samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Our Prime Minister has stated that the question will be discussed at the Social Democrats’ party congress next March. If the congress were to agree that Sweden ought to join, the next step, to quote the government bill, is for the matter to be “submitted to the people of Sweden for assessment”. This can be done in a referendum or an election. An affirmative response would be followed by a government bill, leading to a parliamentary decision on an application. In the speculation about the timing of a participation, what is known as the fast track has been seen by observers as a feasible scenario. It assumes that all the competent bodies are in favour of participation and that the matter is referred to a referendum, in which case the domestic side of the decision-making process could be completed some time around the turn of 2001. However, such a short run-up to euro participation cannot be taken for granted. The Social Democrat congress may refrain from considering the matter or arrive at a more tentative conclusion, for instance along the lines of the British government’s declaration in favour of participation, but not for the time being. That would alter and prolong the process. A number of forecasters and political observers have in fact revised their assessments recently in favour of a later date for Sweden’s probable participation. If and when Sweden does opt for participation, the matter will be negotiated with the other EU countries.

To this should be added the support from institutional changes in budget work and the legal status of the Riksbank. The natural conclusion is completely different. In the years ahead it will be a matter of cultivating our achievements. This means not losing the grip on fiscal policy, even though in simple book-keeping terms there may be some room for expansion. The target of a 2% surplus over the business cycle will not be credible; neither will it provide any room to manoeuvre when activity slackens, if the surplus when activity is strong is not considerably larger. Everything must be done, moreover, to make the labour market function properly. Now that activity is rising and new jobs are being created, it is particularly important to make every effort to ensure that the vacancies are filled without delay. It is also crucially important that wage formation functions satisfactorily and that wage costs stay well in line with the growth of productivity. It is only by conducting policy along these lines that Sweden’s options on the EMU issue will remain open as the Riksdag has ordained. Fortunately enough, if we remain outside the monetary union it is BIS Review 96/1999  4  also such a policy that we should implement in order to create good conditions for increased prosperity and attain the high goals the Government and the Riksbank have set up for employment. 5  BIS Review 96/1999
Convergence went hand in hand with a sizable expansion in output which persists today. Thanks to this, Spanish citizens now undoubtedly appreciate the benefits deriving from macroeconomic stability. But while the economic outlook is currently quite bright, this has not always been the case for the euro area economy as a whole in the period since EMU began. We are all aware that the blame lies not with an unduly tight monetary policy, but rather with adverse cyclical developments and, particularly, with structural rigidities that have cramped growth and employment in some euro countries. With growth subdued, it is more difficult for the public to see how a single monetary policy geared to price stability, contributes to their well-being. Perhaps then, widespread support for the goals of independent central banks will not always be there unless central banks and other authorities insist on the right messages. The Eurosystem has recently launched very successful educational initiatives in this regard. But politicians should also be key players, making clear the role of monetary policy in increasing social welfare. Globalisation Going back to the debate on inflation moderation, I believe that international competition is helping to contain inflation as it guests favourable political economy effects. In particular, market globalisation is strengthening the public’s aversion to inflation. Higher wages and prices immediately erode competitiveness punishing output and employment, and thus people see the damages of inflation more clearly than before.

To make these changes the banks put in place programmes to re-allocate accounts to the right side of their ring-fences in a way which minimised disruption for customers. These changes are all but complete, and have taken place without most account holders needing to take any action themselves. 4 These legal processes were considered sufficiently important that they were included in a list compiled by The Lawyer of the twenty biggest and most interesting court cases to follow in 2018. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  While the change that ring-fencing brings about is substantial for the banking sector, it has been implemented – as intended – with little impact on the public. And when the regime goes live in January, the majority of the banks’ customers and counterparties should notice little substantive difference to the services they receive day-to-day. How will the banks operate from 2019? But what changes will be happening within the banking system? Ring-fencing will change how banking groups are structured and how they are managed. Ring-fencing will also influence the evolution of the industry as a whole. The legislation specifies the activities that must be conducted by ring-fenced banks, as well as the activities they are prohibited from undertaking. Any activities falling outside those two categories – for example taking deposits from large corporates, or mortgage and credit card lending – can sit either side of the ring-fence in the new group structures.
House prices, after several years of increasingly more moderate rises, began to post small declines in some market indicators as from the second quarter of this year, while housing starts fell by almost half. This abrupt change in scenario, together with the tightening of financing conditions, which I shall address in greater detail later, meant that real estate companies had to restructure, with some of them even going bankrupt. This series of factors compounded the correction of the residential sector with adverse consequences for employment, which is acting as the main channel through which the adjustment of the sector is spreading to the rest of the economy. Household consumption is rapidly reflecting the deterioration in confidence, against a backdrop of considerable financial tensions, and the abrupt turnaround in the employment situation. As a result, a certain rise in the saving rate consistent with the current scenario of greater uncertainty and financing difficulties might be taking place. I should stress that this far-reaching slowdown in private consumption is the factor that is most contributing to the loss of dynamism in the economy. Business investment also slowed rapidly, in line with the changing financial conditions, the profile of domestic demand and the deterioration in business confidence. Nonetheless, exports are sustaining a relatively high growth rate, despite worsening world trade so far this year, and they are providing some support to investment in equipment.

In addition, while growth was slowing, inflationary pressures were heightening and inflation expectations were being revised upwards, which has raised the risk that they may become unanchored. Nobody doubts that an eventual loss of control of inflation, with the subsequent deterioration in price expectations, would contribute to seriously exacerbating a slide towards economic weakening in the area. Such is the difficult setting in which the ECB Governing Council has had to take its monetary policy decisions. These decisions have been pondered bearing in mind at all times the impact of tighter financial conditions and of the change in the dynamism of demand. Thus, against a backdrop of growing uncertainty, it was decided to hold interest rates steady until last July, when the materialisation of some of the previously identified risks to price stability made a 25 bp increase necessary. At the recent Governing Council meeting, however, we noted a weakening in activity in the area and the fact that the latest price data point to the onset of some easing. Inflationary risks have therefore diminished somewhat, though they have not disappeared, meaning that monetary policy should continue contributing to containing them. Given the seriousness of the tensions on international financial markets, we also reiterated the readiness of the Eurosystem to provide all the liquidity required for as long as should prove necessary. Let me now turn to the Spanish economy.
The large volume of international trade in currency derivatives, which is dominated by banks reduces, premiums and costs for other business sectors and thereby promote cross-border trade in goods and services. It is not a good idea to throw a spanner into the works. The impact on household consumption and housing investment has been substantial. Business investment is now picking up. In Norway, household debt is higher than household deposits. The decline in interest rates has thereby freed up funds. Households reacted relatively rapidly, and growth in consumption picked up. The fall in interest rates pushed up house prices. Turnover in the housing market has been high. Higher housing wealth provides increased borrowing opportunities and thereby also boosts demand for consumer durables. Household debt has risen by around 11 per cent over the past year. High resale home prices have made it more profitable to build new homes, and residential construction is rising. The fall in interest rates has also contributed to sustaining the market value of office premises and commercial property even with a high vacancy rate. With the prospect of higher occupancy rates, prices are now rising. Owing to higher productivity and a drop in sickness absence, it may have taken time for the effects to become visible in the labour market. However, higher demand for labour and falling unemployment is gradually leading to a tighter labour market. High interest rates in 2002 and fiscal discipline contributed to a deceleration in wage growth to a more sustainable level.

Imbalances in the world economy Low interest rates and risk premiums stand in stark contrast to the considerable imbalances in the world economy. There are particularly larges imbalances both with regard to the US trade and current account balance. This partly reflects the US federal budget deficit. Moreover, US households have a high level of consumption and a low level of saving. Strong demand in the US has sustained growth in the world economy. The deficit in the US is matched by surpluses in Europe and Asia. A persistent deficit has pushed up US foreign debt to a high level. The US population is growing faster than that of other OECD countries. This may suggest that saving in the US is somewhat lower and investment somewhat higher, but the impact is now considerably greater than implied by demographic factors alone. The imbalances may continue for a period. International capital markets are deep and liquid with an ample supply of credit for US borrowers. If creditors begin to fear a fall in prices and withdraw, this may still trigger substantial corrections. This may lead to higher interest rates and perhaps also a fall in US equity markets that spills over to other countries’ financial markets. In that case the dollar will also depreciate. The household debt burden in the US may be another source of instability if households abruptly reduce both demand for housing and consumption.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  sustained basis, that would pose a risk to inflation and, thus, would have important implications for monetary policy. With respect to the inflation outlook, I think there are four important questions that deserve attention. 1. How much slack is there in the economy? In other words, how fast can the economy grow for how long until the economy is close to full employment? 2. Are there speed-limit effects on inflation? In other words, could inflation rise because the rate of economic growth was unusually high, even though plenty of slack remained in the economy? 3. Given the emergence of such economies as China and India, can commodity price pressures be safely ignored as temporary “noise” in terms of the long-term inflation outlook or are these pressures likely to prove persistent? If commodity price pressures persisted, this could undercut one rationale for focusing on core measures of inflation – the argument that core measures are better predictors of future headline inflation than today’s headline rate. 4. What can the Federal Reserve do to ensure that inflation expectations stay wellanchored? With respect to the first question, the economy retains a very large amount of slack by virtually all measures. For example, last month the industrial capacity utilization rate was 76.1 percent. This compares with a long-term average of 80.9 percent (Chart 21).

Recent evidence shows that the large amount of slack in the economy has contributed to disinflation over the past couple of years. This can be seen in the steady decline in core inflation between mid-2008 and the end of 2010. As shown in Chart 18, core PCE inflation in December had risen at just 0.7 percent on a year-over-year basis, down from 2.5 percent in mid-2008. Slack in our economy is still very large, and this will continue to be a factor that acts to dampen price pressures. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why we need to be careful about inflation even in an environment of ample spare capacity. First, commodity prices have been rising rapidly (Chart 19). This has already increased headline inflation relative to core inflation, and the commodity price changes that have already taken place will almost certainly continue to push the headline rate on year-over-year basis higher over the next few months. Second, some of this pressure could feed into core inflation. Third, medium-term inflation expectations have recently risen back to levels consistent with our dual mandate objectives (Chart 20). If medium-term inflation expectations were to move significantly higher from here on a  1  However, growth alone will not resolve the longer-term problem of the disparity between promises made to state and local workers in terms of their public employee pension and health benefits and the resources set aside to pay for those benefits.
We will also be examining, if not now then at some time in the future, whether it is possible to introduce a risk-based element into the setting of the premium so that well-managed banks pay less. It will also be necessary to keep the administrative structure of a DIS as lean as possible to minimise operating expenses. If the go-ahead is given, these and other details will take some time to work out and to enshrine in legislation. It is unlikely therefore that a DIS could be introduced before next year. One advantage of this is that it will give us time to evaluate the impact of interest rate deregulation before the DIS is introduced. Conclusion I hope that I have been able to give you a picture in this speech of some of the trends in the Hong Kong banking sector and how our reform measures fit into these. In the time available I have not been able to discuss all the issues that the HKMA is currently addressing, including the proposal to set up a commercial credit reference agency in Hong Kong. However, the issues that I have talked about – deregulation and deposit insurance – are probably enough for you to think about for the time being. Assuming that they go ahead as planned, they will play a major role in helping to shape the future development of banking in Hong Kong. 4  BIS Review 29/2001

97.4% of all businesses in Malaysia are SMEs, contributing 37.4% of GDP. Our engagements reveal that these significant contributors often have low levels of knowledge on sustainability. Communication is thus key. Banks and industry leaders, those seated in this room, have the responsibility to communicate and create the awareness and acceptance of your clients on the importance, risks and opportunities related to the impacts of climate change. Alignment. 2050 is the goal for Malaysia. But, it is not one that can be achieved if we each march to the beat of our own drums. Our collective effort is key if we are to achieve a just and orderly transition. Aside from alignment between institutions, even more critical is the need for alignment within institutions. Climate objectives decided at the board and management level must be cascaded to the frontlines and across branches to ensure that clients have the support needed regardless of where they are situated. In combination, this alignment will ensure that efforts by each institution are complementary and achieve the maximum impact. Proactiveness. The Sixth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states irrevocably that the window of opportunity to reach the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels is rapidly closing. Decisions of today already have a profound impact on tomorrow's future. Financial institutions must be proactive in ensuring that your own institutions and your clients are prepared in the face of a changing climate and economy.
As I indicated earlier, that represents a significant boost to real disposable income for households. How much this energy windfall boosts consumption will depend, though, on how much is spent versus saved. Turning to the negatives, the support to growth from rapidly rising U.S. oil production almost certainly will fade away. U.S. oil production has been rising rapidly for several years, due largely to new technology that has expanded the amount of oil that can be recovered from existing wells and that has facilitated shale oil production by fracking. Now, with prices dramatically lower, U.S. oil exploration and drilling activity is falling off very sharply. This will exert a meaningful drag on economic activity. Another significant shock is the nearly 15 percent appreciation of the exchange value of the dollar since mid-2014. Such an appreciation makes U.S. exports more expensive and imports more competitive. My staff’s analysis concludes that an appreciation of this magnitude would, all else equal, reduce real GDP growth by about 0.6 percentage point over this year. Turning to inflation, the data continue to come in below the FOMC’s objective of a 2 percent annualized rate for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator. The twelve-month change of the total PCE deflator was 0.3 percent in February, with the core PCE deflator at 1.4 percent. Despite this, my expectation is that inflation will begin to firm later this year. In particular, most of the impact from the decline in energy prices that has weighed down overall inflation is likely over.

It does not mean that monetary policy will be tight. We will simply be moving from an extremely accommodative monetary policy to one that is slightly less so. It also will be a positive signal about the progress we have made in restoring the economy to health. In my view, it would be a cause for celebration, because it would signal that the FOMC believes that slightly higher short-term interest rates are consistent with its objectives of maximum BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  employment and price stability. Near-zero short-term interest rates and a larger Federal Reserve balance sheet were designed to be a temporary extraordinary treatment to help the economy regain its vitality, and not a permanent palliative. I remain confident that when the FOMC does decide to begin to remove policy accommodation that we have the requisite tools to effectively support this decision. We have tested numerous tools including overnight reverse repurchase operations, term reverse repurchase operations, and term deposit facilities to ensure that, when the time comes, lift-off can be managed smoothly. The primary tool will be interest on excess reserves (IOER), with overnight reverse repurchases as a supplemental tool to be used as needed to ensure a firm floor under short-term interest rates. For financial markets, the likely path of short-term rates after lift-off is just as important as the timing of lift-off. Here, I anticipate that the path will be relatively shallow.
At the end of the day, the vision is an industry that is trusted by those who use its services, untainted by crime and abuse, and exemplary of honest, responsible and upstanding corporate citizens. Experience and history have shown us that, these preconditions made business sense and over the long run ensure the sustainability of the industry. The theme of this Conference, “Scaling Up Excellence – Creating Opportunities while Mitigating Risks” appropriately sums up the challenges we face today in the MSB industry. Rapid change is the new normal in today’s dynamic world. The global interconnectivity, the impact of regulatory changes and new technologies are all combining to transform the landscape of the MSB industry, not just within the region, but also internationally. Success for money services businesses in today’s challenging environment will hinge on the ability to adapt to new demands, while making the most of new growth opportunities that come with change. I take recognisance that among the countries represented here today, we all face somewhat different challenges and we are likely at different stages of action. I know with certainty, however that we all agree inaction is not an option as the world changes around us. I hope  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  that this Conference will encourage us to move forward with greater confidence and determination, equipped with deeper knowledge and a better appreciation of the priorities that we need to manage and the paths that we can take to achieve our shared objectives for the industry.

According to a recent article in The New York Times, the poor forecasting record of economists was a principal reason for such cutbacks. A re-examination of the results of a survey conducted by the author found another possible explanation for corporate disenchantment with their economists. It appears that many business economists have not furnished information that can be employed in business planning.”3 Neither the story of the young economist nor Casson’s findings should de-motivate those of you who think of venturing into business after university. There are two conclusions to be drawn. The first is: the professional quality of the business economist is important. But professional quality alone is not sufficient. Quality may easily be drowned in a flood of bad management following from an overcomplex organisation. This leads to a second conclusion: every young economist confronted with bad management has a choice. Albert O. Hirschman distinguishes two possibilities of reaction besides ‘loyalty’, i.e. keeping mum, namely ‘exit’ or ‘voice’.4 In my story the young economist decided to exit the corporation. This was fine because he made his way elsewhere. Had he chosen ‘voice’, i.e. had he stayed with the company and fought for its improvement he would have had a good chance of succeeding within the organisation instead of outside of it. Indeed, not a few of our young economist’s colleagues who stayed with this or similar companies and helped to drive them forward were duly rewarded. Today some of them are even on the companies’ boards. 5.