samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A large-scale downgrading of this debt, to below investment-grade status, would entail considerable potential losses for the financial system of the European Union (EU) as a whole, a significant part of which would correspond to indirect losses attributable to the forced selling mentioned above. The role of rating agencies in this process is fundamental. When making their assessments, these institutions need to take into account the long-term outlook for the corporation concerned and avoid excessively pro-cyclical behaviour. Indeed, this time round, rating agencies appear to have been more cautious than in the global financial crisis and, to date, phenomena comparable to those seen in the past have not occurred. In any event, the results of this exercise serve to show the systemic importance of this vulnerability and the need to be prepared to provide a sufficient, internationally coordinated response, depending on how the pandemic develops at international level. The impact on general government  A system-wide scenario analysis of large-scale corporate bond downgrades, ESRB Technical Note, 23 July 2020. 10  15  During the current crisis, the activation of automatic fiscal stabilisers associated with lower tax receipts and increased cyclical expenditure (for instance, on unemployment benefit), along with the effect of the discretionary measures adopted by the authorities to mitigate the impact of the crisis, is leading to very significant increases in budget deficits and public debt in all countries. Initially, there were also tensions in European public debt markets, which led to a sharp rise in sovereign spreads.

01.09.2020  The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on financial stability Closing address to the seminar “The financial system in the COVID-19 crisis. Challenges and commitments”, Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, organised by the Spanish Financial Press Association Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It is an honour and a pleasure to participate once again in this summer course organised by the Spanish Financial Press Association. It is clear that the scope of the pandemic and its impact on the world economy are very extensive. Following a 5.2% decrease in Q1, with respect to the previous quarter, Spanish GDP fell by 18.5% in Q2, when the restrictions linked to the state of alert were at their height. These declines represent the greatest contraction in economic activity in our recent history. An improving path has been seen during Q2 and Q3. However, this recovery is incomplete, and uneven across sectors and agents. It is also subject to a high level of uncertainty owing to the doubts as to the course of the pandemic itself, as shown by the fresh outbreaks. It therefore seems clear that some of the pandemic's effects will be long-lasting.
Another instance I would like to briefly refer to relates to the assertion of several colleagues from credit institutions, who claim that the NBR performed some sort of a trick in October 2008, making the liquidity in the banking system vanish. In other words, in its attempt to sanction those having orchestrated the speculative attack on the domestic currency, the central bank actually hit domestic credit institutions. Understanding the channels whereby RON-denominated liquidity moves about in the system is, indeed, quite complex and hence likely to easily generate confusion and twist the true meanings of words and actions. In fact, one cannot speak of a liquidity crunch as long as banks have complied with the 20 percent level of reserve requirements in both October and November (according to preliminary data). At most, relative decreases might occur temporarily relative primarily to corporate tax payments to the government budget. But even in such situations the NBR provides a lending facility, allowing immediate access to all banks capable of setting up the required collateral. The fact that some banks have not taken due care to set up a stock of government securities in a timely manner only means that the management of these credit institutions has decided  2  BIS Review 161/2008  to take chances for higher profit and increased market share. However, it is often the case that taking chances does not necessarily bring profit alone. The role of specialised media in grasping the actual dimensions of the phenomena under review is equally important.

The levels of growth, employment and prices for real and financial assets could not be maintained. Partly for these reasons, Sweden experienced a profound crisis. Had the adjustment been made earlier and resulted in stability, perhaps the crisis would have been less painful. In recent years, however, the process of adjustment in Sweden has come a long way. The economy is in the process of adjusting to the conditions that apply in a low inflation regime. This is being accompanied by an appreciable improvement in government finance, not least as a result of the extensive consolidation programme. From a two-digit level just a few years ago, for 1996 it seems that the government deficit has been reduced to between 3 and 3.5 per cent of GDP. Moreover, the improvement is expected to continue. That the consolidation of government finance proceeds successfully to the goal of balance in 1998 is of the utmost importance in that this lays a foundation for balanced, sustainable growth. With the new, globalised capital market, the need for discipline in economic policy soon makes itself felt, particularly for a country that has had a difficult period of deficits and has therefore become more dependent on domestic and foreign creditors. After all the experiences earlier in the 1990s, this is widely understood in Sweden. The resolution with which the consolidation is being achieved has been questioned from time to time.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Introductory statement by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the European Parliament, Brussels, 14 September 2005. *  *  *  Madame la présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les membres de la Commission économique et monétaire, j’ai l’honneur de paraître devant votre Commission aujourd’hui dans le cadre de notre dialogue régulier. À cette occasion, je voudrais rendre hommage à Wim Duisenberg, qui est décédé à la fin du mois de juillet. Le premier président de la Banque centrale européenne a apporté une contribution considérable à la construction européenne. Il a joué un rôle décisif dans la mise en place des institutions monétaires en Europe, dans le lancement réussi de la nouvelle monnaie, dans l’affirmation de la crédibilité de notre monnaie unique – l’euro – et dans l’instauration de la confiance placée en elle. Nous le regrettons profondément. Je commencerai mon intervention aujourd’hui par une évaluation de la situation économique et monétaire actuelle. Ich möchte außerdem zu aktuellen Themen der Fiskalpolitik und zu den Fortschritten im Bereich der Strukturreformen Stellung nehmen. Abschließend möchte ich die Position der EZB zu den Folgeaktivitäten hinsichtlich des EU-Aktionsplans für Finanzdienstleistungen erläutern. Economic and monetary issues At the time of my last appearance before the European Parliament in July the underlying trend in real economic growth in the euro area remained modest.

More fundamentally, the main risks to the inflation outlook stem from potential second-round effects in wage and price-setting behaviour triggered by ongoing oil price rises. In this respect, it is essential that the social partners continue to meet their responsibilities. Against this background, we will continue to monitor inflation expectations very closely. Particular vigilance is required in order to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well-anchored in the euro area. Turning to the monetary analysis, money and credit have continued to grow robustly in the euro area over the last few months, mainly driven by the prevailing low level of interest rates. In particular, the growth of mortgage borrowing remains very strong. In this context, price dynamics in housing markets need to be monitored closely. The liquidity situation in the euro area remains ample by all plausible measures, indicating risks to price stability over medium to longer horizons. In conclusion, oil price developments have again led to upward revisions of inflation projections for the year ahead. At the same time, medium-term domestic inflationary pressures still remain contained, while the balance of risks to the baseline inflation scenario is tilted to the upside. Cross-checking the economic analysis with the monetary analysis confirms the need for particular vigilance in order to keep medium-term inflation expectations firmly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. By achieving this, monetary policy is making a significant contribution towards economic growth and job creation in the euro area.
We pray to the almighty Allah that the Kingdom’s citizens will have many returns of this dear and national occasion and that the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, HRH the Crown Prince and the Second Deputy Prime Minister will be in good health. May the Kingdom continue to enjoy security and stability, so that the development march will continue under our wise leadership. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The Banks also house and manage staff that supervise and regulate banks in the districts (under policy guidance from the Board of Governors), and perform other services, the most widely observed and commented upon of which is the operating of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  open-market operations conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on behalf of all 12 Banks at the instruction of the FOMC. All 12 Bank presidents serve on the FOMC together with the seven members of the Board of Governors. This is where monetary policy for the United States is determined by collective decision. The operating procedure of the FOMC is for each of the governors to have a vote on policy; the bankers rotate their votes, with the New York Fed having a constant vote. However, all 19 members – the seven governors and the 12 bankers – participate fully in every FOMC meeting and actively contribute to policy discussions. The FOMC has traditionally decided the federal funds rate, the overnight rate for interbank lending that anchors the yield curve. In recent years, in reaction to the Financial Panic of 2008 and 2009 and its aftermath, the FOMC has instructed the New York desk to buy mortgage-backed securities and Treasury notes and bonds – eschewing Treasury bills. Presently, the Fed holds more than $ billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and over $ trillion in Treasuries. This expansion of our portfolio and extension of maturities held therein is known as “quantitative easing”, or QE.
The position is complicated in the euro-zone by a reviving political debate about just how much of the unemployment reflects supply-side weaknesses requiring structural reforms, and how much it reflects inadequate overall demand. The outcome of that debate will be crucial to the future evolution of the euro-zone. But in the immediate situation there was no reason to suppose that continued growth of demand and output was inconsistent with effective price stability in the zone as a whole. So much for our different starting points. But over the past year, the world – and I mean the world – has changed quite dramatically for both of us in that we have both been affected by the international economic slowdown. This started, in fact, with the financial disturbances in Asia in the latter half of 1997, but even as late as the beginning of last summer it seemed as if it might have only limited impact on the overall world economy. The IMF, for example, was still then projecting 3–3¾% world growth in 1998 and 1999 respectively – which was certainly a setback compared with their forecast of over 4% just six months before – but it was hardly catastrophic. Since last summer it has become increasingly clear that things are likely to be significantly worse than that.

We’ve already seen a small example of this. The big jump in US lumber prices through the winter (Chart 9 again) encouraged greater supply which in turn led to a  11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  11  significant correction in prices. Lumber prices are now two-thirds below their peak in May, implying that annual inflation rates are likely to be negative next spring. In the data, many non-oil commodity prices seem to exhibit the same “mean-reverting” tendency9. Chart 14: Areas of consumption hit hardest last year have grown more strongly in the recovery  Sources: Barclaycard and Bank calculations. Data weighted by pre-Covid consumption share. 2y growth from March 2021 and 1y growth before that due to Covid base effects. This is perhaps an extreme example. It’s rare that increasing supply is as straightforward as chopping down another tree and cutting it up (and even lumber production isn’t as simple as that). Producing a micro-controller for a car, for example, is a much more complicated process and it takes significantly longer for supply to respond. Many analysts have said they expect the chip shortage to persist into next year. Even here, however, many also believe that we may already have passed the period of maximum strain.
DLT  14  30.3.2023  Swiss Payments Vision – an ecosystem for future-proof payments | Money Market Event | Andréa M. Maechler / Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Thank you for your attention. © Swiss National Bank

European Central Bank: Press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 4 September 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by Commissioner Almunia. On the basis of our regular economic and monetary analyses, at today’s meeting we decided to leave the key ECB interest rates unchanged. The information that has become available since the last meeting has confirmed that annual inflation rates are likely to remain well above levels consistent with price stability for a protracted period of time and that upside risks to price stability over the medium term prevail. While the growth of broad money and credit aggregates is now showing some signs of moderation, the still strong underlying pace of monetary expansion points to continued upside risks to price stability over the medium term. The latest economic data also confirm the weakening of real GDP growth in mid-2008. This reflects partly an expected technical reaction to the strong growth seen in the first quarter as well as dampening effects from global and domestic factors, including direct and indirect effects from high commodity prices. In this environment, it remains imperative to avoid broad-based second-round effects in price and wage-setting.
Last year’s rapid disinflation was not least the result of the substantial appreciation of the króna, which in turn can be attributed to better external balance, lower inflation expectations as the year wore on, greater confidence in stability, and expectations that large-scale investment projects would go ahead. Disinflation last year can also be attributed to a considerable weakness in domestic demand. National expenditure  BIS Review 18/2003  1  contracted by 2½%. The decline in fixed capital formation was particularly pronounced, but private consumption also contracted. In spite of the contraction in national expenditure, however, GDP declined by only ½%. This was due to favourable foreign trade developments, with a contraction in imports and expanding exports. The sudden turnaround in Iceland’s current account from 2000 to 2002 is almost unparalleled among the developed countries. In 2002 there was a 1.8 b.kr. surplus on the current account, or 0.2% of estimated GDP. In 2000 the deficit amounted to more than 10% of GDP, as I mentioned earlier. This shows the great adaptability of the Icelandic economy, which to a large extent can be attributed to the wide range of reforms that have been made to the structure of economy in recent years, including changes in the monetary framework. Now I shall turn to last year’s inflation developments in more detail. In 2001 inflation climbed rapidly, from 5.6% at the beginning of the year to a peak of 9.4% in January 2002. Last year, inflation slowed down steadily and dropped to 1.4% in January 2003.

In particular it pinpointed the need to inform participants about systemic risk and establish risk management and settlement guarantees in the systems, set clear rules on their activities, draw up a contingency plan and increase system transparency. A great deal of work needed to be done and the Central Bank, in collaboration with financial institutions, has firmly underlined that Iceland’s systems should be brought up to international standards. Initially it was decided that the main emphasis would be on developing a netting system for payments below the limits set for the real-time gross settlement system. It was also decided that once work on that system was well under way, further development of the real-time gross settlement system would be addressed. Another necessary issue to consider was the securities settlement system, following the payment system reforms. Operation of the netting system is in the hands of Fjölgreiðslumiðlun hf., which is jointly owned by the commercial banks, payment card companies and the Central Bank. The system handles netting of  BIS Review 18/2003  3  accumulated payment orders lower than 25 m.kr. Work has been in progress on a thorough upgrading of the system and has now largely been completed. Towards the end of 2002 a plan was drawn up for the collateral security amounts in the system and participants made this available to the Central Bank on January 1 this year. Operation of the Central Bank’s RTGS system started in 2000. It handles final settlement of individual payment orders of 25 m.kr.
First, the likelihood of a bank failure as a result of problems in Singapore is small as our banking system is sound and closely supervised, even though it is possible that problems elsewhere will affect a bank’s operations in Singapore. Second, even if a bank were to fail here, it should still have substantial assets to meet its liabilities to depositors. Under the law non-bank depositors enjoy priority in being paid, ahead of other unsecured creditors. This makes it more likely that the failed institution will have sufficient assets to pay out to depositors. Hence, for the guarantee to be called, two things have to happen: a bank has to fail, and at the same time its assets must be worth so little that there is not even enough to repay its depositors. Even then the draw on the guarantee should only be for the shortfall, which should be a fraction of the deposits outstanding. Hence we have calculated that the $ billion backing is an amount that will be ample to meet any eventuality except the most remote. $ billion does not in any way reflect an estimate of the likely draw over the two years of the guarantee. On the contrary, we expect the actual draw to be small or if we are fortunate even zero. Instead, the $ billion reflects the Government’s confidence in the banking system, and its intention to give all depositors that same confidence.

Thus the technological advances of the last 25 years – especially the internet – have not significantly diminished the demand for cash. People still appreciate cash as a store of value and a means of payment. It is visible and tangible, which makes it especially valuable when there is uncertainty about the stability of banks. In addition, interest rates have been very low for some time now, and therefore the opportunity costs of holding cash are also low. However, the significance of cash as a payment instrument, too, remains unimpaired. In this regard, two essential characteristics stand out: As legal tender, cash is widely accepted and extremely reliable to use. Nevertheless, technology is constantly moving forward in terms of new forms of electronic payment as well as in the area of digital forms of money. What is more, the share of the population which grew up without bank cards, the internet and mobile telephones is continually shrinking. Is Switzerland therefore becoming a cashless society? Even if the importance of cash does decline over time, it is unlikely that it will be completely replaced. Its specific advantages suggest, rather, that it will continue to be used as a store of value and a means of payment. With well-established, flexible processes in banknote production and handling, the SNB contributes to ensuring that cash continues to meet the public’s requirements at all times. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
The list of positive effects of free trade is long: the division of labour and specialisation allows countries to produce what they are best at relative to their trading partners and import the rest; 2 unrestricted access to foreign markets facilitates more cost-effective production given the larger sales volumes; the availability of a broad array of foreign products increases choice for consumers with regard to end products and for producers with regard to primary and intermediate products; increased competition from foreign rivals promotes efficiency and innovation; the open exchange of goods and services also leads to the spread of knowledge and new technologies, and in so doing contributes to progress and growth as well. As a small open economy, Switzerland is well aware of the benefits of the freest possible trade in goods and services with the rest of the 1 2  Cf. Sachs and Warner (1995) as well as Frankel and Romer (1999), for example. Cf. Ricardo (1817). Page 2/9  world. Chart 2 clearly illustrates the extent to which our country is integrated in the international trading system. Switzerland profits tremendously from its openness. If the advantages of free trade are so strikingly obvious, then why is there any resistance at all? The answer is relatively simple: because not everyone is profiting from it to the same extent. Although all countries that engage in free trade benefit overall from the unrestricted exchange of goods and services, this is not necessarily the case for every household and every company.

Carney, Mark (2018), From protectionism to prosperity, speech given at the Northern Powerhouse Business Summit, Gateshead, 5 July. Carstens, Agustín (2018), Global market structures and the high price of protectionism, speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 42nd Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25 August. Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer (1999), Does trade cause growth?, American Economic Review, 89 (3), pp. 379–399. International Monetary Fund (2006), World Economic Outlook, April. International Monetary Fund (July 2018), G-20 Surveillance Note, G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meetings, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 21/22 July. International Monetary Fund (October 2018), World Economic Outlook, October. OECD (2016), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2016, Issue 2. Ricardo, David (1817), On the principles of political economy and taxation, London: John Murray. Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner (1995), Economic reform and the process of global integration, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995 (1), pp. 1–118. World Trade Organization (2017), World Trade Report.