samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will start by discussing a couple of aspects of the definition of actual unemployment. Actual unemployment Official unemployment in Sweden is measured by Statistics Sweden’s monthly labour force survey (AKU), in which a sample of the population in the age group 15–74 is interviewed. The unemployed are defined as those who are out of work and who, on the date of the survey or in the previous four weeks, have looked for work that they would be able to take up immediately or within the next 14 days.3 The Swedish Public Employment Service also reports unemployment figures every month on the basis of the people registered at its offices. Each month, the Swedish Public Employment Service publishes figures showing what is known as total unemployment. This includes both the openly unemployed and persons in labour market programmes with activity grants.4  2  See, for example, “Monetary policy and unemployment” in Economic Review 2005:4. In this article, Bergström and Boije discuss the problems of using unemployment as an indicator of resource utilisation. Rogerson (1997) has reviewed the literature covering so-called equilibrium unemployment and points out that the meaning of this term is extremely unclear. Rogerson also points out that there are many different definitions of equilibrium unemployment in the theoretical literature and that their significance varies depending on which theoretical model is being used. The question of how central banks can take real economic considerations into account has also recently been discussed by the Centre for Business and Policy Studies’ Economic Policy Group.

This means large welfare losses for both the individual and Swedish society, and that a well-needed injection of resources to the Swedish labour market risks being lost. Integration work is therefore important to turn this trend around. Integration work should emphasise the importance of education as there has been a large immigration of groups lacking basic education. The possibilities to find work are affected to a great extent by the level of education the job seeker has. Upper-secondary school education is usually a basic requirement when recruiting staff and, according to the Swedish Employment Service, most jobs that do not require an upper-secondary school education have disappeared forever from the Swedish labour market. A worrying development is that the percentage of unemployed with only secondary school education has increased substantially in the age groups below 35 years. This is because a large percentage does not obtain complete grades at upper-secondary school. So it is not surprising that the Swedish Public Employment Service points to the fact that there has been a rapid inflow to the labour force in recent years of people in groups that have difficulty finding jobs quickly. This increase is partially linked to people being transferred from the Social Insurance Office to the Swedish Public Employment Service. At the same time, the Swedish Public Employment Service has been given the main responsibility for people who have immigrated to Sweden.
This process – which has complemented the fixed-rate-full-allotment decision – has always balanced the need to be supportive to our counterparties with the goal of exercising an appropriate degree of risk control, and to protect our balance sheet. Incidentally, Portuguese banks have greatly benefited from these measures. For instance, they were able to strengthen collateral buffers by mobilising additional credit claims for the purpose of obtaining Eurosystem liquidity – and more effectively than other banking systems in the euro area. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, the refinancing risk faced by euro area banks has been minimised by giving them reassurance that monetary policy will remain accommodative for an extended period of time. In the course of 2013, this reassurance has taken two forms: conditional forward guidance on the level and direction of our policy rates in the future, and a pledge to maintain the fixedrate-with-full-allotment policy for as long as needed and at least until mid-2015. These measures proved powerful in addressing the funding risk faced by our counterparties throughout the crisis, as evidenced, for example, by the significant decline in money market term premia. Addressing redenomination fear premia, however, is more alien to central banks, and therefore required a new approach. The Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) initiative was the innovative instrument that we deployed to remove break-up fears from the market pricing of sovereign credit risk, and promote more regular financial conditions. The initiative proved an extremely effective instrument.

Risky asset prices such as equities have risen at a rapid pace, and credit spreads and measures of credit availability have continued to ease. These changes have been driven to a large extent by the improvement in the economic outlook and, in turn, will help to promote the economic recovery going forward. The decisions taken in the second half of 2010 affecting the size of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio have provided support to that process. To be sure, economic fundamentals will ultimately exert the strongest force on financial conditions, as can be seen by the rise in Treasury yields even as the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet. But the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet actions have helped to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. Characteristics of the SOMA portfolio The set of asset purchase programs launched by the Federal Reserve, including those initiated at the peak of the financial crisis and the more recent actions, have changed some of the basic characteristics of the SOMA portfolio. I thought it would be useful to review those changes and to discuss their implications for the conduct of monetary policy. The most obvious effect of the purchase programs has been on the size of the SOMA portfolio. If the intended asset purchases announced in November are completed, the size of the domestic portfolio will reach approximately $ trillion by mid-year – considerably larger than the $ trillion portfolio that would be in place in the absence of the asset purchase programs.
For the insurance industry, more needs to be done to provide products that cater for the OKUs’ needs and to address the issue of high loading of insurance premium imposed by the insurers. Another area for consideration – employment opportunities for OKUs On another aspect, the Government has issued a service circular to implement a 1% policy on employment opportunities for OKUs in the public sector as well as provided incentive by giving double tax relief for employers of OKU. It is encouraging to note that several financial institutions have provided opportunities for the OKUs to be employed in the financial industry and recognized that they have the necessary capabilities to contribute to the financial industry. Nevertheless, more needs to be done and I hope financial institutions will provide the opportunity for more OKUs to be employed in the financial industry. Global trend-benchmarking with financial sector in other countries showed that they are more advanced On the global front, looking at the trends and initiatives by other countries, especially the developed countries, we observe that the industry associations are very proactive and undertake a leading role in ensuring the OKUs’ rights are met. For example, the Australian Bankers’ Association issued Guiding Principles for Accessible Authentication to provide guidance to financial institutions to adopt stronger authentication technologies to facilitate the access of people with disabilities.

This helps to ensure that the central bank is consistent over time. Monetary policy in recent years Has monetary policy been successful? Has it contributed to satisfying the preconditions for a stable krone exchange rate? Before I attempt to answer these questions, I will briefly review the actual conduct of monetary policy and the decision-making basis. The period between December 1992, when the fixed exchange rate regime was formally abandoned, and 1996 was characterised by balanced growth and a stable krone exchange rate. However, in 1996 the economy began to show signs of overheating. Coupled with an increase in oil prices, this contributed to appreciation pressures on the krone. Interest rates were kept at a low level to counter  BIS Review 7/2001  5  appreciation pressures, and fiscal policy was not sufficiently tight to curb pressures in the economy. Developments since the beginning of 1997 show that the exchange rate is no longer suitable as a short-term operational objective of monetary policy. Norges Bank cannot fine-tune the exchange rate. As mentioned, Norges Bank therefore places emphasis on satisfying the fundamental preconditions for stability in the krone exchange rate over time in its conduct of monetary policy. Instability increased further in 1998. In addition to domestic problems of overheating, which translated into strong cost inflation, 1998 was marked by financial crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil, falling commodity prices and general unrest in international financial markets.
The Committee has a distinctly individualistic bias, in contrast to the consensus seeking traditions of many other central banks. It includes four external members who are appointed for their expertise, not as representatives of interest groups; and all members are individually accountable for their votes, which are made public with the minutes. Both the markets and the press take a keen interest in the pattern of voting, and members will often find a way to explain their thinking in more detail. All this adds up to a powerful set of incentives for members of the MPC to focus on maintaining price stability; to pay attention to all relevant information; to weigh up the risks; to take timely decisions; and to explain them clearly. Moreover, clarity about the aims of policy and the transparency of the decision taking process give the MPC significant scope to influence the longer term interest rates set by the market. It’s a far cry from previous policy regimes, when the main players faced very different incentives. Prior to 1997 the key decision makers were politicians, who both set objectives for monetary policy and took responsibility for the technical judgements needed to meet them. Politicians can rarely afford the luxury of focussing on one objective to the exclusion of all others. Attempts to win credibility by constraining their discretion, notably through setting monetary targets, were a fairly comprehensive failure. Interest rate decisions have been the subject of some famous tussles between Number 10 and Number 11 Downing Street under successive Governments.

Rachel Lomax: Inflation targeting - achievement and challenges Speech by Ms Rachel Lomax,1 Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Bristol Society at the University of the West of England, Bristol, 18 February 2004. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be here in Bristol tonight. Bristol and the Bank go back a long way. Our Agent in the South West, the late Michael Knight, was a founder member of this Society. And nearly two centuries ago - in 1827 to be exact - Bristol was one of the first branches that the bank established outside London. Not that it was plain sailing. The Bank’s first Agent in Bristol, Mr John May, resigned after only a few years complaining of the unhealthy situation of the branch premises, situated as they were next to the City Poor House and a pool of stagnant water, at risk of cholera and - this was the time of the great Reform Bill - riots and fire. By these standards, our present Agent, Kevin Butler, has no grounds for complaint. My subject tonight is a more recent episode in our economic history: the improvement in economic performance associated with the adoption of inflation targets just over a decade ago. I’ll look first at why this approach to monetary policy seems to work, and then consider what challenges remain for policy makers.
If we entirely disregard the imbalances in the longer run, there is a risk that we will later be forced to reconsider our monetary policy, which in the prevailing situation could entail drastic repo-rate increases further ahead. Some concluding reflections on monetary policy decision-making Each monetary policy decision is preceded by a long drafting period that follows a well-set schedule. Models give consistency and stability to forecasting but the element of judgement is unavoidable. The economists on the staff contribute their judgements; we on the Executive Board contribute ours. In actual fact the decision-making process is quite complicated and everyone involved must be prepared to compromise. 10 As you all know, no two economists think exactly alike. So the final product that emerges, that is the forecasts for the real economy, inflation and the associated repo rate path, cannot match everyone’s assessment 100%. You might be doubtful about some parts, or want to present a more nuanced view of some aspects of the analysis and so on. But in the end each and every one of us on the Executive Board must commit and make a decision. If your own assessment differs very much in some important respect from the assessment in the decision-making material you can enter a reservation. In this speech I have highlighted some factors that are difficult to assess, such as monetary policy expectations and the view of a well-balanced monetary policy, which have figured in recent monetary policy discussions.

10 Control of the federal funds rate has also been supported by the overnight reverse repurchase agreement  facility, which accepts cash from an array of institutional investors at a rate 25 basis points below the interest rate paid on excess reserves. 11 These exogenous factors include the U.S. Treasury’s cash balance at the Federal Reserve, the foreign central  bank repo pool, the overnight reverse repo facility, and currency outstanding. 12 Because the amount of reserves in a floor system is greater than in a corridor system, this also can be helpful in  easing frictions in terms of payment flows. With large reserve balances, banks have higher cash balances at the Fed. As a result, they are less likely to incur daylight overdrafts and, thus, they have less need to monitor, and, at times, delay outgoing payments. 13 See Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, November 1–2, 2016. 14 See Ben Bernanke, Monetary Policy in a New Era, Brookings Institution, October 2, 2017. 15 Others have proposed adopting a nominal GDP targeting regime, which has its own strengths and  weaknesses, but it is not considered here for the sake of brevity. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
We can expect stronger domestic price pressures over the next few years, and hence slightly higher inflation than we have seen historically. Slightly higher inflation does not mean runaway inflation. MAS will remain vigilant and calibrate monetary policy to ensure that this does not happen. We will not allow inflationary pressures to become entrenched or inflation expectations to build up. Managing risks to economic and financial stability MAS is preparing for risks to economic and financial stability posed by escalation of Eurozone crisis Besides watching growth and inflation trends, MAS has been focusing on downside risks to Singapore’s economic and financial stability. We monitor the risks closely, take steps to mitigate these risks where we can, and draw up contingency measures to manage them if they materialise. The key risk facing the Singapore economy and financial system is the ongoing crisis in the Eurozone. While Eurozone governments have taken important steps to deal with crisis, we must be prepared for a more adverse turn of events. The escalation of the Eurozone crisis can affect Singapore in three ways: first, the impact on economic growth; second, stresses on our financial markets; and third, the safety and soundness of our financial institutions. Let me begin with economic growth. A deeper recession and credit crunch in Eurozone can impact our growth through trade and financial channels. The trade channel will be more direct and impactful. The Eurozone is our largest export market, and Singapore’s exports to the Eurozone have been declining since Q3 last year.

Ladies and Gentlemen: A greater understanding of Islamic banking and finance on the international front would contribute towards our efforts to reinforce the on-going international initiatives towards fostering greater global financial stability. In this regard, the participation of other financial supervisory and regulatory authorities, and other international standard setting organizations would facilitate this process to achieve our shared interest of preserving the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial system. Ladies and Gentlemen: It has been said that Islamic banking and finance is a "mirror of the sea" for until and unless we have the courage to explore its depth, we would never be able to uncover the treasures that reside within. Islamic banking as a new sphere of finance promises vast opportunities and benefits for all. Its integration into the global financial system will contribute towards achieving our shared aspirations for financial stability to ensure balanced growth in the global economy. BIS Review 64/2002  3
(2020b), “When markets fail – the need for collective action in tackling climate change”, 28 September; Schnabel, I. (2021a), op. cit. 33. Economic theory shows that when economic agents fail to internalise the full cost of their individual actions and/or there are informational frictions that prevent them from adequately pricing assets, market forces lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources. 34. Article 127(1) of the TFEU forms the basis for the primary and secondary mandates of the ECB. Primary mandate: “The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability.” Secondary mandate: “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on  European Union.” In addition, “The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources.” 35. See Lipsey, R.G. and Lancaster, K. (1956), “The general theory of second best”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No 1, pp. 11–32. 36. See Papoutsi, M., Piazzesi, M. and Schneider, M., (2021), “How unconventional is green monetary policy”, Working Paper. 37. See Schnabel, I. (2021a), op. cit. 38. See Greenpeace (2021), “Greening the Eurosystem collateral framework”, March. The executive director of Greenpeace International, Jennifer Morgan, has also recently argued in favour of exclusion policies.

Additionally, our Comprehensive Assessment and stress tests have been rigorous and thorough; this means that banks’ balance sheet problems are being dealt with and that the necessary transparency will be provided on the health of European banks. This is in contrast to the pronounced balance sheet problems of Japan in the 1990s. Finally, a number of euro area countries have implemented structural reforms to increase their competitiveness. Clearly, these efforts now need to gain momentum to achieve higher sustainable growth and employment in the euro area. In this context, it is also essential that governments conduct fiscal adjustment that is growth-friendly. Economists and politicians in Lithuania sometimes voice concerns that the economic benefits of being part of the euro area are offset by the rising costs of having the euro, e.g. with the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, contributions by Member States to the European Stability Mechanism, etc. What would your response BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  be to these concerns? Why does Lithuania need to be part of the euro area despite those costs? Joining the euro area is not a free lunch: it entails significant obligations, but many benefits at the same time. The obligations are stated very clearly in the Treaty and in EU regulations. In this respect, compared with those countries that joined in the first wave of entry, Lithuania has the advantage of joining a stronger euro area. The euro area has painfully recognised the flaws in its original design and taken major steps to repair them.
We have to turn to Alexis de Tocqueville in order to attempt to bring back the patience of enduring effort to our history: “[The French Revolution] took the world by surprise; yet it was the mere natural result of very long labours, the sudden and violent termination of a task which had successively engaged ten generations of men”.1 The example of our neighbours, from Germany to Spain, is today nevertheless illuminating in this respect: reforms work in Europe. They are the way, the only way, to make compatible our European social model, which is legitimate, and economic growth, which is essential in order to reduce unemployment and to finance our future. Today, I will focus my talk on other no less important reforms, implemented in a particularly disrupted context: the financial regulations introduced in the wake of the 2007–2009 crisis. Is there any need to recall the disastrous consequences that this crisis inflicted on the real economy, the social dramas, and the democratic fragmentation with the rise of populism? Financial stability is therefore a common good that needs to be guaranteed. It is one of the three core tasks of the Banque de France, alongside monetary strategy and services to the economy. We have been striving to achieve it in the international bodies that coordinated the financial reforms after the crisis. The urgency of the situation required rapid and effective action, and as early as April 2009, the G20 launched a global concerted action plan.

Many observers feared then that, if the crisis were allowed to run its course, it could be near catastrophic for the region and extremely dangerous for the European banking system. But I am pleased to say that this potential “catastrophe” was avoided and I would like to devote my remaining time to the question of how this was done – the third aspect of the convergence process I previously mentioned. I believe answering this question may provide lessons for countries that are currently facing similar challenges in the euro area. 3. The reaction of CEE countries to the global financial crisis: what can be learnt? In my view, the return to the convergence path is being achieved thanks to a combination of four main elements. First and foremost, there are domestic policy actions to address macroeconomic imbalances at the national level. The precise policy actions differ across countries, reflecting the different country-specific challenges and policy frameworks in place. But the actions generally require a strong fiscal adjustment and/or measures to maintain confidence in the soundness of the financial sector. Second, the reaction of the international community has been essential. Where funding challenges became more acute, international financial assistance led by the IMF – jointly with the EU in EU Member States,– has been crucial in supporting market confidence and avoiding financial crises. The balance of payments support facility available for EU Member States has been reactivated, while the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank have supported several countries.