samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
New wealth statistics may also help to tackle our shortage of knowledge about other types of wealth that resemble the funded collective pension wealth that I 2 Nilsson et al. (2014) discuss the significance of collective pension saving in the Swedish financial system. 3 The annual ceiling is set to 7.5 income base amounts. For 2019, the ceiling was at a labour income of SEK 43,300  a month. 4 The annual income cut-off point has been set at SEK 511,500 for 2021. This corresponds to monthly labour income of SEK 42,600. 5 The Inquiry’s terms of reference can be accessed at https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/kommittedirektiv/2021/01/dir.-20214/ . 3 [6]  have discussed so far. Two examples that come to mind are the wealth created by individual pension saving and the wealth created by saving in life insurance. It is currently unclear how these types of wealth are distributed, as they are the result of the decisions of private individuals. International comparison So what about abroad? Is there hidden wealth in other countries as well? Figure 2 presents an international comparison for a selection of countries. I have retrieved data from OECD (2019).6 The blue bars show wealth in pension scheme funds in relation to GDP. The red bars show wealth in buffer funds for national pension systems. As is shown in the figure, there is very substantial wealth in the Danish pension scheme agreements. In the United States, Canada and Australia, there is also very considerable amounts in funded pension scheme agreements.

As far as Sweden is concerned, the importance of the National Swedish Pension Funds is self-evident. The funded wealth is not as large as the Norwegian oil fund, but Denmark, for example, with funds equal to about 200 per cent of GDP, is not that far behind. Among the euro countries, the Netherlands and, to a lesser degree, Finland stick out as they have substantial funded pension wealth. However, such wealth is negligible in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Austria and Greece. Figure 2. Funded pension wealth in relation to nominal GDP in 2019, per cent. 250 200 150 100 50 0  Pension scheme funds Buffer funds for national pension systems Source: OECD (2019), Table 9.2. 6 An earlier comparison of this kind can be found in Ohlsson et al. (2020), Appendix D.  4 [6]  Mandatory collective pension funds (like the premium pension system) or quasimandatory collective pension funds (like the SAF-LO pension agreement) can be found in just less than half of OECD countries.7 The countries in the figure that have mandatory systems are Denmark, the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, Finland and Norway. But as far as Norway is concerned, the wealth is negligible compared to the wealth in the oil fund. I do not have access to information showing how funded pension wealth is distributed in those countries that do not have mandatory systems based on labour income.
In DLT, the term ‘atomic settlement’ is used in this context. Settlement in DLT systems raises issues similar to those for settlement in an RTGS system, just the other way round. Central bank money existed as a secure means of payment before the introduction of the first RTGS systems; what was lacking for a long time was an appropriate settlement mechanism. This was provided by RTGS systems introduced from the 1980s. With DLT, the situation is reversed: A secure settlement model in the form of atomic settlement is designed to be in place from the outset. The unresolved question with DLT systems is which means of payment are the most appropriate. 5  By ‘conditional’ we mean a secure settlement based on the principle that the delivery of assets occurs if and only if payment is made (‘delivery versus payment’, or DvP). Page 7/11  The SNB is open to DLT and the token ecosystem and its potential for efficiency gains and risk reduction. At the same time, however, DLT can introduce new risks into the system. It could fundamentally change the role of financial intermediaries, and thus the architecture of today’s financial system. If we are guided by the three principles, it should help limit the risks. Token transactions require stable-value, generally accepted means of payment. We will now show you which private and government-issued forms of money qualify under principle 1 within the two-tier financial system.

Take, for example, the business model of an online retailer that wants to keep its inventory as small as possible. The company receives numerous orders and payments from customers every day and must dispatch the goods ordered. At the same time, new goods have to be reordered, as well as paid for. If the retailer’s customers pay for their online purchases using instant payments, the retailer will receive the purchase amount during the order process. It can then use this money immediately to dispatch the goods without any credit risk, and to reorder them if necessary. Instant payments can also add value in the case of cross-border payments. Addressing inefficiencies in cross-border payments is a priority of the G20. Together with the BIS Innovation Hub, central banks around the world are experimenting with how to connect instant payment systems across borders. Examples include Project Nexus and the linking of payment systems between India and Singapore. As a result of these benefits, we at the SNB are convinced that an immediate and final transfer of value in cashless payment systems between end users will become the new standard. Until now, cash was the only way this was possible for end users. Page 5/11  When will instant payments be launched in the Swiss market? Before instant payments can be launched, the payment system infrastructure needs to be upgraded (cf. slide 6). This has been under way for some time. During the course of this year, the SIC system itself will become instant payment-capable.
One latest development is the amendment of the Banking (Capital) Rules last year, which brings the current synthetic securitisation rules fully up-to-date with the Basel rules. These products are commonly found in Europe over the last five or six years. Banks in Asia-Pacific are now starting to take note of them as a useful tool for credit risk mitigation and regulatory capital management without having to transfer their portfolio assets. This feature is extremely useful to help overcome typical constraints such as loan assignment and confidentiality restrictions. Such products can offer an additional investment opportunity for institutional investors. 14. When the new capital rules become effective in June this year, the full spectrum of synthetic securitisation structures will be available for use in Hong Kong. For example, the use of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) as providers of guarantees or credit default swaps, which is a common structure for synthetic securitisation products, will be permitted subject to relevant criteria1. It effectively lifts the headroom for growth of the synthetic securitisation 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  market here. 15. Earlier on, I briefly touched on the HKMC, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the HKMA. I should also elaborate a bit more on its role in promotion of securitisation in Hong Kong. 16. One of the key business mandates of the HKMC is to develop securitisation and other financial products that contribute financial stability and facilitate the development of the local financial markets. 17. Throughout the years, it has been a trailblazer in different areas.

By the middle of this century, the median age of the world population is expected to increase by 10 years to 36 years. Globally, the proportion of persons aged 60 years and older is forecast to double. The fastest growing group of the older population is made up of those who are 80 years old or more. This age category is projected to increase more than five-fold over the next 50 years. While ageing is indeed a global phenomenon, it is likely to represent a more onerous challenge for developing countries than for developed ones. The majority of persons aged 60 and over will be found increasingly in developing countries; and as the pace of population ageing is much faster in these countries, they will have less time to adjust to its effects than the developed countries. Developing countries, moreover, will have to meet this challenge starting from a lower level of socio-economic development. For instance, the elderly in developing countries will be living mostly in rural areas and hence will face additional difficulties compared to their counterparts in developed countries who tend to live in urban centres. These differences imply that the policymaking capacity of developing countries will be tested more severely. More specifically, there will be important decisions to take regarding social security schemes, particularly traditional pension systems in which today’s workers pay for the benefits of today’s retirees.
In Spain’s case, the stress tests covered virtually its entire financial system and were conducted in great detail and with a high degree of transparency, providing extensive information on exposure to the principal asset classes. The results showed the system as a whole to be sound, whereby their publication undoubtedly contributed to dispelling the doubts over our financial system. The final piece in the far-reaching reform of the financial system has been the savings bank legislation approved by this House. In opening up savings banks to private capital, the legislation will not only allow savings banks to move ahead without having to request  2  BIS Review 129/2010  assistance from taxpayers, but it will also enable them to meet the demanding capital requirements set under the new international financial regulation known as Basel III. In the budgetary domain, the government reinforced and accelerated the implementation of the fiscal consolidation programme which, in compliance with Community commitments, it had announced in January. To this end, it approved a new raft of measures on 20 May entailing spending cuts of somewhat over € billion to be made between 2010 and 2011 (around 1.5% of GDP), on top of the previously approved spending cuts and tax rises. The new deficit target path was thus set at 9.3% of GDP in 2010, 6% in 2011, 4.4% in 2012 and 3% of GDP in 2013, which would steady the public debt ratio at a level slightly below 75% of GDP as from 2012.

The SNB therefore backs up the VaR calculations with stress and scenario analyses. These simulate extreme market fluctuations and examine the impact of such fluctuations on the assets. Scenarios that have an especially severe impact on the SNB’s assets include a fall in the gold price and a depreciation of the dollar and euro. Such scenarios show that serious losses could potentially be sustained. The volatility of the SNB’s earnings therefore remains high despite the new investment universe. Experience has shown, however, that major losses tend to even themselves out in the medium term, i.e. over a period of three to five years. 2  BIS Review 46/2005  BIS Review 46/2005  3
At the end of 2019, just before the pandemic started, the HKMA held an AML/CFT RegTech Forum to explore the role that technology could play in preventing and detecting financial crime. One of the key lessons that transpired from that event was the importance of bringing different parts of the eco-system together to discuss common challenges and pain points with Fintech firms who may be able to offer solutions. And we have followed up across the three breakout groups of banks, what we called accelerators, enablers and collaborators1, over the past year on concrete plans of individual banks. 22. In January this year, we released a report titled “AML/CFT Regtech: Case studies and Insights”. Through that, we shared comprehensive, hands-on experience from banks at different stages of AML/CFT Regtech adoption, and emphasised a number of key insights on the potential for technologies to assist in detecting and preventing money laundering and financial crime. 23. In that guidance, we have also deliberately and explicitly identified specific technologies and data applications, such as data analytics and the use of non-traditional data like IP addresses as well as robotic process automation in handling transaction monitoring alerts. Actually, some of those technologies featured prominently in the successes we saw in identifying and disrupting networks of mule accounts linked to COVID-19 scams and also the rising number of investment scams. 24.

News conference on new 20-franc note  Berne, 10 May 2017 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  Ladies and gentlemen It is a pleasure to welcome you to our news conference. My colleague Thomas Wiedmer and I are delighted to present the Swiss National Bank’s new 20-franc note to you today. We showed you what it looks like just a few minutes ago – I hope you like it. Personally, I really like the way it has turned out, and I know that both of my colleagues on the Governing Board are also very pleased with the result. I shall start with a brief review of our experiences with the ninth banknote series so far; the 50-franc note – the first denomination in the new series to be released – entered circulation over a year ago. I shall then make some observations about the theme and design of the 20franc note, before handing over to Thomas Wiedmer, who will go through the security features and present the accompanying information material. We presented the new 50-franc note in April 2016 and, as expected, it attracted a great deal of public interest. Not only had it been 20 years since the last banknote series was released, but the new notes also contained features that clearly set them apart from earlier series. For starters, they feel different due to the new substrate. Furthermore, an entirely new design approach was adopted.
Central Bank Assets (LHS) and Liabilities (RHS) United Kingdom  BIS Review 111/2010  37  Chart 6 Deviation of Price Level from Deterministic Target Path  38  BIS Review 111/2010  Chart 7a Simulation of a “Leaning Against The Wind” Policy 2003–6: US Policy rate  Real credit growth (ann %) 15  10 8  10  6 5 4 0  2 0  -5  -2 -10 -4 -6 2001  2004  2007  2010  2001  Real house price growth (ann %)  2004  2007  -15 2010  GDP growth (ann %) 5  10  4 3  5  2 1  0  0 -1  -5  -2 -3  -10  -4 -15 2001  2004  BIS Review 111/2010  2007  2010  2001  2004  2007  -5 2010  39  Chart 7b Simulation of a “Leaning Against The Wind” Policy 2003–6: UK  Policy rate  Real credit growth (ann %) 14  10  12  8  10 6  8 6  4  4 2  2 0  0  -2 -2  2001  2004  2007  -4 2010  -4 2001  Real house price growth (ann %)  2001  2004  40  2007  2004  2007  -6 2010  GDP growth (ann %) 30  6  20  4  10  2  0  0  -10  -2  -20  -4  -30  -6  -40 2010  2001  2004  2007  BIS Review 111/2010  -8 2010  Chart 8  BIS Review 111/2010  41  Chart 9  42  BIS Review 111/2010  Bibliography Adrian, Tobias, and Hyun S. Shin (2008).

an increase in general riskiness) is also worth highlighting: output growth falls, credit spreads rise, real credit growth falls, and real house price inflation falls. This is all as one would expect from the discussion above regarding the risk-taking channel. In both countries, inflation also rises when macroeconomic volatility increases. Charts 4a and 4b show historical decompositions derived using the posterior means of the distribution of the coefficient estimates. As there is rather a lot of information to digest in these decompositions, we show just the main variables of interest: the policy rate, and the four-quarter growth rates of output, real credit and real house prices. We also combine the  6  BIS Review 111/2010  impact of the aggregate demand and supply shocks into a single composite factor, and do the same with the credit demand and credit supply shocks so as to focus more clearly on the impact of monetary policy and macroeconomic volatility. There are a number of points to be made. First, monetary policy (the green bars) during the 2002–5 period is loose relative to the estimated historical reaction function not only in the United States – as might be expected given the evidence from Chart 1 – but also, more surprisingly, in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the Federal Funds rate is, on average, 1.5 percentage points below the rate that would have obtained if the estimated reaction function had applied. In the United Kingdom, the corresponding figure is 2.1 percentage points.
27  The examples are the following articles: N. Roubini “Why Central Banks Should Burst Bubbles”, mimeo, Stern School of Business and Roubini Global Economics, January 2006, and A. Posen “Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles”, Institute for International Economics Working Paper WP 06-1, January 2006. 28  Bernanke B. “Reflections on the Yield Curve and Monetary Policy”, Remarks by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke Before the Economic Club of New York, 20 March 2006. 8  BIS Review 57/2006  resulting from the entire yield curve. While it is difficult to assess which hypothesis is correct, central banks, as sailors did in the old days, should apply two iron rules: firstly, frequently determine their position, secondly, use as many waypoints as possible. This means that, especially where new phenomena emerge or there are structural transformations, the monetary policy must not be described using just a few simple indicators, as e.g. inflation and output gap in the Taylor rule. Monetary policy decisions should rather be a product of a complex analysis of a number of indicators and data and cross-checked with qualitative information. In turn, another Federal Reserve governor, Donald Kohn 29 , devoted his recent address to the analysis of when and on what conditions the central banks should respond to rapid changes of asset prices. In Kohn’s opinion, there are two possible approaches.

Anita Angelovska-Bezoska: Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska-Bezoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries, Brussels, 25 May 2018. * * * Dear Ministers, Dear representatives of the European Commission, European Central Bank and Eurostat, It is my great pleasure to join you on the regular Ministerial Dialogue. At the beginning, let me express our gratitude to the ECB, European Commission and Eurostat for their assessment of our Economic Reform Programme that outlines the ongoing, as well as forthcoming mediumterm reform priorities aimed at more competitive, flexible and resilient economy. Herewith, we appreciate the positive assessment of the monetary policy as well as the recommendation to continue “to conduct monetary policy consistent with the exchange rate peg, using available scope within this framework in line with safeguarding price stability” which is completely in line with central bank views on monetary policy strategic framework. In light of today’s thematic discussion on fiscal sectors reforms, we would like to express our support for the Ministry of Finance’s reforms oriented towards strengthening Public Finance Management system that besides improving the effectiveness of the use of public resources, will also foster the ongoing fiscal consolidation process.
CCPs are therefore increasingly large participants in the repo markets. The requirements for trades to be centrally cleared are still being introduced, so the demand from market infrastructure to exchange cash for collateral will rise. The rise in importance of CCPs is indicative of the generally increasing role played by non-bank financial institutions in recent years. Since these institutions do not hold accounts at the central bank, they are unable to access the deposit facility. The demand from these non-banks to find a secure place to deposit cash is a contributory factor to repo rates trading below the Eurosystem’s Deposit Facility Rate (DFR). Last but not least, changes in the interbank lending market have led to increased collateral demand. In the period since the onset of the crisis, loan losses and weak profitability have constrained the availability of capital for banks. Unsurprisingly, there has been a marked trend in interbank markets away from unsecured towards secured lending in order to achieve more favourable risk weights for interbank lending. I would also like to acknowledge at this point the role of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy in shifting the balance of the repo market. Since the onset of the crisis, the ECB has undertaken a number of necessary and proportionate measures to ensure the efficacy of monetary policy. The first measure relevant here was introduced to repair the transmission mechanism, which had become impaired and threatened the singleness of monetary policy within the euro area.

Therefore, while the central bank does not have direct power to enforce a fair distribution of income, if the central bank fails to do its job properly and this results in high inflation, it can make the situation worse. Next, the general public also wants the country’s exports to be competitive. Here we are talking about the export of goods and services, inbound tourism included. Again, the competitive edge of business depends on many factors outside the scope of central banking: marketing know-how, research and development, and technology included. And when one looks at competitive advantage of firms at the international level, things like quotas, trade protection and trade negotiations do add complications to the equation. 1  BIS Review 106/2000  But there is one factor that cuts across all considerations and that is inflation. If the inflation rate in a country far exceeds those in its trading partners, it will erode that country’s competitiveness over time. Therefore, the central bank can affect the country’s export competitiveness, and the public can rightly expect the bank to guard against this. Finally, the people invariably want transparency. They want to know how the central bank views the situation, how it acts and how it can be held accountable for its action. They will also want to see whether the central bank is capable of looking ahead into the future. … How can the central bank in an emerging economy like Thailand best deliver to the people all that they expect? My answer is inflation targeting.