samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Sri Lanka, India and Iran have completed their Stage I payment reforms. Pakistan is in the process of completing Stage I, while the other SAARC countries are now taking steps to modernize their payment systems. The maintenance of a safe, sound and efficient payment system is a responsibility of the central bank as many of our central banks have increased focus on wider financial system stability as one of their core objectives. In that context, central banks are called upon to coordinate payment initiatives at national, regional and global levels to ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms for smooth payment flows. 2. Why payment systems are critical to regional development? Payment services are highly integrated and interdependent systems comprising payers, payees, payment instruments, financial intermediaries, markets, service providers, technical infrastructure, legal and regulatory systems and organizational structures. The public policy objectives common to all stakeholders are to enhance public confidence, safety, integrity, access to finance and efficiency of payment systems. Therefore, we need to facilitate cross border trade and investment flows through appropriate payment instruments, clearing mechanisms and settlement systems. In a globalized and highly integrated world, financial sector development is closely associated with cross border flows, including foreign direct investment which is critical to developing economies. Most of us in the SAARC region are FDI recipients.

Several of these initiatives have taken on the challenging task of linking regional payment systems on appropriate technological platforms, thus ensuring resilience and safety of common payment systems. With peer pressure, significant reforms have been introduced in payment instruments, payment mechanisms, infrastructure systems, clearing processes, cross-border clearing and settlement systems in individual countries. To ensure efficiency and safety and achieve common goals, there should be a clear commitment by all member countries, which can be clearly displayed by working together as a group. A collective effort and cooperative agenda should support self-help mechanisms and also complement the coordination and cooperation with other regional initiatives and international institutions. As a group, we can mobilize and optimize technical support from other regional initiatives and international bodies like the World Bank, IMF and CPSS of the BIS. A logical conclusion of some of these payment initiatives would be to work towards a single payment mechanism like the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA). This is obviously a longterm objective for the SAARC region and we need to be very cautious in taking a decision towards a single payment mechanism. At the moment, there is no visible political or official commitment towards such a move, but it is worth examining the processes that have taken place in Europe to learn some valuable lessons and avoid potential pitfalls in working towards a single payment space. Since 1999, the European Union has been using a single  2  BIS Review 79/2007  currency, the euro, as the common currency within the Union.
As regards funding, our banks have a relatively reasonable wholesale funding maturity structure, with nearly half of the maturities after 2013. Around 20% of the debt issued on markets matures this year. The recent measures to reinforce solvency should, along with headway in restructuring, allow our banks to re-fund when the foregoing maturities fall due without excessive strains, although probably at still-high costs. Evidently, there was a bout of tension last year in the funding of Spanish banks when the wholesale markets practically shut down following the Greek sovereign debt crises. Spanish banks – inevitably – resorted to a greater extent to the ECB. Once the tensions began to evaporate, Spanish banks immediately returned to the wholesale market to place covered bonds, senior debt and guaranteed debt. This response by Spanish banks is very positive and shows their willingness to cut to the full the resort to the ECB. Indeed, our ECB funding levels are currently slightly below our relative weight in the euro area. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I have so far talked about those areas where we have risks and concerns. I would not wish to wrap up without mentioning an area where we do not have problems. This is, namely, banks’ and savings banks’ exposure to households via mortgage loans for house purchases. Other countries have serious problems with their mortgages, but in Spain the doubtful assets ratios ended 2010 at levels below 3% in this lending portfolio segment, which accounts for more than one-third of the total portfolio.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Current status of the Spanish financial system Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 11 March 2011. *  *  *  Let me thank the Council on Foreign Relations and Mr. Rubin for giving me the opportunity to address this distinguished audience. The current difficulties faced by certain Spanish savings banks have their roots in a long expansion in the Spanish economy dating back from 1996 to 2006. It was a period of sharp growth in employment, activity, and wealth. At the same time the budget deficit diminished drastically and the level of public debt over GDP fell below 40%. However, the expansion was also accompanied by some imbalances. House prices rose substantially; the current account deficit climbed significantly, reflecting in part the loss of competitiveness, and in part the need to fund investment rates that rose to around 30% of GDP, targeted not only on increasing residential investment but also on investment in equipment and infrastructure; Spanish households and firms increased their debt levels notably, in response to low interest rates prompted by euro area membership, reflecting their asset purchases (real estate assets in the case of households, and productive assets in the case of firms, coinciding with a major internationalisation of Spanish corporations). The big financial crisis that began in 2007 had a very limited impact on the asset side of Spanish banks.
I should also mention that Hong Kong is not alone in this culture campaign. In October last year, I was invited by President Bill Dudley of the New York Federal Reserve Bank to join him in a panel to discuss corporate culture. This was in fact the third annual conference on culture organised by the New York Fed. The key takeaway from the New York conference was that there is a growing momentum amongst key supervisors as well as large international financial 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  firms to encourage and nurture good corporate culture and ethical values in the industry. I should also add that, since my appointment to chair the Standing Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation of the Financial Stability Board in April this year, I have been pushing for closer international collaboration in promoting good corporate culture. The priority of this Committee in the next year or two is to place greater emphasis on three aspects of governance, namely, (i) addressing information gaps and due diligence in employment of individuals with a history of misconduct, or the so called “rolling bad apples” problem, (ii) responsibility mapping for senior managers of financial firms, and (iii) the use of governance framework and appropriate compensation system to address culture risk factors that drive misconduct. These priorities, when implemented, will go a long way in promoting the right kind of culture in the financial industry and in helping restore public confidence and trust in the financial firms.

11th International Insurance Conference Paris, 25 October 2019 “Insuring in the long term in a short-term world”  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France Chairman of the ACPR  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 of 6  Madam President, Ladies and Gentlemen I am delighted to participate in this 11th International Insurance Conference. This will be my fourth time at this unmissable annual event, but the first for you, Florence. Bernard Delas and I would like to offer you our warmest wishes for success at the head of the Fédération française de l’assurance (FFA – French insurance federation). For our part, changes are also underway and I would like to take the opportunity this evening to welcome the appointment of Dominique Laboureix as Secretary General of the ACPR, with First Deputy Secretary General, Patrick Montagner, whom you know well, at his side. The subject of your 11th Conference – “Insuring in the long term in a shortterm world” – perfectly sums up the real challenge to the insurance profession. I would like to begin by thanking France’s 712 authorised insurers that never waver in playing their key role in the financing of our economy, with EUR 2,600 billion of investments. In 2018, France became the leading European insurance market, outpacing the United Kingdom and Germany in terms of total balance sheet value and non-life premiums earned.
Once the investors in these financing arrangements – many conservatively managed money funds – withdrew or threatened to withdraw their funds from these markets, the system became vulnerable to a self-reinforcing cycle of forced liquidation of assets, which further increased volatility and lowered prices across a variety of asset classes. In response, margin requirements were increased, or financing was withdrawn altogether from some customers, forcing more de-leveraging. Capital cushions eroded as assets were sold into distressed markets. The force of this dynamic was exacerbated by the poor quality of assets – particularly mortgage-related assets – that had been spread across the system. This helps explain how a relatively small quantity of risky assets was able to undermine the confidence of investors and other market participants across a much broader range of assets and markets. Banks could not fully absorb and offset the effects of the pullback in investor participation – or the "run" – on this non-bank system, in part because they themselves had sponsored many of these off-balance-sheet vehicles. They had written very large contingent commitments to provide liquidity support to many of the funding vehicles that were under pressure. They had retained substantial economic exposure to the risk of a deterioration in house prices and to a broader economic downturn, and as a result, many suffered a sharp increase in their cost of borrowing. The funding and balance sheet pressures on banks were intensified by the rapid breakdown of securitization and structured finance markets.

Two obvious examples: we need to make it much more difficult for institutions with little capital and little supervision to underwrite mortgages, and we need to look more comprehensively how to improve the incentives for institutions that structure and sell assetbacked securities and CDOs of ABS. And supervision will have to focus more attention on the extent of maturity transformation taking place outside the banking system. Second, risk-management practices and supervisory oversight has to focus much more attention on strengthening shock absorbers within institutions and across the infrastructure against very bad macroeconomic and financial outcomes, however implausible they may seem in good times. After we get through this crisis and the process of stabilization and financial repair is complete, we will put in place more exacting expectations on capital, liquidity and risk management for the largest institutions that play a central role in intermediation and market functioning. This is important for reasons that go beyond the implications of excess leverage for the fate of any particular financial institution. As we have seen, the process of de-leveraging by large but relatively strong institutions can cause significant collateral damage for market functioning and for other financial institutions. Inducing institutions to hold stronger cushions of capital and liquidity in periods of calm may be the best way to reduce the amplitude of financial shocks on the way up, and to contain the damage on the way down.
As of now, there are 13 companies holding Treasury Center licenses, of which 4 have been granted in the past 3 months, with one more awaiting approval from the Ministry of Finance. Many more have also made inquiries, which I am pleased to see. The second area is to foster the growth of regional capital markets. Apart from the banking sector, well-developed capital markets are critical to nurture sustainable development of financial interconnections. In this light, Thailand is playing a proactive role to enhance our capital market capacity, aiming to link up GMS capital markets with global investors. Firms from the GMS 7 can raise funds through the Thai capital market to facilitate their businesses, while global investors can invest in products with GMS exposure. As I mentioned earlier, we have seen successful and fast-selling baht bonds, issued in Thailand by the Lao government and corporates. A few years ago, we allowed companies operating in the GMS to be listed on the Thai stock exchange using the holding company structure. In addition, Thailand offers a more opened platform for GMS investors and global players looking for opportunities in the GMS. A new rule has allowed foreign firms, including those from the GMS, to launch IPOs in Thailand and become listed in the Thai stock exchange. This is aimed to provide global investors with wider choices of investment, and to provide an ideal financing destination for both GMS members and global players. The last area of policy to promote GMS financial connectivity is the better-connected payment networks.

From the point of view of the Eurosystem, this was a very important attribute, on top of the fact that covered bonds are akin to our traditional repurchase operations. Since the announcement in May there has been a wave of new issuances. As Spanish banks have traditionally been significant issuers of this type of securities, developments in Spain are representative. The issuance volume of Spanish banks between the time of the announcement and the end of October has reached 16 billion euro. It is now around 20% of the total euro area issuance. Spreads have declined in tandem. In Spain they are now more than 100 basis points lower than the level they reached at their peak. Liquidity has returned to the market, with tangible reductions in bid-ask spreads in secondary transactions. We interpret these developments as a confirmation that our purchase programme, although measured in size, has been effective in bringing new life to an important segment of the European financial market. Overall, we are very satisfied with the effectiveness of this programme. II. Lessons: present and future  What lessons can we draw from the financial crisis that has occupied all of us for more the last two years? The crisis has exposed the fundamental fragility of the international financial system. No segment of the market or category of players has been spared. Therefore, we have to re-consider all aspects of finance as a precondition to reform.
In the first case, we simulated the impact of different transition policies over a three-year horizon: 1) a rise in the price of CO2 emissions to € per tonne; 2) extension of the obligations to acquire emission allowances for the most polluting sectors to all other productive sectors; 3) a combination of the previous measures, which would be compatible with the aim of achieving net zero emissions in 2050; and 4) a combination of these same measures with an extension of the emission trading system to households. 17  This exercise comprises two instruments that operate separately but recursively. The first is a theoretical macro sectoral model, calibrated for the Spanish economy, which can be used to simulate the reallocation of resources across sectors resulting from the implementation of specific measures to combat climate change or technological innovations in this area. The second is an empirical model of the solvency dynamics of Spanish banks stemming from the results of the macro sector model, based on the tool for conducting stress tests (the so-called Forward-Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks (FLESB)). 7  Given the time horizon of the analysis (three years), these scenarios seek to calibrate the initial cost to the Spanish economy of the transition to a green productive model. The results show that the cost of applying these policies in terms of economic activity would be moderate over the first three years, although highly uneven across sectors.

There are I think strong arguments to keep these two models separate and require banks that wish to issue payment stablecoins under the new regulatory regime to do so through legally remote and otherwise distinct entities. I want to turn now to the third potential development: the issue of a central bank digital currency either for retail or for wholesale purposes. As many here may know, the Bank and HM Treasury published a consultation paper in February on the Digital Pound – a Sterling digital currency that would be issued by the Bank of England for general purpose retail use. No decision has been taken to implement the Digital Pound but the Bank and Treasury’s assessment is that it is likely to be needed if current trends in payments and money – some of which I have been discussing – continue. This assessment rests on two main considerations. The first is the need to anchor the value and robustness of all monies circulating in the UK. Physical cash issued by the Bank plays an anchoring role at present in a world in which only commercial banks issue private money. If future trends continue, cash use is likely decline further and cash itself will become less is useable in all everyday transactions, for example if internet commerce grows and if merchants increasingly accept only digital payment. At the same time, new, non-bank players are likely to enter the scene, issuing private money, such as stablecoins, for payment purposes.
Second, this context of “low interest rates for longer” may provide greater incentives for economic agents to take risks, which could heighten the risk to financial stability. Today I would like to devote my address to the analysis of these two matters, focusing on their impact on the Spanish banking sector. I will also present the results of the latest stress test exercise conducted by the Banco de España. 1. Low bank profitability  Profitability is one of the main variables characterising the financial position of banks and the first line of defence against adverse shocks. Indeed, the volume of a bank’s profits determines the return its owners can earn on the capital invested. This, duly adjusted for the risks assumed, will affect the bank’s valuation. Moreover, profit levels determine the margin these agents have to address shocks. Indeed, low profitability reduces the possibility of generating capital internally through retained earnings. Note that banks’ capital acts as a buffer that allows potential losses to be absorbed in adverse scenarios, so that they can continue to offer financial services to households and  3/29  firms, thus contributing to smoothing – rather than amplifying – negative shocks to the economy.1  Since the international financial crisis the profitability of the European banking sector has remained very low and below the cost of capital.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Rising oil prices – a challenge for monetary policy? Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Déjeuners de la Finance, Geneva, 2 November 2005. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Despite oil prices being at a historically high level, inflation has increased only slightly in recent quarters and growth appears to be robust. Are we to assume, therefore, that oil no longer plays an important role in today’s economic environment? What challenges does the current situation pose for monetary policy? For the first time, the steady rise in energy prices is not the result of a political boycott by oil-producing countries, but of an increase in energy demand, coming in particular from the newly industrialised countries in Asia. In other words, the rise in crude oil prices this time can be attributed to the strong growth in global economic activity. This does not mean, however, that the role of monetary policy has changed. Although core inflation currently appears to be under control in most countries, a persistent and continuous rise in energy costs could have an effect on all prices and wages in the long run, thereby jeopardising monetary stability. Notwithstanding the low level of inflation (excluding energy prices), it is vital that the monetary authorities maintain a forward-looking stance so as not to put their credibility on the line and to ensure long-term price stability. 1/1
Mark Carney: Jane Austen to feature on Bank of England banknotes Remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at Jane Austen’s House Museum, Chawton, 24 July 2013. *  *  *  Good afternoon, and welcome to Chawton, home in her final eight years to Jane Austen and her family. This cottage occupied a special place in Jane Austen’s life, as a return to the countryside brought contentment after an unhappy spell in Bath. All six of Jane Austen’s best known novels were published after she moved to Chawton, and three of them were written in their entirety here. It therefore gives me great pleasure to be here today to announce that Jane Austen will be the next character to appear on the Bank of England’s £ note, replacing Charles Darwin. Jane Austen will become the 17th historical figure to feature on our banknotes. She merits her place in this select group as one of the greatest writers in English literature. Her novels have an enduring, timeless and universal appeal – they have never been out of print since first being published, have inspired numerous modern adaptations and are loved by people around the world. Austen’s combination of sharp wit, engaging narrative, knowing satire and social commentary has ensured her place among the country’s favourite authors. I am delighted now to unveil the image for the new Jane Austen note.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  There are two objectives: first, to review the principles and refine the criteria that guide the choice of historical characters for banknotes; and second, to establish a process to ensure that potential candidates are consistently and transparently judged against those criteria. The review will be led by Chris Salmon, the Bank’s Chief Cashier, who will be meeting with interested parties as well as inviting feedback from members of the public via our website. The conclusions will be announced by the end of the year. Now let me introduce a real expert to tell you a bit more about Jane Austen and her time at Chawton. Elizabeth Proudman is Chairman of the Jane Austen Society, and I would like to thank her, along with Ann Channon and staff here at Jane Austen’s House Museum, for hosting today’s event. Elizabeth, over to you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches