samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And we cannot, even if we wanted it, have a single standard. But we collectively have to ensure that these standards are interoperable: as a bottom line, when an entity complies with a set of requirements from any jurisdiction, it should mean that it also complies with the global baseline provided by the ISSB. None of the major sets of norms are carved in  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  stone; the EFRAG and ISSB are fortunately working hard towards convergence, and making strong and quick progress. As a complement to stress tests, relying on robust transition plans from banks and insurers is the best way forward. It would allow for a dynamic, holistic and risk-based approach, which in my view is far preferable to static and not risk-based greensupporting and brown-penalising factors. The question now is how to "operationalise" stress tests and transition plans into capital requirements. In my view(viii) the simplest and most international way forward is to integrate them into Basel capital requirements, in Pillar 2 on risk governance, business model and credit risk as a first-stage approach. ** To conclude, let me recall what the avant-garde fashion designer Issey Miyake inspiringly said: "Many people repeat the past. I'm not interested. I prefer evolution." Today's shifting world gives even more credit to this Japanese master, who relentlessly navigated between Tokyo and Paris, designed Steve Job's black turtlenecks in which he delivered his keynote speeches, and stood as a pioneer of fashion tech and ecology.

But I would caution those who have doubts about the euro, that they underestimate the political commitment to it at their own risk. The euro area is moving towards a more sustainable equilibrium, and comparably fast in international comparison. The ambition to provide long-term foundations for EMU in less than a decade is a historical step of great significance. It is faithful to the objective laid down by the European Treaties to create an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The alternative would be the continuation of the current trend of market fragmentation, leading to protectionism and ultimately to populism. Some of the proposals will imply a greater sharing of sovereignty among Member States. This is unavoidable to guarantee sufficient economic and financial convergence for EMU to function effectively. But it must be ensured that if sovereignty is elevated to the EU level, so is democratic control, and that steps are taken towards the emergence of a true European identity. As central bankers, we all have an interest in global stability. I am confident that, with the measures I have described, the euro area will remain a cornerstone of the international economy. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The buffers can then be drawn on when risks materialise and credit losses occur. The case of counter-cyclical buffers is particularly interesting, first because it is one of the tools with a clear macro-prudential orientation and second, because the ESRB and the European Banking Authority (EBA) could join forces for implementing the framework in Europe. This is suggested by the European Commission in its recent consultation paper on the potential role of the ESRB and the EBA in defining policies and standards that national authorities should follow. Concluding remarks Let me conclude. I see three reasons to expect relevant changes with the start of macroprudential oversight in Europe. The first and most important reason is that better supervision should contribute to a more stable financial system. This is as much to the advantage of all players in the industry as it is to everyone in the wider economy. Second, integrating a macro-prudential perspective should lead to better regulation. In essence, systemic risk is the outcome of the actions of individual market players for the system as a whole. Regulation, which traditionally focuses on individual market players, can be improved by taking account of this potentially disastrous side-effect. Initiatives such as the counter-cyclical buffers and possible capital surcharges or other equivalent measures for systemically important financial institutions fall into this category. The third reason for welcoming the ESRB is that macro-prudential supervision could improve financial firms’ own risk analysis.

Jean-Claude Trichet: Macro-prudential oversight and the future European Systemic Risk Board Keynote address by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the European Banking Congress, Frankfurt am Main, 19 November 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to participate in the European Banking Congress. We are meeting at a very important time for Europe’s financial system, of which so many senior representatives are assembled here. This is also a very important time for the European economy and for the governance of the euro area. Looking at the current situation, we have to be very clear as to what the issues are and where the solutions lie. As its name suggests, Economic and Monetary Union has two attributes: one is “Economic” and one is “Monetary.” The “Monetary” attribute refers to the ECB, its mandate and its independence. I will come to this in a moment. The “Economic” attribute comprises the fiscal regime enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact; the national frameworks of economic policy; and the system of mutual surveillance. The developments we are currently witnessing in Europe’s economy have to do with its “Economic” functions. They have essentially three origins: unsound fiscal policies in a number of member states; inappropriate macroeconomic policies in a number of member states; and overall an inadequate system of surveillance by all member states. This is the triangle that provides the perimeter of the current situation.
And at our meeting in June last year we decided to use the full framework, which meant that our asset purchases ended at SEK 700 billion. Our plan was then to merely maintain the holding, by compensating for principal payments. I will return to our most recent decision later on. Broadly speaking, the Riksbank's monetary policy response followed the same pattern as the major central banks, the ECB and the Federal Reserve, as is illustrated in Table 1. This is not so strange, given that the crisis affected many countries roughly at the same time and in the same way. Figure 2 shows our holdings of securities, while Figure 3 shows how much of the outstanding stock we have purchased in each respective market. On the whole, we now own roughly the same nominal amount of government bonds as covered bonds. Nevertheless, we have bought a considerably smaller share of the outstanding stock of covered bonds compared to government securities. This says something about the size of the market for covered bonds. 3 On 12 March 2020, the index on the Stockholm Stock Exchange fell by 11 per cent. 4 See, for example, Sveriges Riksbank (2021), Cunliffe (2022) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2022). 5 There have also been purchases of smaller amounts of securities with shorter maturities, in the form of treas-  ury bills and commercial paper. 6 The Riksbank also implemented a number of other measures as a result of the crisis.

It is clear, for instance, that the maturity of the covered bonds is considerably shorter than that of the government bonds, which means that most of the holding will have declined within five years through maturities, should the Executive Board decide not to make any reinvestments after 2022. Thoughts regarding the future In conclusion, I would like to talk about the lessons we can learn for the future. During the coronavirus crisis we made extensive purchases that we are now planning to phase out in a predictable manner. We believe that the purchases have worked well. But as you know, no two crises are the same. What strategies are available in the future? Go big and fast, buy a little at a time or take a middle way? One alternative is what Andy Bailey and others at the Bank of England have discussed, namely to 'go big and fast' and then fairly quickly dismantle the holding as soon as the situation improves, to have your ammunition ready for the next crisis or economic downturn.24 I think that the holding should be phased out when it is politically motivated and I am not keen on dismantling it to increase our purchasing scope. This is a variation on the theme of raising the policy rate just to be able to lower it later. Another option is to buy a limited amount of assets when the need arises, combined with a commitment to buy more if the situation deteriorates.
As all of the central banks in the world do more or less the same things, albeit in rather different ways, it is always rewarding to see how others work. We therefore send experts in various fields out to the countries with which we have this cooperation, for instance, experts who design payment systems or make models for inflation forecasting. The other central banks send their staff to us for further discussion of these issues or to talk about other things, such as how we deregulated the financial system in Sweden in the 1980s, or how important information and transparency are if one is to run a central bank with independent responsibility for monetary policy. Recently we have received some young employees who have stayed with us for periods of a month to six weeks on “internships”, where they can, for instance, learn how to write a financial stability report from scratch. Long-term thinking is a central concept of our programme. It takes time to understand one another’s reality and to create relationships that lead to cooperation based on mutual trust. We usually say it takes at least five years. Central bank governors are always involved in various ways (both here at the Riksbank and at the other central banks), which is important for giving the programmes adequate status. In our view, it is important that we are colleagues, not consultants. We are rarely able to stay longer than a week, as we have our own central bank to manage.

Lars Nyberg: The Riksbank's cooperation with Sida Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a seminar arranged by Sida, Stockholm, 13 December 2006. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for this opportunity to briefly describe the Riksbank’s work on aid issues. I would also like to say that it is particularly pleasing to see that the Nobel Peace Prize has this year been awarded to efforts in the financial sector in Bangladesh. Otherwise, the financial sector is often sadly forgotten in aid contexts. Foreign aid to developing countries often concentrates on combating poverty in all its forms, which is of course commendable. But it is easy to forget that a financial sector with functioning institutions is necessary to achieve long-term stable economic growth. A high inflation rate in one country may, for instance, quickly lead to greater poverty among large sections of the population than even the best type of poverty combating measures have time to counteract. A wellfunctioning central bank and responsible monetary policy can therefore make a significant contribution with regard to combating poverty. The Riksbank has cooperated with Sida for some years now in building up and reinforcing capacity within the central banks of Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Uganda. We do not call this foreign aid, but quite simply “Staff Exchange Programmes”.
Another important trend is that with higher commodity prices and advances in green technology solutions, price differentials between traditional solutions and green solutions are likely to narrow substantially over time. Under these conditions, the green technology sector is expected to attract significant investments across many sectors which will produce high value added outputs and create high-income employment opportunities. A United Nations study estimated that about USD76 trillion worth of investment is needed in green technology over the next 40 years to “avert a climate change catastrophe” such as global warming, resource depletion and loss of biodiversity. Already, economies that have invested strategically in the green technology sector are reaping the benefits. Germany, for example, which produces 17% of the world’s green technology outputs has seen an increase in employment in the green technology sector from 166,000 jobs in 2004 to an estimated 280,000 in 2011. Recognising the immense potential of the green sector, 77 financial institutions from 32 countries have adopted the Equator Principles to enhance their capability to provide financing to ventures which are both economically viable and environmentally friendly. Adoption of the Equator Principles allows financial institutions to play a leading role to promote responsible environmental stewardship and socially responsible development. Furthermore, training and access to the tools and research necessary to develop the necessary expertise to adopt green financing is available through global initiatives such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative. To achieve more significant progress in green financing, some key priorities in Malaysia could include the following: i.

I do not think that anybody would argue that the world as a whole today makes up an optimal currency area. Our planet is not yet ready for a single currency. We are therefore bound to live in a world with n, n greater than one, currencies. For the second half of the 20th century, we lived with one dominating  BIS Review 72/2004  3  currency, the U.S. dollar, and many, less important currencies, such as the British pound, the Japanese yen, the German mark, the Swiss franc, and so on. Moreover, the United States is a largely closed economy, so it could regard fluctuations in the external value of the dollar with benign neglect. Of course, most other countries, being rather small and quite open, were fully exposed to turbulences in foreign exchange markets, but there was not much they could do about it. There were several episodes when the internal stability of the dollar was threatened as well, with U.S. inflation rates in the double digits. The flight into more stable currencies put considerable pressure on these. Today, the arrival of the euro has changed the landscape in some important ways. First, as the new kid on the block, the euro commands attention and respect. In economic size, the eurozone nearly rivals the United States. There is now an obvious alternative to the dollar as an instrument of portfolio diversification.
Rather, it was left on deposit or used to invest in other financial assets. The huge increase in borrowing by one part of the population was broadly matched by a big increase in saving by another part. The increase in house prices over the decade to 2007 – and the massive financial flows associated with that appreciation – represent a huge redistribution of wealth between different households within our society. Two important points should be drawn from this episode. First, any analysis of the increase in household debt over the past decade has to pay equal attention to the record accumulation of financial assets. They are two sides of the same coin. Second, changes in house prices do not result in significant changes in aggregate household wealth: for every winner gaining from higher house prices is a loser facing less affordable housing. But that does not mean that changes in house prices can not have significant implications for the macroeconomy. House price changes may directly affect aggregate spending both through their effect on the value of housing collateral, and hence on the ability of households’ to access credit, and through the different propensity of winners and losers to spend their “windfalls”. A debt hangover? Even though the accumulation of debt was not driven by excessive consumption spending, the sharp falls in asset prices associated with the financial crisis have led to a marked deterioration in households’ financial position – assets are worth less but the debts still need to be repaid.

As with changes in interest rates, it will take some time before we see the impact of our purchases feeding through into higher aggregate spending and inflation. However, there are some encouraging signs that the medicine is working. The growth of underlying broad money has picked up in recent months, especially relative to the weak growth rates we might otherwise have seen. Interest rates have fallen. Corporate bond spreads have declined substantially. And the amount of finance raised by companies in bond and equity markets is at record levels. Not all of these developments can be attributed solely to our actions. But I have no doubt that asset purchases have played an important role. At our policy meeting in August, the Monetary Policy Committee voted to maintain Bank Rate at 0.5% and to increase the scale of our asset purchase programme to £ billion. That level of Bank Rate and scale of asset purchases were maintained at the MPC meeting earlier this month. You may have notice that at our meeting in August there was a split vote amongst the Committee. A majority of the Committee – including myself – voted to increase the asset purchase programme to £ billion, whereas a minority preferred a larger expansion to £ billion. It is important not to make too much of this difference; all members were of the view that a further degree of monetary stimulus was needed to meet the inflation target.
10 Like pollution, systemic risk involves externalities, in the sense that each financial intermediary manages its own risks but does not consider its impact on the risk of the system as a whole. The financial crisis contributed considerably to a better understanding of the phenomenon of systemic risk, which is also reflected in aspects of regulatory reforms. In particular, the possibility of aligning capital requirements to a measure of firms’ systemic risk contribution is being contemplated by regulators, e.g. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 11 How could the ESRB then structure its supervisory work on systemic risk? In broad terms, systemic risk analysis can be broken down into two core components: i) surveillance, or risk detection, and ii) risk assessment, each of which I will address in turn. Risk detection Financial stability surveillance concerns risk identification. This kind of surveillance mainly aims to detect potential sources of risk, especially financial vulnerabilities – that is weaknesses which, if unearthed, could lead to a disruption or failure in part of the financial  7  De Bandt, Hartmann and Peydró-Alcalde (2009), “Systemic risk in banking: An update”, forthcoming in the ECB Working Paper series, and Berger, Molyneux and Wilson (eds. ), Oxford Handbook of Banking, Oxford University Press. This paper surveys all the relevant academic research with respect to the three categories and relates them to the present crisis where applicable.

I will today refer to two which I consider to be amongst the most important ones. The first one relates to business model and structural weaknesses. Despite the low profitability being a wider structural European issue, the cost to income ratio of the Cyprus Banking Sector, which amounts to 76 percent as at June 2022 is significantly higher than the respective EU average of 63 percent, signalling serious cost inefficiencies relative to peers. Investment in technology is key in the efforts to unlock efficiency and bridge this gap by addressing chronic issues that dent profitability such as cost inefficiencies, limited avenues of income generation, competitive pressure from entities operating outside the traditional banking spectrum and changing customer demands and needs. The second one relates to the risks of climate change. The ongoing effort to reduce the dependence from Russian energy may increase the transition risks and as such banks shall enhance and adapt their climate risk mitigation strategies. The fact that some of the banks have started making tangible steps on this regard is a positive development, but they are still early on the learning curve. They must act more aggressively and more decisively to meet our expectations of incorporating climate-related and environmental risks into their overall risk management frameworks. Conclusion Let me now briefly summarise the main points of my remarks and conclude: The adverse geopolitical developments led to a significant and persistent increase in inflation, associated with output loss and elevated economic uncertainty.
2  BIS Review 48/2007  This was experimented in one of the development projects implemented by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. In this particular project, bank financing was available for both micro and small businesses. One of the requirements of banks was the submission of a comprehensive business plan, acceptable to the banker, by the prospective micro-borrowers. But, none of the borrowers had the capacity to prepare them. As a result, the utilization of the moneys in the project became a problem. As a solution, it was decided to outsource the function to some business development consultants at a cost to the borrowers. Accordingly, a number of youth who had studied economics, business studies and accounting for the GCE Advanced Level were selected for training as business consultants. Then, they were appointed to provide consultancy services to potential entrepreneurs for a fee. The lending banks also paid a certain commission to them for services such as loan recovery and follow up work. The program worked well and a new generation of fee-based business consultants was developed by the project. At the end of the project, most of these consultants, having used their own expertise, started their own businesses. Another pertinent issue involved in microfinance delivery is how to reduce the transaction costs and make available the loans at the time they are needed by the borrowers. The transaction cost is simply the additional resources which a person has to spend, other than what is paid to the supplier, in order to complete a transaction.

John C Williams: No man is an island Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2019 Asia Economic Policy Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, California, 14 November 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery “No man is an island entire of itself,” wrote the poet John Donne in 1624. Almost four centuries later, his words still ring true. And they are particularly salient when it comes to the financial fortunes of the global economy. Today I’m going to explore the commonalities and interconnectedness of the global economy, and what that means for the outlook in the United States. But before I delve into these ideas, I want to say what a pleasure it is to be back at the San Francisco Fed, among so many friendly faces. The Asia Economic Policy Conference is always a fascinating day, and I’d like to thank Mary Daly for the invitation to speak, and Zheng Liu and Mark Spiegel for putting together an outstanding program. I knew I was back in San Francisco when this morning I spent 20 minutes in line, waiting to spend five dollars on a cup of coffee. This is one thing for which inflation appears to be alive and well.