samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 73/2002  1  Banks which concentrate on asset management are struggling especially with the repercussions of the poorer performance on the capital markets and costs, which have risen sharply just in the last few years. For banks primarily active in interest-earning business, economic development plays a pivotal role. As already mentioned, due to the slowdown in economic activity, a deterioration in loan quality and the resultant need for higher provisions is something this business segment must reckon with. Of some 250 banks which published their half-yearly results, two-thirds saw their profits decline vis-àvis the first six months of the previous year. Thirteen banks even posted a loss; the remaining banks, however, recorded a rise in profits. The aggregate profit was down by 21% compared with the yearearlier period. Despite the regrettable case of Banque Cantonale Vaudoise, the overall situation is favourable as far as equity ratios are concerned: all banks continue to meet the capital adequacy requirements. The average capital ratios of all banks (excluding the big banks, September) exceeded the regulatory minimum by 79%. 98% of banks reported at least a 20% capital surplus. The overall picture can be characterised as follows: the Swiss banking sector suffers from uncertain economic prospects and the tense situation on the financial markets. Many financial institutions are forced to take corrective action. Measures taken range from cost cuts, streamlining the product line, decreasing risk exposure, continued tightening of risk and liquidity management to capital increases and mergers.

Mr Roth remarks on the euro and Swiss franc: two sister currencies? Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Business Association Annual General Meeting, Singapore, 24 February 2000. *  *  *  For more than a year now, the euro has been a reality. It has crowned a decade long process of monetary integration in Europe. The introduction of a common currency in eleven closely related, but independent countries is an unique experiment. It is still too early to assess all the far-reaching implications of this monetary revolution. Therefore, the thoughts and remarks I am going to express today can only be intermediate and provisional. 1. Consequences of the euro for the Swiss economy  Switzerland is not part of the Monetary Union. It is nonetheless deeply integrated in its European environment through its geographic situation and its strong historical, cultural and economic links with Europe. Over 50% of our exports go to countries of the euro-zone, while 70% of our imports come from there. But, besides that, Switzerland has strong traditional links overseas, too. The US, Canada and Japan account for 10% of our imports and 15% of our exports while emerging markets represent 4% and 10% respectively. Although concentrated on Europe, our foreign trade is geographically more diversified worldwide than that of other small open European economies such as Austria, the Netherlands or Belgium.
First, the high level of cross-border capital flows—and their potentially volatile nature—further underlines the importance of solid domestic fundamentals, including exchange rate flexibility, a credible monetary policy framework, sustainable fiscal policy, sufficient foreign exchange reserves, and a strong financial system. The United States has a special responsibility to keep its own house in order, given the large size of its financial markets and the U.S. dollar’s status as a reserve currency. Indeed, the U.S. financial system was the epicenter of the global financial crisis. I believe that promoting economic growth and financial stability at home is the most important contribution the United States can make to promoting growth and stability worldwide. With that in mind, U.S. monetary policy can have a significant impact on global financial conditions, including exchange rates, and shifts in U.S. monetary policy can lead to consequential shifts in global capital flows. Therefore, good communication and transparency from the Federal Reserve is needed. In this respect, I believe we have made a number of improvements in recent years that have facilitated smoother market adjustments to policy changes. One example is the process by which the Federal Reserve began the normalization of its balance sheet last year. We foreshadowed our intentions and initiated a program that was transparent in its design and ramped up only slowly.

While the Federal Reserve has a domestic mandate set for it by the U.S. Congress, it needs to be mindful of the international effects of its actions, which can have important potential consequences for the global economy and financial markets.9 A high level of global interdependence also requires robust cooperation and effective international 6/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  institutions. To provide one example, I have traveled several times a year for the last decade to Basel, Switzerland, to discuss economic, monetary, and regulatory policy with foreign central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This dialogue—supported by ongoing bilateral discussions between central banks—helps build trust, understanding, and the valuable relationships that are crucial during periods of stress. The global financial crisis put the need for a more robust and resilient financial system in stark relief. Such a regime is necessary if we are to maintain the flow of credit to the real economy— both domestically and internationally—during times of stress. Over the last decade, policymakers have implemented a range of reforms that have materially strengthened the banking system, including higher capital and liquidity buffers for the major international banks.10 International coordination has been essential to the successful implementation of these reforms. Banking is a global business that requires a high degree of regulatory consistency and as level a playing field as possible to avoid distortions and regulatory arbitrage.
We are therefore determined to double up our efforts to increase the use of electronic channels to send money. In November last year, Bank Negara Malaysia amended existing regulations to allow money services companies to complete customer verifications electronically, without the need for customers to visit a money services business premise. This is an important change that removed an existing hurdle for companies to support an end-to-end electronic process for performing remittance transactions. We expect this change to create significant momentum for further growth in electronic remittances, in particular among foreign workers. Today, foreign workers in several parts of Malaysia may still face difficulties getting to a MSB office to complete the customer due diligence process. Yet, nine in ten foreign workers have smartphones and use them to access the internet. With technology, we can tap into these alternative access channels to enable e-remittances. Two other important development are also coming together to encourage the use of electronic remittances. The first is the initiative by the Government to require employers of foreign workers to pay their salaries into bank accounts. This removes the need to deliver cash to remittance service providers. The second is the development of an interactive mobile application by the MSB industry that allows users to identify licensed MSB providers, compare services and communicate directly with MSB companies.

Page 3 sur 5 However, beyond traditional financial regulation, international cooperation should be developed in three areas, three cornerstones of the regulation of digital finance. First, cybersecurity is a sine qua non for a reliable and sustainable digital future. It is a clear priority of the G7 French Presidency next week in Chantilly. Second, regarding data protection, financial supervisors and authorities in charge of privacy have to invent new ways of cooperation to address data issues that have become central to financial services. Third, regarding competition and anti-trust policies, situations where “the winner takes most” while staying outside the scope of financial regulation should be adequately anticipated and addressed. “Stable coin” projects, including Facebook’s Libra, are a case in point. “Stable coins” are quite different from speculative assets like Bitcoins. However, regulators will have to keep a very close eye at the global level, and believe me, we will do it. France, as Chair of the G7 this year, has created a dedicated task force. Our aim is to formulate a response that is common to all jurisdictions, and holistic on all the issues. And to quote only two of many requirements: it is imperative that the projects comply with anti-money laundering regulations; the anonymity of the users creates heightened risks. In addition, if issuers of stable coins also want to offer banking services such as deposits, financial investments and loans, then they will have to obtain a banking license in all countries where they operate. Otherwise it would be illegal.
In parallel, the fiscal policy is expected to pursue a consolidating trend, as illustrated by the improvement by 0.2 percentage point in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio and the forecast for the reduction by 2.7 percentage points in public debtto-GDP ratio. The Bank of Albania has supported and continues to support the fiscal consolidation policy, deeming that – in balance – it contributes positively to the country’s long-term and stable growth. The continuation of the consolidating trend in the fiscal policy reduces risk premiums, mitigates the effect of the public sector on domestic financial markets, and increases the space for lending to the private sector. 2. Fiscal projections and public finance stability Based on the macroeconomic backdrop and measures regarding the fiscal package, described above, the draft-budget 2017 envisages: - Public revenues amounting to ALL 436 billion, or 27.3% of the GDP. This forecast implies an increase by 6.9% from the expected revenues level for 2016 and reflects mainly the broadening of the taxable base, in response to the expected economic growth. On the other hand, the effect from changes to the fiscal package is relatively small; - Public expenditures amounting to ALL 467.2 billion, or 29.3% of the GDP. This projection implies an increase by 6.5% from the expected level of expenditures level for 2016; - The budget deficit amounting to ALL 31.2 billion, or 2% of the GDP. This level of the deficit stands 2.4% higher than that expected for 2016.

In conclusion, the exchange of views and experiences is an important step to develop a coherent overall sense of economic identity. With this note, I would like to thank Bilkent University once again and wish a successful conference. Thank you. 11  4  Speech by Issing, O. (2004). “EMU and Economic Governance”. BIS Review 35/2007
The operation was an extraordinary strategy to deal with extraordinary circumstances. And, we delivered on our pledge to exit promptly and effectively. Over the years, we have drawn on this experience to further refine the Linked Exchange Rate System, enhance risk management and strengthen the resilience of our financial system. 8. Recently, our country has also been faced with the need of taking some extraordinary steps to stabilise the stock markets and guard against systemic risk. Any further measures by the Central Government and their effectiveness will be closely watched. In my view, if the Central Government can devise a robust exit mechanism as soon as market stability returns and continue to push through financial reforms, including liberalising the capital account and internationalising the renminbi – in other words demonstrating its staunch commitment to reform and liberalisation – it will be able to regain and reinforce confidence within the country and around the world in the market development and investment environment in China. 9. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Remarks given at a panel to launch the third annual America’s Pledge report, at the 25th Annual Conference of the Parties Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England  US Climate Action Centre, Madrid 10 December 2019  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth for her assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Introduction The Accelerating America’s Pledge report comprehensively documents the scale of change that is needed across our economies to put emissions on a trajectory consistent with building a net zero economy. That will require a more sustainable financial system. Changes in climate policies, new technologies and growing physical risks will prompt reassessments of the values of virtually every financial asset. Firms that align their business models with the transition to net zero will be rewarded handsomely. Those that fail to adapt will cease to exist. Now is the time to ensure that every financial decision takes climate change into account. For that change to happen, we need to focus on the three Rs – reporting, risk management and return. First, reporting In 2015, G20 leaders tasked representatives from the public and private sectors to review how the financial system takes into account climate risks. We established a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), chaired by Mike Bloomberg. Four years on, the TCFD has generated a step change in both the demand for and supply of climate reporting. The demand for TCFD disclosure is now enormous.
As a result, we can even talk now about discouraged employers, as opposed to the periods that follow a crisis, when the employees are the discouraged ones. Thus, we have ourselves another dilemma: ensuring that wage levels are compatible with attracting investors, but acknowledging that, at least in certain areas, wages need to come up at present, in order to mitigate the labour force drain, which affects the private and public sector alike. The key is, in my opinion, to increase wages at an adequate, sustainable pace, so as to ultimately benefit from an improved living climate reflected in a higher purchasing power, but also from preserved macroeconomic equilibria, as well as higher-quality public goods – roads in particular –, because, after all, wages are not the only part of the emigration story. Speaking about roads, I would like to point out that infrastructure is essential for connecting different regions of Romania and promoting cohesion. This is all the more important that, even though EU membership has acted as a catalyst for country-level real convergence, the development gaps across the regions of the New Member States, including in Romania, have not diminished significantly. Let me conclude by recalling the words that Otmar Issing said during a dinner speech on his leaving the ECB, back in 2006, when things seemed to move into the right direction all by themselves: “We were all privileged to participate in a historically unique experiment: the creation of a new currency for Europe.

We have plenty of tools to provide liquidity support to the financial system if needed and to preserve the smooth transmission of monetary policy. In my remarks today, I will discuss our policy path so far and what lies ahead. And I will explain the reaction function that will govern our future rate decisions. The path so far Last year, inflation in the euro area surged strongly, and spread deeply, because it was driven by two types of shocks which hit the economy at the same time. First, we underwent an unprecedented series of negative supply shocks caused by pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing energy crisis. This significantly increased input costs for all sectors of the economy. Second, we faced a positive demand shock caused by the reopening of the economy after the pandemic. That favourable demand environment allowed firms to pass rising input costs through to prices much faster and more strongly than in the past. [1] Our policy stance was starting from highly accommodative levels, having been tailored to the very-low inflation environment of the past decade and the initial deflationary risks of the pandemic. So, we had to adjust, as quickly as possible, a stance that had become inadequate. This initially placed important emphasis on signalling, i.e. demonstrating, through actions and commitments, that monetary policy would cover the necessary ground decisively. That is why we put a great weight on the pace of our actions, hiking rates in large increments.
The complexity of such a process means it is necessary to design forthwith efficient exit strategies, so that they may be implemented when the time is right. The euro area also shares, albeit to a lesser extent than other zones, these signs of incipient improvement. The latest economic data have been less adverse than expected and the quantitative and qualitative indicators coming to light point to a stabilisation of activity in the very short term which, according to the ECB's projection exercises, will be followed by a presumably slow recovery that will not be free from difficulty. Public finances have deteriorated considerably as a result of the operation of the automatic stabilisers, the discretionary measures to stimulate aggregate demand and action to shore up the financial system. In turn, the financial crisis and the fall-off in activity have severely affected certain European banks, which depend in part on public sector support and which remain subject to a deleveraging process whose scope is still not readily discernible. On the prices front, the risks of deflation have diminished substantially. Although the strong easing in commodities prices until mid-year meant that inflation turned negative, there is a broad consensus, of which the ECB is part, that anticipates inflation will resume positive levels towards the end of the year. Such levels would, however, be moderate for a relatively lengthy period, against a background marked by considerable slackness in productive capacity which will help contain potential inflationary pressures.

Indeed there have been many comparisons to the Great Depression. Yet, compared to the 1930s, an importance difference today is that news spread across the globe far more rapidly. Even rural households in China and India can now access this stream of bad news, real-time, through satellite televisions and the internet. The hyperefficiency of information flows has in itself introduced new uncertainties as sentiment shifts rapidly and abrupt loss of confidence becomes self-reinforcing. Crisis response: decisive action needed How do we deal with this crisis? Despite its scale and unprecedented nature, it may be instructive to study the pattern of responses in previous crises. In past crises, the responses typically go through several overlapping phases. Initially, there is a lack of appreciation of the scale and severity of the problem. This then gives way to fear and panic as the problem becomes stark. Next, anger sets in, and a hunt for culprits begins. As the financial and  2  BIS Review 30/2009  economic stresses take root, pessimism sets in. If remedial actions are seen to be tentative and lacking in conviction, recovery is delayed and interrupted by bouts of renewed panic. It may take some time before the hard realities are accepted, and a level-headed search for viable solutions sets the path for recovery. Elements of these have been played out in the current crisis. Initially, the "subprime" issue was regarded as a manageable problem, confined to a small segment of the US housing market. Then it triggered seizure in the wider credit markets.
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Therefore, let me stop at this point and pass the floor to the chairman of our first panel debate, Mr Jakob A. Frenkel (from Merrill Lynch International). Before I do that, though, I would like to welcome you once again and thank all of you for accepting our invitation to this event. BIS Review 17/2003  3