samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Of course, we will ensure that the principles of customer consent and data security are upheld at all times. The platform will also be subject to rigorous governance that will include consumer protection measures. 31. This new data strategy is a paradigm shift in the development of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure. We have always facilitated the secure movement of funds through our robust clearing and settlement systems. Now we will also be facilitating the secure movement of data, at the initiation of the data owner, to enable more efficient financial intermediation in our banking system. 32. This will be an important catalyst for applying technology to enhancing those timeless principles of banking. Think for a moment about what CDI makes possible: an array of new financial products, which enhances service; reduced fraud and lower compliance costs, which strengthen trust; and bespoke lending with finely-tuned pricing, which allows capital to be deployed more efficiently. CBDC—Addressing pain points in cross-border payments 33. As a leading international financial centre, Hong Kong should always be looking to enhance cross-border banking, too. As any of you who have ever made an international remittance will know, the correspondent banking system we have today is far from perfect. In fact, it’s inefficient, costly and opaque. 34. The central banking community understands these issues. So the Bank for International Settlements has set up a specific Task Force to study how we can apply technology to improve cross-border banking. The HKMA is one of the leading central banks in this initiative.

It is indeed a delicate balancing act, having to take into account the differing views and interests of all member countries. We particularly underscore important progress that we made to agree to a more transparent quota formula. With the inclusion of GDP at purchasing power parity in the GDP variable, and the tripling of basic votes, the quota reform could better account for the dynamism of emerging economies, while improving the representation of low-income countries. While no quota reform package is perfect, it is broadly in line with the objectives set out in the Singapore Resolution. Like many others, however, we are disappointed that the headline shift of quota shares from advanced countries to emerging market and low-income countries – which will be the public’s point of focus – is a meager 1.1 percentage points. 11. Difficult compromises have been made, and we believe it is now time to bring this important issue to a close. Agreement on the package by the Fund’s membership will be critical to restore the Fund’s credibility and legitimacy. Within our constituency, many of us will still be highly under-represented after the second round of ad hoc quota increase. However, in the spirit of compromise and flexibility, we are prepared to support this package on the understanding that this is the first of many steps in a reform process which will eventually see all countries close their under-representation.
Consistently, monetary policy had a strong reaction. The Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) was increased by 200 basis points in just four months, starting in June. By September 2008, before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Central Bank estimated that it would be necessary to increase the MPR further, even above market expectations. Monetary and fiscal policy during the crisis As in most of the world economies, financial tensions in Chile were severe after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Interest rates in both peso and dollar markets posted substantial increases in the most stressful times from mid-September to mid-October 2008 (Figure 4). The Central Bank acted quickly, providing peso and dollar liquidity facilities to the financial system to mitigate liquidity tensions, but also to ensure financing in foreign currency should foreign loans become scarce. Also, the foreign exchange reserves accumulation process was cancelled. Local money market conditions normalized rapidly, over a period of weeks. The additional liquidity facilities put in place were not used extensively by financial institutions, reflecting their sustained access to external markets. Beyond the stressful episodes in local money markets, the global confidence crisis that swept around the world was very important in Chile. The events of developed financial markets prompted a deep and widespread revision of investment and spending plans of businesses and households, bringing expenditure to a halt. Domestic demand and economic activity dropped significantly and lending standards tightened (figure 5). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The inflation outlook changed radically, and monetary policy reacted forcefully.

But not many of us know that that when it comes to technology, Dr Zhou was ahead of the curve amongst his peers. In 2014, before the words “fintech” and “digital currencies” became popular, Dr Zhou set up a Digital Currency Research Institute within the PBoC to explore how new technologies like the blockchain and digital tokens could improve and strengthen China’s financial system. Today, China is a leading fintech player and there is even speculation that PBoC may become the first central bank in the world to issue its own digital currency – a topic that Dr Zhou will probably touch on, and if he does not, one of you I am sure will ask him about! And now, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Dr Zhou Xiaochuan to deliver the tenth MAS Lecture. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
In this  2  BIS Review 81/2010  context, it is useful to recall an unease articulated by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan in 1996 2 : “Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets…. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values...?” This uncertainty about the link between underlying fundamentals and current asset valuations is crucial to interpreting this initial phase of the crisis. For example, one relatively benign interpretation of what was playing out was that the financial system was experiencing a liquidity problem driven by a maturity mismatch in the shadow banking system. The liquidity problem was unusually severe because of the collapse of the shadow banking sector and the resulting pressures that collapse placed on the balance sheets and liquidity positions of the traditional bank sector. Nonetheless, the situation was fundamentally viewed as a liquidity problem rather than a solvency problem, meaning that any potential credit losses were likely to be small and easily absorbed. An alternative darker view was that the global financial system was overexposed to land prices in the United States, through the home sale and mortgage refinancing boom that had taken place in the last four years.

For example, the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System, commonly known as the NGFS, in which over 40 central banks and supervisors have already reached a consensus: and I quote, “climate-related risks are a source of financial risk and therefore fall squarely within the mandates of central banks and supervisors to ensure that the financial system is resilient to these risks.” The HKMA is a member of NGFS, and we are fully on board with this 7. The Bank for International Settlements is also committed to supporting green finance and investment practices, and supports the NGFS research on climate-related risks and their implications for financial stability. 8. The HKMA has many roles – as a bank regulator, one of the largest asset owners globally, and a key promoter of market development. Hence, the HKMA is in a very advantageous position to promote green and sustainable finance in Hong Kong. In May this year, we unveiled three sets of measures on green finance: 9. The first measure is a three-phased approach to promote Green and Sustainable Banking in Hong Kong. Initially, to develop a common framework to assess the existing baseline of individual banks to establish how “green” they are, by talking to the industry to identify the parameters to be included in the assessment; secondly, to engage and consult the industry on whether supervisory requirements are needed; and if needed, how the HKMA should develop our supervisory expectation or requirements; and thirdly to focus on implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 10.
Does that get to you? Draghi: I don’t take anything personally in my job. A polite and constructive debate is actually welcome and helps us to explain our policies. BILD: Really? Draghi: Yes. But one thing is clear: the ECB obeys the law, not the politicians. Or, as one of my predecessors put it, it is normal for politicians to comment on our actions. But it would be abnormal if we listened to them. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  BILD: Does such criticism from the Finance Minister or from the German Vice Chancellor threaten the independence of the ECB? Draghi: No. But any perception that the ECB’s independence is under attack can unsettle businesses and consumers. They might then postpone investment and spending decisions that would be good for jobs and growth. That might force the central bank to do more to achieve price stability. BILD: Has the strength of the criticism from Germany also got something to do with the fact that you are an Italian, and what do you think of demands that the next President of the ECB must be a German? Draghi: There is really nobody in the world who is interested in the fact that I am an Italian apart from the German media. And what difference would it make if a non-Italian were now in office? None at all. He or she would pursue the same course as we do now. All other large central banks in the world are pursuing similar policies.

BILD: But it is precisely this policy of cheap money that is not working… Draghi: Wrong – our policy is working, but we must be patient; investor confidence has not yet been fully restored. For two years, the economy in the euro area has been growing month by month, banks are lending and unemployment is steadily falling. Meanwhile, euro area countries are now able to buy more German exports again, which, for German companies, is partly making up for the decline in trade with China. But it is a slow process because the crisis was more severe than anything we’d had since the Second World War. BILD: And when will interest rates rise again? Draghi: It’s quite simple: when the economy is growing more strongly again and inflation rises closer to our objective. Low interest rates today will lead to higher rates tomorrow. BILD: Does the ECB’s policy of cheap money not make it far too easy for euro area countries like Italy and France, for example, to shirk necessary but unpopular reforms? Draghi: No. The majority of governments are acting, albeit too slowly for my personal taste. All of them would be well advised to do more. But that is not primarily dependent on the ECB and its policies. Most countries started to implement reforms when the level of interest rates was already very low. Furthermore, reforms of judicial systems, electoral laws or labour laws, for example, don’t have much to do with interest rates.
They helped underpin confidence in Singapore in the throes of the Asian Financial Crisis. And during the Global Financial Crisis, the reserves were drawn down to finance a package of measures, to preserve jobs by subsidising employers’ wage bills and to help viable companies stay afloat by sharing the risk of bank lending. A second purpose of the reserves is to serve as an endowment. This purpose has grown in importance – and salience - in recent years. The income from investing the reserves provides an increasingly important source of revenue to fund government expenditure. The size of government in Singapore is small. Government spending – comprising both operating and development expenditure – is just about 16% of GDP. But tax and non-tax revenues are even lower, at 15% of GDP. In other words, Singapore runs a structural deficit on its primary fiscal balance. This is where the investment income from the reserves comes in. The Constitution of Singapore bars the government from borrowing to spend or to spend surpluses accumulated from previous terms of government. Instead, it allows the government to spend up to half of the expected long-term real returns from the net assets invested by MAS, GIC, and Temasek. This is known as the Net Investment Returns Contribution (NIRC). The NIRC is already the largest single contributor to revenues in the government budget, accounting for about one-fifth of revenues.

There is limited upside for credit improvement but large downside from the threat of default. We have therefore limited our exposure to some large government bond markets, taking into account the default risk of these bonds. Another area where we have customised our benchmark is with respect to Renminbi (RMB) assets, in particular Chinese government bonds. Here, the consideration was not to limit exposure but to gain exposure ahead of market benchmark inclusion as markets develop. MAS started investing in RMB assets in 2012, fully expecting market indices to catch up at some point. Indeed, recent announcements by major index providers to include or accelerate the schedule of inclusion for RMB assets in their indices reflect this trend. Next, tapping on relevant investment expertise. Part of the MAS portfolio is managed by reputable external fund managers. These investment managers are hired for their deep investment expertise and specialised knowledge in particular investment fields. For instance, factor-based investing is an area that we are watching closely. Institutional investors are starting to look beyond asset classes to view returns via a “factor lens”. There are two applications of this approach, return enhancement and portfolio analysis. Looking through asset class labels to underlying risk factor exposures can enhance understanding of return sources. Flipping them around, they also help to enhance understanding of risk drivers. In fact, the vulnerability-based stress tests that I described earlier is an application of this factor approach. This can help investors to create more efficient and diversified portfolios, compared to a traditional asset class-driven approach.
The SNB’s monetary policy remains focused on the maintenance of price stability in the medium term and, since September 2011, on the enforcement of the minimum exchange rate. Consequently, possible distortions in the growth of credit aggregates that could endanger financial stability should be managed, first and foremost, with the macroprudential toolkit.5  5  Cf. speech by Jean-Pierre Danthine, “Taming the financial cycle”, 30th SUERF colloquium, Zurich, 5 September 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Concluding remarks In conclusion, I would like to stress that we are living in an exceptional monetary policy situation, and not in a new world. The flexibility shown by central banks in the crisis was necessary to prevent a downward spiral. Apart from the central banks, governments have also taken measures to manage the crisis. Important steps have been taken in the regulation of banks, including the tightening of capital requirements. Measures to bring about a longterm restructuring of public finances, however, remain unsatisfactory in many countries. Monetary policy has opened up a time slot that will enable this to be done. It would be disastrous for the long-term future of the global economy if it were not used. In the countries most concerned, government budgets must be returned to a sustainable path as soon as possible. Moreover, a consolidation of this kind would reduce the risk of overburdening monetary policy. As far as Switzerland is concerned, the minimum exchange rate against the euro will continue to apply.

Thomas Jordan: Monetary policy in the financial crisis – measures, effects, risks Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Banking Global Symposium, Zurich, 16 November 2012. *  *  *  The speaker thanks Mathias Zurlinden for his support in preparing this speech. He would also like to thank Katrin Assenmacher, Rita Kobel and Peter Kuster for their helpful comments, and also extends his thanks to the English Language Services. When the Swiss Bankers Association was founded 100 years ago as Vertreter des schweizerischen Bankgewerbes, or Representatives of the Swiss Banking Trade, this step was warmly welcomed by the Swiss National Bank (SNB). Surprisingly, perhaps, the senior representatives of the SNB were even members of the Association between 1916 and 1937. Since that time, of course, the role and the tasks of central banks have changed significantly. It would be unthinkable for the SNB nowadays to belong to a private sector interest group. Nevertheless, I am happy to observe today that the relationship between the SNB and the Swiss Bankers Association has remained good and reliable over the years. The Swiss Bankers Association has been a key dialogue partner for the Governing Board on all matters relating to the financial centre, and continues to be so. My topic today is the monetary policy which central banks have pursued during the past few years to manage the financial and economic crisis.
This period of time  BIS Review 47/2003  5  will also allow us to take careful note of valuable information coming from domestic consultations under way in some jurisdictions, including the process for the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the United States. The Committee also discussed the importance of ensuring that the calibration of the New Accord achieves its objectives. Accordingly, prior to implementation, a further review of the calibration will be conducted on the basis of additional information, such as further impact assessments in some jurisdictions and the monitoring of banks’ parallel calculations. In terms of specific issues, a number of areas were identified where major improvements were possible: the expected versus unexpected losses calibration issue, securitisation, credit cards commitments and risk mitigation techniques. At present, we have offered for public review a proposal to resolve a fundamental concern raised by the industry on the treatment of expected versus unexpected losses. I would encourage those interested to read the statement outlining our proposed revision on our website and to share any thoughts you may have by the end of this year. We have also simplified the proposals for securitisation exposures, as we decided to replace the “Supervisory Formula” approach to unrated tranches with a simpler rule. Also, as we draw closer to finalisation, the Committee has intensified its efforts to facilitate a consistent implementation of the New Accord.

Science means that the costs of producing notes – both economic and environmental – are lower. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2  This is good for the society; the society that the Bank of England serves; and the society that is reflected on our banknotes. The Bank is committed to ensuring that the nation’s money is as inclusive as possible. Being inclusive means: -  ensuring our notes are accessible to everyone. That’s why we have increased the range of features that help the blind and visually impaired distinguish between different denominations, adding tactile dots in the upper left-hand corner. These dots join existing features, such as differing colour palettes, raised print, tiered sizing and bold numerals; and  -  being inclusive means an open and transparent approach to decide the characters that feature on our banknotes, by seeking nominations from the public, which can then be considered by an Advisory Panel. Today, I’m here to deliver on that second objective. Following the success of the polymer fiver and tenner, and the forthcoming £ last month the Bank confirmed that it will issue a new £ note. And this new £ will need a new character to feature on its design. I am delighted to announce today that the field from which nominations will be sought for the new £ note is – if you hadn’t guessed by now – science. Our Advisory Panel chose science in recognition of the United Kingdom’s extraordinary scientific heritage.
And the MPC have instituted an annual “supply stocktake” to enable us to have a regular, full and in-depth discussion of the subject. Although we are uncertain about the pace of productivity growth, one thing that does seem likely is that it will remain lower for the foreseeable future than it was before the financial crisis. This judgement is embedded in our Inflation Report forecasts, where we now assume productivity growth of around 1%. This compares with around 2% before the crisis, but is still up on the 0.6% average rate since 2016. The slowdown in productivity growth has been broad-based across the sectors of the economy. But it has been particularly pronounced in finance and manufacturing, to the point where they account for more than half of the overall slowing (Chart 6).

Those two risks broadly offset each other in terms of the balance of demand and supply, meaning that my best guess for inflation, and the outlook for policy, is in line with the central view. But as I have argued today, the outlook for policy depends on more than just our central expectation for the path for the economy – we need to consider the risks as well. My third lesson from the crisis was that policy needs to be prepared for the unexpected. That is true both for the MPC, who need to take the balance of risks to their central forecast into account when setting monetary policy, and for the FPC, who set financial policy based on their assessment of the risks to financial stability. The FPC track a very large number of risks; I will focus on just two – first, market volatility, and, second, Brexit.6  6  Jon Cunliffe’s speech “Financial stability post Brexit: risks from global debt”, available online at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/speech/2019/financial-stability-post-brexit-risks-from-global-debt-speech-by-jon-cunliffe.pdf, goes into more detail on several key risks including Brexit and global risks. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  First, one widely-used measure of the risks to economic  Chart 10: Measures of uncertainty  stability is the measure of global policy uncertainty shown in Chart 10, taken from the May 2019 Inflation  6  Report.