samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But this process can take too long. There is always the risk that when the dust has settled the initiative and enthusiasm, dare I say, on the part of those less affected by the crisis, may be stifled. There is also the risk that the plight of those who have been seriously affected by the crisis is not given the attention it deserves, simply because they do not have an adequately representative voice on the issues at hand at these international forums. There is no lack of ideas, but they need to be translated into actions sooner rather than later. Let me take this opportunity to outline three broad approaches mooted at different forums and supported by us. The first approach involves enhancing the transparency of markets. Timely and reliable information relevant to decision making by market participants as well as by the regulatory authorities is crucial to the effective functioning of a market. It is thus important that there should be an adequate public disclosure framework to provide information that is necessary for counter-parties, creditors and investors to assess risks properly. Not only should increased transparency be promoted in markets trading products in an established exchange. It is also perhaps time to consider whether some suitable form of transparency requirements should be imposed in OTC markets. This is not an easy task, but I believe that with earnest international co-operation, we can achieve meaningful results.

Moreover, growth in the world economy is expected to remain relatively resilient, benefiting mainly from sustained growth in emerging economies. This should support external demand for euro area goods and services and thereby investment. This outlook is also reflected in the September 2008 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. The exercise projects average annual real GDP growth in a range between 1.1% and 1.7% in 2008, and between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009. In comparison with the June Eurosystem staff projections, real GDP growth figures for 2008 and 2009 are lower. In the view of the Governing Council, the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic activity is particularly high at the current juncture and, generally, downside risks prevail. Risks stem particularly from renewed increases in energy and food prices, which could dampen consumption and investment. Moreover, downside risks continue to relate to the  BIS Review 105/2008  1  potential for the financial market tensions to affect the real economy more adversely than currently foreseen. The possibility of disorderly developments owing to global imbalances also implies downside risks to the outlook for economic activity, as do concerns about rising protectionist pressures. With regard to price developments, annual HICP inflation has remained considerably above the level consistent with price stability since last autumn, standing at 3.8% in August according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 4.0% in June and July 2008.
This never happened! Hence, during the 1980s, policymakers realised that economic reforms were needed as a lasting solution to Zambia’s economic woes. For instance, between 1985 and 1987, Zambia undertook an IMF/World Bank-sponsored adjustment programme. This led to a partial decontrol of interest rates and the introduction of a Dutch Foreign Exchange System as a way of allocating scarce foreign exchange through a quasi-market system. It also entailed the removal of some subsidies as a remedy to the persistent fiscal deficits. The reforms proved to be highly unpopular and culminated in public protests and abandonment of the IMF supported reform programme in May 1987. Instead, the Government pursued an indigenous programme called ‘New Economic Recovery Programme’ (NERP) whose theme was “Growth from Own Resources”. Although this programme was successful in some respects, it suffered major setbacks, such as the overvaluation of the Kwacha, soaring inflation, lack of external financing, among others, that made the programme unsustainable, thus prompting the Government to go back to the IMF and agreed on a new IMF supported programme in 1989.

In the financial sector, the Government undertook further reforms that included the use of marketbased monetary instruments in the conduct of monetary policy. As a result of monetary tightening, inflation fell from 197 percent in December 1992 to about 40 percent in 1995; 18.7 percent in 2001 and 17.5 percent in December 2004. Similarly, the Government took fiscal reforms in 1993, such as the cash-budget to curtail the monetisation of fiscal deficits. Consequently, since 1993 we have seen the Government take measures to strengthen fiscal performance through limiting domestic borrowing as a ratio of GDP to levels below 5 per cent. This should be commended. Ladies and Gentlemen Having outlined a brief history of our economic management since 1964, allow me at this juncture to summarise the lessons learnt. From the foregoing, several macroeconomic management lessons can be drawn. These include: (i)  Attaining lower rates of inflation, as in the 1960s and early 1970s, continues to be elusive. However, lower rates of inflation could be attained if the Government maintained fiscal discipline by sticking to the budget and minimising its borrowing from the central bank and the financial sector, as a whole. This would contribute to the achievement of price stability, which in turn would facilitate sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. (ii)  Lowering of interest rates requires that all key stakeholders play their part. The Government reduction of domestic borrowing contributes to lowering of yield rates on Government securities, which are sometimes used as anchors by commercial banks.
Of this, 27% were first time borrowers and 23% were without collateral and credit guarantee. Nevertheless, our work is far from done. There are pockets of SMEs, particularly the start-ups and those operating in new and high risk segments that continue to face challenges in obtaining financing. When businesses have insufficient access to financial products and services, they may be deprived of a chance to pursue new business opportunities, and as a nation, we are deprived of the benefits of their potential contributions to the economy. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Over the past 45 years, CGC has played a crucial role in bridging the gap between financial institutions and underserved SMEs via its innovative products and services. I commend CGC’s efforts for its latest venture in developing a dedicated online referral platform that connects the banks and the SMEs, known as imSME. The imSME has the potential to transform the SME Financing Landscape in the country, by matching SMEs’ financing needs with suitable products, thus reducing search costs and improving financing prospects for SMEs. The implementation of imSME exemplifies the importance of technology in increasing SMEs’ financing access. SMEs are now able to submit financing applications 24 hours a day, without the need to visit individual financial institutions to search for suitable product offerings. The Platform also facilitates the partnership between key collaborators to deliver end-to-end solution for SMEs that face higher hurdles to obtain financing.

The financial industry should also address any negative perceptions by having an effective communication strategy and ensuring swift response time to SME customers, as these are vital in maintaining the integrity and public image of financial institutions. Moving forward, it is imperative and almost inevitable for financial industry to undertake measures to advance financial literacy and capabilities of SME customers. The commitment to better serve the SME segment would reinforce the critical role of the financial industry in supporting the Government’s development agenda in a well-functioning financial system. CGC has demonstrated that efforts to assist underserved SMEs can be achieved in a financially sustainable manner through its suite of innovative financial products and services. Financial institutions should also explore strategic partnerships with adjacent industries such as telcos and fintechs to reduce market gaps and reliance on Government subsidies for the SMEs. Importantly, the financing ecosystem needs to be complemented with a comprehensive SME development ecosystem to nurture and elevate our SMEs towards greater size and competition. I hope today’s recognition and appreciation of FIs and CGC customers would spur both parties to become more innovative, resilient and progressive. My heartfelt congratulations to all the winners and may you continue to inspire and set benchmarks on SME financing landscape. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Its purpose was to determine what should be done with prudential standards to safeguard recovery. This was no ordinary regulatory convention. Marriner S Eccles, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, called it “guerrilla warfare”. In one corner were the regulators, the Comptroller of the Currency and FDIC. Scarred by their regulatory experience, and fearing further bank failures, the Comptroller and FDIC pushed for high prudential standards, including preservation of fair values for banks’ assets. In the other corner was the Fed. Scarred by their monetary policy  2  Pacioli (1494). 3  Goethe (1796). 4  Simonsen and Hempel (1993) provide a fascinating account of this episode. 2  BIS Review 28/2010  experience, and fearing a further collapse in lending, the Fed argued for laxer prudential standards and the abandonment of fair values. Battle commenced. The tussle lasted two months, often played out in public through the New York Times. In the end, the Fed prevailed. On 26 June 1938, Franklin D Roosevelt announced (without so much as a hint of irony) the Uniform Agreement on Bank Supervisory Procedures. Banks’ investment grade assets were to be valued not at market values but at amortised cost. And banks’ sub-investment grade assets were to be valued at a long-run average of market prices. In the teeth of crisis, and in the interests of macroeconomic stability, the first phase of fair value had ended. This pattern was to be repeated half a century later – the second wave of fair value.

They don’t, however, reduce the size of the participating bank’s balance sheet, as they substitute reserve balances with a less liquid instrument. Reverse repos are a type of open market operation in which eligible counterparties place cash at the Federal Reserve in return for securities from the Fed’s portfolio. Technically structured as a sale and repurchase agreement, a reverse repo is economically equivalent to a collateralized investment with the Fed (with the opposite flow of cash from a repo, the traditional liquidity-adding open market operation described earlier). These transactions are arranged as auctions between the New York Fed and the Desk’s traditional primary dealer counterparties, as well as with an expanded set of counterparty types, including money market funds and GSEs, that typically provide large amounts of short-term funding to the financial markets.13 Reverse repos were initially envisioned to be used as a term, fixedquantity tool. However, with the necessary operational infrastructure to support reverse repo  11  Permanent operations such as asset sales would also remain in the Desk’s toolkit and would result in a reduction in the size of the Fed’s securities portfolio and balance sheet. 12  Operational exercises for both mortgage-backed security purchase and sale operations using the Desk’s proprietary trading system, FedTrade, were started on November 21, 2013. 13  The expanded set of counterparties is intended to enhance the capacity of the Desk’s reverse repo operations beyond that provided solely by the primary dealers.
We have built economic institutions that allow us to reach substantial levels of growth, and the necessary tools to mitigate any adverse shocks facing our economy. But we are not immune. In the globalized world of today, any change in conditions is rapidly propagated to other economies. The movements in financial markets that I mentioned a while ago are proof of this. Trying to isolate ourselves from the rest of the world would be not only useless, but harmful in the long run. The important thing is for us to have the capacity to shield ourselves from negative events and, when necessary, to take action to reduce their effects on our country. We already did so when the Lehman Brothers crisis hit in 2008. We couldn’t prevent the global recession from affecting our economy, but we did succeed in fostering a fast, sustainable recovery from 2009 onwards. In any case, our domestic macroeconomic situation has varied in these four years. Today, inflation is at 3 percent, GDP is growing at near-trend rates and the MPR is in a neutral range. This provides room to respond with monetary policy if necessary, although the timing and magnitude of the measures will have to be evaluated with special prudence and in light of the actual effects of external developments on our economy. Our financial system, meanwhile, has been solid and resilient to sudden changes in the international economy.

In any case, and despite the impact of external volatility on the prices of some assets, financial markets have operated normally. In this context, I would like to highlight the need to continue advancing in initiatives to strengthen our regulatory and supervisory framework. One such case is the bill to reform insurance companies currently being debated in Congress. The banks’ solvency and liquidity indexes have been stable in the first half. In a context of good rents, core capital has hovered around 10 percent while regulatory capital – as measured through risk-weighted assets – around 14 percent. Meanwhile, since the last Financial Stability Report the banking industry has increased its long-term debt certificates, and some medium-sized banks have pursued strategies to attract retail deposits. Another favorable development is the greater diversification of banks into different types of credit from abroad. Also worth noting is the hoarding of liquid assets in foreign currency. The stress tests presented in our Financial Stability Report show that the banking industry’s current capitalization levels allow it to cushion an episode characterized by a GDP slowdown, higher financing costs in local currency and an exchange rate depreciation associated with the materialization of the external risk scenario. As for household debt, it should be noted that, on aggregate, borrowing has increased in tandem with disposable income. This has translated into fairly stable aggregate debt indicators, whether comparing the debt level or financial burden with disposable income or the wage mass.
In parallel, they have raised their core capital ratios (CET1) by nearly 8 percentage points since 2008, from an average of 5.8% to 13.6% in 2018 [slide 3]. French banks’ profitability is in line with the euro area average and well above that of their German counterparts. At an international level, only the US banks stand out as having an ROE in excess of 10%. French banks have come a long way in the past ten years, in a demanding economic, financial and regulatory environment. We need to be wary, therefore, about using two misleading points of reference, the first of which consists in comparing current ROEs to precrisis levels – when they were clearly too high – and the second in focusing on the cost of equity. Apparently, the cost of equity for French and European banks is still too high at over 9% compared with less than 7% in the US; this figure fails to reflect either the strengthening of their solvency and hence resilience, or the sharp decline in risk-free rates [slide 4]. With regard to insurance, the industry remains solid. Figures for end-2018 should show that insurers’ solvency capital requirement coverage ratio has reached nearly 240%, which is similar to the level seen in 2017. But I shall let Bernard Delas come back to that in more detail later. Page 2 of 5  II.

In such circumstances, the Bank intervenes to moderate short term volatility of the exchange rate but not to change the direction dictated by the fundamentals. On the other hand, an improvement in the terms of trade provides an opportunity for the Bank of Zambia to build reserves as it smoothens the rate of appreciation. Finally, Mr President, I wish to congratulate you on the contribution made by manufacturing sector to the GDP growth in 2009. The performance of the sector was favourable, recording a real growth of 2.5% compared with 1.8% in 2008. I am confident that as the economic fundamentals continue to improve, banks are expected to increase lending to the private sector at reduced rates. We therefore expect the sector’s contribution to growth in 2010 to increase. In order to assist the country’s diversification process away from copper, I wish to implore you to seek ways of enhancing productivity in your various sectors as a means improving competiveness of your products for exports. Mr. President, one way by which your members can contribute to increased GDP is through participation in the Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) for which the Government has approved establishment of three. You may wish to note that the construction of the Chambishi MFEZ on the Copperbelt has reached an advanced stage while work on the Lusaka South MFEZ is underway. Several enterprises with significant investments are already being established at the Chambishi MFEZ. There is also a proposal for the establishment of the Lumwana MFEZ in North-western province.
Traditional nine-to-five jobs are becoming less common, and people are increasingly employed in less traditional work arrangements. Measuring the creation and destruction of these new jobs is of utmost importance to gain a better assessment of the health of the labor market. We also need to understand how this evolution is affecting job security and earnings stability. While these jobs might provide workers with more flexibility, they might also come with increased income volatility and financial vulnerability. In today’s gathering, we will discuss the measurement challenges we face to better understand this growing segment of the labor market, and we will facilitate a dialogue aimed at developing a workforce aligned with the evolving nature of work. The Fed’s efforts to understand labor markets include analyzing the comprehensive data that exist now. But, in an ever-changing workplace, it is critical that we hear from external stakeholders to understand their views on these changes and to ensure we incorporate them in our assessments. This is an important part of our discussion. As technological changes persist, it is inevitable that the nature of our jobs will continue to evolve. We may not readily recall the days when there was little job flexibility and we did not have today’s technology to assist us in our work. While technological transformation allows for further growth in productivity and innovation, we must also think through how these changes affect the workforce overall. We must realign our workforce development strategies with these changes.

It is worth noting, however, that this risk persists because a large part of 6 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  promised projects in 2015 were due to be delivered between the last quarter of 2016 and the year 2017. Lately, there has been an increase in the down payment required by the banks to grant a mortgage loan, which could result in more withdrawn promises by those households that were unable to meet the necessary savings to comply. Profitability of the banking system has dropped, as interest spreads have reduced their contribution. This can be explained by a change in composition of the credit portfolio towards lower relative return products—fewer consumer and more mortgage loans—and by the migration towards less risky clients, who are offered lower interest rates. At the same time, the capitalizations of the first half of 2016 drove up the banking system’s capital adequacy ratios (CAR), strengthening their position to deal with adverse economic scenarios. In fact, stress tests indicate that banks have the sufficient capital to face severely stressful conditions. All in all, capital gaps are similar to those in comparable countries. Although several capital increases have been made lately, no changes in banks’ dividend withholding policies have been observed that would allow increasing the capital base endogenously. In an international context, the CAR level of the banking system remains below the 25th percentile in both OECD countries and in the region.
As the debate about adequate capital levels for banks rages on, we feel that it is important to keep these lessons in mind. Whatever is decided in terms of capital requirements, the numbers should be calculated with tail event analysis in mind. A new example: contingent capital securities One present issue is that, given banks will need to hold much more capital in future, how could that best be achieved? Some have called for very high levels of equity capital in banks16; others have been focusing on requirements to raise new equity before it is too late, e.g. mandatory rights issues17. We find contingent capital securities – so-called “co-co’s” – to be a potentially attractive proposition for a number of reasons. One has to evaluate contingent capital on how it would perform in a crisis. First, the funding for extra capital is already in place. In other words, no one has to scramble to execute a contingency plan, or convince someone to come up with new cash in a difficult situation. Obviously, conversion is consistent with a bank being under stress, but if conversion was always automatic, not discretionary, that could help to avoid signalling even wider problems. Second, and related to the examples in this paper, because the contingent conversion feature is explicit, no investor should be able to say that “equity conversion” could never have been anticipated. As new mechanisms are being explored, we believe that it is crucial that investors correctly assess and price the probability of conversion into common equity.

Our new conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate is 1.5% over the entire forecast horizon (cf. chart 1). Stronger second-round effects and the fact that inflationary pressure from abroad has increased again mean that, despite the raising of the SNB policy rate, the new forecast is higher through to mid-2025 than in December. The new forecast puts average annual inflation at 2.6% for 2023, and 2.0% for 2024 and 2025 (cf. table 1). Without today’s policy rate increase, the inflation forecast would be even higher over the medium term. Uncertainty regarding price developments going forward remains high, and there is above all the risk of elevated inflation becoming embedded. Global economic outlook  What is the economic outlook? The global economy hardly grew in the fourth quarter. Nevertheless, Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 will likely be slightly less weak overall than expected in December. Inflation is currently clearly above central banks’ targets in many countries. Against this background, numerous central banks have tightened their monetary policy further. The growth outlook for the global economy in the coming quarters remains subdued. At the same time, inflation is likely to remain elevated worldwide for the time being. Over the medium term, however, it should return to more moderate levels, not least thanks to monetary policy and due to the economic slowdown. Our scenario for the global economy is subject to significant risks, in particular due to the recent turmoil in the global financial sector.