samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
From those years we also saw: the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, which finally came into force in 2016, providing a comprehensive framework to deal with failing banks outside common mercantile insolvency proceedings; and the 2014 directive harmonising national deposit guarantee schemes. Despite these improvements in the euro area’s institutional framework, significant vulnerabilities still persist, both at the area level and in Member States. Additional steps would be required to ensure a more stable and stronger Monetary Union. In order to overcome the current complacency arising from the more favourable economic and financial environment, the European Commission has put forward a number of initiatives aimed at advancing towards further economic integration. Completing the Banking Union was, rightly, given top priority, and included the creation of a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund and a common European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), although, in this latter case, in my opinion, to deactivate the perverse loop between sovereigns and banks a more ambitious approach than the one pursued by the Commission would perhaps be needed. Also, a consensus is needed to move, in parallel, towards increasing private and public risksharing and reducing risks in bank balance sheets, stepping up efforts to lower the still-high levels of NPLs and diversify sovereign risk exposures. Current proposals to create Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities, by structuring asset pools into tranches with different risk levels, could potentially contribute to such diversification. There are Commission´s proposals in other areas.

Growth in the euro area has relied heavily on the ECB’s very accommodative monetary policy. While the area’s aggregate fiscal stance has ceased to be a drag on growth, we could benefit – in full respect of our rule-based fiscal framework – from a more growthfriendly composition of public finances, which would also support the necessary consolidation in Member states with higher debt levels. But it is also essential to try to regain momentum in the structural reform agenda, in order to increase the resilience of national economies and foster productivity and potential growth. The euro area governance reform agenda should not be let aside either. Progress in renewing the institutional architecture of EMU has been substantial, especially since 2012. At the height of the sovereign crisis, awareness of the vulnerabilities that were causing severe financial fragmentation and increasing risks of a break-up of the euro area generated the political consensus needed to establish permanent crisis-management mechanisms, strengthen fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance, and start developing a Banking Union. 7/9  Initially, reforms proceeded at a relatively rapid pace. At the beginning of 2012, two important treaties were signed: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Treaty and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. The agreement in mid-2012 to move towards the Banking Union led to the setting-up of two of its pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), in 2014, and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), in 2016.
Nevertheless, amid high uncertainty this output growth is not yet accompanied with investment increase. Consumer demand also weakens due to the slowdown in annual  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  growth of real income of households which has contracted to 0.5%. As a result, procurement manager sentiment index in the service sector deteriorates. The situation in the labour market remains unchanged, seasonally adjusted unemployment rate stayed at 5.2% in October. Broad set of labour market indicators, including the number of working hours, number and length of unpaid vacations, and others do not bear evidence of considerable concealed unemployment. According to our estimates the labour productivity growth slowed down to 0.7% in January-October this year with persistent gap between the growth of wages and labour productivity signaling of slow pace of economic restructuring. These factors affected GDP dynamics. Our estimate of the GDP growth in 2014 has been slightly raised to 0.6%. Due to the transition to the floating exchange rate, the foreign exchange market absorbs external shocks preserving relative stability of other segments of the financial market. For comparison, during the global crisis of 2008, the volatility of the money market rates exceeded the current values ten-fold. The banking sector continues stable servicing and funding of the economy. During the previous 11 months, loans to non-financial organisations grew by 12% and loans to households by 12.7% (adjusted for currency revaluation). The financial system gradually adjusts to inflation targeting and floating exchange rate.

EBRD’s involvement in two very important initiatives, namely the Local Currency and Local Capital Market Initiative and the Vienna Initiative, has been essential for Romania and the region. I am closely following the evolution of the EBRD. I believe that it finds itself at a cross-road, as the world has been changing rapidly due to the remarkable achievements of the past century: the IT revolution, artificial intelligence, the technological progress and so on. EBRD, as other financial institutions, ought to adapt itself to this new environment and try to respond wisely and appropriately. In this respect, I think that EBRD has to continue its work in the countries for which the Bank was initially created, as transition gaps still exist. We all need to share our experience with the new countries of operations, adjusting our knowledge to new challenging environments. We need to remain open minded and ready to tackle further challenges in this multidimensional environment. EBRD needsto be ready to share, when and if its help is required. Together with the other institutions of European Union, the European Commission, the EIB Group, as well as the national development agencies of the member states, we all have a duty to help/assist the less fortunate. However, as expansion is a “hot topic” today in the EBRD, should it be considered by the shareholders in the future, it needs to be calibrated with a strong and decisive intervention in the current countries of operations, to remove as much as possible the transition gaps.
The crisis is a powerful reminder that liquidity – both domestic and  BIS Review 76/2010  5  international – can never be taken for granted. How will international liquidity be provided in the future, and by whom? These are not new questions. Over the last ten years, the build up in foreign exchange reserves in emerging economies has been spectacular, which is a sign that the supply of international liquidity was seen both as insufficient and uncertain. More recently, Governor Zhu, from the People Bank of China has raised the issue of reserve currencies. According to Governor Zhu, current arrangements for liquidity provision are a source of instability and have played a role in causing the crisis. Governor Zhu has mentioned, in particular, the intrinsic contradiction embodied in the famous “Triffin dilemma”. Because the dollar is the major reserve currency, international liquidity supply depends on the US running a sufficiently large current account deficit which, by itself, aggravates global imbalances and creates instability. Governor Zhu suggested that the role and status of the SDR be enhanced, with the long term objective of creating a “super reserve” currency. However, international liquidity provision should now be considered in a broader framework. The Triffin dilemma goes back to a period when international capital markets were poorly developed. By then, international liquidity was limited to instruments used to settle payments between official monetary authorities. It was represented by claims on such official entities.

In the same vein, allow me, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, to wish the Government, and people of the Republic of Zambia a happy 50th birth year which we will be celebrating on 24th October 2014, and one which has been attained under a tranquil environment and economic progress. Fellow Staff and Invited Guests, I would most likely be in breach of all moral standing if I did not, at this stage, emphasize the Bank of Zambia’s deep commitment to the welfare and well-being of our employees. I implore all of us to aim at leaving a legacy of professionalism and excellence in all that we do. I further encourage all the sportsmen and women participating in today’s events not to despair should they not emerge victorious for one reason or another. Rather, I strongly urge you all to walk away after the games feeling immensely proud that you have been an integral part of a truly momentous and historic occasion. Remember, one can only turn 50 years of age once! Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to further extend my sincere gratitude to the commercial banks that have sent their representatives to come and attend this event. The support we have received to date has been unflinching throughout the years. We shall continue to work together in order to ensure that the levels of service delivery to our customers is raised and maintained at high standards. Distinguished Guests, this really, is not an occasion for long-winded speeches.
Picking up the payments example I used earlier, again as one example of a broader trend, we saw that: Where firms separated out BACS payments from other payment types, the impact tolerances they defined for customer harm or market integrity as well as safety & soundness were all within one working day; The firms that listed CHAPS and Faster Payments as separate IBS typically set 24 hours as the impact tolerance for customer harm or market integrity, but with a range of impact tolerances for safety & soundness that spread from two days to two weeks; For international payments, the impact tolerances we saw ranged from 24 to 48 hours for customer harm or market integrity, and from 24 hours to two weeks for safety & soundness; and Where firms identified IBS more broadly than relating to individual payment systems, the tolerances they set were necessarily more generic. As a supervisor for many years, I have experienced a variety of operational incidents and seen the effects they have had on customers, market confidence, safety & soundness and ultimately financial stability. Based on this, my initial impression is that the range of impact tolerances that have been submitted for payments-related IBS seems surprisingly wide. Therefore, as we go about our supervisory reviews in the coming year, our teams will be pushing firms to justify their judgements and we will undertake more detailed comparisons across peer groups.

While this list is clearly not exhaustive, it does include some of the main sectors that have historically been most subject to over-exuberant credit growth. The final tool is the ability to set and vary a minimum leverage ratio. A leverage ratio is essentially just (a transformation of) the ratio of capital to unweighted assets. Such a measure fails to allow for the varying riskiness of different forms of lending. However, the wide variation in risk weights across banks raises questions about the reliability of those risk-weight models. Moreover, as my colleague Andy Haldane (Haldane and Madouros, 2012) recently documented, a simple leverage ratio measure does a somewhat better job of predicting which banks were more likely to get into difficulties during the crisis than does a  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  risk-weighted capital ratio 2 (see Chart 2). Given the imperfections of risk-weighting, the ability to impose a minimum leverage ratio provides a useful additional instrument that can backstop the usual risk-weighted capital ratio. International discussions about the implementation of a leverage ratio are still continuing and this instrument is only likely to become part of the FPC’s toolkit after 2018. The application of these so-called macroprudential policies is still very much at the developmental stage. When the Bank gained operational responsibility for monetary policy in 1997, there was a long history of practical experience, together with a vast theoretical and empirical literature for us to draw on. That didn’t make setting monetary policy easy, but it certainly helped.
2  BIS Review 61/2001  d.  Fourth, the consolidation should not lead to loss of service for small depositors, for whom affordable banking services are a necessity. e.  Fifth, any cross-border partnerships should not result in the foreign partner taking control of a Singapore bank. I will elaborate on these five considerations in turn. Managing the integration Consolidation, whilst necessary for the local banks to be competitive, is not in itself sufficient to produce strong banks. Having merged, the banks will have to integrate and rationalise different management teams, information and risk management systems, and internal control procedures. The reality is that some mergers work while others do not. Good execution of a merger will produce a stronger bank, by yielding the expected synergies and cost savings. Poor execution will only lead to a more unwieldy and riskier bank. A larger scale and wider range of activities will demand stronger and more institutionalised management. Singapore banks have benefited from having their principal shareholders, including family shareholders, play an important role in overseeing the banks, although most no longer run the management. The controlling families have had the entrepreneurship and business acumen to build up the banks, and their long-term interests were substantially aligned with those of the banks. This situation currently serves us well, but is not likely to endure over the longer term.

Christian Noyer: Euro area’s situation – analysis, challenges and solutions Lunch-debate by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Montreal conference: “Demographic shifts – threats or opportunities?”, Montreal, 11 June 2012. *  *  *  Prime Minister, Governor, Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure and honour to participate in this lunch-debate with you today. I would especially like to thank the International Economic Forum of the Americas and its Chairman for organising this Montreal Conference, which for the past 18 years has been a major international economic event. I would also like to take this opportunity to share my analysis of the euro area’s situation, the challenges we face and the solutions available to us. Before doing so, I think that it would be useful to say a few words about the international economic situation. At the global level, growth is expected to slow down slightly in 2012 compared with 2011, notably due to a moderation in growth in Europe and a little bit also in emerging countries, in particular China. The United States is recovering relatively rapidly, but faces a number of challenges, especially with regard to its fiscal situation and the housing market. Overall, – and this is one of the things that the crisis has clearly highlighted since 2008 – the world’s economic areas are closely interlinked and problems end up being shared.
A few months ago, we brought together mental health and policy experts to examine the pandemic’s impact on mental health in communities of color, including the correlation between depression, anxiety, and economic factors such as lost income.6 And next week, we’ll be hosting an event in collaboration with New York University’s Rory Meyers College of Nursing, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the Low Income Investment Fund, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to discuss the need for investments in maternal and child health.7 Our goal for convening this coalition of thought and civic leaders is to find innovative ways to ensure that all mothers across the city have the care they need to fully participate in the economy and that their children are positioned for a healthy start. Today you’ll hear from an exceptional lineup of panelists: leaders in the medical, academic, and policy worlds. We’ll close with a panel of my colleagues, fellow Reserve Bank presidents, who will share their reflections on what we’ve learned and discussed today. So, with that, I’ll hand it over to Marielle Segarra of Marketplace who will moderate the next part of the program. Thank you all again for joining today’s event. 1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Introduction to COVID-19 Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities,  updated December 10, 2020.

The ratio of vacancies to unemployment – which we consider one of the more reliable summary indicators of labour market tightness in recent years – fell to 0.9, from a peak of 1.1 back in August. That chimes with recent intelligence from our network of Agents and their corporate contacts across the country, which points to some easing in recruitment difficulties. Nonetheless, while pointing to some easing in recent months, these indicators suggest the labour market remains tight in an absolute sense relative to historical experience. In turn, this is consistent with continued strength in UK wage growth. Annual private sector regular pay growth[6] was 7.3% in the latest report, 0.1pp higher than expected in the MPR, even if the momentum of wage growth may now be slowing. Turning to yesterday’s CPI data, inflation fell to 10.1% in January, from 10.5% in December. On the month, this mainly owed to an easing in services and fuel price inflation, although developments in historically very volatile components such as airfares counted for a large part of the former. Both the March and May MPC meetings represent points at which the Committee can again assess the implications of incoming data for the monetary policy stance, with the latter having the advantage of an updated comprehensive assessment in the form of the MPC forecasts.
Credibility and anchored inflation expectations require that we do not give credit to the past “toothpaste” view of monetary policy – contractionary policy cannot fight inflation once it is out – nor symmetrically to the current “string” view of monetary policy – whereby accommodative policy cannot fight deflation. So, our results have to be judged over the medium term. We are only fifteen months after the real start of QE in the Eurozone but we can already see some positive effects. According to Eurosystem staff assessments, without the APP (Asset Purchasing Program) inflation would have been negative in 2015, more than half of a percentage point lower in 2016, and around half of a percentage point lower in 2017. If we pursue our program, what should we expect down the road? The US Federal Reserve has shown us the way, taking a series of very important steps to increase monetary stimulus even after it brought its policy interest rate to zero. The Fed issued forward  2  2  C. Romer and D. Romer “The Most Dangerous Idea in Federal Reserve History: Monetary Policy Doesn’t Matter” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2013, 103(3): 55–60. BIS central bankers’ speeches  guidance to signal a protracted period of low interest rates and began QE. The US logically leads the way as it was the first epicenter of the Great recession. The US QE began in November 2008 and core inflation troughed in October 2010.

The men of Eidsvoll needed a bank that could provide credit in Norway. Norges Bank quickly became an important lender. It was not until the latter half of the 1800s that a private banking system truly came into being. Norges Bank acquired its present-day role of the bankers’ bank and lender of last resort. With private banking came banking crises. The 1899 crash in Christiania triggered the first serious banking crisis in Norway. A real estate bubble in the capital burst and house prices  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  plummeted. It took more than 100 years for real house prices in Oslo to return to their precrash level.4 Banks play a key role in the payments system and channel credit from savers to investors. If the flow of credit seizes up, problems will rapidly spread through the entire economy, as witnessed during the latest financial crisis. A robust banking system is of benefit to us all. Banks are now adapting to new capital requirements. On top of the new capital requirements is a countercyclical capital buffer. The countercyclical capital buffer will vary over time. It will be increased when financial imbalances build up. In the event of economic stress and large bank losses, banks will be able to draw down the buffer. Chart 7: Key policy rate and bank lending rates Even if the key policy rate is low, interest rates on loans to households and enterprises are not particularly low.
And judging from their persistent low profitability and price-to-book ratios, developing sustainable business models remains a major challenge for many banks. One important element of this is misconduct, where the peak of the crisis for banks has arisen more slowly than the prudential crunch in 2008. It casts a very long shadow – most importantly, on the lives and livelihoods affected by unacceptable behaviour, but as a secondary effect on banks’ ability to generate sustainable returns and build capital internally. For example, in their 2015 results UK banks disclosed a further £ billion of provisions relating to past misconduct, which reduced their pre-tax profits by around one half. But this is only part of the picture – even leaving aside misconduct, many banks have simply not yet adapted to the new prudential constraints or the lower-rate environment. This is now a first-order issue for us as the PRA and FPC. A recent paper by Natasha Sarin and Larry Summers provides a useful reminder that on many market metrics the banking system still looks fragile, which they argue may be largely due to 6  weakened business franchises . While we have done a huge amount to repair the financial system in recent years, as supervisors we would be unwise to ignore these signals – we need to complete the implementation and give firms a proper chance to adapt to the new world. That’s what our forward-looking, judgement-based approach now requires.

How much central bank reserves the private banks had depended, among other things, on how much bank deposits they had on their books, related to the reserve requirements the Federal Reserve applied. The banks’ demand for reserves then determined how much bonds the Fed was obliged to purchase to steer the interest rates to the desired level. This led to the Fed already having a substantial portfolio of government bonds before the financial crisis. Since the level of interest rates in many countries has ended up close to the lower bound, most central banks around the world have made significantly greater purchases of financial assets with the aim of making monetary policy more expansionary. Longer market rates can be divided up into the sum of future expected short-term interest rates plus a premium. If the markets are not frictionless, the size of this premium may partly depend on the relative supply of a certain bond, which is to say the outstanding stock in the hands of the private sector. If the central bank purchases a significant proportion of the stock, the price of the remaining bonds can therefore rise and interest rates thereby fall. When the Riksbank purchases bonds, liquidity is injected into the market – the investor swaps the bond for deposits in a bank and the amount of central bank reserves in the banking system as a whole increases. How effective quantitative easing is depends on how investors and bankers use this liquidity.