samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have already published a preliminary report last year. We are now in the process of updating this report and most likely during the summer or at the end of the year we will be ready to publish more definitive results. But there are findings that are already in the paper that was published last year that are interesting. First, we know, and it was explicitly evidenced in the paper, that the reforms at least provided for a financial system that was more resilient than at the beginning of the financial crisis. Banks were better capitalised, better funded, and this was done globally. It was not only done by some jurisdictions rather than others but banks were more resilient globally. It is also true that banks have continued to lend to households and businesses during the COVID-19 crisis, which is a very important difference as compared to what happened in the previous crisis. Even today, if you look at the solvency and liquidity ratios of banks, they are still very high, much higher than before the global financial crisis. Of course, disentangling whether the effects of this increase in resilience were basically the consequence of our reforms or the consequence of the fact that in this crisis, as Athanasios was emphasising, monetary and fiscal policy were very active, is very difficult. There has been extraordinary support for households and firms.

And secondly, because the Spanish parliament was prepared to approve some of the harshest and most difficult measures adopted in Europe to rapidly reduce the budget deficit. But the task is by no means complete and, therefore, the responsibility of Spain’s parliamentary forces remains of paramount importance. True, the countries that required financial assistance have more problems to resolve, but in their favour they have precise programmes of measures agreed with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union with which they must unfailingly comply. If they fail to do so, they will be withdrawn. They know perfectly well what they have to do and when they have to do it. In our case the responsibility is greater, since we ourselves must decide on the content and timeframe of the reforms and that means we must be capable of adopting the right measures for exactly as long and as intensely as required, and over a sufficiently short timescale so as to convey to all the firmness of our resolve to overcome the crisis. Let us turn to the most important and pressing tasks facing us: to bring about far-reaching change in the legal and institutional framework for employment, to comply with the deficit-cutting plan and to complete the restructuring of the financial system and the overhaul of savings banks. Nothing is more necessary for improving the well-being of workers and of all Spanish citizens than reducing the unemployment rate and raising productivity so that wages may grow at a higher rate.
But here I am, and what I thought I would do this morning is to try to provide some sort of UK macro-economic context for your discussion of the challenges facing the West Midlands by first looking backwards at some of the trends that we have seen over recent years and then trying to anticipate how those trends might evolve. People often tell me that retrospection is a sign of old age. But as I reflect on my 40 years at the Bank of England I am increasingly conscious of the remarkable change that has occurred over that time - in fits and starts certainly, but in the same general direction - from a heavily administered economic and financial system to one which is much more market based. Post-war controls on resource allocation had been largely dismantled before I started at the Bank. But the financial system was still governed by all kinds of direct controls - exchange controls, credit ceilings on bank lending - coupled with directional guidance, the queuing of equity issuance and business restrictions - on the activities of building societies, for example; and there was direct intervention in the wider economy through prices and incomes policies and public ownership of large parts of industry, and so on. But all of that has now gone. It's true that plenty of regulation remains reflecting public policy concerns relating to competition and consumer and environmental protection, employment conditions, health and safety standards, and so on - indeed it has intensified in these areas.

Gazi Erçel: The role of the euro from the Turkish standpoint  Speech by Mr Gazi Erçel, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, made during the 6th International Financial and Economic Forum, held in Vienna on 9 November 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank the organizers of this conference for inviting me to share my thoughts on the euro’s role as seen from the Turkish point of view. Of course, the introduction of the euro is affecting not only the economies that are members of the European Union but also non-member economies that have close links with members. These include emerging market economies much of whose trade and financial transactions is with European Union members. Those whose external debt is largely denominated in European Union currencies will be affected the most. Even though Turkey is not yet a member of the European Union, it has close ties with countries that are. Not only does Turkey carry on a large volume of foreign trade with EU members, it is also the only candidate for membership that has entered into a customs union with the EU, signed at the end of 1995. Turkey’s close relationship with EU countries and the present role of the euro in the Turkish economy are illustrated by the following: •  Europe is Turkey’s largest trading partner.
In its latest report on Croatia6, the Commission has released the assessment showing that both household and corporate debt are within prudential levels, though still above the levels suggested by the economic fundamentals. The risks are moderating, but remain relevant mainly related to high concentration of corporate debt, exposure to currency risk and potential solvency risk for companies due to the high debt burden relative to corporate financial assets and equity. 5  European Commission Country Report Bulgaria 2019 Including an In-Depth Review on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 6 European Commission Country Report Croatia 2019 Including an In-Depth Review on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 10  Chart 12. Private debt to GDP by countries  Source: IMF Global debt database. Overall, private debt appears sustainable in most CESEE countries, though risks still remain. External environment remains challenging, making the region vulnerable to economic downturn, capital flows reversals and sharp tightening of financial conditions globally. In the event that monetary and financial conditions remain easy for too long, it may stimulate excessive risk-taking and build-up of financial stability risks. This calls for authorities in the region to maintain and further strengthen macro-prudential frameworks, if needed, to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance resilience to shocks. 11  *** The second issue that we tackle in this note is the phenomenon of “missing inflation” and the “wage–price puzzle”.

Moreover, much of this was funded by short term capital inflows. When the asset bubble collapsed the banks and the companies or individuals who had borrowed foreign currency to finance the investments were unable to repay. The problem was compounded by the depreciation of domestic currencies that increased the real burden of debt repayments. •  Second, banks in a number of economies were ordered or persuaded by governments to lend heavily to companies that were not commercially viable. This “policy” lending destroyed the banks’ incentive to exercise credit judgment and allowed the companies concerned to become overleveraged and thus vulnerable to economic downturn. 1  BIS Review 53/1999  •  Third, over-exposure to connected parties was endemic in some economies. Such lending is not usually made at arm’s length and will seldom satisfy normal credit criteria. •  Fourth, partly because much lending in the region was politically influenced or insider in nature, there was not much opportunity to develop a proper credit culture or adequate credit skills. Name lending and relationship lending were widespread. This went hand in hand with an over-reliance on collateral whose value of course diminishes sharply when asset values collapse - assuming of course that the security can be enforced in the first place, which has certainly not been the case in countries such as Thailand. •  Fifth, a feature of the lack of credit skills was a failure to recognize bad debts and to face up to the full scale of the bad debt problem.
Equally, the policies of the industrialised countries were aimed at ensuring a sufficient level of total demand to maintain stable inflation, and so desired levels of output and employment. That required policies to stimulate domestic demand and current account deficits to offset the surpluses elsewhere. The perverse result was huge flows of capital from the poorer developing economies to the richer mature economies. Large amounts of savings flowing into global financial markets would by themselves have pushed down real interest rates. That, together with the success of central banks in the industrialised world in maintaining low and stable inflation – something that they had not been able to do in the preceding three decades – meant that nominal interest rates fell even further. As a result, nominal risk free returns fell to levels not seen in a generation. The combination of a fall in risk-free returns, and large amounts of capital looking for a home in western capital markets, created a demand for assets offering higher returns – the socalled search for yield. Investors, including banks, overlooked the fact that higher returns could be generated only by taking higher risks. As a result, money was lent on easier terms. That helped to push up further asset prices that had already risen as real interest rates were falling. It also led to an explosion in the size of the financial sector as new instruments were created to satisfy the search for yield.

Irma Rosenberg: The objective of monetary policy Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a meeting arranged by Öhman Fondkommission, Stockholm, 14 February 2006. *  *  *  A discussion has recently taken place in the media on the objective of monetary policy. Some have argued that we should have more objectives while others considered that we already work with too many objectives and that this has created a lack of clarity. In my opinion this discussion is a bit misleading. We have one objective: keeping inflation low and stable. However, in our efforts to achieve this objective, we have, like many other central banks, opted to be flexible to avoid exposing the economy to strain. Our statutory objective is to maintain price stability. It has been left to the Riksbank to decide on the detailed interpretation of this objective. We have defined it as meaning that inflation should be 2 per cent. However, monetary policy affects the economy with a time lag and is simply not precise enough to maintain inflation at a constant 2 per cent. The inflation target includes a tolerance interval of +/one percentage point to underline that temporary deviations are permitted, provided that these are not too large. For further clarity, we apply the principle that in the event of any deviation, inflation should normally be brought back to the target within a two-year period. When we set the interest rate, we must accordingly base our decision on an inflation forecast.
The pace of recovery however varies across regions. Though global conditions have improved, recent developments in Europe have once again unsettled financial markets as doubts have arisen over the fiscal sustainability of several countries in the Euro zone. These episodic concerns serve as broad reminders that the world economy still faces serious challenges as governments, financial institutions and corporations adjust to the new realities of greater prudence, tighter market conditions and lower tolerance for weak governance and excessive leverage. 4. In Asia, economic growth has rebounded strongly above pre-crisis levels and become more broad-based. Fundamentals in Asia continue to be strong, boosted by robust domestic demand, healthy balance sheets and strong resurgence in intra-regional trade. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Asia is expected to grow by an average of 7.1% in 2010 and 2011, up from 3.4% in 2009. Having reformed and restructured their economies following the Asian Crisis a decade ago, Asia was better positioned with less fiscal imbalances or corporate excesses to emerge faster from the downturn. Prospects for sustained growth in ASEAN are also good. Its outlook is enhanced by continuing efforts to create an integrated single market by 2015. With improved trade links with the two Asian giants – China and India, ASEAN will become an even more dynamic and vibrant region within Asia. 5. The GCC countries too enjoy solid growth prospects, and look set to achieve around 5% GDP growth in 2010 and 2011, according to the IMF.

They have implemented broad-based development strategies to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons and harness new growth drivers. While the energy-related sector will remain an important  BIS Review 84/2010  1  pillar in Asia-Middle East relations, we should develop other complementarities between the two regions such as in financial and business services, infocomm technology and media, infrastructure development, tourism as well as green technology and life sciences. 6. In this respect, the linkages between Singapore and the GCC have deepened. We have signed the milestone GCC-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Singapore companies, such as Capital and in Bahrain and UAE, Changi Airport International in Saudi Arabia, Keppel Corp in Qatar and SembCorp in UAE and Oman, have secured about $ billion of projects in the GCC. In addition, a strong cluster of Middle Eastern banks, such as Arab Bank, Emirates NBD, First Gulf Bank, National Bank of Kuwait and Qatar National Bank, is already based in Singapore. Quite a few are looking to expand their operations in trade finance and wealth management to capitalize on new growth opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region. 7. By strengthening linkages at all levels, the Middle East and Asia can then complement each other’s development and seek out new growth areas for mutual benefit. Inter-regional platforms have been established to achieve this; for example, the Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED) and the ASEAN-GCC Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Singapore recently.
They were accompanied by what I think of as "re-regulation" that is to say more formal and structured regulation of both the prudential behaviour and standards of conduct of virtually all financial services activity targeted more specifically at both institutional stability and consumer protection but, subject to that, leaving the market to do its job. Such regulation in the UK has now been consolidated in a single, over-arching, financial services regulator, the FSA (Financial Services Authority). The Bank of England remains responsible for macro-prudential  BIS Review 48/2001  1  oversight, that is to say the stability of the financial system as a whole, including oversight of payments systems. But we are no longer responsible for prudential banking supervision at the micro-level. The re-regulation process, of course, conforms with the access provisions of the WTO and with internationally-agreed standards agreed within the IMF. It incorporates the minimum standards of banking supervision agreed (and now subject to revision) under the Basel Accord. It incorporates, too, those measures that have so far been agreed at the regional, European, level relating to a wider range of financial services activity in the context of progress towards the single financial market.

In particular, it has led to a “search for yield” by investors who have been seeking more profitable and riskier investments. This is evidenced at least by three facts: increasing leverage, the high share of debt at risk and the relatively high valuations of certain assets. Now the current phase of ultra-loose monetary policy is coming to an end. In the US, after seven years of interest rates around the zero lower bound, monetary policy is being normalised. Other advanced economies, such as the UK or Canada, have also started to raise interest rates. Regarding the euro area, the ECB Governing Council anticipates that, subject to incoming data confirming the medium-term inflation outlook, net asset purchases will come to an end in December 2018. In this context, two main developments in international financial markets warrant attention as, in my view, they might currently pose key threats to financial stability and global growth. First, the economic and financial situation of some emerging markets is under pressure as a result, among other factors, of the combination of monetary policy normalisation and strong fiscal stimulus in the United States. Last summer financial conditions in most emerging market economies were tightened, giving rise to considerable outflows and steep exchange rate depreciations, particularly in Argentina and Turkey. This sharp market reaction should be a reminder of the risks that the normalisation of monetary policy at the global level could entail, in particular for those countries that have accumulated macroeconomic imbalances.
From peak to trough, stock prices fell by more than 60% and a group of Asian economies contracted by an average of about 6.2%, not far from the 8.3% fall during the Asian Crisis. Exports fell by  BIS Review 133/2009  1  over 30%, and intra-Asian exports fell even more sharply, by over 48%. These are far worse than even during the Asian Crisis. There was no de-coupling. Just as the fall was swift and sharp, the initial rebound has been rapid and strong. One quarter after the trough in the present cycle, Asia’s GDP grew by 9.4% on a quarter-onquarter basis, more than twice of the 4.3% rise after the Asian Crisis. Exports have also rebounded swiftly, lifted in part by the sharp increase in shipments to China. While the outlook has improved, the sustainability of the recovery is not clear at this point. With this uncertainty, managing the cyclical recovery of Asian economies presents several challenges. A withdrawal of government stimulus measures too early risks stifling the recovery, while a withdrawal too late could result in inflationary conditions. A series of carefully calibrated actions will be needed. Moreover, many analysts and fund managers now hold the view that emerging economies, while not de-coupled, will still grow significantly better than advanced economies for some years to come. Hence, there has been a re-rating of assets in emerging economies.

The exchange rate has been relatively stable after the adjustment that took place in the first half of last year, and the króna is currently somewhat stronger than historical measures would warrant, although it should be admitted that determinism is probably not the most suitable approach for assessing currency developments. One reason for uncertainty about the exchange rate is the large current account deficit, as well as the fact that it can easily be driven by factors over which we have no control, given how closely Iceland’s financial sector is now integrated with global financial markets. A central bank with a legislative and regulatory remit to target inflation is of course pleased with such inflation developments, but would prefer them to be built on a more solid foundation. Domestic demand growth has declined, but rather more slowly than the Bank had hoped. The current account deficit is large and will also contract more slowly than the Bank would have desired. Demand remains buoyant in the housing market and there are indications that the rate of credit growth may be on the increase again. For these and other reasons, the Bank will remain on the alert and not ease its monetary stance until even clearer signs emerge that a lasting change has been established. Equity prices have soared in Iceland in recent years.
Conducting ON RRPs for same-day settlement with a broad range of counterparties – including primary dealers, money funds, government-sponsored enterprises, and banks – allows the Federal Reserve to provide a safe, liquid investment to a wider range of money market participants than those able to earn IOER, and thus expands the universe of counterparties that should generally be unwilling to lend at rates below those available through the Federal Reserve. The increased competition that the availability of this instrument provides should help to firm the floor on the level of short-term interest rates – that is, the rate beneath which market participants should theoretically be unwilling to lend funds. Indeed, ON RRP exercise results over the first year suggest that the operations have been successful working with IOER in establishing a floor on the level of key money market rates (Figure 5). 11  6  A reverse repurchase agreement (reverse repo, or RRP) is a type of temporary OMO in which the Desk sells a security from the SOMA portfolio to an eligible counterparty with an agreement to repurchase that security at a specified price at a specific time in the future. It is economically equivalent to a collateralized investment with the Fed in which the difference between the sale price and the repurchase price, adjusted for the time between transaction legs, implies a rate of interest paid by the Fed on the cash invested by the counterparty.

This operating framework changed as the financial crisis deepened. By December 2008, the FOMC had lowered its target for the federal funds rate from a point target of 5¼ percent in mid-2007 to a target range of zero to ¼ percent. With the federal funds rate and other shortterm interest rates effectively at the zero lower bound, the FOMC’s operating objective for OMOs was expanded to include adjustments in the size and composition of the Federal Reserve’s securities portfolio. In particular, the FOMC initiated large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), agency debt, and later longer-term Treasury securities, in order to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The expansion of the domestic securities portfolio that resulted from LSAPs vastly increased the supply of reserve balances in the system (Figure 1). 4 Importantly, in October 2008, the Fed was granted authority to pay interest on depository institutions’ reserve balances. 5 In an environment of elevated reserve balances that resulted from the Fed’s asset purchases, the payment of interest on excess reserves (IOER) – currently at a rate of ¼ percent – has kept the overnight federal funds rate within its target range (Figure 2).