samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the same time, with the integration of prudential supervision into the central bank, the twin peaks model strengthens the capacity to preserve the stability of the financial system by promoting the necessary coordination between the management of the banking sector’s liquidity (a function which corresponds to the central bank) and the monitoring of credit institutions’ solvency soundness (which prudential supervision looks after). The predominance of the twin peaks model in the various national jurisdictions of the EU has scarcely been affected by the emergence of two new supervisory functions: the management of the resolution of non-viable institutions and the adoption of macroprudential policies to prevent the emergence of potential macro-financial imbalances and mitigate their destabilising effects. As a general rule, the orderly resolution function has been allocated within the realm of the prudential supervisor. In the case of macroprudential policy, there is broad consensus that it is the central bank that should exercise leadership of macro-financial stability committees where government representatives and other supervisors may also participate. Hence, in those EU countries where the twin peaks model has been adopted (such as the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium), the central bank not only acts as the prudential supervisor of all types of financial institutions, but in addition, depending  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  on the case, and by means of special committees and inserting Chinese walls between the different functions, it also manages or leads resolution and macroprudential policy measures.

This is precisely the spirit of "Pillar 2" of the Basel framework. Supervision can and must be responsive, intrusive - including with on-site inspections -, exercised by highly qualified professionals, and applied forcefully. This is not wishful thinking: we have been practising it for decades at the ACPR, and for years now in the SSM. I would like to pay tribute to the ACPR's expertise and to the acclaimed work of its 1,050 women and men: it is indeed a certain "French-style supervision" model that inspired European-style supervision, under Danièle Nouy, the first Chair of the SSM, and which is still in place today under Andrea Enria. This active supervision is one of the greatest success stories of our European Banking Union. The SSM demonstrates the benefits of bringing all players under one main authority only, rather than under regional supervisors, with clearly defined responsibilities and coordination. This also allows for comparisons and for thematic on-site missions to be carried out. Page 6 of 9 Furthermore, our active supervision demonstrates the strong value of regular stress tests, including on interest rate risks, which are also applied to smaller institutions. The European Banking Authority (EBA) conducts an EU-wide bank stress test every two years, taking into account the latest macro-financial developments: in 2023, the stress test scenarios are typically based on a sharp rise in short and long-term interest rates.
The main credit needs among people in low growth areas and with low incomes, in particular, women are: •  access to small, unsecured, fixed term loans in cash;  •  quick access to credit without lengthy or intrusive application procedures;  •  affordable weekly payments with no hidden or extra charges;  •  automatic repayment arrangements, such as deduction from benefit or home visits by a collector; and  •  opportunities for making late payments or rescheduling loans without incurring charges when temporary financial problems occur. If anyone of these or a combination of these factors tend to deny access to financial institutions or to products, that is known as financial exclusion, which is often reflected as a symptom of poverty as well as a cause. As much as we are interested in financial inclusion, it is also necessary to reduce financial exclusion to a minimum, which is also a policy challenge. These are two sides of the same coin.

Ranee Jayamaha: Access to finance and financial inclusion for women Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Centre for Women's Research (CENWOR), Colombo, 4 April 2008. *  *  *  Let me start by giving a general definition for access to finance and financial inclusion before assessing the status of women in these two areas, and then discuss the areas of focus in enhancing financial inclusion for women. What is access to finance? In simple terms, this means to provide an environment in which people, in general, have accesses to the formal financial system, through the use of different financial products at affordable prices. The access could be to any formal financial institution, market, and payment system or to a financial instrument, including savings, loans, remittances and insurance services. What is financial inclusion? This means the process of facilitating those sectors and segments of the population that are outside, to become a part of the formal financial system and enrolling individuals or groups into the formal financial sector.
In other words, the core of the U.S. banking system should be more stable in the face of a broader range and greater magnitude of shocks. However, the increased size and scope of these entities necessarily exposes them to a wider array of potential shocks and risks and means that the failure of one of them could have a broader impact than in the past and be considerably more difficult to resolve. The implications of such a failure would almost certainly fall outside of the range of experience captured in conventional models. At the same time, despite their size and scale, banks now account for a smaller share of financial intermediation in the United States than was true in the past. Depository institutions now hold about one fifth of all assets held by financial institutions, or less than half of what they did in 1984. This crude comparison understates the importance of banks in the credit origination process and wholesale financial markets, but the broad picture it paints of the increased role of non-bank financial intermediaries is still noteworthy. To put it differently, financial intermediaries that are not subject to consolidated risk-based capital frameworks and the full complement of supervisory constraints applied to banks and bank holding companies, now account for most of the assets of financial institutions in the United States. There has also been substantial convergence in the types of financial transactions bank-centered and non-bank affiliated financial intermediaries perform.

Within this area, the IMF has its main competence and can contribute most. At the same time, the world has changed a lot since the IMF was set up at Bretton Woods in the forties, and it is natural for the organisation to expand its involvement in financial issues and, in particular, with respect to how private flows of capital are to operate within a good regulatory framework. The annual meetings in Prague The coming annual meetings in Prague are to some extent a continuation of this discussion. In Prague, the ministers of finance and governors of central banks from the member countries will meet to discuss the IMF’s future agenda and share views on the work that has been done since the meetings in Washington in the spring. Most of the issues that I have mentioned will be taken up at these meetings. They will discuss trends in the world economy and future risks and opportunities. They will discuss the increased role of private flows of capital and how they affect the IMF’s provision of advice and loans. They will also discuss how the IMF can obtain a more constructive collaboration with private financiers. The experiences of standards within different areas will be analysed as well as the poorest countries’ debt situation, and not least how the debt relief is to be financed. BIS Review 78/2000  6  The IMF has accordingly a key role in what we somewhat carelessly call globalisation.
These include the rise of global trade and value chains which offer access to lower-cost inputs, lowering the price of final imported goods and services 8; demographic trends which have added to the economy’s labour supply, lowering wage costs 9; and increased automation and flexibility in the jobs market holding down wage growth and potentially flattening Phillips curves.10 Chart 7: UK GDP after the Great Depression and Great Recession  50 Cumulative percent change 40 30 20 10 0  Years 0  -10  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 The Great Depression  The Great Recession  Source: ONS and Bank calculations. These structural factors would, in theory, be expected to cause a downward shift in the price level rather than in the rate of inflation. But because these factors have played out over a lengthy period, they may have shown up in a persistent drag on measured inflation rates. For example, Faijgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) estimate that global trade integration has lowered the price of the typical household consumption basket by between a quarter and two-thirds – a huge effect. This subdued pattern for global inflation, driven by demand and supply-side factors, has occurred against a backdrop of global monetary policies remaining highly accommodative, itself in part a response to these disinflationary forces. For example, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, central banks lowered  8  Johnson (2018). Goodhart and Pradhan (2020). 10 Haldane (2018).

Table 1 shows peak levels of the primary fiscal deficit in the UK during the global financial and Covid crises. The degree of fiscal support has plainly been materially larger – more than twice as large. And relative to the size of the economy’s output gap, which is smaller than at the time of the global financial crisis, this degree of fiscal support has been larger still and multiplies of the output gap. Table 1: Peak Fiscal Deficits in the Global Financial and Covid Crises Peak primary balance (a)  Peak output gap (b)  Global Financial Crisis  -8.3  -4.2  Covid Pandemic  -18.0  -3.1  Source: OBR and Bank of England Note: (a) % of GDP. (b) % of potential GDP. Fiscal numbers for pandemic are based on OBR November 2020 forecast for FY 2019-20. The appropriate degree of fiscal support to close the output gap has recently been a source of debate in the United States. 21 There, the fiscal response is prospectively larger than in the UK, and the output gap smaller, meaning the upside risks to demand and inflationary are likely to be larger. 21  For example, see Olivier Blanchard here. 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  21  (e) Psychological Scarring A final potential difference from the past concerns the degree of psychological scarring of risk appetite among household and companies as a result of crisis.
Roles of the Bank of Thailand in developing the bond market A High-level Domestic Bond Market Development Steering Committee was set up by the Government in January this year. The committee is chaired by the Finance Minister and comprises high-level representatives from both the public and private sectors, including the Bank of Thailand. The aim of the committee is to promote the development of the domestic bond market in five key areas, namely, (1) the primary market (2) the secondary market (3) taxes (4) market infrastructure and (5) market information. As for the Bank of Thailand, we have been tasked with the responsibility to develop an active secondary market. To meet this challenge, the Bank of Thailand has mapped out a multi-year strategy from which our work plan for bond market development this year will focus on six areas. First is the development of the private repo market. The repo market will provide bond market participants with the tools to hedge their bond position, as well as to manage liquidity more effectively. The private repo market will also provide an important link between the money market and the bond market, meaning that liquidity in the secondary bond market can be substantially improved once a well-functioning private repo market is in place. Second, the Bank of Thailand will coordinate with the Thailand Securities Depository to set up a "Bond Lending and Collateral Management Unit" to activate the bond lending business. This again will help facilitate the private repo market and enhance overall market liquidity.

Under ABF2, the eleven regional central banks will invest a fraction of their reserves in the local currency denominated bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities in eight EMEAP markets, namely, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The passively managed style of ABF2 will help attract the interests of both domestic and international investors in the Asian bond markets, as it would provide an attractive alternative for investors who seek innovative, low-cost and efficient bond products in the Asian financial markets. Furthermore, the ABF2 Initiative would also help expedite market development and regulatory reforms at both domestic and regional levels, which would benefit both potential issuers and investors in the region. But most importantly, ABF2 would make available a new set of transparent, replicable and credible Asian bond indices which will be an important bond market infrastructure for the region. 2  BIS Review 29/2005  Conclusion To conclude, a lot of activities can be expected this year in our domestic bond market. The opportunities will come from continued momentum of investment finance, as well as from the authorities' efforts to push through a number of initiatives to develop the bond market. As for our own monetary operations, the Bank of Thailand also plans to issue more bonds, with more varieties, to support our day-to-day management of domestic liquidity. The Bank of Thailand now sees the local bond market as entering an important period of growth and market development.
The advance in digital technology meets the needs of the rapidly growing client base with ever increasing demand for a wide diversity of services. However, very often people tend to focus on the ease and low cost of access in digital banking and do not pay too much attention on the security of the cyber world, at least until they are hit by cyber attacks. 2. Given the virtual nature and interconnectedness of the cyber world, clearly the security of the cyber world would require different approach and tools from those used in the physical world. In the real world, you would protect your home and property by installing a safe door with a strong lock. You may want to buy a safe deposit box to store your cash and valuables at home. Some may even subscribe to an anti-burglary system. For those who take their home security even more seriously, they may hire on-site security guards, just like the kings and queens who build heavily guarded forts to protect them and their families from the attacks by their enemies. Well, one thing for sure, all these security or safety measures do not come cheaply but it is the price that people know that they have to pay for the protection of their physical properties. 3. In the cyber world, just like the real world, there are plenty of risks and dangers.

One reason for Iceland’s limited success in keeping inflation in check has been precisely that the impact of the Central Bank’s policy rate hikes has not been transmitted in full to the mortgage loan market. In particular this is because one of the players there, the HFF, enjoys Treasury guarantees on its borrowing, enabling it to meet its funding requirement by issuing bonds at very long maturities with lower yields than on shorter issues, so that it can avoid raising interest rates on its new lending, which under normal circumstances would have been warranted and called for by the Central Bank’s monetary stance. Since autumn 2005, market yields on indexed bonds have risen in the range ½ to 2 percentage points, depending upon the issues involved. At the same time, HFF interest rates have gone up by half a percentage point. So it cannot be said that Iceland faces the same conundrum as the US about why long-term interest rates have not risen in the wake of policy hikes. House prices began to increase significantly again last spring, in the teeth of general expectations, and have been the main driver of the CPI in recent months. It is not unlikely that the latest wave of price rises in the housing market is at least partly due to decisions by  2  BIS Review 111/2007  the government and HFF last winter to raise the loan-to-value ratio and mortgage ceilings and to lower interest rates on new lending.
Last Orders: Calling Time on LIBOR Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets & Banking Bank of England “Last Orders: Calling Time on LIBOR” event 5 June 2019  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Authorities, internationally, led by Andrew Bailey, have been calling time on Libor for a while. Panel banks have agreed to continue to submit to Libor until end 2021 securing its future until then, but not beyond. This event focusses on the transition to our future without Libor, and the critical point we find ourselves at today – what we refer to in the conference title as ‘last orders’ for new exposures to Libor. This is a global issue – affecting multiple currencies. However, as you may expect and consistent with the UK origins of the phrase “last orders”, I’m going to choose to focus on sterling Libor and its successor, SONIA, in my remarks today. First, before turning to that transition, a reminder of why, informed by our recent Dear CEO exercise and with 30 months to go, time is being called on Libor. Libor prices in fluctuations in the perceived credit quality of banks, whereas for many users, alternative risk free reference rates are better reflections of the general level of interest rates. Beyond this, although Libor’s methodology and governance has been reformed and improved, an underlying issue remains – the way banks fund themselves has changed. There are very few transactions in the markets that Libor purports to measure.

The scale of the floods and the knock-on effects of natural catastrophes on global supply chains came as a rude surprise. The floods damaged more than 7000 industrial and manufacturing plants in 40 separate provinces. This affected countries with significant manufacturing capabilities in Thailand, most notably Japan. The majority of the insurance losses therefore came not from property damage, but from business interruption claims arising from the disruption to manufacturing and supply chains. It is therefore important that insurers have senior experts in the region who understand Asia’s multi-faceted and inter-connected risks. This will enable the industry to better price and underwrite regional risks, and achieve sustained growth. MAS will seek to increase the depth of expertise in Singapore by continuing to work with existing players to build up their specialty and reinsurance underwriting and broking capabilities as well as expand their regional hubs. MAS will also seek to increase breadth in the industry by promoting growth in emerging business lines, such as cyber risks. Lack of data is a key hurdle for cyber insurance in Asia. MAS is working with industry to create a test-bed for cyber risks where insurers and potential clients can come together to simulate loss events. •  Cyber insurers will be able to generate sets of valuable loss data and raise awareness about the value of specialty cyber insurance cover.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT IN THE DRAFT BUDGET PUBLIC DEBT  120 100 80  CHART 11 BREAKDOWN OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT  % of GDP  60  2017  2018  2019  Debt as a % of PIB  98.3  96.9  95.4  Debt change (as GDP pp)  -0.7  -1.4  -1.5  Balance  3.1  2.7  1.3  GDP nominal rate of change  -4.2  -3.6  -3.7  Flow-stock adjustment  0.5  -0.6  0.9  Due to:  40 20 0 75  78  81  84  PUBLIC DEBT  87  90  93  96  99  02  05  08  11  14  17  2019 STATE BUDGET FORECAST  SOURCES: Banco de España and 2019 State Budget. subject to a set of rules restricting fiscal policy which, in Spain’s case, would mean that: first, the structural government deficit would have to be reduced each year by 0.5 pp of GDP, under normal conditions, until the medium-term objective (MTO) of structural balance were achieved; second, the annual growth of general government spending would have to be less than or equal to the economy’s potential medium-term growth; and, finally, the government debt-to-GDP ratio would have to be reduced each year by one twentieth of the difference between its level and the target of 60%.

I began by saying that the State Bank of Vietnam is currently in a situation similar to that of the Swedish Riksbank just over a decade ago. However, it is also the case that the conditions are different in certain respects. One difference is that the Swedish credit and money markets had been deregulated completely during the 1980s and early 1990s. This meant, for instance, that the central government issued bonds, through public auctions and at predetermined times, and actively attempted to promote the development of a secondary market. Thus, there was already a clear channel through which monetary policy could have an effect. Another difference was that we in Sweden had the support of a long tradition of comprehensive production of public statistics that made our work easier. These are factors that, as I understand it, do not apply to the same extent here in Vietnam, at least not yet. Vietnam has thus – like all countries – its own special conditions that may need to be taken into account and may make it difficult to formulate monetary policy as an exact blueprint of the system in  7  For a detailed discussion of “central bank transparency”, see, for instance, Chapter 1 of Blinder, A.S., (2004), The Quiet Revolution – Central Banking Goes Modern, Yale University Press. 6  BIS Review 21/2006  another country 8 .