samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In regard to, for example, bank offices, institutions should reconsider their scale and probably reduce their number, as well as promoting the productivity of those which remain operational. It is true that the proximity to customers has afforded significant competitive advantages to the Spanish banking model. But it is equally true that the potential advantages of a larger scale and proximity to customers can turn into overhead costs which are burdensome in a crisis and can weaken income statements already under downward pressure due to other factors which are hard to deal with. Having said this, my words cannot and must not be taken to mean that stricter cost management will be the cure-all enabling all institutions to circumvent the potential difficulties for their income statements. From the standpoint of business model redesign and adaptation to a new reality, it is evident that appropriate cost management is essential. But it may not be enough. I am sure that institutions are not going to disregard restructuring processes which will enable them to resize while harnessing synergies and economies of scale. Indeed, in the past, Spain has seen numerous processes of this type which have resulted in highly successful business models. Let me sum up. BIS Review 52/2009  5  The complexity of the international financial crisis and of the synchronised weakening of the real economy in numerous countries puts banking systems in a complex and exceptional position.

The recent forecasts by various international organisations indicate that, in fact, we are in a very serious worldwide recession, from which neither the euro area nor the Spanish economy have been spared. In general, according to the available forecasts for developed countries, the problems will be acute in 2009, although it is expected that at some point during 2010, taking into account the current high uncertainty any forecasting exercise entails, an incipient recovery may become discernible. The Spanish banking system, as is inevitable when faced with a global financial crisis, has not been immune. Nevertheless, the impact has been no less than in other banking systems, where public authorities have had to take control of very large institutions, as I have said. This better relative performance can be explained by at least two factors. Firstly, the business model of Spanish credit institutions is based on traditional retail banking and is founded on long-term relationships with customers and creditors. This type of banking model has enabled credit institutions to acquire in-depth knowledge of their customers, reducing the perverse effects linked to asymmetrical information present in any banking business model. Similarly, since it does not use asset securitisation as a risk transfer mechanism but only as a means of obtaining liquidity, the origination and acquisition of complex structured products has been avoided, which have proved to be substantially opaque and the cause of hefty losses for many institutions in various countries.
While the Thai package showed how neighbours are willing to help supplement Fund resources, this has the tendency to reinforce regional arrangements rather than dealing with the issue on a global basis. 53. We hope that a precedent has not been set that, if the Mexican crisis was an American problem, the Thai crisis an Asian one, the next case will be for whichever region to resolve. Such regionalism does not auger well for international monetary co-operation. We feel therefore that the resources of the Fund should be strengthened considerably and access level reviewed in the light of recent developments. This also applies to monitoring and enforcement efforts by the Fund. It would clearly not be efficient for regional groupings to duplicate the role of the existing international organizations such as the IMF and the BIS, with recognized expertise and the machinery to deal with these issues. In any case, a regional crisis is quite often not limited geographically, but has global ramifications. In dealing with a crisis, the Fund should also have the mechanism and authority in place to negotiate with private sector lenders to ensure that equitable burden sharing remains, and that the burden of adjustment does not fall only on official creditors. 54. Another important area for Asian monetary co-operation is the building of the market infrastructure.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conditional inflation forecast of March 2011 and of June 2011 Percentage change in national consumer price index from previous year Inflation Forecast March 2011 (with Libor at 0.25%) Forecast June 2011 (with Libor at 0.25%) % 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 –0.5 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  Observed inflation June 2011 2008  I nf l at i on  2009  2010 Q2  Q3  Q4  2011  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2.5  2.7  3.0  1.6  0.0 - 0.7 - 1.0 - 0.2 1.1  1.0  0.3  0.3  0.6  Q2  Q3  2008  2009  2010  2.4  - 0.5  0.7  Q4  Conditional inflation forecast of March 2011 with Libor at 0.25% and of June 2011 with Libor at 0.25% 2011  For ecast Mar ch 2011, Li bor at 0.25% For ecast June 2011, Li bor at 0.25%  4  2012  2013  2014  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  0.4  0.5  1.2  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.3  1.5  1.8  2.1  2.5  0.5  1.4  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2.2  Q1  2.6  Q2  Q3  2011  2012  2013  0.8  1.1  2.0  0.9  1.0  1.7  Q4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
These actions will tend to increase the Treasury’s net interest costs and pull down the Federal Reserve’s remittances to the Treasury. Together, these two effects will sharply push up the Treasury’s net interest burden. To show how this may play out, let’s use as an illustration a “current policy” baseline based on information provided by the Congressional Budget Office, including its macroeconomic assumptions. Under these assumptions, the output gap is closed and monetary policy is normalized by 2017. As shown in Figure 5, net debt service is projected to rise to 3.3 percent of GDP by fiscal year 2020 up from 1.0 percent in 2011, based on an assumption that the interest rate for three-month Treasury bills will rise from around 10 basis points today to 3.8 percent by 2020 and the interest rate on benchmark 10-year Treasury securities will increase from around 2 percent today to 5 percent by 2020. On top of this, Federal Reserve remittances are projected to fall sharply. In its recent current law baseline projection, the CBO calculates that net remittances will decline from a peak of 0.55 percent of GDP in 2011 to a long-run average of around 0.2 percent by 2017 and beyond. Thus, on the current policy baseline, the combined effect of higher debt service and lower remittances will total 2 ¼ percent of GDP by fiscal 2020 relative to the current fiscal year (Figure 5). Of course, this assumes that interest rates follow the trajectory used in the CBO baseline.

That, however, is precisely what those are doing who are pressing for an early - as early  BIS Review 2/2001  5  as possible - decision: adopting the euro as the country's currency as soon as possible or a commitment to run our own currency system for ever. These two radical alternatives, however, are fraught with considerable uncertainties. It therefore seems much more rational to adopt a wait-and-see attitude during which experience is gained, and to delay the decision until such time as its implications may be assessed with greater accuracy than is possible today. If you don't yet know where Berne is and whether you will like it there or not, don't take a non-stop intercity train. Rather board a train that will stop once in a while, giving you a chance to make up your mind. Perhaps you will want to leave the train in Olten and go on to Basel instead, or you may prefer to get off in Lenzburg and return to Zurich. With this little side leap into option theory - or should I say common sense? - I shall close my remarks. I thank you for your patience.
Ask not what the economy can do for insurers – ask what insurers can do for the economy Speech given by Anna Sweeney, Executive Director, Insurance Supervision Division Delivered at the Bank of America 25th European Financials CEO Conference 22 September 2020  I am grateful to Alan Sheppard, Megan Bell and Zachary Morris-Dyer for their assistance preparing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Good morning and thank you to Bank of America for inviting me to speak here today. In a normal year, I would use these remarks to run through our regulatory agenda. But this year it is inevitable that my remarks will focus on the effects of Covid-19: a human tragedy for millions, the worst economic crisis in the UK for several centuries and an unparalleled global challenge. Our economy and the actors within it are continuing to face numerous challenges and a great deal of uncertainty. The aim of the Bank of England – along with colleagues from other public sector institutions – has been to build a bridge across the economic disruption caused by the pandemic. And insurers – as providers of protection, as guarantors of retirement income and as institutional investors - have an important role to play in the recovery from that crisis.

And what will the ECB be doing on the day the troika returns home? Well, we won’t perhaps be engaging in similarly wild celebrations – we are central bankers, after all. But I suspect that I, and my fellow board members, may raise a quiet toast to the achievement of a country in so admirably fighting its way back to solvency and stability. I wish you continued success in meeting that goal and we stand ready to work with you in achieving this goal. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Asset purchases are part of our current toolbox, President Draghi has been clear about that. But that doesn’t mean that they are the preferred option in current conditions. And it should be said that if forward guidance on interest rates is credible and steers expectations in the desired direction, further purchases may not be needed at all to ensure that financing conditions are appropriate. Observers increasingly expect the ECB to launch new longer-term refinancing operations for banks – TLTROs – and they make the case that this measure, especially in conjunction with an increase in the deposit facility rate, could improve the situation for banks and support lending. What would you say to that, especially in the light of your concerns about the procyclical behaviour of banks? Our TLTROs have been a very useful tool to deal with impairments in the transmission of monetary policy and are part of our toolbox. As the procyclical behaviour of banks is an important reason why economic cycles sometimes end badly, we do need to monitor the transmission of monetary policy through the banking system carefully. In March we will make an assessment of the current and expected state of bank transmission. You will be leaving the ECB at the end of May, having experienced and helped to shape a period of great change at the ECB.

The medium-term perspective is decisive for us, most especially the question of whether we are dealing with a temporary soft patch or with a more prolonged weakness. And your response, particularly in view of the continuing weak data since the last Governing Council meeting? First of all, the data since the January meeting have not only held negative surprises, they have also contained a few positive signs such as the further decline in unemployment. But it’s also true that growth in the third and fourth quarter of 2018 and most likely also in the first quarter of 2019 is well below the potential growth rate of the euro area economy. So growth will have been below potential for three consecutive quarters and that’s not good news. The question now is whether there will be a rebound in the second quarter and beyond. A rebound is likely, but it is too early to say by how much. So would you say that the ECB’s Governing Council is becoming less confident that we are now merely seeing a temporary economic dip? The economic slowdown is broader and more persistent than had been thought and growth in the short term is likely to fall short of previous expectations. But as I said, what counts for us is the medium-term outlook and we see positive and negative factors there. What does that mean in practice? On the positive side, the situation for households and so for consumption is still favourable. That is a key driver of growth.
I will today refer to two which I consider to be amongst the most important ones. The first one relates to business model and structural weaknesses. Despite the low profitability being a wider structural European issue, the cost to income ratio of the Cyprus Banking Sector, which amounts to 76 percent as at June 2022 is significantly higher than the respective EU average of 63 percent, signalling serious cost inefficiencies relative to peers. Investment in technology is key in the efforts to unlock efficiency and bridge this gap by addressing chronic issues that dent profitability such as cost inefficiencies, limited avenues of income generation, competitive pressure from entities operating outside the traditional banking spectrum and changing customer demands and needs. The second one relates to the risks of climate change. The ongoing effort to reduce the dependence from Russian energy may increase the transition risks and as such banks shall enhance and adapt their climate risk mitigation strategies. The fact that some of the banks have started making tangible steps on this regard is a positive development, but they are still early on the learning curve. They must act more aggressively and more decisively to meet our expectations of incorporating climate-related and environmental risks into their overall risk management frameworks. Conclusion Let me now briefly summarise the main points of my remarks and conclude: The adverse geopolitical developments led to a significant and persistent increase in inflation, associated with output loss and elevated economic uncertainty.

Real GDP growth in Cyprus expanded by about 6 percent over 2022H1, mainly driven by a faster than expected recovery in tourismrelated activities and, to a lesser extent, by growth in information and communication activities and in professional services. At the same time, weakness in the Cyprus GDP performance could be expected to become visible over 2022H2 and 2023, primarily owing to the anticipated worsening in the international environment outlook. More specifically, the impact of the war is expected to be channelled directly, via the disruption in trade of services and the rise in commodity prices, in particular oil and wheat, as well as indirectly, via the impact on business and consumer confidence. Our exposure to Russia via the export of services side is the most significant vulnerability, with the most important exposure relating to financial and other business services and, to a lesser extent, tourism, transport as well as telecommunications, computer and information services. At the same time, it is important to mention significant adaptation effects for example in the area of tourism, losses from the Russian market have been covered to a large extent by other markets such as the UK, Poland, Germany, Israel and Scandinavian countries. The labour market has also been exhibiting continued resilience. Over 2022H1, the unemployment rate reached 6,7 percent, well below the 7,5 percent rate recorded in 2021. The resilience of the Cyprus labour market is in line with business views about expecting a relatively small impact from the war.
The FATF’s Consultation Paper is useful in spelling out the main elements of the due diligence process, namely: •  to identify the direct customer;  •  to verify the customer’s identity;  •  to identify the person with beneficial ownership and control, who may be different from the direct customer;  •  to verify the identity of the beneficial owner and/or the person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted; and  •  to conduct ongoing due diligence and scrutiny. A number of features stand out from this. First, the process of know your customer is a two-stage process - identification and verification. Second, there is a clear obligation on institutions to look behind the corporate veil, nominee or trustee to the ultimate beneficial owner. If necessary, this means following the chain of ownership or control to the natural persons at the very end of the chain. There are obvious practical difficulties in this, which we can discuss with the industry. But the basic issue is whether it is safe for institutions to establish a banking relationship if they do not really know with whom they are dealing. The third point to note is that the due diligence process does not apply simply at the time the relationship with the customer is entered into. It must be an ongoing process using detection and reporting mechanisms that can pick up large or unusual transactions.

One of the main motivations for this rapid research effort is the swiftly decreasing use of cash. Just some two per cent of the money supply is now created directly by the central bank in Sweden, for instance. But even the avant-garde Swedes consider the e-krona a complement of cash, not a fully-fledged substitute. The potential advantages of distributed ledger technology and central bank digital currency are the following: more efficient payment systems, direct and more efficient conduct of monetary policy (perhaps even practically enabling helicopter drop of money) and, if implemented on a sufficiently large scale, an end to the need to run costly deposit insurance schemes. But will central bank digital currency become a complete alternative to cash one day? I’m not sure. Many questions remain: anonymity, susceptibility to cybercrime and IT issues. But above all those, a key issue arises: the problem of competition. Will the central bank change into a direct competitor to commercial banks? Will it serve as a “bank of last resort” for all deposits in bad times? Should it also provide credit to the real economy? Might it become a real monobank, like the ones we saw a few decades ago in former socialist countries? What would the entire money-creation process look like? These questions are too important to rush around. So far it seems to me like social engineering to talk about abolishing cash fully and issuing digital currency instead.
Structural reforms are needed to unleash the productive potential of the euro area economy. Such reforms fall beyond the remit of the ECB and are the responsibility of other national and European policymakers. Now is the perfect time for such reforms, since the current accommodative policy of the ECB can help offset any short-term adjustment costs of their implementation. This is a window of opportunity that needs to be seized. Doing so will raise future income in the euro area, supporting an increase in the natural rate and boosting the returns to saving. 1 See Orphanides, A and J. Williams, (2002), “Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural  Rates”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.2, 63–145, Laubach, T and J. Williams (2003), “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest”, Review of Economics and Statistics 85, No4, pp 1063–70, Laubach, T and J. Williams, (2015), “Measuring the real natural interest rate redux”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper, No. 2015–16 and Taylor, J.B, and V. Wieland, (2016), “Finding the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in a Fog of Policy Deviations”, Economics Working Papers 16109, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 2 Notwithstanding the uncertainty over estimates of the natural rate, key drivers of long-term interest rate in a  standard Solow growth model such as productivity and population growth have been slowing for decades in advanced economies, suggesting that the natural interest rate may have indeed declined.

With these guidelines, the different systems can be monitored consistently, while at the same time keeping the administrative effort of the operators at an acceptable level. Business Continuity Planning (BCP) Different experiences in the recent past – from the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States to minor local technical difficulties – suggest that measures to strengthen the operational resistance of the Swiss financial sector must be taken. During the past year and a half, the SNB has headed a sectoral working group in cooperation with the SFBC secretariat. The group consists of representatives from infrastructure providers, financial institutions and the authorities and has conducted an in-depth analysis of the business continuity plans of the major players in the financial markets. The Business Continuity Planning (BCP) project focuses on precautionary measures to prevent the likelihood of disruptions. In addition, measures are taken to help cope as efficiently as possible with disruptions, once they have occurred. In its analysis, the working group focused on the two business processes which were considered to be especially critical for system stability and which must be maintained without fail even in exceptional circumstances. Firstly, the supply of liquidity to the financial system with central bank money by means of repos and, secondly, large-value payment transactions between the commercial banks in Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC). The analysis began with the following scenario: a severe disruption causing the failure of an important operational centre and incapacitating its staff.