Second, that a clearer signal about what we believe will be the path of interest rates in the future helps to have a more efficient transmission of the Monetary Policy, particularly in turbulent times. In fact, in the more recent period, marked by a higher than normal level of uncertainty associated with both a grimmer outlook for the Chinese economy and the normalization of monetary policy in the United States, we have made a special effort to signal the financial market what is the likely direction of our monetary policy in our baseline scenario as well as the risks involved. We have done this by increasing the transparency of our analysis and, especially, by being more precise in our communication. Of course it is too soon to make a comprehensive and definite analysis about the costs and benefits of this policy, but in my view this extra amount of forward guidance has been positive in order to achieve a smoother economic adjustment in difficult times. I thank you for being here, and without further delay, welcome to our nineteenth annual conference: “Monetary policy through asset markets: lessons from unconventional measures and implications for an integrated world.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Hong Kong  Repayment criteria toughened, a risk weight floor of 15% for residential mortgages, LTV on car park spaces and commercial property  Action on car park spaces followed leakages of the house price exuberance into other sectors  New Zealand  Restriction of new high LTV lending to 10% of new loans  Singapore  Debt service ratio, reduced repayment periods, tightened LTV, increased land supply  Norway  Countercyclical capital buffer of 1% from July 2015  UK  Removed incentives for household lending in Funding for Lending scheme. FPC given ability to recommend changes to affordability criteria on mortgage lending. 8  Part of a series of measures. BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Aikman, D, Haldane AG and Nelson, B (2010) “Curbing the credit cycle”: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2010/speech463. pdf. Aikman, D, Haldane AG and Nelson, B (2014 forthcoming) “Curbing the credit cycle”, The Economic Journal. Bank of England (2009), “The role of macroprudential policy”, Discussion Paper: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/roleofmacrop rudentialpolicy091121.pdf. Bank of England (2011), “Instruments of macroprudential policy”, Discussion paper: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/events/ccbs_workshop2012/paper_ kapadia.pdf. BCBS (2010). Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. Chari, VV and Kehoe P (2013), “Bailouts, time inconsistency and optimal regulation”, NBER working paper no. 19192. De Paoli, B and Paustian, M (2013), “Coordinating monetary and macroprudential policies”, Staff Reports 653, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Goodfriend, M. (2007) “How the world achieved consensus on monetary policy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pages 47–68. Haldane, A. G. (2013), “Why institutions matter (more than ever)”: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech676.pdf.