samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some banks have even moved their core banking systems into the cloud to reap the benefits of its scalability and resilience. Cloud computing has considerably enhanced risk management. Risk assessments are now more comprehensive, more granular, and more real-time. But the cloud has also introduced new risks. The risks are not so much in the technology of cloud computing per se but in the business and operating models of cloud services. Cloud services are essentially a utility provided by specialist third-party providers. And as with any third-party service provider, there are outsourcing risks associated with these cloud service providers or CSPs. But with cloud computing, these outsourcing risks are much larger, given how much of a financial institution’s data and processing functions rely on CSPs. Financial institutions have less knowledge, let alone control, of where their data are stored in a cloud computing infrastructure spanning several different jurisdictions. Data breach or loss might occur due to a natural disaster, targeted attack, or poor security processes at the CSPs. The outsourcing risk is compounded by concentration risk. The top 4 CSPs in the world had a market share of 80% last year. About 25% of the core banking systems of global systemically important banks or G-SIBs is 5/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  now residing on the cloud. A large supplier of cloud services can potentially become a single point of failure when many financial institutions rely on them. The regulatory response to cloud computing has taken two forms.

Fixing the Fault Lines of the Global Financial Crisis Let me begin with the regulatory and supervisory responses to the Global Financial Crisis. The advances over the last 20 years can be broken down into three broad phases. The era of regulatory reform (2008 to 2016) The first eight years following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 saw the most wide-ranging set of reforms ever in the history of financial regulation. The destruction that the Global Financial Crisis had unleashed on our economies and societies galvanised action on an unprecedented scale. The Global Financial Crisis revealed some deep fault lines in the financial system that had been masked by fortuitous growth. Many financial institutions had leveraged themselves to the hilt – some of them by as much as 40 dollars of debt to 1 dollar of equity – unthinkable these days. Many banks had severe mismatches in liquidity. An opaque OTC derivatives market led to rapid contagion when liquidity suddenly dried up. Moral hazard grew as some financial institutions were seen as too-big-to-fail. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  The Financial Stability Board, or FSB, was strengthened and tasked to oversee reforms to address each of these vulnerabilities. The way the international regulatory community came together and forged a consensus on the necessary reforms was exemplary. Between 2008 and 2016, the FSB, working closely with the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and other standard-setting bodies, put in place the basic building blocks for a new regulatory architecture that continues to serve us today.
It has never been a question of inflation having to be 2 per cent just for the sake of it, but because this is a way of ensuring that 2  7 [15]  per cent remains the long-term anchor for price-setting and wage formation in the economy. In the same way that high inflation risks affecting economic agents’ long-term inflation expectations, too low inflation also risks doing so. Since nominal interest rates include compensation for inflation, these rates will on average be lower, the lower the average and expected rate of inflation is. Moreover, there is an effective lower bound for the policy rate, where the positive effects of further cuts cease and the negative ones begin to dominate. The combination of a low average interest rate and a lower bound for the policy rate means that the scope for cutting the interest rate will be limited.9 Monetary policy’s ability to stimulate the economy in serious economic downturns, when this is really needed, will thus be reduced. The fact that monetary policy has sufficient scope to do this is of course important, but it is perhaps not something that people notice in their everyday lives, in the same way that they notice if prices rise in the shops.

This has to do with the fact that the development of the Swedish economy further ahead would be even worse if high inflation were allowed to become entrenched – we know this from experiences both in Sweden and in other countries. The question is not, therefore, whether inflation will return to the target, but how it will happen, and how the Swedish economy will develop during this process. It can be painful, but it can also be relatively smooth. 9 For a more detailed discussion, see Jansson (2020). 8 [15]  How well the Swedish economy in general develops depends on the interaction between different agents. This is an insight that I think has become somewhat neglected, and that was the reason for the speech I held a year ago on the division of roles between fiscal and monetary policy. But it is not just a question of the macroeconomic policy mix. It is about a broader interaction, involving many economic agents. Let me describe how inflation can be brought back to the target in a favourable scenario. In principle, it is the Riksbank’s current forecast that I am describing, but without numbers and in more general terms. The increases in the policy rate that the Riksbank has made, and expects to make, contribute to the fact that inflation will start to decline in 2023.
Lee Hsien Loong: ASEAN - the way ahead Speech by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the opening ceremony of the ASEAN Finance Ministers meeting (AFMM), Singapore, 7 April 2004. *  *  *  Finance Ministers of ASEAN member states The ASEAN Secretary-General Ladies and Gentlemen Let me first welcome all of you to Singapore for the 8th ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting. Introduction In 1997, ASEAN was hit by its worst-ever economic crisis. The Asian Financial Crisis dealt a severe blow to all of us. One after another, our countries succumbed to the flight of capital and investors. Several economies were on the verge of collapse. Before we could fully recover from the Crisis, we were confronted again with yet another shock, this time a global economic downturn. The September 11 attacks in America followed shortly. More recently, ASEAN was hit by SARS and the avian flu. ASEAN has taken quite a few hard punches in the last few years. Although we might have been bruised, we are far from being knocked out. ASEAN countries strived to repair the damage, to recapitalise banking systems, to restructure companies in difficulties, and most importantly to restore confidence. Despite the setbacks, ASEAN countries continued to embrace globalization. We continued to look outwards, do our best to attract FDI, liberalise trade, and broaden our linkages with the outside world. Now most ASEAN economies are on the mend. Economic growth has been strong in many countries.

Exports are growing, and stock markets are up. As a regional grouping, we have continued to integrate our economies while individually pursuing restructuring. ASEAN is now back on its feet, up and running again. The necessity of deeper integration The need to broaden and deepen economic co-operation is a necessity recognised by ASEAN more than ten years ago. In 1992, ASEAN started the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to boost intra-ASEAN trade and establish the region as a common area for manufacturing operations. At that time, the catalyst for greater integration was globalisation. Competition was getting tougher. Europe was consolidating and integrating itself to form the Single European Market. In North America, the US, Canada and Mexico were preparing to form the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA). NAFTA provided US manufacturers an attractive, low cost manufacturing base in Mexico. Mexico too expected to benefit from new investments from the US, which would create jobs and bring growth and prosperity to the country. Both the Single European Market and NAFTA strengthened the competitiveness of the continents, and threatened to divert investments away from Asia. Determined not to lose out, ASEAN responded with AFTA. In retrospect, AFTA is perhaps the most important decision on economic cooperation that ASEAN members have taken together. Today, the world is even more globalised than compared to 1992. Competition is once again at our door step. This time however, the competition comes not from Europe or Mexico, but from much closer to home. China and India are growing very rapidly.
The longer long-term inflation expectations are anchored to the target, the greater that scope will be. One of the main tasks of monetary policy, of course, is to foster such an outcome. However, if other decisions that affect domestic cost levels and demand pull in another direction, such a tug-of-war could result in a further rise in the real exchange rate and could adversely affect employment levels. Honoured guests: Although nearly all of the capital controls were lifted in March 2017, a few restrictions on capital transfers remain: on the one hand, restrictions on offshore krónur, and on the other, restrictions on speculative derivatives transactions involving the króna and other transactions that could undermine the efficacy of the SRR. In order to be released from the current exemptions provided for in international agreements on free movement of capital, vis-à-vis both the EEA and the OECD, we must lift these restrictions, and it is appropriate that we aim to do so as soon as possible. The Central Bank is of the view that the economic preconditions are in place to take the final step towards full capital account liberalisation. This also applies to the stock of offshore krónur, which now equals about 3½% of GDP, 2  down from 40% in late 2008, when the capital controls were first imposed. But this cannot be done without statutory amendment. The Bank does not consider it appropriate yet to begin lowering the SRR.

The high increase of the number of branches relative to agencies shows that banks are not interested only in providing the service of collecting deposits but also in providing other products like crediting to the economy. These developments, besides their positive contribution in enhancing the financial intermediation speak for a better perception of the investing potential from banks, in Albania. An outstanding development is mainly related to the client service, which is accompanied through electronic terminals by the increasing number of electronic cards in circulation. Banks offer already debit and credit cards in co-operation with international companies such as Visa and MasterCard. Six banks provide the ATM service and the number of ATMs reached 108 by the end of February 2005. The banking system results to have a profit level, which has been increasing to Lek 5.1 billion. Return on equity (ROE) was estimated at 21 percent while credit quality is only 4.2 percent, from 4.6 percent in the previous year. These positive developments on the banking system were accompanied by a sound macroeconomic environment. For several years the economy is growing at 6 percent while inflation was kept under control within the two-to-four percent targeted range of the Bank of Albania. The fiscal consolidation has been on track while current trade deficit has been financed mainly by remittances and foreign direct investment inflows. The Bank of Albania has played a crucial role in providing this macroeconomic environment.
Here, everything was well thoughtout, consistent and done so as to fulfil a clear vision of e-government that was supposed to be citizenfriendly and to make their life easier. And Global was not in the wrong. He is still satisfied with his choice. It is worth mentioning that he hesitated over the decision to move. The final straw was an argument at Warsaw district office where Global had gone to in order to obtain some certificate. The certificate was ready, but Global – who had paid the stamp duty by an online transfer – had no proof of  BIS Review 90/2006  1  payment. Without such confirmation the officer would not issue the certificate. The argument reached its climax when the officer shouted out his anger: ‘If only you had paid in cash at the counter here, there would be no problem now!’ Today, in September 2026, John Global recalls this situation with a tint of amusement. How things have changed since that day, and how much easier life is now. Today, administrative issues take him only several minutes monthly, because all these are handled via the Internet, regardless whether located in Asia or Europe. And officers are doing their utmost to provide services to John Global efficiently, as the contract for these services will only be renewed when customers are satisfied with them. Needless to say, customer satisfaction surveys take place via the Internet. As for Global's satisfaction with his metabolism, he can measure it himself.

Since 2015, eight countries including Malaysia had been granted with RQFII quotas; bringing the total available quotas to more than RMB1.4 trillion. In addition, clearing banks across nine countries were introduced since then, adding up to 21 clearing banks worldwide. The increased availability of renminbi globally was evident, with more than sixty central banks and sovereign wealth funds reported to have invested part of their reserves and assets into renminbi, reflecting the broad appeal of the currency: the latest BIS triennial survey in April 2016 showed the renminbi daily turnover reached USD202 billion, almost double the size recorded three years ago, and even more phenomenal when considering it was just around USD34 billion in 2010. The renminbi’s market share globally increased from 2% to 4%, still a small percentage, but is now the eighth most actively traded currency in the world. The sizable pool of offshore renminbi deposit of RMB1.8 trillion has also spurred the growth of renminbi-denominated bonds issued outside China, known as dim sum bonds, while steps are taken to develop the panda bond market within China. Developments of renminbi business in Malaysia Continued growth and investment from China In ASEAN, Malaysia continues to be among China’s largest trading partners. From Malaysia’s perspective, China is our largest trading partner. In 2015, total trade between the two countries expanded by 11.1% to RM230.1 billion, representing 16% of our total trade.
The solution centres on a programme of Government guaranteed bond issue that would provide for the full financing of the estimated cost. This programme of bond issuance will run for a maximum period of twenty years, and the financings will be provided for in the Government budget. This incorporation is projected to keep the share of the debt-service ratio to an average of 13.6% of the Government budget in the first decade and 11.5% in the second decade. This means that there will be little crowding-out effects on the Government’s investment expenditure in the period ahead, while the public debt stock-to-GDP is projected to trend down in the long term. With this programme, Thailand’s long-term fiscal sustainability is now assured. With monetary stability in place and fiscal stability enshrined in the Government’s long-term fiscal sustainability framework, I believe the operating environment in Thailand in the period ahead will be more assured and remain conducive to growth. But to really put the growth engine back on its feet, notably the recovery of the domestic demand, more works will have to be done at the micro level to remove the bottlenecks that inhibits the real economy. This leads to our second challenge: to put the banking system back to normal lending. Our banking system is returning to health and profitability with strengthened capital base, and a much lower level of non-performing loans. Yet, the growth in credit has been very minimal with deposit growth rising and liquidity remaining ample.

David Clementi: Recent developments in securities markets and the implications for financial stability Speech by David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Euromoney International Bond Congress, London, 21 February 2001. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by saying how pleased I am to be giving the closing address at this Conference. I know, in previous years, the Governor has done the honours. While he is engaged elsewhere today, I am glad to keep up the association with the Bank. Especially now we have joined the ranks of issuers in the Euro markets in our own name. If you did not have a chance to subscribe to our euronotes in January, the issue - the 4.5% of 2004 - will reopen in April, July and October. But I have not come to plug our paper. Nor have I come to talk about monetary policy. The minutes of the February meeting, published this morning, are designed to set out the MPC's considered view as well as the vote itself. On the voting front, you will find there was a rare outbreak of unanimity in the Committee with a nine to nothing vote for the recent ¼% cut in rates. But there is little on this front that I can add that is not already in the minutes or in the Inflation Report we published last week. I want to talk instead about recent developments in bond markets that impinge on the Bank's role in relation to financial stability.
There is also a very high degree of complementarity between the financing of investment projects, such as those envisaged in the NGEU programme, and the implementation of structural reforms. In particular, according to Banco de España estimates, if a careful 18  selection of NGEU projects were accompanied by various structural reforms to ease the rigidities in the product and labour markets, the potential growth rate of the Spanish economy could reach around 2% by the end of that decade, nearly 1 pp higher than at present. (vi) The fiscal consolidation challenge Maintaining high levels of government debt over time is a source of vulnerability and leaves less fiscal space in the event of adverse macro-financial shocks. In the coming years, public indebtedness will remain very close to or even exceed current levels, unless an ambitious fiscal adjustment plan is implemented. Specifically, various simulations indicate that if no fiscal adjustment is made in Spain in the coming years, the pressure exerted by population ageing on public expenditure will drive up the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Conversely, under an alternative scenario in which a consolidation effort is made – one consistent with maintaining the structural primary balance envisaged in the Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic projections for 2024 –, the government debt ratio will stand at levels close to 120% of GDP in the coming decades.

At the same time, disruptions in maritime transport, difficulties in the supply of certain inputs and higher input prices affected the recovery in the primary, industrial (particularly in the case of transport) and construction sectors from mid-2021. By demand component, consumption recovered significantly, but not enough to return to pre-pandemic levels.1 It therefore appears that households – particularly higher income ones – still have a high volume of saving built up since the start of the pandemic. Turning to housing, building permits reached levels similar to those seen prior to COVID-19. However, the drastic fall-off in housing starts in 2020 Q2 and Q3 has continued to weigh down on construction completion volumes in 2021 and 2022. For their part, house sales and purchases surged. Private productive investment grew by 8.8%, driven by the intensification of digitalisation and by firms having to adapt to the pandemic containment measures. To date, the boost from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme has been modest. Net external demand contributed nearly 0.5 pp to GDP growth in 2021. By component, at end-2021 trade in goods stood at levels only slightly higher than a year earlier, due to the impact of bottlenecks. By contrast, exports of tourism services recovered vigorously.2 It is worth highlighting that the total number of exporters3 exceeded pre-pandemic levels by 5.5%. However, in 2021 the stable export base (firms that have been exporting for at least four consecutive years) was still 1.4% down on two years earlier.
There are also signs of the same – excess capacity in some areas, excess demand in others – within the UK economy. And although they’re less startling than in some areas of traded goods, it may take longer, if they persist, to accommodate via matching shifts in supply. It’s these more domestic mismatches we’ll have a look at now. Domestic mismatch and the UK labour market Despite the prevailing lockdown, signs of a recovery in the UK labour market began to appear early this year. Surveys suggest employment stabilised in February. The numbers of unemployed and on furlough peaked at around the same time. Job vacancies, which had actually reached a low during the first lockdown, began to rise sharply. All this seems of a piece. Yet in some ways it’s odd – odd, at least, if you think of employers as identical and employees as a similarly homogeneous group – that vacancies and the use of the furlough scheme should co-exist at all. Imagine the corporate sector was like a single representative firm, selling only one thing and employing people with identical skills and characteristics (whose wages are therefore all the same as well). Why would it choose to create a new job, with all the associated search costs, when it could simply re-employ someone on furlough? Why should unemployment start to fall when there were still around five million people on the CJRS, as was the case in late January? There are always job vacancies in the economy, even when unemployment is quite high.

Many other tradable goods have to go through several steps before reaching the final consumer and pass-through of their price changes is probably more gradual. Based on past experience – notably the big falls in the value  In the latest monthly data services inflation was (just) higher than 2%. But there’s a case for measuring these “contributions” relative to past averages, to take account of trends in relative prices. On that basis, because services inflation is well below average, more than all the overshoot in aggregate inflation can be attributed to the goods side. In general, one should be careful in using these “contributions”, or at least make sure not to treat all else as equal. Over the medium-to-longer term, inflation is determined by monetary policy (and the credibility in the regime) not by individual components of the CPI, with relative prices determined by real forces (e.g. the relative demand for goods and services). So over time, assuming the inflation target is on average met, the true “contribution” of a rise in one particular component is likely to be zero – the counterpart is simply weaker inflation in other prices. 15  20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  20  of sterling in 2009 and 2016 – rises in import prices driven by exchange-rate depreciations seem to take longer – perhaps up to 2-3 years – fully to feed through.