samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I’ll always take an opportunity to quote something from the Lord of the Rings canon, so I’ll continue with the story analogy and say that for many people, these past few weeks have felt like we’ve been “There and Back Again.” We again find ourselves in a period of extraordinary difficulty. The emergence and rapid spread of the Omicron variant in the United States and around the world are resulting in new peaks of COVID infections and hospitalizations, as well as severe strains on the healthcare and essential services workforce. This is a reminder that the path of economic recovery continues to be driven by the course of the virus. In my remarks this morning, I’ll share more about what we’re seeing in the incoming data and how it relates to the economic picture in the United States and the world more broadly. I’ll also highlight the significant progress we’ve seen in the labor market and my outlook for inflation. Finally, I’ll discuss the Federal Reserve’s recent policy actions and what they mean for the future. Before I proceed, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. Economic Outlook When I look at the economy, it is through the lens of the Federal Reserve’s “dual mandate.” These are two goals set by Congress: maximum employment and price stability.

Memorandums of Understandings or information-sharing protocols would then be used to ensure the free sharing of information between agencies. The analytical skills and tools required for macroprudential policy are likely to draw on those used for macroeconomic analysis and, to a lesser degree, microprudential analysis. But the  7  This argument is developed by Martin Cihák in a speech “Price stability, financial stability and central bank independence”, 38th Economics Conference of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2010. A number of case studies illustrating how inadequate independence arrangements for financial sector regulators and supervisors have contributed to the emergence and scale of financial crises are presented by Marc Quinton and Michael W. Taylor in “Regulatory and supervisory independence and financial stability” IMF Working Paper, WP/0246, 2002. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  macroprudential agency will need to build new analytical techniques. Before the crisis, many central banks had already begun to develop the type of system analysis that will be required for macroprudential supervision (for example, in the assessment of interdependencies and systemic risks included in financial stability reports) – but the analytical techniques remain in their infancy. Control over a sufficient set of tools As well as the information and knowledge necessary for effective analysis, the macroprudential agency must have access to suitable instruments in order to achieve its mandate. Otherwise there will be unreasonable expectations of what the macroprudential agency can achieve, as it may be unable to address the system-wide risks that it identifies.
Some examples of FSTI-supported institution-level projects that are ongoing include: •  a decentralised record-keeping system based on block chain technology to prevent duplicate invoicing in trade finance;  •  a shared infrastructure for a know-your-client utility;  •  a cyber risk test-bed; and  •  a natural catastrophe data analytics exchange. We look forward to see more such innovation projects coming on-board. Second, digital payments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Changes in the payments scene in Singapore have picked up pace in recent years: •  Our retail banks have released their own flavours of mobile wallets or mobile payment applications: –  •  DBS PayLah!, UOB Mobile Cash, OCBC Pay Anyone, StanChart Dash, Maybank Mobile Money  With the launch of Fast And Secure Transfers or “FAST” in March 2014, we now have a ready infrastructure that allows customers of the participating banks to make domestic fund transfers to one another almost instantaneously from their computers or mobile devices. But there is a lot more we need to do on the digital payments front. First, payments at stores and restaurants. •  •  This is almost a Uniquely Singapore phenomenon –  Many of our stores and restaurants have multiple Points-of-Sale (“POS”) at their payment counters. –  This not only clutters valuable real estate but also makes life difficult for customers and merchants.

Perhaps the most controversial frameworks took the form of commitments to meet targets for the growth in the money supply. These were meant to act as rules, which would tie the hands of politicians, but they proved ineffective, not least because the underlying economic relationships broke down. There were also periods – notably the 1970s – when there was no discernible monetary policy framework at all; when monetary policy was in eclipse and Governments relied on incomes polices to control inflation. These, too, were a dismal failure. 1  Inflation has averaged 2.5% since 1997, with a standard deviation of 0.8%. In the two decades to 1992, it averaged 9.6%, with a standard deviation of some 5.6%. Over the past decade, output has grown steadily, averaging 2.8%, with a standard deviation of 0.7%, compared with an average of 2% and a standard deviation of 2.5% over the seventies and eighties. BIS Review 20/2007  1  All these frameworks suffered from one of two basic problems. They either lacked credibility, or they lacked sufficient flexibility for policy-makers to respond intelligently to events. So it is little surprise that they were associated with two decades of poor macroeconomic performance.
20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  20  Annex Chart 1: Decomposition of long run UK GDP growth  Source: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) “Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.3”, available here. Chart 2: UK labour productivity growth forecast revisions  Sources: ONS and Bank of England Inflation Report projections. Notes: Forecasts for hourly labour productivity. 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  Chart 3: IMF advanced economy labour productivity growth forecast revisions  Sources: IMF and Bank calculations. Notes: Forecasts for productivity per worker. Chart 4: Long run UK total factor productivity  Sources: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) “Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.3”, available here. Illustrative estimates prior to 1850 are based on data on the growth rate of technology between 1AD and 1750AD in “A farewell to Alms” by Gregory Clark. 22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  Chart 5: Decomposition of long run UK labour productivity growth  Sources: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) “Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.3”, available here. Chart 6: Long run UK total factor productivity growth  Sources: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) “Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.3”, available here.

Although these data are far from perfect they suggest that, while within-firm pay differentials have accounted for some of the increased dispersion in pay across households, across-firm variations have made a larger contribution. Tackling the Productivity Puzzle  There has been no shortage of public policy ideas over recent years for boosting productivity growth. Reports by the IMF and OECD have suggested measures ranging from increased infrastructure spending to improved education and training programmes. 58  Earlier this year, the UK Government issued a Green  Paper setting out various pillars to support productivity. 59  And, most recently, here at the LSE the Growth  Commission produced their second report on measures to boost UK productivity. 60  In generic terms, these policy measures fall into three categories. First, there are measures which support all companies, irrespective of sector, region or characteristic. For example, last year’s Autumn Statement provided additional financial support for UK infrastructure spending, while in the Budget a couple of weeks ago the UK government announced plans for increased support for technical skills. Second, there are measures which support technological innovation – the creation and growth of frontier firms. One potentially important micro-economic measure supporting innovation is greater recognition of the importance of companies’ intangible assets, such as intellectual property (IP). These constitute an increasing fraction of companies’ total assets, but are not measured or valued in as consistent and coherent a way as tangible assets such as plants and machinery. This can have real costs for the companies concerned.
Preserving the credibility of our commitment to price stability is vitally important, not least because of the flexibility it affords us to confront future shocks that have the potential to cause damage to the financial system and the economy. Second, it is important that the United States work to build more confidence that it will act on the fiscal front to achieve a better balance between our commitments and our resources, both with respect to the medium term and the longer term. Given the inherent uncertainty surrounding long-term growth forecasts, the formidable rise in costs associated with providing for an aging population with longer life expectancy, and a potentially protracted elevation in national security costs, it makes sense to build a stronger financial position into our fiscal future. The present fiscal trajectory entails an uncomfortable scale of borrowing and little insurance against possible adverse outcomes in an uncertain world. Building a stronger fiscal cushion can help reduce the risk of adverse outcomes - those that might come in the form of a decline in the willingness of foreigners to acquire claims on the United States on the present scale, as well as those that might take the form of a reduction in private investment and lower future productivity gains. Strengthening confidence in our fiscal management and fiscal sustainability is critical to reducing the risk in the size of our external imbalance. Third, the U.S. and the major economies have an important role to play in encouraging further evolution in the international monetary system.

Alongside these fiscal challenges, the size and concentration of external imbalances in the system are at an unprecedented scale, between five to six percent of GDP in the case of the U.S. current account deficit. This imbalance is the result of a combination of a sharp decline in U.S. net national savings, driven by increased public sector borrowing and a large rise in household debt, and a sustained increase in the relative strength of U.S. demand growth compared with Europe and Japan. The counterpart of this deficit is a large inflow of capital from the world’s private savers and foreign central banks. The expected trajectory for this imbalance produces a dramatic deterioration in our net international position and cannot be sustained indefinitely. These two broad forces coincide with the increasingly rapid integration of China and India into the global economy and financial system. Their impact on the world economy already seems substantially greater than their shares of global GDP. This process of integration has a long way to go. It offers tremendous potential gains in income growth, not just for their 2.5 billion citizens, but also for those who trade with them, through lower prices and further impetus to productivity gains. But it also brings greater adjustment pressures for producers of tradable goods and services, generating greater demands on political leaders to provide protection against those competitive pressures.
Furthermore, volatile ISK assets held by non-residents currently total perhaps a fifth of GDP and could rise to almost half of GDP if the failed banks’ ISK assets are recovered in full and paid out to creditors. Iceland has no excess foreign exchange revenues with which to unwind these ISK positions, however. The solution lies in spreading out repayments of foreign loans, solving the ISK problem related to the settlement of the failed banks’ estates in a manner that does not exacerbate the balance of payments problem, and opening up market access to resident entities. A number of possible scenarios that could achieve this are under scrutiny at this time, but there is no need to discuss them in detail here. But if such measures generate the results we are aiming at, it is important to ensure that the impact on foreign debt service, whether in domestic or foreign currency, is manageable; to safeguard Iceland’s public debt position, sovereign credit ratings, and access to capital markets; and ultimately, to provide domestic entities with access to foreign credit on acceptable terms. Some of these goals may conflict with one another, and this should be considered when a course of action is chosen.

Although controversial at the time, these rate hikes have proven their value in containing inflation without derailing the economic recovery. Second, the Monetary Policy Committee’s warning – that the same would happen this year if wage increases should prove excessive – appears to have been credible, which probably would not have happened without the previous rate increases. Third, the foreign exchange market intervention policy introduced by the Bank in mid-May has proven effective. The outlook is for inflation to stay close to target this year if the króna holds relatively stable. This positive outlook is due to a number of factors: favourable inflation developments during the first two months of the year, signs that wage cost increases have been smaller in the recent term than previously thought, the fact that the recent wage settlements – which provided for pay increases consistent with the inflation target – appear to have set the tone for subsequent wage negotiations, and the fact that global inflation looks set to be somewhat lower than previously forecast. Looking beyond this year, however, inflation could rise again when the slack in the economy disappears and the effects of increased investment and the Government’s debt relief measures on domestic demand come to the fore. The impact this has on inflation will depend on how inflation and inflation expectations develop this year, and on other factors that could affect demand in the near term.
That attributes great importance to the composition of the adjustment and, from our own experience, measures based on public spending cuts, especially non-productive spending on consumption and investment, may be most fruitful in this respect. Nonetheless, given the scale of the imbalance it seems clear that certain features of the tax structure will also  4  BIS Review 151/2009  inevitably have to be revised. Selecting tax measures is never easy, and less so when the tax base is being considerably eroded. Accordingly, the tax instruments that cause least distortion and help reduce fraud should be chosen, so that long-term growth prospects are not compromised. And in this respect, indirect taxes, in addition to offering higher tax-raising potential, are more neutral from the economic efficiency standpoint. In any event, one of the main risks of fiscal consolidation strategies entailing tax increases is that the increases in revenue may end up being used to finance new spending demands. Consequently, a strict application of the budget is especially necessary to ensure that new revenue is used in full to reduce the budget deficit. The government has reiterated on several occasions its commitment to budgetary stability, and its intention to resume deficit levels compatible with a balanced budget in the horizon defined by the European authorities in the application of the Stability and Growth Pact rules, which has recently been extended to 2013. The State Budget for 2010 is a first step within this general consolidation strategy.

Bank Negara Malaysia has so far issued eight financial advisers licences which employ a total of 57 financial advisers’ representatives. I encourage you to follow their footsteps and embark on a new chapter in your professional careers, to make the most of the opportunities that you will have to create a lasting impact in promoting sound financial planning among Malaysians. I trust that the distinguished speakers will share their valuable insights and experiences to provide you better clarity on the opportunities as financial advisers. On that note ladies and gentlemen, I wish you a successful and productive seminar. We look forward to your contribution to the further growth and development of the financial services industry. Thank you. BIS Review 136/2008  3
Therefore, we predict the upward trend in the current account deficit to persist in the short run also taking into account the low base effect from last year. Yet, we also envisage that the dampening effects of our recent policy measures on loans and imports will materialize as of the second quarter of the year. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Distinguished Guests, 26. Domestic credit volume, which surged in 2010, accelerated further in the final quarter of the year. As the effects of the crisis waned, the number of sectors utilizing loans increased rapidly and maturities were extended. An analysis of the rise in real sector loans by sub-categories reveals that this rise was supported by the rally in both consumer and business loans. Meanwhile, loan utilization by small and medium-sized enterprises, which were those hit most severely by the crisis, increased as well. 27. I would like to underline that the vigorous loan utilization was underpinned by measures taken by the CBRT in the aftermath of the crisis with a view to maintain the functionality of the credit markets, as well as by the consequent rapid recovery in economic activity and the favorable economic outlook. Furthermore, ample global liquidity owing to the monetary easing implemented by major central banks and the favorable economic outlook providing low and foreseeable interest rates were also instrumental in stimulating loan utilization.

As a matter of fact, the faster-than-expected economic recovery and falling interest expenditures have helped to improve Turkey’s fiscal outlook. The increase in tax revenues amid rapid economic growth and tax adjustments were the major drivers of the improved budget balances in 2010. Moreover, the relative slowdown in the growth of non-interest expenditures as well as the significant decline in interest expenditures driven by falling domestic borrowing rates contributed to the improvement in fiscal balances. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  31. Fiscal indicators in the MTP suggest that the positive outlook, which was also underpinned by the stronger-than-expected recovery in 2010, would continue in the upcoming period. Indeed, the recent data imply that the favorable outlook persists in tandem with the robust economic activity. Nevertheless, I would like to remind that in order to maintain fiscal discipline and ensure that Turkey continues to have more positive readings than other emerging economies, implementation of the institutional and structural reforms set out in the MTP remains critical. Esteemed Guests, 32. In the last part of my speech, I would like to mention monetary policy decisions in 2010 and the monetary policy strategy that we currently implement. In this context, I will first summarize inflation developments, and then, I will move on to monetary policy implementations within the inflation targeting framework. Monetary policy decisions and implementations 33. Inflation was mainly determined by tax adjustments and the course of unprocessed food prices in 2010.
Accordingly, purchases are distributed evenly through the year. At the end of each month, Norges Bank announces the size of the daily purchases or sales of kroner for the coming month, based on estimates of oil revenues and fiscal spending. The amount can be interpreted as our best estimate for the remaining months of the year. The economic outlook Let me now turn to the outlook for the Norwegian economy. We are about to leave behind us 15 golden years. The Norwegian economy has made use of favourable tailwinds and seized the opportunities offered. The other side of the coin is an economy that has become increasingly dependent on oil, and thereby more vulnerable to changes in oil prices and petroleum revenues. And as we know, oil prices have fallen by nearly 50 percent since last summer. The vulnerability manifests itself in several ways. A large share of the business sector and the labour market is linked to the petroleum sector in Norway and in other countries. 1  2  Revenues received from the State’s Direct Financial Interest in the petroleum sector (SDFI). BIS central bankers’ speeches  Petroleum investment, which has long been an important driver of growth in the Norwegian economy, is now expected to fall in the years ahead. The fall in oil prices in recent months has accelerated and amplified an announced decline in the activity level on the Norwegian continental shelf. Lower oil prices reduce oil company cash flows and reduce the profitability of new investments.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The analysis in the Report suggests a key policy rate of approximately 1 percent in the coming years, followed by a gradual increase. The analysis suggests that inflation will increase somewhat in the coming quarters before edging down and lie slightly above 2 percent later in the projection period. Capacity utilisation in the mainland economy is projected to decline further, before returning to a more normal level. Let me summarise. After the global financial crisis, the Norwegian economy quickly rebounded, supported by robust public finances and strong growth in the petroleum sector. Since last summer, oil prices have fallen. Activity in the petroleum sector has probably passed the peak. So far, the impact on the real economy has been modest. At the same time, the Norwegian economy is facing new challenges. Vulnerabilities established during the golden years must be addressed. From being in a unique economic position, Norway is now headed for a period of restructuring. Norway’s starting point is favourable. Inflation is well anchored and the krone is functioning as a stabiliser. In addition, we have been able to transform oil in the ground into financial wealth in a period when oil prices were high. We have significant fiscal leeway. But the conditions and forces necessary for growth in the economy in the longer run will have to be brought more into line with those of other countries. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5