samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At that time, the euro will probably also be easily accepted for payments in Swiss border regions and tourist areas. As final advantage, the single currency greatly enhances market transparency and stimulates competition. On the one hand, Swiss importers can now directly compare euro denominated offers from different countries. On the other hand, exporters can less easily differentiate prices according to the market destination of their products. In the long run, transparency will promote efficiency for EU-members and non-members. The almost daily news about mergers and acquisitions in Europe is an expression of the ongoing fight for a favorable position on the unified European market. 2. Extraordinary stability of the Swiss franc/euro exchange rate in the past ...  After these remarks on the general consequences of the euro for Switzerland, let us now turn to the more specific, but nonetheless central, question of the exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the 1  BIS Review 17/2000  euro. As already mentioned, the exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the euro is of crucial importance to the Swiss economy. So far, the relation between the two currencies has been remarkably stable. Since the introduction of the single currency, the Swiss franc/euro exchange rate has fluctuated in an extremely narrow band of only 2%. Thus, exchange rate volatility has until now been even lower than the 8% volatility observable between the Swiss franc and the Deutsche mark during the three years preceding the monetary unification.

We have instilled equity and equality in all our processes, as well as in the recruitment, promotion and social rights. Women now represent 40% of the Bank’s total workforce, as well as of its management and Board. Our 2019-2023 strategic plan enshrines gender equality as a guiding principle for the Bank’s actions. In 2020, Bank Al-Maghrib has adopted a charter for professional gender equality that specifically recognizes the inclusive nature of the work environment and the mix of professions and promotes work/life balance. In order to explore the best practices in gender awareness and facilitate the exchange of experiences, we have with a number of central banks instituted a regular meeting dedicated to gender and reserved exclusively for women. This initiative has been very successful, and we have been approached by several central banks who wish to join us. We aspire to convert this regular meeting into an intercontinental forum of central banks dedicated to the gender issue, initially in Africa-Latin America. Ladies and Gentlemen, The fight against gender inequality requires a firm and sustained political will, reinforced monitoring and consultation of all stakeholders. Over and above public policies, this is a cultural change that must be carried out, especially in our region, through ongoing education, promotion and awareness raising.
Our track record of the last year and a half provides a good example of how flexible our monetary policy is to respond to significant changes in economic conditions. In hindsight, monetary policy remained expansionary with a stable MPR between October 2014 and September 2015, despite the increase in inflation resulting from a sharp exchange rate depreciation, rightly interpreting that it was a transitory phenomenon derived from supply-side pressures on prices. Towards the end of 2015, a normalization process began, sustained on a scenario where growth was projected to equal potential, and with bounded capacity gaps. This adjustment, however, occurred gradually and prudently, with an increase of 25 basis points in the MPR in October and December 2015. This prudence, accompanied by a vision focused on the future prospects of the economy, allowed the monetary policy orientation to be adjusted quickly when the macro scenario began to change. Indeed, the exchange rate appreciation and signs of weakening in the first half of 2016 led the Bank to revise its inflation and growth projections. As these adjustments revealed a new macroeconomic scenario, characterized by weak economic activity, greater exchange rate stability and a faster deceleration of inflation, the Bank successively adjusted its monetary policy options and bias, culminating in four 25-bp cuts in the policy rate in the last five months. Thus, in response to changes in the medium-term macroeconomic scenario, the MPR has accumulated a decline of 100 bp since January of this year, to 2.5%.

It should be noted that although the economic outlook has deteriorated in recent years, the capitalization of the banking sector has not changed significantly. The system's capital adequacy ratio (CAR) stands at 13% since mid-2016, close to its historical average, but still below international standards. Stress tests show that the banks' capital gap has narrowed over the last few years. Thus, the fraction of banks with a CAR above 10% after a severe stress scenario would go from representing 85% of the system's assets in 2011-2014, to 50% in the last two years (figure 17). This is so because the banks that are most exposed to the economic slowdown have not adjusted their capital levels accordingly. In this context, the new General Banking Law would 8  contemplate a gradual convergence towards the Basel III framework, which has implicit higher capital requirements for the banking system. I would like to end this presentation with some thoughts. Concluding thoughts The two reports I just presented (i.e., the Monetary Policy Report and the Financial Stability Report) provide us with a full overview of the Chilean economy, that includes not only its most likely trajectory, but also the risks that might push it away from it. This illustrates the fact that monetary and financial policies are two important complements in Chile’s macroeconomic policy scheme.
The repo rate according to the NIER’s forecasts in 2002-2003 and the actual repo rate Per cent 5.0  5.0  4.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 Jan-02  2.5  M arch 2002 August 2002 M arch 2003 August 2003 NIER's repo rate Repo rate  2.0 1.5 1.0  Jul-02  Jan-03  Jul-03  Jan-04  Jul-04  Sources: NIER and the Riksbank  8  BIS Review 18/2005  5. UND1X and CPI Annual percentage change 6  6 UND1X  5  5  CPI  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  6. GDP for the United States and euro area Annual percentage change 6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1 0  0 GDP, United States  -1  -1  Forecast United States  -2  -2  GDP, euro area  -3  Forecast euro area  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  -3 06  07  Sources.

The forecast for domestic cost pressures this year has been revised down somewhat all the same compared with the assessment in December on the basis of new data for 2004. Resource utilisation in the Swedish economy was low last year. In particular, the demand for labour is still limited even though some indicators of labour shortages show an upward tendency. Indicators from manufacturing also suggest that capacity utilisation has picked up recently. The Riksbank’s overall assessment is that resource utilisation has risen – albeit from a low level – and will continue to increase as more and more spare resources are put to use. The inflation outlook As I mentioned, both domestic and imported inflation were low in the past year. Domestic inflation was expected to be low at this point in time and the rate of price increases for domestically produced goods in recent months has also been broadly in line with the Bank’s previous forecast. In spite of this, the forecasts for domestic inflation this year and next year have been revised down. One reason is that the downward pressure on prices in the retail food trade is anticipated to be greater than previously assumed. How big the effects will be is difficult to say, though, as is their significance for the general inflation rate in the longer term. Over a longer horizon, domestic inflation is expected as before to rise gradually as the cyclical upswing continues and resource utilisation picks up.
But it stressed the virtue of market discipline more than the possibility of market failure. Financial crises were the fault of inappropriate policies. The remedy was more liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. Markets would work, if only they had access to timely and accurate information. So the emphasis was on policy transparency and data disclosure, to enable the private sector to make “correct” decisions. So steadfast was the faith in open capital markets that, as late as September 1997, after Thailand had run into trouble, the IMF and G7 countries were still lobbying member states to 1  BIS Review 76/2000  amend the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to give the Fund the mandate to promote capital account liberalisation. Crisis shock Given this worldview, the Asian crisis came as a tremendous shock. Financial markets proved highly susceptible to contagion and herd behaviour. Problems in one country triggered a loss of confidence in its neighbours. Manias, panics and crashes occurred on a titanic scale, shaking seemingly sound economies to their roots. Structural flaws in the Asian economies undoubtedly contributed to the crisis. So did policy errors by governments and international institutions in responding to the problems when they emerged. The most serious flaws were in the financial and corporate sectors. Balance sheets were weakened by currency and maturity mismatches. Banks were lax in their credit practices. They borrowed short-term from abroad and lent long-term at home, often to related companies without proper assessment.

Companies borrowed excessively, especially in foreign currencies without hedging their exposures, encouraged by implicitly pegged exchange rates. But lenders in the developed economies could not escape blame either. They were only too eager to extend credit, based on the political connections of the borrowers, or on faith in an Asian miracle. Banks stampeded into the region. When sentiments turned, they stampeded out again, equally indiscriminately. The sudden massive outflow of funds, especially through banking lines, left countries in a severe liquidity crunch, and was an immediate cause of the crisis. The punishment meted out by the markets was out of proportion to the crime. The damage was not just the 9% shrinkage in the GDP of the crisis countries, but the social dislocation and political turbulence that followed. Indonesia suffered the worst, even though the IMF made a pre-emptive house call early in the crisis, and pronounced Indonesia’s fundamentals to be basically sound.1 The Indonesian government had pursued prudent macro policies and maintained steady economic growth. But companies had borrowed large sums from abroad, and the banking sector was afflicted by related party lending, poor credits, and weak provisioning. This, together with concerns about KKN – corruption, collusion and nepotism – was enough to turn an initial loss of confidence into a full-blown crisis of the body politic, forcing President Suharto to resign and pushing the country to the brink of chaos. The origins of the Asian crisis thus lay in institutional weaknesses and inefficiencies.
However, to optimise its benefits objectively, we need to overcome four clichés. I shall then turn to your banking industry and its three key challenges for tomorrow. ** I. Overcoming four clichés in order to optimise the euro area. I am fully aware of the criticisms and debates that exist here in Germany about the functioning of the euro area. Not everything is perfect; but Germany can be proud of having helped to create an internationally recognised currency inspired by its own core values: independence, respect for Treaties, price stability and a long-term approach. The ECB and the euro are the true descendants of the Bundesbank and Deutsche Mark. But today, if we want to move forward with a serene debate, we need to get rid of four clichés. Page 2 sur 7 The first one that needs to be overcome, including by some in my own country, is the somewhat lazy idea that economic union is a substitute for national reforms. I want to make this clear from the start: on the contrary, national reforms are a prerequisite for reinforcing the economic union. I am saying this as a completely independent central banker; the current French government is taking reforms very seriously. France has already reaped the first rewards: strong job creation – 1 million new jobs in the past four years – is lowering unemployment; growth – forecast at 1.3% this year – is proving more resilient than in the rest of the euro area.

In this respect, your central body DZ Bank seems to me to be a good example of a grouping which ensures a geographical and functional complementarity of activities. I welcome the current debates on how to consolidate networks of cooperative and mutual banks in Europe; the German sector has the means of significantly contributing to these debates. Page 7 sur 7 ** Thanks to you, I have discovered Raiffeisen’s beautiful phrase: "Several persons have the ability to do what is impossible for one individual.” iv This phrase perfectly describes the ambition of mutual banks. But it is also, I believe, a model of thought for Europe. In this uncertain world, shaken by the rivalry between the United States and China, Germany and France must, more than ever, overcome their differences. The entry into office of the new European Commission, around Ursula von der Leyen, must be an opportunity to move forward together. It's now, or never. Europeans expect no less. Thank you for your attention. References: i  “Shock Resistant”, France’s Attractiveness Survey, EY, June 2019.  ii  Laurent Abraham, Jean-Baptiste Gossé, “The euro: is the grass always greener on the other side?”, Banque de France blog, May 2019. iii  EBA source and sample. iv  "Was dem Einzelnen nicht möglich ist, das vermögen viele."
Companies’ management information systems can, and are, being used to track flows of workers, goods and services. And administrative data can, and are, being used to track people, money and goods. These micro-level data that could, with time, be pieced together to provide a macro – or micro-to-macro – model of the economy. Or that, at least, is the promise. Managing the Economy  If we can map and model the economy at a high resolution how, if at all, might this affect how economic policy is set? Can analysis of this granular type help when thinking about appropriate forms of policy intervention? Might it help in defining what might be a sensible geographic area for an economic strategy? And might it even help in defining what that economic strategy might be? 34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  There is already a deep and rich literature on these topics. One strand looks at optimal currency areas.43 Another looks at optimal fiscal areas.44 And a third looks at optimal political or policy areas.45 This literature identifies a rich range of factors important for determining the optimal spatial dimension of policy. From that long list, let me highlight three factors which are commonly found to play a crucial role:  (a)  Heterogeneity and Specialisation  Other things equal, the greater are the differences in the economic characteristics of an area, the stronger is the case for recognising these differences in the setting of economic policy.

Several reports have made the case for rethinking local economic policies, including Michael Jacobs’ work as part of the IPPR Commission on Economic Justice.1 The Government has put “place” centre-stage in its own policy agenda.2 I discuss ways in which analytical techniques and data might help in shaping those policy choices. Some areas of public policy can only operate at the national rather than local level, such as monetary policy. Even then, however, a local perspective can be important for better understanding the economic issues people face and for building understanding and trust among those people. That is why the Bank of England has recently augmented its own local initiatives, as I will discuss. Other central banks are following suit. 1 2  IPPR Commission on Economic Justice (2018). See also Collier (2018). Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2017). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  In his recent book, Raghu Rajan blames neglect of the Third Pillar of society – community – relative to the market and the state (the first two pillars) for rising societal disconnection and mistrust.3 Rajan is right. Economic policymakers, including central banks, have a pivotal role to play in resurrecting that Third Pillar, in making economic policy local, to better support our economies and societies. Here is how. Mapping the Economy  Let me begin with some simple mapping of the economy. The most widely-used metric of economic success is Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Speech  Supervising banks’ governance: structure, behaviour and culture Keynote speech by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, Florence School of Banking and Finance’s Bank Board Academy “Sitting on Bank boards: Suitability and better governance” Florence, 11 June 2022 I am delighted to be here and would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to speak here today. I applaud the Florence School of Banking and Finance for bringing together regulators, supervisors, academics and banking and finance professionals, fostering dialogue between us. After all, one of the principles of good governance is listening to a wide range of voices and seeking common solutions. And that is precisely what I would like to talk about today: good governance – its scope, what it looks like, and how the ECB goes about supervising it. Today, I will address not only the more familiar elements of governance, such as internal governance arrangements or the role and composition of banks’ boards, but also the key role played by behaviour and culture within banks. State-of-the art risk management and management bodies consisting of board members who are both individually and collectively up-to-the-job are very necessary attributes of sound, well-run banks. But while they are necessary, they are not sufficient: it is time that we also have a closer look at some of the behavioural drivers of decision-making in banks. I will discuss this particular dimension of governance in the second part of my speech.

And how agile and resolute is the bank in actually changing the beliefs, structures, dynamics and thus behavioural patterns that are preventing it from reaching, or restoring, its reputational and strategic goals? Conclusion Let me conclude. Some of you here today are non-executive directors at banks. As such, you play a vital role in setting the right tone for your entire institution. Your conduct is crucial in creating a healthy risk culture within your organisation, and you are responsible for nurturing behaviour which reflects the core values of your organisation and protects its best interests, not just in the short-term, but also in the future. Beyond your technical skills and your experience in banking, there are broader expectations regarding your conduct and behaviour as board members. You must ensure that there are concrete consequences for failing to adhere to prudent behaviour. Governance in the stricter sense deals with the structure which shapes a banks’ actions. Getting these structures right is of the utmost importance. But that is not the whole story. It is also relevant how people behave within these more formal structures and what the underlying cultural drivers of their  behaviours are. Banks would be well advised to seek to identify these behavioural patterns and to act on them if such patterns encourage conduct which is not in line with their values and risk appetite.
So the message has to be not one like "we think it’s too risky to extend more credit to this sector” but instead more like “have you thought about the entire range of relevant risks in extending more credit and are your underwriting criteria in line with the riskier environment?" It’s important in publishing a financial stability report to present its findings as a range of possible outcomes which the private sector can then be encouraged to factor into its own risk management practices. Stress tests and scenario analysis provide the intellectual backbone for financial stability reports. Stress testing, in particular, has come a long way in recent years. The HKMA’s requirements on stress testing by banks have been in place for some time. Our Supervisory Policy Manual Module on Stress Testing, issued in early 2003, requires banks to have in place a stress-testing programme and to integrate stress testing into their risk management processes. For our own internal purposes we also conduct stress tests by applying a range of shocks to the supervisory data that is reported to us. These shocks take into account various adverse movements in banks’ liquidity, interest rate and market risk positions. However, the techniques of stress testing are rapidly evolving and are becoming increasingly more sophisticated. The first generation of stress tests simply took a variable and subjected it to a shock. It was basically just a matter of saying "let’s see what happens to capital if NPL’s go to 20 percent."

There is nothing new in central banks’ concern with the stability of the financial system. It is part of their genetic code. What is new, however, is the explicitness with which the financial stability goal has been articulated, the broader range of intermediaries and institutions that form the focus of macro prudential policy, and the range and sophistication of the tools of macro prudential analysis. All of these are of a completely different order to those of twenty – or even ten – years ago. Thank you. BIS Review 106/2006  11