, non-banks – including money funds and finance companies – turned to central banks for liquidity during the 2007–08 crisis. The prevalence of non-bank banks as they used to be called, or shadow banks as they are now known, was a deep faultline in the international financial system. Things cannot be left where they are. The status quo was deeply unsatisfactory, and if we do nothing it will be made worse by the re-regulation of the banking system, which creates powerful incentives to reinvent the economic substance of banking beyond the perimeter of prudential regulation and supervision. The authorities internationally, led by the FSB and with the active involvement of Adair Turner and myself, are debating how to tackle the phenomenon of “shadow banking”. A preliminary, but I hope substantive report will go to G20 Ministers and Governors in October.

Multinational companies, as well as large Thai corporations with overseas branches, could similarly benefit from lower transaction costs and improved liquidity management. On top of the tax incentives offered by the Board of Investment, International Headquarters established in Thailand will be eligible to provide financial management services to their affiliated companies, once granted the treasury center license. Rules and regulations also need to keep up with innovations in order to ensure safety and reliability of the financial system, and to maintain confidence of the public. To this end, the Bank of Thailand has been given a full responsibility in the regulation and supervision of the Specialized Financial Institutions or the SFIs, which amount for around 22 per cent of Thai financial institutions’ assets. In performing such roles, the Bank of Thailand will apply the internationally accepted principles and standards taking into account the mission, mandate, and current conditions of each SFI. The ultimate goal is to ensure safety, sustainability and soundness of SFIs’ operations, so that they can perform their core duties for the long-term benefit of the Thai society. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is clear that the world is currently changing fast. The global economy has now entered the new normal environment. Indeed, we expect to experience greater volatility as the world is in transition to a new steady state. Looking ahead, we must not fear volatility, but be mindful of associated risks and ways to manage them.
Therefore, we need to recognize the unknown element, that is, we don’t know their full impact on the financial market and global economy. The latest review of the Financial Stability Board of potential unintended consequences of regulatory reforms pointed to these concerns. Emerging markets have raised some concerns about the Basel III capital and liquidity frameworks. These may have negative impact on domestic financial markets, increase banks’ cost, and thus reduce credit and financial market liquidity. In particular, the liquidity standard, which is not yet finalized, the calculation in the framework may not accurately reflect emerging market’s financial market, and the implementation could distort local financial market. There have also been concerns about the treatment of traditionally low-risk trade finance in leverage ratio which may impact growth and development. Emerging Asia is predominantly bank-based; thus, Basel III will affect its financial intermediation relatively more than in the West, just at the time when financial intermediation is critical to support economic development and integration. Some of these standards are still under discussion, and thus Asia-Pacific region already has a proactive regional strategy to help steer these regulatory reforms, such as through EMEAP forum, to reflect our economic and financial market context. With regard to the OTC derivatives reform which aims to move OTC derivatives trading on to exchanges and cleared through central counterparties. There are concerns regarding inconsistency of regulation between countries, infrastructure that is needed, and cost for users.

Switzerland’s neighbours saw an upswing in industrial output and exports, although domestic demand in these countries remained - and still remains - sluggish. In Switzerland, too, the long-awaited but oft-delayed upswing finally began to make itself felt. The first signs of the upturn became apparent in the summer. These were initially in isolated areas but then became increasingly widespread. The confidence indicators began rising, and order books swelled. The turnaround was facilitated by a marked weakening of the Swiss franc, which was itself triggered by a renewed easing of our monetary policy in March. This downward correction in the franc, which continued for the rest of the year, came as a welcome respite for Switzerland’s export industry, which had been buffeted by the weak global economy and the fall-off in international trade. The Swiss franc’s slide against the European currency was gradual, extending over almost a year. Our currency’s exchange rate dropped from CHF 1.46 against the euro in March 2003 to CHF 1.55 today, thus depreciating by about 6%. The franc’s fall is even greater in real terms owing to the higher inflation rate which prevailed - and still prevails - in the euro zone. Also in real terms, the Swiss franc is worth less in euros than when the single currency was launched five years ago. This development shows that, as the new European currency has gained in stature, the markets have taken a different view of the safe-haven role traditionally played by the franc.
If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. It is just as important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high. Up to March 2001, the Bank pursued exchange rate stability against European currencies. Implicitly, this meant that inflation in Norway had to be kept at the target for the euro area. From 1999 onwards, the ECB’s target was defined as an inflation rate below 2 per cent. Since the introduction of an inflation target, the underlying inflation rate has been around 2½ per cent. The rate of increase in the headline CPI has shown somewhat wider variations, but averaged 2¼ per cent in the 1990s. The use of oil revenues must be counteracted by a tight monetary policy. A tight monetary policy implies relatively high interest rates, a strong krone, or both. As fiscal policy creates demand for resources in public services and other sheltered sectors, industries exposed to foreign competition may be faced with difficulties finding labour and higher labour costs. The contest for resources is likely to lead to a real appreciation of the krone and a deterioration of competitiveness in our exposed sectors. The krone exchange rate has appreciated as a result of a wider interest rate differential between Norway and other countries.

Malaysia also remains the leading global sukuk issuer, accounting for over 53% of new global issuance worth USD34.8 billion in 2015. Over the past decade, BNM and MyClear had invested significantly to build the capital market infrastructures to facilitate multicurrency securities issuance, depository and settlement via the Fully Automated System for Issuing/Tendering (FAST) and RENTAS, respectively. There are immense opportunities to add to the breadth and depth of the Malaysian debt securities market, especially in the diversity of its currency and investor base. Hence, the financial services industry has the opportunity to leverage on Malaysia’s capital market infrastructures by incorporating FAST and RENTAS in the securities offering documents as an additional option for foreign currency securities issuance, depository and settlement. To facilitate the synergistic collaboration that I had highlighted earlier, MyClear would share its infrastructure development roadmap with the industry. This would assist both the financial and business communities to align their resources for infrastructure development as well as to identify opportunities for the offering of innovative solutions to their customers. MyClear and BNM would coordinate the industry awareness and educational programmes to promote the new payment services for mass adoption by businesses and consumers. 4. Providing end-to-end financial solutions to customers  Holistic financial solutions as a competitive edge Financial institutions are no longer differentiated by payment infrastructure that is proprietary and duplicative in nature. Through the centralised payment systems offered by MyClear, the Malaysian Electronic Payment System Sdn. Bhd.
Real growth in public spending Revised National Budget 2002 2002 Growth in central government expenditure - Rise in prices for expenditure  7.0%  = Real spending growth  2.5%  4.4%  Distributed as follows: Real growth, transfers  2¾%  Real growth, investment  6¾%  Real growth, consumption  1½%  SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  Growth in public spending between 2001 and 2002 is estimated at 7 per cent. This is considerably higher than growth in private sector mainland GDP, which is estimated at around 4 per cent. The fiscal guideline is then closely adhered to. Real growth in public consumption is estimated at 1½ per cent. In other words, growth in production of public services will be moderate, even though public spending is rising sharply in nominal krone terms. This is because the cost of producing public services is rising sharply, reflecting high wage growth in the public sector. There have also been substantial increases in transfers to the household sector through social security schemes. The bulk of the high growth in central government allocations therefore translates into strong growth in household income and  BIS Review 48/2002  3  consumption. This tends to be the result when wage and costs pressure are already at such a high level. If the central government were to compensate public sector entities for the high wage increases, the result could easily be a new round up the wage spiral.

Less extreme is the euro zone, where, after a period of slow growth in the area as a whole, recovery is now well established. The internal imbalances in each country - differences between growth of domestic demand and the supply of output - are the mirror image of the external imbalances - current account surpluses and deficits. Widening imbalances are unlikely to be sustainable for long. But the extent to which they will be self-correcting, or will require policy adjustment, depends in large part on why they have arisen. This is my second question - why have the imbalances arisen? Sustained current account deficits can reflect profitable investment opportunities that exceed the supply of domestic savings so that it is necessary to borrow from abroad. And the most popular explanation of the recent rapid growth in domestic demand, especially in the US, is as the consequence of a rise in productivity growth, and investment opportunities, reflecting the so-called “new economy”. It has been pointed out by several economists, including Alan Greenspan and my colleague John Vickers, that an increase in trend productivity growth might increase demand by more than it raised supply initially, as firms invest in new technology and consumers anticipate higher future incomes and spend today out of this revised estimate of their “permanent” income. Hence new information technologies, because they raise  BIS Review 34/2000  2  potential future output in the economy, would add to demand today.
In particular, they need to have enough capital to be considered solvent even after sustaining significant losses, so that they can maintain the market access needed to recapitalize. They also need sufficient liquidity buffers so that they can respond to shocks without having to sell illiquid assets. The forced sale of illiquid assets can push asset valuations far below their fundamental value, which can increase insolvency risk. And, it is important that they not be overly reliant on short-term wholesale funding, which can evaporate during times of stress. Second, when we identify potential sources of instability that could amplify shocks, we need to make structural changes to the financial system to reduce or eliminate them. For example, the financial crisis made it clear that changes were needed in how tri-party repo transactions were unwound each day, net asset values were calculated for prime money market mutual funds, and OTC derivative obligations were cleared, settled, and risk-managed. Third, there should be a viable and predictable resolution regime. We need to be able to resolve a large, systemically important bank or securities firm in a way that limits contagion and stress on the rest of the financial system, while at the same time protecting the taxpayer against loss. Meanwhile, central counterparties (CCPs)—through which most standardized OTC derivatives must now be cleared—need to be open for business for the financial system to operate effectively.

Money market reform has made the prime money market mutual fund industry smaller and safer. The elimination of the net asset value convention for institutional prime money market mutual funds has made these funds smaller and less prone to runs during times of crisis.3 The tri-party repo system has been made more stable as intraday 4 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  exposures of the large clearing banks have been dramatically reduced.4 This means that they have less reason to back away from a firm if it were to become troubled. And, firms are much less reliant on short-term wholesale funding. We have also reduced the amount of risk in the system by requiring that most standardized OTC derivatives be cleared through CCPs, where multilateral netting occurs.5 In a centrally cleared regime, major intermediaries have net exposures to individual CCPs that replace much larger bilateral exposures to other financial intermediaries. Of course, this means putting more eggs in the CCP basket. So, it is particularly important now to closely watch that basket.6 Greater oversight of CCPs is necessary to ensure that they have good governance, sound risk management, robust technological infrastructures, and adequate liquidity support. In addition, we have made considerable progress in developing a viable resolution regime for large, systemically important banks and securities firms. More work is still needed Yet, we should not be complacent, as there are important areas where our work is not complete.7 Relative to other countries, the United States has limited ability to implement effective macroprudential tools.
The most recent published data show that nearly half a trillion pounds of collateral have been delivered to the Bank in this way. The existence of a wide range of facilities, coupled with the presumption of access, has helped reduce concerns about the Bank lending “too little”. But at the same time, it has also strengthened safeguards against lending “too much”. Counterparties can see clearly that the Bank’s facilities are priced to incentivise the use of private markets in normal trading conditions. And the detailed pre-positioning process, underpinned by published collateral eligibility criteria,  2  See the Sterling Monetary Framework “Red Book”, at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/ sterlingoperations/redbook.aspx. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  provides assurance against the possibility that the Bank is taking sub-standard or overpriced collateral. The third lesson from the UK is that richer tools for LOLR require strong governance and accountability mechanisms, to reassure society that the central bank will operate according to clearly established procedures, and will report on its activities ex post. Assurance that the Bank will not lend “too much” under its published facilities (backed by its own resources) is provided through a combination of ex ante safeguards and ex post transparency. The ex ante safeguards include: the new liquidity, capital and resolution regimes; the link between access to facilities and the threshold conditions for supervisory authorisation; the requirement to pre-position collateral; and the pricing schedule.

Michael Gondwe: Islamic commerce and finance Opening remarks by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the workshop on “Islamic commerce and finance”, Lusaka, 24 March 2013. *  *  *  The Guest Speakers, Mufti Shafiq Jakhura and Maulana Bilal Jakhura; Distinguished invited guests; Participants; Ladies and gentlemen; On behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to you all to this important workshop on Islamic Commerce and Finance. To our Guest Speakers, Mufti Shafiq Jakhura and Maulana Bilal Jakhura, I wish to extend a special welcome to you to Zambia and in particular to Lusaka. Ladies and gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia is honoured and delighted to be invited to give a keynote address at this workshop. This Workshop on Islamic Commerce and Finance could not have come at a more opportune time than now, when the Bank of Zambia has embraced financial inclusion on its policy agenda as a way of increasing access to appropriate financial products and services to all segments of society in Zambia. Ladies and gentlemen, Islamic commerce and finance have expanded significantly in the last few decades globally both in terms of size and the number of players. For Instance, Islamic finance is currently practiced in more than 50 countries worldwide. In many countries, Islamic finance co-exists with conventional finance and is not limited to Muslim countries.
The governor of Norges Bank is also required once a year – first in 2003 – to appear at an open hearing on monetary policy of the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs. What can we learn from history? We can learn from history. The experience of the 1970s and 1980s was a costly one. After the last devaluation in 1986, a fixed exchange rate policy was introduced and the economy went through a period of extensive restructuring. Confidence in the krone had to be restored to prevent persistently high inflation. This required very high interest rates. The Norwegian economy entered into the deepest recession since the interwar period. Unemployment rose from around 2 per cent in 1987 to 6 per cent in the winter of 1992/1993. Many companies went bankrupt and households faced debt problems. There was a crisis in the banking sector. Inflation only decreased to 2-3 per cent in the early 1990s. The years between 1986 and the beginning of the 1990s provide a realistic picture of the cost of bringing down inflation from a high level. 8  See Storvik (1998). 9  See Gjedrem ”Challenges in monetary policy”, Aftenposten, 4 May 1999. BIS Review 111/2008  5  Inflation has been low and stable since the mid-1990s because the objective of monetary policy has been to provide the economy with a nominal anchor. Economic agents should be able to rely on the value of money remaining stable over time.

•  Figueiredo, Ivo (2007) “Henrik Ibsen: Masken (Henrik Ibsen: the Mask)”, Aschehoug. •  Jonung, L. (2005) “Den skandinaviske myntunionen 1873-1924 – en översikt (The Scandinavian Currency Union 1873-1924 – an overview)”, in Eitrheim, Ø. and J. F. Qvigstad (ed.) “Tilbakeblikk på norsk pengehistorie. Konferanse 7. juni 2005 på Bogstad gård (Norwegian monetary history in retrospect. Conference, 7 June 2005, Oslo)”, Norges Bank’s Occasional Papers No. 37, Norges Bank. •  Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977) “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans”, Journal of Political Economy, June 1977. •  Minsky, H.P. (1978) "The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A restatement”, Thames Papers on Political Economy 78. •  Qvigstad, J.F. and A. Skjæveland (1994) “Valutakursregimer – historiske erfaringer og fremtidige utfordringer (Exchange rate regimes – historical experience and future challenges)”, in Berg, S. A., J. F. Qvigstad and K. Storvik (ed.) “Stabilitet og langsiktighet: Festskrift til Hermod Skånland (Stability and a long-term perspective: Festschrift for Hermod Skånland)”, Aschehoug. •  Schreiner, P. (1982) "Er Ola Nordmann smart nok? Den fulle sysselsetningen i fare! (Is the average Norwegian smart enough? Full employment in jeopardy! )", Universitetsforlaget. •  Snowdon, B. and H. R. Vane (2005) “Modern macroeconomics: Its origins, development and current stage”, Edward Elgar. BIS Review 111/2008  9  •  Steigum, E. (2000) “Samspillet mellom pengepolitikken og finanspolitikken ved et inflasjonsmål (The interplay between monetary policy and fiscal policy under an inflation targeting regime)", in Røisland, Ø. and J. F. Qvigstad (ed.)