samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are now looking at ways of making it available on a monthly basis, alongside the minutes of the MPC meeting. MPC members regularly take their own eyes and ears on visits to individual businesses, making around 60 visits to the regions a year. As well as acting as a reality check on economic statistics, talking to businesses around the country improves our understanding of longer-term changes in economic environment. These visits are a good opportunity to discuss issues as varied as the impact of migrant labour on skill shortages; or outsourcing to China; or the growth of buy to let housing; or the changing structure of the retailing sector; or even the impact of weather and public holidays on the pattern of consumer spending. And in unusual economic circumstances, the Agents’ network of contacts can give us information that is not available from any other source. The outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001 is a case in point. Our Agents helped us to identify in real time the wider effects on the non agricultural sectors of the economy, notably of course tourism - and that gave us a better picture of the underlying development of the economy. We support measures to improve the quality of official statistics Finally, and most important, our longer-term strategy for mitigating data uncertainty is to support the ONS in improving the quality of the national statistics. Bank staff maintain very close links with their ONS counterparts both on a day-to-day basis, and in developing their ambitious modernisation programme.

In order to dampen shocks in a country and mitigate the contagion effects on other countries, close collaboration between a financial corporation’s home country and the host country in which it operates is necessary. In its latest annual report, the BIS writes the following: “Close cooperation between home and host authorities will be inevitable. And some responsibility will have to shift to host authorities for deciding on the settings that apply to exposures in their jurisdictions and for advising home authorities of local financial conditions.” Norwegian banks are part of a common Nordic banking market. The rapid expansion of foreign banks in the Norwegian market in the growth period from 2004 to 2008 was trimmed back during and after the crisis. I am afraid it must be said that they have amplified fluctuations in Norway. However, we assume that the decline in their market share is due to the impact of the international crisis, which has generally been more severe for foreign banks than for Norwegian banks. BIS Review 113/2010  9  Under the Basel Committee proposal, the time-varying capital buffer requirement will apply to all banks operating in a country, including branches of foreign banks. Home country authorities will enforce the buffer requirement imposed by host country authorities. This means that Norwegian supervisory authorities, for example, can impose a supplementary capital requirement in periods of high credit growth in Norway. The requirement will apply to Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and other banks that provide loans to Norwegian households and businesses.
* Social welfare is calculated as a sum of the natural logs of household disposable income per head by decile. BIS central bankers’ speeches  -20 1st (lowest)  2nd  3rd  4th  5th (highest)  -25  Income quintile Sources: Wealth and Asset Survey, ONS, and Bank calculations. 19  Chart 18 – Median nominal hourly earnings by age 16-17 18-21 22-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+  Index 2007=100  140  Chart 19 – Real income after housing costs by household type £ equivalised in 2014/15 prices (Index, 05/06-07/08 = 100)  115  130  110  120  105  110  100  100  2009  2011  80 2015  2013  95  Working age adults, no children  90  Pensioners  90 2007  120  Working age adults, with children  05/06-07/08  08/09-10/11  11/12-13/14  85 80  Sources: ASHE and Bank calculations. Sources: Household Below Average Income and Bank calculations. Chart 20 – Total net wealth by age  Chart 21- Total net wealth gains by age group 2006/08 to 2012/14  16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54  55-64 2007=100 65-74 160 75-84 85 and over 140 120 100 80 60  2008  2010  2012  40 2014  Sources: Wealth and Asset Survey, ONS, and Bank calculations.

In addition, an upswing is likely to be held back by product and labour market rigidities. BIS Review 19/2002  1  So all in all, it is hard to see how the coming economic upswing can be as rapid as earlier recoveries. But the world economic picture is now appreciably brighter than last autumn and the outlines of an upturn are becoming increasingly clear. Inflation in Sweden is high If the picture we present in the Inflation Report holds good, the present cyclical dip in the Swedish economy will turn out to have been the mildest for over thirty years. GDP growth was admittedly subdued in 2001 but the figures from Statistics Sweden do not show any negative rates. Neither has the labour market deteriorated as much as usual. Nor have any serious imbalances arisen. So thus far there is reason to be positive about the economic situation; most leading indicators point to an economic recovery, with an upturn in activity during 2002. There is, however, the problem that inflation has for a time been clearly above the Riksbank’s 2 per cent target. To a certain extent the comparatively high inflation can be explained by various supply shocks that have raised the prices of electricity, meat, fruit and vegetables, for instance. The background to these shocks includes the previous winter’s low precipitation for hydroelectric power, livestock diseases and poor harvests due to last autumn’s unusually cold weather in Europe.
Table 1 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent)  2013  2014  2015 (f) Jun.15 MP Report  Sep.15 MP Report  Dec.15 MP Report  2016 (f) Sep.15 MP Report  2016 (f) Dec.15 MP Report 2,0-3,0  GDP  4.2  1.9  2,25-3,25  2,0-2,5  2.1  2,5-3,5  Domestic demand  3.7  -0.6  2.6  2.0  2.3  3.1  2.6  Domestic demand (w/o inventory change)  4.6  0.5  2.2  1.4  2.0  3.0  2.5  Gross fixed capital formation  2.1  -6.1  0.7  -1.2  0.7  1.9  1.7  Total consumption  5.5  2.5  2.7  2.1  2.4  3.3  2.7  Goods and services exports  3.4  0.7  1.3  -1.7  -1.7  1.2  1.0  Goods and services imports  1.7  -7.0  1.1  -2.3  -1.4  2.2  1.6  Current account (% of GDP)  -3.7  -1.2  -0.4  -0.7  -1.7  -1.5  -2.6  Gross national savings (% of GDP)  20.6  20.3  21.0  20.8  20.0  20.0  19.1  Nominal gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  23.8  22.0  21.6  21.5  22.0  21.5  21.9  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

In particular, fiscal spending will evolve in accordance with the fiscal rule and the consolidation objectives set forth by the Administration, which has pledged to reduce the structural deficit by about one quarter of a point of GDP per year. The worsened external scenario relevant for Chile is the main factor behind the downward revision to 2016 growth. This phenomenon is shared by all emerging and commodity-exporting economies, mainly because of the substantial drop in the terms of trade and less favorable external funding conditions. Commodity prices fell again in recent months, influenced by the steady appreciation of the dollar and slower global growth. In the case of copper, one must add prospects that the Chinese economy’s recomposition by sectors will continue to erode the demand for the metal. Thus, at the statistical cutoff date for this Monetary Policy Report, copper was trading at under 210 cents per pound, accumulating a drop of nearly 30 percent in the year. This, combined with a discouraging short-term outlook, has prompted a significant reduction in our copper price forecast for 2016 and 2017. We now estimate that it will trade at an average of 225 dollar cents per pound, compared with the almost 250 cents we anticipated in September. The price of oil has also dropped in recent months, to less than 40 dollars per barrel as of the closing of our Monetary Policy Report, around 30 percent with respect to the beginning of the year.
In the current uncertain environment, it is a challenging time to make predictions about the future. Nonetheless, to conclude let me say a few words on what these results might imply for the policy landscape going forward. As I discussed earlier, the new analysis presented in this speech suggests that the effects of the key drivers of Global R*, particularly increasing longevity, are expected to persist. Absent a significant reversal in the key trends that have driven down Global R*, we may expect it to remain low. So it is not unreasonable to expect that Global R*, the long-run anchor for UK equilibrium interest rates, will remain low. Therefore, cyclical adjustments in short-term nominal interest rates – like those we are currently witnessing in the United Kingdom and abroad – will for the foreseeable future continue to be played out against the backdrop of low global equilibrium real interest rates. While we have considered several important drivers of Global R* in the past, other factors may  Page 16  come into play over time. You may wonder, for example, whether the pandemic could have impacted some of the key drivers of Global R*, such as productivity growth. The simple answer, of course, is that we do not yet know. It is too soon to tell what the long-run impact of the pandemic will be for the economy.

Cesa-Bianchi, A., R. Harrison, and R. Sajedi (2022). “Decomposing the Drivers of Global R*,” Bank of England Staff Working Papers 990, Bank of England. Cunliffe, J. (2019). “Financial Stability and Low for Long," Speech by Jon Cunliffe at the Society of Professional Economists Annual Conference, London. De Loecker, J., J. Eeckhout, and G. Unger (2020). “The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications  ,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135, 561–644. Del Negro, M., D. Giannone, M. P. Giannoni, and A. Tambalotti (2019). “Global trends in interest rates,  " Journal of International Economics, 118, 248-262. De Ridder, M. (2016). “Investment in Productivity and the Long-Run Effect of Financial Crises on Output  ,” Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1659, Faculty of Economics,  University of Cambridge. De Ridder, M., (2019). "Market Power and Innovation in the Intangible Economy  ,"  Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1931, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. Döttling, R., G. Gutierrez, and T. Philippon (2017). “Is there an investment gap in advanced economies? If so, why? ,” In Investment and Growth in Advanced Economies, ECB: Frankfurt  am Main. Eggertsson, G. B., N. R. Mehrotra, and J. A. Robbins (2019). "A model of secular stagnation: Theory and quantitative evaluation 48.  ," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11, 1-  Page 19  Fernald, J. and R. Inklaar (2022). "The UK Productivity "Puzzle" in an International Comparative Perspective  ," CEPR Discussion Papers 17321, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. Goodhart, C. and M. Pradhan (2020).
The second argument is that there is no evidence that conflicts of interest between the parts of our Swedish banks conducting investment banking activities and the traditional lending activities have led to abuse. One can, of course, speculate as to why abuse of this type of conflict of interest does not occur in Sweden in the same way as in the United States. I have no clear answer to that. However, there are a couple of institutional differences. Share issues in Sweden have rarely been guaranteed or syndicated in the same way as they are in the United States. The role of the Swedish investment banks in share issues has therefore often been less comprehensive than that of their US counterparts. This may have limited the problem. Another institutional difference is that the bank market is more concentrated in Sweden. This may make the banks more anxious of their credibility than US banks are. If a Swedish bank were to pass on its own credit risks to investors in a share issue, there is a greater risk that this would seriously damage the bank’s credibility. The number of large Swedish investors is fairly small and it would quickly become known if anyone felt they had been cheated. The incentives to exploit a conflict of interest have quite simply been much lower here than in the United States.

This is why part of our vision for 2020 is to support the development of pan-European instant payment services, so that customers can send and receive payments at the same speed with which they can send and receive e-mails. The Euro Retail Payments Board is a multi-stakeholder body which helps foster the development of an integrated, innovative and competitive market for retail payments in euro. This summer it mandated the payments industry to design a scheme for instant payment services by November 2015. The Eurosystem could also consider a possible service expansion in this context, at least on the settlement layer, in order to meet the needs of potential future instant payment providers. TARGET, T2S and SEPA have been important milestones on our journey towards European integration. The Eurosystem’s Vision 2020 will set out the next steps. The actions we take over the coming years will complement the European Commission’s project to establish a Capital Markets Union in Europe – a project which the ECB and the Eurosystem fully support. In fact, T2S and its harmonisation agenda have already laid the groundwork for such a union. With the action plan published at the end of September, the European Commission has transformed its vision into concrete steps. I am confident that through our joint efforts and complementary initiatives we can deepen financial integration and complete the Single Market in Europe in a lasting way. I have briefly outlined a few components of the Eurosystem’s Vision 2020.
Some 600 days have also passed since the establishment of the HKSAR government and the Basic Law came into effect. During this period we encountered the severest financial crisis in many years, sustaining the great pain brought on by the economic adjustments. Nevertheless we are also pleased that with the smooth implementation of the Basic Law, the “one country, two systems” principle has gained recognition not only from the local public, but also the international community and overseas investors. This constitutes an essential basis for Hong Kong’s continued prosperity and stability as well as our status as an international financial centre. The Chinese government has also gained extensive recognition for its firm commitment to the “one country, two systems” policy for Hong Kong. 22. The Basic Law ensures that Hong Kong will enjoy financial autonomy. Article 109 of the Basic Law further requires that the HKSAR government should provide a suitable economic and legal environment in order to maintain Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre.

Under the Basic Law, however, there appears only a corresponding general requirement. Article 76 states that once a bill has been passed by the Legislative Council, all that is required for it to take effect is signing and promulgation by the Chief Executive. In addition, Article 17 states that “laws enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for the record.” But this article also states that “the reporting for record shall not affect the entry into force of such laws.” 4. On the other hand, unlike the Royal Instructions, the Basic Law also prescribes in considerable detail the financial systems to be practised in the HKSAR. For example, Article 109 provides that the HKSAR government shall maintain the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Article 110 provides that the HKSAR government shall, on its own, formulate monetary and financial policies. Article 111 prescribes that the Hong Kong dollar, as the legal tender in the HKSAR, shall continue to circulate. Article 112 states that no foreign exchange control policies shall be applied in the HKSAR and that the Hong Kong dollar shall be freely convertible. Article 113 stipulates that the Exchange Fund of the HKSAR shall be managed and controlled by the government of the HKSAR.
In annual average terms, the unemployment rate is expected to rise significantly this year (to 17.1% of the labour force under the first scenario and to 18.6% under the second) and also in 2021, before starting to descend in 2022 (when, in annual average terms, it would stand at 18.2% and 20.2% under the respective scenarios). Both scenarios forecast inflation to hold at a moderate pace over the projection horizon. Core inflation has slowed notably in recent months as a result of the weakness of demand stemming from the pandemic. Looking ahead, the persistence of a high degree of cyclical slack will mean inflation in non-energy industrial goods and in services will continue to run at relatively low - though growing - rates until end-2022. The risks underlying the scenarios for economic activity published by the Bank remain tilted to the downside. And more unfavourable developments than those contained in the second scenario, i.e. the harsher of the two considered, cannot be ruled out. In particular, in light of the recent course of the pandemic, we cannot preclude the resort to more severe lockdown measures than those envisaged in the scenarios. Moreover, there is much uncertainty over how long will be needed before we have an effective medical treatment, and there are some risks that it will be delayed beyond mid-2021. Lastly, uncertainty remains on the external front, especially concerning the possibility of the Brexit negotiations concluding without an agreement at the end of the transition period or of US-China trade tensions worsening.

Ardian Fullani: Bank-business relationship in Albania Greeting speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the meeting “Business Bank Communication Day”, Tirana, 20 October 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Recently, the promising paces in the increase of crediting to the economy from the banking sector make us realize that the numerous meetings organized with the scope of approaching banks to businesses are finally producing their results. Nonetheless, it is yet, too soon to describe it as a victory. Without diminishing the significance of these meetings, I think that the expansion of business crediting is not an effortless issue to be solved, especially when considered that our economy is still in transition. Frequently, the solution to the arousing issues goes beyond the good will of both, the business and banking community. Thus, avoiding the rhetoric of the previous meetings which habitually sets one’s party claims against the other, I would like to emphasize the need of a better coordination of efforts by the two communities to the solution of various issues. A few days ago, on the privatisation anniversary of one of the participant banks present in this meeting, I stressed the necessity of intensifying the institutional relationship between the banking system and the different business associations. Therefore, this meeting is an outstanding example of putting this initiative into practice and I trust it will serve as a good start of the regular contacts between the banking association and the business one.
To overcome this problem, the Riksbank has begun a review of the regulations, together with the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. Conclusion In the current situation there are great expectations that the future will bring economic growth and good times. “The new economy” with a low inflation rate and high levels of employment and growth has gradually crossed the Atlantic to reach us. In such times of strong confidence in the future, consumption and indebtedness increase, while saving declines. We have seen this happen many times before. If the expectations are fulfilled, there is no problem. However, if the expectations race ahead of economic developments, asset prices and indebtedness can develop in a way that causes imbalances. If there is an economic downturn, households may find difficulty in meeting their payment obligations, which will lead to a rapid increase in saving, falling asset prices and a decline in demand. This is also something we have seen in other contexts. While this development could give cause for concern, it is important not to paint an excessively negative picture. As the Riksbank has pointed out earlier, a decline in the macroeconomic situation would probably lead to problems for individual households, but would hardly cause sufficient loan losses to threaten the banks’ stability. However, there is every reason to be vigilant with regard to continued developments, particularly from a price stability perspective. Continued rising asset prices and credit expansion could risk leading to overheating and thus rising inflation.

The banks of the countries participating in the SSM have been divided into two groups of significant and less significant institutions. The ECB will exert “direct supervision” over the former; as regards the latter, it merely assumes “indirect supervision” functions, as the national authorities will in fact continue to be responsible for their effective supervision. A list of 120 significant banking groups has been drawn up, accounting for approximately 85% of euro area bank assets. 15 of these are Spanish groups, representing around 90% of the assets of our country’s deposit institutions. It should be borne in mind that when we talk about 120 groups, we are referring to consolidated groups; that is to say, the number of individual banks is far higher. In total there are 1,244 individual institutions, which is essentially explained by the importance of cooperative banks in certain euro area countries, in particular France, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. To directly supervise the significant banks, the ECB has created two directorate generals, which shall perform the continuous monitoring of the 120 groups. DG I will supervise the 30 biggest banks in terms of balance sheet and activities, while DG II will cover the remaining 90 significant banks. However, the supervision of specific aspects or matters, what is known as on-site inspection, will be carried out by different teams. The ECB has thus adopted a different model to that place at the Banco de España to date: functionally separating the continuous monitoring of banks and inspection visits.