samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, if national central counterparty is not a viable and efficient model for a small economy, then the cost of hedging would increase with higher risk weight under Basel III. Meanwhile, if derivatives are cleared overseas, through regional or global central counterparties, we need to consider implication for cross-border supervisory coordination, financial stability, and development of local financial market and competition. On a related issue of Dodd-Frank Act, restriction on proprietary trading of US bank could impact the liquidity of US dollar markets abroad, as well as liquidity of foreign government bond markets which are the back-bone of their monetary policy operation. Another key issue going forward is the balance of authority between Home and Host regulators. There are concerns about the proposal of Financial Stability Board on cross-border resolution of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions, or G-SIFIs. The concern is that some Host regulators may not be included by the Home regulator in the Crisis Management Group or resolution planning, even if the institution is systemically important in their jurisdictions. We are glad to see the FSB taking initiatives to identify potential problems. Now it is the time to work together on solutions in an inclusive manner. This is because the inclusiveness of the process assures acceptability and commitment, and reduces the uncertainty from unilateral action of individual countries. These international regulatory  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  standards have no direct international enforcement power.

The dynamics of the political cycle in 2021 led to a pause in the institutions’ work in the process in the country. All the factors are now in place for its resumption through the continuation of the Coordination Council for Bulgaria’s preparations for euro area membership; and the institutionalisation of the Euro Adoption Plan. The draft of this plan, adopted by the Coordination Council on 30.06.2021, has already gone through the formal procedure of public consultation and inter-agency coordination, and has the support of our external partners. In spite of the delay in the formal process, the BNB remained the institution that continued to work actively in all areas related to the euro area accession, falling within the scope of our responsibilities. To this end, we established the necessary internal organisation of work and good operational communication with the European Central Bank. Specific individuals and channels for partnership were identified on both sides. In this sense, the central bank is ready to carry out the huge amount of technical work related to the adoption of the euro in a timely manner, notwithstanding the emerging tighter work schedule. In conclusion, 2022 is promising to be a year of challenges but also opportunities for the banking sector. The achievements of 2021 show that the sector is in a strong starting position to meet the challenges and make good use of the opportunities. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Global imbalances and financial stability There is broad agreement on the need to rebalance aggregate demand across the world. That shared objective has underpinned the cohesion exhibited by G20 countries during the acute phase of the crisis. It has played an essential role in 2008 and 2009 in restoring confidence and setting the path for the recovery. However, this concerted approach to global  BIS Review 160/2010  1  imbalances may have weakened recently. There is clearly a debate going on about two major and interrelated issues: first, the appropriate pace of the rebalancing, with advanced countries feeling a greater sense of urgency; and second, on the most efficient strategies, in particular regarding exchange rates. It would a mistake to ascribe responsibility for imbalances to one specific cause. All countries have legitimate concerns. We have seen in recent weeks a tendency by countries to challenge each other monetary policy. This cannot produce a good outcome. We have to start from three basic realities. First, countries are free to conduct monetary policies they deemed appropriate. Indeed, when Central Banks are independent, they are legally obliged to do so. Monetary policies are conducted with domestic objectives in mind but, as you have noticed, all central banks have the same mandate: to maintain price stability. This is true for all countries, whether small or large. The world has enormously benefited from two decades of price stability resulting from monetary regimes based on Central bank independence and a focus on internal price stability.

Christian Noyer: International financial stability Keynote address by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the International ParisEuroplace Financial Forum, Tokyo, 29 November 2010. *  *  *  Although the financial crisis originated in one country, it quickly became apparent that it was truly global in nature. It brought home a simple message: capital markets are closely interlinked around the world and, thus, domestic and international financial stability cannot be dissociated. They really are two sides of the same coin. Today, I would like to reflect upon international financial stability. The views expressed are my own but, as you know, France now holds the Presidency of the G20 and I will try to put my own thoughts in that perspective. International financial instability has increased over the last period. Whether we look at exchange rates, international capital flows or commodity prices, signs abound of more intense volatility. Volatility may not necessarily be a bad thing. To some extent, it is a sign of well functioning financial markets. Movements in asset prices help the financial system to serve as a cushion, an “absorber” for exogenous economic shocks. This is welfare improving since it avoids, or mitigates, adjustment in more rigid goods or labor markets. Volatility may also be driven by fundamentals. For instance, capital inflows to emerging economies partly reflect very favorable long term growth prospects and high potential returns on capital.
But also the failure of a small bank will have wider effects, and even quite severe ones if it happens at a bad time. Given these wider effects of any bank failure, a number of special regulations to deal with the banks have been introduced over the years. As a result, the banking sector is now among the most regulated industries in our economies. The safety net includes financial supervision to monitor the risk taking of banks, with regulations on how much capital a bank needs to hold and how it should manage its risks. The banks’ owners enter into the business knowing that a serious breach of these regulations should lead to a revocation of the licence and the bank being closed. The safety net also includes the ability of the central bank to lend on special conditions to an illiquid but solvent bank when financial stability is at risk. In many countries, there is also an explicit guarantee to the small depositors, for which the banking sector itself is to take the responsibility. 2  BIS Review 62/2008  But this safety net, while reducing the risks involved, provides no full protection against failures. In particular, it does not extend to the case when the financial system is threatened in its entirety. And while the formal depositor protection should reduce the pressure from the public on the government to intervene in a bank failure, if the scheme is not properly set up, this expectation may prove unfounded.

The way to do it is to set up a state-administered system to which all the banks pay a fee in relation to their risks, much like an ordinary insurance policy. Sure, the state still stands the risk in the event of a large failure. But in this system, it is duly compensated for the risk. And the financing is robust. If implemented widely, this solution will also make for a more level playing field between banks from different countries competing partly on the same markets. I therefore hope that the proposal will get more international attention than it has so far. There must be a strong negotiating position for the government even when financial stability is threatened The above set up is a good set up to be able to handle the average bank failure. But, again, in some situations a different regime may be needed. In particular, this may be the case when it comes to larger and more complex banks in a situation of markets turmoil, when there is a systemic threat to the financial system. In this situation, it may not be possible to immediately revoke the licence for a bank which is in serious violation of the supervisory regulations. The focus will need to be on maintaining the key operations in the financial system. To secure this, the bank may need to stay open, at least for a while.
Although the market realizes that a further rise in the asset price would virtually compress yield, the market appears to be less concern about a bubble in asset prices. Therefore, there is a risk of a sharp correction which we all witnessed in the recent episode in the Thai stock market last week. 6. The second dimension of the great rotation is the global fund flow, which is one of the greatest challenges emerging markets are experiencing. The continued monetary easing in advanced economies, economic growth differential and protracted low interest rate environment are key factors pushing investors to search for yield; fund flows have therefore switched from advanced to emerging economies. 7. This second dimension of the great rotation is a concern to policymakers in the region and has called for wider public discussions among academics, businesses and policymakers. Discussion typically centred on the potential recourse to macroprudential or  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  unconventional measures on the part of recipient countries, given that such practice has been adopted by the source countries of the fund flows. As market participants, we all recognize the benefits of capital inflows that provide a two way view for the market, thus adding depth and breadth to emerging financial markets. Therefore any considerations on the use of capital flows policies need to be carefully thought out with consideration of potential unintended consequences and impacts.

But by now most have realised how unlikely these problems are to disappear so quickly. There is every reason to believe that the coming months could prove difficult as a result, and there is correspondingly little reason to believe that the crisis is past. Uncertainty abounds. A huge investment bank like Merrill Lynch could not foresee that, in only two weeks’ time, it would have to write down billions of dollars’ worth of outstanding debt. The CEO of the company has had to pack his bags and leave, albeit with a generous going-away present. The largest bank in the world is also beset by the restlessness, and it isn’t yet fully clear what the effects will be, but that CEO has received his marching orders as well. And according to the latest reports, while there are reported write-downs of a mere 20 billion dollars on subprime mortgages, the actual amount could in the end be between 250 and 300 billion. BIS Review 131/2007  3  One cannot help but wonder whether market participants in Iceland and elsewhere preferred to suffer through a shaky third quarter in the hope of some redemption in the fourth quarter, and in the process, avoided recording some items that should have appeared in third-quarter accounts.
Just in the last few years, global MNCs have set up more than 30 FinTech innovation labs or research centres in Singapore. The FinTech start-up space has become a lot more vibrant. More than 400 FinTech enterprises have set up base in Singapore. We have start-ups experimenting with new ways to pay, save, invest, buy insurance, and plan for retirement. No innovation ecosystem is complete without physical spaces to facilitate experimentation and collaboration. Last year, we saw the launch of LATTICE80, Singapore’s first FinTech innovation village, occupying two whole floors of 80 Robinson Road. Well, the entire building at 80 Robinson Road will now become a FinTech innovation hub. It will be named 80RR – that’s 100,000 square feet dedicated to housing FinTechs, right in the heart of the financial district! Open Architecture A Smart Nation needs an “open API economy.” APIs are the “connectors” that allow systems to talk to one another, enabling service providers to harness information from multiple sources and produce holistic solutions for customers. MAS has been encouraging financial institutions to develop and share their APIs openly, so that they can work with other service providers to give customers a richer and more seamless experience. We started the ball rolling last year. With the Finance-as-a-Service API Playbook, banks have a common guide to identify and develop APIs. And with the Financial Industry API Register, FinTech start-ups have a one-stop shop to explore the open APIs that have been made available.

How can we make regulation conducive to FinTech innovation, while still ensuring that the system remains stable, key players are sound, and consumer interests are safeguarded? This requires a keen understanding of emerging technologies and new business models, and being alert to potential risks, while taking care not to stifle innovation. Easier said than done! Let me give a few examples of how MAS has tried to strike the right balance. Take for example virtual currencies, or commonly known as crypto-currencies. MAS does not regulate virtual currencies; in fact, we welcome them as an innovation that can potentially reduce the cost of financial transactions. But we regulate the activities that surround virtual currencies if these activities pose specific risks. First, virtual currency transactions could potentially be exploited for money laundering or terrorism financing due to the anonymous nature of the transactions. And so intermediaries in virtual currency services will be subject to anti-money laundering requirements. Second, virtual currencies can go beyond being a means of payment to representing ownership of assets, as we see in many Initial Coin Offerings or ICOs. This makes them look very much like a share or bond certificate. So, if the digital token is structured like a security, then the ICO must meet the requirements of the Securities and Futures Act. This is to protect investors. FinTech developments are forcing regulators to review the way regulation is done. If FinTech is unbundling the financial services value chain, then regulators may have to “unbundle” their regulations too.
That said, an improving path could be seen throughout Q2, in tandem with the ongoing gradual reopening of the economy. At present, then, we are witnessing an incipient recovery in the economy, which, however, is still incomplete, uncertain and uneven. The correlation of this economic activity during Q2 with the intensity of the restrictions on people’s movement in force at each point in time was very high. Thus, some indicators that measure people’s movements hit record lows in the first two weeks of April, with declines of around 80% in motorway traffic and fuel consumption, and of over 90% in the case of airport traffic. This was reflected in the high-frequency indicators of economic activity in the weeks in which the lockdown was stricter; then, for example, we saw reductions in electricity 1  consumption by firms and in consumer spending paid using cards of approximately 30% and 60%, respectively. For April as a whole, there was an unprecedented event in the time series when some variables fell practically to zero. This was the case of new car registrations and international tourist inflows, the latter variable obviously being closely related to the restrictions on personal movement. Since early May, and to a greater extent in June, the progressively staggered and regionbased easing of the lockdown measures prompted a gradual recovery in the mobility indicators and, in tandem, in economic activity indicators.

Before the pandemic broke, Banco de España estimates had placed the Spanish economy’s growth potential slightly above 1% per annum. It is too soon to accurately assess the scale of the damage the current crisis will cause to this potential growth. But, unquestionably, the impact will be negative and, therefore, our growth capacity looking ahead might be lower than that estimated before the crisis. The main factor behind the Spanish economy’s modest potential growth is, undoubtedly, the low structural growth of total factor productivity. These differences should not be underestimated, since productivity gains are a fundamental ingredient for achieving a 9  sustainable increase in a country’s economic well-being. Indeed, the greater these gains are, the greater the possibilities of raising wage levels and the quality of the jobs created, along with increasing the resources for funding public policies. It is thus necessary to address the various structural aspects which, across the board, restrict productivity gains. In this connection, we must improve the quantity and quality of public and private investment in human and technological capital, revise our educational model and promote business growth and dynamism. Elsewhere, labour market duality, a very high structural unemployment rate and high longterm unemployment not only restrict our growth capacity but also contribute to increasing inequality. In fact, since 1980 the unemployment rate in Spain has averaged almost 17%, a figure far higher than that observed in other European countries.
The Government and the Bank of Russia are unanimous that funds allocated for additional capitalisation of banks should be spent on expanding lending to real sectors of the economy rather than patching up the loopholes in banks’ capital (they are not aimed at supporting owners). To our regret, interest rates on bank loans have grown and accessibility of loans for the economy slumped. However, we can see that in recent months banks have followed the reduction of the key rate and above all the mitigation of inflation risks and gradually cut their loan rates. Furthermore, difficulties in the economy and finance are not a reason for curtailing the policy of banking sector resolution. Besides, we consider it necessary to enhance banking supervision. In 2014, banking licences were revoked from 86 credit institutions and earlier in 2015 from another 30, mostly due to the violation of banking laws, suspicious transactions, accumulated financial problems, and non-disclosure of real financial standing through misreporting. The supervisory objective for the near future is to identify banks’ problems as soon as possible. This will allow us to protect the stability of both the financial system and banks’ creditors. As for suspicious transactions, the number of banks servicing the shadow economy is constantly declining: according to our estimates, currently there are about 20 of them, and when we started their number approximated 150. The volume of overseas money diversion and cash withdrawal through the banking system has declined.

Such discipline is not possible without meaningful public disclosure of a bank’s financial condition. I think we would all agree that there is no greater enemy to a stable financial marketplace than a lack of confidence, and surely nothing undermines confidence more than a lack of reliable information. Discipline by the market is not always pleasant – a lesson many companies have re-learned recently. Yet better quality information, or what we often call transparency, can boost the confidence of depositors, investors, and creditors, and it can contribute to stability by encouraging banks to adopt a more proactive approach to managing their risks. In this regard, just last month the Basel Committee published the results of a two-year study on public disclosure practices of internationally active banks as a guide to the industry and accounting standards setters on areas where disclosure can be improved. BIS Review 35/2001  3  While many countries have made great progress over recent years to improve the quality and level of disclosure, disclosure practices have not kept up with the changes in how banks manage their businesses and in how they measure and mitigate their risks. To improve this situation, I believe that the notions of what is public versus proprietary information must change. It is critical to approach the question of disclosure as users of financial statements. Shareholders, creditors, and counterparties cannot understand the risks of their own exposures to a bank until they first understand that bank’s appetite for risk and its approach to, and methodologies for, managing risk.
The first task for the Group is to identify the most appropriate near riskfree reference rate for sterling markets. Alongside that you will consider how contracts referencing the rate can be made robust to changes in market structure. We expect these discussions to reach a conclusion during the third quarter of this year. The Group will then develop an adoption and transition plan over the remainder of 2015, considering the factors that could facilitate adoption of the chosen RFR, as well as metrics of success and a timeline for the transition process. It is anticipated that firms participating in the Working Group will sign letters of agreement to support adoption of the chosen RFR, referencing these metrics. Implementation is expected to begin in 2016. We believe that this needs to be a market-driven process and that the choice of RFR is yours to make. However, this is not an academic exercise. A “choice” means that you will be prepared to make meaningful transition commitments over a 12 to 24 month horizon. Bank of England data collection initiative Before I hand over to you all to begin the important work of this Group, I want to make you aware of a new initiative the Bank is embarking on, aimed at enhancing our measures of overnight interest rates in sterling markets. The Bank has a special interest in monitoring the overnight money market because it is a key aim of monetary policy to influence conditions in that market.

I look forward to the development of a professional qualification regime for treasury market practitioners and to a time when membership of the TMA is seen as confirmation of professional expertise in the field. Credible training and continuous professional development programmes, comparable to those of other professional bodies, will bring the recognition that the treasury market business deserves as a distinct branch of the financial industry. 5. The second area where the TMA will be active is market development. Treasury markets, like all financial markets, are never static: they are vibrant and dynamic. To maintain our competitiveness, we should proactively identify and respond to opportunities arising from this dynamism. And, looking around us, it is not difficult to see that the Mainland is an important source of dynamism and opportunities in the years to come. Hong Kong, with its location, mature and efficient markets, pool of professional talent, as well as its many links to the Mainland, has a clear advantage in tapping this huge potential market. One of the priorities of the TMA, therefore, is to establish a close relationship with its counterparts and regulatory authorities on the Mainland, and to contribute to the development of the treasury markets in the Mainland. I believe that this will provide enormous business opportunities for market participants in Hong Kong and further strengthen our role as an international financial centre. 6.