samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I don’t think so, judging from the strong investor reactions after the collapse of many internet-based crowd funding platforms on the Mainland and overseas. 12. While regulators like the HKMA must exercise care when new technology is introduced in financial services, there are understandable concerns amongst the Fintech industry that overly rigid or conservative regulations may stifle new technology and innovation. So how do we in the HKMA deal with this issue? Let me say this: the regulatory philosophy of the HKMA is that we adopt a risk-based and technology neutral approach. Specifically, we would endeavour to see through the nature and magnitude of the risks involved in a financial transaction or product without positive or negative discrimination on whether a new technology is used. However, it is important not to misinterpret this “technology neutral” approach as one that is insensitive to the contributions that Fintech and innovation can bring to the financial sector. The more correct narrative is that, without compromising consumer and investor protection, the HKMA embraces the use of Fintech and innovation. A practical demonstration of our effort in supporting Fintech development in Hong Kong is the setting up of the “Fintech Facilitation Office” (FFO) by the HKMA earlier this year. In May, the FFO launched its first major initiative, namely, the “Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative”. It is a major endeavour involving the key stakeholders in the banking as well as the Fintech industry. In the interest of time, I do not propose to say much about this important initiative today. 13.

The Bank of Canada already regularly does this, and the Federal Reserve is currently undergoing a review of its framework and strategy.8 Absent such changes, central banks will be severely challenged to achieve stable economies and well-anchored inflation expectations. Outside of monetary policy, there are a number of avenues by which fiscal authorities can enhance the resilience of economies to negative shocks. One is to strengthen the “automatic stabilizers” that provide a boost to the economy during a downturn. A second is to align debt management decisions more with monetary policy. For example, during a downturn, the fiscal authority could choose to shorten the duration of debt issuance to reinforce the effects of central bank quantitative easing. Third, regulatory and supervisory policies that support the resilience of the financial system can limit the economic effects of negative shocks. Finally, fiscal and other economic policies can attack directly the sources of slow growth and low r-star. This includes raising public and private investment in human and physical capital, infrastructure, science and technology, and policies aimed at removing barriers to participation in the labor force and the economy more broadly. Conclusion The facts have changed, and so it is time our change our minds also. It is often said that change is hard. But, experience teaches us that it is better to prepare for the future than wait too long. Ultimately, failure to prepare often means preparation for failure. 1 This is not true for all population groups.
The world economy continues to be marked by expectations about the Federal Reserve (Fed)’s decision on the trajectory of its monetary policy normalization, and by the risks coming from the Chinese authorities’ efforts to meet the country’s target growth rates. During most of the quarter, the markets’ assessment of these phenomena resulted in a loosening of financial conditions compared with the beginning of the year. Most recently, however, these trends have been partly reversed. Thus, our new baseline scenario assumes that our trading partners will post similar growth rates to those of 2015, but external lending conditions will be tighter and commodity prices will remain below their long-term levels. In this context, we have held the monetary policy rate (MPR) at 3.5 percent annually and we foresee that, within our forecast horizon, further increases will be necessary. Of course, this will be contingent on incoming information about the projected inflation dynamics. Thus, if new indicators point at higher expected inflation, monetary policy will need to be tightened, and vice-versa. In any case, we have maintained a significantly expansionary monetary stance, which will remain so in the scenario we believe to be the most likely. Let me share with you the workings of our baseline scenario and the main risks we perceive, which are depicted in the Reports I am presenting now. Macroeconomic scenario As I said before, in recent months both headline (CPI) and core (CPIEFE) inflation have behaved as expected.

These are all areas in which Singaporeans can excel. (II)  Cross-functional capability  Second, we are seeing greater demand for finance professionals with cross-functional abilities, besides a core competence in a particular business area. This is obviously helpful in small institutions, but is also in demand in large institutions as different financial services are being integrated and packaged together for the customer. Cross-functional knowledge and competence also enables financial professionals to take on larger responsibilities, and to achieve greater resilience in their careers in a fast-changing financial sector landscape. (III)  Regional knowledge and experience  Third, regional knowledge and experience. It is now an essential for a good career in finance, not just nice to have. We must give it far greater emphasis, and encourage and support Singaporeans in building up this capacity. Cross-border solutions and transactions are increasingly the norm in the business. Strong regional knowledge is also necessary in meeting clients’ needs, whether in relationship management, transaction banking, specialised finance or product structuring. It also enables financial institutions to manage  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  their risks well, and operate effectively in Asia’s still diverse regulatory frameworks and market environments. (IV)  Technological skills and adaptability  Fourth, technological adaptability. I spoke earlier about how technology is changing the business, and changing jobs. It is not a matter of defending ourselves against the onslaught of technology, but taking advantage of it.
The IMF called it a model for others and a succession of governments visited London to learn from it. The Chairman of the FSA was invited by the US Treasury Secretary to address the heads of the US regulatory bodies. And the Mayor of New York City and a US Senator commissioned a report which concluded that the US needed to learn from London’s approach to regulation if it was to arrest New York’s decline as a global financial centre.1 In short the separation of the three authorities, each with a clear remit and the independence to pursue it, was seen as a good model for a modern economy (Chart 1). 1  2  http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf  BIS Review 21/2009  Revisiting the Great Stability And it worked! We should not underestimate the achievement of the next decade. As recently as fifteen years ago, low and stable inflation still seemed an unattainable goal. But, research published by the Bank around the time I joined found that: “the post-1992 inflation-targeting regime has been characterised, to date, by the most stable macroeconomic environment in recorded UK history”2 As Chart 2 shows, volatility of both output and inflation hit new lows. Similar gains were achieved overseas, although the break in macroeconomic performance appears to have happened earlier in the United States. In the UK we did indeed avoid the sort of cyclical booms in output, income and employment we had seen in the 70s, 80s and 90s (Chart 3).

Broadly, these models can be classified according to the underlying micro-economic friction. For example, a well-established body of literature has looked at the effects of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders in placing limits on credit (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), Holstrom and Tirole (1997)). These constraints can be loosened by the borrower pledging collateral to the lender, in effect as a substitute for information (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). This solves one problem, but at the potential expense of another: movements in the prices of collateral then have the potential to aggravate cycles in leverage and credit (Geanakoplos (2010)). These cycles can in turn act as a “financial accelerator” for the business cycle. These are typically models of a representative bank and creditconstrained investor. A second potential source of credit market friction arises from coordination failures among lenders (Gorton and He (2008)). In these models, banks are heterogeneous and their behaviour strategic. The individually rational actions of heterogeneous lenders can generate collectively sub-optimal credit provision in both the upswing (a credit boom) and the downswing (a credit crunch), perhaps through herding (Acharya (2009), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008)). This is the result of a collective action, or co-ordination, problem among banks. In credit markets, these co-ordination failures are far from new. Keynes memorably noted: “A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him” (Keynes (1931)).
Adjustments and increased volatility recently observed in international financial markets are other factors to consider in this conjuncture, and their implications will depend critically on how they will ultimately affect the future inflation trajectory. We have the luxury of having a well-established macro/financial framework that permits us to be well prepared to face turbulences as they occur. BIS Review 97/2007  9

In such a transaction, banks generally purchase the asset to be financed, and then sells it to the customer at a mark-up, to be paid on a deferred basis. 6  IFSB - Islamic Financial Services Board; IDB – Islamic Development Bank; AAOIFI - Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions; IIFM - International Islamic Financial Market. 7  The Bahrain Monetary Agency was the primary sponsor in establishing the Liquidity Management Centre. 4  BIS Review 147/2008  Financial Services Board Summit, Singapore's plan to set up a facility to provide Shariahcompliant regulatory assets to these financial institutions as part of our efforts to promote the growth of Islamic Finance in Singapore. The sukuk structure is based broadly on the Al-Ijarah structure, or the sale-and-leaseback of an underlying property. Sukuk issued by the facility will be given equal regulatory treatment as Singapore Government Securities, or SGS, and returns will be tied to the risk-free yield of SGS of equivalent tenor. The facility is open to all financial institutions that plan to or are currently carrying on Shariah-compliant financial services in Singapore. We are issuing on a reverse enquiry basis, which means we can size and time the issuance according to the needs of the financial institutions. A number of financial institutions have already expressed interest and we expect the first issue to take place at the start of next year. We invite eligible and interested financial institutions to approach MAS as we work towards a formal launch.
With respect to disclosure, we are going to disclose in March 2019 the climate-risk exposures of our own funds and pension portfolios. We are also working to adopt in the near future a TCFD-like reporting which would fit the specificities of central banks. Regarding the role of monetary policy, some voices have been calling for a “green quantitative easing”. But monetary policy has to be broad based and remain neutral to ensure proper functioning through its transmission channels; it cannot be targeted towards achieving specific social or sectoral impacts. However, this does not preclude the Eurosystem from buying green assets when they fall in the remits of the eligibility criteria of its purchase programmes. For instance, the ECB currently holds around EUR 79 billion viii of eligible green universe bonds from both the public and the private sector, which is already significant. It does not mean though that monetary policy should ignore the question of climate change. Within our price stability mandate, I really believe further analytical work is needed to better understand the medium to long-term impact of climate change on intermediate monetary policy objectives and ultimately on our monetary policy strategy. To this end, a substantial research agenda remains before us and I hope the NGFS can play a role in helping to bridge the “knowledge-gap” in that area.

Chart 8: Accounting for intangibles reduces the missing-investment puzzle  Note: The orange line shows the investment puzzle using industry-level data, and the shaded area around it is the 95% confidence intervals. The line shows the estimated year fixed effects from an industry-level regression of investment rates on the wedge, including industry fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the industry level. See Appendix B to Bailey et al. (2022) for full details. The blue line shows the same statistic from the regressions in which both investment rates and the wedge are adjusted to include intangibles. See Appendix A.2 to Bailey et al. (2022) for a discussion of the adjustment. Source: ONS, KLEMS, Jordà et al. (2017) Macrohistory Database and authors' calculations. The remaining puzzle is mostly concentrated immediately after the global financial crisis, and so it is possible this is not driven by structural factors, but rather the lingering impact of the global financial crisis, for example related to the sluggish demand recovery or financial frictions. [22] While the results suggest an important role for intangibles in explaining the missing-investment puzzle, a few notes of caution are in order. It could be that certain drivers of investment, such as financial frictions, are captured more accurately only at more granular level, such as in firm-level data. Moreover, there could be large non-linearities related to the nature of the global financial crisis that cannot be captured by the simple regression framework used above.
Significant progress has been achieved in this direction during the recent period with the creation by the IMF of new facilities and a new SDR allocation, the biggest ever, for the equivalent of 250 bn USD. More needs to be done and work should be undertaken to find sources of international liquidity truly substitutable to reserves without creating undue and excessive moral hazard. And, finally, an important question is to find, in the future ,reliable international stores of value. The crisis has amplified the “asset shortage” as some instruments, up to now considered as riskless, have proved very vulnerable to changing financial conditions. The ability of the private sector to create “safe” assets through financial innovation has proved largely illusory. So, in the period to come there may be both an increased demand worldwide for risk free assets and much less certainty on their future supply. The search for a reliable international store of value has been going on for many decades. When discussions were held to build the Bretton Wood system, Keynes proposed the creation of a new international currency, the “bancor” which could serve both as a source of liquidity and a store of value. Thirty years ago, there was extensive discussion in the IMF on the creation of a substitution account. Most recently, in 2009, Governor Zhou has reopened the debate and suggested, over the long run, the creation of a new “super reserve” currency, while, in the meantime, enhancing the role and status of the SDR.

Moreover, there are strong indications that the deceleration in domestic credit activity in Malta is not due to any shortage of liquidity in the banking sector but rather to the reluctance on the part of banks to extend their exposure beyond certain limits to a number of economic sectors. A promotional or development bank could enable such sectors to gain better access to financing support that may not be readily available from other sources on reasonable terms. A promotional or development bank can thus complement the domestic financial sector in instances where free market conditions may appear to be insufficient to achieve the desired public policy objectives. Such an institution would normally be underpinned by certain privileges geared to optimise promotional activities and therefore one would need to ensure that the promotional operations of such a bank would not give rise to any distortions in competitive conditions in the market. More specifically, it would have to ensure that its activities will be fully in line with EU State Aid regulations at the final beneficiary level. A promotional or development bank would be on similar lines as in many EU countries, particularly Germany, where such banks undertake very successfully at a regional level a role in promoting the economy and assisting the government in social and environmental projects. Such banks have the backing of a government guarantee and thus can borrow on the basis of the sovereign rating of the government either locally or from supranational institutions.
The OECD publishes a range of well-being indicators as part of its Better Life Index. An un-weighted average of its indicators ranks the UK 12th out of the 36 countries (Figure 1). The UK does well on measures of income, wealth, security and environment, less well on work-life balance, education, skills, and housing (Figure 2). I set out all of this because it has a direct read-across to measuring the societal value of volunteering, to which I now turn. The scale of volunteering You can only measure what you can first define. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines volunteering as:  1  Deaton et al (2014). 2  Coyle (2014). 3  Fitoussi et al (2009). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  “Unpaid, non-compulsory work; that is, time individuals give without pay to activities performed either through an organisation or directly for others outside their own household”. Within this, there is formal and informal volunteering. The former is done through groups, clubs or organisations and is typically easier to measure; the latter can be through any arrangement and so is often much harder to capture. Clearly, volunteering is work. It also involves producing goods or services outside of your own household. So playing a musical instrument for your own pleasure does not count as volunteering, but playing in an old people’s home does. Driving your children to hospital is not volunteering, but driving your neighbours to hospital is. And so on. Figure 3 gives some more examples taken from the ILO manual.

Figure 12: The average lifetime cost of risk factors associated with sexual exploitation Average cost per individual  Preintervention Postintervention Control group  Going missing  Substance abuse  Accommodation Total needs  £  Disengagement from education £  £  £  £  £  £  £  £  £  £  £  £  £  £  Source: PBE (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  25  Figure 13: Benefit of Centrepoint intervention to the public purse, average per Centrepoint client Central scenario £ 2010/11 prices) 6,989 12,332 2,639 46 188 117 –136 22,174  Avoided welfare benefits Tax raised Crime (avoided costs) Mental health issues (treatment costs avoided) Class A drugs (treatment costs avoided) Cannabis (treatment costs avoided) Alcohol (treatment costs avoided) Benefit of Centrepoint intervention to the public purse Source: PBE (2013). Note: row totals do not add to the total benefit due to rounding. Figure 14: Reasons for not participating in volunteering-related activities, 2010/2011 (% of respondents) Work commitments  60%  Doing other things with spare time  34%  Looking after children/the home  31%  Studying commitments  14%  Not knowing any opportunities to help  14%  Not knowing of any groups needing help  14%  Looking after someone elderly or ill  8%  Feeling too old  3%  Feeling too young  1%  Source: UK Civil Society Almanac (2014), Citizenship Survey (2010/11). 26  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Jean-Pierre Roth: Swiss outlook and global developments Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Icon Roadshow Euro 2008, Frankfurt am Main, 17 March 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The Swiss economy looks back on a number of successful years during which it was a very active participant in the growth of the world economy. The export sector rapidly expanded its presence in the new markets, thereby making an important contribution to this development. What was remarkable was that the increased foreign activities were not detrimental to Switzerland as a production location. On the contrary, the Swiss location benefited overall. Reforms aimed at strengthening and opening up Switzerland as a business location have also made a substantial contribution to economic prosperity in recent years. The turbulence on the financial markets that erupted in mid-2007 is unlikely to leave the Swiss economy unscathed. The export sector, including the banks, will be affected by the slowdown in the international economy. An additional factor is the substantial rise in the value of the Swiss franc over the past few months against the euro and the US dollar. However, we are already in a position to learn quite a bit from the financial market turmoil.

By promoting a more consistent approach to supervisory review, we intend to strengthen the quality of supervision across countries. We recognise as well the special function the Committee can offer in strengthening the ability of host supervisors – particularly those in emerging market economies – to regulate the local operations of foreign banks. Harmonisation of accounting standards and the New Basel Accord  Supervisory review helps to create very direct incentives for banks to evaluate and manage their risks carefully. Transparency can supplement that incentive by leveraging the power of financial markets to encourage prudent risk-taking, and I would like now to address the third pillar of the New Accord, namely market discipline. Even just over the past few months, the popular press has reported on several examples of corporations that failed to disclose adequately the kinds of activities in which they were involved and the degree to which they bore risk. Both inside and outside the banking industry, the renewed focus on sound corporate governance practices has highlighted the importance of appropriate disclosure to the market – and the dangers that ensue when companies fail to disclose their risks adequately. These failures in disclosure have added fuel to the drive to harmonise accounting and disclosure practices worldwide. With reference to the New Accord, many respondents quite correctly noted the need to align the supervisory framework more closely with the converging accounting practices worldwide.