samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We would anticipate some nudges or policy changes by relevant stakeholders in order to influence behavioural change in consumers. Over the recent years, concerted efforts between the private and public sectors have resulted in a number of specific financial education initiatives being implemented. For example, financial education elements are integrated into the school curriculum for Year 1, Year 4 to 6 and Secondary 1 following effective collaboration between the Ministry of Education and Bank Negara Malaysia. I am pleased that financial institutions and the private sector are also playing their roles to strengthen learning in the classroom through extra-curricular activities in their respective signature financial education programmes. Moving forward, more can be done to instil positive financial values among the 5 million school children through greater sharing of responsibility. I would also like to acknowledge FOMCA’s on-going initiatives in financial education over the years. Indeed, FOMCA has been a valuable partner in the education segment. I wish to take this opportunity to welcome FOMCA’s willingness to join hands with the FE Network to elevate financial literacy of our consumers under the national strategy. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  FOMCA, through its affiliates and extensive network nationwide, is well-positioned to contribute on two fronts. The following are my suggestions. Firstly, FOMCA can further expand outreach to educate and create awareness on the importance of financial literacy, particularly to the informal sectors. It is important that our financial education initiatives can be reached to the masses.

Benefits for the non-participating Member States The SSM is open to the participation of all EU member States, including those that have not adopted the euro and perhaps many will do so. How will those states that do not participate in the SSM be affected by Banking Union? It is important to stress here that the playing field really will be level. There will be no disadvantage for banks in countries like Britain that stay out of the SSM. Banking Union will benefit all Member States that are part of the single financial market. And as the leading provider of financial services in Europe, I can see only advantages for Britain from its creation. First, Banking Union will facilitate the completion of the single financial market by simplifying supervisory and regulatory practices, which will facilitate wider market access for banks and investors across Europe. Second, Banking Union will reduce the scope for coordination failures between national supervisors, which will in turn allow for more effective implementation of the single rulebook and convergence of supervisory practices. In this way, the presence of the SSM can be seen as reinforcing the coordination function of the European Banking Authority. The SSM will operate in full compliance with EBA guidance and actively contribute to its work. Third, Banking Union will enhance financial stability in the Europe – and this, more than anything, is what is required for the single market in financial services to thrive.
Among the fintech services that have enjoyed the greatest success are mobile money and online payments. •  In the Philippines, GCash has become a popular mobile remittance services provider that leverages on the network of its telecommunications parent. •  In China, transaction volume through third-party payments providers has surpassed RMB 4 billion. Alipay, which dominates the market, has over 700 million registered accounts. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The competitive challenge posed by fintech players to Asia’s banks should not be overstated though. The banks are fighting back – developing online platforms to complement their physical branches. We can expect the Asian banking landscape to continue to transform as banks adapt innovations enabled by fintech to stay relevant and competitive. Conclusion Let me sum up. The three driving forces present both challenge and opportunity for banks in Asia. •  Economic growth will be slower in the next decade compared to the last two. But the composition of that growth in an increasingly middle class Asia will benefit modern services like banking. •  Financial regulation will be tighter and will constrain all banks. But Asian banks will be affected less in relative terms given their stronger capital positions and funding structures. •  Technological innovation will threaten to disintermediate banks. But to the extent that Asian banks themselves adopt the new technology platforms, they will strengthen their ability to penetrate unbanked markets and expand their footprint.

Two trends are noteworthy for Asian banks: the rise of the Asian middle class and the regionalisation of Asian corporates. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Rising incomes and the agglomeration effects of urbanisation will significantly expand the ranks of the Asian middle class. •  In ASEAN, the middle class is projected to make up two-thirds of the population by 2030, compared to less than a quarter in 2010. This rapid expansion of the middle class will spur demand for a wide range of goods and services. Modern services, such as telecommunication, banking and finance, have higher income elasticities of demand compared to traditional services. This means that as income rises and wealth accumulates, the demand for financial services – be it consumer credit, wealth management, or insurance – will rise more than proportionately. As Asian economies develop and integrate further, Asian corporates will expand and internationalise. They will need more funding – not just traditional bank credit but debt and equity financing. They will need more cash management and transaction services. Asian banks who have been serving these corporates in their home markets will follow them as they regionalise their businesses. Financial regulation The second driving force that will shape banking in Asia is financial regulation. The Global Financial Crisis has spurred far-reaching financial regulatory reforms. The ones impacting banks most will be the new Basel III rules.
And I trust they and others like them will use it to lead the world, including India, to expanded economic prosperity. Thank you for having me here this evening. 4  P.G. Wodehouse is widely read and wildly popular in India. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Nina Stoyanova : Banks and business Speech by Ms Nina Stoyanova, Deputy Governor and Head of the Banking Department of the Bulgarian National Bank, during the video conference "Banks and Business", organized by the Capital newspaper, 2 December 2020. * * * I would like to welcome you to the video conference on Banking and Business, organized by the Capital newspaper. The banking sector is sending off a challenging year. In 2020, we witnessed the unprecedented pandemic caused by COVID-19, the imposition of measures to prevent its spread, which led to an economic downturn, as well as to many difficulties facing business and the people we have to deal with on a daily basis. However, there were also positive events during the year, such as the inclusion of the Bulgarian lev in Monetary Mechanism II and the establishment of close cooperation between the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the European Central Bank (ECB) in the field of banking supervision in July. 2020 Banks in Bulgaria were able to quickly adapt to the new reality resulting from the pandemic and ensure continuity in the provision of financial services to businesses and citizens. This became possible due to the high degree of electronicization and digitalization of the banking sector in the country.
In this connection, the European Convention plans in the coming weeks to announce its proposed draft of the future European Constitutional Treaty, which shall be agreed at the Inter-Governmental Conference to be convened in 2004. As regards monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council has, with a view to adapting the operating arrangements of the euro area to the possible entry of new members, recently recommended changes in its voting procedures, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Nice. The proposed Recommendation was approved by the European Council of 21 March 2003 and introduces a rotation system whereunder the number of governors entitled to vote at any one time is restricted to 15, divided into three groups on the basis of their voting frequency. Without delving into the details of the approved formula, I should like to stress that the criteria of representativeness used in determining the voting rights of each member of the Council will place the Governor of the Banco de España within the first group of Governors, who are authorised to vote in the ECB governing council most frequently, on an equal footing with Germany, France and Italy. The Spanish economy In an adverse external setting, the key characteristic of the period analysed in the Annual Report was the capacity shown by the Spanish economy to sustain a comparatively high growth rate of 2%, and to continue generating employment, which increased by 1.3%.

Commercial banks operating in the eurozone are willing to borrow around 250 billions Euro from the European Central Bank paying the key policy rate and at the end of the same day to deposit the same money at the European Central Bank being paid the discount rate, which is 1 percentage point less, but the spread between the short-term money market rates and the key policy rate still persists. Magnitude of the commercial banks’ position compared with the European Central Bank shows how huge the uncertainty has been. Only restoration of confidence about solvency and financial stability among commercial banks can most probably solve this problem. The third frontier we are concerned about is connected to the emergency liquidity assistance. Under standard circumstances central banks provide liquidity to commercial banks only. In case of an urgent need a commercial bank may ask the central bank for an emergency credit. What we see in the United States today is an attempt to extend this emergency assistance beyond the banking system and provide liquidity against collateral to non-banking firms. On one hand, one understands the effort of the Federal Reserve to provide funding also to the non-banking sector of the economy when the traditional channels are freezing. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve is effectively printing money against collateral with uncertain value and there are concerns when and how the Federal Reserve will close and null these operations to avoid potential inflationary consequences.
You might have supposed that this would have weakened the exchange rate, 1  BIS Review 7/2000  shielding us in some degree from weakening external demand growth - but not a bit of it - the exchange rate actually strengthened! But the easing of monetary policy may have helped to reverse the sharp fall in domestic confidence evident throughout the UK economy in the second half of 1998, and to avert the widely predicted slide into recession. In any event, after coming to a virtual stand-still in the fourth quarter of 1998, the economy as a whole bounced back last year, driven largely by domestic demand growth. And, for the economy as a whole, we can now, since 1992, point to the longest period of sustained low inflation - averaging 2.7% on the Government’s target measure, with relatively steady annual growth averaging 2.8% - well above most estimates of our long-term trend rate, together with a sustained rise in the number of people in employment - to an all-time high and an almost continuous month-by-month fall in the rate of unemployment to the lowest rate for about 20 years. But if the performance of the economy as a whole has been relatively encouraging over this period, that is clearly not the case for every sector of the economy. And I am only too well aware that the internationally-exposed sectors - most of agriculture, much of manufacturing industry and some services sectors - wherever they are located within the UK, have suffered.

This completes our network of 12 regional agencies across the UK - with the purpose of keeping ourselves more closely informed of regional economic developments. Previously Neil Kemsley covered Northern Ireland from our Agency in Liverpool and is here to make his farewell - and I am grateful to him for all that he did in reporting on developments here. But Nigel Falls - one of our most experienced regional Agents - is now established here in Belfast itself. He is also with us today. I very much hope that many of you will establish regular contact with him so that he can inform our Monetary Policy Committee each month of the particular problems that exist in Northern Ireland, so that we can take them into account in our monetary policy process. His reports will complement those which Roy Bailie, our Non-Executive Director here in Ireland, gives regularly to our Court of Directors. In our monetary policy role the Bank operates essentially on the demand side of the economy - aiming to keep aggregate demand in line with the supply-side capacity of the economy to meet that demand. But we can also contribute directly on the supply side, by helping to ensure that the financial system properly supports the needs of the wider economy.
Sources: Bloomberg and Bank calculations  Chart 3:  Chart 4:  Measures of uncertainty in the UK have fallen sharply1  US unemployment rate has fallen by more than UK  Standard deviations from mean (1985-2012)  5  14  4  12  3  10  2 1  8  0  6  -1  4  -2  2  -3 -4 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 Swathe of uncertainty indicators First principal component 1  For further details, including of the indicators used and sources, see Haddow, A, Hare, C, Hooley, J and Shakir, T (2013), “Macroeconomic uncertainty: what is it, how can we measure it and why does it matter?”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 2, pages 100–109.

Although the current account position underscores the need for the recovery to shift over time towards investment and export growth, it would be unreasonable to expect that to have happened already. Recoveries are seldom led by investment and strong demand from the UK’s major trading partners, including the euro zone, appears some way off. Ultimately, a sustained recovery in the UK will require a more robust and balanced global recovery. In summary, the UK has been in a situation where the equilibrium real rate of interest has been negative, but with monetary policy gaining traction, there is early evidence that the liquidity trap will be escaped over time. That is not to suggest the warnings are without merit, that interest rates can return to normal soon, that the risks to financial stability arising from the emergency stance of monetary policy are not real, or that escape would bring the freedom to grow at historic rates. It is in this last respect that the second story for a “secular stagnation”, persistently weak supply, is most relevant. 2. Supply pessimism  In many advanced economies, despite persistently disappointing output growth, unemployment rates have remained surprisingly low. Based on a simple Okun relationship, the current UK unemployment rate would be expected to be closer to 14% and the US rate to be around 10%. In fact, they are 7.6% and 7.0% respectively (Chart 4). 2  A point emphasised by Mervyn King, for example here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ Documents/speeches/2012/speech613.pdf.
I will also provide empirical evidence that challenges the view that financial regulation has adversely impacted repo market activity so far. But I will also argue that further evidence is needed to draw conclusions on this matter. 1 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  Asset purchases and repo market activity Let me start with the impact of central bank asset purchases on recent repo market activity. Asset purchases may have two broad effects on repo markets. The first is their impact on excess liquidity. With central banks exchanging large amounts of reserves for longer-dated securities, banks may no longer need to tap the interbank market, both secured and unsecured, to manage their short-term liquidity needs. As a result, trading volumes may fall. The second effect is closer to one of the main transmission channels of asset purchase programmes, namely portfolio rebalancing. In imperfect financial markets, those in need of scarce securities, or those who have a special preference for them, need to bid harder to obtain them, thereby pushing up their price and lowering their yield – which then delivers financial conditions supportive of higher output and prices in the real economy. There is growing empirical evidence that this channel has been very effective in the euro area.4 The flip side to this is that, although purchases are conducted in the secondary cash market, price adjustments in this market can also be expected to affect conditions in the repo market. A simple way to think about this is through short-selling.

Against this background I shall be discussing the current monetary policy appraisal of the Swedish economy, together with some factors of importance for the final assessment. First, however, I shall briefly outline monetary policy’s line of thought. Forecasts and probabilities Monetary policy’s overriding objective is to safeguard the value of money. The annual rate of inflation, measured as the change in the consumer price index, is to be kept at 2 per cent. As it takes time for the Riksbank’s monetary measures to work in full, our actions have to be based primarily on an assessment of inflation’s future path. The policy horizon - the period in which most of the impact of monetary policy materialises - is around twelve to twenty-four months. The Riksbank’s assessment of future inflation is presented continuously in our Inflation Reports. Since the first Report was presented in October 1993, the content has been developed and the Riksbank has, for example, become increasingly explicit in its assessments. In the first two years the Report contained a more general account of how the inflation indicators and inflationary pressure in the economy were developing. From November 1995 onwards the Riksbank has been attaching numbers to its inflation assessments. In the June 1996 Report the inflation assessment was underpinned for the first time with an overall picture of the cyclical position. A further step was taken in September 1997, when the inflation assessment was supplemented with a path for inflation in the forecast period.
In particular, according to the ECB’s estimations, the central scenario8 depletes banks’ capital (CET1) ratio by approximately 1.9 pp to 12.6% and the severe scenario by 5.7 pp to 8.8% in 2022. Impaired credit exposures and market risk losses are the key drivers of capital consumption. In any event, in view of the uncertainty and the complex nature of this crisis, and despite the wide range of measures already implemented, the need to develop certain measures further or to address new ones to avoid potential financial instability cannot be ruled out. As I have already said on previous occasions,9 I think our shared aim should be to prevent the current crisis from being accompanied by a widespread tightening of financing conditions or from seriously damaging our financial system. Therefore the authorities must remain vigilant and head off the risks to financial stability stemming from this crisis and we must be ready to provide a forceful, pan-European response should they materialise. Looking ahead, the low profitability of banks is one of the main challenges facing the banking sector in Europe and Spain. Everything points to the very low or even negative interest rate scenario continuing for even longer and, in this environment, banks may find it increasingly difficult to obtain returns without incurring excessive risk. Additionally, they will also have to face competition from potential competitors in the credit market.

Higher provisioning and, especially, the non-recurring adjustment to goodwill, both as a result of the expected downturn in economic conditions on account of the pandemic, were the main causes of lower profits. The losses were concentrated at the two banks with the largest international presence but profits decreased by two thirds at the other banks. In any event, banks’ recurring business has only been affected modestly to date and this is being offset partly by an adjustment to operating expenses and, consequently, they continue to gain in efficiency. 11  Therefore, the price-to-book (P/B) ratio — which compares listed banks’ market capitalisation and their book value — contracted notably in Spain, as in other European countries, by declining to levels of around 0.4, although it subsequently recovered somewhat. 12  One way of illustrating the risks to financial stability posed by the current episode is through simulation exercises which assess prospectively banks’ resilience to adverse macroeconomic scenarios. Accordingly, the ECB conducted a so-called “vulnerability” analysis – to underline their limitations compared with the usual stress tests – in order to measure European banks’ resilience to the strains triggered by the coronavirus. The results published last July show some of the risks identified.7 Specifically, based on these results, the euro area banking sector overall is positioned to withstand pandemic-induced stress, although the reduction in banks’ solvency under the most adverse macroeconomic scenarios would be significant. Furthermore, the results of this exercise show significant heterogeneity across banks.