samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It will depend on the circumstances, but always based on a rigorous and detailed analysis. Another good example of the interactions among the different macroprudential instruments is related to the surcharge on systemic entities (globally systemic or domestically systemic banks), which is the main capital tool to address the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk. On top of how to calibrate this buffer, we need to study further how it interacts with the countercyclical capital buffer. This is especially important in countries where credit from systemic banks 4  Beyond the LTV Ratio: New Lessons from Spain. J.E. Galán and M. Lamas. Mimeo. 9/11  represents a high proportion of total credit and, in addition, when these banks have a significant international presence. On the one hand, the empirical evidence is quite unanimous in showing how higher levels of capital in the banking system as a whole reduce the probability of systemic crises occurring. Consequently, if systemic entities are the main determinants of how the credit cycle evolves and the buffer applied to them is sufficiently high, it would be reasonable to think that the probability of having a systemic crisis is smaller. Conceivably, then, the degree of activism necessary with the countercyclical capital buffer would be lower than in other jurisdictions in which the systemic banks are less relevant. However, even if the probability of a systemic crisis occurring is lower, this does not guarantee that its intensity diminishes, and this buffer was not designed to be released in these circumstances.

The Banks also house and manage staff that supervise and regulate banks in the districts (under policy guidance from the Board of Governors), and perform other services, the most widely observed and commented upon of which is the operating of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  open-market operations conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on behalf of all 12 Banks at the instruction of the FOMC. All 12 Bank presidents serve on the FOMC together with the seven members of the Board of Governors. This is where monetary policy for the United States is determined by collective decision. The operating procedure of the FOMC is for each of the governors to have a vote on policy; the bankers rotate their votes, with the New York Fed having a constant vote. However, all 19 members – the seven governors and the 12 bankers – participate fully in every FOMC meeting and actively contribute to policy discussions. The FOMC has traditionally decided the federal funds rate, the overnight rate for interbank lending that anchors the yield curve. In recent years, in reaction to the Financial Panic of 2008 and 2009 and its aftermath, the FOMC has instructed the New York desk to buy mortgage-backed securities and Treasury notes and bonds – eschewing Treasury bills. Presently, the Fed holds more than $ billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and over $ trillion in Treasuries. This expansion of our portfolio and extension of maturities held therein is known as “quantitative easing”, or QE.
Central bank account services and global financial stability In addition to the reciprocal benefits central banks derive from providing each other with account services in support of their mutual needs and common missions, many central banks have long recognized that their provision of account services to the global central banking community is important for supporting global financial stability. For these central banks, the rationale for offering account services to other central banks is grounded in the importance of their currencies for international transactions, cross-border funding, and in official reserve holdings. If a given currency is important internationally, the central bank of issue has a special responsibility to offer account services commensurate with this role to the global central banking community. For reserve currency-issuing central banks, this has typically meant a range of payment, investment and securities custody services for reserve assets in their currencies. For the world’s major central banks, the maintenance of operational links through reciprocal account relationships is integral to their ability to engage in global financial stability operations. Having accounts, settlement instructions, tested and secure lines of communication, and business processes already in place at the time of or leading up to a crisis enhances major central banks’ ability to respond to crises efficiently and flexibly.

The New York Fed has maintained a gold vault used to store the gold reserves of foreign central banks since 1924 when construction of its main building was completed. Prior to 1924, the New York Fed held gold in custody for foreign central banks in other nearby vaults, such as the one maintained by the New York Clearing House. 12 Defined in general terms as “an arrangement under which one bank (correspondent) holds deposits owned  by other banks (respondents) and provides payment and other services to those respondent banks.” See the glossary of terms used in payments and settlements, published by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures of the Bank for International Settlements. 13 Perhaps the most vivid historical example of this involved large-scale flight-to-safety flows of European central  bank gold reserves to the vaults of the New York Fed during the Second World War. In addition to safeguarding their gold reserves from the Axis powers, inflows of gold were used by Allied nations to finance their purchases of war supplies from the U.S. 14 The Federal Reserve’s Bretton Woods swap lines with foreign central banks were first established in 1962 and  used extensively until the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. 15 The mechanics of currency swap operations among central banks is a case in point.
Jean-Paul Redouin: Liquidity and transformation Speech by Mr Jean-Paul Redouin, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the General Meeting of the French Association of Bank Treasurers (AFTB), Paris, 30 May 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to speak at this General Meeting of the AFTB. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the successful cooperation that has been established between your association and the Banque de France. It is extremely beneficial for us and I believe that you and your institutions also find it valuable. In many respects, bank and market liquidity is a fascinating area because few phenomena have been perceived in such different ways over such a short period of time. Indeed, market liquidity became abundant and cheap in the 1980s: financial markets deepened and transaction costs fell. In the 1990s, the growth of derivatives products facilitated the management and transfer of risk. In the following decade and up to 2006, many studies had already focused on excess liquidity. Then, during the financial crisis of 2007–2008, sources of bank funding suddenly dried up.

In particular, this is the role of the two new liquidity ratios: –  The one-month liquidity ratio or Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) has the two-fold objective of preventing short-term liquidity shocks and requiring institutions to selfinsure against liquidity shortages in order to limit refinancing exclusively via the central bank. Institutions should in no way consider that they have a guarantee of permanent access to such refinancing. In this respect, the use of foreign currency funding is not always justified by the need to fund assets denominated in these currencies in the absence of a sufficiently broad customer base in the countries concerned. Such strategies are also used for arbitrage purposes. They contribute to overall market liquidity but they must remain of a magnitude that allows institutions to unwind positions in stressed market conditions. However, during complete liquidity dry-ups some institutions became largely dependent on swap lines between central banks, as was the case from the end of 2007 to the start of 2010. It is also clear that the use of swap lines between central banks cannot be considered a natural market adjustment. In this respect, it is advisable for banking supervisors to have indicators that enable them to measure possible foreign currency mismatches, without necessarily imposing a specific currency matching requirement. –  The one-year liquidity ratio or Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), for its part, aims to limit the risk of excessive maturity transformation such as illustrated by the failure of Northern Rock.
In particular, a well-articulated framework for policy that explains our goals and how we use our tools to promote these goals helps market participants, businesses, and workers to anticipate how the Federal Reserve will respond under different circumstances and plan accordingly.1 This helps to anchor private sector expectations in ways that make it easier to achieve the dual mandate objectives. In contrast, if we acted in an unpredictable way, policy would be ineffective at anchoring expectations and this shortcoming would disrupt the transmission of the monetary policy impulse to the real economy. Over the years, this logic has led the Federal Reserve to become increasingly transparent and systematic in its decisionmaking.2 In January, the Federal Open Market Committee took another important step in this direction, endorsing a public statement of longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. This document articulated a 2 percent inflation objective and committed the FOMC to a “balanced approach” with respect to promoting the dual mandate objectives. For me, the key issue is how to interpret these principles and put them into practice. I interpret the strategy document as expressing a relatively straightforward proposition: The Fed should seek the policy setting that generates the best achievable path back to full employment and price stability following shocks that push us away from either of our objectives.

Putting these adjustments into the Taylor 1999 formulation would pull the liftoff date to 2013 (Figure 9). So, why do I believe the policy that promotes the best achievable path back to our dual mandate objectives should be more accommodative than that implied by Taylor 1999 – adjusted or unadjusted? Taylor 1999, like other simple rules, does not take into account two key considerations:   The likelihood that the relationship between monetary policy and the economy has changed significantly following the financial crisis.   The need to apply a risk-management framework to policymaking at the zero bound. I don’t believe that the standard Taylor 1999 formulation is a good guide for policy right now because the neutral real rate assumption embedded in this rule of 2 percent simply doesn’t look plausible. This is important because the degree of stimulus depends not on the current policy setting but on the difference between the current level and the neutral level. For example, a short-term rate that appears highly stimulative under standard assumptions may in fact be much less so under alternative estimates of the neutral real rate. If the neutral real  8  In contrast, optimal control simulations using FRBUS put the federal funds rate liftoff in 2015; see Vice Chair Yellen’s speech of April 12 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20120411a.htm). 9  For more details on this forecast, go to: http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/05/ just-released-the-new-york-fed-staff-forecast-may-2012.html. 10  This estimate should be considered very imprecise.
From our engagement sessions, it was not uncommon for us to hear about stories of anger, resentment and frustration from the migrant workers about the difficulties they had to go through in remitting money to their families. The workers whom we approached in Sapong estate for example, told us that they only had two options to access the remittance service: the closest is in the town of Tenom which is located 8 kilometers away from their estate; or if that is not available, the next option is to go to Keningau which is about 50 kilometers away! We also knew of instances where the workers were robbed on their way to remit money. Some told us that the money that they sent through hawaladars did not reach their families. These aptly sum up why it is crucial for us to promote a remittance service that is safe, affordable and convenient. This is also the primary reason why we decided that Project Greenback 2.0 Kota Kinabalu should be focusing on accelerating usage of digital remittance services.

Fraziali Ismail: Closing ceremony of the Project Greenback 2.0 Kota Kinabalu Welcoming remarks by Mr Fraziali Ismail, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the closing ceremony of the Project Greenback 2.0 Kota Kinabalu, Kuala Lumpur, 14 February 2020. * * * Before I begin, I would like to convey my deepest condolences to the family members and friends of those who were involved in the boat crash incident near Pulau Tanjung Aru, yesterday. Let us pray for the safety of the victims as well as the search and rescue team. Ladies and gentlemen, After we concluded Project Greenback in Johor Bahru more than two years ago, Bank Negara Malaysia together with the World Bank sat down to choose the second “remittance champion city”. Among others, we considered Ipoh, Butterworth and Kota Kinabalu. We discussed long and hard, and weighed our options. Our assessment suggested that Ipoh and Butterworth would have presented us with a rather similar case study to Johor Bahru. This is in view of the similar profile of the target groups who are largely made up of urban migrants, therefore exhibiting similar remittance behaviors. The odd for success would have been easier and kinder to us. But our intention has never been about replicating our experience in Johor Bahru. Kota Kinabalu offers a much more exciting proposition. This is despite our full cognisance of the challenges ahead of us, such as geographical barriers and connectivity issue.
I will touch now on a number of issues concerning the regulatory functions of the SGX as a demutualised, profit-oriented and listed exchange, and its relationship with the MAS as the statutory regulator. Can a demutualised, listed exchange regulate the market? As a focal point of market activity, exchanges have traditionally been accorded the role of frontline regulator of the securities markets. With the demutualisation and public offering of shares by a growing number of exchanges - most recently the Deutsche Borse - questions arise as to whether a listed for-profit exchange is able to discharge its role as frontline regulator competently and effectively. Conflicts of interest in the regulatory functions of an exchange are not new however. They existed before demutualisation. Members of the former Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), a mutual body, had to set and enforce rules in the public interest that could negatively affect their commercial interests. The exchange was also expected to conduct effective and impartial supervision of its member-owners. The potential conflicts of interest in these respects were mitigated by the fact that the SES had only a small number of members, accentuating the financial risks that they each faced from a failure of the exchange to properly regulate. 2  BIS Review 14/2001  More importantly, the potential conflicts of interest made it necessary for the MAS to take a heavy hand in the affairs of the exchange.

Both of these will mean healthy demand for a range of financial services. Financial regulation has become tougher across the board. And as a regulator I say this for good reason. But from a competitive position, our financial institutions are well-placed because of their larger buffers they built up and more prudent risk management practices they adopted. Technology will disrupt existing value chains in financial services. But it will also open up new avenues of growth. It will intensify competition from non-bank players and non-financial institutions, but also create new pathways for our financial institutions to access markets that were previously difficult to reach. While the prospects for the financial sector are good, the outcome is by no means certain. There is much that we need to do – together – to realise the potential and secure a good outcome. Next month, MAS will announce details of the Industry Transformation Map for financial services. I will not give away the details here, but I can say that building up skills, competencies, and deep expertise is a critical part of the effort. If we want to transform the industry, we must start by transforming our human capital. Setting competency standards and certifying the programmes to achieve these standards are IBF’s raison d’etre. Empowering our finance professionals with the requisite skills and preparing them to take on the jobs of the future is at the heart of everything that IBF does. I am therefore pleased to announce the launch of the IBF Standards for Future-Enabled Skills.
At that time, loan losses among the Swedish banks were very large, as I clearly remember from my position as head of the Swedish Bank Support Authority then. The banks’ loan losses were from the commercial property sector, which was devastating for profitability; it was a solvency crisis rather than a liquidity crisis. During the most recent global financial crisis, loan losses on the domestic market were very limited; most losses arose on loans to the Baltic region. This time, the solvency of the banks was not threatened; instead, an acute  10  The average rate of inflation since 1995 has been 1.2 per cent, when measured in terms of the CPI. The interest rate situation was rather different when the inflation target was introduced than it is now. As household mortgage interest expenditure is included in the CPI, the large decline in interest rates has contributed to a lower consumer price index. Average inflation measured as the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate (CPIF) has been 1.6 per cent since 1995. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  shortage of liquidity in the banks arose when the functioning of the capital markets deteriorated. This was managed by means of extensive loans from the Riksbank. Important lesson – financial stability and price stability are interlinked One major question after the financial crisis was whether monetary policy should give greater consideration to financial stability.

To defend the fixed exchange rate, the Riksbank raised the repo rate. During 1990–1991 the major tax reform was implemented, which meant that tax deductions declined significantly. All in all, the real interest rate after tax rose very substantially over a short period of time, which subdued the demand for credit substantially, and property prices took a sharp downturn. The end result of this process was a banking crisis. The banking crisis also led to a dramatic deterioration in public finances. At the same time, there was a currency crisis in Europe. Sweden had abolished currency regulation in 1989 and in 1991 pegged the krona to the ecu, the euro’s predecessor. However, partly as a result of the higher interest rates in Germany, an increasing number of countries in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM, experienced a depreciation pressure on their currencies. The previous history of devaluations also meant that there was even greater pressure for another Swedish devaluation. In an attempt to defend the fixed exchange rate, the Riksbank raised its policy rate to a massive 500 per cent. Finally, the situation became untenable and the fixed exchange rate was abandoned on 19 November 1992. The route to the 500-per cent interest rate was thus part of a longer sequence of events, with several interacting circumstances. It also provides a clear illustration of what can happen when the confidence in the nominal anchor is lost.
Second, should regulators be proactive in leading the agenda of change or keep an active watching brief and intervene only 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  when necessary? Third, how do we balance between oversight and developmental objectives? And the fourth, what are the right set of guiding principles? I would like to turn to these questions for the second half of my speech. Importantly, I believe that regulators have to play a driving role to foster an enabling environment for an efficient and vibrant payment landscape, whilst actively managing the associated risks. Innovation should be industryled. Regulators should instead focus on building the right preconditions for the payment systems to develop in a resilient and progressive manner. In this regard, I would like to share four key focus areas for the payments regulatory agenda moving forward: First, to preserve trust to safeguard the resilience and integrity of payment systems; Second, to apply proportionate regulation to effectively manage risk, whilst not stifling innovation; Third, to enable connectivity through collaboration towards greater standardisation and interoperability; and Fourth, to promote efficiency and innovation through greater competition. Preserving trust Let me start with the first focus area of preserving trust. Trust is at the heart of any effective payment system. Consumers, businesses and governments must be able to trust that a payment made is final, that it reaches the intended beneficiary, and that the value transferred is accurate. Without these elements, a payment system or service cannot serve its purpose.

Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Reimagining the regulatory landscape for payment systems Keynote address by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Global Payments Week 2018 &quot;Reimagining the regulatory landscape for payment systems&quot;, Kuala Lumpur, 4 December 2018. * * * Making a payment used to be an ordinary affair. You’d fill up your cart, head on to the cashier, and reach for your wallet. Today, that cart could be a screen, the cashier a machine, and the wallet a phone. In a span of about 10 years, digital innovation has radically transformed payments. Digital technologies now enable payment services to be easily replicated and rapidly scaled, often at a small incremental cost and increasingly by new and non-traditional players. Geographical and time constraints are becoming less relevant when transferring funds especially with the advent of real-time payment services. Mobile money and e-wallets have brought millions more individuals into the financial fold. ‘Super apps’ combined with payments functionalities have created entirely new ecosystems – these enhance user convenience and offer new opportunities for businesses beyond the area of payments. Cash and cards are no longer the only ways to pay – soon, we may no longer even need to present our physical or digital wallet. Last year, a global fast food chain started accepting facial recognition as a mode of authorising payment in China. This is – quite literally – the new face of payments.