samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is intuitively easy to understand that the amount of money in the economy is a decisive factor for the price of the goods produced in the country. In modern economies, where payments are largely made electronically, the monopoly on issuing banknotes is no longer an equally evident condition for enabling monetary policy to determine price trends. Today, it is instead the right to determine the terms in the systems for large electronic payments between banks and the opportunity to influence how much the banks shall borrow or deposit in the Riksbank that enable us to steer interest rates. For electronic payments to be able to function as money, it is necessary for the central bank to be perceived as guarantor for these means of payment in the same ways as with banknotes. This role can only be fulfilled by a central bank and in this way one can say that the possibility to determine price trends in the economy still lies with the monopoly on issuing money. The Riksbank governs the shortest interest rate in the interbank market, so that it normally remains close to the monetary policy-steered repo rate. The fact that the Riksbank can steer the interbank rate is primarily due to the fact that each individual bank participating in the system handling large interbank payments - known as the RIX system - always has an opportunity to borrow and deposit money in the Riksbank overnight at the lending and deposit rates set by the Riksbank.

Since its establishment in 2002, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has introduced prudential standards for the Islamic financial services industry in the areas of capital adequacy, risk management, corporate governance and Shariah governance. Nine countries have implemented these standards and 19 more are expected to implement them within the next few years. The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has also contributed to the issuance of more than 80 standards in the areas of accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Shariah for the international Islamic financial industry. Further progress on two fronts remains important. The first is to continue to evolve a more refined distinction within prudential and financial reporting frameworks to reflect the different nature and profile of risks under risk-sharing contract arrangements. The second is the need to accelerate efforts to further strengthen the infrastructural underpinnings for the development of the overall Islamic financial system. While the broad regulatory principles and standards developed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis can be applied to most Islamic finance transactions, a broad-brush application of these rules would limit the ability of Islamic financial institutions to implement the more unique risk-sharing contract arrangements. The stage of development of the overall financial system in which Islamic finance operates must also be considered to ensure that the effective application of global standards can be achieved without unintended consequences, given the prevailing associated constraints.
The changes that the Central Bank implemented at the beginning of March concerning repurchase agreements had two components. On the one hand, the definition of the collateral that qualified for repurchase agreements was widened to include again, after an intermission, all market listed government guaranteed securities and central bank certificates of deposit. The purpose of this change is to level the positions of the various government securities, as varying positions in regard to liquidity transactions with the Central Bank can influence their relative market yields. It is clear that such limitations do not exist among Iceland’s neighbours. In addition, the stock of outstanding Treasury bills has shrunk in the recent period, which has caused a shortage of these bills for deposit banks to use in their repurchase agreements with the Central Bank. The other change is, as mentioned before, that the practice of offering repurchase agreements on tap has been abolished and replaced by a weekly auction of the agreements, as is done in many industrial countries. The Central Bank can at its discretion choose to auction reverse repurchase agreements instead of straightforward repurchase agreements. Neither of these changes alters the course of monetary policy. However, they did have the effect of reversing the rise in money market rates that had occurred in January and February, when the interbank rate rose to 8.3 percent because of the shortage of Treasury bills on the market.

Let me pay a warm tribute to the Captain of our vessel, Mario Draghi, as his term soon comes to an end. Thanks to Mario Draghi’s leadership, we protected our most valuable asset, the euro, and kept our monetary union together. Thanks to his unswerving determination and readiness to do “whatever it takes”, we are still all on board. Thanks to him, the Eurosystem has deployed a supportive and innovative monetary policy strategy. Over the past five years, the ECB has experimented with a variety of unconventional policy instruments, and it has arguably gone later but further into the toolbox than the Fed or the BoE. And the different instruments can influence different parts of the yield curve. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  This policy has been effective in supporting the recovery in the euro area since 2013. As a recent memorandum of the “old guard” apparently missed some positive outcomes of the last years, let me remind them: estimates of the effectiveness of the unconventional monetary policies implemented since 2013 have a broad range but are in the order of 2½ percentage points on growth and 1-1½ percentage points on inflation over the period 2015–2018. In times of heightened uncertainty, the recent strengthening of our forward guidance – which is now strongly “state based” – demonstrates our determination to reach our inflation target.
So our focus is on non-banks; on insurance companies, pension funds and investment funds of all sorts. The jury is out here too. I do not start from the presumption that there is an iceberg here. Our duty is to assess whether they could be one. 16  Carney, M. (2013), ‘The UK at the heart of a renewed globalisation’, available here. Even a user of derivatives to hedge another exposure – and thus having limited ‘VaR’ – could find themselves with significant ‘CaR’. It is the potential mismatch in liquidity, between the collateral called for and the assets held that is a source of firesale risk. In addition, as the IMF reports for a sample of funds, the majority of derivative exposures are entered into in order to boost returns rather than hedge existing risks. This would boost both VaR and CaR. 17  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  But in order to assess properly the risks in this area we need much better diagnostic tools. So we are developing them. We are fortunate in being able to draw on data from Trade Repositories which now record all new derivative trades between counterparties and report each day on the outstanding positions between them. We are fortunate that these issues are the topic of international collaboration, with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions leading work to develop consistent measures of leverage – that incorporate derivatives usage – for investment funds.

Moonwalking bears and underwater icebergs: Hidden risks in markets Speech given by Alex Brazier, Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk, Bank of England  London Business School Asset Management Conference 2018 Thursday 26 April 2018  I am grateful to Yuliya Baranova, Johnny Elliot, Dan Gray, Sonal Patel, James Smith and Nick Vause for their assistance with preparing the speech and accompanying slides. This speech draws heavily on: Brazier, A. (2018), ‘Market finance and financial stability: will the stretch cause a strain’, Brevan Howard Centre for Financial Analysis, Imperial College Business School, London, February, available here; Cunliffe, J. (2018), ‘Market-based finance: a macroprudential view’, Asset Management Derivatives Forum, Dana Point, California, February, available here. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Moonwalking bears and underwater icebergs: Hidden risks in markets The theme of today’s session is hidden risks. Since this is the Investment Management Club, I want to focus on hidden risks in markets. In my view there are generally two types of such hidden risk. Let’s call them bears and bergs (slide 2). The bears are the risks that hide in plain sight. These are risks that, after the event, are obvious. Some people are able to see them in real time. Others, because of very human traits, don’t. They are the moonwalking bear in the viral Transport for London Cyclist Awareness video. For those who haven’t seen it, amidst a frenetic basketball game, a person dressed as a bear moonwalks across the screen.
And to protect the system from risks we think are low but prove not, banks are subject to a simple, minimum leverage ratio, which is robust to model risk. Regulation has made banks less complex and more focused. Business strategies that relied on high leverage, risky trading activities and wholesale funding are disappearing, as intended. Trading assets have been cut in half, and interbank lending is down by one-third.38 Not least due to new global liquidity standards, banks have changed their funding models and now hold substantially more liquid assets relative to the liabilities that can readily run. In the UK, such contingent liquidity has increased tenfold since the crisis. An anti-fragile system requires ending Too Big to Fail. But higher capital and liquidity requirements are necessary but not sufficient. Banks must also be able to fail without systemic consequences. A decade ago, large complex banks operated in a “heads I win tails you lose” bubble. They privatised profits in the run-up to the crisis before socialising the losses when the music stopped. The complete loss of confidence in private finance that crystallised in the autumn of 2008 could only be arrested by public support over the following year that totalled $ trillion in bail-outs, government guarantees of bank liabilities and special central bank liquidity schemes.

In this environment, product innovation needs to be escalated accordingly in particular, to respond to the growing need for managing risks to realign the risk-return profile of assets and liabilities for financial institutions and investors in reaction to fast changing economic variables. This is made more pronounced by the fact that increasingly, with the unprecedented economic integration, financial markets across the globe are not immune to financial volatilities. Therefore, it is crucial that market participants have the necessary tools to manage financial risks prudently and this is where derivatives can be applied. Application of derivatives will yield benefits to the general public as spread of risk among economic agents will mitigate risk of financial shocks to the financial markets at the macro level and individual institutions at the micro level. As a result, the financial system becomes more robust, stable and resilient to extreme volatilities in the financial markets. The introduction of derivatives in the Islamic finance with adequate legal, regulatory and corporate governance framework will enhance the development of the functioning of the Islamic financial system. Developing the relevant indicators The pricing mechanism for the Islamic financial instruments has so far been based on the prevailing interest rate framework. There appears to be no real difference in both the conventional and Islamic instrument. In order for the Islamic financial instrument to be efficiently priced, it needs to have its own indicator.
You must recognize that the era of keeping monies in mattresses is long gone. We recognize that Barclays has obviously seen a window of opportunity in opening its branches in such localities. However, it is important to note that the level of incomes in such areas is not at the same levels as for those that obtain their services from high street locations. In this regard, we urge Barclays and other banks opening their branches in these communities to design suitable products. The banks should structure the related costs such that they take into account the lower income status of their clients. I have in mind the withdrawal of small sums of money without necessarily charging for the withdrawals. The challenge of extending access to financial services to the remaining adult population still remains, and for this unbanked population cost is a major consideration. BIS Review 5/2008  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am aware that the demand for banking services is high in Chilenje and therefore Barclays Bank should consider moving to bigger premises. There are a number of longstanding neighbourhood businesses in this location. I can point at Sir Jack, Janu Plaza, Karibu Bakery and Robert’s Fish and Vegies. There are also business entities which were formally parastatals located here. I also know that private entities that have a national presence such as Zambeef Plc and Pama Meats have established branches here. This is a reflection of the economic viability of Chilenje Township and Barclays has done well to come here.

Caleb M Fundanga: Improved financial services in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of The Barclays Bank Zambia Plc, Chilenje Branch, Chilenje, 9 January 2008. *  *  *  • Mr Fritz Seegers – Barclays Global Retail and Commercial Banking ChiefExecutive • Mr J J Sikazwe – Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chairman • Mr Ahmed Khan – Barclays GRCB Emerging Markets Chief Executive Officer • Mr Michael Miebach – Barclays Sub-Sahara Africa Managing Director • Mr Zafar Masud – incoming Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Mr Danie Nel – outgoing Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Invited Guests • Ladies and Gentlemen I am delighted to be the Guest of Honour at the official opening of the Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chilenje branch. My appreciation of this opening is because it reflects a fundamental change in strategy by Barclays Bank Zambia over the last few years. I recall that only a few years ago, Barclays Bank Zambia closed a number of its branches in several towns and locations. We were greatly concerned because it meant that even the few that were serviced by commercial banks would have greater problems in accessing financial services. Barclays Bank Zambia obviously had its reasons for taking such an action and we cannot fault them for attempting to curb their costs. However, it is now evident that there is a turnaround in the situation.
We – central banks and statistical institutes – have been doing this with remarkable results in the Committee for Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics since 1991. And since 2013, we also meet in the European Statistical Forum to discuss topics of strategic cooperation with the heads of national statistical institutes. Keeping pace It’s clear that cooperation is key to getting our job done. But these days, a job well done requires much more than it used to. Central banks need to keep pace with a world that is changing at an ever-faster pace. How do we do that? How do we keep pace? Well, for one thing, we need to be open to new ways of doing things. On this front, I am sure the two words on everyone’s minds are “big” and “data”. It’s true that we central bankers have not exactly been at the forefront of the big data revolution. After all, we are a bit cautious by nature. And we know that big data means different things to different people; and we know that we cannot yet say with certainty which big data applications will be truly useful Big data are quite different from traditional, structured data. So we have much to learn and many challenges to tackle. Collecting the data is only where the challenges start. We also need to adapt verification processes to ensure that the data are of high quality. And this is where big data already pay off, indirectly at least.

Aggregate data provided us with the big picture of the euro area economy and its financial markets. But the big picture was too blurry. And, at times, it was downright misleading. Money markets were a good example. After all, money markets are where the transmission of monetary policy starts. Prior to the crisis, the ECB collected microdata on these markets through the Euro Money Market Survey, the EMMS for short. This survey shed light on what was happening in the money markets during the crisis. For example, in unsecured markets, we could see that euro area banks were taking fewer counterparty risks with banks from other euro area countries. But our vision was limited. First, we didn’t collect direct information on market rates, so we didn’t know how much each market participant was paying for liquidity. If we had had a full picture of the dispersion of rates, we would have had less need to read between the lines. Second, we only published the EMMS annually, which seriously limited the potential for research and analysis. Research on a crisis that was developing by the hour could not be based on data published once a year. But we understood the shortcomings of the data and got to work. In 2016, we started to collect money market statistical reporting, or MMSR, data. The MMSR data include trade-by-trade granular data on four market segments. This means we receive full information on each trade – the maturity date, the rate, the counterparty, the collateral and more.
Heng Swee Keat: The sale of structured products to retail investors Opening remarks by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s Press Conference on the Sale of Structured Products to Retail Investors, Singapore, 17 October 2008. *  *  *  Many individuals who purchased structured products linked to Lehman Brothers are worried about their investments. MAS has been actively working to ensure a fair resolution for these investors. We have also been communicating our actions to the public since the issue first came to light in the middle of September. Our first priority has always been to help affected investors. Let me touch on what we have done and how we have put in place a serious and impartial resolution process to deal with investors’ legitimate concerns. First, we are making sure that HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd, the trustee for the Lehman Minibond Programme, carefully considers all options and acts in the interests of investors. If a new swap counterparty is available, investors would have the opportunity to vote on this option. In order to assist investors make an informed decision, MAS will appoint an independent financial adviser. We expect the trustee to know whether options will be available to noteholders by the end of next week.

Second, each FI now has an independent person to oversee the complaints handling process relating to the sale of the Lehman Minibond Programme, DBS High Notes 5 and Merrill Lynch Jubilee Series 3 Linkearner Notes. These persons are Gerard Ee, Hwang Soo Jin and Law Song Keng. We recognise that the complaints handling process has not been easy, particularly for customers of some FIs. But as circumstances for each case may be different, this is the best way to deal with all the complaints. The independent parties will ensure that customers get a fair hearing. We have set a very clear timeline for complaints to be resolved. All the FIs have also set up internal review panels which are chaired by their CEOs. The panel is expected to conduct a thorough review of each complaint and decide on a course of action within four weeks. The decision will then be communicated to the customer. Third, for affected investors who are not satisfied with the FIs decision on the matter, we have established a fast-track process to refer the case to the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (FIDReC). The FIDReC mediation process is free for consumers. If a case goes to arbitration, it will cost the consumer $ FIDReC will consider all relevant evidence whether written or oral. Statements can be prepared by consumers themselves and need not be made under oath. All FIDReC’s adjudicators are well respected professionals. The chairman of FIDReC is Mr Goh Joon Seng, a retired High Court judge.
The reason is that it has proved difficult in practice to lower nominal wages. If inflation is low and nominal wages cannot be lowered, then it becomes difficult to adjust real wages between different professions, companies and sectors. This can ultimately lead to both higher unemployment and poorer productivity growth in the economy. A moderate level of inflation mitigates these problems. It functions as grease in the wheels of the economic machinery. Another advantage with an inflation target of 2 per cent, which has come to the fore in recent years, is that it creates at least some scope for lowering the policy rate before it reaches its lower bound. If the inflation target, and hence average  4 [17]  inflation, were to be lower, then the nominal rate would also on average be lower. This would be particularly problematic in a world where real interest rates are very low, as is currently the case. The scope for lowering the rate before it reaches its lower bound would then be more limited than it is today, which would make it more difficult to counteract future recessions. Therefore, if one does not like negative interest rates, one should not advocate a lower inflation target, as that would imply that the policy rate would have to be negative for longer periods. In the international debate, moreover, there are several economists who think that not even an inflation target of 2 per cent provides sufficient scope to conduct as expansive a monetary policy as is sometimes necessary.

3 See Alan S. Blinder, Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation, Academic Press, 1979 4 See Tim Mahedy and Adam Shapiro, What’s Down with Inflation? FRBSF Economic Letter 2017–35, November  27, 2017, and Andrea Tambalotti, Stefano Eusepi, and Bart Hobijn, CONDI: A Cost-of-Nominal-Distortions Index, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(3): 53–91, July 2011. 5 See James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, Slack and Cyclically Sensitive Inflation, Working Paper. 6 See Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel, Learning from Inflation Experiences, The Quarterly Journal of  Economics, Volume 131, Issue 1, 1 February 2016, Pages 53–87. 7 See John C. Williams, Monetary Policy in a Low R-star World, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic  Letter 2016–23, August 15, 2016. 8 See John C. Williams, Preparing for the Next Storm: Reassessing Frameworks and Strategies in a Low R-star  World, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2017–13, May 8, 2017. 9 See Thomas Mertens and John C. Williams, Monetary Policy Frameworks and the Effective Lower Bound on  Interest Rates, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 877, Revised January 2019. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches