samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The growing importance of these funds to the UK and global economies demands that we keep up to ensure they can continue to serve the economy whatever challenges lay ahead. So we’ll report on our progress in our regular Financial Stability Reports. 14  See page 18 of the Record of the Financial Policy Committee Meeting on 3 October 2018. See speech by Mark Carney (June 2019) ‘Push, Pull, Pipes: Sustainable Capital Flows for a New World Order’. See report by the Financial Stability Board (2017): ‘Policy Recommendations to Address Structural Vulnerabilities from Asset Management Activities‘. 15 16  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  Opportunity  All this talk of stability may sound all a bit prudent and pessimistic. But it’s really not, because the pursuit of stability can unlock new opportunity. Look back to 2006. Banks were weak and prone to failure but there was no way to deal safely with them when they did. So markets assumed that banks which were important to the economy would be bailed out; that they were too big to fail. That meant those banks could take risks and finance themselves cheaply. The bigger and more important they became, the cheaper it became for them to take risks. There was every incentive to grow. So the system became concentrated. Concentrated in banks, which provided 60% of debt financing. And concentrated in a few big banks. Because the playing field was tilted, competition was driven out.

Fourth, a stronger and better system of FMI governance and oversight can help to ensure that those systems that support a global market are subject to consistent standards regardless of the jurisdiction where they operate. Relying solely on a patchwork of differing national standards in a global world would not work well. It would encourage business to migrate to the lowest standard. Without establishing a global floor, there would otherwise be a “race for the bottom.” These are the major reasons why CPSS and IOSCO took on the task of strengthening and broadening the standards for FMIs. There are two major goals of this effort. The first goal is to strengthen the current standards by: 1) raising the bar for existing standards such as for governance, credit risk, liquidity risk, collateral and margin requirements; 2) including requirements for new areas such as segregation and portability, general business risk, links, tiering and disclosure; and 3) extending coverage to include trade repositories. As proposed in the consultation document, the Principles will significantly strengthen existing requirements for an FMI’s governance and financial resources. One way the Principles do this is by requiring FMIs to take a more comprehensive and proactive view of the roles they play, the risks they face, and their potential to support the stability of the broader financial system.
These numbers, in themselves, are not cause for concern. Indeed, some would argue that emerging Asia’s investment on a per capita basis is not very high. The real question is whether these investments are going into the right places. Asia’s periodic bouts of asset market bubbles – especially in real estate – are a case in point. Michael Pettis of Beijing University, for instance, warns that Asia’s extraordinarily successful development model will eventually run into the constraints of “massive over-investment and misallocated capital”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  8. The key challenge that faces Asia therefore boils down to this: “how can Asia harness its sizeable domestic savings and large inflows of foreign capital to realise its economic potential?’ There are three things emerging Asia needs to do right. First, Asia needs to price capital correctly. Second, Asia needs to strengthen its infrastructure for allocating capital. Third, Asia needs to build up expertise in investing capital. Price capital correctly 9. Let me begin with the pricing of capital. History is replete with examples of how mispricing capital leads to serious misallocation of resources, which in turn leads to excessive risk-taking and a build-up of debt that eventually ends in a financial crisis. 10. Take Latin America in the 1970s. Global interest rates were low and capital sought higher returns in a booming region. International creditors lent huge sums for industrial development. External debt quadrupuled between 1975 and 1983, rising to 50% of the region’s GDP.

Why not have all EU countries commit themselves to establishing independent bodies with the responsibility of enhancing transparency by conducting independent forecasts of the countries’ deficits and providing recommendations on a regular basis? They would have only an advisory role and their authority would stem from impartiality and expertise. The subject of their recommendations would be the overall fiscal stance - neither the specifics nor indeed the political orientation of fiscal policy. The Excessive Deficit Protocol (EDP) states that member states shall ensure that national procedures in the budgetary area enable them to meet their obligations. It would therefore be in the spirit of the EDP to have EU countries commit themselves to establishing these kinds of bodies. At the very least, these independent bodies would be able to make more reliable and unbiased forecasts as a basis for EU recommendations. Such an arrangement would avoid having unreliable deficit figures before elections, only to “discover” the real state of accounts after the vote - such as has been the case in Portugal, France, Germany, and most spectacularly in Greece recently. By having a similar role as the Congressional Budget Office in the US, the bodies would ensure a reliable and unbiased “reality check” in times of fiscal profligacy.
William C Dudley: Securing the recovery and building for the future Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York, 17 November 2011. *  *  *  I am honored to have the opportunity to speak to you today in the hallowed halls of West Point. I do not need to tell anyone here of the long and distinguished tradition of this institution and the U.S. Army. I believe that the U.S. military is one of our nation’s greatest institutions and a living demonstration of the best of America. Your example of national service inspires us all to live up to our duty to do all we can to advance the national interest. I am the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, part of the Federal Reserve System that serves as our nation’s central bank. In this capacity I am also vice chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Federal Reserve committee that sets interest rates and makes other decisions about monetary policy. This committee sets policy to advance the mandate given to us by Congress: to promote maximum employment and price stability. In the support of these objectives I and my colleagues must also guard as best we can against threats to financial stability, because credit is the lifeblood of the economy.

Monetary Policy In 2000, in order to achieve the price stability as its primary objective, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia successfully implemented the monetary strategy of targeting the nominal exchange rate of the Denar against the Deutsche Mark. Hence, the Central Bank aimed the money supply at preserving the exchange rate stability as a nominal anchor in the economy. Thus, the stock of money supply was sized according to the needs for regular execution of financial transactions in the economy. It should be underlined that in the first half of 2000, the money supply registered considerably high annual growth rates, while in the second half of the year they slowed down, due to the high comparison base from the previous year. Thus, in June 2000, the money supply M2 - Denar component compared to the same month of the previous year, was by 24.4% higher, while in December 2000, compared to December 1999 was higher by 17.5%. At the end of December 2000, the broadest money supply aggregate M4 registered annual growth rate of 21.7%. Considerable challenge for the NBRM in 2000, was the high amount of foreign currency purchased by the Central Bank on the foreign exchange market, which exceeded the projections. Nevertheless, the close coordination between the monetary and fiscal policy and the high growth of the government deposits with the NBRM adequately sterilized the monetary effects of the Central Bank foreign exchange transactions.
Scenarios containing different assumptions regarding the repo rate and using a longer time horizon can also contribute to a clearer illustration of the considerations monetary policy has to take into account with regard to balancing inflation against real economic aspects. I have also discussed this. The primary advantage of supplementing the assumption of an unchanged repo rate with alternative interest rate paths and making longer-term forecasts is that it makes it easier to explain the monetary policy message. The simple policy rule – which involves interest rate decisions being based on inflation normally being returned to the target one to two years ahead – will continue to provide a good guide to our actions. The guidelines in the clarification from 1999 will thus continue to form the basis of our monetary policy. When the decisions need to take account of other information than that significant for inflation one to two years ahead, the new working method should make it easier to understand how this is done. Discussing an entire interest rate path can also create the conditions for a more balanced discussion of monetary policy. This can involve when we intend to change our monetary policy stance and how quickly we should proceed. What will happen if we wait a while before changing the interest rate? This type of consideration is probably more important than detailed discussions about tenths of a percentage point in a forecast. In conclusion, I have also mentioned the fundamental framework that governs monetary policy.

One consolation for those who wish for an answer is that they can form an opinion of how the Executive Board develops its view of monetary policy through the Inflation Reports, speeches and the minutes of the monetary policy meetings published. 1. Different measures of inflation Annual percentage change  6  6  5  5 CPI UND1X  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1 1993  -1 1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  8  BIS Review 11/2005  2. Repo rate decisions and inflation forecasts, 1999-2004 Per cent  0,50 IR01:1 IR02:3 IR03:4 IR04:2  Repo rate change  0,25  0,50 IR00:4 IR02:1  IR99:2 IR00:2 IR01:3 IR04:3 IR04:4  IR01:4  0,25 IR99:4  IR03:3  0,00  0,00  -0,25  IR99:3 IR00:1 IR00:3 IR01:2 IR02:2  IR99:1 IR02:4 IR03:1  IR03:2  -0,25  IR04:1  -0,50 -0,6  -0,50 -0,4  -0,2  0,0  0,2  0,4  0,6  Forecast deviation from inflation target  Source: The Riksbank  3.
As the information on the loan stock presented in the surveys is at the aggregate level, it is also not possible to analyse, for example, the distribution of debt ratios. In November 2013, the findings of a government inquiry, “Over-indebtedness in a credit society”, were published. The data in the inquiry was partly based on new information from the Swedish Enforcement Authority and from UC, a credit information agency. However, the data constituted only a cross-section of the households’ debts and thus did not enable an analysis of how debts had developed. All in all, this means that existing sources of data do not provide a complete picture of household debt, and that the discussion of the risks associated with household indebtedness has so far been based on limited material. The Riksbank’s credit data an important piece of the household-debt puzzle In order to be able to perform better analyses of household debt at the individual and household levels, the Riksbank therefore decided in the summer of 2013 to gather credit information on all of the borrowers of the eight largest banks. 6 This information covers all the  4  International studies have shown that a substantial build-up of debt can increase the probability of financial crises and of falls in housing prices, as well as exacerbating the effects if a crisis does occur. See, for example, Borio and Drehmann (2009), Schularich and Taylor (2012), and the IMF (2012).

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Riding out of the global financial crisis – banking reforms and revival Closing remarks by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 13th Malaysian Banking Summit 2009 "Riding Out of the Global Financial Crisis – Banking Reforms & Revival", Kuala Lumpur, 12 May 2009. *  *  *  On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia , I would like to thank ASLI for the opportunity to make the closing address for the 13 th Malaysian Banking Summit. Indeed the theme chosen is highly appropriate and timely as we are currently facing a period that is most challenging. The current global economic slowdown, as many are aware, has been compared to the Great Depression of the late 1920s. It began with the stock market crash in October 1929, otherwise known as “Black Tuesday”. As to whether the current global slowdown reach such proportions, it remains anyone's guess. But as events unfold and with lessons of hindsight gaining clarity, we have seen how institutions failed to fully understand or underestimated the complexity of products, and were unable to adequately measure tail risks as well, the procyclical impact of fair value accounting. While these may have merits in sharing the blame, others like the high levels of risk concentration and gearing together with the failure to manage maturity mismatches, are also equally apparent, if not fundamental, in contributing to the financial crisis. Comforting, however, is that none of our Malaysian institutions undertook complex derivative transactions.
Mr Bäckström asks the question “Is there a new economy?”  Speech given by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at a conference arranged by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and Veckans Affärer, held in Stockholm on 25 January 2000. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to attend this conference and discuss matters to do with the question “Is there a new economy?”. Besides considering that issue, I shall be looking at other factors that may affect economic developments in Sweden, together with their implications for the future construction of monetary policy. Monetary policy aims at promoting economic stability The Riksbank’s primary concern is, as we all know, the future path of inflation. But our deliberations about how to keep inflation at a low and stable level can equally well be described as the Riksbank’s endeavour, with the aid of the repo rate, to ensure that the economic trend in Sweden continues to be favourable. This is because in most situations the task assigned us by the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) - “to maintain price stability” - amounts to acting so that the development of production and employment in Sweden is as stable as possible. There have certainly been times when a tightening of Swedish monetary and fiscal policy has led to an economic downturn and increased unemployment.

However, it is still premature to assess the effect of these shocks on world economic growth. Significant data are not yet available on how economies have performed after the shock. In any event, the size of the possible effect will depend closely on how much the US economy is affected by the turbulence that has arisen there. The information available so far shows that the United States is more resilient to the residential investment crisis than originally envisaged, so the foreseeable effects seem limited. This diagnosis is consistent with the forecasts of international organisations which, while acknowledging a considerable heightening of uncertainty and downside risk, continue pointing to a scenario of ongoing world buoyancy. Realistically, however, if the United States went into recession, a significant  BIS Review 134/2007  1  change in the world economic scenario could take place, although the impact would in any event be cushioned by the continued buoyancy of the emerging economies, which have generally been little affected by the financial turbulence. The extent of the impact on global growth will also depend fundamentally on the force and duration of the shocks generated. In the past, in episodes such as that of 1998 sparked by the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management fund and by the Russian debt crisis, the financial turbulence barely influenced world economic buoyancy despite the dark predictions that accompanied it.
Page 3  To illustrate that, let me quote part of the then Governor Eddie George’s speech given at Mansion House in 1997, a month after the MPC came into being: “The technical implementation of monetary policy is not at all an exact science. It operates with long and unpredictable time lags so that we are necessarily continuously straining to peer into the future, relying substantially upon uncertain economic forecasts and carefully considered, but ultimately subjective judgements about the probabilities – and of risks – surrounding them. So I welcome the Chancellor’s detailed reformulation of our marching orders, which acknowledges the volatility of the real world.” Wise words, which are more relevant than ever today. In the same spirit, I want to spend the rest of my time tonight setting out the judgements we are having to make now, in a real world which is certainly volatile. But I will start with one statement that doesn’t change whatever the circumstances: our job is to hit the inflation target, and in the current circumstances to return inflation to target, always remembering the importance of understanding time lags in policy, and lags in the impact of economic shocks. Let me be quite clear, there are no ifs or buts in our commitment to the 2% inflation target. That’s our job, and that’s what we will do. When it comes to judgements we have to make, it is important to understand the disturbances hitting the economy and their significance for monetary policy.

We cannot accept this assault on democratic systems and values and on the security of the European continent. Economic prosperity is, and will continue to be, built on the foundations of democracy and security. These values are the bedrock of open economies and financial systems, and Russia has betrayed them. The Russian shock is now the largest contributor to UK inflation by some way. There is an economic cost to the war, and we all have to recognise that, but at the Bank it will not deflect us from setting monetary policy to bring inflation back to the 2% target. The last disturbance is a domestic one. The UK labour force has shrunk over the last two years, and this is contributing to inflationary pressure due to the difficulty of recruiting. It is important to understand exactly why the labour force has shrunk, why inactivity – those not working and not seeking to – has risen, and of course what we might expect to see in the future. Have more people retired than was expected, has long-term illness risen permanently, and how many people may return to the labour force and over what time? A one percentage point reduction in the labour force may not sound much, but with a working-age population of around 40 million it is a lot of people. With such numbers, the shrinkage in the labour market adds an inflationary impulse on top of energy and international goods prices.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Is climate change a big deal for the financial system? Speech by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at Bank Indonesia’s Annual International Seminar on “Macroeconomic Impact of Climate Change: Opportunities and Challenges”, Bali, 2 August 2008. *  *  *  Thank you Chairman, First, let me thank Bank Indonesia for the kind invitation. When I was asked whether I could speak on climate change and the financial system, I felt the suggestion was a challenging one, especially at this time when we need to build some momentum on this important issue. My topic today is “Is climate change a big deal for the financial system?”. Given the limitations of time, I want to focus my discussion on just two issues. The first, is why climate change is a big deal for the financial system, and the second, is to offer some thoughts on how to engage the financial system going forward on climate change, especially in the context of emerging market economies in Asia. Much of what I will say is still very much a preliminary thought, which is still evolving. Is climate change a big deal for the financial system? The answer is definitely yes, and there are a number of good reasons why this is so. First, although uncertain, the macroeconomic impact of climate change is thought to be large, which is likely to pose risk to the financial sector, as well as to financial stability.

Also, an increasing number of banks are recognizing climate change risk in response to investor and other stakeholder initiatives. Judging from this evidence, while the response of financial institutions is positive, it is still very much in an early stage. And in the case of Asia, the progress is even more limited. The main supplier of carbon credits in CDM is China, while the rest of Asia lags behind. In Asia, the engagement of financial institutions on climate change is scattered and not yet a momentum. The progress is hampered partly by inadequate supporting framework that includes lack of clear policy and incentive as well as information. Let me now discuss some of the current problems in Asia and the prospects for the financial system in emerging markets, especially in Asia, to become more engaged with the issue. Given limited progress so far, the challenge is how to engage the financial system in emerging markets more extensively on climate change. In moving this issue forward, a critical role has to be played by policy, especially on the role of incentive and the development of tools that can facilitate the response to climate change. On incentive, a good starting point is to discuss the principles that would be important in guiding the design of policy, which in my view, four key principles stand out. First, the role of the states and policy are critical to ensure that the global rule of the market is clear and continuous beyond 2012.