samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Countries were forced to raise policy rates in an attempt to attract scarce gold reserves, dampening domestic spending – a position that ultimately proved unsustainable. These coordination problems led to lower issuance of safe assets in total and meant the potential benefits from competition between alternative providers of reserve currencies were not realised. In retrospect, a more cooperative solution would have allowed countries to cut policy rates in a coordinated manner, providing support to domestic demand without affecting pressures on gold flows. 40 Farhi, E, and Maggiori, M (2018), ‘A Model of the International Monetary System’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 (1): 295-355. 38  14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  14  History shows that the rise of a reserve currency is founded on its usefulness as a medium of exchange, by reducing the cost and increasing the convenience of international payments. The additional functions of money – as a unit of account and store of wealth – come later, and reinforce the payments motive. Technology has the potential to disrupt the network externalities that prevent the incumbent global reserve currency from being displaced. Retail transactions are taking place increasingly online rather than on the high street, and through electronic payments over cash. And the relatively high costs of domestic and cross border electronic payments are encouraging innovation, with new entrants applying new technologies to offer lower cost, more convenient retail payment services.

Nonetheless, higher prices are temporarily weighing on household purchasing power and we must remain vigilant. Sud Ouest: Might the speculative attacks on the some countries’ sovereign debt and concerns over the euro’s future dampen consumption and investment? Christian Noyer: No, there are no grounds for concern. Europe has shown over the past few months that it is capable of rallying together and providing effective and innovative solutions for countries that fall prey to speculative forces. Sud Ouest: But it is evident that this is not enough to deter investors from attacking the sovereign debts of some countries… Christian Noyer: At present, these attacks are centred on the countries of Southern Europe. Markets tend to tar with the same brush all the countries perceived as the most fragile in the euro area, whereas their situations differ considerably. The sovereign debt dynamics of some non-European G7 countries are more worrying that those of many euro area countries. Sud Ouest: Aren’t speculators betting on a break-up of the euro area? Christian Noyer: By definition, this scenario is totally ruled out: no country is willing to consider this option since it would have an astronomic cost for all euro area countries, the strong and the weak alike. Sud Ouest: Won’t the fiscal austerity measures imposed on euro area countries that have benefited from EU-IMF loans have exorbitant social costs? Christian Noyer: They may be hard to bear. But it would be unrealistic to think that growth and purchasing power can be lastingly sustained if public deficits continue to rise.
The public’s recognition of this incentive may help hold down inflation expectations and cause inflation expectations to be more firmly anchored. In addition, TIPS may give the Treasury access to a broader investor base, which also may reduce the Treasury’s overall borrowing costs. The comparison between the prevailing interest rates on TIPS versus nominal Treasuries provides insight into the relative costs associated with issuing a marginal dollar of debt. But just as important is whether TIPS issuance, by displacing nominal Treasury issuance, reduces the level of interest rates that the Treasury pays on its nominal issuances. This would occur if TIPS were not perfect substitutes for nominal Treasury securities and if the demand for nominal Treasuries were downward sloping – that is, not completely elastic. The first condition almost certainly holds given the different attributes of TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. If they were perfect substitutes, then there would not be a liquidity premium for nominal Treasuries relative to TIPS. The second condition seems likely to hold since numerous studies have found that an increase in the net amount of Treasury borrowing leads to higher expected borrowing costs for the Treasury. How big might this effect be? That’s difficult to estimate. A few studies 6 have found that an increase in supply in a particular segment of the Treasury yield curve has contributed to a rise in yields.

Turning first to the issue of measuring the impact of TIPS issuance on the government’s funding costs, this could be done simply by comparing the ex-post costs of a program of TIPS issuance to the costs of a comparable program of nominal Treasury issuance. Studies 1 of this sort have typically shown that TIPS issuance has resulted in a higher net cost to the Treasury. Unfortunately, although this methodology is attractive in its simplicity, it has some flaws that undercut its usefulness in reaching conclusions about the attractiveness of the TIPS program. The problem with an ex-post analysis is that it depends critically upon the performance of inflation over the period in question. If inflation turns out to have been meaningfully different than what was expected at the time of TIPS issuance, then this difference – the so-called “inflation surprise” – can be important in affecting the relative costs of TIPS versus nominal Treasury issuance. If inflation turns out to be higher than expected, then TIPS issuance will likely look to have been more expensive than nominal Treasury issuance. If inflation turns out lower, an ex-post analysis will likely show a savings from the TIPS program. Over the long run – and I mean the very long run – there should be roughly as many downward surprises in inflation performance as upward surprises. But within any relatively short period, such as the last decade, this certainly does not need to be the case.
Achieving success in becoming a world-class player in an environment of greater competition will hinge on the ability of the Malaysian financial services industry to innovate and provide enhanced value propositions for consumers. This underscores the importance of capacity building by the financial institutions in research and development and re-engineering of business processes in search of operational excellence and enhanced customer service delivery. A strong culture of excellence is therefore vital: one that is embedded into all levels of the organisation; one that fosters and rewards innovation and service quality. A customer-centric approach is, and will continue to be, the winning formula for a financial institution to make its mark as a world class financial services provider. Ladies and Gentlemen, While it is acknowledged that substantial investments in terms of time and resources are required for an institution to develop into a world-class player, it is envisaged that the learning curve can be made considerably steeper via collaboration between financial institutions with complementary strengths. This has been one of the underlying premises in the approach taken by Bank Negara Malaysia in granting the new takaful licences to consortia of financial institutions. Such strategic alliances are expected to promote greater efficiency gains within the takaful industry, leading to greater benefits to consumers. This in turn should translate into the takaful operators making the quantum leap forward.

The enhanced and robust competition in the marketplace would lead to greater consumer benefits in terms of improved business efficiency, product development and service quality. It is envisioned that the achievement of these imperatives will ensure that the Malaysian takaful industry is well-positioned to successfully make the transition from being "good-to-great" and, InsyaAllah, will remain as the global leader for takaful and retakaful. Ladies and Gentlemen, The overarching objective of our regulatory policies is to ensure that the financial system is in a position to serve the public with the best range and quality of products and services, that the interest of the consumer is at all times protected, and that best practices are adopted to ensure the soundness and stability of the system. It must be emphasised, however, that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring this rests on the players in the financial system, in particular, the Senior Management and the Board of Directors. This is particularly important to ensure public confidence in the efficiency and performance of the financial system to contribute to the overall development of the economy. The initiative formulated for the takaful industry in strengthening competition through the creation of new takaful players, is aimed at achieving this overarching objective. The presence of players with the right qualities and calibre in the marketplace is part of the process of ensuring product innovation and service excellence.
Then I would like to address some of the questions and issues about Basel II that banks and supervisors in emerging market countries have shared with me. After that, I look forward to hearing the thoughts of my fellow panelists and those of others on what Basel II might mean for the Indian banking sector. Why Basel II is necessary: an overview of the new capital framework Before we discuss how Basel II may affect banks in India, allow me to begin by addressing why the Basel Committee drafted Basel II. The Committee published the text of the new capital framework this past June. This marked the culmination of nearly six years of difficult work for supervisors and for banks. Why did we take such pains to revise the existing capital rules? After all, the 1988 Basel Accord was a tremendous success in many ways. I think that several factors led us to conclude that a new approach was necessary. As you know, the 1988 Accord established the first internationally accepted definition and measure of bank capital. It was adopted in over 100 countries. As a result, it became acknowledged as one of the benchmark measures of a bank’s financial health. While the simplicity of the 1988 Accord was an asset in promoting its acceptance, today its simplicity is quickly becoming a liability for some bankers and supervisors alike. Over the past 16 years, the methodologies for measuring and managing risk have evolved in ways that the architects of the 1988 Accord could not have anticipated.

Durmuş Yılmaz: Overview of the Turkish economy in the light of new global realities Speech by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the International Arab Banking Summit (IABS 2010), Istanbul, 18 June 2010. *  *  *  Esteemed governors and distinguished guests, At the outset, I want to express my gratitude to the Union of Arab Banks along with Turkish Banking Association, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and the World Union of Arab Bankers for their efforts in organizing this summit. As the Central Bank of Turkey, we are honored to be a part of this prestigious event congregating such an esteemed group of participants. In this keynote speech, first I want to discuss the post-crisis episode in a global context. Then I will continue with the extent to which the Turkish economy has been affected by the downturn in global economy. Finally, I will conclude with the opportunities and prospects in our region in the light of the new global realities. Dear participants,  As we all observe from the latest data, signs of recovery have continued in the first half of 2010, albeit at variable speeds across countries and regions. Coordinated efforts of the global community have been so far successful in averting a downward spiral similar to the one experienced during the Great Depression. Although global economy is back on its feet, there are several risks involved in this recovery process and many challenges lie ahead.
We hit it off immediately. It just so happened that both of us had been thinking about the natural rate of interest. And since Governor Meyer had raised the subject, we moved quickly to develop an approach to answer his questions. Although we didn't know it then, we were following exactly the problem the other John Williams laid out in 1931.3 Simply put, Thomas had a hammer. And we found a new nail. The hammer was the Kalman filter, which is about inferring the behavior of an object from its effects on other objects. And the nail was r-star. A Fast Start On December 14, 2000, after a few short months of working together, we wrote our ideas and results in a memo to the Board of Governors.4 The memo started with the bold declaration: "This memo is a first report on a broader project to study alternative definitions and estimates of the equilibrium real rate (R*) and to evaluate their usefulness in the conduct of monetary policy." And the Laubach-Williams (LW) model was born. Starting in May 2001, r-star estimates made their way into the staff Bluebook prepared for the FOMC.5 Looking back, I am struck by how quickly these ideas came together. I must also acknowledge the unwavering support we received from senior leadership to bring this new research to policymakers. Within a year of writing the memo, we put out the academic version of this work.6,7 The original paper included a section on timevarying r-star's implications for monetary policy.

In any event, you need to be rather confident that the potential tensions are indeed likely to be minor, or at least short-lived, because, if they do turn out to be serious, then you could be stuck either with a weak Euro - and more rather than less inflation, higher rather than lower interest rates over the medium-term, and exchange rate instability against outside currencies - or, if the European central bank is allowed to do its job in accordance with its statutes, you could be stuck with persistent stagnation and unemployment across the economically weaker parts of the Euro-area. It’s not enough, it seems to me, to shrug one’s shoulders and say “well, that’s what happens now anyway within individual countries”; at least within individual countries there are alternative adjustment mechanisms, in the form of labour mobility and fiscal redistribution, to moderate the tensions, which will be much less effective within the Euro-area. The architects of the Maastricht Treaty clearly knew all about the Beast, and they evidently shared my scepticism about it turning naturally into Prince Charming. The famous convergence criteria are there precisely in order to reduce the risks of tensions emerging after the start of the Euro. One can argue about how far they do in fact reduce the risks. But it would be a reckless gamble to charge ahead if even those criteria were not met - sustainably, and in substance rather than just in form. So there needs to be a serious debate.
Finally, drawing upon lessons from the recent experience I will talk about risk management in monetary policy, and what it implies in such an uncertain economic environment as we face today. Commodity prices and domestic adjustment Recent increases in the prices of commodities have been dramatic: many reached record highs in a very short period of time. This increase has been particularly broad across commodities and unexpectedly persistent. Commodity price indices (index 1967=100) 500  1000  400  800  300  600  200  400  100  200  0  00 Total Food  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  0 08 Metals  Source: Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). BIS Review 39/2008  1  Copper price (US cents/Lb.) 2006  2007  305  323  2008 (f)  2009 (f)  Jan. MPR 295  Mar. --  Jan. MPR 250  Mar. --  Deutsche Bank (7 mar) Scotiabank (20 mar) JPMorgan Chase (14 mar) Barclays (13 mar) Merril Lynch(19 mar) Cochilco (9 jan) IB's Mean  332 295 315 354 308 310 321  325 325 310 343 320 310 325  274 -228 295 291 270 272  306 250 246 326 291 270 284  Futures (1)  316  368  314  357  Actual Mean (2)  313  350  Central Bank of Chile  (1) Futures consider average of the last 10 working days prior to 20 March 2008.

(2) Up to 25 March 2008. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks (IB), Consensus Forecast and International Monetary Fund. WTI oil price $  2008 (f)  2007  2009 (f)  Jan. MPR 93  Mar.08  Jan. MPR 88  Mar.08  DoE (11 mar) Deutsche Bank (07 mar) JP Morgan Chase (14 mar) Scotiabank (14 mar) Lehman Brothers (29 feb) Barclays (19 mar)  87 80 70 90  82 75 65 --  87  94 85 82 95 86 101  --  86 80 75 95 78 --  Goldman Sachs (04 mar) Merril Lynch (19 mar)  97 76  97 102  --  ---  IB's Mean (1)  83  90  74  83  97  97  --  --  Central Bank of Chile  Actual Mean (2)  72  (1) Excludes Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch. (2) Up to 24 March 2008. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks (IB), Consensus Forecast and International Monetary Fund. We are in the presence of a significant relative price shock. The relative price of foodstuff and energy has changed in a number of countries. Given the persistency of these international relative prices changes, domestic prices are adjusting accordingly, giving the appropriate signals for resource reallocation. Chile is an interesting case in this respect.
Following the impetus of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board, there is a current trend in accounting reform for reducing the scope for mark-to-market and for moving from an incurred loss model to a forward looking model of provisioning. In particular, both the IFRS and the US GAAP will include an amortized cost category for financial assets such as loans. In my view, these types of changes in the accounting rules constitute the first, and to my mind the most powerful line of defense to limit the procyclicality brought forward by the crisis. I also want to point that even we if are witnessing some significant progress between the two sets of accounting standards, I am convinced that further convergence is needed. II. Indeed, when it comes to the sources of differences and discrepancies between US and European regulation frameworks, I’d like to bring to your attention the following issues: –  Regarding OTC derivatives, further consistency at technical and implementation level is key in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage;  –  The convergence between IFRS and US GAAP is particularly needed to allow for a level-playing field implementation of some regulatory requirements, such as a leverage ratio, over different jurisdictions. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2.1 Regarding the OTC derivatives reform, there is a great degree of parallelism in the EU and US approaches, but issues arise as the details are worked out.

Notes The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
As more stores and restaurants introduce self-checkout facilities to improve productivity, we need a unified POS – a single terminal, preferably mobile – that will: –  allow merchants to enhance efficiency by simplifying front-to-back integration; and  –  enhance the shopping or dining experience of customers. Second, reduce the use of cash and cheques. •  It costs as much as $ to process each cheque. •  The cost of cash is less obvious but just as real: in transportation, collection, delivery and protection. •  We need to promote greater adoption of new payments technologies, including: –  electronic Direct Debit Authorisation; and  –  fund transfers using mobile numbers or social networks  MAS and the Ministry of Finance have been co-leading a multi-agency effort to address these issues and guide the development of efficient digital and mobile payment systems. •  The aim is to make payments swift, simple and secure. •  The vision is less cash, less cheques, fewer cards. Third, regulatory reporting and surveillance. As the financial system becomes increasingly complex and inter-connected, MAS needs to sharpen its surveillance of the system with more timely, comprehensive and accurate information to identify and mitigate emerging risks. The vision is an interactive, technology-enabled regulatory reporting framework which will: •  reduce ongoing reporting costs through the use of common data standards and automation;  •  enable the dissemination of anonymised information to industry analysts and academics for deeper analysis of the financial system and its risks.

the Chinese in the US, Jews in different countries or the Portuguese in France). A diaspora is characterized by an internal need to integrate, act together, help one another and to share one vision of the future. This internal motivation has been recognized as a fundamental factor behind the success of a community. It has been observed that talks, discussions and attempts to convince one another will never lead to the level of involvement and commitment present in diasporas, where participation and activities are voluntary. ‘Death of distance’ causes diasporas to be increasingly extensive. One example is the Mexican diaspora where the distance between two members was “up to two phone calls” already 20 years ago. This means that a person in need who has called up the diaspora for help had to wait only two phone calls to find somebody who would be able to help. As a matter of fact, this very topic is already known to us, Poles. I am quite sure that you are familiar with the articles in the Polish press in the period from Poland's accession to the EU to the mid-2006. These articles lamented the fact that during this period more than a million people, mainly young Poles from the so-called PLN 1,200-gross-pay-generation, left Poland for other EU countries in search for work.