samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
B. Fostering “co-opetition” between established players and new entrants Innovation is often associated with FinTech firms and challengers, such as the start-ups that build success from an ability to focus their business and cut costs for a specific service or link in the payment chain. Yet commercial banks, which have traditionally been a major force in payments, also play a key role in innovation. Likewise, the main card schemes helped to drive the emergence of new payment methods, such as contactless payments and mobile payment terminals. Through partnerships, acquisitions and incubation projects, but also by harnessing in house R&D, established participants have expanded their service offerings to add new solutions, while developing competition and cooperation with new entrants. “Co-opetition” relationships are a  deep-rooted feature of the payment industry and are proven to generate value. The challenge now is to nurture them over the long run, taking care to ensure that relationships with BigTech firms are included. This is because the potential network effects enjoyed by BigTech payment solutions and the upstream payment chain positions of these firms could create risks of competitive distortion, particularly in situations where these participants also provide hardware or software components. Users could find themselves effectively captives of an ecosystem and left with no choice in terms of payment service, or at least be influenced by BigTech firms to use their services at the expense of competitors.

6  BIS Review 36/2005  Graph 5: Risk Premium and Real Interest Rates  1000  35  900  30  800  25  700 600  20  500 15  400 300  10  200  Risk Premium (JPMorgan) Real Interest (Calculated w ith inflation expectations)  100  5  Mar-05  Jan-05  Nov-04  Sep-04  Jul-04  May-04  Mar-04  Jan-04  Nov-03  Sep-03  Jul-03  May-03  Mar-03  Jan-03  Nov-02  Sep-02  Jul-02  May-02  Mar-02  0 Jan-02  0  Source: CBRT, JP Morgan. Graph 6: CBRT Interest Rates and Secondary Market Nominal Interest Rates 90 ISE T-Bill and Bond Market Interest Ratescompound  80  CBT Overnight Interest Rates  70  (%)  60 50 40 30  3/2/05  1/2/05  11/2/04  9/2/04  7/2/04  5/2/04  3/2/04  1/2/04  11/2/03  9/2/03  7/2/03  5/2/03  3/2/03  1/2/03  11/2/02  9/2/02  7/2/02  5/2/02  3/2/02  10  1/2/02  20  Source: CBRT, ISE. At this point, within the scope of the changing dynamics of inflation, I would like to talk about the passthrough effect of the exchange rates on inflation, which is quite significant not only in terms of the determinants of inflation, but also the current exchange rate regime.
Page 15  Expressed in the context of the canonical new Keynesian model of monetary policy transmission, this essentially revolves around whether it is sufficient for the policy rate alone to appear in the ‘dynamic IS curve’ equation in that model, or whether other measures of monetary and financial conditions are required. My tentative conclusion is that a consensus exists that the policy rate alone is not enough. A structural understanding of how monetary policy actions influence risk, term, liquidity and credit risk premia – and thus the broad set of asset prices that influence aggregate demand – is likely to require an understanding of portfolio decisions by households, firms and financial institutions, where access to a safe monetary asset plays an important role. But, to the extent that the most important of these asset prices are set in open traded markets where the prices are observable in real time, in many cases the practical implementation of monetary policy can continue by conditioning policy rate decisions on those asset prices as well as the broader economic environment. This focus on the IS curve leaves open the question of whether monetary developments can also enter the Phillips curve relationship in the canonical new Keynesian model, say via influencing longer-term inflation expectations by acting as some form of ‘nominal anchor’ to the economy. I don’t have the time or space to even start to address that question today. But it does seem central to some of the fears expressed by Lord King two decades ago.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Demography and economic policy – the challenges ahead Summary of a colloquium by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, on “Chances et défis du vieillissement” (opportunities and challenges of demographic ageing), at the University of Geneva, Geneva, 10 November 2006. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  What will Switzerland look like in 2050? The demographic changes under way will have a strong impact on the future demographic landscape, with regard to both the working population and the older age segments. The ageing society poses two major challenges for economic policy: ensuring the production capacity of the Swiss economy as well as the continuance of the social security scheme. To address these challenges, an economic policy that promotes productivity increases while guaranteeing economic growth must be implemented with immediate effect. In line with this economic policy, adjustments must be made to our social security system.
Speech  Embargo 16 January 2018, 6.00 pm  How money is created by the central bank and the banking system Zürcher Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board ∗ Swiss National Bank Zurich, 16 January 2018 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2018 (speech given in German)  ∗ The speaker would like to thank Samuel Reynard and Mathias Zurlinden for their support in the preparation of this speech. He also thanks Simone Auer, Petra Gerlach, Carlos Lenz and Alexander Perruchoud, as well as SNB Language Services. Page 1/12  Ladies and Gentlemen It is a great pleasure for me to be your guest here tonight. The subject of my speech is the creation of money in our economy. Since money creation in our financial system is closely linked to the granting of loans by banks, I am also going to talk about lending. I shall, moreover, address the issues of sovereign money and access to digital central bank money, insofar as they relate to our main topic. We are all aware of how profoundly the economic and monetary developments of the last ten years have been shaped by the global financial and economic crisis. Central banks responded swiftly and resolutely to the crisis, reducing interest rates and pumping large amounts of liquidity into the banking system. Once interest rates were down to almost zero, central banks were forced to adopt unconventional measures.

6 The outflows of deposits and central bank money generated by account holders’ payment transactions are – just like the inflows – spread over time and normally represent only a fraction of total deposits. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor legally required that a bank hold one franc in central bank money for each franc it holds in customer deposits. A part of the inflows of central bank money can be used for the granting of loans. This is what is known as a fractional reserve system, as only a fraction of customer deposits have to be covered by central bank money. The Swiss sovereign money initiative, which I will speak about later, aims to abolish this fractional reserve system. What limits the banking system’s credit and money creation? As we have seen, the banking system can increase the volume of customer deposits by granting loans. This certainly does not mean that banks are free to create unlimited amounts of credit and money, however. The reasons are to be found in the banks’ risk/return calculations and the SNB’s monetary policy. 6  There are a number of other transactions that change the volume of customer deposits at banks. When a bank purchases securities from a customer, the customer’s deposits at this bank increase. Customer deposits also rise whenever the SNB acquires foreign exchange or Swiss franc denominated securities from a non-bank seller.
BIS Review 45/2010  11  Second, monetary policy should have been less geared to fine-tuning the economy, in particular to trying to reduce the output gaps which ex post turn out to be very different from their real-time measurement. The long and variable lags in monetary policy transmission mean that a medium-term orientation for monetary policy must be maintained. Temporary deviations from a precise inflation objective are inevitable – monetary policy-makers must focus on containing persistent trends in inflation. Distinguishing between temporary and more persistent shocks to inflation is therefore crucial. Experience has shown that paying attention to specific measures of “core inflation” may mislead monetary policy. An overly mechanical view of such indicators can lead to an underestimation of the strength of inflationary pressures at the global level. Third, policy decisions should have been based on better models of monetary policy transmission. Monetary and financial factors have been too easily dismissed, especially by inflation targeting regimes. Placing greater weight on monetary and credit indicators should allow interest rate decisions to be better calibrated to achieve the appropriate medium-term objectives of monetary policy. Can central banks learn from experience? They can if they are able to recognise what went wrong, rather than sweeping the hard questions under the carpet, and if they are able to adapt their analytical and decision-making framework. Suggesting that monetary policy had nothing to do with the crisis will not help, and might encourage us to make the same mistakes in the future.

Thus, over time, a central bank like the SNB can usually rebuild its equity level all on its own after a loss. Nevertheless, even for a central bank, a long period of negative equity is not without its problems, as it can undermine the bank’s credibility and its independence in the longer term. For these reasons, it is important for the SNB to maintain a sufficient level of equity. To ensure that the SNB can carry out its monetary policy mandate without restriction, also in the long term, in the interests of the country as a whole it is essential that its capital base be adequately rebuilt. This means that the necessary profits must be earned, and retained. In the long run, the entire economy will benefit. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
A rise in long-term inflation expectations above levels consistent with price stability would be a very unwelcome development because inflation expectations are an important determinant of actual inflation. In principle, if inflation expectations rose, this could push up actual inflation despite the high unemployment rate. Obviously, this would make it more difficult for the Federal Reserve to use monetary policy to achieve its dual objective of full employment and price stability. On the issue of the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, the worry among some is that the rapid growth of the Fed’s balance sheet will ultimately lead to an inflation problem. This anxiety stems from the fact that periods of rapid growth of the monetary base (that is, currency plus bank reserves) in the past have typically been followed by rapid credit growth and inflation. While I understand the concerns, I do not believe they are well-founded. We have a new tool: the ability to pay interest on excess reserves and that should enable us to cut the link between the size of our balance sheet and credit creation and inflation. If we raise the interest rate on excess reserves, we can incentivize banks to hold the excess reserves with us rather than lend them out. And that should work, because the price of credit is an important determinant of credit demand. If the FOMC were to raise the interest rate paid on excess reserves, this would raise the price of credit. That, in turn, would limit the demand for credit.

In the treasury market, we have maintained our position as the world’s fourth largest forex trading hub after London, New York and Tokyo. We continue to rank as the second largest over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives hub in Asia after Japan. We will build on these strengths and deepen our markets by developing the structured finance market. The asset securitisation market has already taken off, with structured products accounting for more than half of the Singapore dollar debt market. This will be further boosted when Singapore’s first loan securitisation programme for Small and Medium Enterprises is launched. ASEAN will continue to be an important market. We should build closer ties with some of the fast emerging ASEAN economies. For example, we have made a proposal to Vietnam to connect our two economies, including our financial markets, so as to reap the benefits of synergy. Vietnam is receptive. We are approaching this at a pace which Vietnam is comfortable with. Besides ASEAN, we should also position ourselves to play a bigger role in other growing regions. I am pleased to note that our local players have embraced globalisation to capitalise on opportunities in the region and beyond. In response to increased competition, our local banks have consolidated and expanded abroad. They remain profitable, sound and well-capitalised, and are becoming regionally competitive. China, India and the Middle East offer rich opportunities for both wealth management and capital markets activities. Singapore can play a useful intermediary role to serve the needs of Chinese companies seeking funding and expansion overseas.
We will follow an iterative process for the Pilot Programme. Each iteration will last for about a year and it will help enrich our perspective and refine our approach to a possible implementation of e-HKD. Given the already vibrant retail payment landscape in Hong Kong, we understand clearly that the decision to implement e-HKD would very much depend on whether it can make payment more efficient and convenient than the existing payment methods and whether it can unlock new business opportunities. This is why the experiences from the Pilot Programme would be crucial in informing our policy decision. Selected Pilot Programme Participants I am very excited to see that the Pilot Programme has attracted immense industry interest. 16 companies have been selected to participate in the first batch of the Pilot Programme for 2023. These participants, some in groups, will work on 14 pilots which will span across six major categories, covering programmable payments, "dual offline" payments, and other new developments with the use of blockchain technology, such as settling Web3 transactions and tokenised assets. These innovative use cases proposed by the industry truly open our eyes to new possibilities of what central bank money can do, and how e-HKD can potentially benefit the general public and businesses in Hong Kong. We will invite selected participants to come on stage shortly to give a brief overview of their proposed use cases. We also aim to share the key learnings of the Pilot Programme at the Hong Kong FinTech Week in November this year.

History tells a rather different story. Successful economies have typically experienced appreciating exchange rates during periods of their most rapid development; and the wealthiest economies tend to be those which appear to be the most expensive in terms of overall price comparisons. It is not so much the real exchange rate which determines prosperity, as it is the fundamental characteristics of the economy, such as underlying productivity, which determine the real exchange rate. An economy which can successfully sell high value-added goods and services on world markets and as a result enjoy at the same time relatively cheap imports is better off than one which balances its accounts by selling a higher quantity of cheaper output and buying a lower quantity of dearer imports. There remains a question of whether there might nevertheless be advantage in a short burst of competitive advantage - as might be delivered by an engineered depreciation before the inflationary feedback negated the competitive gains - not just as a means of boosting the economy in the short term but also hopefully as a means of building a better foundation for longer-term growth. Experience suggests, however, that this sort of procedure is a bit like a drug to which the patient too readily becomes addicted. If people come to expect continuing doses of devaluation, then inflation and inflationary expectations may harden and, perhaps more significantly, businesses are spared the discipline of searching for greater efficiency or the incentive to move up-market.
Mr Chairman, it is clear from the definition that money laundering is a tool that is used by people involved in illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, organised crime, tax-evading, political bribery and th above all, corruption. In addition, the events of September 11 have added another dimension to the problem of money laundering and brought to light the synonymity between money laundering and terrorism. What then are the stages in money laundering? Though the money laundering process seems so complicated, it usually follows a traceable pattern and three distinct stages can be identified. These are: •  Placement Stage. This it involves the disposal of cash proceeds of the illegal activity. It is at this stage that the proceeds are introduced into the financial system in a manner that avoids detection by the banks and the authorities. At this stage criminals use techniques like depositing large amounts of money in several smaller batches so as to avoid suspicion and detection. BIS Review 6/2003  1  •  Layering Stage. This is when the true character of the cash proceeds of the illegal activities is hidden through a series of transactions in order to erase the audit trail. This is done by transferring this money to off-shore banking centres with strict secrecy laws, or to bearer bonds, and/or shell holding companies and accounts held in the name of nominees. •  The last stage is the Integration Stage where the successfully laundered money is integrated into the financial system.

As for the Bank of Zambia, our challenge is to recognise that technology and globalisation has given money launderers an opportunity to explore new techniques to commit and cover their crimes. This therefore, requires us to be more vigilant, dynamic and resourceful to thwart and overcome the scourge. In addition, full co-operation and coordination within the banking industry in implementing the Bank of Zambia guidelines will go a long way in enhancing co-operation within the region and internationally because money laundering thrives in jurisdictions where there is piece-meal implementation of standards and laws. Once again, I thank you for inviting me.
A more gradual change in the interest rate can also be justified by the uncertainty of the forecasts and statistics. Monetary policy is normally aimed at attaining the inflation target within two years. This horizon is justified by the fact that monetary policy's impact comes after a time lag, but also by the desire to contribute to subduing fluctuations in activity in the real economy. By aiming to allow some time before the inflation target is attained, the Riksbank can contribute to stabilising the development of the real economy, but at the same time we must safeguard confidence in the inflation target. Taking into consideration developments in the real economy must not mean that the price stability target is set aside. The two-year horizon provides scope for flexibility but at the same time sets a limit for how large the deviations from target can normally be. The fact that we have chosen to specify an exact target for inflation is an expression of our desire to be clear and open. This is also why we have explicitly stated that inflation will normally be returned to target within two years. Similarly, the deviation interval around the inflation target aims to explain that monetary policy cannot, and does not, attempt to exactly attain the target all of the time. The deviation interval thus also emphasises that there must be scope for temporary deviations from the target, which may be justified with regard to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in growth and employment.

At the same time, the implementation of ambitious and far-reaching structural reforms is urgently required in the euro area to strengthen substantially its competitiveness, flexibility and longer-term growth potential. In particular, countries which have high fiscal and external deficits or which are suffering from a loss of competitiveness should rapidly carry out comprehensive economic reforms. In the case of product markets, policies that enhance competition and innovation should be vigorously pursued to facilitate productivity growth. Regarding the labour market, the priority must be to enhance wage flexibility and incentives to work, and to remove labour market rigidities. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Tucker interview by D. Smith, The Sunday Times 25 April 2004. 6  BIS Review 46/2006  Amongst others, Lars Svensson 18 and Michael Woodford have argued that central banks should publish the path they expect for the policy rate or the near-term path of inflation they are aiming for. The Norwegian and New Zealand central banks have been publishing policyrate paths for a short while. 19 The Bank of England does not. What do I – let me stress, personally – think about that? As others have pointed out, managing a scheme for voting by nine members on a path of rates would be pretty complex. Proposals have been made (eg for deriving a median path from individual members’ paths) 20 , but they seem to entertain the possibility of shifting majorities for different parts of the resulting path (or implied money market curve). That may add an extra complication to explaining policy. Indeed, more broadly, there would probably be a challenge in the area of communication. A single path for rates would, of course, be a misleading statement of the policymaker’s intentions; of its ‘reaction function’. The path policy takes will depend, very obviously, on the shocks that hit the economy in the future. But not only on that. Also on whether, even in the absence of new shocks affecting households and firms, the economy evolves on the path the central bank expected, including agents’ responses to past policy decisions and shocks.

When a credible central bank cuts its interest rate to offset the adverse effects of a shock to demand, it will not be perceived as trying to raise demand and employment in the short term (say over the next year or so), at the expense of higher inflation down the road. Rather it will be understood as trying to avoid deficient demand: as trying to stimulate demand a bit in the short run in order to bring it back to the economy’s supply capacity and so, precisely, to maintain inflation in line with its target. For at least this policymaker, however, there is a risk of commentators overstating our capacity to stabilise demand – understandably perhaps following, in the UK, more than a decade of fairly steady growth since inflation targeting was introduced. To be clear, I do believe that we should be able to put behind us the self-inflicted economy-wide boom and bust that, miserably, characterised the UK economy for a few decades until the early 1990s 13 . All too frequently in the past, aggregate demand was allowed to get out of control, bringing with it, variously, a credit boom, an assetprice bubble and, sooner or later, runaway wage and consumer price inflation. Belatedly, the monetary authority would slam on the brakes, tipping the economy into recession. Inflation would then slow. But that we no longer neglect the inflationary consequences of excess demand does not mean we can nicely fine tune demand to ensure uninterrupted growth. Why? I will mention just two reasons.