samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
My second observation is that this is a difficult topic, one that generates very heated discussions, but one that is necessary as the industry tries to tackle the complex issue of what can be done to restore public faith in the financial industry. This begins with questions like: •  What is the source of the problem? •  Are the problems we are experiencing unique to financial services? •  What incentives and disincentives – compensation, fines, prosecutions and other measures – need to be altered for behaviors to really change? This is a topic that we will surely revisit a number of times over the coming months as both the industry and the supervisory community begin to answer some of the tougher questions. Complexity Let me now turn to the third element of the supervisory framework: reducing complexity. In large measure, this translates into sound recovery and resolution planning. The development and implementation of a credible resolution mechanism for large, global banks is a must. By credible, I mean that if a failure of one of these financial institutions arises, then home authorities will proceed with the resolution plan, rather than intervene to prevent a failure. Although the specifics of the resolution mechanisms will necessarily vary to some extent across jurisdictions, the goal is common: to be able to resolve any large, global firm regardless of its home jurisdiction without taxpayer funds and in a way that minimizes the knock-on effect to financial markets and other financial institutions.

Norman T L Chan: Hong Kong – an offshore renminbi business centre Speeking points by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, on the Regulatory Requirements for the Adjustments to Renminbi Risk Management Limit and Net Open Position, Hong Kong, 17 January 2012. *  *  *  The development of Hong Kong as an offshore RMB business centre achieved encouraging results in the past year. Trade settlement using RMB reached RMB2 trillion; RMB deposits almost doubled; and total issuance of dim sum bonds exceeded RMB100 billion. I am very confident that the trend of solid development will continue in 2012. With the continued growth in both turnover and depth of the offshore RMB (CNH) market in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) considers that conditions are now ripe to appropriately relax certain regulatory requirements on the RMB business of banks in Hong Kong. First, on the regulatory requirements of the RMB net open position, the HKMA has decided to raise the limit for RMB net open position, from not exceeding 10% to not exceeding 20% of the bank’s total RMB assets or liabilities. Second, currently the HKMA requires each Participating AI to maintain the sum of RMB cash or balances with the RMB Clearing Bank and the People’s Bank of China, Shenzhen branch, at no less than 25% of its total RMB customer deposits (referred as RMB risk management limit).
Percentage change since 2001 Increased spending over government budgets crowds out other activity. Ministry of Finance calculations 5 showed that a scaling back of private enterprise was an unavoidable implication of the fiscal rule. Labour costs in Norway were estimated to rise by 4–8 per cent more than among trading partners in the period to 2010 as a result of a more rapid phasing-in of oil revenues. The Ministry of Finance figures were conservative, but nonetheless too optimistic. Labour costs rose more rapidly. In the course of the decade, competitiveness actually deteriorated by 20 per cent. When the fiscal rule was introduced in 2001, it was emphasised that some of the additional fiscal leeway provided by the oil revenues would be used to strengthen the long-term growth potential of the Norwegian economy, for example by investing in infrastructure, research and education. The Report to the Storting in 2001 noted that “[…] a high tax level entails economic costs […]”. The authorities have used the fiscal leeway to implement standard increases and raise spending in a number of areas. On the other hand, the priority given to measures aimed at boosting productivity and hence the long-term growth potential, including adjustments to the tax system, seems to have receded somewhat into the background. The main objective of fiscal policy is to secure the provision of good public services, ensure an appropriate distribution of income and invest in major infrastructure. This objective must apply in good times as well as bad.

I am reliably informed that the number of branches has increased from 17 at the beginning of April last year to 55 at the end of November 2007. What is even more impressive is that these branches are found in areas which were previously not serviced by commercial banks. This indeed is a bold move and for this we must commend Barclays Bank Zambia. I am aware that the expansion programme is backed by a capital injection of approximately K40.0 billion which will make it possible for Barclays Bank Zambia to increase its services in the country, particularly to the SMEs sector. Ladies and Gentlemen, the 2005 Finscope Survey undertaken by FinMark Trust confirmed that levels of access to financial services in Zambia are low. Fewer than 15% of adult Zambians are reported to have had access to commercial banks. The reasons given for this low accessibility varied but some of the critical reasons included the distance to banks, the time spent getting to a bank and the cost of getting a bank service. With Barclays Bank Zambia opening branches closer to the people it is our conviction that the number of Zambians to have access to banking services will increase. We therefore encourage as many Zambians as possible to use these facilities. To the residents of Chilenje, I urge you to utilize the services offered by Barclays Bank, otherwise the bank may opt to close its branch due to lack of business and you will be left with no bank in your area.
Estimating the impact of these vulnerabilities on the full distribution is a rich area for future work. The teal distribution conditions on average push and pull factors 1996-06. See Chart 5 and Annex for further details. systems become more sophisticated and institutions trusted and assets and liabilities created by the first two layers are actively managed. See, BIS Annual Review (2017), Understanding globalisation. 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Policy Priorities This possibility underscores that everyone must contribute to building the sustainable capital flows we need. Emerging market economies should continue determined reform of domestic institutional frameworks to turn pull factors into insulators rather than amplifiers. Historically, countries have only benefited from financial openness once they reach a critical threshold of financial depth and institutional quality.23 EMEs therefore need to reinforce the significant progress they have made on monetary policy credibility, including safeguarding central bank independence. Fiscal space will need to be used carefully given ongoing structural imperatives, the rising risks of global shocks, and the clear limits of monetary policy. To realise fully the benefits of financial openness EMEs need to reinforce banking system resilience and deepen their domestic capital markets, particularly to reduce reliance on foreign-denominated debt.24 It will be particularly important for EMEs to continue to develop macroprudential policy toolkits to guard against excessive credit growth and high levels of indebtedness. Tightening of prudential policy in EMEs dampens the spillover from US monetary policy tightening by around a quarter,25 and reduces Capital Flows-at-Risk (Chart 17).

The Bank’s framework can be used to assess policy options and associated trade-offs, and to communicate policy decisions. Today, I will provide some tentative conclusions in order to spur further debate and analysis, including as part of the IMF’s work on its “Integrated Policy Framework” and the G20 discussions on the future of the financial architecture. Our core finding is that the distribution of capital flows will shift and change shape when there is a change in any of the three drivers – pull, push or pipes.5 In an interdependent world, everyone – advanced economies,  5 The Capital Flows-at-Risk model presented in chart 6 does not explicitly model ‘the pipes’. The impact of augmenting  the framework with pipes is shown later on in charts [15 and 16]. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  emerging economies as well as the public and private sectors – is responsible for reducing capital flow volatility and increasing sustainable capital flows in order to meet the challenges of our age. Turning to the three drivers in more detail. Pull factors The conventional wisdom, prior to the financial crisis, was that the best contribution each country can do for itself and others would be to “keep its own house in order”.6 The foundations of that house are:   Credible inflation targeting regimes.
Pull, Push, Pipes: Sustainable Capital Flows for a New World Order Speech given by Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England  Institute of International Finance Spring Membership Meeting, Tokyo 6th June 2019  I am grateful to Daisy McGregor and Simon Whitaker for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Fernando Eguren Martin, Lukas von dem Berge, Carlos Van Hombeeck, Simon Lloyd, Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Nitya Aasaavari, Delma Essel, Sameeta Thakrar and Wayne Chapman for research and analysis. The research presented in this speech will be detailed in a forthcoming Bank of England working paper. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is a pleasure to be at the IIF. I would like to speak today about your raison d’etre: sustainable cross border capital flows. Capital flows can be an enormous force for good. For example, when my native Canada was an emerging economy, net capital inflows averaged 10% of GDP every year for around three decades. But the recent history of capital flows is more chequered. After all, the IIF was founded 36 years ago in response to the Latin American debt crisis. That crisis was the product of an initially well founded and productive – but ultimately over exuberant and destructive – recycling of petro dollars by the banking system. That period provided painful examples both of how capital flows can support development and how capital flow volatility can undermine it.

The Bank and its staff will have to be good at risk assessment, due diligence, assets valuation, good at project financing and management, a good landlord, skillful in project monitoring and have the necessary expertise on specific areas such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, fishing and other industries. Under this model, the banks created are very specialized with a set of expertise that they are not trained and possess. Its an entirely new “ball game”. Currently 71%, the bulk of financing in Islamic finance is fixed, only 29% is on a floating rate. In conventional, only 26% is fixed. This gives rise to the issue of mismatching. For as long as source of funds for Banks is floating and its asset gives fixed return, the risk of funding cost being more expensive than income is a very real possibility. Rate of Return Risk and DCR will become a challenge to overcome. Would an equity based approach significantly remove such risk? Most likely, it is an area of where the practitioners can develop and explore. Or whether the benefits of equity-based financing would outweigh the risks associated with the obviously higher risks posed by the structure. The shift from asset based financing to equity based financing does not mean that Islamic banks will operate without any risks. Whilst the risk of mismatching between floating and fixed will be greatly reduced, it does also mean that Islamic banks will be taking the unprecedented step of actually owning the assets for which they are financing.
Another key difference compared with other advanced monetary unions like the United States is the lack of a central fiscal instrument to act countercyclically at the federal level. I fully acknowledge the political difficulties in building such an instrument in the euro area. Similar difficulties also exist when discussing the completion of the banking union and the establishment of a genuine capital markets union. At the same time, we should remain fully committed to the goal of achieving a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Ignoring the need to fix the remaining institutional weaknesses of EMU would seriously damage what has already been achieved through the commitment and hard work of everyone involved. As I argued in this Committee eight years ago, we need to show “a clear trajectory for the future evolution” of EMU and thus frame the “expectations of both citizens and financial markets”. Allow me to take a longer-term perspective to draw the last lesson. While the euro area did not have a fiscal policy response comparable with that of other advanced economies, the ECB’s response was fully comparable with that of the other major central banks. Thanks to its independence, the ECB has been able to adapt its policy response and reaction function. Preserving this key asset will allow the ECB to adapt to future circumstances and ensure the effectiveness of its measures. This is all the more important considering that the desirability and relevance of central bank independence are increasingly being challenged around the world.

As I argued in my introduction, the best way to preserve the ECB’s independence is to ensure a commensurate degree of central bank accountability. During the past eight years, our accountability practices have evolved and intensified in response to the quest for scrutiny that emerged from the crisis.2 I have always appreciated the ability of this Parliament to react to citizens’ demands, support, concerns and channel them in a constructive manner during our discussions here. And I would like to personally thank you for this. I am confident that this Parliament – and this Committee in particular – will continue the good work it has done during my term as ECB President. This, in turn, will further strengthen the effectiveness of the ECB’s actions and citizens’ trust in the EU project. Thank you for your attention. I am now at your disposal for questions. 1 See Draghi, M. (2011), “Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European  Parliament”, Brussels, 19 December. 2 See Fraccaroli, N., Giovannini, A. and Jamet, J.- F. (2018), “ The evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices  during the crisis”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
4 As Chart 4 shows, this is a return to the strong growth rates seen in the mid-2000s, which was regarded at the time as a period of robust growth across the world economy. Though the IMF expects growth to slip back to 4.2% in 2011, this is still above the average global growth rate in the 2000s prior to the recession. 4  The IMF World Economic Outlook forecast projected world GDP growth of 1.9% in April 2009. This forecast was uprated to 2.5% in July 2009. 4  BIS Review 134/2010  An important driving force behind this global recovery has been growth in Asia and other emerging markets. As Chart 5 shows, annual growth in the seven largest Asia-Pacific economies, an economic bloc on a par with the US and the European Union in economic size, has averaged around 7–8% in the first half of this year, slightly ahead of the pre-crisis rate of growth in this region. Growth in the more mature advanced economies of the US and the European Union has also picked up – though not as strongly as in Asia, reflecting the greater maturity of these economies and hence their lower potential for productivity and labour force growth. In the past year, growth in the US and the European Union has been 3% and 2% respectively. These rates of growth are broadly in line with the trend growth rates we experienced in the US and Europe before the crisis.

And they bring to the forefront French scientific expertise and technology: artificial intelligence, cryptography, distributed ledger technology, etc. Regardless of how they are integrated into the financial sector – via cooperation or direct competition with established players – they make the industry more dynamic. This is also true with regard to the entry into financial services of the Bigtechs, which are often less keen on competition. I’m not just saying this to please the Fintechs that are here with us today. It is a deeply-held belief and a commitment, on my part and on that of the entire ACPR. But what, I hear you ask, are you doing concretely to help the Fintechs in their development? Let me start by reminding you that the Banque de France is working with Fintechs on two levels: via its mission of providing services to the economy – to businesses and SMEs – and via its mission of safeguarding financial stability. Our role as a central bank and supervisor, is to reconcile confidence and innovation. If you would allow me to borrow a metaphor from the history of the railroads – which were originally a major innovation in the 19th century, but also one that was not without its risks – our role is to prevent the train from derailing and to make sure the passengers aren’t afraid to get on board. We therefore need to encourage innovation but also ensure that people trust innovations. At the Banque de France, we have taken various steps to promote innovation.
Will access to credit markets be restored in the near future, so that we can strengthen our foreign exchange reserves and begin lifting the capital controls soon, without jeopardising the exchange rate of our currency or worrying about upcoming payments on the Treasury’s foreign loans in the winter of 2011–2012? Or are we faced with a situation where access to foreign credit remains limited and the capital controls must stay in place much longer than we had hoped? It will then become critical to eliminate this uncertainty. If the conclusion is that we must maintain the capital controls longer than originally intended, and if access to further foreign credit is not forthcoming except at usurious rates, we will have to draft an economic policy that takes account of these circumstances. In that instance, strong emphasis would be placed on preventing the nation’s foreign exchange reserves from becoming dangerously depleted following payments on Treasury loans in the winter of 2011– 2012. Fiscal policy would have to be tighter than is currently planned. As regards monetary policy, two factors would tend to offset one another: the economy would be weaker, but the exchange rate would be lower. The more effective the capital controls are, however, the lower interest rates can be. This could also mean that the Central Bank would purchase foreign currency in the market in order to strengthen its reserves in advance of the loan payments, and that, in turn, would mean a lower exchange rate.

The solution involves settlement of a large portion of the claims that the Central Bank received as compensation for deposits transferred to it, in accordance with the decision of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) on the disposal of assets and liabilities of Sparisjóðabanki Íslands hf. (SPB) in March 2009. The settlement of the compensation has not been finalised, however, and the matter is still being considered by the Financial Supervisory Authority. The Central Bank has concluded agreements with eight savings banks concerning the settlement of claims, and the agreements will be finalised soon after the Financial Supervisory Authority and other creditors have confirmed them. I realise that it is painful for guarantee capital owners and creditors to lose these assets, which were deemed quite valuable before the crash and were perhaps purchased recently with borrowed money. Nonetheless, it is necessary to face facts and try to salvage the value that remains. I have always viewed the savings banks as an important part of a healthy financial system, as they have a certain advantage in assessing local opportunities and risks and are generally trusted in their home communities. But this makes it important that the savings banks limit their activities to the areas where they can compete, and not extend into risky investment banking operations. With the financial restructuring currently underway, it will be possible to strengthen the foundations of important savings banks.
Recently, a  4  BIS Review 146/2009  number of countries, including Thailand was invited to take part in the newly created Basel Consultative Group, or the BCG, which met for the first time during 28 to 29 October this year. Now, let me turn your attention to the second part of my talk. The Bank of Thailand’s view on strategy to achieve “a balanced reform agenda”. Going forward, it will be useful to focus on three key areas. First, we need to balance between emerging market issues and developed economy issues in the global reform agenda. Development of key policy proposals such as building-up capital and reserves buffer should recognise constraint of emerging markets in terms of data and institutional capacity. Therefore, prudent but practical standards for SA banks that are the core in emerging economies in addition to IRB banks should receive high priority. At the same time, with rapid development of local financial markets, IRB challenges will become our issues tomorrow, and a balanced approach means emerging markets need to set strategy to build data and capacity. In this regard, we believe the BIS can play a vital role in increasing resource to policy research, standard development, and supervisor capacity building for SA banks. The BIS regional office has played a strong leadership role, and we strongly support this trend. A similar issue arises in terms of the principles stipulated in Pillar 2 of Basel II.

Tarisa Watanagase: Setting a balanced regulatory reform agenda – the global challenge and an emerging market perspective Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Symposium of SEANZA Forum of Banking Supervisors 2009 "Global Crisis: Challenges for Risk Management and Regulatory Framework”, Phuket, 31 October 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to join all of you here at the Symposium of SEANZA Forum of Banking Supervisors 2009. I am honoured to have the opportunity to share with you my thoughts on the global crisis, and challenges it poses for risk management and regulatory framework, particularly from emerging market perspectives. Despite the recent indication of increasing stabilisation of the global financial markets, the extent of the impact of this crisis and prospect of sustainable recovery still face many uncertainties. This financial crisis has been the most severe in modern time. Not only in terms of width and depth of its impact globally, but more importantly, it has brought into question the very tenet of modern capitalism, the trust in market mechanism, and the rationale for regulation. In short, it ushers in a new paradigm in global financial landscape and regulation. The forces unleashed by the crisis are very powerful, and will continue to drive fundamental changes going forward. We witnessed a widespread collapse of financial institutions worldwide, the apparent demise of certain business models, such as the investment bank, and retrenchment of critical markets such as mortgage securitisation market.