samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The two-tier system is designed to strike a balance between two outcomes: it seeks to preserve the incentives for banks to pass through the stimulus generated by the negative interest rate on their reserves, while mitigating the adverse effects that these negative rates might have on banks’ lending behaviour by affecting their profitability. The euro area needs financial intermediaries to remain engaged and active in 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  monetary transmission, and the new two-tier system will make sure that the ability of banks to extend loans to their customers at favourable terms remains unimpaired. The different elements of this comprehensive package will be mutually reinforcing in supporting favourable financing conditions for businesses and households, which will sustain investment and consumption. Greater business and household expenditure, in turn, will support inflation dynamics and make sure that they durably converge to our aim. Overall, in view of the outlook and uncertainties we are facing, monetary policy needs to remain highly accommodative for a prolonged period of time. The measures we took at our last meeting underscore our determination and readiness to provide the necessary monetary stimulus in pursuit of our price stability objective. We continue to stand ready to adjust all of our instruments if warranted by the inflation outlook.

In addition, we reiterated our intention to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time past the date when we start increasing interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. The net purchases and longer reinvestment horizon reinforce the accommodative impact of our other measures, thereby further easing the funding costs for businesses and households in the euro area. In addition, these measures help keep down longer-term interest rates by mitigating the undue tightening that would otherwise mechanically arise from the reduction in the average maturity of our portfolio. Finally, net purchases also signal our commitment to use all instruments in pursuit of our price stability objective, which can have a powerful effect on the formation of inflation expectations. As a complement to the policy measures I just outlined, we also decided to change the modalities of the new series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III) that we announced in June. Banks can now obtain this long-term funding at lower rates with a longer maturity. This will also help to ensure that our accommodative policies pass through entirely to the funding costs of households and firms. Finally, we also announced a two-tier system for reserve remuneration, in which part of banks’ excess reserves will be exempt from our negative rates.
Eurobarometer surveys find cross-country majorities in favour of closer cooperation to end the crisis. And this is ultimately unavoidable, given the state of political union between countries that monetary union de facto creates. It is now a time for politicians to be bold and courageous, to recognise these trends, and to complete as soon as possible the great project begun 60 years ago towards “ever closer union”. Thank you for your attention. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

At best, some  BIS Review 44/2004  1  small banks might be required to allocate capital for operational risk through the basic indicator approach. In the case of larger institutions, they will be allowed, at first, to implement only the foundation IRB approach. For the advanced IRB approach more time will be necessary for the banks to improve database quality and for supervisors to improve their experience in validation. Also for operational risk, in the first moment, only the alternative standardised approach will be available. The advanced measurement approaches will have to wait a while longer. No significant impact is expected in terms of capitalisation levels after Basle II. As previously explained, current capital requirements in Brazil are 11% and this buffer has allowed banks to face periods of high volatility with no major impact. Two important challenges expected in the implementation of Pillar I are the construction of adequate databases, either of pooled or individual data, and the incipient stage of operational risk management in the industry. As for Pillar II, with the New Capital Accord, it will be necessary for institutions to further develop their own processes for the internal assessment of capital adequacy and for the supervisory authorities to increase their supervisory focus on such processes. Cross-border supervision is another issue where occasional problems are expected to occur.
First, we must give credit where credit is due: the capital provided by global markets has been a key factor in Southeast Asia’s exceptional growth rates and its ability to lift so many out of poverty. Certainly, there are risks in tapping global markets to which no country is immune. At times, markets can be slow to react to changes in economic conditions and then react sharply; and in some instances, herd instinct seems to prevail. But let us not forget that markets also provide tremendous opportunities to accelerate growth and development, as Southeast Asia itself so vividly shows. Thus, the lesson to be drawn from recent developments is not about the risks of global markets, but rather about the importance of approaching markets in a responsible manner -- with strong macroeconomic fundamentals and sound structural policies that give markets confidence and therefore encourage long-term investment; with respect for the signals that markets provide; and with transparent and market-friendly policies that allow markets to allocate resources efficiently. IV. Perspectives for stronger regional cooperation Spillover and contagion effects can be so rapid, so costly, to countries with basically sound policies, that every country has an obligation to keep its own house in order. No country should run the risk of becoming the tinder for a wider conflagration. At the same time, there is also much that can be done on a regional and multilateral basis to bolster the efforts of individual countries seeking to manage their economies well.

It was, of course, difficult for the authorities in Thailand and elsewhere in the region to recognize, after so many years of outstanding macroeconomic performance, that serious underlying deficiencies could seriously jeopardize their track record. This certainly contributed to the delay in taking the necessary corrective action. And at last, in the absence of convincing policy action, the storm broke. We all have been troubled by developments in the Thai economy, both because they have been so costly for Thailand and its neighbors and because they were so preventable. But at least their origins are by and large clear. What is less evident, and therefore more unsettling to all who are trying to make sense of broader regional developments, is how the crisis spread as it did to economies such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, where current account deficits were generally smaller and foreign direct investment more substantial. Although it may be some time yet before we have the complete answer to this question, some elements of the explanation are becoming clear. Part of the explanation lies in the extent to which developments in Thailand have affected conditions in neighboring countries. For example, in expectation that the depreciation of the baht would erode the competitiveness of Thailand’s trade competitors, their currencies also weakened. And as these currency slides acquired an almost self-perpetuating character, the debt service costs of the domestic private sector increased.
For instance, suppose that demand depends on current and future expected real interest rates, and inflation depends on expected inflation and the margin of spare capacity in the economy. Now suppose there is an adverse cost shock that pushes inflation up. One can stabilise inflation by tightening policy sharply but temporarily. Alternatively one can generate the same disinflationary impact on demand by tightening policy less aggressively, but maintaining it for longer. And under normal policy objective functions, the latter course turns out to be preferable because it spreads the burden of adjustment more evenly over time. The problem is that such a policy is not time-consistent. The central bank has the incentive to say that it intends to do this. But once tomorrow comes, it makes sense not to go through with its promise of holding policy tight, as it suffers a cost in terms of output foregone, while the benefit has already been gained in the earlier period. It is better simply to renege on the earlier promise to keep policy tight for a while. Knowing that, private agents will not believe the central bank’s original promise in the first place. So to exploit this “policy-expectations” channel fully, the central bank needs some way of making its promise credible. The issue of how such credibility is achieved tends to be ignored in the literature: it is simply assumed that policy makers can commit themselves – or more often their successors – to behave in the necessary fashion.

Because your industry has taken a lead in learning from the past, in leading the changes needed and in having a sense of your responsibility to the wider economy. Yours is a model of engagement for others to emulate. And I look forward to continuing to work together. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Experiences so far show that the work on the repo rate path and publication of the path have functioned well. To crown it all, we have gained a monetary policy discussion that is aimed more at long-term issues and not merely at whether or not the interest rate should be altered a stage. My view is that our own repo rate path is quite clearly preferable to the other two alternatives that were tested. I believe that this is also the predominant view of most of those outside of the bank, now, three years later. The repo rate path served us well during the crisis. We were able to clearly signal that the repo rate will be low for a long period of time to alleviate the effects of the fall in demand and to attain the inflation target. There have been slight differences of opinion among us Executive Board members with regard to the time when an increase in the repo rate will begin. But these have been only slight, the larger moves have been clear. It has been necessary to have a low repo rate over a long period of time. In this context, changes in the repo rate amounting to 0.25 percentage points slightly sooner or later do not make a significant difference. According to our repo rate forecast in April, the real repo rate will have been below zero for two years, and it will remain low throughout the forecast period.

Thomas Jordan: Current challenges for the Swiss National Bank in the area of monetary policy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event of the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 27 March 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  With its forecast that GDP will grow by 1.5%-2.0% and the average inflation rate will amount to 2%, the National Bank is cautiously optimistic for the Swiss economy in 2008. However, since the summer of 2007, the international environment has taken a clear turn for the worse: Financial markets are in a serious crisis, the major economies are weakening and inflation rates are rising worldwide. This means that the SNB’s monetary policy is facing challenges on several fronts simultaneously. With regard to economic growth, the SNB is called upon to assess the consequences of the international financial crisis for the Swiss economy as precisely as possible and to analyse their implications for monetary policy correctly and at an early stage. On the inflation front, it must ensure that the measures taken in connection with the financial market crisis do not jeopardise the credibility of a monetary policy geared to long-term price stability or shake established inflation expectations. Finally, the challenge in the money market is two-fold.
Banks play a critical role in every economy. For ASEAN economies to continue to grow, they will need new investments. These investments will require financing, by sound banks able and willing to lend to sound borrowers. The immediate priority is to speed up the resolution of the non-performing loans (NPL) within the banking system. The process is underway, but is far from complete. Even today, NPLs in some ASEAN countries remain well above 20%. As in the case of corporate restructuring, effective bankruptcy laws are essential. Asset Management Companies (AMCs) need sufficient power to deal expeditiously with debts which are unrecoverable. Otherwise the banking problems will infect the whole economy, and drag countries into the same deep-seated malaise as Japan. Finding new money and writing off bad loans is the relatively easy part. It is more difficult, but equally important, for banks to put in place proper systems, structures, and prudential standards, to prevent the same problem from happening again. They need to establish rigorous credit cultures. They  BIS Review 111/2000  6  must lend based not on personal relationships, but on objective assessments of the borrowers’ creditworthiness. Many countries are encouraging bank mergers and consolidation as part of their plans to strengthen the financial sector. Mergers can help to strengthen the commercial banks, and give them the scale to compete in the globalised financial industry. However, mergers by themselves are insufficient.

Jean-Pierre Roth: The economic situation – la vie en rose? Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at a meeting with representatives of Ticino industry, Centro di studi bancari, Vezia, 28 November 2006. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  It is true that our exports continue to benefit from a buoyant global economy, that areas of concern such as the volatility of oil prices or the possibility of a significant and lasting downturn in the US economy have partially receded, and that the current economic recovery has led to an improvement in the labour market without endangering price stability. Is this la vie en rose (living life through rosetinted spectacles)? A brief outline of the situation in the national and international economies is given, indicating that the overall perspective remains favourable. It concludes with a concise evaluation of the risks, showing that the current euphoria may conceal significant risks that we must not lose sight of. BIS Review 116/2006  1
In the more desirable scenario in which humankind rises to the climate change challenge, the implications for monetary policy could be equally far-reaching, in particular if the associated shift in the energy mix changes relative prices to an extent that risks destabilising medium-term inflation expectations. I will also argue that there is scope for central banks themselves to play a supporting role in mitigating the risks associated with climate change while staying within our mandate. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Climate change and the monetary policy strategy To appreciate how climate change may affect monetary policy, it is useful to first recall the basic principles of how central banks decide on their actions. Broadly speaking, implementing monetary policy is the practice of identifying the nature, persistence and magnitude of the shocks hitting our economy. Policymakers typically differentiate between two broad categories of shocks. The first is demand shocks. These are shocks that are “benign” or manageable from the perspective of monetary policy because they pull inflation, growth and employment in the same direction – a “divine coincidence” which does not pose a dilemma to central banks.6 The second category relates to supply-side shocks. These shocks are less easy to accommodate for central banks as they pull output and inflation in opposite directions. This generates a trade-off for central banks between stabilising inflation and stabilising output fluctuations.

But a more contentious debate has emerged over the potential use of our asset purchases to pursue climate-related goals. Our corporate sector purchase programme in particular has come in for criticism as it includes emission-intensive sectors, such as manufacturing and utilities.30 In this debate, it is important to recall that the ECB decides on and calibrates its monetary policy measures with a view to achieving its price stability objective under the Treaty. As a consequence, more than 80% of the € trillion of securities purchased under our Asset Purchase Programme were issued by governments or their agencies. The remaining share consists of purchases of covered bonds, corporate bonds and assetbacked securities. For these assets, the Governing Council concluded that the best way to achieve its monetary policy objective was to follow the principle of market neutrality.31 This principle does not preclude supporting environmental objectives, however. 32 The ECB has purchased “green bonds” both under its public sector and corporate sector purchase programmes. Under the former, we currently hold around 24% of the eligible “green” universe, estimated to amount to some € billion. Under the latter, we hold close to 20% of the eligible “green” corporate bond universe, which currently has an outstanding volume of € billion euros. Under both programmes, the share we hold in “green” eligible bonds mirrors, by and large, the share of our holdings of the entire eligible universe.
Even if we could agree on the consistently low inflation objective of monetary policy, we can all perfectly well nevertheless disagree about the appropriate stance of policy - the appropriate level of interest rates - to deliver that objective. You may just have noticed that the MPC members themselves differ more often than not on the policy judgement, though usually at the margin. And you clearly disagreed among yourselves, in our second vote just now. That’s not at all surprising. I’ve often said that the people to be wary of - when it comes to views about interest rates - are those pundits who purport to know with great confidence that they are right. The operation of monetary policy is an art rather than a precise science, though art is often all the better for being informed by at least a little science! We start from a position where inflation is running - and has been running for some months - slightly below the Government’s 2½%. The January figure was 2.1%. Looking ahead - as we must, because monetary policy takes a while before it has its full effect - there is the continuing uncertainty about the strength of the exchange rate, which has of course had an important dampening effect on the rate of inflation. But beyond this, there are a number of unusual factors that might help to hold the rate of inflation down, at least in the short term.

Mr George identifies two distinct issues relating to monetary policy in the United Kingdom  Speech by The Rt Hon Eddie George, Governor of the Bank of England, to the CBI Annual Luncheon at the Guildhall in London on 25 February 2000. *  *  *  Thank you Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would normally open my remarks on occasions such as this by saying what a pleasure it is to be here. But central bankers need to time their appearances before CBI audiences with very great care. And I’ve clearly failed on this occasion. The exchange rate is strong - many would say excessively strong and the latest movements in interest rates have been upwards. Typically that is likely to mean that I’ve entered a lion’s den! Well I hope you’ve all enjoyed your lunch as much as I have - because I once dreamt that Daniel, who must have been one of my ancient forebears, and who knew a bit about entering a lion’s den, gave me some very good advice. He said to me in my dream, “If you really must do it then make sure that the lions have been well fed first - they might just drop off to sleep!” Looking around, I see there is something in what he said! Daniel also said, “Whatever you do, don’t provoke them!” Well at the risk of ignoring this advice I should like to establish just what sort of lions you all are!
Hungary Macaristan Mexico Meksika New Zealand Y.Zelanda Poland Polonya S. Africa G.Afrika S. Korea Kore Turkey Türkiye  900 0.03  700 0.02  400  0909  0107  0 0906  0909  0609  0309  1208  0908  0608  0308  1207  100 0907  200  1.4 0607  1.5  0.01  0506  300  0106  1.6  0509  500  0109  1.7  0908  600  0508  1.8  0108  800 1.9  FX Oynaklığı* Volatility Kur  0.04  0907  2  1000  0507  TL/Kur Sepeti (0,5 euro+0,5 ABD doları) TRY/Basket (0.5 Euro+0.5 USD) EMBI+Türkiye EMBI+ Turkey (sağ eksen)  2.1  *50-day moving standard deviation of daily exchange rate changes. Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. BIS Review 143/2009  9  Distinguished Members of the Press, The second quarter gross domestic product (GDP) release was broadly in line with the outlook presented in the July Inflation Report. Within this framework, the GDP decreased by 7 percent in the second quarter of 2009 compared to the same quarter last year (Figure 22). Meanwhile, the GDP in seasonally adjusted terms displayed a significant upswing compared to the previous quarter bringing an end to the persistent contraction in economic activity observed since the second quarter of 2008 (Figure 23). While domestic consumption demand rose markedly during the second quarter mainly owing to the fiscal stimulus package, external demand remained weak.

0909  0309  0908  0308  0907  0307  0906  0306  0905  0.0  0 Services  Other Services  Transport services  Rent  Restaurant services  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. As I believe that movements of core inflation indicators are essential to better understand the underlying trend of inflation and to evaluate developments more effectively, I would like to further elaborate on these developments. Core inflation indicators maintained their downward trend in the third quarter. By September, annual inflation measured by the CPI excluding energy, unprocessed food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and gold (H index) became 2.44 percent, while annual inflation measured by the I index, which excludes processed food prices, became 3.37 percent. In this period, although the partial withdrawal of tax cuts on durable goods pushed core inflation indicators upwards, seasonally and tax adjusted data indicate that the underlying trend of inflation is still low (Figure 7 and 8). Here I would like to highlight that the said indicators might increase, albeit modestly, in the upcoming period with the expiration of temporary tax cuts in October.