samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus far, it also appears that improved opportunities for risk management have resulted in more stable developments. The consequences of considerable financial turbulence, as for example when the IT bubble burst in 2000, have become less severe than earlier. Norway is lagging behind international developments in this area, together with a number of other European countries. 3. Developments in the household sector and house prices  In recent years, considerable attention has been focused on higher house prices and strong growth in household debt in many countries, including Norway. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, has expressed concern that house prices may be too high in relation to fundamentals in some countries. A sharp fall in house prices or other financial assets can trigger turbulence in financial markets. Norges Bank’s analyses show that high house prices may explain most of the growth in household debt. Sales of new dwellings have also made a positive contribution. The contribution from interest rate changes was high in 2003 and 2004, but has diminished recently. Lower unemployment in 2004 and increased house sales have pushed up debt growth. Higher house prices affect debt for a long period. Changes in the loan-to-asset value ratio of a dwelling is closely related to turnover and only a small share of the housing stock is for sale at any given time. Even if house prices stabilise following a sharp rise, there will be a long period during which houses change hands at a higher price level than the last time they were sold.

At the beginning of 2015, the AFISaR system started operation - this is the central electronic register for the documentation of each element that accompanies the issue and transactions with securities issued by the Albanian state. In the meantime, other successes achieved with regard to information technology include: •  automation of the reporting system of banks to the Bank of Albania;  •  integration and optimisation of the IT network utilisation, thus reducing operational costs of the Bank of Albania;  •  automation of accounting operations at BoA branches;  •  and increase of information processing and storing capacities. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Bigger challenges lie ahead of us in 2016. Another important objective is boosting credit to support the private sector, certainly at lower interest rates. The business plans of banks for 2016 render us optimistic in this regard. Meanwhile, once again I emphasise that our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative in 2016. Furthermore, private sector's demand will be low throughout 2016, thus creating premises to increasingly channel the banking system's liquidity to the private sector. I would like to guarantee the banking system in Albania that the Bank of Albania will be a reliable, open and serious partner, in compliance with its mandate, implying its supervisory function. One of the main aspects in our work will be the compilation of a particular law to deal with banks facing a difficult financial situation, also known in our daily jargon as the Resolution Law.
Paul Tucker: Money and credit – banking and the macroeconomy Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Executive Director and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, at the Monetary Policy and the Markets Conference, London, 13 December 2007. My thanks for comments and/or for background work to Peter Andrews, Charlie Bean, Tim Besley, Roger Clews, Andy Haldane, Colin Miles, James Proudman and Iain de Weymarn. Special thanks to Jing Yang and Alex Haberis. For comments and background work to Damien Lynch. And for secretarial support to Sandra Bannister and Cheryl Feeney. *  *  *  Each month the MPC sets a policy rate, Bank Rate, that will prevail until our next policy meeting. But no one – here today, in the market, or on the Committee – thinks that setting the overnight money market rate for the coming 30 days can be enough to steer demand conditions and maintain stable inflation. Rather, policy works on the basis of expectations of the path of the Bank Rate in the future, and of how our policy settings will vary according to economic conditions: the so-called “reaction function”. Perceptions of the reaction function therefore matter a lot and a great deal of effort goes into being transparent about the three inputs: the Committee’s objective; the MPC’s views on the shocks to demand and supply affecting the economy; and our views on how the economy works and how our policy settings affect it.

By reducing reliance on retail deposits, it reduced barriers to entry. Lenders’ margins fell (Chart 16), and credit conditions in the UK mortgage market eased. Conversely, the painful reminder that undiversified funding and income sources may leave a bank unusually vulnerable will probably bring about another shock to the structure of the market. The persistent tightening in mortgage credit that that would bring was a factor in the MPC’s November projections. In the near term, the extent to which the big or more diversified banks fill the gap will depend on the extent to which they too preserve capital and liquidity in the face of the harsh environment I have described. Money, or bank intermediation So far I have focused entirely on credit. Where does this leave money (or Money), the starting point for much traditional monetary analysis? Well, much that I have said about banks – their capacity, in the short run, to lever up their balance sheets and expand credit at will; their role in providing liquidity insurance to investment vehicles and corporates – turns precisely on their liabilities being money. And for this reason, banks are after all decisively different from other intermediaries. As transactions balances and so the means of exchange in our payments system, the moneyness of bank deposits lies at the core of credit intermediation.
The number of hours worked rose during the years following the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. But developments were strongly affected by the upturn in the economy, which enabled unemployed persons to gradually return to the labour market and obtain work. The positive growth in employment was supported by an increase in the number of persons of working age at the same time as sick leave was at a relatively low level. In recent years, this trend has been broken, partly due to an increase in sick leave. The picture of productivity in recent years has been somewhat brighter. For the economy as a whole it has stood at 2 per cent per year, or just above this figure. This is a marked improvement on the 1980s, when the increase remained at around 1 per cent per year, and even more so compared with the 1970s, when the productivity trend was negative. Factors such as the change in fiscal and monetary policy regimes and stiffer competition have probably played a role in this development. Despite the fact that the strong growth in productivity during the 1990s partly reflects both rapid growth in the private sector relative to the public sector and the large expansion in the ICT sector, there is reason for relative optimism regarding the future. Our economy has become more open, with greater competition and price pressure in many sectors. The problem is primarily the labour supply. Here, developments seem to have turned in a negative direction.

This leads me to another point mentioned in the draft resolution, namely the importance for a central bank to take account of asset prices when assessing risks to price stability, while not introducing moral hazard in financial markets through inappropriate reactions to excessive asset price developments. The ECB fully shares this view. It closely monitors asset price developments as indicators for monetary policy but it does not target them or react to them mechanically. As regards the proposed endorsement of macroeconomic projections by the Governing Council of the ECB, allow me to clarify once again the role of those projections in the process of monetary policymaking at the ECB. These projections play an important role for us, but they have by no means an all-encompassing role. They are an important technical input by ECB and national central bank staff in summarising and assessing the implications of a large body of information for future inflation in a consistent way. However, we are also fully aware of the difficulties of making projections. In particular, we recognise that it is impossible to summarise all the relevant information for assessing the maintenance of price stability in one single projection. Given the difficulties of forecasting over the longer term and the uncertainty regarding the appropriate economic model, we do not advocate the use of a single projection to analyse the risks to price stability.
The reduced potential growth calls for closer attention to the determinants of longerterm growth. Although the incidence of monetary policy is mild, every central bank must be able to monitor the developments affecting the future path of the economy to ensure a more effective monetary policy. 21. Among Chile’s future growth possibilities is the fact that closing the output gap would allow boosting growth in a stable manner from just less than 2% in recent years to a 2.5% to 3% range. As I mentioned before, this is grounded on a better external scenario, the fading of some sectoral factors that have slowed down the pace of growth, a more expansionary monetary policy, and the lack of macroeconomic growth constraints. This requires more dynamic exports, domestic demand and investment. 22. A more significant increase in investment that brings it closer to its historical rates, coupled by increased factor mobility, would boost growth to a sustainable rate of around  3.5%. This would require revitalizing mining investment, better investor expectations in the rest of the economy, favorable financial conditions, and the elimination of bottlenecks that hinder the reallocation of resources toward more competitive areas. A smooth operation of both the labor market and the capital market is essential for this. 23.

I wish you continued success as we build together on our strong foundations. With this, I wish all participants at this conference a fruitful exchange of ideas and discussion. BIS Review 38/2007  3
The preparatory work for the Act states that the reason for the restriction is that trading in these securities involves a significantly greater financial risk than changes in policy rates and purchases of government securities. Given this, it might be easier for the Riksbank to justify sales than purchases. 47 The fact that the premiums have fallen on government bonds this year is hardly explained by the Riksbank's purchases. Our purchases have been small, at the same time as bonds have matured. Our nominal holding of government bonds has therefore decreased from SEK 383 billion at the beginning of the year to SEK 338 billion at the end of November. 25 [30]  However, it must be borne in mind that the effects of the asset purchases vary according to a number of circumstances. It is easy to understand that buying assets can have a major impact when markets are malfunctioning. It is almost as simple to realise that asset purchases can play a more important role in countries where long interest-rate fixation periods are common, and perhaps also in economies where many companies finance themselves in bond markets. It also matters what assets the central bank buys. Are they government bonds with a similar risk profile to central bank money? Or are they high-risk private assets? The value of asset purchases also needs to be set against financial risks and the ability of the central bank to handle losses.

In view of our unique location as the gateway to Indochina, with a population of about 160 million, we have the strength of a potentially much bigger market. Within ASEAN, there is greater progress on the ASEAN blueprint, which lays out the strategic plan to achieve further trade and financial integration within 2015. In fact, with the AEC blueprint, we and the entire region stand to gain more from further trade and financial integration. Soon, Thailand will also be an integral part of the ASEAN Community under the new ASEAN Charter. Indeed, while we continue to wait for the resolution of WTO negotiations, Thailand and ASEAN have made progress on a number of free trade arrangements with Japan, China, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope that I have left you with some food for thought for the two days that you will hear directly from eminent experts of various fields. As a veteran central banker, I believe that over-optimism is just as dangerous as complacency in policy-making. Therefore, in today’s world of uncertainties and volatilities, vigilance and caution are crucial elements because the road ahead is likely to be a rocky one. But this should not prevent us from having a pleasant journey toward the more prosperous future for the Thai economy. The central bank is the only institution that has the legal responsibilities to preserve monetary and financial institution stability.
The focus of this section is on how innovation in financial instruments extends the choice of risk management products available to companies and households, moving us closer towards a vision of liquid markets in state contingent securities. But it must also be borne in mind that imperfections within financial markets will affect the performance of these innovative financial products, that may in turn limit their availability. Such frictions may thus impact on the ability of the financial system to support corporate and household risk management. That is covered in section 4. 7 As an illustration of the potential benefits of innovation in contract design and broadening choice, consider the market for corporate credit risk. In previous decades, the only securities available to investors wishing to invest in corporate debt were corporate bonds. One might call such assets “natural assets” as the same instrument that is issued by the borrower is also that held by the investor. In this example, the role of the financial system is simply to facilitate the intermediation between end borrowers and end investors, and, in some cases, to provide a secondary market in the asset, intermediating between alternate end investors. There is no transformation of the asset. 8 Financial engineering can, however, decompose the returns on a corporate bond into different fundamental components or “atoms” of risk: •  For example, credit default swaps can be used to separate the return on a corporate bond into the compensation for default risk and the compensation earned on a riskfree security.

Extending the above example, single-name credit default swaps have been pooled together into standardised indices. That creates a synthetic market in generalised corporate credit risk, enabling investors wishing to hedge or establish a new position linked to macro-economic risk to do so. And there are many parallels such as products tracking equity indices or commodity prices or emerging market debt to name but a few. 10 The value of standardised indices to financial intermediaries can be illustrated by considering a credit default swap dealer, who may find at the end of a day’s trading that they have been a net seller of default protection on several dozen corporates. The dealer could hedge such a position by buying protection on the standardised indices. The hedge would of course not be perfect as in all likelihood the firms in the standardised indices would not be an exact match to those whom the dealer had sold protection. But because indices are relatively liquid and thus cheaper to trade, the dealer may decide that the resulting saving in transaction costs may outweigh the residual “basis” risk that results from the hedge being imperfect. And through competition, the benefit would tend to be shared by corporate borrowers and investors in corporate credit risk. 11 Taking the example further, investors who wish to take exposure to generalised corporate credit risk but who wish to limit their potential losses can do so through trading options contracts on the standardised indices.
José De Gregorio: Monetary policy and commodity prices in turbulent times Keynote address by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the 2008 Annual Meeting of Latin American Chief Executives of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), hosted by Corpbanca, Santiago, 2 April 2008. I am very grateful to Igal Magendzo for his great contribution during the preparation of these notes. *  *  *  The global economy is in turmoil. In this scenario, monetary policies around the world face strong challenges. Sailing through quiet waters has been pleasant. As we know, the stable and prosperous performance of the world economy in recent years has partly been the result of sound monetary policies. Now, during difficult times, monetary policy should contribute to make the adjustment less costly and lay the foundations for a sound, persistent recovery. Macroeconomic management in emerging market economies have improved significantly in the past several years, owing part of this to the large increase in commodity prices, but also to fiscal consolidation and the commitment to price stability. This has increased the resilience of emerging economies to global economic turbulences. In this presentation I will address three issues. First, the troublesome inflationary effects of the high commodity prices cycle we have experienced. Then, I will argue that, in this juncture, reinforcing the commitment to control inflation and reverse deviations from the target is a first order task.

Economic distortion and instability – Criminal money responds not to economic or financial signals but to opportunities for further crime and the threat of being caught. Therefore money launderers will not generally invest funds in activities that are economically beneficial to the country. iv. Loss of revenue – Money laundering makes governments’ tax collection efforts difficult and diminishes tax revenues. v.  Reputation risk – In today’s global economy, nations can not afford to have their reputations eroded by association with money laundering. Legitimate businesses will not want to deal with a bank or financial institution suspected to handle criminal funds. vi. Undermines the financial sector – The unchecked use of the financial system by criminal organisations risks undermining individual institutions and ultimately entire financial systems. When banks or financial institutions become part of a criminal network, they lay themselves open to loss from fraud if they do not screen out undesirable customers or if their own officers are compromised. In the face of the above economic, financial and political threats, the international financial community has recognised that public confidence in such institutions, and hence their stability, could be undermined if they became associated, even inadvertently, with criminals. In order to prevent the escalation of money laundering, the following measures have been undertaken: i. The Government has enacted the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering (PPML) Act 2001 which has criminalized money laundering and provides for the forfeiture of property by offenders;  ii.
And bearing in mind that monetary policy resources are not inexhaustible, I think it is good to be able to make use of this scope if it can thereby help to avoid major costs to the economy. If it were to take longer to reach the target, it does not mean we would give it up I made the point earlier that it is very important how monetary policy is communicated. Before I go on, allow me to discuss a hypothetical case that makes it particularly clear how central this point is. It is no secret that very low real interest rates have reduced the scope for managing cyclical fluctuations with the help of monetary policy. In a speech three years ago, I said it could not be ruled out that we might at some stage reach a point at which we consider it no longer desirable to make monetary policy more expansionary. 8 If we were to find ourselves in such a situation – and I say if – we may as a consequence have to accept that it takes longer than it normally does to attain the inflation target. The advantages I just described of an inflation target of 2 per cent would of course still apply and we would continue to do our best to attain the target. The difference would be that we open up for the possibility that it could take longer than we normally expect, and we accept this without making monetary policy more expansionary.

We expect all insurers to have cybersecurity practices and controls that are aligned with our Technology Risk guidance and requirements. It is equally important for firms to have in place good cyber hygiene standards, and ensure that such good practices not just feature prominently in your IT systems and policies, but are also embedded in day-to-day work processes. More broadly, how will MAS, as a regulator, partner the industry in this transformation journey? Let me first set out a few principles that guide our approach: Firstly, MAS is technology-neutral and will not seek to favour one technology over another. Secondly, we take on a more principles-based approach where the focus is on outcomes – 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  whether a new business model or adopted technology will threaten financial institutions’ safety and soundness, or the fairness in their dealings with the public. Thirdly, we believe that regulations should support and not stifle innovation. Innovations by their inherent nature will move ahead of rules. What we want to guard against is regulatory arbitrage camouflaged by a supposed innovative business model. Another consideration is whether a new business model or adopted technology will create inconsistency and incoherence with our existing rules. It follows that as a regulator, MAS will need to: First, keep abreast with technological developments by engaging closely with the industry to exchange views and garner fresh insights. Second, assess and adopt our regulatory response based on careful review.
These countries have imported low interest rates and experienced rapidly rising house prices and debt (Chart 14). They have introduced measures to limit household debt in order to prevent imbalances from building up further. In Norway, stricter mortgage lending requirements have been imposed on banks. These measures have probably contributed to the recent correction in Norwegian house prices. 1)  Chart 14 Nominal house prices. Index. 2005 = 100 220 200  220  Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden Norway US, euro area and Japan  200  180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80 2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  80 2017  1) Latest available quarterly data for 2017 are used as estimate for 2017 (broken lines). Series is GDP−weighted. Sources: Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Real Estate Norway, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank  The exchange rate places a limit on how far Norwegian interest rates can deviate from foreign rates. But with a floating exchange rate, monetary policy can help to stabilise the economy when it is exposed to shocks. In addition, the krone exchange rate acts as 13  an important shock absorber, as we last witnessed when oil prices fell in 2014. With confidence in the inflation target, monetary policy has been able to underpin a weaker krone.

Real prices for office premises in central locations (index 1981=100) 500  450  400  350  300  250  200  150  100  50  Stockholm  Göteborg  c05 de  03 c-  de  c04  02 cde  de  c01  c00 de  de  98  c99 de  97  cde  de  c-  96 cde  c95  c94 de  de  92  c93 de  cde  de  c-  91  90  c89  cde  c88 de  de  86  c87  c-  de  c-  85 de  de  c84 de  c83 de  c81 de  de  c82  0  Malmö  Sources: NewSec AB and the Riksbank  6  BIS Review 105/2006  3.