samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In a Taylor rule, such benchmarks are pinned down mainly by the deviation of inflation from target and by a measure of economic slack. On this basis, observers held central banks accountable for monetary policy decisions, as the relation between policy objective and instrument is transparent and not equivocal. In a nutshell, empirical regularities lay the ground for a prescriptive monetary policy rule – even though oversimplified – against which central bank actions can be evaluated. In crisis times, it turned out to be nearly impossible to track the monetary policy stance using a Taylor rule. First, with the interest rate having ceased to be the main instrument, incorporating balance sheet measures into the rule is not straightforward at all.. Second, as the transmission of policy interest rates to the economy has been impaired, their comparison with Taylor rule benchmarks has become much less informative. Third, in view of persistently weak and low inflation and a high degree of economic slack, Taylor rules might well prescribe the setting of interest rates below their effective lower bound, wrongly indicating a tight policy stance, as the easing effects of unconventional measures cannot be accounted for. Developing other comparatively simple monitoring tools has not been possible. Overall, the ability of observers to use policy rules to hold the ECB accountable has been severely hindered. How can we then be sure that the measures taken fall within the ECB’s narrowly defined price stability mandate?

There is no doubt that monetary policy has had beneficial effects on government finances; monetary policy has unavoidable implications for public budgets. The same kind of indirect support occurred during the easing cycle in the early 2000s, when our main refinancing rate was reduced to 2% – a very low level at the time – and was maintained at that level for more than two years. The fiscal ramifications of monetary policy that we see today (and in the early 2000s), however, differ fundamentally from the deliberately coordinated strategy of monetary financing that we observed in some countries in the 1970s. Today the use of any central bank instrument has to be justified solely on the basis of the central bank’s narrow price stability objective, and not on any fiscal consequences thereof. Borrowing from the theory of monetary regimes, it is the dominance of the central bank mandate over the objective governing fiscal conduct that differentiates the setting of monetary policy today from anything we saw prior to monetary union. The ECB continues to have the necessary institutional independence, the financial resources and operational capacity to take all appropriate measures, if and when needed, to counter upside or downside risks to price stability in a truly symmetric fashion. It could be argued that there are multiple channels through which the central bank could take on tasks and obligations that pertain to the fiscal authority, and some of these channels are both more subtle and less apparent than outright financing of public deficits.
To go beyond this first step, we need to build a regulatory framework adapted to the specificities of DeFi. In my view, when designing this framework we should not try to replicate existing financial regulations at all costs. On the contrary, it could be advantageous to draw inspiration from regulations in other sectors. For example, one could imagine setting rules on "products" even when their "producer" or "issuer" is not clearly identified. In addition, we have to recognise the technical specificities of decentralised finance and pay a particular attention to the three layers (blockchains, applications and access gates) that schematically constitute DeFi. First, we should evaluate the resilience of the blockchain infrastructure supporting DeFi. That leads to an open question: can public blockchains provide the right level of security, and if so, how? Second, we need to address the security of the applications, on which DeFi "services" are provided. A logical avenue for regulation would be to define the perimeter of protocols that are deemed "secure", i.e. whose computer code has been certified. Of course, this leads to many subsequent operational issues that deserve careful analysis. 2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Third, we should regulate access to DeFi, in order to protect users, and in particular individual customers. Intermediaries – or "access points", whatever their form – who provide access to DeFi should comply with rules of good conduct, and be subject to a duty of care and advice as well as KYC requirements, when necessary.

Cooperation between the BdF and MAS has strengthened significantly, particularly since the opening in 2020 of the Asia-Pacific Representative Office, here in Singapore, which is one of the most innovative financial centres (with a strong Fintech sector), and a highly important region in today's world. MAS, BdF and ACPR have deepened and diversified their linkages across key and cutting-edge areas, such as (i) cybersecurity, with an international cyber crisis management exercise conducted jointly in June 2022, (ii) Fintech, with a MoU between MAS and ACPR, (iii) post-quantum cryptography, where ongoing work is joining BdF and MAS, (iv) green finance, with a milestone achieved together with the FranceSingapore Conference on Sustainable Finance in May 2022, and finally (v) tokenisation of finance, with Central Bank Digital Currency experiments involving cross-border payments. My warmest thanks go to Ravi Menon and MAS staff, and also to the colleagues of the BdF's office in Singapour, who have helped the strengthening our bilateral ties. I wish to also express my sincere and special thanks to François Haas for his proactive engagement for making this MAS-ACPR-BdF cooperation flourish. François was the right man in the right place to take up the challenge of launching and leading our rep office here, building notably on his former experience as head rep for the Americas. Your achievements François are all the more remarkable when considering that you took office exactly when in person, face to face, interactions, were hampered for a long while by lockdown measures.
On the one hand, the first nine years of EMU have been characterised by low and stable inflation and firmly anchored inflation expectations, vindicating the monetary policy framework laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. On the other hand, the overall achievements of economic policies over the last nine years have been rather disappointing. Progress with structural reforms still falls short of expectations, fiscal policies in some countries conflicted with the rules of the fiscal framework, eventually leading to an adjustment of the rules rather than of policies, and also wage policies have often not taken sufficient account of the requirements of the new situation of a single currency. •  The institutional framework of the EMU provides European policy-makers with the tools to successfully address the challenges ahead. The Maastricht Treaty established a clear allocation of responsibilities to different policy areas, reflecting the fact that assigning policy instruments primarily to one single policy objective and making individual policymakers responsible for one single policy instrument ensures a high level of effectiveness and accountability. •  The single monetary policy was given the task of maintaining price stability in the euro area and was assigned to the ECB as an independent, supranational institution. Economic policy deals with the other economic objectives. Responsibility for the various areas of economic policy has largely remained with the Member States, since these policies are best carried out at the national level in order to ensure that they are appropriately tailored to the specific characteristics and needs of the individual countries.

•  It has sometimes been argued that some macroeconomic stimulus from aggregate demand policies might help foster the implementation of structural reform packages by offsetting potential short-term costs of reforms. This idea that there could be a trade-off between structural reforms and macroeconomic accommodation is disputable, notably in the EMU. Such accommodation could be provided either by monetary policy or fiscal policy, which I will now discuss in turn. •  In the EMU monetary policy is not the appropriate tool for mitigating the potential shortterm costs of structural reforms or for providing incentives for reforms at the national levels. First, reform needs differ across euro area countries and the single monetary policy is by its very nature unable to mitigate the potentially different short-term countryspecific costs of reforms. Second, there are well-known and overwhelming implementation problems of ex ante coordination between policy makers with different objectives. This typically gives rise to incentive distortions for the policy actors involved. An immediate consequence of any attempt to seek closer coordination with the ECB would be a blurring of responsibilities, which would lead to every institution being made responsible for everything, which in the end would mean that, amid confusion, no institution was responsible for anything, and no successful reform implemented. •  Price stability is the best contribution monetary policy can make to structural reforms in Europe.
I want to try and illustrate some of that promise of Big Data, as well as the potential pitfalls, by drawing on examples from recent Bank of England research on the economic and financial system. I will conclude with some, more speculative, thoughts on future Big Data research. 1  The Path Less Followed The first thing to say is that Big Data and data analytic techniques are not new. Nonetheless, over recent years they have become one of the most rapidly rising growth areas in academic and commercial circles. Over that period, data has become the new oil; data analytic techniques have become the oil extraction and 2  refining plants of their time; and data companies have become the new oil giants. Yet economics and finance has, to date, been rather reticent about fully embracing this oil-rush. For economics and finance, the use of data analytic techniques has been the path less followed, at least relative to other disciplines. One simple diagnostic on that comes from looking at the very different interpretations put on the expression “data mining” by those inside and outside of economics and finance. For economists, few sins are more heinous than data-mining. It is the last resort of a scoundrel to engage in “regression-hunting” – reporting only those regression results which best fit the hypothesis the researcher 3  first set out to test. It is what puts the “con” into econometrics.

This point is particularly important because the Commission Bancaire's decision on whether to authorise the use of certain approaches may hinge on meeting these requirements, which, moreover, tie in with those in the new IFRS. It should be underlined that the Commission Bancaire carries out these activities in close cooperation with other European oversight authorities as a member of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) whose objective is to achieve closer convergence of supervisors' regulations and practices. In this regard, CEBS has set up operational networks, known as supervisory colleges, for major cross-border banks. Composed of the home-country and host-country supervisors of Europe's largest banking groups, these networks make it possible to find pragmatic solutions to the main problems encountered when implementing Basel II. Likewise, convergence of supervisory practices must be also materialised by the filing of the first accounting and prudential reports in FINREP and COREP formats, respectively, which form a common framework for Europe. ** * Let me say in conclusion that over the past year the French banking system has demonstrated its ability to develop new activities and thus find the fresh sources of growth needed to diversity its revenues. But these positive results are not without certain vulnerabilities, given that margins are slim and some complex financings are exposed to both operational risk and model risk. It is therefore necessary to ensure that banks’ balance sheets remain robust. To achieve this, naturally, pricing structures must correspond to actual risk exposure, and risk management techniques must be strengthened.
Although natural catastrophes – and damage caused by them – have risen in Asia in the last ten years, we remain significantly underinsured against perils like flooding. As disaster risk exposures grow in scale, size and complexity, it would exceed the individual capacity of local insurance markets, and governments, to insure the risks of its populations and communities. PPPs between public and private sectors, and across national borders, can be effective in maximising the benefits of insurance. Such examples of horizontal integration between markets are key in managing the region’s rising exposures to natural catastrophe risks. 19. Collation of natural catastrophe risk data and analytics across ASEAN countries is a necessary first step toward more comprehensive catastrophe protection, paving the way for insurance integration in this region. Currently, the fragmented market structure in ASEAN constrains data sharing and the capacity of domestic insurers to pool and underwrite risks. In Singapore, key partners from academia and industry, alongside the MAS, have come together to form a work group to explore the establishment of a Natural Catastrophe Data Analytics Exchange. This Exchange serves as a regional platform to collect data and model  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  less understood regions at risk in Asia-Pacific, facilitate better pricing of such risks, and eventually pave the way for more comprehensive insurance against these risks. 20. In combination, these comprehensive efforts among jurisdictions and participants are very encouraging.

I recommend giving it a read: the report itself is a treasure trove of data, and the results do you credit. The average solvency capital requirement (SCR) coverage ratio on the French market climbed from 222% in 2016 to 238% in 2017. What’s more, in the first quarter of 2018, the French insurance market overtook Germany and the United Kingdom to become Europe’s number-one market, with over EUR 35 billion in direct premiums written in non-life insurance and over EUR 2.100 trillion in technical provisions. It also leads in investment capacity: commanding total assets of EUR 2.7 trillion in September 2018, France’s insurance sector is far and away the largest institutional investor in Europe, accounting for over one-third of the total assets of euro area insurers. In comparison, France makes up 21% of euro area GDP. Insurers, then, are a crucial asset for France, and their critical role in financing the economy can and indeed must grow further. Corporate equity is vital to innovation and hence to a vibrant economy, but in mid-2018 equity was equivalent to just 77% of GDP in the euro area and 76% in France, compared with 124% in the United States. II. Tapping into regulatory opportunities. I would like to start this section off by noting that France’s introduction of a flat tax on capital income on 1 January has not had the slightest detrimental effect on life insurance, despite fears on this score within your industry.
Caleb M Fundanga: Review of Zambia’s economy Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia Association of Manufacturer’s Annual General Meeting, Lusaka, 16 April 2010. *  *  *  The President of ZAM – Mr Chance Kabaghe The Vice Presidents (North and South) – Mr Sebastian Kopulande and Mr Eugen Appel The ZAM Executive Committee Captains of Industry Ladies and Gentlemen I feel greatly honoured to officiate at this Annual General Meeting for the Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM). The Bank of Zambia and the Zambia Association of Manufacturers have a long standing relationship which is intertwined in more ways than one. I am sure that without making appropriate policies to support key sectors such as manufacturing, we would be robbing the country of the development that it deserves. I am reliably informed that ZAM has been going through restructuring in the last two years and has achieved a lot in terms of the establishment and making itself relevant not only to its members but to the Government and other stakeholders. It therefore gives me pleasure to stand before you to discuss issues that are pertinent to manufacturing. I am hopeful we will be able to understand the challenges and identify plausible ways of overcoming them for the sector to forge ahead and make a meaningful contribution to the economy. Mr President, the performance of the Zambian economy in 2009 was favourable.

In such circumstances, the Bank intervenes to moderate short term volatility of the exchange rate but not to change the direction dictated by the fundamentals. On the other hand, an improvement in the terms of trade provides an opportunity for the Bank of Zambia to build reserves as it smoothens the rate of appreciation. Finally, Mr President, I wish to congratulate you on the contribution made by manufacturing sector to the GDP growth in 2009. The performance of the sector was favourable, recording a real growth of 2.5% compared with 1.8% in 2008. I am confident that as the economic fundamentals continue to improve, banks are expected to increase lending to the private sector at reduced rates. We therefore expect the sector’s contribution to growth in 2010 to increase. In order to assist the country’s diversification process away from copper, I wish to implore you to seek ways of enhancing productivity in your various sectors as a means improving competiveness of your products for exports. Mr. President, one way by which your members can contribute to increased GDP is through participation in the Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) for which the Government has approved establishment of three. You may wish to note that the construction of the Chambishi MFEZ on the Copperbelt has reached an advanced stage while work on the Lusaka South MFEZ is underway. Several enterprises with significant investments are already being established at the Chambishi MFEZ. There is also a proposal for the establishment of the Lumwana MFEZ in North-western province.
Michael Gondwe: Supervision of non-banks and microfinance institutions Remarks by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the opening ceremony of the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI) regional workshop on “Supervision of non-banks and microfinance institutions”, Lusaka, 8 April 2013. *  *  *  The MEFMI Programme Officer, Distinguished Resource Persons, MEFMI Staff, Participants, Ladies and gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to officiate at this workshop on Supervision of Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Microfinance organised by the Financial Sector Management Programme of MEFMI. May I take this opportunity, on behalf of MEFMI and on my own behalf, to welcome you all to this important workshop and, in particular, to welcome you to Lusaka. I urge you to make some time to visit and sample some of the beautiful spots that our city and country has to offer. I also wish to welcome and thank our distinguished resource persons Mr. Japheth Katto from Capital Markets Authority of Uganda, Mr. Nkosilathi Moyo from World Vision here in Zambia, Mrs. Rachel Mushosho from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and Mr. Kagisanyo Kelobang from the African Development Bank (AfDB) in Tunis for accepting invitations to present at this workshop and hope that their participation will enrich the deliberations of this workshop as well as increase the knowledge of the participants.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Ladies and gentlemen, I note with gratitude that this workshop is designed to address supervisory standards in the non-bank and microfinance sector through three main themes, namely; i)  regulatory structures,  ii)  international trends and standards, and  iii)  integration of non-banks into the formal sector. These are all very important and topical issues and allow me to talk a little bit more about one of these themes – the development of regulatory structures. First, while there is a definite role for international standards for regulation of this sector, it is very important that they are implemented in a way that takes into account the individual circumstances of each country. Secondly, the standards we adopt should in the end not impede financial sector inclusion. We need to balance this in order to achieve our overall objective which is a sound and efficient financial system. Ladies and gentlemen, It is important not to assume that supervisory arrangements should be, or can be, the same in every country. They must be tailored to the individual circumstances of each country. As an example, what is appropriate for Namibia may be totally inappropriate for another country like Uganda, and vice versa. However, there are likely to be common characteristics that cut across and can enable us all to learn from each other.
In many ways, the build-up of vulnerabilities that led to the crisis arose from a series of bad financial decisions made by borrowers, bankers, investors and regulators. This brings forth the importance of sound financial governance as a fundamental element of robust economies and financial systems, one that ensures that the possibility of the existence of weak links within the system is minimised. 1  Kremer, M. (1993). The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Oxford University Press) 108 (3): 551–575. 2  Hartford, T. (2015). Teamwork gives us added personbyte. Financial Times 19 June 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Today, I would like to discuss three inter-related issues relevant to the theme of this conference. First and briefly, the issue of global financial governance. Then I will focus at greater length on the relationship between financial governance and economic growth at the national level. The third and final part of my remarks will cover the governance of finance. Global financial governance: a lack of urgency Let me start with global financial governance. I will be brief on this as much of the discussion has been had elsewhere at various other platforms. Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, while the global monetary and financial system has become more integrated and sophisticated, global financial governance has changed little.

We start from a position in which inflation is in fact running - and has been running for some months slightly below the Government’s 2½% target. The November figure was 2.2% and within this goods price inflation was running at around only ½%, while retail services price inflation was running at nearly 4%. On Europe’s HICP measure, inflation in November was running at 1.3%. In part this out-turn reflects the abnormal international developments I have already discussed. The slowdown in the world economy reduced external demand in the UK. Weak world demand was 3  BIS Review 5/2000  accompanied initially, too, by falling commodity and manufacturing input prices. And sterling’s strong exchange rate had a direct, dampening, impact on our domestic price level. It is clear that world demand has now started to strengthen and commodity prices generally have stopped falling. And the oil price has already recovered strongly - which may benefit the Scottish economy but puts upward pressure on inflation. But sterling’s exchange rate remains uncomfortably strong. Looking ahead, there are a number of unusual factors that might help to hold the rate of inflation down, at least in the short term. Some of these are one-off administrative measures rather than broader economic influences: they include the unusually large price reductions imposed by utilities regulators to come into effect in the spring as well as the Chancellor’s decision to end automatic over-indexation of excise duties on fuel and tobacco.