samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another positive development for both the U.S. and the global economy is the sharp decline in energy prices. Let’s start with the U.S. perspective. Despite the impressive recent gains in natural gas and crude oil production, the U.S. still is a net importer of energy. As a result, falling energy prices are beneficial for our economy. In economist parlance, falling energy prices are a positive “terms of trade” shock for the U.S. Over the near-term, this will lead to a significant rise in real income growth for households and should be a strong spur to consumer spending. Since energy expenditures represent a higher proportion of outlays for lower income households, falling energy prices disproportionately raise their real incomes. Also, because such households are more liquidity constrained, with budgets that often bind paycheck to paycheck, they have a higher tendency to spend any additional real income. As a result, much of the boost to real household income from falling energy prices is likely to be spent, not saved. More broadly, the decline in energy prices also will be supportive to the global growth outlook in two other ways. First, by pulling down inflation in many countries it will spur more expansive monetary policy. We are already seeing this response in Europe and Japan. Second, the decline in energy prices is also likely to ease the global fiscal stance. Over the near-term, for oil exporting governments, falling revenue will not be fully offset by reduced expenditures.

US Prime MMFs saw large outflows, with net redemptions of 30% from prime MMFs offered to institutional investors over a two week period (President’s Working Group, 2020). This contributed to the effective closure of the market for short-term dollar funding (FSB, 2020). US government MMFs, on the other hand, saw huge inflows over the same period. A similar pattern was also seen in dollar denominated MMFs in Europe. 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  The important conclusion I draw from this review of the experience of the dash for cash is that while we can reasonably conclude that the actions taken meant that the immediate problem was tackled, in doing so some serious issues which represent a threat to the stability of the financial system were revealed. Hence, it is right that a very large amount of effort is going towards tackling these issues. Much of the rest of my remarks will set out and assess where we have got to. Reforms to make MMFs more resilient It is clear from experience that money market funds as currently structured may often be perceived as cash-like, but cannot make good on this expectation in a sufficiently wide range of market conditions, and so can contribute to stress in short-term funding markets. The objective must be to improve the resilience and functioning of MMFs to protect the stability of the financial system. In doing so, it is also important to recognise that the reforms after the financial crisis did not tackle this issue conclusively.
The significance of IT is visible in two ways; in production and use. If we look at the production of IT, we can observe that the telecom industry's share of total industry is relatively large in Sweden compared with many other countries. This means that the rapid development in productivity that has occurred in the telecom sector has contributed to pushing up productivity growth in the business sector as a whole. If we instead look at use of IT, Sweden has a relatively large share of IT capital in the total capital stock, compared with other countries. Sweden is in this respect more like the United States than continental Europe. The use of IT means that one can simplify and automate the work so that those who work can carry out more tasks in a shorter time, that is, productivity increases. The financial sector is very skilled at making use of IT to increase productivity. Its customers currently carry out many simple tasks from home in front of their computers instead of going to a bank office. During the second half of the 1990s, major investments were made in IT capital. These investments accounted for approximately half of the growth in productivity during the period 1996-2000 (see Figure 4). The investment upturn was broken in connection with the IT bubble bursting at the beginning of the 2000s. After that the contribution from IT capital to productivity growth has declined substantially.

Sweden’s membership of the EU from 1995, the EU’s enlargement and the gradual intensifying of the EU’s common market have been significant factors here. New, large markets, such as China, India and the earlier planned economies in eastern Europe are being rapidly integrated into the world economy. Trade barriers and customs duties between countries have declined. Technological developments make it easier for companies to build up global trade and production networks. This has resulted in a strong increase in world trade. In Sweden, this is reflected in the fact that exports have increased from around 30 per cent of GDP in 1990 to around 50 per cent in 2006. Another tendency that is related to globalisation is that integration of companies over national borders has increased. Studies by the OECD indicate that a country's productivity increases if companies in the country have a large degree of foreign ownership. 1 Quite simply, a multinational company must be better than the local competitors in order to outweigh the handicap of operating in a foreign country. Compared with other European countries, Sweden has a high percentage of foreign-owned companies. This percentage has increased substantially since the mid-1990s. In the manufacturing industry around 40 per cent of the  1  2  Criscuolo (2005). BIS Review 12/2008  employed are now working in foreign-owned companies. The corresponding figure in the services sector is 55 per cent. 2 IT is another factor that has probably contributed to the rapid rate of increase in productivity over the past 10-15 years.
Furthermore, a fragmentation of the global economy would probably lead to more frequent bottleneck situations, since changes in demand would once again increasingly affect domestic economies and it would be less possible for these changes to be absorbed by the global economy. As a result, inflation and the economy would also become more volatile again. All of this means that monetary policy would have to be focused on tackling inflation more frequently and intensively than in recent years. Moreover, the use of monetary policy instruments could also be affected. Would the traditional instrument of interest rates be used again more often, or would unconventional measures continue to play an important role in countering the impact of adverse disruptions? This primarily depends on whether the neutral interest rate remains low or returns to a higher level. Both of these developments are conceivable. The neutral level of interest rates could rise and the traditional interest rate policy could return to the fore if there were to be a reduction in the investment of savings from the emerging economies in the advanced economies. The neutral level of interest rates would also rise if defence spending and investment in energy infrastructure were to increase government debt or if inflation were to remain high. On the other hand, however, the neutral level of interest rates could also persist at the low level of the past 15 years if there were to be an increase in saving due to the geopolitical uncertainty or if inflation were to decline again.

However, should there be signs of a strengthening and spread in inflationary pressure, we will not hesitate to take the necessary measures to ensure price stability in Switzerland in the medium term. Possible longer-term consequences of the war for monetary policy So much for monetary policy today. However, what could be the longer-term consequences of the war? One key issue in my view is how we are going to deal going forward with the dependencies that have arisen as a result of globalisation. Specifically, which countries will still trade with each other in which goods and services and to what extent? We do not yet have definitive answers to these new questions. From the current perspective, however, it appears possible that in the medium term we will be living in a world that is less integrated than it is today. I would like to focus here on this question: What would a less globalised world mean for monetary policy? There would initially be the impact on inflation and the economy, in other words on the two variables at the core of monetary policy. With a reduction in the division of labour owing to a fragmentation of the global economy, production costs for many goods would rise again. As long as this disintegration persisted, it would be likely to trigger more protracted inflationary pressure.
It is now urgent to make concrete progress on substance, and to move up a gear, by triggering four accelerators of the Economic Union: - A macro accelerator: the French President, Mr. Macron, in his speech about Europe ten days ago at the Sorbonne, started by talking about the “coordination of economic policies”. In this widely-discussed speech, I believe that this was not sufficiently remarked upon. In my opinion – as an independent central banker – we should aim to achieve a genuine collective economic strategy; a mutual commitment between the Member States of the euro area, for more reforms in countries where they are required, and more fiscal support in countries with leeway for this. This collective strategy could be prepared and adopted as of 2018. It could be supplemented by the creation of a common stabilisation fund, aimed at supporting, through lending, Member States facing asymmetric shocks. This could be part of a European Monetary Fund, provided that its scope of action is extended beyond the current European Stability Mechanism. - A micro accelerator: i.e. a Financing Union for Investment and Innovation. The aim is to mobilise the EUR 350 billion savings surplus of the euro area, notably to shore up equity which is the key to an innovation economy, and also to foster synergies, thanks to an integrated steering mechanism, between the Juncker investment Plan, the Capital Markets Union and Banking Union. Here too, progress could be rapid.

Public lecture at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank Vienna, 6 October 2017  The euro area’s monetary policy in the context of economic recovery  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de Francei  Press contact: Clara Martin (+33 1 42 92 98 75; +33 6 74 83 32 38; clara.martin@banque-france.fr). Page 1 sur 8  Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and my friend Governor Ewald Nowotny for having invited me today. A little more than one year ago, the full Governing Council of the ECB celebrated in this very place the 200th anniversary of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). Today, your country is on the eve of important national elections. Throughout history, Vienna has been one of the centres of Europe, and Austria a country that we love: on a more personal note, I am indebted to Austria for enabling me to improve my German during a lengthy stay in Graz, Styria, over 40 years ago. And the Austrian economy has been a strong performer in the euro area: a low unemployment rate of just 5.6% in August 2017, against 9.1% for the euro area as a whole. You are the proof, along with other countries, that our common European social model is compatible with economic success. Today, you have invited me to speak about euro area monetary policy in the context of economic recovery. The prospect of a possible normalisation of our monetary policy gives rise to expectations and somewhat unduly to concerns.
In particular, the FOMC has indicated that it will continue to hold the target range for the federal funds rate at its current level until the economy reaches conditions consistent with its assessments of maximum employment, and inflation has reached 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time. There is still a long way to go before reaching maximum employment, and over time it should become clearer whether we have reached 2 percent inflation on a sustainable basis. Conclusion To close, I’ll say that it’s clear that the pandemic is far from over, both in terms of its effects on health and its effects on the economy. The unusual nature of this crisis means that this recovery is far different than anything we have seen before. But with time, I am confident that the economy will continue to move ever upward. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, December 16,  2020. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Furthermore, as regards the comparison in Chart 10, the Energy Price Cap and the currency have not been the only pieces of news since August that might have influenced market expectations. For example, forward interest rates rose a cumulative 50bp on the (nine) days on which UK price and wage data were released. The market may also be wary about further changes in fiscal policy, and to take a skewed view of the risks in that respect. Bank of England  Page 19  Nevertheless, the graph does serve to illustrate quite how significant the moves in markets have been in the past couple of months or so. If Bank Rate really were to reach 5¼%, given reasonable policy multipliers, the cumulative impact on GDP of the entire hiking cycle would be just under 5% - of which only around one quarter has already come through (Chart 11). Chart 11: Most of the impact of cumulative tightening implied by market prices yet to come  0  Percent 0  -1  -1  -2  -2 Impact of tightening on GDP  -3  -3  -4  -4  -5 Dec 2021  Dec 2022  Dec 2023  Dec 2024  -5 Dec 2025  Chart shows estimated impact of policy tightening to date and as implied by forward market interest rates at close on 17 October, relative to a counterfactual in which Bank Rate is held constant at 0.1%.
This is incredibly difficult to do, particularly to a broad and diverse audience who are more likely than before to be affected by policies that are directed at managing financial stability risks. The challenges are further compounded by the reality that the vast majority of the public prefer to receive information not through traditional channels but through secondary sources, including social media. Authorities are responding in a number of different ways. Some have increased the frequency of published financial stability reviews, while making them more readable and easy to understand. Others have taken their message directly to the masses by supplementing official financial stability communications with multi-faceted media campaigns. Authorities have also strengthened industry and inter-agency platforms for communicating information on financial stability developments. What is clear is that communications has become an integral part of the management of financial stability. And it goes beyond increasing the effectiveness of a particular policy response to emerging risks. It is essential to the integrity of financial stability policies over time, and to public confidence in the institutions that are responsible for implementing them. In a more globalised financial system, authorities also face increasing pressures to conform to global standards, many of which were not designed with institutions that have no or limited activities beyond their domestic borders in mind. Global standards are also often ill-equipped to respond to specific conditions in domestic financial systems that differ significantly in their stage of development and vulnerabilities to risks.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Reflections on the UK’s economic performance over the past year and future challenges Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor's Dinner for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, 20 June 2001. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, my Lords, Aldermen, Mr Recorder, Sheriffs, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is always a privilege, my Lord Mayor, and a pleasure, to be invited to enjoy the splendour, and the generous hospitality, of the Mansion House on the occasion of this annual dinner for the Merchants and Bankers of the City of London. You provide us with an opportunity – in an atmosphere of calm – to reflect upon the events of the year that has gone by and upon the challenges to come. And the past year certainly has been eventful – though it is notable that some of those events did not result in particularly dramatic change. I think particularly of the Election and I congratulate the Government on the outcome, and you, Chancellor, on your own re-appointment. I very much look forward to continuing to work with you.
Their assessment horizon may also be shorter than the social optimum. And, crucially, coordination failures may be a factor: users of a particular infrastructure, many of whom may compete in underlying markets, need to coordinate their actions if they are to influence decisions on the future strategy of the infrastructure provider. Investment in the reduction of operational risk will be one such decision. Difficulties in organising effective bargaining among users may leave them unable to coordinate, particularly in the face of differences in their information, expectations or preferences. Potential welfare-increasing actions may, therefore, not be carried out. These market failures may justify intervention by the public authorities: either via a continuous oversight or regulatory regime; via targeted intervention; or maybe even via public ownership, as is often the case in respect of large-value payment systems and sometimes with securities settlement systems. An alternative strategy when faced with a monopoly provider might be to promote (or even set up) alternative, competing suppliers, to improve market contestability while ensuring adequate interoperability and substitutability across systems. Of course, given the existence of network externalities and increasing returns to scale, the cost of this form of risk mitigation may well be higher than the cost of regulating a natural monopoly on an ongoing basis.

Paris FinTech Forum – 25 January 2017 Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution  France: a European powerhouse for financial service innovation  Good morning to all of you. I am delighted to be here today. Who could have imagined just a few years ago that a central banker would be making an appearance at a forum on innovation? I remember when we first met up, about a year ago, with the developers from the start-up Labo Blockchain to work on a Proof of Concept, everyone from the Banque de France had made an effort: they’d dressed casually for the occasion… except that all the developers had decided to turn up in a suit and tie. It was a complete role reversal! But things change very rapidly. Today, our dealings with innovators go far beyond any of the assumptions we might have had about each other: the Banque de France is testing blockchain technology and is opening a LAB to work with start-ups; the ACPR (the supervisory body which I chair) has welcomed more than 100 key innovators since the creation of its FinTech Innovation Unit, and has set up a FinTech Forum with the AMF to increase our interaction with innovators.
On the other hand, the number of vacancies doubled last year and demand for foreign labour picked up as the year wore on. In February 2004, seasonally adjusted unemployment was 2.9% and had gone down by 0.1% per month since September 2003. Productivity growth appears to have been exceptionally high last year. As in recent years, domestic wage rises outstripped those among Iceland’s main trading partner countries. Measured by the wage index, domestic wages rose by 5½% in 2003, which represents 3½% growth in real terms. Exchange rate developments and foreign reserves Under the new monetary framework, Iceland abandoned a fixed exchange rate regime and the króna was floated in the market. Every so often the argument is put forward that the Central Bank can determine the exchange rate, and some people criticise it if the exchange rate develops along different lines from what they had expected. Such debate was far less prominent in 2003 than the year before, which definitely indicates a growing awareness that the Central Bank cannot exert a decisive impact on the exchange rate of the króna. For the first part of the year the króna strengthened, probably as the result of expectations of currency inflows in connection with investments in hydropower and aluminium. Around the middle of the year the króna depreciated again. Uncertainty about revenues from the Keflavík NATO base and about the Norðurál aluminium smelter expansion, and perhaps to some extent stepped-up Central Bank currency purchases, are probable explanations.

Mario Draghi: Global and domestic inflation Speech by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, to the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 4 December 2015. *  *  *  Over the past years, central banks across advanced economies have provided unprecedented support to our economies, and the results are being felt. Output has been put back on an upward path. Growth is strengthening. The output gap is gradually closing, as is the case in the euro area, or in some cases it is closed already. Insofar as monetary policy is intended as a macroeconomic stabilisation policy, it is succeeding. But our mandate is not phrased in terms of real growth. It is phrased in terms of price stability. And there, success is not achieved yet. Inflation remains low everywhere, lower than our objectives require. And medium- to long-term inflation expectations have been less steady for some time, and also generally lower than our objectives. To some extent this apparent disconnect between real and nominal developments is an expression of lags in the transmission process. But it has also triggered suggestions that perhaps central banks are unable to fully control the trend in inflation – either because they lack the appropriate tools, or because inflation in any one economy is driven to a large extent by global factors outside their control. I would dispute entirely the notion that we are powerless to reach our objective.