samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Since 2011 the reported incidence of zero-hours contracts has risen rapidly, from 0.6% to 2.4% of the working population (Chart 6). What may be welcome flexibility for a company may be unwelcome insecurity for its workforce. •  While participation rates in the UK workforce have increased, in some cases they remain low by international standards. Female participation in the UK labour market remains well below our European neighbours, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. And compared to these same countries, the fraction of NEETs in the UK is almost twice as high. •  Finally on wages, real wages have yet to return to their pre-crisis peak. Rather, they are still 6% below that level. Since the crisis, we have seen one of the largest and longest squeezes on wages since at least 1850 (Table 1). •  Indeed, since the crisis real wages have fallen faster even than UK productivity, which itself has been extra-ordinarily weak having flat-lined for the past six years. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Put differently, labour’s share of the national income pie has fallen since 2009, from around 58% to 53% (Chart 7). •  That squeeze on real wages has been even more acute for some. Declines in median real wages among the young have been roughly twice as large as among the old. And workers in sectors such as construction, health and social work have seen far-larger declines in their take-home pay (Chart 8).

In the event, the unemployment rate in the UK peaked at 8.5%, or 2.7 million people. •  Since 2013, the UK unemployment rate has fallen sharply, to a rate of 5.3% or 1.8 million people. This fall in unemployment is considerably faster than the MPC, and other outside forecasters, had predicted. At the start of 2014, the MPC forecast that the unemployment rate today would be more than a percentage point higher than its current rate (Chart 1). •  The main reason for this striking fall in the unemployment rate has been very strong rates of new job creation. Since 2010, more than 2 million new jobs have been created in the UK. The lion’s share of these new jobs – around two-thirds – have been full-time positions and in highly-skilled professions (Chart 2). The level of employment is at a forty-year high. •  This rise in the demand for workers has been met, in part, by increased participation in the workforce. Participation by women has picked up strongly and is now close to its all-time highs. So too has participation by those aged over 50, in part taking advantage of more flexible working practices and removal of the official retirement age. •  The other end of the age spectrum has also seen improvement. The percentage of 18–24 year olds who are not in employment, education or training – the so-called “NEETs” – has fallen sharply from close to 17% to below 13%.
There are three answers that I would rule out: the answer is not to go back to the good old days, because viewed with hindsight they don’t look that good; the answer is not to wish that finance should be simpler, something that is too idealistic to have relevance to today’s challenge; and the answer is not to repeal the duty of responsibility as it will apply to the Chairs of Boards and Board committees because as quite a few have said to me, “what’s all the fuss, this is just a description of what we are here to do.” So, what might the answer be? In the work that we are doing at the PRA to overhaul our approach to supervision of governance in firms as it relates to our statutory objectives, we want to help to get this issue on the table and make real progress. My hunch, as I have explained today, is that one answer lies in the approach by which Non-Executives are informed by Executives about firms and thus for Executives to enable rigorous challenge and to be given credit for doing so even where the consequences will be sometimes uncomfortable. We will always be cautious of Executives who seem to see Non-Executives as some form of threat; the really effective Executives are those who see their Non-Executive colleagues’ experience  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  and knowledge as a means of improving the effectiveness of the Board’s judgement through constructive support and challenge.

Local authorities can establish who in their area has such difficulties and then they can provide help by delivering cash to homes or help with paying electricity bills and so on. The experiences of other countries can’t simply be copied straight across here, but it is worth discussing them to see whether we could use them in some way to provide cash and payment services to people all across Estonia. I am certain that the commercial banks in particular, though also the state, should be able to provide better solutions than has been the case so far, and I would invite the banks, state institutions and local authorities to take an active role in the discussions about access to banking services. Eesti Pank is of course ready to join the discussion and I do not believe that any solution should be ruled out. Thank you for your attention and I am quite happy to answer any questions you may have. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Third, efforts are underway to reduce counterparty risk exposures by requiring that over-thecounter (OTC) interest rate swaps, credit default swaps, and equity and commodity derivative trades be standardized where feasible – and that all standardized trades be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs). Standardized clearing through CCPs reduces  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  the complex web of counterparty exposures that exist in the bilateral world of OTC derivatives. Everyone that centrally clears becomes the counterparty to the CCP. This enables a high level of gross bilateral exposures to be netted down to a much more manageable set of net exposures to the CCP. Fourth, recognizing that mandated central clearing will only reduce risk if the CCPs themselves are robust, efforts are underway to strengthen financial market infrastructures. In the United States, for example, the Dodd-Frank Act instructs the Financial Stability Oversight Council to designate certain financial market utilities (FMUs) as systemically important. Such FMUs would be subject to a tougher regulatory oversight regime. On a parallel track, at the international level, the Committee for Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) are revising and strengthening a set of regulatory oversight principles and minimum business standards for financial market infrastructures (FMIs). These principles include numerous standards with respect to governance, access, risk management practices, and capital and liquidity standards.

And it is unrealistic for the private sector to self-insure against every possible outcome. But public insurance is costly. Those costs include direct risks to public money: during the LDI crisis, for example, the UK Government provided the Bank of England with a £ indemnity to  Page 6  back its operations. [7] But just as important are the indirect risks: to the achievement of other public goals (which in the LDI case included monetary policy); and to the incentives facing market participants (if they conclude that the state may in the future be willing to cover part of the downside returns to their risk-taking activities). Those costs are worth incurring where the public benefit of intervening (or cost of not intervening) is large. But care is needed to ensure that public resources are not used to substitute for the failure of private actors to take appropriate steps to mitigate their own risks. As I have already mentioned, and Bank colleagues have set out in greater detail,[8] the episode highlighted real weaknesses in LDI resilience. While our gilt market interventions were active, we worked closely with LDI funds and pension schemes to ensure they made best use of the window available to put themselves on a more robust footing. But, as the Bank’s December 2022 Financial Stability Report made clear, further work will be needed in the year ahead to ensure the sector remains resilient on a lasting basis, including through regulatory action.
In particular, China’s financial sector reforms and specifically the eventual opening up of its capital account would likely have profound implications for the global financial landscape. It would be interesting to view RMB developments from the perspective of these potential changes – what do they mean for the global financial landscape and what would be the role of the RMB amid these developments. 4. As we are all aware, China has been moving steadily with financial sector reforms and capital account liberalisation, taking steps towards allowing market forces to play a greater role in its financial system. Recently, the Chinese authorities re-affirmed their commitment to further financial reforms, including the easing of market access, the liberalisation of interest rates, as well as working towards eventually making the RMB convertible under the capital account. And this process has reached an interesting juncture. The future reform and liberalisation efforts will arguably have a greater impact on the global financial landscape than that of measures undertaken so far. 5. As China moves further along the path to open up its capital account, the channels for interaction with global financial markets would broaden and become more efficient. Over the past decade or so, as China rose to become the second largest economy, we have all seen the changes to world economic relationships brought about by China’s integration into the global economic system. We are now beginning to see China’s integration into the global financial system in a more prominent way. 6.

The greater use of RMB in international transactions will be closely related to China’s financial reforms and liberalisation, with new fund flow channels being opened up in RMB. For example, the RMB QFII scheme allows offshore institutions to use RMB funds to invest in Chinese capital markets, and it is a new channel in addition to the US dollar-based QFII scheme. And further to a recent relaxation, outflows under the QDII scheme can also be made in RMB. Such developments, in turn, will bolster the use of the RMB in trade, foreign direct investment and international transactions, thereby supporting the further development of the offshore RMB market. 13. While recent developments in RMB have been exciting, given the possible scope of future expansion, we are probably still only at the early stage of what could be more significant changes in the years to come. After all, RMB deposits and bonds outstanding in the offshore market only account for about one percent of onshore deposits and outstanding debt respectively. The possibility for expansion remains substantial. 14. One of the aims of the Hong Kong-London Forum is to assess what all this means to the financial institutions and to corporates — many of whose representatives are gathered here today. 15. For corporates, especially those already having business links with China, it is important to get prepared for the increasing use of RMB as a currency for transaction, financing and investments.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  pithily summarised by the diarist John Evelyn, who recorded the event 320 years ago in the following terms: “A publick bank... set up by Act of Parliament… for money to carry on the war”. The war in question was against France, and in return for the monies raised the Bank received both income and banking privileges: it was soon the only bank allowed to be constituted as a joint stock company, and had an effective monopoly of the note issue in the London area.2 Its size – partly resulting from its unique joint stock status – meant that, by the first half of the 19th Century, the Bank had become the dominant part of the financial infrastructure. Its notes had become an accepted means of settlement between banks, and as the provider of those notes the Bank acted as banker to other banks. Commercial banks held Bank of England notes in place of gold, relying on the Bank of England’s credibility for ultimate convertibility. Despite the Bank’s founding aim of public service, criticism persisted until after the middle of the 19th Century that it was acting in its own rather than the public interest by protecting its gold reserves at times of financial stress, to the detriment of its customers.

Tougher minimum requirements and institution-specific add-ons will be the responsibility of microprudential supervision. The system-wide counter-cyclical buffer will be the responsibility of macroprudential policy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Those objectives are themselves generally mutually reinforcing. While ensuring the safety and soundness of individual institutions is not sufficient for systemic stability, it surely helps.13 Meanwhile macroprudential policy seeks to reduce systemic risks and in doing so is likely to improve the resilience of individual firms.14 At times there may be a conflict. This is most likely to arise at a turning point in the cycle when macroprudential policy – perhaps in pursuit of its secondary objective to support growth and employment – may mandate a loosening of capital requirements in order to support credit supply and broader economic conditions. A microprudential supervisor at the same time may understandably be more concerned to maintain large capital buffers. The question best answered in a single institution is which dominates – risks from a paradox of thrift or those from weakened institutions? The obvious overlaps in tools and objectives mean that combining the two arms of prudential policy in one organisation makes sense. That will also help to share knowledge and expertise, and to help avoid conflicting messages to firms.
For one thing, the municipality’s credit rating could fall because it takes on another large credit commitment, which would lead to higher loan costs for both the municipality and the housing company. For another thing, there are some credit providers who have already ceased granting loans to municipalities with a poor ability to repay. This situation will probably be accentuated by the advent of the new capital adequacy rules, with more individual assessments of each borrower. Given this, it will be even more important to consider the four points I mentioned earlier. The other important issue is to implement a review of housing policy, as it is important to obtain the construction needed in the regions where jobs are available. This will enable Sweden’s economy to develop well. One example of possible changes is the introduction of market-adapted utility value rents or the complete disappearance of the utility value system. It is possible that more market-adapted rents would contribute to increased production of new properties as a result of increased demand, unlike the current utility value regulated rents where increases in demand do not result in sufficiently large new production of apartment blocks of rental apartments in growth areas. It is often said that a changed, market-adapted system would lead to higher rents, but the question is whether this scenario would not only apply to the more attractive residential areas of the metropolitan regions and university towns.

The longer you wait to settle, the more money you will owe since interest will be charged each month on the unsettled balance. Cardholders therefore need to be careful not use the card liberally. If you think, the card makes you throw caution to the wind as you spend; you might consider leaving the card alone. The possibility of falling into a debt trap is another real danger that cardholders need to watch out for. Interest rates on credit cards can be high. In some countries interest rates on credit cards can be as high as ten times what banks are willing to give on deposit balances. We will keep our sight on what rates apply in the market as a central bank and may even intervene if necessary. But the responsibility of avoiding falling into a debt trap lies primarily with the cardholder. It is prudent to remember that whilst a credit card can make your life easier and can be a wonderful tool for facilitating payments, if you do not use it wisely, it will become a massive financial burden for you. We must learn some lessons from how failure to keep track of purchases and the uncontrollable propensity to spend outside budget, has led to the financial ruin of many people in the developed economies. The last risk, I want to talk about is pertinent to both cardholders and issuers of cards – and that is the risk of credit card frauds.
For it to be credible, we need commitment on sound backstops as a fall-back option for fulfilling capital needs. In Japan, such a close inspection of bank balance sheets was carried out in 2002. It proved to be an important step to recognising losses and cleaning balance sheets to eventually set off a gradual recovery with credit expansion in Japan. Second, one of the objectives of a European banking union is to delink banks from their sovereigns. That also implies that bank funding costs will depend on the quality of banks’ assets, and not on the location of their headquarters. Achieving this would mark a milestone in that it would establish a single capital market throughout Europe that companies can tap into. A single capital market, in turn, provides better financing for companies and eases productive investment, which will revitalise the European economies. Ultimately, it will be decisive in ensuring that Europe avoids a repeat of Japan’s “lost decade”, during which zombie banks poorly allocated financing across firms. Third, orderly deleveraging in the euro area also requires that the restructuring and resolution of individual banks will not endanger financial stability or put public finances at risk. For this, the institutional framework needs to be solid. This is the rationale  10  Entries of business establishments declined from their peak of 7.4% in 1988 and have not exceeded 5.0% since then, whereas exit rates remained at subdued levels of 2.5–4.0% between 1988 and 2000 and have increased to above 4.0% since then.

Obviously, the euro area aggregate figures mask the large heterogeneity among Member States, where gross debt ranges from 10% of GDP in Estonia to 157% in Greece. This notwithstanding, it goes without saying that general debt levels in European countries need to decline, also in view of long-term demographic challenges. Turning to private sector debt, Japan faced severe adjustment needs in the corporate sector, with debt of non-financial corporations declining from 130% to 80% of GDP in the 15 years that followed the peak in economic activity. In the euro area, the debt level of the aggregate non-financial sector never reached the peaks seen in Japan and aggregate household indebtedness is also comparatively lower in the euro area. However, in those euro area countries which experienced housing bubbles, the household sectors have been facing much stronger adjustment problems. Here, again, euro area averages mask significant heterogeneity across Member States. In fact, some euro area countries have seen strong capital inflows and unsustainable debtfinanced economic expansion. This has not only brought the risk of reversal, as seen after 2008 when private capital inflows dried up and domestic demand collapsed, it has also led to economic divergence within the euro area. Some countries have lost heavily in terms of competitiveness relative to their peer euro area countries. Regaining this competitiveness will indeed be a more gradual and tedious process.3 The credit-financed housing boom in countries like Ireland and Spain led to residential property prices more than doubling in the seven years leading up to their peak.
Certainly, the deteriorated external financial conditions and the world deceleration that would be created in this risk scenario could have a negative impact on the Chilean economy. However, as it did at the end of 2008, the Chilean financial system is prepared to adequately deal with this tighter external scenario, and the Central Bank has the necessary tools to mitigate these effects on the liquidity and proper functioning of local monetary markets. The materialization of some of these risks would have direct consequences for the projected scenarios for national growth and inflation. After considering all the above elements, the Board estimates that the risk balance for output and inflation are unbiased. In any case, as it has done before, the Board will adopt all measures necessary to address any events reshaping the macroeconomic scenario and inflationary forecasts. Let me share with you some final thoughts before I finish. Final thoughts In the past few years we have faced several external shocks that have required us to act flexibly, even changing abruptly the direction of monetary policy. For that we have relied on our policy system designed to accommodate to changes in the economy within the framework of a price stability objective. It is enough to recall that in 2007–2008 we lived through a period of high and very complex inflationary upsurge. The causes were essentially external, aggravated by an unusual propagation to other domestic prices.

See: http://www.ellsbury.com/gne/gne-042.htm. 4 In 1946, King George VI appointed Turing an Officer of the Order of the British Empire for his wartime services, although the details of his work remained secret for many years. 5 Turing, A (1936), ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp. 230-265. 3  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  Having imagined the concept of a computer, Turing helped turn it into reality. He played a vital role in the design and development of early electronic computers after the war, continuing to contribute key ideas such as implementing functions by flexible programing rather than pre-set built-in electronic components. Working first at the National Physical Laboratory in London and later at the Computing Machine Laboratory at Manchester University, his insights led to the creation of the Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) in 1950 and the program for Ferranti Mark 1, the world’s first commercially available electronic computer. A visionary as well as a revolutionary, Turing recognised that “This is only a foretaste of what is to come and only the shadow of what is going to be”. True to his nature, Turing himself began to suggest some possible directions. His interests in neurology and physiology led him to ask whether computing machines could be capable of mimicking the faculties of the human mind, including the ability to learn.