samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Bwalya K E Ng’andu: Enhancing corporate governance among various stakeholders within the financial sector Opening remarks by Dr Bwalya K E Ng’andu, Deputy Governor (Operations) of the Bank of Zambia, to the Financial Sector Development Programme (FSDP) presentation of corporate governance model board charter to financial sector stakeholders, Lusaka, 25 October 2011. *  *  *  Chief executive officers and senior management of financial institutions Members of the FSDP Secretariat and Working groups Distinguished participants Ladies and Gentlemen Let me start by thanking the organisers of this meeting for inviting me to make opening remarks at the presentation of the corporate governance model board charter. As you are aware, corporate governance has been identified as one of the most important components of the Financial Sector Development Programme (FSDP). The reason for this is not difficult to discern. The relationship between financial institutions and the public is premised on trust. Loss of confidence and trust in even one financial institution can threaten the stability of the entire financial sector because feelings about one erring institution can be extended to other institutions. This fiduciary responsibility that financial institutions carry requires that all players in the financial sector are subjected to elaborate oversight. In this regard, the Boards of Directors are one organ that is vested with this responsibility of oversight.

In this regard, the fiscal policy adjustments are important, also to obtain external financing to support the balance of payments. The NBRM, with the decision made today, for interest rate increase on the CB bills, is making an additional step towards reducing the external imbalance, and for achieving the interim and final objective of the monetary policy, remaining prepared to futher undertake additional measures, if necessary. V.  In the end, one more information. Today, the Council of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia held its 3rd session this year. Among other issues, on this session, the Council has adopted the 2008 Annual Report of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia; the 2008 Annual Report on Managing Foreign Reserves; the 2008 Internal Audit Report. All these documents shall be available on our web site in the following days. BIS Review 60/2009  5
1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Therefore, we are not at the beginning of this road, we are in the home stretch, and we had come through an important and difficult part of this road when our country joined the European Banking Union and the Bulgarian lev joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. What is next? If we want to complete the accession process successfully, we need to accomplish a few groups of tasks. The first and the most important task is to meet the convergence criteria or the socalled Maastricht criteria. At present, Bulgaria complies with the criteria of the public finances, the long-term interest rates, and the exchange rate stability. Some of these indicators exceed the requirement by a substantial positive margin. Let me remind you, for instance, the wellknown fact that our ratio of debt to gross domestic product is the second lowest one in the European Union. The exchange rate is unshakable and is backed by the foreign exchange reserves of the Bulgarian National Bank, which have reached their historically highest level. The only criterion that we are not complying with is the one of inflation. Behind this are both external and internal factors, but this is the subject of another indepth debate. The second group of tasks includes the commitments taken during the preaccession period. These are the measure in four spheres – the non-bank financial sector, anti-money laundering measures, the insolvency framework, and the management of state-owned enterprises.

Let me mention a few of them: (i) the reinforcement of policy measures to address bank-like risks stemming from the activities of non-banks, which have significantly increased in recent years; (ii) the emergence of new risks, such as those derived from financial technology or cybersecurity; 4/5  (iii) the strengthening of sustainable finance to address environmental risk, and (iv) the creation or expansion of global and regional backstops. I am certain that our speakers in this conference will address these and other interesting matters. Indeed we will have the opportunity to explore this subject in depth through nine selected articles by prominent researchers. Actually, we are most privileged to have with us two distinguished keynote speakers, Ricardo Reis and Torben Andersen, who will no doubt illuminate us on these important matters. This two-day conference is organised in four sessions: the first will address certain money and market-related aspects. During the second session we will try to shed some light on the propagation of shocks when considering higher-order statistical moments of economic and financial variables. The third session will deal with two issues related to risk which are important for central banks, namely the credit risk associated with monetary policy operations and the evaluation of systemic risk measures. Finally, the fourth session on uncertainty will deal with the spillovers from the uncertainty on certain financial markets to the macroeconomy or to other markets. And now, allow me to introduce you to our first speaker, Ricardo Reis. We are particularly honoured to have him here today.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  At the regional level, the ASEAN Natural Disasters Research Works Sharing (“ANDREWS”) Committee has been formed to facilitate dialogue and information exchange between academia and insurance industry professionals on latest research and market developments relating to natural catastrophes. In Singapore, industry players have ramped up catastrophe analytics and modeling efforts rapidly in recent years. This is supported by scientific and state-of-the-art catastrophe risk research undertaken by research institutes such as the ICRM, the NUS Centre of Hazards Research and the Earth Observatory of Singapore. (iii)  Thirdly, a shortage of expertise to properly understand and assess catastrophe risks. Even where catastrophe models are employed, it is essential to overlay deep expertise and good judgment to challenge assumptions in modeling outputs, in order to have a more robust assessment and interpretation of the risks. The Thailand floods in 2011, for example, offered useful learning lessons about how there can be blind spots, without a deep understanding of the underlying risks: (a)  Thailand was not even designated by insurers as a catastrophe-prone prior to the floods, despite the potential risks and exposures;  (b)  Secondary losses arising from the business interruption claims were heavily underestimated; and  (c)  The accumulation of risks arising from Japanese cedants relocating their supply and production chains to Thailand from Japan, which had been hit with an earthquake and tsunami just months before, was generally overlooked.

Page 19 16. See Busetto et al. (2022). 17. See Box A in ‘Monetary Policy Report – August 2021,’ Bank of England. 18. Such an approach would be consistent with periodic reviews of the asset sales programme at a lower frequency, as was envisaged in the August 2021 Box on this topic. (That Box foresaw a review of the parameters governing any quantitative tightening within two years of its commencement.) The MPC and Bank will of course learn more about the impact of balance sheet unwind as it progresses, and those lessons will inform any such review. 19. The empirical exercises reported in Busetto et al. (2022) and Bailey et al. (2020) support this view. 20. Asset sales will also reduce the stock of central bank reserves held by the banking system. In order to avoid that the overall stock of reserves did not fall below the level required to sustain normal functioning of the sterling money market, the Bank of England would need to stand ready with its operational tools to ensure a sufficient level of reserves.
High unemployment and low labour force participation among women may make room for further growth in employment even if the population stops growing. The demographic situation in Norway is more favourable, but the labour force in Norway is also likely to grow at a slower pace. Labour immigration, which has made an important contribution to the labour market since the turn of the millennium, has fallen sharply in recent years. The unemployment rate is relatively low in Norway, but many have dropped out of the workforce. One in six aged between 25 and 54 was without paid work in 2016. If we are able to mobilise more people to join the workforce, labour supply growth may hold steady, but the most likely scenario is slower growth in the labour force. Chart: Productivity growth The other factor, productivity, has contributed less and less to economic growth, which is a tendency we have seen for several decades both in Norway and other advanced economies. The question then arises whether the underlying growth potential of mature economies has diminished. Chart: Growth in technology leading countries and in Norway If we broaden our perspective to span several centuries, it is the rapid rise in productivity in modern times that stands out. For a long time, there were only marginal changes in living standards from one generation to the next. In economic terms, the Middle Ages was something of an ice age. The industrial revolution that began in England in the late 18th century put an end to this inertia.

So what followed was an era of ultra-cheap credit globally – the Heineken era, in which credit reached the parts of society it previously had not reached. Levels of debt, in particular among households, rose pretty much exactly in line with levels of inequality. Rising credit meant expanding bank balance sheets. To maintain this expansion, banks began to manufacture new financial products, slicing and dicing loans to meet investor demand for high yield. The acronyms we have now come to know and loathe – the CDOs, the ABSs and the CDOs of ABSs – emerged to meet this demand. Manufacturing high-tech loans was a lucrative business. Returns to banking rose to their highest levels since the roaring ‘20s. Those designing and selling these new financial gadgets saw their salaries sky rocket. In 1980, an investment banker was paid roughly the same as a similarly-skilled professional in any other industry. By 2007, they were earning nearly four times as much.1 Those salary differences were particularly pronounced at the top of the pyramid. In 1989, the CEOs of the largest US banks earned 100 times the median US household income. That is quite a gap. Yet by 2007, that multiple had risen to 500.2 A similar gap emerged for UK and European bank CEOs. These widening discrepancies within banks compounded the widening discrepancies between banking and other industries. Banks, especially the top of banks, became first among unequals.
Mr. Heikensten looks at the consequences for Sweden of joining EMU Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikensten, at the Baker & McKenzie’s EMU seminar held in Stockholm on 5/2/97. First a word of thanks for the invitation to talk with you about Sweden and the European Economic and Monetary Union. Today I have chosen to consider this matter from three angles: general aspects of the issue of Sweden and EMU; the work we did last year in the Union to prepare for EMU; and some consequences of EMU for Sweden’s financial sector. The EU’s preparations for the economic and monetary union are continuing. The member states are doing all they can to fulfil the economic criteria for participation in the euro area. Along with this, intensive political work is being done to remove any remaining obstacles. After the latest meeting of Heads of State or of Government, in Dublin last December, political agreements are in place on, for example, the stability and growth pact and the relationship between the euro and outside currencies. Solutions are still required on a number of important issues. One is how the path into EMU is to be arranged for countries that do not belong to the first group. Then there are many technical details to adjust in the course of the year. But the puzzle’s main pieces are now in place.

This will  the Ministry of Finance, which will be  enhance price guidance to the market  reviewed quarterly. This will enhance the  and would result in increased liquidity  transparency and predictability of the  due to price discovery and transparency. primary auction process in the government securities market. Such initiatives will provide the same information to all market participants thereby ensuring the availability of information on potential transactions well in advance. Further, with the intention of enhancing the transparency of our operations, since June 2016, a decision is in place not to accept more than the aggregated offered amount at an auction although the Central Bank may accept less than the amount offered. The Primary Auction Rules for government securities will also be published in order to improve transparency and the standardisation of the procedures. Meanwhile, the current auction process is being reviewed, and the draft outcome of this review has been shared with the World Bank and the IMF. The Central Bank expects to get the draft auction system validated by these international organisations before going live with it. We hope to do this in the first quarter of 2017. We have also  The Bloomberg Trading Platform has  invited a consultant from the US  also been introduced for government  Treasury to look into a number of areas,  securities trading.
Specifically, industries manufacturing and selling consumer and investment goods have increased their financial flows above pre-pandemic levels. In contrast, sectors producing intermediate goods (that is, intended for further processing) and many consumer service industries are still to restore their financial flows and business activity. If we estimate the year 2020 in general, GDP will decline by about 4% owing to high performance in Q3. The economy bounced back significantly in response to the easing of restrictions and support measures. It is also worth noting that, amid limited opportunities to travel abroad this year, households kept over 1.5 trillion rubles earlier spent for outbound tourism. In 2020, these funds could partially be saved, but a portion of this amount was spent in Russia, propping up domestic demand. Fiscal measures provide significant support to the economy. This year, budget spending increased by over 14% against 2019. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Recovery growth is expected to resume steadily in spring 2021. Given the economic situation and price movements, the ratio of proinflationary and disinflationary factors and risks has altered considerably. Indeed, demand trends, especially amid the drastic aggravation of the epidemiological situation, continue to contain price growth. However, this impact is currently offset by the above-mentioned proinflationary factors. As I have already said, we will assess whether these factors become steady against the backdrop of increased inflation expectations.

Moreover, costs are pushing inflation upwards for other reasons as well, namely a shortage of manpower in certain industries, expenses to ensure compliance with additional sanitary and epidemiological rules, and possible disruptions in supplies due to the aggravation of the pandemic situation. Of course, the acceleration of current inflation itself should not significantly impact our monetary policy, but there are signs suggesting that proinflationary trends may become longer-lasting. This is evidenced by a material rise in households’ and businesses’ inflation expectations. Increased inflation expectations may induce secondary effects. This is another factor which we took into account. There are signs that secondary effects have already started to manifest themselves. What are the reasons behind them? A considerable rise in prices for individual frequently purchased products, even when it is driven by one-off factors, makes people expect an increase in prices for a broader range of goods and services. This in turn explains the readiness to pay more and pushes prices upwards. Actually, we are already observing such an environment, which once again proves that households’ inflation expectations are currently not anchored yet. When I say that they are not anchored, I do not imply the level of households’ inflation expectations, but rather their response to one-off factors. The fact that households’ inflation expectations are significantly higher than current inflation is typical not only of Russia, but of a whole range of countries (even where inflation is very low).
Therefore, in my opinion, the first major challenge in the next couple of years for banks is to reap the benefits from such an opportunity offered by the Master Plan. In doing so, a bank’s Board and senior management must give its full attention and be fully committed to articulating a strategic plan, successfully integrating their operations, streamlining various business processes, as well as finding their niche markets or areas of comparative advantage. Second, banks must prepare themselves for the new Basel Accord. Most banks in Thailand will start with the standardized approach in the calculation of their regulatory capital, because of the reasons I talked about earlier. Adopting the standardized approach does not require much preparation, since it is quite similar to the existing Accord, with only some differences in the risk weights of some assets. However, if banks stay on the standardized approach for too long, they will not be as risk sensitive as those which adopt the IRB approach, resulting in higher risk and higher need for capital, which means that they will not be able to compete well as internationally active banks. Therefore, the ultimate goal for those who wish to compete internationally would be to move to the IRB approach, after some extensive preparations. These preparations, in particular those on improving data quality and risk management, are in fact something that banks would like to do any way to be safe and sound, with or without moving to the IRB approach.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Now let me turn to the issues that directly impact the banking industry: what might be the implications for financial institutions as a result of the measures discussed earlier, and what are the challenges ahead for the banking sector? I would like to point out a few: First, in the new financial landscape following the implementation of the Master Plan, we anticipate a structural change in the banking sector with more industry consolidation and emergence of financial conglomerates, embraced by the “One Presence” principle. Such processes should lead to larger size and falling number of financial institutions. Although not a sure ticket to success, size will allow the working of economies of scale and scope - to eliminate redundancies in administrative and operational functions, reduce costs from more diversified portfolio of clients and enhance income from provision of wider range of services. For the first time ever in the Thai banking history, banks will have the opportunity to do all these and grow through consolidation and/or forming a financial group. Up until now cost cutting and income enhancement, for example, were possible only through reorganization and re-engineering within the same organization. Of course, there were cases of mergers in the history, but they were mainly out of necessity to solve the problem of some weak  BIS Review 43/2004  3  banks, not as a calculated move for growth.
the net borrowings, lie almost entirely with the US, the surpluses or the net lenders are identified with Japan, China, East Asia, the oil exporting economies, and other emerging markets including Latin America. And the third is the financing of the deficits, as well as the reinvestment of official reserves, which are now a major component of global capital lows. The key issues therefore are whether this process can go on? Is it a permanent or a temporary phenomenon? And what would be the implications for the global economy and financial markets. Today, I want to comment on these issues. Specifically, I will discuss the major forces underlying external surplus and reserves accumulation from an Asian perspective. Next, I will comment on policies that are needed globally to address this problem. To begin, reserves accumulation is essentially the mirror image of the evolution of the US external deficits. Two popular views explaining this phenomenon have been put forward. The first is the export-led development model, i.e. the new Bretton Woods, which sees reserves accumulation as a consequence of an attempt to maintain export-led development, especially in Asia. The second explanation is the global-saving glut hypothesis, of which the glut is driven by the transformation of emerging markets from net borrowers to net lenders in the international capital market. Both interpretations I think have merits, and reserves accumulation is probably a reflection of both.

Andrew Hauser: Between feast and famine – transparency, accountability and the Lender of Last Resort Speech by Mr Andrew Hauser, Executive Director for Banking, Payments and Financial Resilience of the Bank of England, at "The Lender of Last Resort: An International Perspective", a conference sponsored by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Washington DC, 10 February 2016. *  *  *  I am grateful to Nicholas Butt, Ronnie Driver, Tarkus Frost, Nicholas Govier, Rachel Greener, Andrew Lavender, Tim Taylor and Caspar Worthington for their help in preparing these remarks. Introduction Of all the actions taken by central banks during the financial crisis, some of the most contentious involved the extension of huge sums in liquidity assistance to banks and other financial institutions. Those actions helped prevent global economic and financial meltdown. But they also triggered intense public debates around the globe about the appropriate scope and nature of central bank powers. One strand of this debate is led by those who feel that central banks lent “too much”, too often or too freely during the crisis, using public money – so the allegations go – to support institutions of dubious solvency, sometimes in secret, protecting bankers from their own mistakes, and thereby stoking moral hazard for the future. The main policy conclusion from such thoughts is that central banks’ Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) activities should be constrained.