samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is much discussion on the risks of trade protectionism as a consequence of the crisis, but the risks of financial protectionism are at least as significant and probably more evident. For instance, national rescue plans to address the financial crisis may have jeopardised the level playing field that must underpin cross-country financial flows. In a similar vein, capital controls could induce  BIS Review 172/2010  3  market segmentation and trigger a spiral which would erode some of the progress achieved in financial integration over the past decades. Let me be more specific on banking flows and the lessons from the global financial crisis. The crisis has emphasised the vulnerability of cross-country banking flows, and how quickly they may retrench in times of stress. Such retrenchment was an important transmission channel of financial strain during the global financial crisis. However, not all banks behaved equally; lending by some proved more resilient than others. Recent research 1 on the performance of cross-border lending to emerging markets during the recent crisis has yielded a number of interesting conclusions. Among them, that lending by Spanish banks to Latin America was more resilient than lending by other international banks, and that by behaving like domestic banks they did not contribute to the impact of foreign shocks on credit and interest rates. The relative stability of Spanish banking flows has to do with both the banking business model and the quality of supervision.

2  “Principles for the sound management of operational risk”, BCBS 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This systemic risk derives first from the dramatic development of interdependencies across financial intermediaries due to increased automation in financial activities, including in clearing and payment activities, which are a major vector of interconnection. The systemic risk also derives from the possible loss of confidence from the general public in electronic payments that would be triggered by a failure to protect the integrity and reliability of data processed by these payment systems. However, responses to cyber threats can conflict with other established priorities. This is particularly true for financial market infrastructures. For instance, the principle 17 of the CPSS-IOSCO on operational risk clearly states the business continuity requirements for financial market infrastructures. Business continuity plans should aim for the timely recovery of operations, resuming operations within two hours after disruption, and settlement should be ensured before the end of the day in extreme conditions. However, meeting this requirement is raising specific challenges in case of a cyber-attack or in case data is found to be corrupted, when the highest priority might no longer be a swift resumption of operations, but to first recover the quality and integrity of data in order to avoid any risk of contagion. This is also true for the access that could be granted to third parties for accessing online a payment account in order to assist in the initiation of payments.
I think that will need to include in particular: •  groups having enough loss-absorbing capacity, and at the right locations in their corporate structure;  •  resolution authorities being able to enforce a write-down or conversion of bonds issued in foreign jurisdictions;  •  as much clarity as possible about the relative treatment of different categories of creditor;  •  regulatory measures to guard against contagion in a world where bank creditors take losses;  •  legal, operational and financial structures that are aligned with the preferred resolution strategy for a group and with sustaining its most essential financial services;  •  effective co-ordination between home and host authorities;  •  fall back plans, and frameworks for escalating preparations for resolution as a group’s condition deteriorates. Enabling effective resolution: removing barriers and structuring financial groups for resolution For most if not all SIFIs, steps will need to be taken in order to ensure that the preferred resolution strategy can be implemented. Sufficient loss-absorbing capacity, and its terms Perhaps the most obvious prerequisite is that SIFIs should have sufficient bonded debt in issue for losses exceeding their equity base to be absorbed through the process of resolution. This is gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity (LAC).

Yes, my role is sometimes to remind you of your 5-a-day  Page 9  commitments, to maintain a healthy and balanced diet, even when everyone else is promising you ice-cream. So let me circle back to the core of my remarks today: the BPA market is in a period of accelerated growth and yes, while we are pleased with the opportunities this brings, insurers should approach this with moderation. Our existing principles, including senior management responsibility and the Prudent Person Principle – play into all the areas. These are importantly strengthened and supplemented by the additional supervisory measures announced in the Solvency UK package. The combination of existing and new tools will bolster the role of Boards and firms’ senior managers owning their decisions. And, through improved disclosure, we will support market discipline to empower broader stakeholders. Should those prove insufficient, we will not shy away from highlighting areas of market-wide concern or taking the necessary supervisory actions. My resolve is strong: A healthy and sustainable life insurance market is a long-term value creator for the whole economy. It is in everybody’s interests to work together to ensure a dynamic vibrant industry for years to come. One that serves the needs of, and provides protection for, customers, and makes the strongest contribution it possibly can to investment in the wider UK economy. I would like to thank Alwin Luchmaya, Sejal Haria, Alan Sheppard, Stephen Walton, Igor Brkic, Jemima Ayton and Tapasya Bhandari, for their assistance in preparing these remarks. Thank you. 1.
Over the years, the Bank established specialised institutions to enrich the talent ecosystem. These institutions, namely INCEIF, ISRA, IBFIM, the Chartered Institute of Islamic Finance Professionals (CIIF) and the Association of Shariah Advisors in Islamic Finance Malaysia (ASAS) have collectively contributed towards sustainable development of professionals and expertise in the industry. I am pleased to note that the industry has significantly benefitted from the contribution of these institutions. INCEIF is now widely recognised as a global university in Islamic finance and has enrolled more than 2,000 students from 80 countries and produced over 1,000 graduates to date. ISRA plays an instrumental role as a dedicated Shariah research arm as well as a knowledge repository for Islamic finance. It is known as one of the key players in Islamic finance research globally and has emerged as the top contributor in Islamic finance research between 2011–2013. IBFIM, which is the industry training arm, has also made significant achievements with over 6,400 participants attending its training programmes in 2015. In raising the bar of professionalism, the Chartered Institute of Islamic Finance Professionals as the first professional body in Islamic finance seeks to promote the highest standards of professional practice amongst Islamic finance practitioners. Two standards on the admission of members and accreditation of institutions have been issued in November last year and two more are anticipated in 2016. ASAS, with prominent scholars as its members, has also embarked on various initiatives that have contributed towards its objective of inculcating the highest level of professionalism of Shariah advisors.

Were that in doubt, consider that, in 2002, Churchill was voted “the greatest ever Briton” in a BBC poll. Or that he continues to command vast international recognition as a hero of the free world. Churchill’s contributions extended beyond his pivotal roles in the nation’s martial and political histories. He is the only British Prime Minister to have won the Nobel Prize in literature. He was a prodigious painter, and, perhaps thankfully, the only Prime Minister to enter the music charts. The wisdom of his witticisms is legion, extending as far as the dismal science. Central bank forecasters can identify closely with his advice that, “it is a much better policy to prophesy after the event has already taken place.” Polymer But in some prophesies we can be confident: for example that our new polymer banknotes, of which The New Fiver is the first, will stand the test of time. Polymer marks a major innovation. It is cleaner, safer, and stronger. It is resistant to dirt and moisture, so the note won’t wear out as quickly as the current fivers but will stay in good condition for longer. It is stronger than paper and can better withstand being repeatedly folded into wallets or scrunched up inside pockets. Polymer notes can survive a splash of Claret, a flick of cigar ash, the nip of a bulldog, and even a spin in the washing machine afterwards to boot.
These gilt purchases - equivalent to nearly a tenth of UK GDP - increased the supply of ‘cash’, reducing market interest rates, and improving liquidity in the gilt market. In the US, the Fed initially announced it would purchase $ billion in Treasuries, then removed the cap, moving to an open-ended purchase programme.1 In the euro area, the ECB launched a € billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme in March. Over the past decade, asset purchases by central banks have become an established monetary policy tool to support demand. But in this instance, central banks were clear that their actions were aimed primarily at stabilising markets and preventing financial conditions tightening at the very time that economies needed the exact opposite. As a result of these central bank interventions, and as fiscal authorities began to provide support to economies entering lockdown, conditions stabilised. Non-financial investment-grade corporate bond spreads are now over 90 basis point lower than their peak in mid-March (but still around 40 basis points higher than their end-2019 levels).2  The COVID crisis is very far from over. The depth and length of its economic impact remain very uncertain: it is clear that there is likely to be a great deal of pain for the financial sector. Given the economic hit – a very deep synchronised hit to the global economy – we can expect very significant losses on credit to firms and households.

Moreover, this framework should be flexible enough to allow countries to give a response according to the features of the crisis specific to the respective country. Anyway, clear principles for preventing legal bottlenecks and the cross-country spillover of negative effects should be put in place, and countries should share the fiscal burden of a cross-border crisis in line with those principles. BIS Review 56/2009  3  6. The IMF strengthened its role after being criticised for not having foreseen the Asian crisis. A few years ago, many economists expected a sharp decline in the IMF's role in the current economic context. Against the background of the current crisis, the world seems to rediscover the role of the IMF. The institution's funds have recently been increased in order to meet the requests of different countries for financial and technical assistance. The statements of the G20 leaders are indicative of the fact that the IMF will assess regularly the measures taken and the global actions necessary to be initiated. Furthermore, a close cooperation between the IMF and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which will include all G20 countries, members of the Financial Stability Forum, Spain and the European Commission is envisaged. Together, the IMF and the FSB will convey early warnings on macroeconomic and financial risks and will indicate the necessary actions to address such risks. My opinion is that the current financial crisis highlights the fact that in such difficult times, an institution having an image of each economy in the global context is required.
In this period the following had to be done: •  introduce the new Macedonian national currency - Denar;  •  surmount inflation, which at the time of the monetary independence equaled around 1.200 percent on annual level;  •  overcome the accumulated problems in banking, managed primarily by debtors;  •  repay the so-called "frozen" foreign currency deposits to the depositors, as the first precondition for restoring the confidence in banking;  •  build capacity in the Central Bank itself for pursuing an independent monetary policy and efficient banking system supervision;  •  establish a modern payment system. Many of these issues were successfully solved. Manu of them are still being successfully treated. The national currency was successfully introduced, inflation was surmounted, and in the past 12 years it has been on average on the level of only 2.2 percent, annually. The function of prudential supervision has been established, which is continuously being improved and upgraded. Payment operations are conducted smoothly. So is the function of the government's fiscal agent. The capacity for conducting the monetary policy is in constant progress. From April 1992 until December 1995, the National Bank applied a monetary targeting strategy, with the money supply M1 being the intermediate target. At that time, mainly direct instruments were used: selective credits, minimum liquidity, compulsory CB bills, discount rate and reserve requirement.

3  2  3  Cf. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (now Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, CPMI) and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Principles for financial market infrastructures’, April 2012. The Federal Intermediated Securities Act (FISA) introduced in Switzerland in 2008 is a good example of a regulatory change – in this case designed to manage the transition to dematerialised securities at central depositories. Dematerialisation and the associated regulatory changes also significantly improved the efficiency and safety of repo settlement and hence of monetary policy implementation. Page 3/6  From centralisation to decentralisation – how far should it go? Until very recently, safety and efficiency were considered to be functions of centralisation. This trend is reflected in the evolution of central securities depositories 4 and in the emergence of cashless payment transactions. In Switzerland, centralised clearing houses in the 1940s and centralised data processing in the 1970s were waypoints on a journey of convergence. This development culminated in the creation of the centralised ‘Swiss Interbank Clearing’ (SIC) payment system in 1987. 5 Another – more recent – example is the settlement of OTC derivatives via central counterparties. 6 This centralisation process and related economies of scale both reduced costs and improved safety. However, with the arrival of the latest technologies, these third-party clearing and settlement services are increasingly seen as superfluous cost factors; the keywords here are ‘distributed ledger’ and ‘blockchain’. 7 The underlying technology promises first and foremost to reduce costs.
Fullwood, J (2016) “A cat, a hat and a simple measure of gobbledygook: How readable is your writing?”, blog on Bank Underground (https://bankunderground.co.uk/2016/10/04/a-cat-a-hat-and-a-simple-measure-of-gobbledygook-how-readable-is-your-writing/) 20 21  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Chart 2: Level of reading comprehension required for various publications  a  % of population proficient at each level 100 - Mark Twain  90 80  - Tabloid Newspaper - Political Speeches - This Speech  70 60 50  - Bank of England publications - Commercial bank T&Cs - Broadsheet newspapers  40 30 20 10 0 Rudimentary (1-2)  Basic (3-6)  Intermediate (7-10)  Adept (11-15)  Advanced (16+)  Literacy Grade Level of Adults Source: Fullwood, J (2016), US national adult literacy survey (1992), Flesch-Kincaid readability test a Literacy grade level and % of population proficient at each level are based on US data. Experts’ attempts to make themselves heard is also made more difficult by the changing landscape of trust. The age of deference is certainly over. The Edelman Trust Barometer for 2017 finds that in two-thirds of countries, less than 50% trust mainstream institutions of business, government, media and NGOs to do what is right. 22  It is important to note that measuring trust is perilous because reliable longitudinal data is scarce  and when available does not show a clearly declining trend in all areas.

Jacqueline Loh: Re-thinking investment strategies for growth Keynote address by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Asia Investment Management Summit, 25 November 2013. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, a very good morning to all of you. 1. The global economic recovery remains uneven and fragile, five years after Lehman’s collapse. While there have been some encouraging signs over the past year, with stronger jobs growth and the housing recovery in the US and the Euro area economies stepping out of the recession zone, there continues to be heavy reliance on extraordinarily loose monetary policy and low interest rates for life support. 2. Lean economic growth since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, beset by bouts of heightened volatility, present a challenging environment for investment managers. For the insurance industry, higher payouts following natural disasters pose additional difficulties. Five of the ten costliest natural disasters, in terms of money rather than lives, occured in the past five years.1 3. As a result of economic, financial and environmental systems coming under stress at the same time, insurance companies are now operating in extremely trying conditions. Specifically, insurers’ profitability is under pressure simultaneously from all 3 sources: a.  Firstly premium income, which is correlated to weak economic growth and excess capacity;  b.  Secondly investment income, amidst a low yield environment and higher market volatility; and  c.  And thirdly, claims and expenses, given increasing claims for natural catastrophes. 4.
And it applies to small and large banks alike, though for large banks there is not only the question of ensuring access in domestic systems but also ensuring that payment services that are provided on a cross-border basis or require access to financial market infrastructure in other jurisdictions can be maintained. The Bank is considering how best to address these issues both domestically and, alongside Canada and other countries, at an international level. Looking forward, there are three issues around the core payments systems that the Bank is beginning to look at. One relating to risk, specifically cyber risk; one about infrastructure provision, in terms of reviewing the operating hours of the UK’s RTGS system; and one in the field of regulation, which is focused on the changing regulatory landscape for payments in the United Kingdom. Although cyber risks have long existed, over the past year or so in UK circles they have rapidly become a central issue, so much so that, in June the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee made a formal recommendation to put in place a new program of work on cyber security for key UK financial infrastructure1. The Bank of England has set each scheme a specific priority regarding cyber risk and we and the payment schemes need to deepen our resilience to cyber risks. The prompt for this change is probably obvious: the evidence shows that cyber attacks on the financial sector have increased markedly in frequency and sophistication over the past two years or so.

In a cash pre-funding world, settlement banks will only be able to accept further payment instructions if they have sufficient funds in their account with us. Given the changes coming to our retail systems, and recognising that a number of other central banks have moved away from a traditional daylight business day, we have recently decided to review the pros and cons of extending the operating hours for the RTGS infrastructure in the UK. This is not a review with a preferred end in sight: it is entirely plausible we will conclude that no changes are warranted, but we do want to understand if a longer RTGS hours would permit beneficial change in the various wholesale and retail payments systems which connect into it, and so to the wider financial system operating in the UK. The review is a form of sensible housekeeping, being an issue that the core infrastructure provider should periodically address. My presumption is that we will draw our initial conclusions within a year, with a further implementation lag following that, were we to conclude that significant change were appropriate. The final area of focus is country specific: last month, the UK government introduced draft legislation to create a new regulator for UK payments focused on competition, innovation, and the interests of end-users. This will replace the previous regime which had relied on a self-regulatory body, the Payments Council, to achieve these public policy goals.