samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They are evolving rapidly, they are highly automated in key market segments, and information on trading activity is not widely available. As a result, it is challenging for the official sector, market participants, and members of the public to effectively analyze these markets, understand the sources and risks of flash events, and evaluate how liquidity is changing. Given the role of the Treasury market as the deepest and most liquid fixed income market in the world, it is clear that both the official sector and the public need improved access to transactionlevel data, and I am pleased that we are making real progress on this front. Greater transparency into Treasury market activity is necessary in maintaining the market’s many important roles: as a risk-free benchmark for financial instruments; as a liquid investment and source of safe collateral; as a channel for the implementation of monetary policy; and, of course, as a tool to help finance U.S. government activities. As the Treasury market continues to evolve, several complex questions lie ahead. How should data reporting gaps be closed to ensure that as many relevant Treasury transactions as possible are collected? What is the proper scope and best process for sharing Treasury market data with the public? How can the Joint Member Agencies and private stakeholders best collaborate to ensure Treasury market stability and efficient market function, even as market structure evolves and new technologies emerge?

The Treasury’s Request for Information, and comments on various SEC and CFTC proposals, have provided thoughtful perspectives on the evolution of Treasury market structure. We have also benefited from consultation with groups such as the Treasury Markets Practices Group (TMPG), which is made up of market professionals committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the Treasury market. Continued engagement between the official sector and the public on the Treasury market remains necessary to help to manage its evolution, and to best maintain its efficient function and integrity. Those of you who transact in this market have a crucial perspective on how the Treasury market works and what information is useful for evaluating its function. Engagement between the official and private sectors can also facilitate the development of timely solutions to important issues in the industry. Such efforts include the best practices the TMPG has produced for the Treasury, agency debt and agency MBS markets, 4 and the Group of 30’s recommendations on banking culture and conduct5―an issue I believe the financial industry must continue to work on.6 In fact, it is this type of collaboration―between a wide array of market participants and official agencies―that helps different perspectives come together to create effective practices.7 In addition to engagement with the public, the Joint Member Agencies have continued their interagency collaboration. We have been working together to share information and help shape the most effective path forward for public policy.
Andrew G Haldane: Banking on the state Paper by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, and Mr Piergiorgio Alessandri, based on a presentation delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago twelfth annual International Banking Conference on “The International Financial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed?”, Chicago, 25 September 2009. Contributions and comments were provided by Paul Doran, Marius Jurgilas, Samuel Knott, Salina Ladha, Ouarda Merrouche, Filipa Sa, William Speller, Matthew Willison and Nick Vause. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Historically, the link between the state and the banking system has been umbilical. Starting with the first Italian banking houses in the 13th century, banks were financiers of the sovereign. Sovereign need was often greatest following war. The Bank of England was established at the end of the 17th century for just this purpose, financing the war debts of William III. From the earliest times, the relationship between banks and the state was often rocky. Sovereign default on loans was an everyday hazard for the banks, especially among states vanquished in war. Indeed, through the ages sovereign default has been the single biggest cause of banking collapse. 1 It led to the downfall of many of the founding Italian banks, including the Medici of Florence. As awareness of sovereign risk grew, banks began to charge higher loan rates to the sovereign than to commercial entities.

And the state has underwritten any losing streak. Clearer practical examples of a policy timeconsistency problem are unlikely to exist. 4. Resolving the time-inconsistency problem  In addressing this time-consistency problem, two broad approaches are possible: redesign of the financial system to reduce the scale of insurable risks; and redesign of the social safety net to make it less susceptible to gaming. (a)  Redesigning the financial system  What options best tackle excessive risk-taking incentives? A number suggest themselves, some modest, others more radical. •  Introducing leverage limits: One simple means of altering the rules of the asymmetric game between banks and the state is to place heavier restrictions on leverage. European banks were not subject to a regulatory leverage ratio in the runup to crisis. They exploited that loophole. Closing it would bring about a clockwise rotation in banks’ payoff schedule, lowering the beta of banks’ equity returns and reducing risk-taking incentives. This is an easy win. Simple leverage ratios already operate in countries such as the US and Canada. They appear to have helped slow debt-fuelled balance sheet inflation. The Basel Committee is now seeking to introduce leverage ratios internationally. To be effective, it is important that leverage rules bite. They need to be robust to the seductive, but ultimately siren, voices claiming this time is different. That suggests they should operate as a regulatory rule (Pillar I), rather than being left to supervisory discretion (Pillar II). It is important, too, that leverage limits are set at the right level.
The economics of securitisation: benefits and some drawbacks  The role of securitisation in the financial markets of developed economies has expanded dramatically in recent years. Following a relatively slow start compared with the US market, the European market for asset-backed securities grew very rapidly in the past few years as entrepreneurs, bankers and investors increasingly warmed up to the advantages of instruments that allowed them to issue bonds backed by the cash flows from pools of asset classes as diverse as music royalties from rock stars, rental income from pubs, and soccer 2 club ticket sales, as well as more boring stuff such as credit card debt and mortgage loans. Also some European governments were quick to spot the attractiveness from new financial instruments that enabled them to raise funds from the securitisation of future government revenues – whether from the expected sales of real estate holdings and lottery tickets or from pension contribution claims – rather than from more traditional mechanisms of financing public spending that are usually not very popular with voters. There is no sector though more closely involved in securitisation than the banking sector. In fact, asset securitisation was introduced in the 1970s in the US precisely for the purpose to allow depository institutions to sell their pools of mortgage loans before maturity, thereby acquiring an additional source of funding.

In Sweden, the Riksbank has regularly highlighted many of the risks in the financial system. We did so most recently in our Financial Stability Report. There we pointed out, for instance, that the financial turbulence might worsen and that the banks' access to funding could deteriorate. At the same time, we have all along made the assessment that financial stability in Sweden has been satisfactory. We make the same assessment now, and the Swedish banks are financially strong. 2  BIS Review 115/2008  As we have seen, a lot has happened on the financial markets recently. We are following developments closely, constantly updating our analyses and we are prepared to take action if necessary. We have regular contacts with banks, market participants and other government agencies, as well as our central bank colleagues in other countries. There is a generally high level of uncertainty in the world economy at present and this will probably persist for a good while to come. I would therefore like to return now to what I mentioned at the beginning – the inflation target and the stability it offers to the economy, particularly when storms are raging all around us. Monetary policy – focus on the inflation target The objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability and this has been established by law since 1999. To be more precise, inflation measured in terms of the consumer price index, CPI, is to be held at 2 per cent, with a tolerance interval of +/- 1 percentage point.
The Bank’s role is recognised in the Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the Bank, the Treasury and FSA and published in the Autumn of 1997, which sets out how the three organisations are to cooperate in monitoring the UK financial system. To this end, the MOU established a tripartite Standing Committee which meets monthly to discuss issues of current concern; and cooperation is further enhanced by the fact that I sit on the FSA Board and Howard Davies is a Member of Court. Coordination is also important internationally. The Asian Crisis in 1998 demonstrated how quickly shocks could pass between markets. One response from the international financial community was the establishment of the Financial Stability Forum, a body similar in purpose to the Standing Committee. The Forum meets semi-annually, bringing together central banks, regulators and finance ministries from developed and developing countries, to discuss the threats to financial stability. The Bank is an active participant in the FSF, along with HMT and FSA. Having described the organisational structure, I want to turn now to the four broad areas where the Bank is involved in financial stability. The first is the analysis of developments in G10 and emerging market economies and financial markets and the potential impact on financial stability. Macro-prudential surveillance is at the core of the Bank’s financial stability effort, bringing together detailed knowledge of the macroeconomic environment and financial markets to identify potential vulnerabilities in financial systems in aggregate.

The banking groups operating in Estonia are able to manage capital and liquidity in a flexible way at group level. The integration of the banking system consists in the readiness of banking groups to promptly channel money flows to various subsidiaries and branches according to need. The integration of banking is supported by cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic region. I am convinced the daily information exchange and cooperation agreements of our region set an example of ensuring financial stability for the entire European Union. In the final months of 2008, Sweden initiated support schemes, which have had a very positive impact on banking groups as a whole, i.e., national support measures have been implemented from group level also on subsidiaries and branches. In this context, Estonia has in the EU actively supported the principle that the implementation of rescue packages must not discriminate against other Member States. 2009 economic policy priorities in Estonia Now I would like to say a few words about the current monetary and economic policy situation and the most important priorities for 2009. By now it is clear that the Estonian enterprises and households have thoroughly changed their behaviour and expectations over the past half a year. In this respect, a big part of the adjustment process has already taken place and Estonia's primary macro vulnerabilities have considerably decreased. The current account, i.e., the difference between investment and savings, has practically balanced and the financing of the economy's current expenditure is ensured by current income.
Once the adjustments are completed, households can consume more and regain their access to credit, and these developments help to support a more vigorous economic recovery. Of course, we don’t yet know precisely where we are in this adjustment process. For example, families may choose a permanently higher rate of saving in order to rebuild their retirement savings. What they decide to do will depend in part on their expectations for future income, their outlook for the economy, what they think will happen to housing and stock prices, and prospects for taxes and benefits such as social security and Medicare payments. However, we do know that during good times few households are likely to be delinquent on  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  their bills. And, overall, we’d expect their borrowing to grow at least modestly as the economy strengthens. The Household Debt and Credit Report released today indicates that there has been a pickup in credit flows. Households increased their non-mortgage debt last quarter, a development not seen since the fourth quarter of 2008. The number of credit card applications increased – an indication of a pick-up in consumer demand for credit. And, the number of open credit card accounts also increased slightly – as more accounts were opened than were closed. Of course, signs of distress continued: households are still reducing their housing-related debt and delinquencies continue to be a problem. So, the adjustments remain far from complete.

So as to be able to have a new toolkit adapted to this crisis, more than half a dozen laws1 had to be approved, from first creating the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB) in 2009 to the last Decree Law approved in February, with regulations that have set about righting the shortcomings. These include the creation of an institution/fund allowing for the obligatory and orderly restructuring of non-viable banks and encouraging the merger of viable ones; the regulation of institutional protection schemes; the possibility of converting savings banks into banks; new capital requirements to speed through restructuring; the granting of greater powers to the Banco de España; the merger of the deposit guarantee funds, etc. Promoting all these changes in a full-blown crisis was like carrying out two tasks on a ship that has hit the rocks: while evacuating the passengers, it was necessary to repair the lifeboats. A most difficult task, as I said, but the seven laws have now been passed. And there is one very positive aspect, namely that all these regulations had the backing of the country’s two main parties. This is perhaps why these reforms have maintained a series of common characteristics and, while giving due merit to the main actors, i.e. the different governments and the legislative chambers, mention might be made of the advice that the Banco de España has offered and continues to offer.
Strengthening the role of Shariah scholars The Islamic financial landscape today has undergone various transformations and progress over the last 10 years. This transformation can be testified in the increase of global banking assets that had reached nearly USD1.5 trillion, total outstanding sukuk amounting to USD295 billion, Islamic fund assets amounting to USD76 billion as well as the takaful contributions of USD21 billion (Source: IFSB: 1H 2014). In addition, there has been a marked increase in the participation from non-Muslim jurisdictions in Islamic finance, particularly in sukuk issuances, reflecting the increasingly positive reception of Islamic finance among the global community. The sukuk instrument, in particular, is among the most innovative instruments and favoured by governments and multinational corporations. In response to these developments, the role of and the expectation on Shariah scholars will be more challenging in finding solutions to emerging new Shariah issues that require immediate responses from the Shariah fraternity. To me, changes in the Islamic financial landscape should be viewed as a golden opportunity for the Shariah experts to demonstrate the dynamism of the Islamic religion as perpetually modern and evolving through time. Therefore, it is my hope that the role of the Shariah scholars could be further enhanced and not confined solely to only ensuring and monitoring the Shariah compliance aspects. In relation to this, I am also of the opinion that researches and thorough deliberations on Shariah need to consider other fields of disciplines in order for the ijtihad (reasoning) or Shariah decisions to be comprehensive, inclusive and practical.

In compliance with its legal duties, and pursuant to its institutional commitments in the framework of the arrangement, the Bank of Albania will continue to work on: •  Maintaining price stability, in accordance with its 3.0 % inflation target. The Bank of Albania will continue to implement its monetary policy in accordance with the targeted inflation regime and free-floating exchange rate regime. The monetary policy will remain on the easing side, aiming at enhancing transparency of communication and its effectiveness. •  Maintaining adequate foreign currency reserves. •  Supporting banking system stability, by exercising its duties as the regulator and supervisor of the banking system. Special attention, in this regard, will be given to addressing factors determining non-performing loans. For this purpose, the Bank of Albania will cooperate with the banking industry and other national authorities to swiftly address this issue. Moreover, the Bank of Albania will continue to work on improving the infrastructure that assesses and addresses risks facing the overall financial system, in the framework of recommendations left by the Financial Sector Assessment Progam. •  Completing the project for adopting the new IFRS standards on compiling financial statements. Thank You! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
5  Moore’s Law refers to the observation by Intel co-founder Gordon Moore in 1965 that transistor density on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated circuit was invented and the prediction that this would continue. BIS Review 95/2010  11  5. Explaining disaggregated returns to banking  A distinct, but complementary, explanation of high returns to banking is that they reflect structural features of the financial sector. For example, measures of market concentration are often used as a proxy for the degree of market power producers have over consumers. It is telling that measures of the concentration of the banking sector have increased dramatically over the course of the past decade, coincident with the rise in banking returns. Chart 35 plots the share of total bank assets of the largest three banks in the US since the 1930s. Having flat-lined up until the 1990s, the top 3 share has since roughly tripled. A similar trend is evident in the UK (where the share of the top 3 banks currently stands at above 50%) and globally (where the share of the top 3 has doubled over the past 10 years). At the same time, it is well known that market concentration need not signal a lack of competitiveness or efficiency within an industry or sector (Wood and Kabiri (2010)). Highly competitive industries can be concentrated and highly decentralised industries uncompetitive.

This picture is broadly mirrored when turning from returns to labour to returns to capital. In the 1950s gross profitability of the financial sector relative to capital employed was broadly in line with the rest of the economy (Chart 16). But since then, and in particular over the past decade, returns to capital have far outpaced those at an economy-wide level. Chart 17 plots UK banks’ return on equity capital (ROE) since 1920 (Alessandri and Haldane (2009)). Although conceptually a different measure of returns to capital, the broad message is the same. Trends in ROE are clearly divided into two periods. In the period up until around 1970, ROE in banking was around 7% with a low variance. In other words, returns to finance broadly mimicked those in the economy as whole, in line with the gamble payoffs in Chart 6. But the 1970s mark a regime shift, with the ROE in banking roughly trebling to over 20%, again in line with gamble payoffs. Excess returns accumulated to capital as well as labour. These returns were by no means unique to UK banks. Chart 18 plots ROEs for major internationally active banks in the US and Europe during this century. Two features are striking. First, the level of ROEs was consistently at or above 20% and on a rising trend up until the crisis. This is roughly double ROEs in the non-financial sector over the period. Second, the degree of cross-country similarity in these ROE profiles is striking. This, too, is no coincidence.
Both of these facts suggest that any rapid expansion of Central Bank balance sheets or government deficits may be viewed as inappropriate and would therefore undermine the credibility of these institutions and their ability to anchor inflation expectations, which remain fragile. It is with these four points in mind that I pose the question: Is the global financial and economic crisis an opportunity or a curse for Africa? I do not see the global crisis as a curse on Africa – some unknown force guiding us to our inevitable doom. Rather I see the global crisis as presenting a set of circumstances to which Africa is capable of responding proactively – to the great benefit of its people and indeed to the global economy. My reading of the current debates on the state of economics is that the poor predictive power of most macroeconomists in calling the financial crisis has bred the widespread belief that it is not so much that economists failed in their duties, this they certainly did; but that the science of economics itself has been found to be severely wanting. I myself have a more balanced view. There were certainly ample signs that trouble was brewing in the global economy – best reflected in the growing financial imbalances across the globe, for example between the  BIS Review 128/2009  3  United States and China, in an ever more interconnected financial landscape.

New forecasts have not been prepared for this monetary policy meeting, but we have assessed new information against the forecasts we presented in March. Chart 3: International inflation has slowed Inflation among trading partners is also high but has eased in many countries in recent months. Gas and power prices have come down from the very high levels seen last year. Problems at some US and Swiss banks led to large movements in financial markets in March. Global equity indexes have risen since the March Report, and bond risk premiums have fallen. US and European households and firms appear to be finding it more difficult to obtain loans. Chart 4: The krone has depreciated High inflation has prompted central banks in many countries to raise policy rates quickly and more than in Norway. The Norwegian krone has depreciated in recent months and  1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  is now at its weakest level since the onset of the pandemic in spring 2020. The krone is weaker than we projected in March. Activity in the Norwegian economy is high. Household consumption has continued to increase despite high inflation and higher interest rates. The employment rate is high and employment has risen further so far this year. The labour market is tight. Economic growth has nevertheless slowed recently. Unemployment moved a little higher in April, and the number of job postings has declined. Chart 5: Wage growth has risen The tight labour market has led to a pick-up in wage growth.