samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Martin, and S. Pruitt (2012): “The effects of official bond market intervention in Europe”, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, mimeo; Eser, F., and B. Schwaab (2013): “The yield impact of central bank asset purchases: The case of the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme”, ECB Working Paper Series No. 1587 and Ghysels, E., J. Idier, S. Manganelli, and O. Vergote (2014): “A high frequency assessment of the ECB Securities Markets Programme”, ECB Working Paper Series No. 1642; Altavilla, C., D. Giannone, and M. Lenza (2014): “The financial and macroeconomic effects of the OMT announcements”, CSEF Working Paper No. 352. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Inflation developments since the Great Recession Euro area inflation developments over the past six years have been remarkably volatile. From the 4.1% peak of July 2008, HICP inflation fell markedly at the trough of the recession and reached negative levels in the short period between June and October 2009. However, in the second half of 2009, prices started increasing again, also due to a rise in energy prices. In spite of a persisting level of economic slack, the HICP inflation climbed rapidly and steadily up to a peak of 3% from September to November 2011. Similar developments could be observed in the U.S., where inflation remained stable after a decline in the first months of 2009 and gave rise to a debate on the “missing disinflation”.4 If those developments were somewhat surprising for their swiftness, more recent inflation dynamics have displayed a remarkably high degree of persistence.

such as to roughly offset the disinflationary pressures produced by the recession.5 The recent fall in inflation could equivalently be ascribed to unwarranted fears of a possible tightening of the monetary policy stance not too far into the future. Such fears could clearly be observed one year ago, when the Federal Reserve announced the tapering of its large-scale asset purchases. In spite of clear Fed communication on the disconnect between this decision and the timing of “lift-off” of policy interest rates, the tapering announcement quickly led to a rise in forward interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic. The ECB’s adoption of forward guidance in July 2013 was largely the result of these unwarranted developments. Recent studies confirm that our forward guidance was successful in reversing the previous increase in forward-rates and in clarifying the persistently accommodative intonation of the ECB policy stance.6 The same market logic that led to the interpretation of the Fed’s tapering announcement as a signal of a forthcoming tightening of policy interest rates may also have been applied to interpret the implications of the reduction in the size of the ECB balance sheet that occurred  4  See, for example, Coibion, O. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2013), “Is The Phillips Curve Alive and Well After All? Inflation Expectations and the Missing Disinflation,” NBER Working Paper 19598; see also Hall, R.E. (2011), “The Long Slump,” American Economic Review 101, pp. 431–469; and Ball, L. and S. Mazumder (2011), “Inflation Dynamics and the Great Recession,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 337–402.
About the MPR, the changes in the domestic macroeconomic scenario have lowered its expected level compared with June. As a working assumption, we estimate that the MPR will follow a path comparable with what can be inferred with different expectations measures available at the closing of this Report. These measures suggest that the MPR will see additional cuts going forward, that will take it to the vicinity of 3 percent before the end of the year (figure 10). The baseline scenario reflects those events that are estimated to be the most likely to occur with the information at hand at the closing of this Report. There are risk scenarios, however, which if materialized, may reshape the macroeconomic environment and, therefore, may modify the course of monetary policy. On this opportunity, having evaluated the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance for inflation is unbiased, and for output it is unbiased in 2014 and downward biased in 2015. Abroad, the risks foreseen in earlier Reports remain. Although the growth outlook in China has stabilized lately, its future performance continues to pose a risk, particularly relating to the Chinese financial system and real estate sector. Moreover, we cannot rule out that vulnerabilities in other emerging economies may originate new episodes of volatility. In the Eurozone, the macrofinancial situation continues to create uncertainty, which compounded with geopolitical tensions in the continent aggravates the risk of a slower recovery in the region.

The first is the need for place-based policies to invest more in at-risk communities to improve their childhood environments. The second is to facilitate families to be able to move into areas with better childhood environments. 2  Piketty and Saez (2003) and Chetty, et al. (2014). 3  Chetty, et al. (2014). 4  Chetty and Hendren (2015), Chetty, et al. (2014). 5  Measured by income-adjusted test scores, drop-out rates, average class size and per-pupil spending. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  With respect to the first, I would initially like to talk about the importance of schools―and in particular, strong public education. Consistent with the findings by Chetty, there exists a large literature that has established the importance of high-quality education as a key determinant of economic mobility. While there are differences of opinions on the most relevant measures of school quality, there is ample evidence that children who attend better schools on average end up with better outcomes later in life – such as higher levels of educational attainment and higher earnings. It is also well known that there exist large disparities in the quality of education by geography and socioeconomic background. Compared to children born to lowincome parents, those born to higher-income families can better afford to move and live in areas with high-quality schools. The sorting of families by income and their desire for better educational opportunities leads to enclaves of higher-quality and higher-spending schools that are separated from areas of economically less-advantaged populations and lower-quality schools.
We are therefore calling for a reduction in the shock applied to all equity categories, to make the standard easier to read and reduce insurers’ capital charge. “Insuring in the long term”, to come back to today’s topic, means providing our MTEs and SMEs with greater access to equity financing. Our economy, like that of our euro area neighbours, is seriously lagging behind in this field: in France, equity financing only amounted to 79% of GDP in 2019, compared with 122% in the United States. (iii)  The weight of the risk margin, which on average accounts for 30% of capital requirements at the European level, needs to be reduced. The current method of calculation is too prudent and penalises long-term insurance products such as savings, retirement and prudential products. (iv)  Last, we need to move towards greater simplification: “What is simple is always wrong. What is not is unusable”. i This irrefutable observation from Paul Valéry should be an incentive for us to push for concrete measures to simplify the standards and converge supervisory practices. I'm thinking about a reduction in the reporting burden and requirements for activities that are low risk. And on a more structural level, I'm thinking about the overcomplexity of the method for  Page 6 of 6  calculating mathematical reserves, which undermines the comparability of prudential balance sheets. With the upheaval currently underway in standards, it would be a mistake to roll out IFRS 17 too prematurely.

Against this backdrop, the facing of the economic activity contraction at a global level remains an open issue. The Euro area economy is already experiencing an economic slowdown. Euro area GDP contracted in the third quarter while the unemployment rate reached 7.8 percent in November 2008. The U.S. economy showed quite similar features. The further contraction of economic activity – owing to the deterioration of financial indicators in the U.S. corporate and household balance sheets, mirrored in lower consumption spending and reduced aggregate investment – drove the unemployment rate to reach 7.2 percent. Monetary and financial stimuli managed by central banks and the ministries of finance have helped to bolster confidence and relieve pressure on the financial institutions. Against this backdrop, the “resilience” shown by emerging countries is displaying the first signs of weakening. In contrast to the first half of 2008, the latest data attest to the moderation of economic growth rates in the majority of these countries. The channels through which the slowdown in advanced economies has affected the emerging countries differ depending on their development characteristics. China and India have been severely hit by the slowdown in exports; Russia had hard times owing to the slump in raw material prices in the global market, while East European countries have been impacted by the tightening of funding conditions on a global level.
Sir Andrew Large: Financial stability - maintaining confidence in a complex world Speech by Sir Andrew Large, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the City of London Central Banking Conference, National Liberal Club, London, 17 November 2003. *  *  *  I am often asked what we mean by financial stability and what the Bank, or “the authorities” generally, are doing to maintain it. Let me start with the observation that maintaining financial stability is different in a number of important respects from conducting monetary policy. There is no quantified target; no foolproof way of deciding where to look for potential threats; and no fixed timetable for policy decisions. Financial stability is altogether less tangible and more elusive. But it is nevertheless extremely important - as the substantial costs associated with financial instability demonstrate. The Bank of England has had an interest in financial stability for a very long time. But for most of that time its interest was implicit rather than explicit. In the more formal structure put in place in 1997, after the Bank was granted operational independence on monetary policy, our financial stability role was laid down in a published Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank and the FSA. Today I would like to make a few observations on some of the issues at the top of our current agenda. Financial crises are nothing new. Indeed the Bank has been handling them since the eighteenth century. Some are signalled well in advance.

A crisis was narrowly averted when the counterparties were persuaded to purchase LTCM. I might say that in due course they got their money back: which only goes to show that a liquidity crisis can arise even when the solvency position of the institution remains positive. Thirdly, we cannot ignore the threat of a “Major Operational Disruption” (MOD). What I mean by this is a natural disaster, a major act of terrorism like 9/11, or an IT catastrophe such as we sought to mitigate in the Y2K preparations. Considerable time has been devoted to work in this area, on ex ante mitigants to provide predictability and help to enable the system to get back to work quickly. You need robust back-up sites, operating procedures, personnel regrouping plans and so much more. We are not on our own of course if a financial crisis does occur. Clearly we would work closely with FSA and the Treasury both directly and through the Tripartite Standing Committee. The Standing Committee of representatives of the Bank, FSA and Treasury meets on a monthly basis and of course ad hoc. We discuss both individual cases of significance and specific threats which could be relevant to financial stability. The Committee covers surveillance, strengthening the infrastructure and crisis management. For the latter, the objectives and roles of each party are outlined on the Financial Sector Continuity Website. The Bank’s roles relate to ensuring the orderly functioning of the UK markets, including the maintenance of adequate liquidity and the functioning of payment systems.
These expectations have clearly had an impact on the exchange rate with all that implies for output and inflation and for the exceptional circumstances trade off faced by the MPC that I have described earlier. And though it is more difficult to measure, these expectations are affecting to some degree many of the economic decisions of businesses and households. The full and diverse range of expectations of Brexit and of the path to it cannot by definition all come to pass. Over our forecast period, a specific Brexit and a specific path to it will emerge. The MPC cannot forecast what that outcome will be or how it will measure against the diverse expectations in and between households, businesses and financial markets. Nor can the MPC forecast how that outcome will affect the adjustment of the paths of demand, supply and the exchange rate, relative to each other. It is that relative adjustment of these variables that will determine the path of inflation and hence whether – and in which direction – policy may need to respond to meet the Committee’s primary objective. We can, in my view, only work on what we see in the economy now and stand ready to respond as necessary as Brexit emerges. Conclusion  Monetary policy makers complaining about uncertainty is a bit like sailors complaining about the sea. Uncertainty is not a reason for inaction. Economic data are never clear. Economies are adaptable organisms that are always evolving.

1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The liquidity situation appears stable, and its indicators continue to be at good levels. In annual terms, the deposits base expanded by 2.7%, reflecting a shift in the maturity structure. Against the backdrop of low interest rates, time deposits fell at 2.1%. By currency, both lek and foreign currency deposits increased by 1.4% and 3.9%, respectively. Outstanding credit expanded from a year earlier by 0.8%. Long-term credit dominated, whereas short and medium-term maturities shrunk. Credit to households expanded by 4.6%, whereas credit to enterprises contracted by 1.7%, from a year earlier. One of the highlights of this year is the reduction of the non-performing loans ratio at 14.4%, compared with 18.23% at the end of the previous year. Now, after a relatively successfully period, the coordinated plan that we undertook together to reduce the stock of non-performing loans seems to have yielded the expected results. Therefore, in addition to the loss loans write off from the balance sheet, great results have been also achieved regarding the repayment and restructuring of non-performing loans. A number of regulations and other bylaws have been approved by the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, throughout 2017. They aim at improving the banking activity in terms of efficiency, risk management, transparency and depositors’ protection. A special moment was the establishment of the Resolution Authority in Albania and of the Resolution Fund, which will receive regular annual contributions by the baking sector.
3  See, for example, Press Briefing on Q4 2012 Household Debt and Credit Report; Meta Brown and Sydnee Caldwell, “Young Student Loan Borrowers Retreat from Housing and Auto Markets Liberty Street Economics  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  close look at the question of just how weak today’s labor market is for new college graduates by putting their recent experience into context using some hard data. It is important for us to undertake this kind of analysis because, as we’ll show, newly minted graduates always take some time to transition into the labor market and find jobs that utilize their education. And young people with college degrees still fare far better than those without. At the same time, with the sluggish jobs recovery from the recession, it’s clear that the transition of recent graduates into the labor market is taking longer, and they’ve experienced higher unemployment and higher underemployment than in years past.4 Still, while times have gotten tougher for recent graduates, we shouldn’t be too hasty in concluding that getting a college education won’t help people find good jobs. I will now ask Jason Bram to present an update of economic conditions in our region. Blog Post, April 17, 2013; and Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and Joelle Scally, “Just Released: The Geography of Student Debt,” Liberty Street Economics Blog Post, May 14, 2013. 4  Underemployment, for purposes of this presentation, refers to college graduates working in jobs that typically don’t require a college degree.

A gradual recovery should commence in the second part, with export growth benefiting from a strengthening of global demand and domestic demand being supported by our accommodative monetary policy stance. Furthermore, the improvements in financial markets since July last year and the continued implementation of structural reforms should work their way through to the economy. At the same time, necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors, and the associated tight credit conditions, will continue to weigh on economic activity. This assessment is also reflected in the March 2013 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee average annual real GDP growth in a range between –0.9% and –0.1% in 2013 and between 0.0% and 2.0% in 2014. Compared with the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges have been revised slightly  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  downwards. The revision for 2013 mainly reflects a more negative carry-over effect from the outcome for real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2012, while the projected path of the recovery has remained broadly unchanged. The Governing Council continues to see downside risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area. The risks relate to the possibility of weaker than expected domestic demand and exports and to slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in the euro area. These factors have the potential to dampen the improvement in confidence and thereby delay the recovery.
And there are good grounds for this, according to Haldane, who points out that the time inconsistency problem could be just as great with regard to financial regulation and macroprudential policy as for monetary policy. Just as an overly clear political control of monetary policy could give rise to an inflation bias, an overly political control of macroprudential policy could give rise to an instability bias, as the policy would be too short term. As responsibility for macroprudential policy has been given to Finansinspektionen in Sweden, the discussion of an extended mandate has not had the same overtones here as in other countries. But we at the Riksbank have wanted to make sure that the mandate and tools for macroprudential policy in Sweden are adequate and that Finansinspektionen is able to take the necessary measures to deal 22 See, for instance, Fischer (2015), Bernanke (2017) and Georgsson et al. (2015). 23 See, for instance, Archer (2016). 24  See Skingsley (2016). 25 See Haldane (2020). 8 [20]  with household indebtedness without being dependent on Government approval. 26  The importance of freedom of action was reinforced during the pandemic Although the financial crisis and its repercussions have entailed the Riksbank needing to use new instruments in its monetary policy toolbox, it was primarily during the coronavirus crisis that the lessons were learned. One such lesson concerned the financial markets constantly developing, and thereby changing the funding situation for companies.

The environment in which monetary policy was now to be conducted was thus different than during ‘The Great Moderation’. We therefore needed to review the arsenal of measures that can be used in a crisis situation. Many measures during one week in March last year We are now back where we started in my story, that is to say in March last year. What we saw then was a very rapid and dramatic sequence of events. The stock markets began to decline as early as late February, when the coronavirus began to spread increasingly quickly outside of China. The WHO declared COVID-19 to be a pandemic on 11 March. On 12 March we saw the largest stock market fall in one day in Sweden so far, when the index fell by 11 per cent. This meant that the index had fallen by 30 per cent since 20 February. The fixed-income markets were also affected to an extremely large degree (see Figure 7). All bond rates rose to a varying extent. Investors’ new motto was ‘dash for cash’, as they abandoned unsafe assets in favour of safer ones with high liquidity. Corporate bonds market under scrutiny When Swedish companies have needed to finance themselves with loans, they have traditionally used bank loans. But in recent decades, there has been a structural transformation, which means that they increasingly finance themselves via interest-bearing securities (see Figure 8). At present, interest-bearing securities account for one third of their loan financing.
It is only right that we continue to capture these recollections and stories of Governor Ismail Ali and therefore, the Bank will publish a Second Edition of this book. It is our hope that the vision, dedication and resilience of Governor Ismail Ali would inspire our future generations, be it central bankers or not – and to prepare them as they partake in the dynamic financial ecosystem. This book chronicles, not just who he was and what he did, but also what Governor Ismail Ali stood for and what he envisioned for this country. It is said that there are two things parents should give their children: one are roots, and the other are wings. As the first Malaysian Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, Governor Ismail Ali planted the principles that now run deep within the Bank and gave us the vision to soar towards. As guardians of the financial system, central bankers must maintain public trust. Not only does a 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  central bank need to be careful custodians of monetary policy and an able adviser to the Government, we need to be seen and recognised as the competent authority to discharge these roles. A central bank needs to engender confidence. Governor Ismail Ali’s immutable emphasis on the integrity of the Bank’s moral compass and the strength of our competency stems from a sense of duty, Amanah.

I invite distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen to explore the gallery exhibition to honour the life and achievements of this great man, Governor Ismail Ali, our first Malaysian central bank governor. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches