samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It seems to me that we are all – industrial countries as well as emerging economies – very much united in purpose: correct distorted incentives, improve very significantly the resilience of the financial system, and counteract pro-cyclical mechanisms and behaviours. We are also convinced on both sides of the Atlantic – and here in Stanford, I would say also on both sides of the Pacific Ocean – that the success of the enlarged governance of global finance and the global economy through the G20, the Financial Stability Board and the cooperative activities of the Central Banks, is key for the stability and the prosperity of the present unified global economy. Concluding remarks At the height of the crisis – when irrational exuberance had turned into excessive pessimism – I repeatedly stated that regaining confidence was of the essence. Since then, confidence in the short term has been restored, not least because of bold and courageous policy actions around the globe. Going forward, we need to strengthen longer-term confidence, and this requires policy frameworks that will help to prevent a future crisis. I started with Tacitus’ example of bold policy action. I would like to end with Cicero’s fides. There was a famous controversy between Julius Caesar and Cicero 80 years before the crisis described by Tacitus. Rome, at that time, was struggling with a debt overhang. Caesar proposed partly to remit the debt. Cicero strongly opposed such action.

Overall conditions in the markets for capital have improved greatly from the autumn 2008 paralysis. The functioning of money markets is now comparable with the conditions that prevailed in the third quarter of 2007. Money market spreads are close to levels that are reasonable to view as normal after the equilibrium re-pricing of risk that was needed and is likely to have taken place since then. Term lending has resumed on a satisfactory scale. The funding ability of banks is not a restraining factor for lending, as it was the case for some time after October 2008. Since the second half of last year, it appears to support bank profitability. Corporate and bond spreads have also declined steadily across the quality spectrum. Currently, these considerations are what motivate and guide a gradual phasing-out process. We started to phase out our enhanced credit-support measures in December 2009, in an environment of improving financial market conditions and emerging signs of recovery. On 4 March we came to the conclusion that the current pace of phasing-out is appropriate. With the resumption of longer-term loans in the private market, we have started to adapt the conditions of our longer-term credit to banks. The first step was to announce a discontinuation of one-year and six-month longer-term refinancing operations. One-year refinancing now pays an interest rate indexed to the average rate that will be applied in our weekly main refinancing operations over its 12-month life. The pricing will be the same in our upcoming and last 6-month refinancing operation.
Issuance of Euro denominated non-government 4 bonds has more than tripled between 1998 and 2002. It is quite difficult to isolate the specific impact of European Monetary Union, due to the fact that large issuances during the 1999-2001 period were also linked to the refinancing needs arising from intense merger and acquisition activity. Looking ahead over the medium-term, growth in the bond market is likely to be driven by such elements as the development of pension fund assets, while retail savers may move away from bank deposits to invest in other savings products. In turn, the design of savings products will benefit from the standardisation and diversification of fixed income 5 issuance. The integration of interest rate markets in the euro area has been accompanied by a new phase in the development of derivative markets. The proportion of worldwide open interest contracts traded on 6 European derivative exchanges went from less than 1% to more than 15% in 15 years. As derivative  2  BIS and IMF statistics - quoted in RAJAN and ZINGALES - 2002. 3  OECD - Debt management and Government securities in the 21st century - 2002. 4  From about EUR 100 bios in 1998 to about 300 bios in 2000, 2001 and 2002 - source Bondware. 5  RAJAN and ZINGALES - 2002 - Second ECB international banking conference. 6  RAJAN and ZINGALES - 2002 - Second ECB international banking conference .

Given the information at the Bank’s disposal and the assessments made by the Bank at the time the projections are made, the interest rate forecast in the Inflation Report will reflect a monetary policy that provides a reasonable balance between the objectives of stabilising inflation at target and stabilising output and employment. This forecast might in many cases be close to market expectations, but this will not necessarily be the case. When the interest rate forecast reflects a monetary policy that provides a reasonable balance, it contributes to monetary policy predictability. With a predictable monetary policy, market participants can react to new information in a way that contributes to stabilising developments in output and inflation. This makes monetary policy more effective, especially if market participants share the central bank’s analyses and assessments. To be successful, monetary policy must be capable of influencing expectations. This is essential to effective monetary policy. The essence of this argument is that it is primarily through the expectations channel that the central bank can influence economic developments. The expectations channel is the most important channel for monetary policy transmission. 3 The central bank determines the shortest money market rates via the key rate. The shortest rates, however, are of limited importance to economic agents’ consumption and investment decisions. These decisions depend more on agents’ expectations with regard to future developments in the key rate. The key rate is primarily effective because it influences market expectations concerning future interest rates.
The Federal Reserve took a decision on a policy rate and then implemented it in the form of open market operations that increased or decreased the volume of reserves the banks held in accounts at the central bank until the market rate coincided with the decided interest rate level. 3 [16]  It is a long time, however, since the textbook model was an applicable description of monetary policy in Sweden. 3 There is little cash use and the cash reserves of commercial banks are therefore only negligible. Furthermore, there is no requirement in Sweden for commercial banks to hold liquidity at the Riksbank in proportion to their deposits. 4 Put simply, one can say that there is no monetary base in Sweden. 5 In other words, the Riksbank does not conduct monetary policy by changing “the amount of money” in the economy. Instead, the Riksbank determines “the price of money” by directly setting the interest rate on certain financial assets. 6 These assets are either deposits or lending from the Riksbank to commercial banks depending on how much liquidity there is in the system. If there is a surplus of liquidity in the economy, banks will have credit balances on the Riksbank’s balance sheet in the same way as when they are forced to hold liquidity reserves in accordance with the textbook model. The major difference from the textbook model is that the Riksbank pays the market rate on the reserves.

For banks, and direct life insurance companies above a certain size, requirements that MAS considers essential for sound corporate governance are now embedded in directives for compliance. In response to the growing interest in Islamic finance, we also amended our regulations to facilitate the growth of specific segments of the market. These changes will enable financial institutions to use Singapore as a base to reach out to clients and investors beyond the region, especially in the Middle East. Clear regulatory treatment and tax rules can help to catalyse the development of markets. The rapid development of Real Estate Investment Trust, or REITs, is a good example. Since the launch of the first REIT in July 2002, this segment has developed rapidly. Today, the total market capitalization of REITS is close to $ billion, making Singapore the second largest REIT market in Asia, after Japan. Singapore is now a preferred location for property owners to structure their REITs. To further strengthen our regulatory framework for REITs, so that this market segment can maintain its high reputation and grow in a sustained way, we have recently embarked on a consultation exercise to review the Property Fund Guidelines governing REITs. We expect to announce the results of our review soon, which will provide greater clarity on how we will be strengthening the REITs regime to promote better governance of REITS and further facilitate the growth of the industry. As market players, SIBA members understand commercial realities and market practices well.
A “ratcheting-up” of risk within the banking sector can occur over time, creating increasing vulnerability. 17 Low interest rates also encourage a higher level of leverage. Because financial intermediaries – whether banks, broker-dealers, shadow banks, or hedge funds – finance themselves with short-term liabilities, central bank decisions on the level of short-term rate affect their marginal price of leverage. As a result, the behaviour of financial intermediaries – which, by their nature, have high levels of leverage – can be strongly influenced by even small changes in short-term rates. 18 Low levels of interest rates encourage higher levels of leverage and, as a result, an accumulation of additional risk on bank balance sheets. Through all these channels, a prolonged period of low short-term interest rates can support the accumulation of risks and financial imbalances on the balance sheets of both financial intermediaries and the private sector. These imbalances render the economy vulnerable to financial crises: if confidence evaporates, lenders call in loans, balance sheets contract and a painful readjustment is required, with adverse implications for financial stability and the real economy. In particular, the build-up of leverage within the financial sector may unwind abruptly, leading to a tightening of overall financing conditions. 19 Such thinking sheds light on recent developments in the run-up to the financial crisis. Viewing the impact of globalisation on goods prices as the manifestation of a positive supply shock, we can map this abstract scenario into our experience of the past decade.

The agreement being drafted by global regulators is now under fire from banks who say it is convoluted, expensive, heavy-handed and poorly tested, and who now seek to stall or derail it. Not devoid of a dry sense of humour and with a shy smile, Caruana is known as a diligent and rigorous technocrat, a fan of teamwork who avoids showiness. “The core of the issue is whether Caruana will be able to demonstrate his leadership in the next couple of months,” said one committee member who works directly with Caruana, who spoke under the condition of anonymity. “It's not easy to guide such a group of self-confident people,” the committee member said. “He's just trying to fight his way.” Part of the problem is that Caruana's predecessor, New York Federal Reserve Chairman William McDonough, left large shoes to fill. McDonough's unexpected retirement in June left critics wondering whether his successor would be able to hold together a global project. “There were definitely advantages in having a superpower in charge of this committee,” said the Basel Committee member. Karel Lannoo, head of the Brussels-based think tank Center for European Policy Studies, said Caruana is a strong player with anti-establishment nuances who should be able to push through the  4  BIS Review 39/2003  accord and even impart some Spanish character to it. “Caruana is, in the Spanish context, very well regarded,” said Lannoo, a frequent adviser to the European Commission and a member of the academic European Shadow Regulatory Commission. “He was a broker.
The parcelling out of agricultural land impedes the effective organisation of production, decreases the profitability and raises the agricultural mechanics utilization cost. The Bank of Albania deems that energy remains our main challenge in the short-run and in the medium-run. We have been faced with underlined power supply constraints for about a decade. The current crisis coincidence in time with a global environment that is rather sensitive to this problem has relatively increased the energy import costs, which could be unsustainable in the long run. It has resulted out of Bank of Albania surveys that the negative consequences arising from this situation are numerous and directly related to the economic activity of the productive sector, in both levels, corporate and small and medium sized enterprises. The frequent recurrence of such situation poses the risk that periods of significant power constraints are no longer regarded as accidental shocks, but they are more and more classified as permanent factors that should be factorised in the production cost, and hence should be taken into account in pricing policies and their expectations. To this end, the Bank of Albania estimates that, starting from 2007, all the respective decision-making stakeholders should apply a new concrete management policy, different from the 15-year practice. An integral part of it should be not only the management of current energy resources, but also concrete steps in the distribution network, as short-term measures to pass to long-term operations, which would imply the establishment of alternative energy sources.

On August 2006 the ownership transfer of 11.25 percent of the ProCredit Bank’s stake, from EBRD to ProCredit Holding AG (existing shareholder) was approved. On October 2006, the 71.97 percent transfer of the stake of Emporiki Bank S.A. of Greece to Credit Agricol S.A., France shareholder was approved. This transfer influenced also the indirect participation of Credit Agricol S.A. to the Emporiki Bank of Albania’s equity, to the same extent. During 2006, the banks’ network was extended also by 62 new branches and agencies, in the whole territory of Albania and abroad, having the highest share in Tirana, with the establishment of 30 new branches and agencies. Also, the opening of two branches outside the territory of Albania was approved and the opening of two other new branches is under the process of approval. 10. New activities of the Bank of Albania  Payment system From the regulatory and operational point of view, the payment system in Albania has already created the physiognomy of a modern system. The number of transactions processed during 2006 has increased by 13 percent, compared to 2005. In the meantime the value of transactions has increased by 21 percent during 2006, amounting to ALL 2,664.43 billion. Compared to 2005, the daily average number of payments (in both systems) has increased from 312, to 352 or 40 more transactions per day. In 2006, a new bank was added to the payment system, leading the number of participants to 17 banks. On March 2006 the e-payment settlement by VISA cards started.
Investments into the GCC are being driven by several positive factors: infrastructure development to cater for its hydrocarbon sector, rapidly-growing populations, market liberalisation and diversification beyond oil and gas. A 2014 industry survey 1 by Mergermarkets highlighted that investments from Asia into the GCC would soon equal that traditionally sourced from Europe, as Asian companies become more active in the Middle East. The converse is also true. Attracted by Asia’s good growth prospects, GCC investors have increased their investments not just in energy markets, but also in telecommunications, finance, and other industries in Asia. For instance, GCC state-owned oil firms have been investing in ASEAN energy sectors, while GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are also showing interest in the agriculture sector across ASEAN. 5. Thirdly, continued growth of GCC and Asian economies, and an expanding network of Free Trade Agreements, will reinforce connectivity between the regions. Notwithstanding more volatile and lower oil prices, the IMF expects the GCC to expand 3.4% in 2015 2, and 3.2% in 2016. Asia will remain the world’s fastest growing region, recording 5.6% growth in 2015, before easing slightly to 5.5% in the following year. Trade and investment linkages will be strengthened with the conclusion of trade discussions between GCC and China, Korea,  1  Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Investment Outlook 2014, Mergermarkets. 2  IMF Regional Economic Outlook Update for Middle East & Central Asia, May 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  India, Pakistan, Malaysia and ASEAN.

This includes properly designed incentive structures that must reflect risk outcomes. Financial institutions are also required to regularly review their risk management methodologies and processes to account for the changing business environment. This aims to ensure that risk management does not become something one does to check off a box on a list and then forgets about. A second notable observation has been the broader focus of risk management. While financial risks remain a key focus of risk management practices, risks from reputational, human capital and environmental concerns can have equally significant repercussions for a firm’s business. Recovering from reputational damage is a hugely expensive endeavour, takes a long time, and success is often not assured. We have observed in our own work that where institutions take a broader view of risk management in these areas, conversations around the role of risk management at the senior management and board levels are more likely to shift beyond avoiding losses, to enhancing strategic opportunities for improving the institution’s competitive position. This itself can have a mutually reinforcing effect of directing more resources towards risk management and creating better synergies between business and risk functions. While more firms are acknowledging the importance of reputational, human capital and environmental risks, actions however have generally not measured up. Many companies still have weak succession plans in place and remain vulnerable to key-man risks.
Another aspect of EMU governance is strengthening the economic part of EMU. This requires structural reforms aimed at enhancing potential growth, reducing structural unemployment and increasing national economies’ resistance to shocks. While many euro area countries undertook a wave of reforms during the crisis, today, across much of the area reforms have stalled. This is not a uniform picture. Malta is enjoying robust economic growth despite regional headwinds, largely as a result of reforms implemented in recent years that stimulated the development of new areas of economic activity and increased labour participation. Malta has also taken full advantage of its membership of the EU and its adoption of the single currency. Resilience to shocks can also be built up through deeper economic integration. Indeed, as the Five Presidents’ report argues, financial integration helps to share risk across EMU member countries. The completion of a Banking Union, which will strengthen the European banking sector, is a key objective in this regard. In this area, success so far has been partial. The Single Supervisory Mechanism involving the ECB via the Supervisory Board and the national supervisory authorities is up and running, following a comprehensive health check of the euro area banks. The Single Resolution Mechanism is also operational and is being funded according to plan. As regards the third pillar of Banking Union, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), negotiations are still under way. We believe that EDIS is will increase confidence in banks across the euro area.

Jiří Rusnok: Currency, taxes and other institutes of financial law Welcome speech by Mr Jiří Rusnok, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Currency, taxes and other institutes of financial law conference, Faculty of Law, Charles University, Prague, 20 September 2018. * * * Good morning, everyone. It is an honour and a pleasure for me to welcome you to today’s conference on the currency, taxes and other institutes of financial law. The 100th anniversary of the foundation of the independent Czechoslovakia is a good opportunity to look back and identify the main features of our national economic history. As you know, we have been through four periods since 1918 – the period of political and economic emancipation from Austria-Hungary, the wartime economy, the era of central-planning-based totalitarian communism, and finally almost three decades of democracy and a market economy. So, more than enough has happened in our country over the last 100 years. Although these periods could not have been more different, two common features have appeared in various guises. I would characterise them on the one hand as economic moderation, prudence and discipline, and on the other as a struggle for economic independence and a willingness and ability to bear the consequences. Let me give some examples of both. Czechoslovakia’s founding fathers Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Karel Kramář and Alois Rašín were well aware that nurturing a sound financial environment was crucial to the prosperity of the young nation.
These overall statistics mask the severity of the health and economic hardships felt by lowerincome families and communities of color as a result of the pandemic. To cite just a few statistics, the Black unemployment rate is above 12 percent and the Hispanic unemployment rate is over 10 percent, and Black-owned businesses were shuttered at more than twice the rate of white-owned businesses during the early stages of the pandemic.7 In terms of monetary policy, the appropriate focus right now is on getting the country back to work. For that reason, policy is supporting very low interest rates to provide stimulus to the economic recovery and keeping inflation expectations anchored at 2 percent. In thinking about the future path of policy, it is important to recognize that the pandemic engenders a unique and highly uncertain economic outlook. This is not a standard recession and the economic future is inextricably tied to the spread of the virus, people’s behavior in containing that spread, and the development of vaccines and therapeutics. Given this uncertainty, transparency and flexibility in our policy approach will enable us to respond to changes in the outlook as they happen. Indeed, these are key features of the forward 8 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  guidance we issued after the FOMC meeting in September.8 September’s FOMC statement clearly linked our policy to the key elements of the new policy framework.

Before the onset of the crisis, all the banks fulfilled or surpassed the 8 per cent Basle requirement for capital. So, although nonperforming and other impaired loans amounted to 15 per cent of GDP in Sweden (a figure that is rather similar to recent estimates for Korea), the original cost to the government of rescuing the banking system amounted to only some 4 per cent of GDP; since then, moreover, most of this has in fact been recovered. •  Sweden applied restrictive rules to central bank involvement in the banks. Only liquidity support was provided, inter alia in the form of foreign currency deposits to stem the outflow from the banks and to reduce the risk of a credit crunch. This did not involve the Riksbank in any risks because the State guarantee for banks’ repayments also applied to us as a lender. 3. Triggers Now, let me turn to the actual crisis. It is well known that the event (or events) triggering a crisis is often different from the crisis’ underlying causes. In the absence of a triggering factor, countries with substantial underlying problems from time to time have also been able to avoid an acute crisis. The event triggering a crisis is sometimes rather dramatic, such as the assassination of a politician - as in the Mexican case - or a sudden loss of confidence, e.g. due to the presentation of a disappointingly weak fiscal budget.