samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III assets continue to generate substantial proceeds, which are distributed monthly to pay down the New York Fed’s Senior Loans to the respective Maiden Lane LLCs. While the New York Fed may direct its investment manager to sell Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III assets into the market at any time, as a practical matter, the value maximizing strategy has been largely to hold the assets to maturity while collecting interest income, and principal repayments. Currently, the hold-to-maturity expected proceeds of each LLC’s portfolio are greater than the LLC’s debt to the New York Fed. As of May 20, 2010, the balance on the New York Fed’s Senior Loan to Maiden Lane II was $ billion (inclusive of accrued interest), while the total asset value was $ billion. The balance on the New York Fed’s Senior Loan to Maiden Lane III was $ billion (inclusive of accrued interest), while the total asset value was $ billion. In sum, the LLCs have repaid approximately $ billion of the loans made to them by the Federal Reserve. Based on the current performance of both portfolios, as well as our analysis of forecasts provided by our investment advisor, it is anticipated that the proceeds from both portfolios will exceed the principal and interest due on the New York Fed’s Senior Loans to both Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III. We expect to recover our principal and interest on the loans to the LLCs, and on the Fed Facility.

On the evening of September 16th, we advanced $ billion in credit to AIG through a fully collateralized lending, and announced the term sheet for what would become an $ billion revolving credit facility with AIG (Fed Facility). 1 Some have asked why the Federal Reserve did not see the threat that AIG posed to the financial system before September 16th. The short answer is that AIG had hundreds of regulators, none of which was the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve had no regulatory authority over the firm – no authority over its capital, no authority over its liquidity, and no oversight over its control functions. The Federal Reserve was not engaged in supervision of AIG. It did not have the legal authority to do so. These roles and responsibilities remained with state insurance regulators, and with the comprehensive consolidated supervisor, the Office of Thrift Supervision. Throughout the weekend of September 13th and 14th we were assured by those regulators that a private sector consortium of commercial banks had a solution to AIG’s liquidity problems, and we had no basis to question those assurances. But then Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection and the private sector consortium unequivocally stated that they were no longer prepared to lend to AIG. The AIG situation is both different and similar to that of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund that nearly collapsed in the fall of 1998.
But we regulate the activities that surround virtual currencies if these pose specific risks. An example would be the Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements that we have imposed on intermediaries providing virtual currency services. We are assessing if additional regulations are required for investor protection. Another example is the wave of new payment services that have been enabled by new technology. Consumers are increasingly making and receiving payments through digital payment platforms, which fall outside of our existing regulatory frameworks. In recognition of the risks that these digital payment platforms can pose to the system as a whole if they are not adequately secure, MAS will be issuing a new Payment Services Bill (PSB). This will streamline the regulation of payment and remittance service providers under a single regulatory framework, and calibrated to whether an entity offer one, some or all parts of the retail payments value chain. It will also seek to enhance user protection and facilitate the adoption of electronic payments. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  20 Regulations should not stifle innovation. The reality is that innovations will always move ahead of rules. The key is in understanding whether a particular innovation or new business model is simply a regulatory arbitrage. If so, we should deal with that directly such as by bringing that activity within the regulatory ambit or even banning it altogether. Another consideration is whether an innovative business model while purposeful will create incoherence or inconsistency of treatment.

At a global level, the buoyancy of EMEs has resulted in higher commodity prices, which coupled with some specific factors, such as weather problems impacting agricultural production and tensions in the Middle East and North Africa, have pushed food prices to record highs and oil prices to very high levels as well. This price shock, coupled with strong domestic activity, results in inflationary pressures that must be contained with tighter monetary policy. Contrary to the situation in advanced economies, international price (supply) shocks find fertile territory to propagate to wages or other prices when the economy is in a strong cyclical position. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This uneven recovery of the world economy is resulting in an uneven monetary policy landscape (Figure 2), which strengthens currencies in EMEs and induces capital inflows to these countries. Free trade and export-led growth have been a successful growth strategy in developing countries, which see the strengthening of their currencies as a threat to this strategy. Consequently, many countries have been trying to fight the appreciation via capital controls and exchange rate intervention. China and the U.S. deserve special mention, as they are at the center of the tensions of the adjustment. China has been the growth engine of the world, and it would not be an exaggeration to call it the “grower of last resort” for the global economy. They have decided to appreciate gradually, much more slowly than most EMEs and commodity exporters.
Ida Wolden Bache: Norges Bank's management of the Government Pension Fund Global Introductory statement by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing of the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 18 April 2023. *** Thank you for the invitation and for the opportunity to talk about Norges Bank's management of the Government Pension Fund Global. 2022 saw substantial movements in global financial markets. Interest rates rose, and both equity and bond markets gave negative returns. The fund's return last year was equivalent to a drop in value of NOK 1 637 billion. In absolute terms, this is the weakest return in the fund's history. With such a large fund and an equity allocation of 70 percent, we need to be prepared for substantial fluctuations in returns The objective for Norges Bank's management of the fund is the highest possible longterm return within the constraints set by the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry has defined a benchmark index for the fund, and we manage the fund close to this index. Over time, the return on the fund has been higher than the return on the benchmark index. The Executive Board is satisfied with this. The excess return in 2022 was equivalent to NOK 117 billion. The Executive Board has overriding responsibility for Norges Bank's management of the fund. We adopted a new strategy for the management of the fund towards the end of 2022.

Norges Bank will be an active owner and support companies through the climate transition, encourage climate reporting, and further develop our analysis of the fund's exposure to climate risks and opportunities. At the heart of our efforts is driving portfolio companies to net zero emissions by 2050. An operationally robust organisation helps safeguard the fund's assets. Geopolitical risk may be a greater source of uncertainty in the management of the fund in the years to come. Organised cyber-criminals are becoming increasingly specialised, sophisticated and well-funded. It is difficult to identify geopolitical events before they occur or lead to financial losses for the fund. For a large, global fund, there is nowhere to hide. Risk in the Government Pension Fund Global is reduced by diversifying its investments across asset classes, countries, sectors and companies. This should continue. The Sverdrup Committee, which is centre stage in this year's white paper, found that the fund is, in principle, well equipped for an uncertain future, but that its ability to deal with various changes and crises could be improved. We share this view and strive continuously to strengthen our situational understanding, develop our work on scenarios and stress testing, and improve our contingency planning. The Ministry of Finance announced in its white paper that it will be reviewing the matter of investing in unlisted equities. Norges Bank looks positively on this review, and we will return with our advice and assessments towards the end of the year.
Two particularly important exceptions have been the gradual fixing of the exchange rates between members of the European Union, culminating in monetary union, and the more or less formal policies of the newly industrialised Asian countries and Japan to keep the value of their currencies stable against the dollar. Moreover, the Asian central banks have been accumulating large dollar reserves. For most of the post-war period, the quantity of central bank reserves held by Asian central banks was of the same order of magnitude as the reserves held by the G-7. Over the past 15 years, both Japan and non-Japan Asia have rapidly increased their reserves, which are now nearly ten times as large as the combined reserves of the rest of the G-7. Two thirds of these reserves are in dollars, a much larger proportion than the US share of world output. The counterpart to the Asian bloc’s current account surpluses and acquisition of dollar reserves has been large current account deficits in the US. There is nothing inherently wrong with such ‘imbalances’. In principle, they reflect the use of financial markets to allocate savings from around the world to the most profitable investment opportunities. But there is likely to be a limit to the amount of debt that one country can issue as a result of persistent deficits before investors start to worry about its ability or willingness to repay.

My main conclusion is that the international monetary system should be seen not as a series of bilateral relationships, but as a multilateral arrangement, albeit one where a small number of the key players can usefully communicate with each other. I believe that we need to rethink the role of the IMF in the international monetary system. I encourage the Fund to articulate a positive vision for the management of the international monetary system in its forthcoming strategic review. I am not convinced that the future of the Fund is primarily as an occasional international lender of last resort for middle-income countries suffering financial crises. At this Conference the emphasis is naturally on ways to promote productivity and enterprise. Monetary stability at home is now widely recognised as a necessary condition for a successful economy. It provides, as I said at last year’s conference, a springboard for enterprise. But international monetary stability is no less important if trade is to prosper. In The Importance of Being Earnest, Cecily is instructed by her tutor, Miss Prism, to read her political economy. But Miss Prism continued, “The chapter on the Fall of the Rupee you may omit. It is somewhat too sensational. Even these metallic problems have their melodramatic side.” What would poor Cecily have made of the recent melodrama surrounding the values of the dollar, the euro and other paper currencies?
Sachs established an  30  For more on ownership strategies, see the NBIM website: http://www.nbim.no/en/Investments/ownershipstrategies/  31  For more about the UN guidelines, see “Global Compact”: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/. For more on the OECD guidelines, see: http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3699,en_2649_37439_1_1_1_1_37439,00.html  32  South Africa received NOK 149.5 million in development assistance from Norway in 2010. See Norad website http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/norwegian-aid-statistics  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  institute where advanced mathematical methods were applied to study the relationship between the position of the stars and the fates of human beings. 33 Collett was more down-toearth. He studied new methods of crop cultivation and was a keen supporter of the cultivation of potatoes here in South-Eastern Norway. 34 As a contributor to sustainable growth, we would have to say that Collett was closer to the mark than Sachs. Norway’s proximity to valuable natural resources has created substantial opportunities. New technology and new oil finds are still increasing the value of our oil wealth. Two North Sea fields where oil and gas were recently discovered, Galtvort (Hogwarts) and Gygrid (Hagrid), have been given names from the Norwegian version of Harry Potter. One of the books features the lucky potion Felix Felicis. This magical potion is difficult to make. The consequences can be catastrophic if the ingredients are mixed incorrectly. But if mixed correctly, the drinker will succeed in all that he undertakes. The potion also has some highly detrimental side-effects. If taken in excess, it may cause giddiness, recklessness and dangerous overconfidence.

There were too few left in the business sector to bear the welfare state. The resource curse also increases rent-seeking at the expense of value creation, as the economist Trygve Haavelmo noted. Many countries that have experienced a windfall of wealth have been victims of this curse. The state of Alaska has chosen its own institutional solution to avoid rent-seeking among special-interest groups. Once the real value of Alaska’s oil fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund, is secured, dividends are distributed to the owners. Each resident receives an annual cheque that can be spent as desired 13, providing a strong incentive to protect the capital in the fund. 14 The choice of building up a sovereign wealth fund must also be seen in connection with the state’s substantial pension obligations under Norway’s National Insurance Scheme. For the Norwegian state it would not have made sense to choose a solution like the Alaska fund without also addressing the issue of pension obligations. 11  See for example the obituary “Gunter Sachs”, in The Telegraph, 9 May 2011: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/obituaries/8503379/Gunter-Sachs.html  12  Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”, NBER Working Paper 5398. 13  See for example the Alaska Permanent Fund website: http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/dividend/dividend.cfm  14  This would be comparable to using the return on the fund as tax relief.
Like so many aspects of culture and values, it’s not a project with a deadline, where we can say, “OK, we’re done now.” Instead, we need to be constantly reassessing our goals, refining what we do, and how we do it. We need to be vigilant, attuned to change, and open to new ideas. Because it’s one thing to create an open culture, but a much harder challenge to keep it that way. I’m reminded of a quote by Brené Brown, which I believe sums this up: “To not have the conversation because of discomfort is the definition of privilege…” When we step back, when the dialogue—however uncomfortable it may be—stops, or is never initiated in the first place, is when there’s a problem. It’s the conversations that aren’t spoken that erode trust, alienate people, and take us back. I’d like to conclude where I began. I spend a lot of time examining data, and it’s a source of constant disappointment and frustration that LGBT people, women, and people of color continue to have less economic opportunity than their straight, white, male counterparts. Creating equality of opportunity at the national level is a challenge the United States continues to struggle with. But it’s both the right thing to do and the only way we’ll reach our full economic potential. Creating a more diverse—and equally important—a more inclusive Federal Reserve is a key 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  priority. We have come a long way, but there’s no doubt we still have far to go.

But even this combination, which can only be temporary, cannot in the long run prevent a sharp rise in prices if the gap between demand and supply is too wide - as demonstrated by the rise in prices after 1980.” In Norway, the efforts to develop an economy under strong centralised coordination and control culminated in the 1973 proposal to establish an incomes policy council.5 According to the proposal, the social partners would undertake a commitment through the council to keep negotiated wage increases within specific limits. It was also stipulated that demand management policy should be included as part of incomes policy. The proposal to establish an incomes policy council did not receive support. There was ultimately too much control and coordination. Now, only 30 years later, virtually nothing of this system remains. The structure was not solid enough. We know from experience that fiscal policy alone cannot ensure a high level of employment. The structure of the labour market and wage formation are probably of greater importance. The direct regulation of credit, interest rates and capital movements collapsed and was phased out in the 1980s. The krone is floating. Price regulation no longer plays a role as a macroeconomic instrument. The scope of business policy has become more general. State ownership in the Norwegian business sector remains extensive, but ownership management has been reorganised following the negative experience of companies in Kongsberg, Mo i Rana and Syd-Varanger. The economic policy of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to wide fluctuations in the Norwegian economy.
Today’s allocation of zakat contribution to INCEIF by the three Islamic banks is another commendable act of industry in support of learning. INCEIF has received monetary contributions from several other Islamic financial institutions since 2007. This has enabled INCEIF to continuously enhance its internal capacity as the leading provider of Islamic finance education and knowledge. The contributions are being utilized to create the provision of scholarships, research and facilities development. In this regard, INCEIF has recently been accorded the “Project of National Interest” (Projek Berkepentingan Nasional) status. This status, which accords contributors with tax benefits in the forms of tax rebates for zakat contributions and tax deductions for non-zakat contributions, will incentivize more individuals and institutions in providing monetary support to INCEIF. The contributions will indeed go a long way towards the growth and development of Islamic finance in Malaysia and beyond. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 87/2010

But since the target is set at 2.5% on a symmetrical basis, the concept of “prudence” cannot be applied in the same way. The result is that we worry as much about being below the target as we do about being above it. And I believe this makes good economic sense: the problems of severe deflation are at least as great as severe inflation. The particular indexed measure of inflation the Chancellor has chosen is RPIX, that is the headline RPI number after excluding - this is the X bit - mortgage interest payments. Some believe that we should move to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), widely used in Europe and, accordingly, making comparison with Euroland inflation easier. HICP inflation in this country has been running consistently below RPIX by about 1%. This reflects differences in the construction of the index, in particular the treatment of depreciation of property costs. Some have argued - most recently the Engineering Employers’ Federation - that if we moved to HICP, then interest rates could immediately be lowered. But this does not follow. If we moved to a different calculation of inflation, it would seem natural to revise the target at the same time. A 2.5% target for HICP would mean that we are targeting a higher level of inflation than we are at present.
The unwillingness to take new loans could persist to a great degree even if the Riksbank tried to counteract the fall in demand by conducting an expansionary monetary policy. In this case we would experience what is sometimes referred to as a balance sheet recession 8 . It could also mean that the banks  8  The term balance sheet recession was introduced to explain the problems that Japan struggled with during the 1990s, see Koo, R.C., Balance Sheet Recessions: Japans Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  would find it very difficult to fund their operations. Once such a process has begun it is difficult to stop it by easing monetary policy; this is shown not least by the example of the United States. Once you are in it then it is too late! It should therefore be avoided. It is perhaps unlikely that the scenario I have presented here will actually occur, but if it does the consequences will be extremely costly. As I mentioned earlier, my assessment is that our forecasts for inflation and resource utilization, that is highly “conventional” monetary policy arguments, are already arguments for an increased repo rate. It is also reasonable to assume that gradual repo rate increases will help to dampen household borrowing and this will reduce the risk of having to make painful corrections of financial imbalances further ahead.

The performance of Swedish two-year forward rates since the early summer illustrates this, see Figure 1. We can see that two-year forward rates, adjusted for a risk premium 3 , at the beginning of the summer were at approximately the same level as the money market agents’ two-year reporate expectations according to Prospera. Subsequently, however, there was a clear downward trend and from early June to mid-September the two-year forward rate fell by approximately 80 basis points. In my opinion, a substantial downward shift in monetary policy  3  The forward rates in Figure 1 are adjusted using a constant risk premium of approximately 25 basis points, which is a rough estimate of the average size of the risk premium for this time to maturity. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  expectations in this period was hardly realistic given the fact that the Swedish economy was, at the same time, surprisingly strong. Later, during the autumn, two-year forward rates increased and were roughly half a percentage point below the expectations in the surveys. An interpretation that I find more likely is that the development of forward rates in Figure 1 mainly reflects an international fall in risk premiums and, as so often in the past, it seems to be the development of interest rates in the United States that sets the tone. On this occasion it was probably the Federal Reserve’s plans to purchase additional long-term assets that had a downward effect on risk premiums.