samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
4 The mean squared gap takes into account target attainment throughout the forecast period and not just target attainment at a certain horizon, for example 8 or 12 quarters. This is an advantage. This is reasonable as focusing on target attainment at a certain horizon leads to a classic time-consistency problem which means that monetary policy is not consistent over time. 5 Monetary policy must not become unclear Many analysts seem to believe that, in practice, Riksbank monetary policy now focuses on more things than just stabilising inflation and resource utilisation. It is also undeniable that other factors have been referred to in our press releases and minutes, for example growth, housing prices, household indebtedness, financial imbalances and interest rate levels. In the media and market newsletters, there has been a keen discussion of a new focus for  4  For a more detailed description of the mean squared gap see Svensson (2010a, d). 5  This is a time-consistency problem that has been discussed in a classic article by Strotz (1955–56). It differs from the time-consistency problem discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and by Barro and Gordon (1983). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  monetary policy on factors other than inflation and resource utilisation. 6 In several cases, repo rate increases have been applauded with reference to the fact that they would help to stabilise house prices and indebtedness.

Strotz, R.H. (1955–56), “Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization”, Review of Economic Studies 23, 165–180. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2005), “Monetary Policy with Judgment: Forecast Targeting”, International Journal of Central Banking 1(1), 1–54 Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010a), “Inflation Targeting”, published in Friedman, Benjamin M., and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3, Elsevier. Svensson, Lars E. O. (2010b) “Some problems with Swedish monetary policy and possible solutions” speech held in Stockholm, 2010-11-24. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010c), “Monetary policy after the financial crisis”, speech held in Tokyo, 2010-09-17. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010d), “Why a lower repo-rate path? ", speech held at Umeå University, 2010-02-24. Svensson, Lars E.O., and Robert J. Tetlow (2005), “Optimal Policy Projections”, International Journal of Central Banking 1(3), 177–207 Sveriges Riksbank, (2010), Monetary policy in Sweden. Sveriges Riksbank (2011a), Monetary Policy Report: February 2011. Sveriges Riksbank (2011b), “Minutes of the monetary policy meeting”, no. 1, 2011-02-14. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches
This is because Solvency II caps the amount of transitional benefit a firm may derive. Bearing in mind this cap, and the benefits to be gained from a smooth transition, the take-up of transitional measures should be seen as a viable option for firms to take to assist with their capital planning, and are a feature that the UK authorities strongly supported during the development of Solvency II. They are there to be used where appropriate. As we shift to a Solvency II world, I think it is worth bearing in mind that, like a smartphone, regulation tends to get new “updates” and “apps” in response to changes in the external environment. Indeed, the path of the future is in global policy development, including the insurance capital standard (ICS) under the aegis of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) which will look to develop risk-based global standards. Insurance business is fast becoming globalised and interlinked. It naturally follows that so too should regulation. Introducing global capital standards would enhance global cooperation, ensure a level playing field and limit regulatory arbitrage. For this reason, the PRA supports the development of global capital standards and the establishment of a long term vision in order to achieve a single insurance capital standard predicated on a single valuation basis which is genuinely comparable across jurisdictions. Concluding remarks Insurance sits at frontline of innovation and, as seen with climate change and digitisation, insurers can be directly exposed to changes in regulation, public policy and other shifts in society.

Let me express a clear personal opinion; financial crises of the past were often, in large part, created by the people at the top making poor decisions – people not possessing the right information; not having due regard for risk; not being properly incentivised. Significant failures have often had their roots in poor governance with insufficient checks and balances to the decisions of powerful individuals. Strong, effective systems of oversight and risk management are paramount in meeting the PRA’s objectives for the safety and soundness of firms and insurance policyholder protection. Not surprisingly, governance issues are consistently at, or near the top, of the PRA’s agenda whether for banks or insurers. I can safely predict that this focus is not about to lessen any time soon. Firms in tomorrow’s world need to aim for governance best practice. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The recent banking crises further illustrated that one of the most obvious ways in which financial stability can be undermined is through disorderly firm failure and the consequent disruption of financial services. The PRA’s stance is that unsuccessful business models need to be allowed to fail, but that failure should be in an orderly manner so as not to disrupt the provision of core financial services. And I think we would all agree that the taxpayer should not be asked to bail out a failed firm. One difference from banking is that failing insurers usually do exit in an orderly manner.
4 [15]  after, in 1668, Stockholms Banco was nationalised and Sveriges Riksbank was established.3 Other countries followed suit and established similar note-issuing institutions. A prominent one was the Bank of England, founded in 1694 to assist in financing England’s participation in the Nine Years’ War. For centuries, the Bank of England was a privately-owned company with the exclusive right to issue banknotes. Being publicly backed, the notes did not take long to become a trusted and widely used means of payment in London. They should soon also serve other purposes as I will explain shortly. Sadly, the very first deputy governor of ‘the Bank’, my British counterpart three hundred-odd years ago, Michael Godfrey, did not experience that. Long-distance payments were still a mess, and in 1695, this brave man was on duty to pay the troops in Flanders. Invited for dinner by the king, the two men decided to visit the nearby trenches by Namur, in modern-day Belgium. Here, Mr Godfrey literally forgot to keep his head down when cannonballs were fired. Times and duties of central bankers have changed, I note with great relief. Outside England, multiple issuers of banknotes were allowed, with the United States as a prominent example. The latter’s monetary history is rich and dramatic. One particular period was the ‘free banking era’, prompted by President Jackson’s refusal in 1832 to renew the charter of the only nationwide bank at the time. As a result, note-issuing banks mushroomed, and hundreds of notes circulated around the country at varying discounts.

Due to the changed international environment, however, which we are unable to influence, we have no choice but to adjust to a leaner period, whether we like it or not. Monetary policy of the SNB With the end of the minimum exchange rate, the SNB has now returned to interest rate management. However, this does not mean that we have reverted to business as usual for monetary policy. In December last year, the SNB introduced an interest rate of –0.25%, to be charged on sight deposit account balances held by banks and other financial market participants at the SNB. On 15 January – concurrently with the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate – we lowered this interest rate again, to –0.75%. This lowering of the interest rate makes it substantially more expensive to hold Swiss francs compared to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  other currencies. Over time it is intended to cushion the impact of the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate and counter a tightening of monetary conditions. Discontinuing the minimum exchange rate does not mean that the SNB will stop paying attention to foreign exchange market developments. We will continue to take account of the exchange rate situation in formulating our monetary policy in future. Following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate, the Swiss franc initially appreciated sharply against all currencies. The appreciation diminished somewhat in the following weeks.
Its strong fiscal position is exemplary, and the population is relatively young, well educated and quick to adapt to technological and scientific innovations of all kinds. A strong pension system has been built up and – unlike other countries that have great fears about the future of their pension systems and their sustainability – it is clear that Iceland’s pension system is becoming increasingly stronger. Admittedly it is still not mature enough to have begun to pay out a representative proportion of its owners’ lifetime earnings, but this proportion is growing every year and all the pointers indicate that, for the foreseeable future, it will be highly sustainable. Thus the pension system is going from  BIS Review 34/2007  3  strength to strength in Iceland, at the same time as significant weaknesses are coming to the fore in many comparable economies. Real incomes in Iceland rank with the highest in the world, and unemployment with the lowest. Large-scale investments have recently been made which will generate handsome export revenues. Traditional sectors currently enjoy secure markets and high product prices. Undeniably this picture looks very bright and many more positive signs could be cited. But this does not alter the fact that, as I said earlier, the foundation has been precarious in many areas and the medium term will have a decisive significance for the outcome. Uncertainties abound and many households in Iceland thread a narrow path of debt and wages, where if they lose their footing, the fall could be heavy.

Kevin Stiroh: Introductory remarks at 2017 Community Bankers Conference Introductory remarks by Mr Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2017 Community Bankers Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 6 April 2017. * * *  Introduction Good morning. I’d like to welcome you to the 2017 Community Bankers Conference. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is pleased to once again host this conference and to continue to foster a robust dialogue on key industry trends and supervisory issues affecting community banks. In addition to about 130 representatives of community and smaller regional banks in the Second District of the Federal Reserve System, we are happy to welcome fellow supervisors from the states of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey; representatives of the FDIC and the OCC; and colleagues from the Board of Governors and Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago and Atlanta Federal Reserve Banks. In all, we have record attendance with 178 participants. As in past years, our goal for this conference is to promote a constructive dialogue between senior managers and directors of smaller financial organizations in our District and federal and state supervisors. This type of constructive engagement helps us reach our shared objective of resilient financial institutions operating in a safe and sound financial system that supports the growth and stability of the U.S. economy.
International Capital Flows in the Post-crisis World, September 2019  Banking sector  CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE  The Banking sector in Chile looks solid Bank Financial Strength Index  Chilean financial development (*)  (percent, Moody’s weighted average long-term banks rating)  (relative percent) Banking sector  Saudi Arabia Chile China Malaysia Poland Mexico Peru Thailand Indonesia Philippines Colombia Uruguay Panama South Africa India Romania Hungary Paraguay Bulgaria Russia Brazil Turkey Vietnam Nigeria Argentina Ghana Egypt Ukraine  100 75 50 25 0  CAR  ROA  ROE  Cap./Assets  1-NPL/L Market Cap 100 75 50 25 0  Financial sector  1/CDS  Domestic credit OECD Chile  Derivatives  0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  LAC  Branches  EME  (*) Data are relative to the maximum on each dimension at the end of 2016 or to the latest availability. Sources: Moody’s and Central Bank of Chile based on information from BIS, WB, IMF and Bloomberg. Over time, markets have developed adequate FX hedging mechanisms having lower currency mismatches, inflation expectations have become firmly anchored at the monetary policy target level, the CBC has overcome fear of floating and the economy exhibit one of the lowest FX pass-through to domestic prices, financial markets have deepened and the labor market has gained some flexibility.

- In addition, the development of pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies, provided support for banks’ funding needs, and help to develop the FX derivative market that has allowed both, banks and corporations to deal with currency exposure without the need of imposing currency-based measures as we have observed in other emerging economies (this includes regulations imposing a different treatment between domestic and FX-denominated operations by banks, such as reserve requirements on FX denominated banks’ deposits). - Because of this, over the past decades, and despite global financial turmoil and crises, the size of the Chilean-banking system has increased steadily to reach levels similar to developed economies. c. Which policy actions could ensure the stability of unregulated corners of the financial system without affecting negatively global financial integration? - Coordination between regulators and supervisors. - A legal framework that help to avoid fragmentation and the existence of blind spots. - Policy actions towards high quality data on a comprehensive registry of household credit and debt. - Prospective analysis of emerging risks in the traditional banking system that take into account indirect exposures to the non-banking system. - Adapt and/or develop methodologies and models to assess the spillover effect of non-bank lenders in times of stress, as well as considering them in traditional stress test assessments.   Some context on OECD support to the use of CBM:  A recent OECD document (De Crescenzio et al., 2015) emphasizes that mainly countries facing the “original sin” use CBM. Chile is one of them.
I hope that we could learn a great deal from one another in this traditional session, particularly on how we should prepare ourselves for those potential risks in order to maintain internal as well as regional economic stability. In addition, I believe that the Meeting of SEACEN Board of Governors, tomorrow, will continue to play an important role in providing guidelines for future works and activities of  BIS Review 88/2007  1  SEACEN for the years to come. Our guidelines will be important for the SEACEN Centre to pursue its mission and become “a premier regional training centre for central banks in the Asia-Pacific region” according to its vision. Ladies and Gentlemen, This year is a very auspicious year for SEACEN over its 40 year-history as it marks the 25th year of the establishment of the SEACEN Centre. We are, therefore, very honored and privileged to host the Celebration of the Silver Anniversary of the SEACEN Centre, here again in Bangkok, where the Agreement to establish the Centre was signed back in 25 years ago. Over these past two decades, the SEACEN Centre has become increasingly important in promoting better understanding of the financial, monetary, banking and economic development matters. Its role does not benefit only the sixteen member central banks but also extends to several other countries throughout Asia and Pacific region. I would like to take this opportunity, therefore, to congratulate the SEACEN Centre for its work in helping bind together our community of central banks in the region.

The necessity for stronger financial knowledge and financial inclusion is undisputable. It is important for curbing risks, and unleashing the potential of the economies to grow. But, what is the current state of play? Data shows that notable gaps exists and there is a long way to go. International institutions reports indicate that Southeast European countries are lagging behind developed economies in terms of financial literacy and inclusion, despite their efforts to actively address these issues. According to the financial literacy surveys pursuant to the standard methodology of the International Network on Financial Education at the OECD (INFE-OECD), on average 62% of the population of the OECD countries achieved the minimum target score for financial knowledge, while in Southeast European region, this percentage was lower and amounted to 40–55%. Despite the fact that the level of financial inclusion, measured as a percentage of adult population holding a bank account, has been increasing, in the SEE region it is still lower when compared to some of the more advanced countries in the wider CESEE region. The data from the Global Findex database of the World Bank, points to a percentage of 77% in 2017 for our country, lower than that compared to Croatia (86%), Slovenia (98%), Latvia (93%), Estonia (98%). According to the Standard & Poor’s Global Financial Literacy Survey, the average difference in the rank is around 20 places between the countries of the region and the EU-15 countries. What role as central banks do we have in elevating financial literacy?
A salient feature of the Norwegian economy is the importance of oil revenues, which may fluctuate considerably from year to year. The Government Petroleum Fund was established to serve as a buffer against fluctuations in oil revenues. It dampens the impact of changes in oil prices on the Norwegian krone. In recent years, a number of countries have switched to a monetary policy regime based on a target of low inflation. With a passive fiscal policy, monetary policy then in practice assumes a greater role in the stabilisation of economic developments. In Norway, we have a different institutional structure and monetary policy objective. When the krone has been stable and inflation shows signs of rising, Norges Bank’s first reaction is to inform the political authorities that measures other than those available to the central bank are required. Norges Bank would do the same if the requirement of returning the krone to its initial range could no longer apply. In a country with an inflation target, the central bank would deal with this itself, without first consulting with the government authorities. However, as mentioned, Norges Bank cannot with open eyes inflate or deflate the economy. Norges Bank’s mandate must be viewed in the light of the emphasis placed by the government authorities on conducting a disciplined, but active fiscal policy. The mandate gives Norges Bank a basis for conducting a monetary policy that provides a nominal anchor for the Norwegian economy.

It also guarantees the proper monetary support for the economy under this stage of development. In the future, the Bank of Albania remains willing to operate in line with the actual and expected performance of the economic indicators and in accordance with its principal objective. 4  BIS Review 11/2010
[30] Regulatory constraints and internal value-at-risk measures implied that leverage-constrained intermediaries which usually absorb these sell orders were facing higher costs for holding more inventory. As a result, intermediaries demanded higher compensation for bearing exposure to credit risk, over and above expected losses, and they reduced their intermediation capacity, resulting in higher bid-ask spreads, especially in high-yield corporate bond markets (Slide 16, right-hand side). Put simply, QT can be thought of as QE in reverse when it comes to portfolio rebalancing – that is, QE relaxes intermediaries’ value-at-risk constraint and thereby creates space for a reallocation of portfolios towards riskier assets. [31] The end of QE, in turn, has made these constraints more binding again. The absence of reliable empirical evidence on QT makes a quantitative assessment difficult. During QE, for example, we saw appreciable differences in the impact of purchases on yields over time, with higher effects during periods of market stress (Slide 17, left-hand side). Although market conditions were volatile over most of last year, the effects of QT are likely to have been weaker than those of QE at the outbreak of the pandemic. Assuming an average of stressed and non-stressed elasticities, ECB staff analysis suggests that risk premia in sovereign bond markets gradually increased as investors brought forward their expectation of the time and pace of balance sheet run-off (Slide 17, right-hand side).

(2016), “The ECB's asset purchase programme: an early assessment”, Working Paper Series, No 1956, ECB, September; Eser et al. (2019), “Tracing the impact of the ECB’s asset purchase programme on the yield curve”, International Journal of Central Banking (forthcoming); and Blattner, T.S. and Joyce, M. (2020), “The Euro Area Bond Free Float and the Implications for QE”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 52(6), January, pp. 1361-1395. For a discussion of the different transmission channels of the pandemic emergency purchase programme, see Schnabel, I. (2021), “Asset purchases: from crisis to recovery”, speech at the Annual Conference of Latvijas Banka on "Sustainable Economy in Times of Change", Frankfurt am Main, 20 September. 2. Partial reinvestments will be conducted broadly in line with the practice followed during the full reinvestment phase. In particular, the remaining reinvestment amounts will be allocated proportionally to  the share of redemptions across each constituent programme of the APP and, under the public sector purchase programme, to the share of redemptions of each jurisdiction and across national and supranational issuers. See ECB (2023), ECB decides on detailed modalities for reducing asset purchase programme holdings, press release, 2 February. 3. See also Schnabel, I. (2023), “Monetary policy tightening and the green transition”, speech at the International Symposium on Central Bank Independence, Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, 10 January. 4. For more information on the differences between a corridor and a floor system, see Åberg, P. et al.