samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a somewhat nerdy child, I attended an inspirational maths and computing club at Homerton College where we learned, amongst other things, how to do recursive coding using a robot turtle. We purloined one of the earliest Local Area Networks for our ramshackle school computer shed. And I had a holiday job at the Cambridge Science Park – right at the start of its astonishing growth story. I recall one particularly memorable experience working on a robot designed to extract the meat from shellfish: let’s just say the results were messy! FinTech and the Bank of England Nearly three decades on, my current role in charge of the Bank’s banking and payments infrastructure gives me a bird’s eye view of how technology is transforming financial services. From the very visible application of the latest mobile technology in retail banking, to the much less visible but just as important application of cloud computing, cryptographic techniques and ultra-high speed processors to the wholesale and back office functions that keep the financial markets running. Some say there is nothing fundamentally new here: technology has always played an important role in driving change in the financial sector: from the telegraph to the ATM (celebrating its fiftieth birthday this year); from screen-based trading to online banking. Harsher critics even suggest the very phrase ‘FinTech’ is little more than a marketing tool, promoting hype over substance.

Let me discuss each in 9  turn . Distributed ledger technology (DLT) (3 PoCs)  DLT has in many respects been the poster-child for FinTech. Thrown into prominence by the advent of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, the attraction of DLT to central banks really lies in the potentially highly attractive resilience characteristics of the underlying technology. In its purest form, a DLT network operates with no centre, and every node in the network holds a full copy of the ledger. So the failure of a node has no impact on the overall resilience of the system, with transactions simply rerouting elsewhere. A single ledger could also eliminate the need for costly reconciliations between market participants, increasing efficiency and reducing operational risk. For central banks currently operating centralised payments and settlements systems with only limited redundancy and facing growing cyber and operational threats, such a model has obvious attractions. Our first DLT PoC, undertaken with PwC, proved it was possible to build a multi-node scalable DLT environment enabling the transfer of ownership of a fictitious asset. But it also demonstrated that the technology was some way from being sufficiently robust or scaleable to form the core of live central bank infrastructure such as the Bank’s Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) service – a conclusion that helped inform the Bank’s plans for its RTGS renewal programme. PoCs by other central banks have reached 10  broadly similar conclusions . 9  More detailed write-ups of completed PoCs can be found at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/Pages/fintech/default.aspx.
First, not enough was done to reflect changes in business models in disclosure regimes and practices. In some distant world, banks in, say, Germany were exposed largely to German companies and households; and similarly Californian banks to Californian borrowers and projects. So if conditions deteriorated in Germany, California or wherever, the markets would be alert to the need to scrutinise the “home” banks operating in those regions or sectors. In today’s world, the markets knew that risk really had been dispersed. But they did not know where it might be concentrated; and, crucially, did not know how or how far it might flow back to the banking sector and so towards the core of the payments system that supports our  BIS Review 77/2008  1  monetary economy. It is in the interests of banks themselves – and certainly in the interests of their creditors and shareholders – to make those risks clearer in future; and if they do so, they will face stronger incentives to avoid risk concentrations. But my second point is that talk of the shift to “Originate & Distribute” can be overdone. Many of the largest global banks seem to have occupied a half-way house. They retained large positions on what amounted to a view that macroeconomic conditions could never get so bad as to cause material impairment, but booked them to portfolios that were marked-to-market (or to models).

Following the intensification of the financial crisis in Autumn 2008 – and against the background of rapidly receding inflationary pressures – we have taken monetary policy measures that are unprecedented in terms of nature, scope and magnitude. These measures fall into two categories: first, standard measures in the form of interest rate changes (Since October 2008, our key policy rate has been cut from 4.25% to 1%); second, what is known as “non-standard” measures, encompassing a policy of fully accommodating banks’ liquidity needs, enlarging the list of eligible assets, lengthening maturities for refinancing operations, the provisioning of liquidity in foreign currencies but also the purchasing of covered bonds and, more recently, government bonds. 8. Let me add that we never ruled out to implement asset purchases, when it appeared necessary to repair dysfunctional markets to ensure a proper transmission of monetary policy impulses. Indeed, in 2009, the ECB embarked into a program of covered bonds purchases, which is now completed. Although modest in size (60 bn euros), this program has been fairly successful in reviving a market segment which in turn supported bank funding at a time where bond issuance were secure. 9. The recent decision to purchase Government securities should be seen in the same light. The objective of this program is to address the malfunctioning of securities markets to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism. These interventions are sterilized as liquidity injected is exactly drained, thus fully neutralizing the effect on the banking system. 10.
One central area where I believe we should have achieved more is legislation and regulation with regard to how and by whom banks in distress should be managed. Following the previous crisis I saw important reforms in legislation being investigated over a long period of time only to be more or less forgotten with nothing implemented. I fervently hope this will not happen again. Quite simply, it must not happen again. Towards a cohesive and efficient financial regulatory framework The Executive Board of the Riksbank and the General Council of the Riksbank have presented a joint report to the Riksdag where we propose that one or several commissions of enquiry should be appointed to review the regulatory framework in the financial sector. We need to create a cohesive and efficient regulatory framework. It should contribute to maintaining financial stability and if a crisis nevertheless arises, it should minimise the costs to consumers and to society as a whole. These are questions that should neither be discussed endlessly nor allowed to come to nothing when the situation stabilises. If we are to  BIS Review 25/2010  11  prevent costly crises in the future, we must together investigate and implement changes. Urgently! Around the world there is already extensive work being carried out in this field, particularly with regard to the international supervision perspective. But implementing changes at international level can take time.

This development marks an important milestone in the ongoing evolution of the overall consumer protection framework for the industry. A number of initiatives have also been taken by the banking industry to maintain the integrity of the payments systems and instruments, focused at promoting user confidence and ensuring that consumers’ interests are safeguarded. In combating card fraud, significant investments have been made by the industry players to migrate all magnetic stripe ATM and credit card infrastructure to a chip-enabled environment. New payment channels and infrastructures that leveraged on the Internet have also been developed, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency in the financial system. Measures have also been introduced to enhance customer service levels at financial institutions. For this purpose, Bank Negara Malaysia has undertaken a nationwide survey to assess how well consumers are being serviced by the financial service providers. The findings of the survey were shared with the industry and individual institutions to serve as a basis for financial institutions to assess their own performance and to use the results to benchmark themselves against global best practices. The objective is to achieve world-class quality in financial services. Ladies and gentlemen, The provision of adequate avenues for redress is also important to enable consumers to resolve conflicts through an equitable process. Efforts have been made to strengthen redress mechanisms both at the institutional level as well as on an industry level.
Paul Tucker: Money and credit – banking and the macroeconomy Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Executive Director and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, at the Monetary Policy and the Markets Conference, London, 13 December 2007. My thanks for comments and/or for background work to Peter Andrews, Charlie Bean, Tim Besley, Roger Clews, Andy Haldane, Colin Miles, James Proudman and Iain de Weymarn. Special thanks to Jing Yang and Alex Haberis. For comments and background work to Damien Lynch. And for secretarial support to Sandra Bannister and Cheryl Feeney. *  *  *  Each month the MPC sets a policy rate, Bank Rate, that will prevail until our next policy meeting. But no one – here today, in the market, or on the Committee – thinks that setting the overnight money market rate for the coming 30 days can be enough to steer demand conditions and maintain stable inflation. Rather, policy works on the basis of expectations of the path of the Bank Rate in the future, and of how our policy settings will vary according to economic conditions: the so-called “reaction function”. Perceptions of the reaction function therefore matter a lot and a great deal of effort goes into being transparent about the three inputs: the Committee’s objective; the MPC’s views on the shocks to demand and supply affecting the economy; and our views on how the economy works and how our policy settings affect it.

On the way to price stability, the inflation target is determined jointly with the government. As you know, these targets have been determined and announced as follows: 5 percent for 2006, 4 percent for 2007, 4 percent for 2008 Our primary objective is to attain these targets. The Central Bank will support the growth and employment policies of the Government, unless it conflicts with this objective. Likewise, with the Law No: 1211, the Central Bank has been entrusted with the power of establishing the “exchange rate regime” jointly with the government. The floating exchange rate regime, which was introduced within this framework, will continue to be implemented, preserving its basic implementation framework. Turkey has grasped a golden opportunity to get rid of the damage created by inflation with which it has had to live more than 30 years. The period of “Declining inflation” is about to end. Our next objective will be to achieve and preserve the price stability. This will be the most significant contribution of the Central Bank in mobilizing the growth potential of our country. Thank you. BIS Review 33/2006  1
I also want to thank the distinguished participants for their valuable contributions. I hope you enjoy both the conference and your stay in Istanbul. Thank you. BIS Review 124/2009  3

When the crisis materialized and firms began to experience material distress or even fail, US law did not have a framework for achieving an orderly resolution of a systemically important institution at the corporate level. It had tools that have proved highly effective in managing corporate restructuring and depository institution receiverships, but none tailored for a major financial group. Instead, when large financial groups began to fail, policymakers relied on ad hoc interventions. Some of the immediate interventions involved use of the Federal Reserve’s “lender of last resort” functions. It was at this point that “Section 13(3)” entered the lexicon of modern central banking. For those few who are unaware, Section 13(3) was added to the Federal Reserve Act during the Great Depression. It gave the Board of Governors broad authority to permit a Reserve Bank to lend in exigent and unusual circumstances provided that the Reserve Bank was secured to its satisfaction. Prior to the crisis, Section 13(3) loans had last been made during the Depression, to such enterprises as a typewriter manufacturer and a vegetable grower. 4 Fed policy makers and their advisors pulled Section 13(3) back off the shelf, perhaps brushing some metaphorical dust off its cover. In 2008, loans made pursuant to Section 13(3) facilitated JPMorgan Chase’s purchase of Bear Stearns. Loans under 13(3) also prevented the potentially catastrophic failure of American International Group (AIG). Innovations under 13(3) also underpinned many of the Fed’s broad-based facilities to provide market liquidity.
In this context, it was particularly important that the European Central Bank (ECB) initiated very large asset purchases, which led, for example at the end of February and beginning of March 2015, to the krona appreciating strongly against the euro. Against this background, it has been particularly important to follow the ECB’s actions and it is probably in this light that we should consider the fairly common claim in the Swedish debate that “the Riksbank is forced to follow in the ECB’s footsteps”. However, this is a special case in many ways. When we start to approach a situation in which we feel more certain that the inflation target is again well-anchored among economic agents, we will be able to take a more tolerant attitude towards the development of the exchange rate. This means that it will again become possible to conduct monetary policy with a greater degree of freedom. In situations in which confidence in the inflation target has to be defended, it is not only autonomy that is temporarily weakened, in the sense I have just described. This also applies to the possibility of conducting a flexible inflation-targeting policy, which is to say taking account of factors other than inflation. This also reduces the degree of freedom for monetary policy, compared with a situation in which confidence in the target is completely solid.

Figure 3 Inflation and interval for maintained confidence in the inflation target Inflation  t  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 4 Inflation below the interval lowers expected and actual inflation  Inflation  t  Figure 5 The central banks need to find ways to extend the interval and maintain confidence  Inflation  t  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  References Anaya, Pablo and Michael Hachula (2016), The Dilemma or Trilemma Debate: Empirical Evidence. DIW Roundup 95, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). Aizenman, Joshua, Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito (2015), Monetary Policy Spillovers and the Trilemma in the New Normal: Periphery Country Sensitivity to Core Country Conditions. NBER Working Paper No. 21128. Ball, Laurence M. (2013), The Case for a Long-Run Inflation Target of Four Percent. IMF Working Paper WP/14/92. Bernanke, Ben S. (2016), What Tools Does the Fed Have Left? Part 3: Helicopter Money. Blog entry, Brookings, 11 April, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/ 2016/04/11-helicopter-money. Blanchard, Olivier, Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni and Mauro, Paolo (2010), Rethinking Macro Policy. IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/03, International Monetary Fund. Caceres, Carlos, Yan Carrière-Swallow and Bertrand Gruss (2016), Global Financial Conditions and Monetary Policy Autonomy. IMF Working Paper (forthcoming). Côté, Agathe (2014), Inflation Targeting in the Post-Crisis Era. Remarks at Calgary CFA Society, Calgary, Alberta, 18 November. Disyatat, Piti and Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul (2015), Monetary Policy and Financial Spillovers: Losing Traction? BIS Working Papers No. 518. Flodén, Martin (2015), Sweden needs its inflation target. Speech at Fores, Stockholm, 13 October.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  Charts and Tables Chart 1: Evolution of the global financial  Chart 2: Composition of IMF resources  safety net as a percentage of external liabilities (1980–2014) Per cent of global external Per cent of global external liabilities liabilities 14 3.5 Regional Financing Arrangments Swap Lines  12  3.0  IMF Temporary  10  2.5  IMF Permanent Self Insurance: FX Reserves (LHS)  8  2.0  6  1.5  4  1.0  2  0.5  0  1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012  0.0  Sources: IMF, central bank websites, RFAs, Lane and MilessiFeretti (2012) and Bank calculations. GAB – General Arrangements to Borrow NAB – New Arrangements to Borrow Source: IMF and Bank calculations. Chart 3: Regional FX over- and underinsurance (2014)(a)  Sum overinsurance  Sub-saharan Africa  Middle East and North Africa  Latin America  Central and Eastern Europe  Sum underinsurance  Asia  $ billion 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0  Sources: IMF and Bank calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  (a) Degree of insurance is measured against the standard IMF metric. Chart 4: Access to regional financial arrangements bigger than 0.5% of regional GDP (2014)  Sources: National Sources, IMF and Bank calculations. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Brooke, M et al (2013) Sovereign default and state-contingent debt, Financial Stability Paper No. 27.

Take up of the IMF’s liquidity lines has been disappointing in large part because of stigma. As a country with a sound balance sheet, but concerned about potential liquidity problems arising from spillovers from shocks in the rest of the globe, what signal does requesting liquidity support from the IMF convey? Some members of the IMF have resisted more widespread use of these liquidity facilities because of concerns about moral hazard. Is there a way to address both the stigma and moral hazard issues? 6. Lessons from central bank liquidity insurance  These are precisely the issues the Bank of England has had to deal with in the context of central bank liquidity insurance facilities. The Winters Review 10 conducted into the Bank’s published liquidity facilities highlighted the risk of these facilities becoming stigmatised – usage being taken as a signal of fundamental solvency problems. If that led banks to self-insure against extreme “tail” liquidity risks, that would be inefficient for the financial system as a whole. The Bank has reduced the stigma associated with its liquidity facilities by offering greater predictability of access on more favourable terms. This improved access to liquidity has been enabled by the fact that supervision is tougher on capital and liquidity requirements, banks undergo regular stress testing, and credible resolution tools (including ring fencing to protect depositors and bail-in to protect taxpayers) are being put in place. These reforms are recent and not yet fully tested under the most difficult circumstances.
In principle, financial innovation is meant to increase efficiency. But, in financial markets, efficiency depends on the availability of information. And the nature of innovation that occurred in effect  BIS Review 95/2009  1  destroyed information. There was only one way out of this paradox: to create and construct market infrastructures which preserved information, its completeness and its integrity. As the failure of the rating process amply demonstrated, this did not happen. •  Increase in complexity did not come with more diversity. On the face of it, market participants looked more and more different in their legal status, investment strategies, and business objectives. It has now become apparent that, behind these veils of diverse colors, there was a profound uniformity in the approach to risk, its measurement, its management, as well as in the drivers of risk appetite. This uniformity had very destabilizing consequences. In normal times, it helped and crystallize expectations on overvalued asset prices. In times of stress, it made the adjustment process extremely disorderly. •  Finally and most importantly, complexity resulted in an increase in overall uncertainty. -  Complex systems exhibit well-known features: non-linearity and discontinuities (a good example being liquidity freezes); path dependency; sensitivity to initial conditions. Together, those characteristics make the system truly unpredictable and uncertain, in the Knightian sense.

Dynamic leadership  Your role in Investrust Bank Plc is very crucial. As the Management team, you are providing leadership. Your way of doing things must be exemplary, inspirational, and analytical, with drive and with integrity. Keep abreast with current affairs. As Financial Intermediaries in the economy, the public looks up to you for innovative and effective products. 2. Customer focus  The Bank of Zambia is keen to see that the Zambian public is offered quality service by the Banking industry. We wish to see more innovative products introduced on the market. I am glad to note that Investrust Bank Plc is part of some banks who teamed up under ZAMLINK to offer ATM services to their clients. Such collaboration is commended. It is in the same spirit that you have supported the RTGS and DDACC products. I will be pleased to learn that this conference will deliberate and resolve on how best the Bank will improve service delivery to greater heights. You need to develop financial products that reflect the country’s level of development and not just ape what is being done in developed countries. 3. Sound practices  In recent years, we have read of how “big” institutions have been brought down due to unprofessional conduct by their senior executives. I urge Investrust Bank Plc to pro-actively propagate Corporate governance standards at all levels of Management. I commend the Bank for the newly created dedicated function of Risk Management in its structure. This will provide prudential guidance in the other areas of operations.