samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It will be home to 60% of those aged over 65 worldwide by 2030, with countries in East Asia leading the way. This will place great demands on healthcare and retirement solutions, beyond the universal or mandatory schemes that governments put in place in many countries. 6. In the other parts of Asia where populations are still youthful – such as India and parts of ASEAN – insurance penetration remains low and has huge potential to grow. 7. Equally important, Asia is rapidly digitising. 330 million people bought insurance products online in China in 2016. In Singapore, a few of the bigger life insurers have offered online life insurance purchase for some products and two fully online life insurers have emerged over the past two years. Enabling Customers through Digital Solutions Insurers can and must take advantage of the digital wave. In particular, there is significant scope for health insurance to venture beyond paying for medical claims post-affliction, to preventive care and to encourage a healthy lifestyle and habits. 8. Health insurers are already beginning to track users’ health and habits through fitness 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  devices and apps, and are pricing in premium discounts for healthier habits. The top five life insurers in Singapore, including Prudential, have unveiled programmes to support healthier living and habits by their clients. Healthcare itself can be delivered and administered more effectively, and insurers should encourage this. Tele-health is increasingly being used, saving patients time and convenience.

In the banking sector, there have been no bank failures in the recent past, reflecting stability in the financial sector Mr Chairman, the Government has shown commitment to continuing the economic reform programme. To this end, measures are being taken to ensure that the macroeconomic gains attained so far will be consolidated in 2007. Accordingly, Government is targeting Real GDP growth of 7.0% and inflation of 5.0%. Pursuit of these objectives is within the context of the long-term development objectives well articulated in the national long term vision, 2030. Part of this vision is enshrined in the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) from 2006-2010 whose broad macroeconomic objectives for the plan period are as follows: •  to accelerate pro-poor economic growth;  •  to reduce and stabilise inflation; and  •  to sustain a viable balance of payments and external and domestic debt position. At this juncture, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to share with you my understanding of the role of the leasing sector in economic growth. Clearly, the remarkable economic gains that I have outlined above would not have been possible without the leasing sector’s contribution. Leasing companies are specialized lenders that provide asset-backed finance. The assets financed by leasing companies include plant and machinery and motor vehicles. Traditionally, these assets have excluded chattels or personal moveable assets. Though the leasing sector has existed in Zambia since independence, the formal supervision of the leasing sector by the Bank of Zambia only began in the 1990s.
We have gained an increasing understanding that how we finance postsecondary education has significant effects on a variety of critical economic outcomes, including economic growth and inequality. For example, our research suggests that higher student debt and delinquencies reduce household formation and depress homeownership. But there are many important questions still left unanswered. What is the relationship between the amount and type of educational investment that people make and their outcomes? What attributes are associated with borrowers who are more successful at  1  2  Payback Time? Measuring Progress on Student Debt Repayment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  repaying their student loans? Are there particular types of degrees that are associated with better performance with respect to student debt repayment or with better living standards earlier in life? What are the best interventions to help borrowers avoid the consequences of delinquency and default, and to limit any default costs to taxpayers? Do borrowers who use programs like income-based repayment eventually succeed in paying off their debts? How do income-based repayment programs affect important decisions such as labor supply, consumption and household formation? These are important questions for the nation, as the human capital of our citizens is far and away our most important asset, and student loans are an important mechanism for financing needed investments in that asset. But it is very hard to answer these questions with existing data.

These loans are used to finance human capital investment projects with returns that are highly uncertain. It’s true that virtually every study finds that the returns on college degrees are high, on average, relative to their cost. But some people who take out student loans don’t end up with these high average returns. The net returns for some may, in fact, be negative. For example, many who have pursued vocational training may be less remunerated in the market. Similarly, some students attend certain for-profit universities with track records that indicate that their graduates have lower lifetime earnings than other types of educational institutions. While others drop out before receiving a degree – just 59 percent of the 2006 cohort had received their four-year degree by 2012. Of course, uncertain returns are a feature of most investments, but for other loan types this uncertainty is generally managed more effectively through credit underwriting, collateralization and risk-based interest rates. We are fairly confident in the aggregate statistics – over a trillion dollars in loan balances outstanding, 43 million borrowers and the highest delinquency rates of any form of household debt. But we know a lot less about the precise causes and consequences of the heterogeneity in the net returns to educational investments that I just described. What we know so far, based on very imperfect data, suggests that this heterogeneity is likely to be very important.
(a) September 1720 (South Sea Bubble) (b) October 1720 (South Sea Bubble) (c) October 1987 (Black Monday – portfolio insurance) (d) July 1940 (WWII – merchant ships attacked) (e) March 1974 (Price/wage controls, unions, etc.) 12  -400  -200 0 200 Change in yield (basis points)  0.00 400  Sources: Global Financial Data and Bank calculations. (a) March 1974 (b) October 1974 (c) June 1974 (d) January 1701  BIS Review 18/2009  Chart 9: 90th Percentile VaR for a  Chart 10: Percentage under-valuation of  selection of major UK banks, pre and  a put option on UK equities during the  post crisis  Golden Decade Per cent  Per cent 20  VaR Pre Crisis  18  VaR Post Crisis  90 80  16  70  14  60  12  50  10  40  8  30  6  20  4  10  2  0 0.4  0 1  2  3  4  5 6 Banks  7  8  0.6  0.8  Strike  1  1.2  9  Sources: Bloomberg and Bank calculations  Sources: Global Financial Data and Bank calculations.

As after the previous two episodes of systemic failure, in October 1987 and August 1998, a third wave of technological transformation in the standards of risk management is now needed as a matter of priority. Firms themselves admit as much. That calls for a new agenda. I have outlined some elements of such an agenda, to address some of the failures exposed by the crisis. These measures involve a greater degree of engagement both between risk managers and senior management within firms, and between financial firms and the authorities. They would also involve much greater transparency to the wider world about risk metrics and accompanying management actions. These measures  14  Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne and Willison (2008). 15  House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008). BIS Review 18/2009  9  would not prevent a next time –nor should they – but they might help make risk management roughly right. References Adrian, T, and Brunnermeier, M.K (2008), “CoVaR”, FRB of New York staff report no. 348. Aikman, D, Alessandri, P, Eklund, B, Gai, P, Kapadia, S, Martin, E, Mora, N, Sterne, G and Willison, M (2008), “Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model of Systemic Stability” paper presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile on Financial Stability, Monetary Policy and Central Banking (Santiago, 6-7 November 2008). Anderson H.C (1846), “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, Danish Fairy Legends and Tales (1846), Pickering. London.
There is always a group of people who are relentless in their criminal pursuit of economic profit at the expense of others. It is only through our collective efforts that we can manage this negative externality of technological advancement. Challenges posed by Cryptocurrency for AML As all of you are aware, the next frontier in the financial industry is the advancement in blockchain technology that allows the existence of cryptocurrency. With the global market capitalisation now standing at approximately $ billion1, cryptocurrencies could become a major part of the financial system that offers new and exciting opportunities as well as challenges for the industry and regulators. However, cryptocurrency is vulnerable to criminal abuse due to the anonymity it provides to its users and its ability to facilitate cross-border transactions, potentially allowing illicit funds to be transferred globally without a trace. We have seen a range of actions taken by regulatory bodies across the globe in order to manage this risk, ranging from total prohibition, partial regulation, to full legalisation. Each country will need to make an assessment of risks and rewards in its own unique context. We are also in the midst of making such an assessment and we do so with an objective that has and will always remain steadfast – that is to balance between safeguarding our economy and allowing room for innovation and progress. Increasing Threat of Cyber crimes Let me now touch on the increasing threat of cyber-crime. We have seen a double digit growth in cyber-crime in the past decade.

1 Forbes  (2017) www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2017/08/27/cryptocurrencys-total-market-cap-has-risen-nearly800-this-year/#7e89e36b67c7. 2 www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/cybercrime-cost-businesses-over-2trillion. 3 RM2.5 trillion (USD633billion). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Second, the decline in short-term real interest rates has been accompanied by a similarly steep fall in longer-term real interest rates. The yield on the 10–20 year portion of the indexed gilt curve, for example, was 4% in the mid-1990s; by the end of that decade it had dropped to barely 2%; on the eve of the financial crisis, in mid-2007, it was less than 1%; today it is –0.3% (Chart 4). This is significant because, just as a matter of principle, it’s hard to see how pure monetary disturbances – including any independent decisions of monetary  (Woodford (2003)). Occasionally people distinguish the short and longer-term level of this rate (using “natural” and “equilibrium” respectively). Neutral is the term usually reserved for the rate that would keep the economy cyclically stable over the longer term – the intercept in the Taylor rule – though in many settings this is the same as the natural rate. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  policy makers – can have very enduring influences on real things, including real interest rates (that’s particularly true for monetary authorities in relatively small and open economies like the UK). So they’re unlikely to have had much bearing on real forward rates. Third, even if you doubt these basic principles, the data show that, where we’re able to isolate autonomous (or at least unexpected4) shifts in official interest rates, they don’t seem to produce any reaction in longer-term real forward rates (Chart 5).

Because the majority are owned by institutions – banks, pension funds and insurance companies – it is hard to trace through the impact of any capital gain to its ultimate beneficiary. One thing worth saying is that, at least in terms of effective wealth, the gainers clearly include those entitled to future payouts from defined-benefit pensions. You can’t sell such an entitlement. But it does offer a guaranteed flow of future income, much like the coupons from an indexed gilt (that’s why DB pension funds are obliged to discount their liabilities using gilt yields and why, in response, they hold significant quantities of government debt). The present value of this income has therefore risen in similar fashion. To the extent they include equities, the value of defined-contribution (DC) pension funds will have performed less well. The third point is that none of this need have any bearing on the distribution of income, as opposed to that of wealth. This is an important distinction. To the extent that asset prices rise because the marginal investor is becoming more patient, lowering the discount rate (Chart 6(a)), this reflects a change in the present value of a given stream of income, not in the stream itself. Things are a little more complicated if interest rates have fallen in response to slower growth (6(b)). In that case, anyone who has locked in a future flow of income (coupons on government bonds, for example) will gain relative to others.
Such means of payment, adapted to the demand of users in the digital age, would (i) preserve the accessibility and usability of  Page 3 sur 7 central bank money, (ii) support our monetary sovereignty, and limit the risk that “external” digital assets – be they cryptos or non-European CBDC – would be used as settlement assets in the euro area, (iii) support the strategic autonomy of the European continent – and hopefully contribute to the emergence of a pan-European payment solution e.g. the European Payments Initiative, which could be used as a vehicle for the distribution of a digital euro. In the light of these challenges, and under the leadership of my Board colleague Fabio Panetta, the Eurosystem wisely decided on a two-year investigation phase on the issuance of a digital euro, before taking a decision about whether to go further by the end of 2023 / early 2024. I don’t say it’s done yet; but it’s our strategic – and yes, sovereign – responsibility to study the issue seriously, and then to decide. I would hence suggest we don’t focus too much our discussion on this “why” question, but on the “how”, together. And here I come to my third principle. 3. Our possible future digital euro must be designed and developed altogether, and be as decentralised as possible I stressed it here last year: a CBDC will be created with banks, not against them nor in spite of them.ii I don’t have any word to change to this commitment.

The part of the project which is quasi-consensual, with strong use-cases, is the one which raises little public interest – which does not mean that it is not key: wholesale CBDC. I will come back to this later. But let me start with the other face of the CBDC mountain: retail CBDC; this one, by contrast, is the focus of both public excitement and private questions. I. A ‘retail’ CBDC for a renewed intermediation in the digital age Let me suggest three hopefully shared principles to climb together this face of the mountain. 1. Our means of payment are and must remain a partnership between central bank money and commercial bank money  Page 2 sur 7 Until now, the coexistence and partnership of central bank and commercial bank money has structured the retail payment landscape and preserved the stability of the monetary system. Their respective roles are clearly assigned: central bank money anchors the stability of the financial system while the multiplicity of issuers of commercial bank money preserves competition and innovation. Their interplay and their interchangeability at par value ensures the safety and efficiency of the monetary and financial system. Neither one is better than the other, but in a joint venture each partner needs the other: a digital euro should never mean disappearance of commercial  bank money; conversely,  digitalisation cannot mean the disappearance of central bank money. Indeed these foundations – and especially the role of central bank money – are increasingly threatened by the digital revolution of the financial sector.
Once a month, immediately after the meeting of the Governing Council, the President of the ECB holds a press conference- which starts with a precise exposition of the diagnosis of the Governing Council which is immediately made available in real time on the ECB website. This was the case when we met last Thursday in Frankfurt. st  It is extremely important to stress that the Eurosystem was the first in the world to introduce, on the 1 January 1999, the concept of regular, frequent, real-time transparency in the domain of monetary policy. This illustrates the extent to which some criticisms are profoundly unjust ! It is especially noteworthy, in this regard, that soon after we had embarked upon this new concept of real-time transparency, other important central banks decided to go along the same path. Being accountable for an independent institution in a modern democracy or, as it is the case for the Eurosystem, in a subtle set of democracies like the European Union, means being accountable to public opinion at large. In this respect, the public speeches and testimonies of the President of the ECB for the benefit of both European institutions and public opinion, the public speeches and testimonies of the Governors of the National Central Banks to national institutions and public opinion, are crucial. Explaining tirelessly the reasons and the reasoning that underpin the decisions of the Governing Council is a key part of our collective duty.

Jean-Claude Trichet: The Euro after two years: present situation and prospects Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Banque de France, at a conference organised by “The Economist”, held in Madrid, on 7 February 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and an honour for me to be invited to speak in this seminar organised by The Economist, today in Madrid. I also thank Arthur Andersen and the Banco Bilbao Viscaya for their contribution to this gathering. It is also a great pleasure to meet again with my colleague Jaime Caruana, between two meetings of the ECB Governing Council. I am particularly happy to express my views on the already successful existence of the euro and Monetary Union, and the conditions and prospects for its further success. st  As you all know, within ten months, on 1 January 2002, the euro will become a reality across Europe as euro banknotes and coins are introduced. This will be the largest monetary change over the world has ever seen. However, it should be recalled that for all economic, monetary and institutional st purposes, Monetary Union was created on 1 January 1999. Then, a decisive event in the history of Europe occurred. The euro was born and the irreversible nature of this change has convinced an increasing number of economic players that the success of the euro is necessary for Europe.
The cost of the 2022/23 drought already amounts to more than $ 14.14 billion for soybean, wheat and corn producers, Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario, 10 March 2023 ii World Bank, Flood damages and economic losses over USD 30 billion and reconstruction needs over USD 16 billion, October 2022 iii NGFS scenarios portal iv The English version of a recent publication will be available within the next few days; in the meantime, you can refer to the French version of the Bulletin de la Banque de France n°243, Transition vers la neutralité carbone : quels effets sur la stabilité des prix ?, 5 April 2023 v Capital expenditure vi ECB Climate Agenda, 4 July 2022 vii Villeroy de Galhau, F., How central banks should face instability and fragmentation, speech, 12 April 2023 viii European Commission, « Fit for 55 impact assessment », Commission Staff Working Document, no SWD(2020) 176 final, September 2020 i  ix  Pisani-Ferry (J.) and Mahfouz (S.), « L’action climatique : un enjeu macroéconomique », La note d’analyse, no 114, France Stratégie, November 2022 Villeroy de Galhau, F., and Nagel, J., Fostering European unity: time for a genuine Capital Markets Union, published in French in Les Echos and in German in Handelsblatt on 14 November 2022 x

Weak design of crisis management frameworks may also lead to ex ante excessive risk-taking in the private sector (e.g., “too-big-to-fail” behaviours) and, in cross-border crises, to a lack of trust and free-riding behaviours by crisis management authorities, amplifying the initial shock. Since the 1970s, the frequency of financial instability episodes has increased globally. This prolonged trend appears to coincide with the gradual undoing of the post-war financial and regulatory structures. The shift towards less stringent financial regulation, combined with 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  breakthroughs in financial innovation, has profoundly altered the incentive structures underpinning the financial industry. This is likely to have been a primary cause of the episodes of financial instability that punctuated the global economic history of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s and reached a climax with the global financial crisis.1 To prevent the emergence of such bad outcomes, a sound, system-wide approach to financial regulation is of the essence. But what is the role of monetary policy? Can monetary policy be conducted in a way that reduces the likelihood of financial instability? The long-running debate on these issues within academic and policy-making circles can be broadly broken down into three different viewpoints.2 The first is the “pre-crisis consensus” view, which argues that monetary policy should maintain a relatively narrow mandate of price stability, leaving financial stability to prudential authorities. Under this view, the monetary authority should only take financial stability concerns into account in so far as they affect the outlook for price stability and economic activity.