samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  (i) internal total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) or minimum requirements for eligible liabilities and own funds (MREL) and the underpinning it provides for cross-border co-operation; (ii) bail-in mechanics – having required banks to maintain TLAC or MREL, we need, as resolution authorities, to be clear how we would use it; and (iii) disclosure – resolution needs to be credible as well as feasible. With credibility comes market discipline ex ante and less disruption in a resolution (lower probability of default and loss given default in other words). All three areas build on the core work of resolvability that has already been done, illustrating the point that the process is incremental and resolvability is not binary but progressive. Resolvability of firms Let me start then by reviewing what has already been done. I will focus on the standards and guidance coming from the FSB. It is true that they have been drawn up for application to G-SIBs in Crisis Management Groups (CMGs). But in our view, they are equally applicable to domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) or other firms where bail-in is the preferred resolution strategy, especially where firms operate cross-border. The convergence at international level on bail-in as the appropriate strategy for large banks is itself significant. This transcends whether firms are single point of entry or multiple point of entry.

Making banks resolvable: the key to making resolution work Speech given by Andrew Gracie, Executive Director, Resolution Directorate  Risk Minds Conference, Amsterdam 4 December 2017  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Introduction Resolution has come a long way since G20 Leaders put together the post-crisis financial reform agenda in 1  summits in London and Pittsburgh in 2009. In some ways, it represented the most notable gap, and significant change in the pre-crisis regulatory architecture. Nearly ten years on, huge progress has been made in establishing effective resolution arrangements and the commitment to ending too-big-to-fail (TBTF) is undimmed. The immediate priority in this effort was to put in place the necessary legal frameworks. Agreement in 2011 of Financial Stability Board (FSB) Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes provided the international standards to ensure a consistent approach to the design of resolution regimes across G20 jurisdictions. 2  The UK now has in place a comprehensive bank resolution regime that is compliant with international standards and will remain so after Brexit. Similarly, for all advanced economies, there are now resolution regimes that are largely compliant with the Key Attributes in all the jurisdictions that are home to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). But the Key Attributes were about effective resolution regimes rather than resolvable firms – they defined a tool-kit but not how to use it; and a process for resolution planning for G-SIBs but not what would make a firm resolvable. Powers without resolvability leaves resolution authorities vulnerable.
There was scope to manufacture standardised banknotes of sufficiently good quality. Modern banknotes are of course also a high-tech product with all their security features, but as increasing number of electronic payment forms are developed, physical cash appears increasingly outdated. Today we can say the same thing about modern communication technology as about the printing presses in the 17th century. Access to the internet is widespread, and computers, smartphones and tablets are household items. Thus, the conditions are ripe for launching more electronic payment forms. 7 8 . My point is simple, if the market can make use of the new technology to launch new and popular payment services, why shouldn't the Riksbank be able to do the same? I would claim that there is currently a need among the general public and companies to have access to central bank money and that this need will still be there in the future. Perhaps not everyone has this need and perhaps not all of the time, but as the need exists, I think the Riksbank should be able to meet it. I consider that the Riksbank should carefully consider meeting the general public’s need for central bank money by supplying this in some electronic form. Let me call them e-krona, which you can put in an e-wallet. Let me also be clear about the reason. If the Riksbank chooses to issue e-krona, it would not be to replace cash, but so that the e-krona can act as a complement to cash.

Under current circumstances, increasing government savings and adhering to fiscal discipline are essential to control the risks brought about by the current account deficit rising on the back of the decoupling between domestic and foreign demand. Our inflation forecasts take the fiscal projections of the MTP as given. A revision in the monetary policy stance may be considered, should the fiscal stance deviate significantly from this framework, having an adverse effect on the inflation outlook. In the upcoming period, monetary policy will continue to focus on sustaining price stability. To this end, we will meticulously evaluate the impact of macroprudential measures taken by the CBRT and other institutions on the inflation outlook. Fulfilling commitments to fiscal discipline in the medium-term and strengthening the structural reform process would facilitate the relative improvement in Turkey’s sovereign risk, and thus bolster macroeconomic and price stability. Maintaining fiscal discipline will also provide more flexibility for monetary policy and contribute to social welfare by keeping interest rates at low levels permanently. In this respect, timely implementation of the structural reforms envisaged by the MTP and the European Union accession process remains to be of utmost importance. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  15
At the SNB, we are aware of these benefits and have been using FX EAs for our reserve management. In our view, EAs can be useful execution tools in order to reduce market impact and help minimise our footprint in the FX market. But the increased use of execution algorithms may also change the dynamics of FX markets. EAs make it easier to shift trading activity away from public trading venues to proprietary platforms. And this so-called ‘internalisation’ of FX trading creates new challenges. Too many internalised trades could reduce the trading volume at primary venues to a point where the price discovery process is jeopardised. More research is needed to ascertain whether – and to what extent – the growing use of EAs could trigger or amplify flash events in the markets. These changes complicate market monitoring for central banks, which need to be alert to market dislocation, liquidity issues and volatility – as the market turmoil in March last year once again illustrated. To guard against risks arising from these changing dynamics, central banks must step up their efforts to monitor and analyse these markets. This is no small feat. Besides developing new market functioning indicators, it involves accessing a whole new generation of data – possibly at sub-millisecond frequency. For this, we need to set up a new data architecture, new tools and new expertise. In order to address such challenges the SNB and the BIS Innovation Hub’s Swiss Centre have launched a big data project called ‘Project Rio’.

A 2020 BIS Study – which I had the honour of chairing – explored the impact of EAs on market functioning, focusing on FX markets. It found that the rapid rise of EAs in FX markets was driven by the electronification of these markets and their concomitant fragmentation across a multitude of new fast-paced electronic trading venues. According to the study, before the COVID-19 pandemic, FX execution algorithms already accounted for 10–20% of global FX spot trading (approximately 200 to 400 billion US dollars in daily turnover). With the further rise of digitalisation, their use is expected to grow, potentially altering market dynamics. 11 In fragmented, fast-paced FX markets, execution algorithms have many advantages. They process new information quickly and they direct orders simultaneously across multiple trading venues. This helps traders to navigate fragmented markets and to optimise trade 9  Sébastien P. Kraenzlin, Christoph Meyer and Thomas Nellen (2020), ‘COVID-19 and regional shifts in Swiss retail payments’, SNB Working Papers series, 2020-15. 10 Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Tho Pham and Oleksandr Talavera (2021), ‘The Voice of Monetary Policy’, NBER Working Papers series, 28592. 11 BIS (2020), ‘FX execution algorithms and market functioning’, Markets Committee Papers, No. 13. Page 8/10  execution. EAs can improve the matching of supply and demand, which in turn reduces trading costs and helps to mitigate market impact. In addition, EAs help to increase operational efficiency, which is one reason their popularity has grown during the pandemic.
We will participate actively to propagate free and open trading alliances as Asia grows and becomes more economically integrated. In this way, we help to unlock the value, spin off new opportunities and create good jobs for Singaporeans. ASEAN and AEC 2015 One key market for Singapore is ASEAN. ASEAN is a growing region and has a combined population of 600 million people. ASEAN also has a GDP that is the third largest in Asia, after China and Japan. In recent years, ASEAN has embarked on an enterprise to integrate our economies into a regional bloc. ASEAN today, through initiatives like the ASEAN Free Trade Area, has resulted in virtually no tariffs for flows of goods between our countries. Going forward, ASEAN is making good progress towards becoming the single market and product base envisioned in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The realisation of the AEC by 2015 will result in an even more tightly integrated region, and this has opened up more opportunities for corporates as well as investors. A key principle underpinning the AEC 2015 is the free flow of goods, services and investment within the region by 2015. Let me update you on the progress so far. •  1  On trade in goods, virtually all goods in ASEAN already move throughout the region tariff-free1. We are now working on reducing non-tariff barriers. ASEAN-6 countries have eliminated tariffs on 99.65% of tariff lines effective 1 Jan 2010.

Dimitar Bogov: Around a decade after the crisis - heading to the new global cycle and monetary policy normalization Opening speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the 7th Annual Research Conference: Around a Decade after the Crisis: Heading to the New Global Cycle and Monetary Policy Normalization, Ohrid, 12 April 2018. * * *  Honorable Governors, Your Excellences, Dear representatives of central banks, Ladies and gentlemen Let me welcome you all to our 7th Annual Research Conference this year in the beautiful city of Ohrid. Considering the current global surrounding, this year’s conference “Around a Decade after the Crisis: Heading to the New Global Cycle and Monetary Policy Normalization” addresses a relatively long period since the onset of the global crisis and the need to face new challenges. At this point, the questions to ask ourselves and to discuss during the conference would be: how strong and sustainable is the ongoing global recovery, what are the reasons behind the subdued inflation, what should be the pace of monetary policy normalization, are the banks now more resilient, are we better prepared to prevent the risks? Maybe they are simple questions, however, like in many other cases in real life and a real economic framework, there are no simple answers. The current global economic recovery is broadly spread across different regions in the world and associated with positive economic sentiment indicators.
Stefan Ingves: The housing market, the banks and household debt Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 1 March 2011. *  *  *  The origins and the course of the financial crisis can be described in slightly different ways and in more or less detail. I will not provide any detailed account here – I have already done so on more than one occasion, not least here before the Riksdag Committee on Finance. An essential component of the crisis was the build-up of credit and house price bubbles over a number years in a number of countries. When these bubbles burst, the financial system was rocked to its foundations, and governments and central banks around the world were forced to take exceptional measures to stabilise the situation. The decades prior to the crisis were marked by extensive deregulation of the financial markets. There was a strong belief that the financial sector was to a large extent selfregulating, and that it was able to resolve most problems on its own through market incentives. This belief was seriously undermined during the crisis. There is now considerable international agreement that the market’s ability to “manage itself” was overestimated, and that regulations need to be stricter and supervision tightened. Of course, what one wants to achieve is to reduce the risk of future financial crises.

The third candidate explanation is that central banks are the architects of the apparently low trend real rate by pushing up demand for long-dated risk free assets. This argument is, I think, largely mistaken for some of the reasons I alluded to earlier. QE will have affected the price and hence the yields on bonds. Indeed, that is part of the objective. Central banks make use of asset purchases when their preferred policy instruments run into their effective lower bounds. But QE will not have affected the natural rate. QE acts as a substitute for changes in Bank Rate, taking the effective or “shadow” policy rate – Bank Rate adjusted for the impact of QE – down below zero and towards the extraordinarily low natural rate. In other words, central banks are not causing low underlying interest rates, we are responding to them. Policy Implications  What are the policy implications in a world in which the natural rate remains around zero and all else equal will not rise back to close to pre-crisis levels even as headwinds abate? I think there are two main implications for central banks. First, and most obviously, if the natural rate is going to be lower on average then the same will be true of the policy rate.
22  It is possible that families, or more accurately dynasties, can provide such insurance themselves through changes in the bequest which they make to their descendants: passing on a larger bequest if the current generation dies earlier than expected and a smaller bequest if it survives for longer than expected. But only a small proportion of bequests seems large enough to act as a buffer in this way. 23  As far as I am aware, the first instrument offering a return specifically to aggregate longevity was issued by Swiss Re, a large reinsurance company, in 2003. 24  To the extent that insurance companies offer both life insurance and annuities, they may be able partially to hedge the risks. 8  BIS Review 73/2004  There are two ways in which government involvement can, in principle, improve risksharing. First, collective schemes, whether compulsory or employer-based, avoid the costs of adverse selection associated with individual provision. Second, by combining taxes on current employees with deficit finance (i.e. taxes on future employees), statefunded pensions can transfer risks across generations in ways private markets cannot. Alternatively, the government could issue its own longevity bonds. Private annuity providers could use them to hedge aggregate longevity risk. By assuming longevity risk the government would make it possible for the private sector to purchase such bonds and in turn support a private market in annuities.

Uncertainty about future returns on financial assets is the essence of the modelling of financial markets. An excellent introduction to this area is contained in the two 2003 Nobel lectures by Robert Engle (2004) and Clive Granger (2004). 2  BIS Review 73/2004  death.5 Collective risk - that average expectation of life will rise or fall in the future - cannot, by definition, be shared among members of the same generation. The principle of insuring individual longevity risk is that those who live longer than average can be paid using the contributions of those who die earlier than average. But if the average itself rises all contributions must increase - there is no possibility for insuring changes in the average from within the cohort. Can we quantify this risk? The expectation of life has risen significantly over the past century. But how will it change in the future? To answer that question we need to model and quantify longevity risk. 3. Modelling and quantifying risks  Quantitative modelling has been one of the great advances of the social sciences over the past fifty years. But forecasts, whether of longevity or any other economic or social variable, inevitably require a judgment about how far the past can inform us about the future. Projecting longevity is fraught with difficulty.
Boards of regulated subsidiaries need to be able to take decisions where required to meet their own legal and governance responsibilities or in the interests of the safety and soundness of the subsidiary. But, that does not mean they should operate outside the general governance and objectives of the group to which they belong. Independence in this context is carefully defined and limited. As you will all be aware, we have undertaken significant engagement with the boards of banks and building societies on governance. Through our supervisory work, we are seeing improvement but in our view there is more to do. Board effectiveness will therefore remain a key priority. To conclude, governance matters a lot, I can’t understate that. Effective boards are central to the success of firms and the financial sector, and central to the delivery of our objectives. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

It is under such circumstances that output and employment have tended to suffer severely, leading to actual deflation. That, of course, is what prompted the Swedish political system’s resolute intervention at the time of the bank crisis here about a decade ago. It was a matter, not of protecting the banks as such or their owners from losses, but of safeguarding the banks’ central function in our economy. Maintaining a modern market economy would be virtually impossible/ without an efficient credit supply and payment system. In the present context it is positive that the banking sector is functioning well even though stock markets around the world have fallen steeply in recent years. There are also many signs that the banking sector has learnt a good deal from the financial problems in the last few decades. As regards general economic policy, we know that focusing on low and stable inflation creates a better and securer environment for economic policy decisions on the whole. A credible long-term commitment to low inflation does away with some of the uncertainty about future income streams,  BIS Review 50/2002  3  which are what ultimately determine the fundamental value of various kinds of asset. Such a commitment should also provide better conditions for financial decisions. But there is more to it than that. As representatives of the Austrian School pointed out, business cycles are not exactly alike.
Our job is to ensure it works safely and reliably, through ups and downs, so that everyone in society can depend upon it. That means ensuring its value can be depended upon – monetary stability. It means ensuring that the banking system, which creates and issues most of the money we actually use, as well as the payment systems through which that money moves, are safe and can be relied upon – financial stability. It means ensuring that the physical money the Bank of England actually produces – the cash we use – cannot be forged and can be used with confidence. Money, of course, can be a slippery concept. It is, I think, best described as a social convention, the way we calibrate, exchange, store and settle claims we hold on each other in the economy. That convention has been expressed in very different ways at different times and in different societies. It can be expressed in different ways at the same time. At the moment in the United Kingdom, all money is denominated in one unit of account, the pound sterling 1, but it takes different forms. It can be expressed physically as actual claims on the state, in the form of the Bank of England: the banknotes we issue with the famous promise to ‘pay the bearer’. A very small proportion takes the form of physical tokens issued by the state that do not contain any claim – the coins issued by the crown.

We have little experience to go by in this area Would people use stablecoins to a limited extent, as one of a number of forms of money depending on convenience, in much the same way we use cash and commercial bank money now?15  Or would stable coins, or one particular stablecoin, become dominant, substituting for other forms of money not just for payments but also as a store of value? There is certainly the possibility with stablecoins linked to large technology and social media platforms, that it could become mainstream for people to move from holding all or much of the money now in ‘current accounts’ at banks to holding it in ‘stablecoin’ in virtual ‘wallets’ provided by non-banks. There is some experience of the ‘E money providers’ that create, issue and transfer electronic money that can be used for internet transactions. These are regulated and have to back the e-money they issue one for one with deposits in commercial banks. But while they are used by many, they have not become systemic. But they are relatively expensive for merchants and can be used only for internet transactions whereas stable-coin developers intend them to be used for all transactions. 15  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  In such a world, and depending how and whether stablecoins were backed with other financial assets, the supply of credit to the real economy through the banking system could become weaker or indeed disappear.