samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This applies as well for key Shariah personnel in Islamic financial institutions, including Islamic windows. The aim is to ensure Shariah advisors and personnel are equipped with the necessary knowledge that 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  transcends across various disciplines including legal, finance and taxation matters. The timeline for compliance will be decided later. My final point is to engage the world more openly. Issues of Shariah are complex and sometimes difficult to discern. But they are important, and matter very much to a wide range of stakeholders. As Imam Ash-Shafi’i reportedly said, “Knowledge is that which benefits, not that which is memorised”3. Hence, in keeping with the changing landscape of the industry, engaging more openly and transparently about views and decisions will enhance understanding and acceptance. Views and opinions are man-made and should be challenged, questioned and debated through civil and intellectual discourse. During the Islamic Golden Age, such discourses and challenging of ideas were commonplace to assess the veracity of knowledge. Al Haytham, who wrote the influential ‘Book of Optics’, once said: “The duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself an enemy of all that he reads.... He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it..” The goal for us today should be to forge greater understanding and acceptance.

We can learn valuable lessons from the practices of great Muslim thinkers of the past such as Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina who drew strong influences from the writings of Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, but revolutionised and updated the knowledge into the context of Islam and their contemporary times. The benefits are immense. It allows knowledge to thrive and develop further as it becomes more applicable and easier to grasp. It is therefore wise for us to widen our "peripheral vision" to encompass business considerations in interpreting and applying the principles of Shariah. This is essential, if we aspire to break away from a compliance-based mentality into an outcome-based worldview. The mental shift would position Shariah scholars as not merely the leaders in Shariah knowledge, but also as the catalyst for business innovations. It is in this spirit that Bank Negara Malaysia is enhancing the Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic financial institutions. The new framework calls upon the Shariah Committees to integrate relevant business and risk considerations in Shariah decisions. Our aim is to position these committees as an enabler and catalyst in supporting the board and senior management. One that drives innovation by providing practical, actionable and impactful Shariah advice. By capturing multifaceted challenges faced by the industry, this framework ensures an ongoing support to Shariah advice amid the fast-changing business environment. Second is the pursuit of lifelong learning. It is through the relentless quest for knowledge that the great scholars of the past have left a lasting impact on our world.
Should additional pre-funded capital or liquidity resources be needed for cases of resolution, this will have to be shared in a fair way among all relevant stakeholders. Global coordination and consistency is therefore important in order to ensure a level playing field. Looking beyond the debate on CCP loss-absorbing resources, we should keep in mind that there are other key questions regarding resolution. Indeed, the success of a resolution process will not only depend on whether the CCP has adequate resources, but also on whether it is actually resolvable (for instance, whether its viable activities can be separated from its non-viable ones and transferred to another CCP). This will depend to a large extent on the operation and design of the CCP being resolved – e.g. whether its viable clearing activities are insulated from losses from the non-viable ones through separated default management silos. It will also depend on whether or not positions from the CCP which undergo resolution can be successfully transferred to another entity in a safe and timely manner, via an interoperability link or some other means. Further analysis will probably be required regarding the means to facilitate the porting of positions in a resolution scenario, in order to guarantee substitutability across CCPs.

Having clarified this point, I can potentially see four main ways of increasing resolution capacity: The first would be to increase the amount of regulatory capital held by CCPs, and explicitly ring-fence a share of this capital as a means to recapitalise a new entity in a resolution scenario. In the EU, CCPs are required to hold sufficient own resources to cover operating costs over a six-month period – this requirement could be strengthened, not only in order to cover for a potential wind-down, but also to meet the funding costs of a new entity. For the reasons described above, I believe there would be important drawbacks in relying only on CCPs to increase their regulatory capital. CCPs should provide a proportional contribution to the resolution process, but should not bear all the costs. A second policy option could be to make use of initial margin haircutting as a means to fund the resolution process and establish a new CCP. While this would provide CCPs with significant resources, mutualised across the entire clearing membership, and could provide a base for re-launching a viable CCP with some degree of certainty over the sharing of losses, it would also imply a significant change in the way clearing members understand their liabilities towards the CCP – indeed, in certain jurisdictions, initial margin currently has to be bankruptcy-remote. It would be difficult to predict the potential pro-cyclical effects resulting from this tool, as well as the effects on incentives for members to take part in central clearing.
We are working on the assumption that the prices of imported products will continue to fall, due especially to the continued pressure exerted by international competition. This will have a dampening effect on the domestic price level. All of these factors mean that some of the gains in productivity will be passed on to consumers in the form of price reductions. Since there is a considerable lag between the adoption of monetary policy measures and their impact on prices, monetary policy does not affect price developments in the near term. Consequently, the National Bank is guided by the medium-term inflation outlook rather than the short-term forecast. The inflation forecasts published since 2003 show high rates of inflation at the end of each forecast horizon. This makes it clear that we cannot continue our expansionary monetary policy for an unlimited period of time. The three-month Libor was already lifted in June and September 2004, each time by 25 basis points. Because the economy weakened in the fourth quarter of 2004, there was an improvement in the inflation outlook at the monetary policy assessments of December 2004, and March and June 2005. Consequently, a decision not to undertake further increases in the rate of interest was appropriate. However, the forecast of mid-September 2005 indicated that there would be no further improvement in the inflation outlook. Nevertheless, we decided not to increase interest rates at that time.

In this way, we aim to ensure that price stability is not endangered in future. The monetary policy decision The economic and monetary situation has developed in the way we anticipated. The inflation outlook prior to today’s decision was largely in line with the figures presented at the last monetary policy assessment. For 2006, however, we forecast a slightly higher level of inflation to that presented in the last assessment. This is due to revisions made to certain figures that point to a higher rate of utilisation in the economy. In view of this inflation outlook, what is the justification for our decision to increase the target range for three-month Libor by 25 basis points? While we anticipate falling rates of inflation next year, this decline is not relevant in terms of monetary policy. Recent inflation levels of over 1% are probably largely due to the rise in oil prices which began in the first half of 2004. At the time, we decided not to take this increased inflation into account in our monetary policy decisions, due to the fact that its consequences could not be neutralised through monetary policy measures. It seems logical, therefore, not to take account of a decline in inflation attributable to subsiding oil prices, particularly since this drop also results from a statistical effect. A number of inflation components are likely to persist at a low level, even in 2006.
For the UK that is now around 140%, 35 percentage points lower than in 2009. But is that a good number in macroprudential terms? The virtues of credit – facilitating consumption smoothing, house purchase, investment and risk management mean that more credit is not always bad. And the credit intensity of an economy can increase as intermediation becomes more efficient. But at 140% of GDP it is high by historic standards and higher than the G7 average. One useful leading indicator of financial crises in the past has been the credit-to-GDP gap – that is, the gap between the credit-to-GDP ratio at a given point in time and its trend. For the UK that gap now stands at minus 25%. Does that suggest that credit in the economy is 25% below where it should be? The problem of course is that the credit-to-GDP gap measures the stock of credit in the economy relative to an historic average. For the UK, that average includes a sustained build-up of private non-financial credit from 115% of GDP in 1989 to 175% of GDP in 2009. For this reason we have not attached too great a weight on the credit-to-GDP gap to date. Looking at the flows rather than the stocks, private non-financial sector credit growth has begun to increase but is growing slowly in historical terms at around 2.5%. Of course, it is worth emphasising again that history is not something I necessarily want to repeat.

History suggests that there are periods in which credit in the economy builds up and periods in which it declines – often after an explosive turning point. But these are not I suspect something a physicist would be prepared to accept as proven to be cyclical. And though they are associated with the economic cycle (which also, I suspect, would be thought of as unproven in the world of physics), the relationship between the two is unclear and much disputed. The build-up of credit in the economy is not always associated with higher growth nor does it always match the economic cycle. The long build-up of credit in the UK economy between 2000–2007 – from 125% to 170% of GDP – does not seem to have much affected economic growth which was little more than its long-run average. We do know, however, that a build-up of credit that ends explosively can trigger a rapid reversal – a spiral of “deleveraging” – that drives the real economy into a very deep decline, more severe and more persistent than the usual business cycle. Not only is this a lesson from the empirical literature. GDP in the UK fell around 6% in the crisis and the recovery since has been slower than our recovery from the 1930s recession. Policy makers in the UK have spent much of last 8 years trying to halt and reverse headwinds to the recovery, including from disorderly deleveraging.
Monetary policy is still aimed at supporting the recovery in the economy, but a normalisation has begun. According to the assessment we made in June, the normalisation process will continue gradually through interest rate adjustments and the maturity of fixedrate loans. The new information we have received over the summer largely supports the picture of the recovery in the world economy continuing. There are some signs of weakness in the United States and Asia, while Europe looks slightly stronger than expected. The unease on the financial markets has waned, but the situation is still not normal. The new information also points to a continued recovery in the Swedish economy. However, the Riksbank will not make any new overall assessment of economic developments until the next monetary policy decision, which will be made on 1 September. By then we will have received more information and we will update our forecasts. Thank you! 8  BIS Review 109/2010  Global GDP growth Annual percentage change 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 70  75  80  85  90  95  00  05  10  Sources: IM F and the Riksbank  Note. Striped bars represent the Riksbank’s forecast.

So, instead of providing forecasts – a risky enterprise that I will leave to the expert speakers at this conference – let me set out what I think will be the key driving forces for the global economic outlook and examine their implications: First, fiscal policy is on the rise, chiefly in the US but also in the other major advanced economies. Second, monetary dominance is giving way to monetary divergence and financial conditions are tightening globally. Third, the challenge of balancing growth and stability will become more acute in China and emerging Asia. Fourth, a rise in trade protectionism and, more broadly, a pushback against globalisation, can seriously undermine growth prospects not just in 2017 but also over the medium-term. The rise of fiscal policy Let me begin with the new kid on the block – fiscal policy. Since the global financial crisis, across the advanced economies, monetary policy used to be the only game in town as governments struggled to restore debt sustainability. Fiscal policy is now, for the first time since 2009, turning more expansionary. 2/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  According to the BIS, estimated cyclically adjusted primary balances in the advanced economies turned slightly negative in 2016. This is likely to continue in the years ahead. What is behind this shift in the balance of the policy mix? First, policymakers are increasingly recognising the limits to unconventional monetary policies and the associated financial stability risks.
Some notable standards that banks adhere to include the UN Principles for Responsible Banking and recommendations from the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. The Bank of Thailand stands ready to lead and support the financial institutions’ role in this transition. It is our aim to create an ecosystem for sustainable finance that would better internalize a lot of these environmental concerns and issues. This would include incorporating and improving disclosure standards, developing better risk assessment tools, as well as, developing a green taxonomy that is consistent across the financial sector. Let me end my remarks by saying that these are very early steps, and much much more needs to be done. Inaction will only increase the risk of a disorderly transition. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Thank you very much. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Boris Vujčić: Adapting to climate change has no alternative Speech by Mr Boris Vujčić, Governor of the Croatian National Bank, at the online event "The role of banks in greening our economies", 29 April 2021. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, Let me first welcome all of you who have gathered in front of your screens and decided to devote a couple of hours to join today’s conference. It is yet another event that the Croatian National Bank organizes jointly with EBRD, with whom we have a long lasting and productive relationship. Both our institutions have recognized our responsibility to put the issue of banks’ role in climate transition into the spotlight, and open a discussion on how banks, other financial institutions, and central banks and regulators can properly address the climate emergency that is already transforming our living and working patterns. Until recently, it was uncommon for central bankers and bankers in general to talk about environmental issues. So, how did we get to this point, and why should we study the dynamics of climate change and environmental degradation and incorporate it into our business decisions? For more than fifty years people have known that the technological advancement and development that we enjoy comes at a price – the destruction of the environment and a perilous rise in global temperatures. As worrisome scientific discoveries heated up the activism and triggered a grass-roots ecological movement, global institutions and politicians soon embraced the environmental concerns as well.
6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Chart 1: G4 non-residential investment weak since the crisis Percentage changes since 2007 15 United Kingdom  United States  Euro area  Japan  10 5 0 -5 -10 -15  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  -20 2016  Sources: Eurostat, ONS, OECD and Bank of England calculations. Notes: The data for the UK, the US and Japan are for private non-residential investment; the data for the euro area include public nonresidential investment. Chart 2: Weakest UK business investment in half a century Indices, peak in GDP = 100 160 Range of previous recessions  150 140  2008 Average of previous recessions  130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60  -20  -16  -12  -8  -4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 Quarters relative to date when GDP peaked  28  32  36  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. Notes: The chart plots real business investment. The range includes the recessions of 1973, 1979 and 1990. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Chart 3: UK real business investment to GDP ratio is falling Percent of GDP 12 10 8 6 4 2  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  0 2017  Source: ONS.

Economic players simply count, with good reason, on the Riksbank acting if signs of rising inflation were to appear. In such a world, overall price formation centres above all on the level of economic activity. The improved credibility is thus a further factor that may have contributed to a level of inflation that is lower despite relatively strong growth. At the same time, the Riksbank has the major responsibility of keeping a close eye on the more long-term inflation expectations in order to maintain the credibility that has been built up in recent years. Demand assessments difficult A question that naturally has to be included in the assessments is whether the stronger growth of demand we have experienced, not least this year, will last. An important matter to bear in mind in this context is that as long as the monetary stance is expansionary, demand growth will normally be above its sustainable level. But some restrictive effect has, of course, already started to come from the higher bond rates in recent months. BIS Review 92/1999  4  However, both the Swedish and the international economy can be exposed to unforeseen shocks. We need to remember that no one foresaw either the extent or the course of the crisis in Asia. Neither was attention drawn at an early stage to the risks behind last autumn’s international financial unrest. Our knowledge about phenomena of this type is still limited. It may be asked whether we shall ever be capable of making definite predictions in this field.
39  Power, M. (1997), The Audit Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12

f-NExT will assess the training needs of the financial sector holistically, and identify gaps in skills requirements. f-NExT will also strive to attract world-class training providers to set up in Singapore. Reputable training providers will be encouraged to set up more training centres to meet the industry's demands for specialised courses. IBF will gradually phase out training courses which overlap with programmes offered by other training providers. 4  International profile  As a leading financial centre, Singapore has a stake in a sound and stable international financial system. MAS is actively involved in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and initiatives undertaken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to strengthen national and cross border supervisory standards and capital adequacy of banks, market surveillance, and payments and settlement systems. MAS participates actively at the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), contributing to its work in developing principles and guidelines, which serve as global best practice standards. MAS is also an Executive Committee member of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which is the global standards-setting body for insurance supervision. Singapore is actively involved in regional financial fora, including ASEAN, APEC, the South East Asia Central Bank (SEACEN) Governors, and the Manila Framework Group. MAS is also engaged in expanded technical assistance to central banks and regulators in the Asia-Pacific over the past year, including training programmes on macroeconomic management and financial supervision.
In choosing for such an option, Curaçao and St. Maarten could continue to benefit from the financial soundness of the dollar, while still maintaining a certain degree of monetary independence. Last but not least, I would like to point out that the currency choice, whether at the end it would be a local currency or the US dollar, is purely a stage for an economic act. Depending on the actors, the outcome of the play would be a drama or a happy one. In the choice of a dollarization, the role of the central bank would be limited if not nihil, while that of the government would become even more prominent. There is a significant shift of responsibility. While the starting fiscal position for both St. Maarten and Curaçao would be advantageous as autonomous countries, meaning a low debt stance, it is critical that fiscal rules and benchmarks are legally imbedded, and that accountability is a normal way of life. This would ensure that internal fiscal discipline is guaranteed, and it does not need to be forced upon by an external party. That is true independence. I would even go a step further and recommend the creation of special reserves, which would be used to counteract any financial stress. This would provide the necessary confidence to promote financial and economic stability. There is no doubt that these are exciting times in the Netherlands Antilles. I strongly advise you to learn from the experiences of Aruba, the good but also the bad ones.

But it also means we have a long way yet to go in reducing debts and returning to sustainable growth. 5. We are also seeing important shifts in the structure of global finance, besides the gradual contraction in global liquidity. It is too early to say where we will be five years from now, but some of the broad brush-strokes in this new landscape of global finance are already with us and likely to stay: •  The return on equity in global banking has fallen, and will not return to pre-crisis levels, given stricter capital and liquidity rules. •  Deposits have become more important as a source of bank funding. •  Banks in certain major jurisdictions have retreated from global markets, and worryingly, and may stay in retreat for some time. •  The securitised debt markets should recover, but with less leverage underpinning them, and hopefully greater risk transparency. •  In the derivative markets, there will be greater standardisation of products, and much greater reliance on common market infrastructure – for trading, clearing and reporting of trades. High volume, low-margin platforms will likely gain in competitiveness. •  Wealth management will remain a growth industry, especially in Asia, where the pool of wealth is growing most rapidly and the need for diversification remains great. •  And outside of intermediated finance, companies will seek new ways of raising funds, including through private placements. 6. Will this mean a safer financial world? Maybe.