samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With greater transparency, a customer can decide if he is getting his money’s worth for the service and advice provided by his FA representative. Benefit illustrations also do not include a detailed breakdown of the split between the protection and investment components in an investment-linked insurance product. Customers often assume that the insurance policy they bought covers only insurance to their dependants, when in fact the product may contain a substantial savings element. Insurers should strive to provide greater disclosure on how the premium is split between protection and investment on bundled insurance products to enable customers to better understand what they are buying. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Promoting a culture of fair dealing The fifth thrust in our approach to instilling customer trust in life insurance and financial advisory services is through promoting a culture of fair dealing by financial institutions. Dealing fairly with customers goes beyond mere compliance with regulatory requirements. It is an attitude that springs from the ethos and values of the institution. It is about a culture that places the consumer first, that is focused on doing what is right for the consumer, and that places a premium on integrity. It is the responsibility of the Board and Senior Management to forge this culture of fair dealing throughout the organisation. The Board and Senior Management must set a clear strategy to achieve the fair dealing outcomes, monitor its implementation, and train their staff and representatives to treat customers fairly.

For central banks and financial regulators, technological changes have far reaching implications – in particular on the structure of financial markets, banks and other financial institutions. Corporations around the world from every industry, origin and size, are directing enormous resources towards investments in technologies that are transforming the way they conduct business. The global annual spend on business technology is estimated to be close to $ trillion in 2019 . Of this, financial services firms rank in the top quartile of annual spend to revenue. Global investments in financial technology start-ups are reported to have chalked up another $ billion in the first half of 2019 , driven by a combination of interest and demand from consumers for new fintech propositions and the scaling up of challenger and collaborative fintechs. These developments raise important questions for the conduct of monetary policy, the management of payment systems, financial regulation and supervision, and even the very concept of money as the lifeblood of any economy. On many fronts, we find ourselves in unchartered territory – often uncomfortably so. In response, central banks and financial regulators are similarly expanding resources both to better leverage technology in performing our core functions of promoting monetary and financial stability, and to defend against its attendant risks. Central to both these goals is our ability to evolve – and in many respects, re-define – our governance, risk and control environment for the age of disruption. Why is this necessary?
Let us say that a household owns a detached house that is worth 5 million kronor but which was purchased for 2.5 million kronor 10 years ago. The house is taxed every year with a property charge of just under 8,000 kronor. If the household wishes to sell the house, for example to move to a smaller home, this will mean it will have to pay 550,000 kronor in capital gains tax upon sale. In addition, the household will have to pay stamp duty if it decides to buy a new detached house. If we assume that the household purchases a smaller and cheaper detached house for 3 million kronor, this will mean that, in addition to the capital gains tax, it will have to pay 1.5 per cent or 45,000 kronor in stamp duty in conjunction with the purchase. To this, can often be added costs for mortgaging the house. This means that the total taxation for this example household to relocate corresponds to about 600,000 kronor, which is a lot compared to the annual current taxation of only 8,000 kronor. I certainly think it is reasonable to pay tax on the profit from the sale of a home, in the same way as it is reasonable to pay tax on the profit from an investment of capital. And this is something households need to consider in their calculations. But if the level of taxation is too high when a property is sold, it can affect households’ willingness to relocate.

In labour market economics, a system of insiders and outsiders is discussed, where insiders on the labour market benefit, to a far greater degree, from labour legislation that protects them from unemployment and gives them a more advantageous negotiating position for wage-setting and so on. At the same time, this makes it more difficult for outsiders to become established on the labour market. 12 Applied to the housing market, this reasoning could concern two areas. The first area concerns the dividing line between households on the rental market: the insiders, who have master leases for rented flats, and the outsiders, who lack such leases despite being willing to pay rents that are actually higher than those paid by the insiders. 13 Insiders on the rental market thus have a strong interest in maintaining the rent-setting system and have a strong shared voice to argue their case thanks to interest groups. The second area concerns the differences in a wider sense between the insiders who own their homes and who have, in theory, strong economic interests in maintaining their strong position, and the outsiders who have great difficulty in entering the ‘owned’ housing market. Here, I will focus on this latter example. Put  11 Emanuelsson et al. (2018). 12  See, for example, Lindbeck and Snower (2001). 13 See Lindbeck (2016). 4 [13]  simply, what insiders have in common is that, due to their strong position on each market, they can influence decision-makers to maintain their advantages.
Interest rate risk measures the potential for loss which results from a mismatch between the term structure of a bank’s assets (e.g. mortgages) and that of its liabilities (e.g. customer deposits). While the term structure of assets gets increasingly longer, that of liabilities remains very short. The rise in credit risk was due, on the one hand, to the deterioration in the outlook for the Swiss economy. A slowdown in economic growth in Switzerland could have a negative impact on domestic credit quality, with the result that banks would face the prospect of writeoffs on their assets. On the other hand, the continued strong rise in mortgage loans and real estate prices has also caused credit risk to increase further in the past few months. Furthermore, the results of our mortgage lending surveys suggest a high risk appetite on the part of individual banks. In this regard, the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) submitted two important measures for consultation which should counter potential imbalances in the real estate and mortgage markets: more risk-sensitive capital requirements for mortgage lending and a countercyclical capital buffer. With more risk-sensitive capital requirements, incentives for mortgage lending should be structurally improved. The countercyclical buffer is a component of the Basel III framework and represents a variable capital requirement which is only activated in the event of excessive credit growth. As soon as credit growth weakens again, the buffer can be deactivated.

New markets, new customers, new products, new technology: the risks of something going wrong are high if the industry's risk assessment procedures and control mechanisms do not keep pace. The impetus behind all these changes is intensified competition. This is good news for financial efficiency, and given that this is also one of the Bank of England's core interests, we welcome it. But there are undoubtedly some implications for financial stability, at least in transition. An increase in competitiveness may for a period increase the financial system's vulnerability to shocks; academic research suggests that the process of financial liberalisation can increase significantly the probability of a banking crisis. So how do we make this trade-off acceptable, given that we certainly do not want to exchange the overt costs of financial crisis for the hidden costs of financial protectionism? 2  BIS Review 43/2001  Policy response to the changing environment Well, a large part of the answer must be to strive for improvements in the financial and regulatory infrastructure – to 'risk proof' the system as it were. There are a number of very significant initiatives that are worth mentioning in this context. The proposed new Accord from the Basel Committee is deservedly the focus of a number of the papers to be presented at this conference. A large slice of our time here is also going to be devoted to evidence on the effectiveness of market discipline on banks.
16.09.2019  The EMU at 20: from divergence to resilience Welcome address. Third Annual Research Conference of the Banco de España Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, Let me start by welcoming you to the Banco de España for the Third Annual Research Conference. We began organising this conference three years ago, with the aim of bringing together leading scholars and policymakers to discuss frontier research on relevant topics. This year, the chosen topic is “The EMU at 20: current status and the way forward”, which I think ranks highly in the current policy debate. It would be hard to imagine a more eminent group of researchers to discuss this topic. I would like to thank all of you for your attendance here today. 2019 marks the 20th anniversary of the creation of the euro. We reach this milestone in the context of a global macroeconomic deterioration, while still facing the legacy of the crisis, in terms of high unemployment rates and persistent levels of indebtedness. Part of this worsening of economic conditions is linked to trade tensions, against a background in which the multilateral financial and trade system in place since the end of the Second World War is being put into question. At the same time we are confronted with global trends, such as digitalisation and climate change, which pose significant challenges, of a different nature, for the European economy. But I am optimistic about our common future.

In short, some sort of European investment agency, whether in the form of a new or an existing euro area body, with the capacity to issue bonds, might be able to target an optimal fiscal policy stance, while providing the economy with more safe assets, thus facilitating monetary policy transmission, increasing the international role of the euro and completing the Banking and Capital Markets Union. Twenty years ago, the euro was seen, in Christian Noyer’s words, as a catalyst for integration. This view is now as valid as it was then. In order to achieve price stability, the single currency generates the need to pursue sound economic policies. But it is clear now that monetary integration does not immediately lead to financial integration. This is an ongoing process, and the governance framework to guarantee the success of the European project is still developing. We must endeavour to achieve completion of the Capital Markets Union and the Banking Union. This will also require progress towards the Fiscal Union. A European safe asset lies at the heart of all of these initiatives. But, more often than not, the heart is the most difficult place to reach. I am sure that these two days will bring advanced research and a constructive exchange of views to bear on this and other important areas of the euro area architecture. Thank you for your attention. 8/8
On this note, I am encouraged to hear that Maybank’s Yangon office is already driving initiatives for the local community, through its Project H.E.A.R.T (Helping Every Asian Rise Together). Therefore, judging by Maybank’s by-line, with its stated aim of “humanising financial services”, I am confident Maybank will show a stellar example in making a difference in Myanmar. I also expect that as a good corporate citizen, Maybank will contribute to the development of the domestic financial sector, as over the long term and given the opportunity, they can meet the overall financial services needs of the low and moderate income households. I should also expect a meaningful participation and contribution of Maybank in Myanmar’s interbank and foreign exchange markets as well as the payment system. Conclusion As we speak, Myanmar is undergoing a profound shift. It stands at the cusp of something great. During this historic time, it gives us a great honour that Malaysia is actively involved and contributing to Myanmar’s transformation. For we consider Myanmar not only a partner, but a close friend. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  With this, I wish Myanmar all the success in her future endeavours. Congratulations to Maybank again for the start of a new chapter in what I trust will be an enduring and productive presence in this great country. Truly, the future is bright and this is indeed, Myanmar’s moment. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005(a)  1,065  1,315  1,984  3,807  5,522  6,347  Textile and Garments  110  293  628  1,853  2,982  2,895  Tea  373  442  495  481  701  810  All Other Exports  582  581  862  1,474  1,839  2,642  Export Earnings (Services)  279  329  531  821  953  1,540  Worker Remittances  152  292  401  790  1,160  1968  Foreign Direct Investment  43  24  34  28  175  272  Foreign Loans and Grants  307  517  526  847  422  972  Inflows  9  14  13  21  15  19  Trade balance  15  40  57  53  65  76  Loans and grants  50  56  76  93  275  197  Total imports  7  14  15  15  16  22  GDP  4  5  5  6  7  8  Export Earnings (Goods)  Worker Remittances, as a % of Total current account  (a) Provisional  As shown in the table above, in 2005, remittances increased to $ 1,968 mn, indicating a 22.6% growth compared to 2004.
*  *  *  The effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area depends on a well-functioning banking sector. Different to other advanced economies, the transmission of our policy impulses operates predominantly through the bank lending channel. This means that, as monetary policymakers, we have to pay particular attention to developments in the banking system. Indeed, since 2008 many of our policy measures have been focused precisely on addressing blockages in bank intermediation, ranging from short-term liquidity to longer-term funding. In recent years, other European policymakers have joined the ECB in this effort to repair the bank lending channel. In several vulnerable countries there has been a far-reaching restructuring and recapitalisation of the banking sector. And at the European level, policymakers agreed to establish Banking Union, the opening act of which was the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment of euro area banks’ balance sheets. What I would like to focus on today is what these efforts have achieved so far – and what still needs to be done to fix the bank lending channel sustainably. Credit at a turning point There are several factors that indicate credit dynamics in the euro area have now reached a turning point. First, credit data have improved over recent months, albeit from low levels. The annual growth rate in bank loans to households again increased in September to 0.6% – twice the average growth rate recorded last year. 1 Bank lending to firms has continued to contract but the decline is bottoming out.

Part of solution to this is to create a more diversified and contestable financing mix, such that if banks finance becomes too expensive or scarce, non-bank finance can efficiently substitute for it. This is what the ongoing agenda to deepen and integrate capital markets in Europe aims to achieve – the so-called Capital Markets Union. Non-banks such a private equity investors or institutional investors can also play an important role in filling financing gaps, especially for the latter in long-dated lending such as infrastructure that matches their liability profile. But we also know that for certain types of lending that are the preserve of banks, in particular SME financing, asymmetric information problems and high costs of monitoring means banks cannot easily be replaced by non-banks. And perhaps even more importantly, such lending cannot quickly be replaced by other banks, as exit from the market tends to destroy the relationship networks – or “soft information” – that is crucial for small business lending. 3 In this way, exit can in fact create a form of hysteresis in the banking sector. What this shows is that, as policymakers, we cannot be agnostic as to how banks adapt to the current environment. We need to stay alert to the fact that actions by banks that are rational at the microeconomic level can create negative externalities at the macroeconomic level – analogous to the “fire sales” problem during financial crises. 4 And where those externalities risk becoming sufficiently large, there is a justification for policy actions.
However, ensuring that the payment system functions efficiently is also a fairly general definition that requires further precision. To become more specific, it is necessary to define what characterises an efficient payment system. I intend to discuss two characteristics here that I perceive to be the most central – price stability and financial stability. Price stability An important component of an efficient payment system is that economic agents have confidence that the value of the means of payment will remain stable over time, that is in practice that inflation will be low and stable. One usually expresses this as there being a nominal anchor that prevents inflation and inflation expectations from drifting off. If households and companies are confident that the general price level will not change very much, they are better able to plan for the future and need not put effort  1  See, for instance, Santomero, A.M., S. Viotti and A. Vredin, (2001), "Challenges for Central Banking: An Introduction”, in Santomero, A.M., S. Viotti and A. Vredin (ed. ), Challenges for Central Banking, Kluwer Academic Publishers. BIS Review 52/2006  1  into finding ways of protecting themselves against inflation, but can focus on more productive activities. Another argument for keeping inflation low focuses on the role of price formation as a signalling system. When inflation is low and stable it is easier for economic agents to distinguish changes in relative prices and to adjust their decisions regarding consumption, saving, work and investment accordingly.

Inflation targeting is thus much more demanding than a fixed exchange rate regime with regard to the central bank’s analytical work and its ability to communicate its policy. Whether this is something that should be regarded as a disadvantage or not is of course a question of judgement. For the Riksbank, the transition to inflation targeting heralded the start of a fairly comprehensive increase in competence in the field of economics. The number of PhD economists at the Riksbank has risen sharply in recent years and our research in areas related to monetary policy has expanded considerably. Financial stability Let me now move on to the other central component of an efficient payment system. This concerns the stability in the financial system; particularly in the financial institutions that supply payment services, i.e. primarily the banks. Financial stability is currently regarded, parallel to the price stability target, as the main task of a modern central bank. The financial system has essentially three main tasks: converting savings into financing, managing risk and providing efficient channels of payment. Let me give a basic example. A bank receives savings from households which it then lends to other households or to companies that need to invest. Banks are specialists at valuing, monitoring and managing credit risks in the households and companies to which they lend.
That weekly pay packet in 2008 has, in purchasing power terms, fallen to be worth only around £ per week. This makes the recent period very unusual by historical standards (Chart 1). Since as far back as 1870, there have been only two episodes when the real pay of workers has fallen over a ten-year period. The other episodes were associated with seismic shocks in the labour market, often wrenching technological change or sharp cyclical downturns, which raised levels of unemployment and job insecurity. The past decade has bucked that historical trend, with a boom in job creation accompanying weak pay growth. The employment rate in the UK has risen to over 60%, and the unemployment rate has fallen to 4%, respectively their highest and lowest levels since the mid-1970s. The vast majority of these new jobs, around 75%, have been full-time. And this boom has persisted, with around 830,000 job vacancies currently being advertised – the highest since records began. This picture of weak pay and strong employment has been broadly-based, spanning all regions and sectors. Real pay has fallen across every region of the UK since 2008 (Figure 1) and in all three major sectors of the economy (Chart 2). Meanwhile, unemployment has fallen steeply across every region of the UK, by at least 2.5 percentage points. The high-level picture of the UK labour market, then, is a jobs-rich but pay-poor recovery. This pattern is broadly replicated in other countries.

And although at this stage it is difficult to define the magnitude and scope of these changes, it is essential they be identified promptly, since economic policy cannot provide indefinite support for firms that are headed for a structural reduction in their activity. Rather, it should aim to encourage and support the adaptation of the productive system to the new reality and the efficient cross-sectoral and cross-firm reallocation of resources. Moreover, the outlook for the Spanish economy and, therefore, for the business sector remains very dependent on the still highly uncertain course of the pandemic. Since the beginning of July, the strength of the recovery has been adversely affected by the fresh outbreaks of the virus in our country and, more recently, by the worsening of the epidemiological situation both in Spain and in most of Europe. This has prompted the relatively widespread introduction of new restrictions on mobility and activity in certain sectors. Accordingly, economic activity in this final stretch of the year and in early 2021 will foreseeably be less dynamic than was anticipated in the baseline scenarios published a few months ago by the Banco de España and the ECB for Spain and the euro area, respectively.2 By contrast, the latest news on the availability of a vaccine for early 2021 is clearly positive and, if confirmed, should help raise confidence and rule out the most adverse economic scenarios, even though the effects on activity will not be immediate.