samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me now turn to some of the thinking that has already begun surrounding implementation of the New Accord. To ensure that our new rules have gotten it right, the Basel Committee has just completed collecting data for its third Quantitative Impact Study - or “QIS 3” - in conjunction with supervisors around the world. The industry demonstrated tremendous support for this survey, and 265 banks from nearly 50 countries performed concrete and comprehensive assessments of how the Committee’s proposals will affect them. At this early stage, the results suggest that the incentives built into the New Accord are functioning as we had hoped. We are completing a detailed study of the results and will ascertain the need for any adjustments prior to the release of an updated proposal for public comment during the spring. The Committee intends to finalize the New Capital Accord in the fourth quarter of 2003 such that it can be implemented in each member country at year-end 2006. During this three-year period, banks and supervisors are expected to adapt and develop the systems and processes necessary to conform to the standards of the New Accord. In that regard, the supervisory agencies represented on the Basel Committee are making good progress in their preparation for the new framework. To ensure that the New Accord is implemented in a consistent manner across various jurisdictions, such that market competition is driven by each bank’s strengths, rather than by differences in each country’s rules, the Basel Committee established the Accord Implementation Group.

They review such issues as whether the model is based on reasonable assumptions, whether the firm is making appropriate use of backtesting, and how the model performs under normal and stressed market conditions. In addition, they are spending significant time on key controls related to the overall use of models, including the model validation process and the new product approval process. Likewise, as banks rely increasingly on their own assessments of credit and operational risk when determining their capital needs, our examiners will have to become well versed in the changing technical aspects of those models. Some of the conventional, static metrics that we now use - such as those to judge asset quality and to assess the adequacy of credit loss reserves - are likely to be supplanted by more quantitative and more sophisticated measures. As is the case with credit risk, supervisors are in the process of developing a more integrated framework for assessing the adequacy of banks’ operational risk management and measurement approaches. Our approach focuses heavily on how banks are managing operational risk from a corporate-wide perspective. As with any aspect of corporate governance, a key element of our analysis is developing a feeling for the “tone at the top” - that is, the board of directors’ and senior management’s commitment to effectively manage its operational risk.
Indeed, from 2008 to 2014 the Banco de España prepared a considerable number of releases, articles and reports on the crisis and the measures adopted, which were available in print or on our website no sooner were they drafted. That is to say, the Bank had already prepared and published extensive information on and various analyses of the crisis; but what was missing was an orderly overview, in terms of both the timeline and the different themes, addressing the key macroeconomic, financial, regulatory and supervisory aspects. The imbalances built up in the Spanish economy in the expansion prior to 2008 Allow me first to refer to the build-up of macroeconomic and financial imbalances in the expansion years prior to the crisis, linked most significantly to private-sector debt. In its opening chapter, the Report indicates that an intense process of indebtedness unfolded in Spain from 2001 up to 2007, as reflected in Table 1.1 (p. 66). The figures for the period 2001-2007 are as follows: set against nominal GDP growth of 67%, credit to the private sector increased by 221%, concentrated especially in the real estate sector, where growth of 250% in house purchase loans and of 513% in the case of credit to construction and real estate services companies was recorded. Peak growth in credit was in 2005 and 2006. In those two years, credit to the private sector grew by 60%, that earmarked for house purchases by 65% and that to construction and real estate services firms by almost 100%, i.e.

By then, the financial conditions for households and firms had normalised to a significant extent, our economy had resumed a growth rate above 3%, significant increases in employment were posted, the recapitalisation and restructuring of our credit institutions ceased to exert any further significant impact on the increase in the deficit and public debt, and the Single Supervisory Mechanism – incorporated into the ECB – commenced operating. The Report, in which several directorates general of the Bank participated and which was coordinated by the council member Fernando Eguidazu, covers the span of the crisis in the macroeconomic, financial, regulatory and supervisory areas, including national and European reforms. I shall address, first, the aims behind the drafting of the Report; second, the macroeconomic environment in which the crisis unfolded, with the build-up of strong imbalances linked to private-sector debt; third, the restructuring and recapitalisation strategy for a series of credit institutions, essentially savings banks; and, finally, I shall take stock of this process, as far as we can currently consider it. The aim of the Report Firstly, I would like to set out our aims in drafting the Report. On 21 February, the Executive Commission of the Banco de España adopted the resolution to prepare, and I quote, “a detailed report on the financial and banking crisis that broke in Spain as from 2008, addressing its causes, unfolding and resolution, with particular attention to the Bank’s conduct in the crisis”.
It is imperative that a lot more local businesses engage in economic sectors like mining, manufacturing, construction and tourism in order to effectively contribute to the country’s economic development. This can only be possible through innovation and risk taking by indigenous companies with the potential to grow and succeed not only in Zambia but also in international markets. BIS Review 103/2010  1  Moreover, entrepreneurship can play a central role in assisting our country meet the various challenges that it faces today. For instance, entrepreneurship can assist in addressing the challenges arising from:   Low levels of employment;    Social exclusion;    Low levels of competitive products and services in the economy; and    Urbanisation and rural poverty. In order to minimize the adverse effects that arise from these challenges, there is a need to both sustain a high level of entrepreneurial activity in general and to maximise the number of new businesses that are innovative, and that aspire to, and are capable of achieving significant growth. However, if we are to build a much greater number of competitive and innovative businesses in Zambia, then we will need to see many new businesses being created now and in the years ahead. We need to ensure that the culture of entrepreneurship becomes embedded in all our people at a very young age.

I further call on the media to play its rightful role in educating the masses and the youth in particular on the  2  BIS Review 103/2010  importance of entrepreneurship and indeed to give more coverage to Zambians who have succeeded in entrepreneurship in order for our youths to be motivated. I also wish to urge other banks and financial institutions to emulate Intermarket Banking Corporation to develop such well meaning initiatives for this is indeed good Corporate Social Responsibility. I am sure that there are a number of entrepreneurs all over Zambia who are in dire need of that seed capital as well as the initial push to realize their dreams. I have in mind here the very innovative entrepreneurs in Mutendere, Kalingalinga, Garden Compound, Mandevu and several other industrial clusters in our country who are trying to do their best but lack the necessary support in form of finance and education. As I conclude, I wish all the teams that have been shortlisted tonight continued success in future. Unfortunately, there can be only one winner of the overall award but each nominee is already a winner and should feel proud of their nomination and deserving of recognition and our congratulations. I hope that all of you whether you win the award or not will develop your businesses ideas into a reality in future. To the winners, I heartily congratulate you and urge you to make the best use of the K100 Million Prize.
Both regimes may be prone to fluctuations in interest rates in response to shocks, but with inflation targeting, which requires a flexible exchange rate even if managed to a degree, the central bank has a measure of discretion in the magnitude and timing of its response, whereas, with a fixed rate, defensive reactions must be more immediate and may hence be potentially sharper. Hong Kong context Recent criticisms of Hong Kong's currency board have focused mainly on two aspects - the implications for the competitiveness of Hong Kong vis-a-vis other economies and the problems of living with falling price levels. The remainder of this paper is directed mostly at these issues. Competitiveness Changes in competitiveness are typically measured by comparing movements in some appropriate measure of costs or prices at home and abroad, and adjusting for shifts in exchange rates. The  BIS Review 17/2002  1  1  measure of competitiveness thus produced is commonly referred to as the real exchange rate. A 2 stronger real rate means higher relative prices and therefore implies weaker competitiveness. I detect two common misconceptions about the real exchange rate. Influencing the real rate The first is the belief that the real rate is amenable to control by the central bank or government and that the chosen regime for the nominal exchange rate is therefore an important determinant of the real rate. Let me explain what I believe to be some flaws in this view.

In response, and echoing Roosevelt in 1938, President Bush granted the SEC authority to suspend fair value rules. Although this authority was not invoked, it demonstrated a willingness to provide system-wide forbearance through fair value accounting rules. Today, the self-same cycle is in motion. During the long pre-crisis boom, fair value principles gained ground, in particular in the valuation of debt, equity and derivatives: in the US, through Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 157 (SFAS 157); internationally, through International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39). As in the roaring ‘20s, rising asset prices, marked to market, inflated bank profits and balance sheets. Between 2000 and 2007, major international banks recorded accumulated gains in their trading book totalling over £ billion. But as the crisis tide has turned, with falling asset prices and failing banks, so too has the fair value debate. In 2008, under intense pressure from an ailing banking community, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) eased back on fair value accounting rules. For example, banks were allowed to switch financial instruments from trading to holding to avoid mark-to market requirements. So, historically, fair value accounting principles have gained ground when the going has been good, and lost it when it has got tough. From a financial stability perspective, this is a cause for concern. To see why, consider how banks’ balance sheets then appear to investors. During the asset upswing, fair value gains ground. Mark-to-market gains are booked as profits.
As I noted earlier, that reflects the preponderance of adverse cost shocks, which we have largely accommodated, whether by accident or design. But the concentration of such shocks runs the risk that the MPC is no longer seen as taking the target seriously. Having a target in which the acceptable deviations from target are in effect hardwired in might reduce that risk. 6  See, for instance, the forecast errors box on pp.48–9 of the August 2010 Inflation Report. 7  See Bean (1998). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Against that, a nominal income growth target has two drawbacks. The first is that the data for nominal income is less timely than that for inflation and subject to revision, sometimes significantly so. Chart 2 shows the first estimate of nominal income growth, together with the current vintage of data; one should not take comfort from the concordance between the two series in the recent past, as the recent data have not yet had much opportunity to be revised! The average absolute revision over 1993–2009 is a full percentage point. Now the susceptibility to revision is hardly a knock-out blow. After all, the data on growth and employment are also subject to revision and recognising that the data are an imperfect guide to reality is part and parcel of setting policy. But the susceptibility of the data to revision would make it somewhat harder for the public to understand the MPC’s objectives and for Parliament to hold us to account.

as st early as the 1 of January 2004. This provides further evidence of the attractiveness of the European framework, which has provided us with both political stability and economic progress for half a century. The accession countries have accomplished significant progress in stabilising and strengthening their economies and institutions. Observing the accession countries since the beginning of the nineties, we see the major improvements that these countries have made on the road towards convergence with the EU. Nevertheless, there is also general agreement on the fact that the gap in terms of average GDP per capita between the accession countries and the euro area, although diminishing, still remains quite significant. On average, GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity is around 44% of that of the euro area, while in terms of current exchange rates it is only around 22%. The size of the gap, combined with the limited growth differentials between the two groups of countries, suggests that the process of real convergence will be very gradual. Indeed, real convergence is essential to create economic cohesion within EMU and promote integration between Members States, thereby helping to minimise the risk and the effects of asymetric shocks. The Eurosystem, and notably the Banque de France, is following the enlargement process with a great deal of attention. Let me stress a few points of particular relevance for the Eurosystem and for  8  BIS Review 11/2003  accession countries themselves, on the road towards catching up with the EU and achieving convergence.
Bank Negara as service provider has started OKU friendly environment On that note, I would like to share that Bank Negara Malaysia, in our modest ways, has taken some efforts towards being more disabled friendly. Our new premises at Lanai and Sasana Kijang and newly renovated Regional Offices, are OKU friendly with ramp passages at major entrances, lifts equipped with braille buttons, OKU toilets at all floors, OKU designated parking lots and wheelchairs made available when requested. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Our Bank Negara Malaysia’s Museum and Art Galley (MAG) provides special services to the OKU. We have four front liners who are trained in basic sign language. By 2016, the numismatic gallery will have a “Touch and Feel” corner, with special exhibits to cater for the visually impaired. In 2014, we have started our series of financial awareness programme to the OKUs, starting with trainees and staff of Pusat Latihan Gurney, Malaysian Association of the Blind in Brickfields. This year, we plan to conduct more of such programmes. Having said that, for Bank Negara Malaysia, we acknowledge that there are still a lot more that need to be done and we will continue to intensify our efforts in striving to provide a user friendly and barrier–free environment to increase accessibility to our services and products.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In a nutshell: “few, well, till the end”, or in Spanish if I may, “poco, bién, hasta el final”. There are of course non-economic areas: to name a few, defence and border protection; climate change; or youth education and training – an Erasmus Pro programme should be a priority for the unskilled and unemployed youth, which is our common tragedy in France, Spain and Italy. But in the economic field, much remains to be done as well. Although we have succeeded with monetary union, we must make progress towards economic union – so that monetary policy does not remain the only game in town. Page 5 sur 8 1. The first economic priority is to address the root causes of Europe’s continuing subdued growth; and a major one is what I call the “investment crunch”. (Slide 4) Many, following Ben Bernanke’s speech of March 2005, have rightly talked about the “global saving glut” that was putting pressure on the world’s economies. At present, saving remains high, due to the combination of emerging market economies’ surplus and advanced countries’ aging populations. However, (slide 5) what has dramatically changed since the 200708 crisis is investment, which has dropped sharply as a share of GDP in advanced economies. In the euro area, the total investment to GDP ratio has dropped by around 3 points since the 2007 peak and has only slightly recovered since.

Page 1 sur 8  Asociación de Mercados Financieros Annual Financial Convention Madrid, 21 November 2016 François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France Europe facing a new political economy  Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak here in Madrid today with my friend Governor L. Linde, in the midst of the Spanish financial community, and in a country which has demonstrated its active commitment to the European project since it joined the European Union thirty years ago. We have come a long way in Europe and our common history and past success will help us look ahead in these challenging times. The Brexit referendum in June and Mr. Trump’s victory two weeks ago have indeed come as shocks for Europe: both have increased uncertainty and are raising questions about the European identity. How should we, as Europeans, react? Not by less Europe: this would clearly be a mistake if we want to collectively master our own destiny in this new world. But by a better Europe, a more focused and efficient one. In concrete terms, we need to adapt in two ways: first, by building actively on our economic and social assets – among them our single currency and monetary policy; second, by coming together around a few new select priorities – including tackling the current “investment crunch”. **  Page 2 sur 8 I. First, Europe’s assets in the new “political economy”.
David Willetts, for example, emphasises the role of universities with just as much vigour as Newman in his recent book, A University Education. 54 55 56  See, for example, Acemoglu and Restropo (2018) for an organising theoretical framework. For example, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), Susskind and Susskind (2015). Martinelli (2017) and Standing (2017), for example, discuss universal basic income. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  (a) Human Capital Let me start with human capital, workers’ skills and experience. Two fundamental shifts in the jobs and skills market are likely in the period ahead. The first is demographic. A young person born today can be expected to live a 100-year life. 57  That being the case, it is likely they will have a career of 60, perhaps 70, years. Given changes to the future world of work, multiple changes of career, not just job, are likely during a lifetime. This has never before happened in human history. The second secular shift is in the demand for skills. In the past, this skill-shift has been uni-directional. There has been a secular rise in demand for cognitive skills and a corresponding decline in demand for technical skills involving routine and repetitive tasks. That is why cognitive skills have attracted a rising wage premium (Chart 6). Put differently, demand for skills of the “head” (cognitive) have dominated those of the “hands” (technical) and, to lesser extent, those of the “heart” (social) over the past 300 years.

There can hardly be any doubt that in the 1950s, price changes would have been less abrupt in Norway if the devaluation had not taken place.” See Odd Aukrust (1965): Tjue års økonomisk politikk i Norge: suksesser og mistak, [Twenty years of economic policy in Norway: successes and mistakes] Articles from Statistics Norway, no. 15. 16  Erlend Loe (1999): L, J. W Cappelens forlag, p. 376. 17  Loe (1999), pp. 397–398. 4  BIS Review 147/2010  against serious missteps, which seems to be particularly important when decisions are made under uncertainty. This notion is part of the justification for the jury system in our courts of law. The French philosopher Marquis de Condorcet’s now well known jury theorem states that the higher the number of the group is, the higher the probability is that the group will make the correct decision by majority vote. 18 Group decision making has been widely accepted, not only by the courts but also by business, public administration and elected governing bodies. In his book The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki cites a number of examples where large groups outperform individuals or small groups of experts. Contestants on the television game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? have various so-called “lifelines”, including telephoning a smart friend or asking the studio audience for help. It has transpired that the studio audience is the contestants’ absolute best bet.