samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In fact, now standing at 5.9 percent, the unemployment rate has fallen about 4 percentage points from its high – and a full percentage point over the last year. Other measures of labor market health also suggest significant improvements: Notably, layoff rates are low and job opening rates are back to their prerecession levels. But we still aren’t back to full labor market health. At 5.9 percent, the unemployment rate remains above what most people think of as its long-run neutral level. For example, according to the central tendency in the FOMC’s latest Summary of Economic Projections, 1 the estimate of the neutral unemployment rate is between 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent, with my own judgment at the bottom of this range. This leaves a significant gap between our goal and current conditions. Moreover, the labor force participation rate has dropped a good deal. Most of the decline in labor force participation since 2000 is due to demographic trends, such as baby boomers moving into retirement age, and long-running trends, such as reductions in male and teenage labor force participation. These trends are structural in nature, and monetary policy is not the appropriate policy tool to address them. Nonetheless, the labor force participation rate has fallen somewhat more than what would be expected given these structural trends. And it is  1  2  Federal Open Market Committee (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  also lower than what would be expected from its historical relationship with the unemployment rate.

And when achieving the dual mandate called for additional monetary policy accommodation, the FOMC turned to other less conventional approaches, such as large-scale asset purchase programs – what many of you have heard referred to as “QE,” or quantitative easing – and forward guidance about how long the fed funds rate is likely to remain near zero. I believe these efforts have been very beneficial in helping the economy make significant progress and bringing us back closer to our policy goals. Today, with economic conditions much improved, many people are asking when Fed policy will return to normal. That is an excellent question. So in my remarks this morning I will discuss my outlook for the economy and how that outlook and the risks around it shape my views about the appropriate timing and pace of eventual policy normalization. In particular, I expect that there will be further improvements in economic activity over the next three years and that these will be accompanied by additional declines in the unemployment rate toward more normal levels. At the same time, I expect inflation to rise gradually toward the FOMC’s 2 percent target. These forecasts are predicated on maintaining a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy for a considerable time. Indeed, given our recent experience, I feel that before the Fed raises rates, we should have a great deal of confidence that we won’t be forced to backtrack on our moves and face another painful period at the ZLB.
But speaking for my own generation studying economics in the nineties – we were idealistic. In my PhD programme, I was joined by people from all over the world who had great hopes for free trade and sensible economic policy, and what the two could do for their own countries and for the world at large. And yes, the invisible hand has performed many miracles since then. Prosperity has grown by leaps and bounds worldwide. In the past 30 years, 1.2 billion people have risen out of abject poverty. To be more specific, in 1990 some 36% of the world’s population lived on the equivalent of less than two US dollars a day. Now only 9% are that destitute. In the West, globalisation has also been a key to improved living standards and price stability over the past 30 years, with the continuous emergence of new ways to make production cheaper and more efficient by moving it between countries. It also created innumerable international opportunities for well-educated people. But there is a dark side to this upbeat picture. Although globalisation narrowed the gap between rich and poor countries, it widened the income gap within many countries. Although the overall outcome has been profit, the benefits have been distributed unequally, and some groups in society lose out. Income inequality has therefore grown in most Western countries in recent years.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Managing the economy at a crossroads Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand (FCCT), Bangkok, 3 July 2014. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to be here once again, to address the oldest press club in Southeast Asia. I congratulate you for the outstanding works in Thailand over these years. Journalism is indeed a special profession, one whose status is sometimes hailed as “the fourth pillar of the state” alongside the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Such privilege comes with a somber weight of commitment to accurate reporting and balanced viewpoints. These qualities are needed more than ever today, as there is much public demand to understand the implications of the recent political development. I will share with you today my early assessment from a policymaker’s standpoint, regarding the latest economic outlook and key challenges to public policy lying ahead. Current economic assessments First, let me give you a brief summary of where we are. The buildup of political tension late last year came at an unfortunate time for the economy. The economic activity was already hampered by weak domestic demand amid high household debt and a lackluster global economy. As the political uncertainties persisted, the repercussion on consumer and business confidence grew, denting private consumption and investment.
The continuing shift of resources to meet the demand for better public services means that private demand must grow much more slowly over the next few years. In turn, that would enable the trade deficit to stabilise and eventually fall back. The second uncertainty facing the UK is the slowdown in the world economy, and, in particular, the downturn in the United States. In 2000, the world economy grew by 4.7%, the highest rate for twelve years. And, stimulated by an increase in productivity growth, the US growth rate had reached almost 6% a year in the first half of 2000. Such a rate was unlikely to have proved sustainable. Over the past five years productivity growth in the United States has risen markedly. Labour productivity growth rose by more than 1 percentage point a year to an average of 2½%-3% between 1995 and 2000. Some of this rise was the impact of new technology on efficiency, and some was the result of greater investment in IT – capital deepening – which added significantly to the amount of capital with which each employee was working. But demand rose even more rapidly than the supply of output, leading to a large current account deficit. The external imbalance was the mirror image of the internal imbalance. So a slowdown in the US was not only unsurprising, it was desirable. But the speed of the turn-round in the US has taken most commentators by surprise.

Despite the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt problems, the Islamic capital markets have shown unparalleled resilience over the past few years. In particular, the sukuk market climbed to new heights for the fourth year in a row, with global sukuk issuance exceeding $ billion in 2012, three times higher than that before the global financial crisis.2  1  Source: KFH Research. 2  Source: KFH Research. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Strengths of Hong Kong in developing Islamic finance 6. Hong Kong is well positioned to add momentum to the globalisation of Islamic finance. As a free and open economy and major international financial centre, Hong Kong has developed a highly liquid and deep capital market with a strong presence of international financial intermediaries and a diverse base of borrowers and investors, a well-established financial infrastructure, a sound legal system, a transparent regulatory framework and a simple tax regime. 7. In addition to these general capabilities in financial intermediation, Hong Kong can play a unique and pivotal role in bridging the investment needs from the Middle East and the funding needs in Mainland China. 8. Many Middle East investors are now actively looking for investment opportunities beyond their domestic borders to diversify their investment portfolios. This trend has been supported by the huge pool of oil-driven liquidity in the Middle East.
A first cost is that it may create confusion as to the objective of the monetary authorities: inflation or the exchange rate. In our case, we have dealt with this through transparent mechanisms whereby we anticipate the amounts and terms of interventions, and by maintaining a flexible exchange rate. In addition it has always been clear that the exchange rate is not an objective and the main goal of the Central Bank is price stability. A second cost is of a financial nature. Foreign reserves are invested in highly liquid and secure instruments of developed countries, whose interest rates are lower than those of domestic instruments used to finance their acquisition. Conversely, the benefits of having these reserves are the enhanced security they provide in case of an abrupt cut of external financing. These benefits are hard to measure, but it is reasonable to expect that they will decline as the availability of reserves increases, as has been occurring in Chile since 2008. Allow me to express some final thoughts. Final thoughts News during these last weeks have led us to a scenario in which the effects of the deteriorating external situation that we forecast some time back are not evident and in which inflationary pressures stemming from a higher cost of energy have resurfaced. Hence, if a few months ago it was clear that the most likely scenario for monetary policy in emerging economies was a further loosening, today it is much less clear so.

In October we had revised down our growth forecasts for Sweden and abroad considerably and in December we revised the forecasts down by as much again; the economic slowdown had hit with even greater force than we had earlier expected. The weaker krona together with the fall in energy and food prices appeared to some extent to be able to counteract the severe slowdown in the economy. According to our forecast in December, Swedish GDP will decline by 0.5 per cent in 2009, but recover during 2010, when growth increases to approximately 2 per cent. We also revised down the inflation forecast substantially, primarily because of falling energy prices and declining interest expenditure for households. According to our assessment, CPI inflation will on average be just over 1 per cent in 2009. However, inflation will then rise towards the target level at the end of 2010, as economic activity improves and the effects of falling energy prices and interest expenditure no longer affect the inflation figures. The assessment in December was that resource utilisation would be lower than normal over the coming years, while inflation would undershoot the target for a while. Given this, we Executive Board members were agreed that a substantial and long-lasting cut in the repo rate was needed to avoid an unnecessarily long period of inflation undershooting the target and of weak real economic development. Nor were there any advantages to adjusting the repo rate in gradual stages.
Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 3 March 2011. *  *  *  I was here as recently as two days ago to discuss the development of housing prices and household indebtedness. Today, I am here to discuss monetary policy. 1 After several years of crisis management, it feels positive to return to discussing more “usual” monetary policy issues. When I was here a year ago, I showed a picture of a skater on the ice. Having been out on thin ice, I considered we had returned to thicker ice. Today, I would instead say that we’re back on dry land. To use a different metaphor, Sweden, with its small, open economy, could be described as being a small boat on a wide ocean. The financial crisis required “Sailboat Sweden” to navigate some dramatically stormy waters. After such a traumatic experience, it is natural to try to lift your gaze and ask certain all-embracing questions:   Where have we come from?   Where are we now?   Where are we going? Personally, I would be just a little worried if I found myself aboard a boat without knowing where I boarded it, its current position or final destination. Let me therefore attempt to give you my answers to these questions as they concern Sweden’s economy. Where have we come from?

One of the forms taken by this unease is that of rising government bond rates in these countries, which is further increasing the burden of debt (see Slide 8). The high levels of public debt are partially a consequence of the fiscal policy stimulation packages introduced during the crisis. In many cases, the situation has been exacerbated by the excessively weak development of public finances in the years leading up to the crisis. Several countries are now facing a difficult balancing act. On one hand, significant fiscal policy tightening will be necessary for a long time to come in order to reduce public debt to a more reasonable level. On the other hand, this tightening must not be so comprehensive as to threaten the economic recovery. Hopefully the planned European Financial Stability Facility will have a beneficial effect, but the public finance problems will characterise developments for a long time to come, one way or another. The United States also has a large and growing central government debt, and it will require comprehensive fiscal policy tightening to gain control over this development. One advantage is that US government bond rates are still low (see Slide 1). Moreover, asset purchases by the US central bank have contributed towards keeping interest rates down. These expansive financial conditions, together with high profits within the corporate sector, suggest that the recovery will pick up further speed, despite the need for fiscal policy tightening.
In order to achieve this, Eesti Pank is of the opinion that in addition to the steps taken in February, this year's fiscal deficit needs to be reduced by a further 6.5 billion kroons. In addition to fiscal consolidation, it is important to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. Once the acute crisis is over, the first thing to do is to achieve fiscal balance. Then it is necessary to restore the public sector's extensive fiscal reserves. The national budget strategy recently approved by the government creates a necessary macro framework according to which the budget should reach balance by 2011. Eesti Pank is of the opinion the new strategy is a timely and ambitious document which requires cooperation also at Riigikogu level. Taking into account that government expenditure as a ratio to GDP has soared, budget adjustment must be done primarily on the expenditure side. Tax revenue increases may support the adjustment, but they should not play the main role. If only tax advances were used to finance costs at the current level, Estonia's long-term economic growth would be imperilled. Also, we support the principles of the current tax policy, according to which the share of indirect and pollution taxes would increase on account of direct taxes. I would like to emphasise once again that the measures taken over the past half a year in both the public and the private sector have improved Estonia's ability to exit the crisis.

It is clear the events that took place at the end of the last and at the beginning of this year were real challenges for the Estonian monetary and financial system, testing their resilience and ability to adjust to the changing external environment. Today I dare to look at the situation with moderate optimism and repeat what has already been said in March: Estonia has all the possibilities of successfully passing through the crisis. BIS Review 91/2009  1  Estonia's monetary policy and financial stability in 2008 Turning to the tasks of Eesti Pank, I would like to start with an overview of the functioning of the monetary policy framework. The objective of Eesti Pank, member of the European System of Central Banks, is to ensure price stability in Estonia. To this end, we rest on the currency peg to the euro, the currency board arrangement and the EU exchange rate mechanism ERM II. The success of this system is confirmed by the slowdown in the price rise which started in 2008, and the halt in the growth rate of consumer prices in recent months. Looking ahead, Eesti Pank forecasts the price level to decline somewhat in both this and next year. It is clear the Estonian monetary policy or the monetary policy framework will not and must not be changed. The exchange rate of the Estonian kroon will remain as it is and we will accede to the euro area at the current exchange rate.
Talent with these new capabilities have tended to be short in supply. The demand for such talent with the new competencies and skills is made even more complex and challenging by the changing character and nature of the talent itself. Firstly, there is now greater mobility of the talent within industries, between industries and across borders. No longer can organisations rely on employment to retirement. The potential for retention has become challenging with the motivation of the workforce now becoming highly different. Among the factors that are important for the new generation is for the job to be interesting, challenging and fulfilling. They are drawn to greater engagement with the leadership, greater empowerment and being accorded greater exposure and potential for future development. A lack of recognition of the changes in the motivation of the new generation of the talent will not only present itself as a major challenge for human capital management but it is also likely to affect the harmonisation and cohesiveness of the organisation and its overall performance. Talent in the financial sector Let me say a few words about the specific talent challenges in the financial sector. The structural changes taking place in the financial system and the recent global financial crisis has and continues to drive dramatic change in the financial industry. Financial institutions are facing increased regulation, greater uncertainty in the operating environment, uneven competitive conditions and a severely damaged reputation in many parts of the world. These developments have important implications for the financial services workforce.

So, the key to success for CDI clearly lies beyond technology. We need to find the right commercial incentive for all to benefit and create the network effect. 30. Similarly, for the mBridge project, technical interoperability is key but relatively straight forward. The platform now has the flexibility to allow central banks to easily connect through CBDCs or traditional payment systems. But that won’t attract more jurisdictions to join by itself. To do that, the platform needs to account for policy and business challenges. How to build-in different regulatory requirements like anti-money laundering, how to ensure sufficient on-chain foreign exchange liquidity, or how to develop a shared legal framework are all challenging but necessary tasks. The project team will focus on these issues, which are well beyond technology, in taking the project to its next stage. Closing 31. The HKMA began its fintech journey six years ago. We have come a long way, reached some important milestones, kept pace with our peers, and are now pressing on into uncharted territory. But like everyone else, we are still exploring, experimenting and learning. And as we continue our journey, we will stay radically open-minded, learn from our failures and keep trying, and go well beyond technology to achieve network effects. 32. As I said at the beginning, Hong Kong will continue on the road of fintech adoption. Many exciting developments are taking place, and you are bound to see interesting sights and meet interesting people on the way.
That is a lot of ifs and, as I have noted, a further provision is that if the standstill is supported by IMF lending into arrears, it would need to be subject to strict conditionality. But again these conditions could usefully borrow from the corresponding provisions attached to corporate workout standstills. In both cases, the standstill should be subject to a strict time limit; it should allow for a full release of all relevant information from debtor to creditors on a timely basis; it should facilitate equitable treatment of similar types of creditors (for example through the formation of  6  BIS Review 67/2001  bank creditor and bondholder committees); it should provide for the seniority of any new money; and above all it should deliver the rapid presentation of a restructuring plan to creditors. What this means is that any sovereign debt standstill would need to be orderly, efficient, equitable and expeditious. Easier said than done, of course, especially given the fact that generally no single organisation represents the disparate group of private creditors. But, as with corporate workout standstills, the key is to reduce the incentives for creditors to rush for the exits. Of course, some have argued that attempts to negotiate a standstill could have the opposite effect, in other words they could prompt a rush for the exits. But longer-term investors benefit from country runs being forestalled, so the net effect might be a beneficial switch from short-run to long-run investors.

In my recent appearance before the Lower House Budget Committee, I referred to the growing debt of companies and, in particular, of households as one of the sources of medium-term risk to the scenario of sustained growth and the tendency towards the re-balancing of the Spanish economy that I have set out today. Given the importance of the issue, I believe it would be useful to reiterate what I consider is a balanced analysis of this phenomenon. The Banco de España has been on a vigilant footing regarding the rate at which corporate and, especially, household debt has been growing in recent years, particularly given that most of such debt is floating-rate. This tends to increase households' exposure to potentially unfavourable changes in their income or in the cost of borrowing. Such exposure may particularly affect those segments of the population whose room for manoeuvre in these situations is more limited. There is thus no reason for complacency. 4  BIS Review 117/2006  A balanced analysis requires the joint assessment of all factors making up the household financial position. In this connection, it should be remembered that the payments associated with the debt incurred have grown at a substantially lesser extent than the volume of the debt and, at present, they account for a proportion of household income which, at the aggregate level, is still fairly moderate. The value of household financial and non-financial assets has also risen considerably in recent years.