samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the case of Chile, this duty to impart information is stipulated in the Central Bank’s Constitutional Organic Law which mandates that once a year the Bank must inform the President of the Republic and the Senate about its deliberations and developments. This takes place in September when the Central Bank Board presents its Monetary Policy Report to the Senate. Nevertheless, the Central Bank of Chile goes beyond this requirement and reports not only to the Senate in September but also presents a monetary policy report to the Senate’s Finance Committee in January and again in May. The same happens with the Financial Stability Report which is published in January and June each year. Similarly, the Bank gives an account of its management of international reserves once a year as part of its Annual Report. However, this is not enough. The legitimacy of the Central Bank is upheld by direct, open, and non-excluding communication with the general public and so these documents are uploaded on the Bank’s website at the same time as they are being presented. Moreover, the Bank issues other reports, communications, minutes, specialized studies and statistics, all of which are available to the public. There are also press conferences and interviews with Bank board members and staff. The time when the workings of central banks were something complex and mysterious has also passed. We want the community to understand our work since it consists of providing a public good – stability – which enables the country to progress.

On its part, the Bank will continue to support transition activities through the RM1 billion Low Carbon Transition Facility and other funds for SMEs which will complement funds extended by financial institutions to help SMEs implement sustainable low carbon practices. By 2024, we have also required all FIs to make disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Disclosures (TCFD). Given that such disclosures by FIs will ultimately depend on disclosures provided by their customers and counterparties, this will have implications on demands for climate-related information from businesses. Significant efforts are also being pursued to support climate risk management and transition through the Joint Committee on Climate Change, or JC3, which is co-chaired by the Bank and the Securities Commission. The JC3 serves as an industry-regulator collaborative platform to drive and coordinate the financial sector’s response to climate change. As part of efforts to scale up transition finance, JC3 is actively exploring pilot programmes to test new green solutions and instruments. In identifying suitable pilot projects, priority will be given to climate-friendly projects that can help develop the broader ecosystem for green finance, such as carbon accounting and measurement frameworks, climate data aggregators, or green credentialing standards. Another key deliverable of JC3 this year is the upcoming publication of a data catalogue that will point users to credible sources of critical climate data needed to support identified use cases.
The American and British experiences underscore that recovery is not possible without a meaningful and transparent re-capitalisation of the banking system, and that households need to de-lever before they have the confidence to consume again. 1  60,000 jobs per month in the UK is roughly the equivalent of monthly increases in US non-farm payrolls of 300,000. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The question now is whether such progress is sufficient for durable, strong and balanced recoveries over the medium term. Growing pessimism The pessimists would argue that it isn’t. Their case starts from the observation that advanced economy growth rates remain below pre-crisis trends, despite the scale of the fall and years of emergency monetary stimulus. More fundamentally, pessimists point to the pre-crisis period when (retrospectively) loose financial conditions did not generate a boom in output and associated inflation. They ask: could stagnation be the new normal? Today I want to consider two possible explanations for why advanced economies may have entered a low growth phase. First, on the demand side, they could be in a persistent liquidity trap, making it difficult for resources to be fully utilized, and second, there may have been a persistent deterioration in the supply side such that full utilisation of resources is consistent with slower growth. 1. Persistent liquidity trap  A liquidity trap occurs when the short-term nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound.

2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  1 Bloomberg, Banks betting on Paris say there is life after London, 18 April 2023 2 Bloomberg, London losing to Paris in battle of equity markets, 22 March 2023 3 iNSEE, first estimate published on 28 April 2023 4 Villeroy de Galhau, F., Banking turmoil: three blessings and a funeral, speech, 28 April  2023 5 An updated report will be published by the Banque de France within next months. You can already refer to our report published in November 2021 for the key findings from our first nine experiments. 6 ECB, Eurosystem to explore new technologies for wholesale central bank money settlement, press release, 28 April 2023 7 Villeroy de Galhau, F., The role of central banks in the "macroeconomics of climate change", speech, 24 April 2023  3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
11 See: Bank of England: A Blueprint for a new RTGS service for the United Kingdom (May 2017). 10  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  RTGS settlement account, to give assurance that non-bank PSPs can safely take their place at the heart of the payment system. We can go even further. Today, the Bank of England is announcing plans to consult on opening access to our balance sheet to new payment providers.12 Historically, only commercial banks were able to hold interest-bearing deposits, or reserves, at the Bank.13 That reflected their role at the core of the payment system. As new payment providers and systems emerge, access to the Bank’s core infrastructure should change and it makes sense to consider whether they too can hold funds overnight on the Bank’s balance sheet. From the Bank’s perspective, expanding access can improve the transmission of monetary policy and increase competition. It can also support financial stability by allowing settlement in the ultimate risk free asset, and reducing reliance on major banks. Users should benefit from the reduced costs and increased certainty that comes with banking at the central bank. From the perspectives of UK households and businesses, wider access can improve inclusion and services. This access could empower a host of new innovation. In wholesale markets, consortia of broker dealers are working to develop settlement systems using distributed ledger technology that could overhaul how markets operate.

Our levers are the hard and soft infrastructure that we control:   Our hard infrastructure, such as access to our balance sheet and access to our Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, the heart of the UK payments system.   And our soft infrastructure, such as our rules, regulations and standards. In this spirit, last year at Mansion House I announced that Huw van Steenis would lead a review of the future of the UK financial system, including recommendations for how the Bank could best support innovation while continuing to promote resilience.1 I would like to thank Huw and the Bank of England team, who over the past nine months have met 300 entrepreneurs, investors, consumer groups, charities, business leaders and policymakers across the country and around the world to produce an excellent report. Today, we published Huw’s recommendations and the Bank of England’s response.2 And tonight, I would like to focus on a few of the actions that the Bank will take to enable the new economy; to ensure the resilience of the financial system; and to support the UK’s transition to a carbon-neutral economy. 1  Carney, M (June 2018) ‘New Economy, New Finance, New Bank’ speech given at Mansion House. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  First, to enable the digital economy The very nature of commerce is changing. Last year, one fifth of all sales in the UK were online.3 Next year, it will be one quarter.
To build as accurate a picture as possible of the impact of reforms, we need high-quality data. In particular we are asking firms to validate internally the data they submit to us. Other aspects of the review There are some aspects of the review which are important but which do not lend themselves to being tested quantitatively through a QIS, and I wanted to touch briefly on a few of these. To support thinking about asset eligibility criteria for the Matching Adjustment, there will be some qualitative questions about this in the QIS, alongside the main part of the exercise. The Solvency II review also presents an opportunity to simplify the regime, not just for the MA but more broadly: streamlining of the process for approving internal models and model changes, for example. And there are some simplifications that can be made by the PRA even within the existing framework: we plan to produce a consultation paper on simplifications to the Solvency II reporting process. Together, these changes will allow our supervisors to increase their focus on the big risks that matter, while reducing cost, and increasing flexibility for industry. LIBOR The building work for the Solvency II review is important, but insurance isn’t the only sector with construction work going on. And as is so often the case, the building work next door is affecting us too. Sterling Libor is ceasing at the end of this year.

The introduction of the euro has profoundly changed the environment in which the Swiss economy operates. Since 1999, the Swiss franc has coexisted quite harmoniously with the euro. In fact, the franc has been more stable against the euro than it was against the D mark. This is good news for Swiss companies exporting to the European market. On the other hand, such companies have to contend with a greater concentration of foreign-exchange risks. They are responding to this challenge with hedging policies that are more active than those pursued in the past. Pegging the franc to the euro in order to eliminate exchange-rate risks would entail more problems than advantages, as it would inevitably push up the level of interest rates in Switzerland. Against this backdrop, the National Bank is continuing to pursue an independent monetary policy that takes account not only of economic trends and inflation forecasts but also of the situation on the foreign exchange markets. BIS Review 10/2004  1
Haga clic aquí para escribir texto. 01.03.2018  Developments in the economic situation Asociación Española de Directivos, Santa Cruz de Tenerife Luis M. Linde Governor  Introduction Let me begin by thanking the Tenerife Asociación Española de Directivos for their kind invitation to me to join you today. The European environment I shall devote my address to the current situation of the Spanish economy. I will begin by highlighting the favourable cyclical juncture at which the euro area – the economic environment closest to us – stands. The upturn in which the euro area economy is immersed may be classified as robust and dynamic, and extensive to all productive sectors and countries. The euro area economy began to show signs of strength in the closing months of 2016, and these stepped up in the second half of last year. As a result, GDP at the close of 2017 was growing at 2.7%, a rate not seen since the start of monetary union and one significantly above what was expected a year earlier. These figures comfortably exceed the potential GDP growth estimates for the area as a whole and thus contribute to erasing the negative output gap generated by the crisis. One of the characteristics of the current expansionary phase is its intensity in terms of job creation, meaning that the euro area as a whole has now exceeded pre-crisis occupation levels. Wage restraint and the reforms carried out in some countries have been conducive to the vigorous response by employment to economic growth.

However, looking at studies of Swedish data covering the period from the end of the 19th century up to the mid-1990s, it is difficult to find evidence of this. 9  8  See, for instance, Chapter 5 “The changing dynamic of the global business cycle”, in World Economic Outlook 2007, IMF. See also T. Dalsgaard, J. Elmeskov and C-Y. Park. ”Ongoing changes in the business cycle, evidence and causes.” OECD Working Paper ECO/WKP(2002)1. 9  Jesper Lindé, ”Swedish postwar business cycles: Generated at home? Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004:4, 623-45. and V. Bergström and A. Vredin, ”Measuring and Interpreting Business cycles”, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1994. BIS Review 121/2008  3  If one looks at the period from 1980 to 2008, however, the turning points in the economic cycle appear to systematically occur a few quarters earlier in the United States than in Sweden. 10 This could imply that international developments have also gained increased significance in recent years as capital markets have been deregulated and the exchange rate has been allowed to float. One can also see that exports often show a turnaround a quarter or so before GDP. However, there have been few cycles since 1980 and it is therefore difficult to reach any conclusions. Let me illustrate how the components of GDP in Sweden move in the example of a “normal” economic downturn. Export growth often turns around a few quarters before the turnaround for GDP.
But in general, transparency of process can contribute to confidence. Some indeed argue that you should improve transparency generally to a point where lender of last resort support could be withdrawn altogether. And let the market take the fallout from, and absorb, the shocks as they arise. This I fear gets into the realms of philosophy and political thought, and as a mere central banker I would prefer to go no further! Some countries are less inclined to such opacity. To quote Governor Heikensten of the Riksbank “Those who have lived through a crisis are generally in favour of a transparent process”5  14. Conclusion  I have ranged widely on the many factors which - at least in my view - arerelevant to financial stability oversight. So in concluding, let me try to draw together some of the principal themes in what I have been saying. I am naturally well aware that there are many positive features to today’s environment. But central bankers are sometimes accused of being pessimists and seeing the glass half empty. In our defence I suppose it is our job to think out what could go wrong and to be ready accordingly. The first message to leave you with is that we are concerned about financial stability because of the potential economic and social costs arising from financial instability. Private markets will not always reflect these costs fully and prima facie there is a need for public oversight. Second, the degree of complexity and interconnectedness has increased dramatically in recent years.

Everyone is affected, and events in one country affect all other countries too. I hope that this is clear to the decision-makers. In terms of monetary policy, we will do our part to prevent fragmentation in the euro area. The border closures and all the different national arrangements we’ve seen suggest that it is more like “everyone for himself” at the moment. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The primary goal has to be to contain the spread of the virus. It may be that closing borders is an appropriate step from that point of view. That’s something that virologists are best placed to judge. But it’s clear that all protective measures come at an economic cost. And that is precisely why we need coordinated action, so that we can avoid deepening the crisis. But not every country can afford that. That’s true, and that’s precisely why we need European cooperation. What we need now is European solidarity, also in financial terms. That is in the interest of all European countries. Is it even possible now to prevent a recession as a result of the virus crisis? We are experiencing a very severe economic shock. Supply chains are being disrupted and, at the same time, demand is contracting as governments introduce protective measures: people are travelling less than before and cannot go out to restaurants and bars. Falling confidence may also dampen consumption and investment. And if people are not able to go to work, that has an impact on production, depending on the sector.
It will not go unnoticed that several of these mechanisms also affect economic activity. For example, to the extent that a reduction of the MPR is properly transmitted to the cost of interbank funding, financial institutions may offer better credit conditions to their clients or, based on a better spread, bring to their portfolio of clients people and companies that were left out before because of, for example, a higher risk assessment. At the same time, as people and companies see a more attractive offer of credit in terms of amounts or costs, they will decide to spend and thereby boost activity. Central banks are often caricatured as obsessed with inflation and indifferent to economic activity. Nothing further from the reality. The deviations of growth are very relevant for the evolution of inflation in the medium term, which means they play a fundamental role in our actions. The closer GDP is to its potential, the closer inflation will be to its mediumterm target. Moreover, in the great majority of cases, monetary policy influences economic activity and inflation in the same direction, which is not surprising since both tend to correlate within the business cycle. This is especially important when the economy is in a weak phase of the cycle and a monetary stimulus can raise inflation and boost domestic demand.

MONETARY POLICY REPORT PRESENTATION TO THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC ∗  Mario Marcel Governor Central Bank of Chile 3 April 2017  The Monetary Policy Report of March 2017 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl/en  ∗  Introduction Mr. Governor of the Senate’s Finance Committee, Senator Carlos Montes, honorable members of this Committee, ladies, gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation to present the views of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile about the recent macroeconomic developments, their projections and implications for monetary policy. This vision is contained in detail in our Monetary Policy Report (the Report) of March 2017. It is worth mentioning that this Report includes for the first time economic forecasts for 2018, as I will show you throughout this presentation. I am here with the full Board and all the staff responsible for the topics covered in our Report. I wish to make a special mention of our new Board member, Ms Rosanna Costa, recently confirmed by this Senate, and Ms Solange Berstein, our Financial Policy Division Director, as of today. In recent months, annual CPI inflation has continued to decline, in line with forecasts in the December Report. Goods inflation continues to be shaped largely by the movements of the exchange rate, while services inflation has continued to drop gradually, marked by the widespread indexation and consistently with the business cycle. Meanwhile, in late last year and into this, GDP of non-natural-resources sectors performed weaker than forecast.
Luis M Linde: New challenges for a new era Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the 8th Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid, 26 November 2015. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Good morning. First, I would like to thank Banco Santander for inviting me to participate in this new edition of your International Banking Conference. The first edition took place in the autumn of 2008, right after the fall of Lehman Brothers and just before the G20 leaders agreed to launch the financial regulatory reform in an unprecedented globally coordinated action. The objective was clear and so was the mandate given to the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: to build a stronger and more resilient financial system. Since then, the main pillars of the reform have been put in place. The list of new measures implemented is long and, I would say, impressive. I will not review the list, which is very clearly and well explained in the latest progress reports published by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee. I will focus my remarks on three different aspects of the global post-crisis reform that I find particularly relevant for the topic of this Conference:   First of all, the finalisation, next year, of the Basel III framework.   Second, the new total-loss-absorbing-capacity (TLAC) standard, developed by the Financial Stability Board and recently endorsed by the G20 leaders.

In particular, the Financial Stability Board has claimed that the problems of misconduct in some financial institutions have the potential to create systemic risks, considering the scale of the associated fines and sanctions which could run into the millions and also the negative impact on confidence. This is a serious threat that must be properly addressed. The banking business is about trust; if confidence in the financial institutions and markets is lost, the potential for finance to serve the real economy and foster growth will be undermined. In response to this threat, a new area of FSB-coordinated work has been set up. An action plan has been launched which, among other measures, explores the pivotal role played by compensation structures and, more generally, corporate governance frameworks in preventing and mitigating bad practice. The FSB is examining whether the reforms already in place, mainly as a result of principles and standards issued by the OECD, the Basel Committee and the FSB itself, have proven effective or if, on the contrary, more preventive measures are required. 5. Closing remarks  Let me conclude. Back in 2009 the FSB and other standard-setting bodies (such as the Basel Committee) received a mandate from the G20 to restore the resilience of the financial markets and make future financial crises less frequent and costly. Most of the agreed postcrisis measures are now in place and have already begun to deliver benefits in terms of bank resilience and financial stability. The Basel Committee intends to finalise the Basel III framework in 2016.