samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Pay and benefits structures have been adjusted in line with practices of sister institutions to enable the Bank attract high calibre staff. We have also developed a new staff evaluation system which rewards competence and performance. More importantly, the staff and management have, on their own, adopted a set of core values following international standards by developing a Code of Conduct. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Framework for financial stability analysis Your Excellency, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, even though the Bank, in its response to the global financial crisis, has sought to address numerous issues of concern to the stability of the financial system, many more challenges remain to be addressed. The adoption of a financial stability analysis framework through which potential vulnerabilities in the system can be identified and gauged, is key to safeguarding the long-term stability of the financial system. The Bank is aware of these requirements, and has set up a unit in the Research Department to monitor and periodically report on financial stability. Efforts are still at a transitory stage but going forward, the Bank is seeking to develop a full-fledged financial stability framework. As part of the risk assessment drive, the Bank, with technical assistance from the IMF, plans to undertake stress assessment of the banking system to determine the resilience of their portfolios to various shocks. This exercise will be conducted in 2011.

Permit me to pay tribute to all other former Governors who have contributed immensely to our institutional development over the years. I want to take this opportunity to thank them all for their contributions in reforming the Bank and upholding the dignity and effectiveness of our noble institution. Your Excellency, distinguished guests, the recent global economic and financial crisis was a wake-up call to the realisation that low and stable inflation, a sound banking system, as well as high and sustainable economic growth, though necessary, are not sufficient conditions for financial stability. As you are aware, the Bank had developed the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) which was approved by cabinet in 2009, to address the shortcomings in the financial sector. It is expected that funding for the FSDP would be provided under a basket fund arrangement with development partners, including KfW, GTZ, and AfDB, with the World Bank assuming a leading role. The Bank is in the process of setting up a secretariat for successful implementation of the FSDP for which the Head has been appointed. Your Excellency, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, permit me to proceed with the discussion on the highlights of the reform policies to reposition the Bank and the current state of their implementation. Strengthening the supervisory role of the Bank of Sierra Leone Your Excellency, distinguished guests, even though the Bank was granted legal sanction by the Bank of Sierra Leone Act 2000, its powers and operational autonomy are limited.
These include a rate of inflation no higher than 1½% above that in the three EU countries where it is lowest, a one-year record of average nominal interest rates on long-term bonds no more than 2% higher than in the three EU countries where inflation is lowest, and membership of the ERM for at least two years without devaluing the currency and without exceeding the deviation band. Iceland will obviously not be fulfilling these conditions in the immediate future. Some form of EMU membership in the future would therefore not release Iceland from the obligation to bring inflation down to a similar level to that among its trading partner countries. It may be added that even if Iceland fulfilled all these conditions, it is extremely unlikely that it would be able to negotiate, in the foreseeable future, associate membership  4  BIS Review 95/2001  of the EMU or some kind of other bilateral currency cooperation with it. All the signs point in the opposite direction, whatever the phrasing of individual articles in the Treaty of Rome and Maastricht Treaty might suggest. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that twelve Eastern European countries are waiting to be admitted to the European Union and, later, the EMU. The ECB and Community leadership have firmly underlined that these nations should fulfil all the conditions for participation in EMU. Thus the EU is highly unlikely to agree to set any precedent which these nations could take advantage of as a short-cut into the EMU.

This has the intended effect of encouraging firms to shift from a compliance focus to developing a deeper understanding of the risk drivers in their business. In turn, conversations between management and the board, and between insurers and supervisors, have moved to focus on how key risks are being controlled rather than on whether particular rules have been breached. This reflects our expectation that boards, supported by the audit and risk committees, must monitor changes to their risk profiles and actively review risk strategies and internal controls in the light of those changes. An area in which Bank Negara Malaysia is currently seeking to better understand industry practice is with respect to the interactions between the audit and risk committees of the board. Audit committees have a clear interest in risk management within their organisations. Most internal audits adopt a risk-based approach to auditing which requires an understanding of material risks within the organisation. Audit committees also obtain independent assurance from internal audit on the effectiveness of risk management processes within the organisation and this requires a reasonably deep knowledge of risk management. Conversely, risk committees must consider the quality of internal controls, including financial reporting practices, which are an important part of any risk management framework. The Walker Review of corporate governance in the financial industry acknowledged an important link between these two functions. In Malaysia, we have moved ahead of many countries in requiring an organisational separation of the audit and risk committees in order to encourage an enhanced focus on audit and risk.
This can be achieved by the further harmonisation of national procedures for supervision and crisis management, and by preparing for joint actions in one way or another. This of course requires better and more extensive cooperation across national borders. Because cross-border banking has a strong geographical component, enhancing cooperation on a regional basis can be an effective way of proceeding. We have in fact already taken some steps in this direction. Regarding supervision, EU leaders have been able to agree on an extensive set of reforms that will enhance coordination across member states, including the creation of European supervisory agencies and of a European Systemic Risk Board. In parallel, the EU has set up a number of colleges of supervisors for large cross-border banks, which will ensure that relevant national bank supervisors meet regularly, share information and expose or deal with any cross-border problems. In the field of crisis management, the attempts to enhance cooperation within the EU can be summarised in a set of non-legally binding Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). The latest MoU, which was signed in 2008, aims at improving cross-border cooperation between all the 27 EU Member States. Obviously, signing a non-legally binding document is not a solution to the complex trilemma discussed here. Nevertheless, the fact that representatives from supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries across the entire EU have agreed on a common set of principles for crisis management and resolution is an important starting point for more intense cooperation. But obviously more has to be done.

Perhaps the most important part of this deregulation process was the Second Banking Directive, which became effective in 1993 and which introduced the single banking license, enabling European banks to operate in any EU member state without the need for local authorisation. In fact one of the first European institutions that benefited from this regulation was the Nordic financial institution Nordea, which was established through cross-border mergers in 1997. Today, Nordea has substantial activities in four of the Nordic countries, and also constitutes a significant part of the financial system in all these countries. Measured in terms of lending, Nordea constitutes the largest bank in Finland, the second largest in Denmark, the third largest in Norway and the fourth largest bank in Sweden. The transformation of the banking sector towards a more globalised one has become apparent in the current financial crisis. We have experienced several severe financial crises also before cross-border banking became a notable feature of the financial sector, including the Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s. But this time around dealing with the crisis became even more challenging because of the banks’ presence in several jurisdictions, creating a need for cooperation between several national authorities. Why do banks become multinational? How can we explain the increase in cross-border banking, in particular in retail banking? The deregulation of previously strictly-regulated markets made crossborder banking possible.
First, while the outlook for growth has improved considerably in recent months, growth prospects over the next three years are solid not stellar. The MPC’s current forecast is for growth to average around 2½% per year over the next three years, just below its historical average rate of 2¾%. That suggests spare capacity will be used up only gradually. Second, a great many jobs need to be created to bring unemployment down. A fall in unemployment from its current level to 7% over three years would mean well over three quarters of a million new jobs created – and given the shrinkage in the public sector, over a million new jobs in the private sector. Third, a recovery in growth does not necessarily mean faster job creation and lower unemployment. More than half of the increase in employment since the recession has been in part-time jobs. Many part-timers would prefer to work full time. If the recovery were fuelled by involuntary part-time jobs becoming full time, nearly half a million fewer new jobs would be created.2  1  Until the unemployment threshold is reached, the MPC also intends not to reduce the stock of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves and, consistent with that, intends to reinvest the cashflows associated with all maturing gilts held in the Asset Purchase Facility. 2  1.4 million part-time workers would prefer to be working full time, three quarters of a million more than before the financial crisis.

The large investments in this sector in the latter half of the 1990s has led to a high vacancy rate. Statistics Norway’s new price index for office and commercial property shows that in Norway as a whole, prices peaked in the first half of 2001 and have since fallen by over 9 per cent up to end-June 2003. This situation is likely to curb overall investment growth in the years ahead. In 2004, many companies will probably realise the gains provided by the efficiency measures that have been implemented. Continued brisk growth in household demand is expected to boost investment activity in 2005 and 2006. Petroleum investment will also increase as a result of the  4  BIS Review 23/2004  development of onshore and offshore infrastructure in order to produce gas from the Ormen Lange field. At the end of January and beginning of February, our contacts in Region North reported rising demand and output for most industries since autumn 2003. There are prospects of strong growth in all industries except manufacturing for the domestic market. The export industry, however, reported that demand growth is moderate. Restructuring has contributed to growth in the fisheries. High activity in the metals industry is also contributing to increased activity among enterprises providing services to this industry. For the construction industry, demand growth is high. Retail trade continues to show high growth in activity. Developments in the service sector are also positive. Substantial growth in investment, however, is not expected.
And, as discussed in the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) May Inflation Report, it is likely to rise further in the near-term before beginning to fall back (Chart 1). Moreover, the rate of inflation may well stay above target for the remainder of 2011 and 2012. Chart 1 CPI inflation projection based on market interest rate expectations and £ billion asset purchases  As I and many of my colleagues have already discussed in various speeches, MPC Minutes and the Inflation Report, the MPC attribute the rise in CPI inflation to three main shocks – the rise in VAT, increases in global commodity prices, and the impact of the fall in sterling since mid-2007. First, let me consider the increase in the standard rate of VAT to 20%. Mechanically this tax increase could account for around 1½ percentage points of the current inflation rate  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  although, allowing for the behaviour of retailers in absorbing some of the increase, the marginal impact is probably nearer 1 percentage point.1 Second, there have been large increases in a number of commodity prices over the past two years or so. Those increases reflected the combination of renewed strength of the world economy, especially in emerging market economies, and the limited ability of the world’s commodity producers to increase supply – at least at the same pace as demand. Commodity prices are traded as an asset – they are inherently forward looking.

To come up with its forecast, the MPC has to reach a view based on all the information available to us: data, theories, a variety of models, business and market intelligence, our own experiences and judgement and so on. But there are huge uncertainties within the information set and so there must be equally great uncertainties about the resulting judgements. That is why the one, indeed the only, thing we know for certain about any forecast of the economy is that it will be precisely wrong. That is also why the MPC puts little weight on its central projection, and chooses to communicate its judgments to the public by focusing on the range of possible outcomes and the balance of risks, as summarised in the fan chart.7 What this means is that setting monetary policy is about decision making under uncertainty. It isn’t clean. In fact it’s very messy. But nobody has a working crystal ball. The important question for us is not whether we got the central projection right but whether we set the right policy, given what we knew at the time. Crucially, we are accountable to the public, including via the Treasury Select Committee, for our policy decision. I do not think I have heard many argue that we should have done something materially different with policy during the depths of the recession in 2009 (i.e. to the extent necessary) in order to generate a different outcome for inflation now.
Dear Brothers, A review of the topics addressed on the first day of this conference by the distinguished speakers shows that they touched upon important issues and gave a future vision of housing in the Kingdom, and how to benefit from the experiences of different countries in this area. Today will be an extension of those topics that are directly related to housing finance. In general, I find that the conference broadly covers all aspects of housing finance in the Kingdom. In conclusion, I thank the audience and the organizers of this conference, and wish you all success in your deliberations. 2  BIS Review 14/2007

Forth’s work suggests transport networks are a large part of the explanation. By analysing commuting times into Birmingham at different times of the day, he provide a measure of the “effective” working population. At peak times, the effective working population of Birmingham is perhaps 50% smaller than its measured population due to poor transport infrastructure. This helps explain why Birmingham punches below its  demographic weight. This is a terrific example of how high-resolution data can be used to understand local patterns of economic growth. The same data could be used to analyse the “effective” working population in other UK cities, perhaps helping explain their under-performance. It could also be used to answer industrial strategy  questions, such as what impact new transport routes have on the effective working population of the UK’s major cities and hence on their incomes through agglomeration effects. Imagine a transport strategy whose aim was to raise the effective working population of those UK cities currently operating below the line. Using Chart 22, doing so would raise UK GDP per head by around 10% or around $ £ in today’s money. Those annual benefits could be compared with the one-off costs of investment to determine the desirability of such a policy, as part of the UK’s industrial strategy. My second example draws inspiration from recent work at the University of Cambridge by Penny Mealy, including by my colleague on the Industrial Strategy Council Diane Coyle.
The rate of amortisation varies considerably between different households, however; 25 per cent of the new mortgage borrowers amortise the new loans at a rate of 85 years or longer. See “Amortisation requirements – a step towards a more sustainable debt situation”, Financial Stability Council memorandum, November 2014, Sveriges Riksbank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  when tax relief is halved that we will see a clear slowdown of household indebtedness over the coming 10 years (see Figure 13). Halving tax relief on mortgage interest may sound dramatic, but at the current low mortgage rates of approximately 2 per cent, this represents an upturn in the mortgage rate of around 0.30 percentage points (0.15*2=0.30), so about the same as a “normal” repo rate increase of 0.25 percentage points. When interest rates are higher, the effect of lowered tax relief on households’ mortgage rates is naturally greater. Figure 13 Effects on household indebtedness: a comparison of the effects of an amortisation requirement, halved tax relief and different debt-to-income limits Per cent 220  220  Scenario without measures Amortisation requirements  210  210  Reduced tax relief (15%) Debt-to-income limit (600%)  200  200  Debt-to-inome limit (400%)  190  190  Debt-to-income limit (400%, exemption 15% )  180  180  170  170  160  160  150  150  140  140  130  130 05  10  15  20  25  Note.

Broken red line shows an estimate of developments over the next 10 years without further measures. Shaded area indicates a feasible lower limit for when the risks are elevated in the economy. Broken lines show an estimate of the effects of different measures. “Debt-to-income limit (400%, exemption 15%)” means that 15 per cent of the volume of new loans may have a loan-to-income ratio exceeding 400 per cent. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. I mentioned the debt-to-income limit earlier. A limit of 600 per cent in relation to disposable income would affect around 12 per cent of new mortgage borrowers. In Figure 13 we can see that the effect is considerably greater than it would be with the amortisation requirement, but also considerably smaller than with halved tax relief. If a debt-to-income limit of 400 per cent of income were introduced, for example, this would currently affect nearly 40 per cent of new mortgage borrowers. Indebtedness would thereby be dampened considerably in the long term, and we would also see a large amount of the effect within 10 years (see Figure 13). Our calculations indicate that the extent of the effect would be as great as if tax relief were halved. 20 Debt-to-income limits have already been introduced in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
The cost level in the Norwegian economy, compared with that of our trading partners, rose substantially with the beginning of the oil age. The level has fluctuated somewhat since then, without a clear tendency to become higher or lower, and has, over time, been adapted to a steady phasing-in of petroleum revenues into the mainland economy. When we reach a point in the future when the share of imports that can be financed by petroleum revenues declines, the relative cost level will have to be reduced. The real exchange rate may have to be brought back to around the level prevailing at the end of the 1960s, prior to Norway’s emergence as an oil nation. This depreciation can be achieved either by lower price and wage inflation in Norway than in other countries or by a nominal depreciation of the krone. The latter would be the least painful channel, and with a flexible exchange rate it is also the most likely. Final remarks To sum up, increased globalisation and the ensuing terms of trade improvements have exposed the Norwegian economy to a significant upward income shock. This has amplified the domestic upswing. So far, however, strong growth impulses have not led to major imbalances in the labour market or strong upward wage and price pressures. This may be seen as an indication that our fiscal and monetary policy guidelines have been quite successful so far in shielding the Norwegian economy from excessive fluctuations.

Ravi Menon: FinTech – harnessing its power, managing its risks Panel remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore Forum, Singapore, 2 April 2016. *  *  *  FinTech is fundamentally transforming the financial industry. •  The smartphone is becoming our bank. •  Computer programmes are offering investment advice. •  People can now lend directly to one another online. Technology will replace many jobs in finance but will also create exciting new jobs. •  Calls for new and different skill sets – understanding technology and the ability to work with and harness the power of machines and algorithms  •  As someone in Silicon Valley put it, “the geek shall inherit the earth”. Unregulated FinTech companies are now providing many financial services. They will challenge traditional financial institutions (FIs), disrupt and even displace some of them but will not replace them. •  Banks and insurance companies have something that unregulated entities do not have – trust. Trust based on a track record of performance. •  FIs are not sitting still. –  They are actively harnessing technology to enhance product offerings and improve efficiency. –  They are setting up in-house FinTech units to replicate the start-up mentality. Many global banks have set up “innovation labs” in S’pore: Citibank, StanChart, UBS, HSBC, to name a few. And insurance companies too: Aviva, Aon, AXA, MetLife.