samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
29.10.2019  The Spanish economy: outlook and challenges Third Economic-Insurance Meeting: “Economic future and insurance industry trends” Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I should like to start by thanking the president of the Lawyers’ Mutual Society, Enrique Sanz, for his kind invitation to deliver the closing address to this third economic-insurance meeting. It is an honour and a pleasure to participate in this event and to share with you some reflections on the economic outlook for the immediate future and, especially, on the main medium and long-term challenges facing the Spanish economy. The degree of vulnerability of the Spanish economy to possible shocks and, ultimately, the well-being of the Spanish people will largely depend on how the economy’s main structural problems are addressed. The economic situation The global economic expansion in weakening against the background of the downturn in international trade…  The international economic environment in which the Spanish economy operates has become more unfavourable over the past year, with a slowdown in growth and, in particular, in international trade. Global GDP growth continued to moderate, to a rate of 2.8% year-onyear in the second quarter of 2018, down more than one percentage point (pp) from a year earlier. In addition, growth projections have been revised downwards in most economies in recent quarters. Indeed, global GDP growth is projected this year to be at its lowest level since the international financial crisis.

As you know, the Governing Board adopted the expert group's conclusions and indicated to the Federal Council that, based on the profit figure following revaluation, an amount corresponding to half the gold holdings could be earmarked for purposes other than monetary policy. The possible uses for the sales proceeds have been the subject of much political debate. None of the proposed solutions have succeeded in attracting a consensus among the population or in the Federal Parliament. On 16 December, the parliamentary debate was concluded without an agreement being reached. Thus, a sum of CHF 21.1 billion, corresponding to the proceeds of the gold sales, has been included in the usual profit distribution procedure. Some people fear that, following this transfer, the National Bank will no longer have sufficient currency reserves. I have a word of reassurance for them. This issue has been examined in depth and has been discussed by our Bank Council. Our currency reserves total CHF 60 billion – an amount which may be considered appropriate by comparison with other industrialised countries. BIS Review 30/2005  3  But nor are these reserves excessive. Furthermore, it is important that the currency reserves evolve over time, in tandem with the size of our economy. This is why, in accordance with Article 99 of the Constitution and Article 30 of the National Bank Act, the SNB has adopted a provisioning policy that provides for gradual growth in its currency reserves.
Because within the EU we can enter into more or less binding commitments under the terms of rules and legislation that comes out of the process here in Brussels, without infringing on national sovereignty. The fourth point I would make is that the EU, as well as leading the way in addressing that problem regionally, must take a very close interest in the arrangements for global resolution, because pretty well every single one of Europe’s largest financial institutions operates on a global scale and, furthermore, the largest global institutions headquartered outside the EU all have sizable and complex businesses within the EU. In the run up to the G20 meeting of Finance Ministers and Governors in October and then the Leaders summit in November, our community and the political community will have to think about the extent to which sovereignty in this area could be pooled or whether, instead, to come up with a middle road which at least removes obstacles to co-operation. I suspect it is unrealistic at this stage of global financial development and co-operation for there to be a multilateral binding treaty that would put a single country in the sole and unqualified lead in the resolution of a global financial institution. But that doesn’t mean that there is nothing useful to do. We could do things along the following lines. First of all, in our national and EU legislation, we could all remove impediments for one country to co-operate with other countries in the event of a resolution.

The will to pursue a given business activity and succeed is critical if promising ideas are ultimately to evolve into marketable products or processes. Switzerland cannot be truly ambitious without ambitious entrepreneurs, and surveys suggest that the country still has room for improvement here. Against this backdrop, steps should be taken to cultivate innovative drive and entrepreneurial thinking early on, for instance by encouraging high school students to do projects in which they found their own small companies. Various universities already run programmes designed to assist young researchers in bringing innovative products and services to market. Private initiatives also play a significant role in nurturing entrepreneurship in Switzerland, helping young people learn how to transform an idea into an innovation and operate a business. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
It will probably be necessary to scale it back in increments as demand pressures in the domestic economy recede and growth in trading partner countries gathers more momentum. Current forecasts indicate that this will happen, as can be seen at the right in the chart. Long-term interest rates will reflect this, and the longterm interest rate differential will narrow. Chart 6  Another important factor is that it is unclear what benefit the investments affected by the capital flow management measure have for Iceland at present. The Treasury’s borrowing need is limited in historical context, and strictly speaking, the Treasury does not need the funds generated by the bonds in question. If the special reserve requirement were not in effect, the Central Bank would probably have to hold larger foreign exchange reserves so as to mitigate the risk associated with carry trade-related inflows and the potential for sudden outflows. This would be quite costly, as the global market returns on the reserves are unusually low at present. At the same time, foreign investors can expect attractive returns on Icelandic Treasury bonds, and the more stable the króna, the greater the risk-adjusted interest rate differential. In order to reduce 7  that differential, the Central Bank would therefore need to allow increased exchange rate fluctuations, which would also exacerbate the risk faced by residents. Under current conditions, it can even be argued that for the Icelandic economy, the net benefit from such inflows is negative.

Whether it is the volume of foreign exchange reserves or the growth of foreign exchange turnover or the amount of savings that needs to be mobilised for promoting economic growth and development, Asia is likely to occupy top position in the world, if it is not already there. The prospects of a strong relative shift of financial market liquidity into Asia are clear, so is the need for upgrading professionalism in finance, hopefully at a pace that is commensurate with its increasing importance in global finance. It is therefore absolutely right for the first regional office of ACI to be established in Asia and, if I may add, for it to be established in Hong Kong, as the truly international financial centre in the region. On the choice of Hong Kong, we are of course grateful and feel honoured, and I as Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and as Honorary President of the Treasury Markets Association offer the full support of the two organisations to the activities of ACI and ACI Asia. Thank you. BIS Review 90/2008  1
Available indicators suggest that there has been a gradual recovery since mid-2015, which continued in the second half of 2016. A key factor here is improved business and household sentiment in the euro area and other advanced economies, which in turn creates a more favourable environment for the Swiss export industry. Overall, the signals from the economic indicators are consistent with our previous GDP growth forecast of around 1.5% for 2016 as a whole. Developments on the labour market support this view. Employment statistics show that the number of jobs in Switzerland grew in the third quarter, too. Up until November, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for this year was stable at 3.3%. The outlook for the coming year is cautiously optimistic. Over the course of 2017, export demand looks set to gradually strengthen further. For the export industry, this will mean better capacity utilisation and less pressure on margins. We are also expecting a gradual recovery on the labour market. Various surveys confirm this assessment. Together with our continued expansionary monetary policy, labour market developments should boost domestic demand. Private consumption, too, is likely to once again make a greater contribution to economic growth. Overall, as for 2016, the SNB expects GDP growth for 2017 to be roughly 1.5%. However, the Swiss economy will also face some major challenges in the coming year. Structural change continues to affect several important industries. Retailing is having to contend with changes both to distribution channels and the spending habits of households.

Students spend about one to two days in class, and three to four days at work each week for a period of one or two years. Now in its fourth year, the programme has taken in 37 students. This includes 22 who have graduated from the programme, of which 9 students have successfully secured a job oﬀer at the bank before graduation. The WSDeg programme is a win-win proposition. The students get an early taste of what the industry is like which can help them make better informed career decisions. For the firms, internships are an eﬀective talent attraction tool – employers can tell a lot more about the suitability of prospective employees through a short internship on the job compared to any number of interviews and tests. We need to dramatically scale up such programmes. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/gearing-up-for-new-and-evolving-jobs-in-financial-services  14/18  04/12/2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authorit…  MAS will introduce a new Work-Study Support Programme to co-fund the internship stipend of students who are trainees at financial institutions under WSDeg programme. Funding will be at 80% of the monthly stipend, capped at $ per trainee. MAS has been working with the private banking industry for an indicative commitment of about 200 trainees over the next 3 years. We plan to expand our eﬀorts in other growth areas too, such as asset management.
The SSM Regulation conferred on the ECB a large part of the prudential supervision competences that had hitherto been the remit of the NCAs.6 However, a distinction has been drawn between what are known as “significant institutions”,7 which are supervised directly by the ECB (currently 113 institutions representing nearly 82% of total banking assets in the participating countries), and “less significant institutions”, which will continue to be supervised directly by the NCAs and indirectly by the ECB, with the main aim of ensuring they are treated consistently across the area. The tasks of granting authorisation to credit institutions (and, when appropriate, the withdrawal thereof) and of assessing proposals to acquire qualifying holdings are conferred on the ECB irrespective of whether the institutions are significant or not (“common procedures”). In any case, the ECB is ultimately responsible for the supervision of all credit institutions of participating countries, and may adopt regulations or issue guidelines or general instructions to ensure consistent supervision across the SSM. It may also assume the direct supervision of less significant institutions whenever it deems necessary to ensure consistent supervision. 5  In October 2020, the supervisors of Bulgaria and Croatia — countries that have not yet adopted the euro — began “close cooperation” with the ECB. This is the mechanism envisaged for countries outside the euro area to join the SSM.

A long term of office may also be advantageous from the standpoint of accumulation of experience, and may determine the capacity of influence in the different international fora in which the senior officials of supervisory bodies take part. In this respect, the term of office of the Governor (and of the Deputy Governor and Council Members) of the Banco de España – currently six years, nonrenewable in the case of the Governor and the Deputy Governor – although longer than a Parliamentary term, is relatively short by international standards (see Annex 4).8 A good benchmark for the future could be the term of office of the members of the ECB’s Executive Board which is set at eight years and is non-renewable (as is the case at the Bank of England). The explicit prohibition of renewable terms of office is, in my opinion, a key element that should be preserved. While few of our central bank peers share this characteristic, non-renewable terms of office are warranted because they nullify the incentives for the incumbents in the highest positions of authority at those institutions to ingratiate themselves with those who decide on their possible re-election. In the case of the Banco de España, as I have mentioned already, the Governor and the Deputy Governor have non-renewable terms, but the members of the Governing Council do not, since their term is renewable once. Non-renewable terms could therefore also be considered for members of the Governing Council.
Ivan Iskrov: Financial progress and prospects Speech by Mr Ivan Iskrov, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the Sixth Business Roundtable with the Government of Bulgaria, Sofia, 21 March 2006. *  *  *  Dear Minister Oresharski, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to participate together with the Minister of Finance in this panel event dedicated to the financial development and prospects of this country’s economy. Based on the statutory division of labour between the Central Bank Governor and the Finance Minister on the one hand, and between the Central Bank and the Government on the other, in my speech I will deal mainly with the issues relating to the country’s external position, the development of bank lending and inflation, and the impact these variables have on the BNB’s policy. I would like to immediately underscore that these issues cannot be discussed, outside the context of economic growth prospects, the accession of our country to the EU, and the trends of development in world economy. For better understanding of Bulgarian economy in the recent years, several global trends influencing significantly the development of our economy should be highlighted. Firstly, the dominance of the principle of free trade and the liberalization of capital movement, combined with the investors’ increasing propensity to hold assets issued by third country residents, brought about the on-going growth of international trade and exchange of capital.

Mr George talks about monetary policy in the United Kingdom: The Economic Prospect Text of the Chancellor’s Lecture delivered by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr E A J George, at Hertfordshire University on 18/02/99. As you would expect of a central banker I will talk about monetary policy – under the title of “The Economic Prospect”. I will begin by explaining what it is that we are trying to do through monetary policy; then I’ll describe how we’ve been doing, where we are now, and where we might be headed. What we are trying to do So let me begin with what it is that we are trying to do. In one sense that’s very easy to explain these days. The previous Conservative Government had already in 1992 defined the objective of monetary policy in terms of a target rate for retail price inflation. The new Labour Government, immediately on assuming office, similarly defined the objective in terms of an inflation target, but went an important step further. As soon as Gordon Brown became Chancellor of the Exchequer, in May 1997, he announced that he would no longer exercise his powers to set short-term interest rates, which is the heart of monetary policy, but instead he would set the inflation target, and delegate the achievement of that target to a new Monetary Policy Committee to be established in the Bank of England.
As a consequence, the euro is becoming extremely attractive, as a vehicle, a transaction, an investment and a reserve currency. As you may know, as central bankers, we remain neutral as far as the internationalisation of the euro is concerned. We are neither encouraging, nor discouraging the process. But, as a citizen, I cannot help and feel proud of having one the two main currencies in the world. Long term prospects Looking into the future, I would like to try and answer four questions: is monetary integration sustainable in the long run? What are the prospects for the enlargement of the euro area? Can the euro serve as a model for other regions in the world? And finally, is monetary union going to lead to further political integration in Europe? Solidity of the euro area I am aware that there still is, on this side of the Atlantic, a lot of skepticism about the future for the euro. Four years ago, one of your leading academics, (Martin Feldstein) wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs arguing that monetary union would reignite conflicts and war in Europe. This is, of course, the extreme form of a basic argument: that there are too many divergences between European states for them to withstand the pressures of monetary unification. Put in simple economic terms, it boils down to the argument that the euro is not an optimum currency area. In my view, this is less and less true.

Researchers have documented and studied how asset valuations seem to move far more on news that affects risk premiums than on news on future cash flows. This was vividly illustrated by the market turbulence of 2008–2009, as well as the last few weeks. In their investigation of why risk premiums vary so much, researchers have moved far beyond the simplest models of introductory finance classes. Theoretical progress, data availability and computational advances have made it possible to study the implications of potentially important features:   investors are different and not necessarily fully informed or rational;    markets are incomplete and have frictions;    returns might have fat tails and face sudden disasters;    and government regulations are important. Models of investor heterogeneity, non-tradable, non-financial risk, market frictions and timevarying uncertainty go a long way in accounting for variations in market risk premiums. This has profound implications for portfolio theory and practical portfolio strategies. Modern portfolio theory builds on differences in defining characteristics between investors. Investors with distinctly different non-tradable, non-financial risk, who are affected differently by market frictions and regulations, should hold different portfolios. In the NBIM Strategy Plan for 2011–2013, we stated that we will implement an investment strategy built on the Fund’s defining characteristics – with strategies that are long-term oriented, scalable, and focused on underlying value. This sentence covers a wide range of interesting questions. All the speakers today will, in fact, offer perspectives on the challenges outlined here.
A third and more general reason why inflation has been high in the Baltic countries was that the economic impact of the pandemic was more limited in our region and the pandemic was followed by a very strong and swift recovery. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies combined with strong domestic demand pressures therefore contributed to an increase in inflation. On top of this was a change in the Estonian pension system in the autumn of 2021 that allowed individuals to start withdrawing their  2/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  pension savings before they reached retirement age. Some of this money was used to fund private consumption, which further increased inflationary pressures. The substantial dispersion of inflation rates between the countries of the euro area poses the question of how harmful these differences are in a monetary union. Obviously there will always be differences between the structures of our economies, and so there will always be some differences between the inflation rates in different countries. Such differences have been around since the euro was first introduced, though for most of the time they have been minor. Large differences in inflation rates could however lead to problems with the smooth functioning of a common currency area. An obvious problem is that a common monetary policy allowing nominal interest rates to be similar in all of the euro area countries will lead to differences in real interest rates if there are differences in inflation.

This amounts to 4.5 per cent of GDP for 2021, a sizeable amount of extraordinary spending indeed. Some countries have raised additional revenues to cover this by introducing windfall taxes on energy companies5. One positive side effect of higher inflation is that it reduces the ratio of government debt to GDP because nominal GDP grows fast. This good news has been offset though by the sharp rise in interest rates over the past year, and the most likely net effect is that interest payments on government debt will be higher in the years to come6. Inflation affects the fiscal balance through both revenues and spending and there are both positive and negative effects. Higher inflation may bring in more tax revenue relative to GDP if the brackets in the income tax system are left unchanged, but less revenue relative to GDP for excise taxes that are fixed in nominal terms. Spending may decline in relation to GDP if pensions and public sector wages adjust slowly, while discretionary support measures of the type we have seen applied in all the EU countries over the past year increase public spending. It is worth noting how high inflation can affect public finances in surprising and contradictory ways. During the first year of rising prices, the budget balance very often improves. The higher prices first make the tax base larger and there are higher revenues from consumption taxes, while at the same time there can be a long lag before many costs adjust.