samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, there could be a number of policy formulation tasks ahead for the Central Bank which are beyond the scope of my speech today, such as financial system structure – including questions on the extent to which further restrictions should be placed on maturity mismatches in financial institutions’ balance sheets and how the system’s public goods elements can be protected against leveraged speculation. Honoured guests: In closing, I would like to thank the Central Bank’s many collaborators for a successful co-operative relationship over the past year. First among them are the ministries with which the Bank works most closely – in particular, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, which now is responsible within the ministries for the affairs of the Central Bank. In this context, I wish to thank the two Ministers who have led the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs since this arrangement was introduced. I would also like to thank the Parliament of Iceland, particularly the Economics and Commerce Committee, for their cooperation during the year. Thanks are due as well to the Financial Supervisory Authority for growing collaborative relationship. I thank the outgoing Supervisory Council for good cooperation. And last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank the staff of the Central Bank for their hard work and excellent contribution during the year. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Output is still some 4% below its previous peak and more than 10% below where it would have been if the economy had simply continued growing at its pre-crisis historical trend. There have been few winners over the past few years. In a deep sense, the low level of real interest rates here and in the other advanced economies is a reflection of the impact on the financial crisis. Heightened uncertainty and, for some households, a desire to reduce their indebtedness have resulted in an increased propensity to save. And the same heightened uncertainty has reduced the appetite of businesses to invest and encouraged them to build up cash buffers. Substantial dissaving by the public sector could offset that initially, but there are limits to how long the markets will allow high deficits to be sustained. Fiscal consolidation was unavoidable at some juncture. Given that, the stance of monetary policy needs to be loose in order to sustain demand. If we had chosen to run a substantially tighter monetary policy, then that would only have served to depress activity and raise unemployment even further. By slowing growth, it would also make the task of fiscal consolidation and de-leveraging even more challenging. And by providing a gloomier climate for business, it would also inhibit investment and slow the necessary re-balancing of our economy towards manufacturing and internationally tradable services. Treating serious medical conditions often has unwanted side effects. But, unpleasant as those side effects sometimes are, treatment is invariably better than the alternative.
BIS Review 88/2006  3  It is a challenge because of its impacts not only on inflation through aggregate demand, but also on financial stability since concerns about the sustainability of fiscal policy are likely to influence economic variables such as interest rates, exchange rates, and other measures of risk premium. In this context, what differs in many emerging markets is the role of fiscal dominance, a situation in which fiscal policy ultimately governs price determination in financial markets 3 , crowds out available sources, disrupts effective credit allocation in the economy, and impairs the effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand. The high level of fiscal dominance in many emerging market countries is associated with the high level of public sector borrowing requirements. Additionally, vulnerability in public sectors’ balance sheet and debt structure may constitute a barrier to central banks’ policy decisions such as those on short-term interest rate hikes. Such fiscal distortions are rare in industrialized economies and hence, these economies are less susceptible to adverse shocks coming from the fiscal side. Dear guests, In addition to the issues that I have mentioned, there are in my opinion two further issues related to fiscal policy and public debt management that cause challenges in many emerging market economies like Turkey. The first one is the relatively shorter maturity of debt compared to that of developed countries and the other is the “original sin” problem, which is presented in the literature by Eichengreen and Haussmann.

More than 70% of the total trade is with EU countries, the foreign owned banks are mostly of EU origin, and the bulk of financial flows comes from EU. Very importantly, these financial flows went in export–oriented and more productive segments, that fortified the fundaments of the economy, provided impetus to growth and did not add to inflationary pressures, or pressures on foreign reserves. And, this model should actually be the proper way to proceed after the EU entrance, as well. Less reliance on short-term volatile financial flows, and import of longer term capital is the only way to enhance the productivity of the economy and improve its competitiveness. Very often, the entrance on the large EU common market of goods, services, capital and labor, not only is connected to faster growth and real convergence, but also to convergence in price levels. As wages start to increase, and gradual shift towards consumption of more expensive services occurs, the price level might elevate as well, thus posing challenges for monetary policy. These price pressures can be avoided by boosting the 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  productivity, thus creating more favorable environment for the monetary policy, without pressures on the interest rates. The second angle that should be pinpointed is the implication that EU entrance does have on the further monetary integration, the adoption of the Euro as a single currency and the role that the national central bank would have in this context.
demand growth (1997-2002 Q1)  3.8  3.9  2.3  –0.6  Cumulative difference  –7.5  –4.2  0.8  0.9  Note: Growth rates are calculated as the total increase in output (and domestic demand, respectively) over the period 1997 Q1-2002 Q1, based on quarterly data, expressed as a four-quarter growth rate. Cumulative difference is the cumulative growth rate, expressed as a percentage, of output less domestic demand. Source: ONS (for UK data); Thomson Financial Datastream (for data on the Euro Area, US and Japan). Three possibilities deserve consideration. First, the rapid growth in household consumption averaging over 4% for the last five years - may reflect an adjustment to higher real disposable incomes. Consumption growth would then slow naturally as spending and debt reach their new levels. The imbalance between domestic demand and output would unwind as steadily as it built up, with no reason to fear a sudden correction. For this to occur the source of higher disposable incomes must be permanent. In part the increase in recent years has resulted from the improved terms of trade - 7% up on five years ago - which raise real national income for any given level of output. The main threat to the persistence of that improvement is the possibility of a fall in sterling that may be a necessary part of the rebalancing of the UK economy. It is very hard to assess the risk of that over any given time horizon.

The main externalities in today’s international monetary system are most visible in the interaction between the advanced and emerging economies. The rising importance of the emerging economies has perhaps been the most important development since the Bretton Woods framework of fixed exchange rates was abandoned in the early 1970s. China and India alone have brought 2 ½ billion people into the world trading system, with many more in other countries such as Brazil and Russia. And over the next five years, emerging economies are expected to account for almost three quarters of total growth in world output. Trade has promoted development in China and other emerging markets, and has benefited the rest of the world as the costs of a range of traded goods and services, particularly manufactured goods, have been driven down. But the emergence of the accompanying imbalances in current accounts had huge effects on the global pattern of spending. Between 1998 and 2006, annual output in high-saving economies expanded by around $ trillion – $ more than the growth in domestic demand in the same economies. The rise in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  output relative to demand in the high-saving countries was only possible because there were matching capital flows. Capital flowed “uphill” from many of the emerging markets to advanced deficit economies, not an obvious sign of capital moving to exploit profitable investment opportunities.
For their part, inflation rates in April 2022 stood at 8.3% and 7.4%, respectively, that is, 6.9 pp and 6.5 pp higher than in early 2021. According to the earliest leading preliminary data available for the euro area, corresponding to May, inflation has risen once again, to 8.1%. Although the Spanish economy saw a gradual recovery over 2021, which extended to early 2022, this recovery is still incomplete and uneven by sector. In early 2021, the primary 1  conditioning factor was the epidemiological developments, as they required maintaining measures to contain the disease. The swift headway made in the vaccination campaign allowed a more buoyant phase to begin in Q2, but this was tempered from mid-2021 by the bottlenecks and higher energy prices, which were compounded towards the end of the year by the spread of the Omicron variant. In the opening weeks of 2022, with this wave of the pandemic subsiding and the first timid signs of relief in the bottlenecks, it appeared that the path to recovery was beginning to clear once and for all. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February has provided a further negative shock, which I shall refer to later in detail. GDP growth stood at 5.1% in 2021 as a whole, which slowed to 0.3% quarter-on-quarter in 2022 Q1. During this period there was an intense shift in the strength of activity, with the hospitality and leisure sectors becoming more dynamic as headway was made in vaccination.

Including exchange rate effects, in Sing Dollar terms, MAS recorded a net loss of $ billion. In short, we made good investment gains, but when measured in Sing Dollars, these gains were more than offset by the strength of the currency. If we had reported our P/L in an international currency it would show a healthy profit. The effect of a strong Sing Dollar on our reserves should be seen in a broader context. First, the international purchasing power of our reserves is unaffected by strength of Sing Dollar. MAS’ foreign reserves serve two primary purposes in times of crisis: they finance our imports from the rest of the world, and safeguard the value of our currency. On both fronts, it is foreign currency value of the reserves that matters. Second, the strength of the Sing Dollar has safeguarded our domestic purchasing power. It has helped to moderate the increase in Singaporeans’ cost of living. For instance, while global oil prices rose by 20% in FY2010, domestic prices of oil-related items increased by only 10%. Or take another example of food prices. During FY2010, the rate of increase in food prices in Singapore was about half of that in our major trading partners, which includes both advanced and emerging economies. Last, I will elaborate on our efforts to maintain high regulatory standards. MAS is well-placed to meet higher global standards emerging from international regulatory reforms following the crisis.
Since we began the monetary policy normalization process, we have said that we will conduct this process gradually and cautiously, ensuring that the economy can adapt to a milder monetary stimulus and be on the lookout for changes in macroeconomic conditions that advise adjusting the pace of the process. The recent changes in the international economy and the new inflation measurement associated to the CPI updated belong to this class of changes. True to its commitment, the Bank has thoroughly examined these developments, factoring them into its projections, and has concluded that it is necessary to adjust the expected trajectory of monetary policy. Accordingly, we have put the normalization process on hold for some quarters, in order to allow inflation to go back to a path of convergence. In the same way, faced with the uncertainty regarding the value of the structural parameters on which the monetary policy is based after important economic changes, we have decided to include an update in the June Monetary Policy Report, which will allow us to gauge its future trajectory. These actions attest to the Bank’s commitment to its institutional mission, as well as its vocation to act on the basis of solid evidence and rigorous analysis of background information. In this way, we reflect our purpose of being an institution to which citizens can entrust the protection of price stability and financial stability, as essential determinants of their well-being. Thank you.

Our analysis identifies three key factors: first, there are differences in the goods component of the CPIEFE, which point to a lower transfer to local prices from the peso depreciation throughout 2018. This may be explained by the fact that during this period the variation of the peso/dollar parity responded to movements of the global value of the dollar, as opposed to past parity variations (e.g. in 2017) that responded to idiosyncratic shocks to Chile (figure 2). The difference in the pass-through coefficient of forex variations to inflation according to the origin of the former was widely documented in a box in the March 2016 Report and today we see it reflected in the recent behavior of inflation. Second, there are also differences that could be more linked to supply factors in some markets of products and services. One example is the increased competition in the car industry, as well as the emergence of lowcost alternatives in passenger air transport, as seen in the behavior of the CPIEFE for services. The same applies 2  to the increased competition in special offers of telecom packages mobile phone services. Some of these phenomena have been captured by the new CPI thanks to some of its methodological improvements (figure 3). Third, the labor market presents greater slack, resulting from the massive immigration of recent years. Last December, the INE published the new population projections that use information from the 2017 Census, which ratified the significant increase in the immigrant population beginning in 2015.
SORA is a robust interest rate benchmark underpinned by transactions in a deep and liquid overnight interbank funding market. Such a shi would be aligned to the global direction in other major financial centres, and support continued active participation of global institutions and investors in SGD markets. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2021/pushing-ahead-with-sor-sora-transition-in-2021  1/7  12/02/2021  "Pushing Ahead with SOR-SORA Transition in 2021" - Keynote Speech by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets …  4 This transition eﬀort was always going to be a complex task, and a strong public-private partnership was needed to address the wide-ranging implications across multiple industry stakeholders, in order to achieve a smooth transition. To this end, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) established an industry-led Steering Committee (or SC-STS [2] ) to provide strategic direction to develop new products and markets based on SORA and oversee the eﬀective transition from SOR to SORA. 5 Since then, we have made significant strides in developing SORA markets, even while tackling the challenges and disruptions from the ongoing pandemic. In the derivatives space, new market templates were developed to support the trading of SORA derivatives. LCH started the central clearing of SORA derivatives early last year up to the 5Y tenor, while key dealer banks started making markets in SORA derivatives. MAS also launched a daily SORA derivatives auction to facilitate price discovery, and develop SORA Overnight Index Swap (OIS) and SOR-SORA basis curves with prices quoted by dealers and brokers on key market data platforms.

We’re talking about the banking sector: the European banking sector is not as strong as it should be. Just over the weekend we have seen two Italian banks getting state aid, so it was hugely criticised. Why did they get that exception, that they’re allowed to have state aid? Constâncio: It is not an exception. Everything is foreseen in the laws. BRRD, the directive on resolution of banks, was not applied because the Single Resolution Mechanism decided that these two banks did not deserve to be resolved, which according to European law means rescuing some part of the banks, and that the banks should go into liquidation. But going into liquidation means that state aid rules apply, so any public money then requires two things. It requires that shareholders and subordinated debt-holders participate in the costs, which is the case in the two banks, because they go to the entity with the bad assets…  But not senior bond holders? Constâncio: No, but the point – if the solution, for instance, under BRRD, had been applying 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  precautionary recapitalisation in that case also senior bond holders would not have been bailed in. So it’s not much difference from a situation of precautionary recap, which is foreseen in the law. It’s not an exception. It’s not a special privilege.
Speech  Embargo 1 November 2017, 6.15 pm  Credit, debt and growth Collegium generale, University of Berne  Fritz Zurbrügg Vice Chairman of the Governing Board * Swiss National Bank Berne, 1 November 2017 © Swiss National Bank, Berne 2017 (speech given in German)  *  The speaker would like to thank Till Ebner, Rita Fleer and Adriel Jost for their support in drafting this speech. He is also indebted to Robert Bichsel for his valuable comments and the SNB Language Services for their assistance. Page 1/16  Ladies and Gentlemen Returning to one’s alma mater is always a special occasion. It was 28 years ago that I completed my doctorate here at the University of Berne. Since then, my professional career has taken me to a variety of places, but there has always been one topic accompanying me on the way: the topic of debt. In my first job at the Federal Finance Administration at the end of the 1980s, I was charged with analysing the Latin American debt crisis. Then, at the end of the 1990s, working for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington D.C., the emphasis was on resolving the debt crisis in Asia. Back in Switzerland, my efforts went into implementing the debt brake at federal level. And even switching to the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in 2012 was no escape. The European debt crisis had a major impact on the Swiss franc exchange rate and on our monetary policy.

14 A key variable here is the interest rate level: If current and anticipated rates are comparably low, loans tend to be taken out for projects which would not be profitable or not be financed at higher rates. Furthermore, lenders in such an  11  Uncertainty regarding the stability of individual banks can also result in banks no longer lending to one another, thereby mutually aggravating their difficulties and leading to even more restrictive lending practices. 12 Other aspects based on rational considerations that I did not examine further here and which can also lead to excessive borrowing or lending are (misplaced) incentives of an institutional, regulatory and fiscal nature, and the emergence of innovative financial products. 13 Cf. Kindleberger and Aliber (2005). 14 Cf. Jorda et al. (2016). Page 7/16  environment often take higher risks in order to achieve return and growth targets despite the low interest rates. Other key drivers for the increase in credit are movements in prices of assets such as shares and real estate. Rising prices for these assets and growing credit volume often go hand in hand and are mutually reinforcing. This applies to the real estate market in particular, since real estate is almost always part-financed by loans. Two mechanisms are at work here: First, rising asset prices produce ‘wealth effects’ in households. Households become richer and thus more creditworthy. This has a positive impact on household demand for loans. At the same time, rising asset prices translate into higher-value collateral for households to use.
Joseph Yam: Complaints against banks and the role of the HKMA Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Association of Banks Half-Yearly Dinner, Hong Kong, 24 June 2002. *  *  *  I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak to you at this half-yearly dinner, and I am grateful to the organisers for choosing an evening that does not happen to coincide with the quarter-finals, semifinals or final of the World Cup. This has, I am sure you will agree, been an exciting tournament so far. One of its striking features has been the record number of yellow and red cards issued to players by referees for fouls, unsporting behaviour and other forms of misconduct. The reasons put forward include worsening behaviour on the playing field, stricter application of the rules by referees, and a greater tendency among players to complain about real or imagined grievances. Whether all this is good or bad for the game is a matter of debate: it certainly makes for interesting television. But it is not just in the world of football that we see a rise in grievances and complaints. It is a phenomenon affecting many areas of life in Hong Kong, including the relationship between consumers and their banks. Complaints against banks are on the increase.

Less positively, a more difficult economic environment contributes to friction between banks and their customers, for example in the greater incidence of default on debt on the one hand and in the greater tendency among banks, in times of tighter margins, to go after that debt. Whether in good times or bad, a certain volume of complaints is a healthy phenomenon because it encourages improvements in service where complaints are upheld, and improvements in transparency where misunderstandings occur. On a subject so important as the way in which banks handle people's money, there will always be complaints, and we need to continue to develop our machinery for dealing with them. Let me deal quickly with the options identified by the HKMA in its survey last year which, if I read it correctly, the debate within the industry and the community is ruling out. The first option of these is the establishment of a separate banking ombudsman along the lines of the practice in some other jurisdictions. This is, in some senses, a Rolls Royce solution in that it would provide a separate agency, to process and resolve complaints, with powers to arbitrate in complaints and award compensation. It would, however, be a costly solution, and it would take a considerable time to implement. Under such a system, the process of handling complaints would probably also be quite resource-intensive, and it is by no means clear that it would be able to address the full range of complaints being made.