samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Christian Noyer: Global stability, the future of capital markets and Islamic finance in France Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Euromoney Seminars, Islamic Paris Conference, Paris, 29 September 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It’s a great pleasure for me to address such a distinguished audience today. While conventional economies are still suffering from a deep crisis and some of our traditional economic thought is being challenged, this meeting is a great opportunity to discuss how alternative finance, and especially Islamic finance, can contribute to the economic recovery. In the past two years, the French authorities, in active cooperation with the industry, in particular via Paris-Europlace, have introduced substantial reforms to make it possible to allow Shariah’ compliant finance into France. As Governor of the Banque de France, which is in charge of the licensing of French banks, I would like to specifically highlight ongoing work aimed at licensing Islamic banks in a secure framework.

These findings are based on evidence drawn from banking systems with a substantial presence of Islamic banking. Therefore, they are not strictly transposable to France. Nevertheless, precisely because France is a conventional environment, I would like now to conclude my speech with some remarks on conditions Islamic banks need to meet to ensure that their establishment in France offers sufficient safety for their customers and is compatible with the smooth functioning of the French banking system. This is primarily in Islamic banks’ own interest and is also in the interest of the banking system! Regarding licensing, the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee (Comité des Etablissements de Crédit et des Entreprises d’Investissement – CECEI) will assess the same criteria as for any conventional bank: financial resources and suitability of the shareholders; integrity, qualifications and suitable experience of managers; level of own funds; business plan; capacity of the bank to achieve its development objectives and so on. Indeed, there is no specific criteria or requirement for Islamic banks in the French licensing framework. But beyond these standard licensing criteria, banking authorities need to ensure that Islamic banks will interact with their conventional environment in France as soundly as possible.
Investors have increasingly questioned the relative security of assets that were previously considered safe. This is reflected in the main credit rating agencies’ recent downgradings of several sovereign bonds that were formerly triple A-rated. This increased demand for, and decreased supply of, risk-free assets has directly affected Switzerland. The reasons for this are well known. The country has managed to maintain a longstanding reputation for stability. In relative terms, the Swiss economy has also withstood the 2007 financial crisis rather well (slide 10), its economic figures are healthy and, at less than 40% (slide 11), its GDP-to-debt ratio is relatively low (slide 12). All of this has prompted a surge in the demand for Swiss franc-denominated assets and put downward pressure on Swiss interest rates. At the policy level, the SNB used a range of instruments to increase the supply of liquidity on the Swiss money market and exert vigorous downward pressure on interest rates, particularly after the Swiss franc reached an all-time high in early August. In line with the goals stated in the SNB’s announcement of 3 August, the three-month Libor fell from 17.5 basis points on 2 August to a low of 0.3 basis points on 5 September. Other money market rates then fell to historical lows. At that time, futures contracts on the three-month Libor even implied negative future rates. These negative levels were the inevitable result of the exceptional liquidity measures I mentioned earlier.

In addition to changes to the expiry date of the controls, major amendments have been made twice: in October 2009, when cross-border transfers of krónur were prohibited and outflows deriving from new investment were liberalised; and in March 2012, when exemptions from the Central Bank of Iceland were required for disbursements from the failed banks. Parliament has just passed amendments to the Foreign Exchange Act, with broad-based support from its members. The Central Bank participated in drafting this amendment and supports it. The amendment creates a stronger foundation for the work that lies ahead in finding a solution to the settlement of the banks’ estates that is consistent with monetary and exchange rate stability and facilitates larger steps in liberalising the controls. The Bank also welcomes the enhanced understanding of the nature of the capital controls and the fact that they are a necessary evil, as is reflected in the consensus on the issue. The aim of the controls was to arrest the decline of the króna, provide shelter for the restructuring of private sector debt and the financial system as a whole, and create the space for economic policy to mitigate the recession and ultimately support recovery. In broad terms, these goals have been realised. Without the controls, much stricter monetary policy would have been required in the early stages of the crisis. The Treasury would have had much less scope to mitigate the contraction in 2009, as domestic financing of the deficit would have been much more expensive.
As for the special instruments to provide liquidity, we are currently developing such a mechanism. We believe there could be liquidity provision lines for banks experiencing temporary liquidity shortages, not necessarily because of information attacks, but due also to various other factors. Having said that, we assume that these banks should be either solvent or explicitly capable of restoring their solvency independently in the near future. As we understand it, the intention is not to fund insolvent banks by means of these liquidity lines. We are currently working to determine possible parameters of such liquidity lines and to introduce them to our toolkit, because, as you may see, structural liquidity surplus has saved us the necessity of providing refinancing. The demand for both 312P (BoR loans secured by nonmarketable assets) and refinancing through the use of the Lombard list is falling. We will gradually revise these procedures. We are raising the requirements for securities to be included in the Lombard list and will continue to do so. However, you were certainly right to say that under these conditions such liquidity lines are increasing in significance in the face of unforeseen liquidity shortages in banks. We will certainly be working on it. QUESTION from Reuters: You have mentioned banking licences. Some large state-owned banks, such as Sberbank, as well as some bank products have increased their market share during the crisis. Being a regulator, does the Bank of Russia monitor competition in the banking market? Do you believe Russia still has a competitive banking environment? Thank you.

But as markets attained a global dimension, encouraged by financial liberalisation and the advance of information technology, they became far less tolerant of weaknesses than before, and the markets responded to weaknesses with harsh punishments, which many considered grossly unfair. But this is the reality that we face. And if we are to continue to benefit from the greatly enhanced efficiency of global financial markets in international financial intermediation - a process that has contributed so much to development - we have to get on with the necessary reforms. These include the domestic structural reforms to the financial and corporate sectors, to make sure that we can manage the risks and cope with the volatility that are part of that efficiency. And, to the extent that consensus can be reached, they also include measures to strengthen the international financial architecture. Thus, with some encouragement from the Bank and from others, and more importantly, urged on by the brute forces of the market, significant progress has been made in the domestic structural reforms of individual economies in the region. I applaud the progress and the achievements; and I sympathise with the pain and suffering which they have entailed. With the economic recovery of the region now well under way and international funds flowing back into the region, I would also urge a continued commitment to structural reforms and caution against complacency.
Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  - 16 -  But as the industry goes through its transformation, we the regulators must also consider how we should operate in the future. We need to take a proactive and dynamic approach to promote innovation, and act as a catalyst for the industry. We need to promote collaboration and share our experiences with each other to develop frameworks that will fit the needs of our societies. And we need to focus on capacity building to ensure that our staff can meet the future challenges of the industry. We at the CBK firmly believe in innovation, collaboration and capacity building; principles that are the driving force behind many of our recent initiatives to fulfil our role as an enabler and catalyst for the industry. In terms of innovation, the CBK is playing its part to support the banking industry. Last year, we launched our FinTech Regulatory Sandbox. Globally, 36 innovation labs and 48 regulatory sandboxes have already been introduced by different regulators. Regulators are using these tools to create a safe space for experimentation in innovative products and services, thus ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial system but without stifling innovation.16 We at the CBK are also preparing the infrastructure for future aspirations that would enable a truly digital economy. We are developing a state-of-the-art infrastructure project, the Kuwait National Payment System.

Willem F Duisenberg: Another step in the direction of a united Europe Address by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of an audience by Dr Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Italian Republic, in the context of the meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank in Rome, Rome, 2 April 2003. *  *  *  On behalf of the European Central Bank (ECB) and all members of the Governing Council, I should like to thank His Excellency - Dottore Carlo Azeglio Ciampi - for his kindness and hospitality to receive us today, on the eve of the Governing Council meeting in Rome, despite the geopolitical tensions we are currently facing. Moreover, I should like to thank Governor Dottore Antonio Fazio and the Banca d’Italia for organising this meeting of the Governing Council outside Frankfurt am Main. The Governing Council has decided to meet, in principle, two times a year outside the ECB premises in Frankfurt, in order to emphasise the federal character of the Eurosystem, the collective consisting of the ECB and the national central banks of the Member States that have adopted the euro.
The digital euro will offer European citizens an additional option as to how they effect purchases  Page 5 of 6 and transactions; they will determine both the pace of its development and its 'market share'. A digital euro will replace neither physical cash nor other forms of currency – which brings me on to the so-called "competition" issue. We regularly hear an unfounded but very persistent rumour whereby the digital euro would compete with commercial bank money. Let me be very categorical on this point: a digital euro will not lead to disintermediation. It would be distributed by payment service providers - we have absolutely no intention of opening private accounts - and be subject to a holding limit. Our fellow citizens are in need of everyone’s expertise: both the agility and customer relationships of commercial banks and the confidence and stability guaranteed by central banks. Indeed, commercial bank digital currency already exists. It will remain dominant in payments and is generally perceived as being as safe as central bank currency, however, this confidence is rooted in its full and direct convertibility with the public money issued by the central bank. Losing this public anchor - in a world of digital payments without CBDC - would ultimately mean jeopardising this private trust. * The decision here will rest with the public authorities, with a “sovereign” dimension, but today, I would really like to get beyond a mere discussion about the digital "retail" euro.

iv According to the legislative proposal by the European Commission on CBDC, presented on 28 June 2023. v Including record keeping, payments or access to a mobile application. vi BIS, Annual Economic Report 2023, III. Blueprint for the future monetary system: improving the old, enabling the new (bis.org). vii ECB, Eurosystem to explore new technologies for wholesale central bank money settlement , press release, April 2023 viii Adrian, T., Mancini-Griffoli, T., The Rise of Payment and Contracting Platforms (imf.org), Fintech Notes, IMF, June 2023. ii
Fast growth means increasing prosperity, which in turn may result in a stable social and political climate. However, in order for China to switch from export-led to domestic demand at a quicker pace – which has to happen in the future – it will require institutional and other reforms that take time to implement. The financial infrastructure in particular is in great need of change and development. Where will demand come from when the economy is tightened in the US? The weak growth in Europe and the uncertainty surrounding developments in the Japanese economy means that there is no obvious candidate to take the United States’ place as growth engine. While China has recently become the world’s third biggest trading nation it can hardly assume the mantle on its own. Domestic demand in Europe needs to pick up but the current upswing here is sluggish and is being restrained by efforts to tackle public finance deficits in countries such as Germany, Italy and France. So how likely is it that China will abandon its fixed rate with the dollar in the period ahead? Most commentators believe that China will take a gradual, slow and cautious road towards a floating exchange rate. Should the dollar continue to weaken, therefore, the euro will continue to bear a large part of the adjustment in the future as well, thus having an adverse effect on European competitiveness and growth. 2  BIS Review 10/2005  Another important growth factor is how interest rates develop in the period ahead.

There is little to suggest that the US federal budget deficit will narrow to a sufficient extent. That is worrying, especially given that the country in the long term will see sharply increasing costs for medical care, health care and pensions. As a result there is a clear risk of rising market rates in the US that could trigger a fall in house prices, which in turn could dampen private consumption. A reduction in public expenditures would also have a tightening effect but in the long term would lead to a more balanced development and thereby prevent an overly quick rise in rates. Another risk factor is the oil price. As the US is more oil-dependent than the euro area countries, its economy is more sensitive to changes in oil prices. Should the oil price remain at a high, fluctuating level it may curtail growth in the US. All in all, this picture of large global imbalances implies a clear risk that growth will be more subdued over the coming two-year period. The question is how fast this slowdown may come about. If controlled, the moderation would be softer, while rapid changes could entail a considerable weakening of the world economy and thereby also check Sweden’s economic performance in the period ahead. In addition to the competition problems that an ever stronger euro means for Europe there is the issue of how we are to meet the competition from low-wage countries, both the new member states of the EU and the emerging economies in Asia.
However, this was more than offset by increases in Government deposits with MAS and our borrowings from the money market, again due to the diversification of our money market instruments from mainly swaps to include money market borrowings and repos. Income & expenditure statement For the financial year ended 31 March 2000, MAS made profits of $ billion (net of provisions), a decrease of 38% or $ billion compared with the previous year. The lower return was due mainly to translation losses, as the Singapore dollar strengthened against major foreign currencies such as the US dollar and euro during the financial year. The organisation To support MAS’ expanded roles and functions in building a central bank of excellence, we have taken steps to strengthen our human resources. Over the last two years, we have increased our headcount by 30%. Of these, a substantial number were early- and mid-career officers from a wide range of professional and academic backgrounds. The increase in mid-career employees has encouraged greater diversity in perspectives and views within the organisation as we address the increasingly complex issues in monetary policy and financial sector supervision and development. MAS will continue to build up our internal capabilities and human resources, and actively consult the industry participants in our efforts to meet the challenges in the coming year. 3  BIS Review 62/2000

The Central Bank forecasts the forthcoming inflation performance; this forecast is then compared to the targeted inflation rate; and the difference between the forecast and target determines the proper adjustment of the monetary political instrument. But, unfortunately or perhaps, fortunately, this relatively new monetary regime is not the rescue solution of a central banker’s affliction. I am confident that the honourable participants who are speaking during the three days of the seminar, shall enlighten in more details, based on the experiences of the central banks they represent, the complex issues and challenges they had to encounter, while adopting this regime. The agenda of this three-day seminar seems promising, and the interweaving of theory and practice is outstanding. It begins with the theoretical considerations on inflations targeting, proceeds with the three main pillars of monetary policy communication: independence, transparency and accountability. Not by accident, the new approach required by the inflation targeting regime has been defined as the “forecast path”. The distinguished economists from the Centre of Central Banking Studies shall introduce us to the econometric techniques, which come to help during the inflation forecast process. To conclude, the Czech National Bank, shall bring the experience of an economy in transition adopting this regime. And last but not least, on behalf of the Bank of Albania, I would like to thank the Centre of Central Banking Studies (Bank of England) for the opportunity granted to the institution I govern, to cooperate  1/2  and to consent the holding of this regional seminar in our country.
ii) Impact Tolerances The second is the requirement for firms to set impact tolerances for their IBS. Here, we expect firms to assume that disruption to IBS will occur and then set clearly defined time-based metrics, and well defined thresholds, at which the disruption would threaten regulatory objectives. iii) Mapping and Testing The third area is, following the identification of IBS and setting impact tolerances, we expect firms to perform mapping and testing so they are able to demonstrate their ability to stay within their impact tolerances. Firms’ testing strategies should incorporate the risks and vulnerabilities they will face in severe but plausible scenarios and then demonstrate how they will remediate any disruption in a timely manner. The experience gained from this testing can then inform how firms monitor risks to their operational resilience and increase the maturity of their overall processes. Policy interactions For the recent March 2022 deadline, firms had to meet the first two of these elements, namely identifying the IBS and setting impact tolerances. Looking ahead to the next key deadline, which is in 2025, firms will have to prove that they are able to remain within the impact tolerances that they have set out, and this is where the assurance gained from high quality testing will be key. I would also like to highlight the interaction of these expectations with the PRA’s outsourcing and third party risk management policy2, which was published at the same time as the policy on Op Res.

This is a riskier phase of an infrastructure investment but banks are good at doing this. However, the new capital standards for banks do not make it attractive for them to hold on to these loans on a long term basis, even though the projects at the brownfield stage are operating smoothly. At the same time, there are many other investors, including insurance and pension funds, which may be looking for less risky investments that can produce steady long-term cash flow. Therefore I can see a good opportunity for banks to offload their loans to these long-term investors. However, it is easier said than done. There are many issues that need to be tackled. Just to name a few: the large transaction size of infrastructure loans makes concentration risk of (a) collateral a more prominent issue to be addressed, say as compared to the securitisation of a portfolio of mortgage loans comprising a large number of loans but with each being relatively small in size; apart from being large in size, infrastructure loans tend to be significantly less homogenous than the other types of asset for securitisation.