samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me now deal with how the budget has linked the key policy areas within a well-coordinated Macro Policy Framework 2007 budget very explicitly articulates a well-coordinated medium term macro policy framework, which includes fiscal policy, monetary policy, reserve management and investment policy. Through fiscal policy measures, it is intended to: •  promote economic growth beyond 8% and provide impetus to ensure sustainability of growth over the long term  •  enhance productivity through value addition with particular focus on industrial and agroprocessing ventures. •  Where there is a high content of value addition in local businesses, BOI approval will be granted on the basis that duty free imports of related material will be limited for raw material which are not available locally. Such BOI projects will also be granted a VAT deferment facility for the purchase of material from local industries. •  permit local input supplying companies to open foreign currency accounts to enable them to receive payments in foreign currency from BOI enterprises. In summary, the 2007 budget through fiscal measures proposes to reduce expenditure, increase revenue, provide incentives for savings and investments, pay attention to potential growth sectors such as SMEs, entreport trade in selected industries and promote effective delivery of public service. Calls for effective monetary policy and prudent lending by financial institutions The budget recognizes the impacts of inflation generated through excess liquidity and credit expansion and highlights the need for using monetary policy measures efficiently to contain inflation.

This proposal will enhance worker remittances into the country and help to finance the widening trade deficit and maintain a positive balance of payment position. The budget reiterates the need for permitting professionals to earn in foreign currency and retain such funds in foreign currency accounts within the country. The budget also allows expenditure incurred on acquiring international accreditation as a deductible expenditure from taxation. These measures are expected to enhance foreign currency earnings and further facilitate the management of foreign reserves. The down-side risks Effective policy coordination is certainly the way forward as set out in the budget 2007 and it is interdependent on action by all policy-making authorities. If one or two policy areas lag behind, then the sustainability of achievements over the long term will become an issue. The monetary policy has to play its part to bring down inflationary expectations, while the investment policy has to attract FDIs and  BIS Review 7/2007  3  other investment flows. The reserve management policy should attempt to enhance foreign reserves through increased worker remittances and other flows. Pushing all these policy fronts to work within the open economic policy framework and keeping pace with each other is critical to the success of the medium term development plan. Very close coordination is essential for it and it is certainly a challenge. At the same time, the fiscal policy should make all attempts to stick to its revenue and expenditure targets.
Those of us privileged to meet every fortnight in Frankfurt bear constant witness to the success of this undertaking, which is unique in the process of European construction. The Eurosystem blends centralised and decentralised decision-making, reflecting perfectly the common European project. On one hand the ECB takes centralised decisions for three hundred and thirty million citizens who have the euro as their common currency, while on the other, the Eurosystem operates in a highly decentralised and co-operative manner. The National Central Banks are involved in many joint projects. But allow me to discuss one with which I have been closely concerned in recent years: the launch and design of Target 2 securities which, behind this singular acronym, is an ambitious project that will facilitate securities settlement throughout Europe. This platform is being designed and constructed by four central banks: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Any pro-European would be most satisfied to see officials of the banks from these countries working together every day on a common project. BIS Review 24/2009  1  Critics of the euro, who are quite frankly a minority today, try to argue that the divergences observed across the Monetary Union members in terms of inflation and growth during its first ten years have been a problem. But the figures are not on their side. Over the past decade, inflation and growth diversity among the EMU members has been very moderate compared with what had previously occurred.

The number of fines levied on 12 November alone amount to almost three quarters of the number levied in 2013. 20  See Dudley (2014) and Shafik (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  In the UK, we have introduced a remuneration code prescribing that payment of bonuses must be deferred for a minimum of three years and, after payment, be exposed to clawback for up to seven years. Bonuses can be reduced – or clawed back – if evidence emerges of employee misconduct or failures of risk management. We are consulting on extending deferral periods, widening the scope for groups of employees to have their bonuses reduced where there are more pervasive issues of performance or risk management, and considering options to prevent individuals sidestepping these rules. In an international labour market there is a particular role for international standards and coordination to ensure a level playing field. It is unfortunate, for example, that new European rules to cap bonuses to half (or with shareholder approval, two-thirds) of total pay have the undesirable side effect of limiting the scope for remuneration to be cut back. This makes the case for additional reforms to ensure that the burden of excessive risk-taking and misconduct by staff can still be borne by those staff. Standards may need to be developed to put non-bonus or fixed pay at risk. That could potentially be achieved through payment in instruments other than cash.
In addition, the CBC published the Financial Stability Report in May separately from the Monetary Policy Report and presented it to Senate’s Finance Committee. This has allowed for a better communication of the messages of each report, which have been complemented with deeper analysis of issues of macroeconomic and financial relevance, such as trend growth (September 2017 Monetary Policy Report) and the new information technologies applied to the financial industry (Financial Stability Report first half 2018). In December of this year we will continue with this work, including a new offprint of the Monetary Policy Report that will analyze in detail several aspects of the labor market. 10  Institutional relations. During the first quarter we created a new Institutional Affairs Department in charge of diversifying and improving the quality of the CBC’s communications, developing support programs for the community on issues of its competence and implementing the active transparency agenda of the CBC. It is worth noting here that the CBC began publishing the minutes of the monetary policy meetings of ten years back. In April we published the minutes of all the meetings from 2000 to 2007. Governance. The new work scheme between the Board and senior management was developed and implemented as of March for the discussion and decision making of monetary and financial policy matters, as well as the separate inclusion of institutional administration issues. Additionally, in the second quarter, we approved a change in the organizational structure designed to generate greater flexibility, empowerment and responsibility of the CBC’s divisions and areas.

The main risk continues to be an abrupt deterioration of financial conditions facing emerging economies, especially because markets seem to be more reactive to negative news. In this area, what happens in the US is still relevant, in terms of both the evolution of inflation and its outlook and the unfolding of the trade conflict. This situation has revived the fears about China, especially the risks implicit in the imbalances it maintains in several of its markets. In Europe, among other issues, the uncertainty surrounding Brexit is cause for concern. In the context of normalizing global financial conditions, investors have drawn a line between the emerging economies they perceive as more vulnerable and those with more solid fundamentals. Chile meets the current situation with good macroeconomic indicators in terms of growth, inflation and the balance of its fiscal and external accounts. Moreover, our floating exchange rate makes it possible to cushion external shocks, and the monetary policy framework permits us to act countercyclically. This is feasible due to the low exposure to interest rate and exchange rate risks by the main economic agents. On financial matters, one issue drawing attention in this conjuncture is the external debt. The Box in this Report, entitled “Financial Volatility and External Debt”, provides an in-depth analysis of this issue, particularly with regard to corporate debt.
As we advance into the second phase of our Financial Sector Masterplan, the policy of gradually deregulating and liberalising the banking system will be complemented with the objectives of bringing increased benefits to the overall economy. While foreign banks will benefit from this process, it becomes equally important that there is reciprocity in the relationship. It is acknowledged that foreign banks have contributed to the development and vibrancy of our financial sector. They have made large capital investments and facilitated transfer of skills and technology to Malaysia. But the foreign banks have in turn benefited and flourished in the stable economic environment and significant economic growth Malaysia has achieved. Therefore, while greater operational flexibility will be accorded to the existing foreign banks so that they can better serve the needs of the growing economy, foreign banks will also need to become more integrated into the domestic economy. This includes ensuring affordable access to banking products and services by all segments of the society and not to focus only on specific locations. Therefore, the potential to establish additional branches will be balanced with the requirement to distribute the branch network to include non-urban areas. While the focus of foreign banks have been for the most part in urban areas, it should be noted that the  BIS Review 10/2005  1  record has shown that domestic banking institutions with large presence in the non-urban areas have been among those institutions that have sustained strong performance.

Though the initial effect of credit contraction was similar in the United States and the European Union (EU), its propagation was considerably different owing to the EU’s predominantly bankbased system of financing. The first banks to be hit in 2007 were obviously the ones that invested the most in related financial products that had by then lost much of their value. These banks were mostly located in Germany, France and Netherlands, countries with comparably strong fiscal positions. Then, starting in 2008, it was the turn of several Spanish and Irish banks, which were overexposed to the collapsing domestic real estate market. Governments across the globe stepped in to shore up their banking systems. The European Commission estimates that in the EU, public sector aid provided in 2008 was around 5% and in 2009 around 9% of EU GDP. 5 The direct net fiscal costs of financial sector support in the United States between 2007 and 2009 are estimated to be at around 5% of GDP.6 Up until that point, sovereign debt had been considered as effectively risk free, regardless of the rating of the sovereign. The Greek crisis destroyed that illusion, and induced a general repricing of risk in the EU. This repricing of sovereign and other risks, combined with the drying up of funding markets, in turn affected other countries’ banks which, having little exposure to either toxic financial products or to real estate, had been immune up until that point. Banks in, for example, Italy and Portugal were overly exposed to their fragile sovereigns.
Rather, the purpose is to overcome weaknesses in our analytical tools in order to cope with the possible build-up of financial imbalances resulting from keeping interest rates low over time. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 12  At our most recent interest rate meeting the key policy rate was reduced by 0.25 percentage points to 1.50 percent. In its assessment the Executive Board stated that: “...weak growth prospects abroad and the strong krone are contributing to keeping inflation low and dampening economic growth in Norway (...). If the interest rate is set too high, the krone may appreciate further, inflation may continue to fall and growth in output and employment may become too low. This suggests that the key policy rate should be reduced further. On the other hand, there is virtually normal capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy. Moreover, low interest rates over time may induce households and enterprises to take excessive risks and accumulate excessive debt.” After a decade of learning, inflation targeting has become more flexible. The current outlook suggests that it will likely take several years before inflation is back on target. However, the inflation target has to be reached over time, otherwise our credibility is put at risk. Flexibility is good to have, and easy to lose. In assessing various considerations, monetary policy must be geared to meet its primary objective of low and stable inflation. There are limits as to how many goals monetary policy can meet. Other instruments must be used to attain other objectives.

Economic activity in the third quarter is estimated to have increased by 0.4% compared with the previous quarter. In 2010 we expect to see a moderate recovery. This is in line with the latest Eurosystem staff projections, which were published last Thursday. However, this expectation remains surrounded by a high level of uncertainty. In the view of the Governing Council, the risks to the outlook remain broadly balanced. As regards price developments, inflation and inflationary pressures have remained low over recent months. In line with our expectations, inflation rates turned positive again in November, reaching an estimated 0.6%. Looking ahead, we expect inflation to remain moderate over the policy-relevant horizon, in line with a relatively slow recovery in demand. Indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored, in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Our monetary analysis confirms the assessment of low inflationary pressures over the medium term. In particular, we see that money and credit expansion continues to decelerate. In the case of loans to households, the latest data provide further confirmation of a levellingoff at low rates of growth. The growth of loans to enterprises follows turning-points in the business cycle with some lag. The still subdued levels of production and trade, coupled with broader uncertainty regarding the business outlook, will dampen firms’ demand for bank financing also in the coming months, especially for short-term loans.
To sum up, the information and analyses that have become available since our meeting on 6 August 2009 confirms the view of the Governing Council that the current key ECB interest rates remain appropriate. In this respect, at today’s meeting we also decided that the rate for the twelve-month longer-term refinancing operation to be allotted on 30 September 2009 will be the prevailing rate on the main refinancing operations. Price developments are expected to remain subdued over the policy-relevant horizon. Annual HICP inflation was slightly negative in August. This reflects mainly the base effects of the strong rise in commodity prices in 2008. The return of HICP inflation to moderate positive rates is expected within the coming months. At the same time, the latest information supports our view that there are increasing signs of stabilisation in economic activity in the euro area and elsewhere. This is consistent with the expectation that the significant contraction in economic activity has come to an end and is now followed by a period of stabilisation and very gradual recovery . Available indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. A cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis confirms the assessment of low inflationary pressure over the medium term, as money and credit expansion continues to decelerate.

European Central Bank: Press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 3 September 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to today’s press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by Commissioner Almunia. On the basis of its regular economic and monetary analyses, the Governing Council decided to leave the key ECB interest rates unchanged. The current rates remain appropriate, taking into account all the information and analyses that have become available since our last meeting on 6 August 2009. In this respect, at today’s meeting we also decided that the rate for the twelve-month longer-term refinancing operation to be allotted on 30 September 2009 will be the prevailing rate on the main refinancing operations. This decision, which continues to guarantee liquidity support to the banking system of the euro area for an extended period of time at very favourable conditions, should promote the extension of credit to the euro area economy and, therefore, further underpin its recovery. Price developments are expected to remain subdued over the policy-relevant horizon. Annual HICP inflation was slightly negative in August according to Eurostat’s flash estimate. This reflects mainly the base effects of the strong rise in commodity prices in 2008.
In that case, national authorities would licence and supervise domestic banks, which would face significant restrictions on the type and scope of their cross-border activities. Their deposits would be insured by the domestic deposit insurance system, and the national central bank would be their LOLR. Banks wanting a European passport would be licensed and supervised by an EU authority; they would be part of an EU-wide deposit insurance system, and in most cases, their LOLR would be the ECB. Second, at the national level the key issue is that, as long as global risks and EU flaws are not dealt with, individual countries are forced to take action to protect themselves: action that might contribute further to the retreat of cross-border banking. Such action might take the form of restricting international activities of home banks and placing much stricter prudential limits on foreign currency maturity mismatches. For example, when Iceland lifts its current capital controls on outflows, it will probably impose restrictions on the size and composition of the foreign currency balance sheets of home-headquartered banks. Some might see such restrictions as capital controls in another form, but I see them as prudential rules. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Finally, deposit insurance and the LOLR are logically related and should be in the same currency. Part of the rationale behind them is to prevent and stop runs.

In some economies, such as the UK, the biggest risks are associated with the housing market, which is why macroprudential actions have been taken. More generally, as the FSB has recently concluded: “there are increased signs of complacency in financial markets, in part reflecting search for yield amidst exceptionally accommodative monetary policies. Volatility has become compressed and asset valuations stretched across a growing number of markets, increasing the risk of a sharp reversal.” Those risks arise against a backdrop in which assets managed by investment funds have reached almost 90% of global GDP – more than two thirds the size of the commercial banking system. The growth of the asset management sector brings welcome diversity to financial intermediation. However, there must also be a focus, as there has been with banks, on the systemic risks it could create. Although the sector is becoming more concentrated, the risks don’t simply arise from the size of asset managers. They arise from the particular activities some in the sector undertake. The biggest risks arise from combining high levels of leverage with holdings of illiquid assets and commitments to provide liquidity at short notice. In the current environment, those types of activities need careful monitoring, and possibly a deliberate policy response. Conclusion There is no doubt that the reforms made thus far, along with a stronger framework for global co-operation mean we are in a better position to face new risks.
Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 3 March 2011. *  *  *  I was here as recently as two days ago to discuss the development of housing prices and household indebtedness. Today, I am here to discuss monetary policy. 1 After several years of crisis management, it feels positive to return to discussing more “usual” monetary policy issues. When I was here a year ago, I showed a picture of a skater on the ice. Having been out on thin ice, I considered we had returned to thicker ice. Today, I would instead say that we’re back on dry land. To use a different metaphor, Sweden, with its small, open economy, could be described as being a small boat on a wide ocean. The financial crisis required “Sailboat Sweden” to navigate some dramatically stormy waters. After such a traumatic experience, it is natural to try to lift your gaze and ask certain all-embracing questions:   Where have we come from?   Where are we now?   Where are we going? Personally, I would be just a little worried if I found myself aboard a boat without knowing where I boarded it, its current position or final destination. Let me therefore attempt to give you my answers to these questions as they concern Sweden’s economy. Where have we come from?

Both create uncertainty, misallocate resources, discourage productive investment, and ultimately drag down economic growth. Third, asset prices have important feedback loops with consumer prices. Rapidly rising asset prices raise general inflation expectations and also directly affect rentals and accommodations costs that go into the consumer price index. Fourth, asset purchases financed by excessive borrowing on the expectation of future capital gains undermine financial prudence. If households or corporates build up leverage during periods of low interest rates, they will be vulnerable when interest rates normalise. What can central banks or governments do about asset bubbles or the leverage cycle? An oft-cited reason for not doing anything is that we cannot reliably determine whether asset prices have overshot fundamentals or whether leverage has reached unsustainable levels. But the issue is not whether we can establish if there is an asset bubble or not. The issue is whether the rise in asset prices is creating negative spillover effects on the economy or whether a future sharp reduction in asset prices will lead to instability or serious dislocations. If the assessment is that it would, we have to act proactively to moderate prices now. And  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  this has indeed been the approach taken by MAS and the government with respect to property prices. How macroprudential policies have been applied Singapore applied macroprudential tools as early as 1996, to help cool an overheated property market.