samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It raises the prospect of LIBOR continuing under a new methodology as “synthetic LIBOR,” at least in some currencies. But the FCA itself has warned that whatever it does will not be an alternative to firms’ transition efforts, and that any synthetic continuation of LIBOR will still not be deemed to be a representative rate.10 The FCA has said that any action it takes will be focused on contracts that cannot feasibly be amended by the parties to mitigate the effects of LIBOR cessation. It will not provide a solution for new contracts. And even at that, it will not necessarily address every LIBOR setting or currency. For those it does reach, users will be giving up control of the economics of their contracts to whatever the new methodology may be. In short, if you rely on these new powers to take care of your LIBOR contracts, you may not get what you want, and you may not like what you get. The message is clear: you must still do everything you can, right now, to anticipate the end of LIBOR and take control of your own risks. https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  2/6  30/09/2020  The LIBOR Countdown Has Not Stopped - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  In the European Union, there is draft legislation that is similar in approach to the ARRC’s proposed New York law.

LIBOR: The End of an Error Some people have asked whether the end of LIBOR will be pushed out somehow to allow more time for transition. Some people, I suspect, may even hope that this ends up being the case. After all, the task is daunting. But I would remind folks that the adage is not “why do today what can be put off https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  1/6  30/09/2020  The LIBOR Countdown Has Not Stopped - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  until tomorrow?” Quite the opposite.
Furthermore, women’s income growth profile over the life cycle is significantly lower than that of men, women are less likely to keep their jobs and are more likely to go from unemployment to inactivity. Still, the increasing weight of services in overall economic activity, in line with the country’s development, has helped in the insersion of women in the labor market. The study also examines how diverse features of the labor market influence the evolution of the economy’s aggregate productivity (Table 4). On one hand, the human capital that is accumulated via experience and seniority at the job allows to boost total factor productivity. On the other hand, the labor market allows to relocate workers to jobs where they can be more productive and obtain a better pay. In that sense, transitions between jobs contribute to aggregate productivity, to the extent that those flows go generally in the direction from the less productive to the more productive companies. However, for a large group of workers the greater mobility does not necessarily mean better pay or enhanced productivity. In particular, in 46% of cases, turnover does not come with wage improvements. This phenomenon is more present amont high-turnover, low-income workers. Those staying in their jobs longer have significantly greater wage gains over time. In the long term, this phenomenon links wider wage inequalities with slower productivity growth, a topic that merits a more in-depth examination. The study goes on to review how the Chilean labor market responds to economic fluctuations (Table 5).

In the forecast of inflation that we will be presenting in the Inflation Report to be published next week, we will no longer be basing our forecast on the assumption of an unchanged repo rate. The point of departure instead is the policy rate expected by the market in the period ahead, as reflected in implied forward interest rates. With this point of departure - and taking into account the different risks that we envisage - it is reasonable to believe that inflation one to two years ahead will approach our inflation target of two per cent. When the Executive Board convenes to discuss monetary policy on Wednesday next week, future inflation prospects will of course will the decisive factor for our decision. It is likely that we also will have a discussion regarding how we should view the continued rise in house prices. Personally, I do not think that there is any immediate hurry to raise the repo rate, something that the Executive Board also communicated in August. But it is clear nonetheless that this is the next natural step if the current outlook remains unchanged. When it may become appropriate to modify the currently very expansionary monetary policy depends, of course, as usual primarily on economic developments in the period ahead and on the assessment of future inflation. 4/4
When ‘imbalances’ arose and countries were depleting or building their official reserves, a key feature of this system was supposed to be that both the creditor and debtor countries were obliged to adjust their imbalances. In practice, the obligations on creditor and debtor countries were asymmetric, and in part that explains why the system proved unsustainable. One drawback of the system was that it did not allow countries to smooth their expenditure in the face of fluctuations in their income. The role of the IMF was to facilitate some smoothing, by lending pooled reserves. Alternatively, changes in exchange rates would be sanctioned by the IMF for those countries judged to be in "fundamental disequilibrium". In doing this, the IMF fulfilled its purpose to help achieve orderly world growth. The history of the United Kingdom illustrates these features of the Bretton Woods system. Britain faced repeated challenges in achieving external balance during the Bretton Woods era. Sterling was devalued twice and four IMF lending programmes were necessary. Yet in 11 of the 17 years between 1955 and 1971, the UK ran a current account surplus, and its current account deficit peaked at around a mere 1% of GDP in 1964. Over time countries realised that restricting their ability to save and invest overseas was a significant limitation on their wellbeing. Opening up capital accounts broke the link between current income and current expenditure, and enabled countries both to smooth consumption and to diversify risk.

With the increase in money supply, the SNB has simply reacted to rising demand, and its focus in doing so has been firmly on its mandate to ensure the stability of the Swiss franc and thus the supply of sound money. It is worth noting here that bank deposits, which are also relevant for the development of inflation, have grown at a comparatively moderate rate. Growth in the monetary aggregates referred to by economists as M2 and M3 has been much less strong than would have been expected on  Page 6/8  the basis of the increase in the monetary base or base money (M0) alone (cf. chart 3). In other words, there has been a marked decline in the money multiplier. 9 The increase in base money reflects the rise in demand for the Swiss franc, which is seen worldwide as a safe haven in times of crisis. Without an expansion in the monetary base, money would have been excessively scarce and its price would have risen massively. This would in turn have led to a marked drop in the level of prices, our currency would have appreciated even more, and economic activity would have declined. Can this strong expansion be reversed when necessary? Yes, it can. If the demand for Swiss francs weakens, the supply of money can be reduced at any time, thus ensuring that the currency retains its value. The SNB has a wide range of ways and means at its disposal for absorbing liquidity.
Our currency was created in 1850, and the coins of that time were in circulation in 1907, when the National Bank started operations. We still use these coins today for our day-to-day payments. This is tangible proof of our country’s monetary stability. “A franc remains a franc,” declared the President of the Swiss Confederation in a radio address one day after the 1936 devaluation, in an endeavour to reassure the Swiss people about the abolition of the gold standard. I am pleased to be able to say today – 100 years after the National Bank started business – that a franc has indeed remained a franc. All this could not have been achieved if our policy did not enjoy broad support in our country. I would therefore like to conclude by expressing sincere thanks; first of all to the federal and cantonal authorities for the support that they have given us, particularly in difficult times when we had to make unpopular decisions for the sake of monetary stability. Second, I would like to thank the business community for its understanding of our policy, even at times when we assessed the situation differently or when monetary constraints necessitated painful adjustments. And, finally, my thanks go to the Swiss people for their unwavering confidence in our institution and their support for our monetary autonomy over the last 100 years. BIS Review 71/2007  3  May the National Bank continue to enjoy such broad support!

As a compromise, the legal status of the new central bank was situated somewhere between that of a public and a private sector institution and it was given two head offices, one in Berne and one in Zurich. From the beginning, it thus occupied a special place in Switzerland’s political landscape. This special status has hardly changed over the years. In the 1930s, when devaluations and the abandonment of the gold standard often resulted in tighter government controls over central banks, the National Bank Act remained unchanged. Likewise, at the end of the Second World War, when many central banks were nationalised, the SNB remained a stock company open to private shareholders, and it has maintained this status to this day. Since 1973, following the abolition of fixed exchange rates and the introduction of an autonomous monetary policy, the circumstances under which this principle of independence is implemented have changed progressively. A growing need for transparency vis-à-vis the public and the authorities has emerged. This is why we have developed a strategy of active communication, and our relationship with the federal authorities has been gradually institutionalised. Nowadays, transparency and accountability have become principles of good governance for all independent central banks. In Switzerland, the revised National Bank Act of 2004 obliges the SNB to present an annual accountability report on the execution of its mandate to parliament. Application of rules Independence is not merely a theoretical concept, it must be lived constantly.
[16] And (4) for an energy importer like the UK, the rise in European wholesale natural gas prices represented a substantial deterioration in the terms of trade, with adverse implications for national income. In other words, the price of what the UK was buying from the rest of the world rose significantly relative to the price of what the UK was selling to the rest of the world, making the average UK resident worse off. Although the shock was large, the MPC did not interpret it as a signal that a new persistent upward trend was emerging in wholesale natural gas prices. Rather the substantial increase seen in mid-2022 was viewed as a one-off driven by specific circumstances, which was likely to at least partially unwind in the not too distant future. [17] Taken together, these characteristics implied that the direct and indirect impacts of the rise in wholesale natural gas prices represented a transitory shock to CPI inflation, since once the level of gas prices stabilised or reverted to historical averages, the impact on headline inflation would diminish or reverse. This is the basis for the argument that monetary policy makers can – and should – ‘look through’ the direct and indirect effects on inflation of one-off external shocks to energy prices, about which  Page 7  they can do little.

In parallel, the disruption to supply chains I have mentioned above has increased corporate pricing power. After all, for every producer that has difficulty sourcing its inputs, there is supplier one step earlier in the supply chain that faces strong demand and scope to raise prices. Both a tight labour market and strong corporate pricing power are likely to increase the possibility that price and wage setting dynamics add to the intrinsic persistence in inflation. Another influence on intrinsic inflation persistence is the magnitude of the shock itself. Our standard models are linearised around the steady state defined by the inflation target. This approach is robust to small deviations from inflation target. But where deviations are substantial, non-linear effects may kick – and our standard models may underestimate inflation persistence. For example, now that inflation is substantially higher than target owing to the size of the energy price shock, firms may shift from a ‘time-dependent approach’ to pricing behaviour – say raising prices just once a year – to a ‘state-dependent approach to pricing – say raising prices more frequently as energy costs pass different thresholds. [21] Such a change in behaviour will naturally change the dynamics of the inflation response, possibly creating additional intrinsic inflation persistence in ways that are not captured by our existing models. In principle, we can estimate new models incorporating such non-linearities.
Another example is the construction and engineering firm Odebrecht SA using its subsidiaries and shell companies in the British Virgin Islands and Belize to facilitate at least $ million in kickbacks to government officials and political parties. The schemes involved paying consulting and agency fees to shell companies who then facilitated payments to government officials. The most prominent scheme involved Petrobras, the energy company majority owned by the government of Brazil. The U.S. government worked with law enforcement in Brazil and brought criminal charges against Odebrecht and was able to recover billions from Odebrecht and related entities to help offset the theft of national resources. And the FIFA Scandal put a spotlight on corruption in sports – there was a global cabal of FIFA officials directing corrupt payments to executives around the globe controlling “futbol” clubs, or media companies with broadcasting rights to futbol events. Although these payments did not steal government funds, they did impact nonprofit schools and futbol clubs that were supposed to be the recipient of much of these funds. Multiple officials from clubs around the globe were prosecuted in the U.S. for those violations. One common theme in cases like these is that they tend to occur in countries where the powerful can easily take advantage of limited or immature internal controls. As is typical with most classic fraud triangle schemes, these people had the motivation (greed or perceived financial pressure), opportunity (powerful positions with weak internal controls), and rationalization (they deserved the kickback for years of hard work).

There is still a rationale for central banks to hold gold. 2. Gold selling  After having listed all the good reasons for holding gold, you will not be surprised if I reiterate that we have no plans to sell gold! The leading official holders of gold have not changed their attitude in this respect. Neither the American Federal Reserve System, nor the German Bundesbank, nor the Bank of Italy, nor the Banque de France have any plan to sell gold. 3. Gold lending  Concerning gold lending, the Banque de France, as most of you probably know, is definitely not among the active players in the market. Quite the contrary, alongside the other major holders, it has refrained from an active management of its gold holdings. The Banque de France has always adopted a very prudent and rather conservative approach, acknowledging the fact that the issue of gold lending is a matter of common interest to the major holders. Two main reasons are traditionally put forward to justify gold lending: –  The first one refers to a question of principle. Foreign currency assets are actively managed. Why not extend this management to gold insofar as gold is considered to be part of a country’s external reserves? –  The second reason is that central banks obviously have to take into account profit and loss account considerations. From this standpoint, gold should provide a return just like other assets.
First, a number of European politicians are calling for increased transparency requirements relating to actual portfolio positions of SWFs. 19 A more far-reaching development are the calls for legislation that would block SWFs from taking major stakes in companies in any strategic sectors. 20 Second, a number of politicians have proposed the principle of reciprocity as a guiding principle for granting market access to SWFs. 21 For example, Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Euro-group president, has stated, "Countries that protect their own markets cannot expect to be allowed to make unimpeded investments in Europe." 22 In a strict sense, the principle of reciprocity means that SWFs are only allowed to invest in a foreign country if companies in that country are allowed to invest freely in the home country of the SWF. Since many SWFs are located in countries which are financially less open than a typical OECD country, a strict application of the reciprocity principle would place strong limitations on SWF investments. Third, Larry Summers has suggested that if SWFs were to invest through intermediary asset managers, most risks associated with SWFs would be mitigated, if not avoided. 23 Incidentally, Summers argues that the added benefit of such an indirect investment philosophy is that it generates a better risk-return profile. Fourth, there is now considerable political momentum behind the idea of a code of conduct or a set of guidelines for SWFs.

Third, OMTs will focus on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years. This underscores the monetary policy nature of such outright transactions, the principle of which was foreseen in the ECB Statute. And it buttresses the OMTs’ aim to address reversibility premia which, as I argued above, have tended to manifest themselves at the short end of the term structure, while addressing the fact that credit risk embedded in longer-term yields should reflect the credibility of countries’ economic and financial adjustment programmes. Fourth, there are no ex ante quantitative limits on the size of OMTs. This makes clear that the ECB is committed to do whatever it takes, within its mandate, to preserve the solidity and irreversibility of the currency. Fifth, the ECB accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds purchased in the context of OMTs. Finally, the liquidity created through OMTs will be fully sterilised. This reflects the role of OMTs in counteracting destructive self-fulfilling equilibria rather than altering the aggregate liquidity stance. The main features of the framework for OMTs outlined here address by design also three concerns or questions sometimes voiced in relation to outright purchases of government bonds by a central bank. The first concern can be summed up in two questions: are OMTs a form of monetary financing of governments and will inflation be unleashed? The answer to both questions is: No. In fact, quite the opposite.
Poor investment or loan decisions will not be forgiven by inflation. This environment will alter attitudes to property, especially among users who will increasingly regard it purely as a factor of production subject to the full disciplines of cost controls. But lower nominal rents need not mean lower real income. 19 The second fundamental difference lies in the role, and potential, of the Private Finance Initiative. In many ways, the PFI simply reflects processes already underway in the private sector whereby occupiers are seeking more flexible arrangements and are prepared to pay a price for changing the traditional relationship between landlord and tenant. It opens up the possibilities for more imaginative use of property, and the principles are applicable both to public and private sector users of property. The providers of services, whether public sector or private, no longer want automatically to own the productive assets needed to provide them. They prefer to rent them instead with a higher level of service as part of the deal. Landlords with property expertise are well placed to provide this wider type of service and have a competitive advantage in doing so compared with less experienced operators. And maybe the word “property” will itself imply something too narrow. Owners will provide a working environment. They may move from “core and shell” to “finish and facilitate”. Indeed in some PFI cases the owners will go even further and operate as well, “provide and process” you might say. This would give outsourcing a new meaning.

In addition, efforts to enhance transparency have not progressed as well as I myself and many market participants had hoped. 8 There have of course been some positive developments, such as the development by BZW of Property Investment Certificates, the growing importance of data produced by the Investment Property Databank, and the development by RICS of new valuation standards in the revised Red Book. Some of the trade associations, such as the IPF and the Association of Property Bankers, have also developed well and have begun to play a very important role. I believe the Bank of England’s Property Forum, set up in 1993 to bring all sides of the industry together, has also made a positive contribution. But these developments cannot obscure the fact that, on the whole, this period has been one of disappointment. Property’s poor performance in the past few years has undoubtedly caused some to consider very carefully whether or not they wish to remain in property. The Present 9 Are we turning a corner? The commercial property market is important to the UK economy in many ways. Property and related activities such as construction make a significant contribution to GDP. The availability of property of the right standards at the right price is very important to UK competitiveness. This puts some onus on landlords to provide what is wanted. It is equally important that the planning authorities should continue to provide a consistent and flexible planning framework in which developers and landlords can operate and earn a satisfactory return.