samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 36/2004  1  Securitization and the rapid growth in credit risk transfer instruments have enabled risk to be spread more broadly. Risk management practices have improved in sophistication and rigor. Firms have made substantial investments in improving the strength and resilience of their technology and systems infrastructure. Payments and settlements systems have stronger safeguards in place. The overall capacity of the system to handle large hedging volume has increased substantially. Despite the fact that we have experienced a sustained period of accommodative monetary and financial conditions, net credit growth to the private sector has been moderate. The overall financial position of the corporate sector is strong. New household borrowing has grown rapidly, but the broad measures of the ratio of debt service to income remain at a level of roughly 13 percent, and estimates suggest that only a quarter of total household debt is exposed to rising interest rates in the near term. Net credit growth to emerging markets has been moderate relative to past periods. Growth in commercial bank assets has picked up a bit in recent quarters, but remains significantly below the pace of the second half of the 1990s. As the financial markets have built in expectations of a gradual rise in the fed funds rate over the next two years, financial institutions have had some time to position themselves for an environment of higher interest rates and volatility.

Of course we didn’t have Brexit in mind when updating the Remit in 2013, nevertheless the Bank headed into the EU referendum last year with arguably the most clearly defined objective for monetary policy in its 323 year history. And it has been the foundation of the framework the MPC has used to set monetary policy since the referendum result. Although I only joined the Committee in September, the analytical approach in the framework is one that I fully sign up to. So I would like to spend a minute setting it out. Fundamental to the way in which the MPC has reacted to Brexit is that monetary policy cannot prevent either the necessary adjustment – such as that implied by the movement of the exchange rate - as the UK moves towards its new international trading arrangements, or the weaker income growth that is likely to accompany it. These are real phenomena likely to play out over many years – exactly the kind of thing that monetary policy cannot affect, no matter how often it is asked by some commentators to do so. What the MPC can do is support the economy during the adjustment process. But even in doing that the Committee has faced a trade-off between stabilising inflation on the one hand and output and employment on the other.
(a)  Mapping market macrostructure  Many securities regulators collect transactional data for the markets they oversee, typically to help them detect instances of market abuse. But the transactional data collected internationally is about to be transformed. In future, a much larger array of over-the-counter transactions will be cleared through central counterparties (CCP). And transactions in a number of non-centrally cleared markets will be recorded and warehoused in so-called trade repositories. 28 This presents a real opportunity. Prospectively over the next decade, securities regulators internationally will have at their disposal a database which is far richer in its frequency and scope than anything previously. For the first time ever, many of the raw ingredients will exist to map price and quantity dynamics within, and across, markets in close to real time. 27  Perrow (1999), Harford (2011). 28  In the United States, the Office of Financial Research, created under the Dodd Frank Act, is charged with collecting and analysing data submitted by US firms. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  To date, relatively little thought has been given to how best to put these data to work. They will certainly be useful as an archaeological site, allowing a detailed forensic sifting of the genealogy of historical market events. As with the Flash Crash, this may enable regulatory detectives to solve the whodunit: who did what when and, perhaps, why. It will allow DNA sampling of the victim.

Before I comment on the significance of board charters in augmenting good corporate governance in the financial sector, I think it is appropriate that I acknowledge the commendable work that has gone into implementing the FSDP through collaborative effort involving government and other institutions. The Government, working with the three financial sector regulatory bodies, namely, the Bank of Zambia, the Pensions & Insurance Authority and the Securities & Exchange Commission has continued to take the lead in implementing various reforms. This effort has been supported by private sector experts and representatives responsible for the technical aspects of implementing the FSDP recommendations.
All these measures, along with those relating to liquidity provision by the ECB, are intended to help banks better withstand this crisis and to operate as an active lever for promptly overcoming it. And there are already signs that this is proving to be the case. The containment measures adopted to halt COVID-19 contagion are entailing a very sharp drop in the revenues of many non-financial corporations. This has significantly increased their liquidity needs, which they are largely covering through resort to bank financing. Indeed, the latest (and as yet provisional) data, for March, reveal a year-on-year rise of just over 50% in the flow of new lending granted by banks to firms. This includes both new business and increases in the principal that may be drawn down in operations previously entered into (which have almost doubled). This demand for funding may have been met under better conditions thanks, on one hand, to the ECB’s support measures to bank financing, which have helped banks obtain funds under favourable terms; and, on the other, to the government-approved programme of public guarantees on loans to firms, which has mitigated the possible reluctance of banks to incur greater risks in a setting of high uncertainty and growing concern over credit risks. Hence, on the data published to 13 May, a total of 371,070 operations have been entered into under the public guarantee programme, of which 98% relate to SMEs and the selfemployed.

37  Aside from these effects, the estimates available show that potential growth in the Spanish economy is low in comparison with other developed countries. An economy's potential growth, on which the level of welfare in the long term hinges, is the result of the accumulation of the capital and labour factors of production, and the degree of efficiency with which they are combined. The low levels of potential growth in our economy are attributable to both poor total factor productivity and a higher level of structural unemployment. In its recent annual reports,13 the Banco de España has highlighted some avenues of economic policy which, if pursued, could improve the dynamics of these variables in Spain. These initiatives relate to the level of sectoral competition and to the productive structure, tax and regulatory incentives, human capital, R&D and technology, and labour market regulation, inter alia. Here I would like to highlight two areas of action: improving human capital and fostering efficient R&D expenditure, as both could be particularly affected by the situation brought about by COVID-19. As regards human capital, the confinement imposed as a result of the crisis has led to students at different levels of educational attainment ceasing to attend classes in person. This could have significant effects on their academic performance, particularly in lowincome households, where there is a lower possibility of replacing physical access to education.
The strategy and path towards greater financial integration in Asia seeks to preserve the strengths inherent in the diversity of the region, while raising the standards which promote financial stability in the region. Recognizing the various stages of development across our economic and financial systems, the Asian financial integration model for the ten ASEAN economies is focused on: (i) strengthening preconditions through collective capacity building to promote more open market access; (ii) progressively reducing barriers to facilitate crossborder trade; (iii) developing the market infrastructure and an enabling environment to promote the efficient and effective intermediation of cross-border financial flows; and (iv) establishing appropriate safeguards for financial system stability. Two distinct elements of this process are important. The first is that it allows for different speeds of integration depending on the state of readiness of respective member countries. The second is the commitment of members to support each other in developing the preconditions that would make financial integration viable for the group as a whole in the long run. These elements are important for achieving a process and outcomes that will be sustainable. The modernization of Asian financial systems during this period has also been accompanied by significantly strengthened regulatory and supervisory frameworks, improved financial safety nets, more effective surveillance of financial stability risks and stronger legal underpinnings. These reforms supported the transition towards more market-oriented financial systems that are anchored in stronger institutions, risk management capacity and governance.

It shows that the policy stance is also underpinned by the information stemming from our monetary pillar: - From 2001 to 2003, the annual growth of M3 was well above its reference value. However, an indepth analysis of M3’s components and of its main counterparts showed that the dynamics of M3 was mainly due to extraordinary portfolio shifts into M3, in a context of heightened economic, financial and geopolitical uncertainty. This implied low medium-term risks for price stability, as captured by the monetary indicators presented in figures 4 and 5, and allowed the Eurosystem to enter an easing cycle. 6  BIS Review 4/2006  - The situation has changed since the second half of 2004 as reflected by the monetary indicators: first, broad money aggregates accelerated in parallel with increasing demand for loans to the private sector; second, this acceleration was mainly driven by the most liquid components of M3, pointing to a significant impact of low interest rates on monetary dynamics. Furthermore, the growth of borrowing, especially mortgage loans, remained very robust, fuelling a sharp increase of housing prices across the euro area. In such a situation, the risks revealed by the monetary analysis to price stability over the medium-term were strongly revised upward. 4. Predictability and frequency of policy actions Contrary to some preconceptions, most monetary policy decisions have been perfectly anticipated by the markets.
The task of the central banks was to provide the general public with money in the form of banknotes and coins that did not entail any credit risk and that inspired confidence – what was known as central bank money. This task included price stability, that is, that the central banks guaranteed the long-term value of the money. To begin with, the central banks had this task parallel to commercial banks, which issued their own banknotes. Then money from different issuers could have different values, depending on how much money had been issued, and exchange rates could arise between different types of money. Eventually, the central banks were also given the responsibility for creating a uniform standard. In Sweden, this took place in 1904, when the Riksbank was given a monopoly on issuing banknotes and commercial banks stopped issuing them. In time, the banks were able to develop payment channels that enabled the general public to use their account balances as money. In the beginning this involved cheques and gradually card payments were developed. In Sweden, there were also state initiatives to make payments more effective. In the 1920s, the Postgirot system was created, which enable efficient transfers of money to and from accounts in the system. Just over 20 years later, the banks emulated this and created their own joint system, Bankgirot. All of these systems are examples of account-based means of payment.

Our forward guidance comprises two elements: it aims to further clarify our views regarding the economic situation and the manner in which we intend to react to it. It is important to note that the United States and the euro area are at completely different stages of the economic cycle. Here in the euro area economy, an imminent change in the direction of monetary policy would certainly come far too early. But how realistic is decoupling from the United States? The markets, at any rate, don’t seem to have all that much faith in that prospect, if you look at the rising money market rates. I think it’s a little early to be judging that. Overall, we believe that we’ve been successful in reducing the volatility of rates. We’ve been moderately successful as regards the actual level of interest rates. Rates have risen on account of positive economic data. It remains to be seen how the situation will develop in the likely presence of further cautiously positive data. And if things do not go according to plan, will the ECB reduce its key interest rates again or conduct new LTROs? We will continue to monitor the situation. We haven’t said any more than that. Sometimes you have to keep calm, rather than coming up with something new every month. Why is the ECB not publishing inflation projections beyond 2014?
The 1990s also began with a depreciation of the Swedish krona amounting to 20-25 per cent when we abandoned the krona peg to the European ecu in autumn 1992. Unlike the 1980s, inflation was afterwards pressed down to the same level as Germany (see Figure 1). We have even continued strengthening our competitiveness through strong productivity growth and moderate wage increases (see Figure 2). Why did we not succeed in bringing down inflation to the same level as other countries during the 1970s and 1980s? The most important explanations are the history of repeated devaluations, insufficiently tight fiscal and monetary policy, an overheated labour market and deregulation of the credit market with ensuing credit expansion. An important difference compared with the present situation with a clear inflation target is that monetary policy under the regime of that time, with a fixed exchange rate, could not help subdue the overheating as it was detailed to maintain the fixed krona exchange rate. During the 1990s, on the other hand, we succeeded in bringing down inflation to the same level as other countries. However, this required drastic measures. The 1990s began with the most severe crisis in the Swedish economy since the 1930s. Open unemployment rose to a high point of 9 per cent in 1993. This had a dampening effect on prices and wages. In addition, fiscal policy and monetary policy were very tight. The budget consolidation in the mid-1990s was very extensive and interest rates were kept at a very high level during a transition period.

Today’s conference touches on a range of interesting questions concerning both regions: •  Are there policy strategies that can ensure that the global economy will escape from this very long period of very low inflation and very low real interest rates? •  Is there scope for fiscal policy to take on some of the burden of ending this period of persistently low inflation and low interest rates? •  Are we now in a period of secular stagnation or are we in the midst of a deleveraging process that will gradually dissipate? •  Why has investment spending failed to respond to the low level of interest rates? •  What do we believe are the factors underlying the recent slowdown in productivity growth globally? •  Is a banking union with a common deposit guarantee scheme achievable in Europe? •  Are there opportunities for further regulatory and supervisory convergence between the United States and Europe? I would like to thank the participants for addressing these and other questions during today’s three panels, and I look forward to insightful discussion over the course of the day. It is now my pleasure to introduce the European Union Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency David O’Sullivan. The ambassador is extraordinarily well-versed to speak on the issues of interdependence and the policy challenges we face. Welcome, Ambassador O’Sullivan. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In that context, we lowered the growth range forecast for 2012 and pointed out that, given the international threats facing us, the balance of risks for growth was biased downward. We stated our willingness to take action in order to mitigate the impact of the external scenario on the Chilean economy, having the necessary tools to deal with adverse situations. Thus, in late December we took exceptional measures to ease the frictions present in the domestic money market and, in January, we preemptively reduced the monetary policy rate (MPR) by 25 basis points. Facing the uncertain external situation, the expectations of most market analysts and brokers anticipated the need for further reductions of the MPR. With the passing of time, we have seen a somewhat more favorable evolution of the external scenario. In general, confidence has partially returned to global financial markets, expressed in lower risk spreads and higher commodity prices. The outlook for world growth is still weak, even lower than our expectations in December, but the likelihood of a more adverse scenario has decreased. In Chile, domestic demand and output have outperformed December’s projections. Meanwhile, inflation has also exceeded projections and core inflation measures have normalized rapidly. All this has modified the balance of risks for the Chilean economy from December to date. Some months ago, the biggest risk was that a deteriorated external scenario could trigger a sharper deceleration of domestic demand and output and, thus, of inflation too.

2 Given the importance of the in depth of Shariah research in Islamic finance, the International Shariah Research Academy (ISRA) was recently established as part of INCEIF to conduct applied Shariah research on the contemporary Islamic finance issues. The third strategy is to provide a platform that promotes active engagement and dialogue among the relevant stakeholders. The annual Shariah dialogue at international and regional levels have contributed to increased understanding of different views on Islamic finance matters and enhanced mutual respect of Shariah opinions. Closing In conclusion, against a backdrop of an increasingly uncertain global environment, Islamic financial system is indeed well positioned, as a form of financial intermediation in this more challenging environment. In the coming years, it is important for adequate focus to be given on the implementation of international prudential standards and sound risk management practices in Islamic financial institutions to ensure the financial stability and integrity of the financial system. According greater mutual respect to global Shariah views for Islamic finance would also contribute to the orderly global development of Islamic finance, thus sustaining the overall viability and soundness of the Islamic financial system as it becomes an integral part of the international financial system. 2  4  IBFIM's "Shariah Scholars Induction Programme". BIS Review 59/2008
Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London at the Mansion House, London, 18 June 2008. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, My Lords, Ministers, Aldermen, Mr Recorder, Sheriffs, Ladies and Gentlemen: Can it really be only a year since we last met in this magnificent room? With the financial crisis continuing, I was tempted to deliver last year’s speech again. But that would not allow me to welcome the Chancellor to his first Mansion House Dinner as Chancellor. After the past – difficult – year, could I say, Chancellor, how much we at the Bank have appreciated the patience and good humour with which you have handled the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”. Over that year, the west wind of a credit crunch emanating from the United States and the east wind of higher energy and food prices resulting from the strength of Asian economies have been stirring up the waters through which our economic ship must pass. These two challenges of rising inflation and falling economic growth have led to a crop of doom-laden predictions best captured by my less well-known addition to the well-known words of Robert Frost: Some say the world will end in fire, Some say in ice. But whichever it is It won’t be NICE. That “non-inflationary consistently expansionary” decade, as I described it in 2003, has drawn to a close.

This is new territory for us all and I expect it will be part of the ongoing supervisory dialogue in the years ahead. Thank you for your attention and for joining us today at the New York. I will be available during today’s lunch session to discuss further, and I hope you enjoy today’s conference. 1 I thank Jacqueline Fenton for assistance drafting these remarks. 2 Kevin J. Stiroh, Introductory Remarks at the New York Feds first Fintech Research Conference, March 22, 2019. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches