samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is important that SIAS continues and builds upon the good work it has done to-date. As they grow in financial sophistication, more Singaporeans are taking to investing. At the same time, the investment landscape is becoming increasingly complex and challenging. The theme for today’s conference is timely – the future of investing. I will not try to predict that future or, worse still, offer tips on what to invest in. There are many experts that SIAS has gathered, who can do that better than I. Instead, I want to talk about how we might achieve wellness in investment, taking into account some broad trends and how MAS is working with the financial industry to create the investment ecosystem to make possible this wellness. As with achieving physical and mental well-being, may I suggest that achieving wellness in investment comprises three things: eating well; sleeping well; and feeling well. Eating well is about investing for good financial returns. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  While public markets will continue to be the mainstay of investing, the search for yield will inevitably take us to private markets. The rise of private markets has been a structural trend for about two decades now. Identifying opportunities in private markets while minimising risk will be a key theme in the future of investing. Sleeping well is about securing adequacy in retirement. Demographics is one of the few trends we can predict with a degree of certainty.

A vibrant PE and VC ecosystem is critical for the ongoing technological and digital transformation of Singapore and ASEAN. Deep and diverse private markets offer investors an opportunity to tap on the returns potential of Asia’s growth companies. This is why MAS has made the growth of the private market ecosystem a key plank in its industry development agenda, and put in place various supporting initiatives. First, MAS has simplified the regulatory framework for VC managers. We have streamlined the admission criteria and business conduct requirements. This has facilitated faster time-to-market for VC managers, and increased access to financing for start-up and growth stage businesses. Second, MAS is working with industry players to establish private market platforms in Singapore to help match Asian growth companies with international investors. Last year, Capbridge Platform obtained MAS’ approval to operate its private securities exchange as a Recognised Market Operator in Singapore. Third, MAS launched in November last year a programme to allocate $ billion of its own funds as part of its investment portfolio into the private markets asset class. These funds will be placed for management with top global PE and Infrastructure fund managers who are committed to deepening their existing presence or establishing a new and significant presence in Singapore. There has been keen interest from PE and infrastructure managers, and MAS has already funded a few managers who have met our investment and developmental objectives. MAS’ total commitment to PE and infrastructure funds under this programme is currently just over $ million.
For example, we published analyses of the vulnerabilities in our Financial Stability Reviews in 2006 and 2007 and highlighted the declining price of risk, the build up of global imbalances, the growing dependence of banks on wholesale funding, and the risk that structured credit markets could seize up in a downturn. When we took that message to Chief Executives of banks in London and New York, they generally accepted the analysis and agreed that a correction was bound to come. However, almost to a man (and they were all men), they took comfort from the sophistication of their risk management systems and hedging strategies. They were confident they could ride out the storm. But as it turned out their systems were preparing them for a shower not for a hurricane. The limitations of their risk models were cruelly exposed in August 2007. One CFO remarked last year “We were seeing things that were 25-standard deviation moves, several days in a row”, which in plain English means that according to their models, the outright impossible was happening on a daily basis. According to the Value at Risk (VaR) benchmark for example – which measures the amount an institution stands to lose on its portfolio given an abnormal movement in market prices – there shouldn’t have been a big problem But that was partly because recent experience grossly underestimated what the truly abnormal really was.

We are now learning a lesson that Japan learned a decade ago. As the Governor of the Bank of Japan recently remarked “if inflation targeting regimes induce market participants to think of monetary policy decision-making process in terms of an inflation number, they tend to overlook the insidious build-up of unsustainable imbalances […]. Inflation targeting works well if it is properly understood… (but this) can be difficult once an economy has attained and maintained a low inflation rate for a number of years.” This is partly a matter of adopting the intelligent approach inflation targeting. We must be willing to “lean against the wind” of asset price booms and credit expansion and to tolerate somewhat weaker growth and lower employment in doing so. But if we need to prevent asset price and credit booms as well as control consumer prices it would be better to have two instruments than one and that is the last lesson I want to discuss – the need to develop instruments which directly dampen the cycle of credit growth and asset prices. 10  BIS Review 21/2009  Lesson 7: We need another instrument to stabilise the economy The first step must be to decide how ambitious we want to be and define the objective. Then we can design the instruments. I don’t think we have all the answers yet.
However, during the past 20 years, the euro area has essentially forged ahead through crises, with the creation of the European Stability Mechanism to help Member States in 2012 – supporting among others Portugal – or the Banking Union in 2014 in response to the Spanish or Irish crises. As distance grows with the last financial crisis, general European interest has nowadays waned. This is a very serious problem: in 2017 and 2018, in what might be seen as the sunny summer of the economic cycle, we, Europeans, proved unable to fix the roof. And this takes me to our challenges for 2019. II. Our challenges in the face of 2019’s uncertainties 1. A slowdown and not a recession. A word first on our economic environment. At the global level, activity is clearly decelerating, but we are not heading towards a recession. According to the IMF, global growth could stand at 3.5% in 2019 after 3.7% in 2018. The main explanation for this slowdown is the increase in general uncertainty due to geopolitical risks, starting worldwide with trade tensions initiated by the US administration and in Europe with the prospect of a hard Brexit, very damaging but unfortunately less and less implausible. Uncertainty is depressing business confidence and possibly investment by fostering a wait-and-see attitude [slide 5].5 For instance, in France, manufacturers’ expectations on the overall economic outlook have turned down earlier and more significantly than their expectations on their own production.

The advances made by the European Council in December 2018 are a step in the right direction but clearly need to be strengthened and built upon. The success of the Banking Union will depend on the establishment of a solid resolution mechanism, – probably even more than a full common deposit insurance scheme. Regarding the backstop of the Single Resolution Fund, in the interests of financial stability, we should consider extending the maturities on the credit lines. And we will not achieve an effective and 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  profitable Banking Union without cross-border consolidation in Europe: there are still too many roadblocks and not enough cross-border restructuring. Unfortunately, there was almost no progress at all on the Capital Markets Union in the December agreement. Let us finally move on from a rhetorical consensus in principle to concrete headway, notably on harmonising bankruptcy regimes and strengthening ESMA. Both the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union are the key components for a genuine “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation”: I have put forward this idea as a way of better channelling our abundant resources – our EUR 340 billion private savings surplus – towards the concrete needs of European economy: the energy transition, SMEs’ equity or digital innovation. But the strengthening of the euro area should also include public mechanisms of solidarity. Regarding the ESM, it should not be just about managing crises ex post, but about preventing them ex-ante above all by reinforcing our precautionary tools.
So far as I can see, nothing much was done, internationally. We now have another chance. A new round of work is now underway in the BCBS to identify impediments or complications arising from national insolvency laws, resolution regimes, or supervisory practices. I would be amazed if that group does not identify some material issues, for the reasons I have discussed. If so, they should not be dismissed by the Top Brass, left to worry only middle-ranking technocrats, as seems to have happened nearly twenty years ago. Perhaps most important, in April, the Financial Stability Forum (now renamed the Financial Stability Board) issued Principles for Cross-Border Co-operation on Crisis Management. But what really matters is that they were endorsed by the G20 Heads of Government at their subsequent Summit. Which means that there is political endorsement for national authorities to dilute their narrow attachment to local interests, recognising that in globalised markets their interests will often best be served through co-operative solutions. Either that, or the structure of international banking may have to change. Given the starting point, the Principles are demanding. For each of the most important global banks, the aim is that home and host authorities (regulators and central banks) should work together to identify obstacles to effective management of crises. To that end, home authorities are charged with ensuring that firms are capable of supplying the information needed to manage a crisis.

Philipp Hildebrand: Switzerland and global competition - an all-purpose strategy Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the University of St Gallen, St Gallen, 29 August 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Openness was one of the major factors that made Switzerland one of the richest countries in the world. A significant portion of our industry, and one upon which our current prosperity is based, is the direct or indirect outcome of foreign expertise and the efforts of foreign entrepreneurs. These people were attracted to Switzerland – particularly in the 19th century – by its openness and its stable, liberal environment. Openness promotes competition, innovation and progress, thereby securing sustained prosperity. But Switzerland strayed from the straight and narrow when it began erecting barriers to competition – barriers that provided ever greater protection to its domestic market. The ensuing insulation of the domestic market is probably one of the main reasons for Switzerland's growth slump today. External trade policies are always domestic market policies as well. Consequently, external trade policies have instruments that can be effective in opening up the domestic market from outside. This openness to external trade is of utmost importance, therefore, not only for exporters, but also for the domestic market. Being open towards Europe and towards other trading blocks is not mutually exclusive.
This will be done on the basis of examinations of the Swedish economy by the EU Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB). Those assessments will be discussed by the finance ministers of the member states, who will then hear the opinions of the EU Parliament and the heads of state or of government before arriving at their decision. When that decision has been made, the member states must also agree on the time that Sweden should have for completing the necessary preparations. The countries that participated from the start have been given a transitional period of over three years from the euro’s introduction in January 1999 until it completely replaces the national currencies not later than June 2002. That a similar arrangement would apply for Sweden is, however, not certain. If we consider that our preparations can be completed more quickly, perhaps we could ask for a shorter interval. 1  BIS Review 96/1999  Do we meet the entry criteria? The Commission and the ECB will be examining the Swedish economy with reference to the criteria that were included in the Maastricht Treaty. Those criteria are for inflation, long-term interest rates, the exchange rate, the government budget balance and government debt. There are also specific requirements as regards central bank legislation. The principle of equal treatment will apply; that is, the basis for the assessments is to be the same as for the initial group of euro participants. That means that some conclusions can probably be drawn from the examinations in May 1998.

The Treaty states that for two years before the examination the national currency is to have been inside the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The process by which the initial group of participants was selected suggests that the criterion could be interpreted somewhat more freely. Finland and Italy were both approved in May 1998 even though their currencies had then been participating in the ERM for only around eighteen months. The other countries may also have reasons for not insisting too strongly on a strict interpretation of formal participation by outsider countries. Considering the apparent strength of British opposition to a fixed exchange rate arrangement, such an attitude might obstruct a British membership of the euro area. It seems to me that in this respect the United Kingdom is in a more difficult position than Sweden. Our Government and the Riksdag have stated that participation in ERM II can be seen as a direct preparation for joining the monetary union; the Riksbank has noted that we do not see any problems with that. In a future situation where a referendum or a general election has resulted in a positive attitude to the monetary union, it is difficult to envisage Sweden’s participation in ERM II as posing any major political problems. Regardless of the formal requirements that may apply at the time of the examination, the assessments in May 1998 indicate that a central factor in the evaluation will be how the exchange rate has actually developed.
Considering the allocation of liquidity within the system in order to prepare the banking sector for technical rate adjustment, to reduce possible fluctuations in the money markets and to maintain liquidity management flexibility against unforeseen liquidity developments, the Central Bank decided to keep the integrity of both reducing overfunding in the context of the exit strategy and technical interest rate adjustment operations and to adopt a gradual strategy. In the first stage, the amount of liquidity that has been provided as a part of the overfunding policy will be reduced gradually. In this process, as currently is the case, due attention will be paid to keep overnight interest rates close to the announced borrowing rate. The overnight borrowing rate announced by the Central Bank will continue to be the reference rate of monetary policy. As for the second stage, the technical interest rate adjustment process will become operative. In this respect, in order to maintain the flexibility of liquidity management against unexpected liquidity developments and not to create volatility in money markets, it is planned to be carried out in two steps. In the first step, the Central Bank’s borrowing and lending interest rates for overnight transactions will not be changed. However, the one-week repo auction procedure will be subject to change by implementing amount auction procedure via fixed interest rate instead of the traditional auction procedure.

In this context, primarily the measures taken in direct crisis management will be withdrawn, and, as is the case in the rest of the world, the exit strategy will be a cautious and gradual process that safeguards financial stability in our country as well. I would like to end my remarks by extending my regards to all the participating academicians and policy-makers for their contributions to the “Global Crises and Economic Governance” congress. Also, I would like to thank, once more, the staff of İnönü University and everybody for their contributions to the conference. BIS Review 79/2010  7
For our part, the Bank’s long-term focus will be on ensuring that the Bacs and FPS systems are robust and resilient and able to play their part in mitigating systemic risk, and that the NPA is developed to maintain and enhance this. In the short term this means that we will focus our supervisory efforts on ensuring the NPSO effectively manages its integration to deliver the benefits of consolidation. In particular, we expect the NPSO to:      Establish itself as a credible payment system operator, setting out a clear strategy for both what it will, and will not, do over the next three years; Provide strategic leadership within the retail payments ecosystem that is forward-looking; Demonstrate high quality governance across the systems it operates; and Put robustness and resilience at the heart of design decisions of the NPA. Now, the NPSO does not exist in a vacuum. For this programme to succeed, support is necessary from the financial industry itself as well as the payments community and the authorities. The NPSO has a lot to deliver 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  and a great many expectations upon it – but it cannot deliver everything at once. It is vital that stakeholders allow the NPSO the space and time to set out, and then ultimately deliver, a realistic but ambitious set of goals. And, equally, the NPSO will need to manage stakeholder expectations carefully.

And parallel migration by both the Bank and the NPSO will encourage widespread adoption of ISO 20022, a precondition for unlocking these benefits. We encourage stakeholders to take this opportunity to feed into the process and help shape the future of payments in the UK. So, what has been achieved? The consolidation and transition of Bacs and the Faster Payments Service (FPS) to the NPSO has been st  delivered. On the 1 of May of this year, the NPSO formally took over responsibility for the operation of these 1  See: The Bank of England’s supervision of financial market infrastructures – Annual Report 2018. Which manages the paper processing system for cheques and the recently launched Image Clearing System. 3 See: public statement on the commencement of the Bank’s direct delivery of CHAPS. 4 See: ISO 20022 consultation paper: a global standard to modernise UK payments. 2  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  two systemically important payment systems and was brought within the supervisory remit of the Bank. It has been operational for almost two months now, and, with the Cheque and Credit Clearing Company to be integrated shortly, another key milestone on this journey will soon be achieved. Between these retail payment systems, the NPSO will be responsible for the processing of £ trillion payments each year, almost two and half times the UK’s GDP. I think we would all agree that its continued resilience and smooth functioning is a matter of primary concern.
A discussion on this has recently been intensified within the EU and has also involved the question of what type of institution should in that case be the responsible authority at European level. Here I believe that it would be best to wait and see and to build upon the only path that there is currently political scope to realise, namely to ensure that the co-operation between the existing authorities functions efficiently. Some conclusions Financial integration is an ongoing process throughout the world and has positive welfare effects in all countries that accept it and ensure to adapt their regulatory framework to make it possible. International co-operation takes place within several bodies in order to develop the regulatory framework, and Sweden is affected in particular by the legislation within the EU. When designing the rules and regulations for the financial sector, it is most important to identify the essential elements for counteracting stability problems without making product development and efficiency more difficult. There are distinct advantages to focusing on an overall framework legislation without too many details, which would obscure the view and hamper continued adaptation. When it comes to the implementation of the rules and regulations, co-operation is required between central banks and supervisory authorities in order to enable the financial system to develop effectively without risks to the overall stability. A general framework legislation does not make supervision simpler, but instead makes greater demands for competent analysis of operational conditions in the financial sector.

Here, it is also necessary to have an interplay between the central banks and supervisory authorities to implement existing regulations in a good manner. And the more integrated the financial sector becomes within the EU, the larger the number of people who will potentially be affected by such tensions or crises, which will make further demands for well-oiled channels for monitoring between different countries and concerning different types of financial activities. This involves not merely having good systems for mutually providing information on what is happening when things are going smoothly, but also maintaining a readiness to identify problems and intervene in acute crises that might arise and that could threaten the stability of the system. It is complicated to build up this kind of readiness when it comes to authorities in different countries with different traditions, different principals, responsibility for different parts of the financial system, etc., but it is nevertheless extremely important that the network co-operation in this field be developed further. New requirements for co-ordination in supervision and oversight The basic model for financial supervision within the EU is that it shall be carried out by national authorities and this is, in my opinion, the most natural and efficient means of keeping a watch over financial operators and markets. However, this requires that the supervision of other operations and markets that can affect financial conglomerates is also sufficiently co-ordinated.