samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is also vital for sustaining public support for open and global financial markets. The FMSB is not self-regulation. The laws and regulations governing conduct apply and will continue to be enforced. But the official sector has an important role to play in supporting such market-led initiatives, helping to solve coordination problems and enabling the private sector to come together to raise standards and share best practice. An excellent example of this approach is the development of a single global foreign exchange code being written through a partnership between 16 central banks and market participants in both advanced and 13  Further information on the FMSB, its membership and draft guidance can be found at: http://www.fmsb.com/ 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6  emerging economies. 14  This will be the first time that the approximately $ trillion per day foreign exchange  market will be governed by a single code of conduct. Sections of the global foreign exchange code covering ethics, information sharing, execution, confirmation and settlement, including an update on how adherence to the code will be promoted, was released in May 2016. The full text of the code, including additional sections on governance, risk management and compliance, is on track for publication in May 2017. The nature of conduct risks will of course evolve over time and the official sector needs to stay on the front foot.

Heng Swee Keat: A review of Singapore’s economy and financial system Opening remarks by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at MAS' Annual Report 2008/09 Press Conference, Singapore, 16 July 2009. *  *  *  Backdrop on global financial and economic crisis The world economy has witnessed one of the most tumultuous and challenging times. Global GDP is expected to contract in 2009, the first time in the post-War period. 1 The tremors that shook the financial markets surpassed the most extreme stress scenarios. Bank losses have now exceeded $ trillion and further writedowns are expected. In the six months following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, from September 2008 to March 2009, stock markets worldwide fell by almost 40%, wiping off about $ trillion in capitalisation. Singapore’s Straits Times Index (STI) also fell by close to 35%. In the fixed income markets, the rally in government bonds was offset by the sell-off in the non-sovereign sectors such that global bond markets in aggregate also declined over this period. Many institutional and individual investors were affected negatively. These shocks to the international financial system severely disrupted credit flows and led to dislocations in economic activity globally. The US – which was the epicenter of the crisis – as well as the EU and Japan, fell into a deep recession. The collapse in G3 demand, in turn, had a cascading effect on the emerging economies.
But we do have the consolation of knowing that there is a good chance that those who have perpetrated or adopted those misperceptions may have lost a lot of money as a result - if they were brave enough to put their money where their mouth was. Perceptions of the euro I shall turn now to the euro. I would be deceiving you if I said that the euro, as seen from Hong Kong, enjoyed a particularly positive image at present. Arguably one could expect no better for a currency which has lost around 18% of its external value in little over a year, regardless of whether this was judged to be the result of the strength of the US dollar rather than any intrinsic weakness of the euro itself. It is worth noting, however, that the euro was launched at a time when the Euroland currencies were particularly firm against the dollar - having climbed, in the case of the Deutsche mark, by almost 50% since its low point in 1985. Against this background, and the widening of interest differentials in favour of the dollar in recent months, the direction of the euro’s movement is, with hindsight, hardly surprising. BIS Review 23/2000  2  The depreciation of the euro is of course a fact, and it is perhaps the only concrete basis for the scepticism that one hears being expressed about the euro.

The Green Finance Action Plan comprises four strategies:  strengthen the financial sector’s resilience to environmental risks; develop green financial solutions and markets for a sustainable economy; build knowledge and capabilities in sustainable finance; and harness technology to enable trusted and efficient sustainable finance flows. Let me briefly outline the progress we have made under the first three strategies and spend a bit more time on the last – on harnessing technology. First, strengthening the financial sector’s resilience to environmental risks. Later today, MAS will issue finalised guidelines for financial institutions to manage their environmental risks. The Guidelines are among the first of its kind in the Asia-Pacific to apply to all financial institutions, across banking, insurance, and asset management. The Guidelines are comprehensive, covering environmental risks besides climate change – such as pollution, loss of biodiversity, and changes in land use. MAS will assess environmental risk in our supervision of financial institutions and conduct by end-2022 industry-wide stress tests on the impact of climate risks. Second, encouraging the development of green financial products and solutions. MAS is: 8 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  providing grants to offset the certification costs of issuing green and sustainability-linked bonds and loans; promoting insurance solutions for climate risks; attracting green funds and asset managers with a sustainability focus; and anchoring providers of sustainability rating and verification services. Third, building knowledge and capabilities in sustainable finance.
29.05.2018  Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España before the Senate in relation to the draft State Budget for 2018 Luis M. Linde Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, I appear before you today as part of the Senate’s debate and approval process for the State Budget for 2018. Allow me to begin by reviewing the current international economic setting of the Spanish economy and its outlook. I shall then refer to the main aspects of this draft Budget. To conclude, I will mention what, in my opinion, are the main challenges for fiscal policy in Spain in the coming years. The external setting of the Spanish economy The external setting of the Spanish economy broadly remains favourable, although the global economy is subject to factors of risk that should not be ignored. Following several quarters of upward surprises, the opening months of this year have – more so in the euro area – seen some moderation in global economic activity whose scope is still uncertain. Notwithstanding, the information available continues to point to the maintenance of the current upturn over the next two or three years, underpinned by the correction of the previous imbalances, agents’ confidence, the favourable financing conditions and the boost from the expansionary fiscal policies in the United States. On the financial markets, despite the bout of marked volatility last February, asset values remain high by historical standards.

As to inflation, the latest data continue to evidence very moderate behaviour, with an increase in April, for the euro area as a whole, of 1.2%. The projected reduction in the degree of slack in the economy should enable inflation rates in the area to draw closer to levels compatible with the Eurosystem’s objective of price increases below, but close to, 2%. 3/9  Spanish economic developments and outlook Regarding the Spanish economy, the INE estimate for GDP growth in the first quarter of 2018 shows a rate of increase of 0.7%, in line with the two previous quarters. That said, there has been a slight decline of 0.2 pp in the year-on-year rate of change from 3.1%, at end-2017, to 2.9% in the first quarter of this year, which is consistent with the continuation of the current upturn, albeit at a somewhat lower rate of increase than that observed in the past three years. On the latest projections published by the Banco de España in late March, output is expected to expand by 2.7% in 2018, 2.3% in 2019 and 2.1% in 2020. The latest information would broadly confirm this scenario, albeit with a possible slight upward revision this year and next, as a result of the greater fiscal boost built into the draft State Budget for 2018 and in the recently published Stability Programme Update for the period 2018-2021, on which I shall comment later.
We thus needed to take a number of new measures to attain two aims: hold interest rates unchanged as far as possible, and maintain the supply of credit to keep the real economy going. We basically decided on all of the measures we have now in place in the space of a week. After that, we have modified and extended the existing programme. For instance, we have purchased debt securities in the form of government bonds, municipal bonds, covered bonds and commercial paper in the form of corporate bonds and certificates (see Figure 9). Like many other central banks, we have seen our balance sheet total grow (see Figure 10). I consider that the measures have functioned as we intended. 28 All bond yields on higher risk assets have fallen (see Figure 7). Corporate bond yields, that is yields on the market that had the greatest problems last spring, have fallen the most, despite the fact that we only purchased equivalent to around 1 per cent of the outstanding stock. We can also see that lending rates to companies and households remained stable during the crisis (see Figure 11). As I see it, these measures were entirely necessary to attain our monetary policy objectives: to attain an inflation rate of 2 per cent and to support the development of the economy. It is important that we have sufficient tools to attain our objectives.

The Monetary Policy Committee has needed to provide monetary stimulus not only to contain the short-term economic weakness but, even more important, to reduce its longer-run costs – social and economic. But we cannot do that at the expense of price stability – or, more technically, of allowing medium-term inflation expectations to drift away from the target of 2%. Were the anchor to slip, our ability to support recovery would be undermined. It is sometimes suggested that independent central bankers are more averse to inflation than to periods of low growth and increased unemployment. I hope the past few years have demonstrated that, in fact, it is the credibility of the Bank of England’s commitment to price stability that enabled us to provide such exceptional monetary support to help the recovery. It is unimaginable that, prior to Bank independence in 1997, any government would have been able to hold the policy rate at effectively zero and make a further monetary injection of £ without inflationary expectations – and government financing costs – spiralling out of control. But credibility is not to be taken for granted. Even we cannot provide stimulus without limit, without a wary eye to inflation expectations. Nor has it been at all easy to judge just how much stimulus has been needed to secure recovery given the extraordinary uncertainties about what is going on in the real economy.
All public policy is re-distributional and monetary policy is no exception. Relative winners have included debtors, whose borrowing costs have collapsed. Relative losers are likely to have included savers reliant on bank deposits for income, due to falling bank deposit rates. Studies have tended to confirm that distributional pattern (McKinsey Global Institute (2013)). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  But these relativities need to be seen against the backcloth of a rising, not retreating, income and wealth tide. The majority of people – savers and borrowers, old and young – appear to have been made better off absolutely as a result of extraordinary monetary measures. For what it is worth, the Bank’s own research points firmly in that direction (Bank of England (2012)). Of course, some of the losses may be more visible than the gains and some of the relative losers more audible than the gainers. For example, low yields have reduced annuity rates for some pensioners, lowering income streams. But those same low yields have boosted asset prices, raising the value of pension pots. The net effect appears on average to have been positive. And extra-ordinary monetary measures will of course not last forever. When they unwind, so too will any distributional effects. In others words, central banks’ influence on income and wealth shares is likely to be temporary. Yet even if, over the medium-term, central banks cannot influence inequality, the reverse may not be true.

If this is a fair reading of history, then inequality may have a direct bearing on the fragility of the financial system. And while of historical interest when describing the past, its greater significance may be in highlighting risks for the future. As in the 1920s and the 2000s, rising inequality could build pressure for a credit balm to sooth the symptoms. Yet temporary pain relief, through a credit boom, would risk sowing the seeds of tomorrow’s crisis. The good news is that central banks may, in future, be better placed to head-off these pressures by taking pre-emptive regulatory policy action. This is the essence of so-called macro-prudential policy. In the UK, it is the responsibility of the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The FPC aims to curb excess credit at source. A large and growing number of other countries are putting macro-prudential frameworks in place, and taking macro-prudential actions, to serve similar ends (Haldane (2014)). There is a second way in which inequality could affect central bank policy objectives. Based on a detailed cross-country study, IMF research has found that lower income inequality delivers faster and more durable growth (Ostry et al (2014)). Moreover redistributive policies, provided they are not excessive, have benign direct growth effects – and positive indirect effects by lowering inequality. Or, put differently, the IMF’s research suggests that increasing inequality shrinks the pie. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Unfair shares This link between growth and inequality is, at present, no more than an empirical regularity.
All these initiatives, coordinated with other policies, have proven effective. Inflation remains subdued and in check, inflationary expectations are anchored, macroeconomic environment is steady and financial stability is consolidated. Looking ahead, the Bank of Albania holds that the Albanian economy will continue to face the above-cited concerns over 2013 and beyond. Although improving, economic activity is expected to remain below its potential, followed by low inflationary pressures, creating premises for maintaining stimulating monetary conditions in the future. Likewise, our  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  projections suggest that external balances of the economy are expected to improve. On the other hand, slow economic growth rates may generate pressures on debt stability indicators, unless they are identified and taken into consideration in fiscal policy decisions. In Bank of Albania’s view, growth rate recovery will require combining the cyclical stimulus of the economy with structural measures that expand the growth potential. Regarding the cyclical aspect, the Bank of Albania holds that macroeconomic policies are rightfully stimulating. In the absence of space, fiscal policy should continue to be oriented towards long-term stability of debt indicators. The monetary stimulus is expected to be transmitted more completely in the upcoming period. We continue to underline our message that businesses and consumers should have a more realistic approach on sound perspectives for the country’s development as well as revise up their consumption and investment plans.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: The Spanish economy after the crisis Opening address by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the “IV Conference on the unique features of Spanish savings banks”/Federación de Usuarios de las Cajas de Ahorros (Federation of Savings Banks Customers), Zaragoza, 11 February 2009. *  *  *  Thank you Mr Chairman, The profound worldwide economic slowdown, which in the industrialised countries has already turned into a rapid and sharp recession, is undoubtedly the most serious since the 1929 Great Depression. In recent months, the collapse of international financial markets has been averted only with great difficulty and we don’t yet know what the final consequences of the events unfolding will be for the real economy. Faced with this situation, all efforts will inevitably focus on attempting to exit the crisis. Internationally, and within Spain, hitherto inconceivable measures have been adopted, such as unlimited liquidity injections by central banks, extensive fiscal stimuli and exceptional support to the financial system. Naturally enough, governments, politicians, central bankers, supervisors and academics are all contributing to these tasks. And it is not surprising, therefore, that all my speeches in recent months have been to analyse the causes of the global crisis and to review the various measures to tackle it.
The plan is underpinned by a political commitment to spend only the expected real return of four per cent over the business cycle. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the risk that extraordinary economic circumstances could turn a surplus into a deficit. The accumulation of capital in the Fund reflects the depletion of a non-renewable resource, which is exchanged for financial assets through the Fund’s investments. Sound returns on  BIS Review 68/2009  1  these investments will help us cope with future financial commitments linked to an ageing population. But at the same time as the wave of an ageing population flows towards us with its demand for public services and increased consumption, we also should ask if investments in Norway could be an alternative to those we make in international financial markets. And clearly, a good argument could be made for investing more in schools, universities and research to develop our human capital. But that should be possible in any case, given the increased spending the fiscal rule already allows for. It could also be argued that we should invest more in our domestic infrastructure, for example roads and highways. This may be important for regional reasons. But on the margin, these investments are probably not adding very much to our economic growth. To illustrate this point, the net present value of road projects in the new 10-year national investment plan is estimated at some minus NOK 20 billion after positive effects on road safety and the environment have been taken into account.

1 Among other important tasks in coming years and decades, the government would need return from financial assets to provide for future pensioners. We can probably expect that productivity and real wages will continue to grow in parallel, and future pensioners would most likely want to take part in that welfare gain. This may imply that government expenditures will increase more than the overall growth in the economy, as the number of pensioners is growing fast and the demand for healthcare also will be higher. Although real wages increase, it will not be easy to raise the tax level. Thus, the government will need return from financial assets to finance the increased expenditure for pensioners. International capital markets have played a crucial role in allowing us to follow the strategy for extraction of petroleum. We drew heavily on borrowing opportunities abroad when the petroleum industry was being built up. We did the same in order to expand welfare schemes and to finance the countercyclical policy of the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. Over the last decade and a half, international capital markets have enabled us to convert national oil and gas resources into equities and bonds abroad in the Fund. The implementation of our investment strategy is dependent on free capital movements. I would like to remind the audience that only some twenty five to thirty years ago we had very rigorous capital restrictions ourselves.
In fact, this is one of the key innovations of Basel II compared to Basel I. Basel II is about much more than just setting quantitative minimum capital requirements. It is about establishing incentive-based approaches to risk and capital adequacy management, within a framework of three mutually-supporting pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and transparency. I think that Basel II represents an unparalleled opportunity for banks to improve their business strategies and risk management systems. In my view, the combination of better risk management, a stronger capital structure and improved transparency standards in the banking system could significantly improve the access of emerging economies to financial markets. This raises two additional groups of relevant questions that I will also address later in my presentation: the first group relates to the transition by different jurisdictions to the new framework, and the second to the necessary cooperation between home and host countries to make its implementation more effective and consistent. BIS Review 33/2004  1  Our discussions on all of these topics will bear on the very well chosen title for this event: “the international banking system at the crossroads.” That wonderful image of a “crossroads” suggests two metaphors that we should keep in mind. The most immediate image that the term “crossroads” calls to mind is, of course, a place where four roads meet. It is where a traveller, having followed one road to this point, must reflect to select one of the next three roads to continue a journey.

Over the past few months, the staff of our institutions have been in very close contact, preparing together the terms of the contract and finding appropriate solutions to a rather diverse set of challenges. I would like to ask you, Mr Chairman, to extend our warmest thanks to the staff of the Bank of Russia for their efforts to address all pertinent issues. The new three-year cooperation programme will start on 1 April and will focus on banking supervision and internal audit. In the area of banking supervision, the Eurosystem will support the Bank of Russia in its gradual implementation of the internationally accepted principles of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that are commonly known as the Basel II framework. The financial market turmoil that emanated from the US subprime mortgage crisis has highlighted, among other things, the importance of transparency and of sophisticated and effective risk management standards and practices in banks. The Basel II framework provides an advanced approach to capital measurement and capital standards. It represents the regulatory response to the increasingly complex and globally integrated financial markets, where credit risks are often passed from the originators of bank loans to a wide range of investors, instead of remaining on the books of the originating banks. Indeed, the Basel II framework was conceived to support banks in the implementation of advanced risk management standards with the overall aim of improving the stability and soundness of the financial system in all the economies around the world.