samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The well-defined objectives of monetary policy have provided a strong foundation on which the MPC can base its decisions over the course of the crucial period up to and beyond the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. But to be successful, monetary, and indeed financial stability, policy must be effectively delivered. That requires the efficient implementation of decisions. And it requires stable and effective core sterling markets and payments infrastructure. The Bank has a long history of outstanding execution of decisions, of scanning the horizon for emerging vulnerabilities in markets, and of using its position to address them. In keeping with this history, these are things I will prioritise in my term as Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking. Beyond Define, Decide, Deliver, there is of course ‘Describe’. Improving our communications internally and externally is a key priority of the Bank’s Vision 2020 strategy, because better communication will support our mission to deliver monetary and financial stability. A new focus of our communications is on schools. We started last week in Merseyside and over the next year Bank staff are visiting 200 schools covering 9% of the pupil population. But engaging with traditional stakeholders remains important, on which note let me take some of your questions. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  References Bailey, A, (2017) ‘The future of LIBOR,’ Speech given at Bloomberg, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/the-future-of-libor Broadbent, B.

Fahad Almubarak: Top achievements of the monetary sector during the past decade Speech by H E Dr Fahad Almubarak, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, at the National Day, Riyadh, 25 September 2014. *  *  *  Our beloved country is celebrating its 84th national day, which is very dear occasion to all of us. The march of welfare and building continues under the prudent leadership of the Kingdom. SAMA’s employees are overwhelmed with happiness on this occasion in light of the achievements of the monetary policy by focusing on the interests of the country and citizens. SAMA’s balanced monetary policy has contributed to strengthening the stability of the national economy during stages of global stress and turbulence. As a result, the credit rating of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been upgraded. Fitch upgraded the Kingdom’s sovereign credit rating to AA from AA- with a stable outlook. Over the past ten years, the banking sector witnessed a great development quantitatively and qualitatively. M3 rose by 270 percent to SAR 1,669.3 billion at the end of July 2014 against an increase of SAR 451.3 billion at the end of July 2004. Total bank deposits also went up by 284.5 percent to SAR 1,520.6 billion in the same period. Total commercial banks’ claims on the private and public sectors grew by 193.3 percent to SAR 1,314.4 billion at the end of July 2014 compared to SAR 447.8 billion at the end of July 2004.
But the effect of monetary tightening on domestic demand is limited through the processes I have described, where long rates react weakly to the increase in the policy rate. In addition, firms and households increasingly borrow in foreign currency in order to avoid even those limited increases in domestic borrowing costs that take place. This foreign currency borrowing is intermediated by the domestic banking system, where the financing is more short-term than the lending. Thus the banking system has a growing balance sheet in FX, with a maturity mismatch but limited LOLR facilities to backstop it. In short, financial risks are accumulating, both in the financial sector and among firms and households. At the same time, the economy is increasingly in an unsustainable position, with an overvalued currency and big current account deficit. The  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  whole thing then comes crashing down when foreign financing comes to a sudden stop, heralding a currency crisis and even a banking crisis as well. Before I go further, let me warn you, though, that this is only part of the explanation of the financial crisis in Iceland. The offshore activities of the banks and old-fashioned macroeconomic mismanagement were equally important, if not more so. On this topic, I refer you to other speeches and publications by myself and others. 2 What can and should be done about the problems I have laid out?

Given its proven success at maintaining market rates in line with Bank Rate, as well as the benefits of operational continuity, the Bank is minded to keep using a variant of the current floor system for controlling market rates. And, as the quantity of reserves supplied falls towards the quantity demanded by market participants, we will stand ready to meet SMF participants’ demand for additional reserves through regular open market operations. In addition, there is a strong case for holding some longer maturity assets, such as gilts, to back the stable portion of demand for banknotes, and indeed we had already started to do this ahead of the financial crisis. 29  How large a quantity of reserves SMF participants will demand, and therefore how large our future balance sheet will be, is an open and difficult question. As well as changing our own monetary policy toolkit, the financial crisis has changed the behaviour of financial institutions, including in ways that are significant for the size of our balance sheet. In particular their demand for reserves and for liquid assets more generally, is much greater than it was before the crisis. That reflects a combination of tighter regulation which requires them to hold larger buffers of liquid assets, and more prudent management which means that banks have learnt the lessons of the crisis and the value of maintaining liquidity, as well as the fourfold increase in the number of SMF participants. This change was not caused by QE and the expansion of our balance sheet.
The average pace of  Not only are the effects sizeable, but, on past experience, they are potentially protracted. The impact of sterling’s 25% depreciation following the onset of the financial crisis on import prices was one factor that contributed to high inflation throughout 2008–12. The potential for these effects to be persistent highlights their relevance at the policy horizon. 29  To paraphrase one of my predecessors at the Bank of Canada, Gerry Bouey, we didn’t abandon the lower bound; the lower bound abandoned us. 30  See Office for Budget Responsibility (2015), Economic and Fiscal Outlook, July; and IMF (2015), World Economic Outlook. 31  Based on data on short term money market rates, starting 1718. See Hills, S, Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2015) “Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.2”, Bank of England. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  tightening since the adoption of inflation targeting in 1992 was around 50 basis points per quarter. It would not seem unreasonable to me to expect that once normalisation begins, interest rate increases would proceed slowly and rise to a level in the medium term that is perhaps about half as high as historical averages. In my view, the decision as to when to start such a process of adjustment will likely come into sharper relief around the turn of this year. That said, the path is much more important than the precise timing of the first rate increase.

I have noticed that although real growth is evident in the region, it is accompanied by some important risks and vulnerabilities. One of the challenges attached is related to the sustainability of this growth. The National Bank of Romania shares your 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  view. We should not forget the saying “easy come, easy go”. Loose economic policies, unbalanced budgets and wage-price spirals could cost us much when the economic downturn check is due. This problem hit us severely in the recent past, but we have hardly learned the lesson. Because I have mentioned the economic laws, I will turn now to the legal environment: the report covers extensively the rule of law, the role of institutions and the judiciary. In the report, Central and Eastern Europe is presented as an example of effective measures and progress in this respect, which is of no small importance. Romania finds itself in an upright moment when economic performance is associated with strong achievements in the reform of institutions. We should not waste this moment. In the long run, the economy’s, the institutions’ and the society’s progress goes hand-in-hand, and, conversely, so does their regress. Therefore, we have to be careful not to reverse the current trend. Banks in Europe seem to ride better on the economic tide, also thanks to wide-ranging reforms brought by the Banking and Capital markets Union. Credit is still below its potential and the needs of the economy.
The composition of the loan portfolio, which is dominated by the euro dominated loans, is also a point of concern, although this position is supported by a strong presence of foreign currency denominated liabilities in banks balance sheets, a generally supportive environment of exchange rates and interest rates over time and very close trade links to Euro-area countries like Italy and Greece. In this regard, Bank of Albania has been consistent in its approach to introduce regulatory measures that would discourage rapid increase in lending, encourage banks to lend more in domestic currency and increase transparency toward clients on banks products and services. Since the middle of last year, Bank of Albania has been vocal in its concern regarding the indirect impact of the financial crises, in particular regarding the performance of the real economy. We pointed out risks to economic growth related with a potential decline in credit from the banking sector, an increasing trade deficit (due to a slowdown in exports), a sharp contraction of remittances (due to perception of lower wealth and increasing unemployment in the developed countries). We stated that at these times, there is a much stronger need for a careful monetary policy and responsible fiscal policy. When it comes to the monetary policy, we have been careful in maintaining incentives for promoting savings in local currency assets and anchoring expectations for low and stable inflation rates.

During time, the banking sector has increased the number of branches, has improved its products to the public and has increased its intermediating role to provide an important contribution in the economic development of the country. At the same time, the entrance of well-know European banking groups from Austria, Greece, Italy and France, has been associated with consolidation in the banking industry. As it is the case in the entire region, the banking sector dominates the financial sector in our country. Our supervisory work aims at adopting the best international standards in the field. As a result, our legal and regulatory framework is considered to be consistent in achieving our objective of a stable and sound development of the banking activity, and is continuously improved. From the practical aspect, we combine both regulatory and risk based supervision. BIS Review 43/2009  1  The data reported from the banking sector are analyzed off-site and verified on-site. We also try to stay in close contacts and cooperate with foreign supervisory authorities, as an important instrument in improving the effectiveness of the supervisory work. Nowadays, the assets of the banking sector represent around 87 percent of the country’s GDP. Loan portfolio has reached around 37 percent of GDP. Due to increasing competition after the privatization, its growth has been very strong in the last 4 years, albeit starting from a low base. Deposits represent around 80 percent of the banking sector liabilities, and the loan/deposit ratio stood at around 62 percent.
But as the economy grows, the massive amount of money sitting on the sidelines will be activated; the “velocity” of money will accelerate. If it does so too quickly, we might create inflation or financial market instability or both. The 12 Federal Reserve Banks house the excess reserves of the depository institutions of America: If loan demand fails to grow at the same rate as banks accumulate reserves due to our hyperaccommodative monetary policy, the resultant excess reserves are deposited with us at a rate of return of 25 basis points (1/4 of 1 percent per annum). Here is some math confronting policymakers: Excess reserves are currently 65 percent of the monetary base and rising. The only other time excess reserves as a percentage of the base have come anywhere close to this level was at the close of the 1930s, when the ratio hit 41 percent. We are in uncharted territory. To prevent excess reserves from fueling a too-rapid expansion of bank lending in an expanding economy, the Fed will need to either drain reserves on a large scale by selling longer-term assets at a loss or provide inducements to banks to keep reserves idle, by offering interest on excess reserves at a rate competitive with what banks might earn on loans to businesses and consumers. Or we might employ more widely new techniques we are currently testing, such as “reverse repos”, complex transactions in which we, in effect, borrow cash overnight from market operators while posting securities as collateral.

But my confidence will be bolstered if my colleagues adopt the First Law of Holes espoused in the late ’70s by then-British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey: “If you find yourself in a hole, stop digging”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The housing market is well along in repair;5 the economy is expanding; cyclical unemployment is declining. To be sure, there will be individual data points that appear to challenge confidence, like the just-released employment report for December. But I believe the odds favor continued economic progress. And I believe that continuing large-scale asset purchases risks placing us in an untenable position, both from the standpoint of unreasonably inflating the stock, bond and other tradable asset markets and from the perspective of complicating the future conduct of monetary policy. The eye of the needle of pulling off a clean exit is narrow; the camel is already too fat. As soon as feasible, we should change tack. We should stop digging. I plan to cast my votes at FOMC meetings accordingly. Thank you. 5  See “The Long-Awaited Housing Recovery”, by John Duca, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Special Report, January 2014, www.dallasfed.org (note: the report will be available online on Jan. 15). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
On 22 May 2013, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, first mentioned the possibility that the ongoing third quantitative easing programme might be tapered off. The possibility that the Federal Reserve might announce a reduction in the monthly bond purchase programme sparked an increase in long-term US interest rates, which had risen by over 100 basis points by the beginning of September (cf. chart 4). All other major markets reacted in the same way – this included interest rates in Germany – despite the fact that the course of monetary policy in the euro area actually pointed to sustained expansion. The tapering debate coincided with a more favourable economic outlook in the advanced economies. This, in turn, increased uncertainty with regard to the future monetary policy path of the major central banks, and term premia – which form part of bond yields – rose. However, at the same time, short-term interest rates stayed firmly in place. Despite the recent increase, bond yields in advanced economies are at a very low level in historical terms. The impact on foreign exchange markets varied. The currencies of the emerging economies reacted particularly strongly, with capital outflows exerting very substantial downward pressure, as can be seen in chart 4. This shows that a number of emerging economies are still vulnerable to foreign portfolio investments, or hot money flows. The G4 currencies, by contrast, have been largely unaffected by the tapering debate (cf. chart 5). In trade-weighted terms, the US dollar has gained very slightly.

Fritz Zurbrügg: Monetary policy and financial markets – is a return to normal on the horizon? Speech by Mr Fritz Zurbrügg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event, Geneva, 21 November 2013. *  *  *  The speaker would like to thank Bettina Simioni for her valuable support in preparing this speech. I am also indebted to Marco Huwiler, Rita Kobel and Peter Kuster for their insightful comments. Ladies and gentlemen Welcome to the Money Market Event of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in Geneva. It is a great pleasure for me to be able to address you here today for the second time. I am particularly delighted because I am able to talk to you today with a good deal more confidence than I could a year ago. The situation on the European financial markets has calmed perceptibly, and it is more than a year since the SNB has had to intervene in the foreign exchange market to defend the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 against the euro. But let us turn the clock back to 2012 for a moment. At that time, a great many market participants feared that the euro area would collapse. The upward pressure on the Swiss franc was immense. As a result, our willingness to defend the minimum exchange rate with all our resources was put to a severe test. In 2012, we purchased foreign currency for a value of almost CHF 190 billion.
The very high growth figures for productivity during the latter part of the 1990s reflected both the macroeconomic stabilisation, an expansion in the private sector relative to the public sector, and in particular the IT expansion. It is unlikely that the development will continue in the same way in the future. However, we know that productivity growth has been surprisingly high in recent years. Many economists are busy working on the question of which factors lie behind this development. It is clear that, unlike the 1990s, it is not a question of high productivity growth in the IT sector and major investment in IT. One theory that has been put forward is that it may perhaps be explained by delayed effects in other sectors of earlier IT investment; that it has quite simply taken time for companies to adjust and to take advantage of the new technology. It is thus difficult to say anything about the durability of the most recent development. However, there are many indications that the long-term increase in productivity now is higher than it was during the 1980s. The widespread structural changes that took place during the 1990s are also an indication of this. Nor should it be forgotten, that the labour force is better educated today than it was ten years ago, particularly with regard to the percentage of those with a university education. There are studies indicating that the improvement in qualifications has also contributed to the growth in productivity.

Admittedly, the political agreement on the single resolution mechanism has some limitations, insofar as it does not entail per se the full lifting of national borders in respect of the management and resolution of banking crises. Unquestionably, though, the agreement marks decisive progress towards cross-country uniformity in the treatment of different bank liabilities in the event of viability problems and, in turn, it minimises the vulnerability of national public finances to bank crises, by ensuring that investors, and not taxpayers, will bear the brunt of the costs of these crises. In doing so, it does in fact successfully defuse many of the factors that have destabilised the monetary union over the past four years. At the same time, the creation of a single resolution mechanism is a vital complement to the single supervisory mechanism. It resolves the problems of legitimacy and compatibility of incentives that would have been generated by the relinquishing of sovereignty over the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  surveillance of the banking sector and crisis-prevention without concurrently having a common mechanism for managing and covering the ensuing consequences. Accordingly, the political agreements reached are added motivation for all those involved – the ECB, national supervisory authorities and banks themselves – in the intense preparations for the single supervisory mechanism.
While the city has had a number of ups and downs since the early 1990s, in tandem with the United States, the general trend has been upwards. The city withstood a terror attack, financial crisis and natural disaster. Following the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, there was uncertainty over whether this would be a permanent setback for the city. However, the city rebuilt and recovered and Lower Manhattan has evolved into a vibrant commercial, cultural and residential area. Gateway Plaza is still there, but the Battery Park City neighborhood today is now fully developed and well-established. There are even several grocery stores! The city weathered the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession far better than many would have anticipated. Although employment in the securities industry has stagnated after the decline due to the Great Recession, the city has found new sources of dynamism, including 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  rapid growth in the technology sector and the further development of tourism. The number of technology workers in New York City has doubled to about 125,000 in the past decade. That sector is now is nearly as big as the securities industry. And New York City had 56 million visitors last year, nearly double the total of 25 years earlier. In 2011, an important milestone was reached: payroll employment surpassed its previous alltime peak, from 1969, and it has grown strongly since then. Crime rates have fallen significantly across the city since 1990, and real estate values have surged.

Philipp Hildebrand: Key factors for the Swiss economy – financial market regulation in Switzerland Speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Swiss Economic Forum, Interlaken, 4 June 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website. *  *  *  The financial system is the life blood of our economy. Key measures to increase the resilience of the financial system have already been implemented in Switzerland. However, they have not addressed the fundamental problem, which is that systemically important banks cannot at present be allowed to fail. The commission of experts set up by the government to examine ways of alleviating this problem published its interim report a few weeks ago. The report proposes measures in the areas of capital, liquidity and organisational structure. This approach is in line with the key points on the Financial Stability Board’s agenda. The interim report is an important milestone in the efforts to address the “too big to fail” issue. Naturally, we still face considerable challenges. Moreover, cross-border solutions are required for the “too big to fail” question. The commission’s proposals represent a constructive step towards global cooperation. If the key points on the Financial Stability Board’s agenda are not implemented in the major financial centres, we will ultimately be left empty handed. One of the few positive aspects of the financial crisis has been the unprecedented international collaboration to combat the crisis and the endeavours to cooperate internationally on regulatory reform.