samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
MAS does not see a compelling case for retail CBDCs in Singapore. Retail CBDCs are issued to the general public. They are like the cash we carry with us, except in digital form. The case for a retail CBDC in Singapore is not compelling for now, given wellfunctioning payment systems and broad financial inclusion. Retail electronic payment systems are fast, efficient, and at zero cost, while a residual amount of cash remains in circulation and is unlikely to disappear. Nevertheless, MAS is building the technology infrastructure that would permit issuance of retail CBDCs should conditions change. MAS has been actively experimenting with digital currency connectivity since 2016. On the international front, MAS is participating in Project Dunbar, which the Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub is working on in its Singapore Centre. The project is exploring a common multi-CBDC platform to enable cheaper, faster and safer cross-border payments. Domestically, MAS is working with the industry on Project Orchid to develop the infrastructure and technical competencies necessary to issue a digital Singapore dollar should there be a need to do so in future. ANCHOR PLAYERS WITH STRONG VALUE PROPOSITIONS AND RISK MANAGEMENT MAS seeks to anchor in Singapore crypto players who can value add to our digital asset ecosystem and have strong risk management capabilities. A vibrant digital asset ecosystem will encompass a wide range of value-adding activities. Let me cite three examples. JP Morgan has established its digital asset capabilities in Singapore via its Onyx division, which has pioneered several DLT-based products and initiatives.

Do not extend the programme (p 21-24)  November 2021  Purchase assets for SEK 37 billion during January – March 2022. February 2022  Purchase assets for SEK 37 billion during April– June 2022. April 2022  Purchase assets for SEK 37 billion during July– December 2022. June 2022  Reduce the purchase amount for July – December 2022 to SEK 18.5 billion. Purchase assets for SEK 27 billion (p 20-23). 30 [30]
Whatever the ultimate source of finance, we sincerely hope that the UK loans market will be able to play its part in the necessary provision of credit to viable small and medium-sized businesses which will be, in large part, the future source of UK economic growth. 8  BIS Review 126/2010

Indeed, there is some risk that market participants could overreact even before normalization begins, when the pace of purchases is adjusted but the level of accommodation is still increasing month by month.11 Not only could such responses threaten financial stability, but also they might make it harder to calibrate monetary policy appropriately to the economic situation. We will need to think long and hard about how best to develop policy in a way that enables us to respond flexibly to a changing economic outlook, but in a way that is not disruptive to the economy.12 Based on what we have learned to date at the zero bound, I believe that it will be important for us to anchor all our communication around the core principle: The path of the policy rate and the size and composition of the balance sheet over time will be driven by our unbending commitment to our dual mandate objectives of maximum sustainable employment in the context of price stability. As you can see, there will be much more to learn as we go. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. 11  The move to economic thresholds-based guidance for the federal funds rate should help in this regard. While the thresholds are certainly not triggers, they should help market participants adjust expectations about the likely timing of lift-off in a relatively continuous manner and guard against these expectations being pulled further forward in time than is warranted by changes in the economic outlook.
We will urge companies to take the lowcarbon transition seriously – we are looking for concrete plans, not empty words or greenwashing! And not least, we will have a clear voice in our ownership work. 1 Calculations based on analysis firm MSCI’s classification of companies’ transition risk. 80 percent of the market 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  value of the fund’s equity portfolio is in the group of companies that MSCI classifies as having neutral exposure to transition risk. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

Participants in the Lloyd’s market know all too well that what appear to be low probability risks can evolve into large and unforeseen costs over a longer timescale. Claims on third-party liability insurance – in classes like public liability, directors’ and officers’ and professional indemnity - could be brought if those who have suffered losses show that insured parties have failed to mitigate risks to the climate; failed to account for the damage they cause to the environment; or failed to comply with regulations. 17  Discussions on correlation are not new. For example, a current issue is the extent to which European windstorms occur in clusters, such as windstorms Daria, Vivian, Wiebke and Herta in 1990 and Lothar, Martin, and Anatol in 1999. 18  See Standard and Poor’s – “Climate Change Could Sting Reinsurers That Underestimate Its Impact” (2014). 19  In 1992 after Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki hit the US, the price of reinsuring weather risks spiked and several carriers left the market, leading to a rise of up to 40% in premiums in some parts of Florida. A series of hurricanes affecting the Bahamas has prompted several insurers to withdraw flood cover for low-lying areas. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Asbestos alone is expected to cost insurers $ on a net ultimate claims basis in the United States – equivalent to almost three Superstorm Sandy-sized loss events.
On the one hand, the notion that estimating the equilibrium level of asset prices in real time is exceedingly complex is belied by the observation that central banks routinely undertake a conceptually similar estimation exercise when they compute potential output, and therefore the output gap. Since, from a strictly conceptual point of view, there is no difference between estimating the equilibrium level of GDP and the equilibrium value of the price of an asset, it logically follows that, given that central banks estimate the former, and use it as a crucial input in their monetary policy decisions, they could well do the same for the latter. In addition, academic research has questioned the notion that, if the market knew the equilibrium level of a specific asset price, this, in itself, would be sufficient to cause the bubble in that asset to disappear. The logic underlying such an assumption is that if an investor knew with certainty the correct price of an asset which was currently mispriced, or had a reasonably good estimate of such a price, he would have every incentive to take a very large bet on this price, thus “making a killing”, and in the meanwhile contributing to bringing the price back to its equilibrium value. As argued already by Keynes in the 1930’s [and more recently, among others by Shleifer and Vishny],4 this logic misses a fundamental aspect of the way markets actually work: to put it in a nutshell, you may be right for longer than you can stay solvent.

Borio and White, in particular, building upon Kindleberger’s classic historical analysis of bubbles and panics,3 had suggested that periods of inflation and output growth stability may sow the seeds of future instability, by engendering in the general public the erroneous notion that a new and much more stable era had been entered, in which the old rules did not apply any longer. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that the Great Moderation period had been characterized not only by large decreases in macroeconomic volatility for both inflation and output growth, but also by a dramatic compression of risk premia across several asset classes, which is compatible with the notion that economic agents were indeed regarding the volatility decreases as part of a “new norm” characterized by permanently more stable macroeconomic dynamics. With the benefit of hindsight – and of the decisive “test” of the respective validity of the different viewpoints provided by the crisis – it is today easy to appreciate the soundness of Borio and White’s position. The Great Moderation years had been characterized, compared with the previous portion of the post-WWII era, by a significantly more frequent occurrence of asset price bubbles and subsequent crashes. A longer-term perspective focusing on the last two centuries even shows that the occurrence of asset price booms and busts under conditions of price stability, far from being a “fluke” of the Great Moderation era, have in fact been historically quite common.
It is part of the supervisors’ job to take that wider, systemic view and sometimes to curb practices which even prudent banks might, if left to themselves, regard as safe.” See, Blunden G, “Supervision and Central Banking”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, August 1987. 8  Page 206 of the 1999 paperback reprint of Bagehot (1873), “Lombard Street” in the Wiley Investment Classics series. 9  For example, see Eddie George’s 1993 lecture “The pursuit of financial stability”; Mervyn King’s September 2007 letter to the Treasury Select Committee, “Turmoil in financial markets: what can central banks do?”; and, most recently, the document on the Bank’s liquidity insurance facilities, “The Development of the Bank of  BIS Review 67/2009  3  some difficult issues around the transparency of collateral policy, and about how to avoid incentivising imprudent liquidity management. The time-consistency problem and collateral policy Like so much in central banking, time-consistency is at the centre of it. That a time-consistency problem can bedevil monetary policy is well known 10 , and motivates an institutional framework in which independent central banks have clear mandates for fighting inflation. Much less is said about what might be equally serious time-consistency problems in the sphere of financial stability. They can be especially apparent in central banks’ collateral policy. Given banks’ incomplete cover against their maturity mismatch, central banks have long stood ready to “discount” – or lend against the collateral of – certain assets in unlimited amounts.

The Financial Mediation Bureau aims to serve as a one-stop center for the resolution of retail consumer complaints against financial institutions regulated by the Central Bank. The Central Bank is also establishing a one-stop service centre in the Bank that will function as a Public Information Centre for the promotion of financial literacy among the Malaysian public. The service centre will provide advisory services on financial matters to small and medium enterprises. Ladies and Gentlemen, Concluding remarks Financial literacy among women is all about having sufficient awareness of financial matters to enable women to protect and prosper for themselves and their families in a world that is becoming increasingly more complex and uncertain. To be an effective participant in this modern economy, we cannot take financial literacy for granted. It is a knowledge and skill that must be deliberately pursued. From a national and institutional perspective, promoting financial literacy must be an integral part of the overall agenda for financial and economic reform and development. Let me conclude with the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, “We talk of revolutions, political and economic. And yet the greatest revolution in a country is the one that affects the status and living conditions of its women. It is in so far as our revolution has affected our women that it is basic.” Thank you. BIS Review 64/2004  5
More importantly for the real economy, sterling investment-grade corporate bond spreads have fallen over three and a half percentage points since the start of Quantitative Easing (Chart 4). And equity prices have risen by almost a half, the fifth largest increase in a six-month period over the past three hundred years (Chart 5). Accompanying this, UK companies have issued over £ billion worth of bonds and equities since January, compared with an annual average of around £ billion in recent years (Chart 6). Moreover, the spread between the three-month interbank rate over expected Bank Rate, which had been unusually elevated during the crisis, particularly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, has fallen by almost 1½ percentage points and is now more or less back to pre-crisis levels (Chart 7). All this suggests that Quantitative Easing is having the expected effects on the economy. However, there may also be other reasons why asset prices have recovered in recent months. Early in the year, there were considerable fears that the recession would continue to deepen, whereas it now seems that activity here and elsewhere has probably troughed, so some of the worst downside risks look unlikely to crystallise. And asset prices have been rising not only here, but elsewhere, though that could reflect the aggressive monetary policy measures adopted by other central banks too.

Dimitar Radev: Crisis management framework in Bulgaria Summary of statement by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the annual meeting of governors and other central bank representatives from the countries of the Dutch-Belgian constituency of the IMF, organised by the National Bank of Belgium, Brussels, 24 February 2017. * * * The closure of the fourth largest bank in Bulgaria in 2014 put to the test the country’s financial stability. This incident revealed, among other things, serious limitations in our crisis management arrangements in the banking area and, more specifically, the lack of a proper institutional framework to deal with resolution of systemically important banks. Our policy response to the 2014 crisis was incorporated in an 18-month plan adopted in mid2015, defining concrete actions in three priority areas: An independent assessment of: (1) the banks in Bulgaria (through an AQR and stress tests that were completed in 2016), and (2) our crisis management framework (through a still ongoing financial sector assessment, FSAP, by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank); A comprehensive reform of the Central Bank’s banking supervision and regulation framework and practices, based on the Basel Core Principles (BCP); Introducing the BNB’s new bank resolution functions compliant with the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The implementation of the plan helped build sound foundations for our crisis management framework.
I can’t pretend that we are completely out of the wood in terms of the external financial crisis in Asia, but there is now at least a good deal more light between the trees. International attention is now extending to managing the economic fall-out from last year’s financial disturbances, against the background of the longer-standing financial and economic fragility in Japan - which is of course the largest economy in the Asian region. The concern relates in part to the implications for global economic activity; but it relates importantly, too, to the prospective external payments imbalances within the global economy which will need to be handled very carefully if they are not to lead to trade frictions and/or exchange rate volatility. But attention has also turned to an intensive reappraisal, in all sorts of international fora, of more effective means of preventing, and managing, such situations in the future. It would have been understandable in the light of the Asian experience if there had been some turning back from the path towards greater freedom of international capital movements, and there has been some suggestion of this. But on the whole the international debate - in which central banks as well as governments are actively involved - continues to recognise the long-term benefits of free capital movements and the contribution that they can make to global economic prosperity.

In the first part of my talk, I will detail how the Banque de France, in acting as an institution with a strong regional presence, has tailored its services over time to fulfil its three main policy objectives, which are to guarantee monetary stability, preserve financial stability and provide services to the economy. In part two, I will turn to today’s economic and monetary situation and show with our current measures taken to preserve monetary stability, how the fulfilment of each objective is never a given but the result from the committed action by the central bank. **** Today, just as it has always done, the Banque de France offers two main types of nationwide services: first, it guarantees monetary and financial stability, because no economy can work without a stable currency and a stable banking and financial system; second, it supports local economies through its regional presence, serving households and companies, especially the most vulnerable, and supporting the environmental and digital transitions. Let me describe each of these aspects, explaining in each case how the Bank of France has adapted over the years to meet the needs of the day. The first broad set of services provided to the regions are focused on delivering monetary and financial stability. This means conducting a monetary policy that guarantees price stability in the medium term, but also supervising the payment system and ensuring the stability of financial intermediaries.
Percent 6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  2005  2010  2015  ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  2020  1) Weighted average of money market interest rates for seven trading partners. Source: Refinitiv Datastream  A prevailing view over the past decades has been that fiscal policy should follow simple, robust rules and should to a limited extent be used actively to stabilise the economy. Globally, there are now signs that this view is changing. The pandemic may mark a turning point. In the period ahead, we are likely to see a more active fiscal policy among many of Norway’s trading partners. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, there is a recognition that the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy is limited. After the financial crisis, a number of central banks have assumed considerable responsibility for sustaining activity and smoothing economic fluctuations. At the beginning of last year, policy rates were therefore already at very low levels (Chart 7). At the same time, low policy rates reflect long-term trends, such as an ageing population, a high willingness to save, greater inequality and declining productivity growth. The result is that the level of what we refer to as the neutral interest rate is lower than before, even when economic conditions are in balance. The room for policy rate reductions in downturns is therefore smaller.

In the light of long-term considerations, it is also important to reverse the sharp rise in government spending during the crisis. In 2020, NOK 300 billion was transferred from the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) to cover the central government budget deficit. The decision to tap the GPFG has been the right one. An economic shock of the scale that we have witnessed requires potent medicine. The GPFG is intended to act as a buffer when the economy is exposed to shocks. At the same time, it is an intergenerational investment fund to be distributed across current and future generations. The pandemic is the third large economic shock to hit the Norwegian economy in the space of a few years. Each time, transfers from the GPFG to the central government budget have increased, but without being substantially reduced afterward. Chart 10 Before the crisis: One krone in six transferred from the GPFG Transfers from the GPFG as a share of public spending. Percent 30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0 2001  0 2006  2011  2016  2020  Sources: Ministry of Finance, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  12  In 2020, one krone in four of all central government budget spending came from the GPFG. But even in more normal years, transfers have been considerable.
Source: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Bloomberg, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective economy. Figure 6 Interest rates (percent) 20  40  15  35  10  30  5  25  0  20 02  04  Comercial (1)  06  08  Vivienda (1) (2)  10  TPM  12  14  Consumo (1)  (1) Weighted average rates of all operations performed during the month. (2) Housing credit interest rates expressed in indexed-units UFs. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF data. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 7 Interest rates on Central Bank of Chile documents (percent) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 04  06 BCP-5  08 BCP-10  10  BCU-5  12  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 BCU-10  14  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 8 Nominal exchange rate (index, 1 Jan.2014=100)  Real exchange rate (3) (index,1986=100)  120  120  115  115  110  110  105  120  120  110  110  105  100  100  100  100  95  95  90  90  90  90  80  80  85  85  70  70  ene.14 14  jun.14 Jun.

Figure 4 Demand Indicators (*) (annual change, percent) 60  20  40  16  20  12  0  8  -20  4  -40  0 12  13 Imports of consumer goods  14 Retail sales (INE)  Imports of capital goods (*) Quarterly moving average. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 5 Business and consumer expectations (*) (original series) 70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30 04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  IMCE** ex mining  13  14  IPEC***  (*) Value above (below) 50 points denotes optimism (pessimism). **Monthly index of business confidence. ***Economic perception index (Consumer Confidence). Sources: Adimark and Icare/Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez.