samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As of 2016, in all resolution cases, the BRRD will require a bail-in of shareholders and creditors equal to at least 8% of total liabilities of a given bank, including own funds. Only after the 8% threshold of bail-in is attained can money from the resolution fund be used and for a maximum amount of 5% of total liabilities (including own funds) of the concerned bank. Public money for recapitalisation, either national or European, can thus only be considered at the very end of the process after the other two sources of remedial action have been used. Furthermore, the “government financial stabilisation tools” that the Directive introduces is an instrument of last resort after having assessed and exploited the other resolution tools to the maximum extent possible. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The amount of 8% is very substantial compared to the losses banks faced in the recent crisis. To give you an idea, between 2008 and 2010 only one bank had losses exceeding the 8% threshold, and the average for all other banks was slightly less than 3%. Thus, under the BRRD, the injection of public money into banks, either from national governments or from direct European recapitalisation, will happen only in quite rare occasions. Bail-in of shareholders and creditors plus the use of the Resolution Fund should in most conceivable cases be enough to cover the losses incurred by a failing bank.

This reflects trends that point to smaller household sizes; the young moving out from family homes earlier, including to take jobs in urban cities; and an ageing population preferring to remain in their homes than move in with their adult children. Such demand pressures have been further compounded by income levels that have not increased in tandem with the increase in house prices. All told, the shortage in affordable housing based on 2014 data is estimated at 960,000 units. This could rise to one million units by 2020 if further measures are not taken to increase supply of affordable houses and improve affordability. Financing measures implemented by the Bank along with fiscal measures by the Government between 2010 and 2013 did in fact achieve this to a certain degree. House price growth has 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  since moderated to 5.5%, closer to income growth, following measures taken to dampen speculative activities in the housing market and manage high household debt levels. Lending standards that are more aligned with the level of income have also encouraged private developers to shift their focus to the more affordable segments which should help improve supply conditions. Approval rates for housing loans by the banking sector remain high at 74%, with more than 60% of the new housing loans extended for house purchases below RM500,000. Loan rejection rates for houses in the affordable segment have actually been on a declining trend, falling by 18% since 2012.
Ian Plenderleith: Current issues in UK monetary policy  Speech by Mr Ian Plenderleith, an Executive Director of the Bank of England, to the Aberdeen Chamber of Commerce on 26 July 2000. *  *  *  If you look at the performance of the UK economy as a whole, there is a great deal from which we can draw encouragement. Since the early 1990s, we have enjoyed what by any standards has been an impressive period of continued growth in output, employment and living standards. The sustained growth in output has been achieved despite the downturn in Asia in 1997-98, which, accentuated by the crisis in Russia, spread to the emerging market economies as a whole and produced a sharp weakening in external demand felt by all the industrialised countries. With the help of the rapid steps we took then to cut interest rates, we have seen a strong recovery in activity in the UK economy last year and continuing growth this year. Equally, we can draw encouragement from the steady rise in employment that has accompanied this sustained growth in output. The improvement has been shared right across the UK: rates of employment vary from region to region, but all regions have shared a rise in employment rates. What is particularly encouraging is that this substantial rise in employment rates has been achieved in the face of considerable changes in the business environment - for example, shifts in demand and in consumer taste, advances in technology and intensified competition.

“The Thai Economy: The Current State and The Way Forward” Speech by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob Governor of the Bank of Thailand Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) Thailand Dinner Talk 13 March 2017 Mr. Shingo Sato, President of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Members of the JCC Board, JCC members, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, A very good evening to you, First of all, I would like to thank the Japanese Chamber of Commerce for inviting me again to share with you my thoughts on the prospect of the Thai economy. Last year, I truly enjoyed the exchange of views, ideas, and information with all of you and certainly hoped many of you did so too. With more than 5,000 Japanese firms actively operating in Thailand across various industries, Japan is certainly one of Thailand’s most important business partners in both the real and the financial sectors. Indeed, as Thailand is trying to move towards more innovative and high value-added industries, it is encouraging to see Japan continuing to be at the top among countries that applied for privileges under the new BOI investment promotion scheme in 2016. This would not happen if Japanese professionals already on the ground like yourselves did not have strong confidence in the long-term prospect of the Thai economy. Ladies and gentlemen, My talk this evening will consist of two parts. In the former part, I will briefly discuss the current state of the Thai economy, paying special attention to its resilience and growth momentum.
For governments political stability takes precedence to other objectives. Still Central Banks cannot neglect their own mandates. The upshot is that this expansionary fiscal policy will make the work of monetary tightening that much harder. Confronted with many "unknowns", decision makers turn to history to enlighten the course of action. History teaches its lessons not by means of similarities, but rather through differences. For example, the bout of high inflation sweeping across the (western) world today has led many commentators to draw comparisons to the 1970s. On the surface similarities are glaring, notably in relation to energy supply shocks, and in particular the warning that even a one-offshock to prices could cement a structural high inflation regime. But it is essential to bear in mind that the institutional contexts are very different today compared to half a century ago. When inflation began to pick up in the late 1960s/early 1970s, the socio-economic consensus in the West revolved around the "Keynesian paradigm". In the post-war decades, the state actively steered the economy towards full employment. An accentuated interventionist agenda addressed inflation amid restrictions on capital flows and managed exchange rates. Such policies naturally empowered organised labour: unions' significance in the national economy grew and workers were able to extract increasing real wages and benefited from improved standards of living. A wage-price spiral that transformed a one-off shock to inflation into a structural feature of advanced economies. The word stagflation takes us to those days.

It is in this context that the West was hit by oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 unleashing upward pressure on inflation and slowing real economic growth across major economies. Fast forward to 2020s, the pandemic and the war in Ukraine acted like two large supply shocks that put out of balance the global economy. Prices have gone up, and economic activity is slowing. Just like in the 1970s, the risk is that supply shocks spill over to the demand side, initiating a process that could push the world economy into a high inflation regime. Contrary to the 1970s, however, many central banks are more resolute than ever to pursue their mandate of price stability. Looking at the demand side, indicators of wage responsiveness are on the rise, but not to the extent that would fuel a wage/price cycle like in the 1970s. Indeed, despite a tight labour market, organised labour does not exert the influence it had fifty years ago: the  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  labour share of income has declined by around 15 percentage points from the mid1970s to 55%. A caveat on the labour supply. Today we still have to understand fully the make-up of our laboursupply post-COVID. Active ageing has still to come back to the 2019 levels, many young people are changing jobs more often, with some professions being shunned, people are taking time to decide what job they want to go for.
Inflation has nevertheless moved up, and is now close to 2.5 per cent. A stronger krone has been needed to keep down inflation. BIS Review 65/1008  13  The real krone exchange rate measures changes in either the price level in Norway relative to other countries or the wage level in Norway relative to other countries. In common currency, the relative domestic price level is now between 5 and 10 per cent higher than the average for the oil age. The wage level measured in common currency is between 15 and 20 per cent higher than the average since 1970. Norwegian wage costs relative to other countries have reached an unprecedented high level. Nevertheless, there is full employment in Norway. So far, our business sector has been able to live with the high cost level. But, it may be that we have not yet seen the full impact. It is primarily through the government budget – growth in general government spending – that the authorities can influence the krone exchange rate and the scale of internationally exposed business. 14  BIS Review 65/2008  Our projections for economic developments are presented in Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy Report. The Report also includes our forecasts for the key policy rate ahead. Norges Bank’s Executive Board has decided that the key policy rate should be in the interval 5-6 per cent in the period to the next publication of the Monetary Policy Report in June, unless the economy is exposed to major shocks.

Figure 4 displays the volume of private credit, as a percentage of GDP, for South Africa, other sub-Saharan countries and for Northern Africa. With credit exceeding GDP, the financial sector in South Africa boasts a similar size to that of many North American and European countries. By contrast, the financial sector is very shallow in the rest of subSaharan Africa, with credit volumes at less than 20% of GDP. Even more worrying is that the financial sector has hardly deepened over the past 15 years. 4  BIS Review 110/2007  Figure 4: Private Credit / GDP in Africa (in%) 160% 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1993  1994  1995 1996  South Africa  1997  1998  1999  2000  Northern Africa (median)  2001  2002 2003  2004  2005  Sub-Saharan w/o SA (median)  Continuing this undoubtedly bleak picture, we see that the financial sector in sub-Saharan Africa has become neither more efficient, nor more competitive in recent years. Figure 5 displays the nominal rates at which banks lend money, as well as the rate they pay for deposits. Lending rates have stayed more or less constant from 1993 to 2005. Since inflation has decreased substantially over this time, the real interest rate that banks charge has actually increased. By contrast, the nominal deposit rate has decreased, so that the real deposit rate has been constant.
f.  We expect insurers to have effective risk management and governance, including independent risk and internal audit functions; and boards with a majority of independent non-executive directors, for both insurance groups and significant insurance companies within those groups. g. Insurers must disclose their financial position regularly in some detail, based on market prices for assets and liabilities as far as possible. Our regime, however, is not seeking to eliminate all risk (or achieve the stability of the graveyard). Provided insurers match their assets and liabilities, the Solvency II Matching Adjustment insulates them from movements in the market price of assets backing annuity liabilities to which they are not 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  exposed as buy-and-hold investors. They are also able to bring forward into day-one profits any returns on these assets in excess of what is required to compensate for the risk of credit default and downgrade. That adds up to a powerful incentive to invest in long-term assets yielding good risk-adjusted returns. Since the introduction of Solvency II, UK insurers have responded by diversifying out of government and corporate bonds into direct investments in infrastructure finance, commercial real estate lending and equity release mortgages (Chart 3). The infrastructure investments, for example, include renewable energy, hospitals, student accommodation, social housing and railway rolling stock leasing (Chart 4).

The availability of  longevity reinsurance has limited any drag on growth in the bulk purchase annuity market. Although one possible effect has been to make it more expensive for pension schemes with a high 5  The Chancellor’s letter to the Governor of 8 March 2017 setting out recommendations to the Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC) about aspects of the economic policy of the government to which the PRC should have regard when considering how to advance its statutory objectives includes “The government wishes to ensure financial services markets make a positive contribution to sustainable economic growth in the UK economy in the medium and long term, through the facilitation of finance for productive investment and as a productive sector of the UK economy.” 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  proportion of younger members to achieve an insurer buy out. This is because reinsurers have had a lower appetite for deferred than in-payment annuities. Although I hear that this might have changed recently. As Sam Woods wrote to Nicky Morgan in June of last year6, the PRA does not currently see a durable way to implement a change in the risk margin with sufficient certainty for insurers to be able to rely on it for pricing, capital planning and use of reinsurance. We continue to keep this position under review. Current issues Despite the diversification into direct investments, corporate bonds are likely to remain the largest category of assets backing U.K. insurers’ annuity liabilities.
Europe will be an important partner for China and the global economy. Before I leave the floor I would like to bring to your attention a very old Chinese proverb: “No one who can rise before dawn 360 days a year fails to make his family rich”. Thank for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Inflation has risen to levels not seen for decades, and its negative effects on households are reflected in public concern about this phenomenon. In addition, the two-year inflation expectations of economists and financial traders remain above 3%, and business expectations over longer horizons have also risen. It is important to note that long-lasting high inflations become more persistent and evidence shows that the cost of adjusting to them rises, with the consequent impact on the welfare of the population. The Board will be carefully monitoring the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario, ensuring that inflation convergence to the target is secured over the two-year policy horizon. Concluding remarks  Dear senators in this Commission, in closing I will share with you some good news and a personal thought. About the good news, as we announced in September 2021, on 23 June we will publish regional GDP on a quarterly basis. This is an important leap forward in the process of improving our economic statistics; it provides valuable information both for economic analysis and for public policy decisions, as it increases the frequency and timeliness with which we will be able to know the state of the regional economy, information that until today existed only in annual frequency. It is also a long-standing wish of many senators who, because of their close ties with the regions, require more detailed and regular information on the performance of the areas they represent.
Unfortunately I do not think that it makes much sense to try to show specific statistics for such outflows, since in this field data are notoriously unreliable - the more so in instances where controls exist which encourage outflows through what are euphemistically called informal channels. But in general terms the existence of such outflows is strongly implied, if not actually identified, in the overall balance of payments figures. Regarding capital outflows, allow me, for purposes of exposition, to make the following exaggerated distinction. In respect of advanced economies, outflows of direct investment tend to reflect the global workings of comparative advantage, as businesses seek to exploit particular strengths or niches; and portfolio outflows tend to reflect the search by each investor for a balanced international portfolio, within the total of which, however, domestic investments will typically tend to predominate. By contrast, in the less advanced economies there will be less wealth to provide the springboard for a large amount of direct overseas investment, and a large part of the leakage of funds from the country will be through what I have referred to as informal channels - which others may describe as capital flight. The position of any particular country in the spectrum between these two extreme characterisations will depend on, among other things, the stage of economic development that the country has reached, and on the degree of confidence that the population has in the government’s policies and in the financial institutions.

This market has progressed considerably in recent years, with the evolution of the markets for Exchange Fund bills and notes, borrowing programmes by public sector bodies, fundraising by multinational agencies and sizeable funding programmes - mainly at the short end - by Hong Kong financial institutions. But, except for Exchange Fund bills, the secondary markets are not greatly active and there has been little activity by local private sector corporate entities to raise longer-term funds directly from the debt market. Perhaps the difficulty is simply that market conditions are seldom regarded as propitious on all fronts simultaneously - at present, for instance, the general level of interest rates may tend to discourage issuance at term. And there is definitely a chicken-and-egg problem in that prospective investors would like prior evidence of a liquid market, but liquidity cannot be tested until there has been issuance. Dilemmas such as these are certainly not unique to Hong Kong. I acknowledge also that there are perceived obstacles concerning the tax regime, but it is worth noting that Hong Kong does have a low overall tax environment. It is hard to find solutions which fully satisfy all parties in such matters. It is also worth noting that, in normal market conditions, there is perhaps less incentive to exploit the potential of the local currency debt market than there might be in other centres, because of our pegged exchange rate: some borrowers may consider the US dollar 3  BIS Review 52/1999  market a satisfactory surrogate, especially given its established liquidity.
In the next few minutes I will first clarify my view regarding dollarization in general and, subsequently, I will briefly focus on the special case of small-island economies like Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. 2. Dollarized countries  Countries that have dollarized their economy can broadly be divided into two categories. The first group consists of countries, which are generally small and have strong political and/or economic ties with the country that issues the currency they use. Various island states in the Caribbean (Virgin Islands) and in the Pacific (Guam, Micronesia) belong to this group, which are in economic size comparable with Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten. Other examples include the mini states in Europe like Andorra and Monaco, which use the euro as legal tender. All in all, some thirty countries or territories can be classified in this category. The second group of countries is much smaller. It consists of economies that are dollarized because of a former special political event or economic crisis. Ecuador is a good example of this case. At the end of the 1990’s, this country experienced high inflation and depreciation of its local currency (the sucre) when the government suddenly decided to dollarize the economy, even without consulting the IMF. Mr. Stanley Fischer, at that time Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, later stated that he would have advised against dollarization, as the banking sector in Ecuador was unhealthy and the fiscal position weak.

4  BIS Review 33/2004  As the financial markets have built in expectations of a gradual return to more normal monetary and financial conditions, we have seen some adjustment in a range of credit spreads. A range of surveys has been reporting for some time that dealers and other financial intermediaries have generally reduced their exposure to rising interest rates. These adjustments are healthy. That their impact has been relatively contained so far may suggest that borrowers and lenders were less overextended relative to past periods, despite the sustained period of accommodative financial conditions. The fact that this process of adjustment has been relatively modest in overall impact also reflects the fact that it has occurred in an environment of growing confidence in the sustainability of the expansion and a consensus forecast for quite moderate inflation. Even so, risk managers need to continue to be attentive to the implications of further evolution in monetary and financial conditions. This overall picture suggests the supervisory community should continue to focus on the following priorities: •  Ensuring that overall capital levels provide a sufficiently strong cushion against risk. •  Encouraging firms to continue to strengthen the internal management and control infrastructure as it relates to risk management, the compliance function, and systems and technology. •  Improving the quality and integrity of public disclosure. •  Continuing to work toward a more integrated framework for supervision across the functional lines of financial activities within our markets, and globally as well.