samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Del Negro, Giannone and Patterson (2015) ‘The forward guidance puzzle’. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report n.574. 12. Lagarde (2021), Press conference on the ECB monetary policy statement on 22 July 2021. 13. ‘Norges Bank’s monetary policy handbook’, 2022. Other examples are from the Riksbank: “The publication of repo rate forecasts has given the general public greater insight into monetary policy and improved possibilities for evaluation and accountability.” (‘The Riksbank’s experiences of publishing repo rate forecasts’, 2017). And from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand: “Published forecasts help markets assess the economic environment and understand our policy strategy.” (John McDermott (2013) ‘The role of forecasting in monetary policy’). 14. In a speech in 2012, while still Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mark Carney put this well: “Today, to achieve a better path for the economy over time, a central bank may need to commit credibly to maintaining highly accommodative policy even after the economy and, potentially, inflation picks up. Market participants may doubt the willingness of an inflationtargeting central bank to respect this commitment if inflation goes temporarily above target. These doubts reduce the effective stimulus of the commitment and delay the recovery.” 15. Haberis, Harrison and Waldron (2019) ‘Uncertain policy promises’, European Economic Review, Vol 111, pages 459-474. 16. More formal, written constitutions, which usually can’t be altered except by super-majorities in the legislature, and therefore evolve more slowly than the electoral cycle, could be seen as a commitment device to allow for (otherwise) time-inconsistent but optimal government policies. 17.

I said the simple pre-crisis pattern in Chart 1 was the appropriate way to set interest rates if you’re in an environment where swings in economic growth are driven predominantly by shocks to demand, things that push output and inflation in the same direction, and if there are few other enduring shocks to inflation. But if that was a reasonable view of the world in the years before the financial crisis – a period some now call the “the Great Moderation” – it’s clearly been much less of one since. Productivity growth is less predictable and it’s harder to count on a single rate of “trend growth”. (Nor can we be assured of a fixed, “neutral” rate of interest, below which policy is necessarily expansionary and contractionary only above it. In particular, it became clear even before the crisis, and increasingly so after it, that this “neutral rate” had over many years been declining.) And if we’d forgotten during the Great Moderation that domestic output isn’t the only thing that affects inflation we’ve certainly been reminded of it since. In the UK, the two big exchange-rate depreciations in 2008 and 2016 pushed up inflation for a protracted period, independently of activity at home. The strains in global goods markets caused by the pandemic, and the substantial impact on commodity prices of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have done the same, to an even greater extent.
The organisational structure for the regulatory and supervisory functions within the Bank were realigned in November 2006 to move from the previous institutional based approach, to one that integrates the Bank's regulatory functions for the different financial sectors under its purview along functional lines. The new functional based, cross-sector regulatory structure allows us to modernise the regulatory framework for both the insurance and banking sectors at a more equal pace. The increased synergies created will enable the Bank to apply the best regulatory practices in both the banking sector to the insurance sectors. Under the new structure, the Bank is able to leverage on the more advanced developments in either sector to enhance the regulatory framework for both sectors, simultaneously if possible. At the same time, it allows us to develop and train our personnel to be better equipped in the constantly changing operating environment. These efforts, will promote a more consistent regulatory regime for both the banking and insurance sectors. A positive side effect that can accrue from this move is the enhancement of public confidence on the insurance sector which augurs well towards increasing the level of insurance penetration. Achieving a more integrated approach to cross-sector regulation was relatively easy in Malaysia as Bank Negara is the single regulator for both the banking and insurance industries. In other countries, greater coordination and collaboration between separate regulatory agencies can similarly contribute towards a more consistent approach to regulation and supervision across sectors in dealing with similar risks.

Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir: Unlocking opportunities Opening address by Mr Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 10th ASEAN Insurance Regulators Meeting and 33rd ASEAN Insurance Council Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 15 November 2007. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to be here today at the 10th ASEAN Insurance Regulators meeting and the 33rd ASEAN Insurance Council Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Let me first extend a warm welcome and "Selamat Datang" to all the delegates from abroad as well as to fellow Malaysians here today. During this “˜Visit Malaysia Year” which is also the year of Malaysia's 50th Anniversary celebrations of our independence, I do hope that our foreign delegates will make time to enjoy Malaysia's diverse culture and the many unique sights, sounds and flavours. I am indeed honoured to be officiating the opening of the 10th ASEAN Insurance Regulators Meeting and the 33rd ASEAN Insurance Council Meeting. I understand that several fruitful meetings and exchange of ideas have already taken place yesterday, and several meetings have been outlined over the next two days to discuss various matters, revolving around the theme towards moving the ASEAN insurance industry forward. The ASEAN region has recorded significant growth with member countries growing at an average rate of 6% in 2006. ASEAN countries have grown stronger and our trade and cooperation have expanded further.
The fact that the banks are not equipped to manage this type of risk became evident when Lehman Brothers collapsed in the autumn of 2008 and the financial problems spread like wildfire between the market agents. A fourth and final example is that Basel II has in many cases overlooked the risks that have developed off the banks’ balance sheets, and this is something that many banks have taken advantage of. By selling their mortgages to special companies that they have set up themselves off their own balance sheets, the banks have been able to sell their own credit risks and thus reduce their capital requirements. The problem with this is that the banks have not been entirely separated from these special companies. During the crisis, the risks therefore moved directly back onto the banks’ balance sheets where there was no capital to cover the losses that arose. This problem was particularly evident in the United States. 3  The term macroprudential indicates that something – for example regulation, supervision or inspection – aims to limit the risk of serious disruptions to the financial system as a whole. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Inadequate standards for liquidity management Another important lesson from the crisis is that the regulations have paid far too little attention to the banks’ liquidity management. In the present Basel regulations, there are no binding regulations on how banks should manage their liquidity risks.

6  The counter-cyclical capital buffer may consist of Core Tier 1 capital or other capital than can completely absorb losses. The Basel Committee will specify what types of capital the banks can include at a later date. 7  Issuing bond is a less costly alternative for acquiring capital than issuing shares for tax reasons. Interest rate payments for bonds are made pre-tax while share dividends are paid from post-tax profits. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The sum of the new capital regulations There are many new regulations and levels and it may be difficult to estimate what the banks’ total capital requirement will ultimately amount to. It we limit ourselves to looking at Core Tier 1 capital we can see that the new regulations mean that all banks will need to hold share capital and retained earnings amounting to at least 4.5 per cent of their risk-weighted assets. In addition there is the capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent and the counter-cyclical capital buffer of a maximum of 2.5 per cent. This means that in a situation where the countercyclical capital buffer is fully activated the banks will need Core Tier 1 capital amounting to at least 9.5 per cent, and this applies to all banks. There are also discussions about whether additional capital requirements should be placed on those banks that are considered to be systemically important. At present, no decision has been made on which banks this would be, nor on the levels that could apply.
Rodrigo Vergara: Chile’s March 2015 Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Finance Committee of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 30 March 2015. *  *  *  The Monetary Policy Report of March 2015 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Accompanying charts can be found on the Central Bank of Chile’ website. Introduction Mr. President of the Finance Committee of the Senate, senator Andrés Zaldívar, senators members of this Committee, ladies, gentlemen, I am grateful for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile about the recent macroeconomic developments, their prospects and implications for monetary policy. This vision is detailed in our Monetary Policy Report (IPoM) of March 2015. But first and foremost, a few words of solidarity towards my fellow citizens that have recently suffered Nature’s wrath. The images and stories we have been receiving of the catastrophe that has swept across our country’s north are devastating and fill us with concern. In the past few months, inflation has exceeded December’s forecasts, and it is stubbornly above 4 percent. This Report’s baseline scenario also estimates a slower return to the target range than foreseen at the end of 2014. The depreciation of the peso continues to be the main factor behind the price dynamics, which, coupled with widespread indexation and a tighter than expected labor market, has pushed the core measure, i.e.

By countries, the biggest correction goes to the Brazilian forecast, which the market expects to post a GDP drop of 0.7 in 2015, its worst in several years. The greater relative strength of the United States, plus the ever closer beginning of its monetary policy normalization, has prompted a substantial appreciation of the dollar in recent quarters. For sure, news about the situation of the US economy plus the Fed’s statement has caused important swings in the dollar price in the past few weeks. This has reflected in large movements in most currencies around the world. As for the Chilean peso, in the middle of March it was trading above 640 units to the dollar, to later drop to near 620 pesos per dollar at the statistical cutoff of this Report (figure 3). The peso depreciation cycle that began in 2013 stands out as the longest in the last decade and it occurs in the context of a gradual economic slowdown and not a sharp recession. This is one of the main reasons behind inflation remaining above 4 percent. The data indicate that the pass-through coefficient from the exchange rate to inflation has been in line with historic patterns, although in the upper part of available estimates. Besides, the peso depreciation has had different timing than most emerging or commodity exporting economies.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify how much of this decline is due to a lower external stimulus, how much is accounted for by a natural slowdown in each economy, and what part is explained by particular events. All these elements add up to a situation in which, although the external scenario is not worsening, the belief that risks have disappeared is far off. It is possible to think that the likelihood of extreme scenarios is low, but, in my opinion, it is still there. More challenges for monetary policy As already mentioned, the change in how the global panorama was perceived led many emerging economies to change their views on their future economic policies. This made them halt their processes of lowering expansiveness and/or made them resume impulse. However, the new change of mood brought about by the greater calm of the beginning of the year, coupled with geopolitical factors, has again put us in a dilemma. On one hand, probably as a result of the recent memory of the late 2008 and early 2009 global confidence crisis, most economic authorities quickly set up a close monitoring system and prepared a batch of instruments to implement a quick offsetting of the adverse effects of a global crisis. However, time has shown that the effects of the crisis of the Eurozone area have been fairly limited so far. Financial markets have suffered the biggest impacts, but trade, output and employment have not been greatly affected.

8), which will be published in May. Discussion of the timetable for a potential Swedish EMU membership The timetable for a potential full Swedish membership of EMU will be determined by the political process. The Government Bill "Sweden and the Economic and Monetary Union" from 1997 states that if the government later finds that Sweden should participate in the monetary union, the matter should be put before the Swedish people. Pronouncements by, for instance, Prime Minister Göran Persson indicate that a referendum will be held next year. Other political leaders have expressed similar opinions. If the result is a "yes", then Sweden would put forward an application to the European Commission and the ECB for an examination of whether we fulfil the legal and economic convergence criteria. The economic criteria assessed are the inflation rate, long-term interest rates, exchange rate stability and the public sector's budget and central government debt. Following this scrutiny, the European Parliament and the European Council shall present their views on the reports made by the Commission and the ECB and after this the ECOFIN Council will decide on the Commission's proposal to allow Sweden to participate in the union. If Sweden is accepted, there will be negotiations on when entry will occur and at what exchange rate the krona will be fixed against the euro, which is decided by the ECOFIN Council. After this a national changeover plan will need to be drawn up.
Fiscal policy and monetary policy – mutually dependent Sweden and other countries that came through the acute financial crisis of 2008 – 2009 relatively well are characterised not only by an efficient regulatory framework for central bank operations but also by the fact that they have been implementing reforms for a long time that have improved the functioning of the economy, not least as regards how fiscal policy is conducted. The fact that Sweden has, over the last twenty years, managed to reconcile low and stable inflation with good economic growth and sound public finances depends to a large degree on fiscal policy reforms implemented in the wake of the crisis in the 1990s. But experience gained from the latest financial crisis shows that both these sides of the economic policy coin are intimately intertwined and cannot be entirely decoupled from one another. My interpretation of the research situation is that increasing importance is being attached to how dependent monetary and fiscal policy are on each other. 31 It is difficult to believe that it might be possible for a central bank to independently guarantee low and stable inflation, and financial stability, irrespective of how fiscal policy is designed. By the same token, it will be easier to maintain sound and sustainable fiscal policy if there is price stability and financial stability. The difficulties of many countries in countering the economic downturn after the financial crisis via an active fiscal policy has increased the pressure on central banks to stimulate economic activity.

11 As a result of this arrangement and by pledging its foreign currency reserve, the Riksbank could lend a total of approximately SEK 200 billion in US dollars. Conversely, swap agreements were also established between the Riksbank and two of the Baltic central banks. 12 These experiences indicate that, in the future, even tougher requirements will be placed on international cooperation between central banks. How should we organise this in the best way? Can we expect other countries’ central banks to always be able to assist with currency in a crisis situation or must special agreements be drawn up? The development also raises the issue of whether an international ‘lender of last resort’ is needed. 13 These questions are particularly important for Sweden, which has its own small currency. And they will become even more relevant if the major Swedish bank Nordea carries out its plan to change from a subsidiary to a branch structure. With the current subsidiary structure, the central banks in the countries where Nordea has subsidiaries are responsible for providing ELA to them. After the transformation into a branch structure, the Riksbank will take on the main responsibility for providing ELA, should it be needed. This means that the Riksbank will have a greater need of being able to obtain foreign currency in a crisis situation.
Summing up, our assessment of the macroeconomic scenario, beyond the recent data and the adjustment in the GDP range and the inflation projection for 2018, is not very different when viewed from a longer perspective, that is, considering the period 2018/2020. For all the above we believe that our economy still needs a positive monetary impulse over the next two years. Certainly this impulse will be withdrawn as the gaps close and inflation converges to 3%, but when will this withdrawal begin will depend on the evolution of our macroeconomy, which we do not see happening before the end of this year. It is important to bear in mind that although we see a balance of risks biased upwards on domestic activity, on the negative side the main risks come from abroad. The smaller slack for monetary policy making in the United States, the renewed divergence with other developed economies and its pressure on currencies; the political tensions in the Eurozone; the oil price increase and associated geopolitical risks configure a complex scenario for the emerging world. This is especially true for economies that are seen as more vulnerable, either because their macroeconomic fundamentals are weak and/or because they do not possess the institutional characteristics that allow them to deal with external shocks and implement counter-cyclical policies. The link between institutional characteristics and macroeconomic fundamentals with the financial results when facing a stressful episode has been widely documented.

The necessary reforms will call for short-term sacrifices from all walks of life, such as the relinquishment of protection and privileges. However, the long-term gains in wealth for the country at large will more than compensate for these short-term difficulties. BIS Review 42/2005  1
The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: A broad brush picture of the UK economy Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Asian Business Association Dinner, London, 19 March 2002. *  *  *  Thank you, Mr President, for that kind introduction. I'm delighted to be here. In fact it's the second time this year that I've had the pleasure of dining with representatives of the Asian Business Community in the UK. Just a couple of months ago, in Glasgow, I joined the Association of Business Community in paying tribute to Mr Yaqub Ali for the remarkable contribution that he has made to Scottish commercial and community life since he arrived here from Pakistan some 50 years ago. It was a very poignant occasion, coming as it did when the terrorist attacks of 11th September in New York and Washington were still fresh in our minds. Those events sadly have been sometimes represented - or misrepresented - as having something to do with ethnic or religious differences. But, as the universal condemnation of terrorism which followed the events of 11th September showed, they had nothing to do with ethnic or religious differences; they were a reflection of a fanaticism which has no place in any civilised society. Nevertheless they clearly had the capacity to accentuate perceived differences, and to provoke unwanted tensions within our international, national and local communities.

Policy actions may turn out to be ill-timed or miscalibrated in the face of these uncertainties. There is thus an inevitable short-term volatility in UK inflation, which monetary policy makers have  Page 6  to live with. And when the shocks driving that short-term volatility are large, then the amplitude of this short-term volatility in inflation can be large. This story remains an important part of what the UK has experienced of late. Recognising the impossibility of fine tuning inflation developments on a month-to-month basis, the MPC has long emphasised its focus on achieving the inflation target over the medium term. This medium-term orientation of monetary policy is crucial if the inflation target is to be met in a sustainable manner and monetary policy is not to become a source of inflation volatility itself. At present, the desirability of adopting this medium-term orientation is bolstered by the nature of the underlying drivers of UK inflation. The large rises in the prices of international goods and energy not only directly raise UK inflation, but will also weigh on domestic incomes and demand through the terms of trade channel. [10] As a result, in taking monetary policy decisions today, the MPC needs to take account not just of the immediate inflationary impact of higher energy prices in the coming months, but also the potential disinflationary impact of higher energy prices through weaker incomes and demand at longer horizons. This distinguishes the situation we face from that in other jurisdictions – notably from the US.