samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
•  Second, pay a close attention to the implementation of PFMIs and different regulations to ensure that CCPs maintain state of the art risk management practices (margining, collateral, default funds) and adequate governance both for the sake of both their own soundness and the resiliency of the markets they serve. •  Third, define appropriate principles for resolution and recovery of Financial market infrastructures, and particularly CCPs which now concentrate a high level of risks. •  Last, bring transparency in the area of secured and unsecured interbank lending, which are the underlying reference for interest rate derivatives. Monetary policy considerations also call further transparency in that regard as it requires detailed knowledge of the organization of money market and the real conditions under which transactions take place. 2. Meanwhile due attention should be paid to an adequate calibration of the framework. The development of multiple concomitant regulations (capital, liquidity etc…) calls for a perfect coordination. We cannot pile up these different approaches without assessing their impact and the costs incurred for the market and the public. This is a particular concern when considering the collateral requirements that stem from the different regulations. 3. Last but not least, we need to promote a consistent framework.

The vaccination programme has improved the outlook and the UK economy is forecast to recover rapidly thereafter with growth of 14% in the year to 2022Q1, when GDP is forecast to return to its pre-Covid level. But because of the structural changes and permanent scarring resulting from the pandemic output is assumed not to make up all of the lost ground and so doesn’t return to its pre-crisis trend29. Figure 8: Annual GDP growth since 1700 25  Annual growth in real GDP (%)  20  15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020  Source: A millennium of macroeconomic data, updated with the latest ONS data from 1948. 29  More in my speech ‘The potential long-term effects of Covid’ 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  15  The very welcome progress with the vaccination programme has reduced a number of the uncertainties and risks, but they have by no means gone away entirely. Consistent with that, our latest GDP forecast published in February still features a very wide fan throughout as well as a downside skew to GDP in the near term (Figure 9). And while unemployment is forecast to peak at 7.8% in 2021Q3 and fall thereafter the risks remain skewed towards higher unemployment.
These jobs require strong programming skills and in-depth business domain and system knowledge. There are not enough Singaporeans applying for these jobs in the first place, let alone qualifying for them. Technology will continue to lead hiring demand in 2021, with 1,700 hiring opportunities. So ware engineers account for about 30% of these jobs Business analysts and jobs in digital transformation account for another 25%. Technology jobs in the financial sector can be classified into three archetypes. Tech-Lite. These are mostly entry-level job roles for university - and increasingly polytechnic - graduates to gain hands-on experience in programming work and business domain experience. They make up about 10% of the tech workforce. Tech-Intermediate. These are roles which require good programming skills and understanding of business domains. About 75% of tech jobs in the financial sector are in this category. There is keen competition for these talents not only globally but also across diﬀerent sectors in Singapore. Tech-Advanced. These are senior leadership roles and in high-value tech functions, accounting for 15% of the tech workforce. Many global financial institutions have chosen Singapore as a hub for such high-value tech work. For example, 70% of Standard Chartered Bank’s global tech leadership and management sits in Singapore. The financial sector’s strong demand for technology talent will persist. MAS estimates that 2,500 to 3,500 tech jobs will be created in the financial sector each year, over the medium term. The competition for tech talent is economy-wide as more sectors embark on digitalisation.

9 Finally, our decision to publish our own forecast for the repo rate is of course a further step towards greater openness, clarity and more efficient communication. This all means that there are good opportunities for the general public to find out how monetary policy decisions are made. This openness from the Riksbank makes it possible for all those who are interested to follow our policy and see whether we live up to our principles. I am convinced that transparency has been a central issue in gradually building up confidence in the Riksbank and the inflation target. Conclusion In conclusion, let me note that it is difficult to say anything else than that the changeover in economic policy in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s has on the whole been successful. The inflation target for monetary policy has contributed to providing a stability in economic policy that was lacking in the Swedish economy during the 1970s and 1980s. The consolidated public finances are another very important factor. 6  Chapter 1 of Blinder, A. S. (2004), The Quiet Revolution – Central Banking Goes Modern, Yale University Press, contains a discussion of political and economic arguments in favour of transparency in central banks. 7  See, for instance, Eijffinger, S. and P. Geerats, (2006), “How transparent are central banks?” European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 22, 1-21. 8  See Leeper, E. (2003), ”An Inflation Reports Report”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2003:3, 18-42, for an evaluation of the Riksbank’s Inflation Reports.
Massive speculation on that day led to the announcement in the morning of a 2 percentage points rise in interest rates and, when that failed to dampen the pressure on sterling, of a further 3 percentage points rise in rates. That second announcement, far from bolstering the exchange rate, merely convinced financial markets that Britain’s membership of the ERM could no longer be sustained politically. The strong political commitment to joining European monetary union, which was the effective support for other currencies in the ERM, was absent in the United Kingdom. Following its departure from the ERM, the UK introduced an inflation target regime for monetary policy. It succeeded in bringing inflation down to around 2½ percent (see chart 2). 6  BIS Review 5/2004  Chart 2: UK inflation and inflation expectations, Oct 1991-Oct 2003 Per cent 7  Implied inflation (a ) from IGs RPIX inflation rate  6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Oct-91  Inflation target announced  Bank independence  Oct-93  Oct-95  Oct-97  Oct-99  Oct-01  Oct-03  (a )  Implied average inflation expectations from 5 to 10 years ahead, derived from index-linked gilts. Source: Bank of England, ONS  But long-term inflation expectations did not fall as quickly. Only after the announcement in May 1997 by the new Labour government that the Bank of England would be made independent did inflation expectations fall quickly to the target level, as can be seen from chart 2.

The second is debt management, which is normally seen as the responsibility of the finance ministry. So when interest rates are zero unconventional quantitative operations and debt management are indistinguishable. The interplay between monetary policy and debt management may not matter too much when shortterm interest rates are positive because the central bank can control the level of interest rates, even if debt management affects the optimal level of rates. But when rates are at their zero bound then the central bank no longer has instrument independence. Indeed, because its actions can be offset by appropriate sales or purchases in the government debt market, it loses goal independence too. It becomes crucial that fiscal and monetary authorities cooperate. An alternative strategy, equivalent in terms of its monetary effects but avoiding the risk to the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet from holding large quantities of government bonds, would have been for the Ministry of Finance to have issued short-term bills to the BoJ, using the proceeds to purchase and retire long-term government bonds. Similar arguments apply to other unconventional monetary policies, such as purchases of foreign currency, which conflict with the responsibilities of the fiscal authorities for the ownership of foreign exchange reserves.
Besides the mitigation of imported inflation, the cancelling out of the effect of regulated price increases in the previous year and the lack of any further increase in them are factors impacting on the downward trend of the annual inflation rate. From the viewpoint of macroeconomic factors, the annual inflation volatility was induced by supply-side factors, while the demand-side inflationary pressures remained low. Anchored inflation expectations prevented transmission of supply shocks to the cost structure of the Albanian economy, dwarfing the effect of the supply shocks only on the first round effects. On the other hand, below-potential growth of the Albanian economy led to an incomplete utilization of production capacities, generating moderate pressures on wages and production costs in the economy. Also, the sluggish aggregate demand reduced businesses’ ability to dictate prices in the economy and hence their profit margins remained at historically low levels. These developments were also reflected in the performance of core inflation, which fluctuated around the lower half of the Bank of Albania’s target band. Finally, the Bank of Albania prudentially supplied the economy with liquidity and monetary expansion was in line with the economy’s needs for monetary assets, thus preventing the generation of inflationary monetary impulses. Bank of Albania’s monetary policy maintained its expansionary nature in 2011, responding to the performance of inflationary pressures balance and taking into account the contained fiscal stimulus.

Also, the Bank of Albania’s Annual International Conference on “Building our Future through Financial Literacy”, attended by senior representatives of public and private authorities at home and abroad, contributed to enhancing the awareness of financial education importance and drawing the attention of respective authorities and institutions. *** Honourable Members of the Committee, Both current and previous year were filled with challenges posed from the external environment and the internal structure of the economy. I listed above only some of the main accomplishments of the Bank of Albania and issues the Bank was faced with in 2011, while the Annual Report contains more detailed information. The Bank of Albania will continue to work to rigorously fulfil its legal mandate and render maximum contribution to growth of welfare in Albania. Concluding my introduction on the Report, I would like to share with you some reflections on Albania’s economic outlook. Recent years, have brought to the fore certain fragilities of the Albanian economy. Against this backdrop, economic policies should intensify their efforts to ensure a stable economic growth. In particular, increased productivity, ongoing restructuring and strong economic growth require the compilation and implementation of structural reforms to support domestic production and enhance its competitiveness in the national and international markets. Also, economic policies should aim at further improving the free-market terms and conditions, in order to strengthen the structure of the market economy and enhance efficiency in our economy.
Besides that, the risk management system must be flexible enough to adjust to the rapid developments in this area. So, at the end, the risk management system should be established in a way to allow the management to compare risk on a consistent “apples for apples” basis even for those risk factors such as operational and legal risk, where limited data is available. As I mentioned earlier, the management not only has to set standards for its risk policies but also has to ensure that they are disseminated to and understood by the staff who are affected by them. I think this point is worth restressing since it is impossible to launch the risk culture without ensuring those kind of communication channels in the organization. At this stage, I would like to say a few words about reporting and monitoring which are important steps to complete the risk management process. Reporting and monitoring is really important to check the system’s efficiency. Because of this, the risk management function has to have an independent reporting line to provide assurance that the institution is assessing its risks effectively, and is complying with its own risk management standards. With this functionality, reporting is the key component of any risk process, because it is basically the window into the risk management results and the means of communicating risks the institution is exposed to.

For instance, as late as last summer it became possible in Germany to shop after 6 p.m. on weekdays and on Saturday afternoons. However, it is still almost impossible to find a shopping centre in Berlin or Frankfurt that is open on Sundays, a day that ought to be very suitable for retail trade since customers are usually not at work then. So a continued modernisation of working-hour laws could contribute to further improving efficiency in the German economy. Another area is the costs associated with downsizing. European firms are in many cases obliged to pay for laid-off employees a long time after their employment has finished. This may make the labour market less efficient in downturns, as firms often try to retain existing staff instead of implementing costly cutbacks. The situation can become particularly serious if the downturn turns out be longer or deeper than firms initially fear, since cutbacks during the economic downturn risk aggravating the decline. In this respect, the euro area and Sweden are at a disadvantage compared with the UK and the US, where the labour market responds much quicker to changes in economic conditions. Labour market legislation can therefore also be significant for the economic cycle. Firms that are forced to retain a larger workforce than they have use for during a downturn will not be as financially well prepared to meet a future upswing. We can see signs today of how this is having an adverse effect on the European economic recovery.
Hungary was in a similar position, tightening the monetary policy stance, as a reaction to the pressures on the domestic currency and rising risk premium. In Serbia, apart from the tightening at the crisis outburst, it was also observed in 2010 and 2012, in presence of large deviation of the inflation from the inflation target. Yet, excluding these “episodes”, the monetary policy stance in the region was lax, with policy rates declining across the board. The most recent data point to an average adjustment of policy rates close to 4.5 p.p. since 2007, which is a somewhat bigger adjustment compared with the change of the ECB policy rate (4 p.p.). The adjustment ranged between 1 p.p. in Macedonia and 6.6 p.p. in Hungary. Hence, the spread to the Euro Area rate narrowed in most of the economies, which was particularly pronounced after 2012, when a debate on the future of the single currency came to the fore. In such a context, when the anchor currency undergoes a crisis, the compression of the spreads seemed unlikely to become a hurdle for capital influx in the countries in the region.

Specifically, voices have been raised in favour of a substantial increase in the minimum non-weighted capital requirement, the leverage ratio. Moreover, demands for an outright separation of investment banking from commercial banking, along the lines of the Glass-Steagall Act, have gained political clout. While these proposals have merits – and, given the difficulty of the task, one should keep an open mind – qualifying remarks seem appropriate at the current juncture. We are in the midst of implementing a complementary and balanced package of measures. As we have seen, tangible progress has already been made. When it is fully implemented, this package will substantially reduce, and possibly eliminate, the TBTF problem. It is unlikely that a sudden change in strategy would lead to a faster elimination of the underlying risks. Rather than changing the regulation strategy midway, it is imperative that we press on with the full implementation of the TBTF package. We will then be in a position to assess its effectiveness and decide whether further measures are necessary. Full implementation entails, necessarily, further progress on the following four issues: First, the big banks must stay on track, and must fully and consistently implement the tighter risk-weighted capital and liquidity requirements as currently planned. This will, importantly, lead to a significant improvement in their leverage ratios. Second, the quality of the banks’ own risk assessment methods must be improved. Increasingly, doubts have been raised on the reliability of the internal models which banks use to compute their risk-weighted assets (RWAs).
Pablo Hernández de Cos: Central bank independence and policy coordination in a globalised world Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the International Symposium on Central Bank Independence, panel on "Central bank independence and policy coordination in a globalised world", organised by Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, 10 January 2023. *** Let me start by thanking the Riksbank for organising this symposium and for inviting me to take part in this panel. In many ways, the theme of our panel – central bank independence and policy coordination in a globalised world – is a good description of the objectives to which Stefan Ingves' many, many, achievements have contributed during his long and varied career, including most notably as Chair of the Basel Committee and as Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board. It is therefore somewhat humbling for me to take part in this discussion as his successor as Chair of both these Committees. While I will focus my remarks on the financial stability aspects of independence, globalisation and coordination, allow me to start by recalling the main reason why the task of controlling inflation has been assigned to independent monetary authorities in a large number of economies. The argument is based on what the economic literature calls "time inconsistency", which highlights the role of expectations in agents' behaviour. Price stability unquestionably enhances economic growth and improves wellbeing in the long run.

We learnt this lesson the hard way in the wake of the GFC, and that is why the Committee's membership – comprising both central banks and supervisory authorities – is crucial to ensure that we benefit from both the system-wide and institution-specific perspectives. Moreover, given the increasingly cross-sectoral nature of many of today's financial stability issues – such as digitalisation and climate – I believe that more cooperation across different sectors – for example, on accounting, competition, anti-money laundering, data privacy, and taxation, to name a few issues – is also vital. In many instances, we are all working on similar issues from a slightly different angle, and so we would surely all benefit from sharing notes and ensuring that there are no unintended gaps or overlaps. Let me end by noting that cooperation need not mean full harmonisation. While having a single, uniform "global rule book" may be theoretically appealing, the fact is that we live in a heterogeneous world, with structural and cyclical differences across banking systems and jurisdictions. Moreover, many of our central bank and supervisory authority members are accountable to their national legislatures, so it is crucial that global standard setting bodies are perceived to be legitimate and transparent. This is why the Basel Committee has an extensive outreach programme with a wide range of stakeholders that go beyond market participants, to include academics, public sector bodies, legislatures and civil society. Indeed, there needs to be an appropriate balance between globally-agreed decisions and national measures.
I am confident it can be a “success story”. Nonetheless, substantial challenges remain. Ambitious structural and financial reforms are still needed: to put unemployment on a downward trajectory; to ensure that government finances are put on a sustainable path; and to secure a banking sector that can stand on its own feet again and support the Irish economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  And that last item – financial sector repair – is absolutely crucial. The support from the Eurosystem in the form of monetary policy and emergency liquidity loans to Irish banks has been extraordinary by any measure. With these considerations in mind, I would like today to start by considering, first, the origins of the crisis. I will then discuss some macro-fiscal aspects of the adjustment process. However, I want to spend the majority of my remarks discussing, thirdly, financial sector issues and the role of the ECB. I would like to present a clear view on how the ECB has supported Ireland through the adjustment process, working as a true partner to help this country resolve its problems. 1. The origins of the crisis  A somewhat colloquial, description is that when the bubble burst, the economy was lacking competitiveness, that it was unfit and overweight. Is that really a fair description of the Irish economy around 2007?

And let me recall that Eurosystem loans currently carry much lower interest rates than the loans from the IMF and EU Member States. To be clear: ECB support and IMF / euro area member state support are not on an equal footing. They are no substitutes and for good reasons there is a distinction between central bank funding and fiscal financing. By the time the programme of financial support was agreed with the international lenders in late 2010, the ECB had already been providing extraordinary levels of support for several years. To continue the analogy, the Eurosystem was providing life-sustaining transfusions to the banking system. While this support was fully in line with the general rules applied by the ECB to all euro area countries, Ireland benefited more than any other country as its banking sector imbalances were particularly large. The ECB was thus an established key partner of the Irish authorities in staving-off the worst effects of the crisis, well before the EU/IMF programme was designed. This state of affairs is a far cry from the claims that the ECB “bounced” Ireland into the programme in late 2010. By that time, we had already been standing for quite some time with Ireland, and that remains the case today. This support would, of course, not have been possible had Ireland not been in the euro area.