samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To sum up, the information and analyses that have become available since our meeting on 6 August 2009 confirms the view of the Governing Council that the current key ECB interest rates remain appropriate. In this respect, at today’s meeting we also decided that the rate for the twelve-month longer-term refinancing operation to be allotted on 30 September 2009 will be the prevailing rate on the main refinancing operations. Price developments are expected to remain subdued over the policy-relevant horizon. Annual HICP inflation was slightly negative in August. This reflects mainly the base effects of the strong rise in commodity prices in 2008. The return of HICP inflation to moderate positive rates is expected within the coming months. At the same time, the latest information supports our view that there are increasing signs of stabilisation in economic activity in the euro area and elsewhere. This is consistent with the expectation that the significant contraction in economic activity has come to an end and is now followed by a period of stabilisation and very gradual recovery . Available indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. A cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis confirms the assessment of low inflationary pressure over the medium term, as money and credit expansion continues to decelerate.

Given today’s decision, the key rate is at the top of this range equalling from 6% to 7% in nominal terms, or from 2% to 3% in real terms, which is the same, with inflation expected to reach 4%. In this regard, it is of note that the neutral key rate estimate is not ‘a point’, but a range of values. It depends on various domestic and global drivers, as well as the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and may alter, being affected by them. It will therefore take time to ‘feel’ the thresholds of this ‘neutral range’ and make sure that they are in line with our current estimates. If necessary, we will adjust these estimates. A sustainable inflation rate close to the 4% target will be the key criterion suggesting that we are right in our estimates of this range. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Insurance companies undertake an activity that matters, often critically – for the corporates that rely on protection of insurance for the day-to-day running of their businesses, and for individuals who invest a significant portion of their wealth in insurers over their lifetime, or who rely on insurers to protect them against financial disasters. It is for these very basic reasons that we are interested in insurance as a matter of public policy. However, we cannot justify regulation of an industry just because its activity is important. The aim of regulation is always to correct some sort of market failure. The insurance industry has many characteristics that could lead to the market producing a sub-optimal outcome, if left alone. First, the insurance business model is unusual in that it has an inverse production cycle – insurers typically receive premia upfront for a service that may or may not have to be  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  rendered in future (claims), the cost of which is difficult to calculate. Policyholders rely on the insurance company to set aside appropriate provisions to satisfy future claims, but the market may not always be a reliable mechanism for ensuring that insurance companies do not grow excessively by taking on too much risk. Insurance obligations are often long-term and so policyholders trust insurance companies with their money for considerable periods of time.

The role of the PRA is to make sure that the risks for which insurance companies provide protection do not revert to the customer when bad outcomes happen. It would be grossly unfair if you had paid somebody to take your risks away, only to find that you had unwittingly acquired a huge credit risk by giving your money to a financially unsound company. Our main job at the PRA is to ensure that firms are safe and sound, and contribute to policyholder protection. That way, the shareholder can reap the rewards if the risks pay off, but will bear the cost if the firm loses money. This public policy case is well established in many countries, such that the approach of different regulators is often founded in commonly agreed principles. For instance, in the 1970s, the introduction of Solvency I codified these principles into a set of requirements across the EU. The birthplace of insurance However, looked at across the sweep of insurance history, this public policy case is a newfangled set of ideas. I have tried to find out what, if anything, public authorities have thought about insurance through time. In my quest to find the answer to this question, I ended up going back further than anticipated – to around 3000 B.C. – and came across the curiouslynamed practice of “bottomry” in the era of Babylon.
Alternatively, they can sell their house at a profit. In 2006, there was a turnaround in the US housing market and house prices began to fall. This pulled the carpet from under many investments and resulted after a period in rising  BIS Review 115/2007  1  defaults on mortgages. These developments then triggered widespread turbulence in money and credit markets. The US mortgage market has gradually developed into a complex structure with a large number of participants. The distance between borrower and investor can be considerable. The chart shows possible interlinkages in the US subprime market. There is a long chain of intermediaries. On the one side is a borrower who wishes to take out a mortgage in order to buy a house. Between the borrower and the lender is an agent who functions as sales channel. The lender is a financial institution specialising in granting and following up these mortgages. The first special purpose vehicle buys the mortgage and packages it with other mortgages. The mortgages are financed by securities split into tranches. The mezzanine tranches are sold to another special purpose vehicle, which repackages them and issues CDOs split into tranches. A third special purpose investment vehicle invests in the senior tranches and obtains its financing by issuing asset-backed commercial paper. The commercial paper is bought by a money market fund, which in turn has received its capital from savers. Banks can be involved in all stages of the chain.

Lastly, I must add ignorance as another essential cause of improper financial behavior. Even with a well-designed financial education program with meaningful messages and effective delivery channels, financial literacy cannot be achieved if consumers neglect the necessity and benefits of appropriate personal financial management. All in all, desirable financial behavior is sometimes well known, but less likely to be implemented by consumers themselves. It is similar to living a healthy lifestyle. We know that healthy food and exercise are good for us, but we don’t do it. Hence, a solution to the improvement in financial behavior remains a challenging puzzle for many of the policy makers and practitioners to find the right solutions for various groups of people. Ladies and Gentlemen, I truly believe that this seminar would allow an invaluable opportunity for us to learn how to solve these puzzles from honorable speakers who have come a long way to share with us their enriching experiences and lessons-learnt. The achievement of effective financial education and behavioral change would eventually drive the global community towards a more financial- literate and disciplined population who would help ensure sustainable growth and equality in our society. Lastly, I wish the seminar a great success. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation for all of your endless efforts in promoting financial inclusion and financial literacy. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In the consumer portfolio, NBLs include retailers, family compensation funds (CCAF), savings and loan associations (S&Ls), factoring and leasing companies (F&Ls), and car dealerships. The mortgage portfolio includes endorsable mortgage loans (“mutuos hipotecarios”) issued by banks and mutual societies included among the assets held by life insurance companies (LICs). Finally, factoring and leasing companies mainly provide trade credit to businesses. Therefore most, if not all, of the lending activities of this sector is done in local currency. Having said that, we monitor this sector carefully, since the household debt issued by NBLs has increased a share of total consumer debt. Nonbank loans had a real annual growth rate of 11.5% in the fourth quarter of 2018. The contribution of debt with retailers was 4.5%; car dealership, 3.9%; CCAFs and F&Ls,1.2%; and S&Ls, Page 5 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  0.8%. In the same period, bank consumer loans grew around 5.7%. Nonbank consumer loans together were equivalent to about 58% of total bank consumer loans. This rate has been stable since 2012, although the composition has changed. Specifically, the share of retailers has been steadily increasing since mid-2013, while the share of companies oriented toward car financing has expanded more recently. As of December 2018, retailers accounted for 24.3%; car dealership, 12.1%; CCAFs, 12.1%; S&Ls, 6.6%; and F&Ls, 2.8%. High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation?

In 1986, the General Banking Law introduced limitations on currency mismatch, constraints on related party lending, and restrictions for banks to receive goods instead of liquid resources; all of them, elements that were common practice before the 1982 crisis. Paradoxically, what could be considered harsher regulation did not hamper financial deepening. Instead, it fostered solvency and credibility of the banking system and allowed its healthy development in the ensuing decades. At the core of this development was the creation of a funded pension system, and subsequent capital market reforms, together with capital market openness, which dramatically changed the size, composition, depth, and strength of the financial sector in Chile. Now, during the transition toward fully implementing the current policy framework, Chile experienced a period of capital control that have been highly reviewed in the literature. The unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) implemented in Chile during the 1990s helped to change the composition of capital flows toward longer terms but was less effective in terms of reducing the aggregate level of capital flowing into the country. After removing the URR completely by the end of the 90s and allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate freely, the banking and corporate sector learned to operate in a completely different environment, characterized by an extensive used of the derivative market. In In particular, corporations have learned to operate in a flexible FX environment by using both, natural and market-based FX risk hedging instruments.
However, the discussion that has arisen at least indicates that there may be reason not automatically to regard public deficits as a negative thing, as we have perhaps become too accustomed to doing.15  Trend towards lower policy rate and public debt For Sweden, the changed conditions for monetary policy and fiscal policy are clearly illustrated by the development of the repo rate and public finances over the last twenty-five years or so (Figure 2). As the real global interest rate has fallen, the repo rate has had to be lowered to ever-lower levels for each business cycle. Despite this, it has been difficult to keep inflation around 2 per cent on a more lasting basis. During the same period, the consolidated gross government debt, the so-called Maastricht debt, has fallen from just under 70 per cent of GDP to about 40 per cent. The downward trend has certainly slowed down from time to time, most recently in connection with the coronavirus pandemic, but is still very clear. At a more general level and seen over the period as a whole, one may argue that this development also reflects the fact that macroeconomic policy has not been conducted in such a way as to keep public debt as a share of GDP stable. This has, of course, been a deliberate strategy as Sweden has wanted to reduce its debt. At  14 It is worth noting, however, that, from time to time, this problem also arises when monetary policy is dis-  cussed.

One source of concern for both the United States and the world as a whole is the large deficits in the US economy. In the third quarter last year the current account deficit totalled USD 165 billion, or around 6 per cent of GDP. Data for November show that the deficit has continued to grow, reaching a new record high of just over USD 60 billion. This may result in changes in interest rates and exchange rates that could have considerable consequences for world trade. A large share, or about 40 per cent, of Sweden’s exports go to the euro area, and as a result economic developments there are especially important for us. The recovery in the euro area economy is going slowly. Growth in the third quarter was lower than expected. Available indicators for the fourth quarter provide a mixed picture. Germany, which is an important market for Swedish products, is showing some signs of an improvement. After several years of extensive cutbacks there should be a pent-up need among firms to invest. At the same time exports are being dampened by the euro’s rise against mainly the dollar. BIS Review 10/2005  1  The economic situation in Sweden As regards Sweden the Riksbank has been positive in the past year in its outlook on economic developments. International demand has increased faster than anticipated, with above all exports of services proving unexpectedly robust. Economic policy is also contributing to the relatively bright growth prospects.
In particular, low interest rates push up housing demand but also incentivise risk-taking behaviour by banks, by reducing the cost of leverage and weighing on bank margins and profitability. A global normalisation of monetary policy rates seems to be underway, most notably in the UK and in the US, against the background of a sharp rise in inflation. This could help slow down the increase in vulnerabilities, if the normalisation takes place gradually and does not trigger an excessive tightening of financial conditions. However, the global level of interest rates is likely to remain low in the medium term, dampened by structural factors such as demographics, inequality and a strong demand for safe assets internationally. Monetary policy has no influence over these factors. Even more importantly, the focus of monetary policy is price stability and economic developments, and not curbing financial system vulnerabilities. The most suitable way to address these vulnerabilities is therefore through macroprudential policy. Many authorities have in fact already responded to these developments by tightening macroprudential policy. Some countries have tightened borrower-based instruments in an attempt to curb rising vulnerabilities (e.g. Finland, France and Iceland). Others have opted to increase banking sector resilience to ensure that banks have enough capital to withstand a correction. Jurisdictions that released or reduced the CCyB in the acute phase of the pandemic to support bank lending are reactivating or increasing it again, in some cases to a higher level (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, UK).

Gent Sejko: The importance of media in analysing Albania’s monetary policy Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the end-of-year meeting with the media, Tirana, 20 December 2018. * * * Dear ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to our end-of-year meeting with the media. I would like to thank you for your readiness, objectivity, and seriousness in covering the activities of the Bank of Albania and informing the public about them, throughout 2018. Thanks to you, our analyses and decision-making have been communicated in a thorough manner, mindfully tailored and styled in accordance with the age and profession of the targeted audience. I must note that, in addition to broad geographic coverage, your comments and analyses on the economic and financial developments in Albania have been very professional. At the Bank of Albania, my colleagues and I maintain that the current media reality is an important part of our activity. Our decision-making could not be considered complete without your contribution. Communication is a vital and delicate process for a central bank. I must emphasize that, without your help and objectivity, realisation of Bank of Albania’s decision-making regarding monetary policy and financial stability would have been an impossible mission. Figuratively, I would point out that you are the ones that enable the translation of our analyses and conclusions into an adequate and easy-to-understand message for the general public.
1.5  Draft Budget macroeconomic forecast  The macroeconomic forecast underpinning the Draft Budget expects real GDP in Spain to fall by 11.2% in 2020, followed by growth of 9.8% in 2021. In the fiscal sphere, it envisages a correction of 3.6 pp in the general government budget deficit between 2020 and 2021, from 11.3% of GDP this year to 7.7% of GDP next year. In such an extraordinarily uncertain and changing environment as the present one, we need to be especially cautious when assessing these forecasts and comparing them with those made – mostly at different moments in time – by other analysts. In my view, three points should be highlighted. First, the starting point for this Draft Budget, which is none other than the forecasts made for the current year. In general, these are consistent with those published by the Banco de España in our latest projections report. In particular, the scale of the possible fall in GDP in Spain in 2020 – 11.2% according to the macroeconomic forecast underpinning the Draft Budget – is more or less mid-range between the two projection scenarios presented by the Banco de España in September, which envisaged a decline of 10.5% under scenario 1 and of 12.6% under scenario 2. This is also true for the budget deficit estimated for 2020 in the Draft Budget forecast, which is 11.3% of GDP, virtually mid-range between the deficit envisaged under scenario 1 (10.8%) and scenario 2 (12.1%).

In an environment of structurally low interest rates, like the one we are in at the moment, the adverse effects of very high levels of government debt are less visible in the short run. Indeed, the fact that interest rates are lower than nominal growth rates increases the possibilities of expanding government debt before it begins to rise exponentially, but there is a risk that the differential between nominal interest rates and the nominal GDP growth rate will at some point cease to be negative, in which case the unfavourable effect on the dynamics of the government debt ratio will be all the greater the higher the level of debt. In any event, the evidence regarding the adverse effects of running high levels of government debt is abundant. High government debt tends to lead to a decline in the financing available for private spending, as well as an increase in its cost, ultimately hampering the accumulation of private capital and hindering economic growth. High levels of debt, moreover, increase the likelihood of episodes of financial vulnerability, as in the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis when rising funding costs and falling 27  volumes reached extreme levels. Finally, the greater the level of government debt, the less the scope for fiscal policy to respond to the downturns that may arise in the future. During the sovereign debt crisis, all these effects were apparent.
This is after: Deducting $ billion of expenses from domestic money market and other operations; and Contributing $ billion to the Government’s Consolidated Fund, as payment in lieu of corporate income tax. This year, MAS will return half of its profits – $ billion – to the Government while the remainder will be added to MAS’ reserves. CONCLUSION Let me sum up. The economic situation remains dire. We are not at the beginning of the end, but rather at the end of the beginning. Growth rates will pick up – as you would expect coming from a very low base; but the level of activity will remain below pre-crisis levels for quite a while. The recovery is likely to be slow and uneven, weighed down by renewed outbreaks of infection here or abroad. Unemployment and corporate bankruptcies are likely to increase in the months ahead. We will enter 2021 with higher levels of debt, in both the corporate and household sectors, which will act as a further drag on growth and could become a source of vulnerability. MAS’ priorities will be to ensure monetary and financial stability. We will keep the exchange rate stable, to provide an anchor of confidence. We will keep the funding markets liquid, to ensure credit remains available to the economy. We will ensure the financial system remains sound and resilient. We will ensure that our systemically important financial institutions continue to have healthy buffers to absorb any unexpected losses.

With the world economy now beginning to catch a cold from the slowdown in the US economy, the quality and competitiveness of our exports means that our companies are better equipped than others to hold their own in the global marketplace. Foreign trade not only represents Switzerland's growth driver, but it is also our friend when economic times are hard. BIS Review 45/2008  1
Page 7  The views expressed in this speech are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would particularly like to thank Saba Alam, Andrew Bailey, Harvey Daniell, Swati Dhingra, Jonathan Haskell, Catherine Mann and Martin Seneca for helpful comments on earlier drafts of these remarks. The responsibility for all remaining errors is my own. Endnotes 1. Friedman, M. (1961). ‘The lag in effect of monetary policy,’ Journal of Political Economy 69(5), pp. 447-466. ↑ 2. Goodfriend, M. (1998). ‘Using the term structure of interest rates for monetary policy,’ Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 84(3), pp. 13-30. ↑ 3. In commenting on Capie et al. (1993) ‘The future of central banking: The tercentenary symposium of the Bank of England,’ former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan remarked: ‘Implicit in any monetary policy action or inaction is an expectation of how the future will unfold, that is, a forecast. There is no way to avoid making a forecast, explicitly or implicitly.’ ↑ 4. King, M. (2010). ‘Uncertainty in macroeconomic policy making – Art or science?’ Lecture at the Royal Society conference on “Handling Uncertainty in Science”, London, 22 March. ↑ 5. Evans, C., J. Fisher, F. Gourio and S. Krane (2015). ‘Risk management for monetary policy near the zero lower bound,’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring), pp. 141-196. ↑ 6. In December, on a seasonally adjusted, 3-month average on the same 3 months a year ago basis. ↑ 7. Churchman, C. (1967). ‘Wicked problems,’ Management Science 14(4), pp.

The lesson, therefore, is not to rely on either risk-based or non-risk-based measures alone, but to have each reinforcing the other. A combined approach, as Basel III introduces, is better than any single approach. I believe Basel III strikes a reasonable balance by strengthening overall bank-capital requirements while continuing to recognise that there are a wide range of risks within a bank’s business. Going forward, the Committee will look to further simplify the framework while ensuring that it appropriately measures and responds to the risks it is supposed to mitigate. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches