samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Sur notre stratégie de finances publiques, la photographie de départ est une dette publique atteignant 115,7 % du PIB fin 2020, deux fois plus qu’il y a vingt ans :  Page 6 sur 14  À politique inchangée, avec une croissance potentielle de 1,1% et un taux de croissance des dépenses publiques en volume de 1,1 % qui est la tendance des 10 dernières années, nous ne ferons que maintenir ce haut niveau de dette publique sur les 10 prochaines années ; ce serait une stratégie dangereuse pour la France face au risque d’un choc de taux d’intérêt ou à celui d’une nouvelle crise conjoncturelle exogène. Mais nous pouvons écrire un film plus heureux pour échapper à ce scénario tendanciel. Il combine trois ingrédients : le temps – ne commencer à se désendetter qu’une fois sortis économiquement de la crise Covid, après 2022, et se donner une stratégie sur dix ans – ; la croissance – qui apportera des recettes mais pas de miracles – ; et enfin une meilleure maîtrise et efficacité de nos dépenses publiques. Une croissance nulle – une stabilisation, donc – des dépenses totales en volume à fiscalité constante ferait baisser la dette à environ 100 % du PIB en 2032. Une croissance des dépenses en volume ramenée à 0,5 % par an diminuerait la dette à environ 110 % du PIB.

Inferior European management practicesxii seem to explain 30% to 50% of the Total Factor Productivity gap between European countries and the United States. Along with improvement in education, stronger competition and open labour markets could help Europe close this management gap. Capturing the full potential of our single market  To compete with the American or Chinese economies and their companies, scale is obviously of the essence. We are not that bad at start-ups, but the number of scale-up companies in Europe has to be dramatically increased. And this requires two strategic arrows targeted at size and money. Size: As I said, Europe has the advantage of having a single market, the largest in the world. But we need to be bolder and take full advantage of the size effect. We must revive the single market, above all because we can optimise its power by combining its various components much better: free movement of goods, naturally; but also regulatory power. We must use the power of standardisation, notably to direct innovation, as illustrated by the GDPR and data where Europe is taking the lead. We must have the courage to develop an industrial policy with public-private partnerships, as in the case of artificial intelligence and batteries. To achieve this, the European competition policy could be more strategically orientatedxiii. As such, Europe should (i) rethink what is the relevant market for mergers, (ii) not facilitate the market penetration of foreign firms. In the digital sector, network effects should be assessed to take into account monopoly positions.
That reform created an expectation that it would be in the interests of all political parties not to repeal the legislation. For the first time since the Second World War, there was a broad-based and credible commitment in the UK to stable and low inflation. The need for any monetary regime to command sufficient support in order to acquire a reasonable lifeexpectancy was given insufficient weight in the discussions that took place at the IMF and elsewhere on Brazil and other financial crises of the 1990s. The point is made by Guillermo Calvo and Frederic Mishkin (2003) when they write, “the key to macroeconomic success in emerging market countries is not primarily their choice of exchange rate regime, but rather the health of the countries’ fundamental macroeconomic institutions, ... less attention should be focused on the general question whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is preferable, and more on these deeper institutional arrangements” (p5).12  IV. Case Study 2: Currency reform in Iraq  The importance of expectations about the future of monetary institutions is illustrated by the recent monetary history of Iraq. This second case study demonstrates that expectations of future collective decisions can have a major impact on the value of a currency quite independently of the policies pursued by the current government. Expectations of monetary decisions within a given policy regime may be less significant than expectations of changes in the regime itself. In Iraq, regime change took on a new meaning.

Instilling values in the financial sector strengthens trust of the people which benefits the public at large. The VBI initiative is envisaged to shape proactive behaviour amongst industry players. For the Islamic finance industry, the move towards embracing VBI is another hallmark in our journey to manifest the larger aspiration of Islamic finance. Islamic banks, with its natural affinity towards social justice are well-positioned to lead this agenda and become the prominent and leading agent of positive change. However, the momentum of VBI is only sustainable through collective endeavours that prompt a shift in our paradigm and change in our actions. It is only with our strong commitment that we can translate the VBI vision into reality. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
The shift in banks’ funding away from traditional and stable sources – such as retail deposits – to wholesale funding was as much a by-product of securitisation as a source of its potentially unlimited expansion. It was a by-product of securitisation because in order to finance the large increase in their securitisation business the banking system had to draw on a larger pool of financial resources than retail deposits could offer. But that shift also caused, independently, an increase in securitisation because the lending of large sums to shadow banks needed – and needs – marketable collateral. In its essence, this lending is a large-value deposit which has to be secured by collateral. So, securitisation received a formidable boost as banks used it to generate the securities which were required to finance its overall business. Data confirm this close association between shadow banking, collateral and repo markets. A large portion of the financing of the shadow banking system takes the form of repurchase agreements (repos), which work much like deposits. The wholesale lender deposits a large sum with the shadow bank for a very short term, perhaps overnight. As this callable claim cannot be covered by formal deposit insurance, it needs to be protected by collateral. So, technically, the transaction involves the purchase of some securitised assets from the shadow bank in exchange for cash and a promise by the bank to repurchase the securities at the stated price at some future date, perhaps on the day thereafter.

Such a step would be a natural development of the Single Market and would benefit all EU Member States. We believe that one area that deserves particular attention is the development of a wellfunctioning market for simple, transparent and real asset-backed securities (ABS). This would allow banks to still originate loans – notably to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – while preserving their balance sheet capacity. In order to achieve a well-functioning ABS market, it is important that the regulatory treatment of securitisation is proportional to the risk of ABS. In this respect, the ECB welcomes efforts to have a differentiated regulatory treatment of simple, transparent ABS built on real assets. Moreover, the provision of public guarantees should be considered to support lending to SMEs, as other countries do, such as the US. A further integration of corporate bond and equities markets is also essential to overcome the present fragmentation in the euro area and to ensure more robust cross-border lending and investment flows. To achieve this, we will have to streamline differences between countries, for instance, in the legal protection of borrowers’ and lenders’ rights as well as in national taxation and insolvency procedures. To sum up, structural policies are more multifaceted than they are often perceived to be in the political debate and can have a very significant impact on investment in a variety of ways. Growth-friendly fiscal policy Yet this is not the only area where governments can make a difference.
12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 13 U.S.: Fed fund rates and public debt (percent) 16  100  14  90  12  80  10  70  8  60  6  50  4  40  2  30  0  20 82  86  90  94  Fed funds rate  98  02  06  10  Public debt (% of GDP)  Sources: Bloomberg, U.S. Economic Analysis Department and U.S. Treasury Department. Figure 14 Sovereign risk premiums (*) (basis points) 7.000  7.000  700  700  6.000  6.000  600  600  5.000  5.000  500  500  4.000  4.000  400  400  3.000  3.000  300  300  2.000  2.000  200  200  1.000  1.000  100  100  0  0  0  0 10 jul.10ene.11 Jul. 11 jul.11 Jul. ene.10 Ireland  Portugal  10 jul.10 Jul. ene.11 11 Jul. ene.10 jul.11 Greece  Italy  France  Germany  Spain  (*) Measured through 5-yr CDS premiums. Source: Bloomberg. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Figure 15 Long-term nominal interest rate variation (percentage points) Turkey Israel Brazil South Korea Canada Australia Colombia (3) Mexico Germany U.S. Chile (2) -2,0  -1,5  -1,0  vs. max.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 11 Inflation expectations (*) (annual change, percent) 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 10  10  10  10 Jul. 10  10  11  One year ahead  11  11  11 Jul. 11  Two years ahead  (*) Economic Expectations Survey. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 12 Consensus Forecasts for inflation (*) (percent) 2011 5 5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  Developed economies Emerging Asia  2012  5  Latin America  Emerging Europe  (*) For 2011, uses CF forecasts between September 2010 and September 2011. For 2012, as from January 2011. Geometric averages of y-o-y mean inflation forecast for the economies of each region except for Latin America, which uses December-to-December inflation forecast. Developed economies are the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone; Latin America includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru; Emerging Asia includes China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. Emerging Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia. Devloped economies and Emerging Asia consider information through October 2011; Latin America and Emerging Europe, through September 2011. Source: Consensus Forecasts.
More surprising is that there has been no recovery in these rates of productivity gain during the subsequent jobs recovery (Chart 23). The rungs in the jobs ladder have had a smaller productivity spacing than in the past. 20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  20  Chart 23: Firm productivity difference when moving jobs Per cent 16%  Firm productivity change  14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  0% 2018  Sources: ONS and Bank of England calculations. Notes: Chart shows percentage difference in productivity between new firm and old firm with the median workers moves between firms. Summing up, then, a strong jobs recovery has not resulted in workers vigorously re-climbing the jobs ladder. Both their willingness to climb, and the pace of this climb, has been subdued relative to the strength and tightness of the jobs market. Post-crisis risk aversion, and changes in the nature of work, may have increased insecurities and dimmed workers’ appetite for a vertiginous career climb – or indeed any climb. The result has been subdued rates of pay and, in particular, productivity growth. Just recently, some of these patterns in pay, if not productivity, have begun to reverse themselves. Nominal pay growth has been going slowly through the gears over the past few years, from being in the “low 2s” three years ago, to the “high 2s” 18 months ago to having a “3” in front of it now.

The tighter the jobs market, the harder it is for companies to fill vacancies, the greater their incentive to offer workers higher-paid positions and the stronger the incentives among workers to move into these positions.15,16 More productive firms are better able to offer higher rates of pay. This means more productive firms are also the ones most likely to expand, as they bid-away workers with higher pay offers. Less productive firms, by contrast, are unable to pay-up and are more likely lose workers and shrink. As workers climb the pay and productivity ladder, we would thus expect to see simultaneously higher levels of job moves, and higher rates of pay and productivity growth.17  11  Phillips (1953). For example, Broadbent (2017). For example, Pissarides (2000). 14 Melosi and Faccini (2019). 15 Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2018). 16 Abel, Tenreyro and Thwaites (2018) discuss the role of monopsony power in the labour market. 17 Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2018). 12 13  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  The reverse is true during a slowdown. Then, rates of hiring fall and rates of job transition slow. Workers are either forced off the jobs ladder entirely (“unemployment”) or, in coordination with employers, the labour market outcome results in them moving to a lower rung of the pay and productivity ladder (“under-employment”). Lower-productivity firms expand while higher-productivity firms shrink.
The policy frameworks guiding its two founding objectives – monetary and financial stability – have undergone a revolution. So too has the Bank’s degree of external transparency and engagement. The Bank is unrecognisably better than the institution I joined. As a public servant, I consider myself fortunate to have worked on the signature monetary and financial stability issues of the past 30 years, riding the waves of crisis that mark history and make careers. Like those new Bank graduates, this old one could not have wished for a better endowment. It has been an 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  23  education to do so alongside several generations of incredible Bank colleagues, including five exceptional Governors in Robin Leigh-Pemberton, Eddie George, Mervyn King, Mark Carney and Andrew Bailey. As ever, there are challenges aplenty for the Bank today – I have touched on one or two of them. But its strong institutional foundations, and quite brilliant Staff, mean I have never had more faith in the Bank rising to them. I leave with the UK economy surfing as high a wave as any in its history. Inflation is bang in line with its target and the economy is growing at an annualised rate of over 20%. I wish Bank colleagues the best of luck in maintaining this performance after I have gone. Eyebrows will be raised if not.

The mission statement of the Eurosystem very well reflects this by stating that, beyond the overriding objective of maintaining price stability, “we aim to safeguard financial stability and promote European financial integration.” In the light of the recent events, the benefits of financial integration are sometimes put into question and it may look like that the two objectives – safeguarding financial stability and promoting financial integration – potentially conflict with each other. It is exactly because we live in an increasingly interconnected world that the crisis has been so severe and widespread. So why should we – after the recent crisis – still promote financial integration? And still believe in the reconcilability of financial integration and financial stability? I will argue that financial integration is not only a fact, it is absolutely necessary for the functioning of the euro area economy. It is an irreversible process which should be promoted. While it may be true that financial integration poses some risks to financial stability – such as contagion fostered by greater interconnectedness – the benefits stemming from financial integration far outweigh its costs. I will try to convince you that – instead of containing financial integration – our efforts need to be directed at a better understanding of the different forms of financial development, particularly related to two aspects, namely complexity and size. Opaque products, when difficult to understand, may lead to mispricing of risks and distorted allocation of resources.
Imports from countries where the price level is lower than in Norway are increasing, resulting in a fall in prices for a number of consumer goods. On the other hand, higher production in large countries such as China and India has led to higher prices for energy products. As a result, the overall rise in consumer prices has edged up both at home and abroad. The projections in the Inflation Report are based on an interest rate path that in the Executive Board’s assessment provides a reasonable balance between the objectives of monetary policy. Previously, we based our analysis on various technical assumptions concerning future interest rates. One such assumption was market interest rate expectations. As from Inflation Report 3/05, we now base our projections on an interest rate path that we consider reasonable. This gives Norges Bank more active ownership of the projections that are presented and of the uncertainty we believe surrounds these projections. The arguments favouring a very low interest rate in Norway are to some extent less relevant. The outlook and analyses suggest a gradual increase in the interest rate towards a more normal level, but we expect the adjustment to occur in small, not too frequent steps. Output growth is high and may in isolation suggest a more rapid increase in the interest rate ahead. This would reduce the risk of bottlenecks in the economy with rising cost inflation and continued debt build-up.

In the assessment of the Executive Board, the sight deposit rate should lie in the interval 2-3 per cent in the period to the publication of the next Inflation Report in March 2006, conditional on economic developments that are broadly in line with the projections. In the press release following the Executive Board’s meeting on 2 November, the following factors of uncertainty were highlighted: •  Stronger trade shifts and increased labour market competition may result in lower price and wage inflation and weaker pressures in the economy. In isolation, this would imply less frequent interest rate changes. •  We have little experience of such low interest rates over a long period. There is a risk that an interest rate that is kept low for a longer period may lead to expectations of a persistently low interest rate. This might result in a higher-than-projected rise in output and inflation and would in isolation suggest a faster interest rate increase. •  Developments in the global economy are uncertain. Our projections are based on favourable growth prospects in other countries and continued high oil prices. Different developments in global growth and in oil prices would result in a different path for the Norwegian economy. Interest rate setting must also be assessed in the light of developments in property prices and credit. Wide fluctuations in these variables may constitute a source of instability in demand and output in the somewhat longer run.
In Asia, and in many emerging market economies, meaningful headway has been made toward recapitalizing banking systems, ridding banks’ balance sheets of problem assets, and improving supervisory and regulatory frameworks. As a result, economies are growing again, equity markets have rebounded, and foreign capital has begun to return. What a difference two years of hard work can make. When I last addressed this conference in October of 1998, I said that bank supervisors have a special role in maintaining financial stability, and that our special role has two components: facilitating the resolution of problems when they occur, and taking the necessary steps to lower the risk of problems occurring. Two years ago we were busy with the first component – crisis management and resolution. Today, as we stand on the threshold of a new century, we have the opportunity to focus on the second – prevention. With that in mind, it is my view that the greatest challenge to the long-term goal of financial stability, both locally and globally, is the accelerating pace of change and financial innovation, driven by the steady march of technological advancement. To be sure, such rapid change has created unprecedented opportunities for both producers and consumers of financial products and services. But it must also be acknowledged that with such remarkable progress has come new, more complex and potentially farreaching risks.

Part 3 At this point, allow me to offer some reflections on the changing economic and financial landscape for internationally active financial institutions. Asia is host to a diverse group of foreign financial institutions, many of which have a long history and entrenched presence in the region, with strong roots in our local economies. For the most part, these institutions have made important contributions to the development of domestic financial systems and economies. This includes meeting the demands for financial services in areas not being extensively served by the domestic financial system. While the international policy response to the global financial crisis has been extensive and on an unprecedented scale, an area that has not been as extensive is the cross-border dimension of policy making. More specifically, the global financial crisis has highlighted the gaps in the international framework for the regulation and supervision of the cross-border activities of financial institutions. This has generated renewed concerns on the extent to which external shocks might be transmitted to the domestic economies as a result of the presence of such international foreign financial institutions. As part of the international regulatory reforms, significant progress has been made to ensure that systemically important financial institutions have a higher degree of resilience and stronger incentives to reduce their systemic risks over time. This includes through the holding of higher capital, and requirements for all global SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions) to develop recovery and resolution plans.