samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If actual and potential output coincide so that the output gap is closed, inflation is in line with the Riksbank’s target of 2 per cent, assuming that there is confidence in the policy conducted. This means at the same time that the size of potential growth affects the scope for conducting monetary policy. The higher the long-term sustainable growth rate, the higher the actual growth rate can be without resource utilisation becoming so high that inflation takes off and the Riksbank is forced to intervene to subdue demand. This reasoning is of necessity somewhat simplified. In actual fact, temporary shocks to inflation can occur that lead to inflation not being on target, despite the fact that actual and potential output are at the same level. However, in this case, inflation is in practice probably close to the target, so a more realistic description is therefore that the target on average is met when the output gap is closed. Moreover, monetary policy affects demand with some lag. Consequently, the Riksbank adjusts the interest rate in accordance with forecasts of inflation a couple of years ahead. During this period shocks can of course occur in the economy that couldn’t be foreseen at the time of the forecast. We therefore attempt to avoid excessive fluctuations in the economy by gradually bringing inflation back towards the target. Thus, in the short term, the Riksbank can affect output and employment by adjusting the interest rate, thereby stimulating or cooling down economic activity.

The very high growth figures for productivity during the latter part of the 1990s reflected both the macroeconomic stabilisation, an expansion in the private sector relative to the public sector, and in particular the IT expansion. It is unlikely that the development will continue in the same way in the future. However, we know that productivity growth has been surprisingly high in recent years. Many economists are busy working on the question of which factors lie behind this development. It is clear that, unlike the 1990s, it is not a question of high productivity growth in the IT sector and major investment in IT. One theory that has been put forward is that it may perhaps be explained by delayed effects in other sectors of earlier IT investment; that it has quite simply taken time for companies to adjust and to take advantage of the new technology. It is thus difficult to say anything about the durability of the most recent development. However, there are many indications that the long-term increase in productivity now is higher than it was during the 1980s. The widespread structural changes that took place during the 1990s are also an indication of this. Nor should it be forgotten, that the labour force is better educated today than it was ten years ago, particularly with regard to the percentage of those with a university education. There are studies indicating that the improvement in qualifications has also contributed to the growth in productivity.
3  Chart 2 Change in Global Current Account Imbalances, 2006 -183 (Percent of world GDP)  Change in Global Current Account Imbalances, 2006-18 (percent of World GDP) 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5  USA  GBR  Other EMDEs  EA  Other AEs  JPN  CHN  Oil exporters  -1.0 -1.5 -2.0  2006-2007  2013-2014  2017-2018  Source: IMF, External sector report, 2019  The decline of current account balances over the past decade reflects a combination of macroeconomic policies and terms-of-trade effects. Fiscal policy and credit conditions have been key drivers of current account dynamics since the crisis, such that economies with tight (easy) fiscal policies and credit contractions (expansions) have generally experienced an increase (decline) in their current account balances. However, the policy drivers have shifted. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the narrowing of deficits in advanced economies was driven mainly by private sector demand compression and deleveraging, and despite countercyclical fiscal policy efforts. This was mirrored by lower current account balances in surplus economies, largely reflecting a collapse in global demand and trade. Since 2013 divergent fiscal policy stances and credit conditions in key economies have contributed to the rotation of imbalances toward advanced economies. Advanced economies’ aggregate current account surpluses (euro area, Japan) have remained large or risen further since 2013, reflecting a combination of lower energy prices, tighter fiscal policy, and continued private sector deleveraging in some cases.

Mario Draghi: Macroprudential policy in Europe Welcome remarks by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank and Chair of the European Systemic Risk Board, at the fourth annual conference of the ESRB, Frankfurt am Main, 26 September 2019. * * * It is my pleasure to welcome you to the fourth annual conference of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Since this is the last time I will open this conference as Chair of the ESRB, I wanted to reflect on the development of macroprudential policy over the course of the past eight years. In that time it has evolved from an idea that mostly existed on paper into policy instruments that have been widely implemented. Europe is now better placed to prevent or mitigate risks to financial stability than it was in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet there is still unfinished business: analytical tools to assess systemic risk need to be enhanced; macroprudential instruments to prevent or mitigate systemic risk need to keep pace with the evolution of the financial system; and the policy framework needs to be further developed. Establishing macroprudential policy in Europe At the start of my term in 2011, Europe was still dealing with the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Other financial stability risks – notably those associated with the sovereign debt crisis – were also crystallising.
Unfortunately, one can see that the authorities in many countries have insufficient resources, independence and competence to match the often financially strong and rich in expertise financial institutions, whose owners can moreover all too easily gain the support of politicians against the supervisory authority’s demands for measures. This is of course a more serious weakness in a problem situation where a lack of measures, insufficient measures or delayed measures can aggravate the crisis. Another problem, although fortunately one we do not have in the Nordic countries, is harassment of the management and personnel within the public authorities for the purpose of reducing their ability and willingness to take supervisory measures against wrongdoing banks. In addition, it is important to establish clear roles and areas of responsibility between public authorities within the same country, between authorities in different countries and also between the authorities and the financial institutions. I have seen that in some countries it is unclear which authority makes the decisions, or which authority has the power to decide on a particular issue, because the law is unclear or because it is not followed in practice. This lack of clarity is accentuated in a crisis situation and hampers crisis management. This can be expressed in different ways, such as poor coordination between the authorities with regard to public statements and decisions or territorial conflicts arising and special interests being favoured over general solutions.

Managing a crisis also requires laws and regulations that enable a problem institution to be closed down quickly or managed in some other way. Sometimes it is necessary to take measures very quickly, perhaps even the same day. It is not possible to wait for the usual court process to be completed. To avoid this leading to any form of malpractice, the injured party should have the opportunity to obtain redress and damages afterwards. We had this kind of a law in Sweden during our financial crisis. Another question is when a court should be allowed to stop important authority decisions intended to deal with acute bank problems, such as closing a problem bank. When a bank needs to be closed, a difficult balance arises, between the owners' interests and the savers' interest, which are both safeguarded in law. One very current example of this dilemma in Sweden is the case of Custodia. Both the country administrative court and Finansinspektionen (the Swedish financial supervisory  2  BIS Review 83/2006  authority) have made their assessments on the basis of what they should take into account, that is to say the customers' interests and the company and owners' interests respectively. However, I feel that it is very unsatisfactory that we in Sweden do not have a clear legal framework that can manage this type of situation and I assume that these difficulties will quickly be repaired. Crisis prevention also includes creating sufficiently strong public authorities.
Research by Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne has tried to quantify this hollowing-out, by assigning probabilities to certain classes of job being  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  automated over the course of the next few decades. Their work was initially done for the US, but has recently been extended to the UK (Frey and Osbourne (2013), Deloitte (2015b)). Using this methodology, the Bank has recently done its own exercise for the UK. Table 3 classifies jobs three ways in the US and UK – high (greater than 66%), medium (33–66%) and low (less than 33%) probability of automation. It also shows the fraction of employment these jobs represent. Chart 27 provides a more granular breakdown of these jobs. For the UK, roughly a third of jobs by employment fall into each category, with those occupations most at risk including administrative, clerical and production tasks. Taking the probabilities of automation, and multiplying them by the numbers employed, gives a broad brush estimate of the number of jobs potentially automatable. For the UK, that would suggest up to 15 million jobs could be at risk of automation. In the US, the corresponding figure would be 80 million jobs. The BBC website contains a handy algorithm for calculating the probability of your job being robotised. For an accountant, the probability of vocational extinction is a whopping 95%. For a hairdresser, it is 33%. On these numbers, the accountant’s sun has truly set, but the relentless upwards ascent of the hairdresser is set to continue.

16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Appendix Chart 1: Unemployment rate and projections  Chart 2: Cumulative Employee growth by skill level Cumulative increase since 2010Q1, thousands  Unemployment rate , % 12  16+ Unemployment Rate February 09 IR projection February 14 IR projection  1,800 Highly skilled  1,600  Medium skilled  11  1,400  Low skilled  1,200  Total  10  1,000  9  800  8  600 400  7  2006  2008  2009  2010  2012  2013  2014  200  6  0  5  -200  4 2016  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  Chart 3: Percent of 18–24 year olds not in employment, education or training  Chart 4: Nominal and Real total pay growth  Per cent  18  Real pay growth  17  Total nominal pay growth  -400  Per cent yoy  6  16  4  15  2 0  14  -2  13  -4  12  -6  11  2010 Q2 2011  2012  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2013  2014  2015  8  10  -8 2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  -10 2015  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  17  Chart 5: Percentage of people in employment who would like to work longer hours Per cent  Chart 6: Percentage of people in employment on a zero hours contract Per cent  12  3  11  10  2  9 1  8  7  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  6 2015  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  0  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey Notes: Responses to the Labour Force Survey can be affected by respondents recognising the term “zero-hours contract”.
For example, a recommendation, like the one made by the Banco de España in 2013 that the cash dividends paid that year should not exceed 25% of consolidated profit, would be relatively unusual in other countries. As you know, the recommendation made by the SSM Supervisory Board on this matter in January was only restrictive for those banks whose solvency ratios failed to comply with the minimum levels in line with regulatory requirements. The more formalistic approach to supervision to be found in other jurisdictions provides greater clarity regarding the scope of supervision. It also facilitates identification of the respective responsibilities of bank managers and supervisors. However, rigidly subjecting to strict rules and standards of conduct naturally reduces the supervisor’s ability to identify and correct in good time potentially destabilising developments for the bank. In the field of accounting, the experience of the asset quality review recently conducted by the SSM shows that there are appreciable discrepancies between the specific accounting criteria used in the different jurisdictions, although IFRS principles must be applied in all of them. In Spain’s case, as I have already mentioned, the criteria followed are those established by the circular of the Banco de España on public and confidential financial reporting rules and formats (known as the accounting circular). In other countries the criteria applied have been established over time and, generally, with less involvement of the supervisor.

That requires putting in place effective regimes to deal with remaining gaps such as those I have set out: liquidity in resolution, treatment of smaller institutions, unlevelled playing fields in an incomplete Banking Union and appropriate policies for dealing with systemic crisis. Of course, the adoption of such an ambitious reform may require difficult political compromises. But in the current Covid-stricken economies and societies, European citizens deserve a more robust crisis management framework commensurate with the risks threatening us. A consistent and comprehensive bank failure management framework will require that we work together and that every effort be made to safeguard and reinforce financial stability within a framework of cooperation and coordination between authorities at the European and international level. Thank you. 3
This part of the city survived the 1963 earthquake, when nearly all the city's beautiful neoclassical 18th and 19th century buildings were destroyed. After the earthquake, international financial aid poured into Skopje in order to rebuild the city. Today, Skopje is seeing a makeover in buildings, streets and shops, and many projects (Macedonian Struggle Museum, the Archeological Museum of Macedonia, National Archive, Constitutional Court, New Philharmonic Theatre) were finished in order to return some of the looks and spirit of the city. In economic aspect, being many times since 2006 on the list of 10 best reformers by the Doing Business rank of the World Bank, proves that Macedonia has undergone considerable economic reforms. It has developed as an open economy with the trade accounting more  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  than country's GDP in recent years. Although the environment was highly difficult, first with the global financial crisis, afterward with euro area crisis and more recently, with Greece crisis, our GDP growth was on average above 3% for whole this period, which is one of the highest in Europe, and for 2015 it is expected to be around 3.5%. The unemployment from a very high level, throughout this period is on declining path, by implementing many structural reforms and ALMP. The government strategy to attract foreign investments and establishment of a good business environment for the development of small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) was paid off.

Macedonia had its glory days during the build-up of its ancient empire ending with the sudden death of the Alexandar III of Macedonia (also known as Alexander the Great). Afterwards, the Romans established the province of Macedonia, which in time of Diocletian was divided between Macedonia Prima ("first Macedonia", on the south) and Macedonia Secunda ("second Macedonia" on the north). Most of the country's modern boundaries fell within the latter, with the city of Stobi as its capital. We will have the opportunity to take a brief look on this period of the Macedonian ancient history on Wednesday afternoon, when we take you to visit Stobi archeological site. The history of Macedonia later on was influenced by other great empires in which the country was part of, creating a treasury-trove of Byzantine, Slav and Turkish history, with a host of forgotten monasteries, mosques and castles. After the II World War, the Republic of Macedonia was one of the six republics that have formed Yugoslav Federation. As sovereign parliamentary democracy, we have gained our independence in 1991, and the monetary independence in 1992, with Denar as a national currency. Part of the rich history of Macedonia can be seen in Skopje, the capital city of the country. In that respect, the old fortress Kale, that overlooks the modern city center, offers an insight in the first Neolithic settlements, while Old Bazaar, with its narrow streets and craftsman shops, is a snapshot of the Ottoman rule.
19  That appears comparable with the three previous episodes of  technological revolution, which saw the share of aggregate employment accounted for by the most exposed industries fall by between 10 to 20% over long periods. Some argue that the greater scope and scale of tasks (as opposed to jobs) at risk of replacement by technology means that new job creation might no longer increase overall employment. That is, the destruction effect may outweigh the combined impact of the productivity and creation effects. At the same time, the range of tasks at risk could substantially increase the impact on inequality for several reasons. Most fundamentally, the more new technology substitutes for labour rather than complements it, the more the gains would accrue to capital rather than labour. An unequal distribution of capital means that increasing automation will push up inequality by construction. In the transition, what economists euphemistically call frictions can lead to depressed local or national labour markets, boosting inequality. 20  And if education is unable to keep pace with the changing demand for skills, those who already have the skills to use new technologies will earn even higher premiums. labour competing for lower skilled jobs. 22  21  Job polarisation will increase the supply of  Greater global interconnectedness will reinforce these dynamics. 17  For example, McKinsey Global Institute (2017), ‘A Future that Works: Automation, Employment and Productivity’ suggest that 60% of occupations could see over 30% of their tasks replaced by technology, based on O*NET analysis.

It is not surprising that the Central Bank of Turkey, one of the most important institutions of the Turkish economy, which hopes to become integrated with the western economies, is affected by these trends in modern central banking as it maps out its medium and long-term strategies. Accordingly, the main goal of the Central Bank of Turkey, like that of other central banks, should be to maintain the stability of prices in the economy. At this stage I would like to clear up two points with respect to the price stability target. First, the Central Bank’s price stability target and its responsibility for price stability are two different issues. The price stability target assumes a stability which exists under conditions of low inflation. Therefore, the economy has to undergo a “ disinflationary process” before the Central Bank assumes responsibility for price stability. It is well known that in Turkey, which has been experiencing high inflation for years, reducing inflation to the levels of the western economies will require a comprehensive effort and is not a process which can be accomplished by the Central Bank alone. The Central Bank can track the price stability target as a part of the larger disinflationary programme. I believe that once low inflation rates have been achieved by means of such a programme, it will be a rational decision to make the Central Bank responsible for maintaining price stability. The second point I want to stress concerning the price stability target concerns microeconomic functions of central banks.
It is low because inflation is low and because adverse conditions abroad are curbing growth in a number of industry sectors in Norway. Very low interest rates abroad and high risk premiums in money and capital markets underpin this picture. Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy is geared towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy is consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. At the same time, monetary policy shall contribute to stabilising output and employment. We also give weight to the risk that low interest rates may over time lead to excessive risk-taking and debt accumulation in the household and business sector. Such imbalances can give rise to negative ripple effects further ahead, with a considerable impact on output and employment. Chart: Criteria for an appropriate interest rate path and loss function In Norges Bank’s March 2012 Monetary Policy Report, the Bank clarified how the various considerations are expressed in Norges Bank’s response pattern. Adjustments were made to the criteria for an appropriate interest rate path. In the Bank’s system of analysis, the criteria are expressed as a loss function for monetary policy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Criterion 1, which states that the inflation target is reached, is covered by the first segment, where the loss is higher the more actual inflation πt deviates from the target π*.

To sum up the international picture: over the past year, growth prospects have been lowered for all the large advanced regions. In Europe, activity is likely to decline this year owing to debt problems and fiscal tightening. Unemployment is on the rise. Fiscal and monetary policy space is limited, or virtually exhausted. Many countries must tighten fiscal policy to reduce debt to a sustainable level. Central banks have responded by communicating that interest rates will be held low for an extended period. And they have stretched the limits of monetary policy to counteract a deeper and more persistent downturn. Chart: GDP growth The economic situation in our external surrounding environment stands in contrast to that of Norway. Domestic activity is particularly high in the oil industry and construction sector, and both employment and the supply of labour are on the increase. Unemployment remains low and stable. Public finances are healthy. Norway’s terms of trade are favourable, with high export prices and low import prices. At the same time, house prices and household debt are still rising. Nonetheless, the Norwegian economy is not unaffected by the turbulence abroad. Developments in Europe and a strong krone exchange rate are adversely affecting some Norwegian export industries, such as the paper, metal, and furniture industries. While other countries have used nontraditional instruments, we have managed to come through by using our main instrument – the key policy rate – which is now 1.5 per cent.