samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Lastly, I would like to emphasise that a key issue in discussions on changes in regulation and supervision is the search for ways to mitigate the problem of moral hazard associated with so-called systemic institutions. Some of the more perverse consequences of the crisis have manifested themselves in these institutions, i.e. those which, owing to their size, their inter-connectedness or the difficulty of replacement of their business areas, are too “big” to allow them to fail. The governments of most developed economies have had to intervene to avoid the consequences of their failure for the system as a whole, at a considerable cost to the public coffers of these countries. The treatment of these systemic institutions is a cornerstone of the reforms proposed by the G20. The wide variety of work under way includes most notably improving countries’ restructuring and resolution capabilities, i.e. the ability to disaggregate the balance sheet of these institutions, and reducing the likelihood and systemic impact of their possible bankruptcy or severe financial stress. In this respect, the members of the FSB undertook to ensure that cross-border institutions have a restructuring plan whereby these can obtain emergency liquidity and deleverage their financial position to improve solvency, and that they have a detailed resolution plan if they are unable to continue operating. That said, the solution to the problem of systemic institutions must be a global one and encompass many other measures.

Under the Risk Based Supervisory Framework, corporate governance and risk management has always been an integral part of Bank Negara’s supervisory assessment of insurance institutions. To form a supervisory view of an institution, Bank Negara evaluates how an institution manages the inherent risks within its significant areas of activity. The Bank also assesses the quality of the oversight and control functions and tests the resilience of the institutions to different risks under stress conditions. Therefore, it is critical for an insurance company’s internal policies and control mechanisms to be effective in shaping the desired risk profile. This risk profile should commensurate with the level of capital and capabilities of the company. The Bank also initiated, in 2008, the Financial Institutions Directors’ Education (FIDE) program to promote good corporate governance and risk management practices. Feedback  BIS Review 76/2010  3  from the directors who attended the program revealed a deeper appreciation of the importance of sound corporate governance and active engagement of the Board in risk management and strategic issues. We have also observed that the practices of financial institutions in Malaysia showed evidence of strengthened risk governance culture. In particular, we observed higher commitment by Board members, strengthened authority of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), and more comprehensive oversight of risks. It is important to recognize that risk management should not be a “black-box” discussion that is confined to high level management. Risk management should be an enterprise-wide process involving all levels of business functions.
Last year, the number of work permits issued increased by 30 per cent. A large share came from the new EU member states. The waiter from Sweden, the Polish carpenter, the cherry-picker from Lithuania, the dentist from Iran and the physician from Sri Lanka are altering the capacity limits of the Norwegian economy. Nonetheless, many services are provided and must be delivered in Norway. Nor do we want to drive internationally exposed businesses out of the mainland economy. Language and cultural differences place limits on how quickly foreign labour can be absorbed, and the supply may diminish inasmuch as the economies of Sweden and Poland are now growing strongly. Norway’s skills requirements and authorisation procedures are also curbing competition. Laws and resolutions on minimum pay requirements may also restrict the flow of labour. Current evidence suggests that capacity utilisation is increasing in some sectors of the Norwegian economy. Norwegian industrial leaders report that they are nearing capacity limits with regard to labour, plant and equipment. Three of four enterprises in the construction industry report that they are operating at capacity limits. 6 The number of advertised vacancies is rising steadily. There are reports of shortages of craftsmen, project managers and supervisors, engineers and skilled workers. Even though capacity utilisation is rising, there are no visible signs of inflation. Intensified competition is exerting downward pressure on margins. Wage growth is still at such a low level that it is strengthening businesses and employment. However, we have experienced earlier that cost inflation can rapidly accelerate.

Second: In order to reap the benefits of new technology, enterprises must be able to make rapid changes in their workforces. 9 However, at a more fundamental level, growth and restructuring capacity is closely linked to the level of skills in a population. European surveys indicate that there is a high level of science and technology skills among the adult population. 10 Surveys among pupils and students do not provide an equally positive picture. A report from the Norwegian Mathematics Council shows that the level of mathematical skills among new university students has declined markedly in recent years. 11 Even the top performing students score considerably lower than earlier. This is illustrated here as the percentage of correct answers in arithmetic and percent calculation, but we find similar scores for other mathematical skills. Norway is taking an economic risk in allowing the skills level to decline. But – to take a brighter view of this: We have after all experienced that negative trends can be reversed in very important areas of society. Our most important resource is our labour force. The employment rate is high in Norway. This is because many wish to participate in working life, and the vast majority find a job. However, the Norwegian labour market also has its weak points. The annual number of person-years worked is lower in Norway than in the US and the rest of Europe.
Might it be preferable in select cases for a systemic infrastructure to declare a settlement holiday, unpalatable as that may be, or to work with relevant industry associations to declare that select markets are closed? Are the operational challenges of conducting manually activity that is fundamentally dependent upon automation a bridge too far? Do reconciliation challenges that become exponentially more complex as a disruption event extends in duration risk prospects for an orderly return home? Might industry dialogue to agree on the accepted circumstances and corresponding practices for dealing with a settlement holiday in a pre-meditated manner prove to be a superior course? These questions are not easy to answer, but it is very important in the present evolution of industry discourse that they are asked. Provocative Question Number 4: To what extent do measures to address endpoint security risks, such as anomaly detection and assurance regimes, compel a new paradigm for the attribution of liability in the end-to-end payment transaction flow? The reality that endpoint security breaches can undermine confidence in a network even when an operator’s infrastructure has not been violated has spawned a novel body of work, including initiatives to enhance assurance that external endpoints are operating in adherence with an operator’s strict security requirements, and the development of application tools such as anomaly detection to enhance a participant’s management of fraud risk.

I had the privilege of hearing General Michael Hayden, former head of the NSA and CIA, address a payments symposium hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago a few years ago. In that venue, General Hayden spoke of the tectonic shifts affecting the global landscape, and their prospective impact on cyber, terror, and geopolitical threats. His basic message, in two parts: keep your seat belts on, it promises to be a volatile century (yes, century); and when it comes to our critical financial market infrastructure being subject to attack, it is not a matter of “if” but “when". Responding to the current threat environment represents the challenge of our generation; these are days of preparation. I will posit that a fundamental distinction exists between cyber resiliency and traditional resiliency: what works for us in conventional resiliency scenarios, namely the automatic and instantaneous replication of data, works against us in cyber scenarios, reflecting risks that a pernicious malware, or a severe data corruption, or even an application failure propagates itself across primary, secondary, and tertiary operating sites, rendering a systemic infrastructure functionally inoperable. In other venues we have therefore elaborated upon the need for a new paradigm for resiliency, one that endeavors to mate traditional precepts of geographic dispersion of infrastructure and human capital with new realities compelling technological diversity, and a platform for recovery, should the core of a financial market infrastructure become corrupted.
  A thematic review across a number of smaller Lloyd’s managing agents, to assess how distribution channels are changing. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3    Reviews of underwriting and risks around pricing at a number of motor insurers. For example, we will assess how insurers protect themselves against the risk that under-pricing leads them to take on a large number of policies quickly, particularly through price comparison websites. Life insurance risks and supervisory priorities  In the life sector, the search for yield on Solvency II capital is taking insurers in different strategic directions. Some are taking a ‘capital-light’ approach, focused on unit-linked liabilities and asset management. Others are growing their annuity books, particularly by taking on the liabilities of defined-benefit company pension schemes. One of the most direct and notable consequences of Solvency II has been growth in reinsurance of longevity risk. On average, between 2015 and 2016, longevity risk transfer increased by nearly 25% across UK annuity writers. Long-dated insurance risks, such as longevity exposures, attract a high risk margin. We 2  have been clear that we think the Solvency II risk margin is too sensitive to the level of market interest rates . It is therefore too high at current low levels of interest rates, encouraging insurers to transfer longevity risk through reinsurance. The risk margin is our first priority as part of the Solvency II review. We are working in EIOPA to achieve a sensible outcome.

And debt levels in emerging market economies are much higher than they were before the crisis. This is a source of potential vulnerability as interest rates rise. Downside risks around baseline growth forecasts have declined – there is more consensus now about growth outcomes. But tail risks arising from economic policy and geopolitical uncertainties persist. One, trade protectionism. An escalation of trade tensions could disrupt global supply chains and curtail international trade, with an outsized impact on many small open economies in Asia, including Singapore. Two, disorderly Brexit negotiations could weigh on consumption and investment in the UK, with spillover effects on the Eurozone’s exports and growth. Trade and banking channels could transmit these shocks to Asia. Three, rising populist and nationalist sentiments could compel politicians to take measures that unnerve investors and depress economic growth. SINGAPORE ECONOMY Against this backdrop, the Singapore economy is forecast to grow by 1-3% this year, with a strong likelihood that it would be higher than the 2% registered last year. Growth has been somewhat uneven across sectors but this is to be expected in the initial stages of an external-led pickup. Growth is expected to gradually broaden to the rest of the economy over the course of the year. It is useful to look at the sectoral distribution of growth from the perspective of the three broad clusters in the economy. The trade-related cluster has been a major driver behind the rebound in the economy since Q4 last year.
Little wonder that after his already mentioned experience with ‘paying cash at the counter’ Global was keen to join the team introducing innovative thinking and acting into public administration. And how does e-government work in 2026? There are no traditional buildings, long queues or problems with solving intricacies related to taxes or administration. Today, Global reaches the authorities through the global network from anywhere in the world by submitting documents signed with his own electronic signature. He does not have to carry a briefcase filled with documents, as was the case 20 years ago. Now, Global's unique ID allows to validate his authorization whenever necessary. An e-officer makes sure that Global is notified in advance of his civic duties by delivering him already prepared documents for approval via electronic mail. BIS Review 90/2006  3  Tax returns are a trifle, too. Global's employers transfer his remuneration to indicated bank account numbers, and details of his salary reach the relevant revenue office. Each year, he receives tax return from the revenue office, accepts it and sends it back to the office. The current project's innovativeness consists in establishing specialized centres that would provide public services of highest quality, not only in terms of the country but also the entire world. Currently, the project of a global revenue service is being developed. The project schedule is as important as the plan of project communication.

Lawrence Williams: Leveraging central banks’ IT investments for strategic advantage Opening remarks by Mr Lawrence Williams, Governor of the Bank of Guyana, at the conference of regional central banks’ information systems specialists, Bank of Guyana, Georgetown, 4 June 2012. *  *  *  Chairman Deputy Governor Banking Manager Deputy Programme Manager, Information and Communication Technology, CARICOM Secretariat Conference Delegates Directors and other Staff members of the Bank of Guyana Invitees I wish to join with the Chairman in welcoming you to this opening session of the Conference of Regional Central Banks’ Information Systems Specialists. A warm welcome is extended to those of you visiting Guyana and more so to those of you visiting for the first time. A special welcome is also extended to Ms. Jennifer Britton who has taken time off her demanding schedule to present the Conference Keynote Address. The Bank of Guyana deems it a privilege to be hosting the Conference of Regional Central Banks’ Information Systems Specialists for the second time in the history of the Group. We are grateful for the fact that nine central banks accepted our invitation to participate in this conference. I thank you for graciously accepting our invitation. It is my fervent hope that the activities over the next five days will provide a good opportunity to engage in the sharing of ideas and experiences, as well as to gain new insights that would be beneficial to the wellbeing of your respective information technology functions in particular and, by extension, the institutions you represent.
It was also recognized that the existing regulatory framework was insufficient to address systemic risks. This has prompted a more integrated approach to the regulation with substantial strengthening of the macro-prudential elements of financial regulation. A major concern on the calibration of the regulatory reforms is its unintended consequences that could materially impair the vital role of the financial sector in the economy. Of concern is that the cumulative impact of the new measures may affect the cost and availability of financing to the wider economy. There needs to be a balance between long run financial stability and its potential increased costs to financial intermediation. This balance needs to combine regulatory and supervisory systems that are more forward looking and responsive to risk; while having in place appropriate incentive structures for financial institutions to prudently manage risks and strengthen conditions for market discipline to take effect. While the Islamic financial system has generally performed well during this global financial crisis, several valuable lessons can be drawn from this crisis in our efforts to strengthen further the Islamic financial infrastructure for a more resilient and stable financial system. In 2009, a Task Force on Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability was formed by the IDB and the IFSB to undertake an assessment of Islamic finance during the global financial crisis and to identify the further building blocks that are necessary to further strengthen the foundations of the Islamic financial system.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The transformation of the international financial system and the role of the Islamic financial system Keynote address by Mrs Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 6th World Islamic Economic Forum, “The Transformation of the International Financial System and the Role of the Islamic Financial System”, Kuala Lumpur, 20 May 2010. *  *  *  This is a time of extraordinary global economic challenge and uncertainty. The recent unprecedented global financial and economic crisis has resulted in tremendous damage across the world. The meltdown in the global financial system resulted in several setbacks including bank failures, a credit crunch, a collapse of asset markets, massive wealth destruction, a sharp decline in trade and financial flows and widespread unemployment in many parts of the world. To contain the effects of the financial crisis on the economy, extraordinary and exceptional measures were taken by policymakers around the world. With the global economy now on the road to recovery, attention has turned towards securing a more permanent solution in shaping the global economy of tomorrow that would avoid such crisis of such proportions in the future. Significant steps are being taken by the international community to intensify efforts to reform and strengthen the international financial system. The aim is to build the foundations for a stronger and more inclusive global economy – built on the premise of sustainable growth and a greater shared prosperity.
Not least, the Riksbank’s responsibility for financial stability should be clarified. Secondly, we lack tools to prevent crises, a weakness that is partially connected with the unclear allocation of roles. Although Finansinspektionen has the task of promoting stability and efficiency in the financial system and has tools that can be used to influence the banks’ behaviour, it does not have the explicit task of counteracting macroeconomic risks. At the Riksbank, we have interpreted the present laws relatively broadly to mean that we are to safeguard the stability of the financial system, while, at the same time, we lack effective tools to do this. Thirdly, we need a new regulatory framework specifying how the central government is to handle banks in crisis. Today, banks that cannot pay their debts are declared bankrupt – just like any other company in the same situation. This is often a lengthy process and bank customers may have to wait several years to get their money back. Furthermore, it is not enough for each country to have its own solution. Banks are increasingly working across national borders. The government and Riksdag must also decide whether Sweden should have the same regulations for the financial sector as other countries. Financial crises can lead to very high economic costs and there are a number of risks that are specific to Swedish financial stability, not the least of these being the Swedish banks’ great dependence on obtaining funding on the international capital markets.

This describes our assessment of the stability of the financial system, as well as various risks and threats to this stability. From an international perspective, the Riksbank’s work on stability analysis has been at the cutting edge.1 We were the first central bank in the world to publish a stability report, and we  1  See, for example, Allen et al. (2004), who have carried out an independent assessment of the Riksbank’s stability work. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  were also among the first to carry out stress tests describing the banks’ resilience to various types of shock.2 Assessing the banks’ credit risk, which is to say the risk that the banks would not recover the money they had lent, was an important part of this analysis work. It was just this kind of risk that had led to such large losses for the banks in the banking crisis at the start of the 1990s. Consequently, the risks we emphasised in the stability reports were primarily associated with credit risk. We warned of the risks but missed the one that would give us problems In the years leading up to the financial crisis, we made overall assessments along the lines of “financial stability in Sweden is satisfactory” (Financial Stability Report, June 2008). The four Swedish major banks (Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank) were profitable and hade enough capital to withstand possible shocks. However, we also pointed out risks, sharpening our tone when the risks became more apparent, just before the crisis.