samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At this point, I would like to highlight that the measures that we adopted in 2010 to contain the negative effects of the rapid credit growth created by ample global liquidity are critical for maintaining financial stability and enhancing resilience to external shocks; yet, their impacts on loans are expected to be observed with a lag. This matter deserves close attention, which is why I will be returning to this issue in the upcoming parts of my speech. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Distinguished Guests, 28. The decline in public revenues due to global crisis driven economic contraction and the comprehensive fiscal stimulus packages to alleviate the effects of the crisis led to large fiscal deficits and rising debt stocks across the globe, especially in advanced economies. Many emerging economies, including Turkey, are on a more stable fiscal footing, as they entered the crisis with relatively low budget deficits and debt stock, adopted relatively less comprehensive fiscal stimulus measures and recovered more swiftly. 29. The October 2010 MTP for the 2011–2013 period envisages a gradual decline in non-interest expenditures to GDP ratio by 2010. In addition, interest expenditures are expected to decrease amid falling domestic borrowing rates. Tax revenues are planned to be raised by legal and administrative measures aiming to enhance tax audits and expand the tax base. It is notable that the ratio of public debt to GDP has reverted to a downward track amid the gradual reduction in the budget deficit. 30.

Less short termism: the promise of significant returns in the short term was often linked to a misjudgement of underlying risk. At the level of individual institutions, compensation schemes must be adjusted to avoid encouraging excessive risktaking on the basis of relatively small amounts of capital. Instead, the incentive structure should encourage profitability over the medium to longer term. At the same time, on Wednesday, the European Parliament approved significant curbs on bank bonuses as part of wider efforts to reform the financial sector. EU finance ministers are set to endorse the law next Tuesday with the curbs taking effect from the start of next year. At the level of the financial system as a whole, we need to improve decisively the prevention of build-up of risks, including systemic risk. Macroprudential oversight will help to prevent the building up of imbalances. The third area of work concerns fiscal consolidation. This affects all industrial economies. Governments must send a clear message to markets – a message of determination and commitment to sound macroeconomic policies. There is no doubt that  2  BIS Review 97/2010  bold government actions including large capital injections in support of the financial sector helped to cushion the impact of the financial crisis. These measures were courageous and important in avoiding an even worse economic downturn. But many countries in the industrial world have reached the limits of fiscal expansion. Rising debt levels and large fiscal deficits have raised concerns among financial market participants about the longer-term sustainability of public finances.
Mr Bergo focuses on Norges Bank’s responsibility for promoting an efficient payment system  Address by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank, to the Banks’ Payment Systems Conference, held in Oslo on 11 November 1999. *  1. *  *  Background  Risk in the payment system is closely linked to the use of deposits. Payment transactions - via banks take time, and this time-lag (between payment and settlement) is an important source of settlement risk. Cash payment allows immediate settlement without any such risk. Therefore, the transition from cash settlement to the use of deposits involves greater risk, but also greater efficiency. Thus, the public’s choice of means of payment and payment instruments directly affects the degree of risk and efficiency in the payment system. The public’s choice of different means of payment and payment instruments varies over time. This is, of course, nothing new. Already in 1924, the Banking Commission - which drafted a new law on commercial banks at the time - stated the following: The concept of means of payment is not beyond change; it has taken different forms throughout time. The law states what should be considered legal tender..., but common practice also allows certain secure assets to be used as payment... These bank-issued means of payment have - in the more developed countries - reduced the use of legal tender to minor daily disbursements (cash payments in its narrowest sense). Today, the payment system continues to undergo rapid change.

This is also emphasised in the preparations to the law, where it states that ... the processing of licence applications does not mean that the authorities are responsible for the properties of the system’s operation, etc. It terms of the licensing process itself, Norges Bank has initiated preparations and we will be ready to receive licence applications when the law enters into force. At the same time, we are aware that the formulation of these applications will take some time, not to mention that any changes in agreements or routines (which become necessary based on legal requirements) may take even more time. However, we will endeavour to facilitate this process. We have already had informal contact with the banking associations concerning this matter and we are prepared to provide counsel and guidance in the further progress of this process. 4.3. The responsibility of the banks  The primary responsibility for the development of the payment system must, as mentioned, lie with the banks. This is in line with the approach of self-regulation. Further development of the common infrastructure, agreements and new payment services must come from the industry itself. In this process, it is important that banks provide more information on risk in the systems, so that an explicit division of responsibilities can be established - both for the individual systems operator and for the participants in the payment systems. However, the banks’ ability to develop efficient and stable payment services is influenced by the regulatory framework established by the authorities.
The most difficult of these challenges have been in the financial market, where problems from outside can rapidly escalate into crises that threaten the integrity of our whole system. Capital flows, particularly those that are boosted by high leverage, have become large, fast, volatile and sometimes quite destabilising. Large economies with deep markets may have been able to withstand the volatility without their stability being seriously undermined. Yet, even then, government intervention in one form or another has been necessary: witness the LTCM episode in 1998, or the more recent interventions in support of the euro. For small and open economies, such as our own, the challenge is even harder to meet, and the measures necessary to prevent market failure have been even more dramatic. We faced our own episode here in Hong Kong in 1998, when the shock waves from highly mobile and volatile international capital flows threatened our markets with collapse. Our intervention in the stock market in August 1998 to keep our markets working earned us a great deal of vilification at the time, and – for the wrong reason perhaps since we did not go in to make a profit – a great deal of praise since. But let’s leave the last word on this – at least for the time being – to Alan Greenspan. He said, in his post mortem earlier this year on the Asian financial crisis, the following words: Official safety nets and interventions cannot be eliminated entirely.

It is now possible to trade globally over the telephone or over the net from anywhere in this world – and no doubt, with the right equipment, from out of this world as well. But those who trade have to come down to earth to effect settlement and, very simply, Hong Kong is where we would like them to be when they land. To serve as a financial centre in a world connected in this way means primarily having the capability and infrastructure to capture these deals and provide safe, efficient and inexpensive settlement and clearing services. This is why we in the HKMA have, since our establishment in 1993, been paying particular attention to building financial infrastructure as the foundation of our strategy in developing Hong Kong as the financial hub of Asia. 25. We built over ten years ago a fully computerised and paperless debt clearing system as part of our efforts to develop the domestic debt market. We have since linked that system with similar debt clearing systems in a number of other jurisdictions to facilitate cross border and cross currency investments in debt markets. We are about to develop our debt clearing system further into what we call an ICSD or an international central securities depository in an attempt to pull debt issues in the region into our system.
The second factor driving market volatility stems from the plunge in prices of oil and commodities. Depressed prices put pressures on commodity-exporting countries and related industries. For oil producers, the prolonged low prices would also result in losses in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  revenue and profitability, and increase risks of default on their debt payments. These could trigger another rout of credit events and liquidity tightening in financial markets. The third factor is the monetary policy divergence between the US and other major advanced economies. While the US Federal Reserve is poised to gradually tighten its policy stance, the Bank of Japan recently joined the club of many European central banks to adopt a negative interest rate policy, and is likely to ease the policy even further. Amid the fragile global recovery, the divergence in the monetary policy stance as well as in the recovery paths among the major economies cause a great deal of global uncertainty, and prompt capital flows to be overly sensitive to news and even slight changes in market expectations. In this highly interconnected world, these global risks surely have widespread spillovers to all countries not least emerging markets, Thailand included. But, the impact on the Thai financial markets, as you might have seen, has so far been relatively limited, compared to other emerging markets, thanks to Thailand’s strong external position which serves as a great buffer against global volatility.

These could weigh on the pace of the already fragile global recovery and create more bumps in the road for the Thai economy than we have anticipated. Moreover, the impact could be more pronounced in the rural areas, where drought and low commodity prices worsened the already weak farm income. Nevertheless, I believe there are grounds for optimism for the Thai economic growth. The Thai economy this year will continue to be driven largely by domestic demand and tourism. Exports will likely remain flat or decline further, not only due to subdued global demand but also price effects as export prices have tumbled following the low commodity prices. But, so far the impact on the labor market, even those in export-oriented sectors, has appeared well-contained. Notwithstanding the threatening uncertainty around us, tourism continued to be a main growth driver for the Thai economy, with expected tourist arrivals of around 31 millions in 2016. The CLMV market is another bright spot. The Thai exports to CLMV market are expanding in accordance with their growing middle class and vibrant economic activities. The CLMV market is now accounting for 10.4 percent of Thai total exports, which is already larger than our exports to Japan, the third largest export destination. In terms of the domestic economy, we have learned from the latest GDP release that the construction sector has picked up with a strong growth of more than 20 percent in the fourth quarter of last year, thanks to government infrastructure projects.
On the contrary, support should focus on 16  Indexation clauses already cover 24.4% of wage-earners with an agreement in force for 2022, compared with 16.1% at end-2021. By 2023, they will cover 45% of wage-earners with an agreement in force for that year, although as yet this only includes a limited number of workers. 11  lower-income households, who bear the brunt of inflation, and the firms most vulnerable to this new shock. Moreover, any measures should be temporary, so as not to further increase the structural budget deficit, which was already very high even before the pandemic. They should also be designed to avoid significant distortions to price signals. But offsetting the adverse effects of the current supply-side shock also calls for ambitious policies to boost productivity growth and potential GDP. In other words, the optimal economic policy response to an adverse supply shock, such as the present one, entails structural reforms (including, naturally, of the energy market) to ease the supply-side tensions. The common European instrument to realise this ambition is the European Union’s NGEU recovery plan. Under NGEU, investment projects must be carefully selected in order to optimally complement, and act as a catalyst for, private investment. But they must also be accompanied by, or even help fund, structural reforms to support, for example, the reallocation of resources across firms and sectors. At the same time, the sustainability of national public finances must be ensured; this is essential for the smooth functioning of the monetary union.

8  See Menéndez and Mulino (2022). “Results of non-financial corporations to 2022 Q2”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 3/2022, Banco de España. 3  recipients of liquefied gas, including Spain, are unable to transport it to the Central European countries that have been cut off by Russia from its gas supply. Third, the surge in gas prices observed in the Dutch TTF market, Europe’s benchmark, has intensified the reduction in consumption. Between March and June, it had declined by 10% in Europe as whole and, therefore, must accelerate to reach the goal set. As a result, 84% of European storage capacity was in use in September, meaning that it is above the 80% target set for early October. Despite the headway made, how much time will Europe need to wean itself off Russian gas? As I mentioned earlier, this will depend on many factors, including increasing the amount of liquefied gas that can be shipped to Europe, its regasification and subsequent distribution to where it will be consumed, the pace at which technical advances leading to energy efficiency gains occur (and are subsequently adopted), and the possibility of expanding the use of other energy sources, particularly renewables. It is also true that the economic consequences of the war affect countries unevenly, depending on their different levels of dependence on Russian gas.9 However, given the surge in energy prices and European economic integration, economies such as Spain, that depend relatively little on Russian supplies, will also be affected.
And even what we know and can identify today, our perceptions may be obscured by our perceived understanding based on past world views. There is a fine line between the knowns and the unknowns. Navigating through these will require striking the right balance between having an open mindset to allow innovations to prosper while ensuring that key risks can be contained. For the “known territory,” essentially developments that we have begun to identify use cases, can control the risks, and believe that the benefits will outweigh the costs, we must continue to refine our understanding, expand our knowledge, and find ways to streamline them into our policymaking process. This is so that the perception or the extent of what we know becomes clearer. For instance, growing popularity of internet-of-things—from usage of smartphones to various data-transmitting devices—has created massive amount of individual-level and transaction-level data. These “big data” can help unlock our understanding of the behavioral patterns, perhaps, not even realized by individual data owners. At the Bank of Thailand, we have begun employing big data analysis in macroeconomic, banking sector, and financial market assessments to complement our policymaking process. This has helped ensure that our policy actions are evidence-based and timely. At the same time, necessary steps are taken to validate the integrity and quality of data used as well as to safeguard data privacy. We are just scratching the surface of the potential usage of big data and much more work will be done in this area in the years to come.

By April of last year, it had fallen nearly 10 percentage points, which translates to 25 million fewer people working—an astounding drop. Fortunately, EPOP has risen considerably since then, but it’s still more than three percentage points below pre-pandemic levels. That difference translates to about eight and a half million fewer people working, close to the statistic I cited on the number of lost jobs that is based on a survey of employers. These are aggregate numbers and only tell part of the story. It’s also important to understand that the downturn has disproportionately affected certain sectors of the economy and segments of society. Service-sector jobs, especially those in hospitality and leisure, fell dramatically with last spring’s shutdown of the economy. And a large share of the job losses fell on Black and Hispanic households. Now I’ll turn to inflation, the other half of our dual mandate. With recent rises in energy prices and the reversals of last spring’s large price declines, the inflation rate has increased from the very low levels seen during the earlier stages of the pandemic. As the economy further reopens, these dynamics will continue to play out, and I expect inflation to run somewhat above our 2 percent longer-run goal for the remainder of this year. It’s important not to overreact to this volatility in prices resulting from the unique circumstances of the pandemic and instead stay focused on the underlying trends in inflation.
For example, if banks do not have sufficient solvency levels, they may not be capable of passing changes in money market interest rates through to their customers, or may pass them through excessively. In this respect, financial stability may be said to be a de facto pre-requisite for ensuring price stability. 11  Macroprudential policy can also increase an expansionary monetary policy’s room for manoeuvre if the latter is beginning to induce excessive risk-taking by certain agents or markets. In this case, the activation of macroprudential instruments, which are more selective and can affect certain agents alone, may enable the expansionary monetary policy stance to be maintained, by smothering the increases in risks in specific sectors. This is particularly important in the euro area, where monetary policy is determined at the supranational level by the ECB taking into consideration the area as a whole, whereas macroprudential policy remains under the national remit. But nor must we exclude situations in which the objectives of the two policies may clash. For example, in the expansion prior to the international financial crisis, the relatively expansionary monetary policy stance contributed to the accumulation of macrofinancial disequilibria. Had these macroprudential tools then been in place, they could have been activated to counter some of the monetary policy effects on the risks to the financial system’s stability. In short, we cannot ignore the interaction between these two policies.

If Singapore did not have political stability, good infrastructure, and a conducive business environment, MAS’ strategies to grow the financial centre also would not have worked as well. In a world where central banks typically keep a distance from the rest of government, it is amazing how closely MAS works with other government agencies in Singapore – macroeconomic surveillance and national economic policies and strategies combating money laundering risks and investigating financial crimes promoting jobs, skills development, and labour market policies advancing technology initiatives ranging from e-payments to digital identity These partnerships have made a decisive difference to the outcomes for MAS, the financial industry and the Singapore economy. MAS has achieved what it has also because of the close partnership it has enjoyed with the financial industry. In a world, where many regulators are aloof at best and hostile at worst when dealing with the industry, the relationship MAS has with the industry is special. To be sure, we are a no-nonsense supervisor, not averse to setting high prudential standards, imposing tough remedial measures, and occasionally shutting down a bank or two. But MAS has always believed that working with the industry, rather than against it, is the best way to achieve our shared objectives: keeping the system safe and growing the business. In this, MAS has been fortunate to have an industry – banking, insurance, asset management, and capital markets – that has actively supported us through thick and thin.
We need to identify and account for such temporary “special factors” or “distortions” that may affect monetary developments and blur their information content. Second, and more permanently, it is necessary to disentangle, in monetary and credit developments, those which reflect structural and permanent changes from those which simply result from movements in the level of interest rates and the position in the economic cycle. Finally, we must be able to assess whether these developments result from money supply shocks, in which case they clearly entail some risks to price stability, or whether they are caused by money demand shocks that may raise the desired level of money balances without necessarily impacting aggregate demand. Such demand shocks can be triggered by structural changes in the behaviour of economic agents or result from portfolio shifts or financial innovations in the context of financial globalisation. There are indeed some signs that a money demand shock occurred at the beginning of the 2000s in the euro area, as illustrated by a structural shift in the trend velocity of money, which summarises the relationship between money, output and the price level. 5 One possible consequence of current events in credit markets may be to trigger a re-intermediation process, i.e. an expansion of banks' balance sheets which may further complicate our reading and interpretation of monetary and credit dynamics in the months to come. Conclusion There is no doubt that globalisation has impacted in various and non-trivial ways the functioning of our economies.

In a nutshell: “few, well, till the end”, or in Spanish if I may, “poco, bién, hasta el final”. There are of course non-economic areas: to name a few, defence and border protection; climate change; or youth education and training – an Erasmus Pro programme should be a priority for the unskilled and unemployed youth, which is our common tragedy in France, Spain and Italy. But in the economic field, much remains to be done as well. Although we have succeeded with monetary union, we must make progress towards economic union – so that monetary policy does not remain the only game in town. Page 5 sur 8 1. The first economic priority is to address the root causes of Europe’s continuing subdued growth; and a major one is what I call the “investment crunch”. (Slide 4) Many, following Ben Bernanke’s speech of March 2005, have rightly talked about the “global saving glut” that was putting pressure on the world’s economies. At present, saving remains high, due to the combination of emerging market economies’ surplus and advanced countries’ aging populations. However, (slide 5) what has dramatically changed since the 200708 crisis is investment, which has dropped sharply as a share of GDP in advanced economies. In the euro area, the total investment to GDP ratio has dropped by around 3 points since the 2007 peak and has only slightly recovered since.