These forecasts are made more difficult by the continual revision of economic statistics. To reduce the risk of major errors in monetary policy, it is important to bear this in mind when making decisions, and not to have blind faith in the exactness of the measures we use. References Labour Force Survey, March 2010, Statistics Sweden. Bergström, V. and Boije, R. 2005. “Monetary policy and unemployment”, Economic Review, 2005:4: 15–49. Flodén, M., Larsson, A., Ravn, M. and Vredin, A. 2012. “Enkla regler, svåra tider – behöver stabiliseringspolitiken förändras?” (“Simple rules, hard times – does the stabilisation policy  12  The concept of persistency means that unemployment tends to remain at a higher level after recessions or rapid structural transformations and then slowly adjust towards lower, more normal levels. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  need to be changed?”), SNS (Centre for Business and Policy Studies) Economic Policy Group Report 2012, SNS. Forslund, A. “Den svenska jämviktsarbetslösheten – en översikt” (“Swedish equilibrium employment – a review”). Report 2008: 17, Swedish Fiscal Policy Council. Sveriges Riksbank “The relationship between the business cycle and the labour market in Sweden”, Economic Commentaries no. 2, 2010. Sveriges Riksbank, “The effects of the financial crisis on the labour market – a comparison of Sweden, the euro area and the United States”, Monetary Policy Report, February 2011. Rogerson, R. 1997. “Theory Ahead of Language in the Economics of Unemployment”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(1): 73–92. Statistics Sweden, 2010. “Integration – a regional perspective”, Integration: Report 3. Svensson, L.E.O. 1999.

First, in the area of monitoring and assessing risks to financial stability, central banks can benefit from extended access to supervisory information and intelligence to better understand risks and vulnerabilities for the financial system as a whole. At the same, there is clearly the issue, of how to translate the outcome of the financial stability assessment into supervisory action. In principle one cannot but agree that there should be a way through which, if the central bank identifies serious risks to financial stability, the competent supervisor should be able to act. Therefore, communication needs to go both ways: from the central bank to supervisors and vice versa within the respective legal framework. Second, in the area of liquidity, there is clearly room for a closer interplay between the two authorities. Central banks would benefit from enhanced access to supervisory information and intelligence for its role of maintaining stable money markets. To that end for instance access to information on banks’ liquidity contingency planning funds would be useful. At the same time, supervisors would benefit from information available at central banks stemming from their role in the money markets. Third, in the area of crisis management and resolution, depending on the nature and feature of the crisis, there is a need for close interaction between the two authorities. Provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance is a clear point in case where central banks need supervisory information for decision-making.