samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Overcoming these challenges is vital if Spanish banks are to build up a sufficiently strong position to contribute to economic growth and job creation. The first of these challenges is to reduce the assets impaired by the crisis. Chart 17 shows that in June 2018 the volume of non-performing assets had decreased by 60% from its peak, although it remained at still-high levels. Foreclosed assets had fallen by 40%. Economic growth will continue contributing to the ongoing reduction of impaired assets. However, banks need to press ahead with applying active management policies to their impaired assets. In this respect, it should be kept in mind that continued high levels of impaired assets have deleterious effects on banks themselves and on the economy as a whole, which is why the economic and supervisory authorities have a special interest in banks taking appropriate measures in this area. Recouping profitability is another of the challenges facing the Spanish banking sector. Although Spanish bank profitability has returned to positive levels and stands somewhat above the EU average (as shown by Chart 18), it is still below its pre-crisis levels and below those of the banking systems of some developed economies which have performed better in this respect.

ASEAN, with its half a billion people and a combined GDP of more than $ trillion, will then be a competitive investment proposition. ASEAN leaders will also sign the landmark ASEAN Charter which will transform ASEAN into a more cohesive, effective and rules-based organisation. BIS Review 124/2007  3  Singapore: remaking itself As Asia rises, Singapore will not content itself with being lifted by the rising tide. It will continuously remake itself – strengthening the hull, refitting with a more powerful engine, refurbishing the interior, acquiring new knowledge and learning new skills. To reduce dependence on the global electronics cycle, we have built strong growth momentum in areas such as financial services, tourism and biomedical sciences. Our growth will increasingly stem from knowledge- and innovation-intensive activities. This necessitates more investment in human resource development and the creation of a workforce capable of keeping up with the demands of new economic activities. Singapore is therefore planning to build a fourth publicly funded university. Concurrently, we are enhancing our connectivity with our major economic partners and increasing our economic space through FTAs. We have FTAs with 11 countries, including the US, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Negotiations are underway for 11 more, including agreements with China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These FTAs will enable investors and businesses to leverage on Singapore to reach out to our FTA partners. We will press on to develop the financial sector.
That is a counsel of despair, and it contradicts everything I said earlier about the benefits of free trade. How, therefore, should we think about, and act upon, this design challenge? A key issue here is bank resolution. Indeed, arguably it is the cornerstone of making progress. The reason is that without confidence in how we would in future resolve banks operating across borders – typically therefore the larger banks – we are unlikely to break down the trend towards fragmentation. This is because some of the most difficult legal and structural issues in bank resolution concern enabling cross-border solutions to take effect, and this is true whether the resolution plan involves holding the firm together – Single Point of Entry unitary resolution – or breaking it up under a Multiple Point of Entry resolution. For instance, either way it will be important to effect a stay on triggering default clauses in contracts. For me, the big point here is to achieve resolution planning which creates sufficient confidence among national authorities that there is greater trust, and therefore a greater willingness to assume, for instance, that capital and liquid assets are moveable and can be employed across countries when needed. It is an essential pre-condition for confidence in cross-border bank activity and likewise it provides an important counterweight to policies that trap capital and liquid assets in host jurisdictions. In turn this allows a more neutral stance on the subsidiarisation versus branching issue.

Why does this historical detour matter? The five or six years since the outbreak of the financial crisis have seen signs of a reversal of some aspects of the greater openness we had seen in the 1980s and 1990s. And probably none more so than the decline in crossborder bank lending. Moreover, the UK experience in terms of lending has been amongst the more pronounced. But again, does this matter? My answer is yes. First, because many of us do believe in the economic benefits of free trade and capital flows, as well as the contribution of migration to balancing supply and demand in the economy. Second, and closer to home, the City of London and its financial markets benefit hugely from, and are at the hub of, the open world economy. For example, whatever you think about the more troublesome recent innovations of banking, basic trade finance remains a core, simple and essential service provided by banks, and the City has for a very long time been a leading centre for providing this finance to support world trade. International wholesale banking is therefore an important part of maintaining and developing the world economy, just as it was in the nineteenth century. Yet, we have to recognise that in the last five or six years of the crisis we have gone backwards. Cross-border bank lending has declined more sharply than overall lending – home preference has set in.
Even bearing in mind the caveat that I have outlined earlier on the lack of a clear benchmark, it looks like international capital flows are too abundant in good times, potentially fueling domestic bubbles and destabilizing national financial systems, and prone to “sudden stops” in bad times. Emerging market economies have experienced numerous examples of “surge” episodes of capital inflows followed by perilous sudden stops. Current (and preliminary) data suggest that some EMEs are currently experiencing very large outflows. The potentially destabilizing effects of capital flows may be magnified in the current situation, with disappointingly slow economic growth (of a cyclical and structural nature), high volatility in commodity and asset prices, the persistence of both internal and external imbalances in key countries and regions, substantial amounts of currency mismatch on balance sheets in emerging market economies, etc. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  II. So what should be done? I think that we should try to be both pragmatic and ambitious. If we are not pragmatic we will waste time exploring paths that will not lead us anywhere, but if we lack ambition we will never make progress. We should, first, develop a framework to prevent excessive capital flow volatility. Here I see three main avenues to explore: (i)  improving the monitoring of capital flows and hence taking forward the work on data gaps on foreign currency exposures and mismatches.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Numerous challenges for the international monetary system Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the High Level Seminar on International Financial Architecture, Paris, 31 March 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, France, and the Banque de France in particular, has a long tradition of spurring high level reflections on the international financial architecture, such that we very much welcome the creation of the IFA WG by the Chinese presidency. This new working group echoes the IMS (International monetary System) Working Group that was launched under the French presidency of the G20 in 2011. At the time, the debates on the IMS were already very intense, as witnessed for instance by the profusion of proposals to amend the IMS, such as the Palais Royal Initiative, led by one of my predecessors as Governor of the Banque de France, Michel Camdessus. Before that, we all remember the work done by another former Governor of the Banque de France, Jacques de Larosière, who contributed a very influential report in 2009 on the European Union, which also had an international dimension. The Eurosystem, on its part, is committed to financial stability. We decided on March 10th a comprehensive and powerful package, aiming to provide favorable financial conditions for the economy. We will look closely at these financial conditions in the future and if needed, we could act further. The international monetary system is still facing numerous challenges.
The Bank has high 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  expectations for the association to play a key educational role to promote greater industry understanding on regulatory compliance and the latest industry trends, through holistic education and training program such as requirements under the relevant laws and best practices, risk management and consumer protection. Properly structured, the training and development program would result in higher professional standards of conduct and should strengthened safeguards against possible abuses and contravention of the law. Thirdly, as the collective voice of the industry, the association will provide the bridge for constructive engagement between the Bank and the industry. Through regular engagement, the association can play an effective facilitative role in addressing issues concerning developments in the industry, by providing meaningful feedback and input to the Bank or other relevant authorities. We have found over the years that industry associations can add tremendous value in consolidating fragmented views of the industry on important issues and could assist in formulating public policy. There are many benchmarks that the association can draw on, both in Malaysia and globally, in organising itself as an effective association. But of paramount, the players must be united in supporting the Association. Last but not least, the association is expected to undertake an active role in educating consumers on the services that the industry provides and in addressing consumer issues and complaints.

Significant resources have been devoted by the Bank in the last two years to achieve these objectives. One of it was the relicensing process. We had reassessed a total of 839 money changing companies and remittance service providers and issued new licences to those that met the necessary requirements. We have also provided time for companies to improve their operations. These companies had demonstrated that they are able to comply with the required rules. For those that qualify the licensing processes, improvements in their operations could be achieved within a reasonable timeframe. We have also made it clear to the industry that companies found to be carrying out unauthorised activities will be firmly dealt with through enforcement actions. Out of the 839 licenses issued earlier, the relicensing process had reduced a total of 365 licenses as a result of revocation, merger, voluntary surrender of license or industry players themselves decided to convert to become an agent of a larger entity. We have significantly increased our interactions with the industry to help companies understand the regulatory requirements that must be observed. These engagements have also helped the Bank better understand the practical issues that are faced by the industry and we have responded accordingly to some of these issues. I can assure you that we will continue to work with the industry to find solutions to legitimate issues raised by the industry but the industry must act responsibly and with the public’s interest in mind. Enforcing compliance will continue to be an important focus of the Bank.
While the impact of some of the factors underpinning household spending may moderate in the coming quarters, most of the factors operating in the recent past will continue to boost domestic demand and, in particular, productive investment. Likewise, insofar as European markets recover and the effects of the euro appreciation in 2004 ease and are absorbed, the contractionary influence of external demand might be checked. Under this scenario, the outlook for the economy in the short run points to a prolongation of the expansionary phase, with sustained GDP growth rates similar to those observed in 2004. These forecasts are subject, however, to some risk. This poses significant challenges for economic policy, especially when it comes to promoting the sustainability of economic dynamism over a longer  BIS Review 45/2005  5  term, under the constraints stemming from euro area membership. There are certain external risks whose potential influence on Spain is significant, but which economic policy action can do little to counter. This is the case with the dangers arising from the weakness of the euro area, from higher oil prices and from the appreciation of the euro. What economic policy can do here is in line with what policymakers can do to counter domestic risks, these undoubtedly being the most relevant ones for policy design. Accordingly, I shall focus on analysing the nature of the latter and their possible repercussions.

In this way, they will contribute not only to the stable functioning of the institutions for which they are responsible, but also to that of the financial system as a whole. The inclusion as from last year of a chapter dealing with management aspects of the Banco de España allows me to be brief and to point out that in 2004 the branch restructuring plans, the staff renewal and redimensioning plan and the early retirement plan were completed and the negotiation of the 2002-04 collective bargaining agreement was finalised. All these reforms, which enable us to undertake appropriately our important mission and functions in the euro area, have been made possible by the effort and dedication of all the Bank’s staff, whom I thank for their attitude and their work. Finally, I express my gratitude to all the members of this Council for their inestimable support and collaboration. I would like to conclude by remembering two people whose untimely loss we suffered last year: Ángel Pardillos, who was one of the victims of the 11 March attacks, and Eugenio Domingo, who shared, at this table, many sessions of this Council, both before and after his term of office at the European Central Bank. Thank you. BIS Review 45/2005  13
11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  11  Chart 14 Financial conditions index (UK)  Chart 15 GDP fall during the crisis compared to tail risks flagged by high debt vulnerabilities and low bank capital resilience  Difference from average since 1995 (number of standard deviations)  6 5  Three-year cumulative GDP growth 2007Q41 in 20 forecast 2010Q4 (%) (as of 2007 Q4) 0  4 3 2 1  -1 -2 -3  0 -1  2019  2017  2015  2013  2011  2009  2007  2005  2003  2001  1999  1997  1995  -2  -4 -5  Household Credit  Corporate Credit  Current Account  Low Bank Capital  Other  Total  Actual Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Eikon by Refinitiv and Bank calculations. Notes: Financial conditions index (FCI) estimated using principal component analysis. The FCI summarises information from the following financial series: term spreads, interbank spreads, corporate spreads, sovereign spreads, long-term interest rates, equity price returns, equity return volatility and relative financial market capitalisation. An increase in the index indicates a tightening in conditions. Notes: Figure based on Aikman et al. (forthcoming). The chart compares the actual cumulative three-year fall in UK GDP during 2008-2010 to the 5th percentile of real GDP growth forecasted for the same period as of end-2007. This estimate is decomposed in the same way as described in the note to Chart 13 and additionally shows the estimated impact of low bank capital resilience.

We aim to be countercyclical. Our work shows three features of debt to be of particular importance. Thomas Fuller, ‘Inside Apple’s Earthquake-Ready Headquarters’, New York Times, 4 June 2019. This approach was exactly what Andrew Crockett outlined almost 20 years ago: “The received wisdom is that risk increases in recessions and falls in booms. In contrast, it may be more helpful to think of risk as increasing during upswings, as financial imbalances build up, and materialising in recessions… And because the timing of downswings is exceedingly hard to predict, the approach implies a focus on measuring the vulnerabilities that build up in the upswing and on the more recurrent features of cycles. We may not know exactly when the rainy day will come, but we can be pretty sure that it will. It is not wise to decide on policies or business strategies on the assumption that it will not, or that we can predict its timing with sufficient foresight.” 3 4  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  Mortgage debt  Households with more mortgage debt tend to cut back more in downturns. People do everything they can to pay the mortgage. During the financial crisis, the fall in consumption relative to income among UK households with loan to income (LTI) ratios above four was around three times larger than the fall among those households with LTI ratios between one and two.
If two people have telephones they can at least call each other, which has a value. For every new telephone owner that is linked to the telephone network the benefit of having a telephone to those who are already connected increases as the number of people that can be reached has now increased. This reasoning about telephony can easily be applied to payment services where everyone wants to be able to send payments to and receive payment from everyone else, for example a service for payments between private individuals (P2P). The reasoning becomes more complicated when we talk about payments from consumers to companies (P2B). Payment service markets with two distinct sets of customers for payment services and payment flows in only one direction are usually called two-sided markets. The market for point-of-sale payments (POS) is one such two-sided market. The payments on this market go from the private customer to the company and not the other way. The card market is only attractive to merchants if there are a sufficiently large number of consumers with cards. Similarly, it is only attractive for consumers to have cards if it is possible to use  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  them in a sufficiently large number of shops. A new payment service on a two-sided market must solve this “chicken and egg” problem, that is ensure that sufficient numbers of consumers and merchants start using the service. Launching a product that is not fundamentally based on existing payment services thus entails major problems.

For sums between SEK 100 and SEK 500, 22 per cent said that they prefer cash. Second, it appears that cash imparts a sense of security and our survey showed that 65 per cent felt very secure about using cash as compared to 35 per cent for cards. The term security may mean many different things, but the feeling of having the entire transaction under control is central. A card transaction may feel less concrete and be harder to understand. It may also be difficult to estimate the risk of fraud, for example as a result of skimming. We know that older people are much more prone to use cash and less prone to use cards than younger people. The difference is also substantial. Third, appropriate substitutes for cash are not always available. Although cards are accepted almost everywhere, there are few alternatives when it comes to payments between private individuals, for example on second-hand markets on the Internet. Using your Internet bank in the evening to make a transfer between two bank accounts in order to pay for a sofa is not always a smooth and easy alternative to cash. It was in such cases that cheques performed an important function. Fourth, cash is one way of storing a value and it is often wise to maintain a certain liquidity reserve in the form of cash. However, despite everything I have said about the use of cash in Sweden and internationally, there is a lot that we do not know or cannot explain.
As a significant part of the credit growth was being financed from abroad, countries built up large capital account surpluses and corresponding large current account deficits as the mirror image. The mechanism that connected these financial and real trade flows was the loss of competitiveness – that is, an appreciation of the real exchange rate caused by economic over-heating. As this audience knows well, all these developments later implied major problems in the financial sector in peripheral countries when the cycle turned. On the asset side, loan quality deteriorated, while on the liability side, those loans could no longer be funded from abroad. It was only at this point, due to the economic downturn and the need to backstop banks, that sovereign debt began its steep rise and became a driver of the crisis in itself. Drawing the right lessons for the euro area In emphasising this private debt-focused narrative for this crisis, my aim is not to negate the importance of fiscal policies. Fiscal policies certainly should not have been pro-cyclical, and fiscal discipline today is essential to ensure sustainable debt levels in the future. My aim is rather to ensure that we recognise the central role played by the financial sector in the crisis and so draw the right lessons for the future. The most important such lesson is that the euro area needs stronger governance of financial policies – an ability to identify and curb cross-border financial flows and hence prevent debtdriven imbalances.

The Chatroom will provide speedy and timely feedback when new technology or solution is being contemplated, thereby reducing the risk of abortive work by the parties concerned and expediting the rollout of new fintech applications. Second, tech firms may have direct access to the Sandbox. Tech firms may test out their innovation by seeking feedback from the Chatroom without necessarily going through a bank. Third, we understand that our fellow regulators in Hong Kong, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Insurance Authority (IA), will shortly be launching their own sandboxes. Following discussion among the HKMA, SFC and IA, we have agreed to link up the three sandboxes through a common interface so that there can be a single point of access by the stakeholders for fintech solutions covering more than one sector. (C)  Facilitating Virtual Banking  We believe that the time is ripe for Hong Kong to try out virtual banks. In some jurisdictions, it has proved to be technically feasible and commercially viable for virtual or branchless banks to operate. A virtual bank operates on a different model of service delivery and may help promote financial inclusion as they normally target small customers, be they individuals or SMEs. Our view is that the emergence of virtual banks in Hong Kong would also provide additional impetus to the application of fintech in Hong Kong and offer a new kind of customer experience in mobile and digital banking.