samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As FEMR recognised, while fines and sanctions have roles in deterring misconduct, they will not, on their own, bring about the cultural change needed. We must move from an excessive reliance on punitive ex post fines of firms to greater emphasis on more compelling ex ante incentives for individuals, and ultimately a more solid grounding in improved firm culture. This starts with reducing opportunities for bad behaviour, for example, by overhauling the regulation of key benchmarks in FICC markets. It requires compensation rules that align risk and reward. In the UK, a significant proportion of variable compensation now must be deferred for a period of seven years. To address the ‘rolling bad apples’ problem, mechanisms are now in place here to ensure that when individuals move on their history will be known to those who consider hiring them. Firms will be required to share information on breaches of individual conduct rules, their fitness and propriety assessments and outcomes around subsequent disciplinary proceedings. These measures are all very constructive but they are not yet sufficient. That’s why the Bank of England supports initiatives that ensure firms and their employees take greater responsibility – individually and collectively – for their own conduct. UK authorities have used their convening powers to encourage market participants to establish standards of market practice that are well understood, widely followed and, crucially, that keep pace with market developments. Industry has responded. The Banking Standards Board is promoting higher standards of conduct and competence across the UK banking system.

There is at present a long list of reform agenda items being debated internationally: these include strengthening financial institutions by requiring them to hold more capital and liquidity; changing compensation practices to discourage excessive risk taking by bankers and reforming regulatory structures to ensure more effective supervision, especially of large and complex firms that have systemic implications. 5. It is therefore very timely today that we have five very distinguished speakers joining this Panel to share with us their insights into this complex and important question of how we should go about reforming the international financial architecture and regulatory regimes in different jurisdictions. They are, by order of their appearance in the programme: (i)  Mr Rintaro Tamaki, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs of Japan;  (ii)  Dr Jong-Goo Yi, Standing Commissioner of the Financial Services Commission of Korea;  (iii)  The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Financial Services of Australia;  BIS Review 7/2010  1  (iv)  The Honourable Mr Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah, Minister of Finance Two of Malaysia; and  (v)  Professor KC Chan, Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, HKSAR. I understand from the organiser that we will invite Professor Chan to speak first as he may need to leave earlier for the Legislative Council meeting. The order of other speakers will follow the programme. Professor Chan, please. 2  BIS Review 7/2010
At a US Congressional hearing, Peter Fisher of the Federal Reserve qualified the interventions as successful because they had contributed to improving market psychology and reducing the implied volatility in the options market. Sveriges Riksbank intervened in the foreign exchange market in June with the aim of strengthening the Swedish krona. The Riksbank found that the Swedish krona was weaker than implied by fundamentals. This was followed by an increase in interest rates. The Bank of England has seldom intervened in the exchange market after the UK left the ERM in 1992. The currency crisis in 1992 appears to have reduced their faith in interventions as an instrument. However, the Bank of England has made it clear that interventions remain an instrument at their disposal. Canada has had a floating exchange rate for 30 years, and has used intervention operations actively in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. However, in 1997 the Canadian central bank was not able to prevent the depreciation of the Canadian dollar, and since then has not intervened. Australia still uses interventions, and the Reserve Bank of Australia maintains that they have benefited substantially from their intervention operations during the period with a floating exchange rate. New Zealand has not intervened after introducing an inflation target in 1990. An evaluation report on monetary policy in New Zealand, written by Professor Lars E. O. Svensson, supports the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's assessment that interventions would hardly have made a significant contribution to increasing stability in New Zealand's economy in 4 recent years.

In the US, the slowdown in growth has been more pronounced than expected by most observers when the first signs of a turnaround emerged last autumn. Industrial output has declined over the last 10 months and business investment has shrunk by almost 14 per cent, annualised, in the second quarter. Moreover, the impact on Europe and the emerging economies in Asia has been substantially greater than expected. The shift in perceptions of the outlook is reflected in the estimates from Consensus Forecasts. Since the beginning of the year, growth forecasts have been revised downwards by 2 percentage points in Japan, 1½ percentage points in Germany and 1 percentage point in the US. Not since 1974 has GDP growth been below 2½ per cent in all three countries. Growth among our trading partners has been revised downwards by 1 percentage point to a little less than 2 per cent, which is the lowest rate recorded since 1993. Growth forecasts for 2002 have also been adjusted downwards somewhat, but growth is still expected to pick up next year. However, there is substantial uncertainty associated with these forecasts. 12  BIS Review 74/2001  The forecasts are to a large extent based on the assumption that household consumption will continue to fuel growth in domestic demand, as has been the case in the US and Europe so far this year. This is expected because of the solid financial situation of the household sector in most industrial countries after many years of rising employment and real wage growth.
From this it follows that corporate earnings and consequently share prices should also be more stable. Another factor that may point to less marked cyclical fluctuations in the future is the transition from manufacturing to the production of services, together with the era of information technology. Thus, if the yield from share investment is more stable in the future than it has been in the past, this might warrant some downward adjustment of the expected return and thereby lead to a higher valuation. Another argument is that with more and more people saving in shares for retirement, the investment horizon has been lengthened. This category of share investor is less concerned about short-run fluctuations in share prices and that might justify a somewhat lower expected return. A third argument is that financial market developments have resulted in decreased transaction costs and less liquidity risk. There may be some truth in arguments of this type but it is still difficult to believe that the expected return has fallen as much as would be needed to justify today’s stock market valuations. Or is higher earnings growth foreseen? Let us now look at the importance of earnings growth for share valuations. We noted earlier that to justify a P/E ratio between 30 and 35, given an unchanged expected return, real earnings growth must move up from 2.5% to 4.5%. Is it reasonable to suppose that the future earnings trend will be as high as that?

In the long run, it is monetary policy that determine the rate of inflation in the economy and “rational” long-term inflation expectations should therefore still be in line with the central bank's target for price stability. If the public makes this presumption, the negative consequences of taking longer to attain the inflation target will be much less serious. 11 [20]  Concluding comments Let me round off. My purpose here has been to do two things. Firstly, I have tried to put the recent debate on monetary policy into perspective. I have discussed the criticism raised against our policy in general and against the negative repo rate in particular. As I hope I have made clear, there are some gaps in the criticism. I noted earlier that the main argument is often merely that monetary policy for various reasons is wrong. What I feel is often missing is a discussion of why the advantages of the inflation target should no longer apply and what the consequences would be if the Riksbank abandoned it. It is no new phenomenon that the debate fails to answer important questions. In the mid-1990s, when the inflation-targeting regime was relatively new, Lars E.O. Svensson, who was then scientific adviser to the Riksbank and later a member of the Executive Board, argued that the debate often lacked structure.
And yet, the G20 lacks the legitimacy that has historically been associated with a truly multilateral framework. Other countries do not participate, directly or indirectly, but are called upon to contribute to efforts that others have agreed. The vast majority of the members of the IMF have no voice or representation in these discussions, including all low-income countries and most emerging economies. All in all, multilateral cooperation and collective action functioned reasonably well during the crisis. With the world recovering from the crisis, the G20 should strive for wider acceptance and legitimacy to make sure that the basis for strong multilateral cooperation and collective action is also in place when policies for reform and prevention are implemented. Truly global challenges call for truly global solutions anchored in a multilateral and statutory-based system of representation like the Bretton Wood Institutions. All countries, large and small, rich and poor, should be represented, even if only indirectly through constituencies. General government fiscal balances As a percentage of nominal GDP, 2000–2011 Projections from OECD for 2010–2011  These are some lessons learned from the crisis. Still, several unresolved questions remain. 6  BIS Review 113/2010  The chart shows general government fiscal balances as a percentage of GDP in selected countries. Many countries had negative fiscal balances through the last decade despite moderate to high economic growth. Spain seemed to be in a different position with a positive fiscal balance, though this was mainly due to unsustainable high growth in the construction sector.

This shows the importance of international coordination also when it comes to crisis resolution. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 113/2010  9
Against this background, Norges Bank cut the key policy rate by 0.25 percentage point to 1.25 percent in December last year. Weight was given to countering the risk of a pronounced downturn in the Norwegian economy. Financial stability considerations were not taken off the table, but a new risk had entered the scene. Through the following winter months, developments in the Norwegian economy were broadly in line with expectations. The effects of the fall in oil prices on the real economy had been relatively small. Inflation remained close to 2.5 percent and unemployment was stable. At the same time, house prices continued to rise rapidly. Therefore, balancing of the different kinds of risks – the risk of a pronounced downturn in the economy versus the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances – shifted slightly from December. An overall assessment led Norges Bank to keep the key policy rate unchanged at 1.25 percent at the monetary policy meeting in March. However, we also communicated an intention to lower the key policy rate if developments in the economy ahead proved to be broadly as projected. At the same time, Norges Bank advised the Ministry of Finance to keep the countercyclical buffer unchanged at 1 percent. Norges Bank added, however, that if house prices continued to rise rapidly and credit growth increased, it would be appropriate to advise the Ministry to raise the level of the countercyclical capital buffer effective from summer 2016.

The same applies to outstanding government debt. Thus, since the start of EMU, investors have been able without any difficulty to borrow and lend funds in euro, and to trade their euro securities on the secondary market. Looking ahead, it is likely that over time international investors will start to hold a greater proportion of their portfolios in euro-denominated assets than they held in the former national currencies. In other words, the role of the euro as an international currency is likely to be greater than that of the sum of its components. One reason why this may be the case is that the economy and the financial markets backing the euro are large relative to the world economy. In this regard, one of the key elements influencing the international use of the euro is the creation of a large, liquid and integrated capital market in the euro area. As for trade, the existence of a large capital market will also encourage and facilitate the use of the euro in international transactions. In particular, many euro area exporters and importers, who did not previously use their own domestic currency for invoicing, may now take the opportunity to do so with the euro. The same tendency could gain ground in those countries that have close economic ties with the euro area or which have chosen to peg their currencies to the euro. This brings me to some considerations on the use of the euro in the official sector.
Even if the risks linked to debt and housing prices are as large as before, or have even increased as a result of the repo-rate cuts, the problems linked to low inflation have become relatively more important. However, it is unavoidably the case that this places greater responsibility on other public authorities and policy areas with regard to managing developments in household debt and housing prices. I consider it important to note that there has also been criticism from this quarter – as a counterweight to the opinion that in principle everything the Riksbank has done in recent  20  10  See, for instance, Malmqvist (2014), Svenska Dagbladet (2014b, 2014c) and Mitelman (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  years, and in particular the leaning against the wind, has been wrong, unjustified and harmful. My most important messages Let me conclude by summarising my main messages. The purpose of my review has been to point out the flaws in several notions of how monetary policy in Sweden has been conducted in recent years and what the results have been. One thing I hope I have made clear is that it is not reasonable to regard the difference between what the repo rate has actually been in recent years and a fictitious interest-rate development of 0.25 per cent since July 2009 as a measure of how much the Riksbank has leaned against the wind. This is a rather odd reconstruction after the event.

Figure 1: Inflation in Africa (in %) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 South Africa  Northern Africa (median)  Sub-Saharan w/o SA (median)  The figures displayed suggest that businesses and households in most African countries now enjoy an environment of increasingly stable prices. Undoubtedly, the recent inflation record has contributed to the increasingly robust growth environment. Figure 2 shows that per capita growth has picked up in recent years in parts of Africa. This is particularly true where disinflation was strongest. 2  BIS Review 110/2007  Figure 2: GDP per capita in Africa (in constant 2000 USD) 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 South Africa  Northern Africa (median)  Sub-Saharan w/o SA (median)  Governments no longer seem to rely on money printing as a revenue source. This is a sound policy development which encourages private sector activity. Going forward, the challenge for African central banks will be to maintain this recently acquired track record. 3. Payment systems  Next let’s look at the payment system. The development of the payment system determines how easy it is for firms and consumers to access and transfer money. Can businesses pay their suppliers by writing a cheque or making an electronic transfer? Or do they have to undergo the cumbersome and insecure process of sending cash physically?
Lars Heikensten: Introduction to monetary policy Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 16 October 2003. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to come here and talk to the members of the Riksdag Committee on Finance about monetary policy. I believe that the Committee's public hearing of the Riksbank governor provides a good basis for a constructive discussion of monetary policy in Sweden and comprises an important part of the openness the Riksbank wishes to safeguard. These open hearings began originally at the initiative of the Riksbank. They were an expression of our endeavour to bring about an open discussion on monetary policy, an endeavour that has since taken on many other aspects; lengthy Inflation Reports, published minutes from monetary policy meetings, press conferences where we account for our interest rate decisions and explain our deliberations, and so on. Now these hearings are a part of our legislation. The fact that the Committee closely follows our activities has become even more important since the Riksbank was given an independent status. These hearings illustrate the clear link between us and the democratically-elected body in Sweden. Today I shall take up three themes. I shall begin with a few words about the Riksbank's situation following the referendum. Then I shall comment as usual on the assessment of inflation and the interest rate decision we have published. Finally, I shall discuss the Swedish economy's long-term growth prospects.

See Potter, “Money Markets and Monetary Policy Normalization,” April 15, 2015, and Frost, Logan, Martin, McCabe, Natalucci and Remache, “Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy 10 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  Tool: Some Design Considerations,” February 19, 2015. 6 Designated financial market utilities may be paid interest on balances maintained at the Federal Reserve as  well, as provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act and Regulation HH. The payment of interest to these entities does not appear to have had a measurable impact on money markets to date. 7 Recall that federal funds loans are unsecured. Like the vast majority of central banks, the Federal Reserve  conducts its open market operations in the secured market. 8 Although households and firms do not directly transact in the federal funds market, the effective federal funds  rate is used as a reference rate in the setting of a variety of private sector contracts, including in interest rate futures and swaps. Many bank loans are priced to The Wall Street Journal’s Prime Rate, which since the mid1990s has been set by convention to 300 basis points above the FOMC’s target rate or range. 9 See Dudley, “The Importance of Financial Conditions in the Conduct of Monetary Policy,” March 30, 2017.
Most of the growth, such as it was, was down to private and public consumption, though the former was nevertheless quite a bit weaker than we expected. Net trade was distinctly disappointing relative to our expectations. And fixed investment continued to drag on growth. Lurking behind this picture was: first, a much less pronounced improvement in credit conditions than expected, with the spreads over Bank Rate of borrowing and lending rates actually increasing for much of the period and only falling sharply after last summer; second, much weaker global growth, as the problems of excessive indebtedness in the euro-area periphery and the associated uncertainties concerning the resilience of European banks pulled the region into a second recession; and, third, the kick to net exports from the depreciation of sterling was apparently offset by a fall in foreign demand for business and financial services triggered by the financial crisis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As far as inflation goes, at the time of our August 2010 Inflation Report, CPI inflation was a little over 3%, reflecting higher oil prices, the restoration of VAT to 17.5% and pass-through from the depreciation of sterling (Chart 3). Our central expectation was for inflation to remain elevated in the short term, as VAT was raised further to 20%, but then to fall back to well below the 2% target when that rise dropped out of the twelve-month comparison.

In 2019, Facebook unveiled its Libra project that consisted of issuing stablecoins pegged to several currencies, claiming cheap and efficient payment solutions (including for cross-border payments) and greater financial inclusion. Around the same time the strange word "cryptocurrencies" appeared, a word that hurt the ears of politicians and central bankers. From time immemorial, money had been sovereign in order to be reliable and lasting. B. Disappointing learning years? Needless to say Libra had its risks. I will not list them all, but it raised very significant concerns about financial stability, money laundering, etc. The issues at stake reached far beyond mere financial regulation, and also included more acutely than ever the question of competition. This is when big techs entered their learning years in finance, confronting reality. Libra did not materialise, even after it was adjusted and rebranded as Diem. Existing stablecoins are issued by players other than big techs, mainly from the digital asset industry. Incidentally, after the failures and/or crimes committed by some of them, it is high time to regulate cryptos in full and to require licensing. Let us not kid ourselves into believing that we can count on the so called "crypto winter " which has actually lasted for over a year now, to make the problem disappear by itself. That would be a dangerous illusion and would further delay supervision that is so badly needed.v All jurisdictions agree in principle to regulate, under the common FSB umbrella.
As I have argued in earlier speeches, the globalised economy we now inhabit may have many potential sources of instability, including the potential upside pressure on energy and commodity prices as well as volatility in financial markets. 7 In addition, we have learned through this recession that inflation has not performed in the way conventional economic models and our earlier forecasts suggested. As spare capacity has not exerted much downward pressure on inflation so far, there must be a high degree of uncertainty about its future impact. In the highly integrated world economy we now inhabit, the margin of spare capacity in the UK economy may have less impact on our inflation prospects than global inflationary pressures – which have been less benign in recent years. And the exchange rate can play a key role in the transmission of these global price pressures to the UK economy, which may help to explain the above-target inflation the UK has experienced in the last three years. For a legendary rock band like Led Zeppelin, the song should indeed remain the same. When the band reformed at the end of 2007 at the O2 Arena, everyone wanted to hear “Stairway to Heaven”, “Dazed and Confused”, “Whole Lotta Love” and their other classics. But in monetary policy, we need to adapt our tune to the changing performance of the economy, and to absorb what we learn about the economy in new and unprecedented circumstances, such as the recent financial crisis.

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