samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It will also give us the most important public platform to explain and defend our decisions, which sooner or later will prove unpopular. Unlikely as it may now seem, there will come a day when much of the public, businesses and banks find themselves on the same side, united in their opposition to the FPC taking away the Punchbowl before the party gets totally out of control. But the FPC will not be like the MPC in all respects. In contrast to monetary policy decisions, at least as practiced in the UK where we decide via individual votes, we will aim to reach decisions by consensus (although there will be provision for voting). That is essentially because of the wide range of issues the FPC will consider and the range of instruments potentially under our control. Another contrast with monetary policy is that, in some respects, we are entering unchartered territory for a developed economy. We will all – policymakers, bankers, investors, commentators, politicians – be learning about how, for example, varying capital, liquidity or collateral requirements is transmitted into the credit markets and the economy more widely. I therefore expect us to publish papers on how we approach our task and on the underlying economics. And, through the Remit process I described earlier, the government will be able to adapt the regime at the edges as we all learn. And we will need to learn, sometimes from mistakes or missed opportunities.

Turning to fiscal policies, the latest available information suggests that the pace of fiscal consolidation in many euro area countries remains unsatisfactory. It is of particular concern that targets for correcting excessive deficits are at risk in some cases. Moreover, countries that have recently breached the 3% deficit limit are being granted relatively long periods to correct the situation in what constitutes a very generous application of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact. Against this background, it is important to recall that the best contribution that fiscal policies can make to stability, growth and cohesion in the euro area is to effectively tackle existing fiscal imbalances as part of a determined and well-designed economic reform programme. In this context, a rigorous implementation of the new rules is needed. This would reinforce the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact, boost expectations of sound fiscal policies and thereby help to increase confidence in economic growth prospects. As regards structural reforms, the European Commission has recently presented the “Community Lisbon Programme”, which contains a list of measures at the EU level to relaunch the Lisbon strategy. The ECB fully backs this initiative, in particular the measures to further open EU markets and to simplify the regulatory framework within which business operates. Progress at both the Community and the Member State level is crucial to addressing the economic challenges facing the EU.
Finally, I will highlight what is missing and mention a number of important ongoing initiatives that could help to overcoming the key challenges in terms data that we still need to deal with. 2. The macro-prudential oversight function and the role of the ECB  Let me start by reflecting on the macro-prudential oversight function. There are three main components in the macro-prudential oversight process. The first concerns the surveillance needed to identify plausible and (systemically) important sources of risks and vulnerabilities on the basis of an analysis of the individual and collective strength and robustness of the constituent parts of the financial system – institutions, markets and infrastructures. The second involves the assessment of the potential costs and the ability of the financial system to cope with these costs should some combination of the identified risks and vulnerabilities materialise. This requires the ability to measure (and model) the potential costs and to calibrate the plausibility and importance of the various risks. The third component is the possible policy response that needs to be clearly justified and interlinked with systemic risk assessments. In particular, it should inform policy decisions on the appropriate timing of interventions and the selection of tools. The role that the ECB and the national central banks of the EU Member States play in contributing to financial stability is set out in the Treaty on European Union.

Furthermore, in view of the importance attached to publicly available data, there is a need for this information to be harmonised and provided in a standardised format that is easy to access. As in any other policy field, the higher the quality of the input data, the more reliable are the results of analytical work, and thus the policy decisions. In addition, there is the definition of data confidentiality. Taking an extreme view, all information that has not been published could be labelled “confidential”, while the other extreme would be to make everything public. It would be fair to say that the “definition” used in Europe appears to be stricter than that in other jurisdictions. For example, some regulators such as the US Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council publish selected supervisory information on banking institutions operating in the US market, including on subsidiaries of European banking groups, regularly (on a quarterly basis). Parts of these data are “confidential” in Europe, but this is not so on the other side of the Atlantic. As mentioned earlier, a change in attitude by EU financial regulators would greatly benefit the quality of the risk-monitoring and risk-evaluation work undertaken by macro-prudential bodies. In addition, it would provide a concrete signal of increased transparency to market analysts and financial market participants. In turn, it would help significantly to minimise the reporting burden of the industry. Let me try to illustrate my point with some examples.   The breakdowns of banks’ credit exposures by type of collateral or counterparty sector (e.g.
Both capital and margins have costs, and firms seek to limit these costs and choose their preferred combination. The question for policymakers is whether the mix of capital and margins produced by the market is appropriate from the perspective of the financial system as a whole. As forms of financing that enable leverage and as leveraged funds grow in importance, the overall level of margin held against positions can provide an important cushion against the type of adverse market dynamics and general run on liquidity we saw in 1998. For these reasons, in the 2005 report of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, chaired by Gerry Corrigan, a diverse mix of major market participants recommended that margin levels be set at a threshold that is “sustainable over the cycle.” This reflects a view that, in general, the initial margin required of unregulated leverage counterparties should be set to provide some cushion against potential exposure. Financial infrastructure Supervisors should continue to encourage improvements in the infrastructure that supports financial markets. When we think about infrastructure in today’s market, it’s not enough to look just at the technology and risk-management systems that support the major exchanges and the payments and settlement systems operated by central banks and private utilities. This view is reflected in the amount of recent supervisory attention that has been focused on the systems within and among private institutions that support the bilateral over-the-counter derivatives markets.

The initial portfolio was provided by the government, but since then, Temasek’s funds have come mainly from the investment growth of its own portfolio. Compared to MAS and GIC, Temasek is further out on the risk-return spectrum. How are the OFR managed? Let me now move to the third question: how are the OFR managed? This is the portion of the reserves that MAS is responsible for. There are three prongs to MAS’ approach to managing the OFR robust risk management; balanced asset allocation; and efficient investment process Robust risk management The starting point to MAS’ approach to managing the OFR is its risk management framework, which sets out the liquidity and risk tolerance levels of the OFR. These relate to: the ability of the portfolio to meet liquidity needs under stress conditions; and the maximum loss of the portfolio under tail risk scenarios. These liquidity and risk tolerance levels are determined on the basis of what is minimally required to meet the objectives of the OFR in supporting MAS’ conduct of monetary policy. They are factored in the construction of the MAS portfolio and closely monitored on an ongoing basis. MAS employs a comprehensive range of stress tests to assess the risks to the portfolio on an ongoing basis and establish whether the portfolio remains resilient to potential tail risk events over the medium term.
Mr Bergström elucidates the economic situation in Sweden  Speech by Mr Villy Bergström, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the HSB Finance Day, HSB Bank, held in Stockholm on 18 November 1999. *  *  *  The prospects for the Swedish economy look better than for a very long time. We might have to go back several decades to find a period with such favourable conditions as those we are now experiencing. It is estimated that the Swedish economy will grow by as much as 3.6% this year, and the Riksbank forecasts that growth will be slightly higher next year. Despite the marked fall in production at the beginning of the 1990s, around 13% more is being produced now than at the end of the 1980s when overheating was worst. Part of the income from production has been used to pay off our foreign debt, which grew during the 1980s in a way that was unsustainable in the long term. This has been reflected in Sweden’s financial balance with other countries, i.e. the current account balance, which has been in surplus for a number of years and is expected to total SEK40 billion this year. After a number of years of large deficits, central government finances are now in surplus for the second year running. From having had the second worst central government budget balance in the whole EU at the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden’s public finances are now among the strongest in the union.

Paulo Sergio Cavalheiro: Regulation of capital and financial stability Speech by Mr Paulo Sergio Cavalheiro, Deputy Governor for Supervision of the Central Bank of Brazil, at the International Seminar “The New Basel Capital Accord: Challenges and Opportunities for the Americas”, held jointly by “Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos - CEMLA”, “Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas - ASBA” and “Federación Latinoamericana de Bancos FELABAN”, in Mexico City, Mexico, 12-13 July 2004. *  *  *  The final version of the Capital Accord, also known as Basel II, has just been released. The document maintains the basic framework initially proposed, that is, three pillars, the first one dealing with the calculations of the capital requirements per se, comprising market, credit and operational risks (this last being the real novelty), the second describing the supervisory review process and the third detailing the market discipline to be achieved via disclosure. In Brazil, capital requirements were introduced by Resolution 2099, in August 94, which specified 8% of risk weighted assets as the minimum capital required. Following Resolution 2099, in October 94, Circular 2500 modified some values for minimum capital and net worth required for the establishment of banks, in accordance with the location and size of institution. The supervisory authority raised the minimum capital required to 10% of risk-weighted assets in June 97. In November 97, Circular 2784 again raised this value, this time to 11%, which is still the minimum ratio.
Turning back the Tide Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  FICC Market Standard Board “Two years on from the Fair and Effective Markets Review” Bloomberg, London 29 November 2017  I am grateful to Terry Allen, Alice Carr, Orlando Fernandez Ruiz, Edward Ocampo, Analise Mercieca, Sasha Mills, Louse Oscarius, Chris Salmon and Tim Taylor for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is a pleasure to join the FICC Market Standards Board (FMSB) in reflecting on what’s happened in the two years since the Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR). This afternoon I would like to assess recent progress in building real markets for the good of the people and discuss the forward agenda for your important work. Two and a half years ago, FEMR set out a series of ambitious recommendations to restore confidence in 1  Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (FICC) markets. The FMSB’s work is an integral part of the FEMR solution. Your work matters because UK markets are essential for global commerce. The City has a special responsibility to address the root causes of misconduct given its pre-eminent position in global markets. The UK accounts for 40% of both global FX volumes and trades in OTC interest rate derivatives, and two-thirds of trading in international bonds. More international banking activity is booked in London than anywhere else. 2  Your work matters because the financial sector is an important contributor to UK prosperity.

11  The Way Forward  The mutually reinforcing relationship between the regulatory framework and market good practice should help the FMSB, and other market standard-setters, maintain their ambition and momentum even once memories of post-crisis misconduct fade. It could sharpen collective incentives to address, more conclusively, outstanding ambiguities that act as obstacles to real markets. And it should help mitigate emerging vulnerabilities. The Bank of England encourages the FMSB to consider where additional guidance and worked examples could buttress its existing standards, to guard against the risk that certain principles mean different things to different parties. The City’s special responsibility, given its pre-eminent position in global markets, is why it has brought so many ideas and such energy to advance reforms to address the misconduct risk that has plagued global markets. 10  See page 16, Financial Reporting Council (FRC), “Corporate Culture and the Role of Boards: Report of observations”, July 2016. In light of its responsibilities for conduct and market integrity, the FCA is consulting on an approach under which it would formalise that in supervising to, and enforcing, SMR rules for unregulated markets and activities, it would consider whether firms and individuals are meeting “proper standards of market conduct” with reference to “recognised” industry codes.
Except the temporary amendment concerning the short-term advances to the government before the Second World War, no major amendments were made to the Central Bank Law. 1950s and 60s were relatively easy years. However, the authorities thought that the provisions of the Law of the Central Bank fell short of meeting the necessities of contemporary central banking. Therefore, on January 14, 1970 a new Law on the Central Bank of Turkey was adopted. The new Law brought in changes on the structure of the Bank as well as changes in its policy implementations. The most important organizational change was replacing the General Director, the highest post in the Bank, with the Governor. As regards policies, the Bank was directly authorized to set monetary policy in line with the development plans and annual programs. The Bank was also authorized to conduct open market operations in order to manage money supply and liquidity and was entrusted with medium term discount credit facilities to real sector through the intermediary of commercial banks. In the 70s, there were significant developments in the world economy. In the aftermath of the first oil shock in early seventies, inflation all over the world economies became rampant. Accordingly, the main focus was directed towards the fight against inflation. The 1980s and 90s were the years where a number of structural and institutional changes were introduced in the Turkish economy. With various measures taken between 1980 and 1989 Turkey’s both current and capital account transactions were fully liberalized.

These effects are reinforced by the fact that the National Accounts are based on the calculation assumption that there is no productivity increase in the public sector at all. During the second half of the 1990s in particular, there was a rapid development in information technology, which entailed greater efficiency in knowledge transfer between individuals and companies and between companies. The expansion of the IT sector was one of the corner-stones of this "new economy". The effect this actually had on productivity has been much discussed. It is clear that the IT sector itself, and in particular the telecom industry, was responsible for a significant part of productivity growth at the end of the 1990s. Developments were very uneven among the different industries, with the increase in productivity in "IT user" industries being much less impressive, despite large investments in IT products, than that in the "IT producer" sector. The latter is also clearly illustrated when the productivity increase in trade and industry is adjusted for the increase that took place in the telecom industry (Figure 5). When this sector is excluded, productivity during the second half of the 1990s increased by only 1.9 per cent a year, compared with 2.8 per cent if the sector is included. The telecom sector has now greatly declined in importance and there is apparent confusion over its future development. The important question for the Riksbank is what all of this entails for the development of long-term productivity growth in future.
“Japan’s Lost Decade and its Financial System”, The World Economy, 26, pp. 365–384, and Caballero, R., T. Hoshi and A. Kashyap (2008). “Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan”, American Economic Review, 98:5, pp. 1943–1977. 5  See footnote 4. 6  See Krugman, P. (1999). “What happened to Asia?”, in Sato R. et al., Global Competition and Integration, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 315–327. Already in 1590 Hong Zicheng’s Càigēntán claimed that “water that is clear has no fish.”  7  See Krugman, P. (1994). “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle”, Foreign Affairs, 73:6 (1994: November/December). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  were essential.8 The lesson to be learnt was that sustainable growth can only be achieved by fostering an environment that encourages open markets, innovation and entrepreneurship. A third lesson is that re-nationalisation and protectionism are not the solution to a crisis Indeed, there is empirical evidence that more open economies recover faster from the output contraction that usually accompanies a sudden stop of capital.9 As such, the most open Asian economies, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, were among the least severely affected and fastest to recover from the Asian crisis.10 In other words, despite the attendant risks, globalisation in trade is still the best way to achieve progress and economic development, and open financial markets can support it provided they are backed by strong prudential supervision.

Savings have been partly re-nationalised as a consequence of financial fragmentation. This is a trend that, if left unchecked, can be fatal to the Single Market. Completing the Banking Union is key to halt it, and I welcome EU leaders’ resolve to swiftly agree on a Single Resolution Mechanism. Finally, Europe should remain open to the world. Further progress on bilateral or regional free trade agreements, and cooperation in implementing the new financial regulatory standards, are the best signal in this respect. Conclusion Let me draw to a close by re-emphasising that crises, despite their negative consequences, can have positive effects. They can galvanise efforts and focus minds. They can drive change and bring about progress. They can pave the way for innovative solutions. But to secure these gains, cooperation across national borders is crucial, in other words, there must be a willingness to work towards common goals and to learn from each other and resist protectionism. This spirit will be essential to tackle the challenges still ahead of us, not only in the euro area but also at a global level. It is often claimed that the Chinese and Japanese word for crisis, wēijī or kiki (危机 or 危機), is made of the two characters meaning “danger” and “opportunity”. While there can be no doubt that wēi means “danger”, I would rather understand jī as meaning the critical moment when things have to change – the ancient Greeks’ kairos. This critical moment has now arrived for Europe. Europe has emerged from the danger zone.
BIS Review 124/2008  7  References Auer, R. and A. M. Fischer (2008), “The Effect of Trade with Low-Income Countries on US Industry”, CEPR Discussion Paper 6819. Barajas, A., G. Dell’Ariccia and A. Levchenko (2008), “Credit Booms: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6683. Bernanke, B. (2005), “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit”, the Homer Jones Lecture, St. Louis, Missouri. Blanchard, O. and J. Galí (2007), “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks: Why Are the 2000s So different from the 1970s?”, NBER Working Paper N°13368. Buiter, W. (2008), “Housing Wealth Isn't Wealth”, NBER Working Paper No. 14204. Caballero, J., E. Farhi, and P.O. Gourinchas (2008), “An Equilibrium Model of "Global Imbalances" and Low Interest Rates”, American Economic Review, 98:1, pp. 358-393. Allen, F. and E. Carletti (2008), “The Role of Liquidity in Financial Crises”, presented at Mantaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, WY. De Gregorio, J. (2007), “Comments”, en Clarida, R. (ed.) G7 Current Account Imbalance, Sustainability and Adjustment, NBER and Chicago University Press, also economic Policy Document No. 115, 2005, Central Bank of Chile. De Gregorio, J., O. Landerretche and C. Neilson (2007), “Another Pass-Through Bites the Dust? Oil Prices and Inflation”, Economía, vol. 7, number 2, pp. 155-196. Freund, C. and F. Warnock (2007), “`Current Account Deficits in Industrial Countries: The Bigger They Are, The Harder They Fall?,” in Clarida, R. (ed.)

BIS Review 11/2005  1  Low inflation is not in itself a solution to problems like this. But it is a pre condition for solving them. Merseyside had bad luck to be confronted with more economic change in the second half of the twentieth century than most people could cope with at the time. Liverpool never lost its sense of humour, though there were times when it came close to losing its way. Sadly, you can’t laugh your way out of economic decline. High inflation and economic instability fostered the wrong climate for taking the long term decisions that were needed to give Merseyside a new future. The levels of economic inactivity and social deprivation that you are still grappling with today are in part legacies of the 1970s and 1980s, when the sharp ups and downs in inflation, interest rates and national output made it much harder to adapt to structural economic change at the regional level. But more recent success in delivering low inflation and economic stability has created a much better climate for you to succeed. Economic regeneration can’t get off the ground without inspired local leadership, and committed local partnerships. But even with them, it is a long haul to make the investments in infrastructure that modern businesses expect. And so called soft investments – in people, skills, and communities – are even more of a challenge. Low inflation and low nominal interest rates matter to you because they provide a sound foundation for just this kind of long term planning.