samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
SAMA works side by side in cooperation with relevant authorities, namely, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Commerce and Industry to achieve the cherished objectives of the Finance Laws. The Implementing Regulations of the Real Estate Finance Law address criteria and conditions to be observed in the exercise of this activity for the purpose of regulating the finance sector, and protecting the rights of the dealers therein. The Regulations set a maximum limit on real estate financing that should not exceed 70 percent of the house value subject of the real estate finance contract. The Regulations also set up a regulatory framework for real estate refinancing, thereby, establishing a secondary market that contributing to providing the necessary liquidity and reducing the cost of financing to the consumer. The Public Investment Fund will contribute to the ownership of the Saudi Refinancing Company with a capital of five billion Riyals. The Implementing Regulations of the Financial Leasing Law include provisions related to the Financial Leasing contracts. The Regulations identify the basic rights and obligations of both the lessor and lessee, including determining the amount of ownership right and dues of the lessee and lessor in case of the cancellation of the contract. The Regulations provide for the registration process of Financial Leasing contracts in accordance with the best practices in this area through a company incorporated for this purpose.

For OTC derivatives, the redistribution of trading has been less clear-cut in direction, with dealers moving some activities to EU trading venues and others to US venues, the latter having equivalence arrangements with both the EU and the United 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Kingdom. Towards a well-functioning capital markets union in the EU The events of the past year – the pandemic and Brexit – have put renewed emphasis on the need for the EU to have a well-functioning capital markets union. In fact, EU leaders have agreed to finance the recovery from the pandemic by borrowing collectively through financial markets. The issuance of high-quality euro-denominated sovereign bonds under the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund is a step towards achieving deeper, more complete and liquid capital markets and establishing a European safe asset. As the Commission intends to raise 30% of the € billion recovery fund by issuing green bonds, NGEU is also expected to contribute to further developing sustainable and green finance. In parallel, the Commission has set out 16 specific actions to boost the EU’s capital markets union, which are aligned with many of the ECB’s own priorities.4 These actions aim to deepen and further integrate European capital markets, in order to allow investors, savers, firms and market infrastructures alike to access a full range of services and products, regardless of where they are in the EU.
This might prove to be beneficial in terms of efficiency gain in the medium term. Inflation may temporarily go under the corridor of the Bank of Albania, but is expected to be within the corridor for most of the year. Monetary policy will make sure that proper incentives  BIS Review 43/2009  3  to hold local currency denominated assets are maintained and that inflation expectations are kept anchored at the target of Bank of Albania. This is expected to also be important in maintaining adequate financial intermediation capacity in the medium term. The profitability of the banking sector is expected to be lower this year, due to lower volume of the profitmaking activities (lower credit supply/demand), potentially higher financing costs and increasing provisions for non-performing loans. But this is not expected to have a substantial effect on capital adequacy and liquidity indicators. More than sufficient capitalization and liquidity parameter of the banking activity will protect the stability of the banking sector and of the financial system going forward. While the international crisis is impacting every country, the magnitude of the impact will depend on length of the international crisis and the state of that country’s economy. Expectations for the recovery of the world economy, somewhere between end of this year – beginning of next year, if materialized, will remove the uncertainty and the psychological boost will likely support the sense of earlier and stronger economic benefits.

The world economy continues to grow and the US economy remains robust despite the interest rate hikes by the Fed and the slight softening in the property market that ensued. The Asian economies are deriving increasing benefits from China's vitality. An economic upturn is also visible in Europe, especially in Germany, even though it is still moderate. In addition, the fact that world growth is generating more demand for investment goods is creating a particularly favourable situation for our exports. We may expect a positive spin-off from this good foreign trade performance for all areas of the Swiss economy – in production as in employment. To date, the rise in sales abroad has been handled through substantial gains in productivity, but we may hope that this will now be followed by a resumption of investment in equipment, along with increased recruitment. Consequently, the overall economic climate in Switzerland is likely to continue improving over the next few months, thereby supporting consumption. We project growth of slightly over 2% for the year as a whole. This return to growth does not constitute a threat to price stability. Our forecasts indicat that average inflation for this year is likely to be about 1%, and the outlook remains just as favourable for 2007. Compared with other countries, Switzerland will continue to enjoy a privileged position in this respect. What may we expect from monetary policy? The inflation forecast we published in March clearly indicates that the current interest rate level is incompatible with long-term price stability.
But there are signs that the matching of job-seekers to vacancies is not working well. The decrease in unemployment in recent years has, above all, been among those born in Sweden. For this group, unemployment is now on a very low level. Unemployment among those born abroad, on the other hand, has not decreased to the same extent and is significantly higher to begin with. A greater supply of foreign-born labour creates the conditions for long-term higher employment, but it is important that the labour market functions efficiently so that the supply of labour can be fully utilised. With a greying population, this will also become increasingly urgent as the demand for labour in areas such as health and social care rises. Despite the economic situation continuing to be strong and both the labour force and employment being expected to increase further in the future, it is the Riksbank’s assessment that unemployment is not expected to fall much more in the years ahead. So, to keep unemployment down – and above all to bring it down significantly below its current level – measures are needed within policy areas other than monetary policy. I do not mean by this that monetary policy has been exhausted. There is scope to make it even more expansionary if need be. But monetary policy cannot be expected to be able to solve structural problems on the labour market.

For around a quarter of a million households, debt is 6 times greater than income or higher. High indebtedness linked to rising housing prices As most of the debt consists of mortgages, the growing indebtedness reflects the development in housing prices. Prices of detached or semi-detached houses have tripled in the last 20 years, while prices of tenant-owned apartments have increased at an even faster rate. The rapid price increase depends on several factors, in addition to the low interest rate level. The population and income have increased, driving up housing demand while new housing construction has lagged behind, apart from in the most recent years. The abolition of property tax is also a  4 See the article "The repo rate in the long run” in the February 2017 Monetary Policy Report, Sveriges Riksbank. 5 [13]  factor that might explain the growing indebtedness, as is the fact that an increasing number of households own their own home. 5 The rate of increase in lending to households is still on a high level. The Riksbank’s assessment of future developments is that overall household debt will not rise at quite such a high rate as in recent years, due to more subdued housing price growth. But debt is still expected to increase more rapidly than disposable income. So the debt-to-income ratio will continue to rise.
Economic policy uncertainty hit a record high in August 2019  1  14.11.2019 Climate risks and central banks: an SNB perspective | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Source: SNB. The SNB’s balance sheet mainly comprises foreign exchange reserves – a key tool of our monetary policy  2  14.11.2019 Climate risks and central banks: an SNB perspective | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Our foreign exchange reserves are broadly diversified and meet stringent security and liquidity requirements EUR 39%  CAD 3%  GBP 6%  USD 35%  3  14.11.2019 Climate risks and central banks: an SNB perspective | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Sources: SNB, flaticon.com. JPY 9%  The SNB’s risk profile is very different from that of a Swiss pension fund – a reflection of the primacy of monetary policy  78%  Source: SNB.

Looking ahead, volatility in global capital markets may have a pronounced impact on the value of the GPFG, to both the upside and the downside. Good institutions can enable us to use favourable periods to create long-term value. The same institutions can also help us through less favourable periods without permanent damage. And, unlike either good or bad luck, institutions, as a rule, are more permanent. The future management model for the GPFG is ultimately a matter of institutions that are supposed to be long-lasting. Norges Bank’s societal and constitutional role has provided a stable framework for the fund. Should the framework that the Bank can provide still be the decisive factor, or has the fund now become so large and investment management so extensive, that the assets can be best preserved and grown in a separate organisation? The Commission’s recommendation and the ensuing debate show that there is a wide range of views. The discussion reflects both the evolution towards an increasingly complex fund and the fund’s key role in Norwegian politics and Norway’s economy. But once the decision is made, the issue of the fund’s future organisation must be regarded as settled. Regardless of the outcome, we must be prepared to live with the chosen governance model for many years to come. Broad political consensus is an effective guarantee in this context. 1 Regjeringen.no: Pressemelding 16.02.2017 Økt aksjeandel i pensjonsfondet og justert anslag for  fondsavkastningen” 2 The non-oil deficit as a percentage of total general government expenditure.
Yet, these are necessary but insufficient conditions to ensure that the banking system will again become a vibrant financial engine of growth. Why? Because, over long periods of time, the soundness and resilience of banks also hinges on the dynamism of the economy and society: hence the habitat of banks also has to draw itself out of the crisis. The sustainability of public and private finances and the health of the broader financial system are also critical components in securing a successful and resilient banking system. The crisis has left a heavy, uneven structural legacy across the euro area As the earlier stages of this multi-layered financial crisis unfolded, it became apparent that several banks had grown far too large for their economies, making the fate of several governments and banks ever more intertwined. Fears of debt unsustainability in Greece sparked concerns also about the public finances and financial health of other euro area countries. Some speak of a twin crisis of “two debt overhangs”. Others speak of the “sovereign-bank nexus”: they are all referring to the same phenomenon. 2 That was when the “doom loop” between weak sovereigns and weak banks took hold to full effect and when the flaws in the design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) became most damaging. 3 While significant progress has been made towards rectifying governance failings and design flaws, the burden of the crisis on sovereigns, households and banks is considerable and unevenly distributed.

Its objective is to conduct surveys to collect household-level data on households’ income, expenditure, assets, debt and collateral. The data can then be aggregated to gauge a measure of distress of individual households and to calculate credit risk indicators, such as the probability of default, exposure at default or loss given default. Such indicators can then be subject to stress tests for which a scenario can combine an unemployment shock with an interest rate shock and a house price shock. Had such data been available prior to the crisis, it would have facilitated the identification of household borrowing and spending exuberance in several countries at an earlier stage. •  There is the Macro-prudential Research Network (MaRs). Its objective is to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and tools that provide research support in order to improve macro-prudential supervision in the European Union. The work performed under MaRs can yield more complex economic, financial and monetary indicators that can more adequately address the complexities inherent in the euro area. In the context of MaRs and also resulting from work in our own Department of Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability, we have developed analytical tools that include, for instance, early warning systems that can go to the level of individual banks, decision tree risk models, structural VARs and Global VARs , contagion network models and top-down stress test models for banks. One of the least acknowledged outcomes of the crisis is the wealth of tools and models now available for conducting in-depth economic, monetary and financial stability analyses.
Des travaux préparatoires approfondis ont également contribué au succès de l’introduction de l’euro sur les marchés de capitaux (B). A. L’UEM repose sur des fondations solides et profondes 1. La création de l’Union monétaire et de la monnaie unique n’est pas un concept récent et abstrait, fruit de l’imagination de quelques uns. 1  BIS Review 22/1999  Le traité de Maastricht est l’aboutissement d’une série d’initiatives importantes qui appartiennent déjà à l’histoire de l’Europe. Le rapport Werner, élaboré au début des années soixante-dix, a introduit le concept d’Union économique et monétaire. Le traité de Maastricht a été négocié, signé et ratifié d’abord par les douze premiers pays puis par les quinze pays de l’Union européenne. Je rappellerai que treize pays l’ont approuvé sans aucune réserve. 2. Le bien-fondé de l’UEM repose sur les avantages économiques qu’une monnaie unique apporte à l’ensemble de l’Europe. L’Union européenne (pays hors zone euro compris) compte au total 370 millions d’habitants, représente près de 20 % du PIB mondial et 21 % environ du commerce international (échanges intraeuropéens exclus) contre quelque 17 % pour les États-Unis et 10 % pour le Japon. Les avantages inhérents à la taille même du marché unique sont évidents. Il permet à l’ensemble du secteur productif de réaliser d’importantes économies d’échelle et d’affecter l’épargne aux investissements les plus rentables. Il renforce également la transparence du marché et il stimule la concurrence dans l’intérêt des consommateurs. De ce point de vue, la monnaie unique représente le couronnement du marché unique.

L’Union monétaire est donc composée de pays dont les résultats monétaires et financiers ont convergé vers ceux des pays dont les monnaies sont les plus stables et les plus crédibles. L’objectif des autorités monétaires de la zone euro est la stabilité monétaire. Le Traité de Maastricht a conféré une mission claire au Système européen de banques centrales (SEBC) nouvellement créé, celle de maintenir la stabilité des prix. Le SEBC est totalement indépendant des autorités nationales et européennes dans la poursuite de cet objectif. En d’autres termes, les banques centrales nationales sont indépendantes et leurs statuts sont compatibles avec le Traité. Le SEBC a hérité de la crédibilité des banques centrales nationales des pays dont les monnaies bénéficient de la meilleure réputation, c’est-à-dire l’Allemagne et la France. Les 13 octobre et 1er décembre 1998, la BCE a présenté la stratégie de politique monétaire qui sera mise en œuvre durant la phase III de l’Union monétaire. Cette stratégie assure la continuité avec les politiques monétaires des banques centrales nationales participantes : - la stabilité des prix est définie comme une progression sur un an de l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) inférieure à 2 % dans la zone euro. La stabilité des prix doit être maintenue à moyen terme. Définir la stabilité des prix permet également de mettre en oeuvre les principes de transparence et de responsabilité. - un rôle de premier plan a été assigné à la monnaie.
In the end, disorderly liquidation looks to have left unsecured creditors in the holding company with a recovery of around 20 cents on the dollar. The last resort, if no white knight can be persuaded to come forward and if the contagion caused by administration was simply too dangerous, was to use public funds to attempt to recapitalise and resurrect a failing bank. Although it was the last resort, it was also probably the most common. For the UK, this proved to be the only option available for what had, before the crisis, been three of largest five UK lenders. Given these banks accounted for some 40% of lending to the UK economy – and scarred by the chaos in the aftermath of Lehman – the government  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  was left with little option but to make a huge £ injection of funds to shore their capital position. The intervention was successful in stabilising the situation but UK taxpayers are still counting the cost. Today, the government’s stake in RBS, equivalent to economic ownership of a little over 80% of the group, is worth around £ a loss of over 25% on the funds injected. The UK was not alone. The US injected over $ of preferred stock into financial institutions, including a number of the largest firms. On the continent, the three Benelux countries injected € in a part-Nationalisation of Fortis; France, Belgium and Luxembourg injected € of capital into Dexia.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Demystifying cyber risks – evolving regulatory expectations Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the SEACEN Cyber Security Summit 2014 “Demystifying Cyber Risks: Evolving Regulatory Expectations”, Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 2014. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to welcome you to Sasana Kijang for the SEACEN Cyber Security Summit 2014. The theme “Demystifying Cyber Risks: Evolving Regulatory Expectations” is apt given that the subject is not well understood by most and developments in this area tend to change at an exponential rate. I would therefore like to commend the SEACEN Centre for taking an important step to strengthen awareness and promote collaboration among supervisors on cyber security issues. Cyber security risk gives rise to new challenges Cyber security risks are inherently complex. These threats are real and can have severe implications on financial institutions should the threat not properly managed. In 2013, more than 100 million customers had their credit card and personal information stolen as a result of a data breach at a major retail outlet in the US. The estimated cost of this incidence was close to $ million. For a single cyber attack, this is a staggering amount. Increased cyber security risk is a direct consequence of the more digital world we live in, where computing devices, online networks and technology infrastructure are becoming more integral to our daily lives.
Consequently, it appears that the risks for both economic growth and inflation over the medium to longer term may be shifting gradually to the upside. Even after the latest increase, the federal funds rate target range at three quarters of a percent to 1 percent is still unusually low in both nominal and inflation-adjusted terms. While most FOMC participants judge the equilibrium short-term real interest rate that is consistent with a neutral monetary policy to be low—perhaps in a range of 0 to 1 percent—this is still above the current inflation-adjusted federal funds rate. In such circumstances, it seems appropriate to scale back monetary policy accommodation gradually in order to reduce the risk of the economy overheating, and to avoid a significant inflation overshoot in the medium term. Finally, prior to the March FOMC meeting, financial conditions were generally easing rather than becoming tighter, even as the FOMC raised its policy rate in December and market participants increasingly expected further policy tightening in the coming year. Between the December and March FOMC meetings, U.S. equity prices rose by about 4 percent, and credit spreads, such as those for high-yield bonds, narrowed. Long-term yields and the trade-weighted dollar were little changed over this period. William McChesney Martin, the ninth chair of the FOMC, once famously opined that the Federal Reserve is “in the position of the chaperone who has ordered the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up.” I don’t think we are removing the punch bowl, yet.

William C Dudley: The importance of financial conditions in the conduct of monetary policy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the University of South Florida Sarasota-Manatee, Sarasota, Florida, 30 March 2017. * * * It is a pleasure to be here today. I would like to thank the University of South Florida for sponsoring this conference. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System.1 One aspect of today’s event is the dedication of a financial laboratory to help students learn about financial markets, which I think has great value. Knowledge of how financial markets operate is an important aspect of financial and economic literacy, and it leads to greater financial security over time. For example, one important lesson is that when the promised returns on an investment offering are extraordinarily high, it is because the investment is either very risky or fraudulent. When investing, it is important to remember that if it seems to be too good to be true, it likely is! Today, I want to take the opportunity to talk about the importance of financial markets in influencing the economic outlook and, in turn, U.S. monetary policy. This is a subject near and dear to my heart.