samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Their success in reaching net zero will instead be driven by their ability to reduce the emissions of the businesses and households they lend to, insure or invest in – their so-called “financed emissions”. 1 2  Preliminary analysis for the updated NGFS Climate Scenarios. See United Nations, Race to Zero. One perhaps obvious way for them to deliver such rapid reductions is to immediately divest exposures to companies with high emissions and instead invest in companies with low emissions. Financed emissions would fall sharply. However, while individual investors can divest, the financial system as a whole cannot. And with a fixed budget of emissions to reach net zero, if the real economy transition is simply delayed, the sharper and riskier it will be. In this way, seemingly rational individual actions can make our collective future problems bigger. Instead we need those with high emissions today to make the biggest effort to reduce emissions tomorrow. And we need the financial sector to steward them through that transition, as well as to help to build greater resilience to physical risks. This can be done through the provision of finance and risk management solutions that support firms in making changes to business models and operations to align with the transition. And through support of investment in new green companies and technologies that help pull the transition forward. If managed smoothly, this represents a great opportunity. As a supervisor and central banker, however, I worry about outcomes where this smooth transition does not occur.

Firstly, ASEAN has enabled SMEs in the region to gain access to a larger and more extensive marketplace. The realisation of ASEAN into an integrated economic community means that the potential benefits for SMEs in the region are no longer constrained by national borders. With easier cross-border flow of goods, services, capital and people, ASEAN offers significant market opportunities for SMEs. Given the large consumer base in ASEAN, SMEs can also utilise ASEAN as a platform to strengthen competitiveness before entering into the global market. Secondly, the lowering of regulatory barriers to trade within ASEAN has further increased the potential for SMEs. The standardisation of trade procedures, the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the improvement of regulatory frameworks across the region has been an additional enabling factor. This will not only provide SMEs with a level playing field in conducting businesses across the region, but will also maximise the competitive advantage of the individual ASEAN economies. This is evidenced by the emergence of regional supply chains, where reductions in tariffs on imported raw materials have resulted in lower production costs, while the removal of tariffs on a wide range of finished products for export within ASEAN will also benefit SMEs that trade within the region. Thus, the lowering of tariffs within the region and the large regional market will provide an environment for SMEs to grow and achieve the production scale and efficiency required to compete in the global marketplace.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Next-generation SIC payment system The thoroughly redesigned SIC payment system known as “SIC4” came on stream in April 2016. Based on cutting-edge, forward-looking technology, this new system reinforces the principles of security, reliability and high performance that have proved their worth for more than 30 years. It is particularly crucial for Switzerland’s finance industry that transactions can be effected with the highest possible levels of security. The SNB therefore welcomes the fact that the former security infrastructure for accessing the SIC system has been overhauled and that a tailor-made security solution will be used from now on. A large proportion of cashless payment transactions in Swiss francs is settled via the SIC system. In 2015, SIC settled a daily average of approximately 1.7 million transactions worth CHF 154 billion, including both client and interbank payments in Swiss francs. Moreover, SIC is an important system through which the SNB implements its monetary policy. We therefore have a keen interest in the ongoing development of the SIC system to ensure that it is able to meet changing technical and professional requirements. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

But perhaps not covered in any national media, including here in the UK, as much as one might expect. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  But there is a deeper question here about the compatibility of domestic and global objectives. In the monetary sphere, it is well known that one cannot combine capital mobility, monetary policy focused on domestic price stability, and fixed exchange rates. Solution in post-Bretton Woods world has been floating exchange rates. This does not mean there are no spillovers. Hence information sharing in Basel meetings etc. •  There is a financial trilemma too. Cannot combine cross-border banking, and an integrated international financial system more generally; financial stability; and national policies focused solely on domestic stability. •  Came home to roost in the crisis: global banks were, as Mervyn King put it, “international in life but national in death”. Financial autarky is not the answer. •  Solution: co-ordination and co-operation on the resolution of global banks. G20 Financial Stability Board has led the way here. Real progress. •  Means foreign countries have a stake in our banks, and vice versa. Means the key policies are unavoidably international, global. As a trading nation we should welcome that. I hope these brief remarks provide the basis for a good discussion. In short, the traditional roles of central banks – for the first time ever reflected in UK legislation – touch every household and business in this country and, in truth, more widely.
3  BIS Review 118/1999  Opinions about the causes of the pronounced change in the Swedish economy are not completely unanimous. The stable prices presumably played a part. When inflation is low or the price level is stable, those who have to plan for the longer run face less uncertainty. Another significant factor was probably the credit system’s development in the 1800s. Banks were established and the abolition of interest controls was followed by more financial expertise. That made it possible to exploit the inventions and finance investments in the emerging industries. An increasingly stable form of government presumably contributed, too. A series of constitutional reforms provided a guarantee of stability. Economic activities benefited from the abolition of trade guilds, freedom to trade and the reform of joint-stock companies. The reform of elementary education was, of course, another important step that ultimately promoted human capital. This catalogue is not intended to be a complete account of all the factors behind Sweden’s transformation from a poor country into a rapidly expanding industrial nation. The point I want to make is that a variety of institutional changes seem to have been needed to provide a stable framework for the subsequent process of industrialisation. It is just this stability in the fundamental conditions for economic activities that was no doubt important for the process that resulted in the industrial revolution, which in itself was full of commercial risks and uncertainties.

It is rather a matter of a new challenge in the long series of challenges the Swedish economy has had to face ever since the dawn of the industrial era more than a century ago. 5  BIS Review 118/1999
On the downside, the speed of the recovery in the world economy may be held back by a number of factors, including the large outstanding debt position of corporate and household sectors; investment in the UK might remain subdued; or the weakness in pricing pressures we have seen over the past year or so may persist. But on the upside, the US might bounce back more rapidly than anticipated; consumption growth might remain robust; or the sterling exchange rate might begin to adjust downwards. Against this background of risks, it is quite possible we may see rates at current levels for some time until the way ahead is clearer. But, as you know, economic events have a habit of developing quite rapidly, so even short term predictions are never easy. For our part, we will continue to assess the case for interest rate changes on a month-by-month basis. In carrying out our task, the MPC relies heavily on having the very best information at our disposal, and in that we are enormously assisted by our network of regional Agencies. Each month, our Agents drive thousands of miles, eat hundreds of rushed sandwich lunches and, on occasion, no doubt push your goodwill to the limit as they seek out the latest news on developments in your businesses. Nigel Falls, our local Agent, is here with me tonight, and for those of you who have not already met him I really do encourage you to do so after the dinner.

Economic analysis involves a great deal of peering into the future, so it is not surprising that there should be differences of view. And the opportunity to explore and explain these differences in a rational and open way is an important part of getting to a better answer. The outlook for the economy I now want to turn briefly to the current policy debate. The key focus of the MPC's recent discussions has been the implications of the slowdown in world growth, which became apparent in the US during the first half of last year, but was exacerbated by the tragic events of 11 September. World trade rose by only around 1½% in 2001, less than a quarter of the average growth in the previous three years. That of course has had very serious implications for businesses exposed to international trade, of which I know there are many in Northern Ireland. Monetary policy has not been idle in the face of this challenge. Interest rates have been cut by 4¾% in the US since the start of last year, by 2% in the UK and by 1½% in the euro area. How far monetary policy by itself would be able to insulate the world economy if the slowdown were to persist is I think hard to say at this stage. Very significant uncertainties remain. But recent news from the US has been encouraging.
Andrew G Haldane: Drag and drop Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at BizClub lunch, Rutland, 19 March 2015. * * * The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Gareth Anderson, Jeremy Franklin, Richard Harrison, Riccardo Masolo, Becky Maule, Roland Meeks and especially Tom Smith for their assistance in preparing the text. I would also like to thank Rebecca Burnham, Rupert de Vincent-Humphreys, Will Dison, Fernando Eguren Martin, David Elliott, Nicholas Fawcett, Bob Gilhooly, Jeremy Harrison, Simon Hayes, Chris Jackson, Phil King, Jenny Lam, David Miles, Francesca Monti, Liam Parker, Kate Reinold, Gareth Ramsey, Matt Roberts-Sklar, Magda Rutkowska, Ali Schomberg, Kate Stratford, Rahul Thakrar, Ryland Thomas, Dan Wales and Madeleine Warwick for their comments and contributions. In March 2009 the Bank of England cut official UK interest rates to 0.5%, their lowest-ever level. Financial markets did not expect this low level of interest rates to persist, with the first rise expected nine months later in December 2009. Yet six years on, official UK interest rates remain at 0.5%. The first rise in UK interest rates is still expected around a year hence (Chart 1). Like a bad flight, the take-off time for interest rates has been repeatedly put back. That pattern has been mirrored internationally. In March 2009 US policy rates were in a range of 0–0.25%, their lowest-ever level. Markets expected them to rise within a year.

With the financial sector now stronger, the MPC judges there may be greater scope to cut rates below 0.5%. This change in assessment could itself have had some impact in reducing the downside risks to inflation expectations. To see that, consider two inflation fan charts based on simulations from the Bank’s macro-economic model.17 Monetary policy is set according to a policy rule, which weights deviations of inflation from target and output from trend. These rules only differ in their assumed lower interest rate bound.18 Chart 26 shows the inflation fan chart assuming an effective lower interest rate bound of 0.5%, whereas Chart 27 shows it with an effective lower interest rate bound of zero. Both these fan charts are negatively skewed. But by reducing the lower bound, this skew is reduced significantly. For example, at a two-year horizon the probability of deflation is reduced from around 20% to around 10%. 15  Bank of England (2015b). 16  Bank of England (2015b). 17  Because these fan charts are based on stochastic simulations, they do not match precisely the fan charts in the Inflation Report, which are based on the MPC’s best collective judgement of the balance of risks. 18  To keep things simple, the simulation does not consider the effects of QE, though in principle this could also be used to boost demand and inflation expectations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  Essentially, a lower effective bound gives the central bank more room for manoeuvre when responding to downside inflation news.
What is needed is an additional instrument, or possibly a set of instruments, to provide the authorities with the ability to control the growth of the financial sector and its interactions with the wider economy. A set of counter-cyclical policy instruments is the right response to the dilemma of trying to use Bank Rate to control both inflation and excessive expansion of the financial sector. It provides the “top-down” judgement for prudential supervision that I described earlier, but detailed work is needed to flesh out that general principle. How should we deal with the present crisis? I have spoken so far about the long-term lessons of the crisis for the structure of banking and its regulation. But the immediate need is to deal with the extraordinarily steep and simultaneous downturn in so many economies around the world, and to stabilise the banking system in those countries where it has failed. That should be the main priority at the forthcoming G20 Summit. There are three parts to the required policy response. First, there is an urgent need for a collective commitment by all the countries in the G20 to restore confidence. Second, in those countries where the banking system has failed, there must be a credible promise that banks will be restructured and recapitalised so that they can resume their normal functions and support the flow of credit to their own and other economies.

In particular, should central banks continue to use their single monetary policy instrument – in our case Bank Rate, supplemented when necessary by unconventional operations – to aim solely at price stability, or should they aim also at wider financial stability objectives, as some have suggested? For over fifteen years Bank Rate has been set to meet an inflation target. And it was very successful in achieving that objective until commodity prices pushed up inflation in 2007. Since the Monetary Policy Committee was established, the average inflation rate has been only 0.1 percentage points away from the target. The strategy of inflation targeting ensured that the MPC maintained a balance between overall demand and supply in the economy. We could, of course, have pursued a different policy. We could have set interest rates consistently at a higher level in order to lower the growth of domestic demand below the rate at which inflation was stable and close to the target. In the words of my predecessor, we could have rejected the approach of accepting “unbalanced growth rather than no growth”. But to argue that Bank Rate should have been set to achieve not price stability but other objectives would have meant accepting rising unemployment and falling inflation. And that would not have altered long-term interest rates in world capital markets and “irrational exuberance” in financial markets in the US and elsewhere.
Over these past 21 years, he has participated in 90 meetings of the Statistics Committee and chaired 34 of them. He has also been a Vice-Chair of the Irving Fisher Committee, a Co-Chair of the European Statistical Forum, and Chair of the ESRB contact group on data. All these achievements are facts, of course. And they show that Aurel knows his subject, thinks strategically and masters the politics. These are all important aspects of being a good leader. But they are not the only things that are important. A leader cannot act alone; they rely on other people. And Aurel is an outstanding people manager. I think he can teach us all a thing or two when it comes to forming a team, keeping people motivated, managing change and, most important of all, creating an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect. In that sense, I see him as a role model. Aurel, I thank you very much. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, In my speech tonight, I have reminded you of some of your many achievements, both recent and past. But what matters most is not the next big project or the latest database. What matters most are the high professional standards which you have all maintained in your work. And, if we want to keep fighting alternative facts with real facts and fake news with real news, you must continue on this path with the same conviction as you started out with in 1998.

But we must also admit that there is not just scope, but also a need, to apply judgement when producing good data and statistics. And trust plays a key role here. People can trust the ECB and the national central banks to apply expert judgement when it is needed. In my speech today, I will focus on key ingredients that have been crucial in building up the ECB’s good reputation over the past 20 years. The first is to have good data and to use them well when taking decisions. The second is to ensure good cooperation. The third is to keep pace with changing times. Good data for good decisions 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I am aware that the need for good data may seem self-explanatory, especially for an audience of statisticians. But that doesn’t make it less important, particularly in the case of the ECB. The stakes are extremely high: whether for monetary policy or banking supervision, our decisions impact the lives of over 340 million people. This gives the data we use, and the analysis we carry out, enormous importance. Our data need to be reliable and our statistics sound. Only then will they be able to form the basis for good decisions. But not all data are created equal. Even well-collected data may fall short of answering the burning questions of our experts. With the 2008 crisis, for example, we learned the hard way why better and more granular data are necessary.
Over the recent years, the Bank of Thailand has built awareness of this risk in the public which has contributed to the natural adjustment of the market and therefore the slowdown of household debt 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  accumulation. Going forward, the Bank is proposing a national agenda to the government to promote financial literacy and discipline to ensure long-term stability in line with our own ongoing financial awareness projects. I have now talked about the central bank’s commitment to growth, price, and financial stability in order to support sustainable growth. Now that we are in recovery, minding the future risks to financial and price stability, and being in possession of stabilization tools tested and refined over time, the Monetary Policy Committee will carefully weigh the tradeoff between short-term growth and long-term risks and ensure that the economy will have enough financial ease to recover to sustainable growth. Ladies and Gentlemen, I would now like to move on to the second role of the Bank of Thailand: facilitating an expansion of the growth frontier. Keeping balance as described in the first part is achieved through the use of the Bank of Thailand’s tools in guarding economic stability. To allow stakeholders to move forward and capture new opportunities, the Bank of Thailand employs its other instruments to enhance financial sector efficiency and create a favorable financial environment for investment that would lead to higher productivity growth.

For example, the real growth of assets in the banking system in 2006, was 5% as compared to a nominal growth of 19%. Similarly, the real growth of profits of the banking sector in 2006 was 12% compared to a nominal growth of 26%. In essence, the real value of short term profits recorded by the banking sector is only half of the nominal growth. Eventually, there will be pressures for higher wages which will, together with rising non-performing loans, erode profits and threaten the stability of the banking system. Banks and financial institutions should therefore take a longer term view and be more cautious in expanding their loan portfolios towards consumption oriented credit and promoting consumerism. The Impact of expansion of consumption credit Expanding credit to less productive areas specially consumption, would reduce current as well as potential savings and add to inflationary pressures in a situation where there is limited availability of goods and services and resources. Such lending would also lead to high credit risks as short term consumption credit is not backed by realizable collaterals although banks make high profits on interest income. Banks and financial institutions re-arrange their credit portfolios in a manner that support the growth and investment drive. Arranging funding sources without relying on CBSL funds CBSL wishes to see market liquidity “broadly in balance” as it will enable the Bank to conduct its monetary policy more effectively.