samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Singapore can support the financing needs of Chinese companies expanding into Southeast Asia and beyond. Take for example, the New Hope Group, an agricultural and food processing company based in Western China. It has been raising funds in Singapore for its overseas expansion. Or companies such as Chongqing Western Modern Logistics Industry Zone Development Construction and Chongqing Grain Group. They have issued close to $ billion of bonds from Singapore. Bond issuance by Chinese issuers in Singapore almost doubled in 2017 to reach $ billion. More than 25% of this amount was issued by first-time Chinese issuers in Singapore. Singapore’ Asian Bond Grant Scheme will help such first-time issuers by offsetting a part of their typical issuance costs. Haier Group, a leading Chinese consumer electronics player, benefitted from this scheme when it issued a $ billion perpetual debt security in Singapore. Third, enhancing risk management for Chinese firms. Chongqing and Singapore can explore joint projects to mitigate the economic impact of natural catastrophe risks in the Western Region. One example is through piloting a natural catastrophe insurance pool. Similar initiatives are underway in Southeast Asia – and we could share experiences. In May this year, ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers agreed to establish the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (“SEADRIF”), which provides disaster risk financing, and a regional catastrophe risk insurance pool for participating ASEAN member states.

On the other hand, the growth prospects are gloomier, with global growth forecast trimmed by 1.3 p.p., with similar downgrade for the CESEE region (1.7 p.p), where growth is revised down to 3.0% on average. The economic loss will not be contained during this year, as visible by downward revision for the next year, as well. Overall, while current recession is not a central scenario, the risk thereof is not out of the window. Against this background, policymakers are faced with delicate trade-offs - how to address the risk of stalled recovery/ recession, while curbing the rising inflation? Fiscal and monetary policy again are expected to play their role in mitigating social costs, although now in a more complex environment than during the pandemic, which calls for different division of labour. In a high–inflation  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  environment, monetary and fiscal policy cannot work hand in hand to support demand, as they did when the pandemics emerged. Now central banks do not have leeway to focus on other objectives beyond their traditional remit. They have to remain focused on their mandate of medium-term price stability, which requires gradual normalization of monetary policy. Short-term effects of the crisis have to be addressed by using fiscal policy tools, which given the tight fiscal space need to be well-targeted and time-bound. Another argument that supports the above is that despite normalization, monetary policy will remain accommodative as observed by historically low real policy rates.
The Federal Reserve began its efforts to remove policy accommodation with its overnight policy rate at the zero lower bound and with a large portfolio of long-duration securities. Normalization, therefore, has two parts: increasing the overnight rate, and reducing securities holdings. Short-Term Rate Normalization First, let’s discuss overnight rates. The current monetary policy implementation framework relies on providing the market with two overnight investment opportunities to help steer short-term interest rates: interest on reserves (IOR), which is the Federal Reserve’s main tool to control interest rates, and the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility, a secondary tool. 6 This framework has proven to be extremely effective at controlling federal funds rates. As shown in Figure 1, it has maintained the EFFR within the FOMC’s target range on all but one day. 7 Looking at the distribution of traded rates within both the federal funds and eurodollar funding markets, as shown in Figure 2, it is also clear that the framework has broadly fostered trading at rates well within the target range. Indeed, the difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the rate distribution has consistently remained very tight over the course of rate normalization. 8  6  Potter, “Money Markets after Liftoff: Assessment to Date and the Road Ahead,” February 22, 2016, provides a detailed discussion of the new framework. For a discussion of the new and old frameworks, see Ihrig, Meade, Weinbach (2015).

Let me take a few examples: steps have been taken in harmonising elements of insolvency frameworks, such as ‘early restructuring’ and ‘second chance’. But these do not cover the conditions for opening insolvency proceedings nor the ranking of claims. As such, they are not enough to facilitate cross-border investment. Similarly, more should be done to remove overlaps in cross-border withholding taxes and reduce home bias in investment strategies. In my view, we need a single rulebook in a wide range of areas also covering consumer protection, anti-money laundering, or accounting rules for a successful CMU. Another reason for a limited “CMU effect” is that some of the agreed initiatives were only recently implemented. Take the securitisation package, for example. Important technical regulatory acts are still pending which prevent the new framework from being applied in full and are a source of uncertainty for those who would like to use it. It is therefore too early to assess the success of this measure. More importantly however, some proposals will not deliver their full potential. In the case of the pan-European personal pension product, the recent agreement gave birth to a rather complex product for which key elements are left to the discretion of Member States. Lack of ambition in the cross-border portability of the instrument may limit its capacity to facilitate labour mobility and the mobilisation of savings across borders in the absence of geographical diversification requirement for investments.
Tarisa Watanagase: The road ahead for central banks – meeting new challenges to financial stability Luncheon talk by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, Bangkok, 20 July 2010. *  *  *  Distinguished FCCT Members and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank the FCCT Board for inviting me to deliver this luncheon talk as part of the Club’s newly established Speaker’s Lunch Series. To this, I am honored as well as delighted to be back. It was exactly two years ago when I was here for the Club’s dinner program in July 2008, and let me tell you that I very much enjoyed our Q&A session then. I certainly look forward to participating in such a lively exchange again this afternoon. The topic of my talk today is “The Road Ahead for Central Banks: Meeting New Challenges to Financial Stability,” in which I will share with you my views on the roles of central banks regarding the maintenance of financial stability, with particular reference to those at the Bank of Thailand during the past few years and going forward. This talk will be divided into three parts. The first part will be about the changing global view on financial stability policies as a result of the recent global financial crisis. The second part will be a summary of what the Bank of Thailand has done with regard to the maintenance of Thailand’s financial stability.

However, not all incumbent banks are able to fully bridge the technology gap, particularly for newer services; d. This results in migration towards digitally-focused challenger banks such as Atom, Fidor and Monzo that will provide similar services of traditional banks, but utilise technology to deliver faster and cheaper services that better meet the needs of customers; and e. The implication of this is that the landscape of finance will remain largely filed by banks, but a new breed of purely digital banks will gain in significance. The names that we immediately think of for financial services will change from the current banks that we are so familiar with. The fourth scenario is what I call ‘the Tech take-over’ a. Like scenario one, this is a more extreme and less probable scenario, but still one that is worth a thought. In this scenario, technology adoption by incumbent banks is low, with a high level of fragmentation among finance providers; b. However, in contrast to scenario three, technology firms enter as the new preferred provider, successfully capturing the loyalty of consumers due to superior ability in using data to deliver customer-centric solutions; c. Financial services will thus be offered via a wide range of providers such as social networks (e.g. Facebook, Wechat) and e-commerce platforms (e.g. Amazon, Alibaba); and d. Growing comfort with the ability of technology to ensure secured transactions also gives rise to the popularity of peer-to-peer financial services.
Michael C Bonello: Nexus of Basel II and financial stability Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Annual Seminar of the Institute of Financial Services (IFS), Floriana, 14 May 2010. *  *  *  I would first like to thank the Institute for inviting me to their Annual Seminar, which this year focuses on the topical, but complex subject of risk, capital and financial stability after the financial crisis. My remarks will concentrate on the lessons learned and on some open questions being addressed by international standard setters. In the introduction to his recent book “Good value”, Stephen Green, the Group Chairman of HSBC Holdings plc, recalls his thoughts one day in April 2008 on the shores of Lake Como against the background of an unfolding global financial crisis. He describes that time as one of those moments in history when it seems as if the tectonic plates are shifting, striking at the roots of what we had taken for granted for a quarter of a century.

Modelling the desired behaviors sets a powerful example and serves as a form of behavioral risk mitigation. All of these actions reflect choices that a firm makes, either implicitly or explicitly, that can build cultural capital. On the other hand, cultural capital can also decline or deteriorate as a result of internal choices. For example, overt incidences of misconduct such as a trading scandal or a legal issue, deviations between employees’ actual experiences and a firms’ stated values, or observations of 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  inappropriate behavior that is tolerated or even rewarded can all contribute to the depreciation of a firm’s cultural capital. This decline can be self-reinforcing as certain behaviors are rewarded and individuals advance in an organization, or the composition of the workforce changes as employees choose to work at firms with higher cultural capital. The Pandemic’s Impact on Cultural Capital While the discussion so far has focused on how internal choices that a firm or its employees make can impact cultural capital, it is equally true that external factors have the potential to have a similar impact. For example, changes to social norms around what constitutes acceptable workplace practices can alter behavioral norms inside a firm. The nation-wide racial justice movement is another example of an external factor that could impact the internal culture, based on the choices a firm makes in its response. The current COVID-19 pandemic will also surely impact cultural capital in unpredictable and enduring ways.
That is why, in the UK, the Monetary Policy Committee periodically takes stock of developments and updates its estimates of key variables such as the equilibrium rates of interest and unemployment. 34  The MPC provided our assessment of the equilibrium rate of interest – the interest rate that sustains inflation at target and output at potential – in its August Inflation Report. The equilibrium interest rate provides a way to think about the forces acting on the economy, and whether policy is stimulative or contractionary. It is affected by shorter-term influences, such as headwinds to demand, and by slow-moving structural factors that affect the balance between the demand for capital and the stock of wealth available to finance it. For open economies like the UK and Ireland, those factors will be heavily influenced by global developments. As the MPC noted at the time, increased automation could push the equilibrium interest rate up or down. On the one hand, the increases in productivity that result could increase businesses’ demand for capital, pushing up the equilibrium interest rate for a period – and permanently if automation raises productivity growth. 35  On the other hand, however, increases in inequality would likely shift income to those with lower  propensities to consume,  36  increasing the stock saving and pushing the equilibrium rate down.

3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  But such big transitions take time. Workers generally cannot move seamlessly to new jobs in which they can be productive. The benefits of the First Industrial Revolution, which began in the latter half of the 18  th  th 7  century, were not felt fully in productivity and wages until the second half of the 19 . th  Indeed, at the start of the 19 century in the UK, despite a sharp pickup in productivity, wage growth stalled and the labour share fell – a period dubbed “Engels’ pause”. A Framework for Examining Technical Change and the Labour Market 8  To understand such dynamics it helps to have a common conceptual framework. The impact of technological change on employment and wages can be depicted as the sum of three major effects: destruction, productivity and creation. The destruction effect is the focus of most alarmist accounts: the replacement of labour by technology, with an associated reduction in labour demand, wages and employment. Less commonly acknowledged are the positive effects on aggregate demand of new technologies, what can be termed the productivity effect. This effect is analogous to the classic Say’s law in which supply creates its own demand. Technology makes those in work more productive, in time boosting wages and increasing the returns to those who own capital. This greater income boosts aggregate demand and leans against the destruction effect.
The existence of abundant natural resources can be a mixed blessing. Experience elsewhere suggests that the sudden occurrence of major income flows tends to undermine future production potential. In the long term, it is difficult to ensure an efficient distribution of wealth between and within generations without triggering rent-seeking behaviour among households and firms. In the short term, the volatility in income flows and in terms of trade poses a challenge for monetary and fiscal policy. The mixed blessing of national wealth is not a new problem. Vigilant observers were already aware of this in the 17th century. In modern economic language, the Moroccan ambassador to Spain pointed to the problem of deteriorating competitiveness 300 years ago (see Chart 2). The main long-term challenge to economic policy is how the returns on petroleum wealth can be phased into the economy without a deterioration of our future growth potential. Even with our substantial petroleum reserves, human capital is by far our most important resource. It accounts for over 80 per cent of Norway’s national wealth (present value of future labour). Income from oil and gas is transferred to financial assets through the government budget. These transfers are large in terms of GDP, but still minor compared with our human capital. Oil and gas reserves account for about 7 percent of national wealth today, whereas in 2030 these reserves will be reduced to only 1-2 per cent. To meet these challenges, the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund was established on 22 June 1990.

Combined with low growth abroad and increased trade with low-cost countries such as China, this has led to a fall in import prices. The relatively high price increases of Norwegian products reflect high wage growth and a tight labour market. The krone exchange rate, measured against the trade-weighted index, has appreciated around 13 per cent in the last two years. However, the krone was exceptionally weak in mid-2000. The krone is 4-5 per cent stronger today than in the early 1990s, and about as strong as the previous high in early 1997. Thus, the recent strong showing of the krone is not without precedent. Changes in the oil price have time and again been an important factor behind exchange rate movements. Empirical evidence shows that the exchange rate is affected mainly by large fluctuations in the oil price. The krone tends to depreciate if the oil price is very low, as happened during the Russian crisis in 1998. On the other hand, the krone did not appreciate accordingly when the oil price surged from 1999 onwards. Hence, the relationship between the oil price and the exchange rate has not been evident for the last two years. Since late 2001, however, our currency may have been used as a hedge against the upside risk to the oil price, and this may have contributed to its appreciation. Another factor behind the appreciation of the krone is the current low risk premium in global currency markets (measured by a global risk index, GRI).
Gent Sejko: Economic and financial developments in Albania during 2017 and objectives for 2018 Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the end-of-year meeting organised by the Albanian Association of Banks, Tirana, 21 December 2017. * * * Honourable AAB Chairman, Dear banking system executives, Dear friends and colleagues, As always, it a pleasure for me to be together with banking system executives in Albania, in this annual end-of-year event organized under the auspices of the Albanian Association of Banks. In my address, I would like to briefly focus on highlights that have characterised the economic and financial developments in Albania over 2017, as well as on some of our objectives for 2018. Albanian economy The Albanian economy seems to be experiencing an overall positive moment of recovery, from both the global and the regional perspective. Economic activity continued to grow reflecting the favourable financial environment, improvement of confidence, impulses generated by employment gains and the high levels of foreign direct investments, as well as the positive momentum in the economies of our trading partners. In terms of aggregate demand, growth was driven by the expansion of private consumption and investments, and the improvement of the balance of trade with abroad, especially in the third quarter. In response to the improvement by around 10.5% of the trade deficit in goods and services, the current account deficit fell to 4.6% of the GDP in the third quarter, one of the lowest levels in the last decade.

At the very least, firms and households are likely to delay major expenditure decisions until things become clearer. And this may act as a drag on the recovery in activity. The rise in the cost of security and insurance will also probably have a more long-lasting effect on activity. Discussion of the attacks has somewhat obscured the fact that the world economy seemed to be slowing more rapidly than expected even before 11 September. Overall activity in the US had been weak, despite continued strength in some sectors, notably retail. And the euro area grew by just 0.1% in the second quarter, as net trade slowed sharply. The monetary policy reaction has of course been rapid. In the United States, in particular, interest rates have already been reduced by four percentage points since the start of the year. And fiscal policy has been expanded. These actions should clearly stimulate demand. But, as is always the case, the size and timing of these effects is extremely hard to judge. 2  BIS Review 87/2001  So far this year, the UK economy has fared rather better than its main trading partners. GDP growth has slowed from the peaks it reached during 2000. But the economy still grew by 0.6% in the first quarter of this year, and 0.4% in the second. Much of that strength, of course, reflects domestic demand growth, and particularly household consumption, which rose a further 1.3% in Q2. In many ways, this should not be a surprise.
On the assumption that the three-month Libor remains unchanged at 0.75%, annual inflation is forecast to stand at 0.5% in 2006 and reach 1.4% in 2007. Inflation prospects for the medium term now look more positive than they did at the March assessment. A correction to the expansionary monetary policy pursued by the SNB for a long time now will be necessary if the economic outlook improves. Should the Swiss franc appreciate rapidly, the Swiss National Bank will respond appropriately. What were the most important factors that led to our decision to leave the three-month Libor rate unchanged? Before answering this question, I would like to briefly outline the situation we are facing. I will begin by presenting the economic environment, and then go on to describe the monetary situation. As far as economic activity is concerned, we have revised our evaluation downwards since the last monetary policy assessment. In the final quarter of 2004, the Swiss economy slipped slightly, accompanying a rise in the price of oil and a decline in the dollar in the period from October to December. Both of these factors also had an unfavourable impact on the European economy. Contrary to the expectations expressed at our last monetary policy assessment, economic activity in Switzerland remained restrained in the first quarter. Despite a slight increase in domestic demand, GDP stagnated compared with the previous quarter. This disappointing result was mainly attributable to export developments. Companies were faced with slack demand and consequently limited their volume of investment.

Now that the euro has been introduced, there is still work to be done to ensure that the monetary union also functions properly in the longer run. One of the major challenges is to achieve a good working relationship in the euro area between the single monetary policy and other components of economic policy. Achieving this interaction can be difficult even at the national level. Sweden’s problems in the 1980s are a good example: fiscal policy was not sufficiently tight to counter the rapid expansion of credit and neither was the supply side functioning all that well, which also contributed to the overheating. In the monetary union, the single monetary policy has to mesh with the national fiscal, wage and structural policies of eleven countries. While decisions about the other components of economic policy are still mainly national, they are highly important for the monetary union’s success. It is envisaged that good interaction will be achieved in that the euro countries monitor each other and jointly discuss their national policies. Starting from mutually agreed policy guidelines, each EU country is to present regular accounts of how it intends to fulfil the common objectives. If a country’s policy diverges from the agreed guidelines, the idea is that other countries will protest at an early stage; each country must shoulder its share of the responsibility for this. The work of constructing uniform rules has made most progress in the field of fiscal policy.