samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The business investment indicators have also remained generally firm throughout 2015. Allow me now briefly to address employment, the external sector, growth projections and the factors of risk for our economy in 2016. And before drawing conclusions, I shall also refer to the strengths of our banking system and the challenges facing it. Employment The employment figures remain on a positive path. According to official labour force survey figures, numbers employed grew by 182,000 in the third quarter, placing the cumulative figure over the past 12 months at 545,000 people. This figure entails an annual growth rate of 3.1%. Social Security registrations, for their part, increased at a year-on-year rate of 3.2% in October, the same rate as the previous month, with registrations up 530,000 compared with the same month a year earlier. The unemployment rate in the third quarter stood at 21.2%, down 2.5 pp in the past 12 months. On our projections and those of the IMF, it is within our reach by the end of 2016 to bring the unemployment rate below 20% for the first time since 2010. These figures, though they attest to the improvement in the labour market, are still very high, abnormally so in the context of the euro area. They show the need to maintain a high rate of activity and to continue streamlining our labour market to prevent the combination of low activity and inadequate regulations, as so often occurred in the past, from driving job destruction.

This is what the FinTech players have sought to do, and this is what banks are fighting back on. Banks will have the advantage of being highly regulated and trusted, that smaller and newer players may find it hard to challenge. The general consensus is that many FinTechs and the established financial institutions will collaborate. There is a natural synergy here: (a) Collaboration with financial institutions enables FinTech players and technology firms to broaden their reach. (b) On the flip side, FinTech solutions present established financial institutions with opportunities to enhance their product offerings or to improve operational productivity. McKinsey estimated that enhancing digital capacity and adopting technologies could result in productivity gains worth roughly $ billion for the global banking industry by 20252. But the competition will remain intense. Large internet-based firms with their massive customer base can be serious contenders for customer mind-share and wallets including in the area of financial services. There is another development that has gained traction. We see the emergence of fully digital banks that operate entirely online with no physical branches, but are able to provide similar services as the traditional brick-and-mortar banks. Fidor Bank, founded in Germany, is one such example. WeBank in China is another. DBS’ Digibank, a mobile-only bank in India, is also completely branchless and in less than two years, have signed up more than 1.5 million 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  customers. All three have different origins and operate very different business models.
Outbreaks in Vietnam, an important producer of consumer durables for the US market, led to a significant tightening of restrictions throughout the summer. These were ended in early October, but have had knock-on effects on delivery times and shipping demand since then. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  particularly those from East Asia to Europe and North America. For example, despite new shipping capacity coming on stream, door-to-door delivery times on the China-US route have continued to lengthen through the autumn (Chart 10). However, I still think it’s more likely than not – looking a couple of years ahead as we should – that these pressures on traded goods prices are more likely to subside than intensify. Through the autumn there have been signs that some countries in the pacific region are abandoning “zero-covid” policies, or at least pursuing them less stringently6. (Obviously the new Omicron variant might interrupt that process, depending on the effectiveness of existing vaccines against it and the severity of its health effects. Those we don’t yet know.) The easing in US fiscal policy is past its peak and the impetus it’s provided to US durables demand has therefore started to decline. There is probably still significant pent-up demand for cars and, as and when constraints on auto production are overcome, we can expect that spending to pick up again.

For the industry, attracting quality talent with a passion in creating greater good through Islamic finance helps in building a more sustainable business model. Such top-notch talent is essential in driving and executing innovative business strategies that will realise the full potential of Islamic finance. For the talent themselves – such career opportunities will increase their engagement and commitment – hence driving their productivity to achieve tangible results. With a more demanding future ahead of us, greater talent preparation is also required to effectively provide and implement solutions to real world problems. A much broader set of competencies that go beyond knowledge in the application of Islamic finance principles provides a stronger foundation to achieve this aim. This includes wider skills and knowledge ranging from green financing to conducting holistic assessments of credit linked to value-based intermediation. Knowledge of behavioural finance can also be used to “nudge” customers into making good financial decisions. Only with constant renewal and transformation of Islamic finance professionals that we can remain ahead of the curve. Fourth, which is my final point, is that the march towards globalisation of Islamic finance must continue. A reflection on the past traces us to the origins of Islamic finance, with its roots in supporting international trade and commerce. An overview of modern day Islamic finance however – with the exception of sukuk – appears to be more domestic centric. It is timely for Islamic finance to play a more prominent role in mobilising capital to strengthen global trade and investment linkages.
The Joint Staff Report presented data showing that primary dealers now account for less than half of trading volumes in the interdealer broker market, but it is important to remember that this is only a portion of the secondary market for Treasuries. As a forthcoming Liberty Street Economics blog post will show, when these data on the interdealer broker market are combined with the dealer-to-customer market data from the New York Fed’s Primary Dealer Statistics, we can see that primary dealers accounted for roughly two-thirds of overall Treasury market secondary trading volume in April 2014, and about 60 percent on the day of October 15, 2014.6 (see the table) So while the primary dealer share of daily interdealer broker volume has fallen below 50 percent, primary dealers still account for the majority of aggregate secondary market trading activity, owing to their important role in the dealer-to-customer market. 3  The best practice guidance and white paper on automated trading are available on the TMPG homepage. 4  Additional information about the conference is available here. 5  The Joint Staff Report is available here. 6  The forthcoming blog post will be published on the Liberty Street Economics website.

Simon M Potter: The Federal Reserve’s counterparty framework – past, present and future Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2015 Roundtable on Treasury Markets and Debt Management, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 19 November 2015. *  *  *  Good evening. I would like to thank the Office of Debt Management for inviting me to speak at this year’s roundtable. This forum provides a valuable opportunity for policymakers, academics, and market participants to discuss issues related to the primary and secondary markets for U.S. Treasury securities. I will focus my remarks tonight on the counterparty framework employed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which directly affects not only our implementation of monetary policy, but also the underwriting and distribution of Treasury debt issuance. I will begin with an overview of the objectives that underpin the framework, continue by describing how those objectives have influenced the historical development of the primary dealer system, and conclude by looking ahead as the private and official sectors adapt to the evolving structure of the Treasury market.
The position of the interest expense line is a deliberate choice to split the returns from business and the outflows to capital providers. This could be included in other lines to reflect the business funding model in order to support understanding of individual business lines economic returns however this tends to obscure our analysis and therefore supervisors prefer this approach.

Over the last 6 years the cumulative productivity growth in Estonia, relative to its main trading partners, has amounted to 25 per cent. The corresponding CPI-based real exchange rate appreciation amounts to 22 per cent. The share of current and future EU member states in Estonian exports is about 80%. By now, Estonian economy is strongly integrated into the European economic area. Can we say that the restructuring of our economy has been completed? III. On the way to Europe  What are the challenges ahead? For Estonia, like for all new member states, the only possible way to join the euro system is to do it in full compliance with the letter and spirit of the EU Treaty. Speaking about the present accession countries as a group, it can be said that the key challenge of the policy maker is similar everywhere - to foster real convergence and at the same time maintain macroeconomic stability. But although the underlying processes are the same for all, earlier national economic policy choices - and also the size of the country in question - play a very significant role. Thus, the optimal approach to euro area membership can in no case be a uniform one suitable for one and everybody. ERM II provides, in principle, a much-needed buffer zone before a country's EMU entry. However, there are obvious risks involved.
All of these factors will tend to inhibit the pace of the economic recovery. Given that the recovery is starting with an abnormally large amount of slack, and the pace of recovery is not likely to be robust, this means the economy is likely to have significant excess resources for some time to come. As a result, the balance of risks to inflation lies on the downside, not the upside, at least for the next year or two. To see why this is the case, it is useful to note that inflation dynamics are mainly driven by two factors – the degree of capital and labor resource utilization relative to sustainable levels, and long-run inflation expectations. The degree of resource utilization is essentially driven by the business cycle and, and to some extent, by the Fed’s success in achieving the “maximum sustainable growth” component of its dual mandate. Inflation expectations, on the other hand, are driven by a combination of actual inflation outcomes and the credibility of the central bank’s commitment to price stability. If inflation is low and the central bank is credible, then long-run inflation expectations are likely to remain well anchored. In practice, the relationship between the inflation rate and the level of resource utilization is very difficult to estimate accurately. This stems, in part, from the fact that the data on inflation and resource utilization are “noisy” and because sustainable levels of resource utilization are not directly unobservable.

Már Guðmundsson: Capital flows and systemic risk in Iceland Panel comments by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, in Norges Bank's (Central Bank of Norway) 200th Anniversary Symposium, Oslo, 16 June 2016. * * * In my short introductory remarks, I would like to discuss what I consider to be one of the key factors behind the financial crisis in Iceland: the interaction between capital flows and systemic risk. I will focus in particular on those aspects that have more general relevance and herald unsolved problems for economic management and financial stability in small, open, and financially integrated economies (SOFIEs), such as Iceland was before the crisis and now strives to be again, at least up to a degree. The saga of Iceland’s experience during the Great Financial Crisis had two separate but interrelated sub-stories. The first story was related to Iceland’s boom-bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open, and financially integrated economies. This is a story that has played out many times around the globe, and many of its elements have been seen before in Iceland. It might have been somewhat more extreme this time around, but it wasn’t fundamentally different. Strong capital inflows that met with an insufficient policy response and contributed to huge imbalances in the domestic economy were a key part of the story. I will come back to this later. The second story was the rise and fall of three cross-border banks operating on the basis of EU legislation (the European “passport”).
Mr McDonough focuses on issues related to his responsibilities as Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Foreign Policy Association Conference on Global Capital Markets and a New International Financial Architecture, held in New York on 17 November 1999. *  *  *  I am delighted to take part this afternoon in the Foreign Policy Association’s conference on Global Capital Markets and a New International Financial Architecture. It is a special pleasure to be here among so many old friends and colleagues. In my remarks today, I will focus primarily on issues related to my responsibilities as Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. First, I’d like to give you a brief update on the Committee’s efforts to implement globally an agreement reached initially in September 1997 on Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Second, I’ll describe the Committee’s work to promote improvements in risk management, including some related lessons drawn from the LTCM episode. Third, I will discuss the Committee’s proposal for a new capital adequacy framework to replace the 1988 Capital Accord and give you some idea of what on our timetable is going forward. Many of these efforts were initiated prior to the Russian financial collapse in the summer of 1998. There is no doubt, however, that all went into significantly higher gear thereafter.

The Committee also continues to consult actively with banking industry representatives and organizations through holding seminars, inviting presentations at working meetings, and conducting surveys on various topics. The Consultative Paper represents an evolution in the Basel Committee’s approach to capital adequacy. In addition to establishing minimum capital requirements, the paper places an increased emphasis on the supervisory review of capital adequacy and the role of market discipline. We refer to these elements as the “three pillars” of our proposed capital adequacy framework, which together promote safety and soundness. This evolution in the Committee’s thinking about capital follows from much of our recent work on risk management and the surveys we have conducted on banks’ disclosure practices. In our view, the three pillars to assess capital adequacy are mutually reinforcing, each addressing the challenge of aligning capital relative to risk in banking organizations somewhat differently. The Committee’s belief is that by combining the approaches of the three pillars, we can better achieve our overall objective of ensuring an adequate capital cushion across the banking system that at the same time recognizes and encourages prudent risk management. BIS Review 126/1999  4  Let me highlight briefly each of the three pillars and provide some perspective on the key challenges that the Committee faces in relation to each. The first pillar has to do with minimum capital requirements. The 1988 Capital Accord allowed supervisors in the G10 countries for the first time to use a common yardstick for measuring the capital adequacy of banks.
Even though changes in the krone exchange rate do not influence the GPFG’s international purchasing power, the fall in the fund’s value may have been perceived as less dramatic as a result. Equity markets have not always rebounded after a steep decline as rapidly as after the 2008 financial crisis. The chart shows developments in a global equity index in the period after the dotcom crash in 2000. From the peak in winter 2000 to the trough in winter 2003, equity prices plunged at the fastest pace since the early 1930s. Fluctuations in the krone exchange rate amplified the fall in the GPFG’s value measured in NOK. The value of the GPFG at the beginning of 2003 was 30 percent lower than assumed in the National Budget for 2002. Investors buying equities in Japan’s equity market at the end of 1989 experienced even more dramatic developments. The market fell and stayed there. The value of the shares traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange is still no higher than the 1989 levels. From being the largest in the world in 1990, accounting for almost 40 percent of global market capitalisation, Japan’s equity market now accounts for less than ten percent. However, it is important to remember that these developments apply to only one country. Global equity markets in general have shown completely different developments since 1989. 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  What can we learn from these crises? The first lesson is that crises will occur.

The GPFG pursues a responsible investment policy to increase the GPFG’s expected return or reduce the risk associated with the fund’s investments. We also consider that a systematic approach to responsible investment will contribute to maintaining confidence in Norges Bank as manager of the GPFG. Conclusion After 20 years, we have gained some experience of risk in our management of the fund. We have for example experienced two of the worst periods in equity markets since 1900. This experience will be useful the next time financial markets fall sharply. But next time will also be different in many ways. Norway, through the GPFG, owns a small part of listed companies’ share of global value added. Our investments have made solid gains. We have been willing to take on risk and have been compensated for it. History has taught us that we must be prepared for falls in market value that are both deep and prolonged. In a crisis, there will be no place to hide for a large global fund. Managing a crisis is demanding, but for a financial investor, it is essential. Although we must seek to limit the risks we encounter, we must at the same time reiterate that some risk is worth undertaking. Broad support for important principles in the management of the GPFG is a strength that will stand the fund in good stead the next time turbulence erupts in financial markets. 1 Dimson E., P. Marsh and M. Staunton (2018) Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2018/E.
Monetary policy measures have contributed to the increase in activity and in inflation  Economic research shows that these measures have been effective in the recent past, in terms of easing financial conditions and encouraging lending. Bearing this in mind, the new package of measures will boost economic activity in the euro area against a background of high uncertainty and will help to bring about the convergence of inflation to levels in line with the ECB's mandate. As regards negative interest rates, although there is no conclusive evidence to date that they have adversely affected the supply of bank credit, we cannot rule out that maintaining 5/18  rates at very low levels for an additional, potentially extended, period of time, could ultimately have some negative consequences for the bank-based transmission of monetary policy. In this regard, the mitigating measures adopted by the ECB, consisting of a tiered system for remunerating excess liquidity holdings, are intended to soften the negative impact on bank profitability of the new reduction in reserve remuneration, and thus ensure the expansionary effect on activity and inflation of the interest rate cuts in the current setting. Prolongation of the current expansionary cycle, albeit at a more moderate rate than in previous years  In relation to the Spanish economy, the latest economic data point to a gradual weakening of activity. First, the indicators that measure agents’ confidence have tended to gradually deteriorate since the beginning of 2018, albeit less so than in the euro area as a whole.

Looking ahead: the longer term financial stability policy agenda Perhaps I can turn now to some observations for the longer term. These go beyond Basel II and what its architects had in mind for it. But they nonetheless require us to think in terms of the same combination of evolving best practice within the financial services industry on the one hand and public policy needs on the other. I  The challenges of an increasingly integrated financial sector  Firstly, the new Accord is mainly designed for credit risks and hence essentially for banks. Yet we are all becoming clearer that the process of intermediation of risks is itself changing mightily. The silos that were securities, lending, and insurance, are no longer silos. Instead we are seeing the increasing development of a single financial network embracing not only these areas, but also many organisations which fall outside today's definitions of what is a bank, what is a securities house, or what is an insurance company. This process has gathered pace in recent years, and has accelerated since the Basel II process itself began. A couple of examples can illustrate what I mean. First is the growth of the credit risk transfer market. Alan Greenspan has recently noted that this may have benign effects, recently arguing that: 'If risk is properly dispersed, shocks to the overall economic system will be better absorbed and less likely to create cascading failures that could threaten financial stability'. But new forms of contract tend to bring uncertainty.