samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
18.05.2022  Welcoming remarks Pathways to Gender Equality in Central Banks Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Dear ladies and gentlemen, I feel very honored to participate in the opening of this conference co-organized with the International Economic Association, Banco de la República and Banco de España. The development of initiatives, such as this one that gives visibility to issues related to gender diversity, are key to finding solutions to the waste of talent that involves not taking this diversity into account, consequently putting economic growth at risk and depriving economies of opportunities to develop. Ensuring diversity and, in particular, gender balance, must be a priority in our organizations and, with this commitment, we work at the Banco de España, where we have made significant progress in recent years. By the end of 2021, 51% of our total staff were females, and it is noteworthy that, in one decade (since 2012), that proportion has increased in nearly 10 percentage points. More than 4 years ago, in April 2018, Banco de España joined Bank Al Maghrib, the central bank of Morocco, to organize the first international meeting between international central banks with the aim of studying and fostering female leadership in central banks.

Interest rates will continue to be raised gradually ahead so that we can assess the effects of interest rate changes and other new information about economic developments. Thank you for the opportunity to present these assessments before answering questions. 12  BIS Review 47/2007
The guidelines define the role and responsibilities of the Shariah Committee, which extends beyond endorsement of Shariah-compliant products to also ensure that the operations of the Islamic banking institution complies with Shariah requirements at all times. The guidelines also prescribe the fit and proper criteria for members of the committee, and places emphasis on the independence of the committee to report directly to the Board and to accord to the Board the responsibility to ensure that the Shariah Committee can effectively discharge its duties. In addition, members of the Shariah Committee may not sit on the Shariah Committee of other Islamic banking institutions as well as on the Shariah Advisory Council of the Central Bank so as to preserve the confidentiality and avoid potential conflict of interests. To promote greater financial transparency and disclosure and to safeguard the interests of investment depositors, guidelines have also been issued on the model financial statement of the Islamic banks. In this connection, Islamic banking institutions are required to provide disclosure of information, among others, on the segregation of income and expenses from the categories of instruments including the investment of unrestricted investment deposits, restricted investment deposits and investment of shareholder's funds. Islamic banking institutions are also required to disclose information on the profit equalization reserves. In addition to disclosure requirements in the financial statement, a standard framework for the calculation of the rate of return for Islamic banking operations has been introduced.

This framework must set out the functions of each component and level of governance in a manner to ensure accountability of each respective jurisdiction with appropriate division of powers to avoid possible conflict of interests. In this context, consideration may be given to four main ingredients important to the governance framework for Islamic financial institutions. (i)  Firstly, to ensure that the guidance, standards and core principles are able to translate the values consistent with the injunctions of Shariah. The core values of honesty and integrity are key ingredients of the governance framework of the Islamic financial transactions with heavy reliance on the trust relationship. The significance of these core values is clearly highlighted in the Qur'an, Sunnah and the "fiqh". The banking institutions, as user of public funds must act in good faith for the benefit of all stakeholders. If the relationship between the financier and entrepreneur can be built on honesty, efficiency and equity, a durable equilibrium can be established that will serve the mutual interest of both parties. (ii)  Secondly, the governance framework needs to take into account the multi-faceted role performed by the Islamic financial institutions and treat all the relevant stakeholders fairly, including minority shareholders and the investment account holders. It is an embodiment of the concept of justice in Islam as stated in Qur'an, which is nearest to righteousness (taqwa) in the Islamic faith.
A third reason is that households’ ability to service debt has not deteriorated at the same rate as their debt has increased. Households pay much less for their loans today than at the beginning of the 1990s and therefore can afford to take on larger debt. In the early 1990s households’ interest payments comprised around 10 per cent of their disposable incomes, while they only constitute 4 per cent today (Figure 4). 2  BIS Review 67/2004  Households’ assets have also increased in value. Since the mid-1990s the value of households’ financial assets - equities, bonds and other savings - has risen by about 70 per cent. And this has occurred despite the price decline in the equity market. All in all, households’ debts have increased at more or less the same rate as their assets (Figure 5). This development could be seen as satisfactory from the point of view of stability because households don’t need to rely on their incomes only; they also have assets that they can realise and pay their debts with if necessary. We base our regular analyses on data for the household sector as a whole. However, it’s not certain that individual, indebted households also have enough income or assets. To make sure of this, we took a closer look last spring at the indebtedness and the ability to service debt of different income groups, based on data for 2000 and 2001.

10  BIS Review 103/2009  Figure 16: Risk Premium Indicators Change in 5-year CDS rates since Aug 2008 (1 Aug 2008 =1) Turkey Brazil 5.5 South Africa Hungary 4.5 South Korea 3.5  900 800  EMBI+ Türkiye EMBI+ Turkey EMBI+ EMBI+  700 600 500 400  2.5  300  1.5  200 0609  0109  0808  0308  1007  0609  0409  0209  1208  1008  0808  0507  100  0.5  Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. In terms of changes in currency values, the Turkish lira did not significantly differ from other emerging market currencies. However, the relative fall in the volatility of the Turkish lira, which had historically high volatility and extreme sensitivity to the global risk appetite, has become more evident in 2009, when countries’ own experiences began to unfold following the worst period of the crisis (Figure 17). Figure 17: Exchange Rate Developments 1000  0.025  1.7  500  0.02  400  0.015  1.6  0609  0409  0209  1208  1008  0808  0608  0408  0  0208  100 1207  1.4 1007  0.005  0807  0.01  200 0607  300  1.5  0609  600  0309  0.03  1.8  1208  0.035  700  0908  800  0608  EMBI+Türkiye (sağ eksen)  Kur Oynaklığı* Brezilya Çek Cum.
I have in mind here, financing models used in most Asian countries such as the Grameen Bank model in Bangladesh which has demonstrated that women’s potential to contribute towards poverty reduction can be unlocked through provision of finance at community level. Indeed the Grameen Bank model has also proved that women have a good habit of paying back their loans. It is also fitting that women’s potential to contribute to development should be acknowledged and their potential to drive change should be recognised. Although women are yet to gain equality, they are helping to move their families and communities out of poverty. With a little more support, so much more could be achieved. It is my hope that access to finance by women will be enhanced through this exhibition. I am however, pleased to note that, today, more financial institutions are providing financial services to women in Zambia. More women and girls are learning to read and write. We also see throughout the country that women are discovering a new level of economic independence. They’re contributing more to their families and communities. They’re gaining access to credit and jobs that can give them a decent standing of living. This is desirable and should be encouraged. As I conclude, let me extend my gratitude to all the participants and resource persons and commend all the institutions that have taken part to organise both the workshop and exhibition.

The events range from small random informal gatherings to large-scale highly organised events to celebrate women’s advancement while highlighting the need for continued vigilance and action. A good number of Governments around the world, have made commitments to promote gender equality, by among other things, taking initiatives to integrate gender perspectives into national budgets or development plans in order to reflect the differentiated needs of women and men. Zambia is no exception. In Zambia, it is recognised that the creation of the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development, is a deliberate effort by the Government to ensure that the needs of women are addressed. Through the Ministry we are able to recognise the strides that have been made by women in national development and we look ahead to the challenges that are before us as we strive to achieve our goal of gender equality. In addition, Zambia is a signatory to the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. This declaration calls for the equal representation of women and men in the decision making process of member states at all levels. I must concede here that, although we have made significant strides as a country in women representation, more still needs to be done. We are however encouraged that there are a good number of women with potential and ability to rise above any form of challenge.
Commercial banks’ nominal interest rates •  Consistent with the trend in yield rates on Government securities, all commercial banks’ nominal interest rates declined. The weighted average lending base rate (WALBR) and the average lending rate (ALR) declined to 33.7% and 41.3% in February 2004 from 36.2% and 43.9% in January 2003, respectively. The average savings rate for amounts above K100,000 and the 30-day deposit rate for amounts of over K20 million dropped to 7.0% and 11.5% from 7.2% and 15.1% in January 2004, respectively. Real interest rates •  All real interest rates declined due to the decrease in the rate of inflation and the fall in nominal interest rates. The real WATBR fell by 3.9 percentage points to negative 2.2% in February from 1.7% in January 2004. The real Weighted Average Treasury bill Rate (WALBR) declined by 1.9 percentage points to 16.9% from 18.8%. Similarly, the real 30-day deposit rate for amounts above K20 million fell by 3.0 percentage points to negative 5.3%. However, the real ASR for amounts exceeding K100,000 increased by 0.4 percentage points to negative 9.8%. Foreign exchange market •  During the review period, the Kwacha remained relatively stable. It gained 0.2 percent against the US dollar to an average of K4,763.99 per US dollar in February. However, the Kwacha weakened against other major traded currencies, depreciating by 2.7 percent against the pound sterling to an average of K8,879.12 per British pound and 1.7 percent against the South African rand to an average of K706.87 per rand.

Már Guðmundsson: Iceland’s crisis and recovery and current challenges Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a conference, organised by the French-Icelandic Chamber of Commerce; Paris, 28 February 2013. *  *  *  President of Iceland, Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen Nearly all of you probably know that almost 90% of Iceland’s banking sector failed in the first week of October 2008. This fact is well established in the minds of scholars of the international financial crisis. What is probably less well known is that at that point, Iceland was already on its way into a recession after an unsustainable boom and serious overheating during 2005–2007 and a currency crisis in the first half of 2008. The banking collapse and the associated wealth loss and further currency depreciation made the recession worse, of course, but so did the recession that hit the global economy in the fourth quarter of 2008. That autumn, two separate but interrelated sub-stories of the recent Icelandic saga converged in a tragic grand finale. These are: 1. Iceland’s boom-bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open, and financially integrated economies. This is a story that has played out many times around the globe, and many of its elements have been seen before in Iceland. It might have been somewhat more extreme this time around, but it wasn’t fundamentally different. 2. The rise and fall of three cross-border banks operating on the basis of EU legislation (the European “passport”).
There will quite probably be hard questions about the organisation of some banks; about which services needed to be maintained; about conflicts between the insolvency laws and special resolution regimes of different countries; about how losses can in the future credibly be made to fall on wholesale creditors; and, maybe, about the issues confronting burden sharing amongst national authorities if, notwithstanding these efforts, fiscal support nevertheless proves unavoidable when an internationally active bank fails in the future. Over time, this could lead to something of a revolution in the supervision of banks – because of the inducement to  4  BIS Review 134/2009  design regulatory arrangements to cater for circumstances in which supervision had failed to avert distress. Imagine that despite all the obstacles, we make terrific progress with recovery and resolution plans over the next few years. To be clear, it is not that we can promise that yet: the work of the regulators: internationally has just begun. Rather, the point is that even that would not be enough. The community having finally recognised that we cannot rely wholly on regulation and supervision, we must not now make the analogous mistake of thinking that we can rely on resolution plans. However good, those de-risking and wind-down plans will sometimes prove flawed. That is why for some months I have been arguing for the need to articulate a framework for Capital of Last Resort provision.

This forum, which was held on the eve of global turmoil outburst, indicated that the Albanian banking system had significantly increased its resilience. It addressed important matters related to: •  Transparency and customer services,  •  Risks related to foreign currency credit and consumer credit, as well as  •  Interbank market functions and monetary policy transmission in the economy. Today’s forum takes place in an important moment of the banking and financial system. After a hard year, it seems that the situation is becoming eventually normal. Therefore, I am confident that, figuratively, the third forum will have the consolidation of public confidence in the Albanian banking system as the main motif. Achievements in this regard are not lacking. Statistics show that deposit level is approaching steadily to its prior-crisis level, while ALL credit livening-up is continuing. Dear participants, Today’s meeting is held after some important financial and economic events dictated by the global crisis. Now that the situation has cleared up and has entered into an improvement stage, a thorough analysis is being made about its causes, about public authorities’ reaction and about actions to be taken, in order to raise the global financial system’s resilience. Now, allow me to deal briefly with the main features of this unmatched crisis, and then continue with some arguments on the functioning of the Albanian financial system and some necessary regulations for its further perfection.
From the position of the BNB and in view of the goals for controlling inflation, it is very important that the country does not assume significant additional permanent expenditures, which are not backed by permanent revenues. There are two groups of risks associated with such an approach: (i) the risk of an inflationary spiral and (ii) the need for painful fiscal adjustments in the near future, whether in terms of revenue, i.e. by increasing taxes, or by cutting costs. Along with external factors, this would lead to a significantly more complicated macroeconomic environment for the Bulgarian banks. In terms of the external factors and their further complication and deterioration because of the war in Ukraine, most important will be the decisions of the big leading central banks, primarily the ECB in our case. There are already clear statements about three things that will happen during the third quarter of this year: (i) the ECB will effectively end net asset purchases from the beginning of July; (ii) subsequently the ECB intends to raise its key interest rates; and (iii) will do it again in September so that by the end of the quarter we will move away from negative interest rates. Obviously, in the following months and at least a year ahead we will be facing the challenge to find the very difficult balance between the measures to control inflation and the measures to prevent recession. How is our banking sector meeting the new challenges? Our starting position remains very good.

How much of this business will resist the current period of stress remains an open issue, but euro area monetary statistics have shown no sign of a major decline in these money holdings so far. -  In terms of new products, the recent emergence, at least in France, of high-yield liquid deposits that are accessible via direct banking on the internet is very likely to have reduced the interest elasticity of money. Of course, monetary policy, in the euro area and elsewhere, is not committed to react mechanically to monetary developments. Nevertheless, to make the best use of the informational role of money, central banks must be able to filter out the noise that affects current monetary data, disentangling temporary factors from shifts in trends, supply shocks from demand shocks, with the latter possibly resulting from certain financial innovations in the context of globalisation. Fully assessing the effects of financial innovation is thus a real challenge for monetary analysis. Considering the practical difficulties ahead, this seems to me to offer a fruitful field for applied research. Challenges for communication in times of stress: disentangling monetary and financial stability objectives Financial market disruptions that may follow times of exuberant financial innovation may pose significant risks to macroeconomic stability. However, by their very nature and notably the highly non-linear dynamics they may trigger, such events, as well as the magnitude and speed of their macroeconomic consequences are uncertain.
Minouche Shafik: Treading carefully Speech by Ms Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking of the Bank of England, at the Institute of Directors, London, 14 December 2015. *  *  *  I would especially like to thank Grellan McGrath for his help with the analysis and evidence in this speech. Comments from Alex Haberis, Andrew Hauser, Gareth Ramsay, Jon Relleen, Matt Waldron, Martin Weale and James Talbot are also gratefully acknowledged. Introduction In what is likely a first for a monetary policymaker, I would like to begin my speech today with a chart of the depth of tread on car tyres – as measured by the busiest tyre fitting station in the UK whom I recently visited in the South East. Generally speaking, the deeper the grooves are on a tyre, the better is its grip, performance and safety. When the recession hit in 2008, people began to delay replacing their tyres, implicitly accepting a deterioration in quality in the hope of saving on costs (Chart 1). What is surprising, however, is that although we are now into the seventh year of the recovery, the frequency with which drivers replace their tyres has not returned to pre-crisis levels. This illustrates quite nicely that although the economy is thankfully returning to normal, we cannot blithely assume that relationships which held in the past will automatically revert.

Retain flexibility  Of course one can never know exactly what the future holds. So when the time does come to raise Bank Rate, it will be important to retain the flexibility to change course if needs be, either by tightening policy more quickly than originally envisaged or by being prepared to loosen again. Were it required to respond to unforeseen events, the MPC would have two tools at its immediate disposal: Bank Rate and QE. Past experience gives us a good dataset from which to gain an understanding of how changes in policy rates transmit to the economy. Based on a rich literature of international estimates over the period since inflation targeting began, the peak impact on inflation is generally estimated to occur with a lag of between 18 and 24 months, although it begins to  5  See Shafik (2015) and Broadbent (2015) for more on this issue. 6  Though should proposed legislation pass, the number of MPC meetings per year will reduce from 12 to 8, in line with the recommendations of the Warsh Review (Warsh, 2014)  7  The market curve represents the mean of the priced distribution of interest rates. Consideration of risks can cause this whole distribution to move relative to true expectations. Risks can also affect the shape of the distribution, though Dison and Elliot (2015) found that the shape of the distribution is currently being heavily influenced by the proximity of Bank Rate to the effective lower bound.