samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What I have to say starts from the report that Lars Calmfors and his colleagues presented in 1996 – one of the most extensive and penetrating studies of EMU membership’s pros and cons. When the report was circulated for comments, the Riksbank had the opportunity of submitting an opinion and stated that Sweden ought to participate in the monetary union right from the start. I shall be reminding you why the Riksbank came to this conclusion and commenting on how subsequent developments have influenced my own view of the matter. The foundation for my personal opinion includes my working experience as a close monitor of economic developments and debates, both in Sweden and internationally. This has involved participation in the European discussion over the past three or four years as Sweden’s representative in the EU’s Economic and Financial Committee (formerly the Monetary Committee). Arguments for and against Calmfors and his colleagues considered that Sweden ought to join the monetary union but that there were good reasons for waiting. The arguments for and against were presented in the report under three headings: stabilisation policy, economic efficiency and political reasons. In view of this classification’s educational merits, I shall be using it here. The report’s arguments from stabilisation policy The arguments from stabilisation policy focus on ways in which EMU membership could be expected to affect the possibility of achieving a balanced economic development in Sweden, with good economic growth, high employment, price stability and external balance.

Given the anticipated gradual pace of the economic recovery, wage developments should remain moderate. The latest data on wage growth in the fourth quarter of 2003 lend support to this view. Moreover, the past appreciation of the euro exchange rate will continue to alleviate import price pressures and dampen the inflationary impact of higher oil and commodity prices, which are also related to strong demand at the global level. Again, this outlook for price developments is in line with available forecasts and projections. Given their conditional nature, we will continue to monitor all indicators closely. In particular, the increase in commodity prices and the evolution of long-term inflation expectations deserve close attention. Turning to the monetary analysis, annual M3 growth has been moderating since the summer of 2003, though only slowly. At the same time, the growth of loans to the private sector has been edging up. Both monetary and credit growth seem to be supported by the low level of interest rates prevailing in the euro area and may also reflect the improvement in the economic environment since the summer of 2003. Given the strong M3 growth over the past few years, there is currently more liquidity in the euro area than is needed to finance non-inflationary growth. The effects of this high liquidity on inflation over the medium term will greatly depend on future developments in the economy and financial markets. Should excess liquidity persist, it could lead to inflationary pressures over the medium term.
Graph 1 shows the progress that has been made so far with fiscal consolidation and the plans embedded in the fiscal budget for 2011. Provided the plans are carried out, the consolidation involved will be impressive in both historical and international comparison, with a roughly 9 percentage point improvement in the non-cyclically adjusted fiscal balance from 2009 to 2012, even though there will be a significant slack in the economy for most of the period. Although it has been delayed and has faced obstacles on the way, the reconstruction of the domestic financial sector is far advanced. The three major commercial banks have been recapitalised, with foreign creditors taking a majority stake in two of them and the State  BIS Review 139/2010  3  holding a majority in the third. At the end of June, all three had capital ratios above 16%, most of it common equity. As a result, Iceland’s banks meet Basel III requirements more than two times over. The recapitalisation of the savings banks is in its final stages. In June of this year, however, question marks were raised about the capital position of the banking system when the Supreme Court of Iceland ruled that linking ISK loans to exchange rates was illegal. The banking system had a large number of such contracts on its books. The precise scope of the problem was uncertain, but more importantly, it was not clear what interest rates these loans should carry when they were no longer exchange rate-linked.

Már Guðmundsson: The Icelandic economy two years after the crash Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a meeting of the Icelandic-American Chamber of Commerce, New York, 19 October 2010. *  *  *  Chairman and honoured guests, It gives me great pleasure to be with you here today and give a speech at this meeting of the Icelandic-American Chamber of Commerce. In my remarks, I would like to take stock of the current economic situation, two years after the collapse of the bulk of Iceland’s banking system, and assess the prospects for robust recovery. I am well aware that this only gives a partial picture. The saga of economic and financial developments in Iceland during the last decade or so is made up of two separate but interrelated stories. On the one hand, there is Iceland’s boom-bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open, and financially integrated economies. This is a well-known story that has played out in other countries several times. On the other hand, we have the story of the rise and fall of three cross-border banks operated on the basis of European Union legislation (the European “Passport”). That story, at least for smaller countries, is much more unique than the first. Today I will focus on the first story and will have to refer you to another speech 1 and a forthcoming article 2 for my views on the latter.
Not only have the original objectives of European integration been achieved, namely to ensure peace and prosperity in a historically conflict-ridden part of the world, the European Union has also shown its ability to overcome the various economic and political challenges with which it has been confronted throughout its almost 45-year history. Such is the attractiveness of the European integration project that, since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, nine countries have joined the original six, and a host of others are keen to do so. A key accomplishment of this progress towards “ever closer union” will become truly tangible in a few weeks' time, on 1 January 2002, when most of the citizens of the European Union will finally have the euro, our money, in their pockets. In many ways, the prospect of EU accession has also been instrumental in triggering reform in the 12 countries currently negotiating entry into the EU, namely five Central and Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; two southern European countries, Bulgaria and Romania; and Cyprus and Malta in the Mediterranean. Following some troublesome years at the beginning of the transition process, the accession countries have made substantial progress in building institutions and designing appropriate policy. The accession countries have now generally achieved macroeconomic stability.

Inflationary pressures stemming from high productivity growth in the tradable sector of fast-growing economies – known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect – have also been cited as one of the main reasons for higher inflation in catching-up economies, such as those of the accession countries. A closer examination of inflation developments in the accession countries shows, however, that the Balassa-Samuelson effect alone cannot explain the persistence of inflation differentials vis-à-vis the euro area. Moreover, notwithstanding its importance, the Balassa-Samuelson effect should not be overstated when explaining current inflation rates in the accession countries. Indeed, most empirical studies estimate the Balassa-Samuelson effect within a range of 1 to 2 percentage points. This does not mean, however, that the pursuit of real convergence conflicts with further progress on disinflation. On the contrary, the process of disinflation should be advanced in the accession countries, at a pace determined by the overall economic situation and in particular by the need for these countries to increase real convergence. The Maastricht inflation criterion, which will not be revised to take into account any possible Balassa-Samuelson effect, should not be seen as an immediate requirement for these countries, but rather as a medium-term objective for central banks. As the experience of some euro area participants shows, progress in nominal and real convergence can be, and should be, pursued in parallel.
One, we will broaden the scope of eligible investments to include blended finance structures in which financial institutions in Singapore have been substantially involved. Two, we will give more recognition to concessional capital invested in such blended finance structures. Concessional capital is capital that accepts lower returns or higher risks, compared to other investors, and can help catalyse commercial capital into worthwhile but less attractive green and transition projects. The ability to crowd in capital from other investors is why we want to encourage and give extra recognition to concessional capital. Hence, for every dollar of concessional capital invested, we will recognise it as equivalent to up to $ of investments for the purpose of assessing if the SFO has met its investment requirement. Three, we will recognise grants that SFOs give to support such blended finance structures. Grants have no expectation of income or return of principal. Given its deeply concessional nature, we will recognise as $ for every dollar of grant given to blended finance structures. Second, we will encourage SFOs to invest in climate-related projects. For the purpose of assessing if the SFO has met its investment requirement, we will recognise its climate-related investments – anywhere in the world, and not limited to Singapore. 12/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Climate change is a global problem that is not bounded by national borders. As a low-lying island state, Singapore is particularly vulnerable to climate change. We should thus recognise all efforts made to address climate change issues.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Global policy perspectives Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium: Overall Panel on “Global policy perspectives”, Jackson Hole, United States, 1 September 2012. *  *  *  It is my honour to be invited to speak on this closing panel, to discuss global policy perspectives at this year’s Economic Symposium, in this magnificent environment at Jackson Hole. My remarks will focus on global policies from the perspective of a policy-maker from an emerging economy, to discuss the evolving new frontiers of global policies, the global policy spillovers in particular to emerging economies, and on the policy priorities in emerging Asia in this environment. The global economic and financial landscape has changed tremendously over this recent two decades. Yet the underlying motivation and progress in policy-making have not reflected these changes. The disparity between policy and the new landscape has become increasingly more evident since the 2008 global financial crisis. Policy-makers have thus been challenged in preventing the build-up of the risks and imbalances prior to the crisis, arresting and containing the crisis once it had erupted, and then managing its aftermath. At the national level, these changes are well known. Driven largely by innovation and advances in technology, we now have more highly complex and more inter-connected financial systems with financial activity that has broadened to beyond the traditional financial intermediaries.
Chart 13: The near-term indicators of house price growth have weakened  Chart 14: Interest cost of mortgages will probably remain below average for a while  Balance 80 60 40 20 0 -20 -40 -60 -80 2000  Per cent 12  Per cent 8 6 4 2  8  0  6  -2 -4 -6 2005 2010 2015 RICS price expectations balance (LHS) House price growth (RHS)  Sources: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) Residential Market Survey, ONS, Land Registry and Bank calculations. RICS price expectations are three month ahead net balances. 10  4 2  Average 1993-2007Q2  0 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 Sources: ONS, Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) sheet M12, Bank of England, Barclays Live and Bank calculations. The fan is calculated using probability distributions implied by options on sterling interest rate swaps. For further information on how option-implied distributions are derived, see Clews, Panigirtzoglou and Proudman (2000). I can now (finally) get to the point I wanted to make about interest payments. Even if low bond yields don’t presage rapid growth of house prices, one thing they do suggest is that interest payments on mortgage debt will also remain relatively low. Chart 14 plots those payments over the past, as a share of household income. It also includes a range for the future. This assumes that mortgage debt continues to grow in line with household income (whatever that turns out to be).

They are now used by most car buyers, including (one presumes) those who are overall savers. According to the government the majority of student loans will not be fully repaid (the ONS has recently decided that most of it should therefore be re-allocated to the government, an accounting change planned for later this year.) Taken together, car finance and student loans account for almost all the rise in households’ unsecured gearing in recent years, as currently measured. The remainder – comprising the more conventional credit card balances, consumer loans and overdrafts – is plotted in blue in Chart 5. It hasn’t grown much and is pretty much the same as it was, relative to income, in the mid-1990s. 2  You might, however, expect to see them in first differences (i.e. in the growth rate of debt), as these could help cleanse the data of enduring country-specific differences in the sustainable level of debt.
It was becoming clear that the entire system was on the brink of collapse, and on 6 October 2008, the Icelandic Parliament passed emergency legislation with the objective of ensuring continued domestic banking operations. The following day, the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) intervened in the operations of Glitnir and Landsbanki. On October 8, following perfunctory exchanges between the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Icelandic Minister of Finance, the UK government froze the assets of Icelandic banks in the UK and took over Singer & Friedlander, a British-licensed subsidiary of Kaupthing. The deposit part of Singer & Friedlander was transferred to ING. Later that day, a system-wide response of central banks and governments emerged, emphasising international coordination. Such efforts were too little and too late for the Icelandic banks, and on October 9, the FME intervened in Kaupthing Bank. The collapse of these three banks was quite large, not only relative to Iceland, but also on an absolute scale. According to Moody’s list of defaults during the period 1920–2008, 3 Kaupthing, at USD 20 bn, ranks 4th after Lehman, Worldcom and GMAC, with Glitnir close on its heels. The combined balance sheet of these failed banks was much larger than that of Worldcom, and only Lehman’s was bigger. And the effect was felt far and wide, as these banks were truly international. Kaupthing alone was active in 13 jurisdictions.

The industry structure of our economy has changed. A growing number of firms, and not only in the engineering industry, have targeted the oil industry. Labour shedding in some sectors has freed up labour for other uses. Chart: High wages in the oil industry  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Oil companies have had the capacity and the willingness to pay. Tax rules have favoured investment spending and earnings have been solid. Oil company employees have been wage winners here in Norway. A state-of-the-art oil service industry has emerged. New products and technological solutions have been developed. For many firms, the contracts on the Norwegian continental shelf have been a springboard to new export markets. Chart: Growth in oil investment High oil prices and a profitable petroleum production industry have led to record-high oil investment in recent years. The level of investment in 2014 was equivalent to that of all the domestic non-oil industries combined. The positive spillovers to the oil service industry and other firms have been substantial. Employment has remained high and unemployment low, even when the financial crisis hit in 2008. A large share of the business sector and the labour market is now linked to the oil industry. A relatively small number of jobs are directly involved in oil and gas production. But if account is taken of all the suppliers to the petroleum sector, about 1 in 9 jobs in Norway, a total of about 300 000, were linked to the oil industry in 20141.
Philipp Hildebrand: Money and monetary policy – the ECB experience 1999-2006 Comments by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Fourth ECB Central Banking Conference: The role of money: money and monetary policy in the twenty-first century, Frankfurt/Main, 9 November 2006. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Dear colleagues and friends. It is a pleasure to be here today. I am honored to have the opportunity to discuss Money and monetary policy: The ECB experience 1999-2006 by B. Fischer, M. Lenza, H. Pill and L. Reichlin in front of such a distinguished audience. The paper presents an overview of the monetary analysis at the European Central Bank (ECB) since its inception. It provides market participants with detailed information on how the monetary analysis has been deployed by the ECB and how it has evolved over time. A newly created currency presents formidable challenges to monetary policy. Arguably, this is particularly true for the monetary analysis. Two challenges strike me as being paramount: first, policy makers face a fundamentally rearranged financial environment and second, empirical estimates are difficult to come by due to the invariably short sample period. A new financial regime implies potentially unstable money demand equations; a short sample induces imprecise estimates. The presented paper makes a valuable contribution in documenting extensively how the ECB has been conducting its monetary analysis in such an environment.

In that context, both the ECB and the SNB conduct a careful analysis of monetary aggregates partly in an effort to assess the risks of long-term financial imbalances. Moreover, acknowledging the monetary source of long-term inflation helps avoid the build-up of excess liquidity in the first place. In closing, let me therefore repeat that the Fischer et al. paper could benefit from focusing more extensively on the admittedly complex but nonetheless important link between money, asset prices and long-term inflation perspectives. In the  4  For example, Nelson (2003) argues that movements in monetary aggregates provide useful indications regarding different yields usually not incorporated in economic models  5  Baltensperger, Jordan and Savioz (2001), Jordan, Peytrignet and Rich (2001)  6  Reynard (2006)  7  For example, Issing (2002) provides evidence of a close relationship between excess money growth and real asset prices, a relationship that does not appear by looking at a standard Taylor rule as a measure of monetary policy stance. Similarly, Friedman (2005) showed that pre- and post-financial market crash evolutions of stock prices and gross domestic products were strongly related to the pre- and post-market crash evolutions of monetary aggregates. White (2006) pointed to the need of pushing further the frontiers of economic research in the direction of incorporating financial variables to assess longer-term macroeconomic developments.
Yesterday at 8 a.m. Central European Time and 2 a.m. in New York, the ECB announced, together with the Bank of England and the Swiss National Bank, that – thanks to a swap agreement with the Federal Reserve System – we will conduct tenders of US dollars funding at 7-day, 28-day and 84-day maturities at fixed interest rates for full allotment. Counterparties in these operations will be able to borrow any amount they wish against the appropriate collateral in each jurisdiction. This is a “world premiere” in exceptionally confident cooperation between central banks. Another exceptional “first” at global level was the coordinated reduction in policy rates by the same amount of 50 basis points, which was decided by a large number of central banks from the G10 countries. It was justified by the fact that the intensification of the financial crisis had further diminished the upside risks to price stability and that central banks were considered to have regained control of inflation expectations. The role of the Eurosystem operational framework during the financial market turbulence The current financial market turbulence has certainly provided the biggest challenge to the operational framework of the Eurosystem since its inception more than ten years ago. The recent experience has so far proved that some of the structural features of our framework have had an important role in stabilising short-term money market rates, signalling the monetary policy stance and contributing to financial stability.

Finally, addressing impediments to investment, increasing productivity and further improving the business environment remain key for strengthening potential growth. To conclude, my assessment is that significant progress has been made, but that ensuring prosperity on a lasting basis requires continuing the implementation of an ambitious reform agenda going forward. BANKING It is essential to complete the banking union. In this respect, the European summit on 28 and 29 June is very important. The European banking landscape is still characterised by one important feature: a strong exposure of banks to their national economy, including a high exposure to domestic public debt. The completion of the banking union will, over time, lead to a lower exposure to national economies. Regarding the situation of the banking sector, there is still a sizeable legacy of non-performing loans in some banks. An impressive effort has been made to reduce the level, but the situation has not yet been fully rectified. The banks are now much more capitalised. Their liquidity is much stronger. But, on the other hand, we have to be clear: for the large banks, the new regime under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive – BRRD, to use its English acronym – has still not been tested in the event of a crisis – luckily. The banks still have a strong national orientation: they have exposures to the public debt of their country and a strong focus on the domestic economy.