samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At times during 1996 and 1997 the 12-month change figure for the CPI was below the tolerance interval’s lower limit of 1 per cent. On a number of occasions the Riksbank pointed out that this was mainly an effect of the repo rate cuts during 1996. In that it was not a question of more permanent effects and the inflation assessment pointed to a future increase, there was no need for further repo rate cuts. During the summer and autumn of 1997 inflation did, in fact, move up fairly rapidly, as expected, in that these transitory effects successively dropped out of the 12-month figures. As a result, actual inflation has moved closer to the underlying rate. In describing this tendency, the Riksbank has been far from alarmist. The latest inflation report This brings me to the future development of inflation and the current situation for monetary policy. Our December inflation report provides a natural point of departure. The assessment there was that during 1998 inflation would somewhat exceed the target, with a gradual acceleration to a rate of about 2.5 per cent in 1999. Underlying inflation was likewise expected to move up and reach just over 2.5 per cent at the end of 1999. This assessment was broadly in line with the more or less concurrent forecast from the National Institute of Economic Research, for example, as well as with the figures that forecasters in general presented last November and December.

The result is a staggering bank restructuring cost of an estimated 25% of GDP for the crisis-hit economies in Asia. 1  The Manila Framework Group is a forum comprising senior finance and central bank officials from 14 economies, namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States of America. Senior representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements and the Asian Development Bank also attend the meeting. The Group meets twice a year. 1  BIS Review 24/2000  Since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, economies all over the region have taken important strategic steps to promote conditions that foster a full and speedy recovery. But recovery cannot be sustained unless it is accompanied by thorough structural reforms. It is encouraging to see that notable initiatives are taking place in Asia where extensive programmes are in progress to restructure and recapitalise banks. There are also efforts to tackle the problems posed by over-stretched and highly indebted corporations. But there is a risk that the problems that were so evident then will be swept under the carpet in the face of rapid growth. It is crucial that the reform momentum should not be allowed to falter, as it could undermine the fledgling recovery.
Yes, we met on the sidelines of the G20 meeting for finance ministers and central bankers. In our talks we discussed, among other things, prospects for yuan-denominated OFZ to be issued on the Russian market. We not support for this idea in principle, with details to be discussed subsequently. Lenta.ru’s QUESTION: There are concerns in business circles and in the expert community that the ruble is too volatile. What is the Bank of Russia’s view on this matter? What could lead to the Central Bank giving up the floating exchange rate? ELVIRA NABIULLINA: In the foreseeable future, I do not anticipate any factors which would force us to abandon a floating exchange rate regime. I am convinced that the negative repercussions cited by enterprises in the real sector of the economy, namely, volatility, are outweighed by the benefits of this policy. Thus we are saved from any drastic corrections in the exchange rate, which would then hurt the economy overall, including social expenditures, etc. Allow me to stress this point again. We are confident that the arrival of the floating rate regime has in many ways helped the economy adjust to external shocks more quickly than it did in 2008–2009. This is also suggested by the depth of recession. It was the floating regime arrangement that enabled the real sector of the economy, together with the financial sector, to adjust to a drastically different environment. This really is an inbuilt stabiliser, and we see that it does work.

This broad membership makes the TMA the authoritative industry association and focal point for treasury matters in Hong Kong. I am also glad that there are four committees established to focus on the four key areas that I have spoken about. We at the HKMA consider the TMA an important new element of our financial infrastructure. We are confident that the TMA will play a pivotal role in the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. May I congratulate you all on today's inauguration a nd wish you all the very best for the future. 2  BIS Review 4/2006
We are issuing new guidelines on compensation practices so that financial sector employees are rewarded for long-term performance and discouraged from excessive risk-taking. And we are working with foreign regulators to develop more robust international standards for bank liquidity. We are working to make the tri-party repo system more robust and reducing settlement risk by facilitating the settlement of over-the-counter derivatives trades on central counterparties (CCPs). But more needs to be done and much of this requires action by Congress. Congress is now considering several proposals for comprehensive regulatory reform, proposals that merit careful study and debate. Let me offer some general thoughts on the principles that should guide how we approach reform. First, it’s important to take a clear-eyed and comprehensive view of the financial system we have today. As I’ve already suggested, if there is one overriding lesson to be drawn from the events of the past 18 months, it is that the financial system is just that: a system, and a very complex one at that. The operational, liquidity and credit interdependencies that characterize contemporary financial markets and institutions mean that the well-being of any one segment of the system is inextricably linked to the well-being of the system as a whole. Because of this, our approach to reform must be guided by a coherent sense of the system as a whole, not merely by a focus on some of its component parts, as important as they may be.

On the other hand, this would create an attractive surrounding for absorbing and accommodating foreign investment, and allowing the entry of new capital into the economy, which is vital to support the country’s economic activity and its credibility in the region and beyond. The Bank of Albania is committed to guaranteeing a sound banking system and efficient in channelling public savings into the economy. We will continue to carry out our periodic examinations to guarantee the banking system’s stability. Sufficient capitalisation and capital quality remain our primary objective. I would like to guarantee the system that the Bank of Albania will take all the measures to supply with liquidity, while increasing the pressure for higher credit volume and improved quality. Dear guests, I invite you to actively participate in today’s debate and discussions on issues that have been and will remain the focus and our common interest in the future. I invite you all to contribute,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  through presentations and discussions, to setting objectives our region will face in the future and solving the current challenges. Thank you for your attention! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
You probably remember that last year, when we completed the asset quality review, this was a topical issue. No problems were found in this sphere, but we did know that some issues needed to be resolved. The new legal amendments help us make a step forward in this direction. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  A global development that we should mention and that will affect every one of you is the beginning normalisation of the leading central banks’ monetary policies. This coincides with a period of economic recovery both nationally and internationally. We will enter a new cycle of increasing interest rates. This is not going to happen overnight. The process is expected to run smoothly and to become more ostensible in 2019. This immediately raises the question of the actions that we all have to take to manage credit risk and regarding expense policies. Let me briefly outline what we are doing with regard to non-performing loans. Over the last two years the improvement in this area is considerable indeed. At the end of 2014 the portion of these loans was around 17%, now it is around 11%. Only a couple of days ago we sent the banking association a draft of guidelines on the continuation of this trend. We expect to receive your views on these guidelines so that we can finalise them as soon as possible.

Dimitar Radev: Review of Bulgaria's economy and banking system Banker's Day' speech by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, to the Association of Banks in Bulgaria, Sofia, 5 December 2017. * * * Dear Colleagues, Dear Members of Parliament, Dear guests, First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation – on my behalf and on behalf of my colleagues in the BNB Governing Council. We are delighted to be with you this evening. The passing year 2017 was good both for the economy and for the banking system in Bulgaria. Perhaps, this has been the first year for a long time, in which there is more optimism than pessimism. The economy is developing at better rates than we anticipated early this year. The fiscal position is solid. The banking sector is in a very good state. Capital adequacy and liquidity ratios are above the average levels for the European Union. For a second consecutive year this sector’s profits nearly reach the highest historical levels. Lending continues to increase. We see a long-term downward trend in non-performing loans. We also have positive results from the accomplishment of the BNB’s main priorities. Generally, the measures adopted after the asset quality review and the stress test last year are being implemented successfully. The efficiency of banking supervision is improving and all independent observers of the developments in our banking sector point up this progress.
It is not possible to avoid an international economic downturn entirely, but it is possible to prevent it from becoming too deep. In monetary policy it is also necessary to take into account what might happen further ahead if one conducts a very expansionary monetary policy over a long period of time. In particular the experiences of the years with low interest rates and rapid international growth prior to the current financial crisis indicate that one may also need to take into account the more longterm consequences of monetary policy and at what pace inflation should be brought back on target. There is also reason to take into account not only the total amount of spare resources in the economy, but also the composition of those resources. For an export-dependent country such as Sweden it is important, for instance, to take into account to what extent a large fall in exports could be replaced by other parts of demand through expansionary monetary policy and at what rate this could be done without inflation problems arising. Correspondingly, one may need to take into account the extent to which the labour supply will decline as a result of the depth and length of the recession when assessing what consequences a coming recovery may have for wage formation. The conclusion I draw from this is that it is important not to overestimate the available resources in the economy over the coming years.

We must try to make the best possible assessments of the amount of resources that will disappear more permanently as a result of  4  For a more detailed analysis of this connection, see Adolfson, M. and U. Söderström (2003), “How is the economy affected by the inflation target?” Economic Review 1, pp. 49-63, Sveriges Riksbank. http://www.riksbank.com/upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Artiklar_. PV/er03_1_artikel3.pdf. BIS Review 66/2009  7  the recession and of how quickly output can increase without causing inflation problems. Otherwise there is a risk that we will conduct an expansionary monetary policy for too long and thus risk inflation problems later on. One necessary condition for conducting effective monetary policy is that the financial system functions. Since last autumn the Riksbank has taken a number of measures to safeguard financial stability, in particular the extensive lending to the banks. We have recently decided to extend the eligible counterparties for our monetary policy operations and to offer the banks the opportunity to borrow from the Riksbank not merely at maturities of three months and six months, but also at twelve months. If economic developments should prove to be much worse than we are now predicting, there may be reason to proceed with more unconventional measures to support the economy. One possibility is to do as they have in a number of other countries and purchase government, mortgage and corporate bonds. We are currently examining the experiences of other countries and analysing the advantages and disadvantages of this type of measure.
Taking a more personal point of view, there are several reasons why I support our new form of communication introduced in June. My underlying antipathy towards (capital F, capital G) forward guidance has not diminished with the first-hand experience of it in this role. In particular, the ‘further tightening’ language previously employed could not be maintain indefinitely, at least not without taking the (ultimately indefensible) view that the level of rates does not matter. More generally, such guidance is a trap: attractive at the outset but difficult to exit from gracefully. Moving to new language – without the capital F, capital G forward guidance – reflects that reality. Whatever our initial intentions, markets and the media assign their own meanings to specific  Page 10  forward guidance language, which may mislead and/or undesirably constrain policy makers’ freedom of manoeuvre. On my reading, the ‘further tightening’ language came to be understood as suggesting rates would keep on rising at a pre-defined modest pace, largely independently of events and data. Not only did this give a false – and thus misleading – impression that Bank Rate was set to move mechanically and unconditionally upward over the coming months, but it also discouraged markets from pricing the macroeconomic risks to the interest rate outlook. That mispricing is ultimately costly for the efficiency of capital allocation. [16] Our new statement[17] has the form: The MPC will take the actions necessary to return inflation to the 2% target sustainably in the medium term, in line with its remit.

[13] On occasion, it has started well. But – almost uniformly – it has eventually ended in confusion. At a time when policy rates were stuck at their absorbing effective lower bond, a case for forward guidance could be made on the grounds that it allowed for further monetary easing by flattening the forward rate curve when the conventional approach of lowering Bank Rate was no longer available. [14] But – at least for the present – that case no longer holds, now that rates have risen comfortably into positive territory. If some easing were required, Bank Rate could be raised more slowly than currently anticipated (or even reduced if necessary). Forward guidance can also help contain interest rate volatility while policy is uncertain. As central banks make the difficult transition away from the very accommodative policy settings first established in the face of the global financial crisis and maintained, more or less, ever since, a case could be made that forward guidance (capital F, capital G) has helped to ease and support  Page 9  the shift. It is on that basis that I have – somewhat reluctantly – acquiesced in the ‘further tightening’ forward guidance embodied in MPC statements through the turn of the year. But now asset purchases have ceased, Bank Rate has risen, the QE asset portfolio is shrinking, and gilt sales are under consideration. The transition from one phase of monetary policy to another is better established, and better understood.
Another user-aid which we have done, but have not had the time nor resource available to make it really effective, is having a separate English and Thai language webpage. We have instituted this dual webpage, but unfortunately the English translation is quite frequently not available. We will try to have more of an equivalence between the two services. But the English language, not being the language of choice in Thailand, we expect that the word “available only in Thai text” is going to reign supreme for a very extensive part of the alphanumeric system. A webpage might seem only a small matter to bring up for this speech, but actually an organisation’s webpage signals its attitude towards advance technology and its intent to be transparent, so it is an important item and is useful to look at for a quick checking into the attitude of people you don’t know well. More importantly the central bank itself has been undergoing a structural revamp which I shall speak about only shortly as I have spoken on this many times before. Basically the six levels of management and one level of operation have been transformed to have only two levels of management and two levels of operations, with each level having people of different ranking depending on the size of the job. This is the usual broad-base horizontal organisation that modern businesses have, not surprisingly proposed by A T Kearney, our consultant.

At the present time, the insurance provided by many monetary authorities may look cheap because inflation is projected to stay low and markets seem to reward those countries which liquefy public debt. However this equilibrium could be unstable and market makers, aware of some inflation “tail risks”, are hedging themselves through gold or currencies like the Swiss franc whose exchange rates have reached historical highs. By contrast, purchases of sovereign debt by the Eurosystem remained very limited and will stay so. Our objective is simple: avoid disruptions in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Any lasting liquidity backstop has to come from the governments. This is why we are asking for more flexibility in the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Whether amounts are big enough is a matter of opinion but one could envisage to leverage existing commitments to provide greater intervention capacity. At this stage, the euro area is paying a double price. One for its mistakes and one for its virtues. The mistakes were to allow the piling up of debt through unsustainable fiscal policies over a decade, and then to create ex nihilo a doubt as to their ability to pay those debts. But we are also paying a price for our virtue as we refuse to liquefy our debt through massive monetization of our fiscal deficits. Will our virtue be rewarded at the end? I strongly believe so and I will explain why.
This flexibility allows us to be tough where appropriate, but to avoid inappropriate requirements - tailoring the requirements to the nature of the bank’s activities. Most fundamentally, perhaps, we can ask questions, and attempt to take advantage of all the information at our disposal to form a judgement of the risks facing depositors and investors, as well as of the quality of a bank’s management. So in addition to enforcing rules and looking for problems, we can help management. We can spread knowledge of best practice: asking banks about the full range of risks they face (including those - like reputational and settlement risk that they would often rather ignore); and pointing out to complex groups the extent to which their managerial and organisational systems have moved away from their legal structure. It is true that, in addition to being less rule-bound than most other supervisors, the Bank is commonly viewed as doing relatively little on-site supervision. Of course, this depends on how you define the term. Accountants are well aware that the Bank does, for example, make extensive use of reports prepared by auditors - who, of course, operate on-site - in order to assess the adequacy of internal controls. In particular, the Bank regularly instructs banks to appoint reporting accountants to report on systems and controls and on the accuracy of prudential returns. The Bank’s supervisors also spend a growing amount of time on-site.

Our April 1995 derivatives survey showed US firms (including securities houses) accounting for around 40% of turnover in both foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives. We therefore attach particular importance to international regulatory cooperation; and as the trend towards globalisation and multi-functionality continues it is becoming increasingly necessary. The Barings and Daiwa cases have highlighted the difficulty that banks can experience in controlling operations which are far from their head offices. Barings, in particular, demonstrated that losses in a subsidiary in a remote location, in a unit which was not thought to be assuming any significant market risk, can be big enough to bring about the failure of the parent. So home and host supervisors have a mutual interest in the health of the subsidiaries. Regulators will rightly be blamed if any reluctance on their part to work together either exacerbates a crisis or fails to prevent one that could otherwise have been avoided. It is possible to argue that an individual regulator can successfully meet his own objectives, by seeking to build firewalls between his entity and the rest of the group to which it belongs. These might include restrictions or even prohibitions on both financial exposures and operational interlinkages. In addition capital adequacy and other requirements might be set at a more onerous level than if the potential for parental support was taken into account. Such measures may be the best that can be achieved at present; they certainly provide host supervisors with a measure of comfort.