samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
By reducing the number of key players, the introduction of the euro will simplify the international policy cooperation process between the major economies. In particular, it should make this process more efficient by facilitating the reciprocal exchange of information and views, as well as the formulation of common understandings on economic and financial issues at the global level. Each of 3  BIS Review 72/2000  the main partners - the United States, the euro area and Japan - is in a position to speak for a comparatively large economic area. A more balanced relationship between the major players might help to induce each of them to take on responsibility for contributing to a stable global environment. In many ways, the ECB - which as a rule represents the Eurosystem externally - is already involved in the work of international institutions and fora in the area of competencies of the Eurosystem. Formal and informal agreements have already been reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and the several groupings of ministers and central bank governors (G7, G10 and G20). The involvement of the ECB was relatively straightforward for groupings created after the introduction of the euro, such as the FSF or G20. In the case of pre-existing international fora and organisations, however, the arrangements to be made were more complicated.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Fifteen months of financial crisis – a status report Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Associazione Bancaria Ticinese, Centro di Studi Bancari, Vezia, 3 December 2008. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The financial crisis broke out a little over fifteen months ago. The magnitude of the turmoil experienced by the financial industry has been greater than all the forecasts. So far, our entire attention has been focused on the problems of the financial industry, while the real economy appeared to be passing through this difficult period without too many problems. We now realise that this view was deceptive: the situation in the non-financial sector is deteriorating substantially. This could lead to new challenges in 2009. After having benefitted extensively from the international expansion of the past few years, we are currently experiencing the consequences of a widespread recession. This situation is difficult for our country, but we may be better placed than others for coping with it. BIS Review 150/2008  1
This is key to allowing clearing members to measure and manage their exposures at a time of stress. It is therefore important that if the resolution authority intervenes it avoids disturbing the order of losses in the rule-book. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  This requires a robust ‘No Creditor Worse Off’ (NCWO) safeguard which takes as its counter-factual the loss allocation rules in the CCP’s rule book. The issue of NCWO protection is the subject of current debate in the draft EU regulation on CCP Recovery and Resolution. One school of thought is that it is essential to have a weaker NCWO safeguard so that resolution authorities have flexibility to deviate from the way in which losses would fall under a CCP’s rules. This degree of flexibility puts particular focus on the objectives by which home authorities would exercise this discretion. Resolution aims principally to deliver financial stability. But in the case of a global CCP, whose financial stability will be given prominence? This uncertainty may leave participants located outside of the home jurisdiction fearing that they will be exposed to disproportionately greater losses in order to protect the home jurisdiction’s financial stability. The UK does not support that approach. As with banks, it is entirely possible to establish resolution frameworks for CCPs that ensure that interests are mutually aligned and that do not permit or require the home authorities to protect national financial stability at the expense of participants outside of that jurisdiction.

The clearer it is to the bank’s creditors, counterparties and financial market infrastructure firms that a resolution comes with the expectation of access to public liquidity, if needed, the smaller the amount that may end up needing to be drawn-down. In contrast, doubts over whether and how liquidity will be made available to a bank upon its entry into resolution risk undermining a resolution, and leaving the authorities with a potentially far bigger problem. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  So it is important to ensure resolution and liquidity strategies are aligned - whether they are delivered by a single institution, as in the UK, or by separate ones. The Purple Book, to be published next week will set out the Bank of England’s approach to providing a liquidity backstop in resolution, where required. To be eligible, a bank will need to be restored to solvency by the bail in of shareholders and debt holders. It will need to meet the PRA’s authorisation conditions, including capital requirements, so that it can continue to operate while in resolution. Solvent but illiquid banks in such a situation would have access to the Bank’s published facilities subject to meeting the necessary eligibility criteria. To supplement those arrangements, the Bank also has put in place a new, flexible Resolution Liquidity Framework providing the tools to lend to banks which are in a Bank of England led resolution.
In closing, I would like to thank the Supervisory Board and the Monetary Policy Committee for their work over the past year, and I wish to thank the Central Bank’s many colleagues and collaborators for their cooperation – not least the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, and the Financial Supervisory Authority. I would also like to thank the financial institutions with which the Bank interacts for their cooperation. Furthermore, I would like to thank the Parliament of Iceland, particularly the Economics and Commerce Committee, for their collaboration. And last but certainly not least, I want to thank the staff of the Central Bank for a job well done over the past year. 8

This interconnection, if broken down in its simplest form, has two possible outcomes that relate to financial stability. First outcome, the transmission mechanism of conventional monetary policy includes the ways interest rates directly influence the supply for credit for house purchases and indirectly influence the real economy through house prices3. In the history of conventional monetary policy decisions, the ECB, at times, responded to the presence of excessive credit in order to safeguard its price stability objective. In its August 2006 decision to increase interest rates, the ECB stated that the "stimulative impact of the low level of interest rates in the euro area has been an important factor behind the tendency for money and credit growth to strengthen". In the period of quantitative easing, monetary policy tools expanded to include, among others, targeted operations to stimulate bank lending to the real economy4. These are  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  linked to a threshold of the banks' loans to non-financial corporations and households. By recognising the impact this tool would have on housing prices, housing loans have been excluded from the this threshold. Given that monetary policy affects real estate developments, the role of macroprudential policy becomes important in addressing idiosyncratic vulnerabilities and as such the independence of macroprudential policy should be safeguarded, especially in a monetary union. The Second outcome is that, an increase in interest rates will increase the monthly loan payments.
I would like to emphasise once again that this is a question of a forecast for the future development of the repo rate. Forecasts are, as we know, always uncertain and new information and changed circumstances can lead to assessments changing. The new interest rate assumption does not entail any commitment on the part of the Riksbank that the repo rate will actually follow a particular path. Nor does this involve a new way of conducting monetary policy. BIS Review 6/2007  5  When we chose to replace the assumption of a constant repo rate with an assumption based on market expectations, we took a large step towards increased openness and clarity. Now we are taking a further step in the same direction. I hope that this will enable us to become even better at explaining to the general public how we reason when making our monetary policy decisions. Thank you! List of references Alsterlind, J. and Dillén, H., “Monetary policy expectations and forward premia”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2, 2005. Archer, D. (2005), “Central-bank communication and the publication of interest rate projections”, article presented at the Riksbank’s conference “Inflation targeting: implementation, communication and effectiveness”, June 2005. Blinder, A., (2006), “Monetary Policy Today: Sixteen Questions and about Twelve Answers”, paper presented at the Banco de España Conference on “Central Banks in the 21st Century, Madrid, June 8-9, 2006. van der Cruijsen, C. and M., Demertzis (2005).”The impact of central bank transparency on inflation expectations”, Working Paper no. 031/2005, De Nederlandsche Bank, 2005.

Three different approaches exist: (i) That the policy rate is assumed to remain unchanged during the forecast period, (ii) that the policy rate is assumed to follow market expectations, or (iii) that the policy rate is assumed to follow a path that the central bank itself considers to reflect a reasonable future development. 3 Regardless of which of these three interest rate assumptions is used to produce the inflation forecast, the monetary policy decisions made by the central banks always refer only to the current level of the policy rate, that is, the level that is to apply until the next decision-making point. 4 However, the monetary policy discussion and communication differ slightly, depending on which interest rate assumption is used. 1  See the minutes of the Executive Board meeting on 16 January 2007. 2  See, for instance, Eijffinger, S. and P., Geerats, (2006), as well as van der Cruijsen, C. and M., Demertzis (2005). 3  See, for instance, Blinder, A., (2006), and Kontulainen, J., D., Mayes and J., Tarkka, (2004). 4  There are special exceptions to this normal procedure. For example, during the deflation crisis in Japan, the Japanese central bank undertook to maintain its policy rate at a low level during a certain period. For another exception, see the statement in a press release from the Federal Reserve, Board of Governors, 12 August 2003, in connection with fears that inflation would be too low.
Sources: IMF, Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 3. World trade index Index, 2000 = 100, seasonally-adjusted 180  180  170  170  160  160  150  150  140  140  130  130  120  120 05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Source: CBP Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis  Figure 4. Sovereign debts in various countries Gross public debt as a percentage of GDP 200  200  Greece Ireland Italy Spain  160  160  Sweden Portugal  120  120  80  80  40  40  0  0 90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  Note. The broken lines represent IMF forecasts. Source: The IMF  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5. Real housing prices in various countries Index, 1996 Q1 = 100 300  300 Ireland Spain  250  250  USA Sweden  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  Source: Reuters EcoWin  Figure 6.

Niklaus Blattner: System stability and security of the systems Summary of a speech by Prof Dr Niklaus Blattner, Vice-Chairman the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Luzerner Tage für Informationssicherung (LUTIS, conference on information security), Lucerne, 25 May 2004. The references for the speech can be found on the Swiss National Bank’s website. *  *  *  The stability of the banking system and the security of the financial market infrastructure - including the stock exchanges and especially payment and securities settlement systems - have become an important concern of central banks all over the world in recent years. This has notably happened against the background of the numerous financial crises witnessed during the past decades. Moreover, events such as 9/11 have heightened awareness for the security of the financial markets and other infrastructures. In Switzerland, the growing importance of system stability has also been reflected in the new National Bank Act, which entered into force on 1 May 2004. Within the framework of its principal mandate of pursuing a monetary policy in the interests of the country as a whole while at the same time ensuring price stability, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is legally obliged to make a contribution to system stability and to facilitate and secure the operation of cashless payment systems. In implementing its mandate, the SNB takes preventive measures as well as measures aimed at overcoming crises. For instance, in a crisis the National Bank plays an important role in providing liquidity.
Both within the official sector and within the largest banking firms, important work remains to be done to advance the capacity to effectively operationalize a GSIB resolution. Examples include: •  establishing a more rational and less complex legal entity structure that takes into account the best alignment of legal entities and business lines to improve the firm’s resolvability;  •  ensuring the continuity of shared services that support critical operations and core business lines throughout the resolution process; and  •  improved arrangements to enable appropriate access by the firm in resolution to Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs), in a manner that is consistent with the need to ensure the safe and sound operation of FMIs. This ongoing work is being pursued through a variety of channels, including through the joint Federal Reserve / FDIC review of Title I resolution plans, the Federal Reserve’s horizontal supervisory review of recovery and resolution preparedness, and in the international work of the FSB. In addition, while Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the FDIC Orderly Liquidation Fund as a source of backstop liquidity provision for a firm undergoing a Title II resolution, no equivalent official sector liquidity backstop is available under the bankruptcy regime. Since it is the bankruptcy regime that is relevant for the purposes of resolution planning under Title I, this is a challenge that firms need to address under that framework. Further work remains as well with respect to the derivatives close-out issue in resolution.

Second, a set of resolutionrelated reforms are intended to limit the consequences to the financial sector if a failure by such an institution still were to occur. Given the limited time on this panel, I will not review in detail the post-crisis comprehensive capital and liquidity framework that the Federal Reserve has put in place. However, from the perspective of addressing too big to fail, it is important to highlight the Federal Reserve rule finalized this year that imposes risk-based capital surcharges on the handful of U.S. global systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs). Under this framework, a GSIB’s riskbased capital surcharge will reflect the degree to which its failure would impact the financial system. In effect, the risk-based capital surcharge confronts each U.S. GSIB with the choice to either reduce its systemic footprint or instead to hold more capital. The policy approach to too big to fail recognizes, of course, that we can reduce but cannot completely eliminate the possibility of a large financial institution’s failure. Therefore, a second aim of our post-crisis reforms has been to limit the adverse consequences that would result if a large financial institution were to fail. That is, large financial firms need to be capable of being successfully resolved without creating unacceptable collateral damage to the rest of the financial system and to the economy.
What we cannot hope to do is to provide an equally stable environment for every sector of the economy or for every business enterprise, nor therefore can we hope to maintain a stable environment for those regions of the country with heavy concentrations of particular sectors or businesses. We cannot hope, for example, nor should we seek, to obstruct structural change. Consumer demands change over time, and so, too, do technologies and management and production techniques. Competition, to seek out such changes and to exploit them to meet social needs more efficiently – however unwelcome it may be to establish producers – is a vital driver of supply-side improvement, increasing the potentially sustainable growth rate at the macroeconomic level from which we all stand to benefit. Nor can we realistically hope to avoid all shorter-term fluctuations associated with the business cycle, for example, or as a result simply of random shocks - though we can aim to moderate their impact rather than exaggerate it as we have done at times in the past. Nor, finally, can we hope to insulate ourselves from shocks originating overseas. That does not mean that we do not understand the painful impact of the recent state of the world economy or of the strong exchange rate. Nor does it mean that we simply ignore the plight of the adversely affected sectors.

As a result our trade balance with the rest of the world has deteriorated – by some 1¼% of total GDP between 1997 and 1998; employment in manufacturing has fallen by around 2% since the beginning of last year; and business confidence fell sharply to levels last seen in the depths of recession – until it stabilised following interest rate cuts in the autumn, albeit to levels which are almost twice as high as those in the Eurozone. Now you could be forgiven if you thought that all that was me describing the UK economy to an audience in Birmingham, England. In fact it is what my counterpart, Alan Greenspan, might well have said if he were addressing his fellow Americans this evening in Birmingham, Alabama, on the ‘Goldilocks’ economy of the United States! I tease you in this way to make  1  BIS Review 56/1999  the serious point that we are not alone in facing substantial imbalance within an economy that is performing reasonably well in overall terms. In the case of the United Kingdom – and I’m being serious now – the facts are that the economy as a whole has grown consistently for 27 consecutive quarters – though I admit that during the last six months it was a ‘damned close run thing’ – at an average annual rate of 2.9%, which is well above its long-term trend rate of around 2¼%.
In essence, a decision to offer of e-krona will make sure that the citizens of Sweden continue to have access to risk-free Swedish kronor for payments in the future. To achieve this, in its role as issuer of means of payment, the Riksbank needs to modernise its product. We can see this as adopting new technology in the same way as we replaced copper plates with paper notes. Although the issuance of an e-krona can be seen as fulfilling the Riksbank’s obligation to supply banknotes and coins with new technology, it is clear that the ekrona addresses broader issues about the state’s role in the payment and monetary system. For this reason, the Riksbank wrote to the Riksdag in the spring of 2019 providing input to an inquiry that should, among other things, clarify the Riksbank’s mandate regarding the e-krona.11 The inquiry was appointed in December 2020 and will deliver its report in November 2022. Enhancing cross-border payments – a global priority But payments will undergo even more changes in the future. Allow me to conclude here with some words on a subject where the Riksbank, and myself, are heavily involved in international work; cross-border payments. Unfortunately, cross-border payments are one area where I think both the public and private sector have failed to deliver. Of the almost 8 billion people on the planet, about 1.5 billion lack sufficient access to financial services, including reasonable access to a low-cost bank account.

Thirdly, competition will be further enhanced by the fact that RIX-INST is provided in a competitively neutral manner. Decisions about access and prices will be made free of any commercial interests that may characterise private systems of the same kind. This is particularly important in light of the entry barriers arising from network and scale effects and taking into account the future appeal of this specific type of payment, instant transfers of funds. A brief update on the status of the project:8 The new service is planned to go live in spring next year. I believe that we are well on track, not least due to good collaboration with our fellow central bankers within the Eurosystem, as well as the Swedish banks. At the same time, we are also exploring the potential to use the TIPS platform for instant payments between currencies like the krona and the euro. This could be a further benefit from this particular platform sharing. 8  More information about RIX-INST can be found at: https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/payments--cash/the-payment-system---rix/new-service-in-rix-for-instant-payments/  11 [15]  New systems for wholesale transactions RIX-INST will be a service offered based on RIX, the Riksbank’s payment system. RIX is often referred to as the heart of the Swedish financial infrastructure. Among its existing services is RIX-RTGS which is used for large-value transfers between banks. It handles around 531,000 payments a month with an average value of approximately SEK 35 million. The yearly turnover in RIX-RTGS is about SEK 130 trillion, that is, near 26 times the Swedish gross domestic product.