samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As with monetary policy, both operate subject to statutory objectives and remits set by Parliament. And as with monetary policy, each is subject to rigorous accountability mechanisms enforced by Parliament. Both FPC and MPC have instrument, but not goal, independence. These institutional features have attractions as a response to the time-consistency dilemma which faces financial policymakers. The Bank of England is an institution with around 320 years of history. Financial crises have pock-marked its history. This ought to provide the Bank with the institutional memory necessary to make sense of dots on distant horizons, to diagnose emerging obesity in the financial system’s tails, to conscientiously object to next time appearing different. The primary objective of the FPC is to preserve the resilience of the financial system and, subject to that, to support the government’s objectives including for employment and growth. That ordering of the FPC’s objectives helps lean against short-term pressures to go for growth today at the cost of instability tomorrow. In effect, the FPC provides the longsightedness necessary to preserve future stability at a time when private risk horizons may be shortening. And it provides necessary insurance against future tail risks at a time when these tails may be fattening. This macro-prudential regime, with the FPC at its centrepiece, is an explicitly institutional solution to the financial policy dilemma. It is regulation of the system for the system: of the system because the FPC’s focus is system-wide; for the system because the FPC’s aim is stability in the wider economy.

One man’s hyperbolic preferences are another’s policy time-inconsistencies. For example, when setting monetary policy, there may be a desire to go for growth today at the expense of inflation tomorrow – to seek the drugs rather than gas and air option. Because people over time build that behaviour into their expectations, the result may be a permanent upwards inflation bias, the like of which blighted many advanced economies in the 1970s (Barro and Gordon (1983)). Over the past 30 years, practical solutions have been sought to this monetary policy myopia problem. Interestingly, these solutions have often been explicitly institutional. Over that period, monetary policy in a great many countries has been placed in the hands of central banks operating arms-length from government, but with an inflation mandate set by government. The reasons for doing so should be readily familiar from the earlier literature on institutional economics. Central banks have institutional memory, embedding past knowledge of the costs of inflationary excess. For example, the Bundesbank’s inflation-aversion is deeply rooted in Germany’s hyperinflationary past. This memory of the past is crucial for preserving the value of money in the future. So too is operational independence from government. This helps provide the patience necessary to safeguard future stability in the value of money – for example, through an inflation target. It leans against the St Augustinian tendency to dash for growth today at the expense of inflation tomorrow.
17  Table 2 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent)  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national saving (% of GDP) Nominal gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  2016  2017 (f)  Sep.17 Report  Jun.17 Report  Sept.17 Report  1.0-1.75 2.5 1.8 -0.9 2.6 0.7 4.3 -1.0 20.2 22.1  1.25-1.75 2.6 1.7 -1.6 2.7 0.1 4.6 -1.2 19.8 21.7  1.6 1.1 2.0 -0.8 2.8 -0.1 -1.6 -1.4 20.2 23.2  2018 (f) Jun.17 Report  Sept.17 Report  2.5-3.5 3.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.9 6.6 -1.9 20.3 22.2  2.5-3.5 3.9 2.9 3.2 2.8 4.5 7.4 -1.8 20.2 21.8  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 10  CPI inflation (*)  CPIEFE inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  Sept.17 Report  Jun.17 Report  (*) Gray area shows forecast as from the third quarter of 2017.

Philipp Hildebrand: The Swiss National Bank’s ability to act in the crisis Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Executive MBA HSG, Universität St Gallen, St Gallen, 21 January 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The global financial system is in the midst of the biggest crisis of the postwar years. Above all, the crisis is the most complex of this period. Problems in the US sub-prime mortgage market led to the breakdown of both markets and general trust. In particular, the interbank market, the nerve centre of the financial markets, froze up for several months. Governments and central banks managed to prevent the financial system from collapsing. The interbank market has been revived and risk premia have come down from their former record levels. In the meantime, however, the financial crisis has worked its way through into the real economy, which is now moving into a sharp downturn. In order to fight the crisis, the central banks have lowered their key interest rates aggressively. The instrument of the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the repo rate, has practically reached zero. However, this certainly does not mean that the SNB is incapable of action. If needed, there are other options available. The National Bank can extend the terms of repo transactions or give consideration to the purchase of government and corporate bonds.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Intervention at the Eurofi Financial Forum 2011 Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the Eurofi Financial Forum 2011, Wroclaw, 15 September 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to be back here at the Eurofi Financial Forum. These events always provide a very good opportunity to exchange views on issues that are central to the effective functioning of the financial sector and its key task of supporting sustainable growth in the real economy. As we are all well aware, this is a very challenging time for the advanced economies. We avoided a dramatic economic depression in the autumn of 2008 – following the collapse of Lehman Brothers three years ago to this very day. But we still have a long way to go to move beyond this crisis. At the Pittsburgh Summit two years ago, the G20 leaders reiterated their promise to do “everything necessary to ensure recovery, to repair our financial systems and to maintain the global flow of capital”. Now, more than ever, we need to make significant progress in delivering on those promises. Today, I would like to focus on what has been achieved so far by our collective efforts to repair our financial systems – in particular, the establishment of the new European supervisory structure, the agreement on Basel III and the global framework for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).

Caleb M Fundanga: Framework of cooperation between the Bank of Zambia and the University of Zambia Opening remarks by Mr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the University of Zambia, Lusaka, 30 June 2010. *  *  *  The Vice Chancellor, University of Zambia – Prof. Stephen Simukanga The Deputy Governor – Administration and University Council Chairperson – Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula Distinguished Professors and Lecturers from UNZA Colleagues from the Bank Members of the Press Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen; It gives me great delight, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to this important signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the University of Zambia. The MoU that we are about to sign today provides a framework for the support to the Economics Department and Research activities in the Department. Ladies and Gentlemen; the Bank of Zambia continues to view the University of Zambia and the Copperbelt University as strategic partners in the economic development of Zambia. It is for this reason that the Bank has for several years now been involved in the support of various capacity building programmes at the two tertiary learning institutions.
If the monetary authority were to commit to a program 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  of asset purchases until some economic objective is reached and, at the same time, were to make it clear that the policy rate would not begin to rise until the asset purchase program were completed, these steps might help anchor expectations about the likely path of short-term rates more effectively. The Federal Reserve’s third round of LSAPs, which was open-ended, was an important innovation of policy that the paper might have discussed in greater detail. I also don’t agree with the paper’s conclusions about agency MBS purchases. Such purchases do not represent “credit easing” as argued in the paper. The government’s interventions to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have made it clear that there is no credit risk in the Federal Reserve’s purchase of such obligations. Also, the authors don’t acknowledge that the ability to purchase agency MBS has two benefits. First, it enables the Federal Reserve to purchase longer-duration assets at a faster pace without disrupting market functioning. This facilitates larger LSAP programs, when a larger program is viewed as necessary. Second, it opens up another channel by which asset purchases can provide stimulus—by narrowing the spread between agency MBS and Treasuries, the Federal Reserve can drive down long-term mortgage rates and provide support to the housing sector and to home prices.

These include potential selection bias of the events chosen and the fact that event studies may not capture all the factors that influence how market prices respond to LSAP announcements. The first problem with event studies, of course, is the issue of how much new information is revealed by the actual policy announcement. I would argue that LSAPs were always a possibility, so the probability of their use never went from 0% to 100%, even for the first LSAP program. This suggests that event studies could lead to downwardly biased estimates of the impact of LSAPs. In fact, if the announcement indicated that the program was smaller than expected, then bond yields could rise on the program’s announcement. This scenario could occur even though the overall program—including its anticipation—was effective in reducing yields. This makes interpreting the direction of changes in bond yields on the day of an announcement difficult. The second problem with event studies is that there are always other things going on. When the Fed announces an LSAP program, long-term rates might drop because of the announcement, or because market participants were revising downward their views about the state of the economy and the economic outlook in light of the Fed’s actions. Or, conversely, long-term yields could conceivably even rise as market participants became more confident that the policy actions would be sufficient to push the economy toward the central bank’s goals of maximum sustainable employment and price stability.
Therefore, it is important for the Islamic financial services industry to continually promote human capital development and expertise to create a larger pool of experts and high calibre professionals. This involves attracting not only the existing talent pool, but also building a robust pipeline of skilled human resources for the future. This is vital to drive the development of the industry to greater heights. Ladies and Gentlemen, On this occasion of the official launch of Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad, it is with pleasure that I congratulate Hong Leong Bank Berhad for its interest and commitment to contribute to the success of Islamic finance by allocating resources in having a dedicated subsidiary to drive its Islamic banking business forward. The establishment of the Islamic subsidiary is a positive step forward in the aspiration of making Malaysia as a leading and attractive integrated Islamic financial hub. I wish Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad every success in its endeavours. Ladies and Gentlemen, Dengan lafaz Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, saya dengan sukacitanya merasmikan pelancaran "Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad". Terima kasih. 2/2

On the other hand, due to its high share in the expenditures of especially low-income households and corresponding purchasing power effects, food prices are given a great importance by policy makers. Meanwhile, the metals, such as iron ore, copper and aluminum, are among the most important raw materials for the industry and construction sector. The reason why commodity prices have been frequently attracting attention is the current fluctuations in commodity prices of a magnitude that has not been seen since 2007. Price of brent crude oil, which was USD 50 per barrel in early 2007, climbed to USD 145 within one and a half year. Then, parallel to the deepening global crisis in late 2008, crude oil prices went back to USD 35; and now it is hovering around USD 125. And the uncertainties about oil prices, resulting from demand and supply-side developments, and their potential effects keep the policymakers interest in commodity prices alive in the current economic outlook. As they are among the risk factors that affect the inflation outlook, we directly referred to commodity prices, mostly to those of crude oil and food, in our latest inflation reports. As a matter of fact, nearly half of the revisions about official inflation forecasts published in our inflation reports in the last couple of years originated from the changes in our assumptions about food and commodity prices. This suggests that the rise in commodity prices may bring about challenges for central banks not only in terms of direct pressures on inflation.
of GDP Region average  CEE  40.0 30.00  30.0  20.00  20.0  10.00  10.0  0.00  0.0 -10.0  2007-2005  2012-2008  2015-2013  -10.00  2007-2005  2012-2008  2015-2013  -20.00 Direct investments  Portfolio investments  Direct investments  Other -debt instruments  Portfolio investments  Other -debt instruments  SEE  Baltics  30.00  80.00  25.00  60.00  20.00 15.00  40.00  10.00  20.00  5.00  0.00  0.00  2007-2005  2012-2008  Direct investments  2015-2013  -20.00  Portfolio investments  Other -debt instruments  2007-2005  2012-2008  Direct investments  2015-2013  Portfolio investments  Other -debt instruments  Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics. The screening of the structure of the capital inflows pinpoints to a slowdown of all types of capital inflows. Foreign direct investments continued in the region, but at a slower pace especially during 2013-2015. In all three regions, direct investment flows moderated, but were positive on a continuous basis since the crisis. The slowdown of the portfolio inflows was the lowest. The dynamics of portfolio inflows is positive throughout the whole period for all sub-regions. Since 2008 on a cumulative basis portfolio inflows increased on average by 12 p.p. of GDP with highest increase observed in CEE countries of 18 p.p. of GDP. The portfolio flows were mainly driven by the debt component, while the equity component went through mild changes.

Distance of debt level 2020/21 to 60% Maastricht Criteria  3  Strong adjustment  No adjustment  4  -10  0  Gradual adjustment  2 1  20  30  40  ROM  LIT  HUN  LAT  CZR  POL  MKD  BIH  SLO  CRO  BUL  ALB  35  LAT  LITH  15 MK  PL  AL  25  RO  BIH  5 -5  SRB  HU CRO  0 -1  10  45  7  5  -20  BUG  8  6  -30  -15 -25  SLO -35  SRB  IMF DSA Debt change 2021/2020 - 2015  -2  -45  *Size: 0.5 - no adjustment; 1 - gradual; above 1 - strong. ** "-" is above "+" is below the benchmark. ***  To sum up, it appears that ECB policy accommodative actions affected the financial conditions in the region. Reduction of the main policy rate allowed a room for policy rate reduction in the region thus contributing to lower costs for borrowing of the private and public sector. Part of the injected liquidity through asset purchase programs seems to be allocated on the CESEE financial markets, enabling cross– border capital flows that underpinned the process of recovery of asset prices and reduction of the borrowing costs.
Given the implications of these changes for the Bank’s mission and for users, businesses and regulators, it is important that the Bank consider how RTGS will need to evolve to meet and shape payments trends in the coming decades. That is why we are today announcing our plan to design a blueprint for a new heart that can support the future demands placed on the UK’s high-value sterling settlement system. In my remaining remarks tonight I want to do three things. First, set out some of the key drivers of change. Second, explain some of the strategic questions we want to ask on the future role of RTGS. And, third, set out how we will go about developing a blueprint for a new high value payments system. 3  Either directly in the case of high-value payments made via CHAPS, or indirectly after netting in the case of retail payments made via the various private sector schemes. 4  The Deloitte Report on the October 2014 RTGS outage can be found here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ publications/Documents/news/2015/rtgsdeloitte.pdf. An update on the completion of the recommendations of the Deloitte Report can be found here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/paymentsystems/ deliotteactions.pdf. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Evolution in the payments landscape Much has changed in the UK payments landscape in the past twenty years. In particular, I want to highlight two linked drivers of change as being important in shaping the future demands placed on the Bank’s provision of real-time settlement: the changing regulatory environment and developments in payments technologies.

There are differences not only across countries, but also across firms within the individual countries. The role of government debt is now the subject of heated international debate. One argument that comes up more and more often is that the significance of debt has been systematically overestimated. Large countries with their own central banks have no need to worry. Japan and the United States, two countries that are highly indebted but nonetheless pay low interest rates, often serve as examples. That is impossible in the euro area, for purely legal reasons if nothing else. We have set maximum limits on the Member States’ levels of deficit and debt. And the ECB cannot buy government bonds on the primary market, for example bonds which other market participants no longer want because of, say, doubts about the sustainability of a country’s debt. We can only purchase government bonds on the secondary market to a limited extent and only if such a purchase is absolutely necessary to maintain price stability. These are the legal conditions. And what are the economic ones? In the recent debt crisis we had a front-seat view of what happens when individual countries build up too much debt. These states lose the confidence of market participants and their access to credit, or can only borrow at extremely high rates of interest. Moreover, I think we have to reflect 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  on the burden we are leaving to other generations.
A slide in both copper and cobalt export earnings owing to lower prices accounted for this outturn. Nonetheless, it should be noted that commodity prices on the international markets recently have been edging upwards. If this trend is sustained, Zambia’s external position may improve accordingly. Foreign capital inflow Your Excellencies, the global financial crisis has led to the decline in the foreign portfolio investment inflows as investors reduced their exposure to emerging market instruments. The risk aversion towards emerging markets has led to a reduction in foreign portfolio inflows and  2  BIS Review 86/2009  holdings in Zambia’s Government securities. This has resulted in a net outflow of foreign portfolio investment since funds that mature are not being rolled over and funds coming in have be en scaled down. For example, the foreign investor’s total holding of Government securities has reduced from K1,054.7 billion in the third quarter of 2008 to K446.2 billion by the second quarter of 2009. Similarly, the flow of foreign investments at the Lusaka Stock Exchange has switched from a net inflow of $ million during the period January to May 2008 to a net outflow of $ million in the same period this year. Exchange rate volatility and domestic inflation The global financial meltdown has caused a contagion effect to our foreign exchange market and has led to volatility in the exchange rate of the Kwacha against major currencies.

The global financial and economic crises thus negatively impacted on economies around the world by adversely affecting trade and investment flows and the price of key export commodities. To respond to this crisis, several actions are being taken at global level by the major economies to address the root causes and the effects of the global financial and economic crises. These are fiscal and monetary policy stimulus measures aimed at boosting global consumption and investment demand in an effort to avoid a significantly sharper global contraction than that which has already occurred. Measures typically entailed reduction of interest rates, tax cuts and increased Government spending in form of bail-outs of strategic institutions and in some cases virtual nationalisation. Concrete steps are also now being taken to reform the regulatory and supervisory frameworks governing the financial sector. Further, increased resources have been provided to key multi-lateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions have also been mandated to play a central role in leading the global response to the crisis and evaluating the efficacy of the various measures that are being implemented. Impact of the global economic crisis on Zambia The Zambian financial sector has so far not been directly adversely affected by the credit crunch as reflected in the continued stability of the banking sector with most banks being adequately capitalized and the inter-bank market operating as before. This is mainly due to the sector’s limited integration into the international financial markets.