samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Recognising the important role of payment cards in the Malaysian payment system and in the electronic payment agenda, Bank Negara Malaysia spearheaded the migration from magnetic stripe to the chip-based card infrastructure on a national scale for both the ATM and credit cards. This migration is also to counter fraud due to cloning, skimming or counterfeiting. We began with the ATM card migration and by 2005, Malaysia became the first country to fully migrate to the EMV chip-based credit card infrastructure on a national scale. Financial inclusion Efforts and emphasis on accelerating the adoption of electronic payments would also contribute towards Bank Negara Malaysia’s objective of building a progressive and inclusive financial system. Financial inclusion is a high priority in our national agenda and the Bank’s commitment in enhancing financial inclusion is explicitly mentioned in our new Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009. Malaysia has one of the highest penetration of deposit and loan accounts in the world. Based on the study conducted by the World Bank in 2008, more than 80% of the Malaysian population has access to at least a deposit account. In 2009, the penetration of deposit accounts and loan accounts in Malaysia are 3,300 deposit accounts per 1,000 adults and 1,100 loan accounts per 1,000 adults, respectively. The World Bank has also ranked Malaysia number one for three years (2008–2010) in terms of getting credit. Much of this success in achieving a high level of financial inclusion is due to the strategies and policy initiatives undertaken by the Bank over the years.

I will leave these to participants in this Roundtable to deliberate on. I believe that the common purpose of today’s Roundtable is to discuss on ways to speed up the migration to electronic payment with special focus on electronic money. This is indeed a good platform for all key stakeholders to provide their thoughts and highlight areas that require further improvement. In conclusion, therefore, I would like to thank OMFIF and the Lafferty Group for their involvement in this Roundtable event. I wish you all success in your deliberations and look forward to your views and suggestions in achieving our common goal. Lastly, I on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia also wish to register our appreciation to all of you for taking time from your busy schedule to attend this event. 4  BIS Review 69/2010
Ravi Menon: Islamic finance – continued growth Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 5th World Islamic Banking Conference Asia Summit, Singapore, 3 June 2014. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. And to all our foreign guests, a warm welcome to Singapore. The sun is shining on Islamic finance. Let me highlight three promising global developments. First, Islamic finance continues to grow rapidly. The industry grew at double digits last year, as it has for the previous five years, despite global economic uncertainties and market volatility. Global Islamic financial assets are estimated to have reached $ trillion by the end of 2013, from $ trillion in 2012. Second, global regulatory standards and best practices are being established for Islamic finance. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), and the International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM) have been at the forefront of this effort, helping to narrow differences in market practices and regulatory treatment. Common standards are good for facilitating cross border transactions. They help to address risks that are idiosyncratic to Islamic finance, such as Shariah non-compliance risk. In so doing, these standards serve to bolster confidence in the safety and soundness of the Islamic finance industry. Third, more countries are catering for Islamic finance. In Asia, Indonesia has set out to significantly grow its Islamic banking sector and develop its Islamic capital markets.

Monetary policy transmission could not work properly without such a system. At the same time, it is equally important that the financial system itself is not a source of excessive risk for the rest of the economy. Our efforts are thus concentrated on increasing resilience by mitigating systemic risk. To ensure this, we work closely with the Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA, the Federal Department of Finance and various international standard-setting bodies. A great deal has been achieved in our country so far. One of these achievements is the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) 7, which has recently generated a number of headlines. As you know, the SNB has, for the time being, decided against proposing the activation of the CCB. There are two reasons for this. First, as I have already mentioned, we have observed some indications of a possible slowdown of price momentum in the market for residential real estate. Second, two other measures came into effect at the beginning of June – stricter capital requirements for mortgages and a revision of the self-regulation rules for mortgage lending. However, this is far from an all-clear for the real estate market – I want to underline again that the risk of a further build-up of imbalances followed by a significant price correction is  5  Cf. SNB press release, 27 August 2012. 6  Cf. SNB, Financial Stability Report, 2011 and 2012  7  Cf.
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: What future for financial globalisation? – sovereign debt and the global economy Dinner speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Joint European Central Bank–Journal of International Economics (ECB-JIE) conference on “What future for financial globalisation?”, Frankfurt am Main, 9 September 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure to welcome you to this conference on “What future for financial globalisation?” A discussion on this topic could not be more timely as policy-makers and academics are currently making great efforts to make sense of what happened before and during the financial crisis. Questions are being asked about what lessons can be learned and what adjustments need to be made to economic policy in the future. When policy-makers have the opportunity to talk to academic researchers many synergies can be identified. That is why I am pleased that this conference has attracted so many excellent researchers in the fields of international macroeconomics and finance. I am especially happy that the conference has been co-organised by the Journal of International Economics. I should like to thank the journal’s Editor, Charles Engel, for helping to organise this two-day event.

This is largely due to the scarcity of the instruments in the market. In Malaysia, the growing ringgit sukuk market has resulted in an active secondary market. This is largely due to the regular and varied issuances throughout the year. This is supported by the investment in research and development and in talent development to ensure the availability of expertise in the structuring of sukuk instruments and in sukuk documentation. Having the potential to innovate new instruments will depend on having the necessary talent. This is an area of focus in Malaysia to develop the skills, expertise and capability. The Islamic financial system in Malaysia now offers a wide range of financial products and services that are competitive and able to meet the changing requirements of the domestic and global economy. Way forward for the global Islamic financial system As we advance forward, we need to recognise the forces of change and the transformation taking place in the international financial system and global economy. Relentless efforts have been initiated to reform the international financial system by the international community to address the weaknesses that have contributed to the recent crisis. In this environment, Islamic finance needs to continue to evolve to remain effective and competitive. The Islamic financial system does not exist in isolation and will continue to develop as an integral part of the global financial system.
This could lead to higher risk premia and structurally higher levels of precautionary saving by households. Understanding and monitoring these channels is an important task for central banks going forward. This is why assessing climate change is not a dilettante matter for central banks. With regard to the increasing importance of intangible capital, the new results I reported earlier have shown that this has important implications, not only for how we measure capital, but also for the prospects for potential output and productivity. The inclusion of intangibles would lead to an upward revision to the level of GDP (this happened in 2010 with the inclusion of R&D). The impact on GDP growth going forwards is more ambiguous, and would vary by time period – it will depend on the relative growth of intangible investment. Changing the measurement of intangibles would in principle affect both the measurement of output and potential output. So, it is not the case that the output gap, and hence the stance of monetary policy, would differ. Similarly, what matters for the trend real rate, R*, is how intangibles affect productivity growth in the long run, which is less about data revisions and more about the long-run impact of intangibles. Page 17  We have just scratched the surface though: indeed, the findings of our recent research have left us with as many new questions as answers. Are there more factors, beyond intangibles, responsible for the puzzlingly low level of investment?

In the background of this picture, however, are some slow-moving but important structural changes, such as trends in population and demographics, technological changes (like increased automation and the rise of intangible capital), and environmental factors (like climate change and the transition to net zero). These slow-moving forces may not influence the setting of monetary policy meeting by meeting. But understanding the broader policy landscape is important, because it provides insights into the economic trends that will shape policy decisions in the longer term. Economists have developed a number of so-called ‘equilibrium’ concepts that help to summarise key parts of the policy landscape. Of particular relevance for my speech today is the ‘equilibrium real interest rate’, which is the hypothetical real interest rate that would sustain output at potential and inflation at target. [1] Because the equilibrium real interest rate is a theoretical variable, rather than one we can directly observe, it must be estimated and several approaches have been developed to do so. [2] All of these estimates are, however, associated with a high degree of uncertainty. As a result, the equilibrium real interest rate is typically used to look back on past policy and its stance, or to provide an indication of the general outlook for interest rates over the coming years, rather than as a direct guide to policy.
Henry Ohlsson: The inflation target – a benchmark for price-setting and wage formation Speech by Mr Henry Ohlsson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a conference, organised by Facken inom industrin, Bålsta, 16 April 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. I would like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to take part in this conference. It’s a great pleasure to be here. Many faces are familiar after my 18 years on the Economic Council of Swedish Industry, while others are new. My own role is also new, the post of deputy governor of the Riksbank is an honour and carries great responsibility, but is also very interesting. It feels particularly appropriate to be holding my first speech in the role of Deputy Governor of the Riksbank in a context closely linked to wage formation. My subject today is why the inflation target is so important for smoothly-functioning price-setting and wage formation. The Swedish labour market is about to enter into large-scale wage bargaining rounds. Several hundred collective wage agreements will expire in the first part of 2016. As always, the outcome of future wage bargaining rounds is important for the parties directly concerned. This essentially concerns both companies’ competitiveness and employees’ purchasing power. Thus, the significance of the agreements extends across the entire economy. In the traditional Swedish model, different agents have clear roles. The social partners are responsible for wage formation through their negotiations.

Economic outlook: tug of war between improving fundamentals and fiscal restraint The U.S. economy remains on the slow growth track that has persisted since the recession ended in mid-2009. In fact, in 2012 real GDP grew just 1.6 percent, below the 2.2 percent rate of the preceding two years. This lackluster and disappointing performance masks the fact that the underlying conditions that support growth are gradually improving. However, in the near-term, this improvement in fundamentals is being offset by increased fiscal drag. Let’s first examine the fundamentals, which have improved in at least six ways. First, household deleveraging is now well advanced. Household debt has declined significantly relative to income (Exhibit 1). In the same vein, the household financial obligations ratio has fallen to levels last seen in the early 1980s (Exhibit 2).1 Second, the structural adjustment in housing has largely run its course. Activity and prices are firming, supported by low interest rates. Over the past four quarters, housing starts rose by 33 percent, existing home sales climbed by 12 percent (Exhibit 3), and home prices, as measured by the CoreLogic national home price index, were up over 7 percent (Exhibit 4). Although the pace of recovery varies regionally, the U.S. housing sector as a whole is now clearly rebounding. I see the recovery in home prices as particularly important. Houses are a significant component of household wealth. In addition, as home prices begin to rise we are likely to see more transactions and more building activity.
The GDP gap and the RU indicator). An indication of the significance of the crisis for potential industrial production can also be obtained by combining statistics on industrial production and capacity utilisation. 12 Industrial production fell by a maximum amount of 24 per cent from its peak in the first quarter of 2008 to its lowest point in the second quarter of 2009. Potential industrial production fell by 14 per cent with a time lag of two to three quarters and by approximately 20 per cent in relation to  11  A more detailed description of the RU indicator and its characteristics will be published shortly. 12  Potential industrial production has been calculated as [Industrial production] x [Average capacity utilisation 1996–2007]/[Capacity utilisation]. BIS Review 130/2010  5  the previous trend. Such a fall in potential industrial production could explain a fall of approximately 4 per cent in potential GDP, as the level of value added in the manufacturing industry was equivalent to approximately 20 per cent of GDP prior to the crisis. (Figure 11. Industrial production, capacity utilisation and potential industrial production). To sum up, I can note that potential GDP and resource utilisation are difficult to estimate. Different methods give different results. This is particularly difficult right now due to the financial crisis and the deep recession from which we are emerging. At the Riksbank we are continuing to work with these issues and expect to take up resource utilisation in more detail in the next Monetary Policy Report in October.

For my part, I have felt very convinced of two things, which I clearly explained in the most recent minutes. Firstly, we ought to increase the repo rate in the months ahead, as the Swedish economy is developing so strongly. Resource utilisation is increasing, which will increase inflationary pressures over time. We should therefore ease up in order to avoid excessive inflation in the period ahead. Secondly, the long-term repo rate should be approximately 4 per cent, corresponding to inflation of 2 per cent and a real interest rate of 2 per cent. The latter figure is what the short real interest rate on government bonds has been, on average, in both the United States and the eurozone for long periods of time. On the other hand, it is difficult to have a definite opinion of what the repo rate ought to be in two or three years. Neither our own nor the market’s forecasting abilities are sufficient to make solid forecasts over such a period. Among other reasons, the repo rate will be dependent upon developments in the eurozone and in the United States, and the impact these may have on the Swedish economy. Weaker international development could entail weaker development in Sweden and a lower repo rate path in the long term. However, stronger development of the Swedish labour market could entail higher inflationary pressures and a higher repo rate path. Despite this uncertainty, my view is that we should report the assumptions we make about the repo rate in conjunction with our forecasts.
The first danger is that there are sharks lurking under water-- in the form of highly leveraged institutions and hedged funds. No matter how well you try to manage your economy, no matter how good your intentions, there will often be some things out of synchronization. This will cause your currency or your stock market to be temporarily out of balance, or even wrongly perceived to be so. This is exactly when you need some time to work out the problems. But the attack by sharks can rob you of this precious time. I asked myself -- how can these sharks create so much trouble for the emerging markets? The problem is that these sharks are often able to command oversize resources financed by large international banks. I strongly believe that these financing should be curbed. Leveraging beyond a certain threshold is particularly risky. I propose that the international banks that give credits to such institutions should be required to weigh these risks, in their capital requirement calculations, at a much higher rate than the 150 per cent currently being considered in the new Basle Accord. The second danger is that during good weather you tend to get assistance from many international banks. They will give you tow lines hitched to their catamarans that help increase your speed. However, when your ship starts to leak, they tend to cut the lines just when you need them most. On this issue, therefore, I strongly support the idea of private sector involvement that the IMF is proposing.

Moreover, Paris offers the leading source of highly qualified financial services personnel. Consequently, many global banks have already decided to transfer the majority of their market activities to Paris. This new system will require a single rulebook implemented in a harmonised manner. And we are close to achieving it in the banking sector, but we are not quite there in the insurance sector. It is thus necessary to further strengthen the role of the European supervisory authorities, and France supports – although it remains a little too alone in doing so – the Commission’s proposed reform of the ESAs. For example, EIOPA must be allowed to create, at its own initiative, cooperation platforms to better supervise entities whose activities mainly involve cross-border transactions performed under the freedom to provide services regime. EIOPA’s role as a neutral mediator in the internal model approval process at group level must also be reinforced, without giving it direct power in the approval process, which would undermine its neutrality. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  This “financial Eurosystem” will also require shared infrastructures within the Union capable of offering services beyond the confines of the euro area: examples such as T2S and TIPS, the new interbank instant payment settlement system, both multi-currency services, show us that it is possible. We must also deal with the question of private monopolies in the clearing sector. We must ensure that critical key players do not become “too big to fail”.
In my view the actions taken by us in the Nordic-Baltic countries can constitute a promising way forward. We have decided to increase coordination by creating a permanent structure for regional cooperation. This structure takes the form of a so-called cross-border stability group. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first of its kind. The Nordic cross-border resolution stability group includes 22 stakeholders from eight countries that will meet on a regular basis to share information and discuss financial sector developments. To facilitate coordination we have also agreed on a number of specific and detailed crisis management procedures and prepared for a clear division of roles and responsibilities between the authorities and ministries. Ultimately, this should enhance our preparedness for managing a crisis in any of our common international banking groups. At the EU level, the member states have recently agreed that countries with common crossborder banking groups shall establish such stability groups in one way or another. As these arrangements will call for extensive information-sharing and more cooperation across jurisdictions they will impose strong demands on the different national authorities involved. But most importantly, they will make it easier to solve cross-border problems within the EU. As Greek banks are heavily engaged in cross-border banking operations, it may be in the Greek authorities’ interest to consider setting up such a group. It is important to emphasise that the establishment of a well-functioning cooperation structure is not something that is done overnight.

Øystein Olsen: Guardian of the monetary system Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the official event to mark the bicentenary of Norges Bank, Trondheim, 14 June 2016. *  *  *  Your Majesty, President of the Storting, Minister and honoured guests, Exactly two hundred years ago today, the Act relating to the monetary system of Norway was signed into law by King Karl II of Norway. The Act was an important step in the restoration of Norway as an independent nation. Two years earlier – at Eidsvoll – Christian Magnus Falsen, a key member of the 1814 Constituent Assembly, had asserted that no state can exist without a well-functioning monetary system. A national currency would be a symbol of Norway’s sovereignty and freedom. And to secure independence, the country’s economy had to be brought into order. With a monetary system in ruins, this was no easy task. Norway’s governing men – and no doubt Norway’s women too – had long been aware that a country without its own bank was at a disadvantage. It was a long way to Copenhagen, where the nearest bank was located. With no easy access to a bank, people had to rely on friends and relatives or business acquaintances instead. Theatres were not only places of entertainment, but important meeting places where deals could be struck and money exchanged. And if the theatregoer was lucky, he might go home with a loan in his pocket.