samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Global green bond issuance volume reached $ billion in 2018, a four-fold increase from $ billion in 2015. The Asia-Pacific region accounted for almost $ billion of issuance, or almost 30% of global volumes, of which $ billion was from China. Exchanges can support the listings of green, social, and sustainability bonds, as countries and corporates transition towards a low-carbon and climate resilient model. • To foster sustainable growth in ASEAN, the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF) has developed the ASEAN Green Bonds Standards, in collaboration with the International Capital Market Association (ICMA).Đ The standards, based on ICMA’s globally recognised Green Bond Principles, seek to facilitate ASEAN capital markets in tapping green finance to support sustainable regional growth and meet investor demand for green investments. As of October 2019, 80 such bonds from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines have been issued for renewable energy, green buildings and low carbon transportation [6] . 14 Đ Đ Exchanges can also play an active role in supporting sustainable growth through sustainability reporting and integrating sustainability considerations in products that you launch. In particular, sustainability reporting is a key tool in encouraging enterprises to integrate ESG considerations in their performance and value proposition to both internal and external stakeholders.Đ • Sustainable reporting has become more important with growing concerns from consumers and investors that financial returns are achieved with integrity, backed by ESG considerations.

Moving Thailand Towards a New Business and Financial Landscape Speech by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob Governor of the Bank of Thailand European Association for Business and Commerce (EABC) Dinner Event 23 January 2017 Your Excellencies, EU Ambassador Jesus Miguel Sanz, Ambassadors of EU Member States, EABC President, Mr. Rolf-Dieter Daniel, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, A very good evening. It is a great honor for me to be here this evening and I would like to thank the European Association for Business and Commerce (EABC) for the warm welcoming arrangement of this event. I am very delighted to address this prestigious group of audience including ambassadors and leading businesspersons, among which many are Thailand’s beloved and longtime friends. I would also like to acknowledge the EABC Board of Directors and the President, Mr. Rolf-Dieter Daniel, for ongoing efforts and hard work to improve ThailandEU economic relationship. I hope this dinner has provided opportunity for all of us to exchange ideas and share perspectives. For myself, there is much to learn from the business community and I am grateful for all the feedbacks I received. Business partnership with foreign investors has always been important to Thailand’s economy. In fact, not only has Thailand gained much benefits from international trades and investments, including ones with the European Union (EU), we also have benefited from the “needs” to meet standards and requirements set by the international community.
In the economic sphere, these are the single market, the single currency, and our European social model - the soziale Marktwirtschaft. The world needs Europe, today. We must be decisive... and at the same time aware that economic rigour is a prerequisite for our political influence in this world of 2020 so fraught with danger. This brings me to what I want to say today. So far Europe has stood firm in the face of a shock of unprecedented severity: this will constitute the first part of my speech. And I will then address the following question: can reconstruction now strengthen Europe and the Franco-German alliance? **  I. So far Europe has stood firm in the face of a shock of unprecedented severity Over the past six months, we have experienced a crisis of unprecedented proportions: the most serious that the European economy has endured since 1945. The European project has been 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  subjected to a veritable full-scale - almost existential - "stress test". But, to date, Europe has held firm. Europeans have an essential asset: their common social model based on social solidarity and organised public services. For instance, household purchasing power has been preserved overall, thanks in particular to short-time working measures. This is one major difference with the United States, where 22 million jobs were destroyed in a matter of weeks.

We are experiencing, I believe, one of those "Franco-German moments" that will mark history, and we can now rightly celebrate it: on 18 May, a Franco-German initiative on the European stimulus package; on 21 July, a historic agreement by the European Council in Brussels on a EUR 750 billion package, supported by a united Franco-German alliance; on 20 August, the Chancellor visited the President of the Republic in Brégançon. Despite any fears, faced with the threat of the Covid crisis, Germany has clearly and unequivocally opted for Europe and the euro. However, in its early stages, the crisis appeared to distance us, due to our different abilities to respond, and sometimes in different orders. Europe has once again demonstrated in this crisis that it is stronger than is commonly believed. I will concentrate here on economic matters, because that is where my competence lies. Naturally, there are broader issues in Europe, that are concrete and emotional: those of our borders, our institutions, our military and diplomatic power, and, in a wider sense, our common identity, which is apparent to our fellow citizens. The President of the French Republic speaks of the necessary "European sovereignty". I am aware that this expression gives rise to debate. In any case, it means that Europe must not passively put up with events, in the face of the growing rivalry between the United States and China. That we can and should be proud collectively of our achievements.
The role of the reserves as an endowment from which to draw a steady stream of income to finance the government budget will become even more important in the years ahead. An ageing population will mean higher expenditures, especially for healthcare, and slower economic growth will mean lower tax revenues. The third purpose of the reserves is to serve as a stability fund. More specifically, the reserves help to maintain confidence in Singapore’s exchange rate-centred monetary policy framework. As Singapore is a small and highly open economy, inflation and aggregate demand are more significantly influenced by the exchange rate rather than interest rates. Singapore’s monetary policy is therefore centred on managing the exchange rate of the Singapore Dollar against a basket of currencies within a policy band. 2/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  The reserves play an important role in enabling MAS to conduct monetary policy and to secure macroeconomic stability. How are the reserves accumulated and managed? So, how are the reserves accumulated and managed? As I mentioned earlier, Singapore’s reserves are held and managed in three distinct pots: the MAS, GIC, and Temasek. The government sets the overall investment objectives for the three entities and monitors the risk and return profile of the total reserves. But it plays no role in the investment decisions by the three entities, which are made on purely professional grounds. MAS, as Singapore’s central bank, manages the OFR. The process of accumulating or using OFR is intricately tied to MAS’ conduct of monetary policy.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Developing countries and international capital markets Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to economiesuisse, Zurich, 14 June 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  After having plummeted on the back of the Asian crisis, capital flows to developing countries have risen considerably again in the last three years. In 2005, they are likely to reach the approximate level at which they stood shortly before the Asian crisis. Capital flows are channelled mostly to a few emerging markets, notably China. China’s monetary order is currently undergoing profound changes, with the country gradually liberalising capital movements. The concept of the “impossible trinity”, which was developed by the Nobel Prize winner Robert Mundell, asserts that this will inevitably lead either to a loss in monetary autonomy or to a flexibilisation of the exchange rate regime. Both trends can be clearly observed: the pressure on the fixed exchange rate on the one hand, and the rapid expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates on the other. In the longer term, China’s monetary order will probably move towards floating exchange rates. This transition will hopefully be successful. As China’s monetary policy of gradual change has so far proved its worth, it is likely to serve as an example to other developing countries.
As a result, companies that can bypass the banks to access capital markets directly are doing so. Indeed, in the first four months of this year, more finance was raised in debt and equity markets than is normally the case in an entire year. Most companies, however, especially smaller and medium-sized enterprises, rely heavily on bank finance. And with current market sentiment it may take further additions to equity capital before the banking system will be able to supply credit at a price and on a scale to finance a sustained recovery. That is likely to take time. It is too soon to reverse the extraordinary policy stimulus that has been injected into the UK economy through monetary policy, the provision of liquidity support to banks, guarantees of bank funding, and fiscal policy. Nevertheless, it is not too early to prepare such “exit strategies” and to explain how they would work. The challenge facing the Monetary Policy Committee is straightforward in principle but difficult in practice. As activity returns to more normal levels, the outlook for inflation will pick up. And it is the outlook for inflation that will guide decisions on the pace and timing of a withdrawal of monetary stimulus. Reaching judgements on the outlook for inflation is never easy, and assessing their implications for policy will always be a matter of balancing risks. In contrast, the choice of instruments is simple.

Singapore has signed MOUs with Australia and Chile and has an arrangement with New Zealand to develop and deploy low-emissions solutions and technologies, which could potentially be adopted and scaled globally. Second, mobilising transition finance. According to McKinsey, achieving net zero in Asia by 2050 will require about $ trillion in capital annually. As a leading global financial centre in Asia, Singapore can play a key role in mobilising this capital. Let me highlight two areas. One, blended finance. Many sustainability projects in emerging markets pose risks that are not commensurate with their expected returns. We need catalytic capital to improve project bankability and crowd in private sector capital. We also need to recycle capital by taking loans off bank balance sheets and structuring them in a form that institutional investors can participate in. The Singapore Pavilion will feature innovative blended finance solutions and highlight our efforts to synergise public, private, and philanthropic capital. Two, credible disclosure and transition plans. We must give investors confidence to invest in the transition, especially given concerns around "greenwashing". Corporates and financial institutions must therefore develop and disclose credible transition plans that are in line with science-based sectoral pathways. Singapore has been contributing to international efforts towards comparable sustainability disclosures and sound climate data and metrics. Third, developing sound carbon markets. Carbon markets play a complementary role to channel funds to emission reduction and removal projects that would otherwise not have received funding. Singapore can play a useful role as a facilitator of carbon market services in Asia.
Growth in average hourly earnings remains around 2½%, notably below the pre-recession norm of above 3%. A similar picture holds for other measures of pay, such as the employment cost index. This is despite the unemployment rate falling to its lowest level since late 2000. Constâncio (2017) surveys the possible causes of this “missing reflation” in advanced economies during the recovery from the 2008 recession. 3  As shown in Charts 3 and 4, both wage growth and unemployment have persistently surprised the MPC. See ‘Why has wage growth been subdued?’ in February 2017 Inflation Report for fuller discussion of the errors in our wage forecasts. 4  Monetary authorities can use their control over nominal quantities to either peg a nominal quantity or the rate of change in such a nominal quantity. They can, however, not peg a real quantity. (See Friedman (1968)). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  That is why the Bank of England has a clear primary objective of price stability and a forward-looking inflation targeting remit. We have an objective to support the government’s economic policy but it is a secondary objective and subject to the first. However while neither unemployment nor pay is part of our target, the relationship between them is important to our understanding of domestically generated inflationary pressure in the economy and how it is likely to evolve over the 2-3 year period over which monetary policy can have influence.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Knowing Nusantara – money that made the region Opening speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the launch of “Knowing Nusantara: Money That Made the Region”, Bank Negara Malaysia Museum and Art Gallery, Sasana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 26 August 2014. *  *  *  The Numismatic heritage of the Malay Archipelago is as rich as the region itself. There were few other regions that had such a level of trade that has existed in this part of Southeast Asia. Every type of seafarer had been here over the centuries, bringing with them a wide range of currencies. From Chinese copper cash to South American “pieces of eight”, Nusantara has been a magnet for money of all shapes, sizes and materials. When these are combined with the indigenous currency minted in the Archipelago, the legacy is immense. “Knowing Nusantara: Money that Made the Region” explores the coins and banknotes that have circulated in the Malay Archipelago, telling a story that goes back 2,000 years and that continues to evolve. By telling this story, the objective is to create a deeper understanding of the region. The history of the archipelago is largely about contact and the interconnectivity that existed in the region even during that period. Movement between islands and the mainland are mirrored by the encounters between the indigenous and foreign peoples.
In order to avoid excessive regulation you should always ask yourself if the benefits from introducing a new regulation are greater than the costs of implementation. Here I include both financial and non-financial costs and benefits in a broad sense. Admittedly, this is often very difficult to measure with any degree of precision. Regulations should also conform to the way financial institutions and markets operate in practice. Hence, regulation should have a functional rather than an institutional approach. This implies that the same financial function should receive similar treatment, whether it is conducted in a bank or in another institution or market. Market-oriented regulations will cause the least interference to the regulatees and to the development of financial instruments and activities. As an example of modern regulation, the new framework for banks’ management of risks and capital from the Basel Committee, the so called Basel II, allows the banks to apply their own risk measurement methods and other internal bank processes. But the rules also grant strong powers to the supervisors to take remedial action if the banks step outside the boundaries of the allowed framework. BIS Review 111/2006  7  Obviously, regulations must be transparent. There are still many examples of legislation where the institutions and even the authorities themselves must frequently call on legal advice to interpret their meaning. This causes uncertainty and undermines efficiency. Speaking about transparency, there should also be consultations between the authorities and other involved parties when drafting the regulations.

News conference  Berne, 15 June 2017 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  In my remarks today, I will present the key findings from this year’s Financial Stability Report, published by the Swiss National Bank this morning. In the first part of my speech, I will look at the situation of the big banks, focusing on the progress made in implementing the revised ‘too big to fail’ regulations (TBTF2) that came into effect almost a year ago. In the second part of my remarks, I will outline our current assessment of the situation at domestically focused banks. Big banks  Let me start then with the big banks and the TBTF2 regulations. The revised regulations are designed to resolve the ‘too big to fail’ issue in Switzerland, so that systemically important banks no longer have to be bailed out with taxpayers’ money in the event of a crisis. The TBTF2 regulations rest on two complementary pillars. First, they are aimed at strengthening the resilience of systemically important banks in a going-concern perspective. They therefore specify higher requirements for going-concern capital in particular, thereby reducing the likelihood of a systemically important bank getting into financial distress. Second, if a systemically important bank nevertheless gets into financial distress – this is called the gone-concern perspective – the regulations provide a framework for orderly resolution, ensuring the continuation of systemically important functions without the use of public funds.
It is sometimes claimed that we regulators are hell-bent on pursuing the stability of the graveyard by crushing all life out of the financial system – in other words, that we don’t really believe in the mixed economy system. I will leave you to judge whether our regulation, which allows a medium sized bank to run a balance sheet that is thirty three times bigger than its shareholders’ equity, is consistent with the idea that we are insisting on a risk-free system. This is plainly not a zero-failure regime. I also sometimes find individuals in institutions we supervise and regulate who think we take a wicked glee in constantly rewriting the rules. That is also wrong. Revolution is not of itself an objective, so like all self-respecting revolutionaries we are focused on defined goals:   a strong and stable banking system with no taxpayers’ money spent on bailing out a PRA-regulated financial institution; and    a resilient insurance sector which does not pass risks back to policyholders when they crystallise. I think those goals are in sight, and the remaining path to them is now largely set. Therefore, while I cannot speak for other countries, my assessment is that here in the UK we have reached the end of the revolutionary period in which major reforms to prudential standards were required in response to the 2008 financial crisis.

6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6  happy to debate this and I expect there will be good grounds for some exemptions. We will seek views on this, and weigh the costs and benefits, before deciding how to move forward. Sharp edges  So while the design of the reform programme is clear, we are still mid-step in implementing it. Of course things could go wrong, in transition or in the end-state. The world certainly gives us plenty to worry about. But I am absolutely unwilling to have things go wrong because we have retreated from the reforms agreed over the last eight years. For the avoidance of doubt: what was intended will be implemented. I hear many pleas for “tweaks”. Some of these are not quite as modest as is claimed. We are wise to the disguise. But we will of course work to identify and pursue opportunities to give a smoother finish to the reforms, addressing unintended consequences. Solvency II provides one example. It introduced a risk margin: the compensation that a third party would require to absorb the assets and liabilities of another firm that runs into trouble. This provides an extra degree of protection for policyholders, and therefore advances the PRA’s objectives. But because of its design under the current legislation, the risk margin is very sensitive indeed to risk-free rates. This level of volatility is not justified by the historical evidence and does not in my view serve a useful purpose.
This has unified the basis on which supervision is carried out. The largest and most significant banks are now supervised directly from Frankfurt, in close partnership with the national authorities. The euro area has also set up the Single Resolution Mechanism to ensure the orderly resolution of failing banks, while at the same time reducing the impact on the taxpayer. Conclusion This account of how policymakers and researchers have interacted in the past ten years shows 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  how indebted the former are to the latter. From my point of view, one can draw five lessons for policymakers. First, sudden shocks often make visible the flaws in our policy frameworks and challenge the explanatory power of existing theories in ways that have been previously overlooked. But analysis conducted by researchers and embraced by policymakers remains essential in designing the policy response. Second, a policy response that has its foundation in rigorous research is less prone to being impaired by political compromise and easier to explain to the general public. Third, Keynes is often quoted as saying, “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” Well, for policymakers, it is not that simple, and research helps us to decide whether a change in the facts deserves a policy response or, as we say, we should look through it. Fourth, when the world changes as it did ten years ago, policies, especially monetary policy, need to be adjusted.

to promise to keep interest rates low for longer in the future. Such commitments, if credible, lower longer-term interest rates and provide economic stimulus even if the current interest rate remains unchanged.9While forward guidance is a useful instrument, recent research has highlighted that its effectiveness can be improved if combined with other non-standard monetary policies.10 Research in both academia and in central banks has therefore re-examined alternative monetary policy tools, including so-called quantitative easing (QE) policies. And here the newly developed models with financial frictions have been useful.11 Earlier studies based on the assumption of frictionless financial markets had concluded that QE is completely ineffective. The renewed focus on financial frictions clarified that this conclusion is unwarranted, once it is recognised that financial intermediaries are subject to leverage constraints.12 Large-scale asset purchases can ease these constraints and increase investors’ risk-bearing capacity, leading to a portfolio rebalancing towards risky assets and to strengthened lending activity for banks. All in all, research has confirmed that central banks are not powerless at the effective lower bound. Provided they are willing to explore non-standard policy avenues, they can continue pursuing their price stability mandates even in the most adverse circumstances. The evolution of policymaking The policy response by central banks and governments has evolved along the two main lines suggested by research.