samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are many indications that international economic activity will continue to strengthen in the period ahead and that resource utilisation will gradually pick up. High productivity growth and weak resource utilisation have kept down cost developments in a number of industrialised countries. Coupled with the increased integration of low-cost countries into world trade this has contributed to low global inflationary pressures. In the period ahead, price pressures are expected to remain modest even though they will increase as economic conditions improve and there is a reduction in spare production capacity. That means that market interest rates are also anticipated to rise from today’s unusually low levels. There are positive signals emanating from the US economy while the euro area, and notably Germany, has seen somewhat weaker growth than expected. (Figure 6.) Overall, growth in Sweden’s export markets is forecast to be largely the same as in the previous Inflation Report. The Swedish economic recovery began in 2003 and it is predicted to continue during the forecast period. In 2004 robust international demand for Swedish exports contributed to the high economic growth. Manufacturing activity now appears to be entering a slightly slower phase. Indicators and data point to a continuation of firm, healthy growth, albeit at a somewhat lower rate than in early 2004. Growth in domestic demand is assumed to increase while the contribution to aggregate demand from net exports will diminish. (Table 1). In 2005 business investment and private consumption are anticipated to account for the majority of the pick-up in demand.

Banque de France / Deutsche Bundesbank conference Paris, 21 June 2018  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  “Monetary policy making under uncertainty”  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 sur 5 Ladies and Gentlemen, Good morning and welcome to Paris for the 6th joint conference organised by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Banque de France. I would like to thank the organisers Emmanuel Fahri, Emanuel Moench and Benoit Mojon for assembling such an interesting set of papers. I will return to the topic of the conference later. I would like to use my opening remarks this morning to discuss a highly topical challenge for monetary policy: how to enhance confidence and how to respond to policy-induced uncertainty. We obviously live in an increasingly uncertain world. The lack of predictability of US trade policy – or worse, its protectionism - and the lack of clarity about Brexit risks reversing many of the gains of a globally integrated economy. The euro area itself is seeing a return of uncertainty. Winston Churchill once famously said: “true genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous and conflicting information”. Obviously we, Central Bankers, do not claim to be geniuses, but our duty as policy makers, is to deal with this uncertainty, while sticking to our mandate. I. How to enhance confidence? I don’t need to repeat today the important decisions we announced at our recent Governing Council meeting in Riga.
Rather than simply resetting the quantitative standards, we sought to develop a new forward-looking approach that would be more sensitive to the actual risks that banks take on, one that would ensure a level playing field for banks that compete globally, one that would be better able to evolve with, and indeed encourage, future improvements in the measurement and management of risk, and one that would be well-anchored on a solid corporate governance structure and a sound risk culture. If you allow me, I will draw one more parallel between monetary stability and financial stability. I would say that Basel II incorporates some of the key basic principles that are also built in modern approaches to monetary policy and which have successfully resolved the debate between rules and discretion: a flexible and forward-looking approach, anticipatory rather than reactive behaviour to risk, and the need to take into account market views. The new capital framework is much more comprehensive than the 1988 Accord for many reasons: it applies to a wider scope of entities within banking groups; it offers a menu of different alternatives to fit different circumstances; it encompasses additional risks, in particular operational risk; it widens the recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques; it sets out a thorough framework for securitisation transactions; and, most importantly, it is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first pillar aligns the minimum capital requirements more closely to banks’ actual underlying risks.

Qualifying banks will rely partly on their own measures of those risks, a rule that helps to create economic incentives for banks to improve those measures. The second pillar, supervisory review, captures the view that capital supervision requires banks to enter into a dialogue with their supervisors on the processes and internal estimates that they develop to determine how best to navigate the risks and rewards that they encounter. That includes making decisions on how much capital beyond the minimum requirement a firms should hold. The third pillar, market discipline, strengthens external incentives for prudent management. It strengthens the ability of marketplace participants to reward well-managed banks and to penalise poorly managed ones by enhancing transparency in banks’ financial reporting By relying on an “efficient frontier” of three very different policy approaches, Basel II is intended to help supervisors to promote the adoption of sound practices today, to support efforts to improve those practices tomorrow, and to nurture a stronger risk management culture overall. In many ways, Basel II  6  BIS Review 8/2005  brings us back to a traditional focus on risk, but with the benefit of the most advanced techniques emerging today and into the future.
Instruments Extensive and persistent exchange-market interventions to influence the krone exchange rate have, in Norges Bank’s experience, yielded poor results. Market participants may perceive such transactions as an interesting opportunity to make a profit, which may trigger enormous capital movements. The interest rate is therefore Norges Bank’s most important instrument. Higher interest rates normally lead to a strengthening of the krone exchange rate. However, interest rates may reach such a high level that this contributes to a cyclical downturn. This would undermine the credibility of monetary policy and result in downward pressures on the krone. In this situation, lower interest rates may contribute to stability and strengthen the krone. Along the same lines, lower interest rates will normally lead to a weakening of the krone. But if interest rates are so low that this contributes to inflation, this will also undermine monetary policy credibility, and the krone will be unstable. The objective and the mandate Monetary policy can provide a nominal anchor for the economy. Since 1986 the authorities have focused on exchange rate stability. Price inflation has been low. Yields on long-term securities indicate no expectations of rising inflation. The perception of market participants seems to be that Norway will not resume a policy resulting in high inflation. 1  BIS Review 51/1999  The political authorities formulate Norges Bank’s mandate for the conduct of monetary policy.

3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  5 BBM are implemented in Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland,  Slovenia. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Looked at from an economic perspective it would be a considerable mistake for monetary union to go ahead without reasonable confidence of genuine, sustainable, convergence between its members; and it would be a mistake for any individual country to apply to join - or to be allowed to join - unless it had achieved genuine, sustainable, convergence. But at the end of the day it is a political process - and no-one should underestimate the political determination on the Continent to proceed according to the Treaty BIS Review 29/1997  -3-  timetable. I only hope that those who will make the decision really appreciate that if the economics of monetary union were to turn out badly - resulting in policy tension between the euro-member states - then it is unlikely to have its intended effect of advancing political harmony either. I would not at this stage care to put much money on the outcome - central bankers are a naturally cautious breed. But the prudent planning assumption is that monetary union probably will go ahead on time - at least among a limited group of countries. The question then is what would that mean for you. Let me start with the timetable. A final decision on whether to go ahead, and who should participate, will need to be taken next spring.

The picture is rather different if the UK were to opt out of monetary union - at least for the time being. In that case the euro will be a foreign currency in the UK, and businesses, where appropriate, will need to cope with it from the 1 January 1999 just as they cope now with transactions and contracts denominated in deutschemarks, dollars, yen and the like. But the huge difference between the ‘in’ and the ‘out’ scenario will be that notes and coins would not be introduced in this country if we are an ‘out’, so that for most of us life would go on very much as normal. Mr. Chairman, I have dwelt on the practical side of monetary union very briefly this evening, because I fear that the practicalities may be overlooked in the passion of the debate about the principle. But in my youth - which seems a very long time ago now - I was a boy scout, brought up with the motto “Be Prepared”. It is vital in this context that we are indeed prepared, whatever the outcome, and the Bank is determined to do all that we can to ensure that we are. And provided we have properly prepared ourselves I do not believe that monetary union need hold great terrors for this country whichever way the decision goes when the time comes.
State-owned-bank based financial inclusion: Slide 21 Cuenta RUT in numbers Cuenta RUT (millions of active cards) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Starts in 2006. As of 2016:  9.2 8.3  ▪ 900,000 new accounts opened in 2016  7.4  ▪ 52% are female 5.3  ▪ 32% live in rural or remote areas ▪ 75% perceived $ per month (less than two times the minimum wage) or no income  2.9 1.2  06  07  08  ▪ 300.000 are immigrants (69% of total immigrant population) 09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  ▪ 60% do not have past due loans  Source: BancoEstado.

Slide 3  Commercial bank balance sheet Banking sector balance sheet (percent of GDP) ASSETS Loan Portfolio Commercial Consumer Mortgage Comex Cash Other liquid Derivatives  88 48 10 24 5 7 12 5  Other  9  LIABILITIES Demand deposits Time deposits External credit Debt instruments Derivatives Other  22 46 5 23 5 11  EQUITY AND RESERVES 10  All figures as of December 2016, based on individual balance sheet. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF data. [SLIDE 4] Hence, a key concern of a central bank is risk. Risk from external shocks that may threaten price stability; risk of misjudging the macroeconomic scenario and make wrong policy decisions; risk of changes in the behaviour of banks that may compromise the transmission of monetary policy to market rates; risk of liquidity excess or shortage in the banking sector; risk of bank insolvency; risk  3  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  of disruptions in the flow of funds at the interbank or retail level; risk of risk misjudgement, and, ultimately, risk of compromising trust. Slide 4  What do central banks worry about?
It is argued that financial institutions target leverage ratios that are constant (commercial banks) or procyclical (investment banks). Therefore, an increase in the value of financial assets causes financial institutions to increase their balance sheets to maintain their target leverage ratios, which puts further upward pressure on asset prices. This also causes an increase in the level of risk in the financial system because the availability of safe investments is limited, so banks must move up the risk spectrum towards risky borrowers when they increase their balance sheets. Macroprudential policy instruments can affect price stability Macroprudential policy instruments can also have an effect on price stability. This can be illustrated using a highly stylised view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism:  This equation describes how banks’ lending rates are a function of the central bank’s policy rate plus an interest rate margin or spread. The interest rate margin ( ) is a function of the compensation taken by banks for factors such as administrative costs, capital costs, risk premiums and the banks’ profit margins. The failure of macroprudential policy can affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by affecting the interest rate margin. For example, during a crisis, the relationship between the policy rate and market rates may diverge as market rates are increasingly governed by uncertainty over credit risk. But macroprudential policy can also affect the transmission mechanism outside of a crisis.

Small wonder that there are many who feel that this development is in economic terms the most significant event since the industrialisation and entry  of the USA on the world economy in the late 19th Century. You can think in some ways of China as the centre of the offshoring of manufactured goods, whilst India has shown the potential for offshoring services – and these include operational services with high intellectual content as any visit to Bangalore, Mumbai or an increasing number of other places in India will quickly show. For me there are several key issues for monetary policy. Firstly we should recognise the reality of the effective globalisation of the supply of labour, even if it does not involve the physical movement of people. Secondly we need to understand the effect on wage dynamics from a large external supply of labour which this gives rise to in wage bargaining, where the strength of the position of employers is added to by the threat that if higher wages are demanded the goods or services will no longer be supplied by those with jobs in the UK but will be shifted offshore. Not only is this the case in unskilled jobs and in manufacturing, but also in services such as the medical profession and IT specialists. But thirdly, and crucially, how long will this process continue, and for how long will its effects be felt? Will there be sudden changes along the way as, for example, China’s own economy and social context changes?
6 Instead, through its statements and its September 2014 Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, the FOMC indicated its intention that, in the longer run, the Federal Reserve will hold no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively, and that it will hold primarily Treasury securities.The FOMC also communicated its intention to reduce the Federal Reserve's securities holdings in a gradual and predictable manner, primarily by ceasing to reinvest repayments of principal on its securities holdings. Starting in its December 2015 statement, when the FOMC first started to raise its federal funds target range away from zero, the FOMC also indicated that it anticipated continuing reinvestment until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate was well under way. The FOMC’s strategy of waiting to begin reducing the balance sheet until normalization of the federal funds rate was well under way has had several advantages. Most importantly, it reduced the likelihood that an unexpected adverse shock to the economy would have necessitated a return to the zero lower bound on the federal funds rate and potentially a reversal in balance sheet normalization. Second, the FOMC’s approach promotes the use of the federal funds rate as the active monetary policy instrument, an instrument with which the FOMC has much greater experience.

W A Wijewardena: Auditing the key policy functions of a central bank – views from the top Keynote address by Mr W A Wijewardena, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Seminar on “Effective Internal Audit for Central Banks”, Windsor, UK, 30 April 2009. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed as those representing the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. *  *  *  The primary objective of a central bank is to stabilise the value of its currency and continue to maintain that stability to facilitate long term economic growth. There could be other ancillary objectives assigned to a central bank, such as providing liquidity to the government to bridge its revenue and expenditure flows or refinancing banks’ loans to priority sectors. But the primary objective of a central bank takes precedence over any such ancillary objective and, if there is a conflict between the two, a central bank should always give priority to its primary objective 1 . This is because the success or failure of a central bank is gauged by its attainment of the primary objective and not the ancillary objectives. Even if a central bank has done well in realising its ancillary objectives, but failed in the primary objective, then, that central bank is deemed to have failed in its operations.
23 It is important to note that these new regulatory and behavioral factors are related to liquidity in general and not strictly about reserves held in Federal Reserve accounts as in Regulation D. Banks have many possible means for addressing their requirements under the LCR, and the LCR rule does not impose any specific requirement to hold central bank reserves. 7  have various ways to meet their obligations under this system: their choices are not limited to simply holding more reserves. As a result, reserve scarcity may be accompanied by shifts in market pricing and flows that we might not have seen in the old framework. Finally, the old system provided a degree of stability over time through its ability to reallocate scarce reserves among banks in response to shocks through interbank lending in the federal funds market. This interbank activity largely dried up following the crisis and has not meaningfully returned—in part due to regulatory incentives, but also because banks report that they are now less interested in taking on financial exposure to other banks. 24 As a result, it is possible that a regime of less abundant reserves may now be accompanied by an element of increasing volatility or periodic turbulence in money markets. One new way in which scarcity might manifest itself going forward is through effects related to the LCR. Very generally, the LCR is designed to ensure that banks hold a sufficient reserve of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to allow them to survive a short-term period of significant liquidity stress.

Other requirements on maximum LTV ratio and debt-servicing ratio applicable to commercial and industrial property mortgage loans also apply to standalone carpark space mortgage loans. The above measures take effect immediately. However, loan applications in respect of property transactions with provisional sale and purchase agreements signed today or earlier will not be affected. The HKMA is also aware that the risk weight allocated by Hong Kong banks adopting the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) Approach under the Basel Capital Accord to residential property exposures is at a relatively low level. This may not fully reflect the existing and future risks of property market volatility. To further enhance the risk management of banks in Hong Kong, the HKMA has decided to introduce a risk weight floor of 15% for residential mortgages approved by banks on or after 23 February 2013 under the IRB Approach. Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the HKMA, will explain the above-mentioned measures in more details later. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation will introduce revisions to its Mortgage Insurance Programme in line with the latest developments in the property market and will announce the details later. I hope the public would understand that Hong Kong is facing an extremely unusual macromonetary environment. The ongoing quantitative easing by advanced economies is unprecedented in both scale and duration. Interest rates have been artificially maintained at extremely low levels, and we see huge volumes of liquidity flow into emerging markets like Hong Kong.
Jon Cunliffe: Learning from the dash for cash – findings and next steps for margining practices Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at the Futures Industry Association (FIA) & Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Asset Management Derivatives Forum 2022, Dana Point, California, 9 February 2022. * * * It is now nearly two years since the ‘dash for cash’ that swept through financial markets at the onset of the Covid pandemic. A great deal of work is underway by central banks and the international regulatory community to learn the lessons of that episode. And I want to talk today mainly about one element of that work: the examination of the role played by margin payments, both cleared and uncleared. But first, it is important to remind ourselves of just why we are engaged on this work and why it matters that we learn the lesson of that short lived but potentially extremely destructive episode. Unlike the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), more than 10 years ago, one senses that the 2020 ‘dash for cash’ is fading from memory. There are obvious reasons for this. The disruption did not last long. By early May 2020, order had returned to financial markets. There were no spectacular bank failures. Indeed, strengthened greatly by the post-GFC reforms, banks were able to meet the huge drawdown of credit facilities at the beginning of the crisis.

And business needs a climate of stability if it is to commit to the investment that’s needed to revitalise an area. We know that it is entirely possible to transform old urban areas – there are plenty of inspiring examples from London Docklands to Berlin and Baltimore, and if Liverpudlians ever doubted it, nowadays they need go no further than Albert Dock. But it takes long term commitment. The key findings in today’s Merseyside Economic Review provide convincing evidence that Liverpool has turned the corner– with faster growth in the core city than any other English city and jobs growth more than double the national average. Manufacturing remains important and there is still a strong automotive supply industry, which is high tech these days, but the real growth sectors are tourism, leisure and modern services. Increasingly, for those who acquire the right skills, the jobs are there – a picture that fits with a national labour market where unemployment is now as low as it has been in three decades. How confident can you be that we will continue to deliver the stability that is our contribution to your future success? Our latest Inflation Report, published last week, paints a favourable picture for the next few years, with continuing steady growth and low inflation. If you trust the MPC to do its job, you might feel reasonably safe in basing your decisions on that outlook. But those of us on the Committee can’t afford to take it for granted.