samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The results from a study of the IMF (REO – Europe, November 2019) on a sample of EA 15+3 and the NMSs reveals “that all these factors suggest that it is unlikely that the recent increase in wage growth will meaningfully spur inflation in the near term”. These findings support the need for monetary policy in many European countries to remain accommodative for a longer period, but at the same time being vigilant as the “prolonged period of accommodative financial conditions may have created an environment conducive to greater risk taking”. Inflation in the region has been above the average compared with the inflation in the euro area, reflecting the convergence process, the greater exposure to shocks in primary commodities prices, and country specific factors. Yet, the overall inflation dynamics mimics the one in the euro area, given the tight trade linkages. The average headline inflation rate in the CESEE region in 2003 – 2012 period averaged around 4%, while the euro area inflation gravitated around 2%. In the last six years, a suppression of inflation rate was visible across the board, and in both regions (CESEE and euro area) it averaged around 1%. Some reversal to 2% is observed in the last two years, but it is debated how sustainable the pickup in prices is. Very similar is the pattern of the core inflation, which started decelerating in 2013, averaging around 1%, with converging dynamics in the CESEE and the euro area.

These measures were efficient, at least to some extent. Although sometimes circumvented by banks, they have managed to slow down forex credit growth, providing a wise solution to the problems faced at that time by our economy. Back then, we referred to them as unorthodox monetary policy measures, but after the crisis, the IMF mentioned the National Bank of Romania as being among “the pioneers” of what later became “macroprudential instruments”. After the EU entry, the actual membership in this “convergence club” has fueled and enhanced 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  the catching-up process. Being in the EU meant free exchange of goods and services, along with the free movement of capital and labor, which increased trade, foreign direct investment, and migration flows, for the benefit of economic growth in our country. Moreover, in the long run, EU membership fostered convergence through investments from European funds. Romania has certainly come a long way in terms of economic convergence, with growth resuming and gaining momentum after the global economic crisis: its GDP per capita as a share in the EU average (based on PPS) more than doubled from 30.6 percent in 2003 to 62.7 percent in 2017. The advance was the fastest within the group of peer countries that recorded similar trends: for instance, Bulgaria went from 32.4 to 49.3 percent, while Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, which started from a more advanced level, added between 7 and 22 percentage points to the same indicator during 2003–2017.
Mr. Chairman, a dispassionate comparison of the conditions prevailing in 2006 and 2013 tells us that our economy has made an unprecedented transformation over the past 7 years, with strong economic growth, and stable macro-economic conditions. Harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies – case studies The discussion point that then arises is, as to what factors, processes and conditions contributed to this current level of growth and stability. Of course, we are all aware that many factors contributed to the current state of affairs of the country, and those could be the subject of, maybe 50 other Orations! But, for today’s discussion, let us confine ourselves  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  to examining the background of some significant initiatives that would have influenced the current state of the economy, and to understand how the present day outcomes were supported and/or impacted by the harmonization of the Fiscal and Monetary policies. One striking feature in the implementation of Monetary and Fiscal policy over the past 7 years, has been that both institutions, MoF and CB have been taking a keen and enduring interest in both monetary and fiscal policies. We realized that a “blame game” would be of no value to the country or to the stakeholders, and that it was absolutely vital that we should deliver on both fronts simultaneously.

While I firmly believe it is up to history to judge as to whether I have been successful or not in discharging my responsibilities as Governor, I also believe that even at this late stage, it may be useful for those critics to reflect on the profile  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  that John Exter had in mind for the position of Governor when drafting the MLA, and then perhaps consider, whether or not, I fitted the envisaged profile! In that background, I am inclined to believe that the education, training, and professional skills imparted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka, had a major role in my being appointed to this pivotal position as the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Therefore, please permit me to officially and publicly thank the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka for the tremendous impact that the Institute has had on my academic and professional career, in addition to the singular honour you bestowed on me this evening, by inviting me to deliver this prestigious Oration. Conclusion – running between the wickets! Mr. Chairman, let me now conclude, with a little story. About 6 months ago, a journalist friend asked me to explain the official relationship between the Governor and the Secretary, Treasury. In response, I gave him a long lecture for about half an hour, like what I have done today! While listening to me, I could see that he was quite restless, and somewhat bored.
The intention was to gradually withdraw from the multiple policy rate setup in order to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and enhance policy predictability. We were able to stick to our plan until the end of the year, even after the currency pressures increased after the US elections. In fact, our interest rate hike in November was the first conventional interest rate response since 2008. However, the situation in early January necessitated an alternative approach. We have witnessed price movements in the FX market which could not be justified by economic fundamentals. The volatility increased sharply, which could be detrimental for both price and financial stability. The response to this unprecedented episode had to be swift, strong, and targeted. Given the significant downside risks to the economic activity and the credit supply, we decided to implement a monetary tightening which would strongly address the direct cause of the problem, with less significant implications on the real side of the economy. To this end, we have tightened the liquidity supply and induced a sharp increase in the short term interest rates at the interbank market. Moreover, to further strengthen our control on the short-end of the yield curve, we have devised a new tool which is practically equivalent to a currency swap. This facility not only sets a benchmark for the price formation in the FX market but also supplies temporary FX liquidity to the market when needed.

They can also resort to undrawn amounts on their credit lines with financial institutions, to new borrowing, such as new bank loans and debt issuances, to divestments, or to new capital contributions from their members. This list of sources of liquidity for firms highlights the important role of economic policy measures in alleviating the effects of the crisis on the business sector. At the European level, the powerful monetary policy response from the European Central Bank (ECB) has proved essential for facilitating the financing of all European firms against this backdrop of high uncertainty, heading off financial fragmentation problems like those experienced as a result of the last crisis. Besides the approval of a new, very large asset purchase programme, this response has included the provision of liquidity to financial institutions under very favourable conditions providing they meet certain business lending targets. In Spain, the public guarantee programmes for loans to firms, which are managed by the Official Credit Institute (ICO)2 and have reduced the risk taken on by banks when lending in such uncertain circumstances, have been crucial, as have the measures to allow for more flexibility in temporary layoffs and short-time work arrangements (ERTE by their Spanish abbreviation) and the payment deferrals on certain tax obligations, among other measures. 2  ICO COVID-19 Guarantee Facility, approved through Royal Decree-Law 8/2020 of 17 March 2020.
This point becomes clear if we consider for a moment their basic purposes: •  To provide reasonable assurance that the bank’s and its customers’ assets are safeguarded, that its information is timely and reliable, and that errors and irregularities are discovered and corrected promptly;  •  To promote the bank’s operational efficiency; and,  •  To ensure compliance with managerial policies, laws, regulations and sound fiduciary principles. With these purposes in mind, it is clear that the long-term success of any banking organization depends on the effectiveness of its internal control apparatus. And never has this been more true than today. As the activities of commercial banks have become increasingly diverse and complex, internal controls have become critically important to the sound and successful execution of banks’ strategic objectives. I want to stress this point as strongly as I can. As a former commercial banker myself, I know there is a powerful temptation for management to focus its attention and resources on the front office – those areas and individuals that generate profits for the institution. But if something goes wrong in the back office, it can quickly become the most important aspect of a bank’s operations. We’ve seen this time  BIS Review 75/2000  4  and time again. It is essential that sufficient resources, staff and managerial attention are devoted to the back office and internal audit functions. Firmly rooted on the foundation of good corporate governance and rigorous internal controls is the central importance of effective risk management.

William J McDonough: The review of the Capital Accord  Remarks by William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Eleventh International Conference of Banking Supervisors, held in Basel, 20-21 September 2000. *  *  *  I am greatly honored to be here as Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. I’d like to begin by thanking the Swiss National Bank, Kurt Hauri and the Swiss Federal Banking Commission, and Andrew Crockett and the BIS for organizing and hosting this important conference. They’ve done a wonderful job, for which I know we’re all very grateful. It is also a great pleasure to be with you under such dramatically different circumstances than when we last gathered together. Just two years ago, turbulence in the financial markets around the world had affected, in one way or another, the banking systems of virtually every nation, and bank supervisors were struggling to preserve confidence and stability. Today, of course, the global financial situation is much more stable and the outlook is very favorable. In the United States, we continue to enjoy the longest economic expansion in our nation’s history, and, following passage of financial modernization legislation, banks and other financial institutions now enjoy unprecedented strategic opportunities. In Europe, following monetary union in January of 1999, the banking industry, along with other corporate sectors, is becoming more efficient and competitive as economic and political reforms have sharpened the focus on shareholder value.
At the end of their working life, the funds available are an additional source of retirement income. The virtue of these systems is that they do not deter worker mobility. This is so in Austria because, by not forgoing their "established rights", it is workers themselves who manage the accumulated resources during periods in which they are unemployed. Also, this arrangement offers protection to all workers, even those whose previous terms of employment have been short-lived. In Denmark, the choice was of a system which firmly supports the unemployed (with substantial unemployment subsidies and intensive training programmes) in a setting in which, however, firing costs are very low. Just as 50 years ago the external sector crisis obliged Spain to change its trade protection policy, the current, serious unemployment crisis should lead us to examine what we can change in our labour market, given what other countries have done with very favourable results. Admittedly, this is nothing new, since the Banco de España has reiterated in its annual reports, at least in the past 10 years, the need for such reform. What is new is that reform has now become absolutely vital; otherwise, when we emerge from the current crisis, and in the absence of the instruments that were used in the past, we will be liable to grow far below what we did in previous decades. The reform of labour institutions is a pressing task, since the short-run effects on hiring are absolutely necessary in the current circumstances.

Øystein Olsen: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 21 May 2013. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee and thank you for this opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s Financial Markets Report. My statement here today is based on the Bank’s Annual Report, but also on the Executive Board’s assessments for the period to the most recent monetary policy meeting and new information. When I was here last year, the key policy rate had been reduced by 0.25 percentage point to 1.5 percent in March. The key policy rate has since been kept unchanged. The key policy rate is low because inflation is low and because external interest rates are at very low levels. The year 2012 was characterised by weak growth among Norway’s trading partners and turbulence in financial markets. Uncertainty about global economic developments, particularly in Europe, was high. Key rates in many countries were close to zero, and both the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve announced that key rates would be kept low for a long period. Economic developments in many advanced economies remained weak into 2013.
In addition, much of our region was spared the worst effects of the non-prime mortgage boom and bust. There was generally lower penetration of nonprime loans into our housing markets, and in general, our region shows better performance, with fewer delinquencies and foreclosures. This pattern was particularly true across Upstate New York. However, as can be seen on the New York Fed’s U.S. Credit Conditions maps, there are significant pockets of housing distress around the greater New York City metro area, especially in communities in the Bronx, Dutchess County and Long Island. Indeed, we recently documented the severity of problems on Long Island in our Facts and Trends publication. Moreover, New Jersey had non-prime mortgage activity closer to the national average and now has more delinquencies and foreclosures than is the case for much of the region. As the uneven pattern of nonprime lending suggests, the region is hardly uniform. The housing section fared better in Upstate New York than it did in much of the region during the  4  BIS Review 137/2010  recession. In fact, the housing boom and bust largely bypassed Upstate New York, where construction activity is a relatively small part of the overall economy. Relative to Upstate New York, most areas in downstate New York and northern New Jersey more closely tracked the national cycle. Sales activity and home prices ramped up during the housing boom, but then dropped sharply. More recently – over the past year – home sales and prices in the region have followed different paths.

I am pleased to note that private-sector jobs have continued to grow moderately across much of the region in the past few months, just as they have in the nation. Growth in private-sector jobs – which is not affected directly by hires and layoffs from the decennial census – signals that, on balance, firms are expanding their workforces to meet their business needs. While state and local government job cuts have also reduced total employment, the fact that the private sector is creating jobs is a good sign and necessary for a sustainable recovery. The number of private-sector jobs has increased in and around New York City, in northern New Jersey and in some parts of Upstate New York. The latest job market report for New York shows a continuation of the generally rising trend of employment in the state at a pace that roughly matches the nationwide growth rate. In New York City, employment has expanded at rates substantially above the nation. Since we last met, employment in New Jersey has expanded, and while that growth has been quite modest, it is an encouraging sign. In Puerto Rico, employment reports continue to give mixed signals, showing a see-saw pattern that has yet to add up to a strong rebound. Despite these employment gains, unemployment in the region remains painfully high. In August, New York City’s and New Jersey’s rates were very close to the national jobless rate of 9.6 percent.