samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Constant change – and commitment to evolution – is not a choice. It is a necessity to remain relevant and provide a safe, sound and accessible financial sector that also contributes to the health, vitality and dynamic growth of our economy. Overall, we want smooth, efficient markets that support global growth. We want to continue to reduce the systemic risk posed by firms that are large, complex and interconnected. We want to ensure fair access to credit for all. And we want a strong, resilient, safe financial system. Our challenge is how to balance all of these “wants.” As we strive to find the balance, it is important that we continue to have productive engagements with you, the industry. We need honest, frank and educated discussions. And we need to work together to gain a better understanding of our shared goals and how to get there. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9

There is a risk of confusing the market or of "tying up” both the discussion at the monetary policy meeting and the actual interest rate decision. As the need for signalling has also declined with the changes made in our communication, as I see it there is good reason to reconsider the forms for signalling. What conclusion do I reach then? Well, as I see it, it should normally be enough to give clear signals in connection with the seven monetary policy meetings held every year. Only in exceptional cases is there a need to signal prior to the monetary policy meetings. And this is the way it has functioned in practice in recent years. In the cases where we nevertheless choose to signal prior to a meeting, it should in my opinion be clear who is behind the message, for instance, the entire Executive Board. This method of working also guarantees the principle of following correct procedures and observable decision-making that in my opinion is required in our role as public authority. Let me point out that what I have said should not be interpreted as advocating a transition from an individualistic to a collegial committee, or “putting a lid on” internal differences of opinion. Of course the individual Executive Board members should continue to be able to express their own opinions publicly. But as I see it, this should be more a question of afterwards clarifying and explaining personal deliberations made in connection with the monetary policy meetings.
Achieving those was about to get much more complicated as summer came to an abrupt end. III. Autumn – Managing the trade-off in the exceptional circumstances of Brexit The main challenge facing the MPC most recently has been to support the UK economy through Brexit. To maintain the seasonal metaphor, recent years could be described as autumnal, consistent with the start of that season being associated with big changes like beginning a new school year or a new job. Prior to the referendum, the MPC expected that a vote to leave would prompt the exchange rate to fall sharply, inflation to rise above the 2% target, and growth to slow materially.14 That is exactly what happened (Charts 8a, b and c). Chart 8: Following vote to leave EU, sterling depreciated, inflation rose and growth slowed materially a) Sterling ERI  EU referendum  Index, Jan 2005 = 100 95 90 85 80  EU summit 75  Jan. 15 14  Jul. 15  Jan. 16  Jul. 16  Jan. 17  Jul. 17  70 Jan. 18  See the May 2016 Inflation Report.

Unusually during an expansion, business investment has contracted in four out of the past seven quarters and is currently estimated to be just 1½% higher than at the time of the referendum, with cumulative growth more than 20 percentage points less than forecast in the MPC’s May 2016 projections. Household spending growth has remained more resilient, supported by strength in employment and pay, but over the past year it too has slowed as uncertainty about the overall economic outlook has become more entrenched. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  18  Chart 12: More recent deterioration in global and domestic growth a) Global GDP growth Percentage changes on a year earlier 4  EU referendum  3.5 PPP-weighted world GDP 3 2.5 2  UK- weighted world GDP  1.5 2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  Sources: Datastream from Refinitiv, IMF October 2019 WEO and Bank calculations. b) UK GDP growth Quarterly growth (%) 0.5 GDP growth  Potential GDP growth  0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0  2017-18 average  2019 average  In the MPC’s most recent projections, we expected these negative trends to reverse. Overall, UK GDP growth was projected to pick up from current below-potential rates, supported by the reduction of Brexitrelated uncertainties, an easing of fiscal policy and a modest recovery in global growth. This rebound is not, of course, assured. The economy has been sluggish, slack has been growing, and inflation is below target.
Threats to the global outlook began to intensify, driven primarily by the euro sovereign debt crisis and signs of continued fragility in the US economic recovery. Domestically, the devastating floods in the fourth quarter of last year caused severe disruptions to our agricultural and manufacturing industries in affected areas. With upside risks to inflation deemed to be contained, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) agreed that there was room to address the heightened risk to growth and the policy rate was reduced by a total of 50 basis points over two meetings. The current rate of 3.00 percent was judged to be accommodative for domestic recovery as well as supportive of long-term economic stability. This is the story up to now. While the overall environment is improving, one cannot afford to be complacent. The events over the past few years has reminded us that things that seem under control can get out of hand very quickly. So, let me take you farther down the road of 2012–2013. I would like to focus on two key issues. The first concerns future challenges facing Thailand. The second then addresses the Bank of Thailand (BOT)’s policy focus, going forward. First, on the challenges. On the external front, uncertainties surrounding the global recovery remain substantial. Major advanced economies are still grappling with structural weaknesses in their economies. Most prominent is the substantial debt-overhang. In the euro area, this is mainly in the form of sovereign debt. In the US, the problem lies primarily with private sector debt.

As a result, policies have gained credibility and the inflation target has become a more credible nominal anchor for economic agents. This in turn has strengthened the disinflation policy and ensured its continuity. As another development, the Turkish economy has been enjoying high rates of growth for three consecutive years in the falling inflation environment. The GNP growth rate was 9.9 percent in 2004. Accordingly, the real growth rate compared to 2001 was 25.5 percent. 6  BIS Review 38/2005  However, even more important than achieving high growth rates is that dynamics of growth in the Turkish economy are now changing. Now, growth is mainly driven by the productivity increase, comes from the private sector and increase in exports. This provides confidence regarding achieving sustainable growth rates in the future. I want to emphasize that, not only recent developments in macroeconomic fundamentals but also the commitment to prudent policies in the medium-term economic program, prospects of EU membership and the new standby agreement with the IMF help the Turkish economy to operate in an equilibrium of good expectations. Dear Participants, I want to mention that the Central Bank’s commitment to start full fledged inflation targeting in 2006 will deliver extra confidence to economic agents in terms of prudent policies. The full fledged inflation targeting regime will bring more transparency to the actions of the Bank and also enhance the communication policy that the Central Bank put at the center of its policies since the 2001 crisis.
At the monetary policy meeting of 11 August, the Executive Board stated that new information since the previous monetary policy meeting does not suggest that we should deviate from the interest rate path envisaged in the June Inflation Report. Monetary policy easing through 2003 and into 2004 has resulted in low real interest rates. Short-term real interest rates may now be considerably lower than the level that implies long-term balance in the economy – the neutral real interest rate. A low real interest rate, and expectations of a continued low real interest rate, will contribute to stimulating activity even after the effects of the interest rate fall unwind. Calculations may, on an uncertain basis, indicate that the neutral real interest rate for Norway lies between 2½ and 3½%. It has probably fallen somewhat in recent years. Although the projections are based on rising real interest rates, the real interest rate will be lower than the neutral rate during the entire period. The monetary policy stance is therefore expansionary. So far,  the effects do not appear to be stronger than expected, but we have little experience of such low interest rates. It is uncertain how quickly prices and wages will react when growth in output and employment picks up. There is also a risk that an interest rate that is kept low for a longer period may lead to expectations of a persistently low interest rate. This may involve a risk of persistently high capacity utilisation and inflation eventually overshooting the target.

We also see no justification for maintaining restrictions on food exports by some food-rich countries, on medicine by some producing  2  countries, and sanctions on some major oil exporters when the world is beset by high food and energy insecurity and health crisis. We endorse the GPA’s emphasis on “acting together and acting now” to alleviate the immediate hardship due to successive years of global crises, and to build resilience for addressing future shocks that could come with more frequency and greater severity. However, as mentioned earlier, the basic requirement of “acting together” for the common good is at risk by the growing global fragmentation into economic and trade blocks, including the critical energy sector. We welcome the IMF’s continued commitment to help members in need by enhancing and adapting its lending toolkit. The newly established Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) is an important addition to the IMF’s toolkit to help members build strong resilience to various shocks, including climate change and pandemics, through long term financing. We are encouraged by the strong uptake so far and look forward to seeing several RST-backed programs brought for the Board’s consideration by the end of this year. Against the background of swift tightening of global financial conditions, we are concerned about the precarious debt situation and the diminished debt service capacity of LICs and EMDEs, with many of them already in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, it would be more appropriate if depositors are more fully aware of the basic fact of finance: higher returns are generally accompanied by a higher degree of risk and possible volatility, and depositors should be fully aware of this fact. The deposit guarantee scheme should not be exploited to hide this basic fact of finance. Furthermore, higher deposit rates would require increased loan rates or investments in higher yielding assets. Both of these carry risks which, in the current lower interest rate environment, may lead to greater risk being assumed than perhaps would be the case in normal circumstances. It is therefore prudent for such institutions to hold an increased level of capital buffers so as to compensate for the elevated risk. Indeed, in recent discussions which I had with another euro area central bank governor, an approach that his institution uses is to require higher capital requirements when deposit rates exceed Euribor by more than 300 basis points. This is an interesting proposal which merits further analysis. At the international level, the limitations of current regulation and supervision have become more and more evident with the severity of the financial crisis. Too much attention was focused on individual institutions thereby overlooking the macro-prudential risks. In reaction to this, European institutions and member states have engaged in a major overhaul of bank regulation and supervision, with the objective of making financial institutions safe, sound and transparent.

Fraziali Ismail: Climate action in the Malaysian financial sector Keynote address by Mr Fraziali Ismail, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the International Greentech & Eco Products Exhibition & Conference Malaysia, virtual, 20 October 2020. * * * To date, there is a genuine buzz in global climate action. The Paris Agreement, with 197 signatories, provides a pathway for nations to step up their climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. The UK for example, is committed to a ground-breaking target of net zero carbon emissions by 2050. There is zero budget natural farming in Andhra Pradesh in India, the great pivot to natural farming in China, the wide spread adoption of electric buses in public transport urban fleets all over the world, including Malaysia. Seventy two central banks and supervisors around the world, including Malaysia have come together via the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) to pursue climate action. This coalition of the willing has initiated several initiatives such as identification of best practices on supervisory and macrofinancial dimensions of climate-related risks. The issue is clearly now being mainstreamed in discussions at international and state levels, among regulatory agencies, at board levels across industries, in schools, and the list goes on. But while the hills are covered, there are mountains ahead. Green financing is still lacking; green investments remain under funded.
India has acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and adopted the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, signalling its strong commitment to ensure peace and security in the region. India is now a dialogue partner with ASEAN at the Summit level. Last year, the leaders adopted the suggestion of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and signed the ASEAN-India Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, an interim step towards an eventual ASEAN-India FTA. Both sides have agreed to start negotiations on trade in goods this year, including an ?early harvest programme? to boost trade in selected sectors. Singapore supports this far-sighted initiative and will work actively with India and other ASEAN members to fulfil this vision. The India-Singapore CECA Bilaterally, India and Singapore are already negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA), which will be a firm basis for expanding the India-ASEAN relationship. The rewards are not only economic, but also strategic. Singapore naturally hopes to gain freer access to the Indian market. But the benefits extend well beyond this. Singapore wants to strengthen its economic ties with many different centres of prosperity and growth, and not be overly dependent on one or two major trading partners. A strong relationship with India will complement our rapidly growing links with China, and help us to realise the strategy of growing two external wings in the region, with the two emerging economic giants.

Lee Hsien Loong: Connecting India and Singapore Keynote address by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Standard Chartered Bank’s Singapore Conference, Mumbai, 16 January 2004. *  *  *  Introduction I am delighted to be here today to address the Standard Chartered Bank’s Singapore Conference. We stand on the threshold of a major transformation in Asia. With a combined population of 3 billion people, Asia is the largest and most promising region in the world today. It includes Japan, not fully recovered from its post-bubble malaise, but still the second largest economy in the world, with deep capabilities and advanced technology. It includes South Korea, which took painful measures to open up its economy and restructure its chaebol-centred industrial system. And it includes Southeast Asia, whose countries have put behind them the trauma of the Asian Financial Crisis, and are growing and attracting investments again. The biggest stories in Asia are China and India. It has been projected that China’s GDP could overtake Germany in the next four years, Japan by 2015, and the US by 2039. India too is opening up and growing strongly, and could become the 3rd largest economy in the world within 30 years. Globalisation plays a big part in Asia’s vitality. It has resulted in more Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into Asia, and created jobs and prosperity for Asians.
Almost all NPLs of government banks have been transferred to AMCs, and all multi-creditor NPLs of private commercial banks have been transferred to the TAMC. And we will speed up our effort to clear them out. However, please be informed that when similar financial crises occurred in the US in 1982, the US economy was not in as bad a shape as Thailand has experienced in the past four years. At that time, Japan, Europe and the Middle-Eastern economies were strong and contributed certain capital flows into the US economy. But now, under current world economic conditions, where every country has its own problems to solve, we know well that we cannot expect foreign investors to help us clear this NPL mess, so we have to help ourselves. I do not see why we cannot do it. And we will do it. Back to the economic forecast for next year. One important source of growth in 2002 will be fiscal spending, and the projected central government deficit of 224 billion baht or 4.4 percent of GDP strikes a good balance between improving the economic infrastructure, raising external competitiveness, and fostering economic recovery. It is very important, however, that the fiscal stimulus program meets its spending target. 2  BIS Review 99/2001  Safeguarding the recovery would require timely as well as effective disbursements of the 58 billion baht emergency spending plan.

All in all, we are expecting GDP to increase fairly strongly in 2011 and 2012, by around 3.5 per cent a year (Figure 7). This nevertheless means that it will take roughly three years before GDP is back at the same level as prior to the crisis. Figure 7 Employment has fallen less than expected Employment and Swedish GDP, annual percentage change  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Resource utilisation in Sweden is at present very low. The crisis may have lowered the economy’s long-term output level – it is not unusual that such radical changes will have a more lasting negative effect on both capital and labour. But one can probably assume nevertheless that there will be ample spare capacity which can be used relatively smoothly in the upturn. This will entail, for instance, the need for investment, particularly in manufacturing, remaining low for some time to come. It also means that there is hardly any reason to expect a strong growth in employment over the coming period (Figure 7). We are also assuming that the labour market will continue to weaken somewhat, but that the downturn has begun to slow down. It is worth noting that employment has nevertheless been maintained better than we had previously assumed. Unemployment is still expected to be high, but the situation does look much brighter now than in recent assessments and we have gradually revised down our forecasts.
At the start of my testimony, I stressed that the key objective of economic policy at the current stage of the crisis must be to ensure the most favourable conditions possible for when the economy emerges from lockdown. However, more persistent adverse effects on certain sectors after the pandemic has been brought under control cannot be ruled out, although it is undoubtedly too early to anticipate how extensive they will be, or which activities will bear the brunt of the impact. Further, certain tentative indications suggest that, in the long term, demand could fall in some sectors, such as retail trade, and increase in others, such as logistics, technology, and IT systems. In view of this possibility, it would seem advisable to make the relevant preparations through arrangements to ease cross-sectoral and cross-company reallocation and to strengthen the lifelong learning of workers, especially considering that a priori the cross-sector transferability of knowledge between potential losers and potential winners does not appear to be particularly feasible.12  11  For illustrative purposes, if, as a result of implementing structural reforms, potential growth were to rise by 0.5 pp per annum, the debt ratio under the previous simulation would be 6 pp lower in 2030. 12 B. Anghel, A. Lacuesta and A. V. Regil (2020), “Transferibilidad de habilidades de los trabajadores en los sectores potencialmente afectados tras el Covid-19”, Artículos Analíticos, Banco de España, forthcoming.

Only in this way, they may find themselves able to sail into the international waters. Thank you. BIS Review 148/2008  3
It is these risks that are particularly relevant for risk management in banks, following an economic dictum that has been attributed to several people over the years, including an author of science fiction novels and an American General. The general was Leonard Porter Ayres, who also worked as a statistician and economist. When asked by a group of reporters to impart some words of wisdom gathered from his long years of economic study, Ayres replied: “It is an immutable economic fact that there is no such thing as a free lunch.” I am pretty sure that everyone in this room has used that phrase at least once. Translated into the language of finance, it reads: whoever wants to make a profit has to take a risk. The returns, however, are mostly generated right away, whereas the risk might only materialise in the future. This is where good risk management comes into play. Banks and the entire banking system have indeed become much more resilient to shocks. Nevertheless, good risk management is still necessary. It should enrich decision-making by providing a medium and long-term view, and it should highlight the downside to every upside. In a way, risk managers have to be the spoilsports. The same is, of course, true for banking supervisors. One of the tasks of banking supervisors is to ask questions when things are going well, and to intervene when they are not. Therefore, risk managers, as well as banking supervisors, explicitly advocate a forwardlooking, risk-based approach.

Regarding the causes, it seems that markets were driven by a broad set of worries relating to three different areas: •  first, the state of the global economy, including weak growth and weak investment, uncertainty with regard to China and emerging markets, as well as worries about the impact of low oil prices on the financial sector;  •  second, the new regulatory environment, including the concrete implementation of the new bail-in regime established by the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive;  •  and third, some idiosyncratic issues that caused broader concerns. When you listen to some observers, you might get the impression that 2008 is not far away these days. Personally, I would rather argue that it is reasonably far away. In terms of capital ratios as a measure of the resilience of banks, it is actually a couple of percentage points away – since 2008, banks in the euro area have increased their Tier 1 capital ratios from 8.4% to 13.7%. After all, it is not just a matter of the amount of capital held by the banks. It is also a question of capital quality. And that, too, improved dramatically as a result of regulatory reforms in 2010. Euro area banks focus on Common Equity Tier 1 or CET1, the highest quality of capital. The average fully-loaded CET1 ratio of all banks directly supervised by the ECB stood at 12% at the end of last year and will have moved beyond this mark as we speak, pending annual results.