samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Number of central bank employees per 100 000 inhabitants  50 44.6  45 40  40  35  35 29.0  30  26.6 22.5  25 20 13.7  15  11.4  10 5  45  3.8  5.6  14.1  14.7  18.0  18.5  19.3  20.7  11.5  30 25 20 15 10  7.6  5 0  Sw UK ed en Sp D ai en n m N a rk et he F i rl. nl a A nd us t ri a Ita P o ly r Eu tug ro al G are er a m a Ire n y l B and el gi u Fr m an G ce re L u ec xe e m b. 0  Source: The Morgan Stanley Central Bank  Diagram 1 shows the number of central bank employees per 100 000 inhabitants in different countries. From this, we can see that the number of central bank employees varies greatly from country to country. This would also apply if the number of employees was related to some other measure of country size, such as GDP. Not all central bank functions have anything to do with the size of the economy, however, which is probably the main reason why Luxembourg fares worst. One probable explanation for the large differences here is that the tasks of central banks differ from country to country.

When all-important arguments made internally have to be explained externally, the quality of the internal work rises. By being more transparent, we are now open to criticism that is both sharper and more specific, and this has helped us to improve our analysis. This particular effect of transparency is not discussed to a great extent in economic literature but is of great practical importance. Concentration on core activities One problem for many public institutions is that they lack focus. Research and practical experience show that a concentration on core activities is a prerequisite for good performance. Central banks are involved in many different activities. The extent of this in-volvement should be a point for discussion, however. Some central bank tasks may have arisen by historical accident and then remained in the central bank domain without ever being questioned. This raises the issue of whether some services could be provided more efficiently by private entities. For instance, the Riksbank owned a paper mill and a note-printing works in the town of Tumba, as well as a mint in the city of Eskilstuna, for three hundred years. These are largely manufacturing operations that differ greatly from the work involved in monetary policy and financial stability. Since our job is to concentrate primarily on monetary policy and the difficult systemic questions in the financial world, we decided to sell both the operations in Tumba and the mint in Eskilstuna.
By focussing on a clear set of research priorities, by opening up our datasets, and by creating tighter links between policymakers and researchers, both within the Bank and across the broader research community, we can all help advance the Bank’s mission – promoting the good of the people of the United Kingdom. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

However, I cannot affirm that the resolution of market imbalances would result in a reduction of volatility to levels that prevailed before these imbalances were taken into account by market participants. In my view one should not underestimate the part played by technical factors in the persistence of volatility peaks. This persistence in volatility is fuelled by technical features that facilitate the build up of mimetic behaviours (amplifying effects), or that reinforce the links between the various market segments (diffusion effects). Mimetic behaviour is of course by no means a new phenomenon on financial markets. However benchmarking, index management, and risk management techniques may have gradually reinforced this type of behaviour, as participants are under increasing pressure to follow their peers through matching the performance of a benchmark. There is no doubt that the spread of benchmarking allows fund managers and clients to better assess their performance against that of other funds. But, in a context of growing competition within the sector, it may well have increased mimetic behaviour. Some market participants (whose own compensation is closely linked to the relative, rather than absolute, profit and losses they generate) may indeed have come to the conclusion that it would be better to be wrong along with everybody else, rather than to run the risk of being right alone. A striking example of rational mimetic behaviour is the influence that hedge funds posess as “opinion leaders” and trend setters.
Our network of Bank of England Agents is extremely important in this area. Around the country we have twelve Agencies, in general staffed by long-serving Bank of England people, constantly collecting information at the grass-roots level from their many business contacts. And the information, which they provide direct to the MPC on a monthly basis, can often prove helpful: either in helping us unravel inconsistencies in the data; or, as was the case in the Summer and Autumn of 1998, alerting us to problems in the economy before they show up in the official data. Notwithstanding the help of the Agents, problems with interpretation of the data abound. Some of these will be discussed in our Quarterly Inflation Report, due to be published on Thursday this week. I hope you will have the opportunity to read it. Financial stability Perhaps I could now turn from monetary policy matters to financial stability; and to the second part of my job as the Deputy Governor responsible for this part of the Bank’s work. Go back a little over three years and the Bank had a large department with four hundred and fifty staff supervising banks. Hard on the heels of the decision to grant the Bank independence, the Government decided in May 1997 to establish the Financial Services Authority bringing together existing UK  3  BIS Review 102/2000  financial regulators and supervisors under one roof.

The effect of globalization is the establishment of international financial conglomerates. In the case of an economic crisis, the conglomerates may channel it through to other markets. Such companies could be very important for the stability of the financial system in a country or region. Their bankruptcy may evoke a crisis, even in a steadily growing economy and even in the situation when the financial problems have stemmed from a foreign market. The lack of standard procedure for solving problems of international financial institutions impairs prevention and solving of financial crises. The existing safety net established by national economic authorities is frequently a source of moral hazard for large  11  Issing O. “The globalization of financial market”, 2000, www.ecb.int. 12  Lutkowski K., “Mechanizm przepływów kapitałowych w epoce globalizacji” in: ”Globalizacja od A do Z”, NBP 2004. 13  Małecki W., Sławiński A., Piasecki R., Żuławska U. “Kryzysy walutowe”, PWN, Warsaw 2001. 14  Mishkin F.C. “Is Globalization Beneficial?”, NBER Working Paper 11891, 2005. 15  Kamisky G. L, Reinhart C.M. “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems”, American Economic Review 89, 1999, pp. 473–500. Caprio G., Klingebiel D. “Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises”, the World Bank , mimeo, 2003. 16  Rajan R. G. “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” NBER Working Paper 11728, 2005.
But remote events do happen – and by their nature we cannot always see them coming. Researchers at the World Bank have recorded 13 borderline or full-blown financial crises since the late 1970s, involving at least one Financial Stability Forum (FSF) member country. 1 And there are well known incidents not on the list: including the 1987 crash, the less developed countries’ debt crisis and LTCM’s near collapse. So we are fortunate in having a time of relative calm to work out together how we should react when a problem does arise. And we have in the FSF a body that was established “to co-ordinate the efforts of …various bodies in order to promote international financial stability, improve the functioning of markets, and reduce systemic risk” 2 . In its first 7 years, much of the FSF’s focus has been on the identification and assessment of risks in a rapidly changing financial system; it has played a valuable role in building a common understanding among authorities and among market participants of what the risks are and how they can be reduced. However, that level of progress has been less apparent on putting in place arrangements for handling and resolving cross-border crises. During that period a number of countries, including the UK, have improved their processes for handling financial crises – including for crises sparked by business continuity events.

One which particularly exercises me is ensuring that we should always have the option of closing down a large firm in an orderly way, even if we need to use emergency liquidity assistance as a bridging loan to do so (rather than as a step towards keeping the firm open). Looking further ahead, it is clear that these interest groups should not remain inward-looking. In order for any preparations for crisis to be relevant, authorities will need to ensure that they are informed by firms’ plans and views – for example on their likely own actions in crisis, where they see their vulnerabilities in managing a problem, what they expect the authorities to do, and where arrangements could be improved. So the ongoing dialogue that the relevant authorities have with firms may well inform, and be informed by, the work of interest groups. What role could the FSF play in promoting these kinds of bilateral or small multilateral discussions and exercises on practical topics regarding specific firms and markets? As we all know, it is not the role of the FSF to manage cross-border crises. But my view is that the FSF does have a role in this area. To me it seems the ideal group to draw out the common messages and lessons that may emerge from these interest group discussions, and to establish a common framework for handling crises which will be of use both to its members and more widely. 4  4  http://www.bis.org/press/p021210.htm  BIS Review 112/2006
Smaller and midsize firms participating in the facilities can offer additional services to their clients, and more broadly, these firms may develop new business relationships and skills and deepen their expertise when operating in the markets for these facilities. With this as the motivation, let me review how we are broadening access to the facilities for two primary types of service providers: vendors and counterparties. Starting with vendors, in our effort to contain the damage from the pandemic and speed the launch of the facilities, the Fed directly negotiated with several outside vendors to accelerate the rollout of various facilities and to supplement our areas of internal expertise. Our initial vendor selections prioritized scale and, in many cases, the ability to dedicate a large team of personnel behind a wall of confidentiality. This approach proved successful in launching our facilities at maximum speed, but our strategy from the beginning has been to diversify our vendor base in the post-launch phase. Importantly, all of the contracts the New York Fed has signed are short term; each has a provision to cancel with 30 days' notice. Given this flexibility, we are evaluating all contracts after 90 days, with 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  priority on re-bidding those that were not competitively bid. The New York Fed will shortly commence a competitive bidding process for some of these vendor roles.

Since then, Norway has benefitted greatly from the opportunities that the petroleum sector has provided. The spillover effects from the oil sector to the wider Norwegian economy are substantial. Oil-related jobs can be found throughout the country. More than 10 percent of all employed persons in Norway either directly or indirectly work for the oil industry. Innovation and skills development in the industry have also benefitted other sectors. From where Norway stands today, one may get the impression that our history as an oil nation is only a story about success. This is not the case. Chart: Oil and gas revenues and government spending Policymakers’ handling of Norway’s newly discovered petroleum wealth got off to a rather bumpy start. During the first 25 years of oil production, Norway experienced two deep recessions. Both downturns were rooted in wildly optimistic income expectations. In the 1970s, public spending surged before oil export revenue started to kick in. Eventually the government had to tighten fiscal policy. In the 1980s, a credit-fuelled consumption boom in the private sector led to necessary cut-backs after the oil price plunge in 1986. The turbulence made clear how vulnerable a small economy is to terms of trade disturbances. Let that part of our history stand as a warning. But lessons were learned, and formed the basis for the framework that was put in place from 1990 and onwards. During the past 50 years, Norway has experienced how oil prices can change almost overnight in response to international politics, economic disturbances or disruptive technologies.
A major reason for this is the debt brake, which is extremely important for monetary policy and contributes to safeguarding an independent monetary policy. By pursuing a monetary and fiscal policy oriented towards stability, the negative impact of the crisis on the Swiss economy could be mitigated. As the events of the last two years have brought into focus, the monetary policy of a small open economy must also be able to rely on healthy fiscal policies in other countries. The debt crisis and the way the markets perceived it have considerably impaired the conduct of monetary policy in Switzerland. To fulfil its mandate, the Swiss National Bank has had to take far-reaching measures, such as setting a minimum exchange rate against the euro. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

The projected tax revenue for 2013 is subject to downside risks because it is based on the assumption that the revenue targets for 2012 will be achieved. However, on the information currently available, it cannot be ruled out that revenue performs worse than expected in 2012. If this risk materialises and is not countered by appropriate action in the remainder of the year, that would make it difficult to achieve the targets set for 2013, compounding the possible effects of a bigger decline in GDP than that assumed in the budgetary programming. Expenditure On the expenditure side, the weight of three items should first be underlined: Social Security system contributory pensions, unemployment benefits and the interest on government debt. In 2012, these three items are equivalent to 20% of GDP and will account for approximately 36% of total public spending. In 2013, these percentages will foreseeably increase significantly. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Noteworthy among the measures considered on the expenditure side are: the freezing of civil servants’ and public-sector employees’ salaries, although they will recover their December extra payroll, which, together with not filling vacancies, will result in a very low increase in personnel costs in relation to serving employees of around 0.1%. Real investments are reduced by 46%, whereas the interest burden increases by more than € billion. In the Social Security system, spending on contributory pensions, sickness and other benefits will grow by slightly more than 5%, factoring in the raising of pensions by 1%.
In this environment, both the negative interest rate and the SNB’s willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary remain essential. These measures allow us to ensure price stability – and thus fulfil our mandate in the interests of the country as a whole. Facilitating and securing the operation of cashless payment systems is part of the SNB’s mandate. And for good reason: A smoothly functioning payment system is critically important to the performance of an economy. Payments connect buyers and sellers; borrowers and lenders. The ability to make payments securely and irrevocably is fundamental to sustaining confidence in the financial system. Digitalisation and the proliferation of mobile internet services are changing the way we pay for things. New applications and technologies promise ever faster, easier and cheaper payment options via smartphone, tablet or smartwatch. The entire payments ecosystem is set to undergo profound change as a result. My colleague Thomas Moser and I will take a more detailed look at how innovation is shaping developments in the payments arena. We will focus in particular on the challenges such innovation presents to central banks. In the past, payment innovations have often been driven by the private sector. Facilitating – and especially securing – the operation of payment systems has long been a fundamental task of many central banks, however. It is thus essential that all the various stakeholders maintain a constructive dialogue.

As digitalisation progresses, the quantity and value of such client data are increasing. Established providers of payment services are having to confront the fact that competition at the client interface and competition for client data is intensifying. In the digital age, the wide network of branches which traditionally gave banks’ a competitive edge no longer provides that advantage. Developments in China show how quickly banks can lose their client interface to non-banks in the payments arena: Within a few short years, the online marketplace Alibaba and the news app WeChat have managed to capture more than 90% of the rapidly expanding mobile payments segment. 9 The growing focus on the client interface and client data also represents a challenge for central banks. Gross misuse of data and a lack of reliability could seriously erode trust in payment systems – and ultimately in money itself. Even with the new technologies and 8 9  I covered this topic at our Money Market Event a year ago. I stand by the point I made then – namely, that cryptocurrencies are more like speculative investment instruments than stable payment methods. Financial Stability Board (2019), Fintech and market structure in financial services: Market developments and potential financial stability implications, FSB White Paper, 14 February. Page 6/9  possibilities coming on stream, payment transactions must continue to function and be secure. For payment systems to remain future-proof, in-depth discussions between the main stakeholders in the Swiss financial centre are therefore essential.
Norman T L Chan: Responding to the financial crisis – financial reform impacts and regulatory regime changes Opening remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asian Financial Forum 2010, Policy dialogue: “Responding to the financial crisis – financial reform impacts and regulatory regime changes”, Hong Kong, 20 January 2010. *  *  *  1. “It has often been said that history, especially financial crisis, tends to repeat itself. Notwithstanding the disturbingly frequent occurrence of seemingly similar financial crises, I am inclined to believe that history does not repeat itself because, upon close scrutiny, no two crises are exactly the same. It may be more correct to say that mistakes will be punished by the market. If people do not learn from their mistakes, then the market will continue to repeat its punishment. The only difference between the major financial crises is that the punishment is getting more and more severe, if not violent.” 2. “Going forward, I can see two possible ways to learn more about the financial markets. One is to learn from past mistakes and do something now. The second is to wait until the next disaster strikes and try to do something there and then.

There is at present a long list of reform agenda items being debated internationally: these include strengthening financial institutions by requiring them to hold more capital and liquidity; changing compensation practices to discourage excessive risk taking by bankers and reforming regulatory structures to ensure more effective supervision, especially of large and complex firms that have systemic implications. 5. It is therefore very timely today that we have five very distinguished speakers joining this Panel to share with us their insights into this complex and important question of how we should go about reforming the international financial architecture and regulatory regimes in different jurisdictions. They are, by order of their appearance in the programme: (i)  Mr Rintaro Tamaki, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs of Japan;  (ii)  Dr Jong-Goo Yi, Standing Commissioner of the Financial Services Commission of Korea;  (iii)  The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Financial Services of Australia;  BIS Review 7/2010  1  (iv)  The Honourable Mr Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah, Minister of Finance Two of Malaysia; and  (v)  Professor KC Chan, Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, HKSAR. I understand from the organiser that we will invite Professor Chan to speak first as he may need to leave earlier for the Legislative Council meeting. The order of other speakers will follow the programme. Professor Chan, please. 2  BIS Review 7/2010
This increase in financial institution resilience has not been achieved at the expense of economic activity. This brings me to the crux of the question put to me by your Academy today. First, the objective of the regulators was clearly to limit the potential adverse effects of their reforms on the real economy, and to ensure that financial activities support growth and economic development. In 2010, before the roll-out of Basel III, major work was carried out12 to measure the impact of these reforms. The Basel Committee’s Macroeconomic Assessment Group concluded, from a broad range of estimates, that for every 1 percentage point rise in the target capital ratio, the cost of credit would increase by an average of around 0.15 percentage point. Yet in practice, this credit tightening never materialised. The favourable effects of the fall in interest 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  rates under the accommodative monetary policy stance have far outweighed any negative consequences of stricter regulatory requirements. Today in Europe, as in France, the flow of bank lending to businesses and households remains robust. Indeed, the strength in private sector lending is even the focus of particular vigilance in France and on the part of the HCSF. In September 2017, growth in bank lending to households and businesses reached 5.7% and 5.4% respectively in France, twice the rates observed in the euro area as a whole. Since the start of 2010, the cumulative growth in both forms of lending (29%) is almost twice that of nominal GDP.

It is hugely more complex than macro-economic management, being affected as it is by the whole range of public policy issues, often involving difficult political judgements on how to strike the right balance between social and economic considerations. I will have little more to say about the supply side. My involvement is on the macro-economic side. Macro-economic management can do relatively little directly to contribute to improvement on the supply side, but - if we succeed in maintaining stability we can nevertheless contribute to more rational economic decision-making by the private sector, based upon real rather than purely nominal considerations; and that can help improve our supply-side performance indirectly. As the emphasis of macro-economic management - overall fiscal policy and monetary policy taken together - shifted towards stability, a growing distinction emerged between the role of overall fiscal policy, which is set for the medium term, and a more specific role for monetary policy, which became the principal instrument for shorter-term stabilisation. This distinction crystalised first with the adoption of an explicit inflation target as the objective of monetary policy, following our exit from the ERM in 1992, and subsequently, in 1997, when the Bank, through the Monetary Policy Committee, was given independent operational responsibility - legitimised through transparency and public accountability for the achievement of the Government's inflation target.