samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As the e-krona is something new, it will take time to analyse and perhaps develop such an alternative. This work must therefore be initiated in  The Riksbank sent out a consultation over joining TIPS on 5 June 2018. See Consultation on instant payments and the Riksbank's role in the payment infrastructure. www.riksbank.se. 4  2 [8]  good time, before cash usage has declined to such a point that cash is no longer a generally accepted means of payment in Sweden. The Riksbank's e-krona project: results and the way forward In my speech, I introduced the discussion of the e-krona by asking whether the Riksbank should adapt the money we issue to the modern, digital economy. I emphasised then that the e-krona should be seen as a complement to cash, which was in the process of becoming marginalised. I also pointed out the need of working in parallel in three areas: investigating the technical possibilities, analysing the consequences for, among other things, monetary policy, and reviewing the legal issues to which a possible e-krona would give rise. After two years, I can say that we have come quite far within all of these areas, but also that we still have some way to go until we reach our goal. We have discovered that it would be possible to develop an e-krona using existing technology, but we will have to start constructing and testing a finished product to learn more and to establish different alternatives for the Riksbank in the future.

This can be done through investment to modernize new energy-efficient machinery and technology used for production. Importantly, price and tax mechanisms should foster energy saving. As for the commitment to help upgrade education to increase labour productivity, reform in the education system should focus on raising the standard and quality of education for future generation of labor force. Skill specialization must be shaped to complement for Thailand’s competitiveness in the world market. Indeed, better education would also improve financial literacy and access, which will, in turn, allow more efficient allocation of consumption and investment. In sum, no matter how fast the economy manages to grow, at the end it is merely numbers. The development makes a real difference only when we are committed to building strong fundamentals to support long-term growth to ensure that the people are really better off on a sustained basis. Moreover, as we move toward an ageing society, fiscal policy is able to ensure a sound social safety net system to accommodate for an increase of elder population in the future. Meanwhile, the monetary policy takes care of price and financial stability. Ladies and Gentlemen, After a rather heavy presentation, I would like to end my talk on a lighter note. I trust that during your years in Thailand, you may have come across some fortuneteller stalls packed with worried-looking customers. In finding out what lies ahead, these customers hope that the right thing can be done today to secure a brighter future.
With hindsight, there had been plenty to fear. As in 1933, the fear factor is rife in today’s financial markets. The prompt has been sovereign debt concerns in parts of Europe and the United States. This is but the latest – and most severe – in a series of waves in sentiment since the onset of the crisis. Risk appetite has yo-yoed. In the language of the market, it has alternated between periods of “risk on” and “risk off”. Having been indecisive, financial markets are now not so sure. That is reflected in surveyed measures of market participants’ risk appetite (Chart 4). These were at above-average levels between 2005 and 2007 at the height of the boom. During 2008, risk appetite dramatically tailed-off. At its low-point in early 2009, it was more than two  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  standard deviations below normal. Since then it has ebbed (risk off) and flowed (risk on). Today, it is around one standard deviation below normal and falling. Risk is “off”. Market metrics corroborate this story of acute risk aversion. The demand for safe assets has risen significantly. At a 10-year maturity, US government benchmark bond yields are at around their lowest levels in over two centuries (Chart 5) – despite the recent scare over US debt ceilings and subsequent downgrade. Long-term UK bond yields are also close to historic lows, as are investment grade corporate bond yields. The price of gold has risen even more dramatically.

The UK has recently put in place an explicit macro-prudential regime. In July of last year, the UK government announced a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) to execute macro-prudential policy.7 The FPC is housed in the Bank of England and met for the first time in June this year. The FPC’s objective is to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system against risks including “unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth”. Therein lies a key FPC challenge. There is evidence of unsustainably high levels of leverage in some sectors. But elsewhere, there is evidence of credit growth being unsustainably low. Some companies remain over-leveraged. Yet others are suffering a credit shortage, with bank lending to companies continuing to contract over the past 12 months. 5  For example, Graham and Narasimhan (2004), Malmendier and Nagel (2011). 6  For example, Cogley and Sargent (2008), Barro (2006). 7  HM Treasury (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In framing macro-prudential policy today, both these factors need to be weighed: on the one hand, enhancements to the risk-bearing capacity of the financial system to repair balance sheets; on the other, encouragement for the risk-taking capacity of the system to boost credit supply. These factors can sometimes point in subtly different directions. The first might point to higher buffers to boost banks’ risk-bearing capacity, while the second might point to lower buffers to boost their risk-taking capacity.
Andrew G Haldane: The race to zero Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, at the International Economic Association Sixteenth World Congress, Beijing, 8 July 2011. * * * 1. Introduction  Stock prices can go down as well as up. Never in financial history has this adage been more apt than on 6 May 2010. Then, the so-called “Flash Crash” sent shocks waves through global equity markets. The Dow Jones experienced its largest ever intraday point fall, losing $ trillion of market value in the space of half an hour. History is full of such fat-tailed falls in stocks. Was this just another to add to the list, perhaps compressed into a smaller time window? No. This one was different. For a time, equity prices of some of the world’s biggest companies were in freefall. They appeared to be in a race to zero. Peak to trough, Accenture shares fell by over 99%, from $ to $ At precisely the same time, shares in Sotheby’s rose three thousand-fold, from $ to $ These tails were not just fatter and faster. They wagged up as well as down. The Flash Crash left market participants, regulators and academics agog. More than one year on, they remain agog. There has been no shortage of potential explanations. These are as varied as they are many: from fat fingers to fat tails; from block trades to blocked lines; from high-speed traders to low-level abuse.

The approach for the implementation of the action plans outlined  BIS Review 49/2005  1  in a Master Plan needs to be done in an iterative manner, taking into account the potential for change that may occur in both the domestic and external environment. The Master Plan will also identify the building blocks of the various parts of the financial sector that need to be put in place to provide the foundation on which further progress can be built. The Financial Master Plan thus provides the sequencing of priorities and identifies the key financial infrastructure that needs to be put in place before advancing forward. In some areas, the implementation can be simultaneous, while in others a more direct route can be taken to enable a more rapid pace of development. In designing and formulating the Master Plan, consideration needs to be given to the diversity of the member countries of the IDB. The member countries are at various stages of economic development, facing different economic and financial challenges, and with different development priorities. The Master Plan aims to highlight the approaches, templates and building blocks that can be adopted at the different stages in the development of a comprehensive Islamic financial system. A phasedapproach would provide the Master Plan with the flexibility to take into account the different stages of economic development of respective countries. While the starting points may differ, countries may adapt the approaches to their requirements and that is commensurate with their stage of development.
This is what lies behind the AMA (Advanced Measurement Approach) proposal: on one hand, recognition of the growing importance of operational risk but, on the other, to allow unrestricted development, without regulatory constraints, of their management techniques. It is difficult to find another area where a regulator is willing to grant such a broad degree of flexibility as the Basel Committee is prepared to do. In turn, its inclusion as a defined regulatory capital heading ensures that institutions will have a strong incentive to measure and control such risks. Risk management and the New Capital Accord To be sure, running risks is an integral part of banking. However, the leveraged nature of banking business, the risks of systemic contagion, the particular weakness of the depositor as a creditor, and the interaction between the real and the financial economy all mean that it does not suffice to expect banks to manage their risks well. There are three additional factors overarching this management of risks. The first is capital: banks should have sufficient capital of good quality to withstand not only expected losses from activity (which should be covered by provisions), but also unexpected losses, so that the continuity of banks may be ensured in normal times and in crises alike. This factor was already of vital importance at the outset of the financial system as such, when there were no additional safeguards, nor any regulation of economic capital. The second and third factors are common ones, as they involve extra surveillance of a bank’s management of risks.

In fact, investment in technology, in which process savings banks have played a notable part, is an additional and important mechanism for attaining greater efficiency. This is because technological development allows processes to be undertaken more easily, simultaneously eliminating certain timeand labour-intensive tasks so that operating cost cuts are achieved. In addition the capacity to process massive amounts of data efficiently in real time allows for better risk management and also for services better tailored to client needs. In line with the foregoing, appropriate human resources management will also be conducive to achieving greater efficiency. The importance of the role of human capital is beyond all doubt, and all the more so in the sector we are discussing today. BIS Review 31/2003  3  Business risk In terms of not changing the risk profile while trying to gain efficiency, business and operational risks deserve some attention. I have signalled before some of the specific features associated with savings banks. Ensuring the objective of efficiency also involves moderation to some extent in those activities and risks furthest removed from their nature and character. A latent danger arising when cutting costs to improve efficiency, is an increase in the level of operational risk. As I mentioned, efficiency improvements may only be understood as such when the risk profile remains unchanged. As you know, operational risk is increasingly under the scrutiny not only of supervisors but also of institutions.
18  In today’s global  banking system UK liquidity shortages can also arise in other currencies than just sterling: to that end we maintain and regularly test a network of swap lines with other central banks, enabling us to provide liquidity in a wide range of currencies: US and Canadian dollars, euros, Swiss francs and renminbi as well as pounds sterling. And back in 2006, our liquidity facilities were only offered against high quality, liquid assets – predominantly government bonds. That list had to expand quickly in the face of the financial crisis. We now take a much broader range of collateral, accepting asset-backed securities and a range of raw loans, suitable to the wide range of activities undertaken by our member firms. What does this add up to? The 2018 SMF annual report sets out that, as of February 2018, the Bank could lend an additional £ against the amount of pre-positioned collateral available: around 50% again of our current balance sheet size. 19  The Bank’s Independent Evaluation Office review, published in January 2018, emphasised the importance of business as usual as well as the unprecedented or unusual. 20  In response we are refining our  communications efforts to ensure market participants understand our facilities, as well as thinking about how we work and communicate within the Bank – across its operational, policy, and supervisory functions – to make the most of our facilities.

Since there has been no deterioration in their money multipliers, central banks of emerging market economies have not felt the urge – experienced by their counterparts in advanced economies – for an unconventional broadening in their money bases. Esteemed participants, distinguished guests, In emerging market economies, the gradual alleviation of the pressure on financing sources – caused by public sector demand – has provided significant room for the private sector to invest in physical capital. These investments have enabled – via capital markets and the banking system – the use of both domestic as well as foreign savings. These shed light on the importance and prominence of institutional capacity and financial infrastructure for financial stability. Smoothly functioning payment and settlement systems is the first and foremost significant requisite for strengthening financial infrastructure in emerging market economies. The existence of both a stock market backed by a strong capital market and also a bond market in local currency is also essential. Another important structural factor is a sound banking system. An adequate legal infrastructure, strong capital structure and confidence-based management are the prerequisites for such a system. Distinguished guests, A strong infrastructure is a “necessary-but-not sufficient” component of financial stability. Another “sine qua non” for more stable global capital flows is developing and implementing a macroprudential policy framework, and emerging market economies have taken important steps in this direction in the post-2008 period.
15 Moreover, if reforms are not perceived to be sustainable under a wide variety of conditions Moreover, if reforms are not perceived to be sustainable under a wide variety of conditions – for example, if a pension reform is unrealistic over the longer-term – agents will anticipate a reversal in the future and refrain from adjusting their behaviour today.– for example, if a pension reform is unrealistic over the longer-term – agents will anticipate a reversal in the future and refrain from adjusting their behaviour today. We have used our Euro Area and Global Economy (EAGLE) 16 model to analyse for a medium-sized euro area country the effect of credibility and timely implementation 17 – in this  13  Andrews, D., A. Caldera Sanchez, and A. Johansson (2011), “Housing Markets and Structural Policies in OECD Countries.” OECD Working Papers, No. 836, January 2011. 14  Gnocchi, S., A. Lagerborg, and E. Pappa (2014), “Do labor market institutions matter for business cycles?”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 51, February 2015. 15  Giavazzi, F., and M. McMahon (2008), “Policy Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings.” NBER Working Papers 13911, National Bureau of Economic Research. 16  Gomes, S., P. Jacquinot, and M. Pisani (2010), “The EAGLE. A model for policy analysis of macroeconomic interdependence in the euro area.” ECB Working Paper Series No. 1195, May 2010.

Type of reforms Those short-term benefits can also be maximised, however, if the type of reforms is carefully chosen. How structural reforms affect the economy is of course complex, but the evidence suggests that the short run gains can be amplified if reforms are well designed, packaged and sequenced 19, with a focus on measures that minimise short-term costs. For example, the experience of Germany during the crisis suggests that reforms aimed at adjustment through the intensive margin – that is, working hours and wages – are less likely to have negative short-term effects than reforms that operate through the extensive margin – i.e. dismissals. 20 This is supported by new micro level research from the Eurosystem which shows that, for a larger sample of countries, firms with flexibility at the plant-level have reduced employment less during the crisis than those bound by centralised wage bargaining agreements, partly because they have been more able to adjust wages to economic conditions. 21 Moreover, if reforms are targeted specifically at frictions that hold back investment demand, their short-term effects should be largely positive, even at the bottom of the cycle. For instance, reforms directed at sectors with large pent-up demand, such as professional services and retail trade, could be expected to elicit a rapid investment response. 22 Indeed, our EAGLE simulations show that the short-term benefits from structural reform in the service sector arise mainly via a strong reaction of investment. adjust over time their knowledge of the favourable long-run effects.
Another objective is to reduce the basis risk that arises from having liabilities in the form of time deposits that are linked with HIBOR and loans that are linked to prime. The deregulated environment that banks now face will add new complications to the process of managing interest rate and liquidity risks. I shall return to the subject of deregulation in a moment. A second prerequisite for success is the need for banks to develop new sources of income. It looks as if the days of easy profits from mortgage lending have gone, and the banks now need to work harder to generate income growth. The introduction of new fees and charges on deposit accounts is one manifestation of this process. Another is the increasing shift of some banks into higher margin, but also higher risk, products such as credit cards and other types of personal finance. Banks are also trying to become financial service providers rather than just banks. The aim is not just to broaden income sources, but also to reduce the volatility of income through more reliance on recurring fees and commissions. One way of achieving this is to move into the realm of wealth management, by which I mean securities, unit trusts, insurance, pensions and private banking. The interim results of some of the local banks showed a growing contribution from this area, including particularly sales of guaranteed funds. As a result, I understand that May of this year was one of the best ever months for fund sales in Hong Kong.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: Monetary policy is not almighty Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Journée Solutions Bancaires, Geneva, 31 May 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to be here with you all today. At the outset, please allow me to thank the organisers at Unicore for having invited me to speak at the 14th Journée Solutions Bancaires to be held here in Geneva. Today, I will reflect on what monetary policy can and cannot do. I would like to emphasise where central banks’ powers and responsibilities end and where those of fiscal policy and the private sector begin. “Why is he focusing on this now?” I hear you ask. “We are in the midst of a crisis. Shouldn’t he be emphasising what central banks can do, instead of what they cannot?” My answer to you is this: while the monetary policy measures taken in recent years have had a stabilising effect, today, monetary policy has acquired a degree of prominence that could lead to its powers and its reach being overestimated. Central banks are far from almighty and, in efforts to emphasise this, I will review the various policy options at the zero lower bound and the risks associated with the measures currently in place. I will first examine the issue in universal terms, before concentrating on the very unusual case of Switzerland.
BIS Review 60/1999  6  Clearly, some variability is typical for the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar. Market expectations about future cyclical developments and the course of monetary and fiscal policy in the United States and Europe play a role in explaining exchange rate volatility. It is widely recognised that in the medium to long term exchange rates follow a path determined by fundamental factors such as price and economic developments. In this context, it should be pointed out that recent exchange rate developments have as yet not indicated any risk for future price stability. Moreover, internal price stability should serve as an anchor for the development of the euro’s external value in the medium term. Indeed, a stability-oriented monetary policy strategy protecting the purchasing power of the euro is the basis of a solid and stable currency over the medium term. Maintaining price stability in the euro area also promotes credibility and thereby enhances the international role of the euro. The Eurosystem neither promotes nor hinders the development of the euro as an international currency. We consider that the international role of the euro should develop through the interaction of market forces. As yet it is too early to predict how long it will take for the euro to be considered as a truly international currency similar to the US dollar.

The Eurosystem is well suited to take into account the existing synergies. The Treaty itself establishes price stability as a primary objective while at the same time calling on the European System of Central Banks to contribute to the smooth conduct of prudential policies and the proper operation of payment systems. Nonetheless, central bank policies must deal with a heterogeneous economic scenario where national economies retain distinctive features both in terms of exposure to specific shocks and as a  BIS Review 53/2006  3  consequence of the different functioning of domestic policies and allocation mechanisms. Moreover, while markets are increasingly integrated there are still frictions impeding sufficiently flexible flows of products, capital and labour. Even in the financial services area, and although progress in developing the single market is already evident, some transactions involving agents in several euro zone countries are still penalised in comparison with purely domestic operations. Against this background, the Eurosystem has had to face the challenges posed by economic heterogeneity and imperfect integration in two ways. Firstly, by complementing the monitoring of eurowide aggregate variables with the analysis of relevant national developments in order to identify the policy that best helps ensure price stability in the euro area as a whole. Secondly, by promoting a better integration of markets, particularly financial markets, in the euro area. Regarding this latter issue, the role of payment systems is crucial.