samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This mechanism which uses crude palm oil as the underlying commodity will facilitate Islamic financing applying the concept of murabahah or tawarruq. BNM commodity murabahah acceptance As part of these efforts to promote development of products to meet the diversified requirements of investors, Bank Negara Malaysia is pleased to announce the introduction of a new Islamic monetary instrument, Commodity Murabahah Programme (CMP) as part of its diverse range of policy instruments in managing the short-term liquidity in the Malaysian Islamic inter-bank money market. Unique to Malaysia is that the CMP is designed to be the first ever commodity-based transaction that utilises the Crude Palm Oil based contracts as its underlying asset. The Bank has executed CMP master agreements with the eight Islamic banking institutions including the three foreign owned banking institutions to promote the use of the instrument for liquidity management. Several CMP transactions have now been conducted between the Central Bank and the respective Islamic Banks. As commodity murabahah is widely used in other Islamic centres, it is envisaged that this CMP will promote increased linkages between Malaysia and these centres. BNM Sukuk Murabahah/tawaruq short-term securities The Central Bank also intends to diversify the issuance concept of the existing Islamic monetary notes from being based on Bai Inah and Ijarah into murabahah. Currently, the outstanding amount of the respective notes is RM 8 billion. This initiative is the continuation from the commodity murabahah acceptance initiative as the issuance involves the securitisation of the acceptance facility.

In closing, Malaysia is committed to be part of the New Silk Road to facilitate greater cross border economic and financial flows for increased inter-regional trade and investment transactions. InsyaAllah, the greater inter-regional economic and financial linkages would bring greater benefits which will be mutually reinforcing and contribute towards raising the prospects for greater global shared prosperity. BIS Review 31/2007  5
But the world of finance is moving forward not only in the realms of such highly complex or sometimes - dare one say - gimmicky instruments. Continuous change and innovation are observable at the more prosaic level too. Looking at Hong Kong alone, over the past year there has been an impressive list of innovations, actual or planned, in the financial sector. These are not necessarily all of specific interest to the corporate treasurer but are nonetheless significant in a more general context. Thus, first, we have established a reciprocal link with South Korea for access to each other’s bond settlement and custody systems (following earlier links of this sort with Australia and New Zealand). Next, Hong Kong has launched the Tracker Fund as a means of disposing of part of the Exchange Fund’s Hong Kong dollar equity portfolio; although this bears many characteristics of a conventional index-tracking unit trust, it also has some unique innovative features. In addition, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation has successfully introduced its first mortgage-backed securities programme. And notes issued by HKMA and HKMC have been listed on the stock exchange for the first time. Finally, we are preparing a US dollar clearing system which we hope will offer a wider range of facilities than any other offshore clearing; I would not want today to anticipate the more detailed announcements about the planned timetable for this project, which we expect to make shortly. The foregoing is not necessarily an exhaustive list of changes which are being implemented here.

We ought not to feel embarrassed to confess confusion, to seek advice or indeed to pay for advice. So, we live in a very challenging and pressurised environment. I am in no doubt in my own mind that the revolution which has swept through finance in the past quarter century has been beneficial to institutions and customers alike. We have, I think, now entered a phase where the basic margins may be narrower, where temptations may be greater and more varied, where the pressures to move quickly may be much stronger, and where of course the risks may therefore be rather greater. We all need to exercise skilful discernment and judgement, and I am sure this is as true for corporate treasurers and finance directors as for the rest of us. But it is not my intention to be a killjoy; as I have suggested, there will continue to be exciting new opportunities to explore; and I wish you all a fruitful couple of days here doing just that. BIS Review 15/2000  4
A rapidly expanding economy is liable to encounter bottleneck problems because new production facilities are not always available just when demand is rising. Experience from the 1990s suggests, however, that firms are more flexible than they used to be. This applies both to the utilisation of the existing capital stock and to investment in machinery and plant and the introduction of new  3  BIS Review 99/2000  technology when demand does pick up. The amount of unutilised capital resources may therefore not be the important factor at present. Instead, an analysis of the amount of unutilised resources in the Swedish economy should probably focus on the labour market. Another reason for this is that in a macro analysis of price trends, wages are the largest component of costs, being equivalent to over two-thirds of GDP. In an economy that is moving closer to full resource utilisation, one can accordingly expect certain phenomena to occur with a greater intensity and frequency. This refers, for instance, to companies reporting difficulties in recruiting competent labour. It can also take the form of a greater propensity to resort to disputes, both regular strikes and unlawful action. Firms are also forced to compromise when recruiting and employ less qualified personnel in order to cope with demand for goods and services. The matching of job seekers with job vacancies has functioned better than expected and to date this year the wage statistics show increases that, if anything, are slightly lower than expected.

The relations and cooperation of the CBRT in the international scene go well beyond our bilateral dialogue with your esteemed Bank and cover also the financial level (swap agreements signed with certain countries), as well as the educational level (the establishment of an international central banking research facility and regional training centre, the İstanbul School of Central Banking). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I would like to thank the Bundesbank for opening a Representative Office in İstanbul, for signing the MoU agreement and for all the support and assistance you have provided us in diverse fields and at various platforms. Closing my remarks, I would like to welcome my friend and colleague, Dr. Andreas Dombret, a member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and thank him for his tremendous efforts in bringing this project to life. Now let us celebrate our achievements. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In itself that  2  BIS Review 128/2008  does not affect the ability of banks to fund lending, but confidence has been badly shaken after the traumatic events of the past few weeks. New sources of funding will develop only slowly, although the temporary government guarantees of new lending to banks will help. So it will take time before the recapitalisation leads to a resumption of normal levels of lending by the banking system to the real economy. And we cannot assume that there will not be problems in other parts of the financial system and in some emerging market economies to be overcome before the crisis can truly be described as over. With the plan for recapitalisation in place, the focus of attention has moved to the outlook for the UK and world economies. Over the past month, the economic news has probably been the worst in such a short period for a very considerable time. The most recent activity indicators for the second of half of the year have fallen sharply. In the UK, unemployment continues to rise and, over the past three months, has risen at the fastest rate for seventeen years, albeit from a relatively low level. House prices declined by about 5% in the third quarter and are 13% lower than a year ago. The recent weakness of the housing market is likely to continue. And if the news on the domestic front were not sufficiently discouraging, the rest of the world economy also appears to be slowing rapidly.

6/18  Meeting the guidelines of the preventative arm of the European Stability and Growth Pact should show the temporary fiscal consolidation path to follow in the future after having managed last year to cut the budget deficit to below 3%. At the same time, a review of the composition of public spending and revenue might also contribute decisively to improving the economy’s potential growth. There is room both to increase the efficiency of public spending and steer its composition towards those items exerting greater influence on the accumulation of physical, technological and human capital, and to re-define the structure of the tax basket in order to make it more conducive to growth. The presence of high tax benefits in our tax system, arising from numerous exemptions, allowances and special low rates, which generate substantial revenue-related losses and distort the efficiency and fairness of the tax system, are a good example of the headroom existing here. Secondly, despite the notable correction to date, the negative net international investment position is still at 77.1% of GDP. And the nation’s gross debt amounts to 166.7% of GDP, only slightly below the peak seen during the crisis. To bring down the debt vis-à-vis the rest of the world, Spain will have to run external surpluses over an extended period of time. And that, in turn, requires maintaining the gains in competitiveness, which throughout the recovery have been based on the moderation of labour and financial costs, and which, hereafter, should rest to a greater extent on increases in productivity.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  19  Figure 5: The global volunteer workforce relative to the adult population of the world’s largest countries  Source: Salamon, Sokolowski and Haddock (2011). 20  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 6: Proportion of people in a selection of countries who volunteer at least once per month Country  Rank  Turkmenistan  1  Proportion of respondents who volunteered in the month prior to interview 57  Sri Lanka  2  46  3  45  4  43  Philippines  4  43  Canada  6  42  Tajikistan  7  41  New Zealand  8  40  Guatemala  8  40  Uzbekistan  10  38  Ireland  11=  37  Netherlands  11=  37  State of Libya  11=  37  Nigeria  14  36  26  29  34  27  France  41  25  India  68  18  Spain  75  17  Sweden  90  13  Iraq  102  11  China  131=  4  Greece  131=  4  United States of America Myanmar  United Kingdom Germany  Source: Charities Aid Foundation World Giving Index (adapted), based on poll carried out by Gallup. The sample includes 135 countries representing 94% of the world’s population.

It will be followed around a year later by a polymer £ note featuring Jane Austen. The decision to move to polymer for these notes follows a three-year review and a broad public consultation exercise. Our research has shown a compelling case for polymer notes. Polymer notes bring three main benefits: •  They stay cleaner than paper banknotes because they are resistant to dirt and moisture;  •  They are more secure because they incorporate advanced security features that make them difficult to counterfeit;  •  And they are more durable, lasting at least 2½ times as long as paper banknotes, ensuring that notes in circulation remain of high quality. Because replacements are needed less often they are both cheaper over time, and more environmentally friendly. These advantages mean that a switch to polymer is a natural step in the evolution of banknote design. But you don’t have to take our word for it. Nearly 13000 people have told us what they thought, in surveys and at over 40 events up and down the UK, and 87% – the vast majority – were in favour of polymer notes, especially once they had a chance to see and handle prototype notes. After that public consultation, we’re confident that the switch to polymer will have broad public support.
The first is that Hungary has managed major breakthroughs in the recent past which were just as difficult as these future challenges: over the past five years, real privatisation accompanied by a fundamental shift in the structure of industry and services; and, more recently, the handling of a macroeconomic crisis situation. The second is that most of these challenges are akin to those encountered by modern Western societies. For these challenges Hungary is in good company. THE MONETARY POLICY ENVIRONMENT Two recent changes have occurred regarding the institutional environment in which the National Bank of Hungary is operating. I welcome both of them. 1. The possibility of the direct financing of the budget deficit by the NBH has been eliminated. This is in conformity with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, and is a measure which has already been implemented by all fifteen member countries of the European Union and which the EMI closely monitors. To remind you, this provision of the Treaty applies to the member countries at this stage, prior to effectively entering EMU. It would seem to me impossible for Hungary to join the European Union without this change in the law governing the operations of the NBH, even if Hungary’s participation in the euro area were to come at a later stage. But this is only an institutional or political argument. There is more to it. Maastricht or no Maastricht, eliminating the direct monetary financing of budget deficits is simply economic common sense.

Challenges Maintaining macroeconomic stability is critical to sustaining economic growth in Zambia. The challenge is how to sustain stability and mitigate falling domestic demand within the constraints posed by increasingly scarcer external financial inflows. This has to be done in the context of implementing policies consistent with medium-term stability and development goals. The second challenge relates to mitigation of the vulnerability of the Zambian economy to the adverse external shocks. We will have to closely monitor capital flows and adopt supervisory policies that will ensure a sound and stable financial system. The pursuit of policies that promote macroeconomic stability is also important to ensure that the domestic economy remains attractive to both domestic and foreign investors for the long-term growth and development of the economy. One of the unfolding lessons of the current crisis is the need for greater transparency in the transactions players in the financial markets undertake, particularly, with respect to offbalance sheet transactions. We will therefore be acting to ensure that market players provide us with detailed information on their transactions. In addition, we will continue to work towards strengthening and developing our financial markets as well as encouraging competition and efficiency. Prospects for 2009 and beyond Your Excellencies, going forward, it remains important to accelerate diversification of the economy as a way to mitigate the effects of a prolonged global financial crisis. Currently, there are enormous business opportunities which still lie unexploited in Zambia in virtually all sectors of the economy.
Out of the total, only a small part of the SDR allocation  BIS Review 120/2010  5  will benefit countries which may effectively need to use them. More may be needed to substitute for national foreign exchange reserves as a permanent insurance mechanism. Contingent liquidity The search for new liquidity sources meets with an inescapable moral hazard problem. On the one hand, to be equivalent to reserves going forward, multilateral liquidity must be available ex ante and without condition. On the other, there is a danger that fully unconditional liquidity be used to deal with fundamental “solvency” imbalances. In real life, this is not an easy distinction to make. The dilemma is solved, at the domestic level, by the provision of eligible collateral. This may prove very uneasy for international liquidity: transferring ownership of substantial amounts of sovereign assets between countries or to international institutions would meet with huge legal and political difficulties. This is the rationale for conditionality. But, of course, conditionality creates an uncertainty which is incompatible with the purpose of instant supply of liquidity. A conditional facility will never be a perfect substitute for reserves. Many countries fully eligible to the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) have used foreign swaps instead. Anecdotal evidence suggests that swaps are often perceived as carrying less of a stigma effect.

Governor Zhu suggested that the role and status of the SDR be enhanced, with the long term objective of creating a “super reserve” currency. However, the Triffin dilemma goes back to a period when international capital markets were poorly developed. By then, international liquidity was limited to instruments used to settle payments between official monetary authorities. It was represented by claims on such official  BIS Review 120/2010  3  entities. By contrast, in today’s world, most international liquidity is privately provided and represented by claims on private institutions. Interbank markets play a crucial role in this process. The more capital markets become integrated at the short end, the more international liquidity is provided by the private sector. As a consequence, there is a strong continuity and complementarities between domestic and international liquidity. Both depend on the willingness of counterparties to extend credit to each other. Both are subject to aggregate supply and demand shocks with sudden shifts in risk aversion or liquidity preference. Both result from leveraging and deleveraging by private institutions (Adrian and Shin, 2008). When markets seize, counterparty risk is perceived as excessive, uncertainty settles in, financial institutions deleverage their positions towards non residents, and then international liquidity dries up and disappears. When a shock occurs, public provision of liquidity has to substitute to private provision. In a domestic context, this is the function of the lender of last resort. But when the shortage is about foreign currency liquidity, this role has to be played by foreign exchange reserves.
Taking these in turn, data form the core of all AI models and good data management and data governance are essential in controlling issues with, for example, biases that may be embedded in the data. At the model level, we need to think about issues such as ensuring that models continue to perform under a wide range of different conditions and being able to explain the outputs of complex AI systems. Moving to the firm level, some of the key issues will revolve around risk management and governance structures; around accountability and appropriate controls. And finally, for the financial system as a whole, AI may amplify network effects such as unexpected changes in the scale and direction of market moves. In terms of the regulatory challenges, it’s clear that policy thinking in this arena is also evolving rapidly. But the existing regulatory landscape is somewhat fragmented when it comes to AI, with different pieces of regulation applying to different aspects of the AI pipeline, from data through model risk to governance. Policy must strike a balance between high-level principles and a more rules-based approach. We also need to future-proof our policy initiatives in a fast-changing field. With all that in mind, and in order to further our objective of promoting the safe adoption of AI in financial services, the Bank of England, along with the Financial Conduct Authority, is today launching the Artificial Intelligence Public-Private Forum.

Finally, I would like to welcome the members of the Forum and its observers, and thank them in advance for committing to and participating in this exciting and important project. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4
At the Riksbank we are working continuously on, for instance, improving our analyses and forecasting methods to provide the best possible basis for making decisions. Our decision to publish inflation forecasts based on market expectations in the March Inflation Report was an example of this. One can assume that the Ministry of Finance conducts equivalent development work. I believe that an even deeper discussion of what is entailed in the considerations made between inflation targeting and the real economy can be a good thing. During the first years of inflation targeting, the Riksbank sometimes sounded like an “inflation nutter”. However, this stance was abandoned after a few years and since then we have communicated that we also take into consideration financial and real factors. A decision by the Executive Board of the Riksbank in 1999 clarifies our views on these issues. However, we can probably become even better at analysing and explaining the considerations we have to make when conducting a flexible inflation-targeting policy. The Executive Board has held several speeches on this theme over the past year and the aim is to publish some form of joint document on this subject in the near future. BIS Review 39/2005  3  With regard to fiscal policy, it has a stimulating effect on the economy primarily through what are known as the automatic stabilisers, i.e. through systems for taxes and expenditure, which are very extensive in Sweden, being designed to allow some “automatic” adjustment to cyclical developments.

With regard to monetary policy, this means continued improvement of analysis and forecasting methods and to find ways to clarify the balance between the inflation target and the real economy. For fiscal policy it could mean finding ways to make the automatic stabilisers even more effective, but primarily it entails designing preventive systems to enable smoother structural adjustments in the economy when various shocks unavoidably occur. It does not entail any changes in the fundamental role allocation as regards stabilisation policy. 4  BIS Review 39/2005  Summary Let me briefly summarise my responses to the three questions. Stabilisation policy is important, but one should not overestimate what it can achieve. Other economic policy measures are much more important to long-term growth in prosperity. A smoother adjustment process when the economy suffers shocks could benefit employment more than an active stabilisation policy. The allocation of roles between fiscal policy and monetary policy with regard to stabilising the macro economy has functioned well in the new regime and I see no good reason to change it. Both fiscal policy and monetary policy can and should develop, but this should occur within the framework of the present allocation of roles regarding stabilisation policy. For monetary policy this is a question of analysing and describing the considerations made between the inflation target and developments in the real economy. The most important issue regarding fiscal policy is not measures aimed at stabilisation, but providing a good general foundation for prosperity growth. Thank you! BIS Review 39/2005  5