samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The exchange rate The exchange rate is an important but elusive item in assessments of inflation. Last autumn, the main assessment was that the krona would become successively stronger as the financial turbulence subsided and relatively more importance was attached to the favourable economic fundamentals, which include low inflation and a growing surplus on public finances. Recently, moreover, it seems that such a process has begun. Signals of a move by Sweden towards the monetary union may perhaps have acted as a catalyst here. The new political signals about the handling of the EMU issue have brought the question of the krona’s equilibrium level to the fore. Participation in the euro area means that at some stage the krona’s exchange rate with the euro will have to be locked. In the discussion that will then be held with colleagues in Europe, the actual decision will be a matter for the Government. The Riksbank, however, is responsible for choosing the conversion rate we find reasonable on Sweden’s behalf. Meanwhile, we must bear in mind that we are dealing with negotiations between Sweden and the other EU member states, so it may be inadvisable to get tied down in matters of detail at an early stage. The Riksbank has made it clear on numerous occasions that it considers the krona to be undervalued. Much of the debate on this issue has stemmed from an article on the krona’s equilibrium exchange rate that was published early in 1996 in our Quarterly Review.

To achieve greater and more sustainable SME financing, it is necessary to develop market-based approaches which are commercially viable to mobilise private sector investment into the SME sector. I encourage the ADB to further work on this front, including exploring possible mechanisms such as credit enhancement and securitisation. Scaling up private sector lending would require a change in the skill mix of the ADB, in particular in strengthening its market expertise and risk management. Partnering with domestic agencies and private sector financial institutions, other international financial institutions and developed members in the region that have relevant experience would be useful in utilising their expertise, building the capacity of the Bank, and sharing credit risk. There are, of course, other important areas concerning the development of the region where the ADB could play a meaningful role as identified in the new Long-Term Strategic  BIS Review 55/2008  1  Framework. As a member of the Bank and the region, we stand ready to provide support and look forward to strengthening our cooperation with the ADB in furthering the development agenda of the region. And lastly, to successfully implement Strategy 2020, further enhancing the organisational effectiveness of the ADB will be of critical importance. We welcome the Bank’s commitment to develop a more robust results framework and to continue its institutional reforms, and we look forward to ongoing efforts by the Bank in this regard. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 55/2008
We will: •  make more robust risk assessments of financial institutions’ business activities, client profiles, geographical connections, transaction volumes, and quality of controls;  •  intensify supervision of financial institutions that pose higher risks;  •  conduct thematic inspections of activities that pose higher risk across financial institutions; and  •  step up engagement with financial institutions to promote deeper understanding of emerging risks and typologies as well as best practices to mitigate these risks. But MAS cannot inspect every bank every year. Nor can we go through all transactions. And we certainly do not set out to detect fraud – which would take months of intense scrutiny. Responsibility for AML/CFT rests with the board and senior management of financial institutions. They must: •  put in place robust monitoring mechanisms to detect suspicious activities;  •  promote strong risk awareness and constant vigilance among all staff; and  •  empower their compliance and risk management people. My advice to senior managers in our financial institutions is this: keep your risk and compliance people close to you. •  They are often seen as hindering opportunity and profits. •  But when things go wrong, you wish you had heeded them. •  When they say ‘I think something’s not right here’, listen to them. Ultimately, trust and conduct boil down to culture more than any externally imposed rules. By culture, I mean the shared values, attitudes and norms that guide behaviour. Financial institutions must get the culture right.

This requires setting the right moral tone from the top. •  Boards and senior management in particular must send a clear signal that profits do not come before values and ethics. •  Compensation structures must motivate not just high performance but also right conduct. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusion Good fortune has played a role in the growth of Singapore’s financial sector. •  Our financial centre has benefited from connecting one of the fastest growing regions in the world with global markets. But fortune can be fickle and economic cycles will turn. To stay relevant and thrive as a financial centre requires us: •  to remain resilient through good times and bad;  •  to be dynamic in serving the changing needs of the region; and at all times  •  to be trusted as a clean and credible place to do business in. MAS is committed to working with the industry and all our stakeholders – including an inquisitive and fair media – to ensure that. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
12  NSO, unpublished estimates  13  During the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Trade held in March 2002, participating Ministers noted that the dismantling of tariffs will not be enough: “Businesses have to benefit from an economic environment where trade is facilitated by an adaptation and a harmonisation of regulatory provisions concerning the free movement of goods, standards, right of establishment, property rights.”  BIS Review 69/2002  3  join, which means that they will shortly have complete access not only to an enlarged EU market, but also to the reciprocal trade agreements which the EU has with third countries. If local businesses are not to lose out to competition from this new source, therefore, the administrative burdens and financial outlays associated with the achievement of legal equivalence and the adoption of EU technical standards will have to be borne within the same time frame available to the other candidate countries, irrespective of whether Malta joins the EU or not. Yet even if such compliance is achieved on schedule, under any arrangement other than membership Malta would only be able to tap the markets covered by EU reciprocal agreements by negotiating individual bilateral agreements with most of the countries in question. Given Malta’s limited negotiating capacity, combined with the slow pace with which the conclusion of such agreements tends to proceed and also the high degree of protection in many developing countries, this seems to be an unrealistic objective.

If that consensus exists, we stand ready to work with the market to deliver this complementary tool. We strongly encourage market participants to engage on this consultation and look forward to receiving responses. 15  For presentational reasons, Figure 3 shows the SONIA index and compound rates over different time periods from those shown in Section 2 of the accompanying Discussion Paper, but the underlying data and calculation methods are identical. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  Transitioning the Bank of England’s lending facilities away from LIBOR  Our second announcement today also relates to our presence in the market – specifically, how we treat LIBOR-linked collateral in our Sterling Monetary Framework lending operations. We released a discussion paper on this topic last year and today we set out the actions we intend to take. Our lending operations are designed to provide liquidity support to market participants experiencing either a predictable liquidity need or a firm-specific or market-wide shock. We lend to firms against a wide set of eligible collateral. But to protect public funds we apply a risk-averse ‘haircut’ to that collateral to protect against possible falls in its value in the period between a counterparty default and collateral sale, including in times of potentially severe stress. The current average haircut on pre-positioned collateral is a little under 25%, giving the Bank a lending capacity of over £ after accounting for existing lending (for example under the Term Funding Scheme).
The sharp appreciation of the euro has notably been stemming from the significant reappraisal of growth prospects for the euro area, as well as from the geopolitical context. The impact of the strong euro on growth is currently offset by the strength of domestic demand in the euro area; but the recent appreciation of the euro exchange rate has led us to revise down slightly the outlook for inflation. Let me recall that the exchange rate of the euro is not a policy target of the ECB. But the exchange rate remains an element that we closely monitor owing to its possible implications for the medium-term outlook for inflation. I would like to finish by insisting on one word: confidence, but confidence without complacency. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Confidence, because our monetary policy is effective and the economic recovery is robust. But confidence without complacency, because monetary policy is not the only game in town. It must be supplemented by national reforms, particularly in France where the current acceleration of reforms is positive. It must also be supplemented at the European level by strengthening the euro area: in order to lastingly boost growth, we must complete Monetary Union by invigorating Economic Union. All those who legitimately reject overloading monetary policy – on both sides of the Rhine – must now firmly support a stronger economic union. Thank you for your attention.

The crisis has opened a political window for tighter regulation of the financial system, but it is uncertain how long the window will remain open. 4  163/2009
And I firmly believe in the role that you, the fintechs, have in reshaping the financial landscape alongside the existing players who are themselves undergoing transformation. Keep that spark of originality that encourages you to push the existing limits even further, and continue to develop French and European technological know-how. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Consequently, it is also probable that inflation a couple of years ahead will be close to 2 per cent, roughly as forecast by the Riksbank in August, even if inflation in the forthcoming year may be lower. Long-term perspective Before rounding off, allow me also to touch upon the longer-term perspective. Over the last decade, the economic policy debate has largely centred on stabilisation policy. The fact that stabilisation policy was in focus during the first half of the 1990s is easy to understand. Following a severe crisis caused largely by mistakes in stabilisation policy, we changed our exchange rate regime and altered the focus of both our monetary policy and fiscal policy. In the EMU debate, it has been natural to continue the discussion of monetary policy and exchange rate systems. I, at least, believe that this discussion went a bit too far. It was easy to get the impression that welfare in Sweden depended solely on the Riksbank's actions. BIS Review 42/2003  3  This is not the case of course. The objective of monetary policy over the past ten years has been to ensure price stability. This has proved rather successful - inflation is in line with the Riksbank's target and it is important therefore that it lays a solid foundation for growth. But when we alter interest rates, it is mainly with a view to affecting demand around a long-term output trend. While this is important, it must be remembered that we do not affect the trend itself.
But, in addition to looking back, I would like to take this opportunity to map out some fundamental elements that should be part of the future risk management framework, once we have returned to a more conventional monetary policy environment. Of course, these are largely informed by some of the actions we took over the past decade and founded on the principles I have just described. So while we are clearly not in a position to move to this new steady state in one go, its broad features can already be seen today. Navigating through gusts, storms and crosswinds Risk managers, including central bank risk managers, are generally prudent. Such prudence is not only necessary to preserve market confidence in the central bank’s independence and ability to comply with its mandate, it is also appropriate since we are entrusted with public money. In a 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  crisis, however, the central bank’s exposure to financial risks can – and may indeed have to – increase, because it is still expected to fulfil its policy mandate. The non-conventional measures that we implemented were necessary and proportionate to achieve our mandate; they have also contributed to financial stability by reducing financial risks in the euro area. There are, of course, limits to the actions of central banks, as monetary policy cannot address structural or fiscal sources of financial distress, nor can it step in to rectify national deficiencies as our mandate applies to the euro area as a whole.

Yves Mersch: Risk management in times of non-conventional monetary policy Keynote speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Joint Bank of Portugal and European Central Bank Conference on “Risk Management for Central Banks”, Lisbon, 25 September 2017. * * * Let me start by thanking you for coming to this joint ECB-Banco de Portugal conference, and the Banco de Portugal for hosting us on this occasion. I am delighted to see central bank risk managers, practitioners and academics here in Lisbon to exchange views on risk management for central banks. This topic has gained such importance in recent years as central banks across the globe, including the ECB, have sharply expanded their balance sheets, even though the time for ever more of the same is behind us. Like the many great maritime expeditions that started out from this country, some of our endeavours in recent years have taken us into uncharted territory. Now is a good time to take stock of what we have learnt and map out what may come next. Following stable principles in the Eurosystem’s risk management framework The Eurosystem has a clearly defined objective, enshrined in the Treaty, to preserve price stability in the euro area.1 The Treaty does not speak of eligible counterparties, collateral haircuts or issue share limits for bond purchases.
On five occasions between 1990 and 1994, SEB securitised mortgage loans totalling SEK 12 billion, and in June 2000, the same bank securitised mortgage loans worth approximately SEK 8.5 billion. SBAB securitised mortgages worth approximately SEK 1 billion in February 2000 and loans worth approximately SEK 8 billion in October 2000. Bokredit, owned by Den Danske Bank, has securitised a stock of mortgage loans to a 7  BIS Review 99/2000  value of SEK 1.3 billion. A new Internet-based issuer of mortgage loans is Europeloan, which started up operations in Sweden in February 1999. Europeloan is financing their internet based mortgage lending by securitisation of the loans abroad, up to now around SEK 0,5 billion. Objections that have been expressed against securitisation include the fact that up until now it has been relatively complicated and costly to set up special purpose vehicles, and it has not been possible to invest the bonds at such favourable interest rates as their rating would imply. Possible reasons are that the market is underdeveloped and the issues have been few, which has meant that liquidity in the bonds has been low. Securitisation of mortgages is common in the USA, where around half of the total outstanding loans stock of secured loans is securitised. In Europe, housing financing has mainly taken other forms. If competition in the mortgage market increases as a result of EMU, it is likely that the need to finance mortgage loans as economically as possible will also increase.

15%  2% 29%  1%  Denmark Germany Spain  7%  France  1%  Austria Sweden Norway 45% Source: The European Mortgage Federation  BIS Review 99/2000  2  The European market for housing bonds is currently dominated by three countries - Germany, Denmark and Sweden. Together, these countries account for around 89% of this market (Figure 4). Switzerland  0,7  Germany  Spain  Italy  Belgium  Netherlands  France  30 23,84 25 20 15 11,44 10 6,8 5 1,54 0,9 0,65 0,03 0 UK  Billion $  ABS/MBS securitisation transactions by country, 1997. Source: OECD  Competition for customers Although mortgages are a relatively straightforward and standardised financial product that should be well suited to sell abroad, international mortgage sales have been limited to date. One probable reason is that the mortgage market mainly targets private clients, which are hard to reach without using a local distribution network. In this respect, the Internet should be able to lead to greater transparency and competition, both by the credit issuers themselves supplying information and credit services over the Internet and by Internet-based brokerage sites finding the cheapest mortgages for borrowers. While Internet-based mortgage services are still a relatively new phenomenon, they are likely to increase competition on the mortgage market.
23.07.2020  Challenges for the Spanish economy in the face of the impact of the pandemic Webinar Economy, work and society in Spain. The impact of COVID-19. Spanish Economic and Social Council (CES) Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Honourable Minister for Labour and Social Economy, Chair of the Spanish Economic and Social Council, ladies and gentlemen, Good morning. It is a pleasure to be able to participate today in this presentation of the Annual Report of the Economic and Social Council (CES). As earlier highlighted, its content goes beyond the 2019 timeframe of events and delves into the challenges that the COVID19 pandemic entails for the economy, for social cohesion and for the labour market in Spain. In this respect, the CES and the Banco de España have concurred in recent weeks that our respective studies and annual reports should strive to be useful instruments that help society face these challenging times. An incipient, incomplete, uncertain and uneven recovery The COVID-19 pandemic has exacted a very high price in terms of human lives as well as deep-seated disruption to society and the economy. As a result, the dynamics marking the global and Spanish economic environment in late 2019 and early 2020 have been abruptly altered. Specifically, the pandemic and the lockdown measures to combat it have affected all economies most adversely.

For inflation to take off rapidly, we would have to see a jump in inflationary expectations. But inflationary expectations have been quite stable. Indeed, we may be facing a quite different problem. Many forecasters – myself included – assume that stable 2 percent  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  inflation expectations will be an important factor helping to pull actual inflation up. Over the past five years, professional forecasters’ projections for long-run inflation have been at the 2 percent target and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) break-evens have been flat. Yet actual inflation has only just recently made it back up to 1–1/2 percent. Moreover, we still have not seen much at all in the way of higher inflation compensation being built into interest rates or wages. So there is cause for concern that expectations might not produce as strong a pull on inflation as we hope. We can turn to the Japanese experience again to highlight this risk. Long-run inflation expectations in Japan have averaged a little over 1 percent. Yet during that period, the only time inflation was palpably above zero – let alone not in outright deflation – was when consumption taxes increased or oil prices spiked. So inflation expectations may remain stable while inflation itself lags for a prolonged period. Conclusion As I think about the process of normalizing policy, I conclude that today’s risk-management calculus says we should err on the side of patience in removing highly accommodative policy.
Last year, MAS launched the Securities Repo Facility, under which eligible banks can borrow certain Singapore Dollar corporate bonds via repo transactions to facilitate their market making activities. These efforts will take time to bear fruit. We are also engaging investors, issuers and intermediaries to assess if more can be done to facilitate an active repo market and whether this will help deepen liquidity in bond markets. 26 Before I conclude, I should address the issue of defaults and restructuring exercises in the domestic bond market recently. These have so far mostly been from the oil and gas sector, and reflects the protracted weakness in the sector arising from a slump in energy prices. Rising defaults over the late part of the credit cycle and difficulties in particular sectors are to be expected, but MAS’ stress test suggests that most corporates in Singapore remain fairly resilient, and banks’ exposures to weaker issuers are likely to be manageable. The key here again is to ensure that one has a diversified portfolio. Following the recent restructurings and defaults, we have also received feedback calling for a review of the regulations and market practices around the Singapore bond market. Some ideas include enhancing sales practices, recourse for investors when a bond defaults, and the need for credit ratings. We are considering these feedback and will respond soon. Conclusion 27 To sum up, Asia’s capital markets have enjoyed a very good run, owing to a confluence of macroeconomic fundamentals and policy liberalisation.

A legal framework for consumer protection as well as possible incentives have already been taken account of through adequate provisions in the revised Banking and Financial Services Act which is under Government consideration for possible legislation in 2014. Guest of Honour We all agree that one of the major barriers to growth of the SME sector in Zambia is the shortage of financing despite its high potential to catalyze growth and employment creation. It therefore makes business sense that the financial sector should start to look at the financing problems for SMEs in a holistic manner which takes into consideration other developmental constraints which may impede sustainable growth and render the financing ineffective. In line with Government’s desire to enhance local content through SMEs and use of locallymanufactured inputs in the Zambian mining industry, a study in the mining sector is being under taken by the Zambia Local Content Initiative (ZMLCI) facilitated by the World Bank and co-financed by DFID. The goal is to build sustainable collaboration between SMEs and the mining industry. It is our hope that the above initiative will be extended to non-mining related SMEs such as those in agribusiness, tourism and retail. Honourable Minister You may wish to note the following topics that will be discussed during this forum: i.  SME Financing and Business Linkages, IFC Experiences in Africa;  ii. SME Financing and Experiences and Lessons Learned – AfDB;  iii. Promoting Business Linkages in Zambia – DFID Zambia; and  iv.