samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Domestic inputs, particularly labour, must be competitively priced. And since the cost of labour in Malta is relatively high, we must increase the value of output per employee. Once again, the only way forward is through productivity growth. In this regard, there is much room for improvement. The level of productivity has remained roughly unchanged since 2001, while it is projected to increase at an annual rate of only 1% to 2% in 2007 and 2008. For a country that is highly dependent on exports, this is not good enough when many of our competitors are achieving faster productivity growth. Faced with this situation, we would do well to reflect on the experience of others. In France, a recent McKinsey report showed how industrial productivity gains slowed sharply in the last five years, causing the country to miss the opportunity to create an estimated 700,000 jobs. As for the reasons, a report by the Camdessus expert group in 2005 identified two major obstacles to growth: first, not enough people work, and those who do work, do not work long enough, due in part to the introduction of a 35-hour working week; second, the heavy State has become a costly drag on the economy. Malta faces a similar predicament for much the same reasons.

Such spending is already equivalent to 47% of GDP. The same applies to taxation, which stands at 36% of GDP. The only way forward is to pursue the medium-term objective of a balanced budget over the business cycle by reducing recurrent expenditure, by redistributing the resources available and by making the most efficient use possible of both domestic and EU funds. An additional advantage of lower spending commitments is that this would make further tax cuts possible that would, in turn, stimulate private initiative and investment. The course of action I am suggesting, therefore, would bring the country’s spending priorities more closely into line with its Lisbon Strategy goals. If Malta is to move up the value chain, it must acknowledge global realities. It is clear, for example, that there are increasing rewards from innovation; and that ICT has become a major driver of economic growth. A growing proportion of world manufactured products, moreover, are in the high-tech category, 28% in 2000, double the percentage twenty years earlier; and knowledge intensive services are the largest source of employment growth in the EU15, with over 7 million new jobs created between 1997 and 2002 2 . These trends should leave us in no doubt as to the direction in which the wind is blowing.
The Supreme Court was to decide whether a the driver of a car was negligent when in a very difficult intersection he crashed into a car that had the right of way on the other crossing road. The collision occurred in the midst of rush traffic, and the Court argued that crossing traffic should be expected at that time. However, a number of conditions made it difficult for the man to see the traffic before he was close to the intersection. It was dark, with rain and sleet and icy roads. On the other hand, the driver was very familiar with the site and he should have been aware of the all the risks at the intersection. As he did not adjust his driving so that he was able to stop, the Court found that the driver had acted negligently. See Norsk Retstidende (Norwegian journal of law) 1984–91. 36  Preben Munthe, professor of economics, believes that the government was probably surprised by the magnitude of the sterling devaluation. He writes: “When the authorities learned of the British decision, they probably felt they were under time pressure, which is why the situation was not nearly as thoroughly discussed as it actually could have been.” See Jahn Eriksen and Munthe (1996), p. 371.

Launched in 2017, this network, which I am honoured to have chaired from the beginning, brings together central banks and financial supervisors to track supervisory developments and develop climate scenarios for central banks and supervisors. The network also explores paths to scale up green finance and monitor its market dynamics, thereby bridging data gaps and coordinating research in the fields of climaterelated and environmental risks. I am happy to mention that the NGFS has just welcomed its ninetieth member. The Basel Committee’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Risks will continue working on the further integration of climate-related financial risks into the Basel framework and expectations. To help address the remaining challenges in terms of measuring climate-related financial risks, the ECB is working closely with the European Banking Authority (EBA) on the management and supervision of ESG risks. We have also provided our input to the European Commission’s EU taxonomy for sustainable activities and its non-financial reporting directive 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  (NFRD), which requires large European companies to disclose information on their policies in areas such as environmental protection and social responsibility. In particular, the ECB supports the ongoing work by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on effective and consistent regulatory and supervisory approaches for dealing with climate risks. Conclusion Let me conclude. When dealing with the risks arising from climate change, we must be forward-looking, comprehensive and strategic. But we must also be swift.
All reporting institutions are invited to provide comments and views on the draft which may be organized through relevant licencing authorities, self-regulatory bodies, industry associations or directly to Bank Negara Malaysia; and 2. second, I would also like to take this opportunity to remind all reporting institutions, that Bank Negara Malaysia is increasing its supervisory and enforcement of AML/CFT compliance, in which we intend to pursue more deterrent action including taking appropriate enforcement actions under the AMLA, for any identified non-compliances, beginning 2020. As such we urge all reporting institutions present today to engage and discourse any compliance issues with the wide ranging of experts that we have lined up for this conference. With that, I wish everyone a fruitful discussion ahead and Selamat Menyambut Hari Kemerdekaan. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

This could take the form of an insurance-type mechanism between euro area countries to buffer large country-specific economic shocks.” Second, under the umbrella of Economic Union, we need further progress towards the completion of the single market in services, and a more co-ordinated approach to macroeconomic policy at the euro area level. Finally, the sovereignty-sharing that monetary union represents implies moving forward towards political union. We need now to complete the integration of European nations. The political union pillar, is needed to ensure that the other pillars have sufficient democratic legitimacy. I will not dwell long on this issue, as it is fundamentally a matter for the Member States and European citizens. It should suffice to say that the crisis has shown the limits of applying a national mind-set in a deeply integrated monetary union. In this sense, political union is not about moving forward, but about catching up with the depth of economic and financial integration that already exists. What is at stake refers basically to democratic accountability and legitimacy. An important element of legitimacy has been provided in the past, in the European Union and other democracies, by what Fritz Scharpf called output legitimacy (or government for the people)15, that is, by the effectiveness of the system in ensuring the continuous improvement of the citizens´ quality of life. All advanced democratic countries and consequently the European Union will face challenges in this front stemming from the prolonged period of slow economic growth that has now just started.
On the other hand, trade diversion can lead to increased competition within Thailand as excess supplies of goods from China are diverted to the Thai market and priced at discount to compete with local products. Besides, prolonged uncertainties surrounding trade measures had led to unusual front-loading of exports in 2018 and will weigh on export growth in 2019—just when the global demand has begun to moderate. It can also impair business sentiments, preventing firms from taking on new investment projects. Ultimately, as the US-China trade disputes remain unresolved and the US’s inclination for further trade  1 Both products make up less than 1 percent of Thailand’s total exports  3/9  protectionism remains, such as potential US auto tariff measure, trade disputes will certainly be the key concern for all authorities. (2) Slowdown in the Chinese economy is another concern. While the slowdown may be in line with the Chinese authorities’ goal of restructuring the economy towards a long-run sustained growth model, in the short-term it can have significant impact on the Thai economy. This is because of high degree of linkages in terms of supply chain and production networks, tourism, and property investment. For instance, China is Thailand’s second largest export partner following the ASEAN region, making up about 12 percent of our exports in term of value while the Chinese tourists represent nearly 30 percent of total foreign tourists.

With regard to the composition of this adjustment, according to the Stability Programme the public deficit path projected for the period 2017-2020 will be achieved mainly through control of total primary public expenditure, i.e. without including public debt interest payments. Specifically, if the projections are fulfilled, the weight of primary public expenditure in GDP will be reduced by 3 pp over this period, to 36.6% in 2020. At the same time, government revenues are expected to grow moderately, by 0.9 pp of GDP over the programme’s horizon, to 2020. On the expenditure side, the Government projects moderate growth in its wage bill, basically reflecting the 1% rise in the remuneration of public-sector employees approved for 2017 and the impact of savings arising from reforms approved in previous years. At the same time, the Stability Programme assumes that the downward trend in spending on unemployment will continue, in line with favourable labour market developments; that the application of the adjustment factor to pensions will continue to hold down pension spending, in a positive inflation environment; and that current spending on goods and services will continue to be firmly controlled over the coming years. 5/8  As for public investment, the Stability Programme projects an increase in general government investment of 10% in 2017.
Thank you. 15/15

The amounts at stake vary, but as an illustration, the last Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, published last October, estimates that until 2050, the energy-related mitigation investments to limit warming to 1.5°C amount to USD 900 billion per year whereas climate-aligned bonds issued in 2018 reached USD 149 billion. Green financing requires an innovation-friendly framework: green loans, green securitisation, green covered bonds, green derivatives, green crowdfunding platforms and green private equity should all be promoted, keeping in sight our heading, which is preserving financial stability. The work of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance of the European Commission on green bond labels and sustainable benchmarks should be well understood as a game changer by the financial system: green finance should definitely mature, upgrade its professional standards and be “greenwashing proof”. Green finance has actually the ability to be a powerful transformational force but there will be no transition to a low-carbon future without further engagement from corporates, from large companies to SMEs. Financial institutions can provide a trickle-down effect, thanks to comprehensive CO2 disclosures or divestment strategies. But the real economy must embrace the transition on its own. Once again, appropriate public policies, like a credible carbon price, will set the proper incentives. d. Further developing the climate agenda in an inclusive manner Climate change will trigger strong distributive effects: agriculture in Sweden might benefit from an increase in global mean surface temperature while 145 million  people in China are threatened by sea rise in a +4°C scenario.
Emerging markets in particular will need to ensure that supervisory interpretations of the framework are contextualised to the local conditions, and the preconditions for its effective implementation are adequately developed to avoid the potential market distortions. At the institutional level, Basel II provides a unique opportunity for banks to integrate risk considerations with their business strategies. Indeed, several leading financial institutions have successfully taken Basel II beyond the narrow and mechanistic risk applications to a more strategic implementation of the framework across the organisation. Such institutions have leveraged on the upgraded risk infrastructures that have been established for Basel II to create competitive advantages through the application of new business and management tools. This enables the risk function to have a central role in forming strategic moves into new markets or products. In the process, this will ensure that the strategies are aligned with the bank's risk appetite and policies. The benefits of Basel II cannot be achieved with just a strict regulatory compliance approach. While Basel II serves as a powerful catalyst to reposition the role of, and the attention to, risk management in banking institutions, significant efforts need to be directed at strengthening the financial structure, corporate governance, risk management and data capabilities within the banking institutions. The approach adopted by Bank Negara Malaysia has been for these efforts to complement and reinforce the positive outcomes of Basel II. These are important preconditions for, and not automatic outcomes from the adoption of Basel II.

As we continue to ponder its broad and complex dimensions, platforms such as this for open and active dialogue between public and private interest groups are important to provide further insights on the many issues that will provide the direction forward for the wider and effective global implementation of Basel II. On that note, I wish you all productive and successful discussions. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 99/2008
Today's high inflation was hardly caused by excessive asset purchases I do agree that asset purchases should have been concluded earlier. However, the objections I have sometimes had to them have not been about monetary policy becoming too expansionary. My view has rather been that asset purchases are not a particularly effective monetary policy tool when the Swedish financial markets are functioning normally. The small monetary policy effects must be weighed against a number of costs and risks associated with asset purchases.45 In my opinion, the experiences of our asset purchases underpins these views. It is therefore unlikely that the development of inflation in Sweden would have been very different if we had concluded the asset purchases earlier. The rise in inflation this year has been caused by international factors related to the pandemic, energy, raw materials and the war in Ukraine, and has been similar in most developed countries despite differences in the way monetary policy was conducted both before and during the pandemic. There is no point in actively selling mortgage or corporate bonds This interpretation also has implications for the question of whether the Riksbank should begin active sales of our holdings. The question has been raised, among other things, as the Bank of England has recently begun selling securities. Moreover, Calmfors, Hassler and Seim (2022) argue that the best strategy is unlikely to be keeping the securities to maturity. However, the Executive Board of the Riksbank has indicated that the bonds will be held to maturity.

Phase 2a: The acute phase of the coronavirus crisis – broader purchases of securities for continued market functioning On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) announced that Covid19 would be considered a pandemic. Many were, of course, concerned about health risks, but many were also concerned about how the economy would be affected. International economic prospects weakened rapidly. Many economies closed down almost completely and service sectors in particular were hit hard. It was very uncertain how long the pandemic would last and how households and companies would get through it. In this situation, both central banks and other authorities reacted quickly, and comprehensive support packages were presented. The aim was often to facilitate the overwintering of companies so that their operations could be restarted once the economies had reopened. The Riksbank saw a risk that the great uncertainty would mean that households and companies would encounter ever higher interest rates on their loans and that this would impair their ability to cope with the pandemic. In March and early April 2020, this risk was reflected in, among other things, the fact that interest rates on mortgage and corporate bonds began to rise rapidly and that the markets for these bonds were functioning poorly. The risk was therefore that concern over weak economic developments with more and more payment defaults would be self-fulfilling through a vicious circle, where rising risk premiums lead to ever-increasing problems and even higher interest rates.
To a significant degree, the crisis was about regulatory gaps – be it gaps in terms of loosely regulated mortgage underwriting practices in the United States, the activities of bank-sponsored structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits, the providers of insurance guarantees against structured finance products such as AIG Financial Products Group, or the structured  1  In this regard, I am considerably more worried about countries that implement standards that are more lax than the norm, rather than more tough than the norm. However, if many countries individually were to opt for tougher standards, this could raise questions about whether the international norm is too lax. 2  Work underway by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and others all are designed to make the traditional banking sector more robust. This includes requiring more and higher quality capital, better capturing of risk in the application of capital standards, imposing a capital leverage limit on banks, raising liquidity buffer requirements, and requiring compensation regimes to be consistent with financial stability. 2  BIS Review 28/2010  finance models of the rating agencies and others that turned out to be defective. Thus, the experience of the recent crisis strongly suggests that confining regulatory reform to strengthening the banking sector would be insufficient to make the financial system as a whole resilient and robust. A crucial case in point is the too-big-to-fail problem. Having some firms that are too big to fail creates moral hazard, which distorts incentives.

But if surplus countries are perceived as resisting global adjustment, the political consensus in favor of an open global trading regime could begin to erode. Protectionism is a lose-lose proposition – for surplus and deficit countries alike – which would ultimately prove very harmful to global growth. Sustainably rebalancing global growth won’t be an easy task – and it will take time. A larger share of consumer spending (and lower saving) in the emerging economies requires the development of a stronger and more comprehensive safety net for households. Only with institutional support for health care and retirement are families likely to become more comfortable saving less of their income. It also requires the further development of financial systems so that households can more easily obtain credit and shift expenditures forward in time – for example, to finance spending on education or to purchase housing. The fact that progress will be gradual simply bolsters the case for getting started as soon as possible. Action on rebalancing would also bring short-term benefits. As I’ve noted, the positive fiscal impulse that has supported global growth over the past 18 months is set to unwind. Indeed, in some countries, the stance of fiscal policy will soon turn contractionary. This means that such fiscal consolidation could conceivably put the global recovery at risk. This suggests that moves to rebalance growth toward domestic demand in trade surplus countries would provide a useful offset. Such actions would generate stronger external demand for countries undergoing fiscal consolidation.
There is also scope to recycle capital by taking loans off the balance sheets of commercial banks and multilateral development banks and structuring them in a form that could be subscribed by institutional investors, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds. Several blended finance models have been piloted. But they need to be substantially scaled up to channel the extra $ trillion in financing needed for the net zero transition. Singapore is building a comprehensive ecosystem for green and transition finance to facilitate Asia’s net zero journey. We are building capabilities in environmental risk management in the financial sector through climate stress tests. We are providing grants to defray the costs of issuing green and sustainability-linked loans and bonds. We are supporting industry efforts to build the infrastructure for a liquid and transparent voluntary carbon credit market in Asia. 7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  We are deploying technology to address data challenges, such as through an ESG registry to maintain provenance of green certifications and an ESG disclosure platform to allow listed companies to upload corporate sustainability data in a structured and efficient manner. SUSTAINABLE LIFESTYLE The fifth and last key to achieving net zero: a sustainable lifestyle. While many of the changes necessary to mitigate climate change are in the realm of public policies, business practices, financial decisions, and technological advances, people will also need to make lifestyle adjustments.

Speeches  Published Date: 26 May 2021  "The Quest for an Integrated Macro Policy Framework" - Opening Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at Asian Monetary Policy Forum and MAS-BIS Conference on Macro-Financial Stability on 26 May 2021 Mr Agustín Carstens, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements, ladies and gentlemen, good a ernoon and welcome to this year’s special edition of the Asian Monetary Policy Forum featuring the MAS-BIS Conference on Macro-Financial Stability. Macro-Financial Stability: Theory Trying to Catch up with Practice The origins of this conference go back to a conversation that Agustín and I had about 18 months ago on the need to crystallise a coherent policy framework for macro-financial stability. For the three decades preceding the global financial crisis, the traditional inflation targeting framework for monetary policy has served most economies well, delivering price stability as a basis for sustained economic growth. That framework is now coming under strain. Emerging market economies (“EMEs”) faced with large and volatile international flows of capital have had to resort to a variety of policy tools besides traditional monetary policy to achieve both macro-economic and macro-financial stability. The advanced economies faced with rising leverage and growth in financial assets against the backdrop of extremely low interest rates are also looking at macroprudential measures to promote financial stability. Practice has moved ahead of theory.