samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the period from 1996 to 2005, most of the real GDP growth gap (about 80%) between the United States and the euro area could be attributed to differences in labour productivity growth (measured by real GDP per hour worked), the remaining gap (about 20%) being explained by the joint effect of population growth and the rate of change in the degree of labour utilisation. Labour utilisation, that is, the extent to which labour potentially available in the economy is effectively utilised, can be defined as hours worked per head of total population. This is the second important determinant of economic growth. It can be expressed as the sum of four components: average hours worked per employed person, the unemployment rate, the labour force participation rate and the share of the working age population in the total population. Let us look at these components one by one. The contribution to growth of the participation rate and hours worked has been much lower in the more recent past than in the 1960s and 1970s. The lower level of the participation rate and significant  1  The decline in euro area productivity growth is manifest irrespective of the measure of labour input used. In Europe, however, productivity growth has generally been higher when it is measured per hour worked rather than by per person employed. Productivity comparisons across countries face various statistical or methodological problems. Nevertheless, it appears that productivity growth developments in the euro area and the United States are largely independent of the concepts used.

BIS Review 43/2007  7  The differences in social models across European countries are likely to persist, precisely because the underlying values and preferences are different. What policy-makers can, and should, do is to learn from each other and from the different practices and experiences, assess what works and what does not, and then adapt the most promising ideas about economic institutions and regulations to the local conditions and the prevailing economic cultures. This is in fact a great advantage of the European Union’s unique cooperative framework. It can make possible what is neatly encapsulated in the title of a paper by Tito Boeri (2002): “Let Social Policy Models Compete and Europe Will Win”. VI. Price stability: the role of the institutional framework for central banks and fiscal policy  As stated at the outset, a country’s economic performance pertains to both economic growth and stability. Macroeconomic stability includes, inter alia, first and foremost price stability, which ensures that a currency keeps its purchasing power and retains the trust of the people. It also includes a stable financial system as well as prudent and sustainable fiscal policies. Also for this aspect of economic performance, the central proposition I have emphasised in the context of the presented conceptual framework remains intact: institutions matter and the social values of economic agents are embodied in appropriately designed institutions.
So the Bank will be initiating discussions to see what methods might ensure greater access by the public to new £ notes. BIS Review 69/2007  1  Your reforms, Chancellor, encompassed not just monetary policy – through the Bank of England Act – but also financial regulation – through the creation of the FSA and the 1997 Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank, FSA and Treasury. There was, however, some unfinished business in that Memorandum. The Bank of England was given responsibility for the oversight of payment systems. But it was given no formal powers to discharge that responsibility. Instead it relies heavily on the influence afforded by its operational role at the centre of the high-value payment system. But that influence extends only so far. The time has come to deal with the imbalance between responsibilities and powers. The “plumbing” of the financial system represented by payment and settlement systems may not be as glamorous as the trading activity which attracts so many bright young people to work in the financial sector, but it is absolutely crucial to maintaining stability. To have responsibility without power is the misfortune of the bureaucrat. The solution, in my view, does not mean more powers for the Bank, but narrower responsibilities. Proposals are under active discussion among the tripartite partners, and they give me confidence that the imbalance will soon be resolved. Financial stability more generally is a topical concern in financial markets.

Assessing the effective degree of leverage in an ever-changing financial system is far from straightforward, and the liquidity of the markets in complex instruments, especially in conditions when many players would be trying to reduce the leverage of their portfolios at the same time, is unpredictable. Excessive leverage is the common theme of many financial crises of the past. Are we really so much cleverer than the financiers of the past? Concerns about the rate at which credit is being created extend to monetary policy. As I said last week in Cardiff, it would be optimistic in the extreme to suppose that the rapid growth of money and credit could be dismissed solely as a positive shock to the demand for money. The spread between interest rates paid by households and businesses and interest rates available in the money market has fallen. This has been one of the factors behind the strength of demand in the UK economy over the past  2  BIS Review 69/2007  year. Despite greater availability of labour, businesses have not expanded employment sufficiently to prevent stronger demand from increasing capacity pressures. Such pressures encourage businesses to raise prices. And that is exactly what the business surveys suggest has been happening. That underlying upward pressure on inflation has in part been hidden by the volatility of domestic energy prices. But it is why we have raised interest rates four times and by 1 percentage point in all over the past year.
This was the case with Barings, in which I was also heavily involved. There is therefore nothing new about bank resolution. Why have a resolution regime for banks? Why do we need a special resolution regime for banks? The first reason is that at the point when actions have to be taken to deal with a bank in difficulty, there will inevitably be a considerable amount of uncertainty about how bad that bank’s problems are. This is because the scale of the problem will depend on how the future unfolds. But we will know at that point that if the authorities don’t act, the problems of the institution will quickly get much worse, and a deposit run may well ensue. The second reason for a special resolution regime is that the process of resolution itself must not add to the uncertainty and loss of confidence. Put  BIS Review 157/2009  1  simply, it has to be fast and decisive. Most bank resolutions happen over weekends. My overwhelming guiding principle is that by no later than first thing on Monday morning we must be able to tell depositors that their money is safe and its new home is …… There is a simple test of this – the answer to the depositor’s question “Is my money safe?” must be yes – no hesitation or qualification can be added. Normal corporate insolvency procedures are therefore inadequate for banks for a number of reasons.

The Bank of England is responsible for operation of the SRR (with the exception of Temporary Public Ownership, where the Treasury is responsible). The Bank will consult the FSA and Treasury before selecting the SRR tool to be used, and we need to obtain the agreement of the Treasury to the implications of the chosen tool for the use of public funds. Also, the Bank can make recommendations to the FSA when it feels that the SRR should be triggered, though as I have said, the decision is for the FSA. Finally the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) plays an important role in the resolution process. This would be very obvious if an actual payout of depositors was chosen and the FSCS would work very closely with the administrator. They also have a prior role in assessing whether payout is feasible in a reasonable time. But the FSCS can also be requested to contribute to the cost of other forms of resolution up to the net amount it would have failed to recover in insolvency if there was an actual payout. This approach can be used, for example, where there has been a transfer of deposits – and the FSCS can provide  BIS Review 157/2009  3  a suitable deposit to contribute to the immediate cost to the authorities. The FSCS does not however operate a pre-funded scheme in which money is available on call to provide such a substitute deposit.
It is the wish of the Bank of Zambia that in future all the SADC central banks can enter into group agreements on certain ICT services that are provided by the vendors. We also believe that this would enable us share the cost of expensive ICT resources in order to achieve economies of scale and leverage effective support from vendors of common software applications. Ladies and Gentlemen, may I conclude by expressing my gratitude and thanks to the staff of the ICT Department at Bank of Zambia for successfully organizing this Conference. I wish you fruitful deliberations during this business week. It is now my pleasure and honour to declare the 2008 SADC ICT FORUM CONFERENCE OFFICIALLY OPENED. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 42/2008

At this stage, risks of an abrupt turn in the cycle with consequences similar to those observed in 2007-08 appear limited in France for several reasons.v To give just a few in addition to macroprudential measures: over 97% of the stock of housing loans are fixed-rate; borrowers’ solvency is assessed in a very cautious way; real-estate is not used as collateral for credit (as they are in many Anglo-Saxon countries), meaning that real-estate price adjustments do not result in an increased repayment burden. We nevertheless have to remain very vigilant, including in other segments of the market. In particular, commercial real estate (CRE) comes to mind, which has been slowing around the world because of the greater recourse to remote work and online business, and because of rising interest rates. The commercial property sector entails both direct and indirect risks for credit institutions: direct through CRE credits, and indirect through CRE assets pledged to them as a collateral for other kinds of credit. Ireland has once more been a pioneer on this  Page 11 sur 11 front by implementing macroprudential leverage limits for investment funds,vi which could pave the way for a more comprehensive macroprudential framework. In France, at this stage, indicators do not show any particular risk accumulation: both non-performing loans- and loan-to-value ratios are tending to decline. But we will definitely keep monitoring risk indicators closely, given the amounts at stake (around EUR 150 billion of direct exposure, and EUR 85 billion of indirect exposure for French banks).
The foreign currency reserve needs to be readily available in the event of a crisis Sweden has a large and expanding banking sector with major commitments and funding in foreign currency. In the event of a financial crisis, the Riksbank has a unique role as crisis manager due to its ability to provide liquidity support to the banks. In order to provide liquidity support in foreign currency, the Riksbank needs to maintain a foreign currency reserve. This should be so large that it covers the needs that could be expected to arise in the short term in a financial crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) makes the assessment that the current level of the foreign currency reserve is sufficient for the Riksbank to cover the requirements of a financial crisis. 22 My own assessment is that the foreign currency reserve needs to remain at today's level or become larger. However, the Government proposes that the foreign currency reserve should be roughly halved. 23 This is a high risk proposition. It could both take time and be expensive not to have the money at hand at the height of a crisis but to be forced to ask the Swedish National Debt Office to borrow it. If the foreign currency reserve is large enough, it could also act preventively by creating confidence in the Riksbank’s ability to act in a crisis.

Our target is not only to adapt our business lines and redesign our processes, but also to play a role in the development and support of our ecosystem, through a participatory approach. Ladies and gentlemen, To conclude, I would say that we may have taken some time to grasp the scale of the digital revolution, but the numerous initiatives and interactions, such as this meeting, leave us with the hope that the backlog will be quickly cleared and that this revolution will effectively contribute to sustainable and inclusive development in our countries. In this respect, we are pleased to note the willingness of international organizations, including the IMF, main interlocutor of central banks, to upgrade their means and human resources with a view to providing support to their member countries. As such, I suggest, if you deem it suitable, that we request the Fund to institutionalize such a meeting in our region, at the frequency most appropriate to us. Hence, we would be able to continue the debates and exchanges, assess the progress made, ultimately unite our efforts, and capitalize on our mutual experiences in order to better address the current and future challenges of digital transformation. Thank you. 10
As a consequence 6.8 percentage points of the 10.61 percent annual CPI inflation in July resulted from the direct impact of the rise in food and energy prices (Figure 1). BIS Review 100/2008  1  Figure 1: Contribution to Annual CPI Inflation 12 10  Core Goods  Services  Food and Energy*  Tobacco and Gold**  8 6 4 2  06.08  05.08  04.08  03.08  02.08  01.08  12.07  11.07  10.07  09.07  08.07  07.07  06.07  05.07  04.07  03.07  02.07  01.07  0  * Food and Energy: Food, non-alcoholic beverages and energy. ** Tobacco and Gold: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and gold. Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. Food price developments were determinant in inflation in the second quarter of the year. Although domestic weather conditions turned more favorable in the first half of 2008, lagged effects of last year’s poor harvest and continued elevation in agricultural commodity prices continued to keep processed food inflation at high levels. As a consequence, processed food inflation displayed a cumulative increase of 14.2 percent in the first half of the year (Figure 2). At this point, I would like to remind you that the July Inflation Report, soon to be published on our website, will provide a detailed explanation on the factors driving domestic food prices.

In other words, should a requirement arises for a tightening in the public budget, we assume that this requirement will be met by measures for cutting down on expenditures rather than increasing the indirect taxes. Any deviation from this framework may lead to a revision of the outlook for inflation and monetary policy. Distinguished Members of the Press,  BIS Review 100/2008  13  A protracted period of rising food and energy prices has been hampering our disinflation efforts since the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. Ongoing uncertainties resulting from global as well as domestic factors that led to a significant deterioration in inflation expectations necessitated a more cautious monetary policy stance. In this respect, in order to prevent the said uncertainties to be reflected on the general pricing behavior, we have conducted a monetary tightening over the past three months. Monetary tightening was effective in containing inflation expectations, as the deterioration in inflation expectations came to a halt in July. Current stance of the monetary policy supports disinflation. We expect inflation to remain at elevated levels in the short term before gradually moderating towards the targets. Our revised inflation forecasts suggest that the inflation targets of 7.5 percent, 6.5 percent, and 5.5 percent set for the next three years are attainable, even under quite conservative assumptions on food and energy prices.
Moreover, the ECB does not agree that an entity is required to record a gain when the fair value of its own debt falls due to a decrease in its creditworthiness. The rationale being that the entity could buy back the debt and realise the profit. However, in reality and especially in times of distress, an entity does not have readily available the extra cash to buy back their debt. The recognition of such misleading gains was particularly prevalent in the case of Lehman that used it to net against the mounting losses, which simply blurred the entity’s actual performance. As referred to in the recent book “Too big to fail” by Andrew Sorkin: “It means that the day before you go bankrupt is the most profitable day in the history of your company, because you’ll say all the debt was worthless. You get to call it revenue. And literally (…) pay bonuses off this.” I think we can all agree that there is something fundamentally wrong with this argument. Second, with regard to its application, fair value accounting poses certain operational challenges, namely when markets become illiquid and reliable market prices are no longer available. What is the use of marking-to-market when there is no market? The relevance and reliability of fair values based on market prices require a functioning market where prices adequately reflect the underlying fundamentals of the financial instrument. When the market is significantly disrupted, the use of market values may be utterly meaningless.

Towards this aim, G20 Leaders have urged accounting standard setters to develop a single set of high-quality accounting standards. A global set of accounting standards is desirable from the perspective of both investors and regulators since it improves the comparability and transparency on a global basis. This contributes towards sounder investment decisions and thus to a more efficient allocation of resources as well as overall functioning of capital markets. Moreover, the financial crisis clearly revealed the shortcomings of different accounting rules on both sides of the Atlantic, as differences in rules contributed towards a lower degree of confidence in financial reporting. For all these reasons, the ECB welcomes the ongoing efforts of the accounting standard setters to achieve fully compatible, high-quality accounting standards in a direct response to the G20 request. However, we are concerned to hear that the FASB and the IASB are still far from reaching a consensus on key accounting concepts, such as the classification and measurement of financial instruments. The IASB has confirmed a “mixed measurement model” that measures financial instruments both at amortised cost and fair value. In contrast, the US standard setter, the FASB, is determined to move towards a “full fair value model”, claiming that only fair value provides decision-useful information to investors.
The reform of export tax rebates will also benefit exporters. Continuing efforts to strengthen financial markets and the financial infrastructure12 will enable more effective financial intermediation and promote economic growth and development. 15. Fourth, in any case, the competitiveness of the Mainland of China is based on broader structural factors including underlying factor costs, market leadership and the trade policies of major importers. Even after the marked depreciation of Asian currencies, labour costs in the Mainland of China is still lower than most of Asian economies, perhaps with the exception of Indonesia13. And there is in China a continued access to a huge labour pool made up of redundant state sector workers and surplus labour in rural areas. The effect of devaluation on the manufacturing costs in the Asian economies, on the other hand, are 9 Chinese Vice-Premier Mr Zhu Rongji said on 14 January 1998 that ’the renminbi will be maintained at a stable rate.... it will not be devalued’. Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Mr Dai Xianglong, reiterated this on 16 February 1998. 10 Based on the Mainland’s consumer price index, inflation declined from 24.1% in 1994 to 2.8% in 1997 and, based on the  retail price index, from 21.7% to 0.8%. 11 According to European Union (EU) Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan who led an EU team to visit Beijing in February  1998, China had promised to submit to the WTO in March 1998 detailed tariff cuts as part of its bid to re-join the trade body.

Under these circumstances, the traditional pro-cyclicality of credit emerged once again, fuelling asset price inflation (particularly real estate prices in certain regions of the US and Europe) rather than consumer price inflation. In the past twelve months the scenario changed radically: a severe financial crisis, stemming from the US real estate sector, hit mature economies in general, whereas demand pressures over the availability of limited production factors led to mounting inflation in a global scale. Thus, central banks currently face a much more complex and challenging environment than during the years of the great moderation. Monetary responses have been initially diverse due to the nature of the problems that surfaced, but the priority on the need to preserve price stability prevails. Due to both increases in raw material prices and demand pressures, inflation accelerated sharply around the globe. In mature economies in general, marked by broader levels of idle capacity, higher commodity prices probably explain the bulk of the inflation upsurge. In emerging countries, including Brazil, domestic demand pressures have had a relatively more important role in stoking mounting inflation pressures. As a matter of fact, strong domestic demand in these economies created conditions that enabled initially isolated price pressures to become more widespread. Not surprisingly, monetary policy is currently more and more focused in moderating the pace of demand expansion and containing inflation pressures in the majority of the emerging world.