samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The borrowers were willing but the banks were also pushing the supply by reducing costs and conditions (culminating some said in NINJA mortgages – for those with no income, no job and no assets). So I have no doubt that we have seen some supply changes to credit. Next we need to distinguish the sustainable changes from the cyclical. Sustained changes either in the economy or in financial sector technology may justify some increase in supply. For example, we have seen a long period of low and stable inflation and unemployment and that is expected to continue. That reduces some of the risks to lenders and borrowers and may increase both the demand and supply of credit and the value of assets on a lasting basis. The development of information technology allows banks to collect and analyse more information about borrowers which should allow them to target credit better and justify a change in supply. Finally the development of derivative markets has allowed the risks in loans to be split into their separate components and distributed to the people best placed to bear them. Again that should lower the supply curve for credit. All these factors were at play in the consumer credit and the sub prime markets but, despite the new sophistication of credit scoring and the derivatives markets, they both also showed all the classic signs of a credit cycle. Banks competed for business by lowering the costs and conditions on lending while the economy expanded, defaults were few, and profits appeared high.

The figures on output also show that London has been growing relative to the rest of the country (Chart 2), and that has reflected the growth of financial and business services compared with other tradable sectors throughout the UK (Chart 3 and Chart 4). And despite the fall in oil production in the North Sea, we have seen a rise in the real exchange rate by over 15% when comparing the period 1987-1997 to 1997-2007, although of course the financial sector would not have been the only factor behind that rise. More immediately, the GDP figures in May showed that financial intermediation grew by 6% in the sixth months to 2007 Q1 – an annual rate of over 13%. That is not the same as the City of course; but there is every reason to think the City has been growing at least as fast as the rest. However, while the success of the City is currently one factor in these trends, it is not the whole story. For a start there is a lot more to London than finance. There are other successful industries and, on the other hand, London is home not just to the wealthiest boroughs but also to some of the poorest and most deprived areas in the country. As a result it has one of the highest regional rates of unemployment overall. Secondly employment and profits in the City have been highly cyclical.
That means that a successful industry needs to be both dynamic and robust. Uncertainty generates challenges but also represents opportunity. I want to discuss these risk/reward trade-offs and the importance of understanding the potential for new exposures that changing risk profiles can bring. Insurance fulfils important social functions: the provision of income security in retirement; income protection whilst in work; funding for health care services and preserving the continuity of businesses subject to unexpected shocks. Indeed, in some areas, insurance is compulsory such as with motor insurance and employers’ liability. Disruption to these functions is unlikely to be tolerated by wider society, not only because of the social benefits, but because risk transfer and pooling are crucial for sustainable economic growth and development. It is for this reason that the need to protect the interests of policy holders and to preserve long-term critical cover is so important. Although one cannot be sure what the future may bring, we can learn from past mistakes to avoid their repetition. That is particularly apposite given that the residual effects of the great financial crisis are still being felt across the global economy. One of the things we appreciate very well at the PRA is that insurance business is very different to banking, and I have seen that at first hand over the past six months or so. I have also seen that there are lessons to be learnt from the banking crisis that can directly read across to the world of insurance.

In late November, the annual growth of budget revenues was only 2 percent, almost entirely reflecting the low pace of generating the tax revenues. On the other hand, public expenditures have maintained high growth rates, accounting for 16.4 percent in November. The budget deficit reached ALL 65 billion in November. The deficit has been mostly financed through foreign borrowing and privatization receipts, dampening the pressures in the domestic financial market Rapid growth of expenditure and budget deficit during 2009 has further increased the public debt level, accounting for 58 per cent of GDP at the end of November. The Bank of Albania deems that the future budget policy orientation towards fiscal consolidation, aiming at reducing the public debt, is now a prerequisite for the macroeconomic stability in the country. As we have constantly stated, the public debt reduction will mitigate the pressure of the public sector on the financial markets, creating more room for the private sector. Consolidation of public finances will also lower the risk premiums in the economy and will raise the monetary policy effectiveness. Monetary supply slowed down further in the second half, reflecting to a great extent, the ever lower credit growth. Annual growth of private sector loan portfolio slowed down to 10 percent in November. Unlike the first six months of 2009, when credit growth curbing was more  BIS Review 11/2010  3  affected by the tightened supply, in the second half of the year the credit performance was dictated by decreased demand for loans.
BIS Review 88/2005  5

But on account of communication barriers, Zambian businesses might not take advantage of our close proximity. This goes to show Your Excellency that our reliance on English as a lingua franca is detrimental to our national interest, especially in our quest to alleviate poverty in our society. In this regard, the need for us to speak, read and write French so that we communicate effectively at the regional and international level cannot be overstressed. BIS Review 5/2005  1  Furthermore, recent developments in the global economy dictate that we should be able to interact effectively at various international fora where appreciation of the cultures, values and customs of other people is important. Therefore, in view of the foregoing, we, at the Bank of Zambia, have realised that there is a compelling need to overcome our communication barrier by developing our employees’ multi-lingual skills, particularly, in French so as to, among other things: (i)  develop the required patience in their interactions with our non-English speaking counterparts;  (ii)  acknowledge the unique talents and contributions of others;  (iii)  uncover and show concern for the pressures and constraints which others face and modify the demands we may place on them;  (iv)  actively seek facts and data that explain and support others’ views and incorporate others’ feelings and values when restating their perspectives; and  (v)  reduce the cost of hiring external interpreters which impacts adversely on our limited resources.
BIS Review 85/2010  3  During the forecasting process, the main scenario presented at the monetary policy meeting has in practice become a scenario that is supported by a majority of the Executive Board members. If there are any reservations against the main scenario or the monetary policy decision, these are made clear at the monetary policy meeting. Thus, the monetary policy decision is preceded by a long process. As the decision now also includes the Board’s view of the future repo rate, more in-depth and long-term discussions are required than if it was merely a question of whether or not to alter the repo rate. The repo rate path has entailed a fruitful change. The role of the repo rate path during the financial crisis When we began to make repo rate forecasts a few years ago, I do not believe anyone expected a situation like the one we had when GDP fell by 5 per cent in 2009. During the financial crisis several central banks were forced to cut their policy rates to close to zero. This has entailed restrictions on future decisions, as the nominal interest rate has a lower bound. The classical argument in favour of this lower bound is that the nominal interest rate on cash is zero, and that a negative interest rate would mean that economic agents would hoard banknotes. There are many discussions in the academic world as to whether the lower bound lies at zero or slightly below.

In this regard, I urge the industry to take advantage of the knowledge and experience of the panel of experts assembled here at this conference, to better understand and prepare for the implications of the review of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, and the expectations on financial institutions and boards of directors moving forward. For Bank Negara Malaysia, the enhancement to the nation’s infrastructure to combat financial crimes will remain as one of our key priorities. In this regard, our role as Malaysia’s primary financial regulator will continue to focus three broad areas. The first is to deter and prevent criminals from abusing the financial system to be the conduit for illegal activities by ensuring the continued effectiveness of Malaysia’s legal and other relevant infrastructure, systems and processes in combating financial crimes. Secondly, is to ensure all financial institutions continue to strengthen their defences against such threats and risks via our regulatory policies as well as risk-based supervisory and surveillance activities; and thirdly, to strengthen collaboration between the financial industry with other domestic and international stakeholders in AML/CFT initiatives to protect the integrity and stability of our financial system, including implementing capacity building programmes, such as this Conference.
As a result, the Bank plans to bring the £ billion of lending extended through the TFS onto our balance sheet by the end of 2018/19 the financial year. The additional capital means the MPC could, if necessary, re-launch the TFS in future on the Bank’s balance sheet, cementing 0% as the lower bound. Bringing the TFS onto the Bank’s balance sheet next year will mark the first step in winding down the Bank’s Asset Purchase Facility (APF). After the TFS has been transferred, the APF will fall to £ billion – the value of the government and corporate bonds purchased by the MPC as part of its Quantitative Easing programme. The MPC updated its guidance today on unwinding its asset purchases. Previously, the Committee had noted that it would not begin reducing the stock of assets until Bank Rate had reached around 2%. That reflected the MPC’s preference to use Bank Rate as the primary instrument for monetary policy and its  15  In the run-up to the vote, the Bank undertook extensive contingency planning which included encouraging banks to pre-position enough collateral in our facilities to enable them to draw down up to £ billion in liquidity. The combination of this war chest and coordinated G7 central bank action helped ensure markets functioned normally as the system absorbed a result that had been assigned a 10% probability hours before. And it meant we could credibly communicate to the public that we were well prepared for the result. 16 See https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/letter/2018/banks-financial-framework-june-2018.

In 2006, a single digit inflation level was attained. Although inflation rose to double digit levels at the end of 2008 owing to the effects of the global economic crisis, we have since seen it return to single digit levels;  iii. The financial sector has also recorded tremendous growth since the commencement of liberal economic and financial policies in the early 1990s; and  iv. Equally, positive developments have been registered in the payment systems. I must caution, though. that sustaining macroeconomic stability remains a key challenge in the face of limited resources, infrastructure and financial inclusion. Ladies and gentlemen, as you participate in this workshop, allow me to underscore the importance, we in Senior Management attach to capacity building programmes for all Bank employees. I am reliably informed that during the workshop you will cover a number of important topics including the following: i.  Self awareness;  ii. Time management;  iii. Action or goals required to achieve a vision;  iv. Emotional intelligence and values;  v.  Power to take action; and  vi. Ability to manage direction successfully. BIS Review 107/2010  1  I am fully aware that some of the topics that you will be dealing with may not be entirely new to you, but I firmly believe that they may be necessary for purposes of reinforcing what you already know. You are all therefore implored to take keen interest in all the topics if you are to realise the full benefit of the workshop.
Our floating regime admits interventions in exceptional situations, like the one announced at the beginning of the month. Nonetheless, it is important to consider that beyond the evolution of the dollar in international markets, there are some more long-lasting elements underlying the real appreciation of the peso, such as improved terms of trade, the accumulated increase in the ratio of public expenditure to GDP and the reduction in our net debtor position relative to the rest of the world. The effects of these factors on the real exchange rate and the competitiveness of some sectors goes beyond the horizon of the effects of this intervention. Those sectors need to improve their productivity and reallocate their exports to growing emerging markets in order to remain competitive. In any case, additional reserves available will allow to better deal with the contingency of a significant deterioration of the external environment. Foreign exchange markets are under stress and currencies are adjusting asymmetrically. There is also the risk that GDP growth decoupling between advanced and emerging economies will persist longer than expected, thus intensifying the pressure on the exchange rate. Accordingly, the effects of this measure, although temporary, should open room for smoother real adjustments in the domestic economy. Final thoughts and challenges The ability of macroeconomic policies in developing economies to react swiftly was essential to reduce the impact of the global crisis.

In Chile, domestic demand grew rapidly in the run-up to the crisis. During 2004–2007, the average annual growth of output was 5.3%, while the average growth rate of domestic demand was 8.1%. Private consumption grew 7.2% and investment 12.1%. The faster growth of demand than output is explained by a significant improvement in our terms of trade on the back of higher prices for copper and other commodities. In 2007, Chile, like many other economies in the world, suffered a significant inflationary process, which only worsened during 2008 (figure 2). Perhaps the most remarkable component of this inflationary process was how strongly the increase in international food prices was transmitted domestically. This may have partially been due to Chile’s high degree of commercial openness and little distortions in the price setting mechanism. Another factor underlying inflation pressures, and a deceleration of growth, was the higher cost of energy (especially electricity) that hit the Chilean economy with particular strength (figure 3). Not only thermoelectric power plants had to operate with more costly inputs, but also unfavorable hydrological conditions and a severe shortage of natural gas implied that these more efficient sources of generation had to be replaced by diesel, in the context of rising oil prices. Inflation rose from an annual rate of 2.6% in December 2006 to 9.9% in October 2008, when the rise of food and energy prices had also propagated to the rest of consumer goods. Hence, the risks of inflation remaining above the target beyond the policy horizon grew strongly.
It shed off 1.3% value against the euro and depreciated by 1.9% vis-à-vis the rand ending the quarter at an average of € and  8  Lusaka, Livingstone, Mfuwe and Ndola. 9  South Luangwa, Mosi-oa-Tunya, Lower Zambezi, Kafue, North Luangwa, Blue Lagoon. BIS Review 148/2010  9  K677.45/ZAR, respectively. The rate of depreciation against the pound sterling was relatively lower at 0.6% with the Kwacha trading at £ With regard to the volume of foreign exchange transactions, a total of $ million was exchanged in the domestic interbank market. From the rest of the market, commercial banks purchased a net of $ million compared to net sales of $ million the previous quarter. Similarly banks made net purchases of € million Euros during the review period. Conversely, banks’ net sales of the South African rand amounted to ZAR729.3 million, higher than ZAR645.3 million recorded in the second quarter. Transactions involving the pound sterling followed a similar trend, with commercial banks recording net sales of ₤2.5 million depicting a reduction over the previous quarter’s net sales of ₤1.7 million. Balance of payments Preliminary data show that Zambia’s overall balance of payments (BoP) recorded a surplus of US $ million during the third quarter of 2010 compared to a deficit of US $ million in the previous quarter. This was driven by the improvement in the performance of both the current account and the capital and financial account balances.

“Perspektiver på pengepolitikken (Perspectives on monetary policy)", Norges Bank. •  Storvik, K. (1998) ”Aktuelle økonomiske og pengepolitiske problemstillinger (Current economic and monetary policy issues)”, address at the 43rd Annual General Meeting of FOREX Norway on 28 August 1998. 10  BIS Review 111/2008
Given their balance-sheet structure, funding liquidity is a key risk for banks: the transformation of short-term liabilities into long-term assets leaves them structurally vulnerable to liquidity pressures. Banks therefore need to position themselves so as to be able to withstand extraordinary demands on their liquidity. If capital markets work efficiently, a solvent bank in need of liquidity should, in principle, always be able to rely on the market to obtain funds. However, in practice, the interbank market may not always work perfectly; asymmetric information and coordination failures are among the most severe potential frictions. Banks may, therefore, find themselves unable to access normal sources of funding liquidity. The measures to which a bank in this situation would have to resort, such as large scale asset sales, could have major adverse spill over effects through the system, as could the most extreme case of an outright failure to meet obligations as they fall due. Liquidity buffers may help in this regard: a bank holding a buffer of assets that is reliably liquid under conditions of stress, perhaps with a core component that is eligible as collateral at the central bank, should always be able to access liquidity in a way that avoids precipitating severe market disruption. The trends described at the outset are also important here. First, a shift to greater reliance on wholesale funding and greater involvement in capital market activity more broadly perhaps makes banks more exposed to funding liquidity pressures than in the past: they are at the mercy of nimble wholesale lenders.

A third and more general reason why inflation has been high in the Baltic countries was that the economic impact of the pandemic was more limited in our region and the pandemic was followed by a very strong and swift recovery. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies combined with strong domestic demand pressures therefore contributed to an increase in inflation. On top of this was a change in the Estonian pension system in the autumn of 2021 that allowed individuals to start withdrawing their  2/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  pension savings before they reached retirement age. Some of this money was used to fund private consumption, which further increased inflationary pressures. The substantial dispersion of inflation rates between the countries of the euro area poses the question of how harmful these differences are in a monetary union. Obviously there will always be differences between the structures of our economies, and so there will always be some differences between the inflation rates in different countries. Such differences have been around since the euro was first introduced, though for most of the time they have been minor. Large differences in inflation rates could however lead to problems with the smooth functioning of a common currency area. An obvious problem is that a common monetary policy allowing nominal interest rates to be similar in all of the euro area countries will lead to differences in real interest rates if there are differences in inflation.
Economic developments were marked by high and variable inflation. Inflation rose gradually and it took a long time before it fell. The absence of a nominal anchor was one of the main reasons behind the pronounced swings in the Norwegian economy. With a policy of low interest rates and devaluations, inflation took root. Nominal interest rates were kept at a low level even though inflation and the value of tax-deductible interest expenses rose. Frequent devaluations from 1976 were unable in the long term to prevent a decline in the manufacturing sector. On the contrary, they proved to be self-reinforcing. The wide fluctuations culminated in a credit boom in the mid-1980s. A pronounced downturn and high unemployment followed at the end of the 1980s. I would like to highlight three factors that have taken on particular importance for economic policy in general, and monetary policy in particular. – First, economic agents look to the future when they make decisions about consumption and investments, wages and prices, and take account of not only current economic policy, but also their  4  Bjerve, Petter Jakob (1981): “Kva hendte i Norge i 1970-åra - konjunkturpolitisk?” (What happened in Norway in the 1970s in terms of counter-cyclical policy? ), Sosialøkonomen No. 5, 1981. 5  Official Norwegian Report (NOU) 1973:36 Om prisproblemene (price problems). 2  BIS Review 36/2004  expecations of future economic policy.

BIS Review 36/2004  1  •  credit regulation within limits specified in a separate credit budget  •  channelling of loans through the state banks  •  regulation of capital movements  •  low nominal interest rates stipulated by the government authorities  •  a fixed, though adjustable, krone exchange rate  •  use of price regulation  •  an active business policy through state ownership and state grants and subsidies  The use of price regulation was particular to Norway. The following description is by Petter Jakob Bjerve:4 “A characteristic of postwar Norwegian economic policy, compared with policies in other countries in the west, is that prices have largely been directly set by the authorities, while wages and other income have been determined by the market and by market organisations. With the high level of employment that the government sought to achieve in the 1970s, inflation was probably lower with price regulation than it would have been without it. Nonetheless, there was repeated evidence that freezing prices without freezing wages could not prevent a fairly sharp rise in prices. In 1978-1979, we witnessed a demonstration of the extent to which the rise in prices can be slowed, at least temporarily, when a price freeze is combined with a wage freeze.