samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The second group of implications then offers more a practical view which can be summarized as follows: a)  the ‘policy decision-making’ body should have a strong background in law,  b)  the meeting devoted to monetary policy should not deal with any other issue,  c)  the forecast and economic analysis should be submitted by the staff so as to constrain ‘information filtering’,  d)  the decision makers should interact with the staff. 2  BIS Review 88/2005

I would therefore, like to implore all delegates to engage fully in these discussions and make the most of the wealth of knowledge and experience represented in the house. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my pleasure and privilege once again to welcome you to the second AFRACA Central Banks’ Forum. I now wish to invite our distinguished Guest of Honour, the Minister of Finance and National Planning, Honourable Ng’andu P. Magande MP, to officially open this Forum. Honourable Minister! BIS Review 118/2008  3
x European Commission, 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade, March 2021 xi For a discussion in the European context, see Andersen S., Petersen O., Moving from flexicurity to ‘mobication’, February 2012 xii Bloom N., Sadun R., Van Reenen J., “Can European firms close their ‘management gap’ with the US? ”, VOXEU, 2017 xiii For an illustration in the US case, see Gilbert R., Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy, July 2020 xiv Gossé J-B., Hermet E., Mourjane A., Dufouleur M., “Developing the Capital Markets Union to mobilise savings and stimulate investment in Europe”, Banque de France Bulletin, September – October 2020 xv European Commission, Capital markets union 2020 action plan: A capital markets union for people and businesses. xvi BVA, Win, Le Point, International barometer of Trust in the future in 57 countries, February 2018 xvii Nye J., Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power, August 1991

Time will shed more light on the true effects of developments abroad on Chile’s external position and the evolution of domestic balances. For now, it is important that we take the opportunities we have to preserve and enhance the soundness of our economy, but bearing in mind that there are risks and that they are significant. Thank you. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 Real exchange rate (*) (index, 1986=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 88  90 92 RER  94 96 98 00 02 1997-2011 average  04 06 08 10 12 1992-2011 average  (*) August figure includes information up to 30 August 2012. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2 Nominal exchange rate (index, December 2010=100) 110  110  105  105  100  100  95  95  90  90  85  85  Dec. 10  Jun.11 Chile  Australia  Dec.11 N. Zealand  Jun.12 Canada  Source: Bloomberg.
Comprehensive capital controls were an important element in the programme, but their rationale was to help to stabilise the exchange rate in a situation where the currency had fallen more than 50% in 2008, where foreign króna positions that were a legacy of carry trade and capital inflows amounted to around 40% of GDP, and where a large fiscal deficit that had to be financed in the domestic market had developed. The capital controls therefore gave monetary policy more scope to help stabilise and turn around the real economy once inflation came down. Franek will discuss the IMF programme in more detail, but I would like to make one more remark regarding fiscal consolidation, as it is such an important part of the story. The crisis hit Government finances hard, as can be seen from this slide. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  It was therefore of vital importance that Government debt was relatively low immediately before the crisis. However, fiscal consolidation was needed earlier than some considered optimal at the time from a demand management perspective, in order to regain internal and external confidence and open market access. The effort was huge, as can be seen from this slide, but back-loaded, as automatic stabilisers were mostly allowed to work in 2009. And it did not derail the recovery that began around the middle of 2010.

Additionally, it provides for a new resolution procedure for large financial companies, a creation of a new agency responsible for implementing and enforcing compliance with consumer financial laws, introduces more rigorous regulatory capital requirements, affects significant changes in the regulation of OTC derivatives, includes reform of the regulation of credit rating agencies, implements changes to corporate governance and executive compensation practices, incorporates the Volcker Rule, requires registration of advisers to certain private funds, and affects significant changes in the securitization market. In the EU, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive MiFID is an important step in the biggest overhaul of financial markets regulation in the EU for a decade. However, the new regulatory framework consists of Directive (MiFID 2) and Regulation on markets in financial instruments (MiFIR). It is an integral part of the EU’s strategy to address the effects of the financial crisis, but at the same time aims to bring greater transparency to markets and to strengthen investor protection. These changes are a key for restoring the trust in the EU financial markets. In reaction to the global financial crisis, the EU has also introduced the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) that initiates a reporting obligation for OTC derivatives, a clearing obligation for eligible OTC derivatives, measures to reduce counterparty credit risk and operational risk for bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives, common rules for central counterparties (CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs), and rules on the establishment of interoperability between CCPs.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Singapore was among the first jurisdictions in Asia to introduce a risk-based capital (“RBC”) framework for insurers, in 2005. In 2012, MAS embarked on a review to enhance the framework, known as “RBC 2”, to take into account the new IAIS standards and best practices, including relevant aspects of Solvency II. MAS will be conducting a quantitative study to assess the impact on the insurance industry of the proposals under RBC 2. There are no global capital standards for capital markets services providers. The International Organisation of Securities Commission (“IOSCO”) has, however, set out principles for the solvency of securities market intermediaries. Based on these principles, MAS has implemented a risk-based capital framework for capital markets services licensees. Strengthening liquidity buffers The second important area of reform is setting – for the first time – international standards for bank liquidity. Banks are in the business of transforming short-term liabilities (mainly deposits) into long-term assets (mainly loans). This fundamental mis-match in maturity opens banks to the risk that they may not be able to finance short-term liabilities as they fall due. Even solvent banks with lots of capital can fail if liquidity risks are not well-managed. The new Liquidity Coverage Ratio (“LCR”) sets the global minimum standard for bank liquidity. Essentially, the LCR framework requires banks to have an adequate stock of high quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash to survive a 30-day period of stress. In Singapore we have had liquidity rules for a long time.

Therefore, while the focus of my comments will be on the current situation and looking forward to the future, I hope you will allow me also to reflect on some of the things I have learned over the past years. In the first part of my intervention today, I will discuss the current state of the new framework for bank capital adequacy, or Basel II, as well as how supervisors are carrying out work related to Basel II and sound risk management practices. Second, I would like to discuss some of the key lessons that I’ve learned in the development of Basel II, which are factors that I believe will contribute not only to its successful implementation and longevity, but also more generally to financial stability and effective banking supervision. And I will close with some more detailed comments on a lesson we have learned during this process that I think has broader implications for risk management in general – that is, the importance of taking account of the macroeconomic perspective and the effects of the cycle. Basel II update One of Barcelona’s greatest claims to fame is its modernista architecture, exemplified by the work of Antoni Gaudí. The modernistas looked to the past for inspiration, but applied modern tools and techniques to create something new with a focus on intricate details. Of course, the Basel II Framework does not have the beauty of Gaudí’s Sagrada Família, but I nevertheless think that both supervisors and the industry have accomplished something similar.
The FOMC statement indicated that "the Committee anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time. In determining the pace of future increases in the target range, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments. "4 Bringing inflation down is likely to require a period of below-trend growth and some softening of labor market conditions. But restoring price stability is essential to achieving maximum employment and stable prices over the longer term, and it is critical that we stay the course until the job is done. I'll also add that the framework announced last May for reducing the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet is working well, and the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities as planned.5  Economic Outlook We are seeing the shifting gears of tighter monetary policy having the desired effects. Broad indicators show that financial conditions have become significantly less  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  supportive of spending. As a result, I expect real GDP growth to be modest this year at around 1 percent. Robust hiring, low unemployment, and strong nominal wage growth mean the labor market remains remarkably tight.

But with growth slowing, I anticipate the unemployment rate to increase from its current level of 3-1/2 percent to around 4-1/2 percent over the next year. Turning to inflation, I expect cooling global demand and supply improvements to result in declining inflation for goods. These factors should contribute to inflation slowing further from its current rate to around 3 percent this year. While services inflation is still a sticking point, I expect overall inflation to come back down to 2 percent in the next few years as further tightening of monetary policy realigns the balance between demand and supply. Conclusion I'll close by saying that the monetary policy gear is turning. But it will take time for supply and demand to come back into proper alignment and balance, so we must keep moving. While the route ahead is still uncertain, I am fully confident we will return to a sustained period of price stability. 1 John C. Williams, Peeling the Inflation Onion , remarks at the Economic Club of New  York, delivered via videoconference (November 28, 2022); John C. Williams, A Bedrock Commitment to Price Stability , remarks at the 2022 U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce National Conference, Phoenix, Arizona (October 3, 2022). 2 John C. Williams, A Steady Anchor in a Stormy Sea , remarks at SNB-FRB-BIS High-  Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, Switzerland (November 9, 2022).
To the extent there is greater recognition of risks of all kinds and consequent demand for effective risk management solutions, the financial sector will have an important role to play in the years ahead. It is hard to tell at this point what the specific growth opportunities will be. We just have to watch very closely how these trends unfold. But overall, MAS is undiminished in its optimism and confidence in the prospects for the financial industry in Singapore. 1 The circuit breaker refers to the tightened restrictions on movements and gatherings of people imposed from 7  April to 1 June 2020, aimed at slowing the spread of the Covid-19 virus in Singapore. 2 BNY Mellon and Deutsche Bank are the two new players. The existing seven are Citibank, Standard Chartered  Bank, UBS, JP Morgan, BNP Paribas, XTX, and Jump Trading. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Worth noting is that, similarly to Thailand, many Asian economies have also capitalized on the opportunities to lessen monetary policy easing during the period of good economic performance since the latter part of 2010. The main objective has been to preserve fiscal and monetary policy space for potentially more difficult times ahead. For Thailand, I believe that our policy space remains appropriate. But, any higher public spending should be done with special care. At this juncture, the need to increase government consumption is less urgent and the fiscal focus should be put on public investment to expand our potential output. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Therefore, the stimulus should be prioritized and carefully planned to leave some policy space for future needs. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to end my talk today by stressing that we now live in a different and difficult world. Current global risks from the slowdown in advanced economies have clearly heightened. Given good economic fundamentals, the Thai economy should be resilient enough to cope with such risks. I would like to urge investors not to swing between over pessimism and over-confidence and behave in a herd-like manner. Instead, all parties, public and private, should be cautious and prepared for the global risks in moving the country forward. It is my firm believe that protecting domestic purchasing power and let everyone have equal chance to benefit from the economic growth can strengthen the future well being of the Thai economy in a sustainable manner in years ahead.
Secondly, I think that the problem of how to manage the risks from asset prices in the monetary policy decision process to a large extent is pedagogical, i.e. explaining that we do not target asset prices, but that we do not completely ignore them. However, monetary policy is a topic on which a lot of people have an opinion, and you are never going to please everyone. In fact, in recent years the Riksbank has been criticized for putting either too much, or too little, emphasis on property prices. Finally, I would like underscore the necessity of stress-testing the banking sector for sudden shifts in property prices. You can have a whole staff of PhDs running all kinds advanced models telling you that assets are not overvalued. That’s fine, but at the end of the day they might be wrong, and then you would like to know what the consequences are going to be for the banking system. Let me end by thanking the central bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina for hosting this conference and congratulate the bank on its 10th anniversary. 4  BIS Review 101/2007

Even though neither the changes nor amounts involved were large, there is little doubt that they had some effect and prompted a new marketing drive by the banks. In a climate of rapidly growing disposable income, house prices began to soar again. The Central Bank has emphasised the need to change the public sector mortgage credit system but has not stated an official view as to how this should be done. Nonetheless, immediate reforms are vital to give monetary policy more leverage over the mortgage loan market. Another important consideration is that whatever mortgage loan arrangements that are developed should provide a solid foundation for the domestic bond market. The Central Bank has been making these points for several years with little result. International agencies have agreed that a review of the role of the HFF is long overdue. Particular mention may be made of the IMF, most recently this summer. The Fund’s reports show that its analysts have striven to make an in-depth study of mortgage credit arrangements in Iceland. In its Article IV Consultation report published in June, the IMF claimed that a higher policy rate than otherwise had been needed as a result of the HFF’s activities. It should be added that one reason for the limited success in keeping the lid on inflation has been an enormous increase in disposable income in 2006 and 2007, driven by both wage rises and tax cuts. These factors and others have fuelled domestic demand and thereby inflationary pressures.
In fact, during the last decade, the share of advanced economies in global trade reduced gradually from around 75% to around 60%, while the direction of investment also reversed, as evidenced by the fast accumulation of foreign reserves by the emerging nations. In the meantime, we would also observe that these and other developing countries have benefited immensely by the prudent policies that they have implemented for the rapid economic development of their emerging economies. These improvements include more disciplined monetary and fiscal policies, more focused institutions, and more responsible financial sector developments. In essence, the recent success of emerging economies could be explained, to a significant extent, by conventional growth theory. Improvements in physical capital stock; improvements in human capital; and improvements in productivity. We all know that according to growth theory, increased GDP growth leads to an increase in per capita incomes, which in turn leads to a significant improvement in the quality of life of people in a country. We also know that, right now, significant growth is taking place. But, will it continue to happen? Can we ensure sustainability of this outcome? Upto what point is it going to be tough for the countries to keep on achieving? Many economic experts believe that the immediate challenge that is before the developing nations is to reach a per capita income target of around US $ 2,500 as quickly as possible.

In this section I show how consumer prices for various groups of goods and services have developed since 1995. This is the type of basic data needed when calculating underlying inflation with the aid of exclusion. Table 1 below shows the fifteen components (or price groups) in the CPIF that have varied the most since 1995, measured according to the standard deviation for the series. 19 The results show that prices of coffee, tea and cocoa have had the most volatile rates of price increase during the period. Table 2 shows the fifteen components that have varied the least. This shows that rents have had the least volatile rate of price increase during the period. Table 1.
Chart 2: Capital and leverage ratios of major global banks(a) Chart 2a: Risk-based capital ratios, end-2006 Per cent  Chart 2b: Leverage ratios, end-2006(b) Per cent  16 Surviving banks Failed banks  14  16 Surviving banks  14  Failed banks  12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  Sources: Capital IQ, SNL, published accounts, Laeven and Valencia (2010) and Bank calculations. (a) The classification of bank distress is based on Laeven & Valencia (2010), updated to reflect failure or government intervention since August 2009. (b) Total assets have been adjusted on a best-efforts basis to achieve comparability between institutions reporting under US GAAP and IFRS. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Chart 3: Output losses relative to trend after financial crises(a) Per cent 20 Interquartile range-past episodes Total range - past episodes  10  Mean 0  -10  -20  -30 0  1  2  3  4 5 Years from start of crisis  6  7  8  Sources: IMF and OECD. (a) The episodes examined are taken from IMF (2009).

As a result the response of inflation is relatively muted. It still rises, thanks to the weaker exchange rate. But it does so by only 0.5% points, significantly less than we’ve seen over the past year or so. With output declining and inflation close to target it’s not clear the MPC would have wanted to raise interest rates. The point that comes across, for me, is that inflation would be lower had effective expectations of the implications of Brexit, across different parts of the economy, been more uniform. Let me be clear. I’m not saying one side or the other – households and financial markets – is “wrong” or “right”. We don’t yet know. My points are rather (i) that for as long as we don’t know the ultimate Brexit outcome, it’s understandable that expectations should differ and (ii) that the particular difference we’ve seen since the referendum, with the foreign exchange market more pessimistic than the real economy, has been inflationary, and the gap in expectations has therefore been an important contributor to the recent rise in inflation and therefore interest rates. A corollary is that at least until Brexit actually happens, its significance for inflation and interest rates derives not so much from the process itself but from whether those expectations move closer together or further apart. However it occurs, whether via a stronger exchange rate or weaker consumption, a degree of reconciliation would tend to lower inflationary pressure. Further divergence would do the opposite.