samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
William C Dudley: The national and regional economic outlook Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the New Jersey Performing Arts Center, Newark, New Jersey, 18 August 2011. *  *  *  Good morning. I am pleased to be in Newark this morning and to speak to the members of the Newark Regional Business Partnership. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, as we wound down our emergency meetings, I asked my staff to develop an ambitious outreach program so I could visit the different parts of my District. Over time, I plan to visit all parts of the region. Each trip gives me a chance to deepen relationships with the people I represent. As you may know, the New York Fed’s District includes 12 counties here in northern New Jersey; all of New York State; Fairfield County, Connecticut; Puerto Rico; and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In June, I met with community leaders, businesses and elected officials in Brooklyn, and in May I travelled to several cities in the mid-Hudson Valley north of New York City to meet with the leadership of those communities. Today and tomorrow I will meet with a wide range of people and organizations here in northern New Jersey to talk about what I do and to learn firsthand about the economic and financial issues important to you.

First, we have a government which has the capacity to think long term and implement tough policies to resolve problems and transform the economy. The government is not bogged down by disruptive and unproductive domestic political pit fights. Our basic economic strategy is right; our implementation good. We are moving up the value chain to more technology- and knowledge-intensive manufacturing. We are growing our services sector in areas like tourism, healthcare, education, banking and insurance. We are pumping money and talent into R & D. We have enlarged our economic space through FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) and moved into new areas like the Middle East. Foreign Minister George Yeo has just visited Libya and Yemen, the first Singapore Minister to do so. At the right time, I will go there too to strengthen our relations. Minister Mentor is himself engaging Russia and Kazakhstan to open up business opportunities. And if there are opportunities in North Korea, we will go there too. I dare say that our Ministers are not just good at forging relations but also enterprising like businessmen. Second, we have intelligent, hard-working and adaptable people. They know the world has changed and is constantly changing. They know they must run ahead of the pack in order not to be eaten by  BIS Review 55/2007  1  the proverbial lion. Some Singaporeans grumble and complain about the government and its tough policies but basically, they are nagging the government to listen to them more. Singaporeans are pragmatic and disciplined.
But other sectors, those most exposed to international competition - most of agriculture, large parts of manufacturing and some service sectors - were already then having a much more difficult time. Understandably, they were more vociferous. They had been hit, initially, by the exaggerated strength of sterling against the major European currencies in the run up to decisions about the euro. And they were hit, subsequently, by the successive waves of turmoil spreading through the world economy which saw exchange rates fall and demand dry up in Asia and elsewhere. So, faced with this dilemma, what were we to do? It is true that the external factors - unhelpful as they were in a more fundamental sense, in terms of the imbalance in the economy - did act as a restraining influence on overall aggregate demand and on inflation, and that meant we had somewhat more time than we would otherwise have had to moderate the growth of domestic demand. But even allowing for that we in fact had no choice but to tighten policy. BIS Review 98/1998  -3-  It wasn’t that we didn’t know that the internationally-exposed sectors were under the hammer we’d have had to be blind as well as deaf not to have known. Our problem was that if we had held back more than we did, in order to shelter the exposed sectors, we would have put the whole economy - including the sectors we were trying to protect - at risk of accelerating inflation.

And that would have meant eventually having to tighten policy more abruptly, which would much more certainly have plunged the economy into serious recession, a bit further down the road. The harsh reality is that monetary policy can only target the economy as a whole - it cannot realistically seek to shelter particular businesses or particular sectors or particular regions, however much we might all wish it were otherwise. And, in relation to the economy as a whole, the effective choice in the situation we faced was not whether or not to tighten, but whether to tighten sooner, and by less, or later, by more. So we raised interest rates through the second half of last year - and again in June - trying, as best we could through our tactics, to minimise any further unwanted upward pressure on sterling. But things have now clearly moved on. The outlook for the world economy deteriorated further through the summer under the impact of a series of new shocks. Japan, the world’s second largest economy, slipped further into recession. Russia - which had only weeks earlier embarked on an IMF program - saw the collapse of the rouble and default on its debt. And acute nervousness spread through many of the world’s financial markets. Although there has been some improvement in sentiment over the past month or two, and although the US and European economies continue to expand, the likelihood remains that world economic growth will be significantly slower than had been expected earlier in the summer.
Exhibit 1  The percentage of paragraphs in the FOMC minutes that mention the phrase “financial conditions,” excluding the directive and paragraphs associated with administrative matters such as election of the chairman. BIS Review 23/2010  5

Governor’s Speech - the Budapest Eurasia Forum 2022 “Challenges facing small, open economies in the changing global landscape” Dr. Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, Governor, Bank of Thailand Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest, 19 September 2022  Excellencies, distinguished participants,  It is a great pleasure and privilege to be here at the Budapest Eurasia Forum. While the global landscape is constantly changing, the speed and scale of the changes happening now are particularly large and rapid. Many of these changes pose particular challenges for small, open economies. I would like therefore to focus my remarks on three key challenges facing small, open economies in this changing global landscape. Part 1: The first challenge is rapid and synchronized monetary policy tightening •  We are going through one of the most rapid and concerted monetary policy tightening cycles in recent memory. About this time last year, the Fed Funds rate expected for the end of this year was under 0.5%; markets now expect it to be around 4%. Almost all central banks have raised rates as part of what one might call the “Great Policy Normalization”. This reflects the rapid return of inflation. Two years ago, of the 60 countries tracked in the BIS database, 42 had inflation below 2%. Today, that number is zero. •  Adding to the challenge, the prevailing initial conditions under which the major economies are embarking on this “Great Policy Normalization” are far from ideal.
Banks that deal with corrupt PEPs expose themselves to risk of bad publicity, legal action and possible financial loss;  •  other types of private banking customer - particularly from those jurisdictions where the risk of money laundering is severe or whose business makes them more susceptible to money laundering;  •  correspondent banks - particularly those from NCCTs or other high-risk jurisdictions where there are doubts about compliance with FATF standards. Specifically, AIs should beware of  BIS Review 47/2002  3  so-called “shell banks”, which operate without a physical presence in their place of incorporation; and •  corporate vehicles of various types - including offshore companies and trusts where the objective may be to disguise the beneficial ownership. Business introduced by intermediaries Even with a risk-based approach, the process of identification and verification is an onerous one. It is natural therefore that AIs may wish to rely on the due diligence procedures undertaken by intermediaries who introduce business to them. However, experience has shown that this can expose institutions to risk if the intermediaries do not do their job properly. In particular, in Hong Kong, there have been a number of cases where secretarial companies or company formation agents have opened bank accounts on behalf of shell companies without conducting proper verification of the underlying principals. There are cases of such companies being used as the vehicle for bogus investment schemes. We wrote to the industry on this last year, and the basic message bears repeating.

After all, in essence, they amount to no more than being sure that you really do know your customer. 4  BIS Review 47/2002
•  RMB deposits grew more than 20% year-on year. •  Average daily RMB FX turnover grew more than two times in 2014. RMB is now one of top 5 most actively traded currencies in Singapore. •  Aim in coming years is to: o  Grow RMB capital market activities, including through promoting RMB bond issuance;  o  Enhance RMB asset management capabilities, leveraging on RQFII; and  o  Promote cross-border RMB financing, building on RMB pilot for Suzhou Industrial Park and Tianjin Eco-city. Making concerted efforts in two areas that cut across asset classes: skills and technology. 63. First, SkillsFuture. •  We want to be a financial centre that is among leaders globally in workforce skills and expertise, with a strong core of Singaporeans at every level. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  •  MAS in partnership with industry and educational and training institutes, will undertake initiatives to strengthen support for finance professionals to: o  o o  learn continuously, develop expertise, and make strong contributions throughout their professional careers. 64. Second, Smart Financial Centre. •  We want to be a financial centre where innovation is pervasive and technology is used effectively to: o o  o  o •  10  increase efficiency, create new opportunities, manage risks better, and improve people’s lives. MAS in partnership with industry will drive initiatives to create a vibrant ecosystem for innovation and adoption of new technologies while fostering safety and security. BIS central bankers’ speeches

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the outlook for the Norwegian economy Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Norges Bank, at a meeting of Sparebanken Nord-Norge, Tromsø, 25 September 2001. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation Summary and charts. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 19 September. *  *  *  Norway’s economic policy is based on new guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy. The new guidelines were published by the Government on 29 March 2001 in connection with the presentation of the Government’s Long-Term Programme. The inflation target for monetary policy came into force immediately. The guidelines for fiscal policy were discussed in the Storting in June and were approved by a majority. Monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. The inflation target is set at 2½ per cent. In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account. In the 1990s, monetary policy gradually moved further away from the fixed-exchange-rate regime which was practiced from 1986 to 1992. Low and stable inflation is the best contribution monetary policy can make to growth, prosperity and income distribution. In the long term, monetary policy has little effect on the real economy. Low and stable inflation can, however, provide fertile ground for stability and growth.
that monetary union was a political endeavour, and that the final goal was political union, albeit a different union from those we are used to studying in textbooks. Creating the euro, adopting it or not adopting it, are not mere technical decisions but key political choices, and have profound political implications, which are quite different from being a member of the European Union. This might not have been fully realised by all. Let me give an example. No opt-out clause was offered to the Member States which joined in 2004, even though some of them might have been less enthusiastic about joining the euro area than joining the EU itself. A formalistic reading of the Treaty reveals that all countries except the UK and Denmark are committed to converging as soon as possible to the single currency, even in those countries where popular support for it seems to be still limited. A strict interpretation of the Treaty indicates that Sweden should not have had a referendum on the euro in 2003. Indeed, by ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, Sweden committed itself to joining the euro as soon as possible. In practice, nobody complains that the letter of the Treaty is being ignored, because a country cannot be forced into the euro if it is politically unready to join. Being part of a monetary union binds its members at different political levels, not all of which are easily visible. Take fiscal policy.

The substantial increase in new equity investments, despite the effects of the global financial and economic crisis, demonstrates how favourable the Zambian investment climate is in attracting foreign investment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Distinguished Guests, It is also encouraging to note that the Government’s diversification efforts are yielding favourable results. The survey findings show that the concentration of foreign direct investment in the mining sector is reducing as evidenced by the substantial FDI inflows to other sectors such as manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and the tourism sector in 2009. Evidence from South East Asia and the recent global financial and economic crises show that high volatility in foreign private capital if not properly monitored and managed, can induce financial and macro-economic instability. In light of this the results of the Foreign Private Investment and Investor Perception Survey are important and intended to assist the Government to effectively monitor and manage these flows. In addition, better information on investor perceptions will assist Government in designing policies and programmes that will help enhance Zambia’s favourable investment climate. Further, the results of the survey should prove useful to the private sector and other stakeholders as they highlight some concerns which Government should address as well as the overall business profitability and performance prospects of various sectors. The importance of timely and reliable information on capital flows in the design of appropriate policy responses by Government and thus enhancing macroeconomic stability can hardly be overemphasised.
Second, according to the IMF Articles, countries are free to choose their capital account and exchange rate regimes with the proviso that they do not engage in currency manipulation. This is a basic pillar of our current system. The proviso has proved very difficult to define, let alone to implement. The IMF has met with some difficulties in trying to set up an efficient a symmetric process of multilateral surveillance. And, third, we live in a world of greater interdependence and complexity. International capital flows have made countries truly interconnected. The monetary and financial system has become “multipolar”. An increasing number of countries, both developed and emerging, have become active participants in the global capital market. Spillovers between national monetary and economic policies have multiplied. And no country can truly be indifferent to actions taken by others. In current circumstances, those three basic realities have become much harder to reconcile. Divergences in monetary policies are unavoidable given the uneven paths of recovery across the world. And, for each country, this may be a time where price and financial stability objectives may not coincide. In advanced economies, monetary easing, together with inhibitions on credit growth, creates a potential for further financial imbalances. In many emerging countries, inflationary pressures would warrant monetary tightening but there is a clear risk this would trigger destabilizing capital inflows. In those circumstances, there is a major role to play for macro prudential policies. For advanced economies, they should aim at spurring credit growth, while increasing the resilience of the financial sector.

Significant advances are being made. The institutional framework has adjusted to the new world reality. Emerging economies, now fully take their part and role in the constellation of Committees which, in Basel, work on defining core principle of financial regulation. The largest sit as full members of the Financial Stability Board, and its steering Committee. Finally, a landmark agreement on IMF reform reached at the last G20 meeting has fully recognized their role and place in the new financial environment. I am therefore confident that we can – and will – make progress in tackling the difficult issues we face and build a better and safer world financial system. BIS Review 160/2010  3
On the other hand, should it appear likely that inflationary pressure is sustained at a higher level into the medium term, then it is clear what our mandate would require us to do. The MPC has the tools at its disposal to tighten monetary conditions, both in the form of raising Bank Rate and by selling the assets that we bought in 2009 as part of the quantitative easing programme. 8  BIS Review 91/2010

We can also add forward guidance to this arsenal, on PSPP (including the reinvestment horizon) and policy interest rates, which we could strengthen further through a condition of a greater degree of persistence in inflation around our target. This forward guidance provides considerable leeway to adapt to economic changes thanks to its self-stabilising endogenous component. However, it would lose its effectiveness if it appeared to be too volatile or too arbitrary and for this reason cannot be considered a flexible adjustment instrument. Our new instruments to cope with the crisis This is why the ECB introduced new instruments in addition to those already available, which are more flexible in dealing with an unprecedented and multifaceted crisis. The supply of liquidity to banks has been reinforced in terms of quantity and, above all, through an incentivising price structure. Interest rates on TLTROIII operations were cut dramatically on 12 March and again on 30 April and are now, at –1%, 50 basis points below the deposit facility rate for any bank that maintains the outstanding amount of its lending to the economy. This is a radical – and yet largely unheralded – innovation that represents several billion euro in support to the European banking sector each year. Above all, we have created the EUR 750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). While it was its size that impressed, its greatest innovation lies 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  in its exceptional flexibility in terms of time, volume and allocation between countries and asset classes.
7. How do banking and finance fit into all of this? We expect to see two main developments over the next few years. The first is the greater demand for banking services resulting from the growing volume of business that will follow WTO accession. The second is the financial deepening, stimulated by more rapid financial liberalisation, greater banking competition, and product innovation induced by the terms of WTO accession. These developments will accelerate the reforms already in train within China’s domestic banking sector – reforms that cover the whole spectrum of banking management and services from corporate governance to the professional training of staff. The developments will also progressively open China’s business environment to competition from banks from outside the Mainland. In two years’ time, foreign banks will be able to conduct RMB business with Chinese enterprises in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian. Within five years, they will be able to deal with all Chinese enterprises without any geographical restriction. The advantages for banks with a base in Hong Kong are obvious. Many of them have a head start on the Mainland, with networks of branches and more than a generation of practical experience. They also have all the advantages of geographical proximity, a common language and culture, yet separate financial and legal jurisdictions that Hong Kong’s unique position in China brings. Forty per cent of the Mainland’s trade is routed through Hong Kong. Hong Kong is the Mainland’s largest source of foreign direct investment and China’s main financial conduit and funding centre.

To be clear, I am not predicting another LTCM crisis any time in the near future. But I would like to use the case of LTCM to exemplify some key vulnerabilities which played a role in the collapse – acknowledging that LTCM was not an open-ended fund and did not face redemption risk, as most mutual funds do. In particular, let me focus on risks stemming from liquidity mismatches, leverage and interconnectedness across the financial system. The asset management industry keeps reminding us that vulnerabilities in funds cannot be presumed to resemble those of banks. And it is true that investment funds do not issue deposits and that potential losses in a fund are borne by end-investors. But there is a fundamental difference between the equity in banks and the equity in funds. Investors in an open-end fund can run by redeeming their units, whereas equity holders in a bank can only run by selling their shares to other market participants. A run by investment fund unitholders can therefore resemble a run by bank depositors. In both cases, the institution is, in principle, forced to sell assets in a fires sale in order to meet its short-dated liabilities. In general, asset managers are highly aware of their fund’s liquidity position. In the interest of investors, the fund managers have incentives to minimise any impact from their own actions on financial markets, while at the same time accommodating share creations and redemptions. So a bank-like run by unitholders in a fund may not be very likely.