samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Although natural catastrophes – and damage caused by them – have risen in Asia in the last ten years, we remain significantly underinsured against perils like flooding. As disaster risk exposures grow in scale, size and complexity, it would exceed the individual capacity of local insurance markets, and governments, to insure the risks of its populations and communities. PPPs between public and private sectors, and across national borders, can be effective in maximising the benefits of insurance. Such examples of horizontal integration between markets are key in managing the region’s rising exposures to natural catastrophe risks. 19. Collation of natural catastrophe risk data and analytics across ASEAN countries is a necessary first step toward more comprehensive catastrophe protection, paving the way for insurance integration in this region. Currently, the fragmented market structure in ASEAN constrains data sharing and the capacity of domestic insurers to pool and underwrite risks. In Singapore, key partners from academia and industry, alongside the MAS, have come together to form a work group to explore the establishment of a Natural Catastrophe Data Analytics Exchange. This Exchange serves as a regional platform to collect data and model  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  less understood regions at risk in Asia-Pacific, facilitate better pricing of such risks, and eventually pave the way for more comprehensive insurance against these risks. 20. In combination, these comprehensive efforts among jurisdictions and participants are very encouraging.

The RQDII scheme will allow qualified domestic institutional investors to purchase RMB-denominated securities abroad, which was recently approved. In Myanmar, one of the most under-banked countries with bank loans amounting to just one-fifth of GDP6, the issuance of nine licences to foreign banks (including two Singapore banks) will help to bring much-needed capital for economic development, financial services and technology transfer. These are but two examples of the blossoming of financial services in Asia – whether through cross-border channels, overseas expansion or domestic liberalisation – which will integrate the region financially. 9. Financial integration brings clear benefits to both users and providers of financial services. It leads to more effective mobilisation of savings from surplus countries to countries that need capital, and improve the efficiency of investment allocation. A well-developed and competitive financial sector can thus be a catalyst to spur and sustain economic growth. The opening up of the financial sector to foreign participation adds to the sector’s development as foreign financial institutions also promote competition and innovation, and create the urgency for local institutions to upgrade capabilities. This has been our experience in Singapore. 10. International regulatory reforms are adding impetus to market integration. Let me cite two examples. First, as new Basel 3 capital and liquidity rules come into force, banks are seeking ways to manage their capital and liquidity more efficiently.
Today I would like to look at the effect fintech innovations could have on a key element of the financial system, namely the financial market infrastructure. The financial market infrastructure, FMI for short, comprises trading platforms, securities settlement systems and payment systems via which financial transactions are conducted electronically. The FMI is generally not in the spotlight. Nevertheless, both the financial sector and the Swiss economy as a whole depend on a secure and efficient FMI. The SNB monitors developments in this area very closely given that facilitating and securing the operation of cashless payment systems is one of its statutory tasks. In this speech I will be discussing the significance of fintech for the financial market infrastructure. First, I will address DLT’s potential in the FMI. Second, I will be talking about the tried-and-tested division of roles between the central bank and commercial banks. I will look at how this two-tier system paves the way for harnessing fintech innovations that could enhance efficiency, while ensuring that this is not to the detriment of either safety or reliability. Third, using the example of retail payments, I will show that there is a lot more to fintech than just DLT, and that private sector players are much better suited to providing timely solutions and flexibly addressing the needs of customers in this area.

Certain central banks – those of Singapore and Hong Kong, for example – are now focusing on this, as are private initiatives. Should the anticipated advantages materialise, the attendant efficiency gains would be substantial. That said, for both of these potential applications there are high barriers that have to be overcome in order for new solutions to be implemented in practice and find their place in the market. The current ecosystem comprises a large number of stakeholders, who would have to adapt their systems and processes. The high level of investment this entails is curbing the pace of developments, as are the technical and legal questions still to be resolved. Tried-and-tested division of roles between banks and central banks What is the SNB’s take on these developments? We welcome innovations that enhance the efficiency of processes. But while the initial experiments have been promising, there is still a long way to go before market-ready DLT solutions become a reality in the FMI. DLT has still to prove that the hoped-for efficiency gains can actually be delivered in practice. Furthermore, simply enhancing efficiency alone is not enough. Such gains must not come at the expense of the availability and resilience of the systems or the integrity of the data. This applies especially to those parts of the FMI that are systemically important. Here we set the highest of standards when it comes to stability and security. Page 4/8  The secure settlement of large-value payments is a prerequisite for the stability of the financial system.
24 Supervisory issues associated with benchmark transition: Report to the G20, July 9, 2020. 25 BCBS, Basel Framework frequently asked questions, June 2020. 26 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Joint Statement on Managing the LIBOR Transition. 27 OCIE, Risk Alert: Examination Initiative: LIBOR Transition Preparedness, June 18, 2020.  https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  6/6

Már Guðmundsson: Recent economic and financial developments in Iceland Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the 52nd Annual General Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland, Reykjavík 21 March 2013. *  *  *  Madame Prime Minister; Ministers; Madame Chairman; Directors and Ambassadors; Ladies and Gentlemen: As we convene for the 52nd Annual General Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland, the domestic economic recovery that began in mid-2010 continues, although it has slowed down in recent months. At least to a degree, the slowdown is due to developments internationally. The margin of spare capacity in the economy continues to narrow. Inflation has proven more persistent than previously hoped, however. Early on, wage increases far in excess of productivity growth played a leading role in raising inflation well above the inflation target, but since last autumn the weakening of the króna, triggered by deteriorating terms of trade and a heavy foreign debt service burden, has played a greater part. Monetary policy responded to these developments with interest rate increases beginning in August 2011. The Bank’s interest rates have been unchanged since November, however, and intervention in the foreign exchange market has supported the exchange rate in the recent term, thereby supporting the monetary policy goal of bringing inflation back to target. Global output growth lost pace in 2012, but to differing degrees in various regions. There was a contraction in the euro area and marginal growth in the UK and elsewhere in Europe.
8 The emergence of homo sapiens globalus i.e. the global labour market Further in my speech, I would like to present two main global forces that will drive the emergence of the homo sapiens globalus: -  economic migration, i.e. relocation of people in search for better-paid jobs and better living standards;  -  outsourcing and off-shoring, i.e. relocation of workplaces in search of less costly or better qualified workforce to lower the production costs, increase the product and service quality, mitigate the risk, and boost innovation. People relocate in search for work – economic migration One of the strongest motivations behind migration is the difference in wages, or – more broadly – in the living standards between countries. Such differences have existed for many years, as is the case with migration. It may be expected, however, that the emergence of the global labour market coupled with the aforesaid demographical trends and the decrease in the cost of transport will lead to increased economic migration, including migration from poor countries and regions to the rich ones. According to UN estimates, in the period 1970 - 1980 the number of immigrants to the developed countries increased by 2.4%, in the period 1982 - 1990 by 2.9%, and in the period 1990 - 2000 by 3.1%. Migration adds to the value of the global income.

The increased openness in the economy that has resulted from among other things the NAFTA and GATT agreements, has meant that foreign trade has functioned as a “shock absorber” for fluctuations in domestic demand. Finally, fortunate circumstances seem to have played a part. With the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s, resources were freed up, principally in the military sector, which could be put to more productive use in the private sector. Further, both the Mexican crisis and the Asian crisis have been shocks that have checked certain tendencies towards overheating and thus also inflation, yet without leading the economy into recession. During the crises, a “flight to quality” appears to have led to falling long interest rates, which has benefited stock exchange prices and strengthened the dollar. Foreign investors have been willing to finance the deficit in America’s current account, which at present comes to about 4% of GNP. To sum up, it seems likely that a certain rise in the growth potential has taken place in the USA during the 1990s and that inflationary tendencies have declined. Just how much nevertheless remains an open question. The OECD, for example, has raised its estimate of the potential growth rate to just over 3%. However, in the past three years growth has amounted to more than 4% on average, which means that the OECD regards some of the factors discussed above as temporary in nature and expects growth to slacken as these factors die away.
That, in sum, is what Basel II is all about. I believe that the incentives for better risk management that are built into the new capital framework, and the flexibility to adapt the framework to local needs, will ensure its validity. I also believe it marks a major step forward in the right direction, and that it will contribute to a more resilient and stable banking system that is capable of promoting sustainable economic growth. The Committee recently announced its intention to verify that Basel II meets our long-stated objective of maintaining the overall level of capital in the banking system while keeping incentives to adopt the most advanced and risk-sensitive approaches. As a result we intend to conduct a fifth Quantitative Impact Study, or QIS 5, in the last quarter of this year. It is important to understand sooner rather than later what the impact of the framework will be. The Basel Committee will continue its work based on the existing timetable, and supervisors and bankers planning to implement Basel II should continue their preparations accordingly. Banking supervision and financial stability Let me turn now to my second topic, which is the link between effective banking supervision and financial stability. I’m sure we can all agree that a stable banking system is critical to the long-term growth of an economy. But discussing financial stability issues is always a challenge because we don’t have a framework for financial stability as comprehensive as in the case of price stability.

(2007)  BIS Review 156/2009  5  Figure 2 Growth volatility in Chile, 1911-2010 (*)  (Standard deviation of the growth rate)  18% 15% 12%  15.0% 11.5% 12.0%  9%  7.5%  7.3% 5.1%  6%  2.9%  3% 0%  6.9% 3.6%  2.2%  1911- 1921- 1931- 1941- 1951- 1961- 1971- 1981- 1991- 20011920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010  (*) 2009-2010 based on the IPoM of September 2009. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 3 Percentage drop in the MPR between September 2008 and September 2009 and Central Bank independence  % drop in MPR (09.2008 09.2009)  1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0  0.2  0.4 0.6 0.8 CBC independent index (Arnone et al. , 2007)  1.0  Sources: Arnone et al. (2007) and Bloomberg. 6  BIS Review 156/2009  References Arnone, M., B.J. Laurens, J.F. Segalotto, and M. Sommer (2007), “Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends,” Working Paper 07/88, International Monetary Fund. Barro, R. (1995), “Inflation and Economic Growth,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 35, pp. 166–176. Céspedes, L.F. and C. Soto (2007), “Credibility and Inflation Targeting in Chile,” in F. Mishkin and K. Schmidt-Hebbel, eds., Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, Vol. XI, Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policy series, Central Bank of Chile. De Gregorio, J.
But I can certainly tell you a lot about how it is perceived from my part of the world. And when it comes to the behaviour of financial markets we all know that perception is as important as reality. Perception and reality - Hong Kong Allow me to illustrate this point by starting first with Hong Kong, for I cannot resist the temptation to take advantage of this opportunity to do a bit of advertising. I would like to describe some of the negative perceptions which financial markets and analysts have had about Hong Kong over the last few years, and how these have compared with actual developments. First was the belief that Hong Kong’s fixed exchange rate with the US dollar would not survive the Asian economic crisis. The reality is that it has survived, and the Hong Kong economy has now rebounded strongly, with the year-on-year growth rate of GDP for the fourth quarter of last year recording 8.7% and the forecast for the year 2000 now put at 5%. What the doomsters refused to recognise, despite the compelling evidence of the preceding one-and-a-half decades of the same fixed exchange rate system, was that Hong Kong has a highly flexible internal cost-price structure, which can quite quickly deliver the same external relative price adjustment as a currency devaluation.

Very recently we informally polled ten leading financial institutions in London. Their forecasts for the dollar/euro exchange rate by the end of this year ranged from $ down to 90c. This is a considerably wider spread than the trading range already experienced and suggests a huge measure of uncertainty, to a horizon of only ten months. Of course, one might argue that this represents uncertainty over the dollar as much as the euro. Yes indeed, and I apologise for analysing things very much from a dollar base. Over time, all currencies have experienced considerable volatility - the dollar, the yen, the euro and its ancestors, sterling and so on. Yet in all of these, investors have been able to enjoy significant positive real rates of return over the long term. That may not be good enough for everyone: some seek short-term gains; others may be worried by mark-to-market volatility in the short term even if they are there for the long haul. But long-term investors will give considerable weight to the overall economic and monetary management of the economy. As I mentioned earlier, there are a number of aspects of the management of the Euroland economy about which perceptions from Asia may be somewhat sceptical. As for monetary policy, I would suggest that it is perhaps natural for outsiders to be rather hesitant in their assessments, in view of the new infrastructure for monetary policy, but as the ECB beds down one would expect confidence to grow.
Yet, hand on heart, how many of the organisations in this room have recruitment procedures which would choose the second candidate over the first? I suspect few. Fourth, social mobility. The evidence on entrenched barriers to progress among those from socially disadvantaged backgrounds is discouraging. Recent work by economic historian Greg Clark has shown that social status has remained a strongly inherited characteristic through the ages, even more so than physiological features such as height. 9  That high degree of inertia in social status has, moreover, scarcely  changed over the course of centuries, despite decades of attempts to broaden educational and work opportunities. On some measures, social mobility in England today is little greater than in the 17th century. There are few signs of this pattern having improved over recent decades. A report last year by the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission suggested, if anything, there may be evidence of social mobility faltering. Of those born in the highest income quartile in 1958, around a third remained there as adults. For those born in 1970, that fraction is closer to a half. 10  Part of the explanation may lie in patterns of educational attainment among those from different social backgrounds. Here again the evidence is discouraging. Those with the highest IQs but from socially disadvantaged backgrounds are surpassed in terms of academic scores by those with the lowest IQs but from socially privileged backgrounds. Moreover, that cross-over point occurs incredibly early in the educational life-cycle, perhaps around 6 or 7 years.

Diversity is not only about our physiological identity – our gender, ethnicity. It is also about our sociological identity – our background, experience – and our neurological identity – our personalities, how our brains are wired. When I joined the Bank of England 26 years ago, I was physiologically similar to others at the Bank, but quite different along these broader sociological and neurological dimensions. In fact, I was the beneficiary of one of the Bank’s first waves of diversity initiatives. And I am delighted to say that, following a sequence of initiatives over the years, the Bank today is a significantly more diverse place along all these dimensions. So too, I am sure, are all of your organisations. The numbers here speak for themselves with a steadily rising trend, over several decades now, of female and ethnic minority representation in the workplace and, admittedly more limited, evidence of a rising trend at senior executive and board level. That is good 3  progress, spurred on by initiatives such as Helena’s 30% Club , Jayne-Anne’s review of gender diversity 4  5  earlier this year and John Parker’s review of ethnic diversity just last week. But can we rest on our laurels? My answer to that – and I imagine Helena’s, Jayne-Anne’s and John’s too - is a resounding no. Many of our organisations have diversity policies, champions and initiatives. Yet this is still a subject owned by the HR department rather than the Boardroom or Executive Suite in many firms.
As for my part this morning, given the limitations of time, I want to share with you my thoughts on a few issues that I think will be important for the global economy and for Thailand this year. These are my own views on the global outlook and the implications for Thailand. First, the global economy. Conventional market view at this time is for the global economy to slow somewhat from last year, growing at about 4.9 percent compared to a growth of 5.1 percent last year. So, as the numbers suggest, the current view is for a moderate slowdown, reflecting for the most part a slower pace of expansion in the US. This is essentially a soft-landing scenario in the sense that the US will experience only a moderation in growth without major adverse impact on asset prices. From Thailand's point of view, the slowing of global growth will have important implications for our export sector. Exports, particularly last year, have been the key driver of Thailand's performance. Therefore, for the economy to continue to maintain its momentum, it is important that we see in Thailand this year a stronger turnaround in domestic demand, especially in private sector investment. For the global financial markets, I think three important implications are likely to emerge from this year's slower growth. First, inflation is likely to be less of a policy concern across the major economies compared to last year.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Global markets outlook Opening speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Global Markets Outlook Conference Series 2007, organised by Deutsche Bank, Bangkok, 8 January 2007. *  *  *  Thank you very much and good morning, First, let me thank Deutsche Bank for inviting me to give the opening remark this morning. Last year, I was also honoured with the same opportunity, so I am very pleased to be back doing this again this year, addressing this important conference. A lot of things have happened to both the global markets and to Thailand since the time we met last year. And compared to last year, to be speaking on the economy and the markets this year, I think, is much more challenging. At this time, although the mood in the markets is positive, I think considerable uncertainty still looms in the global economy to the extent that even the best of our analysts still do not seem to be coming to a common view on the key issues. For example, the pace of global slowdown and how much further would the US dollar need to adjust. But, this is, in essence, the nature of markets, and a variety of views will provide the markets with the needed latitude and balance for its continued growth and stability. So, I very much look forward to today's conference, and to the presentation on some of these issues, as well as on this year's outlook.