samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Globally, the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosure (TNFD), a market-led initiative set up by two UN Programmes and the WWF in cooperation with major development banks, aims at extending the success of TCFD, its equivalent for climate-change: allow for enhanced disclosure and management of nature-related risks and opportunities; I would like to commend the commitment of the Dutch and the French financial sector in this respect; while closer connection between the TNFD and the NGFS will certainly prove beneficial. Meanwhile, EU regulation on corporate disclosures aims at encompassing a wide range of environmental objectives, including biodiversity. Page 8 sur 13  2. Macroeconomics and macrofinance of biodiversity Despite data gaps and the lack of commonly accepted methodologies for translating biodiversity metrics into the financial world, the central bank community is starting to assess the implications of biodiversity loss and other nature-related risks for the financial system. Building on a pioneering methodological work of DNB (van Toor et al., 2020) ix – the first biodiversity report published by a central bank – complemented by similar studies in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexicox, fruitful research at the Banque de France (“A ‘silent spring’ for the financial system?”, 2021)xi provides such an exploration of biodiversity-related risks for the French financial system. To approximate physical risks, the authors assess the dependency on ecosystem services of each security issuers financed by French financial institutions, using a dependency score computed with the ENCORE database.

Beyond climate change, the NGFS is acting as a great catalyst on nature-related issues. In light of its March report, the NGFS launched in April a Nature-Related Risks Taskforce co-chaired by Sylvie Goulard, Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, and Saskia de Vries from DNB, with the objectives to incorporating nature-related risks into the NGFS’s long standing workstreams within the next two years. As much as possible, let us have interim deliverables earlier.  Conceptual framing and research:  as a problem well-stated is a  problem half-solved. Bridging methodological shortcomings and data gaps is a crucial pre-requisite for action, before jumping to any conclusions on the prudential or monetary front – these must come in due time. Our priority as  Page 11 sur 13 central banks and supervisors is thus to build the capacity to further analyse and study empirical evidence of the financial implications of biodiversity and naturerelated risks. At the Banque de France, we are fully committed to this effort, thanks to a dedicated team of experts within the Climate Change Centre (CCC) who contribute both to NGFS and BDF research advances. We will strive to provide state of the art metrics, financial assessment, and, hopefully in a near future, scenarios analysis. The work plan of the NGFS Taskforce includes the development of a unique conceptual framework adapted to our activities, which will be key to build a common understanding and address the knowledge, capacity and methodological gaps that we face.
It needed support from other policy areas and agents, who, whether they like it or not, also play a role in the development of inflation. And although we now have well-designed frameworks in place for different policy areas, this in itself is not always sufficient to ensure a good economic outcome – the frameworks must also work together and result in a meaningful whole. A lot has certainly changed in a year. Inflation has risen substantially around the world, and central banks have raised their policy rates quickly and quite a lot. The problems with the lower bound for the policy rates and too low inflation have therefore disappeared from the agenda at the moment. However, as I have noted, it is far from clear that the global economic playing field has changed in any profound way in the longer run. Above all, there is a great deal to suggest that the global real equilibrium interest rate remains at a historically low level. It is therefore possible, perhaps even likely, that these problems will reappear in a few years’ time. But perhaps my most important message today is that there is a need for interaction between different agents in the economy also when inflation is too high, as it is today. It is true that the policy rate is not restricted upwards in the way that it is downwards – it can be raised without it hitting any ceiling.

Nevertheless, we see that non-banks should play a more significant role going beyond, and thus we are opening the market to new players like virtual banks and trying to ensure a level playing field. Secondly, we are also to look at open infrastructure to make sure that the infrastructure is open and accessible to players to get that level playing field. For example, as we have made significant improvements in the payment landscape on the retail front, we are now trying to put in place a similar infrastructure for SMEs. To do this, we have the Smart Financial and Payment Infrastructure program that allows SMEs to access more digital solutions on finance, including invoicing and issuing receipts, doing taxes, and on an end-to-end basis. We are also to introduce the retail Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and expect to put out a pilot program by the fourth quarter of this year. We have  Page 5 of 8  done quite well on the wholesale CBDC, dealing with cross-border issues, and the next phase for us is to implement the retail project by preparing ourselves through this pilot project. Since we see that digital currencies are appearing and becoming popular very rapidly, we want to make sure that the public has a safe option that is accessible to all and is for non-profit purposes. We thus see the retail CBDC as an essential part of that open infrastructure component of our digital landscape vision.
To sum up, to the extent that the new economy is a reality, its supply-side effects can be expected to make price tendencies somewhat more subdued than otherwise. If the effects are not transitory, they could pave the way for a less tight monetary policy. At the same time, demand is normally affected as well and there is a risk of this getting out of step with the stronger growth. 3. Conditions in Sweden  One approach to the question of whether the new economy could also show up in Sweden involves looking at conditions in Sweden for some of the factors that are generally considered to have played an important role in the United States: the IT revolution, increased competition and the macroeconomic environment. 3.1 One question is how Sweden compares with the United States in terms of the technologies that are considered to drive the process. Although there is a lack of fully comparable statistics, it is hardly controversial to say that IT use in Sweden is high - higher than in many other countries in Europe and possibly much the same as in the United States. The per-capita level of Internet subscriptions is one of the highest in the world, on a par with the United States, and so is the number of PCs per capita. In certain respects Sweden is even ahead of the United States. In per-capita terms, mobile phones are used more in Sweden than in the United States and most other European countries.

Another indication that the workings of the economy may have taken a turn for the better is the Riksbank’s upward revision of potential output in the light of, for example, good productivity growth and very moderate inflationary tendencies even when GDP growth has been comparatively high. At the same time, methods have now been developed that probably enable us to get a little closer to the mark than before. The current output gap estimates, which represent the difference between actual and potential GDP, suggest that total production will rise above the potential level in the coming years. There is nothing dramatic about this, however. In the longer run one would expect the economy to be above its potential level about as much as it is below. As regards potential growth, the Riksbank, like most other observers, now counts on a rate somewhere between 2 and 2.5%. One approach to estimating this rate is based on the trends for labour supply and productivity. The latest assessments from the Medium Term Survey, based on such factors as demographic changes and labour force participation, put the annual increase in the labour force up to 2008 at 0.5%. Labour productivity, according to the available statistics, has risen faster in the 1990s than it did in the 1970s and 1980s; whereas the annual increase in the period 1974-93, for example, averaged approximately 1.4%, since 1994 the rate has averaged about 1.9%.
These arrangements are laid down in the Basic Law which establishes the post-1997 constitution for Hong Kong. It is based on the “one country, two systems” concept under which Hong Kong shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a Special Administrative region of China. In the banking and monetary areas, this means that: Hong Kong shall retain the status of an international financial centre. The Government of Hong Kong shall be responsible for monetary policy and practice in Hong Kong and for regulation of financial markets and institutions. There shall be free flow of capital within, into and out of Hong Kong. The HK dollar, as the local legal tender, shall continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. It must be backed by a 100% reserve fund. The Exchange Fund which holds the foreign currency reserves of Hong Kong shall be managed and controlled by the Government of Hong Kong, primarily for regulating the exchange value of the HK dollar. The framework that will apply after 1997 is therefore quite clear. The question which then follows is whether the framework will be applied in practice. I think that there are a number of good reasons to believe that it will be. In the first place, we now have institutional arrangements in Hong Kong to put the financial sector provisions of the Basic Law into practice.

Rather, the current emphasis is on promoting an informal grouping of central banks called EMEAP (“Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks) which is exploring opportunities for cooperation in areas such as payment systems, reserves management and banking supervision. Among other things, this may provide the opportunity over time to develop a more distinctive and focused regional voice on international supervisory issues. Consolidated supervision I will now return to the topic which I raised at the beginning of my speech, which is how we view consolidated supervision from the receiving end. I suppose that it goes without saying that we are in favour of the concept of consolidated supervision. As an international financial centre, we are vulnerable to adverse developments in banks abroad and we rely heavily on the consolidated supervision of the supervisors of those banks. The ability to conduct consolidated supervision is a key factor in whether we regard the home supervision of a particular bank as adequate - which is one of the criteria for granting a banking licence in Hong Kong. Within the legal framework in Hong Kong we try to cooperate with overseas regulators to ensure that they can effectively undertake consolidated supervision. In particular, we allow home supervisors to carry out on-site examinations of their institutions in Hong Kong subject to obtaining our prior consent - which we have not hitherto withheld.
More concretely, business should understand that bank is an integral part of its activity, if it is willing to be successful for a long-term period. Finally, I would encourage more institutionalised links of the banking system with various business organisations. Maybe it is time that Association of banks establishes regular contacts with business representations, contacts that would certainly upgrade the relations between business and bank to a higher level. Also, I use the opportunity to renew the Bank of Albania commitment to participate in this initiative by offering its expertise in projects, round tables, forums, debates, etc., which will aim at improving the business climate as well as increasing and channelling more efficiently the bank credit. Thank you. 4/4

Prices which reflect real cost are an important instrument in this connection. Norway has a substantial head-start on most other countries in this field. Current prices largely reflect the difference in costs between various payment services, showing that “correct” prices are a suitable instrument in changing behaviour in the payment system. 3.1.2. The use of cash and the paradox of levelling off  Another characteristic of the Norwegian payment system in the 1990s has been the levelling off of the use of cash, when measured as the value of banknote and coin circulation as a share of GDP, following a considerable decrease throughout the 1980s. Chart 5: Cash in circulation as a share of GDP, 1980-1998  Cash in circulation as a percentage of GDP 8%  Percentage of GDP  7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2%  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  1991  1990  1989  1988  1987  1986  1985  1984  1983  1982  1981  0%  1980  1%  Year  Source: Norges Bank: Annual Report on Payment Systems 1990-1998, Annual Report 1980-1990, Statistics Norway: Historical Statistics 1994, Statistical Yearbook of Norway 1999, 1995. From a level of about 7% of GDP at the beginning of the 1980s, it appears that the use of cash may be in the process of levelling off at close to 4%. A similar levelling off has also been observed in other countries, even though the level varies.
Some property companies, which before the current crisis funded parts of their operations abroad, appear to be experiencing difficulties with their funding. 8  In simple terms one can say that the price of a property is determined by the expected operating surplus, that is rental income minus operating and maintenance costs, and by the investors' return requirement, which is the risk-free interest rate plus a risk premium. Investors are prepared to pay more for a property if they expect the rents to increase or if they do not require the capital they invest to generate such a high return. BIS Review 105/2009  5  Let me now say a few words about the Swedish housing market. Here, prices have not fallen in anything like the same way as for commercial properties. Despite the fact that we are experiencing the severest slump of the post-war period, house prices fell by only approximately two percent during the second quarter of this year compared to the same period last year. House prices in Sweden have so far fallen much less than in a number of other industrial countries (see Figure 14). Several of these countries, for example Ireland, Spain and the UK, have, however, had a much more ioverheated housing market than Sweden. Another reason why house prices in Sweden have not fallen as much may be that the Swedish banks have not been hit so hard by the financial crisis that they have found it difficult to lend money to the households.

SEB's market shares in the same period amounted to 24 per cent in Estonia and 15 and 29 per cent in Latvia and Lithuania respectively. 4  IMF (2009) World Economic Outlook, June. 5  Eastern European Consensus Forecast (2009), August. 2  BIS Review 105/2009  the public sector increased by more than 35 per cent in the year prior to the outbreak of the crisis, and in the private sector by over 30 per cent (see Figure 7). As, however, nominal interest rates remained low, the high level of inflation entailed negative real interest rates, which further fuelled the expansion of credit. Even though credit began to expand from a very low level, the rate of development was startling and it did not take long before the debts of the companies in relation to GDP reached levels only slightly below the level of private sector indebtedness in Sweden (see Figure 8). Household indebtedness did not increase quite as much (see Figure 9). As all three countries had also in various ways tied their currencies to the euro with the aim of eventually joining the European Monetary Union, they were not able to use monetary policy to restrict demand. The interest rate weapon was limited to the aim of maintaining the fixed exchange rate. At the same time, fiscal policy was expansionary and accelerated development. Unlike the other countries in the Baltic region, the Baltic states thus entered the global financial crisis with several underlying weaknesses.
22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  Chart 25: Global tariffs Per cent  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  1988  1992  1996  2000  2004  2008  2012  2016  Source: UNCTAD TRAINS from World Bank WITS. Notes: Weighted global mean of all applied tariffs across all products. Recently, that tide of cooperation, including on trade, has shown signs of turning – what Mark Carney recently called a “sea change”.24 After a prolonged period of peace, trade wars are now being waged: tariffs have been introduced on over $ billion of bilateral goods trade between the US and China; further US-China tariffs are threatened; and there are ongoing trade tensions between the US and Mexico and the US and Europe. These developments are reverberating around global financial markets and among companies. Among global investors, trade wars have risen to the top of their worry lists. Negative trade news has weighed on global equity and corporate bond prices and government bond yields, as investors have sought safety. Chart 26 shows the responsiveness of a selection of global asset prices to (positive and negative) trade news. Asset prices have been particularly responsive to trade news during 2019. 24  Carney (2019).

This approach necessitates greater empathy, which can pave the way for Islamic banks to develop more tailor made financial solutions. Assessment of financial applications would also be based on potential value creation and not on credit scores alone – thus opening up exposure to larger segment of potentially viable businesses. This is central in uncovering new markets, such as within the presently unserved and underserved segment of society. A VBI-driven financial institution – would actively seek out opportunities to assist aspiring entrepreneurs that may be struggling to obtain funds, but have business models that, despite being untested, are more socially responsible or green in nature. VBI therefore considers a broader spectrum of criteria as opposed to the traditional method that places emphasis on credit history and availability of collaterals. VBI also promotes more holistic offerings for entrepreneurs and I would like to suggest several examples to illustrate – how Islamic banks can extend its scope of business to benefit SMEs. In providing infrastructure support, an example is through provision of physical premises that can be rented by SMEs to conduct their businesses at lower rentals. There is an example of a product in the market today, where factory spaces are provided for SMEs to rent at affordable rates, equipped with amenities to cater to the needs of the entrepreneurs. In addition, entrepreneurship training and consulting services are also offered to them. This can particularly assist in increasing entrepreneurial involvement in the manufacturing industry.
Given this, we decided at the monetary policy meeting last Tuesday to hold the repo rate unchanged at 4.25 per cent. The repo rate path remains the same as in February. A repo rate of around 4.25 per cent over the coming year will contribute to bringing inflation back towards the target of 2 per cent a couple of years ahead and contribute to a balanced development in production and employment. However, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the economic outlook and inflation prospects. Conditions for the Riksbank’s monetary policy steering system How is an interest rate decision put into practice? What actually happens when the Executive Board decides that the repo rate should be raised, cut or held unchanged? This can best be answered with a description of how our system works. Like many other central banks, the Riksbank aims its monetary policy at steering the shortest market rate, the overnight rate. This can be done in many different ways. We have a system where we decide the conditions for the banks’ deposits and loans with the Riksbank. The Riksbank supplies a payment system, RIX, which manages payments in Swedish krona. A payment system is an infrastructure that makes it possible to forward payments from one bank to another, and thus payments from households’ and companies’ accounts in one bank to the recipient’s account in another bank. RIX consists of an account system where each of the participating banks has its own account in which payments between the banks are booked.

But the Riksbank also wants the overnight rate to be stable and close to the repo rate, which is in the middle of the interest rate corridor. In other words, we want the overnight rate to be predictable and not to fluctuate within the corridor. The reason why the overnight rate can vary is that the bank system as a whole may have a need to borrow or invest. This means that one or more banks may have a minus or plus in their accounts in RIX at the end of the day, even after adjustments on the overnight market. Without any other alternative, this would mean that banks with a deficit would have to borrow from the Riksbank at the lending rate, and banks with a surplus would have to invest at the deposit rate. The effect would be an overnight rate that varies within the corridor. To prevent this, the Riksbank accomodates the bank system’s total borrowing or investment requirement every week at the repo rate. We thus make sure that the bank system as a whole firstly borrows or deposits at the repo rate, and thus minimise the banks’ need to use the standing facilities. At the same time, we signal the level at which the Executive Board wants the overnight rate to lie in the coming week. In recent years the bank system as a whole has needed to borrow from the Riksbank.