samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Petar Goshev: Alleviating the negative effects of the financial crisis Welcome address by Mr Petar Goshev, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the World Bank event, Skopje, 15 March 2010. *  *  *  Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, It is my honor to give a welcome address at this important World Bank event that it is taking place at a critical transitional stage when it seems that the strongest impact of the severest crisis since the Great Depression is behind us and the global economy is beginning to grow again. Still, although we believe the worst is behind us, the global crisis has had strong negative effects that will continue to be felt in the years to come. Because of that, the efforts of the national authorities and international financial institutions for mitigating the negative effects have to continue. In this regard, the enhanced role of the international financial institutions, including the World Bank, is vital. The economic, social and human implications of the global crisis have further emphasized the World Bank’s mission of eliminating poverty, enhancing growth and providing inclusive and sustainable development. Achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as a set of priorities for the World Bank, is becoming more challenging.

It is rare to find another institution with such an experience. Preservation of global financial stability proved to be an issue of utmost importance to both the growth and the fight against poverty. Basel II has been definitively transforming into Basel III. There is a lot of work to be done to promote the micro-prudent and the macro-prudent frameworks. World Bank’s contribution through its participation in FSB and other international bodies and its cooperation with countries which use its financial and technical assistance is indispensable. I will finish my address with quoting the leaders of the Group of Twenty from the meeting in London, 2009: “We start from the belief that prosperity is indivisible; that growth to be sustained, has to be shared; and that our global plan for recovery must have at its heart the needs and jobs of hard-working families, not just in developed countries but in emerging markets and the poorest countries of the world, too; and must reflect the interest not just of today’s population, but of future generations, too.” Thank you for your attention and I wish you a fruitful discussion and a pleasant stay in Skopje. BIS Review 32/2010  3
Finally, the aforementioned improvements in EMEs are likely to constrain the deterioration in business and consumer expectations. This is also a crucial development as the lessons learned from the past financial turmoils and crises revealed that the most distinguishing feature of an emerging market economy is the significant adverse effects on the real economy through the expectations channel. Among many advances in EMEs, rich policy frameworks have played an important role in improving economic agents’ confidence in EMEs. In addition, EMEs ability and policy conduct to accumulate policy spaces have made significant contributions to solidifying gains in confidence. It is worth noting that in addition to conventional macroeconomic policies EMEs have also extensively used macro- and micro-prudential policies, serving as buffers for shocks (Figure 8). Since the EM financial crises EMEs have continued to use a number of macro-prudential measures when conventional policies, such as rate hikes to manage aggregate demand, were realized to be ineffective and/or insufficient. Such macro-prudential tools have not only maintained low levels of leverage but also accumulated buffers that can serve as policy spaces in cases of economic downturn. Additionally, macro-prudential policy helped monetary authorities implement monetary policy exclusively to achieve price stability. Finally, EMEs learned macro-prudential policy is more appropriate to limit and repair maturity and currency mismatch problems. In addition to the macro-prudential policy, EMEs implemented rigorously micro-prudential policies rigorously in order to make their financial firms, especially banks, more resilient and safer against financial stresses.

Resilience of emerging market economies to global financial conditions In the 1980s and 1990s EMEs experienced financial crises following a sudden reversal of capital flows. In fact, during this period there were two waves of financial crisis in the EME world. The first wave was associated with currency crises as significantly strengthened US  3  Cecchetti, S, M Mohanty and F Zampolli (2011), “Achieving growth amid fiscal imbalances: the real effects of debt”, in Achieving maximum long-run growth, a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 4  Lo, S. and K. Rogoff (2015), Secular stagnation, debt overhang and other rationales for sluggish growth, six years on, BIS Working Papers No 482. 5  Koo, R. (2009), The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan s Great Recession, Revised Edition, John Wiley & Sons. 6  Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013), “Measuring economic policy uncertainty”, Chicago Booth Research Paper, no 13–02, May. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  dollar led to massive adjustments in the fixed EME exchange rates. This followed sovereign debt crises in many emerging markets, i.e., Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The second wave was triggered by sudden stop of capital inflows. The EM banks having intermediated these flows, as a result, caused these severe financial crises in several EMEs such as Mexico and Turkey in 1994, East Asian countries after mid-1997 and Russia in 1998.
2  See Chapter 3 of the 2021 Annual Report of Bank of Spain, 2022, and Cardoso, M., C. Ferreira, J. Leiva, G. Nuño, A. Ortiz, T. Rodrigo, and S. Vazquez, “The Heterogeneous Impact of Inflation on Households' Balance Sheets", Banco de España Working Paper, forthcoming, 2022. 3 Further information can be found in Borrallo, F., L. Cuadro-Sáez and J. J. Pérez, “Rising food commodity prices and their pass-through to euro area consumer prices”, Banco de España, Analytical Articles, 2022. 1  In the current context, however, this central scenario is surrounded by significant uncertainty. Let me describe where I see the main sources of uncertainty, in particular in relation to future inflation dynamics. First, the potential emergence of second-round effects. Second-round effects occur when an increase in inflation is transmitted to wage increases and the latter, in turn, are transmitted to prices –as firms attempt to preserve or even increase their profit margins–, potentially leading to a price-wage spiral. This has not been the case so far in the euro area and, according to the latest ECB projections, significant price-wage spirals are not expected over the forecast horizon.4 Growth in unit labour costs is expected to significantly contribute to domestic inflation in 2023, but less so in 2024 owing to both the moderation in wage growth and the pick-up in productivity growth. Nevertheless, high and persistent inflation increases the risk of second-round effects materialising via higher wages and profit margins.

In this scenario, energy and food commodity prices are assumed to increase substantially due to severe supply disruptions associated with an intensification of the war in Ukraine, combined with other negative shocks to the European economy.5 The result would be an inflation rate of 6.9% in 2023 and 2.7% in 2024. Let me emphasise, however, that despite all the recent developments regarding gas supply through the Nord stream pipeline, one cannot assume that we are already in the downside scenario. This is because the other shocks assumed in this downside scenario have not materialised yet. Indeed, several key commodity prices – including energy prices - are currently below the ECB baseline scenario (and more so in comparison to the downside scenario), which may reflect lower than expected demand. 4  For a discussion of second round effects in the euro area, see Battistini, N. , H. Grapow, E. Hahn and M. Soudan “Wage share dynamics and second-round effects on inflation after energy price surges in the 1970s and today”, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 5/2022 5 See Box 3 of the September ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area,  2  Finally, an additional element of uncertainty is related to the synchronised tightening of monetary policy across countries and its impact on activity – including global spill-overs – and inflation.6 Framing our monetary policy response: the ECB’s monetary policy strategy As I said before, it is the ECB’s responsibility to preserve price stability in the euro area.
However, such crimes are more common in counties that have weak security, or suffer from weak economy and weak judicial and supervisory systems. Among the most prominent negative effects of this phenomenon is the flight of money abroad, with production losing its most important element, namely, capital, hindering production of goods and services, raising unemployment and reducing savings. As a result, investors lose confidence in the economic system and the legislation governing it, creating an anti-investment environment. All this will be reflected on economic growth and the standard of living of society. Money laundering may also result in the availability of liquidity in quantities not commensurate with the increase in production of goods and services, thus increasing inflation and decreasing the purchasing power of the currency. Money laundering affects the country’s position and its reputation among international bodies, and may give misleading economic indicators. From the social point of view, it is significantly dangerous as it leads to non-productive classes acquiring illegal proceeds at the expense of productive classes, increasing the gap between social classes. Moreover, It increases the opportunities of spreading corruption and bribery. Dear Audience, I would like to commend the fruitful coordination and cooperation between the appropriate entities of ministries, security and judicial authorities, and financial and non-financial institutions for combating money laundering.

Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy: Compliance and anti-money laundering Speech by His Excellency Dr Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy, Vice Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) ,to the Fifth Annual Gathering on “Compliance and anti-money laundering”, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Institute of Banking, Riyadh, 26–27 March 2013. *  *  *  Dear Audience, It gives me pleasure to welcome you all, and I would like to thank those who have participated in the preparation for this gathering. I also would like to extend my thanks to the colleagues at the Institute of Banking and the speakers to this gathering. Dear Audience, The continued holding of this gathering for the fifth year confirms the firm conviction held by all of us of the risks that the crime of money laundering poses to the global economy. It also reflects the Kingdom’s commitment to combat money laundering, and its support of the measures taken against it, and the implementation of the best international practices in this field. The discussion of this gathering derives its importance from the increasing trend towards globalization, easing restrictions on international cross-border movement of commodities and services and the revolution of communication and information technology. Dear Audience, Money laundering operations have witnessed a quantum leap at the global level over the last years. This was reflected in the various and diversified methods used in their implementation, expanding the volume this type of crime. Developed and developing countries suffer from this crime.
One of its key functions was to oversee inter-society mergers, which became a frequent occurrence as the number of building societies 30  reduced (largely through merger) from around 2,200 in 1900 to 480 in 1970 . By this point, Registry staff were examining societies’ annual returns and seeking to identify weaknesses in capital and liquidity; indeed, there was a keen focus on the latter when, in 1976, building societies started to submit a monthly liquidity return. I am told that at that time, the Registry had one electronic calculator to which the three building society teams each had access for half a day each week. History does not relate what the calculator did for the other three-and-a-half days – perhaps it was resting. I hope it will be as obvious to you as it is to me that many of these practices have shaped the PRA’s approach to supervision today, just as much as our heritage from the Bank on the banking side. This is partly because as the prudential supervisor of banks, building societies and insurers we must of course draw in full on our heritage across all three sectors. But it’s also because some of our wisest staff have been here all the way through – most obviously Eric Engstrom who was, I understand, born in Ketley’s pub in 1775. Indeed, the general approach that started to emerge for building societies in the early 80s was forward-looking and judgment-based, though nobody at the time would have described it in such terms.

Because of a relatively small population and a number of structural deficiencies it is very unlikely, that increase in the number of students in CEE-4 that have occurred in recent decade will translate into higher innovation potential in the coming years, unless a dramatic change in policies in CEE-4 is made. This is also confirmed by a dramatically low number of patents registered in the CEE countries and extremely low number of scientific publications. As the ability to generate great ideas in the CEE region is limited, it seems that in the transition period the most important modernization channel in the region was through foreign direct investments. Indeed CEE became a very large recipient of FDI, with FDI stock to GDP ratio topping 40 percent in CEE-4 region. Only NIEs economies managed to attract higher FDI stock in relation to GDP and enjoy higher FDI annual inflows. However, in the global knowledge economy it is important to attract foreign direct investments to sectors that can become globally competitive, in particular to these sectors that export hightechnology, i.e. high value added goods or services. While CEE-4 significantly improved the structure of exports, the high-tech goods account for only 12 percent of manufactured exports, which is the world worst result, lagging even behind Latin American countries. NIEs are world leaders and China is about to take over the  BIS Review 137/2007  3  second post from the United States.
Against this background I now want to consider three issues to do with European economic policy that in my opinion have been illustrated by developments in the past six months and should be discussed in the European economic policy debate. All these issues concern the need to develop the institutional framework so that it covers coordination problems that may arise even though the rules are being followed. Firstly, monetary policy is naturally not fully attuned to every euro country at present. Cyclical activity as well as other factors that affect inflation vary over the euro area and as I mentioned earlier, these differences have become somewhat larger. By itself, this need not be a major problem for the monetary union as a whole. The differences may reflect entirely natural deviations in productivity growth, for instance. In these cases the differences in inflation need not be all that important in the longer run. The differences in inflation are more of a problem if they derive from differences in the development of demand. But even in this case it can be argued that they will mainly lead to problems for the particular country where inflation is higher; rising costs ultimately result in downward adjustments of production, employment and inflation. There may be uncertainty, however, about the smoothness of such an adjustment and its consequences for the union as a whole.

The Riksbank has chosen to publish minutes of Executive Board meetings after an interval of 6–8 weeks; the minutes are to reflect the discussion and indicate how the members voted. The clearly independent status that has now been assigned to the Riksbank has much to do with this choice. The minutes make it easier for policy evaluators to follow the formation of monetary policy and assess the actions of Board members. This is a democratic interest. Moreover, the fact that the voting will be published probably increases the members’ motivation to form a personal opinion about the difficult matters that have to be considered. I also believe that access to the minutes can help people to understand the choices that have to be made in the formulation of monetary policy and demystify what the Riksbank is doing. It is arguments of this type that made my British colleague Mervyn King declare, with reference to the work of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, that ‘Divided we stand, united we fall’. I want to emphasise that these matters are by no means simple. It seems to me that a clear analytical framework, combined with a high degree of transparency, has provided a good foundation for Swedish monetary policy in recent years. But with an Executive Board consisting of six members, each of whom is in a position to voice an opinion on monetary policy, it is probable that from time to time the Riksbank will be criticised for being indistinct.
Your Excellency, distinguished guests, given the menace of the growing trend in drug trafficking in the sub-region, the Bank, under its obligation to comply with all international standards on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), has in collaboration with its partners, reviewed the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2005 to address its inadequacies. The AML/CFT Bill 2009 has been approved by Cabinet and is now awaiting legislative enactment. In the meantime, the Bank is enforcing the current AntiMoney Laundry Act through its Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). In this regard, the Bank in close collaboration with the Anti Corruption Commission is examining the possibility of signing a Memorandum of Understanding for investigation and prosecution in relation to money laundering and other financial crimes that involve suspicious transactions and politically exposed persons. Oversight of the payments and settlement system Your Excellency, distinguished guests, the Bank, with the support of its development partners, has embarked on modernization of the payments, clearing and settlement systems by implementing A SWIFT FIN Copy Service in April 2010. This will enable the settlement of large value interbank transactions faster and reduce the risk element.

•  In 1996, the Bank of Zambia attempted to jumpstart secondary market trading in Government securities by restricting the primary issues of Government securities to commercial banks. It was expected that commercial banks would take up the role of market-making. This did not materialize with most commercial banks preferring to buy and hold the securities until maturity. Consequently, authorities were obliged to re-open the primary market to other non-bank investors. •  Further, since 1998, Government bonds have been listed for trading at the Lusaka Stock Exchange. The benefits have not been realised despite the fact that all banks are registered as brokers in this respect. I am sure the LUSE will provide you with more detail on this as you deliberate. •  More recently, the Government and the Bank of Zambia in 2006, with the support of DIFID and the World Bank undertook a study tour of selected emerging markets in Africa and Asia. The aim of this tour was to learn the actual workings of well functioning government securities markets. Technical information was collected and a report prepared. Once the recommendations in that report have been adopted, I expect that these will complement your own efforts to activate secondary market trading. I am aware that the successful development of a secondary market needs a reliable and efficient settlement infrastructure. This is important for it addresses the concern that is normally raised on the possibilities of settlement risk.
Losses likely in the period ahead The fact that the Riksbank’s bond purchases have so far been profitable does not mean that this will always be the case. For example, the ever-lower interest rates have made bond purchases after the spring of 2015 increasingly costly. The Riksbank has now purchased bonds for about SEK 275 billion and several bonds have a long remaining maturity. How expensive it will be to fund this portfolio will therefore depend on the development of the repo rate for a long time to come. According to the current assessments made both by ourselves and others, it is more likely that the bonds that we have purchased in recent months will lead to losses rather than profits for the Riksbank. For example, the yield on ten-year government bonds is now 0.2 per cent. The Riksbank does not make forecasts for the repo rate for more than three years in the future. Even within this limited time horizon, interest rate developments are very uncertain, but let us in any case assume that the repo rate develops in line with the forecast. And let us assume that the repo rate then continues to rise slowly towards 4 per cent (see Chart 5). 14 The average interest rate level up until the bond matures in 2026 will then be 1.2 per cent. Paying on average 1.2 per cent in interest and receiving on average 0.2 per cent in interest represents a loss of 1 per cent a year.

f-NExT will assess the training needs of the financial sector holistically, and identify gaps in skills requirements. f-NExT will also strive to attract world-class training providers to set up in Singapore. Reputable training providers will be encouraged to set up more training centres to meet the industry's demands for specialised courses. IBF will gradually phase out training courses which overlap with programmes offered by other training providers. 4  International profile  As a leading financial centre, Singapore has a stake in a sound and stable international financial system. MAS is actively involved in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and initiatives undertaken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to strengthen national and cross border supervisory standards and capital adequacy of banks, market surveillance, and payments and settlement systems. MAS participates actively at the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), contributing to its work in developing principles and guidelines, which serve as global best practice standards. MAS is also an Executive Committee member of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which is the global standards-setting body for insurance supervision. Singapore is actively involved in regional financial fora, including ASEAN, APEC, the South East Asia Central Bank (SEACEN) Governors, and the Manila Framework Group. MAS is also engaged in expanded technical assistance to central banks and regulators in the Asia-Pacific over the past year, including training programmes on macroeconomic management and financial supervision.