samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In a few moments, I will talk about how this growth abroad also presents an opportunity for Puerto Rico. The firming in economic activity, in short, is due both to natural healing and past and present policy support. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that we at the Federal Reserve have been expecting the economy to strengthen. We provided additional monetary policy stimulus via the asset purchase program to help ensure that the recovery regained momentum. A stronger recovery with more rapid progress toward our dual mandate objectives is what we have been seeking. This is welcome and not a reason to reverse course. Yet, we must not be overly optimistic about the growth outlook. The coast is not completely clear – the healing process in the aftermath of the crisis takes time and there are still several areas of vulnerability and weakness. In particular, housing activity remains unusually weak and home prices have begun to soften again in many parts of the country. State and local government finances remain under stress, and this is likely to lead to further spending cuts, tax increases, or job losses in this sector that will offset at least a part of the federal fiscal stimulus. Moreover, in recent weeks we have experienced several shocks from abroad that could have some impact on the economy’s forward momentum, at least in the short term.

Recent financial market turmoil may complicate the transmission of monetary policy in some countries. If it amplifies the downturn in economic activity, it may accelerate disinflation from what is currently projected, although so far this appears unlikely to fundamentally change the outcome. Inflation and inflation expectations have started to decline in Europe and the US. Disinflation may take somewhat longer in the case of Iceland,  given the still strong economic momentum and prospects for higher wage growth than in trading partner countries. Much will depend on the interaction between three markets: the labour market, the housing market, and the foreign exchange market. Monetary policy will have to remain tight until the relationship between the three markets has been stabilized. Stronger counter-cyclical fiscal policies would shorten the time needed to reach the balance and bring inflation to target.
First, the insurance and takaful sectors have seen positive and continuous growth over the last five years, with total insurance premiums transacted and takaful contributions recording an average annual growth of 4.9%, with annual growth peaking at 13% in 2010. In terms of insurance penetration, in 2011, 67 out of 100 Malaysians had some form of life insurance or family takaful coverage as compared to only 59 out of 100 Malaysians in 2006. This means there remains a large untapped segment of the population with no life insurance or family takaful protection that the profession can further develop. Second, in terms of distribution channels, the agency force is still the dominant intermediation point for the insurance industry. At present, the market share of financial advisers as a delivery channel is still low and therefore, the prospect of growth is tremendous. The prominence of the agency force as a delivery channel of choice for the distribution of life insurance business is evidenced from the more than 10% growth in the number of life insurance agents enrolled between 2006 and 2011. Consistent with the increase in the agency force, the expenditure dedicated to maintain this delivery channel also remained significant, with commissions and agency remunerations consistently accounting for more than 70% of the net investment income of the industry. This trend reflects the attractive payouts a productive agent can potentially earn, although the industry’s commission structure is bound by the limits specified in the operating costs control guideline (OCC Guideline) issued by the Bank.

Presentation of the 2020 Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) Press conference, Friday 28 May 2021  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France Chairman of the ACPR  Ladies and Gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to be with you again for the presentation of the 2020 Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR – Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority), in the company of the new Vice-Chairman, Jean-Paul Faugère, Dominique Laboureix, Secretary General of the ACPR, and Alain Ménéménis, President of the Sanctions Committee. I would first like to pay tribute to the staff at the ACPR – more than 1,050 men and women whose professionalism is exemplary and recognised – who have worked especially hard, both on-site and remotely, to monitor closely the effects of the economic crisis on financial stability. Exactly a year ago, when we were just at the start of the Covid crisis, I pointed out to you, in this exact same setting, how vigilant we were being and how confident I was, both in the competence of our supervisor and in the resilience of the financial system. Looking back, we haven’t done too badly at all: at this stage, the financial risks are, on the whole, under control, thanks to resilient financial institutions with solid fundamentals (I).
Conclusions My purpose today was to provide information on the manner in which the Desk has conducted the asset purchases that the FOMC has decided to pursue and the associated implications for financial markets and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. On the whole, I believe that the recent asset purchases by the Federal Reserve have had helpful effects on financial conditions and have been implemented in a manner that has been flexible enough to avoid any significant negative consequences for the functioning of financial markets. Moreover, while the programs have resulted in significant changes to the characteristics of the SOMA portfolio, those changes will not impede the ability of the Federal Reserve to adjust the degree of policy accommodation when judged appropriate by the FOMC. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

This is the fruitful paradox of recent years: the coexistence of “domestically focused” policies that results in a “globally-cooperative” monetary environment. And for this purpose, monetary policy must be conducted in full independence. That is, independently of political powers, of course, and we regret to have to say it again. But also 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  independently of short-term pressures or any particular economic interests. So we take account of market indications, but we must not be market dependent; this includes not relying too exclusively for inflation expectations on market-based measures. We are data dependent and I say this in particular for the ECB: in our coming Governing Council meetings, we will assess actual economic data and we will act accordingly if and when needed. II. Financial stability issues and crises On financial stability issues, the Bretton Woods system has undergone numerous disruptions and crises since its inception, including its quasi break-up in 1971. And a decade after the GFC, we still have to define the future of our current international monetary system, or “non-system” as many describe it. Today we will discuss financial stability risks caused by the growth of cross-border flows and financial assets. Over the past few years, international capital flows have been too abundant in good times, – potentially fueling domestic bubbles and destabilising national financial systems – but also prone to “sudden stops” in bad times.
Prices, investment and home sales show considerable swings. Homes are important forms of collateral and price developments influence household borrowing and give rise to credit cycles. Housing loans account for 40 per cent of Norwegian bank balance sheets. 5 The framework conditions for the housing market are thus important for how wide fluctuations in output and employment are and for the risk of financial shocks and instability. The experience of the banking crisis in the early 1990s did admittedly entail limited bank losses on loans to households, and substantial losses on loans to business and corporate customers, which were affected by a fall in household consumption. Banks may certainly refer to this when they assess the credit risk of their loans, but they should perhaps not be as certain that people will stand by their creditors in the future as they did 15-20 years ago. Household debt is very high. Attitudes may change and debt servicing discipline may also be influenced by the debt settlement scheme that has gradually become less  4  See Financial Stability 2/2004, p 36, Norges Bank. 5  Including branches of foreign banks, subsidiaries and housing loans in mortgage companies. 4  BIS Review 110/2008  restrictive. 6 Banks should make ample allowance also for this risk in their loan disbursement and interest rate premiums. It is important for stability in the housing market that the supply of housing reacts rapidly to changes in demand.

The euro area has more policy room than others in the non-monetary domain, but under-uses it. Monetary policy can no longer be the only game in town. Central banks – including the ECB – cannot perform miracles. This paradox is either painful or promising…or both: the euro area has more leeway than the US or the UK, but until now has been much less inclined to use it. This has two dimensions [slide]. 1/ The euro area has a lower level of public debt (85%) than in the United-States (104 %) or the UK (87%), it has the lowest sovereign interest rates – even often negative –, but it uses fiscal stimulus significantly less. It should now exploit its fiscal leeway where available – especially in Germany – to support cyclical stabilisation, and long-term growth. There is also room to increase wages in countries which have full employment and external surpluses. And it is essential to choose quality expenditure, starting with investment. In this respect, I welcome the announced creation of a Dutch investment fund targeted to projects in infrastructure, digital, or climate transition. Its magnitude could be up to 7% of GDP: this is food for thought if we transpose this order of magnitude at the European level. Private debt – which stands at about 119% of GDP – is also significantly lower in the euro area compared to the US (148%), UK (152%) or Japan (152%). But of course, the “lower for longer” environment requires increased vigilance on financial stability.
reinvestment of earnings) + capital account balance ***) 4-quarter cumulative data  -6  2009  2017 Q3***  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2005  -25  2006  direct investment, equity (incl. reinvestment of earnings) capital account balance* non-debt-creating capital flows** current account balance  -20  2013-2015 at MTO  2007  -15  -30  percent of GDP  2013  percent of nominal GDP  2008  10  Figure 25. General government structural deficit  f) forecast Source: ECB, Eurostat 18  Figure 26. Households' total debt* 140  lei bn. 120 100 80 60 40 20  consumer loans – banks housing loans – banks write-offs  consumer loans – NBFIs housing loans – NBFIs  Jun.17  Dec.16  Jun.16  Dec.15  Jun.15  Dec.14  Jun.14  Dec.13  Jun.13  Dec.12  Jun.12  Dec.11  Jun.11  Dec.10  Jun.10  Dec.09  Jun.09  Dec.08  Jun.08  Dec.07  Jun.07  0  stock of sold consumer loans stock of sold housing loans  *) the stock of sold loans refers only to sold loans for which the bank continues to provide management services Source: NBR  19  Figure 27.

Even if it were possible, going back to the ECU would present major disadvantages compared to today’s euro: until the euro was introduced, France did not actually participate in decisions on interest rate levels and had to follow German monetary policy; the franc was at the mercy of speculative attacks from the financial markets that drained our currency reserves as we saw in the 1992-1993 period. The euro was introduced to solve these problems. Today, the euro is alive and well. It is the currency of 340 million Europeans, is recognised worldwide and is trusted by the people of France. Almost 70% of French citizens are in favour of the euro because it protects their purchasing power, with prices that increase three times less rapidly than previously; because it makes borrowing easier, with interest rates that are 1.5% to 3% lower; and because it safeguards the value of their savings. Finally, I would like to add that the Eurosystem has not modified its sovereign debt purchase programme in relation to France’s presidential elections. The distribution of monthly purchases between the various countries is based on the ECB’s capital allocation principle. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
The financial system is important, and the risks in the system must be constantly reviewed. Let me give you some examples of areas that I believe will need to be investigated. As I mentioned earlier, the Swedish banks’ high dependence on market funding entails an increased risk that they will suffer liquidity problems in a stressed situation. It is of course always possible for the Riksbank to lend Swedish kronor, but it is unreasonable for the banks to take liquidity risks based on the expectation that the Riksbank will provide extraordinary loans if things do not go according to plan. The ability of the banks to comply with the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in the Basel III Accord should therefore be investigated. The differences in the maturities of the banks’ assets and liabilities in foreign currencies that I described above are also a potential source of concern in more troubling times. The Riksbank cannot after all offer unlimited liquidity in any other currency than our own. As you know, the Riksbank has therefore recently strengthened its foreign-exchange reserve so that in a situation in which the foreign-exchange market is seriously disrupted the Riksbank will be able to provide extraordinary loans in US dollars and euros. The aim of course is to strengthen the Riksbank’s preparedness to safeguard the basic workings of the financial system and thereby help us to avoid major economic costs.

There are therefore good reasons for the banks to examine the matching of the maturities of their assets and liabilities in foreign currencies. The market for bank certificates in kronor has shrunk It is not only long-term funding that takes place in foreign currencies. A large part of the banks’ short-term funding also takes place in foreign currencies, mainly US dollars and euros. The Swedish banks are, for example, important counterparties for US money-market funds. Sweden is the second-largest European market for the money-market funds – larger than the United Kingdom or Germany. Although this indicates a high level of confidence in the Swedish banks, it also entails risks. During the crisis, we saw that the money-market funds were among the more volatile investors. A high degree of funding from the moneymarket funds also makes the banks dependent on US regulatory frameworks and legislative processes. For short-term funding in Swedish kronor there is a market for bank certificates. However, this market has shrunk (see Figure 3). We may wonder why this market has declined so dramatically when it seems that there should be incentives to maintain it. A thriving domestic market for bank certificates in kronor would increase the banks' scope for diversification. Their dependence on markets in foreign currencies and on the swap market would be reduced. Although these markets usually work well and Swedish banks currently have a good reputation among investors this does not always need to be the case, as we saw in 2008 and 2009.
One reason why financial markets might be over-extrapolating international experience is because, at least since the crisis, monetary policy internationally has borne most of the burden of supporting growth in advanced economies. Over that period, central banks have often been “the only game in town”.31 I believe that game made economic sense. The crisis led to a large gap opening-up between aggregate demand and supply in the economy. Pump-priming aggregate demand back towards aggregate supply, through accommodative monetary policy, was the right policy response. And this monetary medicine, as best we can tell, worked. In the UK and US, aggregate demand is now back in line with supply. And in the euro area and Japan, the output gap has shrunk materially. Today, however, the conjunctural starting position for most advanced economies is very different than a decade ago. With the output gap closed in the UK, economic growth and pay rises in future can no longer rely on monetary policy pump-priming demand. It will instead require a lasting expansion in the economy’s supply potential, if capacity constraints are not to bite and inflationary pressures are not to snuff out pay rises. It is not just the economic starting point that differs, now versus a decade ago. So too do the potential shocks. A decade ago, the world faced a sharp shock to aggregate demand courtesy of the global financial crisis. This opened-up yawning output gaps and fed fears of the scourge of 1930s-style mass unemployment returning.

28  Companies’ responses are translated to impacts using the assumptions described under Chart 30. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Chart 30: Bank of England Agents’ Survey of impact of different Brexit scenarios Approximate estimated change (%) 3 Deal and transition 2  No deal and no transition  1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 Output  Employment  Investment in UK  Exports  Sources: Bank of England and Bank calculations. Notes: Chart shows aggregated results from surveys from December 2018 to April 2019. Companies were asked ‘Relative to the last 12 months, what is the likely impact on the following for your business over the next year in each scenario: a deal and transition period and no deal and no transition period?’ For each relevant business factor, respondents were asked to choose between ‘Fall greater than 10%’; ‘-10 to -2%’; ‘Little change’; ‘+2 to +10%’ and ‘Rise greater than 10%’. Responses weighted by employment. Half weight was given to the +/- 2-10% response and full weight was given to those that responded 'Rise/fall greater than 10%'. The approximate estimated change for output, employment, investment and exports are based on a simple calculation assuming a midpoint figure for each of the response categories. For “Fall greater than 10%” the mid-point was -15%; for “-10 to -2%” the mid-point was 6%; for “Little change” the mid-point was 0%; for “2 to10%” the mid-point was +6%; for “Rise greater than 10%” the mid-point was +15%.
In an inter-institutional level, the commitment to be active on AML goes beyond full compliance with the regulatory requirements. We must be mindful of the role we have in the mosaic of the institutions that are relevant on implementing the AML program in the society. Furthermore, we should be sensitive and helpful toward such institutions, especially when we know the difficulties they face in performing their functions. More concretely, I do not believe that the banking industry and other nonbank financial institutions, are giving their maximum contribution, if they suffice with fulfilling rigorously some quantitative mandatory requirements of the law, and not focusing also on some non-mandatory but very important requirements. For example, a very low number of suspicious transactions is currently reported at Anti Money Laundering Directorate (FIU), while the number of reports about transactions above the threshold required by law, is huge. In this instance banks are acting in accordance with the law requirements, but are not in compliance with spirit of the law.

This is the key element of our duty, the feature of a good banker. By being active in AML, we are simply doing our job. Any negligence on this means we are not up to the requirements of our job. We need to emphasize that the key element in the process, is the strong commitment to understand and implement it. It is very important for such commitment to come from the highest management structures of the bank. If such commitment is missing, this will be immediately shown at the structures of the bank that are directly involved in the AML process, whose functioning will be negligible and full of formalism. Within the institution, this commitment should be shown: in the preparation and approval of the internal procedures on AML (including those of knowing the client), in setting up the proper entities and appointing the responsible persons (on monitoring the AML implementation process) with the proper professional and hierarchical qualities, in rightly defining their rights and responsibilities, in giving them moral and material support, in providing qualitative and continuous training for the staff, especially for those that have direct contact with the client and analyse its ML risk profile and in keeping up a positive pressure in the institution for such process to be implemented and be continuously functioning. In one word, the climate that should exist within the institution for such issue (but not only) should favour in any instance the responsible actions being taken from the bank staff on AML.
Consequently, it is of vital importance that the selection of these projects is such that the magnitude of their impact on economic activity and public finances is maximised; this would be fostered by structuring the distribution of the funds around a plan of structural reforms designed to strengthen the economy's long-term growth. As for the distribution of the funds between direct grants and loans, it should be noted that direct grants have a greater impact on activity, allowing for an increase in public spending not matched by an increase in debt, which is what occurs with loans. The latter are particularly useful when there is a greater difference between the cost of financing of a country’s public sector and that of the EU. Currently, the difference between the cost of EU 10-year debt and Spanish Treasury debt ranges from 50 to 80 basis points. Thus, there would be a saving of approximately € million for every € millions of EU loans replacing long-term Treasury issues. However, we should not overlook the fact that the NGEU is mainly useful in the medium term. In the short term, the delays in approving the fund and in the implementation of 8  Indeed, the consensus reached by virtually all empirical evidence is that the medium-term public investment multiplier effect would be higher than 1, whereas that of spending on government consumption or benefits would be less than 1.

SPEECH DATE:  7 October 2020  SPEAKER:  First Deputy Governor Cecilia Skingsley  VENUE:  Nordea  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  Post-pandemic monetary policy and the future of the interest rate as a policy tool* The coronavirus pandemic has had a dramatic impact on the economic playing field. For the second time in a little more than a decade, governments and central banks around the world have needed to take powerful measures to alleviate, as far as possible, a recession and try to prevent lasting damage to the economy. One result of this has been that an increasing number of central banks now find themselves in a situation where inflation is undershooting the target and the policy rate is at or close to its lower bound. In some economies, such as the euro area and Sweden, the policy rates have been low for a long time. But the pandemic has also meant that, for instance, the US Federal Reserve, which as recently as just over a year ago had a policy rate of more than 2 per cent, has had to quickly lower it to basically 0 per cent. Thus, one could say that the monetary policy playing field has become more even (see Figure 1).