samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Fourth, expert views are inevitably incorporated into projections and there can be good reasons at any moment of decision-making to deviate from the particular views or approaches on which they are based. The two-pillar approach chosen by the Eurosystem - including a prominent role for money as the first pillar - is, to some extent, a reflection of these general limitations of forecasts and projections. I should stress that, because of these limitations, the second pillar of the ECB’s strategy also includes other forms of analysis in addition to macroeconomic projections. First, the ECB’s projections are cross-checked and compared with forecasts produced by others, such as international organisations and private sector entities. Second, the forward-looking information and expectations embodied in financial prices and yields is thoroughly analysed and evaluated. This information can also be compared with the staff projections. Finally, any information that is not contained in the staff projections for practical or timing reasons - such as the latest available outturns of certain data series must also be incorporated into the overall assessment. Developments in individual indicators are also closely followed outside the framework of the forecasting exercise. It follows from this discussion that the Governing Council does not use its staff projections as the main tool for organising and communicating its assessment. Rather, the Governing Council evaluates them alongside - and compares them with - many other pieces of information and forms of analysis organised in the two-pillar framework.

Banks should extend all necessary assistance to help these groups to migrate to the e-payment platform. To realise the full potential of the payment network, banks that offer cheque issuing and ATM cash withdrawal facilities should provide the full suite of funds transfer and electronic payment functionalities over the ATMs. Of the 20 banking institutions that offer ATM services, 17 of them today provide the IBFT service, a real time interbank funds transfer service that enable customers to transfer funds via the ATM in a safe and secure manner. Banking institutions are strongly encouraged to also offer the Interbank GIRO (IBG) via their ATMs as a lower cost option to the IBFT. With over 1,400 new ATMs deployment by MEPS over the next 5 years, in addition to the current 12,000 installed nationwide, there is a significant potential for the ATMs to be used as convenient access points to the public to conduct electronic payment and funds transfer transactions. The widespread availability and reach of the ATMs network should serve the needs of the public not just in the urban areas but also in the rural towns. ATM cards to be used for purchases at Point-Of-Sale terminals Whilst Malaysia has a population of about 29 million, we have a high penetration of 39 million ATM cards. The ATM cards issued by banks that are used for cash withdrawals also have the domestic debit card application which can be used at merchants’ Point-Of-Sale terminals to make purchases.
If the Riksbank has not succeeded in building confidence, it would be much more difficult to conduct monetary policy today. I suspect that today's high inflation would have more easily become entrenched and been able to start a price-wage spiral. In that case, the Riksbank would have had to raise the policy rate even more this year, which would have resulted in a greater slowdown in the economy. The purchases in phase 1 may thus have reduced the risk of such a scenario. Is the Riksbank’s financial independence threatened? The valuation losses in Table 1 cannot be directly transferred to an annual result.36 However, since the value of the Riksbank's assets has fallen rapidly, the Riksbank will most likely report a major financial loss this year37 It is not unlikely that the Riksbank's reported equity in the next financial statements will be negative, at least if one disregards unrealised gains in the revaluation accounts for gold and foreign currencies (see Table 4) The fact that capital is shrinking or even becoming negative need not be a problem for a central bank. Some central banks, such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, hand out all of the surplus to their principal and therefore have no capital except a small base fund and any risk provisions. And some central  35 The calculation is based on an alternative where the policy rate is the same.

For example, providing government guarantees for all bank liabilities in one jurisdiction prompted outflows of deposits from other jurisdictions, requiring similar guarantees to be offered elsewhere. This may have resulted in an overall level of intervention that was unnecessarily intrusive and undesirable in terms of the incentives created in the financial sector. In short, the existence of considerable externalities and scope for significant spillovers within a financially integrated region like the euro area may have led to individually reasonable actions resulting in a collectively inferior outcome. Recognising these concerns, the EU institutions have stepped in to ensure that an area-wide perspective, internalising these externalities, is adopted. As we have seen, coordinating both public and private behaviour to achieve a favourable outcome in a multiple equilibrium setting requires both clear and credible programmes at national level, and support and coordination at EU level. After a somewhat hesitant start, the European Union is now moving towards a stronger institutional framework to support this approach. Looking beyond the horizon of existing programmes, the crucial longer-term macroeconomic and financial discipline requires further institutional change and integration, notably an enhanced Stability and Growth Pact, and the introduction of a new and more effective system of macroeconomic surveillance across EU Member States. The creation of the European Systemic Risk Board to conduct macro-prudential surveillance and the three new European Supervisory Agencies for the financial sector also aims to improve the quality and coordination of financial regulation and supervision.
But what can be said so far is that we in Sweden have already been in the situation that other countries may be about to enter and have had, for some time, the debate that may be on the horizon there. In this respect, we are, in a sense, ‘ahead of the cycle’, both as regards the development of inflation and the monetary policy debate. It could therefore be worthwhile to summarise our experiences so far. Maybe there will be a few lessons that other countries and central banks may find useful and that have implications for the international debate. So let me start there. When I discuss the lessons that I think we have learned, I would like to divide the period after the global financial crisis into two different sub-periods and discuss them separately: the period of falling inflation 2011–2014 and the period of rising inflation 2015–2017. I would like to emphasise that, as usual, I am expressing my personal opinion. It is possible that my colleagues on the Executive Board have come to the same conclusions as I do here, but it is also conceivable that they have made a different interpretation. See Jansson (2016), where I discuss the criticism of the inflation target in more detail. It should be emphasised that this was one type of criticism that was expressed. In the speech, I also address other types of criticism, with less far-reaching implications. 4 Yellen (2017b). 5 Brainard (2017). 6 Draghi (2017).

If this has boosted loan demand, the successful policy of inflation targeting has been partly responsible. But so far this is just a hypothesis. It is important, however, for households to feel certain about how large their future payments will be. An international comparison suggests that household demand for home loans depends on how the market is structured and particularly on the availability of instruments for households to manage their interest rate risk. Demand mounts in line with the opportunity to manage risk. In the United States and Denmark, households can fix the interest rates on their mortgages for long periods and also refinance these fixed-rate loans at a reasonable cost should interest rates fall. In Denmark, households’ debt ratio is more than 180 per cent, compared with 120 per cent for Swedish households. This is despite the fact that the country has roughly the same proportion of homeowners as Sweden. The supply of mortgages has increased, too. According to the new capital adequacy rules, Basel II, mortgages will be given a lower risk-weighting than today, which means that banks’ capital requirements will be lower if they hold a large proportion of mortgages. The adjustment to this has started already, thus toughening the competition and depressing lending rates. Households have also become an increasingly important borrower group for the major Swedish banks. Lending to households now comprises a little more than 40 per cent of the banks’ total lending.
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  mortgage and real estate markets? In my opinion, the answer is no, since, in a longer-term perspective, mortgage rates are still at very low levels. And imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets remain high. Chart 7a illustrates this using the relationship between developments in real estate prices and rents, while chart 7b does the same using the ratio of outstanding mortgages to GDP. In addition, despite a slight rise in mortgage rates, there are a number of other channels through which the prevailing low interest rate environment could further increase the risks to financial stability. I would now like to look at three of these risks in greater detail. Risks to financial stability First, in the real estate market, there is an increasing focus on movements in the prices of residential investment property. Both private and institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, can boost the demand for real estate investments even further, either through the search for yield, or because of a lack of other investment opportunities. Yields on real estate investments continue to be well above those on alternative investments, as shown in chart 8a, which compares yields on ten-year Confederation bonds with those on investments in residential real estate.5 This yield difference could cause demand to stay high for the near future, thereby pushing prices up even further.

Dimitar Bogov: What could SEPA bring for the banking and the real sector in the Republic of Macedonia Speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the event “What could SEPA bring for the banking and the real sector in the Republic of Macedonia”, organized by The Banking Association at the Economic Chamber of Macedonia, in cooperation with the European Banking Federation (EBF), Skopje, 13 May 2014. *  *  *  Honorable Mr. Stavreski, Vice President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia and Minister of Finance, Honorable Mr. Janchevski, Chairman of the Banking Association of the Macedonian Economic Chamber Distinguished guests from the banking sector in the Czech Republic Dear representatives of the banking and the real sector in Macedonia Ladies and Gentlemen, One of the primary functions of each central bank is to create conditions for stable, reliable and efficient operation of the payment systems. To achieve this function, and according to the best practices of central banks of the EU Member States, the National Bank performs four basic roles in the payment systems: operational, supervisory, development and catalyst role. The successful performing of these functions is closely related to the importance of payment systems for a national economy. The proper functioning of the systems for large payments, which are owned and managed by central banks, is important for the effective monetary policy conduct.
20  See, for example, the above-referred to Goodhart and Rochet and also M. Woodford, “Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability”, speech at the conference “The Future of Central Banking”, in Rome, September 2010. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Focus on the repo rate over the coming six months Correspondingly, we should concentrate on assessing the repo rate in the coming period, as there is such great uncertainty over the repo rate in the longer run. The Riksbank sets the repo rate. This means that we normally have a fairly good idea of the repo rate level over the coming period, although the situation can sometimes change rapidly and radically as it did in autumn 2008. Market expectations prior to a monetary policy meeting also normally agree with the decision we make regarding the repo rate. Any surprises in the actual decision on the repo rate are normally very minor (see Figure 12). However, there is great uncertainty over the repo rate in the longer run. This is illustrated by the fan chart showing the repo rate. Whether the repo rate path will agree with the forecast will of course depend on how the economy develops in the future. If inflation and resource utilisation develop in line with the main scenario, the repo rate should follow the repo-rate path outlined in the main scenario (the middle line in the figure).

While financial consumers now have a greater array of choice, the challenge is in choosing the most appropriate financial product commensurate to their needs. Lessons learned from other markets showed that high-profile cases of mis-selling of investment-linked and pension products extols the importance of ensuring consumers are properly adviced on the key features, terms, conditions and suitability of a financial product before they enter into any financial contract. Assisting consumers to make wise financial choices As FAs, you have the responsibility to educate consumers on the importance of financial planning, such as saving for the first home or a child’s future education, or buying insurance protection to safeguard against unexpected losses. FAs can assist consumers in better understanding their current and future financial needs and circumstances. FAs can provide independent and impartial advice which is tailored to the consumers risk appetite and financial needs. Apart from educating their clients on what they should be investing in, FAs also play an important role in educating their clients on what they should not be investing in. As you are the industry’s front-liners and are actively meeting with potential customers on a daily basis, FAs can be relied on as a key source of information to prevent consumers from falling prey to financial scams.
7 [13]  Figure 7. Households have increasingly high debt and shorter interest-rate fixation periods Household indebtedness has increased  Shorter interest-rate fixation periods for household mortgages 100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  20  20  0  98  01  04  07 Variable  10  13  16  0  Fixed  Note. Left-hand graph. Percentage of disposable income. Total household debt as a share of their disposable income, totalled over the past four quarters. Right-hand graph. Percentage of mortgages. Refers to loans from mortgage institutions. Percentage of mortgages in each category is calculated based on the value of the loans. Variable rate refers to interest-rate fixation periods up to and including three months. Fixed rate refers to interest-rate fixation periods over three months. Sources: The Riksbank and Statistics Sweden  Most households can continue to pay their mortgages even at significantly higher interest rates ... The question is whether households’ interest-rate sensitivity – in combination with rising interest rates – might result in them quite simply not being able to meet their interest payments. This could lead to banks incurring direct credit losses on their mortgages, which in turn might affect financial stability. But I am not overly worried about this risk. Banks do what is known as a “left-tolive-on” or “discretionary income” calculation, as part of their credit assessment. As a rule, they don’t grant mortgages if there is a deficit in the calculation.

The estimated interest rate they use in the calculation is on average around 7 per cent, which is some way above a long-term normal level, which can be assumed to be between 4.5 and 6 per cent. 7 Calculations done by the Swedish financial supervisory authority, Finansinspektionen (FI), on a sample of new mortgage holders show that only just over 5 per cent of households have a deficit in their discretionary income calculations if the mortgage rate rises to 7 per cent. 8 There is hence nothing to indicate that the household sector as a whole would encounter significant problems in paying their interest expenses even if interest rates were to rise substantially in relation to their current levels. And, as I said earlier, our forecast indicates extremely limited rate increases in the years to come. But when the rate rises, many households might have to adapt their consumption to cope with the increased interest payments. From a macroeconomic and monetary policy perspective, it is therefore important to understand how household consumption is affected when interest rates change. 7 I have assumed a mark-up on the mortgage rate of 2 percentage points over the interval for the long-term repo rate of 2.5-4 per cent. 8 See Finansinspektionen (2018), “The Swedish mortgage market”.
These rates are not only modest, but are also subject to certain risks, which, on balance, point to even lower increases in economic activity. Turning to prices, for some months now inflation has been well short of the 2% benchmark, which is the ECB’s medium-term monetary policy target. The forecasts available continue to point to the risk of inflation remaining too low for too long. The ECB’s latest projections entail a further downward revision, with inflation expected to stand at 0.7% in 2015 and 1.3% in 2016. In recent months, against a background in which, given the weakness of demand and fierce competition, firms have limited price-setting power, the slump in the price of oil has exacerbated the drop in inflation. At the end of 2014, the annual rate of inflation stood at –0.2% (the average rate in 2014 was +0.4%) and it is expected to remain at very low or negative levels in the early months of 2015. This heightens the risk of second-round effects on wages and prices that could have an adverse impact on inflation expectations in the medium term. Indeed, the latest private sector forecasts have seen substantial downward revisions for all terms. Thus, for example, according to the January edition of Consensus Forecasts, the leading private sector economic forecast publication, the average rate of inflation forecast for 2015 is just 0.1%, compared with 0.6% forecast for the same period a month earlier.

The monetary expansion measures taken by central banks are unquestionably vital for achieving the objectives in terms of inflation rates and credit flow stimulation and of the financing of the economy. However, sustainably bolstering economic activity and job creation requires the monetary stimuli to be accompanied by measures in other areas. In the European case, the reform drive has to be maintained to ensure the proper functioning of the markets and fiscal policies favouring growth while at the same time meeting the commitments assumed under the Stability and Growth Pact. Position in the cycle and monetary policies of the main developed economies To conclude, I would like to refer to the different position in the cycle of the leading developed countries. In the United States, and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom, both of which are at a much more advanced stage of economic recovery than the euro area, the monetary policy debate now centres on when and how rapidly to start withdrawing part of the monetary stimulus, whereas in the euro area and in Japan further stimulus measures are being introduced. This difference in cyclical position is affecting prices on the financial markets, and particularly exchange rates.
In some economies, such as the UK, the biggest risks are associated with the housing market, which is why macroprudential actions have been taken. More generally, as the FSB has recently concluded: “there are increased signs of complacency in financial markets, in part reflecting search for yield amidst exceptionally accommodative monetary policies. Volatility has become compressed and asset valuations stretched across a growing number of markets, increasing the risk of a sharp reversal.” Those risks arise against a backdrop in which assets managed by investment funds have reached almost 90% of global GDP – more than two thirds the size of the commercial banking system. The growth of the asset management sector brings welcome diversity to financial intermediation. However, there must also be a focus, as there has been with banks, on the systemic risks it could create. Although the sector is becoming more concentrated, the risks don’t simply arise from the size of asset managers. They arise from the particular activities some in the sector undertake. The biggest risks arise from combining high levels of leverage with holdings of illiquid assets and commitments to provide liquidity at short notice. In the current environment, those types of activities need careful monitoring, and possibly a deliberate policy response. Conclusion There is no doubt that the reforms made thus far, along with a stronger framework for global co-operation mean we are in a better position to face new risks.

We care about the health and stability of the tri-party repo market both because of our interest in promoting stable and liquid financial markets and because we use it to implement monetary policy. The recent financial crisis showed us that the tri-party repo market was inherently unstable due to deficiencies in the settlement infrastructure. Prior to 2008, there was limited recognition of the ways in which adverse developments in this market could quickly transmit risk to other parts of the financial system with unforeseen consequences. We now know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the market was overly reliant on massive extensions of intraday credit by the clearing banks to the broker-dealers, that market participants did not adequately appreciate the magnitude of the risk embedded in the role played by the clearing banks, and, as a result, market participants underpriced risk in ways that undermined the market’s resiliency during periods of stress. These vulnerabilities were made apparent in the spring of 2008 when the events surrounding Bear Stearns demonstrated the run risk that existed more broadly in the tri-party repo market, prompting the Federal Reserve to intervene in order to restore confidence and market functioning. This intervention took the form of the creation of a Primary Dealer Credit Facility in March 2008, and a subsequent expansion of the facility in September 2008. The scope and scale of the market disruption were clearly very troublesome.