samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Christian Noyer: The outlook for the economies of the euro area and France Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Paris Europlace International Financial Forum, New York, 14 April 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here with you today for this Paris Europlace International Financial Forum. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the whole Paris Europlace team for their great work on this specific event and, more generally, for their commitment to the French financial sector. I would like to provide you with a quick overview of the outlook for the economies of the euro area and for France. 1. The economic and financial situation in the euro area  I shall start by updating you on the current situation in the euro area. As you know, the second quarter of 2013 marked a turning point in that it put an end to six consecutive quarters of recession. The euro area economy finally saw a return to positive growth, with a 0.3% expansion, and this was confirmed in the third quarter with 0.1% growth, and again in the fourth quarter with 0.3% growth. The recovery in 2013 was modest and unequal across countries. However, it still reflects a sharp improvement in the overall trend, which is continuing and gradually getting stronger.

Most Singaporeans manage their debt well. The consumer credit situation in Singapore is healthy, with strong household balance sheets, especially compared to many other countries. But a small minority of people have problems related to excessive borrowing. According to Credit Counselling Singapore, overspending is one of the top reasons why people fall into debt. This brings us back to the importance of budgeting and not spending beyond our means. MAS has in place safeguards to discourage excessive borrowing on credit cards and unsecured credit. We are one of the few countries in the world that have such extensive rules on the use of credit cards. These rules have generally helped to keep us out of trouble. Even so, some 3% of those who have borrowed on credit cards and unsecured credit have accumulated debt that exceeds their annual income. And this does not mean that secured borrowing – to buy a house or car – is free of risk. When we borrow, we have to make sure that we can service our debt even if interest rates rise or our income falls. Households who have over-extended themselves often get into deeper debt when they cannot service their existing debts and end up borrowing even more. And once they are in a debt spiral, it becomes very difficult to get out. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In recent years, MAS has tightened loan-to-value ratios for housing loans, and introduced the Total Debt Servicing Ratio (TDSR) framework to prevent households from over-stretching themselves.
As we ponder how best to meet the challenges of the future, there appears a strong case that the IMF should remain anchored to its core macroeconomic and financial areas of mandate and expertise. The Fund’s governing organs – including our Executive Board and the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) – are already actively engaged in this review. They have had various occasions to consider this matter, and I would like to use this opportunity to present some of the key ideas that have emerged in discussion, in the following five areas: surveillance, financial sector and capital markets work, Fund financing and lending, our assistance to low-income countries, and internal management and governance. First, on surveillance, both the IMF’s Executive Board and the IMFC share my vision that a central task of the Fund lies in a stronger and better-focused surveillance process. IMF surveillance provides the foundation for cooperation among our members in the promotion of stability and growth in the global economy. With increased trade and financial linkages among nations, and strong connections between economic performance, poverty, and security issues, such cooperation to address shared problems is now more important than ever. For instance, the IMF has repeatedly pointed to the need to address current global imbalances, so as to reinforce the basis for more balanced and sustainable global growth. The existing relatively benign global outlook provides an excellent window of opportunity to do that, and the IMF serves as a ready vehicle through which to cooperate on the necessary actions.

The area of IMF financing has also seen great transformation. For example, although IMF lending continues to be targeted at short-term balance of payments needs, our financing instruments have, for nearly two decades, included concessional lending for low-income countries. In response to the rapid development of international capital markets as a major source of financing for countries, special IMF financing policies have also been put in place to assist countries facing capitalaccount driven crises. Related to these capital market developments, the Fund also began to play an unanticipated role in facilitating the resolution of sovereign debt problems. This function became critically important following the emergence of the debt crisis in 1982, and it remains so today. All of these changes – ranging from de-colonization and transition, to the rapid development of private international capital flows and new instruments, to the emergence of capital-account driven crises – posed new challenges for the IMF. In many cases, these developments touched upon issues which lay at the frontiers of economic knowledge and research. Addressing them has led to a significant transformation of the Fund, including a broadening of the skills mix of Fund staff, greater dialogue with  2  BIS Review 43/2005  private financial sectors, and more involvement in institutional development in member countries. In the process, the IMF has also become a more open and transparent institution.
May be, one of the reasons as to why we remain under-developed while developed countries progress faster, may be because of our shortage of human capital, with specific and adequate financial insights and awareness. If this situation is to be rectified, we need to develop well financially-educated people to operate financial institutions. We need well trained people to regulate these institutions. We need the investors to master the art of investment. All in all, we need our future generations to acquire sufficient financial knowledge. At the same time, I hope the knowledge that would be disseminated by this newly formed FSA would, also be valuable to change the attitudes of our financial journalists as well. In that regard, I hope that some of these courses may provide opportunities for our journalists too, to better understand financial service related subjects so that they will be able to provide a more meaningful interpretation of such matters. That too would, hopefully, enhance the general public’s understanding of financial operations and I look forward to such an outcome as well. As we all know there is today a vast majority of people who lack the knowledge to take advantage of the enormous opportunities that may be actually right in front of them. I think we have now taken the initiative to rectify that situation.

Marzunisham Omar: Comprehensive approaches to monetary and financial policy making in ASEAN-5 countries Welcome remarks by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the third BNM-IMF Seminar, Kuala Lumpur, 17 July 2019. * * * In his remarks at this seminar last year, Odd Per quoted the book Enchanted; “First time is luck, second time is a coincidence and third time is a tradition.” Here we are gathered today for the third BNM-IMF Seminar to celebrate this “tradition”, a tradition I hope will continue for many years as we can all agree that candid and open dialogue between the IMF and ASEAN-5 central banks is mutually beneficial. Let me take this opportunity to thank the IMF and the team at Bank Negara Malaysia for organising this Seminar and to my colleagues from the region for being highly supportive of this effort. The topic today – “Comprehensive Approaches to Monetary and Financial Policy Making in ASEAN-5 Countries” – is indeed timely given the ongoing work at the IMF on the “Integrated Policy Framework”. I hope today’s Seminar will help shed greater insights on how central banks in ASEAN economies, which are small, open economies, navigate through increasingly complex, interrelated issues in our pursuit of preserving monetary and financial stability. I have no doubt that we in ASEAN will also find today’s Seminar useful in understanding the IMF’s latest thinking on these issues. There are two parts to my brief remarks today.
A reasonable approach would be to adjust the MREL requirement – in both its lossabsorbing and recapitalisation components – so that it takes into consideration at least three factors. First, a balanced assessment of the volume of losses banks will foreseeably post at the time of going into resolution; second, the ensuing change in the level of capital required of banks that have undergone a resolution process, owing to changes in the size of the balance sheet and in its risk profile; and, lastly, the very resolution strategy of the bank in question. 7/10  Concerning the first point, the volume of MREL required to absorb the bank’s losses might be adjusted downwards if it is taken into account that, generally, banks are declared to be in resolution when they fail to meet the regulatory requirements and, therefore, before depleting – due to losses – all the capital they hold. Secondly, the restructuring required in a resolution typically involves an appreciable reduction in the size and in the latent risk of the bank’s balance sheet. It is therefore reasonable to think that regulatory capital subsequent to resolution should be lower than that required beforehand. Thirdly, the bail-in tool (loss absorption and recapitalisation through the conversion of debt into capital) is only one of the resolution strategies of banks.

Allow me to focus on this important aspect of the European regulations, namely the MREL, which will foreseeably be subject to discussion in the forthcoming passage of the revised Directive. 3 Loss-absorption requirements (MREL)  The stringency of the MREL requirement will be determined both by the nature of the eligible instruments and the minimum required volume thereof. Regarding the nature of the eligible instruments, for the MREL to fulfil the objective of providing for the orderly absorption of losses by creditors and the recapitalisation of the bank, the eligible instruments must conceivably be consistent with the seniority of the bank’s liabilities as stipulated in national insolvency regulations, and they must evidence a sufficient degree of stability should the bank undergo serious difficulties. That would suggest a definition of MREL that essentially includes capital instruments plus debt instruments that have a less privileged status than deposits in the insolvency pecking order. The consideration of wholesale deposits at over one year as eligible, which is not excluded in the European Commission’s proposal, will undoubtedly be much discussed in the legislative proceedings, given the special nature of these instruments and their debatable availability to absorb losses in a resolution process. Yet at present the seniority of the liabilities as established in the regulations differs from one Member State to another, specifically as regards the status of senior debt in relation to deposits. That hampers the homogeneity of MREL requirements and prevents the development of an integrated market for senior debt convertible into equity in the event of resolution.
It also covers the policies that central banks have put in place to confront the crisis and, more importantly, the role our institutions must play in the current recovery process. Central banks have played a crucial role in confronting the crisis. In a setting of high uncertainty and a still-fragile economic situation, monetary policies need to continue contributing to maintaining favourable financing conditions that allow the recovery to take firm root. The road ahead will not be easy. We will have to contend with the legacies of the current crisis and face more structural challenges – such as the digitalisation of the economy, population ageing and the fight against climate change – which, in one way or another, will affect all of our countries. In particular, the role of central banks in combating climate change is one of the top priorities on our institutions’ agendas over the coming years. As is well known, the pandemic has led to a global health crisis with a huge and likewise global economic impact, on a scale never seen in peacetime. The unprecedented economic policy 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  response to the shock caused by the pandemic has been crucial in limiting the impact of the crisis. Our experience of this challenging period allows us to draw some lessons that might be relevant for the management of the next stages of the current crisis and, of course, for future crises.

Pablo Hernández de Cos: Central banks at the frontline of the COVID-19 crisis - weathering the storm, spurring the recovery Welcome address and introductory remarks by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at session 1 of the VI Conference of Mediterranean Central Banks, jointly organised by the Central Bank of Tunisia, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and the Bank of Spain, 28 June 2021. * * * It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you all to this Conference on Central banks at the frontline of the COVID-19 crisis: weathering the storm, spurring the recovery, jointly organised by the Central Bank of Tunisia, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and the Banco de España. Let me start by thanking our colleagues from the Central Bank of Tunisia, the OECD and the IEMed and, in particular, Governor El Abassi, Ambassador Florensa and Luiz de Mello for their cooperation in organising this Conference. We could not have asked for better partners to help set up this event. Under the resolute impulse of the IEMed, this Conference is becoming a mainstay among the fora for dialogue and cooperation in economic and financial relationships in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
Of course, ensuring the suitability of its management bodies and key function holders is, first and foremost, the bank’s own responsibility. The ECB acts as a gatekeeper by performing a prudential check on the candidates for these roles, as much as possible under the applicable laws before they take up their positions, and by setting conditions, obligations or recommendations that must be adhered to by the banks to ensure the suitability of its management. When assessing appointees to the board or other key management functions of European banks, we consider their knowledge, skills and experience, as well as their reputation and the time they are able to dedicate to the role. We also take into account any possible conflicts of interest arising from the bank’s various activities and clients which could potentially hinder the independence of mind of those occupying key positions. [3] Most importantly, suitability must be met at all times. The emergence of new facts that may affect the banks’ or the ECB’s initial assessment of a board member’s suitability could lead to a reassessment of the suitability of that member, by either the bank or the ECB. In cases where a board member is deemed no longer suitable, he or she may be removed from their management function, as provided for under EU law. Beyond individual suitability, we also have expectations for the board as an ensemble – i.e. whether collectively its members have the right combination of characteristics to adequately manage the bank.

See CRD, Recital 60, Article 88(2) and Article 91(10) of the Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338); CRR, Article 435 (2) (c) of the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012; and Joint ESMA and EBA Guidelines on suitability, Article 435 (2)(c) of the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
The rate of increase of household consumption, one of the most dynamic items in that period, will foreseeably slacken, in line with the diminished growth rate of earnings and the lower contribution of other sources of income, in particular those stemming from general government measures. The response of consumption is expected to be consistent with a declining trajectory of the saving ratio, in step with the changes observed since the start of the year, after almost two years of successive increases in this ratio. It is very likely the other domestic demand components will continue to reflect the  BIS Review 129/2010  3  weakness of their main determinants. In the case of investment in equipment, this will be due to the excess capacity built up during the crisis and the still-prevailing uncertainty over financing conditions; and in that of residential investment, to the need to complete the adjustment set in train back in 2006. In contrast, net external demand is expected to be more buoyant once the high growth rates of imports of the previous quarters ease, rates which were linked largely to the bringing forward of certain spending decisions, and exports continue on their rising course. For this to occur, perseverance will be needed in anchoring the cost- and price-competitiveness improvements obtained in recent quarters and entrenching them with genuine productivity gains.

In sum, the outlook for the Spanish economy is one of gradual recovery which will take some time to attain the dynamism proper to an expansionary phase with sufficient capacity to generate employment. The restoration of confidence, the positive effects of fiscal consolidation on agents’ expectations and the lessening of uncertainty in the labour market, further to the reform under way, will need to be the essential ingredients of any sustained recovery. The private sector must take up the baton from the public sector in support of activity, and net external demand should play a predominant role. The success of the fiscal consolidation programme is a centrepiece of this strategy. Correcting the budget deficit has become an unavoidable priority for Spanish economic policy. The budget outturn data currently available suggest the targets set for 2010 will be met, at least as far as central government conduct is concerned. On this basis, it is therefore vital to design a budget for 2011 that is fully consistent with meeting the budget deficit target of 6% of GDP for that year. To ensure no deviations arise, monitoring and surveillance procedures for the budget outturn must be reinforced and, should deviations be detected, corrective measures must be rapidly applied. The availability of contingency plans designed sufficiently in advance would contribute greatly to the success of these measures. The draft State Budget details appropriately the revenue- and spending-side measures that should allow compliance with the State target set.
More specifically, the ECB enhanced its Asset Purchase Programme (APP) with the introduction of the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme known as PEPP, the size of which was 1.85 trillion Euros, in order to lower borrowing costs and re-establish  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  favourable financing conditions within the Eurozone. Focusing on Cyprus, the total amount of net asset purchases in government bonds reached € billion Euros at the end of February, 90% of which was purchased by the CBC. At the PEPP announcement, amid severe market fragmentation, the Cyprus 10 year sovereign bond yield increased to 2,21% while within a quarter of these Eurosystem bond purchases dropped by 1,25% (reaching 0,96% in June), exemplifying the benefits of these purchase programmes. Furthermore, the Cypriot banking system benefited from the use of TLTRO III, as well as from the easing of macro prudential measures, in order to support access to credit. It should also be noted that through the explicit assurance to maintain supportive monetary policy for as long as needed, through our Monetary Policy Forward Guidance, the ECB is decisively strengthening the efforts to boost economic activity. Turning to the current challenge that we are faced with, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderated expectations of a continued strong GDP expansion in the Eurozone and Cyprus, at least in the short-term.

One is that I had difficulty in accepting the idea that economic relations we have observed for decades, perhaps even centuries, could suddenly cease to hold. Technologies do change, very quickly at times, but the fundamental economic relationships are not easily overturned. Another reason is that history shows that talk of a new economy tends to coincide with periods of strong economic 1 speculation. Information technology will be a major engine for growth The fact remains, however, that in recent decades we have seen notable technological breakthroughs with far-reaching economic impacts. To understand what this has meant, we need to go back further than to the birth of the internet. The crucial advance occurred perhaps in the 1970s, when it was suddenly possible to construct a complete computer as a tiny chip - a microprocessor. Microprocessors in turn were the fruit of development work lasting several decades. Today computers have innumerable applications, partly because they have become so much cheaper. In the past four decades computer prices have dropped by an average of around 20 per cent a year. So a computer with a price tag of 10,000 kronor today would have cost almost 50 million kronor in the early Sixties. 1  See Shiller, J. (2000), Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex. BIS Review 10/2001  1  This has paved the way for computerisation in a wide variety of fields, besides involving something of a revolution in methods of production and patterns of consumption.