samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 62/2007  5  Changes for more efficient communication Ever since the inflation target was introduced, openness and clarity have been guiding principles for us. We have gradually implemented changes to become more transparent and more efficient in our communication. In February we presented for the first time our own forecast of the development of the policy rate over the coming years, something that our colleagues in Norway and New Zealand have also done. And as I mentioned earlier – a central bank can hardly be much more open and clear with regard to its monetary policy intentions. This increases the opportunities for evaluation and accountability. It has also become easier for us to explain our decisions and forecasts and to outline alternative scenarios for the interest rate. We are better able to live up to the requirements made in our interaction with the general public and the financial markets. There are also other examples of measures taken to increase our openness. Here I am thinking about the publication of minutes from the monetary policy meetings, our monetary policy reports, the many speeches held by Executive Board members every year and the hearings of the Governor by the Riksdag Committee on Finance. Clarity, not just openness – quality, not just quantity But efficient communication is not merely about quantity, it also concerns quality. Publishing a lot of information and doing so very often does not necessarily make the message clearer and the communication more efficient. It is not enough to merely be open.

And I am fairly certain that this is to a great extent due to the fact that we have purposefully worked to attain greater openness and clarity. This provides prerequisites for evaluation, accountability and thus creates legitimacy. All of these factors have contributed to winning confidence in our monetary policy. But the process does not stop here. It is not possible to "rest on one’s laurels” when one works with monetary policy. No, we must keep on adapting to new requirements; we must develop and refine our methods. One expression of this is that we have recently made several changes to become clearer and more efficient in our communication. The fact that we always have these ambitions is something that the general public and our principal, the Riksdag, as well as agents in the financial markets can demand of us. Thank you! BIS Review 62/2007  7
Balance sheet management Within the scope of its mandate, the SNB is also committed to sustainable development in the management of its balance sheet. The SNB differs from other asset managers in several respects. First, we manage foreign exchange reserves. 10 As these reserves perform a monetary policy function, they must remain subordinate to monetary policy goals at all times. These considerations determine the framework of our investment policy. As chart 2 shows, our foreign exchange reserves (represented by the area in blue) have increased substantially since the 2008 global financial crisis. This increase is mainly due to the SNB’s interventions in the foreign exchange market to counter excessive appreciation of the franc and stabilise price developments. The expansion of foreign exchange reserves has also caused an increase – on the liabilities side of the balance sheet – in the volume of sight deposits that banks hold with the SNB (area in red). 9 Cf. the SNB’s Environmental report, which is now called the Sustainability Report. 10 For more information on the specific characteristics of a portfolio composed of foreign exchange reserves (‘policy portfolio’) compared to other portfolios, cf. NGFS (2019), ‘A sustainable and responsible investment guide for central banks’ portfolio management’, October, pp. 7–10. On this subject, cf. also remarks by Matsen, E. (2019), ‘US Senate Democrats’ Special Committee on Climate Crisis’, 17 October, pp. 2–3. Page 7/12  Our reserves could decrease in the future, however.

The diversity and independence of its membership have always inspired ELEC to ask the appropriate questions and formulate coherent opinions, constantly having in mind the European interest. This year’s ELEC conference promises to be equally interesting as it concentrates on “Convergence towards euro enlargement” and I am honoured to be one of the keynote speakers. I salute the close cooperation between government officials in the region with high European officials, as well as with the private sector and prestigious organisations such as ELEC. We should never allow ourselves to lose sight of the fact that these discussions aim to help us on a journey made for the benefit of all. And it is a journey that can only be made through constant and diverse dialogue. Allow me to greet our renowned foreign guests: Baron Bernard Snoy, President of ELEC International, Wim Boonstra, President of ELEC Monetary Commission, Mr. Servaas Deroose, Deputy Director-General, ECFIN, as well as the distinguished speakers and panelists. Ladies and gentlemen, The same as the topics discussed in the previous reunions, “Convergence towards euro enlargement” is highly important and is worth debating at length. Let me start from the fact that euro adoption by the New Member States is a matter of when, not if, because they do not have an opt-out clause. The commitment to join the euro area is undeniable, yet how the complex process of ensuring the prerequisite economic convergence is conducted remains largely at the discretion of the authorities in candidate countries.
The preventive measures that were introduced included placing limits on the loan-to-value ratio for luxury mortgage, raising minimum repayment requirements for credit cards and personal loans, and strengthening NPL provisions by fair valuation standards of IAS39. Looking back, these measures have been useful in curtailing excessive leverage and household indebtedness, thus helping to maintain stability in our domestic financial system. Risk-based supervision was a key driving force to strengthen risk management practices of our financial institutions. Financial institutions and central bank laws have been overhauled to keep up with the increased complexity of the financial system. The new Financial Institutions Business Act, enacted last August, empowers the Bank of Thailand with the authority to regulate banks and non-banks under a consolidated supervision regime. Furthermore, risk management and governance practices of financial institutions have also been strengthened. Board of Directors are now held accountable by law for setting the strategic and policy goals of banks, while corporate governance guidance and notifications under the fit-and-proper rule for the appointment of bank management have been put in place. Financial institutions have been positive in embracing these changes, as they contribute to a more open, more accountable, and more transparent financial system. Given the dynamic changes in the financial system, it is important for risk management and supervision to be forward-looking, and recognize margins of error from risk models. Thus, it is sensible to adopt the conservative approach. Here, let me also highlight the importance of “stress-testing” as a risk management and supervisory tool.

In the current crisis, the securitization boom and the easing of monetary policy in the US helped fund the loan growth, while in the case of the Asian financial crisis, it was the large capital inflows in the form of direct borrowing that funded the credit boom. In both cases, however, poor underwriting standard by banks was an important common contributing factor. Looking back, the Asian financial crisis has been an important turning point for policymakers in the region, as the lessons learned from the crisis had led to many important policy reform initiatives, all of which aimed at strengthening the robustness and the risk management discipline of the domestic financial systems, and this brings me to my second point. BIS Review 96/2009  1  In the case of Thailand, after having restored financial stability in the early 2000s, financial reform became a top priority, with emphasis on instilling prudent regulations and strong risk management. We adopted a macro-prudential approach in the early 2000s, in recognition of the systemic linkages between the financial system and the increasingly opened macroeconomic conditions; utilizing our natural institutional advantage as we continue to oversee both monetary policy and financial institutions supervision. Hence, from 2003 to 2006, a series of macro-prudential measures were introduced, aiming at restraining then the rapid growth of credit, especially credit card loans and mortgage loans.
In the last quarter of the year, there was a positive contribution of the external sector to annual GDP growth of more than 2 pp. In under two years, external financing requirements might have halved. Further, in December last year, the Spanish inflation rate stood at 1.5%, a substantially lower figure. And since then inflation has continued falling and the difference with the euro area countries, now in our favour, has improved to stand at 0.5 pp last month. Nonetheless, such a rapid adjustment of the external deficit and of inflation, centred predominantly as it is on the contraction of demand, activity and employment, entails very high costs. In social terms, the ranks of the unemployed have swollen to around 3.5 million. 2  BIS Review 43/2009  The productive structure is also being affected through the closure of numerous firms, just as the budgetary position is worsening notably under the pressure of more social benefit disbursements and the contractionary effects on revenue due to the fall-off in activity. Uncurbed, all these factors will bear heavily and adversely on our ability to overcome the crisis. Accordingly, all tiers of government and social agents - central, regional and local government, Parliament and the regional assemblies, employers' associations, trade unions, institutions, etc. - should join forces in identifying the measures and action needed to resume as swiftly as possible a sustained growth path, and implement them with the utmost determination and diligence.

As set out in the Financial Stability Board's (FSB) latest progress reportOpens in a new window in October 2022, much progress has already been made including: agreeing global quantitative targetsOpens in a new window and a methodology for measuring progress towards them, undertaking stocktakes and analyses of existing payment systems and arrangements, and publishing proposals and best practice for achieving progress. And there have already been tangible changes, for example the move by SWIFT and some key systems to ISO 20022Opens in a new window messaging standards, increased operating hours and the launch of interlinking arrangements such as between Thailand's PromptPay and Singapore's PayNow. Now the work is at an inflection point: many of the original roadmap actions have been completed, providing a solid foundation from which to make real changes to the crossborder payments experience. In February 2023 the FSB published a set of priority actions that will be taken forward to meet the cross-border payments targets by 2027. The actions are grouped in three priority focus areasOpens in a new window: Payment system interoperability and extension; Legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks; and Cross-border data exchange and message standards. We need to work together to make payments faster, cheaper, more accessible, and more transparent. Some of this work needs to continue to be international for example, agreeing approaches to harmonising rules and standards.
It would consist of an agreement between firms and workers, under the social dialogue framework, to share the inevitable loss of national income that higher commodity import prices entail. 8  Fiscal policy should also play a key role, avoiding an across-the-board fiscal impulse – which would exacerbate the inflationary pressures – and the use of automatic indexation clauses in expenditure items. Conversely, efforts should focus on supporting lower-income households, who bear the brunt of inflation, and the firms most vulnerable to this new shock. Moreover, any measures should be temporary, so as not to further increase the structural budget deficit. They should also be designed to avoid significant distortions to price signals. But offsetting the adverse effects of the current supply-side shock also calls for ambitious policies to boost productivity growth and potential GDP. In other words, the optimal economic policy response to an adverse supply shock, such as the present one, entails structural reforms (including, naturally, of the energy market) to ease the supply-side tensions. The common European instrument to realise this ambition is the European Union’s NGEU recovery plan. Under NGEU, investment projects must be carefully selected in order to optimally complement, and act as a catalyst for, private investment.9 But they must also be accompanied by structural reforms to support, for example, the reallocation of resources across firms and sectors. At the same time, the sustainability of national public finances must be ensured; this is essential for the smooth functioning of the monetary union.

After reaching record highs in late August, it now more than doubles the average prices observed at the start of the year. In the absence of an integrated energy market, the economic consequences of this energy dispute are affecting European countries unevenly, depending on their different levels of dependence on Russian gas. For example, around 18% of mined energy products (gas and coal) and 9% of oil derivatives consumed in the EU are imported from Russia, compared with 3% and 2.5%, respectively, of those consumed in Spain. However, given the surge in energy prices and European economic integration, economies, like Spain, that depend relatively little on Russian imports, will also be affected. Indeed, according to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), gas consumption accounts for some 2% of households’ consumption basket in the euro area, and for 1.5% in Spain. Yet beyond the direct impact on inflation of higher gas prices, inflationary pressures are also fuelled by firms’ higher production costs, as natural gas is the main source of energy for the industrial and services sectors (except for transport-related sectors),1 and by the impact of gas prices on electricity price formation in the European markets.2 In addition, the slowdown in economic activity in the hardest hit countries will pass through, via trade flows, to the other economies in the form of lower external demand.
Private sector external debt, which accounted for about 80 percent of foreign liabilities, increased by 5 percent to $ billion due to revaluation changes in non-us dollar denominated loans predominantly in the electricity, manufacturing, information and communication as well as real estate sectors. Esteemed invited guests, in terms of flows, overall net foreign liability outflows of $ million 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  were recorded in 2020 against net inflows of $ million in 2019. This was due to loan repayments to non-affiliates by the mining, manufacturing, electricity as well as wholesale and retail trade sectors, and the reduction in currency holdings by non-residents in domestic deposittaking corporations. However, FDI liability inflows amounted to $ million compared to $ million in 2019. Reduced re-invested earnings and debt repayments, largely by the mining and quarrying sector, accounted for the decline in FDI inflows. Canada continued to be the major source of private sector foreign liabilities. Ladies and gentlemen, the stock of private sector foreign liabilities declined further in the first half of 2021 to $ billion due to loan repayments mostly by the mining and quarrying sector as well as revaluation effects on equity. However, a net inflow of about $ million was recorded against net outflows of $ million a year ago. This was due to the upswing in FDI inflows on account of higher reinvested earnings by the mining, deposit-taking corporation, manufacturing, electricity, as well as information and communication sectors.

Ladies and gentlemen, this year’s survey response rate was 54.0 percent, a slight reduction from the 56.0 percent recorded in the 2020 survey. We were cognisant of the restricted working arrangements induced by covid-19 and extended the survey period to accommodate a larger number of enterprises who took time to respond. I must mention that the data we collect from various enterprises in this exercise is extremely important as it generates information that enables us understand developments in the external sector, which have implications for the formulation of sound monetary, fiscal, trade, and investment policies. This is in addition to taking necessary measures to improve the ease of doing business in Zambia. The 2021 survey summarises the magnitude, type, sources, and direction of the private sector foreign capital for the year 2020 and the first half of 2021, as well as investor perceptions on the investment climate in Zambia. Let me now turn to the highlights of the survey findings, which is the subject of our discussion today. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, in 2020, the stock of private sector foreign liabilities declined by about 5.0 percent to $ billion. This was due to the fall in the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) owing to valuation effects on equity mostly held by the mining and quarrying sector. Nonetheless, FDI continued to account for the largest share of the stock of private sector foreign liabilities.
At the same time, and particularly taking into account the relatively high level of business confidence in the euro area, private sector domestic demand should increasingly contribute to growth, supported by the accommodative monetary policy stance and the measures adopted to restore the functioning of the financial system. However, the recovery in activity is expected to be dampened by the process of balance sheet adjustment in various sectors. In the Governing Council’s assessment, the risks to this economic outlook are still slightly tilted to the downside, with uncertainty remaining elevated. On the one hand, global trade may continue to grow more rapidly than expected, thereby supporting euro area exports. Moreover, strong business confidence could provide more support to domestic economic activity in the euro area than is currently expected. On the other hand, downside risks relate to the tensions in some segments of the financial markets and their potential spillover to the euro area real economy. Further downside risks relate to renewed increases in oil and other  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  commodity prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. With regard to price developments, euro area annual HICP inflation was 2.2% in December, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 1.9% in November. This was somewhat higher than expected and largely reflects higher energy prices. Looking ahead to the next few months, inflation rates could temporarily increase further.

European Central Bank: Press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 13 January 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. Let me wish you all a very Happy New Year. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome Estonia as the seventeenth country to adopt the euro as its currency. Accordingly, Mr Lipstok, the Governor of Eesti Pank, became a member of the Governing Council on 1 January 2011. Following the adoption of the euro by Estonia there are now 331 million citizens using the euro as their currency. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting, which was also attended by Commissioner Rehn. Based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the Governing Council confirmed that the current key ECB interest rates still remain appropriate. It therefore decided to leave them unchanged. Taking into account all the new information and analyses which have become available since our meeting on 2 December 2010, we see evidence of short-term upward pressure on overall inflation, mainly owing to energy prices, but this has not so far affected our assessment that price developments will remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. At the same time, very close monitoring is warranted.
Simon M Potter: The Federal Reserve’s counterparty framework – past, present and future Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2015 Roundtable on Treasury Markets and Debt Management, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 19 November 2015. *  *  *  Good evening. I would like to thank the Office of Debt Management for inviting me to speak at this year’s roundtable. This forum provides a valuable opportunity for policymakers, academics, and market participants to discuss issues related to the primary and secondary markets for U.S. Treasury securities. I will focus my remarks tonight on the counterparty framework employed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which directly affects not only our implementation of monetary policy, but also the underwriting and distribution of Treasury debt issuance. I will begin with an overview of the objectives that underpin the framework, continue by describing how those objectives have influenced the historical development of the primary dealer system, and conclude by looking ahead as the private and official sectors adapt to the evolving structure of the Treasury market.

In conclusion, let me stress 4 points: It is hard to anticipate the role that stablecoins and more generally crypto-assets might play in the payment system of the future, especially since the features of these assets look set to change considerably. While it is clear that they offer opportunities to improve our payment systems, they can also bring quite material risks which must be addressed. In that context, it is first and foremost the responsibility of private sector entities to design arrangements which do not bring undue risks to our payment systems. Regulatory and oversight authorities also have an important role to play in order to ensure that risk management requirements to be met are clear, comprehensive, coherent acrossborders and complied with, while preserving the potential for technological innovation offered by stablecoins. Beyond contributing to the adjustment of the regulatory and oversight frameworks to address these risks, central banks may make further contributions, notably by revisiting and possibly adjusting the conditions under which they make central bank money available for settlement purposes. To that end, we should keep an open-minded approach and develop an in-depth understanding of innovations currently spreading across the financial sector, including through experimentations. This is critical for our capacity to help deliver a sound, proper and updated regulatory framework supporting innovation, and adequately mitigate their inherent risks. This is also critical for our capacity to adapt the performance of the different roles we play to fulfil our financial stability mandate and conduct efficient monetary policies. Thank you for your attention.