samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The global dimension must be the responsibilities of the IMF and the FSB given their comparative advantage as international organization. And as I already noted, EWE by the IMF and the FSB should focus on monitoring the development of risk in the key global financial markets, risk linked to activities of the internationally-important financial institutions, and the economic conditions and policies of the systemically-important economies. These are the areas of risk that have global-wide implications but are not being monitored sufficiently relative to their importance. Third, the focus of the EWE at the country-level also needs to expand beyond detecting and avoiding local macro-misalignments, and to include assessment of the resiliency and robustness of the domestic economy and financial system to withstand large external shocks. The key point here is that, even with good policies, crisis can happen to an economy if the externally-induced factors overwhelm the abilities and the robustness of the domestic economy to cope with. 2  BIS Review 19/2010  And forth, the value of early warning is that warning leads to the needed actions being taken in advance. This means the EWE process should serve to facilitate actions to deal with the important risk and issues by the relevant parties. To serve this end, credibility and effectiveness of the EWE depends on appropriate degree of transparency of the structural models and its appropriateness to the context, whether national or markets, as much as its track record.

My observations will be on: (1) the nature of future crises; (2) their implications for the role and the conduct of EWE going forward; and (3) some suggestions on what should constitute the important components of the EWE process. First, on the nature of future crises. One criticism we often hear about EWS in the past is that the system is often good in replicating the last crisis but is less useful in anticipating future crises. This point I believe has been echoed also in today’s seminar. A key reason for this is the way the EWS models have been calibrated to fit the explanation for the last crisis, and hence, becomes less useful for anticipating future crises when circumstances or the risk factor change. Similarly, lessons learned from the previous crisis tend to over-prepare policymakers for a repeat of a similar crisis, thereby leaving them vulnerable to the new cause of the next crisis. Therefore, for EWE to be useful, it must have the ability to anticipate the nature of future crises with certain accuracy. This, of course, is going to be a demanding task, but it is this quality that the EWE process needs to have. This is because without certain degree of accuracy, it will be difficult to persuade policymakers to collectively become engaged in addressing certain risk and vulnerabilities.
The banking union will deliver a higher level of structural coherence to the euro area’s financial system, which has already been considerably strengthened since 2008: banks’ capital levels have been substantially consolidated, certain activities have been streamlined and the most stressed banks have been restructured. Recent numbers show major advances for European banks in their efforts to strengthen their capital base, in line with Basel III requirements and, in particular for big international banks, quite comparable to capital strengthening in US banks (when differences in accounting standards are neutralised). The banks have reimbursed half of the liquidity injected via the two LTRO programmes. 4. The Eurosystem  From the very first signs of the crisis (remember the Eurosystem injected 90 billion euros in August 2007 to counter the impact of the first freeze in the financial markets), the Eurosystem has provided constant support to bank funding (and thereby underpinning credit to the economy). We have been able to use our collateral framework – with a wide range of counterparties accepted – to relieve the liquidity constraints faced by banks. The maximum maturity of our operations has increased from three months before the crisis to three years. Through these measures, we have addressed the liquidity pressures on banks and avoided a genuine credit crunch. At last week’s meeting, we decided to take a further step towards forward guidance on our rate policy by saying that we expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.

Benchmarking against the OECD principles and the practices of some advanced economies, the HKMA is of the view that Hong Kong has been doing quite well in protecting bank customers’ interests. We also strive to make changes and improvements from time to time. Yet, I believe there is a need and room for further improvements as to how banks deal with their customers. This is because bank customers are essentially entrusting most of their liquid assets or funds with banks that they trust. Trust between banks and their customers is beyond that between general service providers and their customers. Also, as compared to other financial institutions, it is indeed easier for banks to earn confidence and trust of their customers. In addition to bringing business opportunities and profit to banks, customers’ confidence and trust in banks are also the cornerstone for banking and financial stability. 4. Let me borrow a famous quote and put it simply that with “great trust” comes great responsibility. First, banks should ensure their prudential operation and risk management are in place to safeguard customer deposits. Second, banks should treat their customers fairly when providing various services and financial products to them, and should stand in customers’ shoes in pursuing profit. But how can we achieve this? In the past few months of discussion with the industry, we found that the basic principles of fair treatment to customers are indeed not so complicated. Mr Benjamin Hung, Chairman of the HKAB, will brief us on the five principles in the Charter. 5.
Kohn, Donald L. (2009), “Policy Challenges for the Federal Reserve”, speech held on 16 November 2009, www.federalreserve.gov. Laséen, Stefan and Lars E.O. Svensson (2009), “Anticipated Alternative Instrument-Rate Paths in Policy Simulations”, Working Paper, www.larseosvensson.net. Leeper, Eric M. and Tao Zha (2003), “Modest Policy Interventions,” Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 1673–1700. Norges Bank (2005), Inflation report no. 1-2005, March, www.norges-bank.no. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010a), “Inflation targeting after the financial crisis”, speech held in Mumbai, 15 February 2010, www.riksbank.se. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010b), “Inflation Targeting”, under publication in Friedman, Benjamin M., and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3a and 3b, North-Holland. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2010c), “Why a lower repo-rate path?”, speech held at Umeå University, 24 February, www.riksbank.se. BIS Review 60/2010  11

As a result, banks are increasingly exposed to risks from abroad, and risks to financial stability are far less frequently confined to national borders. The most substantial increase in cross-border activity and market integration has taken place in wholesale activities. For example, the currency-based segmentation of the markets for unsecured interbank deposits disappeared very quickly after the euro was introduced. This could be seen from the rapid convergence of national spreads. Furthermore, market integration has not only been reflected in price quotations, but also in trading volumes. The share of cross-border transactions currently accounts for more than 50% of overall activity in both the unsecured and the repo markets. Some large institutions are starting to act as “money centre” banks with an area-wide scope of activity. The smaller institutions still mainly operate with their domestic counterparts. They nonetheless benefit from the more equal market conditions. Accordingly, the share of cross-border transactions in the area of large-value payment transfers through the TARGET system has been increasing steadily. In addition to the single monetary policy, two main reasons explain the rapid integration of wholesale activities in the euro area, in general, and the market for unsecured interbank deposits, in particular. First, the smooth functioning of the settlement of cross-border payments, mainly performed via the TARGET system, allows banks to trade safely throughout the euro area. Second, the swift acceptance of euro area indices such as EONIA and EURIBOR forms a common basis for pricing.
The object of this forum is to discuss the prime pre-conditions to be met by the Bank of Albania before launching the implementation of a new monetary policy strategy, with a particular emphasis on Albania’s membership to the European Union in the long-term run. The fact that we have been successful in controlling inflation during the last years holds true. We have managed to attain a general stability and I believe the policy adopted by us has been one of the key factors. Another fact which holds true is that, for some time, we have been considering to take another step, attempting a more sophisticated, effective and certainly a more responsible and transparent monetary policy approach. To this aim, we have come to the conclusion that the actual framework of the monetary policy requires the necessity of being further completed and perfected with standard elements, adopted by other countries in the world and where the targeting inflation regime has proven to be successful. We are aware that this is not an effortless initiative to be seized. Therefore, I consider that this is a great fortune for the Bank of Albania to have the possibility, on the verge of discussing the preconditions of adopting this regime, to closely discuss and consult the distinguished guests present in this seminar. I trust straight opinions and recommendations shall be brought forth, be they challenging to be accomplished. According to theory, inflation targeting is a direct regime.

This activity is the first in its kind, and I express my highest considerations for the trust that the Bank of England has put to the Bank of Albania. The Centre of Central Banking Studies is internationally recognised as a centre of intellectual excellence in the area of central banking studies. Considering the goal that this centre has set to itself, as an opportunity provider to central banking employees to be endowed with ampler perspectives in the respective areas of expertise, I call for your attention to listen to what the distinguished experts shall say. Their professional achievements and the central banks they represent guarantee this. Thank you and good proceedings! 2/2
10  Capgemini Survey entitled Online Availability of Public Services: How Is Europe Progressing? Web Based Survey on Electronic Public Services. Report of the 6th Measurement, June 2006. 11  www.iN2015.sg  BIS Review 97/2006  3  countries. Many people who left Poland will achieve success, and set up prosperous companies. Some of these companies may become global challengers. Simultaneously, Poland has gained a million ambassadors abroad. For the time being, we are only lamenting. Have we yet done anything to use this huge Polish intellectual potential located in other countries in order to pursue joint efforts aimed at improving the standard of living for Poles, both at home and abroad. Have we got a vision that would for example indicate mechanisms for creating a diaspora with millions of Poles in the EU or across the globe, a diaspora that could effectively care for Poles’ and Poland’s interest? Actual examples of these include the Chinese and Mexican diaspora in the US, the Jewish diaspora across countries, the Portuguese diaspora in France or Global Scott Network, and many other. In the global economy, greater progress is made thanks to increasing use of information and communication technologies (ICT), also in public services. Firstly, it allows to leave unilateral communication channels for interactive two-way communication, which in turn enables citizens and entrepreneurs to be more active, and allows to offer public services better tailored to the needs of individuals and businesses.

But now that the economy has undergone a period of deep crisis and it is difficult to assess what structural changes the crisis may lead to, the process becomes even more complex. One illustration of this is how one should assess future developments in the labour market. So far employment has not fallen as much as might be justified given the historical relationship between unemployment and GDP, and the large fall in GDP. This has come as a surprise to us and to other forecasters. But what conclusions should one draw with regard to the effects in the slightly longer term when the economy recovers? Employment and the number of hours worked are now beginning to increase. Normally, one might have expected a greater adjustment in the number of hours worked than we have seen in this economic downturn. The fact that the  6  For further information on resource utilisation, see Jonsson, M., Nilsson, C. and Palmqvist, S., 2008, “Should monetary policy stabilise resource utilisation?” Economic Commentary, www.riksbank.se or Öberg, S. “Monetary policy and the elusive resource utilisation”, speech published on 25 May 2009, www.riksbank.se. 4  BIS Review 58/2010  adjustment has not corresponded to the fall in production means that productivity has been very weak. But as we observe in our most recent Monetary Policy Update, which was published last week, we expect productivity to improve in the future, which also means that the number of hours worked and the number of employed will grow slowly.
And the flow of credit outside the banking system may improve, helping to support a recovery in nominal demand. Over the next quarter or so, amongst other indicators I will therefore be looking at what happens to firm and household money holdings, as well as credit flows and risk premia. The Bank’s Asset Purchase Facility schemes for corporate paper are designed to help catalyse that process. The fact that the Bank is buying relatively small amounts of paper may have been misunderstood by some. As the central bank, we are not operating the schemes in order to lend in scale to the real economy, but rather to help revive the markets. Some have described this variant of liquidity insurance as acting as “Market Maker of Last Resort”, and I recently aired some thoughts on the kind of principles that might guide central banks in this area. 1 They include consistency with monetary policy; avoiding undue risk to the central bank; acting as a catalyst; and avoiding attempts to prop up markets that would not be fundamentally viable once peacetime resumes. Yesterday, the Bank issued for consultation some ideas on how we might be able to extend our liquidity insurance, through the APF, to facilities for working capital finance. They cover a possible facility for secured commercial paper, where the underlying assets would be portfolios of SME trade-finance credit, and a facility for supply chain finance.

Authorities everywhere are having to innovate to help get us through this crisis. And we will need to innovate to build a better system for tomorrow. Our dialogue with you can only help that. We are very grateful for it. 4  BIS Review 71/2009
The unemployment rate has been steady in the past few months near its historical low and was 3.6 percent in June. There are now far more job openings than people looking for work, and employers are still struggling to fill roles. The economy experienced a rapid recovery from the pandemic last year, but I expect growth to slow considerably this year as the waning effects of fiscal stimulus, less favorable financial conditions, and slower growth abroad all weigh on our economy. By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. Specifically, I currently expect real GDP growth in the United States to be below one percent this year, and then to rebound slightly  to around 1-1/2 percent next year. With overall growth slowing to below its trend level, I expect the unemployment rate to move up from its very low current level, reaching somewhat above 4 percent next year. Economic Conditions in Puerto Rico Similar to the mainland, employment in Puerto Rico has rebounded quickly and strongly. Before the pandemic, the economy was just showing signs of emerging from a decade-and-a-half-long economic slump, during which both the population and employment had fallen by about 16 percent. Then, in the spring of 2020, employment tumbled another 14 percent, a far steeper decline than after Hurricane Maria in 2017. The subsequent turnaround has been astounding.

I met with government officials to discuss the Commonwealth’s economic plan and pandemic recovery. I also heard from executives about how the banking sector is faring. And I met with leaders of cooperativas to hear about what they're doing to help residents improve their access to credit and financial services. I took a short flight here from San Juan after a full day of engagements yesterday, and I spent the earlier part of this morning at the Aeronautical and Aerospace Institute of Puerto Rico, where I learned about this growing industry. Needless to say, the views from the ground and the air have been delightful. The U.S. economy has experienced a tremendous rebound since the darkest days at the onset of the pandemic. But now, inflation is sky-high, and it is the number one danger to the overall health and stability of a well-functioning economy. The war in Ukraine and the recent lockdowns in China, on top of the ongoing supply challenges and demand shifts, have led to inflation rates we have not seen in four decades. The priority for monetary policy is clear. The Federal Reserve is strongly committed to bringing inflation back down to our 2 percent longer-run goal. Price stability is absolutely essential for the economy to achieve its potential and sustain maximum employment over the medium term. I want to be clear: this is not an easy task. We must be resolute, and we cannot fall short.
Unemployment has been close to a low historical average. Although it is of course difficult to compare and assess different central banks’ deliberations, the repo-rate decisions in Sweden during most of 2013 would appear to be one of the clearest examples of a monetary policy that leaned against the wind. When the prospects for inflation fell, the repo rate was held unchanged with explicit reference to household debt. This makes it interesting both for us in Sweden and for central banks in other countries to assess how successful the policy has been. It is far too early to make a complete assessment. But as there is a substantial need to manage financial imbalances in some countries, and there is a discussion on the role of monetary policy in this context, it may nevertheless be useful to make a preliminary assessment of the policy. Swedish inflation moving further from the target CPIF inflation was around 2 per cent in 2010, when the increases in the repo rate began after the record-high cuts in connection with the global financial crisis. But since then inflation has fallen and CPIF inflation has been around 1 per cent for a couple of years. Last autumn, inflation fell further. It is now very low; in February CPI inflation was –0.2 per cent and CPIF inflation was +0.4 per cent.

The two instruments in question were the countercyclical provisions, which were established by equipping the general provisions already in place with a component linked not to non-performance but to credit growth; and the requirement that structured 5/14  investment vehicles be included within the scope of prudential consolidation of the credit institutions creating them, thereby preventing the transformation and securitisation of poorquality loans from proliferating, which was one of the sources of the international banking crisis. In 2008 the countercyclical provisions accounted for a sizeable volume of funds, of over € billion; the stricter treatment in Spain than in other countries of special-purpose investment vehicles deterred our banks from using this artificial risk-reduction mechanism, which contributed to the impact of the first crisis on our banks being relatively lighter. The main lesson of this process has been the importance of what we call “macroprudential” instruments, which did not exist at the time and which have now been set in place in all developed countries following the work of the Financial Stability Board created by the G20 in 2009, and of the European Systemic Risk Board, linked to the European System of Central Banks, created in 2011. As highlighted in the Report (pp.
In this context, it is a logical next step that supervisory colleges encompassing home and host central banks and regulators from this region cooperate in having a greater input in the Basel Committee’s deliberations. Not only will this make everyone more aware of the variety of banking practices that exist in this region, but in conferring together at a senior level, during and between college meetings, central bankers and supervisors will secure a reasonable agreement between all parties as the best course on Basel III implementation. The National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia continues to be committed to the adoption of the principles and frameworks contained in the Basel guidance papers. In adopting this commitment we take care that implementation is adjusted to our circumstances. In order for individual rules not to harm the bank business in hand specifically, and the economy in general, overall regulation should allow the wise exercise of judgement or discretion by the banks applying it and by the regulator overseeing that application. I wish you, the European Banking Federation Associates’, a successful Meeting today and a pleasant stay in the Republic of Macedonia. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Constraints on earnings distributions through dividends, share buybacks and discretionary bonus payments to staff will be imposed on a bank when the conservation buffer is breached. The closer a bank’s regulatory capital ratio approaches the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  incorporated banks will have to maintain at least 9% Common Equity Tier 1, compared to the Basel III minimum of 7%. Let me explain the reasons for this. (i)  First, the Basel III minimums do not adequately take into account the systemic importance of banks. Each locally-incorporated bank is systemically-important in Singapore and has a substantial retail presence. Together, they account for more than half of the total non-bank resident deposits and loans in Singapore. Hence, higher capital levels are required to strengthen their ability to absorb unexpected losses effectively in a crisis. This is necessary to protect depositors, reduce risks to the real economy, and safeguard our financial stability. The experience of countries at the centre of the crisis in Europe and the U.S. showed that the total cost of a financial crisis to the economy and the public can be substantial. (ii)  Second, Common Equity Tier 1 capital requirements that are significantly above Basel III will not result in a large reduction in economic output but would be beneficial in reducing the likelihood and cost of a crisis. Several empirical studies confirm this.