samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Dropping these, in column (7), adds to the models adjusted explanatory power, which is taken as the “preferred” model.26 Table A1: Simple Wage Phillips Curves using private sector regular pay, qoq annl. (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  Lagged wage  -0.0518  -0.134  -0.211*  -0.211*  -0.122  -0.232*  growth  (-0.40)  (-1.05)  (-1.69)  (-1.67)  (-0.95)  (-1.87)  1.254***  1.060***  1.062***  0.795***  1.135***  (-5.48)  (-5.31)  (-5.22)  (-4.18)  (-5.79)  Lagged CPI  0.458**  0.729***  0.737**  0.791***  0.719***  inflation  -2.17  -3.83  -2.67  -3.28  -4.54  Recruitment  0.421***  0.422***  0.259**  0.281  0.275  difficulties  -2.97  -2.86  -2.12  -1.54  -1.53  -0.0172  0.647***  -0.15  (-0.05)  -2.8  (-0.45)  Unemployment 0.921*** (-5.08)  Infl. expectations  (7)  1.116***  Productivity  0.257*  growth  -1.96  -2  N (adjusted)  61  61  61  61  61  61  61  0.374  0.415  0.489  0.479  0.426  0.508  0.516  Notes: Equation also includes a constant (not shown). t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively based on robust standard errors.

Chile’s economic outlook for 2014 Nevertheless, the changes we have seen in the world macroeconomic scenario have had an impact that exceeded our forecasts of some months ago. Our new projections for 2014 will be released in our upcoming March Monetary Policy Report, but it should come as no surprise that our growth outlook for this year has been corrected downward from December. Private forecasts have already internalized this change. What are the factors behind this? First and foremost, there has been a slowdown in domestic investment, caused by both the abatement of global mining investment cycle and other specific developments. The slowdown in consumption has been more gradual, in line with fundamentals that, although they ceased to improve, are still good. As I said, investment is the one component of expenditure that has endured the biggest adjustments in the past few quarters. One explanation is the deceleration of emerging economies, China mostly, and the impact it has had on commodity prices, particularly metals. The price of our main export – copper – is around $ dollars per pound, compared with a little over $ a year ago and nearly $ in early 2012. In addition, the outlook for future prices has also been revised downward, triggering a postponement of mining investments whose effects spread to other economic sectors. At any rate, what is happening in Chile has been mirrored in other metal exporters, but maybe with a different timing.
However, if we scale it to the country’s GDP, it was in the range between 6.1 to 6.9% over the past five years. Thus, despite the headway we have made in advancing e-payments, the persistency of cash among the public and small and medium sized businesses remains high. This opens up the economy to risks as cash is still being used by criminals to launder illegal proceeds, as we 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  have seen from some high-profile cases over the past year or so. Similarly, this is the preferred mode to finance terrorist activities, which will involve transacting in cash. Therefore, it is timely for us to look at ways to strengthen the controls to mitigate financial crime; namely the cash threshold reporting requirement. When we compare Malaysia with other countries, our current threshold is too high and disconnected from the size of our economy, especially relative to our purchasing power. Hence, it needs to be updated. In this regard, we would like to announce that we will be lowering the daily cash threshold report to RM25,000 effective 1 January 2019. This will bring the cash threshold report in Malaysia to be more at par with other countries. We do not anticipate any impact in terms of economic activity but an increase in effectiveness in taming the black economy that is still heavily reliant on cash transactions.

Legislation in 1942 followed the then German model, particularly in making the Bank of Japan subservient to the Ministry of Finance; and after the war, there was American influence. 1 Rosa Maria Lastra, “Central Banking and Banking Regulation”, LSE Financial Markets Group,  1996, page 285. BIS Review 33/1997  -3-  In Figures 1 and 2, I have attempted to capture some of the distinctions between these leading central banks. (Because I am concentrating on distinctions, I have omitted common tasks - such as the issuance of banknotes and acting as banker for government - which are carried out by virtually all central banks.) Figure 1 shows the UK’s “scores” in five areas, while Figure 2 adds in, by way of comparison, the other G5 countries. Mapping the distinctions is not an easy task. For instance, though in Germany a government office is responsible for banking supervision, it is central bank staff who undertake much of the day-to-day work of monitoring individual banks. In France, supervision is the responsibility of the Commission Bancaire, but its secretariat is effectively part of the Banque de France, and the Governor chairs it. And in Japan, the central bank closely monitors the large banks, though the responsibility for supervision formally rests with the finance ministry.
In the initial stages the risk and returns structure of the portfolio improves. The expected return increases and the expected risk decreases. However, once a given equity share is exceeded, at point B, a trade-off between risk and return begins. At this stage, each further increase in potential return has to be ‘bought’ at the cost of increased risk. In the extreme case, we reach the situation of a portfolio consisting solely of equities (point C). The equity share we are aiming for is obtained by weighing up additional risk against higher potential return. After potential return and risk have been weighed up in this way at the SNB, what does the final result look like? Fundamentally, our efficient frontier presents less attractive risk/return combinations than in the case of many other investors. That means our efficient frontier tends to look more like the right-hand curve in slide 7. In addition, the point at which a further  1  According to a survey published in early 2013, only eight of 60 central banks worldwide held equities as part of their currency reserves at that time. A further six central banks stated that they intended to diversify into equities in the future (cf. Pringle, Robert and Nick Carver, eds. 2013, RBS Reserve Management Trends 2013, London, Central Banking Publications). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  increase in the equity share means a rise in total risk (point B’) is reached earlier than in the left-hand curve. I have already talked about the reasons for this.

This, in the judgment of the Governing Council, warranted a thorough examination of additional information before drawing further conclusions for monetary policy in the context of our medium term-oriented monetary policy strategy focused on maintaining price stability. BIS Review 144/2007  3
For these assessments, we consult our researchers and add critical information that we learn from listening to our boards of directors, regional advisory councils, community leaders and other key stakeholders, such as you and others I’ll meet on this visit. For example, last month members of our small business advisory council told us that for the first time in several years, employees were leaving for other jobs and that they would need to replace those who left for better opportunities elsewhere. The fact that some people with jobs felt confident enough to seek and take other job opportunities was another signal to us that the job market may be improving – although, to be sure, we read such signals cautiously. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  To help me gather more information about the region, I will be meeting this morning with PathStone, a community development and human service organization serving farmers and low-income families and communities, then meeting with students and faculty at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, and then having lunch with faculty of the Maxwell School and the university officials who manage the tech transfer process. This afternoon, I will drive to Skaneateles Falls to tour Welch Allyn, a manufacturer of diagnostic equipment, and meet with the president and CEO, Dr. Julie Shimer. Dr. Shimer also recently became the chair of the Empire State Development Corporation and I am looking forward to our discussion about the challenges and opportunities for economic development in Upstate New York.

The next step is for the policymaker to evaluate what tools might be available to curb the imbalances that have been identified. The idiosyncratic nature of the innovations and belief systems associated with particular bubbles implies that the tools used to respond to each bubble will likely have to be different and tailored to the features of the particular bubble in question. 7  See Eli Ofek and Matthew Richards. 2003. “Dotcom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices.” Journal of Finance LVIII, no. 3 (June): 1113–37. BIS Review 43/2010  5  Finally, the policymaker needs to conduct a careful cost-benefit analysis, weighing how successful a particular policy might be in restraining the rise in asset prices versus how costly it would be to remain passive, letting the bubble grow and then potentially burst disruptively. Many factors will affect the outcome of this analysis including the magnitude of the potential asset bubble and whether the potential asset bubble is occurring in the equity or debt markets. In this analysis, the policymaker is likely to find that compared with equity market bubbles, credit market bubbles are more prone to generate higher costs when they burst. Thus, the benefits of preventing credit bubbles from forming and collapsing are likely to be higher. Credit bubbles that burst threaten the stability of the financial system much more directly than equity bubbles. 8 That is because much of the debt is held by banks and securities dealers that are highly leveraged.
In December, the Riksbank and the Danish central bank entered into a swap agreement with the Latvian central bank. Under this agreement, Latvia may borrow up to EUR 500 million in exchange for Latvian lats. The intention was that this agreement would act as temporary funding in order to strengthen financial stability in Latvia until the IMF decided on its support package. The support package was approved by the IMF just before Christmas. It is not only the Riksbank that has taken action to counter the effects of the financial crisis. The Swedish National Debt Office, Finansinspektionen and the Government have also acted to safeguard the functioning of the Swedish financial system and to mitigate the effects of the crisis on the real economy. The National Debt Office has acted to meet the dramatic increase in demand for treasury bills. Extra auctions have been held in order to issue larger volumes of short-term treasury bills than normal. By the turn of the year, the National Debt Office had issued more than SEK 190 billion in treasury bills over and above the regular loan programme. During the autumn, Finansinspektionen decided to change the regulations for calculating the discount rate for life insurance companies. The aim was to arrive at a more reasonable calculation of the companies’ debts and to mitigate disruptions on the bond markets. Finansinspektionen has also altered the capital adequacy rules for credit institutions and securities companies.

Inflation fell from 4.0 per cent in October to 0.9 per cent in December. Inflation was much lower than we had expected in December, as a result of the repo rate cuts made in the autumn having a greater impact on mortgage rates than anticipated and petrol prices being lower than forecast. Underlying inflation excluding interest rates and energy (the CPIF excluding energy) declined slightly from around 2 per cent earlier this year to 1.7 per cent in December, entirely in line with the forecast at the most recent monetary policy meeting. The krona has weakened further since the beginning of December. Since the financial crisis moved into an acute phase in mid-September, the krona has weakened by around 12 per cent when measured against a trade-weighted index. This could give a slightly larger inflationary impulse than we had previously forecast. There are a number of signs that the situation in the financial markets has improved somewhat since the beginning of December. The TED spreads have fallen to the levels that applied prior to September and it has to some extent been possible to issue bonds. The forceful measures taken in many countries have in any case meant that it has been possible to avoid a collapse in the financial markets. But there are other signs that are more worrying. The financial markets are still far from functioning normally. Surveys indicate that the companies’ difficulties in obtaining loans have increased, although there is as yet no solid data showing that bank lending has begun to decline.
On the other hand, the number of vacancies doubled last year and demand for foreign labour picked up as the year wore on. In February 2004, seasonally adjusted unemployment was 2.9% and had gone down by 0.1% per month since September 2003. Productivity growth appears to have been exceptionally high last year. As in recent years, domestic wage rises outstripped those among Iceland’s main trading partner countries. Measured by the wage index, domestic wages rose by 5½% in 2003, which represents 3½% growth in real terms. Exchange rate developments and foreign reserves Under the new monetary framework, Iceland abandoned a fixed exchange rate regime and the króna was floated in the market. Every so often the argument is put forward that the Central Bank can determine the exchange rate, and some people criticise it if the exchange rate develops along different lines from what they had expected. Such debate was far less prominent in 2003 than the year before, which definitely indicates a growing awareness that the Central Bank cannot exert a decisive impact on the exchange rate of the króna. For the first part of the year the króna strengthened, probably as the result of expectations of currency inflows in connection with investments in hydropower and aluminium. Around the middle of the year the króna depreciated again. Uncertainty about revenues from the Keflavík NATO base and about the Norðurál aluminium smelter expansion, and perhaps to some extent stepped-up Central Bank currency purchases, are probable explanations.

In 2002 the Central Bank began building up its foreign reserves again, purchasing foreign currency for the equivalent of 4.5 b.kr. Last year the Bank stepped up these purchases to the equivalent of 43.2 b.kr. Nonetheless, the Bank’s purchases only amounted to 3.6%  2  BIS Review 18/2004  of total turnover in the FX market during the year. By mid-2003 the Central Bank had repaid its foreign short-term borrowing in full and at the end of the year the foreign reserves amounted to more than 58 b.kr. This year the Bank has continued to purchase currency in the market, but on a smaller scale than in 2003. It thereby aims to strengthen its foreign reserves even more this year. Ample foreign reserves are an obvious prudential measure and one of the factors that international ratings agencies consider when evaluating the creditworthiness of Iceland’s sovereign and corporate debt. However, a high level of reserves does leave the Central Bank’s operations much more exposed to changes in the exchange rate, as reflected in the minor operating loss reported for last year, which was described earlier at this meeting. Financial stability The Central Bank is obliged by law to promote price stability and also an efficient and safe financial system, including payment systems domestically and with foreign countries. In most countries these are he main objectives of central banks.
When confidence in the American economy returns and investment growth takes off, there is every indication that productivity will continue do develop favourably. However, this does not mean that the long-term growth path indicated earlier by developments in share prices and demand will be realised. Secondly, it seems that the over-investment has mainly taken place in the IT sector, where financing has been largely via the risk capital market. The depreciation period for IT investments is often short, which means that investment mistakes do not affect the willingness to invest in the long term. The bank system does not appear to be particularly strongly exposed to the IT sector and the risk spread among the banks' assets is assessed as good. There would thus appear to be little risk of problems in the banking sector reinforcing the slowdown to any great extent. Finally, there is scope to use fiscal and monetary policy to stimulate the economy, if necessary. The American central bank has utilised part of this scope and lowered interest rates by a total of 2 percentage points since the beginning of the year. The central government finances are in good condition. For several years now the public sector – unlike earlier periods of large American current account deficits – has shown a surplus in savings. All in all, there are thus many factors indicating that confidence in the American economy can quickly be recovered. If this is true, the economic decline will not last very long.

Deposit and credit growth of the banking sector continued, with revival in the lending to the corporate sector, accompanied with a decline of the NPL ratio in the first quarter of 2018 to 5.1%, due to claims collection. Current account deficit in 2017 additionally reduced to 1.3% of GDP, reflecting the positive contribution of the foreign capital companies on the export side, which indicates further strengthening of the economic fundamentals. Regarding the recommendation from the last year’s dialogue, the central bank prepared draft strategies for NPLs management and strengthening the use of local currency, both agreed 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  with the Ministry of Finance and currently subject to consultation with other relevant stakeholders. In both areas, as already being confirmed in the assessments and final conclusions, we have already achieved tangible results; however the adoption of these comprehensive strategies will put in place additional mechanisms to deal with these issues. In light of the challenging time that we have faced in recent years, we need to point to the maintenance of price and financial stability as important pillars of the macroeconomic stability, as well as the need to continue strengthening the fundamentals and resilience of the economy. Implementation of structural reforms and strengthening institutional capacities, including sound public finances, should remain main priorities for faster income convergence and EU integration. Thank you! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Such a poor calibration would run afoul of the Brier-based scoring system used in the IARPA tournament. 13 It is clear that extremizing the results lessens the impact of the poor calibration on the scoring system, but it leaves open the question of whether a better calibration is possible. Another financial market indicator we could look at is the stock market. As Paul Samuelson famously stated, the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions. An alternative statement—and this is also true of yield curve inversions—is that no U.S. recession has occurred since the Second World War without a yield curve inversion or stock market correction (or worse) proceeding it. As a recent San Francisco Fed Economic Letter carefully illustrated, yield curve inversions have the additional record of indicating only one false positive in the U.S., during the mid-1960s.14 If we cared equally about forecasting recessions and expansions, these properties would be well-reflected in the Brier score; however, if we view recessions—or more accurately, elevated probabilities of a recession—as more concerning than elevated probabilities of an expansion, then Brier scoring is not sufficient. As Tetlock writes, "One problem is that Brier scores treat false alarms the same as misses."

The activation decision will be based on a comprehensive assessment of market and monetary policy transmission indicators, an evaluation of the eligibility criteria and a judgement that the activation is proportionate. Purchases will be terminated either upon a durable improvement in transmission, or based on an assessment that persistent tensions are due to country-specific economic fundamentals. Relation to the monetary policy stance. Should the TPI be activated, the Governing Council will address the implications of the TPI purchases for the scale of the aggregate Eurosystem monetary policy debt security portfolio and for the amount of excess liquidity. Purchases under the TPI would be conducted such that they cause no persistent impact on the overall Eurosystem balance sheet and, therefore, on the monetary policy stance. 5  In short, we are ready to adjust all our instruments to ensure that inflation stabilises around our 2% medium-term target. Our new TPI will ensure that our monetary policy is transmitted smoothly across the euro area, as we continue to adjust our stance in response to high inflation. The role of other economic policies I now wish to refer briefly to the possible role that other economic policies may play, both in Europe and in Spain. First, against the current inflationary backdrop, profit margins and wages are key to avoiding a feedback loop that results in an inflationary spiral. This is precisely the overriding objective of the incomes agreement that we at the Banco de España have been advocating in recent months.