samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What happens now is that participants in CHIPS submit payment instructions throughout the day. But actual settlement, performed on a net basis, is deferred and becomes final only at the end of the processing day. In the new arrangement, which the New York Clearing House has announced it will put into operation in January, CHIPS participants will continue to submit payment instructions throughout the day. However, through the use of a bilateral and multilateral matching algorithm, the vast majority of payments will be settled and become final over the course of the day. By ensuring that final payment is made promptly, the new procedure will reduce settlement and operational risks and enable participants to manage their risks more effectively. A third major improvement to the U.S financial infrastructure that the Federal Reserve has already implemented deals with a new net settlement service for Fedwire. The net settlement service was  1  BIS Review 93/2000  implemented in 1999 in response to requests from major US clearing associations. These groups asked the Federal Reserve to help their members reduce settlement risk while improving operational efficiency. They noted that Fedwire itself is not an effective way to settle obligations among the members of a clearing group. We agreed and rolled out a new settlement vehicle. This new service helps clearing houses and related arrangements achieve their goals by offering Fedwire-like, immediate and irrevocable finality for entries that have been submitted in a convenient file format by a group’s agent.

Yet at that time, financial crises were a phenomenon felt to be confined to emerging markets. Advanced economies, it was thought, knew better. This, too, would come back to haunt us. Resolving emerging market crises was one thing, redesigning the international financial system to forestall them quite another. Working alongside HM Treasury colleagues (including Sir Jon Cunliffe – another whose path I have lost track of), an intensive programme of international reform began with the aim of preventing a  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10  repetition of these emerging market crises. As part of the Bank’s contribution, under Eddie and Mervyn’s guidance, I worked with the Bank of Canada to produce a blueprint for international monetary reform.13 This blueprint proved controversial, as it proposed restrictions on the IMF’s ability to extend credit to countries in crisis. That jarred with IMF orthodoxy, including the then-Deputy Managing Director Stan Fischer, who at the time was proposing the IMF become an international lender of last resort.14 It also jarred with US orthodoxy. Under Larry Summers and Tim Geithner, the US Treasury had overseen the emerging market bailouts from Mexico in 1994 onwards. In 2002, I was asked by Tim Geithner (now at the IMF) to go to Washington to work on international financial system design, alongside two former US Treasury colleagues, Nouriel Roubini (now better known as Dr Doom) and Brad Setser. There were no prizes for spotting the odd one out.
- Green bond issuance saw the largest increase, comparing with the previous quarter and with the same quarter a year earlier. Financials and governments remained the largest issuers with a share of over 73 percent in 2023 Q1. Indeed, new sovereign issuance increased sharply in 2023 Q1, the European Commission issuing € billion of NextGenerationEU green bonds in its fourth syndicated transaction for 2023. 1  See IMF (2023). Climate Finance Monitor Q1 2023. May. 1  - Conversely, the issuance of most other types of bonds declined. For example, sustainability-linked instruments saw slower growth in the first quarter of the year, which, according to the IMF, “may reflect market participants’ perceptions around greenwashing and the credibility of the asset class to drive companies to meet sustainability targets”. Focusing on the euro area, according to the experimental indicators on sustainable finance developed by the Eurosystem: - The outstanding amount of sustainable debt securities issued in the euro area has more than doubled in the last two years. Securities designed to finance green and social projects, which account for the majority of the market, have seen a particularly strong increase. - Over the same period, sustainability-linked bonds recorded the highest growth rate. However, the relevance of these instruments in the overall debt securities market remains minor. Another interesting aspect highlighted by these experimental indicators is holdings. Since the beginning of 2021, euro area holdings of sustainable debt securities have grown continuously, following a similar trend to the one observed for euro area issuances.

Investment cycle is expected to be further strengthened by the continuation of the productive fiscal investments. As the external demand is envisaged to recover further, additional stimuli is expected through this channel. The above mentioned growth factors are expected to strengthen further the labor market and the disposable income of the households, hence boosting the private consumption as well. The growth expectations provide room for additional rise of the deposit potential in the banking system, which accompanied with the rise in the credit demand and the willingness of the banks to lend, should enable credit growth at a rate of 9–10% in the period to come. The inflation is expected to be influenced mainly by the global prices of primary commodities and the consumers prices of our main trading partners. An average inflation of 0.5% is expected for 2015, with the current forecast indicating its reversal to 2% in 2016, reflecting the rise in the demand and in the import prices. The structural improvements in the export sector are expected to continue in 2015, which along with the overall external recovery and the much lower oil prices, are envisaged to bring about a moderate current  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  account deficit of bellow 1.6% of GDP. In the following year, widening to 3% is expected, reflecting the fall in private transfers and import pressures from the new investment.
A broad range of investors have contributed to this growth: global and regional institutional investors as well as individual investors. Family offices are one particular category of individual investment. The number of Single Family Offices (SFOs) awarded tax incentives by MAS increased to 1,100 as of end-2022, up from 700 in 2021. Second, contrary to popular perception, the bulk of the wealth flows into Singapore come from institutional investors and not family offices or high net worth individuals. Non-retail individual clients – which includes family offices, clients of external asset managers, private trusts, and high net worth individuals – made up only 20% of the increase in total assets managed in Singapore from 2017 to 2021. SFOs that apply for and are granted tax incentives by MAS managed about $ billion of assets as at 2021, less than 2% of the $ trillion total assets managed in Singapore. Third, wealth inflows into Singapore have little effect on the exchange rate, domestic inflation, property prices or car prices. The reason for this is simple: while the wealth is managed here, most of it is invested outside Singapore. This means that the wealth inflows typically remain in foreign currencies and have little or no effect on the Singapore Dollar exchange rate. Singapore is just an intermediary for these flows. As for inflation, it has little to do with wealth inflows into Singapore, let alone the portion due to SFOs.

The key actions so far include: Regular meetings of the FSAC to assist in developing common policies, better coordination and exchange of information with a view to maintaining stability and further developing the financial markets; Launching a new department within the Central Bank with operational tasks and responsibilities in the area of bank resolution; Collection of the first contributions from the banks into the BRF, which will amount to nearly 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  BGN 300 million, including the upcoming 2017 installments; Approving the resolution plans for the foreign subsidiaries belonging to banking groups operating in Bulgaria. We have already planned the next steps, which will further build on recent progress. Our efforts are focused on the following groups of measures: Expanding the FSAC mandate, including for better coordination of agencies’ contingency planning in response to situations threatening financial stability; Creating capacity for the practical application of resolution tools, more specifically the sale of business, the bridge institution and the bail-in tools, if needed; Prioritising the resolution planning for domestic systemically important banks; this process is presently underway but their resolution plans are not yet adopted; Addressing financial and legal restrictions on liquidity support by the central bank, taking into consideration both the existing currency board regime and the EU state-aid rules and procedures for public support to banks. We plan to apply the above measures along with further strengthening banking supervision, reducing bank nonperforming loans (NPLs), and further developing the overall financial sector safety net.
It is crucial in a period of economic hardship – with companies going to the wall and people losing their jobs – that people do not think the Bank is focused on a narrow inflation target for its own sake. If they feel that we are not accepting responsibility for what happens to growth and jobs, they will look for someone else to do so. If we want to preserve the framework we have a job on our hands – now more than ever – to explain our strategy to the general public. The Bank and MPC need to convince them that the policy we are pursuing is the best way of restoring growth and full employment without reawakening inflation. Indeed it is by bringing output back to potential that we will bring inflation back to target. Secondly, I share the view that setting a target for a measure of consumer price inflation which excludes the costs of home ownership has done us no favours. It is widely recognised as a flaw in the harmonised CPI across Europe but it is of particular significance in the UK given the critical role that home ownership plays here in household budgets and wealth. Something needs to be done to remedy that situation, and if progress can’t be achieved at a European level I think we ought to consider going it alone. More fundamentally, if inflation targeting by an independent central bank is an essential foundation of policy, it is pretty clearly not sufficient on its own.

We are now learning a lesson that Japan learned a decade ago. As the Governor of the Bank of Japan recently remarked “if inflation targeting regimes induce market participants to think of monetary policy decision-making process in terms of an inflation number, they tend to overlook the insidious build-up of unsustainable imbalances […]. Inflation targeting works well if it is properly understood… (but this) can be difficult once an economy has attained and maintained a low inflation rate for a number of years.” This is partly a matter of adopting the intelligent approach inflation targeting. We must be willing to “lean against the wind” of asset price booms and credit expansion and to tolerate somewhat weaker growth and lower employment in doing so. But if we need to prevent asset price and credit booms as well as control consumer prices it would be better to have two instruments than one and that is the last lesson I want to discuss – the need to develop instruments which directly dampen the cycle of credit growth and asset prices. 10  BIS Review 21/2009  Lesson 7: We need another instrument to stabilise the economy The first step must be to decide how ambitious we want to be and define the objective. Then we can design the instruments. I don’t think we have all the answers yet.
For the rest of the year, assuming a gradual improvement in the COVID-19 situation, further progress in the recovery was expected, underpinned by a decline in uncertainty, the gradual disappearance of bottlenecks, the maintenance of favourable financing conditions and, in Europe, the gradual implementation of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme. As regards inflation, the data in the first two months of the year had continued to surprise on the upside compared, for example, with the projections made in late 2021. 1  The possible economic consequences of the conflict  The Russian invasion of Ukraine, on 24 February, and the western world’s response, which has led to the imposition of unprecedented economic sanctions on Moscow, represent a new and foreseeably hugely significant shock, with adverse consequences in terms of a weaker economic performance and greater inflationary pressures. To assess the scale of these effects, it is helpful to describe the different channels through which this new shock will affect the global economic outlook:  i. Energy and non-energy commodities. One first economic impact of the invasion of Ukraine stems from the fact that Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine, are among the world’s main producers of certain energy and non-energy commodities, and that Europe is highly dependent on imports of some of these products, especially oil and gas from Russia, but also cereals from Ukraine.1  The price of many of these commodities has already risen significantly as a result of the conflict.

For this mediumterm consolidation programme to be credible it must include the timeframe considered, the proposed objectives and the key measures to achieve these. As I have pointed out on several occasions, defining and announcing this plan in good time would help boost its credibility. It would also lay the foundations for implementing a gradual adjustment process, thereby minimising the possibility of abrupt changes in the budgetary policy stance that may hamper the recovery under way. The preparation of Spain's Stability Programme Update, to be submitted next spring, may be a good time to do so thoroughly. Lastly, we should not forget that the reduction of the high level of public debt we reached after the pandemic ought to rest partly, as an additional lever, on increasing the economy’s potential output. As we know, this requires the implementation of a comprehensive range of reforms to address our structural problems. The use of NGEU funds may also be particularly useful in facilitating these reforms and making the necessary investments to support these transformations. Moreover, as I stressed earlier, the increase in the price of energy commodities, most of which we import from abroad, represents a clear negative shock to our terms of trade 7  and will therefore weaken our economy. This has been compounded in recent weeks by the war in Ukraine.
Most retail deposits can be withdrawn overnight and are remunerated at very low short-term rates. Nevertheless, in practice, they are a sticky or stable form of funding, unless there is a banking crisis. These features allow banks to offer loans with longer maturities and keep only a fraction of the face value of deposits created in this way in central bank “reserves”. This is the basis of fractional-reserve banking. 15. Individual banks can respond to outflows in a number of ways in the short term, for instance by (i) using the bank’s existing central bank excess reserves that it holds on its balance sheet, thus reducing its holding of excess reserves; (ii) acquiring reserves from other banks in the interbank market, by either selling assets or borrowing, which can be secured or unsecured and of different maturities; and (iii) obtaining more reserves from the central bank by either selling assets or using them as collateral for secured borrowing. 16. An individual holding limit is the maximum amount of a retail CBDC that can be held by each end user. See the digital euro glossary. 17. A retail CBDC remuneration rate is an interest rate applicable to retail CBDC holdings. Remuneration is considered tiered if interest rates applicable to holdings are differentiated across holding buckets defined using thresholds. See the digital euro glossary. 18. The design of a digital euro would likely include a combination of tools, even if not all are necessarily activated at the time of issuance. 19.

Perhaps the most important program was the purchase of deteriorated portfolios by the Central Bank under a variety of schemes, including repurchase agreements, and in exchange of debt instruments, liquid resources, and a new liability called “Subordinated Obligation”. The impact of these programs on the assets side of the Central Bank balance sheet was huge, and so were the costs of the complete rescue plan. Altogether, it is estimated that only the direct fiscal cost of the Chilean Financial Crisis of 1982 reached 41% of GDP. The aftermath of the crisis The lessons learned from this crisis highlighted the fact that banking regulation and supervision needed to be substantially upgraded. In 1986, the General Banking Law introduced limitations on currency mismatch, constraints on related party lending, and restrictions for banks to receive  Page 2 of 5  Central Bank of Chile March 2019  goods instead of liquid resources; all of them, elements which were common practice before the 1982 crisis. Paradoxically, what could be considered harsher regulation did not hamper financial deepening. Instead, it fostered solvency and credibility of the banking system and allowed its healthy development in the ensuing decades. Regulation and Financial Development Credit has a valuable role in the economy. Financial intermediaries channel resources from agents that save, to agents that need to borrow to smooth consumption or finance profitable projects.
President Reagan thought that one element of the American dream is “the opportunity to grow, create wealth, and build a better life for those who follow,” while President Obama has described it as follows: “A child’s course in life should be determined not by the zip code she’s born in, but by the strength of her work ethic and the scope of her dreams.” One’s destination in life should not depend on where the journey begins. Equal opportunity does not imply equal outcomes – some people may work harder, be more fortunate in terms of their disposition and endowments, or just be luckier in how their lives evolve. But it does require that income mobility – in particular, upward mobility – be widely evident and remain part of the fabric of the nation. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between income mobility and income inequality. Income mobility is a dynamic concept – the degree to which individuals or families can move  1  Rajashri Chakrabarti, Andrew Haughwout, Giorgio Topa, Joseph Tracy and Wilbert van der Klaauw assisted in preparing these remarks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  up or down in the income distribution over time. Income inequality is a static concept – how unequal are individual or family incomes at a particular point in time. Recognizing that rising income inequality in the United States is an important issue, my focus today will be mainly on income mobility. I don’t think the issue of income mobility receives the attention it deserves.

Timothy F Geithner: Challenges in risk management Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Institute of International Bankers Luncheon, New York,18 October 2005. *  *  *  Thanks for giving me a chance to address this meeting of the Institute of International Bankers. Your presence in our markets adds greatly to the competitiveness and dynamism of the U.S. financial system. The major international institutions contribute not just depth and liquidity to our markets, but also bring new ideas and global perspectives on developments here and abroad. And the Institute has played an important role in fostering dialogue among international bankers and policymakers on issues of mutual interest. You are meeting at a time when the financial markets reflect a substantial degree of confidence about the future—confidence in the stability of future macroeconomic outcomes and confidence in the strength of many of the world’s major financial institutions. Against this backdrop, I thought it might be useful to talk about our hierarchy of concerns and priorities in the supervisory process, particularly those that relate to the financial strength of the major intermediaries and the functioning of the markets in which they operate. I should note that we, of course, have a broader set of related supervisory responsibilities and a broader agenda of specific concerns.
The impact of this adjustment on overall GDP is likely to be relatively small because much of the output of the financial sector  BIS Review 140/2010  3  is treated as intermediate inputs to other sectors in the economy. Such an estimate is supported by the finding of my Bank of England colleagues that the increase in rates of return on equity earned by banks were accounted for almost entirely by an increase in leverage, capital gains on assets in trading books and the reported profits on contracts that produced losses only after the crisis occurred. And it is consistent with the estimates calculated by Colangelo and Inklaar (2010) for the euro area. They found that around 40% of measured financial sector value added probably captured compensation for bearing risk. 3. The theory of banking  Why are banks so risky? The starting point is that banks make heavy use of short-term debt. Short-term debt holders can always run if they start to have doubts about an institution. Equity holders and long-term debt holders cannot cut and run so easily. Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig showed nearly thirty years ago that this can create fragile institutions even in the absence of risk associated with the assets that a bank holds. All that is required is a cost to the liquidation of long-term assets and that banks serve customers on a first-come, first-served basis (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).

Moreover, the Governor shall be heard by the Minister for the Economy about the appointment of six members of the Governing Council. Propose to the Governing Council the Council members that shall form part of the Executive Commission. Propose to the Executive Commission the appointment and dismissal of the Directors General, for ratification by the Governing Council. The Governor shall have the powers delegated by the Governing Council or the Executive Commission. 2 Powers of the Deputy Governor     Manage, at the highest level, the common internal services of the Banco de España. Stand in for the Governor when the post is vacant or in the event of the latter’s absence or illness. The Deputy Governor shall have the powers delegated by the Governor, the Governing Council or the Executive Commission. 3 Powers of the Governing Council   Approve the general guidelines of action of the Banco de España so that it may fulfil the functions entrusted to it.   Debate monetary policy matters and supervise the Banco de España’s contribution to implementation of the monetary policy of the European System of Central Banks by the Executive Commission, all in accordance with the ECB’s guidelines and instructions and observing the independence and professional secrecy obligation of the Governor as a member of the ECB’s governing bodies.