samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It should also be acknowledged that the build-up over time of new European financial regulations, even though they have been beneficial to European financial intermediaries and institutions, has posed an organisational challenge to institutions. It is thus not surprising that they have called on Brussels to contain the rate at which new regulations are promulgated. All European regulators and supervisors, including the European Commission, agree on the need for the thoroughgoing implementation of approved regulations. But we also agree on the advisability of avoiding new regulations in the coming years. The Banco de España has sought, as far as possible, to limit the attendant costs, whether through unifying accounting criteria for reporting to the market, for prudential purposes and for calculating tax bases, through the convergence of our criteria with those demanded by other supervisors, such as the so-called national discretion clauses in Basel II, or through our circulars, i.e. specific regulations that provide institutions with the necessary legal certainty. But new financial regulations cannot be dispensed with indefinitely, since it is quite possible that the very dynamics of European market integration will entail the need for new regulations in specific fields. Indeed, new reforms may even prove appropriate for Spanish institutions. For example, the fragmentation of deposit guarantee arrangements in Europe, in terms of financing, structure and organisation, might warrant a new Directive, which in turn would level the playing field, given the greater rigour of the Spanish system.

Of late, however, academics have started to recognise how critical leadership, politics, good governance and institutions are to growth. I believe that to trigger off and sustain economic growth, three necessary conditions are required: •  First, vision and ideas;  •  Second, sense of reality; and  •  Third, good implementation  As the first and second factors are related, I will discuss them together. Vision and ideas and sense of reality First, vision and ideas. By this, I mean that leaders must offer a political and economic vision to excite the imagination of their people. They must offer hope and programmes to rally the people to sacrifice, struggle and work together to achieve a better future. Second, by sense of reality, I mean leaders must have their feet firmly planted on the ground even as their imagination of growth and prosperity soars. In pursuing growth, sound basic economic principles such as prudent fiscal policies, monetary discipline, and high savings must be practised. Many countries' experiences have reinforced the importance of a stable macroeconomic environment and the benefits of a market-based system. Policies on growth must be applied to local contexts in a practical way, taking into account an economy's resources and constraints. In addition, countries must be open to new ideas and be prepared to change. They must not be trapped in old paradigms but must constantly adapt to the everchanging world. Let me illustrate this with Singapore's example. After independence, we implemented policies that promoted macroeconomic stability.
Market predictions of monetary policy measures have been accurate, leading to lower volatility in financial markets and improving the effectiveness of our policy measures A prime example of this is the most recent increase in our operational target in March 2006. An analysis of interest rate movements shows that the increase of our operational target by 25 basis points was almost fully anticipated by financial markets prior to the announcement. Contrary to what many believe, a central bank does not lose any prestige in seeing its policy correctly anticipated by the markets. It is just proof of a well-understood monetary strategy. 3. Credibility - words are not enough  In Switzerland, the systematic communication of monetary policy has had the desired effect of getting market participants to adapt their expectations well before actual policy interventions are made. Does this mean that the Swiss National Bank now only has to indicate its intentions in order to influence interest rates? Or as some academics and practitioners have posed the question: can central bankers now replace open market operations with "open mouth" interventions? Considering the recent tightening of monetary policy in Switzerland, one might be tempted to agree that open mouth operations are sufficient to move interest rates. After all, short-term interest rates rose long before an increase in the operational target was announced or before we raised the actual interest rates on repo transactions. However, this interpretation of the data ignores one crucial issue.

Cumulatively, these developments have strengthened further the international financial linkages between different jurisdictions and have contributed towards the more efficient allocation of resources across borders. This recent global financial crisis has highlighted the risks associated with financial globalisation. Equally important in the process of internationalisation is therefore the quality of this financial globalization in Islamic finance. Let me touch on two aspects of the financial globalisation of Islamic finance. Firstly, that Islamic finance has been more inclusive in terms of its outreach to not only the participation from the developed world but also from the emerging world, particularly from Asia and the middle-East. This leads to diversification and  BIS Review 20/2010  1  avoids risk arising from over concentration in particular jurisdiction. Moreover, with the relatively better growth prospects in the emerging world, strengthening the economic and financial inter-linkages among the emerging world would mutually reinforce these prospects. The increasing role of Islamic finance in bringing together different parts of the emerging world, and enhancing its links with the developed world would facilitate further this globalisation process. The second aspect relates to the current increased global engagement by the international community to drive the financial reform agenda. As part of this process, it is important for this engagement to be extended to the prudential standard setting entities for Islamic finance as Islamic finance becomes a growing component of the international financial system.
It shows that the stability consensus is overwhelmingly shared among the public to which, as an independent institution, we are ultimately accountable. The euro as a contribution to the completion of the single European market The guarantee of price stability for the now 329 million Europeans in the euro area is the main reason why the euro has been a success story in its first ten years. But it is not the only reason. Let me briefly mention another important reason: the introduction of the euro was an important contribution to the completion of the single European market. The advantages of the single market could be better exploited by the common currency. Trade and capital ties between euro countries have grown. I’d like to mention a few examples:  BIS Review 16/2009  3  •  The cross-border trade in goods and services in the euro area has increased by about 10 percentage points in relation to GDP since the introduction of the single currency. This can be partly attributed to the euro. Trade between individual euro countries now accounts for about half of their total exports and imports. At the same time, extra euro area trade developed very dynamically as well. Increasing trade integration within the monetary union did not come at the expense of trade with third countries. Hence, there is no “fortress Europe”. •  The euro has promoted competition, price transparency and the convergence of prices, and has lowered transaction costs and eliminated exchange rate risk.

In other words, economic agents and financial market participants expect the ECB to ensure price stability over the medium and long term whatever the amplitude of the short-term impact of the various shocks it has to cope with. They trust our commitment to stability. This is expressed most clearly by the issue of eurodenominated bonds with a maturity of 30 and even 50 years, the yields of which stand at a remarkably moderate level. For example, a 50-year French government bond maturing in 2055 currently yields 4.1%. This implies confidence into the stability of the euro – in its function as a store of value – extending beyond more than one generation. Cash changeover and price increases I know that in Germany and in other countries in the euro area the introduction of euro cash in 2002 was “associated” with price increases. Was the euro “a Teuro”? There were some price increases in the course of the cash conversion. The statistics office of the European Union – Eurostat – estimates that the cash conversion added between 0.12% and 0.29% to the inflation rate in the euro area in 2002. This was overall small in 2002 and negligible over the ten years of the euro. Also to be noted is the discrepancy between the “felt” inflation and the actual, statistically measured inflation. This discrepancy cannot be attributed to a measuring error in the consumer price statistics. These statistics are of high quality.
Prior to the recent reforms, all submissions were immediately made public. The aim of the LIBOR-setting process has been to create a set of reference rates that would be credible and would generate robust measures of bank funding costs across a wide range of market conditions. The credibility was based on the borrowing experience from the submitting banks represented through their submitters – those individuals responsible for actually submitting an answer each day to the administrator. The potential conflicts of interest between the submitters and traders within the bank were typically handled through internal policies such as the presence of information barriers that were intended to prevent sensitive information from flowing between the traders and LIBOR submitters. The robustness to market conditions would be maintained even in periods of market stress or a lack of transactions by the reliance on the hypothetical question instead of the use of actual transaction data. That is, even if during stressed times when trading became sporadic in a particular currency-maturity pair, all submitters could still answer the question even if their bank did not happen to engage in any trades on that particular day in that particular pairing. This ensured a large sample size even during stressed market conditions. The trimming of the sample helped to minimize the influence of any outlier submission, but also limited the ability for any one submitting bank to influence the posted rate. 3  See McConnell, “Systemic Operational Risk: The LIBOR Manipulation Scandal.” Journal of Operational Risk, 8(3):59–99.

Even so, most things suggest that equity will continue to be a good vehicle for saving in the long term even if the trend rate of return is not as high as we saw in the 1980s and 1990s or as some foresaw a couple of years ago. References Bradford DeLong, J. and Summers, L., (2001), The ”New Economy”: Background, Questions, and Speculations, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Symposium, August, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Brookes, M. and Zaki, W., (2000), Is the Internet Better than Electricity?, Global Economics Paper, No. 49, Goldman Sachs, July, London. D’Avolio, G., Gildor, E. and Shleifer, A., (2001), Technology, Information, Production and Market Efficiency, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Symposium, August, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Frennberg, P. And Hansson, B., (1992), Swedish stocks, bonds, bills and inflation, Applied Financial Economics, Vol 2, pp79-86. Johansson, Ö., (1967), The gross domestic product of Sweden and its composition 1861-1955, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm. Jungenfelt, K. G., (1966), Löneandelen och den ekonomiska utvecklingen, IUI, Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala. Schön, L., (2000), En modern svensk ekonomisk historia, SNS förlag, Borås. 6  BIS Review 90/2001  Shiller, R., (2000), Irrational exuberance, Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex. Siegel, J., (1999), Stocks for the Long Run, McGraw Hill, New York. Åberg, Y., (1969), Produktion och produktivitet i Sverige 1861-1965, IUI, Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala. BIS Review 90/2001  7
News conference  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and gentlemen It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. As usual, I will begin by explaining our monetary policy decision and presenting our assessment of the economic situation. I will also be addressing three additional subjects: five years of negative interest, the possible consequences of climate change for the SNB in fulfilling its mandate, and a study on the methods behind our company talks. After my remarks, Fritz Zurbrügg will report on the developments in the area of financial stability, and Andréa Maechler will then talk about the situation on the financial markets. We will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions afterwards. Monetary policy decision  I will begin with our monetary policy decision. We are keeping the SNB policy rate and interest on sight deposits at the SNB at −0.75%. We remain willing to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary, while taking the overall currency situation into consideration. Our expansionary monetary policy continues to be necessary given the inflation outlook in Switzerland. The trade-weighted exchange rate of the Swiss franc is practically unchanged compared with September 2019. The franc thus remains highly valued, and the situation on the foreign exchange market is still fragile. Negative interest and the willingness to intervene counteract the attractiveness of Swiss franc investments and thus ease the upward pressure on the currency.

While this dichotomy did not appear problematic before the crisis – indeed, the presence of national regulation was often viewed favourably as a component of a more flexible regulatory and supervisory framework in Europe, which could be more easily adapted to countryspecific conditions – it led to important deficiencies that were first laid bare by the crisis. •  The lack of a robust regulatory and supervisory framework led to the failure to identify and control an unbalanced and unsustainable expansion of credit in some countries, during a period characterised by low interest rates, abundant liquidity and easy access to credit. •  A framework fundamentally based on the national perspective was also not conducive to identifying cross-country interdependencies and the potential for spillovers, which therefore went unaddressed. •  When the crisis erupted and the vulnerabilities materialised, the framework also revealed the lack of adequate crisis management mechanisms. National supervision proved to be a major obstacle towards a more efficient management of the crisis, leading to a serious setback in the process of financial integration. Monetary policy in the crisis In this environment of financial refragmentation of euro area financial markets, central banks had to step in. If risks to financial stability hamper the proper transmission of monetary policy, monetary policy may be rendered ineffective, thereby impeding the ability of central banks to safeguard price stability.
They are, therefore, not likely to face any outflows of deposits. The Swiss franc money market, on the other hand, is dominated by the two big banks. These play a key role in ensuring the stability of the system and therefore must shoulder a heavy responsibility. Role of the Swiss National Bank Central banks also play a significant role in the preparations toward securing liquidity. They are the providers of central bank money which is the medium with which the final settlement of payments is carried out. I would like to give the following brief outline of our plan:  1. Banks and the public can count on our providing the liquidity necessary for coping with the millennium generously and flexibly, i.e. by maintaining a continuous presence in the market. I do not think that there is any basis to the objection that such a promise will lead to a moral hazard. Firstly, because the liquidity planning of each bank is monitored and enforced by a supervising body. Secondly, because we will create liquidity on a collateralised basis only. 2. We will provide liquidity with the usual monetary policy instruments on a spot and - if appropriate - forward basis. We are aware, however, that the processes connected with the individual instruments differ considerably as regards their vulnerability to malfunction or breakdowns. Settlement of a foreign exchange purchase against Swiss francs, for instance, is relatively complex and therefore exposed to a non negligible operational risk.

The ECB staff macroeconomic projections foresee annual real GDP increasing by 1.2% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015. In addition, the majority of soft indicators are improving, and have been above their long-term average for a number of months now, confirming a rebound in economic activity. Although the strength of the rebound varies across countries, it is important to highlight the return to positive growth in those countries most affected by the crisis and which are of major importance to the euro area: I’m thinking above all of Spain and Italy, where exports have rebounded sharply and are currently driving economic activity. On a financial level, we are also seeing a significant return to normal in the euro area: •  bond markets in periphery countries are continuing to stabilise and interest rates have come back down to sustainable levels, with several periphery countries or programme countries recently managing to obtain market financing at perfectly satisfactory rates;  •  fragmentation within the euro area is decreasing – as shown for example by the fall in liquidity surpluses or Target2 balances;  •  credit dynamics are still subdued on the whole, due to continuing weak demand and ongoing bank deleveraging. But we are confident that the asset quality review which we are undertaking and the upcoming stress tests will revive confidence and thus boost credit.
However, reference rates are used worldwide in a variety of contracts and concerning very large contract values. They therefore fulfil a central function in our financial markets. *  I would like to thank Ola Medelberg for help in writing this speech, and Ingrid Wallin Johansson, Anders Rydén, Johannes Forss Sandahl and Marianne Sterner for valuable comments. 1 [8]  A reference rate works as a benchmark in the pricing of financial contracts. The main intention of such a benchmark is that pricing shall follow market developments, and that none of the contracting parties shall be able to manipulate it. I think that reference rates can be seen as a common tool that exists to facilitate for everyone who participates in or is affected by the financial market. As reference rates have such a key function in financial markets, it is important that they are fair and inspire a high level of confidence. And there are, as I shall discuss in a moment, strong grounds for raising questions about how robust and reliable the current interbank rate system is. Interbank rates have been used as reference rates since the 1980s Interbank rates developed as the dominant reference rates during the 1980s. The intention is that these rates shall reflect the interest rates used for unsecured loans between banks at different maturities. Sometimes these interbank rates are referred to as IBOR, which is an acronym for Interbank Offered Rate. The London-based LIBOR and the euro-rate EURIBOR are probably the best-known interbank rates.

With further reduction in NPLs and higher interest rates, there are better prospects for banks’ profitability. We see demons of the past in our region today and we wish to avoid any doubting of our European and Transatlantic engagements. In order to go further we must prevent the demons of the past from questioning the virtues of opening our economy to foreign investment. The only way to preserve this fine moment for Romania is to steer and balance the economic growth, to advance on our European path and grasp the benefits of this historical process. I will now give the floor to Mr. Jeffrey Franks who will deliver an in-depth presentation on the first chapter of the report – “Europe Hitting Its Stride”, accompanied by his discussant, Deputy Governor Liviu Voinea. I wish you all a fruitful debate today! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
It should be borne in mind that in a floating exchange rate regime, economic agents operate in an environment of exchange rate risk. Nevertheless, as repeatedly emphasized by the Central Bank, exchange rate risk is a manageable risk and economic agents should establish the mechanisms that will ensure the efficient management of this risk. Liquidity management Excess liquidity, which was created by the Central Bank’s purchases of government securities worth of YTL 14 billion from state-owned banks and banks transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) in order to meet their liquidity needs following the February 2001 crisis, as well as the intensive foreign exchange purchases during the 2003-2005 period, persisted in 2006. The Central Bank, withdrew the excess liquidity in the market mainly via New Turkish Lira deposit operations in the Interbank Money Market within the CBRT and Repo transactions in the Repo and Reverse Repo Market of the Istanbul Stock Exchange, on an overnight basis. Accordingly, overnight interest rates were constantly realized around the borrowing rate of the Central Bank. Hence, the borrowing rate of the Central Bank has continued to be an indicator for money markets.

Under the assumptions regarding liquidity stated above, the Central Bank’s 2007 liquidity management strategy will be as follows: (i)  The Central Bank will continue to announce overnight borrowing and lending interest rates between 10:00-12:00 and 13:00-16:00 in the Interbank Money Market within the CBRT. In case of a liquidity shortage during the day, banks will be able to borrow at the Central Bank’s lending rate against collateral within their limits. In the event of a fall in interest rates due to increasing liquidity, banks will be able to lend New Turkish Lira to the Central Bank at the Central Bank’s borrowing rate. (ii)  The Central Bank will continue to provide the Late Liquidity Window Facility in the Interbank Money Market within the CBRT between 16:00-16:30 such that banks may borrow from or lend to the Central Bank against collateral without any limit. (iii)  In case of a temporary or permanent liquidity shortage, the Central Bank will continue to carry out liquidity management through one-week repo auctions. When there is liquidity shortage in the market, the Central Bank will announce the amount of repo auction for that day on Reuters’ CBTF page at 10.00. While determining the amounts of the auction, the Central Bank - as long as no extraordinary fluctuations are observed in the market - will endeavor to maintain the average auction interest rate; a.