First individual companies had to be rescued, then the banking system, and eventually the whole economy. Conventional thought held that there was little that policymakers could do after reaching the zero bound – when the central bank’s policy rate hit zero. But the FOMC thought otherwise. By mid-2009, the gross domestic product (GDP) in the U.S. began to recover after contracting 4.3 percent. Progress was painfully slow. GDP eked out 1.3 percent growth in the third quarter and put the U.S. back on a growth path. Meanwhile, the labor market lagged. The unemployment rate was 9.6 percent, employment growth was still out of reach, and real wages were falling. The labor market is central to FOMC deliberations. While most other  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  central banks, including Banco de México, are legally bound to only ensure price stability, U.S. policymakers are charged with a dual mandate: ensuring price stability and maximum employment. By the middle of 2009, the jobs deficit (jobs lost since the prerecession peak in employment) was 8 million and rising. Thus, we embarked on an aggressive path of quantitative easing (QE), launching large-scale purchases of U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities and U.S. housing agency debt. The first round of QE ran until March 2010, when the labor market had finally started recovering. By the conclusion of QE1, the Fed had infused the economy with $ trillion in liquidity. Second and third rounds of quantitative easing were announced in November 2010 and September 2012, respectively.

23 See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority," 43 J. Corp. L. 437 (2018). 24 Martin Wolf, "Monetary financing demands careful and sober management," Financial Times (Apr. 9, 2020). 25 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), "The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Provides Further Information to Financial Institutions in Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic," Press release (Apr. 3, 2020) ("Compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) remains crucial to protecting our national security by combating money laundering and related crimes, including terrorism and its financing. FinCEN expects financial institutions to continue following a riskbased approach, and to diligently adhere to their BSA obligations."). 26 See, e.g., FinCEN, "FinCEN Issues Advisory on Medical Scams Related to COVID-19 and Companion Notice Providing Filing Instructions for Financial Institutions," Press release (May 18, 2020); Financial Institution Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), "FINRA Reminds Firms to Beware of Fraud During the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic," Regulatory Notice 20-13 (May 5, 2020); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), "SEC Charges Microcap Fraud Scheme Participants Attempting to Capitalize on the COVID-19 Pandemic," Press release (June 11, 2020). See also Jennifer Achilles and Alejo Cabranes, "Banks May Need to Update Policies to Fight COVID-19 Fraud," Law360.com (June 16, 2020) (discussing the role of banks in identifying medical fraud in light of FinCEN advisory). 27 See Randall K. Quarles, Letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Apr.