samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The stability of the financial system was thus definitely never threatened. But it is regrettable that we still have not managed to create  BIS Review 30/2008  7  an adequate regulatory framework in this field, more than fifteen years after our own bank crisis. In countries where they have slightly more experience of bank failures, such as the United States and Canada, they have learn that special institutions and arrangements are required to manage institutions that are experiencing financial problems. One of the most important lessons is that the authorities must be able to intervene as quickly as possible when a bank faces problems. There are several reasons for this. The first is to put pressure on the management and owners of the bank to rectify the situation and hopefully to prevent the situation deteriorating further. The so-called Savings and Loans crisis in the United States in the 1980s become more costly when the authorities failed to take action in time. This meant that in the United States at the beginning of the 1990s they introduced a system with so-called prompt corrective action. This means that the authorities quite simply are obliged by law to intervene at certain specified thresholds. In my opinion it is desirable that Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) should also have a large toolbox of measures that can be taken at an early stage. It should be possible to intensify these measures gradually as problems worsen.

But this appears to be an insight that not everyone reaches at the same time. The picture appears to be most clear to the countries that have come furthest in the question of the integration of the financial sector across national boundaries and which themselves have experience of financial crises. It appears to take other countries longer to realise what new demands arise from the changes in the financial landscape. To achieve this it is necessary to surmount ingrained opinions and other internal resistance. I hope that it will not require a financial crisis of catastrophic proportions before the political maturity and willingness to go further can be achieved on all fronts, both nationally and within the EU. As John F Kennedy said, “the time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.” When it starts to drizzle it is high time to speed up. With these words I conclude my talk here at the Swedish Economics Association. It has as always been a great pleasure to be able to share my thoughts with this prominent assembly of economists. I will happily answer any questions you may have now. BIS Review 30/2008  11
I don't know whether or not this is a good comparison, but it is certainly a huge project. Starting on 1 January next year, almost 15 billion banknotes and 50 billion coins will be put into circulation. Up until 28 February the euro banknotes and coins and the old national ones can be used parallel to one another, but with effect from 1 March the euro, and only the euro, will be legal tender throughout the euro area. The changeover is not merely a question of replacing old banknotes and coins with new ones in euro; it also involves all manner of changes from parking meters and new values on stamps to converting prices and wages. The fact that the euro will soon make the transition from the electronic world to the more tangible world of physical notes and coins has a strong symbolic value for the political endeavour to bring the countries of Europe closer together. It will also make it easier to compare prices of goods and services across the entire spectrum throughout the euro area. It will be interesting to see how this contributes to reduced price differentials. Firms will need to consider their price-setting strategies and costs in the production and distribution chain. At the same time, it is important to emphasise that the major step in the economic integration process was taken back on 1 January 1999, when eleven countries irrevocably fixed their exchange rates and the euro began to be their currency.

This is important, as the country with the benchmark issue will by definition be able to borrow at the cheapest rate . The lack of a given benchmark curve which ensues from this has led to both higher financing costs and a less efficient use of treasuries as collateral. Today it seems as though French treasuries function de facto as a benchmark for shorter-term securities , while German treasuries have the same function for longerterm securities. Breaking down barriers is a high priority task The market usually finds solutions to most problems. But sometimes it can be good to give it a little help. A lot has been done in the markets for euro-denominated treasury papers, but a lot still remains to be done. One example is the discussions on joint procedures and dates for issuing the euro countries' treasury papers. An increased degree of standardisation and a review of the counterpart system in the central government loan market are also welcome steps. It is perhaps even more important to establish common regulations for managing collateral and to introduce joint systems for clearing and settlement. It is clear that there is also much to do to strengthen developments on the securities markets in general. There is a lot of work underway to achieve this at the moment. The action plan for financial services adopted by the EU countries is aimed at solving many of the legal problems, in order to give the securities markets common ground.
Interpreting exchange rate fluctuations is often very difficult, but the changes in the expectations of the European and US central banks probably contribute to explaining the recent weakening of the krona in relation to the dollar and the strengthening against the euro. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  It is difficult to foresee the net result for inflation in Sweden, as that is dependent on both how much the various exchange rates alter and what effects this in turn has on import prices, competitiveness and purchasing power. Factors at home also lead to uncertain conditions for monetary policy International events thus account for many of the sources of uncertainty monetary policy needs to deal with. However, there are also developments at home contributing to the uncertainty over the conditions for monetary policy. One question that we have long been seeking an answer to is why inflation has been lower than we and many other analysts have forecast. The answer is, of course, an important piece of the jigsaw puzzle when putting together the picture of future inflationary pressures. At the Riksbank we have therefore put a lot of energy into analysing the available statistics, and also into interviewing companies about the development of their costs and pricing. The other day we published an Economic Commentary on the subject of company pricing. 1 The responses from 895 companies in the retail trade, construction and various service industries imply that companies have experienced difficulties in passing on their increased costs to consumers.

Many of the mortgages are also interest-only loans. This means that there is a risk that housing prices and indebtedness will now be driven up to unsustainable levels. For those of us making the monetary-policy decisions, the key issue is what measures will be taken to slow down the build-up of debt and, not least, what effects these might have on household consumption and ultimately on inflationary pressures in the Swedish economy while our monetary policy is taking effect. This is an important source of the uncertainty we have to deal with. Unfortunately, there is so far little experience to learn from with regard to the effects of socalled macroprudential policy measures. This makes it difficult for those making decisions and for those of us assessing what the decisions will be and what effects they may have. 1  “Results from a survey on company pricing”, Economic Commentary No. 4, 2014. 2  The Riksbank’s Business Survey, September 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  One trade-off concerns “dosage”. What one wants to achieve is that the growth in debt and housing prices slows down, but at the same time one wants to avoid a heavy fall in housing prices. This is a delicate task. Another question concerns the fact that macroprudential policy involves getting banks and borrowers to behave in ways that they would not otherwise, for instance, amortising their loans quicker than they do now.
Likewise, in the case of the financial system, restructuring will be slower if low growth diminishes the volume of banking business and increases bad debts. We should not accept having to pay a spread of around 200 basis points for much longer. This not only increases the portion of public spending set aside to pay interest but, above all, it might ultimately hamper business financing, reducing the supply of credit and raising its cost. To date, credit figures have behaved in Spain as the macroeconomic models might have predicted. After a long phase of excessive debt, households and firms must deleverage, and logically their demand for credit should be contained. And as was likewise to be expected, the reduction in credit is affecting those sectors such as construction and real estate more adversely than other sectors which are even recording positive growth in credit. Past experience also teaches us that we will only see an increase in the solvent demand for credit that is higher than nominal GDP growth when sufficient time has elapsed since the cyclical trough in the economy. All this is true but, if we do not sufficiently narrow the Kingdom of Spain’s spread, complying with our fiscal and financial commitments and changing our institutional framework for employment, credit developments in Spain may be affected not only by the lack of momentum of solvent demand, but also by supply-side limitations. I would like to conclude on an optimistic note.

In the light of higher price and cost inflation in Norway than in other countries, it has been appropriate to maintain higher interest rates in Norway than in most comparable countries. Norges Bank increased the sight deposit rate - which is our key rate - by a total of 1½ percentage points last year. So far this year, the key rate has remained  1  2  The relationship between wage growth and price inflation was also discussed in the Annual Address in February this year. BIS Review 72/2001  unchanged. As a result, the difference between short-term rates in Norway and other countries has increased. The economic outlook The Bank last analysed the outlook for the Norwegian economy in the June 2001 Inflation Report. Price inflation is projected to fall to 2½ per cent by next year already. The risk picture is mixed. The Norwegian economy is still characterised by high capacity utilisation. The labour market is tight. There is a risk that domestic pressures may gradually translate into a stronger price impetus than we have projected. The consumer price index has risen by 2.7 per cent since July 2000. The consumer price index excluding the direct effects of changes in excise duties and energy prices (CPIXE) has risen by 2.6 per cent since July last year, as calculated by Norges Bank. Statistics Norway publishes a consumer price index excluding electricity prices and a consumer price index excluding energy prices. They have a broader definition of energy prices than we use in our calculations.
In this context, we also welcome the ongoing work by international organisations, including the IMF and World Bank, on the design of efficient and effective insolvency regimes worldwide. It is, of course, difficult to establish international standards in this area, because the approaches adopted by different countries reflect not only different legal traditions but also different policy choices, most especially on the extent to which the system should favour debtors or creditors. Indeed, this is a debate that is live in several countries, including the UK where new measures were announced last month in the Queen’s Speech, and I am sure is occupying minds at this Congress. But the IMF work argues, rightly in my view, that any insolvency regime, whether debtor- or creditor-oriented, will enhance financial stability effectively only if it protects value for the benefit of all interested parties and the economy in general; and this requires the allocation of risk among market participants to be done in a way that is predictable, equitable and transparent. Financial sector restructurings Let me turn now to my second area: financial sector restructurings, and I would like to start by noting the importance of confidence in the smooth running of a financial system. Confidence is important in most industries, but it is at the heart of the financial industry. It is confidence that permits banks to operate, as a matter of course, with gearing many times capital, and with a maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities, often concentrated in short-term or sight deposits.

I hope today’s deliberations would guide the relevant committees and those who are associated in policy formulation to take this important initiative forward. Thank you. 2/2
The changes in the slope of the yield curve are calculated from peak to trough. See the footnote of Chart 2 for more details regarding the underlying data. Chart 12 APP impact on the euro area OIS curve (percent per annum)  Sources: ECB, based on Eser et al. (2019). Notes: The blue line represents the overnight index swap (OIS) curve as of mid-November 2019. The yellow line represents an estimate of the corresponding counterfactual curve that would have prevailed in the absence of the APP. Second, the flattening of the curve is to some extent driven by our own asset purchases conducted for the purpose of stimulating the economy. As is shown in Chart 12, one observes that the current slope would be around 70 basis points higher in the absence of the APP and thus much closer to the historical average. [33] What we learn from this example is that we need to be careful when reading the yield curve especially during times when our own actions have a significant influence on it. Despite this caveat, we pay careful attention to the evolution of the yield curve, in order to assess the views of investors concerning future macroeconomic and policy developments and explore non-monetary factors that can influence term premia, such as global shifts in portfolio preferences, risk distributions and risk-absorbing capacity. Conclusion Let me conclude. The yield curve plays a key role for the transmission of monetary policy, under both standard and non-standard policy measures.

Financing For Sustainable Development Report 2019) 3 Air pollution was a cause of almost 5 million deaths worldwide in 2017 while 62 million people were affected by  natural hazards in 2018, with 2 million needing to move elsewhere due to climate events (Source: NGFS (2019). A call for action: Climate Change as a source of financial risk). 4 Imam Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa fi `ilm al-Usul, page 174. 5 Islamic banking assets has grown to 31.4% (RM916.7 billion) of total banking assets (as at end 2018,  compared to only 14.1% in 2008) 6 A blockchain is a digital ledger that holds any kind of information (e.g. transactions, contracts, assets or  identities) that can be stored in a digital format. Entries in the digital ledger are permanent, transparent and searchable. 7 Reference: The Edge Malaysia Weekly (4 – 10 June 2018). Personal Wealth. These challenges include lack of  data (value of the endowment), limited transparency, lack of clarity in accountability, lack of proper auditing and poor planning for waqf assets development  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Since May this year, many SMEs and think-tanks suggested that Hong Kong should develop a market-oriented platform to guarantee SME loans upon the phasing out of the Special Loan Guarantee Scheme. This suggestion has gained a good measure of support from the market and society at large. The HKMC therefore immediately launched an in-depth study and market consultation exercise. In mid-November, the HKMC announced that it will launch the SME Financing Guarantee Scheme on 1 January next year. The Scheme will offer extensive and flexible guarantee coverage to help the SMEs in Hong Kong obtain more sustainable bank financing for their daily operations or purchase of equipment etc. Also, this Scheme will help banks manage their lending risks more effectively – the banks can meet the financing needs of the SMEs without having to warehouse excessive credit risks. Undoubtedly, the Scheme will bring benefits for the SMEs, banks, economy and employment in Hong Kong. We do not expect an overwhelming demand for the new Scheme initially. However, the global market conditions change and turn all the time. There is a high degree of volatility and uncertainty in the future. The business and financing environments for the enterprises could easily come under stress and the SME Financing Guarantee Scheme will then play an important role to help banks maintain a steady and sustainable flow of financing to the SMEs. To promote the launch of this new Scheme, the HKMC will offer a special discount for applications filed on or before 30 June 2011.

Norman T L Chan: SME Financing Guarantee Scheme Opening address by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Deputy Chairman of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited, at the SME Financing Guarantee Scheme signing ceremony, Hong Kong SAR, 13 December 2010. * * * Good morning, I am very pleased to welcome all of you to today’s Letter of Intent Signing Ceremony for the launch of the SME (small to medium-sized enterprise) Financing Guarantee Scheme by the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (“HKMC”). SMEs are an important pillar of the Hong Kong economy and employment. In 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused credit crunch and market dislocation around the world. To mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis, the Hong Kong SAR Government swiftly rolled out a series of measures to “stabilise the financial system, support enterprises and preserve employment”. A key measure to help the SMEs was the launch of the $ billion Special Loan Guarantee Scheme in December 2008. By October this year, the scheme has helped more than 20,000 companies, with the approved loan amount exceeding $ billion, and helping to secure more than 330,000 jobs. With the recovery of the local economy and the improved financing and cash flows for SMEs, the Special Loan Guarantee Scheme will cease to receive applications from early next year.
In August, the balance of these demand, supply, and exchange rate effects was consistent with the need for additional monetary policy stimulus. These measures are working. For those looking to borrow, credit is widely available. For those with debts, the cost is cheaper. Neither solely due nor totally unrelated to the actions the MPC took in August, growth appears to have been materially better than we had expected in the summer. Households appear to be looking through Brexit-related uncertainties at present. For them, signs of an economic slowdown are notable by their absence. Perceptions of job security remain strong. Wages are growing at around the same modest pace as at the start of the year. Credit is available and competitive. Confidence is solid. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  16  In contrast to developments in the real economy, financial markets have taken a less sanguine view of Brexit prospects. Sterling is currently around 16% lower than its peak a year ago. Partly reflecting this depreciation, measures of inflation expectations have picked up notably. Chart 17: Growth has been increasingly driven by consumption Other Real GDP (oya)  Chart 18: Saving rate back to pre-crisis level since around 2013, and consumption rising as a share of employee income  Consumption  Saving rate  4  Per cent 14  3.5  12  Per cent  3 10 2.5 2  8  1.5  6  1  4  0.5 2  0  Source: ONS and Bank calculations.

And it is precisely my role here today to encourage people to read them. I would therefore prefer to share some broad reflections with you, having experienced this crisis from my vantage points on the FSB, the ECB Governing Council and at the Banco de España. Further, given the key juncture at which we stand, I shall add further remarks as to what we must do in Spain to emerge from a crisis in which, after four years, we remain immersed. My first suggestion is that we cease to refer to the “crisis” in the singular and start talking about “crises” in the plural. This is because the far-reaching shock the Spanish economy and its banking system have undergone has not been caused by a single crisis but by the extraordinary overlapping of three economic/financial crises. Spain had never experienced such an occurrence in its history, a fact which should be borne in mind when deciding on the best exit therapies. The impact of the first of the three crises, the so-called international financial crisis, came about in a context in which the banking system was reasonably wellsupervised and focused on the traditional retail business. But, as was noted at the time, neither the economy nor its credit institutions would prove immune to its consequences, in particular to the global recession and to the seizing-up of the regularly used external funding mechanisms.