samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In this regard, it is crucial that banks understand these key risk drivers to accurately assess whether their current systems are sufficiently adequate in the face of such risks and deploy their resources more strategically to focus on addressing specific, high-risk areas. Some best practices for control measures include improving the ability to deter illegal fund flows within the system, conducting swift identifications of illegal transactions and prompt submissions of suspicious transaction reports (STR). Banks are also highly encouraged to make good use of technological advancements to develop more holistic monitoring and risks detection systems, allowing for more prompt alerts and sophisticated red flag systems and stronger compliance to Anti-Money Laundering & Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements. It goes without saying that savvy systems alone are not the one-stop solution. This must be complemented by continuously maintaining and upgrading relevant competencies of AML/CFT personnel through investments in training. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to take a moment here to commend the industry on the strides it has made in the AML/CFT space over time. In particular, STRs received from the banking sector has steadily improved in quality over the years. There is no doubt that these STRs and the overall cooperation of banks with the relevant authorities have been useful in supporting enforcement activities by law enforcement agencies. This includes supporting MACC's investigations through timely responses to orders, provisions of documents and witnesses.

More generally, we have concluded that making the capital requirements more risk sensitive will help ensure that borrowers are charged a more appropriate price for their debt, and limit the build up of unsustainable volumes of debt. This seems to us a better system than the current, extremely risk-insensitive framework of risk weights, where in the sovereign context nothing short of a rescheduling results in any change in capital requirements for exposures to OECD sovereigns, while for non-OECD sovereigns the charges are completely invariant. It is worth noting here that a similar kind of argument applies in the context of public disclosure by banks, which is also one of the key planks of the proposed new Accord. There is a risk that in some circumstances there are drawbacks associated with this, since disclosure could make a troubled bank’s position worse at a difficult moment. But overall, we think the likely behavioural changes induced by greater transparency offer more benefits than risks. By this I mean that the prospect of having to disclose more about positions to the market will reduce banks’ willingness to take on highly risky positions in the first place. BIS Review 132/1999  2  Benefits and drawbacks of complexity A number of other commentators have questioned the effectiveness of introducing greater complexity into the Basel rules, on the grounds that the framework will always be inadequate to cope with innovation and arbitrage.
For those reasons, we have actually approved internal models with credit components that do not meet our QIs, where the firms in question demonstrated that their exposure is atypical and hence warrants a non-standard calibration, or provided off-setting conservatism in other aspects of the model. PRA’s approach to insurance supervision I’d like to turn now to some broader thoughts about what it means for the PRA to supervise insurance 9  companies. I’ve previously spoken about the history of insurance regulation in the UK and won’t re-hash that here, since I’ve not yet reached the age where it is acceptable simply to repeat myself. Happily, according to our longevity QI I should have plenty of time for that further down the track. But I would like to provide some insights into why and how the PRA operates in the way it does. The UK insurance industry is the fourth largest in the world. It employs 300,000 people in the UK, provides 10  cover for nearly 27 million households , and has £ trillion  11  of assets. It is therefore unsurprising that Parliament has given the PRA a General Objective of delivering safety and soundness of insurers, as well as banks. But for insurers only, Parliament has also given us an additional Insurance Objective – of equal weight to our General Objective – which is to contribute to securing an appropriate degree of policyholder protection.

With the world economy now beginning to catch a cold from the slowdown in the US economy, the quality and competitiveness of our exports means that our companies are better equipped than others to hold their own in the global marketplace. Foreign trade not only represents Switzerland's growth driver, but it is also our friend when economic times are hard. BIS Review 45/2008  1
The banks’ trust in other banks dropped to a level where interbank lending almost came to a complete halt. Confidence and credibility is the core in money and finance. What good is a 100 dollar note if there is no trust in its worth to buy 100 dollars of goods and service. When confidence and credibility have been destroyed it may take a long time before they are restored. An example from Norwegian monetary history illustrates this. The example is from the time of the birth of Norges Bank. The successful establishment of Norges Bank in 1816 played a key role in stabilizing the external value of the Norwegian currency after the chaos following the Napoleonic wars in Europe. The previous joint currency with Denmark had collapsed and two attempts to restore the currency based on broad guarantees had failed, first from the Danish government in 1813 and second from the hastily called Constitutional Assembly in 1814. The successful restoration of credibility in the Norwegian currency was finally brought about by the establishment of Norges Bank, but it took a long time. Norges Bank was in full operation already in 1818, but since the Parliament postponed the decision to reintroduce silver convertibility, the value of the notes continued to fall until the Parliament changed its strategy in 1822. In this year a course to reintroduce silver convertibility was set. Convertibility was introduced, first at poor (low) rates far from silver parity, but as confidence improved the convertibility rate was gradually moved closer to parity.

And I would also like to urge you to take a little time off to visit some places of interest, while you are in this beautiful country, Sri Lanka. Thank you. BIS Review 50/2004  1
It is a question of dampening these debt and price increases using macroprudential or fiscal policy measures, but also fundamental reforms on the housing market to generate a sustainable and improved balance between supply and demand. But if the Riksbank is so concerned, shouldn’t it then reconsider its policy and raise the interest rate? I hope that it has become clear during my discussion here that I think there are solid and convincing reasons to pursue the policy the Riksbank is currently pursuing, but I would like to repeat them briefly in any case. The inflation target has been a nominal anchor in the Swedish economy and a major reason behind the favourable economic development over the past two decades. For some time now, following the long period of inflation falling below the target, there have been signs that confidence in the inflation target has begun to falter. The Riksbank’s main task is to maintain confidence in the target – a task it does not share with any other authority. The repo rate is a blunt tool when trying to curb increases in household debt and housing prices as it influences so much else in the economy. A considerably higher rate would likely be needed in order to have a substantial effect, but then inflation and growth would be dampened, quite extensively in the worst case scenario. Neither low inflation nor weaker growth would contribute to a sustainable rise in the interest rate level.

In that case it could be worth discussing a comeback for the tolerance band, but reintroducing the band would neither contribute to higher inflation expectations nor consequently to a rise in interest rates. Monetary policy cannot solve the problem of rising debt and housing prices What can be said then about the growth of household debt and housing prices? After all, one issue central to the criticism is that the low interest rate contributes to further increases in debt and housing prices. 13  The Riksbank (2010). 14  For example, Heikensten and Vredin (1998, pp. 585-586) noted that "A tolerance band could be a reflection of the fact that the central bank does not consider it important to aim for an inflation target in the middle of the band. Instead it may, as long as inflation is contained within this band, want to focus on achieving other targets, such as production or employment for example. This is portrayed at times [...] as "opportunistic" monetary policy. We do not feel, however, that this was the reason certain countries chose to put a tolerance band around their inflation target". 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  It has been obvious to those who have followed the monetary policy debate that the Riksbank shares many people’s concerns about this development. This is clear from reports, minutes, speeches and a number of debate articles. The Riksbank has therefore pointed out the necessity of measures in other policy areas for several years.
According to preliminary statistics for 2013, the total inflow of direct investment from Germany equals Euro 27 million, with the amount of the direct investment from Germany reaching Euro 111 million, or about 3 % of the overall stock of FDI (about Euro 4,000 million). However, this share is lower when compared with foreign capital originating from Austria (12%, or Euro 478 million as of 2013). Third, the significance of the German economy for us is perceived also through the prism of foreign exchange inflows based on the Macedonian emigrants in Germany or the Macedonian citizens who are temporarily working in Germany. Thus, the growth of the German economy is closely correlated with the growth of this, to us, important income flow. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Generally, the German economy, the companies with German and Austrian capital that operate in the Republic of Macedonia, are extremely important for the local economy. The results of the survey, i.e. the responses of the companies on the assessment of current business conditions and perspectives, at the level of both sector and company, regarding: trade, exports, employees – give an impression that a large percentage of respondents (over 80 %) have stable or positive expectations, i.e. claim that the environment is good or that it will improve. This is in line with our projections for 2014, according to which we expect economic growth of 3.7%, mainly determined by the growth of exports and fiscal stimulus in the construction sector.

Under the consolidation approach for NBFIs as stipulated in our Master Plan, local banks and Category A NBFIs are encouraged to acquire upto 3 Category B NBFIs, while all Category B NBFIs are required to merge with local banks or Category A NBFIs, or merge among themselves, so that they fulfill conditions to become Category A NBFIs. Further, where groups of banks and NBFIs have multiple NBFIs in that group, we have requested such NBFIs to be merged so that only 1 NBFI would remain in the group. It was decided to permit banks to operate a newly acquired NBFI as a subsidiary considering the structural, operational and cultural differences that exist between these two types of financial institutions. Further, in the case that a bank or Category A NBFI acquires a negative net worth Category B NBFI and requires additional capital infusion, we will provide an equivalent amount of funding support to the acquiring entity through the SLDILSS. Second: Capital enhancement plan Ladies and gentlemen, one of the key factors underpinning the stability in the financial sector is capital, which needs to be maintained at adequate levels to absorb unexpected losses. Capital is required to be increased gradually in order to ensure that sufficient buffers are built during good times to strengthen resilience of the financial sector for such capital to be drawn down during bad times.
Most importantly, if the strategy causes companies and households to question the MPC’s competence or its commitment to maintaining low inflation, and this starts to be reflected in wage and price setting. If that were to happen, we would be forced to tighten policy, potentially aggressively so with all the output costs that would entail, in order to avoid a return to the bad old days of the 1970s and 80s with truly high and volatile inflation. My single most important message to you this evening is that the MPC remains as hard-nosed as ever in its determination to hit the inflation target. That is the remit given to us by Government, and for which we are accountable to Parliament and the public. To sum up my progress report for 2010: it has been a busy year; substantial progress has been made, both in terms of starting along the road to economic recovery and responding to some of the fault lines exposed by the financial crisis; but there is still a long way to go. There will be as much to do in your 22nd year as there was in your 21st. Happy birthday.

BIS Review 161/2010  7  References Bean, C. (2009), “The Great Moderation, the Great Panic and the Great Contraction” Schumpeter Lecture at the Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Barcelona on 25 August 2009, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech399.pdf Borio, C. (2010), “Implementing a macroprudential framework: blending boldness and realism” http://www.bis.org/repofficepubl/hkimr201007.12c.htm Dale, S. (2009), “Inflation Targeting: Learning the Lessons from the Financial Crisis”, Speech at the Society of Business Economists’ Annual Conference, London on 23 June 2009, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech395.pdf Haldane, A. (2009), “Rethinking the Financial Network”, Speech delivered at the Financial Student Association in Amsterdam on 28 April 2009, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf IMF (2010), “G-20 Mutual Assessment Process – IMF Staff Assessment of G-20 Policies” http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/111210.pdf King, M. (2010), “Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and back again”, Speech given at the Second Bagehot Lecture Buttonwood Gathering, New York City on 25 October 2010, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech455.pdf Mishkin, F. (2008), “How Should We Respond to Asset Price Bubbles?” http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080515a.htm Tucker, P. (2009), “The Debate on Financial System Resilience: Macroprudential Instruments” At Barclays Annual Lecture in London on 22 October 2009, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech407.pdf  8  BIS Review 161/2010
This year, for the first time ever, we have passed the Basel Committee test that recognised Russian legislation as fully compliant with Basel. This is not to say, however, that Russia-specific risks and challenges fall outside of our focus. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We seek to spare banks the burden of unjustly excessive regulations, sustaining balanced regulatory change with the purpose of excluding the negative impact on credit institutions’ capital adequacy and their capacity to lend to the economy. In our opinion, the present moment is the right time for proportionate regulation to be rolled out in the banking sector, that is, the extent of regulatory requirements for banks should match the set of banking activities and the volume of risks a bank assumes. To this end, we suggest that a new credit institution type be identified – a regional bank. This category would cover rather small lenders with a limited range of most standard banking operations. These banks should build their operations on the business model of attracting funds from individuals and legal entities in a specific region so these funds are placed with minimal risks and convert into loans to households and businesses (mainly medium and small) in the same region. Such banks would be authorised to place funds in the interbank market only through a central counterparty.

Instead, I’d like to focus on some of the more awkward questions which confront us as a regulator with prudential and competition objectives. Five years on from the introduction of our competition objective it’s a natural moment to do this. But before turning to those questions, I have to ask you to indulge me for a few moments in picking out what to me are the most significant things we have done to advance our secondary competition objective during the first five years of its existence. I will limit myself to three:   First, the structures we have put in place to encourage the entry of new banks: our New Banks Unit, which engages with prospective new entrants and provides a nursery for newly authorised banks; our ‘mobilisation phase’ which allows new banks to get going in a live environment but before being released into the wild; and our ‘wind-down’ approach to setting PRA buffer requirements for new banks in order to avoid penalising early stage growth. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that we’ve authorised 17 new UK banks in such a short period.1    Second, bank capital. I have long been troubled by the difference between some standardised and modelled capital requirements, particularly for mortgages. And there are remaining tensions on capital which I will come back to.
In 1998, we established a new department to focus our efforts on actively promoting the industry, identifying areas of opportunity, and profiling Singapore as an international financial centre. The task ahead is daunting. External conditions are presently not favourable. The global economy is slowing down. Southeast Asia is taking longer than we had hoped to implement structural reforms that are essential for sustained growth. Investors are waiting to see how events unfold. There are fewer opportunities for institutions to service our immediate region, whether in offshore lending, mergers and acquisitions, or treasury operations. We can and must look beyond immediate problems, and press on to upgrade our infrastructure and capabilities, so that institutions and investors will have stronger reasons to site activities in Singapore and use our financial markets. Then as Southeast Asia recovers, which in time it will, we will be ready to play our part in its pick up. We have come a long way since 1968 when we started promoting the Asian Dollar Market. As we evolve into a full-service financial centre, it will become more difficult to identify individual projects or areas to pursue. Our approach is therefore to establish a conducive overall environment, within which market forces can operate and private sector innovation can thrive. We have to: ·  develop efficient, comprehensive and world-class infrastructure;  ·  put in place a sound but pro-enterprise regulatory framework; and  ·  attract, nurture and retain top talent, both local and foreign.

We must groom a corps of competent and committed economists, supervisors, and investment managers within MAS. But this will not be sufficient. We also have to reinforce our team with talent from industry and abroad. We already have foreign and mid-career professionals among our ranks, but we must attract more such persons. Only by building a truly world-class MAS team, will we succeed in our mission – to promote macro-economic stability, and a sound and progressive financial centre. BIS Review 67/2001  7
And undoubtedly, they thought the chances of getting caught were slim. However, when the scheme to inflate contracts and pay the associated bribes are made in U.S. dollars, the settlement of those transactions will usually be routed through the United States. This means that U.S. prosecutors will be able to take action against those involved – even if their local governments will not or cannot pursue criminal or civil cases in their home country. Many of the schemes I just mentioned were identified by banks around the globe and reported to authorities via Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). Those banks helped root out international corruption schemes. The United States has robust anti-money laundering laws that date back to 1970. But every so often the U.S. makes major changes to its laws and regulations in response to a significant event or risks. The most prominent was the PATRIOT ACT after the 9-11 attacks in 2001. One year ago, the U.S. passed another significant piece of legislation – the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, which has strengthened the position of the U.S. government to act against many financial crimes. Some of the measures include:  2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The unmasking of the true owners and controlling members of shell companies in the United States will establish transparency that is so vitally needed in our financial system. The increased obligations of foreign respondent banks that maintain accounts in the U.S. to comply with requests for information from U.S. agencies and commensurate penalties for ignoring those requests.

In any event, this business segment is not free from challenges, especially at present when some of the economies to which our banks are exposed, such as Turkey and Argentina, are undergoing significant difficulties. Against this background, the international business model of Spanish banks, based primarily on activities conducted through subsidiaries operating in a decentralised fashion, with financial independence and engaging in traditional banking activities, is a mitigating factor that should be borne in mind. That said, and despite the conjunctural difficulties facing some of the countries in which Spanish banks are present, I would like to underscore the undoubted importance of geographical diversification as a source of medium and long-term value added and stability for these banks. The low profitability of the banking business in Spain is attributable to a combination of factors, some cyclical and others more structural. First, the high level of non-performing assets ensuing from the effects of the crisis adversely affects banks’ income statements both through the decline in interest received and, especially, the increase in the attendant asset impairment losses. The volume of these losses for Spanish deposit institutions as a whole peaked in 2012 and has subsequently tended to fall, although these losses continue to consume a large portion of revenue, meaning that pre-crisis levels have not been restored. Specifically, in terms of assets, these losses were, between 2015 and 2017, double those recorded between 2003 and 2005.