samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Overall these measures amounted to 7% of GDP. The measures, and the population’s positive response to them, instilled confidence among Singaporeans and foreign investors. Fourthly, our banks were sound. Even during the boom years, our banks had been generally prudent and conservative in their lending policies. Also MAS had supervised the banks strictly, requiring high capital and liquidity standards, insisting on prompt and adequate provisions for non-performing loans, and frowning upon excessive expansion of bank loans. So when the crisis struck, the banks stayed on an even keel,6 even as MAS required them to make large general provisions in anticipation of future NPLs. Fifthly, we were lucky with our timing as we had deflated a property bubble early. Like several other Asian countries, Singapore had experienced a property boom. It started in 1993, and in just 3 years property prices had doubled. By early 1996, the property market was becoming dangerously overheated. The Government decided to prick the bubble. We restricted bank credit by capping housing loans at 80% of valuation, and imposed other anti-speculation measures. So by the time the Asian crisis struck a year later, property prices were already declining. The froth had been skimmed off. Had we not acted in 1996, the adjustment would have been more painful, and the banks would have had more serious problems with their loans. Managing financial sector reforms Although the crisis is past, we are not back to the status quo ante.

Since the absorbed liquidity is tied up in the form of securities, the banks cannot use it either as a means of payment (like cash or sight deposits) or to satisfy their minimum reserve requirements. To the extent that SNB Bills are purchased by non-banks, customer deposits in the banking system decrease, thereby directly reducing the broader monetary aggregates. The decisive factor in determining the degree of monetary policy restrictiveness remains the level of interest rates on the money market. And we are able to control this level by tailoring the scope and conditions of our liquidity-absorbing operations accordingly. The shift in the liquidity regime has brought about a certain number of changes in SNB central bank operations with banks. For instance, we now normally only conduct operations with banks that need to place excess liquidity. The group of these banks is fairly large, consisting of 80 mainly domestic banks. Something that we no longer offer, by contrast, is regular refinancing. Banks now have to cover their refinancing needs via the money market. Refinancing through the SNB is available only in exceptional circumstances via the liquidityshortage financing facility, at a higher rate of interest. Access to this facility should thus be part of domestic banks’ own liquidity arrangements. A further effect of the regime shift on the money market is that the SNB pays the banks interest for liquidity-absorbing operations, whereas previously it received interest payments for providing liquidity.
Through the NGFS we have been able to share practices and increase our understanding of the implications that climate change has for central banks and supervisors, contributing to the inclusion of these risks in our micro and macro-prudential supervisory 8  Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. 4/5  frameworks. Notably, the NGFS has produced three key reports, which include recommendations not only for central banks and supervisors, but also the industry. We also have today with us the chairman of the NGFS, Mr. Frank Elderson, who is likewise a member of the SSM9 Supervisory Board, where we sit together. I am aware that Frank receives innumerable requests to speak on behalf of the NGFS, so I am also very grateful for his presence here today. Let me conclude. Climate change is a global phenomenon and all of these initiatives evidence the fact that cooperation is key. Of course, official institutions and governments must cooperate, but so too must the public and private sectors. We are all together in the same boat, this planet, so we must also learn and work together to achieve the same shared objective. The Banco de España is aware of the importance of this challenge, and is also developing its own strategy: it is analysing the possible implications of climate change for the stability of the Spanish financial system, assessing data gaps and developing the methodologies and responses it may adopt in its micro and macro-supervisory role.

The degree of financial unease then varied during the course of the following year. The TED spreads peaked when the banks wanted to secure their liquidity ahead of the turn of the year 2007-2008. A further peak was reached in March 2008 when Bear Sterns suspended payments, but things calmed down again after the Federal Reserve mediated the takeover of the bank by JP Morgan. In mid-September 2008, when Lehman Brothers was forced to file for bankruptcy protection, the financial unease became an acute financial crisis. The TED spreads were driven up to very high levels. Many banks, institutions and funds were highly exposed to Lehman Brothers. Few had expected that such an important bank could fail. Previously the US authorities had let the shareholders take the consequences. Now the borrowers also had to take some of the losses. There was a great deal of concern that more players would end up in a similar situation. The remaining large investment banks in the United States also disappeared as independent investment banks. The TED spreads have risen and varied during different periods of time in Sweden, too, but they have been lower than in the United States and the euro area. Causes of the crisis – mortgages, imbalances and inadequate supervision The factor that triggered the financial crisis was thus the problems on the US housing market and mortgage market. An important element behind the prolonged rise in US housing prices was the rapid growth of lending for house purchases to low-income households.
In part due to the Fed’s actions, the U.S. economy gradually recovered, and as a result the FOMC has been slowly but surely moving monetary policy “back to normal.” This process can be thought of in three stages. Stage 1: Lift-off The first stage in policy normalization focused on the lift-off of the federal funds rate target from near zero, which occurred in December 2015. But, well before that happened, the FOMC went to great effort to communicate its thinking to the public to better prepare it for the upcoming change in policy. 2 Importantly, we also made extensive preparations to ensure that we were ready and able to raise rates as needed, in the context of a very large Fed balance sheet and bank reserves. And, consistent with the Fed’s aim to be as transparent as possible, we published our plans on how we would use interest rates paid on bank reserves and overnight reverse repurchase agreements to keep the federal funds rate within the FOMC’s target range.3 At the time—in light of the shallow recovery and low inflation—the FOMC was very focused on balancing the risk of a premature removal of accommodation against concerns that excesses could eventually develop in the economy. In the end, lift-off went without a hitch. The approach developed back then has served us extremely well in controlling the federal funds rate, and has proven to be flexible as market conditions have evolved. I will come back to this point later.

In Switzerland by contrast, the collateral accepted in 99.8% of the transactions in the secured interbank market corresponds to the definition of the SNB collateral basket, that is, to the collateral accepted by the SNB in its own repo operations. The SNB’s collateral policy is based on a transparent, essentially rule-based approach. This means that when securities are excluded from the list of acceptable securities  2  See Diamond and Dybvig (1983). “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy 1983, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 401–19. 3  Typically, the total amount of the deposit will be some amount less than the value of the underlying asset, with the difference called a “haircut”. For more details, see Gorton and Metrick (2009) “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo”, NBER Working Paper Series (NBER Working Paper No. 15223), August 2009. 4  This could be a reasonable approximation. See Gorton (2009): “Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007”, Prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2009 Financial Markets Conference, May 2009; and Gorton and Metrick (2009). 5  Chart 4 illustrates the average repo haircut on structured debt. This is a good indication for an overall “haircut index”, as shown by Gorton and Metrick (2009). 6  Another important difference is that the Swiss repo market is conducted on a highly efficient automated and centralised platform while US repo transactions are traded over the counter. 7  Hördahl and King (2008).
In our open economy, with a floating exchange rate, it can be assumed that an increase in wage growth of one percentage point without  BIS Review 72/2001  1  any monetary policy response will gradually translate into a corresponding increase in price inflation 1 unless wage increases are anchored in higher productivity. When Norges Bank concludes that the key rate should be changed, the change will in most cases be made gradually. This is because there is normally uncertainty about the situation in the economy, potential disturbances to the economy and how fast an interest rate change will affect price inflation. But we will not always take a gradualist approach. A rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate is appropriate if, for example, heightening turbulence in financial markets or a cost-push shock resulting from negotiations indicates that confidence in monetary policy is in jeopardy. Norges Bank analyses the inflation outlook in separate inflation reports, which are published three times a year. Further assessments are presented every sixth week in connection with the Executive Board's monetary policy meetings. Higher interest rates curb demand for goods and services and reduce inflation. Lower interest rates have the opposite effect. If evidence suggests that inflation with unchanged interest rates will be higher than 2½ per cent, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation with unchanged interest rates will be lower than 2½ per cent, the interest rate will be reduced. There is symmetry here.

Otherwise we run the risk of a loss of confidence in those numbers in a crisis. Now I will turn my attention to risks in the life and general insurance sectors. I will also describe the supervisory work we are doing in response. In different ways, both life and general insurers are adapting to  1  Source: ONS statistical bulletin: National life tables, UK: 2013-2015 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectancies/bulletins/nationallifetablesunitedking dom/20132015 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  a world with lower returns on capital. They are also learning how to optimise their activities for the new constraints of Solvency II. Put the two together and we can think of a search for yield on Solvency II capital. General insurance risks and supervisory priorities  In the general insurance sector, underwriting returns remain soft. On 22 June, I wrote to Chief Executives with the results of our latest ‘Monitoring the Market’ survey of general insurers. One unsurprising finding was that premium rates had declined in most lines of business. A perhaps more surprising finding was that, on average, London Market insurers thought rate adequacy had improved slightly. They appear to be incorporating a more benign view of future losses into their technical pricing. Many insurers raised concerns about distribution channels, particularly in the wholesale markets. More generally, our supervisory concerns in the current market include:   Insurers may be tempted to release too much from prior year reserves to bolster current profits.
Heng Swee Keat: How the Monetary Authority of Singapore had responded to the crisis and its challenges ahead Acceptance speech by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, on receiving The Banker’s “Central Bank Governor of the Year in Asia-Pacific” Award, Singapore, 11 February 2011. *  *  *  On receiving the award and paying tribute to MAS’ staff 1. I am deeply honoured and humbled to receive the “Central Bank Governor of the Year in Asia-Pacific” Award by The Banker. 2. This award is a tribute to the collective contribution of the staff of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) who had worked hard to ensure that our monetary policy stance was appropriate for the economy during the downturn and the eventual recovery; and to foster a sound and progressive financial system, which overall stood well under stress during the global financial crisis. Several of our key management team members are here: Edward Robinson, Andrew Khoo and Ng Nam Sin. This is also a testament to the collaborative efforts with the industry to build a resilient financial sector. I thank members present here for the roundtable, and in particular Mr J Y Pillay, who as former MD of MAS, laid a strong foundation of sound central banking and regulation. How MAS had responded to the crisis 3. As a small and open economy with strong linkages with the rest of the world, Singapore was severely affected by the financial crisis through a sharp falloff in global trade.

Willem F Duisenberg: New economy, financial markets and monetary policy Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the meeting of the Zürcher Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft, Zurich, 19 May 2003. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here to address you this evening, and I should like to start by thanking the Zürcher Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft for inviting me to do so. Being trained economists, you all know that in the course of the past century, monetary theory has faced significant challenges from various angles - the Keynesian revolution, the neo-classical synthesis, the monetarist counter-revolution, the emergence of new classical economics with the introduction of the concept of rational expectations, and real business cycle theories. Similar to the experience of monetary theory, monetary policy has had to cope with major challenges as well. We all know that the economic and financial environment in which monetary policy has to operate is continuously changing. During the past few years - as has been rather obvious - these changes have included the discussion about a “new economy” and, driven by the interrelated processes of financial liberalisation and financial globalisation, the growing importance of financial markets. You may wonder why someone should raise the topic of the “new economy” again, as it has been discussed so extensively by many, including myself, on many an occasion before. Is this not a topic which has actually become rather “old” by now; another chapter in the history books of economic science?
The Treaty states that the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) shall "contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system". These and related issues will be considered in tomorrow's policy panel discussion, which will start off on the basis of a paper contributed by my colleague Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. Structural change in the financial system is important not only to central bankers but to other policy-makers as well. For instance, all policy-makers should have a clear interest in a further integration of European financial markets. The economic literature tells us that an integration of financial markets is very likely to contribute to economic growth by making the allocation of capital more efficient. The paper by Jean-Pierre Danthine in our third session tomorrow will address this issue. This is why the freedom of capital flows is one of the "four freedoms" at the heart of the Europe's single market. Indeed, increasing financial integration has always been a major item on the European political agenda. In this context, also the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union should be regarded as giving an important impetus to European financial integration. As things stand now, it is clear that full integration of European financial markets, to the extent possible of course, has not been achieved yet, despite the introduction of the euro.

Our speaker in the third session, Jean-Pierre Danthine, will illustrate the benefits from the discipline that economic theory can impose on our thinking when analysing European equity market integration. He will also present a generalised approach to estimating the importance of country and sector effects in portfolio allocations. One of his discussants, Bruce Carnegie-Brown, will draw on his experience as a market expert to interpret for us recent developments in bond markets. Finally, as already mentioned, the policy panel, which will be the final session of the conference, will discuss the role of central banks in the maintenance of financial stability  2  BIS Review 60/2002  against the background of the transformation of the European financial system. I am particularly pleased to see that we have been able to bring together such highly esteemed policy-makers and academics for this purpose. Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to finish at this point and hand over to our first speaker. I sincerely thank you again for coming here today. I wish you a very interesting and stimulating discussion, and I look forward to hearing about the results of the second ECB Central Banking Conference. BIS Review 60/2002  3
Overall, these different lines of reasoning help explain why most central banks, including us, have followed a tightening path that combines some gradualism (in the sense of reaching the terminal rate –whichever that turns out to be– through a sequence of interest rate hikes, as opposed to doing so in one or two goes) with a certain front-loading of the adjustment path towards the terminal rate (as exemplified by our 75 pb hike earlier this month) in an effort to preserve the anchoring of inflation expectations. At our latest meeting we also announced that further rate hikes will follow. How much will our rates increase eventually? Let me come back to the first of the two questions I raised before: where is the target-compatible terminal rate? Where do we go: the target-compatible terminal rate Let me be clear about it: no one knows where the terminal rate lies. This is not only a consequence of the uncertainty I mentioned before: it also depends on future events, such as the eventual course of the war in Ukraine and the associated geopolitical developments. This, however, does not mean that we are completely clueless about what terminal rate seems more likely from today’s point of view. Indeed, given the current state of the economy, we can employ our macroeconomic models to obtain a range of the most likely values for the terminal rate. These values are conditional on the information available today, so they must be and will be revised as new information arrives.

5  The economic literature is a long way from providing a clear-cut answer as to how monetary policy should react in a highly uncertain environment. A classic reference is the “Brainard principle”, which states that policy should exhibit prudence in the face of uncertainty about the impact on inflation of underlying shocks or of any policy mis-calibration.11 It is typically summarised as “in a dark room you move with small steps”. Indeed, the higher the uncertainty, the greater the likelihood that a more aggressive monetary policy response to shocks may push inflation away from the target.12 However, this view has been qualified by subsequent research. For instance, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation –as is clearly the case in the current context–, it may be optimal for the central bank to respond to rising inflation more aggressively in order to reduce uncertainty about the future inflation developments.13 The reason is that when the dynamics of inflation are uncertain, the amount of uncertainty facing the central bank is greater the further away the inflation rate is from its target. Consequently, to reduce the amount of uncertainty about the future path of inflation, optimal policy becomes more aggressive, pushing inflation closer to target.
Which digital challenges can the interested parties manage on their own? And where might shared solutions be beneficial for all concerned? Ultimately, we have a common goal: to maintain confidence in our currency. Against this backdrop, an efficient and secure payment system will be as critical as ever in the years ahead. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, the SNB has a mandate to facilitate and secure the operation of cashless payment systems. It fulfils this task by acting as commissioning party for the SIC system, and guiding the latter’s ongoing development in conjunction with the banks. In so doing, it creates the conditions at the infrastructure level for efficient, secure and future-proof Swiss franc payments. The SNB acts in the interests of all stakeholders in cashless payment systems in Swiss francs. To this end, we are engaged in active dialogue with both banks and non-banks. This evening, we have given you the perspective of the central bank, however it is important to hear other perspectives, too. So I am particularly looking forward to our panel discussion. The noted economist and author Jürg Müller will act as moderator. After the discussion, our panellists, Thomas Moser and I will be happy to take questions from the audience. I hope we can all continue these conversations during the drinks reception.

The positive movements in household savings contributed to the growth of the lending activity, so according to the latest available data as of September 2017, loans increased by 4.3% on an annual basis, with a solvency that is almost twice as high as the statutory levels and volume of liquidity that enables optimal day-to-day operation. It is also worth noting that in spite of the political environment, the deposit growth and the trust in banks have been achieved in the environment of historically lowest interest rates, both on the financial markets in the euro area and on the domestic interbank market. Also, allow me to mention that in the forthcoming medium-term period, the deposit market will urge banks to make even greater efforts to modernize and increase their offer. We live in times of global digitalization, great advancements in information technology and its daily use in the financial sector. Innovation and application of modern technologies globally put competitive pressure on the traditional forms of banking, and encourage banks to constantly adapt, be proactive and inventive, and by changing their business models to new phenomena and conditions, ensure their market success. Such processes will inevitably touch the bank operations in the Republic of Macedonia. In perspective, the use of modern technologies will not only affect the market performance of banks, but will probably change radically their relationship with depositors and other clients.