samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this case, flexibility means the possibility of third parties voluntarily 5  Garrido, I., P. Moreno and X. Serra (2012), “El FMI y los acuerdos regionales de financiación”, Boletín Económico, March, Banco de España, and (2016), “The new map of international financial institutions”, Economic Bulletin, January, Banco de España. 6 Johannes Linn (2018): “Recent threats to multilateralism”, Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies 9, 86–113. 7 https://www.bundesbank.de/en/press/speeches/policy-evaluation-assessing-the-effects-of-post-crisis-financialsector-reforms-799146 8 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/07/31/pp073117-collaboration-between-regionalfinancing-arrangements-and-the-imf  6/8  adhering to a plurilateral agreement in due course (making the agreement multilateral in essence), while maintaining peer pressure to avoid free riding.9 Furthermore, the new global governance system should recognise that both regionalism and multilateralism are compatible, as some problems are of a local nature and are better tackled locally. Regionalism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, both approaches can support and complement each other, generating synergies that strengthen the global financial safety net. Indeed, bilateral and regional agreements have in many cases brought about improvements in the multilateral trading system. E-commerce is a good example of this.10 In this regard, the European Union, for example, should maintain its proactive approach to preserve the rules-based global trade system.

To quote Anne Krueger, this episode is an excellent example of how "efforts to depart from  3/8  multilateralism have provided more vivid illustrations of the need for multilateral solutions to international economic policy issues”.1 Ever since the signing of the Bretton Woods agreements, international cooperation has focused on creating a system governed by generally accepted rules. These have been complemented by mechanisms and procedures to ensure compliance and to resolve potential conflicts on the basis of fairness and equity from the perspective of all member states. In this rules-based system, multilateral organisations play a key role, by promoting the transparency and predictability of the system and by seeking to limit free-riding. There is a broad consensus that this system has been key to the development of globalisation and the promotion of economic growth and prosperity for many countries over the past half century. Trade barriers were drastically reduced and trade flows soared. According to the WTO, between 1948 and 1993 the value of world merchandise exports increased from $ billion to more than $ billion; and they jumped to five times that figure after the creation of the WTO. More importantly, in 1948, 63 percent of those exports were traded by Western Europe and the US, by 1993, this percentage had decreased to 58 percent and in 2016 it reached 48 percent, with a major shift in flows towards Emerging Asian countries.
Given these critical roles and the risks posed by periods of sharp volatility, understanding the manner in which the evolving market structure is affecting market liquidity, efficiency, and price dynamics is of the utmost importance, and something we plan to study further. Best practices in the treasury market The Treasury Market Practices Group (TMPG) recently released a consultative white paper that addresses the effects of ongoing changes in automated trading on the structure of the Treasury market. This study was well under way before October 15, but it includes some preliminary observations from the TMPG on that event as well. The TMPG is a group of market professionals, sponsored by the New York Fed, committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the Treasury, agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities markets. The group has released a wide range of best practices for these markets, including a fails charge that resulted in a dramatic decline in delivery fails in Treasury securities and agency MBS, and the recommendation to margin forward agency MBS trades, a practice that now covers most bi-lateral forward trades in that asset class. The TMPG white paper on automated trading in the Treasury market includes an updated set of best practice recommendations that provide additional guidance for firms and trading venues involved with electronic and automated trading. Some of the changes to the best  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  practices have to do with improving governance and back-office processes to keep pace with technological advancements.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  October 15 also raises questions about the nature of liquidity in the Treasury market today. As I mentioned earlier, market liquidity is a difficult concept to pin down, and if one asks how liquidity evolved on October 15, the answer will differ depending on the measure of market liquidity you have in mind. It is certainly the case that some frequently-cited metrics of liquidity, such as the quantity of orders available for execution in the CLOB at a given point in time, often referred to as “market depth,” showed significant signs of strain that morning. But volatility was also elevated, so a coincident reduction in market depth may be unsurprising. Indeed, an increase in volatility and reduction in depth can work in a self-reinforcing manner, in which reduced depth causes trades to have a greater price impact, while the resultant volatility causes market depth to shrink further. This dynamic has always existed in markets, but it is possible that automated trading serves to exacerbate it in certain situations. But even if a sharp reduction in market depth makes sense given an increase in volatility, a trade of reasonable size would have been more expensive for a customer to execute in the event window, and would have had a greater price impact, than in more normal conditions. In this sense, liquidity was challenged, and frequent periods of strained liquidity would be undesirable for the most liquid sovereign debt market in the world.
Conclusion It is sometimes argued that the current expansionary monetary policy discourages governments from undertaking the necessary structural reforms in the euro area. But that begs the question: why weren’t these reforms carried out when interest rates were higher? We have to stop searching for reasons why structural reforms are not being addressed. To lift potential growth and strengthen the underpinnings of our Economic and Monetary Union, we need comprehensive, well-sequenced structural reforms in national Member States, as well as at European Union level. And we need them now. European citizens started losing trust in the European Union and its institutions when they started losing sight of their tangible benefits, that is, the impact of the integration process on their jobs and standards of living. Rapidly vanishing trust in turn prevents those steps towards European integration from being taken which are indispensable if we want to meet today's challenges. The burden of breaking this deadlock cannot be borne by the people of Europe: the burden must be borne by the EU and its institutions and by European governments. Indeed, the best way to respond is to identify a sequence of reforms for creating jobs and growth. If carefully designed, such a sequence can gradually recreate trust and lead us to where we want to be: to the point where a discussion on the future of Europe, and the degree of sovereignty which needs to be shared to secure it, is again possible. This is not low-hanging fruit.

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The second was the economic programme developed by the Icelandic authorities in co-operation with the IMF. The programme had three key goals: stabilisation of the exchange rate, fiscal sustainability, and reconstruction of the financial sector. Comprehensive capital controls were an important element in the programme, but their rationale was to help to stabilise the exchange rate in a situation where the currency had fallen more than 50% in 2008, where foreign króna positions that were a legacy of carry trade and capital inflows amounted to around 40% of GDP, and where a large fiscal deficit that had to be financed in the domestic market had developed. The capital controls therefore gave monetary policy more scope to help stabilise and turn around the real economy once inflation came down. Subsequently, they shielded the eocnomy from the financial spillover effects of the crisis in the eurozone. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  But the problem is that they are still in place, over five years after the climax of Iceland´s financial crisis. The reason is that Iceland is still facing a balance of payments crisis that is a legacy of former capital inflows and the unwinding of these big cross-border banks.

For me questions include: is there any evidence that the tight labour market is easing; what is the revised outlook for demand in view of the Government’s fiscal announcements; are domestically generated inflation pressures consistent with returning inflation to the 2 per cent target; and what do financial market developments tell us. The MPC was clear in its language in September that should the outlook suggest more persistent inflationary pressures, including from stronger demand, the Committee would respond forcefully as necessary. In the context of the developments I’ve set out for you, today I think the central question for all nine of us on the MPC is how forceful do we need to be, to ensure inflation does return sustainably to the 2% target in the medium term. These are very challenging times for the UK economy and millions of households and businesses are experiencing real hardship as a result of the cost of living crisis. On the MPC we are acutely conscious that for many our monetary policy actions are adding to the difficulties caused by the current situation. We know from past periods in our history the damage to households and businesses that would result if high inflation persisted. Unlike earlier inflationary episodes, where we saw more persistence in inflation caused by ineffective policy and policy frameworks, this time we have a monetary policy framework which empowers us to take action.
On the bond market, there are some corporate and bank bonds issued in euro. However, trade is modest, which is probably due to the fact that it has not been as cheap to borrow on the euro market as was expected. The fact that Swedish companies still choose to seek financing there may be due to the fact that it is the only way for some of them to borrow really large volumes. Nor has there been any major change in the spot trading in krona on the foreign exchange market, compared with the period prior to the introduction of the euro. The average daily turnover in SEK against DEM during the period 1995-1999 was SEK 19.2 billion. The corresponding figure for 1999 and 2000 was SEK 19.5 billion. BIS Review 26/2001  3  Developments on the Swedish stock market have been similarly modest. Since the introduction of the euro, it has been possible to list shares parallel or exclusively in euro on the OM Stockholm Exchange. During 1999, three companies made use of this possibility. They were Electrolux, Nordea and Stora Enso. Since then, no new companies have registered an interest in being listed in euro and trading in the three already listed companies has been very modest. The talk of the death of the krona has thus been greatly exaggerated. It is hardly surprising that there was no spontaneous changeover to the euro. This is in fact what we at the Riksbank said when the debate reached its peak a few years ago.

Today, low-inflation policies seem to enjoy high credibility in most countries, which is indicated in part by the fact that the rise in the oil price at least so far has had small effects on inflation expectations. The risk of an oil price rise spreading to wages and other prices in the economy is therefore also likely to be low. Furthermore, in the case of Sweden it should be added that inflation is rising from a low level and that agreements in the labour market have been settled for 2005 and 2006, further reducing the risk of contagion effects via the jobs market. To sum up: the fact that the increase in the oil price is partly a demand-driven phenomenon, that the dependency on oil has decreased and that inflation-targeting regimes enjoy high credibility suggests that the higher oil price should mainly be reflected in a temporary, limited rise in inflation and that the effects on the real economy should be fairly small. If this is correct, the general economic and inflationary developments are more significant for monetary policy than developments in the oil price. This brings me to a discussion of the broad outlook for the Swedish economy in the years ahead. Economic activity in Sweden Despite the Riksbank’s relatively optimistic outlook for the Swedish economy compared with other forecasters, we have gradually revised up our forecasts in the past year.
Some of the issues in resolving large, internationally active financial firms have been recognized for some time – the multiplicity of jurisdictions, differences in insolvency regimes across countries, complexities in unwinding certain books and the largely untested nature of national, much less international, resolution processes for such very large financial firms. Over the last 20 years, the international legal and supervisory communities have undertaken several efforts to address these issues. In the wake of the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision formed a Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group to identify what improvements could be made to the international resolution process and recommend actions to be taken. It published its recommendations in March 2010. The CBRG’s report is admirable in its clear description of the problems encountered in the fall of 2008 and the concrete nature of its recommendations. I will be referring to them throughout my remarks. As the CBRG was completing its draft report, the Financial Stability Board asked a working group, the Cross Border Crisis Management Group, to advance the development of recovery and resolution plans for cross-border institutions as recommended by the CBRG. I’d like to make three points today. The first is to highlight the importance of timely supervisory action in preserving the value in a financial firm. The second is to underscore the important innovation in supervisory practice represented by recovery planning. The third is to paint a picture, an admittedly optimistic picture, of the improvements in the international resolution process made possible by following the recommendations of the CBRG.

The transition to a netzero economy can only be achieved with a committed and concerted effort across the public and private sector. I wish all of you a fruitful discussion ahead. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
They mean that in thinking about ways to mitigate systemic risk it is not tenable to focus simply on bank-centered financial institutions, and it is not feasible to achieve change through national approaches applied only to the institutions of the home country. For these reasons, where we see a need to induce a broader change in market practice, a broader range of informal mechanisms of cooperation among supervisors, among market participants and involving supervisors and market participants would be useful. The second generation of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, led by Jerry Corrigan, is one example of a market-led initiative to define a set of common challenges and recommendations for  4  BIS Review 14/2006  change. Supervisors in the major financial centers are following progress against those recommendations closely. The effort to improve the post trade processing infrastructure for over-the-counter derivatives is an example of regulatory cooperation to help address a collective action problem among market participants, with some encouraging initial results. In this effort, the 14 major dealers along with almost as many supervisors and market regulators from the United States and other major countries, met at the New York Fed in September 2005. We outlined our concerns and asked the dealers to give us a plan for how to fix the problem. They came up with a credible plan, with a set of outcomes-based targets, and agreed to report progress on a common set of metrics.

Timothy F Geithner: Risk management challenges in the US financial system Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) 7th Annual Risk Management Convention & Exhibition, New York City, 28 February 2006. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today. We have seen dramatic changes in the U.S. and global financial system over the past 25 years, and we are now in the midst of another wave of innovation in finance. The changes now underway are most dramatic in the rapid growth in instruments for risk transfer and risk management, the increased role played by nonbank financial institutions in capital markets around the world, and the much greater integration of national financial systems. These developments provide substantial benefits to the financial system. Financial institutions are able to measure and manage risk much more effectively. Risks are spread more widely, across a more diverse group of financial intermediaries, within and across countries. These changes have contributed to a substantial improvement in the financial strength of the core financial intermediaries and in the overall flexibility and resilience of the financial system in the United States.
As you know, OMTs, while ex-ante unlimited in time and amount, are strictly conditional upon the country implementing a programme making it eligible to financing from the European Stability Mechanism. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3. By definition, “non-conventional” policies are highly innovative and central banks have made great efforts and devoted large resources to explaining their rationale and modalities. Nevertheless, there remain some misperceptions and concerns which I will briefly try to dispel and address. First, there are fears that the whole process of balance sheet expansion is inflationary. Indeed, one important effect of non-conventional policies is to significantly increase the quantity of central bank money in the economy. Since, ultimately, inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, it may seem natural to anticipate further inflationary pressures down the road. While I understand these preoccupations, I do not see, in the current situation, any reason for concern. True, there has been a strong increase in central bank money and the situation should be monitored accordingly. What matters, however, for inflation, is the changes in broad monetary aggregates, which determine private agents’ ability to purchase goods, hence the price level. These broad aggregates have either remained unchanged or grown very slowly. What has happened, in fact, is that broad money has been substituted by central bank money as economic agents have felt the need to hold more liquid and safer assets. This expansion in central bank money has not affected inflation expectations, which have remained well-anchored.

Interest rates have been on the increase recently in most parts of the world and capital is not as cheap as before, although it can still be procured at very low rates. Conditions in capital markets in general are therefore more likely to tighten in the coming years. Influential as economic developments on both sides of the Atlantic may be for the Icelandic economy, the way we handle our own affairs is still important. The crucial consideration is to achieve a rapid reduction in macroeconomic imbalances and restore stability. To do so, domestic demand must be reduced. Part of this process will occur automatically with the completion of ongoing investments in the aluminium and power sectors. Much has changed since the meeting a year ago, some things for the better, and others not. The current account deficit run up last year will not be forgotten for a long time – it even managed to trump the most pessimistic forecasts. Fortunately, clear signs of a gradual contraction are now visible, but this improvement is likely to be slower than we had previously expected, especially on account of foreign debt service. The Board of Governors of the Central Bank decided yesterday to leave the Bank’s policy rate unchanged at 14.25%, at the level where it has been since December. By contrast, the day before last year’s annual meeting, the Board of Governors raised the policy rate by 0.75 percentage points.
On the crisis prevention side, it has now been agreed that there is a need to reinforce multilateral surveillance at the global level. To this end, the FSF and the IMF will intensify their cooperation with a view to enhancing the assessment of financial stability risks on a global scale as well as to coordinating possible policy responses. This endeavour should be mirrored at the national and the regional level by heightening the level of cooperation and exchange of information between central banks and supervisory authorities to establish an overall better monitoring and assessment of the risks to the financial system. On the crisis management side, the ECB focuses on central bank operations and on crossborder arrangements between financial authorities. With regard to central bank operations, I would underline that we need to ensure that central banks’ operational frameworks are flexible enough to deal with extraordinary situations. In this respect, the Eurosystem’s framework is very flexible. In terms of cross-border arrangements between financial authorities, I would stress the urgent need for enhancing cross-border arrangements between banking supervisors for dealing with weak banks. In fact, the global nature of financial markets and the increasing interlinkages between markets and institutions mean that the systemic impact of a financial crisis can only be properly assessed if supervisory authorities share information on the risk exposures of large institutions and on the impact of shocks in their jurisdiction. In addition, supervisory cooperation should be intensified on a cross-sector basis.

Yet in spite of being the oldest, Matero has not seen any growth in modern infrastructure, let alone banking facilities. For this reason therefore, as Governor of the Central bank, it gives me tremendous pleasure to see a reputable, privately owned commercial bank taking the bold step of bringing banking services, of international standards, to the doorsteps of a community like Matero. In this regard, the opening of the Stanbic Branch today has given me enormous optimism and re-assurance that banking facilities can, indeed, be extended to ‘financially excluded’ communities, like Matero. Ladies and Gentlemen Developments, like the one we are witnessing today, must not be taken for granted nor taken lightly. I am reliably informed that this has come about as a result of the policy reforms, undertaken by the Standard Bank Group, which have culminated in Stanbic Bank Zambia being conferred with the status of a ‘Universal Bank’. By assuming this status, Stanbic Bank Zambia has been given the authority to offer banking services to all the segments of the market. For obvious reasons, this move is not only uplifting to the technological advancement and capability of the Matero community through the provision of modern banking services like the AutoBank, but also goes a long way in assisting the Bank of Zambia, as a monetary authority, to have a firm control over the implementation of monetary policy.