samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Additionally, coastal erosion will directly impact tourism in places such as Kota Kinabalu and manufacturing in industrial zones such as Kota Bharu, Kuala Terengganu and Mersing. If this trend continues, our mangroves would completely sink by 2040 and industrial zones will be affected by 2060. Our ports, the lifeblood of international trade linkages, will also struggle to cope with rising sea levels. A recent study estimates that pre-emptively adapting Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas for climatic conditions expected in 2070 will cost nearly RM3 billion. Naturally, this cost would be far greater if not planned for in advance. The effects of climate change are real. They are already upon us; and make no mistake, they will intensify. For this reason, financial institutions can no longer be passive about climate change and its effects. There is a clear economic case for building resilience to climate change: it directly affects our balance sheets, and can pose a broader risk to financial stability from significant and prolonged climate-related events. So far, I have explained the direct, physical risk posed by climate change to the economy and financial industry. However, it is not only the climate that is changing. The changing behaviours of economic agents also give rise to significant transitioning risks. As the world becomes increasingly concerned with reducing the global carbon footprint, governments, businesses and consumers are pushing for a transition to a more sustainable, greener economy.

It is my hope, therefore, that you will include on your agenda issues to do with ICT solutions to address financial inclusion for sustainable development. Let me now turn my attention to another key issue that I expect delegates to discuss at this Conference. This relates to the crucial role that the SADC IT Forum plays in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which is the SADC long-term (15-Year) Strategy. It is envisaged that the Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) in SADC will continue to work on the process of monetary and financial integration in the region. In order to meet this aspiration, there is a need to harmonise central banking practices and procedures across the SADC region and benchmark these against international best practices. I therefore trust that this Conference will seek to prepare a RISDP Action Plan which will steer ICTs within the SADC region to higher levels. Equally important, I also expect that this initiative will assist central banks to harmonise ICT functions and come up with shared regional communication infrastructures that promote economic development. Distinguished Delegates, at this juncture let me also thank representatives of the hardware and software suppliers for coming to this Conference. These are our partners and the technologies that have been implemented in our central banks would not have been possible without their technical advice, expertise and innovation.
For the CESEE region, data shows significantly smaller capital growth in the post-crisis period (the only exception is Macedonia1). Though the decline/significantly depressed growth in TFP is the key factor for the observed slowdown in potential growth across the region, slower capital accumulation also played a role. Chart 4: Capital, TFP and potential GDP before and after the crisis (average growth rates across countries, in %) 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0  1.0 0.0 avg. 2000-08 -1.0  avg. 2009-16  avg. 2000-08  Growth of total capital  CEE  avg. 2009-16  Growth of TFP  SEE  avg. 2000-08  avg. 2009-15  Growth of potential GDP  Baltics  CESEE  Source: World Bank, The Conference Board Total Economy Database and NBRM calculations. Apparently, the region is in need to boost investment growth, catch-up with the pre-crisis level, and narrow some of the existing gaps. As, not only has investment been lower compared to the pre-crisis period, but also some of the international institutions assess their level to be below estimated benchmarks, which are consistent with the features and the development level of the region. For instance, EBRD in its Transition Report (2015-2016)2 provides estimates for the investment shortfalls in some of the countries in the region. The estimates are perceived as conservative, as they do not reveal the needed investment level. They rather reflect the investment level consistent with the one pertinent to comparable countries.

The first years of monetary independence were years of hyperinflation, recession, insufficient foreign reserves, permanent depreciation of domestic currency and general macroeconomic instability. I would like to mention, as an illustration, that just after the monetary independence, the exchange rate depreciated almost on a daily basis, which along with the high monetary and fiscal expansion led to hyperinflation. In 1993, for instance, the average inflation reached nearly 350%, which was devastating for the economy. With the joint efforts of policy makers and scientists, policies for managing the exchange rate volatility as well as inflationary spiral were quickly adopted, which together with the support of the international financial institutions enabled the economy to stabilize and market principals to function. In October 1995, a monetary strategy of stable exchange rate of the denar against the Deutsche mark was adopted and against the euro since January 2002 – a strategy that then as well as now is considered to have been one of the supporting pillars of the stability of the Macedonian economy. Today, after 28 years of monetary independence, it is my pleasure to note that the National Bank is an institution whose credibility and integrity are being permanently reaffirmed. Maintaining price stability is the ultimate objective of the National Bank’s monetary policy.
In this regard, the debate should focus on finding the incentives to increase the domestic production and support domestic savings. Over the time these would improve our current account balance, and improve the availability of our foreign currency assets;  c)  the expansion of the economic agents’ funding sources. In this regard the authorities should implement policies that support the development of the non-banking financial sector and that sustain the establishment of capital and debt market for private entities. The accomplishment of these targets shall firstly require the strengthening of the financial reporting standards; the completion and improvement of the legal framework for the developments of business relationships and the improvements in the protection of creditors and consumer rights, regarding the financial institutions and products. In more practical terms, these measures are expected to improve the availability of the funding sources for the economic growth, and gradually decrease its dependence from the banking sector;  d)  the improvement and the completion of the legal and operational framework to strengthen the crisis management capacities of the public authorities. In this regard, the authorities should identify the necessary measures for the prevention, the treatment and the elimination of financial crisis consequences. Bank of Albania believes it is important that each public authority carry out an assessment of its legal, financial, human and technological capabilities, to perform its role in the crisisprone situations. Needless to say, throughout this process, the coordination among the public authorities should be at the highest level.

Eva Srejber: Frameworks and stabilisation policy in a monetary union Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Bank of Uganda, Kampala, 17 August 2006. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and speak today on the occasion of Bank of Uganda’s 40th anniversary. On several occasions the members of the Executive Board of the Swedish central bank, including myself, have had reason to address the interesting topic of monetary unions. Besides being a stimulating theoretical exercise, it has been of great practical importance with the creation of the euro. Also, from a Swedish point of view, because of the national referendum in 2003 when a majority of Swedish voters said no to adopting the euro. Another reason, from an international point of view, is the trend in exchange rate policies towards corner solutions, of which membership in a monetary union is one. Although the East African Community (EAC) – with member states Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania – aims at eventually forming a political federation, and not only a monetary union, I am convinced that the experiences from other monetary unions, for instance the CFA Zone, will prove valuable to you in your efforts. However, since my comparative advantage concerns the Swedish and European experience I will discuss monetary unions from that perspective and I hope that this might be of some value.
As a consequence, it has the lowest cross-border mobility of the five currency unions in table 2.14 This has contributed to the need for painful internal devaluation for some countries in the euro area to restore competitiveness. Given that more than 700,000 Scots live in the rest of the United Kingdom and over 500,000 from the rest of the UK live in Scotland, one would be tempted to assume that labour mobility between the two is high.15 In fact gross migration flows between Scotland and the rest of the UK are lower than in the constituent parts of some other currency areas (table 2). That probably in part reflects the fact that economic conditions in Scotland and the rest of the UK have been very similar, such that the incentive for migration is relatively limited. It is reasonable to think that the similarities between Scotland and the rest of the UK mean that there is the potential for higher labour mobility should that become necessary. Given differences in industrial structure, this would put a premium on ensuring barriers to mobility are not allowed to develop if monetary arrangements were to change. It is not just an integrated labour market that helps adjustment within a currency union. Openness to trade and free movement of goods also assists in diluting the effect of shocks by spreading them across the union. If one part of the union imports a large share of what it consumes from other parts, changes in demand will be quickly transmitted.

For example, the preparation of the draft law “On bankruptcy”, a commendable effort by the Ministry of Justice represents a significant development and unique opportunity to render the resolution of a financial obligation as an enforceable, predictable, and efficient process. Concluding, I would like to underline that reducing the level of non-performing loans is closely related to the magnitude of financial intermediation by the banking sector. The need to redirect private investments towards new sectors in the economy, the small market size, problems related to the low quality of financial reporting by private entities, and slowdown of economic growth rates in Albania have dictated an unstable private demand for loans . Therefore, it is important to find, in addition to macroeconomic policies, new alternatives to boost domestic demand, promote optimism in the economy and contribute positively to businesses and consumer expectations. The acceleration of economic growth would provide the conditions for faster and steadier improvement in the level of non-performing loans. Thank you! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It was therefore sometimes perceived as unclear which expectations we meant when we commented on whether market expectations were reasonable. This gave rise to some criticism for unclear communication in 2005 and 2006. Using our own forecast for the repo rate removes the risk of being misunderstood for this reason. Experiences so far of our own interest rate path My impression is that the comments on the new system of publishing our own path for the repo rate have largely been positive, although there has also been some criticism. With regard to our concrete forecasts for the repo rate, the discussion has become livelier and we have heard more criticism. On the two occasions so far when we have presented a new assessment the monetary policy decision to raise the interest rate to 0.25 percentage points has indeed been anticipated and hardly been questioned. But our forecasts regarding future developments have surprised some market agents. 2  BIS Review 112/2007  The Riksbank’s forecast was a surprise in February The path for the repo rate that we presented in February was lower than the expectations that could be detected in the market pricing at that time. It was also lower than the average of the interest rate forecasts made by other forecasters. However, there were considerable differences between the different market analysts. Some had views relatively close to ours, while others differed substantially.

This was one of the reasons why we changed over  1  At present the central banks in Iceland, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden publish their own paths for the policy rate. BIS Review 112/2007  1  in autumn 2005 to basing our assessments on the assumption that the repo rate would develop in line with market expectations. But although this was a more realistic assumption, it was still the case that the forecasts did not necessarily reflect the Riksbank’s assessment of the most probable economic development. This is because market expectations do not necessarily agree with the interest rate path the Riksbank considers to be most appropriate. Now that our analyses are based on our own path for the repo rate, they describe the course of events we are actually expecting to see. This has several advantages. For one thing, it is possible to say something about how accurate our forecasts have been and how well the Riksbank has done its job. And for another thing it will also be easier to internally evaluate and improve the models and methods of working used as a basis for our forecasts. Finally, it makes it more worthwhile to compare our picture of the economy with the picture painted by other forecasters. Reasoning and considerations made clearer The second advantage of an own interest rate forecast is that it becomes easier to show why we believe in a particular policy and how we reason when we make our decisions.
This reflects our conservative investment strategy, which balances the need to hold sufficient liquidity to support the conduct of monetary policy with the aim to preserve the international purchasing power of the foreign reserves. MAS’ portfolio is well-diversified with a risk profile that is commensurate with our role as a central bank. 62 I will stop here, and will be happy to take your questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

How to deal with the reality of the business cycle is an area where Europe -- with its tradition of social safety nets -- and the United States -- with its tradition of flexible work arrangements -- can perhaps learn something from each other. To date, neither of us seems yet to have found the optimal way to cope with the unavoidable reality of the business cycle to enable us to avoid both high unemployment rates and too skewed a distribution of income. My last general observation about the implications of EMU for the United States has to do with the dramatic changes in macroeconomic policies that will accompany the creation of monetary union in Europe. Naturally, the main change will concern monetary policy, and it is in this area that the similarities between Europe and the United States will ultimately be the greatest. The first similarity is that, with EMU, the formulation of monetary policy in both Europe and the United States will be highly centralized and the European central bank will enjoy, as the Federal Reserve does, a considerable degree of independence. These institutional features will reduce the scope for national governments to bend monetary policy to the needs of their country’s business cycle and will help keep the focus of the European central bank on the objective of price stability.
As operator of a payment system in which a Fedwire Funds transfer is immediate, final, and irrevocable, and for which a single transfer can be affected for a penny shy of $ billion, the Federal Reserve Banks recognize that the stakes for public confidence are incomprehensibly large; as users of said payment system, you realize the stakes for endpoints in terms of reputational risk and financial viability are equally profound. Our fates in this domain are inextricably linked. Work to mitigate endpoint security risks in support of our collective interest proceeds across multiple fronts, including efforts to enhance end-to-end understanding of the security relationships within a network; initiatives to enhance assurance that external endpoints are operating in adherence with an operator’s security requirements; and the development of application tools to enhance a participant’s management of fraud risk. I want to elaborate upon three recent actions we have taken to enhance endpoint security, and to provide a preview of additional measures in train. Each of these actions, I will suggest, has particular relevance for community banks: Last Fall the Reserve Banks implemented functionality that enhances the tools available to Fedwire participants to manage the messages they send to the Fedwire services. These enhanced control features allow customers accessing Fedwire services through the FedLine Advantage channel to restrict the creation of transfers outside of specified hours, or to banks outside of the United States, or in dollar amounts that exceed designated thresholds, among other parameters.

It must be recognised that structural reforms, and specifically financial sector reform, is of crucial importance if this recovery is to be turned into sustainable economic growth. A bank with the mandate to promote development in Asia must surely have a role to play in all this and I look forward to greater involvement of the Bank, in whatever capacity, in maintaining the momentum of structural reforms in Asia. Mr President, the efficiency of financial markets in the region in performing the important function of financial intermediation has been found lacking. There has been notably little disagreement about the desirability of developing domestic and regional bond markets. But there has also been little progress. And there has been no lack of explanation of why this is the case. The often quoted impediments include the lack of clearing and settlement infrastructure, the absence of a broad institutional investor base, the lack of a benchmark yield curve, low liquidity, and so on. While these impediments are recognised and are being tackled earnestly by national authorities, there is one problem that has attracted relatively little attention so far. The problem relates to the generally low credit ratings of the Asian issuers, including the sovereigns, granted by the international rating agencies. 1  BIS Review 38/2000  I do not wish to provoke a debate on the objectivity and reliability of the ratings and the rating process of the international rating agencies.
This process, which many analysts considered in the beginning to be a temporary correction, escalated rapidly and turned into a crisis. But the solvency problems of US lower-income residents and their inability to repay their mortgages were naturally not the main causes of the current situation. Every economic crisis is in its nature overproduction, when new services and goods find no buyers. Therefore, enterprises squeeze their production, lay off employees and refrain from new investments. The current situation is no exception to this rule. It also lies in overproduction and insufficient demand, which are caused by two main reasons. One reason is excessive optimism which prevailed in many parts of the advanced economies and in financial markets, encouraging people to consume more and save less. The demand based on over-optimism was driven by overly large fiscal deficits in major economies and probably also by unduly low interest rates in many parts of the world. Another factor contributing to exorbitant demand was the regulation of the financial system, which practically rewarded risk-taking. The other, just as significant reason is economic policy pursued by several Asian countries which was based on relatively cheap exports and low currency exchange rates. Broad-based and sustainable domestic demand was and is too little valued in economies based on cheap labour force, goods exports and related investment. Therefore, it can be assumed that private consumption and domestic demand were below par in Eastern Asia. The result was large current account surpluses and accumulating foreign reserves that were lent to the rich USA.

Thus, the EU economy has already received a significant macroeconomic stimulus, which should lead the EU back to the growth track in 2010. This  BIS Review 89/2009  3  will create the conditions needed for economic restructuring, but every country has to take the necessary steps itself. What are the measures that should be taken to help Estonia out of the crisis? Estonia is part of the EU and the single market, so the framework agreed upon in the EU is also suitable to our economic policy. The general principle we would like to stress is that we must strengthen our ties with Europe and the EU single market even more. This is essential for ensuring the stability and development of the Estonian economy and the financial sector. In order to overcome the crisis, the stability and possibilities offered by the EU and the single market are vital to Estonia. The speed of overcoming the crisis depends on the flexibility of Estonia's enterprises and their success in reorganising production and activities, considering changes in the world and in the EU market. The task of the state is to create conditions supporting the reorganisation and investment. Estonia's economy has, in fact, already displayed a rather good ability to adjust. The main changes include labour market adjustments and decelerating wage growth. This is definitely a difficult, but highly necessary process, which requires state support in the form of both a well-functioning and efficient unemployment insurance system and retraining possibilities.