samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If that’s been true at all over the past couple of decades, however, it’s a much more accurate description of the pre-crisis economy, when interest rates were significantly higher, than of the years since. Currently, house prices, equity prices and mortgage lending are all still materially lower, when measured in real terms, than they were a decade ago (in fact, this has been the first ten-year period since the second world war in which the real stock of mortgage lending has declined in the UK.) So if there had been a macroprudential authority throughout the past twenty years its policies would presumably have been a lot tighter in  economy with low inflation and rapid credit growth, a single policymaker might well choose such a policy setting. It’s generally the case that, as long as there are at least as many objectives as policy instruments, and when there can be independent shocks to those objectives, the policy instruments will occasionally move contrariwise, whatever the arrangements for setting them. For example, the same would be true in an economy with a weak economy but an undesirably high public-sector deficit – the right reaction, even for a single decision maker, could well be to set tight fiscal policy but loose monetary policy (see Kohn (2017) on this point). 7 Differences in objectives also drive many results concerning fiscal and monetary policy coordination. The literature is significant and diverse. But one strand (e.g.

My purpose today is to put the case for continued separation, albeit within the single Bank of England. I think the interactions between the two policies are often overstated, particularly in small open economies like the UK. Domestic interest rates have a smaller effect on financial stability, and financial policy a less significant impact on demand and inflation, than sometimes suggested. And whatever the benefits of formal co-ordination, a full merger could compromise accountability. The risk is that a single committee would pay too much attention to its more verifiable objectives – the cyclical stabilisation of inflation and growth, currently allocated in the main to the monetary policymaker – and too little to financial stability. 1 2  Fernie and Metcalf (1999), Groves et al (1994). The key reference in the economics literature is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  I should say before I start that nothing I say here is very novel. Others, including my predecessor Charlie Bean and the economist Lars Svensson, have made similar points about the interaction of monetary and macro-prudential policy3. I discovered when writing the talk that my former colleague Paul Tucker made very similar arguments regarding accountability back in 20114. FPC external member Donald Kohn gave a talk on this topic only a few months ago. There is, more generally, a substantial and growing literature on the governance of macro-prudential policy and its interaction with monetary policy.
But is that really true? I don’t think so. If we work together, we are still in control and we can still do things well. The history of the EU is a case in point. When European countries signed the Treaty of Rome 61 years ago, they chose to work together instead of working alone. Today more than ever, this choice is also a reaction to a changing world. Some of the current changes are beyond any single government’s control, and are better managed with the help of strong allies and good friends. The world of banking is no exception. Our financial systems have grown closer together and have become much more complex than they used to be. Large banking groups now cover many Member States. We have all benefited from this. But if we want this trend towards integration to continue, we must make sure it does not come at the cost of greater instability and more crises. We need rules that apply across borders just as banks operate across borders. And we need supervisors who have the power to see and act across borders. In short: we need to cooperate. And when I say cooperate, that’s what I mean. I know that some may think we have created a system in which the ECB and the Single Resolution Board hold all the power. I think otherwise. The banking union is very much a joint project. Just look at banking supervision. We at the ECB cannot act alone.

And we also benefit from our broader view when we analyse horizontal issues. A lack of profitability is one of these issues. Here, we can pool insights from a large sample of banks, and this improves our analysis. And it’s the same with other issues, such as governance, cyber risks and the use of internal models. These models in particular are notoriously difficult to supervise, so a broad yet in-depth knowledge of industry standards and practices comes in handy. But it’s not just that we benefit from a broader view. We also benefit from a broader set of views. Supervisors from across Europe work together day in day out, pooling their knowledge and their different experiences. And at the end of the day, it is the ECB’s Supervisory Board and its Governing Council that take decisions. In other words, each decision reflects the views and opinions of 26 national supervisors from 19 countries. There is less room for national bias and less room for supervisory capture. Finally, we benefit from economies of scale when it comes to employing specialists for certain topics. If you supervise just a handful of banks, it might not be efficient to have specialists for each and every topic. But if you supervise the 118 largest banks in the euro area, it does become efficient. This is another huge advantage of European banking supervision. In short, supervising banks at the European level takes us a long way towards making banks safer and sounder.
One possible way forward to ensure something happens and to increase our knowledge in this field would therefore be a strategy that combines different possible measures on a smaller scale. 3 Even a journey of a thousand miles begins with just one step, and it is important to take this step. With regard to the statistics received over the summer, both in Sweden and abroad, they agree fairly well with the assessments we made in July. Economic developments in Sweden still look good and the expansionary monetary policy is supporting the upward trend in inflation. And if it were necessary, there is a high level of preparedness to make monetary policy even more expansionary. We are now working on producing an overall assessment of the situation in the Swedish economy, and in connection with the publication of the monetary policy decision on 3 September, we will present new forecasts. 3  8  See Per-Anders Bergendahl, Monika Hjeds Löfmark and Hans Lind (2015), “Bostadsmarknaden och den ekonomiska utvecklingen” (The housing market and economic development), SOU 2015:48, Appendix 3 to Långtidsutredningen (Long-Term Survey of the Swedish Economy), which proposes this strategy with regard to reforming the housing market.

A data-dependent normalization means policymakers need to see tangible evidence of a solid recovery, prior to any policy tightening. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Given the fragile recovery policymakers would be best advised to lean on the side of caution. Faced with additional shocks, we believe our priority should be to offer additional accommodation to the economy. However, policy makers should be careful in getting the policy mix right so that potential long-term costs do not outweigh short term benefits. To that extent, we believe: Fiscal policy should provide additional support, subject to existing fiscal space. So far, public sector sin the developed economies have little financing constraints, partly on account of massive injections of liquidity from central banks. The same appears to be true also for the emerging market economies, such as Albania, which continue to enjoy both market access and relatively low financing costs. However, the fiscal authorities of emerging market economies should be mindful on the need to preserve market credibility on the sustainability of their finances. Financial intermediaries – such as banks – have also shared their fair share of the burden. They would naturally absorb a large part of the additional financial costs incurred in case of further shocks. However, financial and macroprudential policies should avoid the temptation of shifting an ever increasing part of the cost on the banks’ balance sheets. Financial stability and a robust banking sector remain paramount for the long-term growth. Finally, monetary policy should offer additional stimulus.
These two regulations must naturally be enhanced by proposals on the deposit guarantee fund and the crisis resolution mechanism, which are the two other essential pillars of the banking union. The ECB, and all the other national authorities concerned, must now continue the preparatory work so that the Single Supervisory Mechanism can become operational as soon as possible. The Banque de France and the ACP provide an important contribution and intend to play an active role in the new mechanism. This is particularly the case given that around a dozen major French banking groups will be subject, according to the criteria set out in the regulation, to direct supervision by the ECB, even though the ACP will remain responsible for day-to-day supervision. 2. Resolutely pursuing efforts to strengthen the resilience of the financial system by preparing for and implementing new regulations  The international financial regulatory framework evolved substantially in 2012, and will continue to do so in 2013. It is therefore particularly important to adapt to these changes. 2.1  The insurance sector must continue, in France and Europe, to prepare itself for the application of the new prudential regime, Solvency II  Admittedly, 2012 was marked by tough discussions about the Omnibus II Directive and in particular the question of the treatment of insurance products with long-term guarantees. These discussions were unfruitful and will delay the entry into force of Solvency II.

The same is also true for market making activities that play a vital role in ensuring financial market liquidity and thus in convincing investors to finance the real economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This will therefore mean a new organisation for banks and greater powers for the ACP, including notably banking crisis resolution powers. The ACP will then become the ACPR. In exceptional circumstances, the ACP could call on support from the failing entity’s shareholders and subordinated bondholders. It could then, if necessary, request intervention by the Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund, which is currently only required to intervene in the framework of its depositor compensation arrangements, even though it has already voluntarily participated in restructuring operations. In this respect, in line with the Paris financial centre’s wishes, the draft law provides that the possibility of calling on support from the Fund will be capped at a ceiling set by decree in order to ensure that the Fund’s intervention does not result in contagion. 1.2  A few words on the banking union  Distinct progress was made in 2012 in the area of European banking supervision. The euro area crisis required particularly ambitious measures to be adopted and these steps have now been taken. Thanks to the determination of European leaders, at the end of 2012, an agreement was reached on two draft regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism under the auspices of the ECB.
Apart from the cost in net worth, intervention requires withdrawing money used to purchase foreign exchange by placing debt. This debt has an impact on market interest rates, affecting firms’ financial costs and arbitrage conditions, which could end up undoing the direct effects. At the same time, repeated or frequent interventions lose effectiveness: it is essential for intervention to be an exceptional occurrence in order to transmit the relevant information to financial markets. Nevertheless, it is a valid tool, effective in changing the exchange rate and strengthening the international liquidity position. The board of the Central Bank of Chile constantly evaluates the timing and the size of any intervention and in the past few weeks it has certainly been present in our discussions, based on weighing the benefits, costs and the present context. In the Central Bank of Chile we use a variety of methods for assessing the real exchange rate level with regard to its long-term fundamentals and thus we have an ample range of estimates. Our aim is not to determine which is the equilibrium – that is the task of the market –, but rather to detect any anomalous deviation. These discussions led us to the conclusion in our latest Monetary Policy Report that the real exchange rate is within the adequate range of levels, albeit in the lower part of it, and this is confirmed by the most recent appreciation.

When it comes to undertaking reform in the areas of financial system development, the exchange rate and monetary policy regime, and liberalization of the capital account, there is more consensus on the importance of the efforts than there is on the appropriate pace and sequencing of policy changes. These initiatives are all closely related, and designing sensible reforms in one of these areas requires careful consideration of how to proceed with the others. Progress in one requires progress in the others. And market participants and policymakers need to have the chance to adapt to change and learn as reforms are implemented. This is the classic and persuasive argument for care and for gradualism. But it is possible to move too gradually. There is risk in inertia as well as in change. The policy challenges in occupying the middle ground - the middle ground of trying to allow some but not too much variability in the exchange rate, some but not too much freedom for capital movements with the inevitable increase in leakages around the remaining controls, and some but not too much competition in a still fragile domestic financial system - may be harder during a protracted transition. The more protracted the process of agreeing on and initiating change, the greater the costs for the economy as a whole of the distortions left in place. By outlining a path for reform, governments can dispel uncertainty about the overall strategy and enable market participants to begin to adjust, mitigating some of the concern about moving too quickly.
I understand that among other things, it intends to designate Singapore as its Southeast-Asian hub for RMB business and will make Singapore its wealth management hub covering Southeast Asia and South Asia. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  7. ICBC and Singapore can together play a big role in promoting the greater use of the RMB for trade settlements and other economic activities within Asia, and particularly in Southeast Asia. 8. I congratulate ICBC for its commencement as Singapore’s RMB clearing bank. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

WC-PSS created cross-border payment innovations: international stock markets network, electronic payment message standard, and ASEAN retail payment system network. In addition, BOT in association with Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) launched a new cross-border payment-versus-payment (PvP) link between Hong Kong’s USD CHATS, Hong Kong dollar Clearing House Automated Transfer System (CHATS) and Thai BAHTNET to ensure the simultaneous delivery of US Dollars in Hong Kong and Thai Baht in Thailand in order to eliminate or mitigate settlement and counterparty risks. The link operationally started since 28 July this year. Aligning with cross-border payment innovations, growth of IT investment is another matter that the Bank of Thailand has promoted and monitored. The widespread adoption of advanced technology in banks’ key systems is to advance efficient internal operations – Big Data Analytics for processing customers’ information to analyze customers’ behavior and Cloud Computing for allocating IT resources, and to provide products and services through online platform such as Mobile Electronic Data Capture, Net Bank, Virtual Card, Near Field Communication Contactless, and etc. However, many people, especially in the baby boom ages, have not experienced the online banking services yet, partly because they have concerns about security. So it is our job to secure them. BOT has continuously promoted online banking systems and are aware of their risks and impacts at the same time since we believe that no matter what we have in online mode, they are all connected. As digital banking products thrive, so do the competency of cyber threats.
Eddie charged me with the task of preparing ideas on how the new committee – the Monetary Policy Committee – would decide and set the level of interest rates, and to draft the speaking note for the very last Chancellor-Governor meeting which was brought forward from Wednesday to 8am on the Tuesday. By the next morning when the public announcement was made, a paper was ready setting out the questions that the Bank would have to answer on how the new Committee would operate. We had a script but, at this stage, the cast was incomplete. Only four of the five internal and none of the external  BIS Review 43/2007  1  members were in place. With the support and hard work of some extraordinarily talented young Bank economists, the new arrangements were designed and put in place in not much more than three weeks. They included the arrangements for briefing the Committee, the pre-MPC meetings, the format of the decision-making meetings of the MPC, practical matters such as the ordering of a sound system so that, in a break with tradition, it was actually possible to hear what was said in the Bank’s older meeting rooms, and rehearsals of the meetings and voting procedures with staff members playing the roles of the MPC members. So short was the time available that some of the dress rehearsals came after the first night of other parts of the policy process.

Gent Sejko: Future Balkans - towards a global inclusion Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Tirana Economic Forum "Future Balkans: Towards a global inclusion" Leadership, Institutions and Policies Convergence 2017-2020, Tirana, 24 January 2018. * * *  Your Excellency Mr President, Your Excellency Deputy Prime Minister of Albania, Your Excellency Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo, Honourable Minister of Finance and Economy, My fellow Colleagues and Honourable Participants, It is a pleasure for me to participate at this Conference, convened to discuss on the importance of regional integration, which should be promoted by a forward-looking leadership and supported by the policies convergence. I believe that the dialogue that focuses on sharing our vision for the future, the convergence of perspectives about the challenges ahead of us, and identifying the objectives and drafting agendas for joint action, will be a fruitful dialogue to all of us. Policy convergence, both within and between countries, promotes efficiency and minimizes negative spill-overs. The role of institutions in the growth and development Institutions are the backbone of any modern society, in as much as they generate and implement laws, regulations and policies of development, thus laying out the rules of the game in a market economy. From a broader perspective, these rules should provide for a stable and transparent environment, thus enabling a predictable and long-term decision-making process. They should promote fair competition and equality of opportunities, and they should engender fairness and social cohesion.
Labour productivity in entire economy Annual percentage change, seasonally-adjusted data 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 -2  -2 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11  Note: Squares are the Riksbank’s forecasts. Outcomes are quarterly data and the forecasts are annual averages. BIS Review 154/2008  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  11  Figure 7. Cyclical variation in GDP and number of employed Percentage deviation from trend 6  6 GDP  4  4  Employment  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Note: Trend calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter. Broken lines are the Riksbank’s forecasts. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 8.

This is a substantial cut and it has been made on the grounds that since the previous Monetary Policy Report was published in October there has been an unexpectedly rapid and tangible downturn in economic activity in Sweden and abroad. So, in order to prevent development being far too weak and inflation too low, a significant reduction in the repo rate was required. The fact that the interest rate needed to be cut substantially is also due to monetary policy not having such a large impact recently as it normally does. With lower policy rates and a more expansionary fiscal policy in Sweden and abroad, we expect to see an easing-off in the slowdown of the economy and a recovery at the end of 2009. In this acute situation, one may wonder whether wage formation is something that we need to discuss just now. Obviously, wage formation is not the most central issue for monetary policy at the moment. At the same time, it is important to be able to stand firm when a storm is brewing. Today, the Swedish economy stands on much firmer foundations than it did in the early 1990s – largely thanks to the lessons that we learned from the crisis at that time and the improvements that have been made in the functioning of the economy since then. I would claim that wage formation has been an important element of this and I intend to explain this in more detail in my speech today.