samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Already the industry has undergone substantial transformation in recent years. Products, distribution channels, customer sophistication, and risk types, all look vastly different from how they used to a decade ago. I have no doubt that this trend will accelerate moving forward. A key source of change are regulatory initiatives. While these are primarily intended to enable easier and cheaper access to products by a much wider market, it also means a lower degree of reliance on agents. Examples include the liberalisation of fire and motor tariffs, and the requirement under the LIFE Framework for companies to offer pure protection term products through direct and online channels since July 2017, and starting in July 2018, to extend this to pure protection critical illness and pure protection medical and health products. At the same time, the regulatory expectations on the conduct of agents have also intensified. It is the aim of Bank Negara Malaysia to continuously strengthen the professionalism of insurance and takaful agents. This is not to speak of the impact of technology. In the case of agents and intermediaries more generally, the information revolution can be a particular source of anxiety. In an age of apps, aggregators and “Ask me anything” chatbots, suppliers and consumers are closer than ever before, potentially bypassing the agents or intermediaries altogether. With the emergence of fintech and insurtech, insurers in other countries are starting to experiment with chatbots capable of independently maneuvering sales and servicing processes. Product aggregators are also fast growing in prominence.

Takaful agents can play a key role in reaching out to this broader market, particularly by understanding the takaful products, and being able to explain them simply without diluting the distinct value propositions of takaful. Part of this will require greater acumen and empathy on the part of agents for the diverse needs and preferences of customers from all walks of life. But it is also about developing long-term strategic value: By being well-versed in both fields, agents stand to position themselves as an authoritative voice in advising both takaful operators and insurance firms in relation to the changing trends in the demands and needs of consumers and product features that would better cater to these. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Embody what you sell I’ve spoken at length about the tools and methods that can help sharpen the niche of takaful agents as they enter a new, potentially disruptive phase in the industry’s development. But my final point makes a recourse back to unchanging core of this profession: In particular, the values embodied by takaful. The very existence of this industry rests on the ultimate objective of attaining the well-being of mankind as called for in Islam. Takaful agents, being an essential part of this ecosystem, must embody their role as ‘wakeel’ of takaful to the highest standards. Trust, honesty and fairness are values that I am sure everyone in this room seeks to exemplify in all their dealings with customers.
“Inflation Targeting: Some Extensions”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101(3): 337–361. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches

It reminds us, if need be, that crisis management is always a difficult and potentially long lasting task. Time is a key dimension for fixing the economic and financial systems, which in turn creates the conditions for self sustained recoveries. In a couple of weeks, Greece has been at the epicenter of the phenomenon when doubts about the ability of its government to honor billions of debts maturing in 2010 became widespread. The lack of market confidence translated into spectacular increases in government bond yields. While this extreme situation was largely limited to one Member State, the magnitude of these price movements and signs of contagion to other sovereigns led market participants to fully reassess global sovereign risks. In this global reassessment process even less vulnerable countries were broadly and suddenly impacted with spreads widening very rapidly and reaching sometimes unprecedented levels. The issue at stake is certainly not to refute weaknesses of certain fiscal positions. In fact I, and many ECB Governing Council members alike have regularly called on policy makers to pay due attention to debt dynamics. What was very peculiar was the intensity of contagion between member states and between segments of the financial markets. Some observers have voiced concerns that specific mechanisms were at play, highlighting the potential destabilizing role of speculation and called for decisive policy actions to curb its consequences. I will come back to this issue later on. Looking at the roots of these countries weaknesses, the financial crisis has played a pivotal role.
The third point regarding the changing process of the Turkish economy I would like to share with you is the increase in confidence, which is actually an outcome of the issues that I have just mentioned. To clarify this point, public confidence in the economic policies in implementation and favorable expectations of the results of these policies have improved and are continuing to improve. The most concrete indicator of this confidence is that the inflation target is becoming a more credible nominal anchor for most of the economic agents. In other words, it is more commonly used as a reference. The existence of a strong nominal anchor in an economy, which can be used as a reference, helps to shape other economic variables. Accordingly, volatility both in economic fundamentals and in other variables gradually decreases. As I have already emphasized at the beginning of my speech, this point is of great importance with respect to resolving the pricing difficulty arising from excessive volatility. Moreover, today we are happy to see that economic units are now able to foresee longer terms and they are now able to carry out longer-term transactions. These developments are drastic steps for determining benchmark interest rates for pricing derivatives operations. Thanks to the macroeconomic stability and structural transformation process, we have now reached the point where we can make risk management in a sound and healthy environment. The Turkish Derivatives Exchange is the most important pillar and complementary element of this process.

This is one of the underlying reasons for the poor risk management in our country. The fact that future uncertainty was high until recently due to macroeconomic instability had kept the general level of interest rates in an upward trend. As a result, these factors have prevented the smooth operation of derivatives markets. The second factor that has led to the poor development of risk management and of derivatives markets in Turkey is high public deficits, which caused the fragility of the public finance. As we are all aware, in the past, capital accumulation was based on public resources in Turkey. However, as a result of increasing public deficits, the capital provided by the public sector to the private sector was then extended by the private sector to the public sector. In this context, the market developed by “government securities” that are issued against public debt have become the most important and only market, which uses almost all the resources of the economy due to increasing public debt as well as high real interests payable. Such a framework, in other words, an environment where fiscal dominance is rather high did not allow neither the emergence of new financial instruments to finance the private sector, nor the deepening of financial markets. Moreover, portfolio diversification, the simplest element of risk management; could not be achieved.
Dissatisfactions were recorded in the program design that exacerbated the liquidity problem into a near-systemic problem, in the overly tight stabilization policies based on too optimistic assumptions that led to serious economic dislocations, and also in the Fund’s approach to financial sector restructuring and privatization which were flawed and alleged to benefit foreign interest. Of course, different problems of different economies require different solutions, and it may not be fair to compare one program directly with another. But, for the most part, criticism of the Fund on crisis prevention and crisis resolution centers mainly on four issues: (1) the quality and the effectiveness of its surveillance mechanism in preventing the crisis; (2) the independence of its assessments and decisions on program design; (3) the conditionality that it imposes; and (4) the lack of a clear and predictable process in crisis resolution. As I noted earlier, many good solutions have been put forward. The Fund has also responded positively to the criticisms by implementing many new and important initiatives. Importantly, its work on crisis-prevention has become more pro-active. The Article IV process has been strengthened with  BIS Review 24/2006  1  increased focus on debt sustainability. The Fund’s works on standards and codes, FSAP, and the inclusion of collective action clauses in bond contracts, are all important innovations and provide the global economy with new benchmarks.

We have given some thoughts to this issue, and to execute the idea, one solution would be for the Fund to set up a new department that will handle only crisis cases involving exceptional financings. This new department will take over the responsibilities of crisis management and resolution from the area departments and will have the responsibility for designing the rescue package and acting as coordinator between creditor Governments contributing to the rescue package, other creditors in the private sector, IMF management, and the country concerned, to push through the rescue program. In this model, a separate Resolution Board will also be set up to approve, monitor, and supervise the implementation of the rescue package, of which membership will come directly from representatives of Governments contributing to the rescue package, key IMF members, and IMF management. The IMF Executive Board will vote to provide IMF’s contributions to the package but would have no other involvement. This is to separate the decisions on surveillance and lending. BIS Review 24/2006  3  This simple model of separation illustrates three benefits that can add to the current process. First, there will be clearer accountability within the Fund in terms of duties, responsibilities, and decisionmaking for its works on surveillance and crisis resolution. Second, there are benefits of resource pooling which will allow the Fund to handle crisis cases with all available resources and with the program design structured under a common set of guiding principles.
The Riksbank conducted a study in 2007 with the aim of investigating how large a proportion of the cash in circulation could be explained on the basis of what we know about cash usage.2 The study was based on available statistics on retail sales, secondary markets, liquidity buffers, lost or destroyed banknotes and coins and a number of other factors. Despite this we were unable to explain more than around 40 per cent of the value of the banknotes and coins in circulation. Although the study did not reach beyond 2004, I dare to claim that we still cannot explain what a large proportion of the cash is used for. Part of the explanation may be that the public has more  1  This comparison is based on cash usage measured as the value of the banknotes and coins in circulation (MO) in relation to GDP and on the number of card payments per person and year. 2  Guibourg, Gabriela and Björn Segendorff (2007). The Use of Cash and the Size of the Shadow Economy in Sweden. Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series, No. 204. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  cash at home, as a buffer, than we believe. Unfortunately, it is difficult to get good statistics on things like this as people may feel it is risky and sensitive to say how much cash they have at home. Another explanation is that cash is used in the shadow economy, for example for various household services such as repairs and cleaning.

The second example I would like to mention here is the introduction of the minimum exchange rate in September 2011. This rate was introduced to correct a massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc arising from adverse developments on the foreign exchange market, and thereby avert the threat of a deflationary trend. I have explained to you why this instrument is still needed and is being enforced by us without any restriction. A measure like the minimum exchange rate can only succeed if the central bank is totally credible, in other words, if people believe it will actually defend the rate, if need be. Words can certainly achieve a great deal in the financial markets. But this only holds true if they are followed up with deeds when necessary. In the case of the minimum exchange rate, the deeds in question are unlimited foreign currency market interventions. In 2012, we were required to enforce the minimum exchange rate with extensive foreign currency purchases, and our balance sheet total increased significantly. If there were statutory restrictions on our balance sheet we would be unable to introduce and enforce a measure of this kind. The financial markets would call into question both our resolve and our ability to see the measure through. Concluding remarks Ladies and gentlemen, I come to my concluding remarks. Even seven years after the onset of the financial crisis, the environment remains very challenging for our economy and for Swiss monetary policy.
It is my firm belief that fulfilling its primary objective to maintain price stability is not only the best service which the ECB can deliver to the citizens of Europe, but also the most appropriate way of fostering the legitimacy of our new institution. In the first few months of the euro’s existence we have indeed provided an internally stable currency, although the public perception of this accomplishment has often been confused by too much attention on developments relating to the euro’s external value. In this context, allow me to reiterate that the ECB’s monetary policy objective is the internal value of the euro and that in the longer term the euro’s internal strength will also be reflected in its external value. Our task of maintaining price stability will certainly be made easier as the ECB acquires a track record and further builds up its credibility with the markets inside and outside the euro area. In my view, this process will be greatly facilitated by a monetary policy strategy oriented towards guaranteeing price stability in the medium term, rather than responding to short-term considerations. I should emphasise that it is the ECB’s independent status which will continue to allow it to stand above day-to-day pressures, to pursue a stability-oriented policy to the benefit of all citizens without the interference of short-term political objectives and to ignore short-term market developments if they are deemed to be excessive.

Mr Duisenberg focuses on the possible future impact of the unique monetary unification in the European Union and shares some observations on the challenges facing the ECB and the EU  Speech given by Mr Willem Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the Villa d’Este Workshop in Cernobbio on 4 September 1999. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, A great number of you are clearly familiar with the political and economic developments which led to the introduction of our new currency, the euro. I should therefore like to look ahead and focus my remarks on the possible future impact of this unique monetary unification and share with you some observations on the challenges facing the European Central Bank and the European Union as a whole. Since 1 January 1999, the euro has been the common currency for eleven Member States of the European Union. This was rightly described as a historic event, since the completion of Economic and Monetary Union indeed marks an unprecedented degree of economic and political integration among the European countries participating in this endeavour. I am sure that the introduction of the single currency will help to further realise the efficiency and welfare gains of the Single Market, although this will probably be a gradual process, and will become apparent only over time. However, with the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union, the integration process has certainly gained a new quality.
At the same time, MAS recognises there could be potential benefits offered by innovative retail CBDC solutions in the future. MAS is therefore embarking on Project Orchid – to build the technology infrastructure and technical competencies necessary to issue a digital Singapore dollar should Singapore decide to do so in future. MAS will pursue Project Orchid in close partnership with the private sector,building on the rich findings from the Global CBDC Challenge that MAS launched earlier this year.We have received more than 300 proposals from over 50 countries in response to the problem statements we posed. This afternoon, the finalists of the Global CBDC Challenge will demonstrate their solutions to an international judging panel. PLUTUS AND THE ERA OF DIGITAL FINANCE Not to be outdone, Plutus, the god of finance, has not been idle. Finance is becoming increasingly digitalised, with new types of financial service providers, business models, and collaborations. I will highlight two developments that are shaping the future of Finance: • the quest for real-time cross-border payments; and • the rise of collaborative data platforms. 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  Real-Time Cross-Border Payments and Settlements Five years ago, MAS began experimenting with blockchain technology and wholesale CBDCs through Project Ubin, to make cross-border payments cheaper, faster, and more efficient. The success of Project Ubin has inspired Partior – a blockchain-based interbank clearing and settlement network jointly established by DBS Bank, JP Morgan, and Temasek.

• Retail CBDCs – which are issued by the central bank to the general public; they would be the digital equivalent of today’s notes and coins. MAS sees much promise in wholesale CBDCs.They have the potential to radically transform cross-border payments. But since wholesale CBDCs by definition are not meant to be used as currency by the general public, they are not money. So let me focus on retail CBDCs for now. Retail CBDCs are essentially digital versions of cash.Interest in retail CBDCs has risen sharply in the last two years. According to a survey by the Bank for International Settlements, six out of ten central banks are experimenting with retail CBDCs. MAS has been carefully studying the economic merits and implications of a retail CBDC in the Singapore context. We have just released a detailed paper outlining our current thinking. There are three possible reasons for MAS to issue to the public a digital Singapore dollar. First, a digital Singapore dollar would make available the benefits of using central bank money in the growing world of online transactions. Like notes and coins, a digital Singapore dollar issued by MAS will be safe, widely accepted, and bear the authority of the state. Cash is the ultimate risk-free asset, and means of final settlement. The rapid displacement of cash in favour of electronic payments based on bank deposits or e-wallets is one of the chief motivations for countries like Sweden and China to consider retail CBDCs.
The global financial crisis that originated in the US housing market is perhaps an all too clear example of this. The IT crash that took place just over 10 years ago is a more normal example of how events in the United States affect the global economy via financial prices. Assessing the current situation – the essential starting point for the forecast for Sweden Assessing the current situation entails producing a forecast for the current quarter, and perhaps the next quarter. At such a short forecasting horizon, not so much importance is  2  The GPM has been developed by the IMF. It is available in several versions. For a description of a smaller version of the GPM, see Carabenciov, I., I. Ermolaev, C. Freedman, M. Juillard, O. Kamenik, D Korshunov, D. Laxton, and J. Laxtion (2008), “A small MultiCountry Global Projection Model with Financial-Real Linkages and Oil Prices”, IMF Working Paper No. 08/280, International Monetary Fund. 3  For a more detailed analysis of how the United States affects the global economy and the role that financial links play in this see Chapter 4 of the IMF’s (International Monetary Fund) World Economic Outlook from April 2007. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  attached to large macro models; the assessment is instead based on many different economic indicators. An assessment of the current situation is a kind of mapping of the disruptions and imbalances that are currently affecting the economy; in other words it describes the situation at the starting point for the forecast.

In particular, there has been extensive deleveraging by Spanish households and firms; an increase in the solvency and liquidity of the balance sheets of credit institutions; an improvement in competitiveness (which has enabled a current-account surplus to be maintained since 2012, even after the outbreak of the pandemic and the energy crisis); and a reduction in the share of construction investment in activity to levels similar to those seen in the euro area as a whole. However, certain structural vulnerabilities remain, which shape the outlook and sustainability of economic growth going forward. Notable among them is that arising from the high level of public debt (up by more than 80 pp of GDP since the start of the financial crisis), which is also accompanied by a considerable structural budget deficit. In addition, the Banco de España, along with other institutions and analysts, has in recent years highlighted the vulnerabilities stemming from the increase in certain aspects of inequality in Spain, in particular in the area of opportunities. With this backdrop in mind, what lies behind this failure to converge and what role does productivity have to play in this process? First, it should be pointed out that the comparatively low productivity of Spain’s firms is a widespread problem, unrelated to the sectoral specialisation of the economy or the size of such firms.