samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But let me revert to my main theme of the monetary-policy objective and our performance against it. Since an inflation target was first adopted in October 1992, inflation on the target measure has averaged just 2.6% - and has been more stable than at any time in our history. Since 1997 when the present target - and accompanying regime - was introduced, inflation has averaged 2.4% against the 2½% target. And, on the latest reading RPIX inflation was 2.2% in the year to February. Now some people have suggested that, because inflation has recently been fairly consistently below target - albeit marginally below, by less than ½% on average over the past two years - monetary policy has been unnecessarily restrictive over this period. They've even suggested that we are not behaving 'symmetrically' - aiming to avoid an undershoot, below 2½% as determinedly as we aim to avoid an overshoot, which is of course what we are tasked to do. Well, of course, hindsight is a wonderful thing! Quite frankly I am amazed that we've been as consistently close to the inflation target as we have, and I'm astonished that I have not - or not yet at least - had to write an open letter to the Chancellor.

The exact timing of the relaxation of restrictions is unclear, but once it occurs we could find that this has an impact on this supply source, with potential consequences for monetary policy. Another unknown is the impact on demand in the UK economy. It seems pretty clear that migrant workers will spend at least a proportion of what they earn here, even if many will also repatriate savings to their home countries. The second dimension is bigger picture and less direct. Indeed some may not categorise it in terms of the labour market as such as it has an impact in a number of ways. But I like to think of it in labour market terms. I am talking about the entry of the new Asian economies, and in particular China and India into the world economy, and the ability of countries such as the UK to benefit from the much cheaper wages paid in those countries by sourcing the production of both goods, and increasingly services, to such countries. There is nothing new about the process, based as it is on the age old law of comparative advantage. But what is new is the sheer size of those economies, containing as they do over three times the number of people in the EU and USA combined on the one hand, and the willingness and ability of management of firms in the UK to benefit from them.
I assume that this is one explanation why, for instance, it took Sweden until 1999 before there was sufficient political support to grant the Riksbank increased formal independence and to confirm by law the price stability objective, despite the fact that these reforms had been proposed when the inflation target was introduced in 1993. However, the concern among politicians over making central banks independent is quite unwarranted. The independence does not, of course, mean that the central bank is free to conduct any monetary policy they wish; it only means that it should be able to use the means at its disposal to meet the objectives set by the political system without outside intervention. This is usually expressed as the central bank being instrument independent but not goal independent. The delegation of powers should be regarded as a means for politicians to ensure that the long-term aim of the monetary policy that they endeavour to achieve – but have difficulty guaranteeing – can become a reality. Furthermore, a natural consequence of the independence is that the central bank shall be accountable for its actions and that monetary policy shall be conducted in a transparent manner. 7 It is interesting to note that, despite fairly substantial initial doubts, people have afterwards been very satisfied with the reforms implemented. Monetary policy therefore appears to have essentially delivered what was hoped for and I am not aware of any country where making the central bank more independent has been regretted. Conclusion Let me round off.

My point is that the Fed needs to examine and perfect the transmission mechanism under its purview just as intensely as it looks at monetary policy per se. And we must be ever-mindful that the central bank cannot carry the load alone, as Chairman Bernanke and others of us have often said. Indeed, there is great danger in any temptation to do so. A recent Economist article aptly summarized my perspective on this as follows: “Above all, there is a moral hazard in central-bank activism. It risks encouraging governments to sit back and let others do the work that they find too difficult themselves.”2 If I believe further accommodation or some jujitsu with the yield curve will do the trick and ignite sustainable aggregate demand, I will support it. But the bar for such action remains very high for me until the fiscal authorities do their job, just as we have done ours. And if they do, further monetary accommodation may not even be necessary. With that, I’ll stop. And in the best tradition of central banking, I’d be happy to avoid answering any questions you might have. 2  6  “The World Economy: Central Bankers to the Rescue?” The Economist, Aug. 13, 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches
Even if inflation deviates from target – as will often be the case – it is expected to return to target, and so inflation expectations are anchored. 5 That is why since 2007 the UK has been able to absorb the largest depreciation of sterling since the Second World War, as well as very large rises in oil and commodity prices, with an increase in inflation to an average of only 3.2% over the past five years and without dislodging long-term inflation expectations. So the framework has been tested and has proved its worth. But the current crisis has demonstrated vividly that price stability is not sufficient for economic stability more generally. Low and stable inflation did not prevent a banking crisis. Did the single-minded pursuit of consumer price stability allow a disaster to unfold? Would it have been better to accept sustained periods of below or above target inflation in order to prevent the build up of imbalances in the financial system? Is there, in other words, sometimes a trade-off between price stability and financial stability? 6 The intellectual foundations of monetary policy The experience of the past five years suggests that we reassess the intellectual framework underpinning monetary policy. 7 The emergence of inflation targeting, and the successful results in the form of the Great Stability, coincided with the development of the so-called New Keynesian consensus on macroeconomic theory. This framework offered a theoretical foundation for flexible inflation targeting.

Since pegging these crypto-assets to central bank money – the only legal tender in our monetary system and hence its anchor – is complex and tricky, to say the least, allowing such settlement assets to spread unchecked could affect the transmission of monetary policy and undermine financial stability. II. Our three levers for responding to these challenges I would like to share with you what we are doing to respond to these challenges. The Banque de France is working on three complementary areas: regulation, facilitation and experimentation. A) The first of these stems from the observation that security depends on having an appropriate regulatory framework in place that guarantees financial stability, but also encourages financial innovation in order to enhance end-user services and system performances. At the European level, we have welcomed and are supporting the proposed Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation and the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), presented in September 2020:  With the publication of the MiCA proposal, the European Union was the first G20 jurisdiction to respond to the urgent need to regulate the crypto-asset market. We also support the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). The text will create a harmonised framework for strengthening the IT security of the overall financial sector. I’m thinking in particular of cloud players, whose role in critical segments of the sector raises the question of whether they should be located in the European Union.
Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Shaping the future starts now Speech by Mr Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the launch of the Financial Management for Retirement Module "Shaping the future starts now", Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2017. * * *  Importance of financial literacy There is a growing concern on the low financial literacy level of Malaysians as measured by financial knowledge, attitudes and behaviours. Based on the Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey conducted by Bank Negara Malaysia in 2015, the main observations on the state of financial literacy of Malaysians can be described by: a. First – the majority of Malaysians have inadequate knowledge on financial matters to enable them to make informed financial decisions, particularly among the vulnerable groups; b. Second – a significant majority of Malaysians display short-sighted tendencies and are inclined to ‘live for the moment’ – that is to only focus on instant gratification at the expense of long-term financial planning; c. Third – more than 75% of Malaysians find it difficult to even raise RM1,000 to meet emergency needs; d. Fourth – only a quarter of Malaysians have any form of investment; and e. Fifth – most Malaysians indicated that they will face financial pressure should there be a loss of income. Therefore, building the financial capability and literacy of Malaysians is certainly a priority for the nation.

SAMA works side by side in cooperation with relevant authorities, namely, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Commerce and Industry to achieve the cherished objectives of the Finance Laws. The Implementing Regulations of the Real Estate Finance Law address criteria and conditions to be observed in the exercise of this activity for the purpose of regulating the finance sector, and protecting the rights of the dealers therein. The Regulations set a maximum limit on real estate financing that should not exceed 70 percent of the house value subject of the real estate finance contract. The Regulations also set up a regulatory framework for real estate refinancing, thereby, establishing a secondary market that contributing to providing the necessary liquidity and reducing the cost of financing to the consumer. The Public Investment Fund will contribute to the ownership of the Saudi Refinancing Company with a capital of five billion Riyals. The Implementing Regulations of the Financial Leasing Law include provisions related to the Financial Leasing contracts. The Regulations identify the basic rights and obligations of both the lessor and lessee, including determining the amount of ownership right and dues of the lessee and lessor in case of the cancellation of the contract. The Regulations provide for the registration process of Financial Leasing contracts in accordance with the best practices in this area through a company incorporated for this purpose.
Mr. Chairman, in good times, we normally take the stability and integrity of our systems for granted. Perhaps one of the key lessons from the current crisis is that we should never, ever, take stability and integrity as being “given” conditions, in the future. But, let’s remember that memories are short. This global crisis will almost certainly be forgotten in a few years time. It is also likely that if we enjoy a strong run of growth and prosperity for a few years, our minds too will probably dismiss thoughts of destability. Today’s grim discussions would then be relegated to the drab background, and in its place, the glitz and glamour of fast growth, handsome profits, stunning incentives, and fabulous wealth would reign supreme. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, if and when that happens, the world would unconsciously drift into the danger zone yet again. Needless to say, if we do not want such an eventuality to take place, the price would be intense vigilance on the part of the regulators, governments, media and the academia. I know that is going to be tough, but in the interest of all stakeholders, I sincerely hope it works and that the academia, governments, media and regulators would face up to that challenge.

Concluding, I would like to underline that the Bank of Albania shall always be at the position the public expects it to be, in order to satisfy, at any given time, its legal responsibilities for price level and banking sector stability. In this process, state authorities, in particular the judiciary, would be needed to offer their indispensable cooperation and consider banking system issues a high priority, with the knowledge that a stable economic development of the country depends on it. The Bank of Albania calls on all relevant factors to accelerate their structural reforms on property title and execution of collateral as well as undertake a number of other administrative and bureaucratic regulations which affect banking system costs. Inviting you to openly discuss on these issues, I thank you for your attention! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Lastly and perhaps of most value to SMEs, is the insights that SMEs would gain from a better understanding of their financial deficiencies which lead to rejections of financing applications by financial institutions. This can be deduced from the analysis provided through the Bureau ratings and reports. The credit reports would also serve as a convenient tool for SMEs to carry out a self-evaluation to identify areas that need improvement and initiate adequate remedial actions to increase their competitiveness. SMEs are thereby empowered to improve their own profile, with correspondingly enhanced prospects for the SME sector as a whole. As I mentioned earlier, it is also encouraging to see a considerable turnout by financial institutions at this seminar. This underscores the sustained and growing attention by financial institutions in the SME sector that is critical to provide the enabling environment for the SME sector to thrive. Bank Negara has seen a paradigm change in the way in which financial institutions approach the business of SME financing. Banks have, and continue to invest significantly, in supporting SME financing niches, and the organisational changes that we have seen have been pervasive in many banks. These banks have acquired tremendous insights on effective strategies for successful interfaces with SME customers. In some banks, completely new business cultures for their SME segments have evolved as a result which bodes well for the SME industry.

Secondly, SMEs with good track records will not only enjoy a wider acceptance from banks, they will also be able to access financing on more favourable terms, and obtain faster decisions on their financing applications. This is because the Bureau acts as a one-stop center for banks to obtain consolidated information on SMEs, which is currently scattered, and will take longer for banks to obtain and verify individually. We have already seen how this can work in the case of consumer financing, where real-time and comprehensive information on consumers’ credit exposures and history that is available from CCRIS has  2  BIS Review 67/2008  significantly shortened loan-processing times. With greater availability of information on SMEs, the processing time for SME loans can be similarly shortened. Thirdly, the Bureau includes and takes into account both positive and negative information on SMEs. Certain third party information that financial institutions use in the evaluation of credit applications only provides negative information on the business conducts. Examples are information on bankruptcy and legal suits, which are sometimes not updated and may result in a biased assessment of creditworthiness. By collecting and disseminating both positive and negative information, the SME Credit Bureau will benefit SME loan applicants by providing a more balanced view of SMEs’ credit standings. In an objective rating process, credit bureaus typically accord greater weight to the more recent credit information or behavior. Negative records in the past can thus be mitigated by more current and consistent good track records.
Mr. Heikensten discusses monetary policy Address by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikensten, at the Autumn Conference arranged by the Centre for Business and Policy Studies on 14/10/98. First a word of thanks for the opportunity to attend this meeting. The autumn conferences are a fine tradition to which it is a pleasure to contribute. On previous occasions I have used the opportunity to look back over the past year and discuss what the Riksbank has been doing, including how monetary policy is conducted. Then I have tried to look ahead and pick out some issues of importance for monetary policy in the longer run. My approach this year will be broadly the same. First a review of what has happened since last autumn, with comments on how the Riksbank’s assessment of inflation has evolved over the year. Then, as previously, a look at the question of how we communicate policy and how it has been perceived in financial markets. On this occasion we are in the throes of an international financial crisis, with great uncertainty as to what its real economic effects may be. Contagious effects of the crisis have gradually become larger and larger. Looking back, one can clearly see how the economic forecasts of most observers have swung during the year, from a phase of concern about a future increase in inflationary pressure to a phase of strong anxiety that the global economy will be hit by a recession.

The assessments were based on an assumed appreciation of the Swedish krona from the current TCW index level of 124 to 120 in the coming year and just over 117 in the year after that. Inflationary impulses from the rest of the world were expected to be low in the forecast period. The rising domestic demand was not expected to result in an alarming increase in inflationary pressure. Investment growth and labour supply were judged to be sufficient to avoid general problems with capacity during the period. The development of wages and productivity was expected to be favourable for a moderate, though rising, rate of inflation. Inflation expectations among market agents, firms and households were still low. Inflation was expected to be below the target in the short run and then be in line with the target further ahead. With the fundamentally positive picture of the Swedish economy, including good growth in the forecast period and a successive return to the targeted rate of inflation, the Riksbank left the repo rate unchanged. As uncertainty had increased since the earlier assessments, however, the uncertainty interval surrounding the main path was considerably wider. But the risk spectrum was symmetrical, that is, the risks of inflation being higher than in the main scenario were judged to be as great as the risks of lower inflation.
In the same vein, other economists suggest that dealing with divergences and asymmetries should not prove much more difficult within the euro area, at least in its major countries, than within a long-established monetary union such as the US. II. The euro as a catalyst for further progress  While many acknowledge that the introduction of the euro has been broadly successful, one may ask at this point what needs to happen to ensure the success of the euro in the medium term. What is very encouraging in this respect is the fact that in a number of areas the euro itself appears to be as a catalyst for these conditions to be met. II.1  The euro and the single market  a/ The euro is the crowning achievement of the single market. Need we mention the advantages inherent in the single market? It enables the productive sector to make significant economies of scale and allows savings to be allocated to the most efficient investments. It also enhances market visibility and boosts competition and innovation to the benefit of consumers. But the ultimate objective of the single market could not be achieved while monetary barriers continue to prevent the free flow of goods, services, capital and, in a way, people, by imposing unpredictable and erratic exchange-rate movements and transaction costs.

Therefore, the measures to revise the capital adequacy framework for Zambia enhances the resilience of the sector to both internal and external shocks by improving the quality and quantity of the capital available for commercial banks;  3)  Introduction of the policy rate: the policy rate was introduced in order to provide a benchmark rate for the banking industry on which pricing for lending products can be based. It also promotes transparency in the price discovery mechanisms in the banking sector while minimizing information asymmetry particularly that associated with the credit markets;  4)  Statutory Instrument No. 33 on Bank of Zambia currency regulations: This measure was introduced with a view to reinforcing the use of the Zambian Kwacha as the legal tender in the Republic of Zambia. The increased use of foreign currency cash in our economy has implications for the effectiveness of the conduct of monetary policy given that foreign currency cash is outside the control of the central bank; and  5)  Currency rebasing: Since 2006, (except in 2008 when there were challenges arising from the global financial crisis) Zambia has enjoyed positive economic variables. For instance, overall inflation has been single digit and the country has continued to record favourable balance of payments surplus. During the recent past, inflation has declined to single digit levels such that in December 2011 it closed at 7.2%. This low level of inflation, coupled with favorable macroeconomic conditions, provided an opportune time to rebase the Zambian currency.