samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So far we have only succeeded in the first phase. There are still two more phases in the fight against inflation: In the second phase, inflation needs to fall to below 10% in the second half of this year, in line with our forecast. And then, in the third phase, inflation needs to continue to fall to levels close to 2% next year, which will be the best news for the economy. More than before, the new Bank Board is monitoring and discussing money flows in the economy, and above all loans to households, firms and the government. We must look at money. We conduct monetary policy. The term is derived from the word "money", which we label as M1 and define as the quantity of money in the economy. We have added elements of monetarism to New Keynesian economics, the predominant school of thought at the CNB so far. For illustration, broad money (M3) has risen by 31% since January 2020 (pre-Covid). The price level has increased by 33% in the same period. In order to significantly slow inflation, money growth must also be slowed substantially. Our DSGE model created according to the New Keynesian theory ends with the threemonth PRIBOR interest rate (Michl, 2019b). On top of that, in our considerations, the Bank Board must discuss the evolution of longer client interest rates and take into account how the interest rate transmission mechanism works and how changes in shortterm rates will affect long-term rates.

For example, it means that you, the banks, should now raise interest rates on all household deposits, even short-term ones, and share a somewhat larger proportion of your profits with your clients (Michl, 2019a). Let's base our economy on savings, not on debt. A month ago I made a speech at the University of Economics and Business in Prague (Michl, 2023). I would like to follow up on the speech here, recap its main ideas and expand on them in the context of new data on the economy. I started the speech at the University of Economics and Business by saying that I had good news for the public: inflation is finally falling. This is being confirmed. Annual headline inflation peaked in September last year, when it reached 18%. We managed to stop it. In line with our expectations, a gradual downward trend in inflation started in February this year. Inflation fell to 16.7% in February and then to 15%. In April, it stood at 12.7%. The inflation figure for May (11.1%) was published on Monday this week. It should fall to below 10% in annual terms within two months. This is not a victory. In the second half of the year, inflation will still be at a level we must not put up with. We must not get used to it. We must not adapt to it. Interest rates will therefore remain high  1/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  for longer.
Moreover, we may also allow holding of up to 40 percent of Turkish lira reserve requirements in foreign currency. Meanwhile, technical studies are underway for enabling a facility that allows holding of 10 percent of Turkish reserve requirements in gold. We believe that these three decisions will have positive impacts on our banks, especially through the cost channel. Consequently, the Turkish lira liquidity to be supplied to the market will significantly and permanently diminish the funding needs of our banks; thus, favorably affecting the banking sector via the liquidity channel as well. Now, I would like to talk about our reserve policy. Following the enabling of the facility that allows holding precious metal deposit accounts and a part of FX reserve requirements in the form of “standard gold”, starting from October 28, 2011, we expect to see a rise in Central Bank gold reserves from for the first time since 1991. Central Bank’s gold reserves may continue to increase once it holding of Turkish lira reserve requirements in the form of gold is  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  also allowed. The Central Bank purchased USD 26 billion-worth of foreign currency between August 2009 and July 2011. These purchases were primarily aimed at prudently supplying FX liquidity to our financial system, when needed, in order to support both price stability and financial stability.

SNB Bills allow us to be more flexible in steering liquidity. Consequently, we are now in a position to offer more long-term transactions, which help calm the money markets and facilitate the steering of the threemonth Libor. The financial market crisis has also shown us that the liquidity-shortage financing facility can only contribute to calming the situation in the money markets if it is actually used when needed. However, even during the crisis, it was rarely called upon. The reason for this being that the direct costs of drawing on it were relatively high, as were the indirect costs ensuing from the stigma associated with using the facility. The SNB has thus decided to lower the direct and indirect costs of using the facility. To start with, we will reduce the special-rate interest premium from 200 basis points to 50 basis points. This will become effective from 1 January 2009. The SNB will also make some changes to its reporting methods. In order to protect the borrower’s reputation, claims from the liquidity-shortage financing facility will, in future, no longer be reported separately. These two measures should encourage banks to utilise the facility’s limits more frequently and therefore increase their liquidity provisioning. We have also found that, in periods of turbulence, some of the data reported in our weekly publication Important monetary policy data are misinterpreted, which can have a destabilising effect. To remedy this, we have decided to discontinue the real-time announcement of individual transactions and facilities.
This year also marks a significant transition for Thailand to return to democracy as the general election was just held over the weekend. Ladies and gentlemen, Undoubtedly, one of the most pressing questions many audiences here today are wondering will certainly be on the implications of the outcome of the election and how that will impact the Thai economy. Unfortunately, it is too early for us to make a call as we still await  1/9  ratification of the election result, formation of the new government, appointments of key members of the cabinet, and announcement of the economic policy. So instead, today I want to focus my talk on long-term perspective of the Thai economy and highlight key qualities of our economic resilience that have allowed the Thai economy to endure a number of domestic and external shocks—many of which in the past, I believe, were much more challenging compared to the impending political change post-election. But before speaking about long-term perspective, allow me to talk briefly on our short-term outlook as our Monetary Policy Committee has just recently revised our economic projections. Looking back the past few years, the recovery of the Thai economy had been largely driven by improvements on the external front from the recovery of global demand. Growth drivers were unbalanced; exports of goods and services acted as the main drivers of growth while domestic sectors were well-below historical average. Last year marked a turning point as growth became more balanced.

Mr Tarullo added that “I would not apply the presumption in the case of certain de minimis acquisitions or in cases where asset dispositions were judged to offset any increase in systemic risk from the proposed new acquisiton”. 6  Earlier this year, the Board of Governors issued an order approving Capital One Financial Corporation’s acquisition of a federal savings bank, ING Bank. In that order, the Board set forth two principles that are relevant to this particular issue. First, the Board stated that it would generally find a significant adverse effect if the failure of the firm resulting from a merger or acquisition “would likely impair financial intermediation or financial market functioning so as to inflict material damage on the broader economy”. Second, the Board observed that there are some small acquisitions or mergers that would not raise a financial stability concern, such as “a proposal that involves an acquisition of less than $ billion in assets, [or] results in a firm with less than $ billion in total assets……”  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  banks submitted their “living wills” to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC this summer. We have reviewed the first iterations of their plans and are currently drafting feedback for the firms to incorporate in their next submissions. Through such “living wills”, regulators are gaining a better understanding of the impediments to an orderly bankruptcy. This is the necessary first phase in the process of determining how to ameliorate these impediments over time and then doing so.
One piece of evidence on how expectations are formed is provided by a recent special questionnaire in the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), in which participants were asked about the factors that inform their longer-term expectations, meaning four or five years ahead.13 The responses indicated that trends in inflation emerged as a substantial driving factor, and it is fair to assume that such trends build to a very large extent on historical and thereby backward-looking data on actual inflation. However, the ECB’s inflation objective has remained the most important factor informing the longer-term expectations of SPF participants. Given that trends in actual inflation have clearly weakened in recent years, the role of the inflation objective as an anchor of expectations has been brought more strongly to the fore. One sign of this is the looser association in recent times of longer-term inflation expectations with the average of actual inflation calculated cumulatively over the history of monetary union (Chart 10). While this average ‒ and the same holds for averages taken over shorter time spans ‒ has come down over the period of low inflation, longer-term expectations have declined to a much lesser extent. This suggests that participants have not been overly extrapolative in forming their expectations about inflation. 15 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  Maintaining the medium-term inflation goal as the guideline for households, firms and market participants in forming expectations also requires a consistent communication strategy, especially when the near-term track record of inflation outcomes has deviated from the objective.

Via this re-evaluation, negative rates loosen the perceived lower bound on the future distribution of short-term interest rates.4 Through this mechanism, negative interest rates have a marked impact on transmission, particularly in the euro area, as they push down the short and medium segment of the risk-free curve, which for the most part is the segment of the curve that determines the pricing of loans to non-financial corporations. It follows that control of this segment of the curve directly influences the level of lending rates. To illustrate the effectiveness of negative policy rates, ECB staff undertook a counterfactual exercise. They constructed the forward curve that would prevail in a scenario without either the negative interest rate policy or the forward guidance on the future path of the policy rates. As shown in Chart 2, the forward curve derived from the overnight index swap curve would be pinned at a higher level and would be distinctly steeper (the dashed blue line on the right) than the forward curve that we observe today (the red curve). 3 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  While this mainly serves as an illustration, as it is based on a number of assumptions and input parameters, it is indicative of the sort of tighter interest rate constellations that the euro area economy would face in the absence of this important policy tool. Our negative policy rate thus contributes substantially to providing monetary accommodation.
Just last November I visited OnForce Solar, an installer of solar heating systems located in the Port Morris section of the South Bronx. There has also been a great deal of retail development over the past decade – most notably, perhaps, the Bronx Terminal Market just south of Yankee Stadium. A little known fact is that, on average, jobs pay more in the Bronx than in any other of the five boroughs, except for Manhattan. And my regional economists assure me that it’s not just the Yankees that bring up the average, although they do make a difference. This, of course, is not to say that all is well in the Bronx. Its poverty rate and unemployment rate are both roughly twice the national average, and higher than in any of the other boroughs. While crime has fallen dramatically over the past two decades, it also remains higher than in the rest of the city. Debt is also burdensome for many Bronx residents. Delinquency rates on household debt are relatively high, suggesting that many people are financially “distressed.” All this makes it especially important to maintain the economic momentum that is improving the quality of life in the Bronx. Community banks have an important role to play in this process. Bank lending can help businesses – especially new and small businesses – expand and grow jobs, and help residents invest in improving their homes, neighborhoods and communities.

William C Dudley: Fostering economic growth in the Bronx Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 17th Annual Bronx Bankers Breakfast, Bronx, New York City, 8 May 2015. *  *  *  I am very pleased to have the opportunity to join you today at the 17th Annual Bronx Bankers Breakfast. I would like to thank Bronx Borough President Ruben Diaz, Jr., the Business Initiative Corporation of New York and the Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation for the opportunity to speak about the economic outlook for the Bronx. This is my second visit to the Bronx in the past five months. When I was here last December, I had the opportunity to hear from various community and business leaders about what they were seeing and the issues they were facing. Such visits are an important part of the New York Fed’s outreach efforts to keep apprised of key developments in the Second District, and to identify areas where we should be directing our attention. In my remarks today, I will focus on the outlook for the Bronx, the important role that community banks play in the local economy, as well as specific challenges facing local small businesses. It is important to recognize that small businesses play a vital role in any economy, so fostering economic and financial conditions that allow these businesses to flourish is important to the health of the local economy.
The challenges I have mentioned include shortfalls in capacity on the telecommunications network, accessibility and user problems for some vulnerable groups and possible fragmentation of some segments of the market. But there are other challenges, too. Common to these is that the Riksbank does not have any formal tools to manage the problems. Often the primary responsibility for these areas lies with another authority and often there are many different parties involved who need to cooperate to resolve the problems. For instance, the county administrative boards and the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority have the task of ensuring  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  that everyone has access to basic payment services. Finansinspektionen (the Swedish financial supervisory authority) has responsibility for financial supervision. The Swedish Competition Authority is responsible for ensuring there is suitable competition on the payments market, and so on. The banks, other providers of payment services and the retail trade are on different sides of the market, but their participation is often a decisive factor for bringing about a change. The Riksbank is inviting to a new retail payments council I believe that the Riksbank is well-positioned to take part in managing the challenges arising from a changing payments market. But as I mentioned earlier, successful management depends on the various market participants talking to one another and working together. At present, there is no suitable forum for these discussions.

Thirdly, much of the practical changeover work will occur in the retail trade and shops, partly because this is where we use cash and partly because the banks have cut down on their cash handling. However, conditions vary considerably in the retail trade with regard to, for instance, technical equipment and security. It is necessary to ensure the entire changeover functions in a way that is felt by the general public to be simple and secure. How should we deal with the challenges? To summarise, one can say that there are two groups of challenges on the Swedish payments market. One concerns the slightly longer-term challenges following on from developments on the payments market, and the other concerns more near-term challenges regarding the banknote and coin changeover. Let me begin with cash and the near-term challenges. The cash changeover 2015–2017 The Riksbank has over a long time, and since its planning began in 2008, had a dialogue with the various participants in the market regarding the banknote and coin changeover. This means that the banks, cash-in-transit companies and retail trade have been able to influence every part of the work, especially the timetable. This has been very important to the Riksbank, as we no longer play any role in the practical handling of cash. The timetable for the changeover has been divided into two stages and extends over a relatively long period, which means that all of those involved have had plenty of time to prepare.
Arrangements will be put in place to ensure that the platform will gather useful and relevant intelligence, including those communicated in the Chinese language. The platform would also ensure that users would feel comfortable with providing intelligence on cyber attacks without compromising proprietary information. Needless to say, access to the platform will be through secure channels with robust encryption and on a need-to-know basis. Way forward 10. Ladies and Gentlemen, having announced the launch of the CFI, the HKMA will move full steam ahead in collaboration with our partners and the stakeholders to roll out the programmes I just mentioned with the following timeline:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  11. 4  (a)  the HKMA will issue a formal circular to all banks next week, stating clearly that it is a supervisory requirement for banks to implement the CFI;  (b)  we will at the same time conduct a three-month consultation with the banking industry on our detailed proposals on the risk-based Cyber Resilience Assessment Framework;  (c)  we will work with the HKIB and ASTRI to roll out the first training courses for cybersecurity practitioners by the end of this year; and  (d)  we will work with the HKAB and ASTRI to set up the Cyber Intelligence Sharing Platform by the end of this year. I understand that the timeline for rolling out the CFI programmes is very tight.

Recognising the uncertainties it faces, the MPC must manage the balance of risks to the inflation outlook, taking account of the likely costs and duration of deviations from the inflation target. This so-called ‘risk management’ approach to monetary policy has been at the heart of how central banks have managed policy of late, particularly in the face of deflationary concerns stemming from any lower bound on policy interest rates. [5] And it continues to influence thinking now, given concerns that so-called second round effects in price, wage and cost setting behaviour could create a self-sustaining momentum in inflation that persists even after the initial inflationary impulse from higher energy prices recedes. How does all this fit into recent MPC policy decisions? Changes in the MPC’s communication following its February meeting reflect an evolution in the Committee’s assessment of the inflation outlook. While headline inflation is set to ease this year as the large increases in energy bills seen during 2022 begin to drop out of the annual calculation, the evolution of corporate pricing setting, wage developments and services prices is consistent with greater-than-desirable strength in the underlying, more persistent component of inflation. Recognising that its earlier actions are now gaining traction, the MPC needs to ensure that it does  Page 4  enough to return inflation to target, while guarding against the possibility that it does either too much or – for that matter – too little. Finding that balance is the central challenge for monetary policy at present.
This is primarily a matter of using tools aimed at financial companies, as it is within these companies that problems that may ultimately lead to a financial crisis can arise. But there may also be reason to use tools aimed at households and non-financial companies. Such tools can form important complements, for example by dampening demand for credit. Naturally, there are already policy areas that directly or indirectly influence financial stability. As regards the housing market, which is a sector that is creating a great deal of unease in Sweden due to high indebtedness and high prices, this is influenced by factors such as regulations for tax deductions for interest payments, changes to property tax, rent control and other regulations that affect incentives for housing construction. But decisions on measures in these areas are primarily taken on the basis of other goals than safeguarding the stability of the financial system. In micro supervision, which is the kind of supervision carried out by Finansinspektionen in Sweden, a series of different tools is also used to influence financial stability. However, at present, Finansinspektionen’s remit is focused on dampening risks among individual institutions, not in the system as a whole. What we need, quite simply, are specific tools for macroprudential supervision that can be used with the direct aim of promoting stability in the system. This will make it possible to counteract the systemic risks created by policies in other areas so that the system as a whole remains stable. The housing market is a good example of this.

2 Exactly how these frameworks will look is still somewhat unclear, but a few general principles have crystallised as regards both appropriate institutional structures and which instruments it may be appropriate to use. 3 Finansinspektionen already has instruments at its disposal that are focused on the health and behaviour of individual participants and companies. But one important lesson of the crisis is that this is not enough. Our toolkit needs to be complemented with tools that can focus on the system as a whole. Today, I will discuss what such a Swedish toolbox for macroprudential supervision could include. 1  The speech “Macroprudential policy and clear communication contribute to financial stability” was held at the Swedish Bankers’ Association on 30 March 2012. See www.riksbank.se. 2  For more detailed analyses of macroprudential policy and its ability to counteract systemic risk, see, for example, Borio (2010), Galati and Moessner (2011) and Viñals (2010 and 2011). 3  See, for example Lim, C., et al., (2011),”Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences”, IMF Working Paper, 11/238. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Different types of risk… Before I go into the different types of tools that could be used to manage systemic risks, I will explain what is meant by systemic risk. The Riksbank usually defines systemic risk as the risk that a shock will occur in the financial system, leading to substantial costs for society. 4 Such risks can arise for various reasons.