samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They have to judge to what extent their local currency strength is a result of solid fundamentals and to what extent it is just another “no-brainer” trade that may last for quite a while but may also end suddenly. Research conducted at the National Bank of Poland and by other institutions indicates that financial markets have become much more integrated in recent years, global factors drive the performance of emerging market currencies much more than just a few years back, that home bias is being reduced and even a well-known Feldstein-Horioka puzzle is almost gone 10 , ie the cross-country correlation between saving and investment rates has declined markedly. Favorable global liquidity conditions, attractive rates of returns and good economic prospects draw global investors to Polish financial markets. Additionally, Poland’s accession to the EU and the future  6  See Dooley M., Folkerts-Landau D., Garber P. „An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System“, NBER Working Paper 9971, September 2003; and a series of other papers published by these authors in 2004 and 2005. 7  http://www.um.warszawa.pl/v_syrenka/miasto/mosty-9.htm  8  International Monetary Fund “Global Financial Stability Report”, March 2006. 9  Bank for International Settlements “BIS Quarterly Review. International banking and financial market developments”, March 2006. 10  Feldstein M. “Monetary Policy in a Changing International Environment: The Role of Capital Flows”, NBER Working Paper 11856, December 2005.

Mojmír Hampl: Life outside the Eurozone Speech by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the 5th A/symmetrie (Italian Association for the Study of Economic Asymmetries) conference "Euro, market, democracy", Montesilvano, Italy, 13 November 2016. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, Good morning. Many thanks to Alberto Bagnai for kindly inviting me to speak at this event today. And many thanks to you all, to this audience. It is my first time here and I must say I am really impressed that so many people are willing to invest their effort, money and whole weekend (literally two days) in actively listening to debates on many – sometimes rather abstract – macroeconomic topics. That is truly amazing and at the same time encouraging. Believe me, many people I know are unable to concentrate on presentations even during their working hours in the office, even though they are actually being paid to do so by their employer. So my applause goes to you and to Alberto for mobilising you. Great job. Ladies and gentlemen, The downside of my presentation today is that I am a part of the monetary establishment – of the disliked club of central bankers. That means a thumb down for me in your eyes. The upside – and what saves me today – is that I’m a policy-maker not in your monetary zone, in the Eurozone, but in the Czech monetary zone, where we pay with our own currency, the Czech crown.
Such reports do not in any way implicate the customers of any unlawful activity or that investigation will commence as soon as the STRs or CTRs are lodged. Let me reiterate that the submission of these reports is to facilitate the gathering of financial intelligence for analysis purposes. Then, it is equally important to establish a range of red flags to enable detection of suspicious transactions. One important area is to be alert on high risk jurisdictions. Bank Negara Malaysia has, from time to time, provided information on this area such as circulars on countries that are deficient in their AML/CFT regime as identified by the FATF. In addition, please do keep yourself updated on sanctions from the United Nations as well as reports from multilateral organisations, such as the UNODC, which report on AML/CFT matters for a number of countries. Information from various sources would support the STRs and CTRs mechanism. The effective implementation of internal AML/CFT programme relies strongly on the capacity and capability of the resources supporting the programme. This is translated into the third  4  BIS Review 99/2010  key aspect of the AML/CFT programme, that is the provision of adequate and applicable resources to the compliance section of your institution. It is the responsibility of your Board and management to ensure that the compliance section is given due consideration and importance in terms of resources. It is within this context that I see the financial institutions corporate social responsibility (CSR) should be undertaken.

In other  BIS Review 50/2004  1  words, what starts off as a crisis in an individual institution could easily develop into a balance of payments and currency crisis, which may, in turn, trigger off secondary effects throughout the rest of the financial sector, disrupting other sectors of the economy in the process and thus resulting in a fullblown financial crisis. In the case of the Central Bank of Malta, these considerations assume even greater importance given the Maltese economy’s small size, openness and lack of natural resources, which make it highly dependent on foreign markets. The small size of the domestic market, moreover, also has implications for savings and investment. Thus a limited pool of savings is in turn reflected in a low volume of internally generated resources for investment purposes, making the country highly dependent on external financing. This dependence is evidenced by the private savings ratio, which is not only low by international standards, at around 22% of GDP, but has also been falling in recent years as public sector imbalances have widened to unsustainable proportions. The Central Bank of Malta’s approach to financial stability Against this economic background, therefore, price and exchange rate stability assume particular importance and the need for a stable financial environment becomes all the more crucial.
This event also serves very well to highlight the second reason, namely the political factor, which explains the temporary nature of the milestone steps mentioned earlier. Unless the so-called political “gridlock” is dealt with effectively in the U.S., passing and approving laws will remain a daunting task that needs to wait until the last minute. And unless the Eurozone leaders collaborate unreservedly, full resolution of the Eurozone crisis seems to be too lofty a goal to materialize. Ladies and Gentlemen, High risks and uncertainty surrounding the crises in the U.S. and the Eurozone contribute to higher risks in the global economy and financial markets, and Thailand will be affected in three primary ways – through international trade, financial market volatility, and inflation. I would like to touch briefly on each of these three channels respectively. The impacts through the first channel, namely international trade, are natural given Thailand’s strong tie with the global economy, with G3 economies accounting for almost one-third of Thailand’s exports. Slowdown in the U.S. and the Eurozone, and their spillovers to the global economy, will dampen global demand for Thai exports. But fortunately, the impacts through trade can be cushioned to some degree, given that Thailand has moved toward more intra-regional trade within Asia and also has succeeded in diversifying to alternative export markets. Although I have mentioned before that Thailand’s economic fate next year will be in the hands of domestic demand recovery, further contribution from exports will be very helpful.

In addition to the international trade channel, what we should be even more concerned about is higher financial market volatility. While market sentiment on the U.S. and the Eurozone will determine the direction of capital movements, we anticipate volatile capital flows into Asia given the region’s continued strong growth prospects compared to advanced economies. Over the period ahead, capital inflows into Thailand also owe to the fact that monetary policy in advanced economies will likely remain exceptionally easy, which means excess global liquidity and capital inflows into emerging markets. The third channel that the U.S. and the Eurozone crises may affect the Thai economy is through inflation. Generally speaking, global demand slowdown will likely lead to lower oil and commodity prices, hence the lower imported price pressures. So in contrast to the first two channels, this is a positive one. Nevertheless, domestically, as the flood situation improves, public and private spending will pick up thanks to reconstruction spending and fiscal stimulus. This, coupled with inflation expectations that will remain high over the months to come, points to significant upside risks to inflation that will need to be monitored. Ladies and Gentlemen, Given enormous challenges both at home and from abroad, moving Thailand forward will require policymakers to utilize a wide range of policy instruments at their disposal. At the very least, it is crucial to ensure a proper, integrated conduct of fiscal and monetary policies.
The December survey from the National Institute of Economic Research showed an unchanged inflow of orders and expectations of subdued production. The order statistics from Statistics Sweden, which fluctuate fairly widely from month to month, gave the impression of relatively weak orders in the fourth quarter of 1996. In December and January, however, the order inflow has picked up and more recent survey data likewise paint a brighter picture of activity in manufacturing. The improvement mainly applies to production for export but even the domestic market is somewhat optimistic about the future. Against this background, exports and industrial production could develop somewhat better than expected earlier. The changes are not very large but to date various indicators, including the continued undervaluation of the krona, do point in the same direction. In the case of private consumption, the indicators to date are not uniform. On the one hand, in the first three months of 1997 the number of new car registrations for private individuals has risen in annual terms by more than 60 per cent, albeit from a low level. Moreover, the survey of household purchasing plans by Statistics Sweden shows that since the autumn, household’s economic expectations have become more optimistic. The development of monetary aggregates such as M0 is also an indication of rising private consumption. On the other hand, the lower than expected savings ratio in 1996 may increase uncertainty regarding possible increases of private consumption in 1997 and 1998.

The HKMA BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  takes the view that an overseas bank that wishes to undertake retail business in Hong Kong should operate in the form of a locally incorporated subsidiary. This is to offer appropriate protection to the retail depositors in Hong Kong and to do that the HKMA needs to have an effective supervisory handle on every aspect of a retail bank’s operation, especially its capital adequacy ratio. We cannot achieve this if the bank operates as a branch in Hong Kong. 17. However, we also recognise that subsidiaries may not necessarily be an efficient model of operation if an overseas bank intends to undertake only corporate or private banking in Hong Kong. For example, a branch can leverage on the capital of the entire bank to finance a loan for a large corporate, which would otherwise be impossible if it operated as a subsidiary with rather limited capital in Hong Kong. Likewise, some private banking clients may prefer to deal with or book their investments with a branch of an overseas private bank rather than a subsidiary of that bank. So the HKMA keeps an open mind on whether an overseas bank operating in Hong Kong should take the form of a subsidiary or a branch. It all depends on the business model of the bank concerned.
There are many IT firms that can provide top-notch computer hardware and data-transmission systems. But what differentiates the top IFCs from the rest is not the hardware but their software. So some have argued that to become an IFC is to compete and win in respect of the “soft power”. In other words, the race to become an IFC is a “battle of soft power”. When I say “soft power” I am referring to a wide range of qualities and strengths, which include the rule of law, protection of property rights, free flow of information, taxation, ease of doing business, talent pool, etc. As for Hong Kong, our success has been due to the fact that we have managed to build and develop our soft power in the last few decades. It is not my intention to go through the entire spectrum of qualities that constitute “soft power” today. What I propose to do now is to focus on how we can ensure that the financial institutions and market players, which form the core part of any financial centre, can continue to stand up to the challenge of achieving and, more importantly, maintaining their competitive edge in a highly competitive world. I would like to argue that, in the remainder of my remarks, the success or otherwise of financial firms is to a large extent determined by their ability to exercise the power of the “3Cs”. Let me elaborate what the “3Cs” stand for. “Competence” The first “C” is “Competence”. This is very easy to understand.

Despite very high demand for Swiss francs, the percentage fell from 21% to 15% between 2008 and 2014; since negative interest was introduced, it has fallen further and now stands at only about 11% (cf. chart 7). Conversely, the share of domestic investors has risen. This group often favours domestic bonds for their long-term investments, or is obliged to hold a given percentage of such bonds for regulatory reasons. Nonetheless, demand from foreign investors remains strong in some segments of the Swiss franc bond market, notably that for money market debt register claims. How do we explain this apparent paradox? One contributory factor is the distortions on the FX swap market mentioned before. While they make borrowing more expensive for foreign issuers, they have the opposite effect for foreign investors and offer special arbitrage opportunities. This allows investors from the US dollar or euro areas to achieve higher returns on a hedged basis. 5 The weekly auctions have been clearly oversubscribed, as can be seen from chart 8. Although the average yield to maturity is very low, bids have been significantly higher than actual allocation (blue), with some 60% of outstanding money market debt register claims currently in the hands of foreign investors. All in all, we can say that, despite strong demand for Swiss francs and low interest rates in Switzerland, the outstanding volume of the Swiss franc bond market has barely changed.
Finally, I must in all fairness add that in addition to the shift in stabilisation policy regime there have also been a number of significant changes in other areas that ought to have contributed to the favourable developments over the past decade. I mentioned productivity growth earlier – the strength of this has surprised most economic analysts and forecasters in Sweden. It can probably be attributed to a combination of several factors. For example, a rapid development in both the production and use of information technology has probably contributed to improved productivity. Other factors may include deregulation of various markets and increased competition – the latter stimulated by EU membership and the increasingly interlaced world economy. The Riksbank’s monetary policy framework and strategy Let me now, with this as background, move on to describe our monetary policy strategy in slightly more detail 2 . The inflation target The statutory objective of the Riksbank is to maintain price stability. We shall also promote a safe and efficient payment system. In connection with the introduction of this wording on the Riksbank’s tasks into the Sveriges Riksbank Act of 1999, the Riksbank was also given greater independence, as I mentioned earlier. Monetary policy is now formally the task of the Riksbank and the six members of the Executive Board are expressly forbidden to, as it says in the act, seek or take instructions when fulfilling their monetary policy duties. The Riksbank has chosen to specify an explicit target for inflation.

The target is for the annual rate of change in the CPI to be 2 per cent, with a tolerance for deviations of plus/minus 1 percentage point. The decision to define the target for monetary policy in terms of a specific figure was of course partly due to the desire to create a nominal anchor that everyone could recognise and base their expectations on. However, another important reason was that a specific target would facilitate assessments of the Riksbank’s activities and make it easier to hold the Riksbank accountable, which was important when it had been granted so much independence. Inflation can be measured in many different ways. The Riksbank chose the CPI as target variable partly because it is a broad price index that represents typical purchases made by consumers and the index is familiar to the general public. But the development of the CPI cannot always indicate what monetary policy is needed at a particular time – no single inflation measure can do this. The Riksbank therefore uses various measures of underlying inflation to describe the trend rate of inflation and to justify the monetary policy conducted. Our most commonly used measure, with the not so pronunciation-friendly name UND1X, consists of the CPI adjusted for certain items that are very directly affected by fiscal and monetary policy. So, there are educational gains with using measures of underlying inflation.
These are the correction of macroeconomic imbalances, which I have often characterized as the need to live within our means; the need to respond to, and exploit the competitive forces unleashed by globalization; and the deleterious economic effects of population ageing and of environmental degradation. These challenges are by no means unique to Malta. Economies all over the world at different stages of development are similarly affected. They can, and must, therefore, be transformed into opportunities, because economies which are more successful than others in overcoming them will enjoy a significant competitive advantage. In Malta’s case the task is particularly difficult because all of these issues need to be tackled at the same time. Indeed, undue postponement of the necessary reforms could have serious consequences. The Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances The Maltese economy has been devoting far too many of its relatively scarce resources to consumption. Household and government consumption have increased steadily over the past decade from 80% to 85% of GDP. The household savings rate has meanwhile declined from almost 16% to around 1.5% of disposable income during the same period. These trends are a source of concern. First, because a reduced savings pool will compromise future economic growth by curtailing investment. Indeed, the share of resources devoted to productive investment has shrunk from almost 30% a decade ago to just over 20% today. Second, because excessive consumption threatens the sustainability of the economy given the high import content of  BIS Review 50/2003  1  domestic expenditures.

Conclusion Throughout a long and, at times, turbulent history, our people have faced repeated threats to their livelihood, but our forefathers always rose to the challenge. In a commendable demonstration of courage, solidarity and vision they were able to put aside narrow political and sectoral interests and unite in the pursuit of the common good. Indeed, if we are here today, in control of our destiny as a free and independent people, it is because they found the inner strength to put country first. In recognition, we justly recall their achievements with pride. The challenge we face today is no less serious than any the country has had to deal with in the past. If this generation of policy makers and policy shapers wishes to earn a similarly favourable judgement of history, they must have the courage of their convictions and lead from the front. It must be understood that we are all in the same boat. Tackling our common problems means that we must fight together against inertia and embrace change in the pursuit of progress. For this alone is the key to job creation and higher living standards. In this context I would like to conclude by making my own the message which the recently retired President of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg, gave to ECOFIN Ministers at a farewell dinner they organised for him last month in Venice. Speaking of the reform objectives contained in the Lisbon strategy, he said: “There has been some progress.
Svein Gjedrem: Wealth management in a public setting Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to panel discussion on “Problems of Plenty? Challenges and Opportunities from the Accumulation of Large Exchange Reserves and Windfall Revenue”, arranged as part of the seminar program of the 2006 Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, Singapore, 18 September 2006. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  1. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the challenges that arise when managing financial wealth in a public sector environment. Norges Bank now has eight to ten years of experience of this task, and I shall try to describe in brief the strategies adopted by Norges Bank, and what we believe we have learned. 2. We have a large amount of money under management. Our foreign reserves are probably larger than needed for financial stability and monetary policy operations. But the most important fund is the Government Pension Fund, formerly the Petroleum Fund. We have been responsible for managing that Fund since its inception in 1996, and it has been a major task for us since 1998. 3. The value of the petroleum resources in the North Sea is currently estimated at about USD 700 billion. The government receives the bulk of the revenues generated from petroleum extraction as sales revenues and taxes. The government channels these revenues into the Pension Fund as financial assets.

Where once trust was anonymised, institutionalised and centralised, today it is increasingly personalised, socialised and distributed. Facing these new constraints, the challenge for central banks is to rebuild trust among a wider set of societal stakeholders, more distrustful and diffuse than ever previously, using a set of trust-building technologies, less well-understood than those used previously. As they have through their history, central banks will need to adapt their customs and practices to these new social norms and technological possibilities. 7  This is a big agenda. It is not one remotely unique to central banks. And it is not one I could remotely do justice to tonight. Nonetheless, given the policy weight these days being placed on central banks’ shoulders, and the changing social and technological landscape facing them, it is probably as good a time as any to begin exploring these new frontiers of central bank engagement. Those new frontiers include communicating in simpler, narrative language that engages a wider audience using localised, personalised messaging; finding new ways to engage with cohorts of society currently out of reach, listening as often as talking; and using new technologies – nudging and polling, naming and gaming – to better understand the views and behaviours of wider society. For central banks, this is a brave new world. The Rising Tide of Central Banking th  Let me start by looking backwards. The 20 century may yet be seen by monetary historians as the one when central banking came of age.