samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As discussed in this report, a depreciation of the króna coinciding with a fall in asset prices – possibly originating in tighter global financial conditions – could amplify the forecast contraction. The necessary reduction of pressures in the economy will squeeze businesses and households, many of which are vulnerable due to heavy debt. They could withstand a short-lived reversal, but a lasting contraction would be difficult to weather. In late autumn 2005, after a surge in borrowing by Icelandic banks in international bond markets, investors revised their risk assessments of the banks. CDS spreads and secondary market yields on their issues increased. The banks deferred further borrowing in the European bond markets, which had been their main source of funding. Foreign analysts and agencies published negative reports about the banks and the state of the Icelandic economy. The climate turned most adverse at the end of February 2006 after Fitch Ratings changed Iceland’s sovereign outlook from stable to negative, claiming inter alia that the banks’ tight financing could have implications for the Treasury. This situation and its aftermath squeezed the banks for a while, forcing them to respond firmly to the uncomfortable position that had arisen. They made efforts to explain the structure and organisation of the Icelandic banks. The banks adjusted certain aspects of their operations and cross-ownership in response to relevant criticisms, and refuted what was less relevant with both communication and successful business performance. Temporarily they needed to look beyond their traditional markets for funding, with issuance in the US and Japan.

Taking into consideration even the impossibility of the European Central Bank to serve as liquidity provider to our countries, I would deem that the spaces available to us in the framework of current legal and regulatory aspect have already been exhausted (from the liquidity viewpoint). Otherwise, I would say we have reached a critical point, below which no space for action is left. Let me emphasise that now that the crisis highlighted many “vulnerabilities” of this rapid catching up, the analysis should go beyond just accepting it as valid. This becomes necessary if we take into consideration the designing of a different economic growth model. In this context, I am more and more convinced that the global crisis was a development that advanced in time the need for inevitable steering of many imbalances that our economies accumulated over the last 10-15 years. 2  BIS Review 146/2009
A correct diagnosis of the situation and decisive national policy action to help fully harness the opportunities offered to us by the EU are essential preconditions for future well-being. This is why I advocate achieving broad political and social consensus to address the urgent, ambitious and comprehensive growth strategy that our country needs. Thank you very much. 11  See M. Tommasi and A. Velasco (1996), “Where are we in the political economy of reforms?”, Journal of Policy Reforms, No 1, pp. 187-238. 22

Both borrowers and lenders need to be careful not to over-stretch themselves. In line with the recent FPC statement, we will be keeping a very close eye on developments, and the Bank has a range of tools that can be used in mitigation of those risks. Stage 4: the flow of credit Annual growth in the stock of lending to households and businesses has remained close to zero since mid-2012, similar to rates seen in the run-up to the launch of the FLS. But it is important to bear in mind that prior to the announcement of the FLS, the Bank judged that UK bank lending was more likely to decline than increase over the following eighteen months. The profile of lending seen to date has been broadly in line with our original expectations: the trend in household net lending has been somewhat stronger than expected before the launch of the FLS and net lending to businesses has been perhaps a little weaker. We were also conscious that the stock of credit depends on both supply and demand. We were sure that the FLS would shift supply but the demand effects were always less certain. The price elasticity for firms in particular is likely to be low. It is possible at the margin that some firms will be better able to repay or refinance loans if their borrowing costs are a bit lower, but this effect is probably small relative to the importance of expected demand for a firm’s products.
Looking back, one can notice that a protracted period of rising food and energy prices have led to a significant over shooting of the inflation targets since the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. This has increased the stickiness in inflation expectations, as economic agents have become more backward looking. Under normal conditions, supply shocks are expected to alter relative prices rather than the underlying inflation trend. Nevertheless, the fact that several long lasting shocks appeared concurrently has increased the risks to the price setting behavior. Our revised projections incorporating the latest developments suggest that it will take a relatively long time for inflation to reach 4 percent level. Even more importantly, current inflation target no longer seems to serve as a nominal anchor in the short term. Inflation targeting regime is one of the monetary policy regimes and all regimes have their own rules and frameworks. Our main policy document published in December 2005 describes the framework of our inflation-targeting regime. 24th paragraph of that document states that: “A pre-announced inflation target shall only be changed in the event that very sharp and long-term deviations from the target are expected or medium-term targets no longer make sense due to factors beyond the control of monetary policy. At this point, a new target will be set with the government with respect to the Law.” The paragraph that I have just read completely defines the recent conditions and explains why we revised the inflation targets for 2009 and 2010.

Durmuş Y lmaz: Recent developments in international markets and their impact on the Turkish economy Keynote address by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Euromoney Turkey Finance & Investment Forum, Istanbul, 18 June 2008. *  *  *  Dear Guests, I am delighted to be here to address such a distinguished audience in Istanbul. I hope this timely and important Forum will contribute much to debates about future growth prospects of Turkey, through exploring many prominent issues. Let me begin with recent developments in international markets and their impacts on the Turkish economy. As you may all know, both developed and emerging countries have been suffering from higher inflation and lower growth rates for a while. There are two main reasons behind this undesirable economic situation. One is the turbulence that emerged in the second half of 2007 in financial markets; and the other one is the continuously increasing global commodity prices. The second half of 2007 was not an easy period for central bankers – and 2008 is likely to be even more challenging. There is an apparent acceleration in consumer prices inflation all over the world and the annual inflation even in developed countries is at its highest level of the last 16 years. Improvement in the wealth of big developing countries such as China and India has created a demand-driven pressure on commodity prices.
But it will need to be accompanied by corresponding moderation of the growth of domestic demand - after the offsetting stimulus of a year ago - if we are to maintain overall stability. That essentially is why interest rates in the UK have had to rise since last autumn. We are now in a position where the economy as a whole is again growing above trend - after a pause a year or so ago - while inflation is running - and has been running for nearly a year - slightly below the Government’s 2½% target. Looking ahead, there is the tantalising prospect of new factors that might help to hold the rate of inflation down, at least in the short term. There is evidence for example, although it is hard to evaluate, of more intensive retail price competition, squeezing retail margins across the board, and that could hold down prices, at least for a time. And this effect could intensify and extend further into the future as a result of the spread of e-commerce. And there is, on the supply-side of the economy, the possibility (though so far sadly not much actual statistical evidence) that the spread of IT will accelerate productivity growth across the economy - as it has in the United States, raising the underlying rate of potential output growth at least for a time.

In practice what that would be likely to mean in our present situation is substantially lower interest rates: the intended effect would be to stimulate external demand, but it would inevitably also involve further stimulus to domestic demand. In effect, it implies that we should acquiesce in increasing overall demand pressure leading inevitably to faster inflation. That might conceivably even provide some relief to the suffering sectors in the short term. But increasing demand pressure, including labour market pressure, and accelerating inflation would - as we’ve repeatedly seen in the past - ultimately need to be brought back under control, involving a more abrupt tightening of policy. That frankly would not do the suffering sectors themselves much good at least for very long - and it would have a potentially serious destabilising effect on the economy as a whole. That is precisely what we are trying to avoid. 3  BIS Review 33/2000  The more hopeful news is that we have recently seen strong signs of recovery - of both economic activity and exchange rates - in a number of emerging markets and transition economies. And we are seeing a strengthening of domestic demand and of output in the Eurozone, which may help the euro to appreciate. To the extent that these trends persist, it will help to ease the exceptional pressures on the most internationally-exposed sectors, and contribute to a better balance within the UK economy.
But the independence is not unlimited, as central banks are ultimately accountable to the political authorities. One could see transparency as an obligation that follows from gaining independence. Independence requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency. Transparency is also important for preserving the political acceptance for central bank independence. Finally, let me draw attention to another important issue, namely how to make good collective decisions. Monetary policy decisions are group decisions for two reasons. First, the interest rate decisions are usually taken by a monetary policy committee. Second, the inputs for the decisions are produced by the central bank staff. There has been a significant increase in the research on monetary policy committees during the last years, but the role of the staff in the decision-making process has received remarkably little attention in the literature. At Norges Bank, the staff members have two roles; producer (of analyses, forecasts, research, etc) and adviser. Each economist at Norges Bank has to give his or her interest rate advice before the interest rate meetings, and we have a system of aggregating the advice up to the governor and myself. Since most central banks have a large pool of highly skilled staff members, it is important to utilise this potential. What is the best way to aggregate the judgements of the  10  Duisenberg, Wim (2001): “Letter of Dr. W. F. Duisenberg, President of the ECB to the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs”, www.ecb.int. BIS Review 132/2008  7  staff members?

Sylvester Eijffinger and Petra Geraats 5 have constructed an index that combines the above five dimensions of transparency into a single metric, and they used it for comparing transparency for nine of the major central banks. Negriz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen 6 have extended this work and applied Eijffinger and Geraats’ index to 100 countries. Measured by this index, they found that in 2005 the three most transparent central banks were the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England. Norges Bank was ranked as number 15. The reason why Norges Bank was ranked number 15 and not among the most transparent central banks is, according to Dincer and Eichengreen, the following: 7 1. Norges Bank’s monetary policy models were not public,  2.  the Bank does not publish quarterly economic forecasts, and  3.  we do not publish minutes and voting records from the monetary policy meetings of the Executive Board. As regards the publication of models, Dincer and Eichengreen’s claim is not correct, as we do publish our models (and we did so also in 2005). The lesson I have drawn from this is that central banks should have well designed webpages so that all relevant information is easy to find. Regarding the second reason – that we do not provide forecasts on a quarterly basis – I think this point is overemphasized. We used to publish Monetary Policy Reports (then called Inflation Reports) four times a year until 2001.
To pursue that objective, the Treaty assigned to the Eurosystem,  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  which is composed of the ECB and the NCBs of Member States that have adopted the euro, the core task of defining and implementing monetary policy, together with a number of core central banking tasks in the areas of foreign exchange operations, foreign reserves management, the smooth operation of payment systems, authorising the issuance of euro banknotes, and the collection of the statistical information necessary to undertake these tasks. [8] With respect to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, the ESCB is mandated to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities. [9] In addition, Article 127(6) of the Treaty permits the Council to confer specific tasks upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings. That provision was activated recently through secondary legislation establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),[10] which confers tasks on the ECB relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. Article 130 of the Treaty sets out the requirements of central bank independence. While Article 130 also applies to NCBs, my focus here today will be on the ECB.

Technological progress, innovation, and new models of competition are changing the financial industry and there will undoubtedly be winners and losers. Understanding all of the factors that drive successful transformations will be a critical insight for both risk managers and supervisors. Conclusions 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The financial sector is large, complex and constantly evolving due to a wide range of technological, business, and macro factors. Your job, and ours, is to be vigilant and open-minded in our thinking, constantly questioning our traditional assumptions and scanning the horizon to understand how the risk landscape is changing. The topics covered at today’s conference are some of the most important risks that the industry faces. Climate change and digital transformation are two powerful trends with the potential to fundamentally change financial services. We all need to be forward-looking and proactive in order to promote our ultimate goal of a safe and sound financial system that supports the sustainable provision of financial services and economic growth. Thank you for your attention. 1 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters  (2019), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2 The Impact of Higher Temperature on Economic Growth, Riccardo Colacito, Bridget Hoffmann, Toan Phan and  Tim Sablik, Economic Brief, August 2018, No. 18–08; Climate Change and the Federal Reserve, Glenn Rudebusch, FRBSF Economic Letter, 2019–19, March 25 2019; Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II: Impacts, Risks and Adaptation in the United States, U.S. Global Change Research Program.
More generally, there is nothing to be gained in having more than one currency for transaction purposes. Much of the benefit that allows one to get around the double coincidence of wants gets lost if several currencies circulate simultaneously. “Dollarization” only occurs in those countries where hyperinflation threatens. This is not about to happen in Switzerland which has a long established record of price stability. The fear of losing our monetary independence was clearly misplaced as well. Over the past six years the SNB has repeatedly demonstrated that it can act decisively and independently, often well before the ECB. Given its openness, Switzerland was badly affected by the world slowdown a couple of years ago. The situation was made worse by the fact that our main trading partner, Germany, was itself severely hit, and to compound our difficulties, the worldwide capital overhang had a very adverse effect on our exporters, many of whom specialize in the production of capital goods. Exceptional circumstances require extraordinary measures. From March 2001 to April 2003, the SNB cut interest rates aggressively, lowering the target range for our reference rate, the three-month Libor, by 325 basis points, from 3.5% to just 0.25%. And earlier this year, the improved performance of our economy has allowed us to take some of our interest-rate easing back, even though the ECB did not budge. What about the stability of the external value of the Swiss franc?

Since September 2008 to date, the Bank has sold US $ million to the market against purchases of US $ million; •  Issuance of directives: On March 2, 2009, the Bank of Zambia issued directives to commercial banks prohibiting the extension of loans and/or credits and providing other sources of Kwacha funding to non-residents for any maturity period of less than one year. The Government is in the process of issuing a statutory instrument, which will clarify this position, in order to protect the integrity of the financial market. •  Collaboration with regulators: Engaged other regulatory authorities regarding measures to stem the growing trend of dollarisation, including some consideration to legislate and provide stringent regulations against this practice, which erodes the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. In this regard, the Government is in the process of issuing a Statutory Instrument to ban quoting, invoicing and settling in foreign currency of domestic transactions for goods and services in Zambia. In addition, the Bank has enhanced its vigilance and interaction with the domestic financial system to ensure adherence to its supervisory guidelines and to enhance information flows between banks and the Central Bank. Accordingly, the Bank also introduced measures to ensure that financial market players under its supervision provide detailed information on their foreign exchange transactions. Further, the Bank has continued to reinforce the regulation and supervision of the financial sector.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Queralto, Gertler and Karadi (2012) are recent examples of this work stream with empirical applications as in del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010). 10  A thorough understanding of the generation and provision of liquidity by the private sector’s own means is still at the stage of infancy. First promising conceptual frameworks appear to emerge. Important work has been made by Adrian and Shin (2010) on “Financial intermediaries and monetary economics” and a promising example of theories for liquidity is “The I Theory of Money” by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011). 11  O. Issing, Central Banks – Paradise Lost, CFS Working paper No. 2012/06. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The new normal requires a new communication policy of central banks (in the past it was not always clear that central banking and communication should be mentioned in the same sentence). The crisis was a game-changer in the communication of central banks: We now are faced with the potentially explosive interplay between markets and politics, we have to actively communicate with a broader public, we have to face up to the public and market discourse. We must argue with counterfactuals and navigate the short-term versus the long-term. To sum our new communication strategy up: We have to listen, explain and convince. Given the complexities of today’s financial markets, a deeper and more detailed financial market analysis is an important contribution to the conduct of monetary policy in the pursuit of maintaining price stability.

BIS Review 44/2006  3  Norges Bank seeks to set the interest rate with a view to achieving a reasonable balance between the objective of stabilising inflation at target and the objective of stabilising developments in output and employment. Interest rates are projected to increase gradually in the years ahead, up to a more normal level. Interest rates are also expected to increase in other countries. Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy is now fairly high and will contribute to bringing inflation up towards the target in the course of the next 2-3 years. In the account presented after the monetary policy meeting of the Executive Board on 26 April, it was stated that there are prospects of another interest rate increase in the second quarter – at the monetary policy meeting in May or June – and a further increase thereafter. In addition to projecting developments, we wish to highlight the uncertainty surrounding developments ahead. The projections for the interest rate and other economic variables are based on incomplete information about the current economic situation and the functioning of the economy. Allow me to summarise: The fall in prices for imported goods and services and the increase in export prices have provided the Norwegian economy with an appreciable income boost. The mainland economy has expanded rapidly in recent years. At the same time, inflation has remained low. Increased efficiency and ample supply of labour has made a contribution in this context. This situation is now changing. There are now limited idle resources.