samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Recall that one of the key attractions in working for a particular organization is association with people who are liked and respected. Do people like  2  See Corporate Executive Board, Research Reveals That Integrity Drives Corporate Performance: Companies With Weak Ethical Cultures Experience 10x More Misconduct Than Those With Strong Ones, Press Release, September 15, 2010. See also Anthony Salz, Salz Review: An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices, 189‐191 (App’x C) (discussing the impact of culture on two archetypes of employee behaviors, and collecting sources). 3  Somewhat tautologically, the proof of a good culture might be the absence of bad behavior. As Bill Dudley, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has observed: “How will a firm know if it is making real progress [on culture]? Not having to plead guilty to felony charges or being assessed large fines is a good start.” William C. Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry, Remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry, October 20, 2014. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and respect leaders who lack integrity? Good luck attracting top talent in that kind of organization. A third key component in a strong ethical culture is values. Most firms elaborate rules of proper behavior, often in well‐crafted codes of conduct. In some large, complex organizations, the rules can be difficult and tedious, like the rules for conflicting interests and for avoiding trading on insider information.

It is having a negative impact on world trade and on confidence among households and firms, which may lead them to postpone consumption and investment decisions. In the financial markets, the increased uncertainty is driving up both risk premia and volatility. That said, the main short and medium-term impact of the war stems from the fact that Russia and Ukraine are major commodity producers, particularly of energy and metal commodities in the case of Russia and agricultural commodities in the case of Ukraine. Given that Europe is a net importer of energy and depends, therefore, on Russian gas and 1  oil, the climb in energy prices not only generates inflationary tensions, but by raising the external energy bill it also reduces household income. Moreover, monetary policy normalisation, which is needed to moderate inflationary pressures, has already led to a tightening of financial conditions in the economy. This scenario could reduce households’ and firms’ ability to pay, particularly among those experiencing a slower or tardier recovery from the pandemic. The impact of these shocks on households is also very uneven, with lower-income households being hit the hardest. Lastly we should not forget that the war may also affect operational risk in the banking industry, in light of the potential growth of cyber attacks. This deterioration in the macro-financial situation stemming from the Russian invasion of Ukraine has led us to revise down our economic forecasts for this year and next, and to significantly raise our inflation projections for this year.
Fast economic growth does not happen without shaking a society's economic, social, cultural, political and institutional equilibria. This 'shaking' is both a condition and a consequence of  economic acceleration. It is both an effect of economic, social, cultural, political and institutional disruption and a cause of economic, social, cultural, political and institutional disruption. This is not a moral judgement; it is a statement of what I believe is a sober understanding of the state of affairs. In the well-known words of the Foreword to the Second Edition of Liquid Modernity, the late Zygmunt Bauman, remarks that “Forms of modern life may differ in quite a few respects – but what unites them all is precisely their fragility, temporariness, vulnerability and inclination to constant change.” Bauman’s “liquid modernity” is characterised by, I quote him, “the growing conviction that change is the only permanence, and uncertainty the only certainty. A hundred years ago 'to be modern' meant to chase 'the final state of perfection' -- now it means an infinity of improvement, with no 'final state' in sight and none desired.” Of course Joseph Schumpeter, almost sixty years before (and he was not the first one), had already emphasised the centrality of the disruptive process of transformation that characterises modern economic reality. He described it as “…by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary.

Concluding remarks  3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Let me conclude by reiterating that this Conference is a milestone event and sets the pace for a new era in Cyprus. An era whereby all efforts for the promotion of financial literacy and education in Cyprus are coordinated under the National Strategy umbrella, so as to enhance the well-being and prosperity of Cypriot citizens and to support the financial resilience and sustainable economic growth in the country. As Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus my promise is to assist the new permanent Committee's role in implementing the National Strategy, as we also ensured that the CBC prioritises and leads this initiative since the very first establishment of the committee in December 2020. In this Conference, we brought together a top-notch group of experts from both Cyprus and abroad, that can exchange expert views and share with us their knowledge on best practices from other countries' experiences. I would like to mention by [surname] alphabetical order, Professor Panayiotis Andreou from the Cyprus University of Technology, Dr Sophia Anyfantaki from the Bank of Greece, Professor Adele Atkinson from the University of Birmingham, Dr Maria Demertzis from Bruegel, Professor Michael Haliassos from Goethe University Frankfurt, Professor Alexander Michaelides from Imperial College London, Professor Andreas Milidonis from the University of Cyprus, Dr Elena Miteva from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Professor Dennis Philip from Durham University and Dr Ernesto Villanueva from the Bank of Spain. We are very appreciative and grateful for their participation.
Otherwise you might rationally expect to end up among the small minority that does not expand and at the same time still have the tighter monetary policy that results from everyone else expanding. This is the classic “prisoner’s dilemma” from game theory. The conclusion is that it is necessary to have rules for fiscal policy that limit deficits and debt when monetary policy is united and fiscal policy divided, and that these rules need to be followed in a credible fashion. But, in addition, the conclusion is also that the temptation to over-expand is as strong during an upturn as during a downturn. In fact this is what we have seen in the euro area during the heyday of the late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century – a much too expansionary fiscal stance in some euro area countries, especially in good times, which led to tighter monetary policy by the ECB and thus an incentive for others to further weaken fiscal discipline. When the downturn eventually came, the euro area entered this phase with large deficits instead of surpluses. What the Pact then required, a 180-degree turnaround in fiscal policy to a tighter stance, reinforced the downturn and was considered by some as stupid. In fact it was the lack of savings  BIS Review 88/2006  1  during the boom that was stupid. Thus, rules would be needed not only for a maximum deficit in a downturn, but equally some forceful rule for fiscal rectitude in good times.

This is a strengthening compared to the earlier agreement among the euro area countries, changing the requirement from targeting the cyclically adjusted deficit to targeting an improvement in the structural deficit. When deciding the adjustment path, public investment and structural reforms can be taken into account. If structural reforms are to be taken into account, they should have a large and proven positive effect on the economy and there should be a safety margin to the 3% deficit floor. My view is that there is a possibility to use the newly defined MTOs in a wise manner, more closely adapted to the situation of the individual country. However, the scope for interpretation is so large that there is a high risk of lax and uneven implementation. The experiences of the first year indicate that some member states have more ambitious MTOs than required by the Pact. This is often countries with their own national budgetary rules, such as Sweden, which comprise MTOs. At the same time,  2  BIS Review 88/2006  there are other member states who need to do more to achieve their MTOs. The measures are often postponed too far ahead and are not sufficiently explicit and concrete. Changes in the corrective arm The third part of the changes refers to what happens when a country has an excessive deficit. As before, exemptions can be granted if the country is suffering from a severe economic downturn that it could not foresee, so called exceptional circumstances.
The financial market infrastructures, and hence the central banks, stand to be affected by these changes. As this process unfolds, the SNB’s task is to strike the right balance between maintaining stable conditions and promoting useful innovation. In this speech I will outline why we are most likely to achieve safe and efficient outcomes if we can balance the interests of market participants, regulators and central banks. 1  Switzerland has topped the Global Innovation Index (www.wipo.int) for the last six years. Page 2/6  Financial industry – same core functions, evolving technology The theme for this year’s Sibos conference is ‘Transforming the landscape’. New technologies are paving the way for new financial services. While there are certainly some interesting innovations in the offing, it is important to recognise that many of the financial industry’s core functions will remain largely unchanged. The role of financial intermediaries is, first, to help their clients fund new investments and, second, to offer them investment opportunities and asset protection strategies. Their third role is to facilitate securities safekeeping, and their fourth is to execute payments on behalf of their clients. Customers have long required these basic services, and they will continue to need them in the future. In short, the economic function of the financial industry has not changed. However, the technologies and channels by which financial services are requested and delivered are changing.

When home owners renew mortgage loans at lower interest rates we get a transitory downward effect on inflation. It is important to distinguish between CPI changes and underlying inflation. Transitory effects, for example changes in interest rates or in indirect taxes and subsidies, may cause the general price level to jump up and down. In the conduct of monetary policy it is BIS Review 47/1997  -3-  therefore important to keep an eye on underlying inflation; the transitory effects are of secondary significance as long as they do not affect inflation expectations and thereby trend inflation. Given the time lag that applies to monetary policy, a central bank that targets inflation has to monitor the various factors which determine inflation one to two years ahead. In a simple analysis of inflation’s determinants one can start from the familiar augmented Phillips curve. The rate of inflation is determined by two factors: the relationship between supply and demand in the economy - the output gap - and inflation’s expected rate. Note, however, that while the output gap is a useful starting point for an inflation analysis, there is no simple way of measuring it. This makes it necessary to go into more detail and study a variety of indicators in order to analyse any tensions between demand and supply. Still, the output gap is a suitable starting point for my present purpose. The simple model tells us that when the output gap is closed, inflation is constant and equal to the expected rate.
As with a number of regulatory requirements, the resolution strategy for a firm can change as a bank grows and matures, from the use of the Bank Insolvency Procedure for small firms, up to Bail-in for the largest banks. For the latter, there are Operational Continuity requirements and the Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) that must be met, and for which firms must plan well in advance. 9  Technically this is cancelling the permission to carry out regulated activities granted by the PRA under Part 4A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended). 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  This year the Bank will review the calibration of MREL, and the compliance date, prior to setting end-state MREL. I mention this because the Bank will take account of changes in the UK regulatory framework over the past few years as well as firms’ experience in issuing liabilities to meet their interim MREL requirements. So watch this space. I can also confirm that the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee and Prudential Regulation Committee intend to conduct a review of the UK leverage ratio framework in light of revised international standards and the nature of the relationship with the EU going forward. And let me add that I am very much aware of how these two policies interact. Moving mountains? Today’s draft Supervisory Statement is designed to deliver a clear map from the bottom of the regulatory mountain to the top.

The PRA’s objective therefore is not to avoid all occurrences of failure, but instead to take a three-pronged approach to ensure a safe descent down the mountain– with help where this proves necessary:   As a first step we require all firms – including new and growing banks – to have credible recovery plans that are capable of being invoked in a stress;    Second, for new and growing banks we have set out expectations in the Supervisory Statement that they draw up a ‘solvent wind-down’ plan. That is, a plan to show that the bank could exit the market in an orderly way by winding down its business to the point it can be liquidated solvently;    And third we work closely with the Bank of England as Resolution Authority to make sure that – if all else fails (quite literally) – all firms (whether new or established) are able to fail in an orderly manner. On this latter point, all firms must be prepared for resolution and be resolvable. Given the likelihood of some firm failures, this is an essential consideration in allowing firms to become and remain authorised. And our expectation of such low barriers to exit is of course just the other side of the coin to us having lowered barriers to entry.
48  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18  Chart 1: New high/high building society lending (% of all residential lending)  Notes: High/high lending is defined as over 90% LTV and over 3.50 LTI for single income or 2.75 LTI for joint income. Source: Mortgage Lenders Administration Return (MLAR)  I should make clear that I am not unduly focusing on building societies in making these examples - what we are seeing is a market-wide trend. But I did want to take this opportunity to emphasise that the some parts of the sector face a number of strategic risks beyond those outlined above, including legacy issues relating to commercial lending and pension risk. Operational resilience is a key issue for societies, particularly where IT systems are outsourced, and we have stepped our supervisory efforts up a gear this year. Meanwhile, the finalisation of a number of key reforms (IFRS9, Basel III, MREL) will warrant a significant implementation effort that delivers, for example, genuinely robust (non-merger) recovery plans for societies. We make our assessments of societies’ business models and future plans in light of our judgements about the broader market context and extent to which risks can be appropriately managed and governed. In light of the challenges I have outlined, supervisors will continue to keep a close eye on the effects of these issues on the viability of business models and future strategy for building societies.

This is important because, even though we might think that our rules and regulations are now in much better shape, history tells us that the commercial incentives of firms will create pressures to find ways to minimise the impact of those rules. I am especially mindful that financial institutions will always be able to innovate faster than we are able to modify the prudential rulebook. In order to remain fit for purpose, the prudential regulatory framework must be responsive to changes in the behaviour and structure of the financial system and identify any gaps, faults or incoherence that can lead to perverse behaviour. This is why we need well-informed rule-makers and alert supervisors, who together can smell when something is off and decide what to do about it. And this is one reason, in my view, why supervision will be particularly important in the coming phase. The financial services industry that we regulate is highly developed, highly innovative and highly sophisticated. But, stripped bare of this complexity, it remains a business in which individuals need to exercise judgement, skill and care. The role of the supervisor is to observe this behaviour and form judgements about the extent to which the firm – and the individuals running it – meet the intention, as well as the letter of, the regulation. Some innovation by financial institutions in response to regulation will be intended by regulators, or, if not intended, at least benign.
A distinct accounting regime for banks would be a radical departure from the past.10 But if we are to restore investor faith in banking sector balance sheets, nothing less than a radical rethink may be required. 10  Sharman (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  References Bernanke, B and Lown, C (1991), “The Credit Crunch”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1991:2, pages 205–39. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, “Banking and monetary statistics, 1914–1941”, page 283, available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/bms/. Diamond, D (1984), “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, Review of Economic Studies, 51(3), pages 393–414. Epstein, L and Wang, T (1994), “Intertemporal Asset Pricing under Knightian Uncertainty”, Econometrica, 62(3), pages 283–322. Financial Services Authority (2011), “Proposed Regulatory Prudent Valuation Return”, Financial Services Authority, CP11/30, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/ cp11_30.pdf. Giffords, B and Mainelli, M (2009), “The Road to Long Finance: A Systems View of the Credit Srunch”, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, Number 87. Haldane, A G (2010), “Fair Value in Foul Weather”, available at http://www.bankofengland. co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech427.pdf. Knight, F H (1921), “Risk, uncertainty and profit”, Hart, Schaffner and Marx Prize Essays, no. 31, Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin. Laux, C (forthcoming), “Financial instruments, financial reporting, and financial stability”, Vienna University of Economics and Business. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Lord Sharman of Redlynch (2011), “Going Concern and Liquidity Risks: Lessons for Companies and Auditors, Preliminary Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Inquiry”, available at http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/The%20Sharman%20Report %20-%20final%200311111.pdf.

Plantin, G, Sapra, H and H S Shin (2008), “Fair Value Accounting and Financial Stability”, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business Research Paper 08–15. Simonson, D G and G H Hempel (1993), “Banking Lessons from the Past: The 1938 Regulatory Agreement Interpreted”, Journal of Financial Services Research, pages 249–267. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
In addition, Estonia has no problems with financing its external  2  BIS Review 91/2009  debt. Companies and people in Estonia have taken serious steps to pave way for getting through the global crisis and recovering growth. Therefore, the state needs to implement some important macro-level objectives to support the recovery of economic growth. Here I mean, above all, the readiness to join the euro area as well as medium-term and long-term stability of fiscal policy. In the current situation, accession to the euro area is Estonia's utmost short-term objective. The adoption of the euro will ensure the stability of the money used in Estonia and is extremely important for further reinforcement of the banking system and the investment climate. It can be said the clear perspective of joining the euro area is an absolutely necessary precondition at the national economy level for the permanent recovery of growth. Declining inflation has created all the possibilities in Estonia to meet the Maastricht criteria by end-2009, which makes it possible to join the euro area on 1 January 2011 at the latest. In this context and from the point of view of monetary and financial system stability, fiscal policy has two tasks in 2009. First of all it must be made sure that the current account deficit, which cannot be avoided in the prevailing economic environment, remains below 3% of GDP both this year and in 2010.

Under the strategy plan for 2020-2022, the Executive Board will continue to use external managers in markets and market segments where local knowledge is particularly relevant. After the Storting had discussed the white paper on the GPFG in 2019, the Ministry gave Norges Bank permission to invest in unlisted infrastructure for renewable energy. This is reflected in the strategy for the next three years adopted by the Executive Board. The Bank will assess each investment in relation to risk and return. The management of the GPFG is required to be cost-effective. Norges Bank aims to keep total 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  internal management costs in the period 2020-2022 below 0.05 percent of assets under management. In recent years, the number of Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) employees has been reduced and administrative support functions across the Bank are being streamlined. The Executive Board will continue to monitor costs closely. In the course of 2020, the Executive Board has strengthened the Bank's work as advisor to the Ministry, in accordance with our new mandate. In this year's white paper, the Ministry proposes changes in the composition of the equity benchmark index. The equity allocation to Europe will be reduced somewhat over time, and the allocation to North America will be correspondingly increased. This is in line with Norges Bank's advice. Norges Bank works systematically to set principles, exercise ownership rights and invest responsibly. Our work on responsible investment underpins the objective of the highest possible return.