samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Strengthening relations between Indonesia and Malaysia Remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia, The Malaysian Branch and First Islamic Investment Bank Ltd, Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2009. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to be here this morning on this occasion of the launch of the Malaysian branch of PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia, and its subsidiary, First Islamic Investment Bank Ltd., established under the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC) initiative to operate foreign currency Islamic financial business in Malaysia. This is a significant development as it represents the first Indonesian financial institution in the Malaysian financial system. Indeed, this occasion signifies a further step forward towards strengthening the bilateral, financial and economic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. The settingup of these two institutions in Kuala Lumpur would contribute towards accelerating the financial linkages that will underpin the expanding trade and investment ties between Indonesia and Malaysia. As the largest Islamic bank in Indonesia, we will also have the opportunity to leverage on our respective strengths and expertise and to mutually reinforce the benefits to be gained from this development. Potential of Islamic finance amid slower economic growth in the region Cumulatively, the total output of the ASEAN economies amounts to USD1.3 trillion while total trade of the ASEAN region now amounts to USD1.4 trillion.

There has been a growing number of MIFC players with diverse business activities that range from international Islamic banking business in foreign currency to Islamic fund and wealth management, takaful and sukuk origination. The global sukuk market has expanded by an annual growth rate of 40%. Despite a slowdown in the sukuk issuance in 2008, there was still an estimated USD20 billion issuance taking place, with Malaysia remaining as the main issuer in the global market. The prospect of Islamic finance continues to remain positive despite the more challenging international environment. The global financial crisis has resulted in heightened calls for more transparent forms of banking that are subject to stricter governance and risk management practices. There are also greater demands for increased regulation. Following the financial reform that may take place, the world may see a banking system that is significantly different from before to the crisis. Many of the features currently being discussed are in fact explicitly embedded in the Shariah requirements. The in-built check and balances in Islamic banking avoids the excesses and over leveraging, a feature precipitating the current financial crisis. Ensuring that the Shariah requirements are embraced in its entirety is vital to ensuring the robustness and resilience of Islamic finance. Islamic finance must also draw upon the lessons derived from the current crises. It is vital that the regulatory regime based on the prudential standards issued by the Islamic Financial Services Board be implemented. This will further ensure the stability and soundness of the system.
1  4  Speech by Adair Tuner on 29 September 2011, Credit Creation and Social Optimality. BIS central bankers’ speeches  One key answer to the spiral described by Minsky has been to introduce macroprudential regulation. Instruments such as the countercyclical capital buffer are meant to provide a cushion when the credit cycle turns down. There is also a commonly held view that we need instruments to dampen credit growth during an expansion. We should probably look broadly at how the Minsky style spirals could be contained. Discretionary policy can be a useful tool, but due weight must be given to building strong automatic stabilisers into the financial system to reduce the risk of future bubbles. The topic of this conference is financial innovation. Both Adair Turner2 and Paul Tucker3 have raised doubts about the social value of some of these new instruments. I quite agree: Restrictive regulation of some of these instruments could contribute to stabilising financial markets. One could imagine that the regulator should evaluate the pros and cons of allowing any new instrument. At the very least, the regulator should make sure that any instrument traded in significant quantities is sufficiently transparent to be a useful risk shifter. In short, I agree with Frank that the positive relationship between financial markets and economic growth has its limits. The difficult question is naturally where these limits are. It will be hard for a regulator to draw the line. But there are few other candidates for doing it.

This was not the first time! We were again reminded how responsibilities should be shared between the fiscal authorities and the central bank. It is the responsibility of the parliament and the government to spend taxpayers’ money. It is not up to an independent central bank to spend their money! We still remembered this principle in late 2008 and early 2009 when the funding of Norwegian banks also dried up. Then we made sure that the Ministry of Finance became the banks’ counterparty in the bond swap I mentioned earlier. We thus avoided the discussion we have seen elsewhere about the central bank intruding into the arena of the fiscal authorities. The financial crisis also hit some very small Norwegian municipalities – far up North close to the coldness of the Barents Sea and others deep into the fjords warmed by the Gulf Stream – that had in fact invested in instruments exposed to the US subprime market. They were told that they could earn a risk-free excess return of 50 basis points. The instruments were in most cases sold to them by their very small local savings banks, which had taken them on from large US investment banks. The savings banks did not understand the risks either! Ignorance combined with greed – a dangerous combination. In 2008 and 2009 the municipalities suffered very large losses; from risks they had not understood.
And unemployment has fallen from a peak of 10½% on a claimant count basis at the beginning of 1993 to the present rate of 4%. That is the lowest for 20 years in the UK as a whole, and just about the lowest in nearly every region. In Yorkshire and Humberside unemployment is 4.7%, the lowest rate since June 1980. Our problem - and it is a real problem, as we have recognised for some time - is the imbalance, within the overall economy, between the domestically-oriented businesses and sectors, and those that are most internationally exposed. In part that imbalance is a hangover from the slowdown in global activity from the end of 1997 through to the start of 1999 - though the welcome recovery in global demand means that this influence is now diminishing. The more important factor now is the persistent weakness of the euro - not exclusively against sterling but equally against the dollar and the yen. The impact is particularly severe on the UK because of the closer ties between our economy and that of the Eurozone. I’ve not heard a wholly convincing explanation for the euro’s persistent weakness. Many analysts relate it to market concerns about structural rigidities in some parts of the Eurozone, which are encouraging direct capital outflows attracted elsewhere by higher prospective earnings growth. Whatever the cause, few of those I talk to expect the weakness of the euro to persist.

This is the first time we intervened in the foreign exchange market since 1999. Relatively quickly after the interventions, the market began to function more normally. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Later in spring, the krone appreciated on the back of a rise in oil prices and reduced uncertainty in global financial markets. Recently, oil prices have been broadly at the same level as at the beginning of 2020, and the krone is somewhat stronger than prior to the Covid-19 outbreak. In spring 2020, risk premiums in the Norwegian money market rose considerably. Norges Bank took a range of measures to improve market liquidity and ensure pass-through of a lower policy rate to money market rates and bank lending rates. Among other things, Norges Bank offered banks extraordinary liquidity in both NOK and USD. In advance of the monetary policy meeting in May, financial market stress subsided and premiums in both the money and bond markets fell. The normalisation of liquidity policy is well underway. By the end of August 2021, all extraordinary loans from Norges Bank to banks will have been repaid, and the relaxation of collateral requirements for loans from Norges Bank will be reversed. Downturn in the Norwegian economy Activity in the Norwegian economy fell abruptly in 2020 Q2. The Covid-19 outbreak and extensive containment measures led to production halts and lower activity across a range of businesses. Mainland GDP was around 11 percent lower in April 2020 than in February the same year. Many employees were furloughed or made redundant.
It is not hard to understand the obstacles to developing a mutually beneficial relationship between the two financial systems. Naturally, with financial restrictions much more prevalent on the Mainland than in Hong Kong, relationship-building between the two financial systems, to the extent that it involves relaxation of financial restrictions, invariably requires policy decisions on the Mainland. In making such decisions, the Mainland authorities have to weigh carefully the benefits of financial liberalisation with the over-riding need to avoid doing anything that will destabilize such a large and complex economy. This need for balance and careful sequencing of the reforms that are introduced is, I believe, well understood by the Mainland authorities. It is something that we in Hong Kong, in our desire for rapid change, need to approach with understanding and patience. One thing remains clear: the utility of the financial system of Hong Kong to the country as a whole. The mutual benefits of financial co-operation are also clear – on the one hand greater efficiency of financial intermediation and therefore greater sustainability of economic growth and development on the  BIS Review 98/2006  3  Mainland and on the other hand the successful maintenance of Hong Kong as an international financial centre in accordance with the requirement laid down in Article 109 of the Basic Law. Both are very desirable objectives that are clearly in the national interest.

A study of his speeches suggested that the concept germinated at the beginning of the eighties, before Margaret Thatcher paid him a visit in 1982 at the Great Hall of the People and raised with him the question of the political future of Hong Kong. The phrase was then used, for the first time in public, by Deng Xiaoping when he received industry and business leaders from Hong Kong in June 1984 1 . Since that occasion, it has become by far the most common formula for summarising the governance arrangements for Hong Kong after the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty. It has, indeed, turned out to be a most effective political expression, capturing succinctly China’s policy towards Hong Kong, emphasising that Hong Kong is to be ruled by Hong Kong people (港人治港) and that there is to be a high degree of autonomy in the governance of Hong Kong (高度自治). The policy has also been most successfully implemented, contributing further to the credibility of the formula and the unique political concept that it encapsulates. Indeed, whenever one hears the phrase "one country, two systems", the immediate context will almost invariably be the political arrangements for the governance for Hong Kong.
As part of Singapore's efforts to forge bilateral free trade agreements with strategic partners, MAS has engaged in talks on financial services liberalisation and cooperation, including with Australia, Canada, the European Free Trade Association, Japan, Mexico and the US. 5  MAS annual accounts  Assets & liabilities On MAS' annual accounts, total assets increased by $ billion to $ billion as at 31 March 2001. The main components of the increase were due to a $ billion increase in foreign assets and a $  BIS Review 63/2001  3  billion increase in our holdings of Singapore Government Securities (SGS). As in the last financial year, the increase in SGS holdings reflected MAS' strategy of building up SGS to engage in more repurchase agreement (repo) transactions for our money market operations. On the liabilities side, there was an increase of $ billion in Government deposits with MAS, reflecting mainly increased issuance of SGS through the Authority. Income & expenditure statement For the financial year ended 31 March 2001, MAS registered profits of $ billion compared to $ billion in the previous year. The decrease resulted from translation effects arising from the strength of the Singapore Dollar against major currencies other than US Dollar over the financial year as a whole. 6  The organisation  MAS has strengthened its corporate planning process. We formed several cross-specialisation teams comprising more than 60 staff to evaluate developments and challenges both in the external environment and within the organisation.

Through the themes and art embodied in its design, the national currency remains a faithful herald of the development, culture and history of a country. Thanks to these attributes, the currency is in itself a significant element of the national identity. The theme of the current series of Albanian banknotes, created more than 20 years ago, features important historical periods of the Albanian nation, and prominent personalities of Albania. These themes, embodied in each banknote through the portraits of some of the most illustrious national figures, evoke notable episodes in the history of Albania in its endeavours for freedom and prosperity. The themes lead us on a journey through historical eras, starting from Antiquity, moving through the Middle Ages, the National Awakening, the Independence of Albania, and concluding with the symbols of the national flag and anthem on the latest and largest denomination, the 10.000 lek banknote. These symbols have been chosen as representative and unifying elements for every Albanian. While the new series that we are presenting today retains the same themes of the already existing series, its design is reconfigured and restyled, through the application of modern technologies in banknote production. Thanks to cutting-edge technology, the Albanian banknote is now more secure. Its security features – a key priority of the Bank of Albania – are enhanced. In addition, innovative printing techniques and materials have been used to increase durability and the banknotes’ dimensions have been optimised. The design now boasts a fresher look.
To give you and example, according to the estimates of PricewaterhouseCoopers 5 , by the buying power parity, in 2050 the Chinese economy will be over 40% larger than that of the US, India will catch up with the US, the economies of Mexico and Indonesia will outgrow that of Germany, and the Brazilian economy will exceed Japan. We must ask the question whether the present economic policy in Poland takes these facts into consideration. 5  See the study by Hawksworth J. (2006), “The World In 2050. How big will the major emerging market economies get and how can the OECD compete?”, PricewaterhouseCoopers, March 2006.

Shkëlqim Cani: Review of the Albanian economy Statement by Dr Shkëlqim Cani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, for Euromoney Yearbooks, Global banking and financial policy review, Tirana, 9 August 2004. *  *  *  The Albanian economy experienced a recovered pulse of economic growth over the year 2003. Positive developments are marked in respect of consolidating the country’s macroeconomic stability, economic growth and a sound development of the financial system. A recovery in economic activity and 6% growth of Gross Domestic Product in real terms was proved by all sectors of the economy, but was particularly evident in the construction, transport and services sectors, which are the most dynamic sectors of Albanian economy. The year 2003 was characterised by a low inflation rate, within 2%-4% of the targeted range. The inflation rate as of December was 3.3%, meeting the Bank of Albania (BoA) target. Despite the various factors this low rate emerged from a diligent management of the domestic demand as an outcome of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. BoA’s monetary policy has been a moderate one throughout 2003. Such a trend will continue during 2004 and was recently reflected by the reduction of the core interest rate in the economy. Since April 2003 the REPO rate has been lowered by 2.5%. The 6% REPO rate, decided on May 12, 2004, is the lowest ever in the Albanian economy. The policy aims to reduce borrowing costs in the economy and maintain price and financial stability.
The short-term real interest rate, that is the short-term nominal interest rate minus inflation, is commonly used to describe how expansionary monetary policy is. This can be assumed to average approximately 2 per cent in the longer term. In the United States, the real interest rate was negative in the period 2003–2005, while in the euro area it was approximately 0 per cent in the same period (see Figure 1). At the same time, China and other countries had their currencies tied to the US dollar, which resulted in expansionary monetary conditions in these countries too. Large current account surpluses in China and in oil-producing countries led to capital flows to the United States and the euro area and this also kept down long-term interest rates. The consequences of the expansionary monetary policy became apparent in the development of the economy. Inflation in the United States was over 2 per cent measured using various measures of core inflation, Resource utilisation was higher than normal and there was a rapid expansion of credit. From the mid-1990s to 2006, real housing prices increased unusually rapidly, by approximately 80 per cent, after having been relatively stable from the early 1950s to the mid-1990s (see Figure 2). Housing prices increased dramatically in some parts of Europe too, for example in Ireland and Spain, while they remained largely stable in other countries, for example Germany. However, for the euro area as a whole the increase in prices was not as large as in the United States.

Of course, not many other observers saw the crisis coming either. However, we did draw attention to the problems on the housing and mortgage markets in the United States, and in our Financial Stability Reports we did mention the problems relating to the Swedish banks’ credit expansion in the Baltic countries. But the new feature of this financial crisis was that the banks were unable to fund their operations on the market and this was something we were not prepared for.14 Second, the Riksbank reacted quickly and forcefully once the crisis hit Sweden. The Riksbank’s extensive lending to the banks and the rapid reduction of the repo rate to an exceptionally low level softened the impact of the crisis on the Swedish economy. Together with an expansionary fiscal policy this kept up the level of domestic demand and meant that employment decreased less and unemployment increased less than could have been expected, and that inflation was kept at a reasonable level. Underlying inflation was kept close to 2 per cent and inflation expectations five years ahead, which had increased before the crisis, fell back again and stabilised at around 2 per cent. Monetary policy needs to become less expansionary in the period ahead My third thesis is that the repo rate needs to be raised at every meeting this year, and perhaps next year too. I will now explain why I make this assessment.
Financial market statistics show that lending to households via banks and credit institutions is increasing, but at a slower rate than before (Figure 8). Lending to companies is declining, but not by very much considering that we are in a recession. Figure 8. Households’ and non-financial companies’ total borrowing from credit institutions, annual percentage change 20  20 Households Companies  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 138/2009  9  If we look at the conditions in the financial markets from an interest rate perspective – in terms of price instead of volume – they have become less strained during 2009. This can be seen, for instance, if one looks at what are usually known as TED spreads – the difference between the interbank rate, where the banks lend to one another, and the government bond rate, both with a maturity of three months (Figure 9). The TED spread can be regarded as an indicator of confidence between the banks. One can say that this is a premium that reflects liquidity risk, credit risk and the demand for safer assets. The demand for government securities tends to increase during times of financial market turmoil. Figure 9.

4  BIS Review 7/2002  The uncertainty associated with the analyses is one of the reasons that we normally proceed gradually 5 in adjusting the interest rate to the inflation target. In this way, we have the possibility of utilising new information that becomes available along the way. Most central banks have chosen such a model in their use of instruments. In exceptional cases, situations may arise that demand strong and immediate reactions. An example of this is the situation in Norway in the autumn of 1998, when there was unrest in the financial markets and a rupture of confidence in the Norwegian krone. Another is the Federal Reserve’s interest rate cuts in 2001. Even in these cases, however, the entire interest rate adjustment was not made immediately. In an uncertain world, central banks cannot guarantee that a process of increasing or decreasing the interest rate will necessarily continue. New information may require an adjustment of the projections. Nor can ”gradual” be construed to mean that an adjustment to a new interest rate level will be achieved by changing the interest rate at every monetary policy meeting. ”Gradual” may also imply that we want some time to evaluate new information or are awaiting further information before making a move. Transparency about intensions, strategies and implementation of monetary policy makes it easier for economic agents to assess monetary policy. A monetary policy that is understood and predictable may contribute to improving the efficiency and impact of monetary policy.