samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
3  The Bank published an explanatory note on the FLS, available here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ markets/Documents/explanatory_notefls120713.pdf  4  Drawn sterling loans to UK private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) and households, by the FLS Group, which includes all UK resident monetary financial institutions and related specialist mortgage lenders within a group. 5  If their lending expands by 7% for example, then they can draw down an amount of treasury bills equal to (7+5=) 12% of their initial stock. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  The first point I want to make in reply is that banking in the UK is far from a perfectly competitive market. The six biggest lenders account for the vast majority of lending to UK businesses and households – and the seventh largest accounts for less than a third as much as number six. In large part the quantitative success of the scheme will depend on what these larger lenders do. But each bank is in a different strategic position to start with. They will all have some portfolios they wish to shrink, and others to expand. But some were planning to reduce their overall stock of lending, given market conditions and their own capital and liquidity positions. And some had been ordered to reduce parts of their lending because they had received state aid. The FLS is not intended to undermine competitive and financial stability objectives by forcing banks to change such strategic decisions. What we do want to encourage is an expansion of their core portfolios.

Together these banks account for around 73% of the stock of lending to UK households and corporates. I should also note that a significant number of other institutions are close to signing up too and we will update this table in due course. In addition, we will publish the first set of drawdown data in December, although you will have seen that one bank has already announced that it has drawn £ and plans to draw more. That said, it will probably take some time for banks to review fully their lending plans, and it is likely that drawings from the FLS will be spread out over the full window to end-2013.
In today’s speech, I want to highlight some of the key features of this highly integrated economic system and discuss some of the challenges it may pose in the future. In particular, I will discuss how the changing shape of the world economy affects the task of national monetary authorities, such as the MPC. In other words, how can economic policy-makers maintain stability when we are constantly in danger of being buffeted by powerful global economic forces? The rise of Asia and the changing shape of the world economy A key feature of the new global economy we now inhabit is the increasing economic strength of the Asia-Pacific region. Chart 2 shows that the top ten economies in this region – led by China, Japan and India – have already overtaken both the European Union and the United States in their share of world economic activity. This compares with the situation thirty years ago when these economies were collectively just half the size of the European economy, and about two-thirds the size of the United States. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 2 – The rise of Asia Percentage share of world GDP, at current market prices and exchange rates US  EU-27  40%  Asia-pacific G10 *  35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1980  1990  2000  2010  *: Includes Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand.

When risks are unknown or ill-defined, the market cannot allocate resources in an efficient and profitable manner. Until recently, reliable information on how companies were anticipating, responding or failing to respond to climate-related risks and opportunities has been hard to find, inconsistent and fragmented. 2  For a full list of current supporters see: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters-march-2018/ and supporters at the Paris Summit see: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/TCFD-Press-Release-One-Planet-Summit-12-Dec-2017_FINAL.pdf 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  The information needed goes beyond the static to the strategic. Markets need information to assess which companies are well positioned to seize the opportunities the transition to a low carbon economy brings. Which car manufacturers are leading the way on fuel efficiency and electrification? How are energy companies adapting their mix of energy sources? This needs to be considered against investors’ views of possible transition paths – the International Energy Agency’s Sustainable Development Scenario, for example, sees the consumption of natural gas rise by nearly 20% by 2030 to become the largest single fuel 3  in the global mix. Given the uncertainties around climate, not everyone will agree on the timing or scale of the adjustments required. And different people will have different views about the effectiveness of timelines of government climate policies. The right information allows sceptics and evangelists alike to back their convictions with their capital. At the same time as this increased investor focus, there have been signs that global companies are becoming increasingly aware of the risks climate change can pose.
Bank of England  Page 4  The large portfolio of gilts accumulated as a result of quantitative easing (QE) is being run down: since March, by ceasing to reinvest the proceeds of maturing bonds; and, since the start of this month, by selling gilts back to the market. The language surrounding monetary policy has shifted dramatically: from so-called forward guidance suggesting that Bank rate would remain at its effective lower bound until economic slack had eroded, to a more data-dependent outlook for interest rates reflecting current concerns over the persistence of inflationary pressures.2 This substantial shift has been driven by two factors. Normalisation of the monetary policy stance First, the stance of monetary policy needed to be normalised after more than a decade of exceptional ease, originally established in the face of the global financial crisis and then maintained more-or-less until this time last year. (Of course, the ‘normalisation’ implied here relates to historical norms for the level of Bank Rate and size of the Bank’s balance sheet.) With the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, Bank Rate was quickly floored at its effective lower bound, and additional easing was then provided through large-scale asset purchases. The resulting highly supportive overall stance was justified by a combination of downside risks to the inflation target, a weak economic outlook and tensions in the financial system, all of which had emerged in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Islamic finance and the Fiqh of crisis management Keynote address by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 16th International Shariah Scholars Forum (ISSF) "Islamic Finance and the Fiqh of Crisis Management", 6 October 2021. * * * Assalamualaikum w.b.t and a very good afternoon to all distinguished guests and fellow participants. It is a pleasure and honour for me, to be part of what I believe will be another stimulating and thought-provoking dialogue. I would like to record the Bank’s appreciation to ISRA for hosting this annual platform, and also more broadly, for its continued dedication in advancing the frontiers of applied Shariah knowledge in Islamic finance towards greater heights and prominence. The chosen theme “Islamic finance and the fiqh of crisis management” is very apt and timely. With the persisting rage of the Covid-19 pandemic, our economic and financial backdrop is gripped with unprecedented challenges that emerged within a very short period of time – priced with great health, economic and social costs. The forecasted statistics are rather staggering, sparing no countries from economic fallout and social regress. With as many as 150 million people globally estimated to be pushed into extreme poverty by 20211, exacerbated with the fact that global unemployment is expected to hit more than 200 million people by 20222, the impact from the crisis has disproportionately affected the most vulnerable.
Politically, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out changes to the taxation system making mortgage borrowing significantly more expensive, even if this would be the most effective way of reducing the risks associated with high indebtedness among households. This means we need tools that can counteract this kind of indebtedness and which can be used with the aim of promoting the stability of the financial system. There is a great need for such tools in Sweden The Swedish banking system is large and closely interwoven, which means that problems in one bank can easily spread to the other banks. The costs to society can thus be extensive in the event of a crisis. Increasing the safety margins in the financial system is therefore highly important. It can be enough for one bank to be impacted by problems for confidence in all banks to be dealt a blow. The important role of confidence in the financial markets became clear in the autumn of 2008, when the lack of confidence led to many banks rapidly encountering liquidity problems and being forced to rely on the Riksbank’s measures for their funding. In this regard, the Swedish banks are also particularly sensitive to shocks on the financial markets as they largely obtain funding in foreign currency. Funding in foreign currency is often for shorter durations than funding in Swedish currency and has been seen to disappear abruptly in times of stress.

Given that our AML/CFT rules are in line with international standards, it is not readily apparent that we need more new rules. The problem in all the instances we have picked up has been a failure to comply with the rules and poor judgement. Second, supervision. MAS has stepped up AML/CFT supervision in recent years and FIs are devoting more resources to managing money laundering risks. Through onsite inspections, we assess if the AML/CFT policies and procedures set out by the FIs are adequate and adhered to on the ground. The frequency of MAS inspections has increased six-fold in recent years. In the three-year period from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2013, MAS conducted a total of 108 onsite inspections of FIs; between 2013 and 2016, 608 inspections were conducted. MAS requires FIs to promptly address all deficiencies identified in the course of these inspections. But we can do better. MAS will further sharpen its supervision of AML/CFT controls in the industry. We are establishing a dedicated AML Department to consolidate existing supervisory resources and take a more targeted approach to combat money laundering and illicit financing risks, as we announced earlier. We will conduct more intrusive inspections of FIs identified as facing higher risks. We will increase our engagements with the industry to share perspectives on emerging risks and typologies, as well as best practices on how to mitigate them. Third, enforcement. In recent years, MAS has been stepping up its enforcement actions against FIs that breach our AML/CFT regulations.
Developments in 1998 are one example, when the krone came under growing pressure as a result of the sharp fall in oil prices, turbulence in international capital market in the wake of the Russian crisis and imbalances in the Norwegian economy. Monetary policy The long-term objective of monetary policy is to provide the Norwegian economy with a nominal anchor - domestic price stability, and thereby the basis for a stable krone. Nominal stability is the best contribution monetary policy can make to economic growth and prosperity. A nominal anchor is also a necessary precondition for stable financial markets and property markets. High inflation and wide swings in the exchange rate impair the function of prices as an information vehicle. This leads to booms followed by busts and an arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth. Inflation therefore poisons the economy. By linking movements in the krone to the euro, we have chosen to follow the same standard for nominal stability in the economy as set by the euro area countries. BIS Review 19/2001  7  Since 1997, inflation has been higher in Norway than in the euro area. The difference partly reflects a period of strong growth in Norway, while the level of activity in Europe has been low. But the relatively high inflation rate in Norway cannot continue as this will undermine the basis for stability in the krone exchange rate and weaken confidence in monetary policy.

In 2001, we expect the US economy to expand by less than half the rate recorded last year. Growth in the Japanese economy is also sluggish, but the downturn in Japan has continued for ten years. 4  BIS Review 19/2001  At the beginning of the 1990s the financial bubble burst, following a sharp increase in stock and property values in the preceding years. The banking industry faced serious problems, which have still not be solved. In addition, government debt has increased sharply in recent years, but neither strong growth in public spending nor near-zero interest rate levels has sufficed to boost growth in the Japanese economy. BIS Review 19/2001  5  Growth in Europe was weak in the mid-1990s. The situation has shown a substantial improvement, particularly from 1997. Growth has picked up and unemployment has declined in an environment of moderate price and wage inflation. The US and Japan account for close to a third of the world economy. When their economies deteriorate, the question is whether the upturn in Europe is sufficiently robust to maintain its momentum. Historically, there has been a close correlation between developments in the US and Europe. Slow growth in the US economy will also now have an effect on demand for European goods, but the effects via financial markets are likely to be more important. A turnaround in the US could feed through to European stock markets and may also trigger financial unrest.
Moreover, Credit Suisse and UBS have taken important organisational steps to improve their resolvability as part of their resolution planning. For instance, they have both set up Swiss  1  Final requirements refer to the requirements that will apply after expiry of all transitional provisions. In particular, they concern the qualitative requirements for going-concern capital. Page 1/3  Berne, 13 December 2018 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  subsidiaries that contain their systemically important functions, including, in particular, domestic deposit and lending business. To ensure an orderly resolution in a crisis, progress is still needed in three areas in particular. First, FINMA, as the competent authority, is currently in the process of drawing up resolution funding plans. These aim to ensure that a bank has sufficient liquidity to implement a resolution without recourse to state support. Second, it must be ensured that big banks’ lossabsorbing capacity is adequate, not only at group level, but also on a stand-alone basis at the level of the individual group entities. In this context, the Federal Council has announced that, during the first half of 2019, it will decide on the corresponding requirements for the highest operating unit of the big banks – i.e. the parent entity. Third, Credit Suisse and UBS must further reduce the financial and operational dependencies within the group. Domestically focused banks  I would now like to turn to the domestically focused banks. Here too, there has been little change since the Financial Stability Report was published in June.

News conference  Berne, 13 December 2018 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  In my remarks today, I will be looking at the current developments in the area of financial stability. I shall look at the big banks first before turning to the domestically focused banks. Big banks  The financial market situation facing the two big banks has become more volatile since the press conference in June. Given this heightened uncertainty on the markets, the share prices of big banks both in Switzerland and abroad have come under pressure. By contrast, premia for credit default swaps of such banks have remained at a similar level as in June overall. The SNB’s assessment of the situation at the two big banks is essentially unchanged from that at the last press conference. This applies both to resilience and to the orderly resolution of a distressed bank. As regards resilience, Credit Suisse and UBS are still on track to meet the revised ‘too big to fail’ requirements on going-concern loss-absorbing capacity. They already meet all final 1 risk-weighted capital requirements. However, as regards the leverage ratio, i.e. the unweighted ratio of capital to assets, further improvement is needed. The big banks have made significant progress in recent years in the area of resolution. They have steadily expanded their holdings of bail-in instruments. At group level, both institutions are already compliant with the final requirements for gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity.
James McAndrews: Negative nominal central bank policy rates – where is the lower bound? Remarks by Mr James McAndrews, Executive Vice President and Director of Research of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 8 May 2015. *  *  *  The views expressed in this speech are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System. The Swiss National Bank (SNB), the European Central Bank (ECB), Danmarks Nationalbank (DNB), and the Swedish Riksbank recently have pushed short-term interest rates to levels below the “zero lower bound.” The current extent and depth of negative policy rates is unprecedented; previously only Denmark had a modestly negative policy rate in 2012 through 2014. The actions of the four central banks have led a number of commentators to ask, Is the concept of a zero lower bound on interest rates valid? If not, what might be the lower bound, if any, on nominal interest rates? Indeed, some economists have suggested that with changes to the monetary system, we could in fact eliminate the lower bound to interest rates altogether. I’ll first review the reasons given by the central banks for setting negative policy rates – in all cases, the negative rates were seen as a means of advancing the banks’ macroeconomic objectives in the current environment.

Mr. Bäckström discusses the current situation for monetary policy in Sweden Remarks by the Governor of the Swedish Central Bank, Mr. Urban Bäckström, to the Standing Committee on Finance, in Stockholm, on 23/10/97. I should like to thank the Committee for the invitation to discuss the Swedish economy and the current situation for monetary policy. In my opening remarks today I shall begin by briefly summarising the recent years’ economic tendencies and then consider the present construction of monetary policy. A look into the future will conclude. What I have to say is based on the latest inflation report and events since it was published. From a dual situation to broader expansion Sweden’s economy is now entering the fifth year of expansion since the profound crisis at the beginning of the decade. Since GDP turned upwards in the summer of 1993, annual growth has averaged over 2.5 per cent. Annual inflation in this period has averaged only about 2 per cent. This is a marked contrast with the 1970s and 1980s, when annual growth averaged approximately 2 per cent and inflation about 8 per cent. In one respect, however, the situation to date is still dismal, namely as regards the labour market and employment. If an economy is growing well but employment remains weak and unemployment high, there is a strong probability that the labour market is affected by structural problems. Although growth in recent years has been satisfactory, the generation of a broader upswing in the economy has proved difficult.
The theme of this Conference, Financial integration and inclusive development, is particularly timely at this current juncture of the world economy. Global economic growth is at its lowest level since the global financial crisis, partly as a consequence of the high level of uncertainty surrounding trade and international relations. This weakness of the global economic landscape is adding to the new challenges that have emerged over the last decades: population aging, migration, security threats, the emergence of new economic and political powers, and climate change, to mention only some. And this evolution has taken place in an era of increasing globalization, that is being threatened by the emergence 2/3  of protectionist measures, and of digitalization and rapid development of new technologies. Together, these developments constitute a new frontier for policies that make it necessary to promote mutual understanding and make extensive coordinated efforts in the field of policies. In order to preserve the benefits derived from financial interconnectedness and technological innovation, it is now of the essence to put in place an internationally agreed response that allows to achieve the benefits of innovation while ensuring the mitigation of its potential risks. Policy-makers have the responsibility to support the research and analysis to base to foster growth and fight inequalities. In this Conference we are going to debate on a number of challenges that our countries are currently facing: from technological innovations in finance to migration flows in search for better opportunities, going through increasing financial interdependences or the need of boosting financial education.

I have no doubt that the quality of the discussions we have today will allow us to deepen our understanding of these challenges and, hopefully, allow us to draw some useful conclusion in terms of economic policy. I leave the floor now to Mr. Isidro González, Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean, thanking him as well as you all for your presence here today, and thanking Mr. Senén Florensa, President of the Executive Committee of IEMed, for the cooperation in the organisation of this event. Now, Isidro, the floor is yours. 3/3