samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indeed, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has reiterated that the pandemic has not altered the central assumption that firms cannot rely on LIBOR being published after the end of 2021.3 In fact, the FCA has said that even though LIBOR will continue until then, announcements about its end could come as early as this November or December.4 The Financial Stability Board (FSB)—which is chaired by Randy Quarles, the Federal Reserve Board’s Vice Chair for Supervision—has also emphasized that the pandemic should not prevent firms from removing any remaining dependencies on LIBOR by the end of 2021.5 The Alternative Reference Rates Committee (ARRC), which is the private-sector committee convened by the Federal Reserve to facilitate the transition away from U.S. dollar LIBOR, has recommended that floating-rate notes, syndicated loans, consumer loans, and securitizations should already include definitive fallbacks to cope with the end of LIBOR, and has set target dates by which no new LIBOR-based products should be issued.6 The ARRC also has provided a timeline and resources to ensure that vendors and operational systems are ready for the switch to alternative rates.7 Why? Because having a LIBOR transition office and a high-level plan is not enough. Do not underestimate the operational, technical, legal, communications, and risk management work that will be required to move existing transactions off of LIBOR and prepare to use an alternative rate. It will take time and resources, and the price of failure or delay in any of those areas could be high.

We successfully  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  completed the FAST TR QR Code studies so that the FAST system would be used as an alternative payment method for shopping. Moreover, we launched open banking services to allow our banks to provide services through the Open Banking Gateway (GEÇT) infrastructure. Thus, we provided technical support to our Liraization Strategy with innovative solutions we developed, which contribute to the execution of payments and money transfers anytime, anywhere in a smooth, rapid and secure way. In 2022, we also took major steps in the field of financial innovation. Our bank pioneered the establishment of the Digital Turkish Lira Collaboration Platform, building a consensus with related institutions. Additionally, we took steps to further widen the Digital Turkish Lira Collaboration Platform in 2023 to include selected banks and financial technology companies. In 2022, we continued to keep a tab on climate change developments, one of the top priorities on the global agenda. In line with our country's "2053 Net Zero Emission" and "Green Development" targets, we took a role on national and international platforms to contribute to the combat with climate change in the fields that fall under our Bank's remit. In the period ahead, we will continue to monitor the economic and financial implications of climate change and sustain our cooperation with national and international stakeholders on this matter.
2  BIS Review 72/2002  Chairman, I could go on reflecting on our own experience of all this - but I'm conscious that the weekend beckons - and the relevant question is how it all relates to the development of the single financial market across Europe. The potential benefits of integration I take for granted. The continuing debate is about how - given that we all start from different positions and with different traditions and with different public policy priorities, we get from here to there. It may well be that continuous public pressure for higher and higher standards in financial markets everywhere are leading to greater official intervention any way. But integration was itself always bound to involve more intervention as the EU member states moved towards some degree of harmonisation of standards, requiring legal agreement at the European level and then reflected in national legislation. And a great deal of progress has, of course, already been made in that direction through the Financial Services Action Plan which is due in principle to be completed in 2005. But everyone accepts that a great deal remains to be done - in the context of the integration agenda - and in fact it is bound to be an ongoing process as markets evolve and new issues arise. In that context the recent agreement on Alexandre Lamfalussy's proposals for a faster track procedure in securities markets has been generally welcomed. But the on-going debate extends beyond that to where more precisely we want to get to.

I'm grateful to you for giving me the opportunity to join you this afternoon and I wish you and the European single market in financial services every success. BIS Review 72/2002  3
Also, we cannot exclude the possibility that we will have to intervene substantially again. From the beginning we made it clear that enforcement of the minimum exchange rate was associated with risks. We are endeavouring to reduce the balance sheet risks through suitable diversification of our foreign currency investment. However, the exchange rate risk on the foreign exchange reserves is based on monetary policy considerations and the SNB is therefore obliged to bear it. My colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will talk about the management of the foreign exchange reserves in his remarks. Through its monetary policy, the SNB serves as a buffer for the Swiss economy and cushions the effect of severe shocks. Because it has a long-term focus, it is in a position to carry substantial risks. This means we can react flexibly in exceptional situations in order to fulfil our mandate, which is to ensure price stability while taking due account of economic developments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Moreover, the persistent contraction in the tourism sector and the gradual decline in the favorable effects of commodity prices are likely to cause some increase in the current account deficit in the short term (Chart 14). Esteemed Guests, As you all know, food, energy and import prices also play a great role in inflation forecasts. Therefore, before moving on to forecasts, I will briefly talk about our assumptions regarding these variables. We revised our assumptions for crude oil prices for the upcoming period upwards compared to 7 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  the July Inflation Report, while our assumptions for USD-denominated import prices saw some downward revision (Charts 15 and 16). As depicted on the slide, in terms of annual averages, we kept our oil price assumption constant at 44 USD for 2016, and increased it to 54 USD for 2017. On the food front, food inflation remained far below the level envisaged in the July Inflation Report due to unprocessed food inflation in the third quarter of 2016. Taking account of the current trend of unprocessed food inflation as well as the decrease in the demand for food stemming from the fall in tourism revenues, food inflation, which we assumed to be 8 percent by end-2016 in the July Inflation Report, was revised downwards to 6 percent.
Il Sole 24 Ore: The EU plan to help Greece relies on bilateral aid from EMU countries and on the involvement of the International Monetary Fund. The ECB was clearly against the IMF participation. What do you make of the EU plan? Trichet: I was not against the IMF involvement in itself. I was against the involvement of the IMF alone. I have always been in favour of the maximum level of responsibility exerted by the governments of the euro area as is prescribed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The pact is at the very heart of EMU: it calls for member countries to assess and judge the fiscal policies of their peers; this peer’s surveillance can impose sanctions. In the days preceding the EU meetings, I called all governments to live up to their treaty responsibility and to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact which is essential for the EMU to function well. From this point of view, the declaration of the euro area Heads of State or Government is appropriate. It is also a good and workable solution. Il Sole 24 Ore: Do you expect it will be used? Trichet: At this moment in time I don’t expect this mechanism to be necessary. Greece should proceed with its recovery program in a very determined way as committed in front of the Eurogroup. Il Sole 24 Ore: Is a default of Greece a distinct possibility as some commentators seems to expect?

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Corporate governance developments in Singapore and the region Speech by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, Minister for Education and Second Minister for Finance, at The OECD Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable, Singapore, 27 June 2007. *  *  *  Introduction Good morning and a very warm welcome to Singapore. It gives me great pleasure to be here at the OECD Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable. The last time the Roundtable was held in Singapore was in 2001, and we are happy to be able to host this important international gathering once again. 10 years after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, this year’s Roundtable gives us a good opportunity to do a stock-take, to see where we are now and identify the areas where we must continue to move forward in the region. Avoiding complacency in a benign economic environment The macro picture amongst the Asian countries is vastly improved. The Asian economies are by and large showing strong growth, driven in large part by increased trade and investments both within Asia as well as with the rest of the world. Investor confidence is back. Capital inflows are back to the levels that existed before the Asian crisis. And strong inflows of portfolio capital and foreign direct investments have replaced bank lending as a dominant source of capital inflows. Last year, the ASEAN-5 countries, for example, attracted some $ billion of foreign direct investment, significantly greater than the $ billion seen in 1997.
In total, around 20 persons are usually present at the meeting. What happens at a monetary policy meeting? There is an agenda which states the order in which we will discuss the different items. The meeting usually begins with a brief update on how the financial markets have developed, including market expectations of the repo rate with regard to our meeting, and other new, important information that has been received in the last few days. This is followed by a summary of the main elements in the Monetary Policy Report or the Monetary Policy Update. After these introductory words from the civil servants, I and my colleagues go on to discuss economic developments over the coming three years. First we deal with economic activity and inflation abroad and in Sweden. Each person puts forward his or her view of the current economic situation and how the interest rate needs to be adjusted to attain the inflation target. There is no predetermined order as to who will begin the discussion. The discussion is fairly free at this stage. During the course of the process each one of us has formed his or her own opinion, but of course the formal decision is not made until the actual meeting. The Chairman of the Executive Board usually concludes by summarising the discussions held  8  BIS Review 77/2008  and what proposals have been put forward regarding the current interest rate. After this we move on to the decision and vote.

As at Q4 2018, halal exports amounted to RM40.0 billion or only 4 percent of total Malaysian exports, of which halal exports by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for a mere 8.4 percent2. To capture the market, businesses in the halal industry need to be agile and be quick to respond to changing consumer preferences and behaviours. This means business practices and processes need to be re-calibrated to be more aligned with sustainable expectations. Similarly, quality enhancements are given expectations in terms of product offerings, using a more current and efficient distribution channels and payments methods. In conjunction with Japan Olympic 2020, for example, there is a strong demand for halal products with high traffic of tourists, supporters and spectators. Companies which are able to satisfy the high bar placed by Japan on production, quality, safety and health aspects, will be able to open up a series of medium to longer term opportunities to export to other countries. As such, securing a suitable financial solution to upgrade and upscale production to meet the demand and requirements, would be an important prerequisite for businesses. Recognising these key success factors, recent announcement by Government to introduce The Halal Industry Strategic Development Programme, or ‘be-Halal’ — under the National Halal Council Secretariat to drive the growth of the halal industry is timely.
And the Obama administration is seeking to inject a further fiscal stimulus, incorporating not only the widely expected extension of the Bush administration tax cuts, but also a temporary cut in payroll taxes. The extension of the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase programme has proved controversial, with some US critics asserting that it is inflationary and policymakers in some of the emerging  2  BIS Review 169/2010  economies claiming that it is both an attempt to engineer a beggar-my-neighbour devaluation and that it will boost capital inflows and foster asset-price bubbles. These criticisms seem to me mostly off the mark. Central banks undertake asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank money in order to boost nominal spending. They do that by depressing a range of longer-term real yields and raising asset prices. The earlier phases of quantitative easing both here and in the United States indeed appear to have lowered longer-term nominal and real yields below where they would otherwise have been. 2 This time around, the transmission channel has been rather different, as after falling on the anticipation of further asset purchases, longer-term US yields rose. But the policy should only prove inflationary in the medium to long run if it results in excessive nominal spending growth, which hardly appears likely at the current juncture. Only if the Federal Reserve fails to tighten policy promptly as the recovery takes hold is excessive inflation likely to be a problem. The criticisms from outside seem to me almost as misplaced.

Stress tests provide an assessment of whether the capital buffers held by banks are sufficient to absorb losses in a stress. So they are well suited to guide the calibration of countercyclical capital buffers. The Bank of England is developing a countercyclical approach to annual stress testing of banks. Rather than applying a constant level of stress from year to year, the severity of the stress would vary with the cycle. It would increase as risks build up and decrease after they have abated or crystallised. The parameters of the scenario – falls in GDP, asset prices, employment etc – would be most severe during periods of exuberance when credit and asset prices were growing quickly and the financial system was least concerned with risk. The parameters would be less severe when exuberance had evaporated and prices had corrected, which is often the time when the system is most risk averse. We aim to develop this approach over the next three years, starting with the 2016 stress test. Along with a regular assessment of data and indicators it will be a key part of a forward looking, data driven approach to setting the UK’s countercyclical capital buffer for banks. We have set out more details in a recent Bank paper.2 As always, one issue will be assessing the costs and benefits through time in so far as that is practicable. Another is where to set the countercyclical capital buffer in different parts of the cycle to enable it to be relaxed at times of stress.
Imported goods become more expensive, and inflation in Norway remains high. Chart 3 Frequent devaluations in Norway Krone exchange rate. Index 8.4 Krone in terms of the currency basket index Currency band for the exchange rate target Devaluations  8 Weaker krone  7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6  Stronger krone  5.6 1973  1976  1979  1982  1985  1988  Source: Norges Bank – Historical Monetary and Financial Statistics  Norges Bank  Economic perspectives 2023  4  The devaluations reflect a well-known economic policy problem. The authorities can draw up a long-term plan, such as maintaining a fixed exchange rate. But because it will be tempting to deviate from the plan to reap short-term gains, any promises to stick to it are of little value. In the economics literature, this is called the “time-inconsistency problem”. 3  A new monetary policy framework emerges Over the following decades, economic reforms are implemented in both Norway and other countries. Many of the changes are directly motivated by the experience of the 1970s. It had turned out that it was difficult for the authorities to commit to an objective of price stability. It had also proved impossible to bring about a permanent decrease in unemployment by pursuing an expansionary monetary policy over time. Eventually, such a policy will only cause wages and prices to surge. And if high inflation becomes entrenched, it can be costly to bring it back down.

But we must be vigilant towards any significant increase in longer-term inflation expectations. If high inflation gains a foothold, it may prove more costly to bring it down again, as experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. When my predecessor stood here last year, Norges Bank embarked on a gradual normalisation of the policy rate (Chart 7). But when inflation accelerated over spring, it became clear that the policy rate was no longer appropriate for the economic situation in Norway. Over summer and autumn, we raised the policy rate faster and in larger steps than had been the norm. As mentioned, the main driver of the jump in inflation has been higher prices for energy and imported inputs. So why does it help to raise the policy rate in Norway, some might ask. We cannot influence energy and commodity prices. But by softening demand, we can help avoid price increases for those prices spilling over to other prices and wages, and ushering in a period of high inflation. Chart 7 The policy rate was raised rapidly Policy rate. Percent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2001  2004  2007  2010  2013  2016  2019  2022  Source: Norges Bank  Norges Bank  Economic perspectives 2023  9  Chart 8 Inflation does not come down on its own Consumer price index subcomponents. Four-quarter change.
However, indicators still pinpoint to existence of significant gaps compared to EU-28 in this area. Improvements in fiscal institutions, fiscal rules, public-private partnership, foreign financing partly in form of grants, improvements in public investment management frameworks are some of the possible “remedies” that might generate improvements in the infrastructure in the CESEE region. When it comes to the private sector, the focus has been put on innovative companies, which can fill the gaps in more sophisticated investments that can elevate the potential growth of the economies. Given the more limited access to banking finance for this corporate segment, alternative sources of financing are being explored, which requires concerted policy and private sector action in further and stronger development of financial markets and mobilizing available finance in a more efficient way. Bibliography 1. Transition Report 2015-2016 “Rebalancing Finance”, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2. Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe - How to Get Back on the Fast Track?, Regional Economic Issues May 2016, International Monetary Fund. Winds of Change: Investment in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, European Investment Bank, September 2017. 3. The Western Balkans: Reviving up the Engines of Growth and Prosperity, World Bank Group, 2017. 4. Report by the Working Group on Capital Markets Union, 2018, London. 5. Iorgova, S., Ong L.L., (2008), “The Capital Markets of Emerging Europe: Institutions, Instruments and Investors”, IMF working paper No. 08/103, International Monetary Fund. 6.

Based on this analysis, in the third part of my speech I will describe the wide-ranging regulatory measures taken at international and national level to resolve ‘too big to fail’. Let me just present our own conclusion up front: In Switzerland, the response was quick, targeted and, at the same time, cost-effective. On the one hand, the regulatory amendments strengthened banks’ resilience, reducing the likelihood of a bank getting into financial distress. On the other hand, they introduced measures aimed at ensuring that even a systemically important bank can exit the market in an orderly way in the event of a crisis. We are convinced that the Swiss big banks and the Swiss banking system are much more weatherproof today than they were ten years ago. Many of the planned measures have already been implemented. Page 2/14  However, we have still not quite achieved our objective. Only once the agreed measures have been fully implemented will the conditions for resolving ‘too big to fail’ in Switzerland be in place. The ‘too big to fail’ issue So what is behind ‘too big to fail’, and what concrete form does it take in Switzerland? a) ‘Too big to fail’ institutions must be bailed out in a crisis ...  As I mentioned at the start, ‘too big to fail’ means that an individual institution is so important that the state is under a de facto obligation to bail it out in a crisis. This state obligation arises under two conditions.