samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Aside from anything else, for us this is a development which will increase effectivity of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and as for the people – it provides them with an absolutely reliable and profitable alternative to deposits. We are not anticipating any negative impact on the banking system – currently the volume of such securities is not large, and under conditions of excess liquidity a small flow of funds in the form of OFZ deposits will not prove problematic for banks. Another project concerning government debt is the issuing of renminbi-denominated sovereign bonds. In our view, the issuing of renminbi-denominated sovereign bonds will provide Russian corporate issuers with a benchmark for borrowing securities. Major Russian issuers have already expressed interest in this financial instrument. All necessary financial infrastructure has now been created, and changes to the law have been introduced accordingly. We are in cooperation with the People’s Bank of China and currently there are no obstacles to this project’s deployment. We can now say that technically we are ready to issue these securities. In his speech Mr. Siluanov already mentioned some important initiatives, and here I would like to add to this list those initiatives which we consider to be important for the development of the financial sector. One of the major projects we are working on in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance is the reform of the leasing industry.

At the moment our legislation lags behind global practices. We understand what an urgent topic this is, and in order to make our economy more attractive to investors there should of course be effective mechanisms in place to counter insider trading and market manipulation. The next important issue is the bill concerning a financial Ombudsman for the rights of consumers of financial services. Recently at the State Council Presidium there was discussion about rights protection for consumers of financial services, and, of course, a financial Ombudsman could be one of the instruments used to increase the effectivity of consumers’ rights protection. We propose to bring this in gradually. And here, too, I hope I can count on support for this project from the Ministry of Finance and the government and state Duma as a whole. These bills are in the process of being finalised before submission to the state Duma. Firstly, for us it is important that a bill toughens liability for false statements in the financial sector. We are carrying out major work on improving the cyber resilience of financial organisations and combatting cyber attacks. So it is important for us, taking into account the benefits of digital technology development for the financial sphere, to provide an adequate level of security and protection from risks. Therefore it is necessary to amend the law in order to establish legal requirements for the protection of financial organisations’ information and to combat theft of their clients’ funds. We are now working on drafting this bill, too.
3  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  This analysis alone couldn’t prove whether the increase in UK resilience was down to good judgement or to good  Chart 4: G7 GDP in the financial crisis  luck – the UK might simply have had the good fortune to  Index: 100 = peak pre-crisis GDP 104  be hit by smaller and less persistent shocks. But given  102  the policy changes that had been made – things like  100  successive labour market reforms and changes to the  98  monetary and fiscal frameworks – it was suggestive. 96 94  You’ll have noticed that my sample in the second chart ends in 2007. Of course everyone knows what  92 90 -4  happened next. The global financial crisis triggered the biggest UK recession in post-war history. Unemployment rose to 8.5%, annual GDP growth troughed at -6.1% and inflation see-sawed between close to 1% and over 5%. 0 4 8 Quarters from GDP peak  Canada Italy US  France Japan  12 Germany UK  And the UK fared worse than most of its peers (Chart 4). Why did the crisis trigger such a severe recession, and why was it particularly bad in the UK? One reason was that the pre-crisis build-up of debt had been so large. Another was the very large size of the UK financial sector, which acted to amplify rather than reduce the blow.

Consequently, longer-term inflation expectations became unmoored, and nominal wages and prices spiraled upward as workers sought compensation for past price increases and as firms responded to accelerating labor costs with further increases in prices. That wage-price spiral was eventually arrested by the Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker, but only at the cost of a severe recession in the early 1980s. Since then the Federal Reserve has remained determined to avoid these mistakes and to keep inflation low and stable.” [http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110411a.htm]  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 15 shows two measures of inflation expectations, plotted alongside oil price movements. The red line shows what professional forecasters expected inflation to average over the next 10 years, at various points in time. Their expectations have declined somewhat over the past 20 years, but what is striking is the relative stability of their inflation expectations. In addition, there was no significant reaction to the oil price shock that we experienced in 2008. The chart also shows a second measure of inflation expectations – the University of Michigan Survey (the green line), which asks respondents about their expectations for inflation over the next 5 to 10 years.6 Again these expectations are not very responsive to movements in oil prices, and have remained quite stable over the past two decades. It is worth noting that countries can be affected quite differently by supply shocks. As Figure 16 shows, the importance of food in the “basket” of goods purchased by consumers can vary greatly by country.
Indeed, equity markets continued to operate throughout the crisis, in that investors were able to transact and price discovery was occurring. The same was true for most high-quality corporate bonds, even though that market had more notable episodes of illiquidity. The fact that these markets held up better than others in part reflects that they were less dependent on the availability of leverage and on the continued value of the assets as collateral. Moreover, the crisis did not reveal any major structural flaws in equity and corporate bond markets, thus paving the way to a vigorous recovery of those assets. Indeed, risk premiums on both of these assets have narrowed sharply since early 2009, and corporate bond issuance has rebounded impressively. This recovery has been driven by market forces. Firms have been motivated to issue bonds in order to reduce their reliance on bank funding and other sources of short-term credit, while investors have realized that corporate yield spreads offered appealing returns given that firms in most sectors appear fairly healthy. Lastly, while not a U.S. asset market, it is worth mentioning the performance of the foreign exchange markets, particularly for this audience. Foreign exchange markets also functioned relatively well during this period of turmoil. This resilience has been highlighted in recent reports issued by the Foreign Exchange Committee in the United States and by similar bodies abroad. Broadly speaking, trading in spot foreign exchange markets remained transparent, accessible and relatively liquid.

The Investment Policy Guidelines of the Swiss National Bank, which have just been published for the first time, contain additional information on the investment and risk control process and on the investment universe. They define the principles of investment policy and the investment categories underlying the strategy, and describe the areas of responsibility. The quantitative information already published in the Annual Report will also be published on a quarterly basis in the future, thus providing the public with even more comprehensive information on our investment activities. 2  BIS Review 39/2004  5. Conclusion  The management of the monetary reserves has gained in importance. The National Bank Act requires the National Bank to manage its monetary reserves professionally, subject to the primacy of monetary policy. After the new Act entered into force, we began to further optimise the investment structure. The increased leeway for investment is used for greater diversification. The structure of the National Bank’s investments is thus becoming more efficient overall, yet without compromising monetary policy requirements in terms of the liquidity and security of these investments. We will also take advantage of the extended legal scope with regard to the free assets, i.e. the proceeds from the sale of gold reserves no longer required. Investment Policy Guidelines of the Swiss National Bank (235 kb)  BIS Review 39/2004  3
So disturbances in credit and payment systems can be costly for society and the costs are not primarily the direct consequences that measures of support will have for government finances. The essential consideration instead is the costs that a collapse of credit and payment systems may entail indirectly in the form of decreased production and higher unemployment. When payments and the supply of credit do not function efficiently, the rest of the economy also suffers. That is the main reason why governments are more concerned about the bank sector than they are about other service industries. To appreciate what happens when credit and payment systems are disrupted, one can just take a look at what happened as a result of the financial crises that occurred around the world in the last two decades. There are, unfortunately, numerous examples that can serve as illustrations. The International Monetary Fund has estimated that since 1980, serious problems in the bank sector have arisen in three out of four of its 180 or so members. This has been case in the industrialised world, where one example is Sweden in the early-1990s, as well as in emerging markets. Bank capital bases relatively small There is a variety of factors that could be cited as possible causes of these disturbances. They include shortcomings in economic policy, inadequate supervision and, in many instances, poor risk management by the players themselves. But the roots of the problem go deeper than this. The basic issue is the financial system’s vulnerability to unforeseen events.

In both cases, he is able to capture the macroeconomic implications of decisions made at the firm level, linking micro and macro questions. I conclude by extending my congratulations to Professor Bloom. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Vendors and service providers need to be flexible to pass on the benefits of technological advances to a larger group of users. Demand driven innovations should also be promoted and vendors should look for volumes and turnover, rather than high-priced software sales. 5. Agenda for SAARC region payment systems development  5.1 The banking community in India as well as in other SAARC countries need not reinvent the wheel. There is good news. Following a request made by the SAARC country  BIS Review 61/2008  7  Governors, a SAARC Payments Initiative has been set up to take forward the payment reforms in the region. Within this Initiative, a SAARC Payments Council (SPC) has been set up, consisting of high level officials from SAARC central banks who are also the Chairpersons or senior members of their national payment councils. SPC will be the policy making authority for both high value and retail payments. The organisational structure is considered a very practical one, because of the involvement of all national stakeholders in the national payments councils, which will provide a good forum for the banking community and all service providers to give their inputs for retail payments developments in their own countries, as well as in the region. Currently, Sri Lanka chairs the SPC and a Secretariat has been set up in Colombo to facilitate operational processes. SPC has already prepared a road map for the first year and a rolling plan for the medium term. 6.

Prospects and outlook, therefore, for Asian region trade, and consequently retail payments, are good. 3  Transforming challenges to new opportunities  3.1 Challenges and complexities: Retail payments development is very challenging due to numerous complexities and is much more difficult to modernize than large value  2  BIS Review 61/2008  payments. In order to complete even a small payment, it is necessary to have appropriate and acceptable payment instruments, an institutional set up, an enabling legal environment, infrastructure, processing procedures and money/fund transfer mechanisms. There are enough opportunities to change this situation, if all stakeholders are committed to introducing innovations, with appropriate safeguards. We need to look at some of the practical ways of starting this transformation. 3.2 Discourage cash and paper-based instruments: Progress in the use of electronic payments has been slow in our region due to numerous reasons. Cash is the most popular mode of face-to-face payments for retail transactions. Cash does not require the user to go to specific places, use computers or special equipment to originate or settle a transaction. Moreover, the payment is final. Given the user preference and convenience, cash and cheques still dominate as payment instruments in many countries. Businesses also prefer cheques because of inherited cash management processes, legacy of accounting systems or reluctance by their governments to transact in electronic payment instruments. If there are cheque clearing delays or frequent cheque returns, small businesses have no choice but to borrow for short periods, perhaps at exorbitant interest rates, from informal sources.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE  Forty-Sixth Meeting October 13–14, 2022 Statement No. 46-11  Statement by Mr. Taleb Algeria On behalf of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia  Statement by Honorable Salah-Eddine Taleb Governor of the Bank of Algeria On behalf of Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia Since our last meeting, the global economy has weakened further and its prospects have become more uncertain, reflecting the three recent major overlapping, connected and mutually reinforcing global crises: the lingering supply-demand imbalances of the pandemic; the fallout from the war in Ukraine; and soaring inflation. The “cost-of-living crisis” has hit vulnerable countries everywhere and vulnerable groups in every country, including the middle class, the hardest. To be clear, the underlying global price pressures, particularly food and energy, were already evident in late 2021, but were sharply accentuated by sanctions and disruptions caused by the war in Ukraine. Virtually all risks identified by the April 2022 WEO materialized, but the inflation surprise seemingly blindsided policymakers in major countries, compelling them to move aggressively to tighten monetary policy. The negative spillovers of the tightening of global financial conditions are being acutely felt in Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), including the frontier economies and middle-income countries in our constituency, through currency depreciation, capital outflows, higher external debt servicing cost, and diminished (or even loss of) access to international financial markets.

As before, we call for a revised quota formula that protects the share of poorest members, and for an increase in the IMF’s quota resources to lessen its dependence on borrowed resources and to reinforce its lending capacity. We remain concerned about the projected sharp decline in the IMF’s lending capacity which, unless reversed, could imperil the IMF’s effectiveness and credibility. 4
I shall now go on to briefly describe how the repo rate forecast is produced. How is the repo rate path determined? The publication of our repo rate forecasts makes greater demands than previously on the internal preparation work. The new method of working requires a greater interaction between the staff and the Executive Board, and the Board members are involved at an earlier stage of the process. This is made easier by members of the Executive Board being full-time employees and not merely being called together for monetary policy meetings. So what does the practical work leading to the published repo rate path actually entail? The monetary policy decision-making process normally follows an established preparatory process. 4 During a number of weeks employees in the Monetary Policy Department prepare draft forecasts for economic developments, including the repo rate. After this there are meetings together with the Executive Board of the Riksbank, and a main scenario for economic developments, including the repo rate, is drawn up. Of course, the main scenario is based on a combination of model-based forecasts and assessments. 3  See Lars E.O. Svensson, “Policy expectations and policy evaluations: the role of transparency and communication”, Economic Review 2010:1, Sveriges Riksbank. 4  For a more detailed description of the preparatory work prior to the monetary policy decisions, see Kerstin Hallsten and Sara Tägtström (2009): “The decision-making process – how the Executive Board of the Riksbank decides on the repo rate,” Economic Review 2009:1, Sveriges Riksbank.

Barbro Wickman-Parak: The repo rate path – experiences three years on Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Danske Bank, Stockholm, 17 June 2010. *  *  *  Around three years ago the Riksbank began publishing its own forecasts for the repo rate, and there were many reasons for doing this. It made the forecasts more consistent and it was now easier to evaluate the Riksbank’s forecast in relation to those of other analysts. We were also given an opportunity to describe alternative paths for economic developments, which was a good educational tool that further contributed to increasing transparency. Publishing a whole path for the repo rate was also one step towards becoming more open and clear. It also improved the chances of steering longer term expectations . Experiences so far show that the work on the repo rate and its publication have functioned well. The monetary policy discussions focus more on long-term issues, and they now concern the whole repo rate path rather than an individual decision. This is good. Today the repo rate path is a natural part of monetary policy. Moreover, the repo rate path has served us well during the crisis, in that we could clearly signal that the interest rate was expected to remain low over a long period of time. Market participants’ expectations of the repo rate have rarely been exactly the same as the Riksbank’s expectations. My assessment so far is that the deviations have not been a problem.
A last important theme addressed the sense that the Committee may have adopted an overly conservative approach to some aspects of the framework, resulting in much higher capital charges than banks feel are necessary. These concerns are important, as a key goal for the  2  BIS Review 42/2003  New Accord is to align capital more closely to risk. This means that where the original Accord treats exposures too harshly relative to the degree of risk that they entail, we expect to reduce the capital requirements. But where the risk is greater, and where the existing rules fail to assign adequate capital, it should not be surprising that supervisors will raise capital requirements. Respondents attribute what they view as excessive levels of conservatism to different sections of the New Accord, including, for example, the calibration of capital requirements to both expected and unexpected losses. The treatment of credit losses is an issue which has attracted a lot of comments and which is, indeed, very important. As you will probably be aware, the present proposals to calibrate on the basis of expected and unexpected losses represented a compromise in the face of cross-country differences in accounting practices and supervisory authority regarding provisioning. But the Committee will look into this important issue again, and I am optimistic that we can find a way to improve the present proposal.

In particular, we announce a plan around the middle of each month for the purchase operations to take place through the middle of the following month, once we know the principal repayments that will be received over that period. 5 We are running at a pace of $ billion in purchases this month, and we expect that pace to bump up to around $ billion for the next several months. Looking further ahead, we currently project that the cumulative amount of principal payments on agency debt and agency MBS through 2011 will be somewhat higher than the estimates provided at the August FOMC meeting. I should note that the directive to the Desk is expressed in terms of the overall size of the portfolio. However, under the portfolio balance model described above, the effect on markets will be tied to the amount of duration risk that such purchases encompass. Thus, the composition of purchases across maturities will be quite important in governing the effects on financial conditions. The strategy that the Desk has employed for the reinvestment program is to follow the pattern of purchases that was implemented in the earlier Treasury purchase program. The purchases will be concentrated in nominal Treasury securities with remaining maturities  4  Most of the prepayments of MBS in the Federal Reserve’s portfolio are associated with refinancing activity that will result in the production of new MBS that have to be purchased by other market participants.