samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Others present considerable uncertainty: for example, the extent and duration of the collapse in business and consumer confidence, and the question of how far monetary and fiscal stimulus will contain the collapse; and the scope and economic effects of the war against terrorism, which, we have been told, will be long and unlike any other war. The effects on our regional economy are likely to be severe. We are heavily dependent on exports to the USA, at a time when these are declining and likely to continue to decline for some time to come. Capital inflows into the region are falling because of increased risk aversion. Within the region, many countries face persistent internal problems, in some cases - such as Indonesia - both economic and political. The big engine of the region - Japan - continues to falter, with declining exports, rising unemployment, a weak banking sector, and an economy officially teetering on the brink of yet another recession. The latest news from Singapore - in many senses our sister-city in the region - is not good at all. The bright spot in the region continues to be China, which has sustained real GDP growth of 7.6% and export growth of 7% for the first three quarters. It seems inevitable that exports, and in turn GDP, will be affected by the decline in consumer spending in the US, which accounts for around 20% of China's export market: the latest figures already suggest this.

After struggling to reach the targets in the early years, the Central Bank has managed to keep inflation within the targeted range (since 2005 at 4.5% plus or minus two percentage points) for 5 years in a row. In fact, last year, when global inflationary pressures were quite strong (at least until the third quarter), the BCB was one of the few monetary authorities, within the set of those formally targeting inflation, not to miss its target, even though economic activity, until the end of the third quarter, remained quite strong. Thus, from a narrow balance of payments viewpoint, as well as from a macroeconomic stance, the floating BRL has been remarkably successful. BIS Review 8/2009  1  That has not meant that the regime has counted with unqualified support. Time and again criticism of the floating BRL has mounted, be it because the currency is seen as not floating enough, or floating too much, or being too weak, or too strong, or helping some sectors of the economy or regions of the country at the expense of others. More fundamental is the criticism that the exchange rate is too important to be left to the markets. The recent financial crisis and misdemeanors have made this position fashionable again in mature economies. In Brazil, with a long tradition of heavy state intervention in the economy, which was characterized by close linkages between a few privileged segments and the government, this position has always had, and still has, its vocal advocates in all sorts of media.
U.S. Regulations and Approaches to Cryptocurrencies December 03, 2019 Posted December 12, 2019 Michael Held, Executive Vice President and General Counsel  Remarks at the BIS Central Bank Legal Experts’ Meeting, Basel, Switzerland As prepared for delivery Thank you, Diego, for “volunteering” me to speak about digital currencies—a field in which I count myself as very much a trainee, not an expert. Today I will focus on the U.S. regulatory landscape for digital currencies, in particular on digital currencies issued by private organizations that are intended to be used like money. As always, the views I express are my own, not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.1 Policy makers and regulators in the United States, to date, have not developed an overarching framework for regulating private digital currencies. The field has been seen as too new for a comprehensive regulatory response. To be sure, the digital nature of new private currencies will raise challenges to which policy makers must respond. In my view, however, we spend so much time wrestling with the novelty of digital currencies that we forget that private currency is nothing new. The theme of my talk today is accordingly best encapsulated by a quote that is attributed—perhaps wrongly—to Mark Twain: “History may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” The Past Is Not Dead. It Isn’t Even Past So, let’s take a little walk through the history of privately-issued currency.

Tuan-tuan dan Puan-puan, Kami amat berbesar hati dengan kesudian Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi untuk melancarkan Laman Informasi Nasihat dan Khidmat Bank Negara Malaysia atau Bank Negara Malaysia LINK pada hari ini. Kami mengambil kesempatan dari kehadiran Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri di taklimat ekonomi di Bank Negara Malaysia pada pagi ini untuk merasmikan Bank Negara Malaysia LINK. Penubuhan Bank Negara Malaysia LINK merupakan komitmen Bank Negara Malaysia untuk meningkatkan lagi perkhidmatan yang diberikan kepada orang ramai dan membantu meningkatkan akses pembiayaan kepada perusahaan kecil dan sederhana. Perasmian ini amat bermakna kerana Yang Amat Berhormat Perdana Menteri merupakan peneraju kepada peningkatan sistem penyampaian sektor awam. Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri juga telah memainkan peranan penting dalam usaha meningkatkan potensi perusahaan kecil dan sederhana sebagai enjin pertumbuhan ekonomi negara kita. Ladies and Gentlemen, Bank Negara Malaysia has always been in direct contact with the public. The Central Bank receives walk-in members of the public seeking information in relation to our operations, policies and regulations as well as those who seek redress on financial issues. The SME Unit in Bank Negara Malaysia also has direct contact with the SMEs relating to issues of access to financing. The establishment of Bank Negara Malaysia LINK is to allow the interface with members of the public as well as the SMEs to be centralised and conducted in a more efficient and effective manner. The premises of the Bank Negara Malaysia LINK was previously the Kuala Lumpur branch of Bank Negara Malaysia.
We have a great deal of work to do on these three issues in the months ahead, and I am confident that when bold reforms in these areas are undertaken, we will have achieved the necessary quantum leap in euro area governance. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 97/2010

Today I would like to talk a bit about what went wrong, where we are today, some new initiatives that are underway, what lessons we should take from the crisis and some steps we need to take so this doesn’t happen again. It is well-recognized that one important catalyst for this financial crisis was the easy credit and loose underwriting practices that fueled the boom in the U.S. housing sector. The ability of virtually anyone to get a loan to buy a house pushed up home prices significantly faster than incomes. To keep the boom going, underwriting standards were progressively relaxed, but even with that support to demand, inevitably the boom proved unsustainable. As the boom reversed and housing prices began to fall, the bad underwriting practices and the mispricing of risk became readily apparent. When prices are rising no one needs to default, they always have the option of refinancing or selling the house at the now higher price. But when prices are dropping, there is no easy way out. The result has been a sharp rise in delinquencies and foreclosures as the bust has played out. The fact that these poorly underwritten loans were used in the construction of very complex collateralized debt obligations or CDOs, with risks that were not well understood and grossly mispriced – made a bad situation even worse.
I should recognise at this point the debt I owe to my colleagues Jack Meaning and, in particular, Alberto Polo, who helped me with the simulations of this model. The past couple of weeks have been a busy time for me with the MPC: I would not have been able to complete this work without their considerable help. Charts 1 and 2 illustrate the advantages of difference rules over level rules in this set-up. When restricted to simple forms and optimised, a difference rule performs better than a level rule in stabilising inflation and lowering social losses. This is true however much weight is placed on output gap stabilisation relative to inflation stabilisation – in other words, for all values of ‘lambda’ in standard policy evaluation exercises.24 And – at least in our setup – it is true even as the importance of the persistent shock to the starred variables relative to the temporary shock diminishes. The intuition behind the result is as I have discussed. If monetary policy decisions are based on a mis-interpretation of the shock driving R-star, then the difference rule is more ‘forgiving’ of those mis-perceptions than the level rule, and less noise is introduced into the system as a result. This is illustrated by the impulse responses shown in Chart 3. These show the evolution of model variables following a risk premium shock that lowers R-star persistently, but is believed by policymakers, firms and households to be temporary.

6  10 See Haldane (1997). 11 See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). 12 Sargent (1987). 13 See Brainard (1967). 14 See p.17 in Blinder (1998); for an application to UK monetary policy, see Cunliffe (2018). 15 For applications of this principle to the design of monetary policy rules, see McCallum (1988) and Levin et al. (1999). 16 See Onatski and Stock (2002). 17 See, for example, Greenspan (1994). 18 For a discussion of this issue, see Evans et al. (2015). 19 At least, that is the conventional view, which I maintain in this speech. Mian et al. (2021) explore how debt dynamics associated with the path of monetary policy may influence the level of R-star over time. 20 See Orphanides and van Noorden (2002). 21 See Orphanides (2002). 22 See Levin et al. (1999) and Levin and Williams (2003). This agenda has continued using the excellent macroeconomic model database managed by Volker Wieland and hosted at the Goethe Universität in Frankfurt. 23 An analogue to this result is found in the engineering literature, which advocates difference-based control rules when steady-state values are unknown or uncertain. 24 For an explanation and discussion of the role ‘lambda’ plays in managing monetary policy trade-offs, see Carney (2017). 25 Consideration of lower bound constraints and their role in rationalising aggressive policy easing decisions on risk management grounds – in the manner suggested by Evans et al. (2015) – are absent from these model exercises.
Several analytical approaches for the identification of the factors contributing to the building up of systemic risk may be used and different policy tools may be employed to address them. One policy instrument introduced by Basel III is the countercyclical capital buffer. In line with our past experience of dividing responsibilities, the Ministry of Finance will implement countercyclical capital requirements from 2013. Norges Bank will make recommendations for its buffer decisions. We therefore need to strengthen our understanding of macroprudential regulation and develop relevant analytical tools for our recommendations. The financial crisis called renewed attention to the fact that developments in the real economy and the financial sector are closely linked. In response, Norges Bank has decided to provide monetary policy and financial analyses in a joint report published quarterly as from 2013. The reports will form the basis for both monetary policy decisions and for our advice on the buffer. The primary objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation over time. We operate a flexible inflation targeting regime, which also aims at stabilising economic activity. Furthermore, Norges Bank gives weight to the risk that a prolonged period of low interest rates could lead to elevated risk-taking and excessive debt accumulation in the household and business sectors. There is always room for improvement. We will seek to improve systemic risk indicators and macro-stress testing approaches, keeping them at the research frontier. We will also work to better incorporate the financial sector in our macroeconomic models.

Jan F Qvigstad: Understanding macroprudential regulation Introductory remarks by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the workshop on “Understanding macroprudential regulation”, organised by Norges Bank, Oslo, 29 November 2012. *  *  *  Dear all, It is a pleasure to welcome you to Norges Bank for this workshop on Understanding Macroprudential Regulation. The topic of the workshop is timely; Authorities in all parts of the world are now actively debating macroprudential policy. Academic research provides a necessary foundation, both for the design and the implementation of such regulations. During my years of service here at the central bank, and also some years at the Treasury, I have had my fair share of dealings with banking and financial crises in Norway. In the 1990s, Norway was hit by a severe banking crisis. Three of the four largest banks failed. Required capital injections were more than three and a half per cent of GDP. This is substantially more than the percentage share that euro area banks currently need to recapitalise. Ever since the Norwegian banking crisis in the early 1990s, our banking industry has been regulated more strictly than banks in comparable countries. For instance, bank capital definitions have been tighter, while packaging loans into complex instruments was in practice not permitted until 2007. Financial supervision has also been rather strict.
A UNODC consultant, Mr. Simon Goddard, was here in Freetown recently to conduct a “needs assessment” and it is in line with this assessment that the UNODC/GIABA and the Bank of Sierra Leone are now hosting this workshop. We sincerely hope that at the end of this workshop, participants would benefit from the experience of the facilitators and will be able to put together a National Strategy on Money Laundering Prevention, and will also provide the basis for the effective operations of a FIU. Monitoring cash transactions is a mammoth task because Sierra Leone primarily is a cash based economy where a significant number of transactions far exceed the statutory cash reporting requirements of the Central Bank. The sale of diamonds is especially conducted in cash, mainly U.S. dollars. Policing of the porous borders and the long coastline for smugglers is another big challenge particularly with the inadequacy of manpower and other logistics. I believe however, that as a country, we will be up to the task and that is why the Bank of Sierra Leone is doing all within its powers to attract the necessary assistance from our development partners. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my singular honour to declare this workshop open. In doing so, let me once again use this opportunity to thank all our development partners, particularly the UNODC and GIABA.

Before turning to the focus of this talk – the measurement of household inflation expectations – I want to provide a quick summary of market-based and professional surveys. The difference in yields between nominal and real government debt can be used to derive a measure of market inflation expectations for the price index used to protect the holders of real government debt from inflation. In the United States, that price index is the consumer price index (CPI). Thus, if the nominal 10-year yield is 3.5 percent and the real 10-year yield is 1 percent, one crude measure of average CPI inflation expected over the next 10 years would be 2.5 percent. Further, if the nominal 5-year yield is 3 percent and the real 5-year yield is 0.2 percent, then a crude measure of average CPI inflation expected over the next 5 years would be 2.8 percent and a crude estimate of the 5- to 10-year forward average CPI inflation would be 2.2 percent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I say crude because such calculations ignore any difference in liquidity between and within the two types of debt, any compensation investors require for the uncertainty of the real value of nominal coupon securities and a variety of other issues, such as the fact that Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) are indexed to the CPI with a time varying lag. There are numerous ways to measure inflation expectations that take into account liquidity differences.
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Glossary CESEE – Countries of Eastern and South-East Europe; SSM – Single Supervisory Mechanism (EU) ESRB – European Systemic Risk Board (EU) FSOC – Financial Supervision Oversight Council (USA) ECB – European Central Bank EBA – European Banking Authority FSB – Financial Stability Board PRA – Prudential Regulatory Authority (UK) FPC – Financial Policy Committee; BRRD – Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (EU)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

As part of its contribution to improved business reporting last year, the Bank of Zambia invited Mr Allan Beatie, International Business Editor, with one of the leading global newspapers, the Financial Times, to share views with journalists here in Zambia. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, there are a myriad of pointers that can be given to where economic, business and financial information can be found. As a starting point, I would like to suggest that journalists look around this room and will no doubt recognize the rich collection of invited guests who hold significant information from which we can learn a lot. These are people who can stimulate debate, provide relevant information, validate it, and explain its proper use. Colleagues, allow me now to focus on one key stake-holder mentioned above, namely the business and financial writers’ fraternity. It is heartening to note that the judges feel that the standards of reporting have improved significantly. I am also pleased to note that those who have been past prize winners are continuing to apply themselves effectively and raising the standards of the profession as a whole. It is therefore my delight to be able to officiate at August gathering of business and financial writers knowing they are all putting in a more than average effort to attain today’s awards. Ladies and Gentlemen, the top prizes over the last 3 years have been designed to build capacity in the journalists nominated.
On one hand, a monetary policy that favors sound domestic price stability is consistent with macro stability in the medium term. This is a much sought-after objective in many economies of the region and must be protected. On the other hand, a flexible exchange rate policy is the best framework for dealing the situation we face. The reasons are twofold: first, in a context of high commodity prices and good external financing conditions, a floating exchange rate helps prevent the incubation of macroeconomic imbalances, 5 as Chile can attest from past experience. There are many examples of countries facing favorable external conditions, in which foreign exchange rigidity resulted not only in higher inflation but also in large current account deficits, causing major imbalances in the external accounts. Second, foreign exchange adjustments allow the economy to adjust to fluctuations in external conditions, such as those that have been so prevalent in the past several years. Volatility of the terms of trade and external credit conditions generates a constant need to adjust relative prices, which is more easily accomplished through flexible exchange rates. 6 Current developments in Europe are providing further evidence for this view. The benefits of flexible exchange rates are accompanied by costs, primarily due to the possibility of an increase in exchange rate volatility. This introduces further difficulties for making business and investment decisions.

Joint ventures and funds have been set up in Hong Kong, China for identifying opportunities and managing investments in infrastructure projects in the region. We have also been seeing increasing offshore issuance of Renminbi (RMB) bonds in our market to finance infrastructure projects. With the increasing use of RMB in trade and investment in the region, it is expected that the use of RMB in infrastructure financing will continue to rise. Hong Kong, China, as the largest offshore RMB centre with a wide range of RMB financial services, is well placed to support these infrastructure financing activities denominated in RMB. Besides financial services, Hong Kong, China also has a pool of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  talents in professional services like construction and planning, surveying, engineering, project management, accounting, legal and arbitration, logistics, etc. Firms and consultants of Hong Kong, China are well placed to take part and support infrastructure developments in the region. Substantial investment is needed in many developing Asian economies to break the infrastructure bottlenecks and move forward to the next stage of development. Increasing cross-border connectivity will also promote greater trade and economic integration, unlocking the region’s growth potential. We are pleased to see that ADB and national governments are making this a priority and taking meaningful steps to promote infrastructure investment in the region. As a member of the region, Hong Kong, China stands ready to contribute to this work. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
As one example of that, the Open University has recently made available on-line a set of three modules for helping adults better understand  38  G30 Working Group (2015). 39  New City Agenda (2014). 40  See BIS (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  financial matters and, ultimately, make better financial choices. 41 Charities like Citizens Advice are also doing fantastic work in this area. Of course, part of the reason so many members of the public find finance difficult is because it is difficult – and, sometimes at least, it is made deliberately so. There is plenty of evidence, including from the financial crisis, of financial products being made more complex than was necessary and consumers being charged a premium for buying them. 42 This damaging cycle persists because of the difficulties consumers understandably face when trying to compare these products. To give a personal example, I consider myself moderately financially literate. Yet I confess to not being able to make the remotest sense of pensions. Conversations with countless experts and independent financial advisors have confirmed for me only one thing – that they have no clue either. That is a desperately poor basis for sound financial planning. This problem is one which, if anything, is becoming more acute over time. More of the risk associated with financial decisions is these days being shouldered, not by the state or companies, but by individuals. Take pensions.

These measures consider not only sentence length but also the number of polysyllables (words of three syllables or more) and the average number of syllables per word. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  might be for banks in future to begin publishing self-assessments of their culture, so that customers could have some better sense of the progress being made. If these are important communications lessons for financial services serving society, they are no less important for public policymakers serving society. Let me take my home institution as a case study here. That is not because I believe it is an outlier – if anything, I think the Bank is at the frontier of central bank best practice on transparency and openness. It is simply the example I know best. The Bank has made considerable efforts to improve its openness and transparency over the past few decades, including through published reports of its analysis and decisions, published minutes of those decisions, speeches and Parliamentary appearances. To bring that point home, consider a simple measure of transparency as it applies to monetary policy: the number of words used to describe a policy decision. Back in 1989, when I first joined the Bank, monetary policy decisions were made by the Treasury. Their public communication typically took the form of a press release, usually comprising no more than a few hundred words. Ten years on, the monetary policy world had changed.