samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Their joint, coordinated action stopped the dangerous spiral of financial deterioration and economic contraction in which the world economy found itself at the end of 2008 and in the first few months of 2009. However, whatever the changes in implementation, there is one main principle that remains. I refer to the belief that monetary policy – conventional or not – cannot solve the ultimate causes behind the loss in investors’ confidence or the tensions in financial or banking markets. In fact, its main role is to provide time to adopt the necessary measures to reform and/or adjust. Macroprudential policy The other area in which I see more changes for the role of central banks is in the oversight of efficiency of financial markets and their interaction with macroeconomic stability. One of the main lessons of the crisis is that price stability, without financial stability, does not guarantee macroeconomic stability. Therefore, there is an emerging consensus on the need to develop a specific new area of economic policy, with a preventive focus and the explicit objective of ensuring the stability of the financial system as a whole. This has been named “macroprudential policy” and together with monetary policy, is bound to become one of the main elements in the policy set in the foreseeable future. Macroprudential policy is articulated around two dimensions. The first one, looks at how risk is distributed in the financial system at a given point in time.

Lim Hng Kiang: Towards a new era of growing connectivity between Asia and the Middle East Opening address by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 2nd World Islamic Banking Conference: Asia Summit 2011, Singapore, 8 June 2011. *  *  *  Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Introduction 1. I am honoured to be invited to deliver the opening address at the 2nd World Islamic Banking Conference: Asia Summit (WIBC Asia). I would like to extend a warm welcome to our overseas guests, especially our distinguished speakers who will be sharing their insights during this conference. Growing connectivity between Asia and the Middle East 2. Despite the recent spate of shocks, the world economy has been resilient with growth projected to moderate slightly to 4.5%1, compared to 5.8% last year. Downside risks such as high energy and commodity prices, the European debt crises, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Japan tragedy have not substantially derailed the economic momentum. 3. Asia is expected to remain the main locomotive driving economic growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Asia’s growth to reach almost 7% this year, led mainly by China at 9.6% and India at 8.2%. Asia has been, and will still be the key engine for global trade. In 2009, the region accounted for 35% of world exports, up sharply from 25% a decade earlier2.
There will be some relief, but energy bills will remain a challenge for many people, particularly for those on lower incomes. Chart 3: Food price inflation Annual consumer price inflation in food and non-alcoholic beverages  The story is similar for another essential in life: food. Before the war, Russia and Ukraine supplied significant shares of the global consumption of a number of agricultural products such as sunflower oil, wheat and barley. With disruptions to those supplies, prices increased sharply over 2022. This has driven up food prices in UK shops and supermarkets. As you can see on this chart, food prices were nearly 17% higher in January 2023 than in January 2022. This is an unprecedented rate of food price inflation, adding nearly 2 percentage points to overall inflation. Page 9  Bank of England outreach programmes Listening to people from all parts of the United Kingdom  The charities and community groups taking part in our community forum events have left us in no doubt of the real impact this rise in food prices has had. Many organisations have seen a big rise in demand at a time when their own funding is under pressure, and charities tell us that the profile of their users has changed. They see more people in employment facing difficult choices and having to turn to food banks for help. Consistent with these stories, participants in our citizen panels expressed increasing concern about their ability to manage rising costs through their own actions as 2022 progressed.

Earlier this year, I used the central paths from the February Inflation Report to generate some interest rate trajectories, assuming monetary policy was set to minimise current and future deviations of inflation from target and output from trend (Haldane (2015b)). It is useful to update these interest rate paths for the MPC’s latest GDP and inflation forecasts. These are shown in Chart 14. The interest rate profiles are relatively similar to those in February. As then, they suggest the optimal path for interest rates involves an immediate cut in rates for about a year, which pushes inflation back to target and closes the output gap. Thereafter, interest rates rise gradually in line with the market curve. As with any model-based simulation, these interest rate paths are no more than illustrative. Nonetheless, I find they serve as a useful benchmark: what is it about the economy, not captured by the model, which would cause me to deviate from this path? Earlier in the year, these types of simulations played a role in my judging that a neutral stance on the future direction of interest rates was a prudent course. One important drawback of these model-based simulations is that they tend to underplay the effects of risk, focussing instead on central paths for growth and inflation. So how might risks, including dread and recession risk, affect the path of demand and the optimal interest rate trajectory in the period ahead? In principle, dread risk affects demand in two ways.
It was therefore natural that an existing institution with systems and expertise for managing the country’s foreign exchange reserves was chosen to perform this task. It may be said that the fund was thought of as a savings account that the government opened at Norges Bank, alongside the government’s ordinary sight deposit account. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Chart: A large fund The return on this savings account has so far been good. Since the beginning of 1998, the fund has achieved an average annual return of 6 percent. In NOK terms, the total return came to more than NOK 3 800 billion at the end of September 2017. The return has been around ¼ percentage point higher than the return on the fund’s benchmark index. The annual real return has been 4 percent. Management costs have been low. Over time, they have fallen as percentage of assets under management down to 0.06 percent annually at present. Governance model and governance principles The Central Bank Law Commission has considered alternatives for the future organisation of the GPFG. Before I comment on the Commission’s conclusions, I would like to speak briefly about the current governance model and the interaction between the Storting, the Ministry and Norges Bank. Chart: Governance structure The legislative basis is decided by the Storting, while the Ministry of Finance lays down a management mandate that is issued to Norges Bank. Moreover, the Ministry has established a practice whereby decisive changes are submitted to the Storting for approval.

NBIM now has a staff of around 600, with about half working outside Norway, while Norges Bank Central Banking Operations has a staff of 340. Today, NBIM and Central Banking Operations are two virtually independent operational areas at Norges Bank. The Governor is the chair of the Executive Board and at the same time general manager of Central Banking Operations. Under a resolution of the Executive Board, NBIM is to have its own chief executive officer with a specific job description, mandate and separate lines of reporting to the Executive Board. The Executive Board’s total board time and the number of items for consideration have increased considerably in recent years. This pertains especially, but not exclusively, to investment management matters. In 2015, the Executive Board appointed two new committees, an Ownership Committee and a Risk and Investment Committee. This has strengthened the Executive Board’s work on responsible investment and investment strategy, risk limits and large real estate investments. As you know, in January 2016, the government also appointed a new Deputy Governor, with special responsibility for investment management matters. The supervisory and control structure has been strengthened, among other things by establishing an internal audit function for the Bank and an Audit Committee solely comprising external members of the Executive Board. Moreover, since 2010 Norges Bank’s Supervisory Council has reported supervisory results directly to the Storting, and in addition an external auditor was appointed for the Bank.
One example where the banks did not co-operate in the payment market is the service of digital invoicing systems. Up to spring 2002 the banks were offering two different, non-compatible systems, “e-giro” and “e-faktura”. The existence of two digital invoicing systems was an obstacle with regard to getting both companies and households to utilise the new technology. Today the banks are investing in making the systems compatible with one another and the goal is that invoicers and invoicees will be able to reach one another regardless of which bank they use. If this succeeds, it should lead to increased acceptance from customers and enable critical mass to be achieved more easily. Will cash disappear? The use of cash in Sweden has halved since the mid-1950s, which is of course a result of the technological developments with card payments and later Internet payments offering good substitutes for payment with banknotes. However, the decline in the use of cash has slowed down in recent years and the M0 money supply is currently around SEK 90 billion, or 4 per cent of GDP. Cash is suitable for certain types of transaction, including, unfortunately, those that people don’t want registered, and there is perhaps a lower limit for the demand for banknotes. In addition, the alternative cost for cash has been low in recent years, as a result of low inflation and low interest rates. However, the use of cash in Sweden is higher than in other Nordic countries.

No less than 150 companies with some connection to this information technology were introduced onto the New York stock exchange in 1901 and early 1902. In 1907 there was only one of these companies left that was making a profit and paying dividends, and even this company’s stock market value had halved since its introduction. As far as I know, no one then spoke of a “new economy” that would follow on from the technical developments, but this may be due to insufficient research on my part. Otherwise, the similarities are both striking and depressing. As we all know, if we cannot learn from history, we are doomed to repeat it. My other point is that the burst bubble has certainly made one of the stock market’s main tasks more difficult, namely conveying risk capital between savers and companies - it is no easy task at present to acquire risk capital through new share issues. However, this does not mean that the financial system as a whole is under threat. On the stock market, the banks act as intermediaries and are not directly affected by the downturn, as they only to a limited extent own or mortgage stock market shares. Of course, the income from portfolio management and share trading is declining, and many operators outside of the banks may experience problems, but this does not comprise a threat to the system. It is a completely different situation when a bubble on the property market bursts, as was the case in Sweden in the early 1990s.
Lastly, there are various measures available in current trade agreements, such as antidumping measures and countervailing duties for dealing with “unfair” trade, as well as escape clauses that provide safeguards for industries that face a sudden surge of imports. Again, the challenge is to ensure that such measures are effective, that they help facilitate rather than retard adjustment, and that they are not abused so as to avoid foreign competition. But, both sanctions and temporary relief have been provided for in global trade rules. We should be willing to use them when their use would lead to more equitable outcomes and would help sustain political support for a more open trade regime. Conclusion Free trade is a concept that remains compelling but periodically will be tested by economic change. That is an inescapable fact of life and is a good thing because it requires the economics profession to articulate anew the value of a liberalized world trade regime. While the value from trade is very high, the associated adjustment costs can be significant and will require greater attention if globalization is to work for all of us. Thank you for your time. I would be happy to take some questions. 1 Mary Amiti, John Clark, Gerard Dages, Matthew Higgins, Tom Klitgaard and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing  these remarks. 2 Figures from UN World Investment Report, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, World Bank World  Development Indicators. 3 IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2017, in market exchange rate terms.

We want to define and chart a course toward our desired culture, so that individual decisions reflect the interests of the organization and the intent of the rules.6 To me, there are four central aspects of culture that support effective risk management: learning, listening, helping, and speaking up.7 In a learning culture, we think about and plan for what might happen. And, we learn from experience, what went well and what didn't, so we can improve for next time. In a listening culture, we seek advice, appreciate a fresh perspective, and are open to new ideas and feedback so we can improve. In a helping culture, we work together across the organization, building on each By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. other's strengths, and helping when we have an opportunity. And, in a speaking up culture, we let our colleagues know when we see a problem or after something goes wrong so that we can get started fixing it. Risk management is a creative, social process. It is a way of thinking, doing, and interacting. To bring it to life, we need to work together across the organization, staying continuously curious about the changing risk landscape and possible futures.
However, I wish to focus on another reason why Akerlof’s insight was never fully absorbed by policy makers and the public: I believe that we allowed the workings of the financial sector to become more and more divorced from key stakeholders such as the legislature, who had the responsibility of enacting regulations governing the financial sector, and the public for whom the media was an important source of information – and so our fate was sealed. Mr. Chairman, clearly Africa was not the source of the financial crisis, but it is being impacted by the crisis and there are many who believe that Africa may well bear the long term costs of the global economic downturn – if the broad gains of the past years are reversed and the productive capacities (e.g. human and social capital) are destroyed due to worsening health and education outcomes. From this perspective, the role of the legislature and the media in ensuring the African governments make the right policy choices in dealing with the crisis will be critical in determining how well African economies weather and recover from the crisis once it is over – as all crises do come to an end.

We have tried to consolidate the gains from these seminars through the holding of quarterly media briefings as well as efforts to place as much information as possible on our website http://www.boz.zm. An example of the benefits of this improved dialogue is the recent developments in the Zambian economy related to the global financial crisis. Between July 2008 and March 2009, the Zambian Kwacha depreciated by about 65% against the US dollar. However, unlike in other periods of extreme volatility in the exchange rate, although the Minister of Finance was asked to make a statement on the exchange rate – an important aspect of accountability – he was able to deliver a strong message that an adjustment in the exchange rate under such conditions of stress was an important way in which the economy could adjust to external shocks. There were no (loud) clamours for the re-imposition of exchange controls. We believe that our efforts to communicate our policies more effectively to the public and members of Parliament and the media and Parliamentarians improved understanding of the economic landscape was an important reason for this observation. Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by recapping some of my main points: The role of formulating and implementing monetary policy is very challenging and often attracts a lot of public interest. If not well addressed, this external pressure can distract the focus of the central bank. It is therefore, imperative that the central bank strategically manages its relationships with key stakeholders to promote mutual benefit.
Knowing how asset sales have influenced the market, the setting of Bank Rate can then be calibrated in order to achieve the inflation target over the medium term. In this context, trying to add some quantitative calibration of the impact of asset sales on the  Page 17  economy and price developments directly into our macroeconomic forecasts would amount to double counting. Concluding remarks Earlier this month, the Bank of England celebrated twenty-five years of independent responsibility for monetary policy, institutionalised in the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee. That celebration has come at a testing time for UK monetary policy, for the reasons I have outlined in my remarks today. With inflation forecast to rise into double digits following the very sharp rise in international energy and goods prices, this is biggest challenge the MPC has faced over the past quarter of a century. It is in these testing times that the anchor represented by the 2% inflation target comes to the fore. Supported by the independence accorded to the MPC to pursue that target, we are able to take the sometimes tough decisions to bring inflation back to 2% and keep it there sustainably. It is that commitment that has led me to support a tightening of monetary policy since I joined the Committee last September, and to signal today that this tightening still has further to run. The views expressed in this speech are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee.

But I want to flag some reasons for caution in how to interpret our published inflation forecasts as guides to the validity of the interest rate profiles on which they are conditioned. Interpreting scenarios The sensitivity of the MPC projections to the conditioning assumptions is currently very high. And the uncertainties surrounding those assumptions are significant. For example, the outlook for international commodity prices remains very uncertain. In recent forecasts, the MPC has attempted to illustrate the sensitivity of the forecast to the commodity price assumptions by publishing alternative scenarios based on the path of prices implied by futures curves. This practice was maintained in the May report. As the drivers of commodity prices shift from the epidemiological to the geopolitical, they are unlikely to prove easier to forecast. It is all too easy to envisage outturns – such as the introduction of an oil or gas embargo if the conflict in Ukraine were to persist or widen – that would imply commodity prices quite different from those embodied in the MPC forecast, with very different  Page 13  implications for the economy, for the inflation outlook and ultimately for monetary policy. As members of the MPC have emphasised many times in the past, the outlook for monetary policy therefore cannot be read simply from the MPC’s published forecast. Rather it is conditional on how events evolve. [12] That conditionality is ever present. But in current circumstances it is further complicated by the importance of the joint interaction among the assumptions underpinning the MPC forecast.
It has served to highlight the anomaly between, on the one hand, the institutional framework governing monetary policy in the region, which is centralised in the ECB, and, on the other hand, the framework governing financial sector supervision, which is largely decentralised. The signing earlier this year of a Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the area of crisis management between the supervisory authorities and the central banks of the 15 Member States has underlined the links between these two functions even more. Now some might conclude that if it has been possible to devise a mechanism for crisis management in the EU without the need to create a supranational supervisory body, it should be equally possible to develop a similar co-operative arrangement for crisis prevention. On the other hand, it could also be argued that, not having had the experience of a financial crisis in the region, it is still too early to say whether such an arrangement would work in practice. This topical issue relating to the pros and cons of the unification of supervisory structures at the EU level will be addressed by Dr Gruenbichler. Accession countries have a special interest in this matter, not only because their central banks and supervisory authorities will be invited to sign this accord, but because they will in time also have to adhere to whatever institutional arrangements are adopted by the EU in this area. Conclusion The issues being discussed during this seminar are wide-ranging indeed.

Within this context it is relevant to note that while in general accession countries have made significant progress towards achieving macroeconomic stability, this progress has been far from uniform and challenges remain in this respect too. The paper to be given by Dr Lipschitz and the presentations on EU country experiences should provide some interesting perspectives on these issues. The relevance of transparency and good governance also applies at the corporate level, not least because financial difficulties in large corporations could undermine the well-being of individual financial institutions and markets. This is especially the case in small jurisdictions. Now it is a fact that corporations will always know a lot more about their financial position than any outside entity charged with monitoring them, and financial intermediaries are no exception in this regard. This is particularly true at a time when the complexity of financial products and the intensity of cross-market risks are stretching the capacity of central bankers and supervisors to remain fully in control. Several recent episodes in the financial world indeed confirm that the innate human predisposition to maximise selfinterest can induce behaviour that is not in harmony with the public interest. The implications of this are two-fold. While rules and regulations continue to play an important role in preventing systemic shocks, they will increasingly have to incorporate incentives and credible deterrents to discourage excessive risk-taking and moral hazard.