samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, price developments are uncertain even six months to a year ahead. There was thus a possibility that inflation could fall even lower than projected, and be more than one percentage point below target. As from May 2003, core inflation (measured by the CPI-ATE) has been more than one percentage point below target. Average core inflation in 2003 is now projected at 1¼ per cent. The difference between the outcome and the projection thus proved nevertheless to be unusually wide, largely reflecting the fact that the economy was exposed to sizeable, unexpected disturbances. Inflation through 2003 has been pushed down in particular by the fall in prices for imported consumer goods. The low rise in imported price inflation is a consequence of the appreciation of the krone throughout 2002 and low inflation abroad. The rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services has also slowed somewhat. This is particularly the case for prices for domestically produced goods influenced by world market prices. Weaker than expected economic developments in 2003 The krone appreciated more in autumn 2002 and at the end of the year than assumed in our projections. This was related to unexpectedly weak developments in the global economy resulting in lower interest rates abroad and a wider interest rate differential between Norway and other countries. 1  A measure of core inflation is the rise in consumer prices adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE).

It may be useful to distinguish between three channels through which monetary policy operates: •  The demand channel  •  The exchange rate channel  •  The expectations channel  The effect on inflation of changes in interest rates occurs with a lag and may vary in intensity. In the time it takes for a change in interest rates to feed through, other factors will also have an impact resulting in changes in inflation and output. We cannot assume that the various relationships are entirely stable. As interest rates fall, household and municipal consumption and investment will tend to accelerate. This is because they have more money left over after servicing their debt and because borrowing is less expensive. Corporate finances are strengthened and investment may become more attractive. Higher demand leads to higher output and employment. Wage growth may pick up. Higher wage growth combined with higher profit margins will result in higher inflation. The effect of interest rate changes may be amplified because the interest rate also affects the krone exchange rate. When interest rates are lower, more people will borrow money and fewer will invest in NOK. Lower interest rates will thus normally lead to a depreciation of the krone. Imported goods will then become more expensive and inflation will accelerate. A weaker krone also boosts exports and improves profitability in Norwegian business and industry. The effect on the exchange rate of a change in interest rates will vary as themes and sentiments shift in the foreign exchange market.
13 As a central bank, MAS enjoys warm and substantive relations with our counterparts in the People’s Bank of China (PBC). We have been in close coordination with PBC over the past year to enable cooperation in the RMB business and related arrangements. 14 PBC has recently appointed the Singapore branch of ICBC as the RMB clearing bank in Singapore earlier this year. ICBC has been working closely with the industry since then to prepare for the offering of their RMB clearing and settlement services. I am delighted to share that ICBC has officially launched RMB clearing services yesterday. Key banks in Singapore are ready to actively participate in this promising new market. 15 MAS also has growing relations with the key sectoral regulators, namely the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). MAS and CBRC currently hold annual meetings to exchange views on regulatory cooperation and market developments. MAS also plans to step up its engagements with CSRC and CIRC in areas of common interest. 16 These initiatives clearly indicate the increasing importance and connectivity between the financial markets of our two countries. Certainly, we hope for more of such bilateral collaborations as China continues the progressive internationalisation of its financial market and currency. 17 MAS therefore sees great value in establishing a physical presence here to facilitate such future cooperation and regular interactions.

Both countries have also established regular dialogues including the Joint Council of Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) co-chaired at the Deputy Prime Minister level and the Ministerial level economic and trade councils in seven Chinese Provinces/Municipalities. We want to build on what has been achieved, and explore avenues to deepen our close partnership. Financial cooperation has become an increasingly important pillar of the ChinaSingapore relationship. 9 Singapore has served as a useful platform for Chinese financial institutions to participate in regional markets, especially in ASEAN. To-date, six out of the top 10 Chinese banks already have a presence in Singapore. Two of them – Bank of China and Industrial Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) – were extended Qualifying Full Bank (QFB) privileges as part of the enhanced CSFTA in 2012. These banks are now expanding their Singapore operations as hubs for Southeast Asia. 10 In addition, Singapore financial sector has also served the needs of China’s financial markets. For instance, China is the largest source of offshore reinsurance business in Singapore in 2011. We welcome this presence. 11 At the same time, China has also presented opportunities for Singapore’s financial institutions. Our three local banks already have a presence in 15 provinces in China. Our sovereign wealth funds and private investors based in Singapore are also important investors in China’s financial institutions and markets. 12 There is potential to further these financial interconnections as China gradually widens and deepens its financial markets.
But the longer it persists, the more likely it is that sterling prices will adjust to euro prices, creating the potential for quite long term impacts on UK inflation relative to the euro area. That is what we appear to be seeing at the moment, with the historic relationship shown in Chart 6 suggesting that UK inflation could run 1 to 2 percentage points above euro area inflation for a considerable while unless there is some noticeable appreciation in the value of the pound. The counterargument to this view is that the recent substantial depreciation of the pound against the euro and other currencies is needed to support a rebalancing of the UK economy and sustain the growth of UK manufacturing and other internationally competitive sectors of the economy. But the extent of the depreciation of sterling since 2007 has been much greater than we have seen in previous rebalancing episodes, such as the mid-1990s – which raises the question whether sterling has fallen much further than needed.5 And it is not clear  5  8  See Sentance (2011) for a comparison of the recent fall in sterling with previous episodes. BIS central bankers’ speeches  that the export-based manufacturing activities which could benefit from a large depreciation have the capability to respond quickly by scaling up output – particularly when their demand is already being boosted by a recovery in global demand.

In the debates we have had within the MPC over the past year, there appear to be four key areas where these differences of judgement arise, and which – so far at least – have led me to a different conclusion on monetary policy from the majority on the Committee. These are not new issues in that they have featured throughout my time on the MPC and in many earlier debates on UK monetary policy. But the current economic situation has brought them into sharper focus. Issue 1: The powerful influence of the global economy The first of these key issues I would highlight is the way in which the MPC takes into account the powerful influence of global economic trends and their impact on the UK economy. The way in which the global economy affects the economic outlook for the UK has been a major theme of my speeches and interviews since my very earliest days on the MPC. The UK economy is very open to international trade, with imports and exports combined accounting for over 60% of GDP. We are also the second most important global economy after the US in terms of flows of international direct investment. The UK is home to one of the most important global financial centres in the world – London.
Having these in mind, I believe that Romania is in a good position to pursue disinflation by implementing such a framework. Most of the conditions required for a successful implementation of the inflation targeting framework in Romania have already been met: -  by year end 2004, inflation was brought down to single digit levels for the first time from 1990 onwards;  -  since 2004, the National Bank of Romania has benefited from full operational independence, as stipulated by Law No. 312 of June 28, 2004;  -  the success in disinflation over the recent years has strengthened the NBR’s credibility;  1  Frederic S. Mishkin, “What Should Central Banks Do?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 82, #6 (November/December 2000): 1-13. BIS Review 28/2005  1  -  after five years of continuous development and adequate supervision, the financial sector can undoubtedly be considered sound and stable;  -  fiscal dominance is no longer an issue, witness the afore-mentioned legal independence of the National Bank, a relatively low public debt, as well as the increasingly consistent financial policies mix;  -  inflation targets have been set for the following years in cooperation with the government. The Pre-Accession Economic Programmes underline the commitment to attain these targets;  -  since 2002, an inflation report has been published on a half-yearly basis.

Before proceeding, I will emphasize that I am speaking for myself and these views do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Climate The U.S. economy has experienced more than $ billion in direct losses over the last five years due to climate and weather-related events.1 In addition, climate change has significant consequences for the U.S. economy and financial sector through slowing productivity growth, asset revaluations and sectoral reallocations of business activity.2 For these climate-related risks, a new lexicon has emerged. Physical risk is the potential for losses as climate-related changes disrupt business operations, destroy capital and interrupt economic activity. Transition risk is the potential for losses resulting from a shift toward a lowercarbon economy as policy, consumer sentiment and technological innovations impact the value of certain assets and liabilities. These effects will be felt across business sectors and asset classes, and on the strategies, operations and balance sheets of financial firms. Risk managers must be aware of these risks and develop the tools needed to identify, monitor and manage them appropriately. Physical and transition risks may manifest through traditional risk stripes such as credit, market, operational, legal and reputational risk, but today’s tools are not necessarily well-suited for the unique challenges associated with climate change. Let me mention three of these challenges. First, climate change is a long-term issue where actions today are likely to have an impact over many decades.
And deep and liquid capital markets will also go a long way towards strengthening the international role of the euro and bolstering Europe’s strategic autonomy. Everybody needs to be ready for the profound changes currently sweeping our economies and our societies. The ECB’s ongoing strategy review will ensure that its monetary policy strategy is fit for purpose, both today and in the future. Listening to European citizens’ expectations and better understanding their economic concerns and expectations before making decisions is an important part of this review. [10] If the right actions are taken now, this crisis can be an opportunity for us to create the conditions for more inclusive, greener and more digital growth. To come back to Jean Monnet’s words, this crisis can be an opportunity for Europe to take a step towards the forms of organisation of the world of tomorrow. Conclusion Let me conclude. Almost 60 years ago to the day – on 23 September 1960 – the Europe Bridge crossing the Rhine between Kehl and Strasbourg was inaugurated. It has become a symbol of how close our two countries have become. The success of the Franco-German “bridge” was clearly reflected in the pain caused to families, businesses and commuters by the closure of the Franco-German border at the height of the pandemic, as many of you know all too well. The challenge in front of us is not only to build “bridges” between European countries.

In the 1990s he was Head of the Treasury and Chief of Staff for the Ministers of Finance Edmond Alphandéry and Jean Arthuis. During those years he built up considerable European and international experience. He was a member of the European Monetary Committee and held the office of alternate for the Minister of Finance at the OECD, the G7 and the G10. As Head of the Treasury, he also chaired the Paris Club. In 1998 he was appointed Vice-President of the newly established European Central Bank. In 2003 he succeeded Jean-Claude Trichet as Governor of the Banque de France, a post that he still holds following his reappointment in October 2009. He is a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank and Chairman, since 2010, of the Baselbased Bank for International Settlements. He is also head of the Prudential Control Authority, one of the two most important regulation and supervision bodies in France. Today, Christian Noyer is one of the most respected and long-serving central bankers. He has extensive experience in monetary policy management, and in banking and financial regulation and supervision. He has been at the forefront of efforts to address and resolve the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. As well as for his profound knowledge of monetary and financial matters, Governor Noyer is known for the extremely courteous and careful way in which he always expresses his opinions and even his most serious disagreements.
The most important money market interest rates in both the secured and unsecured interbank segments – we show SARON in blue and three-month Libor in red – hovered around 0% from 2011 to 2014. After the SNB lowered the interest rate on sight deposits to −0.75% in January 2015, money market rates rapidly settled close to −0.75%. At the time the SNB imposed a negative interest rate on banks’ sight deposits, it also introduced a fairly generous system of exemption thresholds. Let us now take a closer look at the purpose of these exemption thresholds and how they work in conjunction with the negative interest rate on sight deposits. Page 7/13  The role of the exemption thresholds A key question is: must all sight deposits be subject to negative interest in order to keep money market rates close to the SNB’s negative interest rate on banks’ sight deposits? The short answer is: ‘No’. The slightly longer answer is: It is sufficient to charge negative interest only on those sight deposits that exceed a certain threshold. Any balances that fall below this threshold can be exempt – or, to put it another way, can be subject to an interest rate of 0%. From an aggregate perspective, these exemption thresholds were deliberately chosen to be fairly generous, so as to limit the burden on the banking system to the minimum deemed necessary for the implementation of monetary policy.

The rate of increase in both household borrowing and house prices is lower now than it was last spring5, while forward-looking indicators such as SEB’s housing indicator and SBAB’s estate agents survey point towards lower rates of increase in the future. However, the statistical base is still fairly uncertain and it is too early to talk of a break in trend. Our experiences and international experiences show that it is difficult, if not very difficult, to make accurate forecasts of housing prices. However, it is clear that the current development, with increases of a good 10 per cent a year, cannot be regarded as sustainable in the long term. On the other hand, I do not believe that a fall in house prices on a broader scale is a particularly likely scenario, although this could happen here and there in certain regions. The most probable scenario is that house prices will continue to rise, albeit at a slower rate than they have done in recent years. Are there any risks with this development? As household debts have increased, the question has been raised as to whether the household sector is borrowing too heavily and what the effects would be on the banks’ loan losses if the macro economy were to develop unfavourably. Given that the Swedish household sector’s total debts currently amount to almost 140 per cent of disposable incomes, which is a few percentage points higher than immediately prior to the bank crisis, this is a reasonable question (Figure 5).
More particularly, we anticipate an increase of up to 90% of the total volume expected by the time all participating central securities depositories (CSDs) connect to the platform. The next migration wave will also lead to an increase in the use of links between T2S markets that facilitate cross-border transactions. T2S has significantly contributed to the integration of post-trade processes across all participating markets. This has been achieved by the gradual implementation of the single rulebook, i.e. standards, rules and procedures, in the T2S market. Harmonisation measures necessary for ensuring efficient and safe cross-CSD settlement in T2S are fairly advanced. Monitoring has shown that, by the time they migrate to T2S, market communities are close to achieving full compliance with the T2S standards. Nevertheless, some gaps in compliance remain, for example in the area of corporate actions. These are complex business processes for asset servicing, which involve rules and procedures developed by a range of different actors. The newly established Advisory Group on Market Infrastructure for Securities and Collateral (AMI SeCo) will address these gaps in compliance, among others. This advisory group will also look at ways in which the existing methodology could be used as a blueprint for building a methodology to harmonise collateral management.1 In addition, the T2S harmonisation agenda has identified a number of regulatory and legal barriers to post-trade harmonisation that fall under the regulatory agenda. These relate, among others, to issues such as conflict of law and withholding tax procedures, which are expected to be tackled this year.

Since 2013, and in addition, naturally, to our contribution to the preparatory work, we have been working hard at the Banco de España in two directions: a)  first, to adapt our structure to the new needs; and  b)  second, to encourage the presence of experts from the Banco de España at the ECB. A few weeks ago a reform of the Directorate General Banking Supervision was approved, designed to create a structure that mirrors that of the ECB, to facilitate interaction between the two authorities and achieve efficient management of resources. The new organisation replicates the arrangements envisaged by the ECB: two departments will be responsible for ongoing supervision of the significant banks, a third will be responsible for the less significant banks, and a fourth will perform the so-called “horizontal” tasks, in addition to on-site inspections of the significant banks. To underpin the position of the Banco de España’s representatives on the SSM’s governing bodies, a new SSM Coordination Service was created in February , which will be responsible for analysing and monitoring non-Spanish significant banks. Regarding the Spanish presence in the SSM, our experts have been very successful in the ECB selection processes, both at senior management and junior analyst levels, which testifies to their excellent qualifications and vast experience.
Reflective of this development is the fact that Icelandic banks have begun to grant credit to borrowers in other countries on a measurable scale, particularly in areas where they have a competitive advantage in analysing the soundness of the prospective borrowers. The title of my presentation is Iceland in a Global Setting. What I have briefly described is a country that has followed the path of many countries, including the Nordic Countries, in liberalising its economy, both internally and externally. This has exposed the economy to market forces and competition from abroad and a monetary regime bent on securing a low rate of inflation was chosen. Iceland is, as mentioned, not a member of the European Union and membership is not on the agenda of the present Government. Iceland operates its own small currency on the margins of the US dollar and the euro. These facts place firm requirements on economic policy while at the same time offering Iceland to reap important benefits from globalisation. This is indeed born out by developments over the last few years that were years of rapid growth of GDP and years which tested the ability of economic policy makers to steer the economy in an environment of liberalised markets and capital movements. More generally, the lesson to be drawn from our experience is that countries only stand to gain from full participation in the global economy. Aside from subjecting the domestic economy to competition from abroad, it disciplines economic policymaking.

But the difficulties we are encountering in the European Union and in the Monetary Union have not only to do with the weak fiscal foundations of this edifice. They are also related to problems of what we call “governance”. Clearly, we have extremely complex negotiating and decision-making procedures in the European Union and the Monetary Union. And, irrespective of or in addition to macroeconomic imbalances, these problems affect the stability of the markets and the perception of risk regarding the area’s future. Most Britons are sceptical about Monetary Union and its future. Although it is not very politically correct to say so, the truth is that this scepticism is really not too bad for us since it helps those of us who are members of the Monetary Union to see ourselves from outside and to take, perhaps, a more realistic view. Sceptics or not, we can agree that the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  fallout from a failure of the Monetary Union would certainly affect the future of the European Union as a whole. The United Kingdom chose not to participate in the Monetary Union and holds firm to this position. Indeed, it would be strange if it were to change its mind in the current circumstances. But it’s clear to me that the United Kingdom has no interest in European Monetary Union failing.