samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The devastating demonstration of the downside risk of globalisation could easily have triggered a nationalist and protectionist backlash. Such sentiments have surfaced to varying degrees. No country likes to be told what to do by the IMF, or be forced to sell off distressed banks and companies to foreign buyers, especially at fire sale prices. But no country is opting out of the global system. All continue to court foreign investments and promote exports. Most Asian governments remain convinced that despite the attendant risks, globalisation is still the best way to achieve progress and economic development. On this most basic article of faith, there has been no change. Secondly, the crisis has highlighted the problems of capital account liberalisation. The IMF has acknowledged that capital flows can be highly volatile and a potential source of crisis.2 Countries are now acutely aware that they must sequence capital account liberalisation judiciously, and to strengthen financial supervision and prudential safeguards as they liberalise. But there is still broad consensus that provided countries take these precautions, they can benefit from international capital flows. No Asian country has imposed exchange controls as a result of the crisis, except Malaysia. And even Malaysia continues to welcome foreign portfolio investments in its asset markets. Thirdly, all the affected countries have recognised the dangers of over reliance on bank-based financing. In most Asian countries, capital markets were undeveloped. Bond markets especially were illiquid or non-existent.

As both a user and a partner, we can affirm that the quality of the Office’s statistical output has increased immensely over the transformation period. Examples include the publication of national accounts according to international standards and the compilation of data on the government debt and deficit. The Czech National Bank focuses mainly on monetary and banking statistics and balance of payments statistics. The harmonisation of the monetary statistics with European standards was recently completed in both main components balance sheet statistics and interest rate statistics. Monetary and credit aggregates and interest rates are now methodologically comparable with the data of other EU Member States. Speaking of harmonisation, I must mention the calculation of another convergence criterion - long-term interest rates. This calculation is based on long-term government bond yields on the secondary market. The Czech National Bank thus provides the statistical foundation for assessing this criterion. International standards such as the IMF’s 5th Balance of Payments Manual are also observed when compiling the balance of payments. The balance of payments is now published every month and the required items are also broken down geographically. In recent years, much attention has been devoted to the category of foreign direct investment, where the data are published in very detailed geographical and sectoral breakdowns. The balance of payments is perhaps the best example of co-operation between the Czech Statistical Office and the Czech National Bank.
I believe that, whilst liberalisation is important, the RMB becoming an international currency to a large extent is not a matter of policy alone – it is also subject to market forces. In other words, it would come from non-resident corporations and financial institutions deciding that the RMB served them well as a unit of account, means of payment and store of value for their international transactions. I’m not sure any of us are in a position to predict if and when this will happen. However, I feel that we can say with some confidence that the landscape of the offshore RMB market will change in two respects. First, we are likely to see the increasing maturity of the offshore RMB market, both in terms of the depth and breadth of the market and the efficiency of price-setting and allocation of RMB funds. In more granular terms, this means we will see an expansion and greater diversity of RMB financial activities:   Up till now, the intermediation of RMB funds has been primarily about placement of bank deposits by personal and corporate customers. In future, it will move more towards issuance and investment of bonds and a wider range of other financial instrument and products.   At the same time, I would expect that in future there will be more active borrowing and lending of RMB funds among banks. If so, this would lead to the emergence of a RMB interbank funding market.

See also Krishnamurthy, A. and A. Vissing-Jorgensen (2013), “The Ins and Outs of LSAPs,” presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson Hole Symposium on the Global Dimensions of Unconventional Monetary Policy; IMF Policy Paper on “Global impact and challenges of unconventional monetary policies”, October; Neely, C. (2013), “Unconventional Monetary Policy Had Large International Effects”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2010–018E, updated August 2013; Joyce, M., M. Tong and R. Woods (2011), “The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q3. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The concerns expressed by various economists and the media that the extraordinary increases in the monetary base in many countries would lead to significant inflation rates, never materialised. As the following slide illustrates, there was no transmission in the prevailing economic situation by the banks, to credit or broad money aggregates. Inflation did not respond, putting in doubt the quantitative vision about its origin. When asked about what Japan should do to overcome deflation, Milton Friedman answered in 2000: “It is very simple. They can buy long-term government securities and they can keep buying them and providing high-powered money until the high-powered money starts getting the economy into an expansion”.2 The more recent Japanese experience is still open to analysis but the channels envisioned by Milton Friedman have seemingly not been operating in the other advanced economies.
For example, there is a duty today on imported children’s clothing and on shirts, suits, jackets and trousers for men and boys. As the world economy recovers, import price inflation will edge up. A rise in labour costs of more than 5 per cent will then only be consistent with the inflation target if the krone continues to appreciate. In the long run, wages must be compatible with the value added that is generated by workers, i.e. labour productivity. Over time, the increase in real wages is therefore determined by developments in labour productivity. In Norway, productivity growth has averaged 1½-2 per cent over the last 20 years. If this continues to be the case, an increase in nominal labour costs of around 4-4½ per cent in the long term will be consistent with the inflation target. There is an important interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy. According to the guidelines for fiscal policy, petroleum revenues are to be phased in approximately in pace with the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund. This guideline implies that fiscal policy will contribute to stimulating aggregate demand in the Norwegian economy every year for many years ahead. The guideline also implies that the use of petroleum revenues will increase as long as the Petroleum Fund is expanding. Variations in oil prices are accompanied by considerable fluctuations in government petroleum revenues from one year to the next. It is important to prevent these fluctuations from spilling over to the mainland economy.

Denis Beau: The current macroeconomic situation in the euro area and monetary policy issues Keynote address by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) Conference "The Future of the Euro Area: Navigating Uncertainty", Paris, 5 October 2022. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be talking to you today at this OMFIF Conference. I would like to express my warmest thanks to David Marsh for organising this event and for the invitation. We are here today to discuss and think about the future of the euro area. But, as Machiavelli once wrote: "to predict the future, one needs to know the past, because the events of this world have at all times links to the times that preceded them". In this respect, reflecting on the history of the euro, it stands out as a remarkable success: More than two decades after its inception, the euro is recognised and used globally, including outside its own borders as a means of payment, a store of value and a means of trade. The internal value of the single currency has been remarkably stable, with inflation averaging 1.7% between its inception in 1999 and 2021, compared with 4.9% during the two decades before 1999. The euro has helped to better protect the purchasing power of European citizens which has increased by 15% since 1999. The euro is also a great success in the area of payments.
From this mixed bag, only one clear explanation emerges: that there is no clear explanation. To a first approximation, we remain unsure quite what caused the Flash Crash or whether it could recur. 1 That conclusion sits uneasily on the shoulders. Asset markets rely on accurate pricing of risk. And financial regulation relies on an accurate reading of markets. Whether trading assets or regulating exchanges, ignorance is rarely bliss. It is this uncertainty, rather than the Flash Crash itself, which makes this an issue of potential systemic importance. In many respects, this uncertainty should come as no surprise. Driven by a potent cocktail of technology and regulation, trading in financial markets has evolved dramatically during the course of this century. Platforms for trading equities have proliferated and fragmented. And the speed limit for trading has gone through the roof. Technologists now believe the sky is the limit. This rapidly-changing topology of trading raises some big questions for risk management. There are good reasons, theoretically and empirically, to believe that while this evolution in trading may have brought benefits such as a reduction in transaction costs, it may also have increased abnormalities in the distribution of risk and return in the financial system. Such abnormalities hallmarked the Flash Crash. This paper considers some of the evidence on these abnormalities and their impact on systemic risk. Regulation has thin-sliced trading. And technology has thin-sliced time. Among traders, as among stocks on 6 May, there is a race to zero.

Easley et al show that their imbalance measure rose sharply ahead of the Flash Crash, contributing to an eventual evaporation of liquidity. A more ambitious approach still would be to develop a system-wide model of financial market interaction. Cliff (2010) describes the trading infrastructure as an example of a “sociotechnical system of systems”. These involve a complex fusion between technology and human behaviour. This interaction increases the system’s vulnerability to catastrophic failure. He proposes a “test rig” for such systems, using simulation techniques to unearth potential systemic fault-lines. These techniques have already been applied to other large socio-technical systems, such as defence, space and weather systems. In each case, there have been some successes. The lessons from these exercises seem to be twofold. First, that although technology may pose a problem, it may also provide the solution. Second, that even if it ain’t broke, there is a compelling strong case for fixing it. Not to do so today runs too great a risk of catastrophic failure tomorrow. We do not need to await a second Flash Crash to establish it was no fluke. To wait is to normalise deviance. (b)  Modifying market macrostructure  Regulators in the US and Europe are in the process of reviewing regulatory rules for trading. In the US, some changes to market rules have already been implemented, while others are the subject of ongoing research. 29 In Europe, a review is underway of MiFID with an early set of proposals tabled.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Recent developments and emerging trends in Asia Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Second Annual South East Asian Institutional Investment Summit – “Recent developments and emerging trends in Asia”, Kuala Lumpur, 2 December 2010. *  *  *  Let me first thank Asian Investor for the invitation to speak at this institutional investment forum. I am honoured to be given the opportunity to speak before such a distinguished group of investors, fund managers and government officials at this important gathering. My remarks will consist of three parts – the first part, on the current trend of rising capital inflows to Asia and its implications, secondly on regional market developments and lastly, I will make some observations on the region’s institutional and central bank investing space. Asia as the investment destination and its implications It has been three years since the financial crisis first erupted. Emerging market economies have demonstrated resilience, showing a steady growth path to recovery, well ahead of major developed countries which face challenges of low growth, high unemployment and mounting fiscal burdens. Such large disparities in the growth rates and economic environment have inevitably led to divergence in monetary and fiscal policies. Where developed countries had maintained low interest rates, expanded quantitative easing policies and implemented stimulus programmes to revive their economies, emerging markets had started normalising their interest rate policies. The recent financial crisis differed from the 1997–98 crisis in many aspects.

Over this twoday period, we have lined up a panel of distinguished speakers, including the Honourable Prime Minister of Malaysia himself as well as Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia. The invited speakers are from various prestigious institutions, domestic and international with unique expertise and experiences. You can be rest assured that the speakers we are bringing to you are renowned in their own field and their views are well sought after by global investors and the financial fraternity. The major highlight of this conference is the keynote address by the Honourable Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi, the Prime Minister of Malaysia who is also the Finance Minister. His address will offer invaluable insights into Malaysia's policy and strategies to sustain its strong growth performance. The next significant highlight of this conference is a speech by Tan Sri Dato' Seri Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz, the Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, who will touch on investment opportunities in Malaysia in an evolving global environment. This speech is timely given so much interest shown by both domestic and international investors in the Malaysian economy. Both the Prime Minister and Governor will offer invaluable insights into strategic orientation of important policies that will chart the Malaysian economy going forward. Therefore, these are the main events not to be missed. Of course you should not miss other speakers too! They will touch on various topics according to their areas of expertise.
Churchill apparently uttered in 1925 that he “would rather see finance less proud and industry more content.”  4  Currently no exact definition of the “shadow banking system” exists. According to the FSB, it can broadly be described as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system” (See Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation, Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board, 27 October 2011). 5  Financial Stability Board: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes, 4 November 2011. 6  See Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 30 October 2011. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The negative perception of the financial industry often focuses on compensation practices. In fact, commentators have frequently expressed their scepticism on whether the activities of bankers and market players deserve those high wages and bonuses compared to the economic rewards earned in other industries. Already Keynes wondered “… how long will it be necessary to pay City men so entirely out of proportion to what other servants of society commonly receive for performing social services not less useful or difficult?” It is by now well understood that excessive wage and bonus packages in some segments of financial markets have encouraged irresponsible risk-taking. Thus, incentives were set inappropriately. Against this backdrop, it comes as no surprise that the overhaul of compensation practices in the financial sector appears to have dragged the most broadbased public attention among all the components of the financial sector reforms.

The restrictions on mobility have affected small businesses more than large firms – which typically have recourse to digital platforms and are able to implement remote working. The pandemic has also sensitised us to how vulnerable we all are to the forces of Nature. If we do not act decisively to limit the increase in global temperatures, we are putting at risk the future of our children and grandchildren. It is perhaps this realisation that has helped to make 2020 a record year for climate pledges – despite being in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic and economic crisis. The number of commitments by governments and businesses to reach net zero emissions has almost doubled in less than a year. The crisis has also demonstrated the power of technology to help find solutions to difficult problems. From making vaccines to contact tracing, from online learning to telemedicine, technology has been at the forefront in the fight against Covid-19 and its effects. Likewise, technology can play a potent role in shaping the post-Covid world. FinTech in particular has great potential to be a force for good. 1 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  We can bring together the power of finance and technology, to help create a more inclusive society and a more sustainable planet. FINTECH FOR AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY – INDIVIDUALS Let me begin with what FinTech can do for an inclusive society, using Singapore as an example. This is the vision: every citizen and every enterprise digitally enabled and financially included.
This may not be detrimental to long-term growth if it has a “cleansing effect”, if non performing firms and equipment disappear and free resources for innovative young firms 3. However, it may also hit young, innovative and risky firms, which are more fragile and financially dependent 4. According to Foster, Grim and Haltiwanger 5, reallocation in the United States during the Great recession  1  R. Jackman and R. Layard, 1991. “Does Long-term Unemployment Reduce a Person’s Chance of a Job? A Time-Series Test,” Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(229), pages 93–106, February. 2  A. Maravalle, M.-E. de la Serve. and G. Verdugo, 2014. “The euro area Beveridge curve in the post-crisis period: increase in structural unemployment since 2010,” Quarterly selection of articles – Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 36, pages 95–109, winter. 3  R. J. Caballero and M. L. Hammour, 1996. “On the Timing and Efficiency of Creative Destruction,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 805–852. 4  M. Ouyang, 2009. “The scarring effect of recessions,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 184–199, March. 5  L. Foster, C. Grim and J. Haltiwanger, 2016. “Reallocation in the Great Recession: Cleansing or Not?,” Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(S1), pages S293–S331. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  was less intense and productivity-enhancing than in normal times, contrary to previous recessions.

7  P. Aghion, P. Askenazy, N. Berman, G. Cette and L. Eymard, 2012. “Credit Constraints And The Cyclicality Of R&D Investment: Evidence From France,” Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(5), pages 1001–1024, October. 8  P. Aghion, D. Hémous and E. Kharroubi, 2014. “Cyclical fiscal policy, credit constraints, and industry growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 41–58. 9  A. Bergeaud and G. Cette and R. Lecat, 2016. “The role of production factor quality and technology diffusion in 20th century productivity growth,” Working papers 588, Banque de France. 10  C. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff. 2010. “Growth in a Time of Debt.” American Economic Review, 100(2): 573–78; Lane, Philip R. 2012. “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3): 49–68. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  impediments to the flow of resources, in particular in the labour market and in the way credit was allocated between sectors, hence revealing that a malfunctioning of the financial sector can reinforce structural weaknesses. 11 In some cases both were present at the same time. Of the uttermost importance were the structural changes targeting an improvement in the monitoring and the resilience of our financial system. Arguably the financial crisis partly resulted from excess risk taking and overinvestment in low productivity sectors. 12 The Basel 3 framework worldwide and the Single Supervisory Mechanism in the euro-zone provide new supervisory and prudential tools to mitigate these risks in the future.
We will be aiming to ensure that the final version of our guideline embodies this approach. BIS Review 24/2000  4

Tarisa Watanagase: The Thai economy – challenges and prospects Speech by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the European Heads of Mission Luncheon, Residence of the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bangkok, 21 February 2007. *  *  *  Ambassador Brümmer, Your Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen, At the outset, I would like to thank Ambassador Brümmer for inviting me to speak at this luncheon. It gives me great pleasure to share my views on Thailand's economic prospects with all of you. This talk is most timely for these are difficult times for Thailand. In the past year, Thailand under major political developments. We saw mass street protests against the previous administration, a military coup and the annulment of the 1997 constitution. The present government has promised an election and a new constitution but, as year-end bombings painfully show, political uncertainties remain. Economic uncertainty has also increased. In the past few months we saw rapid baht appreciation and declining consumer confidence. The threat of a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances still persists. In addition, the implementation of the reserve requirement and the introduction of the amended Foreign Business Act proved to be unpleasant surprises to investors and the global community. These are indeed difficult times. And difficult times require difficult choices to be made. Some of you may be concerned that Thailand may not be able to weather all these challenges. Some of you may fear that Thailand is turning her back on globalization.