samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
26  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  26  Chart 18: Union membership Share of employment  60%  50%  40%  30%  20%  10%  0% 1892  1902  1912  1922  1932  1942  1952  1962  1972  1982  1992  2002  2012  Sources: Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Bank of England and Bank calculations. Chart 19: Collective bargaining  Per cent 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  Source: ONS and Bank calculations. Notes: Share of employees with Collective Bargaining Agreement coverage. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Chart 20: Union membership vs. change in labour share by industry  Change in labour share  0.3 0.2 0.1 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  Initial unionisation rate Source: ONS and Bank calculations Note: Data shown at SIC1-digit level. X-axis shows unionisation rate in 2001, and y-axis shows change in labour share between 2001 and 2016. Size of bubbles represents size of industry. Trend line weighted by size of industry. Chart 21: Robot use by country in manufacturing  Robots per 10,000 employees in manufacturing 600 500 400 300 200 100 0  Source: International Federation of Robotics.

28  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  28  Chart 22: Automation exposure vs. change in labour share by industry Change in labour share 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5  -0.4  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  Initial automation rate Source: ONS, Frey and Osborne (2013) and Bank calculations. Note: Data shown at SIC1-digit level. X-axis shows an estimate for the automation rate in 2001 based on Frey and Osborne estimates for the future probability of automation by occupation. Y-axis shows change in labour share between 2001 and 2016. Size of bubbles represents size of industry. Trend line weighted by size of industry. Chart 23: Settlements data (whole economy) Per cent 5  4  3  2  1  0 2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  Whole economy settlement (12m mean) Whole economy settlement (3m mean) Source: Bank of England, Incomes Data Research, XpertHR, Incomes Data Service, Labour Research Department and Bank calculations. Note: “3m mean” refers to annualised three month-on-three month settlement rate, and “12m mean” refers to settlement compared to same period a year earlier.
The rescue package also spans injecting capital into systemically important players, and neutralizing short-term market impact of valuation of toxic assets by underwriting those risks themselves. Ladies and Gentlemen, Up to now, banks in Asia have been less affected by the direct impact of the global financial turmoil. At this juncture, subprime-related losses have been lower in Asia than elsewhere. The estimated write down and credit loss, as recoded by Bloomberg on 28th October, is about 27 billion US dollars for Asia, compared with 430 billion US dollars in the U.S. and 221 billion US dollars in Europe. While this may be the case, the impact on regional capital markets, including the prices of bank stocks and widening credit spread, signals a much deeper concern. Events in the recent weeks reflected market worries of the second round impact via expected slowdown in the global economy, trade, and exports. Of course, the last leg to all of this is the currency volatility experienced by regional currencies. In fact, we saw, for the first time in this past decade, intervention by some regional central banks that would have been quite unthinkable a year ago. Looking ahead, significant downside risk to growth and upside risk to volatility remains. On the growth side, the October IMF World Economic Outlook sees the world economy entering a major downturn. Global growth is projected to slow substantially in 2008 and only a modest recovery would begin later in 2009.

Turning now to labour markets, also here progress has been rather uneven across areas. A number of countries have lowered marginal tax rates in order to make their tax systems more employment friendly. Some progress has generally also been made with the introduction of more flexibility in working contracts and practices. In many other areas, however, important reforms have not yet got off the ground. For instance, few changes have been made regarding employment protection policies in euro area countries, which remain among the strictest in the industrial countries. Also, reforms aiming to simplify and limit unemployment benefit systems and thereby enhance employment growth have only slowly progressed in almost all euro area countries. The emergence of skill shortages and tight labour markets in several euro area countries shows that structural problems still remain and need to be solved. The euro area could use its potential much better, as is illustrated by its relatively low labour force participation. Whereas, in the euro area, the labour force participation rate was 67% in 1999, it amounted to 77% in the US. BIS Review 61/2001  3  All in all, we see that some traditional hurdles to market flexibility and competition are slowly being removed, but as regards the current state of affairs in the euro area there is certainly still plenty of scope and urgent need for improvement. Structural reforms are of paramount importance not only for raising the growth potential of the economy but, most importantly, for increasing employment prospects in the euro area.
Accordingly, inflation is expected to be, with 70 percent probability, between 3.9 and 6.7 percent (with a mid-point of 5.3 percent) at the end of 2013, and between 3.1 and 6.7 percent (with a midpoint of 4.9 percent) at the end of 2014. We expect inflation to stabilize around 5 percent in the medium term (Chart 21). 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 21. Inflation and Output Gap Forecasts  * Shaded region indicates the 70 percent confidence interval for the forecast. Source: CBRT. In sum, we maintained inflation forecast for end-2013 at 5.3 percent, as there has been no major revision in the factors affecting inflation outlook in the past three months. We expect inflation to resume its downward trend after creeping up in January due to tobacco price adjustments. Although inflation may increase temporarily in May and June due to base effects in energy prices, it will continue to decline in the following months, closing the year at 5.3 percent (Chart 21). We expect core inflation indicators to display a steady downward path and materialize below 5 percent at the end of the year. Revisions in our inflation forecasts are presented on the slide. Although there was no change in the end-year inflation forecast, we revised our inflation forecasts downwards compared to the path presented in the October Inflation Report in the short term due to the benign course of unprocessed food prices (Chart 22). Chart 22.

Coupled with the ongoing slowdown in domestic demand, this led to a sustained fall in the annual rate of increase in core goods prices. Meanwhile, prices of services remained on a mild track (Chart 16). Against this backdrop, core inflation indicators maintained a downward trend (Chart 17). Chart 16. Chart 17. Prices of Core Goods and Services  Core Inflation Indicators SCA-H and SCA-I  (Annual Percent Change)  ( Annual Percent Change)  Source: TurkStat. Source: TurkStat. Now, I will touch upon the developments in economic activity on which the inflation forecasts are based besides the short term outlook. Third-quarter national income data point that domestic demand conditions remained weak due to private investment demand. Private consumption, which displayed an increase for the first time in a protracted period, limited the slowdown in final domestic demand. Nevertheless, demand conditions followed a slightly weaker course compared to the projections in the October Inflation Report (Chart 18). Last-quarter data indicate a mild pick-up in consumption and investment demand as envisaged. Accordingly, output gap forecasts regarding the second half of 2012 are slightly revised downwards compared to the previous report. Chart 18. 2012Q3 Final Domestic Demand: Forecast and Realizations (Seasonally Adjusted, 2008Q1=100)  Source: TurkStat, CBRT. Meanwhile, we estimate that easing financial conditions due to the recent rise in capital inflows may result in a higher-than-expected growth in final domestic demand in the first half of 2013. Indicators for orders, loans and other leading indices also support this outlook.
CPIF inflation has shown significantly more stable development than CPI, which includes the effects on mortgage interest expenditure of the drastic interest rate cuts implemented during the crisis, as well as the recent interest rate increases. Inflationary pressures are starting to increase in tandem with the economic recovery. This means that the repo rate has also been increased from the very low level of 0.25 per cent that prevailed one year ago to 1.5 per cent today. This allows us to safeguard the balance of Sweden’s economy and simultaneously attain the inflation target of 2 per cent. Where are we going? Having come this far, it may be appropriate to stop and spend a moment reflecting over the financial crisis and long-term economic development. As I mentioned in my introduction, the period from the mid-1990s until the financial crisis was characterised by good growth, low inflation and decreasing variation in output and prices. In addition, the financial crisis was preceded by a period of about 60 years of unbroken growth in the world economy. So we could ask ourselves: are crises of the type we have just experienced “improbable events” that take place perhaps once in fifty years and something we just have to accept? My answer is both yes and no. We have learned that financial crises are extremely costly. Governments and central banks are now busy discussing different measures both to reduce the likelihood of crises arising and to mitigate the consequences of any such crises.

Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 3 March 2011. *  *  *  I was here as recently as two days ago to discuss the development of housing prices and household indebtedness. Today, I am here to discuss monetary policy. 1 After several years of crisis management, it feels positive to return to discussing more “usual” monetary policy issues. When I was here a year ago, I showed a picture of a skater on the ice. Having been out on thin ice, I considered we had returned to thicker ice. Today, I would instead say that we’re back on dry land. To use a different metaphor, Sweden, with its small, open economy, could be described as being a small boat on a wide ocean. The financial crisis required “Sailboat Sweden” to navigate some dramatically stormy waters. After such a traumatic experience, it is natural to try to lift your gaze and ask certain all-embracing questions:   Where have we come from?   Where are we now?   Where are we going? Personally, I would be just a little worried if I found myself aboard a boat without knowing where I boarded it, its current position or final destination. Let me therefore attempt to give you my answers to these questions as they concern Sweden’s economy. Where have we come from?
Central banks instituted huge asset purchase programs and brought short-term interest rates to near zero—in some cases below zero—to stimulate economic recovery. The good news is that, for the most part, monetary policy did its job. Advanced economies have seen steady growth and significant declines in unemployment. But the recovery has been slow. And despite low unemployment, inflation rates have been running persistently below central banks’ goals. The Federal Reserve, like many central banks, has a goal of keeping inflation at 2 percent. In the pre-2008 era, inflation was a major concern for the public and central banks alike. And, while I will always be vigilant about inflation that’s too high, inflation that’s too low is now a more pressing problem. The experience of a slow recovery and persistently low inflation is a symptom of deeper problems afflicting advanced economies. Two changes, unrelated to the crisis, have been taking place, causing a shift in economic conditions and quietly shaping the trajectories of advanced economies. These are the “the facts” that have changed. Today I’m going to discuss them in more detail, and explore our options for dealing with the challenges they present. “The Facts” Shifts in demographics and productivity growth have fundamentally altered the economic environment in which we operate. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Starting with demographics, two changes have taken place: People are generally living longer, and population growth is slowing. Dwindling birth rates are bringing population growth to a standstill.

Fraziali Ismail: Non-performing loans in East Asia and the Pacific practices and lessons in times of COVID-19 Opening remarks by Mr Fraziali Ismail, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the webinar and the launch of World Bank’s Report on non-performing loans (NPL) in East Asia and the Pacific, 27 October 2021. * * * A very good morning to everyone! It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this webinar in conjunction with the launch of the World Bank Report on “Non-Performing Loans in East Asia and the Pacific: Practices and Lessons in Times of COVID-19”. This event comes at a time where many of us in the region are still navigating through uncertainties with the pandemic. Recovery in many regional economies including Malaysia has begun to gather pace in recent periods in tandem with the recovery in global economic activity. However, the outlook remains subject to large downside risks as the potential for new variants of COVID-19 remains high. These developments are also happening amid the gradual expiry of policy support extended to households and businesses affected by the pandemic. The unprecedented level of support extended has so far helped to keep loan impairments at bay. But, as these measures are gradually unwound as the economy recovers, we would expect to have much greater visibility on the true asset quality of banks.
Global companies may see their chains of supply disrupted by strikes in far away lands. We have no control over these events and no possible way to guess where the next catastrophe – natural or manmade – will occur. Let me return to global finance. I have said before that the world today is less likely to witness the recurrent crises that afflicted so many countries in the 1980s and 1990s. I am convinced that this is the case. By choosing a flexible exchange regime, they have chosen a more resilient system, and many of them are pursuing sensible macroeconomic policies that should help them navigate turbulent waters more safely than in the past. But I am also convinced that not all countries are equally well prepared to cope with free capital mobility. For those countries with weak institutions and underdeveloped financial sectors, globalisation means more rather than less vulnerability. International financial integration may look like a blessing when foreign capital flows in, but it will look like a curse when foreign investors head for the door. The present monetary order is more resilient than the previous regime of fixed exchange rates, but crises can still occur, and if they occur they are more likely to be extensive and spread rapidly. And globalisation, of course, goes far beyond financial integration. Global companies are located all over the world. They have to deal with different legal frameworks, with different business cycles, with different political realities.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Implications for business of the new international monetary order Address by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Annual Conference of the International Business Academy, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, 8 December 2006. This address has been prepared with the help of Mrs Maria Rueda Maurer, International Research and Technical Assistance Unit, Swiss National Bank. *  *  *  It is a pleasure for me to be here discussing one of the most important issues of our times: financial globalisation and its implications for international business. Globalisation, the landmark of the dawn of the 21st century, has opened up new opportunities for growth and prosperity on the planet. It has created fantastic investment perspectives to those firms that can compete internationally. But it has also changed the rules of the game and brought about new challenges. Today, the success and the survival of international business are determined more than ever at the private level. Because goods and capital are free to move across national borders, protection from risks emanating from globalisation can be a matter for private strategy only, rather than public policy. This, I think, is the main difference between the globalised world of today and the partitioned world of separated nations in the past.
Simply put, a CTC could not claim tax deduction for interest paid to fund providers within the group as expenses, but all its interest income was subject to profits tax. This tax asymmetry greatly diminished the attractiveness of Hong Kong as a CTC hub, especially as our main competitors in the region and elsewhere do not seem to have this problem. 4. When faced with this possible deal breaker in our effort to promote Hong Kong as the CTC hub, what did we do? Rule number two in marketing: you cannot do good marketing if the product is not a good one. You can only fool some people some of the time but not for long. So one has to make good a product if it is found defective or inferior. Thanks to the help from the TMA, we formed a working group to study the problem and make recommendations to remove the obstacles undermining Hong Kong’s development as a CTC hub. We made a report to the Financial Secretary and obtained his support to change this tax anomaly. With the support of the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (FSTB) and the Inland Revenue Department (IRD), and in consultation with the industry, we managed to pass the legislative amendments to remove the tax asymmetry in May 2016. In addition, the Government has gone one step further by providing additional tax incentive by halving the profits tax rate payable on specified CTC activities in Hong Kong from 16.5% to 8.25%.

However, I am less sanguine when it comes to the credibility component, which boils down to trust. Trust has to be earned over a long period of time, and can be lost overnight. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  For Hong Kong to excel, it is not enough for our financial institutions and practitioners to be technically competent only. They must also uphold high ethical standards in order to gain the trust and respect of customers. 10. In the past few years, a number of misdeeds by some financial institutions and practitioners have come to light. For example, the rigging of LIBOR had led to international reform of interest rate benchmarks, a process which is still ongoing. There were also cases of front running and other irregularities in FX and gold trading that had led to investigation into some banks and senior bankers. All these point to the weakness of the tradition of “self-discipline” amongst financial practitioners. It is now considered that more comprehensive and possibly more prescriptive guidelines on ethical standards and conduct are needed to strengthen the system. The latest FX Global Code is the outcome of one of such reforms. The Code was developed over the past two years by 16 central banks, including the HKMA, together with private-sector institutions from both the buy and sell sides. It is a comprehensive set of global principles on good practice in the FX market, and it is intended to promote a robust, fair, liquid, open, and transparent market.
All these developments through the decisive implementation of policies have reflected themselves in reducing uncertainty and increasing predictability, strengthening macroeconomic fundamentals, increasing resilience to shocks and changing the dynamics of the economy bringing the private sector to the forefront; rising productivity, changing behaviors and increasing competition. All in all, it is clear that the Turkish economy has been undergoing a structural transformation since 2001. After going through a deep structural transformation, it is safe to say that the Turkish economy has gradually been normalized. According to our studies, the impact of decisions of short-term interest  2  2  BIS. (1998). “The Transmission of Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies”. BIS Policy Papers No. 3. BIS Review 88/2006  rates on inflation and on the economy is observed up to 18 and 9 months respectively in Turkey. We also calculated that the lag has been lengthening as we progress with the structural transformation. Dear participants, The second challenge of central banks in some emerging economies is dollarization. In fact, the issue of dollarization has become a common characteristic of many emerging markets like Turkey since the beginning of the 1990s. Both our experience and that of Latin American economies clearly indicate that dollarization increases the fragilities of almost every sector of the economy, namely the real sector, public sector and financial sector. From the perspective of the real sector, dollarization appears in several respects. First, it affects pricing behaviors.

In the next decade, the world can be grouped in two categories: on the one hand, advanced economies, with high absorption capacity, low savings and high debt with ratios close to 100%. On the other, emerging economies, with high savings, low debt (around 30% GDP on average) and  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  less absorption capacity. Our common prosperity will therefore depend on our ability to create stable channels of financial intermediation between those two parts of the world. That, in turn, will crucially depend on the existence of assets that can be considered safe stores of value. But, as I have argued from the start, public debt may not be able to play that role to the same extent as before. The ultimate safe asset, therefore, could be the currency itself. Markets will trust currencies that are managed with one overriding priority: preserving price stability and the intrinsic value of the currency unit. On this fundamental basis, we can look at the future of the euro with realistic optimism. I see the recent decision by the Swiss central bank to peg the Swiss franc to the euro as an illustration of this conviction. **** A few words now on the French banking sector. First, banks have been hit in all advanced economies by the downward revision of growth prospects. This reaction can be explained by the fact that slower growth means lower profits, thus lower dividends.