samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Instead, the industry must continuously evolve to meet the needs and preferences of its consumers which are rapidly changing. It must proactively and strategically position itself to offer products via diverse and innovative delivery channels to reach out to different segments of the population with varying levels of financial knowledge. In this regard, under the LIFE Framework, the Bank envisions the market share of regular premiums/ contribution products sold/ marketed via non-agency channels to exceed 30%. Currently the ratio is 14%, and this statistic provides compelling evidence that the industry must double its effort to reach the target of 30%. Similarly, for us to expand the penetration rate to reach 75% by 2020, the industry must add and expand the reach of its non-agency channels. Throughout the world today, financial inclusion has been identified as an important area of focus to achieve a more balanced and sustainable economic growth. Societies that are adequately empowered and supported by suitable financial tools can assist in helping them cope during temporary period of emergencies. Empirical evidence showed that microinsurance customers can be as valuable as a company’s any other customers. This is where the industry can play a major role to develop suitable microinsurance/ takaful products that would enhance the social safety net of this underserved segment enabling them to get back on their feet and become financially independent even after experiencing an adverse event. Yet many in the industry appears uninterested in microinsurance/ takaful for reason that it is a loss making venture and uneconomical to pursue.

While the financial aspects are important, we should inspire our young recruits on the underlying values of the industry and capitalise on the noble objective of providing protection and managing risk for our people. Takaful for example, is built upon the spirit of brotherhood, solidarity and mutual assistance which provides for mutual financial aid and assistance to the participants. Drawing talent that shares the same values will ensure commitment and support talent retention in the industry. When the general public interact with the industry, with highly motivated staff, it will sow confidence and consequently trust. Refrain from making false promises, make clear the terms and conditions up front In building trust, a huge responsibility lies now on intermediaries playing their role, as intermediaries’ behaviour mirrors the image of the insurance and takaful industry. Many consumers are not well versed with insurance and takaful terminology and will rely on the advice rendered and the full disclosure of the policy terms and conditions. This low degree of familiarity with insurance and takaful terms makes it even more crucial for the full disclosure of the terms and conditions governing a policy. An important consideration is the role of intermediaries being the ‘first point of contact’ with the public. Intermediaries create an impression, powerful enough to influence a customer’s decision whether or not to engage in an insurance contract.
Fact number three: on the securities side, the potential for serious market dislocation had been building up. While the turnover in our stock market fell quite substantially as financial turmoil in the region intensified, activity in our stock index futures market grew sharply and disproportionately. A thin cash market, coupled with an ultra-active futures market, is a recipe for market dislocation, if not disaster, beyond the realms explainable by economic fundamentals. Furthermore, at least before the recent changes to the rules on shorting stocks, in terms of the financing cost there has always been a structural bias in favour of shorting stocks. The cost of borrowing stocks was low and there were rather lax settlement requirements that BIS Review 85/1998  -3-  specified T+2 but said at the same time that you could have a few days’ grace if you did not have the stocks on settlement day, even though going “naked” short in stocks was against the law. Indeed, along with increasingly heavy bets being placed in the futures market there had been continuous shorting in the cash market. Fact number four: there had been an abundance of bad news, bad numbers and rumors. In July and the first half of August, an unusually large number of investment houses published research papers on the Hong Kong dollar’s link with the US dollar, predicting that the link would soon be broken. There were also many articles predicting the Renminbi’s devaluation.

A short list of the lessons should reflect all these aspects: what we have learned or think we have learned about the causes of the crisis; about the efficiency of the institutional texture and the array of instruments at hand; and, last but not least, about the most appropriate positioning in the event of a crisis. With these criteria in mind, I will refer to nine lessons, of which seven are universally valid and two hold particularly true for emerging economies, such as Romania. In order to root out any possible confusion, I would like to point out from the very beginning what these lessons do NOT deal with. First, they do not address the issue of shorter or longer economic cycles and do not suggest that a crisis means the end of an economic cycle. Second, the lessons do not provide an answer to the question whether we could ever avoid a financial crisis. 1. Low inflation is not a sufficient condition for ensuring financial stability in the long run. Past experience appeared to have confirmed the opinion that inflation is the major source of financial instability. High inflation episodes were usually accompanied by pronounced financial instability and banking sector crises or were followed by recession after the authorities took inadequate measures to curb inflation. The current global financial crisis became manifest after nearly two decades of relatively low, stable inflation. A number of factors caused low inflation to coexist with ample liquidity.
In line with this global tendency, the  The Central Bank, since the 1980s, has  Central Bank of Sri Lanka has also been  been pursuing monetary targeting (MT)  improving its monetary policy  as its monetary policy framework to  framework over the years. achieve price stability. Under this framework, monetary aggregates were used as a key nominal anchor in the conduct of monetary policy and the final objective of price stability was expected to be achieved by influencing money  In particular, the Central Bank has officially announced that the monetary targeting framework would be gradually replaced by migrating towards a flexible inflation targeting framework. aggregates. Reserve money was  Under this enhanced monetary policy  considered the operating target and  framework, the Central Bank would  broad money was used as the  focus on stabilising inflation in mid-  intermediate target of monetary policy  single digits over the medium-term,  under this framework. while supporting growth objectives and  Nevertheless, monetary targeting has  flexibility in exchange rate management. become a less meaningful framework for  Generally, an inflation targeting  monetary policy conduct, given issues  framework is characterised by an  such as the instability in the money  announced numerical inflation target, a  demand function amidst financial  medium-term inflation forecast, which  innovations and the weakening  facilitates forward looking monetary  relationship between money and  policy decision making and a higher  inflation.

Governors Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe,  Thank you and I wish you all a Happy and  Mr. P. Samarasiri and Mr. S. Lankathilake  Prosperous New Year 2017.  for their continuous support and  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  35
ASEAN is committed to pursue market openness within this region, but also wants to remain deeply integrated within the global economy. A ‘Global ASEAN’ is not an oxymoron – rather it is a declaration of our inclinations, aspirations and direction for the future. Rather than a narrow pursuit of openness for its own sake, experience taught us that balance, readiness and inclusiveness is critical for the success for an open market economy. As a group, ASEAN has been very mindful of the stage of financial and economic development of individual countries. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  ASEAN pursues ‘smart’ integration that is based on the readiness and capacity of member countries. From the global financial crisis to the present We are now entering a decade after the Global Financial Crisis (more apt to be called Trans Atlantic Financial Crisis) and two decades after the Asian Financial Crisis. The implementation of unconventional policies and a prolonged period of low interest rates, led to financial and economic distortions, some severe, around the world. Emerging markets, including Malaysia, witnessed large waves of capital inflows into capital markets, primarily in search of better yield. For our onshore domestic market, we saw the ringgit strengthening following the demand for ringgit assets. Between 2011 to 2013, the ringgit traded at its strongest levels since the Asian Financial Crisis, between 2.90 to 3.30 against the US dollar. FX trading volume also increased, contributing to the overall liquidity of the onshore FX market.

Fortunately, we need to adopt much less drastic measures than those countries that have had to make deep cuts in public sector staffing levels, wages and social benefits in order to stave off the financial collapse of the state itself. And yet, people in Malta continue to expect the Government to hand out money it does not have. This attitude must change, for not only can it lead to bankruptcy, but it is also indefensible on moral grounds. Politicians, trade unions, NGOs and other opinion shapers must explain that we do not have money for everything and that you cannot have gain without pain. The intelligent thing to do is to work together so as to minimize the pain and then ensure that it is equitably shared. In my view, the priority of the welfare state should be to provide equal opportunities for all, but a safety net only for those who need it most. Universality – dispensing free goods and services to all irrespective of income – is a wasteful and unaffordable principle. In the words of the renowned economist, Jeffrey Sachs, “Even playgrounds should collect tolls, when it is billionaires who are playing in the sandpit.” The social welfare system, including health care, has long been identified, including by the European Commission and the IMF, as offering the greatest potential for savings. Effective measures implemented elsewhere which could be adopted range from user fees for certain public services to policies designed to make work pay.
Gold as part of the Swiss National Bank’s currency reserves In my following remarks, I would like to speak about the subject of gold as part of the SNB’s currency reserves. As reported in the media last week, the so-called gold initiative has formally qualified for a referendum vote to be held. This popular initiative demands that the SNB hold at least 20% of its assets in gold, that it be prohibited from selling its gold reserves and that all gold reserves be physically stored in Switzerland itself. The SNB does not generally comment on any political initiatives. However, the gold initiative has a very direct impact on the SNB’s capacity to act. This is why we are taking the opportunity today to present our viewpoint for the first time on the demands of the initiative. The initiators see a high level of gold reserves as a guarantee for currency stability. They fear that the Swiss franc will decline in value and that price stability will be threatened if a large proportion of the balance sheet does not consist of gold holdings. They are also concerned that the SNB’s gold reserves held abroad are not secure and will not be accessible in critical situations. We share the objectives the initiators put forward, such as maintaining currency and price stability and ensuring both the SNB’s capacity to act and its independence. However, the measures proposed to this effect are not suitable; in fact, they are even counterproductive.

First, a supervisory risk assessment which will identify the key risks in banks’ balance sheet; second, a point-in-time Asset Quality Review (AQR) to enhance transparency over asset quality, provisioning and capital; and third, a stress test to examine the resilience of banks’ balance sheet to stressed scenarios. The assessment will conclude with a single disclosure of the outcomes, which will be published before the ECB assumes its supervisory role in November 2014. As the ECB has recently released a communication about this exercise, I will not go into more detail on its features today. Let me however stress that the exercise will be rigorous and transparent and will involve private expert firms, such as external auditors, consultants and specialised asset evaluators. Their presence, together with the announced “strong central governance structure”, will enhance the credibility of the exercise. National Supervisors and private firms involved in the assessment will work within the terms of a detailed framework defined by the ECB and their final output will be subject to a central review to assess their quality and analyse their consistency across banks and countries. We of course do not know what the assessment will find. But we trust that the euro area banks are today better prepared to undergo such an exercise. They are much stronger than in recent years. They have significantly strengthened their capital positions and now compare reasonably well with US banks in that respect.
In a groundbreaking study Rose (2000) estimated that joining a currency union may boost cross-country trade by over 200%. Most economists have agreed with the direction and mechanism behind this – the single currency eliminates the uncertainty related to exchange rate movements and thus diminishes the risk related to foreign trade. However, the estimated scale seems to be much exaggerated. One problematic issue is related to the fact that before the eurozone, we did not have examples of currency unions between developed countries. So the Rose study was based on data on currency unions involving poor and/ or small countries. As noted by Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003), “one does not need to be a eurosceptic to wonder whether such findings are directly applicable to Europe’s single currency”. Follow-up studies (e.g. Rose and Wincoop (2001), Kenen (2002), Persson (2001)) attempted to correct the Rose’s estimates but arrived, rather inconclusively, at anything between a 50% and 150% growth of bilateral trade. Recently, the first studies based on euro area data have emerged. These show that the trade creation effect of the euro has been substantial, although (until now) by an order of magnitude smaller that the original Rose’s estimate (e.g. Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003)). Our knowledge about trade creation effects of the euro is still far from complete and we will probably have to wait another 10+ years to have enough data to draw firm conclusions about its magnitude in the eurozone. Now let me move to the cost side.

Accordingly, the only policy tool left after euro area accession is fiscal policy. For this reason it is of crucial importance to run a balanced budget in the medium run, so that in case of negative shocks, there is room for increasing the deficit, and thus buffer the shock. Additionally, there are also economic forces which can bring the economy back to equilibrium. The most prominent is wage adjustment – after a negative shock, falling wages can help reduce the cost of production and – as a consequence – prices. This will increase demand and help the economy return to equilibrium. A crucial prerequisite for this channel to operate smoothly is a flexible labor market – only if wages adjust immediately, can an increasing unemployment and an economic slowdown be avoided. We know, however, that this downward wage flexibility is rarely seen in real life. Regarding asymmetric shocks, one thing seems certain. We are not able to foresee if serious asymmetric shocks are going to affect the Polish economy after joining the euro or not. We can only speak in terms of probabilities and, given the data, it seems that the probability of huge shocks occurrence seems limited. The Polish economy is strongly integrated with the eurozone, with a majority of exports going to the common currency area. Moreover, most studies (e.g. Fidrmuc, Korhonen 2003, Eickmeier, Breitung 2005) show a relatively high correlation of business cycles between Poland and the eurozone. This substantially reduces, though does not eliminate, the risk of asymmetric shocks.
Something one should always bear in mind, but which I do not intend to discuss further here, is that decisions we make regarding conditions in Sweden must also be incorporated into a broader, European context. There are also a number of questions, particularly with regard to the interplay between macroprudential policy and monetary policy, that sooner or later may need to be dealt with in practice and it would be wise to have thought them through. Coordination... Some of the research into macroprudential policy – which is in general still in its infancy – tries to analyse the importance of coordinating macroprudential policy and monetary policy. The idea is roughly as follows: Monetary policy and macroprudential policy act through largely the same channels. Both the policy rate and most macroprudential tools affect, for instance, credit growth in the economy and developments in various asset prices. This also means that the two policy areas affect one another’s objectives. Monetary policy affects the credit cycle – which was the whole point of “leaning against the wind”, and macroprudential policy has effects on the business cycle. It is therefore desirable to find the right policy mix – the combination of policy rate and macroprudential tools that give the best overall outcome for the economy. The conditions for finding the right mix are normally improved if the two types of policy are coordinated, rather than determined separately. 14 The importance of coordination is also pointed out in more practical economic policy contexts.

Figure 2 Household debt ratio Debt as a percentage of disposable income 350  350  Ireland Spain  300  300  Denmark USA United Kingdom  250  250  Sweden  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0 95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  11  Source: OECD  Countries that have experienced a fall in housing prices in connection with the crisis have also had a fairly severe fall in unemployment (see Figure 3) and in many cases the recovery is still progressing very slowly. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 3 Unemployment Unemployed as a percentage of the labour force, index, 2007 = 100 350  350 Ireland (-47.2 %) Spain (-30.8 %) Denmark (-27.6 %)  300  300  USA (-26.7 %) United Kingdom (-12.9 %) Sweden (0.0 %)  250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50 00  02  04  06  08  10  12  Note. The figures in brackets refer to the fall in real housing prices from the peak to the trough. Source: OECD  It is also worth emphasizing that the countries that have been hit hardest include ones with both stronger and weaker wealth positions than Sweden (see Figure 4).
It is the product of three decades’ work in building strong foundations for the sector to thrive and grow. In reflecting on our journey of developing a vibrant Islamic financial system, imperatives in three areas stand out – Infrastructure; Players; and Talent. Allow me to briefly elaborate on these three areas. First, infrastructure. Similar to developing a conventional financial system, having a robust regulatory and supervisory regime is critical for the development of a strong, resilient and inclusive Islamic financial system. What is unique about Islamic finance is the need for a clear Shariah governance framework to ensure Shariah compliance. In Malaysia, the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 sets out a regulatory framework for end-to-end Shariah compliance. Bank Negara Malaysia is vested with comprehensive legal powers under this Act to regulate and supervise the Islamic financial system. Complementary to this is the role of the Shariah Advisory Council in ensuring greater certainty in Shariah. While our Shariah Governance Framework has met its intended objectives, we are now in the midst of reviewing and strengthening the framework in response to the evolvement of the industry. The Securities Commission Malaysia and the Labuan Financial Services Authority are also vested with similar powers, and are equally committed to building a robust and comprehensive framework for Islamic finance in Malaysia. Our policies also strive to be forward looking and responsive to the needs of the world.

Marzunisham Omar: Supporting the robust growth of Islamic finance in Malaysia Welcoming remarks by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at Malaysia Country Showcase - IFSB Summit 2017, Kuala Lumpur, 22 October 2017. * * * Welcome to Malaysia Country Showcase. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all of you for being here today. I hope that today’s showcase will enhance your understanding of the critical role that professional ancillary services and talent development institutions play in supporting the robust growth of Islamic finance in Malaysia. Indeed, these professional services, which include Shariah consultancy, legal, accounting and talent development, are an integral part that make up Malaysia’s vibrant Islamic finance system. With Islamic finance fast gaining a strong foothold in many countries, Malaysia hopes to be able to contribute to this dynamic phase of Islamic finance development by providing an array of reliable, high quality professional services; one that is backed by decades of experience. Today, Malaysia has a competitive Islamic finance that forms part of the mainstream financial system. Islamic banking assets now account for 28% of Malaysia’s total banking assets, while more than half of our bond market comprises sukuk. We have a diverse range of Islamic financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, which provide competitive, innovative products to meet the varied and unique needs of individuals and businesses. What we have today was not built overnight. The Islamic finance journey in Malaysia has been long and its beginnings were humble.