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The Riksdag was being asked to authorise the Government in principle unconditional drawing rights from the state budget to consolidate the banking sector. If this measure did not succeed in calming interest rates, we would ultimately need to make use of a loan programme from the IMF. Finally, the situation in Sweden became untenable, and the fixed exchange rate had to be abandoned on 19 November 1992. The nominal anchor had completely collapsed. However, inspired by New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, the Riksbank considered adopting an inflation target as a new anchor. 3 No sooner said than done: As of 1993, we have a floating exchange rate and an inflation target of 2 per cent, which still applies today. 4 The results of academic research indicated that the conditions for attaining low inflation increased if one delegated monetary policy to an independent central bank. This reduced the so-called time inconsistency problem in monetary policy, where the long-term objective of low inflation is not compatible with the shortterm motives for high inflation. 5 Empirical studies showed that countries with more independent central banks had lower inflation, without a deterioration in the real economy. 6 I think that an independent central bank is not merely useful in addressing overly high inflation. Independence is also important to avoid inflation being too low, as it facilitates a more long-term focus in decision-making. 7But I will return to this shortly. In the new act of 1999, the Riksbank was given greater independence from the political system.