samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Governing Council decided to leave the current value unchanged at an annual growth rate of 4½% for the broad aggregate M3, as the evidence continues to support the assumptions which have formed the basis of the derivation of the reference value since 1999, namely a trend potential output growth of 2-2½% per annum and a trend decline in M3 income velocity of ½-1% per annum in the euro area. When comparing current developments with the reference value, it is important to bear in mind that the assessment of monetary developments is essential for long-term trends in inflation and that the reference value is therefore to be seen as a medium-term concept. Short-term movements of M3 do not necessarily have implications for future price developments. Moreover, deviations of M3 from the reference value must be analysed in conjunction with other real and financial indicators in order to understand their implications for price stability. Turning to our current assessment on the outlook for price stability in the euro area, and starting with the first pillar, M3 growth remained high in the last quarter of 2002. The continued strength in monetary growth reflects an ongoing pronounced preference for liquidity in an environment of high financial, economic and geopolitical uncertainty. In addition, the low level of interest rates in the euro area makes the holding of liquid assets relatively attractive.

For example, the Governing Council has recommended that owner-occupied housing will in due course be included in the Harmonised Index for Consumer Prices. The ECB also understands the importance of factoring in the impact of climate change. There is 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  now an action plan on how the ECB will more systematically reflect climate change considerations in its monetary policy operations. This is not only about the moral imperative. Bear in mind that the physical and transition risks related to climate change affect not only price stability but also financial stability, having an impact on the value as well as the risk profile of assets held on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet. This is why the ECB will enhance its analytical and macroeconomic modelling capacities, while developing appropriate statistical indicators. Another aspect to emerge from the review was the importance of communication. Monetary policy communication has become a tool in its own right – and the communication needs to be understood not only by experts but also by the public if the ECB wants it to be effective. A number of changes will be made to the statements issued following monetary policy decisions, which should achieve this aim. And last but not least, the extensive feedback received from the review process has highlighted the importance of the exercise given the rapid changes in the global economy. The new review should not wait another 18 years.
Table 2  Domestic scenario 2022  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Private consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Nominal GFCF (% of GDP)  2.4 2.3 3.0 2.8 3.1 2.9 1.4 0.9 -9.0 16.4 24.8  2023 (f) 2024 (f) 2025 (f) Mar.23 MP Dec.22 MP Mar.23 MP Dec.22 MP Mar.23 MP Report Report Report Report Report (annual change, percent) -1.75 / -0.75 -0.5/0.5 2.0-3.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 -5.3 -4.0 1.7 1.1 2.1 -4.6 -3.0 1.9 0.7 1.9 -5.0 -2.9 -0.2 -0.7 2.3 -4.5 -3.0 2.5 1.1 1.8 -5.9 -3.8 2.5 0.9 1.9 6.0 4.5 3.2 3.7 2.2 -5.4 -6.5 0.9 2.5 0.5 -4.9 -4.0 -4.1 -4.1 -4.0 20.2 18.7 19.8 18.9 19.2 24.3 23.3 23.8 23.2 23.2  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 19  Figure 13  Real consumer credit flows  (millions of UFs, moving quarterly average)  40  Rolling credit cards Credit card in installments Loans in installments Overdrafts  Households' financial burden (*)  (percent of monthly income, moving annual average)  20 19  30 18 20  17  10  16  0  15 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  19  20  21  22  (*) Median debtor's financial burden. Monthly income includes labor component (salaried formal) and pension fund withdrawals prorated over six months as from receipt of payment.

The fact that these considerations are now included in the Act and not just mentioned in the preparatory work emphasises the importance the Government and Riksdag attach to them. This makes it even more important for the Riksbank to show that these considerations are included in the monetary policy deliberations and how they are  2/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  included. We may thus need to be even clearer about it in our decisions and in the documentation for the decisions. But this will not entail any revolutionary changes in monetary policy, nor was the legislator expecting there to be, judging by the preparatory work for the new act. The Riksbank has already previously conducted what is known as flexible inflation targeting, which includes taking into account the real economy. In principle, it is now being legislated that the Riksbank shall conduct monetary policy in this way. More focus on motives for decisions and on evaluation In the new Act, the Riksdag has wanted to clarify the boundaries of the objectives and powers within the Riksbank's various areas of responsibility in relation to one another. Among other things, this means that we will need to be clearer in stating the purpose of various measures, that is, which of the Riksbank's objectives we are trying to achieve and which tasks we want to resolve with various measures.
Another example of such an ‘easy’ decision is the proposals to forcedly reduce the exchange rate. I should note that the implications of ‘easy’ decisions will run counter to the promises made. Russia had such an experience in the 1990s suffering a deep economic recession accompanied by high inflation. That is why we should treat such recipes very cautiously. And what is more important – they do not allow to respond adequately to internal and external challenges facing the Russian economy. As far as global challenges affecting Russia are concerned, we should first of all highlight a long-term reduction in hydrocarbon prices and the slowing economic growth in China. These challenges nourish each other with regard to having an adverse impact on commodity prices. As a result of the ‘shale revolution’ OPEC has lost its opportunity to influence oil prices. The latter started to be determined by the profitability threshold of the majority of shale projects. Moreover, energy-saving technologies and an active use of alternative energy sources will also affect oil prices in the long run. One cannot brush aside this prospect the way it was with the ‘shale revolution’. A quick return to high oil prices is not expected, so the Russian economy must learn to live amid low prices for oil and gas. Overall, we should abandon the habit of connecting optimistic target forecasts with growing oil prices, rather than own efforts to restructure the economy.

Second, even if we could implement these measures, they would not result in sustainable growth, because it is potential growth rates that are currently low – about 1.5–2%, according to our estimates – following structural restrictions. Third, many structural reforms directly impact the way we will move to our inflation target. For example, with better competition or tighter regulation of natural monopolies’ tariffs, we may avoid triggering inflationary pressure while cutting rates more dramatically. Monetary and fiscal policy may ensure macroeconomic stability, but it is insufficient for sustainable economic growth. The most important structural reform is improvement of business climate, primarily measures to promote competition, deregulate the economy, reduce the share of state-owned and state-controlled companies, and protect property rights and minority shareholders. The quality of business climate is the reason for insufficiently developed equity financing and capital market in our country. Let me remind you that by debt burden Russia is in the upper range in the list of peer countries, but lags considerably behind them in terms of capitalisation. If corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders’ interests are challenged, shares of such companies will be hardly sold. The fact that our companies earn profits but abstain from investing them in their own business comes from macroeconomic uncertainty, including tax regime, while investments in other businesses, including through financial mediators, are constrained by high risks arising not only from the vague prospects of these business projects, but also poor protection of such interests.
has organized a 5-day workshop to understand the needs of the OKU and identify actions that can be taken to help improve accessibility to financial services. Arising from the workshop, Allianz has formed a special working group to look at the services and facilities for the disabled and will launch three products specifically for the OKU soon. I am confident that more programmes have been initiated by other financial institutions which I do not have the opportunity to mention all of them here. I would like to urge all financial institutions to take greater effort towards these initiatives. Issues and challenges faced by OKUs that need to be addressed Later in this program, as we learn more on the issues and challenges faced by the OKUs in their daily life, especially with regards to their difficulty on accessing the financial product and services, we will appreciate better the challenges that this group has to go through. Let us pause for a while and take this opportunity to reflect on what each of our institution has done to assist and include the OKU into the financial system. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  One issue resolved to ensure greater accessibility to ATM cards/debit/internet banking Based on the feedback that we gathered from our engagements with the OKUs, the most recent in April 2015, there are still a lot of challenges faced by the OKUs in accessing the products and services of the financial industry.

They contain Braille markings as well as tactile symbols to denote each denomination. In 2000, Bank Negara Malaysia presented 13,000 units of Ringgit cash test cards to the visually impaired which measured third series banknotes of all denominations. This year, the Bank will distribute 20,000 units of Ringgit cash test cards to the visually impaired. The Bank has made several improvements to the new cash test card design including to measure the fourth series banknotes and a coin channel to measure third series coins after obtaining feedback from the National Council for the Blind, the Malaysian Association for the Blind and Kementerian Pembangunan Wanita, Keluarga dan Masyarakat. In conjunction with this program, I would like to take this opportunity to launch the new cash test card. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Concluding remarks  3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Let me conclude by reiterating that this Conference is a milestone event and sets the pace for a new era in Cyprus. An era whereby all efforts for the promotion of financial literacy and education in Cyprus are coordinated under the National Strategy umbrella, so as to enhance the well-being and prosperity of Cypriot citizens and to support the financial resilience and sustainable economic growth in the country. As Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus my promise is to assist the new permanent Committee's role in implementing the National Strategy, as we also ensured that the CBC prioritises and leads this initiative since the very first establishment of the committee in December 2020. In this Conference, we brought together a top-notch group of experts from both Cyprus and abroad, that can exchange expert views and share with us their knowledge on best practices from other countries' experiences. I would like to mention by [surname] alphabetical order, Professor Panayiotis Andreou from the Cyprus University of Technology, Dr Sophia Anyfantaki from the Bank of Greece, Professor Adele Atkinson from the University of Birmingham, Dr Maria Demertzis from Bruegel, Professor Michael Haliassos from Goethe University Frankfurt, Professor Alexander Michaelides from Imperial College London, Professor Andreas Milidonis from the University of Cyprus, Dr Elena Miteva from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Professor Dennis Philip from Durham University and Dr Ernesto Villanueva from the Bank of Spain. We are very appreciative and grateful for their participation.

Put simply, the mechanism according to which losses go into the profit and loss account applies to both the ECB and the national central banks. If a net loss remains even after taking into account all provisions and reserves, it could be recorded on the balance sheet as losses carried forward and be offset by any net income in the following years. It is important that it is understood from the principle of financial independence that a central bank needs to be adequately capitalised in the long term. But in no way does it follow from this that all losses carried forward would have to be offset immediately and in full by the capital holders or Member States. Conclusion To conclude, I would like to summarise my arguments. The announcement of OMTs was and is the necessary and appropriate step to eliminate the disruption in the transmission of monetary policy caused by concerns that there would be an unwanted break-up of the euro. The risks of not acting would have been greater. The ECB and its decision-makers are aware of the limits of its monetary policy mandate. Our measures are aimed at maintaining monetary policy transmission and preventing an unwanted break-up of the euro. It is not allowed to, is not able to and does not want to replace the actions of democratically elected governments. Quite the opposite. The OMT programme is therefore aimed at protecting the market mechanism so as to urge the Member States to make the necessary reforms.
The digital euro will offer European citizens an additional option as to how they effect purchases  Page 5 of 6 and transactions; they will determine both the pace of its development and its 'market share'. A digital euro will replace neither physical cash nor other forms of currency – which brings me on to the so-called "competition" issue. We regularly hear an unfounded but very persistent rumour whereby the digital euro would compete with commercial bank money. Let me be very categorical on this point: a digital euro will not lead to disintermediation. It would be distributed by payment service providers - we have absolutely no intention of opening private accounts - and be subject to a holding limit. Our fellow citizens are in need of everyone’s expertise: both the agility and customer relationships of commercial banks and the confidence and stability guaranteed by central banks. Indeed, commercial bank digital currency already exists. It will remain dominant in payments and is generally perceived as being as safe as central bank currency, however, this confidence is rooted in its full and direct convertibility with the public money issued by the central bank. Losing this public anchor - in a world of digital payments without CBDC - would ultimately mean jeopardising this private trust. * The decision here will rest with the public authorities, with a “sovereign” dimension, but today, I would really like to get beyond a mere discussion about the digital "retail" euro.

The establishment of the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance thus comes from the recognition of this need to invest in human capital to advance the industry forward to greater heights. Bank Negara Malaysia has allocated an endowment fund of RM500 million for this purpose. The income from the endowment fund will be utilised to finance the operations of INCEIF. The objective of INCEIF is to produce high-calibre practitioners and professionals in Islamic finance as well as specialists and researchers in the disciplines of Islamic finance. INCEIF will leverage on the wealth of experience of the Islamic finance industry, both in Malaysia and abroad, to provide its graduates with value added insights and perspectives, in particular for their research programmes. Malaysia's experience in Islamic finance for over more than two decades will also provide a training environment, including for internships for developing Islamic finance professionals. The required skill set in Islamic finance is unique. It needs to have the right blend of knowledge of finance with the understanding of the Shariah as being central. The Shariah principles must be embedded in every operational aspect of the Islamic financial institution, including in the design of financial products and financing structures, financial contracts and their execution, liquidity and balance sheet management, risk management as well as asset and wealth management. The upholding of the Shariah principles must permeate from the highest level, including at the broad and senior management levels.
Over the past six months, there have been increasing indications of labour shortages in the Norwegian economy. A rise in sickness absence and an increasing number of persons on disability benefits are pushing down production capacity this year. In view of the tightening taking place in the Swedish labour market, there may be reason to expect a reduction in the supply of labour from Sweden. Inward labour migration to Norway has taken place in a period with high unemployment in large parts of Europe. We have assumed that slower growth in the Norwegian economy and increased demand for labour in other parts of the Nordic region and in the new EU member states will gradually stabilise the number of foreign workers on short-term assignments in Norway. In spite of solid corporate profitability and an unemployment level that has earlier triggered markedly higher wage growth, real wage growth from 2005 to 2006 will probably be moderate. Nevertheless, unemployment fell rapidly through the summer. The main agreements in the centralised wage settlements had then been concluded. The social partners may therefore have assumed that the labour market would be less tight than currently implied by employment and unemployment figures. Some groups negotiate wages locally in the autumn. Wage growth may be higher than average for these groups. Systematic information about these negotiations is limited, however, before the first months of 2007.

Joseph Yam: Establishment of the Treasury Markets Association Welcoming remarks by Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the inaugural ceremony of the Treasury Market Association, Hong Kong, 23 January 2006. *  *  *  Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. First of all, let me, as President of the Council of the Treasury Markets Association, welcome you all to this inauguration ceremony to celebrate the establishment of the Treasury Markets Association. The establishment of the TMA has the strong support of market participants. I am glad to learn that the Association has already successfully registered about 2,000 market practitioners and over 50 institutions as members. This strong membership provides a solid base for the Association to take forward its strategy and plans. 2. To maintain the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre, a requirement specified in Article 109 of the Basic Law, I believe that it is important for us to have, among other things, treasury markets that are active, professional and efficient, and that operate in accordance with international standards. The volume of financial business in Hong Kong is enormous.
And macro-prudential policy cannot solve all problems. It may fall to other authorities and policy instruments to respond to any adverse structural effect from changing business models on the provision of financial services to some sectors of the economy, for example credit to SMEs. While it can create space for demand management by monetary policy authorities and prevent the financial system from amplifying macro-economic shocks in a low for long world, it is not in itself a demand management tool. Whether and how monetary, and perhaps fiscal, frameworks should adapt to a world of structurally low interest rates is a related but separate issue which is receiving considerable attention from academic research and, more recently, policy makers in some jurisdictions.29 29  See, for example Clarida (2019) and Wilkins (2018). 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  15  Discussion is at a relatively early stage and these are, in my view, issues that would need a great deal of careful deliberation. It is not my purpose today to enter that debate. I would only make two observations from a financial stability perspective. The first is that while I am a firm believer in the ‘separation of powers’, to quote my colleague Ben Broadbent30, between in the conduct of monetary and macro-prudential policy, the financial stability dimension needs to play a part in any discussion of demand management. My intuition is that, from a financial stability perspective, not all demand management frameworks are equal.

Not because I have dramatically revised my assessment of inflation prospects but rather because resource utilisation is still rising and a shift can be discerned in the risk spectrum. We will have to bear these things in mind so that the development of production and employment can remain stable. 3  BIS Review 109/2000