Europe, with its deep financial interconnectedness and high risk of spillovers, requires a particularly close level of information-sharing and cooperative oversight – the prerequisite for the Eurosystem to provide liquidity to CCPs. The role of the central bank of issue thus needs to be acknowledged appropriately. On this note, I hope that I have been able to whet your appetite for a vigorous and fruitful exchange of views during today’s conference and leave you in the capable hands of the 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  organisers. Thank you. 1 See Cox, R. T. and Steigerwald, R. S. (2017), “A CCP is a CCP is a CCP”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,  Policy Discussion Paper, Vol. PDP, No 2017–01. 2 See BSCB-CPMI-FSB-IOSCO: Analysis of central clearing interdependencies, 9 August 2018 (second analysis)  and 5 July 2017 (first analysis). 3 See FSB work programme for 2019, 12 February 2019. 4 The revision of EMIR as regards the regulatory framework for CCPs was proposed by the European  Commission (Commission proposes more robust supervision of central counterparties (CCPs), 13 June 2017). Significant amendments have been made to the text during the legislative process, including the introduction of different frameworks for the supervision of EU and non-EU CCPs. 5 Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and Technical Committee of the International  Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO): Principles for financial market infrastructures, April 2012. CPSS was renamed as CPMI as of 1 September 2014.

To open what I hope will be a day of thoughtful and lively discussion, I would like to share a few thoughts on today’s three topics, in my capacity as both member of the ECB’s Executive Board and Chair of the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI). Global CCPs require enhanced cooperative oversight across borders Let me begin with the challenges we face in regulating and overseeing global cross-border clearing activities. As the clearing landscape evolved after the crisis, some derivatives markets became highly concentrated. Major markets are now cleared through a few global CCPs, which, as a result, have become systemically important for multiple jurisdictions besides the one in which they are headquartered.2 If not managed appropriately, risks channelled through these CCPs could spread rapidly across borders with potentially destabilising effects for financial markets more widely. For example, for many EU CCPs, including the most important clearing hubs, over two-thirds of the derivatives transactions they clear are submitted by financial institutions incorporated outside the CCP’s home Member State. Credit risks and potential losses are thus borne mainly by financial institutions in other EU or non-EU countries, and –once bank shareholders and creditors have been bailed in – taxpayers in those countries may ultimately have to foot the remaining bill. For this reason, market authorities, prudential supervisors and central banks have a keen interest in other countries complying with the highest financial and operational CCP risk management standards. They rely on home authorities to carry out prudent due diligence.