samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And in this context, there is clearly a need to improve financial education and promote the development of digital skills among the public at large. The main challenge bank customers face is entering into financial contracts. If they are aware of the importance of the commitment they assume in signing each contract – and by “signing” we also mean ticking the box that reads “I accept the terms and conditions of the contract” in digitally executed transactions – they will appreciate the importance of being fully aware of this commitment before signing, and of knowing what demands they can make during the life of the operation and which unavoidable obligations they may have during that time. Banks benefit from having properly prepared customers, avoiding the unwanted consequences of poorly conceived consent that ultimately gives rise to legal risks and which may seriously compromise their reputation. For this reason banks, while improving the information they give to their customers, should promote customer awareness, integrating financial education not only into their corporate social accountability programmes but also into their product design and governance strategies. However, this responsibility for financial education does not fall exclusively or chiefly on banks. It must extend to other sectors of society, including, inter alia, third persons whose mission is to ensure the proper understanding and scope of contractual terms. And, above all and primarily, financial education must be an essential part of individual learning from a very early age.

As I noted at the start of my address, I believe it is important that they should be mindful that, although technological developments open up a greater range of options for them in terms of conducting their transactions and financial operations, they also demand of them greater responsibility and involvement. It is necessary that customers fully understand the potential consequences of their choices and, in turn, take all due precautions so as not to be the victim of illicit actions, using in this connection the control tools offered to them by their banks. Customers must, for instance, strive to understand the true scope of the authorisation being granted to a TPP and accept, should they consider it appropriate, the possible commercial use of their information beyond the provision of a specific payment service. Evidently, this 5/8  will only be the case if the TPP wishes to seize the opportunity to obtain broader authorisation than is provided for under PSD2, but this is not a remote scenario given the growing value of data in a digitalised society. The fact that, owing to a lack of knowledge or of due attention, any user may ultimately authorise access to a volume of personal information which they would really have preferred to keep private is one of the concerns arising from the development of the new technologies, and it highlights the importance of assigning resources to familiarising customers with the existence of these new risks. Another concern is the area relating to cybernetic threats and fraud.
William C Dudley: Lessons at the zero bound – the Japanese and US experience Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the Japan Society, New York City, 21 May 2013. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak today at the Japan Society.1 Our countries have very close relations and this is particularly true at the central banker level. I just got back from the BIS last week where I had a chance to spend some time with Governor Kuroda. Today, I will discuss the challenge that we both have been working to solve – how best to conduct monetary policy when short-term interest rates are already pinned close to zero, but the economy is still operating well below its potential. This has required considerable learning. After all, until Japan’s experience began in the 1990s, no major country had actually faced this problem since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As the first nation to experience the zero bound in modern times, Japan was an early pioneer in developing unconventional tools and strategies. Its experiences, both good and bad, along with lessons from other periods such as the Great Depression, have helped to inform the policies adopted by the United States (U.S.) and other nations in recent years.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Enhancing financial linkages towards economic prosperity Joint opening remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Joint High Level Conference on Islamic Finance: “Enhancing Financial Linkages Towards Economic Prosperity”, Jakarta, 18 July 2011. *  *  *  Bank Negara Malaysia sangat berbangga kerana dapat bekerjasama dengan Bank Indonesia dalam menganjurkan Persidangan Bersama Peringkat Tinggi Kewangan Islam bertema “Enhancing Financial Linkages Towards Economic Prosperity”. Fokus khusus persidangan ini ke atas kewangan Islam dan perkembangannya di peringkat antarabangsa, telah memperlihatkan perkembangan pesatnya sejak beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini, yang turut menyumbang kepada hubungan ekonomi dan pertumbuhan kewangan antarabangsa. Persidangan hari ini mempertemu peserta industri, penggubal dasar dan pengawal selia, serta ahli akademia dan pakar Shariah dari Malaysia dan Indonesia untuk membincangkan peluang-peluang kerjasama. Pengukuhan jalinan kedua-dua sektor kewangan Islam kita bukan sahaja akan menyumbang dalam membangunkan serta mengukuhkan lagi industri ini, malah ia akan turut memanfaatkan secara optima sumber kewangan serantau dan juga meningkatkan keupayaaan untuk mengurus cabaran semasa dalam persekitaran antarabangsa yang sentiasa berubah. Izinkan saya mengambil kesempatan ini untuk menyampaikan penghargaan kepada Yang Terhormat Bapak Prof. Dr. Boediono, Wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia kerana sudi menyampaikan ucaptama di persidangan pada hari ini, dan merakamkan penghargaan kami kepada Duli Yang Teramat Mulia Raja Nazrin Shah, Raja Muda Perak, Malaysia yang telah mencemar duli untuk menyampaikan titah di persidangan ini. Izinkan saya untuk meneruskan ucapan ini dalam Bahasa Inggeris.
Today, seeing that some of those trends have deepened and widened, we need to return to this topic. As we have noted and is now part of public debate, during the last few quarters real estate prices have been steadily increasing in some districts and for some types of construction (table 3). Aggregate prices of office space also continued to grow, but less than did residential prices. In the residential sector, the sales of houses and apartments have risen substantially, especially in blueprint or catalog stage, indicating some shortage in the short-term supply (figure 6). In the commercial sector, although the available vacancy indicators are still low, private real estate firms continue to forecast significant growth in the supply of office space for this purpose. Although such price increase can find justification in its macro and microeconomic fundamentals, it must be monitored closely. These price increases have occurred in a context of high growth in housing demand and a significant expansion in output in the sector, accompanied with higher leverage among real estate firms. Meanwhile, and because of the stage of the supply-demand cycle the residential real estate sector is in now, an acceleration of mortgage credit in the medium term cannot be ruled out. It must also be kept in mind that the lending standards for these credits have eased somewhat, which reflects in an increase in the fraction of the property price that is lent (figure 7).

This concept covers a significant number of possibilities, some of which are the direct decision of the central banks while others rely on other authorities. For example, the potential risks that could be generated in the real estate sector have driven some regulators and supervisors elsewhere to use a series of prudential instruments to safeguard the financial system and reduce the sector’s volatility. Worth mentioning are the limits to the loan to value ratio, the limits to the ratio between debt and income, changes in the credit risk weighting, and capital requirements. The particulars of these measures vary from country to country, but normally more than one of them applies and entails coordination of several authorities. Because of its short history, a full evaluation of the results is yet to be done. The Financial Stability Board, created one year ago in Chile, is a proper instance of coordination to analyze these issues. In any case, the Board follows closely the evolution of the external and domestic macroeconomic scenarios and their implications on inflation, and reiterates its commitment to conduct monetary policy in such a way that projected inflation stands at 3% over the policy horizon, as well as to continue to closely monitor any risk factors that could affect the financial stability of the country. Let me finish with some reflections. Final reflections The Chilean economy is in a good standing.
In recent quarters, however, this relief has come about more through the channel of lower imports than that of more buoyant exports, which is attributable to the parallel weakness of some of our main European customers. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In these conditions, the outlook for 2012 is not favourable and remains subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Broadly, the Banco de España’s view does not differ greatly from that of the Government implicit in the macroeconomic table accompanying the Budget. The process of adjustment of national demand will continue. Private consumption will be affected by the decline in employment and by the lower support that general government will be giving to household income. However, the impact of these two factors will be partly offset by more moderate price increases and, probably, by a continuation of the decline in the saving rate, although the margin available for this to smooth the pattern of private consumption is increasingly limited. Business investment will undoubtedly be affected by the slackness of domestic spending and because many firms will continue aiming to reduce their level of indebtedness. Nor are significant changes in the ongoing adjustment of residential investment foreseeable. On the demand side, no improvement can be expected in affordability conditions given the outlook for private sector income and wealth and, on the supply side, the overhang of unsold housing will continue to hold back the launching of new construction projects.

Admittedly, as I have noted on previous occasions in this House, the evidence on the effectiveness of previous fiscal consolidation processes implemented in other developed economies shows that it increases when they are concentrated on public expenditure, in unproductive expenditure. However, the scale of the adjustment required in our country is so great that we need to make use of all the instruments available, including taxes. The 2012 Budget envisages an increase in revenue from tax measures falling basically on household and corporate income. Also, a special charge is imposed for the regularisation of hidden assets. The revenue-raising potential of these measures is expected to offset the fall in revenue due to the unfavourable trend in tax bases deduced from the macroeconomic scenario accompanying the Budget. Last year’s experience, when the bulk of the budget deviation stemmed from the adverse performance of government revenue, showed that it is essential to budget prudently for this variable. In this respect, the projected course of overall budget revenue is subject to downside risks. The reasons for this are various. First, because both the expected corporate income tax receipts and any other tax revenue will depend on the ultimate effectiveness of the numerous legislative changes, which is particularly uncertain in the case of the special charge on undeclared income.
The opportunities which enlargement would provide for investors should not be underestimated given that Europe is the region having the greatest concentration of regional trade agreements with third countries, and that it is also the region with the highest proportion of imports that is outsourced from partners covered by such agreements. The resultant increase in employment opportunities should compensate for any jobs lost through restructuring. The prospect of access to a large market will not, of course, alone guarantee larger inflows of FDI. Investment decisions are not based solely on considerations of market size. Unfortunately, Malta is at a disadvantage in terms of other relevant criteria such as resource endowments and transport costs. Such deficiencies, therefore, have to be made up for through other factors, including a sound  19  It could also be argued that the additional tax revenue from the application of the CET to imports from non-EU countries would make up at least partly for any losses arising from the removal of duties on intra-EU trade and trade with EU partners covered by reciprocal agreements. 20  The Cotonou Agreement additionally foresees that the number of developing countries that will continue to receive nonreciprocal access to EU markets under other agreements of this type is expected to decline, although there could remain a certain degree of asymmetry in timing to take into account the specific needs of developing countries.

It should, therefore, be clear that if it is to prosper, Malta will have to seek an accommodation with the EU. The prevailing view among countries on the periphery of the existing EU-15 is that the prospective longterm benefits of membership outweigh the costs. That is why they are anxious to become members. 25  European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. (2001) “The Economic Impact of Enlargement.” Enlargement Papers No 4. June. http://europa.eu.int/economy_finance. The report notes that between 2005 and 2009 the average growth rate in 8 of the accession countries (the first wave of exceeding countries excluding Malta and Cyprus) will be 2.9%, 4.6% and 6.1%, respectively under the baseline scenario, a central scenario and an optimistic scenario. In a similar vein, a recent report by the National Bank of Hungary concludes that the adoption of the euro could boost economic growth in Hungary by between 0.6 to 0.9 percentage points annually for 20 years. Most of the growth will come from increased international trade. See National Bank of Hungary, Occasional Paper 24, “Adopting the Euro in Hungary: expected costs, benefits and timing”, by Attila Csajbok and Agnes Csermely. 8  BIS Review 69/2002  Until such time as an equally well-documented argument is made which seriously questions this view, the case for membership remains a compelling one. BIS Review 69/2002  9
Incomes have also developed positively – at least for those who still have jobs. Another important explanation of why house prices have not fallen more is that the real interest rates faced by the households are at historically low levels. The construction of new housing has also been at a low level since the crisis of the 1990s. This is despite the fact that in most of the large urban areas it pays to build new house in comparison to what it costs to buy an existing house. 9 At the moment, when the crisis appears to have bottomed out and optimism has begun to grow, housing prices are beginning to increase again, especially in the major cities. The Riksbank will closely monitor developments in the period ahead with regard to both the housing market and the market for commercial properties. The Swedish banks can cope with large losses in the Baltic states In the deep recession that we are now experiencing, it is not possible to dismiss the fact that the Swedish banks are facing significant loan losses. During the first six months of this year, these losses amounted to SEK 30 billion, which translated into annual figures is equivalent to 0.84 per cent of total lending. A large part of these losses, 44 per cent, stem from the Swedish banks' operations in the Baltic states.

Or, put somewhat differently, on an ex post (i.e., realized) basis, saving must equal investment. Investment in this case means current spending on new physical, human and intangible capital. This insight is the conceptual basis for national income accounting and the gross domestic product (GDP) statistics that we follow so carefully. Even so, economists have been debating the implications of Say’s Law since it was first expounded. Classical economists argued that this ex post balance would occur in a way that kept the economy quite stable at full employment. If there were shocks to saving or investment spending that pushed the economy away from full employment, prices and wages  BIS Review 41/2010  1  would adjust quickly, providing the market signals needed to bring about the reallocation of resources required to restore full employment. The global depression of the 1930s raised serious questions about this classical theory. Although saving must equal investment on an ex post basis, the two can diverge ex ante, potentially sharply. For example, when ex ante (i.e., desired) saving exceeds ex ante (desired) investment spending, inventories rise above desired levels. If prices of the products in question do not fall sufficiently rapidly so that this unwanted build-up of inventories is sold quickly, then production and employment must fall. Perhaps most famously, Keynes, in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, argued that there are institutional rigidities that inhibit price and wage flexibility.
It is just as important to avoid a rate of inflation that is too low as it is to avoid a rate that is too high. Changes in labour costs influence the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. Labour market tightness is heavily influenced by demand for goods and services. High levels of private and public consumption, investment and exports will sustain the demand for labour. When the supply of labour is limited, competition for labour pushes up wages. Low imported price inflation pushes down consumer price inflation. Price inflation by origin. Per cent 5  5  Goods and services produced in Norway  3  3 CPI-ATE  1  1 -1  -1  Imported consumer goods  -3  -3 1999  2000  2001  2002  Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  In many countries, low and stable inflation is the goal of monetary policy. It can therefore be assumed that imported inflation will remain subdued. But, the rise in prices will still vary as a result of global economic developments. The krone exchange rate also plays an important role in determining import prices. A strong krone will curb prices for imported goods. When there is a rise in interest rates in Norway and a widening differential between domestic and foreign interest rates, investments in NOK increase, and the krone exchange rate appreciates.

Warnock, F. and V. Warnock (2009), “International capital flows and U.S. interest rates”, Journal of  International Money and Finance, 28, pp. 903–919; and Caballero, R. and A. Krishnamurthy (2009), “Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 99:2, pp. 584–588. 3 See Cœuré, B. (2017), “The international dimension of the ECB’s asset purchase programme”, speech at the  Foreign Exchange Contact Group meeting, 11 July; and Cœuré, B. (2017), “Monetary policy, exchange rates and capital flows”, speech at the 18th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 3 November. 4 See e.g. Eggertsson, G. B. and M. Woodford (2003), “The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and OptimalMonetary  Policy”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No 1, pp. 139–211. 5 See e.g. Culbertson, J. (1957), “The Term Structure of Interest Rates”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 71, pp. 485–517; and Vayanos, D. and J.-L. Vila (2009), “A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates”, NBER Working Paper, No 15487. 6 See e.g. Cœuré, B. (2015), “Embarking on public sector asset purchases”, speech at the Second International  Conference on Sovereign Bond Markets, Frankfurt, 10 March; and Altavilla, C., G. Carboni and R. Motto (2015), “Asset purchase programmes and financial markets: lessons from the euro area”, ECB Working Paper No 1864; and Blattner, T. and M. Joyce (2017), “Net debt supply shocks in the euro area and the implications for QE”, ECB Working Paper No 1957.
And I see that as an illustration of a broader conviction: only through our unity and our solidarity will we overcome this trying ordeal for our country.

This is to do with the fact that it is general price levels that can be influenced by monetary policy, and not the prices of items such as meat or nails. This is also to do with the fact that the positive effects of stable monetary value manifest themselves precisely because the players in the economy can rely on purchasing power which is not undermined. At the same time the Riksbank has, in various contexts, maintained that there can be reasons for ignoring effects on inflation which are thought to be temporary. The reason for this is that it is not often possible to influence inflation quickly enough to counteract transitional price impulses without this leading to larger real disruptions. We have said, however, that we shall give as clear an account as possible of what the temporary effects are and how we deal with them. When examining the formulation of monetary policy in situations involving considerable pricemoderating effects, it can also be a good idea to give some reflection to the time perspective of monetary policy. One possibility is that the visible effects ebb away quickly, even though they occur beyond the normal policy horizon. In that case, presumably, one should be careful not to stimulate the economy too much. The opposite would apply if inflation were forced up strongly by some effect which could be expected to dissipate beyond the 2-year horizon. This is obviously a difficult question of judgement. Should a forecast change in prices be considered to be temporary or not?