samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
6  See for example Financial Times (Ralph Atkins), 2 March 2007, p.11: “Central bankers eye Norway’s clarity on rates” and Michael Woodford (2007): “The Case for Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy”, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, no. 4, pp. 3-24. 7  In 1959, Petter Jacob Bjerve, then director general of Statistics Norway, wrote that “Apparently, the question of whether national budgets should be published involved an optimum problem: considering both advantages and disadvantages of publishing, any cabinet will probably decide what to publish so as to achieve best possible results of its policy, according to the social preferences of the cabinet.” See Petter Jacob Bjerve (1959): Planning in Norway 1947-1956, North-Holland Publishing Company, p. 352. 2  BIS Review 140/2009  Hermod Skånland proposed the establishment of an incomes-policy council that was to decide the limits for wage growth in Norway. 8 But the proposal was not in tune with the new views which were already taking root in society. The council was never established. Domestic and international developments in the 1970s weakened the conviction that the economy could be fine-tuned. While market failure was the main concern earlier, focus now shifted to regulatory failure. The political pendulum swung away from government control and towards market liberalisation. 9 When decisionmaking was to be decentralised, it was important that the decision-makers acted in line with the overriding policy objectives. New transparency and disclosure requirements were designed to this end.

Indeed, there are important potential benefits and scale effects that can be reaped from the realisation of the electronic payment agenda for individuals and businesses, as well as for the economy as a whole. Thus, it is for all these reasons that Bank Negara Malaysia has made the migration to electronic payments as one of its strategic results. While the acceptance of electronic payment is on the rise in Malaysia, with electronic payment per capita doubling from 23 in 2005 to 41 in 2009, cash and cheques are still largely popular. Hence, resource intensive and time consuming processes continue to exist in the payment value chain. As electronic payments are more economical for the society and, as  BIS Review 69/2010  1  part of the broader efforts to enhance Malaysia’s long term national competitiveness, it is essential that costs arising from these inefficiencies are eliminated. An area that requires more attention moving forward, is the change in customers’ behaviour and mindset. Undoubtedly, it takes time and energy to withdraw cash, deposit cheques and reconcile cheque payments. However, there are segments of society who still prefer paper as they are so accustomed to paper and have always trusted paper instruments. Thus, one of the greatest hurdles to accelerate the adoption of electronic payments is breaking longstanding habits and changing the behaviour of people. Another important aspect in promoting greater adoption of electronic payments is the need to strengthen consumer confidence in the safety and security of the payment mechanism.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Economic reform in Europe Contribution by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the Panel on EU/US cooperation at the Advancing Enterprise Conference, London, 26 January 2004. *  *  *  Mr Chancellor, Ministers members of the Ecofin, Ladies and Gentlemen, The European Central Bank (ECB) very much welcomes and supports the economic reform process in Europe and it is a great pleasure and honour for me to participate in this very distinguished panel. Well-designed structural reforms in capital, labour and product markets will increase the flexibility of the euro area economy, enhance its resilience against economic shocks and ultimately result in a higher long-term growth rate potential which should be our first priority in Europe. 1. The ECB contribution to long term sustainable growth  The ECB provides important contributions to the economic reform process by helping to ensure a stable macroeconomic environment in the euro area. In particular the ECB maintains price stability in the euro area and helps to ensure financial stability. Maintaining price stability contributes to an economic environment favouring growth and job creation. Four main reasons can be mentioned in this respect. First, it preserves and bolsters consumers’ purchasing power and enhances the efficiency of the market at allocating resources. Second, price stability paves the way for lower uncertainty and risk premia in financial markets: this ultimately implies lower medium and long-term interest rates.

The introduction of the euro has profoundly changed the environment in which the Swiss economy operates. Since 1999, the Swiss franc has coexisted quite harmoniously with the euro. In fact, the franc has been more stable against the euro than it was against the D mark. This is good news for Swiss companies exporting to the European market. On the other hand, such companies have to contend with a greater concentration of foreign-exchange risks. They are responding to this challenge with hedging policies that are more active than those pursued in the past. Pegging the franc to the euro in order to eliminate exchange-rate risks would entail more problems than advantages, as it would inevitably push up the level of interest rates in Switzerland. Against this backdrop, the National Bank is continuing to pursue an independent monetary policy that takes account not only of economic trends and inflation forecasts but also of the situation on the foreign exchange markets. BIS Review 10/2004  1
Exchange market intervention, irrespective of whether foreign exchange is bought or sold, is not an appropriate instrument for influencing the krone over a longer period. We do not wish to act in a way that may trigger a game situation in the foreign exchange market. Foreign exchange intervention rather than a change in the interest rate may give ambiguous signals to foreign exchange operators and a game situation may arise. However, interventions may be appropriate if the krone deviates substantially from the level that the Bank judges to be reasonable in relation to fundamentals, and if exchange rate developments weaken the prospect of achieving the inflation target. Interventions may also be appropriate in response to pronounced short-term fluctuations in the krone when liquidity in the foreign exchange market falls to a very low level. Although the krone may fluctuate in the short term, when inflation is low and stable, it will generally stabilise over time. When inflation has been higher in Norway than among our trading partners for a longer period, the krone has generally depreciated. When inflation in Norway is expected to be broadly in line with that of other countries, the exchange rate will normally also return to its normal range following periods when the krone has been particularly strong or particularly weak. Exchange rate expectations cannot be directly observed, but information from Consensus Forecast, a survey conducted among economists, may be an indicator.

To maintain competitive strength, wage growth in Norway had to be on a par with wage growth among our trading partners when productivity growth in Norway was on a par with our trading partners. With the current monetary policy regime, the inflation target is the nominal anchor. According to updated national accounts figures, an inflation target of 2½ per cent and trend productivity growth of around 2 per cent imply annual nominal wage growth of about 4½ per cent. Wage growth that is lower than 4.5 per cent contributes to increased employment. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation’s recommendations to its members are based on the inflation target: “It is therefore in the interests of all wage earners to control total wage increases to avoid exceeding the level that is consistent with the inflation target defined by Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish parliament).”  Challenges facing the Norwegian business sector History has taught us that individual companies and individual industries in wealthy countries may be threatened by the emergence of producers from low-cost countries. Nevertheless, the emerging Asian economies have not posed a threat to industrialised countries' economies as a whole. On the contrary, growth in Asian economies has led to lower prices for a wider range of products. These countries have also gradually developed into important markets. We know from experience that competition from Japanese and then Korean shipyards was an important reason behind the downsizing of our own shipbuilding industry.
The FOMC has taken a number of steps in recent years to increase transparency and improve communications. This includes press conferences by the Fed chair following FOMC meetings; the publishing of growth and inflation forecasts of FOMC participants; participants’ projections of the Federal Funds rate at various horizons; and a concerted attempt to lay out the guideposts that the FOMC will look at to assess progress toward its mandate. These steps are aimed at reducing the risk that Fed policy adjustment might be associated with undue market volatility. The stance of Fed policy will be far from the only thing affecting the global landscape facing EMEs. As the FOMC considers the appropriate timing and pace of moving to a less accommodative policy stance, central banks in the Euro area and Japan are in the process of implementing additional easing measures. Other important factors affecting the global terrain include China’s slowing of credit growth without derailing economic growth, the behavior of oil and other commodity prices, and EMEs’ own domestic fundamentals and growth dynamics. Fed policy will be only one factor. EME fundamentals are likely to be an important determinant of how EME financial conditions respond to Fed policy normalization. This was one of the key lessons from the Taper Tantrum. At first, market pressure was somewhat indiscriminant and then later became more discerning with respect to EME fundamentals. Financial conditions tightened, especially for countries with fundamental vulnerabilities including: large current account deficits, a heavy reliance on portfolio inflows, and high and above-target inflation rates.

We also need in the Euro area sound public finances and bold reforms. These two goals are closely correlated to the extent that a number of structural reforms in the domains of public administration and social protection would diminish overall public spending. We encourage the Eurogroup of Ministers of Finance to proceed resolutely in this direction under the presidency of Gerrit Zalm today and of Jean-Claude Juncker tomorrow. Third, let me say simply that I find the present enlargement a formidable success for all our democracies that have voluntarily created together a new concept of a union of sovereign states which has no precedent in history. Of course we have many challenges associated with the fact that we are 25 today and more tomorrow. But we should not lose sight that we will all “10” and “15” greatly benefit from the success of our ideas. Fourth, we are living in demanding times. The world is changing. Europe is changing. Future changes look rather unpredictable. I would consider this unpredictability as the very mark of history in the  BIS Review 59/2004  5  making. And I will never forget what Jean MONNET noted in his memoirs: “Those who decide not to start any enterprise because they are not assured that things will move in strict conformity with their plans are condemning themselves to absolute immobility.
For 2010, the SNB is currently expecting real GDP growth of about 1.5%. On the one hand, our export industry is exposed to the relatively hesitant growth in European demand. On the other, Switzerland is well equipped for a recovery. Public finances are relatively healthy, the financial positions of both households and corporates are sound, and the labour market is flexible. The risk of deflation has fallen in the wake of the economic recovery. The most recent SNB inflation forecast from mid-March shows that price stability is not threatened in the short term. The SNB has sufficient leeway to maintain its expansionary monetary policy for the time being. However, the forecast also shows that the current monetary policy cannot be maintained over the entire forecast horizon without compromising medium and long-term price stability. Moreover, this forecast is still associated with considerable uncertainties. The most recent financial market concerns that have arisen about the public finances of individual euro area countries represent a considerable risk in this regard. Over the past few years, Switzerland has benefited from the advent of the euro and the associated increase in European currency stability. Any threat to this currency stability would, by definition, have a negative impact on Switzerland, above all if the Swiss franc were to appreciate sharply due to its role as a safe haven currency. The SNB will not, however, allow such a development to turn into a new deflation hazard for Switzerland.

In the worst case scenario, it is even conceivable that the funds needed to provide such support would exceed our country’s financial resources. The lion’s share of the burden from the measures taken to stabilise the Swiss financial centre was borne by the SNB. For this reason, it has been a staunch advocate of addressing and remedying the “too big to fail” issue. The SNB has always stressed the need for a political decision in this regard. In November 2009, the Federal Council appointed a commission of experts, whose mandate is to formulate possible approaches for resolving the “too big to fail” issue. The SNB is represented by its Vice President, Thomas Jordan. The commission published its interim report last week. The report proposes measures in the areas of capital, liquidity, risk diversification and organisational structure. These measures are designed, first, to be preventative, reducing the likelihood of failure by a systemically important institution. Second, they should minimise the cost to the economy as a whole, in the event that a failure nevertheless occurs. The aim is to remove the need for renewed state intervention in the event of a crisis. The report by the commission of experts represents an important milestone in the “too big to fail” debate. The SNB supports the direction proposed by the commission. It shares the commission’s view that it is necessary to establish a legal basis which will allow special requirements to be imposed on systemically important banks.
The changeover to new types of production makes demands for great, and often swift, adaptation. Some companies become unprofitable and employees both in industrialised countries and developing countries are forced to leave their jobs and look for new. •  Although the situation of more and more people is improving, the gap between the poor and the rich is increasing. Countries, which due to deficient infrastructure and incapable political leadership, etc. are not equipped to take advantage of the benefits of globalisation, risk falling further and further behind. •  The global environmental problems are aggravated. •  Free capital movements make countries more vulnerable if they carry out less credible policies. As quickly as investments flow in when economic prospects are good, they flow out just as quickly when financiers suspect that growing problems threaten the savings they have the task of managing. BIS Review 78/2000  2  These are some of the problems that we cannot ignore. They are among the great challenges for world politics today, and I understand those who feel concern. Many of these issues require coordination between countries, and it is therefore an ambitious agenda that we have to tackle energetically. A lot of work is already in progress, nationally and in various multilateral organisations. However, despite these issues being important, the conclusion is not that we should endeavour to reduce trade or have fewer contacts between countries. A number of the problems I mentioned are rather related to growth and economic development in general entailing change.

Our board representatives receive guidance from their home countries on important issues and statements in the board are coordinated among our countries in advance. In Sweden, the Riksbank has the main responsibility for contacts with Washington, but all issues are coordinated with the Government Offices where the Ministry of Finance is our contact. In certain cases, there is also consultation with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Nordic and Baltic countries are small on the board - our combined voting power is just over 3.5% of that of the IMF as a whole. Our opportunities to pursue policies on the board are in having sensible points of view on the proposals that are on the agenda and, together with other countries, trying to influence proposals so that they move in the direction we want them to. To some extent, we have an advantage in appearing independent on the board, since we represent neither the most influential creditors within G7 nor the large group of debtor countries. This means that our statements sometimes have more weight than our voting powers indicate. Let me give three examples of issues where our countries have been actively involved in the IMF. The first concerns the transparency of the IMF. In Sweden, we are accustomed to authorities publishing their decisions and their way of dealing with items. Many international organisations on the other hand operate behind closed doors.
In my view it should only be a very last resort. The aim of the game should be to manage the system so that society can enjoy the gains of a flourishing financial sector – the efficient allocation of resources and transfer of risk – whilst minimising the threats to economic stability. So we need to have effective systems not just for preventing crises but for dealing with bank failures if and when they happen. The collapse of securitisation markets in August 2007 and the failure of Northern Rock revealed gaps in the UK’s arrangements, With the benefit of hindsight, the main problem was not the handling of the initial rescue – although the tripartite’s footwork may have owed more to John Sergeant than Fred Astaire. But I don’t think anyone believes now that the business could have been saved. It was in terminal difficulties and it was right to rescue it and protect depositors. The bigger problem was that, having stepped in, the authorities were hamstrung by the inadequacy of the legal powers to resolve it quickly and cleanly. We have learned from that autumn’s experience. Since then we have found imaginative ways to provide the market with the liquidity it needs (through the Special Liquidity Scheme, long term repos, and now the discount window), we led the world in recapitalising banks in the autumn and we have resolved the banks which could not survive swiftly and effectively both through private sector solutions and through the use of statutory measures.

We now send the summary reports to every board member of British banks, to the rating agencies and to the banking analysts and we are more forthright in emphasising the dangers through the press in order to try to change the atmosphere in markets. But more broadly, we must not let a proper starting assumption that markets should be allowed to work unless there are good reasons for intervention to become a belief that markets are not to be touched unless their failure and the effectiveness of intervention is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Of course there are risks that some interventions will be proved with hindsight to be too costly or unnecessary. But the economy is not an area, to paraphrase Blackstone, where “it is better for ten guilty markets to escape than for one innocent to suffer” As Alan Greenspan recently observed to the House Oversight Committee,5 rather than assuming that the system is capable of self-regulating itself, our default position should be one of cautious scepticism. The burden of proof for the authorities should be the balance of probabilities. Charts Chart 1 : The Separation of Powers  5  ‘I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such is that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.
It reduces the risk that we will be forced to make more drastic increases in the future. The repo rate path also means that households can gradually adjust to higher interest rates and it is reasonable that their borrowing will slow down. This should in turn reduce the risk of having to make painful corrections of financial imbalances further ahead. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  It is difficult to identify monetary policy expectations The fact that monetary policy expectations, as reflected in forward rates in the slightly longer term, are lower than the Riksbank’s repo rate path has been discussed a great deal outside the Riksbank, but also within the Executive Board. During the drafting of the latest repo-rate decision and at the monetary policy meeting, we discussed pricing on the market and the problems it entails for drawing far-reaching conclusions about monetary policy expectations for Sweden and abroad. Put simply, a market rate can be seen as the sum of expectations of the future interest rate plus a risk premium. 1 It is easiest to understand the role of market expectations if you take the so-called expectations hypothesis as your starting point; this says that a long interest rate is equal to the expected average short interest rate level during the period of maturity. The Riksbank can therefore by means of its monetary policy decisions, and in particular by publishing its repo-rate forecasts, influence market expectations and thus the interest rates offered to households and companies.

Mark Carney: The New Fiver Opening remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the £ note launch, Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, 2 June 2016. *  *  *  I would like to express my gratitude to his grace, the Duke of Marlborough, for his generosity in hosting this historic event at one of the nation’s greatest architectural treasures. On September 3rd 1939, with The Gathering Storm about to break, a new First Lord of the Admiralty was appointed. He was so familiar to the Navy that the signal to the Fleet said simply: “Winston is Back.” In the years that followed, Britain’s resolve, tenacity and spirit would all be tested. The nation proved more than equal to the task. Britain stood steadfast through its Finest Hour. In North Africa, Asia and the Balkans, the United Kingdom helped turn the Hinge of Fate. It would forge The Grand Alliance to liberate Europe from tyranny, and then with victory, set the vision for the reconstruction of the postwar era. The “bulldog spirit” of those years was embodied and emboldened by Winston Churchill. This spirit is just one of his many contributions that the Bank commemorates with The New Fiver. Churchill was not just a martial leader – though he was an exceptional one – he was also one of the greatest statesmen of all time. Blenheim Great statesmen know their history, and Churchill knew more than most.