samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I don’t expect our lives to look like they did a year ago—our sense of “normal” may be forever altered—but with vaccinations well underway and a significant decline nationwide in confirmed new cases, I do expect that we can start to look toward a time that will be “more like normal." In my remarks today I’ll set the scene for the economic picture locally, and for the U.S. economy as a whole. I’ll also highlight some of the disparities we are seeing in the labor market. Finally, I’ll share more about the Federal Reserve’s response and how I view the path forward. Before I continue, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. Dual Mandate Prior to sharing the outlook, I think it’s important to take a step back and explain some of the key factors that my colleagues and I at the Federal Reserve consider in reaching our policy decisions. The Fed has what we call a “dual mandate,” which are two goals set by Congress: maximum employment and price stability. With these goals in mind, our focus is understanding developments that affect labor markets, inflation, and economic growth.

In this regard, initiatives undertaken by Bank Negara Malaysia in the insurance sector have been primarily directed towards enhancing product transparency and disclosure, improving sales practices, raising the bar of professionalism for insurers and intermediaries, as well as strengthening the consumer protection framework. Apart from promoting sound and fair market practices, considerable efforts have also been made to develop the necessary infrastructure to facilitate consumers in obtaining redress, information and advice on matters relating to financial services. These include the implementation of the Consumer Education Programme and the establishment of a dedicated customer service centre (Bank Negara Malaysia LINK) and contact centre (BNM TELELINK) to improve access to information on financial products and services by members of the public. As we advance forward, changes in the global economy and international financial landscape will continue to be dynamic and the level of complexity and sophistication in the financial markets will further intensify. Achieving success in an environment fraught with greater uncertainty and more intense competition, will ultimately hinge on the ability of the industry players to continuously innovate and deliver enhanced value propositions to customers. BIS Review 123/2007  5  On that note, ladies and gentlemen, I hope that the 23rd PIC will not only be a platform for industry leaders to share and explore ideas for the benefit of the life insurance industry, but more importantly, to be followed up with affirmative actions on the part of the delegates involved.
3 The effective federal funds rate is calculated as a volume-weighted median of overnight federal funds transactions reported by banks on the FR 2420 Report of Selected Money Market Rates. The New York Fed publishes the EFFR for the prior business day, along with volumes and rate percentiles, on its website daily at approximately 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time. The EFFR is used as a measure of the typical fed funds transaction and is the way the New York Fed’s Open Market Trading Desk (the Desk) measures its success in meeting the directive on interest rate control from the FOMC. 1  confidence in its ability to appropriately control overnight interest rates over the period of normalization. I will then conclude with some comments on recent developments in broader money market rates, in particular U.S.-dollar LIBOR. U.S. term money market rates are of global significance, owing to the heavy use of the dollar outside the United States and the large stock of dollar-LIBOR-linked debt issued abroad. 4 The spread of LIBOR to overnight indexed swaps has fluctuated in recent years, along with similar term unsecured dollar borrowing rates, driven in part by the same factors influencing overnight rates but also by specific past regulatory and legislative changes that have impacted flows in term markets. Evidence, such as from the FX swaps market, suggests that dollar borrowing markets continue to function well. Policy Normalization Continues As Expected I’d like to start by taking stock of where we are with the normalization of monetary policy in the United States.

These longer-term money market rates are important to U.S. domestic activity to be sure, but they are also of significance abroad, especially in countries with highly trade-oriented economies. In this regard, we have seen continued growth in recent years in the stock of loans linked to U.S.-dollar LIBOR made to non-U.S. firms. As shown in Figure 14, the Desk estimates that U.S.-dollar cross-border bank loans to non-U.S. residents that could be directly or indirectly impacted by U.S.-dollar LIBOR—the sum of the three columns in the panel—total about $ trillion, a significant portion of which is in developing economies. This reflects both the deep,  10  liquid, and global nature of U.S. financial markets, as well as the dollar’s role as a reserve currency and the primary currency used for international trade. My assessment is that the increased supply of Treasury bills and shorter-term Treasury coupon securities has played an important role in putting upward pressure on these rates at times. I think there is also evidence that other policy drivers have played an important role. For example, the recently enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) provides for “deemed repatriation” of corporate profits that had not yet been subjected to taxation in the United States. It appears that some corporations that previously had significant untaxed earnings—and that previously held large stocks of cash on their balance sheets—have begun to alter their capital structures, either by distributing cash held on balance sheet as dividends or by investing it in other assets.
The Riksbank after the referendum The result of the referendum was, as we all know, a "no" vote. What this means for the Riksbank is that we will continue to focus our operations on our statutory objectives; to maintain price stability and to promote a safe and efficient payment system. Quite simply, it will be "business as usual" for monetary policy. This means that under normal circumstances we will continue to follow our simple monetary policy rule: if future inflation is forecast to be higher than the inflation target of 2 per cent, we will raise the interest rate, and vice versa if inflation is forecast to be lower than 2 per cent. This clear intellectual framework makes it easier to influence expectations of monetary policy in society and to evaluate the policy afterwards. Both we ourselves and external analysts can take a stand on whether the policy appears sensible in relation to the target, whether the forecasts we make are reasonable, and whether we follow the principles we claim to follow for attaining the inflation target. Even if the monetary policy framework remains intact, this is no reason to become too comfortable. During the spring we began work on a review of the process used to produce the information on which our interest rate decisions are based. This includes considering how one of our most important documents - the Inflation Report - can be improved. It also involves improving our ability to predict price trends.

Work on the Riksbank's other main objective - financial stability - has been characterised to a great extent by the experiences of the financial crisis that shook Sweden in the early 1990s. The Riksbank has been something of a pioneer, being the first central bank in the world to publish reports on financial stability. There is also reason to make a fresh effort in this field. We are in the process of appointing a group of experts, which includes a couple of international experts, who will evaluate our work and present suggestions for improvements. The evaluations we make will be followed up with open seminars, where we can discuss the future direction of our operations with economists from the academic world as well as actors in the financial sector. The Riksbank is currently one of the world's most open central banks, but we can certainly become better. Our work will in future be aimed at ensuring that the Riksbank reaches a broader general public than is currently the case. Our ambition is to create even broader support for our operations and thereby greater understanding of what we do and why we do it. Personally, I intend to travel around  BIS Review 44/2003  1  the country before the autumn and spring monetary policy meetings to talk and listen to representatives of local industries and regions. The inflation perspective It was observed in the June Inflation Report that for some time there had been gradual downward revisions to the forecasts for the world economy.
This in turn explains why both the central rate and the fluctuation bands will have to be fixed by mutual agreement. The current regime also differs from the conditions governing ERM II in terms of the anchor currency. Strategies based on free floats, pegs to currencies other than the euro and crawling pegs are not compatible with ERM II. Consequently, Malta’s exchange rate, which apart from the euro is also linked to the US dollar and Sterling as anchor currencies, will have to be revised. The question we then have to answer is, “What exchange rate strategy should Malta pursue in the run-up to ERM II?”  2  BIS Review 70/2002  Experience suggests a move to more flexible regimes prior to ERM II Whereas the strategy to be pursued during EMU is prescribed in the Treaty, and while the institutional framework governing ERM II limits the strategies which would be compatible with that arrangement, in principle any exchange rate regime is permitted during the phase preceding ERM II. What matters is that the selected regime should contribute to real economic convergence with the economies of EU member countries, macroeconomic stabilisation and the transition to a functioning market economy capable of dealing with the competitive pressures within the EU. Indeed, accession countries are currently pursuing very different strategies.

Spain, France and Italy have experienced the most rapid growth rates, but in Germany further declines or only moderate increases in prices have been reported. An evaluation of the risks to euro area financial stability stemming from the household sector depends on the balance sheet situation of households as this determines their resilience to adverse financial shocks. Both the households’ debt-to-financial assets ratio and the debt-to-liquid financial assets ratio have continued to grow, but more moderately compared with the rapid increase at the beginning of the current millennium. Although this implies a further deterioration of households’ financial position, the household sector’s liquid assets still exceed its debts. 5. Euro area financial system  5.1. Euro area financial markets  Let me now briefly turn to the euro area stock and corporate bond markets, both of which continued to develop dynamically until very recently. The Review points out that despite the favourable economic outlook, a risk of a slowdown in market dynamics cannot be excluded if risk-free interest rates continue to edge upwards and credit ratings and/or earnings growth surprise to the downside. On the positive side, structural developments in euro money markets, described in Box 6 of the Review, and the increased use of collateral in borrowing and lending transactions, discussed in Box 7, suggest an overall strengthening of the financial system’s resilience to a systemic shock.
It is also important to achieve a necessary division of power. The EOFS should cooperate closely with other organisations but should still be free from direct guidance and involvement from national authorities as well as from the European Commission and the ECB. In my opinion, it should be given the same independent status as the ECB has today. With many other Pan-European regulatory bodies already in existence, it should not be too hard to come up with suggested proper financing arrangements. If successful in its initial role, the tasks of the EOFS can gradually be extended by assuming additional supervisory powers for the truly cross-border banks. It would however first have to prove its merits. As long as the EOFS operates in addition to the national authorities another layer of supervision is added to the present structure. From an industry perspective this would imply a greater regulatory burden. However, I believe – and hope – that it is something that authorities and banks can live with if the supervision as such improves and if the proposal increases the chances of a substantially lower regulatory burden in the future. People acquainted with the present regulatory and institutional set-up within the EU may ask if what I am proposing is not already in place, considering the existing consolidated supervisory model and the role of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). However, even if both of these functions have their obvious merits they do not quite satisfy the needs.

The Standing Facilities which had played this role were re-launched as the Operational Standing Facilities (OSFs), more clearly intended to cope with operational disruptions and short-term market volatility. More recently, in June 2010, the Bank replaced the temporary eLTRs with permanent Indexed Long-Term Repo (ILTRs) operations that regularly offer the system 3 and 6 month liquidity, against a wide pool of eligible collateral. In designing its permanent liquidity insurance operations, the Bank was very mindful of the need to balance the benefits to systemic stability, the incentives for banks to manage liquidity risk prudently, and the need to minimise the risk taken onto the Bank’s balance sheet. In particular, the aim of the Bank has been to leave the credit and market risks associated with collateral with the counterparty, so that we only provide the intended liquidity insurance and not any official underwriting of the underlying risks. Underpinning these objectives are some additional underlying principles: (a)  the Bank does not accept any collateral that it feels it cannot value and then riskmanage effectively;  (b)  the Bank’s prices for lending in its liquidity insurance operations can vary with the liquidity of the collateral delivered and the amount lent, so that use of these facilities only becomes attractive in stressed conditions. These principles ensure that the Bank can manage its own risks prudently and that counterparties are encouraged to manage their risks similarly. Eligibility The Bank’s risk preferences are very different from those in commercial financial institutions.
Compared with other countries, productivity gains have been particularly strong in the banking industry and other service sectors. The business sector has been quick to adapt and change, and to make use of new technology that is available in an international market. This is probably due the modernisation of the functioning of the economy through the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted in more efficient markets. Turbulence in financial markets The financial market turbulence may result in a reversal of some of the positive driving forces in the Norwegian economy. The turbulence was probably triggered by falling house prices in the US. There were reports of an increase in defaults on subprime mortgages from the second half of 2006. Securities portfolios had been developed around these mortgages. Uncertainty arose among bankers and investors who directly or indirectly were exposed to losses on these mortgages. This resulted in a sharp decline in prices for these securities, which then spread to a range of mortgage-backed instruments. In the course of summer 2007, it became clear that the losses had spread to banks, funds and financial establishments in Europe, Asia and the US. The turbulence also spread to other financial market segments. Few knew who was exposed to losses, and financial market participants started to question counterparties’ financial situation, and held on to their money. Many banks have sustained substantial losses on their own investments related to these markets, but have also had to bring back onto their books loans from companies they had established.

Let us try to remain serious, lucid, serene and balanced in our analysis, in our judgements, in our decisions. Let us all beware of the herd instinct which is always a very bad counsellor. Let us beware of fashion. As regards the present situation, we must remain prudent and cautious, but we have some signs indicating a bottoming out in the US and in Europe, including in my own country. And I see absolutely no reason why the European economy pick up would not be as early as in the US, taking account of the strong European fundamentals. §  Third, confidence is of the essence in the present situation. Confidence in our currency, confidence in its capacity to be a good store of value, confidence in its medium and long-term solidity, confidence in the capacity of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem as a whole to deliver price stability. This confidence – which is warranted by the central bank – is a very precious asset for the Europeans. It is a very important ingredient for fostering growth through consumer confidence and therefore consumer demand which is presently the main driving force behind the European economy. I thank you for your attention. 9
Yves Mersch: Interview in Luxemburger Wort Interview with Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Luxemburger Wort, conducted by Mr Pierre Sorlut and Ms Barbara Tasch on 8 March and published on 14 March 2018. * * *  Mr Mersch, the Governing Council has not yet decided to raise the interest rate. When that happens, the debt-to-service ratio will increase and put pressure on households who took out loans to buy their houses. How big is the danger? Let me say first that the bigger the imbalances, the less the economy is prepared for a monetary policy change. Any change in the monetary policy stance is always a shock to the economy, positive or negative. It’s not in our mandate to consider the households of any particular country when we change the monetary policy stance. That includes Luxembourg. We set interest rates for the euro area as a whole. We are not yet ready at this stage to change interest rates. We first take the nonconventional measures towards the exit. Only then will we consider the conventional ones. Today, at our press conference, we confirmed that we’re confident with the path which is leading to our objective. The primary objective is price stability, which we have defined as an inflation rate of below, but close to, 2% in the medium term. Second, on some banks’ balance sheets, loans to the private sector are very substantial and in some there is a high concentration of mortgages.

Thomas Jordan: Mortgage financing and the risks of a credit crunch in Switzerland and abroad Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Schweizer Ökonomentag, University of Zurich, 10 September 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The international financial crisis has raised the question of the risks of a credit crunch on domestic and foreign property markets. A credit crunch can occur if banks’ ability to lend is constrained, or if their lending practices become more risk averse. From a macroeconomic perspective, a credit crunch is relevant because it can reinforce an economic slowdown. The risks of a property market credit crunch differ from country to country. Mortgage markets in the US and UK are showing clear signs of a credit crunch. Both countries have typically seen a sharp slowdown in credit growth, falling house prices and weaker bank balance sheets. Mortgage lending in these countries over the past few years has increasingly been financed through securitisation. The current loss of investor confidence in securitisation has thus hampered banks’ ability to refinance mortgage contracts and, as a result, banks in both countries are finding it harder to grant new mortgage loans. At the same time, falling prices have dampened their risk appetite as regards lending. This decline in the supply of credit is now weighing on economic developments in these countries.
40% of FTBs received help with raising their deposit in 2018-2019 relative to 25% in the mid-90s, showing an increasing reliance on family wealth to purchase the first home18. The ‘Bank of Mum and Dad’ is already estimated to be the 10th most important lender in the UK19  16  The FPC's 2021 remit letter can be found here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/letter/2021/march/remit-for-the-fpc-2021. The Bank of England also has a Public Sector Equality Duty under the Equalities Act. 17 It is important to note that the Gini coefficient overall has not risen over this period. 18 Report based on Nationwide data 19 Legal and General calculations 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  12  The intergenerational impact of the pre-financial crisis housing boom can also be seen in how the age profile of first time buyers and homeowners has shifted. Over the 1998-2008 period and immediately following the financial crisis, the share of young people buying their homes effectively collapsed (Chart 8). From 2014, the share has stabilised. Chart 8: Home ownership rates by age cohort  The price-to-earnings ratio for first time buyers for the UK as a whole shows a similar pattern, rising sharply from 1998-2008, but then growing at a much more moderate rate after the crisis. London, however, shows a very different picture a consequence of the sharp rise in house prices from 2012-2017.

The first is the measurement and evaluation of financial education and its effectiveness. Strengthening measurement and evaluation is a key pillar of FEN’s strategies to increase the impact of initiatives implemented by FEN and its members. This would enable FEN members to design more effective and tailored financial education programmes, that also optimises resources, to achieve sustainable behavioural change. By strengthening the focus on outcomes and impact, we can reinforce effective practices and support the continuous improvement of programmes. With this in view, FEN is committed to develop and execute an annual measurement and evaluation process for financial education programmes that support the National Strategy for Financial Literacy – to be implemented from 2022. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second area of focus today is on opportunities to make better use of data and behavioural insights to advance smarter financial education. A key challenge that we face today is the misalignment between information and resources made available to financial consumers, and the way in which they consume, process and act on such information. Behavioural insights can help us close this gap to make better use of the tools at our disposal to bring about positive change. Advances in technology are also opening up new opportunities to leverage on behavioural insights to achieve more effective financial education interventions. The ability to gain much deeper and richer insights into consumer behaviour are now possible, and could completely change the way we think about and deliver financial education interventions.