samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And, to the extent conflicts occur, they are likely to best be resolved within a single institution through shared analysis and mutual understanding of reaction functions.15 Our strategy will be to conduct supervision as an integrated part of the central bank and not as a standalone supervisory agency that happens to be attached to a central bank. The benefits that close cooperation can bring were demonstrated in 2013 as the PRA and the FPC worked closely together to bring clarity both to banks’ existing capital positions, and the standards expected of them. The FPC mandated the exercise with a view to establishing a system-wide, transparent standard of resilience that would boost confidence and allow the banking system to contribute to economic recovery. The PRA – under Andrew Bailey’s leadership – delivered the recommendation for each of the major institutions. The resulting increase in capital ensured the core of the financial system was on a sound footing and made an important contribution to securing economic recovery. There were clearly lessons to learn from that exercise, most notably the importance of clarity of early communication by the Bank to financial institutions about the standards to which they would be held. Those lessons are being applied now in the first of the Bank’s annual stresstesting exercises, which will bring together the microprudential standards for banks with a macroprudential assessment of the risks to which they must be resilient. As with monetary policy, expectations matter and the system will be more resilient if the Bank’s moves can be anticipated.

In addition, there was a slow down in the growth of Government, private and non-bank financial institutions sectors borrowings to 2.3%, 3.1% and 10.3% in January 2004 from 3.1%, 3.4% and 14.5%, respectively. On a year-on-year basis, domestic credit slowed down by 7.5 percentage points to 40.0%. •  Following the reduction in the statutory reserve ratios on commercial banks’ Kwacha and foreign currency deposits to 14.0% from 17.5% on 31st October 2003, commercial banks’ total loans and advances increased by 6.6% between October 2003 and January 2004 in nominal terms. Sectors to which most of this lending went with respective percentage increases were: agriculture (12.2%), mining (36.3%) and electricity, gas, water and energy (316.9%). However, credit to the manufacturing sector fell by 18.8% while lending to the transport, storage and communications sector declined by 9.6%. Interest rates Yield rates on Treasury bills and Government bonds •  High liquidity levels, coupled with Government’s restraint on further borrowings from the market, continued to exert downward pressure on yield rates. The weighted average yield rate for all Treasury bills fell by 3.7 percentage points to 15.5 percent in February. This was driven by declines in the individual yield rates of all Treasury bills. •  Similarly, yield rates on Government bonds further declined, supported by reduced Government borrowing and abundance of liquidity in the market. Thus, the weighted average yield rate for all Government bonds fell to 17.5 percent in February from 22.7 percent in January.
It can be confirmed from this that the ECB reports with the same intensity and frequency as the US central bank. This does not mean that the quality of interaction cannot be improved, but this depends, to a large extent, on the European Parliament. BIS Review 82/2009  5

In the conduct of monetary policy, we assess the objective of stabilising inflation at close to 2½ per cent over time against the objective of stabilising output and employment. Given the low inflation rate, we have decided to keep interest rates at a low level and at times considered an even lower interest rate. However, against the background of solid growth in the Norwegian economy since summer 2003, we have instead decided to use some time to bring inflation back to target. Household debt has risen sharply since the mid-1990s. At the same time, house prices have shown a marked increase. Debt developments through the 1990s can probably be viewed to some extent as a delayed adaptation to the deregulation of the housing and credit markets in the 1980s, after many households burned their fingers immediately after the deregulation. At the same time, the credit market has deepened. New loan products have emerged, and it is easier to raise loans. Borrowers can choose their repayment schedule. Credit and housing market liberalisation provides homebuyers with the opportunity to establish a high housing standard early in their adult lives and draw on this capital later in life. In recent years, household income growth has been solid, household confidence regarding the future has been strong and households probably perceive higher income levels as permanent. This may have resulted in a further rise in house prices and debt. In addition, low real interest rates are currently contributing to this.
Doing this makes the bad scenario less likely to materialize and the improvement in credit supply helps to engineer a stronger recovery than would otherwise materialize.4 The third implication is that the stance of monetary policy needs to be assessed based on the state of the financial system and the real economy. How the monetary policy impulse is transmitted to the real economy is not immutable but changes depending on how monetary policy affects financial conditions and how financial conditions affect economic activity. During and following financial crises, problems in the financial system can impair the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. When this happens, policy may need to be more accommodative than otherwise in order to achieve its objectives. The experiences of both Japan and United States are cases in point.5 In retrospect, we know that following the collapse of the property bubble and the investment boom in Japan in the 1990s, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) did not follow a sufficiently accommodative monetary policy  4  Ideally, as was the case in the U.S. in 2009, the authorities should require banks to meet their stress scenario capital ratio standards by adding equity capital, with no credit given for reducing assets. This leans against the incentive to deleverage to meet higher capital ratio requirements. 5  See my recent speech “Lessons at the Zero Bound: The Japanese and U.S. Experience”, Japan Society, May 21, 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  to prevent deflation.

Second, financial instability can impair the linkage between monetary policy and financial conditions. The central bank may move to a much more accommodative monetary policy stance, but this may not lead to much improvement in financial conditions. We see this clearly in spreads and risk premia during periods of financial stress. Depletion of capital in the banking system or the interaction of frictions and market failures may also lead to constraints on the availability of credit following a financial shock. As a recent U.S. example of the second issue, households with lower FICO scores have had difficulties in refinancing  1  Krishna Guha, Marc Saidenberg and others on my staff contributed to these remarks. 2  As always, what I have to say here today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  their mortgages or in obtaining new mortgages to purchase a home. This stems from worries by lenders about put back risk – that such mortgages might be put back to them by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac should the mortgages become nonperforming. For any given reduction in mortgage rates relative to normal levels, this reduces the support for the housing sector and consumption. Thus, another lesson of the crisis is that monetary policymakers need to be more attuned to how the condition of the financial system influences how monetary policy changes affect financial conditions. Third, the linkage between financial conditions and aggregate demand may also be impaired.
Our experience is that there are positive synergy effects between active ownership and other aspects of investment activity. It is the political authorities that lay down the criteria for exclusion of individual companies from the investment universe. The Government is now proposing that the responsibility for deciding exclusion should be delegated to Norges Bank. An integration of instruments could BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  strengthen the effectiveness of active ownership. It would make it easier for companies to relate to a single representative of the GPFG, which may also enhance consistency and predictability in its performance of active ownership. Norges Bank aims to expand reporting on responsible investment practices. We are well prepared to take on a wider responsibility within a clearly defined framework. Norges Bank must then have a sufficient degree of freedom to organise and carry out its investment management task as effectively as possible. The overriding objective of investment management must remain the highest possible return within acceptable risk levels with a view to safeguarding and building wealth for future generations. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

I believe this cooperation will grow among supervisors in the South Eastern Europe. On behalf of the Bank of Albania I would like to assure you that we will offer full cooperation in this regard. Taking advantage of this opportunity, I would like to underscore that the Bank of Albania will always respect the public expectations and will fulfil, on time, its legal responsibilities in terms of maintaining the banking system and price stability. I thank You for your attention and wish you success! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Perhaps one lesson to be learnt from history is that the simplest method can sometimes be the best, as Andy Haldane has argued. Friedrich Georg Nissen’s rule that budgets should always balance was not particularly sophisticated, but if his ideas had been followed before the crisis, many countries would now be better off. However, the principles behind Nissen’s ideas were not completely unfamiliar when European politicians drew up the Maastricht Treaty at the beginning of the 1990s. The Treaty contained simple rules for economic policy: budget deficits should be below three percent and government debt below 60 percent of GDP. The rules sparked debate, and academics the world over – including in Norway – ridiculed them as far-fetched and hopelessly rigid. And as so often before, the rules soon sank into oblivion, particularly after the major EU countries Germany and France had pushed them aside. 14  Georg F. Nissen was not alone in focusing on the fiscal balance. Nicolai Rygg wrote the following in 1948: “There is a tenet that is not difficult to endorse: in times of slow economic growth, when the private sector relaxes, central and local government should support the economy, initiate projects to sustain activity and to prevent a rise in unemployment.

Irma Rosenberg: The objective of monetary policy Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a meeting arranged by Öhman Fondkommission, Stockholm, 14 February 2006. *  *  *  A discussion has recently taken place in the media on the objective of monetary policy. Some have argued that we should have more objectives while others considered that we already work with too many objectives and that this has created a lack of clarity. In my opinion this discussion is a bit misleading. We have one objective: keeping inflation low and stable. However, in our efforts to achieve this objective, we have, like many other central banks, opted to be flexible to avoid exposing the economy to strain. Our statutory objective is to maintain price stability. It has been left to the Riksbank to decide on the detailed interpretation of this objective. We have defined it as meaning that inflation should be 2 per cent. However, monetary policy affects the economy with a time lag and is simply not precise enough to maintain inflation at a constant 2 per cent. The inflation target includes a tolerance interval of +/one percentage point to underline that temporary deviations are permitted, provided that these are not too large. For further clarity, we apply the principle that in the event of any deviation, inflation should normally be brought back to the target within a two-year period. When we set the interest rate, we must accordingly base our decision on an inflation forecast.
31.10.2018  Appearance by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Parliamentary Economic Committee Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin my first appearance as Governor of the Banco de España before this chamber expressing my sincere gratitude for the comments made by the Parliamentary group representatives about me when the former Minister for the Economy, Industry and Competitiveness – Román Escolano – put forward my proposed appointment to the house. Likewise, I particularly value all your suggestions and opinions about the functioning and mission of the Banco de España. I take these suggestions as a spur to enhance my work, which I undertake to perform with full independence, as the Law of Autonomy obliges me to. To this end, I should like to seize this occasion to announce that the Banco de España has begun work on an ambitious strategic planning project for the coming years. Under a comprehensive and forward-looking approach, the project will address most of the issues raised here, along with other matters we consider essential so that our central bank may better perform its functions and be of greater value to society, in the context of the Eurosystem and the new economic governance of the euro area.

Finally, I would like to mention the necessary action by government, in at least two areas of its competence. The first is fiscal policy. One of the major advantages of the fiscal consolidation drive during the long period of expansion of the Spanish economy is that the government budget mechanisms, known as automatic stabilisers, can now operate fully. These mechanisms act rapidly, promoting confidence and facilitating agents’ formation of expectations. However, the activation of fiscal policy measures of a discretionary nature must be prevented from jeopardising budget stability in the medium and long-term, since this would entail costs far exceeding any potential benefits that might be had in the short-term. The second area of action is that of measures of a structural nature aimed at improving the functioning of certain markets, increasing the flexibility of wage and price formation mechanisms and expediting the reallocation of factors across sectors of the economy. For this task to be successful, the responsible co-operation of the social partners is also crucial. To go into these matters in depth would need a whole conference in itself, so I shall conclude on this point, but not before reiterating once again the main idea I wish to leave with you today. The Spanish financial system has not participated in the causal factors of the current international financial turbulence and this, together with its financial soundness, puts it in a favourable starting position.
9  According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, “[t]he objective for monetary policy is to maintain price stability”, According to Government Bill 1997/98:40, “[a]s an authority under the Riksdag, the Riksbank, without prejudice to the price stability market, should furthermore support the goals of general economic policy with a view to maintaining a sustainable rate of growth and high employment”. (My italics.) I interprete “high employment” as “highest sustainable employment”. 10  One exception is when average inflation deviates from average inflation expectations for a long period of time. Then average inflation below inflation expectations will increase average unemployment, see Svensson (2012a). 11  According to Englund’s (2011) article on the development of housing prices and explanations for this in the Riksbank’s inquiry into the risks in the housing markets, monetary policy plays no role here and real housing prices are explained by real quantities. In the general equilibrium model for housing prices calculated using Swedish data by Walentin and Sellin (2010) and which is also used by Claussen, Jonsson and Lagerwall (2011), monetary policy has no long-run effect on housing prices or household debt. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  economic costs. Examples of such measures include the loan-to-value cap, regulations on deductions for mortgage rates, taxes, capital adequacy requirements, risk weights and so on. Keeping an eye on risks related to household debt is a task for the policy area known as macroprudential policy. As yet, there is no fully-developed framework for macroprudential policy in Sweden.

However, during the period of turmoil since last summer it has proved toxic, here and overseas, for banks to access liquidity on those terms from central banks unless in broad and quality company. That has created uncertainty about the access of banks to the central banks in practice, and has required innovation and clear assurances from the central banking community. This alone will require reforms to the way in which central banks use their balance sheets, and money creating power, to sustain financial stability. Banks will also need to adapt. It seems that at not a few firms, the discipline of risk management somehow got separated from that of balance sheet management (or funding). It was effectively assumed that financing markets would remain open come what may. There is a question of whether treasury management should somehow be insulated from the pressures of a profit centre. Separately, assumptions were made about relationships between asset prices that have proved groundless. One such is the spread between term money market rates and expected central bank policy rates. So long as the so-called LIBOR/Overnight Index Swap spread was narrow at all maturities, few market participants cared about whether they hedged against a LIBOR-based instrument when in fact sometimes they really needed a hedge relative to a risk-free rate. We sense that some international fixed-income asset managers would like there to be OIS-based contracts alongside LIBOR-based financial contracts, so that they can tailor their hedges more precisely.
The latter, moreover, would be of direct benefit in terms of price competitiveness, as would be the reduction in currency conversion costs and the increased price transparency. Our assessment also shows that Malta is well suited to participate in the euro area. Its economic structure bears a fair degree of similarity with the euro area and both trade and financial linkages are substantial. Furthermore, the lira is already closely linked with the euro so that joining the euro area does not entail a radical change in the parameters applicable to macroeconomic policy setting in Malta. At the same time, most of the formal requirements for entry, with the exception of the criteria on public finances, have been, or stand a good chance of being met on a sustainable basis. As far as public finances are concerned, moreover, the fiscal consolidation process is on schedule, as the EU Council has acknowledged, with the target deficit/GDP ratio for 2004 achieved. A positive track record of exchange rate stability has meanwhile cultivated expectations abroad that Malta will not remain outside the euro area more than is necessary. A delay would thus send the wrong signals to international investors and could well reverse the upgrade in Malta's credit rating as this was partly a response to expectations that Malta would proceed with economic reform at a steady pace to adopt the euro as soon as conditions allowed.

Michael C Bonello: Interview with The Times Interview with Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta. This interview was published in The Times on 26 March 2005. *  *  *  The Cabinet recently discussed Malta's approach to the euro and the Prime Minister has declared that a decision about ERM II might be taken soon. The Times caught up with the Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, Michael C. Bonello, and asked him to explain some of the central concepts involved and how events are likely to unfold in the coming weeks and months. It is almost a year since Malta joined the European Union. The next step for the new Member States is the adoption of the euro. Two Cabinet meetings were held recently to discuss Malta's strategy in this regard. What role do these meetings play in the overall preparatory process? The obligation to adopt the euro reflects the important role the single currency has come to play in what the EU is today and in what it is set to become in the future. As a minimum, by significantly reducing transaction costs and exchange rate risk, the euro facilitates progress towards the completion of the Single Market. This expectation is supported by the conclusions of academic studies which suggest that a currency union results in approximately a doubling of trade. The Treaty, however, does not set a target date for euro adoption.
The perforated number (microperforation), for example, which was initially used only for the large denominations of CHF 100, CHF 200 and CHF 1,000, has been applied to all the existing banknote denominations since the 2000 issue. We cannot rule out the possibility, however, that one day - given the progress being made in counterfeiting technology - some of the currently used security features could be imitated. For this reason, we have to resort to state-of-the-art technologies and visual phenomena to protect our banknotes. As it is a long way between the development of such technologies and their readiness for practical application, our decision to develop a new banknote series could not wait any longer. Theme of the new banknote series The public is doubtlessly more interested in the theme and design of new banknotes than in the security technology. For one thing, the motifs must be easy to perceive and remember. For another, banknotes serve as a kind of national showcase. The visual appearance of our banknotes must both satisfy aesthetic requirements and convey values that represent our country and that are shared by the Swiss people. Several design and communications experts were asked already some time ago to consider a theme for the new banknote series, and a number of proposals were submitted. The Governing Board of the National Bank decided on the theme “Switzerland open to the world” (“La Suisse ouverte au Monde”). This theme permits the depiction of a modern and internationally oriented country.

The recent narrowing of spreads between benchmark issuances and triple A rated papers indicate that risk aversion has now eased. In the primary market, new corporate bond issuance has increased by about 40 percent to RM28.4 billion in the second quarter of this year. In the secondary market, the recent average daily trading volume has also increased by more than 50 percent. Demand for higher-yielding securities are also beginning to rise ahead of the recovery in the global economy. In addition, in view of the prospects for an earlier recovery in Asia, global investors in the current uncertain international environment will increasingly be looking at Asian financial markets for investment opportunities. This trend is already being observed through the substantial inflow of funds dedicated for emerging markets since the middle of April this year with an estimated average inflows of USD 144 million per week compared to the net outflow recorded in the early part of the year. This positive trend enhances the opportunity for Malaysia to further expand its bond market. Timely issuance of corporate handbook by AmBank The corporate handbook being launched by AmBank today therefore comes at an important juncture in the development of the bond market. Encapsulating the profiles of 100 conventional and sukuk issuers in the Malaysian bond market, it is indeed a commendable  2  BIS Review 27/2009  effort by AmBank to provide this comprehensive information to foreign and domestic investors to facilitate their investment decisions.