samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the past, growth in public spending was to be reduced or other fiscal policy measures implemented if the labour market was tight and wage growth high. With today's guidelines, it is primarily monetary policy that is tightened in a similar situation. The rise in labour costs is important when Norges Bank assesses the outlook for price inflation and sets interest rates. Excessive wage growth, in both manufacturing and other industries, will affect the internationally exposed sector through two channels. First, high wage growth will in itself reduce earnings and employment. Second, the interest rate will be increased. Normally, this will lead to an appreciation of the krone, with a further reduction in earnings and employment. The manufacturing sector will therefore feel the effects of excessive wage growth to an even greater extent than earlier. Since the new fiscal guidelines, which entail an increased use of petroleum revenues, were introduced during a period with a tight labour market, it was to be expected that the krone would be strong at times. At the same time, it is important to be aware that low wage growth will be of double benefit to the exposed business sector. With wage growth as low as in the mid-1990s, partly as a result of incomes  BIS Review 2/2003  1  policy, and other things being equal, the interest rate would probably have to be set in such a way that the krone fell in value in order to bring price inflation up to 2.5 per cent.

Source: Norges Bank SG 16. januar 2003  BIS Review 2/2003  7  Forward interest rates Norway, Germany and the US 7.0  7.0 6.0  6.0  Norway  5.0  5.0  4.0  4.0  Germany 3.0  3.0  US  2.0  2.0  1.0 1.0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  Source: Norges Bank SG 16. januar 2003  Real exchange rate (TWI/relative CPI) 90  90  95  95  100  100 1970 - 2001  105  105  110  110  115  115 1971  1975  1979  1983  1987  1991  1995  1999  Source: Norges Bank SG 16. januar 2003  Purchasing power parity Norway and Germany. Relative prices and exchange rate  200  Consumer prices  100  200  100 Krone exchange rate  50  1970  50  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank SG 16. januar 2003  8  BIS Review 2/2003  Sweden's real exchange rate and relative GDP compared with the euro area. Quarterly figures.
Achieving a regime in which orderly failures can occur without recourse to public money is a vital part of the redesign of regulation. This objective is recognised internationally in the work of the G20, the Financial Stability Board, and in the European Union. One important way in which this work has started is with the development of recovery and resolution plans for major banks. But there is a lot more to do in order to embed a credible approach to ensuring failures can be handled into the framework of prudential regulation. In my view, it is vital that we do this, and thereby introduce greater market discipline into the behaviour of banks by making clear to investors that failure is possible, and can be handled without unacceptable disruption. Last, but certainly not least, the new framework of regulation needs to be clearly accountable to the public through Parliament and that accountability will depend on a clear understanding of the objectives of supervision. Alongside accountability goes transparency, so that all interested parties can see what we are doing. There is no doubt the agenda is challenging, but we have very good reasons for sticking at it. I will be part of the new senior management responsible for prudential regulation, and I look forward to having another opportunity to update you as our work moves on. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conditional inflation forecast of March 2011 and of June 2011 Percentage change in national consumer price index from previous year Inflation Forecast March 2011 (with Libor at 0.25%) Forecast June 2011 (with Libor at 0.25%) % 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 –0.5 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  Observed inflation June 2011 2008  I nf l at i on  2009  2010 Q2  Q3  Q4  2011  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2.5  2.7  3.0  1.6  0.0 - 0.7 - 1.0 - 0.2 1.1  1.0  0.3  0.3  0.6  Q2  Q3  2008  2009  2010  2.4  - 0.5  0.7  Q4  Conditional inflation forecast of March 2011 with Libor at 0.25% and of June 2011 with Libor at 0.25% 2011  For ecast Mar ch 2011, Li bor at 0.25% For ecast June 2011, Li bor at 0.25%  4  2012  2013  2014  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  0.4  0.5  1.2  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.3  1.5  1.8  2.1  2.5  0.5  1.4  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2.2  Q1  2.6  Q2  Q3  2011  2012  2013  0.8  1.1  2.0  0.9  1.0  1.7  Q4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
30  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  30  Table 1: Wage growth models (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  Variables  AWE  AWE  AWE  AWE  AWE  AWE  Inflation expectations (lagged one quarter)  0.718**  0.361  0.680**  0.323*  0.464**  (0.270)  (0.237)  (0.255)  (0.143)  (0.161)  Inflation  0.417** (0.023)  Unemployment gap  -0.847**  -0.709*  -0.857**  -0.038  (0.198)  (0.289)  (0.313)  (0.055)  Involuntary part-time employment share  Trend productivity growth  -0.602*  -0.237  (0.297)  (0.364)  0.834**  0.763*  0.708*  0.888**  0.735**  (0.166)  (0.340)  (0.275)  (0.199)  (0.160)  2.646**  0.896  (0.739)  (0.843)  Voluntary job-to-job transition rate  Unionisation rate  0.027** (0.010)  Constant  0.299  2.876*  1.239  -1.249  0.432  -0.125  (0.794)  (1.347)  (1.459)  (0.676)  (0.800)  (0.288)  Observations  105  105  105  94  94  122  Adjusted R-squared  0.603  0.566  0.604  0.617  0.644  0.856  Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Sources: ONS, Barclays and Bank calculations. Notes: Estimation period is 1992Q2-2018Q2 for specifications 1, 2 & 3. For specifications 4 & 5 the sample begins in 1995Q1 due to data limitations.

29  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  29  Chart 24: Distribution of pay packets  Percentage of employees 50  40  30  2018  20  2017 10  0 <0  0  >0 & <1  1  >1 to <=2  >2 to <= 3  >3 to <=4  >4 to <=5  >5  Settlement by bucket (per cent)  Sources: Bank of England, Incomes Data Research, XpertHR, Incomes Data Service, Labour Research Department and Bank calculations.
In concordance with the modern philosophy of macroeconomic administration, the Bank of Albania remains committed to not allowing that rapid and short-term economic growth impair the long-term development perspectives of our country. At microeconomic level, the growth of consumption in economy was followed by increased indebtedness in Albanian households’ and businesses’ balance sheets and by overinvestments in certain sectors of the economy. Both these indicators are either at lower levels than in the regional countries, or at similar levels; hence, they cannot be specified as problematic. However, their rapid growth rate creates the idea of a short-term vision of the economic agents, and in particular cases, even avoidance of rationality. Dwelling upon household consumption, the Bank of Albania invites all economic agents to be more forward-looking and realistic in their consumption and savings plans. This invitation does not imply the contraction of consumption or the change of preferences related to it, but merely placing it in the context of long-term plans that equal income and expenditure at a household level. Beyond the time-related dimension, as we have continuously drawn the attention, borrowers should be cautious as regards their loan currency. This implies that the matching of their loan currency with that of their income would be their best protection. In a more pragmatic  BIS Review 158/2009  3  approach, this advice may be reduced into an appeal for a close consultation with the banking system and the financial market’s specialized agents.

Since the onset of the digital revolution, information flows and networks have spread across borders. We are now in a new era of technology since the advent of cloud computing. More than ever, technology pervades nearly every aspect of our lives. Whilst Asia is home to some of the world’s most digitized and innovative economies, I believe the potential of technology is yet to be fully realised in the region’s banking industry. With the constant challenge from the vast amount of data, banks that can successfully capitalise on rapid access to critical information and able to act quickly and effectively will distinguish themselves in the future. This challenge becomes magnified in post-regulatory reform, as demand is growing across the financial services industry for greater transparency, better information and analytics and improvements to risk management. There is also increased expectation for financial institutions to tap on the new targeted segments of the unbanked. This is where the force of technology can come into play. Technological advancement such as business analytics and mobility solutions can be tailored to markets across Asia to access a wealth of data that can be used beyond strategic risk management to open up the previously inaccessible and unprofitable customer segments – in reaching new customers without the cost of establishing extensive branch networks, and in improving relationships and cross-selling prospects with existing customers. These forces of change present immense opportunities for Asia’s banking industry.
In view of the enormous human and economic cost of the Asian crisis, no wonder we hear many radical suggestions as to how to avoid such losses in the future. There are calls for us to do a better job of predicting and preventing crises, addressing their social impact more effectively, stopping speculators and properly regulating this “casino economy”, seeing to it that investors bear the full costs of their mistakes, stabilizing the international monetary system, providing for more political accountability of our institution, etc., etc. We cannot deny the basic justification of these - at times vociferous - calls for change. No doubt there are at least some elements of validity in each of them. Taken together they tell us that, at this stage, world public opinion expects its leaders to design and build a new, common house with an audaciously modern architecture, and not limit themselves to some plumbing and interior decorating of the old mansion. But, as responsible architects, let us start by recognizing the building blocks at hand. Indeed, they are substantial. Seven building blocks The first of these building blocks is the tremendous potential for growth and prosperity globalization provides countries fully integrating into the global economy. Formidable sources of dynamism are there, engendered by new information technologies and unifying financial markets. The question, then, is how to discipline and channel these forces so that growth will be sustainable and more broadly shared and the fundamental desire for greater equity will be more fully satisfied. The second building block is integration.

By integrating themselves into the mainstream of the globalizing world economy, the poorest countries will avail themselves of a most powerful instrument of acceleration of development, while, if they preferred to do it alone, they would expose themselves to the risks of marginalization, abandoning several generations to economic stagnation and poverty. The third building block is the universal consensus on the importance of an increasingly open and liberal system of capital flows in order for globalization to deliver on its promises. The fourth building block is what we could call the “golden rule” of transparency, now truly seen as the key for modern management, economic success, and rational behavior of global markets. BIS Review 43/1998  -3-  The fifth is good governance, which is equally essential for strong economies and properly functioning democracies. No doubt, competing for excellence in governance is the modern face of statesmanlike responsibility. The sixth building block could be a set of standards and codes of best practices; this could require a few words of elaboration. More and more we observe an emerging recognition that the global markets still suffer from the kind of anarchy that afflicted our domestic financial markets here in Europe during the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries - that is, until various scandals and crises led to the creation of such institutions and rules as securities and exchange commissions, banking supervision, accounting standards, disclosure and prudential rules, and so forth.
Benoît Cœuré: Rebalancing in the euro area – are we nearly there yet? Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, to the Danish Economic Society, Kolding, 15 January 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Mr President, dear Per, The euro area crisis was a crisis fuelled by imbalances. Imbalances laid the ground for economic and financial turmoil, in part due to the euro area’s design flaws. And the difficult process of repairing imbalances within that design sustained the turmoil further and let its consequences become entrenched, tearing our social fabric. If we want lasting stability and growth in the euro area, we cannot let the same things happen again. The long-term solution is to complete our monetary union and make it less vulnerable to shocks. The foundations of this road have been laid by the Five Presidents’ Report, and it implies setting up new risk-sharing mechanisms among the participating economies. But that will not happen in a situation where large imbalances between member countries already exist and are considered as a state of nature. Just like John Rawls pointed out with his concept of the “veil of ignorance”, it is impossible to achieve an optimal solution for a group if the winners and losers are clear a priori. Citizens are rightly suspicious that risk sharing may turn into risk shedding.

The general trend in the market has been to charge SMEs with high interest rates relative to the large scale corporate sector because of the perceived high risk they are supposed to present. Distinguished Invited Guests, my view is that this presumed high risk profile associated with SMEs can be effectively managed by banks if they make the necessary effort to understand the sector and build expertise in dealing with its unique characteristics. I trust that you will double up your effort in building the expertise necessary for your bank to be a major lender to the SME sector. The issue of interest rates is of particular concern to us at the central bank. In response to the current situation, the Bank of Zambia recently took measures aimed at facilitating the reduction in commercial banks’ lending rates with the view to increasing access to credit by private individuals and business entities. Some progress has been made in this area and we are monitoring the situation in the market to ensure that borrowers are enjoying a reduction in their effective lending rates. We do not want the reduction in the base lending rates to be cosmetic, but should be reflected in lower effective lending rates for measures taken so far to be meaningful. Furthermore, with the reduction in the corporate tax rate for banks recently announced by the Minister of Finance in his 2012 Budget, the expectation is for a further reduction in lending rates by commercial banks going forward.
Domestically, financial conditions showed early signs of normalizations, with lending increasing from month to month, low interest rates and credit standards that were more expansionary during the fourth quarter of 2009 than during the preceding quarter (figure 3). The value of the peso has fluctuated significantly since December, partly owing to global phenomena, but largely due to domestic factors. After continuing with the process of  2  BIS Review 61/2010  appreciation that began in early October, the peso peaked at the beginning of January. It then depreciated sharply, driven by increased tensions in world financial markets and by changes in the hedging strategies used by pension funds. The depreciation trend reversed during the course of February due to a decline in external tensions and a change in pension funds’ purchase flows. After the earthquake and tsunami, the peso experienced further fluctuations due to changes in private expectations about how the reconstruction would be financed and how insurance claims would be paid. The importance of idiosyncratic factors is apparent in multilateral indicators that measure the peso’s movements with respect to the dollar and other currencies, which are showing smaller variations than those of the peso/dollar exchange rate (figure 1). Annual CPI inflation returned to positive territory earlier than what had been foreseen in December (figure 2). Core measures, in particular the CPIX1, continued to display low month-on-month variations.

Outlays on welfare benefits will absorb a further 43%, more than the combined amount dedicated to the three crucial areas just mentioned. The remaining 18% represents the cost of general administration. The imbalance evidenced by these shares raises serious questions about the rationale governing the use of public funds, a fair proportion of which are borrowed not earned. We need to ask, for example, whether the allocation of such a substantial budget to social security is promoting a culture of dependence rather than self-help, and of reliance on the State rather than the kindling of economic initiative. And this within the context of an educational system which, despite its merits, continues to produce one of the highest early school leaving rates in the EU and one of the lowest rates of science and technology graduates, and which dedicates a substantial portion of its budget to a subsidy system with questionable educational value. One could also ask whether enough resources are being allocated to priority areas such as tourism, IT and the development of industrial areas, which are vital for the creation of jobs and wealth that would in turn lessen the dependence on welfare payments and subsidies. Returning Malta’s public finances to a sustainable basis also requires careful consideration of the revenue generation mechanisms. The ratio of taxation to GDP stands at around 32%, which is one of the lowest in the EU. This can of course be viewed as one reason for the relatively high fiscal deficit.
As wholesale investors started to exit, this set in motion a bad dynamic – a fire sale of assets that cut into earnings and capital. This increased the incentives of investors to run and for banks to hoard liquidity against the risk that they could themselves face a run. This downward spiral of fire sales and funding runs was a key feature of the financial crisis. The inherent fragility of short-term wholesale funding was greatly aggravated by certain institutional shortcomings in these markets, particularly in the structure of the tri-party repo system and the U.S. money market mutual fund business. Through the tri-party repo market, each day the two large clearing banks were providing a large amount of intraday credit to securities firms to facilitate the daily “unwind” of the prior day’s transactions. In the run-up to the crisis, the daily “unwind” helped make tri-party repo  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  look like a very liquid investment while still being an apparently highly durable source of funding. This masked the underlying risks and contributed to weak risk management practices. As the concerns about the U.S. housing market escalated in 2007, participants in the tri-party repo market became increasingly concerned about the liquidity and credit risks that they faced. The clearing banks became uncomfortable with their large intraday exposures to their clients – broker-dealers, thrifts and others.

William C Dudley: Risks of wholesale funding Welcoming remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the workshop on the “Risks of Wholesale Funding”, New York City, 13 August 2014. *  *  *  Michael Fleming, Jamie McAndrews, Susan McLaughlin and Joseph Tracy contributed to preparing these remarks. It is a pleasure to welcome you to the New York Fed today to discuss the important issue of wholesale funding. As you all know, the financial system plays an essential role in modern economies, and liquidity is in turn critical to the functioning of the financial system. Because financial intermediation is critical to economic activity and intermediation is dependent on funding and liquidity, disruption to funding and liquidity can cause severe damage to the economy. The experience of recent years revealed serious flaws in the system. Risk was mispriced and there was a build-up of excesses before the crisis. Structural weaknesses in the financial system then amplified the effect of the sharp decline in U.S. house prices, and the result was a widespread financial crisis and a deep recession both here and abroad. The extensive use by financial firms of short-term wholesale funding was one critical factor in the crisis.
Need for “a rethink” – a reanalysis It is clear therefore that our Swedish framework for macroprudential policy has major flaws in the way its objective has been formulated, the processes for allocating tools, clarity in the division of responsibility and in legal status. This is problematic as it has contributed to delaying measures that can counteract the high and growing household indebtedness. In their evaluation, Goodfriend and King point out that both the mandate and division of responsibility for macroprudential policy are in need of review. I agree. Without going into more detail about their concrete recommendations, I can see that, based on a socioeconomic efficiency perspective, it would be appropriate to utilise the expertise, experience and resources in the macroprudential policy area, possessed by the Riksbank in its capacity as the central bank, in a better way than is currently the case. There are many different ways of doing this, of which, from both an international and national perspective, the most efficient in the long run would probably be to merge the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen. This would gather our skills and expertise together and strengthen Sweden’s voice internationally. This is certainly a far-reaching change, the collective effects of which would most definitely need to be analysed very thoroughly. It is not in line with the current structure, but when the world around us is changing, our central agency structure sometimes also needs to do the same.

But if they are not adequately addressed - whether within the system as a whole or at the level of the individual market or individual firm - they could - like purely financial failures - weaken public confidence or attract public responses, which would have a damaging effect on overall activity. Mr Chairman, I can’t imagine that anyone working in the City will become bored as we move into the new millennium in the face of these challenges. How successful we are in confronting them will depend, as in the past, upon the interaction of the technical and professional skills and self-discipline of the market and the structure, substance and application of the rules of the game as they are reflected in public policy. We have unique experience within the City on which to build. The market has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to respond successfully to new challenges and currently attracts representatives of the strongest participants from all parts of the world. It is supported by very highly qualified professionals and professional bodies which play an important role in setting and maintaining standards. It is supported, too, by an extraordinary range of specialist professional and technical organisations, which help to ensure that the rules of the game are sensibly formulated and clearly understood.