samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, for borrowing to configure a scenario of systemic risk, it would have to grow in the future at an all-time-high speed. Furthermore, households’ banking credit risk indicators show sustained improvement and tend to stabilize in the past year (figure 13 and table 3). Despite this, it is important that intermediaries keep a watchful eye in this stage of the cycle. These days we have learned of the severe financial situation of a retail store – La Polar – after its Board members recognized the existence of unauthorized reprogramming of credits to defaulting clients. These practices are very serious and have caused severe damage to both clients and investors. Despite the severity of the La Polar situation, every technical evaluation we have made lead us to conclude that it does not jeopardize the financial system’s stability and that its effects on the payment system are limited. As we underscore in the IEF we are presenting today, the Chilean banking system is solvent and liquid, therefore capable of absorbing the frail financial position of La Polar. The analysis contained in this Report also indicates that there is no generalized over-borrowing problem among Chilean households. Our analysis of information collected in the Households’ Financial Survey confirms this view. Households’ borrowing patterns, especially in the lower-income segments, have not changed significantly before or after the global financial crisis. This is relevant, because pre-crisis analyses show a relatively robust repayment capacity of households.

As a result of the reforms carried out in recent years, a high degree of institutional convergence was achieved in the banking sector. The concrete results are the full membership of the country in the European Banking Union and the indicators of our banking sector. All independent observers point out that our banking sector is profitable and well capitalised, including in the report on Bulgaria that the OECD presented yesterday. It gives clear messages that key indicators for our banking sector, such as capital adequacy and liquidity, are above the average level not only for the European Union, but also for the OECD countries. Institutional convergence is therefore not an exercise in itself. It brings significant positive results. Fiscal consolidation means restoring our more than 20-year track record of drawing up and exercising a disciplined budget, which was somewhat lost in the last two years. Fiscal consolidation is important both in the short term and in the medium and long term. In the short term, it is important because it is the main macroeconomic tool at our country's disposal to contain and reduce inflation, which, as stated, is the only criterion for joining the euro area that we do not meet. Even outside the context of the euro area, fiscal consolidation is important, with a view to avoiding the macroeconomic imbalances we witnessed only a few years ago.
We are now learning a lesson that Japan learned a decade ago. As the Governor of the Bank of Japan recently remarked “if inflation targeting regimes induce market participants to think of monetary policy decision-making process in terms of an inflation number, they tend to overlook the insidious build-up of unsustainable imbalances […]. Inflation targeting works well if it is properly understood… (but this) can be difficult once an economy has attained and maintained a low inflation rate for a number of years.” This is partly a matter of adopting the intelligent approach inflation targeting. We must be willing to “lean against the wind” of asset price booms and credit expansion and to tolerate somewhat weaker growth and lower employment in doing so. But if we need to prevent asset price and credit booms as well as control consumer prices it would be better to have two instruments than one and that is the last lesson I want to discuss – the need to develop instruments which directly dampen the cycle of credit growth and asset prices. 10  BIS Review 21/2009  Lesson 7: We need another instrument to stabilise the economy The first step must be to decide how ambitious we want to be and define the objective. Then we can design the instruments. I don’t think we have all the answers yet.

Combatting fraud is a high priority for the Bank, and we will continue to work with the financial industry, Government agencies and law enforcement authorities to further improve banking and payment fraud incident response and recovery actions. Alongside these efforts, increasing digital and financial literacy will be extremely important to build and preserve confidence in the use of digital financial services. Learning how to use digital financial services safely is just one dimension. An important goal of improving digital financial literacy is also to help individuals make better use of digital financial services to improve their financial well-being. With an explosion of digital tools that can help individuals plan and manage their finances better, a much wider range of financial solutions, and easier access to financial advice - financial literacy, including digital financial literacy, is critical to help individuals navigate the complexity that comes with more choice. Faced with the same set of choices, individuals armed with the knowledge and skills to make good choices and good use of facilities available to them could significantly improve their standard of living, while others who make poor financial choices could be plunged into personal financial hardship. 15. The Financial Literacy Month this year aims to amplify the importance of digital financial literacy in helping Malaysians build financial resilience, and enable them to participate fully in the digital economy with confidence. Our efforts should reduce the digital divide, expand accessibility, and strengthen individual skills to manage money wisely. 16.
More specifically, the ECB enhanced its Asset Purchase Programme (APP) with the introduction of the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme known as PEPP, the size of which was 1.85 trillion Euros, in order to lower borrowing costs and re-establish  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  favourable financing conditions within the Eurozone. Focusing on Cyprus, the total amount of net asset purchases in government bonds reached € billion Euros at the end of February, 90% of which was purchased by the CBC. At the PEPP announcement, amid severe market fragmentation, the Cyprus 10 year sovereign bond yield increased to 2,21% while within a quarter of these Eurosystem bond purchases dropped by 1,25% (reaching 0,96% in June), exemplifying the benefits of these purchase programmes. Furthermore, the Cypriot banking system benefited from the use of TLTRO III, as well as from the easing of macro prudential measures, in order to support access to credit. It should also be noted that through the explicit assurance to maintain supportive monetary policy for as long as needed, through our Monetary Policy Forward Guidance, the ECB is decisively strengthening the efforts to boost economic activity. Turning to the current challenge that we are faced with, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderated expectations of a continued strong GDP expansion in the Eurozone and Cyprus, at least in the short-term.

There is increased uncertainty about the economic impact, owing to the length and breadth of the conflict, the degree of severity of currently enacted sanctions and the extent of possible economic retaliation by Russia. Against this background, the world economy is experiencing a double hit by complex supply and demand shocks. Economic impact in Cyprus is expected to be channelled through the foreseen surge in oil prices, the trade in goods and services, such as minerals of oil and fuel, cereals, tourism, transportation and IT services, and a negative impact on a specific part of professional services (lawyers and accountants), while significant confidence effects cannot be ruled out. A set of internal scenarios analysed by the CBC point to a downward impact on GDP growth and an upward impact on inflation in 2022. Under a baseline scenario, assuming that the conflict is not protracted, that is, a normalisation of the situation by end-2022, GDP growth is expected to decelerate to 2,7% in 2022 (compared with 3,6% before the outbreak of the war), with a strong recovery in the medium term of around 3,7%. In 2021, domestic HICP inflation registered a substantial rise, similar to the euro area inflation developments, reaching, on average, 2,3%. In general, this development was largely due to the surge in oil prices, upward base effects and other pandemic-related factors, as well as the recovery in economic activity.
This is currently my best assessment of the sustainable rate of unemployment in Sweden after having read a number of papers on the subject and having discussed the issue with several specialists in the field of labour market economics. 12 The lower repo-rate path is also better if one assumes a level of 6 per cent. 13 At a press meeting on 3 March, the Minister of Finance, Anders Borg, announced that the Ministry’s assessment of the equilibrium rate of unemployment has been revised downwards from 6 per cent to approximately 5 per cent by 2015. 14 The Ministry of Finance plans to publish its calculations in a ministry memorandum in connection with the spring budget bill 2011. One could perhaps object that it is not certain that the lower repo-rate path in panel a of Figure 8 is necessarily the best repo-rate path. It does, however, appear to fulfil the Qvigstad condition in that the inflation gap in panel c is mainly positive and the unemployment gap in panel d is also positive (for the entire forecast period if the sustainable rate of unemployment is 5.5 per cent and for most of the forecast period if it is 6 per cent). One can show that an even lower repo-rate path leads to a lower mean squared gap for unemployment but to a higher mean squared gap for inflation. It is thus no easy matter to stabilise both better. However, a somewhat different profile for the low repo-rate path may perhaps provide a better result.

Up to USD100 billion investments in the region are expected over the next 25 years. As at the end of April 2008, more than USD10.4 billion of investment have been committed by investors, accounting for about 70 percent of the USD15 billion investment targeted by 2010. The targeted sectors identified for development in the region are financial advisory and consulting services; creative industries; logistics; educational services; tourism related services; and healthcare. As an international Islamic financial hub in the Asian region with a track record of almost three decades in Islamic finance, Malaysia is well positioned to promote stronger economic linkages between our two regions. Malaysia is not only already highly integrated to the ASEAN region and to the greater Asia, but also has own initiatives and exciting development projects. On that note, it is our hope that the Malaysia Country showcase be an engaging event for the business and financial communities from this region and the Malaysian delegation. It is hoped that this greater engagement will lead to increased economic and financial ties between our regions. Thank you. BIS Review 57/2008  3
Notes: Net foreign currency exposures shown on the horizontal axis range between -1 and 1. The vertical axis presents the cumulative distribution (the proportion of countries) below each value on the horizontal axis for 1997, 2007, 2012 and 2017. The sample includes 50 advanced (ADV) and emerging (EME) countries. One way of improving consistency across datasets is to integrate sectoral information of the external balance sheet and domestic sectoral data. This was successfully implemented last year at the ECB for the euro area datasets on the balance of payments and the financial sector accounts. In turn, this supports the analysis of interconnectedness and helps to identify the domestic sector imbalances that ultimately drive external imbalances. [12]  Lessons from the pandemic Let me now turn to the pandemic. A detailed account of the anatomy of the crisis and our policy response is beyond the scope of my remarks today, but I would like to touch upon some of the lessons learnt from the crisis in terms of data needs. The first point to make is that the availability of high-quality statistics has been invaluable in understanding the propagation of the pandemic shock. Taking the example of balance of payments statistics, these played an important role in understanding the propagation of the pandemic shock, especially through the monthly data releases.

10  In addition, demand has been helped by an unexpectedly strong global recovery, which  will have boosted trade and investment, as well as by more supportive financial conditions, particularly 10  The MPC’s policy package in August 2016 – which consisted of a cut in Bank Rate, the introduction of the Term Funding Scheme to ensure that that cut was passed through, and an additional £ of asset purchases including corporate bonds – will have provided stimulus, as will the mild loosening in the fiscal stance in the subsequent Budget. In addition, the FPC amended the leverage ratio framework for UK banks by excluding central bank reserves, cut the counter-cyclical capital buffer to zero, and emphasised that banks’ liquidity reserves are usable, while the PRA Board decided to use regulatory flexibilities to smooth insurers’ transition to new regulatory standards in a very low interest rate environment. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  intense competition in mortgage markets, which will have helped offset some of the effects on consumption of the fall in income. 11  Finally, the third channel through which Brexit is affecting the UK economy is through its effect on the exchange rate. I have already discussed its effects of the recent depreciation on demand, where it has contributed to a rotation away from consumption and towards net trade. Equally important for the MPC has been its effect on inflation.
A few points about both monetary policy and supervision in this context. It is now the consensus of most practicing central bankers that monetary policy can’t do much preemptively to correct an existing substantial asset price misalignment. But if monetary policy is calibrated appropriately to keep aggregate demand growing roughly in balance with aggregate supply and to keep inflation low and stable, this reduces the risk that such misalignments will emerge and expand. This is not always easy. It is especially hard to do in circumstances where the central bank is subject to other policy objectives. The most prominent source of conflict is an exchange rate objective; countries with even modestly open capital accounts will not find it possible to sustain a commitment to prevent the exchange rate from appreciating without eventually facing the risk of rising credit growth, asset price inflation, and inflation in the price of goods and services. This challenge is becoming harder to manage for some large emerging market economies, and it is the principal reason why in those countries there is an expectation in the markets that monetary policy will have to be tighter and exchange rate regimes more flexible over time. And as this happens it will, among other things, alter the balance of forces that have been operating on global capital flows. Beyond monetary policy, the principal tools available to policymakers are the province of supervision.

Over the past few years, we have initiated targeted reviews, aimed at improving the sophistication of stress testing practice, counterparty credit risk management in OTC derivatives, structured credit, and hedge funds, and the post trade processing infrastructure in the OTC derivatives markets. We are also looking carefully at liquidity risk management practice and the management of the bridge exposures institutions run in leverage lending, leveraged buyout and merger and acquisition financing, and credit activities more generally. These initiatives are designed with several important features: first, to bring more evenness to the incentives faced by the major global institutions, through closer cooperation across supervisors within the United States and across countries; second, to foster more agility in the supervisory agenda, and a capacity to adapt to change that more closely matches the rapid evolution in market developments; and third, to try to encourage market-led initiatives, reinforced rather than imposed by supervision. The  BIS Review 49/2007  3  careful work of Counterparty Credit Risk Management Policy Group II led by Jerry Corrigan – with the supervisory initiatives I referred to is an example. Today, 18 global banks outlined another set of commitments to reduce settlement risk in the equity derivatives market. This approach to supervision is designed to look ahead to try to ensure the adequacy of capital and liquidity, and the sophistication of risk management discipline relative to risk, over time and at all points in the cycle.
Perhaps even more importantly, there has been a revolution in central bank attitudes towards public engagement. This revolution has, with luck, increased the public’s understanding of the economy and economic policy. But there is no question in my mind that it has also enhanced very significantly central banks’ own understanding of the economy. Having ascended some rungs of the engagement ladder, our panorama on the economy has been much enhanced. Looking back over the past five years, and looking forward to the next five, the Bank is taking further steps towards securing a foothold on the next rungs of the engagement ladder. This will increase the extent to which we “involve” and “collaborate” with a wider set of citizens, as well as “informing” and “consulting” them. From a potentially long list, let me highlight four examples of how we are going about that. 6 7  Arnstein (1969). Haldane (2017b). A number of excellent historical examples are given in Kynaston (2017). 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  (a) Layered Communications  There is a natural temptation among technocrats to communicate in a language that is only understood by fellow technocrats. This tendency has deep sociological roots, most probably dating back to our hunter-gatherer past. At that time, language was a means of bonding and binding people; it was social glue. It still is. Language can also, however, be a barrier to understanding and, as in our hunter-gather past, a source of tribal conflict.

These linguistic barriers apply everywhere and to everyone. But they seem to be especially troublesome among the economic and financial tribe, which stand out relative to others in their insularity. 8  Central bankers are not immune to these primordial tendencies. They, too, sometimes use the tribal language of technocracy. And this too can sometimes serve as a barrier to understanding and a blockage to trust. My “stylised fact” (itself a piece of technical jargon) is that around 95% of all the words central banks utter are inaccessible to around 95% of the population. (Imagine speaking 4 ½ million words and more than 4 ¼ million of them falling on deaf ears?) If you conduct a semantic analysis of central bank text, you will 9  find that I have erred on the side of generosity with these fractions. When someone says to me “spoken like a true central-banker”, they come to bury Andy not praise him. But things are changing. The Bank is making a big effort to simplify and demystify its words and to challenge its ideas and thinking. The Bank’s staff blog, Bank Underground, is one example of such challenge. Last year, it recorded its millionth hit. Recently, the Bank has begun issuing its publications in a “layered” format, to cater for different audiences: a one-sentence, one-graphic version for the time-poor; a 60-page chart-tastic technical text for the masochist. As best we can tell, this has opened up the Bank’s views to a far-wider audience.
Parliament has established the Payment System Regulator, a new economic regulator, to improve competition and innovation in the payment systems, through which payments using bank accounts are made hitherto dominated by the large banks,  To support greater competition and innovation, the Bank of England has widened access to RTGS, the high value settlement system, so that large non-bank payment service providers can access it directly rather than having to go through the banks with whom they are in competition. 10  At the same time, the introduction of electronic technology, Near Field Communication, has allowed the development of contactless payments and reduced the ‘hassle’ of making small value card payments and enabled smart phones to be used as payment devices. And of course, more commerce is migrating to the internet where physical cash simply cannot be used. Internet sales now account for over 15% of retail sales. We are, as a result, seeing important changes in the way we use money as a means of payment. New players, from the largest technology companies to challenger banks and internet startups are coming into the various elements of the transaction chain. And there seem to be changes in the way we use cash.

The role of the physical forms of money, of the transaction systems, and of the legal and institutional frameworks is to make the social technology function as safely and efficiently as possible to serve societies’ needs. By the same token, if they are abused or deteriorate, as happened to the coinage in Newton’s day or the banking system in the US, in the great depression, the underlying social technology of money is harmed – it gets out of order and the damage can be very great. The money of the UK, Sterling, is implemented and supported by a range of technologies. Only about 3% of the money we use is directly issued by the state. That comprises the £ in notes and coins – effectively claims on the Bank of England (banknotes) and the Crown (coins). 7  There is another  £ of state issued money, but it is not in general circulation; it comprises the deposits that private banks hold in their (electronic) accounts at the Bank of England – the claims on the Bank of England that banks exchange to settle transactions with each other. 6  For instance, before the arrival of the Spanish colonist, the Incan economy functioned without a formal form of money. Instead, Incans were required to work a number of days per year on public projects and in return the state provided them with all they required in terms of food and materials, leading to little to no trade within the domestic economy.