Consideration is thus given to the sustained implications of monetary stability measures on the real economy. The law therefore requires the Bank to take a balanced view to avoid the adoption of rigid frameworks that may result in strong biases that would lead to a fundamental and sustained damage to the economy. This balance is also extended to the explicit role of the Bank in developing an inclusive financial system in its responsibility to develop a sound and progressive financial system. These considerations are particularly important for emerging market economies so as to ensure balanced economic progress and development. The new Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 also institutionalises the autonomy for the formulation of monetary policy, thus providing for the integrity and credibility of the decisions made. It also provides for greater flexibility in monetary policy implementation, allowing for a diversified range of instruments that can now be deployed for the implementation of monetary policy. As financial markets trend towards greater sophistication and demonstrate periods of extreme volatility, central banks must have commensurate capabilities to conduct monetary policy operations in order to maintain price stability. Equally important is the mandate to provide oversight over the money and foreign exchange market to ensure the orderly development and functioning of the markets. These necessary powers are however, combined with a system of checks and balances to enable the Bank to act decisively, but yet having in place safeguards so as to enhance transparency and accountability.

They also report higher transparency of banking supervision (based on adherence to the IMF code) in industrial countries than in emerging economies. Another, more recent research (Liendrop at al., 2011) suggests that the overall level of transparency of supervisors in industrial countries is very similar to transparency of supervisors in emerging economies indicating to positive movements in emerging markets in the area in recent years. Indeed, supervisors seem to endorse transparency. In 2006 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision, first mentioned that supervisors should follow transparent processes. This means that supervisors should disclose their objectives and  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  framework and be held accountable for performing their duties in line with those objectives and framework. The Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) stipulates that supervisors need to publish relevant information on the laws, regulations, administrative rules and guidance, information on options and discretions, the general criteria and methodologies used in the supervisory review and evaluation process, and aggregate statistical data on the implementation of the prudential framework, including the number and nature of supervisory measures taken and administrative penalties imposed.The European Banking Authority (EBA) acknowledges the need for supervisory transparency and has set up guidelines for supervisory transparency (CEBS, 2010) intended to increase the transparency of supervisory practices and to enhance the comparability of national practices. Furthermore, EBA publishes relevant information of all EU countries on supervisory laws and regulations and statistical data on national banking sectors, risk indicators and supervisory actions.