samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Regulation of SGX as a self-listed entity When the SGX was listed on itself (on its Securities Trading subsidiary), MAS assumed the role of frontline regulator for the listing and trading of SGX's shares. MAS was the approving authority for SGX's listing, and was directly responsible for vetting SGX's prospectus. We are also conducting surveillance of trading in SGX's shares, and monitoring the continuous disclosure of material information by SGX. MAS has powers under the Exchanges (Demutualisation and Merger) Act to issue directives to SGX to resolve any conflicts of interest arising from its self-listing. Such conflicts are also addressed in a Deed of Undertaking to the MAS. In keeping with the Deed, SGX has appointed a Conflicts Committee to deal with such issues, and MAS is the approving authority for the composition of the Committee. Revisiting the regulatory structure will be necessary The relationship between the regulator and the exchange is evolving internationally. Regulators are monitoring the effectiveness of self-regulation by the exchanges, and the division of responsibilities between regulators and exchanges. No single model has gained universal acceptance, and no model is regarded as good for all time in any jurisdiction. The present MAS-SGX regulatory arrangement has major elements in common with that in the major jurisdictions which have seen the exchanges demutualised, and in particular with arrangements in Australia. The UK approach is also similar, except that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has taken over the listing authority from the London Stock Exchange (LSE).

I will touch now on a number of issues concerning the regulatory functions of the SGX as a demutualised, profit-oriented and listed exchange, and its relationship with the MAS as the statutory regulator. Can a demutualised, listed exchange regulate the market? As a focal point of market activity, exchanges have traditionally been accorded the role of frontline regulator of the securities markets. With the demutualisation and public offering of shares by a growing number of exchanges - most recently the Deutsche Borse - questions arise as to whether a listed for-profit exchange is able to discharge its role as frontline regulator competently and effectively. Conflicts of interest in the regulatory functions of an exchange are not new however. They existed before demutualisation. Members of the former Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), a mutual body, had to set and enforce rules in the public interest that could negatively affect their commercial interests. The exchange was also expected to conduct effective and impartial supervision of its member-owners. The potential conflicts of interest in these respects were mitigated by the fact that the SES had only a small number of members, accentuating the financial risks that they each faced from a failure of the exchange to properly regulate. 2  BIS Review 14/2001  More importantly, the potential conflicts of interest made it necessary for the MAS to take a heavy hand in the affairs of the exchange.
And it works in part by shifting net interest income from those who do save to those who borrow (and hence are more likely to spend out of marginal income). Not surprisingly, loosening monetary policy is often unpopular with savers, just as tightening policy is unpopular with borrowers. We have every sympathy for those who are net savers and especially if they rely on investment income, but we have to set policy for the good of the economy as a whole, in line with our Remit. Ultimately, economic recovery is in everyone’s interests. Monetary policy famously has “long and variable lags”. One of the main reasons why is because the demand for money depends on many other factors in the economy outside of the central bank’s control. There are other forms of money apart from sterling as I have defined it so far. Economic activity is also supported by the extent of deposits created by the commercial banks. Various measures of this are available, usually labelled “broad money” and the definition most commonly used in the UK is known as M49. Ideally, that wider definition of money is what we would like to boost to ensure an increase in nominal demand for goods and services. In the UK it has been clear over the past four years that while we have been busy increasing the supply of narrow money, the growth of broad money has remained weak.

Financial sector weakness was at the heart of the problems in Asia, a crucial element in Argentina and Mexico earlier in the decade, and a contributing force in Russia. Just as strong financial systems act as stabilizers when a domestic economy is battered, weak financial systems amplify the scope and reach of the problems, making bad situations worse. While important progress has been made in rehabilitating Asia’s financial systems, a great deal remains to be done to continue the strengthening of weakened financial and corporate sectors, and improve the region’s resistance to future problems. I am well aware that universal policy prescriptions are difficult to draw, given the wide range of experience and initial conditions. Indeed, individual countries in Asia have followed differing reform strategies, and the results of these efforts will help to inform the ongoing debate. Nonetheless, international experience with financial sector reform suggests a number of cautionary lessons. Let me cite a few: •  Restructuring and reform must adequately address both the current “stock” of problem assets as well as the potential “flow” of new problems attributable to deficiencies in the broader financial system infrastructure. Lack of adequate action on either front can lead to a continuation of the substantial costs of weak banking sectors, sometimes well beyond the immediate crisis itself. •  Clean-up efforts must be sufficient to the task. Half-done measures that leave financial institutions with significant levels of impaired assets at best postpone the reckoning and potentially create incentives for excessive risk-taking.
So, on top of the various internship programmes we have been organising, we have just launched the Industry Project Masters Network pilot scheme which provides internship opportunities to postgraduate students to work on real-life fintech projects of banks. Another major initiative is the launch of a brand new Future Banking Bridging Programme in collaboration with HKIB and the industry. This Bridging Programme is free and provides good opportunities for university students to gain practical knowledge in the hottest areas of banking. The inaugural class will be open for application very soon. 33. In saying all this, we should not miss out existing banking practitioners. So, the second direction is to better “connect” our workforce to the future of banking to ensure they stay relevant in the new era. Our success will be all about upskilling our people to meet the future needs of the industry. For this to happen, an essential ingredient is the availability of in-demand training programmes with credible certification frameworks. 34. To date, more than 13,000 banking practitioners have obtained certifications in numerous professional areas under the Enhanced Competency Framework, or ECF. As the industry demand for fintech and green finance knowledge is strong, we will launch a new ECF on fintech later this year to provide more structured and comprehensive training programmes for fintech practitioners. We will also look into the feasibility of developing an ECF on green finance. 35.

So, have we done enough in terms of financial inclusion? 14. The pandemic has taught us that we must deepen our commitment to financial inclusion. And we should try to weave that into our financial development objectives going forward. In fact, our ability to enhance the financial inclusion role can be helped hugely by technology. With technology, our banking system can provide a more equitable and fairer access to banking services for all. 15. And this brings me to the second role the financial system can play – to build a smarter financial system. Let me share with you an example of how a smarter financial system can help promote financial inclusion. For a long time, SMEs have found it difficult to obtain bank financing without collateral, because banks lack reliable and timely financial data to assess the repayment ability of SMEs. 16. We believe that the introduction of the Commercial Data Interchange can help address this long-standing pain point. This next-generation financial data infrastructure can facilitate banks’ access to customers’ commercial data with their consent. With such data, banks can apply advanced data analytical tools for credit risk assessment. This could allow corporates, especially SMEs, without sufficient collateral or credit history to borrow more quickly, easily and at a lower cost. It is a win-win situation as this will also enhance banks’ risk management capability and unleash new business opportunities. 17. So, we strongly encourage banks, large or small, to embrace digital transformation to provide fair and efficient financial services to customers.
This is why, for instance, the minutes taken at the monetary policy meetings are normally published two weeks after the meetings. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the General Council have the right, according to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, to attend the meetings of the Executive Board, which they normally make use of. 3 The purpose of this is in principle that they are monitoring that things are done correctly, on behalf of the Riksdag and the general public. We decided only a couple of weeks ago to make some changes in these areas. I shall return to this shortly. But let me first state another aspect as to why openness and clarity are so important to us. Target fulfilment – openness and clarity contribute to efficiency There are not merely democratic reasons as to why central banks have become more open and clear. Many central banks have seen greater transparency as a means of more easily attaining their objectives and of making monetary policy more efficient. Openness and clarity can even here enable us to better meet the requirements made by our principal. Firstly, openness and clarity regarding monetary policy make it easier for economic agents to be convinced that the interest rate decisions made are really intended to attain low and stable inflation. This contributes to greater credibility and to anchoring expectations around the target.

For one thing, it may well happen that policymakers, in the light of new facts and figures on ongoing developments, come to the conclusion that the interest rate pattern currently followed needs to be corrected quite considerably. This would mean correcting a pattern that, from today’s vantage point, was not optimal in the past. For another, it may be desirable in certain situations to take the markets by surprise and cause expectations to be revised. Second, it is in the nature of the concept that the information content of a pre-announced interest rate target is much smaller with respect to the time dimension than used to be the case for money supply targets. Under the aspects of transparency and central bank accountability, this is a drawback. We have therefore taken effective countermeasures by defining price stability and deciding to publish our inflation forecast, thus submitting our decisions to public discussion. This has made it clear - and equally clearly communicated - how our actions are oriented and how they are to be measured. I have thus addressed issues that have all seen a particularly large number of changes in the past few years: independence, transparency and accountability. 3  BIS Review 35/2000  3. Independence - mandate - transparency  Independence Right into the 1980s, independent central banks were the exception - such as those of the US, Germany and Switzerland - rather than the rule. This has changed on a broad front in the past ten years.
Whilst non-performing loans in the banking sector rose from around 5% in July 2008 to their current levels of around 10%, they remain within the prudential ceilings above which concerns of systemic risks would be warranted. The increase in non-performing loans thus reflects the deterioration in the real sector of the economy. It is in this sense, i.e. the absence of a significant volume of impaired assets in the financial system, that I describe “financial markets” rather than the “financial system” as bearing the brunt of the crisis. The weight of adjustment was reflected in exchange rates and the Balance of Payments – reflected in a marked draw down of international reserves. However, the ramifications of the crisis on the real sector of many sub-Saharan African economies are real and potentially far reaching, and it is to these that I now turn. In my reflections on the impact and implications of the global economic crisis on Africa, I wish to emphasize four key points: The first and perhaps the most significant effect of the global financial and economic crisis has been the marked slow-down in real GDP growth in SSA, to a projected 1.5% in 2009 from an estimated 5.5% in 2008. This slow-down in growth has occurred after a significant period of strong economic growth and investment that had laid the platform for sustained and significant reductions in poverty across the continent.

1  The circumstances in which financial markets can affect the real economy were covered in my speech: ‘Market finance and financial stability: will the stretch cause a strain?’ (February 2018). 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  So as we consider the bear of stretched valuations in credit markets and the bergs of leverage and liquidity that could affect the resilience of those markets, I’ll look at whether each is an issue just for market risks or also of relevance to the wider economy too. Let’s begin with the moonwalking bear in debt markets. Consider this:  The yield on a basket of dollar-denominated corporate bonds is now closer to the expected average short-term risk-free rate over the life of those bonds than at any time in the past twenty years (see slide 3). The premium investors earn for taking interest rate and credit risk is squeezed. On the face of it that suggests an unusual degree of investor confidence about the interest rate outlook and corporate prospects generally.2 This compression of the premium has meant that – unusually – dollar corporate bond yields haven’t risen, even as the US risk-free rate has. (slide 4)  Perhaps companies, globally, have become less risky? That seems to be the view in the market for credit default swaps at least. Two years ago, the average annual premium of insuring against investment-grade corporate default was 85bp of the amount insured. Today, it is 50bp.
Banks have become more vulnerable to distortions in the credit markets. Historically, our 4 banks primarily obtained funds through deposits by households and enterprises. In recent  1  Folketrygdfondet will manage the new Government Bond Fund. 2  The Government has increased the capital of Kommunalbanken Norway (the local government funding agency), it has increased the scope of GIEK (the central government export credit agency) and Innovation Norway, and has offered state loans to Eksportfinans Norway (the credit institution for export financing). 3  Figures for banks’ equity capital before 1918 are based on: Jan Tore Klovland (2007): “A reconstruction of the balance sheets of savings banks in Norway 1822-1875” and “A reconstruction of the balance sheets of commercial banks in Norway1848-1900” in Øyvind Eitrheim, Jan Tore Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (Ed.) (2007): “Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway – Part II” Norges Bank’s Occasional Papers, No. 38, Oslo. Statistics Norway is the source for figures from 1919 to 1995. Norges Bank is the source for figures from 1996. 4  Figures are taken from the sources in footnote 3 and Hege Imset Matre, H. I. (1992): Norske forretningsbanker 1848-1990: En tilbakeføring av forretningsstatistikken (Norwegian commercial banks 1848-1990). Report No 41 from the research programme Det nye pengesamfunnet. 2  BIS Review 37/2009  years, banks have borrowed in both domestic and foreign markets. When credit markets dried up, this proved to involve high liquidity risk for banks.

Might this perhaps be a niche which a cooperative bank, setting up shop here, might be able to exploit? Furthermore, I think that perhaps I should modify an observation I made earlier: namely, that the need to set up a cooperative bank in Malta has never so far been felt. On second thoughts, perhaps, this is not entirely true. For one of our smaller banks, one that, not surprisingly, was founded by a Jesuit priest in 1910, actually did begin life as a cooperative society. It was originally called the Lega dell’ Apostolato della Preghiera, and its main aims were the setting up of a number of initiatives, all with an underlying social purpose. These included: a savings bank, intended to instil habits of thrift among the working classes; a mutual benefit society; a printing press; the publication of a Maltese language periodical; an evening school for the teaching of languages, music and crafts; an emigration bureau to help Maltese citizens wishing to settle in other countries; schemes for the free provision of food, medicines and medical care to the needy; a public lotto office; and a recreational club for members. It – or at least the savings bank part of its operations – only became a private limited company as recently as 1970, just before Malta’s first Banking Act was enacted. And this, perhaps, should give us a clue as to why we do not have a Maltese cooperative bank today.
The rapid spread of the pandemic in March 2020 also led to wide, abrupt swings in financial markets. The global composite equity index fell by 20 percent in 22 days. However, markets recovered rapidly, and by the second quarter the GPFG had posted one of its best ever quarterly results. For the year as a whole, the GPFG’s investments posted an overall return of 10.9 percent before management costs. The return was 0.27 percentage point higher than the return on the benchmark index the GPFG’s performance is measured against. The Executive Board is pleased that a solid excess return was achieved in a turbulent year. The positive trend has continued, and the return on the GPFG in the first quarter of 2021 was 4 percent. The GPFG’s performance must be assessed over time. The Executive Board is satisfied that the return over time has also been good. The substantial market fluctuations in 2020 nevertheless serve as a reminder that the return on the GPFG may vary considerably. The GPFG’s equity allocation is the decision that has the greatest impact on the volatility of the fund’s return. The equity allocation is not specifically assessed in this year’s report to the Storting, but the Ministry has proposed a number of changes in the equities selected to be included in the benchmark index. Norges Bank has provided analyses and advice when requested by the Ministry.

Øystein Olsen: Management of the Government Pension Fund Global Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting, Oslo, 3 May 2021. * * * Please note that the text below may differ from the actual address. I would like to thank the Committee for the invitation to speak on the Bank’s management of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). Norges Bank manages the GPFG with the objective of achieving the highest possible return over time within the limits of the investment mandate defined by the Ministry of Finance. The GPFG is to be managed within an adequate control and risk management framework and in a responsible and efficient manner with a high degree of transparency. The GPFG is managed to track the benchmark index fairly closely, ie the return largely tracks the return on the benchmark index. The benchmark index is defined by the Ministry of Finance and endorsed by the Storting. However, even though Norges Bank closely tracks the GPFG’s benchmark index, many large and small choices have to be made every day. These choices are based on a clear mandate from the authorities and a well thought-out investment strategy. The year 2020 was a special year for us all, including the GPFG. As for many others, working conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic have been demanding.
Japan's take-off continued right up to the onset of World War II. Economic historians have estimated that Japan experienced a 14-fold increase in income levels over this period. Total defeat in World War II reduced Japan to ruins. After the war, Japan faced the massive task of reconstruction and development. Japanese firms cooperated with the Americans, raised their technical expertise, and benefited from institutional reforms of the Occupation period for a new, market-based economy. By 1950, the pre-war zaibatsu conglomerates were dissolved and family control had been eliminated. The zaibatsu system was replaced by the keiretsu system, built around the main banks, which shared large cross-shareholdings with the corporate sector. Control passed from shareholders to top managers. Managers and workers worked together as one to rebuild the country. The whole system was underpinned by the consistent and coherent political leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party, supported by an elite civil service. This strategy yielded 30 years of unparalleled growth. By the 1980s, Japan had become an economic superpower. But the formula did not work forever. In 1990, the excesses of the bubble economy ended in the collapse of Japan's property and stock markets. Japan entered a prolonged period of stagnation, whose end is still not yet in sight. Policies and institutions had not kept up with the demands of globalisation. The keiretsu model and the lifelong employment system were too rigid to adapt to the rapid changes of the new economy.

A report released shortly after I came to the New York Fed showed that the typical New York State community college engages with more than 100 local employers, spanning every industry sector.4 More recently, the New York Fed hosted an event that explored ways to advance economic prosperity in rural areas.5 Many great insights were shared, including a framework for workforce development programs that contained four principles: 1) fashioning a strategy around a community's assets; 2) designing programs that are adaptable; 3) including traditionally marginalized groups in decision-making; and 4) bringing together community, business, and government leaders-like you are doing today. 2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Conclusion Developing career-building programs that meet the needs of local employers and are accessible to job seekers is critical to bridging the skills gap. Collaboration is a key component of any successful program. By joining together, we can advance the economic resilience of rural areas like Columbia and Greene Counties-and strengthen our Jenga tower. 1 Columbia-Greene LWDA Local Plan, July 1, 2021 – June 30, 2025. 2 Office of the New York State Comptroller, Availability, Access and Affordability:  Understanding Broadband Challenges in New York State, September 2021. 3 Investing in America's Workforce, a Federal Reserve System initiative in collaboration  with the Heldrich Center for Workforce Development at Rutgers University, the Ray Marshall Center at the University of Texas at Austin, and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (2019).