samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Growth in the global economy is expected to moderate somewhat this year and stabilise in the years ahead. In the US, growth seems to have remained solid in the first quarter. Heightened uncertainty with regard to developments in the US economy and weaker results for some large companies have resulted in falling prices on world stock markets. Developments are weaker in the euro area – unemployment remains high and consumer confidence has fallen. In Japan, it appears that growth will be positive from the fourth quarter of 2004 to the first quarter of 2005. Growth in Asia, except Japan, and in Central and Eastern Europe is expected to moderate but to remain strong. The outlook for growth in different regions indicates that the imbalances in the global economy, with large deficits in the US and large surpluses in some other countries, will persist. Low growth in the euro area and Japan is weakening the prospect of a gradual correction. This increases the risk associated with these imbalances. Increased imbalances in addition to high oil prices and volatile oil markets are contributing to the uncertainty surrounding developments in the global economy. Robust expansion in China and India has in particular pushed up prices for oil and other important commodities. Growth impulses to the Norwegian economy may therefore be somewhat stronger than the overall outlook for our most important trading partners would indicate. High demand for commodities produced by Norway is boosting activity and strengthening profitability for Norwegian enterprises.

So, referring again to one of the purposes of the IMF, as defined in its Articles of Agreement, there is a clear need “to promote international monetary co-operation” through “consultation and collaboration” on these “international monetary problems” that we now face in the Asian region. The Way Forward 40. I would like now to spell out how I think monetary co-operation in this region should proceed. In order to have effective monetary co-operation, we must have clearly defined and realistic goals. Over-ambitious goals may not be credible, and may even be counterproductive. In any case, they may not be politically acceptable to the individual economies. Monetary co-operation, and indeed any type of co-operation, is meaningless when you do not have common goals. 41. Notwithstanding increasing economic integration, one has to accept reality, and this is that the economies in Asia are a very diverse group. There are dramatic differences with regard to political institutions, economic systems, basic infrastructure and any aspect you care to think of. In terms of economic structure, for example, they range from some of the largest agricultural economies in the world to the most urban economies. In terms of economic philosophy, they range from some of the freest economies in the world to economies where there is considerable central planning. In terms of the stage of economic development, they range from economies with the highest per capita incomes to those still with a large part of their population living in poverty.
If this agreement is to be upgraded, however, Malta would have to make commitments over and above those it has today. Indeed, many of the countries with whom the EU has a comparable agreement have managed to obtain a better deal than Malta not only because they are much larger in terms of market size, but also because they have entered into additional commitments. EEA countries, for example, do indeed participate in EU programmes, but they have also offered substantial rebates on loan-related interest payments and committed nearly ECU 500 million in direct grants for projects in specific EU regions. In other words, EEA countries contributed to the EU’s financial resources, and specifically to the EU’s regional policy, without being members of the EU. In addition, it is well known that membership of the EEA implies taking on a large part of the EU acquis, whether past, present or future, without having any say in the decision-making process. Nor is the obligation to come into line with the acquis unique to the EEA. As is the case with Switzerland, which is an EFTA but not an EEA country, the EU’s trading partners are increasingly being required to approximate their national laws with those of the EU as a precondition for access to 13 its market .

I do not want to stray more than is necessary from the key idea today, namely the 50 years that we are celebrating and which, above all other considerations, represent a history of success. I must, therefore, express my heartfelt congratulations to you. I trust that our frank and sincere communications may continue, all the more so since I have become Deputy Governor. This clearly does not mean that we will always agree about everything, but rather quite the opposite. As I always say, productive supervisory dialogue is characterised by mutual understanding, where we agree but especially where we disagree. I hope that the next 50 years are at least as successful as the 50 years we are celebrating today. I would like to think they may be slightly less intensive than the last 10 years. Thank you very much. 2
Since its introduction in 1993, however, the inflation target has proved to be a good compass for achieving and maintaining price stability. Confidence in the monetary policy regime has gradually grown and now seems to be firm. Inflation and inflation expectations are low. Since the cyclical upturn in the summer of 1993, annual GDP growth has averaged almost 3 per cent, government finances have been rapidly consolidated and Sweden has begun to repay external debt. Important forecasting variable During lengthy periods of financial unrest and problems with confidence in Sweden’s economy the Riksbank judged that the krona was undervalued. At times, moreover, the exchange rate fluctuations have been relatively marked, even after it seemed that economic policy’s credibility had been established. In the period since the fixed exchange rate was abandoned the Riksbank has not targeted the exchange rate. For monetary policy, the primary consideration since 1992 has been the picture of inflation prospects in relation to the targeted rate of 2 per cent. But the exchange rate is still one important factor in the Riksbank’s assessment of inflation. An exchange rate movement that is judged to have consequences for inflation prospects will accordingly influence the formation of monetary policy, ultimately the level at which the Riksbank sets the repo rate. The exchange rate normally affects inflation through import prices as well as via foreign trade and resource utilisation. All else equal, a weak exchange rate will lead in theory to higher import prices and thereby to higher consumer prices.

These collections that have been built since the earliest days of our Bank over a period of more than five decades aim to foster greater understanding on the history of our currencies and of our economy and financial system, and also represents our support to contemporary art in Malaysia and thus contribute towards preserving the heritage of our country. Allow me now to invite Yang Amat Berhormat, Dato’ Sri Mohd. Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak to deliver his address and to officially launch Sasana Kijang. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits any form of monetary financing of public debt or deficits; Article 124 forbids privileged access to financial institutions by the public sector; and the “no-bail-out clause” in Article 125 precludes that one Member State becomes liable for the liabilities of another Member State. These articles are based on sound economic principles. Monetisation would inevitably lead to higher inflation, with the well-known costs to economic prosperity. Transfers between euro area Member States would – particularly in the absence of far more rigid fiscal rules and sanction mechanisms at European level – risk creating significant moral hazard effects in the beneficiary countries, and would thus further undermine the long-term economic stability in the euro area. Also, the ECB has long warned against the third option – the restructuring of sovereign debt in the euro area. The exchanging of debt, as in the case of Greece, should remain a unique event. In this respect, it must be noted that the contagion effects of such measures are difficult to control, as has been demonstrated by the high volatility of financial markets over the past year. In addition, debt restructuring does not in itself address the underlying economic fiscal and structural imbalances. There is only one way of solving the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area countries: governments should pursue policies of strict fiscal consolidation and far-reaching structural reforms so as to address macroeconomic imbalances and return their countries to sustainable paths of growth.

Each of these process improvements aims to reduce the resource burden on insurers created by the regulatory regime. This should enable insurers to reallocate more resource to innovation with a view to improving, for example, the quality of their underwriting and investment decision-making, and reduce barriers to entry, thereby improving the competitiveness of the UK insurance sector and its ability to provide long-term productive finance to the economy. Conclusions and next steps The reforms I have discussed today are wide-ranging and aim to achieve a tailored regulatory regime for the UK insurance sector. We will carefully assess the package across the review’s objectives. Does it advance the PRA’s primary objectives of insurers’ safety and soundness, and  Page 8  policyholder protection? Does it effectively remove any unnecessary impediments to bulk purchase annuities firms’ productive UK investments? Does it deliver the material gains in process improvements that can further the competitiveness of the UK insurance sector? We believe the package we are contemplating will achieve the Government’s objectives for the review. And while not an objective in itself, the package is also projected to deliver a reduction in regulatory capital requirements. This net capital release can be used to support additional investment if firms choose, and investment in the productive UK real economy, assuming suitable additional supply. The reforms to investment flexibility, reporting and approval processes are not without risks.
To be able to carry out this regular analysis in a good way, the Riksbank cooperates with Finansinspektionen, which in its capacity as financial supervisory authority has good access to information and in-depth knowledge of the individual financial companies. In addition to the regular analyses, we at the Riksbank need to practice our crisis management capacity in various ways. We do this regularly, together with other public authorities in Sweden and in other countries. In other words, crisis preparedness is high on our agenda, as it is for other central banks. It is quite clear that Sweden, with a large bank and payment system, could be destabilised through the payment system. In addition, to our own exercises and preparedness, it is also important that we have the possibility to require that the participants in the payment system have a high level of crisis preparedness. I hope that the Riksbank will be given greater power of authority in this field. 7  Monetary policy is closely related to financial stability Now I have talked at length about the concrete tasks the Riksbank has to contribute to a stable and efficient financial system. But how does monetary policy, which is what my colleagues and I most often talk about, relate to financial stability? There are several links, both operational and analytical ones. Essential that the Riksbank can use its tools flexibly in a crisis Let me begin with the operational work – that is, the tools that we at the Riksbank have at our disposal.

Let me also say a few words about how we work to be able to carry out these tasks in a good way. 5 Riksbank's Annual Report 2009, Figure 11;  http://www.riksbank.se/Upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Rapporter/2010/ar2009_en.pdf 6 https://www.riksgalden.se/en/aboutsndo/Guarantees-and-lending/Our-guarantees/  6 [12]  Regular analysis of the stability of the financial sector and good crisis preparedness To be able to fulfil our liquidity supporting role in a crisis, we must have good knowledge of the financial system and its participants. We therefore analyse financial companies, infrastructures and markets, as well as the links between them, both under normal circumstances and in times of crisis. In the initial stage of a crisis – when the Riksbank needs to make a decision on liquidity support of several billion in the course of a day or so, or in the worst case a few hours – it is not possible to start analysing the bank that is in distress and what links it may have to other participants in the financial system. Being a slow starter does not work, as the course of a crisis can be very rapid. A regular analysis of banks and other financial companies even during normal circumstances is needed also to ensure that the institutions that are members of RIX have good risk management, so that they are stable and do not subject the system to major risks.
I mean that quite literally: the weakness in productivity that we have witnessed means that much of the growth so far has been generated by increased hours worked rather than an increase in output per hour worked. Participation in the labour force has increased in recent years, as has average hours worked per week. Having demonstrated such flexibility, it is fitting that people are now beginning to enjoy the benefits of an increase in real wage growth. For comparison, following the 1990s recession Bank Rate stayed at its trough for 7 months before being increased again, and the equivalent number following the 1980s recession was only 6 months. Indeed were one to look solely at measures of the real economy relative to their value when previous tightening cycles began, you would have expected the MPC to have already begun raising rates by now (Chart 2). And I must admit to getting a gentle ribbing at the dinner table when I come home after each monthly MPC meeting to say that I have voted for no change in Bank Rate once again. “All that work to decide to do nothing!” say my children. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But there are good reasons for Bank Rate to have remained lower for longer this time.

Quoting from his paper: “the future policy that one wishes for people to anticipate is one that the central bank will not have a motive to implement later, if it makes its decisions then in a purely forward-looking way, on the basis of its usual stabilization objectives.” (end  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  quote) This does seem like a hard conundrum to get away from, and probably limits the traction of this type of tool as a strong driver of longer-term rates. Partly due to these limitations, Central banks have also directly tackled the term premium by purchasing large quantities of long-term assets. The idea is that by removing some duration from the fixed income markets, private investors’ aggregate exposure to interest rate risk is diminished, leading to a lower required compensation for bearing such risk. Of course, this logic relies on some form of imperfections and/or market segmentation, but there is by now significant evidence, including some excellent papers to be presented in this conference, that QE has had a measurable impact on long-term rates through this channel. A similar logic applies to the default risk-premium: to the extent that returns on safer debt are compressed by central bank purchases, investors are tempted to reach for yield into other fixed-income markets, such as mortgages, corporate bonds, and emerging market instruments.
As always, what I have to say represents my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System.1 The first trend has been the development of a global financial system. This has increased financial system interdependencies and, hence, the importance of harmonizing standards across national regulatory regimes. It also has made it more important to avoid regulatory arbitrage and race to the bottom types of behavior that could weaken the resiliency and robustness of the global financial market infrastructure. The second trend is the increasing importance of FMIs within the financial system. As trading across a more complex array of instruments and products proliferates, and as more trades are centrally cleared, well-managed FMIs play an increasingly important role within the financial system. The third trend stems directly from the first two. With the global financial system becoming more prominent and FMIs playing a bigger role within this global financial system, it has become ever more essential that major FMIs operate safely. When run well, they mitigate risk. But, run poorly, they could be a source of contagion and risk propagation throughout the global financial system. This means that the CPMI’s work has become much more critical in ensuring a safe and sound global financial system. The growing influence of the CPMI can be seen in its success in staying ahead of these trends.

Faster, cheaper, more transparent, and more inclusive cross-border payment services would have widespread benefits for citizens across the globe both directly and by supporting economic growth, international trade and global development. International work to enhance cross-border payments  The challenge of cross-border payments has been on the agenda for a long time. But bringing about change in this multi-dimensional area is not easy. It requires strong international collaboration and commitment. It was, therefore, very welcome that enhancing cross-border payments was set as a priority for the Saudi Arabian Presidency of the G20 this year. This important G20 initiative has been structured around a three-stage process at the international level:  Stage 1 was an assessment undertaken by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) working with other standard setting bodies, including the Committee for Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), to identify the challenges and frictions in cross-border payments. The work, which was published in April this year3, identified seven underlying frictions that together contribute to challenges around cost, speed, access and transparency of cross-border payments. While a number of these frictions are related to technology (such as legacy platforms, and fragmented and truncated data formats), it is not simply a technology issue. It is a multi-faceted challenge also including issues such as divergent compliance checks, differing operating hours of payment systems and the liquidity costs associated with funding payments. Stage 2 was the development of the building blocks needed to remove these frictions.
Changes are also needed in the collective bargaining framework and in labour hiring, in order to facilitate the adjustment of wages to the new cyclical situation and to smooth the adjustment in employment. Obviously, however, these measures need to be complemented by resolute reforms to the competitive environment in which firms and agents take their decisions through liberalisation and deregulation policies that help reduce the constant growth in profit margins in less competitive sectors and to boost efficiency and productivity. From the viewpoint of the longterm needs of the Spanish economy, all this should be accompanied by improvements in education and in training in order to adapt workers’ skills to the new requirements and to boost their inter-sectoral mobility. Allow me one final reflection not so much on what should be done as on what should not. It is true that the global slowdown is leading many governments to embark on different forms of protectionism, responding to the calls of those economic agents who are demanding help against foreign competitors. It is a mistake to succumb to such calls. Spain should not follow this bad example, since any measures in favour of specific agents solely on the basis of their nationality would ultimately harm other Spanish companies and all Spanish citizens.

Looking forward, we continue to expect inflation rates in the euro area to be in line with price stability over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, thereby supporting the purchasing power of incomes and savings. After today’s decision we consider risks to price stability over the medium-term to be broadly balanced. This takes into account the latest economic data releases and survey information, which add clear further evidence to the assessment that the euro area is experiencing a significant slowdown, largely related to the effects of the intensification and broadening of the financial turmoil. Both global demand and euro area demand are likely to be dampened for a protracted period. A cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis confirms this view. Monetary expansion is moderating further, supporting the assessment that inflationary pressures and risks are diminishing. All in all, the level of uncertainty remains exceptionally high. The Governing Council will continue to keep inflation expectations firmly anchored in line with its medium-term objective of inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. This supports sustainable growth and employment and contributes to financial stability. Accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. Regarding fiscal policies, the Governing Council welcomes the European Council’s reconfirmation of its full commitment to sustainable public finances. In this respect, the current economic situation calls for particular prudence with regard to the adoption of extensive fiscal stimulus measures, taking into account the particular fiscal situation in each country.