samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They are indeed service providers, usually unregulated, vulnerable to cyber risks and, in some cases creators of the most powerful new technologies, which could significantly contribute to spreading risks (application programming interfaces (API), artificial intelligence software, cloud computing structures, etc.). The lack of substitutability of some of these services increases the vulnerability of the financial sector. 2) The second consideration regards the embedding of security in systems from the earliest stages of conceptualisation. The CPMI-IOSCO guidance refers to this principle as “resilience by design”. It makes perfect sense, since it is the most efficient way to ensure the security of IT systems. This principle is however no doubt difficult to implement in the case of urgent and costly IT projects. This is why it requires a more proactive approach from executives and closer attention from regulators and supervisors. The same principle has already been emphasised in the European General Data Protection Regulation which entered into force some months ago. It gives us one more reason to enforce this principle. Page 2 sur 3 3) The third consideration regards speed: the capacities to resume critical activities within two hours after a cyber-attack, the two-hour Recovery Time Objective mentioned by Benoît. In this regard, in today’s environment it would be both unrealistic and unwise to resume activities without ensuring first that IT data have not been corrupted or that recovery of the activity affected does not trigger a higher risk exposure on its own, and for the whole financial ecosystem. II.

WGCR round table 14 September 2018  Remarks by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Key notes  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 sur 3 Ladies and Gentlemen, Cher Benoît, Cher Jean-Paul, Welcome to Paris, The guidance released by CPMI-IOSCO two years ago was one of the precursors in the field of cyber risks. Since then, the level of cyber-threats has obviously increased. According to different public reports, the number of cyber-attacks (700 million in 2017) has increased by over 100% in two years. This is why cyber security will be one of the priorities of the G7’s French Presidency next year. I would like to share with you three considerations and put forward three concrete measures so that these principles do not remain at the conceptual level but actually lead to tangible actions. ** I. Three considerations, or three S’s: Silos / Security of Systems / Speed 1) The first is of a general nature. Considering that “security is a block”, we need to explore how to break the silo within the financial sector, which does not take account of the multiplicity of its stakeholders: the CPMI-IOSCO principles rightly emphasise the need to take into account interconnections, meaning the link between FMIs, between FMIs and their service providers and suppliers. Nowadays, we should also take into account, alongside regulated and supervised participants, the existence of Fintechs, as well as “big techs”.
Bomberger, William A. and Gail E. Makinen (1983), “The Hungarian Hyperinflation and Stabilization of 1945-1946”, Journal of Political Economy 91, pp. 801-824. DeLong, J. Bradford and Lawrence Summers (1988), “How Does Macroeconomic Policy Affect Output?”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 19(2), pp. 433-480. Drechsler, Itamar, Alexi Savov and Philipp Schnabl (2020), “The Financial Origins of the Rise and Fall of American Inflation”, essay, New York University Stern School of Business. Economic Commission (1993), Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik [New conditions for the economy and policy], Economic Commission’s proposal, SOU 1993:16 (in Swedish). Englund, Peter (1993), Ofredsår, Atlantis. 13 [14]  Fregert, Klas (2013), “Belling the Cat: Eli F. Heckscher on the Gold Standard as a Disciplinary Device”, History of Political Economy 45 (1), pp. 39–59. Goldstein, Joshua S. (2003), “War and Economic History”, in Joel Mokyr (ed. ), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, Oxford University Press. Hall, George J. and Thomas J. S (2022), “Three World Wars: Fiscal-Monetary Consequences”, working paper, Graduate Center, City University of New York. Hanke, Steve H. and Nicholas Krus (2012), “World Hyperinflations”, Cato Working Paper No. 8. Hamilton, Earl J. (1977), “The Role of War in Modern Inflation”, Journal of Economic History 37, pp. 13-19. Hasselberg, Ylva (2021), Vetenskapens karaktär – Eli F. Heckscher, del I: Oberoende 1879-1924, [The nature of science – Eli F. Heckscher, part I: Independence 1879-1924] Gidlunds förlag.

I consider that an important conclusion can be drawn from this: Merely because inflation expectations are close to the target, the Riksbank cannot refrain from conducting an active monetary policy to make sure that it is attained in due course. The price increases we have seen in recent months are not something that monetary policy can affect. But the high inflation we have had in recent months risks setting off a spiral of price increases, wage drift, price increases, wage drift and so on. It is essential to ward off these tendencies in time. Therefore, it was time to adjust the direction for monetary policy. At the monetary policy meeting in April, the Executive Board decided on a less expansionary monetary policy, and the repo rate was raised by 0.25 percentage points. It was important to act in good time. As I see it now, the repo rate needs to be a couple of percentage points higher in a few years’ time. One of the purposes of a less expansionary monetary policy is to slow down economic activity and in this way reduce inflationary pressures in the economy. This can at the same time mean lower activity in the labour market. Here it is important to bear in mind that monetary policy can only affect the labour market in an imprecise way, while labour market policy has a significantly greater capacity to focus on the specific problems. References Boianovsky, Mauro (1998), “Wicksell on Deflation in the Early 1920s”, History of Political Economy 30(2), pp. 219–73.
But contrary to government debt, twothirds of the growth in corporate debt has come from developing countries. This poses a serious risk to these economies, especially where the debt is in foreign currencies. We have also seen the quality of borrowers deteriorate. Bonds rated BBB- and below now account for half of global corporate bonds, compared to just a quarter in 2007, before the financial crisis. Global debt over the past 20 years has grown on average by 6% annually. If these rates continue, and global GDP grows by 3.5% per annum as projected, we could see global debt over the next 20 years reaching $ trillion, or 500% of GDP. This is clearly unsustainable, and requires urgent action by both governments and financial institutions. More critically, the low interest rate environment has curtailed banks’ profits in some of the advanced markets, jeopardizing their longer-term viability. And record high debt levels are likely to pose increasing risk of defaults once monetary policy tightening takes course, potentially hurting the quality of banking assets. Collectively, these trends have serious implications for financial stability in general. Beyond banking, there is increasing risk of policy inaction amid weakening global governance, as evident from trade disputes. During the global financial crisis of 2008, advanced countries joined hands to fend off depression through a wellcoordinated and robust policy response.

After the adoption, last December, of a sustainable taxonomy, sustainable reporting is actually the next critical step ahead of us to mainstream green finance. I am looking forward to the report the EFRAG is currently preparing to address this issue [report to be published on 31 January 2021]. We should indeed strive to design our own framework for non-financial data, which meets our own needs (which means, for instance, integrating the ambitious concept of double materiality). It is a European responsibility, and a public one: we cannot just leave it to private bodies, at the global level. We should be committed to make our common framework operational and easy to transpose. We Europeans would then be in a position to inspire potential international initiatives aiming to produce a global sustainable reporting framework, and then make sure that the EU standards are widely recognised. Such a necessary endeavour for the EU also has domestic grounds: we will have to implement the new article 29 of the “Loi énergie et climat”, which will replace article 173. I dearly hope that, the ACPR and the French Treasury together, we can use the decree scheduled for early next year to strengthen harmonisation along the lines of the European standard that is to come. If not – but that would be a second best – we should at least ensure a French comparability. *** I have insisted on what we can do, must do, and will do: regarding supervision, monetary policy, and the harmonisation of financial disclosures.
04.10.2016  Finalising Basel III VII Expansión-KPMG Financial Meeting: “Transformation of the banking business model” Luis M. Linde Governor  Allow me to begin by expressing my gratitude for the invitation to inaugurate this VII edition of the Expansión-KPMG Financial Meeting. Last year we met, around these same dates, to analyse the move from “restructuring” to “transformation” of the banking sector. Today, the focus of the discussion is on “transformation”; and this is positive, as it shows that banks are already immersed in a process of change, enabling them to face the new landscape in the wake of the crisis. The conference programme identifies three areas that are key to the complex setting in which banks are now pursuing their activity. First, the search for profitability, which in a context of very low interest rates is a fundamental challenge for European and Spanish banks alike. Second, how to address the challenges and opportunities arising from growing technological innovation, a question to which the banking sector cannot remain immune. Third, adaptation to the regulatory changes that have come about as a response to the weaknesses identified in the wake of the international crisis that began in 2008. Regarding this latter area, I shall devote my address to the changes in the global solvency framework, not only because of their significance but also because of the timeliness of the matter. The Governors and Heads of Supervision comprising the body overseeing the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision met on 11 September.

The best, and perhaps the only, antidote to these problems is institutionalised transparency; promoting a regular, public debate on sustainable government finances at the national level. This was the Riksbank’s approach ahead of Sweden’s referendum on the euro. We recommended in this context a model that drew on the experience we have gained from conducting a monetary policy with definite, clear targets, consistent openness regarding background material such as forecasts and regular and open assessments and debates. 2  BIS Review 2/2005  Key steps in this regard could be taken by any country that wants to do so. But increased support could also be provided by way of common decisions at European level. Technically, the Excessive Deficit Protocol already contains an explicit commitment to create national institutions with a view to developing a fiscal policy framework. The EU leaders can now realise this commitment. We can also learn from each other in this process. The Commission was quick to perform benchmarking of budget systems in different countries back in the early 1990s. This was of use to Sweden when we reformed our budget process after the crisis in the early 1990s. The Commission could start up this work again. Countries could be studied, compared and put under the spotlight if they have poor fiscal policy institutions. In this way the national debates could be influenced. Allow me now to conclude with one general reflection in relation to my introductory comments.
Main macroeconomic indicators1 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Real economy indicators (in point percentage) GDP growth  7.8  6.5  4.5 - 5  6.0  6.0  Annual CPI (average)  0.0  3.1  5.2  2.3  3.0  Nominal GDP (Lek billion)  539.2  590.2  678  745  823  -8.2  -6.9  -5.8  -4.8  10.6  Fiscal indicators (in percentage versus the GDP) Fiscal deficit  -8.9  Monetary indicators (in percentage point) M 3 Growth  12  19.9  7.0  9.5  3m TB Interest rate  7.8  8.0  10.6  7.6  2.1  Inflation and monetary policy in 2004  The monetary policy of the Bank of Albania during 2003 was characterized by easing trends of the monetary conditions, in compliance with the lessening the inflationary pressures and improving the monetary indicators. The Bank of Albania took up the implementation of an easing monetary policy since April 2003 reducing the core interest rate by 0.5 percentage point. In July and October 2003, there were two other reductions by 0.5 percentage point each, bringing the core interest rate at the level it was at the beginning of the previous year. At the end of November 2003, the core interest rate was 7.0 percent; the annual inflation rate for that month was 3.4 percent, whereas the average annual inflation by the end of October was just 2.24 percent.

Thus the modern central bank is really akin to keeping peace in the nation through enhancing stability and it’s other people’s jobs to create wealth or turmoil as the case may be, the turmoil being a necessary instrument in coming to the right policies or at time the wrong ones or in an ever worse ending turmoil without apparent purpose as is so often the case in emerging markets. But it certainly is not now deemed the function of the central bank to be doing this sort of thing. So central bankers can now claim that they are basically trying to create peace and hopefully in a peaceful economy, there will be better prosperity than a wildly gyrating one. In a peaceful economy, growing stably at a high but sustainable rate, one cannot expect that there will be no criminals hidden deep down somewhere inside the society. A new instrument has therefore been added to the arsenal of monetary policy and financial supervision in the anti-money laundering legislations. The first anti-money laundering legislation was issued in 1970 by the US government. The mechanism is generally that cash deposit of more than the minimum stipulated amount would be examined. In the case of Thailand, this legislation was issued in April and became effective in August 1999. The central bank participated fully in the draft and cooperates with its implementation.
They were also, and to a large extent, the result of deeper, structural factors, as illustrated by the link between global imbalances and asymmetries in financial development. Ricardo Caballero focuses for instance on the notion of asset shortage: as safe financial assets were not readily available in some regions of the world (emerging Asia noticeably), net savings in these regions were channeled to the United States, which, in lowering financial constraints, amplified the current account deficit of this country. One may actually wonder whether this also partly contributed to the development of a financial bubble in the United States. The key idea I would like to take from this literature is that finance most certainly played a key role in the emergence of global imbalances. How and why may the G20 Roadmap help financial soundness and global rebalancing As the global economy is recovering from the crisis, the G20 roadmap aims first at ensuring the transition to a strong, sustainable and balanced growth. By “strong”, we mean that growth should converge to the growth rate of potential output over the medium term whereas that potential is enhanced by the implementation of more effective structural policies. “Sustainable” growth should be consistent with public finance sustainability, price and financial stability, along with social and environmental policy goals. Finally, “balanced” growth implies a growth that is broadly based across all G20 countries and all regions in the world, and as I said earlier, that should not generate persistent and destabilizing internal or external imbalances.

Thomas Jordan: The challenges of the global economic crisis – can Switzerland master them? Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, on the occasion of a panel discussion at the Central Bank of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, 1 February 2011. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website. *  *  *  Many countries are facing major economic challenges as a result of the financial and economic crisis. Which of these are of particular importance for Switzerland? And how can we tackle them? Switzerland is currently facing three key challenges. First, the crisis has shown that countries can encounter serious difficulties due to systemically important banks. Switzerland has two systemically important banks, in fact, these big banks are systemically important even at the global level. Thus for our country, in particular, it is essential that the stability of the financial system be sustainably reinforced. Second, the crisis has substantially changed the economic environment in which Switzerland – an economy with an extremely global orientation – operates. On the one hand, our country has to cope with the appreciation of the Swiss franc, particularly against the euro, which has come under pressure because of the sovereign debt crisis affecting certain European countries. On the other hand, the crisis has reinforced the shift in economic power towards the emerging economies.
Here, the following elements are crucial: (i) setting appropriate credit standards, (ii) proper valuation of collaterals and (iii) development of sound credit risk models. As to credit standards, pricing policies are crucial as they should be oriented to cover, at least, the costs of financing, structure and credit risk inherent to each type of operation. Banks should calculate the cost of the credit risk for different homogeneous risk groups in a manner consistent with their history of recognition of defaults and associated losses and recoveries, as well as with expected economic developments. Data integrity, reliable documentation of losses and adequate modelling to project expected losses ahead all play a key role in this respect. The setting of global limits to credit as a means of controlling the volume of the risks incurred, their evolution over time, their maturity and the application of conservative conditions whenever refinanced credits are negotiated, are all integral elements of the general lending standards that banks should observe and keep up to date as part of their credit risk management policy. Moreover, rapid credit growth usually has a negative impact on lending standards which, down the road, translates into increased needs for provisions, as non-performing loans start to pop up. We saw this clearly, and on a large scale, during the lastest banking crisis in Spain1 and elsewhere, and it is our responsibility to remain vigilant to prevent this from recurring with the appropriate supervisory tools.

It is not possible to avoid an international economic downturn entirely, but it is possible to prevent it from becoming too deep. In monetary policy it is also necessary to take into account what might happen further ahead if one conducts a very expansionary monetary policy over a long period of time. In particular the experiences of the years with low interest rates and rapid international growth prior to the current financial crisis indicate that one may also need to take into account the more longterm consequences of monetary policy and at what pace inflation should be brought back on target. There is also reason to take into account not only the total amount of spare resources in the economy, but also the composition of those resources. For an export-dependent country such as Sweden it is important, for instance, to take into account to what extent a large fall in exports could be replaced by other parts of demand through expansionary monetary policy and at what rate this could be done without inflation problems arising. Correspondingly, one may need to take into account the extent to which the labour supply will decline as a result of the depth and length of the recession when assessing what consequences a coming recovery may have for wage formation. The conclusion I draw from this is that it is important not to overestimate the available resources in the economy over the coming years.
Monetary policy The European Central Bank (ECB), which will be accountable for EMU’s single monetary policy as of next January, was established on July 1st. The monetary policy objective is price stability. The objective has not yet been defined more specifically but statements suggest that there will probably be an intermediate money supply target and that price stability will be represented by an inflation rate of 2 per cent or less. The latter has raised the question of whether Sweden ought to revise its inflation target. The question is somewhat premature in that the ECB’s target formulation has still to be finalised. Moreover, the suggested formulation is in line with what has applied in Germany, where on average in recent decades monetary policy has not resulted in a rate of inflation below 2 per cent. In view of this, together with the advantages of an inflation target that is symmetrical, there are no grounds at present for considering any change in Sweden’s inflation target. The ECB has been given a high degree of independence in fulfilling the price stability target without any short-run political considerations. The institutional conditions for monetary policy credibility are accordingly good. By itself, however, this is not enough. Credibility must also be achieved continuously, through a responsible monetary policy that is properly understood and supported by society in general. At first there may be considerable uncertainty about how the single monetary policy functions and how signals from the ECB should be interpreted.

By no means all this foreign currencydenominated credit has been provided to domestic businesses and households that have foreign currency income or other hedges against exchange risk. This poses a particular risk for borrowers and lenders alike. Foreign debt of deposit money banks at the end of January 2004 had risen year-on-year by almost 300 b.kr., or two-thirds. There are probably a number of explanations for this strong demand for foreign borrowing. Firstly, it is connected with changes in Icelandic business structures and ownership. Following the privatisation of state banks, investors have been actively involved in dissolving the old links in business ownership and forging new ones. Foreign funding, mediated by the banks, has played a key role in these events. Secondly, conditions in international finance markets have been  BIS Review 18/2004  3  favourable for such reshuffling. Foreign short-term interest rates are close to a historical low and foreign long-term interest rates are still very low, although they have risen above the nadir they reached around the middle of last year. Thirdly, Iceland enjoys economic stability and growth prospects are favourable for the next few years. In December last year the Central Bank sent a letter to chief executives of the commercial banks and largest savings bank expressing concern about the rapid increase in lending and high levels of foreign short-term financing. As is generally the case people responded in different ways, and some pointed the finger elsewhere.