samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But rules can be too simple.19 They must be used only as points of reference, not as excuses for doing nothing. Economic policy rules should be common knowledge. An independent body should be established to tell us when we are “speeding”, and procedures must be in place to implement measures to solve the problem.20 The new "Fiscal Compact" in the euro  17  See Berg, Qvigstad and Vonen (2011) Two essays on the magic number 4 , Staff Memo 2/2011, Norges Bank, and Llewellyn and Qvigstad (2012) The “Rule of Four”, The Business Economist, Vol 43, No. 1. 18  The financial sector faces risk involving probabilities of various outcomes that we can forecast fairly accurately. But it also faces genuine uncertainty, where probabilities are also unknown. We do not know all the possible outcomes of bank behavior or the real probabilities. Such uncertainty is more effectively managed using simple and robust rules, rather than rules that are as complex as the systems they are meant to regulate. 19  The psychologist and Economics Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman touches on this theme in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Allen Lane, 2011) (see e.g. page 98). Kahneman points out that the application of heuristics – simple decision-making rules often used to find answers to difficult questions – may produce answers that are imprecise or wrong. The use of heuristics may be regarded as a way of substituting complex questions with simple ones.

Maximum stability in output could, on the other hand, result in sharp fluctuations in the rate of inflation and erode the credibility of the monetary regime. A point somewhere midway between the two extremes must therefore be found. Consequently we cannot be called "inflation nutters" as Mervyn King, deputy governor of the Bank of England, once said. Let me also stress the importance of central bank independence. In order to be successful with the implementation of an inflation target approach, the central bank needs to be able to act independently of day-to-day party politics and to set interest rates continuously according to the specified inflation target. Otherwise a credibility problem may arise because it would be hard for policymakers to convince the general public of monetary policy's long-term nature. Following the changeover to a flexible exchange rate in 1992, monetary policy in Sweden was directed towards an explicit and quantified inflation target. The decision rule by which our monetary policy is usually guided is in fact quite simple. It states that if the forecast rate of inflation 1-2 years ahead is above 2 per cent, then normally the repo rate should be raised and vice versa. The reason why we chose this target horizon is that an adjustment of the monetary stance takes time to exert its full impact on inflation and the macro economy in general.
It is balanced and reasonable: the risk sensitivity of the prudential framework has been preserved thanks to a large-scale retention of the internal model approach, which was one of our main concerns. Moreover, trust in the internal models will be strengthened by greater oversight, while the increase in capital requirements will remain moderate and spread out until 2027. Banks were rightly calling for long-term strategic visibility for their regulatory framework: they now have it. The agreement that we have negotiated relies on a strong commitment to implementation by the main jurisdictions, including the United States. The European Union must of course keep its word with regard to implementation and the timetable. Additionally, we are confident about the rapid completion of the current discussions on the standardised approach to market risk. The first version of  Page 2 of 6 the text, published in 2016, would have entailed ex post an unjustified and excessive increase in the capital requirements for market activities. The ACPR has since then actively participated in the work of the technical Market Risk Group of the Basel Committee. The new rules proposed in the document currently submitted for consultation should permit a return to the impacts initially sought ex ante, i.e. an average increase of 20% to 30% in the minimum capital requirement for market risks. Beside regulation – thus clarified – and microprudential supervision, macroprudential policies now round off in many countries the financial stability trifecta.

Central Bank of Chile March 2019  CBC-IADB Joint Workshop on “Basel III in the Context of the Macroprudential Approach” Opening Remarks by Mario Marcel, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Santiago, Chile – March 29, 2019 Good morning and welcome to the “Basel III in the Context of the Macroprudential Approach” workshop which is co-organized by the Central Bank of Chile and the Inter-American Development Bank. It is a pleasure to host this event in Santiago, at a very appropriate timing. After a year and a half of legislative discussion, on January 12th of this year, the new General Banking Law was enacted. This is the most significant change to solvency regulations since 1986, setting the basis for the implementation of the Basel III framework in Chile. A second reason goes back 35 years. In a few more days, the Central Bank will receive the last repayment of the subordinated debt originated in the rescue of the Chilean financial system of the early 1980s. It has been a long way since this episode, and the fact that only now can we finally put it behind us, highlights the importance of doing everything in our reach to prevent the occurrence of major financial disruptions. Allow me to go briefly over the history of the Chilean financial system over the last five decades, and how regulation has reacted and evolved over time. Some 50 years ago, banks where almost the only source of financing for companies and households.
7 [23]  emerging economies, as well as in the major oil-producing countries, contributed to the downward pressure on interest rates. This is because the large current account surpluses in these regions have been invested on the global capital markets, resulting in low real interest rates. The falling trend in real interest rates may also be due to a reduced willingness to invest. In an article that has attracted much attention, the famous American economist Robert Gordon claimed that the pace of innovation has declined sharply since the 1970s. 6 In his opinion, growth between 1870 and 1970 was abnormally high thanks to relatively simple and growth-promoting innovations, such as electricity and the combustion engine. According to Gordon, it will not be possible to repeat this growth as today’s innovations, such as the Internet and mobile technology, he says, do not provide any major productivity gains in the long term. A reduction in global willingness to invest may thus be due to a slower pace of innovation. This means there are fewer profitable projects in which to invest. ...but there may also be other reasons According to the theory of secular stagnation, the falling real interest rates may be a sign of a shortage of investment opportunities for companies. But has this actually been the case? One way of investigating this is to study the return on companies’ capital stock. Figure 4(a) shows the real return on capital in the US between 2000 and 2016.

Jean-Pierre Roth: International monetary policy 2005 Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 19. Internationales Zins-Forum - Zinsen 2005, Frankfurt am Main, 6 December 2004. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The major central banks reacted to the lacklustre global economy in 2002 by relaxing the monetary policy. The low money market rates in 2002 and 2003 were appropriate for a recession. They are not, however, indicated for a sustained and global upswing. This is why several central banks began to steer their monetary policy back to a normal course in 2003 and 2004. The tempo of monetary policy normalisation obviously depends on the progress of economic recovery, which leads to different reactions in each country. In this rather favourable climate, oil prices began to soar in 2003. However, there is no reason to fear a repeat of the dire consequences witnessed during past oil crises. On the one hand, the rise in oil prices comes at a time when the economic environment is much more stable than it was back then. On the other hand, strong global economic growth drives up oil prices. In order to ensure price stability, a normalisation of economic activity must be accompanied by a normalisation in the interest rate policy. The latest oil price hike has no bearing on this basic premise.
Andres Lipstok: Estonia’s economic environment and central bank activities Speech by Mr Andres Lipstok, Governor of the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank), at the the presentation of Bank of Estonia’s 2008 Annual Report to the Riigikogu, Tallinn, 11 June 2009. *  *  *  Dear Riigikogu, Thank you for the possibility to present you Eesti Pank's 2008 Annual Report. I am going to start with a brief retrospect of the Estonian economic environment and then address issues concerning the activities of Eesti Pank. The Estonian economic environment in 2008 and 2009 2008 was an exceptional year in the world economy. Developed economies have not faced the risk that banking and financial markets could collapse and the global financial system stop functioning since the beginning 1930s. But the financial crisis, which was caused by previous years' incorrect decisions, made this a very likely scenario. In the final months of the past year major banks were too afraid to lend money to each other and trading with privatesector bonds nearly ceased. Loss of confidence in financial markets, loan losses amounting to 3-4 billion dollars and a sharp decline in crediting the private sector had an immediate impact on global trade, investment and economic growth. Global trade contracted 17% in the fourth quarter of 2008 and at the beginning of this year. Major central banks and governments have taken unprecedented steps to alleviate the economic situation.

It is clear the events that took place at the end of the last and at the beginning of this year were real challenges for the Estonian monetary and financial system, testing their resilience and ability to adjust to the changing external environment. Today I dare to look at the situation with moderate optimism and repeat what has already been said in March: Estonia has all the possibilities of successfully passing through the crisis. BIS Review 91/2009  1  Estonia's monetary policy and financial stability in 2008 Turning to the tasks of Eesti Pank, I would like to start with an overview of the functioning of the monetary policy framework. The objective of Eesti Pank, member of the European System of Central Banks, is to ensure price stability in Estonia. To this end, we rest on the currency peg to the euro, the currency board arrangement and the EU exchange rate mechanism ERM II. The success of this system is confirmed by the slowdown in the price rise which started in 2008, and the halt in the growth rate of consumer prices in recent months. Looking ahead, Eesti Pank forecasts the price level to decline somewhat in both this and next year. It is clear the Estonian monetary policy or the monetary policy framework will not and must not be changed. The exchange rate of the Estonian kroon will remain as it is and we will accede to the euro area at the current exchange rate.
Instead, the decision whether to act depends on whether appropriate tools can be deployed to limit the size of a bubble and whether the benefits of acting and deploying such tools are likely to exceed the costs.”12 On the other hand, there is a financial stability case for doing more purchases in the current context. To the extent that risky behaviors and incipient asset price bubbles are fueled by an expectation that interest rates will be “low for long,” asset purchases that strengthen the economic recovery and bring forward the date of liftoff should promote financial stability. Also, to the extent that asset purchases increase the likelihood of a sustainable recovery, this reduces the financial stability risks associated with a Japanese-style outcome of chronic deflation. Although the costs specific to the asset purchase program appear well-contained, it is also true that the costs increase as the program gets larger. In part, this is due to fact that as the balance sheet increases in size, the risk of a period of low or zero remittances to Treasury also increases. As we acquire more longer-dated assets funded with reserves, the Fed takes on more interest rate risk. This is how the policy works. A byproduct is that our net income and remittances will be unusually elevated for a while, then are likely to fall substantially for a period, before returning to more normal levels. This is because our interest expense will increase substantially when we begin normalizing rates.

Instead, the industry must continuously evolve to meet the needs and preferences of its consumers which are rapidly changing. It must proactively and strategically position itself to offer products via diverse and innovative delivery channels to reach out to different segments of the population with varying levels of financial knowledge. In this regard, under the LIFE Framework, the Bank envisions the market share of regular premiums/ contribution products sold/ marketed via non-agency channels to exceed 30%. Currently the ratio is 14%, and this statistic provides compelling evidence that the industry must double its effort to reach the target of 30%. Similarly, for us to expand the penetration rate to reach 75% by 2020, the industry must add and expand the reach of its non-agency channels. Throughout the world today, financial inclusion has been identified as an important area of focus to achieve a more balanced and sustainable economic growth. Societies that are adequately empowered and supported by suitable financial tools can assist in helping them cope during temporary period of emergencies. Empirical evidence showed that microinsurance customers can be as valuable as a company’s any other customers. This is where the industry can play a major role to develop suitable microinsurance/ takaful products that would enhance the social safety net of this underserved segment enabling them to get back on their feet and become financially independent even after experiencing an adverse event. Yet many in the industry appears uninterested in microinsurance/ takaful for reason that it is a loss making venture and uneconomical to pursue.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Insurance supervision - looking beyond Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 24th International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Annual Conference 2017 "Insurance Supervision: Looking Beyond", Kuala Lumpur, 2 November 2017. * * * Welcome to Kuala Lumpur. We are delighted to host the 24th IAIS Annual Conference. The last time this conference was held in Southeast Asia was 14 years ago. Bank Negara Malaysia has a very long and productive association with the IAIS. Not long after the IAIS was established in 1994, a new insurance legislation was enacted in Malaysia. This was a watershed event, changing the course for development of the industry. A deep and comprehensive reform was instituted and the course was set to modernise the insurance sector in Malaysia. I recall how useful the Insurance Core Principles and other IAIS standards were in helping to shape our regulatory approach and supervisory practices. As a market with a long history of global insurers operating within our borders, we also benefited from arrangements that enabled us to better supervise cross-border activities. These arrangements have continued to strengthen over time, culminating most recently, in the IAIS Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding. We are therefore delighted to host this event in Southeast Asia, where the deepening of insurance markets remains key to support economic risk management and broader development goals for this region. Looking beyond… This brings me to the theme of this conference, “Looking beyond”.

Yiu-kwan Choi: The debt market of Hong Kong - what can we offer to investors? Keynote address by Mr Yiu-kwan Choi, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the third Annual Asia Pacific Bond Congress, Hong Kong, 13 June 2006. *  *  *  Mr. Shale, distinguished guest, ladies and gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to speak at this year’s Asia Pacific Bond Congress. On behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, I would like to extend my warmest welcome to everyone here today, especially those of you who have traveled from afar to visit us. I would like also to thank Euromoney for organizing this excellent event, and for organizing it in Hong Kong for the third time. It is a clear recognition of the important role of Hong Kong - Asia's World City, in the bond markets of the Asia Pacific region. Like many other financial markets, the bond markets in the Asia Pacific region have recently seen plenty of new developments, challenges as well as opportunities. I am glad to see that the Congress has rightly covered many of these latest issues, and I am sure that for those who were here yesterday would have learnt from my colleague, Ms Julia Leung, about the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s efforts in enhancing regional cooperation.
Climbing the Jobs Ladder Speech given by  Andrew G Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England  Glanford Park Stadium Scunthorpe 23 July 2019  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Lena Anayi, Shiv Chowla and Doug Rendle for their help in preparing the text. I would like to thank Shaheen Bhikhu, Delma Essel, Rebecca Freeman, Tomas Key, Clare Macallan, Steve Machin, India Rimmer, Michael Saunders, Ali Schomberg, Joann Spadigam, Silvana Tenreyro, Anina Thiel, Jan Vlieghe and David Young for their comments and contributions. This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is fantastic to be here at Glanford Park Stadium, home of Scunthorpe United Football Club. I remember as a boy learning about how Liverpool legends Kevin Keegan and Ray Clemence started their careers here. Cricketing legend Sir Ian Botham started (and ended) his professional football career here too. A couple of weeks ago, my home town Guiseley entertained Scunthorpe in a pre-season friendly. Scunthorpe won 2–0. Off the football pitch, it has not been all wins for Scunthorpe recently.

19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  Chart 22: Occupation job ladder 100% 90%  8 7  80%  6 5  70%  4 3  60%  2 1  50%  0 -1  40%  -2 -3  30%  -4 20%  -5 -6  10%  -7 -8  0% 1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  Sources: ONS and Bank of England calculations. Notes: Chart shows percentage of jobs moves based on extent of upward or downward movement along the occupational job ladder. During the crisis, we would expect a larger number of moves down the industry and occupational ladder. There is some evidence of that, with the lower tail (grey zone) fattening and the upper tail (red zone) thinning a little. Thereafter, as the jobs market recovered, we would expect a fattening of the upper tail (red zone) and a thinning of the lower (grey and blue) zones. There is no real evidence of that. The zone of small rung movements has remained fairly static. We get a similar story if we look at the company destination for jobs moves, ranked by productivity. We would expect to see workers move down the productivity ladder during downturns and to rescale that ladder during upturns. The first part of that story is borne out in the data. Rates of productivity gain from a job switch fell from around 8% pre-crisis to around 3% afterwards.
I think this criticism is also undeserved, because the alternative of lending indiscriminately to unknown clients (into which many banks have indulged) has proved to be even worse. Turning to the behavior of foreign-owned banks during the recent crisis, the evidence is also mixed. On one hand, it is true that international banking groups are the ones which easily spread the contagion (Goldberg, 2009). Even in the absence of abrupt deleverage, foreign-owned banks had to cope with much diminished foreign financing and shifted from financing the private sectors to financing the public sectors of their host countries. Despite the reductions in monetary policy rates, credit in domestic currency remains sluggish at best. For the time being, however, it is fair to say that foreign parent banks have maintained their support for the branches and subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. Most of them had not been engaged into trading sophisticated instruments such as derivatives, so that this type of losses has been relatively contained. It has also helped that the banks present in the region are not major global players, so that contagion is often limited. On the other hand, many of the banks had been involved into financing the real estate boom, and the ensuing losses are only gradually being recognized. As a conclusion to this paradigm, the dominance of foreign-owned banks proved to be both an asset and a liability and it is too early to draw a final balance before the international financial crisis is over.

These CoCos can be converted into CET1 equity or written off in order to absorb losses in current operations. When accumulating the necessary bail-in instruments and high-trigger CoCos, banks have the opportunity to replace existing instruments with the required higher-quality instruments. The further strengthening of resilience through the accumulation of high-trigger CoCos, as foreseen by the regulations, is important and necessary. One reason for this is the big banks’ loss potential, which continues to be substantial relative to their capitalisation. Given their Page 1/3  Berne, 15 December 2016 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  significance to the Swiss economy, it is important that the big banks remain adequately capitalised, even in the event of such losses occurring. A second reason is the critical assessment by the markets as regards the resilience of banks, both in Switzerland and worldwide. By strengthening their resilience, banks can convince the markets of their soundness. The likelihood of share price collapses and sharply increased premia for credit default swaps, such as those observed at some banks this year, would thus be reduced. In addition to a strengthening of resilience, it is also essential that the big banks further improve their resolvability. This requires both sufficient holdings of bail-in instruments and the formulation of credible emergency and resolution plans. Emergency plans are aimed at ensuring that, in the event of imminent insolvency, functions that are important for Switzerland can be maintained.