samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We experienced, however, that having a forecasting round every quarter leaves very little time for the staff to digest new information and conduct thorough analyses before the next Report had to be written. This is why we  4  Geraats, P.M., 2002. Central bank transparency, Economic Journal 112 (483), F532–F565. 5  Eijffinger, Sylvester and Petra Geraats (2006) "How Transparent Are Central Banks?" European Journal of Political Economy 22(1), March, pp. 1-21. 6  Dincer, N. Nergiz and Barry Eichengreen (2007) "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research. 7  I thank Negriz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen for providing the sub-indexes for Norway, which were not reported in their paper. BIS Review 132/2008  5  started publishing three Reports a year instead of four. The Riksbank has come to the same conclusion and reduced the number of reports from four to three per year in 2006. I do not regret that Norges Bank made this move, and if I have to choose between good analyses and a high score on the Eijffinger-Geraats index, I know what I will choose. The third reason why we lost points on the Eijffinger-Geraats index is that we do not publish minutes and voting records. It is true that we do not publish voting records. This is because we have a collegial, and not individualistic, monetary policy committee, where the members of the Executive Boards stand unified behind the decision.

13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13  Table 2: Statements of Commitment to the FX Global Code by 30 largest asset managers  Firm  Assets Under Management $  SoC on public register, or have otherwise informed the Bank of England  1  Blackrock  6,060    2  Vanguard Asset Management  4,663    3  State Street Global Advisors  2,641    4  Fidelity Investments  2,284    5  BNY Mellon Investment Management  1,808    6  Capital Group  1,715    7  J.P. Morgan Asset Management  1,677    8  PIMCO  1,667    9  Amundi  1,626    10  Prudential Financial  1,323    11  Legal & General Investment Management  1,263    12  Goldman Sachs Asset Management  1,224    13  Wellington Management International  1,026    14  Natixis Investment Managers  947    15  T. Rowe Price  941    16  Nuveen  923    17  Northern Trust Asset Management  913    18  Invesco  890    19  AXA Investment Managers  850    20  DWS (Deutsche Asset Management)  800    21  Affiliated Managers Group  794    22  UBS Asset Management  756    23  Insight Investment  751    24  Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank  748    25  Aberdeen Standard Investments  739    26  Legg Mason  733    27  Franklin Templeton Investments  716    28  BNP Paribas Asset Management France  649    29  Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking  611    30  Allianz Global Investors  568    Source: Firm AUM rankings from IPE’s ‘Top 400 Asset Managers 2018’, https://www.ipe.com/Uploads/k/x/x/Top-400-Ranking.pdf.
Given the restrictions on mobility, the latter have not only been unable to do business as usual, but have also been unable to fulfill their traditional role of cushioning this type of situation and probably explain a significant part of the unusual increase in inactivity (Figure 6). By sector, the fall has been widespread, especially in retail, construction and housing, and food services. What we see in Chile is replicated in many countries, although with varying intensity. Depending on countryspecific conditions, there have been sharp falls in employment, significant decreases in hours worked and 2  increased inactivity (Figure 7). According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), compared to the last quarter of 2019, in the second quarter of this year hours worked fell 14% globally—the equivalent to 400 million full-time jobs. The decline has been led by South America (-20.6%), where inactivity has grown substantially. For the remainder of 2020, the ILO anticipates that, globally, hours worked will continue to remain below prepandemic levels. In Chile, the reduction in labor income has continued to be reflected in the evolution of nominal wages and total hours worked (National Statistics Institute, INE), both remaining around their historical lows.

It should be emphasised that the impact of Asia’ s economic and financial integration, would extend beyond its own region to other parts of the world. Today, the economic and financial linkages between the emerging economies have gained significant traction and are likely to continue. All the issues that I had mentioned earlier would only be significantly realized if we have a seamless payment system that links markets as one. As part of our continuing journey in deepening and strengthening our financial markets in Asia and Malaysia in particular, Bank Negara Malaysia is pleased to be a party to the launching of the Pilot Platform for Cross-Border Investment and Settlement of Debt Securities, jointly with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Euroclear Bank. This initiative marks an important milestone in our vision towards deeper financial integration. The rollout of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  this platform will provide investors and market intermediaries with more efficient and cost-effective cross-border access to the bond markets in Hong Kong and Malaysia. Over the years, the bond market in Asia has expanded significantly. To date, Asia’ s share of the global bond market has increased by almost four-fold since the pre-Asian financial crisis. In tandem with the growth of the bond markets, the sukuk market in the region has also evolved as an important avenue for international fund raising and investment activities, generating significant cross-border flows. Malaysia has been an important part of this development with well developed bond and sukuk markets.
At this meeting, the Council set the European Union a new strategic goal for the next decade, namely “to become by 2010 the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The ECB very much welcomes and supports the impetus given by the Lisbon European Council to the economic reform process, the so-called Lisbon agenda. We also welcome that the Presidency Conclusions of the Spring 2004 European Council delivered a message of determination and confidence reinforcing the validity and relevance of he Lisbon process. Four years after the launch  2  BIS Review 23/2004  of the Lisbon agenda, the pace of reforms needs, however, to be significantly stepped up in order to meet the ambitious targets defined in Lisbon. Let me explain why we need structural reforms and we ask Member States to actively pursue their implementation. Structural reforms in participating countries increase employment opportunities and real income, and thus support the sustainability of the social security system. It is widely recognised that structural reforms in labour, products and capital markets are needed to improve the prospects of the euro area. Structural reforms permit a higher level of sustainable long-run economic growth by increasing the supply of production factors and improving the efficiency with which they are used. They furthermore enhance the capacity of the economy to cushion macroeconomic shocks.

The fiscal rules set up under the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact provide an important framework to ensure the necessary fiscal discipline. The rules are useful at the country level to preserve budgetary discipline and sustainable public finances, which is the best contribution fiscal policy can make to macroeconomic stability and growth. In a monetary union like EMU with a single monetary policy and national fiscal policies, there are two additional arguments. For small countries, there is an incentive for an expansionary fiscal bias which could threaten sustainability, because the common interest and exchange rate might adjust only marginally to their fiscal imbalances. For big countries, on the other hand, lack of fiscal discipline may have an effect on the common interest and exchange rates, creating a negative externality for the other participants. Compliance with the fiscal framework of the Treaty and the SGP guarantees the sustainability of public finances and the operation of automatic stabilisers, while respecting as much as possible the fiscal sovereignty of Member States. Could we rely on financial markets to impose sufficient discipline on budgetary policy? In principle, growing concerns about the sustainability of a country’s debt should be reflected in the risk premia that this country would have to pay for its borrowing. However, it would be unrealistic and therefore very risky to rely only on financial markets.
There are two reasons for this. First, bank lending to SMEs is concentrated in a handful of large banks as only they have the capacity to diversify idiosyncratic risks by lending to a broad enough range of firms. The three biggest originators in each euro area country represent on average 80% of the outstanding amount of the SME loans. This makes SMEs particularly vulnerable to any shocks to the banking sector and reduces their ability to switch between banks. 7  At present, the legal position that an account holder “owns” as soon as securities are booked to his account differs across euro area countries: in some jurisdictions the holder enjoys full and unshared property rights, whereas in others the holder receives a position that is in comparison “inferior”, i.e. a shared or indirect property interest or a mere claim against the account provider. 8  For more details see Special Feature C, “Initiatives to promote capital market integration in European bond and equity markets”, in ECB report on Financial Integration in Europe, April 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Second, as smaller firms tend to be less transparent than larger firms, it is more costly for investors to obtain adequate information. This makes it harder for SMEs to substitute capital market finance for bank finance if the latter dries up. This is far from a trivial issue. The ability of SMEs to consistently access finance has vital macroeconomic importance for Europe.

And a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) should ensure that  4  See ECB Report on Financial Integration in Europe, March 2007. 5  An example of this view is Véron, N. (2013), “Banking nationalism and the European crisis”, October. 6  Sapir, A. and Wolff, G. (2013), “The neglected side of Banking Union”, note presented at the informal ECOFIN 14 September 2013, Vilnius. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  banks are resolved from a European perspective and according to least-cost principles, which should in principle open the door for cross-border resolution strategies. In this way, even though the banking sector on aggregate is downsizing, credit allocation across the euro area may become more efficient. Banking Union is key part in ensuring that location becomes a diminishing factor in access to bank finance. While Europe is and will remain a bank-based economy, adding the second missing piece of the euro area financial market – deeper capital market integration – is key to ensure that firms in all jurisdictions can use capital markets as a “spare tyre” when banks are not lending – and not only those in larger countries with more developed bond markets. Within a single currency area, there is no reason in principle why firms should not be able to tap a European pool of savings. What prevents this in practice, however, is regulatory heterogeneity across the euro area.
As I touched upon initially, financial innovation and financial integration have led to explosive growth in the international movement of capital. These flows serve as an important catalyst for domestic financial market development, as reflected both in the size of the banking sector and equity markets, as well as the quality of institutions for supervision and regulation. In recent years, attention has been given on how macroeconomic policies should respond to the unexpectedly big wave of capital flows to many emerging market economies. Regardless of the form or way of these inflows, they create important challenges for policymakers due to their potential to cause overheating of economies. Emerging market countries have responded to address these concerns in a variety of ways, such as exchange rate alignments, efforts to neutralize the monetary impact of interventions through sterilization, and controls on capital flows. At this point, I should note that coordinated fiscal and monetary policies are necessary to attract high quality capital flows  BIS Review 21/2008  3  and to manage flows efficiently regardless of their type. Low inflation and prudent fiscal polices signal to investors the extent of government’s commitment to achieve macroeconomic stability and adds to the credibility of the government. On the other hand, efforts in the field of financial supervision and regulation, together with policies such as labor and product market reforms are important for the stability and soundness of financial systems in handling capital inflows.

We have witnessed significant progress amidst the orderly development of the takaful industry, which growth is underpinned by the holistic and pragmatic approach taken in developing the Islamic financial industry. The market has become more diverse, as there has been tremendous increase in the number of takaful operators operating in Malaysia, where from having a single takaful operator in 1984, we now have 9 takaful operators, 4 retakaful operators and one international takaful operator. In Labuan International Business and Financial Centre, there is also strong presence of the takaful industry, where its takaful market comprises 14 retakaful operators. The market segment for takaful has also widened over the years to meet the financial needs of the economy as its appeals and value propositions have transcended beyond religious reasons. Product offerings by takaful operators have further broadened to cater to the differentiated needs of customers, with family takaful products now dominating the market with a share of 78 percent of net contribution, as compared to general takaful products that dominated a share of 63 percent back in 1984. The takaful industry exhibits high potential, as demonstrated by its robust expansion with annual growth rate of total assets and contributions averaging between 20 percent and 26 percent over the period of 2004 to 2009. Globally, Malaysia also signifies its presence in the takaful market, being the second largest takaful market in the world as its total assets of $ billion dominated 26 percent of total global takaful assets in 2009.
At the outset of this process, many people severely objected to the establishment of derivatives markets claiming that they would encourage volatility and increase speculations and manipulations on the markets. This very much reminds me of the “it is not possible in Turkey” or “it is not the right time,” comments I hear whenever we try to implement something new. The Nobel prize winning economist Milton Friedman’s speech at the opening of the foreign exchange options market at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Autumn 1971 contains some very important information for us2. As Friedman pointed out, financial instruments relating to foreign trade are all complementary and the British case shows that financial services may well become a very profitable export item. Within this framework, he argued that the development of a derivatives market, which is normally expected to exist in the natural evolution of markets, not in another country but in the USA is important not because it increases trade and investment here but it enables export of these services as well. Thus, he claimed that the development of derivatives markets would support the development  2  Friedman, M. (1971), “The Need for Futures Markets in Currencies”, in The Futures Market in Foreign Currencies, Prepared for the International Monetary Market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. pp. 6-12. BIS Review 17/2005  3  of other financial activities in the country, would bring additional income through exports in services sector and enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Examples in other countries show us that there is a strong positive correlation between the transaction volume and liquidity rise of derivatives markets and the presentation of the issue, introduction of the markets and the training to be given. It has been confirmed that training programs aimed at enabling the economic agents to perform more effective risk management using derivatives instruments fueled the development of derivative markets in many countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Japan. Taking these examples into consideration, we see that the training of institutional and individual investors bears great importance in Turkey as well, where derivatives markets are a new concept. The Central Bank has provided all kinds of support for the development of these markets and will also continue to give support from now on. However, it is crucial that especially non-governmental organizations should fulfill their liabilities, introduce the Turkish Derivatives Exchange to their participants and provide the necessary training. Dear Participants, To conclude, I would like to emphasize once more that a drastic step has been taken today with the inauguration of the Turkish Derivatives Exchange, in line with recent favorable developments in our country. I hope this step will bring with it new opportunities for the future. Thank you. BIS Review 17/2005  7
The real interest rates in countries with higher inflation might be too low, while the real rates may be too high for countries with lower inflation. The common monetary policy then becomes too lax for some countries and too tight for others. There may also be possible concerns about the price competitiveness of individual countries in a monetary union if they experience persistently higher inflation at the country level. Finally, not every country in a monetary union will have identical economic and financial cycles, and this can then in turn cause differences between national inflation rates. These are wellknown challenges faced by monetary unions and the solution can only lie in the prudent use of other economic policies by the government – that is their structural and fiscal policies. Inflation and consumers When we talk about inflation, we usually mean how prices change for the average consumer. However, the actual impact that inflation has on individual households can vary quite a lot depending on their consumption patterns and the dynamics of the prices of different goods and services. Households that spend a larger proportion of their money on food are more exposed to changes in the price of food, while households that have higher spending on housing feel inflation bite harder when energy prices rise. Studies show that households on lower incomes are generally more exposed to the problems caused by high inflation than those with higher incomes.

The difference between the levels of inflation experienced by different groups in society was not that large when inflation was low, amounting to about one quarter of a percentage point as shown by the ECB's research1. The gap between the inflation rates for households on higher and lower incomes had widened in the euro area though to 1.9 percentage points by September 2022. Calculations for January 2023 by the Bruegel 2 think tank indicate that it had reached two or three percentage points in many European countries, and as much as five or even seven in countries where inflation was 20%. Such differences can aggravate inequality and have substantial distributional effects. It is low-income households that face higher rates of inflation, but they typically have smaller financial buffers and hold their savings on bank accounts with low interest rates, which are less protected against inflation. This makes it vital that governments target their support measures as accurately as possible. 3/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The consequences of high inflation for public finances High inflation also affects the public finances, as the relationship works through numerous channels and in both directions3. Some of those channels are direct consequences of policy measures to alleviate the impact of high inflation, especially higher energy prices. Bruegel estimates4 that countries in the European Union allocated a total of 657 billion euros to cutting energy taxes and supporting households and firms between September 2021 and January 2023.
One driver of low return on assets for many banks has been the continued effect of low levels of long-term interest rates, which can drag on net interest margins. For this reason, when long-term yields fell on renewed fears about the strength of the global recovery last week, bank stocks fell disproportionately. The return to strong global economic growth that we all hope to see, and to more normal monetary policy settings should support banks’ earnings. There have also been, unfortunately, a series of “one-off” effects – the necessary redress of previous episodes of misconduct. These have reduced UK banks’ pre-tax profits from around  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  £ billion, to less than £ billion during 2013. One hopes this will also be a temporary effect. But some of the effect of the new landscape will be more permanent. This is particularly true of leverage; it will not in future be possible to drive up shareholder returns by levering up on ever thinner capital cushions. For the large UK banks, average levels of leverage have broadly halved and seem unlikely to increase materially. And that is not all of the story. Another driver of low returns on assets and equity is the fact that banks’ paybill has not adjusted to the smaller returns banks are now earning. It was not just the shareholders who enjoyed high returns pre-crisis. Bank employees did too, or at least some of them did.

A crucial part of this more intensive supervision is not just to look at the activities of the firm, but also much greater scrutiny of the quality of its governance and management. This includes a very thorough and careful assessment of the suitability of those who run regulated firms, as well as time spent looking at the Board as a whole to ensure that it has sufficient experience and character. For the largest firms, the PRA Board is involved in these judgments and in approving the appointments of the most senior staff. And, in marked contrast to the pre-crisis period, there is a much greater focus on a firm’s business model and the firm’s understanding of their vulnerabilities. This enables the supervisors to assess if there are risks posed to financial stability by the way that the firm chooses to conduct its business, or if indeed it is not viable. The aim is not that the supervisors should run firms. But they should not be shy to question if executives and boards have the right capabilities, if they understand the business model and the particular risks to which it is exposed and, overall, whether that business model can be operated successfully while managing the risks it entails. These three changes in the official landscape – macroprudential policy, more powerful international governance and more intensive supervision have shaped, and will continue to shape the world in which banks operate.