samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But the key lesson from the upheaval in the global crypto industry is clear: investing in cryptocurrencies is highly risky. This is what MAS has been warning the public about for the past 5 years. In fact, MAS’ repeated warnings against retail investments in cryptocurrencies and ratcheting up of policies to restrain retail access have raised some questions as to where MAS stands with respect to the digital asset ecosystem. Next month, we will organise a dedicated Green Shoots seminar to share our strategies to develop Singapore as digital asset hub. We will explain our position on cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, blockchains, tokenisation, smart contracts, digital assets, etc. – their risks and opportunities; shortcomings and potential. We will set out how our developmental and regulatory approaches will work in harmony to achieve the vision of Singapore as an innovative and responsible digital asset hub. FINANCIAL SECTOR PERFORMANCE AND STRATEGIES Let me now turn to the financial sector, which continued to perform well in 2021. Value-added grew by 7.4%. FinTech investments hit a high of $ billion. A total of 4300 net jobs were created in financial services and fintech. The global financial landscape has continued to transform. The Russia-Ukraine war, COVID-19 pandemic, and US-China tensions have introduced new risks and uncertainties for financial markets and institutions. The nature of globalisation is changing and supply chains are adjusting, with a greater focus on business resilience. At the same time, structural trends towards greater adoption of technology and the drive towards sustainability have gathered pace.

But now that the economy has undergone a period of deep crisis and it is difficult to assess what structural changes the crisis may lead to, the process becomes even more complex. One illustration of this is how one should assess future developments in the labour market. So far employment has not fallen as much as might be justified given the historical relationship between unemployment and GDP, and the large fall in GDP. This has come as a surprise to us and to other forecasters. But what conclusions should one draw with regard to the effects in the slightly longer term when the economy recovers? Employment and the number of hours worked are now beginning to increase. Normally, one might have expected a greater adjustment in the number of hours worked than we have seen in this economic downturn. The fact that the  6  For further information on resource utilisation, see Jonsson, M., Nilsson, C. and Palmqvist, S., 2008, “Should monetary policy stabilise resource utilisation?” Economic Commentary, www.riksbank.se or Öberg, S. “Monetary policy and the elusive resource utilisation”, speech published on 25 May 2009, www.riksbank.se. 4  BIS Review 58/2010  adjustment has not corresponded to the fall in production means that productivity has been very weak. But as we observe in our most recent Monetary Policy Update, which was published last week, we expect productivity to improve in the future, which also means that the number of hours worked and the number of employed will grow slowly.
The work suggests a number of possible mechanisms: consumption that is financed by debt could mean that subsequent spending is more constrained; households may choose to consume from equity gains related to house price rises during expansions but may need to cut spending if those rises reverse; and a lack of investment opportunities could also play a role, weak investment and associated weak GDP growth could show up as consumption-led growth, not least because consumption is stickier. For more details, see www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1703e.htm. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  8  Chart 7: Evidence of a trade-led global slowdown Index (long-term average = 100)  Percentage changes, 3 months on 3 months ago  102  8 US & EA capital goods orders (rhs) 6  OECD Business Confidence (lhs) 101  4  World trade in goods (rhs)  2 100  0 -2  99 2010  -4 2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  Indices, 50 = no change 58 Manufacturing PMI  56 Composite PMI 54 52 50 Export orders PMI  48 46  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  Sources: Conference Board, CPB, European Commission, ECB, Markit Economics, OECD, and Bank calculations.

11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  11  There are three ways to measure the scale of the UK investment underperformance. -  First, by using evidence from the Bank’s Decision Maker Panel survey of companies. 8 Since the referendum, Brexit has ranked as one of the three most important sources of uncertainty for over one third of respondents to this survey – and for one half since autumn last year.9 Investment growth has been persistently weaker among these companies (Chart 10), reducing total business investment by an estimated 6 to 14%. -  Second, by comparing the performance of business investment in the UK with the rest of the G7. Prior to Brexit, UK business investment was growing in line with the average across the rest of the G7. Since then, it has risen by just 1% in the UK, while it is up by 12% on average elsewhere, and by 16% in the US. -  And third, by comparing to pre-crisis trends. The current level of business investment is some 20% below the MPC’s projection from May 2016, conditioned on a vote to remain. These three approaches average to a 12% hit to UK business investment caused by Brexit uncertainty. To compare that to what markets may be pricing in for global trade effects, consider that expected policy rates in the US have fallen by around 150 basis points since the first trade measures took effect in July last year.
The relationship between labour input and future pensions has weakened. The link is especially weak in the contractual early retirement scheme (AFP). For most workers, the annual pension does not depend on when they choose to retire, as long as they are between 62 and 67 years of age. Nor does the age of retirement affect the size of the national insurance benefits after the age of 67. Hence, the earlier an employee retires, the higher the total pension benefit will be. A clearer link between labour input and future pensions may be achieved in a defined-contribution pension scheme. The total pension for individual employees will then be determined by the employee’s contributions and the return on these contributions. The annual pension is determined by the individual’s age of retirement and the total contribution. For every extra year of employment, the employee increases his pension wealth. In addition, the total pension wealth will be spread over a shorter retirement period. This means the longer a person remains in employment, the higher the annual pension will be. 12  BIS Review 11/2002  The main principle is that there should be a clear link between labour input and pensions. Such a link may also be established in a system where the individual receives an annual pension that is stipulated in advance. Sweden has recently implemented a pension reform that ensures that annual pension benefits increase in relation to the number of years the individual has worked.

It is not a case of rescuing banks and bank management for their own sake or that of the shareholders or of “giving away taxpayers’ money” as it is sometimes wrongly described in the debate. In the long term we need a well-developed system for managing insolvent institutions The Riksbank’s possibility to provide liquidity assistance to a financial institution when financial stability is threatened assumes that the institution is solvent and able to continue to pursue its operations. In the case of Carnegie, Finansinspektionen withdrew the institution’s licence to conduct banking operations on Monday this week. The Riksbank then withdrew its liquidity assistance to the bank, is it no longer met the criteria for being granted this type of credit. The Riksbank’s loan to Carnegie Investment Bank AB has been repaid by the Swedish National Debt Office, which has taken over the debt and now owns the company. The Debt Office can now take over a financial institution, as in Carnegie’s case. This applies in a situation where an institution that does not meet the requirements for liquidity assistance from the Riksbank has to default on its payments and this is assessed to threaten financial stability. This is made possible by the stability plan for the financial system decided by the Riksdag just over two weeks ago. The stability plan also means that the government can extend guarantees to individual institutions or to a group of institutions.
When GDP-at-risk is high and outside an acceptable range, however, the convexity of the 𝑓(·) function dominates 𝜙 and drives the macroprudential policymaker towards an absolute (lexicographic) preference for financial stability. 13 The Bank of England Act states that the FPC is not “required or authorised to exercise its functions in a way that  would in its opinion be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term”. 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  15  Chart 7: The relationship between GDP-at-risk and the macroprudential loss function is convex* Social cost of financial instability: 𝑓 (GDP-at-risk)  A  B  A C Tail risks increasing (GDP-at-risk worsening) as move further right Once GDP-at-risk is within an acceptable range, the gains from taking further action to protect financial stability are modest. In this case, the secondary objective carries larger weight, and actions to boost resilience will be tempered to a greater extent by any negative impact they have on the central outlook. Tighter regulation tends to have some cost for the central GDP forecast in the near term while the system adjusts. However, by making the system more resilient, macroprudential policy avoids a much larger hit to growth tomorrow and increases expected productive capacity in the longer term.

So the contribution of energy and other commodity prices to inflation should fall back sharply as we go through the year. Of course, we cannot assume that the evolution of domestically-generated inflation is independent of these factors. Indeed, some countervailing pickup in the contribution of domestically-generated inflation is quite possible if businesses look to provide their employees with some recompense for the past squeeze in living standards. Moreover, one cannot rule out further adverse external price shocks. But a sharp fall in inflation is the most likely outcome and that in turn should mean that the squeeze on real household incomes will ease, providing some support for consumer spending. Even so, real income growth will still only be moderate and high levels of indebtedness may weigh on the spending of some households. Moreover, the uncertainties associated with the euro area are likely to persist, retarding growth there. Not only will that weigh on our exports, but funding conditions may also remain difficult, while British businesses are likely to remain cautious about investing and hiring. At its October meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee agreed that the outlook for UK output growth was markedly weaker than it had believed earlier in the year. Without action, and despite the present excessive level of inflation, the extra margin of slack meant that inflation would consequently be more likely to undershoot, rather than overshoot, the 2% target in the medium term. So it was against that background that we decided to re-start our asset purchases, buying another £ billion of gilts.
1  Chart 1 shows the “fever curve” of the money market, i.e. the difference between the three-month Libor and the three-month (T)OIS rate (tom-next/overnight indexed swap). This difference reflects the credit and liquidity risk premium on unsecured money market trades. It is a barometer of the health of the money market and, in the broader sense, also for that of the financial markets in general. 2  The five crises in the comparison are the stock market crash of 1929, the oil crisis of 1973, Black Monday in 1987, the bursting of the IT bubble in 2000, and the current crisis. In each case, we look at price performance in and around the index’s highest recorded level prior to the crisis, which does not necessarily coincide with the onset of the turmoil. The highest levels were reached on 3 September 1929 (Black Tuesday was on 29 October 1929), on 11 January 1973 (oil crisis), on 25 August 1987 (Black Monday was on 19 October 1987), on 14 January 2000 (IT bubble), and on 9 October 2007. 3  For annual data and the Case-Shiller Composite 20 Index, cf. Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2006, 2nd edition). BIS Review 157/2008  1  These financial losses alone will continue to have a major impact on the real economy for some time to come, owing to the fact that their full effect is not generally felt immediately. Despite the historic disruptions in the financial markets, this is not the 1930s.

8 A spread of this size between the Federal Reserve’s two administered-rate tools is expected to be narrow enough to provide sufficient interest rate control but wide enough to preserve a reasonable volume of trading in the federal funds market and to keep the Federal Reserve’s footprint in the nonbank financial sector from growing too large. As suggested by operational guidance in the March minutes, policymakers may adjust either side of the spread between these two rates, as needed, once normalization is under way. Fourth: Qualifications around the use and settings of an ON RRP facility. The FOMC intends to use an ON RRP facility only to the extent necessary and will phase it out when it is no longer needed to help control the federal funds rate. But what is necessary, and how can the facility be phased out? As the minutes of recent FOMC meetings show, Committee participants differ in their answers to those questions, but all agree that demonstrating sufficient control over money market rates during the critical early stages of policy normalization is a priority. Against this backdrop, the Committee has noted that it plans to allow the aggregate capacity of the facility to be temporarily elevated to support policy implementation at liftoff, but also expects that it will be appropriate to reduce ON RRP capacity fairly soon after policy firming commences.
But we do this for partly different reasons, as we have different tasks. The risks now building up in the mortgage market concern individual banks. But risks are also building up that threaten financial stability – what are known as systemic risks. Ultimately, the macro economy may also be affected. This means that the division of responsibility is unclear. The problem with the division of responsibility can be illustrated as follows. If we assume that the trend in household indebtedness and housing prices does not slow down, despite all efforts, and continues at an alarming pace. Which authority should be the first to take action and on what grounds? Is it a question of consumer protection or of inflation and resource utilisation? Then the answer is simple. But what if it is a question of risks that threaten the financial system? Or perhaps everything at once? We in Sweden are not alone in struggling with these issues. Around the world there is intensive debate on the management of systemic risk – what is usually known as macroprudential supervision. As I have already mentioned, we in the EU have agreed to establish a European Systemic Risk Board to monitor the build-up of systemic risk in the member states and to recommend measures to deal with it. It is of course necessary that we in Sweden have a framework ready to respond to any such recommendations, in the form of allocation of responsibility and tools.

Being utilised little as resources for the economic and social development of the country, remittances may have led to individual, family or local dependency. During the first stage of transition in Albania policies for optimising the administration and utilisation of workers’ remittances for developing purposes have been completely lacking. A few sporadic measures have aimed at driving workers’ remittances into official channels and improving savings and investments incentives of emigrants in the country but have been by and large inadequate. More recently, the Albanian government has taken a more attentive approach toward remittances and their potential contributions in financing the growth and development of the country. With the assistance of the European Union by means of CARDS program, and the support of the International Organization of Migration (IOM), this year the Albanian government has compiled two important documents regarding migration and remittances issues, called: National Strategy of Migration and Action Plan. The main objectives are: (i) the review of remittances flows and (ii) the identification of political constraints and institutional and regulative framework that influence these inflows, in order to: •  increase the volume of remittances;  •  help shifting them into formal channels; and  •  enhance their use in support of country’s economic growth. Bank of Albania role in achieving these objectives consists primarily in maintaining the macroeconomic and financial stability, which constitute important preconditions for the success of any policy related to workers’ remittances.
At the end of this month, it is planned to approve the restructuring plans of the banks in Group 1 (those controlled by the FROB), and those of Group 2 (the other banks which will require State aid) will foreseeably be approved before year-end. The restructuring plans envisage the transfer of assets to the asset management company, which will become operational in December, and the recapitalisation of banks which need it. Each bank will  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  have a schedule for implementing the measures that it must adopt, and these are expected to be completed in the first quarter of 2013. Conclusions The State Budget for 2013 represents a substantial effort in terms of austerity. The intended fiscal adjustment is certainly very ambitious, given the ongoing recessionary setting for public finances next year. Central government efforts would be insufficient if not accompanied too by the adjustment to which regional and local government have committed. From the macroeconomic standpoint, some data show progress is being made in rebalancing the Spanish economy. The bulk of the correction has already been made by the current account and it is close to balance in 2012 which, foreseeably, will enable it to run a surplus in 2013. Similarly, we can see improvements in the competitiveness of the Spanish economy both with regard to labour cost indicators and productivity. We forecast that in 2014, and measured by unit labour costs, Spain will have recovered practically all of the competitiveness lost between 1998 and 2008.

This is fundamental for the timely detection of any slippage from stated budgetary objectives and for standing ready to respond appropriately. It should also be noted that in the past few weeks a good number of regional governments announced their budgets for 2013, although it is still early to make a full diagnosis of overall regional government expenditure. These developments remedy some of the weaknesses in the information available for assessing the budgetary adjustment scheduled for 2013. Even so, the fact that the presentation of the various budget documents by the various governments is not formally coordinated makes the work of analysts harder, given that, obviously, what matters from the macroeconomic standpoint or for the analysis of public finances is general government as a whole. The State and Social Security Budget for 2013 Let me now turn to the essential features of the State and Social Security Budget for 2013, beginning with a reference to the budget outturn in 2012. The budget deficit is being reduced this year in very adverse economic and financial circumstances. Indeed, as a result of the risks of possible slippage, a series of supplementary fiscal measures were adopted for the 2012 Budget. Their effects have begun to be perceived only in the second half of the year. Notwithstanding, on the information available, the possibility of slippage can still not be ruled out.
Have the IMF/EU 1  financing agreements paid off? And what remains to be done in order to have our house in order? Romania itself faced a severe economic downturn which started in the fourth quarter of 2008 and continued until 2011 - first and foremost because of its domestic vulnerabilities. In the year before the crisis, the current account deficit exceeded 13%, the structural deficit was close to 9%, the economic growth was based on consumption of imported goods, and it was driven by loose fiscal policy and by the credit boom based on foreign exchange denominated loans, while the real estate bubble reached unprecedented levels. All that it was needed for a crisis was a sparkle. That sparkle was the global financial crisis, which led to massive speculative capital outflows, although the Vienna Initiative was a useful tool for damage control in this region. The rest is known and I do not want to insist upon it here. The diagnosis that I put in 2009, in my book “The end of illusion economics. Crisis and anti-crisis” is still valid. Since then, Romania witnessed a decade of major transformations. Under three successive IMF/EU programs, we have made a long way to reform the economy and to make it more resilient to further external shocks. In what follows, I will argue that Romania is now more developed and better equipped to deal with external shocks than it was ten years ago; but risks coming from unwarranted domestic policies remain.

It thus applies regardless of whether or not long-term interest rates are affected by depressed forward premiums (for instance, as a result of the Federal Reserve’s purchases of government securities). It also applies regardless of whether market expectations are good and reliable forecasters of future interest rates. The assumptions we make about long-term Swedish and foreign interest rates are thus important. This was one possible explanation why the main scenario contains such a modest krona appreciation. The other possible explanation and corresponding interpretation of the main scenario can be described as follows. In Figure 7 the red and yellow curves show the Riksbank’s forecasts for the repo rate and the TCW-weighted policy rates abroad, respectively. At the same time, the blue and grey curves show market expectations of the repo rate and the TCW-weighted policy rates abroad, respectively. If the current repo rate and the actual policy rates abroad develop over time according to the red and grey curves, the market will be surprised if the repo rate and foreign policy rates are raised more quickly  8  BIS Review 158/2010  than expected. The market will then gradually raise its expectations of future interest rates. That is, over time the blue and grey curves will show an upward shift. This means that the corresponding blue and grey yield curves in Figure 8 will shift upwards over time.