samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Mark Carney: The New Fiver Opening remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the £ note launch, Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, 2 June 2016. *  *  *  I would like to express my gratitude to his grace, the Duke of Marlborough, for his generosity in hosting this historic event at one of the nation’s greatest architectural treasures. On September 3rd 1939, with The Gathering Storm about to break, a new First Lord of the Admiralty was appointed. He was so familiar to the Navy that the signal to the Fleet said simply: “Winston is Back.” In the years that followed, Britain’s resolve, tenacity and spirit would all be tested. The nation proved more than equal to the task. Britain stood steadfast through its Finest Hour. In North Africa, Asia and the Balkans, the United Kingdom helped turn the Hinge of Fate. It would forge The Grand Alliance to liberate Europe from tyranny, and then with victory, set the vision for the reconstruction of the postwar era. The “bulldog spirit” of those years was embodied and emboldened by Winston Churchill. This spirit is just one of his many contributions that the Bank commemorates with The New Fiver. Churchill was not just a martial leader – though he was an exceptional one – he was also one of the greatest statesmen of all time. Blenheim Great statesmen know their history, and Churchill knew more than most.

This added strength means we expect polymer notes to last at least two-and-a-half times longer than the current generation of £ banknotes, generating cost savings over time. Polymer notes are also better for the environment. Because they will last longer, we will have to print fewer. That means less energy in production and transportation. And when a polymer banknote has reached the end of its useful life, it will be recycled. Importantly, using polymer means we can incorporate better security features. It allows for see-through panels, coloured foils, detailed metallic images, and a new advance: tactile features. In fact, I can announce today that tactile features will be present on all the other denomination polymer notes, leaving The New Fiver identifiable by their absence. This all means safer banknotes, with the tactile feature helping the visually impaired to recognise our different notes, ensuring the nation’s money is as inclusive as possible. By adopting polymer, we’re aligning with international best practice, alongside Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. As Churchill did, we may have to wait a while for the Americans to join up. We have exploited polymer’s possibilities in The New Fiver’s design. It features Churchill’s portrait, captured in Ottawa by Yousuf Karsh. The famous glower of the war-time hero prompted, in this case, by the photographer’s decision to take Churchill’s cigar away from him. 1 Behind the portrait is an illustration of the Houses of Parliament by Abigail Daker, viewed from the South Bank, looking across Westminster Bridge.
That would have been a mistake as the problems were different. Spain’s task was fortunately not to urgently recapitalise its large banks, which were indeed collapsing in other countries owing to deficient regulation and supervision. The unavoidable issue here was to oblige certain small and medium-sized institutions removed from market discipline – the savings banks – to restructure, after they had lent in excess to the real estate sector. In Spain, rather than recapitalising, it was vital to restructure these banks and clean up their balance sheets. To have recapitalised banks before cleaning up their balance sheets would have been to waste public funds, without having achieved changes in management or capacity reductions, which are essential for the soundness of the income statements of the surviving banks. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  What is clear now is that the reform of the governance of savings banks and their subjection to market transparency and discipline should have been carried out sooner, in the boom rather than in the crisis. The banking crisis management legislation then in place, which was of no use for addressing non-commercial institutions and was not adapted to the requirements of the European legal framework, which prohibits monetary financing, should also have been amended at that time.

In my view, there are similarities that yield useful policy lessons for the euro area. But there are also differences that need to be kept in mind. What can we learn from the Asian crisis? What are the parallels between the Asian crisis in 1997–1998 and the euro area crisis? The economies of emerging Asia were characterised by buoyant growth and a brisk expansion of credit (see Chart 1). This rise in debt was facilitated by considerable inflows of foreign capital, which financed significant external deficits (see Chart 2). This led to growing financial imbalances, and in particular to currency and maturity mismatches on the balance sheets of local banks. In addition, the economic boom prevailing at that time was accompanied by a loss of competitiveness of the region’s export sector. Investors typically under-priced potential risks as they had overly optimistic expectations of the medium-term growth prospects. They did not identify systemic vulnerabilities such as the risk of sudden stops in capital flows or of twin crises of the banking system and the balance of payments, which eventually materialised.1 Except for currency mismatches, similar developments were evident in the euro area before 2009 – if not at the regional level, at least in those countries that later ran into financial difficulties. It was widely believed that sudden stops in capital flows, not to mention twin  1  See Calvo, G. (1998). “Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops”, Journal of Applied Economics 1(1), pp.
Daleep Singh: Implementing the Fed’s facilities - moving at maximum speed with maximum care Remarks (via audio webinar) by Mr Daleep Singh, Executive Vice President and Head of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Money Marketeers of New York University, 17 April 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery Good morning everyone. Thanks for being here, and let me begin by offering best wishes for everyone’s health under these difficult circumstances. I should also make clear at the outset that the views I express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. In my remarks today I’d like to review the context in which the Federal Reserve launched an unprecedented set of policy actions, and I will then describe our approach to standing up emergency facilities at maximum speed with maximum care as we execute our mission. Context in Mid-March As you will no doubt recall, financial markets in mid-March were seized by the uncertainty caused by virus outbreak, both in terms of the speed and scale of impact on the economic outlook, and for society as a whole. Extreme uncertainty triggered unprecedented market volatility across asset classes, escalating into a system-wide deleveraging event that appeared to overwhelm the capacity of financial intermediaries to absorb and transfer risk in an orderly manner.

Once these exercises are complete, we will analyse the feedback we have received and use it to inform our final decision, which will be announced in December. If a final decision is made to move to polymer, we will also use the opportunity to introduce notes which are somewhat smaller than the current series. These will be easier for both the public and the cash industry to handle and will generate further financial benefits in terms of lower production and storage costs. In moving to smaller notes, we will retain the present tiering of denominations by size, which is of particular benefit to the visually impaired. I would now like to invite any questions that you may have. I’ll be joined in addressing these by the Bank’s Chief Cashier and Executive Director for Banking Services Chris Salmon, and the Head of our Notes Division Victoria Cleland. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Given that our AML/CFT rules are in line with international standards, it is not readily apparent that we need more new rules. The problem in all the instances we have picked up has been a failure to comply with the rules and poor judgement. Second, supervision. MAS has stepped up AML/CFT supervision in recent years and FIs are devoting more resources to managing money laundering risks. Through onsite inspections, we assess if the AML/CFT policies and procedures set out by the FIs are adequate and adhered to on the ground. The frequency of MAS inspections has increased six-fold in recent years. In the three-year period from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2013, MAS conducted a total of 108 onsite inspections of FIs; between 2013 and 2016, 608 inspections were conducted. MAS requires FIs to promptly address all deficiencies identified in the course of these inspections. But we can do better. MAS will further sharpen its supervision of AML/CFT controls in the industry. We are establishing a dedicated AML Department to consolidate existing supervisory resources and take a more targeted approach to combat money laundering and illicit financing risks, as we announced earlier. We will conduct more intrusive inspections of FIs identified as facing higher risks. We will increase our engagements with the industry to share perspectives on emerging risks and typologies, as well as best practices on how to mitigate them. Third, enforcement. In recent years, MAS has been stepping up its enforcement actions against FIs that breach our AML/CFT regulations.

Among the many factors that have influenced the work of the Committee over the years, I thought I would identify five that have shaped what the Committee is today and will continue to guide its activities in the future. The first and most obvious is the evolution from a coordinating and information-sharing group to one that has become a standard setter. Although the 1975 Concordat was the Committee’s first substantive agreement, and its first public document, it was not a standard per se: rather, it was a sensible agreement on how supervisory responsibilities could be divided for banks operating across national boundaries. Its goal was modest: to make sure no bank could escape supervision. It did not try to harmonise supervisory standards. And, of course, it was primarily directed at supervisors, not banks themselves. In subsequent years, the Committee pronounced on international lending and foreign exchange positions. These documents began to set expectations for the way in which banks should manage these risks, but they were not standards in the way we use the word today. It was the first Basel Accord that really marked this new role for the Committee. As in 1974, a severe crisis triggered this step – in that case, the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s, which raised the political pressure for banks to increase their capital base and for the regulators to create an international level playing field in this respect.
If we in the United States and other deficit countries are to move to a more healthy balance of private and public spending in relation to income, other countries cannot be as reliant on us as in the past to be their growth engine. The recent configuration of global demand, after all, has involved persistent trade surpluses in many emerging markets and this represents foregone consumption and investment that has mostly been recycled into large scale accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. To be sure, the crisis demonstrated the value of an ample reserve cushion to protect against sharp shifts in capital flows. However, a number of countries have surely reached a point at which further reserve accumulation comes with more costs than benefits. The expected return on foreign exchange reserves is likely to be quite low in relation to potential domestic uses. In fact, there is the prospect that reserves could earn a significantly negative return in local currency terms, especially when the acquisition of such reserves is undertaken to resist local currency appreciation that must eventually occur anyway. Finally, delay in adjustment of demand patterns and currencies raises the risk that these adjustments will ultimately occur in a more compressed and wrenching manner. How many times have we seen bottled-up pressures ultimately give way to disruptive overshooting? Moreover, lack of progress on rebalancing demand would put at risk the open trading regime that has been so important to global prosperity and growth. To date, protectionist pressures have been largely contained.

The stabilising effect of the minimum exchange rate against the euro played a major role in this development, with goods exports declining only slightly in the first quarter, in an international environment that remained weak, while exports of services rose. An improvement in consumer confidence encouraged a substantial increase in private consumer spending. However, GDP growth was also supported by temporary effects. Value added in the banking industry benefited from the optimistic mood on the financial markets during the first months of the year. In manufacturing and the hospitality industry, however, activity declined, underscoring the particularly negative impact of the strong Swiss franc on these industries. For the second quarter, we expect a significant slowdown in GDP growth. Since the global economy is expected to recover slowly, and the value of the Swiss franc is still high, the demand for exports is likely to remain subdued, even in the subsequent period. The high level of uncertainty and the pressure on profit margins are impacting negatively on corporate investment. Only because of the unexpectedly strong winter half-year does the SNB now expect growth of around 1.5% for 2012. Swiss inflation outlook The inflation outlook for Switzerland has remained largely unchanged from the monetary policy assessment in March. Since the fourth quarter of 2011, the annual inflation rate has been in negative territory. This is mainly attributable to a base effect, because last quarter the price level remained almost unchanged from the previous quarter.
European Central Bank: Press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 8 March 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to today’s press conference. Let me report on the outcome of our meeting, which was also attended by Mr Steinbrück, President of the ECOFIN Council, and Commissioner Almunia. At today’s meeting, we decided to raise the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. This decision was taken in view of the upside risks to price stability over the medium term that we have identified through both our economic and monetary analyses. Today’s decision will contribute to ensuring that medium to longer-term inflation expectations in the euro area remain solidly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. Such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards fostering sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area. After today’s increase, given the favourable economic environment, our monetary policy continues to be on the accommodative side, with the key ECB interest rates moderate, money and credit growth vigorous, and liquidity in the euro area ample by all plausible measures. Therefore, looking ahead, acting in a firm and timely manner to ensure price stability in the medium term is warranted. The Governing Council will monitor very closely all developments so that risks to price stability over the medium term do not materialise.

It has often been argued that economic growth should be given priority at the current stage, and only later on should the nominal convergence goals be pursued more vigorously. As a result, we have heard many warnings against fast EMU entry. In reality, however, most of the accession countries have already achieved impressive results in the nominal convergence process. They are now among the countries with moderate or even very low  BIS Review 17/2003  1  inflation rates, and their nominal interest rates have converged to the EU levels. In the majority of cases, no practical problems with achieving the Maastricht criteria on inflation and long-term interest rates are thus envisaged. Moreover, this progress has often been achieved simultaneously with satisfactory growth performance, even though some countries have gone through periods of growth slowdown correcting previous imbalances in their economies. Therefore, I think that the potential conflict between real and nominal convergence has often been exaggerated. The two processes have different time horizons, nominal convergence being achievable in the medium-run, whilst real convergence remains a long-run matter. There is, however, one particular link between the two processes that needs to be taken into account when we design our policies towards EMU accession. Faster GDP growth is likely to lead to a real exchange rate appreciation, making it impossible to have both very low inflation and a completely stable nominal exchange rate. This issue is well known and has received much attention.
For example, the infusion of big data, artificial intelligence and machine learning allows a better understanding of the varied and specific needs of the different segments especially the unserved and underserved. This enables better customisation of financial solutions and offerings and choice of Shariah contracts as Islamic financial institutions have greater understanding of the risk dimensions and hence more robust decisions. One example is the application of big data analytics on geospatial data to identify flood-prone areas and anticipate financing and protection needs of those in the area. It 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  also enables Islamic financial institutions to better deliver the expectations of Shariah as digitalisation allows for greater transparency and traceability of the flows of funds within the system and with the customers. In supporting more vibrant digitalisation of financial services, the Bank will continue to foster an enabling environment for innovation, such as by enhancing pathways for digital innovations to test, learn and exit. The upcoming refresh of our regulatory sandbox will provide a greater boost to support industry players in bringing financial innovations safely to the market, across different stages of the innovation cycle. We recognise that solution development is not the only way to deliver impact. This leads me to my second point – embracing transformative change. A whole-of-organisation effort to instil total change of institutional behaviour and culture.

Similar to many economies in the region, commercial banks in Thailand will start maintaining capital according to Basel II by the end of next year, and by the end of 2009 for banks with the advanced approach. IAS 39, on the other hand, will be fully enforced by the Federation of Accounting Professions in the beginning of 2010. However, the Bank of Thailand has already adopted some parts of IAS 39, namely the impairment of assets since December last year, and we are now considering adjusting the related regulations to be in line with the concept of IAS 39. For Basel II, preparations on the supervision side started a number of years ago. The Bank has set up several internal working groups to study the guidelines and its suitability to the Thai market. Staff were sent abroad for training on Basel II implementation. Experts from other supervisory authorities and consultants were invited to hold seminar and training on the underlying concepts, applications, and supervision issues. The drafting of the Thai version of Basel II has been quite involving. During the drafting, the Bank of Thailand carefully studied other countries guidelines and consulted with other supervisors to gain insights on the suitability of Basel II to the Thai financial system. As a result, we have made some necessary adjustments to the guideline taking into consideration its practicality. Banks in Thailand have been consulted in the process so that the guideline does not impose extra unnecessary burden.
1  Paper by Robleh D Ali, Andrew G Haldane and Paul Nahai-Williamson. 2  Oh et al (2011). 3  Oh et al (2011). 4  Ginsburgh and Weber (2011). 5  Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (2008). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Compared with these industries, finance has been a laggard. But the tide is turning. Since the crisis, significant progress has been made by financial firms, regulators and trade associations in developing information systems and the common data standards necessary to underpin them. Conferences like this are evidence of that. At the same time, there is a distance to travel before banking harvests the benefits other industries have already reaped. A common financial language has the potential to transform risk management at both the individual-firm and system-wide level. It has the potential to break-down barriers to market entry, leading to a more decentralised, contestable financial sector. And it thereby has the potential to both boost financial sector productivity and tackle the too-big-to-fail problem at source. There is no technological barrier to this transformation. And private and social interests are closely aligned as improved information systems are a public as well as a private good. That public-private partnership is one reason why such good progress has been made over the past few years. So stand back for a good news story – a story of how finance could transform both itself and its contribution to wider society.

11 / 12  BIS central bankers' speeches  I would like to make a final comment on the effects of our APP portfolio on bond yields. While, overall, our APP portfolio will continue to exert downward pressure on euro area long-term interest rates, other factors such as economic fundamentals and the creditworthiness of issuers, as assessed by market participants, remain key determinants of the levels of bond yields and spreads. Conclusion The winding-down of net asset purchases is not tantamount to a withdrawal of monetary policy accommodation. The ongoing rotation from net asset purchases towards enhanced forward guidance on key ECB interest rates has preserved the ample degree of monetary policy accommodation that is necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Prudence, patience and persistence will continue to inform our policy decisions. The sizeable stock of acquired assets and the associated reinvestments, as well as the strong anchor for policy rate expectations provided by our enhanced forward guidance, will continue to deliver the monetary policy stimulus necessary for inflation convergence. In any event, all our policy instruments can be adjusted to ensure that inflation moves towards our aim in a sustained manner. 1 This speech builds on my remarks at the UBS Conference, London, 13 November 2018. 12 / 12  BIS central bankers' speeches