samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I have considerable uncertainty about this estimate. Regional economic conditions Now let’s turn to the New Jersey economy. One feature of the state’s economy is its industrial diversity. A sizeable number of jobs in the state are in the healthcare, professional and business services, wholesale and retail trade, and leisure and hospitality categories. When we look at the northern part of the state, we see a greater concentration of jobs in finance, particularly in Hudson County. Also prominent are goods distribution jobs related to the ports, rail lines, trucking and warehousing. Other large sectors include pharmaceuticals manufacturing and research and development, as well as private education. Looking at recent trends in northern New Jersey, the recovery in the economy in general – and in employment in particular – is lagging the nation and is not going as well as we would like. The Garden State’s economy lost a quarter of a million jobs during the recession, and employment didn’t begin to recover until 2011, and even then it was slow getting started. However, the latest annual employment revisions – released just a few weeks ago – show job gains in 2013 and 2014 were a bit stronger than previously reported. Nevertheless, four years into the recovery, employment has recovered less than two-thirds of the job losses from the recession. This contrasts notably with both New York State and the U.S. as a whole, where employment has far surpassed its earlier peaks.

But the krone exchange rate also shows monthly and yearly fluctuations. The krone was strong towards the end of the previous cyclical expansion, but depreciated when interest rates declined in 2003. Thereafter, the krone appreciated again as growth in the Norwegian economy recovered. Over the past two years, the krone has appreciated by close to 5 per cent. Even though the krone has appreciated, inflation has picked up and is now fairly close to 2.5 per cent. While different measures of inflation as recently as last year were below 1½ per cent, the same measures are now between 2.1 and 3.3 per cent. The rise in the consumer price index (CPI) reflects the increase in electricity prices. Underlying inflation has also increased and is now assessed to be between 2 and 3¼ per cent. Prices for domestically produced goods and services are rising at a particularly fast pace. At the same time, prices for imported consumer goods are no longer falling. Higher inflation is expected one to two years ahead. BIS Review 45/2008  3  At the same time, growth in the Norwegian economy is strong. An ample supply of labour will allow growth in the Norwegian economy to hold up for a period ahead. Capacity utilisation is nevertheless likely to decline. Weaker growth in the world economy may have an impact on developments in the Norwegian export industry, which may gradually spill over to other business sectors in Norway.
5  Within the EU a discussion has come up as to which type of authority is best suited to exercise supervision of the financial system: the central banks with their overall responsibility for the safe and efficient functioning of the payment system, or independent financial supervisory authorities, which are not involved in monetary policy decisions that can have consequences for individual institutions. In Sweden we apply the latter model, which I consider to work well in our environment. On the one hand, the risk of a conflict of interests between monetary policy decisions and supervisory decisions will thereby be avoided, and on the other hand it provides scope for a co-ordinated supervision between financial operations pursued in different institutional forms, e.g. banking and insurance, within financial conglomerates. Other EU countries have other models and there are also ambitions from some quarters to change the division of responsibilities. In my opinion, there is no reason to settle for a particular institutional solution for the supervisory work; it is more important to ensure the good functioning of the arrangements that apply. A larger issue that might have institutional consequences is whether it is sufficient in a more integrated EU to rely on co-operation and co-ordination between national authorities or whether a controlling authority is needed that can take on a leader role as required to ensure that the co-operation functions well.

We have no pre-set course, however; the timing will depend on the data. Moreover, the precise timing of the first rate rise is less important than our expectation that, when rates do begin to rise, those increases are likely to be gradual and limited. Why does the Bank expect this to be the case? In part, because the headwinds facing the economy are likely to take some time to die down. Demand in our major export markets remains muted. Public balance sheet repair is ongoing. And a highly indebted private sector is likely to be particularly sensitive to changes in interest rates. Over the medium term, several dynamics are likely to keep rates lower than in the past. UK rates could be restrained by continued imbalances between global saving and investment, together with potentially lower rates of global productivity growth. Central banks can also be expected to accommodate with lower risk-free rates the higher spreads that are likely to result from new regulatory requirements. All of these factors likely mean that, even when spare capacity is used up, Bank Rate will need to be materially lower than in the past in order to keep the economy operating at its potential and inflation at its target. The Bank is well aware that a prolonged period of historically low interest rates could encourage other risks to develop. In the UK, the biggest risks are associated with the housing market, which is why last spring the Bank took graduated and proportionate actions.
Facing this new reality, the policy reaction function of central banks from the emerging market economies could, to quote BIS General Manager Carstens, be described as a multi-instrument reaction function responding to multiple-indicator variables, including the exchange rate. Given these increasingly complex and interconnected challenges and the risks of policy tradeoffs, what should guide policymakers going forward? Allow me to pose three questions on this. Question 1: The assignment problem First, the assignment problem – how do we assign policy tools to policy targets appropriately? The Tinbergen principle suggests that policymakers trying to achieve multiple economic targets need to have at least one policy tool for each policy target. Robert Mundell went one step further and suggested that each policy instrument should be assigned to the policy target on which it has the greatest relative effect. This may sound good in theory, but we know it is much more complex in reality given the multifaceted and often interconnected risks confronting us. For ASEAN policymakers, how can we assign the tools available to us to our expanding objectives/mandates in the most optimal way? How do we avoid overburdening any single policy tool? If multiple tools are needed, how do we sequence them? Is there a case to be made for an optimal order of policy based on prioritising of objectives? Or is a pre-agreed sequenced policy order too restrictive? Question 2: Rules versus discretion Second, is the old question of rules versus discretion.

Marzunisham Omar: Comprehensive approaches to monetary and financial policy making in ASEAN-5 countries Welcome remarks by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the third BNM-IMF Seminar, Kuala Lumpur, 17 July 2019. * * * In his remarks at this seminar last year, Odd Per quoted the book Enchanted; “First time is luck, second time is a coincidence and third time is a tradition.” Here we are gathered today for the third BNM-IMF Seminar to celebrate this “tradition”, a tradition I hope will continue for many years as we can all agree that candid and open dialogue between the IMF and ASEAN-5 central banks is mutually beneficial. Let me take this opportunity to thank the IMF and the team at Bank Negara Malaysia for organising this Seminar and to my colleagues from the region for being highly supportive of this effort. The topic today – “Comprehensive Approaches to Monetary and Financial Policy Making in ASEAN-5 Countries” – is indeed timely given the ongoing work at the IMF on the “Integrated Policy Framework”. I hope today’s Seminar will help shed greater insights on how central banks in ASEAN economies, which are small, open economies, navigate through increasingly complex, interrelated issues in our pursuit of preserving monetary and financial stability. I have no doubt that we in ASEAN will also find today’s Seminar useful in understanding the IMF’s latest thinking on these issues. There are two parts to my brief remarks today.
Quarterly GDP volatility in the United States, for example, has fallen by more than half since the mid 1980s. And average rates of inflation and the variability of inflation outcomes have of course  BIS Review 44/2007  1  declined substantially as well. This is not to say that these swings in exchange rates have not come with pain and trauma, only that overall economic performance has fared better than many would have expected three decades ago when contemplating life under flexible exchange rates. Among emerging markets, experience with exchange rate flexibility has been more limited, and the record has been more mixed. Chile probably has one of the longest record of successful performance under a flexible regime, success due in large part of course to a strong record of prudent macroeconomic policy management and strong institutions. But there are many more examples today – Brazil and Mexico are two – of emerging economies with sustained periods of improved growth and inflation outcomes under more flexible exchange rate regimes. Emerging market economies face substantially greater challenges than the less open major economies in adjusting to a more integrated world and to the greater exposure to real and financial volatility that comes with integration. Large movements in capital flows can complicate the task of achieving sustainable growth, low inflation and financial stability. This is obvious for those countries experiencing sharp net outflows of capital, but the challenges are formidable even for those countries experiencing sustained periods of large inflows.

Inflation expectations may be sensitive to a large but temporary shock that moved inflation outside the range within which it has remained for some years. With their belief in stability jolted, households’ inflation expectations might move by much more than was justified by the temporary nature of the shock. That would make it more difficult for the central bank to bring inflation back to target. The moral of this particular story is that it may be risky to infer from the observation that inflation expectations are stable that all is well. There will be times when large and persistent shocks occur, and it would be unwise to count on inflation expectations remaining stable when actual inflation starts to deviate substantially from its recent range. So those are the three lessons that I have learnt from Alan: (i) a recognition that economics is not a set of doctrines but a way of thinking; (ii) the importance of using qualitative and quantitative information from a range of sources; (iii) there are a small number of fundamental objectives that are crucial and which we can judge by the Greenspan yardstick of whether we have freed businesses and households from the burden of expending resources to deal with unnecessary policy volatility. Alan’s departure from the central banking scene will deprive us of a source of wisdom, inspiration and leadership. To be sure, Alan’s words, whether spoken or written, will surely still reach us from the sidelines.
Preference of traditional channels of service provision over e-banking In terms of service distribution channel, brick banks still have competitive edge over click banks as consumers still prefer to conduct banking transaction with human contact at bank branches or sub-branches. E-banking is not yet well-accepted by consumers on account of: •  uncertainty surrounding accuracy of the services;  •  lack of transaction evidence that might be useful in case of dispute settlement; and  •  lack of knowledge among some retail customers. The use of automated teller machines is quite well-spread while the use of phone banking and Internet banking is still limited to a small fraction of customers. According to the survey, high-income retail customers tend to make use of phone banking and Internet banking more often than do low income customers. Usage of phone banking and Internet banking by corporate customers is still low, though  2  BIS Review 22/2004  large and medium corporate tend to use phone banking and Internet banking more often than do small corporate. Financial service needs expected in the next few years Due to the current low return on savings with commercial banks, both individual and corporate consumers revealed preference towards alternative saving instruments such as saving bonds and government bonds. As for financing, the needs expected by individual customers are those for the purposes of working capital, residential, education and business expansion, while those of corporate customers remain financing for long-term investment for business expansion and short-term working capital requirements.

After more than 40 years in banking, many of them in Hong Kong, he is about to retire from the field. He is thus currently much in demand among his many friends within the financial community, who wish to fete him on his retirement. He is also receiving bookings in his new, risk-taking career as popular singer and entertainer – a field in which we wish him every success. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to David for his outstanding contributions to Hong Kong during difficult and challenging times, not just in the financial sphere, but also in the many community and charitable activities in which he is involved. Ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour to welcome Governor Jaime Caruana as speaker, and Mr David Eldon as discussant. I now have much pleasure in inviting Governor Caruana to deliver the seventh HKMA Distinguished Lecture. 2  BIS Review 9/2005
We have given advice principally on core functions such as monetary policy and operations, the development of money markets and payment systems, the management of government debt, and banking supervision; but our help has also been sought in some less obvious matters such as the physical security of central bank buildings and their contents. The assistance is provided through our experts visiting other central banks and by their staff coming on study visits to London, as well as through seminars and workshops here and abroad. In the earlier years most of these events were essentially training courses. But increasingly the participants from many countries are able to contribute more themselves to the discussion so that they are now learning not only from our own experience as central bankers, BIS Review 33/1997  -2-  but also from each other. And in some instances, their experience may well hold lessons for us. Since 1990 over 4,000 staff of other central banks - two thirds of them from the transition economies - have participated in these various events. The work of the Centre for Central Banking Studies, and the other inter-bank links we maintain (notably between supervisors) give us, I believe, a privileged perspective on the development of central banking across Europe. The analysis below - particularly the Eastern European sections - is very largely the work of Lionel Price, the Centre’s Director, and his staff.

High unemployment and low labour force participation among women may make room for further growth in employment even if the population stops growing. The demographic situation in Norway is more favourable, but the labour force in Norway is also likely to grow at a slower pace. Labour immigration, which has made an important contribution to the labour market since the turn of the millennium, has fallen sharply in recent years. The unemployment rate is relatively low in Norway, but many have dropped out of the workforce. One in six aged between 25 and 54 was without paid work in 2016. If we are able to mobilise more people to join the workforce, labour supply growth may hold steady, but the most likely scenario is slower growth in the labour force. Chart: Productivity growth The other factor, productivity, has contributed less and less to economic growth, which is a tendency we have seen for several decades both in Norway and other advanced economies. The question then arises whether the underlying growth potential of mature economies has diminished. Chart: Growth in technology leading countries and in Norway If we broaden our perspective to span several centuries, it is the rapid rise in productivity in modern times that stands out. For a long time, there were only marginal changes in living standards from one generation to the next. In economic terms, the Middle Ages was something of an ice age. The industrial revolution that began in England in the late 18th century put an end to this inertia.
The unprecedented high international oil prices, the unfavourable security situation due to heightened terrorist activity, the unforeseen investment needs in the post tsunami reconstruction, the ending of the debt moratorium that was granted in the wake of the Tsunami and the intense export competition arising from the elimination of textile quotas, all left its mark on the economy in 2006. While each of these challenges were very serious, let me briefly deal with the special challenge arising from the uncertain security situation as a result of terrorist attacks launched by the LTTE from early January 2006. In face of these attacks, even reluctantly, this threat had to be faced head-on and the terrible attacks had to be repulsed by the Government. Such efforts obviously required the appropriation of a significant amount of resources, a part of which could have been otherwise available for more productive activity. Nevertheless, no responsible government could ignore persistent and delibarate attacks against the country’s integrity, defence, economic centers and public, and hence, as has been done in many countries across the world, the key economic centers and the public has to be safeguarded from the terrorist attacks through the implementation of the necessary anti-terrorism initiatives. In that context, the governmental interventions to protect the interests of the country, and its economic infrastructure should be clearly recognised as a basic imperative in the overall defence as well as macroeconomic plan of the nation.

This is why it is crucial for central banks to continuously re-think their risk management framework to stand ready, even in the “good times”, to switch to the “crisis mode”, and also to ensure that the decisions taken in the midst of a crisis will not jeopardise their ability to pursue their institutional objectives in the future. 5. Concluding remarks  To conclude, it is crucial for a central bank to fulfil the highest governance standards in organizing its risk management function and applying state-of-the-art tools, in order to ensure that the right decisions are taken in the design of the risk control framework and the implementation of monetary policy and investment operations. By doing so we may also be encouraging other market participants to follow. Therefore, our responsibility is twofold. As you see, the challenges we face may be slightly different from those faced by private institutions. But the lessons learned from the crisis, and the actions to be taken in the near future may not be so different. We are all on the same boat, learning how to sail towards a safe port. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Paris – Banque de France, 11 February 2021 The role of central banks in the greening of the economy  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr), Déborah Guedj (deborah.guedj@banquefrance.fr  Page 1 sur 8 I would like to welcome you to the Banque de France for this 5th edition of the Rencontres on "Climate Change and Sustainable Finance", organised jointly with Option Finance. Central banks’ commitment to the climate cause may seem obvious today, and this despite the urgency of addressing the Covid pandemic. But it was not the case five years ago, and few issues have seen such a rapid and massive change in mindset and initiative. At the Banque de France and increasingly within the Eurosystem, we are driven by a simple but tenacious ambition: to do our utmost to support and add to the collective action in the fight against global warming. We cannot do everything – nothing will replace an appropriate carbon price and therefore, let me be clear, a carbon tax in one form or another. But we can do a lot. The Banque de France spearheaded the creation of the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which was launched in Paris in December 2017 and is chaired by our Dutch colleague Frank Elderson.

In addition to transition risks, climate events are already having increasingly visible effects on activity and food prices. The price of wheat has currently reached a historic high, partly for climate reasons. In Europe itself, the drought in the summer of 2018 had caused the Rhine to drop to a historically low level and slowed growth in Germany by disrupting river transport. Page 3 sur 8 In the longer term, climate change will weigh on the potential growth of our economies. Numerous studies show that higher temperatures reduce labour productivity by about 2% for every degree above 25°C. iv According to simulations by the Banque de France, real GDP in Europe is expected to be 2 to 6% lower in 2050, in the event of a disorderly rather than orderly climate transition. 1.2 For the smooth implementation of monetary policy Climate risk is also a source of financial risk. It is therefore essential, as my colleague and friend Jens Weidmann, President of the Bundesbank, says, that "central banks […] practice what they preach" v for the banks they supervise, i.e. better factor climate risk into their own operations. Moreover, preserving financial stability is a prerequisite for ensuring the smooth transmission of monetary policy, as the NGFS also recently recalled. vi Let's face it: the ECB's balance sheet is "exposed" to climate risk through the securities it purchases and the assets pledged as collateral by banks, to an extent that is insufficiently taken into account.