samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Bank of Canada (2022), “Economic progress report: Controlling inflation”, available at Economic progress report: Controlling inflation - Bank of Canada. Bank of England (2021), “Box A: The MPC’s strategy for the mix of monetary policy instruments to deliver tighter policy”, article in the Monetary Policy Report, September, available at the Bank of England Monetary Policy Report August 2021. Bank of England (2022), “Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting, published 5 May, available at Bank Rate increased to 1% - May 2022 | Bank of England. Breman, A. (2021), “Monetary policy after corona – we need to think in new ways”, digital speech at Swedbank, available at Breman:Monetary policy after corona – we need to think along new lines | Sveriges Riksbank. Brookings (2021), ”What does the Federal Reserve mean when it talks about tapering?”, available at What does the Federal Reserve mean when it talks about tapering? (brookings.edu). Cunliffe, Sir J. (2022), ”Learning from the Dash for Cash – findings and next steps for margining practices”, speech at FIA & SIFMA Asset Management Derivatives Forum 2022, published on 9 February, available at Learning from the Dash for Cash – findings and next steps for margining practices - speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe | Bank of England. Di Casola (2021), 'What does research say about the effects of central banks' balance sheet measures? ', Economic Commentaries No 2, Sveriges Riksbank, available at What does research say about the effects of central banks' balance sheet measures?(riksbank.se).

It is worth returning to this theory and considering in particular the exceptions. We will consider six such exceptions. The first occurs, as illustrated a few years ago by Paul Samuelson, when emerging economies record an elevated rate of increase in productivity in high value added sectors, forcing advanced economies to re-specialise in low value added production, with a resulting loss in income for the latter. 12 The second exception concerns the adjustment costs which have to be absorbed by advanced economies in order to face the new competition. 13 The faster and more enduring the transition is, the greater are such costs. In particular, if one considers the point from  10  L. Bini Smaghi (2006), "Democratic Representation and Economic Policy Rules in an Ageing Society", Eumoniamaster – Institutional and Political Higher Education, 28 September 2006. 11  A. Orphanides (2003), “The quest for prosperity without inflation”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 3, pp. 633-663. 12  See, for example, P. Samuelson (2004), “Where Ricardo and Mill rebut and confirm arguments of mainstream economists supporting globalization”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 3, pp. 135-146. 13  See Chapter 5 of the World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund, April 2007. BIS Review 66/2009  5  which emerging economies start, and their size, in terms of population, the adjustment resulting from their current process of growth could take a very long time and could be of considerable magnitude.
One of the first tasks of the Steering Group is to develop a local green taxonomy that would incorporate the harmonisation work currently being done by the Mainland and EU authorities and take into account local circumstances. The aim is simple: there should only be one local taxonomy for use by all financial regulators in Hong Kong. 26. At the global level, the HKMA is an active member of international and regional networks devoted to addressing climate risk. Through our participation in these networks we are able to contribute to international efforts and to draw on some of the best expertise in these fields. We will do our best to align practices in Hong Kong with international developments. 27. When considering international experience, we have to accept that there is no one-size-fitsall solution. This is something we are keenly aware of as we develop our regulatory approach on green and sustainable banking. While we base this approach on international best practices, we also take into account local conditions, recognising that banks in Hong Kong come in many shapes and sizes, and that their progress in green and sustainable banking varies considerably. We will be flexible, proportionate and inclusive in developing and applying regulatory requirements. It will take time for the less prepared banks to build capacity to address climate-related issues; we are ready to work with them to help them catch up. At the same time, the fast-movers or market leaders are encouraged to make the most of the work they have already done.

Eddie Yue: Opening keynote speech at HKIB Annual Banking Conference 2020 Keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at HKIB Annual Banking Conference 2020, Hong Kong, 28 September 2020. * * * Mr Patrick Fung, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. I am delighted to be with you here this morning for the annual banking conference of the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers (HKIB). It is great to see everyone in person, and I am grateful to the organisers for the hard work they have put into making this possible. 2. The past year has been a testing time for Hong Kong as it faced challenges on three fronts. We experienced prolonged social unrest of a kind not seen for many decades. Geo-political tensions and trade wars have raised fundamental questions about globalisation. And, as in the rest of the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is causing severe disruptions to our economy and threatening people’s livelihoods. 3. All this turmoil has put our institutions, not least our banks, to the test; they have had to adapt rapidly to constantly changing conditions. Hong Kong’s banking sector has largely met these challenges and continues to be resilient. 4. This resilience stems from the fact that our banks entered the current crisis with some of the strongest fundamentals in the world. Through sheer hard work and by learning from past experience, banks have been able to respond to operational challenges posed by both the pandemic and the social unrest.
And the withdrawal of these measures will push consumer prices upwards in the coming years, especially in 2024.3 In this regard, it is important to stress that, in the current high inflation setting, an appropriate policy mix requires a fiscal stance that, at the aggregate euro area level, is not at odds with the tightening of our monetary policy. This means that government support measures should be temporary, targeted and tailored to preserving incentives to consume less energy, and they should be gradually rolled back as energy prices fall. Otherwise, we are at risk of driving up medium-term inflationary pressures, which would call for a stronger monetary policy response. 2  The ten-year risk-free rate yield on April 7th was 15 bps below the level reached at the cut-off date for the projection exercise on February 15th. However, risk premia have risen, reflecting the increased uncertainty, and so did the average cost of financing in the capital markets for banks and low credit quality non-financial corporations in the euro area. Thus, the average cost of long-term capital market financing for banks has increased by 6 bps, while in the case of low credit quality non-financial corporations the cost has increased by 45 bps.. For investment grade companies, the cost of financing has decreased by 14 pb. On equity markets, the Euro Stoxx 50 index barely changed in the same period, while the banking sector index fell by 8.8%.

Gent Sejko: Prospects and challenges facing Albania Statement by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the conclusion of discussions on the eighth review of the arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, Tirana, 28 June 2016. *  *  *  In the last two weeks we have been engaged in intensive discussions with IMF Mission representatives, in the framework of the review of the IMF arrangement. The discussions focused on: the analysis of the current situation of the Albanian economy and financial system; identification of development prospects and challenges facing Albania; and the policies to be implemented with a view to supporting the country's development. The conclusions of our discussions may be summarised in three main points: (i)  Economic activity appears upward and the development outlook remains positive. (ii)  Yet, the external environment is unfavourable and the Albanian economy continues to face structural weaknesses, which decelerate the pace of growth. (iii)  Therefore, the monetary and fiscal policies should continue to generate a prudent economic stimulus, whereas structural reforms should accelerate their pace. In this context, the Bank of Albania deems that the arrangement with the IMF and the measures envisaged as part of the Eighth Review provide a consistent framework for drafting and implementing a programme for the country’s development. Let me now present in greater detail the opinion of the Bank of Albania. The growth pace of the Albanian economy continues to show progressive improvement.
Moonwalking bears and underwater icebergs: Hidden risks in markets Speech given by Alex Brazier, Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk, Bank of England  London Business School Asset Management Conference 2018 Thursday 26 April 2018  I am grateful to Yuliya Baranova, Johnny Elliot, Dan Gray, Sonal Patel, James Smith and Nick Vause for their assistance with preparing the speech and accompanying slides. This speech draws heavily on: Brazier, A. (2018), ‘Market finance and financial stability: will the stretch cause a strain’, Brevan Howard Centre for Financial Analysis, Imperial College Business School, London, February, available here; Cunliffe, J. (2018), ‘Market-based finance: a macroprudential view’, Asset Management Derivatives Forum, Dana Point, California, February, available here. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Moonwalking bears and underwater icebergs: Hidden risks in markets The theme of today’s session is hidden risks. Since this is the Investment Management Club, I want to focus on hidden risks in markets. In my view there are generally two types of such hidden risk. Let’s call them bears and bergs (slide 2). The bears are the risks that hide in plain sight. These are risks that, after the event, are obvious. Some people are able to see them in real time. Others, because of very human traits, don’t. They are the moonwalking bear in the viral Transport for London Cyclist Awareness video. For those who haven’t seen it, amidst a frenetic basketball game, a person dressed as a bear moonwalks across the screen.

So that market finance can continue to deliver for the economy in bad times, as well as a good. Thank you. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13
Each magnifies the risk in the other. The second broad challenge involves the rise of China and the other major emerging market economies. The process of integrating China and India into the world economy offers tremendous gains in global living standards. But the greater adjustment pressures that come with integrating the two most populous economies in the world will put a greater burden on the political sustainability of open trade policies. The framework of international institutions and arrangements for cooperation we now have will need to change to reflect the emerging importance of these economies. One important dimension of this process of integration will be a necessary evolution in the global exchange rate system. The present system, where the major currencies adjust against each other, but many large emerging market economies tie their currencies to the dollar or shadow it closely, creates an awkward asymmetry. This system carries with it the seeds of future stress for the global economy. These challenges - the challenges of unwinding large fiscal and external imbalances and of managing the integration of emerging market economies - are likely to dominate the economic policy agenda for a considerable period of time. If they are not managed well, we risk lower and less stable future growth and unwelcome shocks to financial prices. BIS Review 9/2005  1  These are two different types of risks.

The President, in the speech, precisely pointed out that looking to unemployment as an indicator of this slack in the economy, the unemployment rate now is 9.3%, according to the normal international standard of measuring unemployment; but if we adopt, as in the US, a broader concept of unemployment – which in the US they call U6 – then unemployment in the euro area is at 18%, where it is at 9% in the case of the US. Which would imply that the slack is then bigger than we could judge some time ago. That being the case, it justifies fully what the President said at the end of his speech: that we need persistence. If we want to bring inflation to our target of below but close to 2%, then we have to persist in the type of monetary policy that we have been adopting. But looking at the market reaction, the market took the speech quite hawkish, meaning concentrating on the optimistic comments about inflation, the economy, perhaps also the political tailwind. So is the market right to read your communication style as more hawkish than before? Constâncio: It’s always very difficult to interpret the reaction of markets. I will not try to say 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  rationalise or explain; the reaction of the market was what it was.
Such creativity is essential if we are to get beyond stark and unpalatable choices entailing either massive bailouts or sweeping defaults. Finally, a successful market-based, case-by-case approach also needs to be principled. I would suggest that the essence of an effective case-by-case approach is the development of viable plans that link broad, generally acceptable principles to the particulars of a given situation. G  To achieve this, a clearer and more transparent articulation of the public sector’s objectives is necessary. Greater emphasis and clarity are needed as to the purposes and limits of public intervention, and the extent to which those interests warrant different degrees, modes, and timing of public and private sector involvement, depending on the particular country and circumstances. In this way all parties will be better placed to understand current developments and how the international community might react to future strains. •  There are, of course, other points of view. In particular, it has been suggested that an early recourse to broad suspensions of debt service, perhaps amplified or reinforced by capital controls, would increase the manageability of crises and enhance predictability. •  My reading of the record convinces me that trying to preemptively override market processes would do the opposite. Let me share a few thoughts with you on this point.

William J McDonough: Promoting financial resilience Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Cato Institute’s 20th Annual Monetary Conference on “International Financial Crises: What Role for Government?” cosponsored with The Economist, New York, 17 October 2002. *  *  *  •  Good morning. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to join you on the occasion of this timely conference, and to share with you my thoughts on promoting financial resilience. •  Despite the fact that periodic surges in volatility are a fact of life in financial markets, I think there is general acknowledgment that recent years have been extraordinary in this regard. This has been a period of historic change and remarkable volatility in markets, going well beyond the emerging markets, and carrying with it important implications for political, social, and institutional stability in significant segments of the globe. •  The experiences of recent years have reinforced old lessons and brought home new insights about maintaining financial stability and sustained growth. In particular, a broad consensus continues to develop on ways of strengthening the institutional framework at the national and international level to create more robust, and thus more crisis-resistant, economies. There is general agreement that in order for countries to enjoy sustained and stable growth, the following are crucial: G  a sound and stable macroeconomic environment, and  G  well-functioning and robust financial systems in both capital-exporting and capitalimporting countries.
The above applies provided the increase in asset prices is maintained. Since share prices turned upwards in the autumn of 1992, the increase on the Stockholm Exchange has been one of the largest since the early 1920s, which is as far back as the statistics go. The overall valuation of corporate profits is also historically high. The present level of share prices calls for a further rapid increase in profits for several years to come. Minor changes in this picture of the future could affect current share prices. Another element of uncertainty concerns the economy’s supply side. We cannot be sure of just how much the economy can produce without an increase in inflation. Moreover, it is not only the total reserve of resources that may affect inflation. The rate at which resource utilisation rises may also be important. A rapid activation of the unutilised resources could generate stronger inflationary impulses even if surplus capacity still exists at total level. CPI inflation has moved up sharply during 1997. The 12-month change was down around 0 per cent for a couple of months last spring but after that it moved up fairly quickly to 1.9 per cent for September. In September alone the CPI rose 0.9 per cent, which was more than most observers had expected. The figure also aroused some uncertainty among savers and investors. The question is whether the increase in inflation represents a new and unforeseen tendency. The main features of this development are not unexpected.

Besides entailing rising inflation, this causes firms and households to start accustoming themselves to a high level of inflation. Monetary policy may then be forced to adopt a contractive stance in order to bring inflation back to the target rate. So if the central bank waits too long, the interest rate increases may be all the larger. In the meantime, moreover, economic imbalances and tensions may become so great that they lead to economic setbacks. We are familiar with such a course of events from the 1970s and 1980s, and perhaps not least from the early 1990s. Against this background, in situations when capacity is coming under pressure, it is clearly better for a central bank to act at an early stage. Future inflation The assessment in the inflation report, published just over a month ago, is that growth in the Swedish economy will be about 2 per cent in 1997 and around 3 per cent in 1998. In 1999, the rate is expected to go on accelerating to just over 3 per cent. This assessment envisages that, in an expanding world market, export growth remains relatively high. This is accompanied by an accelerating increase in private consumption, while public consumption at least stops falling. Economic growth in Sweden in 1998 and 1999 would then most probably exceed the potential rate, which is estimated to be just over 2 per cent in annual terms. The broad rise in all the major demand components will therefore gradually exert pressure on the available resources.
Moreover, these measures will  4  BIS Review 124/2009  continue to have significant effects in Spain in the coming quarters, given the prevalence of floating rates, which will continue alleviating the burden of debt for households and firms. Fiscal policy has also contributed to cushioning the decline in activity by means of a most substantial budgetary drive, one greater than that in other developed countries. The effect of the numerous activity-supporting measures adopted in the past two years, along with the impact on public finances of the far-reaching cyclical downturn and with the loss of the extraordinary tax revenue from the real estate boom during the expansionary phase, have prompted a most rapid and sharp increase in the budget deficit. On the latest official figures announced by the government, the budget deficit could climb to around 10% of GDP at the end of this year, an unprecedented level in our recent history. And the outlook for the deficit, in the absence of ambitious measures, is a complex one. True, some of the budgetary measures adopted were designed to be temporary, meaning that once the period they are in force expires, the budgetary situation ought to improve. Yet the cyclical change will take time to exert positive effects on public finances, as the path of recovery of activity in 2010 will still be weak.

Unfortunately, these productivity figures are not the outcome of genuine improvements in the efficiency of productive processes, meaning they will hardly be sustainable in the medium term. The fact that labour costs are still growing at a high rate in this situation (on National Accounts figures wages increased by 4.6% in the second quarter of 2009) while employment  BIS Review 124/2009  3  was declining at a rate of over 7% and inflation was negative, reveals once more the persistence of serious inefficiencies in the behaviour of our labour market. The outlook for the Spanish economy remains highly uncertain, albeit less so in recent months in light of the likely recovery in the world economy in 2010. The Spanish economy will probably continue posting declines in output in the second half of this year, in contrast to the modest pick-up in activity expected in the euro area. Bearing on this different behaviour will be the marked weakness of investment, not only in the case of housing, given the supply overhang, but also probably in that of corporate investment, since low capacity utilisation allows increases in demand to be addressed without having to undertake new investment projects. Nor will it seem feasible to increase public investment in 2010, following the intense effort made in 2009, linked largely to the above-mentioned Local Investment Fund for Employment. How private consumption will fare is much more difficult to predict.