samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
While tightening cycles by the Fed can pose challenges for EMEs, these need not be disruptive. The combination of stronger U.S. growth, improved EME fundamentals and effective Fed communications can limit the stresses caused by the onset of tightening. The experience will vary across EMEs, but EMEs as a group are better equipped today to handle the challenge than they were in the past. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. The U.S. economic outlook Since the end of the Great Recession more than five years ago, the U.S. economy has grown at a disappointing 2.3 percent annualized rate. Several times over that period, it appeared that growth was strengthening, but each time such hopes were subsequently unfulfilled. We appear again to be at a similar junction. Real GDP growth accelerated over the last two years, rising at a 2.7 percent annual rate. However, the first quarter of 2015 is expected to be quite weak with growth only at around a 1½ percent annualized rate. What does this portend for growth going forward? Despite the weak performance of the first quarter, I believe that the growth prospects for the U.S. economy over the remainder of 2015 will improve. I expect that the first quarter weakness will prove to be largely temporary.

5  A couple of years ago the connected cars platform Next became the first company to be authorised to undertake such a round of financing in Spain. 6  W. Mougayar (2016), “The Business Blockchain: Promise, Practice, and Application of the Next Internet Technology”, Ed. Wiley. 2  fractions which, in turn, can bear ownership rights and ultimately render such properties more liquid. An alternative taxonomy distinguishes between traditional crypto-assets and “stablecoins”. In an attempt to reduce their volatility, the latter are usually backed by other real or virtual assets as a means of collateral. For example, some stablecoins are pegged to legal tender, while others are anchored to commodities, bonds or even other digital assets. In some cases, even the overall wealth of the issuer can serve as collateral.7 Algorithmic stablecoins are another, albeit less common, category; here, formal collateralisation is replaced by a series of automatic supply adjustment mechanisms. In comparison to other stablecoins, the latter are subject to greater price fluctuations and arise more doubts as to their potential use as a means of payment. A prime example of this just happened a few weeks ago with Terra: a stablecoin which, despite remaining relatively firm around the US dollar for a long time, suddenly lost that nexus and caused significant losses to investors. The functionalities or operating characteristics of crypto-assets also vary notably. Perhaps the most visible example of this is the consensus mechanism that is used to approve crypto-asset transactions.
The Bank’s supervisory body - the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)– surveyed banks in the UK last year and found that almost three quarters are starting to treat the risks from climate change like other financial risks – rather than viewing them simply as a corporate social responsibility issue.7 Banks have begun considering the most immediate physical risks to their business models – from the exposure of mortgage books to flood risk and the impact of extreme weather events on sovereign risk. And banks have started to assess exposures to transition risks in anticipation of climate action. This includes exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, consumer loans secured on diesel vehicles, and buy-to-let lending given new energy efficiency requirements. To embed essential climate risk management skills recommended by the TCFD in financial decision making, the Bank of England has set out its supervisory expectations for institutions in the world’s leading international financial centre with respect to:8   Governance, where firms will be expected to embed fully the consideration of climate risks into governance frameworks, including at board level, and assign responsibility for oversight of these risks to specific senior role holders;    Risk management, where firms will need to consider climate change in line with their boardapproved risk appetite;    The regular use of scenario analysis to test strategic resilience; and    Developing and maintain an appropriate disclosure of climate risks.

The TCFD report provides case studies – from Rio Tinto to Unilever to Citi – and finds common characteristics of good scenario analysis:   Using multiple climate-related scenarios to assess strategic resilience    Describing assumptions and parameters specific to the company    Identifying potential impacts of climate-related risks or opportunities    Disclosing potential strategic resilience under different climate-related scenarios  To develop leading practices, the TCFD has created a Knowledge Hub which provides guidance, research, tools, standards, frameworks and webinars.16  12  The Task Force encourages companies to describe the characteristics of their strategies that allow them to adapt to climate-related changes materially affecting their business while maintaining operations and profitability and safeguarding people, assets, and overall reputation. The TCFD report identifies that Investors are likely to need information on the range of scenarios considered by a company; implications of each scenario for the business; strategic options considered; and the reasoning around the strategy adopted. Another factor that may warrant disclosure is the company’s ability—and flexibility—to adjust its strategy in response to emerging climate conditions, including alternative ways to use resources and the robustness and redundancy of business processes. 13 TCFD Status Report (2019) pg. 64 14 TCFD Status Report (2019) pg. 63 15 TCFD Status Report (2019) pg. 62 16 This includes several industry associations and non-governmental organizations that have brought companies together to work through sector-specific approaches to climate change issues.
This shift in fiscal and monetary policy led to increased stability and predictability, which most likely enhanced the efficiency of the economy. Moreover, the tax and social security systems were reformed. Sweden’s entry into the EU’s single market together with the deregulation of several important markets also entailed stiffer competition. Furthermore, the faster growth in the private sector compared to the public sector, as well as the evolution of the ICT sector during the second half of the 1990s, most likely contributed to higher productivity growth. Against the background of the lower capital formation since the 1970s, however, it is worth asking what the prospects for Swedish growth are in the years ahead. Will we be able to regain any of our previously prominent position as a comparatively rich industrialised nation? What does the low level of capital formation imply for Sweden’s chances of recapturing the leading position it had among industrialised nations at the beginning of the 1970s? It is important here to note that the structure of the business sector has changed. The industrial sector as a whole, including the basic industries, such as mining, ironworks and steelworks, and paper and pulp, have decreased as a proportion of GDP in favour of the expanding services industries. Basic industries’ share has fallen from 6.5 per cent of GDP in 1970 to just over 4 per cent today, while service production in the business sector has increased from approximately 30 per cent of GDP to just over 40 per cent during the same period.

Productivity in the United States, however, has not been faster than in Sweden. During the first half of the 1990s, Swedish productivity growth was among the most vigorous in the world, which resulted in increased prosperity for Swedish citizens. During the 1950s and 1960s, productivity growth in Sweden increased further. This was partly due to considerable reconstruction needs following the Second World War and the robust demand that resulted from this. In addition, trade was liberalised during this period which led to stiffer competition, and - most of all - capital formation was rapid. The favourable productivity growth during these years furthered Sweden’s prosperity. In 1970, Sweden was in fourth place in the OECD league in terms of GDP per capita, which means that it was one of the four richest countries in the world. During the period that followed, however, productivity growth was appreciably slower and it is widely known that the 1970s and 1980s were bad periods for Sweden. Today, Sweden finds itself in 17th place in the OECD league and is below the average for industrialised countries. What caused this decline then? It may be relevant to look at the reasons behind Sweden’s weak growth during the 20 years up to the mid 1990s. These are mistakes that we need to avoid in the future. When I discuss this unsuccessful period in Sweden I will mainly focus on productivity since it is the measure that determines our standard of living. We then have to somewhat modify the growth formula that I mentioned earlier.
A deeper market reduces transaction costs, and it is easier to find counterparties. This has provided companies with greater scope for hedging against foreign exchange risk. The use of instruments that reduce the risk associated with a floating krone is also increasing in Norway. A considerably larger portion of credit in other countries is now channelled via the bond market. Less risk is being accumulated in banking systems. The development of new markets and instruments, for example credit derivatives, has also led to a broader risk spread than earlier. The improved diversification of risk is probably one of the reasons that world financial markets have coped with the stock market decline and the accounting scandals with limited damage to the wider economy. This is probably one reason why the downturn following the stock market decline in 2000 was considerably less pronounced than earlier downturns. The new instruments spread risk, but do not eliminate it. Financial markets have become highly complex. This alone entails an operational risk, which is a challenge to participants and the supervisory authorities. 2  BIS Review 11/2004  A shift in the international division of labour Increased trade promotes growth and lays a basis for prosperity. A number of Asian countries have experienced strong, export-led growth - Japan from the 1950s and several countries in Southeast Asia from the 1960s. Chart 3.

Discussion as to the institutional arrangements that are most appropriate from the point of view of financial stability remains open. One key question is who should be responsible for the tasks of prudential regulation. Another, although perhaps slightly less important, is who should do the supervision. There are arguments in favor of different policy options, but any specific recommendation must take into account the experience and circumstances of each country. Until the crisis, the prevailing trend was for a body different from the central bank to be responsible for regulation and supervision whereas now the wind seems to be blowing in the opposite direction. In this context, one piece of practical advice is not to significantly change something that has worked well. In any case, the decisions that are taken may have significant implications for central banks’ institutional insertion, the scrutiny to which they are subject, and internal organization of their activities. These implications become particularly important if it is decided to give the central bank broad responsibility for financial stability. In this case, it may be advisable to adjust internal governance so as to ensure the necessary separation of the objectives of financial stability and price stability. Under any institutional model, coordination and communication between the different authorities with functions related to financial stability will always be very necessary.
Against this backdrop the ruble started to appreciate and the situation even allowed us to start replenishing our gold and foreign currency reserves. Now I will give you the details of our monetary policy in 2014. We have decided to grant the access to the main refinancing instruments to a wider range of banks (the so-called 3rd tier banks) and promptly extend the Lombard List. In making the Lombard List we abandoned the exclusive reliance on the international ratings agencies in order to reduce the dependence on them and make our own asset estimation. We are developing special purpose instruments to compensate for the so-called market failures and support lending in certain areas amid low availability of loans, high interest rates, and lack of long-term money. I am talking about four instruments – support of investment projects, small and medium-sized enterprises, military mortgages and non-commodity exports. The total of 290 billion rubles is currently allocated for these instruments. The special purpose instruments will be limited in volume in order to avoid distortions in monetary policy mechanisms. However, since we have introduced these instruments, they must prove effective. Currently, our main objective is to increase their efficiency. To summarise the results of the monetary policy we implemented last year, I would like to emphasise that, first, we acted in strict compliance with the functions assigned by the Constitution and the Central Bank Law, second, in the challenging conditions we tried to be flexible and to apply non-standard approaches, yet using only market mechanisms.

In the last few days, these prices have recovered a little, but volatility remains unusually high (cf. graph 1). Graph 1: prices of securities backed by sub-prime mortgages with AAA ratings 1  105  100  95  90  85  80  75 10.10.06  1  29.11.06  18.01.07  09.03.07  28.04.07  17.06.07  06.08.07  25.09.07  14.11.07  US Subprime Residential Mortgage Backed Securities price index (ABX.HE, subprime RMBS), 2-2006 vintage with AAA rating. Source: Markit. BIS Review 150/2007  1  Crisis caused by high risks, insufficient transparency and inadequate risk management The sub-prime segment accounts for 12 to 15 percent of the US mortgage market. The US mortgage market, in its turn, corresponds to significantly less than 10% in value terms of total bonds and shares traded worldwide. How was it possible, then, that problems which were initially limited to just one segment could spread, triggering such widespread turmoil? Unfortunately, a lot of what has been unfolding has confirmed our fears of last June. First, it has become evident that the risks incurred by many banks were too high overall. There was an ever increasing willingness on the part of banks to accept high risk, which, for example, resulted in strong growth in lending and expanding balance sheets. Moreover, markets probably assessed existing risks too optimistically, as was evident in view of the extraordinarily low risk premiums on bonds, for example.
Internationalisation and increased competition are particularly valuable for growth in a small country like Sweden, as they involve resources that would otherwise be used inefficiently instead being moved towards more efficient use in other sectors or companies. Some years ago, there was a widespread hope in Sweden and in other countries that the "new economy" following the breakthrough of information technology would lead to a sustainable higher growth rate. It is possible that this still remains, in the USA there are calculations indicating that growth  BIS Review 14/2002  3  has been one percentage point higher because of IT than it would otherwise have been during the 1 1990s. The setbacks experienced by telecommunications and IT recently should probably be seen mainly as an unavoidable sobering process for a sector that was too heavily inflated by expectations. The fact that the bubble burst does not change the situation that IT developments have in many ways lastingly changed the conditions for growth, particularly through more efficient flows of information, decentralised production in networks, etc. In Sweden we have seen how total factor productivity, the part of productivity considered to reflect progress in technology and organisation, has risen more strongly than before, and much more strongly than in many other countries, during the 1990s.

There will be deviations from these forecasts, even if they are well founded, partly because the economy is hit by  BIS Review 14/2002  1  unforeseen shocks from time to time. If fruit-growers' crops are attacked by insects, the price of apples will rise, if the dams are not filled with water, electricity prices may rise, and if cows in Europe suffer various diseases, the price of meat and certain other foodstuffs rises. If the Riksbank tried to make corrections for this type of temporary price disturbance, it would probably lead to large swings in monetary policy and unnecessary fluctuations in demand. It would therefore be wrong to give the impression that inflation will always lie at 2 per cent. On the other hand, it is important that the Riksbank constantly adapts the instrumental rate to ensure that the inflation forecast 1-2 years ahead is in line with the inflation target. This means that households and firms can rely on temporary deviations above or below this level being just temporary. One factor that could seriously undermine the credibility of the inflation target is if a higher rate of price increase led to large-scale demands for wage compensation. If wages and prices begin to chase one another upwards, as happened in the 1980s, everyone will lose out in the end. The importance of monetary policy for growth and vice versa The importance of monetary policy for growth is primarily connected to the need for stability in trade and industry and the labour market.
Mr. Erçel reviews central bank operations in 1996 and discusses the philosophy of central banks Remarks by the Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Gazi Erçel, on the occasion of the 65th Shareholders’ Ordinary General Meeting in Ankara on 15/4/97. I expressed my views concerning the main functions of a central bank in my speech to last year’s General Assembly. Today I would like to summarize the past year’s operations and share with you my thoughts on the philosophy of central banking. You will find detailed assessments of economic developments in Turkey and abroad in the Bank’s Annual Report for 1996, which has already been distributed to you. Instead of repeating these details, I will describe the implications of the events of 1996 for the operations of the Central Bank. The most important circumstance affecting the economy last year was the long-lasting period of political uncertainty. After the general elections, it took the first six months of the year to put together a coalition government. Political instability, Turkey’s entry into the Customs Union, and lack of the political determination needed to fight inflation created uncertainty in the financial markets. The Central Bank responded by aiming its monetary policies at achieving and protecting stability in the financial markets instead of aiming them at decreasing the rate of inflation. While withholding announcement of its targets for the second half of 1996, the Central Bank implemented a monetary program in keeping with its inner discipline.

2023 International Symposium, National Association for Business Economics – Paris, 22 May 2023  Monetary policy transmission: where do we stand? Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 sur 14 In the Euro Area, inflation has begun to fall back, from 10.6% in October 2022 to 7% in April, after 6.9% in March, and is expected to recede by the end of the year. But it will still be too high. And while headline inflation has been declining, underlying price pressures show persistence. The Governing Council has already taken prompt and forceful actions to tighten the stance of monetary policy. The primary question today is not so much how much further we need to go with interest rate hikes, but how large is the pass-through of what is already in the pipe. Today I’d like to elaborate on this and review the two steps of the transmission of our monetary policy (i) first to the financing and monetary conditions, and (ii) ultimately to real economy and inflation. I will then draw some conclusions for monetary policy (iii). I. The transmission of monetary policy to financing conditions has proven relatively rapid and overall in line with past tightening cycles The increase in policy rates since 2022 has been exceptionally rapid by any historical standards: 7 hikes in less than ten months, amounting to +375 basis points, in addition to our progressive exit from unconventional policies which began even earlier.
It provides for structural regulatory co-operation on financial services, with the aim of establishing a durable and stable relationship between autonomous jurisdictions based on a shared comment to preserve financial stability, market integrity and the protection of investors and consumers. This co-operation will be supported by a Memorandum of Understanding to be agreed by March, and this will enable discussions on how to move forwards on equivalence determinations “without prejudice to the unilateral and autonomous decision-making process of each side”. To conclude, there is no doubt in my mind that an open world economy supported by an open financial system that respects the public interest objective of financial stability will bring the greatest benefits all round. It needs to be supported by effective institutions and strong international standards. But this must be a global, not a regional, regime to be effective. And that is why we spend so much time and effort on the work of the global standard setting and oversight bodies. What follows from that is much more a matter of implementation and how we each put these standards into practice consistently. We have an opportunity to move forward and rebuild our economies, post Covid, supported by our financial systems. Now is not the time to have a regional argument. Thank you. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

As a result, we may only expect GDP growth to accelerate to 2-3% by the end of 2022, rather than in 2021. A higher economic growth rate should primarily be driven by the shift to a more extensive implementation of national projects and other governmental measures aimed at removing structural constraints. This will promote an increase in investment demand and a quicker rise in labour productivity, household income and, accordingly, consumption. Lending will sustainably expand over the entire forecast horizon supporting economic growth. Corporate lending will annually increase at a pace of 6-10%, and household lending will grow by 10–15% each year. Mortgage loans will account for the bulk of household lending growth. Meanwhile, macroprudential measures will gradually reduce the growth pace of consumer lending. We have updated the balance of payments to factor in the world economy dynamics, prices for oil and other Russian exports. We assume a gradual decline in oil prices to 50 US dollars per barrel in 2021 (as compared to 55 US dollars considered earlier). If external demand weakens, prices for other Russian exports will drop, too. In such conditions, the current account balance will shrink from 83 billion US dollars (5% of GDP) this year to 28 billion US dollars (which is about 2% of GDP) in 2022. Given the actual dynamics observed since the beginning of the year, we have also slightly lowered the 2019 forecast for the private sector’s financial account balance from 50 to 40 billion US dollars.