samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The number used from then on has been about 85, based on a similar approach by Benjamin (1982) and Olshansky et.al. (1990). And the evidence on a limit to increases in the human lifespan is mixed; see for example, Kannisto et.a.l. (1994) and Wilmoth and Horiuchi (1999). BIS Review 73/2004  3  upward shifts over time both in the forecasts of expected life and in the rate at which it was expected to increase.7 That there are large and unavoidable uncertainties in forecasting longevity is clear. The key unknowns are evolutions in lifestyle, diseases and the ability of medical science to combat them. No amount of complex demographic modelling can substitute for good judgements about those unknowns. The danger of relying on computer modelling is well illustrated by the World Health Organisation’s early estimates of the future spread of AIDS, which, at the time, was a significant unknown in forecasting life expectancy even in developed countries. AIDS was first recognised in 1981. The virus responsible for AIDS, which we now call HIV, was identified in 1984. To date, around 20 million people are thought to have died from the disease worldwide. The proportion of those who are infected with HIV who go on to develop AIDS is now thought to be close to 100%. But the spread of HIV, and hence AIDS, has been very uneven.

Research and analysis previously available  4 5  To be published as Notice 627. To be published as Notice 628. Similar guidelines will be issued to finance companies and merchant banks. BIS Review 69/2000  2  only at substantial fees to institutions and high net worth individuals are gradually becoming available to online retail investors as well.6 Secondly, the internet offers increased business opportunities and potentially limitless reach. Thirdly, the internet offers increased scope for cross selling financial products. Successful online firms like Charles Schwab and E*Trade are leveraging on their huge customer base to diversify into banking, bill payment and other areas of services.7 Lastly, do-it-yourself finance facilitated by the internet allows institutions to cut whole layers of customer administration costs. The internet is reducing the cost of capital, at the expense of the spreads that intermediaries traditionally enjoyed from a proprietary informational edge. This reduction of what has been called “knowledge float” will benefit both lenders and borrowers. But at the same time, the internet means new challenges. The same borderless nature can mean footloose customers and businesses. Cyberspace so blurs physical distinctions and facilitates convenient access that financial institutions can uproot themselves, go elsewhere, and yet seamlessly offer the same services online. Jurisdictional boundaries become harder to enforce, while new business models potentially raise new operational, strategic and systemic risks. Evolving the infrastructure for electronic finance in capital markets MAS has been closely monitoring these developments and scrutinising their implications for our financial centre.
1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In recent decades, however, the prime position of the dollar has been unchallenged. Its surpassing of the sterling occurred in the 1920s, although many historians would ascribe the preeminence of the dollar as coming to the fore with the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944. Since then, the “dollar dominance” continued unabated despite the US experiencing various challenges, including the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s and the recession in 1981. Closer to present times, the dominance of the dollar continues to hold even after the Global Financial Crisis, the most damaging crisis since the Great Depression. Although the privileged position of the dollar was not in question, the magnitude of its influence certainly varied across time. It was not linear, consistent nor smooth-sailing. In fact, over the past few years, it was a favorite past time of market commentators to call time on the ‘reign’ of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. A few candidates were cited to supplant the role of the dollar in the past, including the yen, the euro and recently, the renminbi. Necessity for Economic Rebalancing In 1971, the US Treasury Secretary John Connally, famously said to the European finance ministers that the “dollar is our currency, but your problem”. This statement had validity then, as it does now. For emerging markets in Asia, this braggadocio or arrogance rings true.

China’s ascent was in part due to its integration with the global economy, signified by its membership in 2001 to the World Trade Organization. It opened itself to the world, embracing globalisation. This new phase of openness to the global markets was evidenced by the shift from goods export to capital exports, the move up the global value chain by producing high-tech products, new business models such as cross-border e-commerce, and over the last few years, an evolution from being a net capital importer to a net capital exporter. All these further strengthened China’s transformation from a manufacturing and investment based economy, to one based on services and consumption. Economically, China is introducing a bold strategy to enhance connectivity within this region and beyond. The clearest example of this is the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative that is adding to previous initiatives such as the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank. The consequence of China’s economic rise is the increasing use of its currency. This was further spurred by China’s gradual internationalisation of the renminbi in 2009. Renminbi hubs have been established around the world, including in Malaysia, and a global payment, clearing and settlement platform for renminbi, namely the Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is in the development stage. Six years on, an estimated one-third of all Chinese trade is settled in renminbi, making it the third most traded currency in the world after the euro and the dollar.
11  It’s also important to note that, although immigrants are disproportionately represented in low-skilled occupations, they are not, on average, any less well qualified than UK-born people (to the extent domestic and foreign qualifications are comparable). In fact, according to the Migration Advisory Committee, one reason some employers have preferred immigrants for low-skilled jobs is that they “have higher level qualifications than their low-skill job requires”. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 11: Real pay growth more variable  To be sure, you’d tend to under-estimate the  when adjusted for compositional effects  cyclicality of “underlying” wage growth12 and the true slope of the Phillips curve. Over the past few years, as in earlier cycles, real pay growth for people who stayed in their jobs13 has been more variable than the average (Chart 11). But if it’s a really regular thing – if the compositional effects always move in lock step with unemployment – then a Phillips curve estimated on an unadjusted AWE series would still take them into account, only implicitly so. Source: ONS and Bank calculations  12  This point was made by Bernanke (1987) and, in a well-known paper, by Solon et al (1995). 13  To be precise, the red line is pay growth for someone with fixed characteristics – fixed educational qualifications and occupation, unchanging experience. Since any individual’s experience is bound to grow over time (if only by virtue of getting older) there is no such person in real life!

This will result in unsound investments and wider fluctuations in the economy. It is also important to avoid deflation, a fall in prices, because this often accompanies and can amplify a downturn. Low and stable inflation provides households and enterprises with a clear indication of changes in relative prices. This makes it easier to make the right decisions and contributes to price stability in financial and property markets. This is the best contribution monetary policy can make to economic growth and stability. A number of studies have looked at the effects of high inflation on the real economy, see for example references in Qvigstad and Røisland (2000). We have had four periods of very high inflation over the past 100 years: during the two world wars; the Korean War and a 15-year period from the first half of the 1970s to the second half of the 1980s. In Norway, very high inflation is a wartime phenomenon and a 1970s and 1980s phenomenon. Substantial real economic losses and financial instability have followed in its wake. Inflation was a costly affair. BIS Review 59/2002  1  The fourth period of high inflation was unlike the three previous periods. In the 1970s and 1980s, inflation accelerated gradually. It was not as high as during the two world wars, but it took a long time for the level to fall. The fixed exchange rate system of the post-war period, the Bretton Woods system, broke down in 1971.
Banque de France and especially our supervisory arm, the ACPR, have been playing an active role in helping to consolidate the future European regulatory framework for AI. ACPR also conducted this summer its first Tech Sprint on Explainability of AI, which enabled tech providers, Fintechs and larger actors to showcase the potential and limits of explanatory methods on credit risk predictive models: its results are to be published on our website. II. CBDC is a key area of our work to foster innovation Central bank digital currencies is a key area – if not the key area – where the stakes are especially high: central banks are responsible for preserving the soundness of money, whatever its forms! This is a domain where Banque de France is convinced of the benefits of “learning by doing”. This is why we launched in 2020 a programme to carry out experiments on wholesale CBDC with Fintechs, public and private market participants and other central banks. Our objectives have been multi-fold, testing: several use cases (securities settlement, cross-border transactions), on different types of financial instruments (listed and unlisted tokenized assets, sovereign issuances, payments), with various technologies (public or private blockchains, open-source or proprietary protocols), and as proof of concept but also in real-life conditions. A report on the key takeaways from this experimentation programme is being published today on the Banque de France website.

I will focus on how these principles can be put into practice, first through how regulation can address new risks, and then how central banks can foster innovation, with the example of central bank digital currencies. I. New risks, new rules? No corner of the financial system is left untouched by digital technologies, a look at the agenda of this Fintech Festival tells it all: payments, decentralized finance and open banking, crypto-assets, central bank digital currency, quantum computing, etc… These technologies bring competitive pressure and such innovative pressure is healthy: it challenges inefficiencies, helps improving services, brings down costs. Fintechs are key players in the modernisation of the financial sector and I expect banks in particular to seize more systematically the opportunity to participate to this transformation. Can I quote Joseph Schumpeter? He wrote that “most of the creations of the intellect or fancy pass away for good after a time that varies between an after-dinner hour and a generation. Some, however, do not.” Fintech has clearly made it pass the after-dinner hour; it is getting close to the generation mark. I am convinced central banks are instrumental in making sure digital innovation can bring long-lasting benefits. Here, the emergence of decentralised finance raises new challenges for usual regulatory frameworks. Left unchecked, it could result in increased volatility, lack of traceability or clear accountability, concentration risk on certain technical infrastructures, insufficient customer and investor protection, to name a few.
It is key for this framework to be rigorously applied, including in terms of the indicators used, in order to consolidate the effectiveness of this new procedure to assess in particular euro area Member States experiencing sustained losses of competitiveness and large current account deficits. The focus needs to be on the prevention of situations creating risks to economic, budgetary and financial stability in the euro area. In addition, this macroeconomic surveillance procedure should rely on transparent and effective trigger mechanisms. Conclusions Let me conclude with three key messages to policy makers – in advanced and emerging market economies alike – who all have a role to play to address the challenges that are ahead of us. First, what has already been decided has to be implemented expeditiously, comprehensively and fully. This requires resolve and fortitude on the part of the public authorities, but also lucidity on the part of the private sector. Second, there can be no complacency as regards the unfinished part of our reform agenda for a stronger international financial architecture. And I cannot help saying that on top of what is clearly identified by the international community as the urgent issues under discussion in the Financial Stability Board and the G20, we are far from understanding the potential global systemic instability that is associated today with the sheer size of the non-banking sector which experienced an exponential growth over the last 20 years.

The requirements for a very significant reinforcement of the fiscal surveillance of the Stability and Growth Pact and for the creation of a new surveillance of competitive indicators and macroeconomic policy have been discussed widely and in much detail by euro area authorities. We have embarked on a deep and comprehensive reform of its economic governance to reinforce economic policy coordination. The Governing Council of the ECB has called for a “quantum leap” in the economic governance of the euro area. This includes in particular (i) greater automaticity of sanctioning mechanisms, particularly in the Stability and Growth Pact (ii) as well as truly independent fiscal and economic analyses of macroeconomic imbalances. 2  The recent conclusion of the negotiations between the European Parliament and the EU Council on the economic governance reform package are welcome. Fiscal surveillance will become stronger and more coherent with the reinforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact. While falling short of the quantum leap that the ECB was advocating, this agreement strengthens the initial Commission proposals in many ways and is thus a step in the right direction. The EU budgetary frameworks will also be strengthened, including through the introduction of fiscal rules at the national level. The so-called “European Semester” can be expected to provide ex-ante and integrated guidance to the Member States for the formulation of national budgets and structural reforms for the following year. This will be complemented by the introduction of a macroeconomic surveillance procedure, which closes an important gap in the economic governance framework.
Also, the world market price of oil has moved higher than expected. Thus far, the stance of monetary policy has been based on the assumption that the rise in energy prices will be temporary. We have refrained from raising interest rates despite inflation being considerably higher than 2 per cent at times. An alternative way of explaining our approach is to say that we have focused on underlying, demand-driven inflation. Should energy prices remain elevated for a long period or continue to increase, inflation will of course exceed our forecasts thus far. This could have other implications for monetary policy if it were to have a marked impact on cost levels and begin to affect inflation expectations. The highly irregular developments in electricity prices are a considerable problem for many decisionmakers in the economy, not just for forecasters of inflation. A comparison of electricity price developments in Sweden and the euro area speaks volumes (see Chart 4). These developments raise important questions about how the electricity market functions, questions that concern both competition and the conditions for the production of electricity. Summary of the outlook Even when taking into account the factors I have just discussed, the outlook for economic activity and inflation has not changed much since August. The upturn in the US appears to be slightly more evident, with less risks of a setback. In Europe, the outlook is instead somewhat weaker. For Sweden, it seems likely that the economy will experience a rather normal recovery next year.

It is clear that if real wage growth in the coming years is in line with productivity growth, this will facilitate the Riksbank's efforts. The Riksbank's forecast during the summer rested on the assumption that a weaker labour market would restrain the rate of wage increases to just over 3.5 per cent. But there are examples of wage bargaining rounds in which wages increased excessively despite weak demand pressures, e.g. 1995. The conflict over the Municipal Workers' Union's agreement is also indicative of tensions in the labour market. However, the two most recent wage bargaining rounds have been characterised by greater cooperation between labour market organisations. In addition to current economic conditions, this suggests that the forthcoming wage negotiations should result in economically reasonable wage rises of around 3.5 per cent. It is worth underscoring, however, that no one factor is as important for inflation - and consequently for the repo rate - as wages. The Riksbank will therefore be monitoring the autumn wage bargaining round closely. One factor that has proved difficult to assess in recent years is energy prices, in particular those for electricity. Energy prices have not fallen back as much as we expected during the summer. In August, UND1X inflation excluding interest expenditure, among other things, rose by 2.2 per cent, of which 0.7 percentage points were due to the increase in energy prices. Current forward prices suggest that electricity prices will be approximately 10 per cent higher during the autumn and winter than was indicated before the summer.
This caused the average interest rate level in those countries of the future euro area to be lowered considerably before the beginning of Monetary Union. The close cooperation which had always existed between the European central banks was increasingly stepped up in the final months of 1998 between those countries participating in Stage Three of Monetary Union. The coordinated reduction of central bank rates in December 1998 to 3% made it perfectly clear that, de facto, Monetary Union had already begun before the start of Stage Three. Looking at economic developments, in the first few months of this year there have been an increasing number of indications that the negative effects of the crises in Asia and Russia on growth and employment in the euro area could be more serious than was first expected. With the apparent slowdown in economic growth in the euro area, the risks that the 2% threshold for the tolerable rate of inflation would be exceeded in the foreseeable future evaporated. This forecast was also reflected in the revisions to the inflation forecasts of international organisations. At the beginning of April 1999, the Governing Council of the ECB therefore decided to reduce the interest rates on the main refinancing operations by 50 basis points to 2.5%, as well as the rates on the standing facilities to 1.5% and 3.5% respectively. The M3 monetary aggregate did expand such that it was slightly above the reference value at the beginning of 1999.

Whilst in Switzerland disturbances affecting, in particular, the demand for central bank money “for reasons still unknown” have increased in recent years, the ECB faces additional uncertainties at the beginning of Monetary Union in terms of the effects of the shift of regime to a single monetary policy in Europe. It is difficult to assess whether conventional and reliable macroeconomic relationships are changing as a result of the introduction of the euro. In view of these uncertainties, but also in general, it is unwise to rely on a few indicators or only one when making monetary policy decisions. Indeed, to date our studies have  BIS Review 99/1999  2  revealed that the M3 monetary aggregate shows clear signs of stability and healthy indicator properties. This provides a sound basis for the prominent role given to the M3 monetary aggregate. Monetary policy instruments and the operational framework of the Eurosystem The operational framework of the Eurosystem has proved to be an effective instrument for steering money market interest rates and for limiting fluctuations. The Eurosystem controls money market interest rates by means of either the provision or withdrawal of liquidity in the banking system. Open market operations play an important role in the context of monetary policy strategy. The weekly main refinancing operations give an indication of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy and provide the largest share of liquidity. Longer-term refinancing operations provide the banking system with longer-term liquidity (three months).
This has made fiscal policy predictable and sustainable over time as well as making it possible to keep public debt low. Indeed, thanks to a significant increase in copper revenues, this has dropped to a historically low level in recent years and gross central government debt is currently running at around 6% of GDP. All these factors have contributed to financial stability. Prudential regulation has been another key pillar of financial stability. It was completely redesigned after the severe financial crisis of the 1980s. The lessons of this crisis were learned and then incorporated into banking law and, although this has since been subject to updates and modernization, it has maintained the hallmark strictness it acquired in this period. Some of the recommendations put forward in the light of the recent crisis have, in fact, been part of Chilean regulation for some time.

But the rapid growth in the market sectors of emerging and developing economies may also contribute to more rapid growth in global demand and inflation pressures. This changing configuration of world markets complicates the task of forecasting inflation and output within national economies. Energy prices have surprised us over the past few years, in terms of the extent of the rise in prices, the increase in volatility, and the limited negative effects to date on global economic growth. Our capacity to project future energy prices has proven to be very limited, as has our ability to convincingly ascertain the extent to which temporary supply factors, rather than an unrecognized strength in global demand, accounts for the energy price trajectory we've witnessed recently. The consequences of these limits to our knowledge may be even greater given the extent of the price increases already experienced. 2  BIS Review 54/2006  The unprecedented level of the U.S. current account deficit and dramatic rise in U.S. indebtedness adds to the normal degree of uncertainty that surrounds any medium-term forecast because of the dynamics that could accompany the path to a more sustainable pattern of capital flows. The process of adjustment that appears to be underway in the U.S. housing market, occurring as it is after a sustained and very substantial decline in the household savings rate, provides more than the usual challenge in predicting the future strength of consumer spending.