samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Often, their role was to act as no more than an operational agent for the government of the day, managing money, debt and foreign exchange markets. They were agents, not principals. Through the course of the 20th century, central banks’ influence began to grow. So too did their numbers. For some, this evolution began with being granted monopoly rights over issuing legal tender – fiat money. This gave central banks special status relative to commercial banks. It underscored their stability role as liquidity provider to the banking system: stabilising short-term money markets in normal times, acting as lender of last resort in abnormal ones. It also secured, by fiat, a demand for central bank liabilities. This meant central bank money became the natural settlement medium, and central banks the natural clearing house, when discharging obligations among banks. As the marginal supplier of liquidity, this gave central banks the ability to set the marginal price of liquidity – the short-term interest rate. In that way, monetary policy was born and an important central bank step had been taken. The early phases of monetary control by central banks were often inauspicious, highly constrained, or both. Monetary regimes during the latter part of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th were long on rules and short on discretion. The Gold Standard, and later the Bretton Woods regime, tethered monetary policy to a commodity or dollar anchor, with little scope for monetary discretion. And where monetary discretion did operate, it was not always a success.

•  And the regulation must be proportionate to the risk posed. Take for example internet-based payments or P2P lending that takes place outside regulated banks. •  2  We regulate banks chiefly because they take deposits. –  When they get into trouble, they have systemic consequences. –  So, we supervise their lending activity and their payments systems. BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  We do not regulate P2P lending platforms – as long as they do not take deposits. –  •  But if they get very large and pose macroprudential concerns, then we may consider regulation. Likewise, a payment service through the Internet will not automatically attract regulation –  These are typically small payments, often in connection with e-commerce. –  Only larger, more significant players that cross the materiality and other thresholds are regulated. –  Even then, we do not regulate them as banks and throw at them the whole kitchen sink of capital and liquidity requirements under the Banking Act. –  We regulate them under the Payment Systems Oversight Act or the Remittance Agents Act – modular regulation customised to address the specific risks or concerns they pose. –  But I must acknowledge we do not have ready-made regulations for all new technology solutions; often we must improvise the use of existing legislation, even as we draw up new ones. Third – actively promote the FinTech ecosystem and seek to harness its potential for good.
Source: National Satistics Institute (INE),  15  Table 1 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent)  2015  2016 Dec.16 Report  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Nominal gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  2.3 2.0 1.7 -0.8 2.4 -1.8 -2.7 -2.0 21.4 23.6  1.5 1.1 2.0 -0.6 2.8 0.1 -1.4 -1.7 19.3 22.2  2017 (f) Mar.17 Report 1.6 1.1 2.0 -0.8 2.8 -0.1 -1.6 -1.4 20.2 23.2  Dec.16 Report 1.5-2.5 2.6 2.0 0.7 2.4 2.0 4.1 -1.9 19.2 21.7  2018 (f) Mar.17 Report 1.0-2.0 2.3 1.9 0.2 2.5 1.6 4.3 -0.9 20.3 22.5  Mar.17 Report 2.25-3.25 4.1 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7 7.2 -2.1 20.5 22.6  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 7 Real lending by type of credit (*) (annual change, percent)  25  25  Consumer  20  20 Housing  15  Commercial  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5 02  05  08  11  14  17  (*) Horizontal dashed lines show last 15-year average for each series. Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF data.

In particular, the economy would have slightly outperformed previous estimates for the first part of that year. By sectors, it confirmed that Mining posted negative y-o-y growth throughout the whole year, while activity in areas unrelated to natural resources (i.e. Other GDP) continued to worsen, going from growing 3% in the first quarter to 1% in the fourth (figure 3). In the other sectors, most weak in the fourth quarter were particularly those sectors linked to investment in construction and related services, which are usually more persistent. Also personal services decelerated, although it is estimated that it responded partly to the effects of the public sector strike at the end of last year (figure 4). On the domestic expenditure side, y-o-y growth in final demand—minus inventory change—also showed a downsloping trend throughout the year. The biggest loss of 2  dynamism was seen in investment in construction and other works, whose annual rate of change was -4.9% in the fourth quarter (0.5% average between the first and third quarters). Private consumption, as has been the case for some years, provided support to the economy, growing by over 2% annually throughout 2016. This was helped by growth in labor income, falling inflation and persistent low unemployment by historic standards. It is worth noting that while growth in non-durable consumption has remained stable, durable consumption growth has recovered, partly due to the appreciation of the peso in the last year and partly due to the necessary replenishment of stocks after several years of low or even negative expansion.
Determining the economic value of the institution is thus being done with the utmost care since, as the FROB indicated in its methodological note, this is of paramount importance from three standpoints: from that of Community competition rules, to ensure that public aid is granted on an arm’s length basis; from that of the proper use of public funds, so that they are disbursed in accordance with rigorously set subscription prices; and from that of the institution itself and of the “interested parties”, because the market value will also determine the FROB’s actual stake and, consequently, that of the former stakeholders in the resulting capital and in the institution’s governing bodies. On conclusion of this process, before 30 September 2011, the FROB will have taken a stake in the capital of these institutions and will vote on the decisions of their boards of directors on a scale proportionate to the economic valuation. Thereafter, the FROB will participate directly in their management with the mission to monitor fulfilment of their business plans. It shall remain in the institutions only temporarily, and never any longer than the maximum term of five years in which the shares it holds must be disposed of to third parties through a competitive procedure. *  *  *  In sum, we are at the last stage of savings bank restructuring. The aim is that by 30 September the various steps outstanding should have been completed.

This is the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  timeframe set by the Royal Decree-Law on the reinforcement of the financial system, although an exceptional three-month extension for operational reasons and a further three months in the event of an IPO would be possible. In recent years our banking system has made a very intense balance-sheet write-down drive (equivalent to 9% of GDP in the three years from 2008 to 2010), it has evidenced unprecedented transparency in respect of its most problematic exposures, and it has recapitalised drawing on private funds and also with relatively limited public aid when compared with other countries. In turn, Spanish legislation has risen to the challenges posed by the crisis with a raft of measures. These include most notably, due to their intended durability, the establishment of new solvency requirements, the modernisation of the legal regime governing savings banks and the creation of more flexible and efficient banking crisisresolution instruments. We trust we will move into autumn with all our homework completed. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Furthermore, the SSM will have a European focus and support the development and effective application of the single rulebook, the harmonisation of supervisory practices and procedures, creating a level playing field and reducing compliance costs. The SSM, coupled with the other elements of the Banking Union should be conducive to ensuring the most efficient allocation and transfer of intra-group capital and liquidity. Therefore, it should contribute to the creation of truly panEuropean banks and enhance cross-border banking integration which will reduce transaction and compliance costs and bring efficiency gains. On the other hand, the new framework may lead down the road to a period of consolidation in a not much concentrated European banking sector. In fact, there is scope for further consolidation without reinforcing the so-called “too-big-to-fail” problem and for reaping the benefits of efficiency-driven consolidation. The present weak profitability in the banking sector and the existence of over-capacity in certain areas of the European market suggest that some efficiency gains could be achieved. Authority, Helsinki, 12 February 2013; Towards a European Banking Union, speech by Vítor Constâncio, VicePresident of the ECB, Lecture held at the start of the academic year of the Duisenberg School of Finance, Amsterdam, 7 September 2012 (ECB website). 5  2  See “The European Crisis and the role of the financial system”, speech by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, at the Bank of Greece conference on “The crisis in the euro area” Athens, 23 May 2013 (ECB website).

A distinction needs to be made here between two steps. As I noted earlier, entry into ERM II requires a full peg to the euro, either before or on the day of entry. Let us assume the Maltese lira peg to the euro is increased from 70 per cent to 100 per cent before entry. The same principle that applied to past revisions to the exchange rate basket will apply on this occasion, too. When the currency basket was last updated, in August 2002, the value of the lira was derived on the basis of the old basket, which at the time was composed of currency portions representing the euro, with a 56.8 per cent weight, sterling with 21.6 per cent and the US dollar with 21.6 per cent. The revised weights - 70 per cent euro, 20 per cent sterling and 10 per cent US dollar - were used to derive the new currency portions and produced the same value for the Maltese lira as under the old basket. In the same way, the switch from a 70 per cent peg to a 100 per cent peg will not entail a change in the level of the lira/euro rate from that prevailing under the current exchange rate regime. I hope this will correct the impression some people have that the peg to the euro will automatically result in a change in the value of the lira beyond the normal day-to-day market movements currently observed.
As shown in (Figure 6), which shows these two components over time, the business balance is currently unusually high; that is, businesses have very high cash flows relative to their investment outlays. This suggests that some of the required adjustment could occur by fostering greater investment spending as a share of GDP. For this to occur, it will be important that economic policies promote long-term growth and financial stability, and ensure that the United States is a competitive place to base production, with a well-functioning infrastructure, a skilled workforce and a reasonable tax and regulatory system. In addition, it seems desireable that some of the adjustment should take place in the trade sector. Although a current account deficit of 3 percent of GDP by itself would be sustainable over time, for the household balance to remain close to current levels and the public balance to sharply narrow, then the current account may need to move further toward balance. For this to occur, there needs to be two offsetting adjustments. On one hand, the U.S. economy must be reoriented toward global demand and stronger net exports. On the other hand, there will have to be offsetting adjustments elsewhere in the world. After all, on a global basis, the current account balance–properly measured–must sum to zero. This means  2  See "Securing the Recovery and Building for the Future." Remarks by William Dudley at United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, November 17, 2011, for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

This will not last and the fiscal authorities need to factor this in when considering what needs to be done to put the federal budget deficit and the nation’s debt burden on a sustainable path. Second, I will argue that fiscal consolidation should take into consideration the offsetting adjustments needed to keep the economy on an even keel. While fiscal consolidation is a necessary condition for a healthy economy over time, it is not a sufficient condition. Fiscal adjustments require offsetting changes in private-sector spending and saving behavior, and in the trade sector. Prudent economic policies and international coordination can help ensure that such adjustments take place in ways that support economic activity (and, by extension also support government revenue). As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and opinions and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. As we all are aware, the federal budget deficit is very high and the federal debt burden has climbed sharply as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 1). Despite this, the net interest burden on the outstanding debt remains low as a share of GDP (Figure 2). This is due, of course, to the unusually low level of short- and long-term interest rates. These unusually low interest rates are the result of monetary policy actions taken by the FOMC.
The provision is designed to promote the provisioning of the foreseeable losses generated by credit risk at the time this risk is assumed, and not when, years later, such losses begin to emerge, frequently on the downward track of the cycle when activity is lower and the profit and loss account is weakened. I shall conclude this section with a reference to the position in 2001 of Spanish securities markets. Apart from the decline in equity indices and trading in favour of fixed income, I might mention the significant headway made in market integration, which crystallised in the creation of a holding company grouping all existing secondary and derivatives markets, together with all the securities clearing and settlement systems. This process of vertical integration will enable the unquestionable economies of scale and scope offered by the securities industry in Spain to be harnessed, thereby enhancing their efficiency and strengthening their competitive position on the international stage. Banking supervision I shall commence the final part of my address, dedicated to banking supervision, with a summary of events last year in both the international and the Spanish financial system. Given the speed of change in the financial environment, supervision requires an ongoing effort to improve and adapt itself to changing circumstances. This means proving equal to market innovations, developments and trends, but also involves being more attentive and sensitive to the changes that arise in the demands society makes of the financial system and its supervisors.

Thus, there is a long intellectual tradition linking rule of law and sound money to functioning of free markets. But this connection found perhaps its clearest expression in the ordoliberal school that developed in Germany in the 1930s. Conceived at the University of Freiburg by Walter Eucken and Franz Boehm, the central understanding of ordoliberalism was that a stable and well-functioning market economy required a strong legal and institutional  1  “Moneta debt esse quasi quaedam lex et quaedam ordinacio firma”. Nicolas Oresme, Traité de la première invention des monnaies (ca. 1355). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  framework. Pure laissez-faire capitalism was unstable and liable to capture by monopolies. Collectivist central planning, on the other hand, led towards waste and totalitarianism. Thus, as the ordoliberals saw it, the role of government was to frame markets in such a way that actual outcomes would approximate the theoretical outcome in a perfectly competitive market. Achieving such outcomes could imply de-regulation, if government was interfering too much in market processes, or re-regulation, if market failures were apparent – a feature that distinguished it from a laissez-faire approach. In other words, the role of government was both to untie the “invisible hand”, and to keep it firmly cuffed to the rule of law. At the same time, ordoliberalism recognised the crucial importance of monetary and economic stability to a well-functioning market.
Our aim is that by the end of 2016 we will have agreed a blueprint for high-value sterling settlement in the years ahead, with technological development of that blueprint beginning in 2017. To reach that deadline, there is a great deal to do – and we cannot do it on our own. In the first part of 2016 we will be seeking input from a wide range of stakeholders, both in the industry and outside it, to help define the questions and ensure we have identified the right options. We will be looking overseas to learn what we can from similar exercises conducted in other jurisdictions. Later in the year we expect to consult formally and in public on a focussed set of alternative ways forward. Throughout that process, we will need your help and guidance – to ensure we understand how the future payments landscape is likely to develop, to identify the needs of market participants, and to provide practical guidance and assistance. At a time when firms face many competing initiatives, we understand the importance of minimising uncertainty, and providing rigorous costings for what we propose. Throughout the year and beyond, we will work closely with the industry, our supervisory colleagues at the Bank of England, the Payment Systems Regulator and its Payments Strategy Forum, HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority to develop a blueprint with the broadest possible buy-in.

Given the implications of these changes for the Bank’s mission and for users, businesses and regulators, it is important that the Bank consider how RTGS will need to evolve to meet and shape payments trends in the coming decades. That is why we are today announcing our plan to design a blueprint for a new heart that can support the future demands placed on the UK’s high-value sterling settlement system. In my remaining remarks tonight I want to do three things. First, set out some of the key drivers of change. Second, explain some of the strategic questions we want to ask on the future role of RTGS. And, third, set out how we will go about developing a blueprint for a new high value payments system. 3  Either directly in the case of high-value payments made via CHAPS, or indirectly after netting in the case of retail payments made via the various private sector schemes. 4  The Deloitte Report on the October 2014 RTGS outage can be found here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ publications/Documents/news/2015/rtgsdeloitte.pdf. An update on the completion of the recommendations of the Deloitte Report can be found here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/paymentsystems/ deliotteactions.pdf. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Evolution in the payments landscape Much has changed in the UK payments landscape in the past twenty years. In particular, I want to highlight two linked drivers of change as being important in shaping the future demands placed on the Bank’s provision of real-time settlement: the changing regulatory environment and developments in payments technologies.
Our most recent inflation forecast indicates that inflation will approach the target a couple of years ahead, on condition that the repo rate is gradually increased. However, forecasts are of course uncertain. In addition to the usual uncertainty regarding developments in economic activity, it is very difficult to determine the durability of this type of structural change. Is, for instance, the upswing in productivity we have seen in recent years only temporary or is it a more permanent improvement? There is a discussion that inflation could remain low over a long period of time, as a result of structural changes in a globalised economy 2 . The question is what the consequences would be if we were to respond to such a development by conducting a very expansionary monetary policy over a long period of time to bring inflation back on target. What would happen to economic activity, the exchange rate, domestic inflation, asset prices and household and company balance sheets? Probably, such a situation would lead to risks in both the real economy and the financial economy, resulting perhaps in overheating in the economy, high domestic inflation and rapidly rising asset prices. However, if we on the other hand were to allow the inflation adjustment to take a long time, how would this affect confidence in the inflation target? How long can inflation deviate from the target without this affecting confidence and without the inflation target being perceived as meaningless? These are difficult considerations that I assume many of you have also reflected on.

Peter Pang: A decade of Hong Kong Dollar settlement in the CLS system Opening remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the 10th anniversary celebration of Hong Kong Dollar settlement in CLS, Hong Kong, 21 October 2014. *  *  *  David 1, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured to be here today to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Hong Kong dollar settlement in the CLS system. Opening 2. If we were a married couple, this event would mark our Tin Anniversary, with tin symbolizing durability and pliability. It is good to note that our bonding remains robust, despite the fact that CLS has 16 other currency partners, and its desire to have more in the future. 3. According to Jane Austen, “happiness in marriage is entirely a matter of chance”. Being a monetary authority, the HKMA would not leave such an important financial infrastructure for addressing the FX settlement risk to chance. 4. The one thing that keeps our bonding with CLS strong is our common vision – to provide the solution to help market players eliminate the FX settlement risks through a highly effective and efficient settlement platform. 5. Our decision to join the CLS in 2004 was based on the simple fact that CLS provides the most powerful global solution to eliminate the FX settlement risks among market players. And CLS has delivered such a solution without a hitch in the past decade. Good times 6.