samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
4 For announcements of the various programs, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal  Reserve Board Announces Establishment of a Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to Support the Flow of Credit to Households and Businesses, March 17, 2020; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Board Announces Establishment of a Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) to Support the Credit Needs of Households and Businesses, March 17, 2020; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Board Broadens Program of Support for the Flow of Credit to Households and Businesses by Establishing a Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), March 18, 2020; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New Measures to Support the Economy, March 23, 2020; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Will Establish a Facility to Facilitate Lending to Small Businesses via the Small Business Administration’s Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) By Providing Term Financing Backed by PPP Loans, April 6, 2020; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Takes Additional Actions to Provide Up to $ Trillion in Loans to Support the Economy, April 9, 2020. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Section 4 highlights the  1  “Innovation and Integration in Financial Markets and the Implications for Financial Stability”, Rob Hamilton, Nigel Jenkinson and Adrian Penalver, pp. 226-250, The Structure and Resilience of the Financial System, eds Christopher Kent and Jeremy Lawson, Reserve Bank of Australia, November 2007. 2  See for example, the Bank of England Financial Stability Report, October 2007 and the Bank of England Financial Stability Report, April 2008. 3  See for example World Finance and Risk Management, delivered at Lancaster House 25 September 2002. 4  Referring to derivatives in the Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2002 Annual Report. BIS Review 93/2008  1  obstacles to fulfilment of that vision given the imperfections in financial markets. Lessons for the future and possible policy responses are discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes. Section 2: Trends in financial innovation 5 The pace of change in financial markets in recent years is truly remarkable. A few statistics help to illustrate this point and set the scene: •  The outstanding value of interest rate swaps and other derivatives reached almost $ trillion or some 11 times annual global GDP by the end of 2007, according to the BIS. Ten years ago the value was around $ trillion (2 ½ times GDP) (Chart 1). The global derivatives market expanded almost 50% during 2007.
2  BIS Review 65/2002  What determines the real exchange rate in the longer run? Table 1. Nominal and real depreciation, and inflation differential against the euro area 1970- 2001 Percent, annual averages Period  Nominal depreciation  Inflation differential (Sweden – euro area)  Real depreciation  1970 – 1982  2,60  0,75  1,84  1983 – 1992  1,50  2,52  -1,02  1993 – 2001  1,88  -0,56  2,45  W hole period  2,05  0,94  1,11  Remark: Prior to 1999 the SEK/EUR rate is a geometric mean of the nominal exchange rates between the krona and each euro-country currency. The weights are relative TCW weights. Source: Sveriges Riksbank. I have already talked about the real exchange rate and tried to explain that it is this rate, rather than the nominal exchange rate, which is most pertinent for economic decisions and for resource allocation within and between economies. An understanding of the real exchange rate's development, above all in the somewhat longer term, is needed in order to appreciate why nominal exchange rates fluctuate as they do. Here I shall use the Swedish krona relative to the euro as a specific example. Since 1970 the krona has depreciated by about 90 per cent against the euro currencies. What lies behind this?

But there is much to suggest that fiscal policy as early as next year that is, the policy which is being decided this autumn - will be important in this context, at least if the timing that is now being discussed, with full participation in 2005 or 2006, is achieved. Thus, more and more of stabilisation policy's burden is transferred to fiscal policy. But this does not mean that the Riksbank should refrain from using the scope for monetary policy that may exist during the ERM2 period. It is up to the Riksbank to do what is possible to make Sweden's accession to the monetary union smooth and stable. Low and stable inflation in Sweden is one important element here; another is a stable exchange rate. Sweden must fulfil the convergence criteria in both these respects. In practice this means that there may be grounds for continuing to produce inflation forecasts and to publish Inflation Reports in much the same way as at present. We should also do what we can with the interest rate to direct inflation onto our target. But the closer we come to adopting the euro, the smaller will be our repo rate's effect on longer term interest rates. That is because as the entry date approaches, the Swedish yield curve will be increasingly determined by European interest rates. BIS Review 65/2002  5  The fact remains that exchange rate stability is one of the convergence criteria for Sweden's full participation in the monetary union.
Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir: The life insurance industry in Malaysia Speech by Mr Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of Tokio Marine-Asia Life Group, Kuala Lumpur, 9 March 2007. *  *  *  Mr. Kunio Ishihara, President of Tokio Marine, Mr. Morio Ishii, Vice-President of Tokio Marine, Members of the Senior Management of Tokio Marine Asia Pte. Ltd and Asia General Holdings, Mr. Ng Chek Khiang, Chief Executive Officer of Asia Life (M) Berhad, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be here with you this evening to celebrate the official launch of TM Asia Life Malaysia Bhd.. An alliance of this nature is certainly a happy event, especially when it reflects the positive transformation that is shaping the insurance industry in Malaysia. TM Asia Life combines the strengths of the one of the world’s largest Japanese insurance groups and an established life insurer in the Malaysian market that has provided over 50 years of trusted service to Malaysians. It also marks the establishment of the first Japanese-owned life insurance company in Malaysia, adding further diversity to the profile of foreign insurers in our market. When developments like this take place in the industry, we look forward to new innovations, fresh management perspectives and a renewed energy that will take the industry to the next level of development.

Going forward, private pensions and health insurance will have an increasingly important role in supporting sustainable financing in the long term for retirement and healthcare. More Malaysians are already turning to the private insurance industry to finance their healthcare expenditure. As a result, the medical and health insurance business has grown significantly in the last five years, averaging at an annual growth rate of close to 30%. About 80% of this business is written by life and composite insurers, mainly as riders to life insurance policies. Similarly, a larger role for private pensions may be envisaged under the pension reform initiative. At the same time, there is also a growing awareness among Malaysians of individual responsibility in financial planning. Planning for retirement and healthcare needs are clearly among the most important of financial decisions, but sound financial planning also includes individuals protecting themselves and their dependents from financial vulnerabilities arising from death, disability or unemployment, providing for children’s education and as well as making sound investment choices. These developments present enormous opportunities for the life insurance industry, particularly given the large untapped market that still exists with less than 45% of the population having a life insurance or family takaful policy. By the same token, however, they place equally important responsibilities on  BIS Review 24/2007  1  insurers to make sure that the products sold are suitable, that insurers have assets which match their liabilities; and that customers are given enough information to enable them to make responsible decisions.
We know there are effective fintech solutions to this which leverage off the credit of the payer. In such circumstances, and more broadly where fintech moves further into more traditional banking areas such as peer to peer and other lending, the Bank recognises that we need to think about and take forward a proportionate, activity-based regulatory response. Let me turn to the second gap in relation to a lack of client focus: an engagement gap, if I can put it that way. This manifests itself in a number of ways, as noted during the many insightful interventions during our panel sessions. Perhaps Julia Black put it best when she described the dangers of groups of professionals talking just amongst themselves. This has been part of the issue with financial reform – a sense that reform was a pre-packaged process built on discussions between regulators, banks, and investors, with sympathetic academics adding in their words of support. Part of the reason for our broader discussions today is to ensure we move out of this state of affairs. And of course, once we bring in other perspectives, it changes our own perspective and underscores just how hermetically sealed the industry in its broad sense can be. Let me say a couple of words on this. It should be recognized that the industry has made tremendous strides to address a number of issues.

In choosing for such an option, Curaçao and St. Maarten could continue to benefit from the financial soundness of the dollar, while still maintaining a certain degree of monetary independence. Last but not least, I would like to point out that the currency choice, whether at the end it would be a local currency or the US dollar, is purely a stage for an economic act. Depending on the actors, the outcome of the play would be a drama or a happy one. In the choice of a dollarization, the role of the central bank would be limited if not nihil, while that of the government would become even more prominent. There is a significant shift of responsibility. While the starting fiscal position for both St. Maarten and Curaçao would be advantageous as autonomous countries, meaning a low debt stance, it is critical that fiscal rules and benchmarks are legally imbedded, and that accountability is a normal way of life. This would ensure that internal fiscal discipline is guaranteed, and it does not need to be forced upon by an external party. That is true independence. I would even go a step further and recommend the creation of special reserves, which would be used to counteract any financial stress. This would provide the necessary confidence to promote financial and economic stability. There is no doubt that these are exciting times in the Netherlands Antilles. I strongly advise you to learn from the experiences of Aruba, the good but also the bad ones.
6 Despite its limits, the expansion of the balance sheet was seen by the FOMC as the best policy tool available at the time, given the constraint on traditional monetary policy easing from the zero bound on interest rates. The willingness of the FOMC to use this tool is indicative of a central bank that takes its dual mandate seriously and does what it can to deliver on it. The disappointing pace of recovery that has been realized since then suggests that the additional policy accommodation provided by the LSAP2 program was appropriate. Operational success of LSAP2 Let me now switch from the policy objectives of the LSAP2 program to its implementation by the Desk. The FOMC set the broad parameters of the asset purchase program based in part on input from the Desk on our capacity to conduct operations and the market’s capacity to absorb them. In particular, we wanted to complete the asset purchases in a timely manner, but we also wanted to ensure that the pace of purchases was not so rapid as to disrupt the functioning and liquidity of the Treasury market. In the end, I believe the program struck a good balance between these two considerations. I would like to recognize the staff on the Desk for their valuable input to the operational design of the program, as well as the effective implementation of the program over the last eight months. Our presence in the market was sizable.

BIS Review 7/2000  12  4.3.2. The importance of “proper” incentives  It is important to have incentives which reflect the real costs connected to various payment services if participants are to come up with their own solutions balancing risk against efficiency. A pertinent example may be the regulations concerning loans in the central bank. It is a basic responsibility of the banks to ensure that liquidity is sufficient to cover settlement. The main rule for settlement in Norges Bank is that there shall be adequate cover in the account. If, for one reason or another, a bank does not have sufficient cover, it must turn to the market for financing. If necessary, the settlement should in part or in its entirety be delayed so as to give the institution enough time to obtain sufficient liquidity. Too easy access to loans in the central bank in situations where financial stability is not at risk involves costs in that it weakens banks’ incentives to address elements of risk in the payment systems and presents the customer with prices which do not reflect the risk attached to various payment services. 4.3.3. The importance of competition  The stipulated regulatory framework affects competition, such as who is allowed to initiate new payment services. Competition is important, both for improving the use of known, reliable payment services and for the development of new services.
BIS Review 65/2009  7  Figure 3 Accumulated CPI variation (percent) Mexico Colombia South Africa Brazil Poland South Korea Turkey Hungary Hong Kong Peru Czech Rep. Sweden Indonesia U.K. Norway Canada Thailand Eurozone Israel Switzerland U.S. Japan Malaysia Chile  South Africa Turkey Chile Indonesia Colombia Hungary Peru Brazil Czech Rep. Malaysia Israel Mexico South Korea Norway U.S. Thailand Poland U.K. Sweden Eurozone Switzerland Canada Hong Kong Japan 0  3  6  9  12  15  18  -3  January 2007 - October 2008  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  October 2008 - March/April 2009 (*)  (*) In April for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey. Sources: Statistics Bureaus of each country and Bloomberg. Figure 4 Incidences on annual CPI inflation (*) (percentage points) 12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  Public utilities (7.96%) Fresh fruits and vegetables (2.92%) Fuels (6.08%) Other (61.95%) Total Foods minus fresh fruits and vegetables (21.09%) October 2008 - March/April 2009 (*)  (*) In parentheses, weights in the CPI basket of December 2008. Before that, built using weights in the December 1998 basket.

We cannot afford to have banking, so central to the allocation of capital in market economies, semi socialised. Moreover, we need to harness the energies of bond holders to monitoring and helping to contain the tendency to excess characteristic of bankers, over the generations, in the upswing of the credit cycle. That is not  1  See INSOL International (2000), Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to multi-creditor workouts. 2  That strategy was initially set out by the Financial Stability Board in 2010, Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions, available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  in and of itself a guarantee of stability, but I would rather give asset managers incentives to help the objectives of prudential supervisors than incentives to rely on a fiscal backstop. Second, effective resolution regimes, capable of operating across national borders, are necessary for a healthy international monetary and financial system (IMFS). As Mervyn King has said, the large financial groups have been ‘international in life, but national in death’. Without effective cross-border resolution arrangements, domestic authorities are left with a clear incentive to take steps to cap the contingent exposure of local taxpayers, who are local voters. That is surely part of the backdrop to the series of measures taken by national and regional authorities to restrict the range of activities or structure of banking. Those measures need to be taken without the world slipping into a hard-to-reverse balkanisation of the international financial system.
A significant part comes from the US economy, which is currently near or above full employment and inflation pressures that could trigger a more forceful reaction from the Fed. Special mention deserves the fiscal stimulus package recently approved by the US Congress, which will put pressure on an economy where, as I just pointed out, gaps are already tight.3 It is worth stressing that the deterioration that this would cause in the global financial conditions could have particularly severe consequences for those emerging economies with weaker fiscal or financial positions or that are highly indebted. China's situation is worrisome, as there are still several imbalances in its markets yet to be 2  / This Report includes a box analyzing the magnitude of the pass-through coefficient of exchange rate variations to inflation, identifying the origin of the variation and establishing that its effects on inflation change depending on the type of shock faced. In particular, it reviews how the inflationary effects of exchange rate fluctuations change depending on where they originate, e.g. in a movement of the global value of the dollar as opposed to an idiosyncratic shock hitting the Chilean economy. The analysis finds that the inflationary impact of exchange rate movements associated with deviations of the interest rate parity is stronger and more persistent than if stemming from changes in foreign inflation. Thus, the implications for monetary policy are obvious: not all exchange rate variations have the same inflationary consequences and, therefore, the policy rate response must factor in their origin.

For the same reason, as was the case with this Report, the time span between the Report’s publication and this presentation has been a little longer. Please note that we see this delay as a one-time thing and we are willing to attend this Committee to present our Monetary Policy Reports with all the haste that you may require. We have used this opportunity to add some information that came after the Report’s cutoff date to this presentation, plus some issues that have come up in the days following its publication. Thus, we look forward to an exchange with the Committee as enriching as it can be. Now let me share with you the main conclusions and projections of our Report. First, it is important to stress that this Report clearly marks a turning point in the business cycle that translates into higher growth and lower risks to both activity and inflation. The National Accounts figures we published two weeks ago showed two important developments. On one hand, the economy was quite weak between late 2016 and early 2017. In retrospect, these figures are consistent with other recent indicators such as labor market fundamentals, which were some of the reasons why we lowered the monetary policy rate (MPR) by 100 basis points, thus significantly boosting the monetary impulse in the first half of 2017.
The first series of initiatives announced on 2 December 2016, seeks to provide greater room for the onshore ringgit hedging for both resident and non-residents. The focus was on ensuring better access to the onshore financial market. In particular, residents can now hedge without providing underlying documents up to certain limits, while registered non-resident investors have the flexibility to carry out dynamic hedging. At the same time, the scope of the appointed overseas office framework was widened to provide greater avenues for non-residents to access the onshore financial market. 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second series of initiatives announced on 13 April 2017, introduced greater flexibility for investors to manage currency and interest rate risks. Registered investors can now conduct full dynamic hedging and resident investors can now conduct short-selling for Malaysian government securities. All these flexibilities are expected to increase the ease of hedging business risks. The aim is to promote a two-way liquidity in the onshore financial market. At the end of the day, we envision that the implementation of these initiatives will make the domestic financial market a market of choice, where prices are determined by the real economy devoid of speculative and damaging activities. In this respect, we have introduced initiative that enables non-resident investors to access and hedge ringgit assets in the domestic markets.

First, when I read commentaries which go something like: “You wouldn’t believe how low Bank X’s modelled risk weights on, say, mortgages are”. I do note that the commentator can only observe the Pillar 1 capital requirement. They are not observing the judgmental overlay in in Pillar 2 which, as you can tell from the numbers I quoted, has gone up. The trouble is, this tends to suggest that Pillar 3 transparency is not working as it should do. This is all I am going to say today on models and RWAs, I will save that for another day. The second point on Pillar 2 is that, having built it up, we think that we can allow a relatively small part to be used to support the second objective of the FPC. Now, in terms of how we justify this, given the hierarchy of objectives that I described earlier, I believe that it is important to look at the interaction of resilience and lending as I set out. I think it is reasonable to conclude, and the FPC supported this action, that a reduction in the risk arising from this new lending caused by an improvement in credit conditions should help to offset the risk from lower capital buffers. In other words, if such extra lending boosts economic growth, it will enhance resilience in the financial system.