samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will highlight four ongoing initiatives for the financial and digital inclusion of individuals. pervasive electronic payments affordable cross-border remittances timely health insurance claims holistic financial planning  Pervasive Electronic Payments Fundamental to the digital inclusion of individuals and to the success of a digital economy is the ability to make an electronic payment. By broadening access to a common, inter-operable e-payment infrastructure, we extend the benefits of a digital economy to a wider range of users. Singapore’s retail e-payment infrastructure – FAST – enables 24/7 real-time fund transfers through the banking system. PayNow – which rides on FAST – allows us to send money to the bank accounts of individuals using just their mobile phone numbers or personal ID numbers, and to businesses using their unique entity numbers. This secure, inter-operable e-payment infrastructure has supported a boom in e-commerce and a variety of online services, especially after Covid-19. Four out of five individuals and three out of four active businesses in Singapore have adopted PayNow. PayNow monthly transaction values have crossed the $ billion mark – a four-fold jump from July 2019. From February next year, our e-payment infrastructure will be extended to non-bank ewallet payment providers. E-wallet users will be able to transfer funds in real-time between their e-wallets and their bank accounts, and across different e-wallets. This completes the last mile in Singapore’s journey to create an open and accessible epayment ecosystem. Affordable Cross-Border Remittances But making payments abroad continues to be slow, costly, and inefficient.

This leads – again temporarily – to higher growth and more inflation. If, on the other hand, the central bank wishes to curb inflation, it increases its policy rate. I deliberately used the word ‘temporarilyֹ’ because if monetary policy were to target real interest rates below the equilibrium rate on a sustained basis, inflation would go on rising but this policy would not result in higher real growth in the long term. On the contrary, uncertainty about the path of inflation would reduce growth potential. This is one of the reasons why central banks are tasked with ensuring price stability. For this mandate to be fulfilled, the policy rate must be set such that, at the desired inflation rate, the real interest rate corresponds with the equilibrium rate in the medium term. It is likely that the real equilibrium interest rate is lower today than in the past. The case for this hypothesis is supported by the fact that real interest rates have been falling globally for a 1  In fact, there are several possible definitions. The ‘ex ante’ real interest rate is the nominal interest rate less expected inflation. The ‘ex post’ real interest rate is the nominal interest rate less the effective inflation rate. Page 3/16  considerable time because, it is argued, people are investing less and simultaneously displaying a greater propensity to save. The propensity to save is increasing due to population ageing.
Model of international policy reciprocity  Extending Aikman et al (forthcoming), the results in Chart 3 are from a new model that builds on their paper by adding a second country to their model and by examining international policy leakages and coordination. For simplicity, the model assumes that there is no market-based finance sector (𝑏 = 1). In its place, the model allows for an additional determinants of the crisis probability. Domestic credit growth (𝐵1 ) still predicts domestic crises (𝛾1 ), but the credit measure is split between credit borrowed from home banks (𝐵1𝐻 ) and credit borrowed from foreign ones (𝐵1𝐹 ). And to capture the empirical finding that global credit growth can help predict crises over and above domestic credit, the crisis probability also depends on credit growth in the foreign country (𝐵1∗ ). In addition, the CCyB setting (𝑘1 ) also still reduces the crisis probability by enhancing resilience. But the effective CCyB setting depends on whether there is a reciprocity arrangement, since it is a 20  Other than credit growth, all variables are measured as annual averages, such that σ = 0.6 implies that an increase in annual interest rates of 1pp for 1 period of 3 years, reduces output by an average of 0.6% in each of the 3 years. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  12  weighted average of the CCyB settings applied to domestic banks’ domestic lending (𝑘1𝐻 ) and applied to foreign banks’ lending in the home country (𝑘1𝐹 ).

A robust and strong level of ethics can be achieved by providing ethics training and sensitisation as a component of continuous professional development. Although you are well qualified and are competent in your respective fields, it is vital that you have continuous training including advancement in ethical knowledge. Equally there is need to promote and ensure that your members exercise high levels of Integrity in whatever they do. As a country, we need professionals with high levels of social and moral awareness so that all of us are aware of the moral obligations and potential impact of our thinking, decisions and actions. We need to be good role models for others in behaviour, attitude and relationships. Let us endeavour to act in a way that is professional and that retains the confidence of others at all times. With these few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the ESAMI MBA Alumni Association Zambia Chapter officially launched. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 18/2010
In Region East, the rate of growth in manufacturing is somewhat lower than earlier this year, while growth in the building and construction sector is increasing. Residential construction is still driving activity in this sector. Although commercial building activity now appears to be picking up in other parts of the country, this does not as yet apply to Region East. Business sector demand for services is rising. The market for commercial services and IT and telecommunications services is showing marked improvement. The retail trade sector reports rising demand, particularly for consumer durables such as cars and furniture. Our contacts in services and retail trade report a moderate increase in investments in the year ahead. Signals from the regional network indicate that employment is continuing to increase in the building and construction sector, while manufacturing reports a slight decline. Employment in the service sector is rising for the first time since the network was established in October 2002. Directorate of Labour figures show that unemployment has fallen most in Region South and Region East since the beginning of 2004. In Region East, an important sector is commercial services, accounting for close to 15 per cent of employment. It is in this sector, in addition to manufacturing, that unemployment has fallen most on a nationwide basis. Since July, oil prices have varied between USD 34 and 52, the highest nominal levels recorded. Measured in real prices, oil prices are nonetheless clearly lower than the levels recorded in the beginning of the 1980s.

On this issue, the draft of the new Bank of Thailand Act has stipulated this condition. Even though there is a need to review the draft in order to make it more effective, the Bank of Thailand strongly endorses the importance of this Act because it will provide for an up to date framework for the development of the Thai monetary system in the future. In data dissemination, the Bank of Thailand has improved the process of data collection and dissemination to ensure that they are complete, correct, and expeditiously published, such as the improvement of the M3 data, the report on buying-selling of foreign currency especially the forms F.T. 3 and F.T. 4, as well as random checks on the correctness of the report. At this point, we would like to note that the purpose of this random check is not to emphasise the use of penalties but to create awareness amongst the financial institutions the importance of data reporting to the Bank of Thailand, so that the Bank of Thailand can have an up to date database for policy decision-making. On the external data, for the first time there has been a survey and announcement of the International Investment Position (IIP), in order to correctly monitor foreign currency exposure of the Thai economic system. Also, Thailand is the 21st country ranking in the world, in compliance with the International Monetary Fund's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).
(ii) Data disclosure and stress test methodologies, in order to measure more and more precisely and credibly climate-related risks of financial institutions. It is a prerequisite before possibly deciding about additional capital requirements. For these tasks, believe me: we in NGFS are ready to “roll up our sleeves”, and still have the enthusiasm of the pioneers. ** In conclusion, acceleration has been the name of the game since 2017. Still, we should further accelerate in 2021. We have an exceptional political alignment, with major international milestones: the COP26 of course, but also a G7 summit in June, a G20 conference in July in Venice, and a G20 summit in October in Rome. It is time for all policy makers – us included – to be up to Hans Jonas requirement, for the future wholeness of Man. Thank you for your attention. i  Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Responsible Investment Report of the Banque de France 2019, June 2020. iii “Progress report on bridging data gaps”, NGFS Report, 26 May 2021. iv “The role of central banks in the greening of the economy”, Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, 11 February 2021 v “Adapting central bank operations to a hotter world: Reviewing some options”, NGFS Report, 24 March 2021. ii

However, I would like to underline that the attractiveness exerted by advanced countries on our graduates and our specialized profiles is making our task even more complex, especially in recent years. At Bank Al-Maghrib, for example, we lost about 20 computer engineers in just 18 months. I think that this point also deserves to be discussed and debated at meetings such as this one. Thank you! 7
However, in view of the risk exposures and the prevailing uncertainties in the economic environment, it is crucial that the big banks build up a sufficient base of loss-absorbing capital as swiftly as possible during this transition period. After adjusting for the not fully loss-absorbing components, the big banks’ remaining capital buffers are still thin in light of the aforementioned risks. Despite some improvement, leverage for both UBS and Credit Suisse is still high by international standards. Taking only fully loss-absorbing capital into account, the average capital ratio of both big banks amounted to less than 2% of total assets. Against this background, both big banks have already made major strides towards expanding their loss-absorbing capital base. To this end, Credit Suisse issued contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), while UBS retained its earnings. These important first steps have already significantly strengthened the big banks’ loss-absorbing capital base. They also show that the big banks should be in a good position to build up the necessary, additional capital buffer. Situation of domestically focused banks Allow me now to discuss the situation of banks with a domestic focus. The capitalisation of domestically focused banks was almost unchanged in comparison to 2009. The short but sharp recession in Switzerland in 2009 did not have any noticeable impact last year either. Write-downs and provisions were at a historical low. In a long-term comparison, profits remained at a high level overall.

SCAP was a supervisory stress test, meaning that regulators specified the adverse scenario and determined the resulting loss and revenue estimates on a standardized basis drawing on information submitted by each firm. The CCAR process centered on bank-run stress tests in which regulators specified the scenario but required each bank to model the stress event itself. Dodd-Frank mandates both supervisory stress tests and bank-run stress tests. We are still working out how we will do each of these types, but I expect that the SCAP and CCAR exercises will serve as models. Today I will focus on the SCAP and CCAR exercises. The first important point to make is that the purposes of the SCAP and CCAR are very different. Thus, these processes are conducted in very distinct ways. Turning first to the SCAP, its purpose was to restore confidence in large U.S. banks. The SCAP was designed to accomplish this mission by measuring how much capital these banks would need in a stress macroeconomic environment and then forcing these banks to either raise this capital from private sources or take mandatory convertible preferred equity from the U.S. Treasury. The key attributes of the SCAP include:   A common stress scenario was applied to each of 19 large bank holding companies (BHCs).   This stress scenario was applied in a consistent manner across these banks. The test was applied at the detailed trading book and banking book level, with the expected loss experiences based upon the particular characteristics of the portfolio being examined.
So far, however, estimates of the term premium have remained compressed, suggesting that the recent rise in ten-year US Treasury yields reflects, by and large, a reappraisal of the future expected path of short-term interest rates. [16] The literature points to three potential explanations as to why the impact of QT might be more muted. One is that QT is missing the signalling component of QE. [17] That is, while balance sheet expansions signal a lower-for-longer interest rate policy, balance sheet reductions may provide little, if any, information about the future path of short-term interest rates. The second reason is that the unwinding of QE is typically more gradual than the build-up in assets. [18] The third explanation is that QT often happens in an environment of improved market functioning. Indeed, one reason why QE was so effective at the outbreak of the pandemic is that it quickly improved liquidity and reduced volatility. [19] However, isolating the effect of QT is inherently difficult. Many different forces drive long-term yields. For example, purchases by non-resident investors of US Treasury securities accelerated sharply last year, likely reflecting growing interest rate differentials and the rise in uncertainty on the back of Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and its people (Slide 9). Foreign investors alone absorbed nearly 60% of the net supply of US Treasuries in 2022. Increased foreign demand may have offset, at least in part, the impact of the higher actual and expected bond supply from QT.

14, No 5; and Arora, C. and Cerisola, M. (2001), “How Does U.S. Monetary Policy Influence Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Markets?”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 48, No 3, pp. 474-498. 25. Gilchrist et al. (2019), “U.S. Monetary Policy and International Bond Markets”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 51, No S1, pp. 1-200; Motto, R. and Özen, K., op. cit. ; Andrade, S. C. et al. (2023), “Sovereign risk premia and global macroeconomic conditions”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 147, No 1, pp. 172-197; and Eichengreen, B. and Mody, A. (1998), “What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging-Market Debt: Fundamentals or Market Sentiment?” NBER Working Paper, No 6408. 26. See, for example, Miranda-Agrippino, S. and Rey, H. (2020), “U.S. monetary policy and the global financial cycle”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol 87, No 6, pp. 2754-2776; and Gilchrist, S. et al. (2022), “Sovereign risk and financial risk”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 136. 27. Gilchrist, S. and Zakrajšek, E. (2012), “Credit spreads and business cycle fluctuations”, American Economic Review, 102, No 4, pp. 1692-1720. The excess bond premium has also been shown to be a powerful driver of economic activity. See Gilchrist, S. and Mojon, B. (2016), “Credit risk in the euro area”, The Economic Journal, 128, No 608, pp. 118-158; and Bleaney, M. et al. (2016), “Bond spreads and economic activity in eight European economies”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 126, No 598, pp. 2257-2291. 28. Anderson, G. and Cesa-Bianchi, A.
Detailed rules on governance in banks and deliberations on transposing extensive rules on banks’ internal control systems into national law complicate or even prevent the desired level playing field of consistent supervision – they increase fragmentation. Moreover, European supervisory legislation provides more than 150 options to choose from, options which have so far been exercised along highly different lines at the national level. Some are justified by local features – in this respect, the principle is that similar things should be treated similarly and dissimilar things should be treated dissimilarly. Many of the options are based rather more on tradition, and are in conflict with the principle of “same business, same risk, same rules”. The smaller proportion of these options remains national in character. Competence for the majority of the options – for over 100 – has been vested in the SSM since 4 November 2014. The ECB, together with the national supervisory authorities, has now begun to arrange for their consistent application. This process and the resulting adaptations will not always be simple or convenient, but the benefits of the outcome should outweigh the cost of adaption – not just in terms of financial stability, but also through more balanced competition and lower transaction costs. In some respects, we are still at the beginning of the road, but I am confident that the SSM has put us are on the right path towards achieving these objectives. 5.

Let me mention just a few elements by way of a reminder: •  considerably more and higher-quality capital for banks;  •  new standards for liquidity reserves and indebtedness in banks;  •  considerably stricter risk management and governance requirements;  •  the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) that marks significant progress in dealing with distressed institutions. Thanks to these reforms, the regulatory network within Europe has become considerably tighter and more balanced in recent years. It has developed from a purely capital-based system into a set of diversified standards. This has made it more difficult to circumvent individual regulations. It requires banks to give due consideration to a broad range of relevant factors (capital, liquidity, leverage, interconnectedness/systemic significance and structure) when designing their business models. Despite this progress, there is still work to be done here and there. •  We must convincingly weaken the connections between a country and its banks in the long run. Government bonds continue to be considered by regulators as largely risk-free: there is neither an obligation to have capital available that is commensurate with the risks, nor are there rules that address concentration risks. This cannot be allowed. •  We must also improve the calculation of equity in individual banks. A great deal of confidence has been lost in this respect over recent years. Internal bank models are today seen by many to be a means for risky capital optimisation and not as a useful tool for bank management and risk-based supervision.
As Mario Draghi stressed, “there should be a good case for monetary policy”7 for the euro area as a whole: our policy cannot be designed according to the specific needs of some banks or jurisdictions. And secondly, we should look at the whole spectrum of possible tools, including various forms of LTRO, to decide about the recalibration of conditions and maturities. Regarding interest rates, I have often stressed in the past the usefulness but also the obvious limits of negative interest rates. Let me quote what I said as early as 2017: “they are difficult to accept by households and SMEs, and so impossible in practice to pass through to them”8. And thus they are believed by many, if maintained for too long, to weigh negatively on the profitability of financial intermediation with possible adverse consequences for the smooth transmission of monetary policy. Hence, if we had to use negative rates for a longer period than expected, we should study pragmatically how to contain their possible adverse effects on the bank transmission of our monetary policy. 3. Relentless efforts towards a stronger Europe Let me come back to the European spirit I pleaded for. Today, it is also an economic requirement: faced with the slowdown and the uncertainties, monetary policy cannot be the only game in town. This is a German worry I fully share with many others. But then, we need to push relentlessly for a strengthening of our Economic Union. The commitment of Mario Centeno, as Chairman of the Eurogroup, is essential.

Both of these factors create new incentives for fiscal policy to focus more on short-term job creation schemes and less on long-term fiscal soundness. And the new member states are not much different in this respect. They have experienced a decade of incredible structural change, and yet more is ahead. Furthermore the new member states have great infrastructure needs and, coupled with high unemployment, there will be continued pressure for fiscal expansion, even in a cyclical upturn. So from this perspective, too, the hope that the recovery alone will “fix” the European deficit problem might be too optimistic. In addition, structural fiscal deficits in many of the euro area member states might be larger than present calculations show since there is a large risk that potential growth is lower than commonly assumed. Estimates of potential growth for the old Europe have successively been lowered as labour productivity growth has fallen gradually during the last two decades from around 2% to about 1% per year. However, the figures for the second quarter of this year were the highest we have seen for some time. The IMF’s latest potential growth estimate for the euro area is about 1.8%. Nevertheless, inflation has been remarkably stable, just above 2% in recent years despite poor growth and presumed large negative output gaps. If potential growth is lower, the need for fiscal consolidation is even higher than present consolidation programmes show. Let me summarize the problem.