samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the decade before 2007, bank paybills, broadly defined, grew at broadly the same rate as shareholders’ profits. In the 10 years before the crisis, for the global banks, profits attributable to shareholders averaged 60% of the paybill. For the big UK banks, profits were about 75% of the paybill. Since the crisis that picture has changed markedly. In 2013, profits attributable to shareholders were down from 60% to around 25% of the large global banks’ paybills in 2013. Put simply, shareholders have gone from getting 60 cents for every dollar in pay for staff to getting 25 cents per dollar. Across the big UK banks in 2013, the fraction had fallen to just 2% – ie to 2 pence per pound paid to staff. Averages, of course, mask some very different performances by individual institutions. But it is noticeable that, since the crisis, for the industry as a whole, employees have received a larger share of a smaller pie relative to shareholders. And in the UK, due in no small part to one-off factors, this effect has been particularly pronounced. UK banks’ returns on equity would have been nearly 6 percentage points higher in 2013 if the ratio of staff costs to the sum of staff costs and shareholders’ profit had been at its 2000–07 average. The sluggish adjustment in pay may well reflect the expectation that returns in banking are set to increase in the future. There are good reasons why they may do so.

A crucial part of this more intensive supervision is not just to look at the activities of the firm, but also much greater scrutiny of the quality of its governance and management. This includes a very thorough and careful assessment of the suitability of those who run regulated firms, as well as time spent looking at the Board as a whole to ensure that it has sufficient experience and character. For the largest firms, the PRA Board is involved in these judgments and in approving the appointments of the most senior staff. And, in marked contrast to the pre-crisis period, there is a much greater focus on a firm’s business model and the firm’s understanding of their vulnerabilities. This enables the supervisors to assess if there are risks posed to financial stability by the way that the firm chooses to conduct its business, or if indeed it is not viable. The aim is not that the supervisors should run firms. But they should not be shy to question if executives and boards have the right capabilities, if they understand the business model and the particular risks to which it is exposed and, overall, whether that business model can be operated successfully while managing the risks it entails. These three changes in the official landscape – macroprudential policy, more powerful international governance and more intensive supervision have shaped, and will continue to shape the world in which banks operate.
Øystein Olsen: Managing Norway’s oil wealth Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the “Desemberkonferansen” oil and gas conference, Kristiansund, 3 December 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found on the Norges Bank’s website: Charts (PDF). Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. In 1969, on the day before Christmas Eve, Norway as a nation received the gift of the century: we struck oil! The Ekofisk oil field was the largest subsea oil field ever discovered. The discovery of oil was the start of an extraordinary era for the Norwegian economy. Chart: OECD countries’ per capita GDP in 1971 When the first oil was brought to the surface in 1971, income levels in Norway were low compared with other western countries. Chart: OECD countries’ per capita GDP in 2014 The picture has reversed since then. We have gradually caught up with the wealthiest nations. Measured by GDP per capita, Norway now ranks at the very top. It was established at an early stage that Norway’s oil and gas resources belong to the Norwegian people. The tax system and framework conditions for the petroleum industry were designed so that the large revenues from this sector would accrue to the state. The stage was set for greater prosperity, with prospects for growth in both public and private consumption. The discovery of oil in the North Sea generated a wealth of opportunity for Norwegian business and industry.

Until now, the U.S. dollar has played a dominant role in world trade quite out of proportion to the size of U.S. trade flows. This is particularly the case in Asia, where, despite Japan’s strong commercial and financial influence, the yen has failed to play a major role as an anchor. While the Hong Kong dollar has been well served by its solid link to the U.S. dollar, less solid commitments to the dollar in other economies have proved to be expensive and disruptive. Thus, despite the pre-eminence of the U.S. dollar, the Asian region as a whole lacks a viable exchange rate anchor. This is a problem that has to be addressed, and we would do well to look into it, especially once the current crisis has subsided. We have benefited from our own peg to the U.S. dollar, and other countries could similarly benefit from links to key currencies when they are in a strong enough position to make such links fully credible. The introduction of the euro will challenge the supremacy of the dollar elsewhere in other hemispheres by introducing a second currency pole in the global currency system. It will also offer another solid investment option to Asian central banks. The time may come when we might want to consider the possibility of our own Asian currency - perhaps something along the lines of an Asian Currency Unit - that would form an anchor currency for our region.
But, on the other hand, a tightening of US monetary policy and the resulting US dollar strength could expose the macroeconomic vulnerabilities of EMEs and potentially trigger financial instability. Experience of the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Brazilian currency crisis in 1999 and the Argentine economic crisis in the early 2000s clearly indicates EMEs that had accumulated significant macro-financial imbalances could be vulnerable during a strong US dollar cycle. 6. In fact, broadly speaking, most instances of financial turbulence in EMEs could be considered to be some form of balance of payments crisis, which were usually preceded by heavy capital inflows to EMEs that led to the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, such as asset price inflation, strong credit growth and current account balance deterioration. These problems were particularly serious in the past when some EMEs violated the “impossible  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  trinity” by pursuing at the same time, a de facto dollar peg, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy. These conditions tend to encourage an accumulation of significant short-term external debts in the EMEs. Eventually, a combination of US rate hikes and strengthening US dollar generated momentum for capital outflows from the EMEs, exposing their fault lines and macroeconomic vulnerabilities as domestic liquidity conditions tightened. Those with weak fundamentals and significant external imbalances could face speculative attacks, sharp currency depreciation, a surge in value of their US dollar denominated debts leading to a financial crisis. 7. Would history necessarily repeat itself?

Lord Mayor, you know the importance of learning, and the Chancellor has emphasised again this evening the role of education in shaping Britain’s place in the world economy. Both the Chancellor and I have been enthusiastic about the theme of your mayoralty: “City of London – City of Learning”. And all of us here tonight would like to pay tribute to your work since you became Lord Mayor, and to thank both the Lady Mayoress and yourself for the splendid hospitality which you have extended to us all this evening. So I invite you all to rise and join me in the traditional toast of good health and prosperity to "The Lord Mayor and the Lady Mayoress". BIS Review 69/2007  3
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  industry, some partnerships became public companies, in part, so that they could more easily obtain the capital needed to expand rapidly. For example, when Goldman Sachs went public in 1999, it had about 15,000 employees and $ billion of assets. Just eight years later, the firm had expanded to 35,000 employees and $ trillion of assets. In the mid-1990s, the top five banks in the United States had total assets of $ trillion or about 14 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The top securities firms had total assets of $ billion, or about 9 percent of GDP. By the end of 2007, the top five banks had assets of $ trillion or 49 percent of GDP. Similarly, the top securities firms accounted for $ trillion, or about 27 percent of GDP. In addition, the firms’ off-balance-sheet exposures rose sharply. Second, the complexity and interconnectedness of the largest financial firms increased markedly. Factors behind this include the adoption of a universal banking model by some commercial bank holding companies and the rapid growth of trading businesses, especially the over the counter (OTC) derivatives market. In the early 1980s, there were no true U.S. “universal banks” that combined traditional commercial banking with capital markets and underwriting activities. By 2007, there were several operating in the United States, including Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, UBS, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank.

Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus: Shifting tides - future of finance Opening remarks by Ms Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the MyFintech Week 2019 "Shifting Tides: Future of Finance", Kuala Lumpur, 17 June 2019. * * * I would like to welcome all of you to the inaugural MyFintech Week and Financial Industry Conference hosted by Bank Negara Malaysia. This event is being held at a time that brings together two important mileposts for the Malaysian financial services industry - the beginnings of an exciting era of digitalisation and a new chapter in the development of the financial sector as the current Financial Sector Blueprint approaches the end of its horizon in 2020. "Shifting tides: Future of finance" was deliberately chosen as the theme of the event for a reason. For much of history, human civilisation could not reasonably explain how ocean tides occurred. It was only through the discovery by Sir Issac Newton and the dedication of scientists over many centuries that we are able to understand it today. Like ocean tides, the future of finance may be hard to fathom at the beginning. Yet it offers many opportunities and risks. Perhaps most importantly, it also underscores the heavy responsibility and ownership that we collectively bear to build a financial system that is safe, reliable and truly serves the needs of the people. In my remarks today, I will discuss what this entails in order to develop a financial system for all Malaysians.
A reminder of the policies implemented by the ECB and their underpinning. You will remember that the first response to the financial turmoil in the summer of 2007 came from the Eurosystem, which injected liquidity of over EUR 90 billion into the European interbank system which was on the verge of seizing up completely. Since then, the Eurosystem has provided concrete and often crucial responses to the different manifestations of the euro area crisis. To do so, it has redesigned its policy measures both from a qualitative point of view – by creating new instruments – and a quantitative point of view (the size of its balance sheet has trebled since the start of the crisis). As regards instruments, we have used both: •  The “standard” instrument par excellence: interest rates. The ECB’s monetary policy has been very accommodative for several years, with key interest rates currently at historically low levels and negative real interest rates in large parts of the euro area. •  A broad range of “non-standard” instruments that can be grouped into two categories: i) liquidity-providing instruments (with the fixed rate full allotment policy, the expansion of eligible collateral, and the extension of maturities up to three years with the VLTROs) and ii) instruments making it possible to intervene directly on the most dysfunctional market segments (the CBPP and SMP). This diversification and broadening of the Eurosystem’s interventions has naturally raised questions about the ultimate goals pursued, the methods used and the possible risks incurred.

2 Hye Jin Rho, Hayley Brown, and Shawn Fremstad, A Basic Demographic Profile of Workers in Frontline  Industries, Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2020, and Tiana N Rogers, Charles R Rogers, Elizabeth VanSant-Webb, Lily Y Gu, Bin Yan, Fares Qeadan, Racial Disparities in COVID-19 Mortality Among Essential Workers in the United States, World Medical & Health Policy, August 5, 2020. 3 Ruchi Avtar, Rajashri Chakrabarti, and Maxim Pinkovskiy, Understanding the Racial and Income Gap in COVID-  19: Essential Workers, Liberty Street Economics, January 12, 2021. 4 Ruchi Avtar, Rajashri Chakrabarti, and Maxim Pinkovskiy, Unequal Burdens: Racial Differences in ICU Stress  during the Third Wave of COVID-19, Liberty Street Economics, August 9, 2021. 5 New York Fed on Medium, New Initiative Focuses on the Social Determinants of Health, April 7, 2021. 6 New York Fed on Medium, Exploring the Economic Benefits of Broader Support for Mental Health, June 2, 2021. 7 New York Fed, The Fourth Trimester and Beyond: The Case for Broad Investments in Maternal and Child Health. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
International Women’s Day is an occasion to look back on past struggles and accomplishments but even more importantly a time to look ahead to untapped potential and opportunities that await future generations of women. In Zambia today we recognize the strides that have been made by women in national development and we look ahead at the challenges that are before us as we strive to achieve our goal of gender equality. In this regard, Zambia is a signatory to many international instruments and Conventions seeking to empower women. These include the United nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. This declaration calls for the equal representation of women and men in the decision making structures of member states at all levels, and also for the achievement of at least 30 per cent target of women in political and decision-making structures. I must concede here, Ladies and Gentlemen, that although we have made significant strides as a country in women representation; we are yet to meet the target of 30 per cent. I still believe that this target is not impossible to attain. With concerted effort we can achieve and even exceed it because this country has scores of women with untapped potential. This exhibition gives us an opportunity to identify this potential and encourage our women to stand up, and be counted and contribute to the development of this country.

Caleb M Fundanga: Financing for gender equality Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the Financial Institutions exhibition in commemoration of International Women’s Day, Lusaka, 5 March 2008. * • • • • • • • •  *  *  The Honourable Minister for Gender and Women in Development The Country Coordinator of the United Nations System The Permanent Secretary, Gender in Development Division The Director, Environmental Council of Zambia Chief Executives of Financial Service Providers Heads of Non Governmental Organisations Invited Guests Ladies and Gentlemen  I am honoured this morning to address you at the launch of this important Financial Sector Exhibition by financial service providers, in commemoration of the International Women’s Day for 2008, under the theme “Financing for Gender Equality”. The purpose of this exhibition is for financial service providers to showcase how they are contributing to financing for gender equality. It also provides an opportunity for the various institutions to market financial products that can be accessed by women. A further objective is the sensitization of the financial service providers and indeed the public at large to the need for gender mainstreaming in access to finance. International Women’s Day began with the declaration of International Year for Women in 1975. Since then, many countries world-wide celebrate International Women’s Day to recognize the achievements of women without regard to national, ethnic, cultural, economic or political divisions.
The international community turns to the IMF in times of crisis, in part because it is an effective institution that performs the vital functions that are called for, but also for the very simple reason that the world has no one else to turn to. The IMF has played a pivotal role in presenting the initial lessons from the crisis, in providing finance to countries with temporary balance of payments needs, and in preparing the overall framework for the international policy response. When the good times return, we must avoid memory failure and remember these facts of life. The financial crisis has left a legacy. Large public and private debt, high unemployment and wide global imbalances continue to challenge the global framework for economic policy. Shaping the global governance structure In recent years, increasingly assertive non-statutory bodies have emerged in the area of international economic and financial collaboration, most notably the G20. The global crisis pushed the G20 into closer cooperation and at new levels. As an effective and powerful group, the G20 featured prominently in the broad international efforts to stabilise the global economy in late 2008 and early 2009. Without its prompt and comprehensive action, the consequences of the crisis would have been much worse. It is in the interest of all that the large and systemically important countries discuss issues of common interest. Their successful collaboration benefits not only themselves, but also the rest of the world.

Clayton, G. British Insurance, London, Elek, 1971. Debbage, S. and Dickinson, S. ‘The rationale for the prudential regulation and supervision of insurers’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q3 2013. Finsinger, J. and Pauly, M. (eds), The economics of insurance regulation, London, Macmillan, 1986. HeinOnline, Citation: 4 Statutes of the Realm 978, 1547–1624. Leonard, A. ‘Contingent commitment: The development of English marine insurance in the context of New Insitutional Economic, 1577-1720’, in Coffman, D’Maris, Leonard, A.B. and Neal, Larry (eds): Questioning ‘credible commitment’: perspectives on the rise of financial capitalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013. Lewin, C.G. Pensions and Insurance Before 1800: A Social History, East Lothian, Tuckwell, 2003. Persaud, A. ‘How Not to Regulate Insurance Markets: The Risks and Dangers of Solvency II’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PB15-5, April 2015. Pearson, R. and Lonnborg, M. ‘Regulatory Regimes and Multinational Insurers before 1914’, The Business History Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, (Spring 2008), pp. 59–86. Plantin, G. and Rochet, JC. When insurers go bust, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007. Raynes, H. A History of British Insurance, London, Pitman, 1968. Rawlings, P. ‘What can history tell us about insurance regulation?’ in Andromachi, G. and Goldby, M. (eds), Systemic Risk and the Future of Insurance Regulation, London, Informa Law, 2015. Thoyts, R. Insurance Theory and Practice, Oxford, Routledge, 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9
Consistent with the predictions of Merton’s model, a leverage strategy has simultaneously boosted risks and returns to holding bank equity. Chart 5 summarises this strategic evolution in banking over the past century of so. It is based on a simple calibration of the Merton model. Leverage is shown along the x-axis and return on equity along the y-axis. The lines are iso-volatility contours, drawn for different levels of underlying asset volatility. Banking has migrated in a North-Easterly direction, as banks have assumed greater asset risk and higher leverage. In the Merton framework these strategies raise equity returns, precisely as we observe in practice. There is a second, largely silent, factor that contributed to this century-long rise in bank leverage – tax. Debt interest costs tend to be tax-deductible from profits in most developed countries. But the cost of equity financing is not typically tax-deductible. This biases corporate financing towards debt and away from equity. This tax non-neutrality is hardly new. In the UK, it dates back more than a century. Tax legislation for interest and dividends was first established in the UK in 1803. Throughout the 19th century, however, neither dividends nor debt interest were automatically deducted from profits when calculating company tax. Payments to debt-holders and shareholders were made net of tax and, roughly-speaking, treated equally. This equal treatment was justified on the grounds that the profit of a business should not be affected by its method of financing.

Settlement risks  BIS Review 46/1999  2  with repo transactions, however, are significantly lower because in our system, collateral must only be transferred between accounts by the central securities depository. This is a simple and straightforward process which - if necessary - could even be implemented manually. Consequently, we encourage banks to pay special attention to their holdings of repo collateral when engaging in their liquidity planning. Furthermore, we will considerably expand our repo basket by including selected foreign currency securities. This step which is primarily motivated by our intention to transact also with counterparties abroad obviously produces a useful sideeffect on collateral availability over year-end. It is our clear commitment to provide liquidity sufficient to smooth market developments before and at the transition. Of course, all banks, especially those which do not engage in repo transactions, can avail themselves of significantly increased lombard limits just for the year-end, if they wish so. As regards the distribution and the available stock of banknotes, we have made the necessary provisions. After having put a new banknote series into circulation recently, our inventories are more abundant than they would have to be even in a worst-case scenario. Final remarks Let me conclude by making two final remarks. Firstly, the need for successful active and reactive communication can hardly be overestimated. The millennium has an almost magical fascination which may stimulate crisis fantasies and is perfectly capable of triggering herd effects.