samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The relevant models change from one forecast to another. 4  BIS Review 73/2004  behaviour of the economy. The results of that discussion are published once a month, and the Committee, as it did yesterday, appears regularly in front of Parliamentary committees. So I turn now to the question of how information and judgments of risks can be communicated to the general public. 4. Communicating about risks with the public  Although it is often impossible to be precise about the risks surrounding a decision, it is vital that policymakers resist the temptation to communicate a false sense of certainty. Two key principles should govern the communication of risks to the public. First, information must be provided objectively and placed in context so that risks can be assessed and understood. Second, experts and policymakers must be open about the extent of our knowledge and our ignorance. Transparency about what we know and what we don’t know, far from undermining their credibility, helps to build trust and confidence in policy-makers. (a)  (Mis)understanding probabilities  The first principle states that information about probabilities should be placed in context. A simple example illustrates the difficulty we all have in interpreting probabilities when the context is unclear. The stock market is volatile and difficult, if not impossible, to predict over short periods. At the beginning of the week the chance of the market rising over the following week is roughly the same as the chance of its falling.

But it illustrates vividly that the interpretation of ex post outcomes depends critically on understanding the ex ante process which generated those outturns. Another example shows that it is not just lay people who find statistical inference difficult. Experts of all kinds do too. The advent of DNA profiling in the 1980s led to the use of match probabilities in criminal cases. The jury is told that the probability of finding a match between the sample taken from the scene of the crime and the DNA of the defendant is, for example, only 1 in 500,000. That is sometimes taken as evidence that the probability of the defendant being innocent is also only 1 in 500,000. Such an inference is incorrect. In a city such as London where there might be about 5 million people who could have committed the crime, around ten people would have DNA that matched the relevant sample. Hence, in the absence of any other evidence, the probability that the defendant is guilty, far from being overwhelming, is only one in 10. Of course, in practice other evidence is usually available. But this incorrect statistical reasoning has swayed enough cases to be given its own name - the prosecutor’s fallacy.11 The cases of Sally Clark and Angela Cannings, both convicted and imprisoned for the alleged murder of their own children, show the desperate consequences of the false use of statistics to create a presumption of guilt to resolve the cause of apparently inexplicable events.
The PRA does not seek to operate a zero-failure regime. But when failure does occur, this should be with limited disruption to the provision of core financial services and without spillovers to the wider financial sector. One of the main strategic challenges in building the PRA was to establish a new approach to supervision. The key aspects of this are for the PRA to be judgement-based and forward looking, proportionate in its actions, and efficient in its allocation of resources. The PRA’s supervisory approaches for banking and insurance are summarised in published documents and updated regularly. In the first 2 ½ years of the PRA’s life, much of the effort has been taken up with the implementation of the regulatory reform agenda which is the main topic of this lecture. That is likely to continue to be the case until at least 2019. As I will illustrate, the main planks of the regulatory platform have been put in place and it is difficult to conceive of there being space to add many additional reforms to what is already a comprehensive design – neither the regulators nor the regulated are likely to have much spare resource to support substantially more regulatory change over the next few years than currently in train. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The FPC is increasingly focussed on implementation of the reforms for banks and insurers and on understanding the risk from market-based finance.

In Malaysia, the introduction of investment accounts as opposed to deposit accounts in the Islamic financial system is an example, where savings are matched with the funding required by small and medium scale enterprises for financing of specific projects – has resulted in an investment intermediation function by the banking institutions. In addition to innovation, technology is also an agent to deliver quality financial services. Technology can lower cost, increase outreach and expand the range of financial services. The Kenyan mobile payment services, M-PESA, leverages on mobile technology to provide the poor with high frequency, small value transactions and affordable financial services. Priority 2: Building on the Sasana Accord for measurable goals The second area relates to the identification and adoption of the measureable and timebound targets as included under the Sasana Accord. Clear and measurable outcomes provide a shared understanding that will align the different stakeholders towards the common goal of delivering results to the financially excluded segments of society. A key aspect of realising the Sasana Accord is to collect and compile the relevant data in a reliable and timely manner. This will also form a basis for better policy formulation and effective monitoring and assessment of the effectiveness of policies. Data coverage needs to involve both the mobilisation of savings and financing activities, including information on the profile of the new entrants into the formal financial system. This is not only to promote effective participation in the financial system but to avoid conditions of over leverage and indebtedness.
The figure illustrates this pattern, showing a significant response of the Chilean 3  peso but a non-significant movement in long-term bond prices. The opposite results hold for Mexico.2 Similarly, the response at country-group level also indicates differences when an US MP shock hits other countries' MP rate decomposed into expected MP rate and term premium (see Table 1). Whereas in AEs the adjustment mechanism is mainly through expected MP rate, the transmission in EMEs is via the term premium. ER comes out as more reactive in AEs rather than EMEs, presumably because central banks in EMEs are less prone to conduct sterilized FX interventions, aiming to—partially—stabilize interest rates and the ER simultaneously. Table 1: US MP spillovers (†)  10-Year interest rate Expected interest rate Term premium FX depreciation  Advanced economies 2003-2016 Post Nov.08 0.335*** 0.429*** 0.331*** 0.234*** 0.005 0.196*** 7.50*** 10.920***  Emerging economies 2003-2016 Post Nov.08 0.293*** 0.557*** 0.054 0.136** 0.239*** 0.421*** 3.520*** 6.660**  (†) The country sample includes 12 EMEs and 12 AEs. The panel regressions use daily data from Jan-03 to Dec-16. The units represent effects in basis points (bp), for a US MP shock of 1 bp. (***) p<1%, (**) p<5%, (*) p<10%. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Of course, a flexible ER also facilitates the reallocation of economic activity between the tradable and non-tradable sectors by speeding up the adjustment of relative prices.

The Basel Committee is therefore working intensively on completing the current reform work by the end of the year 1. 1  However, it is still not clear when the review of the exposures to governments and public bodies will be complete. 3 [5]  Critics have expressed fears that the reforms I am talking about now will lead to minimum capital for certain banks increasing radically, which in turn risks resulting in a real economic decline. Here I would like to point out that the Basel Committee’s ongoing reform work does not aim to significantly increase the total global capital requirements. Instead, it concerns ensuring that all banks around the world have adequate resilience to manage financial crises and that risks are covered by capital in a uniform way in all banks and all countries. One result of this exercise is that banks that currently have very low risk weights will probably face higher capital requirements, while banks with very high risk weights may face lower capital requirements. Designing a uniform global regulatory framework is not an easy task, particularly as banking systems differ from country to country, but also because we are living in a changing world. The Basel Committee's work is therefore largely a question of finding compromises that all member countries can support and which will stand the test of time. Naturally, the Basel committee is also evaluating very carefully the effects of the proposals now under negotiation. This applies to the effects on the banks as well as on society.
You can’t keep on building up debt, sooner or later you will have to repay it. But you are not putting it correctly. Ideally, we would not only pass on our debts to future generations, but also assets that were created from that debt. That can’t work if you are living permanently above your means. When a crisis breaks out, we are pleased if countries have a buffer enabling them to make anticyclical investments and stimulate growth. Only countries that have previously pursued sound economic policies have that buffer. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

This must be taken in the light of all the information that is available at the time. For my part, I will also look forward with great interest to what my colleagues have to say. Thank you. BIS Review 6/2004  5
It is inevitable that economic growth needs to slow down to bring aggregate demand and supply back into balance. The risk of the major advanced economies entering a recession in 2023 is high. The latest Consensus Forecasts has US and Eurozone GDP growth for 2023 coming in at 0.5% or less. Two recent polls by Bloomberg place the probability of recession in the US and the Eurozone in the next 12 months at 50% and 80% respectively. The Asia-Pacific economies are at lower risk of a recession but they will see a spill-over from the broader global slowdown. Exports from the region are already declining. The key question is: how deep and prolonged will the downturn be? That will depend on how high and persistent inflation is. For if inflation turns out to be stubborn, central banks will have to tighten monetary policy more and for longer than currently anticipated by markets. The good scenario is a short and shallow downturn, maybe even a technical recession – a “soft landing”. What are the signs of hope? First, output gaps in the major economies are relatively modest and bringing aggregate demand and supply into balance may not require much more policy tightening. Second, the recent moderation in global food and energy prices will help to ease overall inflationary pressures and help to prevent inflation expectations from rising. In fact, long-term inflation expectations appear to be well anchored.

[3]  South and Southeast Asia are among the most dynamic economic regions in the world. Growth in these two regions is driven by favourable demographics, rising affluence, young tech-savvy consumers, and rapid urbanisation. ASEAN is likely to benefit from supply chain diversifications and an outward shift of labour-intensive manufacturing from China. South and Southeast Asia have booming tech sectors that present opportunities for PE/VC investments. The pandemic has accelerated digitalisation in Southeast Asia as retail transactions and communications migrated online to overcome COVID-19 restrictions. According to industry estimates, 3 out of 4 persons in ASEAN are now online. [4] Higher digital adoption in ASEAN has helped spur a vibrant technology sector. There is a burst of entrepreneurial energy in ASEAN and the region is home to many innovative high growth companies. The number of unicorns in ASEAN has continued to increase over the last few years. ASEAN’s early wave of tech giants like Grab, GoTo and Sea have made public exits. As other promising start-ups in the region scale up and expand their footprint, they will need to raise capital and seek PE/VC funding. Private credit will be a key driver of growth in private markets. There are opportunities for private credit to play a larger role in Asian enterprise financing just like its private equity counterpart. Private credit is generally structured in the form of floating rate exposures. Hence, investors benefit from larger coupons as interest rates rise.
The achievements of the December agreement must resolutely be built upon: regarding the Banking Union, a common backstop that would be available rapidly and remain in place for a sufficiently long period is an essential element, even more than the deposit insurance scheme, to ensure that the single resolution mechanism is solid and effective. The Capital Markets Union, on which everyone agrees in principle, must finally forge ahead to better channel our EUR 350 billion private savings surplus towards the concrete needs of our economy: digital innovation, the energy transition and SMEs’ capital. Finally, the progress achieved on the public solidarity mechanisms – preventive intervention of the European Stability Mechanism, fiscal capacity – is a promising prospect but it needs to be translated into action. 2 – My second wish is for financial stability 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  I would first like to acknowledge the soundness of our financial institutions. In June 2018, the Tier 1 capital ratio of the main French banks stood at 13.5%, i.e. 7.7% higher than in 2008. The liquidity situation has improved, with an average LCR of 127%. The share of non-performing loans has continued to decline to stand at 3.1% in June 2018, i.e. close to the pre-crisis level, compared with a European average of 3.6%. The same holds true for insurers. Their capitalisation is good, and their solvency has improved, with the average coverage ratio of the major insurers rising by 9 percentage points to reach 241%.

Against this background, Norges Bank increased the key policy rate in September –for the first time in seven years. If the economy evolves as we now expect, this is the beginning of a gradual normalisation of the interest rate level. A long period of low interest rates and mounting household debt burdens has led to greater uncertainty surrounding the effects of higher interest rates. This suggests a cautious approach to interest rate setting. Rising protectionism internationally and turbulence in some emerging economies adds to the risk picture, with potentially strong negative effects for Norway. Communication is an important part of our monetary policy. We aim to be transparent and to communicate frequently, simply and clearly. We have published our own interest rate projections since 2005. All through this year we have repeatedly indicated that the key policy rate most likely would be raised after summer. Financial stability The financial crisis was a reminder that price stability is not sufficient to guarantee financial stability. In an environment of low global interest rates, there is a clear risk of a build-up of financial imbalances, which increases the risk of new economic downturns further out. Norges Bank has thus in periods kept its key policy rate somewhat higher than implied by a short-term goal of inflation and output stability. This does not mean that asset prices or debt have been given independent roles as target variables of monetary policy. The decisive factor has been the 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  consideration of economic stability over time.
Although most countries now have well-functioning modern Central Securities Depositories, the structures below this top layer for providing posttrade services in securities markets remain in many cases extraordinarily complex and balkanised. Multiple tiers of custodians and sub-custodians, issuing agents, correspondent banks, clearing members, registrars and brokers – many operating on a solely national basis – provide an overlapping web of services to separate pools of market participants, using different operating procedures, systems and databases. That siloised model delivers settlement and collateral movements which, though much smoother than they were twenty years ago, are still typically measured in days rather than minutes or hours, and require multiple reconciliations – posing fixed costs, raising settlement and operational risks, tying up collateral, reducing transparency and posing barriers to entry. These segmented structures have not arisen by chance – in many cases they reflect the differing needs of market participants, variations in national practice and regulatory rules, and legacy systems. But they stand in the way of establishing a genuinely efficient international capital market. And they are now under unprecedented pressure from three sources: demand, technology and regulation. The strongest demand pressures come from the largest users of capital markets, who need to find further sharp cost savings if they are to deliver improved return on equity to investors.

Even in the very difficult moments in Croatia’s history during periods of international political isolation, we managed to have a very honest and professional relationship, which today I respect even more than I did then. For me the highlight in our relationship happened last year when Mr de Larosière accepted the invitation to give the keynote speech at the traditional Vth Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies organised by the Croatian National Bank. Definitely, his knowledge, experience and insight into the transition process were invaluable to the Conference. The title of his lecture was non-pretentious (like the man himself): “Transition Economies”, but his messages were very strong and deep (again, like Mr de Larosière himself). In his concluding remarks Mr de Larosière, among other things, had the courage to point out some of the negative human facets of transition, for example: “… in some countries the human costs of transition have been high, for instance in terms of male life expectancy ..., growing inequalities of income and increased poverty.” (de Larosière, 1999, p.10). Of course, there are many positive human sides to transition. What I would like to do today is neither present to you a comprehensive survey of transition as there are numerous articles entitled: “Ten years of transition …”, nor give some new empirical evidence about causalities between the main variables in the transition process. I would simply like to share with you some of the experiences I have had as a policymaker in transition, experience of course gained in my own country - Croatia.
In Asia, this will pose a strong challenge to Singapore, because it will strengthen the tendency for a single major hub to emerge, rather than several smaller ones. Tokyo will perforce be the biggest financial centre in our time zone, because of the sheer size of Japan’s investment funds and its economy. But Tokyo has significant limitations - a high cost structure, domestically oriented financial markets, consensus-based decision making, and not least, a lack of English speakers. This creates room for at least one other major financial hub in Asia. Singapore enjoys good economic cooperation with our Asian partners. We are well-placed to service the region, whether it is PSA, Changi Airport, or financial services. As the region recovers and grows, we hope to prosper together with Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. But our relationship with them is qualitatively different from Hong Kong’s vis-à-vis China. Besides, Southeast Asia is a smaller hinterland than China. Therefore for Singapore to grow as a hub, we must extend our catchment area beyond Southeast Asia. Our orientation must be international, and not just regional. We have done this before. This is how we became the fourth largest forex centre globally and the leading centre for global derivatives trading in the Asian time zone. The challenge is to repeat this feat in new areas of competence. Developed markets and global players are already our customers. Singapore can be a portal, an intermediary or a market for them. Finding the right partners in strategic alliances will be critical.

The overall social, economic, and political climate and policies need to be sound. Similarly, MAS can function effectively only because the Singapore Government as a whole is honest, efficient, and committed to public service. If MAS does its work well, we will not only develop an international financial hub, but also contribute to the governance, stability and prosperity of Singapore. 9  BIS Review 30/2000
It is clear to me that only if the industry and supervisors work together - each meeting our responsibilities and reinforcing the other - will we be able to successfully manage and supervise a modern financial system. While perspectives may differ from time to time, our objective is the same to maintain a strong and vibrant financial system over the long term. Thank you very much. 6  BIS Review 15/2003

Going forward the long term viability of BCH will depend on its ability to create a wide range of innovative product offerings that are endorsed by globally renowned Shariah scholars and on the continuous strong support from the key stakeholders. On that note, allow me to congratulate the parties involved in today's signing of Memorandum of Participation – the Commodity Murabahah House, participating Islamic banks and the CPO suppliers – for showing and giving your commitment to making the CMH a reality. Also I wish to take this opportunity to extend my deepest appreciation to the team at Bursa Malaysia, Bank Negara and SC who had conceptualised the idea and all other stakeholders who have worked hard to make this noble initiative come true, insyaAllah. 2  BIS Review 93/2009
we use cookies together, youtoare theagree blueprint serve the foundation forcan our global This isbythe house we're going to live in for a long time. Let's build it to last. reviewing our Privacy Statement. 1 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, ARRC Commends Decisions Outlining the Definitive Endgame for  LIBOR, March 5, 2021. 2 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, Progress Report: The Transition from U.S. Dollar LIBOR, March  31, 2021. 3 John C. Williams, 901 Days, Remarks at Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA),  New York, July 15, 2019. 4 Forum on Ongoing Innovation in Reference Rates for Commercial Lending, Presentation materials,  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, November 18, 2020. 5 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, ARRC Identifies Market Indicators to Support a Recommendation  of a Forward-Looking SOFR Term Rate, May 6, 2021. 6 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, Second Report, March 2018. 7 John C. Williams, 537 Days: Time Is Still Ticking, Remarks at LIBOR: Entering the Endgame, Webinar,  July 13, 2020. See also: Financial Stability Board, Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, November 20, 2020; and Bank of England Financial Policy Committee, Interim Financial Stability Report, May 2020. 8 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, The ARRC Selects a Broad Repo Rate as its Preferred Alternative  Reference Rate, June 22, 2017. 9 John C. Williams, 537 Days: Time Is Still Ticking, Remarks at LIBOR: Entering the Endgame, Webinar,  July 13, 2020. See also: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, IOSCO Compliance, as of May 2021.

10 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, Best Practices for Completing Transition from LIBOR, as of  September 3, 2020. 11 Treasury Market Practice Group Financial Benchmarks, as of May 2021. By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement.