samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To reach that goal we have based our monetary policy on two “pillars”. As regards the first “pillar” we have set up a quantitative reference value, namely 4.5%, for the growth of the broad monetary aggregate M3; we have recently confirmed this rate of growth of 4,5 % as an important factor for stabilising expectations. It should be noted that the concept of a reference value does not imply a commitment on the part of the Eurosystem to mechanistically correct deviations in monetary growth in the short term. However, the reference value for M3 is consistent with, and helps to maintain price stability over the medium term. The second pillar of the monetary policy strategy is a very comprehensive set of indicators that are important in our eyes in signalling future price developments in the euro area. This strategy, which ensures a great deal of continuity with the monetary policies of the participating national central banks, appears to have been understood by financial markets and the public at large. In particular, the yields on long-term bonds denominated in euros indicate clearly that the Eurosystem has kept intact the legacy of credibility that it has inherited. d/ Finally, the credibility of the euro also results from the Eurosystem's constant efforts towards transparency and communication. I must stress here that the Eurosystem is one of the most transparent central banks in the world.

An incentive for further structural reforms a/ The Euro is, per se, also a strong catalyst for structural reforms in all non-financial domains in Europe : a single currency facilitates the full comparison of prices, taxes and earnings. I think that the euro could encourage "cross-fertilisation" of best practice through stronger co-ordination of Member States' structural policies in areas such as labour markets, education and training, job creation incentives, effective welfare safety nets, etc. It is the reason why the European Council, meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, explicitly mentioned structural policies among the items selected for reinforced co-ordination. The Lisbon European Council made a further contribution to the necessary medium-term strategy for structural reform in the Union. The emphasis put on deepening the single market, the setting of indicators allowing comparisons of best practices among the Member States, the fact that the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines will examine the structural issues closely : all these developments are going in the right direction. BIS Review 11/2001  5  All European countries must resolutely carry on the structural reforms they have already initiated. It must be acknowledged that a lot has already been done, in particular with implementation of the single market. However, continental Europe is still experiencing levels of unemployment that are too high, despite the fact that the jobless rate has been declining significantly in most of its economies for three years.
In the real economy, asset prices rose and household balance sheets in particular became stretched. Fast forward to the present day and the neat separation of powers and responsibilities between policymakers has evaporated (Chart 6). Monetary policymakers are beginning to explore unconventional tools to arrest the economic decline as nominal interest rates approach the lower bound. Fiscal policy has returned as a major tool of macroeconomic management as well as an essential support to the banking sector. And the Bank and the Treasury have been drawn deeper into the financial stability realm. A substantial share of the British banking system is now owned by the UK taxpayer. Are these just temporary changes to deal with an exceptional crisis or were there some more structural flaws in the original design and the consensus that underpinned it? I would draw out seven lessons. (Chart 6) Lesson 1: The limitations of private-sector risk management One weakness in the system was the failure of banks and many other investors to appreciate, price and manage risk.3  2  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/workingpapers/wp290.pdf. 3  For a comprehensive discussion of these issues see the recent speech by Andrew Haldane, the new Director of Financial Stability at the Bank, in Why banks failed the stress test. BIS Review 21/2009  3  It was not that banks were blind to the froth in financial markets.

Which leaves us with the question: is that a price worth paying in order to avoid the fall-out when a bubble eventually bursts? And that leads us to the second judgement that underpinned the non-intervention doctrine. Prior to the latest crisis at least, many policymakers believed that the costs of allowing a bubble in financial markets to run its course were relatively small. Interest rates could always be cut after the event to “mop up” the damage. Blinder and Reis summarise the received wisdom beautifully in their review of the decision to loosen policy when the DotCom bubble burst: “If the mopping up strategy worked this well after the mega-bubble burst in 2000, shouldn’t we assume that it will also work well after other, presumably smaller, bubbles burst in the future?” The large and coordinated cut in interest rates at the start of this decade almost certainly contributed to the build-up of an ever larger bubble. So its not at all clear that the post-2000 mopping up strategy worked that well in retrospect – it just stored up more trouble for the future. And even if it did work well last time around, I hardly need to add that mopping up the fall-out from the latest crisis is stretching the world’s policymakers to the limit. It is evidently not safe to rely on being able to mop up after the crash. Lesson 6: Inflation targeting is necessary but not sufficient A more fundamental question is whether the Inflation Targeting regime itself needs to be rethought.
The path for domestic and external interest rate does not imply any considerable changes in the krone exchange rate. Moreover, the Executive Board pointed out that the objective of bringing inflation back towards the target and anchoring inflation expectations implies a continued expansionary monetary policy. It is likely that continued high growth in output and employment will result in a gradual pick-up in inflation. The interest rate will therefore be set so that monetary policy gradually becomes less expansionary. Projections are uncertain. The uncertainty surrounding the interest rate forecasts is illustrated in the fan chart and indicates that monetary policy reacts to disturbances to the economy. This contributes to increasing the uncertainty surrounding future interest rates, but at the same time contributes to stabilising economic developments. Monetary policy cannot fine-tune economic developments, but it can prevent the largest effects from occurring when the economy is exposed to disturbances. In some situations, it may be appropriate to hedge against particularly unfavourable developments. In the baseline scenario, the interest rate is gradually raised to a more normal level. Norges Bank continuously assesses the effects of interest rate changes and other new information concerning economic developments. Thank you for your attention.

Crude oil prices rose to about USD 75 per barrel over the summer, partly owing to the conflict in the Middle East and reduced production in Nigeria and the US. In recent weeks, oil prices have edged back again. Brent Blend futures prices nevertheless indicate that oil prices will remain high several years ahead. Export prices for Norwegian natural gas largely follow developments in oil prices with a lag. Since autumn 2005, prices for Norwegian gas exports have risen substantially according to the quarterly reports of the oil companies Statoil and Hydro. In the next few years, natural gas will account for a steadily larger share of total petroleum production on the Norwegian continental shelf. Petroleum investment has reached a high level after three years of strong growth. In 2005, investment was close to NOK 87 billion, and it is expected to edge up again this year. The large Ormen Lange and Snøhvit projects have contributed to high petroleum investment, and high oil prices have fuelled activity even at oil fields that have been in production for a long period. The development of the Skarv Idun fields will contribute to holding up petroleum investment from 2007. Information from our regional network suggests that petroleum investment provides considerable impulses to activity in Norway’s coastal regions. According to the network, suppliers to the petroleum sector are expecting strong growth to continue in the coming months.
This new finance demands a Bank of England that is as open to new providers as it has been to traditional players. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  Here’s one way we are changing our hard infrastructure in response. The Bank is in the midst of an ambitious rebuild of RTGS1, which processes over £ billion of payments every day. Until recently only commercial banks had direct access to it, and alternative payment service providers (or PSPs) had to route through them. That made sense in the old financial world arranged around a series of hubs and spokes but it is increasingly anachronistic in the new, distributed finance that is emerging. So we are now making it easier for a broad set of firms to plug in and compete with more traditional providers. Responding to demands from FinTech providers, the rebuild will provide API access to read and write payment data. In July 2017, we became the first G20 central bank to open up access to our payment services to a new generation of non-bank PSPs. Since then, five have become members and there is a growing pipeline of around twenty firms exploring whether and how to join. Wider access will improve services to UK households and businesses and it will bring financial stability benefits by increasing the proportion of settlement in central bank money, diversifying the number of settlement firms, and driving innovation.

A Platform for Innovation Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor Bank of England  Remarks at Innovate Finance Global Summit, London Monday 29 April 2019  I am grateful to Eleanor Connolly and Jen Nemeth for their assistance in preparing these and to John Jackson, Richard Lewis, Tom Mutton and Oliver Thew for background research and analysis. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Introduction A century ago, John Maynard Keynes resigned as a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference over his concerns about the scale of reparations in what would become the Treaty of Versailles. He returned home to write The Economic Consequences of the Peace. In that seminal work, Keynes marvelled that before the war: “The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth… [or] adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world that fancy or information might recommend.” Such global trade and portfolio management were made possible by new technologies ranging from the telegraph to the first transatlantic cable. Replace “telephone” with “tablet” and “tea” with “turmeric latte” and you have not the start of the Twentieth Century but of the Twenty First. The second great wave of globalisation is cresting. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is just beginning. And a new economy is emerging driven by immense changes in technology, the reordering of global economic power, and the growing pressures of climate change.
Of course, it is for Congress to judge what combination of tax increases and spending cuts should be undertaken to achieve this. Nevertheless, the aging of our population and simple math suggest that entitlement reform would need to be part of such a plan. Also, in an ideal world, fiscal policy would have broad-based bipartisan support. That would reduce uncertainty and reassure households and businesses that the U.S. was on a sustainable long-term path. Instead, we have nearly the opposite: significant retrenchment in the near-term, but no credible action over the long-term, with partisan divisions and significant uncertainty about what will happen next. Will the sequester, for example, be sustained or not? Economic outlook Looking at the outlook for 2013, I believe that growth in the first half will be sluggish as the fiscal contraction blunts the economy’s forward advance. While first quarter GDP growth will likely rebound to a 2 to 3 percent annualized rate following the dip in the fourth quarter, this will be due in large part to temporary factors.3  2  Before taking into account fiscal multipliers. 3  This includes a modest boost from inventory investment following the substantial drag of the prior quarter, a recovery in farm output following last year’s drought, and less drag from defense outlays following the steep plunge of the fourth quarter. Rebuilding following the devastation from Superstorm Sandy may also provide some temporary lift this quarter. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I’d also emphasize that there remains considerable uncertainty about the outlook.

5  At the time the FOMC was purchasing an additional $ billion a month of longer-dated Treasury securities while selling an equivalent amount of shorter-dated securities under the Maturity Extension Program. 6  While we specified a current monthly pace of purchases the degree of stimulus depends mainly on expectations for the ultimate size of purchases and how long we are expected to hold the assets that we have acquired. 7  This was made clear in the FOMC statement that the Committee expected to reach the unemployment rate threshold at the same time as the earlier date guidance. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  make it clear that short-term rates will not be raised at the first sign of economic improvement, before a sustainable recovery has been secured. As a result, households and businesses should be more confident in undertaking additional spending and investment today. The shift to thresholds-based rate guidance has other benefits. Relative to calendar-based guidance, it provides more information about the economic conditions the Fed would need to see before raising rates.8 Importantly, the shift to thresholds should also make the eventual normalization of monetary policy smoother, a subject I will return to later. But this raises an obvious question. If quantitative thresholds are good for interest rate guidance, why not also have such thresholds for the asset purchase program? There are two reasons.
Rae, G (1885) The country banker: his clients, cares, and work from an experience of forty years, Jon Murray. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches

European securitisation issuance (EUR billion)  Source: European Securitisation Forum  9  See “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience”, FSF, April 2008. 8  BIS Review 68/2008  Chart 2. Funded issuance by collateral (EUR billion; by month)  Source: JP Morgan  Chart 3. European ABS spreads (relative to 3-month Euribor)  Source: JP Morgan  BIS Review 68/2008  9  Chart 4. Evolution of collateral held with the Eurosystem by asset type  Source: ECB  Chart 5. European securitised products: Publicly placed or privately retained? (EUR billion)  Source: Citi. European Secutitised Products. Strategy Analysis. Securitised Products. Europe 7 March 2008. Secondary Source: Bloomberg, International Insider, Informa GM, IFR, Citi. Note: Publicly-placed issuance includes only deals that have been publicly marketed. Private/Retained issuance includes deals that have been privately-placed or retained by the originator. The Private/Retained issuance figures include all such deals to Citi’s knowledge, but may not include such deals where there is no public information available. For some deals priced since August 2007 it has not been clear whether the deal has been fully placed. 10  BIS Review 68/2008
Second, on top of that, we are fully conscious that we are speaking simultaneously to twelve different cultures today, and many more when time comes. Making sure that a decision is exactly understood simultaneously by a German, an Italian or a Spanish household, by an Irish, a Portuguese and a Dutch citizen is another extraordinary challenge that no other central bank has to cope with. Third, last but not least, we are also simultaneously speaking to the global market participants who have themselves their own language and their own culture. For the ECB to be credible means being credible vis-à-vis all parties concerned. Our transparent communication must permit all parties to understand our mandate and our strategy to ensure price stability, to anchor their medium term and long term expectations and to accurately predict our future behaviour. For the European and global market participants in particular I know how predictability is important. I attach the utmost importance to our predictability which has been very good in the past, thanks to our conceptual transparency, to our own candid explanations on our diagnosis and decisions and - last but not least - to the quality and lucidity of yourself, members of the Frankfurt Economic Journalists, of ECB watchers in general, of economists and of market participants. I will continue to take care that this predictability remains as excellent as possible. BIS Review 5/2005  5

In other words, asset values should be neither a target nor a goal of monetary policy. The rate of increase in asset values alone seems to tell us very little about underlying and future inflation. Because we know so little about how to assess the appropriateness of asset values against fundamentals, because we have so little capacity to both forecast and predictably affect the future path of asset prices, and because we know relatively little about how changes in wealth affect the real economy and inflation, we cannot use monetary policy responsibly or effectively to achieve specific objectives for asset values. Monetary policy does not today and is unlikely in the future to offer us an effective tool for directly reducing the incidence of large or sustained deviations of asset values from what might turn out to be their fundamental values, what some call bubbles. That said, monetary policy still has to take into account the impact of significant movements in asset values on output and inflation. Financial asset prices, by their nature, allocate resources between the present and the future and thereby affect consumption, investment and future growth. History provides us with numerous examples in which significant movements in asset prices have had sizable effects on the path of output relative to potential and on price stability. And experience suggests that asset values can be very sensitive to movements in monetary policy or to the perceptions of future policy moves.
Various initiatives are also being undertaken at the school and university level, as well as targeted and high-impact financial education programmes catered towards teenagers and adults by AKPK. Key imperatives for businesses and consumers Nevertheless, the goal of attaining financial literacy cannot be achieved solely by the efforts of authorities alone. Consumers, too have an equally important role in shaping the quality and delivery of financial services. Indeed, it is the actions and behaviour of consumers that will be powerful determinants of how financing can be fully utilised. In this regard, I would like to suggest some key imperatives for both businesses and financial consumers. Business owners should ensure that documents and business records are accurate and complete to facilitate the ease of credit assessment. Business competency in important areas such as marketing, finance and inventory management, and e-commerce should also be continuously strengthened. This will reinforce the assessment by banks and other investors on the long-term growth prospects and competitiveness of the particular business, thus facilitating the provision of finance. It is important to emphasise that the banking industry is in the business of lending. Thus, banks will only generate profits if they continue to provide credit. This is a point worth reflecting upon, to avoid misperceptions that banks are intrinsically refusing to lend. If businesses have potential, there should not be any issues in obtaining financing. If any of these issues persist, businesses should seek advice from LINK at Bank Negara Malaysia.

It was for similar reasons that we already had to turn down a request from your industry association in 2015 to operate non-interest-bearing sight deposit accounts for the pension funds. 7 Quite fundamentally, the introduction of a ‘fourth contributor’ in the form of the SNB would seem to depart from the rationale on which the occupational pension system is founded. So how can the SNB make any contribution to the health of the pension system? By consistently and credibly pursuing a policy geared to price stability, the SNB is contributing significantly to a solid foundation. In the long term this will facilitate economic growth and prosperity in Switzerland and, in particular, also safeguard purchasing power. Ultimately, this  7  cf. Moser, Dewet (2015), Herausforderungen der aktuellen Geldpolitik [‘Monetary policy challenges currently facing the SNB’], speech at the general meeting of the Association of Swiss Pension Funds (ASIP), Zurich, 8 May. Page 6/8  is one of the decisive factors in ensuring that our country can afford a social security network that is resilient and remains fundable. Stable prices are thus very important for pension fund members. However, price stability is also of utmost importance for the socially disadvantaged and pensioners, as they are scarcely able to protect themselves against an inflation-related loss of purchasing power. Like the pension system, price stability plays a key role in the Swiss success story. It is an accomplishment that is greatly valued – and today almost taken for granted – by the general public.