samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As of 2002, the “implicit inflation targeting regime” was adopted as a strategy of convergence  BIS Review 89/2006  1  with the formal inflation targeting regime and gradually the components of this regime were adopted. In line with these efforts, some changes were made in our Bank’s organization and some new departments have been established, our set of data has been expanded and the decision-making processes have been further institutionalized. By 2005, the monetary policy strategy implemented under the name of the implicit inflation targeting regime had become a regime covering most of the elements of formal inflation targeting and significant achievements had been made in the pre-conditions necessary for a successful transition to the formal inflation targeting regime. In 2006, encouraged by our achievements, the “formal inflation targeting regime” was adopted on time. The new regime necessitated a more institutionalized structure and a higher degree of transparency compared to the previous one. In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the course of inflation and the policy decisions of the Central Bank it is essential to have a good grasp of the framework that we have drawn for the inflation targeting regime. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to highlight some important elements of the formal inflation targeting regime once more in this meeting today. Under this regime, the Central Bank adopts a medium-term perspective. Accordingly, inflation targets are announced for a period of three years.

Rapid changes in exchange rates*  Duration Value at the Top value (days) beginning  % Change  Standard deviation  Beginning Date  Ending Date  15.04.2002  30.07.2002  106  1.2928  1.6966  31.2  1.11  03.12.2002  09.01.2003  37  1.5200  1.6825  10.7  1.00  03.03.2003  25.03.2003  22  1.5962  1.7548  9.9  1.53  24.09.2003  10.11.2003  47  1.3545  1.5048  11.1  0.80  05.04.2004  24.05.2004  49  1.3076  1.5582  19.2  1.18  20.07.2004  21.09.2004  63  1.4293  1.5388  7.7  0.74  08.03.2005  30.03.2005  22  1.2601  1.3905  10.3  1.14  04.05.2006  26.06.2006  53  1.3167  1.7016  29.2  1.61  (Daily change%)  * CBRT indicative USD selling rate  6  BIS Review 89/2006  In this period of fluctuations, in order to ensure the continuation of the downward trend of inflation, the Central Bank used policy interest rates effectively on the one hand, and took the necessary market measures with a view to stopping the fluctuations in the market on the other. First of all, in order to prevent declining foreign exchange liquidity from increasing volatility in the level of the exchange rate, the Central Bank suspended foreign exchange purchase auctions and intervened directly in the market by selling foreign exchange where deemed necessary.
But turning back to banking in the region, even if this scenario is realized, and there must of course be much uncertainty on this, the amount that banks would be called upon to finance would remain very substantial in absolute terms. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the banks will still be playing a key role in mobilizing savings in the region and channeling this into investment. And this makes it even more important that banking systems in the region remain healthy. Of course, foreign banks will play an important financing role, in particular those based in Hong Kong which is the major centre in the region for the arranging of syndicated loans. But within most of the banking systems of the region it is the local banks which predominate in terms of share of assets. The position of Asian banks 10. So let us take a look at the current position of the Asian banks. It is in fact very difficult to generalize because the banking systems in the region are not homogeneous. But certainly if we look at what the World Bank has called the eight “high performing Asian countries”, the Asian banks have been at the heart of the Asian success story2. This is partly due to the emphasis laid by governments on trying to ensure the stability of banks, through prudential supervision and other means, to encourage confidence among savers.

Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala: The strengthening and development of regional bond markets Speech by Mr Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the APEC Business Advisory Council Meeting, Tokyo, 16 May 2003. *  *  *  Lessons from the Asian crisis – a local perspective Thailand’s experience The crisis of 1997 brought to light weaknesses in the country’s financial sector development and the sequencing of liberalization policies. Prior to 1997, the function of financial intermediation fell almost entirely on commercial banks. They mobilized funds mainly through deposits, which accounted for roughly 80 percent of domestic banking liabilities. At the same time, they held almost 70 percent of total financial sector assets, most of which were in the form of credits to the household and corporate sectors. Direct financing through the domestic bond market – through both public and corporate bonds – was relatively small and not well developed. Nine consecutive years of fiscal surplus between 1988 and 1996 provided no incentive for the government to issue regular and substantial amount of government bonds. The resultant limited supply of government bonds inhibited the development of a risk-free benchmark against which to price corporate issues and mark to market daily trading. The crisis brought to the fore an imbalance in the structure and operation of the Thai financial markets. With financing channels limited to bank loans, Thai businesses faced severe liquidity crunch as the banking sector sharply curtailed their credit operations amidst high non-performing loans and massive recapitalization needs.
In this context, we will focus in particular on the possible repercussions of dampened growth dynamics, geopolitical developments, exchange rate and energy price developments, and the pass-through of our monetary policy measures. We will be particularly vigilant as regards the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium-term inflation trends in the euro area. Turning to the monetary analysis, data for October 2014 support the assessment of subdued underlying growth in broad money (M3), with the annual growth rate standing at 2.5% in October, unchanged from September. Annual growth in M3 continues to be supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 growing at an annual rate of 6.2% in October. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was –1.6% in October, after –1.8% in September, showing a gradual recovery from a trough of –3.2% in February. On average over recent months, net redemptions have moderated from the historically high levels recorded a year ago. Lending to non-financial corporations continues to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was 0.6% in October, after 0.5% in September. The monetary policy measures in place and the completion of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment should support a further stabilisation of credit flows.

In this context, early next year the Governing Council will reassess the monetary stimulus achieved, the expansion of the balance sheet and the outlook for price developments. We will also evaluate the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium-term inflation trends in the euro area. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing Council remains unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate. This would imply altering early next year the size, pace and composition of our measures. In response to the request of the Governing Council, ECB staff and the relevant Eurosystem committees have stepped up the technical preparations for further measures, which could, if needed, be implemented in a timely manner. All of our monetary policy measures are geared towards underpinning the firm anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations, in line with our aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2%, and contribute to a return of inflation rates towards that level. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Real GDP in the euro area rose by 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter of this year. This was in line with earlier indications of a weakening in the euro area’s growth momentum, leading to a downward revision of the outlook for euro area real GDP growth in the most recent forecasts.
Christian Noyer: The role of inflation - indexed bonds in the process of setting monetary policy: a central banker’s perspective Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Morgan Stanley seminar on indexed bonds, Paris, 9 June 2004. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, [Dear Friends], It is a great pleasure for me to address you here in the context of the first “Séminaire de Paris” on inflation-linked securities organised by Morgan Stanley. Today, I will focus more specifically on “The role of inflation - indexed bonds in the process of setting monetary policy” from a central banker’s perspective, based on my own experience as the former Vice-President of the ECB and the current Governor of the Banque de France. Throughout my presentation, I will occasionally refer to the monetary policy strategy framework implemented by the Eurosystem in which asset prices, in particular inflation-indexed government bonds, can play a role in the context of our economic analysis. Having said this, I will neither elaborate further on the ECB’s framework nor comment on the last Governing Council’s monetary policy decision. Price indexation of financial contracts is not a new phenomenon. According to Robert Shiller1, the world’s first known inflation-indexed bonds were issued by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1780 during the Revolutionary War. These bonds, the so-called “depreciation notes”, were issued to US Soldiers as deferred compensation for their services. They were mainly designed to deal with severe wartime inflation.

Both initiatives are aimed at promoting the development of index bond funds in the regional markets and, at the same time, enhancing both domestic and regional bond market infrastructure. This is a very concrete initiative, involving the allocation of funds by a considerable number of central banks. These three sets of initiatives use differing approaches and a variety of tools. But they have common aims. One important aim is to identify - through individual studies, experience-sharing, and the practice of fund management - where obstacles exist and how best standards and practices can be harmonised to facilitate cross-border financial transactions within the region. A separate, but parallel  BIS Review 40/2004  3  consideration is the development of financial infrastructure. A number of studies have been carried out to explore the feasibility and desirability of establishing region-wide infrastructure, such as a regional rating agency and regional settlement and payment systems. Apart from the many technical complexities, any proposals for infrastructure on a regional dimension would require thorough discussion among different jurisdictions and rigorous assessment of business viability and impact on the market. Long planning time would therefore be expected before any conceptual proposal could be put into practice. Effective financial infrastructure across the region is a precondition for debt market development within the region. Without it, all of the other initiatives I have described would be about as useful as buying aeroplanes without having the airports in which to land them.
Much has been written of late as to whether costs in Hong Kong are too high. Let me ask you to reflect on the following. Cities such as London and New York have a reputation for being expensive. So also do of a number of capital cities in former communist countries. In a very general sense one can say that London and New York are expensive as a consequence of success as business centres and because, presumably, people still feel that there is value for money there. I leave you to judge whether the others would fit that description; to my understanding, some of them have become expensive for rather different and less palatable reasons. I strongly believe that Hong Kong fits the London-New York paradigm. Actually, our competitiveness (as measured by the real effective exchange rate) is now back where it was in mid-1997 before the onset of the Asian crisis, thanks to the sharp adjustment of property prices and reductions in labour costs, and with help from a strengthening of other currencies, notably the yen. Nevertheless, although costs may now be back closer to their norm, Hong Kong will never be a cheap place. But when you take account of what is on offer here and the high productivity of the labour force, I hope you will agree that you get value for money.

Thus, today, the received wisdom is that central banks should follow clearly articulated policies aimed at a stable monetary environment. This in turn begs the question of how to define a stable monetary environment. BIS Review 135/1999  2  In Hong Kong, a highly open economy with no capital controls, we focus on stability of the exchange rate, but this regime itself requires a flexible economic structure and a sound banking sector. I believe that Hong Kong possesses those attributes, as demonstrated not least by the adjustment of the past two years, and that the peg remains the appropriate regime for us, but I would be the first to admit that it is may not suit others. From the point of view of investors, it is the stability and credibility of macroeconomic policy as a whole which probably determines, or ought to determine, investment strategy. As experience tells us, it can be a costly mistake to pay attention only to particular parts of the policy regime, such as the exchange rate, without scrutinising the wider context in order to be satisfied that the overall design is credible. And so it is my pleasure to help to launch this conference today, and to welcome those of you from outside Hong Kong. We pride ourselves in being a place which offers not only a wide choice of excellent conference facilities but also, more importantly, the critical mass of financial and ancillary services which issuers and investors require - and which many of you here today contribute to.
This will be aided by the fact that the relationship established via the MPF is likely to be a sticky one, and companies are unlikely to shift to another scheme unless there are good reasons to do so. This does not mean, however, that MPF providers can afford to provide a bad service. If they do, they will destroy goodwill and make it more difficult to sell other products. The cross-selling opportunities provided by the MPF are not theoretical. There are already signs that it is making an impact on sales of other funds to individuals. As your Association recently announced, the fund penetration rate in Hong Kong has risen from 7.8% to 10% in a year. This is a creditable performance in view of the weakness in the stock market. One of the reasons for the increasing willingness to invest in funds is undoubtedly the low return now offered by bank deposits. However, it also appears that the marketing of the MPF over the last year has helped by focussing employees' attention on the attractions of funds for long-term savings purposes and on the need to plan for retirement. The role of the regulators I have talked so far about the involvement of the banks in MPF business. In practice, however, the role played by banks themselves is mainly to act as intermediaries, selling and advising on MPF schemes. The various MPF services – trustee, administrator, custodian and investment manager – are generally provided by other companies which may be related to the bank.

Deregulation has been the catalyst – the more cynical would say the excuse – for banks to introduce fees and charges on deposit accounts. Most banks have also introduced tiered savings accounts, with higher interest rates being paid on larger balances. Sometimes the rate depends on the range of the bank's products and services that the customer uses. The converse is that some banks are now paying less than the standard rate on small deposits. A further innovation is that in a few cases there are savings products that are linked to HIBOR. Banks have not rushed to pay interest on conventional current accounts, though some have offered combined savings and deposit accounts that pay interest. At least one bank offers an auto-sweeping service from savings to current accounts. Such products are effectively offering interest on current accounts. Generally speaking, the amounts deposited in the innovative current and savings accounts are still quite small. Perhaps the biggest surprise so far has been that some of the banks have been able to lower their benchmark savings account rate to 1.75%, which is probably 25bp below what it would have been without deregulation. A few years ago, when the debate about deregulation was taking place, the conventional wisdom was that the savings rate was artificially depressed and would rise closer to time deposit rates after the cap was lifted. So far this has not been the case. Indeed, it appears that the interest rate rules effectively imposed a floor as well as a cap.
In the event of a deviation from the inflation target, the Riksbank has to decide how soon monetary policy should bring inflation back to the targeted rate. If this is done too quickly, it will exact a cost in the form of instability in the real economy and in financial markets. If it takes too long, on the other hand, inflation will fluctuate markedly, with the risk of a rising trend or even genuine deflation. Against this background, early this year the Executive Board elaborated on the inflation target and stated that, under certain specific circumstances, the Riksbank has reason to be more flexible in its interpretation.3 When I presented this to the Standing Committee in more detail 3  See Riksbank memorandum: ‘The Riksbank’s inflation target – clarification and appraisal’, 4 February 1999. 9  BIS Review 61/1999  last March, I noted that it amounted essentially to a codification of monetary policy practice in recent years. That is also what I have described today. There is another matter I want to take up concerning monetary policy and its result. It has to do with the outturn for 1998, when the annual change in the CPI was 0.4 per cent, while UND1X rose only 1 per cent and in some months was also outside the lower band limit. Could not an alternative interest rate policy have succeeded in preventing such a low outcome for underlying inflation?

The SNB will continue to monitor developments on the mortgage and real estate markets closely, and to assess whether further measures are necessary to mitigate the risks to financial stability. Page 3/3
In this context, we conducted an intensive process of dialogue with banks to monitor and manage this risk, which so far remains contained. Third, 2022 was characterised by an intensive wave of cyber-attacks against the most critical sectors in Albania, including the banking sector. The focus of our analyses and examination was cyber risk. We increased the requirements for banks to invest in optimum management of this risk. The banking sector has intensified its diligence towards protective systems and preventive measures and has strengthened its capacities for monitoring and neutralisation of cybernetic attacks. In spite of these challenges, developments in 2022 were positive for the banking system. Financial intermediation has continued to expand, financial results have been positive and at comparable values with the previous year, the capital adequacy ratio stood at 18% showing a considerable ability of the banking sector to withstand risks; while the non-performing loans ratio dropped close to 5.0%. Our regular analyses on systemic risks to the banking system, show these risks remain contained. Further consolidation of banking activity was also an important development in 2022. OTP bank purchased the shares of Alpha Bank in Albania, bringing the number of banks in the Albanian banking system to 11. Beyond monitoring the soundness of the banking system, we have oriented our work towards the further strengthening of banking supervision and consolidating resolution plans.

Monetary conditions are almost identical: three and six months Libor and Euribor rates do not differ by more than 50 basis points. I strongly believe that those three features – speed, innovation and cooperation – allowed central banks to play a decisive part in containing the crisis and limiting its impact. Has the crisis changed our vision of central banking? The credit bubble has already extracted heavy costs on our economies and the welfare of our citizens. All must be done to avoid the repetition of such developments. Bubbles are however complex phenomena: hard to detect, hard to prevent, hard to fight. Can we do better in the future and what contribution can central banks bring ? The crisis has revived the old, but ongoing, debate on whether monetary policy should aim, or not, at ensuring financial stability in parallel to its main objective of price stability. The arguments are well known, on both sides. New ideas are being brought, regarding, in particular, the impact of monetary policy on overall maturity transformation and leverage inside the financial system. It is desirable and healthy that this discussion takes place. Let me give you my own reflexion, at this stage: •  The primary and dominant objective of monetary policy should remain price stability. Any dilution of this fundamental mandate would be take us back three decades and be extremely detrimental to our welfare and prosperity in the long run. •  Without prejudice to this primary objective, all mandates allow for consideration of other objectives.