samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With the present fiscal stimulus no longer a factor, however, economic growth is likely to slow down distinctly again next year but should remain robust. We still anticipate an upswing in the EU in the coming year. It is probable, however, that it will take slightly longer to close the output gap than we assumed as recently as September. Inflationary pressure from abroad will thus remain moderate although inflation in other countries will not recede as markedly either in the coming year as we expected three months ago. Furthermore, we anticipate a decline in the price of oil to approximately USD 25 per barrel in the course of 2004. On the assumption that the three-month Libor rate will remain stable at 0.25% during the next three years, inflation should average 0.4% in 2004, 1.0% in 2005 and 2.3% in 2006. The inflation trend according to the new forecast will exceed the September forecast until mid-2005. Until the end of 2004, inflation is likely to remain fairly stable at around 0.5% and to fluctuate only slightly due to basis effects. The new forecast shows that the threat of negative inflation rates has diminished. This is the result of an improvement in the global economy and of the less marked decline in inflation abroad, as also of the weaker Swiss franc vis-à-vis the euro. As from the beginning of 2005, inflation will show a rising trend due to the expansionary monetary policy we took as an assumption.

The industry plays a key role in helping contain costs and to align the consumers and medical industry towards preventive care measures. This will reduce the burden of individuals in society, especially those less privileged. Further, the world’s population is ageing and Malaysia is not far from this. An ageing population will put pressure on growth and the social protection system. Insurance will have a role to play in ensuring the life, health and pension needs of society are met in a sustainable manner. These demands on the industry are far from trivial and will not be met without strong leadership, a longer-term view on investments in capacity, and a relentless focus on quality standards and operational efficiency. Yet, today these conditions remain hampered by what is still a fragmented industry. It is therefore timely, if not more urgent, for institutions to consider synergistic partnerships to achieve the scale and competitive edge to lift performance and break into new markets. Our economy is in need of transformational change in the insurance sector – not incremental ones. To achieve this, we believe there is room for further consolidation in the industry. Technology and innovation Let me turn to our views on innovation. This industry has no shortage of evidence of its ability to seize opportunities provided by technology to improve itself. In the United States in the 1950s, the life insurance industry was one of the first and largest commercial users of the computer during its formative years.
Chart 8: UK market interest rates still responsive to economic data news UK US Euro area  Rolling 1-year sensitivity  Lehman collapse  US presidential election  Draghi "whatever it takes" speech  0.7 0.6 0.5  EU referendum  Eurozone debt crisis  0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. Notes: Dotted lines show 2004 – 2017 averages. For details of the methodology, see 'Stirred not shaken: how market interest rates have been reacting to economic data surprises' , Bank Underground blog. Chart 9: Interest rate volatility as percentile of historic distribution since 1997 Percentile 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 Jun. 16  Sep. 16  Dec. 16  Mar. 17  Jun. 17  Sep. 17  Dec. 17  Mar. 18  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., ICE and Bank calculations. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Guidance into Brexit Now, with the excess supply in the economy virtually used up and the Brexit date looming, monetary policy could travel along two broad paths. The first path is consistent with the MPC’s current central projection which assumes a smooth transition to a Brexit that is the average of a range of outcomes. In this case, the Committee’s reaction function will become conventional again, with the path of policy driven primarily by demand.

Although inflation is projected to fall further over this year as the impact of sterling’s past depreciation continues to wane, building domestic inflationary pressures mean inflation settles at the 2% target around mid-2020. As the MPC has stressed, were the economy to develop broadly in line with the May Inflation Report projections, an ongoing tightening of monetary policy over the forecast period would be appropriate to return inflation sustainably to its target at a conventional horizon. One simple way to illustrate the potential need for modest rate rises is to look at the Committee’s projection conditioned on a constant rate. In it, excess demand increases to close to 1% of GDP three years from now and inflation is well above target at 2.4% at years 2 and 3 (Chart 10).
In the decade prior to the crisis, labour costs grew by around 2½ per cent each year on average, with wages and salaries growing at around 4¾ per cent and productivity at 2¼ per cent. Inflation averaged 2 per cent, 27 however, in part because import prices rose only by around ¼ per cent each year at the same time. The possibility that history might repeat itself points to a third important consideration: the need to monitor developments in firms’ costs other than labour. The sum of these is evident in so-called “core” inflation, which are measures of prices that strip out the most volatile determinants of inflation, like energy prices, revealing more persistent trends. In an open economy like the United Kingdom’s, those factors include import prices, which are affected by movements in the value of sterling, and which, on past experience, can take a considerable time to pass through to core inflation. 28  24  In our May projections, the MPC expected PPP-weighted worth growth of 3 ¼ per cent in 2015 and 3 ¾ per cent in 2016 and 2017, just shy of the pre-crisis average of around 4 per cent. 25  I discussed labour supply developments in the UK in detail last autumn. See Carney, M (2014), Speech to the Trades Union Congress Annual Conference, 9th September 2014. 26  Unlike regular pay, bonuses are closer in spirit to dividend payments, being state-contingent disbursements of profits.

By the end of the third quarter of 2009, the total assets of Islamic investment funds were estimated at about $ 27 billion, spread across 478 Islamic investment funds worldwide. Dear audience Islamic banking contributes to social and economic development through investment in areas related to the real economy such as production of goods and services and commerce. In addition, Islamic Banks and Institutions have proved their success in attracting savings, fulfilling customer’s needs and achieving their interests. Moreover, Islamic banking has made great strides in boosting banking business by introducing innovated products and tools and by adopting new financing forms such as Ijarah (leasing), Istisnaa and Salam, along with Mudarabah (profit and loss sharing) and Musharakah (partnership). Furthermore, a variety of Islamic Sukuk (Islamic bonds) has emerged, and some Islamic banks have started to arrange for syndicated financing transactions in accordance with Islamic forms, and others are managing Shari’ah-compliant investment funds. Every tool of the Islamic banking has its own contractual nature and features, which differ from other tools in terms of risks, guarantees and pricing. Islamic banking services have not been confined to the activities mentioned earlier, but the scope of their transactions has been extended to include other services such as: providing joint finance, issuing banking bonds and opening letters of credit. Islamic institutions and banks provide a variety of finance and insurance methods for enterprises, management of financial portfolios, and Tawarruq assets (assets securitization).
With a fully  2  BIS Review 18/2009  solvent banking system, guarantees may be given without exposure of the tax payers to unacceptable risk (just to mention that the British tax payers currently have larger claims in the form of bank assets, as collateral maintained by the Bank of England, than the total value of the banks' capital in England). That is the reason why the morning of October 8, the Prime Minister of England and the Minister announced the plan for recapitalization of the banking system, which was then, one way or another, followed by others in the world, primarily USA and Europe. More precisely, why did this radical plan have to follow? When the financial turmoil commenced (in August 2007), the markets of numerous financial instruments, including the MBS (mortgage-backed securities), ceased functioning. They dried out. Most of the analysts thought that it is on a temporary basis. But, the time passed and the markets failed to reopen. It became clear that the problem is much bigger. The concern that insolvency is in question was rising and it was verified. Actually, it became evident that the main problem is solvency and sustainability of the financing model. That is why the liquidity injecting was only intended to buy some time.

On the financial markets, the trust to the others plummeted to a point below which the investors sought their way out mainly in the government instruments, for example US Treasury Bills, which at a certain point had a negative yield. Distrust went much further than the sub-group of vulnerable banks. The reports reveal that USA and Europe have registered market losses from the asset loans of nearly 3 trillion US Dollars. Regardless of the fact that all these losses will not encumber the banks and can overemphasize the losses of those able to keep the debt until the maturity, the investors and their partners became very concerned about the amount of the actual losses in the banking and trade portfolio in broader scope of the institutions and their capability to continue financing their business. The focus of the concern moved from prospective profitability to prospective survival. That is why the CDS premium increased to unprecedented ranges, the prices of the banks' shares plunged, while the money market overdried. The interbank lending margin deepened dramatically, the lending, as I mentioned previously, reduced to only overnight loans. Around October 6 and7 even the overnight loans stopped. How did the central banks of the countries in the crisis' epicenter respond? In the beginning, the central banks were committed to provide liquidity as much as necessary. The volume of the liquidity support from the central banks of USA, England, Europe was without precedent in the history so far.
This builds on the foundations of a new responsible global financial system that are being put in place. The combination of robust international standards and greater trust as a consequence of transparent implementation and intensive supervisory cooperation can create a system of enhanced equivalence and mutual deference. Such an approach would allow capital to move more freely, efficiently and sustainably between jurisdictions. With robust standards consistently applied, wholesale financial services could be brought more fully into trade agreements, keeping the global financial system open and resilient, and supporting greater trade, investment and innovation. This high road leads to more jobs, higher sustainable growth, and better risk management across the G20. Working Together to Take Full Advantage The high road can be followed if my third priority – taking full advantage of the progress made – is pursued. In this regard, it is important not just to recognise progress made but how it has been made. The FSB has succeeded by emphasising collaboration, consensus and openness. Its strength lies in its members who bring authority, expertise and shared objectives. The FSB is not a treaty-based organisation, so its standards do not have direct force in any member jurisdiction. Decisions are ultimately matters for national authorities who – acting out of enlightened selfinterest and in recognition of the benefits of a resilient and open global financial system – guide and discipline the reform process.

In order to counteract, for instance, that certain changes in charges lead to CPI exceeding the target, we would be obliged to carry out a monetary policy that would either lead to the use of resources in the economy being too low or too high. Provided that inflationary expectations are not affected, we can, to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in output, therefore decide in certain cases to conduct a monetary policy that leads to the CPI target not being achieved in a 1-2 year time perspective. For instance, we have normally decided to disregard certain factors that affect CPI by focusing monetary policy on UND1X - a price measure that disregards housing costs and indirect taxes and fees. Concern for macroeconomic stability can in certain cases also justify our extending or shortening the time horizon. It is, for instance, conceivable that it may be justified to extend the target horizon if we make the assessment that there is a risk of a substantial increase in inflation immediately after the normal horizon. If, in such a situation, we wait to increase the interest rate and thus comply with the main rule, we could subsequently end up in a situation where we were forced to increase the interest rate very sharply to avoid inflation expectations accelerating and persisting when inflation rises  BIS Review 98/2000  4  rapidly. However, a large interest rate increase would have negative effects for output and employment in the short term.
Furthermore, many NCBs in what is now the euro area were pursuing exchange rate targets within the context of the European Monetary System. In several cases, central banks adopted various combinations of the above approaches. This rich and varied experience provided the context in which the ECB’s strategy was designed. I should like to make two observations. BIS Review 44/2000  2  First, the range of approaches employed by NCBs in what is now the euro area was considerable. Nevertheless, once the commitment to price stability was affirmed, each of these approaches achieved a large measure of success. The convergence of inflation rates to low and stable levels across the euro area in the 1990s was a significant - and, in many quarters, unexpected - achievement. In my view, this experience offers a powerful illustration that there are several ways to achieve and maintain price stability. The strategy adopted by a central bank should reflect the circumstances that it faces, including the initial conditions and consequent need for transition. Those who claim that there is only one acceptable or efficient way to operate monetary policy fly in the face of history and experience. Second, on the basis of our investigations of these various approaches conducted at the EMI, we concluded that the differences among various central bank strategies - differences which are often highlighted in the academic and journalistic debate - are much less important than the similarities.

In such a case, the policy makers are left in a big trade off between monetary policy independence and balance sheet mismatches 7 . Obviously, there is not one single commonly accepted solution for all countries. Nevertheless, country experiences in recent years have shown us that there is a tendency in choosing more flexible exchange rate regimes under the assumption that vulnerabilities regarding mismatch problems are accurately hedged. Subsequently, dollarization affects monetary policy through the increased volatility of money demand. Thus, the traditional transmission of monetary policy would not work properly as central banks have no direct control over foreign currency assets. Accordingly, as Kevin Cowan and his colleague 8 mentioned in their study, dollarization limits the capacity of central banks to conduct stabilizing monetary policy in the short run and to a large extent limits the ability of monetary authority gain credibility in the long run. Distinguished Guests, Having given a brief introduction into the notion of dollarization, now I would like to talk about the Turkish case. As in the evidence of the other countries, the dollarization in Turkey also took its roots from macroeconomic instability with fixed or predictable exchange rate regimes, inefficient market regulations and the lack of credibility of economic policies. In order to comprehend the dollarization in Turkey better, it would be reasonable to look at the macroeconomic instability and examine the evolution of dollarization in a historical perspective.
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database. (a) Indicator based on responses to the following question in the World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey: “To what extent does FDI bring new technology into your country? (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent – FDI is a key source of new technology)”. Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2014. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Cash and nominal government bonds facilitate regular operational needs and can be quickly deployed to fulfil urgent liquidity needs under stressed conditions. Advanced economy inflation-linked bonds are less liquid than nominal bonds but provide inflation protection. Equities provide exposure to long-term growth assets with higher return potential but also with higher risk. MAS’ investment horizon is longer than that of many central banks. This has given MAS the flexibility to invest in more volatile (and longer ‘duration’) asset classes beyond fixed income, including equities. Both the risk management framework and strategic asset allocation are approved by the MAS Board of Directors and reviewed regularly. Efficient investment process MAS strives to achieve an efficient investment process, underpinned by two elements: one, judicious benchmark selection and customisation; and two, tapping on specialised external investment expertise First, benchmark selection. MAS uses asset class benchmarks to represent the investment universe and risk profile of each asset class that can be easily replicated, to evaluate its investment performance. These benchmarks could be market-capitalisation weighted or customised. For some asset classes, we have chosen to apply certain customisations to marketcapitalisation weighted benchmarks, guided by considerations of liquidity, stability, and concentration risk. 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  One area we have applied customisation is in the fixed income asset class, where it is relatively more important to guard against concentration risk. This is because the response to credit risk is more asymmetric for fixed income than for equities.
Since the mid-1990s, a main purpose of the economic policy framework has been to shelter the economy from fluctuations in oil prices. The set-up of the Government Pension Fund Global and the fiscal rule for petroleum revenue spending is one important defence mechanism in this context. The government’s net cash flow from the petroleum industry is transferred in its entirety to the Government Pension Fund Global. A transfer from the Fund to cover a non-oil budget deficit requires a decision by the Norwegian parliament. In addition to preserving the real value of the Fund for the benefit of future generations, this set-up insulates the budget from short-term fluctuations in petroleum revenues. It also leaves space for fiscal policy to counteract economic downturns. In effect, since 2013, the increase in oil revenue spending has roughly matched the fall in oil investment. Monetary policy has also played a role. Our monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5% over time. Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. With confidence in the inflation target among economic agents, monetary policy in Norway has been able to contribute to stabilising the business cycle. Lower income from oil exports following the fall in the oil price meant cost-competitiveness needed to improve. A floating exchange rate greatly facilitated this process.

The key policy rate was lowered and has been kept at 0.5 percent since March 2016. Our experience has shown us the crucial importance of flexibility in inflation targeting in enabling us to make the appropriate trade-offs in response to shocks to the economy. The time horizon for achieving the target must be sufficiently long, and the balance of risks, including risks related to financial stability, must be taken into account. The past couple of years have been demanding for the Norwegian economy, and the transition towards being less oil-dependent is ongoing. New sectors must grow to offset the downturn in petroleum-related industries. Monetary policy can facilitate this process, but the necessary adjustments must take place in the business sector. At its September meeting, Norges Bank’s Executive Board decided to keep the key policy rate unchanged at 0.5 percent. The Executive Board’s current assessment of the outlook and balance of risks suggests that the key policy rate will remain at today’s level in the period ahead, followed by a gradual increase to close to 1.5 percent towards the end of 2020. Inflation is expected to remain low in the years ahead. At the end of 2020, inflation is projected to be just below 2 percent. Capacity utilisation for the economy as a whole is projected to rise gradually and to be somewhat above a normal level in 2020. This assessment is based on the outlook for economic developments abroad.