samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
6  There is of course a vast academic literature on these issues which generally goes under the heading of the “Phillips Curve”, the relatively constant, negative and non-linear relationship between wages and unemployment in 100 years of UK data that A.W. Phillips identified in 1958 (Chart 5). 5  7  Broadbent 2014  6  To illustrate this dependence, growth in hours worked has accounted for 80% of growth in output in the UK since 2013, where it accounted for just 27% of growth in the decade prior to the crisis. 7  Phillips found that the data for 1948-1957 fit the same relationship as seen over 1861-1913. There was greater variation in the war and inter-war years. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  That relationship has not remained constant since then – simple lines of best fit suggest that the relationship between the unemployment rate and nominal wage growth has moved lower and flatter over time (Chart 6). Phillips’s work has been extensively revised and adapted over the past 60 years, most importantly by adding some influence of inflation expectations to explain the apparent breakdown of the relationship in the 1970s when unemployment and pay appeared positively correlated. 8  The framework has been extended to prices rather than wages.

16  The curve has flattened  A lowering of the curve does not change the sensitivity of pay growth to unemployment, and changes in unemployment, will put pressure on pay growth in the same way. It will all just happen at a lower level. A flattening of the curve, however, reduces the sensitivity of pay growth to unemployment at all levels and to all rates of change of unemployment. This appears to have happened in some estimations of the post crisis estimations of the curve. 15  17  See Broadbent (2014)  16  This could result in a ‘double whammy’: pay growth would be accelerated higher demand for labour while at the same time the inflation adjusted curve would shift up, accelerating pay growth further. This can be seen in Chart 8: a fall in unemployment would result in moving from point A to point B (at higher inflation expectations) or point C to point D (at lower expectations). If those inflation expectations were to change at the same time that unemployment falls, the move would be from C to point B. See also Mishkin (2007). 17  See for example BIS (2017) and IMF (2013). Blanchard et. al. (2015) argue that since 1990 there is no statistically significant slope to a price Phillips curve in many countries, including the UK.
http://www.imas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Speeches-and-Monetary-Policy-Statem... 21-07-18  Connecting Global Markets Supporting Asias Growth  •  Page 2 of 7  The rapid expansion of the Asian middle class will spur urbanisation and demand for financial services, especially wealth management and insurance. Global investors are flocking to participate in the Asian growth story  •  There has been a growing diversity of institutional investors – from Asia, Europe and the Americas. Two key trends in the Asian landscape warrant investors’ attention:  •  the expansion of Asian enterprises; and  •  the demand for infrastructure development. More Asian companies are expanding regionally and globally. •  Companies from Asia have become increasingly active in cross-border M&A as they seek to expand their regional and global footprint. The need to fund this expansion has led to a surge in capital raising in Asia and increased the depth and diversity of Asian assets. •  Dollar bond issuance by Asia-ex Japan companies climbed to a record high of around $ billion last year, up 40% from 2016. •  About one-third of equity raised through IPOs globally in 2017 were in the Asia Pacific. •  Investors now have a wide array of Asian assets to choose from. As Asian companies gain market share globally, investing in Asian companies has become more attractive. •  Asia’s share of companies with market value of more than $ billion stands at 30%, compared to 20% just ten years ago. Investors in Asia are also looking to private markets for investment opportunities.

•  Asian companies are choosing to stay private for longer and becoming more receptive to venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) financing. •  Asia is already a major destination for VC and PE investments. • Last year, VC and PE investments into Asia reached $ billion, accounting for 30% of global investments, surpassing Europe for the first time. •  With close to 7,000 start-ups in Southeast Asia alone, there are opportunities abound for private investments in the region. http://www.imas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Speeches-and-Monetary-Policy-Statem... 21-07-18  Connecting Global Markets Supporting Asias Growth  Page 3 of 7  The demand for infrastructure financing in Asia is outpacing countries’ funding capacity. •  According to the ADB, Asia will need around $ trillion annually in infrastructure financing between now and 2030 to sustain economic growth. •  Currently, more than 90% of infrastructure investment is financed by governments. •  This is not sustainable if the demand for infrastructure is to be met. The challenge for governments in Asia is this: to make infrastructure more attractive to private capital. •  At their recent meeting in Singapore, ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed to accelerate infrastructure development through mobilising private capital. This means mainstream infrastructure financing as an asset class. •  The prospects are good. There is a strong pipeline of projects in the transport and energy sectors, diversified across the ASEAN countries. •  We have seen some early success.
Chart 2: The ‘dash for cash’ in US Treasuries  Chart 1: US equity prices and bond yields UST 10y yield (RHS)  UST 30y bid/offer spread (RHS) UST swap spread 30y, inverted (LHS) UST 10y cash-futures basis (LHS)  S&P 500 (LHS)  Brent Crude (LHS) 9 Mar: Start of ‘dash for cash’  Per cent 5  Basis points 10  Basis points 15 Mar: USD 3.2 swapline rate and maturity enhanced 2.8  Basis points 140  0  -10  120  -5  -30  100  23 Mar: Federal Reserve announces further measures  2.4  -10  -50  80  -15  -70  60  1.6  -20  -90  40  1.2  -25  -110  20  0.8  -30  -130  0  0.4  -35 Jan 20  Feb 20  Mar 20  Apr 20  May 20  -150 Jun 20  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. Displayed as changes year to date. -20 Jan 20  6 Mar  2  0 Feb 20  Mar 20  Apr 20  May 20  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P, Eikon by Refinitiv.and Bank calculations. Bid/offer spreads are 5 day moving averages. Moment 2: a global response to dollar shortages  Monday 9 March was another day of turmoil in financial markets: oil prices fell by 30%, equity prices by 8% and there were further sharp moves in UST yields.

The Great Moderation and the subsequent Global Financial Crisis I joined the Faculty at a time when New Keynesian macroeconomics (NKM) and its approaches, immodestly referred to as "the science of monetary policy", had become the official mantra in the central banks of developed countries and had subsequently been translated into a monetary strategy referred to as inflation targeting (or inflation forecast targeting). It was an era characterised by optimistic expectations about longterm economic developments. Macroeconomists spoke of a "Great Moderation" and predicted that we would see decades of low and stable inflation amid brisk economic growth with no significant cyclical fluctuations. With the benefit of hindsight, these expectations were not fulfilled. The low inflation that took hold globally in the 1990s was largely a product of globalisation, not super-smart monetary policy. In the early 1990s, price stability began to gain ground as central banks' primary objective. However, in Ostrava – and the same was true of other Czech universities at the time – we took a more traditional approach and considered monetary stability, or currency stability, to be the main objective of monetary policy. By this we usually meant a more general state of affairs where inflation is low and stable, the banking sector is healthy and not a source of excessive money supply growth, the currency is reasonably strong and external imbalances are not building up. However, the world's macroeconomists longed for a simpler notion of a target that could be expressed in an exact, numerical, way, preferably with a single number.
But frequent fiscal policy changes - to tax rates or expenditure programs – can generate micro-economic uncertainties so that short-run macro-economic stabilisation is normally left primarily to monetary policy. It is important nevertheless that the two arms of policy pull in the same general direction to avoid unwanted sectoral or related regional distortions. In a totally closed economy therefore the objective of macro-economic stabilisation and the respective roles of fiscal and monetary policy would be reasonably clear. But none of us – very fortunately in any wider context – actually lives in a closed economy. We are all vulnerable to external shocks to varying degrees, including of course, increasingly, shocks resulting from international capital flows. Free trade and open capital markets do, as I noted earlier, bring huge benefits in terms of supply-side improvements from which we all, potentially, stand to gain. But there is no doubt that economic globalisation can at times massively complicate our national efforts at macro-economic stabilisation and it is this problem which I should like to address in the rest of my remarks. A key issue is how far we can protect our internal macro-economic stability through our choice of exchange rate regime. My short answer to that question – from the UK’s experience – is that there is, sadly, no ideal solution! BIS Review 54/1999  2  The effective options range from floating, through some form of adjustable peg, to a quasifixed exchange rate by way of a currency board or, ultimately, full monetary union.

It must be acknowledged that no regulation can prevent financial institutions from encountering difficulties. A new regulatory framework must therefore ensure that banks bear the ultimate responsibility for risk undertaken by them. Regulatory compliance will then be in their own interest. We can never fully insulate the financial system from shocks. But we can increase our resilience. One of the most important things we can do is to keep our own house in order – by preventing major imbalances from building up in the economy or in the financial system, and by ensuring that the financial system in general is robust. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
5  On this occasion, the Board considers that situations of this type are mainly of domestic origin. In particular, in the dynamics of inflation and its determinants. The upper bound is defined by events in which local inflation is more persistent than expected. In this aspect, the information provided by domestic expenditure and CPI prints will be key. The Board will evaluate the inflationary implications of these events, as they could mean that the process of reducing the MPR would be slower. Upward inflation surprises in developed economies could require higher international monetary policy rates, which would contribute to a depreciation of emerging currencies, the peso included. This would increase local inflation in the short term, although its impact on the MPR would be mitigated to the extent that it implies a greater contraction in activity and spending. The lower bound of the MPR corridor shows a scenario where the adjustment of the Chilean economy is faster than expected, leading to an earlier convergence of inflation. Different indicators of capacity gaps suggest that inflationary pressures have been gradually contained. A scenario where such gaps become more negative than expected would lead to a more accelerated reduction in the MPR. Such could be the case if a sharper deterioration occurs in the labor market and private consumption (figure 20). As for risks, these emanate mainly from the global macro-financial situation. A further deterioration could trigger episodes of high volatility, reduce liquidity and encourage capital outflows away from the emerging world.

This would lead to a greater-than-expected tightening of global financial conditions, which would cause additional restrictions for the Chilean economy, significantly reducing inflationary pressures. In such a risk scenario, deeper MPR cuts than indicated by the lower bound of the corridor would be needed. Concluding thoughts Dear Senators: After several Reports in which I was in charge of informing you of the complex inflationary situation that our economy was going through, this Report brings news pointing in a more favorable direction. The macroeconomic scenario has evolved in line with our forecasts. The economy is on an adjustment path and imbalances have been resolved in a manner consistent with what we anticipated in the March Report. Inflation has declined to 8.7%, with a significant contribution from volatile prices. Core inflation stood at 9.9% annually, with a slower and smaller reduction than the total CPI. Thus, considering the progress of the economy, the Board of the Central Bank has announced that, if these conditions are maintained, we will soon begin a process of MPR reduction. All in all, inflation is still too high and well above the 3% target. The Central Bank will continue to monitor the evolution of the scenario, ensuring that this downward trajectory of inflation is maintained until it converges to the 3% target, which we expect during the second half of next year.
In the past few decades, international estimates of the neutral real interest rate have fallen and are now at 1 percent or below in many countries (see Rachel et al (2015), Laubach et al (2015), Hamilton et al (2015), Constâncio (2016) and Zhu (2016)). Obviously, international interest rate developments affect Norwegian interest rate setting, particularly through the exchange rate channel. And Norges Bank’s estimate of the neutral interest rate has been gradually revised down in pace with international developments. The Bank’s forecasts are now based on the assumption that a neutral nominal money market rate in Norway will be between 2½ percent and 3½ percent in the coming years. The associated neutral nominal key policy rate is somewhat lower.1 The low level of the neutral interest rate raises a number of issues. Today, I would like to focus on two aspects that have been given weight in recent years in Norges Bank’s assessment of a robust interest rate path. The first is that the effect of changes in the policy rate tends to be more uncertain when the rate is very low. The second relates to the challenge persistently low interest rates pose to financial stability. GREATER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE POLICY RATE Monetary policy decisions are made under uncertainty. Central banks operate in an environment of uncertainty regarding the current situation, the driving forces in the economy and the functioning of the economy. Much of this uncertainty is associated with conditions beyond the influence of monetary policy.

James McAndrews: Rising household borrowing Remarks by Mr James McAndrews, Executive Vice President and Director of Research of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the CFA Society of Stamford, Stamford, Connecticut, 5 March 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’ website. Good evening. It’s a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak with you today on the subject of the economy, and especially the household sector. As is always the case, my remarks reflect my own opinions, not those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System. National economic conditions From the end of the Great Recession in mid-2009 through mid-2013, real gross domestic product (GDP), or the aggregate value, after adjusting for inflation, of all the goods and services produced within the borders of the United States, grew at a rather tepid 2¼ percent annual rate. Then, in the second half of 2013, the pace of growth moved up a full percentage point to around 3¼ percent. Roughly half of this increase in the growth rate of real GDP stemmed from a strengthening of consumer spending. While I will discuss the factors behind this improvement in consumer spending in more detail in what follows, the main driver appears to be the substantial stabilization in household balance sheets that has occurred over the past few years.
But in the nest step, the Asian Bond Fund will extend the investment into the various local bond markets in local currencies. The Fund will be calling on Asian countries. It will be ready to invest, but only if the market builds up the right conditions, and removes all the impediments. And you know that until the last impediment is removed, the market will not be attractive to foreign investors. And since these impediments often extend across many government departments and functions, as well as the judicial system, so only the strongest political commitment can remove all of them. So will the political commitment come forward? With money waiting at the door, and with peer pressure and available assistance within Asia, I think there is a good chance that it will. Someone asked me earlier how much of the Asian international reserves will have to go into these Asian Bond Funds. Well, I hope not a lot. It is not the job of the authorities to replace the market. What the authorities try to do is simply to act as a catalyst. In the long run, private money in Asia should find its own way to invest in Asia, whether it is savings from insurance companies in Japan, mutual funds in Hong Kong or pension funds in Singapore investing in corporate bonds all over Asia. Will there be enough opportunity for investing in Asia? Certainly! Many Asian countries still have very young populations. Half of Thais are under the age of 30.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate Governor Gjedrem for the achievements of the Bank under this leadership during his twelve year terms in office. My remarks today will focus on the role of central banks from the perspective of emerging economies and more specifically in the context of central banking in Asia as we confront the challenges in this rapidly changing global economic and financial environment. Central bank mandates While there is no unique blueprint for the design of the institutional arrangements for a central bank, of importance is that it needs to be relevant to our own circumstances. But of importance is that there is clarity on the mandate, the governance framework and the areas of accountability of the central bank. And that needs to be supported by the empowering legislation to ensure that the central bank has at its disposal the capabilities to deliver the mandate. Central banks in emerging economies generally have a broader mandate beyond the traditional mandates of monetary and financial stability. Even within these traditional mandates, the role of central banks have varied considerably. In the mandate of monetary stability, it has ranged from having the narrow mandate of price stability to the mandate where price stability is the primary role of the central bank while due consideration is also given to economic and employment objectives. While for some the mandates are clearly hierarchical, for others, the multiple mandates involve assessments of the trade-offs.
It should be underlined that this is a temporary situation and the predictability of monetary policy will increase in the upcoming period when the stability in the global economy is restored Decision-making process and the communication policy The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) will continue to meet once a month in 2009 as well, in accordance with the schedule announced beforehand. Monetary policy decisions at these meetings and their rationale will be made public on the website of the Central Bank in a press release posted at 7:00 p.m. on the same day. As in the previous year, the summary of the MPC Meeting will be released on the website of the Central Bank within eight working days, along with its English translation. As in previous years, the Inflation Report, which is the main communication tool of the monetary policy, will be published quarterly and introduced to the public at a press conference.

(iii)  Meanwhile, the Central Bank has implemented a set of measures since October, with the aim of abating potential problems in the Turkish financial markets that may arise from global developments. Within this scope, foreign exchange buying auctions were suspended as of 16 October 2008 in order to keep the liquidity, which is permanently withdrawn from the foreign exchange market through foreign exchange buying auctions, in the system, and hence, to further enhance the liquidity conditions of the Turkish banks. In addition to the suspension of the foreign exchange buying auctions, the Central Bank started to inject foreign exchange liquidity into the market through foreign exchange selling auctions as of 24 October 2008 as unhealthy price formations were witnessed due to a decrease in the depth of the foreign exchange market. The daily amount of the foreign exchange to be sold via auctions was set as USD 50 million, which could be raised on the days of the auction when deemed necessary. It was also announced to the public that depending on developments in the foreign exchange market, the daily auction amounts might be changed and the auctions might also be suspended, when deemed necessary. As a matter of fact, after the auctions held on two working days, the Central Bank suspended the foreign exchange selling auctions on 30 October 2008 as a result of easing concerns pertaining to the depth of the foreign exchange market, which was also facilitated by favorable developments in the global markets.