samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
How Malaysia survived the global financial crisis Let me conclude by outlining why we had not been adversely affected by the recent financial crisis. Banking system maintained strong financial and capital buffers at end 2008 during the peak of the crisis as evidenced by:   Strong capital position with RWCR of 12.6% and core capital ratio of 10.6%.   Ample liquidity with total interbank placements of more than RM150 billion with BNM that can be unwound to release RM liquidity to the system at any time.   Low exposures to foreign currency (FX) denominated assets.   Banks’ leverage position remains manageable and lower than foreign institutions abroad. –  Balance sheet leverage (i.e. total assets / common equity) for the Malaysian banking system of about 15 times (vs. global average of about 20 to 30 times). Banks had strengthened institutional set-up and capacity post Asian Financial Crisis through:   More robust risk management standards and practices.   Stronger corporate governance structure.   Smooth implementation of the Standardised Approach of Basel II’s Capital Adequacy Framework.   Balanced and diversified business portfolios. Enhanced financial infrastructure post Asian Financial Crisis through:   Enhanced depth and size of bond and Sukuk market (about 107 % of GDP).   Strengthened financial safety nets (e.g. establishment of Malaysian Deposit Insurance Scheme)/Danajamin/CDRC/SDRS.   Strengthened regulatory and supervisory approach (e.g. gradual move towards principles based regulations, adopting of risk based supervision).   Legislative reforms (e.g.

José Manuel González-Páramo: Re-starting securitisation Keynote speech by Mr José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe/European Science Foundation (ESF) and Information Management Network Global ABS (AssetBacked Securities) 2010 Conference, London, 16 June 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I. Introduction  I am very pleased to be here in London to participate again at the AFME/ESF and IMN Global ABS Conference. Today, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the restarting of the ABS markets, in the light of the important role that it should play from a macro-financial point of view. More precisely, I shall first outline the role which securitisation should play in the financial system and why this role is important. Then, I shall assess in more detail the current situation of the securitisation markets. Finally, I would like to make some considerations on the way forward for the restarting of the ABS markets. In doing so, I shall assess what has been done and what still needs to be done to reach a sustained rebound of the securitisation markets. II. Current financial market conditions  To set the stage, I shall refer to the ECB’s latest Financial Stability Review, published on 4 June, which analyses in detail the so-called large and complex banking groups (LCBGs), and the findings of which may, with some caution, be extended to the euro area banking sector as a whole.
But do not expect a zero risk environment - and do not demand it. Fear of failure is the antidote for instability. It will go a long way to underpin the long term health of the financial system. 5  Governor Lars Heikensten “The Riksbank’s Work on Financial Stability”: Speech at Göteborgs University, 25 November 2003. BIS Review 5/2004  9

During parts of 2006 house prices in Denmark, for example, rose at an annual rate of more than 20 percentage points, which was way above the Swedish increase. In the countries where  8  BIS Review 70/2010  real house prices had previously increased more rapidly than in Sweden, they have in most cases experienced fairly large price falls in connection with the crisis. For instance, in Denmark real house prices have fallen by around 20 per cent since the peak levels in 2007. So are developments in the Swedish credit and housing market cause for concern? My view is – not in the short term. But nor do I believe that the growth we have seen in household borrowing and house prices over the past decade is sustainable in the long term. The reason I do not believe developments to be a problem right now is that there are nevertheless reasonable explanations for the price increases. Recently it is probably the case that factors such as the fact that it is still cheap to borrow, and that households and companies according to indicators are regaining confidence, have contributed to the nevertheless strong development. There has also been relatively little new housing built in recent years, at least in relation to demand. The housing market is what one might call “regionally segregated” and migration to metropolitan areas has put upward pressure on house prices in these areas. Prices have also increased by far the most in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö.
The view that the central bank should only react if the forecasts indicate problems may appear reasonable, but there are some uncertainties in this, particularly with regard to how this should be translated into practical policy. In situations where house prices and lending are rising very quickly, the central bank can see risks in this development, even if it cannot be sure whether a bubble is building up. It may then be difficult and even inappropriate to remain completely passive, even if the main line of the forecasts is that developments will be balanced. If house prices were then to plummet and pull down demand and inflation, the consequences could be very severe, which is clearly illustrated by the current financial crisis. The conclusion the Riksbank has reached with regard to monetary policy is therefore that this type of risk may need to be taken into consideration in a different way than the normal procedure, via the forecasts for inflation and the real economy. As indicated in the policy document "Monetary Policy in Sweden", this could be done by beginning a phase of interest rate increases slightly earlier than would otherwise have been the case, or by postponing a phase of interest rate increases. In addition, we highlight and warn against various types of risk, for instance in our speeches and reports. This was how we acted for instance in 2006.

Recognizing the clear need for a more risk-sensitive and flexible Basel Accord, the new framework is intended to more closely align regulatory capital requirements with underlying risks, and to provide banks and their supervisors with a range of options for the assessment of capital adequacy. There is more emphasis on banks’ own internal methodologies as well as other elements that are critical to ensuring the capital adequacy of banks, such as strong risk management and sufficient public disclosure of information. The Committee has also discarded the one-size-fits-all framework for the calculation of minimum capital requirements. Instead, the proposed framework provides a menu from which banks can choose, with the authorization of their supervisor and depending on the complexity of their business as well as the quality of their risk management. The Basel Committee is seeking comments on the proposed framework until the end of May and plans to finalize the new Accord well before the end of this year, during which time the Committee will pursue an active dialogue with non-G10 supervisors. It is envisioned that the revised Accord will be implemented in 2004. The role of a sound and stable macroeconomic environment A sound and stable macroeconomic environment is also crucial for financial stability, and more generally for promoting sustainable growth. The converse--macroeconomic overheating--raises the likelihood of an eventual crisis, first by promoting excessive, and eventually unsustainable, external and internal borrowing.
As a consequence, consumers can benefit from lower prices, higher real incomes, and greater variety and quality of goods and services. Increased openness may also reduce wasteful rentseeking behavior on the part of protected industries and the related costs of corruption. These benefits from open trade are very evident in India. Academic research has found substantial gains for India following its dramatic trade reforms in the 1990s, which benefited consumers via lower prices and firms via higher markups. These higher profit margins spurred innovation and provided funds for the development of new products. Looking ahead, the upcoming implementation of the goods and services tax in India—which will create a common market internally—is expected to provide many of the same benefits as trade liberalization does internationally. Openness to trade has certainly played a large role in the economic ascent of Asia. Following the rise of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and others, fast growth in China and India has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of extreme poverty—an unprecedented feat in human history. The benefits 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  of economic integration and other reforms are exemplified in India’s higher growth rate since the introduction of market reforms in 1991. Growth has averaged 6.5 percent annually in the postreform period, compared to about 4 percent annually over the prior 40 years. Indeed, India is the fastest-growing major economy in the world today.

This is why we should rely on a suite of models, and on actual data as much as on models. - the restrictive effects on activity, while being in mean reversed in 2025, are quicker than the dampening effects on inflation: hence we should be patient and consistent, including in our explanations to the broad public. The estimated transmission lags of monetary policy in the literature vary from one year5 to more than two years6. But interpreting these lags is more art than science. Overall transmission lags of monetary policy to inflation can vary over time and across jurisdictions, depending on factors such as the level of interest rates, the phase of the cycle and the sectoral structure of the economy (e.g. share of manufacturing, services, or housing). In the current tightening cycle, several factors suggest that the lag in transmission of policy to the real economy may be at the upper end of the two-year range. First, the current tightening cycle started from exceptionally low levels of real interest rates – as measured by nominal OIS rate deflated by market inflation expectations. 5  5. Smets and Wouters (2005); see also ECB NAWM model presented in P. Lane’s lecture on 16/02/2023, “The euro area hiking cycle: an interim assessment”. 6 Badinger and Schiman (2023), Measuring Monetary Policy in the Euro Area Using SVARs with Residual Restrictions. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2023, 15(2): 279–305, or; see also ECB-BASE model.
Benoît Cœuré: What yield curves are telling us Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Financial Times European Financial Forum "Building a New Future for International Financial Services", Dublin, 31 January 2018. * * * Accompanying slides. The US Treasury yield curve flattened considerably last year, reducing the spread between tenyear and two-year US Treasury yields to less than 60 basis points. When Alan Greenspan first referred to a bond market “conundrum” in 2005, the spread was around 80 basis points.1 In the euro area, by contrast, the term spread remained broadly unchanged last year. At face value, a simple reconciling factor of recent international bond price developments is the tightening cycle that has gained traction in the United States. It is well known that a rise in policy rates typically leads to a flattening of the sovereign yield curve as long-term rates tend to increase by less than short-term rates. In my remarks this morning I will try to shed some more light on the potential factors currently affecting long-term rates. I will argue that, in and of itself, policy normalisation in the US cannot fully explain the pronounced flattening of the US Treasury curve.

The US yield curve is currently at its flattest level for more than ten years, with ten-year Treasuries yielding just about 60 basis points more than two-year bonds. At the start of 2017, the difference was around 130 basis points. You can also see that the German Bund curve is currently about twice as steep as the US Treasury curve and has remained relatively stable, with ten-year bonds over most of the time yielding around 100 basis points more than two-year bonds – not very far from the average observed over the past 20 years. My second slide focuses on the US Treasury curve. What you can see here is the ten-year yield 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  and a model-based breakdown of the yield into its two main components: the average of the current and expected future short-term interest rates over the maturity of the bond and the term premium. All series are shown as cumulative changes since the start of last year. Two facts can be drawn from this chart. The first is that the recent marked flattening of the curve reflects what markets call a “bear flattening” – that is, short-term rates have been rising faster than long-term rates. This is evident from the fact that the ten-year yield – the blue solid line – today is about the same as it was a year ago. Short-term interest rates, meanwhile, have risen by around 90 basis points.
I should add that we will also expect individual financial institutions to design and implement appropriate programs for transitioning employees affected by digital disruptions, beyond compensation arrangements. Preparing society for digital finance My final point has to do with preparing society for digital finance. The consumer experience of financial services is changing dramatically. This is happening on several levels. Customer interfaces are shifting online. The basic commodity of finance – money – is being replaced by electronic forms. Financial products are offered as part of a seamless solution for customers buying property, subscribing to a mobile phone or data package, going on a holiday or enrolling in university. This in turn alters the relationships that a consumer develops, which can be several 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  layers removed from the entity that is ultimately providing a financial product or service. Frameworks and business practices designed to protect consumers have not fully kept up with these changes. This can increase risks to consumers – from a lack of transparency, misrepresentations, the inappropriate use of data to unfairly discriminate against consumer segments, legal loopholes, and financial fraud. Greater access to financial services itself through the entry of new and unconventional players can also contribute to overindebtedness. More needs to be done to better prepare society for digital finance.

In the world of finance, some of the questions being asked today are: What makes a bank a bank? Will digital currency ever replace central-bank issued money? Or more likely, will central banks issue their own versions of digital currency and in the process, disintermediate banks? Are banks selling financial products, or are they offering a lifestyle, opportunity and the freedom to pursue a new and different path in life? What business are banks really in? When everyone stopped using film in cameras, one wonders if Kodak realised that it was actually in the business of capturing memories. Or when smartphones burst into the mobile handset market, did Nokia realise that their business was not selling mobile handsets, but connecting people with the world around them? Three years ago, McKinsey predicted that technological advancements will redefine the landscape of finance, and then went on to argue that incumbents had – at most – a brief window of five years to adapt or risk becoming obsolete. You may or may not agree with this, but I think it would be hard to deny that a shake-up of the industry is already present. To some extent, the finance industry has been responding. Total IT spending is estimated at over $ billion every year across the regions of North America, Europe, Asia Pacific and Latin America. In 2016, a single global bank spent $ billion, or 16% of its expenses on technology.
Mr George discusses national and regional economic prospects in the light of the external environment  Speech given by Mr E A J George, Governor of the Bank of England, to the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce & Industry and Prince’s Trust on 26 January 2000. *  *  *  Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen, It seems only a very short time ago that I last had the pleasure of visiting Northern Ireland - in fact it was in May 1998. Time flies when the world about us is changing fast as it certainly has been in so many respects in the intervening period. Let me start with the world economy. We were already then in the grip of the financial shock that had started in emerging markets in Asia in 1997. But that shock intensified through 1998 - spreading to Russia and parts of Latin America and elsewhere - and at one point, following the collapse of the US hedge fund LTCM, threatening to engulf the financial system of the industrial world. The economic consequence of this financial turmoil was a sharp slowdown in the world economy to around half its longer-term trend rate of growth. It could have been far worse. The slowdown could have turned into an actual downturn had the industrial countries - led by the United States and the United Kingdom and closely followed by the Eurozone and Japan - not succeeded in stimulating their own, domestic, demand.

Huge progress has been made towards implementation of the Good Friday agreement since I was last here in Belfast - the Referendum, the elections and the introduction of devolved government. It is an immense tribute to the extraordinary efforts of the many people involved in keeping an inevitably difficult process on track. The economic prize of permanent peace and political stability is potentially very substantial. It will make Northern Ireland more attractive as a place in which to invest and in which to live and work; it will make it more attractive, too, as a place to visit. And devolved government will allow the fundamental supply-side issues, which are what determine the underlying sustainable growth rate of the economy, to be addressed within the local community. That process has already begun with the report last year of the Economic Development Strategy Review Steering Group - Strategy 2010. And, I agree with their conclusion - that if you play to your considerable strengths and tackle the structural weaknesses which they identify, then Northern Ireland can have a prosperous future. We all have a part to play in this. The Bank of England’s primary role is to help to maintain the stable macro-economic environment - in the interests of the UK economy as a whole but in the interests also of Northern Ireland. The specific purpose of my present visit is in fact to open, officially, our Northern Ireland Agency, which is a direct result of my earlier visit.
In the case of personal income tax and VAT receipts, increases of 1.7% and 2.7% are projected. As to social security contributions, the main regulatory change consists of a 5% increase in the maximum contribution bases. Progress in the reform of the banking system Before concluding, I shall briefly mention the progress in the reform and strengthening of our banking system. This task is at the heart of the responsibilities and concerns of the Banco de España, and, as we all know, it has required a most considerable contribution of public funds. At present we are at a most advanced phase in the ongoing recapitalisation and restructuring of our banking sector. As you know, the starting point was in 2009, when the FROB (the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector) was created, and the process moved up a gear in 2011 further to Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 on the strengthening of the financial system, which raised capital requirements. But the decisive steps were taken in 2012, with Royal Decree Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 on the clean-up of the financial system, the Memorandum of Understanding agreed in July with the European Commission, and the financial support facility of up to € billion annexed to this agreement; and, finally, Law 9/2012 on the restructuring and resolution of credit institutions.

Closing this gap will require further adjustments that will never prove easy because restoring growth will be a gradual process. We must also be mindful of the problems posed by the dynamics of the public debt/GDP ratio and its perspectives in the short term. So far, and as is usual in the initial phases of fiscal consolidation processes, this ratio has continued growing, with a forecast for 2014 of 98.9% of GDP. Reversing this trajectory is vital for ensuring the future sustainability of public finances, but it will require running primary surpluses for a prolonged period; naturally, the sooner we achieve sustained economic growth, the smoother this adjustment process will be. To tackle these challenges, institutional developments geared to ensuring budgetary rigour must be pursued. The independent fiscal responsibility authority, which will foreseeably start up in 2014, must reinforce the quality and independence of budgetary programming. Here I would like to mention the planned review of regional government financing arrangements and the creation of the committee of experts for the reform of the tax system, who are expected to submit their report in the coming months. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As for the public pension system, I shall reiterate what I said before the Economic Affairs Committee last June on the presentation of the Annual Report of the Banco de España. The public pension system is a fundamental factor of economic and social stability and it is in everybody's interest to address the risks of shortfalls arising as a result of demographic developments.