samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, the Swedish banks need to retain the capital they have at present and, therefore, should not pay any extra dividends. Neither does the introduction of the leverage ratio look like being any great problem if the banks maintain current capital levels. We have looked more closely at the four major banks (Nordea, Swedbank, Handelsbanken and SEB) and, at present, none of them falls below the minimum requirement of three per cent. However, the Swedish banks are finding it difficult to comply with the new liquidity requirements. The greatest challenge will probably lie in complying with the structural requirement. Here, the banks have two alternatives – either cutting back on the commitments that require stable funding (for example lending for housing purchases) or exchanging shortterm funding for long-term funding. This second alternative could well result in the banks’ funding costs increasing, which should push lending rates up somewhat. As yet, we have no exact figure on what this may cost in terms of basis points, but we assess that, despite everything, these costs will be small. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  How all this will affect the banks’ customers is hard to say. In the final analysis, the question of how these costs will be divided among the banks’ owners and customers is a question of competition. But, as we are now introducing regulations to reduce the risk of bankruptcies, I think it would be reasonable to assume that the banks’ financiers will lower their expected return.

Sukhdave Singh: The rise of the South at a crossroad – a view from East Asia and Latin America Opening address by Dr Sukhdave Singh, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the World Bank Knowledge and Research Hub Conference “The Rise of the South at a Crossroad: A View from East Asia and Latin America”, Sasana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 16 May 2016. *  *  *  I am pleased to welcome you to today’s Conference on “The Rise of the South at a Crossroad: A View from East Asia and Latin America” organised by the World Bank Knowledge and Research Hub in Kuala Lumpur. For those of you who have not been here before, I would also like to welcome you to Sasana Kijang. I congratulate the World Bank Knowledge and Research Hub for organising this conference on economic integration. Economic integration within the current global context It is indeed an opportune time for us to look at economic and financial integration and what it can offer to emerging economies in Asia and Latin America. It is an opportune time because the world seems to have been unable to bounce back towards a healthy growth path after the financial crisis in the developed world. It is an opportune time because policymakers have not been successful in generating strong sustainable growth. The traditional tools for nursing the economy back to health don’t seem to be working as well – possibly because of overuse or misuse.
I sometimes come across the description that the new structure for cash management has resulted in irresponsible privatisation and outsourcing. This is not true. Instead, it is a question of achieving the greatest possible economic efficiency, not least by creating a sound incentive structure. Those of you who have followed this work know that the path to greater efficiency proved to be more winding than we had initially estimated, and a good deal more challenging. However, we now appear to be well on the way to attaining a more efficient organisation for cash management, together with the banks. With the old organisation, where the Riksbank determined where the depots would be located, there were many transports to the Riksbank’s depots to retrieve and deposit banknotes merely for the purpose of avoiding the cost to the banks of holding banknotes. The new model, which is being launched at present, means that the banks will open their own cash depots and that they will receive interest compensation for the banknotes they hold in these depots. The banks can now establish as many depots as they themselves consider necessary, taking into account, for instance, security and  BIS Review 33/2006  1  efficiency aspects, and locate these depots in regions they consider suitable. This should lead to a reduction in the number of cash transports to and from the Riksbank's offices. So far, three pilot cash depots have been set up to test different systems. These are located in Härnösand, Malmö and Kristianstad.

The cooperation between the Riksbank, the banks and the cashin-transit companies is now made easier by the fact that two bank concerns have each built their own company – Bankernas Depå AB and Bank Service Syd AB – which represent their members. In this way, the establishment of cash depots can be speeded up and we can achieve a well-developed structure relatively soon. The Riksbank is also investigating the possibility of being able to destroy old and worn banknotes at the new depots in the future, in order to further reduce the number of cash transports. This would of course be done under our supervision. At present these banknotes are transported to the Riksbank for destruction, which gives rise to additional transports. We are also investigating whether, as a temporary solution, it would be possible to make banknotes unusable prior to transportation to the Riksbank for final destruction. I believe that the new structure will give us more economically-efficient cash management, where costs and income will more visibly fall to those who participate in the market. The banks and cash-intransit companies will find new forms for their operations and develop their own cash management in a better way than an authority can. I also believe that these measures will help us achieve a higher level of security for the provision of cash in Sweden.
There is uncertainty about the exchange rate, in connection with the settlement of the failed banks’ estates and the liberalisation of the capital controls. There is little I can say about that at this point, but the aim of the work the authorities are doing at present is to minimise that risk. It can be done, but it is a risky process, and one that could be derailed at many points along the way if great care is not taken – and perhaps even if great care is taken. And now I will turn to monetary policy. Yesterday the Monetary Policy Committee decided to lower Central Bank interest rates by 0.25 percentage points, in view of recent developments and the near-term outlook for inflation and the decline in inflation expectations, which I mentioned a moment ago. If the Bank’s interest rates had remained unchanged, its real rate would have been higher than is warranted by where we are in the economic cycle and by the near-term outlook, particularly in view of the fact that it could rise still further in coming months. Estimating the Central Bank’s real rate is not always a simple matter, as different measures of inflation and inflation expectations give differing results. According to an estimate based on the average of various measures of inflation and inflation expectations, the Bank’s real rate was about 2½% before the recent reduction, and it had risen by approximately a percentage point in the previous year, which is a large change in terms of real rates.

In 95% of cases, the massive fluctuations in our income can be attributed to the fluctuating values in gold and foreign exchange positions. Experience has shown that valuation gains and losses on financial investments tend to level out again in the long term. Based on these conditions, we thus estimate the earnings potential of our assets to be between 2% and 3%, which translates into an income of between CHF 1.7 and CHF 2.5 billion per annum on the total assets of CHF 85 billion. Given the fluctuations in the exchange rate and gold price, however, the earnings generated can deviate greatly from this amount. For instance, the marked increase in the gold price this year has resulted in valuation gains of roughly CHF 8 billion to date. Should the gold price drop back next year to its end-2003 level, however, this would lead to a valuation loss of over CHF 7 billion. Long-term income estimates should not be based on such unusual gains and losses. Some of the income is allocated to provisions, thereby ensuring the growth of the currency reserves necessary for monetary policy. This allocation (currently approximately CHF 1 billion per annum) should be made in proportion to nominal GDP growth. After deduction of the SNB’s operating expenses of currently CHF 250 million, roughly CHF 1 billion remains for distribution to the Confederation and cantons. Based on the assumptions regarding the earnings potential of our assets, we can expect a distributable annual profit to be somewhere in this region in the foreseeable future.
So if we were magically able to bring the financial sector back to full health and an optimal leverage ratio by tomorrow, we would not have solved the problem. Significant debt problems would still exist for several sovereigns and several parts of the non-financial private sector. In addition, we would still have the confidence crisis that has been so pronounced in Europe. So it is going to be a more protracted process. The EU has not resolved its crisis, although there has been progress in deleveraging and de-risking bank balance sheets. In September 2008, when I was still at the BIS, I gave a speech in Boston bearing the title: How might the current financial crisis shape financial sector regulation and structure?1 I realise now how foolhardy that endeavour was because those were indeed early days. But still, many of the potential changes that I mentioned have stood the test of time, such as the inevitable deleveraging; shifts in bank business models, especially on the funding side; the need for bigger capital and liquidity buffers; and how potentially difficult cross-border crisis management and bank resolution would turn out to be in the European context. But there were also very important elements missing from my list – elements that have turned out to be of major importance for the unfolding of the crisis and the reform agenda.

The Bank of Albania has been present in the foreign exchange market throughout 2003 by buying foreign exchange. The foreign exchange activity of the Bank of Albania helped in injecting liquidity in the market and it has smoothed the Lek appreciating tendencies during the year. The forecasts for the main trends and inflation for 2004, suggest that the Bank of Albania should apply a similar policy in 2004, too. Developments in the consumption prices are characterized by low inflationary pressures. Our forecasts show that the inflation target of the Bank of Albania will be met during 2003. In case no shock phenomena emerge, inflation will be under control also for 2004. Besides, the expectations on the economy seem to speak about an inflation level sticking to the present one. Liquidity ratios and structures seem to be near their historic levels, whereas interests rates were characterized by downward trends during 2003. Therefore, the Bank of Albania might reconsider the possibility of a further reduction of interest rates, a possibility consisting in the future performance of the monetary and inflationary indicators. This will be in support of the economic activity or inflation target. Judging from the analysis of actual trends, we could say that interest rates during 2004 will be generally stable or in downward trend. The analysis of monetary indicators for 2004 shows that the Bank of Albania is going to be present in the foreign exchange market so as to impede the further appreciation of Lek.
The reason for excluding import prices here is that the exchange rate fluctuations in this period mainly reflected rapid changes in the degree of confidence in the consolidation of government finances. BIS Review 5/1998  -5-  Since 1995, when the inflation target first applied, the annual increase in the CPI averaged 1.5 per cent. This outcome is thus relatively close to the targeted rate and well inside the tolerance interval. Underlying inflation, as measured in the diagram, has averaged 2 per cent. In other words, the transitory effects that lowered inflation have been somewhat stronger than th upward effects. In the absence of any transitory effects, inflation would accordingly have fluctuated around 2 per cent. After only three years with an inflation target policy, it is too early for a final evaluation. But when allowance is made for transitory effects, it is difficult to demonstrate that the Riksbank has acted asymmetrically. What this does show is that CPI inflation sometimes deviates from the target and may even move outside the tolerance interval. It is then important that the Riksbank can make it credible that inflation will gradually return to 2 per cent. This can be done either by showing that the forces at work have been mainly transitory effects or, if the effects in question are more permanent, by using the instrumental rate to pilot inflation back to the target rate in the time frame with which monetary policy operates.

From taking prompt action to prevent the economy from overheating to acting just as promptly to avoid deterioration. In this dilemma, we have always opted for a medium- to long-run look over the short-term ups and downs, and therefore considered all the risks involved. So far this has allowed us to properly anticipate events and stick to what we believe has been the right monetary policy. The international conjuncture puts us to the test; we have identified many risks in this area. Over the months they have increased in both variety and origins. We know that we are prepared to face them in the best way possible. It is impossible to be immune. In fact, a small open economy like Chile is always subject to the vagaries of the international economy: it could not be otherwise. However, policy makers should be able to overcome them without major setbacks. There are also challenges within our borders, especially doubts about the evolution of a number of variables, such as employment and consumption, among others. It is precisely this medium- to long-term vision what helps us not to make hasty decisions. We have said that we are ready to take action if necessary, but overreacting to one particular event would be tantamount to throwing away the well-earned credibility of the Central Bank, which is a fundamental anchor to achieve our goal of safeguarding the stability of the price level and the financial system.
Kristina Persson: On the verge of Eurosystem membership - challenges from a Swedish perspective Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at a seminar organized by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), Akersruno, 1 July 2002. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and speak. The issue I would like to highlight is how a possible Swedish membership of Stage Three of EMU could affect the Swedish labour market. To put this issue into some kind of perspective, I shall begin by briefly describing the changeover in economic policy, followed by the recent developments on the Swedish labour market. Finally, I shall discuss the changes to the labour market that might become necessary if Sweden joins the Eurosystem. The changeover in economic policy Over the past two decades there has been a pronounced reorientation in Swedish economic policy. For instance, the credit market and foreign exchange market have been deregulated, the tax system has been reformed, parts of the transfer system have been changed and competitive pressure has increased. These changes have contributed to improving the way the Swedish economy functions. Price stability has thus become a statutory objective for monetary policy. As of 1 January 1999, the Riksbank has an obligation confirmed in law to maintain price stability. The Riksbank has chosen to operationalise this objective by means of an inflation target.

The inflation target is worded as the annual CPI inflation being two per cent, with a tolerated deviation interval of plus/minus one percentage point. Monetary policy shall thus be conducted to ensure that the purchasing power of the krona remains stable with regard to the basket of goods bought by the average Swedish household. Low inflation is important for many reasons. When a central bank’s target is to avoid high inflation and large fluctuations in the rate of price increase, it also contributes to stabilising economic activity. Practically all of the industrial nations that have changed over to an inflation target of the type we have in Sweden have seen a reduction in variations in inflation. When a central bank stabilises the rate of price increase, it can also contribute to reducing the risk of financial crises, which is especially important because bank crises, as the experiences of for example Sweden, Finland Norway and Japan show, are often linked to a rise in unemployment and a prolonged period of poor growth. Sweden’s experiences of inflation targeting are positive. Growth in the Swedish economy has been at an average of 3.0 per cent a year since 1994, while inflation has been low over several years. At the same time, open unemployment has declined from around 8 per cent in 1993 to less than 4 per cent in 2002.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Audit as a partner of change Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 5th PETRONAS Board Audit Committee (BAC) Forum “Audit as a partner of change”, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2016. *  *  *  The theme of today’s forum “Audit as a Partner of Change” is highly relevant and timely, as the events in the global market today, involving failures of large firms, frauds and market manipulation activities, underscores the criticality of the three lines of defenses in organizations. For confidence and trust to be restored in the marketplace, the role of the BAC and internal auditors as the third line of defense will be even more critical than ever. Our role as members of audit committees is much broader than what we may perceive it to be. Organisations such as PETRONAS are widely regarded as amongst the few key flag bearers for the country. Hence, it is incumbent upon the Board and the BAC members to be strong and energetic in upholding the highest standards of professionalism, ethics and integrity in discharging their roles and responsibilities. The people of Malaysia must have confidence and pride that an institution entrusted with much strategic natural resources are run with utmost integrity and professionalism. Before I proceed further on the topic for today, allow me to touch briefly on the current outlook on the global and domestic economy.

In its internal audit report published in March 2013, the FSA highlighted several issues pertaining to the breakdown of the internal audit function, which led to the manipulation of the rates. Despite the Group internal audit functions carrying out their routine audits in this area, deficiencies in the banks’ systems, controls and policies were not adequately highlighted. The lessons learnt from the above cases and others clearly reinforce the key roles played by both the internal audit function and the Audit Committee. My view is that the strength and effectiveness of the internal audit function will influence the risk and compliance culture in an organisation. The function has to continually be refreshed such that it remains robust and effective. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Clearly, the job is now more difficult and challenging than ever, given the increased expectations by stakeholders and heightened scrutiny when things go wrong, as well as increasing obligations under the statute that place additional fiduciary responsibilities on audit committee members. I would like to share my thoughts on four matters where efforts are necessary to raise the bar on audit standards and audit quality. Firstly, the audit coverage and scope should not be confined to compliance or risk-based parameters. The audit scope should be holistic, encompassing new risk areas and tail risk events that originate from the evolving operating environment and financial landscape.
But as time went on, their speed and size – running to hundreds of billions of dollars – began to overwhelm dealers’ intermediation capacity, which was itself shrinking as the result of rising volatility and the operational challenges of remote working. Rising transaction costs and the breakdown in arbitrage relationships began feeding on themselves: a classic ‘doom loop’ (Chart 2). What was unique about this process, and potentially disastrous for the financial system, was that even the highest quality government assets were not good enough. Just like high street companies facing  1  Leverage rates of 40-60 times were common, but anecdotal reports suggest some ran much higher. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  evaporating revenues, market participants needed cash. In the days that followed, this so-called ‘dash for cash’ would spread to every corner of the global financial system.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Overcoming the energy crisis - a European perspective (and beyond) Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Paris EUROPLACE Tokyo International Financial Forum 2022, Tokyo, 15 November 2022. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to be with you again –physically with you – in Tokyo for this International Financial Forum organised by Paris Europlace. I am honoured to share the closure of this event with my colleague and friend Governor Kuroda. We face together the awful Russian war in Ukraine, and its consequences on energy and economy. I will start with a brief description of the macroeconomic outlook in the euro area, and with our monetary policy normalisation (l). I will then focus on sustainable finance in France, Europe and Japan: it has a key role to play in our ecological transformation, more needed than ever (II). I. Macroeconomic outlook in the euro area  A. Despite recent shocks, growth outlook has shown overall resilience so far Let me start with the macroeconomic situation in the euro area, which has so far shown resilience. In 2021 our economy had strongly recovered from the Covid crisis: growth had reached 5.2 %, and even 6.8 % in France. We Europeans have remarkably overcome the Covid crisis, which hit us early and strongly. We achieved this through enhanced European unity, for instance in purchasing vaccines, and in implementing common budgetary measures to support our recovery (SURE(i) and Next Generation EU programmes).