samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
[6] The entire monetary and financial sector would be deprived of its anchor – central bank money – and would be exposed to potential instability. [7]  It is also conceivable that non-European digital payment solutions and technologies operated abroad might dominate our payments market, as we are already seeing in some segments like cards and online payments. This risk would be exacerbated by the expansion of means of payment offered by big techs, which could use their very large customer base to their advantage. This would raise questions about our autonomy and privacy in payments. It could even endanger European sovereignty. [8] Moreover, the international monetary system may see the emergence of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) in large economies. Such CBDCs would offer benefits in terms of efficiency, scalability, liquidity and safety that would support their attractiveness internationally. And they would have the potential to facilitate cross-border payments, which may enhance their role as a global payment unit. [9] In such a context, not issuing a digital euro could undermine the international role of the euro and create additional risks to sovereignty. This scenario is not imminent, but it could potentially materialise in the future if we do not start acting today. And if we don’t act, we will also see increasing confusion about digital money. Crypto-assets are a case in point. [10] Unbacked crypto-assets, for example, cannot perform the functions of money. They are neither stable nor scalable. Transactions are slow and costly.

[20] A digital euro should enhance rather than constrain services and business options so that service providers can enrich their portfolio and develop new products and services around a digital euro to the benefit of their customers. In this light, we are stepping up our engagement with banks and other market stakeholders, including consumer representatives and retailers. We are listening carefully to their views. [21]  Conclusion Let me conclude. We are designing a digital euro that would make central bank money usable for digital payments, giving Europeans a digital means of payment that they can use throughout the euro area for their everyday payments and supporting Europe’s societal objectives. Having digital money issued by the central bank and available to everyone would provide an anchor of stability for the payments market, preserving the coexistence of public and private money that has served us well so far. By distributing digital euro, intermediaries will play a key role. We are working to address at an early stage any possible undesirable consequences that may result from the issuance of a digital euro for monetary policy, financial stability and the allocation of credit to the real economy. Your role as co-legislators will be key to ensuring that the necessary regulatory framework is in place for both public and private forms of money in the digital age. For my part, I will continue to report to you regularly as we progress to the next steps in our investigation phase. I now look forward to our discussion. 1.
Despite this, it is still too early to give the all-clear. Imbalances in the housing markets have stabilised at high levels only, and the risks of a further build-up remain substantial, not least given the current environment of negative interest rates. Should there be renewed signs of a further build-up, I am confident that we could contain the problem. With respect to the TBTF issue, the knowledge and awareness of the risks stemming from our systemically important banks have improved significantly. As early as in 2011, Switzerland adopted a package of measures to address the core problems in this area. 9 On behalf of the Federal Council, the effectiveness of the Swiss TBTF framework was assessed by a group of experts in 2014. Overall, the assessment indicated that the chosen approach was appropriate to address the TBTF problem. At the same time, the experts concluded – rightly in the view of the SNB – that even the full implementation of the framework in its current specification would not solve the Swiss TBTF problem entirely. Therefore, supplementary measures have been proposed. 10  8  FSB (2014). This FSB report states furthermore that “compared to the country’s banking sector, the size of Swiss shadow banking is considerably smaller – by more than five times.”  9  The package consists of four complementary measures, namely, significantly more capital of better quality, larger liquidity buffers, rules imposing sufficient diversification to reduce counterparty risk, and organisational measures.

The Thai economy has done particularly well. For the past few years it has been the fastest growing economy in Southeast Asia. Through a series of bold initiatives, the Thai government has revived the rural economy, stimulated domestic demand, and repaid its IMF loans. This has bolstered confidence and got business moving again. Indonesia’s economy has improved significantly despite a complex political situation. Reforms were slow initially, as corruption and an unreliable legal system impeded progress. Nevertheless, Indonesia has made significant headway in financial sector reforms. IBRA accelerated the pace of its bank asset sales, while non-performing loans ratios fell from nearly 50% in 1998 to just 8% last year. Indonesia graduated from the IMF programme in December 2003, and has continued to maintain sound macroeconomic policies. While foreign direct investments remain slow, the oversubscribed $ billion sovereign bond sale in March this year is a vote of confidence from international investors. The challenge over the longer term is to attract enough investments to sustain growth and reduce unemployment. Overall, Asia is showing a new dynamism, and has put the financial crisis behind it. For all the difficulties that remain, this is probably the most promising region in the world. Asia’s strategic landscape Asia’s economic growth rests on the stability of the strategic environment in the region. Constructive and stable relations among the major powers set limits on rivalries and conflicts in the region, and enable trade and investments to flourish. The key post Cold War global geopolitical reality is America’s unique pre-eminence.
The objective of the Monetary Policy Council is that the increase in prices, as measured by the consumer price index, should not exceed 2% in 1997. as in the medium term. 2. To meet this ultimate goal, the Banque de France uses two intermediate objectives, one of which is external and the other internal: -  The objective of a stable external value of the currency: as it has been for ten years, the stability of the franc will be maintained against the group of the most credible currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. -  An intermediate internal growth target for the money supply assessed by the development of the narrow and broad monetary aggregates: in 1997, the money supply should be able to show a medium-term growth trend of 5%. This figure is consistent with price inflation of no more than 2% and non-inflationary real GDP growth of about 2.5%, which could be exceeded, in view of the potential for growth to catch up in the medium term. The Monetary Policy Council has decided to simultaneously BIS Review 2/1997  -4-  monitor the main narrow and broad money aggregates in order to obtain a concise estimate of all monetary developments. 3. Total domestic debt is an important indicator. It helps the Banque de France make sure that the economy is supplied with enough financing to grow, and it enables us to track developments in financing for businesses, households and general government simultaneously.

In the last three years, potential growth has averaged a little more than 2% a year for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. We can do better. We believe that our economy's potential non-inflationary growth is around 2.5% in the medium term, and this can be exceeded given the capacity for growth to catch up. The requirements for investment are financing terms, self-financing, competitiveness, and medium-term growth. We believe these requirements exist today. If I had to sum up briefly the message of the Monetary Policy Council, I would say: “The investment plans exist. The time has come today to implement them. Let us invest. It is the surest way for us to contribute to non-inflationary growth that creates jobs and thus to help in the fight against unemployment.”  * *  *  French monetary policy is in line with the European strategy of the President of the Republic and the Government, and therefore with the creation of an economic and monetary union on 1 January 1996. The advance towards the single currency was decisively confirmed at the European Summit in Dublin, where an agreement was reached on the legal status of the euro, on the new European Monetary System and on the stability and growth pact intended to guarantee fiscal discipline in the Monetary Union.
Figure 8 shows the forecasts for average CPI inflation in 2009 made by various forecasters during 2008 and 2009. 8 The figure shows that the pattern over time is roughly the same for all the forecasters. During the first half of 2008, most forecasters expected that inflation would be between 2 and just below 3 per cent in 2009, while the actual outcome was –0.3 per cent. The explanation for this overestimation is that the forecasters did not foresee that the financial crisis would take such a dramatic turn in the autumn and, consequently, that inflation would fall so quickly as a result of the Riksbank’s repo-rate cuts. Once the financial crisis was upon us and the dramatic downturn in economic activity that followed in its wake had begun, all of the forecasters revised their forecasts downwards quickly and substantially. From the beginning of 2009, the forecasts were gathered around the actual outcome. 8  12  The analysis is based on data gathered by the National Institute of Economic Research. One advantage of these data is that they show exactly when the forecasts were made. The forecast comparison covers ten forecasting institutions and their whole-year forecasts for GDP growth, the CPI and the percentage of unemployed. The ten forecasting institutions are: the Swedish Ministry of Finance, the Swedish Retail Institute, the National Institute of Economic Research, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), Nordea, SEB, Svenska Handelsbanken, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Swedbank and the Riksbank.

Thomas Jordan: Monetary policy and uncertainty Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the University Freiburg im Breisgau, Freiburg, Germany, 15 January 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The economy is a complex system. Moreover, it is constantly changing as a result of technological advances and globalisation. Consequently, monetary policy operates in a very uncertain environment. The unforeseen and radical developments in the international financial markets emanating from the current crisis in the US housing and mortgage market have – once again – brought home the major role of uncertainty in monetary policy. We are uncertain about the exact way in which the economy functions, the current state of the economy and about future exogenous shocks. This uncertainty can express itself in the form of risk, with a known probability distribution. Alternatively, it may take the form of Knightian uncertainty, in which the probability distribution is unknown. It is the latter form of uncertainty which presents monetary policy with the greater challenges. Uncertainty is a reason why changes to the monetary policy instrument are generally applied only gradually and in small steps. However, if the economy is thought to be facing major threats, uncertainty may demand rapid and decisive action. Monetary policy decision-makers must be aware of uncertainty and the limitations of their knowledge.
Third, getting a handle on – and where necessary – regulating, the risks in the so called “shadow banking” system: the ecosystem of non-bank financial firms that perform a similar role in credit intermediation to that played by the banking sector. And fourth, and perhaps most important, making sure that no institution, no matter how large, how complex, how international in its activities or to put it simply, no matter how systemic, is “too big to be allowed to fail”. Because if financial institutions can make themselves too big to fail, if they can ensure that if and when they get into trouble the taxpayer will have no option but to bail them out if, as the economists put it, they can ensure that their profits and their pay are private but if it all goes wrong the losses are “socialised” then history teaches us that this is exactly what they will do. III. What has been achieved? So, in these four key areas, what has been achieved? The inputs have certainly been impressive. From a standing start in 2009 the Financial Stability Board has driven the regulatory reform programme. Under the FSB, around 25 groups have been set up to run around 15 major workstreams.

I will then discuss the risks and challenges facing the Thai economy, especially those relating to volatile international capital movements and their impact on the Thai baht in the short term and in building resiliency and enhancing productivity for the longterm. Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me start with the global picture. For a number of years now, we have witnessed strong global growth driven mainly by growth in the US economy and in emerging markets, particularly non-Japan Asia. During this same period, we have also seen growing global imbalances with the rest of the world financing the US’s growing current account deficits. There is yet no consensus on how this global financial imbalance will unwind, but everyone expects that a large dollar correction will be part of the unwinding process, which will impact on financial markets and exchange rates worldwide. My view is that we are likely to see more market jitters along the unwinding process of this global imbalance. Indeed, for the last couple years, we have already experienced large magnitude of capital fluctuations and exchange rate volatilities. This year alone, we have observed two episodes, in February and again in August, of the shift toward greater risk aversions, with sharp falls in the stock markets across the world, from New York to Shanghai, and Bangkok included. At this juncture, there seems to be an increasing disconnect between global growth and financial stability.
The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House. 1  As the recent IEA report3 stresses “the global pathway to net‐zero emissions (…) requires all governments to significantly strengthen and then successfully implement their energy and climate policies. Commitment made to date fall short of what is required”. Meanwhile, the world has been hit by the Covid 19 health crisis. This is a crisis that is due to lack of prevention, unpreparedness at national levels and flaws in international cooperation. This is a crisis that has forced governments to lock down hundreds of millions of people and has stopped or reduced economic activity. This is a crisis with huge macroeconomic costs and which has forced governments to provide substantial fiscal support and central banks to intervene with bold monetary policies, in order to preserve favorable financing conditions. As regards climate change and the environment, scientists as well as the authors of the Green Swan try to explain to us what could happen if we don’t act. On the health front, we experienced “skin in the game” what an unexpected, severe, global crisis can be, because we did not collectively act on time. In advanced economies, thanks to vaccinations, we are seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. This is a relief. However, other crises could occur; there is no vaccine against climate change and environmental risks. This tangible experience makes the Green Swan even more interesting to read and to meditate upon now, than when it was published.

6  I would therefore like to elaborate on the relationship between economic growth and ecological limits, as it has profound ramifications, including for central banks. A growing body of literature, including a recent academic paper in Nature Communications,16 suggests that it may be difficult to reconcile an ambitious mitigation of climate change with unlimited economic growth. Professor Dasgupta argues that this tension between economic growth and ecological goals becomes even more evident if we take into account other ecological disruptions than climate change, such as biodiversity loss. In his words, “our economic possibilities are circumscribed […] by the Earth system’s workings”. In order to make progress in the face of such challenges, we must diffuse many of the passionate and intransigent positions that often dominate in public debates. Let me mention two pitfalls we must avoid: ‐  ‐  that it is too late and we are doomed, or that we should stop doing everything we do: travelling, innovating, creating, and so on. Living within limits doesn't mean that we will not keep investing in innovation or that some economic sectors will not keep growing. In fact, some sectors, such as renewable energy, must grow if we are to meet this century’s formidable ecological challenges. that technological innovations and breakthroughs will eventually solve all our problems, and that we will not have to profoundly change the way we live.
We remain ready to respond within a short time to any consolidating initiative of the public sector. Our easing measures will remain within the legal framework of Bank of Albania’s instruments and in line with the consolidated philosophy of central banks action. The monetary policy may prove successful only if its transmission mechanism is functional. In this context, the banking system plays a key role, as the first actor of the transmission mechanism. b) A prudent supervisory and regulatory policy. This policy maintains sound balance sheets of the financial system and the private sector. Thanks to the timely measures to manage credit, capital and liquidity risks, the Albanian economy has successfully withstood the shock from global financial markets and has now a consolidated financial stability and a banking system that is able to credit and support the Albanian economy. Maintaining banking sector stability is one of the two main priorities of the Bank of Albania. I take this opportunity to draw the attention of the banking industry executives, to engage  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  maximally to act in full compliance with the legal and regulatory framework and respect the standards for sound management of banking activities. Our objective remains unchanged; maintaining and strengthening public confidence in the banking sector. To this end, the banking system should:   Verify constantly the compliance and strengthen the internal audit systems.   Empower capacities for risk assessment and management.   Maintain adequate capital and liquidity levels.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in recognition of the need to provide a conducive regulatory environment which promotes sustainability, accountability, transparency and growth of the building society industry in Zambia, the Building Societies Act was amended in October 2005 to harmonise it with the Banking and Financial Services Act pending the modernization of the Building Societies Act under the Financial Sector Development Plan law reform programme. Ladies and Gentlemen, Bank of Zambia is concerned about the levels of lending interest rates charged by most financial institutions in Zambia, building societies included. With the achievement of relative macroeconomic stability in the recent years as evidenced by a significant reduction in the inflation rate to 11.1 percent as at June 2007, it is the expectation of the Bank of Zambia that all prudent lending institutions would make downward adjustments to their lending interest rates to make financial services accessible and affordable. It is also important to note that high lending interest rates can lead to high levels of delinquency. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is in this light that we anticipate that credit referencing services will help in reducing credit risk through the provision of widely accessible information on the loan repayment profile of borrowers. This should also provide another incentive for lowering of interest rates. Ladies and Gentlemen, in conclusion I wish to state that the Bank of Zambia is committed to broadening and deepening the financial sector through effective implementation of the Financial Sector Development Plan.
Risks  In the last part of my presentation, I would like to talk about the risks with respect to the inflation outlook in the upcoming period and provide some information pertaining to the probable monetary policy strategy should these risks materialize. The fact that inflation will remain elevated for some time warrants the close monitoring of price setting behavior. The combination of several unfavorable developments, such as  unprocessed food and oil price increases, administered price hikes and base effects has led to a significant increase in inflation since the last quarter of 2009. Although these factors are temporary, they cause headline inflation to significantly exceed the inflation target, leading to an adverse impact on inflation expectations. Apart from items that are directly affected by cost push effects, current pricing behavior does not reveal any deterioration to the extent that might endanger the achievement of medium-term targets. However, I would like to remind you that monetary tightening may be implemented sooner than envisaged in the baseline scenario, should inflation expectations continue to rise and lead to a deterioration in general price setting behavior. Although downside risks regarding global economic activity have been decreasing, they remain a concern. Rising budget deficits and ongoing problems in credit, real estate and labor markets across developed economies continue to pose downside risks for the recovery in global activity. Should the global conditions deteriorate again, and consequently delay domestic recovery, the policy rate may remain constant for a longer period than envisaged under the baseline scenario.

However, owing to the effects of tax hikes, increases in food and energy prices, and base effects, the inflation rate is hovering significantly above the target, which is having an adverse impact on inflation expectations, and leading to risks regarding pricing behavior. Therefore, the revised forecasts are based on the assumption of gradually withdrawing the excessive amount of liquidity provided to the market, and increasing policy rates at a measured pace starting in the last quarter of 2010. However, based on the prediction that resource utilization will likely remain at low levels for sometime, the baseline  scenario envisages that the increases in interest rates would be limited with policy rates remaining at single-digit levels throughout the forecast horizon. As shown in the slide, inflation will follow a volatile path throughout 2010 owing to the base effects driven by the temporary tax cuts and unprocessed food price fluctuations that occurred during 2009 (Figure 34). The temporary tax cuts implemented in March 2009, which were withdrawn partly in June and fully in October, would cause headline inflation to increase during March and April, and to decrease during June, July and October of 2010. Accordingly, inflation is expected to increase slightly during the second quarter and then fluctuate at around 10 percent in the third quarter (Figure 34). Inflation is expected to drop significantly in the last quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 (Figure 34).