samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
You cannot just rely on other countries. The message that we would like to hear is that “growth starts at home”. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

It is always true that monetary policy is too restrictive for certain segments of the economy and too expansionary for others. Since there can only be one monetary policy for Switzerland, it must geared to the economy as a whole. Ensuring price stability in the medium and long term is the guiding principle. The SNB’s monetary policy strategy, however, is sufficiently flexible to react in an optimal way to uncertainties related to business cycle developments or the situation on the financial and currency markets. In implementing this policy, the SNB must be able to maintain its credibility at all times. Only then can it effectively – in the long term – fulfil its constitutional and statutory mandate of pursuing a monetary policy in the interests of the country as a whole. BIS Review 70/2010  1
The treaty creating the Fund made clear that its founding purpose was "to promote international monetary co-operation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems”. In reality, though, the Fund is not playing that role at present. Its surveillance lacks focus. Its lack of day-to-day independence hampers its ability to comment effectively on divergences between stated objectives and actual policies at the national level. And it lacks the legitimacy to be an effective secretariat. Despite strenuous efforts by its Chairman, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, to promote discussion, there is little genuine interaction between members of the IMFC (or the Interim Committee as it was) about the international monetary system. I welcome the Managing Director’s recent statement that he intends to examine Fund surveillance. One symptom of the Fund’s decreasing effectiveness has been the proliferation of "G" groups – the G -5 that became the G-7, the G-22 that became the G-33 and then the G-20; the G-10; the G-24 and the G-77. All of these were attempts to create opportunities for serious discussions among countries in the international monetary system. But as the world economy, and hence the relevant issues, have  BIS Review 11/2006  5  changed so it has been necessary to set up new “G” groups. Such groups are perceived as exclusive and lack legitimacy, and their meetings have increasingly become communiqué-driven events. In February 2004, the G-7 met in Boca Raton in Florida.

One solution could be to create more flexible groupings within the Fund to discuss particular topics. For example, the Managing Director’s powers to initiate bilateral consultations about the policy choices of individual members could be expanded to cover multilateral issues discussed by the relevant group of members. If this does not prove practicable, other mechanisms will need to be found to introduce the requisite flexibility in how countries come together under the auspices of the Fund. The institution itself, though, also needs to change. The IMF has the great merit of being a universal institution. But it needs greater focus, independence and legitimacy. In terms of focus the members of the Fund, through the IMFC, could usefully restate the Fund’s mandate in terms of global economic and monetary stability. If it is to be able to meet its remit then surveillance should focus at least as much on balance sheets as on exchange rates. The mandate should make clear both what the IMF is responsible for and what it is not responsible for. But producing more focussed surveillance cannot be achieved in isolation from more fundamental reforms of the Fund. In terms of independence the responsibility for the delivery of a new mandate should be placed more firmly in the hands of the management of the IMF. At present, the Board involves itself in every aspect of the Fund’s activities.
In any case, the fact that bail-in is now on the table and can be used by the supervisor will probably be one of the reasons why the banks will be tempted to increase their capital base regularly over time, to demonstrate to the buyers of senior debt that they are sufficiently protected. It will also be a strong incentive for banks to limit and control their risks and clearly communicate to the market how they do so. EUROWEEK: Has all this done enough to break the pernicious and highly damaging loop between sovereign and bank risk that was so central to the crisis? Or is that loop one that is simply impossible to break? Noyer: I think we have reduced that risk. The work is not totally finished. We need to continue in the direction we have taken. But to my mind there were three decisive moves that have addressed the problem of this feedback loop. One was the action that was taken on the consolidation of public finances, because if you have stronger government finances then of course the risk for banks is reduced. The second was moving decisively on the banks’ capital bases, because clearly if you have stronger banks then the risk for governments is lower. And finally, the decision to move to a banking union starts with supervision and then allows us to advance to the second and third steps which will have to be a resolution scheme and a resolution authority and finally a euro area deposit guarantee scheme.

As we move out of the financial crisis, I believe that having activities in several countries across the eurozone will soon re-establish itself as a normal diversified business model that is regarded as a strength rather than a weakness. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
John Gieve: Uncertainty, policy and financial markets Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the Barbican Centre, London, 24 July 2007. *  *  *  Introduction When I took on this job last year, interest rates had moved only twice in 24 months – once up by 25bp and once back down again. Elsewhere we had seen, both in the US and the EU, two years in which rates had been on a well signalled upwards path, while interest rates in Japan remained anchored to zero. The “Great Stability” seemed to have reached its zenith of total predictability. However, one of the things that struck me from the outset in the MPC was that the predictability outside was not matched by any complacency or self certainty inside. There was a vigorous debate underway about the state of the economy and the policy response. At that stage, some members of the committee doubted that the economy and employment would recover from the slowdown in 2005 without a further reduction in rates, while others, notably David Walton, saw emerging dangers on the other side. The economy has strengthened since then and we have had to raise interest rates 5 times in the last year. One thing that has not changed is the vigour of the internal debate. This is not (only) because economists are famously argumentative. As someone once noted, economics is the only field in which two people can get a Nobel prize for saying opposing things!

The credit cycle and monetary policy The knock on effects of defaults in the US sub prime market and the impact of big investors on asset prices are factors we need to assess not just in trying to understand the financial sector and the stresses it faces but in gauging the state of the economy more widely. The story of the sub prime market illustrates a wider point. In traditional banking markets in the past there has been an observable tendency for banks to overshoot both in offering credit at the top of the cycle and retrenching afterwards. That feeds through into asset prices and can have an impact on the wider economy. Despite the sophistication of the new capital markets, a very traditional cycle seems to have been alive and kicking in sub prime. 3  The definition of the official sector in the US Treasury survey also includes public bodies such as oil stabilisation funds. 4  See ‘International capital flows and US interest rates’, NBER working paper 12560, October 2006. 6  BIS Review 84/2007  A similar story could be told about the credit card and other unsecured lending over the last few years. The growth rate rose in the late 90s until defaults began to build up over the last 2 years and the banks and other lenders tightened up terms and conditions sharply (Chart 13). The path of commercial property prices in recent years suggests the same has been happening there (Chart 14).
We are the first Asian jurisdiction mandating climate-related disclosure across the financial sector by 2025, in line with the global framework set by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. We also made an early commitment to adopting new standards promulgated by the International Sustainability Standards Board. Hong Kong adopts the Common Ground Taxonomy jointly developed by China and the EU. We are now exploring the development of a green classification framework on the basis of the China-EU taxonomy, in order to provide the necessary disclosure and guidance to inform capital allocation and encourage market discipline. The HKMA has set clear rules – for example by formulating clear supervisory requirements and integrating climate-risk into the supervisor-driven stress-testing framework. The various regulatory requirements help build climate resilience into our banking and financial sector. In the process, financial intermediaries such as banks also act as facilitators to help the real sector adapt and transition, in line with global consensus and commitment to achieving carbon neutrality. Second, on data. Currently, there is a lack of accessible, standardised data and analytics support in the market. It presents a challenge, not just for climate risk management but for other purposes such as portfolio assessment and business development. We are working with other regulators and the private sector to address these issues, by improving data accessibility and developing a data repository and analytics capability for the industry. We are making good progress.

As Governor Zeti has persuasively argued, Islamic finance encourages business activities that generate legitimate profits, and rests on principles of fairness, shared risk and ethical practices.1 There is, I think, much for us all to reflect on in this when considering how badly things have gone wrong recently in what might be called "traditional" finance. No institution with such a long history can have escaped controversy, and BNM has had its fair share. What is interesting, however, is that perhaps the most controversial action by the Malaysian authorities in recent years – the response to the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis – has now come to be understood as appropriate and effective. At the centre of this response was the imposition of capital controls to contain speculative capital flows, stabilise the ringgit, and give the economy a breathing space. This was widely criticised internationally as a retrograde step. Yet it was a limited and temporary measure, which, along with other policies succeeded in stabilising the system and providing the conditions for economic recovery. The role of Bank Negara in promoting international understanding of this measure was crucial to its effectiveness. It is not, of course, my purpose to recommend capital controls as a general solution to financial crisis. The lesson here is that unorthodox measures can be effective, provided that they are well thought out and properly implemented.
John C Williams: A new chapter for the FOMC monetary policy framework Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the “In Conversation: New York Fed Presidents on COVID-19” Bretton Woods Committee Webinar, 2 September 2020. * * * Thank you, Bill. It’s great to be with you today, at least virtually, and I am looking forward to our discussion. But before we dive in, I thought I would offer some thoughts on the announcement made last week about the completion of the Federal Open Market Committee’s review of its monetary policy framework and the issuance of a new Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.1 Before I continue—and you know what comes next, Bill—let me give the usual disclaimer that the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. Allow me to add one last “before” caveat. Before I explain the new statement, it is important to reflect on the context in which the original statement was issued. Then I’ll share how the monetary policy framework of today positions us best to achieve our goals and manage the very challenging environment that lies ahead. The original consensus statement was issued back in January 2012 and represented an important step in the Committee’s progress toward greater transparency around its goals and strategy.

It incorporated key aspects of flexible inflation targeting, a monetary policy framework that had gained wide acceptance around the world. This framework served us well, but the need for change was clear. In the past eight years, basic facts that shaped the original framework have fundamentally changed. First and foremost is the dramatic decline in the neutral interest rate, that is, the short-term interest expected to prevail when the economy is operating at its full potential and inflation is at its longer-run target. Since January 2012, FOMC participants’ median estimate of the neutral nominal rate has fallen by 1-3/4 percentage points, from 4.25 percent to 2.5 percent. A similar decline is seen in private sector forecasts and bond yields.2 This secular decline in interest rates is not limited to the United States—we’re seeing it across the globe—and it reflects longer-run trends in demographics, productivity, and other factors that are unlikely to reverse anytime soon.3 Lower neutral interest rates constrain the ability of monetary policy to offset negative shocks to the economy. This effect has been seen most clearly in the behavior of inflation. Over the past decade, inflation in the United States has been below our 2 percent longer-run target most of the time, and measures of inflation expectations have drifted down. These declines in trend inflation and inflation expectations can create a pernicious feedback loop of reduced policy space and even lower inflation expectations.
France has risen from 7th to 1st place, replacing Sweden as the government expenditure record holder. Shedding light on government spending differentials But there is a positive lesson here: the German and Swedish examples, along with many others, demonstrate that recovery is possible... in other countries. After the crisis of the early 1990s, Sweden for example, introduced a new  Page 4 of 19 governance framework and conducted a strategic review of its spending. This brings me to the composition of our expenditure when compared with Germany and the euro area as a whole. What sets France apart in particular is the level of its social protection expenditure, which amounts to 34% of GDP, compared with a euro area average of 29.5%. This additional cost applies to spending on pensions, healthcare and unemployment benefit. Another example is housing benefit, which amounts to 0.9 points of GDP in France, compared with an average of 0.2 points in the euro area excluding France. Consequently, France's spending has risen much more sharply since the early 2000s than that of its euro area counterparts. If we wish to get public debt back down to below 100% of GDP its pre-Covid level – there is only one solution, and that is stablising public spending in volume terms, after having increased it by more than 1% a year on average for 20 years.

Conference at the Académie des sciences morales et politiques Paris, 19 June 2023 Governance of public expenditure and public services: is there any hope left? Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 of 19 Dear Chairman, Dear Permanent Secretary, Dear Academicians, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour for me to speak before you today and I wish to warmly thank your Chairman and my esteemed predecessor, Jean-Claude Trichet. This year, your collective discussion focuses on the theme of "Good governance". Six years ago, at the invitation of Michel Pébereau, I had the opportunity to use the theme of "Reform" to reflect upon international financial regulations. Today, I will tackle a different aspect: good governance in the public sphere. I would like to thank a number of people who are committed to this cause and who have been kind enough to be here today. As the head of a public institution and a fervent supporter of the public service – and also as a citizen – I consider this to be an essential matter. France appears to be drifting towards a "strange defeat", or, at the very least, a gloomy resignation, reflected in constantly increasing government expenditure and public debt (I), together with diminishing intellectual investment in economic optimisation and public management strategies. (II) There is also a growing feeling that essential public services are continuing to deteriorate. In the face of this public crisis, is there any hope left?
Judging the cumulative impact of these changes in a comprehensive way that includes an assessment of costs, benefits, and risks is challenging, but seems an important goal for optimal policy design. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Conclusion A fundamental challenge for effective supervision is that the landscape is constantly evolving and adapting in response to a wide range of regulatory, financial, and technological forces. This type of dynamism is normal and inherently productive for the industry as firms continue to optimize in order to serve customers efficiently and satisfy investors, but it does raise issues that supervisors must consider. As I’ve discussed, one recent type of evolution is the trend toward greater similarity of the largest financial firms in the U.S. In response, supervisors and regulators must continue their focus on taking a broad perspective on supervision and risks. It is not enough to look at individual business lines or products, but we should continue to focus on enterprise risk management that reflects each business and the interdependencies among them. Moreover, supervisors should be dynamic and continue to evolve as the supervised firms do. Finally, supervisors should continue to develop an industrywide, macroprudential perspective to understand the impact of the continuing evolution of the U.S. financial industry.

23.05.2018  25th Financial Sector Meeting: Innovation, Transformation and Reputation Deloitte, Sociedad de Tasación and ABC Luis M. Linde Governor  Let me begin by thanking the organisers – Deloitte, Sociedad de Tasación and ABC – for their invitation to me to participate in this session of the 25th Financial Sector Meeting, which on this occasion turns on three ideas: innovation, transformation and reputation. In my opinion, these three concepts accurately encapsulate the main challenges currently faced by the financial sector. The new technologies are enabling financial institutions to transform their systems and their business models, but this transformation should not lead us to forget that the keystone of any market, and all the more so financial markets, is customer confidence. The financial sector is faced with a singularly complex setting and this conference provides an opportunity to confer with institutions’ key decision-makers on the different ways in which changes are being addressed at this time of transformation, which will be crucial for the future of the industry. The new technologies, which have already significantly impacted various sectors, now have the potential also to substantially change the way in which financial services will be provided in the not-too-distant future. I would thus like to take this opportunity to offer my view on the opportunities and risks these new technologies pose.
Consequently, it does not seem right to me to call Spanish banks “traditional”: Spanish banks bend over backwards for the customer, obtain information and management advantages from their detailed knowledge of their customers and have demonstrated their innovative capacity in the marketing of different products, in their risk control and management mechanisms, and in the application of organisational developments and technological processes, enabling the sector to become one of the world's most advanced and efficient. What will happen to banks in Spain over the next few years? The road travelled so far has thus seen the entrenchment of a banking system with a proven capacity to manage risk and high levels of profitability, efficiency and solvency. This system has contributed decisively to the Spanish economy’s continuously strong growth since 1994 and has withstood the first two phases of the international financial crisis well. At the onset of what I have called the third phase of the crisis, the sector is in a strong position. Moreover, the Banco de España has the ability and experience to resolve the most complex situations without damaging savers or the economy as a whole. However, although there is no sign of problems at Spanish banks in the short term, there is a temptation to which we bank supervisors must never succumb: complacency. Thus, I feel obliged to conclude by identifying the challenges that the Spanish banking system is going to face and suggesting the action necessary to overcome them with the greatest guarantee of success.

I believe that all of us, institutions and authorities, each from their own area of responsibility, are pushing in the right direction, and therefore I am convinced that we will successfully negotiate this extremely difficult time for the financial systems and economies of the main developed countries. Thank you very much. BIS Review 133/2008  9