samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
9  The World Is Flat, Penguin Books, 2006  10  For a detailed exposition, see Gurcharan Das, India Unbound, Penguin Books, 2002  11  The personal experience of the author has been that university students normally tend to give priority to paid professional courses over tuition fee-free university courses. In the third and fourth years, only about a one tenth of registered students attend classes, though public money is spent on all of them. BIS Review 4/2007  7  A further benefit which Sri Lanka could gain by promoting a global market based services sector is the possibility of narrowing the current account deficit of the balance of payments through enhanced service income. Historically, Sri Lanka is having an ever ballooning deficit in the merchandise account. With high international oil prices and rising intermediate and investment goods imports, this deficit has risen to a very high and unsustainable level of about 13 percent of GDP by 2006. Countries with such large trade deficits should perforce attempt to generate an equivalent surplus in the services account so as to finance the same. However, the surplus being generated by Sri Lanka in its services account has not been sufficient to fully off-set the trade deficit. As a result, Sri Lanka normally runs a current account deficit of 5-6 percent of GDP which has to be financed through capital flows. This level of a current account deficit, occurring year after year, is not sustainable.

These are key drivers that will accelerate the transformation of Malaysia into a high-income economy in a sustainable and inclusive way. Last but not least, as part of the holistic review, we should be prepared that some DFIs may have to “graduate” into the mainstream legal and regulatory landscape of the Malaysian financial system. This would mean that they may no longer be placed under the Development Financial Institutions Act. This is a positive development as it reflects the maturity and success of the institution in delivering on its developmental mandates. In conclusion, the progress of the nation is a collective responsibility. All of us have our own part to play. Our roles may be different but we share a common vision towards a shared, inclusive and sustainable prosperity for all. For all of us gathered here today, this outcome is crystallised in the vision for DFIs to lift the growth and development of Malaysia. For this to happen, DFIs need to ensure that they are financially sustainable, possess the agility to support the existing and new economic drivers, and constantly measure their performance and contribution in an appropriate performance management framework. As DFIs will continue to be at the forefront of efforts to meet the SDG goals, I hope that the next two days will sow the seeds for individual and collective actions that will both transform DFIs and increase their development impact. With this, I wish all of you a productive forum. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Not only is it necessary for the cost of credit to be low, but also for households and companies to have access to it and to meet their financial obligations, because it is important not only for themselves but also for the soundness of the financial system as a whole. The importance of this interaction between the functioning of the financial market and economic activity is not limited to the short term. As we have stressed on several occasions, Chile faces an important challenge in terms of improving productivity and medium-term growth. To this end, the support of a stable, deep, liquid, efficient and inclusive financial system is of the essence. From a monetary policy standpoint, this is achieved by having stable, controlled inflation, in a context where the economy successfully smoothes business cycle fluctuations. From a financial policy perspective, there are many instances in which regulatory amendments can improve the efficiency and efficacy of the national financial system. 9  Considering a broad set of developed and emerging countries, Chile shows increasing levels of depth and access to its financial system according to various indicators, such as the loans to GDP ratio, market capitalization or number of bank accounts. However, there are always important challenges to be addressed, so we cannot overestimate the importance of recent or pending regulatory changes that will potentially help Chile to improve in this regard. A first series of measures has to do with the Law that defines actions to boost productivity, including some initiatives to deepen the financial market.

15  16  17  Figure 14 90-day delinquency rate (percent of loans)  10  4 Clearing houses and family subsidies  8  4  6  Chain stores  Banks (right axis)  4  3  3  2  2 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF, SUSESO and SVS information. 20  Figure 15 Household indebtedness (percent of disposable income)  70  Housing  70  Consumer  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF, SUSESO and SVS information. Figure 16 Real housing prices and mortgage debt (*) (real annual change, percent)  16  CChC  House price index IPV in Metropolitan Region  12 House price index IPV  8  15 Mortgage debt (right axis)  12 9  4  6  0  3  -4  0 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  (*) IPV stratified method. CChC hedonic model for new homes in Metropolitan Region (RM). Source: Central Bank of Chile using SII, CChC and SBIF information. 21
This will bring about strengthening of a more wide spread and inclusive global financial integration. The greater diversification of risks also contributes towards promoting international financial stability. The transparent nature of Islamic financial contracts and the need for underlying economic transaction reinforces the stability of the Islamic financial system. Going forward, in the current liberalised and globalised environment, Islamic finance is at the threshold of a new dimension in strengthening financial interlinkages between nations across the globe. Just as the Old Silk Road in the 14th century offered a route that facilitated the trade in goods from the East to the West, we can now envisage the New Silk Road that facilitates financial flows across borders between the East and West. As regional financial integration intensifies, it will be a route that will facilitate this process. The previous trade linkages between the Middle East and Asian regions also has potential to strengthen, being the two of the fastest growing regions in the global economy. While the world trade has on the average expanded by 9 percent over the period 2002-2006, Asia's trade with the Middle East has increased on the average by 30 percent. In 2006 alone, mega transactions involving corporate acquisitions and real estate purchases from the Gulf to Asia, are estimated to total more than USD18 billion. Going forward, the value of such investments are expected to increase.

Money and financial market participants still expect considerably lower interest rates ahead than they did last autumn, particularly in the US, but also in Europe. Norway – signs of easing growth and rising inflation Let me now turn to economic developments and the outlook for the Norwegian economy. BIS Review 37/2008  3  Inflation in Norway has been low and stable since the mid-1990s. Over the past 5-10 years, inflation has been fairly close to, but somewhat lower than the operational target of consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. Recently, however, inflation has been on the increase. The year-on-year rise in consumer prices (CPI) picked up rapidly towards the end of 2007 and the first two months of 2008, reflecting an increase in electricity prices. Other measures of consumer price inflation have picked up as well. In February, the year-on-year rise in core inflation was 2.2 per cent. Prices for services and domestically produced goods, in particular some food products, have exhibited a particularly sharp rise. At the same time, prices for imported consumer goods are no longer falling. 4  BIS Review 37/2008  The Norwegian economy has experienced four years of strong growth. Growth has been stronger than during the economic upturn in the mid-1990s. The continuous growth period of recent years is the longest ever recorded in the quarterly national accounts, which includes figures back to 1978. Annual growth in mainland GDP in the three-year period 2004-2006 was more than 4 per cent.
Once the decision is taken to publish accounts, it is natural to change the frequency of monetary policy meetings to six-week. This will give space for producing the accounts and yet not create confusion with regards to following meeting and any action that might be taken. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conclusion While many uncertainties remain, actions taken during the last two months show that the Eurosystem is flexible, responsive, and, as we have said many times, ready to take any actions that may prove necessary should downside risks further materialise. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

This means that in the light of new FinTech risks, the current supervisory frameworks will evolve in a manner that ensures appropriate oversight of banking and non-banking service provider’s activity as well as new payment systems based on DLT solutions while avoiding innovation hindering. Different countries may follow different supervisory regimes, which includes direct oversight of the new market players, then establishing innovation hubs, accelerators and regulatory sandboxes. The role of Regtech in enhancing regulatory and compliance challenges Digital finance raises new risks and new areas of vulnerability might develop because of new financial products (virtual cryptocurrencies) and new technologies (distributed ledger based on anonymous users and on decentralized governance without accountability). Digital finance gives rise to an increasing number of financial players and eases cross-border transactions, which makes the monitoring of transactions more complex for financial institutions and public authorities. Finally, while new financial players are reshaping the financial sector, they may be outside the scope of banking sector regulation and subject to less stringent AML/CFT rules than are banks. New technologies may support greater efficiency for staying compliant. Regtech companies are especially keen to provide banks with more effective ways to improve their compliance and risk management, through outsourcing or insourcing processes. They may open up opportunities for digital transformation of control and support functions within banks (risk, compliance, legal, finance, IT). Regtech could address a wide array of requirements related to regulatory reporting, financial crime, operational risk (including cyber-security and fraud detection), consumer protection and data protection regulation.
3  “Allmänhetens syn på bankerna” (The Swedish public’s opinion of banks), Temo survey, March 2006, The Swedish Bankers’ Association. 4  Bergman, Guibourg and Segendorf, “The costs of paying – private and social costs of cash and card”, Working Paper Series, (No. 212), Sveriges Riksbank, September 2007. 2  BIS Review 16/2008  Moreover, the increased use of cards is an international trend. For instance, if we look at developments among our Nordic neighbours, we can see that card payments have enjoyed rapid growth in these countries also. As regards the choice between debit cards and credit cards, it is clear that Swedish card users favour debit cards. In 2006, the number of debit card payments accounted for around 80 per cent of all card payments. Charge cards and combined charge cards or credit cards dominate the remaining share of card payments. Cheques have disappeared As I said, card payments have begun to replace cash payments of smaller amounts. They have also replaced a large number of cheque payments in Sweden. In 1990 every seventh transaction was paid for by cheque. Cheque payments accounted for just over one-tenth of the value of non-cash payments. Today cheque payments account for just some tenths of a per cent of both the value of the payments as well as the number of transactions. The death of the cheque in Sweden is of interest, for it was quick and unexpectedly painless. The story is as follows: Over time cheque handling became increasingly unprofitable for the banks.

The costs increased, but none of the banks dared take the initiative to debit customers for these costs. There were concerns that Swedes regarded payments by cheque as an inherited right and would, therefore, vocally protest. But this was not the case. When, at the beginning of the 1990s, one of the banks decided to charge a fee of SEK 15 per cheque (and the others followed suit) the majority of cheque payments disappeared over just a few years – and moreover without political convulsions. The reason for this was that there were excellent substitutes that were free of charge and which were marketed by the banks, primarily cards and credit transfers. When consumers discovered this, their grief over the death of the cheque abated. The United States has always been the promised land of the cheque. By tradition, US consumers have sent cheques in the post when they pay their electricity or telephone bills, for instance. The company receiving the cheque has then forwarded it to the bank, which has then transferred the money and returned the cheque to the consumer. In this manner, tons of cheques have crossed the American continent daily. But even in the United States cheque usage has begun to fall. Giro transfers, other credit transfers and direct debit are used for the larger payment flows.
It may be that firms have been responding more than expected to the rise in unit labour costs, in which case as growth resumes inflation pressure might diminish. But there are other possible explanations for higher inflation. One suggestion might be that the MPC could consider using a range of different plausible estimates of the output gap and its effect on inflation as a part of the methodology of constructing the growth and inflation fan charts. It might also be useful to reconsider the merits of looking to inflation prospects beyond the normal forecast horizon, to ensure any future risks to economic stability are taken fully into account. With the benefit of hindsight, this approach might have been helpful in the period before the financial crisis. 13  8  Trichet (2009). BIS Review 27/2010  Since the summer of 2007, life on the MPC has certainly felt very challenging. It may well be some time before all the lessons for the conduct of monetary policy can be fully appreciated. However, the MPC’s framework has overall proved to be resilient during the crisis and capable of making substantial responses to events. I am sure that this will remain true. References Bank of England (2000), Economic Models at the Bank of England, September 2000 update. Barker, K (2003), “Adjusting to low inflation – issues for policy”, Speech at the Manchester Statistical Society. Bean, C (2003), “Asset prices, financial imbalances and monetary policy: are inflation targets enough?”, Speech at the Bank for International Settlements, Basel.

The implication of these possible explanations is, if these exchange rate and commodity price effects ease as expected, or credit conditions become less tight, inflation will fall as the influence of the underlying demand and supply imbalance becomes the dominant influence. But an alternative and less reassuring explanation might be that the pricing climate has changed (following a lengthy period in which firms appeared to set prices in conditions of intense competition), suggesting that firms’ prices might respond less for a given degree of slack in the economy. The key conclusion I would draw from this is, that although from time to time criticised for too much reliance on one model, the MPC has in fact shown itself open to considering a range of interpretations over time, and is fully aware that different circumstances may point to different challenges. At present, neither the extent of excess capacity nor the impact of capacity pressures on inflation are easy to assess. The track record of the judgements we made in more stable times may well not be a good guide to the future. It therefore makes sense to look at a range of estimates both of the gap and of its effect in order to give some guidance to the range of likely economic outcomes. Implicitly, such a range is contained within the fan charts of GDP and of CPI inflation published quarterly in the Inflation Report.
The sample period is relatively short so our conclusions need to be cautious. And forecast accuracy is not the same as policy acumen. Nonetheless, Chart 3 suggests that, in a complex forecasting task, there is little to choose between experts and 37  non-experts. Tetlock’s second key point, which qualifies his first, is that not everyone can be a super-forecaster. A randomly-chosen panel of non-experts cannot by itself be expected to outperform the experts. Chart 3 demonstrates that. Super-forecasting is not simply a law of large numbers. Tetlock shows that non-expert super-forecasters have particular characteristics, including inquisitiveness and independence of mind. Only those with these characteristics consistently outperform the experts. We do not have a clean test of this hypothesis for our inflation forecasts. But just imagine the Bank had been able to identify in advance one “super-forecaster” among the pool of outside forecasters. How much would that have improved its forecasts over the sample period? The gap in two year-ahead forecast errors between the MPC and the best external forecaster in the panel of outside forecasters is around ¼ percentage point. 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing, but this gives some measure of the scope for forecast improvement. 38  If we take Tetlock’s points together, they suggest that there is real value in seeking the views of non-experts to help inform difficult decisions. But there are limits to these benefits. It is unrealistic to expect everyone to become a super-forecaster.

A central element of the new Social Contract for banking is that firms must be fit to fail in an orderly way. Working backwards from that ultimate objective will necessarily change the dialogue between banks and their supervisors. Microprudential and macroprudential This is consistent with the government’s plan that the statutory objective of banking supervision should be recast in terms of firms being sufficiently safe and sound to ensure the stability of the system. That is a profound change. Supervisors will need to focus on the big issues. Analysing bank balance sheets and businesses. Applying judgment. To my mind a great bank supervisor is forensic; is capable of substituting their judgment for those of management; but is wise enough to do so only where necessary; and has the personality to conduct the regulatory relationship without unnecessary conflict. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In another return to the distant past, the supervisor cannot treat firms as islands. They are part of a system. So, at the very least, supervisors will need to look laterally across peer groups of firms for oddities, and stress test firms’ resilience against short-term and longer-fuse threats from the environment. They will, therefore, need to draw on market intelligence on industry trends from the Bank’s Markets area; insights from the operators and overseers of the clearing, settlement and payment systems; and analysis from the finance and monetary researchers in the Bank.
The banking crisis morphed into a sovereign debt crisis. In these countries credit contracted even further, aggravating the ongoing recession and further weakening the banking system in a vicious circle. Fears of potential sovereign default, with likely catastrophic impact on domestic banking sectors, caused interbank lending between countries to dry up and funding markets in the euro area became fragmented along national lines. This threatened the even transmission of monetary policy across the euro area. The interest rates faced by businesses and households – and indeed sovereigns – became increasingly divorced from movements in short-term central bank rates. The crisis that had started as a global crisis was now becoming the crisis of the euro. The financial sector played a significant role in not only propagating but also originating negative shocks to the economy. Financial frictions – largely absent from both the pre-crisis experience of developed economies and the canonical macroeconomic models – had become major drivers of the recession. The resulting crisis prompted academics to reassess existing economic paradigms and policymakers to adjust their frameworks. The rediscovery of the notion that policy may have a role in coordinating private expectations at times of severe uncertainty played a major part in the transition to today’s post-crisis world.

Second, even if the central bank does recognize the emerging bubble and wants to prevent it from building up, by the time it could form a judgement about this, it would be to late. Third, if a central bank is fortunate with both the recognition and the timing, there is still a risk that it will cause an economic recession. To have any effect on excessive optimism about future returns on financial assets, the monetary response might have to be. Nevertheless, the costs of financial cycles are sufficiently large to warrant an exploration of several avenues for mitigating them and this should, to my mind, not exclude the possibility of monetary policy actions. I’m not saying that a central bank should target asset prices per se. Stock prices and real estate prices rise and fall for many reasons. In my view, however, a central bank needs to be observant when notable increases in asset prices are one of several imbalances that are building up even if inflation in goods and services does not show any sign of rising. Such imbalances could be a combination of strong credit growth, rapidly rising investment and a marked deterioration in the private sector’s financial balance. I do not mean to imply that determining when such a situation is on the way is particular easy. My point is that monetary policy should not be excluded a priori in a scenario like this. There are many other difficult assessments that central banks have to make.