samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The actual insolvency of a central bank: the case of the Central Bank of the Philippines 4 The Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) became insolvent in late 1980s and had to be liquidated in 1993. The events that led to its insolvency are an exact replay of the story outlined above 5 . According to the data published by the CBP 6 , it incurred losses from 1983 to 1990 year after year, making the total cumulative losses for the period equal to 144 billion Pesos. There were three sources of losses: losses arising from the foreign exchange swap arrangements which CBP entered with domestic banks; losses which CBP had to bear on account of providing forward cover for exchange risk involved in international borrowings of domestic corporations and interest rate losses arising from higher out-payments on foreign loans and central bank’s own securities than domestic interest earnings. The swap arrangement was a mechanism used by the CBP to boost its dwindling foreign reserves. When CBP lost its ability borrow abroad due to the continuously experienced balance of payments deficits and CBP’s refusal to allow the currency to depreciate, it got the state banks and private corporations to borrow abroad under a guarantee by the government and swapped Pesos for the foreign currency loan proceeds. In the process, CBP assumed the exchange rate risk at the time the swap was reversed.

Unless the country makes a surplus in its current account, the payment for imports has to be made either through capital inflows (both debt capital and non-debt capital) or running down the existing foreign reserves. Both generate long term balance of payments problems and exert pressure on the exchange rate to depreciate. Thus, the irresponsible use of the discretionary power of a central bank to acquire assets by creating a currency liability will lead to a depreciation of both the domestic value of its currency (domestic inflation) and the external value of its currency (continuous depreciation of the exchange rate). However, the fall in the external value of the currency is linked to, and preceded by, a fall in the domestic value. In other words, depreciating exchange rates are an effect and not the cause of domestic inflation. Hence, the continuous domestic inflation is a sign of a central bank’s failing to fulfil its primary obligation to the community. The new role of auditors of a central bank The central bank auditors, both internal and external, have for long confined themselves to the financial type of auditing of the operations of a central bank. The objective of this auditing is to identify whether a central bank has complied with the set-financial rules and procedures, whether there are irregularities or malpractices in payments or recording transactions or whether frauds have taken place in the operations of a central bank.
We are beginning to aggregate and analyse large data sets to: gain richer insights into customer behaviour and needs; detect fraud or anomalies in financial transactions; sharpen surveillance of market trends and emerging risks. Big data is in turn being driven by advances in: sensor networks and natural language processing to gather information from a wide universe of sources; cloud technologies to store and retrieve large volumes of information at low cost and ondemand; learning machines and smart algorithms that can continuously adapt and improve on their decision making with every iteration. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Smart Financial Centre Vision Be it countries, businesses, or people – those who are alert to technology trends, understand their implications, and harness their potential will gain a competitive edge. To be sure, many of these technologies are disruptive to existing jobs and existing business models. But if we do not disrupt ourselves – in a manner we choose – somebody else will – in a manner we will not like. Last year, MAS laid out a vision for a Smart Financial Centre, where innovation is pervasive and technology is used widely. Since then, MAS has been working closely with the financial industry, FinTech start-ups, the institutes of higher learning and other stakeholders towards this shared vision. MAS’ role in supporting this FinTech journey is two-fold: provide regulation conducive to innovation while fostering safety and security; and facilitate infrastructure for an innovation ecosystem and adoption of new technologies.

As a result of joining the Single Supervisory Mechanism, our country also joined the Single Resolution Mechanism. From 1 October 2020, the European Central Bank exercises direct supervision over five Bulgarian significant credit institutions, and the Single Resolution Board assumed the function of a resolution authority for these institutions and for all cross-border groups. Owing to the good preparation effort, the transition to the new supervisory regime was smooth, without any turbulence for the banks and their customers. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Therefore, the answer to the first question is that up to now we have been successfully performing both the emergency tasks caused by the pandemic and the strategic tasks facing the banking sector. The Banker’s Day is a good opportunity for us to mention the contribution and to commend on and give recognition to all our colleagues for having a banking sector that is just as strong and supportive of companies, households and the entire economy, with a preserved general financial stability in the country. The more important question for us now is what lies ahead? There is no easy answer to this question because of the development of the crisis which makes it much more uncertain in terms of parameters as compared with previous historical periods of economic and financial turmoil. The second wave of rapid spread of COVID-19 and the new phase of the restrictive measures are once again challenging a number of sectors.
Essentially, long-term government obligations are transformed into short-term government obligations. The government benefits from lower interest costs in the near term, but its future net revenues become more sensitive to future interest-rate increases. Government finance problems are reduced today, at a cost of potential future problems. The larger bank reserves become, the greater is the government’s future interest-rate exposure. Chairman Ben Bernanke famously said that “the problem with QE is that it works in practice, but it doesn’t work in theory” – QE3 seemed to succeed in pushing interest rates lower out  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  along the yield curve, energizing the bond market and lowering the hurdle rate for discounting cash flows and earnings of companies whose shares traded in stock markets. 1 This came, of course, at the expense of savers who kept their money in the most basic of short-term investments. But this was a cost that the committee felt was exceeded by the expected wealth effect. Well before last week’s FOMC meeting, it seemed to me that QE3’s effectiveness had waned while its current and potential future costs were mounting. I was thus an enthusiastic supporter of killing the program. Indeed, I would rather we had never had QE3 in the first place. To this day, I feel that the costs of accumulating another $ trillion of Treasuries and MBS will be shown to exceed the benefits.

A range of indicators is reviewed in these reports, accompanied by a discussion of risks and opportunities in the field of inflation. The present situation In the latest inflation report, published this March, GDP growth in 1997 and 1998 was expected to be around 2 and 3 per cent, respectively. It was also argued that sizeable capacity restrictions should not arise in the course of the period. Given that, and inflation expectations being low, underlying domestic inflation (measured with the CPI excluding transitory effects on inflation) in the coming two years was put at between 1.5 and 2 per cent. As we all know, to forecast inflation is a complicated task. In view of the shortcomings in such estimates, it is more a matter of assessing the balance of risks. Our latest  BIS Review 47/1997  -4-  inflation report therefore includes a discussion of two alternatives in which future inflation might be either lower or higher than in the main scenario. One alternative is that inflation could be lower than in the main scenario, mainly if private consumption were to be weak. The other envisages the opposite - higher inflation - on account of a weaker exchange rate that stimulates a stronger growth of exports and GDP, leading to increased inflationary pressure. What are the economic tendencies that have appeared during the last months? During winter there were signs of a slowdown in manufacturing.
Following their pre-university programmes, Imran aspires to be a Mechanical Engineer, Hajar is keen to read Chemistry while both Ying Xin and Nur Shazlin aspire to be Doctors. I am confident that all of you will do your best and will contribute for the future of the nation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In addition to the Kijang Emas Scholarship award, every year the Bank also awards scholarships to 50 high achieving SPM students for them to pursue their undergraduate studies abroad with the objective of them being part of the Bank’s future talent pool. The Bank has put in place a structured, holistic and collaborative Scholar’s Development Programme to support all of our scholars throughout their studies. The programme aims to develop high-quality and well-rounded scholars with leadership qualities as the next generation of young talent who will be the leaders of tomorrow for the Bank and our nation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Allow me to express my sincere gratitude to Mr Benoît Cœuré, Executive Board member of the ECB and Mr. Tao Zhang, Deputy Managing Director at the IMF, for honoring us with their presence today. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  It is a pleasure to have Mr. Luiz Awazu Pereira da Silva, Deputy General Manager at BIS and Governor Gudmundsson to address the audience. I would also like to express my appreciation to all other distinguished panelists in the today’s sessions – deputy governors, representatives from international organizations, global banks and investors and other honorable speakers for contributing to the event. It is an honor to have Mr. Dragan Tevdovski, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Macedonia and Mr. Vladislav Goranov, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria to give their reflections on SEE region perspectives. I look forward to your discussions and wish all the delegates an enjoyable and rewarding conference day. I thank you all for coming, particularly given that many of you had to travel long distances to come to Skopje. I hope that all of you will enjoy the agenda and find the conference productive and worthwhile. In closing, I would like to thank all of those who have worked very hard to make this event happen. My most sincere thanks and appreciation goes to our co-organizer Marc Uzan, Executive Director of The Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee. Marc’s work is wellrecognized among the global economic community.
The ABF Hong Kong Bond Index Fund made history by being the first bond exchange-traded fund launched in Asia. The PAIF has also set two records. It is the first listed Asian bond fund to invest in as many as eight bond markets in the region. As a listed fund, it allows easy access by both institutional and retail investors who wish to have exposure to the Asian bond markets in a cost-effective and convenient manner. Secondly, the PAIF is the first foreign institutional investor that has access to the interbank bond market of Mainland China. This is an important step in the opening up of China’s bond market to foreign participants. I am glad to see that the PAIF has played a catalytic role in development not only in China but also in all the markets in which the fund invests. 4. I take this opportunity to thank State Street Global Advisors (SSgA), the fund manager of the PAIF, for their commitment and dedication to the development of this innovative product and to the idea of an Asian bond market. We have seen a favourable response to the ABF Hong Kong Fund, and I hope that the PAIF, with its broader investor base, will also be well received by markets. I wish you every success in promoting the PAIF. Thank you. BIS Review 50/2005  1

William C Dudley: Risks of wholesale funding Welcoming remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the workshop on the “Risks of Wholesale Funding”, New York City, 13 August 2014. *  *  *  Michael Fleming, Jamie McAndrews, Susan McLaughlin and Joseph Tracy contributed to preparing these remarks. It is a pleasure to welcome you to the New York Fed today to discuss the important issue of wholesale funding. As you all know, the financial system plays an essential role in modern economies, and liquidity is in turn critical to the functioning of the financial system. Because financial intermediation is critical to economic activity and intermediation is dependent on funding and liquidity, disruption to funding and liquidity can cause severe damage to the economy. The experience of recent years revealed serious flaws in the system. Risk was mispriced and there was a build-up of excesses before the crisis. Structural weaknesses in the financial system then amplified the effect of the sharp decline in U.S. house prices, and the result was a widespread financial crisis and a deep recession both here and abroad. The extensive use by financial firms of short-term wholesale funding was one critical factor in the crisis.
We are ensuring that these earnings are reported using the strictest standards. In all likelihood, this trend – of lower but positive profits – should continue for the rest of the year. Third, our banks have regular sources of income. They are universal banks. This sets them apart from banks in some other countries that depend exclusively, or for the most part, on the financial markets. Our banks have sound and revolving sources of future profits. This is a vital asset at a time when it is difficult to raise capital by issuing shares on the market. Lastly, the “manoeuvrability” of our banks remains excellent and they are now ready to play their role in the possible restructuring of the international financial sector. These facts give me reason for confidence. Beyond the sometimes serious tensions and incidents that have affected the recent period, our banks may be justly proud of the progress in terms of productivity and innovation that they have made in the last two decades, which now positions them to cope effectively with turmoil that may occur in the future. 2  BIS Review 130/2008  Public policy during the crisis Over the past two weeks, we have witnessed a marked change in public policy with regard to financial institutions. Having hitherto been exclusively geared to providing liquidity, public intervention is now also aiming to support banks’ financing and own funds. This shift in stance is significant. The problem of liquidity remains crucial at this stage of the crisis.

15 Previous fluctuations in inflation, real interest rates and tax rules have created redistributions that have benefited certain generations at the cost of others and that have created an economic middle class of middle-aged and older people with relatively strong economic resources. Increasingly difficult to enter the housing market At the same time, those people outside the owned housing market, the outsiders, have not been able to take advantage of this development, and the high prices have made it increasingly difficult for them to be able to purchase a home at all. Particularly in metropolitan areas, it is difficult to save enough for a down payment without help. Without parents who can contribute to a down payment or stand as co-borrower for a mortgage, it has become more difficult for many firsttime buyers to purchase a home. The development of the housing market has therefore led to great differences in possibilities for people to enter the housing market. Another aspect of the problems on the owned housing market is that the lack of opportunities to purchase a home forces many young people to sublet. Subletting is often expensive and insecure for the subtenant, at the same time as their consumer protection is weak. Difficulties in finding a home also lead to problems in  14 Långtidsutredningen [Long-Term Survey of the Swedish Economy] (2015) and Jahnson, D. and J Lundberg (2013). 15 Långtidsutredningen [Long-Term Survey of the Swedish Economy] (2003). 5 [13]  skills supply.
Page 24 of 27  Jan-21  Table 1 Domestic scenario (*) (annual variation, percent) 2021 (f)  2022 (f)  2023 (f)  2020  Mar-21 Report  Jun-21 Report  Mar-21 Report  Jun-21 Report  Mar-21 Report  Jun-21 Report  GDP  -5.8  6.0/7.0  8.5/9.5  3.0/4.0  2.0/3.0  2.5/3.5  1.75/2.75  Domestic demand  -9.1  11.7  15.5  3.1  1.5  2.7  1.6  Domestic demand (w/o inventory change  -7.9  11.0  13.3  2.8  1.7  2.8  1.4  Gross fixed capital formation  -11.5  9.2  11.4  4.9  3.2  3.3  2.0  Total consumption  -6.8  11.5  13.8  2.2  1.3  2.7  1.2  Private consumption  -7.5  12.2  15.1  2.3  1.3  2.8  1.0  Goods and services exports  -1.0  3.5  1.1  4.3  5.4  3.7  4.2  Goods and services imports  -12.7  21.4  23.2  3.6  2.7  2.9  2.5  Current account (% GDP)  1.4  -0.9  -0.8  -1.6  -1.1  -2.4  -1.9  Gross national savings (% GDP)  21.2  19.1  20.0  19.3  20.1  18.9  19.8  GFCF (% of nominal GDP)  20.9  20.5  19.9  21.2  20.4  21.6  20.8  (f)=Forecast. (*) Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Figure 2  Private consumption (*)  Gross fixed capital formation (*)  (contribution to annual change, percentage)  (contribution to annual change, percentage)  10  2  5  1  0  0 -1  -5  -2  -10  -3  -15  -4 -20 15  16  17  18  19  20  Durable goods  Non-durable goods  Services  Private consumption  21  -5  15  16  17 M&E  (*) Source: Central Bank of Chile. Page 15 of 27  19  20  Construction and works  18  GFCF  21  Figure 3 Selected employment indicators (1) (millions of persons)  National, Metropolitan Region and Greater Santiago INE (National)  UC (National)  Salaried formal (2)  UCH (G. Santiago)  10 9  6.0  INE  AFP  AFC  Jul-19  Jan-20  Jul-20  5.5  8  5.0  7 6  4.5  5 4  4.0  3 2  3.5  1 3.0 Jan-19  0 Jan-19  Jul-19  Jan-20  Jul-20  Jan-21  Jan-21  (1) INE, AFC, and AFP data in moving quarterly averages. (2) Quarterly data with monthly interpolation.
It has been agreed that all EU Member States may connect their national RTGS systems to TARGET, whether or not they join EMU. The main policy issue outstanding concerns the terms on which the European Central Bank will grant intraday credit to the “outs”. We see no monetary -- or other -- grounds for any discrimination against the “outs”. If intraday liquidity to the “outs” were to be restricted the effect would be to increase the cost of using TARGET, and to damage the efficiency of the system for both “ins” and “outs”. That would simply divert euro payments to alternative mechanisms, including correspondent banking and the EBA’s net end-of-day settlement system. It would be unlikely significantly to deter the international use of the euro -- if that were the objective -- any more than lack of direct access to national RTGS systems deters the international use of the dollar or yen or Deutsche Mark now. Its main impact would be to make intra-European payments less secure. We would regret that. Besides payments systems, the preparation of securities settlement systems for the introduction of the euro is a complex task in its own right. One of the reasons for this is that there are different approaches to securities settlement between different Member States and financial institutions. Another is that different approaches may be required to meet issuers’ requirements for re-denomination.

And, provided we do indeed operate within a co-operative framework, and provided we are indeed well prepared, the City has good reason to be optimistic. BIS Review 106/1997
The final assessment in the Update was that the labour market would develop more strongly than was predicted in Ramses. The most recent labour market indicators pointed in this direction. Moreover, the assessment was that the krona would be weaker than in the Ramses forecast, which contributes to higher export growth. The forecasting process The forecasting work begins in the Monetary Policy Department, normally around six weeks prior to the monetary policy meeting. At least this is the case when a Monetary Policy Report is going to be published, otherwise the process is slightly shorter. 6 The process begins with the forecasting work on international developments. A preliminary draft for this forecast is presented at a meeting to which we members of the Executive Board are invited. Assessments and analyses of developments in the Swedish and international financial markets are often presented at this meeting, too. This information is used in the work on making forecasts for the real economy in Sweden. First an assessment is made of the current situation, then there is a review of the results of the forecasting models. After this there are new meetings, at which draft forecasts and analyses of the labour market, wages, inflation and public finances are discussed. These meetings aim to bring together different views and to reach a joint picture of developments and of the conditions for the Swedish economy, including the labour market and inflation. Using these analyses as a base, a forecast for the Swedish and international economies is made.

We are as always prepared to take whatever measures are necessary to safeguard financial stability. If we need to take action we will, as usual, make it clear what we intend to do, how we will do it and when we will do it. The recent developments illustrate something that has direct relevance to the theme of my speech today – namely the difficulty in capturing all of the relevant factors when making forecasts. Sweden has little trade with Greece and our banks have little exposure towards the country. Nevertheless, Greece’s problems are important factors when we try to predict future developments in the Swedish economy. And this leads me back to what I had actually intended to talk about today – the role of forecasts in monetary policy. Probably like many other economists outside the bank world, I was very sceptical of forecasts when I came to the Riksbank last year. To me, making forecasts appeared to be an activity that required very elaborate machinery, with complicated models and vast amounts of data, the results of which were nevertheless usually incorrect. Since then I have gained a new perspective, both with regard to the process of making forecasts and their role in monetary policy decision-making. Today I intend to share with you some of my new insights into this field.