samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Consequently, the interest rate differential between investments in foreign currencies and those in Swiss francs had declined to almost zero towards the end of last year. This made the Swiss franc even more attractive for investors. The Swiss franc is equally attractive to both domestic and foreign investors. The upward pressure on the Swiss franc is not only due to the fact that foreigners want to invest in the Swiss franc, but also because Swiss residents invest less abroad or repatriate their international investments. Allow me to explain this in more detail. For a long time, Switzerland has had a current account surplus, in other words, it exports more goods and services than it imports. In addition, the high level of international investments earns significant investment income. Due to the current account surpluses, Switzerland has built up considerable foreign assets over time. These asset holdings abroad were largely invested in foreign currencies, partly because of the more attractive returns. 1 The net revenue earned with the current account surpluses has to be “re-exported” in the form of foreign securities purchases or investments abroad. In the years before the financial crisis, inflows attributable to the current account surplus were more or less balanced by outflows in the form of private capital exports. Following the financial crisis, the situation changed completely. Risk appetite in Switzerland reduced sharply. Investment of the proceeds from the current account surplus abroad by the domestic private sector has become increasingly restrained.

We will start with the presentation of Professor Khalsa for about 40 minutes or so, which will be followed by a questions and answers segment. I would like to invite Professor Khalsa to take the floor. Thank you! 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
The ECB’s entire range of instruments, characterised by a wide corridor between the interest rate on the marginal lending facility and the rate on the deposit facility, weekly repurchase agreements, the acceptance of a large number of counterparties and a wide range of collateral, is based on the money market functioning. If the money market doesn’t work, the mechanism for transmitting monetary policy doesn’t work. The only solution remaining for a central bank at this point is to stand in for the market and perform the role of the banks, even by lending directly to the private sector. Maybe this solution is the most preferable? I don’t believe so. In my opinion, the functioning of the market is a statutory objective for a central bank. It should therefore intervene to guarantee the liquidity of the market. It should be remembered that every injection of liquidity is guaranteed by the collateral deposited by the counterparty banks. This means that banks’ assets are made liquid. It’s obvious that without such a liquidity intervention, the market would collapse, taking the banking system with it. This is always true for last-resort interventions whose objective is to keep a solvent but illiquid system alive. It is at the heart of the role of central banking, particularly in times of systemic crisis. There can be no doubt that the ECB had to take on this role and I believe it has done so in an appropriate way.

CEMFI is the outcome of the ambition of the leadership of the Banco de España in the late 1980s, who saw the possibility of innovating in the organization of a graduate programme comparable to the best programmes in Europe. It was Luis Ángel Rojo, at that time the Banco de España's Director General of Research, who invited Rafael Repullo to lead this venture. Precisely as a token of appreciation for his decisive contributions in the early days of CEMFI, the prize for the best Master student bears his name. The Banco de España is very proud of its ongoing support and collaboration with such a special institution providing first-class graduate education and research, contributing a host of public goods to the Spanish economy and generating valuable ideas for public policymaking. An excellent example of this collaboration is the co-organisation of the biennial Financial Stability Conference that concluded this morning at the Banco de España. Demonstrating an outstanding academic level and policy relevance, it has enjoyed the presence of a large number of distinguished visitors, including the Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Jerome Powell. Building on this example, I am pleased to announce a new collaboration between the Banco de España, CEMFI, and the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, an annual conference on the Spanish economy, the first edition of which is due to take place next week in Santander.
One year ahead, the forecast is for an inflation rate of 1.6%, which will accelerate gradually until it reaches the inflation target in the first quarter of 2005 and goes up to 2.8% two years ahead. Subsequently, inflation will continue to gain pace if the forecast assumptions hold, including an unchanged monetary stance. Such forecasts are inherently prone to uncertainties, which in the present forecast in the short run largely involve exchange rate developments, as always. In fact the exchange rate has weakened since the forecast was made. A delay in construction work for the Norðurál smelter expansion could reduce domestic demand and thereby dampen domestic inflationary pressures. Offsetting this, the króna could probably weaken, as we are seeing now with a partial reversal of expectations about currency inflows for these investments. The uncertainty about the global economic outlook and the pessimistic tone in the first half of this year appear to be abating, at least in the US, even though the prospects in Europe are not promising. As I mentioned earlier, the policy interest rate is the Central Bank’s main instrument for attaining its inflation target. The Central Bank last changed its policy rate on February 10 with a reduction of 0.5 percentage points to 5.3%. The Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland have not considered that there are grounds for altering interest rates now, given the analysis and inflation forecast that I have outlined here.

Being engaged internationally is, fortunately, a trait by which Norwegians are known. Maybe we do not always succeed in our endeavours. But the idea of not being engaged, of not using our influence, of not taking the long-term perspective, and instead just standing on the sidelines, is foreign to us. This Fund is global in the truest sense of the word, and it does have a say through its equity holdings, even if this influence is subject to clear limits. The authority to do so is laid down in the mandate and guidelines. It is a task that we have taken on with great commitment and a strong sense of purpose. The management of the Fund is of course subject to certain requirements. But when considering what these requirements should or should not comprise, it is important to tread carefully. Even though globalisation has reduced the emphasis on national borders, we must show caution when we invest in foreign markets – because when we do so, we are entering our neighbour’s house. For one thing, the distinction between ethics and politics may be different in other countries. For another, when we say that a company’s activities are in conflict with the ethical guidelines, we are not only pointing a finger at the company. We are also pointing a finger, albeit indirectly, at the laws and regulations in the country that permits those activities to continue – and we are pointing that finger as a representative of another state.
Mark Yallop is due to join on 1/12/14 and David Belsham on 1/5/15. 5  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/about/default.aspx. 6  See for example, AJ Hughes Hallett (1989) ‘Econometrics and the Theory of Economic Policy: The TinbergenTheil Contributions 40 Years On.’ in Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 41, issue 1, pages 189–214. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  there should be at least as many independent and effective policy instruments as there are independent policy targets. By an instrument I mean any policy setting which can be changed: such as Bank Rate or the required amount of capital to be held by firms. To be satisfied, the Tinbergen rule requires that the policy tools being used must each have an impact on at least one of the objectives in sufficient size to make a substantial contribution towards achieving it. And that the pattern of effects of one tool on all objectives cannot be perfectly reproduced by changing any other tools singly or in combination ie the policy tools are each unique in their precise pattern of effects. Additional conditions are necessary if the objectives are assigned to different policy making bodies. So I will add a number of other sufficient conditions to cover this case. •  Each policy tool should be assigned to meeting a target that it is relatively effective upon (ie to exploit comparative advantage). This may seem obvious, but is less so if one is uncertain about a particular policy’s effectiveness.

Cross-chairmanship and membership from Bank executives should enable us to keep to coherent policies even when there are  11  Derivatives, prime brokerage, secondary market trading activities are all examples of what I mean here. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  differences of opinion. And I say that – despite evidence from operation of the MPC where there has generally been as much dissent recorded between the Bank executive members as by the independent members – because we have a collective institutional need to make the whole framework function in the best interests of the UK economy. And another structural way of addressing divergent views is to have joint meetings and briefings on the issues which have most cross-over, which help bring the different externally appointed members together. That has already happened successfully on several issues, most notably housing. Concluding remarks It is important that we give the new structure time to work. First, because we will learn a lot. If there are flaws – and it would be reasonable to think there will be some – we need a bit of time to identify them and iron them out. Macroprudential tools are being used in the UK for the first time. And the PRA’s new approach to supervision is still being embedded. Second, the regulatory reform agenda is still being decided and implemented internationally – insurance regulation in particular has a long way to go to set truly global standards. Measures to tackle Too-Big-to-Fail are still being finalised.
Scope 1,2,3 GHG Emissions  42%  22%  39%  41%  28%  26%  29%  38%  c. Climate-Related Targets  50%  24%  45%  53%  32%  30%  24%  51%  Recommendation Governance  Recommended disclosure  Strategy  Through multi-sector TCFD summits and more focused TCFD industry preparer forums, companies should continue to share knowledge on how, what and where they disclose information to give the market the information it needs. Better TCFD disclosure is an opportunity. Research by the Bank of England and PwC finds a positive correlation between companies’ stock price and the number of TCFD disclosures that firms make.10 This could be because investors reward companies that are leaders in managing climate-related risks or simply  9  TCFD Status Report (2019) On average each additional TCFD disclosure correlates with a 0.18% increase in stock price. While a positive correlation between financial metric and TCFD disclosure does not indicate that TCFD disclosure caused an increase in stock price, it raises questions for further analysis about the effect of climate-related disclosures. 10  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  because TCFD adoption identifies companies that are more naturally disposed to longer-term strategic thinking and planning.

Current supporters control balance sheets totalling $ trillion and include the world’s top banks, asset managers, pension funds, insurers, credit rating agencies, accounting firms and shareholder advisory services.4 The supply of disclosure is responding, with four fifths of the top 1100 G20 companies now disclosing climate-related financial risks in line with some of the TCFD recommendations.5 On every recommended metric in TCFD, disclosures have been steadily increasing, rising from an average of 2.8 to 3.6 over the past three years. Three quarters of investors are now using TCFD disclosures when investing and the same percentage report a marked improvement in the quality of climate disclosures.6 Japanese TCFD supporters increased from 9 to 199 in just over a year and now have a market cap of almost $ trillion. Japanese government support through the Implementation Study Group and the TCFD Consortium has catalysed action and created a blueprint for other countries in “how-to-TCFD”. 4  Full list of current TCFD supporters available at: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters/. The TCFD’s June 2019 Status Report assessed, using artificial intelligence, 1100 companies reports over three years from 2016 to 2018 inclusive. Full report available at: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-TCFD-Status-Report-FINAL053119.pdf. 6 TCFD Status Report (2019) 5  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  Chart 2: Changes in TCFD disclosures by recommendation 2016 – 2018  As the volume of disclosures has increased, so has their sophistication. Companies, financial firms and policymakers increasingly recognise that disclosures must go beyond the static to the strategic.
It is a particular coincidence that TARGET2, the next generation of the Eurosystem’s large value payment system, will be launched today. TARGET2 is an important milestone. It will offer Europe a more uniform wholesale payment infrastructure, with a harmonised service level and a single price structure. Thus, TARGET2 is another good example of progress in the creation of a common payments area. Let’s now turn to this year’s SEPA Summit, which is called “Ready for SEPA?”, and rightly so. In my view, this question is not limited to the mere operational readiness of the industry to offer SEPA payments. I consider the topic of this conference to be broader. The question  BIS Review 134/2007  1  should perhaps be understood as, is the industry ready to create a “truly integrated” Single Euro Payments Area? The ECB sees SEPA as a major catalyst for more financial integration in Europe. SEPA will influence the payment landscape in Europe for many years to come and this will involve a rethink by all the parties involved. Indeed, it is not enough to defend current market positions or current practices. Rather, the point is that SEPA will benefit those who bring innovative services to their customers. SEPA will benefit those who are future oriented. Today I would like to focus in particular on two issues, both of which are much discussed by banks and which are needed to create a truly integrated SEPA. The two main questions are, first, what about the readiness of customers?

This reflects the heightened state of vigilance in Bank Negara Malaysia as we continue to direct significant effort and resources towards strengthening our surveillance. In addition to macro surveillance, the supervision framework is also more forward looking including increased engagements and dialogue with senior management of financial institution, industry leaders, trade bodies and various chambers of commerce for the early detection of emerging issues and developments. BIS Review 58/2009  1  Facilitating access to credit and easing monetary policy Another area of importance is the continuing availability of credit from the banking sector. We have earlier highlighted the rate of growth in outstanding loans. In addition, the government has introduced specific guarantee schemes while Bank Negara Malaysia also, on its part, maintained a monetary policy easing stance that is conducive to achieve the same goal of facilitating access to credit at reasonable cost. At the same time, to assist the household sector, the Agensi Kaunselling dan Pengurusan kredit (AKPK) is also an avenue for individual borrowers and potential borrowers to seek advice and assistance in managing their finances and debts. Clients of the banking industry may also contact Bank Negara Malaysia hotlines and its LINK and TeleLINK for assistance for info. LINK refers to Laman Informasi Nasihat dan Khidmat. Association of Banks in Malaysia (ABM) has also introduced toll free lines for the benefit of its stakeholders. These combined efforts seek to lower borrowing costs and ease cash flows while at the same time promote financial discipline.
We believe the State Banks have to contribute more towards building a strong and dynamic banking sector. Therefore, the two large state commercial banks, Bank of Ceylon and People’s Bank, are encouraged to operate with higher levels of capital and conduct private banking on a wider scale. Further, these banks are expected to strengthen their off-shore banking operations and grow and expand towards a stronger regional presence. We have encouraged the National Savings Bank to broad-base their banking activities to contribute to the economy on a larger scale while, the Pradeshiya Sanwardhana Bank (the regional development bank of the country) is encouraged to serve the niche market of microfinance, targeting inclusive growth in the provinces. Meanwhile the other smaller state owned banks are encouraged to merge with the bigger state banks or with one another, and play a more cohesive role, since at present these banks account for just around 1 per cent of the market share. Foreign banks operating in Sri Lanka are expected to demonstrate greater involvement, and make a useful contribution to the economy. Larger foreign banks are expected to further strengthen operations and display greater enthusiasm in private banking, off-shore banking, infrastructure financing and support emerging new economic areas of interest such as the 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Strategic Hubs identified in the Government’s development initiative.

On top of that, there were contagion effects on public and private sector holdings of sovereign debt at a time when public finances in many countries were themselves deteriorating independently. I think it is important to appreciate that the existing framework governing sovereign debt workouts in emerging market economies (EMEs) evolved in a world where official financing dominated and private financing was provided by a relatively small number of developed country banks. But private claims now outweigh official claims on the major EMEs – by a ratio of 70:30 in recent years. And these private claims are increasingly to bond investors rather than banks – direct and portfolio investment flows now dwarf bank lending as a source of finance for EMEs. Bondholders are dispersed and often anonymous, so there are potentially greater creditor co-ordination problems. To contain the potential systemic consequences of future crises, both the public and private sectors have an incentive to devise a new framework that can deal more effectively with sovereign debt workouts, and most especially with the role of PSI, when private claims, particularly bondholdings, are substantial. This is very similar in kind to the challenge of adapting the London Approach, whose original principles were most relevant where the creditor group largely consisted of a fairly small group of relatively  BIS Review 67/2001  5  homogeneous banks, to a world where creditor groups had become much more disparate and international, involving large numbers of bondholders and other financial creditors.
Recently the discussion of this issue has finally got going. My view has been that it is not just a question of economics, though the economic arguments do point to participation. EMU is one important component of the EU cooperation in which Sweden is now taking part. From the debate about economic aspects of EMU one sometimes gets the impression that an alternative exists which is much simpler, enabling us to avoid all the adjustments which Brussels imposes. That is not the case. Sweden has experienced a profound economic crisis in the 1990s that was essentially self-inflicted. Development in the rest of Europe has on the whole been better. We must now in any event continue to consolidate government finance and establish long-term confidence in the stability of Swedish economy. This will scarcely be easier outside EMU. I find it hard to envisage that Sweden would ultimately want to remain outside a functional EMU. Bit by bit the countries of Europe will grow together. This makes the question not whether but when Sweden ought to join. Perhaps this perspective can help to make the question less dramatic. In our efforts to prepare the financial sector for EMU we can see that the work has come a long way. We also meet a strong desire from the parties concerned to get going as quickly as possible so as not to fall behind; so as to compete on the same terms as other European enterprises and not lose business opportunities.

The scale of the systemic changeover is tremendous, roughly on a par with our earlier change to driving on the right-hand side of the road. A fundamental principle for the work is that, as far as possible, all those concerned are to find their own solutions to the problems posed by EMU. The Riksbank is responsible for the changeover in the financial sector. To this end we have set up a body called SIFS (the Swedish acronym for Consultation and Information to the Financial Sector). One result to date is a report, published a few days ago, on the situation as regards the euro in Sweden’s financial sector. Good progress has been made in the preparatory work. Timetables and suitable solutions have been established in a number of fields. The Riksbank considers that the financial BIS Review 14/1997  -5-  sector can manage a changeover to the euro on 1st January 1999. Participation from a later date can facilitate the preparatory work in certain respects and complicate it in others. The worst alternative is a long period of uncertainty; that would entail a costly duplication of systems in many fields. I should like to end with some examples of changes that will occur and be of importance for the financial markets. 1. Monetary policy A single currency presupposes a single monetary policy. In EMU this will be implemented by the ECB. In this context the national central banks will function as “operative arms”, acting on instructions from the ECB.