samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In 1857 the Swedish National Debt Office ventured out onto the international capital market. The first railway loan was issued in Germany and comprised the start of an era with extensive capital imports to Sweden lasting more than 50 years. This provided Sweden with access to capital for productive investments on a scale that would scarcely have been possible otherwise. The central government borrowing paved the way abroad for other borrowers, such as municipalities, mortgage institutions and industrial companies. The large Swedish banks were to a large extent given the task of acting as intermediary in bond loans and thus had the opportunity to develop contacts with foreign banks. The integration of the financial markets increased. For Sweden, this meant that our manufacturing companies could make use of the greater access to capital and lower interest rates in industrially-developed Europe. Gothenburg, with its proximity to the British goods and capital markets, played an important role here. For instance, the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget, which was the country's leading bank during the latter part of the 19th century, had its registered office here. The internationalisation of the financial markets was facilitated by the fact that Sweden joined the monetary co-operation of the time, the gold standard, while the national integration of the markets was strengthened by the fact that the Riksbank was granted a monopoly on issuing banknotes at the end of the century. This also helped to lay the foundation for a more modern monetary policy.

At the time, we pointed out that almost 70 per cent of the Swedish national income is comprised of wages. The entry of the euro into Sweden is therefore largely determined by Swedish households. Why would they choose the euro over the krona? There is little incentive to do so, as long as their wages are used for goods, services, mortgage interest payments and other items denominated in kronor. The rest of the national income is the operating surplus generated in companies and that is used to increase the owners' wealth or paid out in dividends. A large number of these companies used have Swedish owners, who cannot be assumed to have any motive for changing over to the euro in the reporting of their balance sheets. Given this, it is reasonable to ask why we had a debate on the repression of the krona at all. I myself believe that it stemmed from the over-enthusiasm of some EMU supporters. They were quite simply convinced that Swedes would not be able to resist the attraction of the euro. As an EMU supporter, I can of course see the advantages of the euro, but to believe in a general, spontaneous transition would be going too far. This meant that the idea of a 'euroisation' was also a bad argument in the debate prior to the start of the EMU. If the Swedes are to be won over to the idea of the EMU, we should be emphasising the facts.
Now I am pleased to inform that the JC3 is one of the collaborators with CGM, together with the Institute of Corporate Directors Malaysia (ICDM) and Islamic Markets in organising today’s forum. The Bank envisions that financial industry players and others from the private sector will play more proactive roles in increasing funding pathways for green and sustainability related projects. By stepping up such efforts, there would be more innovative financial instruments or alternative financing, sustainable or green bonds or sukuk that would support the Government’s climate change agenda. Ladies and gentlemen, The severity and abruptness of the current health crisis do not make climate crisis any less pressing. The resilience of our future economy and financial system will depend on the actions we take now in building climate and societal resilience. This is a sobering reality, one we must take full accountability of, and pledge strong commitment to. This pandemic has not only provided valuable lessons to us on the grave consequences of being ill-prepared when facing a crisis. It is also a strong reminder that sustainability must play a crucial role in our economic recovery and reset. As a central banker, it is not often that I talk about global health – but the current pandemic has challenged me to be more conversant of such issues. The same applies to the topic of climate change which was not in the central banks’ dictionary until recently.

Compensation for the gold price risk and the dollar exchange rate risk, in particular, is relatively poor. It is therefore inevitable that tighter bounds will be set on SNB profit distribution, once the existing distribution reserve has been exhausted. BIS Review 123/2006  3
These rules would add complexity to an already very complicated system, would require negotiating and monitoring the list of expenditure items to be excluded, and would have to be implemented without endangering fiscal sustainability. In any case, the challenges of the green and digital transitions exceed by far the fiscal space of national governments. Thus, a more efficient option would be to set up a common European financing instrument, covering the investments needed to meet common objectives, such as reaching net zero emissions and combating climate change. Joint funding arrangements would allow us to undertake large-scale programmes subject to common quality standards and to assess their compliance in a homogeneous manner, avoiding any excessive or highly unequal impact on national public finances and any disruptions in the single market. Lastly, the European Commission’s orientations miss an element that I firmly believe is essential for the success of any reform of the fiscal governance framework. I cannot conceive of a new EU fiscal rule framework without reforming the rest of the EU’s economic and financial governance framework. 9 This would entail, for instance, establishing a European unemployment insurance system and a central fiscal capacity. It should be noted that, under the current fiscal rules framework, it is not possible to ensure, at any given moment, that the aggregate stance of the national fiscal policies is appropriate for the euro area as a whole, which makes it hard to achieve a balanced fiscal and monetary policy mix.

The Asian crisis almost 15 years later underscored the risks of relying on inflows that look stable but prove ephemeral. And subsequent crises in Latin America around the turn of the millennium and in advanced economies (AEs) a decade ago reinforced the risks of taking capital flows for granted. In theory, foreign capital inflows should support growth through greater allocative efficiency, better risk sharing and increased technology transfer. But in reality financial openness has proven a double-edged sword. The typical emerging market economy (EME) receiving higher capital inflows will grow 0.3 percentage points faster, all else equal (Chart 1). But the typical EME with higher capital flow volatility will grow 0.7 percentage points slower (Chart 2).1  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Capital flows as % GDP  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Real GDP growth (%)  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 Volatility of flows  1.8  Real GDP growth (%)  Charts 1 and 2: Financial openness is a double-edged sword  2.0  Source: IMF. Notes: Volatility is the coefficient of variation of gross inflows scaled by external liabilities. Real GDP growth, gross inflows to GDP and volatility are averaged over 1970 to 2017 for 38 emerging market economies.
But the possibility to carve up the business and sell it in parts could in some cases prove more profitable. In certain cases a reconstruction of the bank may be the most appropriate solution. If it were to take too long to find a buyer, it might be necessary for the state to take over the bank temporarily. This was what was ultimately necessary in the case of Northern Rock. There is a risk in similar situations that the state could be exposed to blackmail. To minimise the costs to taxpayers, it is therefore necessary in my opinion that the state has sufficient strength to negotiate with existing and presumptive shareholders. For instance, there must be legal possibilities for the state to redeem the shares at a price corresponding to the value of the bank if there are no state aid measures. It is also particularly important to avoid situations where a bank ends up in a no man’s land regarding ownership. An essential condition for a well-functioning system is that one can attain a balance between all of the interested parties who come forward when a bank is in distress. The various interests include society’s interest in financial stability and the depositors’ interest in good consumer protection. But there are also the creditors’ interest in good protection and fair treatment, the taxpayers’ and the fee-paying institutions’ interest in the cost of the deposit guarantee system being as low as possible.

It was probably similar considerations that motivated the measures taken in Germany to save IKB and Sachsen Landesbank. Now one has seen that it was not so easy for the British authorities to manage the problems in Northern Rock. The existing regulations and arrangements did not prove particularly effective. Despite the measures taken, they did not manage to avoid a bank run. This has led to the authorities in Great Britain drawing up, in an impressively short time, proposals for a number of improvements in the regulatory framework for managing institutions in distress. In February the British finance minister announced that they had decided to nationalise Northern Rock, as there was otherwise a risk that the cost to the taxpayers would be too high. 6  BIS Review 30/2008  The regulations for managing institutions in distress are inadequate As partially responsible for the stability of the financial system, I ask myself, how are things in Sweden? Do we have the regulatory framework required to manage possible future problems? Unfortunately, the answer to that question must probably be no, at least at present. During the Swedish bank crisis at the beginning of the 1990s a number of extraordinary measures were taken. These included issuing the bank deposit guarantee. This was a general declaration that the banks’ creditors would be protected. In addition, a special crisis management authority was established, the Swedish Bank Support Authority.
He also serves as an Associate Editor at Econometrica and as a member of the Board of Editors at the American Economic Review. He earned a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 2010. Prior to Harvard, he received an undergraduate degree from the Athens University of Economics and Business in Greece. In addition to this Bernácer prize he has received numerous honours and awards. These include a Sloan Research Fellowship awarded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Excellence Award in Global Economic Affairs, from Kiel Institute for the World Economy. For those who know him he is a tireless worker and a perfectionist, who always dots his i’s and crosses his t’s. But he is also very approachable, a man of great humour and always very generous with his time. He combines a brilliant mind and outstanding organisational capacity with great didactic skills. One of his assets is how passionate he is about what he does, transmitting his knowledge and inspiring those around him. Loukas Karabarbounis is one of the most highly cited young macroeconomists in academia, and his research interests comprise macroeconomics, labour economics, and international 1  finance. His latest research has focused on topics such as the global decline in labour's share of income, productivity and capital flows in southern Europe, and the effects of unemployment insurance policy on macroeconomic outcomes.

As a macroeconomist whose work is grounded in thorough analysis, and a profound knowledge of models and data, he also takes into account the policy implications of the findings of his research. This is an important factor as he is a pioneer who has done groundbreaking work, and his research frequently encourages others. In this respect his work on the global decline in labour’s share of income has prompted a number of papers from academia and different institutions so as to understand this change over time and its implications for income distribution and productivity. Similarly, his work on capital allocation and productivity in Southern Europe has been widely influential. Mr. Karabarbounis, congratulations on my behalf and on that of the Banco de España. 2
In the fast changing and increasingly complex financial landscape, our workforce in the financial sector must not only rise above current challenges, but must be well equipped to excel in the significantly changed environment. In Malaysia, we have prioritised talent development in the financial sector as a strategic priority and to approach this in a holistic manner, across the spectrum of the financial services industry. The goal is to develop a deep pool of financial sector talent with world class capabilities to drive responsible growth and development of the financial sector. As many of the initiatives supporting these strategies are multi-disciplinary and multi-layered, the approach is grounded in a shared commitment with the industry in a comprehensive, coordinated and collaborative manner. This is our best hope for rising confidently to the human capital challenge that lies before us. With the strong support of all the key stakeholders and practitioners in the industry, we can make a critical and lasting contribution towards creating a talented workforce for the industry. In this journey, the sharing of best practices and experiences will be extremely valuable. I therefore welcome and encourage your participation at this international symposium to discuss the important issues, challenges and the way forward in talent development for the financial services industry. On this note, I wish you a successful and productive session. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

For example, we do not have a system where the private sector will share risks across borders, where capital and liquidity are fungible in pan-European financial institutions. A common deposit insurance would help, but it’s important to allow a European bank to be able to operate in the euro area as a single entity. Not all banks would be able to do that, but we need to have a timetable where we say, four or five years from now the banks that qualify in terms of quality and quantity of capital will get a European license. You need to put a very serious, technical, timetable for that, and announce it. That would create a new environment for banking. Is there a challenge to the ECB’s credibility because of the change of stance on the effective lower bound of rates? The story of the lower bound is a very simple one. For all non- standard measures there is not much historical experience, there was very little academic literature until recently. Many central banks thought the zero lower bound is zero, and when we initially decided to go for –0.1, we were not fully sure of the total impact on financial conditions in general and especially on banking. The negative deposit rate, like most non-standard measures – the forward guidance of July 2013, the LTROs starting in 2011, the TLTRO and the APP – delivered more than we expected in terms of their impact on financial conditions.
To create understanding and support for the goal of price stability, it has been necessary to explain the conceptual framework that guides monetary policy decisions in a simple, pedagogic way. This has perhaps resulted in our creating an exaggerated idea that monetary policy decisions are arrived at with the aid of very simple rules. A simple conceptual framework is a support in a complicated reality. However, factors that cannot be captured in a simple rule for decision-making need to be taken into account. Since the effects of monetary policy extend over a number of years, every decision must rest on assessments of probability and individual valuations of the risks that are associated with alternative developments in the macroeconomy in future. In conclusion, I draw attention to some of these risks in the development of the Swedish economy in the present situation. The three pillars of economic policy A well-balanced economic policy contributes to creating good prerequisites for stable, high growth, which is generally regarded as an important component of the welfare concept. For this, it is required that all components of economic policy play their roles well. This applies to fiscal, structural and monetary policy. Good conditions for growth are created when uncertainty about future income and expenditure is minimised. If at the same time resources are used where they make the greatest contribution to welfare, there are prerequisites for good development.

On the contrary, financial stability creates trust, which is an imperative for innovation to last. Well-tailored, consistent and evolving regulations are key in this regard. The second false contradiction opposes public and private players, with the former supposedly conscribed in their conservative regulators’ role and the latter in their innovators’ role. After decades of developing and maintaining state-ofthe-art technologies, central banks may sometimes consider this caricature as unfair. To private players who know us better – and to others: you can rest assured that we are willing to continue our fruitful partnership. We will obviously have to reinvent the terms and conditions of that partnership to some degree, but let me stress that central banks’ action will only succeed together with you, not against you. And that we central banks need to be on both sides: regulation, and innovation. I will now elaborate on these two key issues. Page 2 sur 5 I. The need for well-tailored, consistent and evolving regulations A number of players in the crypto world have recently stumbled - so-called “stablecoins”, DeFi protocol, lending platforms, hedge funds -, demonstrating in practice what many regulators and central banks had been claiming for years: that these new tools of payments and finance had unlocked age-old dangers, meaning that the industry requires robust regulation. Salvador’s decision to make bitcoin an official “currency” in September 2021, regrettable as it is, is a noteworthy experience of a forced attempt to label a currency something that is nothing more than a crypto asset.
Many central banks apply an interest rate corridor, like the Riksbank, with the aim of keeping the short market rate in the centre of the corridor. This applies for instance to the Bank of England and the ECB. Like the Riksbank they carry out weekly repos at a particular interest rate, with the objective that the short market rate should be close to this. In addition, there is the possibility to carry out fine-tuning operations. An important difference from the Riksbank is the application of a minimum reserve requirement. Like many other central banks, both the ECB and the Bank of England require that the banks on average during a certain period have a particular, predetermined amount in their accounts with the central bank. The banks receive interest on these funds, at a rate close or equal to the policy rate. As long as the banks on average fulfil the minimum reserve requirement, they can to some extent decide themselves when the deposits and withdrawals from the account will be made during the period. This means that the minimum reserve requirement can be used to even out temporary imbalances in the payment flows between the banks, and between the banks and the central bank. As long as the average minimum reserve requirement is met, there is usually no cost if a bank wishes to deposit more in its account at the beginning of a period, for instance.

Luis M Linde: The European and Spanish economic situation Opening address by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Annual Economists’ Forum/Consejo General de Economistas, Madrid, 29 May 2014. *  *  *  I much appreciate the invitation to participate in this forum and the opportunity to share with you some brief thoughts on the European and Spanish economic situation. Following six quarters of negative growth, the euro area economy initiated a mild recovery in 2013 which has since continued. The recovery is essentially being underpinned by the gradual pick-up in domestic demand, after the strong adjustment it underwent during the recession. However, the latest GDP growth figure, for the first quarter of this year, illustrates the stillfragile and uneven nature of this economic improvement in the euro area. According to the provisional estimate released by Eurostat, the increase in activity in the euro area as a whole in 2014 Q1 was 0.2% in quarter-on-quarter terms, below most analysts’ expectations. Note that this rate has been affected by exceptional temporary factors in some countries. In any event, the mixed nature of the recovery is evident if we compare the strong momentum the German economy is providing to the area as a whole with the behaviour of activity in other countries such as France, where it is practically flat, or others still such as Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Finland, where negative figures have been posted.
Several Asian economies have been raising policy interest rates, though real interest rates still remain rather low. There has also been a fair amount of exchange rate appreciation. Since mid-2009, most regional currencies have appreciated by about 5 to 6 per cent in real effective terms. Monetary policy in Asia is likely to remain tight in the months ahead. This should help to get the price of capital right, tame asset price inflation, and reduce the risk of misallocated resources. 15. Indeed, as emerging Asia continues to grow, allowing the exchange rate to steadily appreciate over the medium term is vital to ensuring that capital inflows are moderated and capital is allocated to productive investments. 16. But interest rates and exchange rates cannot take the burden of adjustment entirely, especially over the short term, given the scale and pace of capital inflows. Therefore,  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  macroeconomic policy adjustments have been complemented in some Asian countries by macroprudential measures, like reductions in banks’ loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-income ratios. In exceptional cases, resort to capital flow management measures may be necessary to bring the situation under control. Strengthen infrastructure for allocating capital 17. Next, emerging Asia must strengthen its infrastructure for allocating capital. Banks are still the principal channel for allocating capital in Asia, and post-Asian financial crisis, many Asian authorities have taken steps to strengthen their banks. Banking systems were cleaned up of their non-performing loans, recapitalised, and strengthened.

This positive growth performance has been broad-based, extending beyond the recovery of the mining sector and withstanding adverse shocks, such as droughts and record increases in oil prices. In 2006, real GDP growth was largely driven by the mining, agriculture, construction, transport and tourism sectors. Last year, Zambia achieved single-digit inflation in 30 years. What were the main contributing factors to this achievement? Bringing inflation down to single digits has been Government’s goal for a long time. It is, therefore, pleasing to note that last year, inflation fell to its lowest level in 30 years. At the end December 2006, the annual rate of inflation had fallen to 8.2 % from 15.9% achieved in 2005 and was well below the target of 10%. This positive development in inflation was due to continued implementation of prudent monetary and fiscal policies, coupled with increased food supply. This was despite the persistent rise in oil prices on the world market. This year so far, inflation has been in double digits. What are the reasons for such a development? What is the outlook for inflation at end of the second quarter? During the first quarter of 2007, containing inflation pressures was a challenge. Inflation rose to 12.7% in March 2007, reflecting both higher food and non-food inflation. Higher food inflation was explained by increased cost of most fresh vegetables, typical during this period.