samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
SOFR is sometimes criticized for the lack of a term rate, but my message is don’t wait for a term rate to get your house in order. Don’t use that as an excuse to halt the vital work of understanding where your exposure to LIBOR lies and how to prepare your business. The OSSG has produced a document explaining how market participants can use overnight risk-free rates, as opposed to waiting for term rates.15 In addition, the New York Fed is preparing average SOFR rates and a SOFR index, with the goal of publishing them daily by the middle of next year. Contracts that reference U.S. dollar LIBOR continue to be written, which only serves to increase the level of systemic risk. In rare cases where for some reason LIBOR must be referenced, robust fallback language that accounts for a future without LIBOR needs to be included. I also strongly encourage market participants to address legacy LIBOR-linked contracts. There’s no one-size-fits-all approach for closing out or converting existing LIBOR positions so market participants need to get ahead of this issue. We know this is difficult and complex work. At the New York Fed, we’re working to identify where we have potential exposure to LIBOR and other non-IOSCO-compliant reference rates. We have teams examining monetary policy operations, foreign reserve management activities, and trading agreements with counterparties. We want to hear your voice so we can incorporate your feedback and facilitate the development of the tools you need to ensure an orderly transition.

For the euro area term premia, the breakdown is based on an affine term structure model fitted to the euro area OIS curve using the method described in Joslin, S., K. Singleton and H. Zhu (2011), “A New Perspective on Gaussian Dynamic Term Structure Models”, Review of Financial Studies, 24, pp. 926-970. 8 The evidence presented here seems at odds with the predictions made in Galí, J. (2017), “Forward Guidance 10 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  and the Exchange Rate”, mimeo. 9 This happened despite US medium-term inflation expectations as well as crude oil prices moving mostly  sideward during this period, with a stable world economic outlook as depicted by the IMF. 10 Many market commentaries also considered that the speech by ECB President Mario Draghi in August 2014 in  Jackson Hole provided signals that the ECB was considering purchases of sovereign bonds in response to a destabilisation of medium-term inflation expectations. See Draghi, M. (2014), “Unemployment in the euro area”, speech at the annual central bank symposium in Jackson Hole, 22 August. 11 For more details about the methodology, see Diebold, F.X. and K. Yilmaz (2012), “Better to Give than to Receive:  Predictive Directional Measurement of Volatility Spillovers”, International Journal of Forecasting, 28, pp. 57-66. 12 See Sims, C. (2003), “Implications of Rational Inattention”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (3), pp. 665–90. The ability of the foreign exchange markets to process all relevant information has been subject to close scrutiny, see e.g. Froot, K.A.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to conclude by saying that the Bank of Thailand fully welcomes and supports healthy competition that will lead to efficiency and sustainable growth in the retail banking industry, which will certainly benefit the consumers at large. Our challenge as supervisor is to provide an appropriately balanced prudential framework that, on the one hand, fosters sound risk management practices on the part of both service providers and consumers, and on the other hand, does not stifle competition and innovation in the industry. And as the central bank, we will continue to be vigilant on any incipient financial imbalances, and take timely action to deal with them should they become potential threats to financial stability and the broader macro-economy. Thank you very much for your attention. I wish the convention every success and that you all have fruitful discussions over the next two days. BIS Review 64/2008  3

In particular, the rapid surge in prices over the last year, has been brought under control and inflation has been declining in recent months, through easing the pressures on household' budgets and reducing uncertainties for enterprises. At the same time, the banking sector appears sound, indicators on the stability of both public and external debt have been improving, the financial environment is calm, and enterprises and households' balance sheets remain solid. These achievements are not a result of chance. They reflect, among other things, adequate and coordinated monetary, financial and fiscal policies and the results of continuous structural reforms which we have undertaken in the financial sector. The proportional and timely reaction of these policies has minimised the immediate consequences of shocks and has safeguarded the production capacity of Albania. In parallel, continuous structural reforms have strengthened the flexibility and resilience of the Albanian economy, by helping both the monetary and financial stability of Albania. 1/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In my remarks today, I will provide an overview on the main directions of the Bank of Albania's work throughout 2022 and its results. I would then like to share a brief summary of our expectations and highlight some of our primary objectives for 2023. ***  1. The outlook for the economy, price stability and the Bank of Albania's monetary policy The global geopolitical and economic environment experienced upheaval in a radical and unexpected manner at the outset of 2022, due to the Russian unjustified invasion of Ukraine.
It should be made clear, in particular, that, whatever the new tasks and functions of central banks, price stability should remain the primary objective of monetary policy. As I said, this may not be a sufficient condition to ensure financial stability. But it is certainly a necessary one. Looking at recent events, the credibility of central banks has enormously helped to contain financial instability and its effects, both directly and indirectly. Directly, because their credibility has allowed central banks to act forcefully in the knowledge that they could do so without “disanchoring” inflation expectations. And indirectly, because, with expectations firmly anchored, the risk of a deflationary spiral has been considerably reduced. Indeed, even when instant inflation turned negative in many countries for several months in a row, long-term inflation expectations remained remarkably stable. To maintain and preserve this necessary clarity, we are fortunate, in the Eurosystem, in having an appropriate and efficient framework. The Treaty specifies that the primary objective of monetary policy should be to achieve price stability; and that other goals can only be pursued without prejudice to this primary objective. The financial stability function fits naturally into this hierarchy. It cannot be pursued at the expense of the main objective. As you know, our approach to monetary policy making is organized around two “pillars”, with one specifically focused on monetary and credit aggregates. We have mainly used this second pillar to detect potential long-term risks to price stability.

Indeed, in many countries, it is envisaged to make the central bank the “systemic supervisor” or, at least, a central pillar in the macro-supervisory architecture. 3. A key question, however, is how this new financial stability function would interact with monetary policy. In theory, things are simple. Central banks would have several tools available for different objectives. One set of tools (interest rates, international  2  BIS Review 147/2009  reserves) would, as now, be used to fulfil the price stability mandate. On the other hand, macro-prudential tools would support and foster financial stability. In such an ideal “Tinberghen” world, each instrument would be precisely assigned to a single objective. Things may be more complex in the real world because these instruments are not independent. For instance, changes in capital requirements will affect credit growth and the transmission channel of monetary policy. Conversely, as I said, levels of or movements in monetary policy rates may increase or decrease the level of risk inside the financial system, hence its vulnerability to shocks. Finally, there may be circumstances in which the objectives of price and financial stability may not be fully compatible. 4. When instruments overlap and the objectives possibly conflict with each other, the potential for confusion is real and significant. To avoid any damage to central banks' credibility and ability to fulfil their mandate, it is essential that a clear and transparent framework should be in place.
An appreciation of the Swiss franc would have caused an inappropriate tightening in monetary conditions, which in turn would have compromised price stability and had serious consequences for the economy. We therefore firmly believe that, given the circumstances, there was no alternative to the minimum exchange rate. Inflation remained in negative territory in 2012. From mid-year, however, the negative inflation rates trended closer to zero. Our most recent inflation forecast also shows that there is neither a threat of inflation nor a threat of deflation in the foreseeable future. In 2012, the Swiss economy did not escape entirely unscathed from the global slowdown in growth, and lost momentum. Nevertheless, Switzerland’s GDP still grew on average by 1% for the year, as compared to 1.9% a year previously. The fact that price stability continued to be ensured in Switzerland and that our economy has held up relatively well in this difficult environment is, on the whole, largely attributable to the minimum exchange rate. Both the Swiss economy and the SNB are faced with challenges this year, too. There are some bright spots, however. According to economic indicators from the US and emerging economies, the recovery of the global economy has taken hold. With regard to the debt crisis, a number of measures taken at European level have helped ease the situation. In particular, the announcement by the European Central Bank that it would, under certain conditions, buy up unlimited quantities of sovereign bonds issued by indebted euro area countries contributed to easing tensions on the financial markets.

As Rabbie Burns wrote, “O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us To see oursels as others see us!”  1  BIS Review 111/1999  The real test of the MPC is whether it aims continuously to meet the inflation target. For that reason, the Monetary Policy Committee must be setting a policy for all seasons. Some of you may say that it is all very well to set a policy for all seasons, but what about a policy for all regions, or parts of the UK? Many critics disapproved of the recent increase in interest rates. Indeed, the Scottish Council Development and Industry (SCDI) itself described the decision as “disappointing”. It also described the rise as “premature”; we would describe it as pre-emptive: prompt action to head off inflationary pressures in the future and so lower the level at which interest rates might otherwise need to be set. The SCDI said that “Scottish business is regaining confidence after a tough period, but this announcement [of a rate rise] will dent that confidence”. Yes, it has been tough – indeed remains tough – for some industries, especially agriculture, tourism and parts of manufacturing. But there has not been an overall recession. GDP growth in the UK, over the previous twelve months, reached a trough of 1.3% in the first quarter of this year, and has been rising since then.
Moreover, tackling climate-related and environmental risks is one of the ECB's key supervisory priorities for 2023-25. Supervisors have set institution-specific remediation timelines for achieving full alignment with supervisory expectations by the end of 2024 and will follow up on the deficiencies identified in stress tests and thematic reviews performed in 2022. The investigation phase of the digital euro project is on track. In the autumn, we expect to decide on the next project phase, in which the appropriate technical solutions and business arrangements necessary to provide a digital euro would be developed and tested. While a digital euro would focus first on the domestic retail payments market in Europe, we are already discussing at the international level the potential of crosscurrency and cross-border payments made in retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). There is agreement that CBDC should eventually contribute to improving cross-border payments. As global work on CBDC accelerates, international cooperation in this field will become even more important. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

The General Court in Luxembourg held in its judgment in 20154 that it would be for the ECB to request the EU legislature to amend Article 22, should the ECB consider that having the power to regulate CCPs is necessary for the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaties. In particular, revising Article 22 is a necessary step for us to carry out the tasks foreseen under EMIR II. Considering the risks the ECB faces with regard to the implementation and transmission of its monetary policy, it is imperative that it be equipped with the necessary tools vis-à-vis CCPs, particularly in a crisis situation. I want to make clear that such measures would aim to address risks in a limited number of areas which are crucial for the implementation of the single monetary policy and the smooth operation of payment systems, which ultimately affect our primary objective of maintaining price stability as mandated by the Treaties. Areas of particular relevance from this perspective are liquidity arrangements, settlement processes, collateral, margins and interoperability arrangements. Let me add that such measures would only be triggered in the event of a clear threat to the conduct of our monetary policy, and would in no way encroach upon the prerogatives of CCP supervisors or the frameworks established by EU legislators. The ECB will act only within its competence, which is to formulate and implement the monetary policy of the euro area.
In those areas where decisions have already been taken by the international community, implementation is now key. The G20 yesterday committed to full implementation of Basel III along the agreed timelines. The EU has already started this process early with the European Commission putting its proposals on the table for the so-called Capital Requirements Directive IV, which will translate Basel III into the legal framework of the EU Member States. In terms of macro-prudential framework, the European Systemic Risk Board has started its operation this year. All jurisdictions must ensure timely implementation so that we can ensure that we have done everything to make a difference as regards the resilience of the global, regional and national financial systems. Let me briefly highlight three key areas on which we need to stay committed and where swift progress is of the essence. The first challenge may come from the shadow banking sector. The introduction of more stringent capital requirements may provide incentives for banks to shift part of their activities outside the regulatory realm. It is therefore decisive that we continue our work to improve our capacity to identify and assess the potential risks stemming from the shadow banking system. This includes regulatory reform of money market funds, securitisation and the interaction with the banking sector. The second challenge is how to keep pace with financial innovation.

Now, at the end of this exposition, it might be useful for me to tell you what is the assessment that the European Systemic Risk Board has expressed after its last meeting only two days ago:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Since its previous meeting on 22 June 2011, risks to the stability of the EU financial system have increased considerably. Key risks stem from potential further adverse feedback effects between sovereign risks, funding vulnerabilities with the EU banking sector, and a weakening growth outlook both at the global and the EU level. Over the past few months, sovereign stress had moved from smaller economies to some of the larger EU countries. Signs of stress are evident in many European government bond markets, while the high volatility in equity markets indicates that tensions have spread across capital markets around the world. The situation has been aggravated by the progressive drying-up of bank funding markets, and availability of US dollar funding to EU banks had also decreased significantly. In that context, central banks have decided on coordinated US dollar liquidity-providing operations with longer maturities. The high interconnectedness in the EU financial system has led to a rapidly rising risk of significant contagion. This is threatening financial stability in the EU as a whole and adversely impacts the real economy in Europe and beyond. Looking ahead, decisive and swift action is required from all authorities.
In addition to customer onboarding and account maintenance, Banking Made Easy would seek to facilitate the use of technology in the areas of online finance, online wealth management and robo advisers. (E)  Open API  The HKMA is currently consulting the banking industry to formulate a framework for facilitating the development of Open API. In the context of banks, Open API refers to a set of publicly available coding that enables recognised third-party service providers, with the consent of the customers 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  concerned where appropriate, to connect to, and conduct data exchange with, the IT systems of the banks. Open API can serve many purposes. For example, it may allow users of online discussion forums and social media platforms to obtain information about products and services of banks for comparison and analysis. Many lifestyle websites and mobile apps may make use of Open API to integrate banks’ foreign exchange and payment services to offer end-to-end holiday or health-care packages. A bank customer may benefit from Open API by using thirdparty applications to consolidate for analysis purposes his cash flow and investments kept in several bank accounts. However, the key benefits of Open API can be reaped only if it is widely adopted in the banking sector. And this is precisely the reason why some jurisdictions are taking steps to encourage or, in the case of the EU including the UK, even mandate through legislation financial institutions to subscribe to Open API.

The adoption of Open API has facilitated very rapid innovations that help provide personalised services and much better customer experience. Recognising these technological innovations and rising aspirations of customers for more personalised and integrated services, Hong Kong must proactively embrace the trend and seize the opportunity to upgrade our banking system. To prepare us to move to the new Smart Banking era, I am pleased to announce that the HKMA will take the lead and launch the following seven initiatives:  2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  full connectivity of digital retail payments through the Faster Payment System;  upgrading of our existing Fintech Supervisory Sandbox 1.0 to Version 2.0;  facilitating the introduction of virtual banking in Hong Kong; a new Banking Made Easy initiative to reduce regulatory frictions and improve customer experience; development of an Open API framework;  stepping up cross-border cooperation in fintech; and  enhancing research and talent development. I will now explain these seven initiatives in turn. (A)  Full Connectivity of Digital Retail Payments through Faster Payment System  The centerpiece of an efficient retail payment system will be our Faster Payment System (FPS), scheduled for implementation in September 2018. FPS will provide the necessary infrastructure for full person-to-person and person-to-business connectivity not only amongst retail customers but also between businesses and between banks and non-bank payment service providers.
One such loophole was the possibility for banks to provide shortterm guarantees without having to set aside regulatory capital. The new capital adequacy framework, Basel II, rectifies this situation. It is also important to encourage market discipline and counterparty surveillance, crucial elements to the well functioning of financial markets. Basel II is enhanced through the so-called Pillar III, which requires banks to publish information on key parameters of their business profile, risk exposure and risk management. The recent episodes have also reminded us of the importance of vigilance and competence in supervision. In general, the markets themselves are the best regulators as long as economic agents follow the advice of Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England: “Financial markets … can only work well if investors and firms expect to live or die by their own decisions and do not come to rely on a safety net to mitigate their losses.” 5 That is a good advice also with respect to safeguarding financial stability in a rapidly changing world. We might not be there quite yet. With reference to the banking industry, as Martin Wolf so eloquently put it in the Financial Times: “No industry has a comparable talent for privatising gains and socialising losses. Participants in no other industry get as self-righteously angry when public officials – particularly, central bankers – fail to come at once to their rescue when they get into (well-deserved) trouble.” 6 Nominal stability Let me now turn to challenges to nominal stability.

Still, while the labour market has proven surprisingly resilient to the repercussions of the doubledip recession, the perils of hysteresis – of real scars – remain: you can see on slide 6 that longterm unemployment as a share of total unemployment has increased from levels around 45% before the outbreak of the crisis to 50% today and has barely declined in recent years. In other words, one in every two of the more than 15 million currently unemployed face the risk of becoming increasingly detached from the labour market. Some of the long-term unemployed will be absorbed back into the labour force as the recovery continues, and some of the marginally attached will also rejoin. But expecting the economic cycle 5/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  to fully resolve these wider problems would be misguided. This is particularly worrisome for younger generations, for whom extended spells of unemployment at the start of their working lives may lead to lifelong “scarring” effects – including a higher propensity for further spells of unemployment, which are likely to constrain labour market choices and earnings throughout their working lives.12 In short, they risk becoming a “lost generation”. Concerns regarding labour market mismatches – effectively precluding the reabsorption of those displaced from some permanently downsized sectors – also remain. The euro area Beveridge curve – as you can see on the right-hand side of slide 6 – looks to have shifted outward during the crisis.