samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The number of Shariah-based unit trust funds have also increased to 136 with a net asset value of over USD5.2 billion while 85% of the listed Malaysian stocks are Shariah-approved counters. The second strategy is to accord greater emphasis on the enabling environment for increased innovation in the Islamic financial industry. The product range in Islamic finance has now expanded into a broad spectrum of innovative instruments, including investment and equity linked products based on musyarakah, mudarabah and ijarah. These products are competitive both in terms of product structure and pricing. The enhanced depth of the Islamic financial markets, in particular, the sukuk market, has increased the attractiveness of the Islamic financial instruments as an asset class for investment. The drive for innovation has been supported by the investment in human capital development. A sufficient pool of the talent and expertise has been key to the development of the Islamic financial hub in Malaysia. The International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) was established in 2006. INCEIF which has an international faculty and students from more than 40 countries is focused on programmes for Islamic finance professionals and specialists in Islamic finance. The first group of students for the Chartered Islamic Finance Professional qualification, CIFP, offered by INCEIF, is expected to graduate at the end of this year after completing a three year programme that includes an internship with an Islamic financial institution. INCEIF also offers a Masters and PhD Programme in Islamic finance.

5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  In their current form, these innovations are simply a new front-end to the banking system where FinTech providers take a slice of customer revenue and loyalty but none of the associated risks. They have generally avoided undertaking traditional banking activities. So for now, absent a substantive change in business models or scale of activities, the FPC is unlikely to want to bring these firms into the regulatory perimeter. 11  The changes to customer relationships resulting from FinTech competition could, however, reduce customer loyalty and the stability of funding of incumbent banks. If this happens, the Bank of England would need to ensure prudential standards and resolution regimes for the affected banks are sufficiently robust to these risks. Figure 2: Financial Services Value Chain and Our Infrastructure  10  For an overview of the changes occurring further along the value chain see: “The promise of FinTech: something new under the sun?”, a speech given by Mark Carney on 25 January 2017, at the Deutsche Bundesbank G20 conference on “Digitising finance, financial inclusion and financial literacy”, Wiesbaden. Available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2017/956.aspx 11 Were any FinTech providers to become systemic in their own right, they could be brought into the regulatory perimeter; this could be under the existing statutory framework for designating systemic financial market infrastructure (FMIs), for example.
Where we continue to have concerns about the internal rating of particular assets, we may commission an opinion from an external credit rating agency in the form of a skilled person review. It should be no surprise that we are paying particular attention to the internal ratings of the securitised notes backed by equity release mortgages. These typically have a high matching adjustment, are complex and relatively large in value. They are subject to credit default and downgrade risks, like any other matching adjustment assets. But the drivers of default and downgrade risks are the risks on the underlying mortgages, such as prepayment, longevity or the exposure to long-term house prices arising from the 9  Article77c 1 (b), Directive 2009/138/EC Solvency II: Matching Adjustment, unrated, illiquid assets and equity release mortgages. Prudential Regulation Authority SS 3/17. 10  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  no-negative-equity guarantee. The essential point of SS 3/17 is that compensation for the risks taken by the insurer, particularly providing a no-negative equity guarantee, should not translate into a matching adjustment benefit on the restructured notes. Moreover, the compensation for risks retained by a firm as a result of the no negative equity guarantee must comprise more than the best estimate cost of the no negative equity guarantee. A best estimate cost of the no negative equity guarantee might be based on assumptions about likely long-term house price growth in excess of risk-free rates, extrapolating for example from historical experience.

This level will still provide solid profitability for many investment projects in the petroleum sector and continued large surpluses on the current account and in government finances. The krone exchange rate, measured against our most important trading partners, has appreciated by about 7 per cent since the spring of 2000. However, the krone exchange rate is about 2.5 per cent weaker than in 1990 and at the same level as in the mid-1990s. Traditional merchandise exports remained high in the first half of 2001 but exhibited a weaker trend in the second half of the year. Foreign trade figures for the fourth quarter of 2001 indicate that the decline in export volumes may have come to a halt, although export prices are still falling. Consumption indicators suggest strong growth in private consumption. Credit growth has slowed somewhat due to reduced borrowing by enterprises. Household borrowing, on the other hand, has increased further. Developments in debt may also influence financial stability. Although borrowing by enterprises appears to be declining, their debt burden remains high. This reduces enterprises’ ability to cope with downturns. The household debt burden is increasing, but the level is low. These developments are due in particular to the housing market, with high turnover and high price rises. Experience shows that private sector debt tends to increase at a particularly fast pace during upturns. Higher asset prices may be a driving force.
As the home country regulator for four G-SIBs and the host for all 30 G-SIBs we see them as essential elements of delivering global financial stability. We participate actively in supervisory colleges, sharing the supervisory expertise we have developed from managing the multitude of complex risks that are traded in London. And we expect the same from those whose firms operate and take on large risks here. Symmetry is fundamental to an effective global system. Third, the most critical element of supervisory cooperation is confidence in how each other will behave when things go wrong. In this regard, operationalising new “gone concern” regimes are critical. These set out what happens when a firm fails. In our view, best practice is captured by the FSB’s Key Attributes and involves resolvability assessments and regular crisis management group meetings for systemic firms. The UK was an early adopter. We host Crisis Management Groups for the UK G-SIBs, G-SIIs and systemic CCPs and attend all such meetings internationally for firms with significant operations in the UK. And we conduct exercises with other major jurisdictions to test preparedness. V.  The Road Ahead  We are at a fork in the road. One path builds on the foundations of a new responsible global financial system that are being put in place. The combination of robust international standards and trust built through transparent implementation and intensive supervisory cooperation can create a system of enhanced equivalence and mutual deference.

Page 1 sur 7  8th International Insurance Conference: “Towards the insurance of tomorrow” – Paris, 14 October 2016 Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Chairman of the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution and Governor of the Banque de France  Ladies and gentlemen,  I am very happy to be here today for this 8th International Insurance Conference - the first to be organised under the aegis of the French Insurance Federation - and I would particularly like to extend my regards to the federation’s Chairman, Bernard Spitz, as well as to its vice-chairmen. Although I have met you all several times in the past year, this is the first time I have participated in an event in my capacity as Chairman of the ACPR, the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution. Rest assured that at the ACPR, I indeed we - regard the insurance sector as every bit as important as the banking sector. With a total of 826 licensed firms in France in 2015, oversight of the insurance sector is a vital part of our mission to safeguard financial stability – which, alongside monetary strategy and the provision of services to the economy, forms part of my threefold mandate as Governor of the Banque de France. Page 2 sur 7  As supervisors, we are concerned on a daily basis with the theme of this conference: the insurance industry of tomorrow. Indeed, given the speed at which things are evolving, tomorrow’s insurance landscape is already very much present today.
However, the support measures and the associated expansion in liquidity, pent-up consumer demand and the supply bottlenecks have subsequently led to increased inflationary pressure in many countries. And this brings me to current monetary policy. Impact of the war on current monetary policy Many countries began 2022 with inflation rates that were already significantly higher than in the recent past. Since then, the war and sanctions have led to an additional marked rise in energy and commodity prices. Inflationary pressure has thus increased further worldwide. At the same time, the war is impacting the real economy, and the scale of the consequences is still difficult to assess. The current forecasts for inflation and growth are therefore very uncertain. Uncertainty can in turn also influence the behaviour of economic agents and amplify the adverse effects of the war. This poses a number of questions for monetary policy. How broad and persistent is the current inflationary pressure, and to what extent will the global economy be curbed? Will inflation also spill over to goods and services not directly affected by the pandemic and the war? And will salaries also begin to rise, thus starting a classic wage-price spiral? In some countries there are already signs of firming inflation dynamics, prompting certain central banks to begin tightening their monetary policy. I will come to the monetary policy situation in Switzerland shortly, but I would first like to talk briefly about economic growth.

However, should there be signs of a strengthening and spread in inflationary pressure, we will not hesitate to take the necessary measures to ensure price stability in Switzerland in the medium term. Possible longer-term consequences of the war for monetary policy So much for monetary policy today. However, what could be the longer-term consequences of the war? One key issue in my view is how we are going to deal going forward with the dependencies that have arisen as a result of globalisation. Specifically, which countries will still trade with each other in which goods and services and to what extent? We do not yet have definitive answers to these new questions. From the current perspective, however, it appears possible that in the medium term we will be living in a world that is less integrated than it is today. I would like to focus here on this question: What would a less globalised world mean for monetary policy? There would initially be the impact on inflation and the economy, in other words on the two variables at the core of monetary policy. With a reduction in the division of labour owing to a fragmentation of the global economy, production costs for many goods would rise again. As long as this disintegration persisted, it would be likely to trigger more protracted inflationary pressure.
Figure 1: Development of GDP in selected countries and regions  Quarterly changes in per cent, annual rate, seasonally adjusted data. Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank (Monetary Policy update, 15 December 2010)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Swedish banks’ access to market funding, which was disrupted after the failure of Lehman Brothers, has recovered sufficiently to enable the Riksbank to withdraw the extraordinary lending it provided during the crisis. 1 In addition, the four largest Swedish banks, which have a combined market share of about 75%, are well capitalised. Indeed, the Riksbank estimates that, by the end of 2011, they will already have sufficient resources to meet the forthcoming Basel III capital requirements, including the capital conservation buffer and a fullscale counter-cyclical capital buffer, without undertaking any exceptional capital raising exercises (see Figure 2). 2 Figure 2: Estimated common equity tier 1 capital ratios for the four largest Swedish banks  Sources: Bank reports and Riksbank calculations. (The Riksbank’s Financial stability report 2010:2)  But potential vulnerabilities are building up in Sweden Despite these positive developments, there are still vulnerabilities in the Swedish financial system. Recent surveys suggest that Swedish households remain capable of servicing their debts. 3 At the same time, household credit losses in Sweden are traditionally low: even in 1992, at the peak of the Swedish banking crisis, credit losses from households only made up 6 per cent of total credit losses.

This may be more difficult to achieve for international tools that require agreement between multiple national policy makers. Macroprudential policy needs to be operational soon It is therefore clear that vulnerabilities are emerging as countries recover from the crisis and it is important that national authorities are soon able to implement macroprudential policies to address those risks. Leading the development of formalised macroprudential policy arrangements are the European Systemic Risk Board, which will hold its inaugural meeting in just two days, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US, which held its first meeting in October 2010. But many other countries are thinking seriously about how to implement and conduct macroprudential policy in their jurisdictions. Governance arrangements for macroprudential policy A vital aspect of the macroprudential policy framework will be the design of the governance arrangements. They will determine how the different elements of the framework are brought together and will influence how macroprudential policy interacts with other policy areas. Governance arrangements should be effective in three broad areas; they must ensure that the macroprudential decision-maker (the “macroprudential agency”) has: (i) a clear mandate;  managed to avoid the fiscal consolidation currently seen in many other EU countries. One reason for Sweden’s robust public finances is that it had to implement a programme of fiscal consolidation in the mid1990s, following the Swedish banking crisis.
The case for monetary policy makers to focus on the persistent component of inflation is therefore clear. But implementing this approach in practice inevitably faces a number of practical problems. In real time, identifying the character and magnitude of the underlying shocks is difficult. The propagation of these shocks to consumer price inflation is uncertain and possibly changing through time, as is the transmission mechanism of monetary policy itself. The lags in monetary transmission are not just long and variable, but also not fully predictable. I address these issues in the remainder of this talk. Nevertheless, the MPC’s focus on the persistent element of CPI inflation is consistent with both its remit – which emphasises that the inflation target ‘holds at all times’ – and with the medium-term orientation of its policy strategy – which emphasises that the Committee seeks to reach the inflation target ‘sustainably in the medium term.’ Underlying these two elements of the framework is recognition that the lags in monetary policy transmission (and the uncertainties surrounding them) rule out controlling inflation on a short-term month-to-month basis. Attempts to control inflation at that higher frequency risk becoming a source of additional volatility, rather than a contribution to containing it. A well-designed policy will focus on the medium term and thereby emphasise the persistent components of inflation that threaten to cause deviations from the inflation target at that horizon.

Between September 2021 (when I first joined the MPC) and its peak at the end of August, the January future price of UK wholesale natural gas rose by a factor of eleven. 17. In the MPC’s forecasts, our initial technical assumption was that gas prices would follow a random walk (in other words, they would stay at their then high level permanently) and then shifted to assuming they would follow the (downward) path implied by market futures prices. 18. For a critical assessment of this approach, see Beaudry, P., T.J. Carter and A. Lahiri (2022). ‘Looking through supply shocks versus controlling inflation expectations: Understanding the central bank dilemma,’ Bank of Canada working paper no. 22-41. 19. The Bank of England employs a suite of wage and price models as part of the analytical machinery underpinning the MPC’s quarterly macroeconomic forecasts. These models capture variants of the Phillips curve, with spot wage or price  Page 14 developments depending on measures of inflation and inflation expectations, as well as import prices and measures of economic slack. See, for example: Speigner, B. (2014). ‘Long-term unemployment and convexity in the Phillips curve,’ Bank of England working paper no. 519 and Esady, V., B. Speigner and B. Wanengkirtyo (2023). ‘Revisiting the effects of long-term unemployment on inflation: The role of non-linearities,’ Bank of England working paper no. 1018. 20. See Pill, H. (2023). ‘UK monetary policy outlook,’ speech by Huw Pill at the Money Market Association of New York University, 9 January. 21.
Efficient financial services are essential for an economy 4  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  to grow and to make growth self-sustaining and inclusive. [SLIDE 6] While advanced economies are characterized by broad and deep financial markets, finance in developing countries is usually fragmented, unstable and costly. Slide 6  Financial development and deepness : international comparison Financial Development Index: Peer Group Average  Financial Development Index: Selected Countries  (index)  Broad Money to Total Reserves Ratio, 2015  (index)  (ratio)  0.6  0.8  40  0.4  0.6  30  0.4  20  0.2  10  0.0  0  0.2  Financial Institutions  Financial Markets  Markets  Overall FD  Institutions  Efficiency  Depth  Access  Efficiency  Depth  Access  0.0  Overall Rating  Bangladesh Kenya Nicaragua Gambia Uganda  Low Inc. and Dev. Switzerland Japan United States Germany Portugal  Emerging  Peru Uruguay Bolivia Paraguay Philippines Colombia Mexico Dominican R. Brazil Chile Sweden Argentina China Australia US  50  Advanced  China Brazil South Africa India Chile Poland Morocco Tunisia Armenia Ecuador  1.0  0.8  Source: Sahay et al. (2015), "Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets," IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/08 and World Bank.

What was unexpected was how soon and how fast the króna fell. It depreciated by 19% against the exchange rate index over 2006 as a whole and all the weakening was confined to the first half of the year. So far in 2007 the króna has been roughly 15% weaker on average than at the beginning of 2006. By comparison, the US dollar depreciated against the euro by almost 11%. For most of the  2  BIS Review 16/2007  period since the middle of 2006, the króna has fluctuated within a fairly modest range. Since the end of the sharp depreciation in the first half of last year the króna can be described as relatively stable and marginally above its long-term average value. At present, the real effective exchange rate is slightly stronger than on average over the last quarter of a century. A wide current account deficit could potentially erode confidence in the króna. The Central Bank has underlined the importance of restoring macroeconomic balance by realigning domestic demand with output capacity, and of establishing a sustainable external balance by such means rather than through a sharp currency depreciation that would fuel inflation and other instabilities. Inflation developments depend heavily on the króna not slipping much from its level over the past few months, at least for as long as pronounced macroeconomic imbalances remain. Confidence in the exchange rate will be a crucial factor over the coming months.
Ajith Nivard Cabraal: The role of productivity improvement in achieving economic prosperity Keynote address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Annual General Meeting 2007/08 of the International Chamber of Commerce Sri Lanka, Colombo, 17 September 2008. *  *  *  Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Invitees, Ladies and Gentlemen, I consider it a unique honour to be invited to deliver the Key Note Address at this Annual General Meeting of International Chamber of Commerce Sri Lanka (ICC Sri Lanka). I also consider it a great privilege to share my thoughts and views on a very timely topic, “The Role of Productivity Improvement in achieving Economic Prosperity” since productivity improvement is essential from both a micro and macro perspective. Therefore, at the outset, I wish to thank the ICC Sri Lanka for inviting me to deliver the keynote address on a vital theme at this important forum and giving me an opportunity to plant a few seeds in your distinguished minds so that such seeds may be nurtured by you in your future endeavours positioning the country at a higher level in the global environment. As we all agree, as individuals, our main objective is to experience a better life and we think, act and react aiming to achieve this. At the same time, the main objective of economic management is to enhance standard of living of the people.

Although the services sector was often criticized as a sector that does not create real wealth, both the theory and evidence prove that the wide-spread development and also the saturation of agriculture and industry has led to the creation of a new source of wealth through a more dynamic growth sector in the form of services. The services sector is currently the largest and fastest growing economic activity in most of the developed and developing world. The World Bank estimates that the share of services in the Gross Domestic Product of developed countries is typically between 60 and 70 percent. While these figures are generally lower in emerging and least developed countries, they have steadily been increasing over the years. However, it is equally accepted that existence of expanded services sector alone cannot generate wealth. It has to be dynamic, vibrant and it should add high values to the economy. The services sector should be more productive and efficient. Today’s customer not only demands services, but demands more productive, efficient and reasonably priced services. Let’s take a closer look at Sri Lanka now …. Undoubtedly, Sri Lanka’s agriculture sector has made its greatest contribution to create wealth and employment in the past. As we all are aware, we have been self sufficient in rice production over the millenniums. We have been producing and exporting agriculture commodities for centuries. At the time of independence, the agriculture sector was dominating with a share of 47 per cent of GDP.