BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  We do not need to run a counter-factual experiment to determine the macro-prudential responses to these emerging pressures. A number of countries have already taken preventative macro-prudential action to forestall excessive risk-taking (Table 2). These measures are intended to forestall too rapid an accumulation of credit. In short, macroprudential stringency is seeking to counteract any adverse risk-taking consequences of loose monetary policy. In the UK, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has been pursuing a policy of extra-ordinary monetary accommodation. Recently, there have been signs of renewed risk-taking in some asset markets, including the housing market. The MPC’s macroprudential sister committee, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), has been tasked with countering these risks. Through this dual committee structure, the joint needs of the economy and financial system are hopefully being satisfied. Some have suggested that having monetary and macro-prudential policy act in opposite directions – one loose, the other tight – somehow puts the two in conflict [De Paoli and Paustian, 2013]. That is odd. The right mix of monetary and macro-prudential measures depends on the state of the economy and the financial system. In the current environment in many advanced economies – sluggish growth but advancing risk-taking – it seems like precisely the right mix. And, of course, it is a mix that is only possible if policy is ambidextrous. To underscore this point, Chart 12 plots a scatter of counter-factual Taylor and Minsky rules in the UK over the period 1964 to 2011.

Hong Kong  Repayment criteria toughened, a risk weight floor of 15% for residential mortgages, LTV on car park spaces and commercial property  Action on car park spaces followed leakages of the house price exuberance into other sectors  New Zealand  Restriction of new high LTV lending to 10% of new loans  Singapore  Debt service ratio, reduced repayment periods, tightened LTV, increased land supply  Norway  Countercyclical capital buffer of 1% from July 2015  UK  Removed incentives for household lending in Funding for Lending scheme. FPC given ability to recommend changes to affordability criteria on mortgage lending. 8  Part of a series of measures. BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Aikman, D, Haldane AG and Nelson, B (2010) “Curbing the credit cycle”: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2010/speech463. pdf. Aikman, D, Haldane AG and Nelson, B (2014 forthcoming) “Curbing the credit cycle”, The Economic Journal. Bank of England (2009), “The role of macroprudential policy”, Discussion Paper: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/roleofmacrop rudentialpolicy091121.pdf. Bank of England (2011), “Instruments of macroprudential policy”, Discussion paper: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/events/ccbs_workshop2012/paper_ kapadia.pdf. BCBS (2010). Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. Chari, VV and Kehoe P (2013), “Bailouts, time inconsistency and optimal regulation”, NBER working paper no. 19192. De Paoli, B and Paustian, M (2013), “Coordinating monetary and macroprudential policies”, Staff Reports 653, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Goodfriend, M. (2007) “How the world achieved consensus on monetary policy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pages 47–68. Haldane, A. G. (2013), “Why institutions matter (more than ever)”: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech676.pdf.