samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I already said, we have the whole day to discuss these tricky issues thanks to our speakers who are not only prominent but also open and humble; I noticed and appreciated these qualities in their recent speeches exploring the new territory we are in. Instead, let me conclude on the limits of the scope for action by CBs. Indeed, I prefer to stress that central banks cannot be the only game in town and, more precisely, that monetary and macro-prudential policies are not conducted in a vacuum. Structural problems require structural answers; in particular, only structural reforms can raise potential growth; aggregate demand policies cannot provide a substitute. What they can do –and it’s precious— is to help better manage time. Speaking of managing time, I think mine is up now and I shall give the floor to Christian who can give us all the benefit of his experience and wisdom. Short bibliography: R. Baldwin, C. Teulings, 2014: Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, CEPR Press; in particular, Chapter 8 by O. Blanchard et al., Chapter 9 by R. Caballero and E. Farhi, Chapter 11 by R. Koo. BIS Annual Report, 2014: “Debt and Financial Cycle” (Chapter IV). O. Blanchard, E. Cerutti and L. Summers, 2015:“Inflation and Activity – Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications”, IMF Working Paper No 15/230.

The relations and cooperation of the CBRT in the international scene go well beyond our bilateral dialogue with your esteemed Bank and cover also the financial level (swap agreements signed with certain countries), as well as the educational level (the establishment of an international central banking research facility and regional training centre, the İstanbul School of Central Banking). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I would like to thank the Bundesbank for opening a Representative Office in İstanbul, for signing the MoU agreement and for all the support and assistance you have provided us in diverse fields and at various platforms. Closing my remarks, I would like to welcome my friend and colleague, Dr. Andreas Dombret, a member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and thank him for his tremendous efforts in bringing this project to life. Now let us celebrate our achievements. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
However, it is also in the big banks’ own interest to hold sufficient loss-absorbing capital, as a high level of resilience strengthens their competitiveness in the core business of wealth management, and boosts market confidence. Situation at domestically focused commercial banks I would now like to turn to our assessment of domestically focused commercial banks. There are clear and growing signs of a build-up of imbalances on the Swiss mortgage and real estate markets. Over the past 12 months, mortgage lending volumes and real estate prices have once again grown strongly. Thus, the mortgage-to-GDP ratio, which was already high in a historical comparison, continued to increase. At the same time, residential real estate prices have reached levels that, in some cases, exceed those that can be justified by fundamental factors, such as demographics or per capita income. Taking the national average, this is the case for prices of owner-occupied apartments. In some regions such as Lake Geneva, Lake Zurich and Lake Zug, this is the case, on average, for all segments of the residential property market. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Under the baseline scenario, the momentum in the mortgage and real estate markets continues. It is therefore to be expected that imbalances will continue to build up, and that, consequently, the risk of an abrupt correction of these imbalances will increase over the medium term. For domestically focused commercial banks, average capitalisation relative to regulatory requirements is at a historically high level.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: The Swiss National Bank’s 2012 Financial Stability Report Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 14 June 2012. *  *  *  Introductory remarks by Jean-Pierre Danthine I, too, would like to welcome you to this news conference, which for me is also the occasion to present the 2012 edition of the Swiss National Bank’s Financial Stability Report. The report contains the SNB’s assessment of the risks to the stability of the Swiss banking system, and of the need for action. This promotes risk awareness among Swiss banking sector agents, thereby contributing to financial stability. Introduction Economic and financial conditions for the Swiss banking sector have deteriorated since the last Financial Stability Report. The sovereign debt crisis escalated, threatening to spill over from peripheral euro area countries to the core countries of the euro area. In addition, global economic growth lost momentum and tensions grew in the international banking system. There was, likewise, no easing of tension on the Swiss mortgage and real estate markets. The momentum observed in real estate prices and mortgages continued. As my colleague, Thomas Jordan, has already mentioned, under its baseline scenario the SNB expects a gradual improvement in economic and financial conditions over the next 12 months. Although this is considered to be the most likely scenario, the risk of a renewed deterioration in the environment remains high.
Lee Hsien Loong: Post crisis Asia - the way forward  William Taylor Memorial Lecture by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, before the Eleventh International Conference of Banking Supervisors, held in Basel, 20-21 September 2000. *  *  *  Introduction Three years have passed since the Asian crisis struck in 1997. The crisis showed how unstable the international financial system could be, and how vulnerable apparently strong Asian economies were to a sudden shock. It has caused a searching reappraisal of the benefits and risks of globalisation, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the Asian economies. I propose to discuss how attitudes towards globalisation have shifted, and what challenges Asian economies face in remedying the weaknesses uncovered. When Mr Paul Volcker, Chairman of the G30, invited me to deliver the William Taylor Lecture to this distinguished gathering of banking supervisors, he asked me to share Singapore’s experience in dealing with the financial turbulence. I will also explain how we are reforming and liberalising our financial sector, to benefit from globalisation while protecting ourselves against mishaps. Not all the lessons Singapore has drawn will apply to other economies because of differing circumstances. But I hope Singapore’s case will illustrate the importance of basing financial reforms on a realistic appreciation of the risks and difficulties. In analysing the Asian crisis, and in describing the Singapore experience, I will be underlining the importance of sound banking systems and strong supervisory oversight.

Therefore we moved last year to open up the Singapore market further to foreign banks. We hoped that this would spur efficiency and innovation among the local banks, and push well-run banks to seek scale and expand at home and abroad. We were convinced that unless we opened up, this transformation would never take place. There is no substitute for real competition. We did not want the liberalisation to weaken our banks and destabilise the financial system. So we are not taking a big bang, laissez faire approach. Instead, we are phasing the liberalisation over five years, and opening the market to financially strong, committed foreign players. At the same time, we are motivating the local banks to strengthen themselves. We have raised disclosure standards to international norms, and we now require banks to publish details of their nonperforming loans and inner reserves, which were previously closely guarded secrets. We are also raising corporate governance standards, which lie at the heart of the improvements required in Asian banking systems. We instituted nominating committees on bank boards, comprising a majority of independent directors. Their remit is to ensure that persons appointed to the boards and  BIS Review 76/2000  8  to key executive positions are selected for their expertise, and their ability to contribute to the bank and to the interest of all shareholders. Most important of all, we are requiring the banking groups to make a clear separation between their financial and non-financial businesses.
In any case, I would like to stress that, from my perspective as a supervisor, Pillar 1 should remain risk-based and that we should move beyond the somewhat artificial opposition between green and brown exposures, by assessing transition risk more on the basis of transition plans. As regards the digitalisation of finance, in addition to contributing to the development of regulations such as DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act) and MiCA (Markets in cryptoassets), which aim to facilitate the development of innovations in a framework that improves confidence and financial stability, we can, as a central bank, play a positive role from an operational point of view by reviewing our offer of monetary services. In this perspective, the Banque de France has successfully conducted nine experiments with central bank digital money (CBDM) for the purpose of interbank settlement, securities transactions and cross-border payments over the past two years. They will continue in 2022 in two major areas: -  The first area concerns the settlement in central bank money of securities issued on new distributed ledger platforms, which will be governed by the pilot scheme from 2023. New technologies offer opportunities to facilitate the trading of financial securities and improve the functioning of markets. However, central banks are careful to ensure that they do not lead to market and liquidity fragmentation. Following the example of what has been done for TARGET2-Securities, the Eurosystem could therefore adjust the means of access to its settlement asset to secure trading of tokenised assets.

Subsequent to the float, the Central Bank became a net buyer of foreign exchange from the market, in sharp contrast to its experience in the period prior to that. Our objective with regard to the foreign exchange market is to ensure an orderly adjustment of the exchange rate, without excessive volatility. Such adjustment should reflect the emerging economic fundamentals of the country. We should ensure that demand and supply mismatches are addressed on time so that there is no excessive volatility in the exchange rate. Turning to the theme of this year’s conference, i.e. “Is it time for a common currency in the SAARC region?”, I believe that it would give rise to much interesting and thought provoking discussion and debate. We know that the SAARC was established in 1985, with the objective to provide a platform for the peoples of South Asia to work together in a spirit of solidarity, trust and understanding. It aims at accelerating the process of economic and social development of member countries. I believe the considerations of the timeliness to introduce a common currency for the region will be supportive towards the objectives and aims of SAARC as well. While taking note that deliberations such as these would definitely lay the foundation for future developments in the SAARC region, I take great pleasure in inaugurating this conference today and wish you all success with the conference.
Policy Moreover, the policy implications of Shleifer’s paper are arguably rather different from those stemming from theories that attribute the crisis solely to bankers acting rationally in response to the private incentives created by remuneration packages and the problem of Too Big To Fail. In that sense, Shleifer’s model formalises the argument of Charles Goodhart and others that bankers badly misjudged the risks rather than consciously ran the system towards the edge of the cliff. One policy implication of myopia is that, as Shleifer himself says, we need to attend to risks beyond banking – in shadow banking etc. I spoke about that around this time last year.6 We need policies on firms and funds that perform similar economic functions to banking, such as money funds; as Shleifer says, the constant-net-asset-value basis of most money funds encourages a belief that they are riskless, and yet in fact they are not insured and carry no capital. We also need policies on markets that deliver maturity transformation and leverage. This crisis happened partly because the authorities did not keep up with developments in capital markets. I shall not revisit that in detail this evening, other than to say that the Bank is glad that its new Financial Policy Committee will have a responsibility for advising HMG when to move the perimeter of microprudential supervision and a power to make Recommendations to the securities regulator on rules governing funds and markets where they are material to stability.

But before coming to the associated international policy debates about the biggest and most complex firms, I want to go back to incentives. Because whatever the merits of the riskmyopia argument I have been reviewing, we absolutely must not build a system that relies on dismissing the incentives argument. While I doubt that many bankers deliberately – that is to say, consciously – took outsized risks that crashed the system because they believed they would be bailed out, I do believe that their behaviour will have been profoundly affected by their cost of debt being too low because asset managers believed they would not lose money. Asset managers held beliefs about the policy world that fatally diluted their incentive, as creditors, to monitor and discipline banks (this is the Too Big To Fail problem). That brings me to the policy debate on resolution. Those of us promoting enhanced resolution regimes, who include Adair by the way, do so for two reasons. First, no one can guarantee that losses will not exceed equity cushions in the future and when that happens if the losses do not fall on bondholders – via resolution or the much more disruptive liquidation – they will end up falling on taxpayers. And second, exposing bondholders to risk has the potential to harness market discipline – or, as I have put it, to bring capitalism back into the heart of capitalism.
Jaime Caruana: Overview of Basel II and its reflections on financial stability Speech by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the International Conference on Financial Stability and Implications of Basel II, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Istanbul, 16 May 2005. *  *  *  Introduction and Overview Thank you, Governor Serdengeçti, for your kind words of introduction and your opening remarks on what promises to be a timely and interesting conference. I am honoured to have the opportunity to share with you some thoughts on two related topics that are near and dear: financial stability and the Basel II capital framework. As I will be discussing this morning, the financial sector and banking supervisors are in the midst of a period of great change. Change and growth must be second nature to this great city on the Bosphorus, where the remains of the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman Empires reside within a modern, forward-looking city. Istanbul has thrived over the centuries in the face of constant evolution, and today serves as a bridge between Europe and Asia, east and west, ancient and modern. Of course, the challenges of Basel II cannot truly compare to the development of a city with almost 3,000 years of history, but certainly Istanbul seems to me a very appropriate place in which to discuss the role of banking supervisors in a rapidly changing world. My talk this morning will address several issues.

One of the fundamental tenets of risk management is that banks need to create provisions to absorb expected losses and to have sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. Accordingly, capital and provisions are an essential part of any supervisory framework. I believe Basel II reinforces the need to implement sound policies in both areas. In this respect, it is important to analyse provisions and capital over at least one complete economic cycle. Moreover, a range of potential future scenarios, with an emphasis on stress scenarios, should be considered, taking into account past experience and current conditions. Indeed, Basel II requires banks adopting the more advanced approaches to credit risk to apply a forward-looking approach to credit risk management by meaningfully stress testing their credit portfolios. Gaining room for manoeuvre and shoring up finances during good times in the business cycle is not only prudent policy, but is also consistent with sound risk management. Many would say that risks increase during bad times, but I believe this is only partly true. In my view, the exposures of banks, and therefore their risks, actually increase during economic upturns. These risks may not materialise until times of difficulty, but the seeds are generally planted during good times. In sum, when designing their capital and provisioning strategies, managers should have the aim of strengthening banks during good times and should remember that the imbalances that foster financial instability usually build up during the best parts of the economic cycle.
“Carbon Dated: Multinational companies planning to cut suppliers by 2025 for failing to curb carbon emissions”. 5 Source: MITI (April 2021). “Investment Policy Reforms to be rooted in the National Investment Aspirations (NIA)”,  Media Release and MIDA (May, 2021). “Malaysia is shifting gears: National Investment Aspirations (NIA). eNewsletter. 6 Source: Musnad Ahmad, ar-Risalah issuance, page number: 502/ 28, hadith number 17265. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

The euro is now used worldwide, with around 15 billion notes in circulation worth over 900 billion euros in all. That’s broadly comparable to the total value of the US dollar bills, no mean feat in just 12 years. Today is also a chance to highlight the importance of maintaining people’s trust in the euro. One of the main reasons for introducing a new series of notes is to ensure that everyone who uses them can continue to do so with complete confidence. That’s why we have drawn on a number of new technologies to modernise the security features, making the notes even more resistant to counterfeiting. In addition, the new banknotes have an innovative coating that makes them more durable than the first series. The five euro and ten euro notes are not always treated kindly. By protecting them better, we can prolong their service life and reduce their environmental impact. The new ten is the second note in the Europa series and follows the new five, which started circulating in May last year. As I’m sure you’ll agree, the note you’re going to see is instantly recognisable as a ten. It certainly resembles the ten euro notes you have in your pockets, with its distinctive Romanesque architecture. However, perhaps it will have more of a visual impact, as the images are larger and more defined, the colours are stronger and the bridge has added depth.
Mr Carse: The importance of corporate governance in banks  Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at The Year 2000 Millennium Dinner of The Association of International Accountants - Hong Kong Branch, Hong Kong Bankers Club, Hong Kong, on 17 March 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here this evening to speak to the Association on the subject of corporate governance in banks. I have chosen this as my theme both because it is highly topical for reasons that I will explain later and because it should be of particular interest to this audience. The Association plays an important role in the training and promotion of the accounting profession; and accountants are a vital component in corporate governance not simply in their specific role as auditors but also as a source of highly trained directors and managers. I will begin by giving you a brief situation report on the banking sector because this is relevant to the governance issue. Clearly, the situation is looking a lot better than it has done for the last two years. As the 1999 results released so far have shown, the performance of individual banks is by no means uniform. Some have done a lot better than others, depending on such factors as the mix of their business and where they are in the provisioning cycle.

While there are no indications that banks in Hong Kong are abusing the rules on connected lending, there seems to be uncertainty among some banks as to how the rules work. We have therefore recommended that the board should ensure that the bank fully understands its legal obligations under the Banking Ordinance and establishes a detailed policy on connected lending. •  Third, the board should ensure that it receives the management letter from the external auditor without delay together with the comments of management. We have specified that the management letter should normally be received within four months from the year-end. Of course, this is not something that is totally within the control of the bank. I would therefore put in a plea to any bank auditors in the audience to submit the management letter without delay. •  Fourth, the board should maintain an appropriate level of checks and balances against the influence of management and/or the shareholder controllers in order to ensure that decisions are taken with the bank’s best interests in mind. The key issue here is the number of independent non-executive directors there should be on the board of banks. We recommend a minimum of three to ensure that there is a sufficient pool of independent directors to sit on the various committees of the board and to cover absences. •  Fifth, the board should establish an audit committee with written terms of reference specifying its authorities and duties.