samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the other hand, our forecasts for the real economy are not as accurate as the inflation forecasts, although they compare fairly well with the time series model’s forecasts. Our forecasts also compare fairly well with those of other forecasters. The result of the comparison with other forecasters shows that our GDP forecasts up to one year ahead are often among the most accurate. This also applies to the CPI, but here the difference is smaller compared with the NIER and the Consensus panel. This does not mean that we have not occasionally made considerable forecasting errors. But the errors are not so systematic that there is reason to believe they are due to inadequate forecasting methods. And nor does this mean that we cannot or do not wish to become even better. We are constantly working to improve our methods. In some areas we need to work extra hard to improve our forecasting performance. One such area is productivity. It is important that we continue to regularly assess monetary policy, and particularly with regard to our forecasts, both in our annual assessments and in other ways. This is necessary both to be able to gain better knowledge of which variables are difficult to forecast and to see where it is necessary to develop methods and analysis. A major advantage of publishing our forecasts is that external experts can also evaluate us. Thank you for inviting me here today! Figure 1.

Repo rate with uncertainty band Per cent, quarterly averages 7  7  90% 75% 50% Reporänta  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 dec-02  0 dec-03  dec-04  dec-05  dec-06  dec-07  dec-08  dec-09  dec-10  Source: The Riksbank  14  BIS Review 138/2007
Christian Noyer: Global stability, the future of capital markets and Islamic finance in France Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Euromoney Seminars, Islamic Paris Conference, Paris, 29 September 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It’s a great pleasure for me to address such a distinguished audience today. While conventional economies are still suffering from a deep crisis and some of our traditional economic thought is being challenged, this meeting is a great opportunity to discuss how alternative finance, and especially Islamic finance, can contribute to the economic recovery. In the past two years, the French authorities, in active cooperation with the industry, in particular via Paris-Europlace, have introduced substantial reforms to make it possible to allow Shariah’ compliant finance into France. As Governor of the Banque de France, which is in charge of the licensing of French banks, I would like to specifically highlight ongoing work aimed at licensing Islamic banks in a secure framework.

Traditional backward-looking models based on historical trends may no longer be reliable, so the development of forward-looking 4 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  approaches grounded in scenario-based analyses may be necessary. 4 Perhaps even more importantly, physical and transition risks will likely introduce new strategic risks associated with the challenges and opportunities of sectoral reallocations of economic activity, new production patterns and evolving industry exposures. Range of Practices Given these emerging risks, what are large financial institutions actually doing to identify, monitor, and manage them? This is a new and rapidly evolving field, so we are far from coalescing around best practices or industry standards. Nevertheless, some emerging themes are emerging from the largest, most complex financial institutions. I will touch on governance, risk identification and management, scenario analysis, and transparency. I’ll begin with governance. Boards of directors and senior management are increasingly attuned to the risks posed by climate change as pressure from various stakeholders intensifies. For example, some firms are establishing internal climate-related working groups to develop enterprise-wide climate frameworks and to ensure climate considerations such as geographic concentrations or regulatory changes are better integrated into strategic decision-making. Some senior leaders are discussing risk materiality in geographic and sectoral reviews and results of forward-looking climate scenario analyses. Few firms, however, have formally modified or qualified enterprise-wide risk appetite statements to acknowledge climate to date, although some are considering this. Based on our observations, information flows and detailed climate reporting appear more prevalent at the management committee level rather than boards of directors.
The Bank of Albania judges that the ability of the banking sector to withstand risks is high. The activity of the banking sector in 2018 was stable with good performance and resilience indicators. The financial result was positive: Return on Assets (RoA) stood at 1.3% and the Return on Equity (RoE) reached 13%. Capitalisation and liquidity levels were above the respective regulatory requirements. Credit risk continues to represent the main risk to the activity of the banking sector, but the credit quality has improved from the previous year. At the end of 2018, the non-performing loans ratio was 11.1% from 13.2% a year earlier, whereas the outstanding non-performing loans reduced by 20%. The Bank of Albania remains committed to fulfilling all its obligations in the framework of the 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  national plan for the reduction of non-performing loans. In view of this goal, it has: (i) prepared a draft-regulation on the out-of-court addressing of borrowers; (ii) expanded the requirements for using official financial statements in the assessment of credit risk for all categories of borrowers; (iii) initiated measures for improving the Credit Registry, and has started work for harmonising credit reporting in accordance with international standards. With respect to safeguarding financial stability, the Bank of Albania has continued to work for establishing and developing macro-prudential policy instruments and for establishing early warning systems for systemic risks. In this context, I would like to point out to two key developments.

In the 18 months since 1 January 1999 when the euro was introduced the US current account deficit was something over $ compared with net long-term capital inflows of nearly $ Meanwhile the Eurozone was in small current account surplus but saw net direct investment and portfolio outflows of some $ The conventional “fundamentals” - which one would still expect to reassert themselves in due course - have been overridden for the time being by these massive international capital flows. To the extent that the capital flows have indeed been driven by an improvement in prospective rates of return in the US associated with the productivity “shock” - and I freely acknowledge that this explanation may be oversimplistic - one would expect that at some point it would be discounted through a change in relative asset values, including the change in the exchange rate. The problem is that we simply do not know how close we are to that point - or indeed whether we have already passed it. Putting that question to the market was, for me, the real point of the recent G7 intervention. We all need to understand much more about the nature of the capital flows and in particular about what motivates the market participants who initiate them. My immediate point, however, is that on the basis of what we do know it seems unlikely that the euro’s weakness in the foreign exchange market is pushed by any obvious macro-economic failure in the Eurozone.
Another important element affecting culture has been the shift in the prevailing business model away from traditional commercial and investment banking activities to trading; that is, from client-oriented to transaction-oriented activities. Clients became counterparties – the other side of a trade – rather than partners in a long-term business relationship. In general, interactions became more depersonalized, making it easier to rationalize away bad behavior, and more difficult to identify who would be harmed by any unethical actions. High-powered pay incentives linked to short-term profits, combined with a flexible and fluid job market, have also contributed to a lessening of firm loyalty – and, sometimes, to a disregard for the law – in an effort to generate larger bonuses. Often allegiance to an external network of traders has been more important than the ties the trader has to his or her particular employer. This is particularly evident in the illegal manipulations of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), and with respect to reference rates in the foreign exchange markets. Although cultural and ethical problems are not unique to the finance industry, financial firms are different from other firms in important ways. First, the financial sector plays a key public role in allocating scarce capital and exerting market discipline throughout a complex, global economy. For the economy to achieve its long-term growth potential, we need a sound and vibrant financial sector. Financial firms exist, in part, to benefit the public, not simply their shareholders, employees and corporate clients.

The submitter says “no way,” tells the trader that this request is inappropriate and that the trader will be reported to compliance. The submitter reports the trader’s attempt at manipulation to legal and compliance. Compliance investigates to confirm the facts. The trader is fired and is fully prosecuted for any criminal actions. For this all to happen, a firm doesn’t just have to have the right rules and procedures in place, but it also needs the right culture to ensure that those rules and procedures are followed, that the bad behavior sees the light of day immediately and that the transgressors are punished in a way that is known broadly throughout the firm – that is, a clear example of the consequences is demonstrated to others. How can better incentives help? In my example, for matters to work properly, I think it is important that all the players – traders, compliance, risk and legal, have the right incentives to behave in the way that is appropriate and that aligns their interests with the broader interests of the firm in rooting out bad behaviors. One way in which incentives can be shaped is through the structure of compensation. I believe that a proper compensation system can be an important tool for enhancing culture, promoting financial stability and rebuilding the public trust in the financial industry. Incentives matter for individual behaviors and decisions in all industries, including the financial industry.
Reducing the European economy’s vulnerability to future shocks will also call for continuing progress towards a full Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union. The necessary support of the European Central Bank On this occasion, and unlike previous crises, the approval of the European recovery fund will prevent the European response to the crisis in the euro area from resting exclusively on the common monetary policy. The European Central Bank (ECB) has deployed a range of emergency measures during this crisis. These have involved, first, the extension of sovereign and corporate bond purchases in the euro area, with the aim of improving financing conditions. Specifically, the ECB has increased its pre-existing purchase programme and added a new emergency programme currently worth € trillion (11.3% of euro area GDP in 2019) and which will last, at least, until June 2021. One new feature is the fact that asset purchases under the new programme are being made with a high degree of flexibility regarding their distribution over time and across asset classes, and, in the specific case of public asset purchases, also as regards the issuing countries. As a result, the Eurosystem is focusing its purchases there where they are most needed at each point in time. The aim is to ensure the smooth transition of the single monetary policy to all countries in the area and to head off the risks of financial fragmentation.

In Spain’s case, in a setting in which the state of alert affected the last two weeks of Q1, we witnessed the biggest-ever contraction in GDP historically in a single quarter, namely a quarter-on-quarter rate of 5.2%. This decline was one of the most pronounced in the euro area, and was in response to several circumstances. These included a relatively greater severity of the lockdown measures (given, too, the greater intensity of the pandemic) and the presence of certain structural factors in our economy that make it more vulnerable to a shock of these characteristics. The most significant factor here is perhaps the high weight of the tourism-related sectors, which have been particularly affected by the social distancing measures. The reduction in hours worked, estimated at 5% in Q1, was also the biggestever in the time series and highlights the marked impact of the various measures affecting movement on the labour market in the early stages of this crisis. Admittedly, the restrictions on movement were gradually eased as from early May. But the state of alert ran for much of Q2, whereby a notable increase in the decline in GDP and in employment in this period is to be expected. The latest Banco de España macroeconomic projections, published in June against a background of unusually high uncertainty, posted estimates of quarter-on-quarter declines in activity in a range between -16% and -21.8%. And the information since available tends to confirm that the decline in economic activity in Q2 as a whole will have been in this range.
In addition, central banks may choose to participate in distorted financial markets where there may be threats to financial stability, as is sometimes done with reserve accumulation and exchange rate intervention in EMEs, or as has been the case of some interventions in debt and other asset markets in advanced economies. However, interventions beyond currency markets must be truly exceptional and only on the grounds of preserving financial stability or complementing monetary policy. Another way to control the vulnerability of the system to the reversals of asset prices is to limit the amount of debt that finances the purchase of those assets with higher prices or increase capital buffers for such debt. In terms of macro prudential policies there are a series of options for this. Higher capital requirements for intermediaries participating in the business of making leveraged purchases of financial assets are one option. In the same vein, reducing loan to value (LTV) ratios in mortgage loans, increasing provisions for housing loans or increasing capital requirements on mortgage lending are all viable options if the distortion is in the housing market. Several countries in Asia have been actively using LTV caps over the last couple of years to reduce the risks from housing price booms. Which of these tools should be used will depend, however, on the institutional setting of each country, the functioning of the financial system and the asset price that is distorted.

The second example I would like to mention here is the introduction of the minimum exchange rate in September 2011. This rate was introduced to correct a massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc arising from adverse developments on the foreign exchange market, and thereby avert the threat of a deflationary trend. I have explained to you why this instrument is still needed and is being enforced by us without any restriction. A measure like the minimum exchange rate can only succeed if the central bank is totally credible, in other words, if people believe it will actually defend the rate, if need be. Words can certainly achieve a great deal in the financial markets. But this only holds true if they are followed up with deeds when necessary. In the case of the minimum exchange rate, the deeds in question are unlimited foreign currency market interventions. In 2012, we were required to enforce the minimum exchange rate with extensive foreign currency purchases, and our balance sheet total increased significantly. If there were statutory restrictions on our balance sheet we would be unable to introduce and enforce a measure of this kind. The financial markets would call into question both our resolve and our ability to see the measure through. Concluding remarks Ladies and gentlemen, I come to my concluding remarks. Even seven years after the onset of the financial crisis, the environment remains very challenging for our economy and for Swiss monetary policy.
BIS Review 36/2005  9  Chart 3: Inflation and Unemployment by Decade RPIX inflation (%)  1950-1959  RPIX inflation (%)  1960-1969  30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5 0  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  1970-1979  8  10  12  -5 0  RPIX inflation (%)  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  RPIX inflation (%)  1980-1992  30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5 0  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  -5 0 2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  RPIX inflation (%)  1993-2005  30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 0  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  Note: The unemployment rate used here is the Claimant Count measure, published by the ONS from 1971. Unemployment data before 1971 is from Haldane and Quah (1998). The published RPIX series starts in 1976. For observations before 1976, the allitems RPI was used. The RPI series before 1976 did not include mortgage interest payments.

Particular attention has been paid to the examination of banks with a major share in the activity of the financial market, those subject to acquisition or merger processes, or banks experiencing rapid growth. Overall, the monitored institutions have responded duly to the recommendations, by undertaking the relevant measures. Increased attention has been paid to the supervision for the implementation of measures for the prevention of money laundering, in cooperation with the Directorate General on the Prevention of Money Laundering (DG PML). Cooperation with the DG PML was more intensive in the framework of the evaluation process for Albania by the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). The Bank of Albania participated actively in fulfilling the comments related to the technical and effectiveness questionnaires. In the final MONEYVAL report, the effectiveness level of financial institutions was rated as “substantial/considerable”. In particular, banks show better awareness of the AML/CFT risks and of legal obligations, and have generally taken due measures in a way that is commensurate to the assessed level of AML/CFT risk. The evaluation process was accompanied by a plan of measures for addressing the main problems identified in the report; their realisation will continue in 2019 as well. In the framework of consolidation in the banking sector, in 2018 some changes took place in the ownership structure of the banking system. As a result of these changes, 14 banks operated in the Albanian banking system as at the end of the year.
Growth rates of population in the old and new members of the EU are quite low and the slowdown in population growth leads to aging in the EU countries. This implies serious problems for the EU economy in general and its labour market in particular. First of all, the problem of aging in the EU suggests lower labour participation rates and higher dependency ratios in the future. This will certainly decelerate the potential growth rate of Europe. Then, fiscal problems due to increase in social security and health care costs as population ages come to the forefront. 9  Bernanke, B. S. (19 January 2005). "Productivity". The C. Peter McColough Roundtable Series on International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations. 10  Trichet, J.C (24 June 2005). “ Monetary Policy in EU: Views and Challenges”. 11  Bernanke, B. S. (19 January 2005). "Productivity". The C. Peter McColough Roundtable Series on International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations. 12  Gros, D. (2005) "Economic Aspects of Turkey's Quest for Membership". CEPS Working Paper." 13  Gros, D. (2005) "Economic Aspects of Turkey's Quest for Membership". CEPS Working Paper. 14  Under Secretariat of State Planning Organization. (November 2004). "Possible Impacts of the Turkish Membership on the EU". 5/8  On the other hand, Turkey s demographic profile makes it different than both the old and the new members of the Union. Turkey is a relatively large country with a young and fast-growing population.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that the said ratio will increase to 36 percent in the EU-15 by the year 2020. However, it is expected to be only 16 percent in Turkey by that time. According to another study by the United Nations, the EU would need an average of 6.1 million immigrants a year from 2015 to 2040 to maintain a ratio of three working-age adults for each retiree20. This I believe clearly implies a substantial contribution of Turkey to the EU on the demographic front. On the other hand, when it comes to labour force participation rate in the income per capita equation, Turkey lags behind the EU. One of the reasons of Turkey’s lagging behind is the low female participation rate in the labour force. Although the female participation rate in banking, legal and medical sectors are among the highest in Europe, the very low participation in rural areas cause the overall female participation rate to remain quite low. Another reason of low participation rates based on official figures is the high share of the unregistered economy. With the ongoing reform process and their expected effects on the structure of the labour market, the share of the unregistered economy would decrease and then the female participation rate would increase. This will imply further increase in the labour force participation rate in the Turkish labour market in the near future. Moving on to the employment side of the equation, I will mention some other important points regarding the Turkish labour market.