samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We expect the recovery of domestic demand to gain more traction going forward, especially in the second half of this year. In light of these recent events, our latest growth projection for this year has been revised upward to 1.5 percent. While this figure may be much lower than long-term potential growth of around 4 to 5 percent, it is chiefly dragged down by the first-quarter contraction – bygones if you like. From this quarter onwards, we anticipate a clear pickup in growth and a V-shaped recovery. Many independent forecasters are currently holding a similar view, and most have revised up their growth projections after the political turning point in May. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This brighter economic outlook is not without risks, however. Exports of goods in particular have underperformed thus far this year, despite their insulation from domestic political turmoil. A number of factors are at play, some temporary, others more secular. Weaker economic growth in regional trading partners, including China and ASEAN, has been one cyclical hindrance. Global trade also appears to be lagging global growth, limiting scope for emerging economies like Thailand to leverage on advanced economies’ recovery. More deep-rooted structural issues at home may also be responsible, as segments of the manufacturing sector are not integrated into the modern global supply chain. For these reasons, exports may play a less active role in its contribution to growth this year. On the financial stability front, we remain cautious but optimistic.

Risk accumulated in institutions that operated at the margin of the explicit safety net, such as mortgage affiliates of thrifts, structured investment vehicles and the GSEs. These changes within U.S. financial markets were complemented by a rise in global financial integration as technology and deregulation made it easier for savings to flow across international borders. As a consequence of this basic evolution of our financial system, a large share of financial assets ended up in institutions and vehicles with substantial leverage, and in many cases these assets were being funded with short-term obligations. And just as banks are vulnerable to a sudden withdrawal of deposits, these non-banks and funding vehicles are vulnerable to an erosion in market liquidity when confidence deteriorates and concerns about default risk increase. These changes in the structure of the financial system were probably not the only causes of the financial boom that preceded this crisis, but they may have amplified the dimension of the boom and they were important to how the crisis unfolded and to how policy has responded. In many respects, financial innovation over this period outpaced the system’s capacity to measure and limit risk, to manage the incentive problems in the securitization process and to provide for an appropriate degree of transparency through meaningful disclosure. Once the performance of the underlying assets began to deteriorate, these weaknesses in the system magnified the uncertainty about the scale of potential losses and added to the intensity of pressures that accompanied the crisis.
However, as this interconnectivity intensifies, the exposure to risks arising from financial and economic developments from other markets will increase. Indeed disruptions in the functioning of financial markets have brought the focus of attention on financial stability issues. In addition, this recent financial market turmoil has demonstrated the consequences of liquidity constraints. This has accentuated the importance of a strong and well developed liquidity management infrastructure. Essentially, international Islamic financial transactions will require the development of the supporting financial infrastructure, in particular, the systems and structures for the management of liquidity. Several key measures are required to improve the ability of the Islamic financial system in managing such disruptions and ensure its stability. A well functioning markets and liquidity management framework are vital for Islamic financial institutions to effectively manage funding of Islamic financial transactions. These would also facilitate cross border capital flows and help expand the Islamic financial markets as well as manage liquidity risks in a Shariah compliant manner. This current global financial crisis has prompted a search for an enduring solution to ensure the stability of financial systems. As part of the global collaborative efforts to enhance the efficiency of Islamic financial institutions in managing liquidity at both national and across borders, a Liquidity Management Task Force was established by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) early last year to develop a liquidity management framework.

If a large bank should experience difficulties, the contagion to other banks and the rest of the economy can be very serious. This is called systemic risk. Banks’ activities have considerable externalities. 7 Few bank failures illustrate this point better than the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. In the course of the week following the closure of the bank, interbank lending rates soared. Banks distrusted one another. Short-term funding markets, money markets, dried up worldwide. US money market funds experienced payment problems. The spillovers spread throughout the financial system. One of the world’s largest insurance companies, AIG, teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. To prevent the Lehman bankruptcy from ending in the complete collapse of the financial system, the authorities in a large number of countries took measures on an unprecedented scale. Central banks in many countries injected large quantities of liquidity into the banking system to keep the wheels turning. The aim of these measures was to keep the banking system operating so that the rest of the economy would not be impacted. That is why banks are bailed out. The costs associated with closing a bank are largely borne by parties other than the bank itself. We bail out banks to prevent systemic crises. We bail out banks to limit the substantial damage a deep banking crisis can inflict on the economy. Why should banks not be bailed out? But it is not that simple. There are also compelling arguments against bank bailouts.
Although Sweden has always contributed financially to the IMF when this was needed, we were not allowed to  2  See IEO (2011), “IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis, IMF Surveillance 2004–2007”. 3  Swap lines entail two parties agreeing to exchange currencies with each other. One example from the crisis is the Riksbank’s agreement with the Federal Reserve, through which the Riksbank was able to exchange Swedish krona for USD 10 billion. The aim of this was to increase the Riksbank’s ability to offer dollar loans to borrowers in Sweden. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  participate and influence the decisions this time; they filtered down to us from the G20 through the EU. The decisions were thus made by a small circle even though they affected all of the IMF’s then 186 member countries. In order for decisions that concern the global economy to have an impact and be implemented effectively, the countries affected by the decisions must feel that they can participate and that they are able to influence the decisions. Legitimacy is thus a precondition for effectiveness. The world cannot and should not be governed by only the largest and strongest countries. The cooperation between the countries of the world that is required to safeguard global financial stability should take place in strong and effective global institutions with a broad membership. This is why an institution like the IMF is important to small countries like Sweden.

This was presented as a global stabilisation mechanism in which the IMF would act as kind of whistle-blower by using its surveillance activities to identify events that risk triggering market unease, which in turn could lead to problems in the financial system. In addition, the IMF could propose measures that aim to reduce the risk of problems spreading from country to country, mediate contacts between countries and central banks to arrange swap lines, involve regional financing arrangements and, of course, also provide loans itself.6 However, proposals of this type find it difficult to “take off”. This because  5  This is also taken up as a recommendation in the IEO’s report; see IEO (2011), “IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis, IMF Surveillance 2004–2007”. 6  Proposals for the build-up of an international structure for the financial system are also presented in the Palais Royal Report, which was published in early 2011. This report was written by 18 former central bank governors  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  although the economy is globalised, policy remains largely national. Governments want to retain their national sovereignty and central banks their independence. So, to sum up, many good proposals are now under discussion and we need to continue to clearly pursue our issues here. But building supranational structures is complicated, as the on going development of institutions in the euro area reminds us. And there it is a question of “only” 17 countries and governments that have to compromise and reach agreement.
To take just one example: only a few weeks ago ECOFIN, the council of economic and finance ministers of the European Union, decided to suspend the excessive deficit procedure - a key feature of the Stability and Growth Pact - that had been initiated against France and Germany. Ernst Welteke, the President of the Bundesbank, has since raised serious doubts about whether politicians in Europe are willing to embrace the collective fiscal discipline, backed up by real sanctions, that is necessary to prevent fiscal free-riding inside a monetary union.5  II. The role of institutions  The technology of collective decisions describes the feasible set of institutional arrangements that can be constructed to reduce the costs of the commitment problem. That problem may lead to inefficient outcomes - the Coase theorem does not apply to collective decisions.6 It is useful to think about the optimal design of monetary institutions using the insights from the theory of incomplete contracts. That theory discusses what contracts would look like if certain aspects of the world could not be verified by an outside enforcer of the contract. In terms of monetary policy, there are two related though distinct aspects of the commitment problem.

Staying on the media, but shifting to another, concrete contribution of it, professionalism and integrity in covering news related to economic and financial developments in Albania increased notably this year. Let me emphasise. We are glad to say that we find your work has advanced in all its dimensions. The language you use as well as the breadth and depth of your analysis in presenting our reports to the public reflect a serious approach and professionalism. Thanks to you, our decisions have been passed on in a timely fashion. Further, they have been translated and adapted using simple and easy-to-assimilate language, not only for market actors, but also for the general public. The media is a unique ally in our efforts to enhance the effectiveness of our decision-making. Please allow me to thank you once again for your work, filled with passion and dedication during the course of this year. I am confident that in the coming year your dedication, truthfulness and objectivity in reporting economic and financial news will continue to characterise your work. I would like to assure you that the Bank of Albania will continue be a transparent institution, ready to provide opinions and assessments as necessary in all public debates related to the performance of our economy and financial markets. For the Bank of Albania, macroeconomic stability and financial solidity in Albania are essential and long-term objectives. We work incessantly to enable such stability, which is vital for all the citizens of Albania.
The starting point for a global stablecoin should be based on single currencies. We should not run before we can walk. Setting standards early on  We must therefore set standards early on so that innovation can take place with confidence on what will be required. This gives certainty not only to regulators and users but also to innovators. Indeed, the international community has agreed that “no global stablecoin project should begin operation until the legal, regulatory and oversight challenges and risks… are adequately addressed, through appropriate designs and by adhering to regulation that is clear and proportionate to the risks.”6  However given the novel form, existing standards do not necessarily easily apply. There need to be minimum international standards for stablecoins. In addition any stablecoin with potential for wide scale use in the UK must meet our domestic expectations. A stablecoin which intends to launch with sterling-based activities in the UK should first meet relevant standards and be appropriately regulated. And if a sterling retail stablecoin wishes to operate at scale in the UK, then we will strongly consider the need for an entity to be incorporated in the UK. This is similar to the subsidiarisation of banks that we require if they are holding UK retail transactional customer deposits above a de minimis level.7  But a global stablecoin is a cross-border phenomenon. It can be operated in one jurisdiction, denominated in another’s currency and used by consumers in a third. The regulatory response must match this.

Reinventing the Wheel (with more automation) Speech given by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England  Brookings Institution, Virtual Event 3 September 2020  I am grateful to Josh Sadler for his assistance in drafting these remarks and Paul Brione, Nicholas Butt, Alice Carr, Ellen Caswell, Victoria Cleland, David Copple, Michaela Costello, Jas Ellis, Chris Ford, Lee Foulger, Sarah John, Louise Johnston, Cordelia Kafetz, Barry King, Jeremy Leake, Manisha Patel, Francine Robb, Christina Segal-Knowles and Michael Yoganayagam for their input. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction Even central bankers can sometimes be accused of overusing language. So, the world is always more uncertain than ever – except that at the moment it really is. And, innovation is all around us except in the productivity numbers. One area where innovation really is around is the world of payments, the focus of my remarks today. Innovation is a good thing. As authorities and regulators it is not in our interest – the broad public interest – to stop innovation. Moreover, when supported by clear standards and expectations, innovation can support the pursuit of public interest objectives such as greater inclusivity and network resilience. Making such standards clear early is much preferred to attempting to claw back the ground later, and particularly if that comes after things go wrong. This is the backdrop to innovation in payments, particularly in the area of so-called digital currencies, developed to offer new forms of “money”.
This raises the expected inflation in the short term with respect to what we estimated in the IPoM. In this context, the BCCh Board raised the Monetary Policy rate (MPR) to 11.25%, and estimates it has reached its maximum level of the cycle that began in July 2021, and that it will remain there for as long as necessary to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target over the two-year policy horizon. The macroeconomic scenario presents high risks whose short- and medium-term implications must be evaluated carefully. The Board will monitor closely the unfolding of these events, and hereby reaffirms its commitment to conduct monetary policy with flexibility, in order for projected inflation to stand at 3% annually in the policy horizon. The corridor for the MPR delivered in the September IPoM considered scenarios that might require a somewhat different monetary policy action. The ceiling of the corridor corresponds to a scenario where foreign financial conditions tighten more following a need of greater monetary adjustment in the U.S. Events after the September IPoM were published are consistent with that scenario although the magnitude of the changes have been smaller. And with last Wednesday's move, the MPR remains in the corridor. It should be noted that, the real monetary policy rate is around 4.5 pp above neutral, if we consider its current level minus expected one-year inflation according to market expectations. This is one of the most contractionary rates in the region 1.

Christian Noyer: Public and private debt – imbalances of global savings Introductory speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at Session 3 “Public and private debt – imbalances of global savings”, Aix-en-Provence Economic Forum, Aix-en-Provence, 6 July 2012. *  *  *  In introduction to this session, I would like to make seven remarks. My first remark is inspired by the very title of this session. In advanced countries, the average public debt to GNP ratio is 100%. In emerging countries, the figure is 30%. This is a very wide gap, and it represents one of the global economy’s largest imbalances. And one of the least mentioned. It also represents a complete reversal of the situation compared with just over twenty years ago. At that time, I remember well, I was chairman of the Paris Club, and emerging countries came to ask for the rescheduling of their debt. Second remark, global demand is still fairly concentrated on the advanced countries. Not only is their debt higher, but their savings (as a ratio of GNP) are lower. The G7 countries alone still account for 56% of global consumption. The problem is clear. How can we hope to raise our level of consumption if we need to reduce our level of debt and increase our savings?
The two would appear to be unrelated, but might well be – though not in a manner that would be readily apparent. I will conclude by trying to connect the two dots. Texas’ record of job creation Here is a chart that displays nonagricultural employment growth by Federal Reserve Districts over the past 21½ years, using the employment levels of 1990 as a base of 100 and tracing job creation through June. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  To illustrate a point, I am going to separate out three districts: the Second, headquartered at the New York Fed and consisting of New York, southwestern Connecticut, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and a dozen counties in New Jersey; the Eleventh, represented by the Dallas Fed, made up of Texas, the wooded areas of eastern Louisiana and southern New Mexico; and the Twelfth, or the San Francisco Fed’s district, which consists of California, eight other states, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa and Guam. The state of New York produces 72 percent of the economic output of the Second District; Texas accounts for 95 percent of the Eleventh District’s output; and California accounts for 62 percent of the Twelfth District’s output. One might consider this second chart to be an imperfect but reasonable proxy for the employment growth over the past two decades of the three largest states in the country.

But I have suggested to my colleagues that while many companies have begun and will likely continue to raise prices to counter rising costs that derive from a range of factors – including the run-up of commodity prices in 2010 and increases in the costs of production in China – weak demand is beginning to temper the ability of providers of goods and services to significantly raise prices to consumers. My concern is with the transmission mechanism for activating the use of the liquidity we have created, which remains on the sidelines of the economy. I posit that nonmonetary factors, not monetary policy, are retarding the willingness and ability of job creators to put to work the liquidity that we have provided. I have spoken to this many times in public. Those with the capacity to hire American workers – small businesses as well as large, publicly traded or private – are immobilized. Not because they lack entrepreneurial zeal or do not wish to grow; not because they can’t access cheap and available credit. Rather, they simply cannot budget or manage for the uncertainty of fiscal and regulatory policy. In an environment where they are already uncertain of potential growth in demand for their goods and services and have yet to see a significant pickup in top-line revenue, there is palpable angst surrounding the cost of doing business. According to my business contacts, the opera buffa of the debt ceiling negotiations compounded this uncertainty, leaving business decisionmakers frozen in their tracks.
Page 7  Towards an international effort – central banks, industry and public authorities rowing in unison In a highly connected and networked industry such as payments, we can only make a real difference if we work together in a coordinated way. We need to row together in unison to reach our destination of faster, cheaper, more transparent and more inclusive cross-border payment services. So what are the concrete actions that each of the groups – central banks, industry and public authorities - need to take? The role of central banks Central banks, both as operators and supervisors, of payment infrastructure, we have a key role to play. We build infrastructure, add new functionality and set standards and policies to underpin safe and efficient economic and social activity. Central banks need to start changing policies and enhancing core payment systems in line with the best practices, assessments and analysis that are developed as part of the work on the 19 building blocks. To do so effectively, we need to listen to and collaborate with industry, involving them in outreach and consultations and updating them on latest developments. And we also need to share our learnings and experiences with our peers, and beyond. This could be done through the establishment of communities of practice, through which central banks can discuss challenges and barriers with peers and find ways to overcome them. The role of industry The payments industry is another key, and wide range group including correspondent banks, FMIs and the non-bank FinTech.

Industry uses payment systems to provide payment services to customers, to innovate and develop new products for users. And industry can help central banks in undertaking the assessments of access and operating hours by collaborating, sharing insights and feeding into consultations and dialogue. To meet the FSB targets there is also a practical role for the industry to respond to the building block actions and reports, with some requiring direct action. This might include: (i) investing in new technologies, (ii) preparing for changing operational procedures and (iii) adapting business models. The role of public authorities And there is a crucial role for the wider public authorities. Central banks changing systems and policies and industry investing in changing operational procedures are just two pieces of the puzzle. There are also important regulatory, legislative and other barriers that overcome on a  Page 8  national and international level. For example, finance ministries will need to prepare legislative change to deliver the benefits of the roadmap (e.g. on AML/CFT standards, data frameworks and settlement finality protections). And international standard setting bodies will need to ensure that these standards are aligned on a global level. The financial system is global, with many of the most important issues requiring the involvement of international public authorities. The FSB, CPMI, the BIS Innovation Hubs, and a range of other standard setting bodies will have a continued important role to play to reach the quantitative targets for cost, speed, access and transparency of cross-border payments.