samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me also note that the question of the appropriate longer-run balance sheet size, the point at which the Federal Reserve holds no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively, is a related, but distinct policy judgement upon which the FOMC has made no decision as yet. We will be monitoring that broad range of indicators to search for evidence that we’re approaching the “steep” slope—and I have confidence that our data and analytics will help us to assess this effectively. 29 We have also conducted a new Federal Reserve survey specifically designed to support our efforts to obtain a high-quality estimate of where aggregate reserve scarcity might occur, and the preliminary survey results strongly support my view that reserve scarcity is some way off. 30 Finally, I am confident that the Federal Reserve has the effective tools and is prepared to take measures as appropriate to ensure that short-term rates remain wellcontrolled and efficiently transmit the stance of policy into broader financial markets. For example, another technical adjustment to the IOR rate, as discussed in the May FOMC meeting minutes, could be used to foster trading in the federal funds market at rates well within the FOMC's target range. Concluding Remarks I remain highly confident that the FOMC’s framework for the normalization of the stance of monetary policy—both in the overnight market and the balance sheet—will continue to proceed smoothly, without unnecessary surprise, disruption, or volatility in financial markets.

These small value purchases are concentrated in newly issued agency MBS in the To-Be-Announced (TBA) market, which is expected to undergo changes next year due to the FHFA’s Single Security Initiative and the introduction of Uniform MBS (UMBS). Given these changes, the Desk plans to develop its operational readiness for conducting transactions in UMBS and, to more efficiently manage the SOMA portfolio, convert some of its agency MBS holdings to UMBS where appropriate. See the Statement Regarding Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities, September 14, 2018. 14  5  limited impact from the reduction in holdings on Treasury yields and MBS spreads thus far. As shown in Figure 6, comparing a matched sample of survey respondents in our July 2017 surveys to the September 2018 surveys, the expected impact on 10-year Treasury yields and 30-year MBS option-adjusted spreads (OAS) during the two-year period following implementation of the change to the reinvestment policy has declined, likely in part reflecting expectations for the balance sheet to normalize at a larger size. 15 Looking forward, the median respondent currently anticipates the cumulative impact over the next two years to be 17 basis points for the 10-year Treasury yield, and 12 basis points for the 30-year MBS OAS. This gradual expected increase contrasts with the experience of the so-called “taper tantrum” in 2013, which showed that markets can have outsized and sharp reactions to changes in balance sheet policy even before they happen.
In doing so I have posed a question. Is the Global Regulatory System fit for purpose in the 21st Century? We could all save time if I answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and sat down. But I will indulge myself with a few reflections, based on eight years as a regulator, before I give you my considered response. The Asian crisis and its aftermath In the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crises of 1997-98, there were widespread calls for a fundamental reform of the international financial architecture. It was argued that the traumas of Korea, Indonesia and Thailand, pointed to fundamental weaknesses in the international financial system. These were countries with relatively sound fiscal positions, enjoying rapid economic growth, yet when a crisis of confidence hit, their financial systems collapsed with alarming speed. This experience, which took the international financial institutions by surprise, appeared to demonstrate both that the IMF’s financial surveillance was inadequate, and that its crisis management tools were similarly lacking. Though it is also appropriate to point out that the markets did not see the crisis coming either. There are those like Jeffrey Sachs and, from a different perspective, Joe Stiglitz, who have used this failure to mount a major assault on the policies and practices of the Fund over many years. These disputes rumble on, as Stigiltz’s ill-tempered ad hominem attack on Stanley Fischer (in Globalization and Its Discontents) demonstrated. Personality-driven disputes are entertaining for the press.

This is an issue that concerns all of us, but bites more immediately on emerging markets. When it comes to banking supervision, the composition of the Basel Committee is rather different. In theory a G10 body, there are now 12 national members, of whom 9 are European. And, for good measure, there are two further European observers, from the European Commission and the European Central Bank. The Committee has worked hard to discuss the emerging conclusions of the revision of the Capital Accord with a broader range of countries, notably through the Core Principles Liaison Group which includes a number of emerging markets. But I cannot help thinking that, in the future, the Basel Committee’s full membership will need to change. The original justification was that the members came from countries which were homes to internationally active banks. But there are other countries which play host to such banks today, and there will be more in the future. I believe that, as a general point, if we want to put pressure on developing countries to adopt higher standards of supervision (and I am one who believes it is right to put pressure on in this sense) then we do need to ensure that the standard-setters are broadly representative, and are seen to have appropriate legitimacy. And this is not just a question of optics. We need to guard against the risk that committees from a selection of the most sophisticated economies devise standards which are not capable of easy implementation elsewhere.
Mr Roth discusses demonitisation of gold in Switzerland Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Vice–Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 22nd Annual FT World Gold Conference in London on 14 June 1999. I would like to thank you for inviting me to participate in this gold conference and for the opportunity to give you some insight into the present state of the discussions on the demonetisation of gold in Switzerland. I must admit that I have accepted your invitation with mixed feelings: why play the role of trouble shooter here among people worried about the activity of central banks on the gold market? How to communicate the SNB’s intentions when its room for manoeuvre depends on a complicated political process? All this makes me dream of the comfortable situation of my colleagues in Belgium and Holland who were able to implement their strategy without outside interference and could communicate their sales as a fait accompli. I also look with envy at the Bank of England which will be able to proceed with sales shortly after the Treasury has made its intentions public.

The fact that this precision was introduced at the initiative of our parliament indicates that the Swiss people wish to keep ample gold reserves. Consequently, we do not envisage going beyond the announced plan of selling 1300 tonnes. BIS Review 73/1999  6
The differences between the inflation rates in the various countries of the euro area first started to widen in 2020 when the pandemic caused stronger disinflation in countries that have large tourism sectors. As the pandemic faded, inflation picked up most in countries where the economy had declined less and where labour shortages were starting to put pressure on wages. The Baltics were hit even harder by supply chain disruptions when the war and sanctions cut off imports from Russia and prices rose. Before the war started, gas and electricity were relatively cheaper in the Baltic countries than they were on average in the euro area. This relatively low starting point made the subsequent price increases larger in percentage terms. After Russia invaded Ukraine, energy became the biggest cause of the divergence between the headline rates of inflation in euro area countries. A range of factors have caused this divergence, including the extent to which energy prices were regulated, and what support measures governments chose to alleviate the energy price shock for households and companies. Differences in the energy generation mix have also contributed to the divergence, as have the terms of household utilities contracts. In countries where the prices for electricity or gas are fixed for longer, it took also longer for the increase in prices to pass on to consumers. Let me summarise the main reasons why inflation was particularly high in Estonia, reaching close to 20% last year.

Even the Basel II regulations, which will come into force in 2007, provide scope for regarding mortgage bonds covered by legislation on secured bonds as more creditworthy than mortgage bonds not covered by such legislation. However, the Swedish market for mortgage bonds is already a large, liquid market that has functioned well since its deregulation at the end of the 1980s. It is the third-largest mortgage bond market in Europe, after the German and Danish markets. After the Swedish government, Swedish mortgage institutions are the largest issuers in both the money and bond markets in Sweden. As much as around 40 per cent of all lending to the non-bank public is mediated via mortgage institutions, which largely finance their activities by issuing bonds and certificates in the securities markets. The market is dominated by five mortgage institutions, which together account for around 99 per cent of all borrowing. The four largest mortgage institutions are subsidiaries of the four largest Swedish banks, while the fifth, SBAB, is state-owned. The mortgage institutions’ annual reports show that as much as around 30 per cent of securities borrowing is carried out abroad, which suggests that there was already considerable interest among foreign players before the legislation on secured bonds was proposed. However, there are considerable differences between the institutions.
Indeed financial services are instrumental for broader human development, as people invest in themselves and seek protection from external shocks. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, as you are no doubt aware, the results arising from the 2005 FinScope demand side study which aimed at measuring access, usage, perceptions and the demand patterns on financial services offered in Zambia were not encouraging. The findings of the study indicated that only 33.7% of the adult population was financially served. This entailed that 66.3% of the Zambian population were financially excluded or not using banks or other financial institutions. Furthermore, the supply side study conducted in 2007 also highlighted a number of weaknesses in the financial sector including, limited outreach of banks and financial institutions to the general populace, high spreads between deposit and lending rates, excessive collateral requirements and poorly managed cost structures which contribute to limiting outreach. As a consequence of the low levels of access to financial services, the Bank of Zambia adopted financial inclusiveness as one of its strategic objectives to ensure improved levels of access for all. In this regard, it is gratifying to note that following the survey, commercial banks and other non-bank financial institutions including Celpay have increasingly become receptive to the calls for increased provision of financial services.

On the fiscal front, emergency stimulus  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  measures have already pushed high public debt to unprecedented levels - 67% on average, exceeding Maastricht criteria, and in some countries reaching up to 100% of GDP. In this context, credible medium-term fiscal consolidation is necessary to rebuild buffers and maintain credibility of public finances which is very important as investors are expected to start more vigorously differentiating countries based on their vulnerabilities. On the monetary front, apart from the conventional side effects of "too loose for too long" stance, as credit conditions remain highly accommodative, the risk of the so called "zombification" emerges. It is argued that this process reduces the overall productivity in the economy by trapping the available resources and hindering the emergence of new, more productive companies. In a nutshell, the general economic conducive policies need to be smoothly substituted with more specific sectoral polices that will facilitate optimal reallocation of resources and thus underpin post-crisis transformation of economies. Notwithstanding all these policy measures, the Western Balkan economy is projected to rebound by 5.1 percent in 2021, which implies that pre-crisis GDP level will not be reached this year; it will be lower by around 5% in comparison with pre-pandemic forecasts, and the overall loss will not be recouped even over the medium term.
On the contrary, if it is deviated from fundamentals, we assume that the exchange rate will converge to values coherent with its long run levels. 2 In this way, with interest rate parity and certain  1  For further details on projection models and as an example of transparency, see Banco Central de Chile (2003). Also Banco Central de Chile (2007) updates the Board’s vision of monetary policy and its price stability objective. 2  Caputo, Nuñez and Valdés (2008) present the various models normally used to evaluate the real equilibrium exchange rate. BIS Review 92/2008  3  assumptions about the distant future it is possible to have a complete trajectory for the exchange rate. I must point out that, in a floating exchange regime, this is a working assumption made only to provide a model consistent with projections, even recognizing that the disclosed interest rate parity has little empirical validation. In any case, as our experience early this year has shown, a significant deviation from this path can have important implications for the course of monetary policy. At the beginning of the year, it was thought that rates could go up in the first quarter. However, the Board considered that the downward pressure on inflation generated by a pronounced appreciation of the peso relieved pressure on monetary policy. One aspect which has received much attention in monetary policy practice and theory is the assumption about future interest rates used in the projections.

With the objective of acting with the greatest independence possible in the monetary policy meetings and minimizing the risks of introducing unnecessary noise on financial markets, we have a self-imposed period of silence, or purdah, in the days prior to the meeting and to the Monetary Policy Report release. Evidence shows that financial markets are much more sensitive to information in the few days prior to a monetary policy meeting (Ehrmann and  3  See Woodford (2007) for recent discussion of the alternatives and coherence with a framework of inflation targets implemented through inflation forecast targeting. 4  BIS Review 92/2008  Fratzscher, 2008) and, at the same time, any comment that is misunderstood or confused could influence the position of someone in the meeting. Are there limits to transparency? The answer is definitely yes. In every democratic society, transparency is a duty. But the limit is to what point an excess of transparency might limit the Bank in achieving its objective which is price stability. For example, we could televise live the monetary policy meetings but that would restrict the open, frank dialogue that goes on. Besides, the discussions could be misinterpreted because they involve much technical jargon and judgments. I imagine that these same reasons prevent court deliberations from being broadcast live. In other words, since context determines conduct, an excess of transparency can limit the freedom with which we discuss and express our judgments, thereby undermining the capacity to make appropriate decisions on monetary policy.
Boosting the determinants of long-run prosperity is the job of government’s structural, or supply-side policies. These government policies influence the economy’s investment in education and skills; its capacity for research and development; the quality of its core institutions, such as the rule of law; the effectiveness of its regulatory environment; the flexibility of its labour market; the intensity of competition; and its openness to trade and investment. The Chancellor’s recent Autumn Statement begins the process of rebalancing policies. While fiscal prudence will continue, the degree of fiscal drag will be reduced somewhat, and major investments in the structural drivers of productivity including R&D and strategic infrastructure are planned. 1  To be clear, these improvements in financial distributions were not explicit objectives but; but welcome outcomes. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  14  Chart 16: Productivity explains all of the shortfall of GDP; while monetary policy has offset all headwinds to it pp deviation from 1993-2007 trend 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 Headwinds 2008Q1  Monetary policy 2010Q1  2012Q1  Productivity  GDP 2014Q1  -25 2016Q1  Source: Bank Calculations. “Headwinds” include the drags on demand from deleveraging, subdued world growth, fiscal consolidation, and uncertainty. The contribution of monetary policy is computed by considering the impact on demand of maintaining Bank Rate the level prevailing immediately before the crisis. VI. Building a Globalisation that Works for All To address the deeper causes of weak growth, higher inequality and rising insecurity requires a globalisation that works for all.

2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2  The deepening of the symbiotic relationship between global markets and technological progress has lifted more than a billion people out of poverty (Chart 2), while a series of technological advances have fundamentally enriched our lives. Chart 1: 3 ½ billion people have internet access  Chart 2: 1 billion fewer people live on less than $ a day since the early 1980s  Billions of people  Billions of people  3.5  2.0 1.8  3.0  1.6 2.5  1.4 1.2  2.0  1.0 1.5  0.8 0.6  1.0  0.4 0.5  Number of poor at $ a day (2011 PPP)  0.2  0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  0.0  Source: Internet Live Stats. An internet user is defined as an individual who can access the Internet at home, via any device type and connection. 2015 and 2016 are estimates. 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001  2006  2011  Source: World Bank. $ a day is the World Bank’s current global poverty line. Globally, since 1960, real per capita GDP has risen more than two-and-a-half times (Chart 3), average ii  incomes have begun to converge, and life expectancy has increased by nearly two decades (Chart 4).
That said, regulatory changes and competitive pressure also pose an important challenge for these institutions which will require them to maintain sufficient levels of operational effectiveness, effective control of risk concentration and, especially, sound foundations for ensuring that regulatory capital is preserved and, if necessary, increased. Consequently, in line with the recent announcement made by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, possible regulatory adjustments need to be studied which, while conserving the essential core of the current business model of credit cooperatives and without calling their identity into question, ensure the soundness of the sector in a more demanding environment. I think that the organisation of credit cooperatives in other advanced economies, where they represent a larger share of the banking business than in Spain, are a useful reference for the reflection I referred to earlier. Thank you very much. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The global economic crisis, which deeply affected all countries of the region, was accompanied by slowed exports, reduced remittances and other foreign currency inflows, increased uncertainty and slowed credit growth. Although 2010 is expected to be accompanied by a gradual improvement in the world economic environment, many of the factors that negatively affected the Albanian economy will continue to be present even during this year. The stimulating fiscal and monetary policy helped supporting the economic activity during 2009. However, fiscal trajectories and the need for long-term stability suggest that the Albanian economy can not rely for a long time on fiscal stimulus. Against this background, in 2010 a more conservative fiscal policy is necessary and is welcomed by the Bank of Albania. In a medium- and long-term horizon, we are of the opinion that fiscal sustainability should be ensured through a clear and prudent fiscal rule. Under new circumstances, the economic growth should be based more on boosting the private sector of the economy and bank credit plays a key role in this regard. The good financial health of our banking system and the progressive improvement of liquidity conditions and risk premiums in domestic and foreign financial markets are encouraging developments. The easing of monetary conditions and the liquidity injections by the Bank of Albania have supported and will further support this process.