samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, firms’ entry and exit rates have been stable in the United Kingdom since the early 2000s, in contrast to the declining rates observed in the United States. [27]  Taking stock and looking ahead My remarks today have purposefully abstracted from short-run influences on the macroeconomy in order to focus on the longer-term structural trends that have driven the secular decline in Global R* and the puzzling weakness of investment in the United Kingdom and other advanced economies. Why do these secular developments matter for central banks? The level of the trend real rate has important implications for the conduct of both monetary and financial policies. In a low interest rate environment, other things equal, monetary policy may find itself more often constrained by the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates (Bernanke et al., 2019). But prolonged periods of low interest rates may also pose financial stability risks via greater risk taking (Cunliffe, 2019). Understanding the trends in investment is also key given the importance of investment in driving long-run growth and productivity. In turn, productivity growth is an important determinant of potential output. Estimates of potential output are used to assess the size of the output gap, or level of spare capacity, which influences the degree of inflationary pressure in the economy. Such estimates can therefore have an important influence on the judgements that inform monetary policy decisions. The analysis I have discussed so far has looked at a number of secular trends over the past few decades.

In pursuing our policy responsibilities, we seek to conduct policy transparently and based on clear principles. We are mindful of the global effects of Fed policy. Promoting growth and stability in the U.S., I believe, is the most important contribution we can make to growth and stability worldwide. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  There is, of course, the argument that Fed policy has been too accommodative for too long, creating risks for financial stability worldwide. Here, I think it’s important to consider carefully the counterfactual. Would countries beyond our borders really have been better off with a weaker U.S. economy? The fundamental issue is whether U.S. monetary policy has helped support our dual objectives of stable prices and maximum sustainable growth, and whether this support is consistent with a healthy global economy. Moreover, it is far from clear that explicitly coordinated policy would produce better outcomes for the global economy generally, or the EMEs specifically. Central banks have challenges enough in tailoring policies to their own domestic circumstances. I believe that it would be taking on too much to attempt to collectively fashion policy in reference to global conditions. Monetary policy meant to suit everybody is likely in the end to suit nobody. Similar considerations underlie the widespread move in the emerging world away from fixed exchange rate regimes. Policymakers worldwide have learned that a framework capable of responding in a disciplined but flexible manner to changing domestic conditions works best over the long run.
In this regard, we see potential value for the use of the SDR in enhancing the provision of global liquidity and asset diversification. We are also open to reflect in its basket the rising role of major emerging market economies. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Low-income countries 10. We welcome the work underway to develop an analytical framework for a Vulnerability Exercise for Low-Income Countries (LICs) as they are particularly vulnerable to sharp swings in commodity prices, natural disasters, and volatile external financing conditions. Due to LICs’ greater vulnerabilities and the limited available counter-balancing analysis, the outcomes of this exercise should be treated with a higher level of care and confidentiality. Ongoing work on improving the debt sustainability analysis framework, to more accurately assess available fiscal space for growth-enhancing public investments, is also welcome. Governance 11. Since we last met in October 2010, the Board of Governors has approved farreaching reforms on quotas and governance and the 2008 Quota and Voice reforms have entered into force. These meaningful steps will undoubtedly strengthen the credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund. However, we are still a long way from the desired outcomes and need to proceed further to transform the Fund into a truly representative institution aligned with global economic realities. Further, we reiterate our call to reform the selection process of the IMF Managing Director and Deputy Managing Directors. The new selection process should be transparent and take into account the Fund’s move towards diversity. Conclusion 12.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the need for such a consensus is as great as before, since the reliance on accommodative policies of advanced countries has reduced their urgency for structural reforms and complicated the conduct of policies in emerging market economies. If the current stalemate were allowed to continue, there is a risk that the global recovery would not be sustained and the functioning of the IMS could become disorderly. In this context, the theme for this year’s IMFC Plenary, “Global Challenges, Global Solutions” holds special significance. Fund surveillance 3. We look forward to the upcoming 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review (TSR). To avoid duplication, an independent opinion of the gaps in the Fund’s surveillance framework can already be found in the IEO report on the Fund’s performance in the run-up to the crisis. The IEO has identified several weaknesses in the Fund’s culture that impedes effective oversight, such as a silo mentality amongst departments, fear of reprisals that inhibit candid views, and a lack of evenhandedness in the treatment of members. Instead of searching for a new legal framework for surveillance, the Fund should concentrate its efforts on how best to implement the IEO recommendations. While the IEO report focuses on dealing with risks in the financial sector, we wish to highlight that surveillance should also focus on fiscal and/or debt sustainability problems, from which the next crisis could emanate.
It is obvious that many households are heavily burdened when mortgage rates rise and this is not something the Riksbank takes lightly. At the same time, it is important to broaden the perspective. Interest rate increases did indeed reduce households' spending money in 2022, but so did the large price increases on electricity, food, other goods and services. Of course, the conditions vary for different households, but looking at an average household, inflation eroded purchasing power more than interest costs did. Higher interest rates are costly for households. But it would cost even more if inflation stays at a high level. Partly because of the high inflation itself, and partly because it would then probably require even larger interest rate increases to bring inflation down again. Broadly favourable real economic development in 2022 But doesn't a higher interest rate mean that the Riksbank is "breaking the economy", as it is sometimes claimed? Our assessment in February was that economic activity is  7/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  certainly slowing down and that there will be a cooler development in the labour market until the economy has cooled down and inflation has fallen. But once we get through that, the economic situation will improve and activity will gradually increase again. Statistics published after our decision show that GDP at the end of last year was slightly higher than we estimated – the Swedish economy was relatively strong in 2022, as in the previous year.

The Riksbank may buy and sell such securities if there are exceptional reasons, as stated in the act. In principle, this means that we must make the assessment that other measures would not have the desired effect on the economy. The new act now also gives the Riksbank an explicit mandate to trade in securities within the framework of our task of contributing to the stability and efficiency of the financial system. For instance, the Riksbank may buy and sell securities to temporarily support financial markets for the purpose of counteracting a serious disturbance in the financial system, if there are exceptional reasons. The Riksbank's mandate remains strong  3/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  I will not go through all the details of the new act that have a bearing on monetary policy. The overall picture is that some things have changed. But the important thing is that we can do what we need to do to fulfil our tasks, in normal times and in times of crisis. The Riksbank has a strong and clear mandate to conduct flexible inflation targeting, where the overriding objective is for inflation to be lastingly low and stable. This is important now that the inflation target is being seriousl put to the test in a situation where inflation significantly overshoots the target for the first time since its introduction in 1995.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Financial education for meaningful inclusion Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Citi-FT Financial Education Summit 2014 “Financial Education for Meaningful Inclusion”, Kuala Lumpur, 5 November 2014. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to be here this morning at the Citi-FT Financial Education Summit 2014. First of all, allow me to welcome the Citi-FT Summit back to Kuala Lumpur. It is my honour to once again address this Summit that has now become an important forum for advancing the financial literacy agenda. It was in 2004, at the inaugural Citi-INSEAD Financial Education Summit in Hong Kong that I spoke on financial education in the context of the demographic forces in Asia and their consequent implications for financial consumers, in particular for women in Asia. Today, another demographic shift – the “rapid urbanisation” – provides a new context to our discussion on the challenges in pursuing meaningful financial education strategies to achieve effective and responsible financial management in our communities. My remarks today will focus on the changing demographics and the role of financial education in enhancing the ability to cope with the realities of this new environment. Asia has probably experienced the most rapid demographic change in the world. In these recent two decades, several Asian economies have had to deal with a number of new challenges including slower population growth, rapid aging, the intensification of urbanisation and the consequences of increasing life expectancy.

The way in which financial services are delivered to consumers is also moving towards more cost-efficient channels that reduce the need for face-to-face contact. Enquiries and complaints are largely handled by phone or e-mail, and usually in a highly fragmented manner by different parts of a financial institution. This can mean less effective advisory support for the vulnerable groups of financial consumers. More recently, the wider adoption of electronic channels to make and receive payments has had enormous potential for greater financial inclusion. Key to this progress is the access to the relevant technology and safeguarding its security and thus gain the willingness to trust it. This will also involve the awareness of its benefits. These developments can be overwhelming to consumers and businesses who are illequipped to make informed financial decisions due to their inadequate knowledge on financial matters, thus diminishing their effective participation in the financial system. Symptomatic of this has been the rapid growth in household debt and leverage in a number of countries. This has been particularly prevalent in an environment of ample liquidity and low interest rates. This is also being reinforced by changing social norms, such as social pressures to spend, which has further eroded financial discipline among households. Such pressures are further compounded by the rising cost of living in the urban areas. Financial capability levels have however generally lagged the socio-economic changes that are taking place, resulting in poor financial management.
This is the basis for central bank independence. If price stability, by contrast, were regarded as just one out of a long list of political and economic objectives - rather than as a common goal and a precondition for the successful pursuit of other objectives - then there would be no legitimacy for entrusting this task (and only this task) to independent central banks. Making value judgements when trading-off different objectives and balancing conflicting interests is the legitimate job of elected politicians with a popular mandate and not of appointed technocrats. An independent central bank thus pre-supposes a broad consensus on the “quasi-constitutional” nature of the common good of price stability. Assigning the central bank a clear overriding objective also imposes limits on its discretionary exercise of power and makes it easier for the public to hold the central bank accountable for its mandate. This is important to keep in mind if we entertain the possibility that while, yes, “money is too important to be left to the politicians” one could similarly concur with Poincaré that “money is too important to be left to central bankers” (as quoted by Milton Friedman in his 1962 essay on “Should there be an independent monetary authority?”). In other words, why should one trust central bankers more than politicians?

Yves Mersch: Challenges for completing Europe’s economic and monetary union Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the MNI Connect event, Singapore, 13 October 2015. *  *  *  Over the past few months, Europe has faced two exceptional challenges. First, there was the new adjustment programme for Greece. And second, there has been the large influx of refugees, a challenge that is very far from the competences of the European Central Bank (ECB). Though very different in nature, these two events offer a common lesson for future challenges that we will collectively face: that Europe is strong only when it acts on the basis of solidarity and cooperation. I would like to talk about two further topics of importance today: first, the ECB’s assessment of recent economic developments and their implications for our monetary policy stance; and second, the necessity for completing Europe’s economic and monetary union. Over the summer, industrial production and other indicators of economic activity in the euro area have shown signs of resilience. Yet at the same time, the macroeconomic environment has become more challenging. The ECB’s latest macroeconomic projections indicate a weaker economic recovery and a slower increase in inflation rates than was expected earlier in the year. Inflation will remain close to zero in the very near term, before rising again towards the end of the year.
12  See the Bank of England’s Policy Statement 3/18, ‘International banks: the Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to branch authorisation and supervision’. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  The pillars underpin the government’s new Global Financial Partnerships Strategy. The Bank of England will be particularly engaged in deepening our supervisory cooperation with major emerging economies and will continue to develop the infrastructure to support cross-border capital flows in their currencies. With respect to the European Union, the Bank remains of the view that an ambitious future financial services relationship, founded on commitments to achieving equivalent outcomes and supervisory cooperation, remains both feasible and in the interests of the UK, Europe and the world. The future economic and security partnership with the EU is for the government to negotiate and Parliament to approve. The Bank’s role is to manage risks associated with the Brexit process and to provide technical support to the government as needed. In this context, HM Treasury and the Bank are aligned on the importance of maintaining the high regulatory standards required by the world’s most important and complex international financial centre. And we are both committed to responsible openness because it allows capital to move freely, efficiently and sustainably between jurisdictions and that supports trade, investment and jobs in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world. More broadly, building on the progress already made, financial services could serve as a template for broader services trade liberalisation.

Checkout can be eliminated. The customer, not cash, will reign supreme. 8  In the UK, intangible investment rose above tangible investment in the early 2000s, and stood at 11% as a share of output in 2014 compared with 10% for tangible investment. Investment in intangibles also exceeded that in tangibles in the US, Sweden and Finland [on average over 1999-2003], but not in other European countries including German, Italy and Spain. See Haskel, J and Westlake, W (2017), ‘Capitalism Without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible Economy’, Princeton University Press; and Goodridge, P R, Haskel, J and Wallis, G (2016), ‘Accounting for the UK Productivity Puzzle: A Decomposition and Predictions’, Economica, Vol. 85, Issue 339. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  Second, RTGS is being re-configured to lower the excessive costs of cross-border payments. To this end, 9  two private PSPs joined earlier this year. In parallel, the Bank is working to connect RTGS and the systems run by other central banks. And we have just begun collaborating with the Bank of Canada, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and several private-sector firms to improve inter-bank cross-border payments, including initiatives based on distributed ledger. The potential returns are large. At present, cross-border payments can cost ten times more than domestic ones. 10  We estimate that in the UK alone there is scope to realise annual savings of over £ million.
If shareholders know that they have to absorb potential  2  Barry Eichengreen and Michael D. Bordo: “Crises now and then: What lessons from the last era of financial globalization?”, NBER working paper 8715, January 2002. 3  “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience”, April 2008, and the recommendations and principles to strengthen financial systems that the FSB published on 2 April 2009. 2  BIS Review 115/2009  future losses rather than passing them on to taxpayers, they will likely become less willing to let management engage in excessively risky activities. Ultimately, this incentive effect can help make future crises less likely. Strengthening capital requirements The crisis has nakedly exposed the dangers of excessive leverage. It also revealed a number of fundamental weaknesses of existing capital requirements. While model-driven risk-weighted capital requirements are sensible and should be maintained, they are not perfect and very likely never will be. Most of us have had to learn the hard way that the modeling of risk involves substantial risks itself. Despite risk-weighted capital ratios that in most cases exceeded the regulatory minima, leverage was a key source of vulnerability going into the crisis. Excessive leverage not only intensified the impact of mistakes on the financial situation of individual banks. It also amplified the crisis as ongoing deleveraging in the industry inevitably put downward pressure on financial markets and on the real economy. It is now also clear that banks were undercapitalized at the start of the crisis.

Joseph Yam: Exchange fund notes Opening remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the signing ceremony for the appointment of retail exchange fund notes distributors, Hong Kong, 3 May 2005. *  *  *  I have often emphasised the need for diversification in the financial intermediation channels to maximise the contribution of the financial system to economic growth and development. Diversification can also promote financial stability through reducing the over-dependence of financial intermediation upon one particular channel. Such diversification is therefore clearly in the public interest, to the extent, I think, of requiring the involvement of the public sector in its promotion, if the free market does not produce the desired results. Indeed, Hong Kong’s non-interventionist Government finally got around to this view back in 1989 and on 14 March 1990 the first weekly issue of 91-day Exchange Fund Bills, amounting to $ million, was launched. Since then the Exchange Fund Bills and Notes Programme has become a central feature of Hong Kong’s debt market. The total amount of Exchange Fund paper now outstanding is $ billion. And it was not just a matter of bringing supply to the market to meet demand. We developed a benchmark yield curve, a market-making system and a sophisticated market infrastructure, including a paperless clearing and custodian system. But more needs to be done.
The war and international rearmament caused the demand for Swedish products to rise dramatically, and the increased exports gave a considerable boost to the economy. Swedish inflation toward the end of, and shortly after, the war has been described as a classic price, wage and profit spiral in an environment with growing access to money and bank credits, speculation and a shortage of fuel, commodities and labour.9 As I noted earlier, the Riksbank was uncertain as to how it should act. At this time, it was mostly academic economists who believed that raising the discount rate, the period’s equivalent to the repo rate, could slow down inflation, while the Riksbank was more hesitant.10 The fact that economic policy-makers did not share the view that the interest rate can be used to influence inflation was not, of course, a  8 Wetterberg (2009), p. 256. 9  Lundberg (1983). The introduction of the eight-hour day in July 1920 contributed to the shortage of labour. 10 Lundberg (1983), p. 56. 5 [14]  good starting point and in itself a partial explanation for the fact that inflation could rise so sharply. An interesting, but perhaps not so well-known, event during this period was that Eli Heckscher, professor at the Stockholm School of Economics and internationally renowned economist, actually caused a bank run at the Riksbank in 1920.11 Although the inflation peak had passed, inflation at the beginning of 1920 was still so high that Heckscher thought that the Riksbank should raise the discount rate significantly.

Jonung, Lars (1999), ”Med backspegeln som kompass – om stabiliseringspolitiken som läroprocess”, [With the rear-view mirror as a compass - on stabilisation policy as a learning process] report to the Expert Group for Public Economics (ESO). Jonung, Lars (2000), “Från guldmyntfot till svenskt inflationsmål – svensk stabiliseringspolitik under det 20:e seklet” [From gold standard to inflation target – Swedish stabilisation policy in the 20th Century], Ekonomisk Debatt No. 1. Jonung, Lars (2017), ”Jakten på den stabila stabiliseringspolitiken” [The hunt for stable stabilisation policy], Ekonomisk Debatt, nr. 4. Lundberg, Erik (1983), Ekonomiska kriser förr och nu [Economic crises before and now], Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle. Rockoff, Hugh (2015), “War and inflation in the United States from the revolution to the first Iraq war”, NBER Working paper 21221. Vaitilingam, Romesh (2022), “Economic consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Views of leading economists”, column on VoxEU, 10 March, Economic consequences of war in Ukraine: IGM Forum survey | VOX, CEPR Policy Portal (voxeu.org) Vernon, J.R. (1994), “World War II Fiscal Policies and the End of the Great Depression”, Journal of Economic History 54, pp. 850-868. Wetterberg, Gunnar (2009), Money and power – the history of Sveriges Riksbank, Sveriges Riksbank and Atlantis. Åsbrink, Erik (2019), Gunnar Sträng, Albert Bonniers Förlag. 14 [14]