samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The same applies to outstanding government debt. Thus, since the start of EMU, investors have been able without any difficulty to borrow and lend funds in euro, and to trade their euro securities on the secondary market. Looking ahead, it is likely that over time international investors will start to hold a greater proportion of their portfolios in euro-denominated assets than they held in the former national currencies. In other words, the role of the euro as an international currency is likely to be greater than that of the sum of its components. One reason why this may be the case is that the economy and the financial markets backing the euro are large relative to the world economy. In this regard, one of the key elements influencing the international use of the euro is the creation of a large, liquid and integrated capital market in the euro area. As for trade, the existence of a large capital market will also encourage and facilitate the use of the euro in international transactions. In particular, many euro area exporters and importers, who did not previously use their own domestic currency for invoicing, may now take the opportunity to do so with the euro. The same tendency could gain ground in those countries that have close economic ties with the euro area or which have chosen to peg their currencies to the euro. This brings me to some considerations on the use of the euro in the official sector.

But the fact that the Eurosystem does not have an exchange rate target does not imply that we are indifferent to exchange rate developments or that we will neglect them. The exchange rate of the euro is monitored within the second pillar of our monetary strategy as a potentially important indicator for monetary policy. If its development poses a threat to price stability in the euro area, the causes of this development will be assessed and appropriate measures taken. With regard to the use of the euro as an international currency, the Eurosystem has adopted a neutral stance: we will neither hinder nor actively promote the international role of the euro, but leave its development to market forces. We observe that the euro is already second only to the US dollar as the most widely used currency in the world, ahead of the Japanese yen. In general, the international use of a currency is determined by several factors. Private agents may use a currency for international trade and investment, as well as for pricing and denomination purposes. In the official sector, it is used as an  BIS Review 116/1999  6  anchor for exchange rate pegs, for holding foreign exchange reserves and for the conduct of foreign exchange intervention. The successful changeover to Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) played an important role in promoting the role of the euro. During the so-called changeover weekend, the bulk of bonds, shares and other financial instruments were re-denominated in euro.
While consumer spending has held up well in the past two years, it is expected to gain momentum as the economic environment brightens. Consumption will thus continue to support growth, though it will probably cede pride of place to more cyclical components such as capital expenditure and exports. It will benefit, in particular, from the gradual improvement that will be seen on the labour market. At this stage of the economic cycle, of course, we must first expect gains in productivity, which means that unemployment will only decline slowly. Nevertheless, here too, the medium-term outlook is now good. The scenario for a recovery that I have presented is, needless to say, full of imponderables. The risks are everywhere. They may take the shape of an uptrend or a downtrend. We can thus not rule out the possibility that the international economy will show more robust growth than anticipated. A swift build-up of inventories, for example, would appreciably accelerate the cycle. But the downside risks could also be triggered at any time by new political disorders. Given the significant internal and external imbalances throughout the world, such unrest could fuel greater volatility on the currency and equity markets. The strength of the recovery is also uncertain. In the United States, the economic recovery, which has been driven largely by tax breaks, is not yet firmly in place; households, labouring under a heavy debt burden, may be frightened by the slow pace of job growth.

Ladies and gentlemen, at the end of my speech I declare the Ninth Conference on Payment and Securities Settlement Systems open, and I wish the chairman, Mr Michiel van Duveren and his colleagues, a successful Conference. Finally, I wish you all a pleasant stay, hoping that you will take with you nice memories of Ohrid, the city with thousands of years of history and beautiful nature that attract the tourists from all over the world. Тhank you very much for your participation in our Conference. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
We will have a better internal base for making decisions. In addition, if we manage to succeed in communicating how we see the driving forces behind economic developments and also the objective and effects of monetary policy, it will also be easier for others to assess how new information will affect the future development of the repo rate. If it becomes clearer to the general public and financial market agents how we view future interest rate developments, this will give us better tools for influencing expectations of the future repo rate. By affecting expectations of short-term interest rates, we as the central bank can also indirectly affect interest rates with a slightly longer duration, which in turn increases the effect of monetary policy. As I said, monetary policy largely works by influencing expectations of future repo rates. When we based our forecasts on market expectations of the repo rate we could only indirectly express our view of the interest rate path by commenting on market pricing. For several reasons this was not very clear. One reason is that there is no clear-cut method for measuring expectations of the repo rate on the basis of market pricing. Different securities differ from one another with regard to duration, credit risk and liquidity, which makes the calculations complicated. Different calculations give different results without any of them being clearly better than the others. Another reason for the lack of clarity was that market expectations could change quickly.

The SNB has therefore emphasised the importance of diversification and limiting the concentration risks of our foreign currency investments. Today, 53% of the SNB’s FX reserves are invested in euro-denominated securities. This is in line with the share of Swiss exports to the euro area, and only five percentage points more than our allocation three years ago, though the size of our FX reserves, excluding swaps, increased from CHF 50 billion in 2008 to over CHF 225 billion by the end of September 2011. In order to promote further diversification, in 2010 the SNB added four new currencies to its reserves, namely Australian and Singapore dollars, Danish krone and Swedish krona. As a result, in addition to euros and these four currencies, the SNB’s portfolio is now composed of 26% US dollars, 9% Japanese yen, 5% pounds sterling and 4% Canadian dollars. Central banks generally have large holdings of government bonds due to their need for liquidity. As is widely known, in recent months the ratings agencies have been reviewing or have downgraded the credit ratings of many sovereign bonds. Despite this turn of events, approximately 96% of all our investments in fixed-income assets are rated AAA or AA. In closing, I would like to emphasise that we are actively exploring and monitoring new asset classes and currencies in developed and developing markets. The aim of this process is to continually reduce concentration risks and to further diversify the SNB’s FX reserves.
This situation has nothing to do with the appeal of our bank secrecy, as many believe, but with the abundance of savings and the high degree of price stability. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the average interest rate on three-month Swiss franc deposits – 1.4% – has been less than half the rate for euro deposits. If Switzerland were to give up its monetary independence by pegging the franc to the euro or by joining the euro area, Swiss interest rates would increase to European levels. Since higher interest rates mean lower asset prices, lower levels of investment, and also higher mortgage rates, the Swiss are, understandably, not keen on giving up their national currency. A major decision of this kind would have to be approved in a public referendum in Switzerland; the prospect of EU and euro membership in the near future is thus highly unlikely. Conclusion Having chosen the option of free trade and free movement of capital, Switzerland is, in many respects, better prepared than others to take advantage of the greater opening of borders brought about by globalisation. To be sure, this is no easy ride, as international competition always necessitates painful adjustments, and Switzerland is no exception in this respect. Given our openness, we are immediately affected by a slowdown of the world economy. On the other hand, as in the current circumstances, we can take full advantage if worldwide business activity is healthy. When we take stock of the last few years, the bottom line looks favourable.

This is why I particularly want to thank Emilio Ontiveros for his dedication, not only in today’s book, to popularising these subjects among those not necessarily expert in the matter. b. Re-designing national policies Yet to attain their maximum effectiveness, improvements in global governance should be matched by national economic policies conducive to ensuring the benefits of globalisation reach all citizens. Indeed, while globalisation has general equilibrium aggregate effects that are admittedly positive, it may also have an adverse impact – as Professor Ontiveros states in his latest work – on specific sectors and groups. It is important to attempt to minimise these effects. Improvements in education and active employment policies providing for the readier redeployment of the unemployed are an essential element in this challenge. The impact of population ageing should also be prioritised by the authorities. Specifically, social insurance systems will have to progressively adapt so as to make sufficiency and intergenerational equity compatible, and for the sake of their own financial sustainability. Broadly, in the setting described, the greatest challenge facing public policies is the proper selection of instruments that may effectively attain the goals set and minimise the potential adverse effects. In this respect, public policies designed on the basis of the evidence available on their effects coupled with arrangements to regularly assess these policies will be crucial. Further, many national policies should be designed with international coordination mechanisms, if they are truly to be effective.
An important lesson learned from the current crisis is that price stability alone is not sufficient to ensure financial stability. Therefore, financial instability or crisis can occur even in the environment of stable prices and well-anchored inflation expectations. This implies that to ensure overall economic stability, central banks will need to go beyond the primary objective of price stability and to systematically embrace financial stability as another policy objective. The relevance of this dual mandate has become very clear in the last few years, in light of the global financial crisis, implying greater roles and responsibility for central banks. The second implication from the global crisis is that, under the new globalisation underscored by more integrated financial markets, the major source of risk and instability that central banks will have to deal with to ensure stability will be external. Typically, this includes the impulse on domestic inflation from global prices, especially fluctuations in commodity prices. Another is the risk to financial stability steming from unintended consequences linked to the spillover effects of policies implemented by other economies. But for most emerging markets at this time, the most serious external risk is the challenges posed by large and persistent capital inflows. The first challenge involves a macroeconomic dilemma that centres around the tension between appreciation pressures, inflation dynamics, and growth prospects. The second stems from financial stability concerns associated with potential build-ups of macroeconomic imbalances, risk of asset price bubbles, and the possibility of an abrupt reversal of inflows.

Jean-Pierre Roth: The position of the Swiss franc exchange rate in the Swiss National Bank monetary policy strategy Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, 19 December 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The exchange rate is an important factor in determining the domestic price level in Switzerland. Nevertheless, it is not a monetary policy goal for the Swiss National Bank and is only relevant insofar as it has an impact on future inflation. Our concerns about our currency's weakness should not be read as a hidden form of exchange rate policy but rather as genuine concern about future price stability. A sustained tendency to weakness on the part of the Swiss franc could trigger inflationary effects that – sooner or later – would have to be countered with monetary policy instruments taking the form of interest rate measures. In the medium-term, this could lead to a reduction in the interest spread between the Swiss franc and the euro. BIS Review 151/2007  1
So disturbances in credit and payment systems can be costly for society and the costs are not primarily the direct consequences that measures of support will have for government finances. The essential consideration instead is the costs that a collapse of credit and payment systems may entail indirectly in the form of decreased production and higher unemployment. When payments and the supply of credit do not function efficiently, the rest of the economy also suffers. That is the main reason why governments are more concerned about the bank sector than they are about other service industries. To appreciate what happens when credit and payment systems are disrupted, one can just take a look at what happened as a result of the financial crises that occurred around the world in the last two decades. There are, unfortunately, numerous examples that can serve as illustrations. The International Monetary Fund has estimated that since 1980, serious problems in the bank sector have arisen in three out of four of its 180 or so members. This has been case in the industrialised world, where one example is Sweden in the early-1990s, as well as in emerging markets. Bank capital bases relatively small There is a variety of factors that could be cited as possible causes of these disturbances. They include shortcomings in economic policy, inadequate supervision and, in many instances, poor risk management by the players themselves. But the roots of the problem go deeper than this. The basic issue is the financial system’s vulnerability to unforeseen events.

Claes Norgren will be talking later on about the proposals for new rules. I should like to acknowledge that the task of achieving such a far-reaching reform of the international capital adequacy standards is by no means easy. Quite apart from the exceptional technical complexity of the substantive issues, it is not always evident how the political and cultural differences that nevertheless exist can be reconciled. BIS Review 9/2000  4  I know that Claes Norgren’s international efforts have been most valuable and appreciated around the world. Permit me to conclude by congratulating the Director General of Sweden’s supervisory body on his successful work. 5  BIS Review 9/2000
This reduces the probability that a negative event will trigger a severe financial crisis. It is not optimal to be fully insured against crises because the insurance premium would be too high. But the financial crisis demonstrated that the imbalances ahead of the crisis were unsustainable and that they could have been reduced through regulatory improvements. The reason that this did not occur may be that the risk had taken on the form of several interwoven imbalances that no single authority had the power to correct. Banking and financial market regulation will be enhanced in Norway and abroad. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), as mandated by the G20, will soon issue recommendations for strengthening regulation of banks’ capital and liquidity management. In the UK, the regulatory authorities have already drawn up new banking regulation. A natural consequence of the financial crisis is that increased weight is given to ensuring system-wide stability and not only the stability of individual banks. Other important questions are whether systemically important banks should be subject to tighter regulation and how to reduce the procyclicality of bank behaviour. BIS Review 163/2009  3  Recommendations from the Basel Committee and the FSB will be examined by national authorities that will subsequently adopt new regulation. In a world with a global financial market, there are limits to how far a single country go it alone. International coordination is important for new regulations to have the intended effect.

The Chinese government was not willing to allow its currency to float freely and the exchange rate against the US dollar was managed. This disabled an important stabiliser and contributed increasing world trade imbalances. Long-term interest rates remained low in spite of substantial monetary policy tightening in the US between 2004 and 2006. International organisations such as the BIS, OECD, IMF and others noted on more than one occasion that growing imbalances in the world economy were a source of concern. But economic policy decisions are the prerogative of national governments. Given the policy pursued by China, there were probably limits to what monetary policy in Western countries could in reality achieve in terms of rolling back these forces. Increased private saving in the US and other deficit countries would probably have required monetary policy tightening sufficient to push up long-term interest rates. Alternatively, a substantial increase in public sector saving would have been necessary. Both alternatives would probably have led to an economic policy driven downturn. It is demanding to pursue such a policy based on the proposition that a crisis might occur in the future. Improved financial regulation would probably have reduced the severity of the financial crisis. Regulation and insurance have similar features: in most cases an annual premium must be paid in the form of slightly lower growth. This occurs because capital is not allowed to flow entirely freely to the highest yielding vehicles. In return, regulation can counter the build-up of financial imbalances.
1.5  Draft Budget macroeconomic forecast  The macroeconomic forecast underpinning the Draft Budget expects real GDP in Spain to fall by 11.2% in 2020, followed by growth of 9.8% in 2021. In the fiscal sphere, it envisages a correction of 3.6 pp in the general government budget deficit between 2020 and 2021, from 11.3% of GDP this year to 7.7% of GDP next year. In such an extraordinarily uncertain and changing environment as the present one, we need to be especially cautious when assessing these forecasts and comparing them with those made – mostly at different moments in time – by other analysts. In my view, three points should be highlighted. First, the starting point for this Draft Budget, which is none other than the forecasts made for the current year. In general, these are consistent with those published by the Banco de España in our latest projections report. In particular, the scale of the possible fall in GDP in Spain in 2020 – 11.2% according to the macroeconomic forecast underpinning the Draft Budget – is more or less mid-range between the two projection scenarios presented by the Banco de España in September, which envisaged a decline of 10.5% under scenario 1 and of 12.6% under scenario 2. This is also true for the budget deficit estimated for 2020 in the Draft Budget forecast, which is 11.3% of GDP, virtually mid-range between the deficit envisaged under scenario 1 (10.8%) and scenario 2 (12.1%).

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Open doors to the changing payments landscape Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the 12th Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures "Open doors to the changing payments landscape", hosted by the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, Ohrid, 3 June 2019. * * * Distinguished guests, excellences Ladies and gentlemen, good morning It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the 12th Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures hosted by the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia. Through the years, the organization of this conference has benefited from the invaluable contribution and unreserved support of the Dutch Central Bank, for which I express my deep gratitude. The presence of the European Central Bank, the Bank for International Settlement and the European Commission is an inherent feature of the conference, as well. And we are privileged and grateful for that, given the prominent role these institutions play in the area of payments. Financial technologies and innovations are reshaping the financial sector, creating new providers, business models, new products and solutions, thus changing the entire financial ecosystem. It is not imaginary, but rather a real possibility today, with a few swipes on a smartdevice, to be able to track payments across accounts, control direct debits, find a better credit card, compare household bills, or cancel unwanted subscriptions or consents.