samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is a major innovation, a robust step, in the wake of the 2008 crisis and the loss of confidence of customers in their financial sector in many advanced economies, sometimes due to deceptive business practices. Restoring confidence is of course in the interest of all those present in this room. This means, for us, ensuring compliance with existing laws and regulations, as well as with the best practices observed or recommended by the ACPR. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Naturally, this consumer protection task is not designed to enforce these different rules in a blanket fashion. Rather, it must be done in accordance with the principles underlying these regulations and fully understanding the reality of these business practices. To sum it up in one sentence, these principles aim to balance relations between clients and professionals. This rebalancing is mainly achieved by taking account of the information asymmetry that can exist between these players. This may include rules that are specific to vulnerable clients, to a category of complex products, to the obligation to consider the interest of customers when the product is designed or in the organisation of product distribution. The reality of business practices, however, is difficult to sum up in a few words. This is where the work of ACPR staff comes into play; in the supervision as well as analysis of different data and through contact with both professionals and consumers. Collecting data on business practices is a prerequisite for the ACPR to guide its supervisory duties.

In Spain, neither conduits nor SIVs (Structured Investment Vehicles) were developed, because the Bank of Spain obliged banks to consolidate these vehicles and required capital of them for the attendant exposures, which eliminated at root any incentive to create these off-balance-sheet vehicles. Accordingly, Spanish banks had hardly any toxic assets. They did not use the originate-to-distribute model to distribute credit risk but pursued a retail banking strategy, in close proximity to bank clients, households and firms alike. On the liability side, when the mistrust and uncertainty worsened, European banks began to suffer the consequences, and their difficulties in raising funds increased. Nonetheless, the long-dated maturities on these products in the past (around 10 years) meant that Spanish banks did not undergo pressing short-term liquidity problems. The financial crisis passed through rapidly to the real economy, with output slumping heavily in late 2008 and over much of 2009. The economic downturn in Spain, and the subsequent recession, impacted banks and progressively raised their doubtful assets and, therefore, their provisioning requirements. Their volume of activity, and new lending in particular, decreased, and the high profitability of Spanish deposit institutions seen so far, began to be eroded. The impact of these developments was uneven, impacting with greater force those banks that had most grown in the expansion and, in particular, a group of savings banks that had concentrated a significant portion of their lending portfolio in financing real estate developers.
Thus far developments in the US have not resulted in a corresponding turnaround in Europe. Share prices in Europe have been relatively stable so far this year, and European economies are still showing solid growth. The effects on the Norwegian economy There are no signs of unrest among economic agents in Norway. Households and enterprises still expect growth in future income. If oil prices fall, the situation may be different. The chart shows the probability of various oil prices ahead. The curve is based on prices in the options market for contracts maturing in December. The vertical axis shows that market participants have priced in a 10 per cent probability that oil prices will be below USD 18 per barrel in December 2001 and a 10 per cent probability that oil prices will be higher than USD 35.5 per barrel in December this year. This would suggest considerable uncertainty. 6  BIS Review 19/2001  The chart shows that high oil prices and petroleum production are generating large current account and budget surpluses, with an attendant increase in Norway's disposable income. The current account surplus came to about 14 per cent of GDP last year, which is one of the highest surpluses recorded in an OECD country in the post-war period. In addition, government budget surpluses have increased sharply and reached 14 1/2 per cent of GDP. The Government Petroleum Fund shall serve as a buffer against short-term fluctuations in oil revenues.

As long as oil prices are high, the Norwegian economy is fairly sheltered. Many central banks are now reducing their key rates. As our economy is affected to a lesser extent, the differential between short rates in Norway and abroad may widen. Thank you for your attention. 10  BIS Review 19/2001
Its implementation must also be timely, which requires having enough information for a better understanding of the economic environment, and acting promptly when changes occur. Obviously this entails taking some risks, as certainty is always elusive. One example of this may come from the recent evolution of monetary policy conduct in Chile. At our presentation before this Committee last December, we noted that our baseline scenario featured as a working assumption that the monetary stimulus would be boosted by 50 basis points, which would be done in the following months. New information convinced us that such impulse would need to be speeded up, so we took action in our monetary policy meetings of January and March. Moreover, the Report I am presenting you now uses a MPR trajectory that goes al little further as a working assumption. Also, as always, as circumstances change and the medium-term inflation outlook varies, monetary policy will be adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, monetary policy and its underlying diagnosis must be persistent enough for it to influence economic decisions regarding saving, investment and pricing, which operate with significant lags. In Chile, estimates indicate that it takes from two to eight quarters for a MPR movement to completely pass through to the economy. Now, this can vary if economic conditions are complex or the magnitude of the impulse is estimated to be still not large enough. The events in the developed world during recent years provide a good example.

Deposit accounts have increased from 19,738 deposit accounts per 10,000 adults in year 2000 to 29,311 deposit accounts per 10,000 adults this year. Similarly, there has been significant increase in loan accounts from 3,105 loan accounts per 10,000 adults to 8,600 loan accounts per 10,000 adults. More than 80% of our adult population have some form of deposit accounts. The ranking by World Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the Poor shows that Malaysia is in the 20th position globally, [Singapore is in the 16th position; Thailand: 33rd; Indonesia: 70th; and the Philippines: 71st]. While we have made considerable progress in improving financial inclusion agenda, the Bank is unrelenting in our aspiration to shape our financial system to be more inclusive and effective in supporting a balanced economic growth for our country. Our financial sector Blueprint that will chart the direction of development of our financial system in the next ten years places a high priority on the financial inclusion agenda. Among the areas of focus are the development of cost efficient delivery channels that will enhance the outreach of financial services, expand the range of products and services to meet the distinct financial needs of the underserved and strengthen the institutional arrangements to enhance the capacity of providers of such financial services. Equally, important will be the attention accorded to financial consumer education and protection in which the standards of consumer care are high and consumers have choices and are confident about making their financial decisions.
More importantly, though, the money market continues to play a crucial role in the implementation of the SNB’s monetary policy, even though much has changed in the Swiss franc money market and in the SNB’s implementation of monetary policy in recent years. For instance, we now use the SNB policy rate rather than the Libor target range to communicate the desired level of money market interest rates. And the most representative money market rate in Swiss francs is no longer the unsecured three-month Libor, but the secured SARON (Swiss Average Rate Overnight). Moreover, since 2015, the negative interest rate on the sight deposits that banks and other financial market participants hold at the SNB has been our main instrument for steering short-term interest rates. These are some of the reasons why we are focusing on the money market today. First, we will explore the significance of the money market for the economy and the SNB. We will ask why the market is so important, and we will examine the roles played by three particular interest rates. They are the SNB policy rate, which is a communication tool; the negative interest rate on sight deposits held by banks at the SNB, which is an instrument for implementing monetary policy; and SARON, the rate for overnight funds on the secured interbank money market. We will then reflect on the current environment. How does the money market work in an environment of negative interest rates? How does the SNB steer money market rates in negative territory?

These momentous developments place on both policy makers and the social partners a heavy responsibility for doing what is necessary to bring this promise to fruition. We must all re-double our efforts within the context of the Lisbon Agenda in order to enhance the economy’s competitiveness. With the cooperation of the social partners, the Government must pursue the targets set for fiscal consolidation, upon which sustained economic growth and the eventual adoption of the euro are premised. Equally importantly, a series of reforms at the microeconomic level are also overdue so as to enhance efficiency and productivity. These challenges are not being faced exclusively by the Maltese economy, but also by larger and more advanced countries who are meeting them by adopting measures - which often appear to be painful in the short run - to sustain the standard of living of their people over the medium term. It is up to all the components of Maltese society to rise to the challenge so as to defend the economic and welfare gains achieved in the past and improve on them in the coming years. 4  BIS Review 32/2005
Government finances have also undergone a rapid improvement. Moreover, revised rules for both fiscal and monetary policy have provided better conditions for future stability. This means that a good foundation has also been established for future economic development. The 1998 round of settlements agreements represents a step in the right direction in the sense that, compared with the previous round, the agreed rate of wage increases in coming years looks like being easier to combine with low inflation. Unfortunately, however, there are still reasons for some concern about the future. Do the wage settlements create really good conditions for increased employment and has a foundation been laid for further responsible wage settlements in the next negotiating round in two to three years time? Some positive things in the Swedish economy have also happened in recent years as regards competitive conditions and price formation. With the ongoing process of internationalisation, European monetary union and advances in the IT field, there is likely to be a further intensification of competition and downward pressure on prices, to the benefit of Swedish consumers. But there is cause to consider whether more can be done, which if there is would also assist monetary policy. Finally I considered aspects of monetary policy and the current situation in this respect. In the past six months inflation prospects have improved.

However, I believe all of us who have experienced this environment have emerged with a very different lesson learnt. Indeed, we cannot overstate the extraordinary potential this setting offers to an institution such as ours which has always valued, and legitimately so, the soundness of its judgement. With that conviction, we should devote most of our efforts to forging closer insertion, collaboration and coordination-based links with our European partners with an essential aim in mind: to reinforce our weight and ability to influence decision-making. This is a challenge and it is also an opportunity, but it is above all a responsibility to support, from the vantage of the Banco de España, the project for European construction. The second objective has to do with our contribution to financial and macroeconomic stability. After an unprecedented financial crisis, the reputation of economic policymakers, of central banks in particular and, indeed, of the economics profession as a whole was enormously dented. 4/5  Testifying to this were the regulatory and institutional changes set in train to prevent similar situations from recurring. However, the real test, where we place our social prestige and credibility on the line, will involve us truly being able to identify risks and vulnerabilities in due time, being able to issue warnings about them and, within our remit, being able to act to mitigate them or to contribute decisively to other players acting when they must.
Third-quarter gross domestic product dropped 2.3%, driven heavily by short-term shocks arising from full fiscal stimulus withdrawal and post-election uncertainties, which impacted  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  negatively on consumption, investments and tourism over this period. Excluding agriculture, the other sectors of the economy dropped, in annual terms. All the aggregate demand components performed poorly over the second half of the year. Private consumption was at low levels, reflecting the low consumer confidence and the decelerated income growth. The low inflation rates contributed to maintaining the savings value. However, Albanian households continue to show a cautious behaviour toward consumption. Also, private investments deepened the downtrend in the second half of the year. The performance of this component has reflected the lower final demand, the boosted uncertainty and the tight bank lending terms. Periodic surveys report that the financial position of businesses remains difficult and this restrains their ability to invest. Fiscal policy was stimulating in 2013, mainly concentrated in the first half of the year. The fiscal stimulus is carried out by increasing spending and reducing taxes. The latest fiscal data are as of November 2013. During the first 11 months of the year, the budget deficit increased 71.5% in annual terms, budget spending increased 4.7%, while fiscal revenues dropped 3.1%. The revenue drop was due to easing tax policy and poor economic performance. Fiscal developments in 2013 worsened the public debt dynamics.

Financial institutions, together with their staff, were at the frontline of this mobilisation: banks by distributing EUR 130 billion of state-guaranteed loans – a record in Europe, and keep up the commitment – but also insurers – and this has been less frequently mentioned – with numerous payouts on claims not covered in policies. Your teams have demonstrated remarkable operational agility. This resilience also stems from the efforts of banks and insurers who went into the crisis on a firm financial footing, with large French banking groups having almost doubled their own funds since 2008 to 15%, and insurers’ capital requirement coverage averaging 239% at end-September 2020. But although we don’t currently need to worry about their financial soundness, we still need to remain vigilant: there is still a high degree of uncertainty, which calls for the maintenance of our fiscal support measures and an accommodative monetary policy. I won’t talk about the latter today as we are in the “quiet period” before the meeting of the Governing Council on 20 and 21 January. Page 2 of 4  II. The challenges for 2021 After a few more difficult months at the start of the year, 2021 should see the end of the pandemic and the beginning of the reconstruction. And in the financial industry itself, we will need to capitalise on 2020’s resilience to meet four challenges that I shall sum up using the four cardinal points of the compass. 1/ The first, of course, is Brexit, so in the North.
The ECB staff macroeconomic projections foresee annual real GDP increasing by 1.2% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015. In addition, the majority of soft indicators are improving, and have been above their long-term average for a number of months now, confirming a rebound in economic activity. Although the strength of the rebound varies across countries, it is important to highlight the return to positive growth in those countries most affected by the crisis and which are of major importance to the euro area: I’m thinking above all of Spain and Italy, where exports have rebounded sharply and are currently driving economic activity. On a financial level, we are also seeing a significant return to normal in the euro area: •  bond markets in periphery countries are continuing to stabilise and interest rates have come back down to sustainable levels, with several periphery countries or programme countries recently managing to obtain market financing at perfectly satisfactory rates;  •  fragmentation within the euro area is decreasing – as shown for example by the fall in liquidity surpluses or Target2 balances;  •  credit dynamics are still subdued on the whole, due to continuing weak demand and ongoing bank deleveraging. But we are confident that the asset quality review which we are undertaking and the upcoming stress tests will revive confidence and thus boost credit.

It will make the transmission of the single monetary policy more efficient, it will break the vicious circle between banks and sovereign risk, and it will bring more confidence, more stability and, ultimately, more growth. However, the problem we face today is that many countries in the euro area are too often unable to take full advantage of these benefits, due to rigidities that have built up gradually during periods of easy growth. The only solution is to carry out structural reforms. In this field as well, the euro area has made considerable progress these last few years, especially in those countries with the biggest competitive lag relative to the rest of the region, and which had thus been plunged deeper into crisis than their neighbours. Cost competitiveness has improved substantially. There has also been a strong correction in current account balances, with several countries managing to turn significant trade deficits into surpluses. This progress can be attributed to major reforms in some of the most decisive areas for competitiveness, that is goods and labour markets, social security systems and pension schemes. Of course, the effects of these changes will mainly be felt over the medium to longterm. We still have a lot of work to do, however, particularly in liberalising goods and services markets, making labour markets more flexible, and increasing profit margins to enable companies to start investing in innovative technology again.
This technological transformation contributed to what was, with hindsight, an extraordinary period of growth and success for the financial system and financial markets – a Golden Decade. Between October 1998 and June 2007, banks’ share prices increased almost 60% and their balance sheets rose more than threefold. In some markets growth was little short of explosive, with the rise in volumes outstanding in the CDS market making Moore’s Law look positively sluggish. And why was this credit boom not destined to end in bust? Because this time was different. At the same time as returns were being boosted by bigger balance sheets and financed by higher leverage, risk was being held in check by a shift in the technological frontier of risk management. A new era had dawned, one with simultaneously higher return and lower risk. This miracle came care of a compelling combination of cavalier risk-takers and roundhead risk-managers. Or so ran the rhetoric. With hindsight, this Golden Decade and its aftermath has all the hallmarks of, in Charles Kindleberger’s words, Manias, Panics and Crashes. Enthusiasm about return gave way to hubris and a collective blind eye was turned to the resulting risk. This was a latter-day version of the Hans Christian Andersen fairy-tale, “The Emperor’s New Clothes”. In a classic collective delusion, the Emperor’s new clothes, you will recall, were admired by all. Conferences like this one became catwalks for banks and the authorities alike, parading their new garments through the streets in all their finery.

Puerto Rico’s economy has, unfortunately, been in a deep economic slump that has lasted for nearly a decade. Over the past few years, public sector job losses have continued to weigh against modest job gains in the Island’s private sector. And ongoing difficulties in the Island’s labor market continue, with labor force participation still alarmingly low, and unemployment stubbornly high at a rate well above the mainland’s. The good news is that we are finally beginning to see some firming in economic conditions on the Island. At the other end of the spectrum, New York City has been experiencing a robust recovery. While the Great Recession was clearly the worst post-war downturn in U.S. history, New York City was not as badly affected as the rest of the country. As of April, almost five years since the end of the recession, the nation has recovered nearly all of the jobs that were lost. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  By contrast, New York City reached this milestone more than two years ago. And, as we’ve highlighted in previous press briefings, this rebound has occurred despite the lack of any significant recovery in employment on Wall Street. The recovery has generally progressed at a more moderate pace in the other parts of our region. Consistent with historical patterns, Upstate New York as a whole has been growing modestly, with Buffalo and Rochester doing a little bit better than their upstate peers.