samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is unfortunate, as the situation in Sweden, as I noted earlier, is actually slightly more sensitive than that in many other countries, where housing prices have already fallen and households have begun to amortise their debts to a more significant extent. Well in line with the international discussion One thing I think it is important to emphasise – and which is not always clear in the Swedish debate – is that the Riksbank's aim to give consideration to the risks arising from household debt and the housing market is well in line with the international view that has emerged in the wake of the financial crisis. The Riksbank's way of reasoning, and the policy we have conducted, are thus not unusual or strange, but are characteristic for the present time. 21  The Swedish National Debt Office (2013) writes, for instance, in its consultation response that with the solution they advocate, "it would not be possible to justify any macroprudential policy measures if the conclusion was that the risks inherent in current household debt were primarily a demand-related problem (rather than a problem for the banking system)." (p. 2). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  There is even reason to claim that the Riksbank was one of the first central banks to highlight this type of risk.

But as yet we do not know exactly where this process will take us, and how central bank operations will look in detail, say, twenty years from now. What we can say with certainty is that the discussion on monetary policy and central bank activities will be intensive over the coming years, both internally in individual countries and internationally. It is important that this discussion is unbiased and modulated and conducted in a good and positive spirit. This will help ensure that it results in wise and sustainable solutions. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Bank of Canada (2012), Bank of Canada maintains overnight rate target at 1 per cent. Press release 23 October. Bernanke, Ben S. (2010), Letter to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 21 December. Available at: http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-1221%20B%20Bernanke%20ltr%20to%20Angelides%20and%20Thomas%20re%20FOMC%2 0information.pdf Blanchard, Olivier, Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni and Mauro, Paolo (2013), Rethinking Macro Policy II: Getting Granular. IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/03, International Monetary Fund. Cagliarini, Adam, Kent, Christopher and Stevens, Glenn (2010), Fifty Years of Monetary Policy: What Have We Learned? In Kent, Christopher and Robson, Michael (ed) Reserve Bank of Australia 50th Anniversary Symposium. Proceedings of a conference held in Sydney on 9 February 2010. Reserve Bank of Australia. Carney, Mark (2013), Monetary Policy After the Fall. Speech at the University of Alberta 1 May 2013. Bank of Canada. Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform (2011), Rethinking Central Banking. Brookings Institution, Washington.
I would like to thank you for your kind attention, and I would be happy to answer any questions you might have. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Slide 1  Slide 2  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 3  Slide 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Slide 5  Slide 6  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

I shall not enter that discussion but simply note that a number of important decisions have been made in the past ten to fifteen years. They include the deregulation of credit and foreign exchange markets, the reform of the tax system, changes to components of the transfers system and the enhancement of competition. All this has helped the Swedish economy to function better. Moreover, price stability is now monetary policy’s statutory objective and the Riksbank, now also formally independent, has been made accountable for this. Other steps, in the form of a far-reaching consolidation of the government budget, provide a stable and credible framework for this objective. As a further move in the new direction of economic BIS Review 99/2000  2  policy, Sweden joined the European Union in 1995. This opened up sectors that previously had been protected from international competition. Competition grew in many fields and prices for some goods and services began to be adjusted downwards towards European levels. The economic policy realignment, which began some time in the 1980s, has coincided with larger changes in the global economic environment. The Swedish economy has therefore been in a position to benefit from the developments elsewhere and so far this has led to a favourable economic path. The realignment of economic policy and the ongoing globalisation were accompanied in the 1990s by a rapid development of the new information technology, globally as well as in Sweden. The innovations have been adopted successively in various segments of our economy.
The industry, through FSBP, can demonstrate much needed business leadership in addressing broader ethical questions that will increasingly confront us as a society and as global citizens. Apart from what ends up in written codes, there is also important value in simply having frank conversations about shared ethical challenges. In the United Kingdom, senior bankers got together to discuss ways to reform organisational culture following the widespread PPI misselling scandals, but some would consider this “too little too late”. We need to bring such discussions forward and actively encourage a process that would allow the industry to get in front of emerging issues around professional conduct and ethics. These include examining issues like how institutions might go about gaining a pulse on culture at various levels within the organisation, and the effects of incentive structures on behaviour. With the digital revolution, there will be an increasing need for the industry to come together to set standards for novel areas of practice. Already now there is much buzz about the use of artificial intelligence and big data in finance. This creates opportunities for innovation, efficiency and growth, but also new risks, challenges and – without a doubt – difficult ethical questions on lines that should be drawn to prevent unfair, systematic, discrimination against specific groups, (for instance as a result of algorithmic programs) the inappropriate use of personal data and excessive volatilities from high-frequency trading.

Given the stronger focus of financial regulators on conduct and culture, such professional codes will matter greatly going forward as an important complement to regulatory standards. The FSPB is well placed to lead and support initiatives to establish standards of conduct for the financial industry. Its standards not only serve as useful frameworks for financial institutions and professional bodies to develop specific guidance for their own employees and members; they also serve to embody the industry’s collective commitment to socially responsible values and 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  ethics. For example, I noted with interest that the Professional Code being launched today commits to dealing with counterparties, including suppliers and agents that “subscribe to sound ethical principles”. Matters such as the environmental footprint or human rights record of third party providers are not typical obligations currently found in regulatory standards, yet, these are matters of great importance. They are a reflection of the values of the industry, and they matter to many conscientious consumers in this age of increasingly accessible information. Given the central role of financial services in any economy, these are issues likely to move from the periphery to increasingly important business considerations. At the global level, we are already seeing greater attention given to sustainable and responsible finance. In many cases, it will require the industry to draw on experience beyond the traditional core competencies of most financial services providers.
To this we would add robust annual stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve, along with the additional tools and procedures of macroprudential supervision, including in-depth horizontal reviews across large companies. Conclusion I trust regulators will rise to the challenges posed by the financial crisis and too big to fail, leaving a legacy of success and providing a practicable infrastructure for next-generation supervision and regulation. I quoted Bastiat’s criterion for a good economist as one who accounts for “effects that must be foreseen.” Economists did not do a good job of foreseeing the financial crisis. Neither did regulators. Moreover, previous measures directed at containing too big to fail proved ineffective, with no one too surprised that when crisis came, many large-bank counterparties were protected under implicit guarantees. Let’s hope that going forward, regulators can do better, avoiding both unintended consequences and time inconsistencies. For if they don’t, and they are unable to solve the too-big-to-fail issue in a timely manner, we will ultimately have to take more draconian measures and simply break up the largest banking organizations to eliminate the threat they pose to financial stability and economic growth. That is my contrarian view, and I’m sticking with it. Thank you. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy, Speech at an event organised by the SAFE Policy center, 11 july 2019  6  Figure 3. Recent divergence between the evolution of household inflation expectations and market based-measures  Sources: ECB, European Commission  7
I will discuss the progress ASEAN is making towards a single market and production base, which will create a more seamless marketplace for businesses. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Third, ASEAN is opportunity. I will focus on the significant investment opportunities in ASEAN, especially in the area of infrastructure. Resilience: managing inflation and capital inflows 7. Let me begin by touching on ASEAN’s resilience in the face of external shocks. The Asian financial crisis of 1998/99 was a life-changing experience for many countries in the region. They were badly affected by the crisis and resolved never again to be so vulnerable. Macroeconomic policies have become more sound, financial regulation and supervision has tightened, national balance sheets strengthened, structural reforms stepped up, and corporate governance enhanced. 8. The ASEAN countries consequently showed remarkable resilience in the recent crisis. While credit tightened and trade plunged during the height of the crisis, there was no systemic financial fallout, especially in the banking industry. The region rebounded strongly, with the ASEAN-5 growing by 8 per cent in 2010. This year, growth is expected in the range of 5 to 6 per cent. 9. But strong growth has come with a new set of challenges. ASEAN and the rest of Asia are now grappling with rising inflation. Consumer prices are forecast to increase by 5.1 per cent in the ASEAN-5 this year, compared to 3.8 percent in 2010. Several factors underpin this. 10. First, elevated food prices.

But let us not only write reports and elaborate ever more sophisticated thoughts, let us act, starting with comprehensive and effective regulation in the US, as has been done in Europe, and as the UK is on its way to doing with its proposed new set of rules that would bring a broad range of cryptoasset activities into the scope of financial services regulation. This is obviously good news, as long as this proposal ensures consistency with existing legislation, notably in Europe. To that end, I suggest the FSB to monitor closely the implementation of its own recommendations on cryptos, as the Basel Committee does on banking regulations. More broadly, big techs did not make the breakthrough in traditional banking activities that many had expected: why is that? Regulatory constraints certainly stand as a first explanation, especially since they were tightened following the great financial crisis. Both lending and deposit-taking are highly regulated in most advanced economies, and big techs tend to set up partnerships with banks in these countries rather than create a fully-owned subsidiary for instance. In addition, the low-rate environment that prevailed until recently may have been unfavourable to new banks – as their business model relies strongly on the value of sight deposits –, and an ageing population in advanced economies may have preserved loyalty to incumbent banks and insurance companies which benefit from high public trust.
Indeed, the perverse dynamics are as follows: high interest rate differentials induce capital inflows to arbitrage those differences; then policymakers strive to avoid the appreciation, which in general is thought to be transitory, since the sustainability of exchange rate management is limited; the incentives for inflows increase as not only the interest rate differential is large, but also the expectations of appreciation; finally, the appreciation takes place, which validates the expectations of arbitrageurs. This process goes for a while and may be accommodated gradually or ended by a sudden stop. In this process there are “excess” inflows and “excess appreciation”, and the issue is how to avoid those excesses. According to the simple dynamics I have just described a first line of defense to avoid excess fluctuations of capital flows is to maintain exchange rate flexibility. This prevents investors from speculating against an authority that will be defending the parity only transitorily. Moreover, by introducing volatility it increases the risks of a one sided bet on the exchange rate. An inflation commitment may also help to stabilize flows. As I discussed before, massive inflows that appreciate the currencies will result in a loosening of monetary policy that should reduce the incentives for carry trade. In contrast, if capital inflows generate a boom of activity, without inflationary consequences due to the appreciation of the currency, there could be the temptation to tighten monetary policy, aggravating the problem of massive inflows. To control expenditure without increasing pressures on the exchange rate, fiscal policy should help.

Conclusions  After I prepared this presentation, I started even more to support the old truth in slightly modified wording – maintaining financial stability is more the art than the science. Maintaining the financial stability is the mission impossible for one institution to carry out in isolation, be it the central bank or any other authority. What is needed is shared data, shared analysis that brings together macro and micro prudential aspects of financial stability, common set of principles to fall back in case of systemic crisis, and perhaps most essentially, there is a need for common mindset. 4  BIS Review 63/2001  I would like to highlight one essential aspect of financial stability. The pan-European consolidation of banking industry has resulted in rapid increase of cross-border ownership. The question of co-operation between central banks and supervisors is the key to maintain sound financial systems. That applies both to crisis prevention as well as to crisis resolution. How to pass on early warning signals, how to provide emergency liquidity support, how to restructure or wind up big financial conglomerates – these questions are highly relevant for us as well as for the whole common market. I believe this a good time to stop and pass the word over to our moderator who will elaborate more thoroughly on the other mission impossible: how to find a right institutional structure for financial sector supervision. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 63/2001  5
For more information, see the Bank of England’s response to the Future of Finance Review available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/future-finance. 13 In recent years we have expanded access to our balance sheet to central counterparties and broker-dealers to recognise the important role played by these firms in the provision of critical financial services to the real economy. In providing these critical functions, both broker-dealers and CCPs are exposed to liquidity risk. As the supplier of the economy’s most liquid asset, central bank money, the Bank is able to be a ‘back-stop’ provider of liquidity, and can therefore provide liquidity insurance to the financial system, promoting financial stability. 14 Oliver Wyman: Fintech 2.0 Paper: rebooting financial services (June 2015) and McKinsey: Global Payments report (2016). 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  retailers. As designed, Libra may substantially improve financial inclusion and dramatically lower the costs of domestic and cross border payments.15 The Bank of England approaches Libra with an open mind but not an open door. Unlike social media for which standards and regulations are being debated well after they have been adopted by billions of users, the terms of engagement for innovations such as Libra must be adopted in advance of any launch Libra, if it achieves its ambitions, would be systemically important. As such it would have to meet the highest standards of prudential regulation and consumer protection. It must address issues ranging from anti-money laundering to data protection to operational resilience.

Our levers are the hard and soft infrastructure that we control:   Our hard infrastructure, such as access to our balance sheet and access to our Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, the heart of the UK payments system.   And our soft infrastructure, such as our rules, regulations and standards. In this spirit, last year at Mansion House I announced that Huw van Steenis would lead a review of the future of the UK financial system, including recommendations for how the Bank could best support innovation while continuing to promote resilience.1 I would like to thank Huw and the Bank of England team, who over the past nine months have met 300 entrepreneurs, investors, consumer groups, charities, business leaders and policymakers across the country and around the world to produce an excellent report. Today, we published Huw’s recommendations and the Bank of England’s response.2 And tonight, I would like to focus on a few of the actions that the Bank will take to enable the new economy; to ensure the resilience of the financial system; and to support the UK’s transition to a carbon-neutral economy. 1  Carney, M (June 2018) ‘New Economy, New Finance, New Bank’ speech given at Mansion House. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  First, to enable the digital economy The very nature of commerce is changing. Last year, one fifth of all sales in the UK were online.3 Next year, it will be one quarter.
European Central Bank: Press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the press conference, held in Frankfurt am Main on 1 February 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you to our first press conference of 2001. The Vice-President and I are here to report, as we have done for more than two years now, on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB, which was also attended by the Eurogroup President, Minister Reynders, as well as by Commissioner Solbes. Let me also take this opportunity to again welcome Greece as the twelfth country to join the euro area. Mr. Papademos, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, has been participating in our meetings as a member of the Governing Council since 1 January 2001. The Governing Council conducted its regular examination of monetary and economic developments and their implications for the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. The decision to keep interest rates unchanged reflects the Governing Council's assessment that the risks to price stability in the medium term now appear more balanced than at the end of last year. Factors which might pose upward risks to price stability in the medium term are still present and as such will be subject to ongoing close monitoring. Let me elaborate on this assessment.

With greater amounts of capital and liquidity in the financial system, this may be more realistic. There may be less need to fine-tune the regulatory engine and correspondingly less need for the tug-of-war between regulator and regulated that has characterised the past few years. A robust banking system ought also to be less prone to credit booms and busts, thereby reducing the need for discretionary macro-prudential actions to lean actively against the wind. Regulation would be handed back to the risk managers. In this world, the operational activities of central banks could also return to a more even keel. Wider collateral, longer tenors and new counterparties were necessary ingredients during crisis. But a return to more conventional operations – short-term lending against government collateral to banking counterparties – may be sufficient to oil the wheels in normalised market conditions, as it was for hundreds of years prior to the crisis. Market-making, at least beyond short-term money markets, would be a last resort. As for central bank transparency, with monetary, regulatory and operational policy no longer hyperactive, it is conceivable central banks could retreat from centre stage. Central banks could migrate to the back pages of newspapers. Like good children, they would be relatively rarely seen and infrequently heard. Central bank-watchers would find something better to do with their lives than hang on to every gubernatorial semi-colon. For a central banker, this sounds like the good life – a low-intervention, low-visibility world. In some respects, it would be back to the future.