samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But it is worth highlighting that the litigiousness and uncertainty associated therewith may ultimately harm the end-customer too. Banks may react to legal uncertainty in two ways: first, by limiting or reducing the number of transactions, which ultimately restricts access to credit; and further, by making newly arranged transactions dearer in order to cover the legal risk-related contingencies. Applied to the real estate market, legal uncertainty ultimately results in greater housing affordability difficulties, paradoxically something it is sought to protect against. The financial crisis has given rise to more demanding legislation which requires that banks not only report but also act impartially, transparently and professionally, taking into account the rights, interests and needs of their customers and going beyond mere formal transparency. Clearly, the Law on Real Estate Lending is a good example of this change. It is a little over 18 months ago that this legislation was approved. The Banco de España views it most favourably, although it is too soon to draw firm conclusions. By introducing various bank-customer safeguard and protection measures, the Law restores and ensures legal certainty. As I have said, such certainty is vital for the proper functioning of the mortgage market. In this connection, I wish to stress that customer protection, far from being a disadvantage for the functioning and profitability of banks, is a centrepiece of any banking business model that is to be viable and sustainable in the long run.

With their technical support, the Government, through the Balance of Payments Statistical Committee, comprising representatives from the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources, Zambia Development Agency, Central Statistical Office and Bank of Zambia, was able to undertake this very important survey. Distinguished Participants, As you are aware, the Zambian economy has recorded significant positive developments in the recent past, owing to the economic reforms the Government has been implementing since 1992. These reforms have facilitated foreign investments in various sectors of the economy. These reforms have also resulted in Zambia recording tremendous improvement in world ranking with regard to the ease of doing business. The favourable investment climate created has raised investor confidence in the Zambian economy thereby attracting both local and foreign investments. Ladies and Gentlemen, the survey findings we are disseminating today show that the overall Foreign Private Investment inflows in 2009, declined to US $ million from US $ million recorded in 2007. This was explained mainly by the notable reduction in re-invested earnings, due to lower profits recorded by enterprises during the year. The overall reduction in foreign investment inflows is also consistent with global developments. In fact, at a global level, foreign direct Investment inflows drastically declined to US $ billion in 2009 from US $ billion in 2008 and US $ billion in 2007. Nonetheless, new equity investment inflows in Zambia surged to US $ million in 2009 from US $ million recorded in 2007.
Figure 8 and 9 show developments in GDP and employment during the recession and subsequent recovery in Iceland, with predictions extending into 2017 for GDP and 2016 for employment. For comparison, it shows the distribution of the same for 30 other European countries, with Ireland highlighted. It shows that Iceland’s recession, as well as Ireland’s, was deeper than the median in Europe, but both countries have been doing better than the average during the recovery, especially lately and in the forecasts. Actually, there is relatively little difference between Iceland and Ireland by both measures, except that Iceland seems to be doing somewhat better lately in terms of employment growth. Iceland’s performance would be even better if we looked at the unemployment rate, as labour supply is rather elastic, both internally and because of cross-border mobility. Iceland lost just over 11% of output during the recession that ended in the first quarter of 2010. It will have probably more than gained that back by the first quarter of this year. Given developments in the supply side of the economy, the Central Bank’s assessment is that almost all of the slack in the economy has been absorbed. Unlike the pre-crisis peak, the current level of output is therefore associated with a relatively well-balanced economy both internally and externally. In recent months, inflation has been below the target because of international developments, and there is a current account surplus, which allows the Central Bank to accumulate reserves without undermining the exchange rate. So is Iceland out of the woods?

The double-digit deficits in the years before the crisis have been replaced by sizeable surpluses from 2009 to this day. Iceland had significant fiscal surpluses in the years leading up to the crisis. As expected, the crisis had a big impact on government finances: through the direct fiscal costs of the banking crisis, the loss of tax revenue, and higher unemployment expenditures as the economy went into recession. This impact was big as can be seen on Figure 6 showing the direct and indirect impact of selected banking crises on government debt and fiscal balance. But yours was bigger! A deficit on the central government amounting to 8% of GDP opened up in 2009. It had to be financed domestically. Capital controls helped in that respect. To build confidence and open external market access, a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan was implemented as a part of the programme with the IMF. In 2009, automatic stabilisers were mostly allowed to do their work, but in 2010 a phased deficit reduction plan set in, with a primary surplus targeted for 2012 and an overall surplus for 2014. This fiscal consolidation was sizeable in international comparison, as can be seen from Figure 7, but it did not derail the recovery that began around the middle of 2010. It helped that monetary policy could be relaxed over the course of 2010, as the closure of loopholes in the capital controls in late 2009 contributed to the stabilisation of the exchange rate.
Some of the potential costs of home-working, including the loss of social engagement, are only now being felt and may grow with time, in ways which affect both our well-being and productivity at work. In what follows, I will try to navigate through some of these issues, drawing on evidence where possible. There are both positives and negatives from the shift in working practices that has taken place this year and the balance of these is likely itself to shift over time. If you’ll forgive the indulgence, I’ll try and weave in some of my own work experiences to add some personal colour. The Changing World of Work Even before the Covid crisis struck, there was evidence of a secular shift towards more flexible forms of working. Analysis of working trends by the Association of Professional Staffing Companies in 2019 found  1  Engaging Business (2020). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  that, over the past two decades, the number of people working ‘flexible hours’ has increased five-fold, from less than 10% to more than half the workforce.2 As with many other things, the Covid crisis brought about an overnight transformation and acceleration of those trends. ONS data suggests that, prior to the pandemic, around 5% of people worked from home as their main location.

Survey evidence for Japan suggests around a 7% hit to labour productivity from home-working.8 Similar evidence can be found in studies of the UK.9 Survey data from the ONS paints a similar picture, with almost a quarter of workers believing their productivity has been negatively affected by home-working, compared with only 12% saying it has improved.10 These differences in the productivity effects of home-working, pre and post-Covid, are perhaps unsurprising. Mandatory home-working thrust large numbers of workers into an alien working environment – their kitchens, bedrooms and attics. There was no option of self-selecting. That meant, for many, not only a worse working environment but a steep learning curve as they adapted to new ways of working. Productivity, predictably, was hardest hit among those with least prior experience of home-working.11  5  These shifts are also likely to affect other labour market and economic behaviour, such as labour market participation and wage growth. See, for example, Mas and Pallais (2017) 6 Bartik et al (2020) 7 Dutcher (2012). 8 Morikawa (2020). 9 See Felstead and Reuschke (2020). 10 ONS (2020b). 11 Morikawa (2020). 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  At the same time, we should be cautious about jumping to too negative a conclusion when assessing the economic costs of the shift to home-working. Even if the amount workers produce each hour has fallen, as evidence and anecdote tentatively suggests, this need not imply workers’ overall economic contribution has fallen.
If people came to believe  6  BIS Review 91/2010  that inflation was not going to be brought back to the 2% target, then Bank Rate would have to change by a potentially much larger amount in order to ensure that inflation is, in fact, returned to target. The recent high rate of CPI inflation can be largely attributed to a number of temporary factors, combined with weak downwards pressure on inflation from the subdued level of demand. Nevertheless, given the expected degree of spare capacity in the economy over the next few years, and that the temporary factors should wear off, the most likely outcome is that inflation falls back to below target over the next couple of years as shown in the May Inflation Report (Chart 12). On that basis it was sensible not to try and offset the recent rise in inflation by tightening policy. But let me be clear about the risks. Our central expectations could be wrong. Certainly the inflation data have tended to consistently surprise on the upside, month-by-month. What if spare capacity continues to exert much less restraint on inflation than anticipated? Or perhaps current data estimates have significantly underestimated demand and output growth? Or the exchange rate effect is bigger than incorporated in the projections? We could also be wrong in the other direction: downside pressures on UK output growth (Chart 13) could yet lead to an even bigger fall in inflation than the central case.

On the other hand, they may lead to creation of bubbles that down the road may burst. Against this background, at the last meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors it was acknowledged that technological innovation may be conducive to higher efficiency and inclusiveness of the financial system. Many risks, however, were also pinpointed with their proliferation – consumer and investor protection, market integrity, tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing. In this changing and challenging environment, staying aside is not an option for the Republic of Macedonia. To tackle the rising challenges, we have already drafted a new Law on payment services and payment systems (in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance) which transposes the PSD2 as well as other European Union relevant directives and regulations in the payments area. The new payment regulation aims to boost the competition in the traditionally bank dominated payments market by opening the entrance for FinTech companies which can provide innovative payment services as well as establish and operate new payment systems. At the same time, we assert our focus on maintaining financial stability by enhancing the resilience of payment market infrastructures which are being assessed against the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures.
(3)  Allan Greenspan in his latest paper “The Crisis” wrote about the reasons for it:  a. “it was the global proliferation of securitized, toxic U.S. subprime mortgages that was the immediate trigger of the current crisis”. But, he says: “the roots of the crisis reach back, as best I can judge, to the aftermath of the Cold War”. Later he explains actually the large increase of the aggregate demand which came from, formerly the third world nations, especially China, which replicated the export-oriented model of the so-called Asian tigers, argumenting it with data that “the savings rate of the developing world soared from 24% of nominal GDP in 1999 to 34% in 2007, far outstripping its investment rate”. b. that “subprime mortgages in the United States for years had been a small appendage to the broader U.S. home mortgage market, comprising only 7% of total originations as recently as 2002”...that “most such loans were fixed-rate mortgages, and only a modest amount had been securitized...” that “..,. starting in late 2003, began to accelerate the pooling and packaging of subprime home mortgages into securities...” that “subprime mortgages securities outstanding in 2007 totaled more than 900 billion USD, a more than sixfold rise since the end of 2001”. c. that “a classic euphoric global bubble took hold”, “that by 2007, yield spreads in the overall debt markets hаd narrowed to a point where there was little room for further under pricing of risk”.

We will continue to set a high bar on professional integrity and quality of advice, and we welcome your ideas and input on how we can continue to encourage firms to grow within the industry and bring financial advisory services to a wider spectrum of the public. The Association of Financial Advisers has a very important role in this process and has been a focal point for the Bank’s engagements with the industry. I look forward to your continued cooperation in achieving our shared goal of developing a financial advisory industry in Malaysia that truly serves to improve the well-being of financial consumers in this more challenging environment, and one that we can all be proud of. Thank you very much for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
We are working together with law enforcement agencies and are now focusing on public awareness. About a month ago, we launched a joint project with Yandex – the microfinance organisations on our register are marked with a special symbol in the search results so that it is easier to understand whether a given microfinance institution is legal or not. Moreover, this year saw Mir cards issued on a large scale. In Russia, they are accepted by all payment terminals and ATMs. The issue is proceeding at a good pace: over 10.6 million cards have already been issued. In the last month and a half alone, over 2 million cards were issued. Mir is a competitive system and offers all the services on the domestic market that the public are used to after using international payment systems. Our strategic objective in the coming years is ensuring Mir cards are accepted internationally, firstly within the Eurasian Economic Union. We are making progress in this area with our partners in the Eurasian Economic Union. Last week, the first cross-border transactions using Mir cards were carried out with Armenia’s ArCa payment system. This is the first project we have undertaken to organise equal intersystem interaction. (I believe the citizens of the two countries will benefit from new financial opportunities. I would like to express my gratitude to the Central Bank of Armenia and the management team of the ArCa payment system for their incredibly effective collaboration and promotion of this project).

Indeed, what we can do together to foster development of the financial sector and what the financial sector can do to foster development of the economy will be the subject of our discussion here at the congress. I look forward to the productive work and successful outcomes we will share. Thank you for your time. 11 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches
As outlined in the Financial Sector Master Plan, the strategies to achieve an adequate and effective consumer protection infrastructure involves: •  A comprehensive and structured consumer education programme;  •  Increased transparency by the financial institutions on the products and services being offered;  •  Legal redress for consumers to deal with grievances arising from the purchase of financial products and services;  •  Expansion in the role of the Banking Mediation Bureau to cover the full range of retail banking related consumer complaints and educating banking consumers of the ways in dealing with the available courses of action;  •  The implementation of Anti-Trust regulation to define the process by which abuses that are detrimental to consumers can be addressed; and finally  •  Establishing a deposit insurance fund to not only create incentives for prudent management by the banking institutions but also to assure protection to small depositors. The objective is to promote a more market oriented consumer protection framework. Ladies and Gentlemen, This new millennium brings with it new opportunities and challenges to both the financial institutions and to the consumers. As we advance forward we can expect an increasing array of choices open to consumers. In making financial decisions, consumers require information on a wide range of matters and details about the processes and documentation involved, the relevant fees and charges to be incurred and the risks and benefits of each type of product or service.

The Executive Board lays down principles for responsible investment management and is responsible for decisions on the observation and exclusion of companies. Norges Bank has recently issued a consultation response to the report by the Mestad Commission assessing the guidelines for the observation and exclusion of companies. The Bank views the report as a good starting-point for further development of the GPFG as a responsible investor. Norges Bank addresses companies, not political conditions in countries. We remark in our consultation response that the GPFG enjoys the advantages of free and open markets, with no particular restrictions on our investments. The GPFG has today a clear financial objective. A change that blurs the distinction between company and state could raise doubts about the role of the GPFG. A new Central Bank Act entered into force on 1 January 2020. The Act has brought changes in the Bank's governance structure and organisation. A Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee was established at the beginning of the year. This has given the Executive Board greater capacity to work on the management of the GPFG. Over the past year, the Executive Board has completed a reorganisation of the administrative support functions at the Bank with the aim of pooling expertise, promoting cost-effective solutions and underpinning the identity of the Bank as a single institution. Another important change is the Executive Board's appointment of a new CEO for the Bank's management of the GPFG.
The high liquidity helps price discovery, and attracts fund raisers and investors to our market. This is shown by the listing of the large state-owned banks this year, including what is expected to be the largest IPO ever in the world - the listing of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. The efficiency of our equity market is underpinned by a combination of fundamental strengths, including a sound legal and regulatory framework and an advanced financial infrastructure. In particular, the high standard of disclosure required in Hong Kong promotes market transparency and good corporate governance. The size of Hong Kong’s debt market is equal to 24% of that of the Mainland, and liquidity is a lot higher. Despite the significant progress made in recent years, the development of the Mainland bond market has been constrained by over-regulation (partly reflecting concerns about corporate governance and credit culture), a narrow investor base, and lack of instruments for pricing and risk management. Hong Kong has built up an efficient financial infrastructure for debt market development over the years. The Exchange Fund Bills and Notes (EFBN) programme has created a yield curve for the Hong Kong dollar of up to 10 years, providing a benchmark for debt issuance by other entities. A multi-currency and multi-product payment and settlement platform serves local and overseas investors to facilitate their fund transfers and delivery versus payments when they buy and sell debt instruments.

However, and as I discuss below, this may not be enough to ensure macroeconomic stability. Monetary policy in the context of an inflation targeting regime also contributes to stability by leaning against the wind. Capital inflows that lead to an appreciation of the currency reduce inflationary pressures allowing for an interest rate cut. This, in turn, reduces incentives to capital inflows and takes pressure off the currency. This phenomenon has been recently experienced in Chile. In recent weeks, the peso has appreciated significantly. At the same time the economy has been showing a rapid expansion: despite the earthquake we suffered this year growth is expected to be between 5% and 5.5% this year and between 5.5% and 6.5% next year. Although in our latest Monetary Policy Report we said that the bank will keep withdrawing the significant monetary stimulus, without the strengthening of the currency the withdrawal would certainly be faster. However, these macro policy actions may not be enough, in particular because capital inflows may be a source of bubbles in domestic asset prices. Indeed, in emerging markets bubbles normally take the form of an exchange rate appreciation. In this way, all assets become overpriced, not necessarily by higher prices in domestic currency, which may also be happening, but by increasing the value of the currency. A much debated issue in industrial countries has been whether tightening monetary policy could help burst a bubble in asset prices.