samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, the convening and collaboration on the development of green and sustainable sukuk is supported and facilitated by the HighLevel Working Group on Green and Sustainable Sukuk (HLWG), which was launched at COP26 by the Islamic Finance Council UK, alongside GEFI, IsDB, HM Treasury, Indonesia's Ministry of Finance and the London Stock Exchange. The HLWG is a threeyear initiative working to coordinate international efforts to promote green and sustainability sukuk as a financial instrument, assist regulatory initiatives and address supply and demand side challenges. In creating a solution the HLWG can draw on experience and expertise from around the world, which is well represented at this event today. Conclusion Among all the shocks – many unprecedented – facing the global economy today the challenge of climate change is the most profound and far reaching. There is clearly a strong will amongst the G20 members to tackle climate change and I hope the modest practical examples I have given today illustrate how the benefits of sukuk can be harnessed to further the development of sustainable finance. I hope my examples of challenging ourselves on the need to find solutions and then convening, collaborating and creating in pursuit of them can be thought of as one means of providing the "way" in the English language saying: "where there's a will there's a way". There will be many other effective ways available from across the G20 members and beyond; indeed sharing those varying approaches as we are doing today is central to the ethos of the G20.

Having done a lot of convening, the Bank is collaborating in key international fora to advance the discussion on transition finance, including the G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group (SFWG). We support the transition finance framework developed by the G20 SFWG this year and look forward to its operationalisation in 2023 to ensure transition finance is mobilised at pace and at scale. Second, through being creative in the use of and access to the Bank's balance sheet. In November 2021, the Bank published a comprehensive framework to 'green' our corporate bond portfolio to support the transition to net zero, while at the same time not undermining the scheme's primary monetary policy purpose. Whilst the portfolio is currently unwinding in-line with monetary policy objectives, we have created a greening framework for other investors on how to green a corporate bond portfolio. And our convening role as the UK's central bank should ensure they take note. This ties in well with the third area, our prudential work. As the UK's central bank and prudential regulator, it is the Bank's role to ensure the resilience of the financial system to the impacts of climate change, including the transition to net-zero. Collaborating with many others through the Network for Greening the Financial System we are seeking to understand how different transition pathways could affect the economy and the stability of the financial system, as well as the safety and soundness of the firms we regulate.
The 1998 fall in domestic lending amounted to $ billion in absolute terms, of which over 60% was accounted for by the Japanese and Continental European banks combined. This withdrawal of credit drastically reduced the funding available to Hong Kong corporates and increased their financial difficulties. This in turn has fed through to increased bad debts for the banks. Hopefully, the economy has now bottomed out and economic growth will resume this year as forecast by the Government. The stock and property markets certainly seem to be indicating an improvement in confidence and if sustained this will reverse the negative wealth effect of 1997/98 and encourage a revival in consumer spending that is necessary to take Hong Kong out of recession. However, in the initial stages of the recovery the financial position of many companies will remain under pressure, particularly as the upturn in the economy will increase their need for working capital. In the meantime, an increasing number of companies are going into liquidation. The number of compulsory winding-up orders jumped to 763 in the financial year 1998/99. This is an all-time high that compares with the average of 480 in the previous five years. It is certain that without the alternative of workouts the number of liquidations would have been much higher. The role of the workout is to provide an alternative to insolvency and receivership which will allow commercially viable companies to survive as going concerns, thus preserving employment and productive capacity.

Obviously this can delay the whole process - a point to which I will return later. This is only a very short description of the mechanics of a workout and hardly does justice to what can be an enormously complicated exercise involving banks with widely different levels of security as  BIS Review 45/1999  2  well as non-bank creditors whose interests also need to be taken into account. But I hope that I have given you enough to illustrate the central principles of the process: a willingness by the debtor to recognize that there is a problem and to approach the banks to seek assistance, matched by support and forbearance by the banks and a willingness to work together to reach a solution by consensus. That solution may not be the optimum one for every individual bank but the objective should be that each bank is at least better off than it would be in a liquidation and is treated fairly vis-à-vis others. In the course of preparing this speech I have had the benefit of talking to a number of market participants about how effectively the workout process in Hong Kong and the HKAB Guidelines are working. It is fair to say that there are varying shades of opinion on this point, but there is general agreement that the Guidelines have made an important contribution in codifying what is expected of banks in Hong Kong. It is equally true that there may be room for improvement in the workout process.
However, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, which has had the responsibility for macroprudential policy since 2014, has taken measures and as a result of this, and possible for other reasons, prices have slowed (see Figure 5). Although lending to households has continued to increase, this has dampened criticism against the effects of the expansionary policy on debt and housing prices. A gradual slowdown in the rate of increase in debt accumulation has probably also played a role. Recently, the discussion has instead focused on the development of the Swedish krona. The expansionary monetary policy has, via the normal exchange rate channel, contributed to a depreciation of the krona. But in countries with inflation targets, like Sweden, it is the inflation target that should anchor long-term expectations while the exchange rate will vary. In recent years, the krona has developed in a similar way as the currencies of other small open economies, although it has been relative weak very recently (see Figure 6). Neither is there reason to believe that Swedish inflation relative to abroad will cause a trend depreciation of the krona exchange rate, as virtually all countries in the world have an inflation target of more or less exactly 2 per cent, just like in Sweden. This is of course in itself no guarantee that we will not see trends in the krona exchange rate.

Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, IMF, and statistics bureaus of respective countries. Figure 11 Actual and expected monetary policy rates around the world (1) (porcentaje) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 05  07 Developed (2)  09 Emerging (3)  11 Chile  (1) Simple average of monetary policy rates of each group of countries. Gray area, as from September 2011, shows market expectations in Bloomberg survey. For Chile, the averaged linear interpolation between the August EES and the FOS of the second half of August is used. (2) Includes the Eurozone, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. (3) Includes Brazil, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Poland, South Africa and South Korea. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, central banks of respective countries and Bloomberg. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 12 Contribution to trading partners' growth (*)  (percentage points)  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3  8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4  90  95 Emerging  00  05  Developed  10  Trading partners  (*) Gray area, as from 2011, shows forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries.
The data processing power of the computer allowed the industry to design new products, scale up operations and increase efficiency. Fast forward to today, we are at the brink of another great technological revolution and disruption. Artificial intelligence, big data and robotics will reshape the way we live, work and play. In many ways, the industry is in a prime position to seize the opportunities arising from these technologies given that the ability to manage risks remains the single most compelling proposition of insurance. For example, e-hailing services have become part and parcel of modern life. Many of the drivers do not benefit from generic motor insurance products. Perhaps usage-based or pay-as-you-drive insurance policies would be better suited for these consumers. Technology such as telematics could also be adopted to incentivise drivers to good behaviour. Artificial intelligence and blockchain can be utilised to enhance the efficiency of the claims settlement process. As a service industry, it is important for insurance companies to address the user experience. From our extensive engagements with the public, many Malaysians still find purchasing insurance too much of a hassle. Products are perceived to be too convoluted, complicated and non-transparent. We are taking this very seriously, particularly given the measures we have taken to encourage the use of plain language coupled with clear and concise disclosures. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Clearly, these measures have not had the desired effect. There is an urgent need for the industry to design a more positive customer experience.

For example, quality engagements with first-time buyers and the underserved will go a long way in closing the huge protection gap which remains our most important priority right now. We will also be looking more closely at the experience with direct distribution channels to date. We would like to see greater impact from direct channels, including online or mobile platforms, in supporting higher insurance penetration. Today, the Millennials and iGeneration expect significant technological innovations in the entire chain of insurance experience – from product comparisons, purchase, claims, and customer support. The industry cannot ignore this fact as they will become the key customer segment in the near future. Further attention also needs to be given to the role of shared infrastructure to support insurance undertakings, building further on the fraud and motor insurance databases. From the Bank’s perspective, our aim is to facilitate innovation in three main ways. First is by lowering the barriers to innovation and competition. This is achieved by providing an environment through the regulatory sandbox for the industry, including non-insurance firms, to test innovations without costly regulatory reprisals. It also allows the Bank to appropriately tailor our rules to better suit innovations as we too, learn from observing the solutions that are tested in the sandbox. Second is through proportionality. We aim to better reflect proportionality in our regulatory framework.
Benoît Cœuré: Investing in Europe – towards a new convergence process Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Panel “The big rethink for a stronger Europe”, The Economist Roundtable with the Government of Greece, Athens, 9 July 2014. *  *  *  I would like to thank Lucas Guttenberg, Jean-Francois Jamet and Marion Salines for their contributions. I remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. Summary Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a political triathlon. It requires resilience and resolve to perform well at all times in the three disciplines of a currency union: fiscal policy, economic policy and financial policy. EMU is a team effort. Only if every participant performs well can the euro area team be strong. This is the most important lesson from the crisis. The European economy is undergoing a moderate recovery, but complacency would be unwarranted. To really overcome the crisis, there are some remaining major challenges still to be faced. The euro area is not in a financial crisis anymore, but it must still contend with high debt, low growth and unacceptably high unemployment. These are reason enough to remain alert and continue acting. In recent years, economic policy-making rightfully focused on re-establishing the most important necessary condition for growth: stability. For companies to invest, for firms to hire, for households to consume, a stable economic environment is tantamount.

There is no better or more effective policy in the short term for addressing the impact of population ageing and of scant population growth on pensions than to stimulate employment and enhance the system’s overall productivity. Thank you very much. 5
To put this in context, in the preceding 3 decades stretching back to the 1960s, annual GDP growth deviated from its 10 year average by more than 1 percentage point about half of the time (about 20 quarters in each 10 year period). 2  BIS Review 80/2008  employers and employees are less likely to adjust their prices and wages to a surprise movement in inflation. In other words, their expectation of inflation in the medium-term remains low, stable and anchored at the target. And that has helped to contribute not only to the stability of inflation, but output as well. Reforms to both the labour market and monetary policy have undoubtedly played an important role in the reduction in output volatility and emergence of a stable, low inflation environment. But there was a third factor at play that was probably also quite fundamental. Over the first decade of the MPC the economic cycles in the rest of the world were generally moderate, although not without excitement. And there is good evidence to suggest that the integration of emerging economies, such as China, into the global economy was beneficial to countries like the UK. The share of Chinese goods in total UK goods imports has almost tripled in money terms over the past fifteen years to around 8 per cent, and it’s likely that much of the content of imports from elsewhere originated in China. This rising share of Chinese imports has reduced manufactured imported goods prices relative to other prices and wages.

As a starting point I think it is worth taking a step back and reminding ourselves why the Riksbank and many other central banks in general have developed inflation targets. 1 The advantages of an inflation target Money as we know it in modern times has no natural, intrinsic value. Historically, coins were minted using valuable metals and central banks promised to redeem banknotes in exchange for a certain quantity of such metals. However, since the early 1970s every trace of this kind of link to valuable metals has disappeared. The reason why banknotes and coins nevertheless have a stable value is based on expectations and confidence – expectations that the money will continue to be valuable in the future and confidence that the central bank will pursue a monetary policy consistent with price stability. There are several ways to build expectations of price stability. It has often been attempted to develop some form of nominal anchor for the economy. The anchor could, for example, be a fixed exchange rate, a target for the development of money supply or an inflation target. When it is credible, an inflation target acts as a benchmark and guides expectations in the economy. When economic agents have a common picture of how prices will develop in the future, it becomes easier to plan for the long term. The inflation target therefore lays the foundations for efficient price and wage formation.
In essence what is needed is to settle the question of ‘who pays’ unambiguously and in advance. We need to pre-position a specific type of creditor who can absorb loss if the bank fails. Clearly, getting a creditor to accept this in advance has a cost; there will be a premium for carrying such an explicit risk. That cost is, however, simply the counterpart of the hidden subsidy being given to banks by the implicit taxpayer guarantee that applies if they cannot be resolved in an orderly way. We now have international agreement on the minimum amount and nature of this type of loss absorbing instrument – which goes under the unlovely name of ‘TLAC’ – that the largest, globally systemic banks should issue.11 And in the EU, under the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), resolution authorities will need to set in advance, for each firm, the overall amount and nature of the resources that can absorb loss both when the firm is a going concern and when it can no longer operate – this goes under the equally unlovely name of MREL. (v) International co-operation The final plank is international cooperation. The hardest challenge in ending too big to fail is dealing with the failure of systemically important banks that operate in a number of jurisdictions. The crisis proved beyond doubt that we did not have the international machinery to handle this.

Accordingly, the defining of effective information and analysis co-operation and exchange procedures between the Supervisory and Resolution Boards is crucial for preventing dysfunctions, overlaps and frictions that hamper the proper functioning of the Banking Union. A Memorandum of Understanding between both agencies is currently being drawn up and will, I hope, contribute to achieving the necessary coordination. Lastly, we should sustain our efforts in order to achieve the degree of cohesion between the various components of the SSM that effective supervision requires. The SSM directly supervises 122 European banking groups, encompassing some 1,200 institutions. This is done with supervisory teams that draw on staff from various institutions, with highly diverse skill sets, seniority, experience and working conditions. Evidently, we must strive to fully develop a sense of mission to which all the component parts must contribute, under the leadership of the ECB and its Supervisory Board, without exclusions or unnecessary subordination. That is vital for maintaining the motivation and commitment of all SSM supervisory staff, irrespective of the authority to which they are attached. Indeed, they have to date shown exceptional professionalism. Final remarks In concluding, I will say that the past year has seen major headway in setting the Banking Union in place, but we still have some way to go. We must move ahead in a setting that will be complex for the European banking industry. Specifically, economic activity remains relatively sluggish, price stability is subject to significant risks and, as a result of this, interest rates are holding at very low levels.
And in China today the authorities have a model split between the central bank and separate banking, insurance and securities regulators, but are looking afresh at these arrangements. My point here is that, while I personally happen to favour the current UK set-up and think it is working well, the sheer variety of institutional arrangements over the past 100 years in the UK, and internationally today, suggests to me that there is no one institutional set-up which outshines the rest. In sum, nine regulatory agencies  40  came together to form the FSA on 1 June 1998. From the outset, it was  “clear that it was not a takeover by any one [body] but the creation of something new”, and the following years were spent defining the new supervisory approach and encouraging the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, which transferred regulatory powers from predecessor agencies to the FSA and granted the FSA its statutory powers. 41  The FSA was a unified regulator for the financial services industry, with responsibility for 29,000 firms . Although the responsibility for supervision now rested in one place, the FSA’s supervisory approach was far from unified to begin with. Michael Foot, Managing Director at the FSA since its inception, described it as “a mishmash”:  the banking supervisors spent a great deal of effort in understanding the strength and weaknesses of a group containing a large bank.

A raise in the interest rate in this type of situation, where over-optimism was rife and both inflation and interest rates were low, could have meant that investors, property buyers and credit institutions would have acted rather more cautiously than if the interest rate had remained unchanged at a low rate and thus at least subdued the price bubble somewhat. The costs to society of waiting too long to change the direction for monetary policy can be high if imbalances are allowed to grow and the fall in production can be drastic when the imbalances are corrected. It is therefore important that monetary policy should act in a preventive manner and that great vigilance is exercised with regard to the temperature of the entire economy, both the real and the financial parts. Let us return, after this outlook, to our own, calmer circumstances. Low, stable inflation expectations cannot be used in all situations as an argument in favour of retaining monetary policy unchanged. It could be possible that the expectations are based on the general public assuming that the Riksbank will act if and when required. The fact that inflation expectations remain stable could then reflect expectations of future monetary policy. If these expectations are not fulfilled, then inflation expectations, and later on the rate of price increase, will rise. The example from Japan also shows that it is not certain that inflationary pressure will be visible in CPI inflation; sometimes price pressure is first seen in other prices than consumer prices.