samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Demography is also important today, but the importance of a reasonable ratio of workers to pensioners has become somewhat less obvious because of the way we now try to ensure financial security in old age. It is probably no coincidence that the Norwegian expression for the end of our working career is “to withdraw with a pension”. The equivalent expression in  1  This figure has been adjusted for estimated extraordinary share dividends as from 2000. 1/7  English, “to retire”, means simply to withdraw. There are no associations with financial benefits. In Norway, everyone is entitled to a state pension at the age of 67. How much each of us will receive depends both on the size of our income through our working career and on the path of growth in the economy. With its current structure, the National Insurance Scheme will be facing a considerable challenge in the future when an increasing proportion of the population is over 67 years old. Many employees receive an extra pension payment in the form of an occupational pension. In Norway, this will soon apply to virtually all employees. Over the past few years, private pension insurance has become more common in Norway. In 2004, individual pension agreements had increased by 13 per cent since 1997. Membership in collective pension schemes increased by 22 per cent in the same period. It is likely that the debate around the state pension system has in some cases generated concern about how much the National Insurance Scheme will provide.

24 For reasons of self-image and social identity, these boys systematically underperformed relative to their ability, not wishing to be seen to be “acting white”. Some of the self-same social identity problems may exist in banking. An experimental study in 2014 looked at the incidence of cheating in different groups. 25 It found not only that bankers were more likely to cheat, but that this cheating was more prevalent when people were reminded that they were bankers. They then “acted banker”. In other words, social  21  O’Neill (2014). 22  Labaton Sucharow (2013). 23  For example, Akerlof and Kranton (2010). 24  Fryer (2006). 25  Cohn et al (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  identity mattered. If that social identity is defined by cheating or by failing to fulfil fiduciary functions, these behaviours will become self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling. If this evidence is right, it suggests that the culture problem in banking may be deeply ingrained, psychologically and sociologically. That still begs the question, however, of what happened to change the social identity of banking in the first place. The crisis alone is not a sufficient explanation. Complaint cases taken by the public to the Financial Ombudsman were rising prior to the crisis, despite bankers riding a reputational high over that period. The erosion of trust in banking appears to have been secular. In making sense of these trends, a useful distinction is between personalised trust and generalised trust.
Admittedly, low productivity gains can be explained in terms of the intense employment generation in the economy and of a composition of growth which, in recent years, has been largely based on construction and on services. But they nevertheless reflect low productive investment, a limited incorporation of technological improvements into the stock of productive capital and the relative lack of competition in certain segments of the economy. BIS Review 39/2004  5  Safeguarding a sound competitive position for the Spanish economy is undoubtedly a priority for economic policy management within EMU. As I have said, the activities most exposed to foreign competition have begun to feel the effects of the losses in competitiveness that have built up. And after squeezing their margins in recent years, they have begun to adjust their staff levels. Competitive pressures are heightening, moreover, as new competitors emerge on the international scene with a similar specialisation pattern to Spain and with a notable edge due to their low labour costs. In particular, the enlargement of the EU to 25 countries, while entailing the opening up of potential new markets for Spanish products, means above all a substantial increase in competition. The Spanish productive system must prove itself able to respond to this with dynamism, innovation and flexibility, as it has in the past when opening up to its external environment. The second source of risk lies in the patterns of financial behaviour of the private sector of the economy.

This would reduce the number of “false positive” rates on transactions and reduce the costs of checks. This is one example of how a common approach to using payment data globally, harmonising our implementation of payment message standards and tackling potential barriers to sharing payment data across jurisdictions could reap significant benefits. The G20 roadmap for cross-border payments highlights key actions for jurisdictions, system operators and the wider financial system and payments industry to undertake and I would encourage all of us who are involved to redouble our efforts[9] . Through that collective effort we will make payments, quicker, smoother and cheaper for all. The benefits of richer, more structured data, including payments data, will only be fully realised if data users are able to access and extract value from the ever increasing pool of data they now have access to. The financial sector has been at the forefront of using artificial intelligence techniques such as machine learning to extract value from the explosion of timely data they now have access to, as the Bank’s surveys have found. [10] It’s obvious why as adoptions of technologies like machine learning have the potential to make financial services and markets more efficient, accessible and tailored to consumer needs[11]. I don’t have time to do anything like justice to this subject today but before I leave it let me just return to the example of fraud detection and anti-money laundering. Here machine learning is particularly useful for card authorisations that flow through the payments chain, very much in realtime.
For now, from observing the data we see that one of the strongest factors in the downturn of both domestic demand and world trade, has been the global crisis of confidence, understood as worsened expectations and increased uncertainty around the world, not overlooking the impact of financial tightening that hit hardest in September and October of last year. The sudden and widespread nature of the downfall of demand across countries that are so heterogeneous is proof of how difficult it is to differentiate and to avoid the instant impact of such an acute crisis. The downfall made no distinction based on the economies’ strengths or weaknesses. GDP fell in nearly 90 per cent of the countries in the fourth quarter of last year (Figure 1). However, macroeconomic policies can build a solid base from where to weather the shock coming from abroad and create countercyclical impulses to mitigate them, thus making room for a rapid, sustained recuperation. BIS Review 65/2009  1  A few years back, it was hard to think that a world recession this big would not translate into major problems in our country and in developing economies in general, but it has not happened. The effects of the crisis in Chile have been mitigated thanks to policy efforts and to our own strengths as a country. This crisis will bring about long discussions and analyses of its effects, and lessons will be drawn.

Table 2 Economic growth and current account (annual change, percent) 2007  2008  2009 (f)  GDP National income  4.7 7.1  3.2 3.8  -0.75 to 0.25 -2.8  Domestic demand Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports  7.8 12.0 7.1 7.6 14.9  7.4 19.5 4.2 3.1 12.9  -4.7 -14.3 0.2 -1.7 -10.6  Current account (% of GDP)  4.4  -2.0  -1.8  (f) Projection. Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS Review 65/2009  11  Figure 9 Effective inflation and inflationary outlook Inflation indicators  EES: Inflation expectations  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2 01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3 2  2 02  09  CPI CPIX CPIX1 CPI minus foods and energy  03  04  05  06  Two years ahead  07  08  09  One year ahead  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau (INE).
What is more, the Swiss franc has only seen a moderate rise against the euro. As Swiss households and companies are on a solid financial footing, they are shielded – so to speak – against a tightening in credit conditions. Lastly, the stronger Swiss franc vis-à-vis the US dollar has limited the impact of higher commodity prices. Several other factors, like a robust labour market and a competitive industrial sector, could cushion the negative repercussions of the financial crisis in Switzerland. Against this backdrop, the SNB is expecting real GDP to grow between 1.5% and 2% this year. Inflation should be below the 2% mark again in the course of 2008. These forecasts still involve substantial uncertainties. Given the present state of the economy, the current interest level seems to be appropriate. However, the SNB will keep a close eye on further economic developments and inflation so that it is able to identify when action needs to be taken and react in a quick and flexible manner. BIS Review 51/2008  1

If the central bank allowed transfers from bank accounts to the digital currency, it would have to cap the amount a single individual could hold in the digital currency, perhaps at the level of the median monthly salary. In the absolute extreme, the central bank could also determine what goods the helicopter money could be spent on. For example, real estate might be excluded in order to prevent a buildup of bubbles in the housing market. In a nutshell, any digital currency used by central banks for monetary policy purposes would have to be heavily customized and tailor-made. It would hardly resemble any of the cryptocurrencies, from bitcoin to bilur, as we know them. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Central banks have needed to find new ways to support a financial system under great stress and to buttress economic activity. Moreover, the crisis also revealed a major hole in our framework for managing the economic and credit cycles. So tonight I want to discuss some of the actions we have taken in dealing with the crisis and subsequent recession, as well as explaining some of the attendant reforms to the policy framework. Let me begin by rewinding the clock five years to August 2007 when financial markets first seized up. UK GDP had grown continuously and at a steady pace for the preceding 64 quarters. And consumer price inflation had been within a percentage point of the Government’s inflation target for every month bar one since the Bank was given operational responsibility for monetary policy in 1997. Such stability was historically unprecedented. But the United Kingdom was not unique: other advanced economies also experienced a long period of unusually benign macroeconomic outcomes. The period of unusual stability led households, businesses and especially financial institutions to underestimate the risks they were exposed to. Together with historically low interest rates, at both the short and long end of the yield curve, that encouraged a debt-fuelled “search for yield”. The associated expansion in credit is shown for this country in Chart 1.

Chart 2: Capital and leverage ratios of major global banks(a) Chart 2a: Risk-based capital ratios, end-2006 Per cent  Chart 2b: Leverage ratios, end-2006(b) Per cent  16 Surviving banks Failed banks  14  16 Surviving banks  14  Failed banks  12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  Sources: Capital IQ, SNL, published accounts, Laeven and Valencia (2010) and Bank calculations. (a) The classification of bank distress is based on Laeven & Valencia (2010), updated to reflect failure or government intervention since August 2009. (b) Total assets have been adjusted on a best-efforts basis to achieve comparability between institutions reporting under US GAAP and IFRS. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Chart 3: Output losses relative to trend after financial crises(a) Per cent 20 Interquartile range-past episodes Total range - past episodes  10  Mean 0  -10  -20  -30 0  1  2  3  4 5 Years from start of crisis  6  7  8  Sources: IMF and OECD. (a) The episodes examined are taken from IMF (2009).
At the Bank, we not only recruit widely but also encourage colleagues to collaborate across the organisation and spend time in different areas to develop the varied skills required of a modern central banker. 4  In large organisations, developing future leaders requires discipline. For example, Vittorio Colao, the CEO of Vodafone, reviews the company’s top 200 executives annually to assess performance, set development actions and manage those who are having difficulties. The Executive Committee at Vodafone then discusses the progress of a different subset of their leaders at each Executive Meeting, making the process transparent and rigorous. The Bank of England has adopted a similar approach. Developing the right people also requires a culture of inclusion that values diverse ideas, encourages open debate, and empowers people at all levels to take initiative. In a moment, I will come onto the steps the Bank of England is taking in these regards. Finally, for leaders, having the right people also means being able to draw on trusted outside perspectives such as an external advisory board or informal contacts with other leaders. I’m fortunate that in my role I can regularly share experiences with a wide range of leaders in diverse fields. Of these, the most important sounding boards are my fellow central bankers. In this circle of trust, we can have regular, frank discussions of issues we either don’t understand or that are particularly sensitive. The second critical thing that leaders do is to set the priorities for their organisation.

Reflections on Leadership in a Disruptive Age Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England Regent’s University London Monday 19 February 2018  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth for her assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  I. Introduction  I was asked to reflect tonight on leadership and values. This is somewhat dangerous territory, and certainly one that creates a target-rich environment for critics who can spot gaps between preaching and practising. Indeed, a review of a recent book on leadership and values suggested that it’s very publication signalled overconfidence – the complacency before the storm – and cautioned that CEOs and investors ought to be wary of the ‘curse of authorship’. There are countless examples of pride coming before the fall in finance. Think of those who dubbed the period before the Global Financial Crisis the ‘Great Moderation’. Or the four most expensive words in the English language. 1  But, because we can learn from experience, and because leadership lies at the heart of Regent’s University’s mission- literally ‘Developing tomorrow’s global leaders’ - I will forge ahead. I will begin by reviewing the main activities of leaders and the core attributes of leadership. I will try to address what leadership is and isn’t and whether it’s inherent or can be developed. I will conclude with some perspectives on the challenges and opportunities you will face leading in our disruptive age. II.
On the basis of current information and prevailing futures prices for oil, annual HICP inflation is expected to remain very low or negative in the months ahead. Supported by the favourable impact of our recent monetary policy measures on aggregate demand, the impact of the lower euro exchange rate and the assumption of somewhat higher oil prices in the years ahead, inflation rates are expected to start increasing gradually later in 2015. This assessment is also broadly reflected in the March 2015 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual HICP inflation at 0.0% in 2015, 1.5% in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017. In comparison with the December 2014 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the inflation projection for 2015 has been revised downwards, mainly reflecting the fall in oil prices. In contrast, the inflation projection for 2016 has been revised slightly upwards, also reflecting the expected impact of our recent monetary policy measures. The Governing Council will continue to closely monitor the risks to the outlook for price developments over the medium term. In this context, we will focus in particular on the passthrough of our monetary policy measures, geopolitical developments, and exchange rate and energy price developments. When discussing the economic outlook and the new projections, the Governing Council acknowledged that the staff projections are conditional on the full implementation of all our policy measures. Moreover, the March staff projections extend the horizon to 2017.

In this context, the Governing Council again stressed that the degree of forecast uncertainty tends to increase with the length of the projection horizon. Turning to the monetary analysis, recent data confirm the gradual increase in underlying growth in broad money (M3). The annual growth rate of M3 increased to 4.1% in January 2015, up from 3.8% in December 2014. Annual growth in M3 continues to be supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 growing at an annual rate of 9.0% in January. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was –0.9% in January 2015, after –1.1% in December 2014, continuing its gradual recovery from a trough of –3.2% in February 2014. The three-month cumulated net lending flows were positive in January for the second consecutive month, compared with sizeable net redemptions still recorded a year ago. Despite these improvements, the dynamics of loans to non-financial corporations remain subdued and continue to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) increased further to 0.9% in January 2015, after 0.8% in December 2014. Our recent monetary policy measures should support a further improvement in credit flows.
But achieving this will take political will and the courage to take difficult decisions. Earlier, I discussed the phenomenon of insiders and outsiders on the housing market and the fact that the measures Finansinspektionen has adopted so far to reduce the risks inherent in household indebtedness mainly affect outsiders. The reforms I have discussed today would also affect the conditions for insiders on the housing market. They are in a strong position, which has probably contributed to the desired reforms having failed to materialise so far. These are difficult decisions that must be taken, and they will affect many people. It is therefore important that reforms be implemented in stages, so that insiders gradually have time to adapt to new conditions. Having said this, I consider it important to look at the housing market from a longterm socio-economic perspective. Is it reasonable for today’s housing market, with all its shortcomings, to be preserved so that the social group that owns its own housing can watch its wealth increase at the expense of those groups who are finding it increasingly difficult to buy housing at all? I consider it to be of socioeconomic interest to adopt the necessary measures now, for the sake of coming generations, so that they can have the opportunity to find housing that suits them in their current phase of life. In addition, there will hardly be a better occasion to introduce the various measures, as Swedish households are currently living in an economy with historically low interest rates and low inflation.

This is a high level, not just from a historical perspective but from an international one too. The Riksbank’s credit data on the stock of mortgage borrowers shows that households with mortgages had an average debt-to-income ratio of 338 per cent in September 2017, which is an increase of 36 percentage points compared to 2011. 10 The same data also shows that 31 per cent of households with mortgages (640,000 households) have a debt-to-income ratio exceeding 400 per cent and 13 per cent (260,000 households) have a debt-to-income ratio exceeding 600 per cent. Since 2011, debt-to-income ratios have increased in all income groups. This means that households are becoming more sensitive to several types of changed economic conditions, such as rising interest rates, falling housing prices and higher unemployment. Allowing this trend to continue is not compatible with taking responsibility for the Swedish economy. See, for example, Alter et al. (2018), Lombardi et al. (2017), Mian and Sufi (2018) or Emanuelsson et al. (2015) for a review of the literature. 7 See Sveriges Riksbank (2013). 8 Dermani et al. (2016). 9 Sveriges Riksbank (2019). 10 Blom and van Santen (2017). 6  3 [13]  The development of the housing market can affect confidence in the banks Another aspect of the Swedish housing market is that the banks, via their lending to both households and companies, are exposed to the property sector.
The complex task facing advanced economies of enhancing productivity and promoting employment growth as populations age is clearly beyond the power of monetary policy. Other policy action is needed to address this task. Boosting potential output growth is a key priority in itself, and higher potential growth would also help to raise the neutral interest rate and reduce the risk of overburdening monetary policy. An inflation targeting regime is a constant reminder that controlling inflation is the central bank’s main monetary policy objective. At the same time, monetary policy cannot be strictly rule-based – it must be flexible and robust. Economic models are useful and necessary tools for constructing an appropriate interest path. But no model is capable of fully capturing the complexity of the trade offs. Moreover, given the uncertainty associated with the functioning of the economy, it is neither possible nor desirable to fine-tune economic developments. Because even the most advanced models cannot reproduce the complexity of economic mechanisms or of the trade-offs facing central banks, interest rate decisions must also be based on sound judgment. Thank you for your attention.

In recent years, extraordinary measures by many central banks have pushed down long-term rates. Over a longer time horizon, the factors behind the decline in interest rates are more structural in nature. The savings glut in 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  emerging economies, particularly China and oil exporting countries, has been one important factor. Savings have probably also increased in many countries as a result of demographic developments and a more uneven distribution of income. At the same time, investments in many advanced economies have been low, possibly reflecting prospects for low returns on investment in productive capital. In the wake of the financial crisis, conditions of a more cyclical nature have also contributed to the fall in interest rates. While deleveraging has pulled up savings, greater uncertainty may have dampened the willingness to invest. These developments have consequences for monetary policy. The level of the real interest rate that is consistent with balanced developments in the economy is usually referred to as the neutral interest rate. The difference between the actual real interest rate and the neutral real interest rate provides an indication of whether monetary policy is expansionary or contractionary. A real interest rate that is below the neutral rate stimulates economic growth, while a higher real interest rate dampens growth. The neutral interest rate is not directly observable. Central banks must nevertheless form a perception of how expansionary or contractionary monetary policy is.