samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Page 7/7  Currencies, money and digital tokens  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank 30th anniversary of the WWZ and VBÖ University of Basel, 5 September 2019  Types of money in Switzerland Currency Issuer  Type Cash  state  Banknotes and coins  state  private  private  Book money  Digital token money  Sight deposits held at the SNB for financial market participants  Swiss franc tokens for financial market participants  Sight deposits held at the SNB for all households and companies  Swiss franc tokens for all households and companies  Bank deposits  Stable coins (value stable against Swiss franc) Stable coins (minimal fluctuations in value against official currencies, e.g. Libra)  private  Crypto tokens (e.g. Bitcoin) Existing types of money 05.09.2019  Potential types of money  Currencies, money and digital tokens | Thomas J. Jordan | © Swiss National Bank

These include: The Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility will bolster the effectiveness of the Small Business Administration’s Paycheck Protection Program by supplying liquidity to participating financial institutions through two-year loans backed by PPP loans as collateral. The Main Street Lending Program will enhance support for small and mid-sized businesses that were in good financial standing before the crisis by purchasing up to $ billion in fouryear loans to small and mid-size businesses. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) will support issuance of securities backed by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, small business loans, and other debt. Moving with Maximum Care Considering the speed and scale of damage caused by the virus outbreak, we are making all efforts to implement these facilities at maximum speed. At the same time, though, we are moving with maximum care, drawing upon all of the lessons learned since 2008. First and foremost, we know that transparency will be key to sustaining public confidence in our efforts. What does this mean in practice? It means that when we work with outside vendors, we explain why we’re doing so, who we’re working with, and how much we’re paying for their services. It requires if we accelerate the vendor selection process to minimize time to market, we operate under a short-term contract and then open up the process to a competitive range of bidders, looking beyond the largest and most established players and providing broad access to a diverse range of smaller players.
This evening I have tried to present a general account of my preliminary view of some aspects of assessments of the future path of inflation. I look forward to the continued discussion of these matters with my Riksbank colleagues. Our decision about interest rate policy is due at the meeting next Tuesday, 4 December. The result of our discussions will be published the following day, 5 December, as will the fourth Inflation Report of 2001. 4  BIS Review 98/2001

 However, the report and the subsequent analysis are restricted in the definition of structural features, in particular on the demand-side. 1   Financial stability is seen in the narrow sense of households being able to repay loans, and banks being exposed to the risk of non-performing loans, mainly because of sharp changes in the house prices. Much emphasis is put on the flow and on trends, and little attention is being paid to the stock.  I would like to focus on these structural features at households’ level, which eventually influence not only the RRE markets but also pose risks to financial stability in a broader sense. The discussion is particularly timely, as residential real estate prices have resumed an upward cycle in the last three years in all EU countries except Greece and Cyprus.  Ex-communist countries in CEE have high ownership rates (mostly as a result of a policy in the early 90’s to sell the state’s houses at affordable prices in the urban areas, as well as due to their large share of rural population). (Figure 1).  They also have low households debt to GDP ratios and low household mortgage debt to income ratio (Figure 2 and 3). However, these countries started from a very low debt level (practically zero), and they witnessed only one major boom and bust cycle of RRE prices in recent history.  These combined features seem to spare them of RRE vulnerabilities. But the devil is in details...meaning the structural features of households in CEE.
The first is that in the long run, monetary policy primarily affects nominal variables such as the price level and the exchange rate. However, this statement is not, strictly speaking, true, and it probably applies primarily to that which we can call “good” monetary policy. Bad monetary policy can probably have a lasting negative effect on GDP growth and living standards and other real variables that we consider important in connection with economic well-being and stability. An example of this is persistently high and volatile inflation or deflation of the type occurring around the world during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The second important point is that in the short term, monetary policy can affect real variables such as GDP growth, employment, the real exchange rate, and the current account balance. This is partly because monetary policy measures affect different prices at differing speeds, and BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  until full adjustment has taken place, relative prices and the real variables affected by them will change. An example of this is the impact of interest rate changes on the nominal exchange rate, which emerges quickly and changes the real exchange rate. To the degree that this change is in excess of what is compatible with underlying economic conditions, it will then gradually reverse with an adjustment in prices and wages. A similar story can be told about real wages.

The equilibrium real rate (typically labelled r*) is the rate required to match the desired levels of saving and investment. The combination of slower population growth, rising life expectancy and an ageing population acts through multiple channels to push up desired savings and reduce desired investment. A reduction in desired investment also reflects slower productivity growth and, possibly, shifts in the structure of the aggregate production function. In the wake of the global financial crisis, risk appetite may also have diminished, which provides a disincentive to invest, reinforces the precautionary saving motive and encourages a portfolio shift to less risky assets, such as sovereign bonds. Finally, the scars of the crisis have also affected desired savings and desired investment levels: many banks, firms, governments and households have focused on repairing their balance sheets or have been constrained by legacy effects when making investment decisions. Some of these forces may go into reverse over time, especially if we see a more complete recovery from the crisis and if there were improved public policies to cope with demographic trends and better productivity developments (such as the successful, widespread adoption of artificial intelligence, innovations in automation and enhanced infrastructure investment). However, for now the downward pressure on the equilibrium real rate is a significant environmental constraint on the options available to central banks. The low equilibrium real rate has been compounded by weak nominal developments over the last decade.
So, I invite you to come to Hong Kong, experience the vibrant ecosystem firsthand, put your most innovative ideas and best technology here, and take advantage of the many business opportunities. I promise the journey will be rewarding in many ways. 33. Thank you. Last revision date : 31 October 2022

During the period of rapid digital transformations, there is no denying that digital divide can worsen, especially in emerging economies. There will be those with access, are able to take advantage of technological advancement, and prosper; and those who lack access or capability to leverage on modern technology, fall behind, and perish. Finding that right balancing will certainly be a challenge for us, central bankers, but it can be an area where international collaboration and networking platforms, like the SEACEN Centre, can play a role. Refining the knowns, looking ahead for the unknowns, and balancing our actions. These are how we should approach our policy questions. I am glad the SEACEN and its organizers have selected a number of topics that will allow us to think deeply about digital transformations and implications for central banks and encourage that future SEACEN activities put even greater emphasis on how we can balance our policy actions and enhance collaboration among members in this new area. I would also like to thank the group of scholars and practitioners here with us today, who will share their thoughts on many important topics, help broaden our perceptions of the knowns, and shed some lights on the unknowns. 3/4  And on this note, allow me to introduce Governor Duvvuri Subbarao, Former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India and currently a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies of the National University of Singapore.
José De Gregorio: Chile’s latest Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Finance Commission of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 4 April 2011. The Monetary Policy Report of March 2011 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. *  *  *  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, senator Eduardo Frei, senators. I am grateful for the Commission’s invitation to the Board of the Central Bank of Chile to share with you our vision of recent macroeconomic developments, their prospects and implications on monetary policy, as detailed in our Monetary Policy Report of March 2011. The data at hand on the last few months show that our country continues to walk a path of sustained economic recovery. The year 2010 closed with a y-o-y growth rate of 5.2 percent, with very strong consumption and investment. To a large extent, the devastation inflicted on our economy by the world recession of 2008–2009 and the earthquake and tsunami of 27 February 2010 has been left behind. Employment is growing strongly and trend inflation has returned to above zero annual variation rates. The strong impulse of macroeconomic policies has been at the center of these results, and the recovery of the Chilean economy attests to the efficacy of our economic policy framework. However, although the challenges posed by the aforesaid events have been largely overcome, today we face new ones.

From the beginning of this year, business surveys have improved, broad money growth has stabilised at around 5% a year, and the housing market is picking up. Despite this encouraging picture, growth is not yet strong enough to reduce the considerable margin of spare capacity in the economy. Nor is recovery at an adequate rate fully assured. The weakness of the euro area and the problems of the UK banking system continue to act as a drag on growth. So the need to support the recovery remains. Of course we must be mindful of the risks from injecting more money into the economy. We cannot afford to return to the inflationary episodes of the past. In the two decades before inflation targeting was introduced in 1992, inflation averaged almost 10% a year. The purpose of inflation targeting was to change the way in which interest rate decisions were made and to build credibility in the UK’s commitment to price stability. Over the following two decades, CPI inflation averaged only a fraction above 2%. Today, inflation is above the 2% target – as it has been for most of the past five years. But our economy has had to absorb an BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  oil price shock on a par with that of the 1970s, as well as a sharp depreciation of sterling.
4  BIS Review 65/2009  Macro considerations relate to the pro-cyclical nature of the current accounting framework. The micro dimension relates to absence of depth in some financial markets, particularly in times of stress when liquidity problems arising from valuation adjustments are quickly transmitted to an institution’s capital base. The presumption in the current valuation rules that a market value for a financial instrument exists does not necessarily hold during a crisis. The reclassification of assets in such circumstances would help financial institutions mitigate the problems arising from the inability to discover prices. Another concept that is gathering support internationally is that of dynamic provisioning, which seeks to avoid the pro-cyclical impact of current accounting rules by recognising portfolio losses over the cycle. As a result, loss provisions are measured against the expected losses over the life of an asset rather than when losses are actually incurred. The losses made during a downturn can then be met from the accumulated buffer built up during the economic upswing. Risk management practices and stress testing Let me now turn to some risk management issues. Another lesson that has been learned from the financial turmoil is that proper liquidity management is of paramount importance to satisfy the banks’ funding needs, and heightens their resilience against idiosyncratic or systemic risks. Although existing EU legislation on liquidity risk is highly fragmented, in part reflecting the various national approaches, adherence to a set of common principles such as those provided by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision should prove fruitful.

Jean-Claude Trichet: Conclusions of the G20 in Seoul – Interview in Le Progrès Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, in Le Progrès, France, conducted by Mr Vincent Rocken and published on 13 November 2010. *  *  *  Are you satisfied with the conclusions of the G20 in Seoul? Let me first of all say how delighted I am to be here in Lyon, breathing my native air and soaking up the beauty of the city and its way of life. With regard to the G20, I took note of the communiqué stating that risks remain for the global economy and that there is a need for extreme vigilance. I share this view entirely with the Heads of State and Government. Four further conclusions are particularly important to my mind. First, a commitment to pursue macroeconomic policies aimed at ensuring sustainable growth, including rigorous fiscal measures in countries where these are necessary. Second, the need to implement ambitious structural reforms to foster growth and employment. Third, the approval of the banking supervision reforms prepared by the Basel Committee. And fourth, a commitment to enhance the flexibility of the exchange rates of certain currencies which are not sufficiently flexible. When France takes over the presidency of the G20 for a year, what guidelines and actions should it focus on at the financial level? The global governance of the G20 is a long-term undertaking.
The aforementioned movements in the policy rate and reserve ratios led to a significant reduction in the debt service of borrowers with loans in domestic currency, an increase in leu-denominated loans and a contraction in foreign currency-denominated loans, confirming the stronger preference for loans in domestic currency. Consequently, the currency risk has receded. Prudential indicators show that the banking sector is stable and sound. The loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD), a relevant financial stability indicator, has fallen below 100%, coming in at 91.3% in December 2014. The solvency ratio stood at 17.1% in September 2014 against 15.5% in December 2013, significantly above the international prudential requirements, and liquidity is at an adequate level. The removal of non-performing loans from the balance sheets has led to negative profitability of the banking system, with credit institutions incurring net losses worth around EUR 1 billion in 2014. Out of the total stock of loans to households amounting to lei 101 billion, foreign currencydenominated loans account for the equivalent of lei 62 billion (or 61% of total). Mention should be made that out of foreign currency-denominated loans worth 62 billion when expressed in domestic currency, EUR-denominated loans held 83.8%, CHF-denominated loans accounted for 15.7%, and USD-denominated loans took 0.5%, as of November 2014.

It is also pertinent that teachers obtain quality and professional training to harness and effectively utilise computers. I therefore urge you to consider enhancing computer literacy amongst your staff. In an information age, knowledge and effective use of computers along with sound education will be the cornerstone of a vibrant, modern society. This is why our teachers are absolutely critical to the future of our economy. I have no doubt that supporting our schools in the manner that the Bank of Zambia is doing today will lead to stronger motivation and morale amongst our students and teachers alike. I am certain that we all desire a country where our  BIS Review 14/2010  1  teachers and students are proficient in using computers and extract immense value from them. This should be the vision that we should all aspire. Ladies and Gentlemen, In conclusion, I would like to urge all students present here today take an interest in using computers. Computers will assist you in your studies and make your lessons more effective, easier and enjoyable but they will not automatically make you a genius. The computer will open doors to communication, research and opportunities. Remember that the goal of computer literacy is for the user to become an explorer, and an active seeker of information which I hope you will be, with this donation. Seize what you have been bestowed with today. Guard against vandalism and use the computer facilities to ensure a brighter future for yourselves.
As a result, smaller firms have had to close and construction labour has moved abroad or gone to other domestic sectors. There are now many indications that construction activity is picking up again, though the rate of the recovery is difficult to assess. But housing demand has grown and there is a large need for new housing as well as for renovation. The Riksbank does not produce independent estimates; the available figures suggest, however, that in the coming decade between 20,000 and 45,000 new dwelling units need to be built each year and between 30,000 and 40,000 units a year need to be renovated. Activity may then grow rapidly in certain regions. Now that construction is recovering, the increased concentration among construction companies and producers of construction materials, as well as the shortages in certain categories of skilled labour, are liable to push costs and wages up. Certain problems with bottlenecks are already discernible; in the business tendency surveys from the National Institute of Economic Research, labour shortages are reported by 7 per cent of construction firms as against 2 per cent in March 1998. These shortages are accompanied by a high overall level of unemployment among construction workers; part of the explanation is that unemployment is high in certain regions and those who are unemployed there are reluctant to move a long way to regions where labour demand is stronger. Bottleneck problems in the construction industry are being studied on behalf of the Government by industry representatives.

But that is not the end of the matter, as investors need to do something with the proceeds from their asset sales. They could just sit on the proceeds, but it is more likely that in due course they will buy other assets, including those that offer a higher return. So, in the course of time, the whole range of equity and bond prices are driven up, lowering the cost of finance to companies and increasing its availability. Our purchases of corporate assets are intended to have the additional effect of improving the functioning of those markets. By standing ready to buy commercial paper and corporate bonds, we hope to improve their liquidity, lowering the spread above safe assets of equivalent maturity, and with it the cost of finance to business. 2  BIS Review 62/2009  There are signs that these measures are having a beneficial impact too. Spreads on commercial paper eligible for purchase have fallen by around ½ percentage point and the size of the market has increased by around 10%. Similarly, average spreads on sterling investment grade corporate bonds for industrial companies have declined by some 60 basis points and gross issuance of bonds by UK companies has been strong. These developments may reflect a range of influences, but feedback from market participants suggests that our purchases have indeed played a helpful role. In addition to these channels, the banks, finding themselves flush with extra reserves, may choose to lend them on, providing a further kick by boosting the supply of credit.
Averaged over that period average inflation has been only a fraction lower than it was before the pandemic, despite a cumulative decline of around 4% in the level of output. If that amounts to a simple matter of “overheating” – if the economy really can’t cope with aggregate demand growth any stronger than minus 2½-3% a year – then one can only conclude that the UK economy’s supply performance has been chilly at best. The reality is more nuanced. I’ve highlighted three contributing factors. By protecting individual jobs the furlough scheme has had the effect of matching lower labour demand with lower supply. In the second quarter of this year this was worth around 2-3% in terms of aggregate output. Prices of many tradable goods have risen sharply. In some cases this reflects specific supply-side problems. Also important has been the general shift in demand, away from services and towards goods, caused by the pandemic. Within the UK, those shifts – regional as well as sectoral – have caused a degree of “mismatch” in the labour market. At least during the early part of the recovery, available jobs haven’t perfectly matched available workers (including those on furlough). There’s a good case that all three of these things will prove temporary. We know the furlough scheme is being wound down, restoring a significant degree of supply to the labour market. As far as tradable goods are concerned, it’s unlikely the pandemic-related shifts in demand will continue if the threat of the illness itself recedes.

Countries have different geopolitical situations, different historical backgrounds, different levels of development and different functions for their official reserves. These differences give rise to different priorities with regard to the role of gold reserves. 4  BIS Review 61/2006  Graph 3: Evolution of World Official Reserves  in USD billion  Gold Reserves  Currency Reserves  4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Jan 95  Jan 96  Jan 97  Jan 98  Jan 99  Jan 00  Jan 01  Jan 02  Jan 03  Jan 04  Jan 05  Sixth argument: increasing living standards will boost private gold demand in emerging Asia My comments on this last argument will be brief. As often when looking at economic issues, there are substitution and income effects at work. On the one hand, prosperous Asian workers will be able to save and consume more, which should be reflected by an increased demand for gold. On the other hand, as financial markets and banking systems become more developed and more secure in today’s emerging economies, the palette of alternative saving vehicles will increase and we should expect the relative proportion of wealth invested in gold to decrease. In other words, we might expect the income effect to be strong at the beginning before receding and giving way to the substitution effect. Conclusions Despite the demonetisation of gold, the yellow metal continues to have a special significance for central banks.