samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A key area for cooperation that is being advanced relates to the provision of a robust liquidity management infrastructure for Islamic finance. This is an important imperative to ensure the resilience and stability of the Islamic financial system, as well as to reduce the cost of intermediation. A significant regulatory challenge remains in terms of having efficient crossborder liquidity risk management in the Islamic financial system, due to the lack of short-term Shariah compliant instruments in international currencies. A chapter in the book describes the regulatory response to the issue of liquidity risk facing Islamic financial institutions, including the important role of the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) in facilitating cross-border liquidity management. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  With these changes set to re-define the financial landscape going forward with far reaching implications, the publication of this book is both timely and relevant. Six years from its first edition in 2007 which made an important contribution to the literature on the regulation of Islamic finance, this second edition captures the diverse range of current information and updates arising from the regulatory issues in a post-crisis global economy. Reviews on the various characteristics of risks faced by Islamic financial institutions will improve the understanding and examination of the implications of current and new reform initiatives for the regulation and supervision of Islamic finance.

Likewise, as supervisors we should strive to avoid financial crises, by applying supervisory tools to mitigate risk accumulations as well as reinforcing banks’ management capabilities; but, at the same time, we should work with a longer-term perspective to complete the institutional framework, in case a crisis still occurs. Thank you. 5/5
Beyond the direct trade policy shock resulting from a rise in import tariffs, two factors at least may amplify the decline in global GDP: a decline in investment demand caused by firms’ falling business confidence due to uncertainty, and a rise in the financing cost of capital due to an increase in actual or perceived borrower risk. According to Banque de France model estimates, the negative impact on GDP of higher import tariffs is 2 to 3 times larger when we account for these indirect channels. And this increase in uncertainty can produce front-loaded negative effects, even before the effective implementation of protectionist measures. That said, protectionism is first and foremost a negative supply-shock, with stagflationary effects. As such, the adverse effects of protectionism cannot and should not be accommodated by monetary policy. In spite of protectionist threats, the global economy continues to expand strongly, at 3.7% this year. We have used a lot in our latest IMF meetings, the nice French word « plateau » to describe global growth. But this “plateau” is not even: the strong acceleration in the US, even if it is temporary and fragile, is offset by a moderation elsewhere. In short, we are moving from synchronized growth to economic divergence. Consequently, countries might be suffering from the ongoing rise in US interest rates. Helene Rey’s famous paper in 20133 argued that floating exchange rates are not sufficient to give countries independence from US monetary policy if they have an open capital account.

To monitor this, we look at the number of issues trading on special in the repo market and at the amount and composition of the securities that the market borrows from our securities lending facility. Both measures have increased some, but we do not see their current levels as indicating notable strains. Moreover, it does not appear that these patterns are more acute in securities for which the SOMA portfolio holds a larger proportion of the supply. Our success at purchasing such large volumes of securities without causing significant market strains reflects some of the operational decisions that were made in the design of the program. One key issue was determining an appropriate speed for purchasing assets. The pace of purchases under the announced plan reflected a judgment by the Desk that it could purchase as much as $ billion to $ billion per month without significantly disrupting the functioning and liquidity of the Treasury market. So far, that appears to be the case, given the evidence just described. 11 Another important aspect of the operations is the flexibility in terms of the securities that we purchase. As noted earlier, our selection of the specific offers to accept at a given operation depends on our assessment of their relative attractiveness. This process should support market functioning. In particular, it allows the market to determine which securities it is willing to sell on the most favorable terms for us.
Thomas Jordan: Switzerland – developments and challenges in 2012 from a monetary policy perspective Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 26 April 2013. *  *  *  Mr President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests Once again, the European financial and debt crisis has dominated events of the past year. And, once again, the Swiss National Bank has been faced with considerable challenges in the conduct of its monetary policy. The crisis in Europe intensified in spring and summer and triggered strong upward pressure on the Swiss franc. This was pressure we had to withstand. In an already fraught global economic environment, an appreciation of the Swiss franc would have caused an inappropriate tightening in monetary conditions for Switzerland. This in turn would have compromised price stability and had potentially serious consequences for the Swiss economy. The SNB therefore enforced the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro with the utmost determination. This called, at times, for a high level of activity on the foreign exchange market on the part of the SNB. The extensive purchases of foreign currency were reflected on our balance sheet. In my remarks today, I would like to start by addressing the key developments and challenges in 2012 from a monetary policy perspective and, at the same time, present you with our assessment of the current year.

The Great Financial Crisis is a good example: at that time, solid and well-anchored inflation expectations in the euro area contributed to counteract the strong deflationary forces affecting our economies. However, since then, market-based measures of inflation expectations in the euro area have been decreasing and this decline has been even more pronounced since the beginning of 2019. This fall in market expectations has raised some questions among central bank watchers on potential risks of deanchoring of inflation expectations and more generally on our ability to deliver our mandate of price stability. I.2. The need for better information on households expectations  Let me stress that market-based inflation expectations are not the only available measures to assess future risks of inflation. Professional forecasters or consensus forecast provide a significantly higher figure than the 5Y/5Y ILS, at around 1,7% rather than 1,2% to 1,3%, although all of them point out to a decrease of inflation expectations over time (Figure 1). Market-based measures have also some technical limitations: first, related to the liquidity of 2  financial markets, and second because they are affected by the evolution of the risk premium over time. Moreover, while financial market expectations provide information on future financing conditions, the evolution of prices and wages depends more deeply and directly on what household and firms expect regarding future growth and inflation. Consequently, existing surveys among firms and households can provide very useful and valuable information on expectations.
This is why the concept of central bank digital currencies has been criticized by, among others, Mark Carney, and why Danmarks Nationalbank concluded in December it had “no plans to issue central bank digital currency.” 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  But central bank digital currency brings another potential response to the problem of the effective lower bound: an easily implementable “helicopter money drop”, i.e., direct support of consumption. Of course, this is an even more controversial idea than negative interest rates, at least in the world of central banking. But I believe it is a real and viable possibility in the event of a deep crisis akin to the one of the late 2000s. In this way, central banks could stimulate consumption directly at the individual level, circumventing the transmission uncertainty associated with quantitative easing. Moreover, such a windfall for all households could also boost consumer confidence at a time when optimism is most needed. The immediate consequence of helicopter money would be a financial loss for the central bank, but central bankers should value the price stability of the nation above their income statement. Financial history of my home country seems to be indicating that there is little interplay between the central bank’s financial position and inflation or financial stability performance. So, central banks with less capital, perhaps depleted by helicopter money drops, are unlikely to underperform in the future.

And central banks do not regulate casino visits. As you can see, I could easily spend all of my time today talking about the problems of cryptocurrencies, and of bitcoin in particular. I could talk about how much energy it consumes – at some points last year, the bitcoin ecosystem consumed twice as much energy as Nigeria, an oil giant with 190 million people. By the way, the energy consumed on a single bitcoin transaction until 2017 could power a typical American household for more than three weeks. I could talk about how a seven-fold increase in the value of bitcoin some time ago was driven by the manipulation of a single trader. I could talk about the volatility of bitcoin, which surpasses that of any other commonly traded commodity and which renders bitcoin useless for the vast majority of people. I could talk about the funny thing that bitcoin as a quasi-currency was created to make payments cheap and fast, while in reality it is more often than not expensive and slow. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  But instead, I will stress – and this is my point today – the positive philosophical influence of bitcoin on the conservative world of central banking.
As generally expected, consumer price increases, as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), picked up in July, with the annual rate of change rising from 0.9% in June to 1.1% in July. This effectively reversed the downward movement in the overall HICP rate which had been evident since April 1999. While prices for unprocessed food declined further in July, this downward effect on the overall HICP rate was more than offset by a stronger increase in energy prices, resulting from a continued rise in oil prices. We expect consumer price increases to rise somewhat further from their July levels, mainly as a consequence of higher oil prices. However, at this stage we also expect this further increase to level out below the ceiling we have defined as being compatible with price stability over the medium term. In conclusion, the prospects for a sustained economic upturn in the euro area are good, as are the chances of continued price stability. However, we remain vigilant taking into account the upward risks to price stability. In particular, with a view to conducting a thorough assessment of the risks to price stability in the medium term, the increase in monetary growth over recent months and the high growth rate of credit to the private sector need to be monitored very carefully. In addition, the short-term upward pressure on consumer prices, which stems from the increase in oil prices over recent months and the lagged pass-through of developments in the exchange rate, have to be taken into account.

If the offices cannot be let, this income does not materialise and the company that made the investment may be forced into bankruptcy. A household, instead, pays its interest with income from other sources. Moreover, in the early 1990s the prices of commercial properties had been pushed up over a long period without any corresponding increase in rental income. The price rises were obviously driven by expectations of a continued strong upswing in prices in the future. When it eventually became clear that these expectations were not going to materialise and it became more difficult to let the premises as economic conditions weakened, the prices fell dramatically. Today, though, the situation in the commercial property market is significantly different. There has not been a prolonged price upswing of the kind seen in the housing market. In connection with the equity market decline in 2000, demand for office premises weakened again and rents and prices in the market for office properties began to drop. The price fall appears today to have moderated and in some regions prices of office premises have risen. Vacancy levels are still high, though, which has contributed to restraining a more general upswing in rents and prices. At the same time, property companies’ earnings and ability to pay are good. Our assessment therefore is that the commercial property market does not either pose a threat to the stability of the financial system.
We cannot have a system where the private sector enjoys the profits of excessive risk-taking while leaving the public sector on the hook for the losses. The post-crisis reforms  The ways in which firms organise themselves, and the tools by which we apply our supervisory judgements, are shaped by global regulatory standards. And in those standards, there has been a revolution. Responding to the emergency of the 2008 crisis, governments set the direction of travel and parameters for regulators to act. We took our mandates, assessed the system accordingly, and set in train a series of unprecedented changes to deliver financial stability. Key to this effort was more effective co-ordination between national regulators and co-operation through international bodies. For banks, this was the right response to the financial crisis, which showed that the standards we had been using were woefully inadequate. The toolkit we have today is miles ahead of what the authorities had as queues grew outside Northern Rock branches – for example the UK has led the way in developing a resolution regime so that we can intervene to manage the orderly failure of a firm. At the same time, UK banks have increased their equity capital by approximately £ since the end of 2008 and now hold more than £ of high-quality liquid assets, four times the level they held before the financial crisis. Governments, regulators and firms together have transformed the banking system.

The annual organisation of this workshop has served to share experiences with the participating central banks and have enriched research work, becoming in turn an integral contributor to policy formulation. These workshops have made a valuable contribution for confirming and interpreting research results, which enable the compilation, calibration and implementation of policy measures for tackling the pandemic and similar shocks. Your findings, comments and discussions assist our authors to improve their studies, and in turn contribute to the formulation and decision making of policy at the central bank. Evidence, analysis and forecasts based on the research work that you will present in these two days will provide accurate and valuable information for orienting and coordinating decision making in the future. 20 research projects will be presented and discussed this year, which in in spite of covering a broad gamut/range of topics, are directly related to the activity and interests of the central bank. We have discussed almost the same topics a year ago however, you could rightly say: “What a difference, compared to last year?” In 2020, discussions were focused on the modern monetary policy, and the role of the central bank’s balance sheet as a permanent instrument of monetary policy that can and should be broadly used to bolster aggregate demand. The current monetary policy debate is concerned with the size and duration of the recent jump in inflation. The latest inflationary developments have divided academics and central bankers into two camps with diametrically opposed positions.
6  BIS Review 35/2009  Figure 4 Lending interest rates without increase in risks after September (percent) Consumer loan rates at 3 years or more  Commercial loan rates at 30-89 days  Mortgage interest rates  40  40  20  20  5.5  5.5  36  36  17  17  5.0  5.0  32  32  14  14  4.5  4.5  28  28  11  11  4.0  4.0  24  24  8  8  3.5  3.5  5  3.0  20  Jan. 08  May 08  Sep. 08  Jan. 09  Effective  20  5  Jan. 08  May 08  Estimated  Sep. 08  Jan. 09  Jan. 08  May 08  Sep. 08  Jan. 09  Simulated rate without increase in risk after September  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 5 Corporate Bond and Long-Term Interest Rates (percent) 6  6  5  5 4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  Jan.08  May 08 EE.UU. (1)  Sep.08 Chile (2)  Jan.09  0  Chile corporate (3)  (1) Nominal 10-year interest rates in the U.S. (2) Interest rate on Central Bank's BCU-5. (3) Interest on domestic 5-year corporate bond. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and LVA indices. BIS Review 35/2009  7  3.0

Bandid Nijathaworn: Update on the Thai economy Luncheon address by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Rotary Club of Bangkok South (RCBS), Bangkok, 20 November 2009. *  *  *  Good afternoon, First, let me thank the Rotary Club of Bangkok South (RCBS) for the invitation, and especially I want to thank Peter Williams for a very warm introduction. It is an honor to be speaking to you today, and my topic this afternoon is updating on the Thai economy. As you are all aware, this year has been an exceptionally challenging year economically, not just for Thailand but also for most other economies. This year the global financial crisis, which has been with us since August 2007, continues to impart negative impact on economic activities, employment, and access to financing worldwide. The good news is that things are looking up. There are better news coming from the advanced economies, suggesting that economic situations are improving and financial markets are stabilizing. In Asia and the Pacific, signs of recovery are also strong and lead those in the rest of the world. On the homefront, recent economic data for Thailand are also more positive and indicate that the economy is slowly returning to growth after a sharp contraction we saw late last year and in the first quarter of this year.
And the euro will also encourage “cross fertilisation” of best practices through stronger co ordination of member states policies in areas such as labour markets, education and training, job creation incentives, effective welfare safety nets, etc. In this sense, the euro – which is in itself a major structural reform- must, and will certainly, bring about other structural reforms. í  The fourth condition is that all economic leaders in Europe must be clearsighted with regard to the crucial matter of competitiveness. Pre-euro economic policy meant in particular monitoring trade balances, the balance of payments and the foreign exchange and interest rate markets. Economic leaders thus received constant and to a large extent real time feedback on key indicators affecting national economic performance and could react accordingly. These indicators remain on the euro-wide level: this is why the mutual surveillance of fiscal and economic policies provided for by the Treaty is so important. But they have disappeared at the national level with the advent of the euro, whilst the. rules of a market economy continue to apply to each economy participating in the euro zone. Jobs are created by consumers when they choose the goods and services they feel are the best value for money. Businessmen allocate these jobs to different possible locations in different countries according to the relative competitive advantages of these locations. Therefore the leaders of each national economy must monitor competitiveness through indicators such as unit production costs, tax and regulatory frameworks and so forth. This is even more important than before.

Indeed, by urging governments to aim for a fiscal position close to balance or in surplus in the medium term, the Pact enables them to let fiscal deficits increase during recessions without exceeding  5  BIS Review 81/1999  the 3% reference value. In short, it allows them to create a fiscal buffer during normal economic periods that can be drawn on, if an asymmetric shock occurs. í  The third condition is that all European countries must undertake structural reforms. Continental Europe is experiencing high levels of unemployment, despite the fact that the jobless rate has been declining slightly in most of its economics. According to the IMF, around 80% of this unemployment is structural, that is, generated by our burdensome rules and regulations. The Monetary Policy Council of the Banque de France agrees with this analysis. Just recently, some external observers were still blaming Europe for its focus on the euro, instead of what they considered the more urgent task, namely the implementation of structural reforms necessary for more dynamic job creation. These critics were wrong regarding the untimeliness of the euro, but their assessment of the problems of the European economy is obviously correct. The euro will be a stimulus to structural reforms. Most importantly, the single currency is decisively contributing to achieve the single market in the three markets of goods, services and capital within the euro zone.